Single-Party Governments as a Cause and Coalitions as a Consequence of Coups in Turkey

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1 Introduction

Sixty-seven years have passed since the first fairly contested direct election took place in Turkey. The country was ruled by single-party governments during 38 of these years, by the military during 5, and by coalition and minority governments (henceforth both referred to as coalitions) during 24.[1] As can be seen from Table 1, the average growth rate under the latter two types of government was 2.3 and 1.5 percentage points lower than

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Table 1 Turkish economic performance under different types of government (1950–2015)

Type of government	Average growth rate		Average inflation rate
	Real GDP	Per capita real GDP	GDP deflator
Single-party *(37 years)*	5.6	3.4	18.6
Military *(4.75 years)*	3.4	0.8	26.7
Coalition or minority *(24.25 years)*	4.1	2.1	45.3
Overall average *(66 years)*	4.9	2.7	29.0

Sources: The growth and inflation rates are computed using the data provided by TurkStat for all years except 1948 and 1968. For the latter two years, growth and inflation rates for the GNP, provided by the State Planning Organization, are substituted for the missing GDP-related figures. The GDP series, from which growth and inflation rates are obtained, is 1968-based for years prior to 1968, 1987-based for years between 1969 and 1998, and 1998-based for years after 1999. The new 2009-based GDP series released by TurkStat on December 12, 2016, is not used because it goes back only as far as 1998, and for the period after 2010 it differs from the old series substantially, in not only level but growth as well.

Notes: Figures reported are in percentage points and are obtained from annual data, as quarterly data are available only for the recent years. In computing the averages, years in which more than one type of government prevailed are given a weight of 0.25, 0.50, or 0.75 depending on whether the regime in question ruled one, two, or three quarters. A quarter is assumed to be under the type of government that prevailed during the majority of that period.

If the first and later terms of single-party governments were considered separately, the three entries in their rows would be 7.7, 5.5, and 16.3 for the former and 3.9, 1.9, and 20.4 for the latter, respectively. If the coalition governments ruling during 1965, 1975–1977, the second half of 1996 and the first half of 1997, which essentially included only right-wing parties, were left out, the coalition row would read 3.5, 1.6, and 47.7.

under single-party governments, and the average inflation rate was 8.1 and 26.7 percentage points higher, respectively.[2] The notes to the table indicate that the poor economic performance under coalition governments was even worse when they involved parties from opposite ends of the political spectrum. The growth rate gap between single-party and coalition governments then rises to 2.1 points and the inflation rate gap to 29.1 points. Had the average growth rate of per capita real GDP during the 1950–2015 period been the same as the rate achieved under single-party governments, Turkey's per capita real income today would be

Table 2 Economic performance in Turkey during various periods (1950–2015)

Period	Average growth rate		Average inflation rate
	Real GDP	Per capita real GDP	GDP deflator
1950.Q3 – 1960.Q2	6.8	3.9	10.0
1960.Q3 – 1965.Q3	4.1	1.8	4.5
1965.Q4 – 1971.Q1	5.9	3.2	7.0
1971.Q2 – 1983.Q4	4.1	1.7	34.1
1984.Q1 – 1991.Q4	5.0	2.7	54.1
1992.Q1 – 2002.Q4	3.4	1.9	68.5
2003.Q1 – 2015.Q4	4.7	3.4	9.1
Overall Average	4.9		29.0

Sources: Same as in Table 1
Notes: Periods under a single-party rule are shaded darker. Notes to Table 1 apply here as well

1.6 times higher.[3] Table 2 shows that the picture emerging from Table 1 is not restricted to particular periods but was consistently the case throughout. Each era under military and coalition governments was preceded and succeeded by periods of single-party rule, which had far better economic outcomes.

If the coalitions had merely reflected genuine diversity in the public opinion and been negotiated accordingly, their economic performance would probably not have been as bad, or their poorness could be justified as a price paid for democracy. However, as will be argued in this paper, such governments, in particular those involving ideologically incompatible parties, were created artificially by military interventions, often with the participation of the judiciary, to prevent conservative parties from gaining full power. All of the successful *coups d'état* (or coups) were conducted against such parties, as they are viewed by the military and the bureaucratic establishment in general as a threat to the secular and Western orientation of the country.[4] The religious-right and economic-right voters in Turkey show a tendency to unite under one roof and most of the time have more than sufficient public support to form a single-party government. After each time they came to power alone, however, their government was toppled and their party was split up by military coups. What moved the armed forces and the bureaucracy in that direction was also the fear of losing their influence and guardianship roles. As Acemoğlu and Robinson (2006) point out, the driving force behind transitions from democracy to non-democracy is the realization by the elites that their *de facto* power is temporary. Before it slips away, they intervene to change political institutions towards those that give them more *de jure* power. Political fragmentations created by coups were the main cause of coalition governments, and single-party governments formed by united conservatives were the main reason behind the coups.

Although economic crises, social unrest, political instability, and, ironically, threats to democracy are often cited in the literature as causes of coups, numerous memoirs written and interviews given by Turkish junta leaders reveal that the planning for coups began years before they took place, when the economy was performing well and there were no signs of social strife, political instability, or authoritarianism. It is true that coups often overlapped with the aforementioned events, but only because juntas timed them that way to make them more justifiable to the public and international community. Acemoğlu and Robinson (2006) show that opponents of democracy are more likely to attempt coups at times of political or economic crises, when the balance of *de facto* power temporarily tilts in their favor. In fact, in several instances street demonstrations

were organized by the coup plotters themselves. Again, through the interviews and memoirs of junta leaders, we know that on some occasions the dates of the coups were moved back for fear of snap elections being called. At least in one instance, a planned coup was postponed because the conditions were not ripe yet. We also know that economic crises far worse than those experienced prior to the coups and the crises while nonconservative parties were in power have failed to trigger military interventions. In fact, if poor economic performance was really the cause of coups, they would occur more frequently while a coalition government was ruling, but that was not the case, as pointed out earlier. Thus, a bad economy facilitates a coup but does not cause it.

The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence to support the foregoing assertions. In the next section this will be done through a study of the historical record, and in the section following that through statistical analyses of the 1950–2015 period. Then in the last section, the conclusions reached will be summarized. However, three things should be set straight right from the beginning. First, the paper's claim is not that coups are the only way coalition governments occur, but that that was the way they occurred in Turkey and that without coups coalition governments would be less frequent. The economic voting literature indicates that losses typically suffered by ruling parties as a result of strategic voting to create checks and balances against them and due to depreciation in their political capital over their tenure usually cannot be offset by incumbency advantage unless economic performance is exceptionally good or a political realignment takes place in their favor.[5] As indicated in the notes to Table 1, the economic performance of single-party governments in Turkey deteriorates after the first term. Thus, it would not be unreasonable to expect the vote share of the ruling party to decline eventually to a level forcing it either to lose power or to form a coalition government. However, the coup plotters in Turkey either did not realize this or did not have the patience to wait for it. Second, nor is it claimed that economic conditions cannot cause coups. They very well may have in other countries, but in the Turkish case they only affected the timing of coups.[6] Third, it is not argued that all coups in Turkey were motivated by a desire to keep the power of the conservative bloc under control. Effective use of coups as a tool to control the power of conservative incumbents encouraged other types of coups. The

1960 takeover, organized by a small number of low-ranking officers and carried out quite easily, was particularly inspiring in this regard. The leaders of that coup prepared the ground for prospective coups also by implicitly "legitimizing" coups as a tool for removing "bad" governments, in the preamble of the 1961 constitution.[7] Also, military and judicial interventions undermined the parliament and shifted the goal of political competition from gaining seats in the parliament to controlling the state institutions at the center directly. Marginal groups, with no hopes of achieving power through elections, tried to obtain it with the help of armed forces or the courts.[8] Some of these groups went so far as to infiltrate the military, the police, the judiciary, and other state institutions clandestinely, with the intention of gradually taking them over and controlling the state through them, bypassing the parliament.[9] Furthermore, because after each coup officers who were part of the junta that effected it got promoted while the remaining officers were either left behind or forced into retirement, the coups encouraged the formation of competing juntas in the armed forces, which eventually led to more coups.[10] Although the latter kind of coups caused a lot of damage through the disruptions and instability they created, they were not a cause of coalitions because their goal was not to dilute the power of the main conservative party but to take power themselves permanently and replace the old order with a totally undemocratic one. They were not successful in the first place. We will refer to the coups aimed at checking the power of the conservative bloc as Type 1 and to coups carried out by marginal groups, motivated by the early successes of Type 1 coups, aimed at grabbing power permanently as Type 2.[11] The former believes in democracy but a guided one, whereas the latter rejects any type of democracy.

2 Historical Background

The Turkish electorate exhibits a tendency to gather in four camps: left-statist, right-conservative, Turkish-nationalist, and Kurdish-nationalist parties. At present, the Republican People's Party (CHP), the Justice and Development Party (AK Party or AKP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the People's Democracy Party (HDP) represent these

groups, respectively.[12] Before 1946, only the first group was allowed to organize formally, except in the period 1924–1925 and 1930 when the Progressive Republican Party (TCF) and the Liberal Republican Party (SCF), representing the second group, were permitted for about six and three months, respectively. After 1946, the second and third and after 1995 the fourth entered the picture formally.

The CHP is the party that founded the republic in 1923 and shaped many of its institutions, most of which were inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The party itself has its roots in the Union and Progress Party (Ittihat ve Terakki Fırkası), which ruled the empire during its final years. Consequently, the CHP can be thought of as the establishment or the center, representing the elites. The party accelerated the modernizing and westernizing reforms, many of which began in earnest at the end of the eighteenth century in Ottoman times to stem constant defeats against Western powers. Most significant of these was the secularization of the state. These reforms were instituted in a heavy-handed, top-down, and revolutionary fashion and aimed at redesigning not only the political system but also society at large. Consequently, they generated strong resistance.[13] To counter that, it was felt necessary to establish rigid centralization in both the political and economic spheres and equip the bureaucracy with increasingly more authoritarian powers and immunity. In particular, the military and the judiciary were appointed the enforcers and guardians of the reforms and the new regime. Members of these institutions were granted even greater powers and privileges.[14] This led to sharp divisions not only between the center and the periphery but also between different segments of the center. Consequently, for more than two decades all opposition parties were banned, including those supporting modernization but through evolutionary and democratic means and a free market economy. The center not only alienated the periphery, but it also began to treat it as suspect. For that reason and because modernity was not fully understood and its definition not revised with the changing times, when modernity began to be achieved, it was viewed by the ruling elites as counterrevolutionary. Any attempt to modernize the modernizing methods was considered reactionary. Ironically, the one-time reformers became the greatest obstacle to carrying out the changes that were needed for further political and economic progress. Of course, the reluctance of the

bureaucratic elites to give up their power and privileges was also a factor motivating them to view the old reforms as not needing any fine-tuning and needing unending protection. With the military and the judiciary on their side, these elites continued to wield enormous power, even after opposition parties were permitted once again and gained power in 1950.[15] Until recently, such governments had to restrict themselves to managing the economy and public order and defer consequential decisions to the military, even those not involving defense and security. Many of their decisions were nullified by the courts or not implemented by the bureaucracy. Politics was viewed by the elites as an obstacle to efficient administration. Election outcomes were belittled as choices of an ignorant and gullible public. Full democracy was considered a threat to the republic, and pluralism a road leading to the partition of the country. Successful businessmen in general were viewed as looters of the state and exploiters of the uneducated public and thus needed to be restrained by the bureaucracy or balanced by state enterprises. Any attempt by conservative governments to push the boundaries placed on them, even the possibility of its occurring, faced a coup or the threat of a coup. This in essence was the military/judiciary tutelage or guardianship (*vesayet*) system, as it started to be called in Turkey.[16] Acemoğlu and Robinson (2008) refer to such regimes, in which elites respond to attempts to reduce their *de jure* power in some political institutions by offsetting increases in their *de facto* power and by raising their *de jure* powers in other institutions, as captured democracies.

The right-conservative movement, which essentially represents the grievances and worldview of those looked down upon and ostracized by the center for many years, is the largest of the four political tendencies. Under normal circumstances, it is unified and enjoys more than sufficient support from the public to form a single-party government. However, each time it took office, or got close to doing so, it was fragmented by interventions from outside the political system such as coups by the military and party closures by the judiciary. Between 1950 and 2016, five such (Type 1) coups took place (Table 3).[17] Four of these succeeded. In the 1960 and 1980 coups, the military took over, but briefly. In the former, the incumbent party and in the latter all of the parties, including the CHP, were banned. In the one in 1971, the military forced the parliament

Table 3 Turkish governments before and after Type 1 coups

	Government			
Coup	Immediately before coup	Immediately after coup	Elections	Following postcoup general elections
May 27, 1960	**DP**	Military	1961	CHP + **AP** CHP + **YTP** + CKMP CHP (minority) **AP** + **YTP** + CKMP + MP
			1965	**AP**
			1969	**AP**
March 12, 1971	**AP**	CHP + **AP** + MGP **AP** + CGP	1973	CHP + **MSP** **AP** + **MSP** + CGP + MHP
			1977	**AP** + **MSP** + MHP CHP +CGP + **DP2** + Ind. **AP** (minority)
September 12, 1980	**AP**	Military	1983	**ANAP**
			1987	**ANAP**
			1991	**DYP** + SHP/CHP
			1995	**ANAP** + **DYP** **RP** + **DYP**
February 28, 1997	**RP** + **DYP**	**ANAP** + DSP + **DTP** DSP (minority)	1999 2002	DSP + MHP + **ANAP** **AKP**
April 27, 2007	**AKP**	**AKP**	2007	**AKP**
			2011	**AKP**
			2015 (JUN)	**AKP**
			2015 (NOV)	**AKP**

Sources: Tuncer (2002, 2007, 2011b, 2012b), Tuncer et al. (2003, 2015), and Tuncer and Tuncer (2016)

Notes: For party names represented by the acronyms see the appendix. The right-conservative parties are in bold and underlined. The largest coalition partner is listed first. The governments are listed in chronological order. Governments that failed to receive a vote of confidence are ignored

under threat of takeover to change the composition of the government. In the 1997 case known as the postmodern coup, using a similar threat, they forced the prime minister to resign. To avoid the formation of a new government under the same incumbent parties, one of them was split up with the help of the president, who was the former leader of that party. The other incumbent party and its leader were banned by the Constitutional

Court for violating the secularism clause of the constitution. Although an attempt was made by the military also in 2007 to bring down the conservative government, the incumbent party thwarted it by cleverly calling a snap election and winning it handily.

Certain patterns can be observed from Table 3. All of the five coups mentioned took place when right-conservative parties were in power. Only one party ruled in all of them, except the one in 1997, when two parties were in a coalition but both were from the right-conservative side. A chain of coalition governments followed each successful coup immediately, except the one in 1980, when coalitions appeared after a delay for reasons that will be explained below. In each instance, however, the conservative parties eventually got together again, which in turn led to another coup and then another period of coalitions.

The postcoup coalitions always included a statist party. The pieces of the fragmented conservative parties were not allowed to form a government by themselves but were forced to partner with a statist party so that they could be controlled more easily than through the bureaucracy alone.[18] Even though in 1961 the right-wing Justice Party (AP), the New Turkey Party (YTP), and the Republican Peasant's Nation Party (CKMP), which captured the votes of the Democrat Party (DP) ousted by the 1960 coup, were willing and able to form a government, the military junta forced a CHP-AP coalition instead. Nevertheless, the planned coalition was formed later, shortly before the next general election in 1965, which brought the AP to power alone. When the 12 March 1971 coup toppled the AP government, leaders of the junta demanded a cabinet composed of AP, CHP, and National Reliance Party (MGP) deputies and a number of unelected technocrats, headed by a prime minister from the CHP.[19] The latter two parties were from the leftist-statist camp. To avoid the AP from coming to power again, the leader of an Islamist party that had been banned only a year earlier, shortly after its establishment, was invited by the generals to return from self-exile abroad to establish a similar party with the aim of splitting the AP votes. That party, named the National Salvation Party (MSP), was encouraged to form and did form a coalition government with the CHP after the 1973 election, the first one following the coup. However, as will be discussed in what follows, when the Welfare Party (RP), which succeeded the MSP and shared with it the very same

leadership, formed a coalition government in 1996 but this time with the conservative True Path Party (DYP), it was toppled by the military within a year. To erect yet another barrier in the AP's path to power, the 1971 junta engineered also the separation of a faction from the party by forcing the party leadership, under threat of another coup, to table a proposal granting amnesty to the banned leaders of the DP. Those opposed to the move formed the short-lived Democratic Party (DP2). This time it took two legislative terms for the AP to acquire the power alone, but it was toppled once more in less than a year by the 1980 coup.

By 1980, the military came to the realization that fragmenting conservative parties was futile and had harmful side effects, and it changed tactics. They decided to control the right-conservative bloc directly by establishing their own conservative party headed by a retired general they trusted. To make the party attractive also to voters from the Turkish-nationalist segment, they gave it a nationalistic slant by naming it the Nationalistic Democracy Party (MDP). Because the leader of the CHP had taken strong stands against both the 1971 and 1980 coups, it was felt necessary to establish a new left-statist party as well.[20] That party was named the Populist Party (HP2).[21] To give the MDP and HP2 a head start, the junta excluded from the 1983 election all parties that were continuations of the previous parties. However, the outcome of the election was a total shock for the military. The winner turned out to be not the MDP as planned but the conservative Motherland Party (ANAP), the only party among the three permitted to participate in the election that was not formed by the junta. The ANAP was allowed to enter the election to give it the appearance of a true contest and to avoid the MDP from dominating Turkish politics. The party was not supposed to win the 1983 election, just as the DP was not supposed to win the 1950 election. The MDP could not last even until the next parliamentary election. Although the ANAP was able to form a single-party government in 1983, its support dropped significantly by the entry of other parties that had been excluded from the 1983 election. The party was barely able to hold on to power for another term by calling the 1987 election before other parties could organize, by capturing some of those who had left the MDP, and by benefiting from its incumbency advantage and the success of its market-oriented reforms. In the 1989 local elections, the party's vote

share dropped below that of the True Path Party (DYP), a conservative party formed by the leadership of the defunct AP. After the 1991 parliamentary election the third wave of coalition governments began.

One of those governments, formed by two conservative parties, the DYP and the Welfare Party (RP), was forced by the military to give up power in 1997. It was replaced by another coalition government formed by the conservative ANAP and the Democrat Turkey Party (DTP), and the left-statist Democratic Left Party (DSP). As mentioned earlier, the DTP was the party that was splintered from the DYP in 1997. It took not the next election but the one after that in 2002 for a right-conservative party (AK Party) to form a single-party government again. The AK Party has managed to hold on to power ever since. A coup was attempted in 2007 to change that but, as mentioned earlier, it failed. Ironically, the 2007 coup, rather than fragmenting, actually facilitated the consolidation of right-conservative votes under the AK Party. That happened because the military inadvertently discredited the ANAP and the DYP in the eyes of their supporters by making them complicit in that coup. To stop the AK Party from electing its candidate as president, the military organized a series of mass protest rallies against the party, and on April 27, 2007 posted on the armed forces web page a thinly veiled threat to take over if they did. A highly controversial decision was announced by the Constitutional Court two days later requiring participation of two-thirds of the deputies in the first round of the presidential balloting in the parliament, a rule not practiced in any of the earlier presidential elections. This took away the AK Party's ability to elect its candidate without the aid of other parties. When the ANAP and DYP decided not to participate in the presidential balloting so that the quorum required by the Constitutional Court could not be reached, they alienated their supporters, who switched their allegiances to the AK Party, which stood firm against the military and later took measures to dismantle the military tutelage system. The AK Party's disavowal of political Islam no doubt facilitated this consolidation.

The failures of the 2007 coup attempt and a later attempt by the Constitutional Court to close the AK Party, the constitutional changes instituted in their aftermath, and more importantly the changes over time in the attitudes of various segments of society (including the members of

the military and the judiciary) toward coups, as a result of globalization, urbanization, the advent of the Internet, the ending of the state monopoly on television and radio, major improvements in the transportation and telecommunication systems, and the market-oriented reforms instituted since early eighties brought the guardianship system to an end. Although a coup was attempted on July 15, 2016 by a religious order to fill the void created, the way it was suppressed with the involvement of the political parties (including the opposition), media, police, majority of the armed forces, and especially the public reinforces this view. In fact, this attempt, which nearly succeeded, made even those who supported the guardianship come to the realization that such a system could easily change hands and be turned against them. Furthermore, this incident created an opportunity for politicians to initiate a number of legal measures to establish supremacy of the elected officials over those appointed and establish effective civilian control over the military. However, at this point it is not absolutely certain that the vacuum created by dismantling of the military guardianship system is going to be filled by institutions of a liberal democracy and not by another guardianship.

3 Empirical Evidence

Vote shares of the four political tendencies in 31 parliamentary and local administration elections (National Assembly general and by-elections, Senate elections, and Provincial Council elections) held between 1950 and 2015 are presented in Table 4. Also given in the table are the shares of the largest parties in each group. The aggregate vote share of the latter is shown in Fig. 1. There, one can see at a glance the political fragmentation and reconsolidation process described in the previous section. The aggregate vote share in question is almost 100 per cent in the 1950s but begins to decline after the first coup. The downward trend continues in a stepwise fashion until the mid-1990s. Noticeable drops occur after the 1960, 1971, and 1980 coups. Each time, the series recovers somewhat but gets pulled down to an even lower level by the next coup. Then a reconsolidation process begins in 1994, which continues until 2011.

Table 4 Major political tendencies in Turkey and their vote shares

Election date	Election type	Provinces covered by the election	Right-conservative		Left-statist		Turkish-nationalist		Kurdish-nationalist	
			Largest party	All parties	Largest party	All parties	Largest party	All parties	Largest party	All parties
May 14, 1950	A	63 of 63	55.22	55.22	39.59	39.59	4.63	4.63	0.00	0.00
Sep. 16, 1951	B	17 of 63	52.73	52.73	38.68	38.68	8.01	8.01	0.00	0.00
May 2, 1954	A	64 of 64	58.42	58.49	35.11	35.11	5.28	5.28	0.00	0.00
Oct. 27, 1957	A	67 of 67	48.62	52.10	41.35	41.35	6.53	6.53	0.00	0.00
Oct. 15, 1961	A	67 of 67	34.79	48.52	36.74	36.74	13.96	13.96	0.00	0.00
Nov. 17, 1963	L	67 of 67	45.46	51.97	36.20	36.60	3.10	6.19	0.00	0.00
Jun. 7, 1964	S	26 of 67	50.28	53.78	40.85	40.85	3.03	3.03	0.00	0.00
Oct. 10, 1965	A	67 of 67	52.87	56.60	28.75	31.72	6.26	8.50	0.00	0.00
Jun. 7, 1966	S + B	24 of 67	56.48	58.76	29.77	33.72	5.17	7.07	0.00	0.00
Jun. 2, 1968	L	67 of 67	49.06	49.78	27.90	38.88	3.50	4.50	0.00	0.00
Oct. 12, 1969	A	67 of 67	46.53	48.71	27.36	39.42	3.22	6.25	0.00	0.00

(*continued*)

Table 4 (continued)

Election date	Election type	Provinces covered by the election	Right-conservative		Left-statist		Turkish-nationalist		Kurdish-nationalist	
			Largest party	All parties	Largest party	All parties	Largest party	All parties	Largest party	All parties
Oct. 14, 1973	A	67 of 67	29.82	53.51	33.30	39.70	3.38	3.96	0.00	0.00
Oct. 12, 1975	S + B	27 of 67	41.34	52.94	43.32	43.85	3.12	3.12	0.00	0.00
Jun. 5, 1977	A	67 of 67	36.88	47.29	41.38	43.78	6.45	6.45	0.00	0.00
Oct. 14, 1979	S + B	29 of 67	47.84	57.27	29.22	35.21	6.44	6.44	0.00	0.00
Nov. 6, 1983	A	67 of 67	45.14	68.41	30.46	30.46	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sep. 28, 1986	B	10 of 67	32.12	63.53	22.74	32.53	2.20	2.20	0.00	0.00
Nov. 29, 1987	A	67 of 67	36.31	62.61	24.74	33.27	2.93	2.93	0.00	0.00
Mar. 26, 1989	L	71 of 71	25.13	56.73	28.69	37.72	4.14	4.14	0.00	0.00
Oct. 20, 1991	A	74 of 74	27.03	67.92	20.75	31.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Mar. 27, 1994	L	76 of 76	21.44	61.53	13.57	26.97	7.97	9.23	0.00	0.00
Dec. 24, 1995	A	79 of 79	21.38	60.21	14.64	25.35	8.19	8.19	4.17	4.17
Apr. 18, 1999	A	80 of 80	15.41	41.22	22.19	30.90	17.98	19.45	4.75	4.75

(*continued*)

Table 4 (continued)

Election date	Election type	Provinces covered by the election	Right-conservative		Left-statist		Turkish-nationalist		Kurdish-nationalist	
			Largest party	All parties	Largest party	All parties	Largest party	All parties	Largest party	All parties
Nov. 3, 2002	A	81 of 81	34.28	51.44	19.39	29.01	8.36	9.38	6.22	6.22
Mar. 28, 2004	L	81 of 81	41.67	58.16	18.23	23.20	10.45	11.61	5.15	5.15
Jul. 22, 2007	A	81 of 81	46.58	54.34	20.88	23.92	14.27	14.27	3.84	3.84
Mar. 29, 2009	L	81 of 81	38.39	48.19	23.08	25.93	15.97	18.33	5.70	5.70
Jun. 12, 2011	A	81 of 81	49.83	52.52	25.98	26.23	13.01	13.76	5.67	5.67
Mar. 30, 2014	L	81 of 81	43.40	46.90	25.62	25.95	17.62	19.19	6.53	6.53
Jun. 7, 2015	A	81 of 81	40.87	43.09	24.95	25.14	16.29	16.29	13.12	13.12
Nov. 1, 2015	A	81 of 81	49.50	50.32	25.32	25.39	11.90	12.43	10.76	10.76

Sources: The dates, types, and coverage of elections are taken from Tuncer (2002, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011a, b, 2012a, b), Tuncer and Kasapbaş (2004), Tuncer et al. (2003, 2014, 2015), and Tuncer and Tuncer (2016)

Vote shares in parliamentary elections were computed by the author using the data provided by Tuncer (2010) for the 1950 election, by Tuncer (2011a) for the 1954 election, by Tuncer (2012a) for the 1957 election, by Tuncer (2012b) for the 1961 election, by Tuncer (2002) for elections between 1965 and 1999 (including by elections), by Tuncer et al. (2003) for the 2002 election, by Tuncer (2007) for the 2007 election, by Tuncer (2011b) for the 2011 election, by Tuncer et al.

(*continued*)

Table 4 (continued)

(2015) for the June 2015 election, and by Tuncer and Tuncer (2016) for the November 2015 election. In aggregating the Grand National Assembly by-elections and Senate elections held in 1975 and 1979, the province-level vote data provided by the Turkish Institute of Statistics (TurkStat) are also utilized. It should be noted that for 1950, 1954, 1957, and 1961 the election data in Tuncer (2002) differ slightly from those given in Tuncer (2010, 2011a, 2012a, b). Here the latter are used as they are based on more detailed and more recent studies

Vote shares in local administration elections are obtained from Tuncer and Kasapbaş (2004) for the 2004 election, from Tuncer (2009) for the 2009 election, and Tuncer et al. (2014) for the 2014 election. The source of data for all other local administrations elections is TurkStat. The figures given for all elections, except the one in 2014, are for provincial general councils. For the 2014 election, the sum of the votes cast for district municipal councils in 30 provinces officially classified as metropolises and for provincial general councils in the remaining 51 provinces is used

Notes: Only parties that received more than one per cent of the vote in at least one election and parties that split from them are considered. For parties included in each category, and the largest party in each category, see the appendix

The following symbols are used to indicate the type of election:

A: National Assembly general election

B: National Assembly by-election

S: Senate election

L: Local administration election (election for provincial councils until 2014 and election for district municipal councils in 30 provinces officially classified as metropolises and for provincial general councils in the remaining 51 provinces in 2014)

S+B: Senate election plus National Assembly by-election (in provinces where no Senate election was held simultaneously)

In instances where different types of elections are held simultaneously, the priority for inclusion in the sample was given first to National Assembly general elections, then to local elections, then to Senate elections, and last to by-elections. The Senate and by-elections were given lower priorities because, unlike the National Assembly general elections and local elections, they did not cover the whole country. The Senate elections involved only a third of the provinces and only a third of the seats in the Senate that were subject to election. The coverage of by-elections was even lower, about 15–27 per cent of the provinces when they did not coincide with a Senate election. When the Senate and by-elections were held simultaneously, their results were aggregated to increase the coverage of the country. In such aggregations, for provinces where the two elections overlapped, the outcome of the Senate election is considered. Local administration elections held in 1977 and 1984 only a few months after the 1977 and 1983 parliamentary elections, respectively, are ignored



Fig. 1 Aggregate vote share of largest parties in each of the four political tendencies (Source: Table 4)

In Fig. 2, the vote share of the largest right-conservative party is plotted separately. The similarity of the patterns in Figs. 1 and 2 shows that the fragmentation in the right-conservative segment was the main source of the overall fragmentation. The greater prominence of the postcoup vote drops in Fig. 2 makes this even clearer. However, the two figures differ slightly. In the latter, the reconsolidation is delayed by 5 years and the vote share level reached after 2011 is still slightly less than the peaks reached in the 1950s and the 1960s. The first is due to the 1997 coup and the second to vote shifts towards the Turkish-nationalist MHP as a reaction to the entry of a Kurdish-nationalist party into the political scene in 1995.[22] Most of the increase in the MHP's vote share after 1995 came from the CHP, but a portion was from the right-conservative parties.



Fig. 2 Vote share of largest right-conservative party (Source: Table 4)

Another thing one can gather from Fig. 2 and Table 4 is the tendency of right-conservative voters to make up about half of the electorate. Only in the 1999 and June 2015 elections did that segment's aggregate vote share not exceed 47 per cent, a level probably sufficient to capture the majority of seats in the parliament. In the same table and the figure, one can observe also the tendency of right-conservative voters to unite under one roof. The DP surpassed the 50 per cent vote share in 1950 and 1954 and came very close to it in 1957. After it was toppled by the military in 1960, its leader executed, members of parliament imprisoned, and the party banned, its votes got scattered in 1961. However, in the Senate election held in 1964 and in the parliamentary general election held in 1965, the vote share of the AP which emerged as the successor to the DP exceeded 50 per cent. The party's share was only slightly less than that in 1969, but following the military intervention in 1971, the right-wing vote was split again. This

time it took until the 1979 Senate election for the AP to come close to the 50 per cent vote share. Then another military coup in 1980 fragmented the conservative segment once more. Although the right-wing ANAP received 45 per cent of the vote in 1983, after the ban on other parties and political leaders was lifted in a referendum in 1987, the fragmentation that resulted was even greater than the ones experienced previously. As mentioned earlier, the 1997 intervention prolonged the fragmentation but, unlike the previous interventions, did not increase it significantly. It took until 2011 for right-conservative voters to gather in a single party, the AK Party. From a short-run perspective the AK Party may appear as an anomaly, but it is really a reincarnation of the broad coalition represented by the DP in the 1950s and the AP in the second half of the 1960s and late 1970s. However, the realignments that began immediately and took 3 and 6 years respectively after the 1960 and 1971 coups, was delayed by almost two decades after the 1980 coup and took 9 years to complete. In addition to the greater magnitude of the fragmentation, the closeness of the vote shares of the conservative parties that emerged after the latter coup was a factor in delaying the consolidation process. The address at which conservative voters can viably gather began to clarify only after 2002, when the AK Party outdistanced other conservative parties. Even after that date, the realignment occurred at a much slower pace than the previous episodes. Just as the AP did in 1961, the AK Party received slightly less than 35 per cent of the vote in 2002, in the first election in which it was on the ballot. However, unlike the AP, which reached 50 per cent before the end of its first term in office, it took the AK Party not the next general election but the one after that held in 2011 to achieve that level.

To measure political fragmentation more precisely, political scientists often use an index devised by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) that aims to measure the effective number of political parties. This index is really the reciprocal of the well-known Herfindahl index of industrial concentration used by economists but applied to the vote shares of parties rather than the market shares of companies. Herfindahl's index sums the squared shares and varies between zero and one. Its reciprocal, on the other hand, can vary between one and infinity and makes a more suitable dependent variable for regression analysis. It is also easier to interpret. The effective number of parties in each political segment and in the country as a whole is reported in Table 5. The one

Table 5 Political fragmentation and preelection economic conditions

Election date	Type of election	Effective number of parties					Economy	
		Right-conservative	Left-statist	Turkish-nationalist	Kurdish-nationalist	All	Growth rate	Inflation rate
May. 14, 1950	A	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.13	3.5	–0.2
Sep. 16, 1951	B	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.28	9.2	4.3
May 2, 1954	A	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.11	4.8	4.9
Oct. 27, 1957	A	1.14	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.42	3.6	20.3
Oct. 15, 1961	A	1.68	1.00	1.00	0.00	3.34	–0.7	4.2
Nov. 17, 1963	L	1.28	1.02	2.00	0.00	2.61	6.8	5.7
Jun. 7, 1964	S	1.14	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.26	4.2	4.1
Oct. 10, 1965	A	1.14	1.20	1.63	0.00	2.54	0.1	4.2
Jun. 7, 1966	S + B	1.08	1.26	1.65	0.00	2.40	4.6	5.2
Jun. 2, 1968	L	1.03	1.82	1.53	0.00	2.67	3.0	5.3
Oct. 12, 1969	A	1.09	1.93	2.00	0.00	2.97	2.1	6.5
Oct. 14, 1973	A	2.45	1.39	1.33	0.00	4.07	1.7	19.2

(*continued*)

Table 5 (continued)

Election date	Type of election	Effective number of parties					Economy	
		Right-conservative	Left-statist	Turkish-nationalist	Kurdish-nationalist	All	Growth rate	Inflation rate
Oct. 12, 1975	S + B	1.56	1.02	1.00	0.00	2.71	4.4	21.0
Jun. 5, 1977	A	1.56	1.12	1.00	0.00	2.98	4.7	19.4
Oct. 14, 1979	S + B	1.38	1.44	1.00	0.00	2.98	−2.2	68.4
Nov. 6, 1983	A	1.81	1.00	0.00	0.00	2.79	2.0	26.8
Sep. 28, 1986	B	2.49	1.79	1.00	0.00	4.36	3.9	40.3
Nov. 29, 1987	A	2.26	1.62	1.00	0.00	4.02	7.1	33.6
Mar. 26, 1989	L	2.68	1.57	1.00	0.00	4.57	−2.5	69.2
Oct. 20, 1991	A	2.90	1.82	0.00	0.00	4.62	1.5	55.2
Mar. 27, 1994	L	2.99	2.57	1.31	0.00	5.92	6.4	66.1
Dec. 24, 1995	A	2.99	1.95	1.00	1.00	5.90	5.6	87.2
Apr. 18, 1999	A	3.05	1.68	1.16	1.00	6.30	−1.8	68.4
Nov. 3, 2002	A	2.04	1.95	1.24	1.00	5.02	−0.6	46.4

(*continued*)

Table 5 (continued)

Election date	Type of election	Effective number of parties					Economy	
		Right-conservative	Left-statist	Turkish-nationalist	Kurdish-nationalist	All	Growth rate	Inflation rate
Mar. 28, 2004	L	1.82	1.57	1.22	1.00	4.12	4.5	18.8
July 22, 2007	A	1.34	1.29	1.00	1.00	3.24	4.6	9.0
Mar. 29, 2009	L	1.53	1.24	1.29	1.00	4.10	-5.6	13.3
June 12, 2011	A	1.11	1.02	1.11	1.00	2.87	7.3	7.6
Mar. 30, 2014	L	1.16	1.03	1.18	1.00	3.35	3.5	7.1
June 7, 2015	A	1.11	1.02	1.00	1.00	3.49	1.6	7.4
Nov. 1, 2015	A	1.03	1.01	1.09	1.00	2.92	2.2	7.2

Sources: Effective number of parties was computed by the author using the formula given in earlier notes and the data from the sources given in Table 4. The growth and inflation rates were computed by the author, as explained in earlier notes, using the data provided by TurkStat for all years except 1948 and 1968. For the latter two years, the rates of change in real GNP and the GNP price deflator, provided by the State Planning Organization of Turkey, are substituted for the missing growth rate figures on real GDP and the GDP price deflator. Population growth rates, provided by TurkStat, are utilized to transform real GNP growth into growth in per capita real GNP. The Turkstat GDP series, from which the growth rates are obtained, is 1987-based for the years prior to 1998 and 1998-based for the years after 1999. The new 2009-based GDP series released by TurkStat on December 12, 2016, is not used because it goes back only as far as 1998, and for the period after 2010 it differs from the old series substantially, in not only level but growth as well

Notes: See the Table 4 notes for the symbols used to indicate the type of election and the appendix table for the parties included in each political branch

(*continued*)

Table 5 (continued)

Effective number of parties in political branch j in year t (Y_{jt}) is computed according to the definition suggested by Laakso and Taagepera (1979):

$$Y_{jt} = 1/\sum_{k=1}^{l_t} s_{kjt}^{\ 2}$$

where s_{kjt} stands for the proportion of votes the kth party received within political branch j in the election held in year t, and l_t is the number of parties in that branch at that time.

The growth rate (g_t) is taken as the growth rate of per capita real GDP during the four-quarter period preceding the election. The latter is obtained by adjusting the growth rate of real GDP during the four-quarter period before the election with the annual growth rate of the population during the year of the election if the election was held in the second half of the year and during the year before if the election was held in the first half of the year. The quarter of the election is included in the four-quarter period if the election was held in the second half of the quarter, and not if otherwise

For the period prior to 1989 when quarterly data were not available, g_t is computed as follows:

$$g_t = m\,G_t + (1 - m)\,G_{t-1}$$

where G_t and G_{t-1} are the annual growth rates for the year in which the election was held and the one prior to that

$m = 0.00$ if the election was held between January 1 and February 14

$m = 0.25$ if the election was held between February 15 and May 15

$m = 0.50$ if the election was held between May 16 and August 15

$m = 0.75$ if the election was held between August 16 and November 15

$m = 1.00$ if the election was held between November 16 and December 31

except for elections in 1965, 1975, and 1984, where m is taken as unity because the governments then were either not in power during the year preceding the election or were in power for less than half a quarter.

For the year 1968, the growth rate of per capita real GNP is substituted for the missing growth rate for per capita real GDP

The inflation rate (p_t) is taken as the rate of change in the GDP implicit price deflator during the four-quarter period preceding the election. The quarter of the election is included in the four-quarter period if the election was held in the second half of the quarter, and not if otherwise. For the period prior to 1989, when quarterly data were not available, p_t is computed as the weighted average of the annual inflation rates during the election year and the one before it, in a similar way the g_t was computed as explained previously

For the year 1968, the rate of change in the GNP deflator is substituted for the missing rate of change in the GDP deflator



Fig. 3 Effective number of conservative parties (Source: same as Table 5)

obtained for the right-conservative group is plotted in Fig. 3. The effective number of conservative parties shows a tendency to move towards a level of unity but spikes after each military intervention. Although the impacts of such interventions increase in magnitude and duration until 1995, they become much smaller and even self-defeating after that date.

To measure the impact of coups on the number of conservative parties more accurately and more credibly, one needs to control for other factors that contribute to fragmentation. According to the economic voting literature, voters tend to reward incumbent parties for a good economic performance and punish them for a poor one. Consequently, we can expect some vote traffic between conservative parties owing to economic conditions when one of them is in the government and others are not. This probably will not be noticeable when the incumbent party is a small one but can cause fragmentation to rise when the economy is performing

poorly and to fall when the economy is doing well if the major incumbent party is a conservative one.

Incumbent parties lose votes also due to strategic voting. Some supporters of the party shift their votes to the party's ideological cousins to check its power and to signal their displeasure with those of its decisions with which they disagree. This urge is magnified in local elections and parliamentary by-elections because then the incumbent party can be given a message without toppling it. The existence of threshold regulations in parliamentary general elections, such as the minimum 10 per cent nationwide vote share requirement to gain representation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, contributes to this effect as well. In parliamentary elections, many small party supporters vote strategically for one of the major parties so as not to waste their vote. Then they return to their first choices in elections where no such handicaps apply, such as parliamentary by-elections and local administration elections in Turkey. Therefore, we should expect the effective number of parties to rise in local and by-elections that follow a parliamentary election and decrease in parliamentary elections that follow a local or by-election if the main conservative party is in power and other conservative parties are in the opposition.

An equation that measures the impact of coups on the effective number of right-conservative parties, controlling for the other influences discussed earlier, is

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t = {} & a + bY_{t-1} + c_0 D61_t + d_0 D73_t + d_1 D73_{t-1} + h_0 D83_t \\ & + h_1 D83_{t-1} + h_2 D83_{t-2} + h_4 D83_{t-4} + h_5 D83_{t-5} \\ & + m\, g_t \times I_t + n\, p_t \times I_t + w\Delta\left(L_t + B_t\right) \times I_t + e_t \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where

Y_t: effective number of right-conservative parties at time t;
$D61_t$: a dummy variable that takes a value of one in 1961 (the year the first election after the1960 coup was held), and zero otherwise;
$D73_t$: a dummy variable that takes a value of one in 1973 (the year the first election after the 1971coup was held), and zero otherwise;

$D83_t$: a dummy variable that takes a value of one in 1983 (the year the first election after the 1980 coup was held), and zero otherwise;

I_t: a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the major incumbent party is a right-conservative party at time t, and zero otherwise[23];

g_t: growth rate of per capita real GDP during the four quarters preceding the election held at time t (henceforth referred to as the growth rate);

p_t: inflation rate in GDP implicit price deflator during the four quarters preceding the election held at time t (henceforth referred to as the inflation rate);

L_t: a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the election at time t is for local administrations, and zero otherwise;

B_t: a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the election at time t is a National Assembly by-election only (that is, not held simultaneously with a Senate election), and zero otherwise;

e_t: error term.

It should be noted that $\Delta(L_t + B_t)$ equals -1 in a parliamentary general election that follows a local or parliamentary by-election and equals $+1$ in local and parliamentary by-elections that follow a parliamentary general election. It takes a value of zero when elections of the same type follow each other. The lagged dependent variable is included in the model to allow shocks, including those created by coups, to have persistent effects. Lagged values of the coup dummies are included as well to allow for sophisticated response patterns. Initially, six lags of the dummy variables were considered. Then the lags for which the coefficient turned out to be insignificant in the preliminary estimation are dropped. I_t was treated as a separate independent variable as well, besides appearing in the interaction terms, but its coefficient estimate was very small and statistically insignificant. Dummy variables for the 1997 and 2007 coups were considered, too, but proved unnecessary, as one would expect from our discussion in the previous section.

The model implies that the effective number of conservative parties fluctuates around a mean given by $a/(1-b)$. The coup-related and random shocks and changes in the growth and inflation rates cause deviations

from this mean, but the series return to it eventually. The magnitude of parameter b determines how slow or fast the mean reversions occur. Inclusion of growth and inflation rates in the model permits us not only to take into account the temporary fragmentations due to the economy but to check whether Turkish coups were caused by economic conditions. If bad economic conditions are the cause of coups and coups in turn cause political fragmentation, then the coup-related dummy variables should have no effect on the number of parties once the factors describing the economy are introduced as independent variables.

Table 6 presents the ordinary least-squares estimates of the parameters in Equation 1. Also included in the table are the t-statistics for the parameter

Table 6 Regression results

Variables	Coefficient estimates
Constant	0.502 (10.80)
$\mathbf{Y_{t-1}}$	0.508 (16.83)
$\mathbf{D61_t}$	0.601 (8.43)
$\mathbf{D73_t}$	1.163 (16.30)
$\mathbf{D73_{t-1}}$	−0.379 (5.09)
$\mathbf{D83_t}$	0.612 (8.62)
$\mathbf{D83_{t-1}}$	0.539 (7.22)
$\mathbf{D83_{t-2}}$	0.233 (3.00)
$\mathbf{D83_{t-4}}$	0.378 (4.96)
$\mathbf{D83_{t-5}}$	0.186 (2.19)
$\mathbf{\Delta(L_t + B_t) * I_t}$	0.060 (2.96)
$\mathbf{g_t * I_t}$	−0.020 (4.20)
$\mathbf{p_t * I_t}$	0.014 (16.79)
F	257.10
Prob > F	(0.00)
Durbin-h	−0.830
Prob > h	(0.20)
White Chi-square	17.53
Prob > Chi-square	(0.89)
R-square	0.994
Adj. R-square	0.991

Sources: Author's computations using the data given in Table 5 and appendix

Notes: The dependent variable in the regression is Y_t, the effective number of right-conservative parties. For the definitions of variables, see Sect. 3, and for the data, Table 5 and the appendix. The equation is estimated using the ordinary least-squares method. The numbers in parentheses, next to the parameter estimates, are the absolute values of their t-statistics. All parameters, except the one for D94, are significant at the 1 per cent level. The latter is significant at the 4 per cent level

estimates, R-square, adjusted R-square, and *F* values, for judging the fit of the equation, and Durbin's (1970) *h* and White's (1980) chi-square statistics and their probability values, for checking autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the residuals and any misspecification in the model. The equation fits the data very well in all respects. Table 5 presents the data used, gives their sources, and explains in detail how the variables are defined and measured. As noted earlier, the data pools different types of elections: National Assembly general and by-elections, Senate elections, and Provincial Council elections. Furthermore, the elections examined are not equidistant. Thus, the series at hand is not a typical time series. The lags $t - 1$, $t - 2$, and so forth refer to the previous election and the election before that and not to the number of years that have passed. The results should be viewed with that caveat.

According to the estimates obtained, the effective number of right-conservative parties fluctuates around an equilibrium of 1.02 [= 0.502/(1 − 0.508)], which is not significantly different than one. The deviations from this equilibrium are related negatively to the growth rate and positively to the inflation rate under conservative ruling parties. The effect of growth is much greater in magnitude than that of inflation, consistent with the findings of Akarca and Tansel (2006) and Akarca (2009, 2010, 2011a, b, 2015a, b) on Turkish voter behaviour. Fragmentation increases in local and by-elections relative to parliamentary elections when the major right-conservative party is one of the incumbents. However, while the effects of these three factors are highly significant, they are quite small in magnitude. The fragmentations observed are due mainly to the coups. The fact that coup effects are large and statistically significant, even after controlling for the economy, implies that the coups transmit far more than the effects of economic factors.

Owing to the presence of a lagged dependent variable in the model, the dynamics of the coup effects cannot be deciphered easily from Table 6. For that reason Table 7 is constructed to present them more comprehensively.[24] The figures in that table suggest that the political fragmentations created by the 1960 and 1971 coups were short-lived. However, the immediate impact of the latter coup on the effective number of right-conservative parties was twice that of the former one (increase of 0.6 vs. 1.2 parties). While the effect of the 1980 coup was initially the same as the one in 1960, its impact in later periods was much greater and lasted

Table 7 Estimated coup-induced changes in effective number of conservative parties

	Coups		
Elections after coup	May 27, 1960	March 12, 1971	September 12, 1980
1st	0.601	1.163	0.612
2nd	0.305	0.212	0.850
3rd	0.155	0.108	0.665
4th	0.079	0.055	0.338
5th	0.040	0.028	0.550
6th	0.020	0.014	0.465
7th	0.010	0.007	0.236
8th	0.005	0.004	0.120

Sources: Author's computations using results presented in Table 6
Notes: The figures in each column are obtained as a ratio of the following polynomials, respectively:
$(0.601) / (1 - 0.508\ B)$
$(0.612 + 0.539\ B + 0.233\ B^2 + 0.378\ B^4 + 0.186\ B^5) / (1 - 0.508\ B)$
$(1.163 - 0.379\ B) / (1 - 0.508\ B)$
where B is the backshift operator

for a much longer time. Even after more than a decade and five elections, its impact was almost as large as the 1960 coup's immediate impact.[25] Nevertheless, in each case there was a consolidation towards a single right-conservative party.

4 Summary and Conclusions

Often electoral and governmental systems are seen as the culprits behind governmental fragmentations in Turkey. Although multiparty governments can emerge owing to these and other factors, in the Turkish case they were a consequence of political engineering by the military. The only time the country came close to having a coalition naturally was on June 7, 2015, when the AK Party temporarily lost its parliamentary majority. Had the opposition parties in the parliament joined forces, or at least one of them agreed to partner with the AK Party, the November 1, 2015, snap election would not have been called and the first Turkish coalition government not created by a coup would have happened.[26]

In the absence of military interventions, single-party governments would be far more common in Turkey because conservative voters, in an economic or cultural sense, make up the majority of the Turkish electorate and exhibit a tendency to gather in a single-party. Whenever their party came to power, however, it was viewed by the military as a threat to the secular, modern state and the supremacy of the military in the established order, and was toppled. Even though the conservative bloc was fragmented after each of these incidents and faced additional obstacles placed in their way to keep them from regaining full power, eventually they managed to come together anyway, first in a right-wing coalition and then in a single-party government. For that reason, Turkish political history consists of single-party government => coup => military rule => coalition governments (first incompatible, then compatible) => single-party government => coup cycles. Since economic growth appears to be highest during the first terms of single-party governments, followed by compatible coalitions, later terms of single-party governments, incompatible coalitions, and then military governments, these cycles in turn generate parallel cycles on the economic front, with economic performance going from good to not as good then to bad to slightly better to good again.

Many reasons are given in the literature to explain why economic performance is not good under coalitions. In the Turkish case, in addition to these factors, the fact that such governments were fruits of coups played an important role as well. First of all, coalitions in Turkey often were not voluntary but forced marriages between left- and right-wing parties laden with frictions and conflicts of interest. Economic performance was especially bad under coalitions of ideologically incompatible parties. Second, frequent party closures and bans on political leaders hindered political parties from institutionalizing, developing democratic traditions (inter- and intraparty), and accumulating valuable experience on good governance. Worse, it caused politicians to develop a reflex of avoiding making decisions on critical issues, passing them on to the guardianship institutions. These adversely affected the performance of single-party governments as well.

It appears that after experiencing the disastrous effects of coup cycles and integrating with the rest of the world, Turkish society (ordinary citizens as well as the elites) transformed in a fundamental way, which in

turn brought the military guardianship system at the root of these cycles to an end. Ironically, the vacuum created by this led to a coup attempt on July 15, 2016, by a small "religious" order aiming to impose their own regime and perhaps another guardianship system. However, the way this takeover attempt, the bloodiest of all, was quashed, with immediate resistance from all political parties (including those that sided with some of the previous coups), mainstream media, business associations, and most members of the armed forces, police, judiciary, and other state institutions, and most importantly the active involvement of ordinary people from all ethnic, regional, cultural, and political backgrounds, a first in Turkish history, suggests that the democratic maturity of the society had reached such a level that coups will no longer be tolerated. Acemoğlu and Robinson (2006) explain how democracies become consolidated as civil society and middle class develops, and the economy becomes more urbanized, industrialized, and globalized. Indeed, all of these have occurred in Turkey over the last three decades, largely as a result of the introduction of the Internet, the ending of the state monopoly on television and radio, major improvements in the transportation and telecommunication systems, and the market-oriented reforms instituted in the 1980s by Turgut Özal, the prime minister at the time.

If coups are indeed out of the picture now, that will be good news for the economy. Then coalitions will be rarer in the future, and when they occur they will not be very harmful since they will be formed voluntarily and will be less likely to involve parties from the opposite ends of the political spectrum. However, as long as a sizable number of people remain who believe that some types of coups are good and who would not object to coups that are compatible with their ideology, and as long as the public looks to charismatic leaders rather than democratic institutions to solve their problems, the possibility of undemocratic interventions cannot be ruled out entirely. To move from a semiconsolidated to a fully consolidated democracy, and to avoid the possibility of another guardianship system altogether, it is necessary to fill the vacuum mentioned earlier with new political institutions that have strong checks and balances. Some of the legal measures initiated in the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt, such as those putting the military under civilian control and eliminating the military judiciary are promising in that regard but not

sufficient.[27] Further efforts are needed to reform the civilian judiciary too, to establish intraparty democracy, and to empower members of parliament, especially in the face of executive powers being increased and concentrated.[28] Perhaps these will aid in closing the performance gap between first and later terms of single-party governments as well.

Appendix: Classification of Turkish Political Parties

Election date	Right-conservative	Left-statist	Turkish-nationalist	Kurdish-nationalist
May.14, 1950	DP	**CHP**	MP	–
Sep. 16, 1951	**DP**	CHP	MP	–
May 2, 1954	**DP**, TKP	CHP	CMP	–
Oct. 27, 1957	**DP**, HP	CHP	CMP	–
Oct. 15, 1961	AP, YTP	CHP	CKMP	–
Nov. 17, 1963	AP, **YTP**	**CHP**, TIP	**CKMP**, MP2	–
Jun. 7, 1964	AP, YTP	**CHP**	CKMP	–
Oct. 10, 1965	**AP**, **YTP**	CHP, TIP	**MP2, CKMP**	–
Jun. 7, 1966	**AP**, YTP	CHP, TIP	MP2, CKMP	–
Jun. 2, 1968	**AP**, YTP	CHP, TIP, CGP, TBP	MP2, CKMP	–
Oct. 12, 1969	**AP**, YTP	CHP, TIP, GP, TBP	MP2, MHP	–
Oct. 14, 1973	**AP**, DP2, MSP	CHP, **CGP**, TBP	MHP, MP2	–
Oct. 12, 1975	**AP**, DP2, **MSP**	CHP, TBP	**MHP**	–
Jun. 5, 1977	**AP**, DP2, **MSP**	CHP, **CGP**, TBP, TIP2	**MHP**	–

(*continued*)

(continued)

Election date	Right-conservative	Left-statist	Turkish-nationalist	Kurdish-nationalist
Oct. 14, 1979	AP, MSP	**CHP**, **CGP**, TBP, TIP2, TSIP, SDP	MHP	–
Nov. 6, 1983	ANAP, MDP	HP2	–	–
Sep. 28, 1986	**ANAP**, DYP, RP, HDP, VAP	SHP, DSP, BVP	MÇP	–
Nov. 29, 1987	**ANAP**, DYP, RP	SHP, DSP	MÇP	–
Mar. 26, 1989	DYP, **ANAP**, RP	SHP, DSP	MÇP	–
Oct. 20, 1991	DYP, **ANAP**, RP	SHP, DSP	–	–
Mar. 27, 1994	**DYP**, ANAP, RP	**SHP**, DSP, CHP	MHP, BBP	–
Dec. 24, 1995	RP, ANAP, **DYP**,	DSP, **CHP**	MHP	HADEP
Apr. 18, 1999	FP, **ANAP**, DYP, **DTP**	**DSP**, CHP	MHP, BBP	HADEP
Nov. 3, 2002	AKP, DYP, **ANAP**, SP	CHP, **DSP**, GP, YTP2	**MHP**, BBP	DEHAP
Mar. 28, 2004	ANAP, DYP, **AKP**, SP	CHP, DSP, GP, YTP2	MHP, BBP	SHP
July 22, 2007	**AKP**, DP3, SP	CHP, GP	MHP	DTP
Mar. 29, 2009	**AKP**, ANAP, DP3, SP	CHP, DSP,	MHP, BBP	DTP
June 12, 2011	**AKP**, DP3, SP, HAS	CHP, DSP	MHP, BBP	BDP
Mar. 30, 2014	**AKP**, DP3, SP	CHP, DSP	MHP, BBP	BDP+HDP
June 7, 2015	**AKP**, DP3, SP	CHP, DSP	MHP	HDP
Nov. 1, 2015	**AKP**, DP3, SP	CHP, DSP	MHP, BBP	HDP

Sources: Same as Table 4

Notes: Only parties that received more than 1 per cent of the vote in at least one election and parties that split from them are considered. Incumbent parties are in bold. Major incumbent parties are also underlined. In each category, the party that received the highest number of votes is listed first. The Turkish acronyms used in the table and the parties they represent are as follows:

AKP: Justice and Development Party

ANAP: Motherland Party
AP: Justice Party
BBP: Grand Unity Party
BDP: Peace and Democracy Party
BVP: Grand Nation Party
CGP: Republican Reliance Party
CHP: Republican People's Party
CKMP: Republican Peasant's Nation Party
CMP: Republican Nation Party
DEHAP: Democratic People's Party
DP: Democrat Party (1946–1960)
DP2: Democratic Party
DP3: Democrat Party (1975–1981)
DSP: Democratic Left Party
DTP: Democrat Turkey Party
DTP2: Democratic Society Party
DYP: True Path Party
FP: Virtue Party
GP: Young Party
HADEP: People's Democracy Party
HAS: People's Voice Party
HDP: Free Democrat Party
HDP2: People's Democracy Party
HP: Freedom Party
HP2: Populist Party
MÇP: Nationalist Work Party
MDP: Nationalist Democracy Party
MHP: Nationalist Action Party
MP: Nation Party (1948–1954)
MP2: Natıon Party (1962–1981)
MSP: National Salvation Party
RP: Welfare Party
SDP: Socialist Revolution Party
SHP: Social Democratic People's Party
SP: Felicity Party
TBP: Turkish Unity Party
TIP: Turkish Labor Party (1961–1971)
TIP2: Turkish Labor Party (1975–1981)
TKP: Turkish Peasant's Party
TSIP: Turkish Socialist Labor Party
VAP: Citizen Party
YTP: New Turkey Party (1961–1971)
YTP2: New Turkey Party (2002–2004)

Notes

1. Minority governments ruled for 3 and coalition governments for 21 years. Here the two types of government are lumped together because minority governments in essence are coalitions, as they require the consent and support of another party or parties to survive.
2. Economic conditions under coalition and minority governments are reported separately in the notes to the table.
3. The reason why economic performance is poorer under coalition governments compared to single-party governments is beyond the scope of the present study. However, we can mention here some of the key reasons given for this in the literature. Reaching decisions in a timely fashion is more difficult when the number of partners involved is large. Because the probability of government's dissolution at any given moment is higher in the case of coalitions than single-party governments, the former are more prone to postponing painful adjustments that are needed for the long-run health of the economy. The shorter time horizons of coalition governments also causes fiscal discipline to be weaker under them. Furthermore, incentives to indulge in populist policies and transfer activities is greater for coalition governments because under such governments it is more difficult for voters to apportion blame among partners for the adverse effects of these, and as long as one partner indulges in them, there is little benefit for the other partners of not indulging.
4. In this paper, coups are defined as in Powell and Thyne (2011): "illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive." Note that this definition allows for the possibility of coups not being led by the military and considers overthrowing governments through threats of military intervention but without use of force as coups as well. According to O'Kane (1987), a coup is considered to be to be successful if it leads to the "installation in power of a government of the conspirators' own choosing." Thus we can say that coups were attempted in Turkey in 1960, 1962, 1963, 1971, 1980, 1997, 2007, and 2016. Of these, the ones in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 were successful.
5. For surveys of the economic voting literature, see Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000), Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000, 2008, 2009, 2015), and Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck (2013). Akarca and Tansel (2006, 2007) and

Akarca (2009, 2010, 2011a, b, 2015a, b) show that Turkish voters behave very similarly to the patterns described in that literature.

6. Kim (2016), Bell (2016), Gassebner et al. (2016), Hiroi and Omori (2013), and Bouzid (2011) survey studies on coups in other countries. The first one investigates in particular whether the economy is a determinant of coups.
7. Londregan and Poole (1990) dub such dynamics of one coup leading to another coup a "coup trap."
8. For example, the 9 March 1971 coup plot, which was prevented by the March 12 1971 coup, was planned by some socialist intellectuals and leftist officers. The political parties that espoused the views represented by the organizers of that coup plot received no more than 3 per cent of the vote in various elections they contested democratically.
9. The Gülen movement, which masterminded the 15 July 2016 takeover attempt, is a prime example of this. Can (2014) explains how and why this religious organization "that probably has 2–3 per cent support at most came to control nearly the entire judiciary and became an asymmetrical power center." In recent years, it has become apparent that prosecutors and judges belonging to this group had tried to eliminate rivals from the military and civilian bureaucracy and embarrass and destabilize the government through various rigged investigations. To help their members in the military schools succeed, they provided them the questions to various tests in advance and arranged the dismissal of cadets competing with them through trumped-up charges and manipulated health and performance evaluations.
10. For example, the failed coup attempt on 22 February 1962 was organized by officers who were about to be removed from their positions by another junta. The 21 May 1963 coup attempt, on the other hand, was a come-back effort by those removed after the unsuccessful 1962 attempt. The 12 March 1971 coup was implemented to some extent to counter the leftist junta that planned the 9 March 1971 coup. Similarly, the 15 July 2016 coup was timed by the Gülenists to preempt the dismissal of their members from the armed forces; it was suspected that it would take place in about a month.
11. The 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007 coups were of Type 1. The coups in 1962, 1963, and 2016 were of Type 2.
12. For classification of parties into the four categories, see the Appendix. The left-statist group is labeled as such, even though its leading parties

cannot be considered left, because they label themselves as such at least since late sixties and occasionally small leftist parties have emerged from them. Also left-leaning people vote for them. In many studies, the Turkish nationalist and conservative parties are grouped together, and analyzed as the Turkish right wing. However, since a distinct Turkish nationalist party existed constantly since 1950, except for brief periods when it was banned by military juntas, it is more appropriate to treat it as a separate movement. Although the rest of the right wing occasionally fragmented into several parties, they always regrouped, as will be explained below.

13. It was the French version of secularism (laïcité) that was adopted, which keeps religion from interfering in state affairs but allows the state to control religious institutions, rather than its Anglo-Saxon version, which keeps the state from interfering in religious affairs and vice versa. Also, unlike Ottoman reform efforts, which allowed many of the old institutions and traditions to coexist with the new modern ones, republican administrations aimed to eradicate the *ancien régime* altogether. These exacerbated the resistance.
14. This was not new. The military was the first institution to be westernized and modernized in the Ottoman Empire, and it was given the duty and powers to guard the reform efforts. Interestingly, over time the military leaders took this duty to heart and increased their powers so much that they gained the ability to replace the emperors who had entrusted them with this task for not westernizing and modernizing fast enough and for trying to curtail their guardianship role.
15. Actually, the right-conservative Democrat Party (DP), which came to power in 1950, was expected to serve as a small opposition party, facilitating the emergence of democracy without rocking the boat. The party's success was a total surprise both for the party itself and for the CHP. This is evident from the fact that the DP demanded a proportional election system before the 1950 election, while the CHP insisted on retaining the majoritarian system, and then the two parties reversed their positions after the election.
16. For excellent discussions on how the guardianship system evolved, the cleavages it created in society, and the distortions it generated in the political system, see Mardin (1973), Can (2014), and Koçak (2014, 219–77). Aydınlı (2012) discusses how it transformed over time, and Ünay and Dilek (2016, 211–15) show how it extended into the economic sphere.

17. All of the Type 1 coups except one were successful (those in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, but not the one in 2007). None of the Type 2 coups (in 1962, 1963, 1971, and 2016), on the other hand, were successful. For that reason and because their goal was not just the fragmentation of the conservative bloc but a permanent or long-term takeover, Type 2 coups are not included in Table 3.
18. As stated earlier, economic performance under such coalition governments was particularly poor.
19. The prime minister resigned from his party before taking office, though, to appear as an independent.
20. It should be noted, however, that the leader of the CHP in 1980 was not the leader of the party in 1971 but its secretary general, and also that he supported the 1960 coup, and his party cooperated with the juntas in 1960 and 1971 and nominated one of the 1971 junta leaders as their presidential candidate in 1980.
21. All of the parties banned after the 1980 coup were legalized in 1994, but of those only the CHP regained prominence and eventually reunited the fragmented left-statist segment. The Turkish-nationalist and right-conservative groups continued under the banners of their new parties.
22. The MHP's vote share, which was at most 8 per cent until 1995 (except right after the banning of the DP in 1960), rose to double digits after that date, except in 2002 when the party was one of the incumbents.
23. I_t is taken as zero in 1975 and 1977, even though the major incumbent was a right-conservative party because almost all of the other right-wing parties were in power as well.
24. In Table 7, the elections are treated as if they are equidistant from each other. Therefore, the table should interpreted with this caveat in mind.
25. It should be noted that part of the slight jump in the impact between the fourth (1989) and fifth (1991) elections and the small drop between the fifth (1991) and sixth (1994) elections are due to the Turkish- nationalist MHP entering the 1991 election under the banner of the right-conservative RP. Raising the vote share of the third largest conservative party gave the appearance of greater fragmentation in that camp. A desire to circumvent the 10 per cent election threshold was the motivation behind the RP-MHP partnership in 1991.
26. However, had that coalition materialized, it could still be tied to a coup. Most AK Party supporters who deserted the party on June 7, 2015, especially the ethnic Kurdish ones, did so strategically to help

the HDP gain representation in the parliament. Rather than fielding independent candidates, as it and its predecessors had done in the past to circumvent the 10 per cent election threshold, the HDP decided to participate in the June 2015 election officially. The unusually high threshold was established by the leaders of the 1980 coup. After observing that the HDP surpassed the threshold handily and regretting the instability they created, many of the same voters returned to the AK Party on November 1, enabling it to form a single-party government. For a more detailed analysis of the election outcomes mentioned, see Akarca (2015b).

27. Ünay and Dilek (2016, 227–28) list these measures.
28. For example, it would be desirable to couple the presidential system that will take effect in 2019, with single-member parliamentary districts for which party candidates are chosen through primaries rather than picked by the party leaders, and winning candidates chosen through two-round elections as will be the case with the president.

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