Giuseppe Caforio *Editor*

Handbook of the Sociology of the Military

Second Edition

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Giuseppe Caforio · Marina Nuciari
Editors

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Editors
Giuseppe Caforio
Centro Interuniversitario di Studi e
    Ricerche Storico-miitari
Pisa
Italy

Marina Nuciari
Department of Economics and Social
    Sciences, Mathematics and Statistics
    (E.So.Ma.S.)
State University of Torino Italy
Turin
Italy

Preface

In the last 12 years, the success of this Handbook is testified by its sales and by its Chinese translation in 2008 [1]. This is the main reason why I was asked by Springer Publishing House to update the first edition in 2007 and to deliver now a completely revised and renewed edition of the entire work.

Time elapsed since the first edition, developments in the disciplinary domain of military sociology, and last but not least the high variety of events happened within the international arena, prevented me from limiting this revision to a soft updating, and pushed me to totally revise the volume. The previous structure of seven sections has been saved, being a valuable frame for presenting scientific components of the discipline, but section contents have been changed in many and substantial respects.

Thus, this Preface to the Introduction to the second edition is intended to underline and explain the changes so that the reader could appreciate the true value of this new edition [2].

Pisa, Italy   Giuseppe Caforio

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[1] This Handbook was translated in Mandarine Chinese language in 2008, and it had a revised second edition by Springer in 2006.

[2] The Preface and the following Introduction have been updated from their first versions by Marina Nuciari, according to preliminary and provisional notes already prepared by Giuseppe Caforio in the weeks just before his sudden passing. Not every change now present in this volume in comparison with its first edition was considered by Caforio in his last notes, since some chapters were missing or yet in their writing process. The final structure of the volume, and of this Introduction as well, has been nevertheless maintained faithful as long as possible to his writings and intentions.

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Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Giuseppe Caforio, Brig. Gen., Dr. (1935–2015), President of the I.S.A. Research Committee 01 on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution (1998–2010) was a professional officer of the Italian Army. Born in 1935 he served until his retirement in 1992, then devoting himself to social research on the military, as it is demonstrated by his scientific memberships and production until his sudden death in 2015. Deputy President of the Italian Centro Interuniversitario di Studi Storico-Militari since 1984, founding member of ERGOMAS since 1986 and then ERGOMAS Board member and Coordinator of the Working Group on the Military Profession, in 1988 he became member of the IUS and of the RC01 of the ISA, where he served as President of the ISA RC01in 1998 since 2010, and as Board Member until his death. He organised more than ten international conferences and participated with papers in more than one hundred seminars, congresses and conferences. He has 160 scientific publication (volumes, journal articles and essays, contributions in volumes and edited books), many of them translated into nine different languages.

Marina Nuciari is a full professor of Sociology at the University of Torino, Italy, and professor of Military Sociology at the School for Strategic Studies, State University of Torino & Italian Army Academy. Founding member of the European Research Group On Military And Society (ERGOMAS), and Chairperson of ERGOMAS 1992–1996; Member of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), Chicago University (Chicago) since 1993 and of the International Sociological Association (ISA), Research Committee 01-Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution. Main fields of research activity: Military sociology, with special reference to the military profession, changes in military organisations, adjustment to asymmetric and CR operations; social change, development and modernisation, with special reference to African countries; Crosscultural Studies in Management and Business; Smart Cities, ICT and sustainable development. Author and co-author of some 90 publications in books, chapters, articles and edited volumes. Phone: +39(011)6706091, e-mail: marina.nuciari@unito.it.

Contributors

Uzi Ben-Shalom Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Ariel University, Ariel, Israel

Bernard Boëne Geneva School of Governance, Geneva, Switzerland

James Burk Department of Sociology, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA

Giuseppe Caforio Pisa, Italy

Tyler Crabb Department of Sociology, The University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

Karin De Angelis Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United States Air Force Academy, U.S. Air Force Academy, CO, USA

Maja Garb Faculty of Social Sciences (FSS), University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Liesbeth Gulpers Faculty of Management Science, Institute for Management Research, Radboud University in Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Lindy Heinecken Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, Universiteit Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa

Doo-Seung Hong Department of Sociology, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea

Ljubica Jelušič University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Georges Kaffes Ilion, Athens, Greece

Claus Kold Copenhagen, Denmark

Tomas Kucera Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies, Charles University, Praha 5, Czech Republic

David Kuehn Institute of Political Science, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany

Gerhard Kümmel Bundeswehr Center of Military History and Social Sciences (ZMSBw), Potsdam, Germany

Udi Lebel Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Ariel University, Ariel, Israel; Begin-Sadat Center For strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

Marjan Malešič Faculty of Social Sciences (FSS), University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Philippe Manigart Royal Military Academy, Brussells, Belgium

Maria Luisa Maniscalco CeAS -University "Roma Tre", Rome, Italy

Michel Louis Martin University Toulouse 1-Capitole, Toulouse, France

René Moelker Netherlands Defense Academy, Breda, The Netherlands

Marina Nuciari Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Mathematics and Statistics (E.So.Ma.S.), State University of Torino Italy, Turin, Italy

Michael Pugh University of Bradford, Bradford, UK

Vladimir O. Rukavishnikov Moscow's High School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

Narda Schenk Netherlands Defense Academy, Breda, The Netherlands

David R. Segal Department of Sociology, The University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

Mady W. Segal Department of Sociology, The University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

David G. Smith National Security Affairs Department, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, USA

Joseph Soeters Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

Henning Sørensen ISF, Institut for Sociologisk Forskning, Søborg, Denmark

Maren Tomforde Staff and Command College of the German Armed Forces, Hamburg, Germany; Department of Anthropology, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

Wilfried von Bredow Marburg, Germany

Alessia Zaretti CeAS-University "Roma Tre", Rome, Italy

Part I
General Introduction

Introduction

Giuseppe Caforio

There are at least two reasons, one immediate and practical and one deeper and more mediated, that lie upstream from the writing of this book and that motivate it.

The first is that, many years ago, when I began to study the military and its dynamics, I looked for a work like this one, a study that would give me an overall view, general but not superficial, of what had been thought, said and written on the topic. I didn't find it then, and I find it difficult to find it now either, when the growth of social studies on the military has attained dimensions, depth and horizontal development (according to geographic areas) that make it truly indispensable.

It seemed to me then—and now, too—that the soundest and most complete scientific approach to the study of the military was the sociological one, although certainly it can be usefully supplemented by historical investigation (especially social history), social psychology, cultural anthropology and political science in general. Interdisciplinarity is a conquest of the modern scientific approach to every field of investigation, (see also my book "Social Sciences and the military", Caforio 2007) an interdisciplinarity whose reasons are reaffirmed, also in this handbook, by Gerhard Kuemmel, who writes: "*The reason for trans-/interdisciplinarity lies in the simple truth that the military is a highly complex social phenomenon in itself and one that cuts through various levels, touches several different contexts and is thus subject to multiple processes of interpenetration*" (see Chap. 25).

The second reason arises from the observation that military matters and, beyond them, the organisation of military society, are continually mixing in man's cultural evolution in its most diverse manifestations. Until the birth of sociology, however, this evidence had never led to scientific investigation, closely reasoned and consistent, of the military phenomenon in itself and as originating factor of many, often fundamental, aspects of organised life in groups. Indeed, historical investigation has not provided this, even

G. Caforio (✉)
Pisa, Italy

when social history, because it lacks the concrete tools to penetrate the social fact at the moment of its occurrence. Nor has the study of strategy, since it is aimed at immediate application requirements, although global strategy certainly draws on the contribution of the social sciences. Not even the science of law is suited to this analysis, because it investigates the regulatory aspect of institutions, their juridical rather than social reality. Moreover, institutions do not exhaust the gamut of social aggregates, just as law does not embrace all human interactions.

Sociology, therefore, is the primary tool for investigating the military world and its relations and interactions with other social groups. But even after the birth of sociology as a science under this name (Comte 1842), it was necessary to await the massive field surveys and the resulting theorisations of the American school to have, in concrete, a special sociology devoted to the military. Prior to this development, which is fairly recent (early 1940s), and in some cases after it as well, the real contributions of sociological investigation on the military appeared in the framework of widely varying disciplines.

But the rise of a special sociology dedicated to the military, determined by an important fact of social life (the Second World War), certainly did not follow any academic planning, but displayed a development that was fully marked by autonomy, diversity and, at times, also by contradiction, often as a result of concrete, pressing requirements. If we add to these factors of dispersion and disaggregation, already relevant in themselves, the heterogeneousness of the cultural formation and environmental background of scholars of the subject, the importance of collecting, rethinking and comparing what has been said and written on this special sociology is clear.

Military sociology thus falls within the special sociologies[1] and, consistently, within the International Sociological Association there is a permanent study group that deals with this discipline, the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution.

But even among the special sociologies, the one dedicated to the military seems to be "especially special". For centuries, the military world and the military mind-set have constituted a quite different, quite separate environment from the other institutions, groups and aggregates of civil society, and in part they still do.

There are various confirmations of this, also in the theoretical environment,[2] but it seems to me that the most significant, statistically concrete piece of evidence is the particular dualism of the specialists of the discipline, who are split between academic scholars working in universities, national research centres and similar institutions, and military scholars, mostly officers on active duty or on leave. The reader will find significant data in this regard in the chapter "Social Research and the Military".

Indeed, study of the sociology of the military seems to require, on the one hand, an adequate sociological preparation—as does every other special sociology—and on the other, thorough, possibly first-hand, knowledge of the particular study environment, that of military society.

For these reasons the most representative scholars in this field today are either university professors with long experience as participating observers in various military environments, or officers who have had pertinent academic training and have decided to devote themselves to this sector of study.

More than in other special sociologies, this "particularity" of the sociology of the military makes one feel the necessity of basic publications, formative and informative, considered important both by newcomers and those who are already well-versed in the subject matter but who often feel the need to complete their training, or to have a broader overview of the different areas of investigation of the discipline.

Browsing through the literature in this sector, one notes not only the rare presence of basic handbooks, as mentioned at the outset, but also, as results from the careful investigation by

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[1]Special sociology, defined as science that embraces a sector of investigation corresponding to an area of collective life that can be identified in more or less every type of society and in different historical periods. In this regard see also Boene (1981), and Caforio (1987).

[2]See, for example, Goffman (1961), Boene (1990).

Morten G. Ender,[3] that "*while military sociology has become a large and growing field, few introductory sociology textbooks discuss the military in depth. However, to date, no studies of the treatment of peace, war, and the military in introductory sociology textbooks exist.*"

Noting this lack, I had already taken the initiative of publishing a reader (Caforio 1998) of the most significant studies of the discipline, divided into six large sectors, as follows: *Antecedents*, which collected essays on the "founding fathers" of our discipline (who are, generally, also the founding fathers of sociology *tout court*); *The American School*, containing the writings by and/or on the American scholars who produced a kind of "renaissance" (or according to some, a birth) of the sociology of the military starting in the 1940s; and then four sectors that assembled the most significant writings in contemporary sociology of the military subdivided according to subject, namely *A Model for Comparative Research*, *The Military Profession*, *Armed Forces and Society*, and *The New Missions of the Armed Forces*.

Now this welcome initiative of the series of handbooks[4] gives me the opportunity to complete this work with a true basic handbook. It is destined, as stated above, to those who are already scholars of the subject and, naturally, like every handbook, to those who are coming to the sociology of the military for the first time, whether for reasons of professional culture (active officers), as university students, or due to a particular interest from a neighbouring discipline, such as the sociology of organisation, the sociology of the professions, or the sociology of politics.[5]

The volume I am presenting here is now subdivided into seven parts which in part reproduce the sectors of the reader mentioned above and in part expand the scope of the earlier ones.

Part I, *General Introduction*, contains this brief introduction and one study (*Some Historical Notes*) devoted to a historical excursus into what was written and said about our discipline prior to the contemporary works and co-authored for this second edition by Doo-Seung Hong inasmuch as an update to current research at a global level was needed. The former Chapter 3 *Social Research and the Military* has moved from Parts I to VII, at the end of the volume, where the potential reader (especially if a newcomer), having acquired all the knowledge and information contained in the book, can better understand and appreciate the results of the huge research work presented here.

Next comes a Part, entitled *Theoretical and Methodological Orientations*, dedicated to the theoretical and methodological orientations of the discipline: like the other special sociologies, the sociology of the military has elaborated its own set of interpretive models and theoretical approaches. This thematic excursus is intended to present to the reader and put up for discussion concepts, models and theories currently employed in social research on the military. In this Part II, Chapter 6 *The Military and the Use of Force* of the first edition has been eliminated and a brand new chapter 4 *Comparative systems of analysis: military sociology in United States and Europe* by Tyler Crabb & David R. Segal has been added, where for the first time a comparison of the two "schools" of the sociology of the military is proposed. The third part, called *Armed Forces and Society*, is devoted to civil-military relations, with all the issues and aspects connected with these relations, including the delicate aspect of democratic control of the armed forces. Part III has been profoundly reorganized, with a new chapter, *Public Trust in the Military* by Marjan Malesic and Maja Garb, dealing with specific media and armed forces relationships and their influence on public opinion and trust toward the military, and another by Maren Tomforde debating about *Combat*

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[3]Ender and Jones (2001).

[4]The first edition, published in 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers, had a second printing by Springer in 2006; this second edition was proposed by Springer in 2013, ten years after the first volume appearance.

[5]Within the social sciences field as well, an interdisciplinary approach is today the rule. See for instance my edited volume "Social Science and the Military" (Caforio 2007).

Soldiers and their Experiences of Violence: Returning to Post-Heroic Societies. The remaining four chapters have been deeply updated by the same as well as by new authors.

Part IV "Inside the Military" poses itself as a broad container for studies on aspects of military culture, professional training, and conditions and problems of minorities in armed forces. Compared to past editions, this Part has been enlarged adding three new chapters dealing with issues of great importance and momentum in particular since the last ten years, on military families, on LGBT in the armed forces, and on military ethics in missions other than war.

Part V takes up an aspect of the strong ongoing change in the military, an aspect that I would define as one of structural change. It contains studies on the restructuring of national militaries and its consequences, on the transition taking place in many countries from conscription to an all-volunteer force, and on the impact of technological evolution on the military and its members. This Part has expanded consideration of *new* trends in the military, not only by means of a strong revision of existing chapters by their authors, but in particular adding a new chapter on *Military Leadership in Heroic and Post-Heroic Conditions,* by Udi Lebel and Uzi Ben-Shalom, a very important theme in military sociology, undergoing substantial changes in current times and not present in the previous edition of this Handbook. The theme of the decline of the mass army, very important at the end of XX century, has been abandoned under the consideration that the process of transition from conscription to all volunteer forces, which was in place in many different countries at the turn to the third millennium, it is now almost accomplished and it does not seem to inspire new studies and debates within military sociologists. The theme of technological evolution in the armed forces has been totally reframed by Renè Moelker and Narda Schenk, with a new title (*Mixing up humans and military technology*) and new contents, as it is expected for a chapter dealing

with a high speed development matter such as technology.

Another aspect of change regards the new endeavours and functions of armed forces in the post-Cold War Era with respect to the traditional tasks, a topic treated in Part VI called *New Missions*. This Part has been rather totally redefined, taking into due consideration the great development in new research fields dealing with asymmetric warfare, multinational and intercultural characteristics of military operations, being they combat or not combat missions, and their consequences over military profession, military mind, psychological reaction and stress deriving from the so-called "new missions".

And finally, Part VII drives to Conclusions enriched also by the replaced chapter on Social Research and the Military, as explained above.

A large bibliography, to which all the chapters of the book make reference, at the end of the volume makes it easier for readers to locate the necessary references to expand and go deeper into the study of the sectors most interesting to them.

Twenty-four scholars from thirteen different countries participated in writing the first edition of this Handbook; now most of them are present in this second edition together with many others, thus reaching a total of thirty-four scholars from sixteen countries: they are all significant representatives of the major currents of thought and research existing today in our discipline.

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Some Historical Notes

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Giuseppe Caforio and Doo-Seung Hong

Introduction

Even if the sociology of the military became firmly established and, especially, demonstrated its applicability to concrete cases starting with the vast research of *The American Soldier* (see Section "The American School" below), sociological investigation of the military and of the phenomenon of war preceded it by nearly a century, and was contemporaneous with the first studies commonly considered "sociological".

Seeking out these roots is not merely an operation of historical interest: those starting out on the study of this special sociology need to know the paths that have already been trod, of which some came to an end and others produced studies and researches of what we consider contemporary sociology of the military (from *The American Soldier* on). Our discipline did not develop in some sort of cosmic vacuum, emerging from nothing, but embraced previous

contributions to thought and research and very often carried them further.

To give just a pair of examples, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz (see below) offered their own solutions to the convergence/divergence dichotomy between the armed forces and civil society already evidenced by Alexis de Tocqueville in the nineteenth century, while C. Wright Mills' model of the "power elite" is clearly indebted to the studies of Gaetano Mosca at the end of the nineteenth century.

Some knowledge of the thought of those I call the "forerunners" here is important, therefore, especially for the novice, in order to build a more complete, broader mental framework of the discipline than would result from the study of contemporary sociology of the military only.

The second section is devoted to what I have called the *American school* because its development took place mainly in the United States and because military sociologists from other countries initially moved within it and according to its schemes. This school begins with the research published in the mid-twentieth century in *The American Soldier* and remains a fertile one, although here we shall stop with the most noted authors of the 1980s. The necessary brevity of the section means that only the contributions of a few authors, generally founders of a scientific current, can be mentioned here.

But because the world-wide development of the sociology of the military in the second half of

G. Caforio
Pisa, Italy

D.-S. Hong (✉)
Department of Sociology, Seoul National University,
Seoul, Korea
e-mail: dshong@snu.ac.kr

the twentieth century, with specific regional connotations, issues from the mould of this school—at times also by reaction to some of its schemes, the third and final section is dedicated to giving an accounting of this development. It is a section that newcomers will find particularly useful for orienting themselves in the panorama of the institutions, now prevalently international, engaged in the subject today.

The Forerunners

The sociology of the military starts with sociology *tout court*, if not as specification of a scientific sector, at least in the treatment of the subjects that would later become its characteristics.

Considered as the founder of sociology (and surely the one who coined the term), Auguste Comte, in his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*,[1] deals with a number of topics that we would undoubtedly include in the sociology of the military today (Comte 1967).

As is well known, Comte's analysis of the crisis of the society of his time leads him to construct a social history[2] of humanity, a history built according to an evolutionary, linear conception based on the Enlightenment principle of the progress of the human species. In this construction, the military, along with religion, plays a fundamental role, especially before the emergence of the industrial, bureaucratic and civil aspects of society in a pluralistic sense.

The military aspect of associative life is as old as Homo sapiens himself, Comte observes: man's first tools are weapons and the first authority established in the group is that of the military chief; cooperation between men is imposed as a necessity and social value especially for the needs of war. War acts on primitive microsocieties (the family, the clan, the tribe, etc.) by expanding them in two directions: on the one hand,

individual human aggregates tend to increase numerically to better meet military necessities; on the other, there is an extension of human associations through the subjection of defeated groups to victorious ones. The human species thus converts the impulse that in many animals remains limited to the destructive act of fighting into a means of civilisation. Indeed, says Comte, even the birth of the typically human institution of slavery is civilising. Since the slave is a defeated person whose life has been spared, his survival is civil progress on the one hand, because it avoids useless destruction of the species, and a perfecting of the military institution on the other, since it is largely the work of slaves that makes it possible to wage war and have warriors.

Morality itself, for Comte, is at the outset mainly a military ethic, in that it subordinates the guiding lines of human action to war aims (Lecture 53, Comte 1967, p. 551). In the evolutionary blueprint that Comte sees written in mankind's social history, the first institutional situation is the polytheistic primitive society, where the eminent man is the eminent warrior, the dominant society is the one that dominates militarily, and power is the prerogative of the warrior caste.

The polytheistic age is followed by the monotheistic one, which is characterised by a markedly defensive military attitude, partly due to a loss of organisation which results in a poor capability of conducting offensive operations. For Comte the growth of monotheism leads to a number of social changes fraught with consequences for the military, such as the separation of spiritual leadership from temporal leadership, the breaking up of centralised authority into numerous local authorities, and the transformation of slavery into servitude. As a result, warfare gradually loses importance, the military leader is stripped of all religious power, armies shrink until they become elitist, and the military spirit declines until it becomes something internal to the military (esprit de corps).

With the coming of the modern age, the military undergoes new and radical changes. First, military leaders also begin to lose part of their temporal power, eroded by the bureaucratic

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[1]Comte's fundamental work was published in six volumes between 1830 and 1842. The edition we refer to is the one published by UTET, Turin, 1967, edited by Franco Ferrarotti.

[2]Understood as "history without the names of individuals and even without those of peoples" (Comte 1967, p. 123).

organisation that is being created in the new structure of the national state. Second, the internal structure of the military is modified: the standing army replaces feudal militias, military leaders come under civilian authority (the problem of political control of the armed forces arises), the international negotiating function begins to be handled by civilian authority as well, and military activities themselves are gradually subordinated to the commercial interests of the nascent nation state (Lecture 55, Comte 1967, pp. 77–81).

The bourgeois society characteristic of Comte's period, increasingly bureaucratising and controlling military activities, leads him to point to a substantial anti-militarism from which he concludes that war is destined to become increasingly rare and ultimately disappear completely. In particular, Comte sees conscription, instituted during the French Revolution, as the decisive element that would reduce the military system to a subaltern task; for Comte the social significance of conscription is a diluting of military customs and mentality, a muting of the specialistic nature of the military profession, a marked subordination of the military to the complex machinery of modern society.

The social history that Comte constructs helps him, finally, to create sociology as "the last major branch of natural philosophy" (Lecture 57, Comte 1967, p. 430), a science that provides the élites who lead the peoples with a rational basis for operational intervention on the various national societies, throughout the world. In these élites he includes military leaders, who, precisely due to their greater awareness of war, must help to rid society of a phenomenon that has become anti-historical and anachronistic, with the conception of the positive society that he believes is coming into being.

Written more or less in the same years as Auguste Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, the chapters that Alexis de Tocqueville devotes to the military and to war[3] depart from the same Enlightenment outlook that inspired Comte's work and would later inspire that of Spencer. In Tocqueville, however, one notes a theoretical caution and an attention to concrete facts that make his historical predictions less distant from actual future reality.

Also for Tocqueville the sociopolitical emergence of nations appears to go in the opposite direction from war and to a taming of the military spirit. For the author of *Democracy in America*, this result, which for Comte (and later for Spencer as well) was to be the product of the process of industrialisation of national societies, would instead come from the internal democratisation of society. But it would be a partial result and slow in coming about, so that "equality of living standards, and the institutions that derive from them, do not exempt a democratic people from the obligation of maintaining armies" (Tocqueville 1951, p. 270). It is therefore important, he concludes, to study the social makeup of armies and the behaviour and tendencies of those who compose them. Tocqueville thus appears to create the subject matter, the topic of study, the central object of what will later be the sociology of the military.

And it is not merely an appearance: Tocqueville immediately identifies and explores a number of very concrete themes, such as relations between the armed forces and society, the social origins of officers, the military profession as an instrument of social ascent, and careerism.

In his analysis of the armed forces/society relationship, Tocqueville takes on what will be the great themes of debate and research in the sociology of the military in the second half of the twentieth century: the divergence/convergence of the military and civil society (see Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1971), the problem of political control over the armed forces, and the excessive strengthening of the executive during a protracted state of war.[4]

The modernity of Tocqueville's approach to the concrete problems he tackles can be illustrated by reporting one of his passages on

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[3]*De la démocratie en Amérique*, was published in two volumes in 1835 and 1840. The edition we refer to is the one by Gallimard, Paris, 1951.

[4]Later, Lasswell (1941) explains such phenomenon with the concept of the garrison state.

political control of the military. After affirming the concept that armed forces are the expression of the country to which they belong, he asserts that the remedy against a possible divergence between their ends and those of society must be found through democratic education of all citizens, when they "will have acquired a virile love for order and voluntarily bent to the rules…, the general spirit of the nation, penetrating in the particular spirit of the army, will temper the desires and the opinions that the military condition brings into being, will compress them through the powerful pressure of public opinion" (Tocqueville 1951, pp. 275–276). It is interesting to note that this concept is taken up in 1960 by Morris Janowitz in his first edition of *The Professional Soldier*, who theorises political control over the armed forces achieved by educating officers in democratic values and their acceptance and a "rubbing off" of such values from national public opinion.

Although little celebrated by military sociologists today, Alexis de Tocqueville appears to be one of the most interesting precursors of our special sociology, not only for the concrete themes that he dealt with, but also for his scientific approach to their treatment.

Indeed, instead of using a prevalently historical method for social investigation, characteristic of Comte, Tocqueville performs a critical analysis of the social aggregate in which he is interested in a single historical moment, a veritable cutaway of a society and a synchronous comparison of it with other societies. Besides being innovative, this methodological approach appears to be the only one that can justify sociology as a science distinct from social history. It is also worth observing that this methodology leads Tocqueville to make use of what later came to be called sociological indicators, thus innovating from the standpoint of research tools as well.

Herbert Spencer, too, adopts a prevalently synchronous, transversal method of investigation, but on the one hand his construction appears much more theoretical than Tocqueville's, and on the other his conclusions are quite close to those of Comte.

Spencer lays the groundwork of his sociological science using chiefly the comparative method, producing a synchronous examination of societies at different levels of development. As unifying principle he uses the biological evolution of the species (Darwin), applied to social aggregates: they constitute for him a superorganic world, set in logical and linear succession to the inorganic and organic ones, without any leap in quality.

The general thesis expressed by Spencer (1967) in his fundamental work[5] is that a law governs the evolution both of living organisms and the groups they form, resulting in a natural and necessary process of development. The evolution of human aggregates is conceived as the set of processes and products that involve the co-ordinated actions of a large number of individuals. The highest form of superorganic evolution is society; the study of society is sociology.

Fundamentally important both for the organic world and the superorganic world is the concept of structure, which designates an entity formed by various mutually dependent parts. The model of structure created by Spencer is homeostatic, that is, change by one of the parts entails change by all the others to maintain the system's equilibrium. Individuals and aggregates initially develop at least two fundamental structures, one for acting internally, for the purposes of maintenance, the other for acting externally, in terms of defence and offence. The structure that acts externally is formed and perfected through war, which is thus the matrix of organised society. It is war that necessitates an authority, a leader, the creation of stable government structures, and a process of aggregation of human groups.

As can be seen, although the route is different, the interpretation of society is similar to that of Comte. Spencer, too, identifies a primitive society, typically military, and a more evolved one in which the activities of maintenance and

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[5]*Principles of Sociology*, published in three volumes from 1877 to 1896. The edition we refer to here is *Principi di sociologia*, published by UTET, Turin, 1967, edited by Franco Ferrarotti.

exchange prevail: industrial society. However, he defines them not so much through a historical process but as general typologies into which the different national societies existing at his time fit more or less separately.

The evolutionary law employed by Spencer leads toward a development of the social industrial type (a superior society because it aims at individual well-being). Unlike Comte, however, Spencer does not hypothesise a linear evolutionary development, but an alternating one, with periods and episodes that can be strongly involutional.

Spencer, like Comte, materialises the antimilitary spirit of bourgeois industrialism, guided by the Enlightenment idea of human progress. However, the outlook is more critical in Spencer, who sees the possibility of involutional processes and warns that peaceful coexistence between societies is not the automatic fruit of the development of industrial society, but derives from the disappearance of militarism. But incomprehension of the real role of the industrial state, which he shares with Comte, prevents him from identifying the terrible war-making potential of industrial society and leads him to focus on militarism as the principal causal factor of war.

Spencer's analysis of the military remains significant, however. Its various aspects of it still appear to be present in many current societies which, according to his classifying criteria, incarnate the mixed type of military-industrial society, so that some Spencerian typologies still constitute a tool for reading and understanding the characteristics of military societies.

Gaetano Mosca brings the nineteenth century to a close for what regards our special sociology and is the first scholar to treat a single, specific theme of this discipline, one that more than half a century later will find concrete, significant development in the work of Mills (1956).[6]

First and foremost, Mosca goes beyond the positivist optimism regarding the disappearance of war with the advent of the positive (Comte) or

industrial (Spencer) or democratic (Tocqueville) society, clearly pointing to the fact that it is not the military institution that causes war. The military function is destined to continue in every type of society, because war is only one of the many manifestations of human nature. The military and its historical evolution are thus worthy of serious study, also in order to understand what should be its optimum organization in the current historical period.

In this regard Mosca reinterprets the evolution of the military establishment of industrial society, already described after a fashion by positivist thought, affirming that "The great modern fact, nearly general in the nations of European civilisation, of large standing armies which are rigid upholders of the law, deferential to the orders of civilian authority, and whose political importance is scarce and indirectly exercised, if not absolutely without example in human history, represents a fortunate exception" (Mosca 1965, vol. 1, p. 330). Real political control over the military has therefore been established, but how, and why?

In the modern state, says Mosca, writing in 1896, the problem of the supremacy of civilian power is solved in part by the makeup of European armies, where diverse social elements are represented and balance each other, but more in particular by the inclusion of the officer class in what he calls the power elite.

In Mosca, the concept of power elite descends from his identification in society of a number of organised minorities. According to this author, in every society there are two classes of people, the governing and the governed; the governing class is a small minority, but it is able to dominate because it is organised. The strength of any organised minority is irresistible for any individual of the majority, who finds himself alone faced with the totality of the minority. According to Mosca it is officers' belonging to the power elite—the organised governing minority—that ensures armies' loyalty to the state and their subordination to civilian power. This belonging, with specific reference to American society, will also be registered by Mills (1956) over half a century later, but with a different value

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[6]Mosca (1965) treats the military especially in Chap. 9 of vol. 1 of *The Ruling Class*, titled "Standing Armies"

judgement: while for Mosca the military poses itself as a valid model of development for all of civil society, for Mills the military leadership's increased influence on politics endangers the democratic structure of the State.

Also in Max Weber (1922) the analysis of the military appears central for the definition of the modern bureaucratic state. Indeed, he defines the modern state as the human community which, within a certain territory, successfully pretends for itself the monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

As in earlier scholars, Weber's analysis starts from a comparative historical investigation to define the types of military recruitment and organisation characteristic of the different societies and historical periods. Unlike his predecessors, however, he creates typologies of military orders which are not linked to single historical periods or geographic regions or inserted in a process of linear, necessitated social evolution.

Among the different typologies, the one of most interest to our field of investigation is the military institution of the modern state, where it reaches its full development. In the modern state, characterised by a bureaucratic organisation, one does not obey the person, but the rule, instituted in the manner provided by the will of the community. The officer therefore does not differ from the functionary, of which he constitutes only a special category; he, too, must obey a norm which is formally abstract, and his right to power is legitimated by rules that lay down his precise objective competence.

For Weber, the bureaucratisation of the military is a road on which there is no turning back: indeed, it is the specific means for transforming community action into rationally ordered social action. The loyalty of the institution is ensured by the fact that the officer is a professional functionary chained to his activity with all his material and spiritual existence, without any power substantially to modify the complex bureaucratic machinery, in which he is nothing more than a single cog. This gives birth to military discipline, which is not, for Weber, a social fact in itself, but the *source of discipline in*

general because it also constitutes the ideal model for the modern capitalist company, reintegrated in American scientific management systems and ordinary business discipline.

The military, says Weber, having taken many of its organisational forms from capitalism, then restores the objectivity of the concept of discipline to the industrial corporation, which will apply it widely. Because objectivity functions equally both in service to a bureaucratic power and to a charismatic leader: the duty ethic, conscientious performance, and meticulous training are what make the strength of an army, however it is led, just as they make the strength and competitiveness of a company or a factory.

It is interesting to note the profound difference between Mosca's elitist view, for the interpretation of the role of the military professional, and Weber's bureaucratic view, which will give rise to two distinct schools of thought. We have already described the developments of Mosca's conception, and for Weber we can cite the application of his theoretical scheme in the pioneering research on the officer corps conducted by Demeter (1965).

In Europe, after Max Weber's studies, the sociology of the military seems to undergo a period of scant interest, where a few treatises (e.g., Gini 1921) and empirical researches (e.g., Demeter 1965) still appear, but remain rather isolated.

In the United States, by contrast, this discipline still had to find the concrete need that would stimulate a specific study and research. We can thus conclude here, obviously without any pretence of exhaustiveness, the section on the "forerunners" and go on, with what I have called the *American school*, to describe that which can be considered contemporary sociology of the military.

The American School

The entry of the United States into the Second World War and the resulting transformation of an army of a few hundred thousand men that lived and operated somewhat on the margins of

national society into a force of over seven million individuals, posed problems to the military that had never before been seen or faced. To solve them it was decided to make massive recourse to the social sciences.

There had been earlier sociological investigations on armed forces and conflicts, during and after the First World War both in the U.S. and Europe (see Demeter 1965; Gini 1921), but it was an approach that had favoured sectorial analyses or study of the phenomena induced by wartime military organisation in national societies. These investigations could therefore not constitute a useful precedent for tackling the problems posed to the American administration by the entry into war in 1941.

Thus, in 1942 the U.S. Army drew up a *Troop Attitude Research Program* and formed a Research Branch to which it called a large team of specialised collaborators, especially sociologists, anthropologists and social psychologists, headed by Samuel A. Stouffer. At war's end this group of specialists published a summarising work which remains the significant testimony to the largest field research ever conducted in the social sciences (*Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*: the first two volumes of this work are better known under the title *The American Soldier*: see Stouffer et al. 1949). It assembles the results of over 200 reports and interviews with hundreds of thousands of soldiers conducted during the research team's three years of work (1942–45).

American sociology at the time featured a recently elaborated theoretical framework, too recent and too new to allow full application in the context in which it was born or acceptance in university faculties, but which lent itself very well indeed to an application in the area of the military. At issue was the theoretical elaboration of the field researches carried out in the 1930s by the team of Elton Mayo (2003) at Western Electric's Hawthorne Works in Chicago[7] to determine what particularly affected worker performance. The results of these researches had

sharply contradicted previous work that explained the phenomenon of fatigue as linked to psychophysical, physiological and environmental aspects by demonstrating that the most significant variable affecting fatigue was the behaviour of the primary group, that is, the narrow social context in which the worker laboured. The primary group therefore became the determinant of individual performance, and attitudes towards the group (the individual's relation to it) proved to be more important than personal aptitudes, until then considered the basis for assessing workers' performance.

The substitution of the concept of attitude for that of aptitude would be used by Stouffer's research team for sociological investigation on the acclimatisation of citizens drafted into the military, and the concept of primary group to investigate the variables that had a bearing on the behaviour of combat units.

Thus, the research group undertakes the investigation on the acclimatisation of draftees basing itself both on the concept of attitude, understood as the individual's reaction to a social situation, and on that of relative deprivation, in relation to the reference group in which the soldier finds himself (Stouffer et al. 1949, vol. 1). The interest and the fecundity of investigation of this point of view, which overturns the two previous, separate approaches to the problem, is evident: individual behaviour as the result of individual aptitudes, and the deprivations of status of the military condition with reference to prior statuses. It both overturns and unites them according to a perspective of investigation proper to social psychology.

Prior status is not completely neglected, however: difficulties of acclimatisation, which generate a differentiation in attitudes (statistically measured), are studied by referring them both to the social backgrounds and personal histories of individuals, and to the situation of relative deprivation. Relative privation, in particular, is investigated by examining the structural elements of the military: social stratification, power relationships, control system, general living conditions and the upward and downward flow of information.

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[7]The first edition of *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* was published by Routledge in 1933

The completeness of the analysis enables Stouffer's team to indicate the tools and methodologies for modifying dysfunctional characteristics of the military. This is a conceptually fundamental aspect of the research team's work: here sociology shows itself to be a completely operational science, a scientific base capable of producing "social technologies" suitable for eliciting a desired effect in the real world.

If the barracks situation could be studied effectively by Stouffer's team by examining the individual in relation to his primary group, the area where the concept of group expresses all its potential and importance is in combat situations, to which the entire second volume of *The American Soldier* is devoted.

The research team identifies the combat situation as an extreme condition of stress where nearly all the individual's needs are denied gratification, the threats regard the essential aspects of the person (life, physical integrity, etc.), radical conflicts are created in values, individuality is often nullified, and anxiety, pain, fear, uncertainty and powerlessness prevail: the aggression against the soldier's ego could not be more radical. However, examination of the cases of voluntary exit from the combat situation (flight, psychological breakdown, suicide, etc.) shows that they are quite rare in percentage terms. There must therefore be some elements that offset all these stress factors and induce the individual to remain in line. Stouffer identifies this element in primary group and group cohesion.

The factors of group cohesion, already on display in garrison life, become far more important in the combat situation, where for the individual, deprived of everything, the psychological and affective gratifications offered by the primary group become essential. According to Stouffer, it is essentially the group that ensures the psychological survival of the individual in combat.

However, the group could extricate its members from the stress situation without affecting the values of cohesion by getting out of the combat situation all together. An external factor

that prevents the group from fleeing is therefore necessary: the research group identifies this factor chiefly in the existence of a system of interiorised norms, along with a system of real, effective repression exerted by the military.

In short, the primary group is induced to fight basically for itself, in order to save its existence and internal cohesion in the institutional system in which it finds itself, by adhering to those values of the institutional system that it has introjected and inscribed in its own informal code.

The foregoing analysis shows the importance of favouring the natural cohesion of primary groups and avoiding any intervention of the institution that can act as a disaggregating factor. The most important aspect of the group is its defence of its internal cohesion, achieved through a balancing of the roles that the group assigns to its individual members: among these fundamental roles is that of the natural leader, who is called to carry out a function of active mediation with the institution.

The immediate operational indication that follows is the importance of preparing the commander of the smaller unit (non-commissioned officer or lower-ranking officer) to become the group's natural leader. He is in the position of being able to assume the natural leadership of the group—provided that he is able to understand and respect the informal code—because he is a member of the group and fully shares in its combat situation, but he is also an element of the institutional hierarchy.

The concrete impact—positive and negative—that the publication of *The American Soldier* had on U.S. sociology has been enormous, and is demonstrated not only by the vast literature to which it gave rise but by the application in industrial sociology, from which Stouffer's team took the first theoretical elements, of the methods and results of the research team of *The American Soldier* through the widespread use of social scientists in industry in the post-war years.

Just as the "American school" produced the first great empirical investigation of the military, it also offers the first great theoretical

systematisation of the special sociology that studies it. This occurs with Huntington's (1957) *The Soldier and the State*.

Huntington identifies the sector of study as "civil-military relations", understood as an aspect of national security policy. The theoretical framework that the author gives to the subject partitions national security policy into three areas: military security policy, domestic security policy, and situational security policy, this last referring to changes in the country's socio-political situation. The primary objective of this policy is to develop a system of civil-military relations that can maximise military security with minimum sacrifice of the other social values. But, says Huntington, civil-military relations essentially reflect the political relationship between the State and the officer corps, so it is this professional corps that he mainly intends to deal with.

A profession, according to Huntington, is an activity carried out by a particular type of highly specialised functional group; the features that distinguish it from an occupation are expertise, responsibility and corporateness.

Having defined the features that identify the ideal-type profession, Huntington applies them to the officer corps. First of all, there is a specific sector where officers exercise exclusive expertise: the management of violence, which Huntington defines as the direction, operation and control of an organisation whose primary function is the application of violence. The responsibility of the military professional lies essentially in the fact that managed violence must be used for socially approved purposes: the officer's *client* is the State and his fundamental responsibility is to the State. The right to practice the military profession is legally permitted to a restricted, well-defined social body which thereby acquires a strong corporative spirit.

It thus appears beyond doubt that the officer corps unites the chief characteristics of a professional body. In particular, Huntington stresses, we are simultaneously in the presence of both a profession and an organisation, both of them bureaucratic. As a profession, the levels of expertise are marked by the hierarchy of ranks; as an organisation, by the hierarchy of assignments, with the former generally winning out over the latter.

But the professionalisation of the officer is not an established fact from the outset: it is the historical change of the figure of the officer, taking place over centuries, that has marked the passage in the officer corps from amateurism to professionalism.

After outlining the characteristics of the military profession, Huntington is concerned with determining how civilian control can be effectively exercised over the military power held by the officer corps.

He finds the theoretical foundations of his thought in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and in the study of war by Karl von Clausewitz. From the English philosopher, he takes the conception of a human nature that is essentially conflictual and a condition of nature in which each state is potentially at war against all the others. From Clausewitz, Huntington takes the concept of the dual nature of war, an autonomous sector of science on the one hand, a process whose ultimate aims come from politics on the other. From the well-known Clauswitzian supremacy of politics over war Huntington derives the ethical and practical delimitation of the military profession.

According to Huntington, there are two types of political control that can be exerted over the military, subjective control and objective control. The first is exercised by maximising the power of one or more social groups over the armed forces; the second is chiefly based on the recognition of an autonomous military professionalism and on a rigid separation of the latter from the political sphere. The theoretical bases of Huntington's thought make him lean toward this second type of political control: once the supremacy of politics is accepted, if the military is an autonomous sector of science and knowledge, the officer must enjoy a professional autonomy of his own.

The necessity of minimising the political power of the officer corps is thus resolved by Huntington by a thoroughgoing professionalisation of the corps which renders it politically sterile and neutral while at the same time preserving the elements of power that are necessary

for fulfilling the institutional task. Made historically possible by the emergence of a military profession, objective control is the only one that guarantees the supremacy of civil power, precisely because it separates the two spheres of expertise and prevents any political involvement of officers.

The distribution of power between civilian groups and the military group varies, for Huntington, according to the compatibility of military ethics with the prevailing political ideology. The historical model for the relationship between military power and civil power to which this author seems chiefly to refer is that of the German imperial period from 1871 to 1914: his thought shows careful study and deep admiration for the German-Prussian general staff, for its professional approach and its relations with the civil power.

Huntington's work in the theoretical and structural organisation of the sociology of the military would provide fertile ground world-wide, especially due to the extensive use by subsequent scholars of his systematic structuring of the subject, delimitation of fields, and identification of problems. It would also give rise to criticism and negative reactions, particularly on the issue of political control over the armed forces, where he is the head of one of the two lines of thought that would dominate American military sociology in the ensuing years.

Indeed, the publication of *The Soldier and the State* is followed a few years later by Janowitz's (1971) work, *The Professional Soldier*, which lays the groundwork of a different and opposing model of political control over the armed forces.

Janowitz' central thesis is that the military institution must be examined in its process of change, because it must necessarily change with the changing conditions of the society to which it belongs. After the Second World War the international context was deeply modified, producing a situation in which military action has much more sensitive politico-social consequences than in the past: this contributes to a convergence of civilian and military interests and spheres of activity. But the individual national societies are also changed internally, and in the face of this

complex of changes the military is called upon to find a series of adaptations.

The first change in the military recorded by Janowitz is a new way of exercising authority. This exercise is closely bound up with the specific role of the armed forces where new conditions of use have accentuated decentralisation, dispersion in the field, and autonomy of command at lower levels. This situation has brought a gradual mutation of the exercise of authority through certain and precise forms of obedience in a search for consensus and manipulatory procedures.

Profoundly changed is also the recruitment of the professional soldier, identified by Janowitz in the career officer. By means of precise statistical analyses, he shows a substantial widening of the officer recruitment base in the United States,[8] due both to the increased size of the military organisation and to the growing demand for specific technical skills. This means that the officer corps is no longer a representative entity of a particular social stratum, but rather a separate organism, better represented in the national political reality as a pressure group.

The broadening of the recruitment base, along with the growing prominence given to commercial values in democratic societies, has led to a change in the motivations of professional choice of the officer corps, where one sees a growing number of officers who consider the military profession more an occupation like any other than a mission.

A further consequence of this broadening, says Janowitz, is the diminished social integration of the officer, which naturally descended from his prevalent belonging, from birth, to a well-defined social class.

And finally, the terms of political control over the armed forces have also changed, owing to the growing involvement of the military elite in the country's political choices.

This whole complex of changes and their particular impact on the officer corps lead Janowitz to give special study to the military profession.

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[8]This is true for other Western nations as well.

According to Janowitz (1971), a professional is, is someone who, as a result of prolonged training, acquires a skill that enables him to render specialised services. The officer is therefore a professional and his professionalisation occurred gradually, developing especially in the nineteenth century.

The professional soldier is not, however, definable according to a unique ideal-type: the traditional "heroic" type, who personifies martial spirit and personal bravery, has been progressively flanked by the managerial type, who reflects the pragmatic and social dimensions of modern warfare. In the years following the Second World War yet a third typology emerged, the technological one, which can also be considered as an offshoot of the managerial type. All three typologies are present in a modern army, differently balanced percentage-wise, but the emergence of the managerial and technological types seems to have significantly narrowed the difference between military and civilian. Contemporary society thus sees a convergence between these two spheres, which Janowitz judges positive and necessary. In this convergence it is the military that draws closer to the mainstream of the society to which it belongs, gradually and continuously incorporating the values that gain broad acceptance in society.

For Janowitz, therefore, contemporary officers must not constitute a separate body from civil society, but be profoundly integrated with it. In the impossibility, and unreasonableness, of isolating the professional soldier from the country's political life, he proposes having representatives of the national political parties participate in the officer's political training. In such a framework the officer will be favourable to civilian political control because he will know that civilians appreciate the tasks and responsibilities of his profession; in addition, he will be integrated in civil society because he shares its common values.

As one readily sees, this is a completely different conception from that of Huntington, one that creates, in the "American school" (which is not only American), a different and opposing current of thought, particularly on the crucial problem of political control of the armed forces.

This gives rise to a dialectic between the divergent model (Huntington) and the convergent model (Janowitz) of the military in its relations with civil society. According to Huntington, divergence is needed for the military to be able to carry out its tasks effectively; according to Janowitz, convergence is necessary, since today's professional soldier is too involved in the country's political choices and needs the full consensus of the society to which he belongs.

Besides being the founder of a school for his conception of the military professional, Janowitz is important for having anticipated and understood the development of the military's functions, from the traditional "shooting war", and from the more recent function of deterrence, to those tasks of international policing for the prevention and resolution of conflict situations that will not reach full development until the end of the twentieth century. His is the conception of a *constabulary soldier*, constantly ready to intervene in any part of the world, dispensing the necessary minimum of organised violence with the aim of achieving an acceptable set of international relations rather than victory in the field. This predicted development also gives rise to his other prediction of a decline in mass armies in favour of leaner armed forces based on voluntary recruitment and increased professionalisation (Janowitz 1972).

Lastly, Janowitz' initiatives have had significant impact on the organisation of social scientists interested in the study of the military and on the internationalisation of the American school.

Outside the currents of thought of these two influential scholars, but operating more or less in the same years, two other American sociologists who elaborated significant theories for this special sociology should be cited: they are C. Wright Mills and Erving Goffman.

Mills (1956) is important for having developed an elitist conception of power that had a wide following in the 1960s and included the officer corps (see also Mosca 1965).

With the centralisation of the media and of power, contends Mills, certain men come to occupy positions from which they are able to look down, as it were, on the daily lives of

ordinary men and women and profoundly influence them with their decisions. In contemporary society these men are found especially in the corporate, political and military sectors, each an area that underwent a process of structural broadening, bureaucratisation and centralisation of decision-making during and after the Second World War. The similarities of the processes and the close-knit relations between the three sectors then led to interpenetration among them.

At the top of these three sectors are men who constitute the elite in business, politics and the military; but since the three sectors converge, these elites tend to unite and act in unison. According to Mills, membership in this power elite is not determined so much by birth (Mosca's ascriptive hypothesis) but by the direct, personal selection carried out by the current ruling class: family, college and the private club are the milieus in which the persons destined for the upper echelons of politics, business and the military are shaped and selected.

Throughout the world, the relationship between the three sectors that make up the power elite has changed profoundly since the Second World War, says Mills, when reality began to be redefined and thought in military terms and civilian supremacy began to crumble, creating a political vacuum that brought the "warlords" to the top. Indeed, having postulated a military definition of political reality, the rise of the generals to the highest levels of the power elite becomes a necessity.

A second consequence is the politicisation of the armed forces: thus, in the U.S., the existence of Republican generals and Democrat generals is recognised and accepted, says Mills, while in 1951, for the first time, the celebrated MacArthur case called the supremacy of the government over the military into question.

A third result of this process of integration is the decline of traditional diplomacy and, in its place, the development of a foreign policy managed mainly according to the ideas of military leaders.

This complex of causes and effects has allowed the military leadership to extend its influence in the country to a greater extent than it would have achieved with an actual coup, claims Mills, and could lead to the creation of the Lasswellian garrison state (Lasswell 1941).

Mills' power elite theory gave rise to a series of studies and researches on the subject, where the most noted intervention is John Kenneth Galbraith's essay, *How to Control the Military* (Galbraith 1967). But what appears most interesting and current in Mills' work is his pointing to a new and different military professionalism, as well as his approach to the problem of the changed relationship between the officer corps and national society, and the related aspect of political control over the armed forces. His arguments are an important contribution to the dialectic opened in American military sociology by Huntington and Janowitz.

The theory of the total institution elaborated by Goffman (1961) has not been studied exclusively for the military, but has been widely applied to it in subsequent studies and researches and is thus of basic interest to anyone dealing with the sociology of the military.

The environment in which Goffman's conception of the total institution develops is American sociology of the 1950s, where the theories of organisation became firmly established (Etzioni 1969, 2016; Parsons 1968). In these theories, which precede it both logically and historically, the total institution finds both a classifying definition and a ready-made conceptual scheme.

For Goffman a total institution is a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered routine of life. Subdivided into five different classes, the examples given by the author include orphanages, psychiatric hospitals, seminars, prisons, and so forth, as well as two installations typical of the military: barracks and ships.

One of the fundamental social aspects of modern civilisation, says Goffman, is that people tend to sleep, amuse themselves and work in different places, with different companions, under different authorities, and without any rational overall pattern. By contrast, the chief

characteristic of total institutions is the breaking down of the barriers that separate these spheres of life: total institutions are thus contained in a single place (seminary, prison, ship, barracks, etc.), are regulated by a single authority according to a rational plan, and unfold in contact with the same group of people, generally a much more numerous group than one's sleep or leisure are shared with in normal life. Lastly, the total institution is characterised by a dual structure: on one side a numerous group of controlled persons (inmates, in Goffman's Terminology), and on the other the staff, a much more restricted nucleus which has the task of controlling.

Total institutions, Goffman asserts, are places in which people are forced to become different. The process begins with the destruction of their previous identity: to do this the institution first raises a barrier between the inmates and the outside world (gates, locked doors, walls, fencing, etc.), creating a separateness that leads to the loss of some of the subject's roles. Other losses are produced by the typical admission procedure: the haircut, the medical examination, the shower, the photograph, the confiscation of one's customary clothing and the assigning of a number or a place. These operations, also for the way in which they are usually carried out, seem designed to mould the newcomer like an object that can be fed into the administrative machinery of the institution for processing and smoothing by routine actions.

Once the inmate has been stripped of what he possesses, the institution carries out a replacement: just as it does in the physical sense for clothing, so it does in a moral sense for one's identity. The assignment and acceptance of the type of identification desired by the total institution is favoured by means of a system of privileges. Basically, the gratifications that the individual was used to in civilian life and now largely denied are replaced by a system of surrogate gratifications—generally more modest according to a scale of civilian values, but promoted by the institution and therefore not generating anxiety. Reinforcement is supplied by the institution of punishments, which are generally

more severe than any experience the individual has had in the world of his family.

The theory of the total institution has been widely studied, applied, and also criticised by those who, following the publication of *Asylums*, devoted themselves to the analysis of the military. In Europe, in particular, it had a fortunate period in the decade following 1968, when the student movement subjected all institutions to radical criticism. Insofar as it is of interest here, the criticism basically pointed out that for the military the theory is applied only to a peacetime situation, it only analyses a few particular structures of the institution (ship and barracks) and, for what regards the Western countries, it is more of historical value than an interpretation of current reality. In other words, in the past, conscription led to phenomena and situations that can be interpreted by drawing on the theory of the total institution, but this situation already appeared outdated in these countries when Goffman published his study.

At the height of the divergence/convergence debate, an interesting attempt was made in the U. S. to reconcile the two sides through a "pluralistic" theory, or "segmented model", as it has also been called.

In the sociology of the military that was becoming increasingly mature in the United States in the early 1970s, numerous scholars contributed to these efforts to reconcile the two theories (Bradford and Brown 1973; Deagle 1973; Jordan and Taylor 1973; Taylor and Bletz 1974), but one of them stood out for completeness of formulation and his marked scientific personality: Charles C. Moskos, Jr. Nowadays, when speaking of the pluralistic model, reference is normally made to Moskos.

Actually, this scholar had already attracted attention with a work that, presented as an investigation on the enlisted man (Moskos 1970), ended up with being a far-reaching analysis of the organisational and institutional aspects of the U.S. armed forces. However, since his initial international renown came for the pluralistic theory that he asserted and developed, that is what we shall present first.

The most complete formulation of this theory appears in a paper that Moskos presented in 1972 at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society in Chicago and published the following year in a specialised journal (Moskos 1973). In it Moskos proposes that the historical transformation of the military be interpreted as a dialectic evolution in which institutional persistences (divergent) react against the pressures toward assimilation to civilian life (convergent) present in society at large. In this process of change, the military establishment passes through historical phases of divergence and convergence with respect to civil society.

Even if the phase following the Second World War would seem, according to Moskos, a phase of convergence, this does not mean that it is Janowitz' thesis that is destined to prevail. In reality, says Moskos, a sectional view of the armed forces in transformation does not present a homogeneous institution, but a pluralistic organism where sectors with marked characteristics of assimilation to civil society coexist with sectors that preserve a more traditional military habitus, far removed from civilian mentality.

According to this scholar, in the current context the pluralistic solution offers the best probability of combining the two fundamental requisites of a modern military in a democratic country: operational efficiency, and political accountability to civilian authority.

From this theoretical framework originates the author's best-known contribution to military sociological thought, i.e., his creation of the institution/occupation interpretive model.

Moskos defines as institutional environment the one in which the soldier enters the armed forces mainly by calling; he identifies with the good of the collectivity for which he is willing to sacrifice himself, he looks more for moral than material incentives, and he manifests his possible dissatisfaction vertically along the hierarchy. By contrast, an occupation is defined in market economy terms, with a prevalence of monetary retribution over other forms of gratification; the individual is much more concerned with his own interests than those of the collectivity and he tends to organise and protect himself through pressure groups; the soldier's responsibilities and duties are contractual.

Moskos conceives this as an evolutionary model that can be applied to the concrete situation of a given national context to determine the position of the country's military (or parts of it) along a continuum ranging from institution to occupation. For this purpose he developed a series of sociological indicators capable of concretely measuring the above (Moskos 1977, 1986).

The ease of practical application of Moskos' scheme to concrete situations roused much interest among military sociologists, not only in America but more or less all over the world. The interest of many later scholars polarised around Moskos' model, in part with critical tones (Caforio 1988) that led him to make adjustments and produce its subsequent editions.

If Moskos takes up different positions from Janowitz regarding the professional military model (pluralistic model versus structuralist model), he appears to be his direct continuer for what regards predictions on the future use of the military and its future physiognomy, bringing Janowitz' constabulary concept to concrete development. Moskos begins his analysis of contingents in peacekeeping operations starting with *Peace Soldiers* (Moskos 1976), the fruit of a field survey conducted in Cyprus in the framework of UNFICYP.

Examining the modes of action of peacekeeping units, Moskos immediately recognises that the point where the departure from traditional military ethics is most marked regards the use of force. In the rules laid down for UNFICYP, the limitations on its use are extremely circumscribed and detailed. This results in the emergence of a new, "constabulary" ethic, and Moskos attempts to outline its features and developments, which come into being more in the field than in a theoretical or conceptual setting. But this constabulary ethic clashes with the traditional military ethic. Instead of pointing to a basic contradiction in this clash, Moskos sees an evolutionary process. His thesis is that the glory of war is not an essential ingredient of military honour and if one understands the tendencies internal to national armed forces, where forms of

absolute authority have gradually given way to forms of managerial leadership based on persuasion, one must also see peacekeeping as a progression of military professionalism along managerial lines. Also towards the exterior, there is a passage from the use of force to the use of persuasion.

Remaining faithful to what was said in the introduction, and therefore bringing this historical overview to a halt in the early 1980s, the last significant contribution by this author that we shall cite here is his careful classification of the sociology of the military and the bibliographic review that he presents in some later works published between 1976 and 1981 (see Harries-Jenkins and Moskos 1981).

Although European and, in some of his works, profoundly Dutch, we include Jacques Van Doorn in the "American school" because his training and thrust, and his points of reference, seem to move within this current of thought (and he is not the only European to do so, particularly in the 1960s and '70s).

Van Doorn reworks Huntington's conception of the military professional as manager of organised violence. For Van Doorn, war is an abnormal situation, an interregnum between two periods of normality during which only one institution is suited to act, the armed forces: in the final analysis, a study of military problems is a study of violence. The essential function of the military professional is therefore the control and exercise, tendentially monopolistic, of organised collective violence.

Van Doorn (1975) approaches the military as a student of complex organisations. This approach leads him to a natural comparison of the two emerging organisations in modern and contemporary times, the military and the industrial company.[9] For both of these the point of origin as complex organisations was the search for improved efficiency, both have implemented a breakdown of human activities into simple,

co-ordinated, organised elements, in both one has had a change in the selection of executive personnel, from the ascriptive type to the acquisitive.

So if the military is a complex organisation, is one who works for the military on a non-temporary basis a professional or a bureaucrat? For Van Doorn the officer corps is an excellent and perhaps unique example of integration between profession and organisation, and with a history long enough to allow complete observation of the blending process.

Having said this, Van Doorn carefully analyses the two concepts: he first identifies common characteristics, such as the fact that both professions and organisations are based on special knowledge and skills, according to individually standardised models; both of them require the actors to refrain from personalising the problems dealt with; in both models the individual positions are acquired through comparative selections of ability. However, the differences are substantial as well, says Van Doorn: the professional exercises a calling focused on essential values for society; he therefore acts on the basis of a precise code of ethics, while the activity of the bureaucrat consists in relating means to ends, following written rules more than a moral code. The professional's loyalty is to his profession and he is mainly judged by his colleagues, while the bureaucrat's loyalty is to the organisation and the judgement that counts is that of his superiors. The structure of a profession is horizontal, while that of an organisation is vertical, a hierarchy.

Applying this analysis to the officer corps, Van Doorn finds that the military is undoubtedly an organisation, because its structure is rigidly vertical and hierarchical; at the same time, however, officers display the salient characteristics of professionals: a calling centred on important social values, social responsibility, and corporateness.

But the professionalisation of the officer corps is something that developed over time, a phenomenon that, for Van Doorn, can be explained only by the intervention of the state. One characteristic of the military organisation is that the state is its client; professionalisation was therefore imposed by this essential client, in its own interest. This interest is the importance of having

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[9]Theorising what had already been done concretely by the team of *The American Soldier*, which had borrowed models elaborated in the area of industrial sociology in order to apply them to the military.

a military leadership that is united by a rigorous code of ethics, legalised through official recognition, and educated through the creation of professional training academies.

A radical dichotomy internal to the military institution developed from this between the officer corps and other military personnel, a dichotomy that has survived and not had dysfunctional characteristics for the institution thanks to a rigid, Goffmanian-type isolation of the military from society in general until the recent past.

But the present (1970s) sees a decline in mass armies, brought on both by changed warfare techniques and by the crisis of the concept of conscription. Van Doorn analyses the necessary passage from the draft to the volunteer army in all its consequences, with special regard to the decline in the social representativeness of the military, as well as to the inclusion of the values and mentalities typical of the industrial world into military values and customs, such as low mobility of personnel, wage demands, and unionisation.

This phenomenon, perceptively identified by Van Doorn at its first appearance,[10] spontaneously leads to still greater similarity between the military organisation and the industrial organisation (already theorised by this author), posing to the military a sizeable set of new problems which, prior to its transformation, were proper only to industry.

Van Doorn's most significant contribution to the current of thought in which he worked consists in having flanked the concept of the military profession as exercise of organised violence with that of the ongoing change in the institution and the profession. These two threads are present in all his work, leading him to largely anticipatory analyses that lend themselves to concrete applications and continue to be appreciated by contemporary scholars.[11]

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[10]It would come to full development in Europe as well nearly twenty years later, in the 1990s.

[11]One of Van Doorn's fundamental works, *The Soldier and Social Change* (1975), receives a warm introduction by Morris Janowitz.

World-Wide Developments

The extraordinary development of the American school of thought in the sociology of the military encouraged numerous studies and researches throughout the world and, particularly in the Western countries, also of autonomous research currents. Outside the U.S., however, the differing dimensions both of national states and their military institutions has resulted in the most significant currents and developments coming more within international organisations than in individual countries. International organisations continue to play an essential role in the debate and development of the sociology of the military and therefore knowledge of them is important for students and scholars alike.

This section, dedicated to developments in the sociology of the military world-wide, will therefore confine itself to outlining the historical development of three international institutions in which broad give-and-take takes place in this special sociology today. The array of scholars working in this sector of sociology is too vast and too recent to allow summarising their efforts in a brief outline.

Research Committee 01, *Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution*, is one of the 53 research committees into which the International Sociological Association is subdivided, each dedicated to a special sociology. It was initially called *Armed Forces and Society* but was renamed in 1980 when its programme was expanded to include the field of conflict research.

The first meeting of what was to become the RC 01 took place at a conference on armed forces held in London in 1964 and chaired by Morris Janowitz. The conference was sponsored by the Research Committee on Political Sociology and the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and brought together scholars from the U.S. and Western Europe countries.

At the Sixth World Congress of Sociology held in Evian, France in 1966, two groups were devoted to the subject. One dealt with "Conflict Resolution and Research in Conflict Resolution" and was headed by Robert C. Angell (U.S.). Eleven papers were presented and two were

published in *Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Vol. III: Working Groups and Round Table Papers*. The other, a working group on "Militarism and the Professional Military Man" headed by Morris Janowitz, became the nucleus of the Research Committee. It was attended by about 70 scholars from Western and Eastern Europe, the USSR, the U.S., South America and the Far East, and 36 papers were delivered. The keynote paper by Janowitz appeared in *Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Vol. II: Sociology of International Relations*. A volume of many of the papers presented appeared in *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays*, edited by Jacques van Doorn. A steering committee was established, chaired by Morris Janowitz, including the participation of Van Doorn.

The group was given the status of ISA Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society at the Seventh World Congress held in Varna, Bulgaria in 1970.

In 1980 it was proposed to change the Committee's name to reflect the views of some members whose interests lay primarily in non-violence, peacekeeping, and conflict resolution. The ISA Executive Committee approved the change at a meeting held in Budapest, Hungary in September 1980 and the Research Committee's new name became *Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution.*

Since then, RC 01 has taken part in all the World Congresses organised by the ISA and has held many interim meetings between one World Congress and the next.

The presidents of RC 01 have been:

Morris Janowitz (U.S.)	1966–1974
Jacques Van Doorn (Netherlands)	1974–1978
Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (U.K.)	1978–1982
Charles Moskos (U.S.)	1982–1986
Bernhard Fleckenstein (Germany)	1986–1994
David Segal (U.S.)	1994–1998
Giuseppe Caforio (Italy)	1998–2010
Gerhard Kuemmel (Germany)	2010–2014
Christian Leuprecht (Canada)	2014–2018

The objectives of RC 01 are:

1. stimulating research on armed forces and conflict resolution
2. establishing and maintaining international contacts between scientists and research institutions
3. encouraging exchange and discussion of relevant research findings
4. supporting academic research and the study of military-related sociology
5. planning and holding research conferences.

Membership in RC 01 is open to all scientists active in research and/or teaching in military-related social sciences and conflict resolution.

Morris Janowitz was also the founder of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, initially based in Chicago.

Founded in 1960, the IUS today constitutes an international "invisible college" that includes academics, military officers, students and researchers in a variety of institutional settings, both public and private. They represent various disciplines, including political science, sociology, history, psychology, economics, international relations, social work, anthropology, law, and psychiatry.

The core premise of the IUS is that analyses of military institutions require intellectual collaboration across university, organisational, disciplinary, and national lines. Seminar Fellows provide new perspectives on the study of military professionalism, civil-military relations, social composition of the armed forces, organisational change within armed forces, public policy on defence issues, peacekeeping, arms control, and conflict resolution. The Fellows of the Seminar differ widely in their strategic and political outlooks, but they all hold the common view that objective research on military institutions is a most worthy goal for which we should continually strive. They believe that such research, conducted along scholarly lines, makes an invaluable contribution to citizen understanding of armed forces.

The current (2015) President of the IUS is James Burk, professor of Texas A & M University (USA). The IUS has an elected Council representing various regions in the United States and abroad. The IUS edits a journal, *Armed Forces & Society*.

The IUS was the first international organisation to bring together scholars of the sociology of the military from different countries: however, it has always been American-led and has moved according to patterns and research themes of fundamental interest to the American school.

Precisely the consideration that the sociopolitical characteristics of the U.S., as well as the size and tasks of its military, were quite different from European reality, led a group of European scholars to meet in 1986 in Le Lavandou, France to found a European research association. This association was given the name *European Research Group On Military And Society* (acronym ERGOMAS).

ERGOMAS is an association of European social scientists who study the relationship between the military and society, and related phenomena. Joint transnational research and intercultural comparisons in thematically oriented interdisciplinary working groups constitute the core of Association. ERGOMAS promotes empirically and theoretically oriented European research cooperation and international scientific communication. Its purposes are pursued through the activities of Working Groups and the Association's Biennial Conferences. Indeed, the founding philosophy of ERGOMAS was to create an organisational framework suitable for promoting the constitution and activity of international thematic study groups, naturally in a European framework. The Association is thus comprised by a centralised organisational body, directed by a chairperson, and several research structures (the Working Groups), which operate in a co-ordinated manner but are completely independent from the scientific standpoint.

As already stated, the Working Groups are thematic and obviously vary in number depending on the researches in progress. They always have a multinational composition (all research is comparative or supranational) and remain active until the researches on the theme have been exhausted. The Working Groups currently (2015) existing are:

WG "The Military Profession"—Co-ordinator: Giuseppe Caforio
WG "Public Opinion, Mass Media and the Military"—Co-ordinator: Marjan Malesic
WG "Morale, Cohesion and Leadership"—Co-ordinator: Franz Kernic
WG "Military Families"—Co-ordinator: Manon Andres
WG "Civilian Control of the Armed Forces"—Co-ordinator: David Kuehn
WG "Gender and the Military"—Co-ordinator: Marina Nuciari
WG "Warriors in Peacekeeping"—Co-ordinator: Maren Tomforde
WG "Military and Police Relations"—Co-ordinator: Marleen Easton
WG "Violence and the Military"—Co-ordinator: Karl Ydén
WG "Recruitment and Retention"—Co-ordinator: Tibor Szvircsev Tresch
WG "Veterans and Society"—Co-ordinator: Gielt Algra
WG "Military Conflict Management and Peace Economics"—Co-ordinator: Ashu Pasricha

For completeness of treatment, it should be added that, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, many countries (especially in the West) have created national study and research institutes in the military sociology sector; most of them are governmental,[12] but there are also private ones (for more details, see the chapter *Social Research and the Military* in this volume).

In addition, this discipline now constitutes a subject of study in military academies throughout the world and often has an important formative

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[12]One can cite, by way of example, the German Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, the French Centre d'Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Défense, the Italian Centro di Studi Strategici e Militari, and the Polish Military Institute for Sociological Research.

role in officers' basic education (see also Chaps. 4 and 14 in this volume).

Military Sociology in East Asia[13]

Research on the armed forces and society has been mostly led by American and European scholars. In 2008, the interim meetings of the ISA Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution took place in Seoul, South Korea, for the first time in East Asian region. Despite the location of the conference, only a handful of East Asian scholars were represented such as those from Taiwan, the Philippines, Mongolia as well as South Korea. The organising committee widely contacted research institutes and individual scholars in China and Japan who might have interest in the issues on the military profession and civil-military relations, but was unsuccessful to invite them.

As to the case of Japan, the field of military sociology, in fact, was a barren ground until the late 1990s. Since the end of World War, anti-militaristic mood has been widespread in Japanese society. The Peace Constitution prohibits the armed forces, and thus, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) is not regarded as the military, but as a constabulary force, a marginalized institution in society. Japanese sociologists never paid serious attention to the military as a legitimate institution (Kurashina 2003). In this vein, Hitoshi Kawano is regarded a pioneering sociologist who attempted to draw attention to the issue of armed forces from a sociological perspective in Japanese academia. His doctoral dissertation dealt with combat organisations of Japan and the U.S. during World War II in comparative perspective under the supervision of Charles Moskos at Northwestern University in 1996. His other studies on military elites before 1945 were published in Japanese, but not available to English audience.

Current issues on the defense forces need to be more explored. Since 1992 when Japan dispatched the JSDF for UN peacekeeping operations to Cambodia for the first time, over 80,000 JSDF personnel have been deployed overseas. Recently, the JSDF expanded its mission to UN PKO activities in addition to domestic disaster reliefs for securing its legitimacy in society.

In case of Mainland China, we can hardly identify any academic research activities or individual researchers in the field we may classify as 'military sociology'. Presumably, the access of academics to the military establishment seems very limited and discouraged while even Chinese sociologists are not that enthusiastic about the issue of civil-military relations. The Academy of Military Science (AMS) located in Beijing is the highest-level research institute of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA). This institute was established in 1958 to consult the Central Military Commission and the PLA institutions. Director of AMS is a general-ranking officer in active duty, and thus, the scope of research should be inevitably limited to follow the general guideline of the PLA.

In a recent publication entitled "Civil-military Relations in Today's China", book chapters are found on the military elites, the officer corps, professionalism, the militia and conscription in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), but mostly written by Western or Chinese scholars working overseas including the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and Singapore (Finkelstein and Gunness 2007). This book was the result of a conference on China's changing civil-military dynamic sponsored by the CNA Corporation, a nonprofit research organisation and analysis located in Arlington, Virginia in the U.S.

However, it seems that something is moving also in China, since the publisher Springer has taken the initiative to translate into Chinese Mandarin and published the first edition of this handbook (2007). We could say that there was enough audience in China to justify this choice.

On the Taiwanese side, since the 1990s Taiwanese scholars have been more involved in pursuing defense issues while Western scholars became to pay less attention to the Taiwanese case than before. In the meanwhile, an international conference organised by the international journal

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[13]This part was prepared by Doo-Seung Hong.

'Taiwan Defense Affairs' was held in 2001 in Taipei entitled "The future vision of Taiwan's defense policy and military strategy" where ten papers were presented. Later these papers were translated and compiled into an English-language volume. Although the contributors included military professionals and journalists as well as academics, they were all concerned with defense issues against perceived threats from Mainland China. As one of the leading scholars in the field of military sociology in Taiwan, Hung, Mo and Tuan (2003) presented a paper at this conference with his two other colleagues on military-societal relations in Taiwan. He extensively published papers on civil-military relations and military professionalism in the 1990s.

On the other hand, over the years, South Korean scholars have performed research more actively than those of other East Asian nations. The area of military sociology is a subfield of sociology in general, but the military itself as an institution has been approached from a multi-disciplinary, not solely from a sociological perspective. The Korea Defense Policy Association, an academic association, consisting of sociologists, political scientists and military specialists had seminars, symposia and workshops and carried out policy-oriented projects on a contract basis with the Ministry of National Defense (MND). President of the Association is Doo-Seung Hong, the first Korean sociologist who introduced the area of military sociology into Korean academic community when he came back from the U.S. in 1980 after earning his doctoral degree in sociology at the University of Chicago under the supervision of Morris Janowitz. Before the 1980s, the topics of civil-military relations and military professionalism were mostly discussed by political scientists (Hong 1989). Civil-military relations were narrowly defined by the relationship between political leadership and the military elites as viewed from the perspective of civilian control over the military establishment. During the most part of the period of the 1960s and 1970s, South Korea has been under the rule of the general-turned-politician Park Chung Hee after the military coup of 1961.

Some other scholars with sociology background who have carried out research on the military are found in Korea National Defense University, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) and service academies. Particularly, research activities of KIDA are noteworthy. KIDA was established as Defense Management Institute in 1979 by the MND to support policy-makers on all defense issues, and changed to the current name in 1987. Such issues as military organisational culture, welfare policy, gender integration in the military, military professionalism and public opinion on the military have been widely dealt with by sociologists. KIDA has published a quarterly journal *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* which is indexed in SSCI. KIDA has also kept Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with defense research institutes in the region for implementing exchange programs with these organisations including the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) of Japan, the Academy of Military Science (AMS) of China, Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation (CSIPF) of Taiwan and the Institute for Defence International Relations(IDIR) of Vietnam. CSIPF is a non-profit foundation.

Lastly, over the years, some Philippine military sociologists have been very active in attending international conferences and carrying out research projects on the issues related to the armed forces and society. Among others, Advincula-Lopez (2009) at Ateneo de Manila University, explored the changing patterns in the socio-economic background of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) cadets in the past 50 years and the effects of military education on the reproduction of social inequality in the Philippine society. She also has delved into human rights issues and ethos in the Philippine military. Hall (2009) at the University of the Philippines Visayas was concerned about the proper role of the military vis-à-vis the police and paramilitary troops in performing counter-insurgency operations in local areas in the Philippines even though the constitutional basis of civilian supremacy was reinstated in 1986.

We close this part by saying that less attention has been paid by East Asian scholars than it

might deserve to research agenda on military sociology. To enhance an understanding of the relations between the armed forces and society in a world perspective, more international network and research co-operations should be pursued between sociologists in this region as well as with those in other regions including the US and European countries.

Military Sociology in Israel

The sociology of the military has had a significant development in Israel since the establishment of the state.[14] This development took place then in a completely independent way not only with respect to the geographical region (Middle East), but also compared to Asia in general and also to Europe. This situation and the wealth of scientific production in the sector therefore merit a brief and separate treatment from the broader Asian context

Sociology of the military in Israel has developed according to the fundamental security challenges facing the nation and the social concerns, attitudes and debates concerning security. Both dimensions affect one another but their correlation is far from being linear. Following Ben-Shalom and Fox (2009) it is possible to depict four distinct phases of disciplinary development:

(a) The establishment of the military—1948–1966: Marked by the challenge of creating the military, secure the borders while receiving firm support from the Israeli society.
(b) The big wars—1967–1982: marked by large scale campaigns against Arab states while the public opinion is shifting toward debated following the Yom Kippur War.
(c) Small wars—1985–1999: The first Intifada and fighting non-state rivals in Lebanon. The public opinion is marked by growing controversy although the magnitude of the security threat was diminished.
(d) The long war—2000–2015: Marked by intense controversy reflecting in the IDF. Began with the Second Intifada and ensued by numerous and ongoing large scale campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon. Thread against the civilian rear became apparent.

The research of the sociology of the military in Israel is conducted by academicians and military experts and sometime they may change positions. However, the number of dedicated military sociologists is small. The following table presents their main activities:

Phase area of research	Building an army 1948–1966	Great wars 1967–1982	Small wars 1985–2000	Long war
Civil Military	Moshe Lisak,	Moshe Lisak, Kimmerling, Victor Azarya	Eyal Ben-Ari, U. Ben-Eliezer, Stuart Cohen	Udi Lebel, Yagil Levi Eyal Ben-Ari, Ednal Lomski Feder, Stuart Cohen, Kobi Michael
Military Culture and Organization	Eliahu Gutman, Moshe Lisak	Reuven Gal Charles Greenbaum	Reuven Gal, Eyal Ben Ari	Eyal Ben-Ari, Motty Safrai
Profession of Arms	–	Hanan Shai, Edward Lutwak	Avi Kober	Uzi Ben-Shalom, Eitan Shamir, Tamir Libel
Military and Security Organizations	–	–	–	Nir Gazit

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[14]For this paragraph we thank the invaluable collaboration of Uzi Ben-Shalom.

The fourth phase is marked by the following:

(a) Studying of the consequences of civil military gap and post heroic trends over military culture (Most notable research are Udi Lebel and Yagil Levi)
(b) Studying identity conflicts in the military—Especially gender, immigration and religion (Most notable research are Eyal Ben-Ari, Stuart Cohen, Edna Lomski Feder and Orna Sasson Levi)
(c) Understanding the sociology of warfighting was in general enlarged but still remain neglected (Most research was conducted by Eyal Ben-Ari and Uzi Ben-Shalom)
(d) Studying of security challenges to the civilian rear (A notable contribution is made by Nir Gazit).

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Author Biographies

Giuseppe Caforio was a professional officer of the Italian Army. Born in 1935 he served until his retirement in 1992, then devoting himself to social research on the military, as it is demonstrated by his scientific memberships and production until his sudden death in 2015. Deputy President of the Italian Centro Interuniversitario di Studi Storico-Militari since 1984, founding member of ERGOMAS since 1986 and then ERGOMAS Board member and Coordinator of the Working Group on the Military Profession, in 1988 he became member of the IUS and of the RC01 of the ISA, where he served as President of the ISA RC01 in 1998 since 2010, and as Board Member until his death. He organized more than ten international conferences and participated with papers in more than one hundred seminars, congresses and conferences. He has 160 scientific publication (volumes, journal articles and essays, contributions in volumes and edited books), many of them translated into nine different languages

Doo-Seung Hong is a professor emeritus of sociology at Seoul National University. He graduated from Seoul National University in 1972 and received a Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1980. He is now president of the Korea Defense Policy Association and also served as president of the Korean Sociological Association. His main research interests are in the fields of military sociology and social stratification. He has two books on the armed forces and society published in Korean *Sociology of the Korean Armed Forces* (2nd ed., 1996) and *The Armed Forces and Civil Society in Korea* (2015)

Part II

Theoretical and Methodological Orientations

The Study of the Military. Models for the Military Profession

Marina Nuciari

Model and Explanations in the Classic Sociological Tradition. The Military in Sociological Theory

The classic approach to the consideration of the military as a social phenomenon is not different from the one applied to every other sector of social life. Classic sociology has a total and comprehensive conception of "society", and within the classics we find general analysis of the various social institutions as considered not only in their peculiarities but mainly in their connections with the general society. The military is one of the many, and basic, institutions considered by classic sociologists according to the various sociological schools, and its features are seen as a distinct set of behaviours, rules, norms and values, coordinated around a defensive or offensive goal (or both) defined by a given society (but generally typical of every society) in their relationships with other, external, societies. The military is considered and explained within the different sociological theories, so that we have a positivistic explanation of the role of the military as a basic feature of the human society since its

origins—as in Comte—, or an evolutionary consideration of the military structure as a first stage in the society evolution—as in Spencer—. Both Comte and Spencer consider the inevitable decline of the military structure and function as a consequence of the development of human society from its primitive features to its highest manifestation, the industrial society (as it was seen and intended in the XIX century).

As it happens many times with the works of the classics, many subjects are considered which will become areas of research for the posterity of sociologists who will invent military sociology. One example among many is the natural divergence between military society and civil society, manifesting itself as long as the process of development proceeds toward its accomplishment within the industrial society. This is true not only for Comte or Spencer, but especially for Tocqueville, who considers also the growing democratic consciousness as a possible solution of the dangerous separateness of armed forces from their parent society.

In Weber a not only deeper but also a much more articulated analysis of the structure and evolution of the military can be found, where some basic concepts for description and explanation of structural features and processes are given. Concepts like discipline, obedience to formal norms, formal authority, rationale division of roles and attributes, competence and loyalty to an impersonal legitimate power, in a word, the bureaucratic ideal-type of organisation,

M. Nuciari (✉)
Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Mathematics and Statistics (E.So.Ma.S.), State University of Torino Italy, Corso Unione Sovietica 218bis, 10134 Turin, Italy
e-mail: marina.nuciari@unito.it

are all tools provided by Weber in the consideration of the military as a social institution, and applied to the understanding of a general process such as rationalisation and bureaucratisation of western society.

It is not the goal of this chapter to consider the classic tradition of sociology in order to enlighten the "sources" of the military sociology of today, since that task has been already done in a previous chapter by Giuseppe Caforio (Chap. 2). What it seems important to stress here is that, with a development similar to that of many other specialised fields, also the military is considered by sociologists firstly within the framework of a general conception of society, and subsequent research topics which will give birth to a military sociology can find an original link in the classic tradition of general sociology.

But to distinguish a classic tradition from a contemporary science is a too sharp division. Military sociology of today does not rely on the classics, but on a second generation of general sociologists who at a certain time in their life began to define the military social field as a peculiar environment, thus acting as "founding fathers" of this discipline. To maintain this distinction, here a "modern" sociological tradition has been defined. This new tradition begins with the possibility to do social research in the armed forces, and with the correlate possibility to define the true first lines of a theoretical framework over which to base a new and autonomous sociological discipline.

A Modern Sociological Tradition. From "The Military in the Sociological Theory" to the "Social Research on the Armed Forces"

The contemporary stage for the study of the military by the sociological discipline begins with Second World War. It is not only a matter of historical dates, it is related to the entry of sociologists (among other social scientists) within the military institution with all their tools and equipment for empirical research. The development of an empirical sociology based on strict methodological support was already a reality since the publication of Lazarsfeld's work (1963). This "second foundation" of sociology as a scientific discipline means a detachment from general typologies and the search of more limited research subjects, easier to be empirically measured and analysed by means of quantitative tools. Strictly related to this scientific development there is the possibility of an *applied sociology*, which opens the door to a long debate over the role of sociology (better, of sociologists) within society and with regards to politics. Leaving aside the main topic, which overrides the capacity of this essay, the fact remains that the first example of sociological research empirically conducted over the military, the four volumes' *opera* "The American Soldier" (Stouffer et al. 1949) had explicit operative goals[1] (Madge 1962), and it provided an enormous amount of empirical findings apt to be treated (and to make exercise and experience, I would say) with quantitative methods.

But these developments do not exhaust the variety of topics and "headings" under which contemporary military sociology can be distinguished. If the empirical military sociology dates from Second World War and it takes place mainly in the United States—thus giving rise to a strong prominence of American researches—, by the end of the Sixties an "European military sociology" begins to emerge. Scientific production becomes wide, and research paths differentiate according to various problematics and theoretical orientations of scholars.

In a first tentative to give a systematic arrangement to the mass of researches and studies on the military, Morris Janowitz proposed a threefold thematic distinction (Janowitz 1979): studies dealing with the military organisation and the military profession; studies dealing with the relationships between armed forces and society; and studies pertaining to conflicts and war in particular. In this essay, only the first theme in the janowitzian distinction will be considered, in

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[1]Stouffer et al. (1949). For comments on the background of this research project see Madge (1962).

order to avoid overlapping with subsequent essays presented in the following sections of present volume; furthermore, only topics where some general theory has been developed will be considered, thus avoiding a mere inventory of research areas, more or less randomly chosen. But a more articulated distinction will be used, which permits a better description of the variety of thematic issues and a deeper discussion of proposed and applied theoretical models. For the same reasons, we need to put some time departure points, thus covering more or less the last thirty years of XX century. Thus, thematic areas have been defined, where the majority of studies can be located, even though overlapping are present and single authors could be attributed to more than one area. The areas are the following:

(a) soldiers in combat and non-combat situations;
(b) soldiers as a professional group and its changing trends;
(c) the military as a formal organisation;

These points will be systematically presented in the following pages.

Soldiers in Combat and Non-combat Situations

Under this heading we find the continuation and the development of the paths already established in the classic works of Janowitz, Stouffer et al., that is the development of a micro-sociology of the military, where soldiers are considered in their very position of combatants, a situation where adjustment is necessary, stress is normal, and effective performance becomes crucial. After Second World War, what has been called "the American School" of military sociology finds in this field many empirical occasions to reflect over combat performance, and these occasions are given by the limited conflicts where western (but mainly American) armies are involved during the peaceful period of the cold war. Korea, Vietnam, Falklands become for the sociology of the military not only "battle fields" but also "research

fields", where theories and concepts can be repeatedly tested and developed. The key problem could be summarised by the word "combat effectiveness", and "cohesion" becomes the related social situation to be favoured and maintained within the troops.[2]

The first attempt to establish a theory of cohesion and effectiveness within combat troops belongs to Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz (Shils and Janowitz 1948), with their study on German Army prisoners during World War II. An updated reading of the essay published just after the end of the conflict, in 1948, gives evidence to the fact that factors influencing combatants behaviour had been all already considered by the two sociologists, notwithstanding the emphasis given to the "discovery" of the primary group function, which has someway obscured the relevance of many other cohesive factors. In this pioneer piece of research, the two military sociologists ante litteram Shils and Janowitz outlined factors influencing soldiers' behaviour in combat and able to positively impact over their willingness to fight:

(a) The nature of group relations. In the combat unit, special relations arise among soldiers so that the individual perceive his personal security and survival's chance as dependent on security and survival of his unit as a whole. The military group tends to substitute civilian primary groups (such as the family), and it gains a capacity to provide soldiers with physical as well as psychological sustain, help and affection; the military primary group plays a general function of sustain for the individual, who feels attached to it and responsible for the group's fate. Positive

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[2]Studies on cohesion and morale cover a very huge amount of literature, and the topic is a major concern more for social psychology and psychiatry applied to the military than for military sociology. In this chapter, only the main studies which can be defined as pertaining to a sociological domain have been recalled, and among them only those who could be considered as key essays, either because proposing theoretical innovation or advancement, either because of their "state-of-the-art" studies purpose.

functions of group relationships as such would have been, according to Janowitz and Shils, firstly relieving combat stress, and secondly the avoiding of the search of individual "solutions" such as escape, desertion, surrender, which would have undermined group's survival.

(b) Officers' behaviour. Qualities and skills of German officers were examined, underlining their ability to consider and take care of their soldiers as of their "children", to give importance of their well-being, and to act in order to be an example for them. The severe importance of the quality of leadership is emphasised, to trigger and maintain group cohesion between soldiers and their immediate leader (what Etzioni defines *rank cohesion*, in order to distinguish it from the *peer cohesion* among soldier), so that both horizontal and vertical cohesion be assured within military organisation.[3]

(c) Organisational patterns. Recruitment and rotation system (in the case of the Wehrmacht, entire divisions were rotated) was structured in order to maintain group cohesion, avoiding the rupture of cohesive bonding among soldiers.

(d) Ideology in a broad sense. So-called secondary symbols were considered, such as the attachment to the nation (patriotism), political ideals (national socialism), devotion to Hitler's person. These factors, according to Janowitz and Shils, did not have a direct and autonomous impact over German soldiers' willingness to fight, but they functioned anyway until they could be linked to the effective functioning of primary groups.

(e) Discipline and military values. Of course discipline and obedience to norms were found to be relevant factors, being armed forces anyway also a coercive organisation; to this the conception of the "soldierly honour" was added, which it was not confined to officers but it extended its importance to every soldier: "For the German, being a soldier was a more than acceptable status. It was indeed honourable".

In the subsequent research on the same subject, cohesion is analysed in order to better enlighten the nature of primary group relationships, but it is evident the "discovery" of other factors that are, even though sometimes differently named, largely included in the Janowitz/Shils' research. A deeper analysis of group bonding is made on American soldiers engaged in the limited conflicts following the end of the Second World War. Here another "classic" work is the anthropological research done by Roger Little on an infantry (fusiliers) unit of the U.S. Army in the Korean War.[4] In his study, based on participant observation, Little goes deeper into the analysis of buddy relationships, considered as dyadic relations between two soldiers: this special bonding between two soldiers create a reticular network of links, which is the true structure of the group. Each soldier feels affection and responsibility toward his personal buddy, but since each soldier in the unit could function as a potential buddy, then the structure of personal relationships can cover the entire group in this reticular network able to control personal behaviour and reduce combat stress.

Rightly the definition of buddyship is put under observation during the Vietnam War by Moskos in his field research on the American enlisted men in Vietnam (Moskos 1975). The role of buddyship is in some way reduced by the explanation of that special kind of bonding as stemming more from a social contract stipulated between soldiers on a rationale basis in order to assure reciprocal survival in an extreme environment such as field battle, than as a set of feelings based on friendship, altruism and humane solidarity as it was depicted in previous studies.

But the strength of such male bonding is anyway recognised as effective in producing cohesion, so that when it is lacking cohesion is endangered. In their harsh criticism of the American military organisation in Vietnam, Paul

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[3]Etzioni (1975).

[4]Little (1964, pp. 195–224).

Savage and Richard Gabriel put in evidence the breaking of buddy relationship, caused by the individually-based enlistment and rotation system, as one of the reasons for the U.S. débacle.[5]

This is by no means the only cohesive factor: all elements stressed by Shils and Janowitz are recalled by Savage and Gabriel on the one side, and by Moskos on the other. According to Savage and Gabriel, in Vietnam the US Military has suffered of a true organisational failure, being unable to keep its structure and functioning separated from, and in a certain way not permeable by, civilian society and changing values and attitudes toward the military and the war. Inadequate leadership, crisis of traditional military values, group relationships' breakdown, were all factors acting against (and not in favour of) units cohesion and related combat effectiveness.

In the Moskos' study, moreover, the relevance of the ideological factor is stressed: not only a manifest *political ideology*, whose impact is relevant when an ideological orientation is really shared by soldiers (for instance in Liberation Armies or *guerrilla* units), but a more *latent ideology,* shared by a soldier as a citizen of a civil society to which he feels attached and for which he thinks fighting to be worthwhile; this was the type of ideological commitment latently present among American soldiers in Vietnam, and considered by Moskos able to "inspire" soldiers on the battlefield.

Valuable research considering cohesion and effectiveness in combat units deployed in real combat situations is that conducted by Nora Kinzer Stewart on British and Argentine militaries fighting the Falklands/Malvinas war in 1982 (Stewart 1988). In this research, Stewart can draw on all the existing literature on cohesion available at that time, and in her empirical analysis she makes a precise and attentive consideration of all factors in one way or another influencing combat effectiveness. At the end of her study, a complex model is offered, where the various elements are linked together: horizontal or peer bonding (primary group relationships,

buddyships), vertical bonding (rank cohesion among different ranks, officer-NCOs-soldier), organisational bonding (relations toward the military organisation at large, military values, patriotism, military traditions and history, internal social norms and rules), and societal factors, added by Stewart as a fourth dimension. This fourth element is important in that, according to Stewart

> Societal factors which impinge on military cohesion are those of society's attitudes towards the military, in general, or, towards a particular war, in the sense that an adequate defence budget exists for training of men, purchase of supplies and armament and staffing of military hospitals and training of officers…If the political will be absent or political strategy is incorrect, the military strategy will also suffer….

Thus, among societal factors we find culture, norms, values taken into the military organisation from the parent society, size of defence budget, doctrine and strategy, training, tactics, and technology affecting command-control-communication-intelligence systems, logistics, medical care and facilities.

Following to a certain extent Stewart analysis and the discussion presented by G. Harries-Jenkins in a contemporary essay,[6] and taking into consideration the literature on cohesion available until 1990, a further elaboration of a general model for cohesion and combat effectiveness has been proposed by Nuciari (1990a, b). The final, and to a certain extent definite, result is an integrated model in which every factor finds its position and can be understood in its links and effects on the combat situation considered as a system.

In this model, the subject of observation is the combat unit, considered as the point where two levels of elements are able to influence unit's cohesion. An internal level embraces the three types of bonding recalled by Stewart. This level is internal in the sense that its elements (or variables) are found directly within the military

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[5]Savage and Gabriel (1976).

[6]Harries-Jenkins, *Cohesion and Morale in the Military: The Regimental System*, ISA RC No. 01 Interim Meeting, Munich, 1988, published in an Italian translation in M. Nuciari, *Efficienza e Forze Armate*, Angeli, Milano, 1990.

organisation, to a certain extent they are "produced" within the organisation itself. An external level embraces three other groups of variables, which belong to the parent society: cultural variables, structural variables and socio-demographic variables. The external level contains, although differently divided into cultural and structural variables, the societal factors defined by Stewart; a third group of variables is added and kept distinct, the so-called "socio-demographic variables", where some characteristics of the population of a given society from which military personnel is necessarily drawn are grouped (levels of education, social origin, geographic origin). The modality assumed by each variable can be positive or negative in creating and enhancing unit cohesion, and the influence of the external level is not direct but interacting with the modalities assumed by the variables forming the internal level.

The study of unit cohesion was crucial because of its not linear link with unit performance. When performance means effective combat behaviour, the understanding of factors influencing cohesion, and of the effect of cohesion on combat performance, are evidently of extreme importance for military organisation. But cohesion is important as a general factor affecting group performance, in military as well as in non-military situations. It is not surprising, then, that a strong impulse has arrived from the new operations other than war, where soldiers are not in situation as risky as that of warfigthing, but they suffer from deployment stress anyway. As it will be cleared in the following pages in this chapter, operations other than war are often characterised by high vagueness and ambiguity, boredom is often a characteristic, the sense of the mission is not always clear and it can be insufficient to motivate soldiers, and sudden or latent risk remains an unavoidable mission component. In other words, stress is part of military non-conventional deployment, for reasons which are partly the same and partly different from those affecting cohesion in combat environments.

In current times, studies on cohesion are conducted more from the side of social psychology, and within medical and psychological units and institutions more or less directly linked to military organisation. A good example of this "new season" of contributions to the "old" question of military group cohesion is given by the great amount or research conducted on American units deployed in peacekeeping operations by the medical-psychological staff of the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe in Heidelberg (Germany). In these studies in particular, the tempo factor is considered, since cohesion levels can change according to the Operation Deployment Tempo (the acronyms OPTEMPO is used). As one of the last results of this on-going research programme states,[7] cohesion generally increases over the course of a peacekeeping deployment, over four months from pre-deployment to mid-deployment, and then it decreases near the end of the deployment (which in the observed unit was six months, a rather average and common deployment tempo for peacekeeping missions), but remaining anyway higher than in pre-deployment period.

In a situation where Operations Other Than War (OOTW) for the military are increasing, and military forces are subject to size shrinking, the deployment tempo becomes a crucial variable affecting unit cohesion and performance. As authors of the paper end their work: "the related question of how to facilitate the rapid growth of unit cohesion, and then keep it from being lost, are more important than ever".[8]

Soldiers as a Professional Group and Its Changing Trends

Here the subject is not anymore the soldier at the troop level, but mainly the soldier as a professional, that is, the officer, and the career officer in particular. Of course, also in the research field treated above, officers were part of the subject since leadership and leader performance were among the factors influencing combatants' behaviours. Empirical research on troop cohesion

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[7]Bartone and Adler (2001, pp. 85–107).
[8]Ibid. p. 105.

and unit effectiveness makes use of conceptual definitions about *the military leader* parally developed in other sectors of the discipline.

But considering now this very sector as an autonomous body of research, the leading term under which to resume theoretical and empirical production in the area of the military profession in the contemporary military sociology is *change*. Point of departure remains the Janowitzian *Professional Soldier,* with its already classic typology distinguishing between the heroic leader and the manager. Janowitz himself was aware of an ongoing change affecting structures and processes within military institutions after the Second World War, and his reference model was in fact the *constabulary force*: that force which "*is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory*" (Janowitz 1960); such a kind of military is inscribed in a new technological framework where at the upper level of the conflicts continuum, development of nuclear weapons and strategic concepts of dissuasion means lead to a transformation of military professionals into controllers of a machine destined to remain inactive.

In these conditions Janowitz was aware of the fact that professional soldiers could suffer from a professional identity crisis, since "*the military tends to think of police activities as less prestigeful and less honourable tasks*", and "*in varying degree, military responsibility for combat predisposes officers toward low tolerance for the ambiguities of international politics, and leads to high concern for definitive solutions of politico-military problems*" (Janowitz 1960, p. 420). Janowitz saw in these changes a challenge to the values typical of the traditional *warrior*, and of the *heroic leader* in particular, and the necessity of a balance between this role and the other defined as the *military technologist*:

> The military technologists tend to thwart the constabulary concept because of their essential preoccupation with the upper end of the destructive continuum and their pressure to perfect weapons without regard to issues of international politics. The heroic leaders, in turn, tend to thwart the constabulary concept because of their desire to maintain conventional military doctrine and their resistance to assessing the political consequences of limited military actions which do not produce 'victory'. (ibidem, pp. 424–425)

The role of the military managers, then, would have been, according to Janowitz, that of assuring the needed balance between these two roles, and the inevitable link with political actors.

The trend already envisaged by Janowitz in the Fifties and Sixties becomes more and more evident in the subsequent years, and the theoretical analysis over the military profession moves around the strains deriving from this role duplicity: the combat leader on the one side, the "**warrior**" with all its traditional set of values such as courage, hardiness, sense of duty, sacrifice and the like, vertically oriented to obedience and discipline within a hierarchical organisation, and the rational **manager** on the other, equipped with highly technological weapons and expertise, bound to costs-benefits evaluations, and horizontally oriented toward professional peers, military as well as civilians, and even outside the military institution.

The debate on the "Heroic leader versus Manager" dilemma is recurrent, since it affects the very heart of the discussion about change in the definition of the military profession, as it has been stated in the other classic reference, contained in the Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*. Here the subject becomes definitely centred around a recurrent question, pertaining to the nature of the job performed within military organisations.

The debate over the "military profession" had already found a steady point in the conceptualisations of Huntington and, further on, of Van Doorn, but it receives new insights from the enlargement of the discipline, since by many new scientists a contribution is given to the general topic of the changes occurring in the profession of arms in current times.

The discussion remains within these terms until the end of the Eighties, that is to say until the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the Nineties and later, recurrent changes in the nature of the missions performed by armed forces, while

fulfilling the janowitzian "prophecy" of the constabulary force, make necessary and inevitable to rethink the military profession in the light of the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTWs), otherwise called Peace Support Operations (PSOs). This new factual situation needs new conceptual frameworks, since the task performed by the military in the various kinds of international missions creates different problems within the armed forces that cannot be understood within existing conceptual tools. This change does not lead to a theoretical break, but to an attempt to enlarge existing typologies so that new forms taken by the military profession could be included.

In order to avoid possible confusion, we can deal here separately with the two periods, by means of a terminology proposed by Charles Moskos for this very purpose (that is, distinguishing armed forces according to geostrategic changes): theories and concepts about the military profession in the Cold War (or late-modern) period, and new concepts for armed forces in the Post-Modern Period.[9]

Theories and Concepts About the Military Profession in the Late-Modern Period

All contributions converge upon the term **profession** to define the kind of activity performed by those who practice the management of organised violence. The recurrent meaning of the concept is that defined within the field of the sociology of the professions, according to which an activity can be defined as a 'profession' when it embodies a number of characters such as: a theoretical and practical body of theory, a high degree of autonomy and control over the exercise of the activity, an ethic peculiar to the professional group and a sense of corporateness linking together the professional practitioners. Some other traits can be added, such as the control performed by the professional group upon the

diffusion of the specialised knowledge and thus upon the access of new members to the profession. These special autonomy and control are recognised by the larger society to the professionals by virtue of the vital relevance of their functional fields for the same society. These functional fields are usually those pertinent to the so-called 'free' or 'pure' professionals, but, recalling the weberian distinction into **autonomous** and **eteronomous** professional work, they also include some professional activities performed within a **bureaucracy**, that is a private or public organisation.

The two situations are actually very similar, the only relevant difference being that of the **independence** of the former (the free practitioner) and the **dependence** of the latter on a formal organisation. In this second case, the monopoly of the activity lays in the hands of the formal organisation, that rules practice and knowledge and it decides upon selection and recruitment of new members and upon practitioners' activities control patterns.

In formal organisations, moreover, professional roles are usually intertwined with a complex role system reflecting the functional structure of the organisation, so that the necessary integration of the professional activity lead to a strong limitation of the single professional practitioner's autonomy, discretionality and control. These limitations are counterbalanced, however, by the very fact that organisational top level is often formed by people belonging to the same professional group, as it is the case for "professional organisations" defined by Mintzberg,[10] and referring especially to public sector organisations (hospitals, universities, armed forces).

The above characteristics are especially pertinent to the military profession, which has historically developed within a formal organisation, the armed forces, holding the monopoly of organised violence on behalf of the parent society. All that means that in the case of military profession the typical traits of the **profession** are hardly distinguishable from those relating to the

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[9]For these definitions, treated also here in further paragraphs, see Moskos et al. (2000, pp. 1–13).

[10]Mintzberg (1979).

organisational position, so that organisation processes can determine kind, contents and boundaries of the military professional activity. The notion of **ascriptive professionalism**, recalled by Feld, is just underlining this peculiarity (Feld 1977).

The impossibility to separate professional role from organisational role, already underlined as the peculiar character of the military profession, is testified by the various models build up to understand ongoing changes both in contents and forms of military activity in contemporary times: even though differences are noted among the various national situations, all models relate to **armed forces** as an **institution** where military professionals necessarily perform their activity, and the common aim is the understanding of the degree of **convergence/divergence** existing between military organisation and civilian society.

With respect to this intrinsic antinomy, a distinction is made among the various role orientations of military professionals by many authors, in one way or in another referring to a similar point of view: the double nature of the true military professional role, stemming from its being at the same time a professional activity and an organisational status-role.

Trying to distinguish without losing the concept of "profession", a difference is stated firstly by Arthur Larson between a "radical professionalism" and a "pragmatic professionalism" (Larson 1977), where the first type defines a form of institutional professionalism, oriented toward a total organisation, the military, seen as inevitably isolated from civilian society because of its high functional specificity and political neutrality; it is the divergent pole of military professionalism. On the other side, the pragmatic professionalism is intended to define that type of moulding of professionalism (in the sense given to it by the sociology of the professions) and amateurism which can be found in the various forms of non-volunteer armies, where the citizen-soldier is preferred to the true professional soldier and receives his role definition from the parent society according to its needs and goals; the pragmatic professional, then, is by no means separated by the parent society, and it represents the convergent pole of military professionalism.

Twelve years later, the same terms are proposed again by Segal (1986), with a difference in meaning. Wishing to overcome the distinction between an institutional concept of the military from an occupational concept (the I/O model proposed by Charles Moskos and analysed here after), Segal defines the pragmatic professionalism as "a mixture of institutional and occupational concerns", that is, a professional with a specific field of application but who also shares preferences and needs with civilian peers in other expertise fields; the radical professionalism, on the other side, identifies the pure professional orientation of the officer concerned with the somewhat traditional image of the professional soldier.

A similar kind of distinction has been made some years later to explain findings from a cross-cultural empirical research on "The Present and Future of the Military Profession—Views of European Officers" (ERGOMAS 1996). In this case the empirical content of the typology is extensively described and supported by research data: in their theoretical introduction to the presentation of the research section dealing with professional orientations of officers from eight European countries, G. Caforio and M. Nuciari define a four-types typology where the distinction between a radical and a pragmatic professionalism is proposed.[11] The typology develops from a first distinction between professional and occupational orientations showed by surveyed officers. As authors state:

> Officers with a professional orientation stress factors which in their job are more linked to specifically military competence and to responsibilities related to the sense of service to the community (…) In this type, professional satisfaction is chosen for its intrinsic value, and for this reason highly evaluated as a goal in itself. On the contrary, occupationally oriented officers give more importance to mainly instrumental factors, such as salary or job security, or even general working

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[11]The first publication of this research's results is in Caforio (1994). The typology is discussed in Caforio and Nuciari (1994, pp. 33–56).

conditions. These two orientations do not result, however, in two opposite poles only, since they are not mutually exclusive but coexistent (…). The typology can thus provide four types, where the professional and the occupational types are the two "pure" types.[12]

To the two pure types, two hybrid types are added: officers who are *indifferent* both toward professional and occupational positions, and officers who have both professional and occupational characteristics; this last type has been called *pragmatic professionalism*, in order to distinguish it from the *radical professionalism* of the pure type. In the research where the typology was applied, pragmatic professionals were present in six out of eight surveyed country (in former-Czechoslovakia 34%, in Greece 26%, in Italy 20%, in France 19%, in UK 18% and in Germany 16%), while radical professionals were majoritarian everywhere but in Greece and in former-Czechoslovakia, where occupational and pragmatic professional respectively were prominent.[13]

The results of this research were first published in 1994, and they relied on empirical findings collected in a time-span of more than one year, covering the end of 1991 to the end of 1992. To a certain extent, it could be said that it closes a research season where typologies for the military profession were intended to explore situations and changes occurred within the period that Moskos has named late-modern, rightly to distinguish it from what it would have happened just after, as a consequence of the end of bi-polarism. As we are going to see in the following paragraph, the new post-modern period is characterised, at a theoretical level, by a research trying to define brand new types of professional officer (and professional soldier in general), those pertaining to soldiers dealing with operations other than war to a much higher extent than before.

Wishing to give a general picture of research on the military profession in the late-modern period, we could say that the common core of all

researches related to these models seems to lay in the generalised perception of an on-going decline in relevance, legitimacy and prestige accorded by contemporary affluent society to military profession, which can be defined as 'role crisis' or as 'deprofessionalisation' or as 'occupationalisation' of military profession. This process of change is also signalled by a change in value orientations of military professionals, who seem to be turning from reference patterns based on the assumption of definite responsibilities in favour of the community (the defence of the common good) at the expenses of the individual good, to individualistic patterns grounded on career and job security, like every other occupation; this change can be defined as a shifting from an institutional/ professional orientation to an occupational/bureaucratic orientation.

A possible progressive **deprofessionalization** of military profession was seen by Cathy Downes in the dilution of its specific content into a number of contents and knowledge which are not specific to the military, and, moreover, which have been 'invaded' by civilian 'military experts' (Downes 1985). The attempt on the part of military organisations to become acquainted with these new abilities has led to the creation of 'internal' experts in non-military matters (that is to say, military professionals expert in political, administrative and financial fields) who run the risk, however, of becoming—and of perceiving themselves to have become—soldiers who have abandoned their own peculiar profession, with related outputs of confusion and ambiguity concerning professional identity.

New Concepts for the Military Profession in the Post-modern Period

The end of bi-polar world gives new inputs also to military sociology, posing new questions and asking for adequate answers not always already given by existing theory. As it often happens, reality goes further and "the strength of things" imposes at a certain extent to renew subjects and explicative paradigms. As far as the field of the military profession is concerned, the repeated

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[12]G. Caforio & M. Nuciari, "The Officer Profession: Ideal-Type", cit. p. 34.

[13]Ibidem, p. 37.

and increasing experience of non conventional missions, for armed forces of many countries all around the world, means a true challenge for the definition itself of the profession of arms. As Reed and Segal note for the US military forces:

> In 1993, for the first time, Army doctrine began to reflect the changing nature of military missions. Field manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, the Army basic field manual for doctrine, explicitly included a section on 'Operations Other Than War' (OOTW), which includes peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions – missions that Janowitz would regard as constabulary. At the same time, the Army began teaching the new doctrine to its junior and senior leaders in the officer basic courses and the senior-level staff schools and colleges. (Reed and Segal 2000, p. 60)

One year later, in 1994, British military doctrine began to rely on what it was called "the Dobbie's doctrine", explained by C. Dobbie in an essay where an attempt was made to distinguish among different types of new missions (traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement), which because of this diversity would have need drastic differences in military personnel's training systems (Dobbie 1994). A further discussion about the Dobbie's doctrine has led C. Dandeker and J. Gow to define the type of *strategic peacekeeping* as an intermediate type of mission, thus giving further evidence to the complex and multifunctional nature of the new missions (Dandeker and Gow 1997).

In all essays and contributions dealing with the new missions performed by military organisations a recall is made to new training and education needs, even though this topic is not always adequately or extensively discussed. The need for something different in knowledge and ability is felt as far as officers' education is concerned, for junior as well as for senior officers, for non-commissioned officers down to the lower levels of the command chain, emphasising the concept of bottom-up initiative and relative autonomy of lower hierarchical levels. When educational contents and behavioural guiding principles are in discussion, a reassessment of a professional field is working. When both ethics and competence are at stake, then something

relevant is changing—or it has already changed —for a professional group.

Thus, what seemed to be similar to a crises of the military profession has turned into a new frame of reference, a different set of factors to be handled out in order to rethink the profession of arms. This new paradigm under which to consider the military role, and the professional military role in particular, has given rise to a new type of soldier, whose nature is going to receive a definite assessment within military sociological theory: the military peacekeeper.

From the Heroic Leader/Manager Officer to the Warrior/Peacekeeper Officer

The new type is not "new". As it happens many times, precursors can be found, and previous assessments of "new" problems are already at disposal. In 1976, Charles Moskos, in its *Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force*, presented his findings of an inquiry over attitudes and behaviours of the various national contingents serving in the United National peacekeeping forces in Cyprus (the UNFICYP) (Moskos 1976). In this pioneer research, Moskos explored attitudes toward change from soldiering to peacekeeping by means of interviews of officers and soldiers from Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, receiving from them the judgement that military professionalism was adequate also to the new tasks requested by peacekeeping missions. This is the frame where the statement "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it" shifted from "oral tradition" to written form. To that, Moskos added that "middle powers" officers could better adjust to the constabulary ethic, which he had defined previously as based on two core principles: *absolute minimal force* and *impartiality* (Moskos 1976).

But after that, the adequacy of military professionals to peacekeeping and other new missions has been submitted to many and highly diverse challenges, not last among them those coming from some side-effects of OOTW: peacekeeping multiple deployments' consequences on officers' and soldiers' careers, and

peacekeeping deployments' training and duties effects on combat readiness. The question was not, and it is not right now, whether the new officer should become a peacekeeper, thus definitely abandoning the Heroic leader pattern, but whether the new officer could be able to include the peacekeeper role within the range of professional tasks requested by the international geo-political situation. Even though it has been taken for granted that only soldiers can do peacekeeping, time and experience have shown that peacekeeping is not simply one task among the many assigned to the professional soldier of today. The emphasis given to appropriate training and attitudes' development by social scientists in more recent times is the demonstration that new missions have caused an unavoidable change in the ideal-type of the professional officer (and of the professional soldier in general as well!).

An empirical science as it continues to be, sociology, and military sociology in particular, draws **from** reality its objects of study, and draws **on** reality to find plausible explanations for events and phenomena. Thus, a general theory of the "officer as a peacekeeper" is far from been definitely assessed, but a wide range of empirical research is anyway at disposal, where empirical typologies and variables' lists are defined and employed.

There is a general agreement on some of the characteristics that peacekeeper should have, and a certain "conventionality" in addressing to similar references and literature when explaining one's findings and concepts. The starting point is normally the "constabulary concept" given by Janowitz, which is by no means considered out-of-date. Reed and Segal, in one of their last researches published in the 2000, make explicit reference to it, underlining the fact that, according to Janowitz, "…*with transforming the military profession into a constabulary force… the modern professional soldier must be able to maintain an effective balance among a number of different roles, and to do this, must develop more of the skills and orientations common to civilian managers*" (Reed and Segal 2000, p. 58).

The problem of preparing military personnel was depicted by Janowitz as the necessity to include in the career pattern "more extensive general competence from its military managers and more intensive scientific specialisation from its military technologists" (Janowitz 1960, p. 425). And Reed and Segal add that

> the prescribed career of the future should be one that sensitizes the professional soldier to the political and social consequences of military action and provides the military professional with a broad, strategic perspective of the entire range of the military spectrum. Under the constabulary model, the requirement for the military professional to be well-versed in political-military affairs is critical. (Reed and Segal 2000, p. 59)

When considering researches exploring attitudes toward OOTWS, it is evident that the "peacekeeping culture" has gained, or it is gaining, a definite status, not only in societies (western and westernised societies, I should say) and in the armed forces, but within military sociology as well. Thus, we already have general typologies where definitions of soldiers as peacekeepers are offered, and we can count empirical researches where possible strains and contradictions between the *culture of the warrior* and the *culture of the peacekeeper* become evident, or they are overcome, or simply juxtaposed and summed up.[14] While dichotomies seem to be largely overlapping, different terms are used, because each typology is actually more an empirical than a theoretical model, having been constructed on the basis of specific empirical findings.

And furthermore, typologies apply mainly to soldiers in general, since empirical research is normally bound to explore behaviours and orientations among deployed units at the troop level. Empirical distinctions are present in the sense that rank is one of the control (independent) variables used for data cross-tabulations,

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[14]We mention here only the most interesting contributions to the development of a "military peacekeeper" theory. Segal et al. (1984, 1998), Segal and Meeker (1985), Miller and Moskos (1995), Segal (1996), Battistelli (1997). On Italian units deployments see Ammendola (1999), Reed and Segal (2000).

but officers in themselves are not considered as a research target, with an exception about which an account will be given hereafter.

Attitudes toward peacekeeping are measured by means of various indicators, expressed as items of questionnaires where a certain comparability, and even re-iteration of the same instrument, is assured. Just to give some examples of surveys aiming at defining to various extent behaviours and orientations typical of military personnel deployed in OOTW, we can make reference here firstly to the here above cited survey on the effects of multiple deployments on U.S. soldiers, presented by Reed and Segal.

In this research, authors derive the constabulary ethic from the Moskos' work on UN peacekeepers, and variables are intended to measure the positive/negative attitudes of American soldiers with multiple deployments. Questionnaire's items are grouped into four categories, and each of them can be considered the empirical expression of a trait of the constabulary (or peacekeeping) ethic:

1. Impartiality and reduced Use of Force (the typical constabulary aspects);
2. Appropriateness of Alternative Personnel Resources (peacekeeping is/is not a soldier's job):
3. Unit Appropriateness and Career Enhancement (attitudes toward the specific peacekeeper role with respect to other more traditional soldiers' tasks);
4. Agreement/Disagreement on Providing Humanitarian Relief as a task for US Army (the idea of the protective attitude of the military peacekeeper).

The aim of this survey was to analyse not simply soldiers' attitudes toward peacekeeping operations, but also the impact of multiple deployment on these attitudes, soldiers' morale and reenlistment intentions. It is interesting for our purpose here to stress that the military peacekeeper is to a certain extent "typified" according to four dimensions, taken or adapted from previous literature on the subject.

The Military as a Formal Organisation

As already stated above, in the case of military profession, organisational processes can determine kind, contents and boundaries of the military professional activity, so that typical traits of the profession are hardly distinguishable from those relating to organisational position. It is not by chance then, that since the Sixties the organisational approach to armed forces develops, particularly in the United States, following theories and results stemming from research conducted in civilian formal organisations such as firms, hospitals, public bureaucracies and the like … Here the sociological tradition can be found in the continuities from *The American Soldier*, in its overall consideration of the military institution about which Edward Shils—whose contribution to research plans and implementation had been anyway relevant—said not to be considered as the mere accidental juxtaposition of thousands of primary groups, nor regulating its functioning, as Janowitz stated, according to soldiers' preferences,[15] as well as in the janowitzian theory of the convergence of military institutions with large civilian organisations. The organisational approach to armed forces is evidently nurtured by the development of organisational sociology, which follows to the progressive lessening of the Human Relations School. Organisational sociology stresses the relevance of factors conditioning motivations and behaviours, which seem to follow specific organisational rationalities, relatively independent from individual wills and manifest goals.

This approach can be considered as the most relevant and fruitful, also because of its capacity to include and integrate results stemming from research oriented to other areas, such as those here mentioned at point 4. Also in this case the distinction used above can be applied, dividing theories and models developed in the late-modern period and typologies set up for the understanding of the post-modern period.

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[15]Shils (1950, p. 19), Janowitz (1959, p. 26).

Theories and Models for the Military Organisation in the Late-Modern Period

The Institution/Occupation Model

The obligatory starting point is the Institution/Occupation (the well-known I/O) model proposed for the first time in 1977 by Moskos (1977). In this model a set of polarised empirical indicators is identified, ranging from an Institutional to an Occupational format of military organisation. Two **ideal types** of armed forces are defined, that can be considered to some extent as mutually exclusive, at least in the first proposal; after a great amount of discussion, even severe critics, and empirically research conducted in many different military organisations, the model has been re-proposed by Moskos himself with a new interpretation, considering the possibility of a "pluralist" military without a zero-sum game effect between the two polar models, in the sense that institutional and occupational traits can co-exist within a given military force, shaping differently among services, branches and echelons.[16]

The I/O model variables list is well known. Here a version is referred to in a somewhat different sequence, and considering anyway the last version proposed in 1986 (Table 3.1).

Moskos calls "institutional" a military "… legitimated in terms of values and norms: that is, a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favour of a presumed higher good" (Moskos 1986, p. 381), and presenting the below reported "institutional" modalities as far as roles, behaviours and relationships with parent society are concerned. This is mainly the traditional image of the military, here intended as a whole, including all ranks, thus avoiding the concept of "military professionalism" as limited to the officers corps. At the other side the "occupational" modalities can be found, where the main legitimacy source is the marketplace economy, and "supply and demand

rather than normative considerations are paramount … The occupational model implies a priority of self-interest rather than the interest of the employing organisation" (Moskos 1986, p. 379). Peculiarities are evident and shape the military "as any other job".

Since its first presentation in 1977, the I/O model has been so frequently considered, applied, tested and criticised that it has become more a classic frame of reference for conceptual definition than a ready-to-use set of indicators that can be used to measure the shift from one format to the other, as it was initially done. Moskos himself, taking into consideration the huge amount of research inspired by the I/O model, proposed an updating of the two ideal-types, underlining its capacity

> to allows us to move beyond the institutional versus occupational dichotomy to examine the different degrees of institutional and occupational aspects and see where they are in opposition to each other and where they are manifest jointly. Such a dynamic approach comprehends not merely an either-or situation, but a shifting constellation of institutional and occupational features in armed forces. (Moskos 1986, p. 382).

In the I/O model, modalities assumed by each variable are concurrent in the determination of the whole nature of military organisation, so that a specific military organisation could be put in an institutional/occupational **continuum** depending on the modality assumed by each variable.

These variables, however, do not have the same nature and the same **specific weight** to determine the position of a specific military organisation at a given point of the **continuum.** As Moskos himself underlines: "… military systems are differently shaped, depending upon a country's civil-military history, military traditions, and geopolitical positions. Moreover, I/O modalities will interface in different ways even within the same national military system. There will be differences between military services and between branches within them. I/O modalities may also vary along internal distinctions, such as those between officers, non-commissioned officers, and lower ranks; between draftees and volunteers; and so on." (Moskos 1986, p. 381).

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[16]Moskos (1985, pp. 67–89). Critics and redefinitions of the I/O model are presented in Nuciari (1984, pp. 75–80), (1985), Segal (1986, pp. 351–376).

Table 3.1 Military social organisation: institutional versus occupational

Variable	Institutional	Occupational
1. Legitimacy	Normative value	Marketplace economy
2. Role commitments	Diffuse	Specific
3. Basis of compensation	Rank and seniority	Skill level and manpower
4. Mode of compensation	Much in non-cash form or deferred	Salary and bonuses
5. Level of compensation	Decompressed, low recruit pay	Compressed, high recruit pay
6. Evaluation of performance	Holistic and qualitative	Segmental and quantitative
7. Legal system	Military justice	Civilian jurisprudence
8. Reference group	Vertical, within organisation	Horizontal, external to organisation
9. Societal regard	Esteem based on notion of service	Prestige based on level of compensation
10. Post-service status	Veteran's benefits and preference	Same as civilian
11. Residence	Adjacency of work and residence locales	Separation of work and residence locales
12. Spouse	Integrated with military community	Removed from military community

Note from Moskos (1986, pp. 377–82)

These variables, in fact, could be divided into **outer variables** and **inner variables** with respect to military system, in that some of them are linked to the type of society and are dependent upon the dominating cultural patterns and their change, while some other are peculiar to the military organisation and linked to cultural and organisational patterns typical of military institutions. We could generally refer to the former as **cultural,** and the latter as **subcultural**. Cultural variables such as *Legitimacy* and *Societal regard* are 'outer' in that their place of definition is the civil society and its institutionalised value patterns; structural variables such as *Basis, Mode and Level of compensation, Evaluation of performance, Legal system and Post-service status* are 'inner' in that they define performance rules, but they are anyway influenced by general norms of social regulation, so that they could be considered as 'boundary' subcultural variables; psycho-social variables such as *Role commitment* and *Reference group* are the 'inmost' subcultural variables, in that they are strongly influenced by peculiar military subcultural patterns; dailylife variables such as *Residence* and *Spouse Integration*, lastly, come directly from military subcultural pat-terns, which traditionally shape a strongly integrated community exercising wide-ranging control over members' activities and demanding obedience to community norms.

If we consider the I/O model as a kind of cybernetic model, acting diachronically, we could imagine a range of situations assigning I or O values to each variable, starting from the basic assumption that general society cultural patterns have an influence on military organisation inner patterns, so that a change in the former would cause a tension and a readjustment in the latter. Thus, a shifting from I to O modalities in var. 1 and 9 could cause tensions on 'peripheral' or 'boundary' variables [nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 10] forcing the institution to assume O modalities. Such a change means a noticeable situational change for the members of the organisation, who may suffer from the role identity inconsistency deriving from the contradiction between diffuse role commitment [I] and vertical reference group [I] and the new 'O-shaped' situation. The reaction could follow two different paths of re-adjustment: (a) assuming O modalities in role commitment and reference group [specific and horizontal respectively], followed, as a consequence, by the re-adjustment of dailylife variables [residence separated from workplace and

spouse removed from military community]; or (b) resisting change and trying to come back to I modalities in vars. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 [what it can cause internal conflicts among roles and ranks, owing the different advantages/disadvantages distribution coming from the shifting from I to O and any reverse movement], until the inconsistency between O patterns in cultural variables and I patterns in subcultural variables becomes a problem. This possibility is mentioned by Moskos when he says that "… There may even be trends toward 'reinstitutionalizing' the military, either across the board or in specific units" (Moskos 1986, p. 381).

The applicability of the I/O model has been tested in a wide range of empirical researches in many different military organisations all around the world, so that it has become a tool to measure not only the shift from one asset to another, rather a measure of the relative presence of organisational traits belonging to the institutional and/or the occupational pole in military forces of current times.

With regard to the janowitzian theory of the convergence between military and civilian organisations, the Moskos model is rather critical: if the fully institutional military is problematic because of its radical divergence from civil society, nevertheless its occupational side, if fully realised, bears strong risks of inadequacy and ineffectiveness for the specific function assigned to the military. As a consequence, the unavoidable specificity of the military organisation is reaffirmed, at least in some of its subsystems, whose maintenance of some institutional divergence from civil society is crucial for the very functional purpose assigned by the same civil society to armed forces.

To conclude with the examination of this model, its application could be adequate also to changes that occurred in the postmodern period, since these are changes in the definition of the spheres of critical relevance for the collective, which means a change in the legitimacy basis of different roles and in their social prestige as well. A change as such means a new pattern of legitimacy given to the military organisation, based not only on its conventional purpose but also

(and sometimes even more) on its "new" tasks. The new type of professional soldier, the "peacekeeper", opens to a partial 'reconstruction' of the role pattern, on the basis of different tasks contents, values and norms, both traditional and new, according to which Institutional and Occupational variables can be applied. And this is what it has been proposed by Moskos himself with a new typological framework, about which we shall discuss later in this paper.

Armed Forces as a Two-Subsystems Organisation. The Career Strategies Interactionist Model

With partly different factors, another model to explain structure and processes within military organisations is proposed in the same time period. It is worthwhile to mention it here, since for a number of years it has remained parallel to but relatively unknown with respect to the I/O model, notwithstanding its capacity to explain rightly the coexistence of the two patterns which Moskos had called as Institutional versus Occupational.

Proposed by a French sociologist, and officer as well, Jean-Paul Hubert Thomas, this model is known as the **four strategies model**. Here two analytical levels are present, the micro level, the actor, and the macro level, the system [the military organisation]. The two levels are considered in their interaction, seen as a strategic interaction between actor and system where both can define and redefine their intentions on the basis of a limited rationality linked to specific definite goals. The synchronic approach offered by Thomas[17] and confronted with the Moskos model by Boene (1984),[18] makes possible to consider **the different contents** defining military roles as the discriminative variable of **two different rationalities** within military organisations, linked to the different **kinds of goals** pursued.

The micro observation point is the individual and its career strategy, and the typology applies

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[17]Thomas (1981); see also Thomas and Rosenzveig (1982, pp. 275–301).

[18]Boene (1984, pp. 35–66). See also on the same subject Nuciari (1985).

to those who enter the institution as volunteer servants at various levels and specialities. Briefly, four career strategies are defined, that means four ideal types: (a) an **institutional strategy**, with longlasting or lifetime career, low task transferability to civilian life, inner reference group, dominating traditional military values and norms; (b) an **individual or industrial strategy**, with brief service in view of a second civilian career, high task transferability, outer reference group, dominating individualistic values; (c) a **communitarian or initiatory strategy**, with the choice of membership in small, exclusive and demanding communities such as commandos, parachuting, flying combat aircraft, marines, reference group restricted to the community, values and norms are those of the community's unwritten code; d] an **unstable or non-existent strategy**, with brief-term and erratic career orientation, no definite reference group or stable values.

To the above four strategies, empirically tested on a large NCOs sample, Boene affirms that a fifth type could be added, defined as **professional strategy**, with a strong initial and longlasting career involvement, high role commitment, ethical code based on the idea of service in favour of the collectivity, high level of expectations in terms of self-realisation and moral rewards; this fifth type could apply to the professional officer, thus making the model applicable to the whole military organisation.

The four or five strategies have varying degrees of congruence with the articulation of the system, considered at the second analytical level. Military organisation as a system is articulated into two subsystems with different rationalities: a **combat-oriented subsystem** and a **technical/administrative subsystem**. Both can be considered as two different types of conflicting logic of collective behaviour, operating simultaneously within military institution. The two subsystems have different functional goals, so that the combat-oriented subsystem is led by an essentially **ethical rationality** [even if combined with some instrumental logic], mainly turned to mission accomplishment without costs calculus, a kind of absolute thinking, an emphasis on the military uniqueness and on the officer/warrior, authoritarian organisational control styles, emphasis on rank and seniority. The technical/administrative subsystem is on the contrary entirely ruled by an **instrumental rationality**, turned to the optimisation of the primary task (that is the goal of the first subsystem). Legitimacy criterion is efficiency, negotiation and technical labour division prevail, hierarchical authority is tempered by collaborative outlook, innovation and out-referred orientation shape a role identity based on the pattern of the technician and of the manager.

The interaction between actor and system produces consistencies and inconsistencies depending on the type of strategy and subsystem: institutional and communitarian strategies are consistent and prevailing with the combat-oriented subsystem, while industrial strategy is more congruent with the other subsystem. The relationship could be reversed by saying that where an instrumental logic prevails, industrial strategies are considered more remunerative, while when the ethical logic is prevailing institutional strategies have higher consideration. The two rationalities are not anyway mutually exclusive, since both subsystems answer to different functional imperatives of the whole military system.

The professional strategy could be consistent with both subsystems: a lifetime career orientation, an ethical basis of role commitment are not in contrast with the logic of the combat-oriented subsystem, while specific and high knowledge and skill, professional peers-referred orientation, emphasis on efficiency and performance optimisation are characteristics peculiar to the professional orientation which are coherent with the instrumental logic of the technical/administrative subsystem.

What can be drawn from this model is, to conclude, the possibility of different individual behaviours interacting with the articulation of the military system, the prevailing of the one over the other being strictly dependent on the relative importance achieved by the rationality of one or the other subsystem at a given time.

Models of Military Organisations for the Post-cold War Era. From the Modern to the Postmodern Military

The end of bi-polar world, by adding new levels of complexity to the international arena, has given a new impulse to military sociologists in order to find some general trends and definitions adequate to understand changes occurring in military organisations as consequences of global situation following the fall of Berlin Wall.

In 1992, in a Workshop on Sociocultural Designs for the Future Army at the University of Maryland, Charles Moskos proposed for the first time a list of variables aiming to distinguish three time periods within this "brief century" (in the words of Eric Hobsbawn). These periods, or phases, were named then "Early Cold War", "Late Cold War", and "Post-Cold War", and were a first systematic tentative to clarify the changes undergoing in the American military organisation[19]. In a later version, published in 1994, Moskos presented a new list, where the periodisation has changed names, not simply because of a nominalistic choice, but because a somewhat different frame of reference was adopted to distinguish changes in the armed forces (Moskos and Burk 1994). Military variables taken under observation were fewer than in the first version: the perceived threat, the structure of force, the orientation of the public opinion toward the military, the impact on defence budget, the main organisational tensions, the dominant military professional pattern, the number of civilian employees, the women's role in the military, the role of military spouse within the military community, the position of homosexuals in the military, the mode of treating conscientious objection. The distinction into three periods, respectively named Early Modern (corresponding to the first version Pre-Cold War), Late Modern (Cold War), and Postmodern (Post-Cold War), is now determined by the choice to consider undergoing changes in

military institutions under a historical perspective. Moskos and Burk address the topic in this way:

> Students of military history have never embraced the stereotypical view that modern military organisation is a rigid, hierarchical, and unchanging bureaucracy… The history of modern military organisation is a history of flux. The critical problem for historians and social scientists and for policy makers is to discern the underlying patterns of change and their significance for defining the military social's role, and evaluating its capacity for fighting wars. (Moskos and Burk 1994, p. 141)

In order to ascertain these patterns of change, authors continue by stressing the fact that no explanation is possible by means of a unique cause, so that many factors of different nature should be taken into consideration under a systemic perspective:

> For this purpose, we undertake a systemic institutional analysis, a perspective that tries to account for the organisational importance of long-term historical developments. (Moskos and Burk 1994, pp. 141–142).

Taking Harold Lasswell's "garrison state" model as a reference, Moskos and Burk intend to identify critical periods of transition in military organisation, in order to understand "*whether now is another similar period of transition and, if so, what is the new idea of military organisation and purpose*" (Moskos and Burk 1994, p. 142). And they continue:

> Our working hypothesis is that we are indeed in a period of transition away from the 'modern' mass army, characteristic of the age of nationalism, to a 'postmodern' military, adapted to a newly forming world-system in which nationalism is constrained by the rise of global social organisations. Much of our analysis will consist of a comparison of these two types of military organisations along a variety of dimensions (Moskos and Burk 1994, p. 142).

These dimensions are defined in order to give evidence to the main phenomena affecting armed forces in current times, which can be considered both as "new" and as "occurring under different forms" with respect to the past. Changes in military organisation are seen as affected (if not simply 'determined') by changes in social organisation, so that specific type of military

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[19]Moskos (1992).

organisations could be distinguished according to specific historical periods.

Moskos and Burk "posit three type of relations between the military and society". The first, called the *modern type*, defines the situation as it was since the end of eighteenth century to the end of the Second World War, that is, the social organisation corresponding to the birth and consolidation of the Nation-State; the mass army was the corresponding military organisation in all that period. The second type of military-society relation is named *postmodern*, it emerges in present days, after 1989, and it is considered to "persist into the indefinite future"; its corresponding military organisation is exactly the topic under discussion, considered not fully realised. The third type is added to better enlighten the transition from the modern to the postmodern type, and it is called *late modern* type, dating from the end of World War II to early 1990. Authors are aware that their proposal is drawn from historical experience of Western world—and of United States in particular I would add—so they try to keep patterns' dimensions in a form suitable for cross-cultural application.

In this version, the eleven variables under examination and their modalities in each of the three types of military-society relations are presented in Table 3.2.

A slightly different and, in my knowledge, last version of this model has been published in the 2000 in a volume whose goal was rightly the cross-cultural application of the model itself. In this renewed version, variables are always eleven, but some have disappeared while some other have been added (Moskos et al. 2000).

The evaluation of the impact on Defence budget and Organisational tension are no more considered, but a Major Mission Definition and a Media relations variables have been entered. In the same Table 3.2, the last version is presented, and the two old variables are added at the end in italics.

Moskos defines this typology as developmental:

A developmental construct posits an ideal-type at some point by which past and present trends can be identified and appraised. The Postmodern military is a developmental construct based on the observation of the past. What is presented is a model, not a prophecy, and may help explain what has happened and predict what is likely to happen.[20]

Looking at the variables contained in the model, they are of different nature, and pertain to the military organisation and to the civil society as well. The model, actually, is bound to give evidence not of the changes within one single actor (the military on the one side, or the society on the other), but of the changes in the system formed by armed forces and society, that is in the special set of relationships binding a society with its military. We could say then, that some variables pertains to the society, in the sense that society is the place where their modalities are shaped, and some other pertains to the military, in the sense that the military is the place where their modalities are shaped. Variables **pertaining to the society** are the following:

- **the nature of the perceived threat**, shaped by cultural values and orientations and by the relative position of the national society in the international context;
- **the force structure**, conscription or AVF and force size are decided in the society;
- **the major mission definition**, is partly derived from the perceived threat, and it is culturally legitimated by the parent society;
- **the public attitude toward the military**, comes evidently from the societal values and orientations toward military organisation and military affairs.
- **Conscientious objection** depends on cultural values of the society and on formal norms ruling the phenomenon.

Variables **pertaining to the military** are the following:

- **the dominant military professional**, while determined by societal variables, it is anyway constructed within the military organisation;

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[20]Moskos (2000, p. 14).

Table 3.2 Armed forces and postmodern society (Moskos, Williams, Segal, p. 15)

Armed forces variables	Early modern (Pre-Cold War) 1900–1945	Late modern (Cold War) 1945–1990	Postmodern (Post-Cold War) Since 1990
Perceived threat	Enemy invasion	Nuclear war	Subnational (e.g. Ethnic violence, terrorism)
Force structure	Mass army	Large professional army	Small professional army
Major mission definition	Defence of homeland	Support of alliance	New missions (e.g., peacekeeping, humanitarian)
Dominant military professional	Combat leader	Manager or technician	Soldier-statesmen; soldier-scholar
Public attitude toward military	Supportive	Ambivalent	Skeptical or apathetic indifferent
Media relations	Incorporated	Manipulated	Courted
Civilian employees	Minor component	Medium component	Major component
Women's role	Separate corps or excluded	Partial integration	Full integration
Spouse and military community	Integral part	Partial	Removed
Homosexuals in the military	Punished	Discharged	Accepted
Conscientious objection	Limited or prohibited	Permitted on routine basis	Subsumed under civilian service
Impact on defense budget	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Organisational tension	Service roles	Budget fights	New missions

- **the media relations,** are defined within the military as far as means and rules are concerned;
- **the number of civilian employees** depends on the *make or buy* strategy chosen by armed forces to cope with budgetary restriction and rationalisation of resource allocation.

The remaining variables (women's role, spouse position in the military and homosexuals' acceptance) are to my opinion strongly dependent on changes in the society, but changes in their modalities must cope more then other aspects with structural as well as cultural patterns shaping the military organisation. This is the reason why I would consider these variables as **pertaining both to the society and to the military**.

The application of this model to a variety of national *society and military systems* have made clear its usefulness at a comparative level, since situations are very different in the various western countries where the model has been applied. The impact of specific historic and cultural factors is evident in the different stages at which each variable is found in the investigated countries.[21] Even though some general trends are evident, such as the postmodern nature of the perceived threat, the major mission firmly and increasingly defined by operations other than war, the structure of force shifting from conscription (the mass army of the Modern type) to the professional military on a voluntary basis, the acceptance of conscientious objection to military service or the entry of women as soldiers, there is a differentiated situation in many countries. Modern as well as Late modern coexist with Postmodern

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[21]Country studies comprised in the volume are: United States, United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Israel, South Africa.

characteristics, and this is the demonstration that the process of change has a discontinuous nature. The set of variables of the Postmodern set shapes the future, or at least one possible (and plausible) future, but this is not a unilinear path.

The fact that many among the countries where the model was tested show an apparent contradiction in the co-existence of characteristics belonging to the three periods means that the three military and society systems are not mutually exclusive nor sequentially determined: each modality assumed by each variable is influenced by history and culture on the one side, and by the choices of decision-makers at any level on the other. But the coexistence of a number of traits belonging to the same pattern is an evidence of the fact that some variables are internally linked and conditioning each other: a certain perception of threat is logically (and also empirically) related to the force structure and to the major mission of a given military institution, and induce changes in the dominant military professional and also in the civilian employees component. Other variables are not necessarily linked, such as the position of spouse, attitudes of publics toward the military, or the acceptance of homosexuals, and can vary greatly among countries where the other characters become similar.

The model has a good descriptive capacity, and it keeps under control the number of elements giving to each of them a clear definition; on the side of cross-cultural studies, it has proved its usefulness for the comparison of different military and society systems, a thing of great importance in a time frame where globalisation, far from homologate societies, cultures and—consequently—armed forces, creates new needs for a greater ability to cooperate among diversities for shared goals.

The Model of the Flexible Soldier

Another attempt to distinguish a "peacekeeper" type of soldier by means of empirical findings has been done in a cross-cultural expert-survey where samples of officers from nine countries,

with various experience of OOTW, were asked to evaluate their preparedness for non traditional missions, difficulties encountered and adjustment, stress and job satisfaction derived from these deployments.[22] In a chapter of the volume (Caforio 2001), dealing with difficulties and adjustment of officers in their relationships with various actors and agencies active in the many and different deployment's theatres, I have made an attempt to demonstrate, on the basis of empirical findings, two hypotheses internally related: the first proposition indicates a relationship according to which military culture (better, the conception of military professional embraced by officers) in the various national units involved in OOTW has an influence, among other aspects, on the ability of officers (in this specific case) to cope with commitments and expectations coming from a complex and often uncertain role set, composed by the many and various non military actors observed on the operation theatre.[23]

Also in this case, an empirical typology has been drawn from data coming from a questionnaire: a distinction has been made between *Warriors* and *Peacekeepers*, built from questions already used in defining the "good officer" ideal-type in a previous comparative research (Caforio and Nuciari 1994), corrected by the introduction of elements taken from this specific questionnaire.[24] The hypothesis is that officers showing a professional orientation more inclined toward the type of the "warrior", or more inclined toward the type of the "peacekeeper", have different reactions to the variety of expectations coming from their role set in MOOTW theatres; in particular, "warriors" could find more difficulties in managing with diversity and

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[22]Complete research results are published in the volume edited by Caforio (2001).

[23]Nuciari (2001, pp. 61–88).

[24]See on this Nuciari (2007, pp. 25–53). In the three-type typology, Warriors are those selecting 4 or 5 items from the "warrior list" and "NO" in the last cell; Peacekeepers are those selecting 4 or 5 items from the "peacekeeper list" and "YES" in the last cell. The third type, Flexible, is formed by those selecting 3 items on the one and 2 items on the other list (and the opposite), and "YES" or "NO" in the last cell.

environment turbulence (many different actors, uncertainty of end-states, mandate ambiguities and the like…), while "peacekeepers" could feel more at ease with flexibility and cooperative non-hierarchical relationships.

The typology is formed by three types: the **Warrior,** the **Peacekeeper**, and a third type, provisionally called **In-between** but finally defined as **Flexible.** It has been defined by assuming that each of the two "pure" types can be indicated by the choice of a certain mix of attributes pertaining to the "good officer" pattern (Table 3.3): for the "warrior" type, typical attributes are discipline, action readiness, decisiveness, leadership, obedience, patriotism, readiness to make sacrifices, ability to undergo physical stress, loyalty to the civil power, and a rather negative attitude toward MOOTW, considering them as not "a normal job" for a soldier. For the "peacekeeper" type, typical attributes are: empathy, expertise, cooperativeness, open-mindedness, determination, general education, sense of responsibility, sociability (ability to easily make friends), mental strength, and a positive attitude toward MOOTW, considered as normal part of a soldier's job. The third type, the Flexible Officer, is not simply a mid-way pattern, and it should not be considered as a transitional figure: it is on the contrary the empirical evidence of that "flexible" type of soldier who has to cope with a job that "it is not a soldiers' job, but only a soldier can do it".

In our sample, peacekeepers were more common than warriors (38% against 24% of warriors), and another 38% can be classified as Flexible. Countries where peacekeepers are the majority are Hungary, Sweden, Poland and France, and the minimum is among officers from USA, South Africa and Italy; Bulgaria and Russia (37%) are slightly under the sample average.

To a certain extent, these findings go in the same direction as in other researches, at least for cases where a comparison is possible. This means also that we can rely upon the plausibility of our typology.

Looking at the total sample, the distinctiveness given by the typology is rather sharp, and according to country we can see cases where a Flexible (Bulgaria, Russia, South Africa and Hungary) or a Peacekeeper outlook (Italy) seems to be more adequate in reducing, if not difficulties as such, at least their perception as problems. In the other four countries, anyway, the winning strategy seems to be that of the warrior (France, Poland, Sweden and USA).

To a certain extent, it seems that the better pattern is the "Flexible" type of officer, who is not someone in the middle, unable to decide what to do or what to be, but a professional able to combine different qualities, some of them pertaining to the warrior model, some other to the peacekeeper model, in order to adapt his/her performance to the uncertain and variable requests coming from a turbulent environment as the OOTW theatre often it happens to be. Our first hypothesis can be considered confirmed, in that the type of military culture is able to influence the military/civilians relationships in the expected sense: officers declaring less difficulties with civilians are mainly those with a Flexible or a peacekeeper outlook.

But a question remains: is there a chance that the Warrior or Peacekeeper outlook be influenced by the very experience of these unconventional missions? Can we speak of an adaptive process, or better of a learning process, so that, even though mission exposure does not really affect the ability to cope with different actors in the theatre, it anyway affects the shift from a warfighter mind to that of a true peacekeeper? This was the content of our second hypothesis. From findings there is evidence that Length of deployment and Variety of Missions experience are able to influence at least the cultural framework of officers: a shifting from the Warrior outlook to the Flexible to the Peacekeeper type seems to go along the same direction of an increased and prolonged experience of Operations other than war, indicating to a certain extent the adjustment of officers to a new definition of their professional role.

The relationship between the kind and the time of deployment with the cultural pattern of officers in our sample seems to go in the expected direction, while in a rather tortuous way:

Table 3.3 The typology warrior/peacekeeper

Warrior	Peacekeeper
Discipline	Determination
To be fit for action	Empathy
Decisiveness	Expertise
Leadership	Ability to easily make friends
Obedience	Cooperativeness
Ability to undergo physical stress	Mental strength
Patriotism	General education
Readiness to make sacrifices	Open-mindedness
Loyalty to the civil power	Taking responsibility
OOTW are NOT a natural part of the military's role	OOTW are a natural part of the military's role

experience acquired in MOOTW is able to affect the military ideal-type, giving room to more flexible and adaptive patterns in the definition of the "good" officer.

How useful, and to what extent, are the above findings for the very pragmatic question of education and training of officers for operations other than war? According to our data, we can say that military culture affects the ability to cope with an uncertain and differentiated theatre where many different actors are present, especially when they are civilians; we have used here the concept of *diversity* to distinguish five different types of differences characterising the nature of the operations other than war. The five general categories of diversity are the following:

1. Diversity as for the military mission itself: MOOTWs are not combat operations, they are something different;
2. Diversity as for the MOOTWs: many different operations are included under this acronym;
3. Diversity as for uncertainty and predictability: mission tempo, mission effectiveness, public opinion moods at every moment;
4. Diversity as for the multinational forces deployed: different nationalities and military cultures must cooperate; different rules and resources are confronted;
5. Diversity as for the operation theatre: many various actors are present (civilians such as

local population, refugees, fighting factions, local politicians, international and NGO officials and members, media representatives …).

To the five types of diversity, five different types of military culture are pertinent. To each category of diversity, in fact, a peculiar 'cultural structure' is pertinent, and a specific kind of skill is required. These categories should be taken as 'levels' at which diversity must be considered: they are not found in the real world as singular elements, following to a certain extent a parallel feature, but as a complex of sequential elements, from the general to the particular, implying also a sort of interconnection among different levels.

It is possible to follow the five-type model also for cultural framework diversity, for difficulties/stress and adjustment types, for educational needs and new skills required, to see how difficulties encountered by officers of the various countries are linked to their diversity in military culture and in formal education. Furthermore, we can say that military culture is affected by the mix of experience acquired by officers, and it is pushed to go in a direction where a mixed, flexible, or definitely "peacekeeper" pattern is prevailing.

An educational path adequate to the non conventional operative theatres should then be oriented to reinforce these attitudes, reducing without eliminating the warrior-like attitudes: wishing to give a synthetic form to this

Table 3.4 Diversities, military cultures, difficulties and new skills for MOOTWs

Diversity types	Cultural diversity	Prevailing military culture	Encountered difficulties	Required skills	Educational fields
1. Military missions	Combat or OOTW	Warrior or peacekeeper	Two opposing role patterns	Political education and sensitivity	Political science international relations International LAW Contemporary history
2. Within MOOTWs	Various types of mission	Ambiguity (warrior and peacekeeper)	Blurring role Roles ambiguities	Uncertainty acceptance Flexible orientation	Uncertainty Management
3. Within the mission itself	Uncertainty and predictability level	Flexible to adapt to a turbulent environment	Motivations at risk Mission unclear in goals and effectiveness	Mission understanding and motivational leadership	Group and work socio-psychology Human resources management
4. Within multinational deployed forces	Norms, values, size, equipment, national military cultures	Intercultural encounters Cooperative ad adaptive culture	Communication Cooperation Divided loyalties	Group thinking Cooperative orientation Teamwork Cosmopolitan orientation	Communication techniques Teamwork training
5. Within the operation theatre	Cultural variety of civilian actors	Intercultural relations open orientation to minimize cultural shock	Communication Understanding cultural differences Opportunistic behaviors	Crosscultural management Ability to solve role conflicts Cultural relativism acceptance	Crosscultural management techniques Sociology cultural anthropology Problem solving and decision-making techniques

Source Nuciari (2007, p. 49)

discussion, a Chart of Diversities and educational adaptation for MOOTWs was proposed (see Table 3.4), where for every type of diversity a specific cultural framework can be found, more or less characterised by diversity; a certain type of military culture is prevailing or more adequate, and some educational fields should be improved, mainly in the rather long period of basic professional education (within the Military Academies).

A simple list could be enough: political science, international relations, general sociology, cultural anthropology, contemporary history, all these subjects permits to cope better with the first and the second level of diversity mentioned above; communication techniques, mass media culture, public opinion understanding, international law, cross-cultural knowledge, cross-cultural management techniques, problem solving and decision-making, social psychology, all these can help in coping with diversities of the third, fourth and fifth level.

The list appears to be rather long, but it is by no means a mere inventory of humanities. Looking again at findings of the cross-national expert survey on the Flexible Officer, respondents gave specific indications about educational needs required by MOOTWs on the basis of their direct and empirical experience (Caforio 2001, p. 18), as it is shown also by Caforio here in Chap. 14. When peculiar difficulties are encountered, then specific skills are required and educational fields are asked (or should be anyway) to be improved or introduced into the formal professional education of officers for Military Operations Other Than War.[25]

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[25]Marina Nuciari, *Coping with Diversity*, cited, p. 49.

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Comparative Systems of Analysis: Military Sociology in the United States and Europe

4

Tyler Crabb and David R. Segal

Introduction

This chapter compares developments in American and European military sociology across five dimensions and three regions. The first dimension is the institutional basis for research into military sociology. This varies across all cases considered, but there is always some relationship between the military and academics at the core. The second dimension is the nature of the military profession. Debates about the changing nature of the military profession have animated military sociology over the past half-century. Included in this consideration are issues of civil-military relations: how autonomous should the military be from the society and state it defends? Civil-military relations have been quite stable in the United States and Western Europe for the past half-century, but Eastern Europe has undergone massive transformations in recent decades. The relationship between military, state, and society has varied massively from those states that peacefully transitioned to democracy and those that were dismembered violently. The third dimension is the end of conscription. The United States and nearly every European country have ended regular conscription, with deep consequences to the meaning of military service. Today's armies are composed of skilled professionals, not citizens' in arms, which makes them particularly suited to the complicated, expeditionary missions that characterize the post-Cold War period. The fourth dimension, the internationalization of military forces, and the fifth dimension, the transition away from conventional war to 'new missions' of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance are components of the postmodern military condition. As there is less scholarship available on these themes in postcommunist Eastern Europe, we treat these cases in a separate section at the end of the chapter.

Military sociology has developed in different institutional spaces across the cases considered. Research in this field has been often hampered by a mutual suspicion between the military and sociologists. But certain institutional arrangements have developed to advance this field. There are academic journals and working groups devoted to the study of military sociology. Military academies and research centers have funded much research. We present information about these bases for research to provide a historical account, not to explain any systematic variation in the way military sociology has advanced. As Caforio demonstrates in the introduction to this volume, the sociology of the military is an interdisciplinary project. Political scientists, economists, and military officers have all contributed to the work we describe.

T. Crabb · D. R. Segal (✉)
Department of Sociology, The University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-1315, USA
e-mail: dsegal@umd.edu

The military profession has been a key consideration since the beginning of military sociology. There are two main topics considered under the rubric of military professionalism: the nature of the military organization and its relationship with the broader political and social institutions (civil-military relations). The origins of this analysis are covered by Caforio's introduction to this volume. In Western Europe, the relationship between the state and military has been fairly stable over the past 60 years, but the East has undergone massive transformations in the past quarter century.

Conscription has ended in most western countries. The beginning of conscription was associated with the massive political transformations at the beginning of the modern era. The democratic revolutions forged a new relationship between citizens, military service, and the state. The debates surrounding the end of conscription highlight the meaning of military service in the twentieth century. Is military service the duty of a citizen or an employment opportunity similar to any other?

We examine each of these topics across three regions. The first is the United States. We use the United States as a reference point, so that differences from the U.S. experience are brought into the foreground. We do this for three basic reasons. First, the U.S. is the case most familiar to the authors, so focusing on the contours of U.S. military sociology provides a useful framework to organize this chapter. Modern military sociology developed first in the United States, and in many ways, it is the most developed. Early European military sociologists looked to the United States' history to find theoretical and methodological tools to analyze their own societies. Second, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has had major orienting points during and after the Cold War. In these situations, western militaries transformed their capacities to fit into a broader NATO oriented collective defense. Postcommunist countries had additional political considerations included to qualify for membership. In both of these processes, the United States' military was a central pillar orienting these transformations. Third, we consider the transition from a conscript to a volunteer force to be the major transformation in Western European and U.S. militaries in recent decades. The Institutional-Occupational model, which emerged to explain the consequences of the end of the draft, may be the most studied idea in military sociology (Moskos 1977; Siebold 2001). Professionalism is the only topic that rivals the Institutional-Occupational model in salience, and the foundations of sociological theories of military professionalism are also in the United States (Caforio this volume; Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960). This intellectual apparatus has guided policy makers and researchers in many European countries.

There are several nations which are omitted from this analysis by their geography alone. Australia, Canada, and Israel, for instance, are occidental in every way but their geography excludes them from the scope of this research. Israel has a particularly vibrant tradition of military sociology that interested readers may want to consider (e.g. Gal 1986; Cohen 1995).

Institutional Basis for Research

Military sociology has enjoyed a stronger position within the discipline of sociology in the United States than in Europe. European research has often been conducted through centers, sometime enjoying official support from the military. Mutual suspicion between sociologists and military professionals has hampered research on both sides of the Atlantic, but this has been a particular problem in Western Europe (Boëne 2014). In Eastern Europe, communism allowed for very little independent social analysis. Russia allowed official research into military sociology beginning in the 1960s (Obraztsov 2009), but most Eastern European societies have only developed military sociology programs in the last two decades.

Military sociology has developed through several organs in the United States and Europe. Psychology was the first social science to undertake research on and for the military, starting in World War I. However, the Society

for Military Psychology was not established until 1945, as Division 19 of the American Psychological Association (APA). The Society's journal, *Military Psychology*, began publication in 1989, and has published research by American and European sociologists who represent a social psychological perspective. The American Sociological Association, by contrast, eschewed the study of war and the military, and did not (reluctantly) establish its Section on Peace, War and Social Conflict until 1979, in the wake of the turmoil produced by the Vietnam War.

In 1960 the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society (IUS) had been established by Morris Janowitz as a small seminar at the University of Michigan. Janowitz moved to the University of Chicago shortly thereafter, and the IUS has evolved as the major international and interdisciplinary learned society concerned with the military. It began publishing its quarterly journal, *Armed Forces & Society*, in 1974. A year earlier, an independent biannual journal, *Journal of Political and Military Sociology,* began publication. *Political and Military Sociology* continues to publish and has since become a research annual.

In 1964, Janowitz had convened a conference in London, sponsored by the IUS and the Research Committee on Political Sociology of the International Sociological Association (ISA), bringing European and American military sociologists together for the first time. By 1970, at ISA's VII World Congress of Sociology in Varna, Bulgaria, this group had evolved into the ISA Research Committee on Armed Forces & Society. In 1980, it was broadened into the Research Committee on Armed Forces & Conflict Resolution.

In 1988, a group of European military sociologists convened in Vienna and, concerned with American hegemony in IUS, formed the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS), which originally was open only to Europeans. Relations between IUS and ERGOMAS have since become cooperative and collaborative, with many scholars belonging to both. In 2014, ERGOMAS affiliated with *Res Militaris*, an on-line bilingual European journal

of military studies which, despite its designation, publishes research by military sociologists from all continents.

Military sociology has been hampered, at times, by a mutual distrust between sociologists and the military. Dandeker (1994) articulates the case in Britain. The enduring distaste for military study in sociology and related disciplines may be related to some aspects of British identity. British localism and a distrust of centralized government capacities, which the armed forces necessarily represent, is one potential source of this antipathy. Another is in the self-conception of the British as liberal and supportive of free markets, unlike their historical European rivals who were understood to be authoritarian and militaristic. This perspective provides a cultural explanation for British ascendance in the 18th and 19th centuries, conveniently erasing the military and economic underpinnings of this power. The British Army's role during colonialism was often far from the public view, fighting small wars on the far side of the world. The marginal position of the army during the British Empire is apparent especially in contrast to the Royal Navy—a ship lost to hostile forces was economic news, while a soldier lost in Afghanistan was of significance only to immediate family (Downs 1988). The major theories driving sociological research in Britain were both heavily economic and viewed military events as by-products of more important social forces, not worthy of study per se.

This distrust of the military by sociologists was reciprocated. Military elites accused sociology of ahistorical, insensitive analysis in the search for general laws; this search produces obvious statements cloaked in obfuscating jargon. According to this critique, sociology was too mired in pacifist ideology to provide analysis of any merit on the military.

Military sociology was established after World War Two in Germany. Like most of Europe, American sociological models were the basis for early German military sociology; Janowitz's work had a particularly notable influence. The Germany military has, since its reinvention in 1955, been conscientiously cultivating civilian control and democratic norms into

the military. The Bundeswehr's ethos is very similar to that of a constabulary force.

Research centers, rather than university departments, have been the main site of advances in German military sociology. Several of the most important of these centers (e.g. Institute for Empirical Research, System Research, and German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research) were funded by the German military. Publicly funded foundations, generally associated with a German political party, occasionally undertake military sociological research. The work accomplished in these centers was not limited to applied research directed at immediate military problems, but engaged in basic, theory driven research about the relationship between military and society. The productivity of these centers is not mirrored in civilian sociology. As of 2000, there were no research groups or sections focused on military sociology in any major German sociological association. There we no sociological journals devoted to the study of the military (Klein 2000).

Klein (2000) suggests that this lack of attention can be explained by the dynamics of the sociological profession in Germany, the opaque and specialized nature of the military profession, and the divergences between them. A German sociologist is vulnerable to several critiques within her profession if she chooses to study the military. As it is a small field, she may be accused of choosing a field where there is little competition. The sociologist could also be accused of uncritically supporting the military, enhancing their efficiency through social research. Also, the relative low-status of military service may rub off onto the researcher. The military profession is increasingly specialized, requiring a long period of familiarization, which discourages both researchers and those who commission research. There can be difficulty communicating between these two professions, with the soldier preferring unambiguous, task oriented statements while the sociologist requires more complicated approaches.

France had a central role in the founding of sociology, and several of these early French sociologists considered the military a vestigial institution mostly irrelevant in market society (Comte 1957) or noted the limited wars and militarism of democratic society (de Tocqueville 1863). So long as French sociologists were primarily concerned with grand theorizing following these classical traditions, there was little purpose or benefit to engage with the military. The development of French military sociology was a deeply influenced by the broader political trends, particularly the increasingly problematic nature of civil-military relations following the defeat in Algeria and attempted coup which followed it. French military sociology developed quickly in the 1960s and 1970s, but it did so largely outside of the military institution.

Martin (2000) identifies two domains within French military sociology: organizational and individual. The organizational concerns included: the role of perennial conscription, and indeed the transition away from the mass army, the degree of convergence between the military and civilian society, organizational questions such as discipline, control, or the changing roles of the military, and the changing missions and roles of the military. Sociological research aimed at a more individual level included: motivation and career development, the recruitment of military personnel and demographic differences between branches. This flowering of research was hampered by a lack of unity; no dominant methodological or theoretical themes developed. Most of this work was done in specialist journals, and rather narrowly focused on the French case to the detriment of historical research.

Teaching sociology in French military academies was not seriously considered until 1982. There have been several hopeful moments, generally during periods of crisis, but these were not institutionalized. Key elements of the American School, particularly Stouffer's work, were incorporated by psychologists. During the period of crisis surrounding the end of colonialism and defeats in Indochina and Algeria, some elite French historians started to build sociological works analyzing the institutional roots and consequences of this transformation (Boëne 2008).

It was in the early 1980s that several reforms made space for the incorporation of sociology in

the main French academy Saint-Cyr. The course of study was expanded from two to three years and more time was allocated for academic training. These Janowitzian reforms sought to bring officers closer to their civilian peers by providing a broader knowledge about the economic and social dimensions of the military. Older officers, who associated sociology with the political instability and anti-militarism of the 1960s, held a deep reservation about these reforms. But the committee which oversaw these reforms was composed of both general officers and elite civilian university leaders. The most junior member of that committee, Bernard Boëne, had written extensively on the development of military sociology in the United States and influenced the direction of many of the reports produced.

Three initial courses were offered in sociology: general sociology, military sociology, and human resource management. The military sociology course was constructed around Stouffer's *American Soldier*. Over the next few decades, a greater amount of military sociology work became available in France, and so the military sociology curriculum became more diverse. The end of conscription influenced the teaching of sociology at Saint-Cyr because drafted graduate students had commonly served as teaching assistants. With the end of conscription, the faculty also had to be professionalized. The cadet's enthusiasm for sociology varied, largely consistent with specialty; some cadets preferred an external, international relations focus while others gladly took to sociology. In the early 2000s, another set of reforms tied the academic and military portions of the curriculum closer together. This move was thought to be necessary owing to the complexity of the new missions. However, by 2006, another set of changes forced a greater specialization and reduction in hours of instruction, which has resulted in a less influential department of sociology (Boëne 2008).

Despite a promising start to the century, the fascist period stifled the development of military sociology in Italy. Much of the research conducted in Italy in the third quarter of the 20th

century was too mired in political ideology and mutual suspicion to make much progress. A leftist research agenda focused on the incompatibility of military and democratic social forms. The military responded to this critique with closure, meaning that all research conducted on the military was done without official permission or support. This hostility waned in the end of the 1980s, and the Military Center for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) was founded as an official center for social research on the military. This center focused on building links between the military and interested external researchers, while publishing scholarly work and advising the defense establishment (Caforio and Nuciari 2000).

Opinion research concerning the motivations and conditions of service members was the main work for the first few years of CeMiSS. The founding of ERGOMAS helped Italian researchers to move beyond models built by American sociologists. It also allowed Italian researchers to encounter empirical concerns outside their own borders. With the support of ERGOMAS, Italian researchers conducted several cross national studies throughout the 1990s. Caforio (1997) suggests that a proliferation of Italian social research is evidence of a decreased level of mutual suspicion between the military and civilian society and a Janowitizian convergence.

The Netherlands have had a large impact on military sociology for a smaller country. This has largely been to the credit of a few highly motivated individuals, particularly van Doorn, who bridged the gap between American military sociology and the Dutch defense establishment (Moelker et al. 2009). This work began in the 1960s, with only a short delay between the development of The American School and Dutch sociology (Soeters 2000).

As with many other aspects of military sociology, The Netherlands were among the first countries to introduce sociology into the Royal Netherlands Military Academy in the 1960s. Jacques van Doorn was the first full professor of military sociology. Social topics had been taught earlier, starting in the 1920s, but sociology became a strong, stand-alone discipline in the Dutch academy in the 1960s and 70s. In the

most recent decades, the curriculum has transitioned to a more integrated, interdisciplinary approach. The earlier courses were designed to help officers, who were overwhelmingly from upper class backgrounds, understand their subordinates (Moelker and Soeters 2008).

During the early Cold War, sociologists taught both at military academies and courses on military sociology at civilian universities. Some early work highlighted the Dutch military as a precursor to scientific management and industrial society. The turmoil of the 1960s brought greater attention to comparative political sociology (to better understand the Soviet system) and youth sociology (to better understand the conscripts). Attention shifted to group concerns, like cohesion and morale. After the end of the Cold War, the Dutch transition to the new missions was accompanied by an expansion in the social and behavioral faculty at the university. The style of education was also changed, focusing on applied problems where students must draw on interdisciplinary knowledge. Sociology is still taught, but not in stand-alone classes; sociological themes are combined with other disciplines and then applied to actual problems (Moelker and Soeters 2008).

Military sociology, whether it is practiced in a university or within the defense establishment, depends upon an intellectual freedom, an ability to investigate potentially unpopular topics and produce findings which may not be in line with preferred policies. This sort of intellectual freedom was generally not present in Eastern Europe under communism, so developing some basis for military sociology was among the tasks necessary to manage the transition. A similar interruption occurred in Italy during the Fascist period. The developments of Eastern Europe are revolutionary compared to the evolutionary development of western military sociology. The collapse of communism meant that both the classic concerns of civil military relations and the nature of the military profession had to be radically reconsidered at the same time as postmodern challenges. The developments which took Western sociology the second half of the

twentieth century had to be accomplished in the last 30 years. They were faced with reforming civil-military relations, professionalism, finding a purpose (internal policing, territorial defense or expeditionary), developing a politically loyal officer corps, and finding a new organizational ethos. There is an added problem in Eastern Europe, which is the need to develop officers committed to democracy and purge communists without undermining military capacity.

Segal and Ender (2008) identified six cross-national trends in sociology in military academies: stigma, cannibalization, co-optation, charismatic leadership, radical social change, and revitalization. As we have noted several times, there is an ongoing tension between sociologists and military officers; academies are not an exception to this general trend. In France, this trend has subsided a bit, but it remains across nearly every other country. Perhaps owing to this stigma, sociology content and courses are commonly taught under other disciplines: international relations, management, or psychology. Even if entire courses are not taken, sociological topics such as gender, organizations, family relations, and small group processes are often taught under other courses. Individual leaders have made a great impact in establishing sociology in Europe. This pattern is somewhat ironic, since in moving to a more sociological approach, the 'great man' theory of leadership has become less common in these military academies. Yet the work of a several charismatic individuals has strongly shaped national traditions of military sociology. Several of those leaders are represented in the bibliography of this chapter. In the United States, individual leaders are less visible in military academies. Rather, civilian universities and professors have placed dozens of students into leadership positions in academies. Sociology tends to become more established following periods of change: shifts in strategy, curriculum reform, scandals, the integration of new groups, and new missions. The position of sociology in academies seems revitalized at present (Soeters 1997).

The common tension between the military and sociology has limited this research, but these

barriers are not absolute. As we shall explore in the following section, the challenges of post-Cold War missions have required a greater social knowledge than earlier wars. The functional need for social scientific analysis has created a larger space within the military institution for sociological research.

Social Science and Asymmetric Wars

The early Cold War saw a more immediate alliance of social science and the military. At the end of the Second World War, colonial regimes across the globe were being dismantled, often by protracted, asymmetric military conflicts in places like Vietnam, Malaya, the Philippines, or Algeria. These wars were generally not fought in conventional ways, not fought between forces that were organized in similar ways. Conventional military power, generally overwhelmingly in favor of the western forces, was not enough to subdue guerrilla forces, who were motivated by many things, including a vision of communist revolution. We call these wars early counterinsurgencies. The development of counterinsurgency as a method to defeat irregular forces requires more than conventional military power: economic, political, and social engineering projects accompanied the use of military force. The successful conduct of these campaigns required a great deal of information about the target population and an analysis explaining why they were gripped by revolution and what could be done to change it.

Social science had three main influences on the development of early counterinsurgency. Firstly, social scientific theories attempted to explain why and how political instability happened. Modernization theory, which claimed that societies went through a period of vulnerability during the transition from traditional to modern society, was one of the dominant theories incorporated into counterinsurgency. Secondly, social scientific techniques were deployed to gain information about the societies that military officers hoped to change. Thirdly, the form of counterinsurgent theory was often markedly

social scientific. The core books were generally written by officers who had served in several of these conflicts and attempted to generalize their experiences into a broader theory of insurgency and how to combat it.

Sociologists have long been concerned with revolution (see Goldstone 2003 for an overview), but it was modernization theories which had the greatest impact on the development of early counterinsurgency. Goodwin (2001) argues that there were three main types of sociological theories of revolution: modernization, economic, and state centered. Economic explanations were largely Marxist, placing class tensions and unequal economic standings as the root of revolution. This was also the perspective advanced by the communist insurgents, making it innately unpopular with the military and political officers conducting these counterinsurgencies. The state-based explanation of revolution argues that particular types of political regimes are more or less vulnerable to revolutionary challengers. As agents of the state, early counterinsurgents necessarily believed that the government had some capacity to resist or promote revolution; otherwise, why bother with the entire project? This branch of social theory has developed relatively recently (Moore 1966), with critical works such as Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions* (1979) not being available until after most of these wars had ended. The study of revolution has advanced largely through comparative historical research (Goldstone 2003), which may not be as straightforward to translate into policy as some social scientific forms.

This left modernization theory. Sociology has focused on the transition from traditional to modern societies since its beginnings in the nineteenth century, but a more systematic approach developed in the middle of the twentieth century. Perhaps the best example of this is Huntington's (1968) work *Political Order in Changing Societies*. In this book, Huntington challenged the idea that economic development would naturally lead to stable, democratic political structures. Rather, economic change could be deeply disruptive to existing patterns of social control, and the development of key political and

economic institutions were critical to building a modern, democratic government. Huntington asserts that it is during the period after economic development becomes destabilizing and before the right institutions are established that a society is vulnerable to revolution. Communism offered a readymade solution to this period of instability, providing a template for political order and a promise of broader social equality. But if a society became sufficiently developed, without being overwhelmed by communist challengers, then this danger would pass. This perspective legitimated a temporary, transformative intervention by western forces. Security and institution building could shepherd vulnerable societies through these moments of instability into a place in the modern, democratic world.

Social scientific theory influenced not only why counterinsurgency could work, but provided more concrete guidance about how to conduct these wars. Systems approaches, which advocate considering an organization or entire society in terms of inputs and outputs, are well suited to practical approaches. For instance, if food aid is considered an input, then increasing this input may produce many undesired outputs; a better fed population has a larger surplus to provide insurgents. Leites and Wolf (1970) is an influential work in this tradition, and the authors insist "the primary aim of this book is generalization and theory—to develop and illustrate a way of analyzing insurgent conflicts rather than application of the analytical methods to actual conflicts" (Leites and Wolf 1970, p. v).

Not all social scientific enterprise was so distant. Social science contributed not only theory to early counterinsurgency, but also provided concrete methods to analyze and advance these wars. There are many instances of this, but we shall offer here two specific examples: one from the U.S. war in Vietnam and another from the British Malayan Emergency. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was an attempt to build an objective statistical database about the political status of South Vietnamese hamlets and to discover what independent variables influenced the control over a village (Sweetland 1968). Though this data had limited influence during the war

(the study's authors felt they were unfairly blamed for not predicting the Tet offensive), it has since been used for historical analysis of counterinsurgency (Kocher et al. 2011). The Malayan Emergency has enjoyed a strong reputation as a 'successful' counterinsurgency (Hack 2009). Among the remarkable features of this struggle were the techniques of intelligence collection, including a system of anonymous surveys. The British collected these anonymous surveys to build social network profiles and give residents a secure opportunity to provide intelligence (Hack 2000). The same professional conventions that social scientists use to protect respondent privacy and confidentiality were used to protect informers from retaliatory violence.

By the end of these wars, counterinsurgents were not only consumers of social science, but producers. Several military and political officers took time after serving in multiple campaigns and attempted to build a generalizable model (i.e. Galula 1964; Kitson 1971; Thompson 1966, 1969). It is worth noting that this was a strongly international process, with members from various western governments sharing information and strategic advice. This theory was motivated by different purposes than most social theory; it was built to provide practical advice and political legitimacy for a set of practices. These works focus on the specific relationship between the state, the uncommitted population, and the insurgency. It recasts war as a social contest, in which the wealth and power of the government must be used to counter the ideological power of the insurgents. These military officers focused on the state nearly a decade before it 'came back into' American sociology. The comparative historical method used also resembles the dominant sociological approach to analyzing revolutions.

The period of the early Cold War foreshadows two of the major processes which defined the western military experience after the fall of the Soviet Union. These wars were strongly international, with western experts working with experts from other western countries, and with local governments. The nature of these challenges were not conventional, and as such, resemble the asymmetric wars analyzed by

Caforio in this volume. The definition of a military professional had to expand, to incorporate a flexible thinker capable of working through complicated social problems and using government powers beyond the military. A new generation of soldier-scholars would return to the works outlined above when the problems of insurgency again defined the main threats to the security of western societies.

Professionalism

The nature of the military profession is one of the founding debates of American military sociology (Caforio this volume; Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1967). This topic has important consequences for nearly every aspect of the relationship between the military, the state, and society. Professions are afforded autonomy, based on the technical expertise and social merit of their function. Establishing or limiting the degree of autonomy is the basic process of civil-military relations. The nature of the military profession has deep impacts on the military as an organization.

The sociological definition clarifies the criteria and precisely what is at stake in defining the military as a profession. Those stakes run high. Sociologically, a profession is (1) socially necessary, (2) highly skilled, and (3) capable of defining its own criteria for membership. The third point is most important, but it is a consequence of the first two. Doctors, lawyers, and military officers all perform socially necessary roles. The disruption of these services would have ramifications beyond the immediate realms of medicine, law, and war. Only a similarly skilled professional can judge who should be afforded the position of public trust that accompanies membership in a profession, considering the educational and experiential prerequisites that determine the capacity to practice such professions. The third capacity, professional closure, is qualitatively different considering the military. Following Weber's (1965) definition of the state, which focused very much on the legitimate use of force, the military is at the root of political order. Clausewitz (1976) famously called war

'policy by other means'. If military force is the arbiter of last resort, then the nature of the military profession is of utmost importance. This tension becomes even more salient at moments of immense political transformation, such as the end of the Cold War.

Huntington and Janowitz defined only officers as professionals, but sociologists have recently expanded the definition. The average enlisted soldier today quite different from when Janowitz and Huntington were writing. He is no longer a conscript, but a volunteer and a professional (Burk 1992). Both American and European force structures now rely increasingly on highly skilled professional soldiers, which are much more cost effective than mass armies (King 2006, 2009). King (2013) speaks of the skills required to be successful in contemporary urban warfare as the basis of professionalism. Soldiers afford one another membership based on perceptions of their relative skill and reliability. Contemporary tactics require small groups to act together in extremely tight unison, and failing to earn the trust of comrades and the necessary skills can be fatal. Professional closure is less formal, but just as important, in defining these new types of professionals (Segal and Kestnbaum 2002). The increased use of deployed reserve forces and the increased use of civilian employees and contractors to do jobs formerly done by military personnel raises questions about whether these groups should be considered part of the profession (Segal and DeAngelis 2009).

Germany was rearmed fairly quickly following WWII, primarily as a way to balance Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, though this was controversial within Germany and among Allied societies. A new military, *the Bundeswehr*, was established in 1955 to draw a strong distinction between the National Socialist past and the present. The past could no longer provide legitimacy, and the values associated with the *Wehrmacht* were discredited.

There was substantial fear, within and outside of Germany, of an autonomous, professional military within the state. The identity of citizen soldiers was introduced along with universal military service. These new soldiers were to be

embedded within the civilian society and democratic government, leaving behind the elitist professionalism that marked much of Germany's modern history. Even within military operations, a democratic ethos was advanced under the principle of *Innere Fuhrung* (Inner Guidance). This doctrine focuses on the individual rights of soldiers and attempts to maximally involve them in operational decision making. *Innere Fuhrung* also advocates that individual soldiers attend critically to their orders and that disobedience to an immoral or illegal order is a soldier's duty.

The Germany military role was legally constrained to the defense of West Germany and allies. There was a massive organizational restructuring designed to build a military identity which was closely related to the defense of democracy and committed to civilian control over the armed forces. This new ethos was extended to the forces of former East Germany after the collapse of communism. These soldiers underwent a political screening and incorporation into existing structures of command (Mannitz 2011). The 'soldierly role' in Germany was designed to bridge the armed forces and democratic society. The soldierly identity as a citizen equal to other citizens dismantled some of the elitism associated with military service. Soldiers were to become stakeholders in democratic social norms. A peculiar institution, the Bundeswehr Association, operates similar to a trade union and is devoted to defending the democratic rights of German soldiers. German CMR are therefore notably Janowitzian, focused on the commonality between soldiers and the society they defend, and based on the shared rights and obligations of citizenship.

Military professionalism in the United Kingdom was complicated by an aristocratic tradition. This tradition entailed the buying and selling of commissions, and the restriction of officership to those of a high social strata. Interestingly, this culture exalted the amateur over the professional—the belief that if a good, noble character could overcome the discipline of other military professionals, then that triumph was especially worthy. There has been a strong social stratification between officers and enlisted in

Britain, particularly in the less prestigious army. Naval expertise was valued more highly (Downs 1988). Indeed, one of the first studies of British military professionalism focused on the navy (Elias 1950).

France's modern defense policy has been devoted to a nuclear deterrence, leaving the army in particular searching for an identity and a mission (Boëne 1988). France's strategic policy has focused on the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. This is related to the desire to have a policy somewhat independent within NATO (Boëne and Danet 2000). This has had several consequences on the organizational ethos of the French military. The direct effect was an emphasis on the highly technical forces which support the nuclear deterrent. Tension arose between these 'services in Blue' which rather quickly adopted a technical, occupational understanding and the army which maintained a more institutional frame. The last decades of the 20th century were characterized by a search for an identity within the army. The state has a central place in French culture, and so military professionals tended to compare themselves more with comparable government employees rather than other civilian sectors (Boëne 1988).

The occupational characteristics of the Dutch military are apparent. Unionization is quite high in the Dutch armed forces. The issue came to a pronounced crisis when a semi-mutiny was violently repressed in the 1990s (van der Meulen et al. 2000). Initial recruitment fell short at both poles of modern military service: combat arms and the highly technical occupations. The Netherlands has paid greater attention to the market position of their service members than most other European states (Soeters 2000). There are two types of contracts available to Dutch volunteers: limited and unlimited. All enlisted personnel and some NCOs and junior officers are on a limited contract, which can originally last from 2 to 4 years. The public supports this structure, which reduces the distance between the military and society (Van der Mullen 2000).

Individual variation within the nature of the military profession has been influenced by the historical place of the military. Occasionally it is

a break from these traditions that forces the search for a new identity and purpose. This was dramatically true in Germany, and the specters of the praetorian past motivated a structure that closely integrated the military and society. But Britain, France, and the Netherlands have all undergone a transition following the end of their colonial empires, resulting in smaller forces focused on territorial defense. While the United States was expanding to take on an ever more global, expeditionary role, Western European power was retracting. This has left certain services looking for an identity, such as the French army. As we move to consider the all-volunteer force in the section below, the consequences of shifting to a military staffed by labor market principles on the ethos of these professions become clear.

The All-Volunteer Force

Following the French revolution, the mythologized *levee en masse* demonstrated the power of mass armies: the nation in arms manned by citizen soldiers. For the centuries that followed, most western nation-states depended upon systems of conscription for their defense. However, in the last third of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st nearly all western governments moved to an all-volunteer system. These transitions happened during the Cold War, and the relative importance of market forces and the meaning of military service were the main issues in this debate. In 1973, the United States ended conscription. The British armed forces had ended national service a decade earlier, but continental European states would maintain a system of conscription until near the end of the twentieth century. The American debates and military sociological models produced to understand the consequences of these changes have been influential in analyzing these later European transitions.

Understanding this transition is the goal of perhaps the most influential military sociology model ever exported from the United States to Europe: the I-O model (Moskos 1977; Segal 1986; Moskos and Wood 1988). This framework provides a method for sociologists to compare the developments across nations and times. The tension revealed in this model-from a military based on national service to one based on economic calculation-illuminates the nature of the military organization. These all-volunteer forces have a different organizational logic and values that interact with a new set of missions and a new set of considerations. The Institutional-Occupational (I\O) model has become the main scholarly focus for such debates. Segal (1986) framed this as two different levels of analysis: concerning the character of the military organization and individual motivations for joining. In this article, we use the I\O model primarily at the organizational level, but they form the two poles of a developmental construct from the past institution to a future one (Lasswell 1941); no military is ever fully institutional nor occupational. An institutional understanding places the military "transcending individual interest in favor of a presumed higher goal", while an occupational military is "legitimated in terms of market forces". These poles map relatively cleanly onto the debate surrounding conscription mentioned in the paragraph above.

The Gates Commission (1970) was a presidential commission tasked with evaluating the possibility of creating an all-volunteer force in the United States. The report concluded that labor market forces could support the U.S. military at a reasonable expenditure. Rostker (2006) highlights several historical transitions that undermined the legitimacy of conscription. The first is demographic: the expansion of the U.S. population as a consequence of the baby boom meant only a small portion of eligible men were actually needed to fulfill the military's manpower requirements. This undermined the idea that the draft was fair because it was universal. Political opposition developed from both sides of the political spectrum; conservatives argued that the government was demanding too much of the population while liberals argued that the draft disproportionately affected minorities and the poor. Highly visible social movements emerged to oppose the Vietnam War, while disciplinary concerns convinced many military officers that

conscripts were not reliable enough to be the base of the military (Rostker 2006).

Historically, broad based military service, understood as the obligation of citizen, existed before the independence of the United States and served an important place in U.S. political culture (Kestnbaum 2000, 2009). Proponents of continuing the draft argued that without any sort of national service, only the disadvantaged would join. Janowitz (1967, p. 75) argued that "a national service program supplies a powerful weapon for preventing the creation of a predominately or even all-Negro enlisted force in the army, an 'internal foreign legion,' which would be disastrous for American political development".

Economic arguments supporting the move to an AVF carried the day. The Gates Commission (1970) recommended rewarding volunteers with education and healthcare benefits and allowing the logic of the labor market to decide who serves. One argument made was that conscription amounted to a tax; by forcing a young man to serve for a wage lower than he could earn on the civilian labor market, the government was applying an 'economic rent' (Rostker 2006). As with all large scale, bureaucratic decisions, a great deal of the analysis focused on projecting budgets and understanding the logistical consequences of the decision. However, the relationship between military service and citizenship was strong enough that the argument was never entirely technical. The transition from service as an obligation of a citizen to a labor market decision has consequences for the meaning of service.

The social position of veterans in society has been a major concern of American military sociology and has been largely absent in Europe. The status of veterans is important for several reasons, particularly in an all-volunteer military (Camacho and Atwood 2007). The transition to AVF forces motivated the development of the Institutional-Occupational (I-O) model. This model suggests that volunteers join the military for the occupational rewards of military service. In the United States, the rewards extend long after service ends, with health-care, employment preferences, and educational benefits available after an honorable exit from the military. Military

sociologists analyze the status of veterans relative to comparable civilians, across different groups, to understand the impacts of military service over the longer term (Burk and Espinoza 2012).

Recruitment is a central concern in an all-volunteer military (Segal 1989). There is a high rate of turnover in military employment, since most members only serve for a few years (Kleykamp 2013a). Military recruitment often focuses on the idea that the military is 'a great place to start', where long-term benefits make the military a rational option even when higher wages may be earned on the civilian labor market. The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs regularly provides information about the 22 million veterans living in the United States (NCVAS 2014). Veterans have generally enjoyed a stronger labor market position than non-veterans since WWII (Segal and Segal 2004). Veterans returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had a higher unemployment rate compared to previous cohorts of veterans, but these rates remain lower than the national averages for non-veterans (Dept. of Veterans Affairs 2014). However, the economic benefit of military service is not uniform across groups. Young, male veterans returning from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had a higher unemployment rate than their non-veteran peers (Kleykamp 2013b; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). These effects are not fixed, but can change over time—for instance, WWII veterans originally enjoyed an advantaged labor market position over their non-veteran peers, but their trajectories have converged over the decades (Smith et al. 2012).

Sociologists are generally interested in differences between social groups, and the military sociology of veterans is no exception. The 'bridging environment' hypothesis posits that those from a less advantaged background receive a greater benefit from military service (Browning et al 1973). This hypothesis suggests that military service can add 'soft skills' or cultural capital which disadvantaged groups are less likely to possess. Employers may also interpret military service as evidence that the veteran does not

share the same negative characteristics stereo-typed onto the group (Kleykamp 2007). Hisnanick's (2003) research, using nationally representative U.S. Census Bureau survey esti-mates, found that African American men who had served in the military had higher incomes, education, and employment rates than compara-ble civilians. Kleykamp's (2007) study found that only African American men who served outside of a combat role enjoyed an advantage in hiring. Nonwhite veterans received a limited advantage in employment and earnings in Angrist's (1998) study.

Quantifying the precise impact of military service on socioeconomic position has been complicated by one major methodological diffi-culty: selection. Veterans may simply appear to be advantaged in the labor markets because military accession policies ensure that those who are eligible to serve are those who would have done better on the labor market anyway (Kleykamp 2013a). Wolf et al. (2013) define three periods of selection. The first is the decision to join the military. Veterans are self-selected groups, but there are also institutional require-ments regarding education, health, aptitude test scores, and criminal convictions. These selec-tions make it difficult for those who would be at the bottom of the labor market to join the mili-tary. These events happen before veterans are observed in most major datasets, so they are very difficult to control for. The second phase of selection is the decision to exit the military; some people choose to stay in the military for much longer than they are required to, a decision that "presumably reflects perceptions of the relative benefits of the military and civilian sectors of the economy" (Wolf et al. 2013, p. 257). Mortality is a final type of selection; to become a veteran, a service member must survive their time in the military. Since military specialties with a higher risk of death have less transferability onto the civilian labor market, there may be a survivor bias as those who served in more occupational roles are likely to be better positioned for the labor market.

Not all investigations have been dependent upon survey and audit studies. Angrist (1990, 1998) has used Social Security Administration earnings records combined with military admin-istrative records to investigate the effects of military service. Being an economist, Angrist's main concern is selectivity: how to avoid those biases outlined above. He takes advantage of two natural experiments: the Vietnam era draft lottery and a period of miscalculated admission criteria. These exogenous effects introduce the possibility to control for self-selection. The draft system was ostensibly random, based on day of birth, which controls for self, but not institutional selection. Angrist (1990) found that draft-eligible White men suffered a substantial earnings penalty. However, the mechanisms of conscription are likely quite different than those of an all-volunteer force.

Angrist (1998) takes advantage of another historical event to produce estimates for the volunteer military. The Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) is a screening test accepted by all branches of the military in 1976. For the first few years of its application, the results were 'misnormed' so that low scoring applicants were more likely to be admitted. This was corrected in 1980, reducing the probability that low scoring applicants would be admitted. So, those who entered the military during this period compose a less selected group. Evaluating the economic outcomes of these veterans, Angrist found that White veterans had several years with a higher employment rate and earn-ings, but the veteran and nonveteran population converged in less than a decade. Nonwhites enjoyed a small employment advantage and about 10% higher earnings than their peers.

American military sociology has had consid-erable impact on the development of European military sociology, primarily in concerns about the military as a profession and the transition to all-volunteer forces. However, in the United States the social position of veterans is a major point when evaluating occupational, all-volunteer forces. The arguments leading up to the devel-opment of the AVF were economic and high-lighted the long-term benefits of military service. Why are these arguments so prevalent in the United States and so quiet in Europe? The

different systems of social provision are an important part of this answer.

The United States is generally understood to provide less social welfare through government transfer programs than governments in Western Europe. The United States has fewer programs, covering a smaller percentage of the population, and spending far less than the nations of Western Europe. Veteran's benefits constitute an important exception to this trend. Pensions for veterans and survivor benefits for their families developed long before The New Deal of 1935, commonly viewed as the beginning of the U.S. welfare state. Social provisions provided for veterans of the American Civil War began in the late 19th century, and at their height, over 1/3rd of elderly men in the Northern United states were receiving a pension from the U.S. government (Skocpol 1995). These initial benefits did not form the core of a modern welfare state, and these benefits were allowed to expire with the generation that fought the American Civil War. They were replaced; "large-scale, twentieth century veterans' benefits are uniquely American. There is no French, British, German, Canadian, or Dutch equivalent to the VA hospital system, the Veterans Housing Authority, or the GI Bill" (Campbell 2004, p. 250). Because these institutional benefits are unique to the United States, they are not often included in comparative evaluation of welfare provision among western countries. These provisions were extended to more and more U.S. veterans during the latter half of the twentieth century, as people were leaving the military at a faster rate than veterans were dying.

The United Kingdom transitioned to an AVF a decade before the United States, but the debates surrounding the transition were similar, if muted (Vasquez 2011). In 1946, the United Kingdom had substantial overseas commitments, making an immediate return to an AVF unfeasible. National Service was seen as a method to develop a trained set of reserves: ready for an emergency but capable of supporting regular units in normal situations. Throughout the long history of the British military, conscription was not the norm. The transition to a nuclear defense

helped to mitigate concerns about potential defenselessness. National service became increasingly unpopular throughout the 1950s, and ended in 1963 (Navias 1989).

Veterans in the United Kingdom have not received the same level of attention as in the United States. This is remarkable considering the relative prevalence of British veterans; a 2006 estimate rated 219,000 veterans per million population in the UK, compared to 90,000 per million in the United States (Dandeker et al. 2006). Defining veteran status is complicated in the UK. Public opinion limits the definition of veteran to those who served in a World War, with the more comprehensive term 'ex-service' describing the others who have separated from the military. Despite this public perception, the government has embraced a large broad tent definition of veteran status (Burdett et al. 2013; Grenet et al. 2011).

Dandeker et al. (2006) explains the indifference towards veterans first by distance and then by intimacy. For the most of British history, the army has been a volunteer service fighting in small wars on the far corners of the world. This distance from the military experience did not engender a great sympathy for veterans, so there was limited public demand to develop a veteran based social welfare state. The more immediate experience of WWII was characterized by a general suffering, a 'we've all gone through this together' idea that also agitated against special treatment for veterans. Limited advantages for military service were incorporated into the mainstream welfare system—such as letting those on a war pension 'jump the queue' for healthcare. In lieu of a national support system for veterans, self-help organizations based on units developed (Dandeker 1994).

France is the historical and symbolic birthplace of the citizen-soldier, but peacetime conscription ended in 1996. Napoleon's 600,000 strong force, led disastrously into Russia, was the first great conscript force. This history, combined with relatively frequent instances of territorial defense, meant France never gained the high levels of pacifism and conscientious objection that marked the later stages of conscription in many European countries. Ever since the 19th

century, conscripts had not been used for expeditionary missions. So, with the end of the Cold War and the removal of the threat of Soviet invasion, conscripts had a limited utility (Boëne and Danet 2000). The end of conscription aimed to make a force with greater "projectability, speed, and efficiency." (McKenna 1997, p. 126). Throughout much of the 20th century, citizenship involved national service. The mass army proved to be ineffective for some of the twentieth century's challenges, with France suffering a string of defeats in the middle of the century. The attempted coup by some military officers who were displeased by the outcome of the war in Algeria rekindled fears about praetorianism and the potential political instability that can result from a professional force.

However, this universal service was not so universal. As with other countries, there were more young men available that could possibly be taken in for compulsory service. Conscription was not being applied equally across all demographic sectors. Ethnic minorities, especially those from North Africa, were being placed in less prestigious, more dangerous specialties at a disproportionate rate. Many of these same men were excluded from the conscription, owing to 'educational deficiencies'. The arguments surrounding the end of conscription in France were more political and less economic than those in the United States. The plan to move toward professionalization was attacked from both the left and the right as likely to cause a spike in youth unemployment and a decline in a venerable tradition. The deployment of French troops in the Persian Gulf War demonstrated a definite lack of readiness, especially compared to nations which had long had professional armies.

The German view of CMR, with its intensive integration with the broader society, as outlined above, fits better with a conscript force than a professional one. But the sorts of missions fought after the Cold War require a different type of soldier than a conscript with limited training, which developed some tension between the democratic principles enshrined at the beginning of the *Bundeswehr*. As training becomes more specialized, more complicated, and operations further from easy public view, the tight democratic oversight may be weakened. There may be less time available for the civic education which has been indicative of German military education (Mannitz 2011). The end of conscription came after the *Bundeswehr* had already been in Afghanistan for a decade, the most significant combat mission for German forces since WWII. The German military has become a more competent expeditionary force, but public opinion has shifted against engagement, even with a professionalized force (Alessi 2013).

The Netherlands was one of the first countries in continental Europe to abolish conscription in 1995. Military and political elites largely agreed on this transition and Dutch participation in the Gulf War. The Netherlands offered quite a lot to the UN effort to repulse Iraq's incursion into Kuwait, but they were unable to commit ground troops. This was not the result of political reluctance but a question of readiness (Van der Mullen 2000). The conscript force was simply not flexible enough to be rapidly deployed in an expeditionary mission (Soeters 2000). The need for a new force structure to face new threats was accomplished in a few years. Perhaps this transition was made easier by the Netherlands long history of building different force structures to fit different tasks. A conscript based mass army was in place in the Netherlands since 1814. However, expeditionary deployments in service of empire were solely the burden of professional volunteers (Van der Mullen 2000). So, the role of conscription was quite unclear in the post-Cold War environment. The debates which surrounded the ending of conscription in the Netherlands were quite similar to other countries. A changing threat needed a smaller, more highly skilled force. An ever smaller portion of male cohorts would be called up for national service, which threatened the legitimacy of a draft based on equality (Van der Mullen 2000).

Italian conscription ended in 2004, but the previous decades had seen the standard development where a smaller portion of the eligible population was needed for military service. An Italian conscript had the option to join a police

auxiliary, which was a rare model in Europe. Italian conscription was opposed by both ends of the political spectrum, with Catholic pacifism and leftist critique that the military is a center of antidemocratic reaction (Caforio and Nuciari 2000).

There are a handful of European countries which maintain conscription: Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Russia and Switzerland. Switzerland proves to be an exception to many of these broad transformations in Western Europe: maintaining conscription, rejecting professionalization, and maintaining a military primarily for territorial defense in a policy of 'armed neutrality'. The Swiss military is composed of 95% conscripts; the officers, as well as the men, are conscripted. Even this stubbornly independent state has experienced an increased pressure to move to an occupational form. Historical experiences certainly shaped the relationship to conscription, but it is not a deterministic relationship. Germany's fear of militarism helped conscription last as long as it did. The Swiss political system matches well with the citizen in arms and broad based conscription. However, France had a relatively simple time eliminating the draft, even though it was the symbolic birthplace of the nation in arms, an event with immense significance in French political history.

Postmodern Challenges

The postmodern military is very different from what sociology generally defines as postmodernism (Booth et al. 2001). If military sociology has been relatively unrocked by the postmodern wave, it is because the military as an organization has been solidly anchored in modern forms. The postmodern has a specific meaning in military sociology. There are eleven main changes that Moskos et al. (2000) identified. The defined threat changes, away from enemy invasion or nuclear war to subnational, ethnic conflicts. National militaries will generally not fight alone, but integrated into international structures. The force structure appropriate to face these challenges is a small, professional force. The

missions blend military and political tasks, requiring a different set of skills to be effective peacekeepers (Sookermany 2012). The military profession requires fewer combat leaders or technical managers and more soldier scholars. This new professional is not a conscript, and the forces are subsequently more isolated from the societies that support them; the public is increasingly indifferent to the military. The media is a more important institution in postmodern times, and so the military courts positive press coverage. Women and homosexuals are fully integrated. Civilian employees, and increasingly contractors, are vital to the effective functioning of the military. In the 15 years following the publication of *The Postmodern Military*, many European militaries have moved in the directions suggested in the book, sparking a series of analyses into the postmodern militaries. In this chapter, we focus on the organizational components of these transitions: new missions and new professionals.

Of central interest to sociologists investigating the postmodern hypothesis is the position of women and non-heterosexual members. Sociologists are generally interested in differences between groups, and military sociologists are no exception in this regard. The military can remain an exclusive environment, even after legal restrictions have been lifted. Gender and sexual integration provide a particular challenge to the masculine, heteronormative cultures common in militaries. We do not cover these processes systematically across cases, but that has been done elsewhere (Segal et al. 1999; Kimmel 2000).

King (2005, 2006) argues that military integration between European states mirrors the broader integration in economic and political concerns. 'Concentration' and 'transnationalization' are the two key processes driving this broader European integration. Concentration refers to the general shrinking of defense budgets and the fielding of smaller standing armies, with priority given to special forces or other highly skilled units. This is not merely a contraction but a structural transformation favoring rapidly deployable, highly skilled units. These units have a wide range of capabilities, while being more cost effective than larger conscript forces. NATO

had provided strategic coordination throughout the Cold War, coordinating many national armies, but recent transnational operations cooperate at a smaller level. Beginning with the European Rapid Reaction Force, European militaries have shifted to a system of mutual dependence. NATO is an increasingly European force, with the United States taking a less central role (King 2005). The most active and dynamic NATO units are transnational expeditionary forces, composed of expert soldiers from several nationalities.

The collapse of communism provided two challenges for Germany: the integration of East German forces and defining a new mission. These two concerns reflect Germany's central position in Europe, as the German military was faced with the emblematic challenges of both East and West. The German *Bundeswehr* had, in an effort to strongly distinguish itself from the past, accepted a very narrowly defined mission—territorial self defense in the event of a Soviet led invasion. With that threat removed, the military needed to develop a new reason to exist. The debates surrounding the use of German forces in expeditionary capacities remains highly controversial.

The German military can be understood as an early adaptor to a postnational military framework. The ethos and basic organizational structure of the Bundeswehr makes it impossible for Germany to conduct a large scale campaign without her allies (Fleckenstein 2000). During the Cold War, the military was oriented for territorial defense, in case of another invasion. The *Bundeswehr* was heavily integrated into NATO from its inception. The autonomy of the Germany military was sharply curtailed: no General Staff was allowed, deployments were subject to extensive parliamentary oversight and regulation (Mannitz 2011). Any large campaigns or wars would require outside leadership and strategy, provided by NATO. Germany is heavily invested in supra-national organizations, and provides about 25% of the NATO budget (Fleckenstein 2000).

Legally, *the Bundeswehr* is limited to defense of Germany or its allies. In the 1990s, German jurisprudence extended that definition to cover expeditionary operations provided that these were viewed as legitimate if founded on NATO consensus (Mannitz 2011). The German contribution to ISAF in Afghanistan "was the largest, the longest, and by far the most costly military operations that the Federal Republic of Germany has engaged into date" (Rid and Zapfe 2013 p. 193). The *Bundeswehr* has undergone several changes in the face of these pressures, resulting in a professional force.

Germany has been less advanced on the other indicators of a postmodern military other than internationalization. Until the year 2000, Germany placed substantial restrictions on homosexual service members. Sexuality was an informal issue, handled in private by medical professionals previous to entering the military. While military service was not limited to heterosexuals, sexuality is included in a calculation about fitness to serve, and homosexuals were routinely dismissed from conscription (Fleckenstein 2000). Homosexuals were not allowed to advance very far up the career ladder. Reforms were precipitated by a lawsuit and there is presently an interest group for LGBT service members. These events provide further evidence that the German military operates in quite similar ways to civilian society.

The UK has defined three descending layers of mission: the defense of the sovereign territory, the defense of allied (NATO) territory, and deploying in peacekeeping or similar missions. The first layer does not refer exclusively to external threats but also internal threats to sovereignty. The military profession has evolved to match the increased priority on these new missions. The skills of the solder-scholar and soldier-statesman roles are better suited to these new missions. The scholar is necessary to analyze and engage in missions which are less grounded in doctrine and requires a greater flexibility. New missions have a less straight forward legitimacy as territorial defense, and so the management of public opinion and interaction with the media has a new importance. In the UK, as in the United States, an increasingly small proportion of the civilian leadership has military experience (Dandeker 1994).

The Dutch military quickly shifted to a new its core missions. The debate centered around two main ideas: crisis management and territorial defense. The first of these, crisis management, was the Dutch take on the demands of peace-keeping and low-intensity warfare. Crisis management took priority in the sense that this was the more likely scenario in the post-Soviet world, but in the event that both tasks were needed simultaneously, territorial defense was clearly the most important. Professional identity was split: the blue-helmet of international peacekeeper required a specific set of skills, but the basic legitimacy of the soldier depended on green-helmet skill in organized violence.

The Netherlands has transitioned from a medium to a minor power in the twentieth century. This position and a culture of democratic cooperation, has made the Netherlands one of the most pro-integration members of the European Union and NATO. This is not to say Dutch national identity has been subsumed by supranational bodies, but simply that a pragmatic balance has been found. Legally, and practically, Dutch soldiers will always be deployed in coordination with a broader international force (van der Muelen et al. 2000).

Overall, the Netherlands seemed to have faced the challenges of postmodernity successfully. The military and political elite believed their professional force was ready to handle the challenges of the world after the Cold War. But the capacity and future of that force would be severely tested at a place called Srebrenica. In July of 1995, a UN designated 'safe' enclave for Bosnians was overrun by Serb forces and over 8000 were killed; this was the largest war crime on European territory since the Second World War. 400 Dutch peacekeepers were deployed to defend that enclave, but they withdrew as their positioned came under attack (European Parliament 2009). This high profile shortcoming has dampened the enthusiasm for these new missions and new structures.

The definition of the new mission is the strongest unifying factor in Western European militaries. Although there have been several notable attempts and postnational structural

transformation, generally the military is more stubbornly national than economic or political structures. Since World War II, Western European nations have developed a similar definition of what threatens them and what military structures are better suited to face these threats (Franke and Heinecken 2001; Vennesson et al. 2009). Since the end of the Cold War, territorial defense seems a less probable, rather new missions requiring expeditionary, professional forces are likely. This changing requirement, this evolving mission, demands a different sort of military professional: both soldier and scholar. A conscript, called up for a few years, is not up to these challenges. Reserves have expanded, but have limited roles in these new conflicts.

International organizations, particularly NATO, have taken on an even greater role in the post-Cold War period in both defining the scope of new missions and how forces are organized to meet these new challenges. It is increasingly difficult to imagine any national force engaging in an expeditionary mission without being closely integrated with allied militaries. These new missions are increasingly specialized, requiring skilled professionals who are capable of handling missions that blur the lines between soldier and statesman. Every individual force has specific skills to contribute and a particular place in these international organizations.

Postcommunist Europe

Throughout the 20th century, the major political decisions of Eastern Europe were largely decided by the outcomes of wars between the great powers. In 1919, leaders of the four Allied powers (France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States) met in Paris divide the territory of the two Empires destroyed in World War I. The new countries were divided based on principles of national self-determination, historical and territorial integrity, and the overall level of development (Macmillan 2007). These overwhelming international forces tended to predetermine the strategic and defense interests of Eastern European states. Soviet invasions in

Hungary and Czechoslovakia demonstrated the penalty for attempting to step outside ideological boundaries (Weiss 2013). This forced the militaries of these countries to orient toward the political control of their own populations. Somewhat ironically, the threat of Soviet invasion was the main orienting factor for militaries on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Eastern European societies had two discourses that helped to orient the changes necessary to enter into the European community. The first, and perhaps the most important to any state, was to develop democratic civilian control over a professional military. Government and military elites turned to the classics of military sociology, the American School of Janowitz and Huntington, works translated into Albanian or Polish for the first times after the end of the Cold War. The second orienting discourse was the supranational institutions developed in opposition to the Soviet sphere: NATO and the EU. NATO membership was extended only when certain criteria were met: the military capacity to fit into broader NATO operations and strong democratic controls over the military (Bebler 1997).

Under communism, loyalty to the communist system was a necessary attribute of every officer; after communism, it was unacceptable. The Communist Party had managed to maintain a strong grasp on the military, as 'the party must always control the gun, the gun never control the party.' But those officers who had been politically loyal to the Communist party, a necessary characteristic for any successful officer, were politically suspect to the democratic governments. Political reliability is always a factor in militaries during revolutions; revolutionary governments must make some compromise between military efficiency and political reliability (Skocpol and Kestnbaum 1990). This created the need for a systematic way to evaluate the loyalty of officers. This has been accomplished through many strategies: (1) A life course strategy of retiring officers over a certain age, assuming that the career prospects associated with different levels of experience, combined with socialization in different eras would result in a loyal force (Danopoulos and Skandalis 2011), (2) purges

and de-purges, which included removing some officers and reinstating some who had been removed under communism (Weiss 2013), or (3) transitions in training: closing certain academies (Obraztsov 2012).

Professionalization in the postcommunist environment firstly meant developing a military that was not sworn to support the communist regime and that could be trusted to uphold the democratic state in potentially turbulent times. Huntington's understanding of the military professional, particularly the concept of 'subjective control' has been influential on postcommunist governments. This was a process fraught with risk. The postcommunist governments were very young and led by new elites who rarely had any meaningful experience managing the military. The surrounding political situations were extremely tense, with state owned assets being redistributed and borders being redrawn. If reforms were conducted too hastily, then that risked revolt. If the reforms did not go far enough, then these new states would be denied entry into NATO and the EU. These processes unfolded with very different consequences in different situations, ranging from the relatively smooth transition of Czechoslovakia to the tragedy of Yugoslavia.

East European military sociologists qualify civil-military relations with the adjective democratic. This is an understated component of the traditional model (Kríž 2010). This alteration focuses on the relationship between the government and the population—since civilian control over the military is no guarantee of meaningful control of the population over the government. The main theoretical advancement in the study of Eastern European civilian-military relations is a heightened attention to conflict vs. consensus between military and civilian leaders. There was little routine disagreement between the civilian and military elites in Eastern European states, as both were controlled by the Communist Party. Successful democratic civil-military relations require the development of an institutional base for conflict, where civilian and military leaders can disagree and debate without jeopardizing their careers (Kříž 2010; Herspring 2009).

In the case of Czechoslovakia, the challenges of postcommunist military transformation were resolved relatively smoothly; the new government managed to get control of a professional military. A few years after the end of communism, territorial division along ethnic lines was remarkably peaceful. The Czech Republic joined NATO in the first expansion following the Cold War in 1999. In the case of Yugoslavia, successful civilian control over the military was not monopolized. Paramilitaries, composed partially of people trained in the communist Yugoslav militaries, followed various leaders. The territorial disintegration was violent, even genocidal. Rather than new member states, the Yugoslav states were battlegrounds bombed and occupied by NATO forces..

The Czech Republic was probably the most successful transition from Warsaw Pact to NATO. A civilian secretary of defense took office in 1990 and that pattern has been interrupted only by 2001–2004, when career officers resigned to take the position. The original civilian secretaries encountered some protest from the military, but that has not been the case in recent years. The Czech Republic and Slovakia were able to maintain peace during a territorial division along ethnic lines, including an effective monopoly over the legitimate use of force (Kříž 2010). The Czech forces have straddled a new role, since the missions of peacekeeping and crisis management are similar to the core missions of the communist militaries, in certain ways. The tension between building an expeditionary force to participate in NATO operations and role in domestic policing have been major poles in defining a postcommunist mission.

The Romanian military was a driving force of its own reforms, often over the objections of the new democratic, civilian elites. This process is a good example of the need to develop institutional bases where the military and civilian elites can peacefully debate. NATO membership was a major motivation for the military's process of self-reform. Romania pursued a relatively independent stance under communism, with official policy arguing for the abolition of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This independence was facilitated by a very extensive system of universal conscription for all men aged 15–60 and all women aged 15–55. This was not an effective force, being more oriented toward communist indoctrination than military effectiveness. The constant interference of Communist elites undermined professionalism and capacity to fulfill defense roles. Despite these attempts at indoctrination, the Romanian military was involved in the overthrow of the communist regime. The military proved to be a force for reform after the end of communism. Resentful of the interference of the communist government, the military moved to reform itself by developing institutional safeguards to prevent arbitrary rule, despite the resistance of civilian leaders. A smaller professional force was proposed by military officers as early as 1993, though conscription lasted until 2007. Romania joined the NATO led Partnership for Peace to provided peacekeeping troops in 1994. Romanian forces managed to integrate into NATO operations with highly skilled professional units (primarily medical and engineering support). New military academies were founded, focusing on technical skills. The debates around ending conscription centered on the familiar themes of the need for highly skilled, expeditionary forces and an unequal distribution of the burden of conscription. These missions enjoyed broad public support. The pressure of the 1997 deadline for reforms to join NATO provided an added incentive to keep up the pace of reforms (Stanescu 2000).

The Balkans

The Balkans' experiences following the disintegration of Yugoslavia provides a dramatic example of what can happen when civilian control over the military is lost. The subsequent chaos remains a difficult topic to research, and the violence of the 1990s means many Balkan states have only recently started to develop stable civil military relations and an autonomous military profession. Analyzing the events of the wars and the rapid institutional transformations forced by them is outside of the scope of this chapter.

Interesting sociological work has mapped how social movement theory can help to explain how paramilitary organizations developed during the war (Schlichte 2010).

The violence of the 1990s means that Serbia has undertaken the task of consolidating democratic civil military relations only in the 21st century. The classics of The American School were only translated into Serb 50 years after their initial publication. While external pressure (the reforms required to join NATO) has influenced the development of military and society in Eastern Europe, the Serbian case is even more extreme. External conditions were imposed on Serbia as a defeated power. In 2003, the constitution outlined the role of the various branches of government in overseeing the army: the executive branch administers while the legislative branch funds. There is not an independent system of courts martial, which is a serious limit to professional autonomy. This institutional framework, which provides a political basis for democratic civil-military relations, has been followed by many reforms designed to consolidate democratic civil-military relations into the ethos of the Serbian military (Rokvic et al. 2013).

The organizational characteristics of the Serbian military have rapidly moved toward a postmodern form in the past few years. Serbian conscription ended in 2011. There is a large desire to join the military, with supply of recruits far outstripping available positions. Women are increasingly incorporated, with the first women graduating from the military academy in 2011. The public is not indifferent to the military; a 2010 poll found that 73% of Serbs had more trust in the military than any other institution. The military is overwhelmingly, ethnically Serb. Soldiers are allowed to vote, but that is the limit of their political participation. Freedom of speech concerning military matters is strictly curtailed. Overall, Serbia has made considerable progress in building a (post)modern military and a stable system of democratic civil-military relations (Rokvic et al. 2013).

Albania, the last European country to end communism, was mostly spared in the wars of the 1990s; the main difficulty was accommodating ethnic Albanians fleeing Kosovo. However, massive economic turmoil promoted protests that were at times quite violent. Albania did not consolidate a democratic control over the military, and attempts at reform resulted in isolating the military from the government to such a degree that the military was unwilling to put down an uprising in 1997. Communist Albania pursued many quixotic policies in a search for a path independent of the Soviet Union, preferring to emulate Maoist China. Militarily, this resulted in the abolition of ranks. For a while Albania had the highest proportion of its male population in the military in the world (14%). Albania's economic isolationism produced a deep poverty, including those in the military, and political considerations nearly exclusively determined promotion. Reform minded officers were regularly purged. Ultimately, the military refused orders to fire upon anti-communist protestors, and the regime fell in 1992 (Danopoulos and Skandalis 2011).

Postcommunist Albania is an example of a system of overly aggressive, hasty reforms which alienated the military from the new government. In some ways, these reforms were very deep, but structurally the relationship between the civilians and military did not change much between communism and democracy; under both regimes the civilians dictated to the military without any military input. And in both situations, the military refused to suppress popular uprisings. The new democratic government purged officers who had supported the old order or seemed antagonistic to the new one. Shortly thereafter, all officers older than 50 were forcibly retired. Despite widespread economic crisis and escalating violence in the region, the government pursued deep defense cuts without any input from the remaining officers. In a unique strategy of internationalization, Albania reached out to the United States, and American officers and advisors were given prominent roles and influence in determining these military reforms; the United States' military had more influence on defense reforms than did the Albanian military (Danopoulos and Skandalis 2011),

Russia

In Russia, as with other areas under communism, military sociology has suffered through 'years of complete oblivion or difficult existence within strict ideological frameworks, unjustified secrecy, and denial of its results.' (Obraztov 2003, p. 121). It remains a difficult society to research, with institutional secrecy still wide spread. Some research was accomplished in the early 1980s, but it was only after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. that a semi-independent military sociology developed in Russia: mostly housed within military research units and academies. Major Russian social science journals have devoted entire sections to military sociology, but the research requires access to information held within the Russian military establishment. This information has become more readily accessible after the fall of the Soviet Union, but it still requires entry to the Russian establishment (Danilova 2010).

In the Soviet Union for the first half of last century, Marxism-Leninism replaced sociology in explaining the social world. The discipline was allowed to reemerge in the 1960s, but took decades to consolidate into its present form. Russian military sociology had a promising start at the end of the 19th century, but many of these scholars did not survive WWI or the revolution of 1917. Some managed to emigrate, where their focus became the sociology of war. The ideological demands of Marxism forbade empirical research which might contradict the teachings about war and the military. Only after the Khrushchev thaw could sociology gain any independence.

The first military seminar was established in a Russian academy in 1965, which both studied the basic theoretical and methodological components of sociology and conducted research into the interpersonal relations in various military contexts. The classics of The American School were transferred to the state library during this period, but access was tightly controlled to experts specializing in criticizing "representatives of reactionary bourgeois sociology" (quoted in Obraztov 2008, p 166). These works were not translated into Russian. Similarly, international contact with other researchers was restricted to a few experts, deemed ideologically trustworthy by the state. Participation in international conferences was framed not as an opportunity to collaborate, but as combat against reactionary, bourgeois sociology (Obraztsov 2009).

Summary Remarks on Eastern Europe

Within Eastern Europe, we see substantial variation across different cases. In the Czech Republic and Romania, there has been rapid and meaningful transformation which has allowed these countries to enter into the international community. In the Czech Republic, these reforms originated within the revitalized, democratic state. In Romania, the military took the lead in establishing safeguards against arbitrary interference from the state. The Balkans have had a very different history. At the extreme end, Serbia lost control over the monopoly on legitimate violence, resulting in multiple self-armed militias and a great deal of violence. Albania's democratic revolution was not accompanied by a stronger relationship between the military and the state. Much as the military was not willing to suppress the uprisings that ended communism, it was not willing to defend a democratic regime from popular upheaval.

These Eastern European examples demonstrate the need for an institutional space for disagreement, where military officers and civilian leaders can disagree and debate without jeopardizing careers. For democratic civil-military relations to be stable, it is not enough that the military is willing to obey the orders of civilian leaders, but those civilian leaders must be accountable to the society they govern. This relationship demonstrates why a sociology of the military must go beyond formal political institutions and understand the larger social contexts to understand civil-military relations. Similarly, communist ideology subsumed much, if not all, social analysis to Marxism.

International organizations have played a key role in orienting postcommunist transformations.

The nations which have most successfully integrated into these new forms are those that have found a particular skill, such as Romania's medical and engineering staff, which are useful to international forces deployed in new missions. The development of military sociology in Eastern Europe provides a space to reflect upon some core concerns of military sociology. As a discipline, independence is central. Our work is valued by many people, with many contrasting objectives; some of the best work is a product of military officers within academies or research centers. All intellectual production is communal and none above influence. Even those who enjoy the academic freedom of tenured positions in societies with a strong history of freedom of speech are constrained by the constraints of our profession. The relationships between the state, military, and society are the core of military sociology.

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Author Biographies

Tyler Crabb is a Ph.D. Candidate in Sociology at the University of Maryland. His main focus is revolutionary war, particularly state responses to revolutionary challengers and asymmetric threats. Previous research has examined the relationship between social science and counterinsurgency. He also works for the federal government of the United States combining survey and administrative data sets to analyze the economic position of veterans.

David R. Segal received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Chicago. He is Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Distinguished Scholar-Teacher, and Founding Director of the Center for Research on Military Organization at the University of Maryland. Prior to joining the Maryland faculty he taught at the University of Michigan, He directed the sociological research program at the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences during the first years of the volunteer force. His research has been published in The American Sociological Review, The American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, Social Science Quarterly, Armed Forces & Society, Military Psychology, and Journal of Political and Military Sociology, among others. His books include The All-Volunteer Force, Life in the Rank and File, Recruiting for Uncle Sam, Peacekeepers and their Wives, The Postmodern Military and a four volume set of readings in military sociology, co-edited with James Burk. He has been president of the District of Columbia Sociological Society, the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society, and the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution of the International Sociological Association, and chair of the American Sociological Association Section on Peace, War, and Social Conflict.

The Order of Violence. Norms and Rules of Organized Violence and the Civil-Military Paradox

Wilfried von Bredow

A basic anthropological feature of human beings is their equality. Their living conditions vary, however, substantially depending on time and space, culture and access to material resources. Still, even the most dramatic social patterns of inequality between human beings, between master and slave, between rich and poor, "top dog" and "underdog" do not completely neutralize this equality. Equality is not a religious or philosophical axiom, an idealist proposition, but a simple empirical observation. One of the salient sources of human equality is the capability to resort to violence, both individually and collectively. To quote Hobbes (1968, p. 183): "For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself".

In combination with other means to enforce one's interests, the resort to violence is indeed an ubiquitous ingredient in the makeup of all human groups and societies. One of the main challenges of social entities is the attempt to institutionalize and control individual physical violence and to distinguish between desirable and undesirable effects of its use. Here we recognize one leitmotif in the history of civilizations (Gat 2008, pp. 662–678).

Since the present paper concentrates on the military as an organisation of optimizing and handling physical violence, we look first into the consequences of modern state building and the modern state system. This process paved the way for new approaches to organize physical violence in such a way that it is tightly kept within the framework of legal and professional norms and rules. The history of modern states and the modern state system can be interpreted as a series of attempts to domesticate internal and external violence and to install a rule of possibly violence-free order with far-reaching and even global validity. Paradoxically, in the course of these endeavours, violence and warfare have intensified and have become even more threatening. The confident assumption of Clausewitz (1989, p. 76) has been refuted—warfare by "civilized peoples" is certainly not less brutal and destructive than warfare by "uncivilized peoples".

Another claim of Clausewitz (1989, p. 605)-war being only a branch of political activity—serves here as a point of departure. This perspective moves violence and order, war and politics as well as state, civil society and peace closely together. How effective is the political instrumentalization of violence and its political control? Are there indications that, in view of current developments of violence and war, this context is dissolving or at least undergoing a considerable transformation? These questions are far too broad in nature in order to receive comprehensive treatment and thus a final answer here. Nevertheless, they at least can direct our initial considerations about a very old and protean problem of human history.

W. von Bredow (✉)
Marburg, Germany
e-mail: wvb@staff.uni-marburg.de

Currently, the international system displays a number of contradictions and paradoxes which have a strong impact on the relations between political order and violence and puzzle the practitioners of international relations as well as the scholars in security studies. *Firstly*, in many parts of the globalizing world the institution of the state has been made to forfeit its monopoly on the use of force and political control of the military. This phenomenon of failing or failed states threatens not only the reliability of internal order but also the validity of international rules and norms in the practices of conflict management and warfare. It generates all kinds of disturbances in cross border interactions. *Secondly*, the partial decay of the now rather dignified norms and rules of international humanitarian law lead to the erosion of the boundary between the status of civil (non-combatant) and military (combatant) persons in violent conflicts. This boundary, albeit, was never fully respected, but at least it functioned partially as a protection shield for civilians. *Thirdly*, in some parts of the world, physical violence is an every-day occurrence and a manifest element of inter-human relations. In other parts of the world, mainly in and also between modern democracies, violence and war are regarded in low esteem. This low esteem also refers to military actions and warfare, which is a stark contrast to the relatively high esteem for the police and the armed forces as institutions to protect the country and the citizens. This difference is called here civil-military paradox.

State-Controlled Violence

In modern states, political control of the institutions of organized violence has always been an important task of state rulers, even if they themselves rose to power with the help of a military coup or are maintaining their power by undemocratic means. In democracies, political control relies heavily on institutionalized supervision (e.g. Parliament) and the media. The definitions of what makes a democracy vary, and the democratic minimum standard has risen over the last two centuries. Statistically, democracies have always been and still are exceptions among states. The majority of states and their ruling establishment do not comply with democratic norms and values, even if they call themselves democracies. There are many examples for ruling elites who frequently and systematically use violence and coercion to maintain an internal order which satisfies their interests.

From time to time, intellectuals get furious about the tortuous sociopolitical world and therefore, they propose remedies against its heterogeneity and contingencies. Some of these remedies derive from the *topos* of the *end of politics*. For example, (muddy) politics will or should be overcome by (clean) technical rationality or by the universal rule of law. However, of course, even in democracies with a high level of citizen participation, politics prevail. This implies not only the existence of deviant behaviour but also the necessity to found and maintain institutions that protest the norms and values of society with the organized violence as the state's last resort. The most visible of these institutions are the police and the armed forces.

In quite general terms, *police forces*, of which there are different types, are responsible for internal order. In dictatorships and other authoritarian regimes, they are used by the ruler or ruling group as instruments of supervision and suppression. Attempts to criticise the regime are penalised. In a rule-of-law system police forces function as an auxiliary service that prevents the breaking of the law, enforces the law and protects the law-abiding citizens (internal security).

The *armed forces* of a modern state usually and primarily have the mission to protect the state and society against threats from abroad and thus provide optimal external security. This mission has a defensive and an offensive dimension. As the key deciding factor for a government's foreign and security policy is the national interest (or what is perceived as the national interest), armed forces are not only responsible for the protection of the territory, but also for the demonstration of power in international politics and the determination of the government to pursue certain goals on the

international stage even against the resistance of other states. After the emergence of the modern state system, often called the Westphalian system of international relations (Buzan and Little 2000, p. 265), the resort to war was regarded as a rather expensive, yet under certain conditions a legal way of pursuing national interests. Since the 19th century, an increase in rules for the behaviour of soldiers and troops during a war have been codified in terms of international humanitarian law. These rules complement the set of unwritten professional codes which have a somewhat longer (but porous) tradition in the profession of arms (Elias 1950). After World War I, the political and legal attempts to remove war from the list of permitted political methods at a state's disposal gained momentum. The legal use of organized violence had been restricted, both before 1945 by the League of Nations and after 1945 by the United Nations, to acts of defence against an aggressor and to acts of maintaining and restoring peace in the name and with a mandate of the "international community" of states, represented by the UN Security Council.

This development has certainly not made war obsolete. On the contrary, both halves of the 20th century have been witness to terrible and bitter wars, a stunning pace in the perfecting of armaments technology, anticolonial and civil wars, and international terrorism. While wars like the two World Wars, with millions of soldiers who fought for several years on different continents, seem to be outdated now, many kinds of small-scale wars, low-intensity conflicts and guerrilla wars are still being fought and will probably not disappear in the decades to come (van Creveld 1991; Beaumont 1995). In this context, armed forces have been and still are used as an instrument to demonstrate the powers of an actor (a state, a group of states, or a non-governmental actor) in a symbolic or a violent interaction. It is worth noting here that the concept of armed forces as an instrument in the hands of a political agent is, of course, based on the Clausewitzean view of politics and warfare. This view has often been criticised as unduly rational. While some of this criticism somewhat overstretches the argument of war as a

transpolitical cultural feature of certain groups (Keegan 1995, p. 35), a strict and simple separation of (non-political) military and political aspects is, indeed, not possible in and for many contemporary violent conflicts (Simpson 2012; Strachan 2013).

Meanwhile, physical violence has become regarded in most Western democracies as a rather crude medium of human interactions within a society and on the international stage. The spectrum of pressure given to individuals and groups who behave deviantly, who violate the norms and laws of democracy or disturb the generally accepted order, has moved away from physical violence and coercion. Persuasion and manipulation have instead become a more prominent means to achieve necessary compliance. As Morris Janowitz has observed, in a "democratic system, persuasion is the process by which political parties come to power and by which they seek to rule, while coercion is circumscribed and limited by the legitimating norms" (Janowitz 1978, p. 393). This distinguishes democratic systems from totalitarian and authoritarian systems.

The move away from violence and coercion not only occurs in the relations between the government and the citizens, but also in the society at large. Teachers and parents are advised to abstain from physical violence to children in their classes or in their family. Physical violence between husband and wife has become a criminal offence in many Western countries. All this occurred within a relatively short period of cultural changes in the second half of the 20th century. The death penalty as the ultimate sanction against breaking the law is being phased out in many (but not all) democratic societies. This vision of a violence-free society is related to a set of norms and values—human rights—which have yet to develop deep roots in many parts of the world. As globalization creates growing "mixed zones" of different cultures, we often observe a kind of "clash of civilizations" due to different and contradicting attitudes towards physical violence.

Undeniably, the current international order, which is forming the social and political structure

of relations between states and other actors with crossborder activities, is still characterized by a high amount of violence and wars. The attempted monopolization of legitimate use of physical violence by the modern state did not effectively reduce the quantity of violence in the world. Paradoxically, it increased the quality of the destructive potential of weapons and armaments. The problematic phenomenon of failing and imploding states is even on the verge of eroding some of the achievements of humanitarian law.

Order and Anarchy in the International System

Students of international systems should aim to use a clear and simple concept of what constitutes an international system. Otherwise, they will soon encounter a surprisingly high number of theoretical problems (Buzan and Little 2000). An international system can be defined as an ensemble of political units with regular political, economic, and cultural relations among them, including the possibility of war between them (Aron 2003, p. 94). In the past, international systems have been regional (the Mediterranean or the Chinese system). The current international system (Westphalian system) with its origins in 17th century Europe became the very first truly global systems. Beforehand, several smaller regional international systems existed side by side, with little contact between them. Now, the existing international system is no longer European; it has spread over the entire planet and has incorporated all other international systems or what has remained of them.

Evidently, regular relations between states, empires, or other entities within the framework of an international system demand a certain minimum of order. Otherwise, these relations can not develop or will falter when the slightest conflict between the actors turn them against each other. The differences in power and stability as well as in cultural traditions and identities between these actors may be overwhelming, and they are certainly not fundamentally equal like individuals are in the Hobbesian perspective.

Because of these differences and inequalities, generating rules that counterbalance the existing correlations of power is imperative for an international system in order to gain stability. To a certain degree these rules should guarantee the rights of the weaker actors in the system.

The current international system has produced a relatively quickly increasing number of rules and regulations by expanding the corpus of international law, by international regimes, and, last but not least, by a tendency to create a functioning world opinion. Some students of international politics contend that this process creates an *international society* (or a world political system) in the long run. This may be so. On the other hand, this development, if it really occurs, does not yet fully eradicate the essential anarchical feature of this system. This basic feature is a consequence of the fact that there is no powerful and authoritative agency above the level of states. Governments comply with the rules and regulations of the international system, because it is in their national interest. Their self-understanding as sovereign actors leaves the door open for non-compliance. This door is often used, by governments of strong and powerful states as well as by outsiders (e.g. rogue states), but also by others if they calculate that non-compliance is advantageous and they could come away with it. If a state acts against its international duties, only the group of other states (plus the international organizations they have founded) can successfully try to lure it back onto common ground.

Anarchy at the top of the international system, the contradiction between the promised gains of international cooperation and the open or smouldering conflicts between rich and poor countries, and the erosion of some states in various parts of the world, all this weakens the possibilities of a functioning world order. And it ensures the option of violent action and war. This option is also very attractive for all actors who strive for a change of the international order. Institutions for peaceful change exist, but they usually function unsatisfactorily.

So consensus and dissent in international politics are often violent terms: enforced

consensus and aggressive dissent. "It is war and the threat of war that help determine whether particular states survive or are eliminated, whether they rise or decline, whether their frontiers remain the same or are changed, whether their peoples are ruled by one government or another, whether disputes are settled or drag on ..." (Bull 1977, p. 187).

Organized violence and war are certainly not the exclusive mechanisms for the maintenance and change of order, but they always were and remain extremely important. All other means, including economic power and ideologies, are in danger of losing ground if they are unable to mobilize military protection, in cases when it is deemed necessary.

Unless there is a powerful empire with the will and the means to unilaterally set and supervise the rules, anarchy prevails in any international system. A unilaterally ordered internal system is, however, only a virtual construct. "Unipolar moments" hardly existed in the past, even when this *topos* sometimes gains a certain metropolitan popularity. Even then, anarchy prevails at least at the margins of the system.

Anarchy in an international system is always moderated anarchy. Otherwise, there is no chance for a system to develop and remain stable for longer periods. The moderation of anarchy in an international system consists mainly of the regulation of violence. This can be attempted in different ways and with different perspectives. With regard to the last two centuries, we can point to at least four different concepts:

First, a more radical and comprehensive approach was elaborated by some of the early bourgeois philosophers of history, like Benjamin Constant (1767–1830), Auguste Comte (1798–1857), or Herbert Spencer (1820–1903). For them, the future of humankind was strongly determined by industrial production and trade, which could be organized so that all peoples might profit from it. Violence, military forces and war were, in their eyes, nothing but relics of the past. They predicted their disappearance. Order between peoples and nations could be established and developed without resorting to violence.

This was, of course, rather naïve and much too optimistic a vision for the future. But it had a strong and lasting impact on the minds of many people. Since the mid-19th century, the quest for a violence-free world and a world government has motivated ideologies and political movements which were, at certain places and at certain times, not without political influence.

Second, a modern humanitarian *ius in bello* emerged during the second half of the 19th century. Although it did not really lessen the dangers or cruelty of war, this humanitarian war law forbade some of the more beastly developments in war fighting by legally excluding specific munitions, particular ways of behaviour on the battlefield and toward noncombatant civilians, and by emphasizing certain minimum standards of professional military fairness. Furthermore, it slowly (much too slowly, in fact) raised the public consciousness concerning war atrocities. After World War II and with renewed effort after the end of the East-West conflict, the corpus of international law was complemented with provisions against certain war crimes and genocide.

Third, the most advanced and probably most successful moderation of the anarchical constellation in the international system with regard to organized violence and its use has been the domestication of nuclear weapons. It is not nuclear weapons per se which seem to exercise a pacifying influence on their owners, but the fear for the catastrophic outcome of a nuclear exchange (Waltz 1999, p. 99). For example, during the East-West conflict in its phase as the Cold War, nuclear weapons created a sufficient amount of mutually assured deterrence, so much so that the nuclear powers refrained from actually using these weapons in conflicts—and not only between them, but altogether.

Fourth, while there is almost no sign of a breakthrough in general and comprehensive disarmament, the concept of arms control has developed into a partially successful tool for making armament processes, in strategic terms, less irrational. Arms control played an important role in the détente phase of the East-West conflict (beginning on tiptoes after the Cuban missile

crisis in autumn 1962), but it continued to moderate and regulate the security relations in some regions on the globe, e.g. between the United States and Russia and on the European continent. Arms control does certainly not create harmony between states with conflicts of interest among them. It prepares, however, a path for conflicted states to search for common security interests.

These perspectives and concepts, different as they are, have one thing in common—they all somehow contribute to the moderation of organized violence in the anarchical international system. The first concept is more or less openly based on the premise that order between human beings can and must be organized in a way that violence disappears completely from people's lives. This is a utopian vision, intellectually stimulating, but not really practicable. The three other concepts do not stipulate a fundamental contradiction between order and organized violence. Rather, they try to reduce organized violence and to keep it under political control as tightly as possible.

For around two decades political scientists have been debating whether or not the international system, which has developed in the 17th century and has seen become global, is about to become obsolete. Some of them, in fact, are busy preparing its obituary.

Westphalian and Post-westphalian System

The main actor in the Westphalian system of international relations or "model of Westphalia" (Held 1995, p. 78) is the *sovereign state*. It is defined by its territory and borders, by its population (citizens), and by its internal order. The state has acquired internal sovereignty insofar as it has at its disposal the monopoly of legal physical violence as well as the processes of lawmaking, the settlement of disputes, law enforcement and, in order to pay for all this, it can raise taxes and make use of other contributions (internal sovereignty). No other state has the right to intervene in these internal affairs (external sovereignty). Sovereignty is, of course, a legal and political concept which is often not realized; nevertheless, it is codified in many international legal documents. States are not obliged to acknowledge any political authority above the level of formerly equal states. Conflicts between states are settled by power either in a diplomatic (non-military) or, if regarded as effective and comparatively cheap, also in view of incidental costs, with military means. The actors' attempts to mutually balance their power, political and military alliances to provide for collective defence, and a minimalist set of (more or less) binding rules for the behaviour of states characterize the Westphalian system, which was named after the peace treaty of Münster and Osnabrück of 1648.

The principles of this modern state system have frequently been disregarded. Krasner (1999) even speaks of sovereignty as "organized hypocrisy". Still, it makes sense to analyse the expansion of this system from Europe to all over the world with the help of this model. During the 20th century, however, the structures and principles of the globalizing international system slowly began to change. Toward its end, the key pillars of the Westphalian system seemed to be cracking. The main reason for this development is the growing difficulty of (most) states to effectively organize their societies, to remain the central institution of their citizens' collective identity and loyalty, and to provide sufficient protection against risks and threats from beyond the borders. National economies have been becoming more interdependent than ever before, which in turn reduces the ability of a state bureaucracy to plan and implement an independent national economic policy. The financial markets function on a global scale without much respect for regional or local specificities. Environmental problems can only be dealt with on a macroregional or global scale—states as single actors are mostly helpless in ecological problem solving. The resort to war as a traditional step in a mixed strategy to realize national interest is either illegal or much too expensive.

Nevertheless, this is only part of the overall assessment of future violence due to the fact that, in some regions, organized violence and war are still an important part of everyday life. There are no indications of their disappearance. Even in Europe, border conflicts and interethnic wars occurred recently. On some continents internal wars have become quite "normal", as have military coups and periods of military dictatorships.

Many observers of the international system and its development over the last decades contend that the most powerful type of actor in the Westphalian model, the modern sovereign state, is in full decline. The sovereign states are not so sovereign any more; they are, to use an expression of Holsti (2004) "tamed". The taming of the sovereigns is, however, an ambivalent process. On the one hand, normative networks exercise a civilizing effect. The institutionalization of an International Criminal Court and the widespread support for the concept of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) promise to warn heads of states who violate all restrictions in war fighting or who are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens against internal repression or torture. Different species of non-governmental actors compete with states for material resources and loyalties. On the other hand, weakened and failing states serve as greenhouses for criminal and terrorist activities. Organized physical violence on a small scale becomes the main currency of local and regional authority. Warlords and sectarian movements with bizarre political goals and ruthless methods of repression create war economy zones. Their use of force is not at all tamed by international conventions or humanitarian law.

So the contours of a post-Westphalian model of international relations remain unclear. Global turbulence, the concurrence of globalization and fragmentation, the increasing number of failing or failed states accompanied by a break-up of political and military authority, the process of de-secularization in politics—these are, indeed, confusing features in the world which emphasize the fact that what the UN terminology means by *human security* is still far away.

Global In/Security Landscape

The 20th century witnessed a permanent reconfiguration of the military space. This term refers to the volume and expansion of the space in which military actions are planned and actually take place. Military technology and military strategy have been globalizing this space and thus blurring the line between a territorial *inside* and *outside*. Social science theories still struggle with the consequences of this development, since "they are explicitly concerned with the politics of boundaries. They seek to explain and offer advice about the security and transgression of borders between established forms of order and community inside and the realm of either danger (insecurity, war) or a more universalistically conceived humanity (peace, world politics) outside" (Walker 1993, p. 18).

Other dimensions of the globalization process (economy, communication, ecology) provide ample illustration of the concept that our lives are integrated in networks of decisions, actions, and developments all over the world. There is no actor on the planet who can reasonably think he has at his disposal the necessary means to effectively protect his territory against influences from the outside.

This recognition has considerable consequences. One of them leads us back to the current problems of the international order. Nuclear weapons and their carrier systems rather emphatically demonstrated the emergence of a single global security landscape. If deterrence had failed and a nuclear war had begun, it could have annihilated human civilization and destroyed the ecological balance of the earth. In the 1970s and 1980s, many scenarios warned against this global threat. The New Wars or wars of a "third kind" (Holsti 1996) of the last two decades which appear to be of a local or regional nature do not reverse this development of devaluation of the inside/outside differentiation, on the contrary. Violations of the local or regional peace can always escalate into threats to international security and order. Such escalations

produce terror, misery, destruction, and death. They are a permanent dark challenge to human dignity.

Security in the broader sense of the term has both a local and a global character. Recently, the ascent of international security studies in the academic world (Buzan and Hansen 2010) has paved the way for a more comprehensive version of the term. Security has in fact become a key concept in the analysis of technological, medical, ecological and other non-military aspects of modernity. Surprisingly (or not), many of these aspects are tightly linked to aspects of violence and war. At any rate, the traditional ideas and concepts about security and security landscapes in the Westphalian state-centred model are now overshadowed by new security challenges.

The advent of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction created a global security landscape. A nuclear war between East and West would have devastating worldwide consequences. The potential threat by nuclear and (to a lesser degree) also by biological and chemical weapons has survived the East-West conflict and is, albeit with a restricted urgency, still with us. The New Wars developed in the shadow of the nuclear confrontation. Mostly confined to a certain local or regional context, they became slowly more and more "international" because of the role of the media and of the corresponding desire of the local actors to attract the world's media attention. This cycle started in the 1950s. It was accompanied by the steadily growing tendency of local wars to break out of their narrow geography, e.g. by projecting acts of terrorism onto the metropolitan areas or other continents and by collecting support wherever a group of partisans of the common cause was found. The global security landscape is, therefore, not just about superpowers and their arms races. The various national liberation movements and militant guerrilla actions against the (mostly Western) colonial powers created another global framework for political and military conflicts. Roughly speaking, this framework was formed by two strong collective motivations—national independence and/or revolutionary socialism.

The considerably high number of local and intrastate wars as compared with the number of traditional inter-state wars after 1990 taught us a lesson: Globalization breeds all kinds of conflicts which are easily turned into violent confrontations. These clashes have the potential to spill over to other regions, either because of their consequences for the civilian populations (refugee problem, ethnic cleansing) or because of horizontal military escalation. Therefore, from a realist perspective, it is absolutely reasonable for the leading states of the international system to consider military intervention both in the name of human security and of their national interest in order to maintain international order.

There is an unavoidable paradox here. In order to contain local wars or, even more usefully, to prevent the outbreak of such wars, an international security effort is necessary. Such an effort, e.g. in the framework of the UN Charter (chapter VII: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression), requires taking a further step in the internationalization of this violent conflict or war. Territorial containment is not possible solely through regional actors but requires the involvement of important actors from outside the conflict area. What is rather euphemistically called "the international community" acts, however, reluctantly and certainly does not have either the material means or the political intention to intervene wherever it deems intervention imperative. Furthermore, the intervention history after 1990 deflates all optimism about the efficiency of humanitarian interventions. To be successful military interventions with predominantly humanitarian motives have to overcome at least four paradoxes:

The *Wilson paradox*: honourable intentions like the protection of human lives and rights and the establishment of good governance structures also create dissidence and opposition against the imposition of norms and values;

The *neutrality paradox*: the intervention aims at providing help to the people in need of protection, but at the same time it changes the social and cultural balance in the region, with the consequence of sometimes creating unmerited "winner" and undeserving "looser";

The *innocence paradox*: the intervention will try to punish perpetrators and political criminals, but a clear and incontestable distinction between innocent victims and criminal culprits is impossible;

The *occupation paradox*: intervening troops may be hailed by the relieved population, but after a while they are often perceived as unwelcome occupational forces with special privileges (von Bredow 2015, p. 90).

All in all, the current debate about the possibilities and limits of military intervention is not really encouraging. We know of cases where this kind of collective action did not take off, did not take off in time, or did not provide the results hoped for. The history of the international efforts to overcome the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to stabilize the country is only one example for a failed or mostly failed intervention by an international coalition. The enormous difficulties of overcoming political traditions, cultural preferences and social cleavages in such interventions are now the subject of many critical studies (among other Martin 2014).

Non-governmental organizations (NGO) with humanitarian goals are often busy trying to stabilize the vague public moral stance in Western democracies and transform it into government action. It is only fair to add that many NGOs are also working in those troubles areas, providing relief and, often enough, cooperate with the soldiers sent by the UN or other international coalitions.

New Wars

Moderated anarchy in the international system implies moderation in the use of organized violence, even if only in small portions. The rules and regulations of the *ius in bello* have much too often been disregarded on the battlefield. The development of a more and more destructive arms technology was not really delayed by the structures of the Westphalian system of international relations.

The "breaking of nations" (Cooper 2004) and the emergence of a post-Westphalian system with

an until now unclear character and a fuzzy design may tame the sovereigns. Yet, this does not mean that the problems of human security are more easily solved. In addition, the new turbulence has a destructive influence on the conditions of war. In the social science literature, these conditions of war, the changing forms of warfare, and their consequences for soldiers and civilians are heavily discussed. The dominant image of war after 1945 comprised three different types of war: traditional conventional war, nuclear war, and guerrilla (indirect) war (Beaufre 1963). It is this third category which developed into what some authors call "new wars" or "asymmetric wars" (Münkler 2005; Kaldor 2013). Some other names in use are limited war, small war, low-intensity conflict, insurgency/counterinsurgency. These are not synonymous names but highlight different aspects of this type of violent conflict. Holsti (1996, p. 36) introduced the rather cryptic name of "war of a third kind" and explained the specificity of this type as follows. In such wars "there are no fronts, no campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honors, no point d'appui, and no respect for the territorial limits of states." This description refers primarily to non-state groups or bands with their criminal or terrorist goals. Because these military enemies are indeed very different to combat by regular (=state-controlled) armed forces, some authors use the term asymmetric war for characterizing wars between different military opponents. Recent wars in which Western armed forces were involved (like the invasion of Iraq 2003 or the ISAF-mission in Afghanistan 2002–2014) showed many features of asymmetric and new wars. As long as the combat follows conventional patterns, training, tactics and the advanced technology of Western armed forces ensured their unequivocal victory on the battlefield. This victory, however, was immediately endangered when the opponents of the Western armed forces began to attack them with tactics derived from the asymmetric war model. The Intifada in Palestine/Israel or the civil war in Libya and Syria as well as conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa display the same features of warfare. Organized violence in a weak, failing or failed state is no longer an

exceptional sort of violent conflict, but the dominant pattern. Even geopolitical disputes between states are today fought with the means of asymmetric warfare, as we can learn from the conflict between Russia and Ukraine (2013/14).

Civil-Military Paradox

Organized violence in the new, asymmetric wars is effective on various levels and in many forms. In order to understand this variance it is necessary to have a clear picture of the causes and driving forces of globalization, its also asymmetric linkages and interdependencies of people, groups, societies, and cultures. The extended concept of security which has become a constituent component of any vision of order in world affairs implies a flowing transition between the civil and the military spheres. Internationally coordinated actions to contain local violence, to restore peace and to stabilize a post-violent political and social order always have a civil and a military dimension which are tightly intertwined with each other.

This does not only apply for actions on the troubled spots in world politics, but also for the military professionalism and for the perceptions and legitimating decisions in the sending countries and organizations.

This new civil-military mix creates a problem in many Western democracies. In fact, here we are currently observing a paradoxical development of civil-military relations. Civil-military relations appear to be characterized by a widening gap between civil society and governments on the one hand, and the armed forces on the other. At the same time, when engaging in crisis stabilization around the globe, security policies of Western governments are forced to come to terms with the dynamic process of overlapping, even with the fusing of the political and military spheres.

The civil-military paradox makes itself noticeable in all Western societies, but not always in the same way. Despite the politico-military cultures and traditions varying considerably among Western societies, they all

substantially influence their national security policies and strategic outlooks. In other words, these societies are confronted with the same kind of security challenges, which compel their government and their military leadership to adapt, transform and refine their mental and their material instruments in order to protect the security of their nation. The process of adaptation, transformation and refinement is difficult, often painful and expensive, and furthermore, follows a different script in each society.

The term *military* is mostly straightforward and refers to soldiers, the armed forces as well as a certain professional way to use force at the request of legitimate political institutions, e.g. national governments. The term *civil* is less precise. It is occasionally used, like in *civil society*, as a concept to mark non-governmental institutions and their ideologies, norms and values. Sometimes, like in *civil-military relations*, it functions as the umbrella term for civil society including the non-military parts of the political and administrative system.

Due to this terminological ambivalence it makes sense to conceptualize civil-military relations not as a binary but as a tripartite relationship—involving (1) civil society, (2) the political system (government) and (3) the military.

The often repeated (and disputed) argument of a widening civil-military gap is based on the observation that Western societies today are what could be called *post-heroic societies*. Post-heroic societies have no or not enough understanding for the needs of an organization that has as its most important mission the use of physical violence in order to defend the territory and the democratic order against external threats and aggressions. The debate about the extent of this gap and its consequences for national security is mostly centred on the United States (Feaver 2003). There are, however, also very telling empirical indications about parallel developments in Europe (Strachan 2003; Vennesson 2003). Rahbek-Clemmensen et al. (2012) have recently proposed the distinction between four dimensions of this gap which they call *cultural gap, demographic gap, policy preference gap, and institutional gap*. The gap-literature is far

from consensus. Nevertheless, most authors share the conviction that the armed forces and, more general, the military way are currently not in the focus of attention of democratic societies. This refers to both civil society and the political-administrative system.

It is, however, only one aspect of a more complex development. The *civil-military paradox* results from the strange juxtaposition of a somehow recognisable civil-military gap and an opposite trend within the realms of security policy, military strategy and the utility of force. In short, traditional security policy becomes more civilized and military missions include more and more civil activities. The traditional separation between political (civil) and military aspects of a violent conflict has become porous. As Simpson (2012, p. 231) has observed, "war is expanded to incorporate all means which deliver political effect: violence is mixed into other political activity, so that there is a severe erosion of the interpretive difference between military and political activity; war and peace".

This trend has been the object of various analyses over the last two decades. More than a decade ago Moskos et al. (2000), among others, announced the advent of the "*postmodern military*". The main point of the description of a (Western) postmodern military has been often reiterated and deepened both by practitioners in the field (Simpson 2012) as well as military sociologists (von Bredow 1997). Whether we speak of "war amongst the people" (Smith 2007, p. 271), of "soldiers drawn into politics" (Ruffa et al. 2013, p. 30) or of a "revolution in strategic affairs" (Freedman 2006, p. 10)—at the heart of these semantics lies the analytic finding that there is a kind of overlapping, or fusion even, of the military and the civil spheres.

It is puzzling to see both new gaps and new bridges emerge at the same time, hand in hand so to speak. These two developments do not neutralize one another, but, in fact, together they shape the features of modern security policies as well as of stabilization missions and warfare. Unfortunately, the paradoxical nature of this phenomenon all too often opens the door for misunderstandings and serious misjudgements

on the side of political and military leaders. The public uneasiness in many Western countries with the "expeditionary security policies" of governments and, to a lesser degree, with the performance of the armed forces in missions like the intervention in Iraq or Afghanistan is both an expression and a consequence of these misunderstandings.

Civil society and its political institutions are building a wall of benign indifference around the armed forces. Whether in political, cultural or demographic terms, the armed forces are put at the margins of national identity. Security is becoming a concept with more civil than military aspects. The most alarming threats and dangers in the world are of a non-military nature. Even if there are military threats, a growing part of the public is convinced that the root causes of these threats could only be cured by overcoming poverty and deficits of economic development.

The concept of post-heroic societies in the West implies that military values are to a certain extent devaluated nationwide. The warrior ethos appears as mostly anachronistic and, even if not completely obsolete, only useful in a few exceptional cases of incomprehensible violence. Post-heroic societies prefer to use their armed forces in missions other than war, e.g. rescue missions, peacekeeping, reconstruction missions. They tend to regard themselves as basically peaceful democracies and hope for a "democratic peace" in the near future. They like to restrict military expenditure to narrow limits, and some of them make extensive use of private security companies. The details vary, of course, from country to country due to different politico-military cultures.

Democratic Peace Ahead?

The development of the international system over the last decades and the quality of the international order are not really an occasion for overwhelming optimism about the containment of organized violence and war on a global scale. Some macro-regions like North America, Australia or Europe seem to have realized a peaceful

internal balance. Some others like most conspicuously the Near East and Africa remain conflict-ridden and places of regular eruptions of violence and war. Globalization does not standardize the levels of violence on the globe, it allows for sharp differences. Nevertheless, it links the more peaceful regions with the less peaceful ones—and this link cannot be broken.

Nevertheless, the political science discourse of the last two decades carries a quite optimistic vision of a peaceful future of the globe, the concept of a democratic peace which, in some circles, has even won the reputation of being an empirical law. From an historical perspective, the democratic peace thesis builds on the ideas of a liberal teleology formulated by philosophers of history like Constant, Comte and Spencer, mentioned above. The growth of international cooperation, competent international organisations and a multitude of international regimes create a fabric of interdependencies which reveal their utility for the great majority of actors in the international system. In such an environment, organized violence and war are not only inhuman but also destructive, even for those who profit from it in the short term. The persuasive power of this argument is most clearly visible in modern democracies. Conflicts with other states, especially if their political system is also a democracy, should be managed without organized violence. In fact, democracies do not abstain from using violence and resorting to war, but they are inclined to remain peaceful and cooperative with other democracies. This is not the place to delve deeper into the academic discussion about the pros and cons of the partly normative, partly empirical democratic peace thesis. It should be noted, however, that this way of thinking has a rather strong influence on the foreign policies of some important states as well as on the "UN philosophy" of conflict management and peace building in international politics. It stimulated, among other issues, the human rights and good governance agenda of many governments. It also delivered some motivation for regime change and democracy export agendas of several administrations in Washington (Ish-Shalom 2006).

The argument that a world of democracies would, indeed, be more peaceful is certainly convincing. But it is more a faint hope than a firm prognosis. We do not know whether the political development of the globe points in the direction of world-wide democratization. Thus, it is today and in the short and middle term future necessary to conceive of a world in which organized violence and war are not at all obsolete.

Violence and Order

Among human beings, violence is ubiquitous. Violence in its virtual and real forms indicates the fragility of any web of order for a group or society. In social and political relations, violence does not mark the breakdown of order, but functions as a dark but important part of it, both in the perspective of preservation of order and in the perspective of change.

Yet, once unleashed, violence is difficult to contain. Containing violence is, therefore, one of the permanent challenges for social organizations which are responsible for the collective survival of people (families, clans, communities, and states). The modern territorial state is unthinkable without its successful claim on the monopoly of legitimated violence. It is only with this concentration and organization of violence that the latent violence between individuals and groups within a state can be controlled, channelled, and defused.

Organized violence between states is deeply embedded in the structure of international systems. An international system is not viable without a minimum of common rules and patterns of behaviour which are accepted by the member states. Ideally, the acceptance of an international order permanently increases and thus expands the quantity and quality of codes, norms, rules, regulations and legal arrangements. One of the aims of such a process is to minimize organized inter-state violence.

In a functioning state, violence is concentrated in public institutions like the police, the gendarmerie, and the armed forces. The emergence

of organized violence outside the public sphere indicates problems of legitimation and stability of the political system. In an international system which is exclusively state-centred, organized violence is a phenomenon between states only. Of course, international systems have never been exclusively state-centred. Today, the current international system is characterized by a growing number of states, by the rather dramatic growth of non-state actors of different kinds, but also by the weakening of states' sovereignty and an increase of instability in many states. The future of the modern, the "Westphalian" state is seen, at least by some observers, in bleak terms. Some of them (van Creveld 1999) predict the decline and fall of the state both as dominant actor on the international theatre and as effective agency for the control of violence. One of the consequences of this process could be a complete breakdown of the international order.

Other observers prefer a brighter future for the state or the development of international relations. They count on the power of modern democracy. Democracies are basically trading states and neither want nor need organized violence to flourish. Democracies are attractive also for people in other forms of government. Therefore, they expect a democratization of the international system, be it as a permanent process or in waves. Trading states are basically non-military states; their societies are post-heroic societies.

Both perspectives seem to represent the two extremes of the spectrum. They contradict each other sharply. Their proponents do, however, find some empirical data supporting their views.

A more pragmatic perspective tries to avoid the ideological surplus of these views and emphasizes the enormous difficulties created by the current leap of globalization for the international order. The re-arrangement of the international system not only with regards to states and governments, but also on the non-state level encourages all kinds of violent moves. Thus, it is necessary to expand and to strengthen the international acceptance of an order of violence which pursues three aims. The first aim is to

decrease the amount of violence in the international system by an array of measures ranging from arms control and partial disarmament to peaceful settlements of conflicts and incentives for non-violent behaviour. The second is to punish the deviant behaviour of outsiders and peace spoilers with military means which are both effective and based on multinational consent. The third seeks the stabilization of fragile local and regional orders in such a way that it functions as empowerment and not as an imposed foreign paradigm.

The international order of violence today is, more than ever before, a global concern.

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Author Biography

Wilfried von Bredow (1944), Ph.D. (Bonn), from 1972 to 2009 professor for international relations at Philipps-University Marburg (Germany). Among his main research interests are Germany's foreign and security policy, the development and the demise of the East-West conflict, civil-military relations and the future of the military profession. His most recent monographs are "*Sicherheit, Sicherheitspolitik und Militär. Deutschland seit der Vereinigung*", Wiesbaden (Springer VS) 2015 and "*Die Geschichte der Bundeswehr*", Berlin (Palm) 2017.

Military Mobilization in Modern Western Societies

6

James Burk

All modern societies mobilize people to serve in the military. The question is how to do so. There are many possible institutional arrangements from which to choose, ranging from voluntary, local militia service to universal compulsory national service. Once made, the choice is consequential along at least three dimensions. It affects the prospects for winning war because the mobilization plan determines the size and affects the quality of the military force. It also affects formation of foreign policy because the mobilization plan presupposes a force structure and force structure determines the viability and variety of military options available for use in the conduct of foreign affairs. And, it affects the way the military is integrated with—to influence and be influenced by—the society it is formed to protect, depending on who is drawn into military service and who is left behind. In this brief survey of military mobilization, we shall see that modern societies consider all three of these dimensions, war, geopolitics, and domestic political culture, when establishing institutional arrangements to raise a military for war. But they give these dimensions different weight at different times for reasons we have to explore.

My attention is confined to the national societies of Europe and North America whose military prowess since the seventeenth century has made their militaries a model for others to fear and to follow. It is further confined to the period beginning in the late eighteenth century and running to the present. It was in the late eighteenth century that aristocratic forms of military mobilization were first challenged by the invention of a mass armed force, raised by conscription and associated (though not exclusively) with democratic social movements. By the late nineteenth century through most of the twentieth century, mobilization for a mass armed force was the dominant practice among European societies. But, over recent decades, beginning before, then accelerating after the end of the Cold War, mobilization for mass armed forces has given way to mobilization for an all-volunteer professional force.

Here then is the question this survey hopes to answer: What explains the long-term secular trend that sees the rise of mass armed forces at the expense of aristocratic forces and then the fall of mass armed forces in favor of all-volunteer professional forces? Is it a matter to be explained by the "imperatives of war"—assuming that the changing nature of war determines the kind of armed forces societies will raise? Is it explained by the "imperatives of geopolitics"—so that a country's size and place within a system of states so determines the conduct of foreign policy as to impose the kind of military it must raise? Or is it explained rather by the "imperatives of political culture"—aristocratic or democratic, egalitarian

J. Burk (✉)
Department of Sociology, Texas A&M University,
4351 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843, USA
e-mail: jsburk@tamu.edu

or liberal?[1] To raise the questions in this way poses the problem in a misleading way. While we can analytically distinguish these three dimensions as factors that influence how societies raise their armed forces, there is (as we shall see) no reason to suppose that they operate independently of one another and even less reason to suppose that any one factor provides a complete explanation. Nevertheless, the last of these imperatives—the influence of political culture—is more important than customarily realized, not only for military organization but also for the way we think about the military in mature democratic societies.

The survey is divided into three parts. To begin, it provides an overview of the most important trends in mobilization that we encounter during this historical period. Next, it examines three theories that have tried to interpret these trends, to explain why they have occurred and what their significance has been. To conclude, it briefly considers some implications of the decline of the mass armed force and the rise of all-volunteer forces for civil-military relations and the meaning of citizenship in democratic societies.

Historical Overview

Throughout most of the eighteenth century, the armies of Europe were built on an aristocratic model. Standing armies of the crown, they were officered by members of the nobility, manifesting an integration of political and military elites. Elite integration worked to ensure the loyalty of the army to the crown as shared ties of land, family, and ideology forged an identity of interests between the military and the ruling class and brought about a "blending of the management of military and civil affairs" (Rosenberg 1958: 38; Janowitz 1977: 187; Hintze 1975: 202).

Nevertheless, the military was not yet a national institution. It was a dynastic institution under the control of the crown. In Hintze's (1975: 199–200)

words, while the army was the "backbone" of the centralizing state, it was still "a foreign body in the state." The old idea that all men were obligated to defend their community and its interests was not forgotten and was still in some cases relied on (as in the Swiss cantons), but it was not the principal justification for raising and maintaining a military and it figured little in military practice (Paret 1992a: 55). Rulers were reluctant to put arms in the hands of their subjects, as they knew such a practice had egalitarian consequences that might undermine aristocratic dominance. Instead, the lowest ranking members of the realm—"the sweepings of city streets and sons of poverty-stricken peasants"— were pressed into the military's rank and file; or, better yet, foreign mercenaries were hired for the task (McNeill 1982: 137; Howard 1976).[2] These men were made into a disciplined and obedient fighting force by repeated drill.

By the end of the eighteenth century, democratic revolutions in America and France challenged this aristocratic model of military organization. The new revolutionary democratic model rested on an identification of the military with free citizens who served as citizen soldiers and were inspired (at least in theory) by "national enthusiasm and democratic ideas of liberty" (Hintze 1975: 205). Like most revolutionary challenges, this one was not completely new but found precedent in past practice; nor was it completely triumphant over the aristocratic model as soon as it appeared.

The roots of the democratic model were sunk deep in the soil of ancient thought and practice in the city-states of Greece and Rome. Vivid in eighteenth century enlightenment thought was the idea that those ancient republics drew strength from the willingness of male citizens to bear arms in their defense—and that the republics collapsed when that willingness waned.[3] Based

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[1]My language and way of framing these questions is borrowed from Cohen (1985), but should not be taken to represent his argument.

[2]Avant (2000: 46) notes, it was not only the crown that preferred to hire mercenaries rather than natives for the armed forces. Captains in the military "believed that mercenaries fought better than natives" and so they "preferred to furlough the natives and retain only the foreigners under arms.".

[3]This was an important theme, for instance, in the writings of Adam Ferguson, Edward Gibbon, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith. It was also an important idea

on this ancient example and drawing on an early intimation that the state was a national political community, theorists began to consider the idea that all men who belonged to the community were citizens who were obligated to perform military service when called on by the state (Paret 1992a: 56). Still, this was an idea that had little direct application before the American and French Revolutions, though (often feeble) militia systems in colonial North America and Europe helped preserve the idea of a community-based military obligation (Delbrück 1990[1920]: 185–86, 236–37, 451).

What the American and French Revolutions effectively established was a format for a mass armed force based on the mobilization of citizens for military service. It conceived of the citizen soldier as an individual ideal and of the nation of citizen soldiers as a nation in arms. In the minds of many revolutionaries, the principle of universal obligatory military service by citizens was consistent with—even an embodiment of—a democratic regime (Janowitz 1983a: 31; Paret 1992b; Kestnbaum 2000). The institution of conscription was the primary means by which this principle was implemented in practice. Conscription was a practical not a theoretical requirement. Initially, compulsion was used to make citizens perform their military obligation only after volunteering to fight in war had flagged, demonstrating that national enthusiasm and patriotic sentiments were not enough, by themselves, to raise a military force of the size political elites believed was needed.[4] Yet, even when compelled, coupling civil and military obligations helped align state and individual interests as military service built "a stronger awareness of national community" (Paret 1992b: 45).

Of course, the connection between compulsory military service and democratic regimes is precarious; it is certainly not necessary. There is a logical conflict between the democratic ideal of liberty that leaves citizens free to decide when and how they will perform military service and the ideal of egalitarianism that ensures that the burdens of maintaining a political community are equally shared among all members of the community Cohen (1985). Revolutionaries recognized the conflict. In 1789, while some revolutionaries in France thought every citizen should be a soldier and sought conscription to ensure it, others thought conscription was a "despotic method" and worried that "the spirit of liberty" was being invoked "to support a most obvious and cruel slavery" (Paret 1992a: 58–59). American revolutionaries held similar doubts about conscription. Summarizing those doubts, Royster (1979: 68) writes, "a standing army departed so far from the American ideal of personal freedom that they were unable, in conscience or in fact, to force a man to serve for as long as he was needed, even while they could explain why he ought to want to do so." In both cases, however, conscription was resorted to before the revolutions were done.

The French *levée en masse* was conducted on a much larger scale than any compulsory military service during the American Revolution and it had far greater historical importance as a model for others to follow. The *levée* decreed in 1793 aimed to mobilize the entire French nation: young men for battle; married men for work forging arms and transporting provisions; old men to repair public places and preach the ideology of revolution; women to make tents and clothes and to serve in the hospitals; and children to turn old linen into lint (Ralston 1966: 66). The military effect was dramatic. All unmarried men, 18–25 were liable to be drafted and, as a result, by 1794 the French army grew to an enormous 770,000 men, giving France numerical superiority over the aristocratic mercenary armies it had to face (Delbrück 1990 [1920]: 396).

In theory, such a mass armed force of native citizens conferred an important military advantage over the smaller aristocratic armies of

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in the earlier writings of Niccolo Machiavelli. Pocock (1975) shows how this theme influenced political thought in America.

[4]For more on this point see Royster (1979) and Paret (1992a). Note that Britain, which was late to adopt the mass army model—not doing so until the middle of the First World War—and was, like the revolutionaries in the United States and France, moved to do so only after the volunteer system had collapsed. For the British case, see Adams and Poirier (1987).

mercenaries. In practice the matter is not so clear. The Napoleonic wars did not provide a decisive test of the comparative worth of the aristocratic and mass army models. What can be said with certainty is that France's mass armed force represented a new pattern of direct rule between the government and its citizens, a pattern that, with respect to military manpower policies, would be copied in the future by other nations throughout the Western world (Tilly 1990: 107–114; Paret 1992a: 65–66).

The Prussians were the first to do so, in reaction to their defeats at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806.[5] It is often the case that military defeat paves the way for reform. In this case, there had already been a party of liberal reformers who sought to move away from the aristocratic military model to rely more heavily on native manpower. The reformers thought such a step would help address problems of manpower shortage that had arisen in part because of difficulties recruiting mercenaries in the midst of the Napoleonic wars. They also thought it good politics to end the isolation between the military and society, to mobilize the state and the people in pursuit of a national ideal. Not until after the defeats of 1806, could they persuade the king and others (liberal and conservative) to embrace their ideas. The reforms after all were untested, many doubted the wisdom of adopting a policy of conscription to raise a mass army, and the country was still under the thumb of France.

By 1813, after Napoleon's armies were destroyed in Russia, Prussia was free to adopt reforms allowing the creation of a mass army and, by this time, the political forces had shifted in favor of reform. With old barriers to the policy felled by "an outburst of patriotic enthusiasm," conscription for a national army of citizens was introduced (Howard 1976: 87). The effects on force size were quickly apparent as the army grew from 60,000 in December 1812 to 270,000 by the fall of 1813. In addition, a reserve force of similar size was created, the *landwehr*, which

permitted men to elect their own officers and "in which service was compulsory for all men of military age who were not called up into the army itself" (Howard 1976: 87). Following the defeat of Napoleon, despite the absence of real military necessity for them, the reforms were made permanent in the army law of 1814. But unlike the French system of the mass army, which was originally grounded in the aspirations of a revolutionary democratic social movement, the Prussian reforms were essentially conservative. While military service became a widely-shared experience, that experience was under the firm control of the regular army, increased the dependence of the middle classes on the state, and reinforced the power of the crown and the landed nobility (Paret 1992a: 72). The reformers were removed from positions of power, the *landwehr* was not well trained, and the officer corps was once again the preserve of aristocrats (Howard 1976: 94–95).

This is not to deny that some social change had taken place. The reforms removed all foreigners from the army turning the army into a national force, they overcame the division between warriors and citizens, and they made the state an object of interest for the rulers and the ruled. But the democratizing influence of these reforms was limited by making universal military service "an extension of the institution of the standing army" and ensuring that "the army owed allegiance to the Crown, not the [representative] constitution"—this, of course, stands in sharp contrast with what happened in England after its revolution of 1688 (Hintze 1975: 206–209).

We might pause at this point in the historical narrative to note more precisely what we mean when we talk about a mass armed force. The term is ambiguous because it may refer either to the size, homogeneity or mobilization of the army. In fact it refers to all three (van Doorn 1975a, b). As we have seen, movement from an aristocratic to a mass army model results in a substantial increase in force size. More important is that the mass army is putatively homogeneous. This refers in part to the technological basis of military force, in which military experience is predominantly the experience of the combat

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[5]Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the Prussian reform movement draws on Posen (1984: 95–99), Paret (1992a: 68–72), and Avant (2000: 59–63).

infantry soldier. Sociologically more significant, it also refers to the state's reliance on native citizens to serve in the force and to the end of its use of mercenaries of various nationalities as soldiers in the army. This paves the way for wars between nations as opposed to dynastic wars between professionals (Howard 1976). Most important, the mass army depends on the state's capacity to mobilize its people to fight in defense of the state. The capacity to do so is only partly administrative. It is also an ideological achievement that rests on the conversion of subjects into citizens. How this conversion is legitimated and institutionalized has important consequences for whether the mass armed force will be part of a democratic or authoritarian regime.[6]

Widespread adoption of the mass army model did not occur until after 1870. After the Napoleonic wars, almost every European country—France included—either maintained or returned to the aristocratic model of military organization. Mass armies briefly appeared on the field of battle in the United States, during its Civil War, but this experience did not influence manpower policies elsewhere; nor did it result immediately in the adoption of a mass army policy by the victorious Union forces once the Civil War was over. Only Prussia maintained a military system based on "extensive and nearly universal conscription of citizens" (Kestnbaum 2002: 118), but its doing so did not seem to confer any military advantage. Prussian troops had not performed well in combat against the Poles in 1831 and the Danes in 1848; nor did they provide effective support for the crown during the internal civil

disturbances of 1848 (Posen 1993: 103; Vagts 1959: 191). Matters changed after 1857 when Moltke, the Chief of Staff, reorganized the General Staff and King William I pressed to revive Prussian military power despite parliamentary resistance. The army bill of 1860 brought the *landwehr* under the control of the regular army, re-enforced the requirement that males serve three years with the regular army and added a requirement that they serve four years with the reserves before passing on to the *landwehr*. These requirements greatly expanded the military's size.[7] In addition, new attention was paid to the speed and efficiency of the army's mobilization, supply and deployment. As a result, the Prussian army became a large, "rapidly mobilizable, well-trained, professionally-officered mass army" (Posen 1993: 104; Howard 1976: 100; Fuller 1992: 113–121). Most important, it proved to be effective in battle, defeating Austria in 1866 and prevailing again in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–1871.

These victories against major powers elevated the attraction of the mass army over the aristocratic army model even though it was far from clear that the manpower policies were either solely or principally responsible for Prussia's victories. The victories appeared to demonstrate the effectiveness of the mass army and the appearance was sufficiently strong to cause other nations, beginning with France, to emulate their Prussian rival (Avant 2000; Posen 1993: 109–113; Challener 1955). Conscription-based mass armies, comprised of citizen soldiers became commonplace.

While clothed in the ideology of democracy, decisions to adopt the mass army model after 1870 reflected judgments by conservative political and military elites about what was necessary for military security and domestic order (Kiernan 1973). They were wary about democratizing tendencies and relied on military training (as they relied on compulsory education) to teach the

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[6]This point requires more study than it has received. It is well-known that the French mass army, born in a democratic revolution, nevertheless was an instrument of an authoritarian regime, as was the mass army of Prussia. Talk of French or Prussian citizenship cannot alter the fact. In contrast, the army mobilized to fight the American Revolution was never a mass army—despite the use of conscription; it was a mixed force composed of a relatively small regular army augmented by militia. It never became an instrument of an authoritarian regime. On the contrary, the ideology of the citizen soldier formed in that conflict helped to ensure that the political settlement following the revolution's success was a democratic one (Burk 2000). The open question is what accounts for these different outcomes.

[7]Posen (1993: 103) writes: "The Prussians were thus able to field 355,000 soldiers against the Austrians [in 1866], and, with the allies of the North German Confederation, a million in 1870."

virtues of order, discipline and obedience—virtues that were required not only for military effectiveness, but also for workers in new industrial employments. The results were not always what they hoped for. Only in France and Germany did compulsory military service become an essential part of public life; and even in France young conscripts thought of their time in the military as "a mere blank, or interruption of life, a disagreeable duty to be got through as best might be" (Kiernan 1973: 150). Attempts by the Italian government to establish conscription in Sicily helped cause an out migration of youth from the region, which was not staunched by legislation that barred men younger than 32 from leaving the country. In Spain, a special levy of conscripts for service in Morocco "provoked a general strike at Barcelona" (Kiernan 1973: 151). Nonetheless, as compulsory military service became a habit it worked to integrate the "average individual" into the life of his country—an observation confirmed by Weber's (1976) study of the effects of military service on the French peasant's sense of national identity.

In Europe, only Britain failed to adopt the mass army model, as did its offspring in North America. In Britain, though, there were demands for conscription after the turn to the twentieth century (Adams and Poirier 1987). At the same time, there was a movement in the United States for military preparedness emphasizing the ideal of the citizen soldier and the value of compulsory military service (Pearlman 1984). Still, Britain clung to its model of an aristocratic and volunteer army even after the outbreak of the First World War. Only when enduring the toll of that conflict over two years had made it impossible anymore to rely on volunteers did Britain finally resort to conscription to raise a mass army.[8] The

following year, when it entered the war, the United States immediately switched from its small volunteer force to establish a conscripted mass army. These mass armies were demobilized and conscription was halted in both countries when the war ended, but there was no doubt that the mass army format would be used again should war resume. By the twentieth century, the mass armed force had established itself as the standard model for mobilizing manpower for war, and it remained the standard model (with some exceptions) through the Second World War until the end of the Cold War.

Yet to say that the mass army was the standard model from 1945 through the end of the Cold War, while true, can be misleading. It was evident by the 1970s, if not before, that among the Western nations allied in NATO there was a transition underway from the mass army toward an all-volunteer professional force, in which only some serve, with this service being their primary occupation (Janowitz 1972; van Doorn 1975a, b; Martin 1997; Kelleher 1978). The evidence for such a shift was found partly in part the establishment of all-volunteer forces in Britain in 1962 and in the United States in 1973. It could also be seen in European countries that maintained conscript-based forces when their reliance on conscripts fell, as measured by the conscription ratio, that is, by the proportion of conscripts in the regular force (Kelleher 1978). Also telling was that, from 1961 to 1986, the average number of months conscripts served in the armies of the NATO alliance fell from a minimum of eighteen to a minimum of twelve months. Obviously, this fall was affected by the decision by Britain and the United States to create all-volunteer forces. But if these two countries are dropped from the analysis, the average minimum length of service still declined substantially, from twenty months in 1961 to fifteen months in 1986 (Burk 1992: 46). Based on these and other indications, there was by the mid-1980s widespread consensus among students of military mobilization that the post-world war period "witnessed a great trend away from semi-trained, primitively equipped, mass conscript armies towards more streamlined, highly professional forces" (Bond 1986: 214).

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[8]Raising a mass army to fight in the First World War caused political and military elites to be concerned about whether the young men recruited into the army were sufficiently well-educated to grasp the reasons for the conflict and the need for their efforts to fight for their country. To address these concerns, the army established in service educational programs that would develop the soldier "not only as an efficient fighting man, but also as a citizen" (Mackenzie 1992: 5). Such programs were conducted during World War II as well.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 quickened the pace of this movement away from mass armies toward volunteer professional armies. Haltiner (1998) has documented the extent of change for the countries of Western Europe. In the mid-1990s, only Britain and Ireland had adopted the all-volunteer professional mode, but the situation was clearly in flux. Belgium in 1992, the Netherlands in 1993, France in 1996 and Spain in 1997 all decided to abolish conscription and establish a volunteer professional force. In Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands the conscription ratio had already fallen below fifty percent. In fact, the conscription ratio was above sixty-six percent only in Finland, Greece, Turkey and Switzerland. Perhaps more important, the extent of the military mobilization of society had declined by a third, as measured by the military participation ratio, from its average of six percent, from 1970 to 1990, to its average of four percent in 1995. These data are sufficient for Haltiner to conclude that in the 1990s we have seen the definite end of the mass army in Western Europe. A confirmation of the claim, if one is needed, might be found on the battlefield of the Persian Gulf War of 1991 in which the United States soundly defeated the conscript-based mass army of Iraq, which was a large and battle-tested force, with its previously untested all-volunteer professional force.

In summary, as we move from the late eighteenth to the early twenty-first century we observe two revolutionary shifts in the military mobilization models followed by the countries of Western Europe and North America. First, there is a shift from the aristocratic to the mass army model, that begins with the American and French Revolutions and is consolidated after 1870, following the defeat of France's professional aristocratic force by Prussia's mass army in the Franco-Prussian War. The mass army model remained the standard model for military mobilization from that point through the world wars and after. But before the end of the Cold War, for reasons we have not begun to consider, a second shift could be seen away from the mass army toward an all-volunteer professional force. After

the Cold War ends, movement away from the mass army accelerates and the professional force is evidently the new standard model for military mobilization. The question that we need now to address is why these changes in force structure occur when and how they do, and how they affect civil-military relations and the meaning of democratic citizenship in the societies where they occur.

Theories of Change

Sociological studies of different mobilization models have concentrated on the recent transition from a mass army to a volunteer professional army. Transition from the aristocratic to the mass army was more or less taken for granted and considered to be a starting point for analysis rather than something to be explained. Building on the foundation laid by Morris Janowitz (1972), the central theoretical problem was to document and explain the decline of the mass army.[9] Janowitz (1978, 1983a) also examined the rise of the mass army, but the aim, as we shall see, was not to explain its origins. It was rather to examine the effects of the mass army on the rise of parliamentary democracy in the West.[10]

More recently, social scientists engaged in military studies have been concerned to explain the origins of the mass army. This new focus may have to do as much with changing patterns of social science inquiry as with the development of the subject matter itself. Social science research in the middle of the twentieth century was predominantly concerned with the present and with matters of public policy relevance. Certainly that remains true for a great deal of

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[9]The leading works in this tradition are Janowitz (1972, 1978: Chap. 6, 1983a); van Doorn (1975a, b), Martin (1997), Kelleher (1978), Moskos and Wood (1988), Segal (1989), Boëne and Martin (1991), Burk (1992) and Haltiner (1998).

[10]Janowitz (1978: 184–205) also challenged the argument that mass armies necessarily have egalitarian consequences. But this theoretical claim and the evidence for it were never fully developed, so I will not discuss them here.

social science research today. Yet, in the late 1970s and 1980s, there was a resurgent interest in the conduct of comparative historical research, much of which focused on social revolutions and formation of the modern state.[11] Recent studies that explain the transition from the aristocratic to the mass army are part of this resurgence and reflect the twin ambitions of historical sociology to represent fairly the complexity of the phenomenon to be explained and yet to construct analytically rigorous models to explain how and why the phenomenon occurred.

From Aristocratic to Mass Armies

The birth of conscription, Kestnbaum (2002) has forcefully argued, was not the result of a binary policy decision simply to switch from an aristocratic to a mass army format. It was rather a complex event that, in his words, "lies at the intersection of three distinct historical processes" (119). These are the emergence of national citizenship as an organizing political principle, the formation of state policies to compel military service in the line army based on national citizenship, and the mobilization of "the people" for war. Kestnbaum exaggerates when he says these are distinct historical processes. It seems obvious to me that, empirically, they are at least partially overlapping events. Nevertheless, his main points are well taken, that the birth of conscription is a complex process in which these three analytically distinguishable phases occur simultaneously and reinforce one another and that, without any one of them, we would not have the birth of conscription or the mass army. Of course, one wants to know why this event occurs when it does. While it was not Kestnbaum's

purpose to provide a causal model, he notes that the birth of conscription and the mass army occurs at the end of the eighteenth and early nineteen centuries because, in that period, some states were drawn into wars that threatened their future and the independence of the people, and did so to such a degree that political and military elites were willing to consider the radical possibility of mobilizing the popular classes into national politics, of converting subjects of the crown into citizens of the nation.

It is possible to model the process in greater detail. Posen (1993) does so in order to clarify the relationship between nationalism and war. The relationship, he thinks, is a reciprocal one in which each effectively intensifies the other. The problem is to explain how the relationship got started in the first place and why it spread across the states of Europe in the nineteenth century. Posen begins his explanation relying on the premises of "structural realism;" that is he thinks nationalism results from the structure of the international system. He accepts the realist position that international politics are anarchic and that states wishing to be autonomous have to compete for their security. That competition causes states carefully to monitor the military capabilities of their neighbors (or any potential enemy) relative to their own. One result of monitoring is that states imitate those military practices of others that they believe are successful. Among the examples of such imitation is the adoption of the mass army in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Critical to his theory is that imitating the practice of the mass army helped spread nationalism across Europe.

Why would it do so? What is the connection between the mass army and nationalism? Posen argues that the mass army has two essential qualities: It is a large army that, most important, has the "ability to maintain its size in the face of the rigors of war;" by mobilizing and training new recruits to replace losses, it can "to a very large extent retain its 'combat power'" (83). In practice, such an army can appear only under certain historical circumstances: a general increase in population size and wealth, the spread of literacy, a political revolution stressing the

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[11]I say "resurgent interest" because comparative historical work was common among the first generation of "classical" sociologists. Subsequently, the method was relatively neglected with the rise of reliance on social surveys. For a history of this resurgence see Smith (1991). Key works in the genre include Skocpol (1979), Giddens (1985), Mann (1986, 1993), Tilly (1990), and Goldstone (1991)—which is not to neglect the classic work of Moore (1966) that provided a template for others to follow.

ideals of egalitarianism, and technological developments in the weapons of war that encourage dispersing rather than clustering infantry forces. These circumstances prevailed in varying degrees across Europe in the late eighteenth century.

To appreciate their importance for the development of nationalism, we may begin with the observation that the Seven Years War in the mid-eighteenth century made it clear that European armies had become "too good at making war the old-fashioned way….Casualties of 20 percent or more per battle were common…[and] infantry casualties could not be replaced at the pace they were incurred" (Posen 1993: 90; McNeill 1982: Chap. 5). One solution to the problem was to disperse infantry forces, making them less vulnerable to new firepower technology. But dispersing troops posed problems for command and control; it put greater demands on a soldier's motivation and initiative; it taxed efforts to coordinate troop movements; and it still required a means of replacing casualties. The problems could be addressed. But addressing them assumed that new recruits were available in sufficient numbers, that they could be quickly trained, and that they were willing to become soldiers. The numbers could be provided by population growth and increased wealth that, together, would allow the state to divert more young men to military from economic pursuits. What about the rest? Political and military elites came to realize that they could affect the training and motivation of soldiers by teaching them (and the young male population at large) how to read and by instructing them in the culture and history that they "shared" with the larger society. That is, they could address the military crisis, at least in part, by taking direct action to cultivate key elements that we associate with nationalism: a group identity based on a shared culture and history that requires a state structure of its own to thrive. Doing so, however, was also to embrace a revolutionary if still formal egalitarian ideal for all members of the nation.

Before the French Revolution, these ideas, while circulating, found no ready institutional expression. With the French Revolution, they coalesced—more gradually than deliberately, as elites responded piecemeal to problems as they arose—to transform the French army of the old regime into the mass army of the revolution. Posen (1993: 94) believes it is mistaken to suppose this institutional transformation was solely a product of the political revolution itself, as if once the revolution began, the French army was immediately a representative "nation in arms." Before the revolution, there was already a surplus population, a supply of young men without work for whom the revolutionary opportunities tied to military service were welcome. But, after they were mobilized, there was, "a sustained political campaign to educate and motivate the armies… and to forge powerful emotional bonds between the army and the civilian population" (Posen 1993: 94). Cultivation of nationalism and the mass army occurred together, reinforcing one another. Resort to conscription after volunteering failed made the armed forces more representative of the whole society. People mobilized into war service moved from their primordial communities to learn that there was a larger France. Leaders increased emphasis on teaching literacy within the army and disseminated political propaganda in army camps (much of which was read aloud by those who could read to those who could not). And civic festivals were held, at first spontaneously, but soon under careful control of the political elite, that brought soldiers and civilians together to celebrate the ideals of the revolution.

The result was an effective military solution to the problems encountered in the Seven Years War. The French mass army was large and its ties to the public helped sustain troop morale. Given the effectiveness of conscription, it could take and replace casualties without losing its military effectiveness. That meant it could "engage in frequent battles of great violence" without reducing its prospects for victory (Posen 1993: 93). The lesson was not lost on France's competitors, as shown by Prussia's move to imitate the French model. This argument, which adopts the logic of a functional explanation, can be

stated in general terms.[12] When changes in the international system undermine traditional military practices and jeopardize a state's success at war, then political and military elites cast about for solutions to the problem—for ways to reform the military structure—that will make success at war more likely. Should reforms instituted by one state seem to resolve the problem, those reforms are likely to be imitated by others. In this case, Posen argues, the institutional reforms that led the French from an aristocratic to a mass army only worked together with the cultivation of nationalism. Not only was the military model likely to be imitated by others, but so also was the cultivation of nationalism. Because nationalism and mass armies were linked at birth they were inseparable afterwards. As one spread throughout Europe, so did the other.

While Posen's argument provides a plausible account of the rise of the mass army and the reasons for its spread, it suffers from a problem common to many functional theories. It understates the degree to which historical outcomes are contingent on local choices from among a variety of alternatives, each one of which may at least be seen as viable under the circumstances. To be fair, Posen (1993: 86) did not attempt a decisive test of his argument; his more modest aim was to determine its plausibility by seeing how well it accounted for the invention of the mass army during the French Revolution and its imitation by the Prussians shortly thereafter. Yet before embracing Posen's theory wholeheartedly, we should wonder why after 1814 until the 1870s only Prussia adopts the mass army format, while other European powers (France included) retain some variant of the aristocratic model. What we need is a theory (more refined than Posen's) that can do two things. First, it should take seriously the contingent nature of historical events. Second, it should account for the invention of the mass army in the French Revolution, the latency of the mass army model in Prussia from 1814 to 1870, and the widespread acceptance of the mass army model following 1870.

Avant (2000) provides such a theory. Like Posen, she argues that the period from the mid-eighteenth century onward was one of "material and ideational turmoil." She notes the material pressures brought on Europe's international system by rising population growth and the subsequent push for territorial expansion. These pressures intensified international competition and increased the prospects for large-scale conflict. She also notes that liberal Enlightenment ideas encouraged a new way of thinking about the relations between states and soldiers and citizens. An important implication of natural law and social contract theories was that the sovereignty of the state rested with the members of the political community, not the throne. But, "if sovereignty rested in the people," Avant (2000: 44) writes, "the defense of sovereignty was an obligation held by all." There was a clear link between belonging to a political community and citizenship and between citizenship and the obligation to perform military service. By this logic, "citizens were representatives of the state—not just more or less willing subjects" and so it was "more difficult for rulers to distance themselves from the actions of their citizens." In short, it would seem as if both material and ideational circumstances converged in a way encouraging for a transition from aristocratic to mass armies. So far, Avant's argument complements Posen's theory.

But Avant goes on to argue that the mass army was not the only proper or possible response to the material and ideational demands placed on the international system at this time. She contends existing limits on order and supply suggested that smaller aristocratic armies would perform better than mass armies (which is not to deny that tactical innovations favoring force dispersal may have been required). Defenders of this alternative could also have drawn support for their claims from Enlightenment thought. After all the aristocratic army was composed of long-term servers who were disciplined by drill. It was a professional army, by the standards of the day, engaged in a thoroughly rationalized military practice; and the virtues of expertise based on rational knowledge, embodied in this force, were Enlightenment virtues—in tension

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[12]On the logic of functional explanations, see Stinchcombe (1987: 80–101).

with democratic ideals to be sure, but virtues nonetheless. Nor should we suppose that the mass army had clearly demonstrated its superiority over the aristocratic armies on the field of battle. Prussia's defeats at Auerstadt and Jena could be explained either by crediting the power of France's citizen army or by pointing to the "ineptitude" of Prussia's field leaders, with the latter a matter that could be remedied without radical organizational reform (Avant 2000: 47). The problem for theory, then, is to explain why states choose one military model over another when the evidence suggests that either might have met the challenges they faced.

Avant (2000: 42) argues, "individual states were more likely to move toward citizen armies when they had been defeated militarily and when the ruling coalition was split or indifferent about the reforms tied to citizen armies." This argument assumes that the climate for institutional reform is prepared by conditions of material and ideational turmoil. But whether conservative or new ideas for institutional development prevail depends on other intermediary factors. The reason why is that institutionalizing new ideas is likely to have distributional consequences within the political community. Typically, aristocratic rulers were reluctant to embrace citizen armies because they worried that arming citizens would have egalitarian consequences undermining their position of power and privilege. Under these circumstances radical change is unlikely to occur unless there is a dramatic exogenous shock to the country—most often a military defeat—that discredits prevailing wisdom and institutional practice. But such a shock, by itself is not sufficient to determine the course of change.

As elites deliberate about how to respond to the challenges they face, they must define the problem and identify how it might be solved. Avant calls agreements about these definitions "focal points;" once the focal point has been reached, then institutional reform is possible. Whether reform is radical or mild or simply reinforces the status quo depends on the relative unity of the dominant elite. The more ideas are shared, the more likely that a focal point will "emerge spontaneously." Such focal points are "likely to be automatic, commonsensical, and therefore conservative" responses to the problem that "fold new problems into old solutions" (Avant 2000: 49). When elite opinion is divided, when there is greater uncertainty about how to respond, then focal points are more likely to be constructed, with new coalitions created to build support for reform. Such reform proposals are more likely to lead to radical change. Assuming divided opinion among elites, a radical outcome is most likely to occur when elites suppose that no proposed solution will have important distributional consequences or, perhaps more likely, when they cannot agree on but are split about what the distributional consequences of any proposed solution should be.

In sum, Avant believes that the shift from aristocratic to mass armies occurs when there is material and ideational turmoil, followed by an exogenous shock to the country and elites are divided about how to respond. These conditions prevailed in France during the revolution and in Prussia in the period 1806–1814. If there is only turmoil without an exogenous shock and elites are divided about military policy—as the Prussians were in the late eighteenth century—then there may be many plans for military reform, but no real prospects that these plans will be adopted. Alternatively, if there is turmoil with an exogenous shock and yet elites quickly agree about what how to respond, then there may be reform, but the reforms are likely to be narrow in scope and conservative. This was the case in Britain following its defeat in the American Revolution.

But Avant does not argue that the probability of transition from aristocratic to mass armies is determined solely by domestic considerations. Like Posen, she believes that states monitor the military practices of their neighbors and potential enemies. When a state adopts a military format that is successful—i.e., it "wins wars, [and] fits with prevailing ideas" (Avant 2000: 43)—it is likely to become a model that other states will follow. It establishes a new international definition of what a military is, how it should be raised and trained and used in combat. The presence of an established model has the effect of quelling the turmoil about what the military form should

be. That does not mean that every state in the system will immediately adopt a newly established form—though, as we have seen, many states did adopt the mass army model in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War. Domestic considerations interact with international demonstration effects. In effect, a newly established model provides divided elites a new focal point around which to build a coalition for reform. This happened in Britain in the 1870s, following embarrassments in the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny. While Britain did not yet embrace the mass army, the Cardwell reforms moved away from the aristocratic army model by making it clear that it was British citizens who should fight for British interests, "while making it illegal for its citizens to fight for other interests" (Avant 2000: 65).

Avant's theory provides a useful explanation of change from the aristocratic to the mass armed force, one that is general, but sufficiently nuanced as it allow for variation in outcomes depending on the experience of particular countries. The generality of the model suggests that it might also be usefully applied to explain the transition from the mass army to the all-volunteer force in the late twentieth century. What Avant's theory fails to take seriously, in sharp contrast to Posen, is the connection between deciding to build a mass army and the cultivation of nationalism. Avant is skeptical of this connection because she doubts the success of the French Revolutionary army depended on the nationalist and ideological motivations of the soldiers. She suggests that attributing military success to the spirit of the French soldiers was a myth cultivated by revolutionary leaders "to enhance the legitimacy of the revolution and their place in power" (Avant 2000: 56).[13] Here is an instance,

however, when we might take myths seriously. Myths may obscure judgments about the technical competence of different forms of military organization, but they are still important for understanding the social and political consequences of adopting a mass army over an aristocratic army.

From Mass Armies to All-Volunteer Professional Forces

The most extensive consideration of the societal effects of the mass armies is found in the work of Janowitz (1971, 1978, 1983a, 1991).[14] His major claim is that the transition from the aristocratic to the mass army helped bring about the fundamental democratization of Western societies and that the decline of mass armies requires refashioning of the citizen-soldier ideal. The argument underlying this claim is subtle and many qualifications are needed to ensure that it is not misunderstood. One cannot simply assert that mass mobilization of citizens for military service is a democratizing force. We have observed many times, aristocratic political elites were aware that the conversion of subjects into citizens and arming citizens for military service would exert an egalitarian influence in their societies. To the extent possible these distributional effects of the mass army were matters to be controlled. Prussia was perhaps most successful in exercising this control, requiring in its constitutional arrangements that the military was allegiant to and commanded by the king and not controlled by the parliament. Its mass army was a "monarchical-civil-service regime" and "the officer corps had its own direct representative at court" (Janowitz 1978: 176).[15] The theoretical

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[13]Avant relies on Blanning (1996) for her historical evidence on this point. The issue engaged, about the ideological motivations of soldiers and the importance of these motivations for military success is a controversial one and as yet unresolved. For contrasting arguments on the matter, see for example Bartov (1992), Shils and Janowitz (1948), McPherson (1997), Linderman (1987).

[14]Janowitz, more than any other, is responsible for establishing military studies as a sub-field within sociology. See Burk (1993).

[15]In this regard, one should not overlook the Russian army in the nineteenth century, where conscription was compatible with "serflike [sic] sociopolitical relations" (Janowitz 1991: 224).

problem is to explain why mass armies and parliamentary democracies emerge simultaneously in the West and, supposing that the connection is not merely fortuitous, to consider not only why mass armies have declined since 1970, but also how their decline may affect the future course of parliamentary democracy.

Janowitz (1991: 224) offers two reasons to explain the simultaneous rise of mass armies and democracy in the West. The first is grounded in the normative meaning of citizenship, associated with a requirement for military service and with a model of civic participation. The second is grounded in the restraint of military elites that had the opportunity and means to intervene in politics, but refrained from doing so.

The ideologies of the American and French revolutions supported a normative definition of citizenship that bridged mass military service and the rise of democratic civic participation, exemplified by the extension of the franchise to groups previously excluded from the political process (Janowitz 1991: 236). They did so by creating a "nationalist symbolism" that stood in contrast to traditional and local community attachments. This symbolism supplied a basis for the political legitimacy of the revolutionary leaders, a rationale for demanding sociopolitical change, and (as Posen believes, but Avant doubts) "a particularly effective basis for organizing the armed forces." The legitimacy of the citizen armies of the revolutions was based on their role in defending the ideals of the revolution: individual freedom and social and political justice. Arming the "ordinary person" and declaring a broad "right to bear arms" forwarded the political aims of the nationalist revolutions and at the same time recruited new social elements into the military and political arena, formally as equals. Service in the revolutionary army enlarged "the concept of who were effective members of the polity" and "supplied a key ingredient in the expansion of the electorate." In short, "the duties and obligations of the armed citizen set the framework for the concept of the electorate in civil society." Once established, the ideal of the citizen soldier made military service an important pathway to political inclusion for previously excluded groups; it was

a powerful democratizing force. In the United States, for example, no one could become a citizen through the first half of the twentieth century—no matter how old or what sex—who would not promise to bear arms in defense of the country.[16] And prior service as a citizen soldier "has been a powerful asset for candidates seeking election to the Senate and the House of Representatives" (Janowitz 1978: 180).[17]

The evolution of military service as "a hallmark of citizenship" and of citizenship as "the hallmark of a political democracy" (Janowitz 1991: 226–27) was not an inevitable development. It was possible because the military leaders of the mass armies did not intervene to redirect political movements toward a more conservative path. This meant the military elite, part of the ruling class under the aristocratic model, "had to be depoliticized or politically contained" (227). This occurred to some degree owing to the broadening of the social origins of the officer corps, making it more representative of the people. But this was not the most important element. In fact the officer corps remained a reservoir of conservative political traditions and attached to the "heroic model" of military service inherited from its aristocratic past. Perhaps unexpectedly, this conservative and "heroic" model of the military officer may have facilitated parliamentary forms (as it would have facilitated authoritarian regimes) insofar as it enacted the value of personal allegiance to the ruler—which means to the parliament in an evolving democratic state. Critical to the officer corps's political restraint, Janowitz believed was socialization in and acceptance of a professional military ethic, based on allegiance to the constitution, that required obedience by the officer corps to appropriate elected officials and proscribed the officers direct intervention into politics. This ethic, like the normative definition of the citizen

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[16]Unlike minority groups who have often struggled to gain political rights through military service, conscientious objectors have struggled not to lose political rights as a result of their refusal to perform military service (Burk 1995).

[17]Recent data suggest that this observation may no longer hold after the Cold War (Bianco and Markham 2001).

soldier, was grounded in the republican ideologies of the American and French Revolutions. These revolutionary ideologies—especially in the American case—made it difficult for military leaders to seize and hold political power. "In the United States," Janowitz (1991: 237) writes, "historians emphasize George Washington's political commitment to civilian rule, but this in turn represented the pervasive ideological and normative definitions of the American Revolution."

Despite the important role that mass armies played in promoting the rise of parliamentary democracy in the West, it was not inevitable that the mass army model would continue to be the predominant format for military mobilization and organization. We have already seen that during the Cold War the mass army began to give way to the all-volunteer professional army. Janowitz (1972) was the first to examine the trend, to offer an explanation for it, and to try to discern its consequences. The decline of the mass army marked the "end of an epoch" in which military service was for many an "act of political affirmation" and an "expression of popular nationalism" (12). What caused its decline?

Janowitz (1978: 183) posited three related causes. First, the destructive impact of the world wars, especially the potential for nuclear destruction following the end of the Second World War, called into doubt the military relevance of mass armed forces and the ideal of the citizen soldier. Under these new conditions, armies could not be mobilized for war and demobilized for peace, enabling intermittent military service by citizens. A continuously mobilized force was required, still large, but smaller than the armed forces raised for the world wars. The primary aim of this force was not to fight, but to help deter the outbreak of any large-scale war. Second, he noted the effects of affluence and higher education on the willingness of citizens to perform military service. High levels of income and education, he believed, produced "opposition to the style of life of the military establishment, resistance to military authority, plus a new diffuse, moral criticism" that refused to defer to any authority; this

undermined the legitimacy of compulsory military service and tarnished the ideal of the citizen soldier. "Literacy, patterns of mass consumption, and political rhetoric have emerged as more important than military service as hallmarks of citizenship" (Janowitz 1972: 13–14). Finally, and as a consequence of the first two trends, there has been "an attenuation of nationalist sentiments." That was not to say that nationalist sentiments have disappeared. "Feelings of national identity remain deep-seated and are readily mobilized in periods of tension and crisis" (Janowitz 1978: 183). But expressions of nationalism are muted. They are diluted by "powerful feelings of transnationalism" and increased acceptance of the ideals of a pluralist society, and this "weakens the very foundation of popular military service" (Janowitz 1972: 14). Under these conditions, an all-volunteer force has greater legitimacy than a mass army dependent on conscription.

Janowitz wondered how a weakened sense of nationalism and the decline of mass armies would affect parliamentary institutions. Unlike the classical sociologists who believed that the recession of military institutions automatically promoted democratic well being, Janowitz believed that the citizen soldier ideal encouraged and legitimated popular participation in politics and that an army composed of citizen soldiers contributed to civilian control of military institutions and the use of force.[18] Underlying his belief was an understanding that effective citizenship and integration within society must be cultivated (Janowitz 1983a).[19] They depend on programs of civic education that engage citizens. The programs must be participatory. The foundations of citizenship and democratic society

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[18]His position should not be confused with an unqualified assertion that preparation for war and military conflict during the era of mass armies automatically promoted democracy. On the contrary, he explicitly argued that parliamentary control over the military was strained by preparations for war that create a strong military-industrial complex and that war created societal tensions that weaken democratic political institutions (Janowitz 1991: 225).

[19]For elaborations on this position, see Moskos (1988), Gorham (1992), and Burk (2000).

were not formed through classroom instruction in civics, but through direct experience within the community, cooperating with others to meet real community needs. The ideal of the citizen soldier is important because the need for military security is real and it is a need that citizen soldiers have for many years been able cooperatively to meet. But with the decline of mass armies, Western states no longer require universal or nearly universal military service from their citizens. When being a citizen soldier is not a widely shared experience, it loses value as a form of civic education. Those who volunteer for service in the professional army may believe that their participation is a positive experience, enlarging their capacities as citizens. But even that belief may be undermined if the meaning of military service is not located within a larger communal framework.

How would Janowitz prevent this negative outcome? He offered two suggestions that essentially reformulate his earlier argument to explain the simultaneous rise of the mass armies and democracy. First, he would generalize the ideal of the citizen soldier, embedding military service in a larger program of national service that includes non-military service projects. Once established, a program of national service would ensure that citizens cooperate together to serve a common good, turning them into more effective citizens. It would create a societal context within which military service in an all-volunteer force could still be valorized as an embodiment of the citizen soldier ideal; it would preserve the association of military service with democratic civic participation (Janowitz 1983a). Second, he would reinforce the social restraints that contained the political behavior of the professional officer corps. Without supposing that social origins directly determine political behavior, he noted that with the transition from a mass army to an all-volunteer professional force, "social recruitment re-emerges as a more relevant variable, since recruitment becomes less representative" (Janowitz 1991: 233). The danger is that an officer corps, isolated from the larger society, is more likely to feel compelled to operate inappropriately as a political pressure group to

influence national security policy.[20] To prevent this from occurring, Janowitz (1983b: 74–76) advocated new programs of professional military socialization. He proposed an explicit program in the political education soldiers that would show the connection of their professional military activities to the attainment of national and transnational purposes. The aim was to ensure that military goals were always seen as means to the ends of a democratic society.

Implications

This survey of changing patterns of military mobilization has shown that the way states recruit armies for war has consequences beyond those directly tied to military organization or to the immediate prospects for military victory or defeat. Changing from aristocratic to mass armies in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was part of a larger social transformation from aristocratic to democratic societies. Converting subjects, previously excluded from political participation, into armed citizens mobilized to defend the state, helped forge dynastic states into nations and empowered citizens to become active participants in the civic life of the nation. Yet, as we have just seen, the close connection between the rise of mass armies and democratization in the West raises questions about the likely social and political consequences of the displacement of mass armies by volunteer forces over the last fifty years. The questions are pressing, as the historical evidence tying patterns of military mobilization to political forms is far-reaching.

In his study of the city, Weber (1981: 319) argued that cities in the West were revolutionary political units established on the basis of a

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[20]Janowitz's concerns were based on an extension of his theory rather than strong evidence. Only recently have data become available to test the proposition that transition from a mass army to a volunteer professional army might create a "gap" between the military and society that is problematic for democratic well being—and these data are confined to the United States. Feaver and Kohn (2001) provide a comprehensive review of the data and discussion of the issue.

"brotherhood in arms for mutual aid and protection, [and] involving the usurpation of political power."[21] The members of this brotherhood were those designated as citizens and their union was the basis for democratization. How far democratization would proceed was historically variable. Its extent was limited by the degree to which citizens were able to provide their own military equipment and subsequently to prevail in battle against a military organization of knights or individual warrior heroes. In other words, democratization was most likely during those historical periods when a disciplined infantry held the advantage in battle. The point is obviously relevant to our study of the rise of mass armies. "Military discipline," Weber (1981: 325) wrote, "meant the triumph of democracy because the community wished and was compelled to secure the cooperation of the non-aristocratic masses and hence put arms and, along with arms, political power into their hands." But when military organization depended on the valor of knights (as in feudal Europe) or on centralized state bureaucracies (as in the ancient irrigation societies of Asia), no notion of citizenship and democratic social organization was likely to emerge. For our purposes, Weber's argument implies that as the rise of mass armies enhanced prospects for democracy so the current rise of volunteer professional armies lessens the prospects for a highly participatory democratic culture.

It is well beyond the purpose of this chapter to determine whether Weber's hypothesis is true. Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons to doubt the hypothesis if it expects the decline of mass armies to hang like a dark cloud over the future of democratic regimes.

First, while it is true that the rise of democratic regimes was associated with the revolutionary mobilization of citizen soldiers for war, we should not suppose it was the sole factor required to establish democratic regimes or that the factors required to establish democracy are necessarily the same as those required to maintain it. The

liberal democratic regimes established in the West were established and are maintained in part by their economic strength, which creates vested interests in this political form across broad segments of the population (Stephens 1993). Moreover, democratic institutions—like the rule of law—once established, have a life of their own and while they are not self-sustaining, they nevertheless develop strong constituencies to protect the benefits of a democratic regime. This process has been particularly evident in the legal history of the "rights revolution" in the twentieth century (Epp 1998). Note also that these internal developments strengthening democratic practices are also reinforced by an international system that punishes regimes deficient in these regards.

Second, we must not suppose that a simple linear model is true, one in which mass armies create citizens who build democracies. To see the limits of such a model we have only to remember that adopting the mass army was not everywhere necessarily a democratic force. The mass armies of Napoleon and Prussia in the nineteenth century served regimes that were democratic to a quite limited degree. The mass armies of the Germans in the Second World War and the Soviet Union in the twentieth century served regimes that were not democratic at all. The invention of mass armies and the ideal of the citizen soldier promoted democracies when the geopolitical threats of large-scale ground conflict were happily at a minimum, as they were for Britain and the United States at least until the middle of the twentieth century. Also important is that, during the American and French revolutions, ideologies defined the meaning of mass armies in terms that contributed to a democratic republic. These ideologies provided the substantive rationale for the citizen soldier ideal and for the subsequent political restraint of military elites. Without this ideological direction in favor of democracy, the political effects of the invention of a mass army would have been open to question. In short, the political significance of any form of military mobilization and organization is contested and socially constructed at that time of its formation. If so, then the consequences for democracy of the rise of volunteer

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[21]Collins (1975: 355–364) offers a formal summary of the logic of this argument.

professional armies—in place of mass armies—is not strictly determined. It is historically contingent (Sheehan 2013).

Still it is possible that contemporary forms of military mobilization might undermine democratic political processes. Consider patterns of military mobilization during the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Initially, political and military elites did ask questions about how many people and how much capital would be needed for the wars. But this first experience in large-scale warfare since the end of the Cold War was novel. Compared to the world wars, the capital and manpower needed for these post-9/11 conflicts were limited. More soldiers were needed than were or could be made available for the fight (Avant 2005). Resources needed to support and protect soldiers (especially against improvised explosive devices) were not supplied in a timely fashion. Capital required to pay for the wars was not ready in hand, but was borrowed, and the borrowings were accounted for "off the books." In addition, traditional means for mobilizing resources for war—conscripting armed forces, raising taxes, and selling war bonds—went unused.[22]

Despite the shortfalls, political leaders seemed unwilling to ask citizens to make personal sacrifices war. On September 20, 2011, when President George W. Bush was asked what he expected from the public in support of the fight against terror, the president replied, in effect, not much. The people were to carry on with their lives and keep shopping; or so the pundits put it. His full response was more subtle and demanding. The president asked Americans to live their lives, hug their children, uphold the country's values, support victims of the tragedy with charitable contributions, show patience for delays required by security checks, participate and be confident in the American economy, and pray for the victims of terror and their families. Nevertheless, the punditry was not far off the

mark. It is not much sacrifice to do what one most likely would have done in any case.

What accounts for this reticence, especially among U.S. political leaders, to ask for more when more was needed? Vennesson (2013) suggests the reticence resulted, at least in part, from declining civic participation in the United States; rates of civic participation have declined steadily since the 1970s. He may be a right. But I suggest other factors may be at work.

Contrast earlier wars with the post-9/11 conflicts. In the world-war era, mobilization for war was characterized by raising mass armed forces. Force size determined military strength. With the end of the Cold War, if not before, that equation no longer held. Since 1989, most NATO nations relied on smaller (more flexible) armed forces and reduced their military expenditures (Kümmel 2013). A smaller force format was well suited to meet the demands of a contemporary war. There was no good military reason to mobilize citizens to fight a war on terror. Nor was it clearly necessary to pay higher taxes or buy war bonds. Instead, it was reasonable to claim that maintaining a strong economy was the foundation for the nation's military strength. What mattered most for success in war was the people's "continued participation and confidence" in the economy—not raising taxes, not raising savings rates.[23]

This is not to say that, since 9/11, war required no major mobilization or no major sacrifice by the nation as a whole. On the contrary, I suggest, the post-9/11 wars saw a shift away from traditional concerns about mobilizing people and capital toward an enhanced concern about mobilizing, gathering and synchronizing, information, that is only possible by reliance on new electronic—cyber—capabilities (Thomas 2006; Hille 2011). Cronin (2006) called this a new *levée en masse*. The analogy is imperfect, but it nicely captures the main idea. We are in the midst of a social revolution, not just a war, but an event shaking up the relationship between the people and the state.

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[22]To put this departure from traditional practice in historical context, see Segal and Korb (2013).

[23]We offer this as a reasonable claim, not as an economic certainty.

The U.S. Patriot Act illustrates the point. The act was passed and signed quickly into law after 9/11 on October 26, 2001. The act was about mobilizing information to protect the United States from another terrorist attack. The law permitted closer information sharing between intelligence agencies, the FBI and local law enforcement agencies. It made it easier to conduct wiretaps by allowing one wiretap authorization to cover multiple electronic devices and by lowering the bar for launching foreign intelligence wiretaps and searches. (An amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act had a similar effect by allowing intelligence gathering on any non-U.S. citizen who was not affiliated with any known terrorist group.) The law allowed the FBI to search without warrant and seize any tangible thing—including for instance, business or library records—in support of foreign intelligence investigations. It also allowed sneak and peek warrants that permitted authorities to search a home or business without immediately notifying the target. The law imposed a gag order to prevent those who turned over the records to authorities from telling anyone that they had done so. The law prohibited any provision of material support to terrorists, to include providing any expert advice or assistance, no matter what its relationship is to any terrorist activity. These provisions—comprehensive though they are—only briefly summarize the act.

People and capital still matter, of course, but gathering information about citizens and non-noncitizens, at home or abroad, by fair means or foul—matters more. Note, too, that the mobilization of information imposed a heavy sacrifice, which political leaders were more than ready to demand from their citizens. Mobilization of information curtailed basic liberties of speech, protections against searches and seizures, and the presumption of a right to privacy. Proponents of the act argued that sacrifice was the price paid for fighting post-9/11 wars. Under the new mobilization plan the old balance between security and liberty no longer held, with liberty losing ground. What cyber technology makes it possible to do is permitted, trumping other valued considerations, so long as it is done in the name of war.

In brief, the Patriot Act—not to mention the use of torture as a means of enhanced interrogation—represented a dramatic shift away from the mobilization of people and capital to the mobilization of information. The consequences of this shift in military mobilization for democratic politics remain unknown, raising questions that future students of mobilization and defenders of democratic politics will have to answer.

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Author Biography

James Burk is Professor of Sociology and a Cornerstone Faculty Fellow in the College of Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University, where he has taught since 1983. He earned his baccalaureate degree, with honors, in 1975 from Towson University, his master's degree in 1978 and his PhD in 1982 both from the University of Chicago. His research is founded on the tradition of philosophical pragmatism. His primary research asks whether and how civil-military relations protect and sustain the institutions and values of a good democratic society. He has authored and edited four books, most recently, How 9/11 Has Changed Our Ways of War, and numerous journal articles and book chapters. He also edited the journal, Armed Forces & Society. He received the College of Liberal Arts' Distinguished Teaching Award. He was named a Cornerstone Faculty Fellow in the College. He received the Morris Janowitz Career Achievement Award from the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, an interdisciplinary and international society for the study of civil-military relations. Most recently, he received the Robin W. Williams Award for Distinguished Contributions to Scholarship, Teaching and Service, this from the American Sociological Association Section on Peace, War, and Social Conflict.

Part III
Armed Forces and Society

Vladimir O. Rukavishnikov and Michael Pugh

Introduction

What is the relationship between civilians ('without arms'), the society at large and the military ('with arms') established as a separate body in order to protect a society? This question has a long history that goes back to antiquity, to the very beginnings of military organizing in civilian societies.[1] In each country, the answer to this question is deeply influenced by national history, sentiments and traditions. It depends on the role of the army as a state institution in the given country, subordination of the military to political authorities, defined in laws, and constitutional arrangements, and so on. Public perceptions of the

military personnel, prestige of the military officer's profession, public opinion toward defence and foreign policy of the regime and certain actions of the army determine it. The very nature of the problem is permanently changing, because both society and the military are constantly changing as well.

Civil-military relations have many dimensions, and, therefore, they can be viewed from different perspectives. Those dimensions include relationships in the spheres of power and politics, economics and media, science and technology, culture and history. For reasons of space, we are not able to consider all dimensions and aspects of the problem in this chapter. The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, we summarize principal phases in the development of civil-military relations' theory that have occurred from the 19th to early 21st centuries. This overview of the field is limited to a selection of publications, mainly in English and mainly to volumes with large sets of country studies and/or cross-national and comparative studies. Then we consider the issue of civil control of the military in democracies in general. In the following section we focus on social and cultural changes in the armed forces and wider society. We have tackled some areas that have been problematic in civil-military relations in the past, and perhaps will continue to be problematic in the future: military conscription and cultural gaps between society and professionals; women in the armed forces; and adjustment of demobilized forces to the civilian way of life.

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[1]By "arms" or "weapons", we understand those instruments of offence generally made use of in war, such as firearms, swords, etc. The term 'military', as a sociological category, is interpreted as "an acceptance of organized violence as a legitimate means for realizing social activities. Military organizations, it follows, are structures for the co-ordination of activities meant to ensure victory on the battlefield. In modern times these structures have increasingly taken the form of permanent establishment maintained in peacetime for the eventuality of armed conflict and managed by a professional military" (Sills 1972).

V. O. Rukavishnikov (✉)
Moscow's High School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: rukavish@hotmail.com

M. Pugh
University of Bradford, Bradford, UK

In the next section, the issue of civil-military relations within international peace-support operations is summarised. Peacekeeping today is no longer what it used to be, because of the scale of the task, the resources, and the institutions involved, both military and civilian. It is clear from UN and NATO experiences that attempts have been made to integrate the civilian dimensions of complex peace-support operations. Conclusions extrapolated from the previous discussions are presented in the final section.

Basic Developments in the Field

For an appropriate understanding of the evolution of civil-military relations through the centuries, one has to scrutinize the records of history, ideas of philosophers and sociologists,[2] insights of poets and folk wisdom. We note that only in the 20th century did political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and economists attempt to study the relationship between the military and society with the theoretical and empirical tools of social science and arrived at results, which had been more precise and accurate than the accumulated wisdom of the ages.

Among those influential scholars, who appreciated the importance of military factors in shaping societies in the first half of the 20th century, one can start by mentioning Max Weber and Gaetano Mosca. Weber's views on this problem were stated most explicitly in his monumental treatise Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1922) and in the masterly essay The Economic Theory of Ancient States. Since the 1920s, Weber's works have been translated into many languages and reprinted many times (Gerth and Mills 1972). Mosca discussed the factors which determine the amount of military influences in politics in The Ruling Class

(New York 1939) which was praised later as "one of the most illuminating treatise on politics ever written» (Andrzejewski 1954).

Concerning the impact of military thinkers, we have to mention the German general Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz. Prussian major general who first encountered war as a 12-year old lance corporal going to be a staff officer with political-military responsibilities at the very centre of the Prussian state. He never commanded but served as the chief of staff and reflected often during staff assignments at the Military College. He wrote about the enduring principles of battlefields, about the nature of war that he experienced first-hand in a battle against Napoleon's forces. Clausewitz is most famous for his treatise Vom Kriege, translated in English as On War. Clausewitz's great book was published in 1831, and subsequently translated into many languages, including Russian, and re-printed several times.

As for military sociology, Stouffers' work on the American Soldier (Stouffer et al. 1950) was one of the pioneering studies on the sociology of social structures, personnel and social psychology, which was based on scientific methods presented in a systematic form. From the 1950s to 1980s, American political scientists examined civil-military relations in the country as interactions between the armed forces, political elites and citizenry, focusing on the influence of the military high-commanders on the making of foreign and defence policy. Major theories, applicable to Western democracies, were developed in the 1950s and 1960s by Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. The 1970s and 1980s were decades of theoretical refinement, influenced strongly by the end of the Vietnam War and the end of military conscription in the United States (Smith 1951; Ekirch 1956; Huntington 1957; Goodpaster and Huntington 1977. For discussion of the impact of these theories and their limitations, see: Feater 1996).

Historically, military personnel have been trained and motivated to protect the entire nation from an external invasion and the ruling regime from domestic unrest as well. With regard to Western democracies, theories of civil– military

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[2]As for a history of the sociology of the military see also in this volume the Chapter "Some historical notes", by G. Caforio and Doo-Hong Seung.

relations, which evolved at the end of the 1960s, also assumed that the major task of armed forces was to defend society from external enemies, and to project forces in support of foreign policy externally.[3]

The military was presumed not to be a major actor in domestic policy, although most Western militaries did have domestic missions such as government disaster relief and control of civilian unrest. However, there was disagreement between the two major theoretical approaches on how a civilian control was executed. The first one, in our view, can be labelled as the 'political science' approach, while the second approach can be called as the 'sociological'(though these labels are rather tentative). Samuel Huntington and his followers advocated the first approach in numerous works, while the roots of the second lies in a general sociology, the American military sociology, particularly in the works of Morris Janowitz. With reference to the U.S. pattern, the 'political science' approach has assumed that a formal body of laws and regulations, and a formal chain of command, would make the military responsible to society, given a civilian head of state serving as Supreme Commander of the armed forces, a civilian legislature to approve budgets, and state elected legislators to represent the will and the interest of the people, with checks and balances existing between government departments. According to this approach, the army should be

professional.[4] The 'sociological' approach developed from the assertion that genuine civilian control over the armed forces could be completely realized only when the military is integrated into the broader network of societal relations. Without going into details, the principal idea of this approach is that civilian control of the military could be realized on the basis of social networks because citizen-soldiers—either conscripts or reservists—would better link the military to its host society through their civilian roots.

Major commentators in the field have agreed also that the ingredients of the first approach are much more operational, measurable and comparative, than those of the second one, while the second one, historically marked also as the 'holist', has existed earlier than the first. The reader can compare various terms and their interpretations (for example, between Wikipedia (http://ieg-ego.eu/author/childsj, 2015, a Swiss publication (DCAF Document 2 2002) and opinions of Russian authors—Smirnov 2010; Peven 2009) and find not just language differences but those linked with national history and military experiences.

As the history of the 20th century shows, civil-military relations in the West reflect various aspects of both models mentioned above. In Western countries there was no the single solution to the problem of democratic control over the military. The legal and political arrangements varied widely and the patterns of civil-military relations therefore differed. Beside specific legal and constitutional arrangements, civil-military

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[3]According to well-established theories of civil-military relations, "the concept of the military as a permanent establishment maintained solely in support of foreign policy objectives presupposes the development of a *civil society* based on consensus. In such a society, the armed forces are called upon to cope with domestic disorder only in extraordinary circumstances, this task being relegated largely to civilian police forces. However, the incapacity of party governments to resolve vexing internal problems, including an inability to mobilize the 'home front' in support of national goals, has on many occasions led the military to do more than provide coercive power for use against external enemies. Their role in this regard has been especially important in those newly emerging nations whose civil institutions and sense of national identity have not yet had sufficient time to develop" (*Ibid*).

[4]Before proceeding further the meaning of the term 'professional military' should be made very clear. It means those, "who pursues a lifetime occupational career of service in the armed forces, where to qualify as a professional, he (or she) must acquire the expertise necessary to help manage the permanent military establishment during periods of peace and to take part in the direction of military occupation if war should break out. Career commitment and expertise, the hallmark of any professional, set the professional military personnel apart from those other personnel in the armed services, who are merely carrying out a contractual or obligatory tour of duty or for whom an officer status primarily represented status as it often did in former times (an honorific, part-time, into which military skill enters only as a secondary consideration)" (Sills 1972, p. 305)."

relations are influenced by a country's historical traditions and, particular, its military history; by economic and social conditions; by the evolution of internal political landscapes, and clearly by the international security environment, primarily a country's inclusion in alliances. Last, politics is shaped by personalities of the military and/or civilian national leaders, and/or by their personal, informal relationships, which might also influence the balance of national civil-military relations. There are differences in this regard not only between nations but also within the same country between successive governments (between the Chiefs of General Staff or from one Minister of Defence to another).

During the Cold War, western scholars paid some attention to civil-military relations in communist nations. Yet their conceptualization and interpretation of the processes, unfolding in the Soviet bloc, were very limited, and currently they appear rather theoretical, partly due to a lack of reliable empirical information (see, e.g., Kolkowicz 1967; Herspring and Volgyes 1978; Adelman 1982; Kolkowicz and Korbonski 1982). They came to the subject through an interest in the role of the military in the internal politics of those countries, and often emphasized that in the socialist system the armed forces were under the close control of the ruling Communist Party. Consequently, they discussed differences between the models of civil-military relations in Western democracies and the socialist world (see, Perlmutter 1981; Sandscheider and Kuhlman 1992; Barany 1991). We will not debate here the extent, to which the Western theories of civil-military relations were in agreement with the reality, or contradictions between different theories. Besides, of course, there were theories of civil-military relations concerning quasi-socialist states that had evolved in Central and Eastern Europe, e.g., in Yugoslavia, during the Cold War. In turn, scholars of civil-military relations in the developing world with its high proportion of military coups as well as revolutions and guerrilla wars, were concerned with the role of the military regimes, violations of human rights, and democratizations (see, Cammack et al. 1988, Chap.4.).

The 1990s were characterized by theoretical reformulation driven by the three historical developments that had changed the entire world—the end of Cold War, the collapse of communist regimes in Europe, and the disintegration of the USSR. These closely interrelated phenomena drove an attention to links between the process of democratization and civil-military relations in transitional societies (Danopoulos and Zirker 1996; Bebler 1997; Joo 1996). They also had compelled a worldwide rethinking of the roles and new missions of armed forces and changing relationships between the military and civilians under the conditions of new global trends (Diamond and Plattner 1996; Danopoulos and Watson 1996).

The relationships between the military and the state, societal structures and institutions formed the core of the complex set of civil-military relations. Despite the importance of this point, we have to stress that the entire set of issues related to civil-military relations cannot be reduced to the political control of armed forces only. Essentially, the military, as a sub-system of the society, is characterized by distancing from the people, and, therefore, by a distinct non-civilian sub-culture. The need for such distinctiveness is related to the tasks, functions, and responsibilities assigned to the military. Sociologists in different countries conducted numerous surveys of military and civilian opinions, covering a wide range of issues, including foreign policy and security policy, basic cultural values, public attitudes toward the military and the military service, the format of armed forces and the issue of conscription (Manigart 1992, 1996; Mueller 1994; Rukavishnikov 1994; Parmar 1994). These studies integrated the survey data with other historical, sociological and interpretive data to address the following issues: the nature and the civil-military gap in attitudes, values, perspectives, and personal backgrounds of the officers and soldiers; the factors that shape a civil-military gap, and whether and how the civil-military gap matters for military effectiveness, education and civil-military cooperation (e.g., the collection of studies in Forum International, SOWI, 6, 1987; vol.15, 1991; concerning the U.S. civil-military, gap *Armed Forces and*

Society, Winter 2000, vol. 27, No. 2; also see the book on cultural differences in a society: Caforio 2007a, b, c).

As for the achievements of military sociology, we have to note the in-depth analysis of civil-military relations into the 21st century in both Eastern and Western Europe, carried out by an international team of scholars that was based on a solid theoretical framework and common empirically measured social indicators (Kuhlman and Callaghan 2000). In this cross-national sociological study, scholars in each country considered the impact of the weight of history on the evolution of civil-military relations, the legitimacy of armed forces in public opinion, the proportion of economic resources directed to the military, and the extent to which military personnel (and their families) were successfully integrated into a wider society. The authors were concerned with public perceptions of a defence policy and actual functioning of armed forces, including issues of recruitment, retention, and transfer of military personnel back to civilian society, the living standards of military families and challenges to a traditional way of military life.

Since the end of the World War II, the function of national militaries was enlarged, and now includes international peacekeeping operations and 'operations other than war'. This led us to a new dimension of the civil-military relations' theory—the problem of interaction of non-government organizations (NGOs) and international agencies, the local civilian population, the media, and military contingents involved in conflict resolution (e.g., Williams 1998; Metcalfe et al. 2012; Caforio 2013a, b, c).

The relationship between the media and the military, which became the subject of scientific inquiry, is also an important dimension of civil-military relations theory in the second part of the 20th and early 21st centuries. The media forms the social image of the military and shapes public attitudes toward the new missions of the armed forces (on the Balkan crisis, see, Malesic 2000a, b). Because soldiers are also exposed to mass communications, it can change the social outlook of soldiers, along with other influences.

Indeed, servicemen and women may have access to internet discussions and even create web blogs for which military rules have to be devised (see, Resteigne 2010). Democracy assumes a free press for the dissemination of information. However, in wartime one country's news is another country's intelligence, and a «psychological», «propaganda» or «information war» unfolds. For instance, from the Vietnam War to the contemporary «total war against international terrorism», announced after the bloody terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001, the U.S. has wrestled with the issue of fulfilling the public's right 'to know' and maintaining the rights of soldiers, including that of 'not being compromised' (Sharkey 1991; Aukofer and Lawrence 1995; Kennedy 1993; Hammond 1988, 1996). The analysis of the main achievements in the field has been made also in the sets of articles in well-known encyclopaedias, textbooks, and the like (see, for instance, Caforio 2003).

Political Control of the Military

Debates on the military and the society deal primarily with political power and the state. The ever-relevant question of 'who guards the guardians' was a central issue in Plato's dialogue The Republic, written some 2500 years ago. In presenting what he considered the right order of society, Plato described the military state as a deviation. Juvenal in ancient Rome had raised the same question. The question that confronted the ancient Greek and Roman Empires continued to confront nations in the 21st century(see also the chapter on Democratic control of the armed forces, by H. Born and S. Kühen in this book).

In any country the status of civil-military relations is inseparable from the democratic (or non-democratic) nature of the state, on one side, and the motivations and goals of the officer corps, on the other. Military attitudes towards a regime (as in Egypt and Turkey for example) may be crucial for the state. Although the military may be characterized by a relative aloofness, they are not out of politics and have often

intervened in domestic matters. There is a direct link between the political system of a country and its propensity to use violence in international relations and at home. Military interventions, military rule and the withdrawal of the military from politics are common processes, yet related to various historical periods, cultures and regions. The last century was not unique. In the 21st century, states such as Pakistan, have military leaders, who are barely accountable to parliament or the nation more broadly.

The salience of military interventions in politics invites comparisons. It raises questions about the extent to which civil-military relations are dependent on different patterns of economic and cultural development, traditions and other elements of political cultures, types of political regimes and forms of social organization. Unsurprisingly, the central issue in modern theories of civil-military relations is the nature of civilian control. Current literature tends to use the term «civilian control» (Lambert 2009; Besley and Robinson 2010; Yagil 2012; Jaskoski 2012) interchangeably with «political control». The term 'civilian' here simply indicates the pre-eminence of civilian institutions based on popular sovereignty in the decision-making process concerning defence and security. The major point of this is as follows: the control of the instruments of violence must be firmly in the hands of legitimate civilian authorities (in this context the term: "legitimate" means "elected by the nation"). This means also that control over the military has to be based on democratic principles.

What does 'democratic principles' mean and how do they work in practice? Briefly, it is supposed to mean that the authority of the state rests in the hands of its people. One of the basic tenets of representative democracy is that politicians who exercise a political power are responsible to those who have elected them, and in whose name they formulate and implement policies. The military brass has no similar constitutional accountability to the nation. Thus, the aforementioned principle requirement follows

from the premise of popular sovereignty that only democratically constituted (elected) civilian authority can legitimately make defence and security policy. Democracy requires an accountability of the government in power to the parliamentary legislative as well as an independence of the judiciary. Citizens, both the military and the civilians, must also respect and support such principles of democracy as a tolerance of differing opinions in open debate, a free press and an exchange of ideas, and regular elections, in which the losers accept a defeat and the winners understand that they will have to face another election before long. The minority must have a chance of becoming the majority at the next election. This presupposes a multi-party system. These are the basic essentials of pluralistic democracy. Closely related to them is the principle of the equality of citizens in a democratic state.

Democratic control is always a two-way process of interaction between the military elite and the civil authorities (the military-government relations) as well as between the military as a whole and its host society at large (military-society relations). The democratic government as the civilian executive authority has the power to determine the size, type and composition of the armed forces; to define the military and national security doctrines and concepts of military reforms; to propose budgets, etc., for which it needs a confirmation by the legislature. In this it can rely on the expertise of civilian and military experts. Therefore, representatives of the military establishment always have a great influence on the decision-making process. Moreover, generals can—and should, if needed—express opposing or critical views in the internal debate on the main strategic options, both in parliament and in the government.

The very idea of civilian control must be truly accepted by the officer corps, at least in liberal democracies. It means the army as a whole agrees with the supremacy of civilian authorities (the democratically elected president, parliament, and government) over military commanders or

with the principles of political control and political subordination (as Carl von Clausewitz wrote). At the same time, the military as a whole must clearly understand that they are the servants, not the masters, of civilian society.

It should be noted also that the models of civil-military relations, which had been developed in the mature Western democracies, assume not only the apolitical military, but also the non-partisan military, while in other societies, where the military is highly intertwined with the state, it is not the case. When a prominent member of the armed forces publicly expresses political views, he or she is acting like a politician. And, as some authors argue, in this case loses credibility as «a neutral civil servant and guardian of the state» (see, Kohn 1997a, b).

The following statement may surprise some readers, but the American people have traditionally opposed a large standing military. One of the Founders, Samuel Adams, summed up this attitude well: «It is a very improbable supposition, that any people can long remain free, with a strong military power in the heart of their country: Unless that military power is under the direction of the people, and even then it is dangerous…. [A] wise and prudent people will always have a watchful and jealous eye over it; for the maxim and rules of the army, are essentially different from the genius of a free people, and the laws of a free government».

The introduction of basic democratic principles into security and defence policy-making begins through legal means. This requires extensive legislative work and continuous refinement, but is relatively straightforward. For instance, among the legal requirements of civil–military reform, which occurred in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s, there were changes and additions to the national constitutions as well as to specific legislation. Such amendments have had to regulate in a better and/or different way, than in communist times. They include inter alia: constitutional provisions referring to war and peace and states of emergency; respect for international treaties and conventions; constitutional guarantees for human rights and freedoms for both civilians and soldiers; the division of power and relations between the head of the state, the parliament, the Supreme Security (or Defence) Council, the Minister of Defence and/or the Chief of the General Staff, and so on. They include specific regulations and laws concerning the jurisdiction of military courts and prosecutors, the scope of the military and state secrets. Among the most important changes are laws that elaborate and guarantee the right to 'conscientious objection from active military service' and allowing the performance   of   an «alternative» or «civilian» service.

The process of shaping of new civil-military relations in ex-socialist countries has been interrelated with a set of processes that determined the future image of society, including democratization of society and the politics, market reforms, transformations of social structure, re-orientation of security and foreign policy and, finally, military reforms. One may agree with the view that the degree of civil control over the military is a good indicator of the depth of democratization processes in each transitional country. In former socialist states the Communist Party's claim to exercise control did not mean at all that civilians were in charge of the military (see, Manig 1997, pp. 26–27). Nevertheless, the Clausewitzian principles of political control and political subordination were assimilated by the military there.

Also it is notable that even in those parts of Europe, where the military have had an exclusive influence on a security policy or where they had been used for internal purposes, there were fewer instances of the military (praetorian) intervention in politics, than in many non-communist or anticommunist states (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Chile, many places in Africa, and in Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia and Thailand). Institutionalized civilian supremacy was based on a consensus about where a legitimate sovereignty lies; on a consensus about processes for making policy decisions,

including political succession; and a capacity of the civilian sector to defend its rights through legal means. In Kosovo, for example, the Kosovo Liberation Army's military successes did not persuade people to overwhelmingly endorse its candidates in local and national elections, though KLA's accountability to both international and local civilian authority remains in doubt (Cooper 2000).

The post-communist states undoubtedly made progress in reforming their civil-military relations, but whether civilian control of the military in these countries is 'more a formality than a reality', remains to be seen. We are cautious because the problem of civil control cannot be reduced to the legal and constitutional spheres only. Even the NATO members, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, which have made great strides in this regard, need considerable reforms. First and foremost, the problem of building a system of democratic and civilian control is simply a much bigger and more difficult one, than is generally recognized. Second, reforming civil-military relations is just one of many problems that these countries have faced. Reforms in economy, social and political spheres are more crucial for transition towards democracy and market economy than reform of the military system. As a result, there was a tendency for civil-military reform to be pushed to the bottom of the political agenda. Although such reforms had public and government attention from the beginning of transition, only in the last ten years have governments of post-communist countries (and western countries providing so-called 'advice and assistance') have come to realize how complex and multifaceted this job is. To a large degree, the specific problem of reforming civil-military relations differs from one country to another, and, of course, deficiencies in states of Central and Eastern Europe differ qualitatively and quantitatively from military reform deficiencies in Russia or Central Asian states (on the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia in the first half of the 1990s, see Szemerkenyi 1996. On civil-military relations in the bulk of Central and Eastern European states

and the status of the army by the end of the 1990s, see Kuhlman and Callaghan 2000. On former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, see: Wiberg 2000; Hadzic 2000; Minic and Lopandic 2000. See, also, Army and State in Post-Communist Europe. In: D, Betz and J. Lowenhardt (eds.) The Journal of Communist and Transition Politics, Vol. 17(1), March 2001; and Mychajlyszyn and Von Riekhoff 2004; Edmunds et al. 2005; Borissova 2006).

Civilian control of the army includes the achievement of transparency in the sphere of defence planning and spending. In a democracy, the government has the obligation to keep citizens informed. Information is a debt to be paid to the public. Citizens have the right to know what their government intends to do concerning the deployment of the armed forces.

Parliamentary control over the defence budget means that the armed forces, their manpower and basic organizational issues, is subject to parliamentary budget appropriation review and approval. Some countries reinforced a parliamentary supervision over the armed forces by increasing the authority of the Defence Committee or by instituting the post of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces. However, in many cases, parliaments are not very effective in overseeing the implementation of the military budget and certain problems in this regard have existed. Debates in the parliaments, concerning investments in the military sphere, reflect the difference of political party goals and visions of national interest, and priorities in domestic and foreign policy as well.

Defence budget allocations, therefore, have become a subject of considerable lobbying. The public at large has a certain interest in controlling defence spending and military planning, bearing in mind the magnitude of expenditures on modern armed forces and the limited sizes of financial, material and human resources in a time of economic crisis. This means, that the defence budget and all proceedings relating to it must be open to public scrutiny. In this regard, this serves as an important channel of political communication, because, in many cases military affairs are

hidden under the cover of secrecy, as evident in the scandals relating to the rendition of alleged terrorists in the first decade of the 2000s.

Civil Society and the Military

Civil society has a vital role in a cultural transformation of the security sector in post-conflict societies the concept of civil society seems an imprecise one and is difficult to capture analytically. It can be defined as 'an emancipatory political alternative to authoritarianism', «where progressive values and a political practice can be articulated and counter-hegemonic associations can be created» (Gershman and Bello 1995, p. 3; Cox 1999). Not all the non-state associations are equal, or exist to guard against the threats from power-holders; some of them may be dedicated to racism and violence, like Golden Dawn in Greece or, like the mafia, may be illegal. Furthermore, "the Western model of «majority rule» is limited; 'in post-conflict situations it can lead to abuse of power in mixed-ethnic societies". In an idealized system of civil-military relations, the separation of powers, political pluralism, and the engagement of civil society seem to be indispensable conditions for the non-politicized military and the non-militarized society. As various researchers have argued, the structures, rules and training policies may change the operation of armed forces, but one of most difficult challenges is to change the mentality of the military, their political masters, and that of the society at large (Manig 1997, p. 25; see also Higgins 2006; Africa 2011; Skaskiw 2011; Gerras and Wong 2013; Badger 2012).

This requires a development that goes beyond the reform of structures and/or a replacement of personnel. Security sector reform in transitional societies has tended to focus on the following areas:

(a) reforming the uniformed security branches;
(b) supporting the establishment of structures of a proper civilian control over the military;
(c) training members of the military in International Humanitarian Law and business rights as well as training of parliamentarians and civil servants for;
(d) strengthening a parliamentary oversight of the security apparatus.

However, these areas do not necessarily address the problem of military/social attitudes. A structure of civilian supremacy does not necessary ensure a successful transformation of attitudes. Civilian control can be executed for the narrow personal or party's interests and the suppression of political opposition. In Croatia under President Franjo Tudjman, for instance, the army staff and the officer class were expected to be members of Tudjman's Croat Democratic Union or face dismissal.

A military professionalism does not guarantee a transformation of attitudes also. According to Samuel Huntington, it may be possible to change attitudes by appealing to the concepts of «legitimacy» and «professionalism» in order to keep the military out of politics (Huntington 1957, p. 74). However, «professionalism» can be interpreted as 'a loyalty to some higher authorities' such as a «nation», and thereby escape political control. In many coup-prone states, nationalism and the need of strong central government have provided invitations for the military to intervene. Moreover, as Alice Hills has noted, 'with all respect to civil police, standards of professionalism are culturally dependent on status-based rights rather than linked to moral choices' (Hills 2000, p. 4).

A transformation in civil-military relations requires something additional to a structural reform, a culture of civilian supremacy, and a reliance on professionalism. It also requires the creation of a 'security policy community' that stretches beyond the military and politicians. For framing a transformative approach to civil-military relations, it is therefore important to note a difference of emphasis between: (1) the civilian control and management, which is constitutionally established through laws and formal decision-making processes; and (2) the civil-society engagement, which is largely a matter of political and social mobilization. These are not absolute differences because the mobilization of

civil society can be formalized also as a constitutional reform. For example, after Slovenia became independent, tribunals for conscientious-objection claims had a statutory obligation to include NGO representatives, such as peace activists, on their panels.

The importance of civil society is in its role in creating an awareness of issues, debates, and security policy options. Right-based women's groups, experts in the media, researchers, and professionals, such as health workers, can make important contributions in the formulation and in the implementation of a particular policy Solheim 1999).

Taking the case of Southeast Europe, and former Yugoslavia, in particular, as examples, the new former Yugoslavian states have been engaged in this process since 1995. Significantly, an NGO, the Centre for Civil-Military Relations was established to advocate changes in the former republics. Many members of the armed forces were forced into early retirement after 20 or 30 years of service in the Yugoslav National Army. Since 1997, the Centre has publicly promoted the concept of transparency in civil-military relations and democratic control over the armed forces. One of its main objectives was «««to animate [the] professional and political interest of citizens, their associations, political parties, parliamentary and state organs for a modern arrangement of civil-military relations». It has been regarded as highly significant in lowering an «old guard's» position in the upper echelons of power (Hadzic 1997, 2000). Southeast Europe may be generally far more modernized than other regions, but the level of civilian expertise and an interest in its defence and security policy is extremely low here also (Vankovska 1999: 36). Consequently, greater investment might be directed toward civil-military relations, introducing processes that reduce the possibility of militarization of societies, and the alienation of the military from the society.' Investment could be used to gain the widest political support for the definition of new military functions and security doctrines (UK Department for International Development 1999b, p. 4).

Civil society groups are bound to operate primarily at a domestic level. However, in the wider world of perceived threats to values in Europe, from supporters of Islamic State for example, new problems for civil-military relations have emerged. Indeed, the powerful democratic states that exercise protectorates in Southeast Europe have exhibited their own democratic deficit. There was negligible parliamentary control over security matters or transparency in decision-making when security issues moved into the intergovernmental areas and military purposes were ill-defined. The North Atlantic Council's promotion of a 'free market' in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an egregious case of a military alliance determining a country's political economy (see, Flemming and Owen 2002). Eventually, external actors may not be able to maintain the contradiction of supporting democratic civilian control within war-affected societies, while their own security forces become the arm of a self-appointed «International Community», which protects forces and manages conflicts without democratic authority or transparent accountability.

Three organizational categories can be identified as follows: veterans' organizations, educational groups, and functional associations.

Veterans' Organizations

These might be expected to take a keen interest in military affairs, but they vary widely in their goals and objectives. There is no an inherent predisposition for them to adopt the transformative approaches (Caforio 2003). Indeed, veterans' organizations are not necessarily interested in depoliticizing the military, or in curbing any praetorian political aspirations the military might have. At the same time, these groups can be highly critical of secrecy and intransigence in military establishments. Some of them are simply military coups, or paramilitary units, in waiting. Others are committed to civilian primacy, but are highly partisan. However, others are often driven more by the welfare needs and the employment of former soldiers. For a literature on veterans

and veterans' organization see, in bibliography, Dandeker et al. (2006), Brown (2009), Bullock et al. (2009), Morin (2011), Ryan et al. (2011), Buzzetta and Rowe (2012), Hanafin (2012), Bichrest (2013), Beekman (2014).

Educational and Intellectual Groups

Within the academic/educational sector, courses and research programs on issues ranging from military history to disaster response are a significant source of debate and contesting theories. These groups form the institutes studying military policy, strategy, and defence, and are a recognized feature of many societies. They may be close to the prevailing military culture, overwhelmingly Realist in outlook, and/or dependent on cultivating government politicians as well. Nevertheless, they will continue to exist and also often take a provocative line. NGOs engaged in campaigning and/or consultancy can present clear alternatives to the existing military policy and practice. For example, in the interesting and successful experiment in South Africa in the mid-1990s, NGOs were involved in drafting the country's White Paper on Peace Missions; see, Williams (2000, p. 3).

Functional Associations and Voluntary Groups

These associations and groups have a direct or indirect role in forming public opinion on military issues and include the following:

(a) trade unions and employers, affected by changes in military expenditures and technologies;

(b) emergency services and Red Cross/Crescent organizations, which might be involved in formulating rules, governing the use of the military in civil disasters and emergency relief. Military aid to the civil authorities in non-political civil emergencies has a considerable transformative potential. Thus military involvement in rescues during the Balkan floods of May 2014 enhanced the reputation of local forces;

(c) women affected by mobilization and demobilization of soldiers, and women's groups engaged in discussions concerning rules for conscientious objection and the welfare of military personnel;

(d) church and welfare groups with an interest in humanitarian, moral, and philosophical aspects of a security policy;

(e) environmental groups, interested in protecting or managing areas, affected by military despoliation and training;

(f) media organizations and journalists' associations that have a commitment to investigative reporting: and;

(g) rights-based groups, such as the branches of Amnesty International, local citizens' forums and Helsinki Citizens Assemblies.

In the context of security sector transitions, civil groups can be singled out for support, if they foster the bottom–up democratic processes for building trust, cooperation, compromise, inclusion, and pluralism. Engaging civil society may mean a funding of training, workshops, and conferences, and the provision of legal materials. It may also mean subsidizing broadcasting of certain publications, such as special issues of journals that incorporate the views of non-uniformed commentators.

It may also mean helping local NGOs to put forward their views on certain issues, such as conscientious objection and the freedom of information, legislation and the welfare of the military. Examples can be found in overseas development policies. Specific programmes in Africa have included:

(a) the Netherlands–Mali initiative that has involved civil society organizations in the formulation of a specific code;

(b) the UK's funding for the provision of legal materials and training to NGOs and professional organizations to underpin a reform of, and wider access to, the justice system in Rwanda;

(c) the Finnish (and Sweden) support to NGO projects for education and policy-making access on a range of democracy and right-based programmes in Africa: and;

(d) the Norwegian (and British) funding for seminars and for training on democratization for defence researchers in South Africa and Zimbabwe (Chalmers 2000, pp. 11–12). The UK's development policy even includes the idea that «the voices of the poor, can be strengthen by supporting those parts of civil society that help poor people to organize, to influence decision-makers…Promoting effective and inclusive systems of government, including an accountable security sector, is an essential investment in a prevention of violent conflicts» (UK Department for International Development 1999a, pp. 25, 27–28).

In summary, an effective democratic control over the military in any democratic country is hardly conceivable without the active participation of NGOs and other parts of civil society. Therefore, the level of interaction between the military and the NGOs is an indication of the quality of the relationship between the civil society and a country's military. As noted above, all NGOs have different tasks. Some of them are working with the military to increase the public credibility of the armed forces. Others are monitoring civil rights violations of draftees and soldiers in some countries and/or some armies (such as the status of minorities and homosexuals and severe bullying of junior soldiers).

Because of the importance of civil rights monitoring, we emphasize that a member of the armed forces—whether a conscript or a volunteer—is a 'citizen in uniform'. Like all other citizens, he/she has inalienable basic civil rights. Therefore, 'citizens in uniform' cannot be deprived of their basic civil rights during their term of service. In principle, these rights continue to obtain. Restrictions may, indeed, be imposed on the exercise of the civil rights of those serving in the military, but only where this is required by the exigencies of keeping the military organization functioning. If restrictions must be imposed, legal provisions are necessary in every single case. This means that in a democracy the rights and duties of soldiers on active duty are defined and protected by law, as in freedom of religion and access to pastoral care.

Military superiors do not have an absolute power over their subordinates, but may only issue orders for military purposes, and must respect human dignity. The national laws regulate the extent to which the basic rights of soldiers could and should be restricted due to the military exigencies. Differences in a legal tradition and historical background play a role here. Although in some western countries, Germany for instance, an active and passive suffrage as well as the freedom of association are unrestricted, other democracies have more restrictive laws governing these rights.

In sum, the establishment and maintenance of an effective civilian control over the military is a way to redefine the status of armed forces on democratic lines. It is a complex process of incorporating the military into a system of democratically-ruled societal institutions. It is a not-stop process in any country, because the ongoing changes in the international environment coincide with profound systematic changes in domestic and external politics. Success or failure of this process could have a direct effect on the world's future.

Changes Within the Army and the Wider Society

In most countries, the armed forces have to be reformed to meet the challenges of a rapidly transforming world. They must adapt to a totally different global political-strategic landscape. The change within the armed forces corresponds to transformations within a society.

There is a permanent tension between the demand of maximizing military efficiency, which implies recognition of the substantial autonomy of military organizations, the format of professional armed forces, and societal fears of a loss of a control over the professional military, which tends to be more and more distanced from the

civilian society. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many analysts argued in favour of maintaining conscription, rather than changing to all-volunteer military forces, out of concern that replacing the conscript—the prototype of the citizen-soldier—would produce either a praetorian or mercenary army, and that this would fundamentally alter the entire nature of civilian control over the military. The historical experience of certain states (e.g., the UK) with volunteer forces has demonstrated that one can have the volunteer military that is neither praetorian nor mercenary, and, therefore, the continuation of military conscription is being broadly questioned in many modern democracies. However, only wealthy states, such as France, which abandoned conscription in 2001, can have genuine professional forces due to the huge cost. In poorer societies such as Russia and Central Asian countries, the model of semi-professional, mixed forces is used.

The transition towards professionalism alters cultural aspects of civil-military relations, and some of these aspects are to be noted (Caforio 2005). According to US studies, there is evidence of disturbing trends pointing to a growing gap between the professional military and civilian society. There are three sources of the gap: civilian ignorance of the military arising from the absence of widespread military experience in the post-conscription era; a politicization of the military, accompanied by a growing estrangement from values of civilian society; and the post-Cold war security environment (Ricks 1997a, b). In short, the US military are significantly more Republican and conservative in political outlook than civilians, and a so-called 'military–civilian cultural gap' in partisan and ideological identification is widening. According to poll data, the degree of respect shown by civilians to the armed forces varies considerably. In some societies officers and service personnel are highly respected—as evidenced by the UK's 'Help for Heroes' charity of 2007 responding to casualties in Afghanistan and the lack of Ministry of Defence provision for wounded service personnel and their families. In others there is often an aloofness or suspicion as in Latin

America. The reason lies in the fact that attitudes towards the military, their missions, their organization and functioning varies, and corresponds to the evolution of the value-attitudinal systems of civilian societies, popular perceptions of external threats, media-military relations and economic conditions. Allegiances to a Military Oath and to a Mother/Fatherland are synonyms of patriotism, occupying the civilian and service value systems of most states (not least in the US and Russia). This is more problematic in some forces and societies. For example, the Ukrainian army and society, notably in 2014–2015, was in violent contest with Russian speaking populations of the eastern part of the country. We have emphasized this point because everywhere the military insists that it is a guardian of basic national values as well as the greatness of the state. Yet this traditional, military, point of view does not leave space for economic strength or for the health and welfare of a population.

The tendency to re-shape the armed forces as a professional military organization is likely to continue. Conversely, the growing distance between the society and its forces gives rise to many problems. One of them is ambivalent public reactions to new external missions (especially by NATO allies), from Kosovo to Libya, which occurred in the last 20 years. A significant part of the public in Western Europe became frustrated and lost faith in interventions, which obviously could not solve political problems that had ignited interstate conflicts. The military, in turn, may have felt let down by politicians. Opinion polls in Europe for instance indicate that resistance to intervention in Syria against Assad was strong, largely because of the costs, corruption and failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, popular resistance to sending ground forces against Islamic State in 2014 meant that intervention was limited to supporting local Kurds and attacking Islamist forces from the air with drones and bombers rather than protecting civilians directly.

Also, despite the fact, that many NATO personnel engaged in UN and enforcement missions are satisfied with their personal job performance, a general military ambivalence about engaging in

peacekeeping per se has been well-documented. As early as the 1960s, sociologists noted that soldiers were not interested in participating in low-prestige constabulary activities, because they are ultimately driven by politics and the end states of such operations are obscure (for US military views see, Goldstein 2000). Other factors have played a role too. Career prospects are not necessarily enhanced; multinationalism implies many problems, including the legitimacy of certain actions; interventions in internal conflict are not always easy to explain to the broad and international publics as being of direct, statist security concern. As a result, while civilian leaders, either motivated by a humanitarian concern or by geostrategic objectives, have sought to employ the armed forces in the situations "other than war" outside national borders, civil-military relations in such countries were becoming strained in the first quarter of the 21st century. For example, the use of torture and rendition of prisoners meant a severe loss of ethical standing for the US (Senate Committee 2014). On the other hand, NATO interpreted of Russia's interventions in the conflicts on the territory of the former USSR, in South Ossetia and the Crimea for instance, as a variety of the old Russia's imperialism. The 2014 unification of the Crimea peninsular with the Russian Federation, was characterised by some western authorities as a process of 'annexation' while the bulk of ordinary Russians had another opinion on the issue (see, Rukavishnikov 2014). The question of the cultural gap, which has been an important area in civil-military relations' theory in the recent past, will continue to be problematic in the future. It has a link with the other changes that has taken place in the militaries of democracies in the 21st century, in particular an increase in women's integration in the armed forces.

Military service has traditionally been a masculine domain. But as a part of the ongoing societal transformations and democratizations, in which a call for extending citizenship rights and obligations to previously excluded groups, women in some countries have demanded better opportunities to serve in military units, and this demand has been granted.

Proponents have argued that it is the right of women as citizens to serve, and that there are also economic reasons why women choose a military career. Opponents have argued either that women have no ethical reasons to support militarism or that their presence in the military undermines military effectiveness, and therefore, generally speaking, weakens national security. As the proponents have held sway, in the US and UK for example, it reflects the emergence of gender equality in the economy and other sectors of social life.

The end of Cold War resulted in military budget cuts and reductions in the size of the armed forces of former foes (so-called 'peace dividends'). This positive development has, however, brought dislocation and severe personal problems for professional personnel affected by the reductions. The lengthy global economic crisis, from the mid-1990s to 2015, severely aggravated the problem of adaptation to civilian life for the former military personnel too. However, it appeared that wealthy Western states could offer more opportunities for people suddenly undergoing a career change than the transition societies. A healthy economy is vital both for a better adjustment of the demobilized military to a new life and for the flourishing of democracy as well. As indicated by Russian elections in the early 1990s, if military and ex-military people are too desperate, they have little inclination for reasoned debate, and can easily succumb to populist or extremist slogans that could promise much but in reality would probably deliver further hardship.

Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Support Operations

In addition to relations between the military and wider society in domestic environments, in this chapter we must also consider the relationship between military and civilians when troops are deployed abroad in the context of humanitarian activities and/or in peace support operations. We are not concerned with matters of civil-military relations arising from military conquest and

occupation, on one hand, and civil emergencies and natural disasters, on the other, but in the particular framework of peace support operations. Thus, the following issues have to be observed: the involvement of military forces in humanitarian work and/or the entire concept of a civil-military cooperation.

First, we must note that the military have often carried out «humanitarian» activities, and some authors argue that «military humanitarianism» is not an oxymoron because a military action has often defended humanitarian values. In practice, an armed protection and a military involvement can be beneficial in preventing or mitigating human sufferings (Weiss 1999a, b).

Military operations, including traditional peacekeeping missions, have long involved a civilian affairs element, which includes activities that can be defined as «humanitarian». In peacekeeping missions, as in Cyprus and Lebanon, a humanitarian relief had been provided with impartial and neutral intentions (Pugh 1996; Williams 1998). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a development of conditionally deployed troops was important in military and international provisions, i.e. in an adherence by parties to the Dayton Framework Agreement (Siegel 2001). In the Kosovo and Afghanistan crises, and in Albania, and in Macedonia as well, the construction of refugee camps was a direct consequence of political and strategic intervention by the military. In the last case, camps were not always appropriately planned or managed, but few commentators would doubt that the military have certain areas of expertise and a capacity that are ancillary to humanitarian purposes, especially in road building and general engineering, logistic support, and mine clearing. This trend toward using the military in «political humanitarian» work does not, of course, turn the military into humanitarians, and there are various problems in civil-military relations as a consequence (discussed below).

Second, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in peace support missions is intended to overcome some of those problems that encompassed a broad range of actors and activities. CIMIC is defined by NATO for situations where external forces supply military security as follows: «the

co-ordination and co-operation in support of the mission between the NATO Commander and the civil population including national and local authorities as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies» '(NATO, NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, AJP-09, Provisional Final Draft, 2000, paragraph J02). This emphasized that «civil environment protection», that is to say 'good relations' between the Allied Forces and civilian organizations, was crucial for effective military operations (NATO, MC 411/1; NATO Military policy on civil-Military Co-operation. Available at: G: /OPS2001/Doc/MC411/090201. doc2001). The development of CIMIC as a doctrine in the US, UK, NATO, and the Western European Union began in the late 1990s. It had to be coordinated with the development of a new strategic concept (SC99).

In messy internal conflicts, external forces are dependent on local authorities and populations for resources and the freedom of movement and on external civilian organizations for advice and information. In the US and UK civil-military co-operation grew out of army civil affairs branches that were capable of providing civil emergency relief and undertaking public works. Such forums facilitated dialogue, mutual awareness, an exchange of information and requests by civilian field workers for military logistic support. Examples are as follows: in Operation «Provide Comfort» in Northern Iraq in 1991, the forces set up a Civil-Military Operations Command Center (CMOC). In Rwanda, the U.S. military again provided CMOCs to coordinate with civilian activities, which were already coordinated by the UN's Rwanda Emergency Office. In Somalia, Civil-Military Liaison Centres were used to brief the civilian agencies (see, Kennedy 1996). In Afghanistan provincial reconstruction teams were devised by the US and its allies (Piiparinen 2007).

There has been a pressing need to define relations on matters of civilian protection. Although an absence of military protection was the rule in most civilian relief missions, in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans, for example, the civilian organizations considered that

maintaining independence, neutrality, and impartiality no longer had adequate protection against deliberate attacks on workers and supplies. Faced with the prospect of suspending their activities, they turned for security to peacekeepers (which the UN Commission for Refugees as the «legal agency» did in Bosnia and Herzegovina) or to a local police and armed guards (as Oxfam did in Somalia). Military protection, especially in coercive peace support operations, remains a thorny issue because it compromises traditional humanitarian principles and associates humanitarians with goals that have little to do within a humanitarian action (see, Abiew 2012).

The coercive orientation of peace support operations may improve physical access to conflict zones and serve to protect the population, but significant problems can also occur. First, the civil-military relationship is subordinate to strategic purposes, as in Kosovo, leading to conditions, being placed on the exercise of humanitarian principles. CIMIC operations give priority to supporting military missions in all circumstances to «create civil-military conditions that will offer the Commander the greatest possible moral, material and tactical advantages», and «[give] the military commander a 'carrot', to compliment his 'stick' in gaining compliance» to agreements such as the Dayton Peace Accords (Pugh 1998, 2000).

The roles of external military and civilian components in humanitarian actions have developed in an increasingly integrative way. Unsurprisingly, NGOs have often had close relationships to the state by taking on state contracts or otherwise drawing on government funding. The military and humanitarian actions became blurred in the cases of the Balkans and Afghanistan (2001). Many NGOs also worked closely with national military forces in Albania and Macedonia during the Kosovo crisis. However, the humanitarian organizations were uncomfortable with the political implications of their roles. Diplomats and the military had their own agendas, which were more about NATO's credibility and the exercise of power in the European security system than about the crises (Chomsky 1999).

Military initiatives to institutionalize the relationship since the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia subsequently led to a dilution of humanitarian independence.

NGOs were implicated in politics by their association with one side in Kosovo and Afghanistan, where humanitarian concerns were dictated by political factors (on Kosovo, see Rieff 1999). The role of international organizations, and notably the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), which was already depleted by reduced state funding, was further overshadowed by the strategic goals of state elites (Morris 1999).

Second, the military and police forces as parts of peacebuilding missions are servants of the states and commissioned by their governments. They can command state resources, regular funding, logistics capabilities, a pool of labour, and the backing of state sovereignty. But even in multinational missions when military contingents are under the «operational» non-national commander, a strategic command remains with individual national governments, which set up national reporting and control structures. The civilian sector has a more diffuse relationship to state power. International civil servants working for UN aid agencies have been sent by organizations whose policies are directly moulded by the states, and which deal with state authorities, but they may also develop a corporate loyalty. Further, the statist and strategic basis of military interventions runs counter to the potential for humanitarian organizations to foster a transnational ethic that would not only preserve humanitarian principles but also contest statist assumptions about conflict, development, and power. The answer may be to clarify guidelines and roles for mutual action in environments that are by nature sui generis and complex.

Conclusion

Over time and across nations a higher level of democracy may be achieved by the larger number of states. Unquestionably, in democracies proper civil-military relations require strong civilian control over the military. Therefore, we

assume that a more limited range of models of civil-military relations than in the previous century will characterize the 21st century.

However, the future world will not settle on a single model of civil-military relations because there is no one model appropriate for all nations. Foreseeing the future convergence between the models of civil-military relations existing now, we have to remember that individual countries are approaching it from very different starting points, reflecting different national histories. Change in the pattern of civil-military relations in each country can be part of a further democratization of society. The post-communist era is now more than two decades old; nonetheless the transformation of civil-military relations to democratic norms is still a difficult issue in many ex-socialist countries.

Democratic associations of civil societies can play a transformative role in changing existing mentalities. This need is not limited to budgetary and performance oversight, but can include development of structures and regulations. The role of civil society groups that would also be able to mediate between wider society and defence establishments is also apparent, facilitated by the diffusion of materials by internet and social media. Civil society groups have also mediated security issues for the public. They can make military questions meaningful to society and resonate social concerns to defence establishments.

Knowledge transfer and the beginning of dialogue can also occur by other means: official statements, military press briefings, investigative journalism, and parliamentarians who take an interest through standing parliamentary committees. Obviously, transformations cannot occur without solid constitutional foundations, a system of accountability, certain concepts of the freedom of information, and a degree of consensus about what needs to be kept secret for strategic reasons, rather than simply maintaining military privilege and power. But there also needs to be a level of knowledge and understanding of security issues in society, and a willingness in militaries to accept social change and civil society influence in a «security policy-community» (Gow and Birch 1997, p. 10).

Moreover, it should be a genuine «contest», in which the civilians are empowered to alert a society and to challenge power-holders. Only then, will it be possible to build a security policy community of mutual respect.

The problem of the military affecting the government is a concern in any democratic society. Hence, if armies became more and more professional, the risk of praetorianism may increase as well. In this regard Alexis De Tocqueville's thought, that the remedy for the vices of the military is not to be found in the military itself but in its host society, should not be forgotten. The armed forces cannot be strong, if the army is backed by a weak economy and is alienated from the nation.

Generally speaking, to avoid military coups one needs to know only that an institution is not a so-called «democratic army», which is simply a contradiction in terms, but an army within and for democracy. Armed forces are needed that willingly submit to the primacy of democratic principles in which the rule of a law obtains, and whose members not only view themselves as «citizens in uniform» but are also regarded and accepted as such by their civilian counterparts.

The first fifteen years of the 21st century have seen radical change. Historic alignments have shifted, and there are opportunities for international cooperation between old adversaries. It is unfortunate that not all of the results of these changes have been positive: religious and ethnic antagonisms have surfaced with a vengeance, upsetting prospects for stability in many regions of the world. Military interventions in internal conflicts, civil wars in the Balkans and territories of the former USSR have revealed many contradictions and prompted new questions concerning the aims of military action, and their moral and juridical legitimacy for the broad public—protection of minority rights, prevention of attempted ethnic cleansing versus defence of national integrity against armed separatists and external aggressors. Sometimes those actions and the behaviour of the military and governments involved has been characterized more by delusion and double standards than by civic values (Rukavishnikov 2001).

As far as the armed forces and their enforcement and constabulary missions are concerned, civil-military relations has been fraught with predicaments. There has been a clear trend towards co-opting humanitarian and civilian movements into 'integrated missions' in which the political-military elements dominate. Furthermore, there has been a blurring of peace-keeping, peace enforcement, counter-insurgency, peace-building and state-building that has been subjected to critique (Caforio 2013a, b, c; Pugh 2015).

We would prefer to see a defining of roles of armed forces in peace support missions in strong compliance with international law, humanitarian law and provisions of the UN Charter. So-called peace missions and interventions in the name of global security require close monitoring by, and accountability to, the societies which send and hosts that receive armed forces. This means a development in relations between the military and national/international society. Because the international system is also unlikely to change in ways that significantly reduce, let alone eliminate, global insecurities—climate change and inequality that prompts mass migration, social unrest and rebellions—further reductions of the armed forces of major global actors seems unlikely. Nevertheless, in the long run leading countries need militaries that are professional, and prepared also for operations «other than war», and which are respected by civilians.

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Author Biographies

Vladimir O. Rukavishnikov (1947) is retired Full Professor of Sociology and International relations at the Department of Global politics in Moscow's Higher School of Economics (the National (State Research) University). He has authorized over 200 scientific publications on various sociological, political science and social research methodology issues including over 15 books and brochures in Russian and English. His works were published in Russia, the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, etc. Prof. Rukavishnikov has been affiliated to the Russian Academy of Sciences during a very long period of time; he served as a deputy-director and a head of dept. of social dynamics of the Institute for Socio-political research RAS during a long time; he was a nominee for the Academy's correspondent member position several times. He awarded numerous grants and fellowships in different countries; he took part in many cross-national research projects, including those on civil-military issues, and he served as a Vice-President of IPSA RC on Armed Forces and Society in 1990s. As a Visiting Professor, he has delivered lectures in the USA, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, South Korea, Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Serbia. He took part in expertizes for the Russian Federation government and also serves as an expert for the Russian National Fund for Humanitarian Sciences and some other bodies since late 1980s.

Michael Pugh is retired Emeritus Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Bradford. He was Visiting Professor, Universities of St Andrews and Radboud University Nijmegen. He has researched extensively on peace operations, CIMIC, war economies and the political economy of peacebuilding. His most recent publications are: *Liberal Internationalism* (Palgrave); *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding* edited with N. Cooper and M. Turner, (Palgrave); 'Oligarchy and Economic Legacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina', in *Peacebuilding*; 'Lineages of Aggressive Peace', in M.Turner and F. Kühn (eds), *The Politics of International Intervention*. His fieldwork in South-east Europe continues.

Public Trust in the Military from Global, Regional and National Perspectives

8

Marjan Malešič and Maja Garb

Introduction

Debates on civil-military relations in the mid-1950s focused primarily on the relationship between the military and the state, whereas broader civil society was not perceived to be a relevant factor. This soon changed with the recognition of civil society as an element of the triad: the military, politics and civil society. The public is an important element of the latter, at least in democratic countries. Social institutions, of which the military is one, require public acceptance and support. In other words, in order to function successfully in a democratic society they require legitimacy, although legitimacy alone is not sufficient. Public legitimacy can be measured through surveys which evaluate the degree of public trust in an institution. The data indicates that the military is one of the most trusted social institutions. Nevertheless, some analysts warn that a high degree of trust is paradoxically accompanied by public indifference, marginalization and even apathy.

We will begin our analysis by explaining the relationship between the military and the public,

and public trust in institutions in general at the theoretical level. We will then introduce the empirical results of the surveys of public trust in the military at the global, regional and national levels. We will compare individual country measurements taken at the beginning of the millennium with measurements taken a decade later to reveal potential idiosyncratic characteristics in the development of public trust in the military. We will conclude by discussing and comparing some crucial facts, figures and trends on public trust in the military. We will also consider the factors that stimulate public trust in the military as well as the factors which some analysts believe increase the marginalization of the military in civil society.

We should emphasize the fact that an empirical analysis of the concept of 'trust' in the armed forces is not without limitations. A comparison of the data is hampered by the fact that the data derives from various national and international surveys. The theoretical assumptions about trust are not necessarily the same in each source, and consequently they influence the instrument and the variables and scales that are part of the instrument. In each survey, the wording of the questions on trust in the military differs, as do the lists of institutions and scales used to measure the level of trust. Furthermore, the surveys were carried out at different points in time. Therefore, the context of each survey may not be directly comparable with the others. As a result, the compilation of data from these sources and its

M. Malešič (✉) · M. Garb
Faculty of Social Sciences (FSS), University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: marjan.malesic@fdv.uni-lj.si

M. Garb
e-mail: maja.garb@fdv.uni-lj.si

detailed statistical analysis presents potentially serious validity and credibility problems. Nevertheless, a general comparison of data trends is possible and will serve the purposes of our paper.

The Public and the Military

Early debates on civil-military relations were limited to the relations between the military and the state (e.g. Huntington 1957), in which the public and civil society in general were not considered to be relevant actors. Huntington identified three major elements that shape civil-military relations that need to be in harmony with each other: the performance of military tasks (functional imperative); the constitutional order of the society; and the political culture/ideology of society (societal imperatives). Janowitz (1960), however, conceptualized civil-military relations in terms of the relations between the military and society, and created a space for the general public to be explored in this context. He argued that the military ought to reflect civilian society as closely as possible, and emphasized that the protection of society from external threat was not important enough to justify the sacrifice of the very values on which that society was based.[1] As Coletta observes (2011, p. 5), the field of civil-military relations in the post-Janowitz period has expanded to include 'skills and attitudes at the societal level'. At the top of the agenda is trust and good will between the armed forces and society, especially in turbulent times: during wars, major military reforms and strategic reorientations.

Several authors have continued this line of discussion. Cohn (2003) concurs that the civil-military concept is broader in its nature, having in mind that 'civilian' can be divided into those civilians who represent the authorities and those who comprise 'general society'. In the past, the analyses of civil-military relations have too often been limited to the relationship between the political and military elites. Cohn (2003, p. 65) asserts that it would be too simplistic 'to reduce all civil-military relations to a question of who is holding the reins'—just as it is true that the state cannot survive without the protection of the military, it is also true that in a democracy the military cannot survive without the support of the general public. She introduces the triad of civil-military relations, in which the government should not abuse its authority over the military institution; the general public should keep itself informed of and participate in matters of national security; and military personnel should subordinate their institutional and personal interests to the legitimate civilian authority. The military should also be made constantly aware of the mutual dependence between themselves and the general populace.

Boëne (2003, p. 121) also uses a triad to explain civil-military relations, taking into account 'the armed forces, the state and society'. Similarly Pinch (2003) recognizes civil-military relations as an interface between the military and the political/governmental establishment on the one hand, and between the military and civilian society on the other. He sees the public attitudes towards the military and military-media relations as an indicator of civil-military relations in society. In a cross-national comparative research on civil-military relations, Kuhlmann (2003) notes that it is important to decide which strata of society should be taken into account when studying the relationship between the military and society. Limiting the analysis to those institutions with legal authority over military bodies would be too narrow. All institutions and organizations that contribute to the public debate on security policy and military matters should be included in the analysis.

The above considerations prove that civil-military relations extend far beyond the relationship between the military and the civilian authorities; they also involve civil society in which the public plays a significant part. Various permutations are possible among and within the individual elements of the triad, however, we are predominantly interested in the question of public trust in contemporary military, which reflects the legitimacy of the armed forces in its parent society.

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[1]See more in Malešič (2011).

The Origins of Trust in Institutions

Two theoretical traditions compete as explanations for the origins of trust: a cultural explanation and an institutional one (Mishler and Rose 2001). **Cultural theories** hypothesize that political trust 'originates outside the political sphere in long-standing and deep-seated beliefs about people that are rooted in cultural norms and communicated through early-life socialization. From a cultural perspective, institutional trust is an extension of interpersonal trust, learned early in life and, much later, projected onto political institutions, thereby conditioning institutional performance capabilities' (Mishler and Rose 2001, p. 31). Cultural theories can be dated back to the 1960s when Almond and Verba (1965) examined political culture and made a connection between political culture and democracy. The emotional element of political culture (the feeling) in particular is related to democracy and the issue of the legitimacy of political institutions. The work of Almond and Verba was continued by Inglehart (1990) who also drew on the work of other analysts (e.g. Banfield 1958). Inglehart (1990) claimed that a sense of trust is required for the functioning of democratic rules of the game. Almond and Verba (1965) as well as Inglehart (1990) were actually writing about interpersonal trust. When discussing measurements of interpersonal trust in a society, they referred to national levels of trust. They also used words such as 'feelings' and 'beliefs' to describe the relationship between the individual and state structures.

Institutional theories (also known as the **performance theories**) hypothesize that political trust is politically endogenous. It is the expected utility obtained from institutions performing satisfactorily, and it is a consequence as opposed to a cause of institutional performance. As Mishler and Rose (2001, p. 31) put it, 'Institutions that perform well generate trust; untrustworthy institutions generate skepticism and distrust'. So, the institutional theories mostly speak of the connection between trust and performance. As Yang and Holzer (2006) note, the link between a government's performance and a

citizen's trust in the government seems intuitive; yet this relationship is not supported in some of the literature.[2] The difficulty of demonstrating this link empirically is rooted in the difficulty of defining and measuring government performance meaningfully.

Modern analysts of public opinion data assess trust in institutions in general and look for explanations using also the following theses: the 'social capital thesis' by Putnam and Uslaner; psychological argumentations and the 'motivational thesis', as advanced by Deutch and by Warren; the 'encapsulation of interests thesis' by Warren (Huang et al. 2012; Hardin 1999; Warren 1999a, b); and the 'media coverage thesis' by Orren.

The term '**social capital**' describes the pattern and intensity of networks among people and the shared values which arise from those networks (Office of National Statistics).[3] The debate on trust in institutions recognizes that trust matters in a democracy in large part because it is the key component of social capital. However, not all forms of interpersonal trust contribute to social capital. The kind of trust that contributes to social capital can be generalized to mean trust between strangers, as opposed to trust in one's family group (Warren 1999a, b).

At least one school of social psychology treats trust and institutional confidence as **basic aspects of personality types**. Trust is an affective orientation that forms part of our basic personality and is largely independent of our experience of the external political world (Newton and Norris 1999). One of the psychological approaches to trust is derived from Deutsch's studies in which he discovered that a cooperative orientation leads to trusting and trustworthy behavior, while a competitive orientation leads to mutual suspicion and distrust (Deutsch 1960).

Hardin (cited in Warren 1999a, b) regards trust as an expression of **encapsulated interest**.

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[2]E.g. Van de Walle and Bouckaert, as cited in Yang and Holzer (2006).

[3]The concept became popular following the publication in 2000 of Putnam's *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (Keeley 2007).

This thesis extends rational choice axioms to relations of trust. As Warren (1999a, b, p. 5) explains, 'according to these axioms, individuals seek to maximize (self-interested) preferences, while economizing on the effort of gaining the information necessary to know what course of action, in any instance, will maximize preferences. Thus, to say that I trust you with respect to some matter means that I have reason to expect you to act in my interest with respect to that matter because you have good reasons to do so, reasons that are grounded in my interest… Your interest encapsulates my interest'.

The media coverage thesis emphasizes the link between political trust and the opinions disseminated in the media. Hanitzch and Berganza make two assumptions: (1) journalists' opinions of public institutions influence the content of their journalism; and (2) the media coverage of public institutions shapes public trust (Hanitzch and Berganza 2012). However, Hanitzch and Berganza note some intervening variables. Namely, that the extent to which journalists trust public institutions varies considerably across nations. Journalists tend to trust public institutions more if they work under conditions of relative media freedom; they have more trust in contexts where corruption is less pervasive and where people more readily trust one another. They also have more trust when they work in state-owned news organizations.

The media coverage thesis deserves more attention due to its increasing importance. The term 'mediazation' was coined to express the significant role played by the media in creating our subjective perceptions, sometimes without regard for fact. The media sets the agenda, both in terms of which topics are covered and their relative importance on the news agenda. This general observation could be applied to a range of important social questions, including the military and its activity. Maltby (2012, p. 255) notes that 'the military are increasingly mediatized where the media act as both a rationale and interface for communication within the military, and between the military and their audiences'. In some countries, military media management strategies are increasingly organized in order to appeal, to reassure and to elicit support from multiple audiences.

Recent discussion within sociology of the military circles has revealed that media coverage of the military has focused on a variety of topics, such as wars, peace operations and missions, strategic issues, reform, the transformation of the military, corruption, and various scandals …[4] The discussion highlights certain characteristics that are typical of the media's attitude towards the military and its performance. Ekovich (2011) suggests that the crucial characteristic of the media's reporting from the Vietnam War was the evolving relationship between American journalists and decision-making and command centers. Whenever there was a high degree of consensus among policymakers, the journalist tended to follow the official policy line; whereas where there was a lack of consensus, the media reflected this and were more critical, especially when political disagreements resulted in information leaks. Levy (2011) uses the case of the Second Lebanese War to illustrate how the Israeli government mobilized public support for the war. Domestic media gave full support to the government, portraying the war as right and just. The occasional criticism referred to the conduct of war rather than the war itself, which was not questioned. Nevertheless the dominant narrative of the war lacked a holistic approach or any criticism of the military, its structures and processes.

Since the turn of the millennium, the role of media propaganda in war has continued to be a pertinent question. During the war in Afghanistan, from 2001 onwards, we witnessed the development of the concept of 'public diplomacy'; meanwhile 'embedded journalism' has been a feature of the Iraqi War from 2003 onwards. The most prominent recent revival of media propaganda has occurred with Russia's military intervention in Ukraine. As Johnston (2015, p. 1) critically observes, Putin's government bombards people through the media with fantastical stories to 'paralyze their critical faculties'; it disseminates lies and half-truths, and it

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[4]See more in Malešič and Kümmel (2011).

censors the opposition press and its leaders. According to Johnston (2015, p. 2), the Kremlin's propaganda strategy 'rests on three key propositions: there is no such thing as objectivity; journalists are not critics but servants of the state and, in wartime, they are 'soldiers of the ideological front''. In short, information is employed as a weapon.

The recent involvement of the military in peacekeeping missions has been another important topic of media coverage. As a matter of course, both the media and the general public tend to be supportive of peace missions that are less violent, less dangerous, and which are performed closer to home. The case of Afghanistan represents a relatively violent, dangerous and distant operation, and the lack of public support for this operation in several European countries has been evident.[5] Nevertheless, negative public opinion has failed to force a withdrawal of international forces from the country. On the other hand, the lack of media and public support for the mission appears to have had a negative impact on the morale of the soldiers on the ground. The operation in Afghanistan has been extensively covered by the media, especially in those countries which contributed their military and civilian capabilities to the ISAF. In countries whose military has suffered casualties, the reports have focussed on those casualties, questioning the wisdom of the operation and the sacrifice of life for distant goals in a remote part of the world. The analyses reveal that 'casualty tolerance' in contemporary society is rather low. Controversies have emerged among the political elite, in the media and social networks discussing security-related issues.

Several authors have recently investigated how social media could be used as a tool of military influence. Jones and Baines (2013) have analysed the significance of sharing information worldwide through social media for strategic communication. Their research, however, reveals that the efficacy of social media usage should not be overestimated: a lot of dialogue, relationship building, shaping and engagement is required in order to influence people's mind in a networked world. The process of engagement is therefore as important as the message itself: the ability to listen is an important part of the process of communication through social media. The current military literature may be too focused on the language of message creation and delivery. Therefore, those who communicate on behalf of the military will have to cede control, adapt thinking and embrace a process of constructive engagement (Jones and Baines 2013).

All of these media activities have (in)directly reflected the general public's attitude towards the military and have also influenced public trust in the military, which is the main interest of our analysis.

Trust in the Military at Global and Regional Levels

Today, the concept of trust is commonly understood and applied as a tool for assessing the legitimacy of both political institutions and individual politicians. The concept of trust is widely used to measure the social position, legitimacy, or, more generally, the public's opinion of social institutions, including the military. Researchers often regard public opinion as the central concept for assessing the legitimacy of the armed forces. According to van der Meulen (2003, p. 299), the military's institutional identity as a 'manager of violence' explains why the issue of legitimacy is so important for the military, especially in a democratic society. For van der Meulen (1998), public opinion is a central concept for assessing the legitimacy of the armed forces.

Moskos et al. (2000) characterize post-Cold War public attitudes toward the military as 'indifferent'. The 'postmodern military' is confronted with a diminished level of military threat, the transformation of their recruitment system from conscription to an all-volunteer force, and a limitation on the resources available for their operations and further development. According to Moskos and others, these trends should lead to the marginalization of the military. Burk and

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[5]See more in Malešič and Kümmel (2011).

Moskos ([1994](#)) assert that public opinion of the armed forces in postmodern societies is skeptical and even characterized by 'apathy'. Since the end of the Cold War, defense no longer seems to be an important social objective; the armed forces are subject to a transformation towards an all-volunteer force, and the military has consequently become somewhat marginalized in the public's view.

Van der Meulen ([2003](#)), however, reports that public attitudes towards the military have not necessarily followed the abovementioned patterns of indifference, apathy and marginalization. On the contrary, while defense may no longer be widely regarded as an important common goal, public trust in the military has increased. Similarly, in postmodern society, new military missions are understood in the context of protecting human rights and therefore tend to receive a high level of public approval. Let us consider the empirical findings.

The global and regional surveys reveal that militaries across the world enjoy high levels of public trust. The World Values Survey data contains a variable of trust in the armed forces. The data available for the 2005–2008 surveys ranked the armed forces in second place: on average, 64.4% of respondents from the total sample expressed trust in their national armed forces. Only the churches ranked higher (66.4%), while third place went to charitable and humanitarian organizations (63.3%).

The Americas Barometer reveals a reasonably high degree of public trust in the armed forces in the countries of both North and South America. Montalvo ([2009](#), p. 2) notes that, on average, 'the degree of citizen trust in the Armed Forces is 59.2 out of 100 possible points'. He adds, 'this value is well above the levels of trust in institutions of representation, such as political parties or the congress, in the same region'. This data was obtained in 2008. By comparison, the 2012 survey reveals an even higher degree of average trust in the armed forces in the Americas— namely, 62.2% (Seligson et al. [2012](#)). In the Americas, public trust in institutions is stable, 'with the Catholic Church and the Armed Forces the most trusted, and political parties the least.

Yet support for political institutions in the Americas has increased over time while support for social institutions has dropped' (Seligson et al. [2012](#), p. 191).

The surveys of trust in the military in European countries reveal that, as a general rule, the levels of trust increased after the 1990s. The special Eurobarometer survey carried out in autumn 2000 among the then fifteen countries of the EU revealed that European public's trust in their militaries was very high. Of sixteen institutions surveyed, the military ranked top (with a score of 71% of respondents). The police ranked second (70%) and the educational system third (66%). From 2004 onwards, when the survey samples were extended to include other European countries, some Eastern-European countries registered the lowest levels of trust in their militaries. The average results indicate that, in 2010 and in 2014, 70% of European citizens trusted their militaries. This represents the highest score attained by any political or social institution (European Commission [2014](#)).

The 2005 Asian Barometer survey included fourteen countries. On the average, trust in the military in these 14 countries was 61% (Asian Barometer 2005). The Afrobarometer project yields data on the levels of trust in the military for some African countries. Eleven countries were included in the 2011/2012 survey sample. The results reveal a reasonably high average level of trust in the military, almost comparable to the levels recorded for European countries. Public trust in the military ranked highest among the institutions included in the survey (the police, the electoral commission, the ruling party, opposition parties, the taxation department). Only the courts gained almost the same level of trust as the military (64% compared to 67%) (Afrobarometer— Round Five—2011/2012). The armed forces have also enjoyed considerable support and trust in Australia. In 2005, the Australian Social Attitudes survey revealed that 82% of Australian citizens expressed 'great' or 'quite a lot' of confidence in the Australian Defense Forces. The Australian military was followed by the police (72%), business corporations (42%), and public services (32%) (Orme [2011](#)).

National Perspective

We now consider the data pertaining to individual countries. Nielsen (2012) reminds us that the USA was born with a distrust of standing armies, whereas today public confidence in the military is 'quite strong', especially compared to other political institutions. Cohn (2003, p. 66) reports that the American military is both respected and slightly mistrusted: 'Military personnel look down on civilians as slovenly and degenerate, and civilians look down on the military personnel as unintelligent and unimaginative; military personnel are told that politics is none of their business, and are then thrust into situations where they have no choice but to be political'. According to Leal (2005), polls in the USA reveal that the military is the most respected government institution; this fact is crucial for the American armed forces in garnering support for funding and in raising recruitment.[6] The Gallup data reveals that in 2004 the level of trust in the US military stood at 75% (representing the sum of answers expressing 'a great deal' and 'quite a lot' of trust), and a decade later it remained at 74%. The trend for trust has thus been very stable during the last decade.[7]

Pinch (2003) reveals that the Canadian public has often adopted an ambivalent position towards the military, returning 'quite a positive' response when asked specific questions about the institution; however, spending on the armed forces has often been perceived to be a relatively low priority. Due to a number of scandals during their deployments abroad in the 1990s, the Canadian Forces have lost a lot of media support and have also suffered from a lower level of both government and public support. A decade ago, polls showed that trust and support had been re-established in several dimensions of military activities, confirming an improvement in the public's view of the armed forces. The level of trust in the Canadian Armed Forces in 2008 stood at 79%, and in 2010 at 76%, which again confirms the stability of public attitudes towards the military.

Wither (2003) reports that the British public respects the armed forces for their professionalism and effectiveness; however, the military profession is little understood by most civilians. This is a consequence of the fact that, with the exception of the two world wars, Britain has relied on a relatively small professional armed forces for the entire twentieth century. Thus, citizens have had little chance to experience military service. Questions of defense and the military are not salient topics during election campaigns, nor do the political elite and the public pay much attention to military matters.[8] The outsourcing and privatizing of some support functions have not improved the picture, the disappearance of military uniforms from the streets has not been helpful either. All these circumstances have increased 'a sense of separate military and civilian societies' (Wither 2003, p. 76). However the data reveals that public trust in the British military in 2004 was among the highest in Europe (79%) and by 2014 had even increased further (84%) (European Commission 2014).

A review of public opinion data in France (Les Français et la Défense 2002) reveals that 81% of the population held the French Armed Forces in high esteem in 2001. The trend throughout the last decade reveals a data range of plus/minus four percent either side of this figure. When asked to consider the armed forces in 2001, the general population expressed sympathy (78%), feelings of security (72%), and pride (67%). The Eurobarometer data reveals that in 2004 there was a slight drop in the level of trust

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[6]Korb and Segal (as cited in Nielsen 2012, p. 374) argue that the failure of American leaders to reinstate the draft during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq represents a moral outrage and reinforces the trend in which 'the military goes to war while the country as a whole does not'.

[7]This attitude is confirmed by the statement that the US armed services contribute 'a lot' to the society's well-being, supported by 84% of the respondents in the 2009 poll and 78% of respondents in 2013 poll (PewResearchCenter 2013).

[8]In 2002, the MoD launched a public discussion of the Strategic Defense Review through local authorities, public libraries and via the internet, but received only 252 replies (Wither 2003).

(70%); however, by 2014 this had recovered and attained the abovementioned level (78%) (European Commission 2014).

Germany provides a contrasting case. In Germany, public trust in the military was higher in 2004 (72%) than it was ten years later (65%) (European Commission 2014). During that period, the German armed forces participated in ISAF in Afghanistan. Taking into account the fact that public support for the mission in Germany was not high (see Collmer 2011), one can assume that the participation of German armed forces in Afghanistan somewhat denigrated the esteem in which it was held. In Spain, where public trust in the military is among the lowest in the European Union, there was no change from 2004 to 2014: it remained at 60%.

The Italian armed forces were not the only armed forces in Europe to experience a relatively low level of public trust until the beginning of 1990s. However, from 1994 to 2005, public trust in the Italian Armed Forces rose from 36 to 67%, most probably due primarily to their participation in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. 87% of the Italian public believed that Italian soldiers were effective in these missions. Thus, unlike the other countries in which there is a low level of public trust, Italy's armed forces have succeeded in overcoming their negative image (http://www.globalsecurity.org; see also Caforio 2008). This trend has also been confirmed by Eurobarometer: public trust in the military has been relatively stable in the last decade, reaching 66% in 2014 (European Commission 2014).

The Russian public's trust in their armed forces has been very much dependent on military campaigns. During the first war in Chechnya, from 1994 to 96, the armed forces sustained a considerable loss of reputation. The portion of respondents who claimed to be 'fully confident' in the armed forces fell from 37 to 27%. During the second Chechen war, which began in 1999 as a 'counter-terrorist operation', public trust in the Russian military increased to 48% due to its initial success. However by 2001 it has again fallen to 33% (Rukavishnikov 2003). Following the Chechen war, public trust in the military gradually recovered, reaching 50% in 2006 and 66% in 2008. Trust was maintained at that level until 2013. In 2014, the annexation of the Crimea and Russia's engagement in Eastern Ukraine pushed public trust in the military up to 78% (Gallup 2014).

Recent public opinion surveys in Switzerland reveal a relatively high degree of trust in the military. Haltiner (2003, p. 85) reports that, although the 'social and political valuation of the role of the military has changed',[9] the Swiss military has been subject to less public scrutiny and criticism since the new millennium than it was during the Cold War. Although acceptance of the military oscillates at around 70%, the attitude is 'characterized by a kind of apathy'. Tresch Szvircsev et al. (2010) reveal that the Swiss Armed Forces attained a moderate level of trust among the federal institutions in 2010. Nevertheless, while three quarters of the population believe that the armed forces are necessary and wish to have a well-equipped and well-trained armed forces, half of the population advocates military downsizing. In 2004, average trust in the military stood at 6.28 on a scale of 1–10 (Haltiner et al. 2004), and gradually dropped to 6.15 by 2013 (Tresch Szvircsev et al. 2013).

Čukan (2003, p. 117) reports that the military in Slovakia was perceived 'very positively' and the armed forces were an institution which Slovaks 'deeply trusted', in spite of the fact that the military 'has never been paid any special attention by society'. In addition, trust in the military is not a consequence of its combat experience, but rather a result of positive interactions between soldiers and the general public, such as the military's involvement in search and rescue activities during natural disasters, and performing other tasks that follow from the 'societal imperative'. Trust in the military grew from an initial 52% in 1993, when Slovakia's independent armed forces were established, to over 70% by the beginning of millennium (ibid.).

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[9]Haltiner refers to two referenda in Switzerland on the abolition of the armed forces that took place in 1989 and 2001. The latter was considered to be a failure with a minimal turnout and only 22% of voters favouring abolition; even among young voters the idea received little support.

Eurobarometer, however, reveals a decline in trust in 2004 to 60%. The 2014 Eurobarometer data reveals a continuation of this negative trend, as a result of which public trust in the Slovak military now stands close to the level it enjoyed at the beginning of nineties (55%) (European Commission 2014).

In Poland, the military appears to be an institution of high social prestige which inspires public trust. In various polls the public has nominated the military 'as one of the most trusted institutions' (Gogolewska 2003, p. 104). Some 60–75% of the population hold a positive image of the military. In 2001, 76% of the respondents declared their confidence in the armed forces. According to Gogolewska, a high level of trust in the army is not necessarily confirmation that it is popular and socially respected. One of the reasons for this can be found in the communications gap between the military and the rest of society. Nevertheless, the level of public trust in the Polish military appears to have stabilized at around 70% over the last decade (71% in 2004 vs. 70% in 2014, as the Eurobarometer polls suggest) (European Commission 2014).

By contrast, in Hungary at the beginning of the new millennium, trust in the military could be characterized as fairly low. Only 27% of respondents expressed an 'absolute' or 'fairly high' level of trust in the military as an institution; this measurement reflected the heated debates taking place at the time regarding the abolition of conscription and the introduction of an all-volunteer force (Kiss 2003). During the last decade, public trust in the military in Hungary has improved, reaching 56 and 50% in 2004 and 2014 respectively (European Commission 2014).

In the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,[10] the level of public trust did not fall significantly below 50%. In fact, the NATO air strikes against the country in Spring 1999 and its subsequent defeat even strengthened public trust in the military (65%). This subsequently fell to 53% in 2000, just prior to the collapse of the Milošević regime, after which time trust in the military increased again to 75%. This was followed by another fall in public support in mid-2001, which took trust down to 57% and even 48% by the end of that year (Timotić 2003). Following the dissolution of the State Community of Serbia and Montenegro into two states in 2006, we can track the public opinion in those two entities separately. Trust in the military in Serbia in 2014 was a little higher (65%) than in Montenegro (59%) (European Commission 2014).

At the beginning of the millennium, trust in the military in Bosnia & Hercegovina was also fairly high: 54% in Republika Srpska and 60% in the Federation (Turković 2003). In 2014, general trust in the military (regardless of entity division) was measured at 62% of adult inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Centar za društvena istraživanja 2014). In Macedonia, a 2001 poll demonstrated that the armed forces were also highly trusted. 78% of respondents regarded the armed forces as an effective institution of crisis management as well as being capable of defending the country (Vankovska 2003). However, more than a decade later, trust in the military had dropped to 56% (European Commission 2014).

According to Slovenian Public Opinion Surveys conducted in the first decade of the new millennium, the Slovenian public's trust in the military has slightly oscillated around 50% (Malešič 2011). The results of the latest Slovenian Public Opinion (SPO) survey on defense and security issues in 2012 reveal that the military ranks third on the trust scale (53.1% of respondents), after family and relatives (94.5%) and educational institutions (75.5%). Eurobarometer measurements taken in 2004 and 2014 reveal a slight increase in public trust in the Slovenian military: from 58 to 64% (European Commission 2014). As far as the factors of trust in the military are concerned, we found that the military's frequent involvement in disaster relief, its professionalism, qualifications and good

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[10]The FRY was renamed the State Community of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. Following the declaration of Montenegrin independence in 2006 both countries became separate and independent states.

performance, and its preparedness to carry out its defense function have all contributed to the result. On the other hand, the potential factors of distrust have included poor procurement and instances of corruption in connection with procurement, the politicization of the military and its organization in terms of its failure to respect hierarchy and discipline.[11]

The Bulgarian Armed Forces also managed to attain a high level of support and trust at the very beginning of its democratic transformation in 1989. Yanakiev (2003) reports that, in the period immediately following the democratic transformation, the level of confidence in the armed forces varied from 63 to 70% and did not change until the beginning of millennium. Nevertheless, in 2004, trust in the Bulgarian military had fallen to 55%; a decade on, the results have further deteriorated: only 40% of the public trust the military. It is interesting to note that in 2014 the portion of those who distrust the military (39%) was comparable to the portion of those expressing trust in it (40%) (European Commission 2014). In Romania, trust in the military has been high and accompanied by a public willingness to support the reform process and to increase the defense budget (Watts 2003). In contrast to Bulgaria, public trust in the Romanian military has remained stable (72% in 2004; 73% in 2014) (European Commission 2014).

Discussion and Conclusions

Levels of and Trends in Public Trust

Many studies have addressed trust in democratic institutions. The concept of trust in institutions has been developed through analyses of the functioning of democracy, and some authors have inevitably connected democracy with trust in institutions. Rose (cited in Yunus 2005) claims that trust in institutions is a necessary

precondition for civil society and democracy; Listhaug and Wiberg (as cited in Yunus 2005) concur that a general lack of trust in state institutions presents a serious problem for democratic systems; while Yunus (2005) concludes that democratic institutions are unable to function without a minimum level of trust. Citing several authors, Mishler and Rose (2001, p. 30) claim that 'trust links ordinary citizens to the institutions that are intended to represent them, thereby enhancing both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of democratic government'. Some authors (such as van der Meulen 1998) likewise claim that public support for the military is crucial in order for it to attain legitimacy in society. However, some analysts have suggested that trust in the military should not be analyzed primarily as an indicator of democratic functioning, but should be considered as part of the broader debate on public trust in institutions of social order, hierarchical institutions such as the armed forces, the police and the church. Inglehart (1997) explains changing public confidence in hierarchical institutions by reference to the prevailing social values (materialism versus post-materialism). His research reveals that materialists place greater confidence in their country's hierarchical institutions than do post-materialists. Consequently, he connects the fall in confidence in hierarchical institutions in the 1980s and early 1990s with the change from materialist societies to post-materialist societies. The question, then, is whether we could say that the almost global rise in public trust in the military during the last decade is an indicator that societies have once again become more materialistic?

Reviewing the results of the surveys on trust in the military across the world, we can say that, in the last decade, the national armed forces have enjoyed a high level of public trust and have consequently enjoyed social legitimacy. According to the regional analysis, on average 61% of citizen in Asia trust their own military (2005), 62% in the combined Americas (2012), 67% in Africa (2011/2012), 70% in Europe (2010 and 2014) and around 80% in Australia (2005). In many cases, the military is ranked at

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[11]These findings derive from a survey of security studies students on the causes of trust and distrust in the Slovenian military, carried out at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana (see more in Garb and Malešič 2016).

the very top of trusted institutions, only rarely accompanied by the Church (Americas) or by the legal system (Africa). Nevertheless, the World Values Survey places the Church slightly above the military, both being at the top of the scale. If we compare Europe with the combined Americas, we find that the average in the former is much higher than in the latter; however a comparison between North America alone and Europe reveals that the average level of trust in the military is higher in North America.

Our random sample of individual countries confirms a high level of trust in the military to be evident in almost all of them, although there are some exceptions. The highest recent levels of trust have been recorded in Great Britain, France, the USA Australia and in Canada; but also in Russia, Poland and Romania. Whereas the lowest levels of trust have been recently observed in Hungary and Bulgaria. When comparing this recent data with data taken a decade ago, some countries display a stable trend in trust (e.g. the USA, Great Britain, and France…), whereas others have experienced oscillations, some positive (e.g. Hungary and Russia) and some negative (e.g. Slovakia, Macedonia and especially Bulgaria). In Hungary, public trust in the military was formerly very low, and while it has increased in recent years, it remains rather low. Russia's military has suffered from a poor public image due to its unsuccessful military campaigns in the nineties (during the wars in Chechnia), but has enjoyed a significant resurgence in public trust following the annexation of Crimea and its involvement in the Ukrainian crisis in general. It is also interesting to note that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's military defeat in the NATO air strikes against the country in 1999 actually brought about a higher level of trust in the military than had existed prior to the attack. This was most probably the result of national pride and defiance. In general, we could say that the level of trust in the military is higher in old democracies than in new democracies (see also Mishler and Rose 2001), however there are also important exceptions at both ends.

Causes (Factors) of Trust

The numerous theoretical approaches used to explain the level of trust in institutions reveal that it is almost impossible to identify a single prevailing causal factor of trust or distrust in a certain country. Therefore, we prefer to speak of a range of factors with differing explanatory strengths. Some seek to explain this by reference to the characteristics of the nation's political culture (Almond and Verba 1965), others by reference to the effects of the political and economic transition from socialism to a liberal-democratic system (Mishler and Rose 2001), or as a result of public disappointment in politics and the personification of democracy (Haček 2013). While exploring the level of trust in institutions, Mishler and Rose (2001) have discovered that in post-communist countries especially the general public express a low degree of positive trust in public institutions and that this is consistent with both cultural and institutional theories (Mishler and Rose 2001).

Concrete reasons for the levels of trust may be found in military campaigns, peacekeeping missions, crisis (disaster) management, structural reforms, budget cuts, professionalism and the like. The intensified participation of the armed forces in international peacekeeping operations and missions around the globe over the last two decades appears to have significantly contributed to the increase in public trust in the military. Several authors have claimed that the participation of Europe's armed forces in international missions has helped them regain their legitimacy and prestige (e.g. Kuhlmann 2003; van der Meulen 2003); however our analysis reveals that, in some cases (e.g. operation ISAF in Afghanistan), the participation of the armed forces in international missions can also reduce the level of trust. Unfortunately proving the direct influence of international deployment on trust is difficult due to a number of other important changes to the defense systems of contemporary societies. These changes include: the introduction of an All-Volunteer Force as a recognizable trend;

significant military budget cuts, especially in Europe; comprehensive defense reforms; memberships of international (security) organizations; and the increased engagement of the military in disaster relief. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that data trends in some of the countries analyzed in this paper would suggest that the engagement of the military in wars influences the level of trust in unpredictable ways (e.g. the data in Russian Federation vs. the data in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).

High Trust in the Military and Its Marginalization at the Same Time?

Some analysts have suggested that a high degree of trust in the military is accompanied by its social marginalization coupled with an indifference and even apathy displayed by citizens. The reasons for this can be perhaps found in the value structure of post-modern society, the prevailing values being pluralization and individualization, specialization and professionalization, hedonism, and the increasing importance of global concerns. One reason for this contradiction is likely to be the profound change in threat perceptions, since -as a rule- military threats no longer attract public attention, and in the majority of countries the 'war against terrorism' has not proved to be an adequate substitute. It is possible that the communication gap between the military and the public also plays an important role to this effect, as some analysts have noted. There is also the potential influence of various reputation-damaging 'affairs' as well as the various military-related problems of corruption and crime, especially in transition countries. The diminishing military experience amongst the general populace due to the abolition of conscription and the introduction of an all-volunteer force and the invisibility of the military in societies (as a rule there are no military uniforms on the streets) do not help either.

To some extent, these problems indicate a civil-military gap. The term encompasses broad possible differences in the values and culture of military and civil society. Although there are

some doubts as to the existence of such a phenomenon as a civil-military gap, there is evidence to support it. The term became common at the beginning of a new century following a survey in USA which resulted in 21 separate studies (see Feaver and Kohn 2001) (although discourse on the gap between the military and its parent society had already existed in the US for a considerable time)[12]. The studies confirmed some of the concerns about the so-called gap. Feaver and Kohn (2001) identified two basic concerns that could present a challenge to future civil-military relations in the US: firstly, the emergence of new professional military norms that are at odds with the traditional understanding of how civilians and the military should interact at the highest policy levels; and secondly, while the public generally holds the military in high esteem, there is evidence that this esteem is propped up by the presence of veterans in civilian society. Some years later, the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS) carried out a similar empirical survey in thirteen countries. It revealed differences between the so called military and civilian cultures. Namely, the military respondents in general expressed the primacy of the community over the individual, a high degree of trust in state institutions, an emphasis on military missions with a stricter military content, greater pessimism, and the need to recognize and respect the professional and ethical autonomy of the military (Caforio 2007). These surveys reveal that the civil-military gap is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. As Rahbek-Clemmensen et al. (2012) have argued, it should be conceptualized in four dimensions: (1) cultural, (2) demographic, (3) policy preference, and (4) the institutional gap. In the case of public trust in the military, the gap could be identified as a communications gap (as discussed above), as well as a civil-military gap in knowledge and experiences, interests and goals, and values.

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[12]For a review of the evolution of the American civil-military gap debate and its main issues, see Cohn (1999). Some issues and dilemmas were also discussed by Garb (2005).

Nevertheless, the above issues need to be further explored, as do the factors of trust in the military. Our analysis of the data has not enabled us to identify all the relevant factors that increase or decrease public trust in the military in contemporary society, nor has it allowed us to rank the various factors in order of importance: for instance, whether it is social culture, military deployments abroad, the portrayal of the military in the media, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, or something else; and to what extent, and in what kind of combination? In spite of the many common developments and common characteristics shared by militaries across the world, individual countries retain their own idiosyncratic variables which will need to be taken into account in future research.

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Author Biographies

Marjan Malešič is a Professor and a Head of Defence Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences (FSS), University of Ljubljana. His recent teaching and research fields have been crisis (disaster) management, environmental security, Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU, public opinion on security, non-military aspects of security and similar. Malešič served as a Vice-Dean responsible for research at FSS (2007–2011) and as a member of the EU COST Domain Committee Individuals, Societies, Cultures and Health (2010–2014). Currently he is a WG coordinator in European Research Group on Military and Society and a member of International Sociological Association (ISA). Recent publications: MALEŠIČ, M. The impact of military engagement in disaster management on civil-military relations. *Current sociology*, ISSN 0011-3921, 2015; MALEŠIČ, M., JELUŠIČ, L., GARB, M., VUGA BJ, KOPAČ, E., JUVAN, J. *Small, but smart?: the structural and functional professionalization of the Slovenian Armed Forces*, (Militär und Sozialwissenschaften, vol. 49). 1st ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015. MALEŠIČ, M & VUGA BJ. Explaining the perception of security: Slovenian public opinion and contemporary security theories. *Revista românæa de ştiinţe politice*, ISSN 1582-456X, Win. 2014.

Maja Garb Ph.D. in Defence Studies (2002), works as Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Ljubljana. Her research interests rest in sociology of military organization, peace operations, conflict analysis and military leadership. She is a course holder of Defence Management and Analysis of Contemporary Conflicts. Currently she also works as a head of a Chair of Defence Studies and as a coordinator of postgraduate program of defence studies. She is a member of ERGOMAS, International Sociological Association, and Slovenian Political Science Association. Recent publications: GARB, M. Public trust in the military: the Slovenian Armed Forces in a comparative analysis, *Current sociology*, 63/3, 2015; MALEŠIČ, M., JELUŠIČ, L., GARB, M., VUGA BERŠNAK, J., KOPAČ, E., JUVAN, J. *Small, but smart?: the structural and functional professionalization of the Slovenian Armed Forces*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015; GARB, M. Evaluating the success of peace operations. *Scientia Militaria*, 42/1, 2014.

David Kuehn

Introduction

Democratic control of the military addresses one of the most relevant problems in the history of social order and political organization: how can unarmed civilians establish, maintain and exert dominance over the military, an organization that potentially is a constant threat to social order and stability.[1] Ultimately, this 'civil-military problematique' (Feaver 1996) stems directly from the military's *raison d'être*: Functionally differentiated societies establish military organizations to defend themselves against existential security threats. To perform these duties, the military is allocated financial, organizational and human resources and acquires coercive means, which in turn it could use to take over political power and enforce its will against the same society it is supposed to defend. Samuel E. Finer, one of the most prominent scholars on the issue, has therefore suggested that instead of asking

why the military engage in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other and civilian groups are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior organization. And, they possess arms (Finer 1962, 5).

While keeping the military's overwhelming coercive potential at bay and ensuring its firm subordination under the political imperatives are relevant for all political regimes that maintain military organizations, it is particularly important for democracies: Most basically, democracy refers a political system in which political authority depends on the consent of the people—realized through 'through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote' (Huntington 1991, 7). In order for such elections to be meaningful, democratically elected representatives must not be deposed through military pressure.

The 'praetorian problem', i.e., the avoidance of military *coup d'états*, is only one aspect of democratic control, however. Elected civilians must also have full and unhindered authority over defense and security policy, i.e., the development and implementation of aims and procedures of external security policy and the organization, funding, equipment, training, and deployment of the military (Bruneau 2006), which are the military's core areas of functional expertise and corporate interest, and where they enjoy considerable informational advantages

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[1]This chapter follows Martin Edmonds' (1988) influential definition of the military as that legally formed, bureaucratically organized and armed state agency that possesses the monopoly over weapons of war; and whose primary function is defense against external threats. Most generally, then, civilians refers to all non-military social actors and organizations (Croissant and Kuehn 2015).

D. Kuehn (✉)
Institute of Political Science, Heidelberg University,
Bergheimer Str. 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany
e-mail: david.kuehn@ipw.uni-heidelberg.de

over the civilians (Croissant and Kuehn 2011, 18–19). This problem captures what Huntington (1957, 20) called 'the relation between the expert and the politician', which entails three distinct challenges. First, how can democratic control over defense and security policy be established? This is mainly relevant for newly democratized nations, where the military as a legacy of preceding authoritarian rule, typically continues to enjoy considerable institutional autonomy and political privileges in these areas. Second, even if democratic control over defense and military policy has been established, democracies have to ensure that this control works effectively on a day-by-day basis. Finally, the question how elected authorities control the military is not only relevant from the perspective of ensuring democratic rule and quality, but also because it affects military readiness and the effectiveness of defense policy and national security. In sum, then, the problem of democratic control contains three distinct dimensions[2]:

1. Avoiding the military's intervention into politics.
2. Establishing effective institutions of democratic control in new democracies.
3. Ensuring the day-to-day efficacy of democratic control while upholding military effectiveness in established democracies.

All three problems have been studied extensively by scholars of civil-military relations, each motivating different analytical perspectives on democratic control. This chapter provides an overview of this scholarship, and surveys its different conceptual and theoretical arguments and empirical findings. It proceeds in five steps: The first section summarizes three different conceptualizations of democratic control. The second section addresses the problem of coups in democratic regimes. Part three discusses the problem of establishing democratic control in new democracies. The fourth section deals with

the working of democratic control in established democracies and its implications for military effectiveness. The final section concludes the chapter by providing an outlook on fruitful avenues of further research.

Analytical Perspectives on Democratic Control

As noted above, the core meaning of democratic control is the subordination of the military under the elected representatives of the people. How this subordination is ensured, however, is less straightforward and scholars have proposed different definitions and concepts of democratic control (Desch 1999; Feaver 1999). Surveying this literature, three main perspectives can be distinguished: a minimalist, a narrow and a broad perspective (Born 2006).

The *minimalist* understanding considers democratic control to be existent if there are no military coups against the democratically elected authorities. While the absence of military coups against the elected authorities is, of course, a necessary condition for democratic rule, it is well understood that it is neither sufficient nor a conceptually valid indicator for democratic control: The absence of military coups could, in fact, indicate that the military simply does not have to intervene into politics because it is already so politically powerful that it can ensure its will without resorting to political intervention (Feaver 1999).

The *narrow* perspective on democratic control, therefore, goes beyond the simple coup-no coup dichotomy and catches a broader range of phenomena relevant to civil-military relations in democracies. It is based on the assumption that the military has certain political and institutional interests (e.g., access to sufficient financial resources, or certain defense policies), which could be in contrast to those of the elected authorities (Huntington 1957; Welch 1976; Edmonds 1988). From this perspective, democratic control ultimately is a question of the distribution of *authority* and *oversight* between elected civilians and the military (Kuehn 2013,

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[2]Of course, controlling the military is only one of many aspects in democratic civil-military relations (see the chapter by Rukavishnikov and Pugh in this volume).

6–8): The military is under democratic control if democratically elected authorities of the executive and legislative branch have the *authority* to decide on all relevant policy matters, including defense and security policy; and if they can effectively *oversee* the responsibilities they have delegated to the military and hold the military accountable for its actions (see also Cottey et al. 2002; Croissant et al. 2010). Authority and oversight over decision making matters are realized through institutions (Pion-Berlin 1992; Bruneau 2006, 7) that regulate, constrain and enable the behavior of civilians and the military on a day-to-day basis. While the concrete structure of such 'institutional regimes' (Bland 1999) that ensure civilian control over decision making matters will vary across time, space and different substantive issue areas, the underlying functional attributes of institutionalized civilian control are invariant: first, institutions must be present that enable civilians to exercise effective authority and oversight; and second, institutional provisions ('prerogatives') must be absent that guarantee the military's autonomous authority and freedom from civilian oversight (Stepan 1988; Croissant et al. 2010). This means that democratic control is but one pole on the continuum of civil-military relations, and that different distributions of the civil-military power balance are possible.

This perspective allows for a nuanced empirical evaluation of the degree of democratic control in a given country at a given point in time and for comparing differences across space and time. It has, however, been criticized as being too strongly focused on institutions and the assumed conflict of interests between the executive and parliament on the one hand, and the military leadership on the other, while ignoring the 'horizontal control' of the military through other civilian actors such as civil society and the media, and the military' integration into society (Born 2006). The *broad* perspective on democratic control, therefore, includes, but goes beyond the institutional elements of the narrow conception and introduces a variety of normative and sociological aspects of civil-military relations in democratic regimes into the analysis.

Even though the three perspectives have at times been portrayed as contrasting or alternative positions, neither of them is wrong. Rather, they are best understood as different analytical tools that serve specific analytical purposes, depending on the specific research question. Consequently, which of the three dimensions of democratic control one is interested in. In that view, the minimalist conception is crucial for scholars interested in the occurrence of coups in democratic societies, while the narrow perspective has been found most useful for students of civil-military relations in newly democratized nations (e.g., Agüero 1995; Cottey et al. 2002; Trinkunas 2005; Croissant et al. 2013), or scholars who are interested in the day-to-day working of these institutions in established democracies and their effects on military effectiveness (e.g., Feaver 2003; Mannitz 2012; Bruneau 2012). Finally, the broad perspective has been found particularly useful for work on the interface between political science and sociology that is interested in the military's relevance for and legitimacy within democratic society (Moskos et al. 2000).

Military Coups in Democratic Regimes

The question of military coups has dominated much of the literature on civil-military relations in the 1960s and 1970s (Finer 1962; Luttwak 1968; Thompson 1973; Nordlinger 1977). While there are a number of competing understandings of *coup d'états*—some broad, including a range of different actors, targets and tactics, others more narrow, focusing on military officers employing violent means to take over political power—a conceptually parsimonious definition conceives of a coup as 'illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state to unseat the sitting executive' (Powell and Thyne 2011, 252).

The Topology of Military Coups Since 1945

For much of the second half of the 20th century, the coup has been the 'most frequently attempted method of changing government' in large part of the world (Luttwak 1968). According to Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne's comprehensive dataset, the world has seen 471 coups between 1950 and 2014 (Powell and Thyne 2015). As Powell and Thyne do not distinguish between civilian and military-led coups, I draw on a revision of their dataset by Croissant and Herre (2013) to identify all military coups from 1950 to 2014.[3] According to this data, out of the total of 471 coups, 407 (86%) were staged by military officers, of which 210 (52%) succeeded in unseating the executive, while 197 (48%) failed. At the same time, the occurrence of military coups has fluctuated considerably between 1950 and 2014. While the 1960s and 1970s have been the heyday of overt military intervention, with 112 and 89 coups per decade, the number of coups has steadily declined from the 1980s (68 coups) and 1990s (44) all through the 2000s (27), with 11 coups between 2010 to 2014. In addition to these longitudinal trends, there have been considerable inter-regional differences: While Northern America has been spared of military coups, and Europe has been virtually coup-free —with 7 military coups in the 1950 to 2014 period—Latin America (132), and Sub-Saharan Africa (158) have been the hotspots of military intervention into politics. Asia and the Middle East/Northern Africa (MENA) have been less coup-prone than these regions, with 58 and 52 military coups, respectively.

These longitudinal and cross-regional facts, however, conceal the considerable variation across different regime-types' vulnerability to military coups. First of all, cross-referencing the Croissant and Here coups data with the Polity IV data on regime types, which considers a country (formally) democratic if it has a combined Polity score of at least 6, it becomes obvious that overt military intervention is mainly a problem of non-democratic systems[4]: 343 out of 407 military coups (84%) occurred in non-democratic regimes; only 59 (14%) were staged against (formally) democratically elected leaders.[5] These military coups occurred in 32 different countries, with many of these countries experiencing two (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Gambia), three (Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, Pakistan) or even more coups in their respective democratic periods (Philippines: four, Sudan: five, Venezuela: 11). In addition to being less common, military coups were also slightly less likely to succeed in democracies: of the 59 coups, 26 (56%) successfully unseated the executive; 33 coups (44%) failed (see Fig. 9.1).

Second, as Fig. 9.2 shows, the regional characteristics of coups against democratic leaders are similar to the general trends identified above: out of total of 59, 23 occurred in Latin American democracies (39%), 15 each in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (25%), 4 in MENA (7%), and 2 in European democracies (3%).[6] The comparatively low numbers of military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa and MENA are simply due

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[3]In the following descriptive statistics on military coups I rely on Croissant and Herre's (2013) dataset, who define a military coup as being 'led by a military officer and executed by the military as an institution (corporate coups) or segments of the armed forces (factional coups)' (Croissant 2013, 266). As the dataset only includes coups until 2012, I updated it to include all coups until 2014. For the regime-type analysis that follows, I cross-referenced this dataset with the Polity variable of the Polity IV dataset on democracy/autocracy (Marshall and Jaggers 2013).

[4]Despite conceptual and empirical criticisms, Polity IV remains the most often used dataset due to its easy availability, the long time-span covered, and its constant updating. For the purposes of this analysis, the Polity score is, however, problematic as the occurrence of a military coup affects the democracy/autocracy score. To correct for that, I have coded cases in which the coup has led to a drop of the Polity IV score below 6 as occurring in a democracy. This was done for a total of 23 cases in the population.

[5]The remaining 5 coups occurred in countries for which the most recently available Polity IV dataset (2013) does not provide data, either because the countries have a population of less than 500.000 (Dominica, Sao Tome and Principe), have not yet been independent (Sudan 1955), or because the coup occurred in 2014 (Thailand).

[6]Remainder to 100% is due to rounding errors.

Fig. 9.1 Military coups in democracies, 1950–2014. *Source* see Footnote 4

Fig. 9.2 Regional distribution of military coups in democracies, 1950–2014. *Source* see Footnote 4

to the relative scarcity of democratic regimes in these regions, with all four military coups in the MENA region occurring in then-democratic Turkey. The two military coups against European democracies occurred in Cyprus (1974) and Spain (1981).

Finally, the 'praetorian problem' seems to be particularly threatening shortly after the transition to democracy: 45 out of the 59 military coups (76%) occurred in countries that had been democratic for ten years or less, 34 (58%) in democracies aged five years or younger. The average age for democratic regimes to experience a coup was 7.7 years. This vulnerability of new democracies is not only obvious for the era immediately after World War II, when many Latin American dictatorships became democratic before being supplanted by military regimes, and the 1960s and 1970s, when many former colonies in Africa and Asia had short democratic spells, but also for the 'third wave' of democratization, which commenced in 1974: Of the 21 military coups that occurred in 'third wave' democracies, only six (29%) took place in countries that had been democratic for more than 10 years. 71% of 'third wave' coups were staged against democratic regimes that had only been installed ten years ago or less, with 12 (57%) being five years or younger; the average age of these democracies was 7.2 years when the coup took place.

Explaining Military Coups in Democracies

Overall, these data indicate two important insights. First, while not totally immune to military interventions, democracies are much less likely to experience a military coup. Second,

once a democratic regime has existed for some time, it has a much lower risk of being toppled by the military. In fact, 'the risk of a coup almost disappears once a democracy survives for two decades' (Svolik 2014, 5). While there is widespread agreement on these empirical findings in the literature (Lindberg and Clark 2008; Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2014), explaining these facts has been much more problematic. This is not due to a lack of scholarly interest, as there have been a great number of studies to uncover the causes of military coups (Croissant and Kuehn 2015). From this literature, three main groups of arguments can be identified: structural-economic explanations, political-institutional explanations and normative-ideational explanations.

Economic explanations focus on the socio-economic structures of different political regimes and their effects on the likelihood of coups. Ultimately, these explanations are based on Seymour Martin Lipset's famous dictum that 'the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy' (Lipset 1959, 75). According to this argument, the connection between coups and democracy is a corollary of the economic affluence of the nation: If high levels of economic development are conducive for the survival of democratic rule, and the military coup is one type of threat to the survival of democratic regimes, coups are less likely to occur in rich democracies. Empirically, the correlation between the level of economic development and coups against democratic regimes is robust: Based on quantitative comparisons of all post-World War II democracies, Przeworski and collaborators have found that once they had surpassed the per capita income of Argentina in 1976 (US$ 6,055, in 1985 figures) 'democracies are impregnable and can be expected to live forever' (Cheibub et al. 1996, 41). At the same time, poor democracies were much more likely to experience a coup.

Institutional explanations draw on the specific institutional structures of democratic regimes to account for the patterns identified above. Three different institutional arguments can be distinguished. The first highlights the pacifying function of democratic institutions on social and political conflicts in democracies: By providing stable, transparent and reliable channels for accessing political office, elections and inter-institutional checks and balances make illegal means of taking over the government less attractive: 'disgruntled members of the opposition can displace incumbents by winning elections, and thus have fewer incentives to form coalitions with military officers to topple incumbents they both oppose' (Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2014, 18). The second stresses the different institutional mechanisms through which democratic leaders ensure the military's loyalty: Different than autocratic leaders, democracies do not rely on counterbalancing the military with other armed organizations, clientelistic promotions of political allies into military leadership positions and irregular purges of high ranking officers, which all might trigger military coups (Kim 2012; Pilster and Böhmelt 2012; Lee 2014). Instead, their interactions with the military are based on established bureaucratic rules and the rule of law, which reduces uncertainty in civil-military relations and, thus, decreases the military's incentives to stage a coup. Third, due to comprehensive political rights, democracies tend to have strong civil societies, which 'constitute a powerful safeguard against military intervention when they "talk back" or resist a coup by mobilizing protests or refusing to comply with plotters' (Belkin and Schofer 2003, 605).

Finally, *normative-ideational explanations* stress the relevance of political legitimacy, understood as the degree to which a political leader is 'treated by its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political power'(Gilley 2006, 500) for explaining the scarcity of military coups in democracies. According to these arguments, democratic regimes enjoy greater legitimacy and popular support than autocracies, which significantly increases the costs of military intervention into politics (Finer 1962; Belkin and Schofer 2003). In addition, democracies are likely to become more stable and less likely to experience a military coup over time, if support and trust in the democratic institutions becomes routinized (Lindberg and Clark 2008). Finally,

after the Cold War, the prevailing international norms have changed towards a decidedly pro-democratic discourse, such that it has become much more difficult for military coup leaders to legitimate a take-over of government (Marinov and Goemans 2014).

All these explanations, based on different structural, institutional and ideational factors, are plausible to the extent that they not only account for the relative scarcity of military coups in democracies, but also for the inverse relationship between the age of the democratic system and coup risk. In addition, all these accounts provide a causal narrative that explains how the relevant factor will decrease coup risk in (older) democracies, some based on sophisticated formal theoretical models. However, there have been thus far few attempts to test these mechanisms empirically and comparatively. For instance, we know that with rising levels of economic development the likelihood of coups against democratic regimes falls, but not really why: Some authors argue that richer societies are too complex to be managed successfully by the military (e.g., Finer 1962). Others stress that richer democracies can buffer the adverse effects of economic crises, which reduces the risk of social instability that could be used as a pretext for military intervention (e.g., Przeworski 2005). Finally, it is held that richer democracies are less likely to experience a coup because incomes tend to be more equally distributed, which reduces the threat that the elite uses the military to repress the masses and defend their privileges (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). But if these mechanisms are adequate representations of the actual causal relationships between economic factors and coups in democracies, and which of these economic mechanisms is more convincing, has not been answered conclusively. The same is ultimately true for the various institutional and ideational arguments (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Croissant 2013). What is missing, therefore, is an adequate empirical comparative analysis of the micro-macro link between the explanatory variables and the military coups in democratic regimes (Saam 1999).

Institutionalizing Democratic Control in New Democracies

As the discussion above shows, while some newly democratized countries are still confronted with the 'praetorian problem'; military coups are only relevant for a minority of these nations. But even for those new democracies that have not experienced a military putsch, the issue of democratic control remains high on the political agenda. Ultimately, this is due to the institutional legacies of the preceding authoritarian regime: While the degree of the military's autonomous political power and the extent of active participation of officers in government differ across various dictatorships, in all autocracies there is some degree of cooperation between the political leadership and the military. This is the result of the mechanisms through which authoritarian leaders attempt to ensure the military's political support: To ensure its loyalty, autocrats co-opt the military leadership into the regime elite and grant the armed forces often wide ranging institutional autonomy and political influence, especially in defense and military policy (Schedler 2009).

During and after the transition to democracy, this presents a fourfold problem: First, new democracies are confronted with the challenge to curtail the remaining 'authoritarian legacies' (Pinto 2008) of military privileges and to establish effective civilian political authority and oversight over all relevant political issues. Second, civilians have to enact these changes against the will and possible resistance of a military leadership that due to its traditions of active political participation and autonomous decision-making has the political experience and willingness to protect their corporate interests against encroachment by civilians (Croissant et al. 2010, 951-2). Third, given the military's coercive capabilities its interests might prevail in an open political conflict against the civilians. This is even more the case, as fourthly political institutions, civil society and political parties in new democracies are typically too weak to provide robust boundaries for containing, structuring

and channeling political conflicts (Born and Schnabel 2009). In combination, these conditions make change towards greater civilian control of the military in new democracies a challenging endeavor (Kuehn 2013).

Surveying Democratic Control in New Democracies

Consequently, the empirical development in 'third wave' democracies suggests a complex picture. Based on proposals by Smith (2005) and Siaroff (2009) and Croissant and Kuehn (2015) suggest classifying civil-military relations in new democracies along a continuum of four degrees of democratic control: Under *military dominance*, democratic control has broken down and the military effectively, if not directly, controls politics. Under *military tutelage*, elected civilians do have political power, but their remaining in office ultimately depends on the military's explicit or tacit consent. Under *limited military subordination* the military does not meddle with politics, but continues to dominate defense and military policy, for instance by staffing the defense ministry with military officers, or by withholding information from civilian legislators. Finally, under *democratic control*, the legitimately elected holders of political office have effective authority and oversight over all political decision matters, including defense and military policy.

Table 9.1 summarizes the state of democratic control in 69 'third wave' democracies in 2010, or the final year in which the country was democratic before 2010. While portraying only a snapshot of the complexity and variance of civil-military relations in new democracies, this survey suggests three important insights. First, it mirrors the findings of the literature on military coups reviewed above that for most 'third wave' democracies active involvement of the military in 'high politics' is not a pressing issue; in only 18 new democracies (26%) the military is able to play a decisive role in the making or breaking of governments and it is only in Thailand, Pakistan and Madagascar that officers are able to dominate the political system. Second, much more problematic for many new democracies seems to be what Cottey et al. (2002) have termed the 'second generation problems' of establishing effective authority and oversight over the military's core area of interest and functional expertise: In 28 'third wave' democracies (41%) the military continues to enjoy wide ranging political and institutional privileges in defense and military policy. Cases of limited military subordination can be found in all five regions surveyed: Asia (Indonesia and Timor Leste), Europe (mainly the countries of former Yugoslavia), Latin America (six countries), the MENA region (Lebanon), and Sub-Saharan Africa (10 countries). Third, the table also suggests that despite the considerable challenges, establishing effective authority and oversight over defense and military policy is possible: 23 (33%) new democracies have successfully reached full democratic control.

In addition to these general developments, two findings of the literature on civil-military relations in new democracies are noteworthy. First, even in the most successful cases, establishing effective authority and oversight over defense and military policy has proven to be difficult. This is true for the former military-dominated regimes in Latin America, Africa and Asia, as well as for the civilian-dominated former authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe, where the military inherited wide-ranging political autonomy in defense and military matters. Second, even when formal institutions of democratic authority and oversight over defense and military policy had been in place or were established rapidly after the transition to democracy, these were often weak and ineffective: Defense ministries continued to be staffed by active or former military officers, civilian defense employees were either sidelined or systematically excluded, and the military continued to withhold information from members of parliamentary oversight committees (Pion-Berlin 1997; Cottey et al. 2002; Bryden 2008; Croissant et al. 2013).

Table 9.1 Democratic control in 69 new democracies of the 'third wave' (as of 2010)

	Military dominance	Military tutelage	Limited military subordination	Democratic control
Asia	Thailand, Pakistan	Philippines, Bangladesh	Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Timor Leste	Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan
Europe			Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia	Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
Latin America		Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru	Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay	Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay
MENA		Lebanon	Turkey	
Sub-Sahara Africa	Madagascar	Burundi, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan	Benin, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zambia	Kenya, Mali

Sources Croissant and Kuehn (2015)
Note The table shows the status of democratic control in 2010, or the final year a country was democratic before 2010

Explaining Democratic Control in New Democracies

This, of course, raises the question how to explain these varying degrees of democratic control in 'third wave' democracies. As of now, the scholarship on civil-military relations has 'not produced a large body of consensus findings that enjoy widespread support and that would apply with equal force to a wide range of countries' (Feaver 1999, 236). While there is no shortage of individual explanatory argument, there is no single dominant causal narrative to account for the diverging trajectories of civil-military relations in new democracies. Rather, different factors have been found relevant for explaining the continuance of military dominance or tutelage over politics than for accounting for the success or failure of establishing effective democratic control over defense and military policy.

In explaining what I have termed 'military dominance' or 'military tutelage', three factors are highlighted in the literature: One important structural factor were the different *historical legacies* elected officials were confronted with

during and after the transition to democracy: In most Latin American and many African and Asian countries, democratic governments had to deal with the institutional remains of former military regimes, which seriously hampered the establishment of democratic control. Especially where the old military elites were able to steer the course and speed of the transition, e.g. in Chile, Ecuador and Peru, but also in Nigeria and Indonesia, they were able to carve out niches and retain wide-ranging political prerogatives (Agüero 1998; Rüland et al. 2013). Military prerogatives in the Soviet Union, and the civilian-dominated autocracies of Asia (e.g., Mongolia, Taiwan), Latin America (Mexico) and Africa (e.g., Kenya, South Africa), in contrast, were much less pronounced; elected civilians in these countries also had at their disposal a well-established set of instruments to control the military (Barany 1997).

Second, the different *internal security threats* the new democracies were confronted with seemed to play a decisive role in shaping the ability of elected to keep the military out of politics. Where, as for example in Thailand, the Philippines, many African countries, or the states of former Yugoslavia, the state was challenged

by armed insurgencies, the political survival of elected civilians depended on the military's coercive power and it was much easier for the military to defend their prerogatives than in countries where the transition occurred peacefully (Zulean 2004; Kieh and Agbese 2006; Croissant et al. 2013).

Third, the new democratic institutions and procedures had to be considered *legitimate* by the political elites and the mass public to ensure the military's subordination. Bangladesh, Madagascar, Ghana and some Central American countries show that where democratic norms and procedures were not supported by broad segments of the citizenry, civilian elites jockeyed for the military's political support, which made it difficult to reach democratic control over the military (Serra 2010). In addition, the strengthening of the international pro-democracy climate of the post-Cold War era has made it much harder for the military to cling to its political privileges, especially in Latin America and East Asia where the military had previously been seen as an important pillar of 'stability' against Leftist movements (Hunter 1997; Croissant et al. 2013).

To account for the failure or success in solving the 'second generation problems' of ensuring effective civilian control over defense and military policy, four factors are prominently discussed: First, the *institutional legacies* of direct military rule seem to be particularly relevant where meaningful institutions of authority and oversight have to be created during and after the transition, as in most Latin American cases, the military was able to continue its dominance over these policy areas for much longer than where the institutional framework was already in place. Second, this was even exacerbated by the fact that defense and military issues were often *politically irrelevant* for elected politicians. David Pion-Berlin, for instance, shows for the new democracies of Latin America that elected politicians did not touch the military's prerogatives in these areas because they 'gain no electoral advantage with voters by making defense a priority because military spending does not

generate large amounts of civilian employment or economic growth' (Pion-Berlin 2006, 52). This was even the case in those countries that, third, experienced an existential *external security threat*: The successful institutionalization of democratic control in countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, on the one hand, corroborate Michael Desch's (1999) argument that external security threats tend to facilitate the military's subordination. On the other hand, there is ample evidence that even in these highly successful cases, the military has justified upholding its institutional autonomy and political prerogatives in the name of national security (Kuehn 2013). Moreover external security threats are neither necessary nor sufficient for robust democratic control, as democratic control has been firmly established in many countries in the stable and peaceful international environment of post-Cold War Eastern Europe. Fourth, this was not least due to the powerful incentives for both civilians and the militaries in these countries to join *NATO and the European Union*, which demanded reforms towards firm democratic control of defense and military policy, including an effective, civilian-led defense ministry and strong parliamentary oversight over the military (Barany 2012).

This discussion suggests two important insights in the current state of the scholarship on democratic control in new democracies. First, there are no 'master variables' that explain civil-military relations during and after the transition to democracy in all 'third wave' democracies. Rather, different factors affected different countries in different ways and, ultimately, it is hard to unpack the often complex interdependence of causal factors (Pion-Berlin 2001). Second, referring to structural, institutional and ideational factors alone is insufficient, as it does not explain how these variables translate into a certain degree of democratic control. Recently, a number of novel theoretical arguments has been proposed that combine multiple explanatory variables and that integrate 'structure and agency' into coherent models of civil-military

relations in new democracies (Kuehn and Lorenz 2011). Rooted in a rational choice framework, these models show how different constellations of structural, institutional and ideational factors interact in providing resources that affect the civilians' ability to establish or strengthen democratic control in new democracies (Hunter 1997; Trinkunas 2005; Croissant et al. 2013; Kuehn 2013). The rigorous empirical testing of these explanatory models, however, is still in its infancy.

Democratic Control in Established Democracies

While for many new democracies the institutionalization of full democratic control remains an important issue, the established democracies of the West can rely on normatively and factually accepted institutions of democratic control. Still, the study of civil-military relations in these nations has a long tradition. The first sociologists, psychologists and political scientists applying modern social science methods and theories to the study of the military were mainly concerned with the question how the 'relation of the expert [of organized violence] and the politician' (Huntington 1957, 20) is organized in the democracies of the West, particularly in the United States.[7] In this, two questions are particularly relevant: what explains civil-military conflict and cooperation within the confines of the existing institutions of democratic control, and how do different patterns and systems of democratic control affect military effectiveness and the ability of democracies to achieve their national defense policy goals.

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[7]While there is a significant body of literature on democratic control in other Western societies, the overwhelming majority of studies focuses on civil-military relations in the United States. Moreover, the literature on civil-military relations beyond North America tends to be less interested in theory development and is often more strongly policy-oriented than its American counterpart (Nelson 2002). Consequently, I will focus my review on this latter literature.

Civil-Military Conflict in Established Democracies

For a long time, the literature on civil-military relations in established democracies has been dominated by normative questions, with scholars discussing extensively how democratic control should be working to maximize democratic accountability and national security (Feaver and Seeler 2009). In comparison, the question how these mechanisms actually work in the day-to-day interactions of civilians and the military and which factors affect civil-military cooperation and conflict has only recently received greater attention. This renewed interest was not least motivated by serious doubts concerning the efficacy of democratic control in the US, especially under the Clinton administration (1993–2001). Two developments were held accountable for the apparent 'crisis of civil-military relations' (Croissant and Kuehn 2011, 69–74): the end of the Cold War; and the perceived normative gap between civilian politicians and society on the one hand, and the military leadership on the other. The relative weight different observers ascribed to these historical developments corresponds to two distinct analytical perspectives and theoretical 'schools' that have characterized the literature since the 1950s: a structuralist and a normative-ideational perspective.

The *structuralist perspective* highlights the importance of the changed external security environment since the early 1990s. According to these arguments, the end of the Cold War led to a worsening of civil-military relations due to two related implications. On the one hand, the absence of an existential security threat triggered socio-political pressures to capitalize on the 'peace dividend' and to reduce military spending and force sizes. On the other hand, the US' global position as the sole remaining 'superpower' led to demands for greater international involvement in 'operations other than war', especially following President Bill Clinton's pledge to promote democracy in the world and to support United Nations peace-building initiatives. This financial, organizational and

operational reorientation and reorganization was strongly opposed by the military leadership who not only were naturally opposed against budget cuts, but also saw their new missions as endangering their ability to perform their self-conceived core function of defending the United States from external threats (Kagan 2002).

This structuralist argument was formulated particularly clearly by Desch (1999), who developed a parsimonious explanation of civil-military conflict. According to his theory, effective control of the military will only be ensured under the conditions of a high level of external insecurity and a low level of domestic threat. Under these circumstances, civilians and the military will do their best to avoid open conflict to ensure national security. While not suffering from serious internal threats, Desch argues that with the demise of the Soviet Union the United States lost its clearly defined external threat, which not only incited conflicts about the military's future missions, but also allowed the Clinton administration to challenge the military's position on a wide range of positions without having to fear that civil-military frictions would endanger national security. In this, Desch dissented from earlier theoretical reflections on the relevance of external threats on civil-military relations. In a highly influential contribution, for instance, Lasswell (1941) argued that lasting external security competition will ultimately lead to the takeover of government by the military and the development of a 'garrison state'. Of course, the historical developments have proven Lasswell wrong: Despite decades of confrontation between the two politico-ideological 'blocks', not a single established democracy did turn into a military dictatorship. In explaining this divergence, Friedberg (1992) highlighted the importance of norms and ideas: the predominant liberal values and the legitimacy of the political institutions, which effectively shielded established democracies militarization.

At the same time, *normative-ideational* explanations also addressed the worsening of civil-military relations under the Clinton administration: According to these arguments, the

considerable normative divergences between the progressive president and the conservative military leadership led to power struggles that Clinton was unable to win. This divergence was particularly pronounced in the conflict over the treatment of homosexuals in the military: During his election campaign, Clinton had repeatedly stated that he would lift the existing ban on homosexuals serving in the military. The military leadership, however, strictly opposed this course and threatened collectively to step down if Clinton would push the issue. As a result, the president backed down and accepted the infamous 'don't ask, don't tell' policy, which allowed homosexuals to serve in the military as long as they did not openly disclose their sexual orientation (Halley 1999). At the same time, these worries concerning Clinton's ability to enforce his political agenda against the military's will were but one aspect of a broader discussion of the allegedly growing divergence of civilian and military values. According to these scholars, the US military was developing a distinct conservative subculture that diverged from the progressive civilian mainstream and would lead to civil-military conflicts, especially under a Democratic president (Kohn 2002).

These arguments on the importance of civilian and military values are firmly rooted in the framework pioneered by Janowitz (1960). According to this theoretical school, civil-military relations will be stable only if the dominant values of civilian society and the military's 'professional ethos' converge, which can be achieved only by closely integrating the armed forces into society. From this position, it was particularly the end of the conscription army, and the resulting patterns of self-recruitment of an emerging 'military caste' (Powell et al. 1994) from certain social and ethnic groups that since the 1970s has led to the growing 'civil-military gap' (Ricks 1997).

However, under closer scrutiny these arguments have been found less convincing. Comparative studies have found little supporting evidence for the presumed negative effects of the changes towards all-volunteer forces on democratic control (Flynn 2002; Pfaffenzeller 2010). Moreover, the thesis of a meaningful normative

gap in US civil-military relations could only be partially corroborated: Surveys of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) supported the predominantly conservative political leanings of large parts of the officer corps. At the same time, the data suggests an overwhelming consensus between civilians and the military elite concerning all relevant normative foundations of democratic rule, including the relevance of democratic control and the supremacy of civilian officials over the military (Szayna et al. 2007).

This suggests that while structural and ideational factors are to some degree relevant for the day-to-day interactions of civilians and the military within the close confines of robust democratic control in the US and other established democracies, they each only capture a small aspect of these developments. In addition, the literature often does not provide much insight into how these variables actually affect these interactions and produce civil-military conflict or cooperation. This weakness was addressed by Feaver's (2003) game theoretical model of the interactions between civilians and military leaders. The model explains civil-military conflicts through three parameters: the severity of the conflict of interest between civilians and the military, the civilians' willingness and ability to monitor the military's conduct, and their willingness and ability to punish military 'shirking'. The smaller the differences between civilian and military interests, the more intrusive the civilians' monitoring of the military, and the higher the likely costs of punishment for military misbehavior, the more likely it is for the military 'agent' to do as the elected civilian 'principals' demand. Feaver's theory, therefore, integrates both the structural and the ideational perspectives, but also possible idiosyncratic factors into a coherent theoretical argument: Political pressure for the restructuring and reduction of military forces, the expansion of military roles into non-traditional missions, and the inclusion of homosexuals in the military were expressions of an increasing civil-military conflict of interest. At the same time, President Clinton's weak authority and the strong position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell, reduced

the willingness and ability of civilians to monitor the military intrusively and punish military transgressions. Together, this lead to what one observer had called the most contentious period of civil-military relations in American history (Kohn 2002).

Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness

The second relevant aspect for democratic civil-military relations is the interrelationship between degrees, modes and patterns of democratic control on the one hand and the ability of the military to fulfill its function on the other. While this of course is also relevant for new democracies (Bruneau and Matei 2008), the literature has mainly discussed this issue from the perspective of established and consolidated democracies. In this, two strands of arguments can be identified.

The first is rooted in the liberal tradition of International Relations theory and the literature on the 'democratic peace' and 'democratic war', which holds that democracies per se are less likely than autocracies to wage war against other nations—or at least against other democratic states—and that if they engage in military conflict they are more likely to win these wars (Rosato 2005). A number of different reasons and causal mechanisms were proposed to explain these empirical findings, for instance the relevance of democratic norms that justify wars to topple authoritarian regimes while prohibiting conflict with other democracies (Friedman 2008), or the fact that due to the democratic institutions leaders will be electorally punished for unpopular wars and thus will only wage war if they are likely to win (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012). Finally, Pilster and Böhmelt (2012) highlight that democracies are more likely to win wars than autocracies because they do not rely on mechanisms of controlling the military that undermine military effectiveness, such as counterbalancing the military with para-military security forces or undermining the professional expertise of the officer corps by promoting

political allies into the military leadership. In sum, from this perspective strong democratic control is a necessary condition for the specific conflict behavior of democracies, as only if the military is under firm control, democratic norms and institutions can unfold their constraining effects.

The second strand of literature focuses more closely on the interplay between democratic control and military effectiveness in warfare (Brooks 2007). Two general lines of argument can be distinguished in this literature. The first is based on Huntington's (1957) classical thesis that there is a trade-off between civilian control and military effectiveness and that increased control and civilian intrusion into the military's sphere of responsibility will undermine the latter's ability to fulfill its mission and functions (e.g., Bland 1999; Feaver 2003, 2). Ultimately this argument is built on two basic assumptions. First, that civilian and military elites are motivated by different functional interests and necessities, civilians being mainly interested in maximizing political gains and votes while the professional military leadership is supposedly mainly interested in maximizing the nation's security. And second, that civilians do not have the necessary expertise to make sensible decisions in defense and military matters.

This line of reasoning, however, is a rather isolated position. The majority of researchers confirm an alternative view that highlights the positive effect of active involvement and strict civilian control in defense and military issues on military effectiveness (e.g., Avant 1994; Cohen 2000; Brooks 2007; Bruneau and Matei 2008). Analytically, a number of arguments have been proposed to substantiate this conclusion. First, some authors have highlighted that it is precisely the interests of civilian politicians to garner votes and stay in office that lets them pursue more prudent defense and security policy. According to this argument, democratic leaders maximize military effectiveness because they are accountable to the people and the people care about national security, which reduces the risk of civilian decision-makers initiating risky wars (e.g., Reiter and Stam 2002). Second, democratic

control over military policy is considered beneficial because particularistic bureaucratic interests of different military branches lead to myopic and self-serving defense planning and resource allocations and inter-service rivalries that undermine military effectiveness (e.g., Snyder 1984; Desch 1999). Finally, some authors argue that coherent, unified and unchallenged democratic control increases military effectiveness mainly by reducing civil-military power struggles, frictions and competition between elected civilians on the one hand and the military on the other (e.g., Avant 1994; Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Brooks 2007).

In summary, the same is true for the literature on the relationship between democratic control and military effectiveness that has been identified above: there is no lack of individual theoretical arguments, what is missing however, is a rigorous and comparative testing of these explanations.

Avenues for Further Research

The goal of this chapter was surveying the state of the literature on democratic control of the military. It has shown that there is a solid body of excellent scholarship that addresses military coups, the institutionalization of civilian authority and oversight in new democracies, and how these institutions and control mechanisms play out in the day-to-day interactions of civilians and the military in established democracies. However, it has also shown that there is room for additional contributions to and improvement of the existing literature. These result, on the one hand, from the fact that societies—and thus civil-military relations—continue to develop due to institutional, structural, ideational and technological changes that pose new challenges to the question how democracies control their militaries. On the other hand, they result from the theoretical and methodological lacunae in the existing literature that should be addressed by future research to make the scholarship on democratic control more systematic and, in turn, relevant.

In terms of new challenges, three developments seem to be particularly fruitful for investigation. First, the effects of an expanding role of private military companies (PMCs) in the planning and execution of military operations. During and after the US-led 2003 war in Iraq, for instance, more than 20.000 members of PMCs provided numerous functions that were previously the exclusive domain of the military (Avant 2006, 2). While there already is a broad discussion of PMCs and their role in modern warfare (e.g., Singer 2008; Kruck 2014), there is still much room for theoretical and empirical research on the question how these non-state organizations are controlled by the political 'customers' who employ their services: Can the elected representatives rely on the same instruments, mechanisms and institutions to exert authority and oversight over PMCs that were created to control the military? Are these institutions equally efficacious? What are the specific problems facing democratic control of PMCs and how to they relate to or interact with the more traditional issues of controlling the military? How useful are the concepts and theories that were developed for analyzing classical civil-military relations for the study of democratic control of PMCs?

A second relevant field of study is the ongoing technological 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA) and their effects on democratic control. While these developments can be traced back to the later years of the Cold War, it was especially since the post-9/11 'War on Terrorism', that the use of special operations forces, unmanned aerial vehicles and 'targeted killings' based on 'big data' and computer algorithms became prominent military and intelligence activities. While there is no indication that these 'post-modern' (Moskos et al. 2000) forms of warfare are actually undermining the authority of the chief executive to decide on the military's activities, they could weaken the ability of legislative oversight as these operations are typically more clandestine and carried out along the lines of intelligence work than more traditional military operations.

The third aspect that deserves further attention is the increasing internationalization of military organizations. While the specific problems related to international cooperation of militaries, for instance in joint NATO operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Libya or the ad hoc coalitions of the 2003 Iraq war, have been studied extensively, especially in the European Union there is an ongoing effort to integrate national militaries under the 'Common Security and Defence Policy' framework. Since January 2007, two so called European Battle Groups, military rapid reaction forces, have reached operational capability to fulfill humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, and peace-enforcement operations. While per the current legal framework the control over the individual deployments remains with the respective national governments, worries about the effects of the shared control on the Battle Groups' effectiveness, the plans for further European integration in defense policy as envisioned by the Treaty of Lisbon, and calls for the establishment of an European army might lead to conflicts over the distribution of authority and oversight over these new European military capabilities (Barcikowska 2013).

But beyond these new challenges there is also ample room for contributing to the more traditional questions of democratic control. First, theory development in the field has been criticized for its tendency to ignore the theoretical progress made in the broader social science disciplines (Pion-Berlin 2001) and for its lack of systematic deductive reasoning (Feaver 1996). While these criticisms are somewhat overstated as much of the recent research reviewed above provides stringent theoretical models; the research on democratic control would benefit greatly from being more receptive of the innovations of the broader disciplines of social science, and pay greater attention to clearly specified causal models. Second, efforts should be made to evaluate empirically the existing theoretical arguments. As shown above, research on coups, the institutionalization of democratic control in new democracies, and civil-military relations in established democracies has

produced a large number of explanatory arguments that need to be put to rigorous empirical tests. The discussion on military coups, for instance, has shown that it is crucial to examine empirically the causal mechanisms through which individual causal factors are assumed to affect the likelihood of military intervention into politics. Similarly, Feaver's (2003) agency theory of civil-military interactions in the US has been able to explain the relatively harmonious civil-military relations during the Cold War, and the post-1990 'crisis' in US civil-military relations. To further assess its explanatory power, it now needs to be tested against more and more diverse empirical data, for instance under other US administrations, or civil-military conflict and cooperation in other consolidated democracies.

In sum, while the field is already well-developed, there still is much to do for future researchers of democratic control. Addressing these remaining lacunae would not only make the study of civil-military relations more scientific and rigorous; it would also provide a stronger foundation for policy advice and the improvement of real-world civil-military relations.

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Author Biography

Dr. David Kuehn is senior research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Heidelberg University, Germany. His research focuses on civil-military relations, democratization, authoritarian regimes, and methodology.

The Military as a Tribe Among Tribes. Post-modern Militaries and Civil-Military Relations: An Update

10

Bernard Boëne

Introduction

The original chapter from which the present update derives was penned in the years 1996–2002. It went through several versions in the form of conference presentations before it finally appeared in the 2003 *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*. The thread running through it was an exploration of the "post-modern" concept, whose popularity among military sociologists (who used it loosely to refer to the transformations under way in the 1990s) was then at its height.[1] Analysis of its four main dimensions was accompanied by a wealth of empirical illustrations from that period. Those illustrations are now partly out of date, and it is well worth contrasting them with what came after 2002 in order to assess the extent to which continuity or change has prevailed since then—and whether the views and predictions expressed still hold. This is precisely what is attempted below.

Though it assumed a critical stance, the original painstakingly probed the heuristic potential of the post-modern concept in the field of military studies, and followed a plan that successively spotlighted the four conceptual dimensions it had identified. While it seems as if post-modernism has now somewhat gone out of academic fashion (and subjecting it to a pointed critique appears far less topical and urgent than it was at the time), its characterization will remain. So will the old structure, so as to facilitate reading for colleagues familiar with the earlier version: it is hoped that it will better contrast the two periods—as need be. In order to avoid the confusion and ponderousness that might result from an accumulation of old and new illustrations, each conceptual dimension will give rise to two sub-sections: one, restating in streamlined form the various points made earlier, will cover 1990–2001; the other, carrying further illustrations, will be devoted to the period elapsed since then.

As was the case in the version published in 2003, the chapter is restrictively concerned with the contemporary armed forces of so-called advanced Western nations, to which alone, it would seem, the "post-modern" label and the "military as a tribe among tribes" thesis can—if at all—relevantly be applied. Key dimensions of their functioning will be examined along the

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[1] Early use of the term "post-modern" in the military field was by American authors: see Moskos, in Kuhlmann and Dandeker ([1992](#)), Moskos & Burk, in Burk ([1994](#)). For more recent American assessments making it the main tool of analysis, see Moskos et al. ([2000](#)). For a dissenting opinion, see Booth et al. ([2001](#)). Yet, the term later caught on in Europe, as evidenced in the rather large share of European contributions to the above-mentioned edited volumes, and elsewhere in separate pieces, notably by Italian sociologists. But while some authors embraced it enthusiastically, others used it much more cautiously. See Footnote 8.

B. Boëne (✉)
Geneva School of Governance, Geneva, Switzerland
e-mail: chancellor@genevasg.com

way: changing roles, mission complexity and degree of predictability, self-conceptions and bases of legitimacy, erosion of long-standing organizational formats, adjustment to tight budgets, real-time media coverage, the rise of multiculturalism, the new standing of military élites and soldier-statesman relations, etc. Though occasional reference will be made to recent American developments, illustrations will mainly be drawn from West European settings.

The Meanings of Post-modernity

The "post-modern condition" has followed partly from the decline and fall of millenarist utopias: from the disillusionment with progress born of the dialectics of modernity so aptly analyzed by Raymond Aron nearly fifty years ago.[2] It also stemmed, decades into the Fordist era of "organized capitalism", from the distrust of concentrated power and its attendant dysfunctions. A third source has no doubt been the coming of horizontal societies made possible by affluence and complexity. Affluence, allowing individuals to satisfy their needs through private purchasing power rather than through local organization, tends to loosen social bonds and atomize society; it also tends to spontaneously flatten social hierarchies.[3] Complexity, increasing the degree of interdependence, bestows a de facto right of veto on the bottom layers of society.[4] Finally, after decades of increasing cultural and epistemological relativism in science,[5] a situation has arisen where uncertainty (or even nihilism) is dominant: there are no longer true and false ideas, but a variety of opinions made respectable by "universal benevolence".[6]

The weakening of universalism has meant that metasocial references—Reason, History, emancipation of the Working Class, Modernization—have lost much of their grip on "post-modern" imagination. All that remains of modernity is the reign of instrumental rationality, and the power and will to bring criticism to bear on established values and ideas, which now makes for an almost complete indetermination of ultimate ends. In other words, while the post-modern concept is an extension of classical modernity's fundamental aspiration for an emancipated Individual, it is also in tension with its belief in indefinite progress.[7]

Indeed, one of the most visible (and earliest) traits of "post-modernity"[8] as proponents of the concept see them[9] is its *hypermodern* character. Far from disappearing, the Enlightenment's old dream of substituting ethics, economics and technology for the government of human communities has been deepening. The pace of technological change has accelerated, bringing about an acceleration of History, generating a powerful trend toward globalization and exacerbating the dialectics of "progress"—high hopes and

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[2]Aron (1969).

[3]Forsé (1989). Applying an "entropic" paradigm to the study of large social entities over long periods, the author shows that the most stable social structure, to which social processes tend spontaneously, is a pyramid characterized by an inverse exponential profile, in which relative inequality is constant. When the system is closed and material or symbolic resources are scarce, such a pyramid has a narrow base and tapers to a considerable height, betraying a high concentration of power, riches or prestige; when they are in abundance, differentials decrease, producing a pyramid that is broader-based and flatter. Opening the system, as is the case today with globalization processes, introduces a measure of negative entropy, thereby (temporarily) increasing differentials.

[4]Thereby fulfilling the "fundamental democratization" prophecy formulated by Mannheim (1940).

[5]Cf. the works of Granet et al. (1995).

[6]Taylor (1989).

[7]See Giddens (1991, p. 9).

[8]Not every author, of course, accepts the term and agrees with the view of history it conveys. Some, like Anthony Giddens, while they see much the same trends developing, argue that the present stage cannot in any meaningful sense be regarded as being *beyond* modernity, and prefer the phrase "radical modernity" because it emphasizes continuity rather than discontinuity. Sharing that view, a number of French authors now use the word "surmodernité" to the same effect. The present writer agrees with that fundamental assessment: despite his skepticism, his use of "post-modern" here is value-neutral.

[9]The list of such authors, from Jean-François Lyotard (who coined the phrase in the late 1970s) and Richard Rorty onward, is long, and the concept has been applied to a huge number of fields. The synthesis presented here seeks to locate its central dimensions: the elements on which leading proponents agree explicitly or implicitly, and the way commentators and critics see them.

disenchantment. On the other hand, complexity and uncertainty, heightened by the often paradoxical quality of trends produced by technology, have led to a constant renewal of *avant-gardes*, and of their aesthetic, moral and cognitive visions. The world of culture has taken on a kaleidoscopic, ephemeral quality.

Opposed to hypermodern, but (as Alain Touraine observed[10]) effectively functioning as complementary, is the *antimodern* aspect of post-modernity. This refers to the cultural fragmentation produced by the loss of an overarching, socially meaningful vision with a claim to universal validity. Societies in which the power implied by rational control of collective destiny is deeply distrusted, where no social group or discourse can credibly assert a monopoly on meaning run the risk of losing their fundamental unity. When it comes to values and interests, the balance between public and private tips strongly in the latter's favor. In such societies, all values tend to be equal: there can be no absolute ideals, except perhaps life, tolerance and equal dignity of cultural identities, as it were by default, or because they contribute to (but do not guarantee) peaceful systemic regulation. "Post-modern" here is taken to mean post-social and antipolitical.

The third, and most central, meaning of post-modernity is *post-historicist*. Without criteria by which to discriminate between values, cultural forms in a given society become synchronic rather than diachronic: instead of succeeding one another, they co-exist in time, thus bringing about extreme forms of pluralism. Language and experience tend to replace values and designs: anything goes, as long as it exhibits an air of authenticity. This includes the possibility of a legitimate return to pre-modern traditions, which at an earlier time would have been frowned upon as reactionary. Native cultural traditions are subverted by instrumental interests and globalizing trends, or by a dominant, least-common-denominator culture.[11] Such being the case, diversity increases *within*, but decreases *among* societies.

Last but not by any means least is post-modernity's *anti-humanist* naturalistic quality. Living in the present and having to choose, without a reliable value map or historical references, between innumerable cultural forms and lifestyles leads to a fragmentation of personalities. Schizophrenic attitudes and pastiche of older forms become normal forms of adaptation and expression. Where violent political conflict is averted, systemic regulation is left to the market, i.e. to an impersonal, blind mechanism. Finally, the "social question" having lost a great deal of its importance, the "natural question"—protection of the environment against pollution or technologies devoid of any meaningful insertion in society and culture—tends to become uppermost.[12] The sum total is that economy, polity and culture come to be entirely disconnected.

Post-modern Militaries in Post-modern Societies?

How effective are these notions in the analysis of post-Cold War military institutions and civil-military relations? Let us examine the four meanings outlined above one by one.

Hypermodernism

1990–2001

Context and missions. The loss of a focal enemy's massive door-step threat after 1989 brought considerable change as regards the meaning of defense and the ends assigned to armed forces. The period also coincided with a bout of intense technological innovation, which considerably altered the military's functional equation.

The unexpectedly swift victory of an imposing US-led international coalition over Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War (1991) ensured that no revisionist power would frontally antagonize the "new world order" envisioned by American

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[10]Touraine (1992).

[11]Touraine, *op.cit.*

[12]Moscovici (1988).

leaders at the time. Though international terrorists of various persuasions had started to manifest themselves, it was hard then for Western public opinions to even imagine the dangers we now know were looming beyond the horizon. In the first post-Cold War decade, North America felt invulnerable, and acted on that presumption. In Europe, opinion surveys and defense white papers mentioned terrorism, pollution, drugs and nuclear proliferation as the main threats to security. A German social scientist noted: "*The concept of security has by now virtually no military connotations. Whether someone feels secure or not has little to do with defense and the Bundeswehr*".[13] In that regard, issues such as unemployment, immigration and welfare crises loomed larger in the minds of majorities of people. As a result, the 1990–2001 time bracket remained marked to the end by the "peace dividend" spirit that prevailed after the Cold War came to a close. Defense budgets went down by as much as 30–50%, and after a while the downsizing of force levels accelerated the pace of bandwagon shifts to all-volunteer forces across continental Europe.

With the West, or rather the "only superpower left", still retaining control of the international order, peace support operations (PSOs) and humanitarian assistance were then standard fare for the armed forces of *status quo* powers[14] wherever armed ethnic strife produced atrocities, or political developments that were grossly at variance with the democratic principles of the "new world order". Participation in such operations, driven by widespread depoliticized "something-must-be-done" attitudes among the public at large, took place in large coalitions involving dozens of nations, some more enthusiastic than others (notably than the US, whose military was long "reluctant to learn how to peace-keep"); it was limited only by the need for political consensus among powers of the first rank—and by cost and capabilities (notably manpower availability).

Things were not as simple and smooth as it sounded, however. Adjustment to restraint in the use of force proved uneasy to begin with.[15] In West European armies, "shoot or scoot" attitudes among French troops during the early years in Bosnia were cases in point. Conversely, Nordic battalions, well-versed in peacekeeping duties, were reported then to be less at ease when the time came to *enforce* the peace rather than keep it. Experience could not even be counted on to iron out some of these difficulties because personnel rotations every four or six months tended to cut the learning curve short.[16] Yet, resort to coercion was at times necessary. Some PSOs, initially governed by the principles set out in chapter VI of the UN Charter requiring the consent of parties to a local conflict, proved less effective and more difficult than expected. Faced with deliberate provocations from aggressive belligerents in former Yugoslavia, the European Blue helmets involved proved unable to restrain them: they had to call upon the resources of US power to help solve the problem, and were replaced by "Green helmets" (1995). As a result, the latter half of the

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[13]Fleckenstein (2000).

[14]The difficulty was documented in the American case by Segal (1996a, b).

[15]This is not to say, however, that Western militaries were left entirely without other missions to perform: quite the contrary. Deterrence of nuclear war remained, albeit in the background. So did the capability to fight conventional wars of varying magnitude and to project rapid reaction forces in bids to prevent local conflicts from destabilizing an increasingly interdependent world. Verification of arms control accords, containment of nuclear proliferation and drug trafficking, aid to civil authorities, at home and abroad, in cases of natural or man-made disasters, infrastructure support, to name but a few, also figured in the possible roles of latter-day military organizations.

[16]The lesson was that if human resource quality is high, training suitable, and doctrine flexible enough, it will make for adaptability; if not, military institutions will become blunt, unresponsive instruments, and schizophrenic soldiers the norm. The latter is especially the case in view of the possibility now offered by satellite technology to soldiers on overseas theaters of operations to communicate with their families back home. Interference between family and military groups with strong claims on the attention and loyalty of service members may disturb the classical sources of motivation and primary cohesion among soldiers. The subject had come to the attention of commanders during the Gulf War: it was raised in the memoirs of Gen. Schwartzkopf and of (French Army) Gen. Maurice Schmitt, former chief of the Defense staff.

1990s saw the emergence of a more "muscular" variety of peace support, signaling a realization that *Idealpolitik* did not always produce the kind of world order aspired for.

The difficulty during the 1990s was that, despite the strong moral backing now enjoyed by the military, there was no consensus on priorities, and controversy was rife within the armed forces as well as without. Defense policy doctrine was often hesitant, and calls were heard for revisions.[17] As a result, instability prevailed and uncertain defense roles created identity problems, especially for ground forces. Uncertainty also undermined planning efforts. While everybody knew that the more probable interventions in the new context were a mix of selective strikes, peace support and humanitarian assistance operations, there was no determining in advance where, when and with what specifications and requirements they would take place. These missions are by nature multifunctional, and more often than not multinational, which makes for added complexity. In such situations, a larger measure of versatility becomes a must, but the meaning of versatility, or flexibility, was itself subject to debate at the time[18]: should one maintain the fullest possible range of capabilities (at the possible cost of sacrificing strategic mobility due to resource constraints), concentrate on smaller, more agile light forces, or try to achieve a compromise, which in reduced budgetary circumstances would conduce to excessive multi-roling, stretching both equipment and personnel to the limit?

Cold War militaries, despite the transformations generated by technology, still were mechanistic, input-driven Weberian-style bureaucracies, governed by the search for *effective* performance and geared to predictable roles. The image they evoked, to use a metaphor favored by management specialists, was that of a continent. In the 1990s, uncertainty and stringent resource constraints brought the search for *efficiency* into the equation, and turned them into organic, effects-led matrix organizations made up of temporary, custom-designed task forces best adapted to unpredictable missions to be performed by skilled, highly trained personnel. Their image, to pursue the metaphor, was now that of a shifting, intricately-woven archipelago.

Technology and its paradoxes. Meanwhile, the "third industrial wave" had brought with it a wealth of technological novelties based on the generation, gathering, processing and dissemination of information. This led many observers to speak of a "military-technological revolution",[19] of which the US was quick to take advantage when it went to war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1990. Decisive victory after only a few weeks of ground battle had seemed to confirm for US military leaders and strategists the validity of a concept of battlefield awareness through satellite and digital technologies embodied in the "Revolution in Military Affairs"[20] (RMA) doctrine, which raised hopes of a fine-tuned, real-time management of military action capable of minimizing casualties and collateral damage. Most innovations now involved dual-use, civilian and military, technologies, thereby accentuating the convergence between the two spheres noted by Morris Janowitz some three decades earlier.[21]

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[17]As witnessed by a series of referendums in Switzerland (or the cool reception reserved for its "Army 95" plan), the fact that the prescriptions (though not the analysis) of the 1994 Defense White Paper in France, deemed too cautious, were all but abandoned after 1995, the debate that raged around the Bett Report in Britain, or the hesitant German compromise between the old continental mobilization and the new expeditionary force concepts.

[18]This was the case in Britain with the "Options for Change" debate from 1990–91 onward. See Dandeker (1996).

[19]Cf. Snow (1991), Toffler and Toffler (1993). The then most recent technological breakthroughs were in the fields of computers, miniaturization, information technology, telecommunications, artificial intelligence, specialty materials, avionics and airframes, precision weaponry, computer-aided design and manufacturing, biotechnology, catalysis and other chemical processes.

[20]The literature under this heading was abundant and growing fast: Perry (1997), Freedman (1998), Hundley (1999), Gompert et al. (1999), Laird and Mey (1999). von Riekhoff and Gongora (2000), Matthews and Treddenick (2001).

[21]Janowitz (1960).

Such developments were bound to affect the rules of the military game,[22] for instance by enhancing the role of sheer instrumental rationality in a domain in which it was traditionally mitigated by non-rational human and social factors.[23] Though designed to be user-friendly and easy to operate by non-specialists, these new high-tech weapons generated new layers of complexity for those in charge of logistics, doctrine, coordination, intelligence, command and control. They entailed higher development, production and maintenance costs, as well as a greater need for sophistication and training among (at least) commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

This in turn led to intriguing paradoxes. One such paradox, noted in the 1970s for the first time but now deepening, is known as "structural disarmament", or Augustine's Law.[24] As budgets (downsized or not) cannot possibly catch up with spiraling high-tech investment costs, the numbers of big-ticket items bought to equip the services are lower with each new generation of weapons. What is more, military managers are often reluctant to use, and risk to lose, these scarcer, more expensive weapons systems when the gain at stake is much lower than the possible loss (as was the case with the 1995 punitive air strikes in Bosnia and other instances), thus to some extent inhibiting the use of armed force. This paradoxical mechanism now also affected the highly trained and more expensive human resources of all-volunteer forces.[25]

Such developments were therefore the continuation and deepening of past—"modern"—trends, already conspicuous in the Cold War, or prior to it.[26] While the motives had changed and the level of resources allocated to the military decreased, as could be expected the drive for technological superiority lived on, subject to hypermodern acceleration and multi-faceted paradoxes, and to the need for satisfactory quantity/sophistication trade-offs if its cost looked like becoming truly prohibitive. Instability was thus on the cards, requiring constant adaptation, periodic reorganization, new operational doctrines, and tolerance for seeming contradictions.

In sum, if hypermodernism refers to technologically-driven complexity, paradoxes, accelerated change and instability, as well as to indeterminate ends and uncertainty, military institutions were then definitely as hypermodern as any.

2001–2015

The thunderbolt out of a seemingly clear sky that was 9/11 suddenly soured the climate of the international arena. America no longer felt invulnerable: in a typical reactive mood, it voted an array of drastic security measures (Patriot Act)

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[22]The revolutionary potential of such technological developments was also perceived by critics, notably among "socially responsible" peace activists: see, for instance, Gray (1997).

[23]Boëne (1990).

[24]This "law" was named after Norman Augustine, a leading figure in American defense industry and government circles who first drew attention, in the mid-1970s, to downward trends in the armament inventories of high-tech armed forces. He foresaw that, if allowed to go unchecked, such trends would leave the US Air Force by the year 2016 with but one aircraft, so sophisticated, versatile and costly that it would by itself exhaust its entire equipment budget.

[25]When the call came for junior officers to reinforce Army units' cadre assets in the Saudi desert as part of the French contribution to the Gulf War, some battalion commanders

were reported to have spontaneously refrained from designating their Saint-Cyr graduates (supposedly the best the officer corps has to offer), on the grounds that their very expensive training made them too precious to be wasted in what they regarded as a side-show…

[26]Technology, over the long term, has increased the destructive power of weapons to such an extent that it limits the rational uses of armed force in the cause of national interests, as well as its legitimacy among populations who, from Verdun and the Somme onward, even more so after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have had every reason to fear a great war. Once the threshold of instant mass-destruction capabilities was crossed, as Janowitz observed, military organizations became "constabulary forces" seeking viable international relations rather than strategic victory, and applying, where possible, the minimum degree of coercion to achieve the limited effects intended by their political masters. The post-Cold War era may have removed the structural conditions for a major confrontation (at least for a decade or two), it has abolished neither the sources of local or regional conflict, nor the western attitudes toward war that are the end-product of a century-long learning curve.

and soon rearmed. National security was back on everyone's mind, and the US defense budget increased enormously.

Context and missions. An overconfident Bush administration launched into two wars of initiative in Afghanistan (late 2001) and Iraq (March 2003) as part of a "war on terror" and of a bid to "remodel the Greater Middle East" in which it dragged an imposing international coalition of big and small *status quo* powers. Though initially successful, those two wars turned into long-drawn-out counterinsurgency and State-building efforts that proved far less so, and soon became unpopular at home. To try and impose democracy by force on culturally infertile ground proved a thankless endeavor, which made winning the hearts and minds of the population—a key factor—at best a difficult task, and produced unanticipated negative fall-out. The Iraq War, in particular, destabilized the region, and squandered the deterrent capital of America's unparalleled military might on which much of the former international stability rested.

When all is said and done, both wars fell short of their initial objectives, encouraged non-State islamist groups to outlast Western public opinion patience by avoiding frontal encounters with far superior forces, and relying instead on skirmishes, bomb outrages, sniping, improvised explosive devices, as well as on exported terrorism and propaganda.

When the troops finally came home from Iraq (2011) and Afghanistan (2014), it was clear that a lesson had been learnt: in present-day circumstances, faced with an unsophisticated but determined, resourceful and elusive foe enjoying spontaneous or exacted local civilian support, superior force finds it difficult to translate into victory and political advantage.[27] Western nations would now think twice before sending ground forces into battle again in large numbers and for long periods. They would revert to previous practice: surveillance, covert action, containment, offshore firepower, resort to local proxy forces, and if need be short interventions from the air and/or on the ground, with limited objectives, assets and duration. Moreover, the public finance crisis suffered by some countries, and the stagnant or depleted defense budgets and force levels it generated, brought further restrictions on military options. But even the new prudence was not always unproblematic, as Libya (2011) showed: while airpower helped Libyans remove Khadafi from power, it also unleashed anarchy and the ultimate consequence was a destabilization of the Sahel region. In the context of "Arab springs", the writing was on the wall when it came to further operations aiming for "regime change".

The present-day situation is dominated by widespread fear of international terrorism and the aggressive resurgence of Russian power. The former, dramatized by numerous attacks in the Muslim world and a few recent, highly publicized ones in Europe, is fuelled by islamist fundamentalism, Arab civil wars (Iraq, Syria, Libya), the old Israel-Palestine conflict, Sub-Saharan African rebellions (Mali, Nigeria) and failed States (Somalia). A major development in that regard is the coalescence of hitherto isolated terrorist movements in the Middle East and Africa under the banner of "Daesh". That organization now controls large portions of Iraqi and Syrian territory, multiplies provocative atrocities, and (unlike Al-Qaeda, which regarded the US as its main foe) explicitly targets European nations as the West's soft underbelly, banking on the echoes jihadist ideology elicits among their large islamic minorities of immigrant descent. Indeed, proselytism among radicalized muslim youths living in Europe's underprivileged neighborhoods (not to mention those who have seen action in Syria and return to their countries of origin or residence with terror skills and hostile intent) raises the specter of home-grown terrorism and the potential emergence of an "enemy within" throughout the continent.

The West has only recently become aware of the danger posed by Putin's Russia after it became clear that it had embarked on a quasi-imperial quest to reconquer its traditional sphere of influence. The war with Georgia

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[27]See also Chap. X in this volume, "The Sociology of the Military and Asymmetric Warfare".

(2008), the annexation of Crimea (2014), Russian support for rebels in Eastern Ukraine, and intimidation of the Baltic States suddenly appeared as so many facets of a larger strategic plan concocted within the Kremlin's walls. The realization that, in case of a Russian attack against a Baltic State, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty would apply and would mean a military showdown, if not high-intensity war, came as a wake-up call. Given the gradual but steady decrease of European defense efforts over two decades, the feeling has emerged that West Europe is being caught with its trousers down and badly needs to reverse course. The US appears less directly concerned, though for it too, the conjunction of several major crises around the world (Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, international terror, Russian aggressiveness) and relative European military weakness within and outside NATO is a source of worry—so much so that fears of a challenge from China and President Obama's pivot to Asia seem placed on the back burner for the time being.

Due to the priority accorded to the fight against terrorism, i.e. against non-State groups, many of the missions assigned to the military bring external and internal security much closer than used to be the case in terms of concerns, resources, collaboration and modes of action. Indeed, intelligence, Special Forces and homeland defense play the leading roles, and as these functions and assets are at the periphery of military institutions, the latter often take backseats to internal security forces and to the likes of CIA, FBI or similar agencies in the battle against unconventional networks. This may explain why defense budgets have continued to decrease in Europe throughout the period (while a slight downward trend started in the US only after the troops came home from Iraq).

Technological advances. The recent period has been marked by the emergence of cyberwarfare as well as of robots on battlefields. Cyberattacks, noted even when no conflict is apparent, involves States, non-State entities and even individual hackers. The aim pursued by players is to interfere with the target nation's utility, economic, administrative and military resources so as to disorganize it. Between States, it postpones but by no means excludes resort to physical violence. Though the military is active in cyberspace, its activity in that domain is clearly apart from its traditional pursuits.

The military incidence of robotics is probably more "revolutionary" for armed forces[28] than even the RMA was ever contemplated to be. Indeed, armed drones and field robots radically change the meaning of things military by depriving action of its immemorial heroic dimension (which may go a long way to explain why the military have resisted their advent until the last decade). As regards drones, the possibility to destroy an enemy target from a distance of thousands of miles in what looks like a video gaming session, at no risk to the firer, with little collateral damage and very little expense, substantially alters the military equation. The attractiveness of such new weapons for political leaders accounts for their fast increasing use, notably for "extrajudicial killings" of known terrorists. But their tactical advantage is counter balanced by serious political-strategic drawbacks as drone strikes elicit outrage and calls for revenge among the surrounding populations, thus nurturing terrorist vocations and making public diplomacy problematic.[29] They also create malaise among both service members and public opinion at home. Not to mention that the precedents thus set promise anarchy and serious security issues when the low-cost technology becomes available to just about everyone. Ground combat robots, for their part, cause fewer problems at that level, but raise identity issues: soldiers appreciate the help they provide in difficult situations but do not relish the idea of such devices substituting for them in active combat.[30]

Cyberwarfare, drones and field robots emphasize the role of engineering considerations at the detriment of traditional human and institutional factors, thus transforming the face and meaning of military action. To put it more concretely, they guarantee that more service

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[28]Singer (2009).

[29]See Byman (2013), Cronin (2013).

[30]Yakovleff (2012).

members will be operating in front of computer monitors, just like any civilian would in industry or a service organization, rather than in battle fatigues actively engaging the enemy.

Thus, while new technologies point in the direction of continuity and definitely deepen the hypermodern trend in military organization, the altered ends and missions of Western armed forces somewhat mitigate that trend by designating clear enemies, "repoliticizing" military action, and better concentrating the minds of everyone on objectives and planning.

Antimodernism

1990–2001

The State and its role. When the Cold War ended, nation-States—the sociopolitical embodiment of modernity—had been on the decline for some time. Their classical features[31]—sovereignty, citizenship, mass and homogeneity—had been steadily eroding since the 1960s and 1970s. The normative and expressive contents of socialization had been seriously weakened by relativism and the reluctance on the part of socializing agents, such as teachers or journalists at all levels, to continue acting on behalf of national Establishments. The influence on cultural traditions of a much freer circulation of ideas and popular media expression catering to world audiences had powerfully added to that trend. Furthermore, economic globalization, powerful immigration flows, major risks (nuclear power station dysfunctions, climate change, etc.), and the growing dematerialization of production had no less considerably reduced the importance

of borders and nationality. Horizontal societies do not like to be governed or influenced by far-away centers of power, public or private; such centers, saturated by the inflow of information, can no longer cope with loads of decision-making that have become too heavy for them.

As a result, decentralization processes became a dominant feature in most countries' administrative and economic institutions from the 1980s onward. Conversely, the pressures of intensifying global economic competition, reinforcing the effects of an earlier wish, fed by too many vivid memories of the consequences of rampant nationalism, to minimize the risks of political rivalry turning into military conflict, have led to the emergence at the regional level of supranational blocs (West Europe chief, and the most advanced, among them) whose eventual status, after decades of uneasy transition, still wavered between federation, confederacy and free-trade area. In other words, national sovereignty had been nibbled at by transfers of power to local as well as supranational echelons, and was becoming a faint shadow of its former self.

Finally, citizenship had for some time been enlarged from political to social and economic, and emphasized rights at the expense of obligations: the link between political participation and service under arms had weakened to the point of disappearing.[32] Just as homogeneity and mass were no longer required by an economy in which the processing and dissemination of information displaced or added to earlier factors of wealth, the armed forces had become capital-intensive, and no longer needed to be manned by huge numbers of unskilled personnel. Due to the central role played by mass-media, and to a growing feeling that politics is irrelevant to the lives of ordinary people, political participation tended to turn into a spectator sport. The new geopolitical context having removed major military conflict and territorial insecurity from the heart of Europe, most conceivable missions were

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[31]This classically comprised a common culture spread through highly normative socialization turning individuals into citizens, an internal market whose size and homogeneity made economies of scale and mass-production possible, and collective political purpose implemented by bureaucratic machinery, of which a mass armed force, geared to the defense of national territory and international status, formed an essential part. Citizenship implied political participation (rights) as well as conscript military service (obligations). The latter, made necessary by the huge manpower requirements of total war, was the condition of the former.

[32]This was a recurrent theme in Morris Janowitz's later works, notably Janowitz (1983a, b). See also Segal (1989).

to take place at the periphery, or much further afield, and were unlikely to involve the majority of a nation's youth, or stir its blood.

Trends in military organization and action. As a consequence, conscription soon went through a steep decline. As of 1990, when the Cold War ended, only four European countries had all-volunteer forces: Britain, Ireland, Malta and Luxemburg. In 1992, Belgium suddenly did away with the draft, soon followed by the Netherlands. After France, supposedly the mother of modern universal conscription, announced in 1996 that it would take the plunge by 2002, Italy and Spain soon followed suit. Individualism had taken its toll on citizenship.

If the military expression of national citizenship had suffered, so had that of sovereignty. The number of bi- or multinational formations was growing by the day.[33] The movement was aided by the necessity of pooling resources at a time of downsized forces and dwindling budgets and came on top of traditional or more recent arrangements within NATO (combined joint task forces, European security and defense identity). While major players like Britain or France still retained autonomous capabilities, other countries, notably Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany placed all or nearly all of their forces under multinational command. Fleckenstein wrote[34]: "*The Bundeswehr is on its way to becoming a truly post-national army*".

Peace support and humanitarian operations, for reasons of cost and external legitimacy, spontaneously tend to be multinational.[35] Their multiplication in the 1990s thus added to the trend underlined above. But they also revealed a new trend affecting civil-military relations. For the first time since the post-World War II period and the colonial wars that followed, officers were entrusted with extramilitary tasks of a political nature. This stemmed partly from dealings with local populations and authorities, but also from the intimate blending of military and diplomatic action in peace support operations, as well as from relations among national contingents. Contradictions between national and international chains of command, criss-crossing lines of political and military authority in such theaters led military officers, reluctantly at first, to take political stands and decisions.[36] Such interstitial room for political maneuvering, though it was probably inescapable (just as it was during the initial Allied occupation of postwar Germany) and does not necessarily entail sinister consequences, is bound to make civilian control more complex (as was seen when official inquiries sought to disentangle the political-military threads in the UN Protection Force's failure to prevent the Srebenica massacre of 1995), and on occasion more problematic.

As a result, even though national interests were never far beneath the surface and tended to cap the amount of spending devoted to *Idealpolitik* goals, peace support and humanitarian interventions appeared to be dictated less by well-thought-out policy than by national and international outcry against intolerable goings-on. If their origins were governed by public opinion, so was sometimes the way they came to an end. The value placed on life tended

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[33]The list of such new formations included Eurocorps (France, Belgium, Spain, Germany, Luxemburg), soon to be transformed into a European Rapid Reaction Force, Eurofor (Italy, France, Spain, Portugal), Euromarfor (ad hoc composition), German-Dutch Corps, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, European Air Group, European Satellite Center, EU Military Headquarters. The same applied to defense industries, downsized and (though to a lesser extent) restructured along European lines in the 1990s.

[34]Fleckenstein, *op.cit.;* Klein, in Boëne and Dandeker (1998).

[35]The only major intervention of that kind in which a European power decided to go it alone was the commitment of French troops to Rwanda following the genocide

which took place there in 1994. The main reason was that other European nations initially refused to participate.

[36]Thus, Somalia placed an Italian general in a position to arbitrate between orders from Rome and from New York; Bosnia saw a British general publicly defend UN action there against attacks from conservative US politicians, a French general ignore or openly defy the UN secretary-general's authority, French and British officers assume positions in Sarajevo that differed from the official stance of their respective ministers of Defense within NATO ("Who's in Charge in Bosnia? NATO and UN Fight it Out", *International Herald Tribune,* 3 October 1994); in 1996, a French general was recalled to Paris after he had openly doubted the applicability of the Dayton accords…

to tip the scales the other way when effectiveness left much to be desired and casualty levels began to rise among peace soldiers (as was the case when the US hurriedly withdrew from Somalia in 1993). As already noted, martial action tended to become depoliticized in hitherto unheard-of ways.

This came at a time when the lower profile of armed forces and the infusion of some *Idealpolitik* into foreign and defense policy had strengthened the military's legitimacy. Somehow, now that they were in a less central position and appeared no longer solely dedicated to the defense of national interests, the services were seen in a more favorable light.[37] General publics looked upon military action in the cause of peace and suffering humanity as more noble, and probably less threatening or demanding, than traditional defense tasks.[38] It translated into high approval ratings, which made the military a (in many cases *the)* most trusted public institution in many countries.[39] A more legitimate and politically more active military in a period of indifferent values and discredited politicians (not to mention other public institutions) made for some change in the sociopolitical landscape.

Civil-military relations. Accordingly, the old liberal suspicion of military professionals' career motives and interests disappeared, and has not returned to the fore since. Not only are their new missions deemed worthy, but their demanding lifestyle has an air of authenticity about it that makes their profession attractive, even if few young men or women are prepared to make it their career. The respect surrounding them contrasted sharply with the vocal disrespect of the 1960s and 1970s. Abundantly documented by survey data (cf. the high approval ratings mentioned earlier), it was also in evidence in public debates and media attitudes.[40]

Part of the story was that the military had become adept in public relations and institutional survival: a then recent comparative study[41] showed that in most countries, the "soldier-communicator" was one of the new roles to be found among officers, alongside those of "soldier-diplomat" and "soldier-scholar". These novel roles, called for by the new context, were made possible by unprecedented levels and types of officer education. It was no longer rare for military élites to hold graduate degrees, not just in engineering but in the social sciences.[42] These educational attainments soon combined with the low numbers which resulted from much reduced force levels to enhance their prestige. In more than one country where senior civil servants were politicized, and politicians had been discredited by scandals, suspicions or what the public perceived as ineffective policies, lack of vision or sterile rivalries, senior officers appeared as the only disinterested, non-partisan élite, thereby enhancing their political influence. That this was already the case in America only added weight and credibility to what was as of then a nascent trend.

Such newfound prestige and influence meant that the decline of professionalism[43] observed in the military as in other sectors during the 1970s and 1980s, was reversed among officers:

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[37]Van der Meulen, in Boëne et al. (2000).

[38]Congruence between peace support or humanitarian missions and dominant (individualist) values in civilian society is no doubt part of the interpretation. Yet, it was not the sole factor: with the draft gone, military action (as Martin Shaw remarked) became a spectator sport. In addition, a slow, little-noticed rise in the valuing of order in the public sphere since the mid-1980s may have played a part: how else can one account for the fact that the police, which does not take much part in peace support operations overseas, also achieves high approval ratings?

[39]See the chapters on Germany, Switzerland and France in Moskos et al. (2000), *op.cit.*; also, Boëne and Dandeker (1998), *op.cit.* A November 2000 Eurobarometer survey squarely placed the military as the most trusted public institution in the EU at large. Approval ratings are in the 70–90% range, which represented a substantial increase over three decades in most Western countries.

[40]At the time of writing the original chapter, a ruling by the German constitutional court to the effect that antimilitary activists could not be forbidden to call soldiers "murderers" without violating the norm of free speech met with a resounding public outcry. In France, following the announcement of cutbacks, disbanded battalions and closing armaments factories, the dominant reaction was to treat service members as an endangered rare species.

[41]Moskos et al. (2000), *op.cit.*

[42]See also Chap. 15 in this volume, "Military Officer Education".

[43]Dandeker (1994).

prestige, generating self-esteem and a sense of moral worth, is the precondition for the personal sacrifice of power and profit in the discharge of one's duty, and gives meaning to it. And if that was the case, professional ethics appeared enough to take care of most civil-military problems likely to arise, thereby removing the possible sting and making the new situation democratically acceptable.

To sum up, national sovereignty and citizenship were less basic in the way Western armed forces functioned than used to be the case, while the Clausewitzian rationale governing the relation between politics and the use of armed force was weakened, at least in the more probable post-Cold War instances of such use, by ambivalent and somewhat superficial public attitudes which tend to limit rationality. While not entirely novel, the political roles played by military leaders in multinational settings contrasted sharply with what had come before. If, then, by "antimodern" is meant post-national, and antipolitical in the sense of distrust of power in the hands of élites expressing and implementing rational political purpose, without a doubt the military then found themselves in a distinctly more antimodern situation than in earlier eras.

2001–2015

Some, but not all, of the trends outlined above have been confirmed and hardened in the period elapsed since the tragedy of 9/11.

Organizational formats. The bandwagon dynamics which had started a decade earlier has gathered momentum to the point that even countries like Sweden or Germany that were profoundly attached to conscription by deep-rooted tradition or for sociopolitical reasons finally decided to go all-volunteer. As of the early 2010s, the number of Western nations which still draft young men has been reduced to a handful,[44] thus bearing out the predictions made by military sociologists in the mid-1990s.[45]

The State, populism and sovereignty. The tendencies previously observed have deepened when it comes to dominant attitudes to power, now systematically distrusted, the (low) degree of confidence and respect elicited by politicians, and decentralization processes. However, change occurred with respect to European integration after countries of the former communist bloc joined the Union. Considering that their national influence over EU institutions had been diluted and the protection they provided against globalizing trends was ineffective, majorities in some of the nations that had historically started the process of unification and had been EU standard-bearers suddenly found (France and the Netherlands chief among them) that they could no longer identify with Europe's governance and regarded it as irrelevant: in 2005, national referendums on a proposed European constitution were either lost or narrowly won.

Fairly strong populist movements have emerged, which demand protection by the State from the competition and lower welfare standards that come with open borders. This protest against globalization is in part directed at what is felt as a subversion of cultural identity generated by EU bureaucratic norms and the mores imported by muslim immigration. Among those who now vote "against the system", irrespective of Left or Right, sovereignty has staged a dramatic comeback throughout Europe, which is all the more remarkable as citizenship norms have remained weak. This can be construed as a partial throwback to "modern" attitudes.

Soldier-statesman relations. The new millennium has seen the trends noted for the 1990s harden. The prestige, respect and confidence enjoyed by the military have remained high, while —due to ineffective policies, institutional deadlocks, lack of representativeness and of sensitivity to ordinary people's concerns—political leaders saw theirs plummet in opinion surveys to what looks like an all-time low. Meanwhile, the conjunction of an increasing number of military commitments and dwindling defense budgets (Europe) or insufficient manpower levels (US) soon generated growing discontent among generals. Dissent on the missions assigned and the

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[44]That the trend is not irreversible is indicated by Lithuania's recent return to conscription (2015) in the face of a resurgent threat from Russia.

[45]Haltiner (1996), Boëne (2009).

proper ends-means balance, as well as resentment of the scant attention paid to their professional advice[46] (or even "arrogance" on the part of key political figures) have marked the recent period. This has been reinforced by the feeling that military identities have been hurt by heightened societal pressures (to be detailed below).

Frustration has been at its height among major troop contributor nations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, which also happen to be countries where the armed services' approval ratings are particularly high—and those of the political class lowest: the US and Britain.[47] It was less in evidence in most of continental Europe, though (as often is the case in cultural comparisons among European nations) France stood somewhere between those two poles.

The war in Iraq was the most serious bone of contention between the Executive and top military leaders in both America and the UK. Whereas they differed in the US on strategy and troop levels, in Britain dissent concerned the value of the mission itself and the inadequacy of equipment available to soldiers in the field. The frustration erupted in 2006 when flag-rank officers decided to voice their discontent and malaise in the media. On the British side, Gen. Sir

Michael Rose, a prestigious Army retiree, explained in the press why he thought the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, ought to stand trial and even face war crime charges—no less!—for his ill-fated decision to go to war against Saddam Hussein for no good reason. Later, Gen. Sir Richard Dannatt, the British Army's chief of staff, denounced the dearth and sorry state of the equipment with which Britain's soldiers had to fight in Iraq, and called—against official policy—for a complete troop withdrawal within two years. In America, a well-publicized "revolt of the generals" took place in 2006 against the "arrogance" of the Secretary of Defense,[48] Donald Rumsfeld, who had consistently ignored professional military advice.[49] In 2009, President Obama felt obliged to relieve Gen. McKiernan of his Afghanistan command for openly expressing dissent on policy options; a year later, he fired his successor, Gen. McChrystal, for derogatory statements in the press about the Vice President.

In France (to a lesser extent in Germany, Sweden and elsewhere), press reports and posts on the blogs supported by associations of veterans or military spouses echo the military's malaise in the face of steady budget decreases and lack of consideration. Vocal protests on the part of retired generals now surface more or less regularly through these channels.[50] But top active-duty leaders have also been known to exert themselves to defend the services' interests. President Sarkozy dismissed the then Army chief of staff when he heard that behind-the-scenes pressure had been exercised to abort some of the measures targeting Army resources advocated in the 2008 Defense White Paper. The list of such illustrations could be lengthened at will.

These developments are remarkable as over two centuries political modernity had set detailed norms to ensure civil control. The military is

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[46]Mention should also be made of the political interference in military action that has become common due to the potential political repercussions of the turn of events in the field: political "logic" and military "grammar" are much closer-knit than used to be the case. While officers recognize that this is made inescapable by instant communications and media reporting, they nonetheless often resent the loss of professional autonomy that it entails.

[47]In Britain, the rate of trust in government and political parties in 2014 was respectively 17% (*British Social Attitudes Survey* n°32: http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-32/politics.aspx) and 14% (Eurobarometer, autumn 2014, p.38: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_anx_en.pdf); in contrast, confidence in the military was placed at 84% (Eurobarometer, autumn 2014, *op.cit.*, p.37). The same year in the US, confidence in government fell to 29% (Presidency) and 7% (Congress), while trust in the military stood at 74% (Gallup Historical Trends 2014: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx).

[48]This complaint was nothing new, however: it had been around since McNamara's days in the 1960s. See Kohn (1993), Snider and Carlton-Carew (1995), Feaver (1996), Ricks (1997a, b).

[49]A worthy introduction to such developments is available in Ellner (2010).

[50]For instance, Cot and Durandin (2013).

expected to show obedience, loyalty and discretion: it may not demonstrate, protest, publicly voice dissent, and much less contradict its political masters openly. In old Western democracies, especially in Britain and America, these norms had hitherto been mostly observed and taken for granted. That generals now feel free to deviate from them betrays an uncommon level of frustration. That they do not feel illegitimate in doing so reflects a situation in which the approval ratings differentials between them and political leaders of any persuasion are crushingly in their favor. And indeed, when the two wars in which they took part became unpopular at home, the confidence and respect enjoyed by the military *increased*. Public opinion is not alarmed at a possible risk to democracy, supports soldiers because it values order and security (though not war), and forgives them when, flouting old rules, they—like the rest of society—show less respect for those in power than before. The conclusion must be that the armed forces no longer are the great symbolic institution premised on exemplary citizenship ideals rather than self-interest that classical modernity had meant them to be. In a period of chosen identities and lifestyles, they are seen as legitimately entitled to defend and promote theirs as long as they do not contradict the precepts of "life, freedom and equal dignity of identities" that now govern society. The "military-as-a-tribe-among-tribes" insight first formulated in the 2003 version of this chapter thus finds itself confirmed.

The sum total as regards the recent period therefore proves difficult to characterize. The recent trends enumerated above indeed point in different directions: sociopolitically, the revival of sovereignty as a value seems to contradict post-modern predictions; on the other hand, soldier-statesman relations appear true to the ideal-type of post-modernity.

Post-historicism

The flattening of value systems and the extreme forms of pluralism it entails have been reflected in many aspects of armed forces.

1990–2001

Society's influence on the military. One of them was the rise of multiculturalism among the troops once the jump to an all-volunteer force was made. Due to demographic "troughs", and because military service is seen as demanding, Western AVFs found it more difficult to recruit the young white males that had hitherto formed the bulk of their human resources. They therefore set out to tap recruitment pools hitherto neglected: women and ethnic minorities.[51] Though many in the forces were ambivalent at best about them, new manpower procurement policies were instituted along these lines not only for pragmatic reasons ("business case"), but also to enhance their image as equal opportunity employers, thus satisfying one of the newer legitimacy constraints ("equity case").[52]

Women and homosexuals found it convenient, conditional upon support from activist groups outside, to turn the armed forces into a symbolic battleground of choice with a view to advancing their cause. In countries, generally to

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[51] Such being the case, it was only a matter of time before cultural diversity displaced social representativeness as the criterion by which to judge the acceptability of the armed services' social composition. When societies were tightly integrated and military service was regarded as a citizen's obligation, the system was considered fair only if the military's rank and file did not become the preserve of the underprivileged: if the middle and upper classes were duly represented in proportions approximating those in society at large. Under an all-volunteer format, the social composition of the military reflects that of the working population, which means that unless incentives can entice upwardly mobile types, the rank and file will be made up of the lower educated. Those who feel discriminated against and ill at ease in civilian society—among them, many second or third generation immigrants, though propensity to enlist varies from one ethnic minority to another—will be attracted to an institution subject to public scrutiny, in which discrimination is distinctly less and where the functional need for internal cohesion translates into "brotherhood of arms". In other words, they will reproduce the African-American community's strategy in the United States.

[52] In the older all-volunteer forces, such policies (fight against race and gender discrimination, promotion of equal opportunity) were enacted during the last stages of the Cold War: in the 1970s in the US military, in 1988 in Britain. They were introduced shortly after the shift to AVFs elsewhere in Europe in the countries concerned.

the North, where feminist movements were not antimilitary, women pressed for complete equality in the services, including assignment to combat units—with mitigated success. But in many others, France among them, despite the absence of outside pressure from activists (but through prodding by Cabinet ministers, Parliament or administrative courts), integration of female service members proceeded apace in a non-adversarial climate.[53] Following the same strategy, homosexuals in the same countries pursued public recognition and access to "first-class citizenship" through service under arms. Yet these changes did not only follow the familiar "modern" pattern of group emancipation: they were replete with "post-modern" signs of going beyond eradication of inferior status ascriptions to recognition of expressive identities which individuals can freely choose or drop.

Thus deprived of the massive threat of old (and less central in the new fight against international terror than other government agencies), the post-Cold War military had seen its other basis of legitimacy change substantially over a decade: it was no longer legitimized by the fact that it faithfully reflects a socially diverse but culturally homogeneous parent society. In a culturally diverse configuration, functional military values that diverge from the mainstream are no longer a problem. In societies where each and every group is left to pursue its inclinations and cultivate its lifestyle free of any constraint from a cultural mainstream, the armed forces are legitimated as a tribe among tribes. The only condition imposed upon them is that they be sparing of human life in the application of force, and tolerant of freedom and diversity.

Finally, the cultural entropy to be expected at the international level had already started in the military field. This stemmed from increased cooperation, and manifested itself in language and procedures. For instance, though French is supposed to be one of the two official languages within NATO (and the second main language of UN agencies), from then on English has been the language of choice, even when British or U.S.

troops are not a party to the multinational operation. Whereas integration of multinational forces under the Cold War was of the horizontal type, with large, mostly self-contained national formations juxtaposed, and contact with foreign service members limited to higher headquarters, it now often tended to be vertical: due to the relatively low numbers involved, interaction of national contingents in the field was apt to take place at battalion level, or sometimes even below. For simple pragmatic reasons, the more intricate division of labor among contingents soon imposed common-denominator (NATO) procedures.

In summary, diversity within, entropy without were changing the face of armed forces, as predicted by the post-modernist interpretation of larger trends. They did so in both functional and sociopolitical respects.

2001–2015

Societal pressures (continued). The issues surrounding female service members (quotas, discrimination, affirmative action, reconciliation of service and family life, low propensity to opt for combat specialties, sexual harassment, feminine expressiveness, etc.) remained in the public gaze. So did those concerning minorities, though more conspicuously in Britain[54] than in America (where the problem seems solved) and elsewhere. But the most salient question in those two countries in the last fifteen years has been raised by gays and lesbians. Given national traditions in which homosexuality was made out to be incompatible with military life, the armed services have found the rapid social change concerning them hard to swallow. Spurred by activists on the outside and the pressure thus brought to bear on political leaders, they have

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[53]See Boëne (2002).

[54]Given minority underrepresentation in the rank and file and (more markedly) among cadres, the British armed services were accused of "institutional racism" in the late 1990s. To remedy that situation, they instituted recruitment targets which met with mitigated success, as propensity to enlist varies from one minority to the next. British nationals of South Asian descent were known to demand that all symbols from colonial history be removed from military museums so as to facilitate recruitment among them.

had to adjust, and the process has been painful. In the US, the previous period had seen the Clinton administration concede a new policy (known as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": DADT, 1993), modeled after an age-old French military tradition which sees sexual orientation as a purely private matter that can neither justify discrimination nor give rise to open expression on the job. This, however, was considered by gays and lesbians a half-measure which did not remove the ban laid on the expressive freedom they have long aspired for. They won the day when President Obama (whose election platform had included DADT's repeal) delivered on his promise in 2010. Though less acute, such redoubling of pressures to conform with prevailing civilian norms were not unknown elsewhere. The military tried to resist them. In Britain, Gen. Rose claimed for the forces a "*right to be different*", but to no avail: the Defense Secretary only conceded a functional "*need to be different*", which did not cover restrictions on women and gays…

Nor have those contentious issues been the sole challenges facing the services at the civilian-military interface. Among the others that have manifested themselves in the time bracket considered, one certainly is the influence on military management of the "Washington consensus" ideology and the private sector methods it helped legitimize: outsourcing, leasing of equipment, private financing have been the order of the day. Such practices have dominated the procurement scene for a while, culminating (with the US in the vanguard) in the rise of private military companies—a development unheard of for over two centuries.[55] Though a recent reconsideration has somewhat toned it down (see below), this has further heightened the military's dependence on civil society.

Another major challenge has resided in the "judicialization" of military action. This stems from two main sources. One is the growing incidence of public international law and the rise of international courts; the other, Western citizens' rising love of litigation. With the result

that, on the basis of new legal norms originating from pedestrian negotiations between jurists with no experience of combat, individual soldiers who obeyed what looked like legal and legitimate orders in action now face investigation, penal charges and trial when they return home. Love of litigation, for its part, derives from the insistence on rights and compensation for victimization born of the rising tide of individualism. When loss of life or physical or moral integrity occurs, somebody has to answer and be punished for it where previously such occurrences were considered normal risks of the military trade. In other words, judges now interfere with martial action after the fact, and thus create uneasy anticipations for future action. Hence the rise of legal advisers to leaders and commanders at all levels. Martial action has seen a new layer of complexity added to a domain that had already been made highly complex by technology, multifunctional, multinational operations, and the intimate blend of military grammar and political logic that characterizes them.

Structure of the present international scene. Relations among States now assume a peculiar configuration, mainly due to interactions between players that have little in common. This has less to do with power differentials than with willingness to use power in the cause of national interests and degree of organization or disorganization. Some States enjoy considerable military might, and make no bones about wielding it to shape their relations with others: the US, Russia, China, Iran belong in that category, which for that reason can be termed "modern". A second category includes nations that are reluctant to wield hard power, and favor cultural, economic and normative influence instead. This, of course, has applied to neutral countries from 1815 onward, but the novelty resides in nations or groups of nations whose potential military power is substantial but which all but renounce it: this is typically the case with EU countries which, protected by US power within NATO, have over the years decreased their defense efforts to such an extent that experts now talk of "unilateral disarmament" as far as they are concerned. Some authors apply the "post-modern" label to such

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[55]Singer (2003), Roche (2010), Dunnigan (2011).

States.[56] A third category comprises "failed" or dysfunctional States, deprived of the monopoly on legitimate violence through political disorganization and internal strife. The violent anarchy that pervades them, generated by rivalries among armed factions, is reminiscent of medieval times: they are styled as "pre-modern" for that reason. Finally, informal coalitions of non-State terrorist groups (Al-Qaeda, Daesh) and local militias openly defy "modern" and "post-modern" States alike. They do so in "asymmetric" ways, that includes terror and sophisticated propaganda techniques that take advantage of the sounding boards provided by both traditional media and social networks.

Previous eras tended to pit against one another States (or polities) that belonged to the same category: tribe *vs.* tribe, empire *vs.* empire, fiefs *vs.* fiefs, nation-State *vs.* nation-State. True, there were periods in history when a center *vs.* periphery configuration prevailed (e.g. Roman Empire *vs.* Germanic tribes), or when "modern" States conquered "pre-modern" polities (colonization). But it probably is the first time that history has generated a configuration that simultaneously brings together so many heterogeneous polities, organizational forms, economic and social development levels or fundamental values, as well as political communities or groups that diverge so strongly in terms of military power and combat modes. Likewise, the unexpected return of "pre-modern" religious fanaticism as a source of armed polarization is both antimodern and post-historicist. Another illustration of extreme sociopolitical pluralism is that while whole regions have been entirely pacified for decades (North America, Europe, Oceania, Latin America's southern cone), others concentrate almost all of the present era's political violence (Middle East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia). The present times no doubt qualify for the post-modern label on that account.

Military organization. Such pluralism is reflected also in the concomitant forms of military action noted by Charles Krulak when he pointed out that recent operations have at one and the same time involved conventional combat, peace support and humanitarian assistance in contiguous city blocks.[57] This, given lower force levels, has entailed a strong requirement for skill flexibility on the part of troops and a capacity to move smoothly from one type of action to the next. While holistic strands of organization and warrior culture remain functional in the combat outfits of land forces, in other parts of the military, especially in navies and air forces, the pressures of technical specialization point in the direction of continued hypermodernity and civilianization[58]—a classic source of organizational tension, brought to a head by the need for a closer combination of, or transition between, different logics of action.[59]

The 2003 version of this chapter had asked whether the legacy of the late Cold War and Gulf War—costly weapons and human assets geared to high-intensity warfare—would be relevant in the non-frontal, low-intensity kinds of military action that were probable in Afghanistan and Iraq. The precedents of colonial wars as well as of US and Soviet third-world interventions in the 1960s and 1980s, respectively in Vietnam and Afghanistan, had taught the forces of highly developed nations that, mainly due to difficult terrain and political constraints, they could not decisively subdue poor guerrilla fighters armed with sub-machine guns, light antitank weapons or cheap surface-to-air missiles whenever their foes enjoyed internal (civilian) and external (military) support. And indeed, combined with the resources now afforded by information technology with immediate impact on national and international public opinion, the same scenario unfolded as Afghanistan and Iraq turned out to be "wars amongst the people".[60]

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[57]Krulak (1997).

[58]So do the strong aspirations of military families to lead "normal lives", and the little-noticed fact that under an AVF format civilian employees form the largest component of defense ministries.

[59]Ben-Ari and Eran-Jona (2014).

[60]Smith (2005a, b).

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[56]Cooper (2003). Jean-Christophe Rufin had expressed the same idea a decade earlier: Rufin (1991).

For Western forces, one important consequence of an elusive enemy hiding in the midst of civilian populations was that high technology and the RMA were of little use when it came to decisively defeating him.[61] As coalition forces were engaged in myriad tactical combat episodes of varying scale amounting to a low-intensity war of attrition and resilience, a "remilitarization" of martial action took place: a "counter-revolution in military affairs".[62] Contrary to what the RMA's reliance on engineering and pure instrumental rationality had led to expect, old military virtues, human factors and functional imperatives (courage, sacredness of mission, primary group cohesion, morale, personalized command, etc.) staged a dramatic return to the fore.

Such (partial) "remilitarization" has been accompanied by pastiche of older forms. If antimodernism has been taken above to mean post-national and antipolitical, it is possible also to construe it as a resurgence of traditional sociability, stressing cohesion, authority, discipline, warrior myths and the like. Indeed, at a time when self-selection becomes an important factor in recruiting soldiers, the type of personality attracted to the military will differ at least in part from the cross-section prevalent when the draft was in force. With lower numbers and less visibility, as well as more separation from family due high levels of overseas deployment, interaction with civilians on the outside will probably be less than it used to be. Exaltation of military values and more conservative attitudes (though not exclusive of some consumerism imported from civilian society) is in the cards.[63] As noted previously, a legitimacy based on the right of all

groups to cultivate whatever identity they care to choose make such trends much more acceptable than they were in earlier periods. In typical post-historicist fashion, they coexist with hyper-modern trends.

Anti-humanist Naturalism

This last dimension refers less to Nature in the environmental sense (though that is not absent) than to a denial of human control over reality—other than the physical world as manipulated by instrumental rationality. Human and social life is seen as governed by impersonal mechanisms (as exemplified by the emblematic role played by language in post-modernist theory). These are reflected in the way military organization has functioned for some time.

1990–2001

Impersonal mechanisms. The rise of volunteer manpower procurement betrayed a growing acceptance of such spontaneous mechanisms as market forces to substitute for the aggregation of citizens' values and interests into collective political purpose. The ideal of autonomous individuals, capable of free choice and self-regulation, participating in public affairs as they decide and taking their share of collective burdens, gave way to a situation in which private preferences do not have to be ordered and consolidated into a unified individual will. In military recruitment strategies, this led, for instance, to advertising slogans stressing job security, the economic value of training for subsequent careers, or adventure, and downplaying the *raison d'être,* risks and burdens of military service, thus favoring extrinsic motivation—and opening the hitherto unheard-of possibility of volunteers applying for conscientious objector status when the time comes to go to war (as happened here or there during the Gulf War)…

The dynamics of technology and its effects on military organization. While science and technology are the product of human action geared to rational ends, their advancement, partly under the influence of random factors, is to a

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[61]This was recognized early on in the United States: the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, partly drafted after September 11th, somewhat toned down the radical changes proponents of the RMA had in mind.

[62]Hassner (2007).

[63]This was noted in the previous period already. Adherence to conservative values (functional as well as sociopolitical) by large portions of the military was among the more prominent findings of then recent studies in Britain and the US: Strachan (2000), Feaver and Kohn (2001). Israel, too, seemed affected by that trend: see Maman et al. (2001).

large extent unpredictable. In other words, full control of its dynamics is beyond reach. Though organizational forms are not always dictated by technology,[64] its impact introduces a measure of determinism into both organization and action. In some cases, it leaves no choice and locks them in an iron cage of inescapable constraints.

A perfect illustration became apparent from 1990 onward with real-time media coverage of the Gulf War. One significant impact of instant world-spanning telecommunications through satellites for military organizations in action was that in the age of CNN, meditation and thinking were turned into luxuries for those in authority; so did fully detailed reports for their subordinates. In the heat of the moment, as one discovered then, the latter (generally junior grade officers) are the only ones to command the particulars of a problem situation calling, under the gaze of world TV cameras, for immediate treatment. As a result, much gets delegated to them, and their superiors in middle management, often being made idle in the process, then become sitting targets for those wielding the streamlining ax.[65]

A third upshot was that the honeycomb structure of communications systems, allowing everybody to confer with everybody else in action, has ever since then relativized the hierarchical dimension of military organization: orders often tend to become general directives to be adapted to a local situation at the discretion of field commanders. Yet, simultaneously, short-circuits tend to be more common between those in control at the top and those in the field as the potential political fall-out of any mishap or error in the field is such that it has been known to affect the legitimacy of the mission itself: for that reason, politicians are often been tempted to exercise detailed control in real time. The consequence of the legitimacy constraints being felt at grass-roots level has meant that young officers were now routinely burdened with political risks

and responsibilities, for which they had to be trained.

Deep ecology, atomic energy and nuclear weapons. Another aspect of post-modern naturalistic anti-humanism was the rise of deep ecology themes, premised on a rejection of anthropocentrism. Central as a symbol of humankind's responsibility for the destruction of natural systems were growing concerns surrounding the storage of atomic waste and the risks of nuclear accidents. Military arsenals capable of destroying the planet several times over fueled a surge of antinuclear feeling in the period which followed the Cold War's demise. True, nuclear weapons had never been popular. Yet despite powerful campaigns against them in the fifties and eighties, especially in northern Europe, they had come to be accepted reluctantly as a necessary evil so long as they promised to inhibit the major war between East and West everybody feared. When that danger disappeared, the sentiment spread that they had outlived their usefulness in that regard. This was revealed by the bitter campaign of protests and boycotts of French goods in Australia, New Zealand, South East Asia, and the whole of Europe when, in 1995, President Chirac decided to resume nuclear tests in the Pacific. In France itself, where consensus on nuclear deterrence had until then seemed strongest, surveys showed that a majority disapproved of the President's decision.

In brief, the devitalization of *homo politicus* and loosening of social bonds that followed the end of the Cold War brought about circumstances in which human will and rationality ceded pride of place to faceless mechanisms, fragmented selves, indifference toward collective control over destiny, societies accused of harming the planet as well as other species, technologies imposing their dictates, and a primacy of the present over the future—again as predicted by post-modernist formulations.

2001–2015

The last fifteen years have seen a continuation and, for some of them, a strengthening of the tendencies outlined above. This is the case with

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[64]Woodward (1958).

[65]The best documented case in that regard was that of Britain. This was a recurrent theme in Christopher Dandeker's works in that period.

the "schizophrenia" brought about by tensions between logics (instrumental rationality vs. institutional norms) which undergird martial action. However, change in the opposite direction has also been noted.

Impersonal mechanisms (continued). While AVFs cannot escape the constraints and influence of the labor market, it seems as if, after gaining momentum early in the period, the private sector philosophy has been somewhat waning in defense management recently. Part of the story is that the "New Public Management" which inspired it has given rise to a close scrutiny of its gains, losses and risks on the basis of over a decade's experience, and early enthusiasm has given way to a more sober appreciation. Britain, where the Private Finance Initiative was pioneered in the 1990s, seems to have downplayed it after controversies about whether it achieves its purported ends.[66] It now applies to infrastructure and vehicles rather than to training or even information technologies.[67] In France, the State, which had tended to give the market freer rein than ever before, now seems intent on "re-institutionalizing" the realm of defense procurement on the basis of a new social design, so that the neoliberal moment in its recent history appears in retrospect tantamount to a purge of obsolete institutional forms.[68] The new trend back to some State involvement in defense procurement of non-core assets or services seems to find echoes in other countries. Likewise, after accusations of indiscriminate firing on civilians (notably in Iraq) and general lack of proper control over action, resort to private military companies on battlefields seems on the decline.

A remobilization of the citizenry? Controversies on nuclear energy are still alive, but their intensity seems to have decreased somewhat despite dramatic reminders of the risks involved (Fukushima 2011). The reason lies in the rise of a larger environmental debate on climate change, to which substitutes for atomic energy (notably coal and gas power plants) actually contribute more. Protests about nuclear weapons have also been declining, probably because they are strategically less central today than they were before 1990. Moreover, in the face of an aggressive Russia's comeback to power politics, there is a realization that the old nuclear deterrent may still be useful in restraining Putin's designs on his nation's "near abroad". In other words, the prospect of political conflict in Eastern Europe and the first tangible consequences of global warming have brought back a sense of risk and purpose—enough anyway to discard nuclear fears for now and reduce the influence of "deep ecology" themes.

Moreover, the return of sovereignty as a value in large portions of Western (especially European) public opinions has translated into a partial reactivation of the public sphere. The issues at stake—the downsides of globalization, the financial and economic crisis which started in 2007–2008, the austerity measures adopted to try and remedy it, but also the loss of faith in European integration, as well as climate change—have generated a remobilization of citizens on both the Left and Right of the ideological spectrum. True, such mobilization takes the form of debates, controversies and protests rather than of citizenship obligations and support for positive political designs implemented by trusted politicians. The latter are discredited and interest in institutional politics is at an all-time low. Consensus on ultimate values is lacking, and the charisma of the nation-State—an important ingredient of classical modernity—has long deserted the scene.

While the post-modern vision can always interpret this rather incoherent remobilization of the citizenry and the (still timid) revival of State voluntarism as a pastiche of older forms, it remains that they no longer strongly agree with the anti-humanist/naturalist dimension of the post-modern concept as posited by its proponents. A desire for more rational control of collective destiny—a hallmark feature of classical modernity—has manifested itself in the period considered.

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[66]See: http://self.gutenberg.org/article/WHEBN0000176737/Private%20finance%20initiative.

[67]Bromund (2009).

[68]Jakubowski (2013).

Conclusions: Good Reasons to Praise the Post-modern Thesis—And to Reject It

In total, the above comparison between the two phases of the post-Cold War context yields contrasted results. Technological hypermodernism and its attendant paradoxes are alive and well, as predicted by post-modernists. But the post-9/11 era has done away with the uncertainty that prevailed in the 1990s as to the ends of military action, and security has at least partly resumed its age-old military meaning. Likewise, the antimodern dimension that came out so strongly between 1990 and 2001 has since been mitigated by the call for a reinstatement of some sovereign powers of the State—even though the place of the military as a tribe among tribes and the deterioration of soldier-statesman relations continue to point in a post-modernist the direction. The post-historicist tendencies at work in the 1990s persisted, and were even reinforced by the "counter-revolution in military affairs" that Afghanistan and Iraq produced, as well as by pastiches of "pre-modern" forms. Finally, the anti-humanist naturalism in evidence during the first decade into the post-Cold War era has been considerably softened, if not erased, since 2001.

The bottom line is that while some of the trends noted in the first fifteen years have since been confirmed and hardened, others have gone through a reversal process that takes us back to earlier situations—closer to modernity than to the fulfillment of the post-modern prophecy. To put it in a nutshell, military sociologists had better reasons to opt for the "post-modern" label in the former period than they have in the latter.

This raises a problem for post-modernist theorists. Critics had remarked two decades ago that, paradoxically enough for a paradigm that takes post-historicism as one of its points of departure, the label they selected to name it has strong historicist overtones: post-modernity is what supposedly follows the exhaustion of classical modernity.[69]

On the basis of the evidence available in 2003, one could be forgiven for believing that the post-modernist interpretation of civilizational trends was verified in its essentials as well as in many of its details as regards Western national military institutions; that the arrow of time had come to a standstill, i.e. to a configuration simultaneously combining all the social forms that had come before; and that the process was irreversible. Yet even then, this writer remained unconvinced: if it was such a fine tool of analysis, why did it fail to carry conviction? His 2003 answer was: probably because its evolutionist view of the Last Man is too ontologically realist to be swallowed with ease by many social scientists who know that contexts are apt to change, and lead to other modes of adaptation, and in the end to new societal and institutional constellations. While critics did not claim that "post-modernist" analyses were absolutely invalid, they favored thinking in terms of a "late (radical, or reflexive) phase of modernity", leaving open the metaphysically charged question of whether it is the last.

The argument in favor of such "late modernist" conceptual and methodological continuity was rather compelling even in 2003. If it is true that the nation-State was the first embodiment of modernity, and that it has declined, the Individual as an ultimate value was there from the start: the nation-State was but a means to an end. So that the contemporary situation can be seen as a natural development, one that is ridding humanity of the unintended, negative effects of exalted notions of the Nation. The trends noted by post-modernists can be interpreted as a hypermodern critique of modernity, in sharp contrast to the reactionary postures which had prevailed until then, and mostly failed to contain it. As Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens suggested decades ago, such trends represent a *deepening* of modern principles rather than their exhaustion.[70]

In 2015 as in 2003, yet another reason (one that is of particular interest to sociologists of the military) to prefer continuity is that

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[69]Touraine, *op.cit.*, p. 221.

[70]Beck (1986), Giddens (1991), *op.cit.*

post-modernists are generally far too optimistic when they postulate societies that are self-regulated through market forces and mutual tolerance of social groups living in separate symbolic and normative worlds. The potential for conflict and anarchy, indeed for a war of all against all, is much greater than they surmise. The fact that in the present circumstances it would not produce a great war of the type that ravaged the 20th century is poor solace: universal insecurity at home would in all likelihood be worse.

The 2003 conclusion, at a time when analysis of military institutions seemed to bear out post-modernist precepts, ran thus:

> The best that can be said of the post-modern thesis is that it has great potential *pragmatic value* in providing insights or new angles of attack, and in drawing attention to trends which the settled ways of the paradigm that has been dominant in the military field for nearly half a century would not spontaneously spot and mark as important. But that paradigm – the Janowitzian tradition: a fine blend of Weberian method and theory, functional analysis, strategic realism tempered by democratic values, and pragmatic philosophy – is perfectly capable of analyzing the developments and para-doxes the post-modernists point to in terms of context, meaning, function and consequences, intended or unintended, of purposive action. Indeed, the followers of that research tradition have done and will continue to do so: *all* of the trends examined in this summary review of post-Cold War developments can be analyzed in such terms – without incurring the intellectual and social risks involved in post-modern conjectures.

One hardly needs to change a single word. Likewise, the 2003 punch line remains valid:

> In short, […] the use by some [military sociologists] of the term "post-modern" has inadvertently introduced metatheoretical considerations that may not be entirely welcome. "Post-modern": useful, yes, but unnecessary.

In any case, as seen from 2015, the idea that the developments noted in 2003 were irreversible seems strange. That a change of context was enough, despite partial continuities, to produce trend reversals on a number of aspects suggests otherwise.

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Author Biography

Dr. Bernard Boëne emeritus professor of sociology at the University of Rennes, formerly Director general for academic affairs and research at the French Military Academy Saint-Cyr and *recteur d'académie*, is presently Chancellor of the Geneva School of Governance. He was vice-president of the International Sociological Association's research committee on armed forces and conflict resolution (1998–2006) and chair of the European Research Group on the Military and Society (2002–2004). His publications, mostly on martial action and institutions in a comparative perspective, include eight books and over 100 articles and chapters in edited volumes. Dr. Boëne is the founding chief editor of *Res Militaris*, a bilingual online social science journal of military issues.

Combat Soldiers and Their Experiences of Violence: Returning to Post-heroic Societies?

11

Maren Tomforde

Introduction

"I am not a hero and I do not need a medal, I just did my job. I do not need praise for what I did in Afghanistan—I only need to know why we were there." (Major 9, Afg. 2011). This statement by a German officer who had been deployed to Afghanistan in 2011 and who has been in combat reflects the view of many service-members returning from ISAF deployment to their Western home countries. Coming home to their peace societies means that soldiers do not only have to come to terms with their mission and combat experiences but also have to find a way to reintegrate into societies for which experiences of war, conflict and violence in theatre are very distant ones if at all. In many cases, the active use of violence during the Afghanistan operation represented a "constitutive breach" (Langer 2013: 71) resulting from the discrepancy of values and experiences between a "post-heroic society" (Münkler 2007; Luttwak 1995) and the armed forces in robust deployment.

This paper focuses on questions as to how soldiers deal with experiences of active and passive violence and how they are viewed by their home societies upon their return (see also Ben-Ari 2011). Still, only little attention has been paid by researchers to the perspective of the perpetrator, compared to the coverage of the perspective of the victims. In most cases, soldiers with combat experience combine both perspectives and are therefore faced with a double burden. How do soldiers experience and deal with combat situations, the fear, the permanent tension; how do they cope with injuries, killing and death? What importance does combat experience have among soldiers and how significant is a (combat) medal to them as a formal recognition of the experienced dangers? And last but not least, how do they reintegrate into their home societies which are so distant, both regionally and mentally, from they have gone through? Do these soldiers have to deal with 'post-heroic' societies that are not willing or not able to acknowledge their service in times of shifted values and norms? The so-called "theorem of the post-heroic society" (Chatterji 2013: 136) is scrutinized here to shed a more complex view on civil-military relations.

Based on half-structured in-depth interviews with German ISAF-soldiers, this paper focuses on the subjective perceptions and interpretations of military violence by soldiers on mission. The objective of this article is explicitly *not* to examine the problems let alone the traumatization of soldiers coming home from the Afghanistan theatre. Rather, the 'voices of the soldiers' shall be heard to shed some light on the question as to what symbolic importance is attributed to experiences

M. Tomforde (✉)
Staff and Command College of the German Armed Forces, Hamburg, Germany
e-mail: marentomforde@suedsinn.de;
maren.tomforde@mq.edu.au

M. Tomforde
Department of Anthropology, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

of violence (including to acts of killing) in the military context, what inward effects these experiences have among the armed forces and what outward effects they have in our society. I examine what different roles returning soldiers play in their home societies and how they deal with their very distinct deployment experiences as well as how societies welcomes them back.

This article is structured as follows: First of all, the 'theorem of post-heroic societies' is defined and discussed to better understand Western industrialized societies' approaches to soldiers with combat experiences. This is followed by an analysis of the empirical data which will be used to demonstrate the multiple dimensions and perceptions of combat, killing and dying from the soldiers' emic point of view. This includes a discussion of the special role that comradeship can play. Especially when it comes to dangerous situations, comradeship can display characteristics of family ties and thus help soldiers to cope with extreme experiences. In this context, the special soldierly humor which makes soldiers laugh even in the middle of combat will be interpreted as an integral part of the mechanisms of coping and interpretation. In a further step, the homecoming process to 'post-heroic' societies is analyzed and a closer look taken on the many facets of this reintegration process that challenges both sides—service-members and societies alike. The article will conclude with a discussion of the multiple facets of the soldiers' combat and homecoming experiences. Topics such as the sense and legitimacy of a mission, mourning and remembrance, 'truthful' recognition from society as well as the interpretation of the existential experience of violence and the soldierly self-perception after having returned home are of notable importance here.

Postheroic Societies?

In a much discussed Foreign Affairs article, Romanian military strategist, political scientist, and historian Edward Luttwak discussed the concept of the casualty shy 'post-heroic society' for the first time (1995). He writes:

> War fought for great purposes implies a willingness to accept casualties even in large numbers. Moreover, a certain tolerance for casualties was congruent with the demography of preindustrial and early-industrial societies, whereby families had many children and losing some to disease was entirely normal. The loss of a youngster in combat, however tragic, was therefore fundamentally less unacceptable than for today's families, with their one, two, or at the most three children. (Luttwak 1995: 112)

Luttwak thus sees an extreme reluctance by today's Western industrialized societies to sacrifice its members for a greater cause and to accept the loss of relatives and friends on active duty (Luttwak 1999: 135). In addition, post-heroic societies are seen to be characterized by law, trading, pursuit of prosperity and dispute resolution for the sake of peace. The fighter of heroic societies who acquires honor through willingness to make sacrifices has apparently disappeared. Heroic fighters transcend mundane realities for something greater while the postheroic subject concentrates on itself and its immediate surroundings (Leonhard 2015: 141). In other words, instead of striving for sacrifice and honor, people in increasingly secularized societies follow rather individualistic goals, such as personal prosperity and happiness (Münkler 2006: 316). The contemporary strategic discourse rests on the assumption that war today is no longer fueled by heroic motivations (Scheipers 2014). If soldiers of post-heroic societies have to fight, they are preferably sent as peacekeepers on humanitarian missions and losses to their own side should be kept at a minimum.

> Technological superior weapons replace the readiness to die. Self-destruction and de-heroisation in the wake of the two world wars have had a lasting effect. We are happy to put peace above everything, to consider human life as the supreme good, and to strive for prosperity in globalized openness. (Bachofner 2014)

In other words, demographic as well as cultural and technological changes have severely decreased the tolerance for casualties in war and have led to the so-called 'post-heroic condition' of Western industrialized societies. At first sight, this concept seems appealing and an appropriate

characterization of these societies. Soldiers returning home from mission areas such as Iraq or Afghanistan do not seem to find sufficient recognition and interest in what they have been through during deployment. War no longer makes popular public heroes in Western democracies it appears. Soldiers do not return as heroes or service-members who need to be actively reintegrated into society but are rather perceived as victims of today's altered security situation. A shift away from conscious action and sacrifice in the sense of *sacrificium* towards passive suffering of the victim in the sense of *victima* has taken place in our western industrialized societies since the 1970s (Leonhard 2015; Münkler and Fischer 2000). Contemporary French philosopher Bruckner (2010) argues in that regard that Western social and political consciousness is plagued by self-imposed, pathological guilt resulting from Europe's history of enslavement, imperialism, racism, and exploitation of much of the world. He even asserts that there is a self-loathing that pervades Western consciousness. Anglo-European dominant culture is perceived as shameful while all other groups are considered less blameworthy when carrying out forms of oppression and violence as these behaviors are perceived as reactions to poverty and exploitation, to Western oppression and hegemony. Sending soldiers on peacekeeping missions and MOOTW is, despite many other reasons, one way of confronting this historical guilt. Soldiers involved in this endeavor are not expected to sacrifice themselves for higher moral norms of their societies but to help rid Western consciousness of this guilt. By deploying to theatre, one might argue, soldiers become part of this pervading shameful consciousness and take on the role of the victim who suffers in societies' stead. As a result of this shift away from conscious sacrifice towards passive suffering for the whole society, civil-military relations are burdened by unclear and undeclared motives of missions abroad.

This becomes apparent when investigating the status of soldiers returning from deployment. At first sight, they are either across-the-board welcomed back as heroes like in the U.S. where the term 'hero' has become hollow in consequence. Or, veterans are—in the same manner—perceived across-the-board as victims, as traumatized service-members in need of (psychiatric) help such as in Germany or Norway. Despite burdened civil-military relations, reality—like always—is ostensibly more complex and complicated. For example, some US citizens might truly regard combat soldiers as heroes as well as members of societies in Germany, the Netherlands or Norway might use this concept for the first time in decades to acknowledge their troops' exceptional service in theatre. Or, soldiers might not apply the term 'hero' to themselves but still and very consciously to their comrades killed in action or to singular service-members who stand out due to brave actions. Therefore, it is understandable that the concept of the post-heroic condition has been contested (see e.g. Leonhard 2015; Scheipers 2014) in the past few years as the theorem may explain a society's unwillingness to accept military losses. However, it "does not tell us anything about the belligerence of a society, and even less does it tell us about whether wars are won." (Chatterji 2013: 137).[1] Also, it diverts our view away from a more differentiated and closer examination of soldiers' roles and needs upon homecoming from deployment in a war/conflict zone and their perception by wider society. And, do not "even post-heroic societies need a basic foundation of heroic values"? as Swiss scientist and Major General Hans Bachofner (2014) rightly asks. Discussions about the much disputed post-heroic theorem at least make way for reflections on clear distinctions between hero and victim, between *sacrificium* and *victim* as German sociologist Leonhard (2015: 155) asserts. Instead, analysis of the deep change of meaning that armed forces have undergone since the end of the 20th century and that make way for

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[1]For example, most members of Western societies oppose the use of violence, on the other hand we are every day confronted with the "performative quality of violence as spectators" (Schmidt and Schröder 2001: 5 f.) and we expose ourselves to the omnipresence of depictions of violence in the media which often illustrates our "unspoken fascination by violence, this irritating lust for excess" (Langer 2013: 75).

links between civil society and the military beyond 'civil perspectives of the post-heroic majority' and 'bellicose perspectives of a heroic minority' should be undertaken. The following sections are aimed at contributing to this analysis. It is shown that (a) soldiers react to and interpret experiences of violence in very diverse ways and that (b) Western industrialized societies also perceive returning soldiers in a plethora of manners. A continuum of seeing them all as heroes (e.g. USA) to approaching them as PTSD-victims (e.g. Germany, Norway) seems to exist with many aberrations when qualitatively examining civil-military relations in these countries.

'The Soldiers' Voices': The Data Pool

In order to get a glimpse of how combat soldiers experience and interpret violence encountered in theatre, a closer look is taken on my own empirical data collected within the German Armed Forces (see also Soeters et al. 2014). Of course, experiences and notions of these soldiers only highlight the 'German side'. However, comparison of my own research results with findings from other international scholars (e.g. Caforio 2013) suggest that German experiences are not singular but allow an understanding of the way soldiers make meaning when in combat during and after deployment.

This paper is based on a variety of different data. It is based on knowledge gained in the course of the last decade in the framework of my anthropological research about missions abroad in the Balkans and in Afghanistan (see e.g. Tomforde 2010, 2013, 2015a, b, 2016). Also, findings on experiences of violence discussed here are based on 30 half-structured in-depth interviews with German combat soldiers returning from Afghanistan[2] as well as on numerous focus group interviews and group discussions that I have conducted with soldiers in a variety of situations and

locations within the Bundeswehr. The interviews were not recorded in order to ensure that the interview partners could speak in an environment as natural as possible and in order to avoid statements that were made 'socially desirable' for being recorded. Instead, the answers to the questions asked as well as the stories chosen by the soldiers have been written down directly during the interviews; crucial statements were included word by word, whenever possible.[3] The statements made during the group conversations were summarized in short notes and later completed from memory.

All of my interview partners volunteered to participate in the privately organized conversations at times when they were off duty.[4] In most cases, the interviews lasted for two hours or more. It was not unusual for the interviewees to name further potential conversation partners. I was also directly contacted by soldiers who had heard of my research project and wished to be interviewed. My conversation partners were mostly male officers between 30 and 50; only few women[5] with combat experience could be

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[2]The expression 'soldiers returning from Afghanistan' has been used intentionally in this context, because not all interview partners see themselves as veterans (cf. Sussebach 2014).

[3]The interview passages quoted in this text have been edited slightly in order to remove empty phrases that disturb the reading flow, unless they contribute anything essential to the meaning of the respective statement. However, I have tried to repeat the soldiers' expressions as accurately as possible.

[4]At this point I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to all the soldiers who have supported my research project and allowed me valuable insights into their experiences and thoughts.

[5]On the one hand this is due to the fact that in the course of my research I have met only few women with combat experience. On the other hand, female soldiers are rarely serving in the protection companies outside the camps. So for example in 2010, more than two thirds of the female soldiers of the 22nd contingent in Afghanistan performed supporting functions and thus mainly served within the camp. Langer (2012: 12), however, were able to ascertain in the course of an empirical study in Afghanistan in 2010 that a gender-specific difference between men and women with combat experience cannot be statistically proven. According to them, both groups display a similar willingness to use violence themselves after a prior exposure to violence. In other words, the data suggest that "the real physical experience of military violence tends to erase gender-specific effects of socialization" (Langer 2012: 15). This result was also supported by my male conversation partners who were unable to detect any gender-specific differences during combat.

interviewed. Thus, in this respect my study is obviously distorted: I did not talk to the 18–30 year old enlisted soldiers and sergeants who mainly participated directly in combat situations in Afghanistan. Instead, my study focuses on the military leaders. Officers with operational and combat experience who are in their early thirties today are the ones who will have a major influence on the Bundeswehr and its system of orientation and values over the next years and decades. With regard to Bundeswehr culture and especially to the question as to what extent the experiences of violence will change the Bundeswehr and last but not least society in socio-cultural terms, an analysis of the future elite will thus provide vital insights:

> The study of elites provides a useful focus for addressing a range of core anthropological and sociological concerns including language and power; leadership and authority; status and hierarchy; ideology and consciousness; social identities and boundary-maintenance; power relations, social structure and social change. (Shore 2002: 9)

Of course, apart from the perspective of the officers with experiences of violence which is covered by my own interviews, I will also take 'voices' of the other rank categories into account. By now there are numerous Afghanistan memoirs written by Bundeswehr soldiers available where the experiences of violence which cannot be expressed verbally have been transformed into a narrative form and (re)interpreted (Böcker et al. 2013; Clair 2012; Sedlatzek-Müller 2012; see also Kleinreesink 2012; Kleinreesink et al. 2012).[6] Apart from these memoirs, this paper will also include direct quotes from documentations, projects and interview material gathered by other authors.[7] As a result, my own data can be complemented by other perspectives.

The interviewees' names have been anonymized and details about the deployment location, the time frame of the mission or about the unit have been deliberately omitted because a research project in the context of war deals with the sometimes sensitive, often highly personal and intimate experiences with violence. All interviewees were guaranteed absolute anonymity prior to the beginning of the interviews. Therefore, any information about the soldiers which could be used by *insiders* to identify the interviewees had to be omitted.

Studying Violence

Anthropological field research in violent *settings*, as has been carried out for this paper, allows us to focus on the cognitive aspects, on statements and narrations about experiences of violence, and thus enables us to develop an ontological understanding of violence (Weiss and Six-Hohenbalken 2011: p. 3; Collins 2011; Aijmer and Abbink 2000). It is a challenging research undertaking to not per se classify violence as something evil (or something good) but, in defiance of the moral challenge, to examine how people can inflict violence upon others or even kill them and how they evaluate the significance of such an act. Violence is being *redefined* by all those involved, in order to understand and give meaning to it. Not only the victims of an act of violence, but also the person who commits this act and inflicts pain or even ends someone's life is equipped with cultural assessment criteria for his behavior (Demir 2013: pp. 9–10).

Here the use of violence and its interpretation by Bundeswehr soldiers in Afghanistan will be analyzed from an internal point of view. In doing so, I will focus on the perceptions and processing of experiences of violence by military personnel.

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[6]The Israeli historian Harari (2004: 19) believes that field memoirs written by the junior ranks rate among the probably most influential historic texts ever written. The way war is perceived by the western public has been shaped by these texts in a significant way.

[7]In this context, I would like to draw particular attention to the projects of Koelbl (2011, 2014) and Würich and Scheffer (2014). The edited volume by Böcker et al. (2013) also points out important internal points of view. On the whole, apart from scientific analyses, a broad

range of documentations, reports, photo exhibitions, documentaries and movies, radio features, theatre plays and even Graphic Novels have been created about the mission in Afghanistan. Taking a closer look at these different approaches to the mission/war in Afghanistan would be worth a separate research project.

The minimalistic interpretation of violence as a sheer *force* which can be used to inflict injury or death will be employed in this text because the focus will lie on the "targeted direct physical injury of others" (Nunner-Winkler 2004: p. 26) during military operations.

German soldiers are socialized as citizens within German society which basically rejects violence and which seems to perfectly fit into the definition of a 'post-heroic society' (see Münkler 2006). At the same time, soldiers are also socialized into the military sub-culture in which they are supposed to use violence in their capacity as representatives of the state, adhering to clearly defined rules. So the question comes up as to which cultural criteria they apply to assess their actions on mission. Yet, there are more factors which influence the perception, interpretation and evaluation of experiences of violence during operations abroad than the sometimes conflicting socialization as German citizens on the one hand and as members of the armed forces on the other hand. The situational framework also influences the way in which an act of violence is assessed. For example, when the first soldiers were killed in attacks in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003,[8] soldiers seem to have had more difficulties in emotionally coping with these impressions in the context of an operation perceived as a peacekeeping and stabilization mission than with combat experiences from 2008 onwards. In those years, Bundeswehr soldiers in the north of the country were already more and more frequently exposed to attacks and combat situations which became the rule rather than the exception (see e.g. Sedlatzek-Müller 2012). Against the backdrop of deteriorating frame conditions from 2008 onwards, the operational use of violence was not only legally legitimized but step by step the soldiers also began to accept it in socio-cultural terms. German society at home has been unable to take this step because it was and is not directly confronted with the dangers of the country of deployment.

The perception and interpretation of violence which illustrates characteristics of an interpretative ambiguity depends on the perspective of those involved in the so-called triangle of violence (formed by perpetrators, victims and observers/witnesses) (Riches 1986).[9] In the following, I will show how Bundeswehr soldiers interpret the use of violence in Afghanistan based on my own research findings.

Good Next to Bad: Combat Experiences

In order to understand the many ways experiences of violence and combat situations are interpreted by troops themselves, let us 'travel' to Afghanistan and mentally accompany German combat soldiers into theatre. In doing so, we shall see that combat is experienced, digested and remembered in various ways. Being professional soldiers (King 2013), people are not only shaken or, on the other hand, excited by the violent experience but have a more nuanced and complex interpretation of events as the following citation highlights:

> Some will come to miss those days and hours, in spite of all the burden. They will never again feel as alive as they did during those hours after having successfully mastered a combat situation and in that first night back in the camp, drinking 'to good friends'. Maybe they will never again experience comradeship in such a high intensity. From the point of view of those soldiers for whom an army's purpose is 'to battle', the days in Kunduz may have been the last in which they were able to practice their profession according to their understanding. (Captain 2013b: 59)

Of course, in the course of this article not all dimensions of combat can be discussed here (see Tomforde 2015, see also Apelt 2009; Zimmermann 2014). Instead, a few important dimensions

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[8]Eight soldiers died in Afghanistan in 2002, and in 2003 seven soldiers were killed in action (http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/DcJBDkAwEAXQs7hAZ2_nFtg0o0b7o_mkRROnJ-_JLD_qg6gXDmqWUaaAfmluaas53WJSol5KX08L0OxAbwWklZvRhVQOYvdvQw3JuKnlbHLuQ_cB0U_KLg!!/, last accessed on 01.12.2014).

[9]David Riches (1947–2011) was one of the most important British representatives of the ethnology of violence. In his anthology "The Anthropology of Violence" (1986) he opened the research on violence for anthropologists as well.

are presented here in an exemplary fashion: coping with fear, comradeship, ambiguous situations and emotions, and last but not least, the act of killing.

(No) Fear and Comrades: "You Twitched When the Bullet Passed by Your Ear, You Wimp"

In published interviews (cf. Koelbl 2011) as well as during my own conversations with soldiers fear has been a frequently mentioned topic. However, fear is not experienced as a hampering phenomenon that engulfs everything else, but rather as a side effect that soldiers have to deal with.[10] Their soldierly self-perception as professional soldiers who can be deployed internationally requires them to deal with fear in this conscious manner. When I was in 'Camp Warehouse' (of the ISAF military base) in Kabul in 2004, a missile was fired on the German part of this international camp. I was surprised that after the attack and after leaving the protective shelter, the soldiers neither talked about the attack as such nor about their fear of injury and death, although one of their comrades had been wounded. Upon enquiry, I was told repeatedly that the risk of an attack was indeed omnipresent. However, they would not talk about the fear of attacks to avoid giving it too much weight. Everyone was afraid somehow anyway, so they did not also need to talk about it. According to the soldiers, it was part of their coping strategy to keep fear of injury and death at a distance. The soldiers were aware that in permission training before a mission they could only partly prepare for the confrontation with combat, injury and death. In most cases, reality turned out quite different from the practice scenario. Especially the superior officers would not so much fear for their own lives but for the lives of their subordinates:

In combat and being afraid to die? Bringing the other guys home safe and sound and living up to the responsibility as a leader is more important than the fear for your own survival. (Major 18, Afg. 2011)

Not only are soldiers consciously dealing with fear, there is also hardly any time and place for it in a combat situation:

Sometimes people ask me if I had been afraid to get injured or to die. In that particular situation, I definitely wasn't afraid. But that's not because I felt like Superman, it was because I just didn't have any time to be afraid. (Captain and Trenzinger 2013: 31 f.)

Ever since our arrival in Afghanistan three weeks before, we were waiting for the first real combat situation, for the first attack. This evil expectation was hanging above us like the sword of Damocles, lying in wait for us. We knew we couldn't escape it. We only knew for sure that we would not be the ones to determine the moment when it were to happen. (Captain 2013b: 39)

At the beginning of an operation, the fear of combat situations, of injury and death is especially great. Only after having survived the first attack or the first combat situation unscathed, the fear of the unknown and of possible failure gives way to a professional way of dealing with dangerous situations (cf. Collins 2011: 107 f.). Subsequently, fear is an omnipresent but not a paralyzing phenomenon during a military operation. Sometimes, the soldiers' fear of losing a comrade seems to be greater than the fear of getting injured themselves. This once again illustrates the significance of comradeship during a mission (cf. King 2013). Comrades help to overcome fear in combat—the very specific comrades' humor is one means to deal with difficult situations: "You twitched when the bullet passed by your ear, you wimp." (Captain 30, Afg. 2010) This is a humorous way to deal with the fact that the comrade could have been hit just as likely. Because he was not injured, the soldiers can now joke about it. The comrades' humor has a relaxing effect in tense situations, bypasses boundaries between ranks and at the same time confirms values such as comradeship, bravery, courage and masculinity.

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[10]The sociologist Randall Collins mentions a continuum between fear and tension as well as between competence and incompetence which can take effect during combat (2011: 106).

Soldiers describe comradeship as the most precious asset or as a kind of social security (cf. Focken 2013: 74; Koelbl 2011). Jonathan Shay also emphasizes the great significance of these small combat teams based on experiences from the Vietnam War:

> As civilians, we cannot comprehend a soldier's pain from his point of view. Battle inspires a passion to care for each other among the comrades in arms that can only be compared to the earliest and closest family ties (1998: 78).

When deployed far from home and far from one's own social environment, comrades are the most important reference and an emotionally highly charged social primary group. Thanks to them, challenging situations can be endured, overcome and dealt with together. In most cases, this important connection between the comrades ceases after leaving the combat area or the location of deployment. In a 'non-violent setting', the unifying framework conditions are no longer present and individualistic values regain importance (cf. Gray, quoted in Arendt 1970: 67).

The Simultaneity of the Non-simultaneous and Emotional Disparities[11]

Let us get back to the experiences in Afghanistan. A recurring motive in the narrations about the ISAF mission is the description of impressions with multiple facets, being two things at the same time: The deployment was "both the worst and the best time of my life" (Major 27, Afg. 2011), "I was afraid of the fight but I also felt the need to at last make use of what I had learned"

(LTC 2, Afg. 2009), "I was yearning to return home as soon as possible but I also felt the urge to get back to Afghanistan at once." (Captain 29, Afg. 2013). It seems to be a characteristic feature of the mission in Afghanistan in general but also of the combat situations in particular that they display a certain ambiguity as well as multiple dimensions. After the interviews with the soldiers it can be stated that the deployment in Afghanistan did not only bring them suffering, horrors and grief, but also the most intense and in some cases even the most beautiful experiences of a lifetime. It is precisely the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous which astonishes the soldiers again and that ties them to this mission, for years and sometimes forever. For example, the commander of the Task Force Kunduz 2010/2011 writes about the beginning of the German operation 'Halmazag', aimed at combating insurgencies and securing the area of a village named Quatliam near Kunduz. He describes the following situation:

> We arrive at the edge of the village of Quatliam, shortly before 9 a.m., and a surprise awaits me: A huge carpet has been rolled out in front of a clay wall, and there sits or rather lies Major W. (an Afghan partner officer, MT], his weapon lying next to him. In an atmosphere of absolute serenity, he is talking calmly to a few villagers who have brought tea and some cream sweets. The cozy little group completely ignores the sporadically audible gunfire announcing the advancement of our troops in the village. (von Blumröder 2013: 85)

Seeing impressive sunrises or sunsets and landscapes that are both beautiful and peaceful before or after an attack is also part of the soldiers' combat experiences that they talk and write about:

> I am told that the minister will probably arrive two hours later than planned, and suddenly, I have time (…). Slowly I become aware of the silence all around me. A silence only interrupted by the whoops of children playing in the valley. At the same spot where my brave soldiers were holding on in a hail of bullets and grenades and fighting back all attacks of the enemy for four days, where IEDs detonated and bombs were falling, where people were injured or killed, I am now watching farmers who are once again working on their fields in the light of the slowly setting sun. (…) At least today there is peace. I have never felt peace the

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[11]The philosopher Ernst Bloch was the first to use the expression "non-simultaneity". Against the backdrop of the coexistence of heterogeneous stages of social and economic progress he attempted to critically explain the popularity of National Socialism in Germany (cf. Bloch 1985). Since the 1980s, Bloch's thesis of non-simultaneity has also been applied to social developments characterized by simultaneity and multiple dimensions (see e.g. Albrecht 1991).

way I did on that 4th of November. (von Blum-röder 2013: 102 f.)[12]

Another special kind of simultaneity of the non-simultaneous becomes apparent when the soldiers get in touch with their families at home.

> (…) and life at home seems to be light years away. At home they celebrate Christmas or other festivities while we in Afghanistan are showered with bullets and we're just exhausted. That makes it difficult sometimes to get truly in touch with people at home. The extreme lack of sleep, the tension and the stress leave their marks in our faces. They don't understand that at home. (Captain 20, Afg. 2010)

After a fight, the soldiers report back to their families the general data of the combat because their often well-informed partners are already aware of what has happened and therefore the information cannot be withheld from them. According to the interviewees, during a mission and often also after their return home, however, they blot out the emotional side of their experiences. The soldiers do not want to worry their families more than necessary by telling them about their fears or possible doubts. They know that they have changed but they do not want to be automatically regarded as traumatized because of this change. The more (operational) experience the soldiers have, the more they are aware of the fact that they have to be very patient with themselves and with their families when they are back home. Reintegration into the peaceful German society as well as overcoming the reverse culture shock upon their return, which is apparently experienced by many soldiers, requires time and consideration from both sides (cf. Weibull 2012: 58 ff.).[13]

Combat, Emotions and Strife for Heroism?

In Afghanistan, soldiers experience sometimes extreme situations which can only partly be shared with the families at home and which are difficult to understand in a mostly peaceful environment in Germany or any other country. During the interviews that I have been conducting since 2009 with soldiers who had experienced violence in the course of their deployment, I have always been told in a very emotional manner and *en detail* about direct as well as the indirect experiences of violence. Many soldiers showed physical reactions during the interviews: Goose bumps, shaking hands, headaches, abrupt nervousness and a sudden loss of appetite. The emotions that they had experienced in a much higher intensity during the actual events in Afghanistan were now surfacing again during the conversations. After his interviews with soldiers who had fought in Vietnam, Jonathan Shay already stated that American front veterans described fighting with attributes like "being in raptures", "an ecstasy of combat" that is "better than sex" (Shay 1998: 138; see also Bourke 1999; Clausewitz 1980: 72). As a reaction to the danger during combat, the adrenal glands release adrenaline and other hormones into the body which can offer a biological reason for these feelings of elation:

> I never felt as good as I did after a fight. I suppose that's because of the release of endorphins. You're just happy that you're still alive and that you've made it through. A combat situation is a highly intensive experience that I sometimes miss here in Germany. Experiencing a combat situation can lead to very different reactions, in my case to positive ones. But I have been looking for extreme experiences my whole life. (Major 22, Afg. 2010)

It is important, however, to point out that this "fascination of aggressive ecstasy" (Moeller 1992: 88) which, at a given moment, can get hold of anybody, in many cases only lasts for the period of fighting and may shortly afterwards change into feelings of guilt and moral conflict (Moeller 1992: 88). These sometimes tormenting

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[12]Johannes Clair wrote his book (2012) about these four November days of operation "Halmazag" from a Corporal's point of view.

[13]In this context, the Swedish ethnologist Weibull (2012) mentions a so-called "post-deployment disorientation" which undoubtedly affects more soldiers returning from deployments abroad than a diagnosable post-traumatic stress disorder.

doubts about oneself which can quickly change into unspoken feelings of guilt become apparent in the following quote:

> When I was lying on my camp bed that evening, a thousand questions flashed through my mind: Could I have prevented the attack? What could we have done differently or better? For what purpose was Flo killed and how is his family coping with that? Will all the wounded get well again? How are my men doing? What will become of my platoon? Even though your superiors always tell you that you couldn't have changed anything about that situation, there's always this little spark of doubt that remains. For my part, during the next three days when we were taken off active duty I was a picture of misery. I couldn't get these questions and thoughts out of my mind, and all of a sudden this protective armor that I had been wearing during the combat situations was lying next to my camp bed – now I was naked and I had to deal with the situation on my own and for my own sake. (Müller 2013: 143)

Apart from the 'desire for combat', all my interview partners have also mentioned the phenomenon of the 'yearning for combat experience' from which some of them tried to clearly distance themselves. Apparently, there are deployed soldiers who crave for combat experience and are longing to make practical use of their theoretical knowledge at last—maybe as a result of previously witnessed violence, but partly also due to the desire for a 'combat medal'.

> I absolutely don't understand comrades who are looking for combat situations. Sometimes you have to stop comrades who want this experience at any cost because that's borderline behavior, I'd say. Then you may have to revise decisions or cancel actions which are not absolutely necessary. Anything else would be lack of responsibility. On the other hand, the desire for combat may also be something that comes naturally, if you've survived countless attacks and have seen countless other people wounded or killed. Here, the commander has a special responsibility. (Captain 23, Afg. 2010)

> Some people try the craziest things in order to get this medal. Seriously, one comrade was so eager to experience a combat situation and to receive the combat medal. But afterwards (after having been awarded with the combat medal, MT], this soldier's performance dropped noticeably. Approximately 20 percent of the soldiers want this medal for weird reasons. (Major 20, Afg. 2010)

Apparently, we have to differentiate between two phenomena in this context: the 'desire for combat' and the 'yearning for the combat medal'. The desire for combat may have 'soldierly' reasons: Soldiers want to make use of what they have been learning for months and years, of a knowledge that is the core of military business and military professionalism. This desire becomes even stronger, the more injuries and deaths the soldiers have seen among their comrades. The yearning for the combat medal and the craving for official recognition as a 'hero', however, is something entirely different.[14] The soldiers know that those with combat experience are sure to receive a certain amount of respect from their comrades for what they have experienced and survived. There are many who would like to be part of this insider circle (approx. 5000 soldiers)[15] and against this backdrop some of them offensively sought the involvement in combat situations, especially during the years 2010/2011. Others symbolically pick up combat experience, e.g. by their way of narrating or clothing: Soldiers who have combat experience do not immediately talk about their experiences of violence during deployments, they simply have this kind of experience. Those who do not have combat experience talk about such an experience in the 'we form', thus including themselves in the group of experienced soldiers, striving or pretending to be one of them. The interviewees also often talked

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[14]See also interview with former German Minister of Defence Thomas de Maizière, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/thomas-de-maiziere-im-gespraech-giert-nicht-nach-anerkennung-2092201.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_2, last retrieved on 01.12.2014.

[15]This number was calculated by an officer with operational and combat experience who was able to approximately ascertain how many soldiers per contingent were involved in combat situations, how many of them were deployed for the second, third or fourth time and who knew in which years the Bundeswehr was taking part "in active combat" (cf. Zimmermann 2014). The official data provided by the Federal Ministry of Defence about the number of awarded combat medals does not offer much clarification in this respect, because on the one hand the medals have sometimes been awarded based on very different criteria and also because some soldiers may have participated in more than one combat situation.

contemptuously about soldiers who rarely or never left the camp in Afghanistan but nevertheless were wearing a uniform equipped for combat when working within the camp.

> One mission is not just like any other. Those who tell the most heroic stories have never left the camp. (Major 20, Afg. 2010)

> I had been observing the area ahead of us through my rifle scope; then I instinctively removed the safety lever and fired four shots at the moving target dressed in grey. The person seemed to suddenly fall down; the grey spot was still visible at the same position. My American comrade Chris said 'Good shot'. While I was lying down in the ditch he kneeled next to me on the path, peered through his binoculars and, grinning at me, he spat out his chewing tobacco. I still wonder whether I've really hit someone or just scared the hell out of the wall across the path. (Captain 2013a: 107)

Soldiers experience killing in highly contradictory ways (cf. Bar and Ben-Ari 2005: 133). This may lead to a range of (emotional) reactions between desire for combat and triumph on the one hand and seeking of sense, feelings of guilt, compassion and remorse on the other hand. Directly after a fight, the soldiers are happy to have survived and maybe to have even killed the enemy. In most cases, unsettling thoughts, questions of meaning and feelings of guilt only arise after some time has passed, because the soldiers also may see "an ominous component of hopelessness" in the bloodshed and killing (cf. Stietencron 1995: 51).

However, fighting is part of the soldier's craft which can be put to the test and applied in combat situations. As in every profession, solid craftsmanship is honored in the military, and the best tools, i.e. types of weapons, are being discussed. For a civilian who is not familiar with this kind of work and who only sees injuries and death resulting from the activity, this perspective may be disconcerting or even frightening (cf. Mann 2014).

The elementary experience of fighting is essential to a soldier's self-perception—even in times of hybrid and multiple challenges. Experiences gained in combat become the "center of gravity" (Haltiner and Kümmel 2008: 51) for the soldiers' self-perception, even for those soldiers who are only indirectly involved in the events.

However, for most of today's soldiers, the reference to this 'center of gravity' is not a simple relapse into dull, violent behavioral concepts combined with questionable role models for soldierly behavior, handed down from earlier generations (Warburg 2010: 72 f.). Instead, according to the numerous interviews and group discussions I conducted in the context of my research, a hybrid and multi-functional self-perception seems to be predominant. And although fighting is a central part of this self-perception, it does not make all the difference even if some soldiers yearn to be acknowledged as experienced fighters and 'heroes'.

Homecoming: Freaks, Heroes or Simply 'Normal People'?

Having looked at combat experiences of German soldiers in Afghanistan, we now want to more generally examine the ways these soldiers reintegrate back into their home societies. For most soldiers, after their return home, the Afghanistan or any other combat mission is far from being over. My interview partners repeatedly pointed out that the images of the operation are always with them—they see them in their dreams at night, but also during the day the images are constantly present. This means that the ISAF mission, although officially completed at the end of 2014, will continue to have its effects in the minds of those involved for quite some time. In spite of these images and the incorporated experiences of violence that have shaped the soldiers, it is important for the returning soldiers to emphasize: "We're no freaks, for heaven's sake." (Captain 29, Afg. 2013) This way the soldiers themselves point out that there are indeed traumatized[16] returnees and also soldiers

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[16]Experiences of violence can be potentially traumatizing, but they do not necessarily lead to a PTSD. Who is traumatized in which moment, in what manner and by which event always depends on a variety of different factors. "Thus the killing is at times banal and not traumatic; it is not too easy, nor too hard to bear." (Bar and Ben-Ari 2005: 150).

who at first have problems[17] with reintegrating into a peaceful society and getting back into 'everyday mode'—but they do not want to be generally degraded to 'freaks' or 'broken' people because of it. On the other hand, they do not want to be regarded as heroes neither as David Botti shows in his BBC documentary (2015). In the US, veterans have even founded a group raising awareness against the overall application of the word 'hero' to soldiers returning from tours to Afghanistan or other conflict zones. After the Vietnam War, most veterans were regarded as 'villains', whereas nowadays soldiers return as soldiers, no matter what they have done in theatre. This overall application of the term 'hero' in the US apparently results in a discomfort on the soldiers' side. They see that the overall application "takes something away from the real heroes" (Botti 2015) and obscures the issues that should be addressed such as rising suicide rates among veterans. Some of the returning soldiers in the US consciously push for a more nuanced and 'complicated' understanding of veterans as they want to do justice to *all* the moments and experiences of their tour, both good and bad. Instead of being called a hero, these soldiers would rather sit down for hours and explain what lies behind them, in order to not feel guilty and ungrateful. While most civilians, in the US, in Germany and other countries alike, only want to hear about the 'exciting' and really violent stories after deployment, returning soldiers have other stories to tell that mean much more to them.

Due to their complex experiences, they need a society to return to with which they can rather be in conversation. Being labelled as a hero means that an intense private act in theatre becomes a public act. By becoming a public hero, soldiers have a big responsibility to share their experiences with an 'unexperienced' society. Or, as

Norwegian researcher Elin Gustavsen (2016: 3) rightly puts it:

> As a result of people's unfamiliarity with military conflict, Norwegian society does not offer an established manner of assessing the veteran experience in union with civilian society. Therefore, the veterans must invent their own strategy for how to evaluate and organize the experience.

It seems that in the US and other countries, civil society partly celebrates its veterans as heroes to grasp onto something despite the prevailing guilt described by Bruckner that a limited number of soldiers and their families have to carry the burden of these missions abroad while the rest of the population can stay safely at home (Botti 2015). In addition, veterans need to push back stories that they are all 'ticking time bombs' ready to commit a serious crime any time.

It goes without saying that the mission in Afghanistan has changed everyone involved, all the more so, if a direct or indirect confrontation with violence and war has taken place (also see Langer 2012: 16; Pichler 2011). A German sergeant major (No. 7, Afg. 2009) emphasized during a conversation: "Of course, when you come back from a mission, you have changed. If someone comes back home *unchanged*, then something's wrong with him."

Returning soldiers have to generally deal with two major challenges: On the one hand they have to come to terms with images of combat, injuries, death, absolute poverty and behaviors from parts of the (Afghan) war society that are difficult to accept for their own system of values (see also Moelker 2014). On the other hand they have to find their way back into their home society which from their point of view is in many ways characterized by abundance, superficiality and waste of time. This period of transition[18] between the country of deployment and their home country

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[17]Jonathan Shay noticed that the war experiences of Vietnam veterans resemble the events already described in Homer's antique epic "Iliad"—problems with reintegration were mentioned there as well, some of them lasting for years. Along these lines a Vietnam veteran emphasized: "I truly haven't slept for twenty years …" (cf. Shay 1998: 17).

[18]The German Navy has a lot of operational experience and is thus aware of these problems with reintegration. Whenever possible, after a completed mission far away from us in geographical terms such as e.g. off the Somali coast, they ship soldiers to a so-called "harbor for Europeanization" in order to make it easier for them to get used to the western oriented way of life again, before going back to their families.

which can last for several weeks or even months can be influenced by a so-called 'homecomer's culture shock'. If their own value criteria have changed due to the poverty and hardship seen in Afghanistan, it is especially difficult for the soldiers to readapt to the circumstances of their home society. Most of the returning soldiers tell us in their stories that the confrontation with absolute poverty, violence and death made them appreciate the small things in life. This also becomes clear in the German book "Operation Heimkehr" (meaning "Operation Homecoming", by Würich and Scheffer 2014) where a range of different Bundeswehr members talk about their interpretation of the mission and about how they had changed when returning from Afghanistan. German psychologist Dr. Zimmermann describes similar experiences (interview on June 10, 2011) from a soldier's point of view:

> I come home, but no one wants to hear what happened to me; no one understands me and the new values I have developed on this mission. I have suffered, I want to be understood, but nobody in my environment is interested in what I've experienced. The time of our deployment has been extreme, and all they care about here in Germany are TV casting shows like DSDS (a German version of 'American Idol'). Everything is so trivial, all this frantic consumption etc.

In many cases, soldiers with combat experience who have been directly confronted with their own mortality now appreciate their home more than they did before (see also de Libero 2014). Often they have also experienced a strengthening of their value system—virtues such as honesty, politeness, reliability and taking care of each other now (once again) have a higher importance. Combat experiences can trigger a certain self-assurance which helps to regain one's "own wholeness" (Moeller 1992: 89). Suppressed or dormant facets of one's own personality are being revived/lived out under the completely different conditions of a violent confrontation:

> Or in other words: we can once again live as whole human beings if we can act out the unconscious, dark side of our personality in addition to living our conscious, bright side, so to speak. This dark side consists as much of killing as of being killed. And it is precisely this 'liberation to wholeness' that seems

to account for the sensual attractiveness of aggression. It is only with our latent desire for violence with its various forms and causes that we feel as 'complete human beings'. (Moeller 1992: 89)

It is of utmost importance that home societies reintegrate these men and women as 'normal people' and do not let them become 'psychopathologized strangers' or "marginal men" (Park 1928; cf. Mannitz 2013) which would put yet another burden on the soldiers' psychological wellbeing and their self-esteem. In Germany, soldiers are often marked as being special "so that their experiences may be excluded as particular ones" (Langer 2013: 86) and we do not have to take pains to accept them as normal experiences into our living environment by entering into a direct confrontation with the experienced violence. In other words, experiences of violence are not being integrated into society; instead, the affected soldiers are being repulsed by either focusing on psychopathology or a trivialized concept of 'heroism'.

Subsequently, social scientist Phil Langer sees the ISAF soldiers with experiences of violence as outsiders who "cannot be integrated, isolated from social discourse" (Langer 2013: 84). According to him, the military personnel in question are being re-victimized and their experiences isolated as abnormal instead of being integrated and reinterpreted. "From a psychoanalytical point of view, it is logical to speak of a 'crooked cure' by individualizing in psychological terms the subject of experiences which are actually related to the entire society." (Langer 2013: 83) For post-heroic societies as a whole, "the abstinence from violence is the decisive moment of social cohesion in modern times" (Reemtsma 2008, quoted in Langer 2013). Problematizing or overstressing the experiences of violence helps to maintain the violence rejecting social canon of values. Society uses the traumatizing or heroic perspective on returning soldiers which manifests itself in a variety of movies, TV series and theatre plays to protect itself from a more thorough discussion of the soldiers' experiences of violence.

Instead of oversimplifying the veterans' experiences and society's response to them, it

should be widely acknowledged that a true and differentiated exchange needs to take place between both groups. Also, it should be accepted that even so-called post-heroic societies cannot survive without some sort of heroism and the willingness to sacrifice for a greater common good—security in this case. German political scientist Herfried Münkler, reflecting on 9/11, called for "heroic equanimity" (2006: 354) of our modern-day societies to counter the heightened violability against a small heroic minority which can carry out attacks such as the ones on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 or simultaneously on several targets in Paris as in 2015. In other words, even so-called post-heroic societies need a basic foundation of heroic values. Swiss scientist and Major General Hans Bachofner (2014) asserts: Civilian citizens "must change. They must know that they are the target of attacks, rarely physically, but always psychologically. They must acquire great composure; a 'heroic composure,' as it was called following the London bombings. Attacks are not worth it if citizens react coolly and calmly, if the economy cannot be intimidated, and the media remain moderate."

To conclude, we live in societies which send a minority of service-members into missions abroad in order, amongst others, to contribute to our safety. Terrorist attacks like 9/11 or the 2015 Paris bombings have shown that in face of international terrorism we cannot completely 'outsource' international security and experiences of violence. Returning soldiers, by means of violent experiences stored in their narrations, archived in language and incorporated "into bodies, movements, gestures, (unofficial) rituals and objects" (Bendix 1996: 169) confront our societies, both directly and indirectly, with what they have been through. Instead of either framing these returning soldiers as 'the other', hero or freak, we should widely acknowledge that civil-military relations are being put to a test in times of international terrorism and MOOW.

German sociologist Nina Leonhard (2015: 155) summarizes that discussions about the much disputed post-heroic theorem should make way for reflections on clear distinctions between hero and victim, between *sacrificium* and *victima*. Instead, we should analyze the deep change of meaning that armed forces have undergone since the end of the 20th century and make way for links between civil society and the military beyond 'civil perspectives of the post-heroic majority' and 'bellicose perspectives of a heroic minority'.

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Author Biography

Dr. Maren Tomforde received her Ph.D. in Anthropology in 2005 from the University of Hamburg. From 2003 to 2007, she worked at the Social Research Institute of the German Armed Forces (SOWI) carrying out anthropological research on German peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. Since March 2007, she is Senior Lecturer in Cultural and Social Anthropology at the Staff and Command College of the German Armed Forces in Hamburg. She also lectures at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy in Hamburg and is Honorary Associate at the Department of Anthropology at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, where she has worked as a Visiting Scholar in 2015. Her main research interests are peace and conflict studies in anthropology, the anthropology of violence and war, culture theory, changing military cultures, migration and diaspora studies.

Soldiers and Governments in Postpraetorian Africa

Patterns of relations in Francophone States

12

Michel Louis Martin

Introduction

Civil-military relations in African states, few years from their independence to the early 1990s, have generally operated on the praetorian mode, that is a hegemonic domination of the political sphere, after its unconstitutional appropriation, by men in uniform and the support of their institution. Hence the proliferation of illiberal and authoritarian regimes, some sultanist and predatory, as the archetypal form of politics throughout the continent for decades.[1] Reasons at the origin of such a situation are numerous, among which corporate issues stand out, in other words, all factors linked to the military establishment and its members, often exacerbated by a context of societal volatility due to poor leadership, economic stagnation, and identitarist ten-

sions. The politicization of the armed forces induced by the logic of the occupation of the seats of power, led, through coups, displacements, plots, and so on, to a process of an "elite circulation" by which various strata of the military hierarchy (sometimes to subaltern ranks) alternated at the core of the governing apparatus. The order of their appearance and the rhythm of their rotation, their respective sociological characteristics and ideological leanings have contributed to elongate the praetorian cycle, while giving its dynamic a ternary configuration, moderate at first, then radicalized (quite so when fuelled by Marxian ideologies), lastly "thermidorianized" (Martin 1989, 1995).

With the global decline of authoritarianism in the late 1980s/early 1990s and the political transitions that ensued, with their democratic promises, such a pattern of military relations to politics waned to become atypical. Not only has it turned out to be politically unacceptable, but also deemed as suffering of systemic inadaptation[2]; past experiences have demonstrated that members of the military have proven inadequate rulers and mediocre developers, while their too long immersion in politics affected the whole institution cohesion and morale to the point of endangering its functionality.

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[1]It is of little import that this type of government includes civilians, which is inevitable. It was the most domineering version of military relations to politics (or oligarchical, according to Janowitz 1964), with regards indeed to the criteria working in advanced systems, liberal or totalitarian, but also in modernizing nations where the military plays a more oblique political role.

Michel Louis Martin—Emeritus Professor.

M. L. Martin (✉)
University Toulouse 1-Capitole, Toulouse, France
e-mail: michel-louis.martin@ut-capitole.fr

[2]With their modernization, societies can no longer be easily dominated and efficiently governed by a sociologically insulated and small-size group, such as a stratocratic junta.

In Latin America and Asia, postauthoritarian civil-military relations have evolved generally as to approach or conform to the dominant Western-managerial model. This implies the political neutralization and subordination of the armed forces, henceforth confined to their primary functional mandate, that is external defence. The same trend followed in polities of Central and Eastern Europe just freed from Communist rule and its distinctive arrangements for controlling the military.

From this viewpoint, Africa, where democratization was portrayed as "without end",[3] passing through more difficulties than elsewhere, remains a kind of an exception. If it could be hypothesized they would no longer—or rather rarely—assume the crude autocratic/coercive praetorian outlook of before, it is to be observed that soldiers-government interactions have not yet standardized and still operate (at least for what concerns the French-speaking area) in a somewhat heterogeneous fashion, with four dominant types, whose labelling is termed here in a rough empirical way. The Western-managerial one, the globally recognized appropriate norm, though on the rise, coexists with three other models: first, in a way that could be named Kemalist, former praetorian leaders who had presided over autocratic regimes, or, as today, officers (in active service or not) who have ousted a problematical civilian government, take it over but with a mandate having all the constitutional trappings; second, the military, normally quartered in barracks, intervene, but in a minimally intrusive way, to censor, generally in the name of democracy and good governance, an administration that is turning illiberal, incompetent or unpopular and possibly have it replaced by a new one; lastly, in a context of civil war and collapsing statal authority, the armed forces, often fragilized, disintegrate into rival, and sometimes gangsterized, groups fighting one another, often in conjunction with political or insurgent factions competing for power.

Caveats are in order should such a parsimonious and ideal-typified taxonomy, constructed here as for didactic purpose, be presumed cogent. Primo, it is derived from a simplified conception of military relations to politics, which focuses on the upper tier of a larger spectrum of interactions: intrusion on the political scene mirroring (ex ante or ex post) a sufficiently collective will from the military to impact the political system.[4] Secondo, it is built on cases from North- and Sub-Saharan French-speaking Africa, (with an emphasis on countries of French colonial succession), that is more than twenty often diverse illustrations, that would have demanded more care to be adequately matched, in any case that precludes a broader comparative validity for elsewhere on the continent.

Tertio, though the typology is constructed on the basis of examples that do not seem too equivocal and present some stability over time, the necessity to take into account the inevitable shifts from one model to another (simply because the time span of the period under study here covers more than two decades and half[5]) complexifies the overall picture; not to mention those ambiguous cases impossible to ascertain with precision as they display traits characterizing two, if not three models, and might introduce some confusion about which category they belongs to in the end. In other words, the models are treated as mutually exclusive for analytical purposes only. Quarto, the typology does suggest a historical or developmental evolution. The praetorian model is excluded because, as alluded, it is supposed to be dated for the period under consideration here (Clark 2011); yet take-overs as in Guinea in December 2008 (by Captain

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[3]To borrow the title of Diamond, Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran's book (1997). Among works written on this question (the litterature is voluminous): Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Quantin (2000), Villalón and Vondoepp (2005), N'Diaye et al. (2005), Diamond and Plattner (2010), *Democratization* (2011), Loada and Wheatley (2014).

[4]A view that could be criticized «as captured by the fallacy of coupism» (Croissant et al. 2010) and in need, especially today, be completed because the military is often a pluralistic institution, interacting with other security actors, especially new ones such as militias or semi-private groups.

[5]To mid-2016 when this study had to be delivered for edition.

Moussa Dadis Camara), which led to the post-poning of a possibly liberal political transition, show that a return to an autocratic praetorian rule is always possible. The Western-managerial pattern is expected to become dominant should democratic standards of political governance be prevalent, with the Kemalist one phasing out, at least in its old fashioned forms, and the disarticulation model as purely situational. If the «light footprint» regulatory model could also be viewed as transitional, it might persist and coexist with the Western-managerial.

Lastly, assuming the relevance of such a classification, it is not sure that all the cases examined here would have been distributed in the same way it has been done here, had they been more comprehensively assessed and had the complexity of the events and proceedings which they were interpreted from been rendered in a less sketchly way as they are here. They would have deserved deeper scrutiny, and not be approached on the basis of only few distinctive and shared features, which ignored national specificities and disregarded the causes of their production.

The Western-Managerial Model

Also defined as democratic or liberal in other more politically mature settings, this type of civil-military nexus has first thrived in Western Europe. It is characterized by the institutionalized compliance to a civilian elected leadership of a separate professionalized military converted to political and ideological neutrality.[6] If it is far from being the norm at present in French-speaking Africa, nevertheless it tends to expand. A few cases, approximating the Western-managerial model, are worth mentioning as good illustrations, though with some variations and not always in a political context that could be considered as fully democratized.

Four are perennial: Senegal, first, which, since independence, has known a continuous nearly-liberal functioning; Morocco, secondly, where the successive monarchs have been able to enjoy a legitimacy mixing religious considerations and a capacity to preserve national integrity; Cameroon and Gabon, lastly, which were and are ruled in a highly tutelary context, but where the military always remains contained. It is worth noting that the Ivory Coast has belonged to that group during President Félix Houphouet-Boigny thirty-three-year tenure, before things, as to be seen, change completely.[7]

For the other instances, it is only after post-praetorian political transitions, and not always easy ones, that the Western-managerial model seems to take root, as in Rwanda,[8] and less so in Burundi (Jowell 2014; Wilén 2016),[9] after the stabilization that followed in the early 2000s the dramatic episodes of civil war, and as in Benin which, after having gone through the full praetorian cycle, began to democratize, not without uncertainty at first, but quite firmly after 2006 (Banégas 2003; Gisselquist 2008). Other cases could be entered, such as Chad and Algeria, but the evolution is still recent, and over the period considered they primarily belong to other models

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[6]To put it in a simplified and idealized fashion, for, even in advanced democratic contexts, civil-military relations are never free of frictions, simply because of the logic of the «principal-agent» duality (Feaver 2003). But these tensions, due to the inevitable bureaucratic propensity of the military to influence civil authority, are not inconsistent with civilian supremacy, and are not of the same vein as those covert, less invasive actions (threat, intimidation, blackmail…) that, while below coup-making, could affect the political decision making process (Finer 1962); see also infra and conclusion.

[7]Decalo (1998) has discussed at length the case of these states spared by military political activism.

[8]President Paul Kagame is of military extraction (as General-major); he served in the Ugandese army. But he was not involved in praetorian dealings. He emerged from the civil war and the 1994 genocide as the leader of the Tutsi faction (the Rwanda Patriotic Front), and was elected as president in 2000 by the Parliament set up after the Arusha Agreement, and then in 2003 and 2010 by universal suffrage.

[9]The protests that flared end of April 2015 against President Pierre Nkurunziza, who decided to run for a third mandate, have not degenerated but discontent is still high. Members of military attempted to intervene mid-May, and again in December and January 2016.

and are dealt with here from a different perspective.[10]

It should be remarked that the perennity, or the return of civilian rule, as well as the garrisoning and the control of armed forces confined to defence missions, has not prevented episodes of organizational restlessness, sometimes politicized, by members of uniformed personnels, if not the whole institutions. In Senegal, late 1962, the gendarmerie backed Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, against President Léopold S. Senghor, try to close the Parliament; in 1968 the Army chief refused to use fire at rebelling students; in December 2001, Senegalese soldiers returning from service with UN troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo mutinied until paid. In Cameroon, President Paul Biya used the rumour of a military plot to replace Prime Minister Maigari in 1983, while, a year later, a group of officers from the North, headed by Colonel Ibrahim Saleh, tried vainly to topple the regime, leading to a harsh repression.[11] In Gabon, an intervention by French troops was necessary to reinstate President Léon Mba deposed by a military coup in February 1964, and Omar Bongo, who succeeded him in 1967, had learnt the lesson by setting a tight control on an armed force maintained small; in 1985, he pretexted a military plot to sentence to death Captain Mandza Ngokouta. Benin, under Nicephore Soglo presidency, witnessed two alleged military plots, in 1992 conducted by Captain Pascal Tawes and in 1995 led by Colonels Soulé Dankoro and Maurice Kouandété, the latter a figure of the past military rule (Kouyami et al. 2011). Yet, none of these actions did seriously challenge the civilian leadership, as in Morocco with two critical attempts. In 1971, cadets of the Royal NCOs School, mobilized by a few senior officers, attacked Skhirat palace during a reception to kill Hassan II, and, the following year, six Northrop-F5 of the air force tried to shoot down the king's plane on his return from France in an operation directed by the ministry of Defense Major-general Oufkir; in both cases, the sovereign's capacity to react swiftly insured the throne more standing and legitimacy. Generally, all these actions resulted in a better civilian grip over the armed forces.

Several factors—political, organizational and geopolitical—account for the persistence of the Western-managerial model and civilian leaders' capacity to maintain their supremacy. From the system side, the prestige or the shrewdness, in any case the statesmanship of successive heads of state played an important part: Senghor then Abdou Diouf in Senegal (Seck 2005; Sidibé 2006), Mohammed V then Hassan II in Morocco (Turquoi 2001), Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya in Cameroon, Léon M'Ba then Omar Bongo in Gabon, all were capable to mobilize governmental resources (even coercive) to consolidate their authority while reinforcing the regime legitimacy that benefited their successors up to present time. The same could be said of Nicéphore Soglo (1992–1996) and later, after Colonel Mathieu Kérékou's mandate Kemalist style, of Thomas Boni Yayi until end of 2015 (Aïvo 2010), of Paul Kagame in Rwanda (Reyntjens 2006), and of Domitien Ndayizaye succeeded by Pierre Nkurunziza in Burundi (Peterson 2006). All were able to insure a proper institutionnalized reach of the state, though not always in a fully liberal-democratic setting as the Western-managerial model of civil-military relations generically supposes; often it is in an electoral authoritarian setting, as shown by Cameroun or Gabon, among others (Ngolet 2000; Mouangue Kobila 2010; Pigeaud 2011).

It ought be noted further that the dominion of civilian leaders' over the defence sector as well as the political neutrality from uniformed personnel are being enforced by a thorough legal formalization, from ordinary regulations, disciplinary codes, statutes, and so on, to the most fundamental texts, such as electoral codes and

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[10]The Chadian regime has consolidated since 2006, though keeping its authoritarian outlook. Yet, given the frequency of plots involving military and insurgent factions (at least until the end of the 2000s), the pattern of civil-military relations is approached here (perhaps overstatedly) as an exemple of the disorganization model (see infra). As for Algeria, the model seems to have been Kemalist, the civilian leadership took hold after Abdelaziz Bouteflika came to power.

[11]There will be another plot in 1993 led by Major Oumharou and Captain Salaton.

above all the constitution. This process of constitutionalization which sometimes go into great details[12] has certainly contributed to the stabilization, if not a harmonization of civil-military relations along the Western model. Undoubtedly, moreover, the spectacle of the generally negative consequences induced by the excesses of military activism in neighboring countries has served as a deterrent.

Interestingly, civilian supremacy and military political neutrality, as principles, are not supposed to denote a marginalization, not even a neglect of members of the military on the part of the governing class. The dismissive treatment of the armed forces often observed elsewhere or in the past, in the shape of delayed salaries, politicized promotions, deficient equipments, of also interferences with professional autonomy or meddling in the organizational functioning, and all issues generally considered as internal, are avoided. It ought be noted that neither does the requirement of civilian supremacy and of political neutrality means that military personnel has to be unconcerned with the state's affairs and kept in the ignorance of all choices, especially those regarding defence, made by political authorities. These actually are careful to avoid that it be so and even associate key military personnel to the implementation of their policies, for example through inclusion in administrative functions, at least to get their backing for keeping public peace.[13] In Burundi, quite interestingly, the constitution goes as far as to specify that members of the defense sector have the right to

be informed about the socio-political life and to receive a civic education.

For obvious reasons, it is indeed difficult to follow and evaluate with accuracy the nature of the interactions between the military and politicians in the Western-managerial model as it operates in Africa, but rumours are not without significance. In Senegal, for example, the military seems to have agreed to prevent any possible contesting of the 2000 presidential elections even if, as they eventually did, they were to be won by the candidate opposed to the ruling Socialist party in power for forty years.[14] In Morocco, the tradition inaugurated by Mohammed V to place the designated heir at the head of the armed forces is obviously aimed at insuring him the valuable, at the same time, unchallenged, support once on the throne.[15]

To consider a more organizational dimension, it is observed that, in general, the role of the military is chiefly defined around missions linked to external defence. These should ideally imply, to be properly fulfilled, that be kept a committed defense administration appropriately budgeted and supervised, adequate and rationally acquired equipment levels, interoperable troops and rank-structures, chains of command free from clientelist or external pollution, which is not always the case. But, and in that regard security sector reform and defence institution building programs helped, the level of professionalization, without being achieved yet, has reached a point that has contributed to feed an ethic of public service, a feeling of self-purpose and self-esteem

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[12]In Burundi, for instance, it is required that the military should not count more than 50% of members of any particular ethnic group. In Rwanda, the constitution requires that senior officers take the oath not to take advantage of their function for personal ends. For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Martin (2015).

[13]A counter-example is offered by the Ivorian military which, after enjoying the full attention of the regime at the time of Houphouet-Boigny (and, as noted, civil-military relations functioned on the Western-managerial model) found itself, under Henri Konan Bédié's leadership, gradually marginalized, a situation which, with other factors, relates to General Robert Gueï's taking over in December 1999; see infra.

[14]The supervision of the 2000 presidential elections was assigned to General Lamine Cissé, chief of the armed forces staff, by outgoing president Abdou Diouf who told him to do everything to keep the elections free; when it was clear that Diouf was losing, Cissé advised him to be prepared to recognize his opponent's, Abdoulaye Wade, victory (Cissé 2001).

[15]A backing that is also «encouraged» by the various special material privileges enjoyed by cadres (Daguzan 2012; Tobji 2006) and that resembles to what is often going on in Kemalist situations.

among members of at least the mainstream units.[16]

In some cases, geopolitics facilitates these processes, notably a heightened sense of national identification. In Senegal and Morocco, the forces have felt valued by their involvement on external theaters placed in the sphere of influence if not the direct sovereignty of the country (e.g. Guinea-Bissau and Casamance for Senegal, Western Sahara for Morocco). Moreover, recurring tensions between Senegal and Mauritania on the one hand, Morocco and Algeria on the other, offered opportunities to fulfill military and combat role-expectations. The pressing necessity for most states in the region to be more implicated in the management of the heightened and complex conflictuality afflicting the whole continent also creates occasions for participation (indeed not in the role of leading responders and more in simple dissuasive deployment) to peacekeeping multilateral forces that were set up through the United Nations, then the African Union and various other regional economic communities[17]; for example with the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group, or

involvement in operations under the aegis of the United Nations, as during the Gulf War in 1991 and more recently Darfur, where 3500 men of the Rwandese forces serve in UN and AU missions, or nowadays in combatting, mounting terrorist threats in the Sahel region (Ngoupandé 2003; Mentan 2004). Obviously, this increasing exposure to other military institutions, sometimes among the most modernized ones, helped to instill or reinforce a more professionally conformed behavior among members of the troops concerned (Olonisakin 2003), not to mention the financial and material returns.[18]

These states have therefore been able, not without success, to implement objective and subjective forms of political control of the military,[19] putting at the same time emphasis on factors of a professional nature, while eschewing isolation of the military from the rest of the nation, by associating them to socio-political evolutions. That being said, civilian rulers remain watchful of the military, witnessing a lingering feeling about the potential danger it could constitute, or a residual distrust born from the time when soldiers were meddling in politics. This explains in part schemes aimed at upkeeping well-attended special forces (such as gendarmeries) together with other intelligence operatives, admittedly to quell particularly trying opposition technically out of the reach of regular forces, but also to deter any manifestation

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[16]It is sure that in some cases the armed forces do not form a well integrated cohesive whole. The process of professionalization does not affect all ranks and all units equally; some of them even seem as if separated, used episodically for ancillary non military tasks, sometimes even left on their own for a living, thusly prone to indiscipline, delinquency, even predation. For an example, see Augé (2015). There is also the problem created by the armed forces' own economic and commercial resources, out of any institutional (parliamentary oversight), still encountered as with the Rwandan military. For a recent statement on military professionalism, see Ouédraogo (2014).

[17]The Africanization of regional interventions on the continent has began with initiatives such as EURO-RECAMP started by France and followed with AMANI AFRICA by the European Union, or such as ACRI (to become ACOTA in 2002) by the United States, who lauched also for fighting terrorism the Pan Sahel Initiative under the US military's European Command and AfriCom (Kandel 2014; Emmanuel 2015). They helped prepare African states to organize their own peace and security architecture and the operationlization of an African force; for an evaluation of the African communities's efforts (and problems) in that area, see Chuter and Gaub (2016), Engel and Gomes Porto (2013), Warner (2015).

[18]Of course, participation in multilateral operations does not impact the improvement of military professionalization is such an automatic and positive maner. Actually it also has unintended negative effects such as prompting feelings of relative deprivation about one's own material standards and institutional status induced by reciprocal and envious comparisons, as for example in the Moroccan military during the Gulf War (Leveau 1993; Daguzan 1998), sometimes to the point of creating a mutinuous climate afterwards (Dwyer 2015). On the other hand, the increased capacities such a participation induces could generate systemic risks at the domestic level for a weakened political leadership, but also at the interstate level, as shown by the Rwanda's military push for regional ambitions (Beswick 2014).

[19]To use the classic distinction proposed by Huntington (1957) who is rather partisan of the former over the latter, which, though potentially risky, can nevertheless have beneficial effects, notably in a phase of democratic consolidation (Karsten 1997); a view which converges with Janowitz's (1964).

of hostility from the latter.[20] Others are meant at formatting with great care and parsimony troop-levels, even at controlling, if not restricting access to armaments and their use.

Lastly, need to be mentioned those external factors which have encouraged, or are favoring the trend or its consolidation. France's influence, however open to criticisms, has its part. Regarding Senegal, now Benin, it helped keeping these rather promising democratic experiments their exemplary character. For Cameroon and Gabon, it derived from the awareness that there are important economic stakes given their natural resources, especially oil; an influence that continues, at least because France is a key security purveyor for the region, and that these assets are more threatened today, due to local insurgencies and terrorist challenges (Notin 2014). In addition, the increasing role of the international community, notably via regional organizations, such as the AU, the ECoWAS, and other Francophone agencies, as custodians of constitutional civilian legality, as also active sponsors of the reform of security sectors, is instilling the idea of a consubstantiality of the Western-managerial pattern with democratic consolidation.[21]

As pointed out the number of cases of civil-military relations organized along this model in Africa, with a politically neutral military subordinated to an elected if not a fully democratic regime, is still small, even though slowly increasing. At some point, countries, as Mali and Niger, gave the impression to enter the model for a brief period of time, but shifted afterwards toward another one. Others, such as Chad, with a thorough constitutional framing of the defence forces' responsibilities and place, as well as noteworthy implication in regional conflicts management, is seeing its civil-military stabilize around a model approximating the Western-managerial, but with a politically hybrid regime. Post-Ben Ali Tunisia, after the constitutional reform of 2014, is a promising case. On the other hand, looming social discontent in Burundi about the regime could lead the military to get politically involved again. But for the time being, the other types of civil-military relations indeed still loom large.

The Kemalist Model

The term «Kemalist» suggests an analogy that is perhaps somewhat stretched for describing out of context a contemporary form of civil-military relations, based moreover upon criteria defined in too a narrow and discriminative manner.[22] Here, it simply refers to a pattern of military linkage with politics, indeed reminiscent of what Turkey as known after World War I, that has become the dominant post-praetorian model in Africa, though possibly on the wane now. Having seized power with the unction, if not the backing of the military from the ranks of which he comes, a leader chooses to govern with a civilian apparatus over a hybrid or tutelary regime, though abiding by constitutionally, if not democratically, accepted standards. The promise of reforms, economic or political, the toleration of a modest and controlled opposition, and the organization of seemingly pluralist and open elections which he runs for after having swapped his uniform for plain-clothes, allows him to test this legitimacy before the public opinion and to expunge the Cesarist genesis of his political trajectory. While

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[20]For example, it was a brigade of the Senegalese *Légion de gendarmerie d'intervention* that intervened against mutinuous elements of the army in December 2001. Yet, if such a policy saves the regular military from having to handle problematical situations, it could alienate it should these special units be monitored as organizationally and financially independant groups; that explains why in the present cases they remain part of the military, as gendarmeries (on the French mode). On possible counter-effects, see infra.

[21]These policies, aimed primarily at neutralizing any military interference with politics (Van Cranenburgh 1999; Soma 2008; Cowell 2011; Souaré 2014), are sometimes conducted without much considerations about their eventual countereffects on efficiency and the counterinsurgency capabilities of the military (Bruneau and Trinkunas 2006).

[22]And that does not fit the full complexity of the concept as discussed by its experts. The analogy here is drawned from Morris Janowitz's book on military in developing countries (1964).

apparently restricted to its ordinary functions, the armed forces can always be instrumentalized or activated politically, if need be, though the possibility that it gets out of control remains.

Two sorts of situation subsumed that model in Africa. The first, the most common during the first half or so of the period considered, covers historical examples offered by those officers who have arrived in power and governed during the pretransitional praetorian phase, before they shed their authoritarian outlook to demonstrate they have dissociated themselves from their past and embrace a reformist-liberal stance to preside over reformed electoral regimes. In other words, they are those who successfully managed—without doubt, for their own profit at first—the political transition that had to be faced in the early 1990s. Sometimes, they assumed power for some time before a change occurs. In that case, the «renewed» leadership is coterminous with the praetorian moment, as in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Togo, Guinea, and Algeria, but it could also be discontinuous when ex-praetorian leaders returned to power only after having had to step down for a while in favour of civilians, as in Benin, the Republic of Congo, and Madagascar.

With time, this two-faceted and vintage version of the model is superseded by a second variety rather different, which for that matter could be labelled neo-Kemalist: the military intrusion on the political scene, led by men who had never been involved in past praetorian regimes, appears at first as simply coping momentarily with a political impasse arrived at by a civilian government without any intent to supplant of it, but their initiators, finally decide and striveo remain in power by running for a political mandate after constitutional normalcy is reinstated. This form of military relations to politics supposes a life-cycle shorter than historical cases and often with different political consequences. Mauritania again, Mali and Niger are among states that have experimented with this particular form of Kemalism. Tunisia is somewhat apart in this category, being the oldest and longest case.

Among historical instances of Kemalist civil-military relations Burkina Faso, Togo, and Algeria are the clearest ones. In the first two, the political evolution was until recently linked to the political career of presidents Blaise Compaoré and Gnassimbé Eyadéma (respectively captain and lieutenant-colonel when they took over). Both have enjoyed a surprising longevity as heads of state: the first since 1987, after the assassination of his comrade-in-arms Thomas Sankara; the second owned his accession to the presidency to a coup led in January 1967. With the transition era of the early 1990s, both also have sought to revive their legitimacy and renewed their mandate through general elections, held four consecutive times between 1991 and 2010 for Compaoré, five times between 1979 and 2002 for Eyadéma. However, though their political narratives aimed to prove their democratic conversion, the reduced room for manoeuver left to political opposants as well as their governing methods quickly compromised their credibility as liberals (Otayek et al. 1996; Sassou Attisso 2001). Compaoré, though eager to run for another mandate, had to resign in October 2014 under the pressure of the street and was replaced by a government of transition presided by Michel Kafando, after a short feud between the army chief of staff, General Honoré Traoré and Lieutenant-Colonel Yacouba Zida who set it up. As for Eyadéma, he died in February 2005 and it was his son who took over after being elected in April.

The case of Algeria is interesting. Given its will to preserve the benefits of the revolution for independence, given its secular tradition and its concern for economic and social development, the military has long played a decisive role (though not always with positive results) in terms of state-building, to a great extent in a truly Kemalist manner. The process, commenced with Colonel Houari Boumediene's eight years of preatorian rule (after he had supplanted Ahmed Ben Bella in June 1965), was continued by his successor Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, designed to be elected president in February 1979 (with the unction of a military caucus of high-ranking officers). During two more mandates (obtained first in January 1983, then again in December 1988), Bendjedid engaged a process of

liberalization, introducing notably more political pluralism, which gave the Islamists the opportunity to emerge as the dominant force, an evolution seen as a threat to be stopped by influential members of the military hierarchy. Bendjedid stepped down in 1992 and after two years of institutional vacuum in a climate of civil war, General Liamine Zeroual, Defence minister in 1993, was first appointed to govern in January 1994 by the State High Committee which ran the country after the electoral process was interrupted in 1992 (Tahi 1995). Zeroual organized the presidential elections in which he ran to triumph in November 1995, until his resignation in 1999, after which the country returned to civilian rule with Abdelaziz Bouteflika, elected president in April (to be reelected in 2004, 2009 and 2014), though with the military close to the political scene (Werenfels 2007). In Algeria, thence, the Kemalist period lasted for a while, though in a discontinuous way, and with a more neo-Kemalist form with Zeroual.

In Mauritania and Guinea, the time-length in power of the leaders was shorter. To the early 1990s, the time of transition, Mauritania experienced five coups and numerous plots since the overthrow in 1978 of the father of independence, Moktar Ould Daddah. It was Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, formerly the army chief of staff and Premier, at the head of the country since the 1984 coup, who had to measure up with the expected liberal transition, that he eventually organized, sustaining his legitimacy through universal suffrage by candidating to the presidential elections of 1992 and again in 1997 during which the opposition was allowed to compete, better the first than the second time.[23] But Taya's rule became increasingly authoritarian and he was displaced by a provisory military government in August 2005, determined to restore the constitutional civilian normality, marking the end to this Kemalist experiment

(Ould Hamed Salem 1999; Antil 2005).[24] In Guinea, General Lansana Conté who took over after the death of Sekou Touré in 1984 had, as elsewhere, to liberalize the country in the early 1990s and organized multipartisan elections which he ran for to be elected in 1993, in 1998, and again in 2003 (after having doctored the fundamental law) to stay in place until his death in 2008, in an atmosphere of mounting opposition (Camara 2000; Picard and Moudoud 2010). In both countries, as to be seen, civil-military relations changed modes afterward.

In Benin, Madagascar, and the Republic of Congo, the Kemalist path is slightly different from the five cases just examined in which power remains continuously in the same hands from the praetorian period to the ensuing phase. Colonel Mathieu Kérékou in Cotonou, Admiral Didier Ratsiraka in Tananarive and Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso in Brazzaville reigned over an authoritarian regime, of a marxist hue moreover, but failed to successfully make the transition. After having incurred their people's disfavour, they were obliged to step down before they could compete again with success to the next electoral round and returned to power. Thus, after having governed from 1972 to 1991, Kérékou who has organized a national forum (the first in Africa) to deal with mounting democratic demands, had to accept the results of the following elections which gave the majority to a civilian, Nicéphore Soglo, in March 1991. Ratsiraka who had presided over the socialist republic since 1975 reluctantly consented to a civilian transition in 1991 and relinquished power to Albert Zafy. He had to wait the 1996 elections to win over his adversary (who had been impeached some time earlier) and become again head of state (Ramasy 2012). In the Republic of Congo, Sassou-Nguesso, Defence minister in the military marxist government set up by Colonel Marien Ngouabi in 1968, took it over in 1979. Later in 1991, he organized the political transition but failed to be elected. In the context of the

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[23]It is to be noted in passing that in Tunisia and Mauritania the legitimacy of the leaders fed also, in the true Kemalist tradition, on their opposition to Islamic fundamentalism. In Mauritania moreover tensions with neighbouring Senegal favoured somehow the place of the military.

[24]The new military government led by Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall was followed by a momentary return to civilian rule, ended again by a coup in 2008 (see infra).

difficulties which followed and a three-year severe civil war with a completely disrupted civil-military relations (see infra), he proclaims himself head of the state in October 1997 with the support of the country and organized a return to some kind of political normalcy framed around a new constitution and new elections which brought him to the presidency in 2002 (Menga 1993; Clark 2008), that he still holds after having prevailed in the presidential elections held in March 2016, after another constitution was promulgated in 2015.

In this version, the Kemalist model of military relations to politics concerns leaders formerly involved in the praetorian phase, either in an immediate or in a discontinuous sequence. This explains, why, whatever the longevity of its actors, it is bound to end shortly, to make place nowadays to its more compact neo-Kemalist equivalent, which Niger, Mali, and again Mauritania are good examples of, and that pre-2010 Tunisia, longer in time, has prefigured.

In that country, in 1987, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali deposed the historic leader, Habib Bourguiba, whose Premier he had just been nominated; the military, which he was linked to as Brigadier and head of national security, was only remotely associated to his accession to power, though pleased by the operation. His tenure as head of state benefited at first of the support of the nation, because modernizing reforms were engaged and his legitimacy searched for on the electoral register. He was subsequently confirmed by his successive victories to five presidential elections (since 1989 to that of 2009), though his rule has tended to harden until he was forced out of power in January 2011. The few officers originally involved in the coup, such as the chief of staff and the commander of the presidential guard, were removed and the armed forces served as any other groups as a political counterweight (Ware 1985; Camau and Geisser 2003).

In Niger, the democratic transition organized by Colonel Ali Saïbou who succeeded in 1987 Colonel Seyni Kountché (in place since 1974 after the coup against Hamani Diori) opened on civilian rule late 1992. But the *cohabitation* between President Mahamane Ousmane, elected

in 1993, and the legislative majority formed after the elections of 1995, and headed by Premier Hama Amadou, led to a political paralysis, edging on conflict.[25] In January 1996, after a year of crisis, the military, under Colonel Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, then the Army chief of staff, felt to have to step in. The prime intention to simply help solving an institutional deadlock was not entirely clear as Baré finally ran for the presidency; he won in July 1996, followed by legislative elections that gave him a comfortable majority. Yet, his government turned gradually unpopular, and he was ousted in April 1999 by another coup, but staged according to what could be said censor style, which ended that brief neo-Kemalist experiment (Abdourhamane 1999).

In August 2008, Mauritania seemed to follow a similar pattern, testing that time a neo-Kemalist experiment when General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz overthrew the civilian government set up a year before, but soon to be confronted to a political and constitutional crisis. After having retired from the military, he decided to be a candidate in the newly organized elections that he won in July 2009 to run again successfully in June 2014 (Ciavolella and Fresia 2009; N'Diaye 2009a). The case of Mali is simpler: General Amadou Toumani Touré, who had in the past played a political role,[26] opted in 2002, after retirement, to compete for the presidency that he won to be reelected in 2007 (Wing 2008).

These regimes form an assorted lot but present a common profile. Their governance is generally hybrid, given a political process never

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[25]The president refused to convene the Cabinet, attempted to impose his agenda, and threatened to use his special powers; for his part, the prime minister decided to demote top civil servants and heads of public services and designated new ones without the president's agreement. After the latter's refusal to promulgate the budget for 1996, the situation was deadlocked which pushed the military to intervene to remedy the situation.

[26]As Lieutenant-Colonel, he has dislodged Moussa Traoré, the perennial praetorian figure in place since a coup held in 1968, and organized a civilian transition before retiring, permitting the election of Alpha Oumar Konaré in 1992, who got relected in 1997 (see infra).

completly liberalized and given the role reserved to military forces. Elections (and reelections) in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Togo and Tunisia were not illustrations of pluralistic procedures as the leaders ran without real competition in a plebiscitary context, which was not the case elsewhere. Their goal, hidden or not, was indeed about keeping competitors at bay but, above all, it was to extend their tenure by circumventing clauses introduced to limit the number of successive mandates. In the other cases, political alternations occurred, though it is not always quite sure whether military leaders did not plan or seek to arrange to prolong their mandate or were genuinely ready to step down, should the political climate be not any longer favorable to them.

Being in the background, the role of armed forces in this type of rule is not always easy to grasp. By some aspects, it resembles that of the Western-managerial, by others it diverges. It is sure that their members, officers especially, are aware that, given a not so remote praetorian past, the interest of the institution is to avoid meddling in politics and to content with, while savoring the presence of one of them at the helm, the business of defence, especially if opportunities for external missions are multiplying.[27] If the military is «to stay disconnected from political life», to quote Blaise Compaoré, it remains that when the regime is threatened by disorder or by a defying opposition—as it is likely to be the case overtime, given its hybrid nature—armed forces could be activated to back it up or replace powerless police forces. In Tunisia, the role of the army became omnipresent (after a long period of low-profile) when it appeared vital to quell Islamic fundamentalism. In Algeria, its collaboration to the point of collusion with the government was even more proeminent, often in its very

backseat (Ghozali 2001; Addi 2002). In Togo, more than 2000 troops helped security forces to crush widespread demonstrations after Gnassingbé's contested election to the presidency in April 2005.

But precisely because the military was a key instrumental resource for the regime's stability and continuity, especially in political contexts liable to volatility, also because it was surreptitiously mistrusted by leaders who had an intimate understanding of that milieu, the latter's main preoccupation was to anticipate and to prevent any possibility that agents in kaki become at their turn political principals. So technics of control diverge from those implemented in the Western-managerial model, because of their coup-proofing dimension. To that effect, objective means are often coupled with more subjective ones.

There is first a focus on legalistic and constitutional norms, rather than on functional and professional devices. These norms go beyond standard assertions on civilian supremacy over the military as with the Western-managerial model (which supposes an ethic of complete neutrality), to denounce adamantly, often to the point of stigmatization, praetorian forms of political intrusion, which are moreover to be opposed with all possible means. The stipulation, most peculiar and potentially hazardous in its consequences, consists in inviting the population to desobey or resist any regime born from military usurpation, an act sometimes even criminalized. Benin and Togo's fundamental laws go further and authorize the head of state to oppose a coup d'Etat by calling on foreign military assistance. Most constitutions repeatedly require from members of their armed forces, not only to be submitted to the civilian authority, but also to be apolitical, politically neutral, respectful of the republic, or yet absolutely neutral, to quote some of the formulations employed. Occasionally, provisions aimed at hindering any uniformed personnel to abuse their functions and their status during an electoral competition are also introduced. In Benin and Togo, any candidate of military origin to the presidency or the national assembly, must have resigned first from the

[27]Not only because of the changing nature of regional conflictuality that, moreover, African states have to deal with, but also because such missions are sought out for domestic political purposes, as they divert attention from the democratic deficits of these governments (Victor 2010).

ranks.[28] These provisions are detailed in electoral codes, party charters and disciplinary regulations, though with more or less clarity.[29]

This form of control, secondly, operates together with more subjective schemes aimed at sustaining and bolstering the military's loyalty to the regime and its leaders, that singularize the Kemalist model from the Western-managerial. The typical way is to shore up the standing of the armed forces and their personnel with better material conditions and appropriations. Frequently, this is done in a patrimonialist manner, that plays on favoritism, be it ethnic, regional or organizational, on providing access to all sorts of non military functions, on consenting commercial privileges, if not on sheer corruption. The higher echelons of the Togolese military were exemplary in this regard, with their large proportion of pampered officers coming from the president's area (Toulabor 1999). Guinea and Algeria were good instances of indulged military institutions, oversized and overbudgeted, enjoying business monopolies, present in various sectors of the administration, military or not, national or local (Bah 2015; Daguzan 2012; Laribi 2007).

Coping with too an unaligned or restless military could also be obtained by dissuasive and coercive methods. They consist generally in the setting up of special or paramilitary units, independent from mainstream security forces, linked to or under the direct command of the head of state. Well equipped and well trained, properly salaried through special appropriations, they serve as a presidential protection circle but also as a network of intelligence operatives around the military personnel whose behavior could thus be scrutinized.[30]

Such arrangements, it is obvious, were indeed efficient in the short run, but they were never free of various negative effects in the long term. The existence of autonomous and pampered security agencies, on the one hand, inevitably suscitates aggrieved resentment in military ranks that could turn willful, seditious if not mutinous, not to mention in addition the fact that these agencies are also liable to be tempted to play their own game.[31] Clientelist strategies of control are even more consequential. They tend to mercantilize loyalties, by rising unceasing material expectations and generating an «extortionist» mentality, likely to turn into blackmailing and «racket» should the regime be in need of protection (Collier and Hoeffler 2006). Furthermore, they are detrimental to the social fabric of the institution. Interservice and interhierarchical jealousies develop, officer corps split as NCOs got alienated and troops undisciplined. Chains of command grow unclear and parasited from outside by patrons and other *bigmen*. Demoralization set in. As a result professional efficiency is impacted and the level of performance when engaged in operations, domestic or external, declines. Overfed but also weakened, the military

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[28]This type of provision is all the more rigorous as it does not even seem to consider a reintegration in the ranks in case of defeat; it is hardly attenuated by the indication that the candidate concerned could claim benefits of the rights acquired according to the status of his corps. For details on these issues see Cabanis and Martin (2010), Martin (2015).

[29]Such rules consenting that members of the armed forces run for politics but imposing that they first abandon their responsibilities in the ranks witness a salient element of the Kemalist practice as it was conceived originally by the founding father of the Turkish Republic.

[30]Given their operational flexibility, their role could also extend to keep civil order when threats are serious. In this regard, they are able to save the armed forces from situations sometimes technically difficult to manage, and from the public opinion's alienation, as it was the case in North Africa. The list of these units is long: the Paracommando of the Pô and after 1995 the President's security regiment in Burkina Faso; the *Pigeons* battalion and the Rapid intervention force in Togo; the *Bérets rouges* parachute battalion, a unit of the Presidential guard in Mali; the powerful Intelligence and security department in Algeria; the Republican guard (also named the Zaghawa guard, given its ethic composition) of Idriss Deby in Chad; the Autonomous battalion of airborne troops in Guinea under Lansana Conté; or yet the M'Bochi guard of Sassou Nguesso in the Congo Republic.

[31]Sometimes in collusion with the military, as in Algeria, sometimes with their own agenda, as in Burkina Faso, where the President's security regiment which under Colonel Gilbert Diendéré attempted in September 2015 to oust the transitional government of Michel Kafando (who was taken as hostage).

grow edgy, less manageable, while, being perceived as in collusion with the powers, it sees its legitimacy eroding. That situation not only fuels risks of coup but fragilizes the capacities of the regime to meet opposition and protest on a large scale, a situation not uncommon with this type of regime.

Though Kemalist governance in general is never as autocratic and coercive as genuine praetorian rule or even as some civilian tutelary regimes, it cannot be defined as democratic and in various cases it is not at all. As noted, historical versions, especially the longest ones, appeared more exclusionary than more recent neo varieties, generally shorter in duration and more «civilianized» and less illiberal. The former began as authoritarian and have often opened only to serve the political interests of leaders not ready to step down. The neo-Kemalist version is instigated by younger generations of officers in a way more socialized to the liberal *Geist*. Yet whatever their forms, such regimes have started by a breach of constitutional legality and civilian rule, and even if they could tolerate a certain level of opposition, with the institutions supposed to channel it, such as parties and parliaments, their authority in the end remains based on their coercive capabilities and the military's potential domestic role. They are hybrid systems, whose civilianized outlook could just be a cover for "recycled" or "laundered" military rule, obstructing any further possibility of democratic consolidation. Not that any sequencing be postulated, a new model of military relations to politics, more low-noise, less intrusive, seems to have emerged.

The Non-Intrusive Model

Among the categories of military relations to politics proposed here, the present model is the most recent. If the clichéd word «coup» seems almost inadequate to define it, it remains however a form of interference with politics. In that regard, it is distinctive from the Western-managerial model; the idiom non-intrusive, indeed, is simply a commodity of language to signify it is minimally invasive. It is so both from the standpoint of its *modus operandi* as well as from the intentions and the objectives of its protagonists.

Generally, it takes place in a postauthoritarian political context (democratic or hybride) and in a postWestphalian time moreover of tempered sovereignty that licenses the censure of illiberal posture by transnational regimes that have become guardians of the political-constitutional rightness with the power to sanction its violations.[32] It consists therefore in a rather modest and self-contained interfering in the realm of politics carried out to monitor a situation perceived as problematical, usually in the name of good governance and in the interests of the society. As it might imply a reevaluation of the country's political balance, it could be broadened in scope with penalties against civilian politicians for their misuse or their violation of democratic rules, through their displacement followed by a temporary occupation of power, together with the promise of a rapid new throw-in.[33] Moreover, these low-intensity interventions, be they remedial, arbitratory, censoring or vetoing, often pretend to pass for a recourse simply anticipating or responding to people's deceptions and desires.

Thus this type of action bears resemblance with those observed in the early phases of praetorianism, a few years after independances, when the military, often with the public opinion implicit consent, sometimes explicitly pleaded, intervened to replace inept or corrupt civilian

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[32]Especially military coups generally denounced by the international community (transnational institutions and donors) and since the early 2000s by African regional organizations. With the Lomé Declaration, the African Union decided the exclusion of any regime set up through unconstitutional intervention, followed by other institutions such as the Francophonie which, with the Bamako Declaration, considered democracy as the unique acceptable norm for governing and its violation as liable to sanctions: see Cowell (2011), Souaré (2014).

[33]The May 1960 coup in Turkey, when the military overthrew an authoritarian government to return it to a democratically elected one, could be seen as a historical precedent of that model (the removal of Prime minister Erbakkan in 1997 would be a later case), which, incidentally, fed the «good coup» and «the military guardian of democracy» theses (Varol 2013a, b; Powell 2014a).

governments. If nowadays, it has lost the assertive redempting outlook it pretended to have in the past, it seeks its justification out of the various discontents born from posttransitional malfunctionings under civilian guidance. The move by the military appears therefore as a form of regulatory judgment on appeal, and all the more so when it is expected to be, even partly welcome by the populations whose expectations it anticipates. Should the military continues to engage in politics in the future, it will probably be under such that pattern.

At the same time, the non-intrusive model is not completely foreign with the two aforediscussed models. The storyline justifying the entree of uniformed personnel on the political scene focuses on the defence of liberal democratic norms, of which they pretend to be the guardians, and above all their explicitly voiced intention to quickly return to barracks and serve obediently a legitimate civilian government, as attested by the rapid reestablishment of political normality, suggests a proximity with the Western managerial pattern. Yet, it is always potentially Kemalist, even sometimes with a praetorian twist,[34] either because the military become intruders and keep for too long the commands of power, or because they decide, as fresh retirees or having traded kaki fatigues for muftis, to compete to win the elections they have organized after their intervention.

So to be distinctive from standard coups and take over, this type of military intervention in politics ought be minimally invasive, brief in duration and followed by a speedy restoration of constitutional normalcy, under the aegis of civilian politics; in other words, on the part of the military, a prompt return to barracks.

To the mid-2010s, seven occurrences could be regarded as proceeding from that logic; they are offered by Algeria, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Mali

and Niger (on two successive occasions in each of these two last countries), in a more of less clear-cut fashion and to be examined here chronologically.

The first intervention in Niger, conducted in April 1999, ended the neo-Kemalist regime under Baré (who was killed during the operation). It was led by the chief of the presidential guard, Major Daouda Malam Wanké, on behalf of democratic governance that had been flouted by Baré's rule. New elections were held again and a civilian government set up under Mamadou Tandja who had became president the same year, to be reelected in 2004 (Alou 2008). The second monitoring episode, still in the name of constitutional legality, occured in February 2010 against Tandja who was planning to modify the fundamental law to give the system a presidential structure and to extend his mandate for three more years after having dissolved the parliament and the constitutional court which opposed him. Major Salou Djibo responsible for the move, as head of the Supreme council for the Restoration of Democracy (a telling designation), prepared new elections which were held in April 2010 and won by Mahamadou Issoufou, a former Premier and president of the National assembly (Baudais and Chauzal 2011).

Mali offers a similar instance of two episodes of the same pattern, though chronologically more discontinuous. The first time, it was the incapacity of President Moussa Traoré, in power since a successful coup in 1968 (as Captain), to deal with the democratic demands presented by the various composing groups of the opposition (grouped in the Alliance for Democracy in Mali) in the early 1990s, which was at the origin of his eviction at the end of March 1991 by (then) Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré. Following the process adopted in many Francophone countries to engage the political transition, Touré organized a national conference and prepared a new constitution. However, he abstained from seeking an electoral mandate and it was the candidate of the opposition, Alpha Oumar Konaré, who got elected as head of state (Clark 1995). Ironically, the second time, it was Touré's tenure, inaugurated in April 2002 after his

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[34]Should, for example, the take-over serves to cover motives which have little to do with the political situation and the defense of democratic ideals, but rather are linked to personal ambitions or to internal tensions within the military.

successful run for the presidency which he was reelected to in May 2007,[35] that was terminated by a coup in March 2012, supplanted by the National Committee for the Restoration of the Democracy and the State, under Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo's lead (Whitehouse 2012). Actually, the operation, condemned outside as well as by most political parties, appears somewhat ambiguous. What its protagonists reproached Touré for was his mishandling of the Tuareg and the Islamist rebellions in the Northern part of the country, but also his disinterest for military affairs and lack of support to uniformed personnel, itself divided. Because, the take-over led nowhere, creating more problems than could be solved (rebels in the North tried to proclaim their independence), Sanogo, less than a month after he displaced Touré resigned after remitting power to a transitional civilian government which permitted in November 2013 the election of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.

In Guinea, after Lansana Conté's successor to power, self-proclaimed president Captain Dadis Camara, prove too autocratic and whimsical, the military intervened again in December 2009, this time to restore a civilian and democratic governance. This was done under Brigadier Sekouba Konaté who had been Camara's Defense minister but had got fired when he sought to arrest the man responsible of the massacres of September 2009. The following December, Camara who had been wounded, was excited in Burkina Faso. Konaté presided an interim government to organize new elections, only opened to civilians, won by Alpha Condé who will be reelected in October 2015: the first democratic elections ever in the country.

In the Ivory Coast, the long tenure of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny ended with his death in December 1993 and the accession to power of Henri Konan Bédié, as interim first then elected head of state in 1995. Until then, as already observed, the tradition of civilian rule, the low-profile of a fairly legalist military institution, with a rather stable, yet modest, number

of troops, clearly positioned the country's civil-military relations as belonging to the Western-managerial type.

But afterwards, the regime grew oppressive in a context of corruption and economic and social crisis. Bédié's xenophobic policy of *ivoirité* excluding non-Ivorian born and Northern Muslim led to a mounting opposition that could not be controlled. Discontent had spread in the armed forces, due to the latent marginalization of heretofore pampered officers, and to aggrieved rank and file and NCOs, those who had served in the Central African Republic under the UN auspices but excluded from special bonuses and those from Northern areas rendered mutinous by the regime's ethnic discrimination. Resulting interhierarchical feuds, disobedience, even rebellion and delinquency, disorganized the institution and led the Chief of Staff, General Robert Gueï, to take over in December 1999 (Dozon 2000; Kieffer 2000; Ouegui Goba 2000). After having given the impression that he did not intend to stay in power, he decided to run for the presidential elections that he lost. Thus the Ivorian case is ambivalent, as it seems to proceed from the non-intrusive model, yet not by design but simply because General Gueï was not chosen in the elections he organized in October 2000. The circumstances surrounding this intervention was already announcing that the Ivory Coast civil-military relations was shifting toward the disarticulation pattern.

By comparison with these instances, the case of Algeria is perhaps equivocal. As noted, by the end of 1992, the military, led by influential high-ranking members of the People's National Armed Forces (code-named "*Janviéristes*") intervened to stop the electoral national process (that was part of the reforms engaged by Chadli Bendjedid's presidency) that seemed to be won by the Islamists, who had prevailed in the first round of the legislative elections. This intervention, which also ended Bendjedid's mandate, was justified by the fear of an Islamist preponderance, by the subsequent threat on secularism (in that, it had a Kemalist tone) and by the "preservation of the nation's vital interests". But it also disrupted a process of political liberalization, covering for

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[35]Giving Malian civil-military relations, as we have seen, a neo-Kemalist outlook.

the decline of the National Liberation Front that seemed to have exhausted the capital of trust accumulated during and after the war for independence; above all, it plunged the country in a dramatic internal conflict (Stora 2000; Souaïdia 2000). The appointment and the election of General Liamine Zeroual reset Algeria on the neo-Kemalist track.

As it is conceived here from empirically complex experiments, this monitoring model implies from the armed forces a modicum of political neutrality and apparent respect, if not full adherence to democratic values, something not always easy to observe in an immediate postpraetorian period. Furthermore, the military is expected to function as an institution normally obedient to civilian prescriptions, but whose expectations as a profession are met, and internal tensions regulated if not appeased, which supposed solved a number of issues.[36] It is the frailty of still recent democratic experiments, vulnerable either to political/social polarizations, or the no longer bearable unpopularity of top political authorities, which motivates a temporary military intervention, even if the impact of possible material grievances or of its instigators' belief that they are capable of mobilizing the polity by themselves, cannot be always excluded.

The acceptability if not the legitimacy of the model, of course, is negatively correlated with the rate of recurrence of interventions and the subsequent constitutional disruptions it implies. Moreover, a history of a too manifest instability within the ranks, affected from within by corruption, unrest and discontent, prone to plots and mutinies, will contribute to undermine the credibility of any idea of arbitration or regulation supposed to justify the action of the military, and make it, on the contrary, appear clearly as a threat for the political system. The Malian military began giving such an impression after

various episodes of internal unrest in 1994 and 1996 particularly; undeniably the intervention of March 2012 was also expressing material grievances as much as a political discontent about the regime policy in the North. The same could be said of the Algerian military, whose highly repressive tactics to quell the Islamist opposition started to trouble the public opinion, while showing signs of internal division, notably among senior officers, and disorganization in the ranks (Addi 1999, 2002; Bourrat 2012; Martinez 2000).

Furthermore, and quite importantly, this type of military relations to politics, if unfrequent, brisk and mildly intrusive, may indeed pass for benign, even useful given its remedial dimension (Powell 2014a), given also the positive image the armed forces might enjoy in the public. Nevertheless, it is intrinsically problematical as it attests the enduring difficulty for many in the ranks to keep away from the political scene, as if addicted. So much justified it could be sometimes perceived, this style of political interference is ambivalent from the viewpoint of the normalization and the institutionalization of civilian supremacy and, beyond, the consolidation of democracy. Should it be reiterated, even episodically, it trivializes the tutelary role of the military and ultimately perverts the nature of the political order where it is tolerated, if not welcome. It is certainly the case when their protagonists decide, after their intervention, to run for the elections they organize, if not take advantage of the restored constitutional legality, and enter a Kemalist cycle.

Such a possibility to penetrate the political realm smoothly under the flag of a «good coup», compromises any prospect for civil-military separation, while it encourages the existence and the thriving of a «postmilitary elite» (N'Diaye 2009a; Obi 2011). An elite which perceives itself as in reserve of the nation and capable to participate to its government, perhaps even, as during praetorian times but in a far more sophisticated way, with the feeling of being key players eligible to handle it as any other political group. So much civilianized and socialized to the narratives and the trappings of the good

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[36]Such as, for instance, the reintegration of those excluded under the previous praetorian regime, the readjustment of promotions, the modulation of sanctions against former authorities, etc. Mali, exemplary in this regard, has gone as far as to organize the amalgamation in the military of members of rebellious armed groups of the North (Baudais 2007).

governance, so much emancipated from its professional culture, and free from any corporate motives it pretends to be, nevertheless it is inevitably different from civilian elites in its conceptions of the state, its relations to authority and force, its political referentials, its networks, notably with the other security milieus, not to mention its other business connections; and all the more so if they have been associated with former military regimes. Perpetuating the transition phase, when it does not simply jeopardize its democratic strenghtening, this type of political interference contributes first to pervert, to the point of hybridation, governing modes, eventhough these seem formally liberal and civilian; secondly, by maintaining the transition at intermediate levels under consolidation, at which the process is the most fragile, it puts civil peace at risk (Collier and Hoeffler 2005). For many then, a «good coup d'Etat» is only a myth (Miller 2011), and the regime it leads to simply proceeds from a form of «garrison democracy» (Omotola 2009), which demonstrates the difficulties that African military, even today, have to turn away from politics and to content with barracks life (Luckham 2004; Malan 2000; Thiriot 2008).

The Disarticulation Model

The word «disintegration» lacks indeed precision simply because, as there are always degrees in the process (with disintegration or dissolution properly speaking at the far end), it materializes under various and changing shapes, all the more so given the societal and political specificities of the settings affected. Therefore, other idioms, such as fragmentation, disorganization, degradation, or self-demobilization could applied as well. Moreover, that state of affairs is inevitably temporary, either because the polity site where it happens collapses or mutates completely as a consequence, or inversely because it gets restructured, often through external assistance.

As for civil-military relations, disarticulation defines a range of situations subsumed by the breaking up of any control, within as well as without, over the armed forces, which are no longer capable or disposed to assume their institutional mandate: delivering security. Left to themselves from above, they separate into rival factions and bands, some still obedient and loyal to their authorities, other simply dissolving, some forming or joining insurgent groups, other acting on their own as gangs; sometimes, they take on all these postures simultaneously, part time soldiers, rebels (hence the neologism «sobels» coined to describe them), as well as delinquants. These armed groups, be they headed by power-hungry chieftains hoping to negotiate their place in the forthcoming post-conflict regime, or by self-promoted predatory warlords looking to sustain their leadership, are fighting with any sort of means, criminal notably, to hold territories where they have ethnic affiliates or simply because they offer opportunities of plunder, or constitute economically rentable enclave to arm and feed their troops, while enriching themselves (Bøås and Dunn 2007; Gershonil 1996; Reno 1998).[37]

The intricate causes for such situations have been amply discussed already, and do not need to be detailed here.[38] They originate from within dysfunctioning militaries, plagued by demoralization, disobedience, desertion and revolt, confronted to a disabled command structures. Such institutional pathologies are the products of various aggravated deficits at the professional and organizational levels, induced by interservices frictions, interhierarchical feuds, transgenerational tensions, incompetent and corrupted leadership, and so on. They also result from a civilian tutelage, either ignorant of, or uninterested by military affairs, if not distrustful of uniformed personnels, often administered via fraudulent and damaging clientelist practices, or by coup-fearing

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[37]This phenomenon has appeared on other continents, in preWestphalian Europe after the One Hundred Years War or in China during the early twentieth century. In all these cases, it was a more or less long parenthesis followed by the progressive take over by a refounded state. Comparisons however should be handled carefully: see Hills (1997).

[38]Notably around the concept of failed or collapsed states and has generated a great deal of literature. For recent view: Taylor (2013); about Africa: Bates (2008), Forrest (1998), Zartman (1995).

leaders who purposefully undermine their armed forces even at the risk of domestic insurgency (Powell 2014b). Indeed, past yet recent episodes of political activism and occupation of power by the military have also left their deleterious marks on internal cohesion and moral.

At a systemic level, this process of disarticulation is precipitated by a regime that has become unable to insure the discharge of basic statal functions and most needed public services, for reasons ranging from government's corruption or ineptitude, to economic troubles related to decreasing revenues, devaluation and all other structural adjustments related to the logic of the new global political economy. As a result, the state legitimacy and societal civility melt down, while bottom up violence due to unemployment and desperation, to insurgent or secessionist tendencies that can no longer be overcome, fueled moreover by the ever-growing availability of weapons, develops and contributes to polarize the whole society along identitarist lines to the point of civil war that security forces, because of their own dereliction, are unable or unwilling to handle, often inviting foreign interventions. The easy transborder diffusion of internal tensions and clashes generates regional multilevel conflict systems (Lanotte 2003; Marchal 2006) that tend to last and consolidate, especially where the kind of natural resources available permit warlordism and rebellion to prosper.[39]

At some point such a plight seemed to have prevailed in other countries than those of French colonial succession,[40] but it was not long before they became at their turn affected. Yet, the deterioration of the armed forces and the dislocation of civil-military relations, have not always reached the same dramatic proportions. The greater resilience of their state structures and military institutions, though sometimes fragilized by a long praetorian involvement, could be an explanation together with France's continued influence and unwillingness to let political situations degenerate in that area.[41]

Chad appears as the country having entered first in this logic of armed confrontation between successively winning military leaders and rebellions, alternatively supported by Libya and France, according to contradictory strategies. Ethnic and religious considerations, along a North-South divide, completed this situation of endemic conflictuality. After the eviction of the leader of the independence, François Tombalbaye, following a military coup by General Félix Malloum in 1975, the country lived through coexistence first, then alternation in power of Goukouni Oueddeï (1979–1982), Hissen Habré (1982–1990), and afterwards Idriss Déby, without counting lesser and more ephemeral personalities at the head of other politico-military movements (Buijtenhuijs 1998; Charlton and May 1989; Conesa 2001). The political fate of the Chadian people was thus in the hands of leaders, incapable to represent it as a whole, each of them seeking the support of specific religious or ethnic groups, commanding a small quasi-personal force controlling a portion of the territory which alternatively serves as rear-base for attack or counter-attack, or as refuge. By the end of 1990, Déby, with French assistance, seized N'Djamena, the capital city, forced Habré to exile, and took over the state. Elected president in 1996, he was continuously confronted by numerous politico-military groups, as well as army coups attempts (as in May 2004 and March 2005) which fragilized his tenure that became more authoritarian. There were clashes with the

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[39]To simplify the intricate matrix of Africa's new conflicts that reconfigurates a new environment (sociological, economic but also psychological) which renders difficult the application of any rule as well as the return of a central leadership (Azam 2012; Hazen 2013; Herbst 2000; Hugon 2006; Ross 2003; Sorens 2011).

[40]Such as Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia or in the three former Belgian territories of Rwanda, Burundi and the now Democratic Republic of Congo, before the 2000s (Howe 2001).

[41]While avoiding any «ingérence abusive» (Ministère des Affaires étrangères 2001) and contenting with punctual and limited interventions, less to arbitrate between rival political factions than to protect civilian populations and assist inter-African solutions (Ela Ela 2000; Renou 2002), France remains attentive, especially when, as today, new threats to the regional stability and security that cannot be fully quelled by local means, such as terrorist actions, arise. For an evaluation of France's role, see Bayart (2011) and Vallin (2015).

Movement for Justice and Democracy for Chad in 2003 and May 2005, and in April 2006, insurgents of the United Front for Democratic Change almost succeeded to get him out. In the early years of his third mandate,[42] in February 2008 and in May 2009, he faced attacks by the Unified Military Command (FUC), another rebellious group and was besieged in N'Djamena that was nearly seized, saved *in extremis* by French and European troops.[43] Yet Déby was reelected in April 2011 and, while some kind of stabilization set in at last,[44] and he continued his policy of regional power projection, helping President François Bozizé, then the latter's foe in the Central African Republic, later Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, intervening with France in Mali, and in Nigeria against Boko Haram lately; Chadian armed forces having thus become one of the most militarily active and reliable in the region. That involvement in external operations surely helped their professionalization and their control by the regime, while giving the latter a greater capacity to quell internal insurgencies and rebellions.[45]

In Central African Republic, the logic of disintegration is different. The country went praetorian at the very end of 1965 with the coup against David Dacko, led by Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, then the army chief of staff, whose autocratic rule was associated with such ostentatious and sultanistic excesses that he was soon deconsidered in the international public opinion and ousted by France in September 1979. With his departure and the ephemeral return of David Dacko, instability set in.[46] General André Kolingba's post-coup regime (1981–1993) was punctuated by various overthrow attempts, until a pluralist electoral process was engaged, which permitted Ange-Felix Patassé, a former Premier, to rise to the presidency in October 1993 (which he was reelected to six years later). At that time however, the armed forces, fragilized by internal divisions dating from Bokassa and Kolingba's recruiting policies, then discontented by budgetary and financial problems and subsequent delays in the payment of salaries, turned against Patassé. Soldiers grew vulnerable to calls of revolt, as attested by recurrent mutinies, throughout 1996 and early 1997. Tensions, induced by identity manipulations, between men of Yakoma origin, Kolingba's ethnic group, and the presidential guard made up of Baya, affiliates of President Patassé, degraded further civil-military relations and the armed forces torn into opposing groups.

The situation was complicated by the presence of foreign troops called on to restore some law and order. That of France led to clashes between April 1996 and January 1997, that of the Inter-African Mission for the Bangui Agreements Watch, followed in April 1998 by the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic (MINURCA) in charge of the disarmament of militias, precipitated violent demonstrations in March and June 1997 against Chadian and Senegalese units, also called in. To quell an attempted coup led by General Kolingba in May 2001, Patassé had to appeal to the Congo Democratic Republic and Libya. None of these interventions (in February 2000, the MINURCA was replaced by the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Central Africa—BONUCA) helped. In 2002, General François Bozizé, the army chief of staff, who had been demoted and had fled with his men to Chad,

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[42]He got the constitution modified to be able to run for this function.

[43]It is ironical that the constitution promulgated in 1996 at the time of the democratic transition, which, with some foresight, had multiplied the formulae in order to quell military activism. A total of fifteen articles were devoted to the issue, trying to ensnare all security forces—the armed forces, the gendarmerie, the police, the national guard and the nomadic guard—in a system of legal obstacles in order to forbid them to outpass their normal roles and submit to civilian rule.

[44]Peace was signed with the United Front for Democratic Change in 2007; but the Sudan-backed Union of Resistance Forces (more than 5000 men from several rebel groups) continued to fight the regime in 2010 and 2011.

[45]The return to (somewhat) normalized civil-military relations called also on patrimonialist strategies (Hansen 2013) and did not change the persistent incapacity from sectors of the army to resort to armed violence in everyday life (Debos 2013).

[46]All the more easily given already existing practices of social violence (Lombard and Batianga-Kinzi 2015).

returned to seize Bangui, the capital city, and supplanted Patassé as head of state in March 2003. Despite the succession of peace-keeping forces (after the BONUCA, it was that of the Community of Sahel-Sahara States, then the Multinational Force of Central Africa, the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa, the International Support Mission to the Central African Republic, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic), armed civil war continued in a climate of human rights violations and insecurity (Mehler 2012), fueled by foreign conflicts spillover, such as the war in Darfur. Bozizé's regime, supported by France and Chad, was faced by the militarized rebellion from the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) led by Michel Djotodia. The fragile truce signed in 2007 did not last long. The Séléka, a large coalition of several groups, allied to the UFDR, with a Muslim majority, captured several cities in the North, East and Center of the country and was able to enter Bangui in March 2013. Bozizé left again the country and Djotodia took over the presidency. Séléka's brutalities precipitated self-defense groups among non-Muslims (the Anti-Balaka) which grew in size and militarized to the point of attacking the Séléka and the regime, creating a third civil war, now with a confessional and regional dimensions, stirred by terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in Islamic Magbreb, that French troops and the inter-African forces of the MISCA and MINUSCA could not stop (Flichy de La Neuville 2014; Kane 2014). If violences seem to recede after Djotodia resigned (in January 2014) and cease-fire agreements signed (in July and January 2015 in Nairobi) by the transition government (headed by Catherine Samba-Panza), state power and public order are far to be restored (Doui-Wawaye 2015), though the reconstruction of a national armed forces has began.

A similar situation has affected the Ivory Coast after 2000, though the process of military disintegration and alienation has began under Konan Bédié's tenure. The elections of October 2000, won by Laurent Gbagbo but contested by General

Gueï who had organized them and had hoped to win, led to clashes between his guard and the population and the gendarmerie (Le Pape and Vidal 2002). Though Gbagbo was declared head of state, instability did not cease. Coups were fomented in September 2002 in the three biggest cities, and several political personalities were assassinated (among whom Gueï), attesting the violence of the anti-governmental rebellion. Many former excluded soldiers, trained in and armed by Burkina Faso and Mali,[47] occupied the Northen half of the country, while the West was invaded by two other groups from Liberia. These were regrouped in the *Forces nouvelles*, 7000 strong, under the command of Guillaume Soro and General Soumaïla Bakayoko, which occupied next to 60% of the territory, opposed to the Ivory Coast Armed Forces joined by several armed groups (Ayissi 2003; Beugré 2002). Thanks to France and the Economic Community of West African States, a cease-fire was signed in October followed in January 2003 by the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, with a power-sharing government and the interposition of French and West African troops between the belligerent forces. Yet, tensions continued and degenerated with France accused of partiality by both parties, while exactions were committed eveywhere. In October 2004, war reignited at the same time the French contingent got in conflict with various groups attached to Gbagbo (Rueff 2004). In March 2007, after much fighting, the Ouagadougou Agreements were signed, and civil peace seemed restored, yet Gbagbo's rejection of the results of the presidential election (which gave the lead to Alassane Ouattara), revived the North-South conflict which lasted until his arrest in April 2011. Since then, under Ouattara, reelected president in 2015, there has been a return to political stability while the economy took off again.

The Republic of Congo seems to be a milder version of the disintegrating process, undoubtedly because it was shorter that the cases just analysed. Very soon after its independence, the

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[47]These states' implications were not motivated only by ethnic proximity but also for reasons of political opportunities (Banégas and Otayek 2003).

country was dominated by a highly radicalized praetorian regime. The military took over in 1966 (after an earlier attempt against Fulbert Youlou) quickly controlled by captain Marien Ngouabi who set up a Marxism-oriented govermnent. After his assassination in 1977, he was briefly replaced by Colonel Joachim Yhombi Opango, and more durably after 1979 by Colonel Denis Sassou Nguesso, who maintained the mono-partist system and the ideological frame of his predecessors. If the military sought to dominate the process of political transition the regime went through in the early 1990s, it ended up losing control of the situation and the national conference fell into the hands of the opposition. In 1991, civilians came back to power, but Sassou Nguesso, remained president until June 1992. Then elections were held and gave the advantage to Pascal Lissouba; in 1997 in an atmosphere of heightened internal tensions, Sassou Nguesso took over by declaring himself president again.

If the Congolese armed forces never constituted a very stable milieu, cohesion was maintained in the past thanks to procedures of subjective control recalling those operated in communist systems. The disintegration they began experiencing in the 1980s was the result of the tensions in the civilian sphere. That was deeply divided, politicians forming very frail political coalitions, which allowed the military to become autonomous at first, then to play umpire. Attempts to regain its control, notably after the eviction of the Chief of staff, General Michel Mokoko, finally failed. With the incapacity of political parties and groups to overcome their disagreements, the military ended up crumbling, all the more irremediably that confrontations between civilians factions which it espoused, operated on a high degree of violence and delinquency fed by a sharp "militian culture" (Dorrier-Apprill 1997; Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999); cease-fires never lasted and from 1992, civil war went on. The lines of cleavage in the forces were complex, intergenerational and hierarchical, organizational and inter-services, with a strong ethnic overtone, notably between Mbochi and Kongo-Lari groups, exacerbated moreover by foreign influences, notably Angolan. At the end of the 1990s however, Sassou-Nguesso was able to recentralize somewhat the state authority over the country, reorienting the revenues of oil resources in a way to buy a modicum of civil peace.

Guinea civil-military relations after the end of Sékou Touré's personal rule in 1984, which has been discussed as a mix of praetorian and Kemalist models, presented also signs of disarticulation so acute were tensions in the armed forces. These have tended to factionalize during General Lansana Conté's leadership, who took over after Touré's death, according to individual ambitions, complicated by ethnic rivalries. Prime minister, Colonel Diarra Traoré, co-author of the 1984 coup with Conté, tried a year later to depose him but was finally arrested and executed. He was a Malinke, Conté belonged to the Soussou group, and his regime seemed to have been opposed also by Mandé officers. In February 1996, Conté himself was detained during a mutiny by soldiers supposed to be ethnic opponents. Civil war in neighbouring Sierra Leone and Liberia aggravated the situation, with cross-borders moves of uncontrolled elements and other security threats. But at close look, internal tensions in the armed forces has never led to any splitting. The military establishment kept its integrity and never seriously threatened Conté's rule. As pointed out, given its business linkages, its large autonomy, its copious budget, there was no reason for it to fall apart nor to revolt (Bah 2015). Interestingly, moreover, adjacent civil wars, though intense, have never diffused in the country, at least with the same detrimental effects as elsewhere (Arief 2009; Bah 2012; Kanafani 2006). For all these reasons, Guinea's civil-military regime is only a borderline case of the model.

It goes without saying that those complex situations, sketchily rendered here for lack of space, were accompanied by human rights violations, displacements of populations, ethnic and religious cleansings, economic devastations, coerced enrolments (notably children), and so on. As a result, return to normality, with the

reconstruction of the state centrality and of the social contract between the government and the population, is never an easy process. Sassou-Nguesso and Déby's regimes have been able to extract their country from such a predicament with strategies mixing co-optation and repression and a better allocation of national resources. But, in general it is a rather protracted process to be run and that needs to be assisted by the international community. It requires appropriate and costly means which go beyond those necessary to counter ordinary underdevelopment, so much economies and societies are distorted (Ajakaiye and Gadir Ali 2009; Collier 2009). The use of natural resources has to be reorganized as to benefit all sectors of the population (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005). Power-sharing or consociationalist mechanisms have to be institutionalized, but in such a way to minimize their «hidden costs» (Tull and Mehler 2005).[48]

A key factor in that process is the restoration of a unified national military institution and the state monopolization of armed violence. This supposed a threefold policy: the disarmament and demobilization, the resocialization and reintegration of all those that have been involved in the conflicts; the amalgamation into corps that had remained loyal to the "legitimate" leader, of key rebelling and insurgent units and their commands, together with the dissolution of militias; the (re)professionalization of all military personnel along Western-managerial norms of civil-military relations and within inter-African multilateral cooperation, that foreign programs of defence institution building seek to promote. The success of such actions is never automatic and immediate. They are complex and costly (Herbst 1996–1997). Demobilization, reintegration, amalgamation (Erickson Baaz and Verweijen 2013; Lewis 1999) and program of reforms (N'Diaye 2009b; Luckham and Hutchful 2010; Hutton 2010; Isima 2010; Augé and Klaousen 2010) are not easy to handle, as well as professionalization (Soeters and Van Ouytsel 2014). As shown in the case of Central Africa, disarmament

works only if a modicum of rule of law and order is ensured first (Faltas 2000).[49] Often, moreover, international peace missions, for many reasons linked to their norms of engagement, are not always successful in coping with problems (Bedzigui 2008).

Conclusion

Through that rather long postpraetorian period of transition, begun at the turn of the 1980s-1990s and during which democracy was tried out, four dominant models of military relations to politics can be identified in Francophone Africa, with several states having experimented shifts from one to another. Indeed, given the number of cases composing the area under consideration here, these models are simplified ideal-types that do not operate under the pure forms under which they have been analytically described here. The reality is rather crossbred, not always easy to situate and define with certainty, even to the point of displaying sometimes traits reminiscent of the pre-1990 praetorian authoritarian brand, postulated here as now outmoded. Lastly, the case of some states of the region, could not be fully detailed, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo[50] and to a lesser extent Bunrundi and Rwanda (the three former Belgian colonies), or examined at all, as, for example, the Comoros, where the government was taken-over in February 1999 by Colonel Azali who got elected president in April 2002 (again in April 2016), and which approximates the neo-Kemalist paradigm.[51]

A tempting interrogation at this point, though not completely futile, concerns the evolution to be

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[48]About the difficulties of power-sharing arrangements, see Horowitz (2008) and Norris (2008).

[49]In their constitutions, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, the Ivory Coast and Gabon have criminalized militias and the use of paramilitary forces; Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo the employement and the arming of youth.

[50]Quite an interesting case of a «decentralized» military institution operating on an «archipelago state» (Stearns et al. 2013). It is probable (at this point of time) that the military will not move should, as expected, Joseph Kabila seek a third mandate that the constitution forbids.

[51]He was to win the presidential elections of April 2016.

expected, its direction and whether it is going to be toward the Western-managerial model, perceived as the only appropriate one in a democratic setting. Of course, should democracy expand and consolidate, together with an economic growth delivering a largely shared prosperity, it will undoubtedly prevail (Lindberg and Clark 2008). Yet, these processes are slow and, at any step before consolidation is achieved, remain precarious. Governments, therefore, in order to preserve a modicum of domestic peace, have to be able to mobilize adequate and efficient coercive means, notably against still potentially dissenting groups (either from low productive areas left out from economic growth, or simply marginalized in a majority rule system), and until dependable police forces are in place, that role is handled by the military. That type of situation tends to hinder the definitive disengagement of the military from politics and the recognition by its members of civilian supremacy.

Moreover, despite its deleterious effects, past political activism still adulterates the military culture and fuels the idea that officers, who often enjoy a positive image in the public opinion, are a politically legitimate and able recourse; such a factor goes against the political neutralization of the khaki establishment, not to mention those cases where it has been able to secure a privileged and unrestricted status.

But, the main circumstance likely to distort further this principal-agent divide is induced by the mounting geopolitical threats affecting the whole continent, under the form of diffusing civil wars, systems of conflicts, and above all regional terrorist deployments. Inevitably, they enhance, through states of exception and emergency regimes, the role of armed forces, all the more so that foreign traditional security purveyors, whose direct intervention has become uncertain and problematical, are now reduced to a role of assistance to inter-African operations. That situation benefits local military establishments, inclined then to turn into new security rentiers, a tendency that not only supports their entrenched positions but also their capacity, if not their legitimacy to interfere in political affairs. This trend could even affect countries where the

Western-managerial model seems to take roots, as in Morocco and Senegal where the radicalization of Islam constitutes new forms of political opposition (Turquoi 2001; Villalón and Kane 1998; Zeghal 2005).

On the other hand, military incursions in politics are nowadays reproved by the international community and associated with sanctions in the name of proper democratic governance. Consequently, it is probable that, should such intrusions be decided and undertaken, they will take the guise of a rather sophisticated and stealthy forms of political monitoring, wholly foreign to the aggressive putschism of earlier praetorian or Kemalist generations, with a briefest as possible, if any, occupation of power, in other words in a minimally invasive fashion. The goal would be limited to censure, veto and/or oust leaders, often in conjunction with a popular protest, either because they have clearly deviated from the democratic norms, or breach the social contract with the population by exclusionary policies (against those led then to find the revolt option or alliance with outside insurgents more profitable), or have been revealed incapable to safeguard the country's sovereignty against threats; this before letting the political/institutional processes reoperate while staying out of it or infiltrating it as new-born civilians. This light footprint arbitration, with an asserted remedial quality, is consistent with the younger generations of military personnel, more socialized to the ideals of rule of law and democracy, and might be more acceptable to, if not tolerated by, the international community, all the more so that there is no complete consensus and coherence in viewpoints on dealing with those issues (Witt 2013).

The use of more hidden non-intrusive methods of bearing upon the central decision-making process (preventive veto and dissuasion, intimidation and blackmail, etc.) could even render this low-intensity model more stealthy, somehow closer to the managerial model, though not isomorphic as in the latter, military influence is not converted in such ways as to threatened civilian supremacy.

This expectation, which anticipates the end of «coup-ism» (Croissant et al. 2010), needless to say, holds only if democratization is still the

political horizon of the region's states, as it had seemed at least a decade ago. Should however, as predicted by many analysts of the «end of the transitions era» and «democratic roll-back»,[52] hybrid authoritarian electoral regimes tend to become the rising norm, with slower elite turn-over (given the no-limit number for political mandates), powerless «agencies of restraint», conditional enjoyment of rights, etc., on the top of other structural vulnerabilities (Belkin and Schofer 2003), within an international context nowadays more opened to influential non democratic powers and donors. Thusly, military relations to politics in Africa will probably continue to operate according to other models than the Western-managerial, noticeably the low-intensity and the neo-Kemalist ones as dominating.

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[52]Cf. for exemple the articles published in the *Journal of Democracy* (January, July and October 2015) and regarding Africa, see Gyimah-Boadi (2015).

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Author Biography

Michel Louis Martin (MA, UCLA and Ph.D., University of Bordeaux, Fulbright and Ford Foundations fellow) is emeritus professor of law and political science. He was guest-scholar for many years at the University of Chicago, professor at the universities of the French West Indies and Toulouse-Capitole where he directed the Morris Janowitz research center on Security and Governance and the graduate and post-graduate programs in International relations and security. He was also the director of the Confucius Institute of Toulouse. He teaches at the Catholic University of Toulouse and, as visiting professor, at Beyrouth St-Joseph University. He is chief-editor of the *Annales de l'Université Toulouse-Capitole* and holds several editorial and academic positions. He is the author, both in French and English, of numerous books and articles in the area of military sociology, international security, and comparative politics and constitutional law.

Organizational Cultures in the Military

13

Joseph Soeters

Introduction

> Every organization has a culture, many have several—(Wilson 1989: 109).

Unlike the structure or technology of an organization, organizational culture is intangible: it is a phenomenon one cannot easily touch, see or draw in a map or scheme. Organizational culture clearly belongs to the 'soft' side of an organization. But this 'soft' side can have concrete and hard consequences as it impacts on the organization's performance as well as on the workforce's behavior and happiness, or lack thereof. According to Hofstede's still attractive definition (2001: 2), culture is the "collective programming", the "software of the mind". If the organization's structure and technology can be seen as its "hardware", the organizational culture is the whole of values, norms, virtues, habits and beliefs, meanings and styles, the informal

restrictions and permissions—including punishments and rewards—that make the machinery work (e.g., Swidler 1986; Alvesson 2013). Through culture organizations penetrate into people's minds (often even after they have left the organization). By consequence, organizational culture influences what the organization and its workforce see as their main tasks: culture is all about selective attention (Wilson 1989: 101).

Culture is a characteristic of groups of people, people who somehow interact. These are people who find themselves in the same situation(s), have to deal with the same sort of problems, and sometimes have the same enemies. Organizations —associations of people working together to reach for common goals—consist of such groups of people who share the same challenges, situation and destiny. Organizational culture and organizational identity are the manifestations of this collectiveness.

Another characteristic refers to the transfer of the organization's values, norms, virtues, habits and beliefs to the new generations. Newcomers in the organization are quickly taught how to behave and think, so much that general practices in the organization quickly become 'common sense'. This may happen subtly and politely, but it may also be a quite rough and aggressive practice if considered needed: "this is the way things are done in this place". Who does not adapt or fit in, can leave voluntarily, or is simply

J. Soeters (✉)
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
e-mail: fam.soeters@tele2.nl

pushed away—being sacked—, which often occurs in the very first period after entering the organization. Those who in later stages of their careers no longer fit, are not likely to be promoted to higher ranks, sometimes receiving the suggestion or clear message to leave.

A consequence is that—although human behavior in groups is susceptive to change and development—the culture of an organization is fairly persistent and stubborn. Cultures change slowly, if at all (Wilson 1989: 91). Another consequence is that organizational culture is also the result of power balances in the organization. Culture and power (of those in charge) are closely related. Culture is a control device: it makes people comply with the formal and informal rules of the game, because, for many organizational members, no realistic alternatives are perceived (Van Maanen and Kunda 1989: 49).

Like other organizations, military organizations can be analyzed from a cultural perspective. Perhaps such a perspective is here even more fruitful because people in military organizations do not only work but also live together. Military organizations are so-called "greedy institutions" (Segal 1986) that demand a lot from their employees. The people in military organizations often live in situations that are isolated from ordinary life: in garrisons and bases, sailing on vessels or during deployment on missions, where ever in the world. This situation, combined with working and living in (potentially) threatening circumstances, urges the people in the organization to be inner-and other-directed at the same time: relying on and adapting to their colleagues inside the own military organization but not, or much less so, to others outside the organization. By consequence, military organizations have a collective mind and memory, in which historical events and traditions play a large role (Burk 2008; Wilson 2008; Sangar 2015), leading to a relatively strong impact of cultural dynamics in the organization (e.g., Sørensen 2002).

This chapter will focus on the general characteristics of organizational cultures and subcultures in the military. The military is here to be seen as the armed forces in the developed parts of the world, i.e. the Western hemisphere and states such as India, South Africa, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Brazil and the like. The emphasis is on armed forces in Western nations, however. Militaries that are part of societal upheaval and enduring conflicts such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Afghanistan would need separate treatment (e.g., Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 2013). More generally, one can say that the validity of this chapter with respect to the armed forces in developing countries has limitations (e.g., Soeters and van Ouytsel 2014).

I specifically refer to organizational cultures or subcultures, in the plural. Differentiation is an important characteristic of those giant military organizations (Winslow 2007; Hajjar 2014). Hence, the larger part of this chapter consists of analyzing the cultural characteristics of groups of people inside the military. The interaction between different sub-organizations aligning for common goals and integration is important to enhance the organization's general performance. We will distinguish between cultural differences at the national level, at the service level, and between military personnel, reservists and civilians working in defense organizations. I will leave the culture-related aspects of demographic differentiation—gender, minorities—aside, as these topics will be dealt with in chapters on women and diversity in the military. As far as possible, the cultural dynamics during operations, the military's core business, will be explored. At the end, the implications for the military's future will be discussed.

Military's Organizational Cultures: Basic Elements

In various treatises of military culture a number of elements are discerned that are specific for the military or at least more prevalent than in other, "ordinary" organizations (Lang 1965; Soeters 2000; Soeters et al. 2003; Winslow 2007; Burk 2008). These are: *community life*, *hierarchy* and *rules, discipline*, the *Janusface-character* and a tendency towards *assessment-aversion*.

Community Life

As said before, a dominating element of military organizations is their *communal life*. In military organizations, much more than in other organizations, working and private life overlap (e.g., Hall 2011). Military people do not only work together, they often also live together, excluding others to areas outside the guarded gates. Military people live on islands in wider society, in so-called 'gated communities' that create fairly sharp distinctions between insiders and outsiders (e.g., Diken and Bagge Laustsen 2005). In fact, the whole military society can be seen as a 'Fortress' so to speak (Hall 2011); in sociological argot military garrisons and camps are "total institutions" (Goffman 1991). Military people wear the same attire (making them visibly uniform), they eat, drink and do sports and games together, they are educated and trained in special military training centers and academies, and often—when opportunities arise—they get emotionally involved, up to getting married. And of course, the work gets done together, in their home country during training and exercises, or overseas during deployments and missions.

In today's modern professional armies the members of the organization have voluntarily decided to do so. They have selected themselves to become a member of the military, often based on *natural identification* and *anticipatory socialization* because they have been raised in a military family, or at least in a family with military ties (Soeters et al. 2003: 249–252). *Endo-recruitment*—recruitment from within—is a fairly strong phenomenon in the military. This implies that the rather intense 'baptizing' practices in the military (e.g., Weber 2012) only provide the 'finishing touch' in the socialization of many recruits, albeit not of all of them. All this leads to a rather uniformed view of the world among military personnel. This uniformity in thinking has most likely increased since the abolition of the conscript system in Western nations, when "birds of various feather" came together in the military organization. This uniformity also creates group cohesion and 'esprit de corps' (Burk 2008), which are essential

aspects of acting during war, crisis and peace support (King 2006; Kirke 2009). In those circumstances the members of the organization need to walk through the fire for each other, sometimes in the most literal meaning of the word. Not surprisingly, traditional military virtues—courage, loyalty, respect—are mainly beneficial to colleagues in the unit and the military organization, less so to outsiders such as the general public or host-nationals in regions where operations are conducted (Olsthoorn 2011; see also Weber and Gerde 2011: 603–606).

There have been changes in the communal life of military personnel over the years, though. After the abolition of the conscript system in most Western nations a process of professionalization has emerged (e.g., King 2013), which comes with changes in working and living conditions. Gradually more time has become available for recruits' self-initiated leisure activities in civilian dress. More importantly, today many people are enlisted while having been educated in civilian schools, colleges and universities, necessitating only relatively limited military training programs parallel or immediately after college education. USA's Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) constitutes a clear example in this regard, enabling young (wo)men to attend college like other students and receive military training through military units at or nearby college. This category is becoming increasingly important in the U.S. military as can be seen from the rising number of promotions for ROTC officers over the past few decades (e.g., Beauchamp 2015).

These developments occur against the background that a contract for life is no longer offered. In current management and political thinking about organizational flexibility lifetime employment creates too many rigidities. By consequence, the *occupational orientation* and *calculative identification* among military personnel has increased, including their feeling for self-interest and their active or passive search for better alternatives on the external labor market. The 'institutional' orientation, on the contrary, emphasizing national duty and internal labor market opportunities, has lost much of its

attractiveness, albeit in some units (e.g., logistics, construction, administration, flying units) more than in others (e.g., infantry). Working for the military has become—in the words of the late military sociologist Moskos (1988)—"just another job", not that different from working for any other business or governmental agency.

Nonetheless, the unique character of the military profession and culture, emerging in communal life and its inner-directedness, has certainly not disappeared.

Hierarchy and Rules

The second characteristic of military organizational culture is the significance of *rules* and *hierarchy*. Of course all organizations know rules and hierarchies, but in military organizations they are deemed more important and pervasive. Military organizations are bureaucracies par excellence; historically military organizations, such as the Roman army, are the origin of this organizational type. The bureaucracy is the age-old organizational configuration, in which a strongly elaborated division of labor is governed by commanders at various hierarchical layers who base their authority on complex sets of formal rules and regulations that are put down in formal paperwork or, today, in computer systems (e.g., Feld 1959; Mintzberg 2007).

The military consists of services (Navy, Air Force, Army, Coast Guard) and within these services functional subunits can be distinguished such as engineering units, the infantry, helicopter wings, the Marine Corps, etc. These different units have to cooperate in a context where the results cannot easily be standardized, predicted or judged, certainly not while in military action. For this reason results control in the military is not the panacea it is in business organizations. The alternative is steering through standardization of actions, drills and skills guided by direct leadership of more educated and older—and hence higher ranking—personnel. Next to their personality characteristics and political skills, these leaders predominantly rely on the use of formal rules and procedures including the power

to reward, punish, promote and discharge. Of course rituals informally imposing the codes of conduct and feeling are equally important here (Van Maanen and Kunda 1989).

However, like in the previous aspect of military culture, there are developments to be seen here. Adler and Borys (1996) have distinguished two types of bureaucracies: the 'coercive' and the 'enabling' bureaucracy. The 'coercive' bureaucracy, which is traditionally quite typical for the military, knows no other law than the commander's wish and the rules he or she refers to. Military personnel simply have to listen, obey and do what they have been told. However, such conduct, which never functioned for the full 100% all the time (Kirke 2010), is no longer accepted by military personnel who themselves have become higher educated and more occupationally oriented. They increasingly tend to resist authoritarian and hierarchal leadership. Resistance behind and against the official culture and power balances—through rule bending and rule breaking (Kirke 2010)—has been demonstrated earlier in police organizations (Jermier et al. 1991).

Professionalized rank-and-file military personnel increasingly realize that they are often better capable of judging what needs to be done, especially if the commanders are not present where the action is. Hence, the increasing importance of 'mission oriented command', a philosophy that fits in the idea of the 'enabling' bureaucracy. This more flattened type of bureaucracy enables autonomous acting by military personnel, which is condoned and even encouraged if—and only if—it takes place within the context of the commander's view, the mission's goals and the general frames of reference for action, such as standardized drills and the rules of engagement (also Hajjar 2014: 131). Even though this is not the same as results management in business firms, it comes closer to it. Gradually the organizational culture in the military is shifting from action through strict compliance with the rules and instructions issued by direct superiors, to positive social control among military personnel at the various hierarchical levels themselves. Leadership by

consequence becomes more subtle, i.e. less openly directive and more about creating the cultural and ethical context, safeguarding the power balances in the organization. Leadership seen this way is an integrated system of relationships that operate across hierarchical levels, driven both by leadership behaviors and organizational culture within and across levels (Schaubroeck et al. 2012: 1074).

Military Discipline

A third character of military organizations' cultures is closely related to the previous one: *military discipline*. Discipline refers to the cultural elements we saw before:

- a bureaucracy-related acquisition of standardized drills and skills, individually but mostly group- or team-wise,
- a precise pursue of formal rules, regulations and procedures, especially if security and safety are at stake (for instance in maintenance and operating machines, vessels and aircraft), and
- acting in accordance with the commanders' instructions or at least in his or her spirit and mindset.

This is called 'functional discipline', which type of discipline is, and has been, an essential element of organized military—"combat" (King 2013)—culture. It leads to what Ender (2009) has referred to as the *McDonaldization* of the military, rendering military action more or less standardized and predictable. Acting within the context of these cultural instructions is considered more important than competence; non-compliance renders a military person a 'cultural misfit' who is likely to be transferred to posts where he or she can do 'no harm' (Davis 1948: 147).

Given the changing character of the bureaucracy that we saw before, there is often discussion about the necessity of rules and the strict adherence to them. Rules, however, are not bad per se. Good rules are rarely noticed, but bad rules stand out and need changing (Perrow 1972: 23–32). In the tendency towards the 'enabling' bureaucracy it is important to change or delete bad rules. At the same time it is important to keep the rules that are needed to render the organization effective, safe and predictable, to avoid ethical wrongdoing towards both insiders and outsiders, and to protect those who are subject to the military's actions.

Next to 'functional discipline', military organizations attach great importance to what has been called 'ceremonial discipline'. More than in other organizations, group-wise appearance and etiquette is deemed important in the military. This implies proper attire, hair dress, saluting and marching in line. This has historical roots: through the use of banners, the cadence of drums and trumpets, and colorful uniforms friends could be distinguished from foes (McNeill 1995; Burk 2008). Like dancing in community festivities, marching and exercising together makes one feel good and makes cooperative efforts of every kind—physical, psychological—easier to carry through (McNeill 1995: 36; Cohen et al. 2010; Sennett 2013). Today ceremonial discipline and etiquette are important to stress; they visualize the common identity of military units, which is deemed of particular importance in moments of loss and grief. Obviously, military organizations experience those moments far more often than conventional organizations do.

Janusface

A fourth feature of military culture is its *Janusface-character*: the military is an organization with two faces. In the argot of fire departments it has a 'cold' and a 'hot' side (Soeters 2000; Soeters et al. 2003). The organization exercising, practicing and preparing itself for the action shows its cold face, so to speak. In the Cold War in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s this was the dominating situation for many Western armed forces. This made military organizations and their various units increasingly look like ordinary public organizations. The commanders became managers who were predominantly dealing with

human, financial and material resources management, without experiencing financial pressures because budgets were undisputed and without confronting threats other than the theoretical enemy at a distance. Bureau-politics between services often emerged as a consequence of military brass experiencing the 'ennui' of peace.

Also the operational activities in such times—predominantly consisting of exercises and low-intensity activities such as 'being there, showing the flag, and observing'—belong to the cold side of the spectrum. Such activities may lead to problems related to boredom, perceptions of underutilization, stimulus deprivation and internal conflicts, even during the missions of that time (Harris and Segal 1985). This is particularly true if this reality diverges from what the recruits have been trained for in the first place (e.g., Ricks 1997).

Since that time, however, a lot has changed. The military of all Western nations have been deployed to missions in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa, and despite experiencing boredom here as well (Ender 2009), they have found themselves in 'hot' situations regularly. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Western armed forces have been involved in serious military action that brought the idea of waging war closer than ever in the period after the Second World War and the Korea War.

Culture-related characteristics of 'hot action' in life-threatening circumstances are among others:

- the need for "heedful interrelating"—peers paying attention to each other—, based on strict subcultural codes derived from effective operational practices (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001),
- the need to prepare for the "unexpected" in order to avoid panic when things go wrong (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001),
- the demand for commanders who are flexible and courageous and who are at the same time capable of fear control and compassion (Hunt and Phillips 1991),

- a 'can-do' mentality of military personnel, which is getting things done without much discussion and doubt, and
- the wish to exclude outsiders from having a look in the kitchen.

The latter two points require further elaboration. First, a 'can-do' mentality is highly valued in operational circumstances, particularly by commanders. However, if taken too far—if no doubts can be expressed regarding ambitious goals or approaches—the opposite effects may occur, spawning more problems than solutions. The war in Vietnam provides ample example of a too strong reliance among the Americans forces on outnumbering resources and weapon capabilities, leading to their final defeat and disaster (Lind 1997: 137). 'Can-do' can easily turn into mindless groupthink.

Second, sometimes at the 'hot' side of the military things happen that the military want to keep away from the eye of the general public. After all, in the 'hot' situation the use and experience of violence is the military's core business. Most military people think this is a unique, opaque and unfortunately also nasty business that cannot be shared with others from outside the organization. The ignorance of others often is conducive to preserving one's own position (Moore and Tumin 1949). This feeling is particularly strong when violence has gone out of control: in such cases—e.g., torturing of prisoners—the group closes the ranks, codes of silence are invoked, and whistleblowers are ostracized (e.g., Winslow 1998). This is a pronounced aspect of a more general, peculiar tendency among professionals—such as musicians and nurses—, which is to denounce the people they work for: professionals deem outsiders ignorant and unworthy of respect (Becker 2014: 20).

Assessment-Aversion

This latter phenomenon is related to a final characteristic of military organizational cultures: the military's *aversion to being assessed*. This is

a characteristic the military seem to have in common with religious and medical professionals. Those professionals constitute distinct elite groups all over the world, which seems an anthropologically constant element of human societies (e.g., Stevenson 1954). All three professions—clergymen, medical doctors and military professionals—dominate the domain between life and death: medicine and military men fight against death and doom, priests do the same and make sure that life after death and demise has a meaning after all. Going through combat has also elsewhere been compared with religious experiences (King 2013: 16). Because of their unique expertise in the dusk between life and death, these professions are deemed almost sacred, and, hence, they are—and consider themselves to be rightfully—exempted from daily obligations, financial worries and general criticism from outsiders (e.g., Cohn 2015).

Hence, the military's tendency to input- and self-measurement, i.e. the evaluation of their capacities in terms of the quantities and quality of the resources they have at their disposal (Builder 1989: 20–22). At the same time they display an aversion against efficiency concerns, external judicial systems and, in general, clear responsibilities and performance evaluations (e.g., Davis 1948: 146–147). "The battle situation is always complex, full of friction, unique and unpredictable", "it is the 'fog of war'", "wars always cost more" and "the results are hard to tell" are the most common arguments in this connection, often in reference to von Clausewitz's book that was published about 180 years ago (Legro 1994: 111–112). Therefore, "laymen who know nothing" should stay out of the kitchen. Not surprisingly, higher officers are virtually always recruited from inside the organization, from the internal labor market, hence excluding competition, views and practices from the outside world.

In this connection one can see the military's romantic admiration of strong personalities and (historical) leadership (Meindl et al. 1985) that tolerates less doubt and hesitation than in many conventional organizations. An example is General Petraeus' initiative to introduce so-called Red Teams, consisting of outspoken intellectuals and nonconformists questioning military's assumptions, ideas and plans. No matter how innovative, these Red Teams "encounter cultural resistance and obstacles in the U.S. military partly because of the organization's long-standing and well-entrenched cultural assumptions and orientations linked to not questioning orders, plans and ideas, especially thoughts from higher ranking members" (Hajjar 2014: 131).

But, as sociologists say, with modernization life and society have become 'disenchanted', leading to the loss of these professions' sacredness. This implies that criticism may emerge, gradually and subtly but sometimes fast and overwhelmingly, as priests in the Catholic Church have experienced over the last couple of years. Also civilians taking over rituals that were always the domain of priests reduced the importance of the clergymen's role in society (Sennett 2013: 87). Medical doctors and military professionals are increasingly experiencing this 'disenchantment' as well: in cases of mal-conduct they are being sued, and not only by their own inside, judicial systems. Even more dominant is the call for more accountability and transparency with respect to efficiency, effectiveness and evidence (Soeters and Heeren-Bogers 2013). In today's democratized, 'disenchanted' societies no one has authority that is taken for granted: *evidence-based action* replaces *eminence-based action* (Milne and Reiser 2012). Armed forces' tendency of not being good at cost control and time management—particularly at the cold side of the organization—is increasingly meeting societal and political criticism in many countries (Sommer 2011; Reich and Tillack 2014). Voices from outside—and inside through mil-blogs (Resteigne 2010)—commenting on the way operations are conducted can also be heard more loudly, albeit at some times and in some nations more than at other times and in other nations.

Total Institution/ Institutional orientation/ Coercive bureaucracy/ Traditional discipline/ Cold/ Assessment aversion	-> -> -> -> ->	Quasi Total Institution/ Occupational orientation/ Enabling bureaucracy/ Discipline based on self- and peer-control/ Hot/ Openness to assessment

Fig. 13.1 Organizational culture-related developments in military organizations

Developments

As indicated, the military's general cultural characteristics are not static; they are in development all the time. The changes in the organizational cultures over time pertain to societal and political developments as well as to the changing role, position and capacities of military organizations and the military workforce themselves. The developments are depicted in Fig. 13.1. It should be emphasized that these developments particularly apply to the Western hemisphere and are not irreversible per se; certain developments, such as from cold to hot, may go back and forth.

The Influence of National Cultures on Military's Organizational Cultures

Military organizations are the state's instrument to prevent, control and dissolve large-scale violent conflicts. In previous times the military were —and in some parts of the world they still are— the power instrument to attack, invade and occupy other nations' territories, in wars with neighboring nations or by means of expeditions and colonial areas overseas. Given these nation-related roles in historical times, it is no surprise that military and political cultures vary across nations (e.g., Mehlkop and Graeff 2003). This can first be seen when looking at the differences in defense expenditures between nations. In the Western hemisphere the USA, and less so, the UK and France spend considerably higher percentages of their gross national income on defense than other nations on the European continent, such as Belgium, the Netherlands and today's Germany (e.g., Beeres and Bogers 2012). Big spenders are easily characterized as "warrior

nations" (Paris 2000) or as nations where they cherish the warrior ethos and train their military personnel to become "dieux the guerre" ("gods of war"). Even under the pressure of NATO's guidelines aiming at standardization and although the political color of the governments of these nations changes from time to time, these differences remain more or less stable. Only after turn-around events such as the total defeat in the Second World War, true cultural transformations may occur as the examples of former militaristic and now more peaceful nations such as Germany and Japan have shown (e.g., Hull 2006; Ienaga 1978).[1]

Because of these persistent differences in budgets, nations make different choices as to how and when to deploy their military organization: in which conflict, in which stage of the conflict, with what aims, with what mandate, in which mission arrangement and when to end and withdraw. The use of the military has more than before become a matter of choices, not of "absolute necessities". These choices are made under the influence of the nation's political culture and power balances, the impact of other nations and the international community, but of course these choices are also affected by the military themselves (Legro 1994: 117, 140). A government is not likely to deploy military units, if the military's strategic apex has not explored and consequently advocated the options for deployment. In such processes the organizational cultures and power balances within the military play an important role. As said earlier,

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[1]Even before and during WWII culture-related differences in doctrines and operational styles between the warring nations Germany, the USA, the UK and France have been as remarkable as their operational consequences (Legro 1994; Kier 1999; Visser 2010).

organizational cultures are all about selective attention (Wilson 1989: 101).

Particularly the operational style—perceptions of how a conflict can be prevented, controlled or dissolved—is a consequence of the military organization's balance of organizational cultures. Nations' armed forces who have had a "warrior culture" since long (and have not changed their habits after the 1940s; King 2010) will be more inclined to advocate quick offensive actions, and will in fact do so after been given permission. One only needs to think of the role of the USA and the UK in initiating and leading the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last fifteen years (Soeters 2013a, b). The governments and militaries of many other nations were far more hesitating and careful, with lesser casualties as one of the results. The initiating and leading role of France in recent operations in Africa is another case of point. In sum, there is a direct link between military beliefs, customs and interests and the way operations are conducted (e.g., Legro 1994: 118).

If national culture-related differences are that large, the question arises how international cooperation between national military partners can develop and exist at all. First, there is the standardizing role of supranational bodies such as NATO with respect to the development of doctrines, directives and training. Next, the increasing collaboration in multinational missions, such as ISAF in Afghanistan, helps to create a sense of mutual understanding (e.g., King 2011). Implicitly this refers to what organizational sociologists have indicated as *isomophism* (Dimaggio and Powell 1983). This concept refers to the organizational dynamics that make organizations within one sector resemble each other and in fact become more alike. These dynamics may occur in a coercive manner, through instructions, doctrines, rules and regulations from above—for instance from NATO. But they may also emerge through professional benchmarking and diffusion of 'best' practices, as well as through the joint development of weapon systems and technologies and by mimicking each other, particularly those examples that are in high standing and reputation.

The follow-up question is in which direction this isomorphism is likely to go. In this connection, cultural theory discerns three categories of collaboration: *assimilation* based on disparity or inequality with respect to valued assets, *separation* based on differences in position or opinions, values and beliefs and *integration* based on a variety of differences of all sorts (Soeters and Manigart 2008; Soeters and Tresch 2010; see also Harrison and Klein 2007).

Assimilation occurs when smaller partners adapt to—literally: become similar to—a majority or a larger partner, on whom they are dependent or whom they deem superior. In the military this phenomenon occurs in air forces of smaller nations employing F-16 fighter jets that in terms of general procedures, instructions of maintenance, training practices, language and style of operations could easily be inserted as wings of the USA Air Force. The air forces of the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and Turkey are topical examples in this regard. After the introduction of the F-35 the composition of these air forces may change, but not the basic cultural mechanism. Together with differences in size and budgets, technology—because of its supracultural scientific theories and methodologies—is the main driver behind these developments.

Another example is the performance of relatively small Danish and Estonian infantry-units that were added to the more numerous and well-reputed British troops in the Afghan province of Helmand. The Danish and Estonian actions were surprisingly warrior-oriented with relatively large numbers of casualties, comparable to or even higher than those of the British troops that were high anyway (e.g., King 2010). Clearly, the smaller nations', particularly the Danish, troops had adapted to the British operational conduct, despite their previous peacekeeping tradition that had experienced a transformation already during the operations on the Balkans (Jakobsen 1998).

Striving for assimilation does not always work well, however. Iraqi security forces that had been supported by the American military to build greater capacity, competence and

professionalism *the American way* (Hajjar 2014) did not behave exactly like this, after the American forces had left the region. More successful examples are former Warsaw Pact-countries that over the past two decades have been able to adapt their armed forces and political-military relations to Western standards (e.g., Poponete 2013).

How the war came back in …

The Netherlands military deployment of relatively large-sized troops in the Afghan province Uruzgan (2006–2010) has led to a remarkable change in emphasis with respect to the military's core business. Whereas the Netherlands' contribution to the ISAF mission in the beginning had been advocated as a reconstruction and civil-military mission following a peace-minded "Dutch approach", the military themselves started to stress the war-character of the mission. Quite suddenly, also in academic publications the "Dutch approach"-character in military operations was denied (Brocades Zaalberg and ten Cate 2012). The army commanders, particularly from the infantry, were quick in specifying the nature of the military's job as fighting, warring and battling, and in the whole defense organization 'war centres' were founded. On top, the commemoration of the army's 200 years anniversary was accompanied with the logo "200 years of *fighting* for peace and liberty". With large nationwide publicity two military officers, both belonging to the Special Forces, were awarded with the highest honor for brave battlefield behavior, which was something that had not occurred in decades. There no longer was a military or public discourse on reconstruction and civil-military interaction; the war-discourse had quickly developed from ideology to common sense (Swidler 1986:

279). The Duch armed forces were not the only mild-mannered military experiencing such a development, as similar stories from Norway (Laugen Haaland 2010), Germany (Sangar 2015; King 2013: 279–280) and Canada (Robinson 2007) reveal.

Clearly, the military's strategic apex wanted to catch up with the English speaking armed forces' more war-prone way of operating, as they had experienced this during their collaborative actions in the difficult Southern part of Afghanistan (e.g., Robinson 2007; King 2010). This is a manifestation of what has been called 'exo-isomorfism' (Souitaris et al. 2012), the preference to resemble external, in this case international partners. The military commanders also wanted to acknowledge the unique experiences of those who had been in combat and had experienced the hostilities. Additionally they had the inclination to go back to what is seen as the military's traditional 'core business'. This renewed emphasis on 'core business' happened with an ideological energy that often emerges in times of downsizing, budget reductions and, hence, unsettling times (Harrison and Carroll 2006; Swidler 1986). At the same time in the U.S. armed forces, numerous culture centers and training programs intended to help cultivate cross-cultural competence among the "warriors" were established (Hajjar 2014: 124). In 2014 President Obama declared to West Point graduates that "just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail."

Clearly, both national militaries are moving, even if this would be predominantly symbolic behavior. But, at least, these examples demonstrate that some sort of multinational convergence or isomorphism in the military sector indeed is occurring; this is a process in which national armed

forces starting from different perspectives and traditions tend to adapt—and sometimes even over-adapt (e.g., Sangar 2015: 12)—to one another. This process is not likely to come to an end at some point in time.

As mentioned previously, assimilation is not the only, not even the dominating pattern in multinational military cooperation. When designing multinational missions on land or at sea, the area of operations is generally divided in different "areas of responsibility" (AORs) that are assigned to leading national contingents. This design strategy constitutes the second category of cooperation, which is based on the separation mechanism. Expanding the ISAF mission to the Southern parts of the country, Kandahar became the "Canadian" province, Helmand the "British" province and Uruzgan in the period from 2006 till 2010 the "Dutch" province. The HQs of those leading national contingents explicitly refer to the troops' national origin, such as "Camp Holland" in Uruzgan; due to this organizational set-up HQs are experienced as "home away from home" (Ender 2009: 85). Cooperating with compatriots is far easier (less language problems for instance) and more comfortable; in such situations one simply feels more at ease.

Also in UN peace operations this federal model—*working apart together*—is the main principle of organizing as it is in sea operations such as the antipiracy operation in the Indian Ocean, or on land such as the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. In the UNIFIL mission every national contingent, for instance Italian, French, South Korean and Ghanaian (Ruffa 2014), has been assigned its "own" box, a part of the land area that is being controlled. Even if the multinational cooperation takes places in a small area, such as Kabul's airport, the national elements are usually separated on the basis of clearly defined functions or tasks that need to be accomplished.

In general, this separation strategy works fine, but it may have detrimental operational effects, when the various national contingents display their own national culture-related operational style and interpretation of tasks and mandate. By consequence, spillover effects may ensue crossing the borders of the various areas of responsibility. Aggressively suppressing the growth of poppies or chasing terrorists by one leading national contingent in their area of responsibility—or the opposite creating a lenient atmosphere in one of the areas (Ruffa 2014)—may influence the operational conditions in the neighboring area. At the overall level, this may result in decreased task performance, and even arguments, conflicts and distrust among the various partners, i.e. the national contingents in the various operational areas (Harrison and Klein 2007: 1203).

This is why the third category of multinational military cooperation, which is based on the integration of variety, is so tremendously important. However, despite its importance this is not an easy way to go. Integration occurs when the best of all cooperating national partners will be utilized. This way the best of all needs to be integrated into a supra-organizational or in this case supra-national military culture to obtain the best possible mixture or blend of cultural influences. Ideally, the input of all partnering nations would need to be judged by and evaluated in the most honest manner. This would for instance imply that one should be open to the idea that the Senegalese or Beninese armed forces could teach Western militaries how to operate in African conflicts. African forces have developed their own autonomous experiences and practices that no longer mirror—or are similar to—the former colonial armed forces (see: Vrey et al. 2013) and they are more familiar with the overall conditions in the continent. In fact, such openness to others' competences implies the appreciation and use of cultural variety.

Unfortunately, this cannot be seen too often in the internationally operating military, probably because the 'social constructions of reality' are still too different among the various national militaries. As said, 'warrior nations' have a firm belief in a predominantly kinetic approach to solve violent conflicts and they spend most of their resources on this particular way of operating. Other nations have more connection with the

so-called 3D- or comprehensive approach, in which the use of military power is aligned with activities in the field of reconstruction, diplomacy and development. But even if there are no 'hot' operational conditions, like in the field of multinational military R&D (e.g., the development of the NH-90, a military helicopter), nationally differing views and interests dominate the process and final results (Uiterwijk et al. 2013).

Separation of national armed forces during operations prevents uneasiness, rivalries and hegemonic strife within the mission, at least to some extent. Assimilation means that the hegemonic organizational culture of one or two national militaries is taken for granted. Integration is the most wanted ideal that is still far from being realized.

Subcultural Differences Within the Military

Organizational culture can be described with a metaphor from the world of music (Soeters et al. 2003; Winslow 2007). If the organizational culture is the same for everyone in the organization, this resembles a stadium full of spectators singing the national anthem: the same beginning, the same ending, the same melody and the same lyrics. At the other side of the spectrum, there is improvisational—for instance jazz—music in which multiple not very well regulated tones can be heard mingling, or not mingling, well together. The culture of large organizations is generally more differentiated than the stadium metaphor allows and less improvisational or fragmented than in the jazz metaphor. The military like many large organizations is more like a symphonic orchestra that has different sections (strings, brass, percussion), each playing its own musical scores in counterpoint, with varying starts and endings, frequencies and duration of the various parts, different rhythms and often even completely different melody lines. Nonetheless, the total result is harmonious, or at least one total musical performance, if it is not intentionally harmonious. It is an excellent example of synergy: the whole is more than the total of the different elements.

In much the same manner one can describe the organizational subcultures within military organizations. Armed forces know the well-known services such as the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and special additional units such as the Gendarmery (Military Police), the Coast Guard or the Marine Corps. Each service has functional sub-elements, such as in the army the infantry, the artillery, the logistic units, engineering units etc. Each of these services and elements within the services has its own task and expertise, and corresponding sets of training programs, work practices, ambitions and even views of the world, in short its own organizational-culture identity. In a large interview study in the British armed forces Kirke (2012) showed substantial differences in organizational subcultures between the services and the locations where these were assigned. Before him, Builder (1989: 31–43) analyzed inter-service distinctions in the American armed forces, pointing at differences in the importance of traditions (strong in the Navy), belief in technology (strong in the Air Force) and the emphasis on duty, honor and country (strong in the Army).

In a substantiated manner Mastroianni (2005–2006) made an analysis of cultural differences between the USA Army and Air Force. Among others he pointed at differences in leadership. In the air force the pilots constitute the core of the organization that conducts the operations. Pilots are the *prima donnas* in air forces all over the world (Kaplan 2007: 183). They conduct their tasks on their own or in the company of a co-pilot or one or two other operators (such as in Apache combat helicopters). Of course, those pilots are dependent on people on the ground for maintenance, intelligence, weather forecasting, planning and the like. However, during the flight, during the action, they are operating on their own, or commanding the few others who are with them.

In the army, on the contrary, officers are used to work together with the other members of the units; in fact, they are fully dependent on them, because army personnel generally work as a team

while in action. Particularly interesting is the connection between officers and NCOs who often teach their superiors the "tricks of the trade" because they usually have more hands-on experience. Army officers often display the attitude of just being "ordinary soldiers", in contrast to the Air Force where the pilots are the uncontested elite. In the army the officers want to maintain good relations with all of their personnel (Mastroianni 2005–2006). Also with respect to their labor market position, pilots have a stronger position: they can easily find comparable or even better civilian jobs. As a consequence, their occupational orientation is more strongly developed, and their work and living conditions are usually more comfortable than those of their army colleagues.

Another remarkable difference relates to the contradiction between the strong technological orientation of the Air Force and the rather limited inclination to "discuss matters", which occurs more often in the army. If Air Force operations are more complicated and requires more engineering and science education, it is not easy to understand that the operational view of Air Force personnel still has something of a traditional, simple Cold War mentality with clear friend-and-foe-distinctions that do not require a lot of discussion. Self-reflexivity and self-criticism are not very well developed in the Air Force, according to Mastroianni (2005–2006).

This paradox can be explained by what is known in sociology as the difference between functional and substantive rationality (e.g., Ritzer 1998). Functional rationality refers to knowledge when the means-to-ends-relation is clear: has the flight been conducted properly without problems, was the target that was aimed at really destroyed? Here the focus is on what went wrong and what went right during the flying mission. Analysis, evaluating and learning from these questions are well-developed practices in the Air Force (Builder 1989: 104–105); Air Force pilots never fail to do this after their operations, because of operational concerns and of course also because of safety considerations (Ron et al. 2006; Catino and Patriotta 2013). Substantial rationality, however, refers to more general questions where

means-to-ends- relations are much less clear: does the destruction of a specific target (a bridge for instance) contribute to the reduction of the hostilities, to solving the violent conflict in the area? Army personnel are more generally confronted with these types of questions because they experience more 'reality checks' on the ground: IEDS, ambushes, suspicious citizens, and protesters who angrily voice their grievances as to the collateral damage of military operations. Clearly, the dimension one works in (ground, air) is determinative of the culture-related view of what is going on and what needs to be done.

The sea-dimension emphasizes the insular character of the organizational subculture on Navy vessels even more than in military organizations in general. It renders the Navy—next to being traditional—"occupationally ethnocentric", as Davis (1948: 151) argued. More than the other services, the Navy is a world in it self (e.g., Kaplan 2007). Comparable to such practices in the Air Force (Catino and Patriotta 2013), the safety aspect of the navy's organizational subculture is pervasive particularly when the engines operate on nuclear energy (Bierly and Spender 1995). In submarines and aircraft carriers simply too many things can go wrong and the consequences will be too large. That is why the organizational subculture on Navy vessels stresses the people on board to be continuously prepared for the 'unexpected' (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). One culture-related way of doing so is the expression of lessons in general sayings and maxims, such as "Hope for the best, prepare for the worst", "Learn from the mistakes of others. You won't live long enough to make them all yourself" and—particularly with respect to air force safety culture—"Look out for the cloud with a stone in it" (Catino and Patriotta 2013: 459).

"Shoe"-related subcultural differences within the U.S.A. Navy
Even within one single service there may be several subcultures. Wilson (1989) reports about the three subcultures within the U.S.A. Navy corresponding with the

type of shoes that the officers wear. The "black shoe" navy is the navy of the battleships, cruisers and destroyers, all ships built to protect the sealanes and bombard the enemy shores. The "brown shoe" navy is the navy of aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft, which comes close to the aviators' culture as even the captain of a carrier usually has an aviator background. The "felt shoe" navy is the world of the submarines (those seamen wear cloth shoes to reduce noise and so help defeat enemy listening services). In the competition over financial resources there are usually strong rivalries among those three worlds of navy "shoes" (Wilson 1989: 106) and the officers' career paths tend to develop within each of them.

Another example of differences in organizational subcultures between the various services in the military relates to the distinction between so-called elite units and conventional troops. Particularly the US Marine Corps (Ricks 1997), but also other elite troops such as Canadian airborne units (Winslow 1999) have been studied more often. In general, it shows that becoming a member of such elite units is far from easy: it demands real sacrifices and special (physical) capabilities to pass the tests. During the period of harsh training and severe exercises the recruits lose weight, undergo constant drills, they are not allowed to smoke, drink, watch TV, play video games and use their cell phones; they experience a total cutoff from previous life, without friends and relatives. When the suffering is over, however, the tendency to feel "one" with the unit and the other members of the unit is particularly strong; often there is lifetime bonding. The organizational identity, the internal cohesion and the habit of standing shoulder to shoulder with one another are in such elite units much stronger than in more common units. However, the tendency for those units to work together smoothly with other, non-elite units is much less

self-evident. One could say that elite units are better in internal *bonding* than in external *bridging* (Soeters 2008).

It is even argued that sometimes a clash of cultures emerges between conventional military units and Special Operations Forces: there often is rivalry about resources, discipline, and authority matters. Special Forces Operators tend to behave in their own way, do not take orders from commanders of regular units easily and show less ceremonial discipline than is usual among the military; at the same time they are often the subject of envy, dislike and misunderstanding because of their equipment and challenging tasks (Horn 2004).

In general, there is good reason to argue that subcultural differences between units and services are not always unproblematic and spawn unhealthy inter-service rivalry. First, members of units and services do not hesitate to speak jokingly about other services' personnel, and sometimes this joking way of speaking turns into derogatory behavior towards the others. In the British military one often blames each other for being arrogant (Kirke 2012: 18). In the Dutch army the officers who deal with expenditures and financial management in general are jokingly called the "pink Mafia", which is not to be seen as a compliment. Second, the strong orientation towards the others inside the own unit can induce unwanted behavior that deviates from the ideals that one has learned during training and education. If possible, this unwanted behavior is likely to be covered to prevent detection by outsiders (Winslow 1998). And finally, the interest of one's own unit or service can dominate everything else. In Southern Afghanistan a commander of the US Marine Corps commented that it would be positive for them if the operations conducted by the Marine Corps would turn out to be successful, even if the remainder of Afghanistan would be lost (Chandrasekaran 2012: 328). Clearly, the subcultural identity of this one single service is so pervasive and dominating here that the harmony of the whole, of the whole symphony orchestra, is out of reach.

Military Personnel, Reservists and Civilians

Military Personnel and Reservists

Another way to see differentiation in the military organization and culture relates to personnel that do not belong to the core of the military workforce. Because of the shrinking defense budgets it is increasingly difficult to employ large numbers of personnel. Reductions of military manpower have been an ongoing trend in the Western hemisphere over the last few decades. Outsourcing of activities is one of the policies to cope with this development. The emergence of so-called *Private Military Companies* in operations is a clear illustration. Another way of dealing with relatively shrinking budgets pertains to the increasingly growing role of reservists: in the USA and the UK reservists are deployed in rising numbers. These are not fulltime military personnel, but civilians with previous military experience who at the moment have a job on the civilian labor market. Civilian employers in these nations are legally required to let these employees go on mission if the government requests so. Of course these reservists are less expensive than ordinary military personnel and they provide a flexible layer in situations when the demand for military efforts exceeds the capacities of the core military organization.

However, from a study in the British army it appeared that the integration of reservists, as a unit or as individuals, into the core organization could not be taken for granted. Particularly under heavy fire, the regulars did not believe the reservists were still skillful enough. On the other hand, with respect to more general, civilian skills —in areas such as ICT, maintenance and repair, financial management, communication and health care—the reservists' contribution was appreciated, especially if these could be used in civil-military action (Kirke 2008: 181). Similarly, in Israel during the second Intifada a special unit of reserve volunteers was established specializing in handling Palestinian civilians and acting as a moderating force for young conscripts, whose conduct at checkpoints had led to strong public criticism (Lomsky-Feder et al. 2008: 600). Acting in the context of civil-military interaction is usually also the type of tasks for which reservists in the Dutch military are deployed.

Still, also in real operational action, reservists can make a difference. Even though reservists are often seen as "second class"-members or even as "spare parts" of the military (Lomsky-Feder et al. 2008: 603), there are positive experiences as well. Farrell (2010) describes how the British "reservists brigade" (52 Infantry Brigade) in Afghanistan province Helmand could change the course of the hostilities because they did not rely on the traditional combat repertoire that the previous British brigades had applied with so much conviction, yet with so little success (Farrell, 2010: 588; King 2010; Soeters 2013a). The 52 Infantry Brigade's staff was not inclined to look at the situation in Afghanistan only through "the scope of a rifle". Their mindsets were not framed to rely on the messages and doctrines that dominate the culture in the traditional UK brigades, rooted in practices from the Second World War (King 2010: 326). The reservists were responsible for introducing a number of non-kinetic innovations in the British military performance in Helmand (Catignani 2012: 16–17).

In general, reservists constitute a separate cultural segment in militaries; they are transmigrants, so to speak, who cross back and forth between two homes: military and civilian life (Lomsky-Feder et al. 2008). Related to the reservists' position and tasks this in-between position coincides with the regulars' appreciation and depreciation.

Military and Civilian Personnel

Next to reservists, there is another category of employees in Western defense organizations who are important in many ways including the organizational subcultures in the military: the civilian employees. Kirke (2012) even refers to the civilian workforce as the "fourth service" next to the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. For a

number of reasons this category is important. First, this group of defense workers is fairly large (in most Western nations varying between 20 and 30% of the total defense workforce). In addition, civilians offer either important, specialist knowledge to the organization or they perform modest jobs, both on a (semi-) continuous basis. Civilian personnel stay in their job usually longer than the relatively short period military personnel is tasked to do a specific job. Therefore civilians constitute the organization's memory in many domains. Furthermore, in discussions with politicians on strategy development, strategic decision-making, policy implementation and strategic budget control civilians tend to play an influential role. And finally, civilians are nowadays more frequently deployed in operations, particularly when civil-military cooperation is required.

In general, there are not many problems in the cooperation between military and civilian personnel, particularly not in peacetime conditions. Admittedly, they constitute "different worlds", but in many respects those groups do not differ a lot, even though salary and work conditions may vary. Civilian personnel knows for which organization they work and they are interested in the military's job often because they have or have had relations with military life, through parents, partners or other family members, or often because they have been military personnel themselves. As said, in defense organizations self-selection and *endo-recruitment* (recruitment from within) are fairly common phenomena, even among civilian personnel. Given the well-developed practice of hiring ex-military people as civilians one could even speak of *retro-recruitment* being as important as *endo-recruitment*. These mechanisms produce homogeneity in military organizational cultures, even though many colleagues are not, or no longer, military people.

As said, in the US military, but also elsewhere in the Western world, civilian personnel is increasingly deployed and integrated in ordinary military operational contexts (Hajjar 2014). First studies in the US Navy show that this is not problematic: the navy military appreciate their civilian colleagues because they perform either specialist jobs they are not capable of doing, such as engineering, or because the civilians do the jobs the military do not see as their core activities (laundry, cooking, cleaning). At the same time, these *civilian Navy personnel* do not harm the morale on the ship. To a certain degree this appreciation is remarkable, because the military also think the civilians are better paid and have better work conditions (Kelty 2008: 556 and further). In a second study, this time in the U.S. Army, the latter phenomenon was even more salient; military personnel appeared to have considerable resentment about civilian contractors who accrued greater benefits for doing similar work (Kelty and Bierman 2013). Even though military personnel valued the civilians' contributions, they were critical as well, leading to general feelings of ambivalence. This ambivalence may have operational consequences. If operations become "hot" and the input of civilians is considered necessary anyway, the cooperation is not likely to be as smooth as decision makers prefer to think.

In the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, civilians have played significant roles. Next to civilian personnel from the MODs, these were civil servants from the departments of Foreign Affairs, Security, Agriculture, Developmental Assistance and Justice as well as the civilian contractors that were just mentioned. Their roles were particularly important for the political, administrative and development-related aspects of the operations that were going on.

In two rather critical books about the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan Washington Post journalist Chandrasekaran (2007, 2012) describes how tensions and rivalries between the various American military units but also between the civilians and the military influenced the course of the operations negatively. For some of the military their annoyance about things going wrong was exclusively aimed at the civilians in charge. "If we lose, it is going to be because of the civilians", an American military person in ISAF HQ in Kabul said (Chandrasekaran 2012: 219). A point in case was that the civilians in charge were selected more because of their

political background, views and ideology and less because of their technical skills and expertise. Being a "true believer" was more important than having relevant experience, expertise and technical skills. The resulting different "constructions of reality" were too divergent to make a harmonious organizational culture within the mission possible. This had clear negative operational outcomes: as said, organizational culture is a soft phenomenon with potentially hard consequences.

Other than in the American context, the integration of Dutch civil servants in military operations seems to have been less complicated, probably because their selection has been less based on their political and ideological beliefs and more on their professional competence. Experiences with the Dutch military in Uruzgan (Soeters 2013a) demonstrate that the integration of (high ranking) civilians in the military's operational decision-making and actions has been accepted and embraced more easily than in the more war-prone Anglo-Saxon militaries. For the Americans and Australians in that province the role and importance of Dutch civilian personnel in the hyper-military context of Southern Afghanistan was outright "bizarre" (Soeters et al. 2012: 172–174).

Civil-Military Interaction

In civil-military cooperation, the input of civilians is important par excellence. Because the civilians in this cooperation do not belong to the military or other national governmental organizations (but to the UN, aid organizations etc.), the organizational cultural integration needs to expand beyond the borders of the military itself. Studies in the Anglo-Saxon context show that one cannot take this organizational cultural integration for granted. Military personnel and outside civilians are *strange bedfellows* so to speak (Winslow 2002; Franke 2006).

Research in the Dutch context confirms this picture: various studies have demonstrated significant cultural differences between the military (including the reservists) and personnel from NGOs and IOs during operations (Scheltinga et al. 2005; Rietjens and Bollen 2008). These differences pertain to time and results orientation, centralization, action proneness and flexibility. Military personnel are directed towards achieving quick and practical results based on clear instructions, whereas for NGO personnel the more long-term process of development seems more important. Additionally, there are often discussions and rivalries about the organizations' domain and competencies (who is entitled to do what?), and among the NGO personnel oftentimes concerns about their impartiality occur when they work together with the military. But a careful selection of personnel and the willingness to look with "different eyes" appear to be important tools to improve the collaboration.

Challenges for the Future

In this chapter the multiple manifestation of organizational culture in the military has been emphasized. Talking about military culture as one *Gestalt* no longer seems appropriate. At the same time the multiple organizational (sub-)cultures in the military—even though seemingly quite stubborn and fairly traditional (Hannan and Freeman 1984)—are not immune to changes and discussions (Hajjar 2014). As indicated earlier (Soeters 2000), the bureaucratic character of the organizational cultures in the military is persistent ànd changing at the same time. Military organizational cultures are becoming generally less coercive (Adler and Borys 1996), which is connected to the increasing educational, professional and perhaps also moral competencies of the work force, the growing orientation towards the external labor market, the increasing influence of the media, and technological changes that make new balances between centralization and decentralization possible.

Looking at future developments, the military is apt and creative in learning, improving and introducing innovations. However, one should be aware that these improvements predominantly tend to be of a technological and functional-rational character as we saw earlier,

fitting in the general framework of conventional, kinetic warfare (e.g., Ender 2009: 86; Etzioni 2016). These innovations are about: faster, more powerful, more precise, better protected, less observable, safer, greener, better sensing, less risks, and better data integration, which is all tremendously important. On the other hand, the military seem less capable of introducing improvements in a broader perspective, at the level of substantive rationality, as sociologists would say. This line of thinking would predominantly aim at preventing, containing or ending large-sized conflicts and reducing unintended negative consequences of military action on the short and the long run. Such way of thinking is often weakly developed as for example has been illustrated by the upheaval and chaos that emerged after the military operations in Iraq and Lybia (e.g., Anderson 2015).

This way of thinking is lagging behind presumably because mono-disciplinary professionals' social and cognitive boundaries generally tend to retard the spread of real innovations, as research in the medical sector has demonstrated (Ferlie et al. 2005). Because military culture consists of many organizational (sub-)cultures these mental boundaries are likely to play a role here as well. This may occur in various manners. For instance, the difficult questions pertaining to the broader "sticky knowledge" of the conflict's root causes are left to the "specialists" at the rear end of the mission. Front-line operators are hardly trained and enabled to see and spread the importance of their first-hand experiences (Feld 1959; Seely Brown and Duguid 1998: 99–100), other than the hostility they may have encountered. Deficient substantive rationality may also be a consequence of preferring (selecting, keeping, rewarding and promoting) people with beliefs and views that are consistent with the traditionally dominating belief systems in the military, and expulsing others. Cultural inbreeding is not likely to be conducive to substantive innovating. By consequence, in a broader perspective the capacities of the military to create changes that match with developments in today's world seem challenging. In general, if organizational cultures are strong (like they are in the military), the organization's capability to display reliable performance attenuates dramatically when the task environment becomes more volatile (Sørensen 2002: 88).

In such a volatile world traditional kinetic military operations will be more frequent yet smaller, and they will be different, making use of relatively small sized Special Operations Forces, local troops and technologically advanced drones and fighting aircraft. Instead, controlling and dealing with large-scale lingering population-centered conflicts and large-sized humanitarian disasters will require relatively more manpower. An important feature of all operations is the cooperation with host-nationals and people from other organizations, be they militaries from other nations, volunteers from NGOs and IOs or civilians from all sorts of organizations including their own military organizations. Creating an "open mindset" in the military will be an important organizational cultural challenge to cope with these developments. Of course in some nations' armed forces this challenge will be less difficult than in armed forces where the warrior ethos, emphasizing the military's core aim of eliminating the enemy, is strongly rooted.

In such armed forces, cultural change is not an easy game. General McChrystal has continuously stressed the contra-productive effects of collateral deadly violence among the "average Omars" in Afghanistan (Chandrasekaran 2012: 251). He also hammered at the importance of negotiation and reconciliation. But, before his approach could have influenced the operational culture, this commander had to leave the mission. This attempt to change the operational culture therefore did not succeed, nor were later—however weaker—attempts successful. Endeavors in the British army to make the military operations less kinetic and more population-centered were accepted on paper, but in everyday operational practice "in the field" this cultural change failed. Operational units at the lower tactical levels were not capable or willing to carry out the operations in a less-kinetic way because they could not understand why this would be necessary. Even training programs did not change: in the UK one

continued to train the units that were going to be deployed in the usual kinetic, offensive manner (Catignani 2012). Similar experiences have been reported in relation to the French armed forces (Haddad 2010).

These experiences indicate that strategies and cultures of organizations are closely connected. They also show that organizational cultures and subcultures in the military are difficult to change. Yet, it will be the challenge for the militaries' apex—both military and civilian personnel—to prepare different units and workforce categories for the future, learning from other armed forces' lessons and walking the path of organizational cultural integration and real innovation. One will need to make use of the organization's differentiated composition and create aligned organizational subcultures that are better working together. Thus, a so-called intergroup relational identity is needed as long as the various elements of the military 'symphony orchestra' tend to be self-definitionally important, mutually too competitive and too sensitive to threats to their own identity (Hogg et al. 2012). Taxpayers and citizens from all over the world who experience military action in their everyday life deserve nothing less.

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Author Biography

Joseph Soeters held the chair of management and organization studies at the Faculty of Military Studies of the Netherlands Defence Academy. Currently, he is a part-time professor of organizational sociology at Tilburg University. He has been an associate editor of Armed Forces and Society for a number of years, and he was the Vice-president of RC 01 of the International Sociological Association (on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution)—currently he is member of the board. He has been the dean of the Faculty of Military Studies in the period 1999–2003. He has published extensively about the military, both in peacetime and operational conditions, in (co-)edited volumes, two monograph, articles in international journals and book chapters.

Military Officer Education

14

Giuseppe Caforio

Foreword

The officer corps has always been a vital component of armed forces: it is their leadership, it possesses and imparts professional expertise, it determines the military mind-set, it upholds and revises the military ethic. Its importance is witnessed by the host of studies that have examined it from a sociological standpoint (1) as well as those of other disciplines.

Naturally, even though it has sought a degree of social separateness in certain historical periods, or been so driven, the officer corps also interacts with all the other social actors present on the national stage and, in part, also on the international one.

Sociology thus undertakes the study of officership according to the same schemes it applies in investigating any group or social aggregate: it studies the process of newcomer socialization, its internal dynamics, the individual's relations

with the group, the relations of the officer corps with other social groups, and with society as a whole.

In this chapter we shall look at the socialization process of those who enter the corps, by which term we mean the process by which an individual learns and absorbs the complex of rules, values, behaviours and cultural models that a given social group has laid down for its members.

For what regards a profession (2), this process is normally considered to be subdivided into two phases: primary socialization (for the profession, anticipatory), and secondary or professional socialization (on professional socialization see Merton et al. 1957; Barretti 2004; Cochran et al. 2005; Miller 2010; Ongiti 2012).

Primary socialization means the process the individual undergoes to become a member of society at large (family, school, sports, friends); it is considered anticipatory when it predisposes the subject to adhere to the set of values proper to the profession that one is concerned with.

Secondary (or, in our case, professional) socialization is the socialization to which the individual is subjected when he wishes to enter a narrower, more specialized social group: in our case a profession. It generally takes place in educational institutions (universities, academies) and is often completed through a practical training period in the chosen professional milieu.

G. Caforio (✉)
Pisa, Italy

In examining the officer's profession, we see that anticipatory socialization takes on particular value in the selection process for admission to the military academies. This selection, usually made on large numbers of applicants, has the specific aim of choosing the individuals best suited to the next process—professional socialization—not only from the intellectual standpoint but especially for adherence to certain social values, character traits, role commitment, and an aptitude for identifying with a highly particular professional reference group. From this point of view it differs substantially from the selection procedures normally adopted by the other professions. For the military, those who enter the academy become part of the institution itself, they immediately become members; their expulsion is therefore in some way a pathological event (3) (see also in this book Chap. 13 by Joseph Soeters).

The first part of this chapter is devoted to the methods and modes of this selection.

The officer's professional socialization instead occurs during an actual educational process: it takes place in special training institutes which until recently (the last decade of the twentieth century) were strongly separated from the national education systems in the various countries but are substantially now in a process of drawing closer to them. These training institutes, mostly called "military academies," basically have two objectives: one is to endow the individual with the necessary expertise for exercising the profession, the other is to transform the anticipatory socialization into a true and complete professional socialization. Professional socialization tends more to strengthen and better define values acquired in anticipatory socialization that are consonant with the military institution than to inculcate them in the individual ex novo (Hammill 1995). For this purpose, special procedures are used in order to induce strong normative compliance, such as community life, discipline, emphasized hierarchical authority, rules for public and private behaviour, and a system of sanctions.

The educational offerings of the military academies, as well as the general characteristics of their internal life, are dealt with in the first part of this chapter as well.

But what is the effect of this secondary socialization on the individual? How and to what extent does it achieve results that are functional to the officer profession? The answers to these questions are of great interest to sociological investigation, because they are the fruit of field research and are able to provide concrete and often new data to those who are called to act on the officer socialization process. The second part of the chapter is devoted to these aspects.

A third part is devoted to giving an account of the assessments on officer training expressed by commanders with field experience, citing some results of an empirical research recently (2014) carried out.

The fourth part of the chapter is aimed at identifying an ideal-type of the military professional of the twenty-first century through the data of an empirical research conducted on military academy cadets.

Finally, a few conclusions are presented, aimed at illustrating the possible evolutionary lines, as well as the problems, of officer education and training in the new millennium.

Selection and Education of the Professional Officer

Selection

The selection procedure generally (4) used for young men and women who aspire to become officers in the armed forces is that of a public competition based on educational qualifications and test performance. The educational qualification is normally a secondary school diploma and the examinations are comprised of a battery of cultural, aptitude and physical tests.

The requested educational qualification is the one normally required to gain access to a country's university system since the officer training programme, whether it leads to a degree or not, is always a college-level programme.

As already mentioned, the testing can be divided into actual examinations aimed at

ascertaining a homogeneous cultural preparation and a given level of knowledge among young people coming from different schools and regions within a country, and selection tests aimed at ascertaining the applicant's suitability in terms of character and physical aptitude for the officer profession.

This second part, which has no parallel in the selection made for the other professions or for access to other university-level programmes, is particularly important for evaluating applicants' anticipatory socialization (5). It includes a medical check-up, physical screening tests, aptitude selection tests and, frequently, an interview. The medical examination and the physical selection are obviously aimed at assessing whether the young person has the psychophysical characteristics needed to cope in a profession that, more than many others, subjects the individual to intense, prolonged physical and psychological stresses. The aptitude tests evaluate character and personality, while the interview is aimed at assessing the compatibility of the applicant's motivations, values and convictions with the value set proper to the military.

In various countries (6), the verification of satisfactory anticipatory socialization continues through an initial period (generally a few months) of actual military life, either a training period at the military educational institutions or a period of actual military service in the rank and file of a military unit (7).

But since sociology is a very concrete science and we have instead so far talked at a very general, theoretical level, it seems appropriate to give a few examples of how this selection procedure is carried out for a cadet programme and how selective it is.

The example given in Table 14.1 refers to Italy and is taken from one of my previously published researches (Caforio 2000, p. 106).

As far as the US is concerned we can report that applications at the Military Academy at West Point for the year 2013 were the following: 15,171 people applied for about 1320 places in the incoming class, with the ratio of applicants per place of 11.5 and an acceptance rate of 9%. At the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs,

9890 people applied for about 1350 places, with a ratio of applicants for place of 6 and an acceptance rate of 13%; and at the Navy Academy in Annapolis 20,600 people applied for about 1211 places, with 17 applicants per place and an acceptance rate of 6%.

A quantitative understanding of how the selection process works can be gleaned from the example given below for some European countries. As can be easily calculated, the average figure here is between 3.7 and 10.8 applicants per opening; the trend is rather constant (see Table 14.2).

Going back to the general discussion, all the selection tests mentioned above produce scores that, added up and considered in various manners for each country, result in an overall score for each applicant. The scores are used to rank the applicants, from the highest to the lowest, and applicants are admitted on this basis until the established number of places are filled.

In many countries the aptitude selection tests are carried out at specialized centres—for example, the Applicant Testing Centre for Commissioned Service in Cologne, for Germany —and include a series of tests such as (the example is taken from Sweden: see Alise Weibull in Caforio 2000, pp. 189–190):

– ability tests: the Bongard test-pattern recognition, spatial reasoning, and number series;
– personality tests: cognitive style (examples of scales used are: sensation orientation, intuitive decision-making, concrete thinking, working group empathy, ethnocentrism, impulsiveness);
– interview: psychologists interview each applicant for 90 min and rate them on the following variables: social ability, professional motivation, stability, intellectual ability, energy, and maturity.

In other cases the interview by the psychologist is replaced by or supplemented with an interview conducted by the military members of the competition board. As a Polish colleague reports (see Jarmoszko in Caforio 2000, p. 142). "*The talk allows the board to get additional*

Table 14.1 Selection of applicants of 176th course (1994) for the Italian army academy[a]

Places 303		
	Discharged	Remaining
Applicants		6307
Rejected applications	242 (most for being more than 22 years old)	
Present at preselection		4593
Failed	2412	
Present at physical selection		2181
Failed	252	
Present at medical selection		1683
Failed	398	
Present at psychological selection		1272
Failed	251	
Present at written exam		923
Failed	267	
Present at oral exam		510
Failed	184	
Suitable registered applicants		326
Admitted to probationary period		320
Discharged	26	
Enrolled		294

Note Between selection tests, the total number of applicants also decreases due to some applicants' abandoning the competition

[a]The selection rate remained unchanged percentagewise in the 2000s. The number of available places has instead declined and now stands at around 85 due to the general downsizing of the armies of the developed countries

Table 14.2 Rate of selection for military academies in some European countries (applicants per place)

Country/year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Average rate
Denmark	4.7	3.8	8.7	14.5	3.6	5.3	2.5	4.6	10.2				6.4
Greece	8.4	7.6	10.9	11.6	10.2	8.3	6.9	7.4	8.6				8.9
Portugal	9.3	8.8	10.1	12.4	10.3	11.9	12.6	10.2	11.3	12.8	10.8	8.9	10.8
Belgium[a]		2.8	3.0	3.3	2.8	3.1	3.4	3.1	3.0	3.7	3.8	4.1	3.7
Finland				3.8	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.5	3.9	3.5	4.1	4.9	3.9
Poland			4.8	5.8	3.1	3.1	6.7	14.8	12.2	9.8	11.9	11.4	8.3

[a]Applicants = only the candidates who were present at the academic exams (last step of the selection process, after initial selection on physical, sport and motivation criteria). The Academy is responsible for the last step of the selection process, not the earlier steps, which are handled by another service (recruitment and selection)

(*besides the documentation provided and examination and test results*) *information on the applicant's motivations*, *interests*, *life plans*, etc. It evaluates: *service as a means* (*logical thinking*, *ability to present arguments rationally*, *language sufficiency*), *understanding of the officer's social and professional role*, *self-control*, *and general bearing*".

In the U.S., for example, for the Army there is a preparatory school at West Point where applicants are prepared, evaluated and rated in the following areas:

Character:

USMAPS has a simple standard: "We expect Cadet Candidates to do what is right—all the time". Character is the foundation for all we do and its development in each of our candidates is central to our purpose

Education:

Cadet Candidates are introduced to education as a lifelong endeavor. They prepare themselves by developing speaking, writing and reading skills, learning to think critically and logically and learning to master fundamental mathematical principles

Health and fitness:

Cadet Candidates develop and learn habits of health and fitness. They learn the importance of staying fit and the consequences of drug and alcohol abuse. They begin to accept responsibility for their own well being

Culture:

Cadet Candidates learn to appreciate individual and cultural differences in an environment which fosters equal opportunity for all and does not tolerate sexual harassment in any form. They interact with people who are different from themselves in the classroom, in the barracks, on the sports fields, and during off duty recreational time

Career:

Cadet Candidates prepare to take their place at West Point and in a challenging Army profession by learning to understand their own strength and weaknesses, setting academic and career goals, and developing a strong work ethic

Communal:

Cadet Candidates learn how to live in a community by respecting their fellow candidates and the environment, serving the community and sharing pride in their school and West Point

Personal:

Cadet Candidates begin to understand who they are by managing their emotions, internalizing the values and principles which guide West Point and the profession of arms, learning how to make decisions and solve problems, and demonstrating personal responsibility

Source US Army Preparatory School (2014) web site

In the Anglo-Saxon countries in general, the preparation of candidates for selection to the military academies constitutes such an important problem that special publications exist as a guide to this preparation (for the UK, for example, see the volume by McMunn 2015).

These brief national examples can, I feel, give an idea of the importance and thoroughness of this process of ascertaining an appropriate anticipatory socialization, a process which, as said, does not have a parallel in the admissions processes for other professions or university programmes.

Education

Generally we can say that the education programmes of the military academies are a mix of strictly military subjects and others more specific to university studies (Kennedy et al. 2002; Klinger 2004; Farrell 2004; Abbe 2009; Corum 2012; Edward 2014). The former usually include strategy, tactics, logistics, weapons and firing, military history, leadership, communication systems, NBC defence, combat training, and military exercises. These days the university subjects are largely those studied in political science programmes (8). They generally include international relations, political economy, contemporary history, computer science, sociology, geography, public law, governmental accounting, and foreign languages.

One important exception to this orientation are the education programmes followed by American officers, where, also for army cadets, the core education is still chiefly constituted by mathematics and engineering, although a sizeable number of disciplines taken from the social sciences have been added in recent years (Franke 2001). The philosophy behind this different approach was that "*because the Army works with both people and machines and because it serves in the United States and abroad*, *it needs officers whose education has provided a solid foundation in both the arts and the sciences*" (United States Military Academy online prospectus 2002).

A philosophy aimed at giving a multidisciplinary preparation and quite confirmed over time, as stated in the rather generic Academic Program Class of 2016: The Overarching Academic Goal (The full document is available at http://indianawpparents.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Family-Weekend-Academic-Brief-20161021-shared.pdf):

> Graduates integrate knowledge and skills from a variety of disciplines to anticipate and respond

appropriately to opportunities and challenges in a changing world.

However, as can be seen from the text, in 14 years the American officer training philosophy has partially changed (albeit with little formal evidence): in the humanistic (arts) training/scientific training dilemma there is no longer insistence on the latter, but a generic reliance on a variety of disciplines suitable for preparing future commanders to cope with constantly changing operational situations.

However, the nature of the education programmes still displays strong national characteristics in the European countries as well. These characteristics allow us to distinguish the two main orientations existing today: one that privileges a typical military education, with less space for general university culture, and a second orientation that tends to bring officer education closer to the national university systems, including the awarding of a true university degree with value on the civilian market at the end of the programme. In this second orientation the civilian university-type subjects (as said, generally political science courses) have prevalence over the more strictly military ones, the advanced study of which is often postponed to later educational stages (such as the various war colleges).

The motivations of the countries that have opted for this second choice are, generally, the following: giving the officer a type of basic education that better integrates him into the context of the surrounding society and facilitates his collaboration with officials and agents of other institutional sectors; providing him with cultural knowledge that makes him better prepared for operating in non-traditional military missions, such as Peace Support Operations (PSOs) (9), also in the context of asymmetric warfare; giving the officer better opportunities for a second career in the event that he leaves the military (10); and enhancing the prestige and attractiveness of the profession by giving the officer a more widely recognized degree in the national environment.

The discussion on the advisability of making practical military training prevail over academic training is still very much alive, as we are reminded, for example, by Ben-Shalom (2014, p. 51), who, reporting the opinions of Israeli officers collected in a field research, states: "*The findings reveal disagreement between a practical approach, one that emphasizes commanders' experience, and a system approach, which emphasizes long-term professional development. The first approach views academic training as taking place at the expense of practical soldiering qualities, while the second approach sees practical soldiering and military education as complementary*".

He then concludes by observing (p. 71) that practical military experience "*is necessary for the successful performance of tasks at the junior commander level. However, formal education provides officers with the ability to deal with more complex military challenges faced at higher ranks. Thus, formal education will be advantageous when today's company commanders become tomorrow's senior commanders. The training of combat commanders in the IDF must ensure that officers receive both experience and formal education, and that neither approach comes at the expense of the other*".

It is therefore a problem of balance between two training processes to which the different countries are giving (or studying) their own original solutions.

One particular aspect of the education system that has significant influence on the secondary socialization process (which we shall talk about in the next section) is the internal environment of the military academies. Traditionally and on principle it is quite different from the environment in which cadets' generational peers in other professional categories pursue their studies, that is, civilian universities. Therefore, it is good to have a general idea of this environment.

As is widely known, cadets normally live a shared, collegial-type life in the institutes where they pursue both their academic studies and, usually, their military training. Their status is military and from the start of the education process they are subject to the rules and customs of military discipline, and are often part of actual military units (14).

The theoretical definition of this type of environment has been given on a more general level—and not only for military institutes—by Ervin Goffman in a study that had considerable echo among social scientists (Goffman 1961; and his interpreters, like, for instance: Becker 2003; Smith 2003; Dos Santos 2009; Vienne 2015; see also the chapter of this volume "Some Historical Notes"), and certainly the military academies, to a different degree from one country to the next, reflect some features of what Goffman called the "total institution". To give, as always, a concrete idea of what this means, I report below what a Dutch sociologist writes on the internal environment of the military academy of his country (R. Molker, in Caforio 2000, p. 123): the academy's motto "Honi soit qui mal y pense", he reports, "*is characteristic of the military education/socialization system as 'total institution'. In principle, a total institution is 'inner directed' and does not easily accept criticism. According to Goffman, other characteristics of total institutions are*:

– *rational orientation towards a goal, or in other words: the total institution is a rational means to an end that otherwise would be realised with difficulty (or not at all)*;
– *the presence of (physical and psychological) barriers between the 'inmates' (the residents) of the institution and the world outside*;
– *work and private life are integrated*;
– *all things, activities, et cetera are scheduled*;
– *inmates and staff are segregated*;
– *life under one authority.*

All these characteristics apply to the military education/socialization system at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy".

What Volker Franke writes referring to the American situation (Franke 2000, p. 177) goes in the same direction: "*Military socialization exemplifies the identification process. Basic training, for instance, typically disconnects recruits from past social network and established identities and develops new identities. Although recruits begin basic training as complete strangers, the isolation from civilian society, an almost complete lack of privacy, and shared socialization experiences create a strong normative group bond among new soldiers. By depriving recruits of any alternative sources of meaning, basic training almost invariably induces individuals to adopt the 'soldier' frame of reference*".

As said earlier, the situation differs from country to country, and the convergence between military studies and university studies also involves the internal environment of the military academies. There is a clash here between what are considered two opposing requirements of officer education: the substantial freedom of academic studies and the necessity of a particular professional socialization for officers (Lovell 1969; Priest 1998; Franke 2001).

Professional Socialization in Military Academies

The professional socialization of officers mainly takes place in military academies, even if, as for other professions, it also continues during their careers and is then completed with experiences in the field.

Obviously, for a suitable anticipatory socialization to a military career to be fruitful, an adequate professional socialization must be grafted onto it. And it is precisely a graft in a botanical sense, where the stock is the primary formation of personality and character and the scion is the complex of values, mentality, and knowledge that make up the professional socialization. If stock and scion are healthy and compatible, the tree will bear good fruit during its maturity.

From these premises the necessity of varied and numerous studies on the socialization in military academies is evident. Among other things, the different case studies make it possible to assess not only the efficacy of the professional socialization produced by the individual academy, but also to evaluate the effectiveness and correctness of the initial selection of the applicants, a selection, as already said, chiefly aimed at determining how suitable their anticipatory socialization is. In addition, according to some authors (15), today's military academies are fully

successful only in the officer socialization process; from the standpoint of professional studies the results are considered less satisfactory.

Here I shall be referring mainly to a general cross-national study on socialization in European military academies and to some sectoral studies (which I shall cite as they arise) on the comparable individual aspects of the American academies or other situations in the developed countries. As stated earlier, these situations are the most significant ones, and also those for which there are valid studies and researches to take as reference.

Methodologies of an Empirical Research

A significant comparative study was carried out by my research group on the professional socialization process of cadets in the academies of ten different European countries (see Caforio 1998).

Before discussing the results, however, some basic information should be provided on how the study was conducted; this information will also constitute a useful example or paradigm for readers wishing to undertake a cross-national research of some type on themes of the sociology of the military.

The survey on the training institutes for European officers was aimed both at assessing cadets' values and attitudes and the changes produced on them by the education period as well as on the cadets' professional conceptions. At the same time we wanted to see what was shared by the cadets of the different countries and what was peculiar to those belonging to one specific country.

Despite the fact that these kinds of studies should require a diachronic procedure—to analyse the same cohort of cadets over time—the findings of our research study regarded different samples taken from different contemporary classes present in the academies. However, we assumed that this type of analysis could give us results that would not be too distant from a cohort analysis. This assumption stemmed from

the fact that at the Italian Army Academy we had done both transversal and longitudinal surveys on this subject. In comparing the results we found that the data and trends of the two surveys were very similar.

Ten countries participated in the research: the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. A structured questionnaire of 37 questions was submitted to 2850 cadets of the countries listed above. The questionnaire had been previously tested on a sample of Italian Army cadets. National samples were selected by class year and were stratified proportionally according to the chosen curriculum. Sample extraction was performed using the random function of the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet program (16).

The processing of the research data was then carried out within a theoretical framework previously discussed and agreed among the researchers. Sociological literature on the military has a number of interpretive models, some of which were considered in the research. Two dichotomous models, the bureaucratic/professional and the professional/occupational, were judged to be particularly well suited. These models had been constructed and already used to analyse the officer profession (Larson 1977; Feld 1977; Prandstraller 1985; Nuciari 1985; Segal 1986; Caforio 1988; Caforio and Nuciari 1994).

As known, the officer's profession takes place in the framework of a complex organization; it is thus characterized both by professional and bureaucratic aspects. This observation led to the construction by various authors (see above) of an interpretive model—the bureaucratic/professional model—that takes account of this bipolarization and is a suitable tool for identifying the position that a single officer (but also, if one wishes, a national officer corps) occupies along the continuum between the bureaucratic pole and the professional pole (17).

The professional/occupational dichotomy originates from American sociological literature (18), which considers two different and somewhat opposing attitudes on the part of the officer: the first, the professional one, emphasizes

professional values and the traditional features of the military profession; the second, termed occupational, is more centred on market values and tends to consider the military profession *just like another job* (Moskos 1988). An empirical research on European officers carried out by our working group in 1992–93 (Caforio and Nuciari 1994) led us to define a typology more pertinent to the results of the empirical research, a typology constituted by the following four positions: *radical professional, pragmatic professional, indifferent, occupational*. This modified professional/occupational model was later used in processing the results of the research on professional socialization in European military academies.

Motivations of Professional Choice

Having completed our methodological premise, we can now summarize (19) the salient data that emerged from the study.

First of all, features common to the different countries definitely exist that allow us to sketch a kind of ideal-type of the European military cadet, as it emerges from the survey.

The cadet in the studied European countries comes prevalently from the middle class, with more lower-class origins in the ex-communist countries and a more upper-class recruitment for the remaining countries. However, there appears to be a gradual converging trend for these situations: recruitment in the ex-communist countries is becoming more elitist, while in Western Europe it increasingly draws on the lower class. Another common trend is the decline in endo-recruitment in recent years, a phenomenon that might contribute to greater convergence (in the Janowitzian sense: Janowitz 1971) of military professionals with the parent society.

Researches conducted on U.S. Army cadets (Hammill 1995) show that also for the U.S. the social origin of cadets is predominantly middle class, with a strong component of endo-recruitment. Hammill and Segal write

(op. cit., p. 104): "*The Corps of Cadets over-represents students from military families*, relative to most educational institutions, *and underrepresents women*" and, further on (op. cit., p. 105): "*West Point cadets are drawn largely from America's middle class. In 1988, almost two thirds of the entering class of male cadets reported annual family incomes of* $40,000 *or more, and the fathers of more than* 60% *of the cadets had college or graduate degrees*". Albeit in a certain homogeneity of the prevalent social origin, some differences nevertheless emerge in comparing the two surveys: the West Point cadets constitute a population that has attained a high standard of academic achievement in secondary school, while the average student admitted to the European military academies does not seem to have achieved the same level of excellence.

The motivations that drive European youths to take up the officer profession are still mostly reasons of the traditional type, such as *interest in the military, wanted to play my part in serving my nation,* and *looking for adventure*, but here, too, with a difference between cadets in the ex-communist countries and cadets in the other countries. The former display higher percentages than the latter with respect to motivations defined here as *post-traditional*, such as *opportunities for education and further training, wanting to be independent, wanting to act as a teacher*, and *interested in technology and engineering.*

Before going into the data analysis in greater detail it must be pointed out that the reasons for choosing the military profession normally stem from a particular anticipatory socialization. This is especially true today, when the values which modern society tends to emphasize—individualism, creativity, self-actualization, personal independence—often appear to diverge from, and at times to clash with, values like solidarity, cooperation, altruism, tradition and discipline, which are proper to the military institution.

Thus, to evaluate the impact that professional socialization has on cadets during their time at the academy, it seems particularly important to

determine the prevalent initial motivations for their choice, that is, the extent to which they have been influenced by anticipatory socialization.

Considering the survey sample in its entirety, these reasons can be ranked as follows:

- interest in the military
- serving one's nation
- looking for adventure
- interest in sports and physical activities
- opportunities for education and further training
- interest in leading men
- because of military ethics
- working in a disciplined organization
- wanting to go to sea/to fly/to parachute
- wanting to be independent
- wanting to act as a teacher.

These 11 motivations of choice out of the total 19 allowed cover 71.3% of the responses; the remaining ones are not listed because they all have very modest percentage shares, also considering the "don't knows" and omitted responses.

It is interesting to note, first of all, how the order of preference of the reasons for the cadets' professional choice is very similar to the one expressed by already commissioned officers in a European cross-national survey carried out by the same working group in the period 1991–92 (Caforio 1994). This seems to indicate that the effect that anticipatory socialization has on the motivations underlying this choice retains its efficacy over time and throughout the subsequent period of professional socialization.

Next, it should be pointed out that a subdivision according to the interpretive models adopted here show that, in the bureaucratic/professional dichotomy, cadets with a bureaucratic orientation register a lower percentage of adherence to the more "traditional" reasons of choice than the "professional" cadets.

In the occupational/professional dichotomy, those who fall into the "occupational" position display higher percentages of agreement with motivations like the desire for economic independence, an interest in getting a good education,

job security (also in relation to unemployment situations), the salary: an X-ray of a subject with an occupational attitude couldn't produce a better fit. For the "professional" cadets the prevalent reasons of choice are: *wanted to play my part in serving my country*, *I was interested in leading men*, *I was looking for adventure*, *because of military ethics.*

In substance, the application of the two interpretative models shows, on the one hand, their intrinsic coherence, but on the other it seems to warn those in authority that the motivations of choice are later influential in determining the professional typology that is selected and produced: prevalently "bureaucratic" and/or "occupational" motivations will produce an officer who is less bound to the military tradition and more inclined to consider the military a profession like any other. This can have, for example, considerable importance for the advertising approach adopted in officer recruitment campaigns.

An interesting non-European comparison can be made with Australian cadets on the basis of a motivational research conducted in 1992 and published in 1995 (McAllister 1995). Although the motivational choice items are not identical, they are similar enough to compare the data from this study with the European ones. Using the same item names as for the European research, we can say that the Australian cadets' reasons for their professional choice are, in order:

- opportunities for education and further training
- interest in the military
- looking for adventure
- serving one's nation
- to get a steady job and pay
- career opportunities.

As can be seen in comparing the two surveys, there is a hard core of motivations that seem to constitute the main reasons for choice in both samples. These are: interest in the military, looking for adventure, serving one's nation, and opportunities for education. However, the Australian cadets display a greater occupational

interest (to get a steady job and pay: a motivation that also exists for the European cadets, but which ranks towards the bottom for percentage of choices).

Some motivations of choice that ranked among the first 11 in the European research—interest in sports and physical activities, working in a disciplined organization, wanting to go to sea/to fly/to parachute, wanting to be independent, wanting to act as a teacher—were not included in the Australian questionnaire and therefore cannot be compared. An additional motivation—career opportunities—that appears in both questionnaires ranks sixth in the Australian sample and only fourteenth in the European one. This result, too, can probably be interpreted as indicating a more occupational mentality among the Australian cadets (it is not possible here to apply the professional/occupational model due to the difference in the items proposed); however, more investigation would be needed for confirmation.

An American research, albeit limited to the Air Force Academy (McCloy 1988), largely confirms the hard core mentioned above (motivations that can be summarized as interest in the military, opportunities for education and looking for adventure), and adds a prevalent motivation typical of all air force cadets everywhere (the desire to fly, to be pilots).

Cultural Model and Social Image

The cultural model of the officer that the European cadet has in mind appears to be characterized mainly by the social aspects of the profession: characteristics like leadership, responsibility, and cooperativeness are the ones he chooses most often. The second set of characteristics in terms of preference are classified here as *individual* and include qualities like expertise, education, and self-control. The more traditional military characteristics, such as patriotism, bravery, and discipline, tend to receive less consideration (on "military culture" see, among others: Alastair 1995; Wilson 2008;

Higbee 2010; Laurence 2011; Munson 2012; Mahalingam 2013; Hajjar 2014: see also in this volume Chap. 13 by Joseph Soeters).

Despite this common European picture, national differences can be discerned. Adherence to the social aspects of the profession gradually declines as one moves from North-West Europe to the South and East. This decline is countered by a higher percentage of responses for the individual characteristics in France, Italy and the Czech Republic, and for the traditional military ones in Poland, and also in Italy.

The socializing effect of the military academies—measured according to the concentration of the choices—appears more significant in the academies of the Western European countries (with Swedish cadets at the top) than in those of Eastern Europe.

A study that presents comparable data taken from a research conducted at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (Stevens 1994) provides results not unlike the European ones. Also in this research, the cadet's cultural model proves to be centred mainly on the social aspects of the profession (called "interpersonal values" in the study), immediately followed by the individual ones (called "personal values"); the traditional military aspects are not contemplated by the study. Comparison between freshmen and seniors seems to show growing importance of interpersonal values during the socialization process, particularly with regard to some of them, such as "leadership" and "independence".

On the whole, the European cadet's perception of the social image of his chosen profession is good in all the examined countries, with the partial exception of cadets in the Czech Republic, who show less confidence in public esteem. The national situation is rendered by Table 14.3.

Application of the interpretive models to the responses on social image shows that the occupational/professional dichotomy is significant here: the "occupational" cadets are less convinced of the profession's prestige than their "professional" colleagues, an attitude that appears to be consistent with the motivations underlying the choices of this group.

Table 14.3 Perceived social image of the military officer by country (data in %)

Score	Czech	Denm	France	Italy	Lithuan	Nether	Poland	Sweden	Switz
Positive	5	62	65	50	39	66	60	50	41
Neutral	70	38	34	41	57	33	37	49	56
Negative	25	–	1	6	4	1	3	1	3

Evaluation of Professional Choice

But where the effect of socialization at military academies appears to be most significant is in the comparison between the cadets' expectations from military life and the concrete reality of this life as it is lived in these institutions.

Whatever its weight in determining the behaviour and value orientations of young people who choose a career as an officer, anticipatory socialization creates expectations with regard to military life. Such expectations must eventually come to terms with reality, and a first and fundamental moment of this process occurs at the military academy. It thus seems important to evaluate how certain preconceptions fare in comparison with the reality of military life, both upon admission to the academy and in the later years of study.

The general situation from this standpoint is that over half the cadets interviewed find life at the academies conforms to their expectations: however, the percentage of cadets who feel disappointed with respect to these expectations is significant, a good 30% of the sample.

The evaluation expressed as "it is worse that I expected" is considered here in greater depth since it is the most interesting one for possible initiatives by those in authority, and Table 14.4 is dedicated to these negative assessments. The table shows the percentage data for respondents who judged the reality to be worse than they expected for the single aspects considered. The overall average is presented first, followed by the data recorded for the cadets of each country.

The disappointment of European cadets mostly focuses on four aspects of life at the academy, aspects that for this reason are considered "critical" here. From the most critical to the least, they are: efficiency of organization,

behaviour of superiors, impartiality of treatment, and internal dissemination of information.

As can be seen from Table 14.4, there are countries where the idea cadets formed of their future life and activity at the military academy appears to match quite closely the perception they have of the reality at the academy, and other countries where the gap is significant. Since the size of this gap is undoubtedly an interesting indicator, an overall average was made of the positive assessments, the "neutral" assessments ("it is like I expected") and the negative assessments for the respondents of each country. This gap appears rather modest in Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and the Netherlands; it then widens for the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Italy, France and finally Poland, where it reaches truly significant values.

Moreover, the data show widespread and increasing disappointment of expectations during the socialization process, chiefly for those aspects where disappointment showed itself to be most marked. The spread is not uniform, however: while it regards all the countries in relation to the example set by superiors, it regards only three (France, Italy and Lithuania) in relation to the education received. For the problem of equality of treatment, which already appeared significant from general examination of the data, it shows a clear growth trend between first- and second-year cadets in five countries out of eight (France, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland): this is tantamount to saying that life at the academies confirms the opinion of the cadets of these countries that their superiors' behaviour toward them is not impartial.

In applying these interpretive models to the dissatisfaction about the aspects in question, one sees first of all that the cadets' judgements are influenced quite clearly by their bureaucratic or

Table 14.4 Disappointment of expectations among European cadets (%)

Aspect	General data	Czech Republic	Denmark	France	Italy	Lithuania	Netherlands	Poland	Sweden	Switzerland
Impartiality	**45.3**	36.2	11.8	**59.9**	**65.1**	**45.7**	19.7	**67**	13.1	25.9
Efficiency	**54.5**	**56**	**81**	52	46.1	40.2	**68**	**71.9**	42.1	53.1
Values	28.9	**43.3**	14.3	**36.1**	27.7	**36.6**	8.6	**48.7**	6.1	13.8
Sports	22.5	**26.2**	4.8	**25.1**	19.7	16.2	**30.4**	19.8	20	**57.5**
Comradeship	21.3	12.1	4.8	**28**	**32.6**	**30**	12.4	**28.9**	3.2	17.5
Education	27.7	11.4	16.7	**57.2**	18.7	21.5	25.9	22.3	26.2	22.2
Superiors	**47.6**	44	35.7	**58.7**	46.9	44.3	27.1	**68.6**	29.8	38.3
News	**45.1**	44.3	26.2	**55**	**49.1**	30.4	**58**	**50.5**	30.4	**48.1**
Discipline	22.9	**30.2**	**26.2**	22.4	10.1	22.7	**23.9**	**28.1**	**23.8**	**27.2**
Acceptance	23.6	**57.4**	14.3	9.9	**45.6**	**28.9**	**23.9**	23.8	9.3	5
Personality	28.5	12.8	7.1	21.7	**29.1**	**43.9**	19.1	**54.4**	11.5	3.7
Qualities	30.7	30	–	**31.9**	**40.5**	**38.2**	21.3	**38.9**	15.8	16.5
Relations	22.6	**26.2**	7.1	20.4	**24.5**	**35.2**	18.3	**37.3**	3.6	13.6
Severity	18.2	10.6	9.8	**30.2**	15.7	**24.4**	**23.5**	**20**	5.2	18.5

The highlighted data for the individual countries are those that exceed the averages of the overall sample

professional attitude. The cadet with a professional attitude is quite disappointed in life at the academy: the percentage of "professional" cadets who express a negative judgement is higher than the sample average in 10 aspects out of 14, often with quite large differences (10–11%). The cadet with a bureaucratic attitude is in a diametrically opposed position, of course: perhaps precisely because of his bureaucratic orientation, he displays less "pretentious" cultural models from the start, or adapts more easily to less "professional" situations.

In a less distinct way, breakdown according to the professional/occupational model also produces a figure that stands out, by and large, for dissatisfaction expressed with regard to the various aspects in question: this is the cadet with an occupational attitude. Data show that the "occupational" cadet displays greater than average dissatisfaction in nine aspects out of 14, even though this time the differences are smaller (maximum 7–8%). Here it can be hypothesized that embracing the officer's career while considering it a job like any other makes it harder for this type of cadet to deal with the sacrifices that military life demands from the start, sacrifices greater than those required by comparable professional socializations in just about all countries. It may be that—as for the "bureaucratic" cadets, although in a quite different way—anticipatory socialization has worked for these cadets in a manner that is not entirely functional to the chosen profession.

The confirmation or disappointment of expectations finds correlation with the level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction regarding the choice made. Generally speaking, most European military cadets display satisfaction about the time spent in the academy; however, some dissatisfaction can be observed among the respondents from the Czech Republic, Poland, France and Lithuania, all ranging between 31 and 32%. Conversely, the percentage of dissatisfieds remains particularly low (below 18%) for Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy.

Among the factors influencing cadets' evaluation of their time spent at the academy is of course their assessment of the usefulness of their studies for their future professional work. In general, the data show that the cadets judge the adequacy of their curriculum at the academy rather harshly: less than 50% of respondents consider their studies to be highly useful, and over 20% consider them to be of little use.

Lastly, a few remarks can be made in regard to anticipatory socialization. As we have seen, a presumable lack of anticipatory socialization causes significant departures from the average values of satisfaction/dissatisfaction compared to the expectations for some categories of interviewees ('bureaucratic", "occupational"). One might hypothesize here that a relative lack of anticipatory socialization makes some types of cadet more fragile in coping with the undoubted hardships and sacrifices of military training. Analysis of the group of cadets who seem to display insufficient anticipatory socialization lends support to this hypothesis, at least for those countries where this group is fairly large.

Of course, the issue of disappointed expectations—like that of confirmed expectations—cannot be reduced to a purely statistical matter. Local, environmental and cultural factors, such as the real living and learning conditions at the academies and the social acceptance of officers in the country in question, certainly come into play as well.

The World of Values

The survey also revealed a number of value-related and social aspects that are of undoubted significance for defining the ideal-type of the European cadet.

The analysis on the value orientations of cadets was conducted according to two lines of research. The first was aimed at examining cadets' attitudes—and the change in them during the socialization process—toward the significant social institutions common to the different countries; the second sought to define their attitudes toward sets of behaviours taken as indicators of corresponding values.

The confidence expressed by cadets in the various social institutions was considered by

grouping these institutions into the following sectors, which appeared to be significant:

a. public institutions (civil servants, teachers, magistrates, government)
b. law and order institutions (police, military)
c. ideological institutions (politicians, clergy, journalists)
d. work/business (entrepreneurs, banks, trade unions).

Globally, the cadets' confidence in social institutions appears to be high in all the countries and towards all the institutions, with the partial exception of journalists, politicians and trade unions, for which lower percentages of confidence are registered.

As could be expected, an analysis according to the above groupings shows the highest levels of confidence for law and order institutions.

Confidence in public institutions generally appears to be high among the cadets of all the examined countries, although less high in the East European countries. Within the "public institutions" group, the levels of confidence expressed toward national governments are particularly interesting: confidence in government is especially high for Switzerland (73%) and France (72%), and quite low in Eastern Europe, where lack of confidence reaches significant levels (34% in Lithuania, 32% in Poland, 22% in the Czech Republic).

The world of work and business receives rather high levels of confidence. If it ranks below the levels received by public institutions, this is mainly due to the strong and nearly generalized lack of confidence that cadets display for trade unions: 70% among the French respondents, but around 50% for the Italian, Polish and Swiss respondents.

The level of confidence drops considerably when respondents' attitudes toward the "ideological institutions" are examined: a good 40% of the sample shows open distrust toward the institutions of this group. Among them, as mentioned, it is politicians and journalists

(20) who inspire the least confidence, but there is also a diversification of positions between East and West: the cadets of the ex-communist countries seem to be particularly critical toward their political class, while the cadets of the Western European academies are especially critical of the press.

A breakdown of the responses to the different items of the four institutional sets according to the two interpretive models generally used in this research yields the following data: cadets with bureaucratic attitudes tend to show lower percentages of confidence in all the groups examined except for work/business, but this is due to only one item, confidence in trade unions, where the "bureaucratic" cadets show a positive gap of 12% points over their "professional" counterparts.

In the professional/occupational dichotomy, it is still the "professionals" who show the highest average levels of confidence in the institutions, with a gradient of 20% points for the "law and order" set and 10 for "public institutions". In conclusion, in both models the cadets with professional attitudes show a higher level of professional socialization—probably anticipatory—than the cadets with bureaucratic or occupational attitudes, an expected result if one considers that a high level of confidence in social institutions is one of the aims of military socialization.

Making, then, a comparison with their generational peers in the universities, we can say in general terms that European cadets have a degree of confidence in social institutions that can be considered higher than for their civilian counterparts. This is not true of all social institutions, however: the cadets display less confidence in the mass media, the political class, and trade unions, and in so doing fall in line with the dominant behaviour of already commissioned officers (Caforio 1994).

* * *

Correlated with the analysis on confidence in social institutions is cadets' level of involvement in social contexts, a topic that was examined by a question aimed at determining the degree of

involvement of the cadet towards different values of aggregation, from the large (the world) to the small (oneself). Also in this case, the aggregates were united two by two to characterize the four different social contexts below:

a. global (world, Europe)
b. national (country, native city)
c. academy (academy class, platoon)
d. private (family, yourself).

The general datum common to the whole sample is a strong feeling of involvement for the private sphere and little identification with values like Europe and the world, which are evidently perceived as abstract and distant. Nearly equivalent are the levels of involvement toward the national and academy aggregates, which are at median values compared to the global and private ones.

Breakdown by country shows that the cadets who feel least involved by the global values are the Lithuanians and the Swedes, while the most involved are the Italians, Swiss and Poles, where, however, the involvement is mainly for the value of Europe.

Applying the general interpretive models, we see that cadets with a bureaucratic attitude are less involved than their "professional" counterparts toward the set of global values, especially Europe.

In the professional/occupational dichotomy, the cadet with an occupational attitude appears less involved in everything except the private sphere. Significant within the "national" set is the greater involvement of the "professional" cadet for his country (a gap of 24% points), while the "occupational" cadet appears to be somewhat more tied to his native city.

The professional socialization process displays some effects on the degree of social involvement, but aside from a quite natural and obvious one—a greater feeling of involvement in the academy context with the passing of time—the most significant effect is the opposite of what might have been expected: involvement for the European context decreases along the socialization process. In times of the globalization of armed forces and the increasingly frequent recourse to multinational expeditionary forces, one would have expected that the socialization process acted in the sense of producing a growth in involvement toward global social contexts (Europe and the world).

An American study conducted at the United States Military Academy (USMA) (Franke 2000) provides interesting data comparable with the European ones. Franke's research contemplates the following five groups: family, religious, social, military, national. As can be seen, with the exception of the religious group and, in part, the social group, the others appear to be easily comparable with some groups of the previous European research, as follows: family ⇒ private, military ⇒ academy, national ⇒ national. Also the situation found at the USMA shows that it is the family that is the most important reference group, followed at considerable distance by the military and national contexts. It should be pointed out in this regard that also in the European research it was the family rather than the "yourself" item that attracted the most consensus in the "private" category.

For the sake of completeness it should also be said that the second point of reference chosen by the American cadet is religion, unfortunately not comparable with the European data.

The trend of change during the socialization process—comparison between cadets during their four years at USMA—is an increase in family and military references and a significant falloff in identification with religious groups. In particular, on the growth trend of this reference, Franke writes: "*Overall, military socialization at West Point appeared to affect cadets' identification with military and national groups differently. While their USMA experience did not enhance the potency of their national identity images, military reference groups became significantly more potent with length of exposure to military socialization. However, identification with the military did not render other reference*

groups less central to cadets' self-conceptions"
(the reference here is chiefly to the family group).
The European data also show increasing identi-
fication with the military context during the
socialization process.

* * *

The survey aimed at defining the attitudes of
European cadets toward behaviour sets indicative
of value choices was later taken further by
applying analysis tools already used to conduct
similar surveys in the military academies of the
United States (21).

Cadets were asked to indicate approval or
disapproval for a set of 15 behaviours taken as
indicators of corresponding values.

The level of approval/disapproval was mea-
sured through three response choices:

I always agree with it
I never agree with it
I agree or disagree according to the situation.

Total agreement and total disagreement were
considered to be traits of *absolutism*, in that
individuals did not consider the possibility of
adapting their behaviour to the situation.

As a first step, an *absolutism* index was cre-
ated (for this elaboration and the following see
Nuciari, 1998).

In a second step, 12 of the 15 indicators were
taken from the "Scott Values Scales" (indicated
in parentheses with the original item names in the
list below: see Scott 1965); they therefore pro-
vide data comparable with the studies carried out
in the U.S. (see note 21). The selected values
were put into three groups, as follows:

a. a *community-oriented* group, including "be
loyal", "be honest" (honesty), "be concerned
with others" (kindness), "be able to get along
with every kind of people" (social skills);
b. an *individual-oriented* group, including "be a
leader" (status), "be creative", "be
self-controlled" (self-control), "be indepen-
dent" (independence);
c. a *practical-oriented* group, including "study
hard" (academic achievement), "enjoy physical
activity" (physical development), "learn many
things" (intellectualism), "gain recognition".

The data resulting from applying the *abso-
lutism* index indicate that the level of absolutism
is high for the whole sample (always over 75%)
and that the most radical cadets in their abso-
lutism are the Swiss, French and Lithuanians; the
Czechs and Danes appear most *relativistic*.

For what regards the responses pertaining to
the three groups as determined above, the
national differences are sizeable, appearing more
significant than the datum common to the whole
sample.

Looking at the first set of
"community-oriented" values one sees a partic-
ularly wide range of agreement according to the
country the cadets belong to. The Dutch and
French cadets display a very positive attitude
with respect to this set of values (over 50% *al-
ways agree*), while the cadets of four countries
(Denmark, Switzerland, Poland and Lithuania)
show decidedly low levels of agreement, below
30%; the rest of the respondents are at interme-
diate values.

The set of "individual-oriented" values gar-
ners a high percentage of agreement everywhere,
always over 50%, with peaks among Lithuanian,
French and Swedish cadets, all above 70%.
Among the values of this set, the most univer-
sally accepted one is *to be a leader*, something
that confirms the widespread choice of leadership
as one of the characteristics proper to the cultural
model of the officer.

The level of agreement on the third,
"practical-oriented" set of values is also differ-
entiated, where the cadets of only three countries
(France, Italy and Lithuania) *always agree* with
percentages higher than 50%. For all the other
countries the levels of agreement are much lower,
particularly for Sweden and the Netherlands.

Aggregating the above data by geopolitical
areas, we can say that the most significant divi-
sion is according to the prevalence of the coun-
try's religious faith. In the countries of the
Lutheran area, stronger adherence to community
values is found, while in those of the Catholic
area, especially France, Italy and Lithuania, the
cadets are more drawn to a set of practical duties.
On the level of values, it is likely that religion

still constitutes a stronger differentiating element than geopolitical position.

The best comparison with the value orientations identified among American cadets can be made with the research that R. Priest and J. Bach conducted in the 1990s on four classes of cadets at the U.S. Military Academy (Priest 1998). Applying the subdivision into sets of behaviours used in the European study reported above to the data collected by these authors, we see that the American cadets display stronger adherence to community-oriented values than their European counterparts, who appear much more individual-oriented. The same Priest research provides an element of cultural explanation for this phenomenon, however, as this research also tested the value choices of a group of students of University of Colorado. From this it appears that identification with community-oriented values is also higher among American university students in percentage terms than among the European cadets. In short, it can be reasonably deduced from this comparison that greater adherence to community values may be a cultural characteristic of American society.

However, Priest and Bach's research also lends itself to a comparison of the effects on cadets of the socialization process in military academies on both sides of the Atlantic. Table 14.5 is devoted to this comparison.

From this table, beyond the basic differences already pointed out—probably due to cultural factors—a few interesting observations can be made. First of all, for both the European cadets and the American ones, the socialization process acts in the sense of a general decline in adherence to nearly all the examined value sets: the only one that registers an increase—significant for Europe, almost symbolic for the U.S.—is the desire to be *"independent, outspoken, free-thinking, and unhampered by the bonds of tradition or social restraint"*, to use Priest and Bach's words (Priest 1998, p. 84). A second observation is the differing degree of importance that the socialization process takes on in the two continents for some value sets (the related differential numbers are highlighted in boldface in the table). What occurs for the inclination to socialize with others (social skills set) is especially interesting: for the American cadets it is very high when they enter the academy but then drops significantly during their studies, while the opposite is seen for the European cadets. Something similar and in the opposing direction is also seen for leadership qualities, the desire to stand out, and to assert oneself (status set), which records a still more significant drop in adhesions for the U.S. cadets during the socialization process while remaining nearly unvaried for the European ones. A different phenomenon takes

Table 14.5 Value changes during the socialization process

Scott values scales	First year		Fourth year		Difference	
	U.S. (1992)	Europe (1995–96)	U.S.	Europe	U.S.	Europe
Social skills	0.83	0.59	0.72	0.66	**−0.11**	0.07
Physical development	0.80	0.70	0.78	0.58	−0.02	−0.12
Academic achievement	0.84	0.59	0.58	0.44	−0.26	−0.15
Intellectualism	0.72	0.55	0.71	0.34	−0.01	**−0.21**
Kindness	0.84	0.40	0.74	0.35	−0.10	−0.05
Honesty	0.65	0.59	0.57	0.44	−0.08	−0.15
Status	0.77	0.73	0.61	0.71	**−0.16**	−0.02
Religiousness	0.61	0.16	0.50	0.08	−0.11	−0.08
Self-control	0.38	0.81	0.28	0.75	−0.10	−0.06
Independence	0.26	0.52	0.27	0.63	0.01	0.11

U.S. data from Priest (1998, p. 90), EU data from Caforio (1998), free elaboration

place for the desire to learn (intellectualism set), which remains more or less unvaried at West Point but drops sharply in the European academies.

What are the possible explanations for these changes? The general decline in adherence to the different value sets has already been explained by Priest and Bach, who wrote (Priest 1998, p. 93): "*Students progressively develop an ability to reason critically. Characteristic of this increased cognitive capacity is less reliance on authority and dualistic thinking. Thus*, *one is less likely to indicate 'always' admiring or 'always' disliking any particular behaviour*". It is thus a decline of that "absolutist" position that we identified in the "absolutism index". Applying this index to the data of the two samples, we find that the absolutism in the choices decreases with the socialization process both in Europe and in America.

Still unanswered are the questions regarding the differences in the two samples in the trend of this index for some value sets such as social skills, status, and intellectualism. Further investigation would be needed to explain this phenomenon.

Also connected with the world of values is the cadets' political orientation, which was investigated in Europe through two questions contained in the questionnaire. The general attitude of the cadets in the sample is to stay informed about politics but without the direct involvement declared by minorities of respondents; only among the French cadets is there a high percentage of respondents (47%) who declare themselves to be politically committed. Conversely, very few cadets say they are disgusted by politics, the only exception being Poland, where disgust with politics reaches the significant level of 16%. It bears repeating, however, that the great majority of the cadets (over 60% in nearly all of the countries) declare that they keep themselves abreast of the political events of their country without letting themselves become directly involved.

The political orientation of the cadets was investigated along very general lines by questioning them as to their position on a scale ranging from the far left to the far right. From this standpoint the cadets seem on average to place themselves in conservative positions, in accordance with the constant predictions of the literature in this regard (for all: Huntington 1957).

An analogous position is seen in the studies on American cadets, where a progressive growth of political conservatism during the military socialization process is observed (Stevens 1994, p. 475; Franke 2001, p. 587).

* * *

Lastly, leisure and free time were investigated as well. To describe how the cadets spend their time free from studies, work, social life and family obligations, we analysed their leisure preferences, their sociability and their modes of self-realization and self-expression, as well as their characteristics as a social group. The analysis of leisure activity also made it possible to evaluate other dimensions of cadets' daily life.

The interpretive framework used here was divided into four sets of leisure activity:

a. *culture consumption set*: classic concert, playing instruments, museum, theatre, listening to music, reading;
b. *sport-oriented set*: sport, sports events;
c. *social life set*: dancing, pop concert, strolling with friends;
d. *private life set*: visiting family, girlfriend, stay alone.

The distribution of the preferences of the whole sample shows a clear prevalence of the private life set, which with 69% of responses clearly outdistances the culture consumption set (37%), the sport-oriented set (29%) and the social life set (26%).

So, how does the European cadet spend his time when he is free from the activities of the academy? A good part of it is spent on activities of a private nature (family, girlfriend, time dedicated to himself); the rest is divided in a fairly balanced way between cultural, sporting and social activities.

How does the process of military socialization in the academies act on preferences? Breaking down the data by class year, withdrawal into the

private sphere appears evident during the academy years, as does, although to a lesser extent, an average increase in cultural interests (if we draw the regression line it displays an increasing trend for this set as well). Cultural activities appear to be favoured by cadets with more modest socio-cultural backgrounds, while the trend of the preferences seems to oscillate for the other two groups of activity.

This link with private life had already emerged in the survey in relation to the principal groups of reference.

Internal Assessment of Received Education

A recent (2014–2015) field survey (22) enables us to know how active-duty officers deployed on current missions assess the education they received at the military academies.

As known, the current missions are PSOs which prevalently take place in an asymmetric warfare environment (23). This environment poses significant new challenges for the professional preparation of officers called to operate in an often undefined and highly variable context, amid civilian populations in which hostile elements camouflage themselves. They are situations in which it is necessary to operate with great diplomacy and circumspection if one wishes to win the populations over to one's cause (as is generally the objective in PSOs), and consequently running not inconsiderable risks to oneself and one's men in order to avoid collateral damage to civilians. For the first time, then, since the end of the Second World War the military commanders of many small and medium sized countries have found themselves also having to face situations of outright combat in undeclared conflicts, countering actions conducted with guerrilla and terrorism methods. Basically they have found themselves having to respond to new and not entirely foreseen challenges to their professionalism.

A first datum that emerges from the interviews conducted is that the basic preparation offered by the academies today is considered absolutely

insufficient for facing these environments and challenges. Answers like:

> The basic training is not useful for missions of asymmetrical warfare. My training for these missions took place only at the units of assignment.

or

> The basic preparation is to be improved taking into account the new challenges that the asymmetric conflict entails.

are repeated by many interviewees, while others highlight the complexity and variety of the tasks that a commander finds himself faced with in the actual operational contexts. An officer in the Italian Marines, for example, states:

> I missed a preparation to manage additional assets to my platoon. For example, in Kosovo, I found myself having to deal with dog units of the police, to manage private contractors in Iraq, elsewhere having to collaborate with armored units of the army and I had to learn everything on the ground. In Iraq the civil contractors had security functions of the governor, with ROE [Rules Of Engagement] completely different, but as I was answering of the security of the base, I found myself also managing them.

"Learning on the ground" is an expression used by many and testifies to the insufficiency of the basic education received.

Another general datum emerges, however, namely that the commanders and units of the countries that operated in asymmetric warfare contexts generally performed well in the field and no particular professional shortcomings emerged. But how was this possible?

In reality, the professional preparation of officers today is completed in two additional ways.

The first is a pre-deployment training phase which all units destined to operate in the new operational contexts undergo for a period of at least six months. Concretely, the general staffs (more or less all the general staffs of the countries involved) realized that officers' basic education was insufficient and that it would be difficult to broaden this preparation to all possible deployment contexts, and therefore set up specific preparation courses for each individual theatre, called pre-deployment courses. One interesting

common characteristic of these courses is that they are carried out by the military units (platoon, company, battalion) in their entirety so as to also constitute a useful phase of amalgamation of these units as well as a concrete command exercise. Group cohesiveness, absolutely indispensable in situations of uncertainty like those of asymmetric warfare, is thus enhanced. In the pre-deployment phase the officers naturally also receive personal, specific training for their command action.

The positive function of the completion of their basic education that is achieved by the pre-deployment courses is affirmed by many interviewees in the cited research, with statements like:

> The pre-deployment training has significantly completed my preparation.

or:

> For Afghanistan, the pre-deployment training has been good and quite functional to the assignment.

and, albeit with some criticisms:

> The pre-deployment training has been limited for Iraq; for Afghanistan training was more accurate, but too compacted in time; we would have to devote more time before having exhausted all the red tape (medical, patents etc.).

But even the pre-deployment training is considered insufficient by many, because:

> The asymmetric environment continually creates new challenges and new problems, for which the training is never enough.

and:

> It is enough for what you can do here in Italy, but the theater has different characteristics. The colleagues' support (transfer of tasks) in the theater ranges from one to two weeks and it is too little.

The second path for completing officers' preparation is therefore that of experience in the theatre, and especially conveyance of this experience by working alongside the preceding commanders. In other words, due to the heterogeneousness and variability of the situations and tasks, the completion of the basic education is entrusted to a sort of practical apprenticeship, or traineeship, in the field.

Although pre-deployment

> gives a partial preparation for asymmetric warfare only, the dynamics that we found in the theater are totally different.

it is definitely

> Positive, but also to be completed daily in the theater, especially taking advantage of the experiences of the previous commanders.

Commanders' professional education today is therefore carried out concretely in phases: a phase we might call "academic" in the training institutes (deemed insufficient by those concerned, but where in any case professional socialization is carried out and basic preparation is given), a pre-operational phase in the home country aimed at the individual mission, and finally an operational phase in the field, prevalently carried out through transmission of experiences by the preceding commanders.

Substantially, then, nearly all the interviewees feel that participation in missions in asymmetric warfare environments (inclusive of the preparatory activity) gives commanders extremely high professional competence which was often not achieved in the past.

The fact that this training process is not included in the basic training, however, creates a dangerous dichotomy between officers who have taken part in asymmetric warfare missions and those who have not had this opportunity, so the idea is beginning to made headway that service, in rotation, on missions of this kind can (or must) constitute a phase in the officer training process.

The Ideal-Type of the Military Professional

It may be useful at this point to sketch the ideal-type of the cadet as it emerges from the empirical researches cited above in order to give the reader a broad general idea of the situation. It should be said at the outset, however, that this

operation entails ample approximations which do not always take significant regional and national differences into account.

With this premise, we can say that the ideal-type of the military cadet in the developed countries displays a few significant common characteristics, a kind of solid core that can be considered typical of the officer profession (on the ideal-type of the military officer in general see also, among others: Moskos and Woods 1988; Caforio and Nuciari 1994; Snider and Watkins 2002; Wong et al. 2003; Bennis 2003; Russel 2008).

First, it is found that the middle class dominates as the prevalent class of origin of the cadets, with obvious national differences. These differences regard both the percentage of this prevalence, which differs from country to country, and the notion of middle class itself. For example, the middle class identified by the American researchers, with its minimum income of $40,000 a year, is certainly not the middle class of many European countries examined in our researches.

A second common characteristic is that a career as officer is often a tool for upward social mobility for the young person; naturally, this tool is more significant in the more rigid societies, where other means of social mobility still appear limited.

The cadet often comes from a military family: endo-recruitment appears significant in all the countries examined, obviously with different percentages of incidence and also with different social origins: in some European countries, the percentage of NCOs' sons is greater than that of officers' sons. In these cases, endo-recruitment acts as a means of social mobility as well.

A common set of motivations characterize the typical cadet's choice of profession. They are:

– interest in the military, understood as a generic, generalized inclination toward the military world, its values, traditions, way of life. This interest often takes shape as a specific interest within the military world: the desire to fly, take to the sea, be a parachutist, a member of the mountain troops, etc.;

– a desire for adventure, an active life, to put oneself to the test;
– the wish to serve one's country, to put oneself at the service of the community in the particular sector of defence;
– the opportunities for university-level education and training at low or no cost.

On the continuum between the two poles of the well-known professional/occupational dichotomy (for all, see Caforio 1994), the cadets of the examined countries place themselves mostly in intermediate positions (here called pragmatic professional), with some greater professional radicalization for the cadets of a few European countries (France and Italy, for example) and the United States. Defining the individual cadet's motivations for his career choice according to this dichotomy also reveals a significant impact on the type of officer later produced by the academies: depending on the motivations that underlie the professional choice, we shall have, on one hand, an officer who considers his work almost like a calling, on the other an officer who considers it a job like any other.

The young person who embraces the military profession has generally received an anticipatory socialization that has prepared and predisposed him for this choice, so it is interesting to evaluate to what extent cadets feel that the expectations generated by this socialization are borne out by daily life at the academy. The typical cadet is divided here: while nearly two thirds of the interviewees declare that their expectations are confirmed, one out of three affirms the opposite. This is a sizeable percentage, and deserves careful examination. In the countries where this examination has been made, the areas of disappointed expectations appear to be mainly the following: efficiency of the organization, behaviour of superiors, impartiality of treatment, and internal dissemination of information. The professional socialization process during their studies causes the percentage of disappointed cadets to increase, particularly in regard to these four aspects of academy life.

The cultural model that the typical cadet identifies with is chiefly characterized by interpersonal values such as leadership, responsibility, and cooperativeness; however, values of an individual nature, such as expertise, education, and self-control, are important as well.

This very widespread adherence to the sets of community and individual values together shows how cadets everywhere recognize and support a model of the officer who is first and foremost a leader, patient, controlled, creative in thought and independent in judgement. Breakdown by social origin seems to show that adherence to this model is more widespread among cadets from military families, and seems to indicate that a traditional nucleus of defining characteristics and values proper to the military profession exists and is perpetuated.

The social identification of the typical cadet is chiefly towards his family, which appears to be the most significant reference group right from the start of the professional socialization process and increases during that process. Secondarily the cadet appears to identify with his country and the military institution, but while the socialization process does not seem to increase the national identification, the tendency to see the military as a reference group significantly increases during the cadet's stay at the academy.

The cadet's world of values appears to be less homogeneous than other characteristics of the ideal-type sketched here, when one compares the data relative to European and American cadets.

Indeed, by applying the same investigation tool (Scott Values Scales: Scott 1965), one sees that the U.S. cadet displays greater adherence than the European cadet to community values like loyalty, honesty, caring about others, empathy, and so on. The European cadet appears to be more individualistic, more interested in being leaders, creative, independent.

The professional socialization process acts in the same way on the world of values for cadets on either continent, however: for both the American and European cadets, it produces a decline in absolutist value choices in favour of relativistic ones, that is, correlated to a situation, an environment, a circumstance. Whatever the chosen value (to be honest, to be a leader, etc.), for cadets in their final year at the academy the choice is much more likely to be "according to the situation", that is, in relation to the concrete circumstances in which it must be made.

Another characteristic of the ideal-type is the more politically conservative nature of the military world with respect to civil society, confirmed for the cadets of all the countries examined. It is also significant that this characteristic appears to be only partly dependent on the cadets' social origins. But also the more or less professional typology that can be applied to each cadet according to the interpretive models used here provides indications on the assimilating value of the profession: it is the "professional" cadets, not the "occupational" ones, who tend to be most conservative.

For the countries for which it is possible (Caforio 1994), comparison with the political positions of commissioned officers shows that the fourth-year cadets (generally the last year) display political attitudes that are quite close to those of serving officers.

This complex of data underscores the unifying value of professional military socialization.

To Conclude

The basic education provided by officer training institutes today (2015) is going through a moment of difficulty in tackling the problems created by new, highly variable and volatile operational contexts. Officers' basic preparation, which is now five years almost everywhere, does not currently appear to be sufficient, on its own, to give them the ability to operate effectively in such contexts.

All the authors (see Moskos 1976; Blomgren 2008; Gentile 2008; Nagl 2009) agree in believing that the traditional military preparation for conventional conflicts constitutes the indispensable base also for operations of asymmetric warfare. This preparation is no longer sufficient, however, and other skills appear necessary for the military professional faced with a new scenario.

And in regard to the content of this updating of professional preparation, Nagl (2009, p. 25) wrote: "*We should invest in foreign language training, cultural awareness and human intelligence, political knowledge, historical preparation, social ability, empathy, and other needed counterinsurgency and stabilization skill sets: in short, the culture of the officer corps should also include the intellectual tools necessary to foster host-nation political and economic development*".

Almost everywhere these shortcomings have been compensated for with a sort of field traineeship, an apprenticeship with colleagues who already have operational experiences, in a process that seems to be fairly effective. It will be interesting to see whether this process will become permanent, by institutionalizing a completion and specialization phase subsequent to the basic training, or if this training will be perfected and completed so as to make it suited to the new challenges posed to the military profession in this millennium.

Notes

(1) See, for example, in the chapter "Some Historical Outlines", the descriptions of the thought of Comte, Tocqueville, Weber, Mosca, Huntington, Janowitz, Wright Mills and others.

(2) That the officer's job is a profession is supported by numerous studies. See in this regard Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1971) and Prandstraller (1985). Basically, as we have written before (Caforio 1998, pp. 7–8): "*The very concept of profession sanctions the status of an activity by establishing the following characteristics of the activity*: *a. existence of sound theoretical knowledge (the "doctrine"); b. existence of an ethic (values and norms) regulating individual behaviour to role expectations; c. existence of a sense of belonging, an "esprit de corps", peculiar to professional group members who recognize one another as bearers of competences and attitudes typical of that peer group*".

(3) One concrete datum in this regard can be seen in the differing selection rates during the educational process. Following admission to the academy and possibly a short training period, cadets leave their studies in much lower numbers than their generational peers enrolled in universities. In Italy, for example, fewer than 10% of cadets abandon their studies or are expelled from the military academies, whereas some 70% of first-year university students fail to graduate (average data from 1999 up to 2010).

(4) The reference here is to the so-called developed countries: Europe, North America, Australia, South Africa and similar. However, it must be said that most of the Third World countries have borrowed the officer education structures and procedures of the developed nations. In particular, the specific data that will be cited here from time to time refer to a survey conducted by my research group on the following countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

(5) But this verification also takes place through other mechanisms, which differ from country to country according to culture and tradition. By way of example I can cite: analysis of the value concepts expressed by the applicant in the general culture questions which are almost always part of the examinations; the privileged access to the academies for graduates of military prep schools; facilitations for the offspring of military families; an assessment, in some countries, of the applicant's personal and family background. In the U.S., admission to the entrance examination for West Point

requires an individual nomination by a member of Congress or another important public figure.

(6) Of the countries examined in the research cited in note 4, this occurs in Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden. In reality, however, the first months of service are a trial period at other academies as well. At West Point, for example, during the summer military training, extensive demands are made on new cadets as a test of their emotional stability, perseverance, and ability to organize and perform under stress.

(7) As occurs in Germany, for example, and also in the U.K., where the officer education process is completely different from the other countries. University culture is not included in the officer's professional education in a strict sense, because around 80% of the officer candidates already have their degrees and for the remaining ones, support and time is provided for attending university courses, separately from the specific military training. The training provided by the military academies, in particular that of the army (Sandhurst), is short (around one year), intense, and strictly military.

(8) The reference here is to the normal courses that regard most of the future officers. When one examines the officer courses of particular technical services, the set of university subjects obviously changes and, according to the case, takes a direction in engineering, computer science, electronics, etc. An example of the percentage distribution of cadets by major is supplied by Lindy Heinecken (Franke 2001, p. 571) for the South African academy, "*With roughly 55% of students enrolled in the human sciences, 12% in the natural sciences and 25% in management programs*".

(9) The phrase Peace Support Operations (PSOs) has now taken the place of "Military Operations Other Than War" (acronym MOOTW, much used at the end of the last millennium). PSOs include peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, peacemaking and peace-building operations even when they lead to counterinsurgency actions, as frequently occurs in asymmetric warfare environments.

(10) The problem of the early departure of officers arose especially in the 1990s, when the generalized downsizing of national militaries following the end of the cold war made it necessary to streamline the officer corps as well. This problem was particularly acute for the East European countries, which had oversized armies. To give a concrete idea of the problem, I report what a Bulgarian researcher wrote about his country (S. E. Nikolov, in Caforio 2000, p. 15), where officers' lack of a valid educational qualification in the civilian sector "*left most of them unable to find appropriate job in the civilian labour market. For example, many colonels and even generals were forced to work as door-keepers*, *janitors*, *wardens*, etc., *in order to add something to their low pensions*".

(11) Published in the already cited "The European Officer" (Caforio 2000) and in "The Flexible Officer" (Caforio 2001a, b).

(12) For a theoretical presentation of the convergent/divergent model, see Caforio and Nuciari (1994).

(13) The American military academies were not examined in the research I referred to (Caforio 2000). The U.S. was therefore inserted in the table a posteriori by applying to the six parameters used to define the level of convergence/divergence the same scoring criteria used for the academies of the countries included in the research.

(14) For example, for West Point, the online admissions prospectus for 2001 (http://www.usma.army.mil/admissions/prosp_military.asp) reads: "*The Corps of Cadets is organized as a "brigade" under the command of a Commandant of Cadets. The commandant is a brigadier general in the U.S. Army. There is both an officer and a cadet "chain of command," providing many opportunities to practice and develop personal leadership skills*".

(15) According to R. Molker (cited study, p. 135), in the Dutch military academy "*motivation to study is low and academic objectives are not met*; *the military objectives are probably only partly met*; *it seems that the objective of group development is met. During their time as cadets, officers create an 'old boys' network that is of great use during the career*".

(16) For the whole sample the standard error of the mean ranges from 0.09 to 0.89. Standard error indicates how greatly the mean score of the sample is likely to differ from the mean score of the investigated population.

(17) For a complete description of the model see Caforio and Nuciari (1994, pp. 33–56). For the application of the "*Burpro*" variable to the research in question, see Caforio (1998, p. 14). On the same page see the application of the "*Profes*" variable relative to the professional/occupational dichotomy.

(18) Larson (1977), Feld (1977), Segal (1986) and Moskos (1988).

(19) Anyone wishing to read the entire research report will find it in Caforio (1998).

(20) Diffidence toward the mass media is not proper only to cadets, but appears to be confirmed at all levels of the profession by various researches: for all, see the one conducted on European officers by our working group (Caforio 1994).

(21) For all, see Priest (1982), and also Priest (1998).

(22) The survey referred to is the "Officer and Commander" research organized by "The Military Profession" Working Group of the European Research Group On Military And Society (ERGOMAS). It started out from the consideration that asymmetric warfare operations require officers with command responsibilities to make deep changes of mentality, professional attitude and tactics with respect to the traditional preparation for conventional war operations. It was thus deemed opportune to hear from the direct protagonists (commanders with field experience) their opinions and assessments on the command and control issues encountered during PSOs in asymmetric warfare environments. This was done through a series of semi-structured in-depth interviews among officers of the ten countries participating in the research (which as of 2016 is still in progress). The research report will be published in 2017 under the title "Officer and Commander".

(23) For a more complete definition of asymmetric warfare, see the chapter titled "The Sociology of the Military and Asymmetric Warfare" in this volume. See also in the references, for example Nordstrom (2004), Abrahamsson (2008), Amidror (2008), Bacevich (2008), Mazarr (2008), Kilcullen (2009), Nagl (2009) and Caforio (2010).

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Participation and Change in Gendered Organisations. Women in the Military Forces

15

Marina Nuciari

Premise

Occupations are generally linked to gender stereotypes defining feminine as well as masculine jobs, as research on women and men in non traditional or unconventional occupations has largely demonstrated. This is especially true for military and defence/security jobs. This is why military organisations are normally considered as gendered organisations. Women soldiers' recruitment and careers within armed forces have inevitably produced various reactions and adaptations, both in military organisations themselves and women's approach to them, as far as military roles are considered, as mere working places or something "more than just a job". If a "normal job" totally comparable with a civilian job couldn't be denied to women under any respect, as far as legal as well as cultural norms and values are developed in modern democracies, the consideration of the military job as more than just a job (Moskos et al. 1988) implies that a job as such can be highly demanding and especially in combat roles even unfit for feminine nature.

Discussion here is based mainly though not exhaustively on recent comparative research on women soldiers' condition in armed forces, with special reference to NATO countries. The participation of Women in Allied Armed Forces has been steadily increasing over the past few decades, and significant efforts have been made also to improve recruitment and retention of women soldiers. Notwithstanding the various and continuous attention, however, there is a widespread opinion, supported with evidence, that women continue to remain underrepresented.[1]

The role of women in the military has a long history, and a brief recall of it can help to better envisage the fact that recruitment and retention policies, verbal statements and even legal actions and many different kinds of pro-active behaviours are not enough to reverse profound conceptions about gender and role assignment which are deeply inscribed and active within cultures in every society at levels not easily changeable even with the best political and social intentions.

We approach the topic by means of scientific tools, offered by empirical sociological research, which is rather abundant and addressing a various and problem-led set of issues. The discussion here can be articulated under the form of answers to specific questions:

M. Nuciari (✉)
Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Mathematics and Statistics (E.So.Ma.S.), State University of Torino Italy, Corso Unione Sovietica 218bis, 10134 Turin, Italy
e-mail: marina.nuciari@unito.it

[1]The reference here is at the research project named *UNSCR 1325 Reload: An Analysis of Annual National Reports to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives from 1999 to 2013: Policies, Recruitment, Retention & Operations*. The project, supported by the NATO Science for Peace & Security (SPS) Programme, was conducted by a Research Group formed within the "Rey Juan Carlos University" of Spain, the Australian Human Rights Commission and the Australian Defence Force, and published in October 2015.

(a) What are the reasons inducing armed forces to open their doors to women'

(b) In which ways do women enter and remain in the military professional career?

(c) Which orientations do women show toward military profession and military organisation?

(d) Which problems arise within armed forces as a gendered organisation? The dark side of the moon: sexual harassment; questioning the "brotherhood of male soldiers": do women endanger unit cohesion?

(e) Which opportunities are available for women from the very nature of Crises Response Operations and the wide range of missions encompassing the notion of Asymmetric Conflicts?

What Are the Reasons Inducing Armed Forces to Open Their Doors to Women?

Different ideas have been expressed on this subject, according to which there are particular time periods where the military institution (traditionally considered as a true all-male society) on the one side, and society on the other side consider the possibility of women joining the armed forces with favour. Under a historical point of view these periods are frequent, and rather obviously coincident with war times, when a society is directly involved in its own defence: to remain confined to the contemporary period, World War One and World War Two are occasions where at least one definite role is assigned to women in military activities, that is, that of nurses. The process through which the practice, before, and the profession, then, of nursing has been created is actually linked to the needs for assistance and caring of wounded soldiers in field hospitals. What it is important to be reminded here is the fact that this is the first role to be institutionalised by western military institutions to be played specifically by women. There is in fact a difference with respect to other activities, mainly bureaucratic services, assigned also to

women as part of the civilian personnel working in the administrative sectors of defence departments. The role of military nurse is considered as a true female activity within military activities, not directly involved in the battlefield but often severely touched by combat risk.

Thus, a first opinion, aiming to explain the quest for female participation in military operations at various extents, relies on the fact that this participation becomes a necessity when a society is in war. This is particularly the case in total wars like the two world conflicts, when civilian population is inevitably involved and modern military institution manifests its greater structural complexity: the practical reason is a question of optimisation of scarce resources for combat. Women are then a substitutive human resource for all those support and service tasks which, being not directly linked to combat functions, "can be performed also by women", thus saving men for combat.

Sharing an idea with Abrahamsson (1972), modern military organisation could be considered as a good replication of civilian society, in the sense that division of labour, roles and functions coming from the ongoing differentiation and specialisation of modern society are replicated within armed forces aside and around their core function (combat). Abrahamsson says that military organisations tend to produce inside all what is needed for their functioning, with the only exception of human beings which are "produced" outside by civil society.

Taking this comparison for granted and considering that military institution is an all-male society, we could say then that such a replication means also that many roles are assigned to males even though the same roles in the society are traditionally played by women. And this also happens for those roles that modern society begins to assign mainly to women: from the traditional service and care roles within the family to the occupational roles linked to public and bureaucratic service, such as nurses, teachers, clerks, office assistants, and typists; the process continues with the enlargement of occupational skills at professional and technical level, where formal education and specific

expertise become the formal requisite without any sort of gender ascription.

Generally speaking, even as women in modern society enter more and more public roles under an achievement perspective, military institutions continue for a long time to assign their roles under an ascribed perspective, that is according to (male) gender. Only emergency situations (such as, but not only, a war), which make male manpower a scarce resource, call for a rationalisation that progressively leads to an enlargement to female personnel in military non-combat roles; such possibility begins with activities considered to be more consistent with female "nature", and it goes on with those roles which in the civil society are step by step occupied also, and sometimes mainly, by women. Since modern society considers combat role as an exception rather than "a job like another", and since combat is considered by definition a typically male activity, it appears to a certain extent "natural" and unquestionable that soldier roles remain the last to be assigned under an ascriptive orientation (denied to women because they are women and imposed on men because they are men).

But scarcity and emergency are not the only causes able to move military organisations to accept ever-growing gender integration. Nor are simply the changes within role assignment in modern societies. An attempt to define a more systematic theory to explain the ongoing and widespread change in female roles related to military activities has been undertaken by various sociologists dealing both with the military and gender studies. The aim of a theory as such should be to predict, and not only to explain, the trend moving armed forces to integrate women across a large variety of countries, where the process of integration is highly different in the various national military organisations.

Just to outline the main steps followed in this chapter, a departure point can be one major theory about female-military relationships, that is the model proposed by Segal in (1995); the model in its first version included many variables of different nature, defined by Segal as structural, military and cultural variables, which make evident reference and use of economic, psychological, historical, juridical, technological, anthropological as well as organizational elements. The model has been recently redefined and enlarged in order to better include diverse countries' experiences (Iskra et al. 2002), adding some political variables drawn from a political science approach.

A First General Model of Women-Military Relationships

The best attempt to provide a middle-range theory is given by Segal (1995), in an essay proposing a general theory of factors affecting women's participation in the military. According to Segal, the main factors affecting women's role change in the armed forces can be grouped into three sets of variables, each of them defining a specific dimension: a military dimension, a socio-structural dimension and a cultural dimension (see Fig. 15.1).

(a) *Military variables* are considered in a wide sense, and include national security situation, kind and level of military technology, the combat to support function ratio, the structure of forces and the policies driving women's entry into the military.

(b) *Social structure variables* include country's demographic pattern, characteristics of the labour force (women's participation to the labour force and occupational gender segregation), the state of civilian economy (expansion or depression), the structure of the family (average age of marriage and maternity, role responsibilities sharing).

(c) *Cultural variables* such as the social construction of the notions of gender and family, social values underlining the above definitions, public discourse about gender and gender equality, values concerning the ascriptive definition of social roles and the question of equity.

Fig. 15.1 Theory of factors affecting women's' military participation (from Segal 1995, p. 759)

From the combination of these variables' modalities a number of assertions are derived according to which women's participation in the armed forces changes: as far as the military variables are concerned, the level of **perceived military threat** has a curvilinear effect, in that

> At the high end of threat to the society, women's military roles seem to increase (…) In societies with low threats to national security, but with cultural values supporting gender equality, women's military participation also increases (…) the extent of women's participation in combat jobs will be minimised when there is a medium threat… defined as the situation in which the society is not threatened with imminent extinction or invasion by superior military forces, but there is a moderate to high probability of military action on its soil in the near future … The greater the relative importance of actual warfighting (especially ground combat), the less the participation of women (Segal 1995, pp. 761–762).

This last assertion seems to be of particular importance in current times, since the increased presence of military operations other than war is likely to increase women's participation in the armed forces.

As far as **military technology** is concerned, "*Some technological developments have led to the substitution of brainpower for brawn in the warrior role*" (p. 762).

These changes, the related specialisation of military roles with increased emphasis on technical skill, and their assimilation to civilian occupations, all these elements have a positive impact over the possibility for women to fit with military roles.

Another factor is the **relative prevalence of combat roles over support roles**: as Segal says, "*Women's involvement in military operations is negatively affected by the proportion of combat jobs*" (p. 764). Because of the increase in support jobs over time, this has given women more possibilities to serve in the military. This goes also together with the variable concerning the **force structure**, since a force relying more on reserves for support tasks gives rise to an increased number of women in the reserve.

And finally**, military accession policies** have an impact as far as armed forces become more and more All-Volunteer Force: "…*Women's*

military participation tends to increase under voluntary accession systems" (p. 765).

Considering now the set of variables defining the social structure dimension**, demographic patterns** affect women's participation ratio as far as "the supply of men does not meet the demand for military labour" (p. 766), and this becomes dramatically true for volunteer forces. Furthermore, **characteristics of the labour force** in the sense that a gender segregated labour structure is associated with limited roles for women in the military, while the contrary happens when the occupational structure of the labour market is more gender integrated. Economic factors affect women's participation in the sense that a **high unemployment rate** increases the availability of men for armed forces and it prevents access to women; **family structure** and its role burden for women can also prevent them from military jobs, but when this burden is shared or postponed to the future, then women's representation in the armed forces tends to increase.

In Segal's discussion, the **cultural dimension** appears to be crucial, since it appears always at the background and is involved in every change in the other two dimensions. The **social construction of gender**, both feminine and masculine, is culturally determined, and it changes within the same culture according to time, and from a one culture to another. As Segal says,

> Cultures can stress gender equality or differences between the genders, which has strong effects on women's military roles. The greater the emphasis on ascription by gender (and thereby the less the emphasis on individual differences), the more limited women's military role (p. 768).

A modified and enlarged version of the model has been presented in 2002, where **political variables** such as national security situation, civil-military relations, political ideology, current leadership policies, public policy regarding race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, etc. are added (Iskra et al. 2002). Each set of variables provides positive and/or negative effects on women's entry into the armed forces, and this variance is considered under an historical point of view as well as with a socio-economic change approach.

What is valuable in this model is the fact that it shows the inevitable interaction among many different levels and sectors of human reality where phenomena must be observed in order to understand a specific object: in this case the object is the access of women in a social sub-system, the military, where the gender role distinction receives its absolute expression. Armed forces have been traditionally defined as all-male societies; a strict link, even a sort of identification, has always been recognized between masculinity and the practice of war; aggressiveness expressed in the human beings' inclination to combat has always been associated with a typical masculine personality trait. We could say that the phenomenon of women in the military, considered in its current configuration, cannot be approached nor understood without giving attention to, in principle at least, all fields where human action manifests itself, and this rightly because it touches a permanent aspect of the human condition. This is why I wrote above that to explain the trend leading to the entry of female personnel within armed forces an interdisciplinary viewpoint is unavoidable.

The latest version of the Segal's model provides a first attempt to reconcile different levels of analysis, where many specific types of knowledge must be considered in the analysis of a single social phenomenon. Its applicability seems to be at first sight rather universalistic, since a great variety of empirical results can arise from the "simple diversity" of each empirical case. Under a synchronic point of view the model can be applied to different countries, where a diachronic dimension is given when considering each case in its historical and social change dimension.

The above observations can be summarized in the two following propositions:

The entry of women in the military is driven mainly by structural and military variables; these variables are strongly affected by socio-economic change.

Women soldiers' integration is driven by cultural variables, such as the social construction of the notions of gender and family, social values

underlining gender and family definitions, public discourse about gender and gender equality, values concerning the ascriptive definition of social roles and the question of equity.

As far as the first proposition is concerned, socio-economic change has had a strong impact over military organisations, and it was the cause of the well-known process of *civilianisation*, defined and described by Janowitz (1960, 1971) in the early Sixties, and become a prominent trait in every contemporary western (and not only western) armed forces. With civilianisation, many technical roles are assimilated to roles in big civilian corporations, there is an increase of highly bureaucratic roles and of scientific-technological and managerial content roles as well, the organisational structure becomes similar to that of a civilian administration, and the professional practice, expected to remain essentially peaceful, removes the perception of activities in the military as intrinsically combat activities. This process, in my opinion, reduces progressively the military role impermeability with respect to women: women, in fact, are already accepted in parallel roles within civilian society. The process of civilianisation goes along with womens' emancipation and progressive integration in every occupation and profession within western societies, and it makes possible the opening to women of professional roles in the armed forces even in the absence of national emergencies or demographic shortages. To a certain extent, it is not possible anymore to keep armed forces as a world apart.

The second point stresses the role of culture: since women enter in the military usually in a segregated way or with limitations, the level and scope of these limitations are strongly affected by culture, and by cultural change in particular: when career opportunities are at stake, when selective criteria for advancement become more subjective, then discrimination and segregation can remain untouched if social values (that is, culture) about gender remain more or less untouched as well.

As I have argued above and elsewhere (Nuciari 2002), value change—including also the prevailing of value orientations based on universalistic principles combined with the so-called principle of achievement (as opposed to the traditional ascription principle[2]) as well as of equity-based reasoning as far as citizenship rights and duties entitlement according to gender are concerned—provides a better explanation for the widening gender integration in the armed forces (that is, the progressive accessibility for women to every military role), than to the opening to women of military roles, per se. Presence of women in the armed forces in the various countries can be found in the past under various forms, mainly peripheral to the military core roles, and without any intention about gender integration. Also in contemporary times, in the first half of twentieth century, Women's Corps in UK, Canada or US, as in many other western and non-western countries, are exempla of a certain recognition of women's capacity to serve in case of emergency (war mobilization), but where segregation was the rule. In this respect, in fact, all historical accounts about women and armed forces begin with statements such as "women have participated in military forces since ever", or recall occasions and situations where women's contribution was worthy of recognition. But a different phenomenon is when female soldiers are considered as members of an organization where roles and tasks are assigned without distinction in terms of gender. This is a very recent occurrence, and rather rare yet in its accomplishment. It can be considered the final point of a developmental process where the starting point is the possibility given to women to serve in the military organization in some peripheral –but anyway necessary- roles, such as nurses, or even drivers or administrative personnel. From simple presence to full integration is a long road, along which transitional situations are the rule, and variety a persistent trait.

The change in cultural values about women's social roles is linked also to changes in the **definition of family roles**, so that the movement away from traditional conceptions of family and

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[2]Universalism/Particularism and Ascription/Achievement are two of the five well-known pattern-variables pairs proposed by Parsons (1951).

family duties, and the growing supportive policies outside the family, permit a greater participation of women to military activities.

It has to be underlined furthermore, in my opinion, that changes in values defining gender and family structures have an explicative value independently from the type of force in a given society, be it an AVF or a conscription based military, and also from the economic situation which can enlarge or reduce male labour force availability. An All-Volunteer Force is more vulnerable to demographic restrictions, and more dependent on the labour market contingencies: it is not by chance that the percentage of women in military roles reached in a rather short time its highest figures in volunteer militaries (United States 14%, Canada 11%, United Kingdom 8%). But since even demographic restrictions can be influenced by changes in the conception of genders and consequential opening of labour market to women, this last set of cultural variables seems to have a major causal capacity.

A confirmation of these assertions can be found in the fact that usually the highest proportion of female personnel is found in the air forces, just where technical roles outnumber combat roles and where gender integration, as a consequence and not considering combat pilot positions, begins earlier and continues faster. In the air forces, because of the same reasons of technological specialisation, voluntary recruitment is already present in substantial numbers even within compulsory recruitment systems, making easier the adaptation to a technical expertise and gender-free appointing criterion.

To conclude this point, we can affirm that the entry of women in western and western-like armed forces is a consequence of the process of civilianisation on the one side, and of the parallel and progressive change in value sets defining gender ascription characteristics; this last process leads to women integration in jobs and in the society at large. Furthermore, women entry in the armed forces widens with the decline of the draft system and the prevailing tendency to rely on voluntary-based armed forces (Haltiner 1998).

In Which Ways Do Women Enter and Remain in the Military Professional Career?

A first answer to this question is very sharp: women enter in the armed forces on a voluntary basis. We can make use here of data reflecting the situation of servicewomen in NATO countries.. Data coming from the Office for Women in the NATO Forces in Brussels provides good comparative information for a large number of contemporary military organisations. It is true, nevertheless, that information could profit, for this as well as for other points raised in this chapter, from the availability of data concerning non-western armed forces.

In every NATO country where women are so far present, they are recruited on a voluntary basis, whatever role and task they are assigned to. Of course, the percentage of women soldiers varies from country to country, depending on the military format: in all-volunteer forces there are comparatively more women than in conscription based militaries, and they are allowed to serve in more specialities, though not in every specialities, in AVFs than in those armed forces based on the draft system.

But another factor impacts women's presence, that is the great variation among NATO countries of the time period since when women's recruitment was allowed. Last comers, such as Italy (where womens recruitment has been permitted by law only in the year 2000) see much lower percentages than countries where women soldiers have been present for many decades. These two factors together give rise to a very different situation from country to country.

Under a general perspective, and leaving aside the role of military nurse, military roles where women are normally employed have two main characteristics:

(1) First roles opened to women in the armed forces are in the administrative sectors, where tasks are mainly bureaucratic; then women are allowed to serve in technical roles in logistic

services, and subsequently in combat-support technical roles. If we put all military roles along a continuum from the farthest to the nearest to the true combat role in terms of task content and relative risk, we can see that women enter the armed forces from those roles which are more detached from the combat situation, and they approach progressively the combat sector until arriving at the current situation where even this last restriction is totally removed or is going to be removed;

(2) For reasons linked also to the nature of the above mentioned roles, entry at first is allowed for medium and medium-high levels of military hierarchy, that is as officers and non-commissioned officers, and only as a second step are female personnel recruited as private soldiers.

Both processes are linked to the reasons why military organisations become accessible for women: the most civilian-like roles (that is, the least true military roles) are an offspring of the process of civilianisation, and they can be easily filled with women because of the growing availability of women with medium and high educational standards in the civil society. Furthermore, technical and administrative roles have intrinsically a lower combat content, are normally performed in areas not directly touched by real warfighting (even though this situation presents many exceptions and it is not always clearly defined to this respect), and requested expertise are usually achieved and not easily ascribable to gender.

As far as combat roles are concerned, when a more or less direct contact with an enemy against whom to use weapons and the risks of being killed, wounded or capture are present, two further considerations can be pointed out:

(1) As far as subordinate levels (soldiers) are concerned, the ultimate reason to keep women away from combat roles are ascriptive gender differences linked to physical strength and aggressiveness, raised in order to explain women inadequacies to attain performance minimum standards. A second reason is the maintaining of unit cohesion among buddies, which would risk to be undermined by the presence of female soldiers in a male bonding system such as "buddyship". Different countries consider both reasons valid or invalid in different periods. Even though women's integration in every posts at a legal level has gone further in some armed forces during the last decades, in practice combat roles remain in most cases unattained by women. On the second reason in particular, some research details will be presented below.

(2) As far as officers and NCOs are concerned (that is, for leadership roles at various levels), operative roles and assignments are obviously much desired and much rewarded by the organisation: it is a well-known organisational process, then, that the most prestigious roles are retained by an elite, who tries to keep their access limited and controlled in quantity and quality. The resort to ascription criteria, and among them especially to gender, is one among many attempts to create and maintain role exclusivity.

An Index of Women Soldiers Inclusiveness

From a different perspective, by considering a greater number of variables, Carreiras (2006) proposed an Inclusiveness Index of women in the military, from the analysis of which she argues that servicewomen's integration is not a unilinear process at all, in the sense that it does not seem to be linked to time or to the increasing number of women in the ranks; a distinction has to be made, on the contrary, between those factors that concern women's 'simple presence' in the system and those referring to women's 'qualified' presence.[3] Carreiras' index can also be used to sustain the cultural hypotheses mentioned before, as it is demonstrated in her essay.

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[3]See on this Carreiras (2006). New and update insights on the same topic can be found in Obradovic (2016)

In her research, Carreiras has plotted together data from eighteen NATO countries (namely Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK, USA); for each one of them the *Integration* Index has been calculated, thus giving rise to a cross-cultural image of the level of integration of women in each country's military. Various indicators have been chosen to build the index, including organizational structure and organizational policy indicators.

In Carreiras' words:

> Structural variables refer to the overall representation of women in active duty forces (1), occupational sex segregation (3) and rank distribution (5). These indicators are usually considered of major importance to determine the extent of women's roles in the military. The impact of related policies is also captured through the inclusion of indicators pertaining to the existence of segregation practices (6), and presence or absence of formal limitations in occupational (2) and hierarchical terms (4). Hence, beyond the question of relative numbers, other dimensions of the integration process are included that concern respectively the structure of opportunities and power distribution. This is why, together, these indicators contribute almost 90% to the indexes' overall weight. Finally, the index includes two additional variables relative to existing programs or policies aimed at confronting erosion factors, such as those derived from the difficult conciliation between family and a military occupation (7) or sexual harassment and gender equity monitoring (8). Since these factors may have a strong impact over integration processes, attention given by policy-makers to 'quality-of-life' areas should be taken as important elements for the qualification of women's presence in the military (Carreiras 2006, pp. 114–115).

Applying the Index to the situation of the various NATO countries as far as data were available in the year 2000, a general assessment of women integration within the military was given, and in particular:

1. the relative position of the 18 countries presents a great variety;
2. this variety, according to the scale points, can be split into three categories, indicating situations where the position of women soldiers is one of a rather low integration, or one of a medium integration and finally one of a high integration.

Countries belonging to each category can be considered to be part of some clusters of countries, which can be named as follows[4]: an English-Speaking or Anglo-Saxon cluster (USA, UK and Canada), a North European cluster (Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Belgium), a Central-South European cluster (Germany, France, Luxembourg, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy), and an East European cluster (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland). East-European cluster, with Turkey and half of the South-European cluster (Italy and Greece), belong to the lower integration portion; the second half of the South-European cluster (Spain, Portugal) with part of the North-Central European cluster (France and Luxembourg) occupy the central (mid-integration) position; the higher integration portion is formed by North-European cluster and English-Speaking countries cluster (Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Canada, UK and US).

The strength of this effort is really in its capacity to provide not only a measure for integration but also the possibility to compare different situations. These differences are relevant, and call for some explanatory reasons, since we deal here with countries belonging to the same institutional alliance, NATO! Even though some relative positions could be affected by recent positive changes in restriction and numerical presence (Carreiras' data refer to the year 2000), nevertheless these results are rather sharp, and lead to the following question: is there any common factor explaining this high variety? Among the possible explanations

- *time*
- *organizational format of the military*
- *personnel accession policies.*

are the most frequently addressed, some of them also sustained by theoretical assumptions.

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[4]See my discussion of this model in Nuciari (2007).

Carreiras' results do not sustain the explicative capacity of time (integration does not seem to increase with time), while organizational format (conscription or AVF) has an effect over women presence "but does not seem to be as powerful when it comes to understanding variation in gender inclusiveness levels" (Carreiras 2006, p. 123). Personnel accession policies, on the other side, could be considered as a mirror of the socio-political and economic situation of a country, where legal rules and opportunities applied to every citizen in the labor market are signals of the overall integration of women in a given society. Socio-cultural aspects, then, values and gender-related issues, are at stake.

A Career in the Military

As far as career and length of stay in the armed forces are concerned, reality differs greatly in the various countries. Women soldiers are relatively young in their career in the majority of NATO countries for which data are available, so it is rather difficult to generalise about their career length and advancement. In the earlier studies on this subject it seemed that female careers in the armed forces were shorter than men, but cross-national researches permitting to evaluate such a difference not only among different armed forces but also with respect to other occupational sectors were not available. In current studies, and especially according to cross-national data available for that large group of military forces now belonging to NATO (as members or as partners), the situation is much more differentiated and somewhat positive for servicewomen career's opportunities. Positive actions in order to improve women's recruitment and retention have been implemented with a certain success, while not so great and not everywhere to the same extent. Actually, the situation varies greatly from country to country since it depends very much on the year from which women's admittance in the armed forces begun, a fact that impacts over the career duration and the possibility to see women having reached highest ranks. According to this, women in uniform in

highest rank positions are present in those countries whose armed forces accepted women since twenty years and more (such as USA, Canada and UK).

A first discussion of this subject was given actually by Charles Moskos for US female officers, where it was demonstrated that the true turning point for women in uniform's career is marriage, and child birth. This is the case not only because marriage and maternity means in the majority of cases a choice between career's demands and family endeavours, but also because there seems to exist a negative relation between marriage and rank. This has been noticed in particular by Moskos for the American armed forces, when he wrote that "…the more the senior the female, the less likely she is to be married. The opposite pattern prevails for males. Reconciliation of a military career and family life impacts much more on women than it does on men" (Moskos 1999, p. 25). Comparing the percentages of married women and men in the USA total force, in 1997, the M/F ratio for married people ranged from negative ratios in the lower ranks (that is, more married women than men among privates) to a rapid increase of positive ratios as long as rank increases (that, is, more married men than women for sergeants up to sergeant major, and for all officers' ranks), as Table 15.1 clearly shows.

In a previous essay, Moskos noted that different attitudes toward professional life are present for women in uniform according to their rank position (Moskos 1990): for women commissioned officers, military career is a lifetime choice as it is for their male colleagues, and this explains the fact that difficulties in career advancement are mentioned especially in higher ranks where operative performance (that is, combat role) evaluation is crucial for promotion and selection; for women non commissioned officers and even more for enlisted women, career is considered as a temporary choice, and this reduces the perception of frustration coming from a difficult or even blocked advancement.

The higher presence of married men than women among officers and NCOs has been also commented on by Moskos, introducing a

Table 15.1 Percent married by ranks and gender, DOD total, 1997

Grade	Males	Females	M/F difference
O6 and above	96	58	+38
O4–O5	91	66	+25
O1–O3	65	50	+15
E7–E9	89	65	+24
E5–E6	80	62	+18
E4	50	52	−2
E1–E3	20	25	−5

Source Moskos (1999, p. 25)

generation criterion. In both American and British armies it seems that the deadly choice between military career and family (many times defined also by referring to the common "greedy" nature of both institutions) is governed by a generation factor. Women senior officers (more aged women) seem more inclined to prefer career to family life, while on the contrary among junior officers (younger women) the idea seems to prevail about the possible reconciliation of the two careers, finding a specific momentum, in the first employment's decade, when professional career is less demanding and it permits to build up a family, having children, and then coming back to career's requests after a few years.

But "the Times They Are a Changing…"

Some enlightening insights on the actual situation come from data presented by the yearly *National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives*, and by the 2015 last delivery in particular (NATO Report 2015, Fig. 2, p. 9). Since the year 2001, percentages of women in the ranks of the NATO countries have increased in average rather slowly but consistently from 6.1 to 10% in the 2006 (Table 2), remaining around 10% until 2010.

Since 2011 and considering with a deeper attention the most recent available data, an increase is observed until 10.8% in the year 2015. This last datum, looking at the percentages by country, is mainly due to the growth in percent of women in Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia and

Bulgaria, a process already at work in the previous years. The situation is actually very different when looking at each country, ranging from the 20.2% of Hungary to the 0.9% of Turkey. The breaking point of the average 10.8% divides the 27 countries into two halves: 13 countries are over the average and 14 are under the average. The thirteen over the average are Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia, Greece, USA, France, Bulgaria, Canada, Albania, Czech Republic, Spain, Portugal and Germany (these last two being very near the average); 14 countries lie under the average and namely Croatia, U.K., Slovakia, Estonia, Norway, Netherlands, Lithuania, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Romania, Poland, Italy and Turkey, these last four being well below the average (NATO Report 2015, Fig. 3, p. 10).

By means of a comparison over the years it is possible to distinguish some rather stable situations from other more dynamic ones, thus leading to some general statements.

A first evidence is that a numerical gender balance is far from being attained in the military forces, and this datum seems to remain true notwithstanding the more or less adequate social policies in the various countries over time aiming at improving women's recruitment. It must be admitted, however, that a "flat" balance has never been posed as a true goal, having been questioned, on the contrary (and not simply by the military establishment itself) as a great risk for operational effectiveness of military organisations. According to Kanter's theory (1977), in fact, four types of gender ratio can be found in

team works, that is that there are four group types or work environments:

- **Uniform group**: homogeneous group, only one type of person, only one social type. Ratio of 100:0, that is all-male group or all-female group:
- **Skewed group**: dominant versus token culture. The token group is pushed to adapt to dominant culture. Ratio of 85:15.
- **Tilted group**: majority versus minority culture. Minorities are strong enough to affect majority culture. Ratio of 65:35.
- **Balanced group**: Cultural balance. Ratio of 60:40 or 50:50.
  (Kanter 1977: 129–208; 245–249).

While unlikely, in practically every status and professional position in democratic countries, the balance ratio of 60–40 or 50–50 between women and men has become a dominant issue, inspiring specific policies in order to attain it[5] and aiming at changing the previous situation. Within military organizations, on the contrary, women remain at a *token* level in nineteen of twenty-seven countries, that is they do not overcome the 15% considered the level over which a minority begins to be accepted as a normal component in an unbalanced group according to Kanter's definition. But the situation is much more complicated, since women's presence is highly diverse according to services and even more according to unit, rank and roles. It happens for instance that they could reach a condition of balanced group in the German Military medical services, where women had a majority of more than 50% (Carreiras 2006, p. 100).

In cases like Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia, however, given the average presence in 2015 higher than 15%, *tilted* groups are possible, that is, where "... *groups begin to move toward less extreme distributions and less exaggerated*

effects. In this situation, with ratio of perhaps 65:35, dominants are just a "majority" and tokens become a "minority" (Kanter 1977, p. 209).

But the normal situation is that of a *skewed group* where relative gender percentages for women are generally lower than 15%, and in 2015 data the distribution of women and men in the armed forces of NATO member countries in all ranks are 16.1 and 83.9% respectively (NATO Report 2015, Fig. 23a, p. 24).

As far as career advancement is concerned, the glass-ceiling effect is still strong, even though some exceptions are present, especially in armed forces of former-communist countries where advancements in democratic and modernisation standards seem to have improved and facilitated the upgrade of women's careers. But yet, overall, women are much less present in higher ranks, and remain much less represented in combat roles. In 2015 servicewomen in NATO countries are employed in large majority in logistics and medical services (NATO Report 2015, Fig. 22, p. 23) and their highest presence is 17.3% in OF-3–5 and OF 1–2. A deeper insight, however, gives a different perspective to the matter of gender balance, since it is evident that women remain underrepresented with their numerical presence substantially lower than that of male soldiers. By considering the percentages respectively of men and women in each rank, the percentage of women and men are similar in NCOs ranks, women are more represented in young officers ranks (OF 1–2) and men are more present among private and corporal ranks. The largest difference remains at the highest officer ranks: here there are four times as many men compared to women (NATO Report 2015, Fig. 23b, p. 25). Optimistically, there is a slight trend toward women increasing presence in officer ranks together with a decreasing percentage of female personnel in other ranks.

What seems having changed in the general data within Armed Forces of NATO countries is the possibility to reconcile work demands with private life, which for servicewomen means to reconcile career demands with having children (NATO National Report 2015). Retention polices

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[5]Quota polices toward a balanced gender representation in boards, councils and committees in firms, parliaments and other political governance bodies in particular are well-known.

specially oriented to women have been defined in order to reduce women's difficulties in coping with a highly demanding profession and family duties, following the consideration that the main reason for women to leave the military is, after retirement (the main reason for men), the difficulty to find a right balance between family and work. In the Summary of National Reports already quoted, "…61.5% of nations reported that they have specific programmes or policies to maintain work-life balance" (Idem, p. 28).

Among such policies there are measures to support families in which both parents belong to the military, supportive child-care policies, part-time employment and support for single-parents.

General conditions seem to turn then, at a slow pace anyway, into a more balanced situation in recent years; a situation mainly ascribable to the various but insistent policies oriented to introduce and sustain a gender perspective in those armed forces whose countries are NATO members or partners, following the repeated resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council on Women, Peace and Security since the famous 1325 on 31 October 2000.

This does not prevent us in any case from the consideration of the military as a strongly gendered organisation, especially as far as work orientations, attitudes and daily behaviours currently occurring are concerned.

The Gendered Organization

In every essay and piece of research on women in the armed forces since the 1970s the term *gender* has been used, when considering the possible or impossible presence of women as *military* members.[6] Since then the adjective *gendered*

began to be attached to the substantive term *military organisation*, to underline the inevitable quality of armed forces, that of being dominated by a masculine culture, where the combat soldier represented the best and most appreciated model (we could say the ideal model) of man. Thus a lot of research has been done to understand how, why and to what extent women could be part of such an all-male organisation, built exactly on an extreme and hardly attainable masculine model. What attitudes do women share with regards to this organisation? What about their professional orientation, their job satisfaction in a context anyway considered *sui generis* like the military? And what contradictions, fears, risks, dangers and wounds do they suffer, in addition to the mere fact they are in an armed organisation "playing war"?

This topic, together with the following one, is crucial from a realistic point of view, since it has direct implication with daily life; it is in this domain that usually justifications for women's exclusion or impossible total integration within military life can be found.

Problems, real or supposed, that women can meet within the armed forces can be distinguished into two groups:

(a) Difficulties of adaptation to an often harsh environment, where living conditions are far from the normal life in an advanced society (living at camps, during training or missions, combat and non-combat, where environmental conditions are highly uncomfortable and various levels of promiscuity are rather obliged); such concerns are emblematically indicated as "feminine hygiene" and "bodily privacy".

(b) Difficulties in sustaining and giving efficient performance in combat environment, or simply with severe work rhythms and workload, where conditions are worsened by the fact to be a small gender minority in strict contact with a male majority.

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[6]In a highly valuable and useful bibliography on "Gender and Military Issues. A categorized research bibliography", issued by the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences of the Norwegian Defence University College in 2010 authored by Kari Fasting and Trond Svela Sand, the beginning of the use by sociologists of the term *gender* instead of *sex* is dated to early Seventies, with the clear intention to consider distinctively *sex* as referring "…to the

anatomical and physiological differences that define male and female bodies" from *gender*, concerning "…the psychological, social and cultural differences between males and females" (Fasting and Svela Sand 2010: 14).

As far as point (a) is concerned, in her anthropological study on the "GI Jo", Devilbiss (1985) affirms that the first order of concerns is rather easily overcome, and normally women do not suffer facilities restrictions more than men do, nor they show necessarily a higher, gender related, sensitivity; what comes to the fore is what Devilbiss called a "gender-consciousness", forced to some extent by the fact that being among a majority of men "…make you think about it—it is emphasised that you are different (and) you stick it out… You have to constantly and actively seek to do things so as not to be treated differently" (Devilbiss 1985: 531). Very often the specific question of personal hygiene is more a problem of the individual independently from gender, and it could rather easily be solved at the organisational level by means of choices which take a gender heterogeneous environment into consideration, as well as the fact that privacy needs are differently felt by different individuals.

As far as point (b) is concerned, in the same research the question is observed of women's ability to cope, both physically and psychologically, with activities performed, during missions or training, in hostile and difficult environments, near combat areas. The case under observation concerned a radar squadron of the U.S. Air National Guard, deployed for training with approximately 200 squadron personnel from the East Coast to the training site on the West Coast. Operations were conducted in isolated conditions and in climatic and orographic environment defined as "difficult and hostile". Female personnel counted for 10 percent (of the 200 individuals), active in various kinds of technical specialities linked to squadron activities. Also in this case, it did not seem that difficult environmental conditions and heavy round-the-clock work activities to be performed resulted in less efficiency nor created more problems when actors are women.

What is important to stress, on the contrary, is the already mentioned "gender-consciousness", which is perceived by women who do not have such a perception in "normal" conditions. This feeling transforms current activities and difficulties into everlasting challenges to a woman's

ability to manage with tasks "notwithstanding her gender", or else into reasons for being offered non requested help, or, on the contrary, for being refused an help which could have been normally and spontaneously given to a male colleague.

According to Devilbiss, three factors could explain the fact that problems not related to gender per se, could be perceived by women as caused by their being women. Factors are the following:

(a) *High women visibility,* physical and social, due to the fact that "…in combat situation exercise (as in other similar situations), women—for a variety of reasons—are often a small numerical minority, and, therefore, they are often highly visible" (Devilbiss 1985, p. 532). Such visibility, and the consequent perception of one's female identity as a "diversity", is part of a theory elaborated by Rosabeth Kanter in her studies on civilian corporations where men and women work together at various hierarchical levels (Kanter 1977). According to Kanter, the presence of a minority gender group within a majority is differently perceived on the basis of the group size. In very small groups, few people of a different gender, are paradoxically much more visible than relatively larger minorities, whose ubiquitous presence may be differently considered.

(b) *The social impact* of such visibility, that is to say the fact that women in traditionally male environments and performing male tasks are *social exceptions*, who go against common standards and expectations, thus emphasising their being women.

(c) *The social definition* of women in the armed forces, according to which they are normally exempted from direct combat, which means exempted from the highest professional risk. This makes servicewomen a special group, gender-stigmatised as not fully useful for the organisation, and for this same reason protected and different from any male soldier who can be sent to combat as needed without any other consideration. Such a law-based diversity, far from being understood as

aiming at the protection of the weaker part, is going to be considered rather iniquitous: women can be members of the armed forces and perform traditionally male jobs, but they continue to be safe from most severe risks, to which men are subject notwithstanding their professional task.

Many of the problematic issues raised by the entry of women in the armed forces have found adequate solution **at a practical level** in the military organisations where gender integration has been adopted with various levels of completeness. These solutions include adaptation and readjustment of infrastructural facilities (so that privacy could be assured), extension of legal norms from the civilian to the military sector as far as servicewomen as employed women are concerned (such as maternity leaves and medical facilities according to current civil legislation in each country); social services and child care facilities for military families where the soldier is the mother or both are parents; special norms or adaptation to military environment of norms aiming at opposing and punishing sexual harassment in its various kind of manifestation; retirement and dismissal policies and the like. To a certain extent, this level of adaptation, while introducing unavoidable change within military organisation, has been far less difficult to adopt, since it was led by general legal norms already at work in civilian sectors.

More difficult has been the adaptation as far as specific military functions and roles are concerned, and **at the normative social level** as well. Formal and unformal social relationships cannot be totally regulated by means of legal norms, and interpersonal relationships, being as they are culturally determined and shaped, cannot be changed by law.

The relevance of the numeric proportion between men and women for the determination of attitudes and behaviours in both genders has been raised in a study conducted by Dunivin (1988), aiming at determine if men and women in the U.S. Air Force perceive differently their work environment, and if this possible difference could be ascribed to gender or, better, to

numerical proportion between genders. Referring again to Kanter's study (1977), Dunivin considers *tokenism* as the condition in which women working in a male-dominated environment find themselves when their relative number is very small. In such a case, they are a token group, and experience a negative situation formed by four components: (a) *pressures toward performance* (they must demonstrate that they are able to do what they are asked to do), (b) *social isolation* (they have difficulties to be accepted as members of unformal groups mainly formed by men), (c) *role entrapment* (they are always and everywhere considered firstly as women rather than colleagues or workers), and (d) *boundary heightening* (exaggeration of tokens' differences from dominant members in order to exclude tokens from the dominant group), as it is the case for women in managerial positions who are not accepted as "colleagues" by male managers.

The research conducted by Karen Dunivin aimed at testing the validity of the tokenism explanation within the context of the U.S. Air Force, by means of a large survey of 21,631 officers, of which 2711 officers were women (sample proportion, 12.5%, was very near the 11.3% of women officers serving in the US Air Force at the time). To the total sample five additional subsamples were added, with different gender ratios and gender-traditional work ratios. The aim was in fact to explore different **work attitudes and perceptions** of female personnel **with regard to career opportunities**, **power structure** at individual's disposal, and **gender ratio** in work environment. In a few words, since in the Air Force the group's gender ratio is covered in large majority by types 2 and 3 of Kanter's typology, the aforementioned *skewed* and *tilted groups*, a demonstration is searched of the fact that servicewomen in skewed and tilted groups perceive the negative situation described above in the four components: pressure toward performance, social isolation, role entrapment and boundary heightening.

In the case under examination, the rather uniform group is formed by combat pilots with 1% women, the skewed group was formed by two groups (air traffic controllers and personnel

officers with 15 and 17% women respectively), the tilted group type was formed by two other groups (administrators and nurses, with 30 and 77% women respectively); no balanced group type can be found currently in the armed forces. As far as type of work is concerned, military activities in the groups studied range from the most non traditional female role (combat pilot) to air traffic controller, personnel manager, administration and nursing, these last two being considered the most traditional female roles in the armed forces as well as in the society.

Dunivin's results are not totally consistent with Kanter's hypothesis about tokenism: even though at a general sample level the perception of fewer career opportunities and of a weak position in the power structure is held more by women in a token environment than by men, other attitudes toward work and organisation do appear differently shaped than expected, and probably explained by some other variable. Dunivin argues that the token group situation does not explain *every* work attitude, and that the intrinsic nature of the work itself can have an explanatory capacity. Thus the author proposes two causal variables, the combination of which gives rise to four theoretical types of work situation. The two variables are defined as **numeric domination** (group gender ratio, many women/few women in the group) and as **work type** (traditional/non traditional for women); the four cells in Fig. 15.2 are the following: (1) few women and traditional work; (2) few women and non traditional work; (3) many women and traditional work; (4) many women and non traditional work, which cannot contain cases since it is intrinsically contradictory (if many women would perform non traditional jobs, these jobs should no longer be non traditional).

Thus, three cells are consistent with data and theory, and in each of them women officers manifested different attitudes toward work environment and organisation.

- In cell 1, officers in administration and personnel management are present, among which women are a minority and perceive themselves as tokens, with low career

opportunities and low power, and performing a traditional job rather underestimated by the military organisation.
- In cell 2, combat pilots and air traffic controllers are mainly men, but the nontraditional job performed by the female minority causes a similar satisfaction for the two genders in all the three components; because of the high evaluation given to this job by the organisation, women in these posts consider themselves according to their occupational status and not according their gender, thus perceiving even their token situation as rather unimportant.
- In cell 3, where there is a female majority (nurses), servicewomen show more positive attitudes than men as far as career opportunities are concerned, but they feel they have low power and autonomy, even less than their male colleagues. Even in this case full explanation is given by the very nature of the role performed, coherent with female identity in certain respects (nursing is a traditional job for women in the armed forces) and not subject to a token effect, but anyway perceived as a low prestige role within the organisation.

As Dunivin stresses:

Numeric domination influences tokens' attitudes since women feel less attachment in a male-dominated culture where they are viewed as 'outsiders'. As a result, women will be less positive than men in their attitudes about their work environment. Work type also influences women's attitudes since women evaluate their career fields to assess their potential for organisational opportunity and power. Each element has associated status: numeric domination typifies women's ascribed (gender) status, while work type exemplifies women's achieved (occupational) status (Dunivin 1988, p. 82).

Since the two statuses can have contradictory consequences within the military environment (stressing the gender status prevents from prestigious professional roles), then it is plausible that women evaluate separately their two statuses, giving a higher importance to the status more rewarded by the military, that is, the

Work Type

	Traditional	Nontraditional
Few Women	**Personnel and Controllers Administration** Less positive attitudes than men for -relative numbers -opportunity structure -power structure 1	**Pilots and Air Traffic** Similar attitudes as men for - relative numbers - opportunity structure - power structure 2
Many Women	3 **Nurses** More positive attitudes than men for - opportunity structure but similar attitude for - power structure - relative numbers	4 **Contradictory cell:** **many women** in **nontraditional women jobs** cannot co-exist

Numeric Domination (row label spanning upper section); Many Women (row label)

Fig. 15.2 Career typology based on numeric domination and work type (from Dunivin 1988, p. 83)

occupational status, and downplaying their ascribed gender status.

> In short, this model suggests that occupational status predicts military women's attitudes better than does gender status (specified by numeric tokenism)… Again, the interaction of the structures likely occurs: women who perform non traditional but valued work may perceive more opportunity and power and therefore may not perceive their token status (Dunivin 1988).

But the numeric question remains important because it has consequences for a different type of problems, already discussed here when speaking about cohesion in integrated units. In the study by Rosen et al. (1996), the number of servicewomen was negatively correlated with cohesion of the integrated unit, in the sense that the negative effects of tokenism (role entrapment, boundary heightening, social isolation) affected cohesion, but the possible solution to tokenism was only apparent: increasing the number of women in units had unintended effects of enhancing negative attitudes toward women, since their growing minority was perceived as a threat to the declining majority. Here Blalock's theory on minority group relations is relevant by

considering the feeling of increased internal competition perceived by a once strongly majoritarian group when it sees its numerical superiority threatened by the growing minority.

Some distinctions proposed by Yoder (1991) permit to better place the role of tokenism: according to her findings, negative effects of tokenism function and are perceived only by individuals playing low prestige roles with respect to the majority, and in this case to increase the minority size in these roles should not have "Blalock-like effects". For high and medium-high prestige roles, on the contrary, internal competition between the male majority and the female minority (as it is the case in the armed forces) would generate negative attitudes toward women, conversely related to the growth in numbers of the female minority.

The Dark Side of the Moon: Gender Relationships and Sexual Harassment

In the scientific literature in social science dealing with the presence of women in military

organisation there is of course a great variety of themes. In the Bibliography dated 2010 of 39 different themes were identified, considering only the 2571 papers published in English as articles in journals, chapters in volumes, research reports from various national and international institutions, and Ph.D. theses (Fasting and Svela Sand 2010: 21). The two most treated themes, after the first "Gender and History" that is understandably very broad, are meaningfully "Gender, Sexual Harassment and Abuse in Military Context" (189 titles) and "Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Issues" (170 titles). These are evidently highly problematic issues for men and women in the military in many countries, being so tightly linked to gender perspective and to the traditional gendered image and substance of the military organisation. Since the LGBT issue is treated here in Chap. 20, some insight about the situation of the former will be considered hereafter.

The question of sexual harassment within the military has been for a long time something hidden or confined to courts and prosecutions when victims had the possibility and the courage to denounce them, and were treated then as exceptional criminal behaviour. In this way, only rape, assaults and violence were considered, denounced and recognised worthy to be punished, and the statistical occurrence of such "incidents" was inevitably low, mainly because of failure to report them for fear of retribution (Parker 2011).[7] When it became possible to inquire directly within units, asking servicewomen and conducting authorised researches, it appeared suddenly how the question of sexuality was a real and crucial concern for military leaders and an issue questioning the very realm of

military culture and values. As Serrato (2016) writes about her extensive anthropological research on the topic:

> these themes were inevitably discussed by female and male participants – whether in the context of basic training, garrison life, or deployment. Based on the prevalence of these topics in the interviews, we can deduce that these experiences are inextricably linked to the experiences of servicewomen and servicemen alike. The discussions also shed light on factors that are pertinent to discriminatory and abusive military practices (Serrato 2016).

Researches on the topic are evidently not confined to the US Military; observations and empirical data have been collected and sociological surveys conducted in many European countries, also disclosing different attitudes toward gender relationships and sexuality in working situations, in some cases inclined to cover or underestimate sexual harassment behaviours, especially those more precisely defined as *gender harassment*. Gender harassment indicates those behaviours where the harassment has a nonsexual nature (Miller 1997), and according to Miller these behaviours are much more frequent and difficult to be denounced.[8]

In general terms, both gender and sexual harassment constitute a major source of tension, conflict and stress inside the military, and this is proved by the fact that a Military Sexual Trauma is defined as the main cause of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder among US Military women veterans (Street et al. 2008). Notwithstanding prevention and reporting activities are present and educational policies are constantly reformed, doubts are allowed about whether such practices are really adequate to reach their formal goals.

In the already quoted *NATO Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives* (Brussels 2015, p. 29), 80% of NATO countries have training and programmes

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[7]It is noteworthy that in a study by the RAND National Defense Research Institute in 2014 on *Sexual Assaults and Sexual Harassment in the US Military,* it is precisely stated that "women's experiences with retaliation after filing an official report to a military authority are unchanged in 2014. In both 2012 and 2014, **62% who filed such a report indicated that they experienced professional retaliation,** social retaliation, adverse administrative actions, or punishments for violations associated with the sexual assault" (RAND National Defense Research Institute 2014, p. xi).

[8]Gender harassment can be defined as tactics including "a variety of behaviours, such as slander (in the form of gossip and rumors), constant scrutiny (especially about performance), indirect threats, feigning ignorance (when giving orders), sabotage, and foot-dragging (like following directions at a slower pace than necessary) (Serrato 2016).

oriented to prevent sexual harassment, and more than 60% declare they have strategies, appointed personnel and formal procedures to prevent and report cases of sexual harassment. In 2015, cases of harassment were reported in 37% of NATO countries, in a measure of two-thirds against women and one third against men.

At an explanatory level, the persistent diffusiveness of sexual harassment in its various declinations recalls cultural determinants such as values, social hierarchies and gender definitions: there is a true link between sexual violence and power structure within a social community like the military, as well as with gender inequities and discriminations. As Serrato points out in her conclusion, "*It is important to continue studying how the issue of power plays a role in the day-to-day lives of soldiers at home and abroad, given that organisational hierarchy is fundamental to the military and that cultural values pertaining to gender roles play a significant role in how soldiers are trained and how they interpret the contribution of females ad males alike*" (Id., p. 13).

Gender and Unit Performance, the Question of Military Cohesion

Performance evaluation is, among others, a crucial issue under many respects: on the one side, an incorrect use of standards could cause in fact discriminative choices; to avoid this problem, unit segregation or segregated training have been sometimes chosen, or different standards for men and women were adopted. With time and experience, gender-free standards for recruits' selection, training and performance have been adopted in some countries, in order to enhance women's possibilities to be selected and promoted for ever more kinds of posts.

Under another point of view, performance is also affected by social relationships coming from common training and shared experiences. Because armed forces are a place where performance is generally calculated at a collective level, the crucial question is not simply to assure an adequate individual performance, but an adequate group performance, assuming that group performance is not the flat sum of many separated individual performances. Within armed organisations this issue is addressed as "unit cohesion question", and more or less total gender integration has been considered in the light of its consequences on effective behaviour and combat readiness, considered to be strongly affected by the special male solidarity called *buddyship,* which arises in risky and stressing situations shared by unit members (see, on this subject, Chap. 3).

Unit cohesion and male bonding are recurrent topics in socio-psychological research on combat readiness and behaviours, and a great bulk of empirical research on the military has been and continues to deal with this subject. Factors of cohesion have been repeatedly investigated and tested, so that it should not be surprising that creation and maintenance of that special set of relationships called buddy relationships, stemming from that solidarity peculiar to an all-male living condition, could be considered at risk as a consequence of the "turbulence effect" of the entry of women, the "unknown other", into the military in-group. Empirical research on this specific subject, unit cohesion in gender integrated units, has been repeatedly conducted, in operative and non-operative units, aiming at reaching a definite and scientifically satisfying answer to the *vexata questio*: do women endanger or not military unit effectiveness with respect to group cohesive behaviour? As it often happens with sociological enquiries on human affairs, a straightforward answer is not available, but some knowledge can anyway be usefully taken from a number of studies conducted on US units in the early 1990s.

In the above-mentioned research by Devilbiss in 1985 the question of unit cohesion was posed concerning a gender specific perception felt by women employed in male-dominated environments, or engaged in activities traditionally considered as male jobs. Her observations of

soldiers' behaviours in gender integrated groups allowed her to affirm that mixed groups can develop the same cohesion level as one-gender groups, and provided that such cohesion be positive as far as organisational goals are concerned, mixed groups are able to perform with the same efficiency as do one-gender (usually, all-male) groups.

That special kind of male brotherhood found in military units is linked, in fact, to the special living conditions that in military jobs can be particularly harsh and stressing; it is also sustained by relationships' duration, and it does not seem to be affected by gender: **Buddyship** arises among buddies, and when prerequisites are present, all buddies are **buddies** no matter what gender they belong to. Buddyship is eminently important in combat situations, that is to say in those situations where life is at risk and stress reaches its extreme peak; in situations as such, Charles Moskos, analysing enlisted soldiers' reactions in Vietnam war, pointed out how solidarity among buddies looked more like a social contract of mutual help in case of danger than an affective bonding between two or more people (Moskos 1970): when individual survival is the main goal, and its attainment is guaranteed by group or buddy solidarity, then gender does not seem to have an appreciable impact over in-group relationships.

But the topic remains of crucial relevance, and social enquiry continues to work on it especially as long as women's participation to military roles more and more approaches the ground combat role. In an essay published in 1999, Rosen, Bliese, Wright and Gifford try to compare five studies on the subject of group cohesion in gender integrated American military units, in order to gain some definite and non contradictory results. As authors wrote in their discussion,

> The relationship of gender composition to unit cohesion was addressed in two recent studies conducted by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. The first of these studies (Rosen et al. 1996) based on data collected in 1988 found a significant negative correlation between percentages of women in the work group and horizontal cohesion among male junior enlisted soldiers. The finding did not support Kanter's tokenism hypothesis, which posits that the increased presence of women would have positive organisational outcomes for women. However, it supported a competing hypothesis developed by Blalock… which posits that the increased presence of a minority will lead to increased discrimination because of the perceived threat of competition. In the second study conducted in 1995 (Rosen and Martin 1997), we found no significant relationship between the percentage of women in the work group and unit cohesion (Rosen et al. 1999, pp. 366–367).

The 7-year time-span separating the two studies seems to indicate that some change has occurred in the consideration of women in uniform, so that a certain ability to consider "women as soldiers without a gender tag" could be taken as achieved within military units. However, authors argue that "…in the minds of many, the gender tag is still very prominent", and their purpose is to compare results along these and three other studies on the same subject in order to ascertain the extent to which "these two studies represent real before and after changes, rather than two chance findings that have little potential generalizability". And their conclusion is not so much encouraging, in that

> this meta-analysis on the relationship between gender composition and unit cohesion found that while the negative effects of increased female presence on group cohesion have occurred in a variety of settings, both deployed and non-deployed, the findings are by no means universal or even consistently strong. No specific factor has hitherto been found that could account for all the differences, but some that should be examined in future research include size of the unit, soldiers' support for the mission, level of violence in theatre, and the effects of leadership policies regarding the treatment of the genders (p. 382).

Great variety of possible related factors has resulted from this effort to find a general explanation of the ambiguous effect of gender integration on military unit cohesion. And non contradictory findings arise from a further study on gender integrated group cohesion, readiness and morale, conducted by Laura Miller and

Margareth Harrell for the RAND's National Defence Research Institute and published in 1997. The aim of this study was "a short-term analytical effort to evaluate the progress of gender integration in the services and the effects of this integration on selected units" (Harrell and Miller 1997: 5). The research followed and was consequence of the legislative and policy changes that occurred in the 1992–1994 period in the United States, which opened to women more posts in the military so that they became eligible for assignment to all positions for which they are qualified, except for their exclusion from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground.

Based on a combined quantitative (a sample of 934 individuals surveyed by means of a structured questionnaire) and qualitative (focus groups) methodology, this research has been conducted within five Army units, seven Navy units and two Marine Corps units; units included combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units. Among the many interesting results of this survey, a major finding is that "gender integration is perceived to have a relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion and morale" (Harrell and Miller 1997: 99). Researchers affirm that this does not mean that gender has no impact at all, but that other factors are more influential, such as leadership and training, on cohesion and readiness. A link between cohesion and gender was found in the sense that "gender appeared as an issue only in units with conflicting groups", and "any divisions caused by gender were minimal or invisible in units with high cohesion".

Thus it seems plausible to conclude that gender integration alone does not lead to reduced cohesion and that possible negative outcomes can be avoided by adequate leadership. To a certain extent, this topic could be another example of the over-repeated affirmation according to which "If men (and women?) define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas and Thomas 1928: 572).

To Conclude, Which Opportunities Are Available for Women from the Very Nature of Crises Response Operations and the Wide Range of Missions Encompassing the Notion of Asymmetric Conflicts?

This last point does not intend to analyse in details limitations posed to a full integration of servicewomen in the military organisation, since situations greatly vary from country to country and the integration process is subject to progressive changes. The general trend seems in fact to be that of progress toward an ever more enlarged involvement, especially in those countries where women's entry in the military is a rather recent event, or a true novelty (as in Italy).

Women's entry in the armed forces goes along the transition from conscripts-based and large armies to the smaller and technologically advanced All-Volunteer Force. This process goes also along with two other dynamic phenomena of high relevance: force downsizing, at least in the armed forces of western societies, and frequent deployment in unconventional missions. In the MOOTWs the use of force is reduced, and soldier's orientation is undergoing a change, becoming less centred on the "warrior" ideal type, and more on a protective disposition which has been called, among many other definition, the "miles protector" model.

Each one of these processes has specific influences on womens condition within armed forces. The transition to a professional and voluntary military made the entry easier to women because their exclusion from a public sector employment was seen as unacceptable, and also because of the necessity to heighten and enlarge the recruitment basis (both in quality and in quantity). On the other side, downsizing had and continues to have an opposite effect, as noted by Mady Segal and recalled here before, in reducing posts for women. But the process deserving more attention is the increased frequency of unconventional deployment. Here the military role of women could receive a more appropriate

evaluation and prominence. This is true in principle and it has been repeatedly recognised, but it does not mean that women in unconventional operations or in asymmetric conflict situations are founding substantially better integration conditions.

It is far beyond the scope of this chapter to reconsider the wide range of analysis provided by social scientists in general about nature, impact and evaluation of the once called "new missions" for armed forces, now generally addressed as Military Operations Other Than War or Peace Support Operations, and generally as Crises Response Operations. Definitions as such indicate the many-sided nature of these operations, their intrinsic ambiguity and imperfect predictability. One among the many subjects dealing with PSOs is also the need for specific education and training on the side of military personnel, for officers and NCOs but also for privates.

New educational profiles have been adopted to give to the peace soldier a wider orientation than that conventionally described as the "warrior", including attitudes, values and specific knowledge and expertise so that he/she could be able to act in a large variety of situations, from true warfighting to ever-decreasing violence levels until true peacekeeping and humanitarian aid missions. This new soldier, by no means destined to lose his/her character of a defender of one's own society (we could say "egoist defender"), should learn to be also the altruistic protector of "others", in many cases weak and oppressed people, mainly civilian populations of women, children, aged people, refugees and the like. This soldier is also asked to be cold and enduring against possible offences coming from the conflictual situation in which he/she has to operate: the use of the organised force, its degree and also the choice and the extent to which to use it, this is his/her peculiarity, the true "soldier's job".

But the use of force must be legitimated, as it happens in any case for conventional armed forces in conventional warfare. In military operations other than war, legitimacy comes from many sources (Dandeker and Gow 1997), but one of the most important is the defence of the "other", the reasons of the weak, and this has to

be done "according to the interest of the weak". It is not only an altruistic help given to someone in difficulty, it is the application, possible or real, of a legitimated violence for "other's" interests and goals.

For this peculiar attitude requested of the peace soldier, the word *flexibility,* often abused, has been proposed as the new quality of the non conventional soldier; *flexible*, then, and not *tough*, should the new soldier be for the military missions of today. This flexibility does not contradict the eventual aggressive attitude and toughness requested in case of true warfare, since it means rightly the soldier's ability to cope with the entire spectrum of situations where his/her performance is asked.

Many have expressed the opinion that women soldiers could find an easier adjustment in a field condition where aggressive attitudes do not function or are even disruptive, and where on the contrary a large part of the task is care and service to people in many different states of deprivation. More adequate cognitive dispositions have been actually found in non-homogeneous (that is, gender mixed) units in one of the first studies conducted on soldiers deployed in operations other than war, the Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, and co-authorised by Miller and Moskos (1995).

In their study, Miller and Moskos found a distinction among U.S. soldiers deployed in Somalia, so that two ascribed conditions, race and gender, seemed to cooperate in the definition of two different and somewhat contrasting orientations toward the situation. These two orientations were able to define two different strategies of adjustment to the continuous ambiguity and precariousness present in the situation. Thus, a *warrior's strategy* and a *humanitarian strategy* have been defined.

The first is adopted by soldiers who define the (Somali) population as "hostile and unfriendly", uneasy to understand in its behaviour or superficially classified on the basis of cultural stereotypes and ethnocentric principles. This strategy is typically adopted by soldiers in combat units, exclusively formed by males, and white males in large majority.

The humanitarian strategy is, on the contrary, typical of black soldiers and of white women soldiers; it refuses negative stereotypes about Somali people, showing an empathetic orientation bound to understand the situation, the culture *and the reasons of Somalian people* (italics mine), and it refuses also the resort to force even though it would be a justified reaction to violence and damages committed by the "protected": Miller and Moskos, in their comments on American military performance in Somalia, say that: "American troops exerted far less excessive force during Operation Restore Hope than did other national contingents", and in their opinion all that was to be imputed to the mixed composition of military units by race and by gender, in that servicewomen and black soldiers were able to act as bad behaviour controllers more than other soldiers in one-race and one-gender units.

This empathetic orientation has been explained by means of a better ability of people in condition of minority to consider differences between self and others in a more positive as well as respectful way. Women and black (men and women) as minorities in gender and race mixed groups were thus able to reduce the resort to the more aggressive and harsh culture of all-male (and white) soldiers units.

Since then, many missions with very different goals in highly diverse theatres have seen servicewomen deployed. But still, there was good reason to push the United Nations Security Council to pronounce its 1325 Resolution in the year 2000. After many years of talks and conferences stressing the need for a gender perspective in the consideration of conflicts and conflicts resolution, promoting womens strong presence in peace-keeping missions as well as in any kind of those Crises Response Operations, the gender balance remains extremely far from expectations and advocacies, and very near the one found in military units deployed in high-risk and war-like operations. A recent research on the topic reports that in 2015, fifteen years after 1325 Resolution and several following it, reality is far from expected since "…female military personnel account for a paltry 3.2% on average in UN peacekeeping missions

(Berg and Bjarnegård 2016) and in 2017 the situation remains unchanged.[9]

The main reason for this apparently unchangeable situation is not, in the discussion presented by Berg and Bjarnegård, the plain consequence of an open choice to discriminate women, keeping them out of the possibility to serve on equal basis in PK operations, but it pertains to a variety of reasons. Some of them can be generally ascribed to organisational traits, such as the lower presence of senior women in those high-ranking officer roles where usually UN military experts and military observers come from, because of women's late recruitment and also because of the great gender imbalance of national armed forces contributing to those missions. But research data evaluation moves toward another explanatory realm: risk and combat risk in particular is strongly related to the low number of women in those missions where combat and violence are supposed to be highly probable.

As Berg and Bjarnegård write:

> Within contingent troops, a higher mission risk has a negative effect on the proportion of women. The explanatory factor suggested for this relationship is the influence that ideals of military masculinities exert in the assignment process. (…)With risk taking being closely linked to the ideal of a military masculinity, these gendered ideals will to some degree prevent women from being deployed on equal terms with men. Sending women to missions with a high risk and thus a high probability of combat is not compatible with the masculine identity as reproduced in military organizations (2016: 11).

The main reason for those persisting extremely low percentages of women in military operations, considered as they are just those where a strong presence of women soldiers would be the best solution, has then a cultural basis: the masculine stereotype of the male-warrior continues to prevent women from those missions and roles considered at combat

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[9]UN Peacekeeping—Gender Statistics, monthly tables on the number of male and female uniformed personnel deployed in the various United Nations peacekeeping missions. The last considered figure is January 2017. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/gender.shtml.

high-risk. And this happens even though variety and diversity within military units are known to allow easier acceptance of and adjustment to diversity in situations such as those frequently found in Crises Response Operations. This could be another aspect under which to consider the quest for flexibility needed by peace soldiers, adding one more reason to the need for repeated research and deeper data analysis, in order to distinguish the many and diverse and even subtle factors preventing women's integration and empowerment in the armed forces.

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Managing Diversity: From Exclusion to Inclusion and Valuing Difference

16

Lindy Heinecken and Joseph Soeters

Introduction

Growing numbers of police officers and soldiers, particularly in Western nations, are 'dissimilar' in terms of gender, sexual orientation, race, religion, age and even language. Uniformed organizations' work forces no longer consist of 'young white males' only. Over the past decades women, Afro-Americans, Muslims and Hispanics have become increasingly important in American security organizations for various reasons (Ender 2009). Increased diversity has occurred due to demographic changes in the societies from which the military and the police recruit, but also political pressures to become more representative of society (Pinch et al. 2004). Uniformed organizations necessarily need to be in step with larger society's demands to accommodate diversity, as this affects not only their legitimacy, but civil-military relations at large. Where they are perceived to be hostile to certain groups, this not only affects their ability to attract and retain personnel with the

necessary skills, but can undermine operational effectiveness.

In this chapter the focus is on diversity issues in the military. We focus on issues of race, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, and touch on gender issues, a subject which is dealt with in more detail in a separate chapter by Nuciari in this Handbook. We see why this issue will not disappear from the agenda, and the consequences this holds. We use South Africa as an exemplary case study for its uniqueness, but also because this case brings forth the many challenges that armed forces face in managing diversity at various levels both within the organization, and when deployed on military missions abroad. Here it is shown why it is both necessary to deploy with a diverse workforce, as well as understand how one's own race affects interaction with the local population.

In closure, we debate whether diversity in the armed forces will in time shift from a culture of exclusion to one of inclusion—the feeling among 'different' soldiers that they belong to the organization and are valued for their unique characteristics and capabilities. These are important debates as high quality work relations, well-being, creativity and perceived fairness are outcomes that lead to more institutional legitimacy and in the end, to a more effective military. But as we argue, this is not likely to come about without some uncomfortable dilemmas as the South African case illustrates.

L. Heinecken (✉)
Department of Sociology & Social Anthropology, Universiteit Stellenbosch University, 422 Arts & Social Sciences Building, Ryneveld Street, Stellenbosch 7602, South Africa
e-mail: lindy@sun.ac.za

J. Soeters
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
e-mail: fam.soeters@tele2.nl

Why Diversity Matters

Why has diversity become so important for the armed forces? There are several major reasons for this as explained by Soeters and van der Meulen (2007). The *first* relates to the armed forces' legitimacy. In many countries it is a democratic imperative that the Defence Force is broadly representative of the populace (Bayman 1990: 9–10). The general assumption is that control of the military is more or less guaranteed where all segments of society are represented. During conscription the armed forces served as national institutions par excellence, because the conscripts constituted a more or less equal representation of the general (male) population. There were no biases in composition in terms of socio-economic class, political affiliation, religion and region, except in some cases for the very rich, who in certain nations have been exempted, or where they were excluded (like South Africa) based on political policies. Nonetheless, by and large most young males in the period of conscription were obliged to fulfil their national military duty. If today's armed forces want to maintain a comparable degree of nation-wide legitimacy, they need to keep the mechanism of equal representation alive. Above all, the military must prevent that some groups, for instance Muslims in European countries today, or indigenous people in Latin-American nations in the recent past, start seeing the national military as their *enemy* (Selmesky 2007).

The *second* is that the armed forces have come to fulfil the role of the "school of the nation". In this regard, militaries have not only assumed an important 'nationalising role', but serve as an instrument for social upliftment of the poor and less educated segments of society (Soeters and van der Meulen 1999: 212). Through their army experience, peasants and labourers became Frenchmen, Germans, and Americans. In the U.S.A. Afro-Americans became colonels and generals, and in many societies the military has been the pathway to social mobility (Moskos and Butler 1996).

Besides this, there are other reasons why diversity remains high on the agenda.

The *third* reason relates to the increasing power of civil rights movements and the pressure placed on armed forces to accommodate individual rights. Women and ethnic minorities, whether immigrants or indigenous groups, gays, lesbians or other identity groups want to exert their right to serve in the military and be afforded the same opportunities for promotion. Although some national armed forces may be slower in recognizing these basic rights, this development is often imposed on national armed forces by internal political, and external forces like the United Nations.

The *fourth* argument stems from more pragmatic realities, which is that many Western countries face a problem of recruitment of the 'right' candidates. Where armed forces have sufficient youths available to serve, they may not possess the qualities and technical skills the military requires (Smith and Heinecken 2014). These skills are often not evenly available on the labour market, which means that the military has to tap into all segments of society, including women, ethnic minorities and even foreign nationals to fill their ranks (Van de Berg and Richardson 2009). This reality has obliged armed forces to recruit personnel from non-traditional pools to augment their manpower requirements. Dandeker and Mason (2007: 142–143) call this the "self-interest or business case" for diversity, which is driven by need, and not necessarily the value of having a diverse workforce.

This brings us to the *fifth* reason why diversity management has become an imperative. Militaries have come to realise that having a diverse workforce is increasingly important for organizational effectiveness, especially when deployed in foreign countries where the forces have to interact with the local population who are different from themselves. Particularly in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, the military needs to develop proper working relations with host-nationals, and for this it needs personnel that

can identify with what host-nationals deem important and appropriate. In this regard, there is growing evidence that a better gender/racial mix is more suited to certain missions, especially where these involve greater interaction with the local community (Miller and Moskos 1995). Clearly, in-ranks' cultural diversity connects to cross-cultural competence of the force in general, which is something that can be seen in the U.S. forces (Hajjar 2010) as much as elsewhere. For example, during operations in Muslim societies, Western soldiers with a Muslim background were found to be more effective in developing ties with the local population than average soldiers (Bosman et al. 2008).

A *sixth* reason why some armed forces have been obliged to deal with issues of diversity relates to the need to integrate previously adverse military groups, often from different ethnic or ideological backgrounds to build a new army after a change in the political dispensation (Soeters and van der Meulen 1999: 213–214). We see this occurring, for example in Germany after the end of the Cold war, and in Eritrea and South Africa after years of liberation wars (Tessema 2007). This brings an added dimension to diversity management, namely that of political ideology and past loyalties that have a powerful influence on workplace relations and the legitimacy of the armed forces. This has meant that the management of diversity is more than just accommodating diverse groups, as it is often also about dealing with the underlying tensions that cultural, ideological and military differences bring about.

Within this, there emerges another *seventh* dimension associated with diversity management and this is the power dimensions associated with the various layers of inequalities that relate to race, class, gender, language and past military experience.

In this regard, very few case studies can depict these challenges of inclusion and exclusion as aptly as South Africa. In many respects, this case represents a microcosm of the issues armed forces have to deal with, albeit with some unique

differences which is why it is important to provide some contextual background.

The Case of the South-African Armed Forces

Background

During the Apartheid years prior to 1993, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was essentially a white, male conscript force, where blacks were permitted to serve in the military in separate ethnic battalions on a volunteer basis, but were not conscripted. Similarly women were allowed to volunteer for military service, but were only permitted to serve in support or non-combat roles. Their admission was not driven by any democratic imperative, but due to a shortage of white males who were fighting the so-called 'communist onslaught' on the country, both externally and internally. Hence, one can say it was 'pragmatic realities' and self-interest that required the military to tap into these groups to augment their manpower shortages. Despite admittance, their 'inclusion' was limited in terms of where they were allowed to serve, as well as in terms of career advancement. For example, blacks were not permitted to become officers and were clustered in the lower ranks. White women could progress within the ranks on a relatively equal footing to men, but were confined to support branches and were not permitted to the South African Military Academy.

This was to change following the first democratic elections in 1994, which resulted in the adoption of a new Constitution and the formation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The new SANDF was forged out of the former SADF, the four former homeland armies, namely the Transkei Defence Force (TDF), Bophutatswana Defence Force (BFD), Venda Defence Force (VDM) and Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) (collectively known as the TBVC forces) and the former non-statutory revolutionary forces of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK),

the liberation army of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA) of the black consciousness Pan African Congress (PAC). Included later was the KwaZulu Self Protection Force (KZSPF) of the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) (Heinecken 2005, 2007: 83). The integration of these predominately African[1] forces, together with the legal and politically driven affirmative action (AA) and equal opportunities (EO) programme were to change the racial and gender profile of the SANDF significantly (DOD 2002). For South Africa the need to manage diversity became a social, economic and political imperative which if dealt with incorrectly, "could influence the future prosperity and stability of the country" (Human 1996: 46–64). Even more so for the military which had to deal with not only a racial, but political transformation.

At the political level, the SANDF was obliged to conform to the requirements spelt out in the Constitution which forbid discrimination on the grounds or race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and language. Thus it became a 'democratic imperative' that the SANDF review all its policies and practices that were exclusive, or prevented inclusivity. Blacks and women could now serve in any position in the SANDF and to address the injustices of the past an assertive affirmative action programme was introduced to advance both women and blacks in the military. The emphasis placed on AA and EO would change the racial, ethnic and gender profile of the South African armed forces significantly in years to come (Heinecken 2007: 79–80). However, the greatest challenge was the need to restore the legitimacy of the military (DOD 1996). For this, it was important that the leadership of the SANDF was not only seen to be transferred to blacks, but to those of the revolutionary forces who were responsible for the liberation of the majority of the population (Heinecken 1999a). But first, the challenge was how to create unity among this diversity.

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[1]African in this context refers to black (Africans), while blacks are the collective term used for coloureds, Indians/Asians and Africans.

Management of Diversity Programmes

In an attempt to create cohesion, different management of diversity programmes were introduced (Heinecken 2013a). The first was referred to as the Psychological Integration Programme (PIP), which sought to diffuse underlying feelings of mistrust, insecurity and racial tensions associated with integrating former enemies. This was a five day-programme intended to facilitate discussions of feelings of guilt, bitterness, fear and anger associated with the past. This process was intended for everyone serving in the SANDF, but was soon discarded as the implementation tended to exacerbate, rather than diffuse the tensions. The lessons learnt from this experience was that a culture of tolerance must first be created, before one can deal with deep-seated racial and political hostilities.

This led to a shift away from a psychological, to a more sociological approach to managing diversity by cultivating an awareness of cultural differences and the effect that racial stereotyping has on unity. Most of the trainers on these programmes had attended the Defence Equal Opportunities Management Institute (DEOMI) in the United States. Subsequently, a Civic Education Cultural Diversity Programme was introduced as part of the curriculum of the various military courses. This was a more successful approach as it created an awareness of cultural differences and stereotypes. However, it did not address the underlying power dynamics embodied in the vast inequalities in education, language ability and understanding of the functioning of the military bureaucracy that continued to place blacks in a disadvantaged position relative to whites (Mashike 2007). This fuelled racial tensions with often dire consequences, including the shooting of white officers, which promoted a commission of enquiry into racism in the SANDF (Setai Report 2001).

One of the main problems facing the SANDF in accommodating so many different armed forces and cultural groups was to create a common core value system. Recognising this, the SANDF moved away from managing difference, towards creating a common value system that could be

embraced by all. These included professionalism, respect for human dignity, integrity, leadership, loyalty and accountability. The 'value' most closely linked to the management of diversity is that of respect for human dignity, which emphasises respect for others, tolerance of differences, the need to abstain from condemning and judging others, fairness in the treatment of others and effective communication to promote common understanding (DOD 2003a). This was the first attempt to create one universal military culture acceptable to everyone serving in the SANDF. These principles are included in the code of conduct of the various military units. However, racial tensions have persisted due to the manner in which affirmative action for blacks and women have been implemented.

Race and Affirmative Action

Affirmative action (AA) was introduced as a political driven process to address past racial imbalances brought about by Apartheid, as well as create a more representative military. As affirmative action embodies a form of discrimination by advancing certain groups (blacks and women), this often leads to resentment and tension, especially where the focus is on getting the numbers right, irrespective of the consequences this may hold (Heinecken 2009). Here the emphasis is not on valuing diversity, but on achieving diversity with the aim of meeting a specific political objective. While there is now a greater level of racial tolerance in the SANDF, largely due to the emphasis placed on respect for diversity, many whites no longer see a future for themselves in the military. There has been an atrophy of experienced, white skilled military personnel, and those that remain have come to feel increasingly disempowered, undervalued, socially isolated and alienated (Heinecken 2013a). In conversations with white officers, many state they feel that they are no longer wanted or valued. This is most aptly reflected in the following quotes.

> A white naval officer commented: "I feel that as a white senior officer with scarce needed skills in a branch that is not attractive to Africans my service is no longer wanted or needed based on the colour of my skin. I find this very hard to accept as I serve my country and serve just as loyally as in the past. This is expected of a military officer. My goal of attaining rank after a successful career is no longer achievable. For the first time I need to think of another career in the medium term" (Heinecken 2007: 83)

What this quote illustrates is that this officer feels that his contribution is no longer valued and sees no future for himself in the military. Another army officer commented on his frustration in trying to impose the rules and regulations as a white, in a now predominantely black military.

> It just becomes pointless trying to make a difference. If you question things, you are isolated. If you apply the rules and policies and they don't like it, then you are racist, punished and victimised, and all you are trying to do is your job. In the long run, you just become totally disillusioned and leave (Heinecken 2013a: 18).

Such feelings of isolation and disillusionment affect not only retention, but recruitment. Whites are no longer volunteering for military service and the few that do, state that they feel lonely and left out due to cultural and language differences (Heinecken and van der Waag-Cowling 2009). There is now an active attempt to recruit whites the SANDF will soon no longer be representative of society, which will affect not only the armed forces' legitimacy, but civil-military relations in general.

To a large extent, the management of diversity in the SANDF has been complicated by the integration of the different military forces. In this regard, Perlmutter and Bennet (1980: 23) point out that one of the main dilemmas facing countries having to integrate revolutionary soldiers in post-revolutionary times into a professional military is "how to disarm these soldiers politically and re-arm them professionally". Over the years there has been a creeping politicization of the military as members of the former revolutionary have assumed the leadership of the SANDF. According to Honey (2003: 29) members of the former revolutionary forces are the ones who

have benefited most from affirmative action, by being rewarded with high ranks, often without regard to experience, skills or age. For years, many have warned that this is leading to a "growth of an inexperienced and politicised army" and a "decline in standards of discipline and professionalism" (Rapp 1995: 63).

Gender and Sexual Orientation

Associated have the SANDF's policies of AA and EO has been the need to address gender equality. This is not driven by a shortage of manpower as during the Apartheid era, but pressures stemming from the political environment. The Constitutional provisions that forbid discrimination on gender and sexual orientation meant that the SANDF was compelled to review its policies that prohibited women from serving in combat positions, and discriminated against gays and lesbians. Today, women are allowed to serve in all ranks and branches and represent just under 24% of the full-time uniformed services. They receive the same training as men, except with respect to certain drill adaptations that are considered fair discrimination based on physiological differences. The SANDF has also embraced the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 to actively increase the number of women in peacekeeping operations, not as a right, but as a necessity. Some 15% of those deployed on peacekeeping operations are women. A commitment has been made to increase recruitment targets of women to 40%, in order to have at least a 30% representation of women in the military (DOD 2015).

In essence, for women serving in the SANDF the real issue is not whether they may serve in combat, but whether they do so in a gender friendly environment. In the SANDF, the management of gender integration is premised on gender neutral standards. This places women under tremendous performance pressure not only to meet the physical standards, but assimilate the predominately masculine military culture. As

such, they continue to face a litany of challenges that 'other' them, in terms of their physical and mental strength, suitability to serve in certain roles and not least, the challenges they face on deployment that are different from men. This is especially the case where female peacekeepers are seen as a liability, and portrayed as potential victims of rape and abuse (Heinecken 2013b). Then there is also the cultural dimension of gender relations. Menon and Kotze (2007) for example found that white women feel less empowered and integrated because they are not regarded as professional 'career' soldiers. Black women in turn experience greater levels of subordination in terms of traditional African culture, and find that their leadership and authority is challenged to a greater extent, and are more likely to experience sexual abuse and exploitation from seniors than white women.

In terms of the rights of homosexuals in the SANDF, the DOD White Paper on Defence declared that it will operate strictly within the parameters of the Constitution and will not discriminate against anyone in terms of their sexual orientation (DOD 1996). No action is instituted against a member of the SANDF for being a homosexual, although any sexually atypical or immoral behaviour that could detrimentally affect morale, or cause emotional stress, thereby affecting military discipline or effectiveness, is subject to disciplinary action and the perpetrator may be punished with detention, be reprimanded, fined or discharged. This policy applies to unacceptable sexual behaviour by both heterosexual and homosexual members. While legally homosexuality is permitted, it remains a 'silent right' (Heinecken 1999b). Substantial prejudice and stereotypes with regard to gays and lesbians still exist and most remain 'in the closet' because they are afraid of being rejected, scorned, oppressed, victimized, criticised and publicly judged (Steyn 1997). Thus, in the SANDF one finds the situation where homosexuality is permitted by law, rather than accepted and incidences of abuse and discrimination continue to be reported (DefenceWeb 2013).

Culture, Religion and Language

Together with race, the SANDF has needed to become more Africanised in its traditions and practices. Many of the present traditions stem from the former SADF and are Eurocentric, or more specifically British in origin. As such, blacks felt that little recognition was given to their cultural practices and beliefs, including the acceptance of customary marriages and dependants, weddings, funerals, godparents and spiritual beliefs such as the need to communicate with the ancestors (Setai Report 2001: 34). In this regard, numerous steps were taken to introduce policies to accommodate certain cultural and religious practices. The SANDF Dress Policy was changed to allow religious adornments to be worn (DOD 2002) and a special leave dispensation was introduced that gives members up to five days special responsibility leave to attend funerals (DOD 2003b). There has also been a greater accommodation of cultural differences in terms of marriage. The African practice of having multiple spouses has been accommodated, as well as customary marriages. Life partners are also recognised, whether this be of two persons of the opposite, or the same sex. Increasingly as time has progressed, policies and practices are being adapted to accommodate religious differences, as well as African traditions and cultural practices as far as possible within the military context.

With eleven different languages being spoken in South Africa, this is another divisive factor in the SANDF. Although English is the official language for defence communication this is generally the second or third language of Africans. As a consequence, they are at a disadvantage on military courses where these linguistic shortcomings often result in diminished academic performance. Language is undeniably a tool of inclusion and exclusion: just as blacks feel alienated by not being able to speak Afrikaans, so do whites as the SANDF becomes Africanised and few whites can speak any of the African languages, such as Zulu or Xhosa. This increases the feelings of social isolation, powerlessness and alienation felt by whites (Heinecken 2009: 29–31).

What his case study shows, is that there are many different cross-cutting social variables that affect the management of diversity. While there has been an acceptance and accommodation of diversity, there has not been much 'valuing' of diversity in terms of how this can benefit organizational effectiveness. However, this is slowly changing due to the experiences on peacekeeping operations where the benefits of having a more diverse force have become more apparent.

Diversity and Deployments

At present, South Africa is one of the largest troop contributing countries to peacekeeping missions on the continent, with almost 3000 members deployed on various missions. The major deployments have been to Burundi (terminated 30 June 2009), with current operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Darfur, Sudan. These missions not only take place in culturally diverse environments, but with and alongside troops from many different nations. This not only creates operational difficulties in terms of communication, but affects the interaction of troops with the local populations and NGOs (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012). This is not specific to South Africa, but is true of almost all of today's military operations in the world, be it under the aegis of the UN, the AU, the EU or NATO (Soeters and Tresch 2010).

Interaction with Other Contingents

In terms of their interactions with military contingents on these missions, it is clear that not only issues of race, culture, and language, but also regional dynamics influence relations in military operations. In general, it appears as if South Africans generally get along well with the French, Swedish and personnel from the UK, but found them dominating and arrogant. So in this type of multinational cooperation there is a bit of

super-power—regional power-politics, but there is enough common ground in terms of military culture and language to overcome some of the difficulties. In contrast, the relationship between the South Africans and other developing countries not from the African continent, reflect an interesting dynamic of racial tension, jealousy and contempt. For example, there appeared to be a distinct dislike of the Bangladesh and Uruguay contingents, because they "were not there to die, but to make money" (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012).

What was clear was that there appears to be a 'professional' jealousy or pecking order among the forces, where the Europeans and Indians thought themselves superior to the South Africans, and the latter better than the other African contingents. Thus, both politics and prestige influenced these interactions and strained relations on these missions (see also the chapter on organizational cultures in the military in this Handbook). Added to this were problems of language (e.g., van Dijk and Soeters 2008), making it difficult to conduct operations with these contingents, with them having to resort to 'finger and body language' in order to communicate. One thing that did bridge all these political, military and cultural divides was sport, which was seen as one activity that united everyone across these divides (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012). Indeed, stressing supranational goals and organizing common activities such as sports or festivities have been observed as tremendously important to gain some degree of operational unity in many multinational military operations (Elron et al. 1999).

Understanding Cultural Diversity

In terms of their deployments South African peacekeepers serving on these various missions over the years consistently express the desire to have a better understanding of the 'human terrain' (Heinecken and Winslow 2010). This equated to having some knowledge, of the local languages and culture in order to understand the local people and political situation. This is a need that has previously been expressed in other forces, such as the American army, as well other troop contributing nations (González 2008). Most military people experience difficulties when interacting with the civilian population, local authorities, and local fighting factions as a result of these shortcomings. Referring to the South African case, this was found in operations that ranged from humanitarian relief to peacekeeping intervention missions. An officer involved in the flood relief operation in Mozambique in February 2007 explains:

> We were not aware of the cultural importance of the social standing of people (families, male versus female versus children) of the deeper rural more traditional communities, which caused unhappiness among the people we tried to help in the way we did. People were rescued in the order of need, or when and where we saw them, while the belief among the people [was] that we had to start at the head of the community. If we knew this beforehand, it would have been possible to negate the feelings by explaining our rescue procedures to the people much earlier and this could have had a much more positive feeling towards the efforts by the SANDF during the mission (Heinecken and Winslow 2010: 199).

This is a telling example of how a mission can be influenced by a lack of understanding of the power dynamics embedded within communities that military personnel have to assist. South-Africa's experiences in Sudan reflect similar shortcomings in their knowledge and readings of the 'human terrain'. Military personnel deployed to Dafur/Sudan merely get an introductory lecture on the causes of the conflict, the demographics of the country and a brief introduction to Islamic culture. Very little attention is paid to the political, ethnic, religious and not least, gender dimensions of this conflict in their mission readiness training. The bulk of cultural intelligence is transferred through word-of mouth, or immersion. As a result, South African soldiers often have to muddle through with inadequate and sometimes wrong information, which at times affected mission success (Heinecken and Winslow 2010).

This is not unique to South Africa. Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that national security decision-making has suffered due to a lack of knowledge of foreign cultures—their habits, intentions, beliefs, social organization and political symbols. This has implications at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Misunderstandings of culture at the strategic level can produce policies that can exacerbate an insurgency. A lack of cultural knowledge at the operational level can lead to negative public opinion and hostility towards peacekeepers. Ignorance of culture at a tactical level can endanger both civilians and troops where it exacerbates tensions on the ground. Consequently, an understanding of the human terrain is a distinct and critical element of military operations (González 2008).

The Need for Diversity

From this one can see that race, gender and religious affinity have a profound impact on operations in different and complex ways (Miller and Moskos 1995). This is demonstrated by the experiences of South African soldiers on these missions, as reflected by a comment made by a SANDF Colonel deployed in Dafur:

> As a white, I found that I could interact more easily with the different fighting factions because I was African (not seen as a European), but was neither Black African nor Arab. In this war the Sudanese Arabs are fighting the Sudanese Africans, so where do you think they place the loyalties of our black soldiers instinctively—with the Africans. I had a Black Muslim Senegalese officer and thought he would be perfect to sort out some tensions. It was a disaster—they would not talk to him (Heinecken and Winslow 2010).

In Darfur/Sudan interacting with the civilian population seemed more strained. Here South-African peacekeepers commented that the local population did not like 'foreign white soldiers' and believed they 'were enemies and came to steal their resources' and came to Sudan to 'change their Islamic religious culture' (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012: 44). Commenting on their deployment in Burundi, it appears as if

relations between South-Africans and host-nationals were more cordial, but that they got on better with the Tutsi minority, than the Hutus who were more hostile towards them. So it is not just race, but ethnicity and the relative power relations embodied in this that plays a role. In the DRC relations with both the rebel forces and local population relations were better, because most of the South African troops are black and from Africa. Here the South-African soldiers had an advantage as they could pick up on the language and customs quite easily because of a certain resemblance between South-African languages (Zulu) and other Bantu languages (Swahili) that are used elsewhere on the continent.

What the South African experience indicates, is that it is better if one's own forces are able to speak the local language and identify with the local customs, than to interact with the local community through foreigners or translators. This was mentioned especially in relation to Dafur/Sudan, where there were concerns that the translators were not relaying the correct information. Many armed forces experience language problems in operations overseas (Bos and Soeters 2006; van Dijk and Soeters 2008). The suggestion was made that it would be better to recruit local South African (civilians) who understand Arabic and know their customs in Darfur, than to use host-country translators whose loyalties are unknown (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012). This comment in itself illustrates the importance of having a diverse military workforce when deployed on such missions. There are other examples from elsewhere to illustrate this. For example, Dutch Muslim soldiers, NCOs and officers had clear advantages when dealing with host-nationals in the Muslim societies in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, without their loyalty being questioned by their fellow-soldiers (Bosman et al. 2008).

Last, but by no means least is the importance of gender. Much has been written on how a more gender balanced force can improve interactions with the local community, diffuse potential conflict, improve intelligence and the plight of local women (Miller and Moskos 1995; Mobekk 2010;

Simiç 2010). However, these benefits are dependent on their ability to interact with the local population and how they are perceived, as reflected in the following comment by a young female peacekeeper:

> The ladies in Sudan, they don't like our South African ladies because they do not behave similarly, they don't like women wearing trousers. They think South African ladies do not respect their culture. The men don't like us talking to the ladies, I think they think we will corrupt them (Heinecken 2013b: 19).

In general, the peacekeeping environment in Africa is hostile to women due to the high levels of rape and sexual violence. This means that they often have to conceal their identity, which defeats the point of having more women on peacekeeping missions if they cannot interact with the local population. Male peacekeepers also report feeling vulnerable to attack, and consider having women as part of their platoons a security risk (Heinecken 2015).

What these experiences show is just how central diversity is to military operations. This relates not only to the need for personnel to have a better knowledge and understanding of the cultural contexts in which they are deployed, but of the influence their own national origin, culture, race, religion and gender have on military operations. Based on this, their inclusion, or exclusion can have a major influence on military effectiveness and ultimately peace, security and development in contexts which themselves are ripped apart by ethnic and religious conflict.

From Diversity to the Inclusion of Difference

Reflecting on the previous sections it is clear that having a diverse military workforce matters at numerous levels, but that managing this diversity comes with its own challenges. At the political level as an instrument of the state, when armed forces are not representative of all segments of society, this can affect their legitimacy. This in turn has repercussions at the institutional level, where it impacts on both recruitment and

retention. However, accommodating a diverse workforce, as the South African and other cases illustrates brings forth many different challenges, depending on the motivation for diversity. For South Africa, it was a political necessity to ensure stability, but was complicated by the past political and military history of the country. To deal with the underlying animosities, various management of diversity programmes were implemented to inculcate a more inclusive culture. While there is now a high degree of racial tolerance, certain inequalities in terms of education, language ability and military expertise fuelled racial tensions in the initial period of integration. In the latter years, these tensions have persisted, but in different forms due to the effect of affirmative action and the creeping politicization of the military.

While the South African military has been able to foster cohesion around a core set of values, the culture is still not one of inclusivity based on valuing diversity. Managing diversity in itself is not where ambitions should end. Making use of the potential benefits of diversity is the aim that one should strive for. The emphasis should be on fostering a culture of inclusion (Roberson 2006). Inclusion implies that there are other dynamics that must be taken into consideration (Shore et al. 2011: 1265–1266). In this regard, Shore et al. (2011) discern four elements of diversity based on whether or not 'dissimilar' employees are treated as 'insiders', as 'people belonging to the organization' and whether or not they are seen as providing 'unique value' to the organization.

The first and less preferred social mechanism when dissimilar people meet in an organization is that of *exclusion*. This occurs when 'different' individuals are not treated as insiders, nor as people with unique capabilities and are excluded from better jobs or opportunities. In terms of diversity management this obviously is the worst scenario, as there may be harmful cognitive, emotional, behavioural and health outcomes for the ones who feel neglected and excluded. In terms of the South African case, this was how blacks felt at the point of integration into the new SANDF, but how whites now may feel as a result

of affirmative action and patronage. The next category is *assimilation*. This is where the 'different' individuals are expected to fully conform to the dominant cultural values and norms of the organization, but where their own uniqueness is downplayed. Typically women too have to assimilate the masculine culture of the military, which means that all have to conform to the existing norms, standards and culture. But, this cannot be achieved where *differentiation*, or some form of other-ing continues.

Only when differentiation shifts to recognizing and/or valuing diversity can one say that diversity is really embraced. One sees this happening where such difference is valued in relation to the contribution to operational success in peacekeeping missions. While there is still an 'other-ing', this is now no longer seen as something that has to be changed, but embraced not as something that needs to be accommodated, but as a necessity for organizational efficiency (Heinecken 2016).

This leads to a true sense of *inclusion* where 'different' individuals are treated as insiders who really belong to the organization, where their contribution is valued, but also where they can retain their uniqueness within the work group. This is the situation where employees have learned to adjust their stereotypical thinking and correct their inaccurate stereotypical attributions about the 'others', hence improving diversity-related dynamics (van Dijk et al. 2017). This is the ideal organizations should strive for. How close are today's armed forces to this ideal?

Conclusions

While it is difficult to generalize, there does seem to be some emerging trends. It is clear that diversity issues continue to be important even where previously excluded groups (i.e. ethnic minorities and women) are now included. This is due to the fact that this often ignites other challenges, as reflected in the South African case, around issues of meritocracy, politicisation and alienation. This is not unique to South Africa and surfaces in different ways in national armed forces. For example, in the Israeli Defence Forces, new tensions are brewing between so-called religious soldiers and secular female military personnel. The religious soldiers' complaints relate to the women's dress, their right to serve in combatant roles and the importance of female free zones within the military (Levy 2013). Whatever these manifestations of exclusion are, they are generally detrimental to the armed forces' legitimacy and effectiveness.

More and more it is being recognized that differentiation (dissimilar people being valued for unique skills) has enormous advantages that improves the functioning of armed forces. This implies that certain groups may continue to be seen as different, but that this difference is being valued. Host-national interpreters in Western military operations overseas are an example here (Bos and Soeters 2006). Those interpreters are often, not always valued by the military organization, as without them the military would not gain the needed intelligence and develop good relations with the local stakeholders. However, these local interpreters are not likely to be seen as real military (wo)men, let alone as Western people. Most likely the same applies to the Ghurkhas in the British army, originating from India and Nepal, who are highly appreciated for their soldierly skills, but are considered different anyway. We also see how gender difference, is now being valued by the military, especially in operations which require engagement with the local population.

Whatever the motivation, inclusion of dissimilar people in the military—treating all people as insiders and valuing them for their different skills and backgrounds—is clearly something that is going to increase, not decrease in the future. Changing recruitment needs and ongoing pressures from civil rights movements, as well as general political and international legal developments, such as in the context of the UN, will continue to drive this. However, underneath this there are always lurking tensions that have to be managed as these policies and practices of inclusion meet resistance and obstinacy, both within and among different national armed forces.

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Author Biographies

Lindy Heinecken was formerly a researcher and Deputy Director of the Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS) at the South African Military Academy. Since 2006 she has been at the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch University, South Africa and is currently Professor of Sociology lecturing in political and industrial sociology. The main focus of her research is in the domain of armed forces and society where she has published widely on a range of issues including military unionism, the management of diversity, HIV/AIDS and the experiences of military personnel on peace operations. Her more recent research focuses on gender integration in the military and military recruitment. She serves on numerous academic boards, including the Council of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), the Board of the International Sociological Association's (ISA) Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution Group (RC01), the European Research Group on Armed Forces and Society (ERGOMAS) and on various National Research Foundation (NRF) Committees. She serves on the editorial board of the journals *Armed Forces and Society* and *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*. She is a NRF B rated researcher and serves as one of the pool of specialists conducting research for the South African Army.

Joseph Soeters held the chair of management and organization studies at the Faculty of Military Studies of the Netherlands Defence Academy. Currently, he is a part-time professor of organizational sociology at Tilburg University. He has been an associate editor of Armed Forces and Society for a number of years, and he was the Vice-president of RC 01 of the International Sociological Association (on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution)—currently he is member of the board. He has been the dean of the Faculty of Military Studies in the period 1999–2003. He has published extensively about the military, both in peacetime and operational conditions, in (co-)edited volumes, two monographs, articles in international journals and book chapters.

Military Families: A Comparative Perspective

Karin De Angelis, David G. Smith and Mady W. Segal

Introduction

More than 57 countries have deployed in support of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. At over ten years in duration, this fluid international coalition of more than 1.5 million servicemembers has encountered a war distinctive in its mission and tactics, especially the evolving use of technology and the return to counterinsurgency doctrine. As a consequence of these changes in war-making, servicemembers and their families have encountered both familiar and unprecedented injuries and stressors.

Servicemembers have served in these long wars while also experiencing broad cultural and demographic shifts in families. In many countries, they are an older, volunteer military who, because of their age, are likely to be in a committed, intimate relationship and have children. As part of a military family, they live at the intersection of two major social institutions, both of which make great demands on the individual's time, loyalty, and energy as "greedy institutions" and shape the direction, transitions, and intersections of each family member's life.

In this chapter we examine ongoing issues affecting military families by exploring comparisons among countries regarding the potential spillover and conflict (both positive and negative) experienced by military families. Using a life-course perspective, we focus on the changing definitions of family, and what this means for formal and informal support systems, and the changing nature of warfare and the impact this has on the health and well-being of servicemembers and their families. We also highlight outcomes by country for military families such as satisfaction and retention. We see this work as providing potential hypotheses that can be tested with further research, rather than providing an in-depth analysis of any one country or trend.

Conceptual Model on Military Life Course and Family Well-Being

The military is unique in the combination of demands it makes on the servicemember and, by extension, his/her family. The pattern of demands that characterizes the military lifestyle

K. De Angelis (✉)
Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United States Air Force Academy, 2354 Fairchild Hall, Suite 6L-107, U.S. Air Force Academy, CO 80840, USA

D. G. Smith
National Security Affairs Department, U.S. Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI 02841, USA
e-mail: david.g.smith.phd@gmail.com

M. W. Segal
Department of Sociology, The University of Maryland, 9007 Gettysburg Lane, College Park, MD 20740, USA
e-mail: msegal@umd.edu

include: risk of injury or death; geographic mobility; separations due to deployments, training, and temporary duties; residence in foreign countries; normative constraints which dictate proper behavioral norms; and a masculine environment which can affect family socialization and organization norms (Segal 1986). It is this combination of demands that largely explains the differences in work-family conflict, stressors, policy, and support programs between the military and civilian work organizations. Although people in other occupations experience some of these characteristics, the military is unique in that servicemembers and their families are likely to experience all of these over the course of a career.

Life course theory is very useful for analyzing military family life. Recent contributions have highlighted the ways in which life course concepts and principles are directly applicable to research on servicemembers and their families (Wilmoth and London 2013). The model developed by Segal et al. (2015) is quite consistent with other prominent approaches to military well-being. It further specifies some of the dynamics in the lives of military personnel and their families that relate stress to well-being. We present here some elements of the model.[1]

To understand the well-being of military members and their families, the model is complex, specifying four dimensions of the military family life course: Servicemember's Military Career Life Course, Family Life Course (including servicemember and spouse events), Child or Children's Life Course, and Unexpected (but Common) Major Life Events. In addition, characteristics of individuals and their social situations are important mediators and moderators of the effects. The effects of life course events on well-being are likely to vary as a function of individual characteristics and demographic variables, such as sex, race, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, education, socio-economic status background, family size, marital status of parents, adoption, military family background, reason for

entering service, and childhood and life experiences. Such variables may serve as mediators or moderators of effects of the event on well-being. These effects also vary according to the historical context.

Other factors that affect well-being in the face of these events are financial resources, personal resiliency, and social support. The latter includes informal social support as well as the "community capacity" of the surrounding civilian area (e.g., Bowen et al. 2000; Huebner et al. 2009; Orthner and Rose 2005). Also important are military contextual factors, such as leaders' behaviors, unit climate, community strength, and organizational policies and practices (Bourg and Segal 1999; Segal 1986). Modeling and measuring such causal dynamics is a gap in much of the research that has been done.

The conceptual model also helps to identify where changes can be made to improve personal well-being and organizational outcomes. Major attention in research and clinical practice should be given to improving well-being by making organizational changes (in policies, programs, and practices) and by developing and evaluating the effectiveness of interventions. Such interventions include both those that help to prevent stressful events from negatively affecting well-being and those that provide treatment to servicemembers and their families after they have experienced events that are harmful to well-being. The military provides a myriad of programs to support servicemembers and their families (Booth et al. 2007, especially Chap. 7). Many active scholars and practitioners have noted the paucity of systematic program evaluation research, especially assessments planned before the development and expansion of the programs.

All life course events identified may be repeated over time. Some are more likely to be repeated than others. For example, for the Servicemember Military Life Course, promotions, relocations, training, and deployments are likely to recur. For the Family Life Course, events likely to recur include development of a significant relationship, pregnancy, and birth of child. For dual service couples, there would be two servicemember military life courses.

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[1]To understand the model, we recommend reading the full published version.

Emphasis is placed on the intersections of events in the life course of family members, especially how servicemember's military events intersect with family life course events in ways that affect the well-being of the servicemember and his/her family. It is not just individual demands of the military that affect its personnel and their families, but the combination and timing of those events. For example, having to relocate shortly after return from deployment is stressful and likely to have negative effects on servicemembers, their spouses, and their children. Being deployed while one's spouse gives birth is stressful for both the servicemember and the spouse; coming home from that deployment with a serious injury compounds the negative effects on everyone's well-being.

Changing Missions and Impact on Families

Life course theory emphasizes the importance of historical context in analyzing the events of individuals and families. The current impact of military service on servicemembers and their families is critically affected by the nature of recent wars. The 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States prompted a multi-national, multi-faceted response. Some countries opted to show support with the United States by participating in vigils or through their newspaper editorials; others provided airspace and airport use for American military aircraft. Many allies also elected to participate as military partners with the United States in Afghanistan and some later in Iraq. Although some countries, most notably the United Kingdom and Australia, participated in combat operations through the duration of both wars, others supported one or both wars but did not participate directly in combat operations, either because of military limitations or because of a conscious decision to limit combat involvement. For example, in Afghanistan, Greek troops operated the airports and staffed hospitals, but did not participate in combat operations. This distinction carried over to Iraq, where there was greater opposition to the war by

many countries and much greater reluctance to support the broader "war on terrorism" militarily. South Korean troops, for example, ran a hospital and a vocational technology program in the Kurdish North of Iraq, while Kazakh troops ran a water purification plant. In some cases countries decided to deploy combat troops to Iraq, but in small numbers. Macedonia and Estonia, for example, provided one platoon each for combat patrols. These servicemembers not only had to deal with the stress of combat, but also had to do so without support of their chain of command or a support unit from their home country.

A hallmark of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was the use of irregular types of warfare counter to the training, doctrine, and expectations of the conventional warfare perfected by American and other Western militaries (see Chap. 24 in this volume for more discussion on asymmetric warfare). What servicemembers encountered in these conflicts was an enemy that did not use the traditional organizational structures of Western militaries—there were no uniformed adversaries or major operating bases that could be targeted—and that intentionally broke the international laws of wars as a way of manipulating the general population. As the battlefield shifted from defined combat zones to civilian-populated areas, the impact of war also extended beyond combat troops to those tasked with support missions, such as civil engineers and convoy personnel. Thus, the stressors of wars typically associated with combat troops also became a part of the deployed experience for support personnel, whom, at least for several years, were not adequately trained for insurgency warfare and ground combat. The large scale, long term nature of the war required supplemental Reserve and National Guard units to mobilize, extending the impact of the war to families who, for the most part, were not accustomed to long deployments and combat. Supporting these Reserve families and their injured servicemembers who were not centrally located with military installations was a new challenge that researchers continue to study.

This initial lack of preparation for irregular warfare also brought new stressors and new

injuries, both physical and mental. Unsure of who the enemy was or where it was embedded, troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan had to negotiate the possibility that their enemy was hidden among the civilian population and that engaging in conventional warfare tactics would further feed into the insurgent cause. They also had to negotiate an enemy who capitalized on arms, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which were random, deadly, and created a constant stress. Conventional weaponry, such as tanks and fighter jets, provided little relief against evolving homemade weapons that could be hidden in the ground and detonated remotely. Thus, one characteristic of today's military mission and of the experiences of deployed servicemembers is the unceasing unpredictability of irregular warfare which defies internationally-agreed-upon conventions and creates a grating mental and physical stress. Although mental stress, or post-traumatic stress (PTS), is not a new phenomenon during warfare—terms like shell shock and battle fatigue are past labels—it has become the signature injury of these wars. Research suggests that at least 18.5% of American servicemembers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan have PTS and/or depression, making its detection and treatment primary issues for servicemembers and their families (Tanielian and Jaycox 2008). United Kingdom personnel returning from Iraq reportedly have lower rates of PTS than their American counterparts, but are still showing symptoms at an alarming rate (Hoptopf et al. 2006).

This new type of warfare also has brought new types of physical injuries. Due to improved science and technology, the gear and transportation options issued to servicemembers provide increased protections against IEDs. Servicemembers who in previous conflicts would have died from combat exposure are now surviving. However, they are doing so with the increased possibility of traumatic brain injury, which can be caused by multiple concussions and the pressure changes created by IED explosions. It is estimated that approximately 19.5% of American servicemembers experience a traumatic brain injury during deployment (Tanielian and Jaycox 2008). Loss of limb also has increased with over 1000 American servicemembers becoming amputees; the UK reports similar amputee rates (Davenport 2010; Tan 2012). The increase of these injuries not only strain the medical treatment options operated by each country, but also fall back on military families, who, in many cases, are at the center of diagnosis, treatment, and ongoing support (Rand 2008).

The change in the military's mission also increased familial separation due to deployments and training requirements. During peacetime these separations mainly involve professional military education, occupational training, unaccompanied tours, routine field training, and rotational sea duty (Segal 1986). During wartime, these separations continue, but they occur alongside unpredictable and longer wartime deployments. Since 2002, more than 1.7 million U.S. servicemembers have been deployed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, with approximately 150,000–200,000 troops deployed in hostile locations per month (Hosek and Martorell 2009). From 2001 to 2014, the United Kingdom has deployed approximately 220,000 personnel, and Australia has deployed approximately 33,000 servicemembers to Iraq and/or Afghanistan; after the United States, they are the next biggest contingents of combat personnel (Beale 2014).

Beyond considering the differential impact of specific demands in different nations, we must also consider the nature of the military institution in each nation. Countries with military conscription of youth are likely to have fewer married servicemembers, while those that rely on volunteers and long-term retention are likely to have mostly married personnel. Incorporating reserve personnel, who tend to be older and therefore more married, also increases the number of military family members. All of these have implications for the intersection of the military and the family in the international context.

Changing Families

Changes in the military have important life course implications for how the military intersects with other social institutions. In the United States and internationally, families also have experienced major shifts, especially in demographic trends and cultural norms. This shift is most pronounced in the changing definition of who constitutes a family. Diverse family structures continue to challenge, both numerically and culturally, the once-dominant separate spheres model of a married heterosexual couple. These demographic changes are seen in military families and are fundamental to the life course model and family well-being. Indeed, family formation trends impact support resources, career paths and servicemembers' and their caregivers' outcomes when unexpected life events occur such as combat injuries and death.

The most noticeable change over the last few decades is that marriage rates continue to decline steadily in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe. Age at first marriage also continues to increase for both men and women. Accompanying these changes is the rise in cohabitation for both same-sex and heterosexual couples, which is now a majority experience for most age cohorts in Western countries, either as a step toward marriage or as a replacement of it. There has been an increase in couples having children outside of marriage, as the rate of cohabiting and single parent families have increased as a proportion of all families in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe and are expected to continue to do so. The rate of one-person households also is increasing with more individuals living alone, often by choice. While single servicemembers are not necessarily new, the life course model helps us to examine the impact of psychological injuries when the servicemember returns, the type of social support needed, and who provides that support.

Changes in family structure, and public acceptance of them, are connected to attitudinal changes about the proper roles for men and women in the family and in the paid labour force.

Women continue to enter into higher education and the paid labour force in greater numbers and they also are entering into occupations once closed to them, including the military. The United States and Canada have the highest representation of women, but women's presence is increasing, albeit slowly, in most Western militaries to include the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Australia, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Germany, and Turkey, among others (Nielsen 2001, also see Ch. 15 in this volume for more in-depth discussion of women in the military). Although fatherhood still is epitomized by the provider role, men are becoming increasingly involved with domestic life, to include child care (Bianchi et al. 2006; Townsend 2002). Military families reflect these attitudinal changes, with more women, either as civilian or military spouses, expecting to participate in the paid labour force and more men expecting to share domestic responsibilities. Non-traditional caregivers for children of deployed servicemembers provide a life course intersection that emphasizes military contextual factors such as support programs and policies, inclusivity of diverse family forms, command climate, and community capacity.

Although demographically distinct in several key ways, military families are embedded within society, and as such are affected by these broader changes in work and family life. Women's participation in the military, for example, has increased in line with women's overall increased presence in the paid labour market. This has implications for both male and female servicemembers who are now more likely than in past decades to be in a dual-earner couple. Many of these couples, and especially those that include a female servicemember, are dual-military couples. There also has been an increase in single parent families in most Western militaries, especially the United States, and a growing formal recognition of cohabiting couples, to include those who are same-sex, in many European militaries. In countries where gay marriage is legal, these families are entitled to pay, benefits, and support connected to their marital status. Little research has focused on the well-being of these diverse

families as new policies and programs are put into practice. The life course conceptual model provides a lens to understand how these families' resiliency, financial resources, and social support are impacted as they contend with combat deployments and shifting societal norms at home.

Despite the similarities that American military families share with society, they also differ from broader societal trends in important ways, especially in regard to marriage and childbearing. Whereas marriage rates have been declining and cohabitation rates have been increasing in Western countries, American military servicemembers tend to have higher marriage rates than their age-matched civilian peers, with the greatest difference among groups, such as African Americans, who have the lowest rate of marriage as civilians (Lundquist 2004). Military couples also marry at a younger age than their civilian counterparts (Segal and Segal 2004). At the time of recruitment and initial entry into the military, however, servicemembers are less likely than their age comparable civilian peers to be married. This suggests that there is something distinct about this population which makes it more receptive to marriage or that there may be motivators to marriage inherent in the military lifestyle (Segal and Segal 2004). Research supports both hypotheses, suggesting that these differences may be linked to the availability of benefits to married families that are not available to cohabiting couples and the importance of military accession standards in screening out populations who are less likely to be married (Karney et al. 2012). In addition, required relocations often force servicemembers to make a decision about the future of an ongoing romantic relationship, choosing among ending the tie, maintaining a long-distance relationship, or getting married. The increased likelihood of marriage among military servicemembers means that the military, as an employer, has more people affected by organizational demands; in fact, in the United States, at a ratio of 1:1.4, there are more family members than servicemembers attached to the military (Booth et al. 2007; Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 2012).

The earlier age at first marriage plus the benefits offered to married heterosexual couples are connected to increased fertility for military families and an earlier age of first childbirth than comparable civilian peers (Kelty et al. 2010). However, these trends reflect the experiences of male servicemembers rather than female servicemembers. Military women have lower marital rates and fertility than their male military peers suggesting the unique challenges faced by this group in negotiating a masculine work organization that uses a traditional family model in its approach to work-family conflict.

Unique Stressors of Military Family Life

With the growing number of military families, as well as the increased diversity in these families, there is the potential for increased conflict between the military and the family. Aided by formal support programs, the family is expected to adapt to the military institution, rather than the military adapting to the family. However, this assumption becomes more problematic as military families change in expectations, structure, and norms, leading to increased difficulty or outright rejection by servicemembers and their families to organizational demands and prescribed roles (Segal 1986). Internationally, militaries increasingly acknowledge a moral responsibility to military families, while also noting that by recognizing and fulfilling family needs, it may engender greater organizational commitment from them (Bourg and Segal 1999). However, the types of programs needed by these diverse families may vary by their career stage and life stage, to include presence of children.

The unique combination of demands outlined by Segal (1986) still applies to military families, with its impact in many cases being measurable and demonstrable of their continued greediness. Perhaps the demand most indicative of this increased conflict is the repeated, ongoing war deployments required of servicemembers, especially those in the United States Army and Marine Corps. There are cross-national

similarities in experiences with deployments. Some soldier reactions and family dynamics seem to be common across nations, at least among those with similar cultures. For example, all stages of the deployment process appear to be stressful for families in all nations studied, including the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S. The nature of the stress varies by deployment stage, with pre-deployment stress resulting from the anticipation of separation and the necessity to prepare for it, as well as anxieties about safety and other worries (Booth et al. 2007). During the deployment, a common spousal emotional reaction is loneliness. Reunion is often not the ideal that spouses expect, but rather a time of readjustment in their relationships. Research on the U.S. Army has shown that the longer a deployment—and the more time a soldier is away from home—the greater the stress for soldiers and their families and the less satisfied spouses are with Army life (Booth et al. 2007). Family separations have ranged from 1 to 18 months or more, with satisfaction levels decreasing with each additional increase in separation time. Some research in other nations, like the Netherlands, may not have corroborated this relationship (Andres 2010), but that may be because the separations were not nearly as long. Therefore, it is important in cross-national comparisons to analyze the effects of specific deployment lengths, as well as time at home between separations.

This demand is experienced alongside other required separations, such as training and military education, as well as ongoing frequent relocation. American military families move on average every two to three years, a rate that is 2.4 times more than civilian families. They also move further distances than civilian families and are more likely to be separated from extended family, a situation that can be especially problematic for single parent families who rely on this support (Cooney et al. 2011).

Relocation of servicemembers and their families is frequent in the U.S., with negative consequences for families (e.g., children's schooling, spouse employment and income, maintaining friendships, etc.). Because the U.S. covers a large geographic area, moves even within the contiguous states can cover thousands of miles, making in-person contact with friends and family difficult, expensive and time-consuming. The effects of relocation in other nations are likely to be a function of several variables. We expect that the longer the distance of moves, the more difficult the adjustments for families. For nations with less geographic area, moves are likely not to be as far and, therefore, to be less stressful for servicemembers and their families. The longer the time spent in one location, the better are spouse employment outcomes and satisfaction (Cooney et al. 2011) and family adjustment (Booth et al. 2007). These findings need to be tested cross-nationally.

Dual military couples' life course decision-making is inherently more challenging as they manage two career life courses and a family life course. They have to work hard to get assignments in the same geographical location (called "collocation"), contend with twice the number of separations due to deployments and training, and deal with institutional expectations of fast track careers (Smith 2010; Smith and Segal 2013). For dual-earner couples, the frequent relocation is challenging for spouses who need or want to participate in the paid labour force. To keep the family together in a joint domicile, spouses become both tied stayers and tied movers, with their employment location determined by the military requirements of the servicemember, rather than the employment location that is most advantageous to them (Cooney et al. 2011). Civilian wives also experience human capital penalties if they work in labour market areas surrounding military bases, with higher unemployment and lower wages than in other labour market areas without a military installation (Booth 2003).

These employment challenges are more pronounced now than in past decades because of the increased financial need for families to be dual-earner, and because women, who previously were discouraged from labour market participation, have employment goals and career needs. Despite these changing social roles, families make different demands on different members,

with women experiencing higher demands than men in the domestic sphere and increased social pressure to do family work. These familial pressures are exacerbated or reduced by the formal work-family policies available in each country. Although this varies by life course stage, financial resources, and race/class intersections in the United States, women are still more likely to opt out of paid work to take care of their family at home. Those women who stay in the workforce are more likely than men to take advantage of family friendly policies designed to reduce the work-family conflict; this is especially pronounced during greedy life course stages such as childbirth (Glass 2004). Unfortunately, there are no formal protections for American military family members who need to reduce this conflict during times of servicemember absence and are expected to manage all domestic responsibilities (in addition to or as a replacement of paid labour). There is greater formal support for families in Western European countries, however, where paid parental leave is the norm for both military and civilians.

Even as more military spouses attempt to participate in the paid labour force, there may be limitations to their full participation because of the behavioral expectations connected with being part of a military family. Despite the increased presence of military women and of dual-earner (including dual-military) couples, family members may feel pressure to accommodate certain social roles in line with a traditional family model, which most Western militaries still favour. If the servicemember is married, this model often assumes a "two-person single career" approach to military life, positioning the husband as the military servicemember (or breadwinner) and the wife as the supportive homemaker (Papanek 1973). This model is especially pronounced in the United States military.

This model disadvantages family types that are increasing in the military: dual-earner, dual-military, and single parents. Husbands in dual-earner couples may not enjoy the benefit of having someone manage the home front; they are men within a greedy institution who do not have

the privilege of living the "two-person single career" model. Likewise, married military women do not experience the same advantages as their male counterparts because there is no role counterpart for their husbands. Single parents do not have a spouse to manage any part of the domestic homefront. Same-sex military families are vastly understudied, although research on civilian families suggest more egalitarian gender roles and a greater willingness to equally share domestic and paid responsibilities (Bos et al. 2004; Patterson and Chan 1999). Servicemembers in these types of families may find themselves in stressful positions due to the often incompatible demands between home and the workplace and the military's continued reliance on the separate spheres model of family life. The life course conceptual model is well-suited for studying these long-term family life course impacts (e.g., childlessness, marital dissolution) and career life course impacts (e.g., retention, promotion, readiness).

This potential conflict between the military, as the lead employer, and the family is important because spousal employment—and whether this employment meets the spouse's expectations—is a major determinant of overall family satisfaction with military life and key predictor of retention decisions (Segal and Segal 2004). Because family satisfaction has a significant influence on retention, many Western militaries operate formal family support mechanisms at military installations. However, despite the additional attention and support these programs offer, they often rely upon the traditional military husband-civilian wife model, leading to support services that do not account for the unique needs of the growing number of dual-career, dual-military, single parent families, or same-sex families who rely on non-traditional caregivers. Harrison and Laliberte (1997) argue that family support centers, which are formally run by the military, not only facilitate the military's gendered organization, but are an example of it. It is common for civilian wives to lead these centers, particularly during deployments. Additionally, active duty wives and husbands and civilian employed spouses often are excluded from the

informal spouse social networks that provide instrumental and affective support (Marriott 1997).

If implemented effectively, organizational support of military families decreases the conflict experienced between work and family by creating an environment where military personnel can express high commitment to both the military and the family (Bourg and Segal 1999). However, there also is the possibility that formal and informal supports provided by the military fail to alleviate many of the demands experienced by families that do not conform to the traditional family model. This problem is exacerbated in today's wartime environment and with the increased diversity of today's military families. The life course conceptual model intersection of gender, family life course, military life course, and military contextual factors provides evidence that military women are impacted differently from men as evidenced by military retention, as well as family and psychological outcomes.

Physical and Psychological Injuries and Families

The impact of physical and psychological injuries incurred in war zones reverberate throughout servicemembers' families (see, e.g., Dekel et al. 2015). Specific life course effects of military contextual factors need to be studied, such as the ameliorative processes of formal and informal support mechanisms and other resources. Indeed, cross-national research can be valuable in measuring the extent to which, the conditions under which, and for whom social support functions to alleviate stress caused by various aspects of the military family lifestyle.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a toll on military families because of family separations, but there are tragic consequences in the thousands of cases of fatalities and injuries to servicemembers. Changes in warfare, military equipment and technology, and medical technology have reduced U.S. combat casualties steadily from WWII (152,359 killed in action, 752,396 wounded), Vietnam (38,281 killed in action, 235,398 wounded) to Iraq/Afghanistan (6823 killed in action, 52,311 wounded) (Department of Defense 2015; Holcomb et al. 2006). While combat casualties have decreased in Iraq/Afghanistan, psychological injuries are prevalent with almost 57% of the US veteran population having sought VA healthcare for mental disorders from 2002 to 2014 (Veterans Administration 2015). Serious injuries, such as loss of limbs, Traumatic Brain Injuries, and Post Traumatic Stress (PTS) have created caregivers out of military family members. Parents, spouses, and children of the wounded feel the effects of these wars quite directly. Cross-national research employing a life course conceptual model such as Segal et al. (2015) is needed to analyze how the effects vary by nation, including the effects of culture and institutional supports available to these families.

The impact of returning servicemembers' combat-related physical and mental injuries on their families may follow several trajectories depending on social support, couple/relationship functioning, communication patterns and nature of injuries (Erbes et al. 2012). U.S. servicemembers from 2002 to 2014 were diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress (55%), depressive disorders (44%), neurotic disorders (42%), and affective psychoses (28%) (Veterans Administration 2015, also see Ch. 28 in this volume). The negative effects of these mental injuries on families have been studied cross-nationally (e.g., U.S., U.K., Israel, Netherlands, Croatia) providing important findings about barriers to care, readjustment/reintegration from combat deployments, spouse and parent roles, moral injury, relationship intimacy, boundary ambiguity, caregiver resources and coping strategies, effects on children and PTS symptom cluster relationship (intrusion, avoidance, hyperarousal) (Dirkzwager et al. 2005; Frančišković et al. 2014; MacManus et al. 2012; Rona et al. 2009).

Stigma associated with seeking help for mental health problems remains a challenge for returning warfighters. In a 2010 study with U.S., U.K., Australian, New Zealand and Canadian forces, stigma-related concerns such as "my unit leadership might treat me differently" and

"I would be seen as weak" were most prevalent, and respondents who exhibited mental health symptoms were more likely to have these concerns (Gould et al. 2010). Similarly, in a meta-analysis of 20 studies conducted from 2001 to 2014, respondents endorsed stigma-related similar statements more than 40% of the time (Sharp et al. 2015). These mental health stigma concerns led to almost 60% of servicemembers who could benefit from treatment not seeking help. However, some studies found that although there is widespread mental health stigma, respondents still sought mental health treatment or intended to seek help.

For those servicemembers who sought help, family and relationship functioning are areas of research important to the long-term health of military families. While the care of physically injured servicemembers can take a toll over the long term as caregiver burden, the comorbidity of servicemember mental health symptoms can also be related to caregiver outcomes. Combat-related PTS for military veterans can create stressors and symptoms experienced by family members through "secondary traumatization" (Galovski and Lyons 2004: p. 478). PTS symptoms have been identified as mediators to secondary traumatization of family members. Recent research identified the delayed onset of secondary traumatization following reintegration and readjustment periods following return from combat (Gorman et al. 2014). While PTS effects have been causally connected to intimacy problems, parenting stress and functional impairment, more recent research also highlights the mediating relationship of PTS symptoms to include partners' symptoms and negative perceptions of relationship quality (Dirkzwager et al. 2005; Rona et al. 2009; Solomon et al. 2008; Taft et al. 2011). Of note, there were gender differences in one study with male servicemembers' female partners reporting lower relationship quality and more psychological distress than female servicemembers' male partners (Lambert et al. 2012). The complexity of PTS symptomatology effects is further confounded as the directionality of servicemember and partner symptoms are considered over time in relationship adjustments

that may be indicative of more severe PTS symptoms, levels of support and conflict (Erbes et al. 2012; Wadsworth et al. 2013).

In addition to family members' psychological symptoms from combat-related injuries to servicemembers, anger and hostility may lead to violence perpetrated against family members. In a study of U.K. armed forces, 12.6% of families experienced domestic violence upon return from deployment (MacManus et al. 2011). Regarding PTS, veterans being treated for symptoms were 5.4 times as likely to perpetrate any violence and 26.4 times as likely to perpetrate acts of violent aggression compared to veterans without PTS symptoms (Sherman et al. 2006). In a meta-analysis of PTS and intimate relationships, Taft et al. (2011) found higher associations of PTS symptoms and physical and psychological aggression in military samples compared to civilian samples. Additionally, men had stronger associations of aggression than women with PTS symptoms. It was hypothesized that military training and socialization may contribute to the explanation of the higher association of aggression in servicemembers.

Despite many of the negative aspects of physical and psychological injuries, family functioning and social support have an important role in the trajectory and outcomes of injured servicemembers and their families. Evidence of children's functioning and well-being while parents' were deployed in combat generally shows that children are resilient and most impacted by family functioning particularly as it pertains to the supporting parent at home (Andres and Moelker 2011). Parental well-being and maternal well-being in particular was most influential in children's outcomes in one study of deployed Dutch servicemembers. Since this was a finding of correlation, it is also possible that causation also goes the other way: a child's problems have negative effects on the well-being of the parent who is at home with the child. Ambiguous loss (absence) when a servicemember deploys has long been studied as it pertains to the emotional cycle of deployment. More recent research examined boundary ambiguity in families determining that in combat deployments,

families maintained the psychological presence of the servicemember by retaining family boundaries related to roles and responsibilities, staying in contact with family support organizations such as Family Readiness Groups and staying abreast of news media information (Faber et al. 2008). When there was concern for the safety of the servicemember, families would reduce information to trusted sources to reduce ambiguity. For injured servicemembers, spouses and parents were the most common caregivers upon return. The level and quality of care differed between spouses and parents based on family functioning and social and financial resources (Griffin et al. 2014). Parents' accumulation of resources over time and longer relationship with their child accounts for much of these differences. Additionally, it is easier for parents who have a built-in support system/network with their spouse to revert back to the care role for their child than it is for a spouse to take on a new role and meaningfully change their role as spouse.

Long-Term Effects of Service on Families Across the Life Course

Life course perspectives on military service have focused on the cumulative (dis)advantages of servicemembers, but has more recently turned to understand effects on families as evidenced in Segal et al.'s (2015) life course conceptual model. In the context of the Global War on Terror, a continued and increased state of combat and deployment has increased concerns about stress on military marriages and families. However, military marriages have proven to be quite resilient. Indeed, with one exception, military marriages are at less risk of dissolution the longer a servicemember was deployed for the US military (Karney and Crown 2011). The exception to this finding was the active duty Air Force enlisted and officers. Further analysis of the data reveals that younger servicemembers, those without children and men were at a reduced risk of marital dissolution. There are several explanations for this reduced risk of marital

dissolution. One hypothesis that needs further research is the long-term effects of combat and military service on marriages after servicemembers leave the military (Karney and Crown 2011). While the military is often touted as a family-friendly institution because of the numerous benefits and support systems in place for families while serving, the absence of this support when a veteran reenters civilian society is less clear. These support systems are a normal part of military family life as deployments and combat are inherent in the profession of arms. Deployments and combat as expected events are perceived differently from unexpected non-normative events (unexpected life course events) and may lead to better family functioning (Karney and Crown 2011). The satisfaction and pride servicemembers take in accomplishing their mission accompanies the stress inherent in combat. Combat deployments also allow servicemembers unique advancement opportunities and increased pay and benefits which may also help reduce marital dissolution.

Considering marriage and families across the life course has historically been from a male servicemember's perspective since women's roles in combat and combat support have been limited in most countries. However, with changes in recruitment and laws regarding participation in combat, women have been experiencing combat and deployments that deserves new research and understanding of their unique experiences. Military women's families differ from men in that women are less likely to be married and have children than men, but those who are married are seven times more likely to be married to another servicemember (Smith and Segal 2013). For those women not married, they are three times more likely than men to be single parents (Clever and Segal 2013). Single parents and dual military couples have unique stressors related to deployments and childcare concerns. In many ways, women returning from combat deployments from Iraq and Afghanistan have reported similar physical and psychological injuries as men. However, single mothers report more depressive symptoms and poor family functioning (Chartrand et al. 2008; Kelley et al. 2002).

Military mothers may also find reintegration with children particularly difficult compared to men since women are often responsible for domestic affairs (Mattocks et al. 2012).

Beyond stressful military experiences and post-deployment reintegration concerns, women contend with sexual harassment and sexual assault at higher rates than men. Veterans Administration reports place the figure at 22% of women experiencing military sexual trauma (Kimerling et al. 2007). However, recent reports of Iraq/Afghanistan veterans indicate 15% of women reported military sexual trauma (Mattocks et al. 2012). Like combat-related posttraumatic stress, military sexual trauma is associated with higher rates of PTS and substance abuse (Booth et al. 2011).

Patterns of victimization for military sexual trauma include higher likelihood of women who experienced sexual assault before and after their military service that is consistent with homeless veterans. In a study of homeless female veterans, 41.1% reported military sexual assault during their service (Decker et al. 2013). These findings indicate that military sexual assault is more likely among homeless female veterans among other risk factors such as substance abuse/dependence (Decker et al. 2013). Homeless veterans who experienced sexual trauma were also more likely to report other psychological disorders and increased mental health visits to treatment centers (Pavao et al. 2013). More research is needed to understand the effects of sexual trauma as it relates to women veterans as the number of military women and the roles in which they serve increases in the future.

Conclusions

With a focus on the changing definitions of family and the changing nature of warfare, we have explored cross-national comparisons regarding the potential spillover and conflict experienced by military families. We have emphasized the intersection of life course events for the family members connected to one, possibly two, military careers and the impact this has on individual and familial well-being across countries. We do this at a time when more than 1.5 million servicemembers from more than 57 countries have deployed in support of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are unprecedented in their duration. Although these wars may be drawing down, at least in regard to declared combat operations, there is potential for the trends above to continue, whether in regard to adversaries who flagrantly defy conventional warfare, women's increased integration into militaries globally, or the continued ways that families are challenging the traditional separate spheres model.

Unless the demands of the military on servicemembers and their families decrease substantially over the next decades, we expect increased conflict between the military and family institutions. In some nations, the military demands less of families than is true of the United States, but in the United States and those nations with continued military demands, we are likely to see pressures from servicemembers and their families for changes in the military. These increased pressures stem from the changing missions of the military, which have become more expeditionary. Many countries rely upon a volunteer military, which is expected to deploy and fight repeatedly, with little chance for rest and retraining in between missions. Research suggests differences in stress based on deployment duration in the United States, but this has not been corroborated with findings from the relatively short deployments in the Netherlands. Cross-national comparisons must consider the effects of specific deployment lengths, as well as time at home between separations and availability of formal and informal support mechanisms. It also must consider the different experiences of military servicemembers by deployment mission and by numbers of deployed personnel overall. Some countries, such as Macedonia and Estonia, deploy small numbers of troops without a physically present chain of command or other support units. We anticipate these servicemembers and their families experience unique stressors connected to their cultural and numeric isolation.

Accompanying this change in military missions has been a change in family structures and expectations. Whereas the traditional family of a breadwinner husband and a homemaker wife was once the dominant model, there has been an increase in cohabiting and same-sex couples and single-parent families, all of whom potentially have different stresses and needs. Attitudinal changes also have occurred regarding the proper social roles of men and women. More adults now expect to participate in both domestic life and in the paid labour force, regardless of their gender.

As the military and the family change, the potential for conflict increases, especially as the greedy demands of these institutions continue, with intersections of multiple events that are likely to be stressful. As part of the military organization, families are expected to absorb and accommodate the combination of demands unique to the military lifestyle. To facilitate this adaptation and as an acknowledgment of the importance of familial satisfaction, the military provides formal support services to spouses and children. These resources, however, cater to traditional families, with less formal support available to other family types. Consequently, we can anticipate further pressure for the military to do more to accommodate other family types if it wants to retain committed servicemembers. Regarding dual-military couples, for example, some American services have been adding flexibility to "fast track" careers, such as leaves of absence and parental leave, with the United States Coast Guard leading the way. Assuring that couples are assigned near to each other would decrease these couples' stress and allow them to have a semblance of normal family life. Other nations provide society-wide government-supported paid parental leave so the situation for parents is quite different.

Reducing the frequency of relocations would likely enhance servicemember and family well-being and make the military lifestyle more appealing to many families, including those with school-age children (especially teenagers), as well as civilian spouses who need or wish to be employed (and certainly those who aspire to a professional career or who are in occupations that require state or provincial licenses). Clearly, it would reduce the stress on dual-military couples and enable them to be together more. It also would allow single-parent families to remain close to their established support system.

With the repeal of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, the United States joins an increasingly growing list of countries where gay men and lesbians are now permitted to serve openly in the armed forces. In addition, some countries and some states in the United States have passed laws allowing gay marriages. Regardless of the definitions of these couples, they further increase the diversity of military families, and will likely join other civilian spouses and dual military couples in pressing for recognition and change.

These calls for support are especially pressing considering the combat-related physical and psychological injuries being experienced by servicemembers today. Traumatic Brain Injury and Post-Traumatic Stress are the signature wounds of these wars. These injuries reverberate through the family members of injured servicemembers, who often become caregivers. Cross-national research could facilitate positive change by measuring the extent to which social supports, under various manifestations, can alleviate stress connected to the greedy demands of the military lifestyle, especially post-deployment.

The effects of military service on the servicemember and his/her family continue past the actual time of service and may result in cumulative advantages and disadvantages over the life course. Research is available on the resiliency of American military marriages, but no comparative data exist. There also is a research gap in regard to the families of military women, who report similar physical and psychological injuries, with the added burden of proportionally higher incidences of sexual harassment and sexual assault. Cross-national research is needed to examine the experiences of military women integrating back into their families, especially those who are mothers, and to analyze the impacts of different cultures.

Military families, in all of their diverse forms, exist at the intersection of two major social institutions that make great, often competing,

demands on their time, energy, and loyalty. Even as the military and the family have undergone considerable change, there is sufficient overlap in experience to merit continued cross-national research. Using common measures and theories, we are better able to understand the challenges and successes encountered by servicemembers and their families, and together are able to provide workable solutions. Military readiness and effectiveness is enhanced for all by making these comparisons.

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Author Biographies

Dr. Karin De Angelis is an Associate Professor in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA). She joined the USAFA faculty in 2011, and now teaches a range of sociology courses as well as a core leadership class. She earned her B.A. in Sociology from the University of Chicago and her M.A. and Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Maryland. Her research interests include military Families, especially same-sex military families; the intersection of gender, work and family; diversity in organizations; race/ethnicity in the U.S. military, with a focus on Hispanic service members; and the role of culture in sexual assault prevention.

David Smith Ph.D. is the co-author of *Athena Rising: How and Why Men Should Mentor Women* and Associate Professor of Sociology in the Department of Leadership, Ethics, and Law at the United States Naval Academy, having served four years as the chair. A former Navy pilot, Dr. Smith led diverse organizations of women and men culminating in command of a squadron in combat and flew more than 3000 h over 19 years including combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a sociologist trained in military sociology and social psychology, he focuses his research in gender, work, and family issues including dual career families, military families, women in the military, and retention of women. Dr. Smith is the author of numerous journal articles and book chapters—many on the topic of gender and the workplace. Learn more about David at his website: davigsmithphd.com.

Mady Wechsler Segal earned her Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. She is Professor Emerita of Sociology at the University of Maryland, where she has been Distinguished Scholar Teacher, faculty affiliate of the Women's Studies Department, Associate Director of the Center for Research on Military Organization, and Associate Dean for Undergraduate

Studies. Her research on military personnel issues has focused on military women, military families, and race/ethnicity in the military. Her latest publications include "Conceptual Model of Military Career and Family Life Course Events, Intersections, and Effects on Well-Being" (*Military Behavioral Health*, 2015) (with Michelle Lane & Ashley Fisher); "The Role of Leadership and Peer Behaviors in the Performance and Well-Being of Women in Combat: Historical Perspectives, Family Issues, and Unit Integration" (*Military Medicine,* 2016) (with David G. Smith, David R. Segal, and Amy Canuso); "Military Women's Life Events and Well-Being: A Life Course Model" (*Military Medicine,* 2016) (with Michelle D. Lane); "Linked Lives in Military Sociology: Family, Research, Teaching, and Policy." in Helena Carreiras, ed., *Researching the Military*, 2016 (with David R. Segal).

A Military Ethic for New Missions

18

Tomas Kucera and Liesbeth Gulpers

Introduction

In recent history the European militaries have been predominantly deploying their soldiers into operations that diverge from the traditional military task of national or collective self-defence. Missions and operations with the objectives defined in the terms of human security have become commonplace and moved to the very core of military profession. Half a century ago Dag Hammarskjöld noted that 'peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it'. This rings true for the human security missions in general even today. It is the aim of this chapter to show how the moral structure of the military could be adapted to the requirements of human security missions.

We use the term 'human security missions' as a concept that includes various operations of a cosmopolitan nature, such as unarmed humanitarian operations, robust peacekeeping as well as

humanitarian interventions. However, modern counterinsurgency operations with their emphasis on winning the hearts and minds of the local population can easily qualify for this category as well. The distinguishing feature of a human security mission is the privileged position of the 'others', local civilians in the need of help and protection. Consequently, our argument presented in this chapter is developed upon the assumption that the position of these 'others' should rise in prominence in the military ethics.

The argument of this chapter advances in the way of answering three questions. The first question asks *why should human security missions be considered different and new*? In response to this question, the first section describes the essential challenges to the legitimacy of military activities that the human security paradigm brings about. The second section is a literature review of concepts and ideas that suggest a transformation of the military ethic and professional identity in response to the challenges of the new paradigm. The following two sections aim to answer the question *why does the traditional military ethic need a transformation?* A framework for the analysis of military ethic is introduced in the fourth section. According to this framework, three distinct orientations of moral responsibilities—inwards, upwards, and outwards—constitute the military ethic. Subsequently, this framework is applied to identify the most fundamental deficiencies of the traditional military ethic under the conditions of human

T. Kucera (✉)
Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies, Charles University, U Krize 8, 158 00 Praha 5, Czech Republic
e-mail: tomas.kucera@fsv.cuni.cz

L. Gulpers
Faculty of Management Science, Institute for Management Research, Radboud University in Nijmegen, Postbus 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands
e-mail: l.gulpers@fm.ru.nl

security operations. The sixth and final section deals with the practical question *what measures can be applied to adapt the military ethic to the human security missions?* Here we propose that an adaptation towards a more humanitarian military ethic may proceed through certain changes in recruitment, training and education, conditions of service, and operational command structures.

Challenges of New Missions

What is supposed to be new in human security operations, a new type of missions, is the basis for the legitimation of the use of force and violence. The new missions rest on legitimation that differs from the moral paradigm upon which the national armed forces are traditionally established. Without exception, modern militaries are intimately linked with their states and societies; the nation state's need for security justifies the existence of the military's coercive power. The military is the ultimate guarantee of national sovereignty and an instrument of protecting the interests of the state. In the words of Elliot and Cheeseman, 'in a globalising world, state-based militaries are often one of the last repositories of national independence, pride and assertiveness'.[1]

Consequently, it is deep in the design of national militaries that their ultimate function is fighting interstate wars. The military has to be prepared to use maximum available force against the opponent in order to secure a victory. Although innocent civilians in interstate wars are supposed to enjoy protection against military violence, the military concern for civilians is usually limited by what is perceived as a military necessity. Moreover, in the system of states, of which the interstate war is an inherent institution, only the state should be responsible for security and rights of its citizens.

However, today's military operations, especially human security operations, are motivated differently. Their cause should rest on a perceived 'responsibility to protect' (R2P). The R2P doctrine was introduced by the International

Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and holds 'that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, from starvation—but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be born by the broader community of states.'[2] In the context of R2P-motivated operations, force is used not to win the war but to win the peace.[3] These new missions require a shift from the state-centric paradigm of national security towards the cosmopolitan principles of human security. The military no longer faces an enemy state which, more or less legitimately, represents its citizens. Instead, it is the complete or partial failure of the state to exercise its obligations to its population that necessitates new military missions.

The reference point of security here is an individual human being *qua* human being, regardless of his or her nationality. The military is tasked here to participate in 'defending the "other" rather than defending *against* the "other"… [Its mission] is to defend and save lives rather than to vanquish the enemy or destroy infrastructure'.[4] Protection of civilians rather than elimination of the enemy is the order of the day. Importantly, this mission of protecting 'strangers' may also demand sacrifices of soldiers. Yet, instead of the patriotic ethos of national militaries this sacrifice would have to be justified by essentially cosmopolitan principles.

Concepts of Humanitarian Soldiers

A number of authors argue for a military ethic that is more attuned to the requirements of today's military operations and that focuses on the needs of 'the other'. Däniker introduced the concept of 'guardian soldier' as early as 1995.[5] The guardian soldier is described as one whose motivation rests on twofold commitment: first,

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[1]Elliott and Cheeseman (2002), 35.

[2]ICISS (2001), VIII.

[3]Ceulemans (2013), 49.

[4]Elliott and Cheeseman (2002), 37.

[5]Däniker (1995).

'his willingness to participate in the defence of basic values' and, second, his conviction to act 'on behalf of new regional or global security structures which enhance stability and thus promote peaceful development and prosperity'.[6] Similar principles are promoted in other concepts, too, such as the 'cosmopolitan social worker',[7] 'Athenian type of soldier',[8] or 'world-citizen in uniform'.[9]

The aim of the new missions is not to win a war over a conventional enemy, but to manage crises and conflicts and to enable a peaceful development of war-torn societies or nation-states unhinged with famine or internal conflicts. This has also been typified as a shift from 'victory' to 'success'.[10] In such a situation the line between the military and non-military worlds becomes blurred. Therefore, in order to accomplish the complex task of conflict resolution and state building, these concepts stress that soldiers, first, besides their role of combatants, need to adopt a role of 'cosmopolitan social worker' whose task is to protect, assist, rescue and mediate. Second, they need to cooperate with a whole range of non-military actors. Civilianisation of the military professional identity, or rather approximating the character of the police ('politicization'), is therefore considered necessary.

With the transformation of soldiers' tasks come also alterations of military ethos and ethical commitments. With the concept of the 'world-citizen in uniform' Arenth and Westphal warn that the new missions cannot afford soldiers with the mentality of a 'foreign legionnaire'. Instead, they propose an alternative in the form of 'a humanistically educated, ethically acting homo politicus'.[11] For Wiesendahl, an essential attribute of the Athenian type of soldier is strong altruism. This is significant, in particular, owing to the fact that this altruism does not concern protection of one's country, community or even one's own family. Instead, the soldier is asked to risk his or her life by protecting strangers. Individual identification with the cosmopolitan principles that underline the human security missions is thus deemed necessary.[12]

Several authors have proposed that the military ethic, which emphasizes classic military virtues such as obedience, loyalty and (physical) courage be expanded with 'new' virtues such as moral courage[13] and chivalry.[14] These virtues are deemed a better fit with the characteristics of today's military operations and the increased significance of interactions with the local population. Others propose new military ethics that are more closely allied with care ethics. For example, Topolski has developed a military ethic which centres on the concepts of 'relationality' and 'respond-ability'. Topolski claims that the binary thinking which underlies war-fighting (the 'us' vs 'them' mentality) has to be replaced in human security operations with a way of thinking that focuses on relations with others. She writes: 'relationality develops an 'us-ness' without making recourse to an excluded 'them'. By promoting multiple relational bonds, each of which is always in a dynamic relation to all others, indeed, with a diversity of others, an 'us' is developed that is not based on one absolute, an excluded other.'[15] Such an ethic is more in line with the values that soldiers are supposed to uphold and protect, such as human dignity, equality, cooperation and security. It expands the boundaries of the community to which the soldier belongs to include 'strangers', including civilians as well as non-military actors partaking in the operations. Respond-ability is the pedagogical principle underlying this relationality; it entails a vision on moral responsibility as the responsibility to think, judge and act in a relational manner, i.e., by taking into account 'the other'.[16] This demands that soldiers take

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[6]Ibid., 75.

[7]Von Bredow (2006).

[8]Wiesendahl (2010).

[9]Arenth and Westphal (1994).

[10]Ruffa et al. (2013).

[11]Arenth and Westphal (1994), 132.

[12]Wiesendahl (2010), 42.

[13]Olsthoorn (2007).

[14]Moelker and Kümmel (2007).

[15]Topolski (2014).

[16]Ibid.

responsibility for all the actions, not just those they were directly involved in. This ethic goes against pointing the finger and the disappearance of responsibility.

The Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, chaired by Mary Kaldor, essayed a comprehensive list of normative prescriptions for soldiers engaged in human security missions. The Human Security Task Force, which they propose, would have to develop a guiding ethos based on the following elements:

- putting individual human beings, whoever they might be, above nation or homeland
- maintaining the military spirit of sacrifice, heroism, discipline and excellence but combining it with the civilian spirit of listening, individual responsibility, empathy and enabling others
- respect for and knowledge of law, in particular human rights and humanitarian law and general principles of criminal law.
- awareness of gender dimensions of conflict and intervention.[17]

The way of thinking that is behind all the concepts presented here is explicitly stated by Greener-Barcham. She makes clear that the essentially liberal aims of the new missions require the military to adopt liberal values and principles also inside its organisation. If states genuinely pursue liberal ends through their military deployments, the means should be commensurate with such ends. 'Rhetoric and reality must thus match if states are to achieve a sustainable and consistent approach to the promotion of liberal values in international affairs.'[18] In more specific terms, Greener-Barcham argues for a transformation of military culture 'where hierarchy was de-emphasized, where a less masculine environment was created and maintained and where notions of difference were accepted'.[19] Effective performance in new missions is thus

argued to require the military to abandon the attributes traditionally related to its warfighting orientation in favour of values and principles of liberal society.[20] This is believed to remove outdated national parochialism from military ethic and motivate soldiers, instead, to put 'individual human beings, whoever they might be, above nation or homeland'.[21]

Conceptualisation of Military Ethic

Life in the military organisation is covered by law and regulations and subjected to relatively severe discipline. Nonetheless, the military ethic remains crucial for the functioning of the military organisation owing to the fact that its imperatives, if properly accepted and internalized, compel soldiers to engage in appropriate behaviour even with no mechanisms of control and coercion being present.[22] To better understand in what way the military ethic and consequently the military organization may need to adapt to the requirements of human security operations we will divide it into three constitutive categories. Any military ethic has to provide soldiers with guidance concerning their obligations towards three different groups of people: (1) the relationship inwards to the military community, i.e. fellow soldiers; (2) the relationship upwards to the political community, i.e. the state; and (3) the relationship outwards to the 'others', i.e. the enemy, allies and civilians in need of protection.[23] Any military ethic needs to address all three orientations of moral responsibility; nonetheless, we will demonstrate here that it is the outward orientation, in particular, that is more important in human security operations and needs further development.

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[17]Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities (2004), 23.

[18]Greener-Barcham (2007), 80–81.

[19]Ibid., 76–77.

[20]See Kucera (2015).

[21]Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities (2004), 23.

[22]Martinelli-Fernandez (2006), 57.

[23]Kucera (2017).

Inward Orientation

The inward orientation of the warfighting ethic is meant to render the military efficient on the battlefield. The sociological surveys of soldiers' performance in the Second World War emphasised the significance of social cohesion within small units as the main factor that keeps soldiers fighting and risking their lives.[24] In the second half of the 20th century militaries began to gear their institutional ethic more intensively towards the presumed good of in-group cohesion. Identification with and loyalty to one's platoon, battalion or regiment became a solution to the fundamental issue of how to get and keep soldiers in battle with the enemy effectively. The virtue of loyalty is thus cherished in military ethic 'because it motivates soldiers to act in a particular way. It is one of the structural responses to the individual problem of enabling killing.'[25]

Social cohesion and the virtue of loyalty also necessarily entail the commander's duty of care for his or her soldiers. Loyalty to one's unit may facilitate self-sacrificing behaviour among its members; nonetheless, the commander's responsibility is to avoid unnecessary risks to his or her soldiers. As Walzer puts it, a commander is bound 'not to persist in battles that cannot be won, not to seek victories whose costs overwhelm their military value, and so on'.[26] Soldiers' loyalty and commander's due care may forge strong bonds of affection. Once created, these bonds may make the soldier consider the ethical obligation towards his or her comrades as the primary one.

The inward orientation also lies in obedience to one's commander. Like loyalty, obedience is also meant to contribute to the effectiveness of military operations and to victory. The obedient following of the commander's orders is activated and reinforced through an organizational structure that assigns responsibility for all actions to the commander. A consequence of this division of responsibility within the military organization is that responsibility for actions is likely to disappear and pointing the finger is encouraged. When everybody can be held responsible, nobody *feels* responsible. In addition, military law states that soldiers should follow all orders, unless they are manifestly illegal. According to Osiel, such an ethic does not invite soldiers to critically assess commanders' orders and to consider their moral quality.[27] In this way, too, moral responsibility in the military is ambiguously assigned, which hampers moral thinking, judging and acting.

Upward Orientation

Although the nation and the state represent a much wider community than a platoon, the military has traditionally had a very intimate relationship with the state. It is the state whose security and interests justifies the very existence of the military. Hegel conceives of the military as a 'universal class' because of its alignment with the interests of the state. In his view, the highest military virtue is true courage, which he defines as 'readiness for sacrifice in the service of the state'.[28] Huntington's concept of professional military ethic—academically controversial but very popular among military officers—includes responsibility of the officer corps for the security of the state as one of its constitutive elements. Huntington argues that also the military obedience to the authority of government follows from this responsibility.[29]

The upward orientation is of particular importance in citizen armies based on short-term compulsory service. The identification with one's state and nation and realisation of one's civic obligations is here a prerequisite of effective functioning of citizen armies. In more

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[24]Marshall (1947), Shils and Janowitz (1948), Stouffer (1949), 105–192, Moskos (1975), Shalit (1988) and Wong et al. (2003); for review of the combat motivation theories see Wessely (2006).

[25]Connor (2010), 283.

[26]Walzer (2004), 24.

[27]Osiel (1998), 944–1129.

[28]Hegel (1942), para. 205, 327 Additions.

[29]Huntington (1957), 15–16.

authoritarian societies the military itself may function as a vehicle for solidifying this patriotic commitment—the so-called 'school of the nation'. In liberal-democratic societies this idea of utilising compulsory service for nationalistic indoctrination is considered rather controversial. As Wolf von Baudissin, spiritual father of the West-German military ethic, asserted in 1955, a 'form of life and government which every citizen will consider worth defending' is absolutely essential for establishing the citizen army as a capable and effective defensive force.[30]

Outward Orientation

What distinguishes war from an unorganised mass violence is, among other things, a set of rules regulating the exercise of violence against the adversary and the treatment of prisoners, wounded, and civilians. Although the rules may vary very significantly in times and places, the definition of what an honourable war is like is an essential part of a normative structure in nearly all, if not all, developed cultures. For the Western societies and the contemporary *international society* in general the moral principles underlying military conduct are derived from the just war tradition and its specific rules have been developing for one and half century in the form of international humanitarian law (IHL).

What defines the outward aspects of military ethic is the question of the 'significant other'. For a military which dominantly focuses on warfighting the significant other must be the enemy and hostility determines the meaning of outward moral obligations. The role of the IHL—which is founded on the principle of common humanity and pragmatic reciprocity—is only to impose limits on violence exercised in war. In comparison with warfighting, the perspective of human security emphasises the outward ethical obligations to the civilians in need. In fact, rigorous discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, and protection of innocent people who are trapped in war zones or are the

victims of failed states lies at the heart of the just war tradition and the IHL. However, the rules of war tend to regard the innocent civilians only as a third party to the military conflict. Soldiers are bound to do as much as possible to avoid harming civilians; nonetheless, the moral obligation remains a negative one. In contrast, the human security missions require from soldiers a positive approach towards the protection of the civilians: they are expected to protect and help civilians, rather than merely refraining from harm.

It is, therefore, the outward orientation of military ethic that is crucial for the adaptation of military ethic to human security missions. The soldiers engaged in human security need 'to internalize the fact that those individuals they are protecting depend upon them for their very existence'.[31] The outward orientation of military ethic thus has to reflect that the 'significant others' in human security missions are the innocent civilians and that the moral commitment to their protection should rise in prominence in the system of military ethic.

Deficiencies of Traditional Military Ethic in New Missions

In the previous section we introduced a framework through which we may understand the moral commitments and responsibilities that the traditional military ethic entails. Next, this framework will be applied so as to demonstrate why the traditional military ethic is ill-suited for the human security missions and needs a transformation. This section points out the most fundamental deficiencies of the military ethic when employed within the human security context.

Deficiency of the Inward Moral Obligations

Within military units, the inward moral orientation dominates. The virtues that are emphasized

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[30]Von Baudissin (1955), 3.

[31]Tripodi (2006), 218.

in the traditional military ethic are loyalty and obedience. Both these virtues and the organizational practices and structures designed to support their development create a military mindset that sits well with traditional military operations and warfighting, but is insufficiently geared towards the moral requirements of human security operations.

Primary-group/small-unit cohesion helps soldiers overcome a natural aversion against killing and come to terms with the life-threatening conditions of warfare; it motivates them to hold positions in the face of incoming danger. A soldier's identification with his unit's comrades and his loyalty to them may place the interests of the platoon, company, or even battalion above the natural instinct of individual self-preservation. In the words of the British Defence Doctrine, cohesion 'embodies genuine and deep comradeship that endures even as the experience of violence and fear of death and injury begin to pervade an individual's conscious and sub-conscious'.[32] Military organisations thus tend to consider small-unit cohesion as an essential requirement for the development of a combat-effective force. It is the chief characteristic of the British regimental system that a collective identity within individual regiments and battalions is built up and forged even at the cost of excessive rivalry and tribalism within the Army as a whole.

A purposefully designed and maintained military culture, such as the British regimental system, is by no means a prerequisite for developing primary group cohesion. By surveying American soldiers in Vietnam Moskos observed that primary-group cohesion arises from immediate life-and-death exigencies. 'Much like the Hobbesian description of primitive life, the combat situation also can be nasty, brutish, and short.' The development of primary-group ties thus may be conceived as a kind of 'rudimentary social contract which is entered into because of advantages to individual self-interest.'[33] Not so

dissimilar processes were also observed among soldiers participating in peacekeeping operations. Tomforde's examination of German peacekeepers in Bosnia shows that a long-term deployment significantly contributes to the development of a corporate identity and to socialisation of the participating soldiers in it. 'Dealing with long working hours, no weekends and permanent dress code even outside the working hours and outside the camp connects the soldiers. The creation of a corporate identity helps to overcome the problems in the place and the separation from home.'[34]

Despite its benefits for combat efficiency and the well-being of soldiers during operations, small-unit cohesion also poses considerable risks to the functioning of the military organisation and, importantly for our purposes here, to military performance in human security missions. The in-group loyalty of small units may be employed against superiors. When analysing the phenomenon of fragging, that is retribution of soldiers against their superiors, Moskos points out that such a breakdown of discipline necessarily involved covert knowledge or even active cooperation of other members of the unit. 'It is an irony of sorts,' says Moskos, 'that the primary-group processes which appeared to sustain combat soldiers in World War II are close cousins to the social processes which underlay the vast bulk of fraggings in Vietnam.'[35]

In a similar way, excessive loyalty towards comrades within a unit may lead to resolving moral conflicts in a way harmful to the local population. This problem is of special relevance in the context of human security missions. As Peter Olsthoorn points out, the emphasis on loyalty and honour promotes in-group favouritism to the extent of being 'dangerous to the people the military are supposed to protect'.[36] Elsewhere, Olsthoorn et al. observe that the codes of conduct currently used in militaries emphasize military effectiveness and the interests

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[32]MoD (2011), para. 412.

[33]Moskos Jr., "The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam," 37.

[34]Tomforde (2006), 111.

[35]Moskos Jr., "The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam," 35.

[36]Olsthoorn (2011), 37.

of the organization and comrades.[37] In the context of human security missions, contact with the local population has become a core operational activity and an important aspect of morally responsible and effective military action. Being moral in the context of these missions involves the ability to put oneself in other people's shoes, or, in the words of Topolski, to think, judge and act in a relational manner. Given the predominant inward orientation of the military ethic and its focus on the well-being of colleagues, this presents a potential difficulty for the military.

In addition, the conformity to which soldiers are compelled by their loyalty and honour discourages them from raising objections to the wrong committed by peers against outsiders.[38] In this vein, the Aitken Report, an investigation of abuses and unlawful killing committed by British soldiers in Iraq, warns that the 'wall of silence' which units built to protect their members is a kind of behaviour inherent to 'an organisation that trains its people in the virtues of loyalty, and which stresses the importance of cohesion'.[39] Winslow, who investigated the reasons behind abuses of local civilians by Canadian soldiers in Somalia and Bosnia, comes to a similar conclusion that loyalty can quite easily become 'an exaggerated force that undermines good order and discipline'.[40]

Deficiency of the Inward Moral Obligation—Alienating Chain of Command

The inward moral obligations of soldiers include their obligations within and towards the chain of command. Within the military chain of command responsibility ultimately rests with superior commanders. The classic military ethic further emphasizes obedience to authority. Just like in-group cohesion, the focus on obedience to the chain of command is meant to enable soldiers to perform their jobs well and to hold the line even under challenging conditions. Thus, effective military performance is ensured through an emphasis on unquestioning obedience to authority. However, the organizational characteristics that encourage obedience may also activate mechanisms of moral disengagement, especially the diffusion and displacement of responsibility.[41] Since everybody can be held responsible, nobody *feels* responsible: there is always someone else who can be blamed. The disappearance of responsibility is well-noted, both in the literature and in history. For example, Kelman and Hamilton's famous study on crimes of obedience,[42] and Milgram's obedience to authority experiments[43] demonstrate detrimental effects of divisions of labour and the diffusion of responsibility for moral behaviour.

Various incidents such as the massacre at My Lai and the abuse of prisoners exhibited at Abu Ghraib can at least in part be attributed to processes of moral disengagement as a result of the diffusion of responsibility. In fact, the article in which Bandura develops his theory on moral disengagement takes the military as its prime example, suggesting that moral disengagement is inherent to the military profession. In short, the chain of command and the way moral responsibility is assigned introduce deficiencies in the military ethics for human security operations. First, they encourage unquestioning obedience to authority rather than moral reasoning and acting. Such reasoning should be encouraged and facilitated for soldiers to take the 'other' in need of care and protection as the main motivator for their actions. Second, the focus on the demands of the military chain of command prioritizes values of obedience and loyalty over the values of peace, humanity, dignity and security that are central to human security operations. If soldiers are meant to protect these values, the military organization should aim to activate them.

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[37]Olsthoorn et al. (2010).

[38]Olsthoorn (2011), 51–53.

[39]MoD (2008), para. 42.

[40]Winslow (2004), 3.

[41]Bandura et al. (1996).

[42]Kelman and Hamilton (1989).

[43]Milgram (1965).

Deficiency of the Upward Moral Obligations—Moral Disempowerment of the State

The core purpose of the liberal state is ensuring security and promoting interests of its citizens. It is not, therefore, very controversial to say that the liberal state possesses moral power to obligate its soldiers with a potential ultimate sacrifice in the defence of vital national interests. National security may even justify conscription of citizenry into armed forces. Yet, the moral authority of the state to risk soldiers' lives for the benefit of 'strangers' in human security missions seems to be a considerably more contested issue.

In the view of Allen Buchanan, the liberal state may and should be defined as an 'instrument of justice'. Because through the state its citizens carry out collectively their moral duties, the state has the authority to use collective means to help other people. However, this engagement of state resources and capabilities abroad cannot sacrifice the basic interests of its citizens, both collectively and individually. The 'state-as-an-instrument-of-justice' concept thus recognizes that 'there are limits on the costs that the citizens of one state must bear to protect the rights of other persons'.[44]

From this argument it follows that the state, although it can and should deploy its soldiers to alleviate human misery abroad, cannot legitimately order its soldiers to exercise the same self-sacrificing commitment as might be expected in national defence. Baer puts forward an argument that the soldiers intervening in other people's conflicts should be considered bystanders only. 'As mere bystanders we can require that they not be indifferent to the horror, and that they do what they can to alleviate it, but we cannot require that they risk their lives to stop it.'[45] The citizens may be asked to bear their 'fair share in the common defence',[46] but it would be beyond their civic obligations to risk lives for

any other objective. Even if the state has a perfect duty to intervene, 'for individuals the duty remains imperfect'.[47]

A logical consequence of this moral disempowerment of the state is the practice of force protection and casualty aversion in troop contributing nations. This practice unequally distributes the risks between military personnel and civilians. The state and the military are interested in reducing the risks of military personnel as much as possible. Public support for military operations is contingent on the number of military casualties. The deaths of military personnel tend to generate far more attention than the deaths of civilians. Since military organizations go to great lengths to ensure the safety of troops and are able to profit from technological advancements to further protect their troops, the inequality of risk distribution between military personnel and civilians increases. Especially when the motivation to intervene is to protect innocent civilians, these tendencies may undermine the moral status of the mission as well as operational success.[48] Furthermore, this tendency is at odds with the moral principle of discrimination, which, according to some authors, involves a duty on the part of soldiers to accept greater risks to themselves in order to avoid civilian casualties.[49] A voluntary consent from soldiers may restore the legitimacy of their ultimate sacrifice in human security operations. Yet, what kind of consent makes soldiers liable to ultimate sacrifice for humanitarian cause? It may be argued that the acceptance of voluntary military service is a sufficient consent. As Tesón explains, when signing their contract professional soldiers give consent to fight for whatever cause the legitimate government decides: 'the draftee has plausibly delegated to the government the right to choose for him whether a war is worth fighting'.[50]

However, from the perspective of liberal ethics, such a delegation of moral subjectivity for

[44]Buchanan ([1999](#)), 76–76, 85–86; also Parekh ([1997](#)), 64.

[45]Baer ([2011](#)), 312.

[46]Mill ([1946](#)), 10.

[47]Walzer ([2002](#)), 32.

[48]Shaw ([2002](#)), 343–59.

[49]Walzer ([2004](#)).

[50]Tesón ([2001](#)), 52.

pecuniary recompense seems rather controversial. Despite the fact that the professional soldiers willingly accept service in the military and the possible risks it involves, their employment contract should not turn them into expendable instruments in the hands of the state. In words of Kant, 'being hired out to kill or be killed seems to constitute a use of human beings as mere machines and tools in the hand of another (the state), a use which is incompatible with the rights of humanity in our own person'.[51] Most of the militaries in the liberal West are primarily intended for national defence and to protect vital national interests and to these ends professional soldiers commit themselves through their oath of allegiance. The lack of adequate consent with the humanitarian cause thus provides the state with little to no legitimacy to demand from professional soldiers an ultimate sacrifice in missions to which they are not willingly committed. The democratic majority have no right to pursue *their* understanding of moral obligation by risking lives of their compatriots—professional soldiers.

Deficiency of the Outward Orientation of Military Ethic—Dehumanisation of the Other

Despite its general recognition and deep roots in the moral codes of all modern militaries, the outward orientation entails the most burdensome aspects of the military ethic. For a military which focuses dominantly on warfighting, the 'significant other' must be the enemy. From the soldier's perspective, the enemy is necessarily viewed as a threat not only for his or her own life but also for the lives of his or her comrades. Moreover, political authorities and military superiors present the enemy to soldiers as an objective of lethal violence. The inward and upward moral obligations thus commit soldiers to uncompromising behaviour against the enemy. Simultaneously, habitual social norms proscribe harming and killing other people. Soldiers therefore need to suppress their aversion of

killing. Among the purposes of military ethic hence is to strip soldiers of habitual social norms proscribing harming and killing other people, and enable them, upon order, to engage in 'killing or maiming designated human beings, destroying property and suppressing freedoms', as Boëne puts it.[52] These processes of individual adaptation to the military ethic thus lead to moral disengagement of soldiers from their conduct against the enemy.

Dehumanising of the adversary is one of the most pervasive mechanisms of moral disengagement from one's own injurious conduct. As Bandura explains,

> To perceive another in terms of common humanity activates empathetic emotional reactions through perceived similarity and a sense of social obligations. The joys and suffering of those with whom one identifies are more vicariously arousing than are those of strangers or of individual who have been divested of human qualities.[53]

The need to engage in harmful conduct may hence require moral disengagement by stripping the adversary of human qualities. As Bandura explains, to make it easier to kill the enemy soldiers, it is a commonplace feature of warfare that they are depicted 'in the most dehumanized, demonic, and bestial images'.[54]

It is particularly the confusing environment of asymmetric conflicts that leads to blurring the distinction between combatants and noncombatants and extends the dehumanizing view also to civilian population. Significantly, the same functional instinct to become morally detached from the enemy may also find its way into human security missions. Miller and Moskos's surveys of Army troops who served as peacekeepers in Somalia reveal how soldiers' understanding of the situation changes when they are exposed to hostile actions on the part of local population. Soldiers trained for combat tend to adopt 'the warrior strategy'. According to this strategy, the population is categorised in hostile terms and treated accordingly. 'Soldiers adopting the

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[51]Kant (2006), 69.

[52]Boëne (1990), 8.

[53]Bandura (1999), 200.

[54]Ibid.

warrior response characterized the locals as lazy and uncivilized people who prefer a lifestyle of gunfire, drugs, and the resulting poverty… such generalizing eased the tension of not knowing who was an enemy.'[55]

The argument of this chapter is built upon the premise that the human security operations require a significant transformation of the outward orientation of the military ethic. In this section we have tried to demonstrate that the military ethic's outward inadequacy stems from deficiencies of all three ethical orientations. The excessive in-group loyalty gives rather a low priority to the interest of strangers. Moreover, the responsibility for strangers and respondability to strangers are blurred by the complex and alienating chain of command. The interests of strangers may also be undermined by the practice of force protection. This practice is only a logical consequence of the lacking authority of the state to demand ultimate sacrifice of soldiers for the benefit of foreign civilians. Last but not least, the psychological adaptation to warfighting produces a tendency to dehumanise those people who may occur at the receiving end of the military use of force. Since all three orientations contain some aspects that may undermine the military performance in the human security operations, all three orientations should be affected by measures that improve the moral responsibility of soldiers to strangers.

Ways of Humanitarising the Military

Liberal moral thinkers tend to agree that the state has fairly limited legitimacy to put soldiers in harm's way in order to protect lives and human rights of 'strangers'. As Walzer puts it, it is not the state that may order its soldiers 'to accept risks to themselves in order to avoid imposing risks on the civilian population',[56] it is only the soldiers who can and should make such a commitment. It is Baer's main assertion that the defence of human lives and basic human rights is

valuable enough to justify the 'ultimate sacrifice'; yet, no individual ought to be *forced* to risk his life for such a cause. Hence it is crucial to respect individual freedom to decide under what conditions, if at all, one's life will be put at risk. 'The choice of an individual to risk his life in order to defend the life and basic human rights of another may be so obviously good as to be beyond objection and yet it must still be his'.[57]

Should this philosophical principle be applied absolutely, the corresponding military ethic would need to discard traditional inward and upward obligation in favour of individually autonomous development of moral commitment to the cosmopolitan cause. The practicality of this idea would probably be impossible to defend. Nonetheless, it is nowhere near the realm of phantasy to agree with Olsthoorn that 'stressing social cohesion somewhat less than currently is the case, furthering loyalty to a professional ethic instead of group loyalty, and promoting a form of respect that is not limited to colleagues but also includes outsiders', would make the military better morally equipped for human security tasks.[58] What we want to emphasise here is that the military should be more appreciative of individual commitments and the moral autonomy of its members as well as the interests of those the military seeks to protect and serve.

The military ethics is not a matter of doctrinal writing alone. Organisational practices and structures affect the mindset of soldiers at least as significantly. The importance of organisation has already been emphasised by Kohlberg. He observed that schools at his time, while officially uninvolved in moral education, produced an institutional culture based more on authority than on ideas of justice and hence became unintentionally detrimental to the moral development of children.[59] Similarly, various aspects of military organisation contribute to the moral development of soldiers. It is the aim of this part to focus on some specific aspects of military organisation

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[55]Miller and Moskos (1995), 625.

[56]Walzer (2002), 35.

[57]Baer (2011), 302, 307.

[58]Olsthoorn (2011), 139.

[59]Kohlberg and Hersh (1977), 57–58.

that may facilitate a more humanitarian moral environment. An adaptation towards a more humanitarian military ethic may proceed through certain changes in recruitment, training and education, conditions of service, and operational command structure.

Recruitment

Recruitment is among the most, if not most important institutions through which the military organisation may render its ethic humanitarian. A properly humanitarian ethic would need to abandon the ethos of patriotic service in favour of cosmopolitan commitments. In Baer's words, 'to fight and die would not be circumscribed by patriotic limitations but rather by the simple and straightforward cause of the defence of human lives and basic human rights'.[60] Original motivation is crucial here. Hence it is the stage of recruitment that determines the cause for which prospect soldiers would commit themselves.

The militaries of Sweden and Denmark may provide illustrative examples of recruitment systems particularly well-suited for human-security operations. Quite counterintuitively, the cases of Denmark and Sweden demonstrate how conscription (in Sweden suspended in 2010) can be utilised for building specifically humanitarian forces. This is not to say that conscripts would be ordered to serve abroad; on the contrary, compulsory military training only gives opportunity to young people to volunteer for service in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

Prior to the end of conscription in Sweden, soldiers who had completed their compulsory service could apply for peacekeeping deployment. If the applicant was selected, he could be offered a short-term contract for peacekeeping service. After this period, he would leave the military.[61] Similarly, conscription in Denmark played an important role in bringing volunteers to the Danish International Brigade (DIB)—4550

strong mechanised brigade established in 1994 as a Danish contribution to peacekeeping missions mandated by the OSCE and the UN. Until the DIB was disbanded in 2004, 80% of its members had been conscripts who voluntarily joined the DIB for three years.[62]

The end of conscription in Sweden and disbanding of the DIB in Denmark do not mean that the respective armed forces would lose their cosmopolitan ethos. International deployments have become rooted as the main mission of the professionalised armed forces and recruitment campaigns reflect this fact. Military advertisements tend to refrain from any reference to patriotism and civic duties. Instead, what is emphasised is the possibility to 'make a difference' in a globalised world. The prospect soldiers, as Joenniemi describes the Danish recruitment campaign, 'are induced to broaden their visions beyond the Danish nation-state with compassion extended also to cover people that used to be figure as outsiders in the previous military-related discourse'.[63]

The benefits of volunteering specifically for international missions are obvious. This system produces contingents of peacekeepers with strong motivation to help 'strangers'. The volunteers were reported to have higher altruistic basic values and more positive attitudes toward their military education.[64] Moreover, the Swedish system, in particular, produced four to five more applications than the army needed. This advantageous situation hence allowed the Swedish military 'to select and recruit the most competent, strong, well-suited, well-educated, and motivated soldiers for peacekeeping operations year after year'.[65]

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[60]Baer (2011), 320.

[61]Hedlund (2011), 181.

[62]Jakobsen (1998), 110.

[63]Joenniemi (2005), 18–19.

[64]Österberg and Rydstedt (2013).

[65]Hedlund, "What Motivates Swedish Soldiers to Participate in Peacekeeping Missions," 181.

Training and Education

In addition to recruitment systems and practices that yield a group of soldiers motivated to participate in human security operations, the army should provide them with the trainings and education necessary to maintain this motivation and to develop the skills involved in human security operations and dealing with 'the other'. In order to instil a humanitarian ethics in soldiers participating in human security operations, specialized training and education is needed. Militaries in the western world have been developing new training programs to prepare soldiers for the peculiarities of human security operations, including trainings in moral issues likely to surface during such operations and the development of cross-cultural, language and diplomatic skills. Rebecca Johnson focuses on the moral formation of the strategic corporal, and discusses on-line simulations that expose soldiers to increasingly complex and ambiguous moral situations.[66] Such simulations are used amongst others by the U.S. Naval Academy and may prove to be fruitful approaches to encourage moral reasoning and increase awareness of the needs of others. In the Netherlands, cultural training is part of the pre-deployment preparation and informs soldiers about cultural practices in their area of operations and the history of the country they are deployed to.

However, basic training of military personnel will continue to be focused on the combat readiness of soldiers, thereby increasing the tensions between the things that soldiers 'must be trained to do'. Aronovitch signals tensions between the requirements of moral military behaviour and effective military behaviour: 'Soldiers must be trained to kill, *but also* be trained not to be brutal; soldiers must be trained to react in combat situations almost automatically, lest hesitation be fatal or harmful to a mission, *but also* be trained to deliberate and decide if a command is unlawful; and soldiers as peacekeepers must be trained into impartiality, *but* they must *also* be trained to know right from

wrong and to be firmly committed to what is right and to oppose what is wrong. Additionally, of course, peacekeepers who are soldiers must be trained to fight *and yet also* trained to resist the impulse to fight even in situations where for soldiers it could otherwise be just and obligatory to do so.'[67] For human security operations and in order to develop a humanitarian ethic, restraint in the use of force has to be trained but not to the point where inhibitions against killing cannot be overcome.

Conditions of Service

Should the individual motivation and moral autonomy be applied absolutely, all soldiers would need to give consent with each deployment. Admittedly, few military organisations can work that way. Operability and an efficient use of manpower require some predictability in planning and stability in composition of units. By no means uncommon is thus the expectation of complete and unconditional subordination of soldiers to the authority of political and military leadership. British Defence Doctrine of 2001, e.g., obliged every member of the Armed Forces to 'be prepared to fight and die for *whatever* legitimate cause the UK is pursuing through military endeavour.'[68] Such a perfect obedience, however, is hardly compatible with the preservation of individual moral autonomy.

Hence it is the allowance for conscientious disobedience or conscientious objection to being deployed in operations of questionable moral or legal justification that retains the possibility to exercise moral autonomy without significantly affecting the effective use of armed forces. The German Armed Forces may show an example of military ethic which appeals to individual moral commitments and consistently with this also allows for a selective conscientious objection. The German military authorities explicitly acknowledge that an effective engagement in the operations with humanitarian objectives requires

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[66] Johnson (2012).

[67] Aronovitch (2001), 14. Emphasis added.
[68] MoD (2001), 3–4. Emphasis added.

not merely soldiers' trust in the government and political representatives but also their own personal commitment to the cause of the deployment. The German soldiers are supposed, 'out of personal conviction', 'to actively defend human dignity, freedom, peace, justice, equality, solidarity and democracy'.[69] They are encouraged to use their individual conscience and the military regulations explicitly legitimize disobedience based on 'freedom of conscience'.

Freedom of conscience is thus an officially recognised limitation of obedience in the German Armed Forces.[70] This is not only stipulated in the list of rights and duties of soldiers; it is also guaranteed by the German constitution and explicitly articulated in the ruling of the Federal Court of Administration in the case of Major Florian Pfaff's refusal to collaborate with the US Army at the time of the American invasion to Iraq in 2003. The court made abundantly clear that the constitutionally guaranteed 'freedom of conscience is unconditional; the individual cannot be forced to actions that would incriminate their conscience'.[71] The legitimate conscientious decision was then defined by the court as 'any serious moral, i.e. in the categories of "good" and "evil" oriented, decision…, which the individual in a particular situation internally perceives as binding and inevitably committing, so that he could not act against it without serious moral dilemma.[72] As a consequence of this judicial decision, the military authorities affirmed in the service regulations that 'the state does not have the right to force an individual to commit acts that violate ethical standards of good and evil'.[73] So far there have been only a couple of cases of selective conscientious objection. Nonetheless, the existence of this right, even if rarely exercised, is important for the moral environment within the armed forces.

Operational Command Structure

In the past, the centralized command in military operations may have contributed to moral disengagement and to the occurrence of immoral conduct towards the local population. Jan Achterbergh and Dirk Vriens claim that moral development may be supported through organizational structures that allow people an insight into the aims of the organization and the way their own actions contribute to the realization of these aims.[74] This requires an organizational structure that consists of low levels of fragmentation and specialization. Such an organizational structure assigns the soldiers tasks that are relatively complex and require higher levels of skill and expertise.

Current developments in the command structures during operations towards flatter and more flexible organizational structures provide potentially fruitful opportunities to further the humanitarian ethic we propose. In addition, collaboration with non-military actors, also referred to as the 'comprehensive approach', is an intrinsic part of human security operations. Military actors have to coordinate and collaborate with other military and non-military actors, agencies and organizations. The military may not always be in the lead but rather have a supportive role and may be tasked with creating the preconditions under which other actors can do their work towards an increased human security and stability in the region.

Human security operations require a level of flexibility and decision making capacity at the lowest level that has resulted in increased decentralization. In recent years, the distribution of responsibility through the military organization has changed and militaries have increasingly adopted a command and control structure based on the commander's intent. Decision making rights have been shifted towards the lower levels. This is meant to contribute to the effectiveness of military operations, since it facilitates flexibility and a speedy response to changing environments. A side-effect of this shift is that soldiers are

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[69]BdV (2008), para. 106.

[70]*Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1: Innere Führung (Leadership Development and Civic Education)*, (Bonn: Der Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2008), Annex 2/2, § 4c.

[71]Gillner (2009), 210.

[72]Ibid., 197.

[73]BdV, *ZDv 10/1 2008*, Annex 2/2, para 4c.

[74]Achterbergh and Vriens (2010), chap. 11.

required to think about their actions more. This shift addresses an important philosophical point often made by military ethicists: soldiers should be held morally responsible for their actions and they should think for themselves. It appears that the current shift towards decentralization can contribute to this request.

Junior military leaders are instructed on the general aims of a mission but are left to decide on how to realise those aims by themselves. This requires them to consider the moral implications of their actions and to conceive of approaches towards obtaining the aims of their mission in a responsible way. As a result, they are in the position to make important decisions relatively independently and to act on their situational awareness. During human security operations, this situational awareness is bound to include an awareness of the presence and needs of 'significant others'. A humanitarian ethic demands that the strategic corporal takes their interests into account in his decisions.

However, the compression of the levels of the military hierarchy—strategic, operational and tactical—combined with technological advances in the military domain and the presence of media in the conflict zone, means that such decisions can have far-reaching operational and strategic consequences—hence the term 'strategic corporal',[75] also in the moral domain. This development has not necessarily been considered a positive one. It requires high levels of trust in the capacities and judgments of junior military leaders. Thus, the development towards greater independence and responsibility at the lower levels may also invite micro management. The Netherlands Defence Doctrine warns against the problems of micro management and notes that individual commanders may differ in their willingness to give freedom of action to their subordinate commanders. Micro management by senior military leadership and politicians also poses threats to a humanitarian military ethic: given their lack of situational awareness, of eyes and ears on the ground, politicians and senior

leaders are less likely to take into account the interests of the 'significant others' on scene.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have argued that the new military missions, human security operations, require a shift in military ethics towards a cosmopolitan or humanitarian ethic. Since the traditional military ethic prioritizes the inward and upward moral obligations of its members and the organizational structures and practices to a significant degree support these tendencies, the interests of 'significant others' in current military operations are insufficiently addressed. We recommend a larger emphasis to be placed on the outward moral obligations of the military and have developed ideas for changes in the military's recruitment, training and conditions of service and command structure that we think would support such a shift. It should be noted that the shift can already be seen in recent changes in western military organizations.

However, the humanitarian ethic needs further elaboration, amongst others in terms of the presumed allegiance of soldiers, the responsibility of the state towards outsiders in general, and the moral values that are included in such an ethic. Furthermore, while we have focused on the outward dimensions of the military ethic, a full account of a military ethic for new missions requires a balanced account of the inward, upward and outward moral obligations of the military.

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[75]Krulak (1999), 18–22; Cf. King (2003).

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Author Biographies

Tomas Kucera is an assistant professor at the Department of Security Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. He studied international relations and security studies at the Charles University before receiving a doctorate at Aberystwyth University for a dissertation dealing with the relationship of liberal ideology and defence policy and organization of armed forces in the UK and Germany. His teaching focuses on war studies, civil-military relations and ethics of war. His research interests also include sociology of security, organisation of armed forces and society, and military ethics.

Liesbeth Gulpers is a Ph.D.-student and lecturer at Radboud University, Institute for Management Research (IMR) in Nijmegen. Her research interests include military ethics, moral development in the military, organizational structures and well-being of soldiers. Her current project focuses on moral behaviour and moral development during military deployments in relation to the division of tasks in the military crisis organization and integrates insights from virtue ethics, social psychology and socio-technical systems theory. Liesbeth Gulpers' current research project is a collaboration of the IMR and the Faculty of Military Sciences at the Netherlands Defence Academy. She has presented her work at various international conferences, including EBEN, ISMS and ERGOMAS.

Unionisation of the Military: Representation of the Interests of Military Personnel

19

Giuseppe Caforio

The growing trend towards partial or total abandonment of conscription for more or less broad forms of professional volunteerism in armed forces is giving renewed importance and topicality to the study of union representation of the interests of military personnel. The subject attracted widespread interest among military sociologists in the 1970s before being substantially abandoned for more than 20 years. A resumption of interest was then seen in the early 2000s, precisely as a consequence of the new makeup of the rank and file, which had become prevalently volunteers in most countries in the first years of the new century (Olivetta 2005; Bartle and Heinecken 2006; Olivetta 2006; Olivetta 2008).

It thus seems opportune to give some space in this handbook to the social and political issues that the unionisation of professional military personnel can involve and to report the most significant studies published on the subject.

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Originating in the Scandinavian countries in the early years of the twentieth century, union representation of military personnel was initially considered a private matter, tolerated by the State, despite some initial conflict, in the general framework of the broad liberties ensured by those advanced democracies. Only later did military union organisations begin to be recognised by the State and regulated by it, in a way not dissimilar from the other occupational unions.[1]

This process in the Scandinavian countries was gradual and can be considered to have more or less reached completion by the time of the Second World War. But in the same historical period, the fall of the totalitarian regimes and the wider democratisation of Western Europe, the disappearance of the guarantee function that some forms of government (monarchy) or regime (Nazism) had for professionals in uniform, and the general demilitarisation of the individual national societies, extended the issue of union representation of military personnel to just about

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[1]In the Scandinavian countries, because that is where forms of industrial democracy first developed in the civilian sector. Broedling (1997, p. 21) writes in this regard: *"The Scandinavian countries were in the front line of the industrial democracy movement and their industries were the first to be actively involved in experiments with increasing worker participation ... Their labour confederations were greatly influential in controlling what legislation was passed to benefit those they represented."*

G. Caforio (✉)
Pisa, Italy

all continental European countries (but in the U.S. too) where free expression of citizens' needs and desires was possible.

In this situation—expression, according to some, of a "secularisation of soldiering" (Manigart 1984, p. 4)—a clear line was drawn between conservative tendencies, which considered any form of unionisation incompatible with the military institution, and innovative tendencies, which, with the disappearance of the royal army or the caste army, deemed an alignment of the military profession with the other professions and occupations both possible and necessary.

Reasons for the Division

At this point two questions arise spontaneously: why was there this generalised push, or at least interest (more or less all Western countries, the United States included, had to face the issue in the aftermath of the Second World War), in autonomous forms of defence of the interests of military personnel? Why was union representation of military personnel seen as a problem and resisted so vehemently?

The Push for Unionisation

We said how, historically, the disappearance of some forms of government (or regime) that performed a guarantee function for the professional members of the armed forces was one of the causes that extended the push towards unionisation beyond the countries of the Scandinavian area. This affirmation must now be better specified: in reality, what influenced this trend most directly seems to have chiefly been the new situation in which professional military personnel found themselves in their home societies.

In other words, it was the change that took place in their societies, or, at least, the change in the relative positions of the different components within each single society, that produced the phenomenon.

For what interests us here, the essential aspect of this change was the loss of prestige and social appreciation of the military social group and a resulting sense of frustration of the personnel. "*The mood to unionize,*" writes Harries-Jenkins (1977, p. 63), *"in the armed forces as in other organizations, arises when the general feeling of individual deprivation is converted into the rare sense of collective deprivation."*

The thinking of other authors, such as Philippe Manigart and Lucien Mandeville, runs along the same lines. The latter writes (Mandeville 1976): *"The continuing decline of the standard of living in the military, combined with the general trend towards relations of a new type between a superior and his subordinates, is beginning to produce new expectations among military personnel."* Manigart further states that "*the process of unionisation of the armed forces is part of the general evolution of labour relations in Western societies. This evolution is characterised by greater participation by citizens, by their propensity to defend their interests, and by a supplanting of individual labour relations with collective labour relations ...*" (Manigart 1984, p. 4).

As a consequence of social change, the internal connotations of soldiering have changed as well. David R. Segal points to the transformation of "*the calling of military service into a secular occupation*" due to three changes: "*the changing technology of warfare that, making civilian population as vulnerable to attack as are frontline troops, has socialized the danger of war*" (Segal and Kramer 1977b, p. 31); the changed nature of the individual soldier's work, which has become significantly more like working in an enterprise; and lastly, the progressive acceptance of this assimilation by those responsible for managing military personnel. And, according to Harries-Jenkins, another important change took place as well, namely *"a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment by virtue of a shift from authoritarian domination to greater*

reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus" (Harries-Jenkins 1977, p. 56).

A further aspect of social change was identified by Taylor et al. (1977), who observed how the changed social extraction of officers meant that they were coming in ever greater numbers from those classes or social sectors where unionisation had long been entrenched.

That the push for unionisation began, in a direct manner, from a change in social standing is made particularly evident by the examples, opposite in their results, of two countries where institutional changes were not made, Belgium and Great Britain.

"*Before the First World War,*" writes Werner (1976, passim), *"the status that the military professional enjoyed in Belgium was quite enviable. At each level of the social hierarchy, the armed forces occupied a privileged position."* The officers formed a caste, but the other ranks of career personnel were satisfied with their status as well: *"At each level of the hierarchy, the career personnel were aware of belonging to one of the most important organisations of the State, an organisation that enjoyed the highest public regard."* But also on a concrete level, military personnel *"enjoyed certain privileges that, at that time, were not granted to workers, such as stability of employment, free medical care, the provision of food and clothing, paid holidays and a pension."*

According to the same author, the situation after the Second World War appears profoundly altered: soldiering undergoes a sharp drop in social prestige and military personnel *"are no longer the object of the attentions and preoccupations of the State."* On the concrete level, *"At the same time the country enjoys a situation of full employment, and the social conquests in the industrial labour sector are spectacular. From this standpoint the material position of career military personnel becomes relatively less advantageous."*

There is thus a social change that is independent of institutional changes (although in the countries where these occurred they were certainly not without influence); it alters the pre-existing balances and does away with the old systems of protection, thereby producing new demands in the military environment as well. Indeed, in Belgium (still according to Werner), the drive towards unionisation stems from the fact that *"in this changing society, career military personnel, who also work to earn a living, are swept along by an irresistible tide."*

A contrary example is provided by the English situation, where a persistence of form of government and regime was accompanied by a substantial maintenance of the positions and, especially, of the forms of protection previously in vigour for career military personnel, despite social change in general. Indeed, regarding the union issue in Great Britain, Harries-Jenkins writes that in his country, the armed forces have *"a special relationship with the civil power whereby the rights and privileges of the dominant social group are automatically guaranteed to members of the military; in this relationship there is no need to seek unionisation to provide the political, social and economic rights of members of the organisation for these will be always protected by the power elite with which the military is closely associated"* (Harries-Jenkins 1977, p. 68).

But when he talks about the European situation in general, this author, too, points out that the push towards unionisation in the military *"arises from the feeling that the armed forces, in comparison with other institutions in society, have lost their previously held status and have suffered an undue amount of deprivation"* (Harries-Jenkins 1977, p. 61).

A further reason for the trend to unionise armed forces is identified by Cortright (1977), with reference to the American reality, in the notable growth of unionisation in the public employment sector starting in the 1960s, growth that could hardly fail to have an entraining effect in regard to military personnel as well. Cortright further observes, however, that it must not be forgotten that the push towards unionisation in the armed forces is not created by the unions, it is not unions that create discontent and frustrations: these factors are inherent in daily working conditions and depend on the possibility or capability that the chain of command has to come to

terms with the problems of the various categories of personnel.

Although opposing an introduction of unionisation in the armed forces, this affirmation is confirmed by U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond, when he notes that the problem arises due to the frustrations and disappointments of military personnel, created in part by the feeling of having been abandoned by the national government. Thurmond reports (Cortright and Thurmond 1977) in this regard a report drawn up by the United States Defense Manpower Commission (1976), which states that many members of the Armed Forces feel shocked and disappointed because they feel they have been ignored and neglected by a government that doesn't keep its word; it also seems there is a significant lack of communication between politicians and the troops in the operational units.

The push for unionisation of the military presented itself again, mainly in Europe, in the first decade of this millennium, as mentioned at the outset of this chapter, since the general abandonment of the draft, added to the factors cited above, *"has led some to raise the issue of whether the time was now come for some form of independent voice through which they* [militaries] *can articulate their needs to military leadership, government and civil society. This growing interest in some form of military unionism is reflected in the membership of the European Organization of Military Associations (EUROMIL) which has increased from seven member associations in 1972 to 34 associations in 2005"* (Bartle and Heinecken 2006, p. 2).

The Opposition to Unionisation of the Armed Forces

But if a convergence between the military establishment and civil society is in progress and has brought the two areas of life and work much closer together, why is there a unionisation issue for the armed forces, and why is there opposition to a collective bargaining system for military personnel?

The fundamental reason must be sought in the specificity of the military, which is summarised thusly by David R. Segal: *"Because of its unique social function—the legitimate management of violence—the military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required by other modern organizations. Military personnel, unlike their civilian counterparts, enter into a contract of unlimited liability with their employer. They cannot unilaterally terminate their employment any time they wish. They are subject to moving and working in any environment where the service decides they are needed. They are required to place the needs of service above the needs of their families, and must frequently endure long periods of separation. They are often called upon to work more than an eight-hour day, for which they receive no additional compensation. And in time of war, they must face prolonged danger, and may even forfeit their lives. Obviously, the man on the firing line is required to make a commitment of a different order from that made by the worker on the assembly line."* (Segal and Kramer 1977a, b, p. 28).

Bernhard Boene, in a study devoted to a different research topic (Boene 1990), is both precise and efficacious in differentiating military "work" from civilian work. Military specificity, writes Boene, does not lie only in the area of the risks to which one supposes the combatant is exposed, but also in the limits of application of common rationality in combat and in the situation of habitual transgression of social norms that it entails. This implies a particular type of socialisation. Notwithstanding partial analogies, according to Boene civil emergencies belong to a different reality than military ones do. An officer, in particular, is not an ordinary civil servant: he must respond to a "call", consisting of a particular interest in military things, dedication to the common welfare, acceptance of risking his life, submission to a series of obligations that are peculiar to the military profession.

Concerning the specificity of the military profession, see also van Doorn (1965); Caforio (2006); Bartle and Heinecken (2006). See also, in this volume, the chapter *Military Culture*.

Some Theoretical Positions on the Issue

Discussing a sample survey, David Segal observes that in the U.S., in the absence of a union for military personnel, there is a considerable "misfit" between soldiers' perception of the characteristics of their role and the preferred characteristics, while in an analogous sample of civilian manpower this misfit is much smaller. In examining the attempted remedies, Segal states: *"Any change to be achieved through organizational interventions, however, is likely to be incremental, and not to resolve the discrepancy between the characteristics that military personnel would like in their jobs and the characteristics that they perceived their jobs to have"* (Segal and Kramer 1977a, b, p. 46). According to Segal, unionisation can solve this problem, but it presents two dangers that must be carefully weighed: the first is that it tends to extend its influence also to aspects of management and direction of the military apparatus; the second is that it involves a politicisation of the personnel.

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins examines the consequences that unionisation would have on the operational efficiency of the armed forces and identifies three fundamental ones:

1. The creation of a dual authority structure. *"Since there has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment and a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group consensus, unionization extends the boundaries of these changes: it brings into armed forces the full effects of the organizational revolution which pervades contemporary society, creating a dual authority structure while modifying the traditional basis of compliance"* (Harries-Jenkins 1977, p. 70).
2. A much greater resemblance of the style of military command to that of civilian management. The new tasks and the introduction of unionisation would require commanders to possess skills and orientations more and more like those of civilian managers.
3. An abdication by the officer of his traditional image. Indeed, if the officer *"wishes to retain his self-image and ideas of honor, then the introduction of trade unions into the military creates a conflict situation with substantial dysfunctional consequences"* (Harries-Jenkins 1977, p. 71).

Harries-Jenkins concludes, however, by affirming that, as a radical criticism of the existing military system, *"the unionization of the armed forces can only result in an improvement to an otherwise defective situation"* (Harries-Jenkins 1977, p. 69).

According to Taylor et al. (1977), many reasons offered in the U.S. for or against the unionisation of military personnel appear to be rhetorical and not sufficiently investigated. Those who take a negative critical stance, for example, contend that unionisation would lead to a breakdown in discipline, threaten the chain of command and, especially, undermine the military's ability to carry out its assigned mission. Through a concrete field analysis, these authors believe they can shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of this process. Among the advantages are the acquisition of a greater sense of individual security, a valorisation of the dignity of individuals, improved social communication, and greater competitiveness with other occupations and professions in recruiting personnel. The real drawbacks would essentially be reduced to two: a risk of divisiveness within units, due to acquired strife between personnel categories, and an increase in personnel costs.

Jean (1981) states that in itself, the creation of unions would inevitably produce increased confrontation; without it, the union representatives would have neither prestige nor credibility. He does not believe, however, that the biggest drawback that would derive from it would be that of undermining the internal cohesiveness of the armed forces and their operational capacity. According to this author military leaders would align themselves with the union's demands out of necessity, to avoid internal break-up. An unacceptable corporative force would be produced that sooner or later would inevitably oppose it to the

political power. The danger that a union of military personnel involves for civil society is, in his opinion, much greater than its negative implications on the efficiency of the military itself.

Along the same line is the fear expressed by Sen. Thurmond (reported by David Cortright, cited essay) that unionisation might reinforce the military establishment and increase its influence over society at large, decreasing the capacity for political control.

This issue had already been treated by Cortright in another essay (Cortright and Thurmond 1977) where on the one hand he argued that unionisation in the armed forces would help to prevent any form of separateness from civil society while noting on the other that little attention was given to the possibility that unionisation substantially strengthens the military's ability to wield influence. Thurmond, again, judges the European experience negatively and asks himself how unionised troops would respond in battle. However, to remain faithful to his position, Thurmond conceives the armed forces as a separate body from civil society, argues that military personnel are not comparable to other labour force categories, and advances the fear that union representation of the interests of military personnel would bring the defence budget to unacceptable levels.

More recently Heinecken (2006, p. 483) observes that *"Internationally, there has been growing pressure on armed forces to accommodate individual rights, including the right to freedom of association. This has led to many countries permitting soldiers to belong to some form of union."*

Analysis of Historical Experiences Through the Thought of Various Authors

The case of Austria presents two interesting peculiarities: the first is that it constitutes the first example of unionisation in an army recruited totally voluntarily. The second is that, if I am not

mistaken, it represents the first case of a unionised army that has faced conflict situations.

There were two such situations: a conflict, albeit limited, with Hungary, for the border territory called Burgenland (1921–1922), which despite its limitedness nonetheless involved over a third of the Austrian army. The second situation was a massive intervention to maintain public order, in 1924, against Social Democratic demonstrators who had taken possession of the city of Vienna, erecting barricades in the streets: the army intervened with a force of 9600 men and lost 31 killed and 170 wounded.

The significant aspects of these interventions are, according to Bell (1977):

- despite the ideological divisions then existing in the country (reflected also, within the army, by two opposing unions), there is no evidence pointing to decreased efficiency of the military: on the contrary, in both types of intervention the Austrian army seems to have conducted itself quite well;
- in the cited operational phases, the unions never interfered in the chain of command.

Hence, according to the author, the Austrian experience demonstrates that a clear line can be drawn between exercising union prerogatives and the execution by commanders of lawful and necessary commands.

These assessments are shared by David Cortright in his analysis of the experience, now historical, of the military unions in Sweden and the German Federal Republic. Responding to the fears of a diminished efficiency of the military, Cortright states: *"It should be obvious from our discussion of the professional unions of West Germany and Sweden, however, that no such negative effect exists"* (Cortright 1977, p. 49).

Olivier and Teitler (1982) also make an evaluation of the union experience, arguing that union activity in favour of military personnel cannot be seen as an erosion of subordination or of the apolitical nature of the Dutch armed forces, although certainly there is a change in

military style and a growing awareness that today, career military personnel cannot ignore the tactics of pressure groups, with whom they compete for the allocation of tax moneys.

However, this change of style does not mean a slide from a professional position to an occupational one, Oliver and Teitler insist. On the contrary, the actions taken to protect the interests of military personnel testify to a sense of professional responsibility, which adapts to the changed social context of the country.

The necessity of a change in the style of command, a change which is already in progress due to the natural evolution of national societies, is, according to Manigart (1984), closely tied to the introduction in the armed forces of a system for representing the personnel's interests. Also according to this author, the change is from an authoritative system to a participatory one.

"The available evidence suggests," writes Harries-Jenkins, *"that two distinct cultural models can be envisaged. In the first of these, the continental model, the ongoing relationship between military institutions and citizenship creates a very specific political culture in which military service in the mass army is defined as an integral part of citizenship. This recognizes that the institutionalization of citizen conscription was an essential component in the emergence of Western parliamentary institutions"* (Harries-Jenkins 1977, p. 67). Owing to this relationship, the protection of citizens' rights in their working activity could not fail to extend from the civilian sector to the military one. The continental model of the citizen-soldier thus leads to extend to the soldier the systems of protection proper of the citizen.

Of the same opinion is Teitler (1976), who, pointing to the origin of mass armies and obligatory conscription in the French Revolution, writes that, with the Revolution, the whole people was mobilized in the name of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, thus enabling the State to call (to arms) all the citizens to defend and spread the Revolution.

But in the English model, notes Harries-Jenkins, *"military service has never emerged as a hallmark of citizenship. Instead, in Great Britain, for example, it can be argued that an inalienable right of the individual has been that of not serving in armed forces"* (Harries-Jenkins 1977, p. 68). In the Anglo-Saxon model (or "insular" model, as Harries-Jenkins calls it), the protection of the rights of military personnel is automatically ensured by the officer cadres' belonging to the elite that heads the country.

Taylor et al. (1977) makes another interesting observation: the European countries that have military unions are generally governed, in the 1970s, by Social Democratic or Labour parties; unionisation thus derives from the close connection that these parties normally have with trade unions in general.

Taylor further observes that concrete experience has shown that it is not useful to prohibit military unions by law: the problem would only be shifted in its times and modes. If one wishes to oppose the penetration of unionism among military personnel, it is necessary to act on the causes upstream, both on the material dissatisfactions of the personnel and their motivations. With regard to the latter and, in particular, the American situation, Taylor argues that it would be necessary to return to a conscript army, motivated not by economic incentives but by a feeling of service to one's country.

According to Philippe Manigart, however (Manigart 1984), the line of demarcation between countries that have forms of free and elected representation of military personnel and countries that refuse it only partly, and incidentally, coincides with the division between conscripted armies and volunteer armies. Premising that effective representation of soldiers' interests has always had to be imposed on a military leadership reluctant to cede power, either from within—pressure from the membership—or without—pressure from political parties,

Manigart argues that where the military establishment still enjoys broad autonomy and effective power (in the U.S., Great Britain and France, for instance), the brass has so far been able to oppose any form of unionisation of the armed forces, while the opposite has occurred in the countries where this was not the case.

A recurrent opinion is that career soldiers and conscripts (in countries that have conscription) must necessarily have distinct bodies for union representation. Gerard Perselay writes, for example, that *"the European experience is that conscripts or draftees generally have their own labor organization to represent them. Part of this separation is based on a lack of a community of interest with career military. This can be interpreted to mean that the conscripts have different interests and purposes, many of them not lying wholly within their relatively short term of service in the military"* (Perselay 1977, p. 175). And David Cortright writes, *"The military unions of Europe show two basic patterns: the development of separate associations for each class of military employee and a division between professional unionism and conscript unionism"* (Cortright 1977, p. 223). This difference of issues is also pointed out by Arango (1977), as well as by Manigart (1984), who describes the diversity of the two phenomena.

One quite constant datum found where military personnel are completely free to organise is that they tend to choose associations of origins and types typically internal to the institution over sections or groups of general unions devoted to military personnel (significant data in this direction have been found chiefly in Belgium and Germany, but the tendency is also noticeable in the Netherlands and in the Scandinavian countries). At least for now, therefore, a corporative-professional type appears to be winning, likely due to awareness on the part of professional personnel of a real specificity of the military.

This specificity also affects the so-called institutional solutions adopted in countries like Italy and France (see below).

This phenomenon is also felt by the civilian unions, which can therefore put themselves in a position of contrast with the representative associations of the type cited. Manigart (1984), for example, points out in this regard that the chief motivation of the civilian unions in Belgium in requesting the right to organise in the armed forces was not to increase their membership as much as to put an end to a monopoly by organisations of a corporative nature, as the professional associations of military personnel were considered to be.

Among the significant historical experiences it is interesting to cite one of the few opinion surveys conducted in armed forces undergoing a process of unionisation. The survey was performed by the AOSA (Association des Officiers en Service Actif) of the Belgian armed forces in 1980 (two years after definitive regulation of the representative function) and is reported by Manigart in an appendix to the essay cited several times above. The survey universe was comprised of all officers on active duty; the response rate was 35%, but the breakdown by rank, origin, age group, etc., makes the author consider the sample sufficiently representative. The most interesting data are:

1. The distribution of the respondents by union membership: 48% belonged to the AOSA (a corporative-type representative association, as stated earlier), 3% to intercategory civilian unions, and 4.5% were not enrolled in any union.
2. The respondents' opinions on the unionisation of military personnel: 82% considered this process positive with regard to the category associations of a corporative type, while only 25.5% express the same judgement on the possibility of joining the intercategory civilian unions.
3. The classification of the objectives of union representation, by order of importance:
   – defend moral and professional interests;
   – defend material interests;

– enhance the profession in the eyes of public opinion;
– inform commanders on the problems of the personnel;
– collaborate with commanders to solve such problems;
– inform public opinion on national defence;
– inform the officers themselves;
– defend the interests of retired personnel;
– mediate between commanders and other union organisations;
– participate in bodies for social and cultural promotion.

4. The tools of action of union representation: chiefly action towards the military authority, participation on the committees provided for by regulations, action towards the press, interventions vis-à-vis the political power, and studies, seminars and public conferences on topics of interest.

Roger Manley et al. conclude the already cited study on military unionisation by stating, *"It may well be that some form of unionization or, at the minimum, some form of effective representation of the interests of military personnel is inevitable …"* Just as it occurred in civilian industry, *"so might we now be witnessing an inexorable trend toward representation of the military which will continue even though the courts hold that there is a clear and present danger associated with organization of the military"* (Manley et al. 1977, p. 114).

Also for Manigart (1984), it is false to say that unionism is, by definition, incompatible with the mission of armed forces; on the other hand, *"since the Western armed forces are there to defend democracy, it seems logical that they should apply democratic principles to themselves,"* also to avoid the danger that failure to participate in social change might lead to an isolation of the military establishment from the society to which it belongs.

In Germany, too, as already mentioned, a corporative-professional type appears to be winning, in a context where the law gave freedom to members of the armed forces to join unions. The dominant German military union, the Deutschen BundeswehrVerbandes, thanks to its semi-institutionality, does not carry out only the typical role of the protection of the interests of individuals, but has also taken on a function of direction and political solicitation.

Dr. Gerd Strohmeier (University of Passau), for example, conducted an opinion poll on behalf of this union in 2006–2007 among the German military personnel belonging to the union[2] aimed at determining their assessments regarding the living and deployment conditions in the armed forces. The survey was carried out between 10 Dec. 2006 and 28 Feb. 2007 and no fewer than 45,040 soldiers took part.[3]

The general results of the survey show great dissatisfaction in key sectors. In particular, against the background of the growing responsibilities of the Bundeswehr (participating in international missions for conflict prevention, management of humanitarian crises, rescues and civil protection actions) a gap is created between the Bundeswehr's tasks and the allocated human and material resources. It is interesting to note that analogous assessments had been made shortly before by the Parliamentary Commissioner Reinhold Robbe and by the Bundeswehr's inspector general, Wolfgang Schneiderhan, thus realizing that synergy of intents and actions theoretically already suggested by Carlo Jean (see above) where he states that *"military leaders would align themselves with the union's demands."*

The Situation Today (2015) in the Individual Countries

Following the useful scheme created by Bartle & Heinecken (Bartle and Heinecken 2006), for what regards the unionisation of the military, we can consider three groups of countries. The first

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[2]The Deutsche BundeswehrVerband e.V. (DBwV) has approximately 200,000 members, between military personnel and civilians (data from 2012).

[3]The results were published in *Bericht zur Mitgliederbefragung des Deutschen BundeswehrVerbandes* (Strohmeier-Studie), Universität Passau, PD Dr. Gerd Strohmeier Sperrfrist: 26 April 2007.

—which includes, among others, the United Kingdom, Italy,[4] France,[5] Canada,[6] Portugal, Greece, Turkey, the United States[7] and Russia[8]—*"has restricted the right of military personnel to belong to some form of military unions. Instead, they have adopted various paternalistic, institutional or sophisticated human*

resource strategies to address areas of dissatisfaction"* (Bartle and Heinecken 2006, p. 3).

A second group—which includes, among others, South Africa, Slovenia, Ireland, Australia, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria—can be defined, with the cited authors, as *newly unionised countries*, as they are countries where the access of members of the armed forces to unions was allowed only towards the end of the 20th century (or even more recently).

Finally, a third group includes countries where some associations of this kind are long-standing, such as those in the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and Sweden (the first was formed in the Netherlands in the late 19th century). In countries following this third approach, members of the armed forces are not legally restricted from joining military associations. These military associations enjoy autonomy and accountability to their members, and are therefore able to speak with authority on their behalf.

In particular, the situation in some individual countries can be best summed up as follows.

Bulgaria (for the data reported below, see Leigh and Born (2008), passim).

The Rakowski Bulgarian Officers League is an independent professional organisation of active servicemen, reserve servicemen, and their families. Formed in 1991, it now has 10,000 members in the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior.

Its main objectives are defence of the professional and social interests of its members and the professionalisation of the armed forces.

The League has been especially active in lobbying for legislative reform leading to the civilianisation of the armed forces, and has actively supported Bulgaria's membership in NATO and the EU. It has worked in partnership with the Ministry of Defence, and they signed a formal co-operation agreement in 2002.

France. *"The right of association is strictly limited within the French armed forces. Article 10 SGM prohibits the existence of 'professional grouping with trade unions character' and hold the membership of soldiers in such unions as being 'incompatible with military discipline.' This general interdiction seems to be anachronistic and*

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[4]In accordance with Art. 1475, paragraph 4 of Legislative Decree No. 66/2010, *"*military personnel cannot exercise the right to strike.*"* Analogously, under paragraph 2 of the same article, military personnel are also forbidden from "forming professional associations of a union nature or joining other trade unions," and in any event, pursuant to paragraph 1, "the formation of associations or organisations among military personnel is subject to prior consent from the Ministry of Defence."

[5]MOSCOW, 2014, October 2 (RIA Novosti)—The European Court of Human Rights ruled Thursday that a blanket ban on trade unions within the French armed forces was a violation of the rights of military staff, according to the official website of the Council of Europe. *"The European Court of Human Rights has today issued its Chamber judgment1 in the case of Matelly v. France … The case concerned the absolute prohibition on trade unions within the French armed forces. The court held, unanimously, that there had been: a violation of Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the European Convention on Human Rights,"* the website reported.

[6]A push towards unionisation is nonetheless present. Indeed, on 9 September 2013, *Esprit de Corps* military magazine published an article written by Michel W. Drapeau and Joshua M. Juneau titled "Co-Existence and Convergence: The Lawful Formation of a Military Professional Association" in which the authors opine that Canada should permit members of the Canadian Armed Forces to join a professional association representing their interests. The authors write that this would be in step with the global trend towards the formation of such associations for serving military personnel. Indeed, there is a well-structured dialogue taking place in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands concerning military associations. Experiences in these European nations have shown that the right of association has not compromised combat efficiency or military discipline. On the contrary, in these European nations, there are over 42 military associations from 24 EU nations representing approximately 500,000 soldiers recognised as valuable partners for defence administration.

[7]Membership in military unions, organising of military unions, and recognition of military unions is prohibited by Public Laws 113th Congress (2013–2014).

[8]Russia: The Trade Union covers only civilians working for the Russian Armed Forces.

contrary to the French Constitution. Recently, during a EUROMIL meeting, members of the French Parliament seemed to be interested in the German experience and the DBwV. Article 10 RDGA furthermore strongly restricts the right of free assembly. [omissis] Article 13 RDGA prohibits any kind of collective demonstration, petition or complaint."

The issue of effective representation of military personnel crops up periodically in France, as it did in early 2014, when the four chiefs of staff of the French military threatened to resign if the government decided any further cuts in the budget (for several years now the military has been "used" for budgetary adjustments, though it is mobilised in Africa). In this situation, several people (commentators, rather than military—at least in the upper stratum) have said that unionisation could be a tool to defend military corporative interests. The question of resignation seems to have calmed down since President Hollande said that there will be no further cuts.

Hungary. Following a 1989 amendment to the Constitution granting the right of freedom of association to servicemen, the Association for Protection of the Interests of Military Personnel was established, with 56 individual members and seven local associations in 1991. The Trade Union of Military Servicemen was created in 1995 as an organisation with individual members. It now has more than 10,000 members. The law prohibits strikes but permits demonstrations and meetings by members of the armed forces. There is an interest conciliation forum (Military Interest Conciliation Forum) that operates within the armed forces at the level of the Ministry of Defence.

These developments were confirmed in legislation for the defence forces in 1996 and 2003.

Italy. The representative bodies of the Italian military personnel are established as mandatory institutional bodies: they have the exclusive right of the representative function and any other form of union associating among military personnel is prohibited (even non-union associations between members of the armed forces need prior ministerial authorization.). These bodies are elective: the elections occur according to category (officers, NCOs and rank and file) and are structured according to three levels: basic, intermediate and central. The central level, "Central Representative Council" (COCER), only has some power of bargaining and discussing with the MOD. Any form of public demonstration is prohibited, including strikes.

Poland. Ministry of Defence decisions from 1994 allow for meetings of officers at all levels and for the election of commissioners to act as advocates for soldiers' interests (Decisions No. 81 and 82 of 22 August 1994). In 2000, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that a ban on membership of trade unions in the military was constitutional provided there were alternative means of exercising the right to freedom of association (decision of 7 March 2000). Art. 10, Sec. 3.4 of the Act on Military Service of Professional Soldiers (11 September 2003) allows professional soldiers to form representative bodies under regulations issued by the Ministry of Defence and establishes a consultative council (the Council of Senior Officers of the Corps of Professional Soldiers).

South Africa. The South African National Defence Union is the only recognised union in the South African National Defence Force, with a membership of around 18,000. The South African Security Forces Union has met the 5000 member threshold for registration, but not the target of 15,000 membership required for recognition by the Department of Defence (2006 data).

Slovenia. The Defence Act, adopted in 1994, regulates the unions within the defence sector as a whole. Currently (2015), four different unions (Union of the Ministry of Defence; Union of the Military, Defence and Protection; The Union of the Slovenian Soldiers, and the Union of the Military Pilots) have met the target of 15% of the employed personnel required for recognition by the Ministry of Defence. The unions are supposed to sign a contract with the minister of defence where their working conditions, rights and obligations are agreed. They are prohibited from opposing the acts of command. The strike of the military personnel is not allowed. The strike of the civil servants within the Ministry of defence is possible, but strictly regulated.

Sweden. An Association of Military Officers (SAMO) exists.

Founded in 1995 following the merger of two older unions, the Swedish Officers Association (Svenska Officersförbundet) and the National Association of Officers (Officerarnas Riksförbund), it has around 9500 officers of all ranks, from second lieutenants to generals/admirals. SAMO is a member of the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations. It operates through the Public Employees' Negotiation Council, a negotiation cartel for unions of employees working in the service of the government, county councils, or local authorities. SAMO has concluded a series of agreements with the armed forces on matters concerning working time, travel and lodging regulations, the employment of officers in the reserve, employment of other categories of military personnel, and on international service. Although it is not legally prohibited from calling a strike, SAMO has agreed, through a collective agreement of limited duration, not to use strike action.

In the U.K. there is the British Armed Forces Federation ("BAFF") which is an independent non-statutory professional staff association for members of the British Armed Forces. Founded in late 2006 as a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee. Membership is open to anyone who is serving or has served in the Royal Navy/Royal Marines, British Army, or Royal Air Force, irrespective of rank or type of engagement (Regular or Reserves). As it exists primarily for the benefit of the members of a profession, BAFF is not a registered charity. Neither is BAFF a trade union. The Steering Group which took BAFF to formation seemed at pains to stress that the organisation would not be a trade union. In any case, although Regular service personnel are permitted by Queen's Regulations to join civilian trade unions or professional associations in order to enhance their trade skills and professional knowledge and as an aid to resettlement, armed forces personnel are specifically excluded from the definition of "workers" for the purposes of British trade union legislation. A body set up to represent such personnel cannot, therefore, register as a trade union under the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.

Conclusions

The abandonment of conscription and the resulting transition to professional armies in the first decade of this century have strengthened the tendency, already in progress, to deal with the issue of union representation on behalf of military personnel. This tendency has its origins in other factors, such as the institutional transformation of many states which took place in the course of the 20th century, waning prestige and political influence of the military profession, and the changed nature of the individual soldier's work, which has become significantly more like working in an enterprise. The changed social extraction of officers meant that they were coming in ever greater numbers from those classes or social sectors where unionisation had long been entrenched.

Still today, the fundamental problems that lawmakers in the various countries find themselves faced with in coming to grips with this tendency are:

1. ensuring that the creation of military unions does not weaken the action of the chain of command;
2. the need to avoid that a coalition of military brass/unions is created that would be able to influence the country's political choices, reducing political control over the armed forces[9];

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[9]As already mentioned, this is a phenomenon that already appears in embryonic form in some countries, such as Germany, where news items like the following can be found (*German Trade Unions March in Step with German Army*, by Heymanns and Stern, 7 March 2013): *"The German Trade Union Federation (DGB) is publicly backing the increasingly aggressive role of the German army (Bundeswehr). This was made clear at a meeting between DGB leader Michael Sommer and the chairmen of the eight unions affiliated to the DGB with the German defence minister, Thomas de Maizière (Christian Democratic Union), in early February. At a joint press conference, Sommer and de Maizière said that the meeting was only a prelude to a more intensive dialogue between the DGB and the Bundeswehr. Further discussions are planned. Both men also agreed to prepare a joint statement 'dealing with the major social issues,' de Maizière declared."*

3. maintaining full efficiency and reliability of the armed forces in any hypothesis of deployment.

The experience gained by those countries that have long adhered to a unionisation of the military offers many cues for assessment and planning of proper unionisation of the armed forces where it is still in discussion.

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Lesbian Gay Bi-sexual Transgender (LGBT) Personnel: A Military Challenge

20

Alessia Zaretti

Introduction

The Armed Forces are a basic institution of a democratic state and society; they play a key role in securing the inalienable rights and freedoms to which we are all entitled as human beings. As members of a democratic state institution, in the exercise of their duties military personnel are bound to respect human rights and international humanitarian law.

In recent years, many states have had to adapt their military structures in order to respond to a fast changing security environment, transforming their armed forces from conscription-based into a fully volunteer professional force. In addition, the involvement in many crisis response operations has also changed the tasks and roles of the military and ensured democratic control over military forces in order to make them consistent with international human rights obligations and international humanitarian law.

But only if their rights are guaranteed within their own organization will military personnel be able to ensure respect for the rights in the accomplishment of their tasks both at home—during crisis and emergency situations or in the barracks—and in overseas operations deployment, such as for peacekeeping operations, crisis

response operations, asymmetric warfare, etc. As "citizens in uniform", military personnel are entitled to the same rights and fundamental freedoms as all other citizens. Indeed, the cornerstone of all international human rights treaties is that all human beings, regardless of their professional situation or position in society, are entitled to their inalienable rights and freedoms.. According to Council of Europe's Recommendation «in the context of the work and service life of members of the armed forces, as well as with respect to access to the armed forces, there should be no discrimination in relation to their human rights and freedoms based on any grounds such as sex, sexual orientation, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status» (CM/Rec 2010, 4, art. 77).

At the same time, necessary limitations on the human rights and fundamental freedoms of armed forces personnel must be taken into account in order not to underestimate the characteristics and constraints of military life as well as the requests of National and international security. Thereby «The principle of non-discrimination will not be violated if the distinction between individuals in analogous situations has an objective and reasonable justification in the pursuit of a legitimate aim, such as maintaining combat effectiveness, and if the means thus employed are reasonably proportionate to the aim pursued» (CM/Rec 2010, 4, art. 77).

A. Zaretti (✉)
CeAS-University "Roma Tre", Rome, Italy
e-mail: lachesi9@hotmail.com

In the difficult balance between rights and freedoms of members of the armed forces as citizens in uniform and the operational needs of an organization which is the only one to demand to put one's own life at risk and to kill as a professional duty, the issue of people of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT[1]) personnel has been emerging in the last few years.

LGBT inclusion in armed forces is deemed as a matter of justice, equality, and human rights: if people are willing to serve their country, they deserve to be recognized for who they are. But the debate about the presence of LGBT people in the armed forces has recently gone beyond its simple recognition as a matter of justice, equality, and human rights to be considered as a strategic opportunity (Polchar et al. 2014) to increase their effectiveness.

In this chapter some aspects connected with LGBT issues in military life will be discussed without neglecting a historical overview which can help better framing the discourse.

Homosexuality in Military Forces. A Historical Perspective

A homosexual orientation in the military personnel is not a novelty of our time; the existence of homosexuals in the military service can be traced back to a number of early civilizations. History offers many examples of the ways in which homosexuality or bisexuality were valued, tolerated or stigmatized in the military, and many famous military leaders are remembered for their homosexual or bisexual orientations.[2] However, beyond the exemplary cases, and being difficult to find unquestionable historical studies,[3] from a sociological point of view it is certainly possible to consider the degree to which homosexuality pervaded or not various military cultures. First of all, we can start by mentioning two extremely significant past military customs connected with a formalized male homosexuality.

In ancient Greece, male homosexuality was regarded as contributing to armed forces morale and combativeness[4]; it was not only considered a matter of routine but also enhanced and emphasized, being believed to contribute significantly both to corroborate the right ethos in battle and to give clarity of purpose and of strategic action in choosing the most appropriate *Kairos*. Emblematic is the case of the so-called Sacred Band of Thebes, which played a crucial role in the battle of Leuctra (371 BC) and was then annihilated by Philip II of Macedon in the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC. The Sacred Band formed the elite force of the Theban army, organized by the Theban commander Gorgida in 378 BC, consisting of three hundred units that were actually a hundred and fifty pairs of male lovers. This force

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[1]In use since the 1990s, the term LGBT (enlargement of the initialism LGB) has become mainstream as a self-designation and has been adopted by the majority of sexuality and gender identity based community centers and media in the United States and some other English-speaking countries. The initialism LGBT is intended to emphasize a diversity of sexuality and gender identity-based cultures. And is sometimes used to refer to anyone who is non-heterosexual or non-cisgender instead of exclusively to people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. Transgender people is a collective term that describes individuals whose sexual identity and/or sexual expression partly or always differs from the norm of the sex that they have been assigned at birth. The term includes transsexuals, intersex persons, transvestites and other gender variant people. Only transsexuals people undergo hormone therapy and surgery (sex-reassignment) in order to change his/her physical sex. LGBT initialism is controversial: some argue that transgender and transsexual causes are not the same as that of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people (LGB) whose issues can be seen as a matter of sexual orientation or attraction while transgender and trans-sexuality have to do with gender identity, or self-understanding of being or not being a man or a woman heedless of sexual orientation.

[2]Historical records propose that Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon were all either homosexual or bisexual (Humphrey 1990); in his relationship with Nicomedes of Bithynia Caesar was believed to have had the passive role.

[3]For example, Burg's (2002) attempts to examine the nature of homosexuality in western military history has been criticized by many.

[4]Some Greek philosophers wrote on the issue of homosexuality in the military. In Plato's *Symposium*, Phaedrus commented on the power of male sexual relationships to improve bravery in the military.

was deliberately created with the aim to enhance the bravery and reliability in battle by virtue of the desire to protect the couple and the partner, be honorable in his eyes, avoiding humiliation and discredit. Plutarch, in the "Life of Pelopidas", advances this argument claiming that a group that has been consolidated with the friendship rooted in love never melts and it is invincible.[5] Plutarch claims furthermore that the origin of the "sacred" appellation of the Band was due to an exchange of sacred vows between lover and beloved at the shrine of Iolaus (one of the lovers of Hercules) at Thebes, thus sanctioning the sanctity of the union.

Despite this reference to the couple's bond, which seems to foreshadow a gay marriage, not always in ancient Greece one can speak of homosexuality in contemporary terms, because, according to Cantarella (1992), for the ancient Greeks the word "homosexual" did not make sense, and the same distinction between heterosexuality and homosexuality was completely foreign to pagan ethics. Masculinity—in opposition to female passivity—was synonymous with activity in every sense: in the intellectual dimension, in the warlike field and in the sexual behaviour.

In the ancient Rome homosexuality was prohibited by law. In any case, the problem was merely the passive part of the relationship (among free citizens, since slaves didn't count), which was regarded as effeminate and thus unwarlike. Such practices are also found in northern Europe: for example the Celtic warrior aristocracy, famous for its ferocity, was known by the Greeks and Romans to have preferred the sexual company of men (Sargent 1999).

Another important notation can be developed starting from this ancient Greek practice; Plutarch's observation leads to recognizing the role of emotions in supporting an institution that prepares and motivates its members to the possibility they may die during operations. In ancient Greece, the homosexual couple was considered to have the capacity of developing these disciplined emotions that are essential to sustain military qualities such as sense of sacrifice, mutual trust and moral solidarity.

A "functional" homosexuality was also present in the military order of the Japanese samurai—archetypes of the noble and brave warrior—to the extent that they borrowed the so-called *wakashūdo* from ancient monastic practices. *Wakashūdo* was not limited to the homosexual relationship between teacher and student, also accounting for the latter a spiritual and military training of excellence, including sexuality. The veteran was permitted, if the young agreed, to take him as his lover until his coming of age; this special relationship, frequently formalized in a "brotherhood contract", was expected to be exclusive, with the sacred promise of both partners to take no other (male) lovers, seeing that sexual activity with women was not barred for either partner.

The older partner would teach the younger one martial skill, the chivalrous behavior of the samurai etiquette and their strict code of honor, later known as *Bushido* (Blomberg 1994), while his desire to be a good example of behavior for his disciple would lead him to behave more honorably himself; the young man, under the wing of a more experienced adult man, was initiated not only to the arts of combat but also to the loyalty and brotherhood, carnal or not. Thus a *shudō* relationship was deemed to produce a mutually ennobling effect. In addition, both partners were expected to be faithful unto death, and to support the other both in feudal obligations and in duties of honor such as duels and revenges.

In the Middle Ages, the Christian Church started its persecution of homosexuality (as the last vestiges of pagan rites) and every formalized homosexual practice disappeared also from the military world. But in everyday life the Church made slow progress in fighting homosexuality which, as it seems, was more ignored than persecuted. Only when the French king Philip IV needed a good pretext for the discharge of the

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[5]Plutarch—in his *Parallel lives. The Life of Pelopidas*—is the source of the most substantial surviving account of the Sacred Band of Thebes.

Knights Templar did sodomy become useful as a reason for persecution.[6]

In the following centuries, the violent punishments sporadically in use were useful more to safeguard appearances, but little changed about the reality of the soldiers' daily life. During a military campaign it was normal for two men to share a straw hut or a tent. Although from the 16th century on there are more reports that mercenaries were burned for sodomy, there are also accounts that in emergency situations, when every man was needed, the death penalty was left out.

Until the 19th century it was furthermore frequent practice that two soldiers slept in one bed when they were billeted in towns and villages. In colonial service, where soldiers lived together for years in small, remote outposts, they developed close ties which without doubt often went beyond mere "companionship". The widespread practice of making each other heirs is surely no proof of homosexuality, but is an additional indication of the closeness of these bonds. Homosexuality was so widespread in the French Foreign Legion[7] that the Arabs talked of "Madame Legion". The main reason for homosexuality among the Foreign Legion was certainly the lack of women; particularly in the isolated outposts and lonely desert forts, young recruits felt easy prey to the veterans, but more established couples were not uncommon in Algeria (Porch 2010).

The historical evidences concern many more cases: for example, homosexuals have been involved in the military actions of the United States even before it was a nation and before there were a formally organized armed force. Shilts (1993) offers one of the most interesting cases of the earliest period of the U.S. military history. In 1778, a weakly organized continental armed force needed leadership and discipline in order to challenge the British units. Baron Fiedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, a captain in the Prussian army, accepted the invitation of Benjamin Franklin to assist in training the Continental Army, also because he run the risk of being involved in a homosexual scandal in his homeland.

Charged with the task of reviewing the troops and offering suggestions for their improvement, Baron von Steuben served as a field commander during the battle at Yorktown and historians have considered him and Washington as the two major makers of the success of the American Revolution. General von Steuben's drill book was the official drilling manual until the War of 1812.

Shilts (1993) also provides accounts of decorated gay navy captains in the early 1800s, gay soldiers fighting during the Civil War and others who served in the cavalry under General Custer. Among these there are officers and soldiers whose homosexuality was well known, but ignored due to their fighter contributions.

During the Great War, Wilfred Edward Salter Owen and Siegfried Loraine Sassoon, two famous English poets and soldiers decorated for bravery—who at the same time were harsh critics of the horror of trenches and gas warfare—were homosexuals. Although throughout their lifetime, and for decades after, homosexual activity between men was a punishable offence in British law,[8] their works show homoerotic elements (Moorcroft Wilson 2014; Stallworthy 1974).

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[6]The Templar's Order—officially endorsed by the Roman Catholic Church around 1129—was among the most wealthy and powerful of the Western Christian military orders. The organization existed for nearly two centuries during the Middle Ages and was a greatest skilled fighting units of the Crusades. Non-combatant members of the Order built fortifications across Europe and the Holy Land and managed a large economic infrastructure throughout Christendom, innovating financial techniques that were an early form of banking. In France, in 1307, many of the Order's members were imprisoned, tortured into giving false confessions, and then burned at the stake. The Pope Clement V, under pressure from Philip V, disbanded the Order in 1312 (Barber 1978, 1994).

[7]The French Foreign Legion, established in 1831, was exclusively created for foreign nationals willing to serve in the French Armed Forces. As its personnel come from different countries with different cultures, the Foreign Legion needs not only military skills but also a strong *esprit de corps* as a way to strengthen them enough to work as a team. So *Legio Patria Nostra* (The Legion is our Fatherland) is the motto of the Foreign Legion.

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[8]UK armed forces banned gay personnel from serving until a European Court of Human Rights ruling in 2000.

Well known is also the homosexuality of some prominent Nazi military officers, although homosexuals were among those persecuted in Nazi Germany. According to Quigley (1966), Hitler was given power by a homosexual group that subverted Germany's free elections by deceitful and violent strategies. Shirer (1960) affirmed that Hitler welcomed murderers, homosexual perverts and drug addicts. Among the many gay leaders in the Nazi party, was the army officer Ernst Julius Röhm, co-founder of the *Sturmabteilung* ("assault battalion"—SA), the Nazi Party militia, and later SA commander. Röhm flaunted his homosexuality in public and asserted that male homosexuality was the foundation of all nation-states. He viewed homosexuality as the basis for a new society and was devote to ultra-masculine, male-supremacist and homosexual ideals (Hancock 1998).

Bérubé in his landmark book, *Coming out under fire: The history of gay men and women in World War Two* (1990), argues that US armed forces began discriminating against homosexuals at the outset of World War Two. Until then, although homosexual men were required to keep their sexual behavior hidden, there was modest attention given to homosexual orientation. All changed during World War Two when psychiatry became involved in the military's personnel screening process. Psychiatry's definition of homosexuality as a mental illness shifted the military's focus from the sexual act to the individual, thus the new screening procedures deemed homosexuality as a personality feature that was unfit for military service.

Men who were suspected or determined to be homosexual were sent back to their recruiting station with documentation explaining why the individual was rejected. When women were allowed to come into the military, they were subject to the screening process as well. However, there were no policies concerning lesbians and criminal law did not address lesbian sexual acts, thus most homosexual women were able to enter the military unnoticed.[9] But at the end of the war, when the need for military personnel decreased, the anti-homosexual policies were enforced, leading to a large number of gay and lesbian—labelled as sexual psychopaths— discharges.

In 1993, the United States Congress passed and President Bill Clinton signed a law instituting the policy commonly referred to as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) which allowed gay, lesbian, and bisexual people to serve as long as they did not reveal their sexual orientation. In December 2010, the Congress passed and President Barack Obama signed the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010" and under its provisions restrictions on service by gay, lesbian, and bisexual personnel ended as of September 20, 2011. Nonetheless, Department of Defense regulations ban openly transgender people from military service, even though this last barrier is starting to crumble.

Sexual Orientation: Military Culture, Civil Rights and Career

The Armed forces represent a specific organizational culture with its own specific purposes[10]: the securitization of the homeland, the use of legitimized violence the management of threats and the conduct of war are still defining the military's core business, and, as a consequence, the mainstream of military culture.

Military organizations are a "greedy institution" (Coser 1974), although various characteristics of the military culture have changed and democratization processes have been present for a long time inside many armed forces. However, one can still notice everywhere the presence of some traditional traits of a transnational military culture, which is mainly institutional, hierarchical and discipline-oriented. Military culture is governed by a moral code of conduct that highly regulates the everyday behaviour of personnel.

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[9]Although women constituted only about 2% of military personnel, in making his book Bérubé interviewed 71

people who served in World War Two, of which 8 were women.

[10]For further discussion on the distinctive features of military culture, see chapter *Military Culture* by J. Soeters, in section IV of this volume.

Non-compliance to orders incurs sanctions or penalties that may appear harsh comparing to civilian standards.

High morality, good order and discipline, loyalty and duty, patriotism, unit cohesion and bravery are the essence of the military values where the warrior is a key figure. The warrior is a hardy, courageous or aggressive person who distinguishes himself or herself in fighting (Hastings 2005). In order to be effective in combat, the armed forces need their members to perceive themselves as fighters and implement this perception through the intention to combat and kill the enemy. In the same way, the conduct of the warrior is also highly regulated by a code providing a moral framework for behaviour (Poole 2001). This code separates the actions of warriors during warfare from the non-legitimated use of violence; warriors do not indiscriminately take life without reason. Soldiers "kill" rather than "murder". Furthermore, they kill for a collective cause rather than personal gain. Hence, warriors approach killing in a highly disciplined and selective manner; so, the term "warrior" conveys moral superiority, also calling to mind the uniqueness of the hero.

For centuries and across different cultures a link between manhood and military has been present. The armed forces "build" men; depicting their men as straight, physically well-built, brave, cis-sexual, military masculinity became the prism through which many scholars understood manhood. In their essay "Military socialization and masculinity" Arkim and Dobrofsky (1978) explained how the military common socialization is full of prototypes and stereotypes of heterosexual masculinity. In modern societies, nationalism resonates with military manhood associated with bravery, courage, independence, duty, and patriotism,[11] simultaneously implying both unity and Otherness. In the armed forces, idealized masculinity holds a hegemonic position over other genders, profoundly pervading most military organizations and institutions.

Military discourses on masculinity frequently employ a typology of action in order to define masculinity.[12] Masculinity is something men do (a performative act), with the physicality of male bodies playing a crucial role in how gender and warrior identities can be understood (Higate 2003). The physical male perfection was a central component in military training, as well as in the military's public perception. Armed forces have always been characterized both by the fact of conveying a message related to power, dominance, strength and by the use of the human body as a representational medium for the warrior identity. Although many of the primary traits of hegemonic masculinity facilitate physical domination—such as physical size and strength, assertiveness, aggressiveness, and skills in warfare—hegemonic masculinity does not include the use of force or violence, though those may be used to attain or maintain it.

However, the soldier's toughness is a signifier for success and victory. The body along with posture and uniforms as its external projections are elements intended to emphasize the sense of superiority and dominance. The exaggerated shoulders of the Japanese *yoroi* armour, the tall Russian ushankas, the African war masks, the belts worn tight at the waist by soldiers to accentuate the V-shape, all this refers to a trans-cultural use of the soldier's body as a living metaphor of an extreme masculinity deviating into machismo.[13]

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[11]The traditional warrior models exclude not only women, but also ethnic minorities from their symbolic representation (for example, Dandeker and Mason 2001).

[12]Masculinity is a gender process—usually associated with the male sex—that shapes gender relations and personal identities. Men are most often held to—and judged by—their culture's current standards of masculinity. Gendered expectations are fixed into social relationships and institutions, and influence the way individuals understand each other and live in society. Social scientists examine the role of masculinity in regulating gendered norms and interactions. Masculinity has been problematized by many scholars in the field of "men's studies", challenging the idea that it has a "core" or an "essence" because it is influenced by the ethnicity, "race", disability, religion, age and class; as such, gender may not always be the primary base of identity (Brod 1987; Brod and Kaufman 1994; Petersen 2003).

[13]The concept of "machismo" typically, but not only, dominates the Latino culture.

If there is one word which is often associated to military institutions, it would be "macho". Nevertheless, the hyper-masculinization and its excessive machismo don't seem to exclusively belong to heterosexuality; they are, on the contrary, borrowed by a part of the homosexual culture to the point that the military macho figure has become an extremely present icon both in the collective gay imagination and in its representations.

One needs only to look at the homoerotic works of Touko Laaksonen, known with the pseudonym of Tom of Finland, who profoundly influenced the gay culture of the XX century for forty years with more than 3500 illustrations. The men depicted by Tom of Finland are the bold emblem of the homosexual pride and of an exaggerated military masculinity as for posture, physical traits and even clothing, the latter including a large selection of uniforms, leather boots and hats.[14]

Military cultures are varied and evolve out of the specific social and historical contexts of domestic and international politics; hegemonic masculinity is a highly idealistic creation and traditionally military masculine norms were challenged particularly by those (women, homosexuals, bisexuals and transgenders) who represent themselves as soldiers in ways outside of the mainstream of the "idyllic" masculinity. For the first time, indeed, a considerable number of armed forces have policies that explicitly permit LGBT individuals to serve and armed forces incorporate the issue of diversity in their human resources management. Yet many other countries have policies in place to exclude LGBT individuals. So, if LGBT people have seen increasing recognition and acceptance of their differences in many armed forces, these transformations are far from universal, and far from complete. As Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters argued, from the end of the 1990s «onward the optimistic metaphor of a diverse 'rainbow' military, reflecting a multicultural 'rainbow' society, has been juxtaposed with a rather more gloomy vision of 'culture wars' being imported into the armed forces» (van der Meulen and Soeters 2007, p. 1).

According to Polchar et al. (2014) armed forces around the world take a variety of approaches to LGBT participation. The main are: (a) inclusion: the military pursues to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of the diversity among personnel. Inclusion values and integrates individual's differences into all functions of organization and into processes of decision making; (b) admission: LGBT individuals are de jure allowed to serve, but their differences are not necessarily recognized, valued, or integrated into the organization; (c) tolerance: LGBT individuals are not formally acknowledged, or may be required to hide their sexual orientation. There may be norms against sexual activity between members of the same sex; (d) exclusion: LGBT individuals are banned from serving; (e) persecution: LGBT individuals are aggressively victimized.

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) has analyzed nineteen LGBT military participation policies related to the five guiding principles listed above and scored them for over 100 countries. The *LGBT Military Index Ranking* shows relatively high levels of inclusion among countries in Europe, the Americas, and Oceania.[15] A number of countries in the Middle East and Africa show the greatest tendency toward exclusion and even persecution of LGBT individuals. The top ten countries are: New Zealand, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Belgium, Israel, France. The United States ranks fortieth, Italy ranks forty-first and Nigeria comes in last (Polchar et al. 2014, p. 58).

Scoring highest for inclusion are New Zealand, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, and Australia. These countries implement policies

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[14]The importance of military uniforms in the gay imagery is witnessed by the fact that gay military associations have more than once asked for permission to walk in gay-pride parades wearing uniforms.

[15]A detailed explanation of LGBT Military Index is provided in "Index Methodology" (Polchar et al. 2014, p. 89). To access the complete LGBT Military Index visit www.lgbtmilitaryindex.com.

and practices of inclusion. For example, the Netherlands' LGBT military support organization was the world's first. Eight of the top ten countries recognize same-sex marriages, the exceptions being Australia and Germany; Israel only recognizes same-sex marriages solemnized abroad. Transgender personnel face differing challenges even in the most inclusive of countries; for example in Belgium a person must undergo surgery resulting in sterilization in order for the military to recognize their identified gender (Polchar et al. 2014).

In recent times, debates have emerged around whether and how armed forces should allow, recognize and include LGBT people. These debates mainly take place in societies which assign great significance to human rights. Attitudes towards LGBT people are changing, particularly in liberal democracies and this change suggests it is becoming rarer for people to feel disconcerted by the presence of acknowledged LGBT colleagues (Pew Research Center 2013).

Recognition and acceptance of the differences of LGBT people is increasingly seen as a moral obligation by supporters of equality, civil rights, and human rights. Armed forces interact with the values of the societies they serve. Civil movements are on the rise, including minorities claiming their collective identity. The so called "power of identity" (Castells 1997) does not exclude the armed forces; LGBT people want to exert their rights to enter any position in the military. They join the military to take advantage of the same opportunities offered to heterosexuals: education benefits, social mobility, career, medical care, family support, ect. They want to have a fair chance to achieve the higher ranks as well as position in units of élite and in technologically specialized branches.

In defence of LGBT military personnel and their families several specific associations and organizations have been created, along with those dealing with general protection of LGBT people and advocating for human rights and equality in armed forces. An example is the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), an international organization, with its headquarters in Geneva,

bringing together more than 750 LGBT and intersex from around the world. It is active in campaigning for LGBT and intersex rights on the international human rights and civil rights arena, and it regularly sends petitions to the United Nations and governments. ILGA is represented in more than 110 countries across the world, is accredited by the United Nations and has been granted NGO ECOSOC consultative status.

Many armed forces around the world believe they can benefit from faithfully reflecting the composition of their own country's social fabric. Recently a change in US Defense Department (DOD) policy concerning transgender troops has taken place. On August 5, 2014, DOD eliminated a regulation designating "sexual and gender identity disorders" as grounds for administrative discharge. Therefore, while Army, Navy and Air Force regulations continue to require the discharge of transgender personnel, the removal of the DOD-wide ban means that service branches are no longer required to designate transgender identity as grounds for discharge, and could opt to allow transgender personnel who are already serving to remain in service.

Moreover, the condition of LGBT people in armed forces is increasingly recognized as more than just a human rights issue; the recruitment and retention of skilled personnel based on talent rather than on gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity is a very important strategic decision for military organizations. Many countries include LGBT communities as part of their recruitment strategy being persuaded that LGBT peoples may have professional skills required by the military organization.

Gender Prejudice, Cohesion and Combat Effectiveness

It is evident that gay, bisexual, lesbian and transgender (LGBT) people have a history of serving in the armed forces (Herek 1993), despite many military policies and practices that have barred these individuals from serving openly. A recent Report of the Williams Institute estimates that approximately 15,500 transgender

individuals are serving on active duty or in the US Guard or Reserve forces and that there are also an estimated 134,300 transgender individuals who are veterans or are retired from Guard or Reserve service (Gates and Herman 2014).[16] Presumably, similar situations can be found in many other armed forces.

Yet, a series of long-standing prejudices led people to think that homosexual and transgender individuals were incompatible with the military service because of their sexual orientation interfering on the critical factors to combat effectiveness, including bravery, unit morale and cohesion. It was believed that the presence in the armed forces of people who engaged in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrated a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct or showed signs of gender dysphoria[17] could have had a deleterious impact on units and hinder the accomplishment of the military mission, affecting the ability of the armed forces to maintain discipline, good order, cohesion and morale.

Consequently, policies allowing and acknowledging LGBT service are claimed to have a number of negative implications. These claims relate indeed to the suitability of LGBT people to serve in a military organization, the effects of their presence on the effectiveness (the ability of the armed forces to achieve their objectives) and the interaction between military and societal values. The rationale for LBGT exclusion is that the armed forces must maintain personnel policies that don't include people whose presence would create an unacceptable risk to the armed forces' high standards of morale and duty, good order and discipline, loyalty and cohesion, which are the essence of military capability. Three main issues of concern arise: the capabilities of LGBT personnel, particularly as for operative roles, the alleged higher incidence of HIV infection and related diseases among homosexual or transgender individuals[18] and their mental health.

Regarding the first issue, prejudices against military capabilities of LGBT personnel are based on the association of military environments with dominance, aggression, physical strength, and risking one's life. As we previously saw, these characteristics have been traditionally viewed as mainly heterosexual masculine attributes. If they are required of all service members, and if only heterosexual males possess them, then LGBT individuals are not qualified to serve. But no scientific evidence has been produced to suggest that homosexual, bisexual, and transgender individuals are necessarily less capable of providing the skills and attributes that military profession requires (Herek 1993). In addition, the skills and characteristics required from contemporary armed forces are wide and diverse. Best-qualified personnel (computer engineers, weapons experts, language specialists, pilots or medical professionals) might also be LGBT person.

A number of studies investigating the effects of acknowledging LGBT service on the combat effectiveness have showed they are not necessarily negative. According to a survey among

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[16]The primary data source for the estimates of transgender military service is the National Transgender Discrimination Survey (NTDS), which was conducted by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force and the National Center for Transgender Equality (Grant et al. 2011).

[17]According to American Psychiatric Association (2013) the gender dysphoria is the experience of an enduring and profound conviction that the sex assigned at birth does not match the self-identified gender. Elders et al. (2015 p. 203) report that «in the newest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5), a comprehensive classification of psychological conditions and mental disorders that reflects the most up-to-date medical understandings, gender identity disorder has been replaced with gender dysphoria, a diagnostic term that refers to an incongruence between a person's gender identity and the physical gender that they were assigned at birth, and to clinically significant distress that may follow from that incongruence. While gender identity disorder was pathologized as an all-encompassing mental illness, gender dysphoria is understood as a condition that is amenable to treatment».

[18]In their study, Elders et al. (2015) analyzing US Defense Department regulations and considering a wide range of medical data, conclude that there is no compelling medical reason for the ban on service by transgender personnel, that the ban is an unnecessary barrier to health care access for transgender personnel, and that medical care for transgender individuals should be managed using the same standards that apply to all others.

Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans (Moradi and Miller 2009), the most important argument against the ban was that sexual orientation is unrelated to job performance and that the main argument in favour of the ban was the possibility of a negative impact on unit cohesion and readiness.[19] However, the authors indicated that the analysis of these war veterans' ratings of unit cohesion and readiness revealed that knowing a gay or lesbian unit member was not uniquely associated with cohesion or readiness; instead, the military values, the quality of leaders, of equipment and training are more critical factors to unit cohesion, readiness and performance than the sexual orientation.

Other studies have examined whether the presence of known LGBT personnel may affect unit cohesion, which is one of the most important characteristics of armed forces. Some have claimed that the differences of LGBT people may undermine trust among colleagues, but not empirical evidence was found. In a study of the Israeli armed forces, the knowledge of gay peers was not found to lead to a decrease in cohesion (Kaplan and Rosenmann 2012).

According to some (for example Polchar et al. 2014) the lack of a link between LGB service and unit cohesion can be explained through a better understanding of the meaning of the military unit cohesion. According to De Angelis and Segal (2012) a difference must be made between social cohesion and task cohesion. Social cohesion refers to interpersonal and emotional bonds within a group. Task cohesion refers to a commitment toward a commonly defined goal through coordinated efforts of the group members. The literature indicates that military unit cohesion is task oriented rather than socially focused, thus the members are committed to achieving a shared goal, not concerned with liking each other (Segal and Kestnbaum 2002).

Therefore, in highly professionalized armed forces, competencies and abilities represent the main criterion for judgement; and on the battlefield, as some striking cases have showed, other characteristics are much more relevant than sexual orientation.[20] The fighter contributions of LGBT personnel are well known and they confute that LGBT personnel were unfit for military service.

The second issue is much more complex; armed forces are concerned about the risk of HIV transmission among personnel, given that men who have sex with other men are more likely to be infected with HIV; in addition, in the military life exposures to infected bodily fluids (the cause of HIV transmission) are more likely, for example through open wounds sustained in combat. Not less importantly, HIV infection needs an intensive drug regimen.

Lastly, the view of homosexuality as a mental illness was supported by the American Psychological Association until 1975,[21] by the World Health Organization until 1990, and by the Chinese government until 2001. In the past, many countries have considered homosexuality, bisexuality and transgender status as pathological conditions. Still today, some states consider

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[19]On the link between social cohesion and motivation in combat see MacCoun et al. (2005).

[20]Kristin Beck (born Christopher Beck), former United States Navy SEAL, gained public attention in 2013 when she came out as a trans woman. She published her memoir in June 2013, *Warrior Princess: A U.S. Navy SEAL's Journey to Coming out Transgender* detailing her experiences. Beck served for twenty years in the U.S. Navy SEALs before her transition and took part in seven combat deployments. Beck was a member of a special counter-terrorism unit and received multiple military awards and decorations, including a *Bronze Star with Combat Distinguishing Device* and a *Purple Heart*. A similarly high decorated soldier (*Star with Combat Distinguishing Device* and a *Purple Heart*) was Leonard Matlovich, a Wietnam war veteran. Despite his twelve years of exemplary service, despite his amazing performance ratings, despite his military medal and decoration and his shrapnel wounds, the Air Force demanded his discharge. Matlovich was the first gay service member to purposely out himself to the military to fight their ban on gays and a famous gay men in America in the 1970s. His photograph appeared on the cover of the September 8, 1975, issue of *Time* magazine, making him a symbol for gay and lesbian service members.

[21]In the Unites States the psychiatry's determination of homosexuality as a mental illness shifted the military's focus from the sexual act to the individual, thus during many years the screening procedures deemed homosexuality as a personality type that was unfit for military service (Bérubé 1990).

people who are homosexual, bisexual, or transgender mentally ill and therefore unfit to serve. Gulf states organize clinical screenings to "detect" homosexuals (Saul 2013) and Turkey excludes from the armed forces those proved to be homosexual; mental illness is cited as the reason (Azizlerli 2012).

Nevertheless, things have changed over the years and for the first time, as seen before, a considerable number of armed forces have policies which explicitly permit LGBT individuals to serve; the first one was the Netherlands, in 1974. Other countries allow open transgender military service to some extent. These countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.[22] Transgender service members and these nations' militaries as a whole are operating effectively and efficiently, further proving that gender non-conformity is not a barrier to performing one's duties.

If LGBT people have seen growing recognition and acceptance of their sexual orientation and gender identity, these achievements are far from universal and far from complete. Several hybrid situations are still in place. In the United States, despite the repeal of DADT on September 20, 2011 and the elimination by the Department of Defense (August 5, 2014) of the regulation designating "sexual and gender identity disorders" as basis for administrative discharge,[23] full military inclusion for transgender service members doesn't exist yet. The Pentagon's new announcement (July 13, 2015) of a plan to lift the ban on transgender people serving in the military would allow for a six-month window to assess the impact of mainstreaming trans people in the military.[24]

The Persistence of Discrimination and Sexual Trauma

Nevertheless a variety of obstacles hinder the attainment of real equality for homosexual and bisexual personnel. Another important issue is discrimination in policies supporting families[25]; as an example, in the United States the same-sex spouses of gay and lesbian service members are not treated on a par with the different-sex spouses of military service members because of restrictions imposed by Section three of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and certain federal statutes containing definitions of marriage that exclude same-sex couples. Same-sex partners are denied death benefits, identification cards, base access, participation to repatriation ceremonies, and other entitlements.[26]

Many other countries have policies in place to exclude LGBT individuals, but, even where there

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[22]After many years of the British Army admitting transsexuals, in January 2015, official news arrived that captain Hannah Winterbourne underwent a sex-change (male-to-female) operation. Captain Winterbourne continues serving the British Army and has no intention to be discharged. The novelty is that until that date only soldiers or petty officers had openly reported about their experience.

[23]Until then transgender personnel remained unable to serve openly and continued to be barred from service by military medical policies (Kerrigan 2012; Harrison-Quintana and Herman 2013). These medical policies set up exclusions for what are deemed to be "psychosexual disorders," counting trans-sexualism, cross-dressing or a history of gender transition (Witten 2007). Transgender people who desired to join the US

armed forces were prohibited from doing so if their transgender status was known.

[24]see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/13/transgender-in-military_n_7787060.html.

[25]When discussing military regulations, very often the family is overlooked or forgotten about, but it is important to remember that many homosexual and transgender troops are married and/or have children. On military family see chapter *Military Families: A Comparative Perspective*, by Karin Modesto De Angelis, David G. Smith and Mady W. Segal, in section IV of this volume.

[26]In the last years, the situation has been slowly changing; the Department of Defense's extension of certain military "additional benefits" to same-sex spouses—which are not explicitly prohibited under the Defense of Marriage Act—was announced in addition to "member-designated benefits" which were already available to same-sex spouses. In June 2013, the Pentagon announced plans to begin issuing identification cards to the same-sex partners of service members, which will allow them to access education, survivor, commissary, travel, counselling and transportation benefits, but not health care and housing allowances.

are no explicit bans, LGBT personnel may choose to lie about their sexual orientation or gender identity due to a sense of stigma. Social and psychological consequences can stem from hiding something which is stigmatized (Pachankis 2007; Smart and Wegner 1999). Prejudices and discrimination against LGBT individuals is deemed to be a cause of stress contributing to anxiety and depression and can undermine the unit cohesion. Secrets about sexual orientation and gender identity have enabled blackmail to take place in armed forces; service members are at risk of blackmail if they hold secrets that can be exploited to extort classified information or to coerce them to otherwise break military rules. Coming out can have positive consequences for LGBT personnel's mental health, performance, and morale. These benefits can extend to the armed forces by creating more sincere professional relationships, and by reducing the vulnerability of LGBT personnel to blackmail.

Despite changes in culture and policies, the LGBT personnel often have to tackle an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment and to be exposed to harassment, violence and assault within the military; LGBT-phobia is used as a generic concept referring to hatred and incidents targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex people. LGBT-phobic incidents include all acts motivated by hatred towards individuals or groups because of their real or perceived sexual orientation.[27] The violence can take a multitude of forms including physical, sexual or psychological violence, attacks towards individuals or groups or their belongings. The threat of violence can also be reported, especially when it is repetitive and creates fear in the victim.

Today, in the United States, besides post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which is caused by field operations,[28] the existence of a form of stress caused by repetitive sexual abuses and psychological violence (Street 2014), both against cis-sexual and homosexual individuals, has been recognized and assigned the term "military sexual trauma" (MST). A specific rehab centre has been created in Palm Spring to the purpose. Military sexual trauma is a definition for sexual assault or repeated, threatening sexual harassment occurring during military service.

The analysis suggests that systematic workplace aggressions (physical assault of a sexual nature, battery of a sexual nature, or sexual harassment) are associated with a culture with high power orientation and adherence to traditional (heterosexual masculine) military norms (Koeszegi1 et al. 2014). Sexual harassment and assault are sometimes thought of as women's issues and rates of sexual harassment and assault in the military are indeed higher among women. However, smaller rates for men nonetheless result in a significant absolute number of victimized men or LGBT individuals. In addition, there are ways in which experiences of sexual trauma may be particularly difficult for male and for LGBT survivors. The latter have indeed to add this further form of violence to the stress linked to prejudices and discrimination of different nature, besides to an unfriendly or offensive working environment.

To conclude, armed forces are changing; while, in many parts of the world the social recognition of LGBT people has changed considerably, LGBT inclusion in the military has increased rapidly, with many countries removing bans on LGBT service in recent decades. As diversity (including the presence of LGBT service members) becomes increasingly the norm, it should be viewed as a strategic asset to be managed in order to convey maximum benefits for the military.

To acknowledge this socio cultural change is to focus on maximizing the synergy between LGBT participation and military functioning.

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[27]Homophobic incidents include all acts motivated by hatred towards individuals or groups because of their real or perceived sexual orientation. The violence can take a multitude of forms including physical, sexual or psychological violence, attacks towards individuals or groups or their belongings. The threat of violence can also be reported, especially when it is repetitive and creates fear in the victim.

[28]For an analysis of stress and trauma, see chapter *Anxiety and Stress in the New Missions*, by Henning Soerensen and Claus Kold, in section VI of this volume.

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Author Biography

Alessia Zaretti is a researcher at Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence "Altiero Spinelli" (University "Roma Tre").

She has participated at national and international research projects and taught sociology and sociology of cultural processes at various Universities (La Sapienza, Roma; Tuscia, Viterbo; Università degli Studi Internazionali, Roma; Università Link Campus, Malta), in specialised Course at Italian Police High School and at many Italian Military Schools. One of her major areas of expertise is the study and training courses on crisis management, crisis and emergency risk communication, cultural trauma, cultural awareness and gender studies. As an expert on gender questions she has done consultancy activities for the Italian Army General Staff.

Among her latest publications are: Politiche di asilo e trauma in una prospettiva europea 2014, La cultura del trauma. Nascita ed evoluzione, 2013.

Restructured Armed Forces

21

Philippe Manigart

Introduction

Because military organizations are open-ended systems (i.e. they are in constant interdependence and exchanges with their environment), it follows that different types of military organizations correspond to different types of society (Feld 1977).

In advanced industrial societies, the end of the Cold War, technological change, economic and social-cultural evolution have brought about the end of the mass army. First with the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union itself and secondly (and more importantly) as a result of 9/11, the Western armies' missions have also changed. They are no longer to deter a known enemy, as during the Cold War, and even less to fight conventional wars on the European heartland, as during the mass armed forces era, but rather, with other actors, to respond to very diverse and complex crises all over the world. In the context of these new engagement scenarios, political and military logic calls for quick reaction capability of what Janowitz (1971) called "constabulary forces". These kinds of forces are smaller and more professional.

The aim of this chapter is to describe this restructuring process from a comparative per-spective, using examples when appropriate, and to show how these recent developments in the environment of military organizations of advanced industrial societies have influenced, and will continue to influence, their organizational structure. In order to survive and remain pertinent and efficient, military organizations, like their civilian counterparts, had to develop new, more decentralized structural forms, with more open boundaries and flatter hierarchies. The old big, centrally coordinated and routinized bureaucratic structures, well adapted to their stable milieu, have been gradually replaced by new, smaller and flexible organizations, better adapted to the new, uncertain and fluid environment of the 21st century.

But before analyzing the various general dimensions of the restructuring process of Western military forces, let us briefly[1] look at its macro social causes.

Causes of the Restructuring of Advanced Industrial Societies Armed Forces

Among the variables that influence military organizational structure, five are especially important. Four are exogenous variables (the level of economic development, the existing technology, the social-cultural environment, and the geopolitical context in which the organization

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[1]Other chapters in this Handbook indeed analyze these variables in more details.

P. Manigart (✉)
Royal Military Academy, Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: philippe.manigart@mil.be

Fig. 21.1 Main factors influencing military organizational structure

functions) and one is an intermediary variable (the mission of the organization). These five variables taken together act as selection pressures, or structural constraints, pushing armed forces of advanced industrial societies to adapt their organizational structure in order to remain efficient,[2] as shown in Fig. 21.1.

The Environment

The restructuring of military organizations that began after World War II has been characterized by a decline of the mass army model (Harries-Jenkins 1973; Janowitz 1971; Van Doorn 1975). In fact, with the decline of the mass armed force, one sees a transformation similar to the one that affected complex civilian organizations in the industrialized world, i.e. the transition from labor- to capital-intensive organizations. A model based on universal conscription in peacetime and national mobilization in wartime has been progressively displaced by a new form of organization, the postmodern military organization.

The Economic Environment

Western economies are experiencing what some (Dicken 1986; Giddens 1992; Kennedy 1993) call the third industrial revolution (information technology). The rhythm of technological innovations is ever more rapid and product life cycles ever shorter. At the same time, the economy has become global. The old national markets disappeared and were replaced by a global market dominated by transnational organizations.

According to Schuler and Jackson (1996: 63), a transnational organization is structured in such a way that national boundaries disappear. The transnational organization operates in several countries and does not recruit its personnel using national criteria. It functions in a global manner and production is entirely integrated at the global level. The difference between a transnational and a multinational organization comes from the fact that a multinational firm is an organization that has operations in more than one country and whose major business decisions are made at the headquarters, while a transnational structure refers to an organization that also has operations in more than one country but whose major business decisions are made throughout the world. This structure often results from the growth of companies and the nature of business. So IBM, Ford, and so on were multinational corporations (MNC) in the 1960s–1970s. Now they are true transnational organizations.

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[2]Or, from a less pro-active view of organizational change, these selection pressures can be seen as more or less rapidly eliminating organizational forms that are no longer adapted to their environment. For a more detailed discussion of this approach of change in populations of organizations, see Hannan and Freeman (1989).

Table 21.1 Defense expenditures as a % of GDP in 10 NATO countries

Country	1989	2013
Belgium	2.7	1.0
Denmark	2.1	1.4
France	3.7	1.9
Germany	2.9	1.3
Greece	3.9	2.3
Italy	2.5	1.2
Luxemburg	1.2	0.4
Netherlands	2.9	1.3
Portugal	3.0	1.5
Spain	2.1	0.9
United Kingdom	4.2	2.4

Source http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20140224_140224-PR2014-028-Defence-exp.pdf, accessed July 9, 2014

This means that the world has become a lot more interdependent and that economic or political instability in one part of the world can have consequences for our economies. The United States and Europe have consequently a vested interest in contributing to maintain or restore order in places where instability is present.

As a consequence, the military field has also become more global. Indeed, not only have defense industries, as other industries, undergone a radical restructuring process and have become transnational corporations (Serfati 2000a, b), but Western military organizations are operating also all over the world, in culturally, ethnically, and linguistically very diverse regions. Furthermore, these operations are conducted most of the time in a multinational framework. The accent is indeed put on co-operation much more than before. In the future, as will be explained under "Integration of European Armed Forces", one can even envisage the possibility of truly transnational organizations under the control of some regional or international organization, such as the European Union or (although more far-fetched) the UN In other words, it is likely that one will see the same evolution as in the private sector, i.e. the proliferation of joint ventures, strategic alliances, etc.

Concurrently with the growing pace of globalization and partly linked to this trend, most European nations have been confronted with more or less huge budget deficits. The European integration process (single market, enlargement, the advent of the European Monetary Union), public demands for less taxation and the concomitant rise of populist anti-tax political groups and parties have forced European Union member states to drastically reduce government spending and lower taxes (Kriesi et al. 2006). In such circumstances, the temptation has been great to cut defense spending. As weapons systems and other military hardware are more and more costly to acquire, the easiest ways to reduce the budget is to pool resources (equipment, training, headquarters, etc.), downsize the military, and abandon conscription. The end of the Cold War greatly facilitated this trend. Table 21.1 shows the evolution of defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP between 1989 and 2013 in 10 NATO advanced industrial countries which are also EU member-states.[3]

[3]Former East bloc European countries which are now NATO and EU member states are not included in this and the following tables to the extent that most of them are not yet advanced industrial societies. Furthermore, no data were available for 1989.

The Technological Environment

The armed forces of the 21st century are organizations using very complex technologies (weapons systems, etc.). In fact, at the close of the 20th century, the sheer critical mass of technological novelties, as part of the "third industrial wave" based on the generation, gathering, processing and dissemination of information, had allowed some observers (Snow 1991; Toffler and Toffler 1993) to speak of a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), i.e. a revolution combining precision-strike weapons technology with real-time information and communications (Cohen 2004: 395). Though designed to be user-friendly and easy to operate by non-specialists, these new high-tech. weapons also generated new layers of complexity for those in charge of logistics, doctrine, co-ordination, command and control. They entailed higher development, production and maintenance costs, as well as a greater need for educational sophistication and training among (at least) commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

This has two consequences: On the one hand, as in the industrial and service sectors, one needs more and more highly trained personnel, with a higher educational level. The least specialized functions tend to disappear; they are either automated or outsourced. On the other hand, the training of these specialists is long and costly. In order to make this training cost effective, personnel must remain in place for a minimum period of time. At the same time, if the so-called «revolution in military affairs» leads to more precision ("*smart weapons*") and mobility, it also entails a sharp downsizing of the organization in order to finance these new technologies. From all these developments follows the fact that, in all Western military organizations, the role of draftees has been progressively marginalized, to the point that in almost all Western advanced industrial countries, the draft has been ended or suspended.

The new information technologies also redefine traditional authority structures. Because information is now directly accessible, those at the top can short-circuit the intermediary levels of the hierarchy and have direct access to leaders in the field. The consequence is *delayering*, as one does not need as many hierarchical levels as before to control people (see "Downsizing"). The result is thus flatter hierarchical structures and more use of teamwork.

King (2009: 659) offers an illustration of this contraction of command resulting from increased access to information in the British armed forces.

> *Following the 9/11 attacks, the SAS deployed to Afghanistan almost immediately to play a role in OEF (…). As part of the initial phases of this operation in November 2001, an SAS squadron was deployed to assault a cave complex near Kandahar, where Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters were taking refuge. Having identified enemy fighters in the caves, the SAS assaulted the complex, using small arms and hand grenades. (…) The assault squadron (Alpha 11), led by a sergeant, relayed its situation back to Zero Alpha, the Special Forces operational control room located in Britain, via satellite communications. Zero Alpha, in turn, reported to PJHQ and Geoff Hoon, the defense secretary. It is important to recognize the extraordinary contraction of command here. In contrast to the cold war, where the tactical level was divided from the strategic by multiple layers and there was no possibility of a sergeant having any access or even relevance to the strategic commanders, there were only two layers of command between a sergeant with a squadron of forty men in Afghanistan and ministerial level in London.*

Another consequence of the "revolution in military affairs", and more particularly of the increasing use of drones, is that the distinction "warriors"—"not warriors", once very clear, fades, as well as the differences between services.

These new technological developments lead also to intriguing paradoxes (Boëne 2003:170). The first of these paradoxes is known as "structural disarmament". As budgets (downsized or not) cannot possibly catch up with spiraling investment costs, with each new generation of weapons, the numbers bought to equip the

services are lower. There is more, however: military managers are often reluctant to use, and risk the loss of, these scarcer, more expensive weapons systems when the gain at stake is much lower than the possible loss (as was the case in the Kosovo war in 1999 with the Pentagon's refusal to use Apaches helicopters),[4] thus to some extent inhibiting the use of armed force. But this paradoxical mechanism also affects highly trained human resources. For example, Boëne (2003: 171) cites the case of some French battalion commanders who, when the call came for junior officers to reinforce Army units' cadre assets in the Saudi desert, as part of the French contribution to the Gulf War, were reported to have spontaneously refrained from designating their Saint-Cyr graduates (supposedly the best the officer corps has to offer), on the grounds that their very expensive training made them too precious to be wasted in a side-show. This also partly explains the increasing use of drones and of proxies (such as local militias or private military companies) (see "Reserve Forces, Civilianization, and Outsourcing") in several areas of conflicts, such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, etc.

The second paradox is that, if these costly weapons and human assets may be very good at deterring, punishing, and compelling, they may not lend themselves to effective employment in asymmetrical conflicts, such as the fight against international terrorist networks (as the Al Qaeda network, ISIS in Syria and Iraq, al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, etc.), or interventions in failed states, that have become the typical types of conflicts in which Western armed forces are currently involved. Some authors have even spoken of a "counterrevolution in military affairs". For instance, in his book on the Iraq war, Ricks (2009: 163) quotes Kilcullen as saying that what was going on in Iraq in 2007 was "a counterrevolution in military affairs led to a certain extent by David Petraeus".

The Social-Cultural Environment

At the social-cultural level, individualism and hedonism become dominant. The nature of work is changing too: the notion of a job for life disappears. Postmaterialist values are growing (Inglehart 1990). There is also a greater cultural diversity, the essence of postmodernism (Inglehart 1997; Lyons 1999). According to Maffesoli (1996), this is the time of the tribes (and of segmentation in marketing). Under the impact of the globalization process and of the increasingly transnational nature of cultural, economic and military organizations, the national sentiment is fading even more than in the previous period. One of the consequences of these cultural shifts is that the search for one's personal interests comes before everything else and that the feeling of belonging to a larger community tends to fade away, to disappear. Indicators of this trend are, among others: (1) individual rights are stressed and duties towards others and the nation are downplayed; (2) traditional values tend to disappear (work ethic, religious values, etc.) (Stoetzel 1983); (3) civic consciousness also tends to disappear; (4) as a consequence of the rise of postmaterialist values, people's expectations of work have changed. Soldiers are no longer motivated by patriotism. They are much more interested in their working conditions than before (Moskos 1977; Moskos and Wood 1988); and (5) there is a decline of trust in institutions in general, and in military institutions in particular (Page and Shapiro 1992; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995), although concerning these last institutions the situation is more complex. In the last few years indeed, there has been a trend reversal in the public confidence towards the military, at least as far as the European Union is concerned.

Some authors (Boëne and Dandeker 2000; Manigart and Marlier 1996; Van der Meulen 2000) explain this trend reversal by the reorientation of post-modern armies' missions towards peacekeeping and humanitarian aid: peacekeeping operations, most often implemented to guarantee stability and help populations in distress, are regarded by public opinion as noble

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[4]Source: *Washington Post*, December 1999, "Army's Apache Helicopter Rendered Impotent in Kosovo" (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-12/29/014r-122999-idx.html, accessed July 10, 2014).

Table 21.2 Confidence in the military in selected EU countries, 1981–2010

Country	1981	1990	1997	2000	2010
Belgium	43	33	33	67	67
Denmark	40	46	74	82	76
Germany	53	40	60	66	70
Greece	–	–	85	87	67
Spain	63	42	56	65	67
France	55	56	54	68	71
Ireland	76	61	83	85	71
Italy	56	48	55	67	65
Luxembourg	–	–	61	74	61
Netherlands	43	32	53	74	71
Austria	–	–	59	49	72
Portugal	–	47	58	78	61
Finland	71	–	88	91	91
Sweden	61	49	64	72	63
United Kingdom	82	81	74	83	85
European Union	–	–	61	71	70

Sources 1981 and 1990: European Values Survey 1981 and 1990 in Listhaug and Wiberg (1995: 304–5); 1997–2010: Eurobarometer 48, 54.1 and 74
Note Germany: 1981 and 1990 = West Germany; 1997 and 2000 = new and old *Länder*
1981 and 1990: % "a great deal" and "quite a lot"; 1997 and 2000: % "rather confident"; 2010: "tend to trust"

causes, even though over the long term, this type of operation may become more difficult to justify, particularly if it involves casualties ("zero-deaths wars") (Luttwak 1994, 1995) and/or has a less than clearly defined mandate.

Table 21.2 illustrates quite well this trend reversal. It presents the evolution of the confidence in the military in selected European Union countries between 1981 and 2010.[5] If it is indeed true that confidence in the military in the 1980s and early 1990s, i.e. during the late Cold War, was rather low in every countries, except in the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent in Ireland, it bounced back in the late 1990s almost everywhere.

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[5]The countries figuring in Table 21.1 are the former EU 15 countries, the only ones for which long trend data are available. The item "trust in the army" was last asked in the November 2010 Eurobarometer.

The Geopolitical Environment

On the international scene, the new geostrategic environment that emerged at the end of the Cold War can be characterized, on the one hand, as one of greater complexity and uncertainty compared to the certainties of the bipolar world of the previous decades (Freedman 1991). One has gone from a war environment dominated by a binary logic "friend/foe" to an environment of crisis response operations based on a fuzzy logic "friend/foe/non-foe" (Battistelli et al. 1999: 1).

During the whole Cold War period, the envisaged Central European confrontation, with her known adversary, made an extremely precise operational planning possible. But with the disappearance of the East-West conflict, uncertainty has become the rule: uncertainty concerning the potential theaters of operations, the modus operandi of the adversary, the rules of engagement, the missions, and above all the threats.

There are no longer any clearly identifiable threats, but rather a multitude of risks and dangers.[6] This leads some authors to refer our post-modern societies as "risk societies" (Beck 1992; Giddens 1992; Shaw 2000) and to say that we live in an era of "risk complexity" (Dandeker 1999). The new confused, uncertain, and complex landscapes in which postmodern armed forces are called to operate (think of the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and even more in Syria) prevent any a priori forecast and lead to favor new skills such as adaptability, flexibility, decentralization, and initiative.

But perhaps more important than the changing objective risk and threat situation is the subjective dimension: the perception of these risks and threats by Western publics has quite radically evolved since the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the West has lost its privileged enemy. Risk has become diffuse, and therefore less visible. On the other hand, crisis response operations (or «operations other than war» to use a term popular in the early nineties), given their nature, are less spectacular than a conventional war. The consequence is that, all other things being equal, armed forces become also less visible, less central among the public. This led Moskos and Burk (1994) to speak of apathy and/or skepticism. In this context of apathy, the impact of media on the conduct of operations becomes paradoxically greater.

The other dimension of the changing geopolitical landscape is that the disappearance of the Soviet threat has caused an acceleration of the trend towards *downsizing*[7] and what Janowitz (1971) called a *force-in-being*, i.e. smaller, more

professional forces. It has also, and perhaps above all, caused a modification of the role of these forces (from deterrence towards constabulary).

Missions

The mass armed forces' mission was to prepare and to conduct total wars[8] for their respective nation-states. The military was therefore an instrument for state nationalism. The expected threat was an enemy land invasion, such as Belgium's invasion by German troops in 1914 and 1940. With the advent of the Cold War and nuclear weapons, the concept of deterrence replaced that of total war. The goal was to deter a nuclear war between the two superpowers. In the new international environment that has emerged at the end of the Cold War, the missions have become much more diverse and fuzzy. Certainly, a conventional war has not become totally impossible or unimaginable; territorial defense even remains the ultimate justification of national armed forces. But, in the short and middle term, it is not the most likely scenario. For one thing, according to Van Creveld (1991), traditional inter-state wars have been supplanted by intra-state wars that cut across state boundaries. Ethnic/religious/sectarian identity-based conflicts (such as in Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Congo, Central African Republic, etc.), terrorist threats (such as the one posed by Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network or terror organizations and states in the Middle East), but also those posed by the new mafias (such in the Balkans or Russia), have become the typical examples of postmodern conflicts, conflicts for which traditional military organizations are not always the most appropriate and certainly not the only one actor.[9] For another, the defense of basic democratic values and human rights is

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[6]A distinction should be made among risks, threats, and dangers. Dandeker (2000: 108) defines risk as `capacities that have the potential to cause harm to one's security. Threats arise when such capacities become conjoined with an intention to cause harm.' By dangers, he refers to `those capacities that have a high probability of causing harm but without anyone's hostile intentions through, either, the negligence of identifiable actors, or the unintended consequences of social action'.

[7]Downsizing is naturally not a specific military process. It also impacts on the whole civilian sector and is a consequence of a global economy.

[8]By total war is meant the mobilization of the whole nation, of all its activity sectors (military, but also and mainly industrial) for the war efforts (Janowitz 1971: xi).

[9]Kaldor (1999: 1–9) calls these new types of conflicts the "new wars" as distinguished from the "old wars" (between states).

increasingly an aspect of "security" as we conceive of it. In short, the main mission (in term of frequency at least) of postmodern military organizations are rather to counter this type of new subnational threats and to maintain and restore order in regions where our interests are in jeopardy and/or for humanitarian reasons. Concretely, these new, constabulary missions range from conventional warfighting, to maintaining or enforcing peace in unstable regions of the world, to fighting international terrorism and other threats, to carrying out humanitarian missions. In other words, postmodern armed forces have become organizations specialized in crisis management in a broader sense). In order to carry out these new missions, large conscript armies are no longer adapted. There is a need for smaller, but more flexible and highly capable professional rapid reaction forces, what King (2011) calls "empowered brigades". Draftees do not have a place in such restructured forces.

Characteristics of the Restructuring Process

In this central section, we analyze seven main dimensions, at least in the author's judgment, of the restructuring process that have impacted, to a greater or lesser extent, all the military organizations of advanced industrial societies. These seven dimensions reviewed here are: downsizing, professionalization, increased use of reservists, civilians and outsourcing, inter-service integration, multinationalisation of formerly national military structures, and cultural diversity.

Downsizing

The end of the Cold War brought a significant reduction of military expenditures, arsenals, production of armaments and armed forces personnel. But apart from this specific military cause, the downsizing of armed forces was also the consequence of the same process as the downsizing of business firms, namely technological evolution. Because they have become very capital-intensive organizations, armed forces from advanced industrial societies need fewer personnel and are therefore much smaller than the labor-intensive mass armies of the past.

Another reason for the downsizing of armed forces is the need to make them more flexible and able to react swiftly to changes in their environment.[10] Mass armies, like large mass production firms in the 50s–70s, were bureaucratic organizations. As organizations grow, structural differentiation becomes greater and the number of hierarchical layers tend to proliferate (Perrow 1967; Thompson 1967; Woodward 1965), making them too rigid. So one crucial aspect of the restructuring of armed forces, as the restructuring of large civilian organizations (Robey and Sales 1994: 457–8), was their downsizing and delayering to make them *leaner and meaner*. To use the terminology developed by Ashkenas et al. (1995), the goal is to minimize vertical boundaries, i.e. boundaries between levels and ranks of people. According to them, speed has replaced size as a critical factor of organizational success. As was the case for large firms for much of the 20th century when the larger a company became, the more it was able to attain production efficiencies, size was also a crucial factor of victory for mass armies. This is no longer the case. Ashkenas et al. (1995: 8) make the following comparison: "*large organizations are like tankers. Compared to smaller firms, they need more space and time in which to change direction because they have a greater mass to be mobilized, informed, convinced and channeled. The challenge for them is to act like a small company while retaining access to the large company's broader resources.*" Therefore the trend in all Western armed forces has been to reduce the number of personnel and the size of centralized staffs. Probably we will also see in the near future a reduction in the number of ranks, so as to have flatter hierarchical structures, like those in the post-bureaucratic organizations.

As one can see from Table 21.3, with the exception of those of Luxembourg, all Western NATO armed forces were seriously

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[10]See Dandeker's chapter.

Table 21.3 Active force reduction among Western NATO countries, 1980–2014

Country	1980	2000	2014	% reduction
Belgium	87,900	39,250	30,700	65
Canada	78,646	59,100	66,000	16
Denmark	35,050	21,810	17,200	51
France	494,730	294,430	222,200	55
Germany	495,000	321,000	186,450	62
Greece	181,500	159,170	143,350	21
Italy	366,000	250,600	176,000	52
Luxembourg	660	899	900	+36
Netherlands	114,980	51,940	37,400	67
Norway	37,000	26,700	25,800	30
Portugal	59,540	44,650	42,600	28
Spain	342,000	166,050	134,900	61
United Kingdom	329,204	212,450	169,150	49
United States	2,050,000	1,365,800	1,492,200	27

Source The Military Balance 1980–1981, 2000–2001, and 2014
Note in 1980, Spain was not yet a member of NATO

downsized between 1980 and 2014. The forces reduction percentages go from a minimum of 16% in Canada to a maximum of 67% in The Netherlands and 65% in Belgium, the two countries that suspended the draft in the 90s (see following section).

In most Western countries, downsizing should mainly affect the corporate (support) activities of military organizations through rationalization, elimination of redundancies and outsourcing. Saving achieved through personnel cuts can then be channeled into procurement by rationalizing and restructuring the various staffs and support branches (administrative and logistics services, schools) and reducing the number of people working there.

Professionalization

Perhaps the most discussed aspect of the restructuring of armed forces from advanced industrial societies is their professionalization, i.e. the end of the draft. Although Canada, Great-Britain and the United States had long ago abandoned the conscription system, most of the continental European countries had maintained it during the Cold War. As Shaw (2000: 23) points out, it was because of the greater threat of land invasion, long established national traditions of military service (e.g., France), national beliefs concerning the democratic significance of conscription (Germany), local conflicts (Greece), and/or, more importantly, the high budgetary costs of a professional military.

The collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union itself changed all that. Such large armies were no longer necessary. To this extent, an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) became feasible—economically affordable—for most Western European states. But more importantly, the mission of these armies, as already pointed out, has changed. In the new kinds of conflicts, draftees no longer have their place. Finally, as mentioned earlier, due to social-cultural changes at work in post-industrial societies, in most European countries, the draft had become quite unpopular among young people.

A question asked to a representative sample of young Europeans aged between 15 and 24 in a special Eurobarometer survey, carried out in

Table 21.4 Opinions on compulsory military service in the 15 EU countries (1997)

Country	% for
Greece	79
Finland	52
Sweden	40
Denmark	39
Portugal	35
Germany	34
Austria	30
United Kingdom	18
France	17
Italy	17
Belgium	15
Spain	13
Ireland	12
Luxembourg	10
Netherlands	9
EU 15	23

Source Eurobarometer 47.2
Note DK/NA included

spring 1997, provides an indirect indicator of this unpopularity.[11] The question dealt with compulsory military service. Did they think that young people their age would be rather for or rather against this institution? Table 21.4 presents the results for the 15 EU countries.[12]

On a comparative level, it is in these countries where compulsory military service no longer existed at the time and where the issue was debated (see below) that the percentages of respondents who thought that young people their age would be in favor of this institution were the lowest. Among the 15 EU countries, it was in the Netherlands that military service was the least appealing (9%). There was also very strong opposition in Luxembourg (10% in

[11]It is interesting to know that in a 2001 replication of this survey, this item was not included anymore, meaning that this issue had completely lost its salience and relevance in most EU member states.

[12]Sample size was 7059 for the 15 EU countries. This survey was carried out for the Directorate General Education and Culture of the European Commission.

favor), Ireland (12%), Spain (13%), Belgium (15%), France (17%), Italy (17%), and Great Britain (18%). On the opposite, it was in Greece and, to a lesser extent in Finland, two countries which have (or had) difficulties with their neighbors that military service seemed the most accepted among young people: 79 and 52% of respondents respectively thought that young people their age were in favor of compulsory military service.

As a consequence of all these factors, almost everywhere in continental Europe, the debate on the end of the draft was reopened, and most European advanced industrial countries have now reached their conclusions. Belgium and The Netherlands were the first countries on the European continent to abolish—or to be exact, to suspend—conscription. France, the country that, with the United States, invented the *levée en masse* also abandoned the traditional draft system in 2001. As Table 21.5 shows, in 2014, among Western NATO member states, only Denmark and Greece still had a draft system; all the other armed forces had gone all-volunteer.

Because the military organizations of advanced industrial countries are *high-tech* organizations, the role of draftees in these organizations had progressively become marginalized. During the Cold War already, the trend was to use them either in non-specialized tasks, such as infantry, or in non-military functions. The latter were either non-specialized service functions (cooks, drivers, etc.), or highly specialized ones not requiring on-the-job training, such as computer specialists, engineers, etc. In some countries, such as Belgium, the unpopularity of the draft further initiated a vicious circle that led to the 1992 decision to suspend it: the more unpopular the draft was, the shorter the length of service and therefore the less there were functions open to draftees; draftees were thus more and more confined to boring roles which, in turn, led to low job satisfaction and to an even greater unpopularity of the draft and of the military; the government then responded by shortening the service length even more.

As already said, one of main reasons explaining why the draft was kept for so long in

Table 21.5 Percentage of conscripts in Western NATO armed forces, 1980–2014

Country	1980 (%)	2000 (%)	2014 (%)
Belgium	26	0	0
Canada	0	0	0
Denmark	34	23	7
France	53	20	0
Germany	45	40	0
Greece	72	62	31
Italy	63	45	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0
Netherlands	43	0	0
Norway	72	57	31
Portugal	60	13	0
Spain	67	31	0
Turkey	66	87	
United Kingdom	0	0	
United States	0	0	

Source The Military Balance 1980–1981 and 2000–2001
Note in 1980, Spain was not yet a member of NATO

continental Europe was that it was a relatively cheap method of manning relatively large armies (on paper at least) and that the East-West confrontation justified maintaining relatively large armies (in spite of a reduction caused by technological change). In other words, until 1989, i.e. as long as there was an East-West conflict, an all-volunteer force was, especially for small countries, from a budgetary perspective, too expensive. As a result, most European countries maintained mixed systems, i.e. systems where draftees and volunteers worked alongside each other, although in different roles. The advantage of these "mixed" systems was that it allowed the professional military to receive more sophisticated weapons while, at the same time, allowing a military of a sufficient size to exist. Again, as already said, the end of the Cold War changed all that.

Professionalizing Western armed forces, however, has not been an easy process. Most countries which have ended the draft have indeed experienced problems at the human resource management level. Indeed, ending the draft means that the military must recruit all its personnel on the labor market. In other words, if

they want to survive, armed forces have to be attractive to potential recruits.[13] Such a new state of mind was quite new for them: after having relied for so long on some form of forced labor, they must now offer potential recruits career or training perspectives attractive enough to lure them.

Furthermore, in the near future, with the ageing of European societies, on the one hand the number of young people entering the labour market will decline, while, on the other hand the number of seniors (and their life expectancy) will increase. As a result, European Defense organizations will likely face severe recruitment and retention problems, especially but not only in technical specialties. To offset the shrinking base of recruitment, they will have to increase the number of candidates in segments previously under-represented (for example, women and ethnic-cultural minorities), or to broaden the base (by raising the age limit), while trying to keep employees longer by reducing attrition or

[13]An illustration of this is the following article of the *New York Times* about the German Army: *A Dwindling Army Tempts New Recruits With a Charm Offensive* (July 27, 2014).

increasing the retirement age for certain categories of personnel.[14]

Reserve Forces, Civilianization and Outsourcing

Another aspect of the restructuring of armed forces is that the reserve is playing a greater role than in the late Cold War military organizations. This role, however, is fundamentally different from the reserve's role in the mass armies: while the huge reserves of the mass armed forces were composed of an undifferentiated mass of mobilized citizens filling in non-specialized, simple combat functions, the new, smaller reserve consists essentially of specialized functions, such as (combat) support functions and critical and/or scarce skills (such as linguists, intelligence, civil-military co-operation, public relations, medical, air movements support, etc.).

Because of budgetary constraints, the diminution of the immediate threat and the extreme diversity of possible missions, it has become impossible to recruit, train and retain enough specialists for all possible scenarios. One therefore either uses, and deploys, reservists for a certain number of tasks and/or contract out some activities (*outsourcing*). In other words, as with the private sector, armed forces increasingly concentrate on their *core competencies*,[15] or primary mission, i.e. the management and prevention of organized violence, and contract out the remaining functions and/or use reservists as temporary workforce.

In fact, as Dandeker (1994) notes, the armed forces of the future are becoming more like a flexible firm with a core of full-time specialists and a highly trained immediately available reserve, particularly in the areas of logistics and other supporting technical arms (doctors,

information specialists, engineers, but also pilots, civil-military co-operation personnel, etc.). In the same vein, during peacetime, these organizations outsource a growing number of peripheral tasks, such as maintenance, transport and catering. They also use more civilians, for administrative, management, and scientific tasks[16] for instance, because they are cheaper to employ than highly and expensively trained military specialists, stay longer in their functions than military personnel (officers rotate every 3–4 years), therefore providing continuity and expertise and because, in so doing, one releases hard to recruit military personnel for operational tasks.

In other words, the challenge for human resources military managers is to identify what are the core functions that must assigned to military personnel and what are the other tasks that can be assigned either to reservists, or to civilian personnel, or to be outsourced to specialized civilian firms. One of the decision rule could be the following (Dandeker 1999: 40): if a function is necessary both in time of peace and operations (the core functions of military organizations, i.e. combat related functions), then active-duty military personnel is indicated; if one needs it only during operations (for instance, linguists, interpreters, medical personnel, transport aircrews, air movements support staff, civil-military co-operation, etc.), then one can use reservists; and finally, if it is only needed in peacetime (administrative tasks, catering, routine maintenance, etc.), then it can be outsourced or civilianized. Among other decision criteria, one can cite the necessity for one's own personnel to acquire and maintain a certain level of know-how, of expertise, in order to be able to use it in specific circumstances, such as long-term operations abroad; or the fact that, in the organization, for some tasks, one can use, in peacetime, military personnel who are assigned to operational functions in time of war, or of long-term operations abroad. In that case, these

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[14]On the impact of demographic change on the recruitment and retention of personnel in European armed forces, see Manigart (2013).

[15]Prahalad and Hamel (1999) define core competencies as activities that are central to the organization's customers and mission, in which it has unique capabilities and can meet world-class performance standards.

[16]In Afghanistan, the U.S. Army also used social scientists (especially, anthropologists) as part of its controversial Human Terrain System program. See, for instance, Winslow (2010).

people will, in peacetime, perform a function similar to his operational wartime function, even though, in peacetime, it could perfectly be possible to outsource this task. Instances of such functions are cooks, mechanics, etc.

As far as outsourcing is concerned, one observes also a significant—and potentially worrisome—evolution, but up to now mainly in the case of the American forces. As just mentioned, before the wars in Iraq (*Operation Iraqi Freedom*) and Afghanistan (*Operation Enduring Freedom*), the use of outsourcing was essentially restricted to peacetime peripheral support functions. It grew first in Great Britain and the United States. To cite Dunigan (2011: 2):

> Neoliberal economic thinking (…) led to the development and expansion of private companies that could provide all non-core military services for the troops, leaving the skilled war fighters free to perform the actual combat tasks. These companies provided services such as weapons system maintenance and upkeep, supply transport, cooking, cleaning, and base construction, among many others.

But, in Iraq, the U.S. military began to contract private military and security companies (PMSCs)[17] for tasks nearer to the core of the military specificity, i.e. warlike types of functions, such as bodyguards, security personnel, convoy protection and escort, strategic planning, intelligence, troop training.[18] As Heinecken (2014: 629) mentions, "The ratio of contractor support has increased from 50:1 military versus contractor personnel during the first Gulf War to 1:1 during the recent intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan". At the height of the Iraqi war, 190,000 civilian contractors worked for the U.S. military. Some of the consequences of this evolution is that the expertise domain of the military professional shrinks, that it engenders in theater a sort of rivalry and jealousy between regular and private soldiers (the latter being better paid than

the former),[19] and that it creates risks of incidents (such as the shooting of 17 civilians by Blackwater military contractors in Nisour Square, Baghdad on September 16, 2007).

Beyond the increasing use of reservists, civilians and contractors, however, there is also the possibility of outsourcing some functions to other armed forces, or even militias (as in Iraq and Afghanistan). One enters here the domain of international co-operation and integration (see "Integration of European Armed Forces").

There is, however, a pitfall of contracting out too many functions (and notably civilian administrative tasks); that is, by so doing one risks eliminating possible second career slots for combat soldiers who, after some years in very demanding and physically heavy functions (long-term operations abroad, etc.), aspire to more sedentary functions, such as administrative ones. One would thus further decrease, unwillingly, the attractiveness of a military career and would create a new problem, this time at the recruitment level.

All these developments make the borders of restructured military organizations more flexible and permeable and further blur the differences between military and civilian organizations, but also between service branches.

Inter-service Integration

For technological and budgetary reasons as well as given the diversity of the engagement scenarios, in the new restructured armed forces, there is also greater inter-service integration, what Dandeker calls the "purple trend" (1999). One goes from forces operating more or less independently and autonomously to "*joint task forces*".

Inter-service integration results also from what the British call "force packaging",

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[17]According to Singer (2001: 20) PMSCs are "corporate bodies that specialize in the provision of military skills—including tactical combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence gathering and analysis, operational support, troop training and technical assistance.".

[18]See on this topic, among others, Singer (2007), Maninger (2009) and Heinecken (2014).

[19]To cite Heinecken (2014: 636), "in 2007, security guards working for companies such as Blackwater and Dyncorp were earning up to $1222 a day, while an Army sergeant was earning a maximum of $190 per day".

i.e. modular structures. Dandeker (1999: 30) defines such structures as

> "a series of coherent, self-contained, mix-and-match sets of units borrowed from the various organic commands for a given mission. Such modules can be assembled at short notice to form a mix of force appropriate for the specific demands of unforeseen crisis demanding the use of armed forces"

(see "Virtual Organizations and Multinationalization of Armed forces").

As Dandeker (1999: 30) also aptly points out, inter-service integration has serious implications as far as expertise and education of military personnel of all ranks are concerned. It also requires the development, among personnel working in these integrated staffs, of some sort of "cultural interoperability", i.e. the development of a joint organizational culture encouraging the effective cooperation among different service cultures. Finally, it makes also cohesion more difficult, at least in the beginning, to the extent that the members come from disparate units, do not know each other before the mission, and therefore are not used to work together.

Virtual Organizations and Multinationalization of Armed Forces

By far the majority of military operations are now carried out by multinational intervention forces (such as ISAF, UNIFIL, or Operation Atalanta off the Somali coast), or permanent multinational forces (such as NATO or the Eurocorps). In other words, one sees again the same evolution as in the private sector, i.e. the proliferation of joint ventures, strategic alliances and virtual organizations. According to Schuler and Jackson (1996: 44), a virtual organization is a temporary network of companies with diverse core competencies who quickly form a collaboration to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. Having exploited these opportunities, the "corporation" may disband as swiftly as it formed. The temporary firm has no hierarchy, no central office, and no organizational chart. Among the examples of virtual organizations in the military domain, one can cite, among many others, *Operation Desert Storm* (1991), SFOR in Bosnia (1996–2004), *Operation Unified Protector* in Libya (2011), or the current *EU Training Mission* in Mali, but also NATOs strategic concept of *Combined Joint Task Forces* (CJTF) and the notions of modular forces, force packages, etc. (see preceding section).

Package structures are so-called matrix organizations. A matrix organization has a dual reporting and control mechanism, a vertical one (functional hierarchy) and a horizontal one (product or service). In a matrix structure, employees report to more than one boss, with each boss responsible for a different aspect of the organization. Once the project is completed, the employee returns to his or her department or is directed toward a new project. The structure is therefore temporary (Norgan 1994: 29). On the one hand, the advantages of such a structure are greater flexibility and the avoidance of duplicate functions (one shares skills according to the project). It encourages cooperation, conflict resolution, and coordination. It is, however, important that individual team members have considerable tolerance for confusion and ambiguity since a lot of employees from different levels within the organization are grouped together in an informal environment where lines of communications are loose and unorganized. On the other hand, the disadvantages are that it is difficult to put into place in a traditional (functional) organization, that there is a risk of power conflicts, that it requires flexibility, cooperation and highly developed interpersonal skills at all levels.

Actually, Western military organizations have had some of the characteristics of matrix organizations for a long time. But before (e.g.: NATO), the horizontal dimension was permanent. With the new force packages (KFO, OEF, ISAF, Atalanta, etc.), the horizontal dimension changes with the mission. All these changes, however, require a fundamental change in organizational culture (more emphasis on values such as initiative, cooperation, trust, etc.) (Kipnis 1996; Mishra 1996; Reimer 2009).

Edmonds (1993) distinguishes two forms of multinationalization of armed forces: horizontal

and vertical. Horizontal multinationalization means the integration of national units within a multinational formation only at the HQ level; vertical multinationalization, on the other hand, implies mixed bi- or multi-national contingents, where integration takes place at Bn and Cie levels.[20] Examples of horizontal multinationalization are NATO and the Eurocorps; the various ISAF Regional Commands (such as RC North) and the international cooperation between the Dutch and Belgian Navies are, on the other hand, rather examples of vertical multinationalization. One can also classify multinational cooperations in function of the specialization degree of the various national components: simple (Eurocorps) or advanced (ISAF).

Some other implications of these new structures are (Dandeker 1996: 32) that responsibility shifts to lower level task forces commanders; work is intensive and very demanding, but also rewarding—with responsibility for equipment, people and the success of the operation; flexibility means multi-roling of equipment, a more flexible work force at all levels of the hierarchy and in all specializations, and the end of the notion of a job for life (which means that the proportion of those, at all levels of the hierarchy, who spend only a few years in the military, increase).

Within the European Union, the trend toward (horizontal and vertical) multinationalization has taken a more specific form that one can call the Europeanization of armed forces.[21] This process, although slow and difficult, is probably inexorable given, on the one hand, the severe budgetary cuts imposed on defense budgets in almost all EU member-states and, on the other hand, the operational pressures caused by the multiplication of crisis response operations. Aware of their individual declining military prowess, EU member states have therefore tried to overcome it by means of enhanced cooperation and improved interoperability within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

The process began with the 1992 creation of the Eurocorps and the 1999 decision to set up a EU rapid reaction force of 50–60,000 men. In 2004, France, Germany and Great Britain proposed the creation of EU Battle Groups (EUBGs). EU Battle Groups consist typically of approximately 1500 troops, plus command and support services, ready for deployment within 15 days; they designed to carry out so-called Petersberg missions, i.e. humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions. Thirteen Battle Groups were initially pledged by EU member-states (2004), with associated niche capabilities. EUBGs reached full operational capability on 1 January 2007,[22] although, up to now, they have not yet been deployed. Another step in the direction of a greater integration of European armed forces was the pooling and sharing initiative, originally proposed by Germany and Sweden at the 2010 Ghent defense summit. The concept refers to initiatives and projects to pool and share more military capabilities among EU Member States.[23]

According to King (2005: 333) however, the development of enhanced cooperation mechanisms among various European armed forces does not necessarily mean that they "are on a supranational trajectory. There is no evidence to suggest that the national identity of personnel will become irrelevant or that the sovereignty of member states will be subsumed to a higher authority. There is no sign that current developments will produce a 'European army.'" Rather it means that "Europe's armed forces are increasingly being concentrated into empowered centres of capability and competence […] National nodes of military power are appearing. At the same time, these nodes are operating more frequently and more closely with each other. At operational and tactical levels, Europe's armed

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[20]See also Klein and Kümmel (2000).

[21]According to Merlingen (2012: 12), Europeanization refers to the construction and institutionalization of rules and practices at the EU level and their integration in the national policymaking process.

[22]http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/91624.pdf, accessed October 7, 2014.

[23]See the November 2011 EDA Facts sheet *Pooling and Sharing* (http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/factsheet_-_pooling_sharing_-_301111), accessed October 10, 2014.

forces are converging on common patterns of expertise" (King 2011: 272). Initiatives to increase convergence among European armed forces have also been taken at the strategic level, as for example the establishment, in 2005, of the European Security and Defense College (ESDC); its goal is to develop a shared security culture amongst a variety of professionals—including military officers—at the European level (Paile 2010: 17).

Cultural Diversity

In a global world, postmodern military organizations, as other complex organizations, have become more diverse not only internally but are also operating in an ever more diverse environment. The new missions of these culturally diverse armed forces are indeed themselves very diverse (warfighting, peace-enforcing, peace-keeping, humanitarian, monitoring, etc.), take place all over the world, in culturally, ethnically, and linguistically very diverse regions, and are conducted most of the time in a multinational framework.

Internally, to the extent that recruitment is, and will remain, problematic, because a job in the military is seen as dangerous and relatively unglamorous, AVFs are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit the "young white males" that until recently formed the bulk of their human resources. Consequently, they must explore new population segments, and/or be more attractive to certain groups that they had earlier tended to overlook. In short, postmodern military organizations must become attractive employers to all these categories of employees; therefore also the introduction of new forms of work conditions (flexible working hours, etc.).

In other words, postmodern organizations are more diverse culturally,[24] in terms of gender, sexual orientations, ethnicity, and even, in some armed forces, nationality. Not only for pragmatic reasons (recruitment), but also to improve their image and maintain, or improve, their legitimacy.

According to Boëne (2003: 179), traditionally, mass armies were legitimized, in part, by the fact that they reflected the social composition of their respective nation-states. In other words, they had to be socially representative. At least as far as the male population was concerned, they could attain this social representativeness thanks to the existence of universal compulsory military service. As mentioned before, the draft has been abolished or suspended in the great majority of advanced Western countries and what is now expected from postmodern military organizations is that they, as other (civilian) organizations, be tolerant of cultural diversity, open to all social groups.

Externally, the need to have intercultural skills, be sensitive to cultural differences, is increasingly felt. To function effectively, military personnel (especially the officers) must possess new skills and capabilities. Because officers, for instance, are increasingly assigned "extra-military" or political roles (relations with local authorities, with the local population, with the other contingents, etc.), they need further academic training (political sciences, sociology, foreign cultures, study of foreign languages, diversity training, etc.) in order to be able to face all these new contingencies.

One may add that the two levels are closely interrelated: culturally diverse organizations, because they are more tolerant of ambiguity and respectful of differences, are also better equipped to cope effectively in a foreign and confusing environment. As Schneider and Barsoux (1997: 228) notes, referring to economic firms:

> Another interesting argument for the benefit of using cultural diversity is that it creates systems flexibility. Given the complexity of the current business environment, there is a need for organizations to match that variety internally, to have what is known as "requisite variety". In addition to the complexity, the pace of environmental change requires the ability to live with, even thrive on, ambiguity and chaos in order to achieve maximum organizational flexibility and adaptability. Multi-cultural organizations foster both the variety of perspectives and the practice of managing ambiguity. Less is taken for granted, and there is not the assumption of one best way of doing things.

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[24]See, among others, Soeters and Van der Meulen (2007).

In the case of military organizations, Miller and Moskos (1995: 634) have suggested that, in Somalia, "the uniquely mixed-race and gender composition of the American forces helped to limit the outbreak of effective forces against Somalis. That is, women and black men in mixed units were more likely to act as monitors of misbehavior than were soldiers in units that were all male or all one race".[25]

In short, if they want to survive and remain efficient, military organizations, as their civilian counterparts, will have to adapt and become truly multicultural organizations. According to Schneider and Barsoux (1997: 227), "a truly multicultural organization can be defined as one wherein diversity is valued and utilized rather than just contained. The strategy of utilizing cultural differences can create competitive advantage." In other words, these organizations seek to accept and capitalize on employee differences.

Conclusion

Restructured armed forces of advanced industrial societies have several of the characteristics of what in the HRM literature are known as networks of organized anarchies, i.e. organizations with permeable boundaries and flat hierarchies, given to decentralized decision-making (hence a reduction of the size of headquarters), and with a greater capacity to tolerate ambiguity and diversity. Finally, as far as European armed forces are concerned, the restructuring process goes also hand in hand with a greater integration and cooperation of armed forces at the European level. Only greater integration and cooperation will make possible a greater degree of task specialization among European armed forces and therefore allow solving the present adjustment problems given the present and future budgetary constraints facing all European governments.

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[25]They were referring here to the violent—and sometimes racist—acts committed by some Belgian, Canadian, and Italian troops.

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Author Biography

Philippe Manigart is Professor of Sociology and Head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences at the Royal Military Academy. He is also assistant professor (part time) at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Mons. He has a M. A. in Sociology from the University of Chicago and a Ph.D. from the Free University of Brussels.

His main research interests and expertise lie in the fields of organizational sociology (with an emphasis on military organizations), survey analysis, market research, and security studies. For the Belgian Defense, he has conducted several surveys on Belgian and European security, on the image of the Belgian Defense among the public, on the identity and job satisfaction of members of the Belgian Defense, as well as market researches on the recruitment of personnel. He has published several books and articles on military organizations and on European public opinion and security issues.

Conversion of the Military: Resource-Reuse Perspective After the End of the Cold War

Ljubica Jelušič

Introduction: Are Military and Conversion the Adversaries?

Defense conversion has attracted scientists from different backgrounds, among them many macroeconomists, sociologists of industrial organization, defense analysts, peace researchers, and in past two decades, sociologists of the military. The majority of studies on defense conversion emerged after the downsizing of the military and defense sectors in the late 1980s, after the end of the Cold War. However, conversion is not a new phenomenon. It was presented throughout history as part of post-war reconstruction and in this respect it was generally successful. Conversion became a concept worth of analytical and scientific studies in a longer period of peace, in the 1960s, when it accompanied the process of downsizing in the defense sectors and the disarmament of different world countries. The first downsizing issue concerned the size of military personnel after the end of the WW2. The second driving force for modern conversion was because of disarmament negotiations, which encouraged the economic analysis of possible benefits from the military industry.

The early studies on defense conversion focused on certain specific characteristics of the process, sometimes even on very limited aspects of conversion (for example economic conversion). The narrow sense of conversion, i.e. "direct conversion from research establishments and defense factories to research and manufacturing enterprises of civilian products in order to eliminate a loss of employment or firm closures" (Struys 2000: 34) was one of the main specifics of the first scientific approach to the conversion. Another specific of the early studies was their strong connection with peace activism and disarmament, which has made the studies very popular in public, especially among peace activists, but on the other hand has made other scientific fields regard it with suspicion. The sociology of the military was among those sciences that were very suspicious about the substance of the defense conversion, mainly because of its possible foundation in peace studies.[1]

Economic school on defense conversion is the oldest scientific approach to the field (Benoit and Boulding 1963). Sociology of the organizations owes its analysis of the defense conversion to one famous expert, American professor of

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[1]The doubts of the sociology of the military towards the peace studies in general and defense conversion as the subject were indirectly expressed at the very beginning of the sociology of the military, when its scope of interest was defined. Kurt Lang, author of the annotated bibliography of sociology of the military in Current Sociology (16, 3, 1968, published in 1970), described the included pieces of bibliography according to the sociological approach, regardless of scientific affiliation of the author, but disqualified the works from peace studies.

L. Jelušič (✉)
University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: ljubica.jelusic@fdv.uni-lj.si

Industrial Engineering, Melman (1970, 1974, 1983), whose works are still studied as the handbooks on conversion. There were many attempts to verify the issues closely related to conversion, although their authors did not use the correct terminology. There was also no common concept of conversion, which is prerequisite to establish the analytical framework for transformation of armed forces and related industries.

The sociology of the military is interested in defense conversion as a process, tightly connected with concepts of disarmament, demilitarization, and demobilization. Melman launched the thesis on demilitarized society in 1988, where he drew connections between disarmament processes and economic conversion. Three years earlier, in Europe, Haltiner (1985) empirically tested demilitarization as a value change process. Shaw (1990) discovered the connection between militarism and demilitarization. Van Doorn established the thesis on the decline of the mass army (1975), which was later on empirically tested by Haltiner (1998). These authors and their theories have proven that the sociology of the military is mostly interested in the process of qualitative military conversion, whereas the quantitative concept of defense conversion stayed in the main interest of economics.

Within two decades of waiting on "dividends" from post-Cold War reconstruction, the concept of conversion broadened its meaning to include military post-conflict and peace demobilization and re-use of military infrastructure.[2] Nevertheless, the criticism that conversion and the "peace dividend" in general have failed, has gained some public and experts' support (Voronkov 1996: 134).[3] The empirical verification of different aspects of conversion outputs took place in some European states between 1996 and 2001[4] under the title "Defense restructuring and conversion". The study has shown a dilemma concerning the relationship between the two processes, whether they are complementary or competing in the global community.

The notion of conversion has gradually lost its anti-military and anti-war theoretical meaning and it has been transferred into practice, which helps military establish mechanisms for successful re-use of freed military resources.

If at the beginning it was mostly economic interest that pushed for research on the benefits of conversion as well as it being a handy public slogan for peace activists, it is now very much clear that it calls for an interdisciplinary approach on a scientific level and also for financial and business support on a practical level. Anti-military oriented at first, the concept and practice of conversion has developed into phenomenon process, which acts in the interest of the military and the services that support the military (defense industry), as well as in the interest of the civilian society. If at the first, conversion seemed to be a controversial issue between the military and civilian society, it has grown gradually into a concept that binds the two poles.

Conversion: Transformation of Defense Hardware and Change of Social Perspective

In the past three decades, conversion developed as an empirical phenomenon as well as an analytical concept with various understandings. The Dictionary of Alternative Defense states that the term conversion signifies a shift of productive resources from military to civilian production, or

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[2]The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) began to publish the yearly Conversion Survey series in 1996 and finished it in 2005. The publication has brought recent data on the global disarmament, demilitarization and demobilization. The data were measured by BIC3D index (the BICC Conversion, Disarmament, Demobilization and Demilitarization).

[3]Voronkov argued that during the Cold War many myths had been created about the peace dividend as a magic tool for the resolution of all kinds of problems.

[4]The European Commission has launched the project within the framework of COST (Cooperation in Science and Technology Program) "Defence Restructuring and Conversion", which was supposed to be the empirical test of different concepts of conversion, and of economic, social, cultural and political outputs of conversion in participating 14 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Slovenia, Spain, The Netherlands, United Kingdom).

in a broader sense, a shift from military to civilian use of resources. In an even broader sense, conversion means a shift of society from wartime to peacetime (Møller 1995: 91–92). Brzoska (1999: 132–133) distinguishes between three groups of analytical concepts used of conversion. The first group of concepts is limited to the transformation of defense plants from military production to civilian goods (which was used in 1970s and early 1980s). The second group of concepts focuses on transformation of all types of resource found in military sectors. The third group of concepts loses the economic focus and is used to include all kinds of economic, psychological, cultural and political changes happening in societies where military efforts are reduced. According to Brzoska, the first use of conversion concept is too narrow, because it focuses on only one of the changes in reducing military sectors, that is, the total changeover from military to civilian production. The third use overburdens conversion as an analytical concept, because it includes phenomena not necessarily related to the downsizing military sectors. The second use of concept is the most useful for analytical and practical purposes, because of its resource re-use perspective (Brzoska 1999: 133).

The resource re-use approach was conceptualized at the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) and served as a basis for empirical measurement of conversion in six issue areas, published in a yearly periodical Conversion Survey. The conversion issue areas are the following: reallocation of financial resources, reorientation of research and development, restructuring of the military, demobilization and reintegration, base closure and redevelopment, disposal of surplus weapons. These are issue areas where the quantitative measures of economic sciences can be used; explaining to what extent the quantitative transformation of defense hardware is achieved. The project leader of the BICC Conversion Survey was Michael Brzoska. The publication was issued every year between 1996 and 2005.

The European Commission project "Defense Restructuring and Conversion" (1996–2001) took place within the framework of the Social Sciences and it elaborated on the three dimensions of conversion: conversion of the arms industry (Serfati 1996), regional dimension of base closures and closing of arms industry facilities (Jauhiainen et al. 1999), and sociocultural aspects of conversion (Jelušič and Selby 2000; Manigart and Jelušič 2001). All three dimensions have incorporated the relation between post-Cold War defense restructuring and conversion.

The sociology of the military is interested in the qualitative aspects of conversion; this means that it explores the sociocultural aspects of all six conversion issue areas, although the main focus remains on the demobilization and reintegration of the military and defense personnel. Qualitative conversion is discussed not only as the by-product of force restructuring, but also as an achievement of a growing relationship between military organizations and civilian environment, where the new social perspectives should be developed for those who stay in the military or in services connected with the military (bases, arms industry), as well as for those who leave it and whom society accepts a the surplus of freed military capabilities. Recent history shows that in many cases, military force reduction was not followed by qualitative conversion of freed resources, which seems to imply that conversion is a luxury for the richest countries.

Conversion and Related Concepts (Disarmament, Diversification, Defense Restructuring)

Conversion and disarmament are parallel processes, which increased their speed with the waning of the Cold War. Both processes occurred on a large scale in countries that belonged to the former Cold War Alliances, i.e. to the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and also in countries that proclaimed their foreign policies as neutral or non-aligned with regard to the two main Cold War adversaries. Disarmament was partly a guided process, which means that it took place as a result of achieved

agreements among former adversaries or other interested countries. In some cases, disarmament was also a spontaneous process, in which military personnel leaving the military organization in larger numbers, trying to find more prospective jobs in the civilian labor market. It was the result of a rapid decrease of the living standards of military personnel, which appeared in most post-socialist countries. While military personnel were seeking new jobs, the large surplus of weapons was spread around the world, mainly to new conflict areas of the 1990s. In the Balkans, a large number of "freed" soldiers from the other countries appeared as volunteers in the armed conflicts, acting as mercenaries and fighting for different conflicting parties. Therefore, freed military personnel had looked for jobs in the civilian market, but also for jobs in the military market, outside their home countries.[5]

Brzoska (2000a, b: 15–16) established the relationship between disarmament and conversion in the sense of disarmament being merely a point of departure in studies of conversion. Disarmament is a multi-faceted and contradictory issue. It results in a reduction in the number of arms, but it does not necessary mean that is always followed by reduced military capabilities. Reduction of specific types of arms might lead to an increased number of other (more sophisticated) arms, which results in an increased level of military capability. Reductions in military expenditures should result in structural adjustments within the military sector, maximizing its efficiency and productivity. The start of the 1990s in general pushed militaries into a situation, in which they had less men (or personnel), and no priority goals, but at the same time more defense commitments and military deployments. The "less of everything" paradigm (Boëne et al.

2000: 43) shows the contradiction between reduction in military expenditures after the end of the Cold War and the political and public expectation for military to be more effective and capable of confronting new threats and risks.

Therefore, disarmament has quantitative dimensions, which may result in lower or increased military capabilities. Furthermore, the reduced military expenditures might not result in a lower importance of the military in civilian societies. The authors of the study on "The Swedish Military in International Perspective" (Boëne et al. 2000: 44–45) concluded that military defense is perceived as a policy goal of low priority, because education, health-care, fighting crime, creating jobs, environmental care, and other things from everyday needs, come first. Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s, the confidence in the military as an institution has either been stable at a high level, or has risen from a down-trend in the 1980s.

The discussed contradictions of disarmament show that defining disarmament as a quantitative reduction in all military sectors, and at the same time as a qualitative reduction in military capabilities and a reduction of the importance of military in society is no real solution. Brzoska (2000a, b: 29) suggested differentiating the concepts into concepts of quantitative disarmament, resulting in resource-reuse economic conversion, qualitative disarmament, resulting in force restructuring or military-political conversion, and demilitarization, resulting in cultural, psychological reorientation or societal conversion. Looking from the perspective of these concepts, the sociology of the military studies mostly the military-political conversion and societal conversion.

As the peace dividend did not show quick results after the end of the Cold War, some experts and public opinion complained that conversion was the wrong concept. This was the result of naïve expectations and very narrow definitions of conversion, expecting full engagement of the freed military resources in a civilian environment. The disappointment had some influence on public opinion and political circles, as well as in the academic sphere. Some

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[5]Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was using the Russian volunteers who fought at the Serbian side in Bosnia-Herzegovina armed conflict (1992–1995), as a mobilization source also in time of NATO air strikes in 1999. The Russian volunteers attended the big anti-war demonstrations in Belgrade and in other cities in order to show the preparedness of Russia to help Serbia under NATO attack. Russian soldiers were accepted with ovations by other protesters.

actors as well as analysts are hesitant to put their work within the framework of conversion (Brzoska 1999: 131). This can be seen in the implementation of a new concept, which describes the policy of the use of military technology in civilian domain, and is called "defense diversification". It was a very popular concept in the United Kingdom, where the government supported the process and helped establish the Defense Diversification Agency in 1999 to overview and collect efforts for defense industry conversion. In general, diversification is a situation, in which a firm (or technology) becomes involved in a completely different economic domain without abandoning its former activities, either by modification of its internal structures or by the purchase of social shares (Struys 2000: 34).

Another process, parallel to defense conversion, is the defense restructuring. The dilemma between the conversion and the defense restructuring can be explained in the following findings (Jelušič 2000: 311–12):

First, defense restructuring is a process that affects all national and transnational defense organizations and institutions. The end of the Cold War has influenced the nature of contemporary conflicts; it has created possibilities for reductions in military expenditure and the size of the armed forces. Many new perspectives for attaining international security have been offered, especially to former socialist countries. All countries, regardless of their political systems, size and role in the international community were forced to restructure their defense capabilities.

Second, conversion is a process, depending on reduced use of military and defense resources, which needs plans, programs, and conscious action. It involves an organized shift of people, skills, technologies, equipment, and financial and economic resources from defense or military related activities to civilian purposes. Conversion is not a cheap or spontaneous process. It needs investment of skills, money, ideas and time.

Third, defense restructuring is usually a state-governed process (as defense is the responsibility of the state), though it might also be supervised by international organizations, which in some cases leads to disarmament, demilitarization or even conversion, but often only to restructuring within the defense sector. In some situations, conversion might not only be state-governed, but also a regional, local or even privately supervised process. Governments are not always interested in investment to conversion.

Fourth, defense restructuring and conversion should be examined together in cases where there is a social need for reallocation of defense resources to other social sectors with potential for development and growth. If there were reallocations inside the defense sector in order to establish more effective defense, or to achieve better use of scarce resources, it would be more correct to refer to this process as defense restructuring.

Fifth, there are some new developments in the defense sector, which might be seen as defense restructuring aimed at both defense effectiveness and development of civil society. The example is information technology. The history of information technology shows that the first form of networked electronic communication was developed inside the US military—Arpanet, the predecessor of contemporary Internet. Today, Internet allows the quickest transmission of enormous amounts of information for civilian purposes. Unfortunately, it is also an appropriate media for waging cyber war or war on Internet, a term used to describe some events concerning the Kosovo crisis in 1999 (Caforio 2000). It is the military that tries to adapt to the order (or disorder) of (civilian) Internet now. Paradoxically, it is more convenient and cheaper for military organizations and the defense sector to adapt to "non-military" technologies and strategies, in order to improve defense capabilities, rather than to stay with the traditional concept of a closed and heavily armed military.

Conversion and the Post-Cold War Dividend

At the end of the Cold War, economic conversion became the hit of economic analysis, political language and even public opinion. It was

translated into "the peace dividend" (Gleditsch 1996) notion. The "peace dividend" is a concept that has been used to refer to the benefits derived from lower defense spending and the conversion of military production into civilian production (Intrilingator 1996: 1). Converting from military to civilian production is not simply a matter of shifting funds from one category of social spending to another. It entails the fundamental transformation of resources in the economy, including retraining soldiers and defense workers, retooling the capital, and developing the capability to produce non-defense goods and services. There are some potential gains from reduced defense spending. In the short term, defense cuts lead to unemployment or underemployment of labour, capital and other resources, interpreted as costs. In the long term, the investment process as result of reduced defense budgets would produce benefits, as the unemployed resources are re-employed to produce civilian goods and services (Intrilingator 1996: 3).

There was also a great deal of public optimism (not only experts' fascination) about the defense conversion at the beginning of the 1990s. It derived from the perception that post-war conversions have been generally successful (Gansler 1995: 7–9). Unfortunately, what happened after the Cold war was not comparable to other post-war periods. The post-war periods that followed conventional wars were characterized by many victims among military persons and civilians, and great destruction of mainly civilian facilities. The post-Cold War period did not have to repair or fill the void of destroyed civilian facilities, as these functioned fairly normally as the arms race went on. This effectively meant that the defense sector was forced into huge downsizing, with nowhere to put the resulting surplus. The situation had the specifics, i.e. the absence of the "re-conversion", defined as the post-conflict return of certain firms to civilian activities (Struys 2000: 34). Defense industrialists of the 1990s had to convert resources, originally developed for defense purposes, into production for civilian markets. In the post-Cold-War period, the drastic reduction in demand for military goods coincides with

economic and industrial recession (especially in Central and Eastern European countries). Freed military resources found themselves unemployed together with the civilian freed resources, competing for a place in the civilian labor, financial, technological market. In the past, industry compensated for (or reconverted) the lost military demand from wartime with increasing civilian production in peacetime. Therefore, re-conversion according to Struys (2000: 34) is the return of certain firms to civil activities after having been engaged for a certain period of time in military tasks. In the case of defense enterprise, this means the redeployment of its activity base by allocating military and non-military tasks to its non-converted economic capacity. The contradiction between short-term costs and long-term benefits stemming from reduced defense spending caused increased disappointment with the "post-Cold War Peace Dividend" in general.

The reality of the post-Cold War transformation can be described in terms of defense cuts, an absence of the traditional military enemies, the challenge of new (non-military) threats and risks, active regional and local armed conflicts, and regional arms races. There are different reactions to this reality, many of them more in the scope of the restructuring inside the area, with production of side effects for the civilian environment, which is already under pressure of its own transformation and is in many cases incapable of accepting the dropouts from the defense sector. To deal with this situation, the following processes and reactions occurred:

First, planned defense restructuring is a process in which the defense sector adjusts to reduced defense spending; reallocation is done mainly inside the defense sector, with surplus labor still on the payroll, or having taken early retirement. The result of the process is effective defense with lower costs, and has been seen in richer countries of Western Europe and in the USA.

Second, unplanned, ad hoc defense restructuring is a process that mostly results in closing of military bases, leaving soldiers, officers and civilian workers in the defense sector

unemployed. The common result is less effective defense and reduction of outputs and incomes. This can be seen in the majority of Central and Eastern European countries after the end of the Cold War.

Third, defense conversion is reallocation of economic, technological, labor and other resources from the armed forces and defense related industries towards civilian activities. It presents long term potential gains from defense cuts though often with short-term unemployment or underemployment of labor, capital, bases, plants and other resources (swords to ploughshares). It is a common European ideal, but only seen in the richest countries in a very limited number of cases.

Fourth, defense diversification is a process where civilian enterprises are capable of converting their production, originally developed for the civilian market, to military wartime capacities (ploughshares to swords).

The restructuring and diversification processes need public support and/or pro-military ideology of the government in order to legitimize changes in the defense sector. However, conversion is more successful when there is an anti-military ideology in the government and public skepticism about the military. As conversion needs time to produce profits, it is most effective with positive attitudes from the public, the political elite, and workers in the defense industry, military professionals and managers.

Conversion and Demilitarization (Societal Conversion)

Demilitarization is a multifaceted concept. The narrowest understanding of it is in international law, where demilitarization concerns the prohibition of establishment of any military facilities or stationing the armed forces on by contract specified territory. The demilitarization of a certain territory usually follows peace accords, in order to lower the armed tensions and possibility of conflict outbursts. Total demilitarization aims at destruction of military sites, prohibition of establishing new military infrastructure,

prohibition of all types of armed forces, except for law-and-order forces, prohibition of military recruitment and training. According to the international law, demilitarization describes also the return of armed forces to the barracks after a coup d'état.

The more complex understanding of demilitarization is connected with the changes in the values of modern societies and with the reformed place of armed forces in society. This concept of demilitarization is also linked to economic conversion and improvement of quality of life, mostly as factors that unleash an individual style of modern society life. This, so called "post-modern" project became a very popular concept, describing the changes in societies at the beginning of the new millennium, although it was presented to a lesser extent through the concepts of "demilitarized society" (Melman), or "silent revolution" (Inglehart) long before the turmoil of the 1990s.

Melman (1988: ix) thought that a demilitarizing society institutionalizes democratic decision-making and decentralization, reinforces productive life-serving values and frees up the resources needed for improvement in quality of life. The conversion from military to civilian economy serves as the economic alternative to the arms race. Melman has shown how the three processes: conversion, demilitarization and disarmament are interlinked and dependent on each other. Nevertheless, his work on demilitarized society was met with doubts and criticism, mainly concerned with the utopian character of his idea that war-making institutions and superpowers, should embark on the simultaneous course of disarmament and economic conversion.

Demilitarization can be understood also in terms of value-changes and attitudes towards the central role of the military in the national security system. Haltiner explained that the military is no longer seen as a central national or state institution in modern societies and termed the process as "secularization of the military" (Haltiner 1985: 39). It means that the military is tolerated in society as one of the institutions that provide national security, but no more as the central or the only one. The social attitudes regarding the

military are not so much oriented against it, as anti-military attitudes, or anti-military ideology, but measured in terms positives and negatives. They are connected with dimension of relevancy from important to not important. The level of ignorance is increasing. Moskos touched upon the same problem while writing on the armed forces and public attitude towards them in different eras. In modern pre-Cold-War society, the public was supportive towards the military; in late modern (Cold War) era the public attitude was ambivalent. In postmodern (post-Cold-War) era, the public mood toward the armed forces becomes one of indifference (Moskos 2000: 15, 20). This can be connected to the end of conscription, which makes military service less salient to the general population, and produces a growing gap between the military and society. The end of the conscription era is the result of a long-term process of declining armed forces size, observed from the end of the WW2 (Van Doorn 1975a, b; Burk 1992; Haltiner 1998).

Conversion of Military Personnel

Social Consequences of Reduction in Defense Spending

A particular focus of the sociology of the military in the post-Cold War period is oriented toward demobilization of soldiers, which happened as a result of war termination or as a result of a peaceful reduction in defense spending. The concept of post-Cold War demobilization in some respects covers issues similar to the "decline of the mass army theory" (Haltiner 1998: 7), mostly in parts where it concerns the erosion of the concept of mass armies on the basis of conscription. However, it addresses much broader issues of demobilization of professional military personnel (personnel on a military pay-roll) too, which due to defense cuts, has lost a job in the military, or wishes for new, more prestigious, better paid and more stable jobs in the civilian labour market. It is also tied to the issue of reintegration into civilian life, as an expected result of demobilization, and which is

not necessarily tied to the "decline of the mass army" concept. As the latter will be further elaborated in another chapter of this volume, we will focus on the detailed analysis of problems accompanying demobilization of professional military personnel.

The quantitative measures of military downsizing in past decades would show that the total number of military personnel had fallen from 28.8 million in 1987 to 22.0 million in 1997, and to 19.9 million in 2003 (Conversion Survey 1999: 76; Conversion Survey 2005: 161).

The demobilization is reduction in number of personnel, and it includes the reduction of the size of regular military, of paramilitary forces and of civilian personnel employed by the armed forces. The Conversion survey (1999: 76) does not include the general turnover of personnel into the term "demobilization", as this occurs in every army. From the perspective of the sociology of the military, the general turnover of personnel is also an issue worth of survey with regard to the demobilization, because the size of turnover in general and the speed with which the functions' rotation take place, are the indicators of potentially high innovation rate within the military and potentially "occupational" versus "institutional" (Moskos and Wood 1988) character of the personnel. The turnover shows to what extent the soldiers were professionally socialized as a convergent or divergent social occupation with regard to other civilian occupations (Caforio 2000). The soldiers who went through convergent professional socialization are more prepared to leave the armed forces than those educated in divergent system of military education, and they are also better prepared to reintegrate in civilian life and production of goods.

The personnel turnover is usually the highest in countries with large amounts of conscripts, who remain in the armed forces for a certain period of time, and after finishing obligatory military duty, move to the reserve service (or some of them become active soldiers by contract). Voluntary privates sign up for a certain number of years, with possibility of prolongation. Some of them would go on to continue their military career by entering the files of

non-commissioned officers. Non-commissioned officers usually volunteer for a limited number of years, and in some militaries they could stay to the end of their military career. The officer corps consists of professionals on contracted periods that might stay until end of their career if they are able to pass the requirements of different ranks. This system of turnover, where many of those who join up know that they will stay for a fixed period, experiencing a stability that might be absent from certain civilian jobs, but also allowing for promotion if one shows certain abilities, brings many different people into the armed forces and upholds the rank pyramid.

Voluntary departure from the military amounts expected in military personnel planning. There are many privates, NCOs and officers who would like to remain in the military.[6] International operations and missions require many young soldiers, which means that it is essential for militaries with an all-volunteer force to compete on labor markets and to continue recruiting young personnel "whilst at the same time providing retraining to older personnel and assistance in finding new jobs" (Manigart 2000a, b: 61).

The demobilization is only the first part of the "human conversion" process (Kingma and Pauwels 2000: 16). The second part of the process, namely the "reintegration" is de facto conversion. It means that the demobilization may end in dismissal of soldiers[7] in some cases, which would increase the rate of unemployment in society or even pose the threat of jobless veterans searching for means to survive. Turning demobilization into conversion demands additional

sources for reintegration of soldiers. The reintegration is needed in order to secure a productive role in civilian life for demobilized soldiers. Kingma and Pauwels (2000: 16) differentiated between various aspects of reintegration: social, political, economic and psychological. Social, political and economic aspects of reintegration correlate with the ability of the community to accept the ex-soldiers and their dependants. Psychological adjustment depends on a soldier's personal adjustment to their new civilian situation. It is a process of cultural changes in the soldier's "military mind" and/or (especially in cases of ex-combatants) the process of psychological treatment of stress disorders.

Reemployment is one of the first steps in the reintegration process of people who become accustomed to a certain way of life, and have attained specific knowledge and skills. Some skills, for example combat skills from teeth army units, are non-convertible to civilian life. Armed forces have a hard time attracting adequate soldiers if they do not provide adequate compensation, benefits and prospects to find a job afterwards. During a period of high unemployment, military offers a stable job and permanent income.[8] In times of relatively low unemployment, the armed forces have to be open to

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[6]Some countries with all-volunteer force, like Belgium, are facing the "aging" of the military as the natural result of the combined suspension of the draft and the substantial downsizing of the organization (Manigart 2000a, b: 55).

[7]The demobilization sometimes works out well for the armed forces, assuring reductions and reintegration of soldiers, but from the point of view of many individual soldiers the consequences are not so positive. The case of dissolution of the former East German armed forces went smoothly, but many professionals were not incorporated into the military of the unified Germany. They did not meet the conditions to be accepted and they were left on their own (Kingma and Pauwels 2000: 18).

[8]In post-socialist countries at least two different types of relations towards military jobs occurred. Due to drastic reductions of professional officers and NCO's in some countries (like Hungary, Czech Republic), not only the older, less-qualified persons did leave the service, but also the young, well-educated, energetic officers, who were frustrated, because they could earn relatively little and who felt that their opportunities for upward mobility were poor. Beside, their workload increased significantly due to the shortage of staff, and they were forced to work overtime without adequate remuneration (Kiss 2000: 224–225). A different attitude towards the military job was developed in Slovenia after getting independence. The civilian labour market was overloaded with unemployed people from destroyed industry; the threat of bankrupts was hanging over many enterprises. Therefore, many middle and also top managers from the not-prospective civilian enterprises, having rank of reserve officer from the former military, decided to leave the civilian jobs and asked for military employment. They brought a lot of managerial knowledge and skills to the military and they retained their "occupational" expectations regarding the military profession.

turnover and must prepare personnel for a subsequent civilian career in order to attract workers (even for short term contracts).

According to Brzoska (2000a, b: 31) there are different way in which the armed forces can help in bridging the gap between military service and a civilian way of life. They include in-service training for civilian jobs, benefits and early retirement subsidies. The most prominent is training. Some military tasks also have civilian applications and the armed forces can provide an additional formal education, either at military or civilian institutions, which are recognized by the civilian educational system. Formal education for conversion to civilian life may take place during the military career or at the end of it. The soldiers are educated for a double occupation. In some militaries, soldiers are supposed to have a civilian degree before starting their military career (dual-use soldiers).[9]

The search for civilian job, regardless of additional training in the armed forces, appropriate counseling pre- and after discharge, and reintegration support, requires a willingness to adjust to a different environment. Those who have been part of the military organization from an early age would have to undergo a fundamental transition (Brzoska 2000a, b: 38), the so called "conversion of military mind".

Conversion of Military Mind

The individuals, who are forced to leave the armed forces because of downsizing or in search of a better job, must adapt to the new professional culture in civilian enterprise. They were trained in top-down leadership styles; they hold the knowledge and skills of limited applicability. They are forced to leave established social networks and are facing possible social alienation. The major problem is in the incongruity of values as a result of specific military culture. There are some saliencies in the military culture that can be regarded as positive and stimulating inside the military organization, but negative and repulsive outside the military. A combative image and a masculine warrior image are two elements of military culture, which are not generally accepted in civilian environment (Garb 2000: 278). Furthermore, both become more and more unacceptable in the non-military world of liberal values.

The value gap is a significant obstacle for soldiers' conversion, because they were trained in a conservative military ethos necessary for discipline, morale and obedience. As the military is increasingly expected to reflect values and norms of society in order to maintain popular support, the military ethos might come into contradiction with public expectations. In order to achieve efficiency, military has to shape a common professional military culture and a common mind. The military mind is tied to a distinct goal, mission and the methods required for executing that mission. It is a product of intra-occupational socialization, which provides homogenization of values or occupational minds. Abrahamsson (1972: 78) listed the five components of a military mind: nationalism, pessimism, alarmism, conservatism, authoritarianism. These components derive from specific military goals and military education, but they might be also a product of strengthening certain values, attitudes and interests of people (cadets) who have decided to become officers. Military values may reflect the anticipatory socialization, military socialization stage or a life-cycle of the soldier. Therefore, in order to change the military mind into a civilian professional mind (and culture), military professionals should be exposed to re-socialization and re-education, which is actually the beginning of the conversion of the military mind.

There are two predominant theses on the role of military socialization and its impact on the development of military mind. The first one belongs to the theory of total institutions, like prisons, concentration camps, orphanages or military garrisons, where the institution guides the life of its members according to a fixed

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[9]In Slovenian Armed Forces the precondition to enter the professional files of the army is the adequate civilian degree: the vocational degree for privates, the high school degree for NCOs and the college or the university degree for officers.

schedule, at a common place and separated from society. The socialization in the total institution is mortification (Goffman 1964), which totally changes the socialization framework of the individual. The military mind, produced in this kind of military socialization, would require a broader range of re-socialization approaches, mainly concentrated on the "demilitarization" of values.

The second thesis of military socialization argues that the military organization mainly strengthens the attitudes and values, developed in primary and/or in anticipatory socialization, of self-selected military personnel. The cross-national study of students from ten European military academies, led by Giuseppe Caforio, tried to "determine the extent to which value orientations and ethical conceptions typical of professional officers are due to the educational process undergone by individuals before entering the academies (as a process of primary socialization or as a kind of anticipatory socialization), and the extent to which, on the contrary, military educational institutions have an impact as secondary socialization agencies" (Caforio and Nuciari 1998: 7).

The self-selection for military jobs opens the questions of motives to enter the military organization and consequently, the question of the conversion's success in a time of reductions or expected turnover of professionals. Sarvaš and Hodny (1998: 20) differentiated between divergent (traditional) motives for joining the military, for example serving the nation, interest in the military or admiring a certain military personality, family tradition, interest in a leadership role, in a disciplined organization, in sport, in physical activities; and convergent (post-traditional) motives, as for example income, job security, further education and training, social promotion.

Knowledge of motives that draw people to join the military is important to explain the success of reintegration or conversion of military professionals. A group of professionals sharing convergent motives to enter the military would convert into civilian life more successfully than the group with divergent motives. The expectations of the "convergent" group regarding the

working conditions in the military derive from the factors that could also be provided by many civilian institutions. The "divergent" group is searching for characteristics of the military that make it the so-called "sui generis" organization. Their personal motivation to leave the military and to adapt to general civilian values and attitudes would be far more difficult.

Post-conflict Demobilization and Conversion

The post-war or post-conflict demobilization is the complex of military, social, economic, and psychological measures, which occurs after the termination of violent conflict, and sometimes also within the time of it. Some militaries mobilize soldiers for the whole duration of the conflict (like guerrilla combatants in partisan units of the Second World War in Yugoslavia, or combatants of The Governmental Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992–1995), whilst others mobilize combatants for a certain period of offensive operations, then demobilize them, and call them up again before the next offensive (for example, Croatian Army in the 1991–1995 war). Demobilization involves many actors with different roles and interests. It follows peace accords, capitulations, and victories, with or without the help of the international community. If it comes after victory, it usually affects the traditionally non-military groups of soldiers, as those with a more traditionally soldier-like image form the new post-conflict military. Women combatants[10] and marginal ethnic groups are among the first to be dismissed. Female ex-combatants produce new social tensions, because during combat, they have acquired a new

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[10]There were many women combatants in Croatian Army in 1991–1995 war. They were allowed to serve in all services and branches, without restrictions and in general, their male comrades did not make any exceptions when letting them fight in all dangerous situations. Immediately after the war, in demobilization processes and soon after, women were restricted from some jobs and their military knowledge and expertise was put in question. It means that their expertise was good enough for waging war, but not to administer in peace.

war identity and became aware of the possibility of equal chances in civil society as well. When released, they are expected to return to their traditional roles. This is an analytical interest of the sociology of the military, i.e. who are the groups that are the first to leave the military.

The post-war demobilization might be a planned process, which follows the pre-existing military plan. Also in some cases, where international organizations provide help to demobilize the combatants, the procedures are well known: combatants are brought to assembly areas, where they are registered, disarmed, issued with identification cards, sometimes they are also given health care, reorientation assistance and financial or material support to start the new activities. In other cases, soldiers are demobilized directly out of the barracks (Kingma 2000: 222). The period, which follows the act of demobilization, is of interest for the sociology of the military. The reintegration to the civilian life is very slow and not always a successful process. Ex-combatants have to find employment, which is difficult, especially in post-conflict areas, often with destroyed industry.. Their military experiences, skills and norms might cause social conflicts. They are very dangerous in situations where de-mythologization of the war in which they fought appears. If they are converted into new professional roles (for example, the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) combatants were disarmed as soldiers and re-armed as members of the Kosovo police or Kosovo Security Force), they might continue with behavior learned in the military organization. In some cases, veterans are exposed to psychological rehabilitation efforts. In many post-war countries there is no psychological help and veterans with war trauma might pose a threat to themselves or to the broader community (murders, suicides).[11]

There is also a possibility of moving into another military or even crime. People with military skills are easy to mobilize, if they are not in adequate living conditions. They can be used as mercenaries in other conflict areas, as happened in 2015 with Croatian veterans fighting at the side of Ukrainian Governmental Forces, and Serbian veterans, taking part in the East Ukrainian Crisis as Anti-Governmental Rebels.

Child Soldiers

A special problem of demobilization involves child soldiers. According to Vandergrift (2000: 347), child soldiers are defined as people less than 18 years of age who form part of regular or irregular armed forces. Pursuant to certain legal documents, the term "child soldier" means young people under the age of 18 (Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in 1989) who are militarily trained, accompany armed family members and military units as candidates for combatants, or who are used as slaves of military commanders during civil wars. Some cultures do not care about such global-level documents, but regard military involvement as part of personal maturity or as one of the phases of initiation. This comes about when soldiers are needed, regardless of their age. The children who take part in hostilities become legitimate military targets, individuals whose death or disablement results in the weakening of the armed forces of the enemy, which is the only legitimate aim in war (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill 1997: 70). Children are recruited (forced) into the army or they volunteer.

The low cost of lightweight guns makes the use of child soldiers very attractive for militaries. Advanced army technology is also very simple to use. Child soldiers are easily manipulated to go into dangerous situations and may be prepared to carry out the toughest jobs to satisfy their commanders. Some children act as spies. Other young people perceive their own personal security as greater within an armed movement than outside, alongside fellow orphans, street children, refugees and displaced civilians. Demobilizing child

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[11]War in Croatia (1991–1995) produced large veteran population, because about 350.000 men and women circulated through Croatian Army. More than 900 war veterans committed suicides after the war. Incidents with weapons (hand grenades, rifles, and pistols) are still very common. Experts estimate that almost 20% of Croatian war veterans need psychiatric help (Zunec et al. 2000: 300).

soldiers is complicated due to their experiences in war, detention, committing harsh crimes, their desire to seek revenge, having witnessed violent acts and the killing of family members. Even if they regret their decision to volunteer, they often find it impossible to leave the armed group safely. Converting a child soldier is far more difficult than for older combatants. They have lost school time, suffered physical injuries and experienced severe trauma. For those who spent their school-age years as fighters, it is unlikely they will return to education programs, because they are more concerned with getting a job. Without any skills and training applicable in a civil society, they are unlikely to find work.

Beside the problems the child soldiers pose after the end of a conflict due to difficulties in adapting to civil life (without schooling, family support, burdened by war traumas), they are also very dangerous adversaries during conflicts. Their behavior on the battlefield is unpredictable. Soldiers from peacekeeping units are frequently shocked when they are forced to act against child soldiers.

Conclusion

Defense conversion was perceived as a peace-activists' slogan from the military point of view for a long time. During the Cold War it was seen as a strange and threatening idea to the military, and as desired goal for the peace movements, which fought for humanity's needs, rather than military security. A lot of myths were created about it and many people naively expected a direct shift from military expenditure to other categories of social spending after the end of the Cold War. There were some positive results in quantitative measures of conversion in the first decade of the post-Cold War period, but not as many as expected. Many other goals, not only quantitative economic, but also qualitative political, cultural, personnel goals of conversion, were achieved. As they are not quantitatively designed, it is not possible to count them in a short-term period. The reality of the post-Cold War period brings the rapidly increased decline

of armed forces of the whole world and especially in Europe. It brings the urgent need to reorient research and development for military purposes into other, civil, activities. Many military facilities, such as bases, barracks, and training fields are closed and the search for new functions of the closed military infrastructure is a common military and social effort (Prebilič 2001). Demilitarization of armed forces, known as civilianization, and demilitarization of social values (Haltiner 1985) are pushing the contemporary military into a postmodern military (Moskos et al. 2000). Nearly eight million soldiers were dismissed between 1987 and 1997 as a result of peacetime demobilization. So, there is a huge post-Cold War dividend appearing in the world of modern militaries, but it brings many requests for additional financial help to convert freed resources from military to civilian use. Conversion of surpluses in the military is becoming the desired goal of the freed and dismissed human military surpluses and not just the peace activists' weapon against the military.

The military identity is under many types of pressure: the push to change its exclusiveness into more a civilianized outlook comes from the civilian society, from political decision-makers and from the international community. The military has lost some classical military functions regarding the national security of the country and gained some new military functions, incorporated in operations other than war. Armed forces, which were in the past reduced to main social border-control mechanisms within states, are now at the forefront of establishing flexible borders. Contemporary armed forces in Europe and in transition countries are encouraging cross-border cooperation with their bilateral and multilateral military agreements. Soldiers from different countries, serving together under UN command in peace-keeping operations, are developing a new sense of multicultural military identity. This means the overwhelming conversion of nation-based military mind into international military identity.

As the post-Cold War period has brought about greater scepticism and a lack of interest in defense matters among the public, the social

context of changes is very much in favour of conversion. The defense sector as a whole and especially the military has to accept the challenge of transforming thir warfare identity into wellfare identity.

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Author Biography

Ljubica Jelušič professor of Military Sociology, Polemology, and Peace Operations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. She published numerous articles and book chapters on armed forces and society, military legitimacy, public opinion on security matters, defense conversion, restructuring of the armed forces, international operations and missions. Between 2008 and 2011, she served as Defense Minister of the Republic of Slovenia.

Mixing up Humans and Military Technology

23

René Moelker and Narda Schenk

There is a problem with doors. Visitors push them to get in or pull on them to get out (or vice versa), but then the door remains open. That is, instead of the door you have a gaping hole in the wall through which, for instance, cold rushes in and heat rushes out. Of course, you could imagine that people … would be well disciplined … They will learn to close the door behind them and retransform the momentary hole into a well-sealed wall. The problem is that discipline is not the main characteristic of people. Are they going to be well-behaved? Jim Johnson (1988: 300)

The Rise of Transhumans

People are not disciplined by nature. Therefore the technology of the door closer is used as a solution to the problem of discipline and the problem of those darn doors that should be shut. Latour's (1997) door closer is about relations of humans with nonhumans and how this relation is intertwined. And it is all about power, the chance to influence the behavior of others (Weber 1978: 53). One can delegate closing the door to a human, but humans are often unreliable and undisciplined, therefore, closing the door is delegated to the door-closer! And here comes in military sociology, since Latour describes the function of technology to be a lieutenant. Latour means literally *lieu tenant,* locum tenens (Moelker 1995). Machines, computers and other technological gadgets are replacements, place holders. In this way machines become human, and humans become machines. In the same line of reasoning, a general may treat his subordinates as robots, and his machine gun as his girlfriend.

The machines do not yet actually have awareness, but with smart technology this will be the next step. Technology in this perspective is deeply anthropomorphic. We are all place holders, humans as well as nonhumans. Since the difference is hard to establish we might speak of transhumans and considering recent developments it seems that the transhuman quality of technology is on the rise.

In Latour's work technological artifacts obtain human characteristics and humans are depicted as machines, robots or computers. In one of his groundbreaking articles on technology—titled 'mixing humans and nonhuman together, the sociology of a door-closer'—the author himself becomes a machine. This is achieved by writing under the pen name of Johnson (1988). Jim Johnson is the computerized author Latour and—to use a concept of Latour that is closely connected to the military—is his own lieutenant.

Military technology also shapes the relationships between humans and humans and nonhumans and moreover the lines distinguishing the two are getting blurred. The boundary between man and machine always was blurred, because technology springs of from human imagination and is designed to fit the human body and the human organization. The blurredness of it all is in the fact that technology is man made, but also

R. Moelker (✉) · N. Schenk
Netherlands Defense Academy, P.O. Box 90.002,
4811 XC Breda, The Netherlands
e-mail: r.moelker@mindef.nl

it is a maker of men. An early revolution of military affairs is in the invention of the stirrups that spread from China to medieval Europe. It changed history. It changed the role of the cavalry. And it changed men riding on horses into horsemen. The small iron prosthesis caused for a fusion between man and horse, and also changed the mind of the riders in terms of changing strategy, tactics and military culture (McNeill 1982: 20).

From the stirrups it is a great leap in time to the Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS) but the idea again mixes humans and technology. The suit is an example of really fusing the human and the nonhuman and making cyborg science fiction to a reality (van Burken 2013, 2014). The Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit is designed as 'a ballistic protection armor, a chemical/biological detection device, a medication or live sustaining delivery instrument and a health status monitoring device' (van Burken 2013: 219). The idea of using liquid kevlar based body-armor gained the suit its nick name 'Iron Man'. The exoskeleton enhances and multiplies bodily power so that the soldier of the future can outrun others whilst carrying heavy military gear. The soldier is connected and lined up with hundreds of biosensors that provide an external sensory network. Vision and other bodily functions can be enhanced and feedback from other sources can be integrated in the information processing hardware of the suit. From afar the soldier is monitored and manipulated by manned and unmanned systems that amongst others relate to climate control. If the soldier's bodily functions like blood pressure or heart rate are too low or too high, medication can be applied from far away. Some one at the other side of the world may control all biological parameters. '… experimentation has started to fully comprehend how this innovation may impact existing doctrines, organizational structures, training' and of course also the soldier himself (van Burken 2013: 220). The soldier himself will in future be confronted with technology that is invasive, meaning that the men-machine interface will be a machine in men interface.

Although the above reads like science fiction, the developments are for the near future and just as with the stirrups … men has always used technology to gain the competitive edge and to intentionally or unintentionally lever organizational structures and tilt the power balance. If technology is part of planned invention, it can be used as a means to adapt the organization to the complexity of the environment and to lessen the complexity of the organizations' work processes (Demchack 1991) according to Ashby's (1956) law of requisite variety. If technology is applied haphazard, without plan, it often leads to disappointing results that are contrary to expectations. Moreover, since technology can be used as either a tool for change, or as a tool solidifying power relationships, it can be a blessing or/and a curse. It can be a tool in the hands of progressive change agents just as easy as it can be used to conserve the status quo and to protect vested interests. It can be used to further well being, and at the same time it can be used to control and discipline people.

The argument in this chapter is developed along the three axis in Fig. 23.1. First of all the technology axis describes how humans broke away from nature by using tools and machines. Making tools is part of human nature, but tool making also enables humans to be more independent and rise above subsistence level. This introduces the second axis, the individual axis, because while making tools and machines, humans create freedom for themselves, but at the same time they also create their own forms of captivity, more specifically, people subject themselves to discipline by their own agency. The third axis regards the organization of the way that humans relate to other humans and the manner in which they deal with constraints. Humans have a need to be social and want to live in groups. People organize themselves in societal structures, develop a division of labor and organize along power lines. Dealing with constraints is political work by which technology is used in order to change power relationships. At the organizational level the constraints can be resolved by agency or planned invention by individual actors. Therefore the organizational

Fig. 23.1 Technology axis, individual axis and the organizational constraint axis

constraint axis might just as well be equated to the political axis.

Outline of the chapter: before this chapter really takes off, first 'technology' will have to be defined. From the definition we already learn to look beyond the gadgets and novelties that are so often equated with the concept. Definitions are important so that the mix up between technology and humans can be decomposed in analytic fashion. It will help us (in section three) understand how it was possible that technology became a leading ideology (Moelker et al. 1997) that mystified the man made nature of things and led us to believe in the redemption of the positive outcomes of technology and the way that technology determines the progress we make without human choice having much effect. We debunk different forms of technological determinism as ideology. We will illustrate the workings of technological determinism by illustrative cases from history (machine guns and tanks), and by fleshing out the political factors that impacted the introduction of the M-16 in Vietnam. In section four the debate on determinism versus human agency is decided in favor of 'planned invention'. Organizational change agents like the Prince Maurice and Lieutenant-General De Gribeauval, proved to be able to use technology to remodel the military organization in a fashion that levered power, changed their own organization and helped them to win their battles. The careful implementation of technology often had to be introduced gently by convincing many

adversaries and other constraints and hence change agents had to apply 'planned invention'. In the fifth section we go beyond the debate on determinism versus freedom of choice whilst trying to find out what remains of the boundary between technology and humans. Military technology is getting more advanced in the field of robots and drones, 3D printing, the cyber domain, space and biometrics and engineers and scientists are pushing the frontiers in all these areas so convincingly that the line between the technology and the human is getting blurred, the technology axis collapses, hence the advent of trans-humans. The distinction between humans and machine gradually becomes irrelevant with machines that are intelligently making machines. We will conclude with some guidelines on safeguarding this borderline, and some reflections on the future of war and technology.

Introducing Technology and the 'Research' Questions

Technology is a buzzword as well as a container concept and therefore the meaning of the word is diluted. On the one hand technology is embraced and regarded with optimism (Moelker and Klinkert 1999, 2000). Each infantryman is already connected to several battlefield management systems that make use of portable computers, the Internet, and military networks. He or she is able to communicate with other soldiers

and superiors and get information on locations and weapon systems of friend and foe. These developments behold the promise of enhanced capabilities whilst improving the individual safety of the soldiers. On the other hand there always is resistance against the introduction of new technologies. During informal gatherings one can hear service men muttering about the modernization of military training: man to man fighting skills, or the skills to wield the bayonet, are lost. Culture, tradition and vested interest are mostly the reasons for the resistance against emerging technologies.

Technology is without doubt one of the major factors impacting the changes in the military profession. Some of the changes in war are directly connected with the rise of new technologies. Wars are no longer restricted to certain seasons but can go on summer or winter, day or night. Technological improvements in means of communication, logistics, precision and firing range of weapons made it possible that the length of the frontline and the depth of the battlefield changed. Frontlines became longer and the depth of battlefield became shorter. Dupuy (1980) calculated that the average depth of the battlefield was only 17 km in WWI (Table 23.1). During WWII the depth of the battlefield was 57 km. During the Yom Kippur war (1973) the depth was 70 km. Over time the length of the frontline became longer. 14 km during WWI, 48 km in WWII and 57 km in the Yom Kippur war. This development automatically meant that the battlefield became emptier. Soldiers were dispersed over the battlefield. The amount of square meters per soldier augmented in the course of time. During WWI each soldier had 2475 m^2 of the battlefield to himself. During the Yom Kippur the dispersion of the soldiers was such that each

soldier had 40,000 m^2 at his disposal. These changes also changed the way of fighting from static attrition warfare to swift maneuver warfare and the present day preference for Effect Based Operations. In modern warfare the emphasis is not on direct confrontation with the enemy but on smart, swift, and small operations avoiding direct enemy contact (Moelker and Born 1997). Many theorists of strategy nowadays dispute the existence of any sort of frontline. Drone technology only underlines the fact that the concept of a frontline has dissolved. The operators are in places remote from the places where the drone will eliminate its target. Special Forces are parachuted deep into hostile territory but the adversary acts similarly out of area. The proponents of Islamic State or similar political entities may strike in a conflict area but just as easily they will strike in Paris, Brussels or anywhere. The home front is the immediate target in modern warfare causing immense collateral damage, in fact, although politicians will never admit it, it seems that collateral damage has become the objective of modern warfare. It is not only hearts and mind that have to be won, but also bodies and souls. We will elaborate on this idea later on.

Technology raises the expectation that the future will be bright and that armed forces can do more with less (personnel). The latest developments are in line with this optimist expectation. The use of artificial intelligence enables robots to perform tasks without human intervention. Robots now can detect targets and fire at them autonomously. Accordingly the new weapons are nicknamed 'kill bots' (Singer 2011). In the demilitarized zone between North- and South Korea this technology is applied successfully. The autonomously operating technology meets little legal or ethical objections in this area

Table 23.1 Patterns of dispersion of armies in the past (army or corps of 100,000 soldiers)

	Napoleontic wars	American Civil war	WW I	WW II	Yom Kippur war (1973)
Frontline (km)	8.05	8.58	14	48	57
Depth (km)	2.50	3.0	17	57	70
M2 per soldier	200	276	2475	27,500	40,000

Source Dupuy (1980: 312)

because they are applied where trespassing is punished by immediate death. Yet, even in this supposed no man's zone, people err and for different reasons try their luck. A robot named 'BigDog' is intended to serve as a mechanical mule that carries weapons or provisions for US military troops. A robot does not tire, nor loses concentration. Drones can reliably perform at surveillance tasks to gather intelligence that would otherwise have been difficult to gather. Because of miniaturization it is possible to send unmanned aircrafts into urban areas where they can get closer to possible targets. The sensors on robots are superior to human eyes and can also detect heat and movement in the dark, in bad weather conditions, or through walls. Robots do not experience emotions that impair their functioning and therefore are less liable to violate ethical standards of behavior, i.e. a robot, if programmed well, is less likely to commit war crimes. Nonetheless they can do the dirty work while the operators are out of harm's way so that new technology saves the lives of the own soldiers (Oudes and Zwijnenburg 2011).

But, as already mentioned, there are downsides too, because the technology in use causes more civilians than soldiers to be killed in conflict. The percentage non-combatant victims has become larger, whilst the military casualty rate dropped (Pinker 2011). Whilst the chances of survival for regular soldiers never have been so favorable, the non-combatant population seems the main target and victim in modern conflicts.

With automation specific skills are lost. If robots take over tasks from humans, deskilling (Braverman 1974) will take place. The knowledge required will eventually be lost if there is nobody to learn the skills from (Rochlin 1997). By automation human flaws are removed from the workflow, but along with this, the creativity and adaptive capability that makes humans so special is removed as well (Rochlin 1997). There is an additional risk of moral deskilling. If humans step out of the loop and leave the targeting decision to robots, we are deprived of the opportunity to act morally (Vallor 2013). Automation, computerization and mechanization

do reduce human error, but the Network Centric Warfare system introduces also new kinds of friendly fire errors (Rochlin 1997; Snook 2000). Friend or foe recognition remains difficult as is illustrated by the civilian Malaysian aircraft MH17 that was hit in the Ukrainian air space. The MH17 was perhaps deliberately taken down, but it is probable that the civilian plane was mistaken for a military target.

All can agree that technology is important. But what are we actually talking about? How can technology be defined? The meaning of the concept has broadened and become a shallow indication for novelties, but it is more than that. According to Berting (1992: 19) technology has a three-fold meaning.

1. Technology can refer to a combination of man-made and man constructed *artifacts*. Technological objects are things, utensils, and apparatuses. The computer is an example of an apparatus useful for calculations, designing, writing and so on.

2. Technology also refers to human activities, to human labor connected with the use of technical artifacts. The artifacts are useless without the knowledge of the manufacture, maintenance and use of them. When we return to the example of the computer; it is impossible to operate the apparatus without the knowledge of the human–machine interface as—for instance—described in manuals. The manuals are a description of the *action system* necessary to operate the machines or artifacts. To be able to write this chapter, the author first had to acquire knowledge, by reading manuals and consulting his kind and more informed colleagues, on the use of word processors.

3. The third meaning of technology is as broad as can be and refers to a higher level of knowledge. In this meaning technology is the totality of knowledge necessary to generate new solutions. It refers to a scientific *system of knowledge* in it's most abstract forms. One of the sciences governing the operation of the software in our computers is mathematics.

Without it, programmers could never have made the programs we work with.

After defining 'technology' the questions guiding the analysis can be specified and they are threefold. First of all we aim at illustrating the use of the technological determinism for covering up power relationships and the use of agency in organizations. The myth of technological determinism states that technology is almost automatically introduced causing power relationships to be masked. Seemingly the introduction of new technology is automatic. This automatism gives the impression that power has got little to do with the introduction of technology. It is this myth that is debunked in the sections below. Secondly we deal with the question how military commanders may make more transparent use of power in the introduction of new technology. This question focuses on the transformative use of agency in relation to technology and planned invention. Thirdly we ask ourselves where is the end to the blurring of the boundaries between technology and humans? The relevance of this question pertains to accountability and disciplining of humans and machines. Since artificial intelligence enables machines to kill based on autonomous decisions, we hence are transferring decision-making processes to machines, computers and gunnery systems. Moreover humans and machines are becoming transhuman tilting the organizational constraint axis in such a manner that agency could be moving away from humans.

Debunking Determinism

The basic idea behind all deterministic models lies in the paradigm of control. This paradigm implies that reality can be controlled by the use of technology. The roots of this way of paradigm originates from the era of enlightenment. Before the enlightenment the social arrangements were legitimated by the traditional order installed by the highest deities. People acquiesce in this situation for there is no way that they can protest against this divine order. The enlightenment replaced the traditional world-view with the paradigm of control. It states that;

- the world can be created by men aided by technology;
- scientific models can be applied to all areas of life (rationalization and secularization);
- the technological factor is the 'prime mover' (Moelker 1992).

The appliance of calculation (Weber 1992: 17) leads to a disenchantment—'die Entzauberung der Welt'—completing the rupture between the pre-modern and magical way of thinking that is characteristic of the times preceding the enlightenment. A disenchanted world is a world dominated by science, technology and bureaucracy (as a rational instrument of control). The model of Kerr et al. (1973)—in which the concept of the '*iron hand of technology*' is put forwards—is renowned and is an example of the disenchantment of the world caused by science and technology. In this model scientific knowledge is imperative to the appliance of technology. Rational processes of decision-making, aimed at obtaining the most optimal position in competitive economic systems, lead automatically to the choice of the best technology. The next step in the model is that the form and structure of organization is determined by the best technology. Industrial relations, the way labor processes are organized, quality of work and all other societal institutions are derived from the preceding causal factors in the model. The last (and least important) part of the model is culture. Culture—in this model—is no more than a remainder. It is not capable of autonomous influence although it might facilitate adaptation of humans to the technological system requirements. Educational systems and labor market make the system function smoothly. People have to adapt to the (educational and labor market) system so that they can fit into the form of the organization and the technological demands. Interesting in this model are the political implications. As technology is the most important factor causing change political systems will converge. The differences in political systems—

capitalism and socialism—will finally disappear. Technology causes societies to converge upon each other. Especially the percentage of 'white collar' workers will grow in both type of societies. Presently only North Korea diverges strongly from the Western mode of production.

The technological paradigm of control takes on different forms, but the fundamental idea remains the same. For example: Bell (1976) states that our society has evolved into an open society that is no longer industrial but post-industrial and knowledge based. An optimistic belief in progress is inherent in the views of authors like Bell and Kerr (1983).

Military intellectuals, strategists, and commanders often think along the lines of the technological paradigm of control. In order to obtain pragmatic solutions they turn to new or emerging technologies more advanced then the technologies of their adversaries. The optimism that problems are controllable thanks to modern technology is not the only thing that appeals to the military elite. Technology and especially information technology promises control over matter. Technological tools beholds the sweet promise that when the machinery of violence is released, the military elite remains in control. It is a promise of power that is promoted because the myth of technological determinism masks the power structures that underlie the introduction of new technology.

The Myth of Automatic Introduction; Machine Guns and Tanks

World War I was crucial to the development of modern industrial warfare. In only four years military technology (Griffith 1994) and its battlefield applications advanced tremendously. The static trench warfare stimulated innovations whose purpose it was to regain mobility. From the perspective of the paradigm of control one would expect that every innovation would be applauded. In accordance with the model of Clark Kerr new technology should lead to adaptations in organization. Rogers (1983) explains this optimistic view from the '*pro*

innovation bias': the expectancy that all progress comes from new technological innovations.

Contrary to optimist expectations, the machine gun and the tank were not welcome in the traditional structures of the English armed forces. The weapons found their ways in independent corps, the Machine Gun (established 1915) and the Tank Corps (established 1917). But implementation of these weapons met much resistance.

Introduction of the Machine Gun

Based on nineteenth century American inventions by Gatling, Hiram S. Maxim and John M. Browning (see Ellis 1986) a gun with high firing speed was constructed. Civilian engineers made these inventions, not army technicians. The military in general was not supportive of this kind of modernization and technology. The second half of the 19th century was an era of invention, mass production and technological progress, but in the military the idea lingered that wars were decided by courageous individuals who were motivated by patriotism, honor and heroism. Most prestigious were bayonet fighting and the cavalry charge as signs of human strength of will and courage. This dominant way of thinking also was a protest against the modernization of society. Especially officers stuck to a worldview that was predominantly pre-industrial.

Was the machine gun not used at all? No, limited amounts of guns were bought for use in the colonies. In colonial wars, where European powers were outnumbered by their adversaries, mostly the original inhabitants, the machine gun proved to be effective. It was a weapon not considered honorable to use against civilized Europeans. Black opponents were not regarded as equals, which made it easy to disregard the concept of 'fair play'.

Neither colonial experiences, nor the use of the machine gun in the Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905) changed the mindset of the military. The simple idea that increased firepower could be decisive in modern warfare fell on barren grounds. Cultural preoccupations and

mindset caused much discussion on the question where the machine gun could fit into the organization. Officers with experience in colonial wars favored the idea that the infantry should use the weapon. But most infantry officers were against the use of the heavy and not easily transportable machine gun and preferred to regard it as a part of artillery far behind the front line. Artillery officers were not keen on incorporating the machine gun into their midst neither. In 1914, the beginning of WWI, none of the traditional army branches was willing to adopt the machine gun.

The most important advocate of the machine gun was Captain George M. Lindsay. The infantry officer had learned to appreciate the machine gun based on experiences in the Boer war. He realized that firepower was crucial in combat. Ceaselessly he pleaded his case before the British military top decision-makers. Idealistically an elite unit of specialists should use the weapon in order to gain as much profit as possible without hindering infantry and artillery. Lindsay wanted an independent, mobile, motorized *machine gun force* to break through the trenches. Lindsay claimed that new technologies would replace traditional fighting.

Trench warfare in winter 1914–1915 and the failure to bring maneuver warfare tactics into the battle changed things for the machine gun. The onslaught that resulted from attempts to break through enemy lines became characteristic for the Western front. The Germans, having the availability over more machine guns and using them in a more dispersed way, caused heavy losses to the British. Though the British were tempted to ascribe these losses to their own lack of 'offensive spirit' the real cause of the losses was a change in the nature of battle. Battle had become dominated by mere firepower putting aside old military values as bravery and sacrifice. Given the effectiveness of the machine gun, the firepower of one machine gun equals that of eighty infantrymen, civilian politicians pointed to the fact that the use of the machine gun would save lives. Technological development and modernization were inevitable. Old values had to disappear. But Lindsays' wish that the Machine

Corps should be an independent unit was not feasible. The corps was obliged to work closely with infantry and artillery.

From 1915 the machine gun had developed to the nucleus of both firepower and maneuver tactics in infantry. In 1918 the first regulations were written down underlining the importance of firepower. But the Machine Corps soon was threatened by emerging technologies, especially the invention of the tank (Liddell Hart 1959). Financial cuts after WWI resulted in the end of the Machine Gun Corps.

Introduction of the Tank

Just like the introduction of the machine gun, the tank also met resistance from traditional branches of the army. Again, the most fervent advocates of innovation were to be found in strange places, more specifically a group of engineers in the navy. Propagandists were Winston Churchill, at the time First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lieutenant-colonel Swinton, a military engineer. As early as 1914 Churchill propagated armored cars. Though rejected by the army, this idea survived in navy circles and led to the establishment of the Land Ship Committee. Swinton was inspired by the caterpillar tracks used on American agricultural machinery and hoped to overcome the difficulties of trench warfare by using tanks. The new machines should be able to destroy machine guns and to cross obstacles and trenches in the terrain.

The army was skeptical about the new innovations—minister of war Field Marshall Horatio Kitchener—called them 'pretty mechanical toys', but when the machinery improved technically, Swinton got his chance. In 1916 the first constructions—in separate parts—were transported to France. Not to lose the element of surprise people were made to believe that the parts were water tanks for Russia and the Middle East. This also explains the origin of the name 'tank'. An independent Tank Corps was established. Lieutenant-colonel John Fuller made plans for the future use of the tank and got to put his ideas into practice during the battle for Cambrai in

November 1917. Hundreds of tanks were able to make a breach of 10 km depth into the German front line. But the Germans, after the first surprise, were able to regain the terrain. The British military top brass was not convinced of the tanks' usefulness. Field Marshall Douglas Haig still believed in the decisive role of cavalry. In August 1918 350 tanks again broke through the front lines in the battle of Amiens, but this military success did not take away the resistance against the tank.

After the war Fuller kept on promoting the use of the tank. In 1923 the Armoured Car Companies were renamed the Royal Tank Corps and the soldiers were allowed to wear the black beret (an idea which originated from the French).

But even after 1923 the Royal Tank Corps was not integrated into the organization and tactical procedures of the traditional army branches. Amongst the cavalry the ideal of officers as gentlemen and sportsmen remained one of the central values. Resistance was not uncommon even in the United States where the tank was a part of infantry since 1920. Cultural barriers delayed the implementation of new technology. Politics are maybe as important as culture. Vested interests are decisive for the openness of mind of the established military elite. The use of machine guns and tanks could be the end of traditional branches such as infantry and cavalry. At the least these branches would have to be reformed and reorganized. Returning to the model of Clark Kerr: technology did—because of cultural and political factors—not automatically lead to changes in organization. In fact, in many instances culture and vested interests caused technology to be used in a wrong manner. The necessary changes in the organization could only be brought about by political labor of advocates of the new technology, advocates who did not regard technological artifacts as isolated 'gadgets' but who were willing to think in a holistic way about the best way to couple new technology to organizational requirements and to introduce the new technology in a convincing manner, slowly overcoming resistance.

Political Resistance Bordering to Criminal Negligence: The M16

Tradition, culture and vested interests are important factors in the introduction of new technology. Demonstrating the role of these factors unmasks the myth of technological determinism. Vested interests and underlying power structures can hinder the successful implementation of technology. It is only occasionally that the power relationships become visible and in those scarce instances the naked truth can be shocking. Conspiracy, intrigue, power plays, self-enrichment and even criminal negligence come to the surface when critical researchers unveil the sinister webs that are woven by powerful stakeholders. In general theories of conspiracy, like the theory on the Military Industrial Complex, lack plausibility, but sometimes there is a grain of truth in them.

Fallows (1985) is one of the few successful debunkers of myths of technology. His story is on the introduction of the famous M16 riffle in the United States Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. The M16, produced by the Armalite Corporation, was a competitor of the M14 that was produced in a joint venture between civilian industry and the army's own arsenal system and Ordnance Corps (a part of the US-army responsible amongst others for the testing of rifles). The Ordnance Corps' M14 used a large .30-caliber round and was uncontrollable in automatic firing. The explosive charge needed to propel the heavy bullets was so great that the kick was ferocious. This even caused nosebleeds. The M16 proved to be the superior rifle, at the time it was the most reliable, most lethal infantry gun ever invented—therefore it was decided that after 1965 it should be handed out to soldiers in Vietnam. It was technically superior, used a smaller caliber round (0.22) and was easier to operate. The technicians of the Ordnance Corps ridiculed the caliber size. In their opinion the gun using this caliber was only fit to shoot at squirrels. But the smaller caliber resulted in greater stability of the

gun. The greater stability made it better controllable during automatic firing. On entry in the human body the smaller caliber started to rotate causing more damage than a larger caliber would. The M16 was not so heavy as the M14. Therefore the soldiers could carry more ammunition.

As the M16 was made by a civilian enterprise, the Amalite Corporation, the Ordnance Corps felt put aside. The Ordnance Corps lost it's monopoly. This is the reason why the Ordnance Corps made some 'improvements'. Adaptations to the barrel made the bullet rotate more during flight and therefore it followed a straighter path. But this improvement also caused the bullet to be less lethal at the moment that it penetrated the human body. The most important change was the appliance of a different powder: 'ball powder'. A higher firing speed was made possible because of the use of this powder. 1000 bullets a minute could be fired instead of 750.

According to Fallows the results were disastrous. The bullets jammed on many occasions because of 'fouling', a powder residue on the inside of the gas tube and chamber. The higher firing rate also caused the weapon to jam. Testing proved that with normal powder there were 3.2 malfunctions per 1000 rounds. Using the ball powder the failure rate was six times higher per 1000 rounds. The weapon, because of this powder, chronically refused to function in battle conditions. Soldiers in action in Vietnam were desperate. They were equipped with a gun that stopped functioning during life threatening moments. They started to write letters to their girlfriends, parents, to the weapon industry and to their congressmen. Parents in Idaho received this letter from their son, a Marine:

> Our M-16 s aren't worth much. If there's dust in them, they will jam. Half of us don't have cleaning rods to unjam them. Out of 40 rounds I've fired my rifle jammed about 10 times. I pack as many grenades as I can plus bayonet and K bar (jungle knife) so I'll have something to fight with. If you can, please send me a bore rod and a 1¼ inch or so paint brush. I need it for my rifle. These rifles are getting a lot of guys killed because they jam so easy.

One man wrote to a member of the Armed Services Committee Staff, recounting what his brother told him:

> …in battles there in Vietnam the only things that were left by the enemy after they had stripped the dead of our side were the rifles, which they considered worthless. That when battles were over the dead would have the rifles beside them, torn down to attempt a repair because of some malfunction when the enemy attacked…

Another private wrote:

> Dear Sir: … our company … ran into a reinforced platoon of hard core Viet Cong. They were well dug in and boy! Was it hell getting them out. During this fight and previous ones, I lost some of my best buddies. I personally checked their weapons. Close to 70 percent had a round stuck in the chamber, and take my word it was not their fault.

And, according to Fallows (1985: 251):

> When investigators … went to Vietnam, they confirmed another report: that one Marine had been killed as he ran up and down the line in his squad, unjamming rifles, because he had the only cleaning rod in the squad.

In 1967 a congressional investigating committee conducted an exhaustive inquiry into the origins of the M-16 problem. This committee concluded that 'the failure on the part of officials with authority in the Army to cause action to be taken to correct the deficiencies borders on criminal negligence'. The bottom line is that the M16 was sabotaged. Bureaucratic rivalry, a battle in which technological and scientific arguments served as weapons, between several powerful organizations within the armed forces could probably have cost the lives of several hundreds and maybe even thousands of young soldiers. Fallows states: 'The hearing record, nearly 600 pages long, is a forgotten document, which received modest press attention at the time and calls up only dim recollections now. Yet it is the purest portrayal of the banality of evil in the records of modern American defense'.

Fallows story on the M16 rifle is a bureaucratic horror story that illustrates that politics are an essential factor in the introduction of new technology. Technology and politics are always

interwoven, and in this case for the worst because the best rifle did not get automatically adopted, since organizations from within the organization sabotaged it.

Agency and Planned Invention: The Organizational Constraint Axis

Power can be put to use to hinder the introduction of technology. But agents who intelligently make use of the power structures in order to overcome resistance to change also can deploy power to help bring about changes. Moreover there seems to be a pattern that change agents need to be aware of when combating resistance.

Travers (1990: 76) has pointed at the similarity in the stages of development regarding the organizational constraint axis:

- Invention and introduction of the new technology meets resistance of the established order;
- Acceptance at the lower levels. At shop floor level the usefulness of the new technology is acknowledged;
- No development in doctrine or tactics which could lead to implementation of the new technology. The establishment tries to marginalize the new technology. The political will power to integrate new technology into existing branches of the army or to create a new branch is lacking. The weapons are seen as an extra but the existing technical imperfections are an argument for the opponents;
- Opponents and proponents speak out more clearly. Weapons are improved;
- Tactical role of the weapon is elaborated on leading to integration in the existing order.

Fortunately, there are many illustrations of creative ways of dealing with resistance during implementing technological innovations and where officers acted as change agents. For the first example we go back to the early seventeenth century in the Netherlands when the prince Maurice reorganized his army and defeated the Spanish. The second example comes from France where in the last half of the 18th century Lieutenant General De Gribeauval reformed the Artillery overcoming resistance from Cavalry and Infantry. Both cases are examples of planned invention where the political work of making coalitions and overcoming resistance is laid bare.

Organizing for Fire Power: The Prince Maurice

One needs to consciously change power figurations in order to implement technology. Often technology and organization principles are so much intertwined that it is impossible to decide where technology stops and where organizing begins. Technology is deeply integrated in the organization. Since Henry Ford this may sound as a platitude but in the seventeenth century this concept was a novelty and a revolution in military affairs. The Dutch sociologist Jacques van Doorn was the first to point out that Ford had an important military predecessor, the prince Maurice of the Netherlands. van Doorn's (1971, 1974) thesis was that the principles of scientific management were already applied by the prince Maurice at the end of the sixteenth century /beginning of the seventeenth century. Maurice understood that he had to reorganize his army in order to profit of the new technology of his days, muskets. If he had not reorganized his army, the new technology would not have met the expectancies.

Maurice of Nassau (1567–1625), prince of Orange, was a son of William the Silent. He became stadtholder of Holland and Zeeland after the assassination (1584) of his father. He was later appointed (1588) captain general and admiral of the United Netherlands and became (1589) stadtholder of Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel. Throughout his career the Netherlands continued to struggle for independence from Spain (Biographical data from Columbia Encyclopedia 2001; for excellent Dutch biographies see Wijn 1934; van Deursen 2000).

The most dangerous weapon at the time was the cavalry. The new technologies that emerged at the end of the sixteenth century consisted of a

combination of soldiers wielding pikes together with musketeers providing for firepower. Pikes and muskets were arranged in squares with pikes in the center and musketeers on the side. Pikes normally had a length of eight meters. Musketeers could fire at the charging cavalry and when cavalry came up close they ran into a wall of pikes. This technology changed the balance between infantry and cavalry, making infantry relatively more important. But pikes and muskets were not easy to operate. Muskets were dangerous. Before inserting a bullet a charge of gunpowder had to be added. Because of the weight a fork had to be used in order to aim the musket. The musket was fired by use of a fuse that set fire to a pan with gunpowder. First the pan had to be filled with powder. Then, whilst holding the musket, the burning fuse had to be fastened to a sort of festoon that was connected to a trigger mechanism. After aiming the musket was ready to be fired. All in all it took a skilled musketeer at least three minutes to fire and to reload his musket.

The usefulness of the new technology would have been limited without organizational reform. The secret lied in infantry drills. The Spanish had developed drills but Maurice soon came to understand that the weak side of the Spanish drills was discipline, mobility and maneuverability. The squares formed by the Spanish were large and consisted of company size units (300 soldiers per square). Maurice turned to classic Roman literature and experimented with tin soldiers on a wooden table to evaluate the effect of organizational changes. He (together with his nephew) kept on experimenting till they arrived at a solution. Many changes were necessary. He divided the normal amount of soldiers per square by three creating squares of 100 soldiers thus increasing maneuverability. He tripled the amount of officers putting more emphasis on instruction, discipline and leadership. Maurice did away with the principle of self-equipment, he did not allow soldiers to bring their own muskets, and standardized the musket.

Drills were part of the organizational technology. As the time to recharge a musket amounted to three minutes Maurice introduced

the back march. After firing the musket the musketeer had to march to the back of the square. At the back the recharging started. Because of this drill Maurice was able to bring out fire constantly.

On top of all these changes the 'human resources philosophy' was adapted. Recruiting officers could no longer keep the money for recruitment in their own pockets leaving the company half-empty (sometimes companies were only filled on paper). Education and training of soldiers was improved by scientific analyses. Maurice ordered the artist Jacob de Gheyn to break down all the movements needed to fire muskets or to handle pikes. Every movement was translated in a drawing. 34 drawings were needed for instruction purposes on the firing of a musket. When one would make a slide show of these drawings an animated movie would have been the result. The same was done for the handling of pikes (18 drawings) and other weapons. Instruction needed to be visualized for the soldiers, since the mercenaries from all over Europe were not able to communicate in Dutch. Translations of the book were made resulting in one standardized command language. The drawings made by Jacob de Gheyn were no less than a classic time-motion study that was used in scientific management three centuries later.

Van Doorn rightly pointed at the similarities between the organization of Maurice's army and the principles of scientific management. Scientific analysis and time motion studies were the corner stones of his system. Maurice demonstrates that technological innovation goes hand in hand with organizational change. It then becomes possible to benefit the most from the technology outcomes. The way the organization is transformed makes part of the new technology. Without integral organizational reform new technologies would not perform as well as they could. Maurice warns us against piece meal changes that are directed at only substituting one technologic gadget with something newer. In managing change a holistic point of view and an integrative course of action is necessary. Maurice deployed agency in order to change the organizational design and moreover by experimentation

he deliberately planned the changes to be implemented. Technology was not the prime mover, but human agency was. Maurice demonstrated that humans have free choice to decide how to deploy technology.

Overcoming Resistance to Change: De Gribeauval

From Lieutenant-General De Gribeauval we learn an additional lesson. Again scientific analysis, experimentation and integral organizational design are elements in the strategy of the change agent, De Gribeauval. But De Gribeauval also knew to overcome resistance to change from the traditional branches of the army. In the eighteenth century he knew how to implement his artillery reforms by deliberately and strategically convincing the strongly opposing infantry and cavalry.

Technological developments in artillery were manifold. In the early eighteenth century each gun had to be cast in a unique and individual mold. Due to this technique it was impossible to get the core of the mold accurately with the exterior (McNeil 1985). There were many irregularities on the inside. As a result cannons had to be heavy to withstand the forceful explosions. Cannons could be used most effectively on shipboard and in fortresses. They were too heavy to serve on the battlefield and when they were used on the battlefield (or when they were used to put fortresses under siege) civilian transporters carried out the transportation. They had the means to carry heavy loads. From a military point of view this was disadvantageous for the civilian transporters were not subject to military discipline and were not willing to endanger their own lives. This limited the use of cannons.

Swiss engineers, Jean Maritz and his son, improved the technology of forging guns considerably by developing a boring machine. This machine was capable of producing a perfectly centered and smooth bore. In the period 1755–1774 this technique eventually was applied all over Europe, from Russia to England. The advantages of the new technology were greater safety and equal strength and thickness. The bored-out barrel allowed a closer fit between cannonball and gun tube. Smaller charges were needed. The walls of the cannon could be thinner allowing the weight of the gun to be reduced considerably. Reduction of the weight of cannons enabled artillery to follow the troops and to join in at the battlefield. Transportation was no longer an insurmountable barrier. Only civilian contractors were able to provide transport before these changes. Thanks to the technological developments the personnel responsible for transportation could be militarized.

Lieutenant General De Gribeauval was the key player who in the second half of the eighteenth century translated technological developments into workable organizational formats by using rational methods, science and experimentation. In this he differed little from the prince Maurice. De Gribeauval introduced many technological improvements, a screw device for elevation, a combination of shot and powder into a single package, etcetera. But the organizational side of the reforms was just as important.

As the transport of the new field artillery became the responsibility of the soldiers who fired the guns, there arose a need for drills and education. The soldiers had to learn how to maneuver with the equipment and how to attain the highest firing speed possible. De Gribeauval set up schools for artillery officers. Not only theoretical aspects were taught but also tactics of joint operation together with infantry and cavalry.

De Gribeauval did not stand-alone. He formed a group of reform minded officers. People who understood that the French army was badly managed and that changes were in place. The reform party favoring artillery changes understood the importance of mathematics and science. Social origin may also have played a role. To obtain a commission in infantry or cavalry, people were obliged to be in part of noble descent. People in artillery could obtain a commission on the basis of their civilian skills, be it technical or mathematical skills. The reformers were very much more in favor of modern

methods of warfare. As was to be expected resistance came from infantry and cavalry. These traditional army branches valued 'courage' and 'physical power' for these qualities were essential for man to man fighting. The new weapons introduced by De Gribeauval were not popular among cavalry and infantry:

> a weapon that could be used to kill soldiers impersonally and at a distance of more than half a mile offended deep-seated notions of how a fighting man ought to behave. Gunners attacking infantry at long range were safe from direct retaliations: risk ceased to be symmetrical in such a situation and that seemed unjust. Skill of an obscure, mathematical, and technological kind threatened to make old-fashioned courage and muscular prowess useless. (McNeill 1985, 236)

Disapproval was even greater in Prussia. Whereas De Gribeauval had convinced the other French army branches of the usefulness of his system—the many victories of the French army were partly based on the use of field artillery—Prussia under Frederic the Great and his successor clung to the old military values. Frederick downplayed the artillery in favor of 'discipline' and 'honor'. In 1806 the Prussians paid the toll for backwardness when they lost the battle of Jena. 'Discipline' and 'honor' were no match for the sheer firepower of the French field artillery.

De Gribeauval knew to persuade and convince the military elite and especially the infantry and cavalry generals because of several reasons. Early in his career he learned about Prussian artillery methods and became experienced with foreign artillery when he was transferred to the Austrian service. The improvements the Austrians already made formed his mindset. Presumably De Gribeauval and his party had a clear image of the future direction of artillery operations. What De Gribeauval was implementing was a form of 'planned invention' that nowadays is a common part of research and development departments.

The way he convinced the other branches was by experimentation, by demonstrations in the field and by piecemeal improvements. The firepower demonstrated in the battlefield constituted the ultimate argument.

But this argument would not have mattered much if the timing had not been right. Among the Frenchmen there was a widespread feeling that the army was badly managed and that things would have to change. These common beliefs were needed to topple the vested interests of the traditional branches that felt threatened by the rise of 'civilians' (not noblemen) into the ranks of the army.

As Travers (1990) points out, there are similarities in phases of diffusion of military technology such as the resistance that has to be overcome. This is true for muskets, field artillery, machine guns and tanks. But the introduction of machine guns and tanks clearly was a bottom up development initiated by captains and /or lieutenant colonels. The introduction of muskets and field artillery was a top down development initiated by the top brass. Both paths of development have led to the implementation of new technologies. The bottom up path is the trial and error path. The army wrongly implements technology causing failure and loss of human life. Later the errors have to be corrected. The top down path implies a choice in favor of science and management studies. The prince Maurice did not sacrifice his men if he could prevent it, but experimented, analyzed, instructed and reorganized. De Gribeauval managed to convince the other army branches by his scientific labor but also by political labor (winning votes, making coalitions, pointing at shared interests and win-win solutions). They gained leverage along the organizational constraint axis by carefully applying political agency.

The Blurring of Man and Machines

When asked 'what's new' regarding technology we all mistakenly look at the novelty of the high-tech gadgets whilst we should be looking for transformation processes. Agriculture as a first technological revolution turned hunter-gatherers into farmers and initiated a development that led to city states and a specialized caste of warriors. The steam engine was new and by rendering sail obsolete it changed naval warfare. The machine

gun and the tank were new and it changed infantry and cavalry. The jet fighter was new and it changed organizations and war fighting. All these innovations were integrated into the existing organizations, sometimes forming dedicated branches and services, and when change was brought about by holistic 'planned invention' by change agents who implemented technology non-deterministically, it mostly brought forth victory in battle (and that is what armed forces are about). Generally coined the third wave (Toffler and Toffler 1993) is the revolution that transforms our society into an information society. 3D printers however might initiate the fourth revolution, referring to the maker movement, which enables people to print their own technology, and which will be also be the first step to machines that are creating machines (the literature in this regard refers to singularity). Thus, latest developments take us into four frontiers; space, cyber, robotics and biometrics. What is new about these frontiers is not the novelty character, but the change in the way of fighting wars it implies and most of all the deep integration of technology into humans. New is firstly the already mentioned fact that due to technology there is no front any more. Secondly, the thin line between humans and machines is evaporating and it will vanish totally in the near future.

Man–machine interfaces always impacted humans considerably but latest developments are sure to impact revolutionarily onto the psycho-social makeup of man himself because the technology is invasive and mixes up humans and non humans. It is regarding this point that the technology axis collapses and the human and the machine become hybrid entities. Intentionally we started this chapter with Bruno Latour provokingly stating that there is no distinction whatsoever between humans and non-humans. We are all 'lieutenants'!

Drones

With drones the virtual and the real world are very much intertwined. When a drone pilot or operator is in his cubicle with only a sensor operator who assists him and a voice in his ear that directs him, the desensitization experience is already so high that the difference with reality is just as far as the actual target is. A concern is that this new way of fighting will blur the lines between the virtual and the real world, and that operators will lose sight of the ethical implications of their work. A very telling quote of a drone operator in Qatar confirms this concern: 'It's like a video game. I can get a little bloodthirsty. But it's fucking cool.' (Oudes and Zwijnenburg 2011: 21)

The blurring of the virtual and the real actually describes the psychology of world's most famous sensor operator Brandon Bryant who suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. First of all he tried to deny responsibility by believing he was just following orders. Later he realized that his PTSD was not caused by danger or trauma, but by moral injury (Maguen and Litz 2012). Bryant mentions he was fighting with the ghosts of his victims in his nightmares during the time he was working on the drones. Sometimes he felt powerless for not being able to rescue his buddies out in the field who were hit by an IED. He felt like a coward killing people from afar whilst sipping a soda. From his Nevada container he watched his victims die from blood loss. After one hit he wondered and asked 'was that a child?' and a coworker from an intelligence unit answered 'for the record, … it was a dog'. Bryant was certain it was a child (Modderkolk 2014).

Legally the use of drones can be justified, because every operation and every command is subservient to parliamentary supervision. Every decision can be based on thorough information gathering whilst mandates can be construed that are as tight as can be (Osinga 2013). Technically it is a weapons system just like any other. In praxis however parliamentary oversight does not guarantee there will be no collateral damage and one should worry about legitimacy. In 2016 the largest user of drones, the Unites States of America, bombs in seven different countries in the world (Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lybia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia). The USA has not declared war on any of these countries. Is there really an accounting in terms of proportionality

and the principle of the least impacting form of violence?

Drone technology is one of the most proliferated technologies, because anyone can buy a drone for circa 15 dollar from a common children's toyshop. By swarming these drones will make a most attractive weapon of terrorist attack that is bound to be used in the future. Human snipers can probably not eliminate all of these devices what would call for automatic goalkeeper solutions or kill bots.

Kill Bots

Robots who kill are already in existence in diverse forms (Singer 2011). Depending on the definition the simplest form would be an electric wire with lethal voltage. Guardian robots that scan for movement are in place in several places in the world. Many forms of auxiliary robots, like bomb disposal robots, can easily be transformed for killing purposes. To be effective robots will acquire more autonomy and human intelligence. The advance in robotics is to supply them with a humanoid makeup and indeed it has been reported that soldiers treat bomb disposal robots as fellow warriors and have even risked their own lives to save them (Sharkey 2012). A robot can be programmed, and then the programmer could be held accountable for the assigned task, but a robot is not capable of gauging the morality of life-and-death decisions in combat situations. Robots do not have agency outside their programming. They have no conscience and cannot take responsibility for their actions.

Cyborg Warriors

The cyborg solves the problems of human awareness and consciousness because the cyborg is a hybrid kind of warrior. The cyborg would be a human whose capabilities are enhanced beyond the species-typical level of functioning by technology that is integrated into the body or clothing. The exoskeleton and the Google Glass like helmets that enhance situational awareness are

first steps in this development, but technologically biomedical developments can take it much further. The costs of changing and adapting the human genome are declining so that enhanced soldiers are already a possibility. Chip implants and other implants (like the use of the eye socket) will make the future warrior a new species. Military training within a virtual reality can modify the mind or 'mindware' of the soldier 'A new cyborg soldier is constructed and programmed to fit integrally into weapons systems … So the idea is that through gaming soldiers are able to achieve moral disassociation with their enemies. Video games put the soldier at an advantage because by disciplining his "mindware", and acting on the world through computer simulations, the soldier can remain all the more removed from the bloody consequences of his actions.' (Robins and Levidow 1995, 120) By "mindware" Robins and Levidow mean that soldiers can improve their skill in using weapons against enemies, while keeping further at a distance the psychological consequences of murder.' (Robins and Levidow 1995). Beyond training methods, implants, clothing, etcetera, a cyborg can also be established by psycho pharmaceutics. Drugs are being developed that alleviate the pain of moral objection, or in more popular wording, that relieves the soldier of conscientious objection. Moral inhibitions that naturally limit the soldier are taken away, thus improving ruthless fighting capacities (Kamienski 2012). All these methods of creating cyborgs have one thing in common, that is that they partly dehumanize the soldiers. Limitations to this development is that the enhancements should be reversible. A soldier should be able to return to normal standards of achievement once he takes of the enhancing technology or as soon the enhancing effect of the drugs wear off. This is to protect both the soldier and society.

The Maker Movement Revolution

Technology is renowned for its double and ambiguous effects. On the one hand it can help the powerful remain in power, whilst on the other

hand it has the potential for democratization and rendering leverage to those who seek to change power relationships. The makers are examples of the latter group seeking change. Scanners and 3D printers are but tools because makers strive to use any tool that will help them gain autonomy in their production processes.

But the 3D printing tool is a nice example because it illustrates that anyone can print out the parts for a weapon like 'the Liberator' and these tools are getting cheaper so that anyone will be able to make use of it. One can buy and make anything by ordering parts from the web and if they are not legally available one can order by the dark web.

> Defense Distributes designs wikiweapons. Among the organization's goals is to develop and freely publish firearms-related design schematics that can be downloaded and reproduced by anyone with a 3D printer. On May 5, 2013, Defense Distributed made public the 3D printable files (STL files) for the world's first fully 3D printable gun, the Liberator .380 single shot pistol. (source: wikipedia)

Just as with drone technology the maker movement forms a revolution in military affairs in itself because it allows for easy access to weapon systems and thus the state's monopoly of violence is endangered. The implications are immense, because government oversight of diffusion of military technology will prove untenable. The makers can acquire and produce their own drones, robots and cyborgs and use these systems to their advantage. They can make peaceful use of their products, skills and capabilities, but they can also use it to destroy and eliminate adversaries. The Liberator is a single shot pistol, which makes it perfect for one assignment. After the job one disposed of it.

Discussion: Where Is the End to the Blurring of the Boundaries Between Technology and Humans?

The concept of what it means to exist as a human is changing. Can one exist when one is not integrated in the Internet? How can one function without a smart phone? How can one find one's way without navigation? How can we pay taxes without a virtual identity known to the state's computer system? How does the mind change when machines are integral parts of our lives, brains and bodies? Google-glasses are but a forerunner of the sensory enhancement that is soon to come! And what does it mean for machines when they will be bestowed with awareness? Should robots have legal rights for themselves? And how should they relate to human beings? Although science fiction is a source of inspiration, these questions are real and relevant at this very moment.

Early science fiction writers already tried to answer these questions and Asimov (1950) even formulated guidelines for robots that should keep them and us safe. These so called laws of Asimov are

1. A robot cannot harm a human being not even by not intervening
2. A robot must obey all assignments, unless the assignment is in violation with the first law
3. A robot must protect it self unless this would contradict laws one and two.

These guidelines or laws seem straightforward and airtight, but the core body of writing by Asimov of course was designed to demonstrate that airtight solutions are non-existent. And that is why science fiction always ends in nightmare scenarios in which robots derange or try to take over control.

In fact, science fiction warns us about a 90 degrees' rotation of the organizational constraint axis (see Fig. 23.2). Technology is meant for humans to break away from the realm of determinism and discipline, because it promises the optimistic and perhaps utopian dream of freedom, self-determination and economic independence. But with singularity installed in computers, cyborgs and robots, trans-human kill bots can be created. No longer agency lies with humans, but agency is transferred to non-humans, pushing humans more and more

Fig. 23.2 The rotation of the organizational constraint axis

into the quadrant of the disciplined and the determined.

Recent developments indicate that the future nightmare scenario of science fiction lies only just around the corner. How will the developments affect war and war fighting? The answer is simple, because it is only a matter of extrapolation. The battlefield will in future be devoid of real human soldiers, but the victims will be real humans sure enough. We develop from 'war amongst the people' (Smith 2005) in the twentieth century to twenty-one century war against the people. The only counter weight being the double effect of technology it self. Exactly the fact that technology diffuses exponentially, is miniaturized, and is accessible to the public at large, offers possibilities to individuals, or groups of independent actors, to create worlds of their own, to use the very same technology, but put it to uses that countervail concentration of power into state or big corporation's hands, and thus the maker movement can provide a force that balances out power. Oppressed people, people that are used as cannon fodder can organize themselves by using similar technological tools, and transform them from tools of oppression to tools of resistance.

Technology was and will always be a lever of power, and yes, any piece of technology, however simple, is also thru and thru human.

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Author Biographies

René Moelker is associate professor of military sociology at the Netherlands Defense Academy. His research interests cover military families, military technology, socialization processes, military profession and stress theory.

Narda Schenk M.Sc. is a social-psychologist master from the University of Amsterdam, who worked on 'military technology' at the Netherlands Defense Academy.

Military Leadership in Heroic and Post-heroic Conditions

24

Udi Lebel and Uzi Ben-Shalom

Introduction

The traditional sociological discussion on leadership is based on binary assumptions pertaining to the components and functions of leadership. For example, Max Weber characterizes a leader as one who relies on various differentiated foundations of legitimacy (Riesebrodt 1999). Vilfredo Pareto argued that leaders belong to one of two skilled communities ("foxes" or "lions") which alternate periodically (Ashin 1996). Another feature of the sociological discussion about leadership—following Weber and Pareto —is the interest in the establishment of leadership and the acceptance that a leader's authority should be respected by those being led (Gunter 2010). Perhaps this explains why the sociology of leadership developed around the functionalist sociological tradition aiming to match leaders (their skills, rhetoric, education, etc.) to the reality of their geographical location, so that they can continue to be perceived as leaders by their

subordinates. This is especially true in the military context in which organizational experts often focused on adjusting the military to the civil environment in which it operates, although this environment is often critical and suspicious of the military (Burk 1998). During the past two decades, sociologists have developed diverse theories regarding such adaptation processes. However, they have done this while seemingly neglecting their ability to harness sociological theory and imagination towards developing theories of military leadership and socio-psychosocial ways to lead in such a dynamic environment.

It is also apparent that the previously acceptable binary reference to leadership patterns has been repeated. This refers primarily to the differentiation between heroic military leadership and post-heroic military leadership. Unlike papers by Moskos et al. (2000), according to which a sequence and hierarchy exist between the heroic and the post-heroic situation and these two stages may exist simultaneously, most sociological writing identifies with either one of the two options and views heroic leadership and post-heroic leadership as dichotomous. This is evidence of the degree by which those who develop military leadership rely on their understanding of the military environment more than they focus on leadership development. This is true thanks to the fact that the sociology of the military can be traced as the source of the dichotomy between the heroic and post-heroic

U. Lebel (✉) · U. Ben-Shalom
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Ariel University, Ariel 40700, Israel
e-mail: ulebel@gmail.com; ulebel@ariel.ac.il

U. Ben-Shalom
e-mail: uzibs@ariel.ac.il

U. Lebel
Begin-Sadat Center For strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan 5290002, Israel

combat environments, as can be seen in a variety of examples: Old wars versus new wars (Kaldor 2013); Industrialized wars versus Folk wars; Traditional military action versus military operations in Civilian Environments; Total Warfare versus Urban Warfare (Hahn and Jezior 1999); High-Intensity Conflict versus Low-Intensity Conflict (Kinross 2004) and more. All these are symptomatic expressions of binary portrayals and perceptions of the military organization: They are either traditional, total, heroic, or they are new, limited and post-heroic (Kinross 2004).

Respectively, as we will illustrate in this article, among other things, the insights reached by studies in the sociology of military leadership, as formulated through analysis of the actions and decisions made by leaders during the different world wars and to some extent in the Middle East, have retroactively become the sociology of heroic military leadership. Such a sociology focuses on the leader's victory and his efforts to overcome his enemy and become dominant in his environment. The leader must exhibit his dominance before the enemy as well as his subordinates. Heroic military leadership is thus seen as one which is intended to motivate the troops to accelerate victory, stimulate initiative and encourage them to fulfill the mission even if there is an immense sacrifice. It is an ethos that is so deeply ingrained in military leadership, that traces are evident from the Peloponnesian War and the military leadership in ancient Greece (Grint 2010). In contrast, the sociology of military leadership that was fashioned after the Mỹ Lai Massacre in Vietnam is organized around the ethos of post-heroic military leadership. This gauges a leader's success according to his restraint, ethical action and the extent to which he neutralizes the "heroic instincts" among his subordinates, in addition to the adoption of a variety of civil management skills that place more focus on process than on results and objectives. Such leaders command over values more than they command over achievements (Kober 2008).

In this paper we will present the binary perspective by examining some key dimensions of military leadership, as they exist in contemporary sociological literature. Later, we will propose a way to bridge the gap between heroic and post-heroic schools of thought, a mediation required due to our central criticism of the existing literature, which is not as linear and continuous as Moskos et al. sought to show (Moskos et al. ibid). We will propose such mediation—i.e.: the skills necessary to allow a military leader to shift from a heroic to a post-heroic position—in the form of the Sociology of Framing, originally developed in the fields of Cultural Sociology and the Sociology of Discourse, most recently been applied to the Sociology of Management. Therefore, we believe that this article will contribute to the relevant literature in two ways:

1. By attempting to view the sociology of heroic and post-heroic leadership as two ideal types —achieved in this article by way of a thorough review of the literature. By so doing, we will connect between this theoretical framework and Bourdieu's sociological theory and thus see how the military habitus forms and works.

2. By proposing that the framing theory of sociology is relevant to Moskos's insights regarding military leadership, i.e. enabling continuous leadership and the ability to transition between a heroic and post-heroic position. As we see it, these skills are necessary because combat often includes peace enforcement duties that turn within minutes into total warfare, as happened for example in Somalia and Srebrenica, and, vice versa, also during total warfare, when the forces failed to recognize that they were required to take limited action (Winslow 2004). We propose that the challenge of identifying the situation (heroic or post-heroic) and conveying it to one's subordinates is a major test for the modern military leader. After all, we live in a time in which each mission can be seen alternately as heroic and post-heroic; these are not different missions for each commander, but rather realities of military warfare to which all commanders are exposed (Caforio 2013a, b).

Using the framing theory, sociology can become a valuable resource for dealing with this challenge; Framing is a skill which can help leaders "forget some of the fundamental principles of combat" (Caforio 2013a, b, 9). The heroic/post-heroic position should be understood as a continuum rather than dichotomous situations. It is up to the military leader to diagnose the situation and prevent a "Vertigo-like" loss of control among his subordinates.

The following table assembles the basic dimensions of military leadership discourse, which shall be later explained in detail (Table 24.1).

Orientation of Leadership

Heroic Leadership: Normative Goal-Oriented Leadership

The heroic military leadership sees the leader as the one who carries military culture into the combat zone. He is the one who will "overcome nature" and enforce desired behavior. Whether this means that the environment will either be cleansed of "pockets of resistance" that will eventually be destroyed, or the enemy forces will be defeated (e.g., the PLO's surrender and withdrawal from Lebanon during the First Lebanon War in 1982 or the surrender of pockets of resistance in the city of Fallujah during the American campaign in Iraq), or that any other type of "new order" will be enforced onto an environment. According to this concept, a leader

is always task oriented and committed to the mission dictated to him even before the start of a conflict. Therefore, this type of leadership is characterized by a maximal level of activism, beginning with the leader himself and trickling down to the very last soldier. The leader is charismatic, inspiring and magnetic. He symbolizes and concretely encourages all subordinates to do their utmost to complete the task, as a failure to do so would cast shame on the leader and the entire force. It is a romantic concept of leadership that sees the leader as an independent variable with maximum impact on the environment; a force to which the environment adapts rather than the other way around. A nostalgic, masculine and hierarchical perception that holds the task as the be-all and end-all, with the battle being the supreme expression of this approach (Michel et al. 2013).

Post-heroic Leadership that Is Experience Based and Process-Oriented

The post-heroic military leadership conveys to the lea that he must join with his forces into an existing environment or culture and adapt to it. He and his subordinates are required to undergo a process of cultural cooptation to the combat field and their assigned task (Silverstein and Crawford 2004). For example, in a religious environment, the local leadership must be respected and the military leader should, to his utmost ability, minimize contact between male soldiers and

Table 24.1 Dimensions in the dichotomous discourse about military leadership

	Heroic military leadership	Post-heroic military leadership
1. Orientation	Mission	Process
2. Knowledge	The commander as an epistemic authority	Commander mediates between epistemic authorities
3. Virtue	Narcissistic	Polycentric
4. Institutional values	Unity of command	Military embeddedness
5. Visibility	Leadership in an open and closed arena	Leadership in a constantly open arena
6. Justification	Pre-warfare	During warfare

woman living in the area, who may experience the situation as humiliating or immodest. Post-heroic warfare is one in which the leader does everything in his power to progress toward the goal, while the living environment in the area is not disturbed. He is also aware of the fact that not harming the resident's daily routine is considered more important than achieving the mission. He should also report to his superiors about any secondary mission received that is relevant to the area to which he is stationed and he is expected to fine-tune the task in accordance with the environmental constraints. The process is more important than the mission and the leader must adhere to an ethical, sophisticated, moral, legal, culturally friendly and constrained process, as any violation of the ethical standards will lead to a "Pyrrhic Victory" (Zecca 2014).

Some refer to this "contextual leadership" (Osborne et al. 2002) as a leadership style that changes incrementally, or an "adaptive leadership"—a model developed by the US Army to enhance the role of the leader by providing context; i.e. the leader is responsible for clarifying the task to his subordinates, reducing uncertainty, recognizing the situation and instructing them to adapt their behavior accordingly (Cojocar 2012). For example, this is how the concept "Containment" came about, as that which expresses the need to be exposed to reality, to understand it, but to consciously choose to 'absorb' expressions of violence when responding to them would only exacerbate said violence (Kelly 2010). This idea was used by the US during the Cold War—a stance which required the political leadership to show restraint in the decision to deploy the military and to prefer diplomatic solutions. However, today, this principle is not routinely implemented by presidents and defense ministers, but rather by low level commanders on the ground, wishing to instruct their soldiers when to refrain from responding to violence directed toward them by armed groups (Aran 2012).

Leadership of this type is not based on a normative model but is engaged in adapting itself to the reality in the field and to various constraints, through the understanding that in a post-heroic situation, maintaining the status quo

and long term order is more important than achieving short term goals (Szayan et al. 2007). Therefore, rather than encouraging subordinates to execute missions in a combat environment to the detriment of the daily routine of the area's residents, the leader must now aim to nip in the bud any actions that could spill over from the tactical field into the strategic arena.

In this context, it is important to mention the challenges faced by military leadership, including sensitivity to cultural diversity; to the local population's culture and to preventing the escalation of unnecessary conflicts, as well as providing information about the formal and informal local leadership, social networks, political and tribal structures, and more (Zehfuss 2012). This kind of emphasis gives the leader skills that are more attributable to those needed for initiating cultural anthropological research, rather than military expertise. In turn, the leader becomes an expert in driving the process, rather than achieving the military goal.

Knowledge

Heroic Leadership: The Commander as an Epistemic Authority

Epistemic authority is defined as an agent having decisive impact on the reception of knowledge on military tasks. The information obtained from those perceived as epistemic authorities is considered real, factual and reliable (Kruglansky 1989). Leaders who are seen as epistemic authorities in the military are those who possess the professional military knowledge and whose judgment of reality and decisions will be considered just and binding. Conceptualizations that perceived the military in general and military commanders in particular as epistemic authorities, also perceived the military leader as the soldier's "significant other" and actual authority, who becomes a cognitive authority that shapes their behavior (Wilson 1983). For the soldier, his commander's perceptions are not necessarily "more authoritative than others" (Mills 2005, 91). The military leader's epistemic authority

enables reproduction of the military organizational structure, in which rank is associated with the reliability of the commander's knowledge, judgment and authority.

Post-heroic Leadership: The Commander Mediates Between Epistemic Authorities

In the post-heroic context, the military leader is expected to lead a complex community, in which many members have epistemic authority that exceed his knowledge and control, his corporate position or the hierarchical structure of authority. Many of a commander's actions during a post-heroic situation demand the legitimization and cooperation of local military leaders (Caforio 2013a, b, 11) or local civilian leaders (Caforio 2013a, b, 13), thereby making it a non-linear leadership. Post-heroic leadership is based on different skills while fostering a cooperative, ambivalent and slow military culture which coordinates between various agencies: military, paramilitary and purely civilian, some of which belong to a population traditionally seen as a monolithic enemy. For this purpose, an outstanding leader is conscious not only of the sentiments of the soldiers he directly and indirectly commands, but also those of a variety of forces with whom he interacts. Such leadership does not necessarily demand rigid continuous communication, but rather adheres to a membership that is open to interpretation. It is not that the commander leads an epistemic community whose members share the same views of reality and reach the same conclusions, but rather that he coordinates between a variety of individuals and groups who belong to many epistemic communities, each considered both a constraint and an informant. This leader is not only an epistemic authority, but adapts to and shapes modes of action and also exposes, balances and studies a great deal of information, data and interpretations. His decisions will be based on those reached by existing epistemic authorities, even if they are not part of the hierarchy of command (Fletcher 1993).

Virtues

Heroic Leadership: The Narcissistic Virtue

The heroic leadership ethos deals with motivating subordinates to act and is based on the assumption that everyone shares a common system of symbols that they understand and translate into dispositions such as courage, toughness, respect, determination, adventurism and aggression (Robinson 1999). The leader, in a manner which some perceive as narcissistic, views the compliance of others to his orders as expressions of their appreciation and signs of his power. Even if this comes at the expense of his subordinates' needs, such leaders espouse qualities such as mental strength, resoluteness, passionate command, consistency, an ability to instill their determination to achieve a goal amongst a task force and the skill to eliminate subordinates' doubts and hesitance as normative qualities (McCoy 2006). The leader pushes his fighters to carry out the task, even if they see it as dangerous, unnecessary, counterintuitive or in contrast to their impressions from the actual battle field. It is an ethos that views hesitancy and failure to fulfill the task at hand (even if it turns out to be wrong in retrospect) as embarrassing and therefore motivating the troops is considered among leaders' top tasks and their toughest test. There is even an official ceremony for such missions: the Commander in Chief's address to the soldiers before battle, which is called in German "Feldherrnrede". This speech is supposed to instill the fighters with an uncompromising determination to achieve their mission (Keegan 1987).

This concept does not allow subordinates to oppose a mission, and the individual soldier or single power becomes a "voice" that is incorporated into the collective chorus. At any given moment, as proposed by Ben-Shalom and Shamir, "the senior commanders can be calm because they know that their subordinates are acting according to the orders that were imposed on them… even if their conclusion is different" (Ben-Shalom and Shamir 2008, 29). This

approach was also noted by General Hans von Sackett (quoted by McCoy) in his book "Passion of Command" (McCoy 2006). The heroic virtue calls the leader to indoctrinate the soldiers and his subordinates with the habit that the task must be executed and that they should impose themselves on reality, to overcome reality rather than to let reality influence them, as the reality of combat always aims to dismantle and destroy the military unit and its personnel (Conger and Kaunungo 1988).

Post-heroic Leadership: The Polycentric Leadership

In a post-heroic situation, the leader needs political skills that are often seen as contemptible in the eyes of professional military personnel who were raised on the heroic ethos. The mission is not a holy task because it can change at any moment and adapt to reality, and it should be advanced with the help of various coalitions in the armed forces and in collaboration with colleagues and residents of the area in which the activity is performed (Moskos et al. 2000). This is so during peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions, as well as during "small wars" (Harris and Segal 1985). The leader will not motivate his subordinates by virtue of a common ethos alone, if such indeed exists. He must act at any given moment as the person who shapes and stirs feelings, as the type of leader who "drives others to lead themselves" (Manz and Sims 1989, 18), as a leader who encourages his subordinates to report at any given moment a change or incongruence regarding the mission or the environment and calls for his subordinates to show maturity in order to implement orders and achieve the goals according to the conditions in the field. Manz and Sims call this type of leadership "Super-Leadership" (ibid) which seeks to instill in each soldier what D'Intino and colleagues call "Self-Leadership" (D'Intino et al. 2007). This is not about the leader's victory, but rather his desire to let reality influence and affect the tasks and orders. Failure to fulfill a task, or avoiding a task - which could be considered as

contempt according to the heroic ethos and even lead to harsh sanctions in some societies - may be appreciated in the post-heroic context, for preventing complications and a crisis of power.

Institutional Values

Heroic Leadership: Unity of Command

The structure of the modern army values the ways in which leadership is conceived, as well as the challenges of its commanders. They must become an epistemic authority for the soldiers, so that the army will be able to exercise the principle of "Unity of Command", which expresses the sovereign state, the separation of authorities, and most importantly the army's ability to conduct its missions (Lebel, 2014, 299-300). "Unity of command" constitutes the central principle in the army's management principles. According to this principle: "the commanders should not be tempted to express loyalty to their civic social communities of origin" (van Avry 2007, 129). The full realization of this principle makes it possible to "unify the power of the military under one command in favor of any goal". Thus, it "will find a single present authority among the executing forces, which will be recognized and perceived by them as such" (Frost 2005, 53). The Napoleon wars taught military researchers about the intimate link between soldiers' loyalty and commitment and their belief in the legitimacy to put them into action (Levine 1990, 9). This link guarantees unity of effort, unity of actions and the ability of commanders to demand obedience from their subordinates.

By realizing this principle, the modern army forges the image of an "effective machine". This image is maintained thanks to the separation between the soldiers and primordial civic frameworks. Thus, the principle was not only seen as a structural instrumental device but was also endowed with a moral dimension, which makes it possible for the military organization to sustain within itself the value of loyalty, without which the senior commanders would not be able to control nor direct the military organization

toward its goals (Connor 2010, 287). On the political level, the principle was seen as a critical element in guaranteeing state sovereignty and the civil leadership's authority of military leadership. This is made possible since the principle encapsulates a promise that the army will exercise the orders it is given in a loyal, coordinated, unified manner without any disagreements or fragmentation, while no soldiers will place their loyalty outside the chain of command.

This condition is the result of the army's conceptualization as a "total institution", which sustains what Kolominus and Bar Tal call a "mechanization of conduct": a process that "minimizes and suppresses the quota of the subject's individuality in the face of the authority of the organization and the team (Kolominus and Bar Tal 2011, 40). The military leadership was meant to "beat" the civil psychology (Lebel, 2014, 298) from which the recruits originate, by turning military leaders into the ultimate "significant other" for the soldiers (Goffman 1961, 13).

Post-heroic Leadership: Military Embeddedness

In the post-modern state, the phenomenon of the military embeddedness, on which Polanyi wrote, became relevant not only to the civil leadership but to the military leadership as well. This is due to the fact that in his post-heroic missions, the military leader finds himself dependent on the social networks to which both his direct subordinates and the different players he has to motivate into the mission belong. All these individuals require legitimization from their social environment to carry out their commander's expectation (Kraatz and Zajac 1996). This discovery eventually crystallized the "new institutional theory", which gave up on the autocratic management and unity of command in favor of a democratic, polycentric, bargaining model (Pfeffer 2003, 92–112). In this kind of management, the management hierarchy and organizational effectiveness are damaged, since the individual formerly serving as the head of the organization is not necessarily the ultimate

epistemic authority for each of the employees (Vickers and Kouzmin 2001). In this regard, leadership is defined as the ability to propel a "coalition of teams" and for this, the military leader is often required to make "adjustments" that would contradict his original goals and missions.

This leadership requirement was seen as foreign to the ethos of military leadership. Thus, for instance, historian Richard Kohn claims that in the current state, it is impossible for a commander in the American army to lead his people in the battle field, as the leadership swirls "out of control" in action (Kohn 1994). Nevertheless, given the multiplicity of players and teams manning the battle field and the "fighting coalition" which the leader commands, a leader has to use constant political skills to never cease to invest in the coalitions' integrity and never stop reading into the values and constraints of the political teams from which the agents he wishes to put into action originate, in order to "adapt" the mission to them (Lebel 2014).

This is a leadership that does not command a total institution, since many elements in the force do not view the formal leader as the epistemic authority. Herberg-Rothe called the warrior in the post-heroic era "the democratic warrior" (Herberg-Rothe 2014): a soldier, who although he belongs to the army, is loyal to the norms and expectation of the civil democratic society and will not hesitate to defy his commander. This results in the post-heroic leadership being forced to invest in "fraternizing" with the social authorities from which the soldiers and the other operating forces are drafted, so that they will give them "accreditation" to comply with their dictated military objectives (Howorth 2004).

Visibility

Heroic Leadership: The Open/Closed Condition: An Enclosed Concealed Battle Ground

The heroic leader has to prioritize the goals of the missions, with the assumption that when he

returns from battle he will have to face criticism for not meeting the goals. This is a dichotomous perception of the leader's position after battle—either receiving the "medal of honor or dishonor", much like the academic saying about university life: "publish or perish".

Even if this is not the actual state of affairs, the leader "enjoys" the distance from the public eye, which makes it possible for him to encourage his own predispositions as well as those of his subordinates: aggressiveness, manliness, venturesomeness, hatred and a gamut of behavioral expressions which do not befit the image of the "officer and the gentlemen" occupying the public sphere of his state. This constitutes, in Goffman's view, "dramaturgic management" (Schimmelfennig 2002) of military behavior. This behavior radically differs when the power is visible (in camp, in rituals, in journalism photography, or media coverage) and when it is conducted outside the public eye. In this sense, the leader manages the performance of his subordinates, allows and prohibits behaviors, suppresses and accelerates predispositions, and manages parallel and competing ethical systems among his subordinates (McDonald et al. 2008).

Post-heroic Leadership: A Constantly Open Arena

Post heroic warfare takes place in an environment with a multiplicity of communication organizations, representatives of human rights organizations, interest groups, and political elements. Technologically, every element in this arena is able, via basic technological equipment, to broadcast in real time the way in which the forces operate. This is what Lebel and Mash call "full visibility warfare" (Lebel and Mash 2015). The leader is obligated to assume that he is located in a panopticon: an open and limitless arena, in which each internal element is seen by an external element. The leader, therefore, must not allow himself or his subordinates to free themselves from strict ethical constraints and instill among his subordinates the realization that the process by which they accomplish the

mission is no less important than the mission itself, and that if their means are unethical, they will cause a growing crisis (Bai and Morris 2014).

The widely used term "strategic corporal" manifests this conception. The term teaches us about the broad implications of decision-making among all ranks including the lowest rank in the post-heroic reality. The leader must instill among every soldier the understanding that his decisions, his choices to take risks, to stick to the mission while ignoring changes in the environment, and his behavior towards the local residents is constantly documented and could deprive legitimacy from all of their country's military operations (McMaster 2008).

Justifying Security Policy

Heroic Leadership: Pre-existing Justifications

Until the Vietnam War, when nation-states would go to war, their military leaders did not have to justify their fighting goals. This was made possible since there was an agreement that wars between nations are a given. This was so even when the wars became less and less acceptable to the public following what is called the civil-military gap (Rahbek-Clemmensen et al. 2012). The required adjustments were made through the recruitment method, which was replaced from a conscription army to a professional or volunteering army. This has led to a situation in which military leaders received fighters who wanted to fight, whether they identified with the goals of the war or whether they were mercenaries who were obligated to prove themselves in battle to justify their professional reputation (Morgan 2001).

Post-heroic Leadership: Justification During the Process

In his research "Commitment in the Military", Cotton found that soldiers who do not identify

with the army's policy goals become what he calls "beleaguered warriors": frustrated, ambivalent and alienated toward their commands and commanders, leading them to carry out their assignment in a partial and unprofessional manner (Cotton 1990, 49). Raviv et al. (1990) found that the more the political orientation of the source of military authority resembles the political orientation of the one who constitutes the soldier's civil epistemic authority, the more the soldier is inclined to diligently follow his orders. Furthermore, Wesbrook found a negative correlation between "socio-political alienation" and the effectiveness of the drafted soldiers (Wesbrook 1980).

There is a constant need to create justifications for the post-modern army's mission, both in the way the army operates strategically on the macro level and the importance of the tactic behavior on the micro level. This is especially true in the event of losses or unexpected injuries both among the fighters and among civilian residents in the area of activity (Dobos 2010). A different kind of motivation is needed for peace operations and other post-heroic missions (Jelusic 2007). The test of the leader lies in his ability to "inject" to his subordinates a sense of identity with the mission and make it seem compatible with their values and world views. Moreover, the leader must operate among his subordinates to change the character of the mission if he sees that some of his subordinates will not receive legitimization from their social networks to carry out the mission as it is (Meyer 1982).

The process which Doron dubbed "justification of policy" (Doron 1986, 86), is no longer only relevant to the civil arena but also to the subjects who will have to take the required risks during warfare. This requirement slows down the pace of the campaign, turning the leader into someone who is constantly entrusted with generating meaning, propaganda and education, and mainly with legitimizing his commands amongst his subordinates. Dealing with doubts, ideological difficulties and ambivalence and preventing mutiny, truancy, or avoidance of action are his tests. Thus, for instance, the post-heroic fighting method has often been viewed as unnecessarily

life endangering, since the activities of the infantry could have been conducted via an artillery bombardment or an air strike. However, the requirement to contain the adversary's violence could be interpreted as defeatist and degrading, and will also have to be justified while exposing the fighters to the macro considerations of policy and security.

The test of the leader in this case is to make it clear to his subordinates why the risk that is required of them is justified, since an air strike that will lead to the death of many uninvolved civilians could deprive their state of international legitimacy to continue and fight for their people. The challenges of justifying these types of policies are part of the repertoire of skills of the military leader in the postmodern era.

Mind the Gap: Sense Making and Framing as Relevant Theories for Challenging the Dichotomy Between Heroic and Post-heroic Leadership Conditions

As the debate among military sociologists regarding leadership usually included a dichotomous trait, in this part we continue this line of thinking and, using sociological terms, apply it to a number of principal dimensions of leadership. However, as is well known, the post-heroic context is extremely versatile and contains not only the avoidance from war and an aspiration to conduct it in a calculated manner, but could also turn a war from a limited campaign into a heroic warfare, as is shown by the bloody confrontation in Ukraine and perhaps even the coming new confrontations in the Middle East. Following the Second Lebanon War, most of the criticism towards the IDF stemmed from the fact that it when it started fighting the Hezbollah, it believed that it was running a post-heroic campaign and it continued to hold onto post-heroic limitations, skills and principles even when the campaign turned into a heroic war (Kober 2015).

In this context we wish to offer a few concepts, insights, and directions through which the leader would be able to develop the relevant

skills at any time, be it heroic or post-heroic. These skills will make it possible for him to avoid an irrelevant style of leadership. We argue that the military leadership must relate to the issue of sense making (Wilfred and Palus 1994). This is no longer an obvious matter and as Debora Avant's research shows, even security companies encounter the need to frame and give sense to the sacrifice and risk involved in their activity (Avant 2013). The practice with which sense making will be conducted is the practice of framing.

Drawing from Weick (1995) and Fairhurst Entman (1993), Avant defines framing as the ability to shape the meaning of a subject, to judge its character and significance. To hold the frame of a subject is to choose one particular meaning (or set of meanings) over another. When we share our frames with others (i.e., "the process of framing"), we manage meaning because we assert that our interpretations should be taken as real over other possible interpretations" (Fairhurst 2005, 168).

Fairhurst's basic reading is to "understand leadership as the management of meaning through framing" (Fairhurst 2007, 167). The leader is the reality framer, the chief symbolized agent who works so that the world of his subordinates will seem to operate in accordance with his own predictions (Fairhurst 2007, 172).

Therefore, in case they need a habitus of constraint, heroic dispositions need to be suppressed or vise versa, and a certain operational behavior needs to be extracted from the possible behavioral repertoire (having one heroic end and one post-heroic). The leader will do this by framing reality and endowing sense to the choice of a chosen habitus. Sometimes the commander's leadership chalange will be enforcing this habitus and its correct script and dispositions among his soldiers, which are not always convince with its rational and might even implement it with alienation and ambivalence (see for example: Lebel, 2013). Framing is the means to choose a behavior within the repertoire of power, the same behavioral psycho-symbolic toolbox which exists as a variety of predispositions among subordinates (Coleman 2009).

Conceptualizing the leader as the one who give sense, frames reality and arouses relevant predispositions, obligates him to be aware of his framing authority, skilled in the different framing methods, and erudite. An American report from the current millennium on the required training for officers in the battlefield clarifies that a leader must know his way around a multiplicity of topics "from technical matters to social, economic, and state processes… to better interpret his environment and successfully act in it" (Kober 2001). It is not enough to interpret, since from this interpretation he must derive the correct behaviors, understand the place of the environment on the heroic post-heroic axis, and instill this diagnosis among his different subordinates.

Conclusion

Caforio compares the transition from a heroic surrounding to a post-heroic arena as a theater production in which the actors suddenly change (Caforio 2013b, 57). But he could point to the fact that it is not just institutional change, but a transformation in the perceptions of the soldiers and commanders and in the way they experience the area in which they are operating (Caforio 2013b). Due to this, Caforio recommended that the realities of post-heroic practices readjust to the training and education of military leadership (Caforio 2007, 2013a, b, 18–24). Following suit, we suggest that framing strategies should be included in the practices, conceptualizations and theories that will shape the contemporary leadership discipline, and that the meaning of a "Military Habitus" will be clarified, based on the understanding that the transition from one consciousness to another is not dichotomous but continuous and linear.

Sociological discourse engaging with military leadership has had to, de facto, construct two different schools of leadership during the past two decades: heroic and post-heroic. We claim that its future challenges will be to bridge between the two, since many arenas will be simultaneously heroic and post-heroic. We believe that concepts which originate in the

sociology of communication and discourse, such as the concept of framing, or which originate from the sociology of culture, such as the concepts of habitus and repertoire, will become part of military sociology and of acceptable military leadership skills.

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Author Biographies

Udi Lebel (Ph.D., King's College London) is associate professor in the Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology at **Ariel University**, and a senior researcher at the **Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies- (Bar Ilan University)**, Israel. His main research interests: Security Communities; Trauma and Memory Communities; the Political Psychology of Bereavement and Loss; Military Victimology. His recent books: *Politics of Memory-The Israeli Underground's Struggle for Inclusion in the National Pantheon and Military Commemoralization* (2013, Routledge, London and New-York) and *Yom Kippur War and the Reshaping of Israeli Civil-Military Relation*s (co-editor, 2015, Lexington, Maryland). For contact: ulebel@gmail.com; ulebel@ariel.ac.il

Uzi Ben-Shalom (Ph.D., Hebrew University of Jerusalem) is a military sociologist, senior lecturer and chair of the department of Sociology and Anthropology at **Ariel University**, Israel. He is a retired IDF behavioral sciences officer and an active reserve officer. Following his retirement, he joined Ariel University and serves as head of the military and security community (joint) in the Israeli Sociological Association. His areas of research include unit cohesion, decision making in combat and, military leadership.

Gerhard Kümmel

Introduction

If we ask for military identity and for identity in the military, i.e., the individual soldier's identity, one is tempted to look for something universal and perennial. In this vein, in 1965, i.e. at a time that was to be shaped by the Vietnam War, the Scottish Folk-Singer Donovan, the British response to Bob Dylan and Joan Baez, sang a song about the 'Universal Soldier'. With this song Donovan not only became Number One in the British charts; this song, indeed, became a worldwide hit. Originally written and sung by the First-Nations-Canadian singer Buffy Sainte-Marie it was meant to be a resolute protest, a nagging critique and a powerful statement against war and, simultaneously, for peace. The lyrics of this song describe the 'universal soldier' in the following way (Donovan 1965):

> 'He's five foot-two, and he's six feet-four,
> He fights with missiles and with spears.
> He's all of thirty-one, and he's only seventeen,
> Been a soldier for a thousand years.
>
> He's a Catholic, a Hindu, an Atheist, a Jain,
> A Buddhist and a Baptist and a Jew.
> And he knows he shouldn't kill,
> And he knows he always will,
> Kill you for me my friend and me for you.

> And he's fighting for Canada,
> He's fighting for France,
> He's fighting for the USA,
> And he's fighting for the Russians,
> And he's fighting for Japan,
> And he thinks we'll put an end to war this way.
>
> And he's fighting for Democracy,
> He's fighting for the Reds,
> He says it's for the peace of all.
> He's the one who must decide,
> Who's to live and who's to die,
> And he never sees the writing on the wall.
>
> But without him,
> How would Hitler have condemned them at Dachau?
> Without him Caesar would have stood alone,
> He's the one who gives his body
> As a weapon of the war,
> And without him all this killing can't go on.
>
> He's the Universal Soldier and he really is to blame,
> His orders come from far away no more,
> They come from here and there and you and me,
> And brothers can't you see,
> This is not the way we put the end to war.'

For several reasons, Donovan's protest song is well-suited to introduce the reader to the topic of this article: First, Donovan stresses the central importance of the (at his time almost exclusively male) soldierly subject for the military profession. Phrases like 'without him Caesar would have stood alone' or 'without him all this killing can't go on' illustrate this. By doing so Donovan's song represents the subjective turn within the discipline of military sociology that accordingly, in this perspective, analyzes the soldierly subject within a given military organisation, her operations and missions (see, e.g., Seifert 1996;

G. Kümmel (✉)
Bundeswehr Center of Military History and Social
Sciences (ZMSBw), Potsdam, Germany
e-mail: gerhardkuemmel@bundeswehr.org

Warburg 2008; Caforio 2013). Next, in the lyrics the in the end existential dimension of soldierly action comes to the fore: As can be inferred from the phrase 'He's the one who gives his body', soldierly action requires the unconditional willingness and preparedness of the individual to sacrifice oneself. And it demands from the individual the delicate and difficult trespassing of a veritable threshold—the killing taboo (see Grossman 1995; Eisele 2007) which is referred to in the lyrics in the sentence 'And he knows he shouldn't kill, and he knows he always will'. One can only imagine the extent to which the individual soldier is plagued by the responsibility that is transferred to him/her and by the burden that his/her conscience may place upon him/her because 'He's the one who must decide, who's to live and who's to die'.

Furthermore, the lyrics imply, although rather sub-cutaneously, that the soldierly subject has to undergo considerable socialization in order to do what is expected from him/her (Treiber 1973; Bröckling 1997; Piecha 2006). Only socialization turns him/her into a sufficiently reliable instrument, into a ‚weapon of the war' according to Donovan. This requires an organization, the military. Yet, military socialization, discipline and training alone would only lead to some sub-optimal functioning of the soldierly individual. To extract the best of a person, some intrinsic element is required, some personal incentive, some individual motivation. In this respect, too, Donovan's song gives us some information as one finds references to the nation, her society and to patriotism. The soldier fights for his/her family, his/her community, his/her country and land. As the lyrics go: 'He's fighting for Canada, (…) France, (….) the USA, (…) the Russians, (…) Japan'. One also finds references to some political or ideological ideas that persuade the soldier to fight. In such a vein, he/she is fighting for socialism, democracy, freedom, the *umma* or for god and a religious belief as comes to the fore in phrases like 'He's fighting for Democracy, he's fighting for the Reds' and 'He's

a Catholic, a Hindu, an Atheist, a Jain, a Buddhist and a Baptist and a Jew'. And, last but not least, the universal soldier is convinced to somehow fight for peace because 'He thinks we'll put an end to war this way' and 'He says it's for the peace of all'.

This, however, is nothing but a tremendous misperception of each single soldier if one takes sides with Donovan; according to him, the universal soldier is seduced, abused and senselessly victimized, he is cannon fodder. But where there is darkness, there also grows hope. For democratic societies and the political public, the way out rests with the individual turning into a political subject (see Greven 2008), because according to the lyrics 'his orders come from far away no more, they come from here and there and you and me, and brothers can't you see, this is not the way we put the end to war'.

In this vein, 'Universal Soldier' is meant to be a wake-up call for society that is requested to realize her political power and responsibility. In addition to this, this wake-up call is addressed to the individual soldier, as well. Here, the song is meant to be a call for the soldierly subject to becoming a subject that is capable of reflection and self-reflection which may (and should) initiate a change in practical action because 'without him all this killing can't go on'. Only if both these wake-up calls reach their addressees, there is a chance to disrupt the eternal coming back of the same and to stop the trans-historical circle of the 'Universal Soldier'.

This means that—for Donovan—the soldierly individual, so far, is characterized by universal homogeneity. The lyrics are explicit here by using the phrase 'Been a soldier for a thousand years'. The national context may vary as well as the politico-ideological references and the weapons ('He fights with missiles and with spears'). But this does not make a difference to Donovan. According to him, the self-perception and the identity of the soldier, so far, are trans-historically and universally homogeneous; soldierly identity is derived from soldierly action

and this soldierly action prominently consists of fighting; fighting is the central and often-times repeated term within the lyrics.

Such a woodcut-like avenue to our thematic field is undoubtedly legitimate for an aesthetic approach to the theme in question, and, indeed, this avenue provides some interesting insight into the issue of military identity and identity within the military. For a military-sociological analysis, however, this does not suffice because in such an endeavor presumably a larger differentiation may be needed in order to establish whether fighting is the essence of soldierly identity or whether fighting constitutes only one, although central, facet of military identity and identity within the military/soldierly identity.

In what follows, then, I will first pay attention to the term identity (see also Gleason 1983) and put it into context with related terms like self-image, self-concept, personal identity, social identity, professional military image, me-identity and we-identity. Second, I will develop a conceptual framework in which I think an analysis of military identity has to be placed. This conceptual framework will, thirdly, be explicated by an analysis of the situation in our times. Finally, a model of military identity and identity within the military will be presented that may be conceptually and heuristically useful for the future research in this thematic field.

Shedding Light to the Terms Used in the Thematic Field

There is a vast literature on identity in the social sciences (see, e.g., Gleason 1983; Leary and Tangney 2003). Psychology places the individual center stage and psychological theories on the development of identity argue that identity basically has to be understood as a communicative and interactive process (see also Erikson 1959, 1968; Elias 1987). Identity is nothing naturally given, but it is a construction of the individual in response to the environment and thus emerges in contact between and interaction of a 'Me' and a 'You'. Identity describes the specific selfness

that differentiates one individual from the other. These specific differences comprise both physical and mental aspects. A good deal of identity, then, follows from the individual's reflection about him-/herself and of his/her actions in a given context, i.e., identity necessarily entails identity work.

In these processes of identity construction, there is a cognitive and emotional component. The self-image of the individual emerges from his or her responses to the questions: 'Who am I really?' 'What am I?' and 'How am I?' and leads to the self-concept or the personal identity (Erikson 1959; Perry 1975; Rorty 1976) that guides us when it comes to the question 'How do I want to be and act in my interactions with my environment?' This is the cognitive element that carries some normative element (see also Taylor 1989). The emotional component of identity is the sense of self-esteem that emerges when one's self-concept meets social reality. The individual, then, tries to establish a balanced relationship between the self-concept and the sense of self-esteem. Every now and then he/she is necessarily engaged in both the preservation and the modification of the me-identity as experiences are made by the individual in the real world that may pose a challenge to the existing me-identity and have to be somehow amalgamated with the me-identity which may change accordingly.

Social psychology pays considerable attention to the role expectations the individual is confronted with when interacting with his or her social environment. These role expectations are established by some collective or group that define the criteria one has to meet in order to be part of the collective or group (see also Hogg and Abrams 1988; Elsbach 1999). Such commonly or collectively shared role expectations, then, constitute a collective or a social identity so that one differentiates between a '*me-identity*' and a '*we-identity*' which basically results from 'the need to belong' (Baumeister and Leary 1995). Usually, the relations between the me-identity and the we-identity are quite unproblematic. Yet, sometimes the tensions between the me-identity and the we-identity may be quite distinct and

sometimes even very pronounced (Tajfel 1981, 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 1987; Jenkins 1996; Pratt 2001; Kreiner et al. 2006).

As is obvious since it can already be inferred from the uniforms the individuals wear, the military and its individual soldiers constitute such a group and, as a consequence, share some we-identity. In the military, these role expectations and this we-identity are defined and created by the military organization and thus resemble the professional image of the military. This is usually laid down in official, formal documents, military laws, military regulations, military manuals, mission statements, codes of conduct and the like, but can also be influenced by traditions that are being passed down from generation to generation or through the ages. They establish mental and physical criteria that the individual soldier has to meet in order to be a soldier and they also prescribe norms that should govern interactions within the military, shape the behavior of soldiers and be followed in military missions as well.[1]

Here, pedagogy comes into play as it takes sides with psychology's and social psychology's assumption that identity has to be understood as an endeavor of construction and formation. Thus, at least to a certain extent, the construction of identity and the formation of identity can be influenced by the military organization through socialization and training. And this is what the military actively does as it wants its role expectations to be internalized by the soldiers in a process of the individual soldier's identification with these expectations.

Yet, there is some element of anti-organizational resistance within the individual (Trice 1993; Stölting 2010) that sets certain limits to the full-fledged success of the military socialization and training and the internalization of the military's role expectations. In some cases, to be sure, such resistance has tremendous and far-reaching consequences as it may take the

form of fragging, defection, mutiny or the like (see, e.g., Lepre 2011), but in most cases, the soldiers only nourish minor forms of such resistance that may, e.g., be displayed in unofficial rituals among soldiers (Biehl and Kümmel 2014). Having said this, it becomes clear that there is a difference between the me-identity and the we-identity that may not be fully bridged. The me-identity and the we-identity are congruent only to some extent, sometimes more, but sometimes less.

So far we have shed light on the we-identity the military organization advocates and demands from the individual on the one hand and on the me-identity of the individual on the other. But in the formation of military identity and identity within the military politics as well as society also have a say and demand to be heard and listened to. In politics, there is, of course, the government that wants the country's military to fulfill certain missions and tasks as an instrument of the nation's foreign, security and defense policy. By ordering and sending the military and its soldiers to military missions a given administration exposes the military organization and the soldierly subjects to specific situations, conditions and experiences that may affect one's self-perception as a soldier as well as the military's self-reflection. Next to the government, the opposition and other political actors like lobby groups including union-like associations of soldiers have their views on military identity, as well. And the society and civil society groups like humanitarian organizations, the churches and others also advocate a specific identity for the military that suits their political interests and objectives.

Military identity and identity within the military or soldierly identity, respectively, then, is contested terrain in which several actors including the military as an organization and the individual soldier try to construct group-identity or we-identity as well as individual or me-identity in a dialogue-like format. In essence, then, the issue of military identity and identity within the military constitutes a field of identity politics. Military identity and identity within the military cannot be defined once and for all so that it is

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[1]In recent years, e.g., there has been quite some debate about military core values and about the expeditionary mindset (on this see, inter alia, Shields 2011; Kasher 2011; Tripodi and Connelley 2011).

necessary to conceive military identity and identity within the military not in terms of a singular identity, but in terms of plural identities.

The Conceptual Framework of Analysis

From what has already been said it can be inferred that it is necessary to deal with a complex web of relations if we want to adequately tackle the questions of the military identity and identity within the military. This web of relations is more complex than the picture sketched so far and entails different levels of analysis. In the center of this pentagonal web we place the soldierly individual that is engaged in identity work by responding to the perceived developments in four different reference dimensions. The analytical model proposed here places the soldier within a web that, in addition to the soldierly subject, entails:

(1) the military as an organization: The search for an answer to the question of the soldierly identity requires the inclusion of the organization and her tasks into the analysis, because the soldier is part of a larger organization, the military, and is subject to the regulations and procedures the organization is working with.

(2) national politics as being coined by a given government: Our research needs to consider the political sphere because politics in general and the government in particular impact upon the military and the individual soldier. In fact, the relationship between politics and the individual soldier can be conceived of in terms of the relationship between a principal and an agent and thus by resorting to principal-agent-theory. Politics, or rather the government tasks the military not only with general duties and specific mission objectives and tasks, but also allocates financial and material resources towards the military.

(3) the home society: The inclusion of society, i.e. the processes, changes and shifts that occur within society, is required because the members of the military organization are part of society and are connected to society by various means and through different channels; and

(4) the international environment: We need to look at the global arena because the developments and processes in the international system decide if and how situations escalate and whether they turn into regional or even international conflicts. It is within the international arena where the security political and military challenges are shaped and defined. The answers to these challenges by politics on the one hand and the military on the other define the concrete activities of the soldierly individual.

This model of analysis works with the explicit assumption that any analysis of the soldierly individual that does not reflect his/her organizational, societal, political and global dimensions and the effects that come from these reference dimensions necessarily falls short. The reason for this is that both military identity and identity within the military, i.e., soldierly identity, are complex, dynamic and changing phenomena that result from the mutual relations between and the dialectics of the individual and the environment and their co-determinedness. Figure 25.1 may be taken as an illustration of the analytical model.

The Model Applied to Present-Day Social Reality: An Analysis

The International Environment/Arena

The prime mover in international relations are the dynamic processes that can be subsumed under the heading of mondialization (see also Hopkins 2003).[2] Mondialization encompasses three distinct, but nevertheless mutually related processes: Globalization, transnationalization and

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[2]I prefer to use the term 'mondialization' to indicate the broader meaning that is commonly attached to the term 'globalization' (see also the tracing of the term in James and Steger 2014).

Fig. 25.1 The model of
analysis

internationalization (see Giddens 1991; Held et al. 1999; Martell 2010; Turner 2010; Michie 2011; Lechner and Boli 2012; Burk 2013; Steger et al. 2014). By using the first letter of each of the three sub-processes mondialization can also be referred to as the GTI-process, an acronym that, given its origin in the world of fast automobiles, essentially carries and reflects the notion of the dynamics involved in mondialization.

Globalization, to start with, relates to developments affecting and shrinking space and time. Various aspects of infrastructure, traffic and communication technologies and the like come into play here. Thus, globalization here is understood in a narrower way than it is usually done. Transnationalization, in turn, refers to a development in international relations that moved international relations from predominantly inter-state relations to transnational relations. This means that the international system nowadays is not only populated by states as prime and predominant actors, but the nation-state has increasingly met competition as an international actor by transnational or non-state actors of various kinds who engage in cross-border interactions with both state and other non-state actors. Transnationalization thus implies a change within the set of actors in

international relations. Internationalization, at last, circumscribes a process in which state actors try to reduce the costs of international transactions by establishing governance capabilities beyond the nation-state, i.e. on a supra-national and international level. Global governance is the catchword here.

The GTI-process or mondialization leads to a tremendous growth of interactions. At one point, such growth in interactions is more than just quantitative and instead becomes qualitative leading to a situation marked by interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977). Interdependence may lead to cooperation advantages or interdependence profits, but interdependence also causes costs, interdependence costs. Joining interdependence does not only strengthen the actors; interdependence also makes actors more vulnerable and sensitive towards the disruption of interdependence patterns. This is why the various actors are confronted with the question to what extent and for how long they should engage in interdependence. Since the answer to this question is contingent and depending on several variables, the answers may change. Thus, integration processes in international relations find their counterpart in desintegration processes. Actors refrain from interdependence if they are

no longer willing to bear the costs of interdependence (Bredow et al. 2000).

The development and the establishment of interdependence structures is accompanied by legitimate peace-strategic expectations and hopes. Nevertheless, interdependence is not tantamount to a large-scale harmonization of international relations, a dissolution of conflicts and the onset of an age of peace. Rather, the growth of interactions, interdependence itself, becomes a source of conflict as interdependence vulnerability and interdependence sensitivity are different from actor to actor. In addition, increasing contacts and intensifying relations entail a likely potential for conflict. In most cases, these conflicts may just be conflicts of coordination. In some cases, however, they may become more basic in character, endanger cooperation itself and may escalate into the use of collective organized violence. Such conflicts may not always be condoned; they carry some spill-over potential that may well reach the zones of wealth and peace in the world. The dark side of mondialization is thus represented by the fact that effective barriers against spill-over effects from far-away conflicts cannot be established. This also implies that societies have become much more susceptible towards both intended and unintended turbulences in cooperation such as in the fields of energy politics, transnational terrorism and failing state structures which has led to a broadening of the meaning of the term security. Societies, even peaceful societies therefore live in what Ulrich Beck has termed the 'world risk society' (Beck 2007; see also Kümmel 2005) which is basically the rationale why states and their respective societies keep regular armed forces (Kümmel 2007).

At the same time the world has become somewhat more normatively integrated than in the past. The existence of an international public, a concern for the other, cosmopolitan orientations and the various examples of a lived international solidarity may be taken as proof of this as well as the global discourse on human rights. The fact that the international community, the global/world society, most sincerely thinks about 'human security' (Ulbert and Werthes 2008) and

a 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) (ICISS 2001) and has even successively developed capabilities to match words with deeds, including, if necessary, deeds of a military nature, has also to be mentioned here.

In the end, then, the mondialized world is an ambivalent world. This ambivalence of the world risk society is the starting point for the actors in international relations to define and shape their foreign, security and defense politics which includes among others the armed forces. The present world order is characterized by the co-existence of classical, zero-sum security provision on the one hand and cosmopolitan, positive-sum security provision on the other hand.

National Politics

As we have seen, in the present time, the world risk society is the starting point for any nation-state and society to define and shape its role in the world. In this endeavor, the states are basically sovereign, i.e. they are free to chose their individual response to the challenges of the international environment. Since the interdependence of the world risk society entails both costs and benefits, these responses vary. Accordingly, the degree to which the states and societies engage in interdependence differs and ranges from minimal to full-fledged engagement.

Most countries want to adequately respond to the challenges of mondialization and the world risk society and thus develop a global orientation and pursue their interests through coordination and cooperation with other countries, sometimes in a more, sometimes in a less structured and formalized way. Most of them would like to see a world order that is peaceful, stable, and respectful of difference and acknowledge their responsibility to contribute to achieve this. Given the unequal distribution of individual power resources, the responsibility of some states is more pronounced than it is for some others. In both cases, however, these states look for the adequate means to achieve such a world order while simultaneously being fully aware of the potential

and the existence of conflict in a world risk society that is characterized by a broadening of the challenges to security. In this regard, the armed forces are considered a very important instrument of the state in its foreign, security and defense politics and are designed to meet a whole range of different purposes. Politics is in need of the military to paraphrases, under reverse auspices, Naumann's (2008) notion of the military being in need of politics.

The government is usually the most important player in this arena of national politics, but if the political systems allows for this, the opposition or rather the various parties that form the opposition are influential players as well. Sometimes there may be a situation in which there is a far-reaching national consensus in the country, but more often than not the opposition parties do not necessarily share the same view on the national interest and the foreign, security and defense politics as the government, but have sometimes more, sometimes less diverging perspectives on these issues.

Nowadays, the ambivalence of the world risk society leads governments to task and use the military for the deterrence of an attack on the state, for the defense of the state and for the defense of the state's allies, but also for securing elections in fragile countries, for providing humanitarian help, for keeping the peace in conflict zones, for enforcing peace, for training and socializing security forces in other countries and for post-conflict restructuring of state institutions. This resembles a substantial extension of the military role set: Defense, deterrence and attack, the three classical, traditional roles of the armed forces throughout the 20th century, are still valid today, but they are no longer the exclusive and most important elements within the military task profile. The role set of the military has become much more diverse and differentiated and entails a magnitude of roles such as international crisis and conflict management, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peace-/nation-building, humanitarian intervention, fighting transnational terrorism, and international disaster relief (Moskos 1976; Dandeker 1998, 1999; Franke 1999; Kümmel 2003; Keen 2008).

To be sure, within the last decade there has been considerable disillusionment regarding the prospects, possibilities and successfulness of military interventionism (Rieff 2003; Seybolt 2008). This has undoubtedly led to a posture that may be termed post-interventionism which denotes that military interventionism has become more selective and even more linked to the definition of one's national interests than it has been in the past (Kümmel and Giegerich 2013). It does by no means indicate that interventionism with military means has come to an end which, in turn, implies that the multifunctional soldier and the multifunctional military are still required. We thus live in an era that is characterized by the hybridization of the military. The military national politics of today is aiming and striving for a hybrid military that calls for the hybrid soldier.

Home Society

Depending on the nature of the political system, the home society also has a more or less influential position in the identity politics regarding the military and its soldiers. In democratic political systems, societal participation is usually present to quite some extent. There are various lobby groups including union-like associations of former and/or present soldiers (Heinecken 2010; Bartle and Heinecken 2013), the churches and civil society organizations. Public opinion also comes into play as the findings of population surveys on foreign, security and defense political and military issues are taken up by the various actors involved in the identity politics in this area (Kümmel and Biehl 2015). The attitudes of society to the military as a state institution as well as to the living and working conditions within the military and to the tasks and missions of the armed forces are important indicators of civil-military relations and say something about the relationship of the society to the armed forces.

Usually, the society is quite positive about the armed forces as a state institution as comparative research on civil-military relations shows

(Moskos et al. 2000; Kuhlmann and Callaghan 2011; Biehl et al. 2013). So most societies think that the armed forces are needed and therefore a substantial majority of the population is willing to contribute considerable resources to enable the military to do its job. Yet, the question is for what kinds of tasks and missions the military is needed and employed. Here, the approval is much more differentiated and sometimes there is more disagreement than consensus. For quite a few, especially Western countries, the trend is clear: The more violent a given conflict in a scenario of a non-traditional mission, the less agreement within society to engage the armed forces in this particular mission (for Germany, see Kümmel 2013).

Whereas, in general, providing humanitarian assistance and help abroad in cases of natural disasters, defending the country and its allies and keeping the peace are overwhelmingly supported by the population, missions like the active prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the participation in the fight against international terrorism or active peace enforcement are, sometimes much, less agreed to. The impression, then, is that most societies overwhelmingly support and trust the armed forces as some 'natural' state institutions and are adequately taking the various processes of mondialization into account; they also, in principle, acknowledge that in times like these the defense and security politics of the country has to have a global outlook and that the military factor has to play a crucial role in here (Biehl et al. 2013).

At the same time we find interesting processes of some distancing of society from the military that are rooted in the socio-cultural shifts in advanced societies. In particular, the acceptance of the military as an organization is oftentimes paralleled by a rather weak individual willingness to actively join the armed forces. Also, approval of the missions of the armed forces increasingly needs legitimatory work because with regard to military missions abroad, the approval of a particular military operation varies according to the level of violence the operation entails; with increasing violence, with increased risk the approval rate declines.

What follows from this is that societal support for the hybrid tasks and missions of the military is nothing that comes natural, but it is contingent. The governmental/political and the societal perception of the military and its tasks is not necessarily in line and congruent. For governments, the requirement to provide legitimacy to a certain mission and to find the needed societal backing of a certain mission has certainly become more pronounced within the last decade.

The Military

The military in industrialized countries usually accepts the primacy of politics, perceives itself as one of several tools to realize the tasks defined by politics and tries to do so with the resources and funds provided by the government. Simultaneously, the military, to various extents, tries to make its military expertise felt by participating in the relevant discussions from the moment when an issue comes up, is defined and handled; it thus attempts to influence the process of identifying security threats and defining the tasks and objectives of the military. Basically, however, it accepts the extended military role profile outlined above and has meanwhile expressively incorporated it as an element of the collective identity, the collective self-perception and the collective professional role model of the military which the armed forces disseminate among the members of the military organization through training and socialization.

Furthermore, to meet the security and defense political challenges of the world risk society, since the end of the East-West-conflict Western militaries have been and are still being reformed, transformed, modernized and overhauled quite extensively and substantially (Burk 1998). These efforts focus on the most likely military missions, on multinationality and on the ideas of jointness and network-centric warfare and include working on organizational structures, military equipment, training, the operative-strategic mission concepts and the people within the military. The overall goal of these efforts is the sustained improvement of the armed forces' military readiness and

performance. (Helmig and Schörnig 2008; see also Soeters et al. 2010) Interestingly, for some militaries which have been more managers than warriors during the East-West-conflict the 'remilitarization' of the military in terms both of robust non-traditional missions and classical military missions poses a mental challenge and a re-focussing on acquiring or regaining fighting expertise.

A Model of Military Identity and Identity Within the Military

The discussion of terms, the identification of a conceptual framework for the analysis of military identity and the individual soldier's identity plus the nutshell analysis of the present situation in the pentagonal web inspires an identity model that acknowledges the dimension of time and thus allows for identity changes over time. This model will be sketched in what follows.

On the basis of this model lies the global order that is given at a specific point in time which implies that the world order is not the same once and for all, but changes in the course of history. To illustrate this: At the times of the Cold War and the East-West-conflict the international environment was quite different to the international arena that developed after 1989/90 up to the present time. For example, bipolarity has given way to multipolarity; the state-centric world has given way to the multi-centric world; non-military threats emerged as security threats; and transnational terrorism assumed a role few have thought of before. Since the role set for the military and the members of the military organization follows from the security political fabric of a given world order, these role sets change according to the changes within the international arena.

The international environment present at a specific time is then analyzed and interpreted by all the actors involved in the political game of military identity politics. From this interpretation that is also influenced by their distinct world view these actors derive the capabilities requirements and the role set they would like to see met and performed by the military and its soldiers. This being said, it is obvious that different actors have different preferences regarding the military role set and thus different views on what military identity and identity within the military should entail or not. Some actors, including the military and its individual members, may be more inclined to buy the idea that non-traditional roles have to be added to the traditional military role set than others.

For these non-traditional roles to be identity forming and practice shaping on the side of the military organization as well as on the side of the individual soldier time is needed. In this vein, e.g., the task of peacekeeping was long not considered to be a genuine task for the military and it took quite a while until peacekeeping became more acceptable as part of military identity and, even more so, of the identity of individual soldiers (Moskos 1976; Franke 1999). The same applies to the non-traditional roles mentioned above.

The model that may conceptually help conceive of military identity and identity within the military (Haltiner and Kümmel 2008) will first concentrate on soldierly identity, i.e. on the identity of the individual soldiers. The model basically resorts to three ideal-type axes which eventually result in a three-dimensional model and matrix (Fig. 25.2).

The first axis stems from juxtaposing the personal motifs underlying the actions of soldiers. Here, action with a sense for a broader and larger sense and meaning is differentiated from action that is an end in itself and follows some narrow and parochial interests. The basic difference here is whether a given soldier in his/her actions follows a simple command and order impulse or a set of relatively banal incentives on the one hand or requests a more complex and meaningful context, an ethical or political framework to embed his/her actions into (Seiffert 2005; Biehl 2005; Warburg 2008). For example, a soldierly action is defined as driven by simple impulses of narrow or banal incentives when a soldier participates in a military missions only because of the financial and economic gains he/she expects or solely because of careerist considerations or simply because he/she has been ordered to do so or just because he/she belongs to

Fig. 25.2 A model of soldierly identity

the so-called mission junkies who go for military missions to serve purely egoistic needs and longings. By contrast, a soldierly action is defined as complex and with an orientation towards some deeper sense and meaning when the soldier is convinced that his/her action is good, justified, morally responsible or politically widely accepted.[3]

The second axis reflects one of the classical debates in military sociology and is marked by

the opposing positions of two well-known American social scientists, one is the political scientist Huntington (1957), the other the sociologist Janowitz (1960). While Huntington's name symbolizes the ideal image of a relative separation, a segregation of the military and its parent society, Janowitz' name represents a conception of civil-military relations in which the armed forces are fairly well integrated into society. Within the first concept, the military is seen as an elitist institution that is in need of being protected against unwelcome and undue influences resulting from societal and sociocultural developments in order to ensure the effectiveness of the institution. In contrast to this, the latter vision starts from core values in Western society such as democratization and participation and strifes for the military's acceptance, respect and legitimacy in society and thus favors the military's integration into society.

[3]For this discussion see also Battistelli's (1997) distinction between paleomodern, modern and postmodern motivations to participate in military missions abroad with (1) paleomodern motivations emphasizing normative commitments including to be helpful to others or to strengthen one's country; (2) modern motivations emphasizing an instrumental or utilitarian commitment to personal benefit such as making money or receiving education; and (3) postmodern motivations emphasizing some desire for self-realization, for adventure, and for making extraordinary and meaningful personal experiences.

The third and last axis represents the mental background of military missions and juxtaposes a national reference frame and a post-national or world society one. Thus, the distinction here is between a military operation scenario foremost along national and patriotic orientations and one that is much broader to include a global and international outlook following world society or cosmopolitan orientations. While the first position is circumscribed by the traditional military functions of defense, deterrence and attack, the latter one includes non-traditional military tasks such as peacekeeping, peaceenforcement, state-/nation-building, humanitarian interventions and post-conflict peacebuilding (Kümmel 2003; Haltiner 2006).

Discussion

The model just outlined allows for the description of various sets of soldierly functions, capabilities and competences irrespective of whether these sets exist simultaneously or successively. It thus includes the dimension of time, i.e. it allows for identity changes in the course of time. Military and soldierly identity cannot be fixed once and for all, but are subject to dynamic processes of change. At the time when the objective of armed forces was rather narrowly defined as defending the national territory, the soldierly competence requirements focussed upon combat and fighting. According to this, the stress in soldierly identity in those days was on the role of the warrior. Everything else was secondary at best. During the East-West-conflict and under the umbrella of mutually assured nuclear destruction, there occurred some shift that has been summarized under the heading of 'Warriors to Managers' (Martin 1981).

For the present time the identity narrative is again different in so far as we are witnessing the extension of military missions which requires a much broader role set than before. To capture this, Däniker (1995) spoke of the *miles protector*; Moskos (2000: 15) added diplomatic skills and 'scholar-states-man'-qualitites to this list; others included the characteristics of the policeman and the streetworker in order to have capabilities at hand that are necessary for international stabilization or, more ambitious, state-, peace- and/or nation-building operations (Bredow 2006); in still another turn, the notion of the 'democratic warrior', motivated by 'Republican virtues' has been suggested to capture the change in an illustrative formula (Herberg-Rothe 2011). Further on, the concepts of postmodernism (Moskos et al. 2000; Hajjar 2014) and of the expeditionary mindset (see the contributions to Fürst and Kümmel 2011) were discussed with the latter requiring the moral, humanitarian and/or cosmopolitan conduct of military operations, the mental preparedness to deploy on short notice, the capability for conducting network-centric warfare, knowledge of the local culture, empathy, negotiation skills, some degree of critical thinking and reflectivity to help manage changing, ambivalent and ambiguous environments, improvising skills, persuasion, or the ability to cooperate and build relationships with a multitude of different military and civilian actors which follow different codes of conduct, different organizational principles and different logics or mental maps.

To turn back to the model: What is clear is that the type of soldier requested by the present-day world risk society is a multifunctional one that leaves the monofunctional role set behind (Haltiner 2003; Kümmel 2003; Tomforde 2008). In addition, he/she is more inclined to take sides with Morris Janowitz on the notion of socially integrated armed forces as the military and its missions today more than ever need to strife for societal legitimacy. And, last, but not least, he/she rather goes for the meaningful action compared to parochial acting.

He/she is a warrior and a fighter as well as a constable, a policeman, a diplomat and an armed global street worker. The soldier today needs to know how to fight, how to secure local security, how to deescalate conflict situations, how to treat local adversaries in an interculturally competent way, how to mediate, how to cooperate with civilian international relief and humanitarian organizations, how to help rebuilding war-torn infrastructures, etc. While being experts in violence, i.e., in the use of force, the soldier needs to

be well-trained, well-educated, capable of cultural and social empathy, in possession of intercultural and social skills and competences and knowledgeable in diplomatic behavior and communication. Next to a pillar of soldierly identity that entails patriotism and national commitment, a second pillar is to be developed that rests upon some sort of humanitarian cosmopolitanism and an orientation towards human dignity and human rights that are not in contradiction of national interests, but go beyond them. Team work competences and capabilities, critical loyalty, reflection capacities and power of judgement regarding one's own actions and one's responsibility for one's deeds plus an awareness of the need to link the armed forces to society and to secure democratic legitimacy are critical for the soldier to have.[4]

A good illustration for this is the Swiss army knife that surely carries a big blade, but also comes with a whole range of complementing and enriching tools. The notion that may best capture the soldierly identity that is needed and wanted by the world risk society, national politics, the military organization and, perhaps somewhat less and somewhat more contingent, society is the notion of the hybrid soldier.

Without a doubt, the reality of military operations by Western armed forces has initiated socialization and learning processes among the individual soldiers as well as within the military organization at large along the lines sketched here, although the change may not yet be fully interwoven into the mindsets of all soldiers. To further complicate things, there also are distinct sub-groups within the military that nourish distinct sub-group identities (see also Griffith 2011). What comes easily to one's mind here are the sub-group identities of the three services, the army, the navy and the air force. Also, special forces often share a world and a worldview of their own.

The model presented above has been invented for heuristic reasons and it may be useful in the future research on this thematic field. It claims to include each and every construction of military identity and soldierly identity that has been, is and will be developed by all the actors involved in military identity politics. It allows for constructions of individual identity as well as for constructions of collective identities of different reach ranging from the we-identity of the platoon to the we-identity of the military organization at large.

At present, the available constructions of military identity and identity within the military meanderingly, but clearly move around a gravitational center along the lines of the new profile of the military and its soldiers sketched above. This has met some critique: Some argue that the hybridization of the military leading to hybrid militaries and to hybrid soldiers may by far be too demanding for the military and, particularly, its soldiers to be put into military practice and may thus represent a distinct overstretch. Especially with regard to the individual soldier there is concern that the multitude of capabilities and roles requested for the hybrid soldier may lead to an identity crisis and, perhaps, to a mental breakdown of the individual which may endanger military effectiveness (Warburg 2008; see also Broesder et al. 2014).

Indeed, the notion of the hybrid soldier and the hybrid military is a demanding one, but may nevertheless not generally represent an overstretch. Role theory (see, inter alia, Dahrendorf 2006) tells us that human beings are capable of 'playing' various social roles simultaneously. There may be a conflict of roles, but at the same time there are various strategies for managing multiple identities (Ashforth and Johnson 2001). Pratt and Foreman, e.g., (2000) have described four such strategies: (1) compartmentalization meaning the preservation of multiple identities without aiming for synergy among them); (2) deletion of a particular; (3) integration, i.e. the amalgamation of multiple identities to a distinct new one; and (4) aggregation implying the keeping of all distinct identities as well as creating links between them. According to this, the last strategy would be the one for the hybrid soldier.

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[4]See also the German concept of *Innere Führung* (Ebeling et al. 2002; Dörfler-Dierken 2005; de Libero 2006; Kutz 2006; Bald et al. 2008).

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Author Biography

Gerhard Kuemmel (*1964), Dr. phil., studied political science, sociology and history at the Philipps-University Marburg (1985–1991). His dissertation (1994), supported by the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation and the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC, dealt with transnational relations in international politics and analyzed German-American business relations in the interwar-period. Following a post-doctoral scholarship from the German Research Foundation for an analysis of the current European security environment (1995–97) he was a DAAD-Lecturer at the University of Victoria, BC (1997). Later that year he joined the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Research (SOWI). Since 2013, he is Senior Researcher at the Bundeswehr Center of Military History and Social Sciences (ZMSBw) in Potsdam, Germany. He was President of ISA RC 01: Armed Forces & Conflict Resolution (2010–2014) and teaches Military Sociology at Potsdam University.

The Sociology of the Military and Asymmetric Warfare

26

Giuseppe Caforio

Introduction

Once there was guerrilla warfare.[1] Guerrilla fighters were able to stymie powerful, organized armies, like Napoleon's in Spain in the nineteenth century, or the Germans' in Europe during the Second World War.

Nowadays it's *asymmetric warfare* that allows David to challenge Goliath. This is a form of war in which a weak party, as opposed to a strong party, uses a non-conventional instrument of struggle in order to bridge the gap between the two sides.

But what is new about asymmetric warfare compared to guerrilla fighting (which is also a form of struggle—one of many—used by it)? Asymmetric warfare takes place in a completely different context than those in which guerrilla warfare operated, it unfolds in a global society profoundly connoted by the emergence, as Al Gore (2013) writes, of:

– a planetary electronic communications network that allows billions of people to connect with each other in real time and share their thoughts, feelings and experiences;

– a global economy characterized by extensive interconnection;
– a new equilibrium between political, economic and military powers;
– hard-to-sustain growth in terms of population, which, in view of the limitedness of resources, creates steadily broadening pockets of poverty and social exclusion.

All this produces a socially and politically explosive mixture in many parts of the world, a mixture that often only needs a tiny spark to explode and give rise to wars of poor against rich, small against large, weak against strong. In other words, to what has been defined as asymmetric warfare, whose components and fighting tools are guerrilla warfare, terrorism,[2] media exploitation of the *information and communica-*

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[1]On guerrilla warfare, see Ernesto "Che" Guevara (1961), Levy (1964), Asprey (1975).

[2]Which can be correctly defined with the words of Rob Wainwright (Wainwright 2012, p. 4): "*Terrorism is the attempt to achieve political goals with the use or the threat of violence. The ideologies behind terrorism vary widely, but can be roughly divided into a number of identifiable main drivers. Examples include religiously-inspired terrorism and strong ethnonationalist sentiments leading to separatist terrorism. The identified drivers are not static, however, and can evolve or vanish over time in response to political or socio-economic developments, merge with other ideologies or convictions, or be the building blocks of new and sometimes very specific and highly individual motivations.*"

G. Caforio (✉)
Pisa, Italy

tion technologies (ICTs)[3] proper to globalized modern society, for this reason also referred to as the *information society*.

To define this new type of conflict, scholars and security operators have given free rein to their imaginations: from the term *new wars* used by Mary Kaldor, to the various terminologies used by military publications, especially American—*irregular warfare (IW), stability operations, counterinsurgency (COIN), fourth generation wars, full spectrum wars, small wars, low-intensity conflicts*—to those of military theoreticians (*hybrid wars*: Hoffman 2007), to a definition, finally, based on the main cause of its spread, the asymmetry of the contending parties, called *asymmetric warfare*, a term that is preferred here precisely because it gives the reason why more traditional forms of warfare (called "*conventional*") were abandoned by one of the parties in conflict.

This terminology and the underlying conception of the operations that the militaries of the industrialized countries are prevalently called on to perform was arrived at via a historical path that started in 1960, from the definition of the new armed forces as constabulary forces. This definition was created by Morris Janowitz, who already wrote at the time: "*The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture. The constabulary outlook is grounded in, and extends, pragmatic doctrine*" (Janowitz 1960: p. 418).

The development both of the military thought and of the concrete actions undertaken by the various countries later led to the new terminology of peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace enforcing, attributed from time to time to the single operation according to its prevalent characteristics (see Caforio 2013b).

But the variety of situations now present in every operation and the multiplicity of the responses required a progressive aggregation of the individual typologies, which led the Americans to develop the new notion of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and the English the still widespread term of Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

Finally, a marked co-presence of full-blown war operations (see Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, but not only), together with civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), medical assistance (MEDEVAC etc.), governance and other activities, has rendered the "other than war" terminology obsolete and has led to the new and now widespread name of "asymmetric warfare", all-inclusive, as opposed to increasingly rare operations of the "conventional" type.

In the 1990s, the concept of "asymmetric conflicts" began to gain favour among military analysts,[4] who asserted that, when forces in confrontation do not possess the same level of military power, they adopt dissimilar tactics. In such cases, the military objectives are no longer the systematic pulverization of enemy lines but rather, in many cases, the erosion of popular support for the war within the society of the enemy (see the web site by *The World Guide*, "The Changing Face of War" in bibliography).

This terminology, moreover, occupies a neutral, *super partes* position. Indeed, from the standpoint of the countries that send expeditionary forces to the various theatres listed below, such operations are called *PSOs, counterinsurgency (COIN), peacekeeping*, etc., while the insurgents refer to their operations as *holy war, war of national liberation*, etc.

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[3]They include all the software, interfaces and devices that connect up to computers and make possible, through the use of a technological support aimed at the elaboration of symbolic systems, the construction, negotiation and sharing of significants. Mobile phones should also be included in this list, due to their ability to send text messages to an unspecified number of recipients, as well as dissemination tools like DVDs.

[4]But already in 1964 Galula (2006, p. 3) wrote in regard to what was still called "revolutionary war": "*There is an asymmetry between the opposite camps of a revolutionary war. This phenomenon results from the very nature of the war, from the disproportion of strength between the opponents at the outset, and from the difference in essence between their assets and their liabilities. Since the insurgent alone can initiate the conflict, strategic initiative is his by definition*" (p. 3).

Consequently, if one wishes to use a term that isn't restricted to just one of the sides in the struggle, asymmetric warfare seems the most correct, because it identifies a situation in which a weak side, opposing a strong side, uses non-conventional forms of conflict aimed at overcoming the gap between the two sides Caforio (2013a).

To better define the new scenario created by asymmetric warfare, we can use the classical description that Kaldor (1999) gives for this phenomenon, which she has called "New Wars". According to her, a typical new phenomenon is armed networks of non-state and state actors. They include: paramilitary groups organized around a charismatic leader, warlords who control particular areas, terrorist cells, fanatical volunteers like the Mujahedeen, organized criminal groups, units of regular forces or other security services, as well as mercenaries and private military companies.

The Information Society and Its Vulnerability

That said, let's see what the principal effects of the now familiar globalization process are, and in particular those effects that have had the most impact in changing conflict scenarios in the first decade of this new century.

First it needs to be said that, although globalization has produced general progress of the societies involved, the very instruments that globalization depends on can be used for destructive effects on those same societies (see Hartman 2002, p. 2). This vulnerability is chiefly "Western" because the tools of modern technology, and especially those of communication, have broad possibilities of being used particularly against and within the democratic countries (Bockstette 2009, p. 13).

The communication technologies available today have offered a new and quite vast range of instruments to terrorist groups, enabling far-flung

propaganda and information by means of the Internet, safe, widespread connections (mobile phones and email), and propaganda for training in guerrilla warfare and/or terrorism through the distribution of DVDs (see Caforio 2010).

Globalized Internet communication creates a strategic hinterland or "virtual sanctuary" for terrorism.

In the last few years also official military authorities show, in the U.S., for example, that they have fully understood the potential and dynamics of the new tools of struggle offered by ICTs. Indeed, ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations (ADRP 3-0 2012, p. 1–4) states:

> Modern information technology makes cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum indispensable for human interaction, including military operations and political competition. These two mediums inherently impact the influence of an operational environment and will be simultaneously congested and contested during operations. All actors – enemy, friendly, or neutral – remain potentially vulnerable to attack by physical means, cyberspace means, electronic means, or a combination thereof.

A collateral phenomenon that several authors (see, for instance, Nordstrom 2004; Kilcullen 2009) call "shadows of war", constitutes the economic support of the present forms of warfare. The new forms of warfare produce a new kind of economy, based on violence. Money is collected through robberies, pillaging, drugs, spirits, cigarette trafficking, managing illegal immigration, forcing regular immigrants to give up a share of their wages, and taxing international humanitarian assistance. According to some writers (see Kaldor 2003), the new wars can be considered the main source of the transnational criminal economy that represents the dark side of globalization.

A concrete analysis of the phenomenon is offered to us by the study by Ehrenfeld and Ken (2013, p. 1), *who write*:

> The nexus of terrorist groups and international criminal organizations is complex, linking money, geography, politics, arms, and tactics to create a mutually beneficial relationship. This nexus yields

hundreds of billions of dollars in revenues world-wide – for 1992 alone, the figure was close to $1 trillion. A decade later, with the exponential growth in drug consumption, U.S. experts estimated the profits to be as high as $2 trillion. Since then, a staggering supply of heroin from Afghanistan, Iran and Mexico, and cocaine from South America, have created millions of new drug addicts the world over and filled the coffers of Islamist warlords.

While Islam forbids the use of drugs by Muslims, there are no such limitations in selling it to the infidels. Islamist terror organizations' drug trafficking has been even encouraged by special fatwas. Why the emphasis on drugs? There are no other commodities on the market today with as high and fast a return, as cocaine, heroin or amphetamines. In addition, the drug trade is a triple pronged weapon that helps the jihadists to:

*Finance their activities.
*Undermine targeted countries politically and
 economically, and create crises in public health.
*Recruit new members to destroy the corrupt drug
 addicted Western societies.

But there are also other sources of funding. For example, the Maghreb group's kidnap-for-ransom business, especially in North Africa, generates many millions of dollars.

But globalization is not an achieved goal; it is an ongoing process in which we now have to consider another recent phenomenon, one that originated in the industrial and business world but then spread to other sectors, glocalization.[5] Indeed, one particularly interesting aspect of the use of the media for new conflict purposes is constituted by glocalization, which integrates globalization through a hybridization of new and global cultural forms with old, local ones to give the message greater penetrative capacity.

One instrument in particular of globalization—communication—has already demonstrated its "military" power in favour of terrorist groups, with the role that media play in influencing the world environment. And this occurs through the parallel transformation of society, which has led to what has been termed the "information society".

The information society employs, and is in part shaped by, *information and communication technologies*, of which Van Dijk (2002, pp. 33–35) lists the main characteristics as follows:

- *fast long-distance communication*
- *potential geographic and demographic range*
- *enormous storage potential*
- *accuracy of the transmitted information*
- *selectiveness of messages.*

The information society is today's globalized society; communication,[6] in its old and new forms, thus constitutes the pillar of globalization, and as such also constitutes the new battleground between opposing powers.[7]

As is widely known, collective social communication is accomplished through the media, which today constitute the chief agents of socialization,[8] primary socialization included. The media must therefore be the starting point for our treatment.

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[5]The term "glocalization" stems from Japanese business practices in the 1980s, as a combination of the words "globalization" and "localization", used to describe a product or service that is developed and distributed globally but is also fashioned to accommodate the user or consumer in a local market. This means that the product or service may be tailored to conform with local laws, customs or consumer preferences. By definition, products or services that are effectively "glocalized" are going to be of much greater interest to the end user. Recently its use has been extended to other contexts (see, for instance, Friedman 2005, or Shawhan 2005).

[6]Communicate, from the Latin *communis = which belongs to all*, properly means sharing, "putting something in common with others" (see Karl Erik Rosengren 2001). The act of communication has the purpose of transmitting information and messages to someone. The ways of communicating are numerous and varied, and are given the name "media".

[7]Where by powers are meant economic and/or industrial powers (such as multinationals), and national states (and/or aggregations of several states), and those that found room to manoeuvre once the frozen equilibria of the Cold War faded away. I mean to refer here to a number of religious movements, revolutionary forces, either internal to states or interstate, and politically organized ethnic groups.

[8]Socialization corresponds to the learning of values, norms and cultural models by the members of a collectivity. They are not only known but also internalized, so that most desires, expectations and needs conform to them, and individuals perceive adopting certain choices rather than others as "natural".

By media is meant the means of communication that convey information, messages. But the etymology of the term can better explain its dual nature.

Medium, indeed, was chosen because the English language does not possess a term with the dual meaning of "means" (as instrument) and "something that is halfway between two poles" (in this case between the author of a message and its recipient).[9]

In today's globalized society, the traditional media are joined by the new media of ICT.

At the end of the twentieth century we then saw the irresistible rise of the Internet and the computer, as well as of mobile telephony and the use and distribution of DVDs, all instruments indicated here under the generic term of ICT.

A technological transformation has taken place that has brought with it a social transformation that can also be summed up by talking about a passage from the mass media society to a personal media society, where one-to-all communication is flanked—and at times replaced—by **many-to-many communication**, often through the so-called social networks.[10]

In the information society, therefore, information sources have multiplied enormously, augmenting the information supplied by the mass media with information provided by so-called personal media.

It is not difficult to document how the media cited in the preceding section are all contributors to the socialization of individuals and groups and that, as such, they are exploited as an instrument —the leading instrument, in my view—of asymmetric warfare.

The school, first and foremost, as an agent of primary socialization, is abundantly used—in numerous Islamic madrassas, for example—for ideological conditioning from the tenderest age, associating the possibility of cultural elevation with fundamentalist religious fanaticism and providing the operational arm of the weak side in the asymmetric confrontation with potential tools for the struggle, up to deliberate sacrifice of one's life (kamikaze).

Today in fact, the weak side's offensive tool is man, and man is no longer a person who carries and operates a weapon but is himself a weapon, who sacrifices himself to strike the adversary, and he does this because his mind has been convinced to do it. As Magdi Allam writes (Allam 2006, p. 161, my translation): "*...in the age of globalized Islamic terrorism, the real weapon isn't bombs, but the brainwashing that transforms people into robots of death.*"

How he/she strikes is not important: it may be the terrorist who blows himself up on a crowded bus, the one who kidnaps hostages, the girl on a chat line who attracts a boy from the opposing side to a lovers' tryst that becomes a death trap, the elimination of moderate fellow citizens and co-religionists, other instruments aimed at terrorizing a population… One could continue at length with this list but what counts, what has to be understood, is that the basic weapon is man himself, the man whose brain has been wired in advance to act and explode, like with a remote control.

Nor does it seem necessary to provide examples of how the more traditional media—press, radio, television—are bound up, and have been for some time, in ideological penetration of the masses.[11] Their action benefiting forms of asymmetric warfare has been clear for years, enabling (see Marret 2003, p. 46) to write: *"Les médias offrirent au terrorisme ce que jamais elles n'accordèrent à une entreprise commerciale—une promotion gratuite."*

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[9]To the Latin term, used in the plural to designate the various means of communication, was then added the word "mass" to indicate a pluralistic communication, theoretically, at the time the term was created, from one to all.

[10]Social networks, understood as means of public communication (i.e., from many to many), may be identified with the most well-known ones, Facebook and Twitter, but the category also includes media reserved to narrower categories of professionals and/or intellectuals, such as LinkedIn, Academia, etc.

[11]See the research "Officer and Commander", the report on which will be published in 2016 in the volume *Officer and Commander: The Leadership in Asymmetric Warfare Operations*.

We need only report what is cited by Janes (http://jtsm.janes.com 4 July 2008), i.e.: "*There is growing concern that the Internet has replaced the Afghan training camps as the principal training ground for aspirant jihadists. A vast library of information on bomb-making, weaponry and tactics is now available online*."

Also Armstrong (2008), in his article "The Art of Asymmetric Warfare", illustrates quite well, with reference to the Afghan theatre of operations, the general, diffuse use of the media by the weak side of the parties in conflict, the Taliban.

The same author also reports (op. cit.) that:

> A US military officer quoted in the excellent report by the International Crisis Group into Taliban propaganda operations released a few days ago says, "unfortunately, we tend to view information operations as supplementing kinetic [fighting] operations. For the Taliban, however, information objectives tend to drive kinetic operations… virtually every kinetic operation they undertake is specifically designed to influence attitudes or perceptions."

He then comments:

> Equally, the idea that military operations should be decided primarily according to their effect on populations and thus should be determined to a significant degree by the exigencies of modern media technology and by journalists is anathema to most Western soldiers, most of whom see the press as a necessary evil at best… The Taliban by contrast are quite happy to shape their military strikes according to the media demand. They know that spectacular attacks such as that on Kabul's Serena hotel or the repeated attempts on President Karzai's life are effective.

Furthermore, William Hartman observes for the USA (Hartman 2002, p. 9):

> The media has had a tremendous effect on a nation's ability to pursue its national objectives in modern times. We saw the effects when the U.S. was forced out of Vietnam after the horrible images of the Tet offensive, out of Lebanon after the Marine barracks bombing, and out of Mogadishu after 18 Army soldiers were killed and dragged through the streets. Did the death of 18 soldiers truly change the tactical balance of power on the streets of Mogadishu? Absolutely not.

We can conclude that combat operations, on the ground, are no longer conducted with the precise end of defeating and destroying the adversary forces, but to produce a certain media effect, on public opinion in general (especially Western) and on the populations affected by the conflict in particular.

New Aspects of War

It is common experience that we are seeing new aspects of war in the twenty-first century that appear to be characterized by a prevalently political and ideological (often religious) nature, by a diligent effort to exploit the media, by consciously and determinedly ignoring any ethical standard. The strategy is to gain political power through sowing fear and hatred, to create a climate of terror, eliminate moderate voices and defeat tolerance Caforio (2008).

Facing these new forms of war has thus become the prevalent task of the armed forces of the advanced countries. As Sheppard (2014, p. 2) writes in this regard,

> In the aftermath of the Cold War, the primary activity of military forces, particularly ground forces, has gravitated towards confronting asymmetric warfare and peacekeeping operations against non-State actors. Whether the future holds another conventional war or not is debatable, but for the moment clashes with unconventional forces and terrorism clearly absorb the greatest energies of the world's militaries.

The new forms of conflict following the end of the bipolarization of the Cold War created large regional pockets of instability that necessitated widespread, prolonged intervention by national armies in operations of a constabulary nature (Janowitz 1960). As Nagl (2002, p. 66) observes,

> If this instability anywhere poses a threat, then ensuring the existence of stability everywhere – denying terrorists sanctuary in rogue or failed states – becomes a security imperative. Therefore winning battles becomes less urgent than pacifying populations and establishing effective governance. War in this context implies not only coercion but also social engineering.

Therefore, as already said, combat operations on the ground are no longer conducted with the precise end of defeating and destroying the adversary forces, but to produce a certain effect

on the populations affected by the conflict and on public opinion in general (especially Western). As a result, also the fighting operations should be decided primarily according to their effect on populations and should thus be determined to a significant degree by the exigencies of modern media technology and journalists. As George Dimitriu writes (Dimitriu 2012, abstract, p. 1):

> In conflicts of the information age success in the application of force depends less on the outcome of tactical operations on the battlefields but more on how the war's purpose, course and conduct is viewed by public opinion at home as well as within the theatre of operations. Therefore western allies in Iraq and Afghanistan are not only involved in a physical struggle but also in a struggle over perceptions, for no long-term engagement of troops is possible without support from home, nor can a counterinsurgency succeed without the support of the local population.

A second aspect of the new forms of war is that the prevalent operations no longer take place in "no-man's land" but in the midst of civilian populations. Military engagements today can take place anywhere, in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force in some cases.

For example, in a thoughtful and strongly argued study, Frank G. Hoffman (reported by Helfstein 2012) prefaced his Introduction with the following bold and far-reaching claim: "The state on state conflicts of the 20th century are being replaced by Hybrid Wars and asymmetric contests in which there is no clear-cut distinction between soldiers and civilians and between organized violence, terror, crime and war."

And against civilians is directed precisely one of the weak side's favourite tools of struggle, terrorism (about terrorism see Hogenraad et al. 1995; Hoffmann 1999; Williams 2000; Ihekwoaba 2001; Marret 2003; Hartley 2010; Caforio 2013a), doubly useful both for disseminating that atmosphere of terror that enables the insurgents to control local populations, and to have that resonance in the media that the weak side constantly seeks.

In the use of the instruments deemed useful to the struggle, any moral or humanitarian restraint is discarded. A single example, among the many, is enough to give an idea of the scorn for any ethical rule, an example taken from the everyday reporting of an authoritative on-line review (Foreign Policy, 16 December 2014 issue):

> The Taliban stormed a military-run school in northwest Pakistan on Tuesday, killing at least 100 people – most of them **children**. Around 10:00 a. m. local time, five heavily armed Taliban gunmen entered the Army Public School and Degree College in Peshawar, opening fire on some students and taking dozens of others hostage and holding them in the main auditorium; some managed to escape the school compound. As the day wore on, military forces battled with militants still inside the school, but the rescue operation is ongoing and it is unclear if there are still hostages inside.

From practice to theory, the contents of a manual that was located by the Manchester (England) Metropolitan Police during a search of an Al Qaeda member's home is illuminating. The manual was found in a computer file, described as "the military series" related to the "Declaration of Jihad". The manual was translated into English and was introduced at the embassy bombing trial in New York. It states (page UK/BM3):

> Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth. They don't make a truce with unbelief, but rather confront it. The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless and apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals…, nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.

One must not think either, however, that ideological fanaticism and contempt for all ethical rules are characteristics only of Islamic fundamentalism; indeed, they normally belong to the code of conduct of the weak side in the asymmetric conflict. As I wrote in another work Caforio (2013a, p. 23):

> It should also be pointed out that asymmetric conflict does not consist solely of the clash between fundamentalist Islam, represented by Al Qaeda (and other similar organizations), and the industrialized countries. Many other movements,

both national and international, now adopt this form of struggle, as testified by the impressive list assembled by Weimann (2005):

- *From the Middle East, Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement), the Lebanese Hezbollah (Party of God), the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Fatah Tanzim, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Kahane Lives movement, the People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI-Mujahedin-e Khalq), the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), and the Turkish-based Popular Democratic Liberation Front Party (DHKP/C) and Great East Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C).*

- *From Europe, the Basque ETA movement, Armata Corsa (the Corsican Army), and the Irish Republican Army (IRA).*

- *From Latin America, Peru's Tupak-Amaru (MRTA) and Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN-Colombia), and the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC).*

- *From Asia, Al Qaeda, the Japanese Supreme Truth (Aum Shinrikyo), Ansar al Islam (Supporters of Islam) in Iraq, the Japanese Red Army (JRA), Hizb-ul Mujehideen in Kashmir, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Maoist insurgency in India and the rebel movement in Chechnya.*

Although Islamic fundamentalism currently seems to be the main actor in the area of asymmetric warfare, this must not lead to the erroneous conclusion that it is the religion of Islam as a whole that provides the religious ideological support for this form of struggle.

Also contributing to the creation of an uncomfortable framework for the military (on the challenge to military leadership see Wells et al. 2013; JMH Groen 2013) are the pressure of the media, the fundamental difference in values between the society of which they are an emanation and the societies in which they must operate (especially the different value attached to human life), and the low tolerance of developed societies for loss of life.

Military professionals thus find themselves faced today with a situation that requires not a simple update, but a substantial change in their preparation and professional performances and a continued **evolution** of it. Indeed, "*the change from an invasion defence towards a defence based on flexible response puts the military profession under the strain of changing large parts of its expert base, as well as ethical norms and corporate traditions*" (Abrahamsson and Weibull 2008, p. 13).

A range of abilities, skills and knowledge that enormously expand the professional baggage that today's military professional must possess.

Jung (2009) on this theme writes: "*Preparing forces to operate in a world where asymmetry appears to be the only logical option for adversaries will require some significant and innovative adaptations to training and education methods.*"

Contrarily to what is commonly thought and often appears in the media, the military impact of the new forms of struggle is not limited to the terrestrial environment, does not concern only ground forces, but displays a global environmental character, extending also to the maritime environment, menacing sea trade routes. This aspect is well illustrated in its world-wide globality by Vreÿ (2013, p. 3), who writes:

The international response to piracy through naval deployments off the Horn of Africa indicated that the piracy threat held a greater challenge than expected. The incompatibility between the war-fighting capabilities of the naval forces and the non-military status of the pirate groups can be attributed to the asymmetric nature of operations between the two actors. The piracy case off Somalia is not the only example of how asymmetry at sea offsets stronger and more sophisticated opponents. In a scenario closer to naval warfare, Iran with its Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy is an example of deliberate employment of asymmetry to counter the advantages of opposing naval forces in the Persian Gulf region. The Sea Tigers of the LTTE movement in Sri Lanka also portrays the use of asymmetry at sea, but by an irregular opponent against a regular navy.

But who is the adversary of the strong side in the new forms of conflict, what, in sum, is the ideal-type of the insurgent, as he is prevalently called in journalism?

First of all one must speak in the plural, of insurgents, because their typology is composite. Referring, for example, to Afghanistan, Janes writes:

> The Afghan insurgency is a hotchpotch of Islamist factions, power-hungry warlords, criminals and tribal groupings all pursuing their own agendas and interests, from local blood feuds to establishing a pan-Islamic caliphate. Yet, within this chaos, the Taliban leadership appears to be slowly consolidating its control over part of the country through its "shadow state". (http://jtsm.janes.com; 6 November 2009).

Wherever he operates, the insurgent is then characterized by a lacking, or minimal, assumption of responsibility, where the elements of the strong side must take on the burden of all the military, civil and juridical responsibilities that their function of pacification and moral and material reconstruction entails. Galula (1994, p. 9) acutely observes: "*The asymmetrical situation has important effects on propaganda. The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use every trick; if necessary, he can lie, cheat, exaggerate. He is not obliged to prove; he is judged by what he promises, not by what he does*."

In any case and in all known examples of asymmetric warfare, there is a mixing between criminality and ideological struggle: so it is in Afghanistan for the opium traffic, so it is in the Middle East for kidnappings aimed at ransoms, so it is along the routes of the Mediterranean for the traffic of clandestine emigrants, so it is for the warlords and the exploitation of the oil wells in Libya (and the list could go on).

The insurgent's "work" often is not a "full-time job" but one of the aspects of his activity: this aspect, as well as the camouflaging of the insurgent among civilians, is well expressed in the declaration in an interview of an Italian officer (see Footnote 9): "*The big problem of asymmetric conflict is that as long as a herdsman is with his herd he is a herdsman, only when he pulls out a gun becomes an insurgent, but then again becomes a herdsman if he hides it.*"

In other cases the insurgent is an ideologized fanatic, anxious to sacrifice his life for a religious or political (but more often religious) faith instilled in him, as stated, since childhood through an fundamentalist religious education, like that practised in some madrassas.[12]

A general typology of the insurgent is offered to us by Metz (2012, p. 5 ff.) in his classic article, "Psychology of Participation in Insurgency", where he distinguishes six major categories of insurgents:

> The Survivors: The survivor is an insurgent who lives in an environment where it is safer to be part of an armed group than not
> The Lost: The lost is someone whose life is missing meaning, structure, or a sense of identity, and who becomes convinced that the insurgency offers these things.
> The Thugs: There are people in every society – usually young males – with a propensity for aggression and violence. Insurgency attracts them since it is more prestigious and legitimate than crime
> The Ambitious: A large literature has emerged in the last decade focusing on "greed" – the desire for personal gain – as a motivation in internal war. Greed can be for material goods, power, or status. Simply put, insurgency has appeal in a system where upward mobility is blocked for the talented and ambitious members of the lower classes.
> The Aggrieved: The primary fuel of the aggrieved is sensitivity to injustice. They believe that the existing political and economic system, or specific government policies or practices (such as pervasive corruption) are unfair to some group
> The Idealists: Idealists are closely linked to the aggrieved. But rather than being driven by the desire to end injustice by imposing revenge, they seek to construct a more just and equitable system

With reference to a concrete theatre of asymmetric warfare, Afghanistan, one can say that the mujahidin were a mixed bag of Islamist, nationalist and Maoist activists, clerics and their supporters, tribal and community leaders with their followers and outlaws, and Bernstein (2012, p. 30) reports that "*Kilcullen estimates that most Afghan insurgents—perhaps as many as 75–90%—are, in fact, not hard-core Taliban; rather, they are 'local disaffected citizens and tribal leaders, upset by the government's*

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[12]See Caforio (2008).

fecklessness … and often feeling aggrieved about life. In short … they are "accidental guerrillas"."

Sociological Studies on Asymmetric Warfare

As has always occurred for new phenomena that have a social impact, sociology (but not only)[13] has dedicated itself to the study of asymmetric warfare and of its impact on the military institution, especially in the developed countries.

The positions present in the literature on this theme, often diverse and at times in contrast, help us to better understand and frame the complex and variegated phenomenon of this form of war.

Rapisarda (2005) observes that the period following the Cold War showed a growth of wars, in Europe, Asia and Africa, but the most important aspect is the change in the nature of conflict itself. Compared to the past we have less direct participation and the losses do not reach the figures of the preceding conflicts. Perhaps for this reason some define them as "low-intensity" conflicts. Civilian victims are eight times higher than the military ones, however, overturning the ratio of the wars of the first half of the twentieth century; indeed, the objective is often to destroy society, forcing migrations of populations through the tool of ethnic cleansing. The war in the former Yugoslavia, for example, caused three and a half million refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina; the wars in the autonomous republics of Georgia (Abkhazia and Ossetia) produced a half-million refugees in addition to the destruction of dwellings, architectural works and historic and religious monuments. These case histories could continue, including Syria, Iraq, some Central African countries like Nigeria, Sudan, etc.

In addition, the duration of hostilities tends to increase, as it is difficult for one of the adversaries to succeed in winning outright, and even in periods of formal truce, clashes and massacres continue.

In his book *La guerra dopo la guerra*, General Mini (2003) explains that the West has a linear approach to interpreting war, while the East adopts an a-linear one. He asserts that the confusion and uncertainty of the West in facing asymmetric threats derives from its inability to understand nonlinear systems of thought and action.

Sovereign nations thus often find themselves in difficulty, since they are not suited to taking on decentralized structures that do not abide by any rule, with the possibility of striking everywhere and often financed by organized crime or by extraterritorial religious and political organizations.

In the book *Unrestricted Warfare* (1999 and 2002) the two Chinese colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui state that "*compared to such adversaries* [the weak side], *professional armies are in fact gigantic dinosaurs which, in this new era, lack a force commensurate with their size. Their adversaries, instead, are rodents with extraordinary capacities for survival, able to use their sharp teeth to torment the best part of the world.*"

And it is the countries governed by a democratic system that, at least initially, have difficulty in contrasting forms of asymmetric warfare.

In fact democratic societies cannot take very strong measures of citizen control, and that makes it easy for extreme groups to insert themselves and grow within these societies. In addition, the porous environment allows them to move around the world undetected. And it is very difficult and unpopular to expel these groups from civil society.

A concrete and extreme example of this aspect is given to us by experiences in the field, such as that reported by Safranchuk (2003), who writes about an action aimed at detecting and defeating small enemy groups in villages:

> This type of action is extremely unpopular amongst the local population. The major problem is that enemy combatants may represent only 1-2

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[13]In the multidisciplinarity which is the salient characteristic of research in the behavioural sciences sector today, also other disciplines have dealt with this phenomenon. First and foremost psychology, which is especially interested in the psychological (and psychiatric) impact of this new form of struggle on military personnel and their families, but also cultural anthropology, political science and contemporary history.

percent of the village population. The most effective way to execute such an operation is to establish a full blockade of the town and evacuate the population while conducting passport control and arresting detected enemy combatants. With regards to human rights it is a brutal operation, but there are no other ways to minimize the risk of combatants escaping and to prevent them from free access to housing, food, water, etc. in villages.

Situations and operations like these substantially change the traditional ethical and professional references of the armies of the democratic countries.

To better understand this departure from the traditional frame of reference, first of all we have to consider the multidimensional aspects of the military engagement. The military today has to execute different operations (humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, local militias training, combat, reconstruction, nation building, etc.) simultaneously rather than sequentially. As (Dake 1999) writes: "*We believe a marine will be engaged in humanitarian assistance at sunrise, peacekeeping at noon, and conventional combat at sundown.*"

This aspect is also underscored by Buffaloe (2006, p. 29), who writes:

Multidimensional warfare lends itself to asymmetry. For example, in Iraq today, there are four dimensions operating at once: (1) first and foremost, a devastated country badly in need of rebuilding, (2) counterinsurgency, (3) counterterrorism and (4) sectarian and communal conflict. The difficulty is that if you address one of the four, you lose ground on the other three. For instance, you cannot rebuild the nation because of all of the violence. So do you end the violence first? Well, no, because if you do not reconstruct the country then you add to the insurgency. If you give power to the Shia, then you feed the Sunni violence, etc.

What long-term trends, if any, are discernible in this specific type of conflict?

If we look at the roughly 200-year period covered by Singer's seminal Correlates of War data set,[14] we discover that "strong actors" have

been losing more and more asymmetric conflicts over time. According to these data we realize, first, that weak actors were victorious in nearly 30 percent of all asymmetric wars, which seems high given the 5:1 asymmetry represented here. And second, that weak actors have won with increasing frequency over time (see Arreguín-Toft 2001).

Record (2005, pp. 16-31) writes in this regard:

What is not in dispute is that all major failed US uses of force since 1945 – in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia – have been against materially weaker enemies. In wars both hot and cold, the United States has fared consistently well against such powerful enemies as Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union, but the record against lesser foes is decidedly mixed. … The phenomenon of the weak defeating the strong, though exceptional, is as old as war itself. Sparta finally beat Athens; Frederick the Great always punched well above his weight; American rebels overturned British rule in the Thirteen Colonies; the Spanish guerrilla bled Napoleon white; Jewish terrorists forced the British out of Palestine; Vietnamese communists drove France and then the United States out of Indochina; and mujahideen handed the Soviet Union its own "Vietnam" in Afghanistan. Relative military power is hardly a reliable predictor of war outcomes.

* * *

On the definition of asymmetric warfare, many different approaches are present in the literature.

Taking the Iraq conflict as an example, (Scott et al. 2009, p. 305) observes:

Even the casual observer now has been exposed to an ever-growing list of descriptors for the Iraq war: irregular, long, small, asymmetric, 4th generation, counterinsurgency, and full-spectrum are all terms that appear in the popular and professional literature. These terms, emphasizing differing aspects of the conflict, share a common reference to wars departing from the conventional frame of reference upon which most modern armies are built.

A plurality of names that certainly does not favour either the analyst or the operative. Limiting ourselves here therefore to the one that is now most generalized and accepted in this work (see above), we start from the definition given in

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[14]J. David Singer is best known as founder of the Correlates of War (COW) Project, dedicated to the systematic accumulation of scientific knowledge about interstate and civil military conflict, which had its genesis in a 1963 grant from the Carnegie Corporation to the University of Michigan's Center for Research on Conflict

Resolution, a portion of which went to Singer and for the study of war.

1999 by the Joint Strategy Review (JSR 1999, p. 2), which describes asymmetric conflict by saying that in this form of conflict

> the strategy of the enemy is aimed at eluding, deceiving or undermining the weaknesses of the USA with methods that significantly differ from the operational ones expected by the USA… usually they focus on psychological elements, like shock effect or disturbance, which influence the American ability to initiate, morale, as well as freedom of action. The asymmetric approach is based on thorough evaluation of the vulnerability of the enemy. It often applies innovative, not traditional procedures, weapons or technologies. Asymmetric warfare can appear in the entire spectrum of military activities, it can be operational, tactical, and strategic.

In Metz (2001, p. 25) wrote: "*In military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing and thinking differently from opponents to maximize relative strengths, exploit opponents' weaknesses or gain greater freedom of action.*"

And then in 2008 he specifies (Metz et al. 2008): "*Asymmetry when applied to national security and the military, practically represents different varieties of action, organisations, way of thinking from those of the opponent, which is aimed at maximising their own strength and to use the weaknesses.*"

In 2006 (Buffaloe 2006, p. 27) gives the following definition:

> Asymmetric warfare is population-centric nontraditional warfare waged between a militarily superior power and one or more inferior powers which encompasses all the following aspects: evaluating and defeating asymmetric threat, conducting asymmetric operations, understanding cultural asymmetry and evaluating asymmetric cost.

An interesting definition because it puts the emphasis on the cultural and economic aspects of this asymmetry.

On the asymmetry of costs, David Galula had already noted Galula (1964) an asymmetry of cost between an insurgent and a counterinsurgent. An insurgent blows up a bridge—a counterinsurgent now must guard all bridges. An insurgent throws a grenade into a theatre—a counterinsurgent must take very expensive steps to ensure that the population feels safe.

This concept is drastically illustrated today in the tremendous cost to the all developed countries to secure their airways after the relatively inexpensive (for the attackers) 9/11 attacks.

As for the cultural asymmetry (or asymmetry of values), Buffaloe (op. cit., p. 23) goes on to say:

> Bismarck's statement that the "the strong is weak because of his moral scruples and the weak grows strong because of his audacity" referred to cultural asymmetry of values, norms and rules. The West believes that it values life too greatly to employ suicide as a political or military tactic. Suicide terrorists see themselves as sacrificing their lives to achieve legitimate military goals—and, in the context of the terrorist suicides of Islamic extremists, to reap commensurate rewards in heaven. This is foreign to the Western mindset; without condoning such actions, we must look through our cultural barriers to try to understand why someone would commit such an act.

To these cultural and economic aspects identified by Buffaloe must also be added a new characteristic of asymmetric conflict, that of being, as already said, *population-centric warfare*. Indeed, according to Kilcullen's classification (Kilcullen 2009, p. XIII), the different types of warfare can be identified according to the objective

> as either **terrain-centric** (as in World War II, and also in the Falklands or in Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm) or **enemy-centric** (as in Phase 1 of Operation Iraqi Freedom – OIF-1 – wherein the primary goal was to seek out the Republican Guard and the Ba'ath Party wherever they might be). But asymmetric warfare is **population-centric**; the population is the ultimate key to victory for both sides of the conflict.

Finally, a very succinct and recent definition is given by Ellen Sexton in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Sexton 2014): "**asymmetrical warfare:** *unconventional strategies and tactics adopted by a force when the military capabilities of belligerent powers are not simply unequal but are so significantly different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other.*"

* * *

Not everyone is in agreement on accepting the term "asymmetric warfare" to define the new and complex forms of conflict characteristic of the new millennium, however.

In his *Manuale di Studi Strategici*, (Jean 2004) asserts that all wars are asymmetric and above all that the ends pursued by the parties in conflict are opposing but not symmetrical. In addition, the strategic cultures, weaponry and the staying power of public opinion with respect to the prolongation of operations are different and each one tries to exploit their own asymmetries both in the choice of political and military objectives and in the strategies for achieving them. Asymmetry is therefore not a characteristic peculiar to the new forms of conflict, which in reality are not new.

This position is also taken by Blank (2003, p. V), who made the final compelling critique that the "*term had become too many things to too many different people and that its amorphous nature detracted from its utility.*"

According to him,

> For the last several years, the U.S. strategic community has used the terms "asymmetric" and "asymmetry" to characterize everything from the threats we face to the wars we fight. In doing so, we have twisted these concepts beyond utility, particularly as they relate to the threats we face. … Clearly this use of the term asymmetric or of the concept of asymmetry does not help us assess correctly the threats we face. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has voiced his discomfort with the term asymmetry, indicating his unease with its use.

On the same line are (Bolgár and Krajnc 2010, p. 213):

> As a starting point we can consider a simple fact that in wars, in conflicts when weapons are used there are always present differences (asymmetries) between the participants, in the terms of quality, quantity and morale… Almost all relevant experts establish that asymmetric warfare is not a new category, since even in the bible David and Goliath exemplify the difference in the strategy of warriors who possess asymmetric capabilities.

A more general terminological dissatisfaction is expressed by Buffaloe (2006, p. 16), who writes:

> Warfare today has taken on a new form and grown to new levels. The type of warfare is not new, and few of the tactics are new. **What is new is that this type of war has recently reached a global level** [my emphasis] – and the United States and its allies have found themselves ill prepared. Many strategists and theorists have attempted to grasp the concept of the war we are facing today, yet none have adequately given it definition and understanding.

Finally, a critical analysis of the concept of asymmetry is advanced by Winter (2011, p. 1) who evidences its purposes and scope, writing:

> Contemporary military conflicts are frequently referred to as "new", "irregular", or "asymmetric", labels that are meant to distinguish contemporary conflict formations from previous ones. Yet the language of asymmetry is not just a conveniently vague gloss for a variety of conflicts; it also introduces a normative schema that moralizes and depoliticizes the difference between states and non-state actors. The description of contemporary conflicts as asymmetric allows states to be portrayed as victims of non-state actors, as vulnerable to strategic constellations they ostensibly cannot win. "Asymmetry" is today's idiom to distinguish between civilized and uncivilized warfare, an idiom that converts ostensibly technological or strategic differences between state and non-state actors into moral and civilizational hierarchies.

Despite these critiques, however, the grouping of the new forms of war under the term "asymmetric warfare" is generalized today,[15] and if one wished to do a statistical survey on the frequency of titles in the literature, one would discover that a strong majority of authors are comfortable with using this terminology.

Empirical Research and Asymmetric Warfare

The impact that the new forms of conflict have had, and continue to have, on militaries and their components has given rise to a good number of field researches. These researches have focused especially on the human aspects of participation by military personnel in asymmetric warfare missions, on the adequacy of the preparation of commanders to tackle these forms of struggle,

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[15]See also in the literature, in addition to the works already cited: Barnett (2003), Fowler (2006), Paul (1994), Pfanner (2005), Schroefl (2007), (2009), Steven (2001).

and on the psychological and social consequences of participating in these operations (particularly "post-traumatic stress disorder").

In view of the difficulty of giving even summary mention to individual researches, I have chosen to describe one conducted in the years 2010–2013 by the research group that I coordinate.[16] This description may also be useful to newcomers in order to have an example of how a cross-national research of this type can be set up and conducted.

The aim of the research, as I wrote in the research report,[17] was to achieve the following objectives:

1. glean a set of "lessons learned" through a survey at all levels by giving voice to the protagonists, that is, to those who have concretely lived the experience of this type of warfare;
2. obtain orientation elements on the prior preparation given at the various levels to cope with this experience;
3. consider the human aspects of the deployment of military personnel in these kinds of missions, including their relations with the other actors present in the theatre;
4. compare different national experiences and relate them to national traits and the traditions of the individual armed forces.

The project called for interviewing, in semi-structured interviews, a non-numerous but significant group of military personnel who had taken part in asymmetric warfare operations.

A significant group in that it would be inclusive of all the traditional categories—officers, non-coms and soldiers—belonging to the various armed forces of each country involved.

The project drew the participation of Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, the Philippines, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain and Turkey,[18] with a sample of military personnel who had taken part in these kinds of missions. A total of 237 officers, 140 NCOs and 165 soldiers were interviewed.

A choice was then made to carry out a mainly qualitative analysis since, as Marina Nuciari writes in her chapter, "Some Methodological Remarks" (Nuciari 2013a, p. 41),

> The choice to perform a qualitative research has driven also the choice to frame the research into the context of Grounded Theory, as defined in its first terms by Glaser and Strauss (1967 and renewed versions). This choice does not mean that every research team worked in a strictly similar manner as far as data treatment and interpretation are concerned, but rather that a similar sequence of research phases has been adopted by all involved research groups. The sequence can be summarised in the following rather usual steps: first step has been concerned of course with data collection, that is with semi-structured interviews to meaningful groups of military personnel; the second step, usually named as note-taking, has been conducted by means of tape recording and transcription (what Glaser did not like so much!); this phase is crucial for qualitative research, but it is of absolute relevance for comparative research when researchers belong to different countries and are different language speaking. Interviews and their transcriptions were of course in native languages, but data treatment and interpretation had to be done by all researchers: original texts have thus been reduced and summarized according to a common framework, and translated into English in order to permit reading and data analysis to everybody in the international research group. At this stage, distribution of all the interviews sets to each researcher or research team permitted the accomplishment of the analysis, which has been done using by some teams the most frequently used softwares for qualitative analysis, such as N-Vivo9.

Analysis of the research data then led to the writing of a report (see Footnote 17), subdivided into the following thematic chapters, which I will described in the main trendlines that emerged:

1. First Impressions

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[16]The group is named "Working Group on the Military Profession" and is part of the institution called *European Research Group On Military And Society* (acronym ERGOMAS).

[17]The research report was published in the volume *Soldiers Without Frontiers*. See Caforio (2013a).

[18]The choice of the participating countries was made by excluding the strongest powers and the countries who are the largest contributors, which seem to have been studied extensively before: we tried to find out more about the experiences of soldiers from middle-sized powers and small countries, not so dominant in the international arena.

The soldiers' first impression upon arrival in the mission theatre is generally negative. Negative for the human environment, characterized by poverty, hunger, backwardness, social inequality, scarce infrastructure, corruption and abuses of all kinds, leading to statements of the type: "*What hit me in Afghanistan was the effect of the particular geographical environment with a human ambience that seems to have stopped some centuries ago*." Negative for the natural environment, strange and often desertic or harshly mountainous, with wide climatic swings that severely tried both personnel and equipment, as pointed up by statements like: "*They had to confront hot weather and sandstorm in desolated areas. The soldiers remember that they felt suffocated by sauna-like hot air and sandy dirt as so different from Korea*." Negative for the lack of personal security due to a situation of undeclared war, with an enemy who lurked everywhere and nowhere, most often blended in with civilian populations that had to be respected.

2. Rules of Engagement in Asymmetric Warfare

The rules that soldiers deployed in asymmetric warfare operations have to abide by were of two quite different and at times conflicting types: the directives of the home country (very often in the form of national caveats) and the actual rules of engagement laid down by the authority that directed the mission (UN, NATO, etc.).

The caveats established by the various national governments of the participant countries mostly had the aim of avoiding the use of their troops in operations with the greatest risk of losses or likely to cause collateral damage to civilian populations.

From the testimonies of the interviewees such caveats were found to exist for at least four of the nine contingents studied. At times they were cited openly: "*National caveats are imposed to limit the participation of the Bulgarian troops in dangerous situations. This is a problem.*" It is a frustrating situation that prevents the soldier from being on an equal footing with his comrades in other contingents.

Among those who offer an opinion on the subject (nearly 25% of the sample did not respond on this item), the majority express a positive evaluation, considering the ROEs adequate for the situation. This assessment is more widespread among interviewees belonging to navies, much less so among air force personnel.

Of greatest interest to us, however, is the minority (which is a sizeable one) that expresses critical judgements.

These critical assessments can be classified as follows: ROEs too restrictive; ROEs inadequate for the task in the theatre; ROEs that make the units of the coalition too vulnerable; ROEs too different from contingent to contingent.

3. Operational Experiences

The operational experiences of the personnel of the interviewed sample naturally vary according to the theatre of deployment and the armed force to which they belong, and touch on the various aspects of asymmetric conflict: protection and escort (convoys or columns), reconnaissance, area control (territory or maritime zone), humanitarian aid distribution, mine clearance, reconstruction assistance, training of local forces, etc. However, what constitutes the true discriminant in the perception of the operational experience of the interviewees is participation in firefights. These took place in a variety of situations: air support, anti-piracy interventions, ambushes, mopping-up operations, improvised mines, suicide attacks, salvos of rockets and mortar rounds directed at the base. All this not in a typical war environment but prevalently among the civilian population, where the aggressors are often intermingled and disguised.

The long period of absence of traditional conflicts for the countries that are the focus of the survey resulted in the fact that their armed forces had not acquired previous experiences of being under fire. Not only, but this event occurred for the interviewees in a context of asymmetric warfare, while their preparation to face enemy fire had prevalently been provided in the context of training for conventional warfare. The "baptism

of fire" is thus perceived as a very significant event by all the involved interviewees, even those with long years of military experience, with statements of the type: "*It was a strong emotion to be under fire.*" The majority of the interviewees describe their reactions in firefights as completely positive, however. Almost all say they experienced the impulse to react immediately and to do so following the rules received in training, with statements of the type: "*In an actual battle, training takes over and fear comes after. Often, it is pure adrenaline rush.*" Application of what was learned in training is nearly automatic.

Although the baptism of fire appears to have been the operational experience that most deeply affected the respondents of our sample, other types of experience should not be overlooked, as they present an interest of their own.

Here it is mainly the various aspects and different commitments that asymmetric warfare entails that come to the fore: civil-military commitment, humanitarian aid, reconstruction, Psy-Ops, all those operations useful for ensuring effective governance of the territory and winning hearts and minds of local populations.

4. Training and Military Education in Asymmetric Warfare

The lessons learned from the operational experiences must be compared with the training received, an operation that in this research is largely performed by the interviewees themselves, whose assessments are obviously of great interest for the purposes of the research.

The author of the research on training, (Durán Cenit 2013, p. 121), groups the responses into three categories: "(i) *adequate or positive assessment responses; (ii) negative assessment responses, in which the reason is detailed; and finally (iii) an array of responses which suggest improvements. The final group consists of responses from groups (i) and (ii) which provide suggestions for improvement or clarifications on different matters.*"

The first conclusion to be drawn is that the interviewees of all the countries of the research feel, albeit with different majorities, that the training they received in preparation for the mission was adequate.

Adequacy does not mean that the training cannot be improved, however, and it is interesting to note that concrete improvement proposals come both from those who considered the received training inadequate for the mission and from those who considered it adequate.

Generally speaking, the improvement proposals do not regard the strictly military preparation because, as Durán Cenit (op. cit., p. 121) writes, "*some respondents point out that they do not think they are prepared for asymmetric warfare since they feel they should be better prepared for hostile actions.*" The completion of the required preparation instead basically regards two aspects, the acquisition of greater socio-cultural skills in relation to the mission theatre and an improvement in technical capabilities (especially in contact with well-equipped and technically prepared contingents like the American forces).

For what regards the first aspect, greater knowledge of the theatre of operations is requested (from a historical, geographic and social standpoint), information on the local political situation, better knowledge of English, and at least some rudimentary knowledge of the local languages. Indeed, as Durán Cenit further writes, "*It is paramount to know the socio-cultural fabric of the theater of operations, particularly in asymmetric or hybrid threat scenarios, since the population, whose support the multinational forces and the insurgency struggle to win, becomes the center of gravity for the operation.*"

5. Interaction with Other Role Actors

Very significant for the purposes of the research were the perceptions that the soldiers sent on mission had of the relations with the other actors present and acting in the theatre of operations: local armed forces, local population, authorities (both local and international), soldiers of other

contingents of the multinational force, the international press, NGOs.

The relations with the local armed forces, rebuilt and trained by the military mission, are neither easy nor linear. Differences in culture, in mentality, in attitude weigh strongly. As a Spanish soldier states for Afghanistan: "*Working alongside with Afghan forces was very complicated, mainly due to cultural and language barriers as well as differences in professional procedures and huge technological gaps. Besides strong feelings of mutual distrust, the Afghan way of principles in discipline, punctuality and healthcare was not acceptable to NATO standards*." Hence the necessity of building a bridge between the local culture and that of the industrialized nations whose contingents are deployed in that theatre. And this step must necessarily be made by both parties, as many interviewees seem to have grasped, shown in statements like: "*You have to consider the Afghan soldier in the Afghan reality, with the bonds that religion, customs, etc. involve*."

Relations with the local population and authorities are subject to the same set of problems: the soldiers have to take their customs into account, understand and accept their hierarchical and social structures.

The asymmetric warfare operations that we concerned ourselves with were carried out by multinational forces, as already stated, forces supplied in various cases by many different countries (48 in the case of Afghanistan). The experience of the relations between the various national contingents reported by the examined sample thus seems important. As Yanakiev and Markov observe (2013, p. 161), "*Multinational coalitions are complex assemblies of people, both leaders and followers, structured in teams of teams and networks, representing diverse national and organizational cultures, with different education and training, doctrines and concepts, organizational structures, decision-making procedures, level of technological advancement, etc.*"

In interaction with the soldiers of other contingents the interviewees seem both to achieve improvements in operational efficiency and professionalism and to encounter cultural barriers that make cooperation more difficult. The benefits include the development of their ability to work in groups, the acquisition of new skills and knowledge, learning different organizational procedures, practical use and perfecting of their knowledge of English, growth in professional competence in general, and the development of social activities as a tool of integration.

As Ünsal Sığrı observes in the chapter he contributed (Sığrı 2013, p. 170), "*Peacekeepers alone cannot achieve a sustainable peace. The various partners involved in peace operations include the parties to the conflict … and other international parties such as international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international media. ... The actors of peacekeeping are interdependent; their ability to accomplish their objectives depends on other organizations involved in peacekeeping*."

But the quality of the relationships with the international organizations was not as high as expected in collaborative peacekeeping activities.

In particular, the collaboration with NGOs reported by the respondents seems to be limited to convoy escort, vehicle supply, housing and, more in general, providing security to the various humanitarian operations. In the practical carrying out of these operations the different mentalities and organizational cultures of the two actors seem to weigh negatively, manifesting themselves in statements like: "*We avoided the NGOs like the plague. Most were passionate about what they were doing, but did not know actually what to do. They considered the military as an obstacle. Their objectives and the military objectives were not always the same*."

6. Satisfaction and Motivation

What motivates a soldier, what keeps him or her motivated during long periods of absence from home in a foreign country? Two types of motivations emerge globally from the survey: personal motivations (reinforcing self-image) and professional motivations (improving professional identity). Such motivations, however, as Marina Nuciari observes in her contributed chapter, "*are

taken as a process of understanding of turbulent and uncertain situations, and presented as ex-post reasons why to go. From ex-ante reasons to join, motivations become ex-post reasons to stay." (Nuciari 2013b:232) They therefore appear to be closely correlated to the level of satisfaction achieved by the mission, a level that is generally very high and that was measured in the research according to two different indicators: personal level of satisfaction with the mission, and personal level of satisfaction with the performance of the person himself. A strong majority of the personnel declare that they are highly satisfied with their personal engagement in the mission; this satisfaction decreases in regard to satisfaction with the whole mission. This second indicator also appears to be strongly influenced by the theatre of operations where the respondent was deployed.

Finally, it is interesting to note that among the motivations that drive soldiers to go on missions, even repeatedly, those of an economic nature seem to have little importance. Indeed, as Rialize Ferreira notes in her chapter (Ferreira 2013, p. 48), "*The notion or myth that peacekeepers only volunteer for these missions for occupational reasons, extra pay, benefits and career opportunities is dispelled by these findings, because most peacekeepers reflected a sense of duty, obligation and commitment to assist, protect and save civilians and create conditions of peace world-wide.*"

7. Psychological Stress

The reality of asymmetric warfare, as it emerges from the soldiers' testimonies obtained in the interviews, could hardly fail to leave its mark in the emotional sphere.[19] The period of peace that the industrialized nations have enjoyed over the last half century and the extraneousness of war to the culture and practices of these countries, together with the particular methods of asymmetric conflict, result in an undeniably powerful range of emotional experiences for the individual participants.

As already said, undergoing the "baptism of fire", therefore, that took place for a sizeable part of the sample for the first time in asymmetric warfare operations, was experienced as an important event by most of the interviewees.

We examined the psychic impact on the participating soldiers from three points of view: the stress resulting from the concretely experienced situations, the suffering due to long separation from one's family, and the difficulty of readjusting to life in the homeland following the missions.

The dominating stressor during deployment was caused by dangers, threats and attacks mainly in operations. It is therefore first and foremost the dangers, even only potential ones, that impact everyone, even those soldiers who did not find themselves caught up in actual firefights. This is expressed very well by testimonies like that of a Slovenian soldier: "*The most stressful situations were when Italians and Spanish had victims at the same roads where Slovenians were also patrolling.*" The threat is something that becomes imminent each time a contact with potential insurgents takes place, whether it be in a remote Afghan village or with sailors on Somali craft in the Arabian Sea.

Family and the military are defined by the prevalent sociology as greedy institutions (see Coser 1974), in competition with each other, and this is mostly experienced and perceived when their demands become strongly antithetical, as in the case of asymmetric warfare missions. The biggest fears in relation to the family are a deterioration or loss of the relationship with one's partner; the effects of failure to be present in the children's upbringing; and the fear of not coming back, lived as a destructive consequence for the family. The coping strategy most used against these fears is frequent communications with home (Skype helps…), thus providing a virtual presence where a physical one is not possible.

The homecoming isn't always easy: as known, an abundant literature exists on post-traumatic stress disorder (see Dolan and Adler 2006; Andrews et al. 2007; Richardson 2007; Chesnek 2011; Duclos 2012; Kold and

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[19]See Bartone and Adler (1994).

Sørensen 2013; Caforio 2014). Although it does not seem that any actual cases of this pathology are revealed in the sample, difficulties of readjustment, sometimes short, sometimes long, are reported by various interviewees.

The difficulties pertain to all areas of the returnee's life: family, ordinary barracks life, civil social relations. In the family he/she feels superfluous (they are used to making do without him/her). In the life of the unit he/she has been sidelined (in professional and career terms) for a certain time, and is often looked at with envy and/or hostility by those who have not lived that experience. With friends in ordinary social life an ethical and psychological gap has opened up, efficaciously expressed by responses such as: "*I was bothered by luxury, superficiality. I had seen what it is to live and fight to survive, I had seen dead and wounded, it was very heavy stuff.*"

An interesting example of how post-traumatic stress disorder is generated is given by the film "American Sniper", directed by Clint Eastwood 2014.

Counterinsurgency and Other Theories

Asymmetric warfare—defined here as *a form of war in which a weak party, as opposed to a strong party, uses non-conventional instruments of struggle in order to bridge the gap between the two sides*—is a form of struggle that is imposed by the weak side on the strong side, the latter of which moves in that context like a *gigantic dinosaur* put in difficulty by *rodents with extraordinary capacities for survival* Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui, Italian Edition edited by Mini (2001), *Guerra senza limiti. L'arte della guerra asimmetrica fra terrorismo e globalizzazione*. Gorizia, Libreria Editrice Goriziana. It must be recognized that, on the basis of the fundamental principles of war, as enunciated by Clausewitz (1973), the weak side immediately seizes on one in its favour, the choice of the terrain and the moment of battle.

The strong side, therefore, the dinosaur, must find an adaptation to a form of struggle that it not congenial to it, on a terrain chosen by the adversary. It is for this reason that analysts, especially Americans, have elaborated counterinsurgency (COIN) theories, which should be given some mention here to complete the discourse on sociological studies of asymmetric warfare.

First and foremost in the USA, a broad awareness is created that, faced with the challenges of the new forms of struggle, it is necessary to elaborate theories and methods to counter them effectively. Long (2006, p. IX) writes, for example:

> As part of the global war on terror, Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom showcased the dazzling technological capability and professional prowess of the U.S. military in conventional operations. Yet the subsequent challenges posed by insurgency and instability in both Afghanistan and Iraq have proved much more difficult to surmount for both the military and civilian agencies. Thus, both the current and future conduct of the war on terror demand that the United States improve its ability to conduct counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.

And, further on (ibid., p. 1), "*The U.S. military in particular has had difficulty adapting to COIN, in large part due to an overwhelming organizational focus on conflict with peer competitors and conventional warfare contingency operations.*"

American political-military thought distinguishes between two different aspects of COIN operations, i.e., the examination and cataloguing of individual technical and tactical measures that can be used in such operations and the theories that seek to build a philosophy and strategy of deployment for such operations. It is chiefly this second aspect that is treated here in its fundamental lines.

Ample debate has taken place in the U.S. between those we might call the scholarly warriors and those who support the topicality and importance of a COIN doctrine to be conducted in the intellectual context of strategy's general theory. As Long again observes (Long 2006, p. XV).

> When COIN is placed properly in its conceptual setting as a thought and activity set necessarily

housed under the big tent of the general theory of strategy, truly helpful perspective and discipline apply. Whether or not we prefer to view COIN far more as armed anthropology/social work than as war with its warfare, still it is essential to understand that it is war and also that it is ruled by the dicta of strategy. … As behavior in a war, countering an armed insurgency, COIN necessarily is about politics and is conducted ultimately for political reasons.

This dichotomy takes concrete shape in two schools of though on COIN, one which endorses an enemy-centric approach and another that opts for a population-centric approach.[20] The former, in the words of (Kilcullen 2007, blog),

… basically understands counter-insurgency as a variant of conventional warfare. It sees counter-insurgency as a contest with an organized enemy, and believes that we must defeat that enemy as our primary task. There are many variants within this approach, including "soft line" and "hard line" approaches, kinetic and non-kinetic methods of defeating the enemy, decapitation versus marginalization strategies, and so on.

The population-centric approach, instead,

understands counter-insurgency as fundamentally a control problem, or even an armed variant of government administration. It believes that establishing control over the population, and the environment (physical, human and informational) in which that population lives, is the essential task.

Kilcullen is in favour of this second approach, as are others, such as David Galula, for example, while others (Gray 2012) stress the fallacy of viewing counterinsurgency as either a principally military or principally political venture and the dangers of removing it from its conceptual setting.

The official American military authorities are instead more oriented towards an enemy-centric approach and produces manuals on the concrete modes of action to use in counterinsurgency operations.[21]

As (Mockaitis 2011, p. VII) affirms, "*The study of counterinsurgency (COIN) has focused disproportionately on its operational and tactical aspects at the expense of larger strategic considerations.*"

But the direction of thought that is formed among the majority of scholars is substantially the one expressed by Schofield (2014, see the quoted web site), who writes:

COIN involves all political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions that can be taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. COIN operations include supporting a Host Nation's military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency. Avoiding the creation of new insurgents and forcing existing insurgents to end their participation is vital to defeating an insurgency. COIN operations often include security assistance programs such as foreign military sales programs, the foreign military financing program, and international military training and education programs.

The enemy-centric view is also opposed by the already cited (Long 2006, p. 21), who writes:

The answer [to insurgents] is to restore the hope of the people and gain their support for the government. In order to do this, COIN would consist of providing the people security from predations by government and insurgent forces and reducing the negative consequences of development while enhancing the positive aspects. Increasing political rights of the people, improving standards of living, and reducing corruption and abuse of government power were key prescriptions of this COIN theory, which came to be known as 'winning the hearts and minds of the people,' a term coined by Sir Gerald Templer during the Malayan Emergency. HAM theory was the dominant paradigm for COIN in the early 1960s.

A position that is shared also by the most enlightened U.S. military leaders, such as generals Petraeus and McChrystal (Petraeus 2006).

HAM (winning hearts and minds) theory is opposed by the so-called *Cost/Benefit Theory*,

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[20]The terrain-centric approach is not taken into consideration here, as it is applicable to past wars but not to COIN.
[21]Such as the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Paperback—July 4, 2007. Five years later, the armed force most interested in COIN, the Army, although remaining anchored to the enemy-centric approach, is beginning to show some openness to a more

updated conception of the adversary. Indeed, ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations (ADRP 3-0 2012), defines the menace that the Army must face as a "hybrid threat" and describes the adversary (p. Glossary-3) as "*The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.*".

enunciated by (Wolf 1965, p. 5; see also Wolf et al. 1983), who argued that popular support was far from necessary for insurgents in lesser-developed countries. He pointed out:

> From an operational point of view, what an insurgent movement requires for successful and expanding operations is not popular support, in the sense of attitudes of identification and allegiance, but rather a supply of certain inputs … at a reasonable cost, interpreting cost to include expenditure of coercion as well as money.

Wolf further attacked the argument that increasing the standard of living through development would reduce insurgency.

This theory assumed the population to be completely indifferent to insurgent and counterinsurgent, however, so whichever side provided the better set of incentives and disincentives would prevail, while in the reality of individual countries many other factors come into play, as argued by (Ellsberg 2006). Also the already cited (Long 2006, p. 24) expresses doubts on Wolf's theory, writing: "*Many authors regard economic growth as one of the criteria for winning. This is not listed here as necessary, though in most cases some economic betterment of the people is necessary for popular support of the government and its programs*."

There were some attempts to apply the Cost/Benefit Theory in Vietnam, without much in the way of results. Following the example of HAM, instead, concrete realities have been built that have had appreciable practical results, such as the realization of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. PRTs are bodies created in some provincial capitals in the two countries to assist and coordinate the process of material, institutional, organizational and political reconstruction in territories ravaged by asymmetric warfare and in contexts of backwardness and indigence. They are mixed bodies, made up of military (especially with security functions) and civilian personnel in various sectors, suited to directing and assisting the local forces in the reconstruction process. Its activities are material reconstruction (schools, hospitals, other public buildings, works connected with road networks), training and instruction of local personnel for the various public functions (police, judiciary, education, health, etc.), assistance in the reconstruction of a territorial political activity and structure able to properly run the province. PRTs are therefore directed by a commander and by a military structure and their success is closely tied to a more constabulary than warrior mindset on the part of the commander and his staff.

The PRT model is actually not an American creation for Iraq and Afghanistan: it descends from the French "Sections Administratives Specialisées" deployed in Algeria, as well as from the "Civil Operations and Rural Development Support" employed by the U.S. in Vietnam and from the "Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells" created in Afghanistan in 2002. The PRT constitutes an expansion and perfecting of these models; it is also the first to have been used in a context of international forces (PRTs have been set up in Afghanistan under British, Italian, German, Spanish and Swedish leadership).

The model seems to have worked fairly well in Iraq, while in Afghanistan, connection and collaboration with the Afghan local authorities seems not to have always been achieved. One of the critics of this institution, (Chiari 2014, p. 21) writes in this regard:

> In reality, the PRTs were attempting to support a state that existed only in a rudimentary form. In order to give the Afghan state legitimacy, the western interventionists had to rely on historical, political, and societal references that were barely congruent with the western canon of values, advertised to the Afghan populace like a mantra. The PRTs were faced with the Afghan state's perceived illegitimacy at a grassroots level and were forced to deal with this fundamental deficit.

Chiari's final thesis is that organisms created to pacify a territory have found themselves in the last few years in Afghanistan[22] having to deal with genuine warfighting operations, which explains the tenor of his book's title, *From Venus to Mars*.

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[22]In Afghanistan, since other missions carried out in various countries have instead had success. One obvious example is the pacification of the Balkans.

As can be seen from what is reported above, the debate on COIN theories is still (2015) very lively, especially in the U.S., and the military establishment of that country, which more than others has occasions to come to grips with asymmetric warfare, does not yet seem to have found consensus on the solution to the problem. The European armies, permeated by a more constabulary mentality,[23] appear to be able to manage COIN in a more productive manner (see in this regard the broad overview presented in the already cited book by (Chiari 2014).

A further current of thought, prevalently American, has preferred to include the response to the new forms of struggle adopted by the weak side under the name "stability operations", thus putting the accent on an activity of pacification of the concerned territory (but with less semantic commitment that the term "pacification" of British "Peace Support Operations").

This terminology originates especially from high military circles, which in the latest official U.S. document (ADRP 3-0 2012) define it as follows:

Stability is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (pp. 2–5).

As Virgilio Ilari reports (Ilari 2014, without page indication), it was

theorized and formally defined in 2008 by the American army, in particular by the Doctrine Directorate, Combined Arms Center, i.e. the "brain" of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) charged with elaborating the doctrines for use on the basis of the "lessons learned". The introduction of the concept in the Pentagon's official lexicon goes back to a directive of November 2005 and to the principles and directives sanctioned by four doctrinal publications (JP 3-0, ADP 3-0, and ADRP 3-0 and 3 0-7).

But Ilari also puts emphasis on the fact that the most evident aspect is that "stabilization" is a less ambitious surrogate for "nation building" and thus signals a significant downsizing of the objectives determined by the growing difficulties encountered in managing the "after-Saddam".

It thus appears that this concept has more of a contingent political valence than a new contribution of thought.

Unlike the military leadership, the scientific sector, including the American one, is not unanimous in accepting this term, as is well testified to in the following passage by (Dennys 2013, p. 1):

This article is a rejoinder to Roger Mac Ginty's polemic (Against Stabilization) arguing that, whilst the author is correct in identifying the inconsistencies in the concept and practice of stabilization, it is a viable concept. This article draws on field research from Afghanistan and Nepal to demonstrate that within stabilization's philosophical pedigree and practical application are components that can articulate a form of sub-national international intervention that can address political threats. Further this form of intervention is morally defensible and can promote control rather than constrict it. Stabilization is a new term that has been applied to many old practices, but it has been inconsistently used suggesting that it is both a practice for national level interventions and those directed at a sub-national level. This has been

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[23]This mindset appears very clearly in the responses to the interviews carried out, for example, in the research published in the book *Soldiers Without Frontiers* (Caforio 2013a). Many interviewees in fact call for a much softer approach by European armies to local populations in the various mission theatres as compared to the Americans, as well as greater attention to avoiding collateral damage. And it is interesting to note that also in the European armies a different approach is taken by reservists and career military. For example, Joseph Soeters writes, in the chapter "Organizational Cultures in the Military" in this volume: *"Still, also in real operational action, reservists can make a difference.* Farrell (2010) *describes how the British 'reservists brigade' (52nd Infantry Brigade) in Afghanistan province Helmand could change the course of the hostilities because they did not rely on the traditional combat repertoire that the previous British brigades had applied with so much conviction, yet with so little success (*Farrell 2010*: 588; King 2010; Soeters 2013). The 52nd Infantry Brigade's staff was not inclined to look at the situation in Afghanistan only through 'the scope of a rifle'. Their mindsets were not framed to rely on the messages and doctrines that dominate the culture in the traditional UK brigades, rooted in practices from the Second World War (*King 2010*: 326). The reservists were responsible for introducing a number of non-kinetic innovations in the British military performance in Helmand (*Catignani 2012*: 16–17)."*

unhelpful as it confuses stabilization activity with other forms of intervention.

where the author criticizes an improper and indiscriminate use of the term.[24]

And to Conclude

The broad overview provided here on the definitions, interpretations and contents of the new forms of conflict of the third millennium can give an idea of the impact that these forms have had, and continue to have, on politico-military thinking in the developed countries. The flourishing of these interpretations, of the debate, of the proposed solutions, in itself provides a measure of the process and, together, of the extent of the change to which our societies are exposed on the level of security policies. The relative certainties of the Cold War have been supplanted in the first decade of the twenty-first century with the general uncertainty of asymmetric conflict. The phenomenon of war, which seemed to have been shifted to the periphery of the first world, the world of the developed countries, reappears in insidious and unexpected forms within all countries, in the framework of their own disarmed civil society. It confirms and configures the passage from an international system centred on the Westphalian state to a post-Westphalian system where, as Wilfried von Bredow affirms in the chapter of this volume to which the reader is referred,[25] *"The international order of violence today is, more than ever before, a global concern."*

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[24]On the concept of stabilization, see also Call and Cook (2003), Paris and Sisk (2009), HMG (2011), Mac Ginty (2012).

[25]See in this volume, "The Order of Violence, Norms and Rules of Organized Violence and the Civil-Military Paradox" by Wilfried von Bredow.

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Georges Kaffes

Anomie and Terrorism. Some Conceptual Definitions

It could be a "blasphemy" if we would not start our sociological approach attempt of interpreting a war form by referring Carl Von Clausewitz war theory: *"War is a mere continuation of policy by other means"*. If it is so we could make a sociological definition of terrorism as a form of war saying that "***Terrorism is a mere continuation of war by anomic means***". We started using the Durkheim's term of Anomie in order make clear that our approach will be sociological. Let's remember that Anomie is a condition in which society provides little moral guidance to individuals. Furthermore it is the breakdown of social bonds between an individual and the community if under unruly scenarios resulting in fragmentation of social identity and rejection of self-regulatory values.[1] For Emile Durkheim from Lorraine, France (1858–1917), anomie arises more generally from a mismatch between personal or group standards and wider social standards, or from the lack of a social ethic, which produces moral deregulation and an absence of legitimate aspirations. This is a nurtured condition: We know that most sociologists associate the term with Durkheim, who used the concept to speak of the ways in which an individual's actions are matched, or integrated, with a system of social norms and practices; anomie is a mismatch, not simply the absence of norms. Thus, a society with too much rigidity and little individual discretion could also produce a kind of anomie, so that a fatalistic suicide can arise when a person is too rule-governed. Terrorism is commonly defined as violent acts or even the threat of violent acts, intended to create a kind of social anomie. That's because we started involving this sociological term of Anomie given that many definitions now include acts of unlawful violence and war.

We will not insist on a simple definition. Studies have found more than 200 definitions of terrorism. In fact, Simon (1994) reports that at least 212 different definitions of terrorism exist across the world; 90 of them are recurrently used by governments and other institutions. Schmid and Jongman (1988), two researchers at the University of Leiden (Netherlands), adopted a social science approach to figure out how to best define terrorism. They gathered over a hundred academic and official definitions of terrorism and examined them to identify the main components. They discovered that the concept of violence emerged in 83.5% of definitions; political goals emerged in 65%; causing fear and terror in 51%; arbitrariness and indiscriminate targeting in 21%; and the victimization of civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, or outsiders in 17.5%. What

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[1]Anomie was popularized by French sociologist Émile Durkheim in his influential book *Suicide* (1897). Durkheim never uses the term normlessness; rather, he describes anomie as derangement, and an insatiable will.

G. Kaffes (✉)
Gennadiou Str. 14, 131 21 Ilion, Athens, Greece
e-mail: kaffes@wanadoo.fr; luce@otenet.gr

Schmid and Jongman actually did was only a content analysis of those definitions. A content analysis is a careful, thorough, systematic analysis and interpretation of the content of texts (or images) to identify patterns, themes, and meanings. Merari (1993) found that, in the U.S., Britain, and Germany, there are three common elements that exist in the legal definitions of terrorism of those countries: First was the use of violence, the second was the political objectives, and the third was the aim of propagating fear in a target population.

Remaining in a classical definition of terrorism like Schmid and Jongman did, is that

> terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by semi-clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence based communication processes between terrorist organizations, imperiled victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target audiences, turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

Of course for us it will be more useful to stay at the sociological definition by accepting two things: First one that War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, and sometimes, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. This defines the political terrorism. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to War relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses. This is not valuable for terrorism because that the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means, the Art of War (let's remember Sun Zu theory in the Art of War)[2] in general and the Commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling one. But however powerfully this may react on political views in particular

cases, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them; for the political view is the object, War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.

Why Humans Fight Wars? Tentative Definitions for Terrorism

The point is that if the wars of civilized people are less cruel and destructive than those of savages, the difference arises from the social condition both of States in themselves and in their relations to each other. Out of this social condition and its relations war arises, and by it war is subjected to conditions, is controlled and modified. But these things do not belong to war itself; they are only given conditions; and to introduce into the sociology of war itself only a principle of moderation would be an absurdity.

Initially two motives lead men to war: instinctive hostility and hostile intention. In the general definition of War, we have chosen as its characteristic the latter of these elements, because it is the most general. It is impossible to conceive the passion of hatred of the wildest description, bordering on mere instinct, without combining with it the idea of a hostile intention. On the other hand, hostile intentions may often exist without being accompanied by any, or at all events by any extreme, hostility of feeling. Amongst savages views emanating from the feelings, amongst civilized nations those emanating from the understanding, have the predominance. This difference arises from attendant circumstances, existing institutions, and, therefore, is not to be found necessarily in all cases, although it prevails in the majority. In short, even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other.

These general observations conduct us to the tentative making of a terrorism typology. It could be simple but not complete. The comparison between old and new terrorism can also be explained through the evolution of terrorism in four waves, the Fourth Wave being new terrorism. The first Wave was in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Second Wave was the

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[2]**Tzu** 2008.

colonial wave, confined within national geographical boundaries from 1921 until today. The Third Wave was the contemporary wave when it is the apogee of the Nation-State (we remain at Montesquieu's classical definition of political function of the State)[3]; this wave introduced international terrorism, crossing national boundaries, which began in the 1960s. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks gave rise to the Fourth Wave of terrorism (both for the U.S. and nations world-wide). The Fourth Wave is symbolized by a tentative of religious justification for killing, international scope, unparalleled gory tactics and weapons, and dependence on technologies of modernity. The latter consists of communications, ease of global travel (i.e., moving across borders), and accessibility to finances and WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction). In the Fourth Wave, terrorism has reached its universal phase. The use of any weapon is justifiable. The "Other" is now a legitimate target. No distinction among targets should be taken into account. Terrorism, then, becomes *bellum omnium contra omnes* (the war of all against all). That's because the Fourth Wave suggests a Culture of Terror, which refers to a collapse (both physically and figuratively) of America and the West through massive killings, the constant availability and uses of WMDs or CBRN weapons (initials used to refer to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear warfare), and religious legitimating for terrorist attacks against civilians in any country that is considered Satan, infidel, or apostate (i.e., religious rebel). For example, the intent of Aum Shinrikyo to kill people in Tokyo subways in 1995 (through sarin poison gas attacks) was to punish everyone: "infidels and faithful" alike. This heralds the reality of sacred apocalyptic terrorism.

Proposed by Huntington (1996), the Clash of Civilizations posits that cultural and religious differences between civilizations worldwide have become the primary source of terrorism today. This can be easily observed in the concept of new terrorism. Terrorists want to produce a Clash of Civilizations or cause radical changes in the U. S. presence in the Middle East. The Clash of Civilizations is akin to the War of Ideas, where ideals and ideologies clash between the West and the Muslim world (which continues to oppose Western political forms such as democracy). Both the Clash of Civilizations and the War of Ideas give rise to a controversial concept: the new world order, a wide-ranging global agenda intended to change the world, establish new ideologies, and eventually replace sovereign nation-states.

The Third Millenium Terrorism

Generally, "religious" terrorists compose their own community or population. They are not worried about upsetting their supporters with their terrorist attacks. They view themselves as people accountable only to their God. New terrorists may not even deny responsibility for their acts of destruction. They oppose any type of negotiation. As Morgan (2004) explains it, "**Today's terrorists don't want a seat at the table; they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it**" (p. 30).

Another major characteristic of new terrorism is its ultra-flexible networked and less hierarchical organizational structure, enabled by state-of-the-art technologies. Terrorist groups within these networks become very autonomous but are still connected through advanced communication and common objectives. In this manner, terrorist organizations can adjust more easily to various situations. Although members may communicate with their leaders, groups can operate independently. From a social network perspective, new terrorist organizations adopt a mixture of the hub and spoke design, where nodes in the network communicate with the center, and the wheel design, where nodes communicate with each other without having to go through the center.

Arquilla et al. (1999) remark that terrorist leadership follows a "set of principles that can set boundaries and provide guidelines for decisions

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[3]Montesquieu is famous for his articulation of the theory of separation of powers, which is implemented in many constitutions throughout the world.

and actions so that members do not have to resort to a hierarchy "they know what they have to do" (p. 51). Often, new terrorists have no group life because they only come together to commit their terrorist acts and then disassemble. They do not receive training or logistical support from state supporters. Rather, they depend on support networks and instructions on the web. By using information and communication technologies, new terrorists can communicate secretly and reduce distances more easily. Their massive range of communication toolkit includes mobile phones, satellite phones, and the web to prepare for their upcoming terrorist attacks, communicate with other terrorist factions, and spread their message across the globe. The financing of new terrorism does not stem from funds received from state backers; it comes from illegal channels such as drug trafficking, credit card fraud networks, and money laundering. Conversely, their financing is sometimes based on legal business investments, donations from the wealthy and charities.

It is certain that there are more mass murders now than in the past. This phenomenon has in the same time increased an artifact of journalistic attention. One feature of the phenomenon is the impossibility of defining it in statistical terms. Generation Xers[4] pointed out that today's youth

is collectively less violent than in the past, that our schools are collectively safer. The rash of middle-class massacres is not equivalent to a "crime wave" provoked by a surge in pure criminal motivation, as with the introduction of a new drug or the loss of entry-level jobs in a recession. The murderers with no doubt feed on each other mimetically, but they feed as well on the complacency of a safe and prosperous society. One can base a "critique of pure fairness" on the idea that the better and fairer things become, the more intolerable the situation is for "losers" who fail to benefit from these favorable conditions: a stock trader who loses money in a bull market[5] for example.

Let's remember what Andy Warhol said about a self glorification: "In the future, everyone will be world-famous for 15 min" in the program for a 1968 exhibition of his work at the Moderna Museet in Stockholm, Sweden. The attention we are devoting to mass murderers offers two lessons in human mimesis: (Eric Gans wrote also in August 7, 1999 in his chronicle no 177): the obvious one of our preoccupation with our greatest danger, man-made violence, and the only

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[4]Generation X by broadest definition includes those individuals born between 1961 and 1981. The collective persona of Gen Xers is frequently debated and discussed among academicians and marketing experts worldwide. It traditionally applies to North Americans (U.S and Canada); Australia, and various European countries. There are well over 50 million members of Generation X. We are sometimes referred to as Baby Busters because our birth years follow the baby boom that began after World War II. That boom began to decline in 1957. Sometimes, you'll hear about Generation Jones, a small subculture or subset of Generation X born between 1954 and 1965. The years for Generation X vary from one historian, government agency and marketing firm to the next. Neil Howe and the late William Strauss, defined the generation in the broadest terms I have come across: 1961 to 1981. The United States Social Security Administration defines Generation X as "those born roughly between 1964 and 1979, while another federal agency, the U.S. Department of Defense, sets the parameters at 1965 to 1977. But, I don't see how a generation can only be 15 or 12 years in length. Childhood and youth comprise 18 years of our lives. Generations stem from shared

experiences. Depending on your birth order and the area of the country you grew up in as well as other influences, you may identify with one generation more than another. That is perfectly fine. All of this is subjective. It's worth noting the simple definition of a generation found at Dictionary.com.
• The entire body of individuals born and living at about the same time…
• The term of years, roughly 30 among human beings, accepted as the average period between the birth of parents and the birth of their offspring.
• A group of individuals, most of whom are the same approximate age, having similar ideas, problems, attitudes, etc. (Compare Beat Generation, Lost Generation, etc.).
• A group of individuals belonging to a specific category at the same time.
The point is, opinions vary on when generations begin and end. It would be correct that people should lay claim to the generation whose collective persona most reflects their own life experiences.

[5]A bull market is a period of generally rising prices. The start of a bull market is marked by widespread pessimism. This point is when the "crowd" is the most "bearish". The feeling of despondency changes to hope, "optimism", and eventually euphoria. This is often leading the economic cycle, for example in a full recession, or earlier.

slightly less obvious one that killing a dozen people is the only way the average person has of making it to the front page of the newspaper. This is an absolute mimetic relationship between the mass murderer and the general public. Leaving aside the unbalanced few who would follow the killer's example, his act fulfills for the public at large something like the function of ritual sacrifice in traditional societies. Our "mourning" for his victims, whom we come to know only after their death, relieves our own aggression. This relief may be psychologized in a number of ways: sociologically as the fulfillment of unconscious impulses, the projection of hostilities, or the simple deferral of resentment. But the sacrificial model is the most parsimonious and therefore the most anthropologically valid. This "positive" function of violence like that of the Holocaust for instance on a larger scale, depends on our cultural ability to recuperate its effects through sacralization, purging our imaginary complicity in the murders that made them sacrificial in the first place. But this is how sacrifice has always functioned. Nor is the fact that we have neither selected nor killed these victims any stranger to sacrifice, where responsibility for killing is often avoided through the use of aleatory or collective procedures or by entrusting it to a kind of "sacred" individual on the margin of the community.

We are continuing on the same hypothesis that the 21st century modern market system is characterized by two things: on the one hand by the circulation through "product-signs" of the "natural" use-values that cannot themselves be exchanged within it, and, on the other, by the recycling into productive activity of the resentments generated by the failure to obtain these signs. The terrorist mass murder brings these two features together in the most radical and scandalous manner. The value created by the circulation through the system of the "natural" element of death defers resentment in defiance of morality. Yet the scandal of the mass murderer is that, as the author of a genuinely (as opposed to representational) irreversible gesture, he cannot be recuperated by the system but, on the contrary, can discount his own scandalous value within it. Herostratus serves a function within the

social order and, aware of this, can anticipate, even if he does not live to see it, the reward of publicity that society cannot deny him. The naive cynicism of Oliver Stone's *Natural Born Killers* expresses the self-serving critique of an "outsider" to the system as though the film's portrayal of mass murder as entertainment were not the worst kind of pandering to the phenomenon it purports to denounce. *The terrorist mass murderer is not a "hero"; but his ability to frustrate the system arouses a grudging admiration that, in more cases that we care to admit, is acquiesced in rather than fought against.* The Palestinian **"martyrs"**, for example, were at least semi-heroes for many to whom the marginally political inspiration of his murders serves as pretext to deny, or simply forget, the innocence of their victims.

Herostratus finally blackmails the system by taking to an inhuman extreme the founding premise of the human social order: the primacy of the mimetic over the appetitive. Thus he sacrifices his life, in principle at least, to the pleasure of being recognized, and recognized not within the standard market publicity apparatus, which offers only representations of the "natural", but as one who by accepting his own mortality, has turned his back on this apparatus. Like the 1997 Heaven's Gate suicides, he is a dandy, but one who like Lacenaire[6] in Marcel Carné's *les*

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[6]Lacenaire was born in Lyon. Upon finishing his education with excellent results, he joined the army, eventually deserting in 1829 at the time of the expedition to the Morea. He became a crook and was in and out of prison, which was, as he called it, his "criminal university". While in prison, Lacenaire recruited two henchmen, Victor Avril and François Martin, and wrote a song, "Petition of a Thief to a King his Neighbor", as well as "The Prisons and the Penal Regime" for a journal. In the months between the beginning of his trial for a double murder and his execution, he wrote *Memoirs, Revelations and Poems*,[1] and during the trial he fiercely defended his crime as a valid protest against social injustices, turning the judicial proceedings into a theatrical event and his cell into a salon. He made a lasting impression on the age and on several writers such as Balzac and Dostoevsky. He was executed in Paris, at the age of 32. He is depicted in the French film *Children of Paradise* (*Les Enfants du Paradis*, 1945), directed by Marcel Carné from a script by Jacques Prévert. where his stance as a loner and a rebel is stressed. In the film, Lacenaire (Marcel Herrand) refers

Enfants du paradis, understands that the most scandalous demonstration of the dandy's superiority comes from killing others rather than himself.

The Socio-Psychological Approach to Terrorism

Since the classic supply curve suggests that the publicitary attractiveness of terrorist acts of mass murder would grow with their increasing rarity, stamping them out altogether would require the eradication of the Herostratus syndrome from the entire population hardly a realistic assumption. This does not make any less clear the ethical imperative we as individuals and collectivities should follow to prevent them: act so as to defer resentment. In some private cases, to implement this ethic is simply to follow the moral model brought to the fore by the monotheistic ethics like in Judeo-Christian tradition. But we must not forget on a broader scale, implementation is a matter of serious policy decisions. It might help just a bit if policy-makers, who read the same headlines as the rest of us, were more clearly aware of this goal. We sociologists have to analyze this and make a use to our first typology of these acts.

But let's go further with some useful approaches from the point of view of social psychology such as Michael Myslobodsky's essay on "the fallacy of mother's wisdom: Perspective on health psychology". He wrote (p. 213) that

> some people who do not appear to be clinically mentally ill might still manifest an inability to handle their relationships and end up perpetually dejected, demoralized and frustrated. Their weakness is expressed in low self-esteem, lack of self

control, suicidal intention and work functioning. Socially, shame, humiliation and a sense of not belonging builds upon preexistent susceptibility. By dramatizing personal doom such individuals may tend to blame others unjustly for their failure.

This is exactly what we pretend to say on our topic: Looking at the recent jihad[7] of the ISIS acts (the auto-designated "Islamic jihad") is to considerable extend a resentment struggle of unhappy people. We must consider here that religion provides a binding glue to all those who feel kinship in the fight against "infidels".

This why a potential "martyr" can accomplish his goal twice since on a personal level, each is assured the rise from a simple paltry anonymity of his past to the "glory" of posters on the wall of his town. We can see it on many Palestinian

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to himself as a bold criminal and a social rebel, but his actual criminal activities mostly stay outside the film's narrative. Philosopher Michel Foucault believed Lacenaire's notoriety among Parisians marked the birth of a new kind of lionized outlaw (as opposed to the older folk hero), the bourgeois romantic criminal, and eventually to the detective and true crime genres of literature.There is a French film called *Lacenaire* (1990) starring Daniel Auteuil.

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[7]Jihad is an Arabic word meaning "struggle." According to the Qur'an (where jihad appears forty-one times), Muslims have the duty of fighting enemies and invading non-Muslim territories to spread Islam. The belief is that the violent elimination of apostate regimes, the slaughter of the People of the Book (monotheistic non-Muslims, mostly Jews and Christians), and the removal of kafir (those who disbelieve in Allah) are justified in the cause of jihad. This has driven non-state actors (e.g., Al Qaeda) to commit terrorism. The greater jihad is the struggle a person has within him- or she to fulfill what is right. On account of human pride, selfishness, and sinfulness, believers must continually wrestle with themselves and accomplish what is right and good. The lesser jihad refers to the external, physical effort to defend Islam (including terrorism) when the Muslim community is under attack. The key characteristics of modern jihad ideology include (1) hakimiyya (true sovereignty of Allah over nation-states or civil laws), (2) Islamic society and upholding hisba (praising good, forbidding evil) by following the sharia (i.e., "Islamic law"; the required implementation of virtuous vs. materialistic, status-driven behavior based on group interpretation), (3) the necessity for jihad, (4) occupation of Muslim lands (used as justification for jihad as individual duty), (5) martyrdom (i.e., "dying or suffering as a hero"; martyrdom is associated with jihad and praised through videos, poetry, songs, and web postings), and (6) takfir (i.e., "disbelief in Allah"; non-Muslim governments are viewed as infidels and unwilling to be subdued by Islamic law. Therefore, it is an object of jihad). Jihadists have near enemies and far enemies. Near enemies are Muslim governments and forms of Islamic law that do not embrace the jihadist view. If non-Islamic powers or countries outside the jurisdiction of Islam (i.e., the West, the U.S., and Israel) do not embrace the jihadist view, they are referred to as the far enemy.

cities today. This leads to the point that tendency to commit suicide as an act of retribution for personal deficiency is so abhorrent that it justifies the name of Herostratus syndrome.

As we said above, Theopompus[8] writes about Herostratus that he is a fool person of 356 B.C. whose claim to immortality is in burning down the beautiful temple of goodness Artemis at Ephesus, one of the seven wonders of our ancient world. This relevance of pyromania, albeit as a form of impulse control disorder from the point of view of psychology, rather than due to an intellectual and so-called affective disorder of humiliated individuals akin to regrettably discarded monomania of Jean-Etienne Dominic Esquirol (the French psychiatrist 1772–1840). For the Russian poet Nadson (1862–1887) the "bard" of hopelessness, humiliation, misery and, finally, the death was more on target in trying to explain also the Herostratus unfathomable crime by maybe an acute sense of being a loser, a pariah who was "mistreated" by chance and pushed aside as drifters are looking for a way to get even with the more successful others. This could be interpreted as a seeking of immortality among successful people using social integration. This terrible crime that we could classify in the typology of the first well known terrorist act on human history, meant to deprive those who were ahead of him of the reasons for their aspirations, pride and enjoyment. In M. Myslobodsky essay

(p. 214) we see something more about Nadson's thesis that explains Herostratus life with the painful realization of being a "maggot squashed by destiny" in the midst of the countless hordes.

Of course the Herostratus case is not only a medical case but a sociological case and a personal drama. This shared despair as well as unmitigated loneliness constitutes familiar motives for terrorists for retribution directed at specified "them". We often lack methods in sociology to deal with such motive adequately when their triggers are centuries away from our grasp. This is why let alone the capacity to understand crimes of such magnitude even if depression is considered effective and real when caused by an internal psychological dysfunction and not if symptoms are a simply reaction to standard or better a common negative social environment.

We must also take in consideration that nations like individual persons can be depressed. Among people of such nations can born the perfect profile of this kind of terrorist. They tend to think that other nations persistently measure their total decline and pay more attention to their actions than they actually do. One might add that these so called depressed nations, like we said for depressed individuals, can be excessively sensitive to the attitudes of others, quite unlike those with power, influence and self-respect, who may show a degree of disregard of their surroundings.

At this point exactly our analysis shows the sociological interest, when groups and communities adhere to the code of social behavior which demands monitoring and protecting their honor. Individuals who fail to establish a reputation as tough fighters and cannot protect themselves from potential insult are unlikely to deter potential thieves of their property. As a result, the impact of violating honor perceived or real, is unbearable without settling of scores sometimes delayed years and generations. Such populations are often designated as "cultures of honor" and show that they develop in environment where there is little law enforcement (for instance frontier communities such as Kurds) and where wealth is easy to lose (Nisbett and Cohen analysis).

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[8]Theopompus's work The *Hellenics* treated of the history of Greece, in twelve books, from 411 (where Thucydides breaks off) to 394 BC the date of the battle of Cnidus (cf. Diod. Sic., xiii. 42, with xiv. 84). Of this work only a few fragments were known up till 1907. The *papyrus fragment* of a Greek historian of the 4th century, discovered by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, and published by them in *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, vol. v. (1908), has been recognized by Eduard Meyer, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and Georg Busolt as a portion of the *Hellenics*. This identification has been disputed, however, by Friedrich Blass, J. B. Bury, E. M. Walker and others, most of whom attribute the fragment, which deals with the events of the year 395 BC and is of considerable extent, to Cratippus. In the *Hellenics*, Theopompus mentions Herostratus and his arson of the Temple of Artemis, thus helping Herostratus to his goal of achieving fame, despite the Ephesian authorities forbidding mention of his name under penalty of death.

The Herostratus Syndrome

After 9/11/2001 terrorist acts we enter to a new era and kind of terrorism. Disconsolate, embittered and depressed Arabs with their overblown sense of historical role and guided by corrupt (see Kaddafi's regime for example), tyrannical regimes that offer nothing to their insecure population following several bitterly fought and humiliatingly lost wars, start to speak of suicidal terrorists as a strategic answer to the total technological military and economic dominance of the West world and offset of its military supremacy.

How we could define the basic components of Herostratus syndrome? First of all signs of deep humiliation due to public revelation that can be actual or latent, of either personal inadequacies assumed or genuine or even those presumably shared via the socialization in groups. Secondly there is an attribution of unhappiness and resentment to individuals who belong to salient factions or institutions. Third component is the relative prosperity of adversaries that is considered unfair. Forth component is the feeling of being trapped in a punitive situation with no way of recovery from the current bleak state unless the 'enemy' suffers recognizable injury or pain. Fifth component is generally a culture of redemption and recovery through retribution. Last but not least is the unquenchable craving for recognition and immortality, what Herostratus was searching for.

These components are not so unusual requirements. Eric Gans wrote that "no one in history has equaled, let alone improved on, Herostratus example?" Those of Al Qaeda who crashed the airplanes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, or the self-designated "martyrs" self-explode in the market place or restaurants of Israel, Kenya, Madrid or Bali could give an answer to this question. We could agree that Herostratus was certainly unearthed in the image of Osama Bin Laden before his death. Although with this the same applies to his less spectacular followers, even some comic creatures who were caught before they delivered the bomb.

One might recall that in Fernando Pessoa work "Heróstrato e a busca da imortalidade" or in Jean-Paul Sartre's story in "Le Mur" the protagonist was labeled Erostrate, even though he did not commit his intended crime, a wanton act of indiscriminate shooting on a busy street or in Charlie Hebdo bureaus in Paris. In this case we refer these kinds of herostratic acts in terms of a theory of comparison developed in the early fifties by Leon Festinger (1919–1989), one dominant figure in American social psychology. This theory derives from the principle that social groups present a need to socially compare themselves with others who could be similar in some relevant aspects, particularly when they are uncertain about their abilities or find themselves participating in presumably inequitable relationships. In our societies a person may be unpopular or downright rejected for multiple reasons not generally justified. In keeping with this Festinger's theory, people tend to protect themselves against unfavorable social comparisons in the realm of possessions, marital relations, sports achievements, and economic and scholastic since the view could be a potent source of mood changes. The same is true for group comparison, and even for Facebook or other virtual activities and modes of communication, as we have recently seen in France or other western countries where some young people manifested the willing and joined ISIS or other marginal terrorist groups. This "social deviation" can be described in terms of sociology, behavior culture and socialization. Cultures of honor may well pose the question "of "why we are not as they are" in social comparison. This question can be answered in terms of the everyday life: very often unable to live by a code of honor, their chieftains moralize via internet on the benefits of honorary death. It is intriguing that suicidal acts are common among humiliated people, particularly among adolescents with a sense of severe anxiety due to peer-group pressures or rejection regardless of their social circumstances.

The example of Maxime Hauchard is a pure description of the Herostratus Syndrome. Maxime Hauchard, the Frenchman identified by authorities as a jihadi involved in the beheadings

of an American and Syrian captives, is a 22-year-old from Normandy who converted to Islam at 17. Hauchard appeared in the so called "Islamic State" (ISIS) video which on a Sunday showed cynically the killings of 18 Syrian captives and an American aid worker Peter Kassig. In the video he is standing in a lineup of jihadists and is not masked. He was recognized by French writer and journalist David Thomson who posted to the twitter a picture of him. Prosecutor François Molins confirmed his identity at a press conference on Monday afternoon.

Hauchard is from Le Bosc-Roger-en-Roumois, which has a population of 3250. He took on the "nom de guerre" Abu Abdallah el-Faransi, reflecting his French citizenship, and has never sought to conceal his affiliation with Islamist fighters, posting photos on social media of him carrying weapons. In July he gave an interview to BFM TV in which he described how he became interested in Islam via the internet and how he travelled to Syria in August last year to help create a caliphate. Dressed in black, Hauchard described the month-long training in Syria as "not a holiday, but like a holiday". He said there were more French nationals at the ISIS headquarters in Raqqa, but the group there was mostly made up of Arabs, including Egyptians, Libyans, Tunisians, Moroccans and Saudis. In the interview, Hauchard said he had been deployed in Mosul, the northern Iraqi town overrun by ISIS in June, and added that he was about to go on a more "spectacular" mission. He also said he expected to die. "My personal goal is martyrdom, obviously," he said. He has been known to french intelligence services since 2011, and an arrest warrant was issued for him last month. His uncle, Pascal, said he was aware that his nephew had travelled to Syria but was puzzled as to his motives. "I don't get this. My nephew would never chop off a head, it's not possible. He wouldn't hurt a fly," he told BFM TV. A friend suggested Hauchard was a "weak and easily influenced" person who had become committed to radical Islam after watching online videos. French investigators say Hauchard, like most of young like him who integrated ISIS the same way, received his religious training in Mauritania in 2012, and then went to Syria via the Turkish town of Gaziantep, posing as a humanitarian worker. That was exactly what gave him access through the "back door" to the sentiment of social integration because social integration in western societies has failed. Let's see the main reason rapidly: At a fundamental level, it is difficult to deny that Western societies, in particular those in Western Europe have simply not reached out and encouraged Muslim immigrants to identify themselves as members of the national community, affiliate with the national identity that binds together the country's citizens, and integrate into the larger culture and society. That was the finding of a comprehensive report from late 2005 that examined the UK, France, Germany, and Spain. The report noted that "social deprivation, discrimination, and a sense of cultural alienation may make some European Muslims especially those of the second or third generation more vulnerable to extremist ideologies".

A Problem of (Dis)Integration?

British author Kenan Malik[9] has presented extensively on the subject of integration as being crucial to countering the appeal of extremism: Many second-generation British Muslims now find themselves detached from both the religious traditions of their parents, which they often reject, and the wider secular society that insists on viewing them simply as Muslims. A few are drawn inevitably to extremist Islamist groups where they discover a sense of identity and of belonging. It is this that has made them open to radicalization. British policies led to the de facto treatment of individuals from minority groups not as citizens but simply as members of

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[9]Kenan Malik (born 1960) is an Indian-born English writer, lecturer and broadcaster, trained in neurobiology and the history of science. As a scientific author, his focus is on the philosophy of biology, and contemporary theories of multiculturalism, pluralism and race. These topics are core concerns in *The Meaning of Race* (1996), *Man, Beast and Zombie* (2000) and *Strange Fruit: Why Both Sides Are Wrong in the Race Debate* (2008).

particular ethnic units, resulting in the creation of fragmented societies, the scapegoating of immigrants and the rise of both populist and Islamist rhetoric.

We see the failure of integration in one writing made by a radical Muslim cleric in the UK named Anjem Choudary, in response to an ISIS video in which a man with a British accent beheaded American journalist James Foley: "It's not important if it's a British person carrying out the execution because you're Muslim first and British second." We are wondering whether someone who leaves the UK to join ISIS remains British at all. To really understand the situation, we can ask someone who was an active Islamist, who participated in a group that called for the creation of an "Islamic Caliphate", i.e., a state governed by religious law which would encompass all the Muslim faithful of the world. Here's what Ed Husain who, while remaining Muslim, has since renounced these extremist beliefs and now works actively to counter them had to say about why extremism attracts Muslims whom Britain failed to integrate:

"On a basic level, we didn't know who we were. People need a sense of feeling part of a group but who was our group? Nobody ever said you're equal to us, you're one of us, and we'll hold you to the same standards. Nobody had the courage to stand up for liberal democracy without qualms."

Western societies must do these things. They must help Muslims feel part of our group, something that Mr. Husain is absolutely right about people needing. That process is a two-way street, but it starts with what the majority does, both on an individual level through personal interactions, and a societal level through policy and the broader culture. That means that going forward we must treat Muslims and all immigrants as well as anyone potentially alienated by mistreatment or discrimination as full members of the community. In return, we expect that they respond by adopting liberal democratic values, and identifying themselves as members of the community as well as with the common interests of the country. Both the mainstream and Muslim communities must challenge extremist ideology by vigorously promoting an affirmative, inclusive vision of the nation. Both sides bear responsibility for integration's success. At this point, as we wrote above, integration in Western Europe is clearly failing and we have to do something for this before it's too late taking in account that there is also the majority of people belonging to moderate Islam who they do not accept distortion theories of the Koran. It should also be pointed out that terrorism does not exist solely in the clash between fundamentalist Islam and the industrialized countries. Many other movements, both national and international, now adopt this form of struggle.

And to Conclude… a Lesson from the Past

Let's start with some conclusions seeing the point of view of Albert Borowitz's essay about Terrorism for self-glorification: the Herostratus Syndrome. Borozitz speaks (p. 111) about Herostratus at the World Trade Center writing that the final stage of Herostratus's globalization has been his invasion of cyberspace. When the twin towers and the Pentagon were struck in the morning of September 11, new readers and viewers around the world placed articles and messages on the Internet to draw parallels between the shocking American tragedy and the crazy arsonist in ancient Ephesus. It is without any doubt that remarkably, the postulation of this Herostratic analogy in online writing and chatter was generally unaffected either by the degree of the writer's sympathies with the United States or by the fact that al-Qaeda's concerted attacks on Manhattan and Washington D.C., unlike the burning of Artemis's temple, were apparently motivated by ideology. Some days after, in a Brazilian site of Globonews.com.br of São Paulo, we saw an interesting comment about "from antiquity to modern era" remembering us like a prophecy what it would happened in the next years when these ISIS "ignorant warriors" would destroy with hummers antiquities and museums in Iraq. It was saying: "great monuments and icons of historical significance have been victims of attacks like

those that leveled the twin towers of the W.T.C. and the Pentagon." These are exactly the interesting parallels between tragic events of antiquity and the attacks prepared not only against United States but all dominant culture system; the desire to break the barrier between dominator and dominated are expressive motives impelling attacks of hatred intolerance and violence.

There is essentially a general conclusion to our tentative for sociological approach of such kind of terrorist acts: Terrorism has entered into a new form leaving from its classical definition and typology until now. These kinds of acts are using ideology as a pretext to justify simple crimes. Terrorist acts are increasing steadily in preferring a criminal and spectacular death to an obscure and lonely destiny even if it is only for 15 min of celebrity; these people are qualified as "monsters", but they are simply misunderstood. Society and human history will not remember anything about them. Herostratus has been the proof that this imbecilic temptation to drag along innocent people to death cutting heads through youtube demonstrations, in order to attract attention to themselves is anything but heroic act; it is simply a crime against humanity, a common murder, whatever its scale. Terrorism for Sociology will remain a pure crime act against human kind even if in its Herostratic syndrome is seeking for an immortality and social acceptance.

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Author Biography

George Kaffes WORK EXPERIENCE: Academic year 1992-1993 until now: Hellenic Army Academy. Current position Professor of Military Sociology. Direction of Human Sciences Academic Programs in the Hellenic Army Academy. 1991-1993: Responsibility for interview and psycho-technical test for recruitment of the greek military service. 2011 until now: Organizing comm. of the open university of Municipality of Peristeri. 2014 until now: Collaboration with the Institute of International Relations of the Panteion University of Social Sciences of Athens for postgraduate teaching and conferences.

INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES: Regular Member of International Sociological Association, (RC 01 Armed Forces and Conflict Resolutions), of French-speaking International Sociological Association (AISLF), the Hellenic Sociological Association since 1986, the American Eastern Sociological Association (military sociology group) and the European Sociological Association.

2015: elected President of ERGOMAS.

Invited Professor of National Defense School of Greece since 2001.

Military Cooperation in Multinational Missions

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Maria Luisa Maniscalco

Introduction: Framing the Increase in Multinational Military Cooperation

For centuries, from the Hellenic League[1] to the most recent alliances and coalitions, multinationality has been a feature of military institutions; political communities and states have always formed military pacts, acting in concert both to seek mutual security against real or perceived threats and to further their common economic and strategic interests. Therefore, from a historical point of view, an ethnic as well as national differentiation is certainly not a novelty in the armed forces: the ancient use of mercenary forces, the multiethnic armies of the great states and empires, the various colonial troops and alliances characterized the military world for centuries.

Nevertheless, many new and more complex factors have emerged in the last decades. Since the end of World War II, multinationality has increasingly developed, with a diversification of tasks at several levels, marking a profound transformation in the use of military contingents: the different national armed forces have had to work more and more closely together, cooperating in military operations of various nature, such as peace and humanitarian missions.

Therefore, in order to explain the development of military multinational relationships, it is important to remember two key aspects. First, during the Cold War, the two competing military alliances—the Western Bloc (the United States, North Atlantic Alliance' allies, and others) and the Eastern Bloc (the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact)—enhanced the capabilities of the involved national armed forces to work together and share common risks and threats. For decades, the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact dominated the international relations system. Each side was equipped with nuclear weapons aimed at deterring attacks by the opponents; the doctrine of "mutually assured destruction" (MAD) epitomizes this situation.

Second, in that same period the other significant aspect of multinational military cooperation was the start of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in 1948, when Security Council authorized the deployment of a force of UN military observers in the Middle East. Since then peacekeeping operations have come to represent a particular form of employment of armed forces from different countries deployed abroad in non-usual tasks (Janowitz 1960; Fabian 1971). It has to be said that this intense modality of military cooperation didn't originate from military initiatives: it resulted, instead, from the political intention to increase—through the participation of numerous states authorized by a mandate of the UN Security Council—the legitimacy of

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[1]The Hellenic League was the association of Greek city-states during the Greco-Persian wars of the 5th century B.C.

M. L. Maniscalco (✉)
CeAS -University "Roma Tre", Rome, Italy
e-mail: marialuisa.maniscalco@uniroma3.it

military missions aimed at preventing the escalation and widening of conflicts. For, while a single country sending soldiers off to a mission abroad would inevitably be suspected of acting out of purely national interests, a UN coalition is less likely to be accused of the same.

With the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the end of bipolarity, the opportunities for multinational military cooperation started expanding even further to cope with ever-evolving conflicts and to counter unfamiliar dangers and threats. If the traditional use of armed forces in the international arena had always been unequivocally connected to wars and characterized by precise alignments and clearly defined alliances and threats, since the last decade of the twentieth century a profound change has begun taking place (Rush and Epley 2006). The post-Cold War turbulent and complex scenarios—characterized by the "asymmetric", "new" and "globalized" wars (Baud 2003; Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2002; Maniscalco 2008a)—have highlighted the need for multilateral interventions at all levels (political, military, civil).

As a result, the United Nations have shifted and expanded the scope of their field operations from "traditional" peacekeeping missions (originally created as a means of dealing with interstate conflicts) to multifaceted peace support operations. Consequently, the national armed forces have had to adapt to new forms of cooperation, new tasks and contexts (Burk 1994).

Starting from 1948 there have been sixty-nine UN peacekeeping operations, sixteen of which are still on-going; during this time, multinationality has consistently been the distinctive emblem of all UN missions. In addition, multinationality has been evolving towards more complex structures: approximately one half of the UN peace operations and two-third of the EU peacebuilding and reconstruction operations have been deployed in cooperation with local partners (Wieland-Karimi and von Gienanth 2012).

Since the Soviet threat has gone, the North Atlantic Alliance—despite politicians and scholars questioning its *raison d'être*—has remained the main organization for Western security, inaugurating, during the nineties, a policy of enlargement that has made it the largest alliance of all time. With the London Declaration of July 1990, NATO announced its intention to place more reliance on the integration of multinational forces. A wide enlargement process of NATO extended different forms of military cooperation to all continents. According to the new strategic concept adopted in Lisbon on November 19–20, 2010, NATO's future commitment must be guided by the "cooperative security" principle and by a more active engagement with global partners, in order to effectively cope with the threats and challenges of the international scenario.

Furthermore, in the process of NATO-enlargement as well as in the framework of its various international military missions, the particular significance of multinationality has become evident for the growing integration of old, new and future allies or partners. "Partnership for Peace", "Mediterranean Dialogue", "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative", "Membership Action Plan" and "Global Partners" are all programs within which non-NATO member states can experiment with different forms of military cooperation along with the NATO member countries.

Multinationality is also the pattern for NATO-led crisis response operations; this pattern was first developed in the mid-nineties on the basis of the concept of the "Combined Joint Task Force", launched in late 1993 and endorsed at the Brussels Summit of January 1994. It was followed by the NATO Response Force, which—based on the concept of a joint, combined, high-readiness force, available for rapid deployment—was first endorsed with a declaration at the Prague Summit (November 2002). In the Wales Declaration (September 2014), NATO launched the "Readiness Action Plan". According to the "Smart Defence" definition, all these strategic concepts imply the attempt at "pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better".[2]

In the European Union, most multinational structures on the level of military units started

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[2]http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/78125.htm.

developing around the nineties. In 1987, France and Germany intensified their military cooperation through the Franco-German Brigade, which has been considered a laboratory where to test the defence cooperation of the future (Bahu 1990), a sort of prototype for the experimentation of common processes and the coordination of the daily routines of troops from two different national armies. The Strasburg-based Eurocorps has been active since 1993, now involving nine countries (five framework nations and four associated nations), of which eight EU members plus Turkey.

In more recent years, Europe's armed forces have been undergoing a great transformation and a transnational military network is now appearing, where the different national forces are converging on common forms of military expertise. The EU Battlegroups—combined arms military units based around an infantry battalion or armoured regiment for early and rapid responses—have been active since 2007. The EU Battlegroups are based on the principle of multinationality with interoperability and effectiveness as key criteria.[3] Member states can also invite non-EU countries to participate in the Battlegroups. Starting from their establishment, the Battlegroups have been an opportunity for enhanced military cooperation between European member states, also improving mutual knowledge of each others' capabilities.

Within about one decade military multinationality became one of the most important strategies for European states to match new military tasks and requirements, while simultaneously reducing the size of their forces. Most European countries also began restructuring their armed forces to make them more usable for expeditionary operations on short notice. Today multinational military bodies and units are an important symbol for an unifying Europe.

As for other geopolitical areas, since the nineties, the Organization of Africa Unity (OUA) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have tried to develop capabilities for conflict prevention and management using multinational military forces. For about a decade, the African Union (the new organization which replaced OUA in 2002) has been trying to increase military multinationality and effectiveness by developing multinational military capabilities, rapidly deployable to crisis areas to keep or enforce peace. The African Standby Force is comprised of standby brigades, one in each of Africa's five regions—Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), Northern Africa Standby Brigade (NARC), Western Africa Standby Brigade (ECOWAS), Center Africa Standby Brigade (ECCA), Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADC)—and also incorporates police and civilian components.

China, in its turn, is the co-founder of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a multilateral security organization established in 2001 with the participation of Russia and four Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.[4] Over the past few years, the organization's activities have expanded to include increased military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and counter-terrorism. There have been a number of SCO joint military exercises, the first of which was held in 2003, with the first phase taking place in Kazakhstan and the second one in China. China and Russia also teamed up for large-scale war games in 2005 (Peace Mission 2005), 2007 and 2009, under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Peace Mission 2010 (involving personnel from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) conducted joint planning and operational manoeuvres. These military exercises, like many others, aim at consolidating coordination capabilities between

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[3]In general, interoperability refers to the capability of units, forces or systems to offer services to and accept services from units, forces and systems, using these services to enable them to operate effectively together. NATO has accomplished a huge organizational task by creating the so called "standard operating procedures" (SOPs) to achieve interoperability.

[4]According to Tugsbilguun, SCO represents a mature security organization which doesn't necessarily have to conform to traditional alliance theories (Tugsbilguun 2008–2009).

different national armies in order to reach interoperability.[5]

In 2013, in its military reawakening, China joined UN MINUSMA (Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, deployed with the contribution of troops from thirty-five countries) with Chinese personnel (395 units of infantry troops) deployed for the first time with fighting tasks. Before then China had only provided the UN with medical personnel and engineers, according to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state (Taylor 2014). Moreover the Chinese navy has also taken part in international anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, which allowed it to interact and socialize with the European powers. China has long recognised the need for naval cooperation in order to defend its own economic and commercial interests, making huge investments in naval armaments (Guibert 2013).

To sum up, in the twenty-first century, cooperation between armed forces of different countries has become the standard; armed forces not only are integrated into alliances, but they also cooperate in a wide range of activities, including first aid operations in humanitarian missions (the so called crisis response operations), peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations as well as peace enforcement and counterinsurgency operations. In addition, multinational armed forces are called to cooperate in the reconstruction of local institutions, sometimes vicariously assuming some of the public functions in situations of state failure.

In recent years, all major overseas operations have been carried out by ad hoc multinational forces–such as UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) in Lebanon, ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan and KFOR (NATO Kosovo Force) in Kosovo—or led by permanent military structures such as NATO and the Eurocorps. Likewise, many other forms of bilateral or multilateral military cooperation (joint training, exercises and manoeuvres, etc.) have been facilitating the interaction and mutual understanding between armed forces of several countries from around the globe.

In their study of the "postmodern military" Charles Moskos et al. (2000) claimed that one of the defining features of the armed forces today is the development of multinational and international forces. The internationalization of the military life is now a global phenomenon affecting the armed forces of countries worldwide; according to Klein and Kümmel (2000), this general form of multinationality can be understood as a result of the Cold War and globalization. One the most composite forces of the past is UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia), which included troops from forty-four countries belonging to almost all of the geopolitical areas of the globe. The EU mission in Bosnia, EUFOR (European Force), which in December 2004 had replaced NATO-led SFOR (Stabilization Force), benefited from the contribution of troops from thirty-three countries of which twenty-two EU members, while in NATO-led ISAF (International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan) contingents from forty-eight countries were employed.

Such level of cooperation involves problems of integration and operational coordination that are lumped together under the term "interoperability". Four key elements are necessary to obtain a good military cooperation among contingents from different countries: compatibility (capacity of undisturbed interaction), interoperability (capacity of complementary cooperation), functional inter-changeability of equipment and personnel, and standardization of equipment and training. Not only arms and equipment are

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[5]Other multinational military exercises have been carried out in this area, as in the case of the Central Asian Battalion (CentrAsBat) exercises, organized to improve interaction with the central Asian States, by focusing on peacekeeping/humanitarian operations and exercising command, control, and logistics within a multinational framework. CentrAsBat exercises have been conducted in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Participating nations (Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, United Kingdom, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Mongolia as well as a US battalion) used these exercises as a tool to increase interoperability and improve the participating forces' abilities to acquire a good level of cooperation conducting basic peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

concerned here but also the degree of interaction and communication between military personnel of several armed forces. Indeed, although high military technology today appears to be overestimated compared to the human factor, we must never neglect the importance of the human dimension. Small and agile tactical units are playing an increasingly important role in today's multinational military operations of asymmetric warfare (Caforio 2008, 2012) and—despite new sophisticated weapon systems–vertical and horizontal cohesion in small tactical units and the ability to operate autonomously have become very important components of effectiveness in any kind of military action.

At this point, however, social, cultural and psychological components—which cannot easily be codified and are even more difficult to harmonize—come into play.

Remarks on Models and Terminology

Until the end of the Cold War, the use of the term "multinationality" in a military context was restricted to units created in peacetime on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements. Later, the term has been used with a wider connotation, covering technical meanings as well, which has caused a series of problems. On one hand, there is a persistent vagueness regarding which level (political/strategic, operational, or tactical commands) the term can apply to and whether or not it can be used to mark a differentiation between headquarters and troops. On the other hand, it is not clear whether the term is to be used to describe structures built up in peacetime or, instead, arrangements for a particular mission abroad. Some terminological clarification may therefore be useful.

The phrase "multinational operations" describes military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations; these operations are undertaken within the framework of a coalition or alliance. Multinational operations may be driven by: (a) common agreement among the participating alliance or coalition partners; (b) terms of

an alliance; (c) a mandate or authorization provided by the United Nations.

An alliance is the relationship that results from formal agreements (for example, treaties) between two or more nations for wide, long-term objectives that promote the common interests of the members and assure mutual protection. One of these broad, long-term objectives is the standardization of materiel (equipment) and non-materiel (doctrine) matters in order to achieve more effective military capabilities. Alliances usually have standing headquarters and organizations.

The term "coalition" refers to an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations willing to cooperate in a joint action for a limited purpose and for a set time, outside the bounds of an established alliance. Coalitions don't imply the same political decisions and commonality of aim as alliances; thus, military planners must closely study the political goals of each participant as a precursor to planning. Lately, the United States—among other countries—have frequently opted for ad hoc coalitions; an early documented use of the expression "coalition of the willing" dates back to June 1994, when President Bill Clinton spoke about a possible military intervention against North Korea. The most renowned coalition is the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in March 2003, while the most recent one is that against the Islamic State (IS) in September–October 2014, once again led by the USA.

Military operations undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance are based on military cooperation. The phrase "military multinational cooperation" is now part of a common lexicon; by using it we usually refer to all kinds of cooperation among soldiers of different countries; however, it is necessary to distinguish more precisely between "horizontal cooperation" and "vertical multinational integration".

According to many scholars (Gareis 2007; Klein and Kümmel 2000), the expression "horizontal cooperation" describes a simple lining up of units from different countries deployed next to one another in a horizontal manner within a battle

group. This pattern of troop deployment is traced historically in numerous alliances and is routinely used in the UN peace operations or in military operations under the aegis of a NATO's command structure. In this simple conglomerate of units from various nations on an ad hoc or at least non-permanent basis, military cooperation takes place almost entirely at the level of headquarters among skilled officers and liaison cells. As a rule, the military personnel of the different nations taking part to the mission remain separate from each other. Direct work-related contacts between the different national contingents are limited—if they happen at all—and soldiers have to deal with differences and peculiarities of their counterparts from other countries only to some extent. Within each national contingent, norms, prescriptions and disciplinary rules are those of the motherland and the mother tongue can be used for communications; military service mainly retains the characteristics of the national service. To sum up, in general, national distinctiveness and characteristics of the organization are retained.

As for vertical multinational integration, it has been developing since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, gaining increasing significance especially for European armed forces. The main feature of this kind of cooperation is a deep interpenetration at multiple levels: work-related interactions between personnel occur at the battalion or even at the company level. As far as equal participation between partner states is concerned, only vertical military multinationality can achieve the political aim of deep integration. Typical integrated multinational formations—such as the German-French Brigade and the German-Netherlands Corps—also stand under a common supreme command in peacetime. This set-up has obviously troubling implications for the notion of national sovereignty—one of whose clearest expressions is found in a nationally controlled armed force—since troops of one nation are directly commanded by officials of another nation.

All multinational operations have an unique architecture; each national commander—fraction of a multinational force—is responsible not only for the command of the multinational force but also for his national chain of command. Therefore, troop-contributing countries maintain a continuous communication to their national headquarters and thus to their own national governments.

Crossing these two dimensions, Soeters and Manigart (2008a) outline four distinct forms of multinational military cooperation: simple horizontal, advanced horizontal (e.g. operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan), simple vertical (e.g. the NATO International Security Assistance Force—ISAF) and advanced vertical (no examples to date; maybe one day, some kind of structure of an integrated European army could arise).

The two basic organizational models for multinational military operations fall into one of three types of command structure: lead-nation, parallel command and integrated command. As stated by Durell-Young (1997), these structures don't need to be mutually exclusive (see also Bisho 2004).

According to the lead-nation model, one nation is assigned the lead role and all member nations put their forces under the control of that one nation; the lead nation is usually the country providing the largest number of forces and/or resources for the operation. This command structure can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. Depending on the size, complexity, and duration of the operation, staff expansion from other national contingents may be required to supplement the lead-nation staff. This ensures that the lead nation headquarters represents the entire coalition. Such expansion facilitates the planning process by providing the mission commander with a source of expertise from the coalition members.

The parallel command model is an alternative to the lead-nation one. Under this command structure, no single coalition commander is named. The mission leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to achieve unity of effort.

A third type of command structure is the integrated command structure. This type of structure occurs when all members of the coalition participate equally in the operation and are represented in the command headquarters to assist the force commander—who is usually selected amongst the contributing nations—in the decision-making process (Lescoutre 2003).[6]

Multinational Cooperation as a Challenge

In the last few years, in a trend towards a growing cooperation, soldiers of different nationalities have more and more interacted under a common command structure. Particularly, this phenomenon concerned Western countries' soldiers, but not only them.

However, as far as organizational structures, terminology, military doctrine, equipment, capabilities, technologies and training are concerned, substantial differences continue to exist between the armed forces of different countries. This can hinder deepened cooperation or integration, sometimes even making them impossible. According to Zanini and Morrison Taw (2000), operation Desert Storm (Iraq, 1990–1991) demonstrated a substantial technology gap between coalition partners. For example, the French military forces lacked night vision equipment, while the United Kingdom had problems with command and control systems and with electronic warfare capabilities. Additionally, many coalition partners were required to use U S satellite communications equipments, secure radios, and phones down to battalion level to ensure connectivity (Bensahel 2003).

In Afghanistan, multiple differences among contingents in the German–Dutch Multinational Brigade at Camp Warehouse in Kabul caused tensions at the tactical level. In 2003, the Dutch accused the Germans of administrative and operational bias. Soeters and Moelker (2003) reported that the Dutch claimed they were forced to mount guard duty more often than the Germans, and they were accommodated in tents instead of huts like the Germans. In their turn, the Belgian troops deployed in Tibnin, South Lebanon, from 2006 to 2007, reported they had problems working with countries that were not familiar with NATO standards and operating procedures. As a matter of fact, as Resteigne and Soeters claim (2007), Belgian and Polish troops merely cohabitated in the same camp.

In the same decade, NATO's efforts to establish uniform standards in the arms and technologies of the member states brought forth only limited success. In the European Union, the three major powers (France, Germany and Great Britain) have different professional cultures and strategic orientations, which hinder their integration.[7] If other European forces are considered, a significant technological gap emerges as well (Adam and Ben-Ari 2006).

In many respects, cooperation and progressive integration represent a heavy challenge for the military organization, which has been a pregnant symbol of unity and national sovereignty since the formation of the modern state. It wouldn't be rash to affirm that, in Europe, armed forces have played an essential role in the development of the different national identities and in the strengthening, even through wars, of the idea of nation-state. Many scholars—from Max Weber and Charles Tilly, to Martin van Creveld and Charles Mann—have all recognized an intimate connection between modern armed forces and the national state building process, the former being the guarantor of sovereignty and the symbol of national unity.

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[6]Good examples of such command structures can be seen in many UN operations such as UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia) and UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda).

[7]According to King (2011) in his research on the formation of a transnational network of headquarters, the British defence doctrine highlights a war fighting ethos as one of its central military principles, distinguishing Britain's armed forces from other European ones; the French leadership style is highly dirigiste, reflecting a command culture that impedes operational planning and initiative; on the contrary the Bundeswehr has a "weak" command culture.

Stemming from a long historical process, all modern military organizations are characterized by a powerful common identity as well as by the intentional creation and preservation of a homogenous culture. The basic assumption is that a common identity and an uniform culture—shaped by symbols and rituals as well as by norms, attitudes and values—enable the units to function better. In few organizations the concepts of "culture" and "identity" are literal as in the military ones[8]: looking alike and performing in perfect coordination are still key disciplines. The idea that a strong common culture and identity provide a strong performance has been one of the core assumptions of military management practice.

On the contrary, the social and cultural environment of the multinational missions is a plural field, where different national identities combine and compete with differences in culture, traditions, procedures and languages. In such missions, all military personnel are required to confront with many different challenges, which are not only related to the operational or combat level but also to the socio-cultural one. Troops interact with many other partners from around the world; the differences in the organizational and national cultures of the countries that contribute personnel to missions can have an impact on the overall operational effectiveness of the multinational force. They have to deal with different traditions and have to successfully operate under increasing diversifying and demanding conditions. These differences need to be continuously mediated and re-negotiated in order to gain a better understanding of the mission's purpose, share a common operational approach, increase the interoperability, carry out the assigned duties and give birth to a new sense of belonging, all those being key elements to the mission's effectiveness.

Therefore, while the multicultural environment could be a good opportunity for a better mutual comprehension and a deeper cooperation between soldiers from different countries, it could also represent a threat to the mission's effectiveness without an adequate awareness and competence in dealing with these differences. In other words, on one hand, multinational cooperation in missions abroad could create a better working environment while, on the other hand, it could produce a reinforcement of misperceptions and stereotypes, which can create a lack in communication and many troubles to the military chain of command and control.

To cope with these difficulties, military commands—both structured and defined as in the case of NATO, the EU and the UN, or temporary as in the "coalition of the willing"—make reference to the military organizational culture as the principal element of aggregation: all military organizational cultures have many aspects in common that make working together easier and facilitate mutual understanding. Scholars have underlined that military expertise—intended as a complex of cultural competences and professional ethos—implies, beyond national differences, consistent features that facilitate interaction processes and a commonality of actions. Moskos claims that military personnel coming from different cultural backgrounds find it easier to work together compared to civilians from non-governmental organizations and local agencies (Moskos 1976). Soeters and Manigart (2008a) argue that, in spite of cultural differences between individual armed forces, a certain transnational military culture exists. When compared to the civilian environment, this transnational military culture is more collectively oriented, hierarchically organized, and it is not primarily profit driven. For this reason military personnel, regardless of different cultural backgrounds, can cooperate with each other without any major difficulties.

These cultural shared characteristics are rooted in the specific nature of the military; while it could be said that all organizational cultures are influenced from their mission, worldwide military institutions are more strictly connected with their

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[8]Generally speaking, culture is a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviours, and artefacts on the basis of which people interpret and behave, individually and in groups. For further discussion on the distinctive features of military culture, see chapter *Military Culture* by J. Soeters, in section IV of this volume.

primary purpose: war fighting and securing peace by the use of arms. This mission determines still today the central beliefs, values and complex symbolic formations defining military culture. Although armed forces are now involved in a range of activities, including the so called MOOTW (operations other than war) and—according to the new and all-inclusive terminology—"asymmetric warfare" (Caforio 2008, 2012), a more encompassing definition of the core military function still has as its central focus the notion of the legal and legitimized use of weapons. In the case of asymmetric warfare, which is characterized by war operations together with a broad spectrum of other activities (humanitarian aid, civil-military cooperation, governance, negotiation, mediation, etc.), the use of weapons is not only meant to wage war but also to defend or maintain peace either within or outside of national boundaries.

Military intra-occupational socialization and training—represented by basic military and auxiliary trainings, as well as by daily work experiences that follow similar procedures worldwide—provide a homogenization of values and "habitus" (Burdieu and Passeron 1970). This way, a common professional military culture and a common military mind develop as important resources aimed at enabling cooperation and integration among armed forces from different countries (Elron et al. 1999).

The core elements of military culture, as rooted in history and tradition, are based on group loyalty, cohesion and conformity and are oriented towards discipline and obedience to superiors. According to Hofstede's comprehensive attempt to capture national values and cultural differences,[9] in general, in military organizations worldwide, hierarchies and power distances are more elaborated and fundamental than they are in the business and civil society organizations. In any case, however, they show national differentiations in leadership styles and hierarchical power distance. Moreover, in the military, collectivism (i.e., group orientation, loyalty, interdependency and cohesion) is a more important attitude than it is among typical civilian organizations. These are all key features to achieving combat-effectiveness and are consequently developed and strengthened as organizational values through formation and training. According to Savage and Gabriel (1976), the US military failure in Viet Nam was caused by the lack of sense of collectivism and cohesion, even if only in terms of buddyship, intended as mutual protection rooted in a rational choice to assure reciprocal survival in an extreme environment (Moskos 1975).

However, if the militaries of the world share some common elements, beliefs and ideas, this should not imply that all military cultures are the same; the historical development, the political and economic background as well as the national cultural differences have contributed to develop peculiarities in each national military organization. Therefore, besides the common traits, all armed forces have their historical military roots, their own military identities, micro-traditions, doctrines, styles of leadership, training practices, and work concepts, which emanate from their specific economic development, culture, language, religion, class and gender customs, work ethics, military values, levels of expertise, and standards of living, just to name a few. All those elements are indeed the natural consequences of the values and social structures of the countries they belong to (Plante 1998). Therefore, the military intercultural differences need to be continuously mediated and negotiated in order to share a common approach to the mission and to carry out the assigned duties. Conversely, not

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[9]Geert Hoftsede (1991) identified five dimensions in cultural differentiation: (a) power distance (the degree of inequality among people that is considered normal); (b) uncertainty avoidance (the degree of preference of situations in which there are clear rules); (c) masculinity vs. femininity (the degree to which values like assertiveness, performance, success, and competition typically associated with the role of men prevail over values like the quality of life, warm personal relationships, service and care for the weak, that are more associated with the role of women); (d) individualism vs. collectivism (the degree whether one's identity is defined by personal

choices and achievements or by the character of the collectivity; (5) long-term versus short-term orientation (the degree to which a culture embraces, or does not embrace, future-oriented values, such as perseverance and thrift).

considering them could lead to issues in the implementation of multinational operations.

The increase in multinational missions has led to the identification of a number of potential areas of conflict or stress factors between the armed forces of cooperating countries, stemming from inter-group relations and dynamics. Bowman (1997) identified ten "points of friction" that have historically affected coalitions: differences in goals, logistics, capabilities, training, equipment, doctrines, intelligence, language, leadership and cultural practices. Although these differences may all have been present in previous multinational operations, they could be exacerbated by the existing more intense level of interaction among units and by the limited pre-deployment preparation of most coalitions today (Marshall et al. 1997). For example, as a recent study on French, Ghanaian, Italian and Korean units of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon documents, the implementation of the UN mandate in the daily military activities differs among the four armed forces. Furthermore, it shows that they also interpret the operational environment in their own way, which is consistent with their different military behaviour and with the value and significance of their previous experiences (Ruffa 2014).

Difficulties in the implementation of multinational missions have also emerged at high command level; some commanders of national subunits operating under National jurisdiction and under super-national supervision have experienced various conflicts, some of which deriving from different ways to conceive the implementation of the mission. As is well known, in July 1993 general Bruno Loi, commander of the Italian contingent, refused to execute the orders of the Turkish general Cervik Bir, commander of UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in Somalia). Certainly, this is not an isolated case: role conflicts of this kind, even if less striking, can be found.

There exists, therefore, the need to consider and integrate the intercultural issues and factors surrounding and influencing multinational military cooperation, particularly at the operational level of command. Consequently, the implementation of a military mission on the field requires a significant quota of mutual trust among all organizational actors. That is functional to the specific tasks assigned to each unit and to the control of uncertainty and risk, which typically characterize military operations of any kind. Nevertheless, this mutual trust among soldiers continues to be oriented first and foremost towards their own armed forces. As a consequence, the bond to fellow soldiers from other countries could never be as stable and reliable as that to soldiers from one's own country, given that close social ties between soldiers can only develop on the basis of a common ground. In a quantitative survey conducted at the end of 1991 in the German-French Brigade, the overwhelming majority of the French and German soldiers regarded the bi-national formation as a "good thing", even if their view of the brigade was more sober than euphoric (Klein 1993).

As I wrote in a study on military cooperation in the mission EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, multinational forces are characterized by an unresolved tension among different national and transnational senses of belonging and loyalty (Maniscalco 2008b). This tension generates a situation of "social ambivalence" (Merton 1968) found in many multinational settings where the actors are confronted with each other and national identities interact to create a new common sense of belonging and mutual trust and loyalty. It is necessary to adequately consider the intercultural factors that influence multinational military cooperation in the areas of organizational factors, leadership and command, teams, pre-dispositional and psychosocial factors, communication and technology. Multinational military education and pre-deployment programs and training need to promote cultural sensitivity and cultural awareness.

Despite these problems, however, some authors (for example, Ben-Ari and Efrat 2001) have found that the consolidation of a successful military cooperation, along with the development of a sense of multinational belonging, intensifies the sentiment of national identity, rather than diminishing it. In this kind of situations, multilevel loyalties and belongings tend to emerge: the

national and the military corps identity develop along with that of members of a multinational mission.

A situation arises in which, on one hand, for the very nature of the activities they carry out, relationships between the military personnel of different nationalities tend to be intense (based on a formal legitimization and on forms of loyalty and trust towards their superiors and fellow soldiers of other nationalities), on the other hand, the single national identities, the *esprit the corps* and the influence of the respective national governments remain strong. This is what two research studies on the Balkans (in Prizren in 2005, on the contingent Kfor and in 2006, in Mostar, on the Multinational Task Force Salamander-Eufor Althea) (Leonard et al. 2008; Maniscalco 2010) also highlighted.

In Camp Airfield (Kosovo), despite national rules and language differences hindering cooperation, German and Italian soldiers helped each other and developed good relationships. They organized informal gatherings with national foods and drinks and common recreational facilities. The informal social gatherings where participants of different nations eat and drink together are an important facilitator of cohesion and create common objectives and a good climate in multinational units (Aubry 2010). Over time, the soldiers developed a transnational camp identity, that they were proud of. Germans and Italians attempted to learn the basics of their counterparts' language for daily use. All these factors helped in overcoming severe living conditions in the camp and resulted in mutual trust and understanding (Tomforde 2007).

An Agenda for a Sociology of Multinational Military Cooperation

While during the nineties multinational structures kept on developing, academic social research activities dealing with military multinationality were taking place. Before that time, the phenomenon had been usually dealt from the security-political perspective.

The early sociological studies on multinational missions focused on the UN peacekeeping operations and on the unusual characteristics of their new tasks; these field studies mainly showed the difficulties of the military personnel of many armed forces—especially those of the most important states[10]—to integrate their professional identities with typical peacekeeping activities and tasks. The contradictions experienced by the soldiers—called to combine the two roles of peacekeeper and warrior and to integrate the received training with on-the-field tasks—were highlighted by almost all of these research studies (for examples, Moskos 1976; Miller and Moskos 1995; Miller 1997; Segal and Wechsler Segal 1993). On the contrary, the aspects and contradictions related to the fact of operating in multinational corps were paid little attention.

Later, however, the need for dedicated studies formulating a permanent, standardised, cultural, evaluative, and organizational pattern emerged in order to solve the inevitable problems related to multinational units of any kind (Gasperini et al. 2001; Elron et al. 2003; Soeters and Bos-Bakx 2003). The daily issues affecting multinational troops living together have to be managed somehow, given that the involved armed forces show some structural and cultural differences that create unavoidable difficulties. Indeed, as a series of research studies has demonstrated, they have different national concepts of strategic culture (Longhurst 2000), different organizational cultures (Hagen et al. 2003), different conceptions of military traditions, different understandings of the key military terms and different ideas of leadership (Klein and Lippert 1991).

As a result, multinational military bodies have to cope with national differences about culture, operational style, experiences or equipments, facing, therefore, an integrative task in addition to the official mission's duties (Gareis and Hagen 2005).

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[10]In general, the military personnel of the small and medium powers have shown a different approach. Italian soldiers, for example, have managed to integrate their new tasks with their traditional professional mission without significant difficulties (Battistelli 1996).

More recent works on military sociology have examined in particular the soldiers' role in peace operations, focusing on the social, political and contextual aspects of their behaviour. For example, Soeters and Manigart (2008b) as well as Soeters and Tresch (2010) have identified national operational differences, also studying how these characteristics hinder or foster multinational military cooperation. Among other things, peace operations—and, to some extent, asymmetric warfare operations as well—show a decisively wider interpretation gap concerning the way to implement the mandate than conventional military operations do. It is exactly in this gap that cultural influences, traditions and past experiences make themselves be felt, producing systematic differences in how national contingents carry out their daily military activities.

In the field of military sociology and psychology there are studies on a wide spectrum of multinational military activities; a heritage of research and data draws attention to the main analysis topics, also showing in which direction to continue the theoretical and on-the-field research work and how to deal with some additional study areas and issues.

Some of the most fundamental matters deserving of deeper examination are—also under a comparative approach between distinctive macro geographical areas the processes, interactions and mechanisms that contribute to the daily definition of the operational environment by the members of multinational contingents. As a matter of fact, this definition affects the interpretation and implementation of the mandate and the way in which soldiers carry out their daily duties, be they essentially military and security tasks or civil cooperation activities. This is a key aspect, which is influenced by a multitude of variables, whose impact is to be assessed both analytically and through on the field surveys. First of all, an important role is played by the national military doctrine and by the strategic concepts learned during the training, especially as far as the new complex tasks are concerned. Past experiences are also of great importance, both at a collective level (national sense of

identity, *esprit de corps*, etc.)—with the formation of distinctive organizational myths and the memory of experienced traumas[11]—and at the level of the individual soldier. The importance of the personal past experiences in shaping perceptions and thus, ultimately, behaviour already emerged from many field research studies (Ammendola 1999; Caforio 2013; Leonard et al. 2008; Maniscalco 2010; Ruffa 2014). Secondly, what also plays a fundamental role in shaping the situation is the perception of threats and risks deriving from the specific mission's tasks, the territories in which these are carried out, the image of the local populations and the kind of relationship established with them.

If the different national contingents have a completely dissimilar vision of the operational context, the consistency of the entire multinational force and the efficacy of their actions will be diminished as a result. For this reason, another important dimension to focus on more accurately is that of the daily mediation and negotiation processes initiated in order to share a common approach to the mission and to carry out the assigned duties coherently and consistently.

I will now address a traditional, fundamental and always topical issue in military studies: cohesion. The implementation of any military mission on the field requires also a significant quota of trust and cohesion among all organizational actors, factors that are the cornerstone of every survey on multinationality. Those are functional to the specific tasks assigned to each unit and to the control of uncertainty and risk that

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[11]Criminal, violent or dubious actions perpetrated by the members of an organization during the implementation of their duties can remain as open wounds in their institutional image, representing a sort of "organizational trauma". One could talk of a trauma of the "culpable" ones as a concept relating to a common responsibility shared by all the members of the organization, rather than to specific individuals, that is, the "actual" offenders. The criminal facts mark a decisive and negative turning point in the history of the organization, which can't represent itself anymore in its usual manner. The organizational identity undergoes a crisis and it is necessary to introduce procedures aimed at restoring a sense of belonging to it. The case of Dutchbat (the UNPROFOR's Dutch Battalion), after the massacre of Srebrenica in 1995, is a relevant example.

typically characterize military operations of any kind. Indeed, in peacekeeping operations, in performing stabilization and nation-building duties and, even more so, in asymmetric warfare contexts, each soldier needs—as it happens in war—to be able to count on the bond to his fellow soldiers for his own personal security and for the implementation of his tasks. The sense of belonging to a specific corps acts as a strengthening factor for the professional and cultural identity, while mutual trust—consolidated through daily activities—increases the level of self-confidence in the implementation of duties.

Esprit de corps and camaraderie are fundamental resources, which, besides being the result of the internal traditions and of the organizational image, originate from the daily activities, the mutual understanding and the development of a sense of trust.

Now, multinationality—in its continuous action of putting together and taking apart the jigsaw pieces of the different national military units that contribute to form contingents—for sure doesn't represent the ideal context in which to develop the team spirit and sustain mutual trust.

Moreover, given that many armed forces have a strong national identity and pride, as well as a strong sense of belonging to their corps, military personnel, at every level, often don't like to take orders from a non-national chain of command, especially if they consider the level of command expertise to be inferior to their own and the mission as a risky one.[12]

In a multinational mission, where work activities also have intercultural connotations, the creation and consolidation of trust relationships are very complex tasks because of the existence of practical (lifestyle and language-related[13]) as well as organizational and socio-cultural issues, the latter being also linked to stereotypes and prejudices. Although the formal structures establish norms, roles and duties with the intent to strictly define relationships between the military personnel of different nationalities, the daily routine often shows how it is difficult to implement them. For example, cooperation in the NATO framework can avail itself of procedures and mechanisms so consolidated—and whose legitimacy is held in high regard by organizational actors—as to reduce a large amount of the uncertainty characterizing every kind of intercultural working situation. However, as the social studies of the last fifty years have largely demonstrated, informal social relationships and cultural dynamics can increase or decrease the efficiency of these structures.

In other words, among the different national contingents there are social and cultural dimensions that facilitate or hinder mutual cooperation: if there are strong differences in mentality, culture and religion,[14] cooperation becomes difficult to achieve. For example, as far as gender issues are concerned, a different national perception of the woman's role can make it difficult to accept the presence of female soldiers[15]; similarly, a country that is not against homosexuality in the military cannot understand why it should be a problem for other countries.

On the contrary, cultural similarities—as in the case of a common religion (Yanakiev and Markov 2013) or a homogeneous organizational

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[12]As it emerged from field research studies in Kosovo and Bosnia, (Maniscalco 2010), the more the risk increases, the less the multi-national cooperation seems to work.

[13]Almost all research reports highlighted language difficulties and differences in the interpretation of even crucial information, such as a commander's intent, among different nationalities. The language barriers and the lack of understanding can lead to miscommunications in performing the mission's duties.

[14]Multinational contingents may include a great variety of religions: Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and others. Each one of these has special requirements, including different food restrictions, times for praying and fasting, religious holidays, etc. Sometimes these differences may be unbridgeable and provide a substantial barrier to mutual understanding and cohesion.

[15]For further discussion on the issues related to the integration of women in the armed forces, see chapter *Participation and Change in Gendered Organization. Women in the Military Forces*, by M. Nuciari, in section IV of this volume.

culture—can make the relationship more friendly and easier.[16]

For this reason, for an initial period of time, traditional military tasks should be complemented with integrative relationship-building tasks aimed at creating a common ground and a sense of mutual trust as key elements to multinational cooperation. In multinational contexts, an open-minded attitude and willingness to tolerate dissent are the best way for the creation of trust on all sides. Acceptance and the practice of integration are crucial resources in multinational armed forces, because they allow them to function as a single body. Multinational headquarters and military units rely on the ability to cooperate effectively and trustworthily. These "soft" skills of multinational interaction are priceless for the achievement of "hard" military goals.

The time units spend together and the stability of personnel in a multinational environment need particular consideration. Time, and specifically the amount of time, is a crucial element in forming trusting relationships and building cohesion. However, coping with crises often requires the rapid deployment and consequently the rapid establishment of trust relationships among soldiers, units and organizations. Building these relationships depends on many factors, such as reputation, presumption of trustworthiness, stereotypes and prejudices.[17] When multinational units are deployed, soldiers and units often find themselves working together for the first time. But not only this: different national contingents frequently arrive into theatre at different times and their deployments vary in time duration. Some nations deploy their units for as short as four months, while others stay in the theatre as long as twelve months. Stability of personnel in multinational units is hindered by these circumstances and consequently multinational unit cohesion suffers because of this mismatching turnover of personnel.

Another issue the studies on multinational contingents have frequently addressed—which, however, still deserves deeper scrutiny—concerns the different concepts and styles of leadership. Different values and beliefs in different cultures influence the idea of leadership. Depending on the specific national culture, authority may be based on achievement, tradition, wealth, education or charisma. In some societies, leadership is characterized by an authoritative style and by a decision-making structure that is more hierarchical; in others, leadership is more democratic and the decision-making structure more concerted.

In today's peacekeeping and asymmetric warfare operations we can identify different ways of conducting military operations than in the past. Small and agile tactical units are playing an increasingly important role, requiring confident and competent leaders to work successfully. So, in addition to determining how unit cohesion is acquired in general, more research is needed to address how and to what extent unit cohesion can be fostered in multinational units and how a leader can contribute to it. In order to be influential and prevent conflicts arising from cultural differences, leaders, having to deal with people from various cultural backgrounds, should be aware of these differences and try to overcome them.

In particular, research should address the basis for leader's qualities, behaviour, competences and tools that are required to facilitate cohesion in the multinational units.[18]

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[16]The military organizational culture can fall either in the "burocratic type" or the "network type", although in general the armed forces show a strong tendency towards bureaucratization with an authoritarian style of leadership and communication. The military organization is functionally shaped by bureaucracy, because of the continuous need for readiness and difficulties in controlling the implementation of duties in unsafe situations, which require the certainty of command, typically associated with bureaucracy.

[17]Some research studies focusing on the mutual perceptions of soldiers working in multinational units have highlighted the persistence of stereotypes and prejudices. As Hofstede (1991) explains, intercultural encounters among groups, rather than with single foreign individuals, provoke group feelings that are not automatically and mutually understood. Indeed, intercultural encounters usually confirm each group in its own identity. The members of the other group are not perceived as individuals but in a stereotyped manner.

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[18]For an analysis of leadership, see chapter *Leadership in the military: the foundations and process of change*, by U. Lebel, in section V of this volume.

Some emerging issues for possible future studies concern the fact that, in order to operate, effective teams develop common norms and shared capability expectations, eventually generating a sort of "hybrid culture". This does not mean that everyone on the team has the same views, but that significant mutual understanding exists, along with a number of cultural contaminations and connections.

A hybrid multinational culture may derive from overlapping national cultures in a habitat that appears to be itself as provisional, flexible and risky. As it has already happened in the past,[19] military sociology, through research on multinational cooperation, could provide new keys of interpretation to understand intercultural processes and dynamics, which are playing an increasingly significant role within and in between today's societies.

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[19]I am referring here to the monumental study conducted by Stouffer (1949).

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Author Biography

Maria Luisa Maniscalco former full Professor of Sociology, is Research Director at Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence "Altiero Spinelli" (University "Roma Tre"). She was Dean of the Faculty of Security Sciences at the Multinational Intelligence Studies Campus of Lugano (Switzerland) and vice-president of the Humanitarian Law Committee of the Italian Red Cross. She has headed several research projects on multinational military cooperation and taught at various Universities in Italy and abroad as well as at the Italian Police High School and at many Italian Military Schools. She has done consultancy activities for the Italian Ministry of Interior, Italian Ministry of Defence and directed research projects for the Italian Military Centre of Strategic Studies.

Her research focus on social transformations in contemporary societies, peace, security and dialogue between cultures. She is the author of more than twenty books and about two hundred essays, some of which were published in French, English, Polish and Arabic. Among her latest books are: *Voies et voix de l'islam européen* (2014); *Answering the Challenges of Dialogue* (with al., 2014).

Stress and Anxiety in New Missions: The Case of PTSD

29

Henning Sørensen and Claus Kold

Abbreviation	
APA	American Psychiatric Association
CBT	Cognitive-behavioural therapy
CPT	Cognitive processing therapy
CSR	Combat stress reaction
DAH	Disordered action of the heart
DSM	Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorder of the American Psychiatric Association, respective years
DoD	U.S. Department of Defence
NIMH	National Institute for Mental Health
OCO	Overseas contingency operations
OEF	Operation enduring freedom (in Afghanistan)
OIF	Operation Iraqi freedom
OND	Operation new dawn (in Iraq after August 2010)
PCL	PTSD check list (17 item self-reported checklist)
PE	Prolonged exposure therapy
PTSD	Post-traumatic stress disorder
RCoD	Research domain criteria
SCID	Severe combined immune deficiency
TBI	Traumatic brain injury
VA	Department of Veteran Affairs
VHA	Veteran Health Administration

H. Sørensen (✉)
ISF, Institut for Sociologisk Forskning,
Søborg, Denmark
e-mail: isfdanmark@gmail.com

C. Kold
Copenhagen, Denmark
e-mail: clauskold@icloud.com

Introduction

Two types of mental stress disorder for veterans exist related to the time for their occurrence: An acute Combat Stress Reaction, CSR, and a delayed reaction, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, PTSD. The PTSD *concept* is rather new, introduced in 1980. Two models show the rather different perceptions of how to define PTSD. One is a process model issued by the American Psychiatric Association, APA, including elements other than the "pure" diagnosis of PTSD. The other model suggested by National Institute of Mental Health, NIMH, deepens just the contents of PTSD itself by defining its biological, medical, chemical, social, functional, and psychological symptoms. Then, the *content* or specific symptoms of PTSD according to the APA model of 2013 is presented, problematized, and compared with the NIMH model. The *chronology* of PTSD-like symptoms in war history are old, however, with different names attached. PTSD has developed from ignorance for many centuries via recognition in the last half of the Nineteenth century of stress caused even for psychological reasons, then to be forgotten up to and after WWI, and since 1980 named, accepted, and attended. Four *contributors* or risk factors may create/increase PTSD, in particular. One civilian: Personal background and three military: Combat exposure, military organization and type of war waged. The new types of wars are identified, including missions led by the UN, NATO, the OSCE and others. They have not reduced the prevalence of PTSD. PTSD can lead to two types of *consequence*: Medical diseases and social disabilities, of which only the former is analysed. Its perspective has shifted from military effectiveness to society's political, economic and ethical responsibility towards the veterans to minimize/cure medical illnesses and social inabilities caused by PTSD. Consequently, *coping* strategies have moved from zero, i.e. for the individual veteran self to handle to a massive effort for society to relieve PTSD sufferers, even if no single cure has yet proven to do so. Accordingly, *costs* for the caring of suffering veterans will increase for the simple reason that they first reach their peak decades after wars ended. Much research on PTSD are based on U.S. data; so, is this article.

Concept

Stress, in general, is not "inevitably followed by symptoms or illness" (Clausen 1981: 393). It is like the "zero" in Mathematics. It has no value standing alone, but elements before and after define it. Stress, you can manage makes you stronger and more robust. Stress you cannot is characterised by a variety of symptoms that may develop illnesses and social inabilities. Stress "developing within one hour of exposure to the exceptional mental or physical disorder" (Weisaeth and Eitinger 1991: 1) is "acute" stress, "delayed" stress begins six months after the trauma. Short-term stress may improve your concentration, for instance before a competition. Long-term stress weakens the resistance of your body. A "chronic" stress lasts for more than three months. Six cross-national PTSD studies give an impression the increased interest in PTSD veterans research over time: In 1991, Weisaeth and Eitinger only registered 50 articles on all PTSD suffers including concentration-camp inmates, children, Prisoner-of-War, veterans, etc. from 11 nations in Europe, the Middle East and Africa (Algeria). In 1994, Orr presented 10 articles and other 20 articles were annotated on PTSD veterans only from 11 countries). In 1999, Schnurr and Friedmann (1999) counted around 1100 articles published from 1989 to 1999 by the National Center for PTSD in *PTSD Research Quarterly* and told that the number of connections/users to the *Pilots* Data Base has increased from 821 in 1992 to 2596 in 1999. In 2003, Taylor (2004: 6) on a web search on "peacekeeping and stress" in four data bases, found 654 entries. In May 2015, 371,000 entries in Google was listed, while "stress and peacekeeping" gave 396,000 entries. In 2006, Peleg and Shalev could tell that studies of PTSD have increased from 159 in 1988 to 990 in 2004, and that the number of the costly, longitudinal PTSD studies went up from 2–9 studies in the period 1988–1997 to 31–33 studies in

2003–2004. In 2013, Norris and Slone informed on the worldwide research over the last ten years on PTSD in public and military populations. Finally, in 2014, Hunt et al. (2014) present the research efforts of 97 references of the last twelve years on the mental health of mostly just UK military personnel.

Psychologists and psychiatrists define the PTSD concept differently. In psychology, stress is defined as a special mental relationship between a person and his/hers environment, perceived as a strain threatening the well-being of that person. In psychiatry, stress is a mental as well as a physical disorder (due to an intracranial injury named Traumatic Brain Injury, TBI) having either a physiological or a psychiatric distorted impact on the body. Thus, the PTSD concept in psychiatry is broader with respect to both trauma, content, and cure than that of psychology. To both psychiatrists and psychologists PTSD is not an illness in itself, but a mental disorder defined less by its own symptoms than

by its surrounding elements. It is less than 40 years ago, in 1980, that the APA for the first time described the PTSD disorder in its *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder* (DSM-III). It was a result of "…a political struggle waged by psychiatric workers and activists on behalf of the large number of Vietnam War Veterans who were then suffering the undiagnosed psychological effects of war-related trauma" (Young 1995: 5). The present DSM-5 of 2013 model operates with four clusters and 20 symptoms distributed on eight criteria: (A) Exposed to traumatic incident; (B) Intrusion; (C) Avoidance; (D) Negative alterations in cognition and mood; (E) Alterations in arousal and reactivity now including recklessness and self-destructive behaviour. On top of that, three parameters outside define PTSD: (F) Duration; (G) Social inability and (H) Medical treatment is impossible. The DSM-5 definition with criterions "A–G" is shown in Fig. 29.1 together with its most recognized contributors or risk factors.

Fig. 29.1 PTSD and its elements according to APA version DSM-5

Figure 29.1 relates the four phenomenons of PTSD: An *incident* experienced during military deployment creates a *trauma*; a supressed or dissociated memory hereof and its incompatible self-perception may lead to one or more "stressor criterions A–G" or *contents* of *PTSD*. The single most important criterion is the "A" that specifies that a person has been exposed to a catastrophic incident involving actual or threatened death or injury. Criterions B–E is the veterans behavioral strategy towards PTSD, criterion F is the demand of duration of PTSD for at least one month, while G specifies the serious social consequences, and H lists that the symptoms are not due to medication; the vulnerable mental PTSD-position may further be strained by four *contributors* or risk factors. Two *consequences* may occur: Illnesses such as anxiety, fear, depression, and Inabilities such as unemployment, social isolation, divorce.

"Trauma" in Greek means "wound." A *traumamatic* event is conceptualized as a catastrophic stressor outside usual human experiences such as war, torture, rape, earthquakes, automobile crash, etc., while more normal life painful experiences such as serious illness, divorce, rejection, etc., are not. However, trauma, like pain, is not an external phenomenon that can be objectified. Any traumatic experience is filtered through cognitive and emotional processes before it becomes an extreme threat, in short a memory.

Memory is a certain type of rememberence. It demands revival of the incident, an identification, and a creation of an identity. The search for meaning in the confrontation with a meaningless incident reinforces the veteran's revival of the incident in an effort to better understand it even if the individual, at the same time, often tries to avoid thinking of it. "The disorder's distinctive pathology is that it permits the past (memory) to relive in the present" (Young 1995: 7). So, the core of the DSM-5 model is the struggle between the memory's revival/avoidance, etc. of the extreme event and one's self-identification, often further strained by the four contributors, cf. Fig. 29.1.

The DSM-5 *PTSD diagnosis* depends—as the earlier versions—not only on the patient's symptoms but also on its consequences. From the vulnerable state of mind of PTSD, a number of *illnesses* may be ignited: Intense fear, nightmares, memory problems, reduced interest in significant activities, hypervigilance, concentration difficulties, anxiety, insomnia, depression, flash backs, etc. and social problems such as unemployment, divorce, loose of social contacts arise.

After the APA presentation of DSM-5 in spring 2013, the NIMH, officially abandoned it for its inability "to align with emerging findings from neuroscience and to capture the underlying mechanisms of dysfunction" (Karstoft 2014: 153). Instead, NIMH suggested a new framework for PTSD classification, Research Domain Criteria, RDoC. It defines mental health by a matrix consisting on seven biomarkers and four behavioural elements. Each of the seven biomarkers: Molecules, cells, self-report, behaviour, psychology, neural circuits, and genes are placed on a *dimensional* scale ranging from normal to abnormal for each of the four behaviour elements: Function, motivation, cognition and social behaviour. Even if RDoC seems complicated with behavioural elements both among biomarkers and behaviours, more researchers use it to identify PTSD (Yehuda et al. 2014). An illustration of a biomarker diagnose diagram for two PTSD-veterans is shown in Fig. 29.2.

Figure 29.2 presents a perception of PTSD confined within its own symptoms. The centre "0" represents normality, 35 major abnormality; the seven biomarker radar-strings illustrate different degree of abnormality for each veteran. Veteran 1 has normal neural circuits, cf. the 0, but scores high on molecules, cells, and self-report. Veteran 2 has in particular psychological problems.

Content

In 1952, APA published its first "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder, DSM-I" and in the DSM-III from 1980, it was accepted that soldiers may suffer from a disorder with a delayed onset, therefore named POST-traumatic Stress Disorder, PTSD. It saw the mental

Fig. 29.2 Two PTSD veterans with different diagnosis due to their biomarkers

disorder as an individual delayed dysfunctional reaction on an experienced traumatic experience/incident that could hit all soldiers as an individual disease. In the DSM-IV version of 1994, APA introduced as the "most important change to PTSD…the "etiological agent," i.e. the "stressor criterion"" (Young 1995: 288; Friedman 2013: 10). It is a death-involving event that the traumatized person has experienced or been confronted with to which he/she responds with intense fear, horror, and helplessness. The DSM-IV expanded the variety of experiences and memories to be used to diagnose PTSD (Young 1995: 289) as even accounts of death and injury (in contrast to direct encounters) allows a PTSD diagnosis and excluded the demand of the DSM-III that the event had to be "outside the range of usual human experience" (killings, rapes, car crashes). The DSM-5 of 2013 with its four clusters and eight criteria of which "the "A" stressor criterion is maintained and the most decisive symptom of them all as it "made PTSD the only DSM mental disorder that required …an external environmental stressor as part of its diagnosis" (Barglow 2012). The DSM-5 revised its criteria A1 by eliminating "criteria A2 (the removal of the requirement that A1 events must produce fear, helplessness, or horror)" (Friedman et al. 2014: 543). It introduced a new criteria D in order to encompass negative alterations in cognition and transform the former D to criteria E (Norris and Slone 2013: 2). Thus, the "new criteria D and, in particular E (self-destructive behaviour) will enhance practitioners' ability to

capture the full array of symptoms among children that was not captured in the adult version of the current (DSM-IV) diagnosis" (Friedman et al. 2014: 394). The DSM-5 version is further enlarged "to include anhedonic (lack of will to live)/dysphoric presentations" (Friedman 2013: 11). Another change is that PTSD is no longer "considered an anxiety disorder, (but) …categorized as a trauma and a stress-related disorder" (Osei-Boamah et al. 2013: 3). It narrows PTSD as "any (PTSD) disorder has been preceded by exposure to trauma" (Friedman 2013: 11). On the other hand, it expands the concept, as "stress" is a wider concept than "anxiety." Finally, the PTSD content required additional social impairment, criterion F, to have lasted for at least one full month to fulfil the PTSD diagnosis.

The DSM/5 PTSD concept is problematic for more reasons. Figure 29.1 may illustrate some of them: Some trauma victims do not report significant symptoms for a longer period of time and some of them do not report, at all (no box 3) (Gray et al. 2004: 909). Some PTSD veterans lack trauma (no box 2), but still suffer the consequences (box 4) or the other way around: One third of the soldiers (36.8%) showing the full PTSD symptom pattern on the SCID suffered no more than a slight impairment in their lives (Engelhard et al. 2007: 140–145). A study of PTSD among Vietnam veterans showed the same: Individuals—exposed to traumatic incidents with only minor PTSD symptoms and did qualify as having PTSD—lived well-adjusted, productive lives (Dohrendwend et al. 2006: 979–982). Some PTSD veterans have not experienced a lethal incident (no box 1), but only heard/seen/red about them, cf. that DSM-5 accepts PTSD based on accounts. Some veterans do not meet any of the five criterions or symptoms (no box 3) but still suffer. For example, veterans suffering from the feeling of a constant "threat" may get ill and behave socially dysfunctional without meeting the required symptoms. The problems are thematically, as well: Medically, the diagnosis of PTSD in DSM-IV (and DSM-5) are "characterised by medically unexplained syndromes" (Jones and

Wessely 2005: 192). Psychologically, "the phenomenon of "delayed-onset" PTSD remains somewhat controversial." (Richardson et al. 2010: 11). Socially, "…different people react differently to extreme events and conceive differently what "a threat" is" (Young 1994: 289). Scientifically, factors after PTSD defines its content. Functionally, the inclusion/exclusion of one or more of the five criterions decide if and what type of PTSD is at hand. By regulating the number and rates of PTSD veterans, the DSM-5 definition "fail to capture the heterogeneity of posttraumatic stress reactions (as it)…is too heterogeneous to be accurately predicted" (Galatzer-Levy and Bryant 2013).

A major difference between the DSM-5 and the NIMH model is that the former includes a trauma, cf. post-TRAUMATIC stress, while the latter ignores elements before and after the PTSD symptoms. Another is the intensity of the NIMH model. It looks only at PTSD symptoms, but from many more angles than DSM-5. A third is that the existence of PTSD of the NIMH model rests on degrees of abnormality within one or more of the seven biomarkers by which a PTSD veteran is defined. In the DSM-5 model abnormality is both the five criterions A–D within the PTSD concept, and the trauma and the social consequences, criterion F, without it. In the NIHM model, all elements before and after the mental disorder are excluded. A fourth difference is the duration of PTSD for more than one month in the DSM-5 model where no such demand exists in the NIMH model. A fifth difference is that the DSM model has, as described above, gradually expanded. A sixth difference is that DSM-IV (and DSM-5) "PTSD is a popular diagnosis because it has the virtue of clarity… (in contrast to) most psychiatric diagnoses (that-) are descriptive, not aetiological…Saying that someone has depression is a statement about their symptoms…but not the cause. PTSD is the exception… it mentions the cause "trauma" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 185). Seventh, the DSM/5 PTSD concept has expanded its purpose, as well. From a professional tool for psychiatrists and psychologists to wider understanding of a

complex mental disorder to improve veterans' access to benefits and compensations from society based on their PTSD diagnosis.

The increased heterogeneous DSM/5 PTSD concept has not only met the above-mentioned scepticism but raised the more fundamental question: Who is actually sick? The PTSD-veteran or society? Some researchers see PTSD as an individual disorder among veterans leading to dysfunctional behaviour. Others see soldiers engaged in a war decided by society to which soldiers respond "normally" with distress on such an abnormal situation. This response is not a psychiatric one, but "normal (human) reactions to an abnormal situation," (Jones and Wessely 2005: 172).

Chronology

The perception over time of PTSD, its historical event, type of trauma, name, and symptoms is presented in Table 29.1.

Table 29.1 is based on the argument that PTSD is a "…relatively common human problem…known for many hundred years, although under different names" (Trimble 1985: 5) and that "the disorder and its memories (goes) back to the dawn of recorded history…PTSD is a historical product…the reality of PTSD is confirmed empirically" (Jones 1995: 3 + 5; Weisaeth 2001: 38–59). King Gilgamesh who lived around 2800–2600 B.C. revealed PTSD symptoms according to *The Epic of Gilgamesh* (cf. Boehnlein and Kinzie 1992: 598) who "after the loses of his friend Endiku…he races from place to place in panic, realizing that he too has to die" (Crocq and Crocq 2000: 47). Crocq and Crocq moreover present PTSD among warriors from the battle of Marathon (Herodotus 440 BC), among Greek (Hippocrates 460?–377) and Roman soldiers suffering from frightening battle dreams (Lucretius'poem *De Rerum Natura* 50 BC), and among Vikings (Gisli Súrsson Saga) (2000: 47–48). In the middle Ages, the distinction between soldiers and citizens based on experienced violence and followed by a trauma was blurred. With the Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648, a specific "military stress" was identified in accordance with the Treaty's distinction between state, society and military. Thus, the violence caused by states through their armed forces separated fear and anxiety among soldiers from that of the civil population (van Creveld 1991: 40). In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a new type of military stress named "nostalgia" is found in various Swiss and Spanish accounts on conscripts sent to foreign territories from where they had little prospect of returning home (Rosen 1975). In the Napoleonic Wars, 1795–1815, soldiers suffered from PTSD syndromes such as "cerebral-spinal shock," evidenced by tingling, twitching and even partial paralysis by soldiers who had been close to projectiles, explosions but not injured physically. During the Crimean War, 1853–1856, "palpitation" was the name for the same disorder. PTSD-like veterans from the American Civil War 1860–1865 were diagnosed with an "irritable heart" (Da Costa 1871). Now, the hardships of campaigning and the acute stress of combat was accepted to cause an immediate mental effect on soldiers. Doctors in the British army in the nineteenth century preferred the diagnosis "melancholia" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 3). At the end of the 1890s, a further step was that the recognition of a painful memory, even including previously forgotten incidences, could imply a psychological PTSD-like symptom called "repression" and "dissociation" (Young 1995: 3f). The symptoms proved themselves in the individual reactions of the veteran (e.g. dysfunctional actions, inactivity, hysteria, bodily contractures, etc.). These new PTSD symptoms were almost identical with the one used during WW II, but were forgotten at the time of WWI. And even more so: WW I soldiers arguing that they suffered from military stress without having experienced physical incidents were seen as simulating their disease in order to get dismissed or transferred to less lethal quarters. In contrast, Sigmund Freud giving witness for "the Austrian Government Committee on War Negligence" wrote in 1920 a memorandum in which he described the PTSD-like diseases as "war neuroses" related to an unconscious interest of the soldier to withdraw from service, as it was

Table 29.1 Trauma, PTSD names, and their contents

Time and event	Source/author	Trauma	PTSD name	Contents or symptoms
2800–2600 BC	*Epic of Gilgamesh* Gerson and Carlier (1992)	Survived violent encounter	–	Inability to sleep
490 BC Battle of Marathon 356–323 BC Alexander the Great	Crocq and Crocq (2000) Weisaeth (2014)	Involved years of bloody hand-to-hand combat	–	Change in personality
1648 Westphalian Peace	van Creveld (1991)		"Military stress"	
1500–1600 Colonial Wars	Rosen (1975)	Spanish conscripts far from home	"Nostalgia"	
1795–1815 Napoleonic Wars		soldiers suffered from PTSD like syndromes	"Cerebral-spinal shock"	tingling, twitching and even partial paralysis
1853–1856 Crimean War			"Palpitation"	"Palpitation"
1861–1865 American Civil War and after	Da Costa (1871) Erichsen (1866/1882)	distinct disorder identified Chest pain, palpitations/ Erosion of ability to calculate and spell words	"Da Costa syndrome"= "Irritable heart" "Railway spin"	Self-inflicted wounds, unexpected tremors
1890s	The UK	–	"Melancholia"	
1914–1918	WW I	The sound from the large calibre artillery	"Shell shock"	Crying, confusion
1920	Sigmund Freud (1920/1955)	Psychological trauma produced…	"Neurosis"	
1939–1945			"Combat fatigue" "Battle exhaustion"	Of 800,000 combat soldier 37% had a psychiatric problem
1952	(DSM-I), APA		"Gross stress reaction"	
1950–1953	Korean War		"Operational fatigue"	Of 200,000 US soldiers 25% had eventually psychiatric problem
1968	DSM II APA		"Transient, situational disturbance"	
1980	DSM III (1980) APA	Extreme trauma event	PTSD	
1994	DSM-IV, APA	Trauma	PTSD	Impairment consequences

Table 29.1 (continued)

Time and event	Source/author	Trauma	PTSD name	Contents or symptoms
2013	DSM-5 APA	Trauma	PTSD, 8 criteria: F. For more than a month H. Exclusion of medication	A. Exposure to extreme incident B. Intrusion, C. Avoidance, D. Negative cognition E. Alterations in arousal G. Severe functional impairment
2013	Rod NIMH	No trauma	Dimensional abnormality with respect to…	…7 PTSD elements: Molecules, cells, self-report, behaviour, psychology, nerves, genes

2800 BC–Today

dangerous (Freud 1955b: 206ff). From around WW II, Western societies have diagnosed many soldiers as suffering from a psychological disorder caused by psychological factors. Since 1980, PTSD has been the main concept to describe mental problems for veterans. Even if it is neither "the only injury nor occupational hazard facing service personnel …. (nor) the main issue… (as) depressive and alcohol disorders are more common" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 184f).

More patterns on the chronology of PTSD emerges. First, PTSD-like mental disorders are identified throughout in war history under no or different PTSD-names, but in most of the historical period, PTSD-like symptoms was not given any medical diagnosis. Second, a continuous and gradual understanding of PTSD does not exist. There is a lack of historical and theoretical continuity in the evolution of psychiatric knowledge of PTSD (Gerson and Carlier 1992: 742; Jones 1995: 5). Third, in the nineteenth century, war syndromes caused by physical incidents were accepted but forgotten up to, during and right after WW I. Fourth, acute Combat Stress Reaction, CSR, were recognized centuries before the delayed onset of PTSD was introduced in 1980. Fifth, already before WW II and onwards, more nations accepted that their soldiers might suffer from PTSD for psychological reasons. Sixth, after WW II we talk more compassionate and forthcoming of these disorders than before. To conclude, "What changed was not the incidence of the disorder (PTSD) but the way it was classified and described. From being a heart disorder of mysterious organic cause to a functional disorder with psychological features" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 196).

"*PTSD statistics are a moving target*" (Veteran PTSD Statistics 2015: 1). To compare the prevalence of PTSD by the numbers and rates for different nations and periods includes more reservations. First at the societal level, most PTSD studies exclude the influence of societal factors on PTSD such as "the gradual undermining of social stability and cohesion as well as the shift from collective to individual values, and the erosion of lack of trust in political and cultural institutions," (Jones and Wessely 2005: 173, originally Furedi 2003).

A comparison of soldiers with PTSD over time within the same nation is problematic, as well. Changes in the welfare state and in the educational level is crucial. Recent veterans are more likely to have completed high school than were draftees during the Vietnam War. So is differences in military personnel and methodology. Even within the same decade and the same population of veterans from either Iraq or Afghanistan, differences in the rate of PTSD-prevalence for U.S. veterans are between 5 and 25% (Ramchand et al. 2008). Even more crucial seem nation to be. In a review of 39 PTSD studies from four wars, the Vietnam War (7), the Gulf War (16), and the Iraqi, and the Afghan war (16) covering soldiers from the US, the UK, Australia, Canada, Kuwait, etc. PTSD affected 14–16% for deployed US military personnel but only 7–8% of the general population. In contrast, the PTSD rate for UK veterans from the Iraqi and the Afghan war was only between 3

and 6% (Gates et al. 2012: 361–382). Another article comparing 17 PTSD studies from the US, 7 from the UK, 3 from Canada and 2 from Australia with respect to lifetime and current PTSD prevalence. The study found a current PTSD rate between 2–17% for the US Vietnam War veterans, 4–17% for US Iraqi war veterans but only between 3 and 6% for UK Iraqi War veterans while lifetime PTSD for Australian veterans was 21% and 12% for current PTSD, and for Canadian soldiers respectively 7% and 3% (Richardson et al. 2010: Table 1, pp. 20–22). Therefore, the review concludes: "Lower ceiling and more narrow range among other Western veterans" than that of U.S. military veterans (Richardson et al. 2010: 12).

The PTSD rate is influenced by the presence or absence of compensations, as well. If society offers no compensation to soldiers with PTSD, the veterans of this country do not bother to register as victims of PTSD. The health beliefs of the civil society influence the number of veterans with military stress, too: "In particular, ideas about acceptable levels of casualties and the general level of psychological understanding are pertinent. In the decade before the Boer War, when life expectancy for UK males was only 44 years and knowledge about syndromes was embryonic observed psychiatric casualty rates were so low as to be almost non-existent. (…) Expectations of survival and quality of life were far lower in 1918 than in, say 1968 and the contrast between civilian and military life less dramatic" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 119). Finally, the stability of the nation is important. A survey of De Jong et al. (2001: 555–562) found much higher PTSD rates in conflict areas such as Algeria (37%), Cambodia (28%), Ethiopia (16%), and Gaza (18%) than in less volatile Western nations). Still, the U.S. stand out. Kessler and Üstün (2008), after collecting data from nearly 200,000 respondents in 27 different countries on four continents found a lower life time prevalence of PTSD in most of the surveyed countries (below 5% in Ukraine to only 2% or less in Israel, Spain, China, and Italy) than in the U.S.

Therefore, any PTSD level for veterans shall be related to that of each nation, in general. If, "at any given time, perhaps 15% of the US population is in need of mental health service" (Olsen and Micklin 1981: 390), one should not wonder if there is a PTSD rate for veterans between 5 and 10%. On the contrary. The PTSD level for veterans should expectedly be lower than the one for the entire population, as soldiers in most countries are screened before recruitment and deployment. However, that is not the case. "It is estimated that 7–8% of the US population will have PTSD at some point during their lives (while) more recent data estimate that PTSD affects 11% of veterans returning from Afghanistan and 20% of veterans returning from Iraq" (Osei-Boamah et al. 2013: 1f; NIH Medicine Plus 2009: 10–14).

Second, at the scientific level "most literature on delayed (onset PTSD)… (is based on) small case studies and anecdotes, that only limiting conclusions can be drawn" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 183). Besides, variables as number of deployments, duration of service, force type, and rank are most seldom identical. Third, at the methodological level PTSD data can be collected either by "following soldiers on the battlefield… or (by) identifying soldiers with PTSD and go back in history" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 176). The former measures PTSD accurately, but is very difficult to undertake and very seldom used. The latter is easier to do, but less precise. For the simple reason that "researches may lose track of military personnel once they retire… (as)… there are over 2.3 million American veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (compared to the 2.6 million Vietnam veterans who fought in Vietnam and the 8.2 million "Vietnam Era Veterans" (personnel who served anywhere during any time of the Vietnam War)" (Veterans PTSD Statics 2013: 1). Fourth, at the medical level, "many observational studies are unable to distinguish between delayed presentation (they were there from the beginning) and delayed onset…it is not satisfactory for showing delayed onset by looking at clinical records…most PTSD studies are retrospective… based on self-report that are seriously flawed…many confuse cause and effect" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 179–184). Fifth, at the quantitative level, more veterans

claim VA care. Even if the total U.S. veteran population has decreased by 17% from 26.1 million in FY 2001 to 21.6 million in FY 2014, the VA enrolled veteran population has increased by 78% in the same period from 5.12 million to 9.11 million (Bagalman 2014: 4, Table 1). Sixth, at the qualitative level it is difficult to measure the effect of differences in compared studies. What is, for instance, the statistical significance for the rate of PTSD veterans diagnosed either

- for all types of military personnel or only combat soldiers,
- having served at home or in a target country abroad
- within a six months period of return from battle or over a whole life span,
- by self-reports or clinical studies
- by a psychiatrist, a psychologist or a lay observer/interviewer, etc.?
- by more or just a few criteria
- anonymously or openly.

However, even if comparison of studies over time, borders, and background is problematic, some over-all impression of the prevalence and rate of PTSD for veterans are possible. First, different wars have different PTSD rates for veterans. The PTSD rates for the Iraqi War are higher than for the Afghan War for US PTSD veterans (2010: 10). Another is that "…the prevalence range (of PTSD) is narrower and tends to have a lower ceiling among veterans of non-US Western nations" (Richardson et al. 2010: 12). A third is that fewer civilians than veterans (in the U.S.) suffer from PTSD. A fourth is that any PTSD rate depends on a specific definition of PTSD. If changed, the number and rate of PTSD will do so. "Studies… typically find that roughly half of the (US) veterans who had PTSD at some point in the past do not meet diagnostic criteria for current PTSD" (Richardson et al. 2010: 11; Barglow 2012). Others have identified the same drop in PTSD rates (Dohrendwend et al. 2006; McNally 2007a, b; Hoge, et al. 2004). The introduction of the DSM-IV "has ultimately decreased the prevalence rate of PTSD" (Richardson et al. 2010: 8), cf. that the

annual PTSD "cases of not previously deployed US Service personnel" went up from 1611 in 2000, 2287 in 2005, 2969 in 2010 and then dropped to 1942 by October 2014 (Congressional Research Service 2014: 2, Table 2). However, the latest change in definition of PTSD has had only a minor effect: "Most patients (97.5%) (of a sample of almost 3000 patients) who met DSM-IV criteria also met DSM-5" (Norris and Slone 2013: 2). A fifth trend is that over time the PTSD rates increase. A re-analysis of Vietnam veterans found "that contrary to the initial analysis of the NVVRS data, a large majority of Vietnam Veterans struggled with chronic PTSD symptoms, with four out of five reporting recent symptoms when interviewed 20–25 years after Vietnam," (Price 2014). A sixth trend is that "retrospective studies of…. Korean War veterans, Lebanon War veterans, and World War II veterans indicate that the duration of "chronic PTSD" can span an entire adult lifetime" (Richardson et al. 2010: 11). In short, "PTSD is an occupational hazard of military life" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 175).

Contributors

Four risk factors may worsen PTSD, in particular. One civilian, the *soldier's personal background and situation* and three military factors, *combat exposures military organizational* elements and finally the *specific type of war.*

A personal background has many aspects: Psychological, personal, social, matrimonial, educational, and economical. Veterans with previously diagnosed psychiatric disorder and genetic inherited mental problems run, in particular, the risk of getting PTSD (Jones and Wessely 2005: 175; Rona et al. 2009; Brewin et al. 2000). Personal factors such as ethnicity, lower intelligence, and lower age are other PTSD contributors (Jones and Wessely 2005: 175) as well as being "enlisted and current smokers and problem drinkers" (Richardson et al. 2010: 4). Lack of relation to loved ones and family is another aspect that correlates with PTSD (Mouthaan et al. 2005: 101–114; Jones and Wessely

2005: 175). Single or divorced officers and soldiers are more likely to get PTSD than married military personnel (Greenberg et al. 2008: 78ff; Richardson et al. 2007: 8) and so is those with "lower education and lack of educational achievement" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 175; Richardson et al. 2010: 4). Actually, for many PTSD veterans home is where stressors always are, both before, during and after deployment (Kold and Soerensen 2013: 233–254).

Aspects of *combat exposure* as a military contributor to cause PTSD involve its intensity, number of deployments, their duration, time between deployments, and types of operation. In general, soldiers exposed to combat exposure are more at risk of getting PTSD than other military personnel (Richardson et al. 2010: 12; Tanielian and Jaycox 2008; Institute of Medicine 2008; and Rona et al. 2007 for UK armed forces). A significant association was, moreover, found between the duration of deployment and the likeliness to develop PTSD, while the number of deployments and PTSD was not identified (Rona et al. 2007: 506–511). A review study of Canadian soldiers realized an over-all relation between combat exposure and PTSD, as well, but no relation between combat and an increased risk of suicide (Sareen et al. 2010: 464). Another analysis comparing 91 WW II veterans in 1946 and in 1988, predicted a relation between combat exposures and symptoms of PTSD together with early attrition and death (Lee et al. 1995: 516). In the Soldier/Marine Well-Being Survey of the US Army's Mental Health Team Advisory surveying 1320 soldiers in 2006, the number of combat exposures correlates with PTSD, as well. Besides, the study found that duration of operation, deployment frequency, and time between deployments played a role for creating PTSD, as well (Castro and McGurk 2007). With respect to combat intensity "…it was established (during WW II) that the higher the killed and wounded rate, the greater risk of psychological break down" (Jones and Wessely 2001a). A study of Vietnam veterans showed that even if 93% of the Vietnam veterans had served in Vietnam war-zones, only 41% of the total sample had objective evidence of combat exposure

documented in their military record (Frueh 2005: 467). It may question the just mentioned results of a clear relation between combat exposure and war syndromes as Vietnam "combat" and "non-combat" groups do not differ on relevant clinical variables. With respect to the number of deployments in combat operations and increased possibility of PTSD one study found that duration of operation, deployment frequency, and time between deployments did play a role for creating PTSD (Castro and McGurk 2007). It corresponds with a study for around 1300 Canadian peacekeeping soldiers deployed to the former Yugoslavia. It found a PTSD rate of "only" 10.92% for veterans deployed once and a 14.84% rate for veterans deployed more times (Richardson et al. 2007). With respect to the duration of the deployment period and risk of PTSD one study showed that longer deployments and first time deployments are associated with an increase in distress score (Castro and McGurk 2007). An analysis indicated that 4 months deployment period were less distressing than a 6 months period, suggesting that deployment length is a predictor of psychological health (Adler et al. 2005: 122). At the same time, this study found that deployment length predicts soldiers' adjustment. They mentally adapt to the deployment period: "These studies on soldiers in peacekeeping mission is based on a constabulary model, and thus it differs from combat operations in its fundamental approach and expectations" (Adler et al. 2005: 121).

Aspects of *the military organization* as a contributor to PTSD are lack of cohesion, rank, and type of branch. It is a basic finding in military sociology that cohesion improve soldiers' endurance and robustness (Shils and Janowitz 1948). Even so and the fact that "1 million peacekeepers worldwide have served abroad, little is known about this phenomenon in peacekeeping" (Mouthaan et al. 2005: 103). Both views have been questioned:"…a large body of empirical research on military and non-military groups showing that social cohesion has no independent impact on performance" (MacCoun et al. 2006: 646). Low rank is important for a higher PTSD rate, as officers are less likely to get

PTSD than NCOs and regulars (Greenberg et al. 2008: 78; Richardson et al. 2007: 8). Besides unit cohesion and rank, type of force and service is related to PTSD. Higher risks of PTSD were found for U.S. Army soldiers, U.S. National Guard, and U.S. reservists than for other groups of military service members of the U.S. (Tanielian and Jaycox 2008). In a study of soldiers returning from the Iraq war it was shown that type of force had an impact on various aspects of mental health service use (Fikretoglu et al. 2009: 358–366).

Aspects of the *types of war waged* as contributor to PTSD are their purpose, the present war ethics and laws, military technology, war performance in terms of speed and range, etc. (Wright 1942: 88). In a world perspective, four distinctive types of war can be identified after 1945: *Liberation wars* (1945–1980), *Cold War* (1945–1990), *civil wars* in the former colonies during the same period (van Creveld 1991: 192ff; Hirst 2001: 94; Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 81), and *peace operations* (1948- and onwards) based on the UN charter, chapter VI (peace-keeping) and VII (peace-enforcement). In each and every war, soldiers may suffer from war syndromes. But it is interesting that (UN-) peace operations may cause PTSD, as well. The first generation UN peace operations (1945–1989) were symmetric non-coercive state-state operations with the objective to keep the agreed truce after a period of war (Moskos 1976; Tardy 2004; Ramsbotham et al. 2005). Here soldiers just made "a blue thin line" between the two belligerent actors causing little war syndromes except boredom. The second generation (1989–1999)—after the Cold War—changed wars from symmetric to asymmetric conflicts where nations intervened *in* civil wars (Boulden 2001: 83; Duffield 2001; Tardy 2004) and made the new peace operations increasingly more complex than the former maintaining of a ceasefire (Dobbie 1994; Ramsbotham et al. 2005; Tardy 2004). The third generation (1999 onwards) have changed peace operations into asymmetric interventions, as well, and the root of these conflicts cause large state conflicts and terror, named "new wars"

(Kaldor 1998; Münkler 2005) or "hybrid wars" (Fleming 2011; Tardy 2004).

The are more reasons for increased risk of PTSD among soldiers in these new missions. First, the conflict scenario has now changed into a state–culture scenario (Kaldor 1998; Duffield 2001; Ramsbotham et al. 2005; Pretorius 2008: 100; Maguen and Litz 2006), whereby deep cultural and religious identity processes become part of the asymmetric conflict. Instead of symmetrical visible military capacities soldiers are confronted by cultural symbols, behavior and languages they don't understand, and they themselves perform cultural practices, which the local populations, in turn, don't understand (Duffey 2000; Rubenstein 2008; Rosén 2009, Kold 2013). Another contributor is that third generation of peace operations stresses soldiers more than before as they combine potentially lethal situations with the task of an individual self-control, cf. the *UN soldier stress syndrome*, (Wiesaeth 1990) where soldiers feel a strain between their aggressive or retaliatory impulses and forced non-reaction (Adler et al. 2005: 121). In the same way, peacekeeping may be difficult to reconcile for some combat-trained soldiers and create a risk for PTSD, *the professional soldier stress syndrome* (Litz et al. 1997: 178–184). Third, a specific external control is imposed on UN- and other peace soldiers by the laws of war and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) in the midst of battle. In particular, "ambiguities in how to interpret the ROE were commonplace, leading not only to confusion and frustration but also to feelings of moral ambivalence" (Franke 1999: 126), see also Litz et al. 1997; and Adler et al. 2005: 121). The problems with ROE is supported in an international study of nine-nations' involvement in international military operations abroad. "Only 28.6% (of the interviewed 542 soldiers) consider them (ROE) adequate and a fifth of the interviewees did not answer" (Martinez 2013: 87). A fourth stress factor is the fact that UN soldiers previously did not expect and were not emotionally prepared to fight asymmetrically and kill children, women and enemies in civilian clothes as they now have to do. In

contrast, a perceived meaningfulness of the mission, post-deployment social supports, and positive perception of homecoming were associated with lower likelihood of distress (Sareen et al. 2010: 464–472, Franke 1999). Fifth, the frequency and the intensity of wars, as well as the number of deaths, has declined sharply over the last half century (Pinker 2011). It stands in contrast to the increased rate of veterans with a PTSD diagnosis and may be a result of a public, more than a political, "war fatique." Sixth, even if the nature of conflict most certainly will continue to change towards increasingly use of unmanned systems, for instance when remotely piloted aircraft attacks an unmanned oil installation, the military personnel serving such weapons may still suffer mentally when they later on realize the violence they have inflicted on others. The conclusion is that the new types of wars and the new missions by the UN, NATO, OSCE, "Coalitions of the willing" and others have not reduced the prevalence of PTSD among veterans.

The four main contributors for PTSD may be mutual related so that a soldier who is single, lacks social support, and have low education is almost by definition no officer and cannot improve social cohesion. The combined effect of these contributors will more probably expose such a soldier to PTSD than the average soldier. On the other hand, each contributor is no clear-cut cause of PTSD. They are probabilities and tendencies, no one-to-one relation.

Consequences

Two types of *consequences* may occur due to PTSD: Illnesses and social inabilities. Thematically, five types of diseases caused by PTSD symptoms can be listed: *Biological* "pressures on the arteries of the chest" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 191), *psychological*, "constitutional inferiority…reduced memory" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 191), *medical* "toxic exposure…bacterial infection", *psychiatric*, "schizophrenia," and *social* "lack of adaption, social incompetence". Two types of social relation inabilities that can be

identified: *Material* or income related inabilities such as loses of jobs, higher unemployment and divorce rates (Angrist 1990). They can be estimated economically in contrast to *immaterial* related loses—often related to family—such as lost contacts to family, children, friends, and to one self, i.e. lost self-confidence, quality of life, etc. (Wool 2013).

Thus, four consequences stems from any war: Its military expenses, direct costs of care to ill veterans (from the loss of lives and limbs via disability payments and medical care expenditures), indirect or individual costs such as loses of material related inabilities, and finally immaterial loses. Compared to the military expenses for the U.S. of waging war it seems reasonable to involve not only the direct and direct costs, but also try to price tag immaterial costs, as well. So, the next time a nation consider joining a multilateral military mission abroad, it should multiply its immediate military costs by a factor of two or more to get a more realistic amount of the total costs of waging wars.

Coping

Three aspects of coping is touched upon here. Its historical development, the types of treatments, and views on their success. The history of treating war syndrome veterans starts with aid of fellow soldiers and the military system. In 1678, Johannes Hofer believed that war syndromes was due to pathological processes in those parts of the mind where images of desired persons and places were stored. Treatment, in the form of purges, was specific diets and digestion thereby freeing up vital spirits. After the American Civil War, one of the first psychiatric hospitals for veterans with war syndromes was established. Here, physicians tried to explain and treat soldiers suffering from different unexplainable somatic disorders, such as "Disordered Action of the Heart", DAH, and psychogenic rheumatism. For the British war veterans with PTSD, the British War Office Committee's coping strategy was: "Good results will in a majority of incidence be achieved with the most simple forms for psycho-therapy."

(1923: 150). It is fair to say that treatment of PTSD first begun after WWII based on the idea that extreme experiences produce memories, normally concealed for the affected person, but with the intervention of a civilian expert the sufferer might be helped. The "significant change… in the PTSD (was) the stipulation that the etiological agent was outside the individual (…the trauma) rather than an inherent individual weakness" (Friedman 2013: 10; see also Institute of Medicine 2014: Treatment).

The five coping tools used to treat PTSD veterans are individual or group *psychotherapy, cognitive behavioural therapies* (both conversations), *medication* (pharmacology), *psychosocial and integrated interventionism* (by force). The first tool "psychotherapy…falls into three broad categories: Behavioural therapy, Cognitive therapy, and psychodynamic therapy (including hypnotherapy)" (Young 1995: 176). The most successful interventions are cognitive-behavioural therapy, CBT, (Schnurr 2008: 2), compared to medication: "It is clear that CBT has consistently proven more effective than pharmacotherapy" (Friedman 2008: 6). Promising results are moreover obtained with specific CBT approaches such as Prolonged Exposure therapy, PE. Actually, Institute of Medicine have concluded that "…therapies that include exposure as part of the treatment such as CPT are the only types of psychotherapies that have been found effective for PTSD" (2008; see also Foa et al. 2009; Friedman 2013: 14f). Jones and Wessely agree: "cognitive behavioural therapies has provided the best evidence of efficiency," (2005: 187), but also, "interventions might prove promising" (Foa and Rothbaum 1989). In contrast, the debriefing system (the individual veteran's conversation with a psychologist) used by many military organizations seems less effective.

Three shifts in the coping treatment over the last half century can be observed: *From military coping actors to civilian professionals*. In pace with the research of contributors of war syndromes the emergence of a new class of authorities, medical and mental experts have claimed access to memory contents that owners (veterans were hiding from themselves (Young 1995: 4) and thereby excluding the military experts from handling war syndromes. One reason for civil professions to help veterans with war syndromes is the fact that most veterans are no longer serving in the military but living and working in the community as civilians. Another is that military treatments were extreme such as court-martials, executions or electroshock (Freud 1955a: 212F). *From fewer to more coping tool*. Today, a wide range of war syndrome treatment tools compete and neither has won the battle. Rather, they often cooperate. At the same time, these civilian physicians and psychiatrists increase their knowledge about the emotional impact of peacekeeping and try to cope by relating the PTSD to the stress igniting extreme incident, its trauma, and contributors. *From military arguments for coping with PTSD to individual considerations*. Previously, any screening of recruits served the purpose of military organizational efficiency on the battlefield. Now, it also serves the obligation of any nation participating in international military peace operations to take care of its veterans.

No matter these shifts, both psychiatric and psychological experts see PTSD differently. Most of them define PTSD as an individual syndrome; others see it as a societal phenomenon: "Treatment of the individual is not required because the trauma affects the whole society" (Jones and Wessely 2005: 172). They argue that war syndromes are a functional response to a dysfunctional societal incident (Summerfield 2001; Bracken 2001). "Sufferings cannot be reduced to a diagnosis," (Jones and Wessely 2005: 172). The disagreement rests on a criticism of the criterion A of PTSD. It has"… made PTSD the only DSM mental disorder that required…an external environmental stressor as part of its diagnosis… (Thus,) the use of the PTSD diagnosis may contribute to treatment failures because it fabricates a spurious invalid category of illness, rather than seeing a unique sufferer (which) a strict application of Criterion A of the PTSD diagnosis does not accomplish" (Barglow 2012: 6).

Cost

Decisions on public benefits to veterans starts by how to define them. Either as anyone who have served in the armed forces (The U.S., Canada, UK), all former armed forces personnel having served in war or warlike circumstances (the Netherlands, Belgium, Indonesia, Russia), military personnel having served in specific wars (Albania, Bulgaria), or veterans do not formally exists (Germany, before 2013: Denmark) (Leigh and Born 2008: 300–304, box 18.1). Then, the criteria for receiving benefits as a veteran has to be defined. Either according to the veteran's type of service (combat/non-combat, deployed/at home (the U.S.), injuries (most Western countries), needs of the veteran (Canada), or the type of war in which the veteran was enrolled (Russia and Romania distinguish between World War II veterans and other war veterans). Next, the three main types of benefits offered veterans must be decided. Either material/financial benefits, (compensation for loss of lives, limbs, income, health, working ability, health care), non-material benefits (psychiatric/psychological help, social work and relations), or commemorations (cemeteries, celebrating national veteran's day). Finally, the providers of care has to be identified. Either a special ministry (Department of Veteran Affairs in the U.S., Department of Veterans' Affairs in Australia, or Veterans Affairs Canada in Canada), a shared responsibility between the department of defence and civil ministries (the UK, France, the Netherlands), a civil ministry alone (Norway, Spain), or a partner model of governments, more ministries, military, civil organization, private associations (Denmark) (Leigh and Born 2008: 197–199).

Thus, the cost of PTSD for any nation depends on its definition of veterans, their benefits, and providers. The care system in the U.S. is the Department of Veteran Affairs, VA, that helps the veterans while the Department of Defence, DoD, pays for the cost for the health of its active personnel. Even if the concept of PTSD is rather new, The U.S. veteran care system has a nearly 400-year history based on principles of social justice, where a society provides fair treatment to its citizens (Committee 2007: 47 + 51). Three issues will be addressed to get an impression of the costs of PTSD:

– the number of veterans helped by VA, including the number of PTSD veterans
– the total costs of wars, both direct military spending and costs to disabled veterans
– the proportion of PTSD veteran care users and their share of the care system compared to other veteran beneficiaries.

The first issue, the number of veterans, of veteran care users and of PTSD veterans for the three major wars waged by the U.S. in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan is shown in the first four columns in Table 29.2. The last column includes all deployed soldiers and veterans in the U.S. by 2013, no matter the type of war in which he/she participated.

Table 29.2 shows the drop in the number of Vietnam War veterans from 3.1 million in 1988 to 2.5 million in 2014 while the number of Vietnam War veterans enrolled in VA care grew from 479,000 to 700,000. The decrease of Vietnam War veterans by 600,000 is associated with deaths and suicides. More than 100,000 of the Vietnam War veterans have committed suicide since 1972, twice the number of killed U.S. soldiers in the Vietnam War. While the number of all veterans dropped, the proportion of PTSD veterans grew from 15 to 28% (Kulka et al. 1988, vol 1: 2; Vietnam War Veterans 2014: 1–2). Before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 1999, the number of PTSD veterans was 120,200. In 2004, it grew to 215,900. Thus, 21% or one out of five deployed veterans suffered from PTSD (Committee et al. 2007: VIII Table 1). In 2007, this relation dropped to 18%. In 2013, 9,300,000 veterans got VA care out of the actual number of U.S. veterans of 22,000,000 or 42% (Department of Veteran Affairs 2014:"Expenditures") and "more than half a million veterans (of the 9.3 million)…have sought care for PTSD through VA Health care services—making up 9.2% of all VA users" (Institute of Medicine 2014: 2). Thus in the beginning, the relative number of PTSD veterans to all VA beneficiaries is rather low, but

Table 29.2 U.S. veterans, veteran care users and PTSD-veterans 1988–2013

	Vietnam War		Iraq + Afghanistan Wars		All wars by
	1988	2014	2004	October 2007	2013
Veterans or deployed U.S soldiers	3,100,000	2,500,000	1,140,000	1,640,000	21,882,000
All enrolled in VA care	1,200,000		–	–	9,300,000
PTSD veterans	479,000	700,000	215,900	300,500	500,000
PTSD veterans/all soldiers (%)	15	28	21	18	2
PTSD/All Beneficiaries (%)	58		–	–	6

Table 29.3 Total costs for the U.S. of three wars, including cost of killed and wounded veterans 1964–2014

	Vietnam War (1964–1972)	First Gulf War (1990–1991)	Iraq and Afghanistan (OEF/OIF) (2001–>)		
			Edwards (2012)	Cost of War (2015)	
				2001–2014	2014–>
Direct military cost, BN of 2008 $	899	96	1559	1543	7.9 = 1622
Historical and projected Veterans' benefits BN 2008 $	555	372	673	160	1000 = 1160
Other costs (DoD, Homeland Security, Interests, Pakistan, etc.)			–	(1672)	–
Total costs in BN 2008 $	1424	468	2232	(3375) 1703	1079 = 2782
Veterans' benefits/Total Costs %	39	79	30	42	
Personnel	8,744,000	2,225,000	2,100,000		
Killed	28,200	383	5376		
Wounded	153,303	467	39,900		
Surviving	8,685,000	2,223,000	2,094,000		

it will increase over time, cf. the development of PTSD veterans from the Vietnam War to all enrolled VA veterans.

The next issue to be pursued is the total costs of war, including not only direct military spending and historical and projected veteran benefits, but also the economic loss due to killed and wounded soldiers even if such figures are financially debatable, cf. Table 29.3.

Table 29.3 shows the calculation of costs of four wars (in Vietnam, the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan) waged by the U.S. in the last half of the twentieth century (Edwards 2012: 16, Table 2; Cost of War 2015: 1). The direct military spending and long-term expenditures to veterans' care differs from one war to another.

The short First Gulf War has the lowest direct military costs in absolute and relative figures of all of the U.S.'s wars in the 20th century, but the highest costs of veterans' care of 79% of all total expenditures. The highest direct military spending of the four wars (of all the 12 U.S wars from 1775 to 2014) has been the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with of $1559 trillion already spent according to Edwards and $1591 trillion according to Cost of War. These figures include the statistical life value of $4.8–7.2 million and disability value of between 30 and 50%, in average, of statistical life value. The calculations of total direct military spending of $2782 trillion to total veterans' cost of $1160 trillion gives 42%. Here, almost half of the total costs take

place decades after the end of the war. For all twelve U.S. wars it can be concluded that "thirty years after the end of hostilities, typically half of all benefits remain to be paid" (Edwards 2012: 54). Thus, "the peak year for paying veterans disability compensation to World War I veterans was 1969…for World War II veterans 1982… (while) payments to Vietnam and the first Gulf War veterans are still climbing" (Bilmes 2011: 7).

The third issue is the proportion of PTSD veteran care cost to the total care cost for all veteran beneficiaries. More studies have pursued the federal cost of only PTSD veterans offered by the Department of Veteran Affairs even if it is difficult to isolate PTSD veterans from other veterans with mental disorder as a PTSD suffer often will experience multiple types of mental diseases. Nevertheless, it is argued that PTSD is probably the single most common and costly of them. At least in the US: "According to US Department of Veteran Affairs, PTSD is the most common mental health diagnosis (21.5%) among veterans, and based on current deployment rates, health care providers anticipate an annual expense of U.S. $200 million on PTSD care" (Osei-Boamah et al. 2013: 2). "Out of U.S. $3.8

billion awarded as a result of U.S. Congressional funding bill HR2638 to the U.S. Veterans Administration (VA) in 2009 mental illness, the single largest mental disease category funded was PTSD…The first year of this health care cost was $1.4 billion (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 2012)" (Barglow 2012: 1).

The U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs operates with four budget categories offered VA veterans: Medical, social security, disability, and other costs, from 2004 to 2053, cf. Table 29.4.

Table 29.4 presents five perspectives on total care cost for the Department of Veteran Affairs, VA. In 2004, VA used $65 billion and the medical and disability budget post equaled each other with $28.1 to $29.8 billion. In 2012 and for the period 2001–2014, disability cost (compensation and pension) increased the most and is expected to do so in the years to come towards 2053. Bilmes figures (2012–2053) are built on Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008). They wanted to find the war's true cost, i.e. both *government* cost (military operations, demobilization cost, VA, disability payments, and future spending) and *societal* cost (local community cost, cost of reserve personnel, cost of fatalities, loss due to TBI and other injuries) and all of them to the

Table 29.4 Total federal costs for the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs 2004–2053

	Committee et al. (2007: 1–2)	Dept. of Veteran Affairs (2014) Institute of Medicine (2014: 2)	Bilmes (2011: 4, Table 2)	Crawford (2014: 7–11, Tables 3–5)	
	2004	2012	2012–2053	2001–2014	2015–2053
All cost BN $	–	–	–	3375	79
Total VA costs BN $	65.1	142.8	589–934	160	836–1000
VA medical	28.1	56	201–348	28	288
Social security		–	33–52	5	42
VA disability	29.8	63.6	355–534	41	420
+VA other costs	7.2	23.2	–	86	86
VA costs 2001–2014/all costs 2001–2014				5%	
VA costs 2015–2053/all costs 2015–2053					26%

"last man standing." They reached a result of the total cost for the Iraq war alone to be at 3 trillion. Later, they estimated the long-term cost of providing medical care and paying disability compensation for veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and identified a total care amount in the range between $400 billion and $700 billion. This figure is now expected to be between $589 billion and $934 billion …due to higher claims activity and higher medical utilization…following the pattern of Vietnam veterans, where it is estimated that 30% suffered from PTSD" (Bilmes 2011: 3). The Crawford figures for 2001–2014 are based on Bilmes and for 2015–2053, the costs are, as shown, estimated to grow ten times, except for "VA Other Costs." These cost "directly relates to…Mental health/PTSD" among other categories (Crawford 2014: 7, note 26 based on Bilmes 2013). It is interesting that these PTSD costs do not increase.

The cost of PTSD veterans exceeds those offered the average VA veteran according to a number of studies. "The number of beneficiaries receiving compensation for PTSD (has) increased significantly during FY 1999–2004, growing by 79.5%, from 120,265 to 215,871 cases….(however their) benefits payment (has) increased 148.8% from $1.72 billion to $4.28 billion in the same period" (Committee 2007: 2). For the period 2012–2052, PTSD costs will increase, as well: "The incidence of PTSD is likely to increase the long-term medical cost beyond the level of previous conflicts…taking all these costs into account, the total budgetary costs associated with providing for America's war veteran from Iraq and Afghanistan is likely to approach $1 trillion" (Bilmes 2011: 5). In 2012, an analysis calculated that the total cost for the first four years of treatment offered by Veteran Health Administration, VHA, to all the 496,800 veterans at that time amounted $3.7 billion of which the 130,100 PTSD sufferers plus 8700 with TBI took 60% or 2.2 billion, while the 358,000 other treated veterans did only cost 1.5 billion or 40% (Congressional Budget Office 2012: 1 + Table VII). A 2015-study found that "PTSD (has been)…diagnosed in nearly one-fifth of veterans of OEF/OIF/OND" (i.e. from Iraq,

Afghanistan, and Pakistan) (Finley et al. 2015: 73). In short, "PTSD has one of the highest cost to treat any disorder" (Market Watch 2014: 1).

The expected increase in PTSD costs are based on more factors. First, the increase of the PTSD group as such: "Studies of the prevalence of PTSD among OEF/OIF (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan) VA users consistently show a rise over time" (Schiner 2011: 1); "At least 20% of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans have PTSD and/or depression…while interviewed 20–25 years after Vietnam …four out of five Vietnam veterans struggled with cronic PTSD symptoms" (Veteran PTSD Statistics 2015: 1). Second, the over-consumption of PTSD users: "The body of literature on VA services use among OEF/OIF Veterans has documented a high level of service use and a high rate of PTSD among service users" (Schiner 2011: 3); "Veterans with PTSD consumed almost twice as much general health care as those without a mental health diagnosis" (Schiner 2011: 1). Third, the level of medical activity of PTSD veterans compared to other VA enrolled clients: Veterans with PTSD from Iraq and Afghanistan completed more mental health visits and were less likely to drop out of treatment as other VA-care outpatients (Schiner 2011) based on the examination of 30 studies of the utilization of VA Health service. Consequently, PTSD veterans have a higher user-rate than the average VA service user. Fourth, the level of consumption of the PTSD group decreases more slowly than that of other VA veterans users: The "continuation of use of VHA's Services by OCO (Iraq and Afghanistan) veterans" show a drop to only 80% for PTSD veterans…(but) for others to 40% (Congress Budget Office 2012: 14, Fig. 1).

This domination of PTSD users to other VA beneficiaries have more explanations. One is *military*. It is related the asymmetric type of warfare in which soldiers are deployed. "PTSD might be a common form for psychiatric casualty in "low-level" warfare" (Crocq and Crocq 2000: 53) and as many as "a third of the veterans returning from Afghanistan and Iraq are currently affected by PTSD or depression or….TBI while deployed" (Tanielian et al. 2008: 435). In 2005,

Table 29.5 Four roles of a PTSD veteran based on the presence/absence of being a VA user—VA qualified

VA qualified	VA user	
	−	+
−	Hero (honor, prestige, positions, political recognized)	Stigmatized (lazy, looser, ashamed, dishonoured, useless)
+	Entitled (social rights, job, marriage, grateful children, friends)	Victim (empathy, pity, love, support, loyalty, respect, comradeship)

100,000 veterans were treated by the Veteran Affairs out of 500,000 veterans. In 2010, the number of treated veterans has grown to 500,000 out of 1,300,000 deployed service members (Congress Budget Office 2012: 1). Thus, the number of deployed soldiers in asymmetric warfare positions went up with 20%, the number of treated veterans by 31%. This explanation of the asymmetric warfare goes along with the findings that UK veterans with conflict/combat experience enjoy more benefits than veterans without such experience (Dandeker et al. 2006).

Another is *economic*. A postponed help from VA increases its future cost: "Literature clearly documents that there are long-term negative repercussions of having these conditions (PTSD, major depression, and TBI) if they remain untreated "(Tanielian et al. 2008: 437); "Among those who met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD and major depression, only 53%… seek …help… in the past twelve months" (Tanielian et al. 2008: 435) and "of 1.2 million service members eligible for VA services, only 600,000 have used the VA health service" (Schiner 2011: 1).

A third is *organizational*. The armed forces organization creates PTSD when it for more than a decade have been on the alert to meet the political demands of deploying soldiers abroad. "Between 2004 and 2012, the percentage of all active duty members with a diagnosis of PTSD increased from 1 to 5 percent" (Institute of Medicine 2014: 1f).

A fourth is *psychological*. The individual soldiers may fear or wish for deployment abroad. Both feelings may initiate PTSD. Another psychological factor to create PTSD is the contending roles of the veteran depending on the right to and use of VA care, cf. Table 29.5.

Table 29.5 is a matrix placing a PTSD veteran in four different position as either a hero (neither right to nor receiver of VA care), entitled (right to but no user of VA care), stigmatized (no right to, but receiver of VA care), and finally victim (right to and receiver of VA care). It is easy to imagine the stress for any veteran to move from one of the two positive boxes at left to either of the two boxes to the right. In particular, it adds to the mental disorder of any PTSD veteran to be misplaced by society, comrades, and family. A fifth is *medical*. "The majority of people with PTSD have three other disorders (depression, anxiety, substance abuse)" (Market Watch 2014: 2). Whatever the reason, PTSD creates many victims, has more contributors but no single responsible actor. Societies feel obliged to assist. From the point of social responsibility, not from the position in a court as the guilty defendant.

Conclusion

PTSD is not a disease, but a historically and culturally variable latent disorder, that may be activated by the veteran's memory of the incident and own self-perception and other peoples' behaviour that create a variety of diseases. It is documented by the different perceptions of the concept (the process model, Fig. 29.1, versus. the biomarker model, Fig. 29.2), content (the five DSM versions), chronology (the many names over time for PTSD and the absence of names), contributors (personal and military), consequences (illness and social inability), coping (medicine or cognitive consultations), and cost (what type of expenses should be included and how). One crucial may be raised: How can it be

argued that PTSD has existed throughout history, when each war/violence is different. One answer is: "Every war is different. Every time there is a war, different social attitudes to fundamental questions like fear, madness and social obligation will redefine the role of military psychiatry in a different way. Medicine will be different; and symptoms; so, too, will military and institutional circumstances. (Shephard 2000: p. xxii). The answer here is that society define PTSD and PTSD define society, medicine, military psychiatry, etc. But, it is no explanation, only a relation. Another answer to the question is: "I will argue that this generally accepted picture of PTSD, and the traumatic memory that underlies it, is mistaken. The disorder is not timeless, nor does it possess an intrinsic unity. Rather, it is glued together by the practices, technologies, and narratives with which it is diagnosed, studied, treated, and represented and by the various interests, institutions, and moral arguments that mobilized these efforts and resources." (Young 1995: 6). This answer operates with a "timeless" PTSD that is "glued together." How can it be moveable and at the same time "glued" and what makes it be one or the other? A third answer is that PTSD is a more profound and previous element in the lives of human beings than war/violence. It is a human tool of preparedness and survival. It exists before the traumatic event. PTSD is an activated latent stress phenomenon ignited by traumatic events. Thus, its proper name should be Activated Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, APTSD.

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Author Biographies

Henning Sørensen Born in 1944. Graduated in 1972 from Copenhagen University with a master in political Science, in 1981 from Aarhus University with a master in Public Administration and in 1988 from Copenhagen Business School (CBS) with a Ph.D. in Organization Studies. Did research at University of Chicago in 1977 (Morris Janowitz). Worked as associate professor at the Danish Naval Academy 1970–1979 and more academic institutions. Main occupation at Gladsaxe Gymnasium (Now Retired). Established in 1986 a

minor private consulting company, Institut for Sociologisk Forskning, ISF, (Institute for Sociological Research) specializing in the sociology of the military. Has written extensively on Danish Defence issues, national security, military professionalism, PTSD and terrorism. See ISFs homepage "isfdanmark.dk" for a number of published articles, books, etc.

Claus Kold is a sociologist, Ph.D. He has been working as a senior researcher at DIGNITY Institute Against Torture, 2009–2015. The last three years in the department: Prevention of Urban Violence with the focus to build con- tact and trust with the police institution. In the period 1997–2004, he worked in the Danish Military Academy, in the section for development of leadership and organization. He did his PhD field study in the UN peace enforcement operation in Kosovo, KFOR. In the same period (1992–2000) Claus Kold also worked at the national Police Academy, as a teacher in general sociology, conflict theory and conflict management. From 1995–1997 he was working as a leader in the Danish Refugee Council.

His work and research interests are the two state institutions, the police and the military. He focuses on the recruitment, training, and behavior of both policemen and soldiers, and how the task and the leadership influence the development of a professionalized organizational culture.

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Part VII

A Conclusive View

Social Research and the Military: A Cross-National Expert Survey

30

Giuseppe Caforio and Marina Nuciari

Foreword

This chapter has not been modified with respect to the first edition of the Handbook for a good number of reasons. The first and most obvious one is that the research presented in the pages that follow has not been repeated on an international scale in the decade that separates the two editions of the Handbook. It still has its validity, however, since both actors and conditions in which the research was conducted do not appear to have changed in the meantime. The ideal-type of the military sociologist has remained unchanged, just as the driving forces of the research are still the same: identical procedures used by the commissioners, and even freedom of research encounters the same limits today as it did ten years ago.

But these reasons would be insufficient to justify reproposing the data and methodologies of the research if the latter did not still constitute a significant, valid example of how a research of this type can be conducted, with special regard to the instrument used (interviews via the Internet),

which, thanks to the development of technologies and the diffusion of social networks, has become more common and user-friendly today than it was ten years ago.

What has changed is the position of the chapter in the context of the Handbook. It is now placed at the end of the volume, where the potential reader (especially if a newcomer), having acquired all the knowledge and information contained in the book, is better able to understand and appreciate the results of the research presented here.

Introduction

The reason why this research is presented in a handbook is to let the reader know who carries out research in the sociology of the military and in what conditions. As the reader can see from the pages that follow, there are common traits that characterise this research in the various countries as well as distinguishing ones: together, thanks to the good number of countries represented in the research, they provide a useful world overview on the subject.

Added to this reason is another one, that of giving the reader an example of a quite new research methodology in the sector, one that makes it possible fully to exploit the resources offered by the Internet.

G. Caforio
Pisa, Italy

M. Nuciari (✉)
Department of Economics and Social Sciences,
Mathematics and Statistics (E.So.Ma.S.),
State University of Torino Italy, Corso Unione
Sovietica 218bis, 10134 Turin, Italy
e-mail: marina.nuciari@unito.it

Since the study was conducted at the beginning of the 2000, a question arises about the current situation of social research within and for military institutions. Under many respects, actors are the same, and situations, even though within a more complex and often unpredictable environment, are as usual, war in its conventional meaning, conflict and non-conflict relationships, peace-keeping, institution building, humanitarian aid and civil population relief in dramatic non-war circumstances. Social research and social scientists must always work within the limits and the idiosyncratic outlook of an organization. As noticed in one of the last volumes reflecting on research methods and behaviors in military studies (Soeters et al. 2014), if doing research in an organization is always difficult, "…studying the military is probably more complex because, more than other organizations, the military is a world on its own, an island within society-at-large on which its inhabitants work and live together" (Soeters et al. 2014: 3). Today as in the past, if for not inhabitants can be difficult to get access to this world apart, also inhabitants wishing to do social research can meet a chain of difficulties: military organizations want to control on-going research and dissemination of results as well, they can influence the timing of the research schedule or limit publication by means of delay or even final prohibition to let findings go "outside". Situations as such have been experienced and accounted by experts surveyed in the 2003, and they are easy to be seen currently more or less untouched: what are the relationships between theoretical work and empirical research within the military and on crucial military affairs? What methods and subjects are preferred? Today as yesterday, as Soeters et al. say "…one can observe a societal and political push to know and an organizational tendency, however slight, to hide." (Soeters et al. 2014: 4).

The subject of this study is military sociological research. The study is based on an expert survey conducted by e-mail, in successive stages, among a group of colleagues from different countries who agreed to participate. These countries are: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America.

The basic questions we posed to ourselves in this study were of two types. One was of a methodological nature, namely, what are the advantages/disadvantages and the prospects offered by a survey carried out by e-mail? The second area of interest regarded content and was aimed mainly at providing answers to the following questions:

– What is the ideal type of scholar who engages in military sociological research?
– Who commissions such research, and what procedures do they use?
– How much freedom do researchers have in this field?
– What is the social status of military sociological research in the various countries?

The study naturally falls within the more general context of the relationships between theoretical work and empirical research. In its results, it lends support to the thesis, already authoritatively expressed (Boron 1999), of a crisis of theoretical studies and the advance of a sociology aimed at chiefly pragmatic ends, without our wanting to express any value judgement on this change here.

Boron for instance argues (Boron 1999, p. 47 and following) that the discrediting of theoretical work is due to:

1. the crisis of the university format;
2. the growing role played by non-academic institutions (and for what concerns us here, the military is undoubtedly one such institution) and private foundations in drawing up research agendas;
3. effects of the social sciences market, which rewards pragmatic, realistic stances and punishes theoretical ones;

Fig. 30.1 Conceptual framework for a multicase "research on the military" field study

4. the practical approach that is increasingly demanded by research funders;
5. what he calls the deplorable consequence of the garbage-in, garbage-out cycle, due to the conditions in which the research is performed.

The presentation of the study results begins with an analysis and discussion of the data resulting from the research, followed by a paragraph that illustrates the methodological aspects of the research, and ends with some concluding remarks. Lastly, an appendix (Appendix B) contains the questionnaire used for the expert survey.

Before starting the analysis of data it is convenient to present the "*Conceptual framework for a multi-case research on the military field study*" (see Fig. 30.1) that we used as a guideline for the very research. This scheme is then reproposed at the end of the study (Appendix A), modified in accordance with the results of the empirical survey, under the name "*Resulting framework for a multi-case 'research on the*

military' field study". We thereby intended to give the reader a quick graphic view of the unfolding of the research and its results.

Who and How Is Running the Research in the Sociology of the Military?

Ideal Type of the Military Sociologist

To outline the ideal type of researcher in the scientific sector examined here, we can start from the socio-demographic data.

Without large national characterisations, they present a prevalently male researcher (76% of the sample), fairly well distributed in the different age groups (see Table 30.1), who mostly began doing research in the sector during the 1980s (see Table 30.2) and for the most part is engaged in military sociology in a prevalent (64.7%) but usually not exclusive way (only 11.4%). The military sociologist's education is quite

Table 30.1 Distribution of age in military sociology

Age of respondents	
30–40	28%
40–50	28%
50–60	32%
Over 60	12%

Table 30.2 Distribution of decade

Start to work in the field	
Before 1970	12%
In the seventies	17%
In the eighties	53%
In the nineties	18%

diversified, where the most numerous group is the PhD's (40.6%, several of them are also officers), closely followed by university professors (37.5%). Officers (19.8%) are rather numerous and are equally divided between active and retired.

Most of the university professors teach sociology, but not all: 25% teach military psychology (only, or together with military sociology), 17% teach military history, and 8% subjects that can be grouped under conflict resolution science. The main places where the teaching is done are universities and military academies, with equal percentages of respondents (40% each); 11% teach in war college-type institutions, and the remainder elsewhere.

Most of them do their research work mainly in state-run research centres (34.4%), but a good percentage do it in universities (28.1%), and some free-lance (18.8%); a minority (12.5%) work in private research centres. From this point on, however, the situation begins to appear rather different from country to country.

There are countries in which the researcher says he performs military sociological research chiefly (when not exclusively) in a state-run centre, and others where the research activity on this topic appears to be more balanced between public and private centres; in both cases there is almost always collaboration with the university. And finally, in a few countries it is the research of the free lancers that appears to be most active and widespread.

The first area seems to include Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. The respondents from South Africa, Slovenia and Belgium do their research work almost exclusively in universities. Research activity appears to be more evenly divided between public and private in Bulgaria, Italy, Russia, Slovenia, the U.K. and the U.S., while it seems to be almost entirely entrusted to free lancers, usually in a university environment, in Argentina, India, and Lithuania. The free lancers' contribution also appears strong in Austria, Italy, Russia and South Africa.

This areal division brings the survey to the parties to whom the research is concretely entrusted by the commissioning bodies. Here, too, the general average does not always seem to be significant, given the big national differences. However, this average sees state-run research centres in first place in percentage terms, followed by the individual researcher, and then the private research centre.

In a first, more numerous group of countries, the commissioning bodies assign the research without distinction to an individual researcher, a state-run centre or a private centre. This group includes Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Israel, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the U.K. and the U.S., with perhaps a slight prevalence of assignments being given to private centres for the U.S. In a second group of countries, entrusting research to private centres appears to be rare (or non-existent). This group includes Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Russia, Sweden, South Africa and Switzerland, but with different positions: in Bulgaria, Germany, Russia and Sweden it seems to be almost exclusively the state-run centres that receive research assignments in this sector, while in Switzerland it is normally the individual researcher who is called to do research.[1]

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[1]By this term is meant, almost always, applied research.

Then there is a third group of countries where there are few or no commissioning bodies and the input to the research often comes from the bottom, from the individual researcher, so that, in adjusting the subsequent sets of the questionnaire, we had to replace the expression "commissioner" with "authority who accepts/finances the research". This group is made up of Argentina, India and Lithuania.

Finding a suitable generalisation to connote the work environment of our ideal type is difficult, because in some countries the universities are mainly public, and in others mainly private, with all the shades in between, so attributing to the individual researchers a public or private work environment is strongly disturbed by the "university" variable.

Trying to generalise anyway, we feel it is fair to say that our typical researcher works mainly in a public research centre, with strong exceptions in the U.S. and the U.K. The commissioning bodies, almost exclusively public, alternate in awarding the research to individual researchers, to the public centres where they work, and, where they exist, to private centres as well.

But are there preferences/exclusions in the choice of researcher by the commissioners?

In general, the countries where there is no exclusion and/or preference in choosing the researcher prevail, but not by much (55.6 vs. 44.4%), and the situation has to be looked at country by country.

Here, too, it is possible to divide the countries into groups.

In the first, numerous group, the respondents state that there is no exclusion or preference in the choice of researchers, except what may be dictated by the individual's scientific qualifications. These countries are: Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and the U.K.

Then there is a country where the respondents' opinions are divided, and this is Germany: two respondents say there are no preferences, while the third states, "*I believe there are, but it is very difficult to prove…*".

The absence of preferences and exclusions may be determined by particular local factors, as in Switzerland, for which a respondent says: "*In a small country there are often not many experts in the field. You have to rely on those at disposal independently of gender, race, civilian or military, and so on.*"

Countries with reported exclusions or preferences are: Argentina, Austria, France, India, Italy, Lithuania, and Russia.

Where there are preferences, they seem to be in favour of friends (40%), military people (20%), civilians (20%), and for political reasons (20%).

Examples of such preferences or exclusions expressed by researchers of individual countries are:

1. A preference of gender and function, expressed in assertions like: "*Research is exclusively commissioned to high ranking officers, or clerks/bureaucrats from Ministry of Defence or academy. As usual they are males.*"
2. Or this plus acquaintances and political attitude, expressed by responses like: "*Preferences: In general terms: personal friendship; conservative attitudes of researchers; sex: male; reserve officers; party membership (of course, of the political party in power)…*
3. Preferences due to acquaintances: "*Preferences or exclusion depend upon who knows whom.*" Or: "*Friends of bureaucrats who belong to the commissioning body.*"

With these data in mind, therefore, we can say that in many countries our typical researcher still has greater likelihood of being male, a high-ranking officer or functionary (or an ex officer, or ex functionary), with acquaintances in the usual commissioning body, and politically close to the party in power.

An attempt to learn, in very general terms, the political positions of the respondents did not have much success, as 53% of the sample did not respond to this question, judged by some as "*too private to answer*".

However, the data for those who answered confirm a prevalently sympathetic position to the party in power (28%), with 12.5% professing indifference and 6.3% opposed.

And what is the real role that the military sociologist plays, beyond the research activities?

We tried to determine this by means of a question asking whether sociologists acted as advisers or experts to the General Staff (question 26: see questionnaire in the Appendix B).

This figure is present in several countries: it takes on the dual role of adviser and researcher for the General Staff in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, and the U.S.

For the U.S., for example, one respondent states: "*There are a few military officers with education in sociology that do act as advisors in personnel matters. The greatest influence is from academics who do research and then present it to military personnel. In a few cases, noted sociologists are consulted directly by military leaders and appointed to commissions and study groups.*"

Such a figure appears as an adviser in Austria, and mostly as a researcher in South Africa. He is an occasional figure ("*for specific issues*") in Belgium and Switzerland, and a composite one ("*specialists from psychology and related disciplines*") in the U.K. There seem to be initiatives towards the hiring of such a figure in the remaining countries (except for India and Lithuania), expressed in statements like: "*Until now, connections in the right place (more often than not, political) were the main source of influence. There is now talk of institutionalising social science adviser….*"

Our typical researcher thus tends also to take on an official role of consulting and/or research for the top echelons of the military establishment. This is already a reality in some countries (especially the U.S.), in progress elsewhere.

Driving Forces of Military Sociological Research

To determine what are, generally speaking, the driving forces of research in this sector in the different countries, questions were asked about the commissioning bodies, the existence of research centres particularly dedicated to the discipline, and their nature and composition.

The main commissioner, where there is one,[2] appears to be the state, chiefly in its governmental component dedicated to the sector, the Ministry of Defence. Another general datum is that there is almost always more than one commissioning body that turns to research centres,[3] so that in Table 30.3, devoted to the general average recurrence of the various commissioning bodies, the total percentage is much higher than 100.

As can be seen in the table, many research inputs come from the research centres themselves, both state-run and private, while the initiative of international foundations is also significant. Looking at individual countries, we see that international foundations play an especially important part in the Eastern European countries. The fact that universities have an apparently modest role in commissioning derives from that fact that, in reality, many research centres exist within the framework of universities and therefore university commissioning is in large part absorbed by that item. Something similar can be said for the apparently low incidence of the military establishment: actually, the inputs of the military leadership are often mediated by the public administration; others pass through state-run research centres, which therefore figure as commissioners since they are the ones that concretely set the research protocols.

Looking at individual countries, there are some departures from the prevalent commissioning by the public administration. In one group of countries, private commissioning, either directly by private research centres or other bodies, is more important. These countries are: South Africa, the U.S., the U.K. and, although to a lesser extent, Italy, Israel, Bulgaria, Russia, and

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[2]As already pointed out, countries with quite different levels of development of the discipline are examined here.

[3]For example, an American researcher writes: "*There are various agencies under the Dept of Defense that sponsor research on sociological issues of military relevance… Some research activities regarding the domain of socialization to the professional military can be found within the military training academies. In a few cases, these centres are under medical branch.*"

Table 30.3 Distribution of commissioners of military sociology research

Commissioner	
Public administration	74%
State-run research centres	58%
Private bodies	51%
Private research centres	48%
International foundations	22%
Military establishment	6%
Universities	6%
Individuals	6%
Others	3%
Nobody	3%

Slovenia. These last three countries have the particularity that private commissioning is largely constituted by Western international foundations. A second group of countries (Argentina, India, and Lithuania) is characterised by an almost total absence of commissioning. The input to the research can vary widely and often originates from the researchers themselves, who must seek funding and authorisations on their own.

A second important aspect in seeking to understand the mechanisms of military sociological research is analysis of the research centres, public and private, from the standpoints of the importance given to the discipline, their nature and their makeup.

The importance given to the discipline is drawn first here from the division between exclusively or prevalently dedicated centres (about 70% of the responses), a minority of centres that are only partially dedicated (around 12%), and situations where no centre for military sociological research exists (almost 10%).

But these general data take on interest and significance only in a breakdown by countries. There are countries that have several research centres in this discipline, often an exclusively dedicated one and others that are partially dedicated. This is especially true for the U.S., for which one respondent writes: "*Only one is a discipline-based center, but many others are multi-disciplinary (primarily military*

psychology) and some are specifically problem-oriented, e.g., military family institute." On a smaller scale in terms of numbers, a situation of a centre exclusively or prevalently dedicated to a few (from two to four) institutes that partially or occasionally deal with research in the sector exists in Bulgaria, France, Israel, the Netherlands, Russia and Sweden.

What emerges in countries like Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany and Switzerland is a situation with one centre,[4] usually state-run, that is dedicated to the discipline and is the only one authorised to conduct research in the sector. This situation produces different results in the various countries, however: while the German respondents, for example, feel that a situation of this type does not influence freedom of research, others affirm: "*There is no independent and free research in the field of military sociology with respect to funded research projects. MoD has some kind of 'monopoly'*".

In Italy, Slovenia, South Africa and the U.K. there are only sectors of one or more centres that are dedicated to military sociological research. The most typical (but not the only) case is that of an institute dedicated to strategic studies that also has a department that deals with military sociological studies; alongside it there are other institutes, generally private, that occasionally conduct research in this field.

Finally, the responses to our survey show a group of three countries, Argentina, India and Lithuania, where there does not seem to be any study or research centre in the sector. One respondent describes the situation of this group of countries as follows: "*As far as I know, at the moment, there is no (public) real research of Military Sociology as empiric research on the inside of the Armed Forces. When commissioned*

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[4]The situation in Germany has changed to January 1, 2013, when, for reasons of budget, the German government has unified the SOWI (dedicated to sociological research) and MGFA (dedicated to historical research) in one institute called "Center for military History and social Sciences of the Bundeswehr" (Zentrum für Sozialwissenschaften Militärgeschichte und der Bundeswehr—ZMSBw), based in Potsdam.

by the Armed Forces the motivation seemed to be the protection of the Institution, in front of the Society and/or improve its performance."

Let us now see in greater detail where these research centres are, how they operate and what their general make up is.

In all the countries where centres that carry out research on this subject exist, at least one is supported by the state, most of the time directly under the MoD (in two cases, South Africa and Sweden, it appears to be set in the university structure). In most of the countries examined here research is also carried out, at times prevalently, in private centres. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Sweden seem not to have private institutes that deal with this type of research.

The private centres are mostly supported by the universities, sometimes by national foundations (Italy and South Africa) or international ones (Bulgaria and Russia).

The modest involvement, in many countries, of universities in military sociological research is ascribed by several respondents to a national culture with little interest in general for military issues. This opinion is expressed in statements like: "*Military sociology issues are in general not of broad national interest, outside the military organisation. This is of course reflected in little support for research.*" Another phrase used was: "*Generally low interest in military issues, lack of a broader institutional base for military research (no independent academic research, no institute for strategic studies).*"

The composition of state-supported research centres is almost always mixed, i.e. with both civilian and military scholars. An apparent exception is Italy, where the personnel making up the research department dedicated to the sector is all military. The exception is only apparent, however: such personnel have mainly organisational and managerial tasks, while an outside team of scholars, both civilian and military, is selected for each research project.

The private research centres generally have an all-civilian composition, with the exceptions of Bulgaria and Russia, where career military men are also present.

A third significant indicator on the nature and efficiency of the driving forces of military sociological research is provided by the opinions directly expressed in this regard by the scholars who participated in this expert survey. From this standpoint the responses given by the interviewees make it possible to identify three distinct areas: a Western area, an area of Eastern European countries, and an area of Third World countries.

In the first area there is predominant satisfaction with the suitability of the existing forces that drive research, although obviously with individual remarks and proposals for improvement. This satisfaction is not uniform, however: on one end of the range is the extremely positive opinion for the U.S., where five respondents out of six express themselves with expressions of the type: "*The United States' military does much more social science research than any other country I think of. I would like to see government social scientists, like me, get more freedom to determine what we will work on. I would also like to be able to do more of the work rather than supervising the works of contractors. I believe that in other countries the research is more likely to be done in universities and that should give the scientists who do the work more control over what they are doing.*"

Opinions are less enthusiastic for countries like Austria, France and Italy, where one respondent writes, for example:

> Among those who make decisions as to the expected value of proposed research projects, not enough are experts: people who are both trained in the social sciences and familiar with the field's classical literature. Many are officers or civilian generalist social scientists who act as if nothing had been written in the military field, in the country or elsewhere. As a result, projects are sometimes awarded to complete beginners who are apt to reinvent the wheel without reference to some central concepts (e.g. 'professionalism', 'radical' or 'pragmatic', 'occupationalism'), and often without considering the military's unique characteristics. Also, except for a few individual researchers, there is no consideration of the international dimension: as in my country the number of social scientists doing research in the military field is too small for a proper mutual evaluation of published work at national level, much mediocre

work is allowed to stand. Lately, many researchers entered the field because they were attracted by the money on offer to study the future all-volunteer force, but have no intention to invest heavily in the field. Amateurism has become a plague. What is missing in my country is a specialized milieu organized into an 'invisible college' recognized by the military establishment, as in the United States.

In the area of the ex-communist European countries the inputs to research and the organisms that carry it out are often perceived as distorted by different interests from those of the research itself, still limited by a degree of closure on the part of the military establishment; however, there is research, it has taken on considerable vigour since the end of the Cold War, and the respondents consider it to be undoubtedly growing. Here, too, there is a range of evaluations, as in this negative one expressed by a Russian respondent: "*All researches are focused on the struggle for power in coming elections. In big cities, there are priorities of Yury Luzshkov's Movement. In far-away regions, adepts of Egor Stroev screw out ideas of military sociologists. And 'poor' oligarchs let down all private research centers in provinces to concentrate efforts within the mass media (TV, newspapers, magazines, and video markets with the military or police topics). We should remember that unpredictability of elite's behavior in Russia has under-estimate the value and, correspondingly, need in sociological data among potential commissioners.*" Other researchers are more optimistic, affirming "*According to me these are only the first steps. We have a lot of work to do in the field of military sociology in Bulgaria in the future,*" and "*It starts to change for better: earlier it was completely closed for anyone outside the defense establishment itself. We haven't reached, however, the normal for the developed democratic countries situation, where this stuff is published in academic journals and discussed in the larger academic community.*"

Completely outside this framework is Slovenia, which seems to have attained much more Western standards in this sector as well: it is the common opinion of the Slovenian respondents that military sociological research is considerably

developed and free in their country. One of them writes: "*I would describe Slovenian situation as very liberal. Which means that military is open to the research, is aware of sociological aspects which have to be viewed by neutral 'outsiders'. There are also problems deriving from the lack of sociological military research tradition. Sometimes the commissioners are too liberal, and sometimes too close.*" The situation in the Czech Republic, as described by the respondent of that country, appears to be close to Western European standards as well.

The last area takes in the countries of the Third World included in this research. The respondents from Argentina, India and Lithuania consider research inputs in the sector almost non-existent in their countries, research centres either non-existent or hobbled, the prospects for change still far off. One colleague writes: "*As mentioned before there is not any institution which commissions research projects of military sociology in my country. All activity and proposals are based on private initiative, commitment and interest of researcher. There is a 'dream' to create a research centre within a Military academy or other university in order to develop the military sociology in Lithuania.*" Another colleague even sees regression: "*There has been advisory work for the public officials and political parties, mainly on civil-military relations. This has been particularly true during the period of return to constitutional rule (1983/9). Some research has been conducted into the Armed Forces, commissioned by the Armed Forces on manpower, recruitment of officers,* etc. By now this kind of research is close to zero, for budget constraints.*"

Procedures Used by the Commissioning Bodies

As already seen in the foregoing sections, military sociological research appears to be prevalently entrusted to state-run research centres, although commissions to individual researchers and private centres are extensive. But if we look

at the criteria with which the commissioning bodies choose the person responsible for the research, it seems interesting to go deeper into that 44.4% of the interviewees, already cited above, who say that in their countries there are preference criteria for choosing the persons to whom research projects are to be assigned.

From the study it emerged, as mentioned above, that the highest rate of preference (40%), where one exists, is for "friends" or "friends of friends": that is, in a large group of countries, knowing the right people in the right place means a greater likelihood of the researcher obtaining assignments. In addition to friendships, or perhaps combined with them, there is political affiliation: the 20% who claim that in their countries there are particular preferences in choosing the person responsible for research attribute these preferences to a criterion of political sympathy or affiliation.

It also emerged that 20% feel that there is a preference for military people, but another 20% feel the preference goes to civilian researchers: here, of course, the aggregate datum says nothing and it has to be broken down by country. Thus there seems to be a preference for civilian researchers in the U.S., but this opinion is not unanimous, since among the respondents there are also those who claim the choice is often oriented in favour of mixed military/civilian groups. One American researcher writes: "*In my experience, many grant agencies prefer a mix of military (active officers) and civilian (university or private research firm) investigators on a research proposal: these proposals often have a better chance to be funded.*"

The preference for a military researcher is specifically expressed for Austria and Lithuania (or possibly a reserve officer).

Although, as has been seen, a large majority of the sample (76%), and therefore, presumably, of the surveyed universe, is made up by male researchers, the commissioning bodies do not seem to demonstrate substantial criteria of preference linked to gender: only two interviewees indicate gender as a deciding element, but together with other preference criteria. Then there is

an American interviewee who indicates an opposing preference for some types of research: "*In recent times, female researchers seem to get preference on studies related to gender issues.*"

Almost always (over 80% of the responses) the commissioning body sets the research budget and topic in awarding the research and, for the majority of the respondents (66%), it also sets the time available to the research group. Usually more freedom is left to decide the sample, as well as the research methodologies. Nevertheless, limits are frequently imposed on the researcher, generally consisting in taboo subjects, military units that cannot be investigated, or constraints on the data and results of the research. Nearly 64% of the interviewees report that there is one or the other of these constraints. In particular, divulging the results of the research appears to be subject to restrictions of various kinds in a large group of countries. These restrictions range from the requiring an authorisation for publication to prohibition of publication for some (and at times for many) researches that seem to exist in other countries.

The description of research authorisation procedures by a Dutch interviewee is quite explicit, and as one can read in the following lines, testifies to substantial freedom not only of research but also of initiative for those who are qualified: "*As a researcher I can ask a commander (general or even colonel or lower) for permission to do research. Sometimes I only ask permission of the military to be interviewed. When the research has political implications (media that are interested, et cetera) I try to 'cover my back' by acquiring approval from higher ranking military (even generals). Commanders are mostly surprisingly open to give information or co-operation. It is normal procedure that we keep others informed on forthcoming research by way of an official research plan, this research plan contains all research going on at the Military Academy (technical, economic, strategic as well as behavioural research). This research plan also allocated means (money, time) to researchers for a specific research. But some publications I write (like the*

one on the social origins of cadets) are not planned for, neither have I asked official permission to write on the subject."

Objective reasons are also cited for why research on the military appears destined to grow in the future. The British respondent writes, for example: "*In recent years, the MOD has become more open about developing a dialogue with academics in the area of military sociology. This is set to continue I think, not least because this area of personnel (broadly conceived) is of critical importance for military effectiveness.*"

In some countries constraints are also present, however, both on the units on which research may be done and on the dissemination of results. An example is offered by one of the Russian researchers interviewed, who writes: "*Today it is pretty hard to get a permission from the MD officials for a study to be carried out inside the troops and combat detachments. The reports on the study are often considered as classified material with the restricted zone of circulation. Due to mentioned cause it is often impossible to present the results of the study at the civilian scientific meetings, in sociological journals and open media.*"

Nonetheless, the situation seems to be improving in the countries of Eastern Europe as well. A Bulgarian interviewee writes, for example: "*Research in the field of military sociology in Bulgaria has more than 30 years of history. This is especially true for the surveys among military personnel, conducted by the Sociological Research Centre of the MoD. The problem was that until 1990 the results were classified, and few publications resulted from these surveys. During the last several years the first steps towards co-operation with colleagues from civilian institutions in the country and military sociologists abroad were undertaken.*"

And for Russia, too, an interviewee states: "*The application for research in the area of military sociology is likely to be approved by the leading national funds and relevant organizations. Despite all troubles life is going on. The basic problem for Russian scholars is a lack of financial resources for research and even for salaries and wages. The military sociologists are suffering from this reason like others.*"

The research budget appears to be agreed between the commissioning body and the person responsible for the research in most of the countries of the sample. It appears to be fixed a priori by the commissioning body in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia and South Africa. In a few of these countries, however (Czech Republic, Netherlands, South Africa), and also in Switzerland, it can be modified during the research on the basis of the actual costs. In some countries (Argentina, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, South Africa and the U.S.) it is all-inclusive; in the remaining ones—the majority—researcher remuneration is a separate item from research costs.

Almost everywhere the commissioning body refrains from interfering with the conduct of the research: sample selection, administering questionnaires or conducting interviews, and collection and coding of data are left completely up to the research group, with the sole exception, it would seem, of some interference in sample choice in Argentina. In Poland questionnaires are subject to prior control by the commissioner.

Degree of Freedom in the Research Performing

The point raised here pertains to an apparently outdated *querelle*, about the relationships between social research and social institutions, or better, between sociology and politics, or even between social researchers and some specific institutions where, like in the military, values and political issues maintain a strong relevance becoming (recalling Janowitz 1978) particularly intriguing when relating to topics such as war and peace.

Limiting the scope of the discussion to the specific field of military sociology, many statements and propositions already applied to

general sociology as a positive science (the Weberian *Wertfreiheit*,) as a critical science (unmasking contradictions within social institutions), and as an applied science (to know in order to help solving social problems) can easily be applied and discussed. This is especially true when the topics are rightly those of the institutional position of the social scientist, within or without the military institution, and of the type of research commissioning, directly from the military or from other "civilian" research centres.

Here there is a tentative to renew the discussion about status and role of social research "on", "in" and "for" the military.

In the research conducted among experts and military sociologists, some topics were raised about: research freedom degree as far as military subjects are concerned, research outputs' use and possible limitations in circulation of results, research status (that is, its relevance and given importance by military staff and authorities).

As it can be seen, these are critical and topical issues in the field of applied research when it is conducted within or commissioned by an institution whose core business is not scientific research (unlike the case of universities or independent research centres). It is by no means an exclusive matter for military institutions, since secrecy, researchers loyalty and institutional interest conditioning are present and well-known aspects in social research within profit organisations (firms, for instance), or political organisations (such as parties and the like). But there are good reasons to think that these issues become even more critical when military institution is involved (Boëne 1990).

As a general remark, when speaking with sociologists and social scientists in general who deal with armed forces, a common trait arises, about a more or less explicit and more or less widespread mood of "suspicion" and "reticence" of military institution toward sociology and social scientists in general; such a mood has to be overcame and turned into trust by means of an accurate and somewhat continuous action of explanation, clarification, and re-assurance that the research is necessary, its outcome will be fruitful and intentions are positively bound to the well-being of the institution. Such a work is necessary when the researcher does not belong to the institution, and especially when he or she has not a military status. It is not necessary, or less necessary, when the researcher has a military status or when he or she does belong to the military institution (in military research centres, or defense departments' research centres), since in those cases hierarchy, obedience and institutional loyalty are supposed to be internalised traits, thus reducing and in any case controlling any "opportunistic behavior" by the researcher. In this last case, researchers sometimes complain about restrictions in the choice of research topics, pressure in order to get fast and ready-to-use results (at the expenses of a deeper and cautious scientific outlook), or even about the perceived underestimation and final uselessness of their work.

In the present research, it is possible to see and to compare these different situations, even though the "occasional" character of the sample (formed by those researchers only whose e-mail address was known to us and within them by only those wishing to answer to our questionnaire) can put a certain bias over our considerations. In any case, we can consider our sample as a Delphi-type sample (as it was already said), since all respondents can be easily considered as "experts" of the field, the number is not necessarily fixed by any sample/universe ratio, and they answered to the same question-sets in an independent and individual way by means of a e-mailed questionnaire. It is not a true Delphi method since there has not been iteration of the interview, but there is chance that the first evaluation of data here presented could be considered as part of an iterative process in order to gain a more stable and self-corrected description of the phenomenon under study.

The topic can be considered under three aspects: the true freedom in the research path (choice of topics, of researchers, of methodologies…); the use of research output (dissemination, copyright…); and the status occupied by social research on military matters within military institutions and in general among the various commissioning bodies.

Freedom in Research Work

This is a critical topic. Of course, the main difference is given by a structural distinction pertaining to the status of researchers, since it is assumed that the very place where research should be intrinsically free is within an academic/university framework (university in general, and centres like national centres for scientific research), provided that the single researcher or the research group be totally responsible for the choice of the topic, the conduction of the research in all its stages, data treatment and dissemination of results, and the only authority recognised to judge (but not to limit) the work done be made of professional peers, that is the scientific community. There is the question of research funding, but also in this case, the difference is given by the source: academic/institutional or private coming from outside. Another difference comes from the type of the research: basic or applied. Freedom in the research work could be put on a freedom scale, varying from a maximum to a minimum, where all these factors assume different ways and weights (Table 30.4).

We could say that the degree of freedom is normally highest in the first case, when research is done within a university, with public/institutional funds, is basic and results are judged by the scientific community; freedom degree can lower down to the last, the Military Research Centre where commissioner and funding are internal, the research is rather totally applied and the control is performed by the institution itself. Of course this is a very general

scheme, since the single case can be considered under more than one category, and subdivision can also change according to different nations and normative-legal standards (see for instance the different situation of a public, state-run university and of a private university). We can take this classification as provisional, and we shall try to describe and interpret our data under these different combinations. Adaptations and changing will come later, according to our data.

The Research Path

According to our data, there is a generalised possibility for a single researcher to propose a research project to any commissioner (state or private centre), even on a private individual basis, and this option is declared to be acceptable in a large majority of cases (i.e. countries): 75% of our respondents are positive to this regard. But this possibility remains more in principle than in practice, since (as it is clarified elsewhere in this chapter) there are selective preferences for state centres to be committed more frequently.

Generally speaking, there is a link between the variety of possible research entitlements and the liveliness of social research in the field: in countries where military sociology has gained a relatively high status, all the three options (state centres, private centres and single researchers) are chosen, even though with differences among countries; on the contrary, in countries such as Argentina, Lithuania and India research in the field is rare and usually committed (or permitted and financially sustained) to single researchers

Table 30.4 Freedom scale

Control over research	Type of institution	Funding source	Type of research output	Freedom level
Only or mainly the scientific community	University/National Scien. Res. Centres	Public/Institutional	Basic (B)	******
		Private	Applied (A)	*****
Institution and/or external commissioner	State run Res. Centres	Public/Institutional	Basic and applied	****
Institution and/or external commissioner	Private Res. Centres	Institutional, various	Mainly applied	***
Institution	Military Res. Centres	Institutional	Applied	**

acting as the true input source. It is evident, and even obvious, that the general difference is given by the different degree of "institutionalisation" received by military sociology in each country: this institutionalisation is proved by the presence and activity of research centres totally or partially oriented to this special field, indifferently public, private or both, and by in the discipline "military sociology" in universities the existence of courses at undergraduate and/or postgraduate level or military academies.

Being mainly state and/or private centres to be entitled for social research, a certain "veto" power over the choice of the very researcher is declared in 10 countries (38%), and these are Austria, Germany, India, Italy, Lithuania, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, USA and Argentina; for some of them, where respondents are more than one, there are controversial answers, such as for Germany, Sweden and USA, where some says that preferences are present and some other assert the contrary. This means that countries where there is no declared preference for researchers are Belgium, Bulgaria, Cekia, Israel, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland and UK, that is, 9 countries. These preferences are clarified by a minority of respondents (five people only), so that answers cannot be considered to be meaningful with respect to our sample); some says that only military personnel is preferred, some that only civilian researchers are preferred, some other speaks about "friends of bureaucrats belonging to the commissioning body". There are in general certain topics not allowed to investigate, and this is the case for 41% of respondents (that is, for Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, USA and Argentina, of which six countries are among those where also control over researchers is exerted by the commissioning body). Only a few respondents indicate what kind of topics are not allowed for investigation, and these are so called "sensitive matters" for Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Argentina, ethical and unpopular issues for USA, ethical issues for Sweden.

As far as control over methodologies is concerned, this peculiar control is exerted in Austria,

in Russia, in Sweden and in the USA, but in the last three countries experts are divided between positive and negative answers. But control can be enlarged also to more technical aspects of the research path, such as questionnaires (if any) and gender or status of the interviewer. The first is true in the experience of the large majority of respondents, and the only exceptions are in Cekia, Slovenia, Sweden, UK and, controversially in Russia. The fact that structured questionnaires are usually submitted to a prior control by the commissioner is a normal procedure in organisational research, and it is linked not only to a will of control over the research process but to the strength of hierarchical power usually exerted over personnel: as long as the military is a highly hierarchical organisation, this power is performed in order to prevent disloyal behaviours, or disruptive consequences for the organisation.

The case of armed forces is peculiar also because of the existence of "classified matters", what means matters which military personnel are not allowed to speak about freely or with non-military people. The second element is given by preferences expressed over gender or status of the interviewer, that is the person who directly approaches military personnel: in this case control is present in Austria, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, Argentina and controversially in USA. Types of preferences are not indicated by respondents, only a few speaks about preferences of "military personnel" or "military-oriented" people, and very little indication is given about gender.

An "Index of Control Over the Research Path"

In order to give a picture of the situation, a table can be drawn by data shown above, so that a kind of measure of the control degree could be formed. This "Index of control over research path" is formed by five elements, two pertaining the person of the researchers involved, and three the content and methods of the research. Presence/absence of each element gives us the

level of control exerted in each country, ranging from 0 to 5, where 0 means no control at all and 5 means the highest control in each country; where controversial answers are presented, a .5 point is given to the specific element.

From the table an index can be formed, ranging from 0 to 5, that is from a situation where the control is absent to one where the control is performed over each element: in order to simplify interpretation, we can divide countries into three groups, according to the following classification:

from 0 to 1.5 points = no and low control
from 2 to 2.5 points = medium control
from 3 to 5 points = high control

Using this classification we have a first group of six countries where research path seems to be rather free of control (Czekia, Slovenia and UK) or at a low level (Bulgaria, Netherlands and Switzerland); a second group formed by six "medium control" countries (Belgium, Italy, Poland, South Africa, Germany and Sweden); and a third group of five "high control" countries (Austria, Argentina, Lithuania, Russia, and the USA). Regrouped countries are shown in Table 30.5, single countries Index is shown in Table 30.6.

Each group does not seem to be internally homogeneous under some respect, unless we look for different explanations leading to similar results. In the "low control" (LC) group three former Eastern countries are present, where we could say that this rather free condition could be the output of the generalised liberalisation

followed to the overall political and economical change after 1989.

But this explanation does not apply evidently to the situation of countries such as Switzerland, The Netherlands and United Kingdom. Making reference to a well-known distinction among countries according to their position along some general cultural dimensions (Hofstede 1997), the three last countries score low in the so-called Power Distance dimension. The PD Index is a measure of the relevance assigned to hierarchy and of respect for authority, so that a high score on this dimension describes a country where authority, control and obedience are largely present and valued, while a low score means cultural patterns where more egalitarian, non-hierarchical behaviours are preferred. It seems here that this dimension could be responsible for the variance in the level of control performed, and accepted, over sociological research, at least with respect to the military domain. In the second MC group, Belgium, South Africa and Italy have high scores on PD Index, but this is not the case for Germany and Sweden (PD Index score is low); because of absence of this kind of data, Poland cannot be judged under this respect, and its rather medium-low control comes probably from the same reasons recalled for the other former Eastern countries in the low-control group.

The last HC group is formed by Russia and USA (where military matters were and continue to be of critical relevance because of their international role, in the bipolar and in the postpolar world as well) and by Lithuania, Argentina and Austria. Here PD Index fails in its explicative

Table 30.5 Countries by level of control over social research

Low control (0–1.5 points)	Medium control (2–2.5 points)	High control (3–5 points)
Czekia	Belgium	Lithuania
Slovenia	Italy	Russia
UK	Poland	USA
Switzerland	South Africa	Argentina
Netherlands	Sweden	Austria
Bulgaria	Germany	

Table 30.6 Level of control over research path, by country

Country	R	T	M	TL	I	Index
Argentina	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	4
Austria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	5
Belgium	N	N	N	Y	Y	2
Bulgaria	N	N	N	Y	YN	1.5
Czekia	N	N	N	N	N	0
France	–	–	–	–	–	–
Germany	YN	Y	N	Y	N	2.5
India	Y	–	–	–	–	–
Israel	N	–	–	–	–	–
Italy	Y	N	N	Y	N	2
Lithuania	Y	N	N	Y	Y	3
Netherlands	N	N	N	Y	N	1
Poland	N	Y	N	Y	N	2
Russia	Y	Y	YN	YN	Y	4
Slovenia	N	N	N	N	N	0
South Africa	Y	N	N	Y	N	2
Sweden	YN	Y	YN	N	N	2
Switzerland	N	Y	N	–	N	1
UK	N	N	N	N	N	0
USA	YN	YN	YN	Y	YN	3

R Researcher; *T* Topic; *M* Methodology; *TL* Tooll *I* Interviewer; *Index* total Y

capacity, since USA and Austria have low scores, Argentina only has a high PDI score, and for Russia and Lithuania there are no data of this kind.

Another dimension, defined by Hofstede as Uncertainty Avoidance, is supposed to measure the way through which a culture deals with uncertainty and risk: a high score on the UA Index (UAI) means that uncertainty is feared and thus overcontrolled by means of rules and restrictions, while a low score means that uncertainty is generally accepted, with the consequence of reducing rules to a minimum and considering new things without anxiety. Also this dimension could give some insight for our topic, since acceptance or anxiety toward science and its output could be differently managed by different cultures coping with uncertainty in different ways. In our case, countries in the LC group—where such data are available at least—

have low scores on the UAI (Netherlands and UK, but not Switzerland); in the MC group, UAI has high scores for Belgium, Germany, and Italy (but not for Sweden and South Africa); in the HC group, UAI is high for Argentina and Austria, but not in the USA. In particular, the USA are a true exception, since with their low scores on both indexes, should stay in the LC group with Holland and UK.

A second attempt to explain the different levels of control over social research in the various countries could make reference to data collected in the interviews, by considering the place where research is usually performed, together with the place where the respondent (being a researcher in the field) usually conducts her/his researches.

We could assume that control could be (or perceived to be) lower when research is self-commissioned or commissioned by the

public administration and performed within state-run centres, run by the Ministry of Defence, where researchers normally do their job: this because researchers, being submitted to a sort of hierarchical control, are insiders with respect to the institution responsible for the research, and control is "internalised" in their status-role. For research commissioned to free-lancers or scholars working in universities, their outsider status can induce the commissioning body to a stronger control over various steps of the research path. In the LC group, Czekia, Slovenia, UK, Switzerland, Netherlands and Bulgaria are all countries where research is usually conducted within state centres run by MOD, and respondents in these countries generally belong to the same centres. A similar situation is found in the MC group countries. In the last HC group, Lithuania, Argentina and Austria are countries where sociological research on the military is rare and normally conducted by outsiders, over which control by the commissioner is (or is perceived to be) rather strong and step-by-step; for Russia and USA, the situation is a mixture of MOD and private centres, and in fact the level of control is rather medium-high than high.

As a second step we can see what other aspects related with research conduction and output are put under institutional control in each of the three groups.

The other aspects investigated are more technical elements, such as sample selection, questionnaire administration, interview conduction, questionnaire gathering and data codification, the possible perception of any kind of pressure and its degree, and the control over research output such as copyright, dissemination and publication of results.

Sample selection, questionnaire administration and gathering, interviewees and data coding, that is, all technical aspects, are performed by the research group everywhere, with the only exception of Argentina, where sample selection and questionnaire administration are done by the commissioner.

The feeling of some kind of pressure is declared in 11 countries, notwithstanding their position in the three groups (Czekia,

Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland and UK in the first group, Sweden and Germany in the second, and USA and Austria in the third group). Paradoxically, this feeling is declared by researchers in all but one of the low control countries, and less in the other two groups where control is higher. This could be the consequence of the degree of freedom left to researchers: where freedom is high a pressure of any kind concerning time or research output is perceived as disturbing, where freedom is restricted, on the contrary, pressures are to a certain extent a part of the game. The degree of pressure perceived is high only in Austria, a country at the highest level of control, moderate in UK and USA, rather low or really low in Germany, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Netherlands, absent in Poland (all these countries belong to the first and the second group, low and medium control level). Only the Austrian expert affirms that pressures are done in order to manipulate results, and one American respondent says that pressures are intended to change or adapt some contents of the research report; for Czekia, Sweden and UK pressures are also perceived in the form of urgency to reach final results.

Research Output

Another critical aspect in the research/commissioner relationships is given by the possibility to disseminate research results. In this very aspect the control performed by the commissioner can restrict the scientific evaluation made by professional peers, and the process of knowledge accumulation created by the free circulation of research outputs. Here again there are differences among countries, with some relation with their position in the "control classification" above presented, but also with some generalised traits that induce to think that a certain control over research output dissemination is present everywhere, and it is clearly performed by the commissioning institution.

As far as research output is concerned, there is usually a publication paid by the commissioner in Slovenia, Bulgaria and Netherlands (LC

group), in Belgium, Germany and South Africa (MC group), and USA (HC group); a selective publication under commissioner's judgement is another form of results dissemination in Austria, Russia and USA (HC group), Bulgaria and UK (LC group), France, Italy and Poland (MC group). The possibility for the research group to freely publish their research results is declared for Slovenia and UK (LC group), for all countries but Italy in the MC group, and for Russia, USA and Lithuania (HC group). Independently from the position in the "control classification", an unpublished report for internal circulation is also a possible output in Belgium, Cekia, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, UK, USA and Argentina. The range of possible forms of publication is evidently wide, but the option to freely publish research results is absent in Austria, where the maximum control is performed and only a selective publication under the commissioner's judgement is possible, as well as in Cekia (where previous control is absent), in Italy and in Germany (medium control) and in Argentina (high control). Research results are covered by copyright everywhere but in Belgium, Slovenia, USA and Argentina, and the copyright holder is in general the commissioner; copyright is held by the research group in Cekia, Netherlands, Slovenia and Switzerland (all low control countries).

Social Research Status

The last aspect to explore is given by the status and relevance recognised to sociological research by the military, independently by the fact that some more or less limited research be made or not. It is not unusual the case where research is done but results are practically forgotten or underestimated. Many times research is performed in order to legitimate a choice already done and hardly changeable by means of research results.

A good indicator of the status of military sociology within the military institution is the presence of sociologists in the role of adviser or expert. Such a role can be permanent, occasional,

or absent; another indicator for the importance given to social research on the matter is the existence of specialised research centres, state-run or private. In this last case, specialised centres for social research on the military are present in the large majority of countries; in Switzerland and South Africa there are only centres where this specialisation is part of a more general orientation, and only Indian and Lithuanian respondents say that no centres at all exist in their countries. In any case, the number of these agencies is very limited, one in the majority of cases, somewhere two or three, like in France and USA.

These research centres are mainly part of the Defense Department, with the only exceptions of South Africa and Switzerland where centres are dependent partly from the MoD and some University. Only in two cases, Slovenia and Sweden, personnel is exclusively civilian, and only in one case, Italy, personnel is totally military; everywhere else personnel can have a civilian and a military status as well. In some countries military sociology is practised also in private research centres, and this is the case for Bulgaria, Cekia, Israel, Italy, Russia, Slovenia. South Africa, Sweden, UK and USA; in four countries these centres have a university status (France, Israel, Slovenia and USA), while in Bulgaria, Italy, Russia and South Africa they are national or international foundations. If in state-run centres the majority of cases presents a mixed personnel structure (civilian and military), in private centres researchers are mainly civilian, and only in Bulgaria, Russia and USA a mixed structure is reported.

Summing up, we can consider countries where social research on the armed forces is "rather popular", in the sense that it enables to sustain public as well as private agencies, and this is the case for Bulgaria, France, Israel, Italy, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, UK and USA; there are countries where social research is conducted only "under the banner" of the Ministry of Defence, such as in Austria, Belgium, Cekia, Germany, Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland, with some support in some cases from a university; and there are cases with no

research centres at all, such as India, Lithuania and Argentina.

Of course, there are differences, especially in the first group of countries, where military sociology seems to have reached a rather institutionalised status: differences are in quantity (how many centres, what level of budget, how many people at work, productive standards…) as well as in quality (quality level of research, selection and control over researchers…), but these elements are not valuable by means of our questionnaire. In many of the countries where military sociology has a recognised status a sociologist is present as Staff advisor: in a permanent role in Austria, Bulgaria, Cekia, Netherlands, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, UK and USA; occasionally a sociologist is requested as advisor in France and Switzerland, while this opportunity is declared to be absent in Belgium, Italy and Poland. It appears to be rather obvious that no sociologist is requested in such a role in India, Lithuania and Argentina, where military sociology has a rather low status and surely not an institutional position.

Methodological Framework

The Methodology of the Research

This is a quantitative and qualitative research conducted by mean of semi-structured interviews.

The semi-structured interview method was chosen because, since it is an expert survey, the authors are interested in exploring the personal experiences of the interviewees through their feelings and evaluations, or even concrete events and situations but described from their own perspective.

The use of a semi-structured questionnaire (contained in the Appendix B) also made it necessary to use qualitative research methodologies alongside the prevalent quantitative ones. We consider the use of the two research methodologies a fully positive experience as it allows a multilateral approach to the subject of investigation.

The questions in the questionnaire were put to the interviewees in successive sets sent by e-mail. Administering the questions by e-mail was designed to achieve the advantages listed below.[5]

1. Overcome problems of time and space: As Murray and Sixsmith (1998) write, '*Access to face to face interviewees can sometimes be difficult or impossible to orchestrate due to geographical and time constraints. E-mail interviewing can enable such access, thereby expanding the possible diversity of the research sample.*'

2. Allow the interviewers to make the most of the opportunity of modifying the next set of questions on the basis of the responses given in the preceding set: Sending successive sets of questions at different times makes it possible to expand enormously the amount of time the interviewer has, with respect to face-to-face interviews, to adapt the next question to the answer provided to the previous one. This possibility of feedback accompanied by the possibility of cross-fertilisation, given the fact that the interviewer has all the interviewees' answers before administering the next set of questions.

3. Conduct surveys on large samples or samples distributed world-wide at little cost.

4. Give interviewees the possibility of responding at their best convenience in terms of time and place, and with a more meditated language than in oral interviews: As Murray and Sixsmith again (1998) observe, '*the asynchronous character of e-mail exchange (sequentially and extended over time) gives recipients time to consider their responses.*'

5. Simplify analysis of the data: The responses arrive directly on the interviewers' computers and are practically ready for being coded and analysed, eliminating all the work (and also a certain dose of subjectivity) involved in transcribing the interviews.

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[5]For a theoretical examination of the advantages and disadvantages of an e-mail survey, see Murray and Sixsmith (1998).

These pluses do not allow us to overlook the drawbacks that this system of interviews already involves a priori, and which we examine as listed in the already cited study by Murray and Sixsmith.

1. Relatively slow and interrupted flow of information: The time interval between one set of questions and the next can make the interviewee less present and less involved in the research objectives.
2. Evaluation of the context: Murray and Sixsmith observe that in face-to-face interviews the interviewer sees the context in which the interview takes place and is therefore able to evaluate whether this context is influencing the responses; this is not possible in e-mail interviews. However, we feel that the prevalent response context, in our case, is the interviewee's workstation, and therefore an entirely favourable one, because it is familiar and is normally without the imminent presence of third parties.
3. Non-verbal communication: The full array of non-verbal communication is definitely absent in e-mail interviews.
4. Invisibility and presentation of self: Both the interviewee and the interviewer can give any representation of themselves. This advantage would appear to be particularly significant when the survey deals with personal or family issues, much less so in our case.
5. The sampling: The sample for an e-mail survey risks being completely elitist, especially in certain countries, because it can only include people equipped with a computer and an Internet connection. This problem has little importance in our survey, which is conducted among scholars, the vast majority of whom are now equipped with such systems.

This analysis of the pros and cons made us feel that, for a research like the one in question, at least in the planning phase, the advantages clearly outweigh the possible disadvantages, among which only that of not being able to analyse the non-verbal communication really remains relevant. We shall see in the next section what other positive and negative aspects of this survey method emerged as the research unfolded concretely.

In order to avoid the first of the four researcher's nightmares, well described by Miles and Huberman (1994),[6] we first carefully identified the subject and the purpose of our investigation. The subject of the survey is 'sociological research on the military'; the purpose of the survey is 'finding out and comparing how social research on the military is carried out in the different countries.' The conceptual framework of the research was outlined in Fig. 30.1.

Development of the Research

This section is aimed at answering the familiar question, 'How should things be set up so that the study could be verified or replicated by someone else?'

The research began by putting together a mailing list of 128 scholars (a Delphi-type sample) in the sector who might be interested in participating in a survey like the one we had in mind. All of them were sent an e-mail message describing the purpose and subject of the research and defining in particular the following points:

– survey times and methods
– research methodology
– acceptance deadline
– possibility of withdrawing at any time
– dissemination of results

All were asked to express explicitly their willingness to participate.

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[6]'Researchers have four recurring nightmares about data analysis. In the first nightmare, the data are not good. They have not illuminated what they were supposed to. In the second nightmare, systematic error has occurred in the most important data. In the third nightmare, conclusions come out of the wringer of successively more sophisticated analyses looking ever trivial or trite ("You spent $77,000 to tell us that?"). And in the last nightmare, the data resist analysis, are opaque, even inscrutable.' (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 77).

A first selection occurred when a number of messages came back because of erroneous, changed or expired addresses. The number of messages that reached their destination was 118. Five colleagues asked for further clarification before accepting. Forty-nine colleagues ultimately accepted, representing 25 different countries.

The answers to the first two sets of questions showed us at this point that some of the subsequent questions were now superfluous and could be eliminated or grouped together. Six questions were eliminated and, as a result, it was possible to reduce the number of sets actually administered from the six originally planned to five.

Below is the numerical trend of the responses to the different sets of questions:

Adhesions	49
Responses to the 1st set	33
Responses to the 2nd set	29
Responses to the 3rd set	26
Responses to the 4th set	25
Responses to the 5th set	26

For the purposes of the research, the questionnaires with only one set of answered questions were used as well. The total number of questionnaires examined was therefore 33, representing 20 different countries.

Finally, the overall representativeness of the examined sample proved to be good. Taking the percentages of members of RC 01 ('Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution') of the ISA as a reference, the distribution by geographic area was as follows:

Region	Expert survey %	RC 01 Membership rate %
U.S.	19	23
West EU	35	35
East EU	29	17
Other	13	27

Considering that membership in RC 01 broadly represents the range of active participation in research in military sociology world-wide, we see that the sample resulting in the expert survey appears quite close, in percentage terms, to the membership rate for Western Europe and the United States, is above the rate for Eastern Europe, and somewhat deficient for the remaining regions of the world. The greater participation of East European colleagues appears consistent with the enthusiasm they have demonstrated towards research in the sector since 1989.

Final Remarks on Methodology

Researchers' Assessments

A final assessment of the adopted methodology was made by comparing the advantages and disadvantages that we had expected might be involved in carrying out semi-structured interviews in successive sets by e-mail and those that actually cropped up as the research unfolded.

Let us first examine the advantages on the basis of prior expectations:

1. Overcome problems of time and space: the hypothesised advantage can definitely be considered confirmed.
2. Allow the interviewers to make the most of the opportunity of modifying the next set of questions on the basis of the responses given in the preceding set: This possibility was confirmed with the limit that, given the delay with which many responses arrived, the time available to the researchers to make adjustments in the next set was actually quite short due to the desire to respect the general timetable of the research.
3. Conduct surveys on large samples or samples distributed world-wide at little cost: This expectation was definitely confirmed.
4. Give interviewees the possibility of responding at their best convenience in terms of time

and place, and with a more meditated language than in oral interviews: We have data indicating that this condition was generally fulfilled (see below).

5. Simplify analysis of the data: This condition was undoubted fulfilled.

Going on to analysis of the disadvantages:

1. Relatively slow and interrupted flow of information: Analysis of the data leads us to say that the fragmentation of the questionnaire does not seem to have affected the logic of the responses.
2. Evaluation of the context: What was said in the paragraph No. 1 holds true.
3. Non-verbal communication: despite what was stated in the paragraph No. 1, it must be pointed out that some non-verbal information was supplied to us by the different interviewees' ways of answering:. answers only to questions; answers to the questions plus clarifying comment; no response to individual questions and a single summarising, discursive response for all the questions of the set, etc.
4. Invisibility and presentation of self: As already observed, given the survey topic, the absence of this type of observation does not seem important.
5. Elitist sampling: Also for this point our pre-research observation holds.

However, the following disadvantages not foreseen in the research planning stage emerged:

1. A kind of 'loss of interest' during the research, shown statistically by the number of participants at the start and the number of respondents who stayed with the research to the end.
2. The choice of the survey times was no longer completely up to the researchers, but significantly depended on the pace at which the responses flowed in.

3. The semi-structured interview was transformed into a free-form interview at times, when the respondent decided not to respond question by question but to write a statement of his own on the overall subject of the questions in the set. However, this might also constitute a peculiar characteristic of qualitative research, where, according to Kvale (1988), '*data are not being collected but rather co-authored.*'

A final note: in the analysis of the results, general figures were outlined, and then national specificities were often be sought. The latter have often been based on responses given by just one expert who participated in the research for that country. On the one hand, therefore, one must consider the degree of approximation that the indication of such national specificities can have (although in many cases this is a typical aspect of expert surveys); on the other, one must consider that in many medium-sized countries, such as Italy, the scholars who deal with this sector of investigation—not necessarily full time but at least chiefly—can be counted on the fingers of one hand; in others (such as India, or Lithuania), it is not easy to find even one. In any case, the individual country data in this study must be considered with caution, more as expressions of probability than as certainties.

Interviewees' Assessments

But what was the opinion of the interviewees on the advantages/disadvantages of the method adopted for administering the interviews? Once the interview period was completed, the researchers sent those who participated in the whole survey an additional e-mail asking for their opinion on the course that had been pursued. Answers were given to this question by 19 interviewees: 16 expressed evaluations of the adopted methodology that were positive on the whole, two were neutral (it was like answering a mailed questionnaire), and one was negative.

Both in the overall positive responses and in those critical or neutral, observations worth reporting emerge.

The first regards a certain difficulty initially, later overcome. It takes the form of answers like '*I was a bit stilted when I wrote the responses to the first questionnaire, but after I got used to it,*' and '*I had a vague feeling that answering through Internet I am not so responsible as doing it in a normal way. And I had to check my answers several times…*'

A second type of comment expressed the fear that precisely the ease of conducting world-wide surveys over the Internet would lead to a kind of saturation of the method. This type of observation is expressed in responses like '*However the easiness of the e-mail survey may enhance the number of surveys per time which might then create quantity problems to the interviewed persons. In fact I participated recently in three e-mail surveys on different topics.*'

Some also point out the difference in validity of a face-to-face interview, with notations of the type '*In a direct, face-to-face interview one could give more in-depth answers and meditate on them,*' or '*Compared to an interview I am convinced that you will never get out the same. But it is quick and cost effective,*' and a remark we feel is particularly penetrating, '*If I did not completely understand the intent of a question, there was no way to get immediate clarification.*'

Some then point to the technical difficulties of program compatibility that we mentioned earlier, writing, for example, '*The major irritant was software problems, and that can probably be worked out,*' and '*I had troubles with technical aspects at the beginning, but I overcame them gradually.*'

For the sake of completeness, it should be pointed out that the two responses considered neutral are of this tenor: '*An e-mail survey has about the same advantages and disadvantages as a normal mail survey, except for the rapidity.*'

The only completely negative assessment of the adopted methodology is worth reporting in its entirety. It goes: '*I find electronic surveys somewhat troubling and I can easily delete them without a second thought. I prefer something hardcopy that I can stare and contemplate. For your survey, because it was specific to military sociologists, I had to force myself to respond on-line. My mailbox is become so full now with administrative items, it becomes a chore to do everything and I am relieved when it is empty.*'

What do these comments add to what has already been pointed out above? They definitely confirm the obvious difference between a face-to-face interview and one set up as a questionnaire to be filled out, however it reaches the interviewee. In this confirmation, however, a significant problem arises which deserves to be dealt with and if possible solved: that of providing a prompt explanation of a question that turns out not to be completely clear.

The difficulties of the initial impact with this new methodology—difficulties which also seem to have contributed to the completely negative assessment reported—as well as the purely technical ones regarding software, are no doubt something that is destined to be overcome gradually as the methodology spreads, while the one regarding overuse of this tool is undoubtedly a significant concern.

Appendix A

Below we report the "*conceptual framework*" of the research complete with the collected data.

Resulting framework for a multicase "research on the military" field study

% (Respondents may tick more than one response, so that the total percentage is over 100%)

Committent   Researcher

Public administration	74
Private bodies	51
State research centres	58
Private research centres	48
The military	6
Internat.Foundations	22
University	6
Individuals	6
Others	3
Nobody	3

Single researcher	55
State research centre	68
Private research centre	45
Team of research	6
Others	6

Funding	80
Topic	74
Time available	64
Sample	32
Sample chosing	16
Methodologies	10
Constraints	61
Outlet	13
Other	00

Output

Publication by commissioner	23
Selective publication	23
Freedom to publish	32
Internal report	29
Other	00

Appendix B: Questionnaire

Military Sociological Research in Your Country
   Part I—Research Data
   First Set of Questions

   1. Are there research centres in your country that can be considered to be specialized in military sociology?

      1.1   Yes
      1.2   No

   2. If yes, what types of centres or institutes are there? (you may check more than one response)

      2.1   State-run research centres
               If yes:
                    How many ....
                    Who runs them (Ministry of Defence, etc.) ....
                    Composition of personnel (civilian, military, mixed, etc.) ....

                    ....

      2.2   Private research centres
               If yes:
                    How many ....
                    Who supports them (universities, foundations, industry, other) ....

                    ....

                    Composition of personnel ....

   3.   Who commissions the individual research projects? (you may tick more than one response)

      3.1   Public administration
      3.2   Private bodies (companies, associations, etc.)
      3.3   State research centres
      3.4   Private research centres
      3.5   Other (specify)
               ....
               ....

4. If there is more than one commissioner, please indicate as precisely as you can the percentage of the total research that each one commissions in a year.

4.1	Public administration	.......%
4.2	Private bodies	.......%
4.3	State research centres	.......%
4.4	Private research centres	.......%
4.5	Other	.......%

5. Is it possible for a research proposal made to the potential commissioner by a single (private) researcher to be accepted?

5.1	No
5.2	Yes
5.3	If yes, indicate the approval procedure:

....
....
....

6. What is your opinion on the commissioning of research in your country? If you wish you may draw comparisons with what occurs in other countries.

....
....
....
....

Second Set of Questions

7. To whom does the commissioning body (if any) usually commission the research? (you may check more than one response)

7.1	To single researchers
7.2	To a state research centre
7.3	To a private research centre
7.4	To others
	(indicate to whom)

....
....

8. In the choice of the person responsible for the research (or in the acceptance of a research proposal), are there any particular preferences or exclusions, such as active officers, gender of researcher, or other characteristics?

8.1	Yes

8.2   No
8.3   If yes, specify what preferences or exclusions, how they are expressed, and whether
       they are always valid or only in some cases or for certain types of research.
       ....
       ....
       ....
       ....

*** for the following questions, in countries where there is not a commissioner, you have to
read "authority which accepts /finances the research" instead of "commissioner".**

9. What aspects of the research are laid down by the commissioner? (check all the aspects that are
    laid down)
    9.1   the funding
    9.2   the topic
    9.3   the time available
    9.4   the sample
    9.5   the ways the sample is chosen
    9.6   other ways of conducting the research
           (indicate what they are)
           ....
           ....
    9.7   constraints on the dissemination of the results
           (indicate what they are)
           ....
           ....
    9.8   outlet of the research
    9.9   other (specify)
           ....
           ....

10. What do you think of the research aspects that are laid down by the commissioner? Are you able
    to compare them with the situation in other countries?
       ....
       ....
       ....

Third Set of Questions

11. The research budget:
    11.1   is established by the commissioner
    11.2   is agreed between the commissioner and the person responsible for the research
    11.3   other (specify)
               ....
               ....

12. The research budget:
    12.1   is rigidly set according to an estimate
    12.2   can be modified based on actual costs
    12.3   other (specify)
               ....
               ....

13. The research budget:
    13.1   is a lump-sum amount
    13.2   specifies the remuneration of the researchers
    13.3   other (specify)
               ....
               ....

14. Are there topics that it is not possible or allowed to deal with?
    15.1   No
    15.2   Yes
               If yes, what ones? ....
               ....

15. Does the research commissioner express methodological preferences?

    15.1   No

    15.2   Yes

               If yes, are these preferences such as to concretely prevent the use of some methodologies?

    15.3   No

    15.4   Yes

               If yes, what ones? ....

               ....

16. If a questionnaire is used, is it subject to prior control?

    16.1   No

    16.2   Yes

               If yes, what control, and by whom? ....

               ....

17. In the case of surveys through interviews or participating observation, does the commissioner express preferences/exclusions in relation to the researchers?

    17.1   No, not at all

    17.2   Yes, there is a preference for:

               (specify) ....

               ....

    17.3   Yes, there is an exclusion of:

               (specify) ....

               ....

18. Who are the following operations normally performed by?

    18.1   Sample selection:

                      by the research group

                      by the commissioner

                      by others

                      (specify): ....

    18.2   administering questionnaires:

                      by the research group

                      by the commissioner

                      by others

                      (specify): ....

    18.3   conducting interviews:

                      by the research group

                      by the commissioner

                      by others

                      (specify): ....

    18.4   gathering questionnaires:

                      by the research group

                      by the commissioner

                      by others

                      (specify): ....

    18.5   data coding:

                      by the research group

                      by the commissioner

                      by others

                      (specify): ....

Fourth Set of Questions

19. Briefly, when you conduct empirical research within the military, do you ever feel subjected to any kind of pressure?

    19.1   No

    19.2   Yes

               If yes, by whom, on what aspects, and by what means?

               ....

               ....

               ....

               ....

        19.2.1   If you feel subjected to pressure, please indicate its degree:

                      high

                      moderate high

                      moderate

                      moderate low

                      low

20. The outlet of the research is normally:

    20.1   publication at the expense of the commissioner

    20.2   selective publication based on the commissioner's judgment

    20.3   freedom to publish by the director of the research

    20.4   a report for the commissioner without publication

    20.5   other (specify)

               ....

               ....

21. Is there a copyright on the collected data, or on the finished product (research report, book, etc.)?

    22.1.   Yes

    22.2   No

               If yes, who is the copyright holder?

       22.1.1   the commissioning body

       22.1.2   the research group

       22.1.3   a specific agreement is reached each time

23. What do you think of the procedure normally used in your country to disseminate the research conducted in the sector? Are you able to compare it to the procedures used in other countries?

....
....
....

24. What is the actual use of the results of the research that is conducted in your country?

....
....
....

25. In general, what role and importance does sociological research have for the military in your country?

....
....
....

26. Are there sociologists acting as advisors or experts to the General Staff? If so, what are their tasks, and what is their range of action?

....
....
....
....

Fifth Set of Questions
PART II—Demographic Data

1. What country are you from? ....

2. How old are you?
   - 2.1 under 30
   - 2.2 from 30 to 40
   - 2.3 from 40 to 50
   - 2.4 from 50 to 60
   - 2.5 over 60

3. What is your gender?
   - 3.1 female
   - 3.2 male

4. Where do you carry out your research work?
   - 4.1 Within a governmental research centre
   - 4.2 Within a private research centre
   - 4.3 Within a university
   - 4.4 By myself, as free lance
   - 4.5 Other
     (please specify) ....
     ....

5. What are your qualifications?
   - 5.1 University professor
   - 5.2 Active military officer
   - 5.3 Retired military officer
   - 5.4 Ph.D.
   - 5.5 Other
     (please specify) ....
     ....

6. With respect to the party or parties now governing your country, is your political position:
    6.1   sympathetic
    6.2   opposed
    6.3   other
          (please specify) ....
          ....

7. Which response best describes study of the military in relation to your field of research?
    7.1   exclusive
    7.2   prevalent
    7.3   one of several
    7.4   secondary or occasional

8. In what year did you begin conducting research on the military?

    ....

9. Have you taught, or are you now teaching, subjects of military interest?
    9.1   military sociology
    9.2   military psychology
    9.3.   military history
    9.4   military law or the laws of war
    9.5   other
          (please specify) ....
          ....
    9.6   No

10. If yes, where?
    ....

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Conclusion: Themes and Issues of the Sociology of the Military

31

Giuseppe Caforio and Marina Nuciari

Premise

This handbook, compiled with the collaboration of many of the leading scholars of the sociology of the military, from different countries and continents, and representative of different currents of thought, ends up as a picture of the state of the art of the discipline fifteen years after the start of the new millennium. Beyond being a manual for consultation and study for those who pursue this discipline—or are approaching to it—the book constitutes a kind of *summa* of sociological thought on the military as it presents itself in the year 2015.

But not only of sociological thought, because the approach to our field of investigation is often interdisciplinary, as it is evident from the essays presented in this volume. Indeed, the reader will have noted that the slant of some of them owes more to political science than to sociology, and others present approaches and aspects of social psychology, cultural anthropology, or strategic thought in general.

As Gerhard Kuemmel observed in his essay in a previous edition of this Handbook, the reasons for this interdisciplinarity lie "*in the simple truth that the military is a highly complex social phenomenon in itself and one that cuts through various levels, touches several different contexts and is thus subject to multiple processes of interpenetration.*"[1]

Armed forces find their justification in the existence of inter-state violence, in large part still anomic, dominated by a sort of international anarchy, to overcome which different systems and projects have long been studied. It is the task of political science to study such systems and to propose projects in relation to them, just as it is the role of strategy to study the structure and tasks of the militaries that must confront and, if possible, dominate and control this inter-state violence; but it is the task of the sociology of the military to study the impact and the consequences that the forms of violence that take place between states and the structural and operational modifications made on the military have on its components, its internal dynamics, its relations with the other social actors.

This *summa* offered by the volume—interdisciplinary, as we have said—not only presents a series of theoretical and empirical results, but also poses a number of questions, new queries to which our discipline will be called to provide answers in the short and medium term. It is on these aspects

G. Caforio
Pisa, Italy

M. Nuciari (✉)
Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Mathematics and Statistics (E.So.Ma.S.), State University of Torino Italy, Corso Unione Sovietica 218bis, 10134 Turin, Italy
e-mail: marina.nuciari@unito.it

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[1]Kuemmel (2006, pp. 417–33).

that we would like to dwell, synthesising them in these concluding remarks, as it has no sense to recapitulate here the data and results acquired by the many studies presented in the volume.

Social Change and Political Control

The challenges put to our discipline today, which we shall attempt to list below without any claim to exhaustiveness, arise first and foremost from the rapid process of change taking place in society at large, but more in particular from the change in international relations and the resulting security policies of the different countries.

Known to all, and repeatedly evoked in the chapters of this book, are the alterations in the international arena, which have produced a flood of changes in the area of national security in the various countries. The end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the "focal enemy", the emergence of the "new wars", the transformation of the regimes in the Eastern European countries, the revival of ethnic and religious differences: these are the chief factors of change that we have seen in the last twenty years.

One of the consequences of the changing face of international violence has been the progressive abandonment of mass armies and the transition to smaller, entirely professional ones. This fact presents a sizeable set of new problems and aspects that the sociology of the military was studying and continues to study.

One first important aspect is a different composition of military personnel compared with the past, a transformation fraught with consequences on the level of human relations inside and outside the military, that also poses two questions of a general nature:

1. Will the abandonment of conscription lead to a weakening of the democratic spirit of the armed forces, even in the consolidated democracies?
2. Can citizens' lack of personal experience of national military service alienate public opinion from external security issues and a country's own armed forces?

The possible weakening of the democratic spirit within the military is closely related to another important aspect studied by the sociology of the military, that of political control over armed forces. The problem of the military affecting the government is a concern in any democratic society. Hence, if the citizen-soldier disappears along with conscription as armies become increasingly professionalized, the risk of praetorianism may increase as well. As David Kuhen (Chap. 9) recalls, democratic control of the military addresses one of the most pressing, relevant and broadly discussed problems in the history of social order and political organization, and it cannot be confined to the mere absence of a military take-over of the government: it is necessary that elected decision-makers have effective authority and oversight over defense and military policy and that military subordination under democratic civilian leadership is achieved without undermining the military's social function.

As for the second question, there is evidently a problem of public trust toward an institution like the armed forces, that according to Marjan Malesic and Maja Garb (Chap. 8) runs the risk of marginalization in civil societies because of the lack of citizens' military experience due to the existence of an all-volunteer military recruitment. Relationships with media and public opinion are thus crucial, in order to manage criticism and to fill the possible communication gap between the military and civil society, contrasting the rise of indifference and apathy as the public's most diffused feeling.

Among the fields of attention, two seem to me to be especially important: the changing perceptions of security, where we should ask to ourselves, "*How do the civilian authorities and the military perceive security and the role of the guardians of the state within the post-Cold War security context?*" and the internationalisation of democratic control, where the question is, "*What are the consequences of the internationalisation of the militaries for the civilian oversight of the military?*"

And further: if political control over the armed forces during this process of change is a problem in the advanced democracies, how can it be

solved, then, in those regions of the globe such as Africa, where, as Michel Martin (Chap. 12) reports, democratisation is not a linear process at all: after the praetorian mode typical of the post-independence period, civil-military relations in African states seem now to refer to at least four different models, so that the Western-managerial model, globally recognized as the most appropriate norm, coexists with (a) a Kemalist model where former praetorian leaders who had presided over autocratic regimes take it over but with a mandate having all the constitutional trappings; or (b) a situation where the military intervene in a minimally intrusive way to censor, generally in the name of democracy and good governance, an administration that is turning illiberal, incompetent or unpopular and possibly have it replaced by a new one; or lastly (c) in a context of civil war and collapsing state authority, the armed forces disintegrate into rival, and sometimes gangster-like groups fighting one another, often in conjunction with political or insurgent factions competing for power.

Restructuring and Downsizing

The changing international context has also brought other consequences, among them a deep restructuring of the militaries of many countries. Armed forces, however, like every bureaucratic and, what is more, state-run organisation, always display considerable inertia to change. Political decisions in this regard must therefore first of all provide an answer to the question: What are the main obstacles to reforming the armed forces?

A second question regards the type of military institution we are to have at the end of the restructuring process. Can we consider the hypothesis that Philippe Manigart (Chap. 21) advances to be valid, that "*Restructured armed forces of advanced industrial societies have several of the characteristics of what in the HRM literature are known as networks of organized anarchies, i.e. organizations with permeable boundaries and flat hierarchies, given to decentralized decision-making (hence a reduction of*

the size of headquarters), and with a greater capacity to tolerate ambiguity and diversity"?

The restructuring process considered by Manigart involves a generalised downsizing of armed forces, resulting in a significant reduction in military expenditures, weapons production, and the numbers of active service personnel. These are all aspects that deserve special investigation, even in their constant interrelationship. And as Ljubica Jelusic writes (Chap. 22):

> The sociology of the military is interested in the qualitative aspects of conversion; this means that it explores the sociocultural aspects of all six conversion issue areas, although the main focus remains on the demobilization and reintegration of the military and defense personnel. Qualitative conversion is discussed not only as the by-product of force restructuring, but also as an achievement of a growing relationship between military organizations and civilian environment, where the new social perspectives should be developed for those who stay in the military or in services connected with the military (bases, arms industry), as well as for those who leave it and whom society accepts as the surplus of freed military capabilities. Recent history shows that in many cases, military force reduction was not followed by qualitative conversion of freed resources, which seems to imply that conversion is a luxury for the richest countries.

In particular, in advanced industrial societies, the end of the Cold War, technological change and sociocultural evolution have brought about the downsizing of the armed forces. This substantial reduction of personnel, which has been most significant in the Eastern European countries, has generated a number of problems, in part still unresolved, regarding the demobilisation of personnel. One of the most important is the problem of reintegrating demobilised personnel into civilian life, a problem that is not only economic and organisational, but is also centred on the fact that those individuals forced to leave the armed forces, due to reductions or in their search for a better job, must adapt to the new professional culture of the civil enterprise. From the perspective of the sociology of the military, the general turnover of personnel is also an issue worthy of surveying with regard to demobilisation because the size of turnover in general and the speed with which functions are rotated are

indicators of a potentially high innovation rate within the military and the potentially "occupational" versus "institutional" character of the personnel.

Professionalisation

The most discussed aspect of the downsizing and restructuring of armed forces in the advanced industrial societies is their professionalisation, i.e. the end of the draft.

The growing trend towards partial or total abandonment of conscription for more or less broad forms of professional volunteerism in armed forces is giving renewed importance and topicality to the study of union representation of the interests of military personnel. These studies, developed particularly in the 1970s, revealed strong opposition at the time from the political-military establishments of many countries towards military unions.

But, if a convergence between the military establishment and civil society is in progress and has brought the two areas of life and work much closer together, why is there a unionisation issue for the armed forces, why is there opposition to a collective bargaining system for military personnel?

The fundamental reason must be sought in the specificity of the military, as synthetized by David R. Segal (Segal and Kramer 1977a, b, p. 28): "*Because of its unique social function – the legitimate management of violence – the military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required by other modern organizations. Military personnel, unlike their civilian counterparts, enter into a contract of unlimited liability with their employer.*"

Now, in a changed social context, and especially faced with a different composition of military personnel, the responses given then must likely be revised. The sociology of the military will have to examine the new pushes towards unionisation that arise from increasingly professional personnel, and evaluate whether such pushes can be channelled without impacting the efficiency and cohesiveness of the units, and how to achieve this.

Forces' Composition

The composition of military personnel is also being strongly impacted by the growing presence of social minorities, such as women, ethnic groups, and LGBTs, the last being the very new issue under the label of diversity within the military.

As for the issue of women in the military, Marina Nuciari (Chap. 15) notices how women's entry in the armed forces went along the transition from conscript-based and large armies to the smaller and technologically advanced All-Volunteer Force. This process went also alongside two other dynamic phenomena of high relevance: force downsizing, at least in the armed forces of Western societies, and frequent deployment in non-conventional missions. In the Crises Response Operations the use of force is reduced, and soldiers' orientation is undergoing a change, becoming less centred on the "warrior" ideal type, and more on a protective disposition which has been called, among many other definitions, the "miles protector" model. But rightly to this respect the presence of women in CROs is not higher than their average presence in conventional combat missions, confirming the persistency of a cultural bias: the masculine stereotype of the male-warrior continues to prevent women from those missions and roles considered in one way or another at combat high-risk.

The social minorities are not only women, however, but they include on the one side the ethnic minorities, that are ever more present in the armed forces, as demonstrated by the statistical data to this regard. It therefore makes sense to study the concrete experiences that armed forces have with intercultural encounters, as well as with diversity management and training. From another side, as Alessia Zaretti (Chap. 20) explains, in recent decades LGBT inclusion in the military has increased rapidly, with many countries eliminating bans against the LGBT

service. The Armed Forces interact with the values of the societies they serve and the so-called "power of identity" does not exclude the armed forces. So LGBT people want to exert their right to enter any position in the military. These changes have raised questions on the suitability of LGBT people to serve and on the effects of their service on the armed forces: what are the effects of their presence on the effectiveness and on the high standards of morale and duty, good order and discipline, loyalty and cohesion? It is evident how similar these questions are to those asked at the times of women's integration in the armed forces: here again the masculine stereotype of the male-warrior continues to prevent a prejudice-free consideration of human diversities when applied to military jobs, in any case confirming the persistency of prejudices and forms of LGBT-phobia in current societies.

Missions Other Than War and Asymmetric Conflicts

However, the restructuring of national armed forces has not had only aspects that we might call "passive"—downsizing, budget cuts, conversion, a lower incidence on the active population (end of conscription)—but also "active" ones, that is, aimed at creating instruments functional to the new military requirements.

Flexible forces, variety and indeterminateness of missions, and internationalisation of the operational context (see Chap. 28 by Maniscalco) are all aspects that complicate the management of military missions much more than in the past. Today's officer is entrusted with extramilitary tasks of a political nature and finds himself covering a number of new roles, as "soldier-communicator", "soldier-diplomat", "soldier-scholar" and "soldier-engineer" (if no other). This derives from the fact that commanders at various levels must interact with the population and local authorities, as well as with international authorities and the contingents of other countries.

In fact, as Caforio states in his Chapter on asymmetric warfare (26)

> The relative certainties of the Cold War have been substituted in the first decade of the twenty-first century with the general uncertainty of asymmetric conflict. The phenomenon of war, which seemed to have been shifted to the periphery of the first world, the world of the developed countries, reappears in insidious and unexpected forms within all countries, in the framework of their own disarmed civil society. It confirms and configures the passage from an international system centred on the Westphalian state to a post-Westphalian system where, as Wilfried von Bredow affirms in his chapter of this volume: 'The international order of violence today is, more than ever before, a global concern.'

This complex of roles and activities involves an unprecedented level of preparation on the side of new officers. And the effect is that every officers education processes in the different countries are subjected to deep transformations since the Nineties and are still ongoing, as outlined by Caforio in his Chapter on officers' education (14). The utmost problem of this process is striking the right balance between socio-political studies and traditional military disciplines, a problem reflected in the high percentage of officers with experience in asymmetric warfare operations who feel their preparation inadequate for these missions, as field surveys repeatedly confirm.

Stemming from the same intrinsic diversity of asymmetric conflicts and counterinsurgency operations are extremely important aspects of military life and conduct, such as leadership and command, stress and anxiety management, and private life versus professional duties of military personnel.

As Lebel and Ben-Shalom discuss in Chap. 24, a dichotomy between the Heroic and the Post-Heroic models of military leadership is at stake, a true gap between two different schools of thought relating military leadership and claiming for new knowledge sources to be overcome. If a good leadership is also the one able to successfully manage with stress, anxiety and fear (inevitably arising from military operations), an adequate knowledge of stress factors is

needed, especially in unpredictable and often ambiguous situations such as those encountered in asymmetric operations.

These missions, particularly peace support operations, involve rather long deployments of military personnel far from their home bases and, therefore, from their families. For most countries, this is a new problem, practically unknown before Second World War.

As Karin Modesto De Angelis, David G. Smith and Mady W. Segal write in their essay (Chap. 17):

> as a consequence of these changes in war-making, servicemembers and their families have encountered both familiar and unprecedented injuries and stressors. Servicemembers have served in these long wars while also experiencing broad cultural and demographic shifts in families. In many countries, they are an older, volunteer military who, because of their age, are likely to be in a committed, intimate relationship and have children.

Matters become complex when we consider that families share the characteristic of greediness with the military organisation. Hence, to avoid a conflict between two greedy institutions, the military has had to move to create social support systems, both for spouses back home and for the psychological and social reintegration of soldiers into their families upon their return from missions.

As a result of all of these changes, attention to families by the armed forces has increased dramatically over the past twenty years. Field research has already demonstrated that positive coping strategies are: keeping family ties intact, developing self-esteem, developing social support, developing a positive attitude, learning about a problem, reducing tension by hobbies, talking. The way to implement these strategies in the different contexts (national, armed force, etc.) is one of the challenges of the social sciences today and for a foreseeable future in which missions abroad, often in distant lands, do not seem destined to diminish in frequency or duration.

Military Culture

Today's military culture also appears subject to change, with a progressive loosening of many traditional rules, discipline, hierarchy, in a constant convergence with civil society and its values and a resulting abandonment of the traditional isolationism of the armed forces.

This already occurs to a great extent in the area of the professional training of military cadres, where, as pointed out in Caforio's essay on officer education, a process of convergence of military education towards civilian university education appears to be general. But it also takes place on a more general level, in the armed forces as a whole, where occupationalism undoubtedly will grow: this is an obvious and overriding tendency.

The question, however, is how this will affect the military organisation's performance and readiness. Will military performance worsen or improve? According to Soeters, (Chap. 13 in this volume):

> These developments occur against the background that a contract for life is no longer offered. In current management and political thinking about organizational flexibility lifetime employment creates too many rigidities. By consequence, the occupational orientation and calculative identification among military personnel has increased, including their feeling for self-interest and their active or passive search for better alternatives on the external labor market. The 'institutional' orientation, on the contrary, emphasizing national duty and internal labor market opportunities, has lost much of its attractiveness.

Further factors of change can be found in two crucial domains for the military organization: weapons technology and military ethics. In their chapter on Military Ethics for New Missions (18) Kucera and Gulpers reflect on the fact that "…*These new missions require a shift from the state-centric paradigm of national security towards the cosmopolitan principles of human security. The military no longer faces an enemy state which, more or less legitimately, represents*

its citizens. Instead, it is the complete or partial failure of the state to exercise its obligations to its population that necessitates new military missions". A new ethics means a shift from an inward responsibility to an outward responsibility, where the main concern for a soldier are the consequences of her/his action for the "significant other" who is not the enemy anymore but a civilian "stranger" claiming for protection. "*The outward orientation of military ethic thus has to reflect that the 'significant others' in human security missions are the innocent civilians and that the moral commitment to their protection should rise in prominence in the system of military ethic*s".

But what happens when the soldier is a cyber-soldier? What happens when soldiers on the terrain are robots? Moelker's question about robots and cyber-soldiers becomes the affirmation of a new actor, a mixture of machine and human being, the transhuman.

Technology, in a somewhat similar but anyway different mode, becomes not only an amplification of human power but a substitution of non-humans to humans. As Moelker and Shrenk write (Chap. 23):

> Technology is meant for humans to break away from the realm of determinism and discipline, because it promises the optimistic and perhaps utopian dream of freedom, self-determination and economic independence. But with singularity installed in computers, cyborgs and robots, trans-human kill bots can be created. No longer agency lies with humans, but agency is transferred to non-humans, pushing humans more and more into the quadrant of the disciplined and the determined. Recent developments indicate that the future nightmare scenario of science fiction lies only just around the corner. How will the developments affect war and war fighting? The answer is simple, because it is only a matter of extrapolation. The battlefield will in future be devoid of real human soldiers, but the victims will be real humans sure enough.

Social Research and the Military

But how does social research on the military tackle the complex of issues listed above?

The survey on the conditions in which research is carried out in the various countries (see Chap. 4 and this chapter) shows us that the typical researcher is prevalently male, fairly evenly distributed in the different age groups, and for the most part engaged in military sociology in a prevalent but usually not exclusive way. The military sociologist's education is quite diversified, where the most numerous group is the PhD's, closely followed by university professors. Officers are quite numerous and are equally divided between active and retired.

The commissioners of research are chiefly national governments and this entails a number of limitations, particularly in some countries, limitations that must be faced and resolved in the interest of the research itself. Such limitations regard the aspects listed below.

1. Choice of research topic. Obviously, it is natural for the State, or its organs (the military), to promote researches on topics of interest to it, but what is lacking in many countries is the possibility of an autonomous choice of research topics, made by universities or other institutions, "research for the sake of research".
2. Choice of researcher or research group. Findings showed that in different countries and situations this choice is often determinated by friendships, political reasons, membership in the military, etc.
3. Limitations often set by the commissioner on the conduction of the research which appear to be absent (or present more rarely) in other contexts of social research: limitations on specific subjects of the research, on the military units where the research can be conducted, prior approval of questionnaires or other survey tools, etc.
4. Dissemination of research results. This is one of the severest limitations and it is present quite frequently. It ranges from the simple need for an authorisation to an actual bond of confidentiality and strictly internal dissemination of the data.
5. Finally, the research carried out on behalf of the institutions is often merely something to

show off but not use concretely. In such cases feedback is lacking on the results and indications that often emerge from empirical investigation.

One of the issues that the sociology of the military is called to deal with in the near future is therefore that of completer freedom of research, freedom that is in the very interest of the potential commissioner, as only in this way can data of sure reliability be provided.

As I mentioned, however, the limitations often differ from country to country, and this leads us to another issue for the development of the sociology of the military: the big regional differences that characterise its development.

There is an area in which the discipline is strongly developed that includes North America, Europe and Australia, with offshoots like South Africa and Israel; a second area of the world in which the discipline is cultivated but still shows modest development and breadth, constituted by India, Latin America, a few Pacific Rim countries such as South Korea and the Philippines, and a smattering of African nations; and a third area where it appears to be nearly absent that includes China and Japan, all the Islamic world of Asia Minor and North Africa, and much of Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the sociology of the military has a concrete problem of linkage with the cultural elites of the countries of these areas and of promotion of internal development. These are countries where, among other things, the local situations of the military organisation and its relations with the national society are often singular and more than elsewhere deserving of focused investigation.

It remains to be said that, as the reader may have noted while leafing through the essays presented in this volume, sociological research on the military is very often cross-national, comparative on an international scale.

This is due to various factors. Primarily, the military is an institution so particular and so special that it is difficult to compare it with other institutions within the same nation: useful comparison can therefore only be made with the same

institution in other countries. Secondly, the superseding of the nation-state and the ongoing political trend toward continental or subcontinental aggregations appears to be felt particularly strongly in the area of military security. NATO and the European Union are certainly leading examples in this direction. And lastly, the problems posed to states by peace support operations and, more in general, MOOTW, carried out by international coalitions, has made comparison and harmonisation among the different national militaries increasingly necessary.

In the 1990s the sociology of the military therefore gave particular attention to the development of methodologies of cross-national empirical research. These already make up a valid store of knowledge of the discipline but need to be further pursued and developed.

Together with them, and precisely because of the need for inter-state research, attempts have been made at low-cost, high-yield empirical investigation, such as surveys via the Internet, of which an example is given in the chapter "Social Research and the Military". Further exploration and development of this survey methodology seems useful.

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Many themes have been treated here and some of them might seem to lie outside the field of research of the sociology of the military. However, this special sociology deals with a social aggregate that today is called to perform tasks so diverse as to inspire this fitting description: *It is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it* (Moskos 1976, p. 139).

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