Cris Beauchemin *Editor*

Migration between Africa and Europe

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Foreword

Of all demographic outcomes, irregular migration is among the most difficult to study. Even when they are fully documented, migrants are difficult to survey simply because they are by definition mobile. Unauthorized migrants are especially difficult to study given their clandestine presence in places of destination and the inherent risks they face when revealing information about their existence to strangers. Under these circumstances, standard survey methods do not work, and more subtle and imaginative approaches must be used.

During the 1980s, my colleague Jorge Durand and I developed the ethnosurvey as a new tool for studying undocumented migration. Rather than seeking to undertake a representative survey of migrants at places of destination, we sought to locate and interview migrants within specific communities of origin. Even when applying random sampling to locate respondent households, we found that within hometowns the implicit threat of revealing to strangers sensitive information about clandestine behaviors abroad was greatly reduced. Returned migrants were willing and often eager to talk about their foreign experiences and the role that international migration played in their own lives and the lives of family members. After establishing a relationship of trust with their interlocutors, respondents were quite willing to share information about family members still living or working abroad, thus enabling researchers to follow social networks to places of destination where they could interview additional migrants from the community.

Jorge Durand and I originally developed the ethnosurvey approach to study documented and undocumented migration between Mexico and the United States, beginning with representative surveys undertaken in 4 communities in 1982 and then moving on to construct a much larger, cumulative database by surveying 4–6 communities new each year from 1987 to the present, an effort that came to be known as the Mexican Migration Project (MMP). Having proved the utility of the approach in Mexico, in 1998, we went on to create the Latin American Migration Project to carry out ethnosurveys in other nations of the hemisphere.

Over the years, variants of this multisite, multi-method approach to data collection have been applied in a variety of other nations to study migratory streams emanating from Eastern Europe, China, South Asia, and other regions. The Migration

between Africa and Europe (MAFE) project represents perhaps the most elaborate and well developed of these efforts, with wide-ranging surveys fielded in different countries to reveal in rich detail the complex operation of three different migration systems: one connecting communities in Senegal to destinations in France, Italy, and Spain; another linking communities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to destinations in Belgium and the United Kingdom; and a third binding locations in Ghana to points of destination in Great Britain and the Netherlands.

The chapters in this volume document in great detail the evolution of each of these migration systems from their origins in the 1970s to the present. In doing so, they identify key determinants of migrants' decisions to depart and return at different points in time, shine new light on how migrants integrate within both sending and receiving societies, and document the subtle interplay between migration and the social organization of households and families. The MAFE project definitively proves that it is indeed possible to conduct rigorous, scientifically valid, and empirically reliable research on the illusive phenomenon of unauthorized migration. One can only hope that scholars take note of the great value of MAFE's methods and findings and that policy makers draw upon them to base their decisions on facts rather than fantasies.

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Douglas S. Massey

Preface

This book is a product of the *Migration between Africa and Europe* (MAFE) project, which involved a multinational team of researchers working in nine countries (Belgium, Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Ghana, Italy, Netherlands, Senegal, Spain, United Kingdom).[1] Although more than 20 authors have contributed to the book, not all researchers on the MAFE team are included. Their publications can be found on the project website (http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/en/). For all of us, the MAFE project was a quite unique experience of collaboration, bringing together people from all over the world and from many disciplines (anthropologists, demographers, economists, geographers, sociologists, and statisticians). The large number of authors for each chapter reflects the fact that the book is the result of a strongly coordinated effort. The work began with preparing and conducting the same sociodemographic survey in the nine countries listed above. Systematically, interviewing about 4000 households and 5400 individuals was for us a precondition for producing new evidence on African migration. The initial idea of collecting new data on migration between Africa and Europe came from Douglas Massey. Although the MAFE project is based on an original methodology, it is largely inspired by the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) that he initiated with Jorge Durand and which provided data for some of the most important sociodemographic studies of international migration.[2]

Like any other survey project, MAFE enjoyed the support and assistance of many people and institutions. The INED Survey Department played an essential role in the development of the methodological tools: we benefited from the great expertise of Raphaël Laurent, Cécile Lefèvre, Nicolas Razafindratsima, Geraldine

[1] The MAFE project was coordinated by the Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques (C. Beauchemin) and also involved the Université catholique de Louvain (B. Schoumaker), Maastricht University (V. Mazzucato), the Université Cheikh Anta Diop (P. Sakho), the Université de Kinshasa (J. Mangalu), the University of Ghana (P. Quartey), the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (P. Baizan), the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (A. González-Ferrer), the Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull'Immigrazione (E. Castagnone), and the University of Sussex (R. Black).

[2] More details at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/

Vivier, and the late Martine Quaglia. The INED Statistical Methods Department also played a crucial role in preparing the data that are freely available for research use[3]: many thanks to Fofo Ametepe, Arnaud Bringé, Ariana Caporali, Tania Lejbowicz, Amandine Morisset, and Marc Thévenin. Although we cannot cite all the people who took part in this vast collaborative project, we are grateful to all of them, especially to the interviewers and their supervisors, the team coordinators, and the administrative staff. Finally, many thanks to the outside reviewers who commented on the chapters during the book's preparation: Joaquin Arango, Mumpasi Lututala, Douglas Massey, Ronald Skeldon, and the late Graeme Hugo. The MAFE project received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement 217206. The MAFE-Senegal survey was conducted with the financial support of the Institut National d'Etudes démographiques (INED, France), the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR, France), the Région Ile-de-France, and the FSP program "International migrations, territorial reorganizations and development of the countries of the South."

Paris, France Cris Beauchemin

[3] The project's micro and macro data are available in both French and English, and we hope they will be the starting point for many future studies. All the methodological documentation for the MAFE study is available online, along with information on data access at http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/en/

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Cris Beauchemin

1.1 African Migration: A Major Concern

Since the start of the twenty-first century, migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe has been a major concern in Europe for both public opinion and policy makers. Although Africans are still a small minority of the migrant population in Europe, they are one of the fastest-growing groups (see Box 1.1). The flotillas of boats bringing would-be migrants to Europe since the late 1990s have constantly focused media attention on one tragic form of migration, leading public opinion to fear an African invasion of illegal migrants (Haas 2008; Hatton and Williamson 2003; Lessault and Beauchemin 2009). In 2005, migrants' attempts to reach Spanish territory by climbing the fences of the Ceuta and Melilla enclaves based in Morocco elicited a rapid response from EU countries in the form of new policy measures. The informal meeting of the EU Heads of State and Government at Hampton Court in December 2005 launched the so-called "Global Approach to Migration", with a special focus on Africa (COM/2006/735 final). International migration also became a key issue in the dialogue between EU and African countries with the initiation of the "Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development" (known as the "Rabat Process"), which brings together countries in Europe and North, West and Central Africa, as well as the European Commission (EC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with a view to tackling questions arising from migration issues.

Yet the scope, nature and likely development of sub-Saharan African migration to Europe remains poorly understood. In spite of its visibility in public discussion, African migration remains an understudied research area, as acknowledged by various scholars (Lucas 2006; Grillo and Mazzucato 2008; Hatton and Williamson 2003). Common wisdom is rarely corroborated by scientific evidence, while policy

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Box 1.1 African Migration in Europe: Basic Facts

A view from Europe

A growing minority. In 2000, the number of sub-Saharan African migrants living in Europe was close to 3 million, almost 1 million more than in 1990 (Lucas 2006). Despite a rapid increase, in 2012 sub-Saharan migrants were still only 12% of the foreign population living in Europe (EU27).

Increasing flows. Legal migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa to six Western European countries (Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) grew from about 13,000 migrants per year in the early 1960s to nearly 50,000 in the late 1980s (Zlotnik 1993) and over 100,000 in the early 2000s (Migration Policy Institute 2007).

Asylum seekers. In the six European countries involved in MAFE, asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa totalled just over 10,000 per year in the early 1980s, but over 60,000 per year in 2001 (Migration Policy Institute 2007).

A view from Africa

Intra-continental migration. Fewer than one in a hundred people born in sub-Saharan Africa and aged 25 or over lived in an OECD country in 2000 (rate of out-migration: 0.9%). This is three times fewer than the proportion of emigrants in North Africa (2.9%) and thirteen times fewer than the number in Central America (11.9%) (Docquier and Marfouk 2006).

Highly educated migrants. In sub-Saharan Africa, the rate of out-migration reaches 12.9% among people with at least 13 years of education, compared to 0.9% taking all educational levels together. This is one of the highest rates of in the world: the proportion of educated people living out of their birth country is around 1% for North Americans, 5% for Asians and 7% for North Africans, Europeans and Oceanians. Only the rate for Central Americans is higher (17%) (Docquier and Marfouk 2006).

measures are often formulated without a clear understanding of the underlying causes, consequences, mechanisms and dynamics of African migration. It is widely recognized that the main cause of this situation is the dearth of quantitative data, especially individual and longitudinal data, (Salt 2001; Black and King 2004; Lucas 2006; Cross and Gelderblom 2006). The MAFE project aimed to overcome this lack of understanding by collecting and analysing new statistical data.

1.2 A Dual View of African Migration

The overall hypothesis underpinning the MAFE project and this book is that migration should not be seen only as a one-way flow. The project objective was therefore to study not only migration from Africa *to* Europe, but rather migration *between* Africa and Europe. Defined in this way, the project appears truly vast in scope. In

Box 1.2 The Choice of Countries for MAFE

The three African countries (DR Congo, Ghana, Senegal) were chosen for two reasons. First, their migrants constitute three major "new African diasporas" (Koser 2003): according to OECD data, they represent three of the four largest sub-Saharan populations in Europe. Secondly, they offer contexts that allow interesting comparisons: they have different histories, and especially different colonial backgrounds; their political situations are very diverse (with a very stable country, Senegal, and a post-conflict country, DR Congo); their official languages also differ, as do their ecological and economic conditions.

In Europe, MAFE includes both old host countries (Belgium, France, Netherlands, UK) and new ones (Italy, Spain) that offer contrasting contexts. The former have started to apply more restrictive policies towards African migration, especially since the mid-1970s, while the latter have granted regularizations on a large scale, in a situation where migrants were needed to fuel labour-intensive regional economies.

For each African origin, one of the destination countries is its former colonial state (UK for Ghana, France for Senegal, Belgium for Congo). The other destination countries have been chosen because of the contrasts they offer in terms of receiving contexts (language, integration and migration policies, work opportunities, etc.).

fact, it is limited to the study of international migration by people from three African countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Senegal) to six European countries (see Box 1.2). The initial step was thus to create a methodology for collecting data that would give us a dual view of migration, taking account not only of immigration in Europe but also remigration, return and circulation, and not only destination countries but also origin countries. Although some data of this type already existed,[1] there was no equivalent in relation to African migration.

With African migration, as in other cases, the most commonly available data are those produced in destination countries, so that research tends to focus on immigration rather than emigration. With statistical output limited to the data collected by receiving countries at their borders, immigrants' subsequent movements – whether return to the country of origin or onward migration to a new destination – have received little or no attention. In most cases, they are simply not measured (Willekens et al. 2016). In fact, very few countries record departures from their territory (emigration flows), and the dispersal of their emigrants (expatriate nationals or departed immigrants) to different countries makes the counting of emigrant stocks difficult,

[1] See e.g. the MMP (Mexican Migration Project) and the LAMP (Latin American Migration Project), which largely inspired the MAFE project.

to say the least.[2] The fact that statistical studies and sources focus so strongly on immigration from the destination country's viewpoint has been called a form of "methodological nationalism" (Beauchemin 2014; Wimmer and Schiller 2003). This has a knock-on effect on attitudes to international migration, contributing to the general perception that immigration is a one-way process, and that the newcomer's sole intention is to settle permanently in the host country. Graeme Hugo denounced what he called a "settlement bias" in the perception of migration and the fact that the reversible nature of migration is too often overlooked (Hugo 2014). The failure to take account of out-migration is not the only limitation of data in international migration studies. In a context of policy restrictions regarding the circulation of people, part of the flows (the people coming and going) and stocks (migrants living at destination) go unnoticed in official data because they fail – by definition – to register undocumented migration (unauthorized entry) and irregular migrants (i.e. migrants without a permit to stay, whether or not they entered illegally). Another limitation is that conventional data are ill-suited to describing migrants' precise profiles or studying their reasons for migrating and for choosing a particular destination. Above all, the impossibility of comparing migrants and non-migrants (because they live in different countries, where data are usually not collected in the same way or at the same time) prevents researchers from making a serious analysis of the determinants and consequences of migration.

Understanding and overcoming the severe limitations of available data on international migration is really a crucial step towards a better understanding of the phenomenon, all the more so when it is such a visible and sensitive issue in public debate. The data produced by the MAFE project are by no means perfect (the methodology is described in full in Chap. 2). However, they provide researchers – and their readers – with unique information for original analyses in four main areas: migration patterns (trends in departure and return, migration routes, legal status, migrants' profiles etc.), the determinants of different types of migration (departure, onward migration, return), the effects of migration on family life, and the economic impact of migration on migrants and their families. The MAFE survey was specifically designed to enable measurement of various migration aspects that had hitherto gone largely unmeasured. For instance, it brings answers to such questions as the following: Has Europe actually become the main destination of African migrants over recent decades? To what extent has irregular migration grown? Do all migrants choose to bring their relatives to Europe? How common are transnational families, i.e. families whose members live apart across borders? Has return to Africa increased in recent decades, as European policy makers expected? Do return migrants suc-

[2] It is only since the 2000s that the worldwide aggregation of census data (or across a specific country group such as the OECD) has made it possible to estimate emigrant stocks in various countries. Three databases of this type are available: those of the OECD (http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm), the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-bilateral-migration-database), and the United Nations (http://esa.un.org/MigOrigin/). These databases measure stocks of persons of a given origin living outside their country of origin (by country of birth or citizenship), but do not measure immigrants' remigration.

cessfully reintegrate into the labour markets of their home countries? Do they fit in better than if they had not migrated?

To answer these questions, the MAFE project uses a quantitative approach based on a dual strategy. The first strategy was to apply a multi-site design. On the one hand, the project was carried out in both origin and destination countries, in order to produce counterfactuals for the analyses (for instance, it is possible to study the determinants of departure out of Africa by comparing migrants at destination with non-migrants at origin). On the other hand, the project offers a comparative framework that allows for several types of comparison: African vs. European destinations, different origin countries (Congo, Ghana, Senegal), different migrants groups within the same receiving country (Ghanaians and Congolese in the UK) and different destination countries within Europe (e.g., UK vs. the Netherlands for Ghanaian migrants). In this respect MAFE project provides real added-value; until now, it has been hardly possible to compare destinations because most socio-demographic research on international migration has focused on migration to just one country, the USA.

The second strategy was to avoid a one-shot approach, collecting cross-sectional data that would be valid only at the time of the survey. The project set out to document migration *processes* both at the individual and collective levels. In other words, the data allow for analysis both of migrants' trajectories (taking a life course approach at the micro level) and of migration trends since the mid-1970s at the macro-level. In short, the MAFE data and this book provide information that goes much deeper than a description of the populations of interest at the time of the survey: they give insights into migration processes and trends from the 1970s to the late 2000s.

1.3 Key Lessons

Taking a view of African migration that is not restricted to *im*migration in Europe provides new perspectives on African migrants. For instance, by comparing migrants in Europe with non-migrants at origin in Africa, we can correct the pervasive view in the media that sub-Saharan migrants in Europe are desperate people fleeing poverty. Our results show – as has been observed in most of the world – that African out-migration is a highly selective process (Chap. 4): migrants tend to be more educated than non-migrants and to belong to households with better living conditions. Interestingly, positive selection is also at work in the reverse flows. Return migrants also tend to belong to better-off households than migrants who remain at destination, and also to have a higher educational level. Return migration thus reduces the loss of human capital and resources caused by out-migration. In a way, this result could lessen concerns about a potential *'brain drain*'. On the other hand, our results on the occupational trajectories of migrants show no evidence of a *'brain gain*' (Chap. 5). A large proportion of African migrants experience downgrading on entering the European labor market. With the exception of those who pursue part of their studies in Europe, African migrants obtain jobs for which they are overqualified, and have few opportunities to improve their situation over time. In other words,

migration does not pay off for well-educated Africans; what is involved here is '*brain waste*'. When they return, overall, they obtain better occupational positions than non-migrants. But this advantage reflects their initial selection at departure and subsequent selection for return. After a period of deskilling in Europe, they only experience a sort of '*brain regain'* back home.

Looking at both ends of migration trajectories, i.e. both origin and destination countries, also sheds new light on family migration. Official statistics on family migration are usually based on counts – in receiving countries – of the number of residence permits issued on grounds of family reunification. They count the number of people entering for reunification, but do not record those left behind, i.e. migrants' relatives who remain in the origin country. While the conventional data focus on entries into Europe, the MAFE project also pays attention to what happens at origin and puts into perspective the amount of reunification in Europe and the process involved. Chapter 6 shows that family relationships span nation state borders: it shows that partners, parents and children may live separately for very long periods. It also shows that reunification does not only occur in Europe through legal immigration procedures. In many cases, families are reunified at origin when migrants return. Furthermore, Chap. 4 shows that reunification in Europe does not necessarily rule out migrants returning to their home country. *Living apart together across borders* (Beauchemin et al. 2015) appears to be quite a common arrangement, contrasting with the common belief that most, if not all, African migrants enter Europe with the intention of staying permanently and bringing their whole family there.

Comparisons between migrant groups suggest that transnational families are partly the result of cultural preferences. Family and gender norms in sending countries influence migrants' family arrangements. For instance, the higher proportion of transnational families among Senegalese migrants, compared to Congolese or Ghanaian ones, certainly reflects the fact that child fostering and the spatial separation of couples are common and socially well accepted in Senegal. International migration just extends these family patterns beyond borders. But international migration also makes family arrangements contingent on policies adopted in receiving countries. For instance, the fact that transnational families are less common in the UK than in Belgium (for the Congolese) or the Netherlands (for Ghanaians) is probably due to the less liberal approach of family migration policies in the latter countries than in the UK, at least until the late twentieth century.

Contextual effects in Europe can also be seen in the selection of migrants and their economic integration. Migrants are socially stratified by receiving state. Former colonial countries that are also old destinations (e.g. France for the Senegalese, Belgium for the Congolese, the UK for Ghanaians) tend to receive more students and skilled workers, while newer destinations (i.e. Spain and Italy for the Senegalese, the UK for the Congolese, the Netherlands for Ghanaians) receive migrants with less skills or education. It can be said that the more educated migrants benefit from colonial legacies such as a common language or easier recognition of their educational and professional credentials. The influence of colonial history is also perceptible if we compare different groups in the same country. For instance, despite high levels of education, Congolese in the UK (a new destination for them)

have poorer labor market outcomes than Ghanaians, who experience no language barrier and whose diplomas are more easily recognized.

Context also matters at origin. This emerges, for instance, in the very particular patterns of return migration to Ghana. On the one hand, Ghana is the only one of the three MAFE African countries where the probability of returning has increased recently (2000–2008 – see Chap. 3). On the other hand, this is also the only country where returnees enjoy successful economic reintegration (Chap. 5). Both results suggest the influence of an advantageous economic context at origin, at least by comparison with Congo and Senegal. In any case, these results illustrate the variety of African migration patterns.

While African migration is often considered a homogeneous migration stream (most available statistics merge all sub-Saharan origins within a single group), the results of the MAFE project show the variety of migrations between Africa and Europe. The book is organized so as to show the specificities of the three flows under scrutiny and to derive some general patterns from the case studies. After this introduction, the first part of the book is dedicated to a comparative approach of African migration. In four domains, Congolese, Ghanaians and Senegalese migrant flows are systematically compared. Chapter 2 presents the survey methodology that made possible this comparative work. Chapter 3 shows how migration trends have evolved since the mid-1970s, offering a unique overview of migration patterns, including some undocumented and/or sensitive subjects (e.g. return, legal status and routes). Chapter 4 analyses the determinants of migration between Africa and Europe, giving as much importance to return as to departure. Chapter 5 examines the socio-economic integration of migrants both at destination and at origin, whether after return or during their stay abroad, through different types of economic links (remittances to households, investments in durable assets, participation in associations). Finally, Chap. 6 examines migrants' family arrangements. It shows how complex they can be and demonstrates that families can live apart across borders for very long periods. After this comparative part, the rest of the book examines more deeply the three flows that were studied in the MAFE project. For each flow, three topics are systematically examined: patterns of migration, economic participation and family arrangements. Part II is dedicated to Congolese migration, Part III to Ghanaian migration and Part IV to Senegalese migration.

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Part I
A Comparative Approach of African Migration

Chapter 2
Migration Between Africa and Europe (MAFE): Advantages and Limitations of a Multi-site Survey Design

Cris Beauchemin

2.1 Introduction

Sub-Saharan immigration became a major concern in Europe in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Images of migrants attempting to scramble over barbed-wire fences in Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, followed later by footage of brightly painted boats being hauled ashore on the Canary Islands, captured the attention of the general public and political decision-makers. The idea of an "African invasion" gained in currency, despite quantitative analysis showing that sub-Saharan migrants accounted for a minority of migrant flows and populations in Europe (de Haas 2008; Lessault and Beauchemin 2009). But the fact remains that African migration has long been under-presented in international migration research (Grillo and Mazzucato 2008; Hatton and Williamson 2003; Lucas 2006). The goal of the Migration between Africa and Europe project, or MAFE project for short, was to collect quantitative data with a view to shedding new light on African migration patterns, their causes and consequences. Addressing the classic methodological problems facing the designers of international migration surveys, this chapter presents the approach adopted by the MAFE project.[1] With survey methods remaining often uncertain and ill-documented in this research field, the aim is to explain and discuss our methodological choices so as to help future survey designers go further in their quest for new solutions.

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[1] An extensive account of the MAFE project and methodological choices is available in Beauchemin (2012).

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Migration is by no means an uncharted field in socio-demographic research. Some previous surveys served as invaluable sources of inspiration for the MAFE project. Two major characteristics of the project were inspired by the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) (Massey 1987), namely its transnational sample, with data collected in major urban regions of both Africa and Europe, and its retrospective nature, with the collection of quantitative life histories. Previous life history surveys carried out in Europe and Africa served as a starting point for the design of MAFE event history questionnaires (Antoine et al. 1999; Poirier et al. 2001). Lastly, the sampling strategy was based in part on that of the project Push and Pull Factors of International Migration (Groenewold and Bilsborrow 2008).

The design of a survey naturally depends on its scientific objectives. The aims of the MAFE project are as wide-ranging as those of the MMP and the Push-Pull project. The idea is to produce data that can be used to analyse migration trends, causes and consequences at micro level. The project's founding assumption is that migration should not be seen as a one-way flow from Africa to Europe, and that return migration and transnational practices are important and need to be understood in order to develop appropriate migration policies. That idea is conveyed in the name of the project, which addresses migration *between* Africa and Europe rather than *from* Africa to Europe. The idea also justifies the project's transnational approach that consists in conducting quasi-simultaneous surveys in three origin countries and six destination countries (Table 2.1). More than 4000 household interviews were completed in Africa and over 5400 individual life history questionnaires (also called

Table 2.1 Countries included in the MAFE project

Origin country	Destination country	Migrant stocks (2010)			Percentage of migrants from origin country in total immigrant population of destination country (2010)
		Population	Proportion of expatriate population (%)		
			In Europe	Worldwide	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Belgium	19,370	14.8	1.7	1.7
	UK	20,646	15.7	1.8	0.3
Ghana	Netherlands	13,310	6.7	1.9	0.7
	UK	82,586	41.6	12.1	1.2
Senegal	Spain	56,751	24.4	11.5	0.9
	France	111,630	48.0	22.6	1.6
	Italy	53,981	23.2	10.9	1.1

Interpretation: 19,370 Congolese lived in Belgium in 2010, representing 14.8% of the Congolese living in Europe and 1.7% of the Congolese living outside DR Congo. In Belgium that year, the Congolese accounted for 1.7% of the immigrant community

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). *Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin* (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013)

biographic questionnaires) were filled in for migrants interviewed in Europe, and for returnees and non-migrants interviewed in Africa.

This chapter explains how the MAFE project surveys were designed. The first section looks at how migratory experiences were recorded, showing how the concepts of "migrant" and "migration" were operationalized when selecting the respondents and designing the questionnaires. The second section presents the nature of the data collected and highlights the need for longitudinal, multi-thematic and multi-level data comparable in time and space. The third and final section focuses on sampling problems, which can prove particularly complex when dealing with international migration. Descriptive in nature, this chapter seeks to remedy the lack of factual data on the design of surveys on international migration. Highlighting the project's innovative aspects, while also pointing up the limits of the data collected, it is also an invitation to make use of the MAFE project data.

2.2 Recording the Migration Experience

The terms "migrant" and "migration" obviously need to be defined before carrying out a survey aimed at studying the trends, causes and consequences of international migration. The problem is that no standard practice exists in the field, with each new survey shifting the definition of the two concepts. The MAFE project initially followed the recommendations of the statistical offices of international organizations (including the United Nations and the European Commission) that define an international migrant as a person having stayed for at least 12 consecutive months in a country where they were not born. This standard definition does not explain how to record international emigrants when surveying in the origin country, a point which MAFE had to clarify, and which we will address later. Also, while adopting this definition of international migrant, the MAFE project aimed not just to look at "long" stays (of more than a year) outside birth countries but also to explore forms of infra-annual mobility reflecting aborted migration projects (migrants unable to stay in the country of their choice), the complexity of migration itineraries (migrants travelling through several countries before arriving or failing to arrive at their destination) and preparations for a long-term stay via short-term stays. Lastly, the fundamental objective of the MAFE project is to show the reversible and possibly repetitive nature of international migration – an objective that requires more than a simple record of migrants' latest movement. Given the breadth of our ambition, the MAFE project adopted a variety of viewpoints to record migrations. Two questionnaires were designed to provide complementary views of individuals' migration experience (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Level of information on international migration experience by type of MAFE survey

	Household survey	Life history survey	
Survey location	Origin country	Origin country	Destination country
Person interviewed	Head of household (or, in their absence, another representative of the household) who responds on the migrant's behalf	Return migrant in person	Current migrant in person
Migrants included in the data	Migrants at time of survey: people declared as living abroad among the three following categories: – children of household heads – partners, mother or fathers[a] of household members – people related to the household head (or his/her spouse) in regular contact with the household in the last 12 months Return migrants: household members at the time of the survey having lived at least 12 months outside their origin country. In the household survey, all return migrants are recorded independently of their age, birth country and nationality.	People who... – were born in DR Congo, Ghana or Senegal – have (or had) the nationality of their birth country – have lived at least 12 consecutive months outside their origin country – were aged 25–75 at the time of the survey	
		Return migrants were included regardless of their age at the time of first departure	Current migrants were included only if they left Africa at age 18 or over
Coverage of the migrant population	All international migrants regardless of their current or past place of residence	All return migrants	Surveyed migrants (only) in the European countries included in MAFE
Information on international migration	– A module on migration experience. Questions limited to first and most recent departures, and first return – A module on transfers of money and material goods	– Complete migration trajectory since birth at the time of the survey – All long- and short-term stays (more or less than a year) – 12 modules describing different aspects of the migration experience, including unsuccessful migration attempts	

Source: MAFE survey

Note: For purposes of comparison, the MAFE surveys also include non-migrants in the origin countries. They are not mentioned in this table. The questionnaires are available in English, French, Spanish and Italian on the MAFE project site: http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/en/

[a]Mothers and fathers living abroad were not included in the MAFE-Senegal survey

2.2.1 Which Migrants Are Included in the MAFE Surveys?

Data on international migration are commonly collected via surveys of households in the countries of origin. Yet no standardized methodology exists, and each survey makes its own definition of the emigrants it includes in household questionnaires. Some use a social obligation criterion, as in the Push-Pull questionnaire, which documents "those who currently live elsewhere but whose main commitments and obligations concern this household [the surveyed household] and who are expected to return to this household or be joined by their family in the future". Others, such as the NESMUWA surveys (Network of Surveys on Migration and Urbanization in West Africa), use place of residence criteria which document people having previously lived at least 3 months in the household and having lived abroad for at least 6 months at the time of the survey (Bocquier 2003). Still others focus on family relationships, including the MMP, which identifies all the children of the household head regardless of their place of residence, be it in Mexico or abroad. This last option has a major advantage in that it is based on permanent relations (family ties) that are constant over time. In contrast, the notion of household, on which the other surveys are based, is problematic when the information recorded on the household does not correspond to the situation at the time of the survey.[2]

In the light of these studies, and taking account of the analysis objectives (to establish migration trends, understand transnational family forms and study the effects of migration on domestic economies), the MAFE project adopted a combined approach; its household questionnaire includes not just the household members but the following individuals who can be considered as "associated" with the household[3]:

- all children of the household head living outside the household, independently of their place of residence (including those who are deceased). These may or may not be international migrants. This category therefore includes internal migrants;
- household members' partners living abroad, and (for MAFE-Congo and MAFE-Ghana only) the household members' mothers and fathers living abroad;
- all the other people related to the household head or his or her partner living abroad and in "regular" contact with the household in the 12 months preceding the survey.[4]

[2] The concept of household is traditionally used to describe a group of people living under the same roof, under the authority of the household head, at the time of the survey. At another point in time, the head or place of residence could be different, with some members leaving and others arriving. Consequently, when speaking of a household, the reference to the future or the past is far from clear. Does it refer to the group, the place of residence or the household head?

[3] In the MAFE project, the household is defined in a conventional manner as a group of people living together and sharing their resources in part or in full with a view to satisfying their essential needs (housing, food). To be considered as members of a household, the people in question must have lived or have the intention to live under the same roof for at least six months.

[4] The meaning of regular contact was left to the judgment of the respondents. A questionnaire module addresses the nature and frequency of this contact.

Overall, a relatively large number of international migrants were recorded, with 44% of the households surveyed in Ghana reporting the existence of at least one international migrant, 47% in Senegal and 63% in DR Congo (see Chap. 6 in this volume). When working on this broad and composite population of migrants mentioned by the households, it is important to keep two things in mind. First, the people belonging to these three categories are, by definition, not "members" of the household that reported their existence because they do not live under the same roof. Second, the three categories of people constitute an extremely heterogeneous population. Some of them are systematically recorded regardless of their place of residence, including in the origin country (children of the household head). Others are recorded only if they live abroad (partners or relatives of one of the household members). And still others are included in the sample on the condition that they have maintained relations with the household in the last year (other people related to the household head or his/her partner). Depending on their research objective, the users of MAFE data need to select the individuals to be included in their analyses and decide whether they want to focus purely on permanent household members, on international migrants or on another particular group. For example, the migration rates cannot be calculated on the basis of all the individuals mentioned in the household questionnaire. The same categories of people must be found in the numerator (migrants) and the denominator (people exposed to the risk of migration). This is the case for the children of the household head (recorded regardless of their place of residence) but not for the other categories, recorded simply because they are abroad.[5] To take another simple example, if the researcher is interested in the composition of households in the major agglomerations of DR Congo, Ghana or Senegal, it may be in their interest to exclude all the individuals who, though recorded in the survey, are not, strictly speaking, members of the household. And if the research consists in analysing remittances, the survey population may be limited to international migrants (Rakotonarivo and Mangalu 2013).

The migrant sample constructed on the basis of household surveys has two advantages. First, the relatively extensive method of recording international migrants serves to limit the conventional bias of surveys in the origin country, in which it is always possible to miss migrants who have left with their entire household (migrants that no-one can report in the origin country). Second, the household data include all international migrants, independently of their destination. The household databases of the MAFE project include migrants who may live anywhere in the world. This is not true for the individuals recorded in the life history survey, since the migrant sample is limited to the countries in which the data were collected (Tables 2.1 and 2.2). For obvious financial and logistical reasons, it was impossible to carry out the individual surveys in all the countries that receive Congolese, Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants.

The migrant populations in the household and life history surveys do not differ merely by the variety of the destinations included. While in the household surveys

[5] For more information on calculating migration rates with MAFE data, see also Schoumaker and Beauchemin (2015).

migrants are recorded independently of their age, place of birth and nationality, these variables were used as selection criteria in the life history survey. These criteria were established in the same way for all individuals, regardless of their country of residence (DR Congo, Ghana or Senegal) and migrant status (current migrant, return migrant, non-migrant), so as to ensure the greatest possible homogeneity between the transnational samples. The selection criteria are as follows:

- the respondents are aged 25–75 at the time of the survey, the lower age limit serving to ensure that the life histories are sufficiently eventful;
- the respondents were born in one of the origin countries targeted by the survey (DR Congo, Ghana, Senegal), the place-of-birth criterion serving to exclude immigrants from the African samples and the children of immigrants from the European samples;
- the respondents have (or had) the nationality of the origin country. This criterion is used, alongside the place of birth, to exclude the children of immigrants in African countries (for example, children born in Senegal to French parents);
- in Europe, migrants are included only if they left Africa at the age of 18 or over. This criterion serves to harmonize the sample by focusing on adult migration.

2.2.2 Migration Experiences Recorded in the MAFE Questionnaires

The data from the household and life history questionnaires present complementary views of migration. The data collected with households in Africa have extended (and unbiased) coverage in terms of destinations, but the variables describing the experience of international migration are limited because the information is not obtained from the migrants themselves. Conversely, the individual life history data are limited in terms of destinations (at the time of the survey) but highly detailed in their description of international mobility (Table 2.2).

The household questionnaire essentially focuses on the individuals' most recent migration experience, i.e. their last departure and their situation at the time of the survey. It also includes a few questions on first departure and return, which can be used to reconstruct migration trends (Schoumaker and Beauchemin 2015). An additional module focuses on remittances made by the international migrants to the household. The information collected can thus be used to study relations between Africa and Europe through a description of the flows of people and goods in both directions (departure and return).

The information in the life history questionnaire, collected through the migrants themselves (and not proxy respondents), is much more detailed and reliable than that of the household questionnaire. It includes the entire migration history of the individuals, from their birth up to the time of the survey, which can be used to describe complete migration trajectories, including circular movements or complex trajectories between countries of origin and of residence at the time of the survey. It

contains information not just on the respondent's long stays abroad (of at least 12 months, as in the household survey) but on their short stays as well. These data can be used, for example, to show the growing complexity of the itineraries taken by the migrants entering Europe. In the three origin groups, a growing proportion of respondents have transited via other countries before settling in the country where they were surveyed (Schoumaker et al. 2013a). The life history questionnaire also includes questions on migration "attempts"[6] and on intentions to settle in the countries of destination. For example, the data shows a decreasing trend in the proportion of Senegalese and Congolese migrants in Europe who plan to return to their country of origin (Flahaux 2013).

Not all forms of mobility are described in the same detail. Short stays (of under one year) for business or leisure purposes that are not connected to a long-term migration project are simply recorded (year and country). However, short stays as part of a migration project to settle outside the origin country (transit stays and interrupted stays in which the migrant intended to stay in a country but in the end was obliged to leave) are described in as much detail as stays of over one year through a set of modules including questions on the organization of each journey (itinerary taken, persons who decided on the journey, persons who financed the journey, persons accompanying the traveller, etc.), on the conditions of integration in each destination country (legal status, language proficiency, use of public services, etc.) and on the relations maintained with the origin country during each migration spell (remittances to relatives or friends, participation in community groups, community-based investments). The MMP questionnaire served as a basis for the modules describing migration experiences. But the questions were extensively revised and extended, since migration between Africa and Europe is much more complex than that between Mexico and the United States. While Mexican migrants head almost exclusively to a single destination country, African migrants target a broad range of destinations. Second, while a single border separates Mexico and the United States, African and European countries do not share a border, which means that the trajectories taken by African migrants to Europe can be considerably more tortuous than a "simple" border crossing. Taking account of the complexity of migration itineraries was one of the challenges of the MAFE life history survey.

2.3 Comparable, Retrospective, Multi-level and Multi-thematic Data

While the MAFE project addresses international migration, it does not focus purely on migrants. This is because understanding the experience of migrants and the causes and consequences of their departure (and return) hinges on comparing them

[6] For a detailed discussion of the recording of attempted migrations and an analysis of the factors in attempted and effective migrations, see Mezger (2012). On return intentions, see Flahaux (2013).

with people who have not migrated. The challenge and difficulties of surveys on international migration lie specifically in including the relevant comparison groups in the sample. For example, to understand the determinants of departure from a given country, the people who leave (and sometimes return) have to be compared with those who stay behind. Similarly, migrants and non-migrants must be compared in order to study the effects of international migration on individuals' economic and family histories. This requirement of comparability has been well established in the literature (Bilsborrow et al. 1997; Massey 1987; Rallu 2008) but raises significant methodological problems, since it involves comparing people living in different countries and – a further difficulty – comparing them at a particular point in time which, in general, is not that of the survey. The objective of producing comparable data between different migration flows, involving multiple origin and destination countries, makes survey design even more problematic.

2.3.1 Retrospective Data

To study migration, longitudinal data are needed. To understand the factors behind departure, for example, the situation of the migrants just before their departure must be compared with that of non-migrants at the exact same time. Comparing them at the time of the survey (sometimes years after migrating) will not provide any useful information on the determinants of migration. If we wish to compare individuals in the past and not only at the time of the survey, then longitudinal data must be collected. Two solutions are theoretically possible: either a panel survey involving repeat observations of the same individuals and households over time, or the collection of life histories on a one-off and retrospective basis. The first alternative was not possible for the MAFE project as not enough time or resources were available to build a panel with the timeframe required to understand changes in the medium term or to reconstitute past migration trends. Also, gathering panel data for transnational samples that include mobile and potentially vulnerable people (including undocumented individuals), poses substantial practical and methodological problems. The MAFE project, then, is based on retrospective data. Such data may have certain limitations, notably related to recall effects, but past experience has shown that high-quality data can be collected in this way using appropriate tools (Antoine et al. 1987; Freedman et al. 1988; GRAB 1999).

While the retrospective approach is not entirely absent from the household questionnaire, which contains a few time-specific questions, it is mainly applied to the biographic, or life history questionnaire, which is designed to retrace the life histories of individual respondents in a detailed and highly standardized manner. In terms of form, the MAFE life history questionnaire was largely based on biographic surveys already carried out in France and Africa (Antoine et al. 1999). It includes two separate tools: an "Ageven" grid and a book of thematic modules containing the

precise questions.[7] The Ageven grid – Ageven being an acronym for Age Event (Antoine et al. 1987) – is an invaluable tool for establishing reliable dates for the respondents' life events, such as migrations, unions and changes in employment. Using the grid, the interviewer and respondent can refer to exact years, the respondent's age or other landmark events to produce a detailed inventory of his or her life history. This collection technique makes it easier to recollect events and improves dating consistency.

Once the data have been collected and recorded, they are arranged in the form of thematic person-period files (one file per questionnaire module). Unlike more conventional databases in which each individual represents one line in the file, a single respondent can appear on several lines. For instance, in the file on international migration spells, each person is present as many times as he or she begins a stay in a new country. Each stay is listed on a new line, with the columns showing the variables describing the migrant's living conditions. These data are designed to be used with longitudinal analysis methods, including sequential and event history analysis.[8]

2.3.2 Multi-thematic and Multi-level Data

Studying the causes and consequences of migration requires information on aspects other than migration itself. Five of the 17 questions in the life history questionnaire focus on the respondents' family history (unions and children), economic history (training and occupation, investments) and residential history. These thematic modules, a mainstay of life history surveys, provide a series of variables (having a child, forming a union, investing in a company, etc.) that can serve as dependent variables to examine the socio-demographic and economic consequences of international migration or, inversely, as explanatory variables to study the migration process itself (González-Ferrer et al. 2014).

Besides individual factors, migration depends on family factors as well as institutional and structural factors at community, regional, national and even international levels (Massey et al. 1993). While not having data on all those levels, the MAFE project nevertheless collected contextual information. In the life history questionnaire, several variables capture changes in the respondents' social environment. For example, the module on residential history gathers retrospective data on the subjective well-being of each household in which the respondent has lived. For each residential spell, the interviewees were asked whether they had enough to live on and whether their living conditions were better, worse or the same as those of the other households in their village or town. An entire module is dedicated to describ-

[7] The questionnaires can also be found on the project website: http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/en/. While the MMP is presented as an "ethnosurvey" (Massey 1987) giving interviewers the latitude to formulate the questions, the MAFE questionnaires contain precisely worded questions to be respected by interviewers.

[8] For a complete overview of the databases, see Beauchemin et al. (2014).

ing the respondents' migrant networks, and was used to verify and expand theories on the role of social capital in the migration process (Liu 2013; Toma 2012).

At macro level, a contextual database was built to collate existing series of economic, socio-cultural and political variables for each project country. In addition, an original database on immigration policies, ImPol, was developed for MAFE-Senegal, coding international migration control measures each year for Spain, Italy and France (Mezger and González-Ferrer 2013). Community-level information could not be included in the MAFE survey system, however. A specific survey was initially planned but came up against two obstacles. The first of these was conceptual, as the idea of "community" is difficult to translate into operational terms in African urban environments (MAFE's survey area), where it is hard to establish the boundaries of communities, particularly in the continent's fast-changing large cities. The second obstacle was of a practical and methodological nature. Collecting community data to be included in a life history survey involves administering the survey in all the places mentioned in the respondents' residential histories (and not just where the individual data are collected), failing which the relationship between community context and migration cannot be correctly established (Schoumaker et al. 2006). A community-based retrospective survey was therefore impracticable, given the large number of data collection locations and the high costs involved.[9]

2.3.3 The Challenges of Comparisons over Space and Time

The longitudinal nature of the MAFE project called for particular care in designing questionnaires that have meaning for all respondents in all contexts, i.e. across countries and over time. The concepts used had to apply equally well to a Congolese man having stayed in his country in the 1970s and a Senegalese women living in Italy in the 1990s. In short, a "one-size-fits-all" solution had to be found for the MAFE life history questionnaire design. Some concepts can be easily transposed because they are universal or because methods of comparison have already been identified and are widely recognized, as in the fields of education and socioeconomic status. Other concepts raise considerable problems because they are intimately linked to a specific context, even if they may appear universal at first glance. Devising appropriate questions involves gauging how the respondents understand the questions and then identifying the exact categories and terms that have the same meaning for everyone at any time and everywhere, keeping in mind that the questionnaires are translated into several languages.[10] This calls for thorough preparation, with numerous survey tests

[9] Alternatively, questions could have been included in the individual questionnaire to describe the places in which the individuals have lived. But this idea was dropped as the questionnaire was already very long.

[10] The survey tools exist in French, English, Spanish and Italian. The questionnaires were not translated into the local African languages but workshops were organized during the interviewer training sessions to discuss the translation of potentially problematic concepts.

and in-depth discussions between national teams. It took several years to design questionnaires that satisfied the requirements for all countries in the MAFE project. The first versions were designed in Senegal in 2005. MAFE-Senegal then carried out several tests, first in France and Senegal and then in Italy and Spain, before launching a simultaneous pilot survey in the four countries. In parallel, the questionnaires were tested and adapted in Belgium and DR Congo as part of the MAFE-Congo I survey (2007), giving rise to new adjustments that were taken into account in the final MAFE-Senegal survey (2008). Finally, after a few minor adaptations, the questionnaires were used for MAFE-Ghana (in Ghana, the Netherlands and the UK) and MAFE-Congo II (in DR Congo, Belgium and the UK) in 2009.

While methodological problems of comparison may potentially concern any comparative survey (regardless of subject), such problems are inevitable in surveys on international migration that, by their very nature, seek to compare individuals living in different places (migrants, return migrants and non-migrants). Two examples illustrate the "one-size-fits-all" solutions devised as part of the MAFE project to improve questionnaire comparability.

The first example concerns the legal status of migrants (i.e. documented or undocumented). The objective was to reconstitute the legal trajectories of the migrants when living outside their country of birth (and not just in Europe). The difficulty was threefold: (1) each country has its own legal system (and no worldwide database yet exists in this area); (2) the legal framework may vary over time within each country; and (3) the status of migrants is often complex, as the right to reside does not always depend on entry conditions (with or without a visa) and is not always connected to the right to work. In fact, intermediate situations exist between documented and undocumented statuses. Considering all these complications, the solution adopted by MAFE distinguished between the legal categories of "work permit" and "residence permit". Within each category, the response modalities are designed so as to ascertain at all times whether the respondent had a permit or not, or if a permit was not needed. As a result, the questionnaire covers all possible legal situations as part of a standardized framework that is fully comparable in all situations.[11]

The second example relates to the concept of the couple. The problem here is that there is no simple and universal objective criterion for determining the moment at which two people start to form a couple, particularly in the context of international migration. Living under the same roof can be used as a criterion in some single-sited surveys but is not relevant for transnational couples who, by definition, are not cohabiting since one of the partners has migrated to a different country (Baizán et al. 2014; Beauchemin et al. 2015; Mazzucato et al. 2015). Furthermore, the marriage criterion is difficult to apply in the MAFE project or at any rate in some of the countries in which it is administered. While marriage is practically universal in most sub-Saharan countries, it is relatively rare in some European countries, where consensual union has become a social norm. All in all, considering the difficulty of defining a couple with objective criteria that would be relevant in multiple contexts, it was decided to adopt a subjective definition for the MAFE project, with respon-

[11] For a detailed analysis of the legal trajectories of Senegalese migrants, see Vickstrom (2013).

dents listing the person (or people) they considered as their partner(s) at the time of the survey or in the past. That decision raised translation problems, however, since such neutral terms do not exist in all languages. For example, the translation of the word "partner" in local Senegalese languages and in Spanish is "spouse", a term that excludes partners in consensual unions, a form of partnership that, while quite rare, does exist in these societies. To ensure that the questionnaire would be understood in the same way by all respondents in all contexts, we specified in all languages: "Let's talk about the partners that you have had in your life, whether you were married to them or not".

The questionnaires are almost identical in all the countries. The sole adaptations regard cultural (religion, ethnic groups) and family variables (no polygamous unions and no reference to the family nucleus in households in Ghana and Congo; no reference to fostered children in MAFE-Senegal). The same data entry programs were used in all countries (thanks to a multi-lingual design), so the MAFE datasets, designed to facilitate comparisons across time and countries, have exactly the same structure wherever the survey took place.[12]

2.4 Sampling Problems

Building a representative sample for a survey of international migrants is a challenging task in most countries. The relatively small numbers of migrants and, even more so, of return migrants, the vulnerability of certain individuals (undocumented migrants) and the lack of appropriate sampling frames are all major obstacles. A range of methods have been tested, sometimes on an experimental basis, but none of them have proved ideal (Groenewold and Bilsborrow 2008; McKenzie and Mistiaen 2009). In this highly constrained methodological context, the aim of this Section is to explain the sampling strategies used in MAFE and to document the problems encountered.

2.4.1 Finding an Acceptable Compromise

As mentioned earlier, the fundamental objective of the MAFE project was to produce data for comparison of migrants, return migrants and non-migrants. MAFE employed two techniques that can be used to simultaneously produce information on these three categories of individuals, who, by definition, live in different countries. The first technique consists in creating a sample of households in the origin country to describe their members (mostly non-migrants, sometimes return migrants) and migrants "associated" with the households, irrespective of their

[12] MAFE project data are available in French and English and can be freely accessed at: http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/en/data/

destination (Table 2.2). The other technique involves carrying out a multi-site survey by interviewing return migrants and non-migrants in their countries of origin and migrants in their destination countries. A perfect sample would include a sub-sample representative of the population of the origin country along with dispersed sub-samples representative of the entire migrant population in the rest of the world. Of course, given the dispersion of migrants across the globe, such an approach is totally unfeasible, as it would require a quasi-worldwide survey. Multi-site surveys, by nature, call for a compromise that consists in selecting at least one destination country. Thus far, MAFE is the only project to have surveyed several destinations for one origin. For each African origin country, the project decided to systematically select the former colonial capital and at least one new destination. In fact, just two or three destination countries were chosen, and they are all located in Europe (Table 2.1). Other destination countries are not entirely absent from the MAFE project, however; they are included in the data collected on migrants from households in the origin countries and also figure in the migration histories of international migrants interviewed in Europe and Africa.

In another compromise, to limit survey costs, the samples were restricted to particular regions and so do not achieve national coverage. In Senegal and DR Congo, the MAFE samples are focused exclusively on the regions of the capital cities (Dakar and Kinshasa), while in Ghana the sample covered both the capital Accra and the city of Kumasi. These regions in Senegal, DR Congo and Ghana are home, respectively, to 26%, 12% and 17% of the total population of the countries[13] and are known for their high migration rates. For example, Dakar was the origin region for 31% of international migrants reported in 2001–2002 by Senegalese households in the ESAM II survey (Sall 2008). The African samples, then, are not representative of the countries but are more closely linked to their capital cities, where out-migration is most frequent. Neither do MAFE's European samples cover the destination countries in their entirety. Target regions were identified so as to maximize coverage of the target populations and minimize survey costs stemming from sample dispersion, while also collecting data on regions where migrants are less concentrated. In France, the three regions where the survey was administered account for 64% of the country's Senegalese population. In Spain and Italy, where Senegalese also live in farming areas, the samples cover both urban and rural zones.[14]

Besides the general objective of comparing migrants, return migrants and non-migrants, the MAFE project initially set specific objectives on the number and characteristics of respondents. At least 150 migrants were to be included in each destination country, to allow comparisons with non-migrants. Though relatively low, that number ensured a ratio of migrants to non-migrants as yet unattained by any other similar surveys. In the MMP survey (Massey 1987) and the OECD survey on migrants in the Senegal River Valley (Condé and Diagne 1986), the ratio is one migrant in the destination country for ten non-migrants in the origin country. The ratio is much higher in the MAFE survey (see ratio (1)/(2) in Table 2.3). While no

[13] Source: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/unup/index_panel3.html

[14] The sample target regions are described in Schoumaker and Diagne (2010).

Table 2.3 Description of MAFE samples

		MAFE Senegal	MAFE Ghana	MAFE Congo
Household survey in Africa		1141 households, of which 205 with at least one return migrant and 617 with at least one current migrant	1246 households, of which 346 with at least one return migrant and 675 with at least one current migrant	1576 households, of which 351 with at least one return migrant and 1027 with at least one current migrant
Life history survey (individuals)	(1) Africa	1062 individuals, of which 193 return migrants and 101 migrant partners	1243 individuals, of which 319 return migrants and 84 migrant partners	1638 individuals, of which 322 return migrants and 77 migrant partners
	(2) Europe	606 migrants, of which 39–51% women and 12–18% undocumented[a]	421 migrants, of which 47–48% women and 7–19% undocumented[a]	429 migrants, of which 45–50% women and 10–12% undocumented[a]
	(1)/(2)	1.8	3.0	3.8

[a]Depending on the country of residence at the time of the survey

quotas were set beforehand, the sample of migrants in destination countries necessarily had to include undocumented migrants so as to reflect the diversity of migration experiences. For each origin country, the initial objective was to include roughly 200 return migrants. Lastly, to analyse international migration from the viewpoint of gender, our samples had to include around 50% women in the destination countries, and left-behind women (partners of migrants) were to be over-represented in the origin countries.[15] Table 2.3 shows that these objectives were met and the following section shows how this was achieved.

2.4.2 Sample Selection Techniques

This section is based largely on Schoumaker and Diagne (2010) and Schoumaker et al. (2013b), who may be referred to for more detail on sampling design and weighting methods.

In Africa, the MAFE surveys drew inspiration from the experience of the Push-Pull project (Groenewold and Bilsborrow 2008) to ensure adequate representation of households and individuals of interest, some of whom form a potentially rare population (households with migrants, individual return migrants and partners of migrants). In each target region, the sampling strategy was based on random samples stratified in several stages. First, a sampling frame of primary sampling units

[15]The over-sampling of some categories of persons, such as women, is corrected using weights (Schoumaker et al. 2013b).

(PSUs) was built by stratifying regions according to the level of emigration.[16] The PSUs (census zones in Dakar and Accra-Kumasi, and districts in Kinshasa) were selected randomly but with an over-representation of regions with a high prevalence of migration. In each PSU, a listing operation led to a ranking of households into one of three strata (international migrants, return migrants, non-migrants), which enabled us, in the second stage, to randomly select households by over-sampling those affected by migration. Lastly, in the third stage, the individuals were selected from households, once again on the basis of their relationship to migration. In Ghana and DR Congo, all return migrants and partners of migrants were selected, along with another non-migrant member selected randomly from each household. In Senegal, where the individuals were chosen in an equally random manner, the number of return migrants and migrants' partners was limited to two per household.[17] Through this repeated selection of units (i.e. areas, households and individuals) affected by migration, the initial objectives for the African samples were met (Table 2.3). With this selection method, weights must be used to correct for over-representation (Schoumaker et al. 2013b).

In Europe, the construction of representative samples of migrants was a major challenge. The absence of an accessible sampling frame covering the migrant population (including undocumented migrants) practically ruled out the use of random selection techniques. Spain was the exception in this respect, and one that the MAFE project took advantage of. The country's undocumented migrants are listed in the municipal registers (*Padrón*) compiled by the national institute of statistics, constituting a sampling frame from which Senegalese migrants were randomly selected. In the other countries, the quota method was used. This last approach is often recommended for constructing small samples, particularly in the absence of a sampling frame (Ardilly 2006).[18] In all countries (apart from Spain), quotas were set by age and sex at least.[19] In France, the occupational category was also included as a criterion in the quotas, while in Belgium and the UK, the place of residence was used. The use of different recruitment methods (public spaces, snowballing, community groups) and experienced interviewers ensured that all types of migrants had

[16] In Senegal, this process relied on the results of the 2002 census that included questions on international migration. In DR Congo, in the absence of a recent census, stratification was carried out on the basis of information provided by qualified individuals (researchers, specialists from international organizations, managers in public administration, etc.) Given the prevalence of international migration in Accra and Kumasi and the dispersion of migrants in these cities, stratification of this kind was not necessary in Ghana.

[17] This is not the main explanation for the smaller number of return migrants in Senegal observed in Table 2.3. Their number was increased in Ghana and in DR Congo through finer stratification of households. For further details, see Schoumaker et al. (2013b).

[18] Given the small sample size in each country, it was not possible either to apply alternative selection methods designed to reach rare populations in the absence of a sampling frame, such as respondent-driven sampling (Heckathorn 1997) or intercept point surveys (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2009; Marpsat and Razafindratsima 2010).

[19] Weights were calculated to fit the distribution by sex and age observed in other available sources, the source naturally varying by country. For more detail, see Schoumaker et al. (2013b).

a non-zero probability of being interviewed and, in particular, that undocumented migrants were represented in the samples. Random selection techniques were also introduced in different phases of the surveys. In Belgium, for example, survey locations were randomly chosen by taking account of the number of people originally from DR Congo living there. In France, Italy and Spain, some of the respondents were also selected on the basis of contacts obtained through the household survey carried out in Senegal.

2.4.3 The Representativeness of MAFE Data

As detailed data on both migrants and non-migrants were needed to fully meet the objectives of the project, we constructed dispersed and heterogeneous samples. This raises the question of what exactly the MAFE data are representative of.

We are certain that the household samples in Africa are representative of the entire population of the agglomerations surveyed (Dakar, Kinshasa, Accra and Kumasi). The selection methods ensure that all the households had a chance of being interviewed (including households with immigrants in these cities), with use of weightings to correct for non-response (Razafindratsima et al. 2011; Schoumaker et al. 2013b). Migrants in the household data, for their part, are representative of the migrant population scattered across the world eligible to be reported by the surveyed households, given the criteria selected to record them (family, conjugal and other relations, as explained in Table 2.2).[20] A study in Senegal shows that the migration trends observed by the MAFE project concur with those suggested by other data sources (2002 census and the 1992 EMUS survey), namely a slight increase in the propensity to migrate out of Dakar between the 1990s and 2000s, combined with a redirection of flows from Africa to Europe, North America and other destinations (Lessault and Flahaux 2014).

The individual data are, by nature, more heterogeneous since they were collected in several countries. Within each origin country (Ghana, DR Congo and Senegal), individuals, like households, were representative of the populations living in the surveyed agglomerations, the exception being that immigrant populations were excluded. In DR Congo, for example, only individuals born in DR Congo and with Congolese nationality were included in the sample. Weights correct for both individual non-response and the over-representation of return migrants and international migrants' partners (Schoumaker et al. 2013b). For each European country, it can be said that the individual data are "as representative as possible" of the migrant populations. Given the lack of a sampling frame (except in Spain), it was simply impossible to build strictly random samples. But every effort was made to diversify

[20] It should be noted that some reported migrants may never have lived in the agglomerations or even the countries surveyed (a grandfather from Accra may mention a grandson born in the USA but with whom he nevertheless has regular contacts). These migrants can, where necessary, be removed from the analysis samples.

the sampling sources and ensure that all types of migrants had the chance of being selected (including undocumented migrants, as shown in Table 2.3). The important thing was to combine different forms of recruitment so that the biases of one would be offset by the biases of another. By doing so, we avoided the selection biases stemming from the exclusive use of the snowballing method initiating in the origin country (when migrants in destination countries are surveyed through contacts obtained in the origin country). This type of selection method, tested in MAFE-Senegal and inspired by the MMP, turned out to be ineffective and was not used for the MAFE-Congo and MAFE-Ghana surveys. Detailed analyses based on MAFE-Senegal revealed two main flaws in the method (Beauchemin and González-Ferrer 2011). First, its "yield" was very low, with the ratio between the number of international migrants reported in the household questionnaires in Senegal to the number of migrants found and surveyed in Europe being just 5%; other recruitment sources therefore had to be used. Second, the collection of contacts in the origin country resulted in biased samples, as the probability of obtaining a contact is stronger when the household head in the origin country him/herself has international migration experience and when the household is modest (not homeowners) and receives substantial financial assistance from its migrant(s). In other words, relying on a sample of individuals whose contact details are obtained in the origin country leads to overestimating both the role of migration chains in explaining migration and the migrants' economic contribution to their origin family.

Assembling the data collected in the different countries – a necessary stage for comparing migrants and non-migrants and studying the causes and consequences of migration – is also problematic. The ideal scenario would be to have universal samples representative of all the Congolese, Ghanaians and Senegalese living around the world, all origin and destination countries combined. The MAFE data provides only imperfect sub-samples of these ideal samples, however, since they (partially) cover a limited number of destination countries. For analyses using these transnational samples, weightings were calculated to take account of the size of the population in each country (since for each origin group, the migrants surveyed in Europe are over-represented compared with non-migrants surveyed in Africa).[21] The transnational samples are nonetheless marked by geographical mismatches. The first of these stems from the regional coverage of the samples. For example, while all the non-migrants and return migrants interviewed in Senegal lived in the Dakar region at the time of the survey, 35% of the migrants interviewed in Europe had never lived there. The second mismatch lies in the incomplete coverage of the destination countries of Congolese, Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants. While at the time of the survey the interviewed migrants lived in a limited number of European countries (Table 2.1), the return migrants interviewed in Africa may have returned from any country in the world.[22] These mismatches call for caution when interpreting the data.

[21] See Schoumaker et al. (2013b) for an overview of the different weightings and discussions on the use of weightings in the specific cases of transnational samples and life event history data.

[22] For more statistical detail on these mismatches, see Beauchemin (2012). In the future, they could be minimized by extending the samples to other countries and origin regions, or both, as the retro-

2.5 Conclusion: Progress and Future Challenges

The aim of this chapter was to examine the methodological choices made in the MAFE project, to explain the rationale behind them, but also to acknolwedge their limits. In short, the MAFE surveys are multi-sited (origin and destination) and comparable (between all countries), providing retrospective, multi-thematic and multi-level data. Drawing on previous experience of migration surveys, including the MMP, the Push-Pull project and the life history surveys carried out in France and Africa, the MAFE project introduced a number of innovations. It developed new retrospective modules on topics such as migrant networks, migration attempts, migration itineraries, legal status of migrants and remittances that had previously been addressed life history using a cross-sectional approach. These new data offer scope for new analyses.[23] In addition, MAFE is the first project to collect data on several migration systems, enabling comparisons of three African migration flows and several destinations for each one of those flows. But these innovations also have their limits and call for further methodological research.

The first limit concerns the quality of the data generated by the new life history modules. The numerous tests made in the development of the questionnaire and the final survey show that the individuals surveyed were able to respond to the many retrospective questions asked. Initial analysis also showed that the data collected were coherent. But further work is needed to better assess the quality of these new types of data. For example, research has already demonstrated that subjective assessments of economic well-being at the time of the survey are relatively reliable (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2001), but their usefulness for retrospective research deserves more in-depth study.[24] Retrospective information on migrant networks could also be assessed in more depth. The main question here is the extent to which respondents are able to reconstitute the migration history of their entourage. One way to address this issued might be to compare, on the basis of MAFE data, the components of a migration history recorded in the household questionnaires via household heads with the detailed migration histories collected in the life history questionnaires completed by the migrants themselves (return migrants in the three African countries and Senegalese migrants interviewed in Europe whose households were interviewed in Dakar). The use of proxy respondents is a widespread practice in surveys on international migration, and such an approach would provide an opportunity to identify the necessary conditions for obtaining reliable data by this means.

spective nature of the data makes such an extension possible. The MMP has collected data gradually over time. In 1982 the sample concerned just five Mexican communities; today it concerns over 100 (Massey 2000). As part of the MAFE project, a second wave of around 400 Senegalese migrants was interviewed in Spain in 2010 and 2011.

[23] See the MAFE project website for more details on the work already carried out.

[24] The ideal solution would be for a new survey to collect both subjective information on the well-being of households (such as questions Q312 and Q313 in the MAFE life event history questionnaire) and objective information, like the EMIUB survey, for example, which collected retrospective information on housing quality (Poirier et al. 2001).

The second limit concerns sampling. First of all, while the samples may be expanded in the future, their size is relatively limited, which can make some types of analysis difficult. Secondly, although every effort was made to ensure that the samples were "as representative as possible" in each European country, selection biases cannot be totally ruled out. Unfortunately, these biases are not measurable and are specific to each country, which means that differences in results between countries should be interpreted with caution in comparative analyses. Thirdly, the destination countries included in the life history surveys are limited in number (two or three) and in space (in Europe only). Since African migrants have diverse and varied destinations, this inevitably introduces a selection bias that needs to be taken into account in analysis. This bias could be assessed using the data from the household questionnaire. Lastly, while the MAFE survey was designed to enable comparisons between migrants, return migrants and non-migrants, mismatches exist between the samples, which also call for caution when preparing analyses and interpreting the results.

Overall, the MAFE project has produced a set of data that are both unique and imperfect; unique, in that they can be used to make new analyses of international African migration,[25] and imperfect because the data have limits that call for caution in analysis and interpretation. These limits are inherent to all surveys of international migration, which face problems of sampling and information quality that are structurally different to those encountered in other fields of demographic research. To compare migrants, return migrants and non-migrants, there are only two options: to rely on limited information collected through proxy respondents and/or to work with an imperfect multi-site sample that can nevertheless be used to collect a wealth of data from the concerned individuals themselves, irrespective of their geographical location. Considerable progress still needs to be made in sampling. The contribution of MAFE here is rather modest, and simply shows that contacts collected in origin countries lead to biased migrant samples in destination countries. In the absence of a satisfactory sampling frame – one including documented and undocumented migrants – other methods of selecting migrants in destination countries need to be tested and assessed (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2009). That said, it is essential to improve the content and accessibility of existing sampling frames. From that standpoint, censuses that add modules on international migrants (as in Senegal and Morocco, among other countries), and questions that make it possible to identify return migrants are opening up a new avenue of progress. In the meantime, documenting survey design as precisely as possible should become standard practice. In the field of international migration, methodological papers, even if simply descriptive, remain all too rare (Groenewold and Bilsborrow 2008). Yet recognizing and assessing the limits of the data collected is a beneficial exercise that not only allows users to analyse data with fuller knowledge of the facts but also opens the way to future improvement.

[25] Although the MAFE data (particularly the African samples representative of capital city regions) can also be used to address subjects other than international migration.

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Chapter 3
African Migration: Diversity and Changes

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3.1 Introduction

African migration to Europe is regularly at centre-stage of media and policy attention. The media coverage of migrants arriving by sea on the shores or islands of Italy and Spain has encouraged the idea that the European continent is being invaded by floods of destitute migrants. Migration policies in Europe have also to a large extent focused on the control of irregular migration at its external borders (Gabrielli 2011).

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The idea that African migrants are largely irregular migrants travelling long journeys across the Sahara – and the sea – has become common wisdom. For instance, the widely consulted Wikipedia website states that "the majority of the African migrants haven't got European travel visas, therefore their only accessible ways northward is that of travelling through the trans-Saharan routes" (Wikipedia 2015). This focus by the media and policy-makers on irregular African migration does not acknowledge the great heterogeneity of African migrants to Europe. It also tends to mask the diversity in trends and patterns of African mobility, including returns and circulation.

This is partly due to the lack of data on African migration (Lucas 2006; Beauchemin 2015). This lack of data contrasts sharply with the increasing importance of migration in the policy agendas of both sending and receiving countries. Census data are used to estimate bilateral stocks of migrants for many countries (Parsons et al. 2007), but they give no direct information on migration flows. Administrative statistics on immigration flows are mainly limited to developed countries, and suffer from imperfections (Poulain et al. 2006). Statistics on outmigration flows are even less frequent, and are also seriously deficient (OECD 2008). As a consequence, reconstructing trends in departures from African countries from existing data is challenging, and measuring returns of African migrants is next to impossible in most countries. Data on migrants' characteristics are also limited. While census data provide a few characteristics (gender, education) of stocks of regular migrants in destination countries, irregular migrants are largely invisible in these statistics. Finally, data on migration routes also give a partial picture, and are to a large extent based on qualitative studies focusing on irregular migration.

This chapter provides an overview of the patterns of African migration using quantitative MAFE data. Three broad topics are addressed: (1) patterns of mobility, focusing on trends in departures, returns and circulation, (2) profiles of migrants, and (3) migration routes and strategies. The chapter is by nature mainly descriptive, and does not try to identify determinants of migration as such (see Chap. 4 in this volume), although links with changing political, economic and policy contexts in both origin and destination countries are discussed. More simply, the aim is to document – with extensive data on three origin countries and six destination countries – how changing and diverse African migration is, and how monolithic approaches fail to acknowledge the complexities of migration patterns and, ultimately, their causes and consequences.

3.2 Background

3.2.1 Trends and Patterns of African Migration: A Brief Review

Researchers usually agree that the lack of data is a serious constraint to research on trends and patterns of African migrations (Lucas 2006). Research mainly relies on international databases on stocks of migrants or flows to developed countries. These sources supply some of the main characteristics of and changes in African migration, but, as discussed later, lack details on trends, patterns and routes of African migration. They do, however, provide a global picture that is summarized below.

3.2.1.1 Destinations

First, existing data show that African migrants mainly live in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2000, around 70% of the 17.5 million African migrants lived in sub-Saharan Africa, and often in neighbouring countries (Lessault and Beauchemin 2009; Özden et al. 2011). This depends on the country: in general, migrants from less developed African countries (e.g. Niger, Burkina Faso) tend to stay on the continent whereas those from more developed African countries (e.g. Kenya) are more likely to go to OECD countries (Lucas 2006). Intercontinental migration from Africa is largely directed towards Europe (Lucas 2006), although there are also large variations across countries. Senegalese living outside Africa are overwhelmingly in Europe, whereas Liberians mainly live in the United States. According to the global bilateral migration database (Özden et al. 2011), the number of sub-Saharan African migrants living in Europe was close to 3 million in 2000, almost 1 million more than in 1990 (Lucas 2006). More recent OECD data indicate that as many as 3.9 million migrants from sub-Saharan Africa were living in Europe in 2011 (OECD 2014), representing two-thirds of sub-Saharan migrants in OECD countries. This concentration in Europe (and to a large extent in France and the United Kingdom) is partly due to historical ties (former colonial powers being European countries) and geographical proximity as well as economic, political and linguistic reasons (de Haas 2007). Despite this growth, the populations of African migrants in Europe remain relatively small in most countries. For instance, they represent approximately 1% of the total population in France and Belgium (Lessault and Beauchemin 2009; Schoumaker and Schoonvaere 2014). Finally, although Europe remains by far the major destination of sub-Saharan migrants leaving Africa, the United States and Canada have also attracted a growing number of African migrants over recent decades (Capps et al. 2012; Zeleza 2002; Zlotnik 1993; Thomas 2011; Zong and Batalova 2014).

The "stock" of African migrants in Europe has increased steadily for 50 years and this increase in migrant stocks also reflects increasing flows towards Europe. Although data on flows are less readily available than data on migrant stocks, several pieces of evidence indicate that entries have substantially increased since the 1960s. According to Zlotnik (1993) (legal) migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa to six Western European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom) grew from about 13,000 migrants per year in the early 1960s to nearly 50,000 in the late 1980s. More recent data indicate that entries from sub-Saharan Africa into these countries were over 100,000 legal migrations per year in the early 2000s (Migration Policy Institute 2007). Adding migrants to the other major European destinations (Italy, Portugal and Spain), well above 100,000 sub-Saharan African migrants enter Europe legally per year. Indirect estimates of migration flows derived from migrant stocks (Abel 2013) also point to increasing flows from Africa to Europe in the 1990s. Finally, Flahaux and de Haas (2014), using the DEMIG database of migration flows to OECD countries, show that migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa to North America and Europe have increased greatly over recent decades, especially since the 1990s.

The 1990s were indeed a turning point in many respects. Several sub-Saharan African countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, experienced serious economic and political instability. Asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa (which are usually not included in statistics of legal migration, unless they are accepted as legal migrants), also increased significantly. In the same six European countries as above (Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom), asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa were just over 10,000 per year in the early 1980s, but were over 60,000 per year in 2001 (Migration Policy Institute 2007). The extent of irregular migration is notoriously difficult to estimate, but observers suggest that irregular migration between Africa and Europe has also increased significantly, especially since the 1990s (de Haas 2006). This occurred in a post-Cold-War context, where the "fear of invasion" triggered by the opening of the Iron Curtain was accompanied by a tightening of immigration policies in Europe (Streiff-Fénart and Segatti 2011, p.viii). Since then, and especially since 2005 and the Ceuta and Melilla events, sub-Saharan migration to Europe has become a key issue in European politics (Kabbanji 2013).

3.2.1.2 Characteristics of African Migrants

Limited information is available on the characteristics of sub-Saharan African migrants to Europe (in terms of age, gender, qualification, skills, etc.) and on any changes over time (Hatton 2004; Lucas 2006). The existing literature indicates that the educational levels and qualifications of migrants are usually higher than those of non-migrants in the region of departure and that international migrants do not come from the poorest strata of African countries (Lucas 2006). According to a database on skilled emigration to OECD countries (Docquier and Marfouk 2006), the level of emigration of highly skilled people is much greater than that of people with primary education or less. This is found in *all* sub-Saharan African countries; emigration of highly skilled people is also higher from sub-Saharan Africa than from most other regions of the world (Lucas 2006; Hoba and Marfouk 2011). Women are also increasingly represented among African migrants in developed countries, including Europe (Van Moppes 2006; Adepoju 2004). Among migrants from sub-Saharan Africa aged 25 and over in OECD countries, the share of women increased from around 44% in 1990 to 47% in 2000 (Docquier et al. 2009), and the proportion of women in the migrant stock in OECD countries has increased for most African origins. However, data on flows by gender are lacking (Vause and Toma 2015), and little information is available on gender differences in motives, strategies and routes.[1]

[1] These gender differences will only be briefly discussed in this chapter, but can be analysed in some detail from the MAFE data (see for instance Toma and Vause 2014).

3.2.1.3 Returns and Circulation

The lack of individual and longitudinal data in countries of destination (on migrants) and origin (on returnees) is clearly a handicap for measuring and understanding return migration and circulation. Even aggregate data – such as data on emigration flows from European countries – are insufficient to study patterns of return migration. We can neither estimate the level and trends of return migration in most countries, nor measure the duration spent in the destination country before returning.

Returns do, of course, occur, and many European countries have tried to encourage them through return programmes (Dustmann 1996). Scattered evidence suggests that return migration – at least from some European countries to some African countries – has decreased recently. Increasingly restrictive policies are thought to have stimulated illegal migration and at the same time decreased returns (de Haas 2007). For instance, out-migration statistics published by nationality (but not by destination) in Belgium suggest – for Congolese migrants – that the likelihood of return migration has diminished since the 1990s (Schoonvaere 2010). Data also suggest that a large proportion of returns are spontaneous returns. Assisted returns are relative rare, as illustrated by the REAB programme (the programme of assisted voluntary return implemented by the IOM) in Belgium (IOM 2007): the number of returns of undocumented sub-Saharan Africa migrants was between 100 and 200 per year between 2002 and 2006 (including rejected asylum seekers and non-asylum seekers). Removal of undocumented migrants – although not insignificant – also seems to involve a limited proportion of migrants in Europe. For instance, according to Eurostat, fewer than 800 Senegalese migrants and 2000 Congolese migrants were forced to leave Europe in 2011 (expulsions and assisted returns combined) (Flahaux 2012).

Migrant circulation is also receiving greater attention in academic research as well as among policy-makers (Constant and Massey 2002; Hugo 2003; Vertovec 2007). There is, however, little quantitative empirical literature on this topic, in part because of the lack of individual longitudinal data (Constant and Zimmermann 2003). The prevalence of the phenomenon is unknown, as are the trend in circulation of migrants and the characteristics of circular migrants.

3.2.1.4 Routes of African Migrants to Europe

The motives for migration and legal status at entry into Europe of African migrants are diverse, and so are the routes they use to reach Europe. Contrary to popular belief, African migrants usually enter their destination country in a legal manner (de Haas 2007). Even among undocumented migrants, illegal entry is thought to be relatively infrequent (Vickstrom 2014): significant numbers enter legally and overstay their visas, and rejected asylum-seekers who do not leave the country are another major category of undocumented migrants (Collyer 2006; Düvell 2006). Although some information on the way African migrants enter Europe and on changes in their legal status over time was collected for some African countries in

the Push-Pull project in the 1990s (Schoorl et al. 2000; Içduygu and Ünalan 2001), more recent and detailed data are not available.

The current literature suggests – albeit impressionistically – that a wide variety of means of transportation and itineraries are used by migrants entering Europe (Van Moppes 2006; Schapendonk 2012). Some research indicates that people entering Europe legally come mainly by air, but that a large share of migrants entering illegally travel by sea, whether by cargo ships or by small boats, mainly to Italy and Spain. In the early 2000s, the major departure areas of (irregular) sub-Saharan migrants were thought to be Northern Morocco (to Ceuta and Melilla and Southern Spain); Libya and Tunisia (to Lampedusa, Sicily, Malta, etc.); and Africa's West Coast (Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal) for migrants going to the Canary Islands (de Haas 2006; Hamood 2006; Van Moppes 2006). Senegalese migrants tend to leave either directly from Senegal by boat to the Canary Islands, or head northwards to Mauritania and Morocco. Ghanaians are thought to reach Africa's West Coast via Bamako and Dakar, or to cross the Sahara to Morocco or Libya (Van Moppes 2006). Congolese are also thought to be common among migrants moving to Europe via North Africa (Collyer 2006). A survey among 1000 migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in five cities in Morocco, mainly undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, found that 10% of the respondents were from DR Congo[2] (Mghari 2008). Congolese also travel via countries further south (South Africa, Angola) to reach Europe by air (Sumata 2002). Again, existing data are rather limited.

Migration itineraries shift over time, in response notably to tighter controls and changing policies and political situations in transit countries (Düvell 2006; Väyrynen 2003; Gabrielli 2011; Reitano et al. 2014). In the 1990s, the Strait of Gibraltar was a major itinerary between Africa and Europe, but the intensification of controls since 2002 has diverted flows of migrants towards Spain's Canary Islands (Alscher 2005). In the mid-2000s, departures from Africa's West Coast moved further South (Düvell 2006). In recent years, instability in North Africa and the Sahel has contributed to a surge of migrants leaving for Italy from Libya, as it became "a hub for migrant smuggling" (Reitano et al. 2014, p.4). Itineraries may also change in response to visa policies in transit countries. For instance, the Turkish visa regime for sub-Saharan African countries was changed in 2005, making migration to Europe through Turkey more difficult (Brewer and Yükseker 2006).

Evidence on the organization of travel for African migrants to Europe is also fragmentary. Studies tend to concentrate on irregular migration, and as a result give a biased picture of the organization of travel among African migrants. Those studies that concentrate on irregular migration agree that most people entering Europe irregularly are serviced by smugglers at some stage in their trips (Van Moppes 2006; UNODC 2010). Surveys in transit countries also indicate that the services of smugglers are common. For instance, according to Mghari (2008), 87% of 1000 migrants from sub-Saharan Africa living in five cities in Morocco had used the services of smugglers to enter Morocco, and few came by air. Observations in Libya also suggest many migrants turn to smugglers (Reitano et al. 2014). There is, however, a

[2] Another 13% were from Senegal and 5% from Ghana.

variety of reasons for using the services of smugglers, as well as a variety of types of smugglers and options for migrants; some migrants may pay for only part of the journey, while others may opt for a "full package" including false papers (Reitano et al. 2014).

All in all, available data on migrant stocks and migrant flows reveal some broad patterns, but lack details on migration trends from African countries, the profiles of migrants, their motives, and the way they travel. While case studies provide in-depth data on some topics and specific populations, they give only a partial view of African migrations. The MAFE data offer a middle ground between the large-scale databases (that lack details) and the case studies (from which generalization is not possible). By including various origin and destination countries, the MAFE data reveal diversity and country-specific results, as well as showing more general trends among countries.

3.2.2 A Short History of Congolese, Ghanaian and Senegalese Migration

Four distinct phases in the history of international migration in ***Ghana*** may be distinguished (Anarfi et al. 2003). Up until the late 1960s Ghana was relatively economically prosperous and was a country of net immigration, particularly attracting migrants from the West African sub-region (Twum-Baah et al. 1995). During this time emigration from Ghana was minimal; most emigrants were students or professionals who left for the UK or other English-speaking countries. In the second phase, beginning in the mid-1960s, Ghana became a country of net emigration (Twum-Baah et al. 1995). The economic crisis contributed both to a decline in immigration to Ghana and an increase in outmigration (Anarfi et al. 2003). The majority of emigrants were professionals such as teachers, lawyers and administrators who went to other African countries (Botswana, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia) (Anarfi et al. 2003). The third phase started in the early 1980s, when the economy of Ghana was shrinking (Anarfi et al. 2003), and was marked by two shifts in migration patterns: other sectors of society, not only professionals, began to migrate *en masse* from the southern parts of Ghana and migratory flows spread to more distant destinations in Europe, North America and North Africa (especially Libya). Compounding the situation, Nigeria expelled all foreigners from its territory including 1.2 million Ghanaians in 1983 and a further 700,000 Ghanaians in 1985 (Anarfi et al. 2003). It is thought many of those expelled sought greener pastures overseas. In the fourth phase, migration from Ghana to overseas destinations continued steadily so that in the 1990s Ghanaians came to constitute one of the main groups of 'new African diasporas' (Koser 2003). Since the mid-1990s there has been some evidence of return migration to Ghana as a result of an improving economy in comparison to neighbouring West African countries to which many Ghanaians migrated; but also due to the tightening of immigration laws and restrictions on travelling

abroad, particularly to European countries that require the possession of valid travel and employment documents (Anarfi et al. 2003; Twum-Baah et al. 1995). Furthermore, Ghana regained political stability in 1992 when democratic elections were held after a decade of military dictatorship. In general though, there are relatively few data on international return migration to Ghana, in terms of either numbers or the impact on the development of the country at large (Black et al. 2003).

In ***DR Congo***, the country's independence in 1960 marked a turning-point in the history of migration in several respects. While some Congolese migrated to Belgium in the first half of the twentieth century (Cornet 2014), migration to Europe did not truly take off until the 1960s. At that time, most migrants were members of the country's elite who went to Europe to study (Kagné and Martiniello 2001; Schoonvaere 2010), and returned to the Congo after completing their education. The deterioration of the economic and political situation in the 1980s, and even more so in the 1990s, led to an increase in flows and a diversification in the destinations and profiles of Congolese migrants, with more women and migrants with less education (Demart 2008; Schoonvaere 2010; Schoumaker et al. 2010). Migrants' ways of entry and itineraries also became more diverse. First, many Congolese migrants started coming to Europe as asylum seekers (Schoonvaere 2010; see Chap. 7). Second, migration trajectories became more complex. Illegal immigration developed and several studies indicate that it has become a key component of Congolese migration (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Ngoie and Vwakyanakazi 2008), though its scale has not been documented. Destinations also changed. France gradually became the preferred destination, and other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, also attracted growing numbers of Congolese migrants (Ngoie and Vwakyanakazi 2008). Major changes in the patterns of migration within Africa were also observed in the late 1980s and the 1990s. In the 1990s, and especially after the abolition of apartheid, South Africa became a leading destination country (Steinberg 2005; Sumata 2002). Existing data on return migration from Europe show a downtrend in returns and a low proportion of intentions to return. Using Belgian administrative data, Schoonvaere (2010) reported a substantial decrease in returns among migrants who arrived in the 1990s.[3] Based on a small survey among 122 Congolese migrants in Paris, Lututala (2006) showed that three-quarters of migrants intend to stay in France, and that only 14% intend to return to RD Congo (12% were undecided).

The history of ***Senegalese*** migration began in the early twentieth century with merchant seamen, demobilized "*tirailleurs*" (soldiers) and early traders who settled in the countries of French West Africa and, to a lesser extent, in France (Robin et al. 2000). These flows intensified from the mid-1960s, to countries of the sub-region (Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana), notably with the economic success of the cocoa and

[3] Existing statistics also suggest that many returns are spontaneous; expulsions and returns under assisted voluntary return programmes are a minority. For example, between 50 and 100 undocumented Congolese migrants are deported from Belgium each year (CECLR, 2008), and the number of migrants assisted by "voluntary return" programs is also relatively small (Tshibambe and Lelu 2009).

coffee sectors, as well as to more distant flourishing economies (Gabon). The recruitment of labour for the automobile industry in France (Pison et al. 1997) also stimulated migration to Europe. At that time, the Senegalese in France were mainly single men who left their families in their home villages (Petit 2002). The stop to labour migration in the mid-1970s, and the promotion of family reunification in Europe, are thought to have contributed to more permanent settlement (Robin et al. 2000). The late 1980s were marked by extensive emigration and a diversification of destination countries (Tall 2001). Traditional destinations within Africa lost their attractiveness, as a result of economic and political troubles (Robin et al. 2000), and Senegalese emigration within Africa ran out of steam (Ba 2006). France continued taking in Senegalese migrants, and other Western countries (especially Italy and Spain) have attracted increasing shares of migrants from Senegal. Senegalese migration has also received significant media and political attention due to the large numbers of Senegalese migrants arriving by sea on the shores or islands of Europe (Pastore et al. 2006). However, existing studies on Senegalese migrants' routes are mostly thematic monographs (Antoine and Sow 2000; Sakho and Dial 2010). Data on return migration are also limited. Robin et al. (2000) indicate that the majority of Senegalese return migrants are those who had migrated to neighbouring countries such as Gambia and Mauritania (Robin et al. 2000), suggesting that return migration from Europe is more limited.

3.3 Migration from Ghana, Senegal and DR Congo: A General View from the MAFE Data

The MAFE surveys are used to complement these broad pictures of Congolese, Senegalese and Ghanaian migration. Data on first international migration (date, destination) of current household members and of selected relatives were collected in household surveys in the three African MAFE countries. Using event history models, these data make it possible to reconstruct migration trends by long period and destination, as well as trends in returns (see Box 3.1).

Box 3.1 Reconstructing Migration Trends

MAFE data make it possible to reconstruct the trends in departures and returns of migrants using event history models. The household questionnaire in the surveys conducted in origin countries provides the dates of the first international migration (for at least 12 months) of the head of household, his/her partner(s), and his/her children. This information is available for migrants regardless of their current country of residence (still living abroad or return

(continued)

Box 3.1 (continued)
migrants), and the date of first return is available for those who returned after their first departure. The household questionnaire also records the date of birth, gender, and level of education of the head of household, the partner(s) and the children, whether they migrated or not.

Theoretically, we need to include in the analysis all people who have been "at risk" of moving abroad, regardless of their current place of residence. Household heads' children are the only eligible category of people in our data since they were registered regardless of their place of residence at the time of the survey. As a result, trends in migration are computed using only the information on the household heads' children, including deceased children. Age-specific migration probabilities are computed by dividing the number of people undertaking a first migration at a given age during a given year, by the number of people of that age who had not yet migrated by that year. These probabilities are estimated using a discrete-time event history model including only age and time periods as independent variables (Donato 1998; Schoumaker and Beauchemin 2015). Data are organized as a person-period dataset, in which each individual is represented as many times as the number of years between the time they turn 18 and the first migration, or age 40, or the time of the survey if the person never migrated and is under 40. The migration variable (dependent variable) takes the value 0 for all years, except for the year of migration (last year in the person-period data file) if the individual migrated (value equal to 1). Age is controlled with two age groups (18–24, 25–39), and three broad periods are used (1975–1989, 1990–1999, 2000–2008). The three broad periods correspond to broad changes in migration policies as well as economic and political conditions in origin countries. Based on the age effects and the period effects, a cumulative probability of first migration is computed for each period (Donato 1998; Schoumaker and Beauchemin 2015). The indicator measures the probability of undertaking at least one international migration before age 40 in a hypothetical cohort experiencing the age-specific probabilities of migration in a given period.

Returns are estimated among children of heads of households who left their origin country after age 18 for at least 1 year. Probabilities of return are also computed using event history models with time periods and duration of migration as independent variables. The coefficients of the models are then transformed into a cumulative probability of returning within 10 years of first departure for separate periods. Because the population at risk of returning is only composed of those who left, the sample sizes for returns are much smaller, and confidence intervals are larger. Since return probabilities are estimated with event history models, censoring is taken into account. In other words, the fact that people who arrived recently have had a shorter period to return is taken into account.

(continued)

Box 3.1 (continued)

Apart from problems of small samples in some cases, these techniques for reconstructing migration trends retrospectively are not free of bias. One possible bias is the fact that, for people not living in the household, data are collected from proxy respondents. Some migrants may not be declared, and data on those who are declared may be inaccurate. Other sources of bias and their potential impacts on estimated trends are discussed in Schoumaker and Beauchemin (2015). Overall, sensitivity analyses indicate that these reconstructed trends are fairly reliable, but should nevertheless be interpreted as indicative of broad changes.

3.3.1 Leaving, Returning – The Changing Dynamics of African Migration

Migration trends have followed diverging paths between countries (Fig. 3.1). In both DR Congo and Ghana,[4] chances of migration have increased over time, with a particularly strong increase in DR Congo. In contrast, migration from Senegal has been virtually stable since the 1970s. As a result, the differences in migration probabilities between countries have also changed considerably. In the 2000s, cumulative probabilities of migration varied between around 15% in Senegal and around 30% in DR Congo. In other words, given the current rates of migration, between one adult out of seven (Dakar) and one adult out of three (Kinshasa) would undertake at least one international migration between ages 18 and 40. *International mobility is clearly a central component of people's lives in these cities*. As explained below, it is necessary to examine trends by destination so as to better understand these changes. Changes in DR Congo mainly result from increases in migration within Africa, while migrations to Western countries predominate in Senegal and Ghana.

As mentioned above, return estimates (Fig. 3.2) are not very precise owing to small numbers of observations. Nevertheless, two major conclusions can be drawn from these estimates. First, *return is neither the norm nor the exception*. Point estimates show that between 10 and 40% of migrants return within 10 years of their first departure, depending on country and period. Second, no clear trend emerges from these estimates, illustrating the diversity of patterns across countries. Returns to Senegal have been stable, as have returns to DR Congo. The only significant changes are visible in Ghana, where returns first decreased in the 1990s, then significantly increased in the 2000s. Again, it is necessary to examine returns separately by destination to better understand these patterns.

[4] For the sake of simplicity, we use the name of the countries. However, the data were collected in cities and are not representative of the countries as a whole.



Fig. 3.1 Cumulative probability of migration (between ages 18 and 40) from Africa (1975–2008), by country

Source: MAFE Household surveys in DR Congo (2009), Ghana (2009) and Senegal (2008). Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children (between age 18 and 40), including deceased children
Definition: Migration for a period of at least 1 year
Interpretation: Each bar represents the cumulative probability of migration between 18 and 40, i.e. the probability of undertaking at least one international migration between ages 18 and 40 in a hypothetical cohort that experienced the age-specific probabilities of migration within a given period. For more technical details on the computation methodology, see Schoumaker and Beauchemin (2015)
Statistical significance: In DR Congo, the difference between the first period and the second period is significant ($p < 0.01$); the difference between the second and the third period is not significant ($p > 0.10$). In Ghana, the difference between the first period and the second period is significant ($p < 0.10$); the difference between the second and the third period is not significant ($p > 0.10$). Changes are not significant in Senegal ($p > 0.10$)

3.3.2 The Changing Geography of African Migration

Overall trends in departure from the three countries mask major differences by destination (Fig. 3.3). The increase in migration from DR Congo appears to result from a surge in departures towards other African countries, and not towards developed countries (Fig. 3.3). While the odds of leaving the Congo for Europe (and other Western countries) rose in the 1990s during the worst moments of the political and economic crisis, they returned to their pre-1990 levels in the 2000s. On the other hand, migration to the rest of Africa truly took off, quadrupling during this period; Africa was by far the first destination of Congolese migrants in the 2000s. This predominance of African destinations contrasts sharply with migration levels and trends in the other two MAFE countries. In Ghana, the opposite is found: migration probabilities within Africa have remained at low levels since the 1970s, while migration to Europe and North America took off from the 1990s. Senegal



Fig. 3.2 Probability of returning within 10 years of first departure, (1975–2008)

Source: MAFE Household surveys in DR Congo (2009), Ghana (2009) and Senegal (2007). Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children who left at age 18 or over (including deceased children)
Definition: Migration for a period of at least 1 year and return for at least 1 year
Interpretation: Each bar represents the cumulative probability of return within 10 years of first departure, i.e. the probability of returning within 10 years in a hypothetical cohort that experienced the duration-specific probabilities of return within a given period. Periods refer to the time of return, not to the time of departure
Statistical significance: Changes are not significant for Senegal or DR Congo ($p > 0.10$). For Ghana, the difference between the first period and the second period is not significant ($p > 0.10$); the difference between the second and third periods is significant ($p < 0.05$)

displays yet another pattern: migration trends from Senegal have remained fairly stable regardless of the destination, and Western countries, especially European countries, have been the prime destination of migrants from the Dakar region since the 1970s.

As a result of these diverging trends by destination, the geography of migrations has changed considerably. In Ghana, the share of migrations to Europe grew from less than 20% (1975–1989) to almost 50% (2000–2008). In Senegal, it grew from around 45% to almost 60%. In contrast, the share of migration to Europe dwindled to 10% in DR Congo, and African destinations represent 80% of first migrations in the most recent period (Fig. 3.4).

These changes are due to a mix of opportunities and constraints in potential destinations. Opportunities in Africa for Ghanaian migrants have reduced since the 1970s. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Nigeria used to be a major destination for Ghanaians. The oil boom attracted many West African migrants (Makinwa-Adebusoye 1992), especially Ghanaians. Massive expulsions of immigrants from Nigeria (in 1983 and 1985) meant Nigeria was no longer an option for Ghanaians,



Fig. 3.3 Cumulative probability of migration (between ages 18 and 40) from Africa, (1975–2008), by destination. (**a**) Africa (**b**) Europe (**c**) Other destinations (mainly North America) (**d**) All Western destinations combined

Source: MAFE Household surveys in DR Congo (2009), Ghana (2009) and Senegal (2007). Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children who left at age 18 or over. (including deceased children)
Definition: Migration for a period of at least 1 year. Africa includes all African countries (including North Africa). Western countries are mainly European and North American countries.
Interpretation: Each bar represents the cumulative probability of migration between ages 18 and 40, i.e. the probability of undertaking at least one international migration between 18 and 40 in a hypothetical cohort that experienced the age-specific probabilities of migration within a given period
Statistical significance: (a) Africa: changes are significant in DR Congo (from first to second period: $p < 0.05$; from second to third period: $p < 0.01$), but not in Ghana or in Senegal. (b) Europe: the decrease between the second and third periods in DR Congo is significant ($p < 0.01$); the increase between the first and second periods in Ghana is significant ($p < 0.05$). No significant changes in Senegal. (c) Other destinations: changes are not significant, except in DR Congo between the first and second periods ($p < 0.01$). (d) Western destinations: in DR Congo, the increase in the second period is significant ($p < 0.10$), and the decrease in the third period is also significant ($p < 0.01$). The increase in the second period is Ghana in significant ($p < 0.05$). Other changes are not significant



Fig. 3.4 Distribution of first migrations by destination, by period of departure (1975–2008). Household data, weighted figures

Source: MAFE Household surveys in DR Congo (2009), Ghana (2009) and Senegal (2007). Weighted figures
Population: All household heads' children who left in 1975 or later, regardless of age at departure (including deceased children)
Definition: Migration for a period of at least 1 year. Africa includes all African countries (including North Africa). Other countries are mainly North American countries
Interpretation: Each shade represents the share of each destination among the total number of migrants for the period

and no countries in the region offered significantly better opportunities. As a result, Europe and North America became the preferred destinations of Ghanaian migrants.

Among the Senegalese, the share of migration to Europe also increased somewhat, but was not accompanied by a significant decrease of migrations within Africa. However, migrants from Senegal to African destinations have increasingly moved towards countries that may be transit countries for Europe. Until the 1990s, many Senegalese migrated to flourishing economies in French-speaking Africa. In the 1970s and 1980s, Côte d'Ivoire was the major destination (around 30% of migrants heading to African countries), while Gabon was the preferred destination in the 1990s (also around 30%). These two countries together attracted 40% of the migrants from Senegal to African countries between the 1970s and the 1990s. Both Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon were hit by economic crises and adopted anti-immigrant policies in the 1990s; in the 2000s, fewer than 10% of Senegalese migrants to African countries headed to one of these countries. In contrast, North African countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) were the destinations of almost 25% of the

Senegalese migrants within Africa in the 2000s (compared to around 10% in earlier periods).[5] South Africa also attracted growing numbers of Senegalese migrants from the mid-1990s, and the bulk of these are thought to move on to Europe (Robin et al. 2000).

So, paradoxically, even though migration to Europe was becoming more difficult because of increasingly restrictive policies, the lack of opportunities in African destinations and the growing demand for cheap labour – notably in Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy) – helped fuel migration from sub-Saharan Africa.[6] Italy and Spain gradually became major destinations for Senegalese migrants. In the 2000s, they together accounted for about 30% of migrants from Senegal in the MAFE survey, compared to 23% for France. Ghanaian migrants increasingly migrated to the UK, as well as to the US and to new European destinations (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain). As explained below, the profiles of migrants to these new destinations differ significantly from those of migrants to the 'traditional' destinations (France for Senegalese, UK for Ghanaians).

The story of Congolese migration is quite different. Unlike what happened for Senegalese and Ghanaians, new opportunities opened up in the region for Congolese migrants. The end of the apartheid regime gave a boost to migration to South Africa from the mid-1990s (Steinberg 2005; Sumata 2002). The end of the Angola war in the early 2000s and the unprecedented economic development in that country also attracted many Congolese. Maybe as a result of the competing opportunities in Africa and stricter migration policies in Europe, Congolese migration to Europe did not really take off. Mediterranean countries – which attracted many poorly educated Senegalese migrants and increasing numbers of Ghanaians – have not attracted sizeable numbers of Congolese migrants.

3.3.3 Profiles of Migrants: Gender and Education

MAFE household surveys also provide socio-demographic profiles of migrants and make it possible to compare migrants to African and Western destinations. Since data for people living abroad were collected from proxy respondents, only simple information is used. This section describes the profiles of migrants by gender and education (Fig. 3.5).

Regarding the gender composition of migrants, a few key features emerge. *In all three countries, women are less numerous than men among migrants*. Overall, the percentage of women varies between 30% and 50% depending on the origin country and the broad destination (Europe or Africa). Women are also slightly more represented among migrants to Europe than to Africa but, except for DR Congo, differences are not significant. Differences are much greater when destination coun-

[5] Gambia, Guinea and Mauritania also doubled their share of African migrants to almost 40%.

[6] Family reunification also contributed to the increasing migration to Europe, and migration for studies has also been a major way of entry for Ghanaian migrants to the UK.



Fig. 3.5 Proportion of women migrants among first-time migrants, by country of origin and destination (1975–2008)

Source: MAFE Household surveys, 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children (between ages 18 and 40), including deceased children
Definitions: Only stays of at least 1 year in a European country are considered
Interpretation: percentage of women among migrants to each destination, for the first migration at age 18 or over between 1975 and 2008
Statistical significance: The difference in the percentage of women to Africa and Europe is significant for DR Congo ($p < 0.05$) but not Ghana or Senegal ($p > 0.10$)

tries are broken down further. In Europe, traditional destination countries (former colonial powers) tend to attract a larger share of women, whereas men are more frequent in new destination countries (Table 3.1).

Figure 3.6 show that the percentage of women among migrants to Europe has increased among both Ghanaians and Congolese, but has remained stable among Senegalese. Women are now a little more numerous than men among Congolese migrants to Europe. For Ghana and Senegal, women are still less numerous than men, but they nevertheless represent around two-fifths of migrants. The increase in women migrants among Ghanaians was very sharp in the 2000s. The change was more gradual among Congolese migrants, and partly reflects the transformation of Congolese migration from temporary migration to migration for settlement and the increasing place of family reunification, but also more frequent autonomous migration (Vause and Toma 2015). Interestingly, the stability for Senegal masks a feminization of migration flows to France and Italy.[7] However, the growing weight

[7] In France, the percentage of women migrants grew from 44 to 52% from the 1980s to the 2000s, and from 4% to 22% in Italy. For Spain, the numbers of migrants in the household survey are much smaller, and cannot be used to measure trends in the percentage of women migrants.

Table 3.1 Gender and education of migrants by origin and type of destination in Europe (1975–2008)

Origin country	Characteristic	"Traditional" destinations	Other European destinations
DR Congo	Women	68%	43%
	Some higher education	60%	42%
	N	41	147
Senegal	Women	47%	31%
	Some higher education	50%	11%
	N	121	113
Ghana	Women	38%	29%
	Higher education	58%	58%
	N	61	47

Source: MAFE Household surveys in DR Congo (2009), Ghana (2009) and Senegal (2007). Weighted percentages
Population: All household heads' children who left at age 18 or over (including deceased children)
Definition: Migration for a period of at least 1 year
Traditional destinations are Belgium (for DR Congo), France (for Senegal), and the United Kingdom (For Ghana). Other European destinations include all other European countries
Interpretation: percentage of women or people with some higher education among migrants to each type of destination, for the first migration at age 18 or over between 1975 and 2008
Statistical significance: Differences in the percentage of women between traditional destinations and other destinations are significant for DR Congo ($p < 0.01$) and Senegal ($p < 0.05$), but not Ghana ($p > 0.10$). Differences in the percentage of migrants with some higher education between traditional destinations and other destinations are significant for DR Congo ($p < 0.10$) and Senegal ($p < 0.01$) but not Ghana ($p > 0.10$)

of Spain and Italy in the total number of migrants, combined with the lower proportion of women in these countries compared to France, translates into a stable percentage of women among Senegalese migrants as a whole. Even though this percentage is relatively stable overall, the growing percentage of women within countries, as well as the larger share of women among migrants from DR Congo and Ghana may reflect the declining costs and risks of migration associated with the growing networks of family members and friends in destination countries (Massey et al. 1993). Political and economic troubles in DR Congo may also have influenced the composition of migration flows, with migration being less selective in times of crisis (Massey and Capoferro 2006). This feminization of flows is in line with the growing share of women among stocks of African migrants in OECD countries.

Educational profiles of migrants vary widely by destination (Fig. 3.7). Overall, migrants to European destinations are roughly twice as likely to have some higher education as migrants to African destinations. This selectivity of migration to Europe by level of education is due to a variety of factors, including the higher cost of migration to Europe that the less educated may not be able to afford. Again, there is diversity within Europe. The share of highly educated tends to be higher in traditional destinations than in new destinations (Table 3.1).

Trends in education profiles among migrants to Europe are more complex and vary widely between origin countries (Fig. 3.8). Among Congolese, the share of



Fig. 3.6 Proportion of women migrants among first-time migrants to Europe, by Period of departure

Source: MAFE Household surveys, 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children (between ages 18 and 40), including deceased children
Definitions: Only stays of at least 1 year in a European country are considered
Interpretation: Each bar represents the proportion of women migrants
Statistical significance: The increase of the proportion of women between the second and third periods is significant for DR Congo ($p < 0.10$) and Ghana ($p < 0.05$). Changes are not significant for Senegal

educated migrants decreased drastically between the 1980s and 1990s. Congolese migration to Europe was traditionally a migration of elites, but the characteristics of the flows were profoundly affected by the economic and political troubles in the 1990s. The share of migrants with higher education, over 70% in the 1980s, dropped to a little over 40%. In Ghana, the share of highly educated migrants increased between the 1980s and the 1990s, and has remained stable since the 1990s – at the same level as Congolese migrants. This increase reflects both the increase in the level of education in Ghana, and greater selectivity by education. Senegalese migrants to Europe are currently much less educated than their Congolese and Ghanaian counterparts, but this was not the case in the 1990s. A possible explanation for this trend is that in the first period, migrants going to France were little educated, mainly hired as workers. Educated migrants going to France, especially for studies, increased in the second period, leading to a peak in that period. A decrease was observed in the latest period for two reasons: migration to France for study became more difficult, and the increasing share of migrants heading to Italy and Spain has pulled down the average level of education of Senegalese migrants to Europe.



Fig. 3.7 Percentage of migrants with some higher education among first-time migrants, by country of origin and destination (1975–2008)

Source: MAFE Household surveys, 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children (between ages 18 and 40), including deceased children
Definitions: Only stays of at least 1 year in a European country are considered
Interpretation: Each bar represents the proportion of migrants with some higher education for the first migration at age 18 or over between 1975 and 2008
Statistical significance: Differences by destination are significant for DR Congo ($p < 0.01$), Ghana ($p < 0.01$) and Senegal ($p < 0.01$)

3.3.4 Returns: Diversity Over Space and Time

Overall, returns have been rather stable for Congolese and Senegalese migrants, and have fluctuated among Ghanaian migrants (Fig. 3.2). These global trends mask wide disparities by origin and destination (Fig. 3.9). On average, returns from African countries have been much more frequent than returns from Western countries (Fig. 3.9), and have also been relatively stable (Fig. 3.10).[8] The higher level of returns from Africa than from Western countries is partly a question of proximity and less immigration control, making it easier to leave and return. Less frequent returns from Western countries may also reflect larger differences in living conditions between Western and African countries. As shown before, the profiles of migrants going to African countries are also different from those heading to Western countries; the higher investments needed to reach Western countries may delay or deter returns from these destinations.

[8] Or at least our data do not enable us to detect significant changes.



Fig. 3.8 Percentage of migrants with some higher education among first-time migrants to Europe, by Period of departure

Source: MAFE Household surveys, 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children (between ages 18 and 40), including deceased children
Definitions: Only stays of at least 1 year in a European country are considered. People with some higher education have completed 1 year of higher education
Interpretation: Each bar represents the proportion of migrants with some higher education
Statistical significance: The decrease between the first and second periods is significant for DR Congo ($p < 0.01$), but not between the second and third periods ($p > 0.10$). Changes are not significant for Ghana ($p > 0.10$). For Senegal, the increase between the first and second periods is significant ($p < 0.01$), and the decrease between the second and third periods is significant ($p < 0.01$)

Differences in returns across origin countries are also quite large (Fig. 3.9). Returns (from Africa or from Western countries) to Ghana have been highest, those to DR Congo have been lowest, and levels of returns are intermediate for Senegal. While a host of reasons may explain these differences, they show that returns are the most frequent to the country with the highest level of human development of the three (UNDP 2015) and are least frequent in DR Congo, where political and economic troubles are the most pronounced and human development is lowest. While development may increase outmigration (de Haas 2007) it may also facilitate return migration. Ghanaian migrants' economic integration in destination countries is also better (Chap. 5), and this may facilitate their return.

Changes over time have been much more pronounced for returns from Western countries than for returns from Africa. Changes have been most drastic for Congolese migrants. While returns were common among Congolese migrants in Western destinations in the 1980s, since the 1990s returns have been the exception. As discussed in Chap. 7, this has occurred in a context of economic and political crises and tighter migration policies. Given the strong uncertainty in the political and eco-



Fig. 3.9 Probability of returning within 10 years of first departure (1975–2008), by country of origin and by destination

Source: MAFE Household surveys in DR Congo (2009), Ghana (2009) and Senegal (2007). Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children who left at age 18 or over (including deceased children)
Definition: Migration for a period of at least 1 year and return for at least 1 year. Africa includes all African countries (including North Africa). Western countries are all other countries, mainly European and North American countries
Interpretation: Each bar represents the cumulative probability of returning within 10 years of first departure, i.e. the probability of returning within 10 years in a hypothetical cohort that experiences the duration-specific probabilities of return within a given period
Statistical significance: Differences by destinations are significant for returns to DR Congo ($p < 0.01$) and to Senegal ($p < 0.01$). The difference is not significant for Ghana ($p > 0.10$)

nomic situation in DR Congo and the difficulties many Congolese migrants have had to overcome to reach Western countries, returning may seem a risky move. Families tend to encourage their members to stay in Western countries to continue sending remittances (see Chap. 8). Popular expressions in DR Congo such as "RIP" ("*retour interdit au pays*", forbidden return to the home country) illustrate this pressure to stay abroad. The drop in return migration has *transformed Congolese migration in Western countries into migration for settlement.*

Returns from Western countries to Senegal have not changed in a significant way. There was a slight (non-significant) decrease in the 1990s, but the main result of these analyses is that returns have been quite stable at relatively low levels: fewer than 20% of migrants return within 10 years. Ghana's story is different. Returns decreased in the 1990s, and then went up in the 2000s. In fact trends computed year by year indicate that returns started decreasing in the early to mid 1980s and increased from the early to mid 1990s (results not shown). The decreasing returns in the 1980s occurred in a period of economic crisis and dictatorship. The democrati-



Fig. 3.10 Probability of returning within 10 years of first departure (1975–2008), by period, country of origin and destination. (**a**) Africa (**b**) All Western destinations

Source: MAFE Household surveys in DR Congo (2009), Ghana (2009) and Senegal (2007). Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children who left at age 18 or over (including deceased children)
Definition: Migration for a period of at least 1 year and return for at least 1 year
Interpretation: Each bar represents the cumulative probability of return within 10 years of first departure, i.e. the probability of returning within 10 years in a hypothetical cohort that experiences the duration specific probabilities of return within a given period. Periods refer to the time of return, not to the time of departure. Africa includes all African countries (including North Africa). Western countries are all other countries, and are mainly European and North American countries
Statistical significance: Changes are not significant for returns from Africa ($p > 0.10$). For Western countries, the difference between the first period and the second period is significant for DR Congo ($p < 0.01$); the difference between the second and third periods is significant for Ghana ($p < 0.01$). Changes are not significant for Senegal ($p > 0.10$)

zation in the early 1990s, improved political stability and Ghana's economic recovery have probably played a role in attracting return migrants from Europe since 2000. However, no similar trend is observed among Ghanaian migrants in Africa (Fig. 3.10). Part of the explanation must be specific to Ghanaian migrants in Western countries. In fact, several indicators suggest that the profiles of migrants to Europe in recent years were different from those of the 1990s. In short, migrations for study reasons were more frequent in the 2000s than in the 1990s, and these migrants may be more likely to return.

3.4 African Migration to Europe

Departures and returns between the three African MAFE countries and Europe have followed diverse paths, and profiles of migrants to Europe have also changed in significant ways. Biographic data collected in European countries complement the

global picture obtained from household data. Detailed quantitative retrospective information was collected on a variety of topics among migrants in several European countries (see Chap. 2). While these data are not representative of the migrants from DR Congo, Ghana and Senegal in Europe, they are useful for documenting major changes in terms of migration motives, strategies, and routes, and differences between migrants to traditional destinations and new destinations. In short, they indicate clear changes in various features of African migration to Europe and strong differences between migrants heading to new destinations and those going to traditional destinations. More complex strategies and smaller proportions of migrants intending to return are two key changes.

3.4.1 Motives for Migration

For each long stay out of their origin country (1 year or more), migrants were asked for their reasons for leaving their home country. Answers to this open-ended question were coded afterwards[9] and enable us to describe the motives for first arrival of Senegalese in France, Italy and Spain, of Congolese in Belgium and in the UK, and of Ghanaians in the UK and the Netherlands. Once again, diversity is a key result. Motives vary strongly across origin countries, across destination countries, and over time (Fig. 3.11).

Economic motives cover reasons related to work and to living conditions. These are the main motives among Senegalese migrants. Since the 1970s, around 60% of them have moved to Europe for these reasons, with no significant changes. Economic reasons have been especially important among Senegalese migrants to Italy and Spain, where demand for labour in agriculture and industry has fuelled immigration since the 1990s. Economic motives have represented around 40% of migrations from Ghana to the UK and the Netherlands (no significant difference between countries) since the 1970s; a surge in economic migration was found in the 1990s, but this percentage later dropped. In contrast, economic motives have been relatively marginal among Congolese migrants since the 1970s. Those heading to the UK have been more likely to move for economic reasons (Fig. 3.12), attracted by perceived better work opportunities than in other European countries (Pachi et al. 2010; see also Chap. 7), but the percentage remains much lower than for other origins.

In contrast, the main motives among Congolese migrants in both Belgium and the UK in recent years have been *political*. Almost a third of the migrants who arrived in the 2000s mentioned political reasons for migrating, compared to fewer than 10% in the 1970s and 1980s. This growing importance of political motives is clearly related to the deterioration of the political situation in DR Congo, especially since the 1990s. It is also mirrored in the large increase in the number of migrants

[9] A first level of coding contains roughly 80 categories that were grouped into 11 broad categories. For this chapter, these were further simplified into 4 main categories of motives. This inevitably entails some simplification of the diversity and complexity of migration motives.



Fig. 3.11 Motives for migration, by period and country of origin

MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey
Interpretation: Each bar represents the proportion of migrants who mentioned the specific motive of migration, by period of arrival
Statistical significance: For Congolese migrants, changes are statistically significant for study between the first and third periods ($p < 0.01$), and for political reasons between the first and second periods ($p < 0.05$) and between the first and third periods ($p < 0.05$). For Ghanaian migrants, changes are significant for economic motives between the first and second periods ($p < 0.01$) and between the second and third periods ($p < 0.01$); for study between the second and third periods ($p < 0.01$), and for political reasons between the first and second periods ($p < 0.01$). For Senegalese migrants, changes are significant for study between the first and third periods ($p < 0.05$), and for family-related reasons between the second and third periods ($p < 0.05$). Other changes are not significant ($p > 0.010$)



Fig. 3.12 Motives for migration, by country of origin and destination (1975–2008)

MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey
Interpretation: Each bar represents the proportion of migrants who mentioned the specific motive for migration, by country of arrival
Statistical significance: For Congolese migrants, differences are statistically significant for economic motives ($p < 0.01$), study ($p < 0.01$) and family ($p < 0.05$), but not for political motives ($p > 0.10$). For Ghanaian migrants, differences are not statistically significant for economic motives ($p > 0.10$) or family motives ($p > 0.10$), but are significant for study ($p < 0.01$) and political motives ($p < 0.01$). For Senegalese migrants, differences are statistically significant for economic motives ($p < 0.01$), study ($p < 0.01$) and family ($p < 0.01$), but not for political motives ($p > 0.10$)

who have made asylum applications (see Chap. 7). In the 1990s, when the political troubles were at their most acute, the proportion of asylum seekers reached 60% among Congolese migrants to the two countries. In contrast, political motives have represented a very small proportion of motives among Ghanaian migrants, and even smaller among Senegalese migrants. A substantial percentage of Ghanaian migrants

mentioned political motives in the 1980s, a time of military rule in Ghana and expulsions from Nigeria. Since the 1990s the percentages have been very low.

Study has also been a major motive among African migrants in Europe, especially among migrants moving to former colonial powers (Fig. 3.12). Since the 1970s, between 20 and 30% of migrants to Belgium (Congolese), the UK (Ghanaians) and France (Senegalese) migrated for study-related reasons. This is partly due to the fact that education systems in former colonies are modelled on the system of the former colonial powers; scholarships are also more frequent for former colonies, and a shared language also influences this situation. However, for Congolese and Senegalese migrants the overall percentages have decreased since the 1970s, reflecting the diversification of destinations and flow composition. In contrast, the share of Ghanaians migrating for study increased in the most recent period.

Finally, *family-related motives* have been quite stable over time. They have been highest for Ghanaian migrants (around 30%), and lowest for Senegalese migrants (below 20% on average). Senegalese migrants are however very diverse. In France, 29% of the migrants arriving in France for the first time declared they came for family reasons, compared to only 13% in Italy and 6% in Spain. This is partly related to the gender composition of these flows, flows to new destinations (Italy and Spain) being largely composed of male migrants. Among Congolese and Ghanaian migrants, differences across destinations are less pronounced.

3.4.2 Networks at Destination and Choice of Destination

Moving to Europe is only partly motivated by family reasons, but migration may nevertheless be facilitated by having friends and family members in destination countries. Data was collected on the entire network of family members and acquaintances respondents had; the data make it possible to establish who knew someone in the destination country prior to moving. The percentage is quite high overall (Fig. 3.13); the majority of migrants are not arriving in countries without knowing anybody. The nature of social and family networks differs across countries, but knowing someone in the destination country is common. It is a strong determinant of migration (see Chap. 6) and is also one of the major reasons for choosing a particular destination. As shown in Fig. 3.14, between a third and half of the migrants who arrived in the 2000s mentioned having family and friends in the destination country as their motive for choosing that country.

Overall, the percentage of migrants who knew someone in the destination country before migrating to Europe has increased in Senegal and in DR Congo. At the same time, for Senegalese and Congolese, having family and friends in a European country has become a more common reason for choosing that country. In contrast, knowing someone in destination countries did not increase among Ghanaians, and the role of networks in the choice of destination lost some importance, maybe as a result of growing student migration. In DR Congo, part of the increase results from



Fig. 3.13 Proportion of migrants knowing at least one person in the destination country before migrating, by period of departure

MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey
Interpretation: Each bar represents the proportion of migrants who knew someone in the destination country the year before migrating
Statistical significance: For Congolese migrants, changes are statistically significant between the first and third periods ($p < 0.01$). For Ghanaian migrants and Senegalese migrants, changes are not significant ($p > 0.10$)

the increase in migrants who had a spouse/partner in the destination country, from around 10% in the 1980s to 20% in the 2000s. This is in line with the other changes in Congolese migration: more women are moving, and returns are decreasing (see Chap. 7). In contrast, in Senegal, the increase results from the growing percentage of people knowing other family members and friends. The strong increase in the percentage of migrants with friends reflects a characteristic of migration to new destinations.

3.4.3 Growing Irregular Migration

The "fight against irregular migration" is one of the key aspects of the European Union's overall approach to migration, and considerable means have been devoted to preventing irregular entry. Lack of data is a serious issue, and knowledge of irregular migration is patchy. Research suggests, however, that restrictive immigration policies may have curbed legal migration, but may also have encouraged irregular migration (de Haas 2007). This is one of the potential substitution effects (categorical substitution) identified by Czaika and de Haas (2013). Before we



Fig. 3.14 Proportion of migrants mentioning family and friends as a motive in choice of destination

MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey
Interpretation: Each bar represents the proportion of migrants who mentioned family and friends as reasons for choosing their particular destination country
Statistical significance: For Congolese migrants, changes are not statistically significant ($p > 0.10$). Changes are significant for Ghanaian migrants ($p < 0.10$) and Senegalese migrants ($p < 0.05$)

discuss the results, it should be noted that irregularity is not easily defined (Vickstrom 2014). A typical image of irregular migrants is one of people crossing the sea from Africa and reaching Spain or Italy in boats or pirogues, a "geographic flow" into irregular status (Triandafyllidou 2010; Vickstrom 2014). In fact migrants may also enter a country legally (for instance with a tourist visa), and overstay their visa (a "status flow", Triandafyllidou 2010; Vickstrom 2014). Other situations may also lead to irregularity, or to "grey zones" that lie between regularity and irregularity. In this chapter, we consider as irregular migrants all migrants who mentioned they did not have a residence permit at some point during their first year in the destination country. It will not only include people entering without the proper documentation, but also people entering a country legally and overstaying their visas or entry authorizations.

Figure 3.15 shows that there has been an increase in irregular migration for migrants from all three countries. However, the situations and trends are very diverse. The percentages are quite high for Congolese and Senegalese people (30–35% irregular migrants in the years 2000), and have increased significantly since the 1980s. In contrast, percentages are much lower for Ghanaian migrants, where fewer than 10% of the migrants were undocumented during their first year of stay in UK



Fig. 3.15 Proportion of migrants without residence permit during their first year in the country of residence, by period of first arrival (**a**) Changes over time (**b**) Differences across destinations

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: Migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey
Definitions: People without a residence permit are those without a residence permit at some point in the first year of their stay in the destination country
Interpretation: Each bar represents the proportion of migrants who were without residence permit at some point during the first year of stay, by period of first arrival in the country of residence or by country of destination
Statistical significance: the difference between the first and second periods is statistically significant for DR Congo ($p < 0.01$). For Ghana, changes are not significant ($p > 0.10$). For Senegal, changes are significant ($p < 0.01$) between the second and third periods
Legend: DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), BE (Belgium), UK (United Kingdom), NE (Netherlands), FR (France), IT (Italy), SP (Spain)

or the Netherlands. Overall, these data provide clear evidence of growing irregular migration, as expected from the tightening of entry requirements. However, even if the percentages of irregular migrants are substantial among Congolese and Senegalese, most migrants are regular migrants. It should also be emphasized that people entering illegally or overstaying their visas may obtain papers, sometimes quickly, and that, in all the countries, the percentage of migrants who were undocumented was lower at the time of the survey than during their first year (Table 3.2). Interestingly, Ghanaian migrants are both less likely to arrive as undocumented migrants and more likely to return. Their higher propensity to return may be linked to the greater ease with which they can circulate, illustrating the idea that restricting legal migration may limit people's ability and willingness to return.

Irregular migration takes various forms depending on origin, and the strategies have also varied over time. Many of the Senegalese migrants going to Spain have come by sea (24% on average, 37% since 2000, Fig. 3.16) and, since 2000, many people travelling by sea from Senegal to Spain have come by *patera* (pirogue) (more than 80% according to the MAFE survey). These data clearly show that it is not a

Table 3.2 Percentage of undocumented migrants in the first year and at survey time, by origin

Country of origin	Country of destination	In the first year	At time of survey	N
DR Congo	Belgium, UK	29.8	11.1	414
Ghana	UK, The Netherlands	8.5	6.2	402
Senegal	France, Italy, Spain	28.4	16.1	583

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey
Definition: Legal status is defined by the type of residence permit during the first year. Undocumented migrants in the first year are those who declared that at some point during the first year in the country of residence, they did not have a residence permit. This is not synonymous with illegal entry: a person may have entered legally, with a visa that expired. Undocumented migrants at the time of the survey are those who do not hold a residence permit; they may have had a residence permit before the survey
Interpretation: Each percentage represents the proportion of migrants who are undocumented at a specific point in time (year of arrival, or date of the survey)
Statistical significance: For Congolese migrants and Senegalese migrants, changes are significant ($p < 0.01$). Changes are not significant for Ghanaian migrants ($p > 0.10$)

marginal phenomenon among Senegalese migrants in Southern Europe. However, the situation of these migrants and the way they travel cannot be generalized to African migrants as a whole. For instance, very few Senegalese migrants going to France come by sea. Like migrants from Ghana and DR Congo, virtually all of them travelled to the European MAFE countries by plane (Fig. 3.17).

Regardless of the way people travelled, some of them used the services of smugglers. Around 10% of Congolese migrants arriving in Belgium and in the UK in the 2000s mentioned having used the services of smugglers, and a substantial share of them used false documents or someone else's documents (14% of all Congolese migrants of the sample, see Chap. 7). Among Senegalese migrants going to Spain, a little over 10% used the services of smugglers. But this is clearly a minority of migrants reaching Europe, and even among people coming by *patera*, not all used smugglers.[10] Among Ghanaians, few migrants are undocumented at arrival.[11]

[10] Some of these people may indeed have travelled without smugglers, but some may not consider that the people who helped them migrate were smugglers.

[11] However, the percentage of undocumented Ghanaian migrants is much higher in the Netherlands than in the UK, and the share of migrants who used the services of smugglers is also higher in the Netherlands.



Fig. 3.16 Proportion of migrants who travelled by sea at some stage in the journey from Africa to the country of residence at the time of the survey, by period of arrival (1975–2008) (**a**) Changes over time (**b**) Differences across destinations

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: Migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey
Definitions: People who travelled by sea are those who mentioned having travelled with a boat or pirogue at some point during their journey to the destination country
Interpretation: Each bar represents the proportion of migrants who travelled by sea, by period of first arrival in the country of residence or by country of destination
Statistical significance: Changes over time are not significant for DR Congo or for Ghana ($p > 0.10$).Changes are significant for Senegal ($p < 0.01$). Differences across destinations are not significant for DR Congo or for Ghana ($p > 0.10$). Differences across destinations are significant for Senegal ($p < 0.01$)
Legend: DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), BE (Belgium), UK (United Kingdom), NE (Netherlands), FR (France), IT (Italy), SP (Spain)

3.4.4 Routes to Europe: Relatively Simple but Becoming More Complex

The MAFE data also make it possible to reconstruct complete migration routes, including short and long stays in intermediate countries, for Ghanaian, Senegalese and Congolese migrants currently living in Europe. A migration route is defined here as the succession of countries through which people passed before reaching their 'final' destination, i.e. their country of residence at the time of the survey. Because of the way data were collected, people 'in transit' between Africa and Europe at the time of the survey are not included in our samples. The MAFE surveys thus provide a partial picture of the phenomenon, describing routes of people who succeeded in reaching Europe. They are furthermore limited to 6 destination countries and 3 origin countries. Despite these limitations, these data enable us to nuance some common assertions regarding migration routes.



Fig. 3.17 Proportion of migrants who travelled with smugglers at some point on their journey to the MAFE countries (first arrival) (**a**) Changes over time (**b**) Differences across destinations

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: Migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey
Definitions: People who travelled with smugglers are those who mentioned having travelled with smugglers at some point during their journey to the destination country
Interpretation: Each bar represents the proportion of migrants who mentioned travelling with smugglers, by period of first arrival in the country of residence
Statistical significance: Changes over time are not significant for DR Congo or for Ghana ($p > 0.10$), but are significant for Senegal ($p < 0.01$). Differences across destinations are not significant for DR Congo ($p < 0.01$), Ghana ($p < 0.01$) or Senegal ($p < 0.01$)
Legend: DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), BE (Belgium), UK (United Kingdom), NE (Netherlands), FR (France), IT (Italy), SP (Spain)

First, migration routes are in their majority simple, and most migrants arrive directly in their destination country (Fig. 3.18). Those who passed through other countries before arriving in their current country of residence represent between 20 and 45% of the migrants living in Europe. Migrants moving to traditional destinations are more likely to arrive directly (Ghana-UK, DR Congo-Belgium, Senegal-France), while people moving to new destinations are more likely to have transited through one or several other countries before settling in their country (Fig. 3.18). For instance, more than 40% of Congolese living in the UK had transited through another country in Europe, Africa or both, and around 35% of Ghanaians in the Netherlands and Senegalese in Spain had transited through another country. In contrast, around 20–25% of migrants in traditional destinations had transited through other European or African countries. These differences are in part due to the fact that migrations to new destinations are more recent – and that routes have become more complex since the 1990s.

Overall, people are as likely to transit through African countries as through European countries, except for Senegalese migrants in Italy and Ghanaians in the



Fig. 3.18 Proportion of migrants who transited through another country (short or long stay) before arriving in the country of residence, by country of residence and region of transit (1975–2008)

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009
Population: Migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey
Definitions: Transit countries include any country in which the migrant spent at least one night between departure from the origin country and first stay (for at least 1 year) in the country of residence
Interpretation: Each portion of the bars indicates the share of migrants who transited through African countries, European countries, or both. Very few people transit through other countries, so that the height of the bars is very close to the proportion of people who reached their destination through indirect routes
Statistical significance: Differences in the proportion of transits across flows are significant ($p < 0.01$). Differences in transits through African countries are significant ($p < 0.01$). Differences in transits through European countries are significant ($p < 0.01$)

Netherlands, who are more likely to come through other European countries. The percentage of migrants who transited through other European countries varies from around 10% (Senegalese in France, Congolese in Belgium, Ghanaians in the UK) to 25% (Congolese in the UK, Ghanaians in the Netherlands, Senegalese in Italy). Transits through other European countries are more frequent for migrants living in new destinations than for those living in traditional destinations. Around 18% of Senegalese in Italy passed through France (Table 3.3), and one Ghanaian out of seven in the Netherlands came through Germany or Italy (very few through the UK). France

Table 3.3 Most frequent transit countries and routes (1975–2008)

Country of Origin	Country of residence	Transit countries	Routes	n
DR Congo	Belgium	France (6.3%) Angola (5.5%) Burundi (2.5%)	DRC-Belgium (69.6%)	278
			DRC-Angola-Belgium (4.3%)	
			DRC-France-Belgium (4.1%)	
	UK	France (12.5%) Belgium (11.4%) South Africa (5.0%)	DRC-UK (55,0%)	149
			DRC-Belgium-UK (8.0%)	
			DRC-France-UK (6.7%)	
Ghana	UK	Nigeria (5.5%) Germany (3.0%) Netherlands (2.9%)	Ghana-UK (75.8%)	149
			Ghana-Nigeria-UK (3.9%)	
			Ghana-Germany-UK (3.0%)	
	Netherlands	Germany (8.2%) Italy (5.5%) Nigeria (3.1%)	Ghana-Netherlands (65,0%)	273
			Ghana-Germany-Netherlands (6.4%)	
			Ghana-Italy-Netherlands (5.2%)	
Senegal	France	Mauritania (5.2%) Spain (4.0%) Morocco (3.4%)	Senegal-France (79.2%)	200
			Senegal-Spain-France (3.6%)	
			Senegal-Morocco-France (2.9%)	
	Italy	France (18.4%) Spain (8.7%) Morocco (2.8%)	Senegal-Italy (68.9%)	203
			Senegal-France-Italy (14.7%)	
			Senegal-Spain-Italy (3.8%)	
	Spain	Morocco (10.5%) France (7.9%) Italy (7.4%)	Senegal-Spain (63.8%)	200
			Senegal-Morocco-Spain (8.8%)	
			Senegal-Italy-Spain (4.3%)	

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009
Population: Migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey.
Definitions: Transit countries include any country in which the migrant spent at least one night between departure from the origin country and first stay (for at least 1 year) in the country of residence.
Interpretation: percentages for transit countries indicate the percentage of migrants who spent at least one night in each of these countries. The three main transit countries are given in order of decreasing percentage. Routes indicate the series of countries through which migrants travelled (in that order), and the percentage of migrants having used the route. The three main routes are given in order of decreasing percentage

and Belgium are common transit countries among Congolese in the UK, illustrating the "Euro-Congolese" wave of migrants (Pachi, Barrett and Garbin 2010). These results indicate that new destinations are clearly not gateways to old destinations, and that even though migrants in new destinations are more likely to have come through another European country, a large majority of them did not. Transits in African countries are also not that common. Except among Congolese in the UK and Belgium, and among Senegalese in Spain, fewer than 15% of migrants passed through another African country before reaching their current place of residence. Because of the small numbers, a detailed description of the specific routes and their changes over time would not be very reliable. Some routes were used by only a handful of migrants in the sample, and their occurrence in the sample is to some extent due to chance. However, the top three routes (Table 3.3) illustrate the relative simplicity of routes.

Migration routes have also become somewhat more complex, especially since the 1990s. The percentage of indirect migration increased significantly for Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants in the 1990s compared to earlier periods, and also somewhat increased among Congolese migrants, especially among those heading to Belgium (see Chap. 7). The 1990s thus mark a clear change in the migration routes, possibly another sign that policies aimed at limiting migration from Africa to Europe have affected migration routes (Streiff-Fénart and Segatti 2011) (Fig. 3.19).

3.4.5 Returns, Circulation: Rupture with the Home Country?

Household surveys in origin countries showed that returns from Western countries, including Europe, were consistently lower than returns from African countries. As far as trends are concerned, no common pattern emerges from these analyses. Returns to DR Congo drastically decreased from the 1990s, whereas returns to Ghana have increased in recent years, and no significant trend was found for Senegal. Overall, returns are more frequent among Ghanaian migrants than among Senegalese or Congolese migrants.

Biographic surveys offer additional insights into returns. Data on migrants' intentions of stay at arrival provide an approximate way of estimating intentions to return. Each respondent was asked, for each stay in a foreign country, how long he/she had intended to stay in the country when they arrived. The percentage of people intending to stay less than 10 years is used as an indicator of intentions to return.[12] Data collected in Europe show that, as with actual returns, the intention to return within 10 years is not the rule. Depending on the country and the period of arrival, between roughly 20% and 60% of migrants intend to return. Intentions are higher among Ghanaian migrants than among Congolese or Senegalese migrants, as are actual returns.

Intentions to return have diminished in all three countries (Fig. 3.20). The decrease is especially pronounced in DR Congo and is correlated with the strong

[12] This is a proxy indicator of return, since some people may intend to move to a country other than their origin country.



Fig. 3.19 Proportion of migrants who transited through another country (short or long stay) before arriving in the country of residence, by country of origin and period (1975–2008)

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: Migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey
Definitions: Transit countries include any country in which the migrant spent at least one night between departure from the origin country and first stay (for at least 1 year) in the country of residence
Interpretation: Each bar indicates the share of migrants who transited through at least one country
Statistical significance: Changes between the first and second periods are statistically significant for Ghana ($p < 0.01$) and Senegal ($p < 0.01$) Other changes are not significant ($p > 0.10$)

decrease in returns found with the household survey. These two trends illustrate the transformation of Congolese migration into migration for settlement, and the probable impact of the deteriorating economic and political conditions in DR Congo. Trends for Ghana and Senegal are less pronounced, but migrants who arrived from after 1990 were also increasingly likely to intend to stay longer periods. This trend may reflect increasingly restrictive immigration policies in destination countries. Although the links between trends in intentions and actual returns are not straightforward,[13] these trends nevertheless suggest that the majority of migrants are not willing to return. Given that intentions are strong predictors of actual returns at the individual level (Flahaux 2012), one may expect returns not to increase much

[13] These trends are not entirely comparable for several reasons. First, only selected European countries are used for intentions, whereas all Western countries were considered for returns. Secondly, periods refer to the periods of arrival for intentions, whereas probabilities of return are computed by period of actual return. Finally, intentions are computed among people still in Europe, probably leading to an underestimation of the downward trend.



Fig. 3.20 Proportion of migrants intending to stay less than 10 years at arrival in the destination country, by period and country of residence (**a**) Changes over time (**b**) Differences across destinations

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals).
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey.
Definitions: Migrants intending to stay less than 10 years at arrival correspond to people who answered "Less than 10 years" to the question "At the beginning, for how long did you plan to stay in [country of stay]?"
Interpretation: Each bar represents the percentage of migrants who intended to stay less than 10 years in the current country of residence when they first arrived in the country. Only people still in the country are used in the computation. The downward trend may be underestimated because people who have left were probably more likely to intend staying less than 10 years.
Statistical significance: changes over time are statistically significant for DR Congo ($p < 0.01$), Ghana ($p < 0.01$) and Senegal ($p < 0.01$).
Legend: DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), BE (Belgium), UK (United Kingdom), NE (Netherlands), FR (France), IT (Italy), SP (Spain)

compared to current levels. People moving to new destinations also intend to stay longer than people moving to traditional destinations, and return in the short term does not seem to be an option for some migrants, such as the Congolese in the UK and the Senegalese in Spain. These migrants have had the most complex routes and strategies and may have made huge sacrifices to come to Europe. Given the difficulties they had to overcome to enter Europe, they are unlikely to move back to their home country.

Short visits to the home country and circulation between the two may to some extent be substitutes for long term returns, allowing migrants to "live" in several spaces (Lututala 2005). Low levels of returns may thus be accompanied by intense circulation, and do not necessarily indicate a rupture with the home country. Transnational economic practices indicate that migrants living in Europe keep a variety of links with their home country (see Chaps. 5, 8, 11 and 14). Do they also travel regularly to their home country? The MAFE surveys collected information on

Table 3.4 Percentage of people living in Europe who have made at least one visit (short return) within 5 years of first arrival in Europe, by period of first arrival, origin and country of residence

Origin country	Country of residence	1975–1989	1990–1999	2000–2008	1975–2008
Ghana	United Kingdom, Netherland,	25%	24%	43%	36%
	N	82	109	216	407
Senegal	France, Italy, Spain	50%	58%	48%	52%
	N	108	208	272	588
DR Congo	Belgium, United Kingdom	9%	7%	11%	9%
	N	73	144	194	411

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK (Congolese migrants), the UK and the Netherlands (Ghanaian migrants), and France, Italy and Spain (Senegalese migrants), 2008–2009. Weighted percentages (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Europe at the time of the survey
Definitions: *Visits* are defined as short stays (less than 12 months) in the country of origin. The percentage of people making a short visit are Kaplan Meier estimates
Interpretation: Each figure represents the percentage of migrants who went at least once to their origin country for a short stay within the first 5 years of their stay in Europe

visits (for less than 12 months) to the origin country. From these data, the percentage of migrants who visited within 5 years of their first arrival is computed as an indicator of circulation between the destination and origin countries (Table 3.4). *Overall, visits are not very frequent*, and their frequency varies a lot across origin countries. Senegalese migrants are the ones most likely to visit their home country. Around half of them went back to Senegal for a short stay within 5 years of their first arrival. Senegalese migrants are also more likely to engage in transnational activities than migrants from the other countries. Even though their propensity to return for a long stay is not very high, they maintain stronger links with their home country, notably by investing in Senegal (see Chap. 13). Family reunification is also lower among Senegalese than among Congolese, and transnational families are more frequent (see Chap. 14). Ghanaian migrants are somewhat less likely to visit their home country (a little over one third), but the percentage of visits has clearly increased in recent years. This may be related to the change in the composition of migration flows (more study-related migration). Interestingly, returns have also increased in recent years, suggesting that in Ghana's case visits may not act as a substitute for returns, but instead be a way of preparing reintegration. Further analyses would be necessary to confirm this hypothesis. Finally, fewer than 10% of Congolese migrants visit their home country within 5 years. The very low percentage of Congolese migrants visiting DRC, along with the very rare returns, suggest that Congolese migrants have to some extent broken their links with their home country. Low investments in DRC (see Chap. 8) also indicate that Congolese settle and do not maintain as strong links with their home country as other African

migrants. Their administrative situation may also limit their mobility, as many Congolese migrants arrive as asylum seekers (see Chap. 7).

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has shown a few major transformations in African migrations from three countries (Ghana, Senegal and DR Congo). It confirms some known aspects of African migrations (e.g. the diversification of destinations), but also provides new data on some topics that are little documented (e.g. return migrations) or much debated (e.g. irregular migration). It also nuances some known trends (e.g. feminization of migration) and counters messages that are sometimes conveyed by the media or policymakers (e.g. that most African migrants arrive by sea). The data used in this chapter are limited to a few origin and destination countries, and the results cannot be generalized to African migration as a whole. However, one thing can be generalized: diversity is a key aspect of African migration. For instance, departure trends for Congolese migrants are completely different to those for Senegalese and Ghanaian migrants. Trends in returns from Western countries are very different for Ghanaians to those among the Congolese. And within Europe, we also find considerable differences between populations living in old and new destinations, in terms of education, legal status, migration routes etc. In sum, African migration is diverse and is constantly evolving.

While the objective of this chapter was not to identify determinants of migration (see Chap. 6), the changes over time in departures, returns, profiles and routes can to some extent be traced to economic, political and policy changes in origin and destination countries. Yet the links are neither obvious nor clearcut. For instance, despite increasingly restrictive policies in Europe, migration to Europe has increased among Ghanaians, illustrating that push and pull factors can be sufficiently strong to overcome barriers to migration. The growing complexity of migration routes and the growing numbers of undocumented migrants are just two illustrations of the strength of people's motivations to reach Europe. These trends illustrate some of the unintended effects of migration policies (Czaika and de Haas 2013). Decreasing returns among the Congolese are another possible unintended effect of more restrictive immigration policies, contributing to the growing size of the African population in Europe.

Despite restrictions, the size of African populations in Europe may continue growing. The growing size of the African populations in Europe in recent years may facilitate further immigration. The development of African countries may also further fuel migration to Europe. While this has long been acknowledged by migration researchers, the idea that development may stimulate migration from Africa to Europe is not yet completely acknowledged among "politicians, officials and the public [who] still believe that if we can only work out and tackle the so-called 'root causes' of international migration, we can *drastically reduce it*" (Castles 2008, p.1). The demand for cheap labour or labour in the care sector may further fuel migration

from Africa to Europe. Migration from violence-ridden countries, such as recent waves from Somalia, may also lead to increasing numbers of African migrants in Europe, as well as in other regions. Recognizing that African immigration is likely to be an integral part of Europe's demographic future may be a necessary step for migrants, host societies and origin countries to fully benefit from these flows.

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Chapter 4
Migration Between Africa and Europe: Assessing the Role of Resources, Family and Networks

Amparo González-Ferrer, Elisabeth Kraus, Pau Baizán, Cris Beauchemin, Richard Black, and Bruno Schoumaker

4.1 Introduction

In Chap. 3 we reviewed in detail the main changes in the intensity of migration and return between Africa and Europe[1] over the last four decades and in the profiles of the migrants concerned. We saw that there have been significant changes over time in most cases, and also that migration dynamics have varied widely across the three African populations studied.

[1] In this chapter, as well as in the rest of the book, we use 'Africa' to avoid repeating Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Senegal; and 'Europe' to avoid listing the selected destinations in this continent (United Kingdom and Belgium for DR Congo; United Kingdom and the Netherlands for Ghana; France, Italy and Spain for Senegal).

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Concerning outmigration, the data presented in Chap. 3 suggest that the probability of migrating to their main destinations in Europe had substantially increased since the mid-1990s for Ghanaians, but remained fairly stable for the Senegalese and fell substantially for the Congolese during the 2000s. By contrast, the results also showed a huge decline in the probability of returning from Europe for Congolese migrants since the late 1980s, exactly the opposite pattern for Ghanaians, and no major change for Senegalese migrants over the period under study.

Apart from these changes in the intensity of migration and return over time, our data showed that the proportion of women in the flows of Congolese and Ghanaians to Europe had significantly increased since the late 1990s, whereas the traditional male-dominant profile of Senegalese migration to Europe remained virtually unchanged, or even slightly reinforced in the 2000s. Similarly, the average educational level of Ghanaian migrants to Europe increased in the 1990s, whereas it dropped substantially among the Congolese, with no significant change among the Senegalese.

Some of these results are consistent with previous studies and with our expectations given contemporary changes of various kinds in both origin and destination countries. Others, however, are new and somewhat surprising.

In any case, as stated in Chap. 3, the nature of the analyses conducted in that chapter is mainly descriptive. The results summarized above identify major patterns at the aggregate level but cannot establish what factors explain the decision to go to Europe or to return from there to the country of origin. In other words, the results in Chap. 3 do not allow causal interpretation.

For example, we know that the proportion of female Ghanaian migrants to Europe has risen over time, and also that Ghanaian flows to Europe have become more educated. But we cannot ascertain whether Ghanaian women are migrating more because women in Ghana have achieved, on average, a higher level of education, which seems to facilitate migration to Europe, or regardless of it (e.g. due to a growing labour demand in female occupations in destination countries).

To be able to estimate the real net effect of each factor (e.g. being a woman and having higher education) in facilitating migration to Europe, both factors along with all other variables that may influence the chances of migrating from Africa to Europe need to be taken into account at the same time, and discounted from the effect we are looking at. This is precisely the goal of this chapter, in which multivariate event history models are fitted to individual biographical data in order to identify the determinants of African migrants' departures to Europe and returns to origin. We will compare the characteristics (sex, education, age, socioeconomic resources etc.) of those who migrate with those of individuals who remain in their country of origin, so as to identify how each of these characteristics increases or decreases the probabilities of migrating to Europe and of returning to the country of origin. Similarly, returnees in Africa will be compared with migrants who have remained in Europe, in order to identify the drivers of return from Europe. In addition, we will investigate whether the same factor (e.g. having a partner in Europe) plays a different role in the propensity to migrate depending on a migrant's sex and level of education.

We first review the main theoretical ideas that have been put forward to explain international migration to more developed countries and return migration to origin countries. Next we present the type of data and methods we will be using in our analyses, highlighting the aspects in which they differ from the ones used in Chap. 3. In Sect. 4.4 and 4.5, we will present and discuss the results obtain for both departure and return. Finally (Sect. 4.6) we conclude with some of the main theoretical and political implications of our findings.

4.2 Theoretical Overview and Previous Evidence

As shown in Chap. 3, our three African flows are not only different from each other but also show considerable internal variability over time in terms of main destination, average educational level and gender composition. One aspect where such variability was most visible concerns the reasons motivating an individual's first international departure. *Economic* reasons have been especially important among Senegalese migrants to Italy and Spain, while they represented around 40% of migrations from Ghana to the UK and the Netherlands, and were relatively marginal among Congolese migrants. For Congolese migrants, since the 1990s the most common reasons have been *political*, owing to the deterioration of the political situation in DR Congo (in the 1990s, the proportion of asylum seekers reached 60% among Congolese migrants to Belgium and UK). Between 20 and 30% of Congolese migrants to Belgium, Ghanaians to the UK and Senegalese to France migrated for *study-related* reasons. And finally, *family-related motives* have been quite stable over time, representing approximately 30% for Ghanaian migrants and less than 20% for Senegalese migrants.

Such diversity in reasons for migrating implies that no single theoretical framework suffices to account for migration to Europe among the Sub-Saharan Africans in our samples. Economic motivations are, in any case, of central importance among the micro-determinants of the migration decision, even where they are not the main reason for migration (González-Ferrer 2011). This remains the case whether we depart from the individual perspective and conceive of migrants as income-maximizing agents that move in reaction to international income differentials (Stajaast 1962; Harris and Todaro 1970), or whether we take the view that migration is best understood within the broader context of household survival strategies aimed at reducing economic risk and facilitating capital accumulation (Taylor 1986; Stark 1991).

Where international migration is a response to the household's need for diversified income sources in order to minimize risks and the impact of market failures (Stark 1991), individuals belonging to families with some resources and economic activity (a business or waged employment that provides income) are expected to be better able to migrate than those who live in households where all the members are unemployed or struggling with poverty (Shaw 2007). By contrast, when international migration is more of an individual decision, education and skills are likely to play more of a role (Guilmoto 1998), since the migration project probably lacks the

support that networks at origin and destination can provide by pooling resources and offering information and installation assistance upon arrival.

In any case, financial constraints are known to be a strong factor for poor individuals, some of whom would like to migrate but cannot afford to. Angelucci (2015), for instance, identified such financial constraints for poor Mexicans willing to migrate to the US, and this is expected to be even more the case with long-distance international migration such as we are studying here, with the high cost of long journeys and visa requirements, and the higher cost of living in all the receiving countries.

In this connection Shaw (2007), in a review of the main drivers of migration in ten African countries including Ghana and Senegal, pointed out "threshold effects" whereby those who lack financial resources, assets or education are unable to move at all. However, as Quartey (2009) emphasized in his analysis of the Ghanaian experience, the limited employment opportunities at home, especially for well-educated entrants to the labour market, are key amongst the determinants of recent Ghanaian skilled migration. Van Dalen et al. (2005) insist on the importance of expectations of a higher living standard, more in line with one's qualifications, to explain migration out of Ghana, rather than on poverty per se.

In sum, economic motivations for migration are of more than one kind. They may be a response to the need to cover basic material needs for one's household members or may be to do with fulfilling professional career expectations; the profiles of migrants leaving their country for one or other of these reasons are expected to differ widely. Among the former, financial constraints can be a serious barrier to international migration to Europe. For the latter, opportunities in the origin and destination labour markets are expected to be the most crucial factor shaping migration decisions.

Last but not least, the availability of social networks at destination is likely to affect the roles played by education and economic resources, as networks greatly facilitate migration. Networks reduce the costs, risks and uncertainties, providing potential migrants with information about jobs in destination countries and basic assistance upon arrival, which reduces the time lag before income is earned and some savings can be gathered and sent home (Massey 1987). For the same reasons, networks may also substitute for financial resources by easing the migration experience of the poorest migrants.

Many studies have shown how individuals with household or community ties to former or current migrants are more likely to migrate across borders (Massey and Espinosa 1997; Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003; Curran et al. 2005). However, as Palloni et al. (2001) discuss, the network effect should be distinguished from the simple case of family reunification. Moreover, the pulling effect of having a partner or child at destination is expected to differ strongly between men and women, since social expectations about who should do what are strongly gendered (Toma and Vause 2014). For the same reasons, having a partner in the country of origin is likely to militate against a woman migrating independently, while having a partner at destination is likely to have a strong pulling effect for male migration. In some cases, family ties may even have opposite effects for men and women. But these possibili-

ties have rarely been explored, for two main reasons: (1) lack of information on the (changing) locations of partner(s) and children over the individual's lifetime and (2) samples being too small to allow an exploration of differences across gender. Fortunately, in this chapter we are able to explore both these aspects using the MAFE Biographical survey data.

Unlike economic migration, migration for family reunification remains largely untheorized (Kofman 2004), even though it accounts for a large share of total migration flows from developing to developed countries (OECD 2010). Obviously, the decision to migrate to join close relatives abroad will very much depend on whether the first relative left with the idea of returning soon, or settling permanently, or with no clear plan, and on the time elapsed since the first migration. Changing conditions affecting relatives left behind in the country of origin and legal possibilities for family reunification are also major determinants of migration for family reasons, and its timing. Of course, economic and family reasons for migration are not mutually exclusive (González-Ferrer 2011), and the reasons for remaining abroad may change over time. It is therefore difficult to provide an explanation for the migration decisions of those whose main reason for migrating is given as 'family'. Moreover, 'family reasons' are expected to mean different things and imply different behaviours according to gender.

Finally, migrants wanting to leave their country of origin for political reasons are most likely to be mainly constrained by economic (and legal) barriers. Once the costs of migration can be met, other constraints are expected to play only minor roles given the urgency of leaving.

While the diversity of reasons for migrating means that no single theoretical framework suffices to account for departure, this is probably even more true of returns from Europe to Africa.

In principle, return is expected to be common among individuals who migrated for study reasons, and rather rare among those who migrated for family or political reasons. The return behaviour of economic migrants remains particularly difficult to predict, however. Neoclassical economics sees migrants primarily as income maximizers and expects them to use their earnings to increase their utility at destination rather than spend the money at home (Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 1976). Return migration is mainly presented as a failure due to lack of information and a resulting miscalculation about economic potential (e.g. job opportunities) and emotional costs. Moreover, migrants are expected to become aware of their miscalculation soon after migrating, so return migration is predicted to be greatest soon after arrival and to decline over time (DaVanzo 1983; Constant and Massey 2002).

However, greater purchasing power at home and a higher return on host-country education in the country of origin are some of the reasons why a temporary stay abroad may help to maximize the migrant's life-time earnings or wealth and encourage return (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996; Dustmann and Weiss 2007). These alternative explanations move away from the view of return migration as a mark of failure, although they all require some degree of skill transferability between the countries involved and are therefore applicable only to a certain type of migrant. People migrating for study and education are particularly likely to behave according to this model.

The 'new economics of labour migration' has often been used to account for return flows. However, when Stark and colleagues analysed return migration from developed to less developed countries, their main line of reasoning was not risk diversification but the greater purchasing power at home of savings generated through work abroad (see for instance Stark et al. 1997). The reason for this theoretical turn is probably connected with the particularities of long-distance international migration, which involves restrictive admission and circulation policies, substantial initial investments and a longer period for reaping the potential benefits of migration.

Return is strongly time-dependent. Migrants usually have a plan as regards their ideal migration duration. Many leave with the idea of coming back to the country of origin at some point in their lives. Between 20 and 60% of the migrants in our samples intend to return, depending on the group and the period. Others, however, leave with the idea of permanent migration. The reason why the initial reason for migration is likely to be a good predictor of return or non-return is precisely that reasons for initial migration entail different return intentions. Obviously, whether these plans are realized or not depends on many other factors, such as the degree of economic, social and legal integration achieved in the destination country and the situation of their left-behind relatives, especially when migration is a family endeavour rather than an individual one.

In our case, African migrants who go to Europe are expected to extend the duration of their stays longer than initially planned, owing to the high cost of long-distances travel, which is often increased by policy restrictions. These factors are also likely to make frequent trips home to visit household members difficult, and undermine the functioning of risk pooling logic (see Mazzucato 2009, for an example). Visits probably make longer stays abroad easier to endure (Grillo and Mazzucatto 2008) rather than heralding an imminent return as had been assumed for other migration flows (Constant and Massey 2001). With regard to the logic of risk pooling and the role of remittances, for instance, it is also difficult to anticipate whether migrants who regularly remit are more or less likely to return: risk diversification within the family across different labour markets might become a stable arrangement, and interrupting the flow of remittances by returning home will be particularly costly. Obviously the final decision will very much depend on the possibility of keeping ties with home alive.

Visits and remittances aside, to understand the potential impacts of international migration on families and countries of origin it seems crucial to know more about the role of education and skills in shaping the decision to return. The question of educational and skill selectivity in return migration is highly relevant to the debate on the potential brain drain effects of migration for developing countries (Docquier and Rapoport 2012 for a review). More educated and skilled people are more likely to find a (good) job on returning home, especially if they acquired fully transferable educational credentials in the immigration country. If this is the case, their ultimate decision to return will depend on the relative wage gap between origin and destination for the type of job they can aspire to, as well as the respective levels of social status it will bring in the host and origin societies. Similarly, behaviour may be influenced by immigration and education policies that prevent the transition from international

student visa to work and residence permits, and rules making access to some scholarships conditional on returning home after completing studies abroad. At the other end of the scale, poorly educated migrants who faced difficulties in finding and keeping a job in the immigration country may be also highly likely to return.

Finally, it is even harder to predict differences between men and women with respect to return migration than with departure. There are several reasons for this. First, we know little of the dynamics of return and how different individuals shape their decisions in this regard. Secondly, women have been traditionally assumed to migrate for family reunification (legally or not). However, as we saw in Chap. 3, this was probably the case of Senegalese women much more than that of Congolese or, especially, Ghanaian women. Finally, since international migration is generally riskier and subject to stronger barriers for women than for men, especially in patriarchal settings such as the Senegalese and Congolese society (Toma and Vause 2014), once a woman has managed to migrate the incentive to return may be weaker than for a comparable man. However, this is likely to be quite dependent on other factors such as reason for initial departure and family ties at origin and destination.

4.3 Data, Samples and Methods

4.3.1 Data and Samples

In Chap. 3 we estimated, for 1975–2008, the age-specific probabilities of first international migration and first international return, using the information on all offspring aged 18 to 40 of each household head included in the MAFE Household Survey. In this chapter, we use data from the MAFE Individual Biographical Survey, and our analyses will cover 'direct' migrations and 'direct' returns by individuals aged 18–70, in the period 1960–2008, between our selected African countries (Senegal, Ghana and DR Congo) and their main European destinations (France/Italy/Spain, UK/Netherlands, and Belgium/UK, respectively). As with Chap. 3, we focus only on first adult long-duration migration and first long-duration return (stays at destination or back home lasting one year or more), in order to simplify the interpretation of the results. Note that short-term visits to Europe and repeated moves (second and further migrations or returns) are likely to respond to different decision-making rationales; for instance, the immigration rules governing an individual's first entry for a long stay often differ from the rules governing shorter stays and subsequent entries. Had we merged them all together we would have blurred the roles that different factors might have in shaping migration decisions of each type.

With the same goal of isolating the drivers of first migration and return, we excluded from our samples migrations and returns by individuals who stayed in a third country for more than a year (a long stay) on the way out or back. The reason is clear: if someone migrates to Europe from a country other than their country of origin, the contextual factors shaping their migration decision are not the same as

Table 4.1 Samples for the analyses of departures and returns, by country of origin

	DR Congo		Ghana		Senegal	
	Departures to BE/UK	Returns from BE/UK	Departures to UK/NTH	Returns from UK/NTH[b]	Departures to FR/IT/SP	Returns from FR/IT/SP
Individuals who migrated/returned (percentage)	333 (2)	50 (31)	372 (6)	83 (35)	597 (14)	85 (18)
Individuals who had not yet out-migrated/returned at time of survey (percentage)[a]	1728 (98)	391 (69)	1288 (94)	389 (65)	1072 (86)	577 (82)
Total individuals at risk (percentage)	2061 (100)	441 (100)	660 (100)	472 (100)	1669 (100)	662 (100)

Source: MAFE Biographical Survey. Weighted percentages in parentheses
Interpretation: 2% of individuals in our sample of adult Congolese individuals had migrated 'directly' (without intermediate stays longer than 1 year) to one of our selected destinations in Europe (Belgium or UK); and 65% of the total number of Ghanaian migrants living at some point in the period 1960–2008 in either the UK or the Netherlands had never returned to Ghana for a stay of one year or more at the time of MAFE Survey (2008)
Notes:
[a]The total number of individuals at risk of returning to their country of origin is always different from and higher than the total number of migrants counted for each of the three flows (e.g. we identified 577 Senegalese who migrated to France/Italy/Spain but 662 Senegalese migrants at risk of returning to Senegal from one of these same three European countries). The reason for this difference lies in our restricted definition of first migration, and the further mobility of migrants once in Europe. Some of the 'direct' migrants left their initial destination in Europe for other regions and are no longer included in the population at risk of returning, which includes only returns from our selected countries in Europe (France/Italy/Spain for the Senegalese). Others, who initially migrated to destinations other than FR/IT/SP, later migrated to one of these three countries and are therefore included in our analyses of risk of return
[b]There is sometimes quite an imbalance in the returns from the different European destinations for each African flow. In the case of Ghana, for instance, virtually all the returnees we found in Ghana had migrated to the UK; almost none had returned from the Netherlands. This is partly because Ghanaians have been living in the UK for longer than in the Netherlands. This is something we take into account in our analyses

those that apply to their compatriots leaving directly from home. And the same applies to cases of return from countries other than the selected European destinations where we ran the MAFE survey. We therefore talk about 'direct' migration and 'direct' return, although intermediate stays shorter than one year are allowed.

Table 4.1 summarizes the sizes of the samples used for the analyses in this chapter, after applying the restrictions explained above. Note that these percentages are not good estimates of the individual's life-time probability of departure and return, since time of exposure to the possibility of migrating and returning (i.e. age and length of residence in Europe, respectively) is not considered here. To account for that, we have estimated the Kaplan-Meier survival functions, represented in Fig. 4.1,



Fig. 4.1 Proportion of people who had not yet migrated to Europe, by age (Kaplan-Meier survival functions)

Source: MAFE Biographical Survey. Weighted data. Samples described in Table 4.1

which summarizes the proportion of individuals in Senegal, Ghana and DR Congo who, according to our data, had not yet migrated, at increasing ages. Individuals are considered to be at risk of first adult migration to Europe at age 18.

Figure 4.1 shows that, in our sample, the incidence of international migration to Europe is markedly higher among Senegalese than among Ghanaians and, especially, Congolese. By age 30, approximately 88% have not yet departed, meaning that 12% of the Senegalese adult population have already migrated to Europe by this time, and 16% by age 45. Very few people migrate after the age of 45, so we have cut off the graph at that age. By contrast, the corresponding proportions are 5% and 7% among the Ghanaians, and 1.5% and 2% among the Congolese.

4.3.2 Methods

In order to identify the main drivers of migration and return between Africa and Europe, we follow individuals over time from age 18. Each year, we observe whether a migration occurs or not. For each time, we know the person's characteristics (e.g. whether he or she has a job or not, his or her family situation, etc.). We are thus able to identify which of these characteristics are statistically linked to the fact of migrating. For each flow (Senegalese, Congolese and Ghanaian) we ran separate regression models for departure and for return. We ran discrete-time logit models that estimated the net effect of each factor on the probability of experiencing a first adult migration

from Africa to Europe (versus staying in Africa), and the probability of returning to Africa (versus staying in Europe), after controlling for some other variables.

Our dependent variable for analyses of departure takes value 1 in the year when Ego migrated from his/her country of origin in Africa to one of our selected destinations in Europe, and value 0 in all the previous years until the year of the survey, or until the individual dies or migrates to a country other than our selected destinations. The structure of the MAFE Biographical Surveys gives our event history analysis here a crucial advantage: it enables us to use information about the people who never migrated to (or never returned from) our destinations during the observation period, and so to estimate the true effect of each factor on the probability of migrating/returning.

Note that the event history regressions give the probability of migrating or returning of one average individual in our samples in a particular year, whereas in Chap. 3 and in the Survival Functions shown in Fig. 4.1, we calculate cumulated probabilities over a certain number of years. This is why the results of regression analyses are better suited to identifying how much and in what direction different variables shape individuals' migration and return probabilities, rather than estimating life-time probabilities of migration and return.

Box 4.1: How to Interpret the Results

Individual probabilities in a particular year: The probability of migrating to Europe (or returning to origin in Africa) is the final product of a combination of variables. Therefore, we compute changes in these two probabilities when the value of one variable of interest changes while the other variables remain at their mean values for our sample.

Clear definitions and values of all the variables introduced into the regression models are given in Appendices A and B; the coefficient estimates obtained from our event history regression models are shown in Appendix C (departure) and D (return).

Determinants of Departure/Migration (Appendix C): In model 1, we analyse the average effects of the main factors expected to influence migration propensities among our three African groups over the entire observation period (from 1960 to 2008/9). In models 2 to 6, we add interaction effects that allow us to see how the effects of some variables differ across gender and educational level, instead of focusing on the effects for the average individual in the sample as we did in Model 1. In model 7, we estimate the final model containing both main effects and those interaction effects that were found to be significant.

Determinants of Return (Appendix D): In model 1 we analyse the probability of returning from one of our selected destinations in Europe to the country of origin in Africa, taking into account the socioeconomic characteristics of the migrants and their households. In model 2, we add information about the

(continued)

Box 4.1 (continued)
reasons for migrating, to see whether there is a relationship between the characteristics of the initial migration decision and the decision to return. This allows us to examine the extent to which return is embedded in and conditioned by the context in which the migration decision was made in the first place.

Unfortunately, the analyses of return are based on smaller sample sizes. Thus, the results only offer average effects in our samples; interaction effects cannot be estimated. However, the reader must bear in mind that the estimated effects for the different variables might vary across gender and educational level.

Graphic representation of change in the probability of migrating/returning: For the sake of clarity, we include figures summarizing the predicted probabilities of migrating to Europe and returning to origin as estimated by our event history regression models and shown in Appendices C and D (see Box 4.2 for a more detailed explanation based on Fig. 4.2).

Difference between the statistical significance and the size of the estimated effects: Our results are estimates based on samples that aim to be representative of the total reference population (e.g. Senegalese population in the region of Dakar at a given time, or Senegalese migrant population living in France, Italy and Spain in a particular year of our observation period). These estimates therefore entail a certain margin of error. To ensure that our results are valid we have used standard errors and confidence intervals. These statistical instruments show whether the estimated effect of a particular variable on a given probability can be considered a reliable estimation of the real effect of that factor for the overall population of reference. We will comment mainly on those effects which were found to be statistically significant and therefore reliable indicators of how the probability of migrating (or returning) is actually shaped.

Event history models and the importance of time: Note that we have not observed the entire lifespans of the individuals in our samples. They were still alive when we interviewed them, so they might still migrate if they had not yet, or might still return if they were interviewed in Europe. In view of this right censorship of the data, the results should be interpreted with caution: a negative effect of unemployment on the probability of return, for instance, does not necessarily imply that unemployed migrants in Europe return less than employed ones, but perhaps only that they take longer to do so. For this reason, in some cases we interpret negative and positive effects as factors that delay or accelerate migration/return rather than decreasing or increasing the probability of migrating/returning.

4.4 From Africa to Europe: The Determinants of Departure

4.4.1 The Socioeconomic Selection of African Migrants

From the neoclassical viewpoint, international migration is an investment that takes time to become profitable: individuals will need time to reap the benefits of their investment, which includes learning a new language, becoming familiar with a different labour market, and acquiring enough relevant work experience and contacts to move up the occupational ladder. Accordingly, younger people are more likely to migrate internationally because they will have more time to get a return on their investments in the destination labour market. This reasoning especially applies to economic migrants who intend to work at destination and have planned their migration strategy accordingly, as well as individuals who migrate for study purposes. However, people migrating for purely family reasons and especially those migrating for political reasons may not be drawn from the youngest age brackets. This probably explains the pattern in Fig. 4.2, where the Senegalese are most likely to migrate to Europe before the age of 35 and the Ghanaians between the ages of 25 and 34, whereas there is no clear age selectivity for the Congolese. In Congo's situation of severe political crisis, a smaller proportion of migrants leave for economic reasons. Our estimates indicate that the average Congolese person (i.e. one whose data for sex, education, resources, employment and networks are the mean values for each of these variables) is less likely to migrate than the average Ghanaian, and less again than the average Senegalese.

Box 4.2: How to Read the Graphs

We have graphically summarized the main results of the regression models. The figures show, for an average individual in our samples, the change in the annual probability of migrating to Europe (vertical axis) caused by a change in the value of the characteristic represented on the horizontal axis.

For instance, in Fig. 4.2, the first graph summarizes the changes in annual probability of migrating to Europe, for the average Senegalese individual in our sample, between different age brackets (under 25, 25–34 and 35 or over).

The dots represent the average probability of migration as estimated by our model, for each category. The spikes traversing each dot indicate the degree of precision of the estimate. If the spikes around two dots in a graph considerably overlap in width, it is very likely that the difference between the estimated probabilities for those two values of the variable in question is not statistically significant.

If the line linking two dots has a negative slope, it means that a change from one value to the next in the characteristic represented in the horizontal axis entails a decrease in the probability of migrating to Europe. If it has a positive slope, the change entails an increase in the probability of migrating. A flat line indicates no change in the probability of migrating.

(continued)

Box 4.2 (continued)

In the first graph in Fig. 4.2 (annual probability of migrating from Senegal, by age bracket), the estimated probability of migrating to Europe for a Senegalese individual aged 18 to 25, with the other characteristics in the model at their mean values, is 0.008 (value on vertical axis corresponding to the first dot). There is almost no change in this annual probability between age brackets 18–25 and 25–34 (the second dot has almost same value on the vertical axis, the line linking the two dots is flat and the spikes around the two dots overlap almost perfectly). However, the probability drops sharply, to close to 0.003 (the value of the third dot) for age 35 and over. The spike around the third dot does not overlap with the other spikes, showing that the difference with the first two age groups is statistically significant.



Fig. 4.2 Probability of migrating to Europe, by age

Note: Predicted probabilities have been estimated from the models in Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 in Appendix C, with the other variables set at their mean values for the sample
Source: MAFE Biographical Surveys. Weighted data
Interpretation: see Box 4.2

The knowledge and skills acquired with formal education definitely help a person successfully navigate the legal and bureaucratic system to obtain a visa. People who migrate for study purposes are usually more educated than the rest of the population. For both reasons, more educated individuals are expected to have higher probabilities of migrating internationally. Our results clearly confirm this expectation for Senegalese with secondary education or more and Ghanaians with tertiary education, as can be seen from the positive slope of the lines for these two countries in Fig. 4.3. However, education does not appear to be a significant factor in



Fig. 4.3 Probability of migrating to Europe, by educational level (secondary or more/tertiary, or not)

Note: Predicted probabilities have been estimated from the models in Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 in Appendix C, with the other variables set at their mean values for the sample
Source: MAFE Biographical Surveys. Weighted data
Note: Whereas the threshold selected for Ghana and DR Congo was tertiary education, for Senegal it was secondary education, owing to the greater skew in the distribution of educational levels in that country. In all cases the reference category was individuals with educational levels below the threshold

Congolese migration (confidence intervals clearly overlap). Other analyses show that here the education effect is absorbed here by the variable on marital situation (having a partner in Europe). In our sample most Congolese individuals who have a partner in Europe also have tertiary education, and it is not easy to distinguish the respective effects of the two variables. Both factors increase the probability of migrating to Europe, but the facilitating effect of couple reunification seems to be so strong that it obscures the effect of tertiary education.

Obviously, migration selectivity is expected to operate not only by educational background but also by socioeconomic status more broadly. Many poorer people lack the extra money that is needed to pay for the trip and for initially settling in a new place. To explore the effects of having or lacking the material resources that help to cover the costs of travelling to Europe and settling in a new, expensive country, we have analysed the combined effect of two indicators that proxy the economic resources possessed by an individual and their household in the previous year[2]: (a) whether the individual belongs to a household that is able to cover the basic needs

[2] In order to be able to claim causality it is important to measure factors that are believed to influence the probability of migrating at a time prior to the year the migration took place. This is why all the characteristics that may change over time (resources, property, employment status, etc.) have been measured in the previous year (t-1).



Fig. 4.4 Probability of migrating to Europe, by possession or not of extra material resources*

Note: Predicted probabilities have been estimated from the models in Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 in Appendix C, with the other variables set at their mean values for the sample
Source: MAFE Biographical Surveys. Weighted data
* Having extra resources takes a 'yes' value when individuals have properties (land, housing, business) and/or when their household has sufficient income to cover basic needs

of its members, and (b) whether the individual owns some property (including land, dwelling and/or business) or not.

Against our expectations, having some economic resources due to membership of a better-off household or/and to property ownership does not increase the probability of migrating to Europe for either Senegalese or Ghanaian people (see Fig. 4.4: the lines are almost flat and the confidence intervals clearly overlap). In other words, barriers to intercontinental migration in these two cases do not appear to be directly related to economic resources once other factors – especially education and networks – are taken into account. By contrast, having a better economic position as proxied by these two indicators multiplies by two the probability of a Congolese individual making a first migration to Europe, even after discounting the positive effects of education and networks.

It seems more difficult to predict the impact on migration decisions of employment at origin. On the one hand, in principle being employed implies having access to more resources, both material and informational about potential job opportunities in other places, which should increase the probability of migration. On the other hand, people in work may have less need to migrate, while leaving one's job in order to migrate for either family or study purposes obviously increases the cost of migration.



Fig. 4.5 Probability of migrating to Europe, by employment the previous year

Note: Predicted probabilities have been estimated from the models in Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 in Appendix C, with the other variables set at their mean values for the sample
Source: MAFE Biographical Surveys. Weighted data

Our results indicate that there is no significant difference in the probability of migrating to Europe between employed and unemployed individuals in our samples, once the effect of other relevant factors like education, economic resources and networks at destination are taken into account. This result could reflect the diversity of people's reasons for migrating, so that having a job entails different meanings and circumstances that may affect their propensity to migrate in opposite ways (Fig. 4.5).

4.4.2 African Migration Strongly Depends on Family and Social Networks

Moving from Africa to Europe is not only determined by socioeconomic factors. Social relationships play a major role in the departure decision. Even though it was expected that links with people already living in our European destination countries would increase the probability of migrating from the origin country to Europe, the size of these effects is striking. Having a partner in Europe displays the strongest effect of any of the factors considered in our analyses, for all three groups, though the size of the effect is largest among the Senegalese, as can be deduced from the steeper slope of the blue line in Fig. 4.6 for Senegalese compared to the Ghanaians and Congolese.

In estimating the effect of network connections on facilitating migration to European destinations we took into account not only the links individuals had at



Fig. 4.6 Probability of migrating to Europe, by partnership status and partner's place of residence

Note: Predicted probabilities have been estimated from the models in Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 in Appendix C, with the other variables set at their mean values for the sample
Source: MAFE Biographical Surveys. Weighted data

destination, but also the potentially discouraging effect of having similar links in the country of origin. For instance, hitherto it has not been clear whether the pulling effect of friends in Europe can be counterbalanced by the discouraging effect of also having children in the country of origin. Answering this question requires a multisite approach, with systematic information on the location of partners; the MAFE surveys include such data and allow us to estimate the different network effects.

Our results, shown in Fig. 4.6 (above), show that having a partner in the country of origin (red line) reduces the probability of migrating compared to those individuals who have no partner at all (reference category, coded 0), although the negative effect is much smaller than the positive effect of having a partner in Europe. In countries like Senegal, for instance, where it is relatively common for men to have more than one spouse, some may live in Europe and some in Senegal, but the pulling effect of the former predominates over the latter: four co-spouses in Senegal would be required to neutralize the pulling effect of one spouse in Europe. Note that we had no previous evidence on how polygamy may impact men's probability of migrating.

Apart from having a partner in Europe, having children or other relatives there, or even just friends or acquaintances, clearly enhances the probability of Africans in our samples going to those destinations (Fig. 4.7). However, the strength of their pulling effect varies across the three groups. For the Senegalese, children are almost irrelevant in predicting migration probabilities to Europe (the confidence intervals for values 0 and 1 on the blue line clearly overlap), whereas having other relatives



Fig. 4.7 Probability of migrating to Europe, by presence or not of children or other relatives and friends in Europe

Note: Predicted probabilities have been estimated from the models in Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 in Appendix C, with the other variables set at their mean values for the sample
Source: MAFE Biographical Surveys. Weighted data

and friends or acquaintances in Europe multiplies the probability of going there by almost four (red line). For Ghanaians, children in Europe have a clear positive effect on the probability of their parents going there, but the effect of other relatives and friends seems stronger and more robust (smaller confidence intervals) than the effect of children. For the Congolese the pattern is the reverse: children in Europe have a more powerful effect on migration than do other relatives or friends there. However, as before, the estimates for the Congolese case are shakier due to smaller sample size, and should be taken with caution.

In addition, and in contrast to the results for partners, having children in the country of origin does not significantly reduce the probability of migrating to Europe for any of the migrant groups covered by MAFE (results not shown in figures but only in estimates from Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 in Appendix C).

4.4.3 Variations in the Determinants of Migration to Europe by Gender and Education

The results described so far have shown a great deal of variety in the drivers of migration across origins. We saw that higher education strongly facilitates departure among the Senegalese and Ghanaians, but has no effect on the Congolese. Other

characteristics, particular gender, show a similar apparent lack of selectivity for migration from DRC. The probability of migrating to Europe is substantially lower for Senegalese and Ghanaian women than for their male counterparts, but there is no difference by gender in the Congolese case (see Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 in Appendix C). To further explore the extent to which the drivers of migration vary according to background factors, we ran some additional models incorporating the most relevant interaction effects by sex and education (models 2 to 7 in Appendix C). In other words, we explored whether gender and educational level modify the effects of networks, socioeconomic resources and employment on the probability of migrating to Europe, for people in our Senegalese, Ghanaian and Congolese samples. The results do indeed differ between the three origin countries.

A specific pattern of Senegalese migration is that moving to Europe is extraordinarily selective among Senegalese women, by comparison both with Senegalese men and with women of other origins. To have a high probability of moving from Senegal to Europe, women must possess considerable economic and social resources. The likelihood of migrating to Europe is the same for Senegalese women with secondary education or more as for Senegalese men with less than secondary education (Appendix C, Table 4.2). In addition, while having more economic resources is not relevant in explaining men's migration to Europe, a better economic situation significantly increases women's probability of doing so. Both results clearly confirm that migration to Europe is more costly for Senegalese women than for men and, consequently, female Senegalese migration is more positively selected than male. Senegalese women are also much more likely to migrate when they have a partner abroad. All these results emerge only for Senegalese women, not for Congolese or Ghanaian women.

For the Senegalese, gender is thus a strong factor for diversity in the drivers of migration. On the other hand, the factors of migration from Senegal do not vary according to educational level, whereas this appears as a powerful factor for internal diversity among Ghanaians. It proves to be especially important for explaining the impact of being employed at origin on the probability of migrating from Africa. The results presented so far show that, in all three countries, employment at origin does not affect individuals' probabilities of migrating, whatever their educational level. However, the effect of having a job or not seems likely to vary according to education. Previous studies, as we mentioned before, have concluded that frustrated expectations rather than unemployment per se are the main push factor behind labour migration from Africa. Therefore, we can expect that more educated individuals who do not have the type of job they expect are the most likely to migrate, while among less educated people being employed or not is not a great predictor of migration behaviour. In fact the Ghanaian case is the only one that confirms this assumption: there, the individuals most likely to migrate to Europe are those with higher education who were employed in the previous year, whereas the least likely to migrate are individuals who were also employed but had less than tertiary education (models 6 and 7, Table 4.3, Appendix C). Among Ghanaians, education also diminishes the pulling effect of partners in Europe.

The main distinctive trait of Congolese migration is the interaction between the location of partners/children and education or gender. The pulling effect of having children in Europe is less for people who received tertiary education (as in Ghana), but much greater for women, in line with social expectations regarding child care. The retention effect of having a partner at origin also depends on gender, with women much more affected than men (as in Senegal).

4.4.4 Out of Africa: Summary of the Determinants of Departure

In sum, our analyses of the main determinants of migration to Europe suggest first of all that we have good reasons to reject the widespread idea that it is the poorest and least skilled Africans who are most likely to come to Europe. Our results clearly point the other way, as previous empirical evidence had already suggested. This is particularly obvious in the case of Ghana, where highly educated individuals who have been in employment are the most likely to migrate to Europe. Among the Senegalese, secondary or higher education strongly increases the probability of migrating to Europe, especially among women, for whom having additional economic resources also significantly facilitates migration. Among the Congolese, the most important asset for migrating to Europe seems to be economic resources rather than education.

In all three cases, networks proved to be the strongest factor of all in facilitating migration. However, their role varies substantially by gender and, to a lesser extent, by education. The strong facilitating effect of having a partner in Europe is much stronger for women than for men among the Senegalese and Congolese. Other relatives and friends or acquaintances also increase the probability of going to Europe for all groups, though not as strongly as partners. Having children already in Europe only has a significant pulling effect on Ghanaians, both men and women, and on Congolese women. As to the role played by family links with people living in the country of origin, while having a partner at origin substantially reduces migration probabilities for women, it makes no difference with men. The presence of children in the country of origin is irrelevant in predicting migration compared to childless individuals. This result is surprising, as migration is usually expected to be related to the economic needs of children in the origin country, especially for women.

4.5 Determinants of Return from Europe to the Country of Origin

As is the case with departure to Europe, when we analyse the factors that explain the first return to Africa, flow-specific particularities coexist with common patterns. Unfortunately, the small number of cases of return migration in our samples means that we cannot explore whether some factors have a different effect by gender or educational level, as we did when analysing the determinants of departure for Europe.

The first relevant result we found in our estimates is that, for the Senegalese, Ghanaians and Congolese alike, return from the former colonising country in Europe (France, UK and Belgium respectively) is much more likely than from newer European destinations. In Fig. 4.8 we summarize the differences in the probability of return for individuals from each of our three origin countries living in different European destination countries (former colonial power versus new destinations), as well as changes in the probability of returning as time of residence in each destination country lengthens. The distance between the red and blue lines shows the difference in the probability of returning depending on whether the migrant lives in the old colonial country (red) or in a newer destination (blue). In all cases the red line is significantly above the blue, which means that return probability is higher for migrants living in the former colonial country. This result is not due to the fact that migrants have spent more years, on average, in their traditional destinations: differences in length of stay across individuals in each European destination



Fig. 4.8 Probability of returning, by country of residence in Europe and length of stay

Note: Predicted probabilities have been estimated from the models in Table 4.5 in Appendix D, with the other variables set at their mean values for the sample
Source: MAFE Biographical Surveys. Weighted data

have been taken into account and discounted from the effect. However, this result very probably reflects the more favourable visa policies that France and the UK used to have for citizens of their former colonies, until the mid-1980s and mid-1990s respectively. These policies obviously favoured return because they favoured possible further circulation.

The relationship between length of stay in Europe and return is not always linear. The propensity to return increases as stay in Europe lengthens for the Senegalese, who are the ones who take longest to return (see Fig. 4.8). By contrast, length of stay seems completely irrelevant for predicting the probability of return of Congolese migrants in Europe (since the width of the confidence intervals around the dots on each line overlap with each other almost completely (Fig. 4.8)). In the case of the Ghanaians, the migrants with the highest probability of returning are neither those who arrived recently nor the ones who have been longest in Europe but the ones in between, i.e. migrants who have been living there for 4–6 years (red line).

Along with length of stay, we have included two more indicators that proxy the socioeconomic integration achieved by the migrant in Europe: whether the migrant had a job or not in the previous year; and secondly, whether the household where they lived in Europe had enough resources to cover their members' basic needs, or not. As can be seen in Fig. 4.9, the results show a clearly different pattern for each group. For the Senegalese, neither of these indicators shows a significant difference in the probability of returning (results are not significant at all, as shown by the overlapping confidence intervals). But both employment and household resources



Fig. 4.9 Probability of returning, by employment status and household resources

Note: Predicted probabilities have been estimated from the models in Table 4.5 in Appendix D, with the other variables set at their mean values for the sample
Source: MAFE Biographical Surveys. Weighted data

seem to significantly predict return to origin by both Ghanaians and Congolese. In the case of the Ghanaians, migrants who were employed and living in households able cover the basic needs of their members in Europe are clearly more likely to return than those who were not (both lines have a positive slope, and the effects are clearly significant, especially the effect of being employed). In the case of the Congolese, although migrants living in better-off households are also more likely to return, the effect of being employed goes in the opposite direction: migrants who have a job are less likely to return than their non-employed counterparts. In other words, the profile of the Ghanaian returnees fits better with the idea of return as a sign of success, whereas in the case of the Congolese or Senegalese the results obtained are not that easy to interpret.

In the previous sections of this chapter we have shown a clear positive selection in terms of educational profile when analysing migration from Africa to Europe, a fact which has led to fears of a brain drain and related issues. The results shown in Fig. 4.10 suggest that more educated migrants are also more likely to return than less educated ones (blue lines rising for all three groups). Therefore, at least in the case of Senegal and Ghana (countries that are not suffering serious political conflict as DR Congo is), return migrants are clearly drawn from among the more educated members of the migrant communities in Europe. This should soothe fears of a brain drain. Moreover, this result highlights the contribution migration can potentially make to development in countries of origin if the skills and experience migrants have acquired abroad can be applied back in their countries of origin.



Fig. 4.10 Probability of returning, by educational level and gender

Note: Predicted probabilities have been estimated from the models in Table 4.5 in Appendix D, with the other variables set at their mean values for the sample
Source: MAFE Biographical Surveys. Weighted data

As well as the positive selection of migrants to Europe by educational level, the results we described earlier also pinpointed network connections at destination as the strongest pulling factor in migration from Africa to Europe. Having a partner in Europe proved to be the strongest predictor of migration to Europe for all three groups. With regard to return behaviour, it might be thought that having left behind close relatives like partners and children would play a similar role. However, the costs associated with return and reintegration are lower than those associated with first international migration to Europe. The role of networks at origin are thus expected to be less crucial in terms of material support for the return decision than for departure. Moreover, migration is often a family decision, and the emotional costs of separation are frequently justified precisely because of the economic benefits that other members of the household (children in particular) may obtain from it. For the same reason, having reunified the nuclear family in Europe is likely to greatly weaken the desire to return in most cases.

Overall, the results are mostly consistent with our expectations. Having a partner or children in the country of origin (green and yellow lines) increases the probability of returning, as indicated by the positive slope of these lines in all graphs (Fig. 4.11). However, for the Senegalese these effects are only significant for partners (yellow line is flat), and in the case of Ghanaians and Congolese only for children (confidence intervals for green lines are too wide). Quite unexpectedly, for the Senegalese, having a partner or a child in Europe (blue and red lines) only reduces the probability of returning compared to migrants with no partner and/or children at



Fig. 4.11 Probability of returning, by presence or not of a partner and/or children in Europe or country of origin

Note: Predicted probabilities have been estimated from the models in Table 4.5 in Appendix D, with the other variables set at their mean values for the sample
Source: MAFE Biographical Surveys. Weighted data



Fig. 4.12 Probability of returning, by remittance behaviour and visits to country of origin

Note: Predicted probabilities have been estimated from the models in Table 4.5 in Appendix D, with the other variables set at their mean values for the sample
Source: MAFE Biographical Surveys. Weighted data

all (reference category). And among the Ghanaians and Congolese, migrants with no partner or children at all (reference category) are equally likely to return to origin as those with a partner or child in Europe, which casts doubt on the common assumption that family reunification in Europe weakens the desire to return.

The effect on migrants' return behaviour of the existence and location of partners and children would be expected to depend strongly on two additional factors: (a) the frequency of visits that interrupt long separations and help keep the relationship alive despite the distance and (b) the extent to which separation is viewed as necessary or, at least, desirable, in order to afford certain expenditures or investments from which all family members may benefit. In other words, visits and remittances are expected to delay return by making separation more bearable and worthwhile. Our results completely support these expectations for Senegalese and Ghanaians, as can be deduced from Fig. 4.12.

This result contradicts previous findings for other migrant groups in various reception contexts, where remittances are interpreted as revealing strong links with the country of origin and announcing return, especially if reunification at destination does not take place. And something similar might be argued for the role of visits. However, these predictions do not take into account the time-dependent nature of the return process and the fact that remittances and visits may change their meaning over time or, at least, may help to delay return even if migrants still wish to return at some point in the future. This is especially the case in contexts where living apart together is socially well accepted (see Chaps. 6, 9, 12 and 15). Note also

that these results, in the case of the Senegalese in particular, are fully consistent with our findings that children's location (in origin country or Europe) has no effect on migration or return.

Finally, as we argued before, it seems reasonable to expect different return patterns among migrants who left home for political reasons or to study, for example. Different reasons for migrating are generally associated with different migration plans, different intended lengths of stay and, consequently, different return intentions. And even if it is well established that migration and return intentions are not perfect predictors of behaviour, there does seem to be a positive correlation between the two. Moreover, reasons for migrating are also likely to correlate with other characteristics. People who migrate for study purposes are likely to be more educated than the average migrant since most international students migrate to complete tertiary education or to acquire some specialized training in their area; people who have migrated for economic reasons are more likely to have found a job and be employed than those who migrated for political, family or study reasons; and family migrants are more likely to have partners and children in Europe than the rest. Thus, omitting information about reasons for migrating may cause confusion about the factors explaining return behaviour. This is exemplified by changes in some results between Model 1 and Model 2 in Appendix D. Once the variable 'reason for migration to Europe' is added to the estimation in Model 2, the positive effect of higher education weakens. The explanation for this is straightforward: those who migrated to study tend to be already more highly educated than other migrants. If the 'study' reason for migrating is not included in the model as one relevant explanatory variable, 'level of education' captures the effect of both variables. When we include both variables, the net effect of each is precisely measured, and what was initially attributed to level of education is split between 'education' and 'reason for migration'.

The results in Fig. 4.13 show that migrants who left to study in Europe are more likely to return than the rest, but only significantly so in comparison to those migrating for family reasons in the case of the Ghanaians and, to a lesser extent, of the Congolese. The effect is not significant for the Senegalese. The results for Congo also confirm that migrants who leave for political reasons are the least likely to return, and the effect in this case is very robust in terms of statistical significance.



Fig. 4.13 Probability of return, by reason for first migration to Europe

Note: Predicted probabilities have been estimated from the models in Table 4.5 in Appendix D, with the other variables set at their mean values for the sample
Source: MAFE Biographical Surveys. Weighted data

4.6 Discussion. Theoretical and Policy Implications

4.6.1 African Migrants Are Positively Selected, for both Departure and Return

Our results contradict the idea that Sub-Saharan migrants who come to Europe are the poorest of the poor, desperate people fleeing material deprivation in their countries of origin, as is sometimes implicitly assumed in the media and political discourse. Sub-Saharan Africans who migrate to Europe tend to have a higher educational level than their average countrymen, and are also more likely than comparable non-migrants to belong to households that are able to cover the basic needs of their members. In particular, our results show that being employed or not is not by itself an informative factor for predicting migration. As we discussed and as suggested by previous studies, in many cases it is not lack of employment but rather a mismatch between the individual's actual job and their occupational expectations that encourages them to migrate in search of better opportunities. In the Ghanaian case especially, it is clear that the individuals most likely to migrate are not the unemployed but, rather, highly educated individuals who had a job in the country of origin. This points to migration in search of better jobs, not simply for jobs.

This positive selection on educational and, in some cases, economic criteria would justify the widespread concern about a potential brain drain from Africa to

developed countries. However, according to our data and analyses, the selectivity at work in return migration does not necessarily increase the initial loss of human capital and resources derived from out-migration, but rather the opposite. Migrants who are among the better educated in their communities and/or belong to better-off households are also more likely to return to their countries of origin. In addition, migrants who left home to study, most of whom have accumulated additional skills during their stay abroad, are also more likely to return than people who migrated for other reasons; this reinforces the recovery of human capital for the country of origin and adds a potential gain. Furthermore, in our samples, Ghanaian and Congolese migrants who reported that their households in Europe had sufficient resources to cover their basic needs were more likely to return than their poorer counterparts. Also, Ghanaian migrants in the UK and Netherlands are more likely to return if they had a job the previous year in Europe. In short, successful migrants are more likely to return than those who have failed in their destination country. Our results not only discard the idea that immigrants in more vulnerable situations are more likely to return, as some people argue, but also the idea that immigrants only return if they fail in the labour market and are not able to remit.

4.6.2 African Migration Is Diverse

Although the three origin countries share patterns of positive socioeconomic selectivity for both out-migration and return, our findings also challenge the dominant image of Sub-Saharan migration to Europe as a uniform flow. The internal diversity of each group and its migration dynamics casts serious doubt on the usefulness of conventional theories (typically developed in connection with economic migration) to explain the migration and return of our three populations. Chapter 3 explained that motivations for migration to Europe are quite diverse across flows but also within each one: economic reasons dominate among the Senegalese and, combined with study reasons, among Ghanaians, while up to 60% of recent flows from DR Congo have consisted of asylum seekers. People migrating for family reasons make up a proportion of total flow that oscillates between 20 and 30%. In this chapter we have shown how reasons for initial migration are important in explaining different return patterns. In fact, the long-lasting effect of the reason for initial migration on return decisions deserves to be emphasized, since it confirms that migration is a life project, and that migrants in many cases remain faithful to their initial plans. For this reason, among others, a proper study of migration and its potential effects on development requires a life course perspective and dynamic data.

Moreover, the diversity of people's reasons for migrating may help to explain the lack of empirical support for some of the main predictions of the dominant theoretical approaches to the subject. If migrants who left for, let's say, economic and political reasons have different plans from the outset with regard to returning, it does not make sense to apply the same explanatory framework to both of them. In fact, our different results concerning length of stay as a possible explanatory factor

for return might have to do with this diversity in the profiles of the migrant population.

According to our results, Ghanaians are the ones who return soonest, but it still takes them more than 3 years to do so; for Senegalese migrants return probabilities peak more than 6 years after arrival and, not surprisingly, years spent at destination are unrelated to Congolese migrants' return probabilities. Thus the time before return seems to be longer than traditionally expected by most academic literature on economic migration, except maybe in the case of the Ghanaians, who, as we said, are the ones who best fit the image of the economic migrant.

Overall, return only happens 4 or 5 years after arrival. Migration and installation in Europe is a very costly endeavour and it takes time. Migrants are not willing to return soon after arrival because they have goals to achieve, for themselves and their families, and they are able to bear long-lasting separation from their close relatives thanks to the flexibility of family forms, particularly in Africa. Therefore, receiving countries should not expect very short stays from most Sub-Saharan migrants; however, there is also evidence of clear intentions to return by a relative large part of this migrant population (Flahaux 2015). Overall, our results better fit the image of returnees who to some extent choose when to go home, once they have achieved their goals or once their economic situation is good enough for them to return in a way that will not be seen as failure by their family left behind in the origin country (economic migrants).

4.6.3 Connections at Home Delay Return

Obviously, relatively long stays in Europe do not completely exclude the possibility of visits to the country of origin, but according to our results these visits delay the return to origin rather than encouraging it. The same applies to remittances: instead of being a predictor of upcoming return, the fact of ever having remitted from Europe to the origin country tends to make migrants less likely to return compared to those who have never remitted. In other words, keeping alive the bond with the country of origin through visits and remittances seem to delay return, instead of accelerating it as was traditionally assumed.

As suggested by Grillo and Mazuccato (2008), visits play a crucial role in helping "to oil the functioning of the split families", and remittances are also a way to reinforce pooling agreements between the migrants and the relatives left behind (Mazzucato et al. 2014), especially when the separation lengthens. For these reasons, the results concerning the effects of visits and remittances should be interpreted jointly with the results concerning the role of family links both at origin and destination in shaping migration and return decisions.

4.6.4 Family Migration Does Not Prevent Return

Our data clearly confirm the important role of networks in facilitating migration to Europe. Having relatives, friends or acquaintances there strongly multiplies the likelihood of migrating for all three groups. However, the strongest pulling factor is having a partner already living at destination. This is not strictly a network effect as conceived in the literature but rather the result of family reunification processes, which respond in many cases to migration plans that were decided even before the first-mover left the country of origin (Palloni et al. 2001; Liu 2013). Conventional wisdom assumes that reunification of close relatives at destination ends any return intention and so implies permanent settlement. One of the most telling findings in our analyses is that having reunified with partner and/or children in Europe does not make migrants less likely to return than their single and childless counterparts in Europe. However, it is true that Senegalese individuals whose partners stayed behind, and Congolese and Ghanaians with children in the country of origin, are more likely to return than single and childless migrants in Europe.

In sum, the effect of family reunification and family separation on migration decisions and, more especially, on return to origin are not straightforward. Individuals who left close relatives in the country of origin tend to be more likely to return than single and childless migrants but this is not the case for migrants who have reunified part of their families in Europe. Partners already living in Europe are clearly a very strong pulling factor but couple reunification does not necessarily imply permanent settlement. In other words, keeping families apart through policy restrictions on family reunification does not necessarily ensure that migrants will return sooner.

Appendices

Appendix A: Variables Included in the Multivariate Analyses of Departure

Variable	Definition	Values	Lagged	Comments
Departure	First adult migration from country of birth in Africa to one selected destination in Europe without staying more than one year in intermediate countries	0 = no, 1 = yes		
Age	Ego's age	<25, 25–34, 35+		
Female	Ego is a woman	0 = no, 1 = yes		
Educational level	Ego's highest educational level	Senegal: 1 = some secondary, 0 = less.		
		Ghana and DR Congo: 1 = some tertiary, 0 = less		
Employed	Ego is employed	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	All Egos included; economically inactive Egos counted as non-employed
Household resources	Ego's household in country of origin had enough resources to cover basic needs of its members, or ego has some assets in country of origin, or both	0 = none, 1 = yes to at least one of the two indicators	Yes	

(continued)

Variable	Definition	Values	Lagged	Comments
Partner in Europe	Ego has a partner in the selected EU destination	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	Any kind of partner is included in this variable (not only spouses but also non-married partners declared by Ego).
Child(ren) in Europe	Ego has at least one child living in the selected EU destination	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	Children of all ages are included in this variable (not only minors).
Other relatives/ friends in Europe	Ego has other relatives and/or friends other than partners and children in the selected EU destination	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	
Partner at origin	Ego has a partner in the country of origin	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	Any kind of partner is included in this variable (not only spouses but also non-married partners declared by Ego).
Child(ren) at origin	Ego has at least one child in the country of origin	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	Children of all ages are included in this variable (not only minors).

Appendix B: Variables Included in the Multivariate Analyses of Return

Variable	Label	Values	Lagged	Comments
Return		0 = no, 1 = yes		
Metropolis	Country of destination in Europe	0 = other, 1 = colonial power		
Length of stay	Ego's length of residence in selected European countries (number of years)	1–3, 4–6, 7+		
Age at migration	Ego's age at first migration to selected destination in Europe			
Female	Ego is female	0 = no, 1 = yes		

(continued)

Variable	Label	Values	Lagged	Comments
Educational level	Ego's highest educational level	Senegal: 1 = some secondary, 0 = less.		
		Ghana and DR Congo: 1 = some tertiary, 0 = less		
Employed	Ego was employed	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	All Egos included; economically inactive Egos counted as non-employed
Household resources	Ego's household in Europe had enough resources to cover basic needs of its members	1 = suff. or more than suff. 0 = just suff. or insuff.		Refers to the dwelling where Ego was living the year before return
Partner in Europe	Ego has a partner in selected EU destinations	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	Any kind of partner is included in this variable (not only spouses but also non-married partners declared by Ego). Note that Ego may have partners in different locations (not only because of legal polygamy, since here we include non-married partners)
Partner at origin	Ego has a partner in country of origin	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	
Child(ren) in Europe	Ego has a child in selected EU destinations	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	Children of all ages are included in this variable (not only minors). Note that Ego may have children in different locations
Child(ren) at origin	Ego has a child in country of origin	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	
Ever remitted	Ego ever remitted to origin	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	
Ever visited country of origin	Ego ever visited his/her country of origin	0 = no, 1 = yes	Yes	
Mig. reason	Reasons for migration to the selected destination in Europe declared by ego	Family, economic, study, political, other		In the Ghanaian analyses there were too few people citing political reasons, so Stata systematically expelled that category. To avoid this problem, these cases are put into the residual category other reasons

Appendix C: Multivariate Regression Analyses of Migration

Table 4.2 Logit regression of first adult migration from Senegal to Europe (France, Italy or Spain), discrete-time

	Senegal						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Ref 18–25							
26–25	−0.0148	−0.00481	−0.0744	−0.0194	−0.0188	0.0187	−0.0658
>35	−0.944***	−0.929***	−1.055***	−0.934***	−0.945***	−0.907***	−1.033***
Ref. no							
Partner in EU	2.263***	2.298***	1.493***	2.244***	2.303***	2.272***	1.584***
Partner at origin	−0.498**	−0.478**	0.0501	−0.488**	−0.490**	−0.495**	0.0287
Children in EU	0.347	0.475	0.344	0.437	0.455	0.315	0.358
Children at origin	0.0719	0.119	−0.0585	0.0756	0.0766	0.0792	0.0299
Other relns./friends in EU	1.366***	1.344***	1.341***	1.350***	1.496***	1.363***	1.321***
Ref. less							
Secondary education	0.658***	0.403**	0.651***	0.674***	0.988***	0.716**	0.442**
Ec. resources	0.0828	0.0749	0.0545	−0.0781	0.0891	0.0192	−0.0750
Employed	−0.0204	−0.0858	−0.0725	0.0211	−0.0123	0.125	−0.134
Female	−1.042***	−1.363***	−0.642**	−1.476***	−1.037***	−1.013***	−1.294***
Female*secondary		0.976**					0.802**
Female*partner EU			0.811*				0.729*
Female*children EU			−0.187				

Female*other in EU			0.0135				
Female*partner at origin			−1.619***				−1.523***
Female*children at origin			0.110				
Female*Ec. resources				0.660**			0.542
Female*employed				−0.148			
Secondary education*partner EU					−0.139		
Secondary education*children EU					0		
Secondary education*other in EU					−0.457		
Secondary education*resources						0.245	
Secondary education*employed						−0.430	
Constant	−5.089***	−4.964***	−5.114***	−5.006***	−5.184***	−5.170***	−4.924***
Person-years	29,271	29,271	29,271	29,271	29,221	29,271	29,271

Source: Biographical MAFE Surveys. Weighted data
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001

Table 4.3 Logit regression of first adult migration from Ghana to Europe (UK or Netherlands), discrete-time

	Ghana						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Ref 18–25							
26–25	0.625**	0.639**	0.644**	0.620**	0.588*	0.631**	0.631**
>35	−0.874**	−0.858**	−0.840**	−0.865**	−0.875**	−0.893**	−0.852**
Ref. no							
Partner in EU	2.843***	2.817***	2.698***	2.827***	3.091***	2.848***	3.116***
Partner at origin	−0.180	−0.183	−0.211	−0.162	−0.170	−0.159	−0.240
Children in EU	1.741***	1.750***	1.589*	1.741***	1.740***	1.739***	1.624**
Children at origin	−0.0651	−0.0704	−0.0281	−0.0624	−0.0534	−0.0756	−0.0839
Other relns./friends in EU	2.251***	2.254***	2.644***	2.258***	2.223***	2.251***	2.572***
Ref. less							
Tertiary education	1.056***	0.952**	1.023***	1.057***	1.381***	0.475	0.696
Ec. resources	0.0139	0.0186	0.0429	−0.0843	−0.00606	0.0392	0.0501
Employed	−0.197	−0.204	−0.218	−0.413	−0.187	−415*	−0.410*
Female	−0.504**	−0.552**	−0.0912	−1.049*	−0.453*	−0.506**	−0.116
Female*tertiary		0.289					

Female*partner EU			0.344				
Female*children EU			0.0609				
Female* other in EU			−0.904*				−0.770*
Female*partner at origin			−0.0321				
Female*children at origin			−0.160				
Female*Ec. resources				0.238			
Female*employed				0.482			
Tertiary*partner EU					−0.978*		−0.960
Tertiary*children EU					−1.024		
Tertiary*other in EU					−0.0310		
Tertiary*resources						−0.103	
Tertiary*employed						1.012**	0.964**
Constant	−6.240***	−6.216***	−6.414***	−6.029***	−6.290***	−6.110***	−6.310***
Person-years	32,195	32,195	32,195	32,195	32,195	32,195	32,195

Source: Biographical MAFE Surveys. Weighted data
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001

Table 4.4 Logit regression of first adult migration from DR Congo to Europe (Belgium or UK), discrete-time

	DR Congo						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Ref 18–25							
26–25	0.638**	0.640**	0.616*	0.640**	0.551	0.652**	0.595*
>35	−0.292	−0.317	−0.388	−0.282	−0.293	−0.298	−0.432
Ref. no							
Partner in EU	3.435***	3.288***	4.146***	3.433***	4.255***	3.396***	3.350***
Partner at origin	−1.109**	−1.124**	−0.255	−1.134**	−1.091**	−1.110**	−0.356
Children in EU	2.574***	2.756***	1.219	2.553***	3.631***	2.608***	3.148**
Children at origin	−0.0611	−0.0118	−0.135	−0.0614	0.00189	−0.0662	−0.0543
Other relns./friends in EU	2.119***	2.115***	1.805***	2.126***	2.274***	2.122***	2.079***
Ref. less							
Tertiary education	0.514	0.138	0.591	0.515	0.942*	−0.175	0.638
Ec. resources	1.108***	1.105***	1.054***	1.111**	1.007***	0.957**	0.995***
Employed	−0.0263	−0.0416	−0.146	0.0929	0.0468	−0.0960	−0.0826
Female	−0.112	−0.356	−0.00436	0.00272	−0.167	−0.112	0.224
Female*tertiary		0.761					
Female*partner EU			−0.879				
Female*children EU			2.405**				0.732

Female* other in EU			0.510				
Female*partner at origin			−1.522**				−1.431**
Female*children at origin			0.119				
Female*Ec. resources				0.00876			
Female*employed				−0.224			
Tertiary education*partner EU					−1.588		
Tertiary education *children EU					−2.827**		−2.615*
Tertiary education *other in EU					−0.381		
Tertiary education *resources						0.610	
Tertiary education *employed						0.212	
Constant	−8.390***	−8.260***	−8.369***	−8.458***	−8.442***	−8.219***	−8.437***
Person-years							
N	40,686	40,686	40,686	40,686	40,686	40,686	40,686

Source: Biographical MAFE Surveys. Weighted data
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001

Appendix D: Multivariate Regression Analyses of Return

Table 4.5 Logit regression of first adult return from Europe to the country of origin, discrete-time

	Senegal		Ghana		DR Congo	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Ref. no						
Metropolis	0.947**	0.802**	1.963***	1.767***	−0.124	0.680
Age at migration	0.0323	0.0232	0.0295	0.0497*	−0.00601	0.00237
Ref. <3 years since migration						
4–6 years since migration	0.900**	0.933**	0.901**	1.116**	−0.415	−0.157
7+ years since migration	1.269**	1.300**	0.0298	0.418	−0.746	−0.480
Female	0.668*	0.548	0.121	0.279	−0.446	−0.335
Secondary school & more	0.720**	0.533	1.212**	0.681	0.518	0.386
Employed previous year	−0.476	−0.239	1.362*	1.565*	−0.890*	−0.989*
Suf. resources in household	−0.213	−0.283	0.575	0.683*	1.163	1.441*
Partner in Europe	−0.971**	−1.198**	−0.542	−0.634	0.865	1.271*
Partner at origin	0.803**	0.709*	0.288	0.199	0.912	0.945
Children in Europe	−1.245*	−1.397*	−0.579	−0.630	−0.454	−0.485
Children at origin	−0.217	−0.0207	0.608*	0.605*	1.700***	1.885***
Ever remitted	−0.868**	−0.770**	−1.530***	−1.459***	−1.962***	−1.976***
Ever visited	−2.050***	−2.079***	−1.775***	−1.908***	0.738	0.654
Ref. economic reasons for migration						
Family reasons		−1.087*		−0.152		−0.958
Study reasons		−0.211		1.037*		1.155*
Political reasons		−0.686		−0.484		−2.381**

(continued)

Table 4.5 (continued)

	Senegal		Ghana		DR Congo	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Other reasons						−1.034
Constant	−4.759***	−3.787***	−6.895***	−7.699***	−3.745**	−5.855**
Person-years	7319	7319	5141	5141	4677	4677

Source: Biographical MAFE Surveys. Weighted data
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001

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Chapter 5
Understanding Afro-European Economic Integration Between Origin and Destination Countries

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5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores patterns of labour market integration by African migrants in Europe, the re-integration of returnees in origin countries and their transnational economic contributions whilst abroad. To do this we analyse migrants' transnational employment trajectories before leaving, during their time in Europe and upon

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return, and also the ways in which they participate economically in their origin countries during their time abroad.

The labour market integration of migrants at destination and their economic re-integration at origin are crucial issues in the current academic debate and a major concern for policy makers in Europe and Africa. In Europe it is crucial in order to maximize the benefit of migrants' human capital and so stimulate growth and productivity and also in order to promote social cohesion; in Africa it is crucial in order to enhance the potential of migrants and returnees as key players for the development of their origin countries (Black and King 2004; Van Hear and Sørensen 2003; Sjenitzer and Tiemoko 2003).

However, the study of migrants' economic outcomes has been embedded in two distinct fields of study and theory and is dealt with empirically as two separate subjects, depending on whether migrants are viewed from the receiving or sending countries' viewpoints.

From the **receiving countries' perspective**, migrants' integration into the labour market at destination is covered by the literature on integration and social cohesion and on determinants and outcomes of migrants' economic integration at destination.

Skill mismatch has become a growing concern among scholars and policy makers as it has important economic implications for individual migrants, as they do not receive a salary commensurate with their abilities; for firms, as it reduces productivity and increases on-the-job search and turnover; and at the macroeconomic level, as it generates a loss of human capital (brain waste) and a reduction in productivity and efficiency (Quintini 2011).

However, the existing literature on labour market mismatch among migrants does not appear to have explored work experience prior to migration, particularly the phenomenon of an education-occupation mismatch in the home country before migrating (Piracha et al. 2012), or how this phenomenon relates to later outcomes in receiving countries. Comparing the education-occupation mismatch *before* and *after* departure is crucial for understanding the extent to which migration is rewarding for migrants in terms of opportunity to put their skills to use.

Furthermore, few studies have taken a longitudinal approach to their analysis of migrants' labour market attainments, providing a dynamic picture of their economic integration in receiving countries (Lubotsky 2007; Duleep and Dowhan 2008). While common wisdom suggests that migrants face initial disadvantages upon arrival in the labour market at destination, their outcomes are expected to improve over time (OECD 2007). Yet there is increasing evidence that migrants may face persistent labour market barriers that threaten their full integration, and that patterns of economic integration vary markedly according to country of origin (Münz 2008; Borjas 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 2006) and country of destination (Münz 2007; Dustmann and Frattini 2010). Little comparative research has been done on the long-term labour market performance of the migrant workforce across the different EU member states taking into consideration differences in employment, economic performance and integration of different national groups.

On the **origin countries' side**, a separate strand of literature has mainly concentrated on the links between migration and development (Kabbanji 2013). From the perspective of sending countries, which invested in the education and training of

each migrant, the outflow of highly skilled nationals (brain drain) constitutes a heavy financial burden as they lose some of their better educated individuals (Kohnert 2007), especially when educated migrants cannot obtain skilled jobs in their destination countries and can make little use of their skills and knowledge (brain waste). While brain drain can be potentially disruptive for sending countries, the circulation and return of skills may positively impact on their development (Ghosh 2000). But the extent to which this happens depends heavily on patterns of integration into the labour market in Europe (de Haas and Fokkema 2011; Shima 2010) and on the transnational links migrants may be able to maintain with their origin country whilst abroad (Cassarino 2004). In the migration and development discourse, migrants' remittances and other transnational activities are often deemed to play a crucial role at origin, positively contributing to the development of households and national economies. The depth of a migrant's transnational links depends on their characteristics and those of their household, and on the success of their migration project in terms of integration into the labour market at destination.

Although increasing attention is being paid to return migration and the challenges of migrants' economic reinsertion, little research has taken into account the economic trajectories and achievements returnees experienced prior to migration and during their time in Europe, or the skills and qualifications they may have acquired whilst abroad (Ammassari 2004). This is also due to some major methodological gaps and data shortage. Statistical data are usually collected and made available for single countries (Wimmer and Schiller 2003: 210), through censuses and surveys, and on a cross-sectional basis. One-off studies still prevail, focusing on specific events (transitions from study or inactivity to employment, etc.) or specific phases of the migration process (settlement and integration in destination country; temporary returns and circulation between sending and receiving countries; permanent return to origin country), often disregarding the trajectory as a whole (King et al. 2006).

As available data are mainly cross-sectional and collected at country level, they seldom allow matched analyses of migrants' long-term occupational attainments between origin and destination countries, *before* migrating, *upon arrival*, *after* initial settlement at destination and *upon return*. Furthermore much of the research is focused on individual migrant groups in particular places, providing in-depth information on single cases, but failing to provide more general and contextualised information, while comparative research would be necessary in order to disentangle specific features and general processes across national groups, destination and origin countries, and different populations (migrants, returnees, non-migrants).

Some biographic surveys have already filled some of these research gaps. The Mexican Migration Project (MMP) has built a major longitudinal biographic dataset, generating numerous insights into the patterns of economic integration and transnational behaviour of Mexican migrants in the United States (Massey 1987). It was later extended to other Latin American countries through the Latin American Migration Project. Other longitudinal studies of migrants' (economic) integration at destination include the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), the longitudinal survey on the Settlement of New Immigrants to Quebec (ÉNI: *Établissement des Nouveaux Immigrants*) and the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) (for a review, see Black et al. 2003). In Europe, however, very

little research has been undertaken with such longitudinal, matched, cross-country approaches. As a result, there is a lack of solid scientific evidence and sound guidelines for European and national policies on the long-term transnational economic performances of migrant workers between origin and destination countries.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore longitudinally the labour market outcomes of African migrants and returnees, looking at different stages in the migration process, considering labour trajectories before leaving, at arrival and during migrants' time in Europe, and upon return.

The chapter addresses the following questions: How do immigrants' careers unfold during their first years after arrival? Do African migrants find jobs in Europe that match the levels of skill they arrived with? Does their employment situation change over time? To what extent do their experiences differ from one destination country to another? What role does gender play in such outcomes? To what extent are returning migrants reintegrated into local labour markets? What is the educational level of those who come back? Lastly, the chapter examines to what extent African migrants are engaged in transnational activities. It explores their attitudes to sending remittances, investing back home and participating in development associations, as well as how these attitudes change over time and in relation to their integration in the destination country in terms of legal and occupational status.

5.2 The MAFE Data

From this perspective, the MAFE longitudinal and multi-sited data (see Chap. 2 for further details) present some major advances, as they allow us to:

- investigate retrospectively the life-long labour trajectories of the individuals in the samples, at different moments of their lives and throughout their time in different countries they may have lived in;
- retrace the different forms of individuals' transnational economic participation, such as remittances, participation in development associations and investments in the origin country;
- cross these data with variables on occupational and legal integration in the destination country;
- compare different populations: migrants, non-migrants and migrants who had returned to the sending countries at the time of the survey;
- compare different national groups of migrants: Senegalese, Congolese and Ghanaian;
- compare different destinations in Europe: France, Italy and Spain for the Senegalese; Belgium and UK for the Congolese; Netherlands and UK for the Ghanaians.

In our analysis of migrants' occupational trajectories we decided to take into consideration key stages in migratory paths, such as the year before the first departure to Europe, the first year of arrival and the following years in Europe up to ten

years of stay. For returnees, we focused on the last year before leaving Europe, the first year back in the origin country and the year of the survey. Focusing on key migration events (e.g. exit from or entry to a country) and on fixed years of the migration experience, rather than comparing respondents' trajectories by calendar year (e.g. 2005) or period (e.g. 2000–2010) made it possible to compare different groups, migration time frames and receiving contexts, or at least reduced the complexity and heterogeneity of these factors. This gives us a better grasp of the *structure* of the main pathways of labour market integration for the three African groups. However, this choice leads to analysing similar events (e.g. entry into the labour market in the first year of arrival at destination) regardless of timeframe; for instance, no distinction is made between migrants who arrived in Europe in the 1980s and those who arrived in much more recent times, when the historical, socio-economic and legal frameworks were very different. It should also be taken into account that analyses based on retrospectively collected data are based on "survivors" in the sampled countries: less successful trajectories are more likely to bring about a further migratory step (either to a new destination country or a return), and thus become increasingly under-represented with the passage of time.

The key variable analysed in this chapter is occupational status, distinguishing between "skilled" and "unskilled" workers (whether formally and informally employed); "unemployed"; "inactive" (i.e. individuals not actively looking for a job or active in unwaged occupations such as reproductive tasks), and "students" enrolled in training or formal education courses. The variable is computed on the basis of two questions in the biographic questionnaire, for each stage in the respondent's trajectory: (i) a multiple-choice question about labour market status (study, economically active, unemployed, various inactive statuses); and (ii) for those in work, an open question that recorded in detail the occupation, tasks performed, sector, etc. The information provided was subsequently coded using a three-digit occupational classification adapted from ISCO-08.

All biographic data, including information on occupational status, were collected on a yearly basis. Where status had changed during year (for instance changes of job or short periods of unemployment between jobs) or multiple jobs were held at the same time, the survey registered the one considered the main status or the main job (either the longest one, or the one regarded as the prevalent one). As a result, trajectories may be over-simplified, with occupational spells shorter than a year and second jobs not taken into consideration in the analysis. Finally the survey did not record whether the jobs reported by the migrants were performed with or without a regular contract; this prevents any analysis of the presence, magnitude and characteristics of undeclared jobs within the sample.

Section 5.3 deals with African migrants' integration into the European labour market, exploring their labour market outcomes and trajectories over time. This part highlights the composition of migrant flows at the moment of departure, looking in particular at migrants' last occupational status in the year before leaving, by origin and destination country. Their labour trajectories are then considered for their time in Europe (up to first ten years of stay), looking at how migrants' careers unfold across time, by origin and destination country. Labour market integration pathways

are also explored by gender across the six European host countries, highlighting the very different outcomes between men and women.

Labour market re-integration in the origin countries of returnees from Europe are then considered, comparing the employment outcomes of returnees at different times of their lives and vis-à-vis the non-migrant population at the time of the survey. Lastly, migrants' economic contributions to origin countries and their transnational activities while abroad are discussed, presenting data on individual investments at origin, remittances to origin household and membership in local associations. Lastly some conclusions are drawn on the basis of the findings presented.

5.3 Not at Random. Migrant Workers' Profiles According to Destination Country in Europe

The first step in our analysis of employment trajectories is to analyse the profiles of migrants prior to departure, looking at their occupational status in the year before leaving, by origin country and destination country (see Fig. 5.1, far left column of each graph).

Results from our samples suggest that migration flows to the more recent migration countries are mainly composed of low-skilled workers. Senegalese in Spain and Italy were mainly employed as unskilled workers before leaving (72.2% and 60.8% respectively), while only 34.4% of those migrating to France were low- or unskilled workers prior to departure. Migrants from Ghana having left their origin country as unskilled workers and residing in the Netherlands also largely outnumber the skilled ones, accounting for over 50% of the total for this group, while those migrating to the UK show an inverse proportion, with 42.7% reporting skilled occupational status before leaving and 22.9% unskilled status.

Congolese migration is the exception; here we find a high proportion of students in both host countries (around 25%), with about 20–30% of the total being non-working individuals (inactive plus unemployed). This reflects the particular circumstances of migration for this group, many of whom left the Democratic Republic of Congo as asylum seekers (see Chap. 7).

In contrast to more recent destinations, migration to traditional destinations involved much higher proportions of persons who were students or in skilled occupations in the year prior to departure. Among Senegalese in France, Congolese in Belgium and UK and Ghanaians in the UK, students were between 24% and 28% immediately before leaving. Colonial links thus seem to be a crucial factor in determining the composition of migration flows, particularly owing to opportunity structures for citizens from former colonies, such as shared language, similar education systems and recognition of educational credentials from the former colony.

Another factor encouraging the choice of the former colonial country as a destination for study is the greater availability of student grants, often combined with other facilities such as student residences, documents, housing and economic



Fig. 5.1 Occupational status in the last year in Africa and in the first and tenth years of stay in Europe, by country of origin and of destination

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in France, Italy and Spain; MAFE RDC biographic survey in Belgium and UK; MAFE Ghana biographic survey in UK and the Netherlands
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain, Belgium, UK and the Netherlands; weighted data
Interpretation: The figures show the distribution of the last occupational status of migrants in Senegal, RDC and Ghana before leaving (far left column in each figure) and the distribution of migrants' occupational statuses in the destination countries in the first and tenth years of their stay

support. Former colonial powers have always favoured the migration of students from former colonies as part of the global package of foreign aid; providing higher education for foreign students has been an important channel for host countries to disseminate their cultural, economic and political norms abroad (Beine et al. 2013). Established networks of highly-skilled working migrants and students in these receiving countries can also play a crucial role for people arriving from the origin country (*ibid.*).

Students and the highly skilled seem thus been more inclined to have chosen former colonial countries as their destination. Given this framework, the structural opportunities offered by the receiving countries can also be expected to positively impact the students' subsequent employment careers, shaping their integration into the labour market at destination.

5.4 What Happens Next. Post-arrival Labour Market Trajectories in Europe

Given that the composition of the flows to different destination countries varies in terms of employment profile, with Congolese and Ghanaian migrants in Europe more often having been in higher-skilled occupations prior to departure than their Senegalese counterparts, Figs. 5.1 and 5.3 analyse how migrants' careers unfold after arrival and to what extent migrants' experiences differ across destination countries.

Results for long-term outcomes by destination country within each origin-country flow suggest that here too the pathways for labour market integration differ between new and old host countries (again with an exception for migrants from DRC). Most Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands and Senegalese in Spain and Italy enter the labour market in unskilled jobs and stay in such jobs (see distribution of occupational statuses at year 1 and 10 in Fig. 5.1 and labour trajectories in Fig. 5.2). This may mean staying in the same unskilled job or changing to another job at the same skill level, but anyway implies a persistent stagnation in the lower segments of the labour market.

Of migrants who were working in skilled occupations before migrating, the overwhelming majority experienced a drastic downgrading upon entry to the European labour market in all the sampled European countries, as shown in Fig. 5.1, where the proportion of African workers in skilled positions routinely drops in the first year of stay in Europe.

For Congolese in both the European host countries, Ghanaians in the Netherlands and Senegalese in Spain, the proportions of skilled workers subsequently recover over time, though without returning to the levels they stood at before departure. For Senegalese in France and in Italy and Ghanaians in the UK, however, the proportions of migrants in skilled occupations reach higher levels than before arrival in Europe (see proportions of skilled workers in last year in origin country and in year 10 of stay in Europe).

In the UK, for migrants from Ghana in particular, skilled migrants experience less downgrading upon arrival in Europe and by the tenth year a higher percentage are in skilled jobs than before leaving home. Although the UK is a more recent destination for Congolese migrants, with higher linguistic barriers and weaker social networks, for this group too it provides comparatively better access to skilled jobs.

However, although we found evidence of upward mobility trajectories in the destination countries (*Unskilled*→*Skilled* sequences in Fig. 5.2), the increase in the proportion of migrants in skilled jobs across the destination countries is mainly explained by students' post-studies entry into the labour market in skilled positions, compensating for the skill mismatch of migrants who arrived with skills. In other words, a migrant has a much higher probability of obtaining a skilled job if he/she has spent time as a student in the destination country (*Student*→*Skilled* sequence), rather than entering as an already skilled worker (*Skilled* sequence for those who



Fig. 5.2 Migrants' five most frequent sequences of occupational status during their stay in Europe (%), by country of residence (possible statuses: Unskilled, Skilled, Unemployed, Inactive, Student)

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in France, Italy and Spain; MAFE DRC biographic survey in Belgium and UK; MAFE Ghana biographic survey in UK and the Netherlands
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, UK and the Netherlands; weighted data
Interpretation: The figure shows the most frequent sequences of occupational status for each of the three migrant groups. Horizontal mobility trajectories (implying job changes within the same status) are not tracked here: if an individual has changed from one unskilled job to another, his/her trajectory will be registered as a single "Unskilled" sequence

entered the labour market as skilled workers; *Unskilled→Skilled* sequence for those who were either underemployed upon entry and afterwards caught up, or experienced an upgrade once in Europe).

Nonetheless, the data also show that a certain proportion of students do not achieve upward occupation mobility but join the labour market in unskilled occupations or fall into unemployment or inactivity (*Student → Unskilled; Student → Inactive; Student → Unemployed*).

5.4.1 In and out of the Labour Market: Gendered Trajectories Involving Inactivity and Unemployment

In order to better grasp the dynamics of economic integration at destination it is important to understand how gender affects migrants' trajectories and labour market participation.

As the MAFE data show, before leaving their origin countries male migrants are much more likely to be involved in waged labour than are female migrants, especially among the Senegalese and Congolese, as shown in the far left column of each chart in Fig. 5.3. Rates of inactivity in the year prior to departure are 31% for women vs. 4% for men among the Senegalese and 20% for women vs. 3% for men among the Congolese, while the Ghanaian rate for women (5%) is close to that for men (2%). This reflects differences between the three origin countries in the organisation of gender relations and family life and may point to a selection effect among women migrating to different countries.

Ghanaian women are less likely than Congolese or Senegalese to come to Europe for family reunification, and are more likely to come as students to the UK (see Chap. 3). As shown in Chap. 11, Ghanaian migration has become increasingly feminized with more women migrating independently of men to fulfil their own economic needs, with professional women, especially nurses and doctors, increasingly engaged in international migration (see Chap. 11).

Unemployment and inactivity rates are much lower for Ghanaian women than for women from Senegal or DRC, from before departure and throughout their stay abroad. In terms of labour outcomes at destination, the Ghanaian migrant population is also far more gender-balanced than the Senegalese and Congolese, with men and women experiencing similar career paths.

In Senegal women receive less education and are less involved in the formal labour market, while they are more engaged in informal activities and in unwaged labour (Fall 2010). While there is a growing, albeit slow, feminisation process in migration from Senegal, migration from this country is still undertaken mainly by men, with women very much relying on their families to decide on and organise their migration plans. This aspect is also crucial to the construction of subsequent labour trajectories in Europe.

Congolese women participate in the labour market more than Senegalese women and more often migrate autonomously (Toma and Vause 2011). Among Congolese



Fig. 5.3 Occupational status in the last year in Africa and at each year of stay in Europe (for the first ten years), by gender

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in France, Italy and Spain; MAFE DRC biographic survey in Belgium and UK; MAFE Ghana biographic survey in UK and the Netherlands
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain, Belgium, UK and the Netherlands; weighted data
Interpretation: The figures show the distribution of the last occupational status of migrants in Senegal, DRC and Ghana before leaving (far left column in each figure) and the distribution of migrants' occupational statuses in the surveyed countries in their first and tenth years of stay

migrants, unlike the Ghanaian and the Senegalese, inactivity also significantly affects men. As mentioned before, this may reflect the fact that many Congolese have migrated as asylum seekers rather than as economic migrants in the conventional sense.

On entry to Europe, for all three groups, the rate of female inactivity shows an increase, reflecting the reason for or mode of migration (more frequently than for men on grounds of family reunification). The rate then declines for Senegalese women, who increasingly tend to become employed over time in the receiving countries (see Chap. 14); it remains constant for Congolese women (see Chap. 8) and even slightly increases for Ghanaian women (see Chap. 11).

With regard to education, for all three countries, overall, women's probabilities of coming as students and of engaging in periods of education abroad are not very dissimilar to those of men. Senegalese women are even slightly more likely to undertake education or training in Europe than their male counterparts, unlike Congolese and Ghanaian women.

5.4.2 How Qualifications Compare with Jobs in Europe

The above analyses have already shown a systematic and persistent downgrading in the European labour market for skilled migrants. To investigate this issue further, Fig. 5.4 shows, for working migrants from DR Congo, Ghana and Senegal, how far their educational levels are matched by their employment positions in the year prior to migration and across their first ten year of stay in Europe.

The data show high levels of education-occupation mismatch (i.e. of individuals with higher education working in unskilled jobs) prior to migration, to varying degrees: 13% among migrants from DRC, 27% from Senegal and 39% among Ghanaian.

The incidence of mismatch rises dramatically upon entry to the host country, mirroring the occupational downgrading shown in Fig. 5.1, reaching its peak in the first year of stay for the Senegalese (91%) and Congolese (64%), and in the third year for the Ghanaians (69%).

In subsequent years, the incidence of education-occupation mismatch decreases rapidly until the 6th year of stay in Europe (around 50% for all three groups) and then continues to decline, but at a slower pace. This means that, after an initial downgrading, migrants' repositioning in the labour market to a level that matches their skills takes place mainly within the first 5–6 year of stay in Europe, while those who have not managed to upgrade their occupational niche within this time will have less possibility of doing so in subsequent years of their stay abroad.

Comparison of the longitudinal trends for the three groups shows that overall, migration has mostly not been rewarding for skilled individuals from the three African countries. If we compare the two ends of the trajectories covered, i.e. the status before leaving and after ten years of professional experience abroad, we find a zero-sum game or even a loss in terms of labour market outcomes. Mismatch in origin country and at destination after ten years of stay is similar for Senegalese and Ghanaian migrants, with a slight increase for the first group (27% prior to migration and 32% after ten years abroad) and a slight decrease for the second (39% before leaving and 36% after ten years of migration), while Congolese skilled workers,



Fig. 5.4 Proportion of individuals with higher education working in unskilled occupations in the last year before migrating and in their first ten years in Europe

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in France, Italy and Spain; MAFE DRC biographic survey in Belgium and UK; MAFE Ghana biographic survey in UK and the Netherlands
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain, Belgium, UK and the Netherlands; weighted data
Interpretation: The figure shows the percentage of individuals with higher education diplomas but employed in low-skilled jobs, at each year of their stay in Europe, for the first ten years

who showed the best economic performances in the country of origin, are the ones who experienced the most disruptive and persistent downgrading across time (from 13% over-qualified before leaving to 45% after ten years of stay). This low performance is probably linked to the fact that many Congolese migrants come to Europe for non-economic reasons, as asylum seekers.

5.5 Post-return Labour Market Re-integration in Origin Countries

Here we analyse the occupational trajectories of return migrants, comparing their outcomes in the origin country before migrating, in last year in Europe before returning, in the first year upon return and in the year of the survey in the origin country. Returnees in the MAFE survey –unlike in the previous part- were sampled and interviewed in the three African countries and only migrants having come back from European destinations are considered in these analyses (see Annex).

Occupational status upon return, shown in Fig. 5.5, suggests that most returnees join the labour market after returning to their origin country, while return migration



Fig. 5.5 Occupational status in last year in Africa, last year in Europe, first year after returning, and survey year (all returnees from Europe)

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal; MAFE DRC biographic survey in Congo; MAFE Ghana biographic survey in Ghana
Population: Return migrants and non-migrants interviewed in the surveyed regions and cities in Senegal, DRC, and Ghana; weighted data
Interpretation: Distribution by occupational status at four points in time for returnees, compared with the distribution by occupational status of non migrants at survey time

in connection with retirement from the labour market (expressed as inactive status) does not appear to be frequent. This is partly linked to the age distribution of the sampled population, which comprised mostly individuals younger than the retirement age (see Annex).

For returnees to Ghana and Senegal there is an increase in unemployment immediately after return (from 4.3% before leaving Europe to 10.6% upon return among Ghanaians and from 1.8% to 15.4% among Senegalese). The interruption in their local labour market experience and weakened social network ties in the origin country, coupled with the downgrading of their occupational status abroad, may hamper a smooth reintegration into urban labour markets at least in the first period upon return (Mezger and Flahaux 2010). Over time, returnees seem to find a way out of unemployment, which at the time of the survey stood at 3.3% among Senegalese returnees and 8.2% among Ghanaian returnees.

Among Congolese returnees, although their rates of both unemployment and inactivity while abroad were higher than for the Ghanaians or Senegalese, unemployment also decreases in the years after returning (from 12.9% upon return to DRC to 8.0% at the time of the survey).

Compared to the last year in Europe, the percentage in skilled jobs increases considerably from the very first year after return, in all three countries of origin (from 12.3% in last year in Europe to 57.2% upon return among Congolese; from 16.8% to 60.2% among Ghanaians; from 3.8% to 22.3% among Senegalese).

However, in the case of Senegal and DR Congo, occupational skill levels upon return are similar to those held before migration and the slight differences are mainly due to a change from pre-migration student status (Senegal) or inactivity (DR Congo) to employment. This means that all in all returnees experience a "brain regain", rather than a "brain gain" through knowhow and skills acquired while abroad: the returnee profile, and in particular the percentage of skilled workers, reflects the profile of migrants before leaving. However, given the very broad categories of "skilled" and "unskilled" labour adopted here, while the percentages are the same, migrants' competencies and skills might be different in nature on their return as they have probably acquired different competences while abroad compared to never-migrants.

The case of Ghana once again stands out, with Ghanaian returnees performing better than the other groups on re-integrating the home labour market. The percentage in skilled work increases after return, and is higher than before migration (37.1% before migration to 60.2% upon return and 55.8% at the time of the survey). This pattern could be due to returnees who completed their studies abroad having better access to higher-level jobs once they are back in Ghana. An additional explanation is that, returning mainly from the UK where their economic integration was better overall (Fig. 5.1), Ghanaians may have brought back higher-level skills and professional experience from there. This hypothesis should be explored further; if confirmed, it would support the thesis of a positive link between labour market outcomes at destination and positive re-insertion in the economic context at origin.

In all three countries, the overall integration of returnees in the labour market shows better outcomes than for individuals who never migrated. Especially in DR

Congo and Ghana, we observe both considerably smaller shares of returnees in unskilled occupations or inactive (Congo: returnees 12.8% unskilled and 0.9% inactive vs. non-migrants 51.8% unskilled and 6.7% inactive; Ghana: returnees 23.6% unskilled and 10.6% inactive vs. non-migrants 61.5% unskilled and 13.3% inactive). Though less pronounced, the general pattern is similar in the case of Senegal (returnees 43.7% unskilled and 16.3% inactive vs. non-migrants 51.9% unskilled and 28.9% inactive).

Nonetheless, the migration experience itself is not the only driver of this advantage on the labour market, or the main one. Positive (self)selection is at work. Returnees were comparatively more likely to be in skilled occupations already before migrating, indicating a strong selection effect both at first out-migration and at return. The difference between non-migrants and return migrants who had been to Europe seems to be primarily related to the particular characteristics of individuals who migrate internationally and, later, decide to return. To a certain extent, it may also be related to the benefits of migration such as access to education (see students' trajectories in Figs. 5.1 and 5.2) and the ability to save money. However, the relative weight of these two factors should be carefully assigned; as both are likely to play a role, their relevance should be explored further.

5.6 Migrants' Economic Contributions to Origin Countries

Migrants' economic contributions to origin countries take many different forms and vary with the type and length of the stay abroad and the degree of integration into the labour market at destination at different stages of their life there. Depending on the migrant's occupational and economic trajectories whilst abroad, transnational economic activities range from occasional contributions to the origin household when particular circumstances arise to long-term commitment to productive and social investments in the origin area.

Several hypotheses have been put forward concerning how transnational behaviour evolves over time in the destination country and how it is related to migrants' characteristics in terms of gender, education, employment conditions and household composition at origin and at destination. The attitudes of migrants who consider their experience abroad to be permanent, progressively increase their economic engagement with the destination country and proceed with family reunification there, can be expected to differ from those who consider the possibility of return or of circulating between the origin and destination countries.

Highly-skilled migrants may make fewer contributions at home if they come from wealthier households that do not need an external source of income. Or they may engage in larger and more complex investments at home because they are earning more and have a better understanding of savings management. Economic contributions may also depend on the migrant's legal status: undocumented migrants may earn less on average than documented ones, but they are more likely to transfer earnings to their origin countries because the lack of documents may hinder access

to the savings and investment market at destination. Establishing what characteristics and motivations of migrants and households determine the level of a migrant's economic engagement with the origin country is an empirical exercise.

In this section we use the MAFE data to explore three distinct levels of migrants' economic contributions to origin countries while they are abroad. At the individual level, migrants can invest in buying assets in the origin country with the aim of maintaining a link with the home country. The acquisition of assets can act as insurance, open up further economic possibilities for a potential return and reintegration, and provide additional financial resources for productive and investment purposes in the origin country.

Secondly, migrants often transfer money to their households in the origin country. Remittances are perhaps the best understood of migrant's transnational activities and certainly play a crucial role in most migrant sending countries, contributing to GDP at the macro-level and providing an additional income source for origin households at the micro-level.

A third type of economic contribution is participation in collective development initiatives through membership of associations in the origin country. Membership as identified in the MAFE data implies that migrants "pay contributions or membership fees to one or more associations (including religious organisations) that finance projects in [the origin country] or support [...] migrants in Europe." Hence, migrants' contributions may be designed to feed into local development actions at origin or to provide services to co-nationals abroad.

These three types of transnational engagement are part of reciprocal social relations between migrants and their origin households and, often, an interplay between the two. In some cases they represent a significant contribution to the origin household and to a migrant sending country as a whole (Piper 2009). Considering these flows and activities within a framework of reciprocal relations and empirically examining how they vary among different migrant communities in Europe we can achieve a better understanding of the potential impact of migration on origin households and on the surveyed countries in Africa (de Haas 2008).

5.6.1 Assets, Remittances and Association Membership: Commitment Increases Over Time

Figure 5.6 shows the MAFE data on the average level of transnational economic activity by migrants, as reported by Congolese, Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants at the time of the survey in Europe (2008–2009). Assets owned in the origin country that are recorded in the MAFE survey include construction land, agricultural land, dwellings and businesses. The results presented refer to the average number of assets owned per migrant. With regard to remittances, migrants are recorded as remitting in each year for which they report having regularly sent money to a recipient in the origin country. Hence, although our data do not capture the total amount



Fig. 5.6 Mean number of assets owned per migrant, proportions of migrants sending remittances and paying association contributions at the time of the survey

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain; MAFE DRC biographic survey in Congo, Belgium and UK; MAFE Ghana biographic survey in Ghana, UK and the Netherlands
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain, Belgium, UK and the Netherlands; weighted data
Interpretation: the graph shows the average number of assets owned per individual, the percentage of individuals sending remittances and the percentage contributing to associations at the time of the interview, for Senegalese Congolese and Ghanaian migrants living abroad at the time of the survey

of money sent or the frequency of the transactions, we can pinpoint the proportion of migrants who are remitting at different times during their stay abroad. From a question about contributions or membership fees paid to associations in the origin country we can identify the proportion of migrants involved in local or migrants' associations at different points in time.

In general, transnational activities and support for origin households and communities seem to be an important aspect of the migration experience. The migrant samples from all three origin countries include a high proportion of remittance senders (between 60 and 80% remitted regularly at the time of the survey), and the number of assets owned per migrant is significant, especially among Ghanaians (more than 1 asset per migrant in the sample). A smaller but relevant proportion of migrants are involved in associations at origin.

These activities are better understood if analysed from a longitudinal perspective, with the average level of economic contribution of migrants from the very beginning of their stay abroad. To compare longitudinal trajectories in a more precise way, Fig. 5.7 compares the same indicators (asset ownership, remittances and association contributions) at two points in time: at the beginning of the migratory



Fig. 5.7 Migrants' economic contributions to origin countries at start of migration trajectory and after 10 years of stay in Europe: assets, remittances and association contributions by (**a**) employment status, (**b**) gender and (**c**) legal status

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain; MAFE DRC biographic survey in Congo, Belgium and UK; MAFE Ghana biographic survey in Ghana, UK and the Netherlands

Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain, Belgium, UK and the Netherlands (see Table 1); weighted data

Interpretation: The first figure of each row shows the mean number of assets owned per migrant at two points in time: the last year before migration and the tenth year of stay in Europe, according to (**a**) employment status, (**b**) sex and (**c**) legal status. The second and third figures present the percentages of sampled migrants sending remittances and being members of associations in the origin country at two points in time, the first and the tenth year of stay in Europe, by (**a**) employment status, (**b**) sex and (**c**) legal status

experience and after ten years of stay in Europe. Furthermore, the data are disaggregated by (a) employment status, (b) gender and (c) legal status. As is consistent with a progressive integration into the labour market at destination, levels of all the three types of economic engagement increase between the time of arrival in Europe and the time of the survey (see Chaps. 8, 11 and 14).

Employed migrants show higher levels of transnational engagement and a greater increase than non-employed migrants. Asset ownership starts from a very low level for all the three groups but increases markedly more for the employed than for the non-employed. Senegalese employed migrants reach a peak of 85% sending remittances, while non-employed ones stick at 54%. Nevertheless, those who declared not being in employment also increased their level of engagement during their stay abroad and between 45 and 56% of them were sending remittances during their tenth year in Europe.

As regards gender differences, patterns of transnational activity are consistent with the data on labour market participation among men and women before migration and during their stay abroad, discussed in the previous section. While the level of transnational activity increases for both men and women, the level reached after ten years abroad is often markedly different. Ghanaian migrants show the most balanced situation across gender, with women surpassing men in the average number of assets owned and in the proportion contributing to associations. Senegalese women are less likely to invest in assets or to remit than their male counterparts. Congolese migrants present a more mixed situation: women are more likely to send remittances but are less engaged in private investments and local associations.

As to legal status, Fig. 5.7c shows differences between those undocumented at arrival and those who started their stay in Europe with documents. Undocumented migrants are less likely to engage in transnational activity, with the relevant exception of undocumented Ghanaians who tend to invest more and to participate more in migrant associations, even at the time of arrival.

To sum up, remittance transfers are the most common practice for all three origin groups, followed by investment in assets in the origin country. The high proportion of remitters among the undocumented may testify to the need to transfer earnings abroad since access to the formal bank and savings market is prevented at destination. In the case of Congo, low levels of investment in assets after migration and of participation in associations may be due to the lack of security for persons and businesses in that country and to the fact that not many Congolese migrants intend to return (see Chap. 3).

As regards contributions to associations, while the higher average level among Ghanaians could be connected with their strong involvement in religious organizations, it may also be the case that our data underestimate the actual level of engagement in organizations and associations. As the MAFE survey only asked whether respondents paid formal membership fees, and so excluded other, non-formal forms of membership or contribution, it may not have captured African migrants' widespread participation in informal networks, often of religious inspiration (for example Murid Muslim network membership among Wolof migrants: see Sakho 2013).

5.7 Conclusions

This chapter explored the long-term effects of migration on the labour market outcomes of Africans in selected European destinations, by considering their overall transnational labour trajectories before leaving, during migration, and upon return. The chapter also examined their long-term engagement in transnational economic activities according to employment status, gender and legal status. The data analysis yielded the following key findings.

First, the pattern of migrants' educational levels varies significantly across origin countries. This is reflected in employment profiles, with Congolese and Ghanaian migrants being more often employed in higher-skilled occupations than are Senegalese migrants. A strong self-selection effect appears for specific destination countries. While migration to 'traditional' destinations – that is France, Belgium and the UK – involved much higher proportions of students and medium- to high-skilled workers, flows to 'new' migrant–receiving countries, such as Italy and Spain for Senegalese, the UK for Congolese and the Netherlands for Ghanaians were found to be mainly composed of less educated and lower-skilled individuals.

Besides structural factors that made former colonial countries more attractive to the migrants from their old colonies (such as a shared language, a common educational system, specific opportunities offered to students, etc.), historical, economic, political and cultural relationships with the elites of the former colonies have been maintained. As a result, there has been a social class stratification according to destination country, forming a complex relational capital, which translates in a framework of opportunities for the social and cultural elites from origin countries.

While most experts acknowledge the fact that well-educated individuals from Africa are more likely to move to their former colonial power (Constant and Tien 2009), very few studies have examined the force of colonialism as a determinant of African migration to Europe. Analysis from this research provides quantitative evidence of migration self-selection based on work experience and educational level, suggesting that the destination choice of the more highly educated has been strongly affected – at least until recently – by colonial legacies, with opportunities in the former colonial countries exerting a long-lasting pull on the highly skilled and students.

However, migration patterns are changing fast. The old receiving countries are receiving new flows, both in terms of countries of origin (e.g. the Congolese in the UK who, as we have seen, show different outcomes to those of Ghanaians in the same country), and in terms of changes in the socio-economic composition of the flows from the former colonies. In addition, the ability of labour markets to absorb and integrate a foreign labour force changes over time, as do the conditions of entry, admission and access to the labour market for different migrant groups (unskilled, skilled, students, asylum seekers, women, etc.) (Cangiano 2012). The economic downturn in European countries in the last few years has strongly affected migrant workers' participation in the labour market, severely challenging their economic integration at destination. Migrants' economic performances therefore need to be constantly monitored over time for different groups and different countries.

Second, the analysis shows that a high proportion of Africans experience downgrading (employment in jobs for which they are overqualified) on entering the European labour market. Newly arrived migrants are more likely to take jobs below their formal educational level as they often do not have host-country-specific human capital (i.e. knowledge of the receiving country's language and the way its labour market functions), or have the same access to functional networks as more established migrants do (OECD 2012). The literature stresses that in time they would tend to move on from such jobs as they become more integrated into the host country's labour market. However, our data suggest that over-qualification may or may not decrease over time, depending on origin country (and related migration system) and destination country.

The analysis of education-occupation mismatch among skilled workers, which is seldom studied from a longitudinal perspective, shows that it already affects candidates to migration in their origin countries. Its incidence increases dramatically upon entry in the host country, falls to around 50% by the sixth year of stay abroad and, for the Senegalese and Ghanaians, after 10 year of stay reaches a level similar to the one prior to migration, while the Congolese in Europe more often remain stuck in jobs for which they are overqualified. This result suggests that, overall, migration does not pay off for well-educated Africans, who are subjected to extended periods of de-skilling on arrival and have limited opportunities to ameliorate their occupational situation over time.

While the overall share of migrants working in skilled jobs seem to increase over time, this is only partly the result of a 'catch up' in their careers by workers overqualified for the jobs they held on entry, or of upward occupational mobility more broadly. Rather it reflects the entry into the labour market of those who have completed their studies in the destination countries.

Thus things seem to go better for African students in Europe. This finding suggests that pursuing education and training in destination countries is more likely to yield positive labour market outcomes than trying to access medium- or high-skill jobs on arrival in the destination countries, with the exception of skilled Ghanaian in the UK, who integrate more easily. Foreign students in Europe seem more likely to overcome the labour market problems that other immigrants face immediately upon arrival as they are in a better position to acquire destination-country-specific language skills, training, experience and more mixed social networks, which the literature suggests is more valuable than education acquired in the country of origin (Friedberg 2000). In addition, local employers can assess and understand their credentials better than credentials earned in the origin country (Hawthorne 2008).

However, although European countries are increasingly introducing policies to attract highly qualified migrants, this does not necessarily mean that international students mobility is a skilled-migration panacea. International students are likely to stay and work in the host country once they have completed their studies (Rosenzweig 2008), but their flows are volatile, as students are a highly mobile population. There is growing competition between developed countries for international students and international students may also decide to come back to their origin countries once they have completed their studies abroad. Finally, some doubts have recently been

cast on former students' perceived 'work readiness' in the host country (Hawthorne 2008) and on their successful integration in the labour markets in the countries where they have completed their studies.

Overall, the most successful example of labour market integration from MAFE research comes from Ghanaian migration to the UK, where a majority of migrants who had been in the country for over a decade were found to be working in skilled positions. By contrast, Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands were found to be mainly working in unskilled positions, with the proportion of those employed in unskilled jobs increasing over time. The comparison between Ghanaians in the UK and the Netherlands suggests that conditions are more favourable in the UK in terms of labour market integration, but it also reflects selection, in that the Ghanaian migrant flows arriving in the two countries differ in their educational and occupational composition. Comparison between Ghanaian and Congolese migrant outcomes in the UK belies the idea that the UK is the optimum for the integration of migrants into the labour market. Despite having fairly high levels of education, Congolese in the UK show much lower labour market outcomes than the Ghanaians there. Language barriers and lack of recognition of diplomas may hamper their integration into the labour market, as may the fact that a large proportion of Congolese migrants arrived as asylum seekers (see Chaps. 8 and 11), a category that has been shown to commonly experience disadvantage in accessing qualified jobs in Europe (Cangiano 2012). Further analysis is needed to disentangle the effect of context (UK as an optimum in integrating labour migrants) from the effect of composition (the specific features of the population concerned).

Fourth, evidence provided in this chapter suggests that labour market participation in destination countries is strongly affected by gender and is primarily connected to migrants' departure conditions and motivations. While few men were unemployed before leaving home, women are much more likely to have been excluded from the labour market in their origin countries (especially among the Senegalese and Congolese). Women's inactivity rates rise upon arrival, with different subsequent outcomes for each of the three origin-country groups. However, a much higher proportion of women migrants remain inactive at later stages of their time in Europe and they are more likely to return to inactivity having joined the labour market at some point.

Fifth, the chapter showed that the data do not unequivocally confirm the common image of return migration as a "triple win situation" for the individual migrant, the destination country and the origin country. Among the Senegalese and Congolese, return migrants seem to regain a status similar to the one they had before leaving their country of origin, showing a brain 'regain', rather than a 'brain gain'. While return migrants in all three countries are better placed than non-migrants, most of this difference seems to have already existed before they migrated.

Ghanaian returnees show a more dramatic increase in skilled positions upon their return. This group are coming back mainly from the UK, where labour market attainments were comparatively good, and their good economic outcomes back home suggest a positive link between economic integration at destination and reintegration in the home country economy.

This suggests that return should also be studied as a reverse migration process, involving new and specific challenges for (re)integration into the local labour market, but in connection with the earlier trajectory before migrating and during the time abroad. Labour market integration in receiving countries, in terms of labour status, skill level and activity sector, largely determine whether or not the acquired skills and competences can be useful for economic reintegration in origin country labour markets (Ferro 2010). A migrant who worked as an unskilled labourer in the manufacturing sector in Europe will not necessarily find a demand (especially in rural areas) for the skills they acquired abroad. Nor do jobs held in Europe, in a highly segmented labour market, necessarily give migrants the kind of industrial culture that can be translated into organizational capacity and ability to invest in productive activities upon return (*ibid.*).

Finally, the chapter analysed migrants' transnational activities while abroad, which may range from occasional contributions to the origin household to long-term commitment to productive and social investments in the home locality. Decisions about private investments in assets at origin, remittance transfers and contributions to local or migrant associations depend on migrants' occupational and economic trajectories and are also connected with eventual return and reintegration into the home country.

As is consistent with a progressive integration into the labour market at destination, levels of all the three types of activity recorded by the MAFE survey increase between the time of arrival in Europe and the time of the survey, for Congolese, Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants alike. Sending money regularly to the origin household is the most common practice, regardless of the migrant's gender and their employment and legal status. The lack of security for persons and businesses in DR Congo may explain the relatively low level of economic contributions by Congolese migrants, especially with regard to investment in assets and participation in associations. Ghanaians tend to invest more and to participate more in migrant associations than the Congolese or the Senegalese even on arrival in Europe. Senegalese migrants, both men and women, show the highest proportion of remittance senders at all times.

Looking at these transnational flows and activities from the standpoint of reciprocal relations between countries and connecting them with the migrants' labour trajectories at origin and destination provides a better picture of the potential impact of migration on origin households and on the African survey countries.

The connection between migration and development is at the centre of a long-lasting debate on the possible positive impact of migrants as 'development agents' both during their stay abroad and after their return (de Haas 2012; Geiger and Pécoud 2013). Analysis of migrants' transnational engagement and potential social and economic re-integration upon return is crucial, insofar as economic contributions and return are very much dependent upon the success of the migration experience – or the lack of it (Castagnone 2011). As failure to integrate into the labour market at destination may prevent migrants from achieving the hoped-for level of economic contribution at origin, migrants who return after failing to integrate at destination may decide to migrate anew (Sinatti 2010).

From this standpoint, longitudinal and transnational approaches prove to be indispensable for analysing migrants' economic trajectories at different stages and across different countries as interconnected pieces of a broader puzzle.

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Chapter 6
Migrant Families Between Africa and Europe: Comparing Ghanaian, Congolese and Senegalese Migration Flows

Valentina Mazzucato, Djamila Schans, Kim Caarls, and Cris Beauchemin

6.1 Introduction

West African families are often described as complex and households as fluid. This is partly related to the long history of internal and international migration in this part of the world. Migration of household members is often used as a coping strategy for the survival of the family and children may be relocated to other households in the extended family to enable migration (De Bruijn et al. 2001; Tiemoko 2003). Over recent decades, however, migration patterns have changed from internal migration and migration within Africa to larger shares of migrants moving to Europe and North America. This type of international migration has consequences for the organization of family life, yet these consequences are not yet well understood. Decisions on how to organize family life across borders are influenced not only by the family systems practiced in the country of origin, such as norms around child fostering and

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the occurrence of polygamous marriages, but also depend on the receiving context, most notably visa/citizenship and family reunification policies.

Family reunification has become a major concern for policy makers in Europe and increasingly restrictive policies have been implemented in this domain. The underlying presumption is that migrants come to stay and family reunification is their ultimate goal. However, the academic literature on transnationalism (Basch et al. 1994; Faist 2000; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002) has highlighted the fact that nowadays, through modern communication technologies and the ease of travelling long distances by plane, migrants often maintain a variety of ties with countries of origin through regular visits and transactions such as remittances, and might not have reunification as their preferred outcome. For example, some anthropological studies of West African migration systems argue that migrants are reluctant to reunify in Europe and prefer to organize their family life transnationally (Barou 2001; Bledsoe and Sow 2011; Riccio 2006).

Finally, migration histories and migration patterns differ between receiving and origin countries, which in turn affects family arrangements. For example, migration from Congo to Belgium, from Ghana to the UK, and from Senegal to France has a longer history, related to colonial ties, resulting in more established migrant populations in these countries. Yet while migratory flows tended in the past to follow old colonial ties between countries, since the 1980s they have been diversifying to include new destinations, so that Senegalese migrants can now be found in large numbers in Italy and Spain, Congolese in the UK, and Ghanaians in the Netherlands (Grillo and Mazzucato 2008; see also Chap. 3).

This chapter presents some of the first salient findings on migrant families – how they function, how the migrants stay in touch with home, where the family members are located – for the three migratory flows of the MAFE research project, providing a comparative picture between these flows. The dataset is unique in that it includes information from the origin countries and the receiving countries, so providing a multi-site account of migrant family life. The paper is structured as follows. The following section provides an overview of the literature on family norms from the three countries of origin (Congo, Ghana, and Senegal) and a discussion of family life in a context of international migration. Secondly, we describe the ties that those at home maintain with migrants overseas from the perspective of households in Congo, Ghana and Senegal, revealing active family ties across borders that extend beyond the nuclear family. Thirdly, we turn to the perspective of migrants in Europe and compare migrants' family arrangements according to countries of origin and destination, and show the different types of family composition that prevail. The focus in this part of the chapter is particularly on transnational families, where nuclear family members are divided across borders and/or in the process of family reunification. We show that transnational family life is quite a common arrangement among migrants, yet there are differences between the three African flows, to which we pay particular attention. Interestingly, our findings challenge the common assumption that migrants always reunify, and that reunification always takes place at destination. Finally, we draw the main conclusions.

6.2 Families Living Across National Borders

6.2.1 Family Norms in Congo, Ghana, and Senegal

While the separation of family members as a consequence of international migration is increasingly receiving scholarly attention, most studies are small and many are directed at specific migration contexts, such as migration from Latin America or Asia to the U.S. Migration between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe has received scant attention, even though the so-called 'new African diasporas' of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa now constitute one of the largest migrant populations of Europe. Norms concerning family life can differ widely between West African contexts, and to understand our findings on migrant families living between Africa and Europe, these family norms need to be taken into account.

Locoh (1989) identified some key characteristics of the African family, including the tendency for extended family structures, marked separation of gender responsibilities, stronger lineage than conjugal solidarity, integration of reproductive and productive functions, and dominance by elders. Nevertheless, the organization of family life and patterns of migration differ between countries in West Africa.

In many West African contexts, the norms for family living arrangements are such that geographical proximity is not a requirement. In Ghana, men and women traditionally lived apart, each spouse with his or her own family, stressing the importance of lineage ties over conjugal bonds (Clark 1994; Goody 1982; Fortes 1950; Manuh 1999; Oppong 1970). Even today, multi-local residence is quite common for couples in Ghana (Coe 2011). In Senegal, multi-residential systems are even more prevalent. Compared to other African countries, the proportion of spouses living 'apart-together' is highest in Senegal (Findley 1997). Multi-local residence is not uncommon for Congolese spouses, albeit to a lesser extent.

In addition to these multi-local residence patterns between couples, the practice of fostering children is also prevalent in many African countries (Mazzucato and Schans 2011). Again, Senegal has the highest proportion of fostered children in West Africa (Locoh and Mouvagha-Sow 2005), but the geographical separation of parents and children is quite common in Ghana and Congo too.

These living arrangements, with parents, children, and spouses living 'apart-together', can be partly explained by the role of the extended family. Loyalty towards one's own lineage can result in weaker bonds between spouses and the feeling that children belong more to the lineage than to the biological parents. In Congo and especially in Ghana, matriliny also shapes the linkages between parents and children. For example, the relationship between a child and his/her mother's brother (i.e. uncle) is more important than the relationship between a child and his/her father. These matrilineal kinship ties also determine spousal relationships. In Ghana, women from matrilineal kinship groups are said to enjoy greater autonomy than their patrilineal counterparts (Bleek 1987; Clark 1994; Takyi and Gyimah 2007). In Senegal, a mainly patrilineal country, gender hierarchy is much stricter. Levels of interaction between spouses are very low, polygamy is highly prevalent, and large age differ-

ences prevail, all contributing to a social distance between Senegalese husbands and wives (Dial 2008; Findley 1997; Marie 1997). Polygamy also occurs in Ghana and Congo, but to a much lesser extent than in Senegal. In Congo, new Christian churches combined with urbanization patterns have resulted in greater emphasis on the nuclear family and geographical proximity (Ngondo 1996).

It is important to take these norms concerning family life and living arrangements into account, since spousal (geographical) separation, or parent-child (geographical) separation in such a context might influence decisions and practices concerning transnational family life and family reunification differently than in contexts where proximity is viewed as a necessity for familyhood.

6.2.2 Family Life and Policies in Europe

It is important to analyze transnational family life within the context of the family norms described above, since social parenthood, child fostering and separate spousal living arrangements can all facilitate family forms in which one member migrates while other family members stay in the country of origin. In these contexts, family separation might even be a preferred option for some. Nonetheless, living-apart-together internationally poses different challenges to those of family separation in a national context (Mazzucato and Cebotari 2017). With globalization, long-distance communication and travel have become much easier. Yet the benefits of these globalization processes are not equally accessible to all migrants. Maintaining family relationships over distance often remains problematic, especially for poorer and undocumented migrants (Fresnoza-Flot 2009; Dito et al. 2017).

Whether transnational family life is a choice or a consequence, transnational families can be faced with a number of challenges. Transnational practices such as long-distance communication and visits are shaped by the policies of nation states (Mazzucato et al. 2004).

Nation states can have a constraining role in the lives of migrants by determining who enters or continues to live in the country, through visa requirements. Unlike citizens of countries within the Schengen Area, who are allowed to travel without restriction, visas, or passports, and tourists from North America, who are able to enter Europe with a passport, migrants from third-countries, those with "high migration potential", are subjected to extensive scrutiny and often require expensive visas to enter Europe (Bledsoe and Sow 2008, p. 5). These visa requirements can hamper transnational family life, as they make it difficult and sometimes impossible for family members to travel. Additionally, family reunification policies affect the possibility for family members to live together at destination.

Nation states can further affect migrant lives by issuing, or not, residence permits or citizenship. Having an undocumented status, or a temporary status such as a visa, not only restricts the opportunity for family reunification, it also limits possibilities

for transnational practices such as visiting or remitting money or goods. Maintaining family relationships back home can be eased through visits, yet undocumented migrants often cannot travel. Additionally, undocumented migrants are more often poorer, which makes these transnational family relationships even more problematic. Making frequent long-distance phone-calls can be very expensive, and the sending of remittances can be extremely difficult, or even impossible, which can put stress on these family relationships (Poeze and Mazzucato 2012; Fresnoza-Flot 2009).

As mentioned in the introduction, policy makers are increasingly concerned about migrant families. For migrants, family migration has become the main legal mode of entry to Europe, accentuating the attention and concern of policy makers. These concerns are further strengthened by two main assumptions: (1) that migrants' goal is to stay at destination and, ultimately, to reunify with family members from the origin country; (2) that this desire for reunification is always directed at the country of destination. Yet for some, family reunification might not necessarily be the desired outcome of the migration process (Baizán et al. 2011; Landolt and Da 2005; Mazzucato and Schans 2011), the desire for families to reunify is not always directed at the destination country (Baizán et al. 2011; Landolt and Da 2005), and reunification at origin needs to be taken into account as well.

Although European countries in general have instituted increasingly stringent family reunification policies, there are differences between the European receiving countries in this study. Dutch family reunification policies have become increasingly stringent and are now among the most demanding in the European Union. Recent requirements such as a minimum age of 21 years for spouses and an income requirement of 100% of the minimum wage for the migrant, family reunification and formation have become increasingly difficult. In the UK, family migration policies were very restrictive during the 1980s and 1990s (Bhabha and Shutter 1995) but experienced a period of relative liberalization in the late 1990s (Kofman et al. 2008). More recently, the UK has become stricter again. Another restrictive measure in both the Netherlands and the UK is the recently instituted pre-entry test for family migrants (Kraler 2013) that has to be completed in origin countries in order to obtain a visa. Family reunification has been comparatively easier in France, where laws have been in place since 1976 and, until 1993, allowed the reunification of polygamous families. Family reunification laws are much more recent in Italy (1998) and in Spain (1996), although the criteria used in France, Italy and Spain are similar.

In all European countries studied, migrants do not equally enjoy rights to family union. On the contrary, these rights are heavily dependent on factors such as class, ethnicity, nationality and gender (Kraler 2010). Undocumented migrants have no legal means of family reunification.

6.3 Households in Africa and their contacts abroad

6.3.1 A Measurement of Extended Families Across Borders

As stated above, when considering African families, the notion of family differs from the Western notion. While the latter concentrates on nuclear family members and geographical proximity, African families extend beyond the nuclear family and are often characterized by multi-local residence. To account for these extended family structures, we examine different categories of household members: the household head, his/her nuclear family members (i.e. spouses and children), his/her siblings, other relatives (e.g. grandparents, uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews), and non-kin. And to capture further the complexity of African family life, the MAFE household surveys include not only these household members living physically in the household, but also individuals living outside the household, whether within the origin country (Congo, Ghana or Senegal) or abroad (see Box 6.1).

Box 6.1: Defining Household Members, Households' Migratory Contacts, Nuclear Family and Transnational Family

It is difficult to capture fully the complexity of family life in the three survey countries, Congo, Ghana, and Senegal. Throughout this Chapter, we use various units of analysis to partially capture this complexity: (1) households, including nuclear and extended family members, (2) households' migratory contacts, and (3) nuclear families.

First, employing the MAFE household surveys, we look at households, which include both *nuclear family* members and *extended family* members, who may be other relatives of the household head, relatives of other household members, or even non-kin. The MAFE project employed a classical definition of the *household* as "a group of individuals who live together and partly or totally share their resources to satisfy essential needs (housing, food)". Other individuals are also included in the MAFE household survey: all children of the head, all individuals living abroad who have a nuclear family relationship with one of the household members, and all other persons living abroad who are relatives of the household head or his/her spouse (for more details concerning the household survey, see Chap. 2).

Second, to emphasize the distinction between household members in the strict sense and individuals living outside the household but included in the survey, we refer to those living in the household as *household members*, and those living outside the household as *migrants* or *migratory contacts*. In the MAFE household surveys, families with migratory contacts are households who declared migrants living abroad in at least one of the following categories: (1) the children/spouses of the head; (2) partner(s) of a member of the house-

(continued)

Box 6.1 (continued)

hold; (3) relatives of the household head or of his/her partner and who have been in regular contact with the household over the past 12 months.

Third, employing the MAFE biographical surveys, we focus on the *nuclear family*, which we define here as fathers, mothers and their children under 18. These nuclear families can be spread across borders, and will then be referred to as a *transnational family*. By this we mean a group of persons who are nuclear family members and who live spread across nation state borders. The term *transnational* does not refer to the nationality of these family members; it only refers to the country where they live (for more details concerning the biographical surveys, see Chap. 2).

Table 6.1 Households with nuclear and extended migratory contacts abroad

	Congo		Ghana		Senegal	
	f	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
Only nuclear family members abroad	235	13	185	11	245	17
Extended family members abroad	792	51	465	32	371	30
No contacts abroad	549	37	596	57	524	53
Missing	–	–	–	–	1	0
Total	1,576	100	1,246	100	1,141	100

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – household surveys
Population: Congolese households (n = 1,576), Ghanaian households (n = 1,246), and Senegalese households (n = 1,141)
Interpretation: The Congolese sample consists of 1,576 households. Of all interviewed household heads in Congo, 235 indicated having nuclear migratory contacts abroad, which is 13%
Statistical significance: Having migratory contacts abroad differs significantly between the three countries ($p < 0.000$, Design-based F-test)

Migration within Africa has been a long-standing phenomenon reflecting historical trading ties and mobility due to conflict and to long-standing relationships between regions that were artificially divided by borders during the colonial division of territories (Davidson 1966). More recently, however, migration to the Global North has become increasingly common, especially since the late twentieth century (see also Chap. 3). Increasing migration flows from Africa to Europe and to the Global North more generally has led to many ties between people living in Africa and migrants in the Global North. We refer to these ties as migratory contacts, and we will discuss these migratory contacts as they relate to nuclear family, extended family and non-kin members of a household (see Box 6.1).

The MAFE surveys show that a large share of households in the African cities surveyed have migratory contacts. This holds for almost half the Ghanaian and Senegalese households (43% and 47% respectively) and a majority of the Congolese households (63%) (see Table 6.1). For all three countries, we find that most migra-

tory contacts are with extended family members, while a minority are nuclear family members. This points to the importance of the extended family as a unit of analysis for understanding migration.

When examining more closely the type of relationship between migrant and household head in Africa, we see that of all married household heads interviewed in Ghana, 10% were married to a spouse who had migrated abroad. These percentages were lower in Senegal and Congo (see Table 6.2). Yet we see a different picture when looking at children of household heads living abroad: Ghanaian household heads are least likely to have a child living abroad, while Congolese household heads are the most likely have an extended family member living abroad. Information on the share of households that are married and with children can be found in Table 6.21 in Appendix.

In line with the above-mentioned trend of migration flows from Africa increasingly being directed at Europe, we find that migratory contacts are mostly located in the Global North, especially the contacts of Ghanaian and Senegalese households, of whom 85% and 78% respectively are living in the Global North (see Table 6.3). Congolese households also have a large share (48%) of migratory contacts living in other African countries.

In terms of country of destination, it is notable that Ghanaian households have a large percentage of nuclear family members (spouses and children) living in North America while this is less common for Senegalese and Congolese households, which have Europe and Africa as major destinations (Figs. 6.1 and 6.2). Extended family members – mostly siblings and other relatives and in some cases non-kin members of the household – follow similar patterns: Ghanaian households tend to have contact with migrants located mostly in Europe (49%) and North America (38%), Congolese have a large percentage in Africa (42%) and Europe (48%), and Senegalese mainly in Europe (74%) (see Fig. 6.3).

Table 6.2 Household head's nuclear migratory contacts abroad

	Congo		Ghana		Senegal	
	f	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
No spouse abroad	1,122	96	717	90	774	94
At least one spouse abroad	64	4	151	10	74	6
Total	*1,186*	*100*	*868*	*100*	*848*	*100*
No children abroad	1,116	76	853	88	763	79
At least one child abroad	363	24	144	12	269	21
Total	*1,479*	*100*	*997*	*100*	*1032*	*100*

*Only biological children of the household head included
Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – household surveys
Population: Congolese household heads that are married/with children (n = 1,186/1,479), Ghanaian household heads that are married/with children (n = 868/997), and Senegalese household heads that are married/with children (n = 847/1,032)
Interpretation: The Congolese sample consists of 1,186 married household heads, of which 4% have a spouse abroad
Statistical significance: Having at least one spouse or at least one child abroad differs significantly between the three countries (both $p < 0.000$, Design-based F-tests)

Table 6.3 Regions of residence of household's migratory contacts

	Where do contacts abroad reside?							
	Africa		Global North		Other		Total	
Country	*f*	%	*f*	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
Congo	1,286	48	1,224	51	26	1	2,536	100
Ghana	144	9	1061	85	67	5	1,272	100
Senegal	193	17	977	78	57	5	1,227	100

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – household surveys
Population: Congolese migratory contacts (n = 2,536), Ghanaian migratory contacts (n = 1,272), and Senegalese migratory contacts (n = 1,227)
Interpretation: The Congolese household heads have in total 2,536 migratory contacts. Of these migratory contacts, 1,286 currently reside in Africa, which is 48%
Statistical significance: The difference between the regions where household's migratory contacts live is statistically significant between the three countries ($p < 0.00$, Design-based F-test)



Fig. 6.1 Current region of residence of household heads' migrant spouses

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – household surveys;
Population: Congolese migrant spouses (n = 61); Ghanaian migrant spouses (n = 146); Senegalese migrant spouses (n = 72)
Interpretation: 17% of Congolese migrant spouses currently reside in Africa
Statistical significance: The difference between the regions where household head's migrant spouses live is statistically significant between the three countries ($p < 0.00$, Design-based F-test)

6.3.2 Family Functioning Across Borders: Support, Remittances and Visits

Above we have explored the relationships that households have with people abroad. Here we look more into the types of contact households have with migrants. Such contacts can be of very different kinds, ranging from receiving remittances and visits to phone calls. It is important to look at these types of contact, as they can serve as an indication of how families function across borders. Families can maintain a sense of familyhood despite the dispersal of their members across different



Fig. 6.2 Current region of residence of household heads' migrant children

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – household surveys;
Population: Congolese migrant children (n = 697); Ghanaian migrant children (n = 273); Senegalese migrant children (n = 464)
Interpretation: 63% of Congolese migrant children currently reside in Africa
Statistical significance: The difference between the regions where household head's migrant children live is statistically significant between the three countries ($p < 0.00$, Design-based F-test)



Fig. 6.3 Current region of residence of household heads' other migratory contacts

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – household surveys;
Population: Congolese other migratory contacts (n = 1,775); Ghanaian other migratory contacts (n = 848); Senegalese other migratory contacts (n = 686)
Interpretation: 42% of Congolese other migratory contacts currently reside in Africa
Statistical significance: The difference between the regions where household head's other migratory contacts live is statistically significant between the three countries ($p < 0.00$, Design-based F-test)

Box 6.2: Defining Support and Remittances
Household heads were asked questions about each migratory contact separately. For each contact, they were asked whether or not the household supported the migrant for their migration trip. The exact question wording was: *Did he/she receive support from your household to finance or organize the migration?* Response categories were (1) *No, he/she managed to organize everything by himself/herself;* (2) *Yes, we helped with the preparations (e.g. to obtain the documents);* (3) *Yes, we helped to pay for the trip;* (4) *Yes, we supported him/her in another way*. These four response categories were turned into a dichotomous variable, with (0) *No, migrant didn't receive support,* and (1) *Yes, migrant received support.*

As regards remittances, the household head was asked *Have you or anyone in your household received any monetary transfers from "name migrant" over the last 12 months?* with response categories: (0) *No* and (1) *Yes.*

countries. This sense of familyhood can be strengthened and facilitated by such practices as remittance sending and visits.

According to current migration theories, most notably the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM), migrants remit to pay back the initial investment the household made to send them overseas (Stark and Lucas 1988). We therefore also look into whether households supported the migration of members, whether the migrant sends remittances and if there is a relation between these two activities. We also describe the amount of contact and the occurrence of visits by migrants. Again, we compare these results between Ghana, Congo and Senegal. For definitions of these different types of contact, support, and remittances, see Box 6.2.

Migration is often described as a household strategy, where households invest in the migration of a household member. Our data (Table 6.4) show that this situation is the case for only a quarter or less of total migrants. There are large differences, though, in the types of family relation households supported. In all countries, household heads are most likely to support the migration of their children whereas spouses are less likely to have received support, especially in Senegal and Congo. This might be an indication of the "weakness of the conjugal bond" in these countries (Findley 1997, p. 123). Prevailing gender norms might also play a role. In Congo and Senegal, migrant wives are more likely to have received support than migrant men. This means that left-behind husbands are more inclined to support their migrating spouses, which is in line with a traditional gender role division, where the man financially supports his spouse.

Next, we examine the proportion of migrants who send remittances, according to household heads (Table 6.5). Around half of the migratory contacts of household heads had sent remittances. Migrants who had sent remittances were not only nuclear family members (spouses and children): many were extended family members (siblings and other kin). A notable difference between countries is that for

Table 6.4 Migrants receiving support from the household, by relation to the household head

	% yes: migrants having received support					
	Congo		Ghana		Senegal	
Relationship to the head	*f*	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
Spouse	11	16	37	29	11	15
Child	279	41	133	44	226	44
Sibling	152	21	58	10	80	28
Other kin	196	21	40	11	55	12
Non-kin	0	0	1	6	0	0
Missing	0	0	1	38	1	75
Total	638	26	270	19	373	27

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – household surveys
Population: Congolese migratory contacts (n = 2,536), Ghanaian migratory contacts (n = 1,272), and Senegalese migratory contacts (n = 1,227)
Interpretation: The Congolese household heads have in total 2,536 migratory contacts. Of these migratory contacts, 638 had received support from the household for their migration trip, which is 26%. Of all Congolese migrant spouses, 16% had received support from the household for their migration trip
Statistical significance: Receiving support differs significantly by type of relationship to the household head in Congo, Ghana and Senegal (in all countries $p < 0.000$, Design-based F-tests). The percentage of receiving remittances also differs significantly between the three countries ($p < 0.000$, Design-based F-tests)

Table 6.5 Migrants sending remittances to the household, by relation to the household head

	% yes: migrants having sent remittances					
	Congo		Ghana		Senegal	
Relationship to the head	*f*	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
Spouse	38	55	113	80	56	73
Child	365	46	160	67	262	56
Sibling	339	50	213	49	135	48
Other kin	520	49	166	52	184	40
Non-kin	9	17	5	28	9	52
Missing	5	74	2	52	2	100
Total	1,276	49	659	56	648	49

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – household surveys
Population: Congolese migratory contacts (n = 2,536), Ghanaian migratory contacts (n = 1,272), and Senegalese migratory contacts (n = 1,227)
Interpretation: The Congolese household heads have in total 2,536 migratory contacts. Of these migratory contacts, 1,276 had sent remittances in the past 12 months to the household, which is 49%. Of all Congolese migrant spouses, 55% had sent remittances to the household in the past 12 months
Statistical significance: Sending remittances differs significantly by type of relationship to the household head in Ghana and Senegal ($p < 0.000$, Design-based F-test), but not in Congo ($p > 0.10$, Design-based F-test). The percentage of sending remittances also differs significantly between the three countries ($p < 0.000$, Design-based F-tests)

Ghana and Senegal a majority of spouses remit, while for Congo only half of the spouses remit, which is similar to the proportion of children and extended family members that remit.

We also examined correlations (not shown) between support and remittance receipt, which revealed a significant positive relationship between supporting migration and receiving remittances. That is, those who did receive support are significantly more likely to send remittances than those who did not, giving support to the argument made in NELM theory that migrants remit, among other reasons, to pay back their households for the initial investment made.

Migrants are also in touch with their family back home through other means than sending remittances. We therefore turn to the frequency of visits and contacts such as via phone or internet. Visiting is not uncommon for migrants from all three countries (Table 6.6) yet there are some striking differences. Whereas only 16% of Ghanaian households' migratory contacts visited the household in the past 12 months, this percentage increases to 38% for Senegal and even 85% for Congo. These differences are most likely explained by the migration patterns we described earlier, with Congolese migrants being more likely to be living within Africa than their Senegalese and Ghanaian counterparts, who are more often on other continents. Intercontinental visits are not only more expensive; they also depend on possessing identity documents that allow return. For undocumented migrants in Europe, visits are not an option.

Table 6.6 Migrants visiting the household, by relation to the household head

	% yes: migrants having visited the household					
	Congo		Ghana		Senegal	
Relationship to the head	*f*	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
Spouse	49	77	32	16	39	58
Child	613	89	40	11	159	33
Sibling	552	84	91	21	102	39
Other kin	903	82	74	15	161	40
Non-kin	20	90	4	6	8	45
Missing	7	100	0	0	2	100
Total	2,144	85	241	16	471	38

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – household surveys
Population: Congolese migratory contacts (n = 2,536), Ghanaian migratory contacts (n = 1,272), and Senegalese migratory contacts (n = 1,227)
Interpretation: The Congolese household heads have in total 2,536 migratory contacts. Of these migratory contacts, 2,144 had visited the household in the past 12 months, which is 85%. Of all Congolese migrant spouses, 77% had visited the household in the past 12 months
Statistical significance: In terms of visiting the household, there is no significant difference by type of relationship to the household head in Congo ($p > 0.10$, Design-based F-test), but it is significantly different in Ghana and Senegal ($p < 0.10$ in Ghana and $p < 0.00$ in Senegal, Design-based F-test). The percentage of migrants visiting the household also differs significantly between the three countries ($p < 0.000$, Design-based F-tests)

Table 6.7 Migrants having weekly contact with the household, by relation to the household head

	% weekly: migrants having weekly contact with the household					
	Congo		Ghana		Senegal	
Relationship to the head	*f*	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
Spouse	34	80	113	81	55	75
Child	192	23	143	52	224	48
Sibling	126	18	147	27	92	39
Other kin	181	15	144	40	131	29
Non-kin	5	18	2	3	3	18
Missing	1	24	1	5	2	100
Total	539	19	550	40	507	40

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – household surveys
Population: Congolese migratory contacts (n = 2,536), Ghanaian migratory contacts (n = 1,272), and Senegalese migratory contacts (n = 1,227)
Interpretation: The Congolese household heads have in total 2,536 migratory contacts. Of these migratory contacts, 539 had been in touch on a weekly basis with the household, which is 19%. Of all Congolese migrant spouses, 80% had been in touch on a weekly basis with the household in the past 12 months
Statistical significance: In terms of having weekly contact with the household, there are significant differences by type of relationship to the household head in Congo, Ghana and Senegal ($p < 0.00$, Design-based F-test). The percentage of migrants having weekly contact with the household also differs significantly between the three countries ($p < 0.000$, Design-based F-tests)

We examined the frequency of contact between households and their migrant members (Table 6.7). It is very high, with the majority of spouses having weekly contact and the majority of other relations having weekly or monthly contact. Phone is by far the most common way to stay in touch, reflecting the widespread use of mobile phones in Africa, in contrast to Internet use. It also reflects the fact that mobile phones are much more in use than fixed phones because of the weak development of land-line infrastructures. Interestingly, Congo is the country in which households have the most infrequent contact with migrants (except for spouses). This may reflect the fact that it is more difficult to communicate within Africa, where the cell phone infrastructure is more limited and where rates can be higher than for calling from Europe.

6.4 Family Life: Migrants in Europe

Transnational families, by definition, consist of family members living in different countries. While the previous section discussed transnational family arrangements from the perspective of the origin country, we turn in this section to the perspective of destination countries, i.e. of migrants in Europe. Since migrants from Congo, Ghana and Senegal were interviewed in different European countries, we refer the reader to Chap. 1 for a detailed account of the methodology, and Chap. 2, which presents an overview of the composition of the samples and discusses some of the

notable differences, both between the different African samples and, within the same African flow, between the different receiving countries.

We adopt a more restrictive definition of family in this section, as we only consider nuclear family arrangements. To be precise, we consider migrants, their spouses, and their children under 18. Although we acknowledge the prevalence and importance of extended family ties, we now shift our focus to one of the major concerns of European policy makers, namely family reunification. We consider only nuclear family members since most countries restrict family reunification to minor children and spouses. After examining the prevalence of transnational versus reunified and unified families, we look at the extent to which these families differ in their socio-economic and migration-related characteristics.

6.4.1 Living Arrangements of African Migrants in Europe

The migration process can lead to families living in various constellations, such as a father who migrates while leaving his wife and children in the country of origin, or a mother who migrates with her husband and children. These various arrangements, at times spanning different countries, can also change over time. In Table 6.8

Table 6.8 Family arrangements typology

Ego's spouse[a]	Ego's children[b]			
	No child(ren) <18	Cohabitating child(ren) (*always unified*)	Cohabitating child(ren) (*after period of separation*)	Non-Cohabitating child(ren)
No spouse	1. No nuclear family	2. Totally unified family	3. Reunified	4. Transnational family
Cohabitating spouse (*always unified*)	2. Totally unified family	2. Totally unified family	3. Reunified	4. Transnational family
Cohabitating spouse (*after period of separation*)	3. Reunified	3. Reunified	3. Reunified	4. Transnational family
Non-cohabitating spouse	4. Transnational family	4. Transnational family	4. Transnational family	4. Transnational family

[a]Informal unions are not considered, i.e. spouse always refers to marriage, and conversely, no spouse also includes those within an informal union

[b]Children >18 (and their whereabouts) are not considered, i.e. no child also includes those with only children >18; In case of children <18 who are living at different locations, when at least 1 child <18 is not living with ego, it is considered 'non-cohabiting'

Box 6.3: Explanation of the Typology of Table 6.8
Some immigrants in Europe are neither married, nor have children (or no children under 18), and as such are considered as having (1) "no nuclear family". All other migrants have a spouse and/or child under 18.[1] When migrants have a spouse and/or children under 18, and they all lived together abroad at the time of the survey, without having lived apart, they are considered a (2) "totally unified family". This category captures both families that moved to Europe as a whole and families that were formed in Europe (i.e. migrants who got married and/or had children at destination). Migrants who lived together with their spouse and/or children at the time of survey after having lived apart (transnationally) for at least one year are considered a (3) "reunified family". When migrants had either their spouse or at least one of their children not living with them at the time of survey, or when migrants had none of their family members living with them at the time of survey, they are considered a (4) "transnational family". A transnational family is thus defined not by the nationality of its members, but by the fact that at least one of the nuclear family members lives in a different country to the migrant.

we introduce a typology of the different possible constellations, based on the existence of a spouse and children and on their location (same country or not as the migrant interviewed). This typology ranges from *no nuclear family* to *transnational* and *reunified family*. Box 6.3 provides a detailed explanation of this typology.

We present the analysis of each flow separately, focusing on the differences between receiving countries. In Tables 6.9, 6.10, and 6.11 we present the distribution of the four family types for each migration flow.

The results clearly show how family arrangements differ between origin countries. Senegalese migrants are mainly living in transnational family arrangements (44%), followed by Congolese (23%) and Ghanaians (17%). Receiving countries also make a difference. For example, both Congolese and Ghanaians tend to be more frequently in transnational family arrangements in Belgium and the Netherlands than in the UK, where around 13% of both migrant groups live in transnational families. Senegalese transnational families are more prevalent in Spain and Italy than in France.

These descriptive results do not allow us to draw definitive conclusions, but cultural and structural factors in the country of origin and migration history and migration policies in the receiving context can help to plausibly explain some of the observed differences. For example, the nuclear family is less important in the family system in Senegal, where marriages are alliances between families rather than individuals and the spatial separation imposed by migration is socially acceptable for couples. Furthermore, women are kept under the protection and surveillance of the

[1] In cases of polygamy, we took into account only the most recent spouse.

Table 6.9 Family arrangements typology for Congo

	All countries		Belgium		The UK	
Family arrangement typology	*f*	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
No nuclear family	114	26	80	27	34	25
Totally unified family	106	27	59	22	47	33
Reunified family	102	24	56	21	46	28
Partially or totally transnational family	104	23	83	30	21	13
Total	426	100	278	100	148	100

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo – Biographic survey
Population: Congolese migrants in Europe (n = 426)
Interpretation: In total, we have 426 Congolese migrants in our European sample and, of those, 26% have no spouse and no children
Statistical significance: The distribution of this family arrangement typology differs significantly by country ($p < 0.00$, Design-based F-test)

Table 6.10 Family arrangements typology for Ghana

	All countries		The Netherlands		The UK	
Family arrangement typology	*f*	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
No nuclear family	121	27	74	23	47	27
Totally unified family	119	40	62	24	57	42
Reunified family	69	17	46	19	23	17
Partially or totally transnational family	101	16	81	34	20	14
Total	410	100	263	100	147	100

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants in Europe (n = 410)
Interpretation: In total, we have 410 Ghanaian migrants in our European sample and, of those, 27% have no spouse and no children
Statistical significance: The distribution of this family arrangement typology differs significantly by country ($p < 0.00$, Design-based F-test)

husband's family, where it is felt they are safer and better cared for than when they migrate overseas (see Chap. 15). This is reflected in the high prevalence of transnational families. That Senegalese migrants are more likely to be in a transnational family in Spain and Italy than in France is plausibly related to the fact that migration from Senegal to France has a longer history and more migrants have established themselves there and obtained residence permits or French nationality compared to the newer migrants in Italy and Spain who are often undocumented.

Similarly, more Ghanaians live in transnational families in the Netherlands than in the UK. While the history of Ghanaian migration between the two countries does not differ greatly, with both countries experiencing a large increase in Ghanaian migration since the 1980s, they have different family formation and reunification policies: the Netherlands was the more restrictive country in the 1990s, making it a more difficult country to migrate to as a family. Secondly, the UK attracts more highly educated and fewer undocumented migrants, the former being more likely to

Table 6.11 Family arrangements typology for Senegal

	All countries		France		Spain		Italy	
Family arrangement typology	*f*	%	*f*	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
No nuclear family	127	24	54	26	33	27	40	19
Totally unified family	118	19	65	32	34	8	19	8
Reunified family	111	13	34	19	46	10	31	7
Partially or totally transnational family	247	44	47	23	87	55	113	66
Total	603	100	200	100	200	100	203	100

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Senegal – Biographic survey
Population: Senegalese migrants in Europe (n = 603)
Interpretation: In total, we have 603 Senegalese migrants in our European sample and, of those, 24% have no spouse and no children
Statistical significance: The distribution of this family arrangement typology differs significantly by country ($p < 0.00$, Design-based F-test)
N.B: Statistical significance: The distribution of this family arrangement typology also differs significantly by all three origin countries, comparing Tables 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11 (i.e. Congo, Ghana and Senegal) ($p < 0.00$, Design-based F-test)

qualify for family reunification. Congolese migration presents yet other characteristics. With the longer history of Congolese migration to Belgium, we might expect more established and therefore unified families in Belgium than in the UK, but the opposite is the case. Yet here again, we see that conditions in the receiving country make a difference. Many more Congolese migrants entered the UK as asylum seekers than entered Belgium that way (they have more varied reasons for migrating to Belgium (see Chap. 7)), and refugees are better facilitated than economic migrants to reunify with their families.

Importantly, some migrants, irrespective of provenance, seem to opt for a transnational life style even when the option of reunification is available to them. In the next section we explore the characteristics of those migrants who are in transnational family arrangements.

6.4.2 Characteristics of Transnational Families

For each country, we compared the characteristics of migrants who are in transnational families with migrants who are not. We did so by using a logistic regression that assesses the likelihood of being in a transnational family. For this purpose, we combined the categories *totally unified* and *reunified* families, and compared them with *transnational families* (the category *no nuclear family* is dropped for these analyses). Box 6.4 explains the methodological details of the logistic regressions.

In Table 6.13 we see the estimations for Ghanaian migrants in the UK and the Netherlands. While Ghanaian migrants living in transnational families are on average younger, less educated, and have a lower occupational status than migrants who are not in transnational families, these differences are not significant (see Model 3 in Table 6.13). Most Ghanaian migrants in transnational families arrived later than

Box 6.4: Assessing the Likelihood of Being in a Transnational Family

To assess the odds for a migrant to be part of a transnational family, we used logistic regressions. In these regressions, we explored several relationships simultaneously, which allows us to see the relative importance of each characteristic while controlling for the others. Importantly, these are exploratory analyses, aimed at understanding relationships. They are not intended for causal interpretation. Owing to the small sample sizes and possible multicollinearity between variables, we used few variables. For example, we only included period of arrival at current destination, and excluded duration of stay and age at arrival, since these three variables are too strongly correlated.

For each migration flow, we used pooled samples to model the odds for a migrant to be part of a transnational family. We united the data from all destination countries per flow, so that for the Congolese flow, we pooled the Belgium and UK samples, for the Ghanaian flow, we pooled the Dutch and the UK samples, and for the Senegalese flow, we pooled the Spanish, French, and Italian samples. The results of these pooled samples are presented in models 1, 2 and 3 for each flow. We also modeled the odds for a migrant to be part of a transnational family for each survey country separately, the results of which are presented in models 4–9. These logistic regressions are presented in Tables 6.12, 6.13, and 6.14.

For both the pooled and individual country samples we examined three models, in which variables were incorporated in a step-wise fashion. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable representing whether or not a migrant is part of a transnational family. Of the independent variables, the first model includes basic socio-demographic indicators: age (whole years) and gender (0 is male, and 1 is female). The second model includes socio-economic indicators: education (measured as years of schooling), occupational status (measured using ISEI-scores),[2] and subjective wealth status (measured on a three point scale: "All in all, would you say that during this period you had enough to live on from day-to-day?", with response categories "absolutely", "it depends" and "not at all"). The third model adds migration-specific characteristics: period of arrival at current destination (whole years) and residence permit (with three options: a residence permit/citizenship, a visa, or no residence permit/citizenship (i.e. undocumented). Finally, for the pooled samples only, we also included a variable representing the survey country.

[2] ISEI: International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status. This is a continuous indicator of occupational status, with index scores derived from education and income, and with higher scores referring to higher occupational status.

Table 6.12 Logistic estimation of likelihood of being in a transnational family – Congolese migrant flow

	Pooled sample			Belgium			UK		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female	0.72*	0.90	1.29	0.74	0.62	1.04	1.01	0.57	0.72
	(0.18)	(0.35)	(0.63)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.60)	(0.53)	(0.54)	(0.98)
Age	0.97***	0.96*	1.06**	0.95***	0.96*	1.04	1.02	0.99	1.13*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Education		1.01	0.97		0.81***	0.81**		1.13	1.11
		(0.05)	(0.06)		(0.08)	(0.10)		(0.13)	(0.14)
Occupational status		0.99	1.00		1.01	1.01		0.96	0.92**
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.05)
Subjective wealth status									
Absolutely (ref.)									
It depends		0.95	1.81		1.51	1.49		1.50	5.39
		(0.58)	(1.32)		(1.43)	(1.56)		(1.41)	(8.01)
Not at all		1.00	1.00		1.00	1.00		1.00	1.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Period of arrival			1.21***			1.19***			1.51***
			(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.23)
Residence permit									
RP (ref.)									
Visa			0.13**			1.00			4.13
			(0.14)			(0.00)			(7.65)
No RP			4.84*			1.00			0.77
			(4.75)			(0.00)			(1.34)
Country									

UK (ref.)									
Belgium			3.70***						
			(2.02)						
Constant	1.87	1.93	0.00***	8.53***	109.35***	0.00***	0.08***	0.18	0.00***
	(1.13)	(2.19)	(0.00)	(6.66)	(220.83)	(0.00)	(0.09)	(0.45)	(0.00)
Observations	312	163	159	198	109	96	114	54	53
Ll	−195.9	−91.34	−69.89	−129.1	−63.27	−47.31	−53.86	−21.48	−14.65
df_m	2	5	9	2	5	6	2	5	8
chi^2	5.360	3.332	37.38	11.10	8.752	21.27	1.202	2.341	15.67

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers; Standard errors in parentheses; ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.10$
Source: MAFE-Congo – Biographic surveys
Population: Congolese migrants in Europe with families (n = 312)
Interpretation: Model 1 shows that men are more likely to be in a transnational family, yet this gender difference is no longer significant when controlling for socio-economic and migration-related characteristics in Models 2 and 3

Table 6.13 Logistic estimation of likelihood of being in a transnational family – Ghanaian migrant flow

	Pooled sample			The Netherlands			The UK		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female	0.63**	0.75	0.72	0.60**	0.74	0.77	0.79	0.90	0.73
	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.54)	(0.63)
Age	0.96***	0.96***	1.02	0.96***	0.96**	1.01	0.94***	0.96	1.12
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)
Education		1.01	1.03		1.04	1.08*		0.93	0.87*
		(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.06)		(0.08)	(0.09)
Occupational status		0.97***	0.99		0.97***	0.99		0.98	0.96
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.03)
Subjective wealth status									
Absolutely (ref.)									
It depends		0.78	0.85		0.70	0.85		1.22	0.78
		(0.30)	(0.38)		(0.34)	(0.48)		(0.81)	(0.72)
Not at all		1.24	1.00		2.19	0.69		0.71	1.19
		(0.83)	(0.85)		(2.08)	(0.82)		(0.87)	(1.77)
Period of arrival			1.16***			1.13***			1.62***
			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.28)
Residence permit									
RP (ref.)									
Visa			0.88			0.36			1.98
			(0.49)			(0.32)			(1.96)
No RP			3.97***			6.73***			0.17
			(2.17)			(4.36)			(0.28)

Country									
UK (*ref.*)									
Netherlands			2.18**						
			(0.94)						
Constant	3.60***	8.29***	0.00***	4.68***	5.19*	0.00***	4.29	12.03	0.00***
	(2.25)	(8.14)	(0.00)	(3.67)	(6.17)	(0.00)	(5.31)	(23.47)	(0.00)
Observations	289	228	223	189	154	153	100	74	70
Ll	−181.7	−140.3	−112.4	−125.7	−100.4	−81.95	−47.03	−37.39	−21.50
df	2	6	10	2	6	9	2	6	9
chi^2	10.66	16.05	65.12	6.642	8.348	44.10	6.024	4.988	29.74

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers; Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic surveys
Population: Ghanaian migrants in Europe with families (n = 289)
Interpretation: Model 1 shows that men are more likely to be in a transnational family, yet this gender difference is no longer significant when controlling for socio-economic and migration-related characteristics in Models 2 and 3

Table 6.14 Logistic estimation of likelihood of being in a transnational family – Senegalese migrant flow

	Pooled sample			Spain			Italy			France		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Female	0.10***	0.06***	0.05***	0.05***	0.04***	0.03***	0.09***	0.04***	0.02***	0.20***	0.14***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Age	0.97***	0.96***	1.01	1.00	1.01	1.11***	0.99	0.98	0.96	0.98	0.95**	1.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Education		0.94***	0.94***		1.00	1.03		0.83***	0.82***		0.92***	0.91***
		(0.02)	(0.03)		(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.03)	(0.04)
Occupational status		0.97***	0.98***		0.98	0.99		0.98	0.98		0.97**	0.98*
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Subjective wealth status												
Absolutely (ref.)												
It depends		1.19	1.13		1.37	0.87		1.00	1.00		1.28	0.75
		(0.35)	(0.42)		(0.65)	(0.49)		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.78)	(0.53)
Not at all		1.53	1.36		2.44	1.49		0.61	0.47		1.81	2.21
		(0.88)	(1.05)		(2.14)	(1.90)		(0.71)	(0.68)		(1.82)	(2.92)
Period of arrival			1.09***			1.26***			1.00			1.08***
			(0.03)			(0.07)			(0.05)			(0.04)
Residence permit												
RP (ref.)												
Visa			0.27***			0.08***			0.32			0.31
			(0.15)			(0.07)			(0.42)			(0.39)

No RP			20.80***			2.41			18.85***			1.00
			(17.07)			(3.28)			(24.42)			(0.00)
Country												
France (ref.)												
Italy			4.31***									
			(1.45)									
Spain			1.82*									
			(0.69)									
Constant	13.22***	105.17***	0.00***	6.68**	6.21*	0.00***	13.44***	276.98***	0.48	2.50	48.72***	0.00***
	(8.04)	(86.90)	(0.00)	(7.11)	(8.84)	(0.00)	(17.80)	(516.39)	(53.25)	(2.56)	(74.48)	(0.00)
Observations	476	436	429	167	150	149	163	131	127	146	144	136
Ll	−268.4	−223.0	−180.8	−80.80	−67.82	−53.39	−78.90	−53.90	−45.32	−83.76	−75.68	−65.26
df_m	2	6	11	2	6	9	2	5	8	2	6	8
chi^2	122.4	157.0	231.9	69.61	71.64	99.24	43.18	51.74	62.61	15.95	30.55	34.27

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers; Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
Source: MAFE-Senegal – Biographic survey
Population: Senegalese migrants in Europe with families (n = 476)
Interpretation: Model 1 shows that men are more likely to be in a transnational family, and this gender difference remains significant when controlling for socio-economic and migration-related characteristics in Models 2 and 3

those in unified or reunified families. They also are more likely to have neither residence permit nor visa, and thus have undocumented status. There is a difference between the UK and the Netherlands, with migrants in the Netherlands being more likely to be in a transnational family. Therefore, we also examined the odds of being part of a transnational family for the two countries separately, as is shown in Models 4–6 for the Netherlands, and Models 7–9 for the UK. Here we see that in the Netherlands, undocumented status is strongly related to being in a transnational family, while this association is not significant in the UK. The non-significance of documented status in the UK is most likely due to the small sample size, as we hardly had any undocumented migrants in our UK sample.

In both countries, we see that migrants who are in transnational families arrived more recently. In the Netherlands, transnational family life is associated with a higher level of education, while we see the reverse for the UK. One important difference between these two countries that may help explain this discrepancy is that migrants in the Netherlands, and possibly the more educated ones, might be less inclined to bring their families over owing to the difficulties children might have in school – not speaking Dutch – and the fact that it is more difficult to have one's educational credentials acknowledged in the Netherlands than in the UK (Mazzucato 2008). Secondly, the educational system in Ghana is based on the one in the UK, so that the two have more similarities in their curricula and final high school examinations, making it easier for children to transfer to UK schools than to Dutch schools. Lastly, although both the UK and the Netherlands have stringent family reunification policies, the UK was comparatively more liberal during the 1990s, up to the turn of the century, making it easier for families to reunify (Kraler 2010).

For Congolese migrants a somewhat different picture emerges (Table 6.12). Like Ghanaian migrants, migrants in transnational families have arrived at an older age, have resided for a shorter period in the country of destination and are more often undocumented. And although there are some differences in terms of education and occupational status between migrants with and without a transnational family, they are not significant (Model 3 in Table 6.12). Migrants in Belgium are more likely to have a transnational family than migrants in the UK. Looking at these countries separately, we see that in Belgium, migrants in transnational families are less educated. We could not estimate whether having a residence permit affects the odds of being in a transnational family in Belgium because there is no variability: almost all migrants with visas or without legal status are in transnational families. We also see, as with Ghanaians in the UK, that having a residence permit is not significantly related to being in a transnational family. For Congolese in the UK, having a lower occupational status is related to transnational family life. Thus, as explained in Sect. 6.3.2, differences between Belgium and the UK in the prevalence of Congolese transnational families seem strongly related to the receiving countries' policies; the UK having had more flexible family reunification policies than either the Netherlands or Belgium in the latter part of the twentieth century (Kraler 2010), and the UK attracting proportionately more asylum seekers, who, when granted refugee status, are given greater facility for reunifying with their families than are economic migrants.

In Table 6.14, we show the results for Senegalese migrants in Spain, Italy and France. The first three models show the results for the pooled samples. Here we see

that gender, for the first time, seems to be an important element. Senegalese migrant men are more likely than women to be in a transnational family, reflecting gender norms prevalent in Senegal, where it is considered preferable for the man to migrate and his wife/wives to stay behind (Sect. 6.3.2). In general, migrants in transnational families are a bit younger (not significant), are less educated, and have lower occupational status than migrants in unified or reunified families. They arrived in the country of destination more recently and are less likely to have a residence permit. Transnational family life seems more likely in Spain, and especially in Italy, than in France, reflecting the longer history of Senegalese migration to France. Looking at these countries separately, we see that especially in Italy, undocumented status and being in a transnational family are strongly related. In France, we could not estimate the relationship between undocumented status and being in a transnational family owing to a lack of variation: all migrants with undocumented status are in a transnational family.

Besides these interesting differences *within* each migration flow and between the different destination countries, there are also interesting similarities and differences *between* the three migration flows. For all three flows, we find that migrants who are part of a transnational family have arrived at destination more recently. This might indicate that it takes time for transnational families to become reunified, but not necessarily, as it might also be an indication of the increasing restrictiveness of family reunification policies across Europe (Kraler 2010). Undocumented status is considered a likely consequence of these more stringent migration policies in Europe, and for all three flows we have seen growing numbers of undocumented migrants (see Chap. 3). In all three flows we find that migrants who are part of a transnational family are also more often undocumented, or have only temporary documents, such as a visa. For Senegal, unlike the Congolese and Ghanaian migration flows, we find that transnational family life is linked to educational level: migrants with less education are more likely to be part of a transnational family. This could reflect the composition of the Senegalese migration flow, which has a much larger share of less educated migrants than do the Congolese and Ghanaian flows (Chap. 3). Additionally, gender only matters for the Senegalese migration flow, which differs from the Congolese and Ghanaian flows in terms of the share of female migrants. While the trend in all three flows is towards a higher proportion of women migrants, this trend is far more marked among Congolese and Ghanaian migrants (Chap. 3). This may be associated with the stricter gender norms in Senegal, where it is considered appropriate for men to migrate but less so for women.

6.4.3 Reunification

Family reunification is an important policy concern in Europe. It is estimated to account for about 60% of immigration into the EU by third-country nationals (King et al. 2010). In this final section we turn our attention to the reunification process, including timing and the location where reunification takes place. We examine reunification for couples and for parent-child dyads. First, we show the marital and parental

Table 6.15 Marital status at the time of 1st migration to current destination

	Congolese migrants		Ghanaian migrants		Senegalese migrants	
	f	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
Single	110	27	130	27	243	47
Consensual union	53	15	80	27	40	6
Married	213	48	172	42	288	42
Divorced	36	8	24	3	25	5
Widowed	14	2	4	1	7	0
Total	426	100	410	100	603	100

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – biographic surveys
Population: All Congolese migrants (n = 426), Ghanaian migrants (n = 410), and Senegalese migrants (n = 603) in Europe
Interpretation: Of all 426 Congolese migrants, 110 (27%) were single at the time of their 1st migration to current destination
Statistical significance: The marital status of migrants at the time of their 1st migration to their current destination differs between the three countries ($p < 0.00$, Design-based F-test)

Table 6.16 Parental status at the time of 1st migration to current destination

	Congolese migrants		Ghanaian migrants		Senegalese migrants	
	f	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
No children	199	49	234	61	339	62
Only children <18	88	23	69	15	122	16
Only children >18	99	18	88	21	94	15
Both children < & > 18	40	9	19	3	48	7
Total	426	100	410	100	603	100

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – biographic surveys
Population: All Congolese migrants (n = 426), Ghanaian migrants (n = 410), and Senegalese migrants (n = 603) in Europe
Interpretation: Of all 426 Congolese migrants, 198 (49%) had no children at the time of their 1st migration to current destination
Statistical significance: The parental status of migrants at the time of their 1st migration to their current destination differs between the three countries ($p < 0.00$, Design-based F-test)

status of the migrant populations at the time of their first migration to the country of current destination, as this indicates the percentage of people who could potentially qualify for reunification. In this section, as in the previous section, we only examine migrants who were married and/or had children under 18 at the time of arrival, as both marriage and having children under 18 are requirements for family reunification.

For all three flows, around 40% of migrants were married when they migrated to their current destination (Table 6.15), thus potentially qualifying for family reunification. The percentage of singles is high, especially among Congolese and Senegalese migrants. Most migrants did not have children when they first migrated to their current country of residence (Table 6.16), although between 14% (Senegal)

and 22% (Congo) did have children under 18. Ghanaian and Congolese migrants also often had children aged over 18, but this was not the case for Senegalese migrants. This shows that at the time of migration, most migrants were single and/or without children under 18, and as such, most migrants were not eligible for family reunification.

Turning now to only those who are married (for couple reunification) and those who have at least one child under 18 (for parent-child reunification), we investigate the proportion of migrants who reunified, how long they took to reunify (if ever) with their spouse and/or child and whether this differs by host country. Additionally, we include in our sample former migrants who are currently living in the country of origin again, in order to see whether there is a difference between reunification at origin and reunification at destination. We examine these reunification patterns for couples and parent-child dyads separately. Box 6.5 presents a detailed description of the computation of these survival estimates.

Box 6.5: Computing Survival Estimates

"Survivor functions" have been computed to study the timing of reunification between individuals in two types of dyads: (1) a migrant and his/her spouse(s) and (2) a migrant and each of his/her minor children. Each dyad (of spouses or of parent-child) is followed over time from the first year of separation (when they started to live in different countries, i.e. at the time of the migrant's first departure) until reunification (when they start to live in the same country again for a duration of at least one year). Here we use the information from the biographical questionnaire on the year-by-year location of the interviewee and of his/her spouse(s) and child(ren). For all results shown below, we only show the proportion of dyads reunified during the first 10 years after geographical separation.

Reunification may take place either in Europe (when the person left behind joins the migrant who is already in Europe) or in the country of origin (when the migrant returns to Congo, Ghana, or Senegal as the case may be). Using an analytical sample that captures both current migrants and returnees allows us to take on a broader view of reunification by taking into account the fact that family members may reunify either in Europe or in Africa, when a migrant returns. This analysis is based on the MAFE transnational sample and so includes all migrants surveyed in Europe as well as returnees from these countries who were surveyed in either Congo, Ghana, or Senegal.

Married couples start to be 'at risk' of reunification when one spouse leaves the country of origin (either Congo, Ghana, or Senegal) to go to the country of destination (for Congolese migrants this is either the UK or Belgium, for Ghanaian migrants either the UK or the Netherlands, and for Senegalese migrants either France, Italy or Spain), leaving his/her spouse behind. While living in separate countries, geographically separated across nation state borders, they are considered transnational couples. Couples are

(continued)

Box 6.5 (continued)
no longer 'at risk' of reunification in two cases: (1) when they reunify or (2) in case of right censoring due to the separation of the spouses (death or divorce). Censoring refers to a specific missing data problem that is common in survival analysis. When an individual does not experience the event (reunification in this case) during the period of observation, they are described as 'censored'. In our case, this means that we cannot observe what has happened to these individuals after the time of the survey (2008). In addition, when individuals divorce or become widowed, they are no longer 'at risk' of experiencing the event, i.e. reunification is no longer an option. These individuals will, from the time of divorce or widowhood, no longer be taken into account.

We estimated separate survival functions for each situation (i.e. reunification at origin and reunification at destination), using a competing risks approach. When analyzing reunification at origin, censoring occurs if the couple reunifies at destination in Europe. Conversely, reunification at origin is considered as a censored case when looking at reunification at destination in Europe.

Regarding reunification with children, migrants enter the 'risk' set when they move out of the country of origin leaving their child(ren) behind. Each child is considered separately, which means that migrants with several children left behind are observed several times. Each parent-child dyad is no longer 'at risk' of reunification when they reunify or in cases of right censoring (when the child dies or reaches the age of 18). As with the couple analyses, when analyzing parent-child reunification at origin, censoring also occurs if the dyad reunifies in Europe. Conversely, reunification at origin is considered a censored case when looking at reunification in Europe.

For reunification of both couples and parent-child dyads, we show two results. First we examine the proportion of reunified couples/parent-child dyads in the whole sample, irrespective of the location of reunification. We also look at whether the sex of the migrant makes a difference for reunification (Table 6.17 for couples and 6.18 for parent-child dyads). Second, we look at the two modes of reunification: at destination and at origin. The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 6.19 for couples and 6.20 for parent-child dyads. As mentioned in Box 6.5, we only show the proportion of migrants reunified during the first 10 years after the geographical separation across international borders.

Not all couples reunify, as is shown in Table 6.17. But after a period of 10 years of geographical separation, 61% of Congolese migrants and 77% of Ghanaian migrants have been reunited with their spouses (Table 6.17). Reunification occurs to a much lesser extent with Senegalese migrants (30%). In none of these three survey countries did we find significant differences in rates of reunification between migrant men and migrant women.

Table 6.17 Rate of reunification between spouses within 10 years, by survey country and gender

	% reunified			
	Females	Males	Total	Significance[a]
Congo	23	67	61	n.s.
Ghana	93	64	77	n.s.
Senegal	33	30	30	n.s.

[a]Log rank tests: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10, *n.s.* not significant
Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – biographic surveys
Population: All Congolese current migrants + returnees from Europe that were in a transnational relationship (n = 99), Ghanaian current migrants + returnees from Europe that were in a transnational relationship (n = 103), and Senegalese current migrants + returnees from Europe that were in a transnational relationship (n = 172)
Interpretation: Of all Congolese current and former migrants that were in a transnational relationship, 60% reunified with their spouse within 10 years of separation. For migrant men, this percentage was 67 and for migrant women 23
Statistical significance: The difference between men and women is not significant in any country (Log rank test, p > 0.10) but the total rate of reunification between spouses is significantly different between the three countries (Log rank test, p < 0.00). The gender differences are also significant between the three countries (Log rank test, p < 0.00)

Table 6.18 Residential patterns of spouses after 10 years, by survey country and country of reunification

	% still transnational	% reunified at origin	% reunified at destination
Congo	39	37	24
Ghana	23	52	25
Senegal	70	14	16

*Log rank tests: Comparisons of confidence intervals of cumulated incidence curves indicate that they are significantly different between the three countries
Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – biographic surveys
Population: All Congolese current migrants + returnees from Europe that were in a transnational relationship (n = 99), Ghanaian current migrants + returnees from Europe that were in a transnational relationship (n = 103), and Senegalese current migrants + returnees from Europe that were in a transnational relationship (n = 172)
Interpretation: Of all Congolese current and former migrants that were in a transnational relationship, 37% reunified with their spouse within 10 years of separation at origin, and 24% reunified at destination

As mentioned earlier, family reunification is an important issue for policy makers, often surrounded by serious concern based on the assumption that all migrants wish to reunify, and that they wish to reunify at destination. Yet, as we have argued throughout this Chapter, transnational family life can also be a preferred option. And, importantly, migrants do not necessarily reunify at destination (Baizán et al. 2011; Landolt and Da 2005). Therefore, we also distinguished between reunification in the origin country and reunification in the destination country (Table 6.18).

Table 6.19 Rate of reunification between parent-child dyads within 10 years, by survey country and gender

	% reunified			
	Females	Males	Total	Significance[a]
Congo	72	77	76	n.s.
Ghana	70	60	62	n.s.
Senegal	65	22	33	***

[a]Log rank tests: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10, *n.s.* not significant
Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – biographic surveys
Population: All Congolese current migrants + returnees from Europe that were in a transnational parent-child dyad (n = 362), Ghanaian current migrants + returnees from Europe that were in a transnational parent-child dyad (n = 299), and Senegalese current migrants + returnees from Europe that were in a transnational parent-child dyad (n = 673)
Interpretation: Of all Congolese current and former migrants that were in a transnational parent-child dyad, 76% reunified with his/her child within 10 years of separation. For migrant men (fathers), this percentage was 77 and for migrant women (mothers) 72
Statistical significance: The difference between men and women is not significant in Ghana and Congo (Log rank test, p > 0.10), but it is significant in Senegal (Log rank test, p < 0.00). The total rate of reunification between parent-child dyads is significantly different between the three countries (Log rank test, p < 0.00). Gender differences are also significant between the three countries (Log rank test, p < 0.10)

First, reunification at destination may not always be the preferred option, or may not be feasible, and reunification clearly also occurs through the migrant returning home (see Table 6.18). Especially for Congolese and Ghanaian migrants, we see that reunification at origin is more prevalent than reunification at destination (for Congo, 37% versus 24%, for Ghana, 52% versus 25%). The difference between these two reunification options is smaller for Senegalese migrants, of whom 16% reunified at destination compared to 14% at origin.

In the next tables, we look at the time of separation between parents and children in the same way we compared couples above. As with the reunification patterns of migrant spouses, we see that parent-child reunification occurs more often among Congolese and Ghanaian migrants (Table 6.19). Senegalese migrant parents seem to reunify with their children to a much lesser extent. Most Senegalese migrants did not have young children when they moved to Europe. When they did, they mostly left them behind in Senegal.

For Congolese and Ghanaian migrants, there are no significant differences between migrant fathers and migrant mothers in their parent-child reunification patterns. Among Senegalese migrants, there is a large difference between the mothers and fathers: 65% of the Senegalese migrant mothers reunified, compared to 22% of the migrant fathers.

Reunification can take place either in the country of origin or of destination, so we examined both cases for parent-child dyads as well. Reunification is more common at origin, but reunification at destination is also a significant phenomenon (Table 6.20). For Congolese migrant parents, 49% reunified at origin and 27% at destination. For Ghanaian migrant parents, this difference is even greater: 50%

Table 6.20 Residential patterns of parent-child dyads after 10 years, by survey country and country of reunification

	% still transnational	% reunified at origin	% reunified at destination
Congo	24	49	27
Ghana	38	50	12
Senegal	67	23	10

*Log rank tests: Comparisons of confidence intervals of cumulated incidence curves indicate that they are significantly different between the three countries
Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – biographic surveys
Population: All Congolese current migrants + returnees from Europe that were in a transnational parent-child dyad (n = 362), Ghanaian current migrants + returnees from Europe that were in a transnational parent-child dyad (n = 299), and Senegalese current migrants + returnees from Europe that were in a transnational parent-child dyad (n = 673)
Interpretation: Of all Congolese current and former migrants that were in a transnational parent-child dyad, 49% reunified with his/her child within 10 years of separation at origin, and 27% reunified at destination

reunified at origin and only 12% at destination. Senegalese migrant parents reunify with their children to lesser extent than Congolese and Ghanaian migrant parents, but when they do, we see that for them too reunification at origin is more common: 23% reunify at origin compared to 10% who reunify at destination.

The results in this section indicate that although family reunification has become one of the main ports of legal entry to Europe, this does not mean that reunification in Europe always happens, and it may not always be the migrant's preferred outcome or goal. Although our data can only show that reunification also happens by migrants returning home, further research should explore whether this is by choice or due to the difficulties imposed by policies in Europe.

6.5 Conclusion: Comparative Perspective on Family Arrangements Between Africa and Europe

This chapter shows the high level of relationships that migrants and their families back home maintain, in terms of remittances, visits and contact via technologies such as mobile phones and Internet, but also in terms of the nuclear family relationships that may span nation state borders. It is therefore extremely important to study such dynamics using multi-sited data that can show the full variety of migrants' family constellations, their characteristics and their functioning (Mazzucato and Schans 2011). The MAFE project does just that. The African family goes beyond immediate nuclear family members to include extended family members, who may be other relatives or non-kin. Moreover, families are not necessarily bound to a particular geographical space. On the contrary, one can observe that a large share of household members live scattered throughout the globe. Despite this, family ties

persist and migrants continue to function as members of a wider extended family. The high frequency of contact and the occurrence of remittances are indicators of this.

By comparing both countries of origin and countries of destination we revealed differences in family arrangements and migration patterns between Ghana, Senegal and Congo, as well as within these groups according to the European countries they migrated to. Family and gender norms in countries of origin influence the way migrants organize their family lives. In Senegal, for example, polygamous marriage and the spatial separation of couples are common and socially accepted. In this context, transnational couples are an extension of a form of family life where couples often live apart even within the national context. Nevertheless, although it would be easy to say that in the case of Senegalese migrants transnational family arrangements are the culturally preferred option, the MAFE data show that this explanation is too simple and does not take into account historical migration flows between Senegal and France, or the differences in receiving contexts. The fact that transnational family arrangements among Senegalese migrants are much more common in Italy than in France indicates that both migration history and legal status play a role. Migration from Senegal to France has a long history, linked to colonial ties, and has produced a more established migrant community with fewer undocumented migrants and a longer period for family reunification to take place. Italy, on the other hand, is a relatively new destination for Senegalese migrants and where they are more often undocumented. This results in a higher incidence of transnational family arrangements.

Similarly, the fact that both Congolese and Ghanaian migrants are less likely to be in a transnational family arrangement in the UK than in Belgium or the Netherlands indicates the importance of policies on migration and family reunification. Even though policies in the UK have become more restrictive over time, with particular focus being put on preventing 'fake marriages', the UK has been relatively more liberal than Belgium and the Netherlands, especially in the latter part of the last century (Kofman et al. 2008).

Finally, this chapter shows that family life is not static, with some families reunifying over time. Larger proportions of those who reunify do so in the country of origin. There are several factors at play here. Increasingly stringent family formation and reunification policies in Europe make it difficult for migrants to reunify in European countries. At the same time, some migrants prefer to keep their nuclear families in the country of origin where family life and gender roles are more in line with their espoused norms. Yet others feel their children can grow up better in their home communities (Bledsoe and Sow 2011).

Reunification also seems to be a gendered process, with Ghanaian migrant wives and mothers reunifying more commonly with their husbands and children, while the opposite is true in Congolese migration. Senegalese mothers reunify more frequently with their children. An important matter for further investigation is to what extent these trends are driven by choice and cultural preference and to what extent family reunification policies in Europe might be favouring or penalizing men with respect to women.

Appendix: Marital and Parental Status of Household Heads – Household Survey

Table 6.21 Proportion of married household heads and household heads with children, by survey country

Share of married household heads			
	% married[a]	% not married	% Total
Congo	74	26	100
Ghana	72	28	100
Senegal	75	25	100
Share of household heads with children			
	% with children	% without children	% Total
Congo	93	7	100
Ghana	79	21	100
Senegal	90	10	100

[a]Informal unions are also included
Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo, MAFE-Ghana, MAFE-Senegal – household surveys
Population: Congolese households (n = 1576), Ghanaian households (n = 1246), and Senegalese households (n = 1141)
Interpretation: The Congolese sample consists of 1576 households. Of the interviewed household heads in Congo, 74% are married and 93% have children
Statistical significance: The share of married household heads does not significantly differ between the countries ($p > 0.10$, Design-based F-test), but the share of household heads with children does differ significantly between the three countries ($p < 0.00$, Design-based F-test)

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Part II
Congolese Migration

Chapter 7
Congolese Migration in Times of Political and Economic Crisis

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7.1 Introduction

With a population of around 70 million in 2014 (PNUD/RDC 2015), DR Congo is one of the most populated countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and the largest French-speaking African country. It is also currently one of the least developed countries in the World. While it fared well compared to countries like Uganda, Burundi, Mali and Senegal in the early 1980s, DR Congo has experienced the slowest progress in the Human Development Index (HDI) over the last 35 years and, as of 2014, was ranked 186th (out of 187 countries) on the HDI (UNDP 2015). Since independence it has also gone through numerous political and economic crises.

These *crises are thought to have profoundly affected international migration from DR Congo* (Sumata 2002). However, although it is possible to draw a broad picture of Congolese migration, existing data are patchy (Tshibambe and Lelu 2010) and several of its characteristics and changes over time are undocumented. In this chapter, we use data from the Migration between Africa and Europe project

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(MAFE) to depict the changing patterns of migration in DR Congo in times of crisis. These data were collected in Kinshasa (capital city of DR Congo) and in two European destination countries: Belgium and the UK. Data collected in DR Congo are mainly used to sketch the broad changes in departures and returns by destination.[1] Data collected in Belgium and the UK give more in-depth information on migration to two specific countries. While not representative of all Congolese migrants in Europe, these data illustrate both the major changes in Congolese migration to Europe over time, and differences between migrants to traditional destinations and new destinations.

The first section provides background information on the recent political and economic changes in DR Congo. Next, trends in departure and return are summarized from existing data and the MAFE surveys. The remaining sections focus on migration between DR Congo and Europe, documenting major transformations that have been witnessed over three decades. Overall, *the MAFE surveys confirm the growing importance of international migration from DR Congo*, partly as a response to growing political and economic troubles in DR Congo (Sumata 2002). Opportunities and constraints in destination countries, in both Africa and Europe, have also had an effect in reorienting migration flows and transforming the profiles and trajectories of migrants. While the increase in migration has mainly concerned African destinations, the *nature of migration to Europe has also changed considerably since the 1970s*. Migrants have come from increasingly diverse backgrounds and have experienced more complex trajectories. They also now tend to settle in Europe for longer. These changes illustrate migrants' responses to instability and uncertainty in DR Congo and increasingly restrictive policies in Europe.

7.2 Background: Political and Economic Changes in DR Congo

Since the country gained independence in 1960, the DR Congo has experienced a series of economic downturns and episodes of political instability. Until the mid-1970s, the economic situation was fairly good, benefiting among other factors from high copper prices on world markets and from foreign direct investments. The first few years after independence were marked by political instability. The 1965 coup by Mobutu brought some "order to the chaos by restoring nominal stability" (McCalpin 2002, p.41), at the price of repression, which characterized Mobutu's regime for years (McCalpin 2002). From the mid-1970s onwards, the economic situation seriously deteriorated. The oil crisis, together with the collapse of the price of copper (and of other commodities) and bad economic policies, wiped out the gains of the preceding period (Peemans 1997; Nzisabira 1997; McCalpin 2002). This period was also characterized by political turmoil, as in 1977 and in 1978 (the

[1] Data were collected in Kinshasa and our analyses of migration from DR Congo are therefore not representative of the Congolese population as a whole, but rather of the inhabitants of the capital.

Shaba wars). The period from 1983 to 1989 started out with economic reforms, a slight increase in GDP and the start of a structural adjustment programme (Nzisabira 1997). These improvements did not last, however, and by the end of the 1980s the GDP growth rate was negative (Schoumaker et al. 2010). This coincided with the end of the cold war and with serious changes in the political situation in DR Congo.

The 1990s were one of the darkest periods in the Congo's recent political and economic history. The democratisation process announced by Mobutu in April 1990 lagged and was accompanied by political instability. Riots erupted in 1991, shortly after the Conférence Nationale Souveraine was set up to decide the future of the country (Hesselbein 2007), and new riots occurred in 1993. In 1994, the genocide in Rwanda led to a massive influx of people from Rwanda, which also contributed to political instability in DR Congo (Hesselbein 2007). Two years later (1996), Laurent-Désiré Kabila led a rebellion with the support of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola (McCalpin 2002). By May 1997, Mobutu had fled to Morocco and the rebel forces had seized power. The next year, another rebellion started in Eastern DR Congo – this time with the goal of deposing Kabila (Dunn 2002). This was the start of the second Congo War. Laurent-Désiré Kabila remained in power until he was assassinated in January 2001. He was replaced by his son Joseph, who made overtures to the international community showing willingness to move towards peace (Putzel et al. 2008). From 2002, violence was significantly reduced (Hesselbein 2007), and the second Congo War officially ended in 2003. In 2006, elections were organised, and Joseph Kabila was elected President. He was re-elected in 2011. Despite the end of the war, Eastern DR Congo has continued to be regularly prone to violence.

The 1990s were also characterised by a rapid deterioration in the economic situation. The estimated GDP growth rate, which was already negative at the beginning of the period, decreased from −6.6% in 1990 to −14% in 1999. DR Congo's economy was struck by hyperinflation, and the country's public debt also soared (McCalpin 2002). Official development assistance also decreased drastically in the 1990s (Hesselbein 2007; Mutamba Lukusa 1999; McCalpin 2002). During that period, the purchasing power of the Congolese population declined considerably. Since the year 2000, and especially since 2003, the economic context and living conditions of the population have slightly improved. In 2002, the country experienced positive GDP growth rates for the first time since 1995 (Schoumaker et al. 2010). The improvement in the economic situation can be explained by the post-war reunification of the country, the resumption of international development aid and a massive injection of foreign currency by the IMF (IMF 2002). However, the living conditions of the Congolese population remain extremely difficult (PNUD/RDC 2015).

In this chapter our analyses distinguish three broad periods. The first period starts in the mid-1970s, when economic conditions in DR Congo began to deteriorate and migration policies in Europe began to tighten. The second period covers the 1990s, during which political and economic conditions were at their worst in DR Congo. The end of the Cold War and the "fear of invasion" triggered by the opening of the Iron Curtain (Streiff-Fénart and Segatti 2012, p.viii), also led to increasingly restrictive immigration policies in Europe. Major changes also occurred in other African countries, among which the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa has been of

major importance for Congolese migration. The third period, starting from year 2000, is characterized by an improvement in the political and economic situation in DR Congo and in other countries of the region, and growing restrictions on the entry of third country nationals in Europe (Beauchemin et al. 2015).

7.3 Leaving, Returning

7.3.1 A Short History of Congolese Migration

In the first half of the twentieth century, emigration from DR Congo mainly involved short-distance movements to neighbouring countries (Tshibambe and Lelu 2010). A few Congolese immigrants arrived in Belgium before the 1960s but, unlike other European countries such as France, where substantial numbers of migrants from former colonies (e.g. Senegal) arrived before independence (see Chap. 13 in this volume), Belgium did not encourage migration from DR Congo (Demart 2013). The few Congolese migrants in Belgium at that time came mainly as sailors working for the Compagnie Maritime du Congo, and remained in Belgium; a few Congolese migrants also took part in the first and second World Wars, and some of these few remained in Belgium (Cornet 2014).

The country's *independence in 1960 marked a turning-point in the history of Congolese migration* in several respects. Chronic political instability gave rise to mass refugee movements to neighbouring countries, whose intensity and destinations varied from one crisis to the next. Migration towards Europe also developed gradually after independence. At that time, most migrants were members of the country's elite who went to Belgium to study (Kagné and Martiniello 2001; Schoonvaere 2010), and returned to the DR Congo after completing their education. The deterioration of the economic and political situation in the 1980s, and even more in the 1990s, led to an increase in flows, a decrease in return migration (Schoonvaere 2010) and a diversification of the destinations and profiles of Congolese migrants (Demart 2008; Schoumaker et al. 2010). While Belgium was the main European destination for Congolese in the 1960s and 1970s, France gradually became the preferred destination and other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada and the US also attracted growing numbers of Congolese migrants (Tshibambe and Lelu 2010). Around 2010, the largest numbers of Congolese migrants outside Africa were found in France, Belgium, Canada, England and Wales, the United States and Germany (Table 7.1).[2]

Major changes in the patterns of migration to other African countries also occurred in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Lack of data in destination countries (e.g. in Angola) make it difficult to evaluate precisely the distribution and trends in migration from DR Congo to other African countries, but existing estimates (Global

[2] For a brief history of migration to Belgium and to the UK, see Chap. 8.

Table 7.1 Numbers of congolese migrants living in selected western countries with large numbers of congolese migrants

Country	Year	Number	Source
France	2005	49,600	Eurostat
Belgium	2010	36,600	National Register
Canada	2011	19,900	Statistics Canada
England and Wales	2011	19,200	Office for National Statistics
USA	2008–2012	15,000	US Census Bureau
Germany	2011	10,000	Foreigner Central Register
Switzerland	2013	6400	Eurostat
Italy	2013	6100	Eurostat

Note: Figures have been rounded to the hundreds
Data sources: Figures for France, Switzerland and Italy are from the Eurostat database (tables on Population by sex, age group and country of birth), based on register data or censuses. Data for Belgium are from the National Register, and were prepared by Sophie Vause (Université catholique de Louvain). People born with Belgian nationality in DR Congo were removed from estimates to correct for the large number of Belgian people born in DR Congo. Eurostat's uncorrected estimates for 2013 are 84,278 migrants. Data for Germany are not available in the Eurostat database and come from the Central Register of Foreign Nationals (2011). Data for USA are from the American Community survey. Estimates are for a five-year period (2008–2012), with a margin of error of 1000 migrants. According to the 2000 Census, there were 4990 Congolese migrants in the US. Data for Canada are from the 2011 National Household Survey. There were 15,795 Congolese migrants in the 2006 Census. Data for England and Wales are from the 2011 Census

bilateral migration database, Özden et al. 2011) suggest that numbers of Congolese migrants in Africa have increased over the last four decades, and especially since the 1990s. In 2000, an estimated 500,000 migrants from DR Congo (excluding refugees) were living in one or other of its 9 neighboring countries, representing 80% of all DR Congo migrants in the world. South Africa has also become a leading destination for Congolese migrants since the 1990s (Tshibambe and Lelu 2010).

Data from the MAFE household surveys, focusing on migrants from Kinshasa, fill out this broad picture. According to these data, departures from DR Congo – regardless of destination – have dramatically increased since the 1980s (Fig. 7.1). Cumulative probabilities of migration increased threefold between the 1980s and the 2000s. The migration rates observed in the 2000s suggest that one in three Kinshasa adults between the ages of 18 and 40 migrates over his lifetime, compared to slightly over one in ten in the 1980s. Of course, some of these migrants return, and some go to nearby countries. Nevertheless, the figures show that international migration has been a central feature of Congolese society in recent years, especially in Kinshasa (Tshibambe and Lelu 2010; Tshibambe 2010; Sumata et al. 2004). This incredible increase in Congolese emigration has occurred against a backdrop of deteriorating economic and political conditions since the 1980s. It represents a search for better living conditions for the migrants themselves, as well as a means of diversifying income sources for the families who stay behind (Sumata et al. 2004), who may go heavily into debt with the goal of later benefitting from monetary returns (Sumata 2002).

7.3.2 More to Africa, Fewer to Europe

The MAFE surveys show a key feature of Congolese migration: *The increase in migration from DR Congo results from an upsurge in departures towards other African countries, and not towards Western countries* (Fig. 7.1). Congolese migration to Europe has not exploded. On the contrary, the odds of leaving the DR Congo for Europe rose slightly in the 1990s during the worst moments of the political and economic crisis, but then returned to their pre-1990 levels. Migration to other countries (mainly in North America) has increased somewhat since the 1990s, but has up



Fig. 7.1 Cumulative probability of migration from DR congo (between ages 18 and 40), by destination and by period

Source: MAFE Household surveys in DR Congo, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children (between age 18 and 40), including deceased children
Definition: Migration for a period of at least 1 year
Interpretation: Each bar represents the cumulative probability of migration between ages 18 and 40, i.e. the probability of making at least one international migration between ages 18 and 40 in a hypothetical cohort that experiences the age-specific probabilities of migration within a given period. For more technical details on the computation methodology see Schoumaker and Beauchemin (2015)
Statistical significance: *For all destinations,* changes over time are statistically significant between the first period and the second period ($p < 0.01$) but not between the second and the third period ($p > 0.10$). For *Africa*, changes are significant between the first and second periods ($p < 0.01$) and between the second and the third periods ($p < 0.01$). For Europe, the increase between the first two periods is not significant ($p > 0.10$); the decrease between the 1990s and the 2000s is significant ($p < 0.10$). For the other destinations, changes over time are statistically significant between the first period and the second period ($p < 0.01$) but not between the second and third periods ($p > 0.10$)

to now remained limited. On the other hand, migration to the rest of Africa truly took off, quadrupling during this period. In all, almost half of departures before the 1990s were to Europe and half to Africa. In the 2000s, Africa was the destination for more than 80% of migrants, and Europe for only 10%. This prominence of African destinations is in sharp contrast with migration levels and trends from the other MAFE countries (Ghana and Senegal).

This is partly a question of geography: Kinshasa is just next to Congo-Brazzaville, and a few hundred kilometers from Angola and Gabon. But the growing importance of African migration is also the result of new constraints and opportunities since the 1990s and especially since the 2000s. The deteriorating economic and political context in DR Congo in the late 1980s and 1990s very probably encouraged outmigration (Schoumaker et al. 2010). Growing restrictions on African immigration to European countries (Beauchemin et al. 2015), as well as the interruption in cooperation between the DR Congo and several European countries in the early 1990s (Hoebeke et al. 2007; Luntumbue 2010) limited opportunities for migration to Europe. The high cost of migration to Europe also made it inaccessible to many would-be migrants. At the same time, *new opportunities have been opening up for Congolese migrants in Africa*. In the late 1980s, and especially after the end of the apartheid regime, South Africa became a leading destination country for Congolese migrants (Steinberg 2005; Sumata 2002). Angola has also attracted growing numbers of Congolese people, particularly to the diamond-rich province of Lunda North since the late 1980s (De Boeck 2001). The end of the war in Angola in the early 2000s, combined with unprecedented economic growth in that country, also helped to attract many Congolese. According to the MAFE survey, South Africa and Angola alone received more than half of the migrants leaving Kinshasa in the 2000s. Congo Brazzaville was the destination of a further one-fifth of migrants from DR Congo.

Data on migration projects[3] confirm that Europe is losing ground compared to African and North American destinations. Projects to migrate to Europe did increase in recent years (maybe reflecting the lower rate of success in reaching Europe), but at a slower pace than for other destinations (Fig. 7.2). *This relative decline of Europe in both departures and migration projects contrasts with the idea sometimes put forward that Europe is as attractive as ever to African migrants*. The continent certainly still appeals to migrants from some specific countries (e.g. Ghana, see Chap. 3), and remains a prime destination. However, the difficulties of integrating into the labour market in Europe (see Chap. 8), the "end of easy money" in some countries (Trapido 2011) and increasingly restrictive (and in some cases harassing) policies may well discourage would-be migrants from opting for Europe.

[3] We use the term "project" to refer to the steps people have undertaken in order to migrate. A special module was devoted to these projects in the MAFE surveys (called migration attempts in the questionnaire). As these projects refer to practical steps, they are more than mere intentions. Only people who have not succeeded to migrate are included in the analyses of migration projects in this chapter.



Fig. 7.2 Cumulative probability of taking steps towards migration by intended destination and by period (1975–2008)

Source: MAFE Biographic Surveys in DR Congo, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: Samples include persons living in Kinshasa at the time of the survey
Definition: People living in DR Congo were asked to mention the steps they had undertaken in order to leave and settle in a different country but without having been successful in getting there so far. The date of the first step and the intended destination country were also recorded
Interpretation: Cumulative probabilities indicate the likelihood of taking at least one step towards emigration in one's lifetime (18–40), if the rate of steps taken by same age group for the period remained constant
Statistical significance: For *all destinations,* changes over time are statistically significant between the second period and the third period ($p < 0.01$), but not between the first two periods ($p > 0.10$). For *Europe*, changes are not significant ($p > 0.10$). For Africa, changes are significant between the first and second periods ($p < 0.10$) and between the second and third periods ($p < 0.01$). For the other destinations, changes over time are statistically significant between the first and second periods ($p < 0.05$) and between the second and third periods ($p < 0.01$)

7.3.3 Returns

Alongside the rise in departures, returns to DR Congo have decreased since the 1970s (Fig. 7.3). Estimates of returns based on MAFE data are much less precise than estimates of departures, but show a few key features. For all destinations combined, returns decreased between the 1980s and later periods, although this trend is not statistically significant. *This decrease in returns results exclusively from the dramatic drop in returns from Western countries* (essentially from Europe) since the 1990s. The situation for migrants to other African countries is different. Returns are much more common, though clearly not systematic, and not less frequent today



Fig. 7.3 Percentage of migrants returning within 10 years of their first departure from DR congo, by destination and by period (1975–2008)

Source: MAFE Household surveys in DR Congo, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children who left at age 18 or over
Definition: Migration for a period of at least 1 year and return for at least 1 year
Interpretation: Each bar represents the cumulative probability of return within 10 years of first departure, i.e. the probability of returning within 10 years in a hypothetical cohort that experiences the duration-specific probabilities of return within a given period. Periods refer to the time of return, not to the time of departure
Statistical significance: *For all destinations* and for *Africa,* changes over time are not statistically significant ($p > 0.10$). For *Western countries*, changes are significant ($p < 0.01$). between the first period and the second and third periods

than in the past. Circulation between African countries is much easier, because of geographical proximity and administrative facilities. Moreover, contrary to returns from Western countries, returning from an African country does not necessarily jeopardize the chances of a new departure.

7.4 Congolese Migration to Europe

As shown above, departures to Europe have not increased dramatically. On the contrary, the slight increase in the 1990s was followed by a decrease in the propensity to migrate. However, there have been several major changes in Congo-to-Europe migration between the 1970s and recent years.

7.4.1 From Temporary Migration to Settlement Migration

A major change has been the drop in return migration, *transforming temporary Congolese migration into settlement migration*. Before the 1990s, substantial numbers of migrants went back to DR Congo within ten years of their departure for Europe (Fig. 7.3). Congolese families whose children were students in Europe encouraged them to finish their studies quickly and return home, and people working in Europe also frequently returned (Flahaux 2014). According to the MAFE surveys, the Congolese scarcely return from Europe and North America any more.[4] This drop in returns has occurred at a time when the situation for Congolese migrants is extremely uncertain. Given the tightening of entry requirements for European countries, the possibility of a new departure to Europe after returning to DR Congo is by no means certain. The investments and sacrifices that migrants make to reach Europe, combined with the chronic instability in DR Congo, also make it unlikely that they could return to their country of origin and be able to go back to Europe later. The differences in living conditions (e.g. access to health care and education) and the lack of employment opportunities in DR Congo also tend to limit returns to the country.

Biographical data collected in Belgium and the UK also indicate that Congolese migrants who have arrived recently (since 2000) are unlikely to want to leave their host country (Fig. 7.4). Less than 20% of the migrants stated that, when they arrived in Belgium or the UK, they intended to stay for less than ten years. This finding is in line with Lututala's survey (2006) of immigrants in Paris, where three-quarters stated they intended to stay indefinitely. In short, most Congolese migrants no longer return, and currently do not intend to return. This has not always been the case. Upon their arrival, around half of the Congolese migrants who arrived in Belgium or the UK in the 1980s and 1990s were thinking of staying for fewer than ten years (and probably returning to DR Congo). Most people now seem to know from the beginning that they are unlikely to go back to DR Congo, and this is especially pronounced in the UK Fig. 7.4), where very few migrants intend to leave. The low propensity to return is also visible in popular expressions in DR Congo such as "RIP" ("*retour interdit au pays*", return to home country forbidden), one of the signs that returns are not encouraged by families back home (Bazonzi 2010; Sumata et al. 2004; Flahaux 2011b).

Lututala (n.d., p.3) suggests that non-return is part of the phenomenon of residential ubiquity, according to which migrants "consider […] their host country as being part of their living space and not as a foreign country where they are living temporarily". This residential ubiquity is demonstrated through the money that migrants send home (see Chap. 8), but also through visits to DR Congo which may, to a certain extent, substitute for a return. However, data collected in Belgium and the UK show

[4] These figures come from surveys and are affected by sampling and measurement errors. The exact figures should be interpreted with some caution. Broad trends, however, are supported by evidence from other sources, such as register data in Belgium (Schoonvaere 2010).



Fig. 7.4 Percentage of migrants intending to stay less than 10 years on arrival in the destination country, by period and country of residence

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Belgium or the UK at the time of the survey
Definitions: *Migrants intending to stay less than 10 years on arrival* are those who answered "Less than ten years" to the question "At the beginning, for how long did you plan to stay in the 'country of stay'?"
Interpretation: Each bar represents the percentage of migrants who intended to stay less than 10 years in the current country of residence when they first arrived in the country. Only people still in the country are used in the computation. The downward trend may be underestimated because people who have left were probably more likely to intend staying less than 10 years
Statistical significance: changes over time are statistically significant for Belgium ($p < 0.01$) and for the two countries together (p.0.01). Changes are not statistically significant for the UK ($p > 0.10$)

that only around 10% of migrants make a visit to DR Congo within their first five years of stay in Belgium or in the UK, and the likelihood of visiting the DR Congo has been stable over time. In the UK, fewer than 5% of the Congolese migrants visit DR Congo within five years of their first arrival in Europe. In short, *visits are rare, and have not replaced return*. These results suggest a growing distance between Congolese migrants in Europe and their country of origin. While Congolese migrants maintain all sorts of links with DR Congo (see Chap. 11 on remittances and Chap. 15 on contacts between households in DR Congo and migrants), they increasingly settle in Europe and do not visit DR Congo regularly. Return intentions and circulation are particularly rare among people who left for political reasons, people of low education, and women, who have represented a larger share of Congolese migrants in recent years. Do such trends indicate a break with the origin country? Qualitative

research conducted in the UK (Garbin and Wa Gamoka Pambu 2009) suggests that many Congolese migrants still regard DR Congo as their "home", or one of their homes. However, this home appears increasingly distant, if only because they lack the means to travel to DR Congo in a regular way.

7.4.2 More Women and More Migrants with Low Education

The feminization of migration and the changes in the educational profiles of migrants to Europe are two key changes that have been witnessed in the last decades. Up to the late 1990s, about 40% of migrants to Europe in the MAFE surveys were women; this figure has increased to 60% in the most recent period (Fig. 7.5). While women were less likely to move to Europe than their male counterparts in the 1980s, their propensity was greater in the 2000s (Fig. 7.6). As highlighted by Vause and Toma (2015), this feminization does not reflect a growing propensity to migrate among women but a sharp decrease among men. The increase in the share of female migrants is in part a direct consequence of fewer men returning. In the 1980s, when returns were frequent, women did not have to move to Europe to live with their husbands. In a society where the nuclear family is highly valued (Ngondo 1996), the vanishing prospect of men returning has encouraged family reunification in destination countries. Migration by single women has also increased, as has migration for economic reasons among women, indicating more frequent 'autonomous' migration (Vause 2012). The growing share of women among Congolese migrants may also be linked to increasing violence (Mukwasa Gipela and Kapinga Wa Diamba 2009). The economic crisis in DR Congo has also led to greater involvement of women in the labour market (especially in Kinshasa), giving them greater autonomy in their households (Vause and Toma 2015). Interestingly, the percentage of women among Congolese migrants to Europe is also much higher than among migrants from Senegal, possibly reflecting less social control of female migrants in DR Congo, and greater autonomy among female Congolese migrants.

Like the men, women are unlikely to return. While the MAFE data do not enable us to reliably measure differences in return rates by gender, administrative data in Belgium suggest that women are less likely to return than men (Schoonvaere 2010), adding to the feminization of the Congolese migrant population in Europe. MAFE surveys in Belgium and the UK also show that women are less likely than men to intend to leave within 10 years of their arrival (Fig. 7.7). While in the 1980s around 40% of both men and women intended to stay less than 10 years, only 15% of women now intend to stay less than 10 years, compared to 24% of the men (significant, $p < 0.10$). These gender differences are partly tied to the motives for migration. Women are much more likely than men to migrate for family reasons, and people arriving for family reunification are also more likely to intend to stay for at least ten years. In contrast, people coming to study (more frequent among men) are more likely to want to stay for a shorter period. In addition, very few women who come for political reasons – an increasing proportion of migrants – wish to return.



Fig. 7.5 Share of women and less educated migrants (aged 18 to 40) from DR congo to Europe, by period (1975–2008)

Source: MAFE Household surveys in DR Congo, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children (between ages 18 and 40), including deceased children
Definitions: Only stays for at least 1 year in a European country are considered
Interpretation: Each bar represents the percentage of women migrants (left-hand side) or the percentage of migrants with secondary education or less
Statistical significance: the increase of the percentage of women between the second and the third periods is significant ($p < 0.10$); the increase in the share of people with secondary education or lower between the first and second periods is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). Other changes are not significant ($p > 0.10$)

Qualitative research also indicates that, when a couple has reunified in Europe, the man may return while his wife and children remain in Europe (Flahaux 2011a; Vause 2012). Women migrants are also more likely than their male counterparts to acquire Belgian citizenship (Schoumaker and Rakotonarivo 2011), another sign of their greater propensity to settle in Europe.

Migrants' educational profiles have also changed radically (Fig. 7.5). People with higher education are still more likely to move from DR Congo to Europe than their less educated counterparts (Fig. 7.6), but the difference has decreased over time. In the 1970s–1980s, people with higher education were twice as likely to move to Europe as people with secondary education. In the 1990s profiles changed radically, due to a large increase in migration to Europe among the less educated (Fig. 7.6). Both the less educated and the better educated had less propensity to migrate in the 2000s, but the differences according to educational level were smaller than in the 1970s–1980s. As a result, while people with secondary education or less



Fig. 7.6 Cumulative probability of migration (between ages 18 and 40) from DR congo to Europe (1975–2008), by period, gender and level of education

Source: MAFE Household surveys in DR Congo, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children (between ages 18 and 40), including deceased children
Definition: Migration for a period of at least 1 year
Interpretation: Each bar represents the cumulative probability of migration between ages 18 and 40, i.e. the probability of making at least one international migration between ages 18 and 40 in a hypothetical cohort that experiences the age-specific probabilities of migration within a given period. For more technical details on the methodology, see Schoumaker and Beauchemin (2015)
Statistical significance: changes over time are not significant among women ($p > 0.10$); the decrease in the third period is significant among men ($p < 0.01$ compared to the second period, $p < 0.05$ compared to the first period). Changes among people with higher education are not significant ($p > 0.10$); among the less educated, probabilities of migration are significantly higher in the second period than in the first and third periods ($p < 0.01$)

were a minority in the 1980s, their share increased substantially in the 1990s and they have represented more than half of the migrants in the recent periods (Fig. 7.5). These changes result from several factors. This situation is, to some extent, related to the feminisation of migration, inasmuch as women have progressively accounted for a larger share of Congolese migrants to Europe and also, on average, are less educated than their male counterparts. This also reflects the growing share of asylum seekers among migrants in the 1990s (see Sect. 4.3), many more of whom were in the less educated bracket. The interruption of cooperation between the DR Congo and several European countries in the 1990s (Hoebeke et al. 2007; Luntumbue 2010) and decreasing opportunities for pursuing studies in Europe may also have contributed to these changes to some extent.



Fig. 7.7 Percentage of migrants intending to stay less than 10 years on arrival in the destination country, by period, gender and level of education

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Belgium or the UK at the time of the survey
Definitions: *Migrants intending to stay less than 10 years on arrival* are those who answered "Less than ten years" to the question "At the beginning, for how long did you plan to stay in the 'country of stay'?"
Interpretation: Each bar represents the percentage of migrants with a given characteristic who intended to stay less than 10 years in the current country of residence when they first arrived in the country
Statistical significance: changes over time are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) for all categories (males, females, secondary or lower, higher education). The difference between males and females is significant in the most recent period ($p < 0.01$) but not in earlier periods. Differences by level of education are significant in all the periods ($p < 0.01$)

The overall decrease in returns observed since the 1990s with the MAFE household surveys is found both among the better educated and the less educated migrants. As mentioned above, returning was the norm in the 1970s, especially for educated people who were very likely to obtain a good job in DR Congo upon their return. Deteriorating living conditions in the DR Congo have significantly changed this situation, and educated Congolese migrants are increasingly likely to stay in Europe. Despite the difficulty they have in integrating into the European labour market, many educated migrants being employed in unskilled jobs (see Chap. 8; Vause 2011), they consider that their prospects are probably better in Europe than in DR Congo. Return intentions have also seriously diminished among educated migrants (Fig. 7.7). In the 1970s–1980s, more than half of the migrants with higher education intended to stay for less than 10 years, whereas only one third of them were in this

category in the 2000s. However, educated migrants have not completely given up on the idea of returning to DR Congo. A far higher proportion of them than of their less educated counterparts intend to return, and many more intend to return than actually do so. A possible explanation is that they have postponed their return until the situation in DR Congo improves. Prospects of return may indeed improve (Tshibambe and Lelu 2010), and these intentions may translate into higher returns among the better educated in the coming years. At the time of the MAFE surveys, however, no upward trend in returns was visible. The less educated have very low intentions of return. This in part reflects the fact that less educated migrants experience more difficulties in reaching Europe and are also more likely to come as asylum seekers; return intentions are much lower among these migrants. In contrast, return intentions are much higher among people coming to study (Flahaux 2015), who are concentrated among the better educated.

7.4.3 Changing Motives of Migration

These changes in the composition of migrants are strongly correlated with changes in migration motives.[5] Whereas pursuing studies was the main motive for moving to Europe (Belgium and the UK) in the 1970s and 1980s (more than a third of migrants) *political reasons ranked first in the 2000s* (Fig. 7.8). These shifts in migration motives partly mirror shifts in the destination countries. Belgium used to be a major destination for studying, and the decreasing weight of migration to Belgium compared to other destinations has also reduced the share of migrations for study (Fig. 7.9). By contrast, economic reasons represent a much larger share of motives among migrants in the UK than in Belgium. Qualitative research shows that some Congolese migrants moved to the UK because they perceived better work opportunities and less discrimination than in other European countries (Pachi et al. 2010), or were attracted by "easy money" in the UK in the 1990s (Trapido 2011). Political reasons also ranked high among migration motives for the UK. Early Congolese migrants in the UK were mainly intellectual opponents to the Mobutu regime, who were later followed by asylum seekers.

Political reasons have also been a major motive among migrants in Belgium, showing that both destinations have been important for escaping political violence (Trapido 2011). The growing importance of political motives is mirrored in the large increase in the number of migrants seeking asylum. In the 1990s, when the political troubles were at their peak, the proportion of asylum seekers reached 60% among Congolese migrants to both countries (Fig. 7.10). This is in line with the peaks in asylum applications observed in administrative data in Belgium in the 1990s (Schoonvaere 2010). The MAFE surveys also show that asylum applications

[5] For each long stay, migrants were asked the following question "For what reasons did you want to leave the country where you were living at this time?" Answers to this open-ended question were coded afterwards; in this chapter, the four main categories of motive are used.



Fig. 7.8 Motives of first migration to Belgium and the United Kingdom among Congolese migrants, by period of arrival (1975–2008)

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over living in Belgium or the UK at the time of the survey
Interpretation: Each bar represents the percentage of migrants who mentioned the specific migration motive, by period of arrival
Statistical significance: changes are statistically significant for studies between the first period and the third period ($p < 0.01$), for political reasons between the first and second periods ($p < 0.05$), and between the first and third periods ($p < 0.05$)

were much more frequent in the UK (Fig. 7.10) where, on average, three-quarters of migrants applied, compared to one third of Congolese migrants living in Belgium. Interestingly, the percentage of asylum seekers in the UK has decreased, suggesting that other ways of migrating, such as family reunification, have been increasingly available to migrants to the UK.

7.4.4 Diversification of Strategies and Routes

While new barriers to migration may have somewhat curbed Congolese migration to Europe – probably by diverting some of them to other African countries – and contributed to the decrease in returns, they may also have contributed to the diversification of migrants' strategies for reaching Europe. In a study of Congolese migrants in Paris in the early 2000s, Lututala (2005) indicates that two-thirds of migrants in his sample (n = 122) had transited via another country before arriving in



Fig. 7.9 Motives of first migration to Belgium and the United Kingdom among Congolese migrants, by destination country (1975–2008)

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over living in Belgium or the UK at the time of the survey
Interpretation: Each bar represents the percentage of migrants who mentioned the specific migration motive, by country of destination
Statistical significance: Differences between countries are statistically significant for economic reasons ($p < 0.01$), family reasons ($p < 0.05$) and studies ($p < 0.01$). Differences are not statistically significant for political reasons ($p > 0.10$)

France. Irregular immigration has increased and several studies show that it has become a key component of Congolese migration to Europe (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Tshibambe 2010), though its scale has not been documented. The phenomenon of "Ngulus", migrants travelling with an official group (e.g. sports team, music band or religious group) and overstaying their visas, is thought to have helped boost the numbers of undocumented Congolese migrants (Sumata et al. 2004; George 2004; Hanon 2004; Tshibambe 2010).

The MAFE surveys both confirm and nuance this picture of Congolese migration. The growing complexity of strategies is visible through several types of data collected in the biographical surveys (Fig. 7.11). For instance, people were asked to mention the types of step they had undertaken to migrate to Belgium and the UK. These data show that migrants have increasingly used false documents or other people's documents; this was the case with one out of six migrants who arrived after the year 2000, compared to 5% in the 1970s–1980s (Fig. 7.11). This is consistent with the findings of qualitative work on this topic (Sumata et al. 2004; Tshibambe 2010). The increasing role of smugglers is also visible in the data collected on the people with whom migrants travelled. Some 9% of people who arrived after 2000



Fig. 7.10 Percentage of Congolese migrants having applied for asylum in the first year of their stay (Belgium, United Kingdom), by period of first arrival (1975–2008)

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Belgium or the UK at the time of the survey
Interpretation: Each bar represents the percentage of migrants who applied for asylum in the first year of their stay in their country of residence, by period of first arrival
Statistical significance: changes are significant in Belgium between the first and third periods ($p < 0.01$), in the UK between the second and third periods ($p < 0.01$) and in the two countries together between the first and second periods ($p < 0.01$) and between the first and third periods ($p < 0.01$)

mentioned having travelled with a smuggler, compared to 3% in the 1970s and 1980s. While these figures represent a small proportion of Congolese migrants and the change is not statistically significant, *this is part of the diversification of migration strategies* (Sumata et al. 2004; Tshibambe 2010). Finally, the growing percentage of undocumented people is another sign of these changes. Almost one in three migrants arriving in Belgium or the UK in the 1990s and 2000s was undocumented at some point in the first year of their stay, compared to about 10% before the 1990s. When any of these three characteristics are combined, some 40% of Congolese migrant arriving in Europe in the 2000s were in some way "irregular" migrants, compared to 15% in the 1980s.

The growing share of irregular migration is probably a response to increasingly restrictive immigration policies (Beauchemin et al. 2015). In contexts where legal means of entry are to a large extent limited to people with human and social capital (Vickstrom 2014), people with little education and no family members in destinations countries have few options for migrating to Europe. The MAFE surveys show that less educated people without close family members (parents, children or part-



Fig. 7.11 Percentage of congolese migrants travelling with smugglers, using false documents or having no residence permit in the first year (Belgium, United Kingdom), by period of first arrival (1975–2008). Biographic data, weighted percentages

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Belgium or the UK at the time of the survey
Definitions: *Smugglers* correspond to people who mentioned having travelled with smugglers at some point during their journey to the destination country; *false documents* corresponds to people who mentioned having acquired false documents or someone else's documents in preparing for their migration; *no permit* corresponds to people without a residence permit at some point in the first year of their stay in the destination country. The category *any one of these three* concerns people who were in any one of these three categories
Interpretation: Each bar represents the percentage of migrants who travelled with smugglers, or with false documents, or who were without a residence permit at some point during the first year of stay (or with any of these three characteristics), by period of first arrival
Statistical significance: differences between the 1970s–1980s and the 2000s are statistically significant for false documents ($p < 0.10$), people without residence permits ($p < 0.01$), and the three characteristics combined ($p < 0.01$). Changes are not significant for the percentage of people travelling with smugglers or for changes between the 1990s and the 2000s ($p > 0.10$)

ner) at destination are indeed the most likely to be irregular migrants (half of them), whereas migrants with some higher education and close family members at destination are much less likely (less than 20%) to use false documents, to be undocumented at some point in the first year, or to use smugglers (Fig. 7.12).

Another aspect of the changes occurring in strategies to reach Europe is that routes are shifting. Migrants may transit through one or several countries before reaching their destination for various reasons, and may adapt these routes to new circumstances. Tighter border controls may force migrants to use more complex routes; migrants may also settle temporarily in third countries (e.g. Angola) to raise



Fig. 7.12 Percentage of Congolese migrants travelling with smugglers, using false documents or having no residence permit in the first year (Belgium, United Kingdom), by level of education and family members at destination (1975–2008). Biographic data, weighted percentages

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Belgium or the UK at the time of the survey
Definitions: *Irregular migrants* are defined as those with one or several of the following characteristics: travelled with smugglers, used false documents or someone else's documents, had no residence permit at some point in the first year of stay. Low education includes levels from no education to completed secondary education. People with *family* at destination refers to respondents whose partner, father, mother or child was living in the destination country the year before the respondent's migration
Interpretation: Each bar represents the percentage of irregular migrants for each combination of the variables 'education' and 'family'
Statistical significance: All differences are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), except between the first and second categories, and between the second and third categories ($p > 0.10$)

money before travelling to Europe (Trapido 2011) or to obtain false documents (Tshibambe 2010); they may move to another country to more easily obtain a visa for a European country (e.g. migrants going to Gabon or Cameroon to obtain French visas, Lututala 2007), or may live for a while in one European country before moving to another. For the purposes of this chapter, a migration route is the series of countries in which people stayed (for a short or long period) before settling in the country of residence at the time of the survey. For instance, someone may move from DR Congo to Belgium, and then settle in the UK. Others may have much more complex routes, or go directly from DR Congo to their country of residence (usually flying from Kinshasa to a European destination).

Overall, indirect migration routes have not increased in a significant way when both destinations are analyzed together, and around 60% of migrants still fly directly

Table 7.2 Top three transit countries on the way to belgium and the United Kingdom, by period of arrival (1975–2008)

Periods			
1975–1989	1990–1999	2000–2008	1975–2008
Migrants living in Belgium			
Congo Brazzaville (6%)	France (12%)	Angola (7%)	France (7%)
France (3%)	Portugal (6%)	France (5%)	Angola (6%)
Angola (3%)	Angola (5%)	Kenya (3%)	Kenya (2%)
N = 50	N = 84	N = 131	N = 265
Migrants living in the United Kingdom			
–	Belgium (14%)	France (16%)	France (13%)
–	Nigeria (9%)	Belgium (9%)	Belgium (11%)
–	France (6%)	Angola (4%)	South Africa (4%)
N = 7	N = 63	N = 79	n = 149

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK, 2009. Weighted figures
Population: All migrants aged 25 and over, living in Belgium or the UK at the time of the survey
Definitions: Migrants are considered to have transited via one of these countries if they spent at least one night there on their way to their destination country
Interpretation: figures between brackets represent those who transited through the country as a percentage of all migrants. Samples are small and these results are therefore subject to large sampling errors. They should be interpreted accordingly

from DR Congo to their destination country.[6] However, indirect routes to Belgium did increase significantly in the 1990s compared to the earlier periods, resulting mainly from increases in transits through France, Portugal, and Angola (Table 7.2). This partly reflects the growing percentage of undocumented migrants, and is consistent with qualitative research documenting migration routes among Congolese migrants (Lututala 2007; Tshibambe 2010). Migrants to the UK were more likely to use indirect routes than migrants to Belgium. A substantial percentage of migrants settling in the UK came through France and Belgium (almost one in four migrants over the 1975–2008 period), reflecting the fact that the UK was a new destination for migrants who were already in Europe. Some African countries also served as transits (Nigeria, Angola, South Africa). The higher proportion of complex routes to the UK is also correlated with UK's larger share of undocumented migrants (Fig. 7.13).

All in all, routes have somewhat diversified, but it is mainly from the administrative point of view that the strategies of Congolese migrants have become more complex, especially since the 1990s. The increasing use of biometry for travel documents – making false papers less effective – and restricted access to family reunification – rendering legal entry more difficult – may lead Congolese migrants to diversify their routes to Europe, or choose other destinations altogether.

[6] MAFE surveys also show that, unlike other migrants (e.g. Senegalese migrants to Spain), Congolese migrants are very unlikely to travel by boat or pirogue.



Fig. 7.13 Percentage of Congolese migrants who reached their country of residence through an indirect route, by period of arrival and country of residence (1975–2008)

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in Belgium and the UK, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All migrants aged 18 and over, living in Belgium or the UK at the time of the survey
Definitions: Migrants are considered to have used an *indirect route* if they did not go directly from their country of origin (DR Congo) to their country of residence (Belgium or the UK), i.e. if they spent at least one night in another country on their way to their destination country
Interpretation: Each bar represents the percentage of migrants with an indirect route
Statistical significance: changes are significant ($p < 0.10$) in Belgium between the first period (1975–1989) and the second period (1990–1999), but not between the first and third periods. Changes are not significant in the UK or for the two countries together ($p > 0.10$). Differences between Belgium and the UK are significant for the first period ($p < 0.01$) and the third period ($p < 0.05$)

7.5 Conclusion

Congolese migration has undergone enormous changes since the 1970s. Departures from Kinshasa have greatly increased, while returns have decreased over the same period. *These changes have not been homogeneous across destinations,* however. Departures to African destinations have rocketed, whereas migration to Europe somewhat increased in the worst moments of the crisis in DR Congo, but decreased later. North America has attracted a growing share of Congolese migrants, and Congolese would-be migrants increasingly mention North American countries as their destination of choice.

The large increase in departures and the decrease in returns are probably connected with the deterioration in economic and political conditions in DR Congo. Migration has become a key strategy for improving living conditions in Kinshasa,

where conditions are very uncertain. Changes in destination countries have also contributed to the reshaping of Congolese migration patterns. Increasingly restrictive immigration policies in Europe, along with the opening up of new opportunities in Africa in the 1990s, have probably both led to the growing share of migrants heading to African countries. *Migration policies in Europe have encouraged the adoption of increasingly complex trajectories and strategies for reaching Europe and contributed to the decrease in returns from Europe*. Since the 1990s, the migrants' strategies have become increasingly complex. The combination of great uncertainty in economic and political conditions in Congo and the increasing difficulty of gaining entry to Europe makes return very unlikely. Very few Congolese migrants living in Europe have returned in the most recent periods, and most Congolese also intend to stay for a long time. The changing profiles of migrants to Europe are further signs of transformation in Congolese migration over recent decades. The increasing percentage of female migrants partly reflects the shift in Congolese migration towards settlement migration, while the larger share of less educated migrants is related to the instability in Congo and to the growing share of asylum seekers since the 1990s.

As to the future evolution of Congolese migration, *political and economic conditions in DR Congo have been very unpredictable over the last decades, and their impact on future departures and returns is necessarily speculative*. An improvement in living conditions in DR Congo may facilitate returns (Tshibambe and Lelu 2010), but will not necessarily translate into fewer departures. As more development usually goes hand in hand with more migration (de Haas 2007), improving economic and political conditions in DR Congo may in fact lead to more migration. Where to? While Europe has lost some of its attractiveness in the eyes of Congolese migrants and would-be migrants, its relative proximity, the historical ties, a common language with some countries and the presence of a large Congolese community in Europe may continue to make it a destination for migrants or would-be migrants. However, trends in both recent migration and migration projects suggest that African and North American destinations will be increasingly attractive to Congolese migrants, and that the Congolese diaspora may be transformed in the coming decades.

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Chapter 8
Congolese Migrants' Economic Trajectories in Europe and After Return

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8.1 Introduction

The economic integration of migrants is a central theme in the migration policies of destination countries. As spelled out by the European Commission, the integration of migrants is a "driver of economic development and social cohesion" (European Commission 2011a, p.12). From the host societies' perspective, the economic integration of migrants is important for economic competitiveness, to avoid the risk of social exclusion, and as a response to public concern about immigration (European

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Commission 2011a; Benton et al. 2014). From the migrants' standpoint, integration into the labour market is a major way of fulfilling a common objective of migration: improving their living conditions and those of their relatives back home. The contribution of migrants to their home country, through remittances, investments or transfers of knowledge and skills, is also an important policy theme (European Commission 2011b), and this contribution depends on the economic and social integration of migrants in their host countries. Understanding the links between the integration of migrants in host countries and their contribution to the home country is thus an increasingly important topic (M4D 2012).

Existing knowledge on the integration of African migrants into the European labour markets is still patchy. While it is widely acknowledged that third country nationals in the European Union have lower employment levels than European citizens (European Commission 2011a), there have been few specific studies of African migrants' labour market participation. Existing studies mostly rely on cross-sectional data, preventing analyses of changes in labour market participation over time. Recent reports by the Migration Policy Institute and the International Labour Organization are exceptions (Benton et al. 2014). Using successive Labour Force Surveys (2003–2011) and a synthetic cohort approach, these studies offer new insights into the labour market integration of migrants in several European countries. However, except in the French report (Simon and Steichen 2014), migrants from sub-Saharan Africa were not isolated for analysis as a group. Moreover, while these studies provide innovative and useful information on migrants' integration, the links between migrants' economic participation and their contribution to their home country is not studied; looking at migrants' reintegration after return is not possible either, since LFS data are collected in destination countries only.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe Congolese migrants' occupational trajectories during their stay in Europe and after their return to DR Congo, as well as their economic contributions to their home country during their stay in Europe. While the chapter's aim is essentially descriptive, selected analyses by socio-economic variable also give insights into the factors that influence migrants' position in the labour market. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section is a brief review of existing studies of the economic integration of Congolese migrants in Belgium and the UK, on their economic contribution to DR Congo, and on their reintegration back home. The second section focuses on the integration of Congolese migrants into the labour market in Belgium and in the UK using the data collected as part of the *Migration between Africa and Europe* (MAFE) project. Remittances, investments, and contributions to the non-profit sector are described in the third section. Finally, the trajectories of return migrants from Europe are analysed in the fourth section.

8.2 Background

Congolese migration to Belgium dates back to colonial times, but the number of Congolese migrants remained low until the independence of DR Congo (1960). The 1960s and 1970s marked the beginning of significant immigration from DR Congo, and by 2010, the number of Congolese migrants in Belgium (including undocumented

migrants and asylum seekers) was estimated at about 50,000 (Schoumaker and Schoonvaere 2012). Congolese immigration to the UK is much more recent. It began in the 1980s and gained momentum in the 1990s (Rutter 2006; Styan 2003). In 2011, the population of Congolese migrants was estimated by the Annual Population Survey at around 20,000 (ONS 2012). In both countries, the composition of the migrant population has changed significantly over time: asylum seekers have represented a significant share of Congolese migrants since the 1990s, the education profile of migrants has diversified and the share of female migrants has increased (see Schoumaker and Flahaux, Chap. 7 in this volume). In both Belgium and the United Kingdom, Congolese migrants are mainly living in urban areas, and notably in or close to the capital. Half of all Congolese migrants in Belgium live in Brussels (Schoonvaere 2010), and approximately two thirds of Congolese in the UK are thought to live in the Greater London area (IOM 2006). In Belgium, Congolese migrants predominantly live in the French speaking regions (more than 80% of migrants live in Brussels and Wallonia), so that the language barrier is limited in Belgium. In contrast, language may constitute a problem for job access in the UK (Hack-Polay 2008).

Studies of the economic integration of Congolese migrants in Belgium and in the UK – and of sub-Saharan African migrants in general – are rare and based almost exclusively on cross-sectional data (Box 8.1). The main data come from censuses – which generally include only legal migrants and are collected at 10-year intervals – and from the Labour Force Surveys (LFS), but small samples of Congolese migrants limit the possibilities for in-depth analysis. Some very interesting qualitative work has been produced on Congolese migrants in Belgium (Kawaya Meya and Mazzochetti 2014; Maskens 2014) and in the UK (Pachi et al. 2010), even though their results cannot be generalized to the Congolese migrant populations as a whole. Despite these limitations, it is possible to draw a broad picture of Congolese migrants' employment situations in Belgium and in the UK.

In both countries, data show that Congolese migrants have poor outcomes in the labour market (Desmarez et al. 2004; Schoonvaere 2010; Vause 2011; Feld 2010; Spence 2005), and are among the most disadvantaged migrant populations in terms of employment (Schoonvaere 2010; Mitton and Aspinall 2011). In Belgium, the unemployment rate of Congolese nationals[1] was slightly over 40% in 2006 (Sopemi-Belgique 2008), and was estimated at close to 50% in the 2001 census (Feld 2010). Data in the UK also show very high unemployment among Congolese people: a study in the London area, based on the 2001 Census data, indicates that 45% of the active Congolese people were unemployed, which is one of the highest unemployment rates among foreigners in the London area.[2] Congolese migrants are also disproportionately employed in low quality jobs. According to the 2001 UK census, 45% of working Congolese migrants in the London area were working in the four

[1] The data do not strictly refer to migrants, but only to Congolese nationals. Naturalized migrants are more likely to work (Phongi Kingiela 2010), so unemployment rates among migrants are probably a little lower.

[2] Unemployment rates of Congolese living outside London were lower (22.7%), but still one of the highest among foreign populations (Spence 2005).

Box 8.1: Economic Integration of Migrants in Belgium and in the UK
Employment rates among immigrants are particularly low in Belgium (OCDE-SOPEMI 2008), and Belgium is the European country where non-EU-born migrants have the lowest employment rate (de Keyser et al. 2012). In 2010, 46% of immigrants born outside European Union (aged 15–64) were working, compared to more than 60% for EU-born migrants and people born in Belgium (de Keyser et al. 2012). Lower employment among non-EU migrants persists after controlling for age, gender and education (de Keyser et al. 2012). Discrimination, restricted access to certain types of jobs and lack of recognition of diplomas are thought to contribute to the wasting of the economic potential of non-EU-born migrants (de Keyser et al. 2012; Huddleston et al. 2011).

In the UK, employment rates for non-EU-born migrants are over 60%, above the European average (de Keyser et al. 2012). While non-EU-born migrants are less likely to be employed than EU-born people, differences in employment rates are much lower in the UK than in Belgium (Clancy 2008; Eurostat 2011), reflecting easier access to the labour market for non-EU migrants in the UK than in Belgium (Huddleston et al. 2011). Indeed, Congolese migrants perceive the UK labour market as more dynamic and open (Pachi et al. 2010).

In both countries, sub-Saharan African immigrants are disadvantaged in the labour market (for the UK, see Dustmann et al. 2003; for Belgium, see Desmarez et al. 2004). Their unemployment rates are higher than for migrants from other regions, and the jobs they hold are often in the lower occupational categories. The reasons for this situation, which is also observed in France (Simon and Steichen 2014), have not been studied in detail to our knowledge.

lowest-paid occupational groups. In Belgium, several studies also indicate that the labour market is highly segmented, with African immigrants (largely composed of Congolese) overrepresented in low-skilled jobs (Adam 2007a).

The poor outcomes of Congolese migrants partly reflect the disadvantages found among other immigrant communities, particularly black African communities. Discrimination, lack of recognition of diplomas, language barriers (especially for French-speaking migrants in the UK) influence their integration in the labour market (Dustmann et al. 2005; Ouali 2007). Their difficulties also result from particular features of Congolese migrant populations. A high proportion of Congolese migrants arrived in Belgium and the UK as asylum seekers, a situation that may partly explain their low participation in the labour market (Spence 2005; Mitton and Aspinall 2011; Rutter 2006, Hack-Polay 2008). On the other hand, Congolese migrants have fairly high levels of education compared to other migrant populations (especially in Belgium), and their difficulties in the labour market do not *a priori* result from their lack of qualifications. Belgian data show that unemployment among educated Congolese people is lower than among uneducated migrants, but is still very high (Feld 2010).

Existing studies of the economic contribution Congolese migrants make to their home country are also limited in numbers and rely on small samples, but they provide useful background information. They show that migrants' contributions mainly take the form of remittances to help their families (De Bruyn and Wets 2006; Sumata 2002; Bazenguissa-Ganga 2005; Mangalu Mobhe 2011). With the deterioration of economic conditions in the 1980s and 1990s, migration became a strategy for diversifying incomes, and remittances are thought to have become a key aspect of migration to Europe (Sumata 2002). Remittances are to a large extent used for daily consumption, education, health care and particular circumstances like funerals (De Bruyn and Wets 2006; Mangalu Mobhe 2011). In contrast, investments tend to be small (De Bruyn and Wets 2006). According to Sumata (2002, p. 622), investing in business is "too risky with a weak return to investment", reflecting the impact of DR Congo's poor economic situation and challenging business climate. The literature shows diverging views on Congolese migrants' investment in the non-profit sector and their contributions to community development. According to some researchers, Congolese migrants make a limited contribution to development projects (Bazenguissa-Ganga 2005; De Bruyn and Wets 2006); others suggest that Congolese migrants (in Belgium) are very much involved in such projects (Perrin and Martiniello 2011). These qualitative studies rely on small purposive samples, making generalization and comparisons difficult. To our knowledge, no research has specifically looked at the link between Congolese migrants' integration in Europe and their economic contribution to their home countries. However, results from Mangalu's research (2011) suggest that employment is a key factor, as Congolese migrants in Europe are twice as likely to send remittances when they hold a job as when they do not.

Finally, return migrants' reintegration in DR Congo has received very little attention in the literature. Until the late 1980s, migrants to Europe were to a large extent intellectuals and qualified people coming to Europe for education. A large proportion of them returned with the prospect of finding a good job on their return (Flahaux 2011; Ngoie Tshibambe and Mbuyi Kabunda 2010). From the late 1980s, and especially in the 1990s, the economic and political situation deteriorated and the conditions for return migrants worsened. As a result, return migrations drastically decreased (see Chap. 3), and it is also thought that the share of voluntary return has decreased in recent generations (Ngoie Tshibambe and Mbuyi Kabunda 2010), although few data exist on this topic.

8.3 The Migrants' Integration into the European Labour Market

In this chapter Congolese migrants' occupational trajectories are described, starting from their last year in DR Congo and up to the present in Europe. The data were collected among Congolese migrants aged 25 and 75 living in Belgium and in the UK.

8.3.1 From Congo to Europe: Leaving Employment

For Congolese migrants, *leaving their country means a radical change in their occupational status*. Before leaving DR Congo (Fig. 8.1, last year in DR Congo) half of the migrants had a job and about a quarter of them were students. Around two thirds of people with a job were in intermediate or higher occupations, indicating these migrants come from better-off groups in DR Congo. The rest of the migrants (about a quarter) were either unemployed or inactive. Two major changes occur on arrival. First, *the share of students increases* to more than 40% in the first year in Europe, illustrating the importance of studies as a motive for migration among the Congolese. Secondly, *the share of employed people decreases drastically*, from 50% to a little over 10%, and those working become concentrated in



Fig. 8.1 Occupational status in the last year in Africa, at each year of stay in Europe (for the first ten years) and at the time of the survey in Europe, (weighted percentages)

Source: MAFE-Congo–Biographic survey in Belgium and in the United Kingdom
Interpretation: percentage distribution of respondents by occupational status at various points in time, before leaving Africa (last year in DR Congo), by duration of stay in Europe, and at the time of the survey (last bar).
Significance (Design-based F-test): The difference in the distribution between the last year in Africa and the first year in Europe is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test). The difference between the first year in Europe and the tenth year in Europe is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test)

elementary jobs. As a result, the percentage of unemployed and inactive people reaches almost 50% of the migrants in their first year in Europe. This shift to low levels of employment and low-skilled jobs clearly shows that migrants' occupations are largely affected by their migration – and not for the better, at least in terms of types of job.

Changes of status between the last year in Africa and the first year in Europe (Fig. 8.2) give insights into the dynamics of these aggregate changes. First, a large share of those holding better jobs in DR Congo become students in Europe (Fig. 8.2); they form, together with people who were already students in DR Congo, the bulk of the students. Inactive people tend to remain inactive, but a significant share of people who were employed or students also join the inactive group in Europe (especially among females). Unemployed people tend to remain unemployed, but are joined by former workers and a few former students. All in all, *very few of the migrants who were working in DR Congo were still working during their first year in Europe*. Most of them either became students, or became inactive or unemployed.



Fig. 8.2 Comparison of occupational status in the last year in DR Congo and the first year in Europe (weighted percentages)

Source: MAFE-Congo–Biographic survey in Belgium and in the United Kingdom
Population: Congolese migrants living in Belgium and the United Kingdom
Interpretation: a little over 30% of the migrants were in intermediate or high-skilled occupations before leaving DR Congo (*before)*. Among them, around half became students during their first year in Europe (*after*)

8.3.2 Staying in Europe: Slow Improvements

As time passes, occupational statuses change (Fig. 8.1). The most visible changes are the decrease in the share of students and the increase in working people. After 10 years of stay, approximately half of the migrants are working, as against just over 10% in the first year. Among working migrants, the proportion with intermediate or high-level jobs also increases, reaching around 45% after 10 years compared to 30% in the first year. In summary, *there is a shift towards greater employment, mainly due to a decrease in the number of students*, and a relative stability in the distribution for the other statuses. The distribution of occupational status at survey time is overall quite similar to the distribution after 10 years of stay: only half of Congolese migrants are working, and the unemployment rate is 22%.[3]

How have people moved between statuses between their first year in Europe and the time of the survey? Those with intermediate or high-skilled jobs are largely former students (Fig. 8.3). Some people who were unemployed, inactive or in low-skilled occupations have also succeeded in getting high-skilled jobs, but they remain the exception. As shown in previous research among Congolese migrants in Europe (Rakotonarivo and Vause 2011), studying in Europe is the most common route for getting a skilled job in Europe. Not all students get a high-skilled job however. Some remain students, others become inactive or unemployed, and a significant share obtain elementary jobs. As discussed later, approximately half of those with higher education are in elementary occupations.

At the time of the survey, the majority of Congolese migrants who held a job were dependent workers in elementary occupations (Table 8.1). The large majority of Congolese migrants work in trade and services, few of them work in industry, and nobody in our sample worked in agriculture. This contrasts with Senegalese migrants in Spain and in Italy, for instance (Castagnone et al. 2014). Types of job and levels of employment differ strongly across gender. While women are more likely to be employed in trade and services, they are also more likely to be employed in low-skilled jobs. They are very much concentrated in a few specific types of job: nurses, caregivers and cleaners. Men occupy a much wider range of jobs, from labourers to doctors and teachers.

[3] This rate (ratio of unemployed people to active people) is high, but is much lower than the unemployment rates for Congolese nationals estimated from census data in the early 2000s (above 40% in Belgium). Differences in definitions of the population may explain part of the discrepancy: published statistics often refer to Congolese nationals, and do not include Congolese migrants who have acquired Belgian or UK citizenship – and who are also more likely to have a job (Phongi Kingiela 2014). The younger people (<25) are also not included in the MAFE surveys, and the inclusion of undeclared labor in the MAFE surveys may also contribute to a lower unemployment rate in the MAFE data.



Fig. 8.3 Comparison of first occupational status in Europe and occupational status at survey time in Europe (weighted percentages)

Source: MAFE-Congo–Biographic survey in Belgium and in the United Kingdom
Population: Congolese migrants living in Belgium and the United Kingdom
Interpretation: a little less than 30% of migrants were inactive in their first year in Europe (*first)*. Among these, the majority were either still inactive at the time of the survey or are in elementary occupations (*survey*)

Table 8.1 Employment sector, level of occupation and type of employment of congolese migrants in Belgium and in the UK in 2009, by gender

	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Employment sector			
Agriculture	0	0	0
Industry and construction	12	1	7
Trade, services and other	88	99	93
Level of occupation			
Elementary	47	68	57
Intermediate	18	11	15
Higher	35	21	28
Type of employment			
Dependant worker	81	93	87
Self-employed	19	7	13
Total	100	100	100
N	118	90	208

Source: MAFE-Congo – Biographic surveys in Belgium and in the United Kingdom
Population: Migrants in Belgium and in the UK. Weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Interpretation: 12% of males working Congolese migrants were employed in industry and construction in Europe (Belgium and the UK) at the time of the survey (2009)
Statistical Significance: Differences between men and women are statistically significant (Design Based F-test) for employment sector ($p < 0.01$), level of occupation ($p < 0.05$) and type of employment ($p < 0.01$)

8.3.3 Migrants' Integration Compared Across Categories

Occupational trajectories vary across categories of migrants (Fig. 8.4). Analyses by gender show that the profiles before migration are not very different, but during their stay in Europe female migrants are more likely to be inactive than their male counterparts, and less likely to be working or studying. These differences in occupation partly reflect the fact that female migrants are more likely to come through family reunification than their male counterparts. As discussed in the previous section, the situation improves over time, but in the end men are more likely than women to have a job, especially in intermediate or high-level jobs.

The global picture is broadly similar in Belgium and the UK, but migrants in the UK are overall less likely to be working than migrants living in Belgium. This difference is visible *before* migration, on *arrival*, and the difference persists at survey time, with higher unemployment in the UK (27%) than in Belgium (19%). This may seem paradoxical, since the UK is viewed as offering more opportunities in the labour market than France or Belgium, including among the Congolese migrants (Pachi et al. 2010). However, this may result from the larger percentage of asylum seekers and undocumented migrants in the UK, who have more difficulties integrating into the labour market. Language barriers may also explain the higher unemployment rate in the UK. Migrants in the UK are also more likely to be undocumented at some point.

Undocumented migrants are overall less likely to be working than documented migrants. *Before* migration, migrants who were undocumented their first year in Europe were less likely to work, and were also more likely to hold low-skilled jobs, illustrating a selection effect with regard to legal status. In their first years in Europe, very few undocumented migrants find work and those that do are mainly in low-skilled jobs; a significant share of these migrants has reported being students.[4] Over time, the situation of undocumented migrants improves, and a significant share work in skilled jobs. Some of them may work as undocumented workers and others may have experienced only a short period as undocumented migrants. At survey time, migrant occupation is strongly linked to possession of a residence permit: 18% of the migrants without a residence permit were working, as against 53% among migrants with a residence permit.

Differences by period of arrival are more pronounced. Patterns of Congolese migration to Europe have greatly changed over the last four decades (Schoumaker and Flahaux, Chap. 7 in this volume), and this is also visible in occupational histories. Migrants who entered Europe before the mid 1990's were more likely to be former students than were those who arrived after 1995; those arriving after the mid 1990's were also more likely to be in low-skilled jobs or unemployed before migration. The most striking difference, however, is found during their stay in Europe:

[4] Some migrants may succeed in registering at University without a residence permit. Moreover, undocumented migrants include all migrants who, at some point during the year, did not have a residence permit. Their undocumented status may thus be for a limited duration.



Fig. 8.4 Occupational status in the last year in Africa, at each year of stay in Europe (first ten years), and at survey time, by gender, country of residence, period of arrival, legal status and education (weighted percentages)

Source: MAFE-Congo–Biographic survey in Belgium and in the United Kingdom
Population: Congolese migrants living in Belgium and the United Kingdom
Interpretation: percentage distribution of respondents by occupational status at various points in time, before leaving Africa (last year in DR Congo), by duration of stay in Europe, and at the time of the survey
Significance (Design-based F-test): All the differences in the distributions between the last year in Africa and the first year in Europe are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test). All the differences between the first year in Europe and the tenth year in Europe are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test)
Note: Legal status for the first year in Europe is used for the last year in Africa



Fig. 8.4 (continued)

access to intermediate and high-skilled jobs has decreased markedly for Congolese migrants. While this may be partly linked due to their changing profiles (less educated, more female migrants), this transformation also suggests that upward professional mobility among migrants has become increasingly difficult.

Finally, *the most striking differences are found between migrants with some higher education, and those with lower levels of education*: their profiles prior to migration are very different and their occupational histories in Europe are also highly contrasted. The better educated were more likely to work and hold high-skilled jobs while in DR Congo, and are also much more likely to work and have high-skilled jobs in Europe. Again, this points to the very high impact of human capital on access to employment, especially for intermediate and high-skilled jobs. Nevertheless, people with higher education are not immune to unemployment and low-skilled jobs: at the time of the survey, more than a third of the Congolese migrants with higher education either had no job or were working in an elementary job, confirming that many educated migrants are underemployed (De Keyzer et al. 2012).

This mismatch between education and employment is further described by comparing level of education and type of employment over time (among working people with some higher education). People in the "severe mismatch" category comprise migrants with some higher education working in elementary occupations. The "mod-



Fig. 8.5 Mismatch between level of education and type of job in the last year in Africa, at each year of stay in Europe (first ten years) and at the time of the survey in Europe, among respondents with higher education, (weighted percentages)

Source: MAFE-Congo–Biographic survey in Belgium and in the United Kingdom
Population: Congolese migrants with a job (time-varying) and higher education (time-varying) living in Belgium and the United Kingdom
Significance (Design-based F-test). Difference between educational mismatch …
… last year in Africa and first year in Europe : $p < 0.01$
… first year in Europe and tenth year in Europe: n.s ($p > 0.10$)
… first year in Europe and year of survey (2009): n.s. ($p > 0.10$)

erate mismatch" includes migrants with some higher education and intermediate jobs. The "no mismatch" category includes people with higher education and high-skilled jobs. As shown on Fig. 8.5, severe mismatches increase strongly between the last year in Africa and the first year in Europe. In their first year in Europe, more than half of the workers with higher education have unskilled jobs (severe mismatch). This percentage increases in the first few years, as new migrants obtain (or accept) jobs that are well below their qualifications. The situation progressively improves, but the situation at the time of the survey is not significantly different from the situation in the first year: less than 40% of the Congolese migrants hold a job that matches their level of education. This high level of 'brain waste' confirms results from previous studies in Belgium (Adam 2007b; Schoonvaere 2010).

Previous studies among Congolese migrants suggest that the likelihood of occupying a job below one's level of qualification results from a variety of factors. Migrants in vulnerable situation such as undocumented migrants are more likely to

experience this situation (Phongi Kingiela 2014). Migrants with stronger obligations or commitments towards family members in their home country (elder children, migrants with parents in DR Congo, female migrants) may be also be more prone to accept any job in order to fulfil these obligations (Phongi Kingiela 2014; Vause 2011). In contrast, social capital in Europe helps in finding better jobs and tends to limit the brain waste (Vause 2011). In addition, the lack of recognition of diplomas and discrimination may force migrants to accept jobs below their level of qualification (Ouali 2007; Rugira 2014; Hack-Polay 2008). This brain waste and the difficulty educated migrants have in "taking off" (Maskens 2014) not only directly impact their earning potential and economic well-being, but also their self-esteem, their relations with spouses, and their credibility in trying to encourage their children to invest in education (Kawaya Meya and Mazzochetti 2014; Maskens 2014).

8.4 Migrants' Economic Contribution to DR Congo

Migrants' integration into the labour market in Europe is a key factor for their well-being. Their economic integration in Europe also has implications for DR Congo. While staying in Europe, Congolese migrants send remittances (usually mainly to their family (Mangalu Mobhe 2011)), invest in houses, land or businesses, and also contribute to the non-profit sector. These economic contributions are not equally frequent, and they also vary depending on the characteristics of the migrants.

Remittances are both the most frequent type of economic contribution to the home country and the ones that increase most clearly with time (Fig. 8.6). During



Fig. 8.6 Proportion of congolese migrants sending remittances, owning asset(s), and contributing to the non-profit sector at three points in time (weighted percentages)

Source: MAFE-Congo–Biographic survey in Belgium and in the United Kingdom
Population: Congolese migrants living in Belgium and in the UK in 2009. Weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Significance. Changes over time are significant for the three variables (F-test, $p < 0.01$)

their first year in Europe, a quarter of the migrants report sending money regularly to DR Congo; at the time of the survey, almost two-thirds of Congolese migrants were remitting to DR Congo (Table 8.2). As shown by Phongi Kingiela (2014), most Congolese migrants start remitting at some point, and, once they have started, few migrants stop sending money to their home country. In the Congolese context, where economic conditions have seriously deteriorated since the 1990s, remittances from migrants are an important way of helping families back in DR Congo with their daily living expenses, as well as health care and schooling expenses (Sumata 2002;. Mangalu Mobhe 2011). They enable families to diversify income sources and face up to market uncertainties (de Haas 2008; Gubert 2010).

Remitting is also the transnational economic behaviour most tightly linked to employment (Table 8.2). People with jobs are much more likely to send remittances than people who are not working, both at the beginning of their stay (45% versus 24%) and at the time of the survey (72% versus 57%). This clearly illustrates the link between the migrants' integration into the labour market and their contribution to DR Congo. Migrants with low levels of education are also less likely to remit when they arrive in Europe, but this difference disappears over time, as does the difference between countries. Legal status, in contrast, is strongly related to remitting behaviour at the time of the survey. In short, remittances are widespread and are clearly greater among migrants with a better integration status as measured by employment and residence permit.

Investing in assets back home may also be a way for migrants to increase and diversify their sources of revenues, as well as a way of supporting their relatives, for instance by providing them with a house. It may also be a way of preparing for their return. At the time of departure, a fifth of migrants already owned at least one asset in DR Congo, mainly in real estate (Table 8.2).[5] Overall, investing in the home country does not seem to be a priority among Congolese migrants (contrary to Senegalese or Ghanaians–see Chaps. 11 and 14 in this volume). The percentage of migrants owning an asset in DR Congo increases relatively modestly over time, from 21% to 31% at the time of the survey (the average time from arrival to date of survey is 15 years). The increase in the mean number of assets (0.40 in the first year, and 0.56 at the time of the survey) is also relatively small. The lack of security for investments in DRC (Sumata 2002) and the low level of intentions to return among Congolese migrants (see Schoumaker and Flahaux, Chap. 7 in this volume) probably partly explain this. Some of the migrants actually preferred investing in their destination country; at the time of the survey around 10% of the migrants had invested in Europe (mainly Belgium).

There are, however, notable differences in asset ownership by gender in DRC, education and legal status. First, men are much more likely to own assets than are women. Men are often household heads and regarded as the owners of family property. Their higher incomes may also explain their greater asset ownership. Interestingly, women's investments increase significantly over time, and the relative

[5] The assets mainly comprise houses and apartments (about 30%), building plots (about 40%), agricultural land (10%), and businesses (20%).

Table 8.2 Percentage of congolese migrants sending remittances, owning assets in DR Congo and contributing to the non-profit sector at three points in time, according to various characteristics (weighted percentages)

	Remittances		Assets			Non-profit sector			N		
	First year Europe	Time of survey	Last year DRC	First year Europe	Time of survey	Last year DRC	First year Europe	Time of survey	Last year DRC	First year Europe	Time of survey
Gender											
Male	26	62	28	27	37	1	3	16	228	228	228
Female	27	66	15***	16***	26**	0	2	17	199	199	199
Employment											
Employed	45	72	30	21	31	1	3	18	200	360	213
Others	24***	57***	12***	21	31	0	2	15	228	59	214
Education											
Higher	33	62	32	30	34	0	1	20	117	132	268
Sec. & lower	24*	66	17***	17***	27	1	3	12**	310	286	158
Country											
Belgium	30	67	22	23	30	0	1	21	279	270	278
United Kingdom	22*	61	20	20	32	1	5**	13*	149	149	149
Legal status											
Documented	27	68	–	23	33	–	2	18	–	311	42
Undocumented	25	34***	–	17	19*	–	6**	8	–	92	377
Total	27	64	21.0	21	31.2	0	3	16	428	428	428
Signif. of change	***			***		***					

Source: MAFE-Congo – Biographic surveys in Belgium and in the United Kingdom
Population: Migrants in Belgium and in the UK. Weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Interpretation: 26% of male Congolese migrants were remitting regularly in their first year of stay in Europe
Statistical significance: ***: $p < 0.01$; **: $p < 0.05$; *: $p < 0.10$; +: $p < 0.20$; n.s.: Not significant (F-test)
Tests refer to differences across categories, except for the total where tests indicate whether changes over time are significant
Notes: Total sample size may differ slightly across periods and variables owing to deletion of missing values.

gap between men and women decreases. Staying in Europe may contribute to women's economic emancipation and reduce the gender gap in investments. Differences in asset ownership by level of education are also reduced with time. While the highly educated were twice as likely as the less educated to own assets in DRC prior to moving, the difference is much smaller at the time of the survey. This equalizing effect of migration on asset ownership was also found among the Senegalese (Beauchemin and Mezger 2013).

Finally, contributions to the non-profit sector are very low at the beginning of the stay in Europe and then increase, but remain lower than the other forms of economic contributions. Interestingly, this low level of investment in collective projects mirrors the more 'individual' nature of Congolese migration mentioned in the literature (compared to migration from West African countries, for instance), and is consistent with some studies on this topic (Bazenguissa-Ganga 2005; De Bruyn and Wets 2006). Very few differences are found across socio-economic characteristics, and unlike remittances, employment is not a strong predictor of contributions to the non-profit sector. Education is the major explanatory factor, suggesting that people's involvement in the non-profit sector is related more to their human capital than to their economic capacities. Differences across destination countries are also significant, probably partly because of the differences in migrants' educational profiles and durations of stay.

8.5 Labour Market Reintegration in DRC of Returnees from Europe

Who returns, and what do returnees do after their return? Schoumaker, Flahaux and Mangalu Mobhe (Chap. 7 in this volume) have shown that returns of Congolese from Europe have greatly decreased since the 1980s. As a result, there are few returnees from Europe in our sample: only 47 (Table 8.3). Most of them had returned

Table 8.3 Socio-demographic characteristics of returnees from Europe and non-returnees in DR Congo at the time of the survey (weighted percentages)

	Returnees from Europe	Non migrants (in DRC)
Gender		
Male	65	43
Female	35	57
Level of education		
None/primary	21	46
Secondary	13	37
Higher	66	17
Age		
25–34	3	37
35–44	24	30
45–75	73	33
Total	100	100



Fig. 8.7 Occupational status of returnees from Europe at four points in time in their migratory life, and of non migrants at survey time (weighted percentages)

Source: MAFE-Congo–Biographic survey in DR Congo
Population: Returnees from Europe in DR Congo and non-migrants in DR Congo. Weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Statistical significance: ***: $p < 0.01$; **: $p < 0.05$; *: $p < 0.10$; +: $p < 0.20$; n.s.: not significant (F-test)
Notes: Sample size may slightly differ across periods and variables due to deletion of missing values
Significance (Design-based F-test). Difference between…
… last year in Africa and last year in Europe : $p < 0.10$
… last year in Europe and first year in DR Congo after return: $p < 0.05$
… last year in Africa and first year in DR Congo after return: n.s ($p > 0.10$)
… first year in DR Congo after return and survey time in DR Congo (2008): n.s. ($p > 0.10$)
… non migrants and return migrants at survey time : $p < 0.01$

from Belgium, France and the UK. Two-thirds of them returned before the 1990s, and a substantial percentage spent more than 5 years in Europe. Consequently, return migrants are much older than non-migrants living in DR Congo. Returnees are also much more highly educated than non-migrants. This results from a double selection: better-off people are more likely to migrate to Europe in the first place and, once in Europe, they are (or at least were until recently) also more likely to return (Gonzalez et al. in this volume; Flahaux et al. 2014). Virtually all of the return migrants were documented at the time of their return, and the large majority of them returned voluntarily. Unfortunately, the small sample precludes solid comparisons

across cohorts of returnees, since most of the returnees in our sample returned to DR Congo before the 1990s.

Figure 8.7 shows occupational status of returnees from Europe at four points in time: the year before their departure for Europe, their last year in Europe, the first year in DR Congo, and the year of the survey. The fifth bar shows the distribution of occupations among non-migrants in Kinshasa at the time of the survey. From this figure, *the return migrants' stay in Europe looks very much like a parenthesis*. The percentage of migrants in work, notably in intermediate or high-level occupations, is much lower during the stay in Europe than in DR Congo. In contrast, more are studying or unemployed when they are living in Europe. After their return, the distribution is relatively similar to the situation before departure, with a higher proportion employed and fewer inactive people. Return migrants are much more likely than non-migrants to be in intermediate or high-level occupation; but this was also the case before migration. Migration may have slightly increased the chances of return migrants of having a good-quality job,[6] but *the difference with non-migrants mainly results from the fact that migrants tend to be selected among the better educated*.

8.6 Conclusion

Congolese migrants' economic trajectories are strongly affected by their migration to Europe. At their arrival in Europe, few hold a job and most are either students, inactive or unemployed. While the migrants' situation improves over time, *participation in the labour market remains low for Congolese migrants in Europe, and Congolese migrants are disproportionately employed in elementary jobs*. The trajectories of return migrants are very telling in this regard: their professional situation in Europe looks like a parenthesis in their career. After their return, their professional situation resembles the one they had before leaving, with a large share of returnees in intermediate and high-skilled jobs. Yet, most migrants currently do not return (see Chap. 3), and the professional aspirations of Congolese migrants in Europe are probably not met.

The reasons for this situation are diverse, and were not explored in detail in this chapter, but a few factors correlated with lower employment rates were found. Undocumented migrants are much less likely to work, confirming that economic integration is highly dependent on administrative status. Higher education is associated with greater chances of working and of occupying better jobs. The analyses also show that a large share of Congolese migrants with high level jobs started their stay in Europe as students. Gaining higher education in Europe thus seems a major route for economic integration. Yet, a large percentage of well-educated people are

[6] For instance, return migrants may have more responsibilities and better wages.

inactive, unemployed, or working below their level of qualification, showing that employment depends on many other factors, including possibly discrimination from employers and difficulties with language.

Despite their difficulties in integrating into the labour market, a large share of Congolese migrants remit to their home country. Integration clearly makes it easier for migrants to contribute economically to their home country, but remittances are widespread even among migrants with no employment. In contrast, investments and contributions to the non-profit sector are relatively low, partly because of low prospects of return and the risky business environment in DR Congo, as well as limited participation in the labour market.

In sum, this chapter shows key features of Congolese migrants' economic integration in Europe and of their contribution to their home country. This is a first step towards understanding whether migrants are able to fulfil the objectives of their migration, and how their economic integration and contribution to their home country could be improved. Our results suggests that much remains to be done to improve the match between migrants' professional aspirations and their employment, and to help home countries and host countries fully benefit from migrants' potential. The MAFE data set will undoubtedly be further exploited to inform policy-makers on these issues.

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Chapter 9
Migration and Family Life Between Congo and Europe

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9.1 Introduction

Family migration has become the main legal mean of entry into Europe. In Belgium for instance, half of the residence permits issued to Congolese migrants in 2007 were for family reunification (Schoonvaere 2010). For all third-country migrants, family reunification is less common in the UK than in Belgium (18% in the UK versus 48% in Belgium, Scarnicchia 2011). Still, in all countries, including the UK, and at the

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European level, family reunification has become a major concern for policy makers, who design increasingly restrictive policies in this domain (Pascouau 2011). This is due in part to the belief that immigrants, notably African immigrants, overuse their right to family reunification in Europe (European Migration Network 2012).

Part of this concern about family reunification comes from the fact that administrative figures on family reunification provide only a partial view of family reunion and forms of family life. Though the statistics count close relatives – spouses and children – who enter European countries to join a prior migrant, they do not count the relatives who stay in the origin country. As a result, they say nothing about transnational families, i.e. families whose members live in different countries. In addition, since data on out-migration from European countries are quite rare, there is also no information on the processes of family reunification in origin countries, i.e. a reunification resulting from the migrant returning home, where they meet up again with their family.

Alternative data on family migration are not very frequent. Some surveys in destination countries include questions on the location of migrants' close relatives (e.g. TeO in France and ENI in Spain). These show that reunification is not a straightforward option for African families, and that sub-Saharan migrants (as a group, with no details regarding country-specific origin) are more likely to live apart across borders than other groups of migrants in Europe (Esteve and Cortina 2009). They also take more time to reunify (González-Ferrer et al. 2012). The MAFE project data provide the basis for an even more refined picture of the various family arrangements of African migrants, especially since they do not only rely only on data collected at destination: they also contain information obtained in the origin countries, from left-behind households and returnees.

The aim of this chapter is to assess the extent of transnational vs. reunified families among Congolese migrants, adopting a double viewpoint based on the use of data collected both in Europe (Belgium, UK) and in Africa (DR Congo). The next section, based on a literature review, provides an overview of Congolese family arrangements and will show that living apart is a relatively common situation in Congo. This leads to the idea that transnational families are, to some extent, an extension of this way of life, even though they may also result from policy restrictions aimed at curbing family reunification. This section also describes recent out-migration trends from DR Congo in relation to family arrangements. Using the MAFE data, the third section looks at the extent to which households in the Kinshasa region are indeed involved in transnational families. We then adopt the opposite viewpoint, looking at the family situation of migrants in Europe. Finally, Sect. 9.5 studies how transnational families are formed and how they evolve (or not) into reunified families.

9.2 Literature Review

9.2.1 Family Arrangements and Migration in DR Congo

Even though social realities are obviously diverse across the African continent, Findley gives some insights on general patterns regarding family and migration in sub-Saharan Africa (Findley 1997). She shows that, in contexts where families are

quite extended, spouses living in separate places are not rare, both because economic and environmental constraints force families to spread their sources of risks and incomes and because the process of couple formation entails low levels of interaction within couples (more often than not, spouses do not choose each other and have a large age gap; in some countries, polygamy also adds to the distance between partners). Children also quite commonly live with other adults than their parents (even when the latter are still alive): according to Demographic and Health (DHS) surveys in African countries, between 9% and 35% of households shelter children living without their parents (Pilon and Vignikin 2006). It is thus quite common in African countries to live at a distance from partner, parents or children. This also seems to be somewhat the case across borders: some rare available statistics show that sub-Saharan families are more likely to live apart across borders than other groups of migrants in Europe, or that they take more time to reunify (Esteve and Cortina 2009; González-Ferrer et al. 2012). To what extent does family functioning in DRC depart from this very general pattern and family model?

The Congo is a vast country and family norms are quite varied. However, some evidence suggests that families in this country do not depart from the model in which some couples (and also parents and children) are used to living apart in different places. In matrilineal ethnic groups, in which uncles traditionally play a major role in children's education, wives and children commonly circulate between the husband's home and the wife's place of origin. In other cases, multi-residence of the couple is due to labour migration. It has been demonstrated, for instance, that rural and urban households in Congo often complement each other and form a common social unit (MacGaffey 1983).The tendency for families to live apart has mainly been described in rural contexts and in socio-anthropological studies on the functioning of lineage systems. It seems that the process of urbanization, combined in recent decades with the upsurge of new Christian churches, is increasing the frequency of nuclear families living together (Ngondo 1996). Nonetheless, multi-residence seems to remain a quite common living arrangement for Congolese families. According to the 2007 DHS, 13% (16% in Kinshasa) of children aged less than 18 in DR Congo lived with neither of their biological parents, and only 63% (and even less in Kinshasa, 53%) lived with both parents (Ministère du Plan and Macro International 2008). Such data show that the separation of parents and children is quite common in DR Congo, although this result can partly be explained by the parents' death, especially due to HIV.[1] Ascertaining the multi-residence of couples is more difficult with existing data. Using DHS data, it is possible to measure it among married heads of households: 9% (nationally, and also in Kinshasa) of married household heads do not live in the same household as their spouse.[2] Again, this shows that multi-residence of spouses is not exceptional. These percentages reflect the situation at the time of the survey, so the percentage of people likely to experience such a situation at least once in their lives is greater.

Lututala (1989) conceptualized the patterns of multi-residence under the label of "ubiquitous families". At the international level, living apart together is also an option for Congolese families, especially if they succeed in maintaining strong ties

[1] 30% of the households in DRC hosted a fostered or orphan child aged less than 18 (Ministère du Plan and Macro International 2008).

[2] Computation by the authors, using the 2007 DHS household survey.

with their left-behind relatives through visits or financial or in-kind remittances. To some extent, these relationships could delay reunification or even substitute for it. Vause (2012), for instance, reports cases where male migrants have business activities in Kinshasa and their families (wife and children) in Europe and, for this reason, do regular round trips. They live between here and there as a long-term way of life.

9.2.2 Migration from DR Congo

While some Congolese migrated internationally in the first half of the twentieth century,[3] migration to Europe, especially Belgium (the former colonial power), did not truly take off until the 1960s, when the country became independent. At that time, Congolese migrants did not match the classic profile of the labour migrant: most of them were members of the country's elite who went to Europe to study or for professional or training missions in big firms or the administration and returned to Congo after completing their task (Kagné and Martiniello 2001). Although we were not able to find information on the likelihood of reunification before the 1990s, we hypothesize that family reunification was not very common at that time even though family reunification was somewhat facilitated from the early 1980s on.

The deterioration of the economic and political situation in Congo in the 1980s, and even more so in the 1990s, marked a pronounced turn in migration patterns. Out-migration progressed sharply, especially towards neighbouring countries, which took in the bulk of the refugees. In Europe, while Belgium was the main European destination for Congolese in the 1960s and 1970s, France gradually became the preferred destination, and other countries, notably the United Kingdom and Germany, also attracted growing numbers of Congolese migrants (Ngoie Tshibambe and Vwakyanakazi 2008). At the same time, return migration decreased (Sumata 2002) and Congolese migrants tended to stay for longer periods in Europe (Schoonvaere 2010). In short, while Congolese migrants tended to circulate between countries before the 1990s, since then they have tended more to settle in the destination countries (see Chap. 7).

The late twentieth century was also a time of changes in migrants' profiles: Congolese migration became less selective. More migrants came from less favoured socioeconomic categories (Sumata 2002; Schoumaker et al. 2010). The proportion of women also increased in migration to Europe (Vause 2012; Schoonvaere 2010; see also Chap. 7). In 1992, they became more numerous than men to enter Belgium (Schoonvaere 2010). This feminization process may be a sign of a greater tendency for couple reunification than in the previous period. However, in the post-1995 period many women entering Europe were single upon entry and the proportion of female migration associated with the partner's migration tended to decrease from the pre-1995 level (Vause 2012). As profiles diversified, migrants' itineraries also became more diverse. Firstly, many Congolese migrants started coming to Europe as asylum seekers (Schoonvaere 2010; see also Chap. 7). Secondly, migration tra-

[3] Most emigration at that time involved short-distance movements to neighboring countries (Ngoie Tshibambe and Vwakyanakazi 2008).

jectories became more complex and illegal immigration increased (Sumata et al. 2002; see also Chap. 7), so that several authors think it has become a key component of Congolese migration (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Ngoie Tshibambe 2010).

9.3 Transnational Families from the Kinshasa Viewpoint

How common are transnational families in Congo and especially in the region of Kinshasa? In other terms, to what extent do the households of the capital city have links with international migrants? What kind of relationships do they have with them? Are the households and their migrants closely related? Do they have frequent contacts? Are these contacts only of a social nature or do they contribute to the material well-being of the left-behind members of the household? These are the questions addressed in this section.

9.3.1 Assessing the Proportion of Transnational Households in Kinshasa

An important result of the MAFE project in Congo is that the population of Kinshasa is extraordinarily highly connected with international migrants: only 37% of households declared no migrants at all (Table 9.1), which means, by contrast, that *almost two thirds of the capital city households "have" at least one migrant abroad*. This huge proportion takes into account all types of migrant, wherever they are (in neighbouring countries as well as distant destinations, such as Europe or the United States of America) and, to a certain extent, whatever their degree of relationship with the

Table 9.1 Households with migrants abroad

Households who declared…	f	%
… no migrant abroad	549	37%
… only migrants who are spouse and/or child of the head (nuclear family)	235	13%
… at least one migrant who had lived in the household for at least 6 months (other than nuclear family members)	665	44%
… at least one migrant who had never lived in the household (and no migrant who had lived in the household)	127	6%
Total	1,576	100%

Note: unweighted numbers & weighted percentages
Time of Survey: 2009
Population: Congolese households (n=1,576)
Interpretation: 13% of households declared that the head has at least a child or a spouse living abroad at the time of the survey. In addition, 44% of households have contacts abroad with migrants who have lived in the household for at least 6 months (other than nuclear family members)

surveyed households (see definitions in Chap. 6, Box 6.1). However, a look at details shows that most households have strong connections with the migrants they declared.

The migrants declared in the household questionnaire of the MAFE survey are not mere acquaintances. Up to 13% of the heads declared at least a child or a spouse abroad (Table 9.1). The other migrants have quite often a common residential history with the households interviewed in Kinshasa: 44% of all heads declared international migrants who used to live within their household (other than their spouse(s) and children), the vast majority of them being siblings or other kin. This result reflects the importance of the extended family in the Congolese context where it is not rare for households to include people far beyond the nuclear family of the head.

That a majority of households in Kinshasa have contacts abroad does not mean that all members of these households are candidates for reunification in Europe. First, family reunification schemes are usually restricted to migrants' spouses and minor children. Restricted to these kin, the potential for reunification is actually small: only 4% of married heads in Kinshasa have a spouse abroad, whatever the country. Second, it is worth adding that most migrants are located in neighbouring countries and not primarily in Europe (see Chap. 7). Finally, as mentioned above, living apart is not a rare family arrangement and couples can "survive" in this situation for relatively long periods of time. Actually, it is worth noting that living apart is more common for couples within Congo than across borders: 6% of the married heads in Kinshasa have a spouse who lives in another dwelling in Congo (possibly in Kinshasa), while 4% have a spouse abroad (and 90% live together with their spouses).

9.3.2 Congolese Households' Contacts with Migrants

As already mentioned, although they are rarely members of the heads' nuclear family, the migrants declared by households in Kinshasa are not mere acquaintances. This is reflected in the varied and quite intense contacts that households left-behind in Kinshasa have with their migrants abroad: in the 12 months preceding the survey, of all households who declared at least one international migrant (n=1027), 95% had phone contacts with "their" migrant(s), 62% received money, 45% received in-kind remittances, and 6% received a visit from at least one of the migrants they declared in the MAFE survey.

Of course, the migrants' degree of connection depends of their relationship to the head. But the results show that contributions from migrants to households in Congo are not exclusively from nuclear family members. 55% of the spouses abroad sent money to their origin household (Table 9.2), a proportion that is hardly higher than among adult children (51%), siblings (50%) or even other kin (49%). And 17% of the non-kin migrants declared by the households in Kinshasa also sent money. The difference between spouses, children and the other migrants is more pronounced with other types of connection. The propensity to send in-kind remittances is clearly higher for spouses (60%), but about a third of the children, siblings and other kin also send some sort of material contribution. And spouses are also more numerous

Table 9.2 Intensity of migrants' contacts according to relationship to household head

Relationship to the head	Monetary remittances	In-kind remittances	Visit	Distant contact* every week	Distant contact* at least once a month	*f*
Spouses	55%	60%	23%	80%	12%	61
Children 0–18	2%	33%	2%	29%	54%	54
Children >18	51%	37%	11%	22%	42%	642
Siblings	50%	37%	16%	18%	39%	662
Other kin	49%	30%	17%	15%	44%	1,085
Non-kin	17%	12%	10%	19%	17%	24
Missing	71%	1%	0%	23%	47%	8
Total	48%	34%	15%	19%	42%	2,536
P-Values	0,016	0,000	0,001	0,000	0,000	

Note: unweighted numbers & weighted percentages; Time of Survey: 2009; Population: Migrants declared by households surveyed in Kinshasa (n=2,536)
*Distant contact: phone, email, internet…
Interpretation: Of all migrants, 48% sent monetary remittances to "their" household (i.e. the household that declared them). 55% of migrants who are spouses of household heads sent money
Statistical significance (F-test, one-way ANOVA): The differences in percentages by type of relationship are significant for each type of contact (see P-values)

(proportionately) than other kin to have weekly distant communication (mainly telephone), although the latter also have quite frequent contacts with their household (about 40% of the children, siblings and other kin have at least a monthly contact (Table 9.2).

All in all, about 50% of all migrants send money and a third send in-kind remittances (with a higher proportion of women than of men), some of them contributing to household needs through both channels. In doing so, they sometimes provide the left-behind households with major resources. According to the heads' declarations, 3% of all remitters (whatever their relationship to the head) covered a "very large" share of the household's expenditures on food, medicine, housing, transport, etc. during the 12 months preceding the survey; a further 9% provided a "large" share (Table 9.3). Again, if spouses are more likely to contribute very largely than other kin (14% as against 3% on average), they are far from being the only contributors. For instance, 16% of remitting siblings are declared to contribute largely to the household's expenditure. In total, siblings and spouses are equally likely to contribute a large or very large share (19%, Table 9.3).

It is sometimes argued that remittances are a way for migrants to reimburse the support they have received for organizing their migration. According to our results, migrants' contributions are clearly not only such paybacks. Indeed, migrants who received some sort of support to organize or pay for their departure are no more likely to send remittances than those who moved by themselves (half of those who received some support remit and half do not). These results remind us of the significance of the extended family in the context of Congo. They reflect the fact that the household economy is not only organized around the nuclear family.

Table 9.3 Migrants' contributions to household expenditures in Kinshasa, by type of relationship

Relationship to the head	Very large	Large	Moderate	Small	Insignificant	Missing	Total	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	f
Spouses	14%	5%	72%	7%	2%	0%	100%	42
Children <18	0%	0%	25%	57%	9%	9%	100%	15
Children >18	2%	7%	48%	35%	8%	0%	100%	402
Siblings	3%	16%	45%	27%	8%	1%	100%	402
Other kin	2%	6%	47%	28%	15%	2%	100%	629
Non-kin	0%	23%	58%	5%	15%	0%	100%	11
Missing	0%	0%	2%	98%	0%	0%	100%	5
Total	3%	9%	46%	30%	11%	1%	100%	1506

Answers to the question "What share of the household's expenditures on food, medicine, housing, transport, etc. has been covered by the money and in-kind transfers you have received from [Name] over the last 12 months?"
Note: unweighted numbers & weighted percentages; Time of Survey: 2009
Population: Congolese migrants declared by households and who contributed to their expenditures through money or in-kind remittances (n=1506)
Interpretation: Of all migrant spouses, 14% contributed a very large share of the household expenditures by remitting
Statistical significance: the differences in share of household expenditures by type of relationship is significant (Design based F test, p=0.000)

9.4 Family Life: Congolese Migrants in Europe

One advantage of the MAFE data is that it makes it possible to look at migrants' families from both origin and destination viewpoints. In the previous section we focused on families in Congo, assessing the proportion of transnational families, i.e. of households who have contacts with migrants abroad. In this section, we will focus on Congolese migrants in Europe, i.e. in Belgium and the United Kingdom. Using the MAFE European biographical data collected in those two countries, we will first assess the proportion of migrants who live with their nuclear family (spouse and children) vs. those who live apart across borders (referred to in the rest of the text as "transmigrants" because they are part of a transnational family). Secondly, we will examine whether the migrants' profiles differ according to their family arrangement. Descriptive results will bring preliminary insights into the reasons why some migrants and their relatives live apart across borders.

We have mentioned before that the functioning of Congolese families is not restricted to family nuclei. It is probably not completely impossible to give a quantitative account of the families' complexities but it is a major challenge. For the sake of simplicity, but also because most European migration policies focus on migrants' spouses and children, we will focus here on these close members of migrants families. In fact, even with these restrictions, migrants' family arrangements are so diverse that showing clear patterns remains a challenge. In an attempt to show this family diversity as simply as possible, we have built a typology that

takes into account the country of residence of a migrant's spouse[4] and/or child(ren) aged under 18. The typology, fully explained in Chap. 6 (Table 6.8), forms a gradient from "totally unified families" to "totally transnational families" (Table 6.9).

9.4.1 An Account of Migrants in Transnational vs. Reunified Families

When thinking about reunification in Europe, a first important finding to bear in mind is that *a high proportion of migrants have nobody to reunify with*. According to the MAFE data, a quarter of all Congolese migrants have no nuclear family, i.e. neither spouse nor (minor) child (26%, Table 9.4). Looking more closely, it appears that a third of them have no children under 18 (33%), while half of them have no spouse (51%, Table 9.4), these proportions being very similar in the UK and Belgium (result not shown). However, when migrants have a spouse and/or children, their family arrangements differ depending on the country where they live. *Transnational families are much more numerous in Belgium than in the UK*: 30% of migrants living in Belgium live apart from their spouse and/or children (in most cases from both), while that proportion is more than halved in the UK (13%, Table 9.5, taking into account both partially and totally transnational families). Conversely, totally unified families are more numerous in the UK (a third of all migrants) than in Belgium (only 22%), as are reunified families, albeit to a lesser extent (28% in the UK, against 21% in Belgium, Table 9.5). This is apparently in contradiction with the fact that Congolese migration to Belgium is older, so that we would have expected more reunification in this country than in a more recent destination like the UK. This may partly be linked to the fact that Congolese migrants living in the UK are more likely to have lived in another country before settling in the UK (see Chap. 7) and may have reunified there. The difference between UK and Belgium may also be related to the differences in migrants' profiles. Asylum seekers represent a larger share of Congolese migrants in the UK. These are more likely to want to settle, and are also less likely to maintain strong links with their home country (see Chap. 7).

9.4.2 Characteristics of Congolese Transnational Families in Europe

Bearing in mind that a large proportion of migrants have nobody to reunify with because they have no nuclear family, we now focus on those who have a spouse and/or minor children in order to draw a profile of the migrants who live apart across borders by comparison with other migrants, i.e. those who were never separated

[4] In case of polygamy, the analyses only take account of the last spouse.

Table 9.4 Family arrangements typology

	Ego's children**				
Ego's spouse*	No child(ren) <18	Cohabitating child(ren) (always unified)	Cohabitating child(ren) (after a period of separation)	Non-cohabitating child(ren)	Total
No spouse	26%	12%	5%	7%	51%
Cohabiting*** spouse (always unified)	0%	15%	3%	2%	20%
Cohabiting spouse (after period of separation)	4%	7%	5%	2%	18%
Non-cohabiting spouse	3%	2%	2%	6%	12%
Total	33%	36%	15%	16%	100%

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Congo data; Time of Survey: 2009; Population: Congolese immigrants in Belgium and the UK (n=603)
Interpretation: Of all migrants, 26% currently have no nuclear family, i.e. have neither spouse nor child
*Informal unions are not considered, i.e. spouse always refers to marriage, and conversely, "no spouse" includes those in an informal union. In the case of polygamy, only the most recent spouse is taken into account (39 cases among 602 observations)
**Children > 18 (and their whereabouts) are not considered, i.e. no child also includes those with only children > 18; In the case of children < 18 who are living at different locations, when at least 1 child <18 is not living with ego, it is considered 'non-cohabiting'
***Cohabitation refers to the fact of living in the same country

Table 9.5 Family arrangement typology, by destination country

Family arrangement typology:	All countries		Belgium		The U.K.	
	f	%	f	%	f	%
No nuclear family	114	26%	80	27%	34	25%
Totally unified family	106	27%	59	22%	47	34%
Reunified family	102	24%	56	21%	46	28%
Partially transnational family	28	7%	20	8%	8	5%
Transnational family	76	16%	63	22%	13	8%
Total	426	100%	278	100%	148	100%

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo data; *Time of Survey*: 2009; *Population*: Congolese immigrants in UK/BE (n=426)
Interpretation: 27% of Congolese in Belgium and the U.K. have totally unified families
Statistical significance: Differences by country are significant (Design-based F test, p=0,0012)

from their close relatives and those who have reunified. The question at stake is whether they are different because living in a transnational family is the result of a specific migration strategy, or whether they are still a transnational family because the government of their destination country does not allow them to regroup. In the

Table 9.6 The incidence of (re)unified vs. transnational families among Congolese migrants in Europe (only migrants who are in nuclear families)

	All countries		Belgium		UK	
	f	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
F1. Totally unified family	106	37%	59	31%	47	45%
F2. Totally reunified family	102	32%	56	28%	46	38%
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	104	31%	83	41%	21	17%
Total	312	100%	198	100%	114	100%

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo data; *Time of Survey*: 2009; *Population*: Congolese immigrants in Belgium and the UK (excl. "no nuclear family") (n=114)
Interpretation: Of all migrants with a family, 31% in Belgium and 45% in the UK have a totally unified family
Statistical significance: Differences between Belgium and the UK are significant (Design based F test, p=0,0002)

Table 9.7 Socio-economic situation of Congolese migrants in Europe, by country and type of family arrangement

	All countries	Belgium	UK
% of migrants with only a primary level of education			
F1. Always and totally unified family	11	3	17
F2. Totally reunified family	19	5	31
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	24	17	44
Statistical significance (F tests, one way ANOVA): the differences between migrants according to family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.073) and for migrants in Belgium (p = 0.005), but not for migrants in the UK (p = 0.143).			
% of migrants who are studying at the time of the survey			
F1. Always and totally unified family	15	6	23
F2. Totally reunified family	7	5	8
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	20	21	16
Statistical significance (F tests, one way ANOVA): the differences between migrants according to family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.024) and for migrants in Belgium (p = 0.004), but not for migrants in the UK (p = 0.132).			
% of migrants who are unemployed			
F1. Always and totally unified family	7	5	9
F2. Totally reunified family	19	20	19
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	11	10	15
Statistical significance (F tests, one way ANOVA): the differences between migrants according to family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.022) and for migrants in Belgium (p = 0.036), but not for migrants in the UK (p = 0.377).			

Note: weighted percentages
Source: MAFE-Congo data; Time of Survey: 2009; Population: Congolese immigrants in Belgium (n=198) and the UK (n=114), excluding "no nuclear family" migrants). All countries, n=312
Interpretation: 15% of migrants in always and totally unified families (all countries combined) were studying at the time of the survey

latter case, the fact of being part of a transnational family could be a transitional state before reunification.

At first sight, living apart across borders seems to be correlated with lesser resources (Table 9.8). Transmigrants present vulnerable profiles in several respects. First, they are three times more likely to be undocumented than the other migrants: on average, 16% of them have no residence permit, while this proportion is about 5% for the other categories of migrants (Table 9.8). This result is not surprising since undocumented migrants cannot apply to official reunification schemes. Second, transmigrants are also vulnerable in socio-economic terms. Compared to the other migrant categories, they are less educated (with 24% having only a primary level of education while the average is 17%), even though a higher proportion of them were studying at the time of the survey than in the other migrant categories, especially in Belgium (Table 9.8). They are also more often unemployed. All in all, it seems that migrants' legal and socio-economic vulnerability is a factor that tends to hinder or delay reunification. This is not surprising, both because migrants themselves may wait to have a good situation before calling their spouse and children, and because a migrant's socio-economic situation is one of the criteria governments use to grant reunification.

To some extent the economic difficulties encountered by transmigrants may be due to the fact that they have been in Europe for a shorter time than the other migrants (6 vs. 10–11 years, Table 9.8). This suggests that reunification may be a matter of time for Congolese migrants. This is the more credible for the fact that reunified and transnational migrants were approximately at the same stage of their life cycle when they left Congo: both categories were, on average, about 33 years old at the time of their first departure to Europe (Table 9.8). However, to better understand their migration strategy a more refined analysis would be needed, giving a better account of the migrants' family and occupational situations at the time of their departure. As a first step, the next section will examine more closely the relationship between migration and family building.

9.5 Transnational Families: Family Formation and Reunification

The results of the previous section have shown two important facts regarding the relationship between family formation and reunification: first, most migrants had neither spouse nor children at the time of the survey, which suggests that they moved before forming a family; second, for married migrants and those with left-behind children, reunification seems to be a matter of time. In this section, we take a closer look at the relationship between international migration and family formation. We examine how transnational families are formed, and to what extent they are transformed into reunified families. For the sake of clarity, we study couples and children separately.

Table 9.8 Migration conditions of Congolese migrants in Europe, by country and type of family arrangement

	All countries	Belgium	UK
Age at arrival (mean)			
F1. Always and totally unified family	25	25	26
F2. Totally reunified family	33	33	34
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	33	32	36
Statistical significance (F tests, one way ANOVA): the differences between migrants according to their family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.000) and for migrants in each country (p = 0.000).			
% of migrants who do not have a residence permit at the time of the survey			
F1. Always and totally unified family	5	1	8
F2. Totally reunified family	5	5	5
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	16	14	20
Statistical significance (F tests, one way ANOVA): the differences between migrants according to family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.007) and for migrants in Belgium (p = 0.042), but not for migrants in the UK (p = 0.192).			
Duration of stay at current destination (mean number of years)			
F1. Always and totally unified family	12	13	11
F2. Totally reunified family	10	11	9
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	6	6	6
Statistical significance (F tests, one way ANOVA): the differences between migrants according to family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.000), for migrants in Belgium (p = 0.000), and for migrants in the UK (p = 0.002).			

Note: weighted percentages
Source: MAFE-Congo data; Time of Survey: 2009; Population: Congolese immigrants in Belgium (n=198) and the UK (n=114), excluding "no nuclear family". All countries, n=312
Interpretation: Migrants in always and totally unified families arrived in Europe at a mean age of 25

9.5.1 Couples

What was observed at the time of the survey in the previous section is confirmed here at the time of first departure: for the most part, adult migrants left Congo while still unmarried. This is especially true for men, 66% of whom were single at the time of departure (Fig. 9.1). The proportion is also very high for women (57%), which may be the sign of some kind of autonomous female migration. Another result also reflects the existence of autonomous female migration: albeit a minority, some married women move first, leaving their husbands behind. This is the case for 7% of all women surveyed in Europe (Fig. 9.1). Of course, in line with conventional wisdom, the proportion of "pioneers" is much higher among men; however, only one migrant in five left a wife behind in Congo, which makes a small reservoir for reunification in Europe.

What happens after migration? Like anyone else, migrants' marital status evolves with passing time. This can be observed by comparing marital status at the time of migration and at the time of the survey. Some who were single start a union, as



Fig. 9.1 Marriage at the time of 1st migration

* Not married captures: singles, informal unions, divorcees and widowed
Note: weighted percentages
Source: MAFE-Congo data; *Population:* Congolese immigrants in Europe (n=426); *Time of survey:* 2008
Interpretation: At the time of 1st migration, 71% of men were not married. For women, this figure was 60%
Statistical significance: Differences between men and women are significant in all countries (P = 0.000), in the UK (P= 0.007) and in Belgium (P= 0.000). Design-based F test

illustrated by the sharp increase in persons, especially men, who are married or, to a lesser extent, in a consensual union (Table 9.9). What happens, after migration, to those who were already married? Some of them become widowed, with a higher proportion among women because of the age difference in couples (women being usually younger than their spouses). Some divorce. This might be not only an effect of the passage of time but also an effect of migration. One can imagine that, for partners separated by migration, being a couple at a distance is not easy and can lead to a breakup. On the other hand, for those who moved together or who reunify, the change of social context may act as a factor of divorce: they are far from the family and the social control exerted in the origin country (although communities may exert control at destination). Living in countries were women's emancipation is valued and where the law gives both partners quite easy access to divorce may also contribute to the rise in the proportion of divorced persons.

Of course, migration does not only lead to couples breaking up. Some of them reunify. However, reunification in Europe should not be seen as a universal outcome of couple separation due to migration. It does not happen to all transnational couples: some maintain their relationships across borders for many years and others reunify at origin when the migrant partner returns. In all cases, reunification is more

Table 9.9 Marital status of Congolese migrants in Europe, by sex

	Male migrants		Female migrants	
Marital status…	at the time of 1st migration	at the time of the survey	at the time of 1st migration	at the time of the survey
Single	51%	33%	43%	23%
Consensual union	12%	11%	9%	16%
Married	34%	48%	43%	49%
Divorced	2%	7%	3%	8%
Widowed	0%	1%	2%	4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	228	228	198	198

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Congo data; Population: All Congolese immigrants in Belgium and the UK (n=426). Note that all migrants were over 18 at the time of their first departure
Interpretation: 51% of male migrants in Europe were single when they first migrated. Only 33% were still single at the time of the survey (2009)
Statistical significance: Differences between men and women are not significant at first migration (P = 0.1147), but are significant at the time of the survey (p = 0.0382). Design-based F test

often than not the result of quite a long process. To illustrate these points, we followed the transnational couples over time, carrying out what is technically called "survival" analyses. We started to observe the migrants as soon as their status was that of a "transnational married couple" and we looked at how long this status lasted. In other terms, we started to observe migrants when they moved from Congo and left their spouse behind, and followed them to see when and how they reunified (some of them dropping out of the analysis because their couples ended with a divorce or the death of a spouse). However, the observation is limited to a period of 10 years after the geographical separation.[5] Since reunification is an important policy concern in Europe, we first focus on the probability of reunifying in Europe. For this we use only the European MAFE samples. However, since reunification does not only occur at destination, we complement this view by analyzing the probability of reunifying either in Europe or in Congo. In this case, we use all samples of MAFE-Congo, including migrants living in Europe and returnees living in Congo at the time of the survey.

Figure 9.2 shows the time taken for Congolese migrants in Europe (Belgium or the U.K.) to reunify in their current destination countries with their left-behind spouses in Congo. After 5 years, the probability of being still separated is 60%. In other words, after 5 years, approximately 40% have reunified with their spouse. After 10 years, about 50% of the married couples separated because of migration are finally reunited in Europe. Interestingly, the probability of reunifying in Europe is highly gendered: men are much more likely than women to be joined in Europe

[5] The curves are stopped after 10 years because the samples get smaller with time, and changes may be erratic after 10 years. Ten years is also used as a cut-off point for return migration in Chap. 7.



Fig. 9.2 Time to reunification in Europe of Congolese couples (survivor function)

Note: Weighted results
Source: MAFE-Congo data; *Population*: Congolese migrants living in Europe at the time of the survey who have experienced a period of separation from their spouse because of migration (they moved out of Congo, leaving their spouse behind). Note that the sample used here does not include migrants who married after migration with someone who was still living in Congo. (n=96, 34 failures)
Interpretation: The figures measure the duration between time of separation of married couples and time of reunification in Europe. After 5 years, the probability of staying separated is 0.60. In other words, after 5 years, approximately 40% reunified with their spouse. Differences between men and women are significant (Logrank test, $p<0.05$)

by their spouses. When a man first moves to Europe, his probability of reunifying there is 52% after 5 years (48% still separated) and 68% after 10 years (32% still separated). For a female migrant, the probability of reunifying in Europe is much lower at all durations (only 21% after 5 years and still only 26% after 10 years, Fig. 9.3). This confirms the existence of some kind of autonomous female migration and shows its persistence. Figure 9.4 shows that reunification at origin, in Congo, is also a common option for migrants who come to Europe: after 10 years of separation, the probability of being reunified is about 25% in Belgium or UK and 37% in Congo. It should be noticed that this analysis aggregates all migrants, whatever their period of departure. However, earlier evidence shows that the pattern has changed over recent decades (see Sect. 9.2 of this chapter). Congolese migrants who arrived in Europe before the 1990s, among whom students and trainees were numerous,



Fig. 9.3 Time to reunification in Europe of couples, by sex of the migrant

Note: Weighted results
Source: MAFE-Congo data; *Population*: Congolese migrants living in Europe at the time of the survey who have experienced a period of separation from their spouse because of migration (they moved out of Congo, leaving their spouse behind). Note that the sample used here does not include migrants who married after migration with someone who was still living in Congo. (n=96, 34 failures)
Interpretation: The figures measure the duration between time of separation of married couples and time of reunification in Europe. After 5 years, the probability of staying separated is 0.60. In other words, after 5 years, approximately 40% reunified with their spouse. Differences between men and women are significant (Logrank test, $p<0.05$)

were probably more likely to return and reunify at origin. In the following decades, during the persisting conflict in DRC, Congolese migrants mostly came to Europe as asylum seekers and were more likely to regroup there.

9.5.2 Children: Time to Reunification

Since most migrants were quite young adults when they left Congo for the first time and had no partner, a majority of them also had no children. At the time of departure, 51% had no children, 23% only children aged 0–18, 18% only adult children, while 9% had children both under and over 18. What did the migrants do with their minor children when they left? The answer is highly gender-determined. For the



Fig. 9.4 Time to reunification: couples, by country of reunification

Note: weighted results
Source: MAFE-Congo data; *Population*: Congolese migrants living in Europe or back in Congo at the time of the survey who have experienced a period of separation from their spouse because of migration (they moved out of Congo, leaving their spouse behind). Note that the sample used here does not include migrants who married after migration with someone who was still living in Congo. (n=99; at destination, 33 failures; at origin, 5 failures)
Interpretation: The figure measures the duration between time of married couples' separation and time of reunification either in Europe (at destination) or in Congo (at origin). Reunification at destination is censored when looking at reunification at origin, and vice versa. After 10 years of separation, the probability of being reunified is 24% in Europe and 36.8% in Congo

most part, men left their children behind, which is in line with above results showing that they also left their spouse behind (Fig. 9.5). Women – many of whom had been left behind by their partner – were more likely to move with their child(ren). This is especially true in the UK context, probably because this destination is more recent and has attracted mainly asylum seekers, who are more likely to move with their family than are other migrants. Nonetheless, a significant proportion of them left their child(ren) behind, which is not completely surprising in a context where, as mentioned in the literature review, child fostering is not rare.

When there is separation between a migrant and his/her child(ren), to what extent does it end with reunification? As with couples, we analyzed the extent, timing and location of reunification. Each dyad formed by a migrant and each of his/her minor children is a unit of observation. In other terms, it means that the analysis follows each left-behind child from the departure date of its mother and/or father, looking at whether the child moves to Europe, whether its parent comes back or whether they



Fig. 9.5 Children's location at time of first migration

* Children over 18 are not included in the analyses
Note: weighted percentages
Source: MAFE-Congo data; *Population:* Congolese immigrants in Europe (n=426); *Time of survey:* 2008
Interpretation: At the time of 1st migration, 87% of men had no children under 18. For women, this was 79%
Statistical significance: Differences between men and women are not significant

remain separated. Again, the observation is limited to a period of 10 years, which is already a huge duration at the time scale of a child.

Figure 9.6 shows the time to reunification in Europe (i.e. Belgium or the U.K.). As with couples, the results show that migrants do not systematically reunify with their children in Europe and that, when it does occur, reunification may take a very long time. After 5 years of separation (which is a long period for children), only 30% have been reunified in Europe. And after 10 years of transnational family life, about half of the children who were left-behind are still living in Congo while their parent(s) is/are in Europe. Figure 9.7 shows that migrant fathers are more likely to reunify with their left-behind children than are migrant mothers. This may be due to a selection effect of autonomous female migrants: mothers who decided to migrate



Fig. 9.6 Time to reunification: Congolese parents and left-behind children

Note: weighted results
Source: MAFE-Congo data; *Population*: Children of Congolese migrants living in Europe at the time of the survey who experienced a period of separation from their parent because of their parent's migration. Note that the sample used here does not include children born in Congo after the first departure of one of the parents (usually the father). (n=370, 121 failures). Censoring cases: when parents have not reunified with their children before the occurrence of the year of the survey (2009); or when the child has deceased; or when the child reaches the age of 18 since he/she is then no longer eligible for official family reunification
Interpretation: After 5 years of separation, 31% children left behind were reunified, and 49% after 10 years. Differences between men and women are significant (Logrank test, p<0.05)



Fig. 9.7 Time to reunification: parents and left-behind children, by sex of the migrant

Note: see Fig. 9.6.

Fig. 9.8 Time to reunification: parent-child dyads, country of reunification

Note: weighted results
Source: MAFE-Congo data; *Population*: Children of Congolese migrants living in Europe or of returnees living in Congo at the time of the survey and who experienced a period of separation from their parent because of their parent's migration. Note that the sample used here does not include children born in Congo after the first departure of one of the parents (usually the father). (n=362, 120 failures at destination, 27 failures at origin). Censoring cases: when parents have not reunified with their children before the occurrence of the year of the survey (2009); or when the child has deceased; or when the child reaches the age of 18 since he/she is then no longer eligible for official family reunification
Interpretation: The figure measures the duration between time of separation of parent-child dyads and time of reunification either in Europe (at destination) or in Congo (at origin). Reunification at destination is censored when looking at reunification at origin, and vice versa. After 10 years of separation, 49% of the children are again living with their migrant parent in Congo and 27% are reunified in Europe

without their children in the first place may be less likely to want, or to be able, to reunify at destination. Qualitative analyses would be needed to better understand these migration patterns.

Figure 9.8 breaks down reunification by place. Of the Congolese migrants who came to Belgium or the U.K., we examine the difference between those who reunify at destination and those who reunify at origin. After 10 years of separation, about 50% of the children are again living with their parent in Congo (after the latter has returned), and a quarter have migrated to Europe to join their parent(s). This shows that children are more likely to reunify at origin than in Europe (Belgium or UK).

9.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, we used the MAFE data to study the relationships between migration and family in the context of DR Congo and Europe. While most earlier quantitative studies have offered a restrictive view, focusing either on origin or destination, we took advantage of the transnational nature of the data to offer a dual viewpoint on families. This led us to a first important finding: *transnational families are quite common*. Data collected at origin show that a very high proportion of households in Kinshasa are connected with international migrants, with two-thirds of all households from the region of Kinshasa declaring migrants abroad (wherever their place of residence may be). Households in Kinshasa are strongly connected with these migrants, notably through remittances (half of all households), as well as phone calls, emails or visits. Importantly, these contacts do not only concern spouses and children but also members of the extended family (siblings and other kin). Even when adopting a restrictive (and European) perspective on family by focusing on nuclear rather than extended families, transnational arrangements remain a common fact. Using the data collected in Europe among Congolese migrants, we have shown that transnational families are very common (almost a quarter of migrants). We have further demonstrated that living apart across borders is quite often a long-lasting arrangement for Congolese couples and for their children. Results also show that reunification is not a one-way phenomenon: families also reunify in the origin country, when migrants return. However, a decline in the number of returns (see Chap. 7) makes such reunification at home less likely for Congolese migrants. As a result of decreasing returns, family reunification in Europe is likely to increase, or transnational families will last longer.

An important question is to understand why some migrants remain separated from their families for long periods, why some reunify in Europe, and why others reunify in DR Congo. This question cannot be answered from the results presented in this chapter, but some results suggest that transnational families result from a mix of personal choice and economic, administrative or other constraints. For instance, transnational families are more numerous among students. We can expect that this is a transitory situation, and that either the migrant will return to DR Congo, or will try to reunify at destination. Descriptive statistics show that transnational migrants are less educated than reunified migrants, suggesting that educated migrants succeed in reuniting their family or returning. For transnational migrants with more vulnerable profiles (less educated, lower occupational status), the transnational situation may result from barriers to reunification (lack of resources, no residence permit, etc.), or a strategy of diversifying activities across continents. Again, the results presented here do not give definite answers, but research is ongoing. The differences observed between countries (with a higher proportion of transnational families in Belgium, for instance) also call for new analyses that take into account the effects of national policies on the reunification process.

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Part III
Ghanaian Migration

Chapter 10
Changing Patterns of Ghanaian Migration

Djamila Schans, Valentina Mazzucato, Bruno Schoumaker, and Marie-Laurence Flahaux

10.1 Introduction

Migration has been part of people's experience in many parts of Africa throughout history (De Bruin et al. 2001) and Ghana is no exception. Migration typically took place within one region and was due to trade, forced labor and circulatory nomadic routes. Over recent decades, however, African migrant flows have been diversifying and migration patterns have extended geographically with higher proportions of migrants moving to Europe and North America (Grillo and Mazzucato 2008). Yet few comparative empirical data on migration flows between Africa and Europe exist and many of the characteristics and patterns of change of these flows are still largely unknown. The aim of this chapter is to describe patterns of international migration from Ghana using the MAFE data collected in Ghana and in two European countries: the UK and the Netherlands. The chapter addresses three broad topics: (1) trends in departures and returns, (2) migrants' profiles, and (3) migration routes.

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10.2 Short History of Migration from Ghana[1]

Four distinct phases in the history of international migration in Ghana can be distinguished (Anarfi et al. 2003). Up until the late 1960s Ghana was relatively economically prosperous and was a country of net-immigration, particularly attracting migrants from other parts of West Africa (Twum-Baah et al. 1995). Ghana continued to attract migrants after its independence in 1957 owing to its relative economic prosperity and the government's promotion of pan-Africanism as part of its foreign policy (Anarfi et al. 2003). During this time emigration from Ghana was minimal; most emigrants were students or professionals who left to the UK or other English-speaking countries as a result of colonial ties with the UK. There was also some migration of Ghanaians to other African countries, namely Gambia, Botswana and Sierra Leone.

In the second phase, beginning in the mid-1960s, Ghana became a country of net emigration (Twum-Baah et al. 1995). Economic decline, characterized by a balance of payments deficit, rising unemployment, and political instability pushed many Ghanaians to emigrate. That economic crisis also contributed to a decline in immigration to Ghana, as it became an increasingly unattractive place for both foreigners and nationals. The proportion of foreigners in Ghana decreased from 12.3% in 1960 to 6.6% in 1970 (Anarfi et al. 2003). The majority of these emigrants were professionals such as teachers, lawyers and administrators who went to other African countries including Uganda, Botswana, Nigeria and Zambia to assist in those countries' development following independence (Anarfi et al. 2003). The formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 stimulated further Ghanaian emigration to other parts of the region. Migrants who had left for education or training purposes following Ghanaian independence either returned to those other countries to work where they had received training, or stayed on in the countries where they had studied or been trained. Anarfi et al. (2003) estimate that around two million Ghanaians emigrated from the southern parts of the country between 1974 and 1981.

A third phase in the early 1980s was marked by two shifts in migration patterns: other sectors of society, not only professionals, began to migrate *en masse* from the southern parts of Ghana and migration flows spread to more distant destinations in Europe, North America and North Africa (especially Libya). By the 1980s Ghana's economic growth was negative (Anarfi et al. 2003). To reverse that situation, the government introduced a Structural Adjustment Program that included the removal of subsidies for social services such as health, transport and education, which contributed to growing unemployment and social hardship and led to further emigration from Ghana. As a consequence, all labour groups (highly skilled, semi-skilled and low-skilled) began to migrate. Compounding the situation, Nigeria deported all foreigners from its territory, including 1.2 million Ghanaians, in 1983 and a further 700,000 Ghanaians in 1985. Returning to Ghana was not an option for many as the economic crisis and a severe drought in 1983–1984 made livelihoods there precarious. Thus many of those deported sought greener pastures overseas.

In the fourth phase, migration from Ghana to overseas destinations continued steadily so that in the 1990s Ghanaians came to constitute one of the main 'new

[1] This section draws heavily on Mazzucato (2007).

African diasporas' (Koser 2003). Their primary destinations were the USA, Germany, Nigeria, Italy and the UK (EUROSTAT 2000) and have remained largely so to date, although other destinations can also be noticed in our dataset (see below). Paths into Europe have been determined by where travel permits were easiest to come by (Peil 1995; Grillo and Mazzucato 2008), although the more highly skilled tended to go to English speaking destinations to be able to practice their professions, with a higher proportion of less-skilled ending up in countries such as the Netherlands, Germany and Italy (see for example, Orozco et al. 2005). There are no accurate figures on total Ghanaian migrants in the world today, because the Ghanaian government does not do any systematic data collection, because some migrants have undocumented status overseas or simply because censuses in host countries do collect information on country of origine. Twum-Baah (2005), using data obtained from European and North American embassies in Ghana, estimates that approximately 460,000 Ghanaians were living in Europe, Canada and the United States in 2003. He also estimates Ghanaian migrants in African countries (predominantly in ECOWAS countries) to be approximately 1 million. If one allows for migrants in the Middle East and Asia, then these figures would suggest that there is a total of 1.5 million Ghanaians overseas. In contrast, according to the World Bank global bilateral migration database (World Bank Group et al. 2011), only around 500,000 Ghanaian migrants were living overseas in 2000. The correct figure is likely between these two figures.

Recently, there has been a particular focus on the issue of brain drain resulting from skilled migration from Ghana, notably of doctors and other health-care workers, including some quantitative evidence in Ghana that their movement is often stimulated by a desire to obtain specialist training that is unavailable or difficult to access in Ghana (Anarfi et al. 2010). Many educated young people also move in order to complete higher education, and this is increasingly a major route through which a work permit can be obtained in OECD countries (OECD 2007).

Since the mid-1990s there has been some evidence of return migration to Ghana, as the economy there has improved in comparison to neighbouring West African countries to which many Ghanaians had migrated, but also because of tighter immigration laws and restrictions on travelling abroad, particularly to European countries where valid travel and employment documents are required (Anarfi et al. 2003; Twum-Baah et al. 1995). Furthermore, Ghana regained political stability in 1992 when democratic elections were held after a decade of military dictatorship. In general though, there is relatively little data on international return migration to Ghana, in terms both of numbers and of the impact on the development of the country at large (Black et al. 2003a; Mazzucato 2007).

In the case of the UK, migration from Ghana grew in the late 1980s and 1990s in the context of an expanding labour market as the country emerged from recession to a period of substantial economic growth, which continued until the most recent economic crisis of 2008. Immigration to UK during this period, and especially after around 2001, was from an increasingly diverse set of countries, including Central and Eastern Europe as the UK labour market opened to these new EU member countries. Such a liberal approach to labour market access did not apply to African migrants, and indeed the 1990s saw a tightening of immigration controls for many of them. Nonetheless, African immigration has grown, including through student

and asylum migration, and the direct recruitment of doctors and nurses to the UK's National Health Service since the late 1990s.

In the Netherlands, migration from Ghana also represents one element of a major diversification of immigration trends over the past 15–20 years in the context of a buoyant labour market and a strong policy emphasis on multiculturalism compared to other European countries (Koopmans et al. 2005). Migration from Ghana to the Netherlands is a recent phenomenon, mostly concentrated in the last decades of the twentieth century. Ghanaian migrants first arrived as economic and political migrants, reunifying with family members later on. In 2011 slightly more than 21,000 Ghanaians were registered in the Netherlands, a 70% increase since the 1970s. This number includes both migrants (62%) and children born in the Netherlands (38%). The division between males and females is almost 50–50. This number does not include unregistered migrants from Ghana, a population estimated to be around the same size as the registered population (Mazzucato 2008; CBS 2012). More than half of the Ghanaian population resides in Amsterdam, more specifically in southeastern Amsterdam, an area also known as the 'Bijlmer".

Whilst quantitative studies on migrants have been conducted in both the UK and the Netherlands, in neither case do major quantitative data sources specifically include migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, let alone specific African countries. This reflects the fact that African migrants represent a small – though growing – proportion of migrants. For example, in the Netherlands, only Somalia features among the top 10 'non-Western' migrant origin countries. Moreover, no data exist on undocumented migrants from Ghana.[2] In this chapter, we try to fill some of these gaps using the MAFE data.

10.3 Departures, Returns and Circulation (1975–2008)

10.3.1 Trends in Migration from Ghana

The aim of this section is to better understand the dynamics of Ghanaian migration. Using the MAFE household data[3] collected in Ghana it is possible to provide an overall picture of migration trends, destinations and patterns. We will explore whether the probability of migration has increased over time and whether countries of destination have changed.

Largely in line with the historical trends described above, we note a significant increase in the probability of someone from Ghana migrating between 1975–89 and 1990–99 and migrating to Europe in particular. The decline of the Ghanaian economy and large-scale deportations of Ghanaian migrants from Nigeria started a trend of migration from Ghana to Europe and beyond in the 1980s, which accelerated as these migration streams became more established and pioneer migration gave way to chain migration and family reunification/formation abroad (Fig. 10.1).

[2] The only estimate that exists is in Mazzucato (2008) where the undocumented population was estimated to be around 20,000 in the year 2000.

[3] For notes on methodology and all details on MAFE samples see Chap. 2 in this volume.



Fig. 10.1 Cumulative probabilities of migration out of Ghana by destination

Source: MAFE Household survey in Ghana, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children (between age 18 and 40), including deceased children
Definition: Migration for a period of at least 1 year
Interpretation: Each bar represents the cumulative probability of migration between 18 and 40, i.e. the probability of doing at least one international migration between 18 and 40 in a hypothetical cohort that experiences the age-specific probabilities of migration within a given period. For more technical details on the computation methodology, see Schoumaker and Beauchemin (2015)
Statistical significance: *For all destinations,* changes over time are statistically significant between the first period and the second period ($p < 0.01$), not between the second and the third period ($p > 0.10$). For *Africa* and *Other destinations*, changes are not significant ($p > 0.10$). For Europe, the increase between the first and the second period is significant ($p < 0.01$); the change between the 1990s and the 2000s is not significant ($p > 0.10$)

10.3.2 Changes in Migration Destinations

Taking a closer look at the countries of destination of Ghanaian migrants and changes in preferred destinations in recent decades, we see that the UK and the USA have been the top destinations throughout (Table 10.1). Flows to the UK reflect colonial links, and the UK was initially a preferred destination for highly skilled migrants as similarities in the educational systems facilitated entrance to universities and other institutions of higher learning. The USA was also favoured because its language is English. As more people migrated to the US, as America entered the public imagination through its highly popular soap operas (Manuh 1999) and as the US Green Card lottery system got underway, many Ghanaians of different backgrounds thought of migrating there and a steady stream of migration to the USA built up. While these two destinations have stayed constant over the last few decades, migration destinations have diversified compared to the predominantly regional

Table 10.1 Top 5 destinations from Ghana

1975–1999		2000–2008		1975–2008	
Country	% of migrations	Country	% of migrations	Country	% of migrations
United Kingdom	30	USA	33	United Kingdom	28
USA	20	United Kingdom	27	USA	27
Nigeria	10	Nigeria	6	Nigeria	8
Japan	6	South Africa	6	Italy	4
Australia	5	Italy	5	South Africa	3
N	87		131		218

Source: MAFE-Ghana, Household survey, 2009. Weighted percentages
Sample includes first migration of children of heads of households, who left at age 18 or over in 1975 or later
Interpretation: 30% of migrants who left Ghana between 1975–1999 went firstly to the United Kingdom
Statistical significance: The percentage of migration to specific countries varies across periods (F-test). France ($p < 0.01$), Italy ($p < 0.001$), Mauritania ($p < 0.001$), USA ($p < 0.001$), Côte d'Ivoire ($p < 0.001$), Spain ($p < 0.001$), Gabon ($p < 0.01$), Gambia ($p > 0.10$), Mali ($p > 0.10$), Morocco ($p > 0.10$)

migration that was common before the 1970s. Nigeria, Southern European countries and even Japan became some of the top 10 destinations. It is noteworthy that the MAFE data come from two Ghanaian towns, Kumasi and Accra, so that the top destinations are indicative of these urban households.

10.3.3 Migration Trends by Gender and Destination

While historically women from southern Ghana have migrated within the West African region, primarily for commerce, inter-continental migration flows were at first male dominated, with women mostly migrating as dependent wives. However, migration has become increasingly feminized with more women migrating independently to fulfill their own economic needs. Studies on this issue highlight the way women migrate independently of men, as skilled workers, entrepreneurs and traders (Kofman 2004). Many Ghanaian women migrated as professional nurses when countries such as the UK and, to a lesser degree, the Netherlands, were actively recruiting for nurses in Ghana. This can be seen from the increase in female migration, especially since the year 2000 (Fig. 10.2). This increase is caused by an increase of female migration to Europe and other destinations (mostly USA and Canada). Female migration within Africa has decreased slightly over time. Figure 10.2 shows that the increase in Ghanaian migrants to Europe has been significant for both men and women, while to other destinations it has only been significant for men.



Fig. 10.2 Cumulative probabilities of migration out of Ghana by gender

10.3.4 Migration Trends by Educational Level and Destination

This brain drain is an important issue in Ghana, where 40% of university faculty positions, 60% of polytechnic faculty positions and 65% of elementary school teaching posts were vacant in the early 2000s (Manuh 2005), while at least 25% of tertiary educated Ghanaians are overseas (Carrington and Detragiache 1998). Sixty-one percent of doctors trained in Ghana between 1985–1994 left the country, mainly for the UK and USA (Nyonator and Dovlo 2005). In general, Ghanaians with higher education are increasingly likely to migrate to Europe and the United States and less likely to remain in Africa (Fig. 10.3). This has been exacerbated by active recruitment of medical personnel by the UK and other European countries in the early 2000s (Eastwood et al. 2005) and flexible migration laws for medical personnel in the US (Hagopian et al. 2005). Such programs were criticized for the brain drain they were creating in countries like Ghana, and have since been stopped. However, scholarships and more generally rising wealth amongst middle and upper class Ghanaian families have brought UK and US universities within reach of students. Hagopian et al. (2005), for example, report a widespread expectation amongst medical students in Ghana to migrate abroad, even permanently.

While much attention has been paid to the brain drain issue, it is important to note that there has also been an increase in migration among less educated Ghanaians, especially to Europe in the 1990–1999 period (Fig. 10.3). This has made the Ghanaian population in Europe highly diverse, consisting of university trained migrants as well as people who have not completed primary or secondary school.

10.3.5 Trends in Returns

Return migration has increasingly figured in the general debates on migration and development. It is seen as a potential benefit from migration that can boost development in the migrants' origin countries and can counterbalance the negative effects of migration caused by the 'brain drain' (Mazzucato 2007). In general, there is relatively little data on international return migration to Ghana, whether in terms of numbers or of the impact on the development of the country at large (Black et al. 2003b; Mazzucato 2007). Using the data from the household survey we can assess the scale of return migration in Ghana (Fig. 10.4).

The percentage of migrants who return to Ghana within 10 years of their first departure ranges from 10% to 60% depending on periods and places where they were living before they returned. Return rates are highest for migrants within the African continent. Those migrating to Europe have lower return rates, but there has recently been a major surge in returns from there, suggesting that there may be some important period effects. Whereas fewer than 20% of migrants to Europe returned between 1990 and 1999, that percentage has increased to more than 50% in the last decade. Various trends may help to explain these findings. First of all, migrants in



Fig. 10.3 Cumulative probabilities of migration out of Ghana by education and period

the 1990s were in general less educated, more often undocumented and such migrants tend to return less. Secondly, the increase in returns from Europe since 2000 most likely is a combination of increasing difficulties at destination (both economic and political) and improving economic conditions in Ghana. Qualitative



Fig. 10.4 Percentage of migrants returning within 10 years of their first departure from Ghana

Source: MAFE Household survey in Ghana, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children who left at ages 18 or over
Definition: Migration for a period of at least one year and return for at least one year
Interpretation: Each bar represents the cumulative probability of return with 10 years of first departure, i.e. the probability of returning within 10 years in a hypothetical cohort that experiences the duration specific probabilities of return within a given period. Periods refer to the time of return, not to the time of departure
Statistical significance: For all destinations and for Europe, increases between the second period and the third period are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). Other changes are not significant ($p > 0.10$)

case studies of Ghanaian migrants in the US and Canada (Bledsoe and Sow 2011; Wong 2000) also suggest highly skilled migrants may decide to return to Ghana in order to avoid racism, give their children a better future, and receive support for reproductive tasks allowing them to focus on their careersHowever, the MAFE surveys indicate that very few Ghanaian migrants return from North America (included in Others), and that returns have not increased (Fig. 10.5a).

The 'brain drain' is a policy concern in Ghana, with many highly qualified migrants such as doctors, nurses and teachers having left the country (Anarfi et al. 2010). However, our data on returns nuances this argument. Overall, returns used to be more frequent among less educated migrants, but there has been a general rise in returns of highly educated migrants since 2000 (Fig. 10.5b). Furthermore, highly educated migrants are the most likely to return when they migrate to other African destinations. Also, a higher proportion of highly educated people return from Europe than from the US (analyses not shown). However, the number of returnees in our sample is small.



Fig. 10.5a Percentage of migrants returning within 10 years of their first departure from Ghana by gender (all destinations)

Source: MAFE Household survey in Ghana, 2009. Weighted figures (90% confidence intervals)
Population: All household heads' children who left at ages 18 or over
Definition: Migration for a period of at least one year and return for at least one year
Interpretation: Each bar represents the cumulative probability of return with 10 years of first departure, i.e. the probability of returning within 10 years in a hypothetical cohort that experiences the duration specific probabilities of return within a given period. Periods refer to the time of return, not to the time of departure
Statistical significance: For *males,* the increase between the second period and the third period is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). Other changes are not significant ($p > 0.10$)

10.3.6 Trends in Circulation

Whereas most studies focus on migration and return, it is important to also look at circulation, with people moving back and forth between two countries. Circulation has been defined in different ways depending on who is talking about it (Mazzucato 2009). European and North American policy documents usually refer to circulation as a movement from an origin country, to a destination and back to the origin country. Yet on the ground, 'spontaneous' circulation, when people are given the choice, often involves back and forth movements without necessarily ending at origin. We take this latter view. Some qualitative studies describe the phenomenon of circulation, yet it is poorly documented quantitatively. Table 10.2 shows the percentage of migrants currently living abroad who had migrated at least once before migrating to their current destination. The destination of the earlier migration was not necessarily in the same region. For instance, among migrants currently in Europe, some may



Fig. 10.5b Percentage of migrants returning within 10 years of their first departure from Ghana by education (all destinations)

Source, population, definition and interpretation: as in Fig. 10.5a
Statistical significance: Among the *less educated,* the decrease between the first and the second period and the increase between the second and the third period are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). The increase between the first and the third period among migrants with higher education is significant ($p < 0.05$). Differences between migrants with low education and with higher education are not significant ($p > 0.10$) in the most recent period

Table 10.2 Proportion of people living outside Ghana who had already migrated and returned at least once before their last departure

	Period of last departure				
Current place of residence	1975–1989	1990–1999	2000–2009	1975–2009	N
Europe	1	4	8	6	521
Africa (not Ghana)	0	2	15	10	96
Other	1	3	11	8	457
All	1	3	10	7	1,074

Source: MAFE Household survey in Ghana, 2009. Weighted percentages. Population: Sample includes all migrants currently living abroad (not only spouses, household heads and children). Migrants who left Ghana before 1975 are not included in the sample
Statistical significance: Significant change over time in Europe ($p < 0{,}10$), in others ($p < 0.01$) and for all regions together ($p < 0.01$)

have migrated first to another African country. We see that in all cases, circulation in the form of a previous migration and return to Ghana, has increased over time for all current places of residence.

Short visits may act as a substitute for definitive return and become part of a transnational way of life. Table 10.3 shows the percentage of Ghanaian migrants currently living in the UK or the Netherlands who had returned to Ghana for a short or long stay since their first arrival in Europe (not necessarily their current country of residence). Migrants in the UK show higher percentages of both long and short returns (visits) than do migrants in the Netherlands. But in both countries' cases, well over half the Ghanaians living there had returned to Ghana, for long or short visits, again attesting to high circulation rates. This pattern of movement deserves more attention in migration statistics.

10.4 Why Do People Migrate?

10.4.1 Migration Motives

The aim of this section is to provide information on the motives for migration and the choice of destination. It uses both household and biographic data. Work is the main motive for migration across periods as well as destinations (Table 10.4). Studies and family are the other important motivations for migration. Migrating for study purposes is especially a motivation for Europe and other destinations (most likely USA) whereas it is almost absent as a motivation for migration within Africa. Family has increased as a motivation for migration to Europe and other destinations but it is still by far less important as a motivation than are work and studies. Even though from a European policy perspective it is often said that family migration is now the main driver of migration from non-EU countries, looking at the statistics from Ghana, this cannot be confirmed (but see also below).

Table 10.3 Proportion of people living in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands who have made at least one long return migration or a short visit since their first arrival in Europe

Current place of residence	Long return	Visit (short return)	Short or long	N
United Kingdom	10	64	66	136
Netherlands	5	57	58	271
United Kingdom, Netherlands	9	63	65	407

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in the UK and the Netherlands, 2009. Weighted percentages
Population: Sample includes migrants aged 25 and over, who left Ghana at age 18 or over after 1975, currently living in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands
Interpretation: Long returns corresponds to return in Ghana for a period of at least one year. Visits (short returns) correspond to stay in Ghana for less than one year. The category short or long includes people who did a short or long return, or both. Since a large share of people doing a long return also do visits, the percentage is not the sum of percentages for short and long returns
Statistical significance: Significant difference ($p < 0.10$) between countries for long returns

Table 10.4 Motives for departure from Ghana

Region of residence	Motives	Period			
		1975–1989	1990–1999	2000–2007	1975–2008
Africa	Work	94	66	87	84
	Family	6	34	9	14
	Studies	1	1	2	2
	Other	0	0	2	1
	N	*24*	*21*	*49*	*93*
Europe	Work	92	84	85	86
	Family	3	9	7	8
	Studies	21	13	22	19
	Other	0	1	0	0
	N	*58*	*151*	*288*	*497*
Other	Work	64	86	74	77
	Family	4	4	15	9
	Studies	43	16	24	24
	Other	0	0	2	1
	N	*55*	*137*	*247*	*439*
All	Work	79	84	80	82
	Family	4	8	11	9
	Studies	29	14	22	20
	Other	0	0	1	1
	N	*137*	*309*	*584*	*1030*

Source: MAFE Household survey in Ghana, 2009. Weighted percentages. Population: Sample includes migrants currently living abroad who were born in Ghana and left at age 18 or over in 1975 or later. Motives of migration are reported by proxy respondents
Statistical significance:
Tests of differences over time for all destinations: Significant changes in departures for studies ($p < 0.10$) for all destinations. Other differences are not significant ($p > 0.10$)
Tests of differences across regions for all 1975–2008:Significant differences across regions in departures for studies ($p < 0.01$) for all periods (1975–2008). Other differences are not significant ($p > 0.10$)

Women report family reasons as a motive for migration more often than men, although they also mention work as an important motive (Table 10.5). It may not be easy to disentangle the two since both might act as motivating factors at the same time. Obviously, studies is mentioned more often by more highly educated than less educated people, but work is the most frequent motive for migration even among the more highly educated.

Table 10.5 Motives for last departure from Ghana by gender and education

Region of residence	Motives	Gender		Education		All
		Males	Females	Secondary or less	Higher	1975–2007
Africa	Work	97	57	84	(85)	84
	Family	2	38	15	(9)	14
	Studies	2	1	0	(8)	2
	Other	0.0	3	1	(0)	1
	N	*62*	*32*	*70*	*24*	*94*
Europe	Work	86	84	91	79	86
	Family	0	23	10	4	8
	Studies	20	16	10	32	19
	Other	0	0	0	1	0
	N	*331*	*164*	*274*	*223*	*497*
Other	Work	80	74	82	73	77
	Family	1	24	10	9	9
	Studies	25	22	15	32.2	24
	Other	1	2	1	1	1
	N	*288*	*151*	*201*	*238*	*439*
All	Work	84	77	87	76	82
	Family	1	24	11	67	9
	Studies	21	18	10	32.0	20
	Other	1	1	1	1	1
	N	*687*	*354*	*549*	*494*	*1043*

Source: MAFE Household survey in Ghana, 2009. Weighted percentages
Population: Sample includes migrants currently living abroad who were born in Ghana and left at age 18 or over in 1975 or later. Motives of migration are reported by proxy respondents
Percentages in brackets are computed on less than 30 observations
Statistical significance:
Tests of differences by gender for all 1975–2008:Significant differences by gender for departures for work ($p < 0.10$) and for family ($p < 0.01$). Other differences are not significant ($p > 0.10$)
Tests of differences by education for all 1975–2008:Significant differences across regions in departures for work ($p < 0.05$) and for studies ($p < 0.01$). Other differences are not significant ($p > 0.10$)

10.4.2 Migration Motives Compared for the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

When we compare the motivation for migration among migrants currently living in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom some significant differences become noticeable. The percentage of migrants that state studies as a motive for migration is much higher in the UK (23%) than in the Netherlands (9%) (Table 10.6), while the percentage of people who mention work/living conditions is higher in the Netherlands than in the UK.

Table 10.6 Motives for migration to United Kingdom and the Netherlands

Motives	Country		All destinations
	United Kingdom	Netherlands	
Work/living conditions	36	45	38
Family	31	31	31
Studies	23	9	21
Other	10	15	11
N	135	261	396

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in the UK and the Netherlands, 2009. Weighted percentages
Population: Sample includes first long stay in country, at age 18 or over (after 1975) among migrants still living in the country
Statistical significance: Significant differences of motives across countries ($p < 0.05$)

Table 10.7 Motives for migration to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands by period

Country of residence	Motives	Period			
		1975–1989	1990–1999	2000–2009	1975–2009
United Kingdom, Netherlands	Work	29	49	35	38
	Family	30	34	29	31
	Studies	17	12	28	21
	Other	25	5	7	11
	N	64	114	218	396

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in the UK and the Netherlands, 2009. Weighted percentages
Population: Sample includes migrants currently living in United Kingdom and the Netherlands, who were born in Ghana and left at age 18 or over in 1975 or later
Statistical significance: Significant changes of motives over time ($p < 0.05$)

Work has remained the main motivation for migration across periods and family remained about the same over time (Table 10.7). Studies become a more important motive for migration after 2000. This might be due to the fact that work permits and family reunification became increasingly difficult to obtain.

An important difference between migration motives reported by Ghanaian migrants in the UK and the Netherlands (Tables 10.6 and 10.7) and motives reported by households in Ghana for migrants overseas (Table 10.5) is that the family motive is more frequently reported by migrants (30.8%) than by households (7.6%). There are three possible explanations. First, the motivations of migrants going to all European destinations are reported in Table 10.5. It could be that the U.K. and the Netherlands have a larger share of migrants who come for family reasons. This is plausible, as migration to these countries has been occurring on a large scale since the 1980s, giving families the time to form and reunify in these countries. Second, the respondents in the two surveys are different: in Table 10.5 household heads report the reason why the migrant left, whereas in Tables 10.6 and 10.7 migrants

themselves give their motives. Third, in the household survey responses were closed-ended questions with fixed response options whereas in the migrant biographical survey these were open-ended questions, allowing migrants to express more fully what their motives were. These differences show that the method used to collect data can have an important effect on findings; this should be a major consideration for migration researchers.

10.5 Legal Status and Migration Routes

10.5.1 Legal Status on Arrival

Irregular migration is a high priority for policy makers. Despite the political relevance of the phenomenon, assessments of the size of the irregular population are rare. In our sample the percentage of Ghanaian migrants without a residence permit is higher in the Netherlands than in the UK (around 20% compared to 5%, Table 10.10) even though the percentage of people without a residence permit has been increasing in the UK over time (from 0 to almost 7%). This has to do in part with the different characteristics of Ghanaians in the UK and the Netherlands, with over two-thirds of our UK sample having completed tertiary education while only one-third of our Netherlands sample had tertiary education (Mazzucato et al. 2015). Tertiary educated migrants are more likely to have a residence permit. Yet this is also a reflection of the facts that migration policies were stricter in the Netherlands in the 1990s than in the UK (Mazzucato et al. 2015), that it is more difficult to have a Ghanaian degree certified in the Netherlands than in the UK (Mazzucato 2008), and that Ghana and the Netherlands do not have the same national language. As a result, there are more undocumented migrants in the Netherlands and even highly educated migrants are more likely not to have residence permits (13%) than in the UK (1%) (Tables 10.8 and 10.9).

10.5.2 Most Frequent Migration Routes

Recent studies have indicated a diversification of migration routes between Africa and Europe (Grillo and Mazzucato 2008; see also Schoumaker and Flahaux 2013). A migration route is considered in this work as the series of countries in which people stayed for a short or long period before settling in the current country of residence. The majority of migrants from Ghana to the UK and the Netherlands arrive directly from Ghana (Table 10.10), although this is more the case for the UK (76%) than for the Netherlands (65%). Other migrants either come through a different African country or from within Europe.

Table 10.8 Legal status during the first year in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

Current residence		Period of arrival			
		1975–1989	1990–1999	2000–2009	1975–2009
United Kingdom	Residence permit	86	87	88	87
	No residence permit	0	6	7	5
	No residence permit needed	14	8	3	7
	Unknown	0	0	2	1
	N	27	35	74	136
Netherlands	Residence permit	77	78	73	75
	No residence permit	23	21	17	19
	No residence permit needed	0	0	6	3
	Unknown	0	1	4	2
	N	40	81	148	269
Both countries	Residence permit	85	85	86	85
	No residence permit	3	8	8	7
	No residence permit needed	13	0	4	6
	Unknown	0	0	2	1
	N	67	116	222	405

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in the UK and the Netherlands, 2009. Weighted percentages
Definition: Legal status is defined by the type of residence permit during the first year. No residence permit means that the person declared that he/she did not have a residence permit at some point during the first year. If a person had a visa that expired they are classified under "no residence permit"
Population: Sample includes migrants currently living in United Kingdom and the Netherlands, who were born in Ghana and left at age 18 or over in 1975 or later
Statistical significance: No significant changes over time (the two countries combined). Differences across countries significant ($p < 0.01$)

10.5.3 Alone or Accompanied?

Migrants also often arrive in a context where they know someone who can facilitate migration and/or host them. However, the majority of Ghanaian migrants in the UK and the Netherlands had travelled alone (Table 10.11). In the UK none of the interviewees mentioned using a smuggler to enter the country but in the Netherlands 5% of interviewees admitted to this. The percentage decreased, however, from 10% between 1975–1990 to 3.2% in 2000–2009.

Table 10.9 Legal status during the first year in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

Current residence		Gender		Education			All
		Males	Females	None or primary	Secondary	Higher	1975–2009
United Kingdom	Residence permit	84	91	–	77	92	87
	No residence permit	8	1	–	12	1	5
	No residence permit needed	6	8	–	9	6	7
	Unknown	2	0	–	1	0	1
	N	71	65	7	46	83	136
Netherlands	Residence permit	74	76	(45)	73	84	75
	No residence permit	21	17	(33)	21	13	19
	No residence permit needed	2	4	(10)	3	2	3
	Unknown	2	2	(11)	2	2	2
	N	141	128	17	159	93	269
Both countries	Residence permit	83	88	(75.)	77	92	85
	No residence permit	10	4	(13)	14	2	7
	No residence permit needed	6	7	(2)	8	6	6
	Unknown	2	0	(10)	2	0	1
	N	212	193	24	205	176	405

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in the UK and the Netherlands, 2009. Weighted percentages
Population: Sample includes migrants currently living in United Kingdom and the Netherlands, who were born in Ghana and left at age 18 or over in 1975 or later
Statistical significance: No significant differences by gender. Significant differences by education ($p < 0.01$)

Table 10.10 Top 5 routes of migration from Ghana to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

United Kingdom							
1975–1989		**1990–1999**		**2000–2009**		**1975–2009**	
Trajectory From Ghana	**% of migrants**	**Trajectory From Ghana**	**% of migrants**	**Trajectory From Ghana**	**% of migrants**	**Trajectory From Ghana**	**% of migrants**
…-United Kingdom	84	…-United Kingdom	68	…-United Kingdom	77	…-United Kingdom	76
…- Nigeria-UK	7	…- Netherlands-UK	8	…- Germany-UK	5	…- Nigeria-UK	4
…-Denmark-UK	4	…-Bulgaria-UK	4	…-Nigeria-UK	4	…-Germany-UK	3
…-Norway-UK	3	…-UAE-UK	4	…-Togo-UK	2	…-Netherlands-UK	3
…-Netherlands-UK	3	…-South Africa-UK	4	…-Switzerland-UK	2	…-Togo-UK	1
	27		35		74		136
Netherlands							
1975–1989		**1990–1999**		**2000–2009**		**1975–2009**	
Trajectory From Ghana	**% of migrants**	**Trajectory From Ghana**	**% of migrants**	**Trajectory**	**% of migrants**	**Trajectory**	**% of migrants**
…-Netherlands	66	…-Netherlands	64	…-Netherlands	65	…-Netherlands	65
…- Germany-NL	13	…- Germany-NL	8	…- Italy-NL	8	…- Germany-NL	6
…-Belgium- NL	6	…-Cote d'Ivoire- NL	4	…-United Kingdom- NL	5	…-Italy- NL	5
…-Italy-NL	5	…-Libya-NL	2	…-Germany-NL	3	…-United Kingdom-NL	4
…-Nigeria-NL	3	…-France-NL	2	…-Nigeria-NL	3	…-Nigeria-NL	3
N	40		81		147		268

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in the UK and the Netherlands, 2009. Weighted percentages
Percentages computed for numbers lower than 30 are in brackets
The five most frequent trajectories are represented
Population: Sample includes short and long stays outside Ghana (for settlement or transit) after the last departure from Ghana and before the first long stay in country of destination (current residence), at age 18 or over (after 1975), among migrants still living in the country
Statistical significance: Significant changes in routes over time for the Netherlands ($p < 0.10$) and for the United Kingdom ($p < 0.05$)

Table 10.11 Percentage of migrants by type of co-travelers

Country of residence	Co-traveler at some point during the journey	Period			
		1975–1989	1990–1999	2000–2009	1975–2009
United Kingdom	Alone	75	74	81	78
	Spouse	8	15	4	8
	Children	3	7	6	6
	Other kin	10	2	6	6
	Friend	7	0	2	2
	Group (official, sport, music)	0	7	1	2
	Smuggler	0	0	0	0
	Other people	0	2	3	2
	N	27	35	74	136
Netherlands	Alone	75	69	76	73
	Spouse	2	5	9	6
	Children	2	8	5	6
	Other kin	2	11	5	7
	Friend	0	4	2	2
	Group (official, sport, music)	3	0	1	1
	Smuggler	10	6	3	5
	Other people	6	5	4	5
	N	40	81	148	269

Source: MAFE Biographic surveys in the UK and the Netherlands, 2009. Weighted percentages
Note: Weighted percentages. Co-travelers include all types of persons cited at least once as co-travelers during the journey from Ghana to the current country of residence (first arrival). People cited as co-travelers on journeys to intermediate countries (for short or long stays) are also included
Population: Sample includes short and long stays outside Ghana (for settlement or transit) before the first long stay in the country, at age 18 or over (after 1975), among migrants still living in the country
Sample includes migrants currently living in United Kingdom and the Netherlands, who were born in Ghana and left at age 18 or over in 1975 or later
Statistical significance: No significant changes over time (the two countries combined). Differences across countries significant ($p < 0.01$)

10.6 Conclusions

Although the field of migration studies has vastly expanded in the last decade, little quantitative evidence exists on the characteristics of migration between Africa and Europe. In this chapter, using the longitudinal MAFE data, we describe trends in migration from Ghana between 1975–2008 and focus more in detail on two destination countries in Europe: the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

The main conclusion we can draw based on our data is that migrant realities are complex, change over time and can involve back and forth movements between countries. Migration from Ghana diversified from being Africa-oriented to include various destinations in Europe, the United States and Canada and even Japan. At first most migrants to these new destinations were males but, like other sending countries, Ghana has seen a feminization of migration, not only through wives following their husbands abroad but also through independent female migration, as shown by the high percentage of female migrants who migrated without knowing anyone in the destination country.

The most frequent motives for migration amongst Ghanaian migrants are work, study and family. However, when we compare the motivation for migration among migrants currently living in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom some significant differences become noticeable. The percentage of migrants that state studies as a motive for migration is much higher in the UK than in the Netherlands, while the percentage of people who mention work/living conditions is higher in the Netherlands than in the UK.

Traditionally, Ghanaian students found their way to the United Kingdom, owing to historical ties and knowledge of the English language, whereas Ghanaian students have only more recently arrived in the Netherlands as an increasing number of university programs are now offered in English. The characteristics of the Ghanaian population in the two countries therefore differ, with migrants in the Netherlands being less educated. Yet there are also indications that migrants in the UK are better able to put their qualifications to work, as there are hardly any migrants with tertiary education who are undocumented in the UK whereas in the Netherlands 13% of tertiary educated migrants are undocumented, pointing to an important policy domain to address: recognition of the home-country degrees of third country nationals in the Netherlands.

Migrants are found to frequently circulate between a destination country and Ghana, be it for visits or for longer periods but without a definitive return. This suggests evidence of transnational lifestyles (see Mazzucato et al. 2015). It is important to acknowledge this type of back and forth circulation in policy discussions of circular migration; at present such discussions tend to focus on movement from an origin country to a destination and then back to the origin country (Mazzucato 2009). Interestingly, a higher proportion of women circulate than men. Studies suggest that facilitating the mobility of (former) migrants, enabling them to maintain and use their transnational social networks, has various advantages for migrants as well as for their ability to contribute to their home country's development (Mazzucato 2008). Furthermore, a striking finding is that Ghanaian return migration has experienced an increase since 2000. This could be an indication that Ghana's stable political and economic climate of the last decade is an incentive to return, although no evidence was found of the effect of Ghanaian GDP on returns (see Gonzalez-Ferrer et al. 2013). Although stricter migration policies in Europe and North America may

lead to less returns, as discussed in the chapters on DR Congo and Ghana, they may also make it more difficult for families to reunify and encourage returns (Kofman 2004), especially in contexts of declining job prospects in European countries. Our findings also indicate that the opportunity to return is not equal for all migrants. Ghanaian migrants in the United Kingdom are more likely to return than those in the Netherlands, and since 2000 the return of highly educated migrants has increased, especially from Europe. The growing numbers of highly educated returnees help to nuance the debate on the 'brain drain' in Ghana.

While policy concern is also directed towards irregular migration and the smuggling of migrants, our data show that this is not a widespread phenomenon for Ghanaian migrants in our sample. Most Ghanaian migrants arrive directly by plane, both in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Especially in the UK, very few are undocumented.

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Chapter 11
Ghanaian Migration: Economic Participation

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11.1 Introduction

As noted in the previous chapter, international migration from Ghana has undergone a number of different phases over the last century in line with the changing socio-economic environment. In the case of the UK, expansion of migration from Ghana to the former colonial metropole in the late 1980s and 1990s took place in the context

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of an expanding labour market at destination as well as a substantial expansion of post-secondary education and significant growth in the number of international students. During this period, and especially after around 2001, immigration to UK grew, not only from African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa but from an increasingly diverse set of countries, notably central and eastern Europe, as the UK labour market opened to these countries on EU accession in May 2004 (Black et al. 2010). This liberal approach to labour market access did not apply to African migrants: indeed the immigration controls for many African countries tighterned during the 1990s. Nonetheless, African immigration has grown, through student and asylum migration and also through the direct recruitment of doctors and nurses to the country's National Health Service since the late 1990s (Raghuram 2008).

In the case of the Netherlands, migration from Ghana also represents one element of a major diversification of immigration trends over the past 15–20 years in the context of a buoyant labour market and a very strong policy emphasis on multiculturalism compared to other European countries (Statham et al. 2005). In turn, a substantial literature on labour market integration of international migrants exists in both the UK and the Netherlands focused on this period, although in few cases are the specific experiences of Ghanaian or even sub-Saharan African migrants evident. In particular, whilst quantitative studies on immigrant integration have been conducted in both countries, in neither case do major quantitative data sources – the Labour Force Survey in the UK, the Social Position and Use of Provisions by Ethnic Minorities survey (SPVA 1998; SPVA 2002) and the Netherlands Kinship Panel Study in the Netherlands – allow us to drill down even to sub-Saharan Africa, let alone specific African countries. This reflects the fact that African migrants represent a tiny part of even the immigrant labour market. For example in the Netherlands, only Somalis feature in the top 10 migrant origin countries even for 'non-Western' countries, and a major recent report on trends in integration of non-Western migrants in the Netherlands (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2010) does not mention Ghana or Ghanaian migrants at all. Labour market integration can be measured both in terms of whether individual immigrants are employed, but also in terms of the level of employment.

In this chapter, we explore patterns of Ghanaian migrants' integration into the labour market in the UK and the Netherlands, based on the MAFE data outlined in previous chapters. The chapter seeks to fill a gap in understanding of the patterns of integration of these two relatively recent migrant groups, and also to explore their trajectories over time. As in Chap. 5, analysis also extends to migrants' economic contributions, and eventual return to Ghana, as we try to understand the factors that influence both integration and re-integration after return. As noted in Chap. 5, there are some distinctive features in the Ghanaian case in terms of the relatively high level of qualifications of many migrants (especially to the UK) and the existence of potentially more positive relationships between integration at destination, and re-insertion of returnees.

Relatively little literature exists to provide background on the specific experience of Ghanaian migrants in the two countries, especially from a quantitative perspective. In the UK, a study by Vasta and Kandilige (2010) based on a small sample of Ghanaians living in London suggests that in the context of a relatively hostile policy environment, there is a considerable degree of downward economic and social

mobility. A particular problem is faced by those who are undocumented, usually as a result of having overstayed on an initial visa. For these individuals, although employment rates are high, as individuals mobilise family and community ties to find work, available jobs are usually low-skill and poorly-paid. London is seen in this context as a 'leveller' for many Ghanaians in spite of their education and professional background. A similar conclusion, again on a small sample, was reached by Asima (2010) although with the nuance that women's labour market outcomes have been relatively better than those of men, since even low-paid employment involves many women entering the formal labour market for the first time.

Such findings are consistent with larger-scale studies of the low-wage sector that have covered a much wider range of migrant groups. Thus a series of studies of the London labour market have revealed what Wills et al. (2009) call a 'migrant division of labour', in which African, Asian and Latin American migrants tend to be trapped in minimum-wage (or below minimum-wage) employment, especially where they lack secure legal status. West Africans are seen to be archetypical of this phenomenon, although along with other English-speaking migrants they have had specific opportunities to obtain work involving caring for elderly or sick people, where one-to-one interaction with clients has been a specific feature of the job (Datta et al. 2010; McGregor 2007). In turn, although there has been considerable public policy attention to the promotion of 'social cohesion' between different ethnic and migrant communities in the UK in recent years (Hickman et al. 2008), this has tended to focus on social and cultural interactions rather than representing a policy on labour market integration. In this latter respect, successive UK governments have adopted something of a 'laissez-faire' approach.

In contrast, the Netherlands was one of the first European countries to develop a formal integration policy for immigrants, based on the experience of recession in the early 1980s and its disproportionate impact on immigrants. However, a recent study for the OECD shows that labour market outcomes for immigrants in the Netherlands in general have remained significantly below those of the native-born population, with particular differences in employment rates for the least qualified (OECD 2008). This report also observes that labour market outcomes for immigrants in the Netherlands fell behind those for immigrants in other OECD countries in the period 2002–2006, although this finding especially reflects the position of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants rather than those from sub-Saharan Africa.

Similar to the UK, there is some variation in integration experience between different immigrant groups in the Netherleands. For example, van Amersfoort and van Niekerk (2006) found in a study of the experience of four 'post-colonial' groups in the Netherlands from the East and West Indies that two factors – Dutch citizenship and 'cultural capital' in the form of educational attainment and Dutch language skills – were significant predictors of levels of labour market integration. Similarly, whilst a study by Bevelander and Veenman (2006) found that Somalis had the lowest probability of being employed of any of the five refugee groups they considered (the others being Afghans, Iranians, Iraqis and people from the former Yugoslavia), the acquisition of Dutch citizenship significantly increased the likelihood of employment.

The remaining part of this chapter is divided into two sections before conclusions. In the first (Sect. 11.2), we consider the integration of Ghanaian migrants into the

labour market in the UK and Netherlands. This section highlights the characteristics of the sample of migrants interviewed, including their occupational status, employment status and sector and level and type of employment, before going on to consider how labour market integration differs between the two countries and between genders; the extent to which it involves downward occupational mobility; and the extent to which it is influenced by migrants' legal status. In Sect. 11.3, we turn to the potential impact of migrants' transnational ties and activities on countries of origin by examining how remittances, investments, and participation in economic development initiatives through associations vary amongst migrants in the two countries. Finally, we consider the economic re-integration of return migrants back in Ghana.

11.2 Labour Market Integration Amongst Ghanaians in Europe

11.2.1 Background to the Sample: Ghanaians in the UK and the Netherlands

Before proceeding to an analysis of the data, it is important to note that the sample on which analysis in this chapter is based includes 422 migrants from Ghana living in the UK and Netherlands, but excludes the 'non-migrant' control group that was included in the previous chapter. The sample was selected through a snowballing technique, using quotas of interviewees in different age groups based on weights derived from the best available census data. A total of 273 migrants were interviewed in the Netherlands and 149 in the UK. A full profile of the socio-economic characteristics of the sample at the time of interview is provided in Black et al. (2013).

Overall, a higher proportion of those interviewed in the UK (69%) had already completed higher education than those interviewed in the Netherlands (35%), reflecting findings elsewhere that African migration to the UK involves individuals with qualification levels that exceed the average for UK-born populations (Kyambi 2005), and that a significant part of immigration to the UK is of individuals seeking to enter further or higher education. However, it is also notable that virtually no migrants interviewed in the UK had only secondary-level education – rather, there is a bi-modal sample with a majority highly qualified, but a significant minority (29%) with no more than primary education. In contrast, in the Netherlands, some 45% of respondents had secondary education, with less than one in five having primary or no education.

The high proportion of Ghanaians interviewed in the UK who had completed tertiary education may be a selection bias; however, it also reflects the fact that a degree from Ghana is often necessary to gain access to higher education in the UK, and that such student migration represents a significant proportion of the total. Thus whilst almost a half of all Ghanaian men interviewed in the UK, and over a quarter of Ghanaian women had moved into education in the first two years after their

arrival, much of this appears to have been study at Masters or even PhD level. In contrast, those who had completed secondary education but had not gone on to tertiary education was the largest group of all in the Netherlands.

In both countries, a majority of those interviewed – both men and women – had been in Europe for at least 10 years at the time of interview, with little difference in the proportion (around 16%) who had arrived within the past five years. Equally, the vast majority (over 90%) had arrived with a residence permit (or a legal right to stay by virtue of the visa they held), a proportion that remained roughly the same at the time of interview in 2009.

Turning to employment and occupational status, relatively high rates of employment were found both in the Netherlands (82%) and the UK (74%). Perhaps the most striking difference between the two countries is the type of occupation, partly reflecting the educational differences on arrival noted above. Thus whereas in the Netherlands, 83% overall and nearly 90% of women were employed in elementary occupations, in the UK over 40% of men and women were employed in higher-level occupations. This reflects the significant numbers of doctors and nurses in particular, but also university lecturers and other skilled professionals, among Ghanaian migrants to the UK, a pattern not replicated in the Netherlands case. It may also reflect language barriers for Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands, shown to be a significant factor in labour market outcomes elsewhere (Dustmann and Fabbri 2003).

There are some variations in the occupational status of men and women who were not formally employed at the time interviews were undertaken. In particular, in the UK, there was little reported unemployment amongst Ghanaian women, consistent with much lower rates of registered unemployment amongst women than men in the UK as a whole. Instead, quite high proportions of Ghanaian women in the UK were found to be either studying or reported themselves to be inactive. In contrast, in the Netherlands, women were more likely to be unemployed than men, but rather less likely to be studying.

It is also noticeable that in both countries, the vast majority of those employed were wage-earners rather than self-employed. In turn, in the Netherlands, employment for women in particular was dominated by the tertiary sector (trade and services), whilst very few men were employed in the secondary sector (industry and construction) and in 'other' employment, which includes administrative and IT workers, nurses and teachers. In contrast, in the UK, employment is dominated by this latter category for both men and women, with only a third employed in 'trade and services' and very few indeed in industry and construction. No Ghanaians interviewed in the UK were employed in agriculture, although this may simply reflect the fact that all interviews were conducted in urban areas.

It is important not to draw too much from these descriptive statistics. Relatively low unemployment rates amongst Ghanaians interviewed in the UK may be partly explained by the concentration of interviewees in London and the South East, which overall has lower unemployment rates for all nationalities. Moreover, unemployment of non-UK born workers had started to rise by mid-2009,[1] suggesting that rates for

[1] Office for National Statistics, Statistical Bulletin, Labour Market Statistics, June 2010.

Ghanaian migrants in the UK may also have risen after the time when the MAFE interviews were undertaken. At the same time, the migrant population interviewed was younger than the population of the two countries as a whole, and whilst young people have not necessarily experienced more job security in the recession, rates of unemployment are certainly age-related.

Another reason not to dwell on descriptive statistics of occupational experiences of migrants at the time of interview is the unique opportunity that the MAFE dataset provides to analyse occupational *trajectories* over time, comparing rates, levels and types of employment both before and after migration to Europe, and for each population within Europe over time. More detailed data on these trajectories are presented by Black et al. (2013); our focus here is on key trends across the two countries of destination and by gender, as well as the specific questions of whether there has been a process of 'deskilling' of migrants, and whether legal status is a significant factor influencing occupational outcomes.

11.2.2 The Receiving Contexts and Differing Labour Trajectories

Overall, our survey data shows that prior to arrival in the UK and the Netherlands, a significant proportion of Ghanaian migrants were working in relatively skilled jobs (31% of the 404 migrants for whom we have a full occupational trajectory were employed in 'highly-skilled' or 'intermediate' level employment[2] before leaving Ghana), a situation that was not maintained after arrival, at which point only 22% of those interviewed were in high-skilled or intermediate level employment. However, this masks significant differences between the two countries of destination, that are amplified in the years after arrival.

In the case of Ghanaians moving to the UK, with over 40% holding highly-skilled or intermediate jobs before migration, there appears to have been an initial deskilling on arrival in the UK, with this proportion falling to under a quarter of those interviewed. However, this was followed by a gradual recovery to a point around 4–5 years after arrival, when this group already regains its status as the largest single occupational status category. Indeed, by the time interviewees had been in the UK for 10 years, a large majority of those interviewed held higher-skilled jobs (Fig. 11.1).

In contrast, in the Netherlands, fewer migrants came from relatively higher skilled employment, and on arrival in the country there appears to be a shift to unemployment. Moreover, over time, no such 'rebound' of higher level employment is observed; rather, the sharp rise in the proportion unemployed in the year after arrival is followed not by a return to skilled employment, but by a rise in the proportion undertaking elementary occupations (Fig. 11.1).

[2] "Highly-skilled" is defined as occupational categories 1–3 in the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). "Intermediate" is defined as categories 4–6 and "elementary" is defined as categories 7–9.



Fig. 11.1 Occupational status in the last year in Africa and first 10 years of stay in Europe, by country of destination

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic surveys
Population: 149 migrants in the UK and 273 migrants the Netherlands during the first year in Europe
Interpretation: the figures show the distribution of the last occupational status of migrants in Ghana before leaving (first column on the left); and the same for each year after arrival in Europe. We present only the first 10 years after arrival for easier comparison
Note: weighted percentages
Statistical significance: The differences between countries during the last year in Ghana and first year in Europe are significant ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test). Within each country, the differences between the first year in Europe and the last year in Ghana on the one hand, and the tenth year in Europe on the other hand, are also significant ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test)

More detailed data on occupational trajectories between last status in Africa and first status in Europe, as well as first status in Europe and status at the time of the survey in 2009, are provided in Black et al. (2013). These data show that across the two countries, those in elementary employment before migration were most likely to have stayed in this category on arrival (64%), followed by students (49%); in contrast, only 34% of those in the higher occupational categories found jobs at the same level on arrival – albeit that 37% had become students, and only 19% had taken unskilled jobs (and just 6% of this group were unemployed).

Subsequent to arrival, a certain degree of churning between occupational statuses appears to have continued, with over 60% of the sample changing occupational status at least once, and a quarter twice or more. In particular, whilst most men and women who obtained an intermediate or high level job on arrival were still in this category at the time of interview, more than one in five of those who obtained an elementary job on arrival, and a quarter of those unemployed on arrival had subsequently found an intermediate or higher level job. This implies some measure of upward occupational mobility, although this mobility is largely limited to the UK, and is barely present in the Netherlands.

Table 11.1 highlights the most frequent trajectories of occupational status during interviewees' stays in Europe, showing that overall, the most common trajectory in the Netherlands was for an individual to remain in an elementary occupation, followed by movement from a period of unemployment on arrival to employment in an elementary occupation at the time of interview. In contrast, in the UK, the most common trajectory was to move from being a student on arrival to working an intermediate or higher-status occupation at the time of interview, whilst there was also a significant group who remained in intermediate or higher-status occupations throughout their stay.

Overall, people who were working in their first year in Europe were very likely still to be working at the time of the survey, and although there was a slight downward mobility amongst those in intermediate or higher level jobs before migration, the numbers are very small and this downward mobility occurs at the time of migration, not after. Meanwhile, those who were unemployed, inactive or students before arrival were very likely to be working at the time of the survey, whilst those who were students in their first year were very likely to be employed in intermediate or higher level occupations.

11.2.3 Labour Integration in Europe: Gendered Trajectories

Whilst the previous sub-section provides information on labour market trajectories across the board, it is important to break these down by gender, as men and women may vary sharply in their labour market experiences (Asima 2010). Data presented in Fig. 11.2 show that a significant share of both men and women in the MAFE sample were in high or intermediate level occupations prior to leaving Ghana, and that after arrival in Europe, this group became smaller in both cases, before gradually increasing again as a share of the sample. In turn, there was an overall increase in the share of both men and women who were students, or unemployed, in the 2–3 years after migration, with these percentages then declining again over time.

Analysis of individual trajectories shows that the outcome for men and women who were in more skilled occupations before leaving Ghana, and those who had been students, was roughly similar. Thus only around a third of men and women who had higher status occupations in Ghana secured similar employment on arrival in Europe; and whilst a larger percentage of men in this group than women became students, similar proportions of men and women in this group moved into elementary occupations or became unemployed.

Where a difference emerges between men and women is that the number of men in elementary occupations rose sharply upon arrival in Europe, whereas the main increase amongst women was in the share who became students. This is explained by two factors. First, three quarters of men who held elementary jobs in Ghana before migration retained such jobs on arrival, with almost all of the remainder becoming unemployed. Combined with a significant number of male former students, skilled workers, and

Table 11.1 Most frequent occupational trajectories of Ghanaian migrants after arrival in the UK and the Netherlands

Rank order	Netherlands		UK		Both countries	
	Trajectory	%	Trajectory	%	Trajectory	%
1	Elementary → Elementary	39	Student → Intermediate/High	20	Elementary → Elementary	21
2	Unemployed → Elementary	20	Elementary → Elementary	19	Student → Intermediate/High	18
3	Student → Student	4	Intermediate/High → Intermediate/High	14	Intermediate/High → Intermediate/High	12
4	Student → Elementary	4	Student → Student	6	Student → Student	6
5	Inactive → Elementary	3	Elementary → Intermediate/High	5	Elementary → Intermediate/High	5
Total	%	70		64		62
	N	273		149		422

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic surveys
Population: Migrants in the UK and the Netherlands. Weighted percentages & unweighted numbers.
Interpretation: The occupational trajectories compare occupation in first year after arrival with occupation at the time of interview.



Fig. 11.2 Occupational status in the last year in Africa and first 10 years of stay in Europe, by gender

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic surveys
Interpretation and population: see Fig. 11.1
Statistical significance: The difference by gender is significant ($p < 0.05$) the last year in Ghana, but not the first in Europe. Among males, the differences between the first year in Europe and the last year in Ghana on the one hand, and the tenth year in Europe on the other hand are significant ($p < 0.01$). Among females, the difference between the first and tenth year in Europe is significant ($p < 0.01$), but the difference between the last year in Ghana and the first in Europe in not significant. (Design-based F-test)

individuals outside the labour market altogether who took an elementary job in the year after arrival, this resulted in a net increase in elementary employment amongst men.

In contrast, amongst women the picture was much more varied. Although some 58% of women previously employed in elementary occupations remained so after arrival in Europe, the act of migration appears to mark a point of occupational mobility for at least some women, with 18% of former unskilled workers moving directly to more skilled jobs on arrival and a further 7% becoming students. In addition, over half of women who were outside the labour market before moving to Europe became students in their first year of migration, whilst some 28% of previously unemployed women obtained skilled work (the equivalent figure for men was just 2%).

Although the MAFE-Ghana data suggests some occupational mobility for women at the time of migration from Ghana to the UK (and to a lesser extent the Netherlands), there is less evidence that this is the case after arrival. Thus although the 29% of women who started work in the UK or the Netherlands in elementary occupations moved to higher-skilled work, compared to 18% of men, overall, the majority of both men and women remained in the same employment category at the time of interview as they did in the first year after migration. The principal exception to this was those who were unemployed or students on arrival, where most men and women had subsequently found work – unskilled work in the case of the unemployed, and skilled work in the case of students.

11.2.4 Human Capital and Brain Waste

Notwithstanding relatively high levels of education, and high levels of employment amongst Ghanaians interviewed in the Netherlands and especially the UK, the fear remains from much existing literature that many migrants with good qualifications end up working in 'menial' jobs, creating the phenomenon of 'brain waste' (Oyelere 2007; Pang et al. 2002). There is some evidence of this in the MAFE-Ghana dataset – thus whilst the majority of those in higher-level occupations (unsurprisingly) have higher level qualifications, around 30% of those with higher level education are working in elementary jobs (Fig. 11.3), suggesting that their qualifications are not fully used.

There are a number of reasons why this might be the case, including the possibility of non-recognition of Ghanaian qualifications, and the likelihood that Ghanaian professionals experience a high degree of discrimination. However, although constituting a form of 'brain waste', this may simply reflect a more general trend within the population towards 'over-qualification' or 'under-utilisation of skills'. For example, in the UK, the proportion of all graduates working in 'non-graduate' jobs is estimated to have grown from around 20% to 30% between 1992 and 2006 (Green and Zhu 2010), and appears to have risen during the current recession (McKee-Ryan 2011). Meanwhile, brain waste overall represents only a small proportion of the sample (around 7%), because of otherwise low levels of education.

In Fig. 11.4, occupational status is shown by years of stay in Europe separately for those with no or only primary education, those with secondary education, and those with higher education. Interestingly, these graphs show that amongst those recently arrived with low levels of education, the proportion in low skilled jobs was very high, but unemployment remained low. Similarly, amongst those recently



Fig. 11.3 Distribution of migrants by level of occupation and level of education in 2009

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic surveys
Note: weighted percentages
Population: Migrants in the UK and the Netherlands
Interpretation: Level of education indicates qualifications/level completed



Fig. 11.4 Occupational status in the last year in Africa and first 10 years of stay in Europe, by level of education at time of the survey

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic surveys
Interpretation and population: see Fig. 11.1
Note: weighted percentages
Statistical significance: The difference by education level is significant ($p < 0.01$) the last year in Ghana, the first and tenth year in Europe. Among males, the differences between the first year in Europe and the last year in Ghana on the one hand, and the tenth year in Europe on the other hand are significant ($p < 0.01$). Differences by period are not significant among the less educated migrants, but are significant among those with secondary ($p < 0.01$) or tertiary education ($p < 0.05$). (Design-based F-test)

arrived with tertiary education, unemployment was also low, but a significant proportion – almost half the sample – were doing further study rather than working in higher-level occupations. In contrast, it was the group with secondary-level education who had arrived in the past two years – most of whom were living in the Netherlands – who were experiencing elevated levels of unemployment.

Overall, these data provide only limited support for the notion of 'brain waste', notwithstanding the point, noted in Sect. 11.2.3, that only a third of those working in higher-skilled occupations had found equivalent work immediately upon arrival.

11.2.5 Economic Integration and Legal Status

A second major concern of recent literature on economic integration of migrants in the UK and the Netherlands has been that legal status and citizenship – or their absence – represent critical factors in terms of occupational outcomes. Analysis of the MAFE-Ghana biographic data by legal status at the time of arrival shows no significant relationship between legal status and the likelihood of being employed; however, there is a significant difference between Ghanaians who arrived with and without legal documents in terms of whether they had subsequently secured intermediate or higher-skilled occupations.

Thus whilst 93% of undocumented migrants interviewed were working in elementary occupations, amongst those with a legal right of residence on arrival, some 27% were in intermediate occupations, and 39% in higher level occupations. This is also evident in Fig. 11.5, which shows recently arrived undocumented migrants



Fig. 11.5 Occupational status in the last year in Africa and first 10 years of stay in Europe, by legal status on arrival in Europe

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic surveys
Interpretation and population: see Fig. 11.1
Note: weighted percentages
Statistical significance: The difference by legal status is not significant ($p < 0.01$) the last year in Ghana, but significant the first year in Europe ($p < 0.01$). Differences by period are significant among documented ($p < 0.01$) and undocumented migrants ($p < 0.1$). (Design-based F-test)

much more likely to be working in elementary occupations, and very unlikely to be students compared to documented migrants.

11.3 Ghanaian Migrants' Economic Contribution to Origin Countries

The previous section suggests a reasonable level of labour market integration of Ghanaian migrants in Europe, albeit this varies according to the destination country and the migrants' characteristics (their duration in Europe, gender, level of education and legal status). This section turns to how this translates into economic contributions back to the country of origin, before considering re-integration back in Ghana of return migrants. There appear to be some concerns in policy circles that integration in Europe and economic engagement back in Africa are activities that are in tension with each other – that those who send money home are less likely to be integrated in Europe; or conversely that greater integration of migrants in Europe might limit engagement with home countries (although see Bilgili 2013). Concerns have also been expressed in some contexts that the volume of remittances, for example, might decline over time as people become more integrated (Martin et al. 1990).

11.3.1 Changes in Remittances, Asset Ownership and Community Investments

Overall, the evidence of the MAFE-Ghana biographic survey suggests that the transfer of remittances, investments back home, and taking part in development initiatives through diaspora organizations also vary by country of destination, and according to how long migrants have been in Europe, with a substantially higher proportion engaged in each of these practices at the time of the MAFE survey in 2008 compared with the point at which they first arrived in Europe (Fig. 11.6). Differences were also observed on the basis of occupational status, where those employed were unsurpringly more likely to be sending remittances or to own assets than those who were inactive or studying. Differences between men and women, and people with different levels of education and legal status were less marked overall. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that less educated people, and those with insecure legal status, were more likely to be sending remittances and investing in assets back in Ghana, perhaps reflecting their more tenuous prospects for integration in Europe, and the need therefore to prepare for a possible return.

In Fig. 11.7, the proportion of migrants sending remittances to Ghana is shown according to the number of years they have stayed in Europe, separately by gender, education (at the time of interview), employment status (in the year in question) and



Fig. 11.6 Proportion of migrants owning an asset, sending remittances, and paying associative contributions by country of residence, on arrival in Europe and in 2008

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic surveys
Interpretation: 9% of migrants in UK send remittances in their home country the year of their arrival. The proportion is 28% in 2008
Population: 149 migrants in the UK and 273 migrants the Netherlands at the time of arrival
Note: weighted percentages
Statistical significance: For each type of contribution and each country, the difference by period is significant ($p < 0.01$). (F-test one way anova)

legal status (at time of arrival). These data show that although only a minority of interviewees sent remittances in the first year after arrival, more than half sent remittances within 2–3 years, rising to 65–70% for those in Europe for three years or more, with no sign of a decline up to 10 years after arrival, or of any major differences by gender (although women were more likely to send remittances more quickly after arrival than men). Those with higher level education were less likely to be sending remittances than those with secondary education or less, whilst unsurprisingly, those employed were much more likely to be sending remittances than those who were not in employment. Amongst those who were undocumented on arrival, fewer sent remittances in the first two years in Europe, but subsequently they were more likely to send remittances.

Turning to assets, data in Fig. 11.8 show that from a position where less than one in six men, and one in three women owned an asset in Ghana before they migrated – a plot of agricultural land, building plot, housing unit or business – this also rises substantially over time, albeit not as quickly as the increase in the proportion sending remittances. It is interesting to note that whereas women appeared more likely to own assets prior to migrating, and also more likely to send remittances in their first three years in Europe, men seem relatively more likely to have prioritised asset acquisition, such that their overall levels of asset ownership equalled those amongst women within three years of arrival.

A striking difference is also seen in patterns of asset ownership amongst those who arrived in Europe without documents, compared to those who arrived with



Fig. 11.7 Proportion of migrants sending remittances to Ghana, at each year of stay in Europe

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic surveys
Interpretation: The first year after arrival in Europe, 25% of the unemployed migrants send remittances to Ghana compared to 54% of those who are employed
Population: 149 migrants in the UK and 273 migrants the Netherlands, the first year in Europe
Note: weighted percentages
Statistical significance: For each type of contribution and each country, the difference by status and period is significant ($p < 0.01$, F-test one way anova)

secure legal status. Specifically, whilst those who arrived without documents owned virtually no assets on arrival, their level of asset ownership overtook that of their 'legal' counterparts within four years and stood at much higher levels on average after 10 years in Europe (even though the difference is not significant the tenth year after arrival). This may reflect the prioritisation of asset ownership in Ghana over acquisition of assets or other forms of integration in Europe by those who knew that their legal right to remain in Europe was tenuous at best.

Finally turning to participation in development activities in origin countries through associations (including religious associations), data presented in Fig. 11.9 shows again that overall this participation is the greater the longer the migrants have been in



Fig. 11.8 Mean number of assets in Ghana per migrant at each year of stay in Europe

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic surveys
Interpretation: See Fig. 11.7
Population: 149 migrants in the UK and 273 migrants the Netherlands at the first year in Europe
Note: weighted percentages

the UK, with women and those in employment both becoming more likely pay contributions to associations over time compared to men and to those not in employment.

Overall, the data suggest that engagement with home increases with time spent at destination, and that the rate of growth of this engagement varies depending on gender, education, occupational status and legal status on arrival. In particular, the fact that undocumented migrants appear more likely to be sending remittances,



Fig. 11.9 Proportion of migrants paying associative contributions, at each year of stay in Europe

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic surveys
Interpretation and population: See Fig. 11.7
Note: weighted percentages

building up assets back in Ghana, and joining Ghana-based assocations suggests there may also be a relationship between these activities and whether an individual considers return to be likely or necessary. Any of these actions might be seen as smoothing a posssible re-integration back in Ghana.

11.3.2 Labour Market Re-integration in Ghana of Returnees from Europe

This final section focuses on returnees in the MAFE-Ghana dataset who had spent at least one year in Europe, but were living in either Accra or Kumasi at the time of interview. In total, just 87 individuals were in this category, of whom the majority had returned from the UK, but virtually none from the Netherlands (Table 11.2). For this reason, and because of the small numbers involved, all European returnees are included rather than simply those returning from the two countries in which integration was considered. These returnees are compared with 1001 interviewees who had either not migrated out of Ghana, or had migrated to, and returned from other destinations, principally in Africa (Table 11.3). Overall, the returnee sample was dominated by men, and was well-educated and relatively older compared to the wider population interviewed in Ghana. Nearly three quarters of the returnees interviewed had returned from the UK, and nearly half had spent less than five years abroad. Just one returnee had come from the Netherlands, with the others returning from other EU destination countries.

The most important reason given for return was the end of a period of study. However, the reasons for return stated varied quite widely, and although this should be treated with caution due to the small sample, and the fact that only one reason was considered per returnee, this finding is in line with the findings of other authors who have shown that return to Ghana has been motivated variously by the end of a

Table 11.2 Characteristics of the returnee sample in Ghana (%)

Country before return	**%**	**Years in Europe**	**%**
United Kingdom	71	Less than 5 years	49
Germany	10	5–9 years	36
Spain	6	10 years and over	15
Netherlands	2	**Total**	**100**
Other European countries	11	**Motives of return**	
Total	**100**	Studies	30
		Other	21
Legal status before return		Work	18
Documented	72	Family reasons	14
Undocumented	8	Administrative reasons	12
Missing	20	Difficult living conditions	6
		Missing	1
		Investment	0
Total	**100**	**Total**	**100**

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey in Ghana
Population: Returnees from all European countries in Ghana. Weighted percentages
Interpretation: 71% of the returnees interviewed in Ghana had ccme back from UK. 72% were documented before their return

Table 11.3 Socio-economic characteristics of returnees from Europe and non-returnees in Ghana at the time of the survey (%)

	Returnees from Europe	Non returnees (from Europe)
Sex		
Males	64	38
Females	36	62
Total	**100**	**100**
Level of education		
No/primary	14	48
Secondary	32	37
Higher	54	15
Total	**100**	**100**
Age		
25–34	25	38
35–44	22	28
45–64	53	34
Total	**100**	**100**
N	**87**	**1001**

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey in Ghana
Population: Returnees from all European countries in Ghana, plus all "non-migrants" in Ghana (i.e. individuals who never migrated to Europe, including those who migrated to and returned from other parts of the world). Weighted percentages
Interpretation: see Table 11.2

period of study, work or administrative difficulties abroad, but also work and other economic opportunities back in Ghana, particularly since the country's economic growth from the 1990s onwards (Ammassari 2003). Of particular note is that very few in the sample admitted to being undocumented in Europe, nor was an 'administrative' return (the end of a visa, deportation) common. However, this – and the relatively high level of education of the returnees interviewed – does not necessarily give a representative picture of return to Ghana. For example, it is reported that from 2002 to 2008 over 700 individuals were supported by IOM to return to Ghana from a range of European countries including the UK and the Netherlands (International Organization for Migration 2013). It is possible however that those who have been removed or deported or had returned with other forms of state assistance or coercion are more difficult to track down, unwilling to be interviewed, or unwilling to talk about their experience if they were interviewed.

Existing literature on return from Europe to Ghana is relatively limited, but is reasonably positive about the extent to which migrant re-integration has been possible, at least since the early 1990s, and about the impact of return on returnees themselves, and on wider chances for development. For example, Ammassari (2004) found that highly-skilled migrants returning to Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire up to the end of the 1990s had generally positive experiences, and a positive impact on development, so long as broader economic and political circumstances in the home country were propitious. She also suggests that there is an 'optimal work duration' abroad – approximately five years – during which the greatest benefits are felt

(Ammassari 2003). In contrast, using the same sample of returnees, Black and Castaldo (2009) found that work experience abroad was a critical factor in influencing engagement specifically with entrepreneurial activity after return.

As can be seen from data presented in Fig. 11.10, the occupational status of returnees both at the moment of their return, and at the time of the survey, can be viewed quite positively in the sense that a majority had found intermediate or high level employment, including many who had worked in elementary jobs immediately before their return from Europe. However, some caution is needed, particularly in light of the relatively high levels of education of a significant part this group. For example, nearly 30% of the group were students before leaving to Europe, and nearly 40% had been students immediately before returning, yet it is not clear that all of this group had found higher level occupations on return. Indeed, the proportion of the sample who were unemployed immediately after return was quite high, and even at the time of interview was twice the level in non-returnee population.



Fig. 11.10 Occupational status of returnees from Europe over time, compared to non migrants in 2009 (%)

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey in Ghana
Population: see Table 11.3
Interpretation: Among returnees from Europe, the proportion involved in studies was 29% the last year in Ghana before departure to Europe, 39% the last year in Europe before return, and 11% the first year after return
Statistical significance: Differences in percentages are significant between the last year in Europe and the first year in Africa ($p < 0.01$) and between the last year in Ghana and the first year in Ghana after return ($p < 0.01$). Differences are not significant between the last year in Ghana and the last year in Europe ($p > 0.10$), nor between the first year after return to Ghana and ten years after return to Ghana ($p > 0.10$) (Design based F-test). Differences at the time of the survey between non-migrants and and returnees is significant ($p < 0.01$)

This latter observation raises a question that is seldom addressed in existing literature, namely: does the return process also risk a phase of 'brain waste' in which individuals are unable to obtain employment equivalent to their skill level, or indeed unable to obtain employment at all. Whilst brain waste was not found to be a major problem on arrival in Europe amongst our sample population, a major reason for this was that the most educated migrants had moved to Britain where they were able to enter higher education before seeking to join the labour market. In contrast, such an option either does not exist, or is highly unattractive on return to Ghana, as only a extremely small fraction return to study. Thus the risk of brain waste is arguably higher on return, reflecting the fact that lack of skilled employment opportunities may have been a significant reason for departure in the first place (Table 11.4).

Data presented in Table 11.5 shows that the proportion who were self-employed was substantially higher after return than it had been before departure, consistent with the finding of Black and Castaldo (2009) that significant investment in entrepreneurial activity had occurred post-return. It is worth noting that the proportion of returnees who were self-employed increased over time from 35% the first year after return to 54% at the time of the survey, suggesting that returnees need time to develop their own activities. At the time of the survey, they are proportionally much more likely than non-migrants to be employed (54% against 35%), a comparison that Black and Castaldo (2009) did not make as their sample was exclusively of returnees, again suggesting that the experience of migration is linked to the development of entrepreneurship.

Finally, Figs. 11.11 and 11.12 show trends in the reported average occupational level, as measured in the ISEI (International Socio-Economic Index of occupational

Table 11.4 Employment sector of returnees compared to non migrants

	Employment sector			
	Agriculture (%)	Industry and construction (%)	Trade and services (%)	Other (%)
Returnees: Last year in Africa before leaving	0	9	42	49
Returnees: Last year in Europe before return	0	25	45	30
Returnees: First year in Ghana after return	6	8	36	51
Returnees: At survey time in Ghana	6	10	34	50
Non migrants	3	23	60	15

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey in Ghana
Population: see Table 11.3
Interpretation: The occupational trajectories compare occupation at each stage of migration for returnees, and occuption of non-migrants in 2009, at the time of the survey
Statistical significance: Pairwise differences by period are not significant ($p > 0.10$), but the difference between returnees and non migrants at the time of the survey is significant ($p < 0.01$, Design base F-test)

Table 11.5 Type of employment of returnees compared to non migrants

	Type of employment	
	Self-employed (%)	Dependent worker (%)
Returnees: Last year in Africa before leaving	24	76
Returnees: Last year in Europe before return	18	82
Returnees: First year in Ghana after return	35	65
Returnees: At survey time in Ghana	54	46
Non migrants	35	65

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey in Ghana
Population: see Table 11.3
Interpretation: The occupational trajectories compare occupation at each stage of migration for returnees, and occupation of non-migrants in 2009, at the time of the survey
Statistical significance: Pairwise differences by period are not significant among returnees, except between the last year in Europe and the time of the survey ($p < 0.05$), and between the the last year in Africa and the time of survey ($p < 0.10$). The difference between returnees and non migrants at the time of the survey is significant ($p < 0.1$, Design base F-test)



Fig. 11.11 Mean occupational status of returnees from Europe over time

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey in Ghana
Population: Returnees from all European countries in Ghana
Interpretation: Scores are the mean ISEI index for interviewees at each stage of their migration trajectory
Statistical significance: The ISEI indices are significantly different between the the last year in Ghana and the last year in Europe ($p < 0.01$) and between the last year in Ghana before departure and the first year after return in Ghana ($p < 0.05$, F-test one way anova)



Fig. 11.12 Reported living conditions of returnees over time

Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey in Ghana
Population: Returnees from all European countries in Ghana
Interpretation: During their last year in Ghana before departure, 15% of returnees declared their living conditions to be "more than sufficient", 76% "sufficient" and 9% "just sufficient"
Statistical significance: Differences across periods are not significant

status) score; and trends in self-reported living conditions, again from the year immediately preceding migration from Ghana to ten years after return. In terms of occupational status, Fig. 11.11 suggests a significant drop in average occupational status for this group of migrants whilst in Europe, but a recovery to levels that exceed the pre-migration experience on return. The low levels of occupational status in Europe immediately before return reflects the high proportion working in elementary occupations, or in full-time study, mirroring evidence in Fig. 11.10, and hinting at reasons for return.

In contrast, Fig. 11.12 shows living conditions higher in the last year in Europe before return. This result, albeit not statistically significant, is consistent with findings in Chap. 4 that sufficient household income increases the chances of return. Nonetheless, even though conditions on return to Ghana are reported as lower than in the last year in Europe, they exceed, on average, conditions prior to departure, and appear to improve over time after return, again suggesting that returnees in the sample have been able to achieve some form of socio-economic re-integration.

11.4 Conclusions

This chapter has explored the labour market experiences of Ghanaian migrants in the UK and the Netherlands, their economic contributions and investments back in Ghana, and their re-integration after return. Although some existing qualitative

evidence has been quite pessimistic about labour market integration in the two countries, data from the MAFE-Ghana survey suggests a more optimistic scenario, with quite high levels of employment in intermediate and high-level occupations, in the UK at least, reflecting the high educational qualifications of a significant proportion of those interviewed. Women in particular appear to have experienced occupational mobility associated with migration, and there is relatively limited evidence of the type of 'brain waste' identified in the UK for a number of other immigrant groups.

Similarly, although some concerns exist elsewhere about whether greater integration of migrants might mean less engagement with home countries, the MAFE-Ghana data suggests less cause for concern. Indeed, levels of engagement with Ghana – whether in terms of sending remittances, buying assets 'back home', or engaging in 'development' associations – appear to grow over time, and to do so consistently regardless of gender, occupational or educational level, or whether the individual was documented or undocumented on arrival.

However, despite overall evidence that is positive about the integration of Ghanaian migrants in the two countries, as well as about their continued engagement with the home country, there remain some reasons for concern. First, it is clear that in the first two years after arrival, especially in the Netherlands, the situation is often tough in terms of access to employment in general, and especially to higher-status employment; indeed, although there is improvement over time, this is arguably limited to the UK. Second, as has been identified in a number of other studies, those who were undocumented on arrival appear to have experienced much more varied – and overall less positive – employment outcomes.

In addition, whilst a high proportion – around two thirds – of those interviewed in Europe reported sending remittances back to Ghana, this percentage is lower in the first two years after arrival, and some evidence exists of the propensity to remit being higher amongst those whose status in Europe is less secure, or where there is a greater likelihood of return. This suggests that policies designed to promote development through migration need to pay attention to the circularity of migration, but also avoid temporary migration schemes of such short duration that they do not allow migrants to build up the capacity to save and remit.

Finally, both policy approaches and existing literature have been quite positive about the potential for return in West Africa, and some evidence is provided in this chapter which supports such optimism. For example, compared to both their immediate pre-migration experience and their experience in the UK and the Netherlands, the returnees in the MAFE-Ghana survey reported higher average occupational levels, and in particular a larger proportion reported working in intermediate and high-status jobs. Indeed, even though this proportion appears to decline from around 7–8 years after return, this appears to relate to a move of some of the sample into retirement (i.e. 'inactivity').

However, even here, some caution is called for, not least because the total number of returnees from Europe in the MAFE-Ghana survey is quite small. In particular, it is clear that not all Ghanaians have obtained jobs that are commensurate with their level of qualifications, indicating some evidence of the phenomenon of 'brain

waste' after return rather than after initial migration. In addition, reported living conditions, whilst marginally better for returnees than they were before the migrated, clearly appear to be worse for returnees than in the final year before departure from Europe. This fact alone may account for the relatively low level of return.

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Chapter 12
Transnational Families Between Ghana, the Netherlands and the UK

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12.1 Introduction

Both methodologically and theoretically, families are typically imagined as nuclear and co-residing (Mazzucato and Schans 2011). Consequently, transnational families, in which family members live geographically separated across nation-state borders, are regarded of as temporary, and family reunification in the receiving country is considered the desired outcome for these families (Landolt and Da 2005; Mazzucato and Schans 2011). However, because of a scarcity of quantitative evidence caused by the lack of academic and policy attention to this phenomenon, the exact prevalence and composition of transnational family arrangements is unknown, especially where sub-Saharan African families are concerned (Mazzucato and Schans 2011). Using the MAFE-Ghana data, the objective of this chapter is to

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provide information on transnational family life in the context of international migration between Ghana and Europe.

In Sect. 12.2 we discuss the literature on family systems in Ghana, and the literature on transnational family life between Ghana and Europe with specific reference to the Netherlands and the UK. We identify prevailing Ghanaian family systems and the variety of living arrangements that exist. The importance of extended family relations is stressed, but also the prevalence of child fostering and multi-local residence between spouses. These family practices provide a contextual background to support the interpretation of the results of our analyses, as presented in the subsequent Sects. 12.3, 12.4, and 12.5. Each of these sections focuses on a different element of family life in relation to international migration.

In Sect. 12.3 we examine the family arrangements of Ghanaian households and their relationships with migrants overseas. We show that households in Ghana are involved in multiple transnational relationships, with both nuclear and extended family members. We used the data from the *household survey* (see Chap. 2) to identify the prevailing family arrangements in the two Ghanaian urban areas that we surveyed, Accra and Kumasi, as well as the functioning of family life across borders. When examining family practices across borders, we notice the importance of remittances that are being sent to the households from migrants abroad, and interestingly, we also find evidence of *reverse remittances*, that is, flows from households in Ghana to their migratory contacts abroad.

In Sect. 12.4 we change our perspective from Ghana to Europe. Using the *individual biographical survey* (see Chap. 2) that was carried out among Ghanaian migrants currently living in the Netherlands and the UK, we examine how nuclear family life takes shape in the context of international migration. We find that transnational nuclear family life is a relatively common phenomenon amongst Ghanaian migrants in these two countries. Additionally, we show that different types of nuclear family arrangements prevail among these Ghanaian migrants, and we distinguish between *transnational families, unified families*, and *reunified families*. We study to what extent migrants in these different types of nuclear family arrangements differ concerning several socio-demographic, socio-economic and migration-related characteristics. The focus in this section is on nuclear family members, as these are mainly the people who are eligible for family reunification.

In Sect. 12.5, we delve further in the study of transnational families by first examining where nuclear family members are living at the time of a migrant's first departure to the Netherlands or the UK, and subsequently, whether those who did not migrate together as a family eventually reunified. We look at the reunification of spouses as well as that of children with their parents. As we did in Sect. 12.4, we use the *individual biographical survey.* We find that family separation can be a long-lasting arrangement, if reunification occurs at all. An important element of our analysis is that we trace where reunification takes place. Previous studies on reunification have generally focused on the migrant-receiving country, yet the MAFE multi-sited dataset allows us to examine also where families reunify. Distinguishing between reunification at origin and at destination, we show that reunification is not limited to the migrant-receiving country, but that reunification to a large extent takes place at origin.

12.2 Literature Review

12.2.1 Family Systems in Ghana – The Importance of the Extended Family

Before presenting our findings it is important to understand the kinds of family systems that prevail in Ghana, how these are changing and the norms that guide familial relationships. These can be important elements in interpreting the findings that follow. In Ghana, as elsewhere in Africa, 'the family' extends beyond immediate nuclear members to include other relations to whom one has 'extensive reciprocal duties, obligations and responsibilities' (Nukunya 1992, pp.47). These members include grandparents, uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews and cousins among others. Additionally, polygamous marriages in the form of a male with multiple spouses are socially accepted and comply with traditional customary law, although they are officially illegal according to national state law. They are particularly found amongst rural inhabitants and the less educated, and are more prevalent in the northern part of the country.

Linked to kinship, both patrilineal and matrilineal family descent systems exist in Ghana, with members tracing their descent through the father's or mother's lineage respectively. The type of descent system one belongs to has implications for inheritance, responsibilities within the family and relationships with its members. In patrilineal descent systems, the offspring, particularly the male children, are the direct beneficiaries while in a matrilineal situation, a man's nephew through his sister directly inherits from him, to the detriment of his own children.

The importance of the extended family system has been significantly affected by modern trends such as urbanization and technological development, though it continues to be important. The effects include a change in the family structure with a tendency towards nuclear family focus, a reduction in family size and the use of paid house helps instead of family members (Oppong 1974; Ardayfio-Schandorf 1994). Other functions of the family such as sanctions for socially deviant behaviours have been taken over by the state and other agencies, which have also lessened the influence of the extended family. An example is the Intestate Succession Law (PNDCL 111) of 1985, which gives inheritance rights to the nuclear family members and is designed to attenuate negative effects on the children of a deceased parent (Mensa-Bonsu and Dowuona-Hammond 1994).

In spite of all these changes, the extended family system in Ghana continues to play effective social support roles on occasions such as the birth of a child, education of its members, marriage, and particularly in times of crisis such as ill-health and death. And importantly, in the context of this chapter, the extended family also plays a role in sponsoring foreign travels. Additionally, multilocal residence is still widely practiced, both in urban as well as in rural areas. According to the 2008 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), child fostering occurs almost equally between rural and urban areas (19% and 18%, respectively), and non-residential marriages are even more frequent

among urban households (28% of married women have their husband staying elsewhere, compared to 22% for rural households) (DHS 2008, author's calculations).

12.2.1.1 Marital Relationships in Ghana

The role of the extended family in the institution of marriage in Ghana cannot be over-emphasized, particularly because marriage is perceived to be between the two families of the couple involved. The woman's extended family plays a key role in deciding whether to accept the offer of marriage made by the man. Furthermore the extended family mediates in marital problems and is usually resorted to rather than going through the official legal system. In recent times, however, the role of the extended family in finding a marriage partner has lessened. While in public discourse this reduced role has been said to contribute to an increase in divorce rates in Ghana, others argue that divorce has always been prevalent in Ghanaian society, especially among Akans (Bleek 1987; Fortes 1950; Takyi and Gyimah 2007), who comprise the largest ethnic group in Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service 2012).

According to some, matrilineal kinship ties influence the instability of marriages, as matrilineal ties provide greater independence for women (Takyi and Broughton 2006; Takyi and Gyimah 2007). Matrilineal (Akan) women are believed to enjoy greater autonomy than their patrilineal counterparts. Greater autonomy for women in turn is often associated to marital instability, as these women are more able to establish independent households. Several studies point to the fact that the independence of Ghanaian women is decreasing due to processes of modernity (Boni 2001). According to Oppong et al. (1975), modern developments of the twentieth century have enhanced the position of the men and decreased women's independence and power. Yet matrilineal (Akan) women are still believed to enjoy greater autonomy than their patrilineal counterparts (Boni 2001).

Multi-local residence is quite common for Ghanaian couples (Clark 1994; Coe 2011; Fortes 1950; Manuh 1999; Oppong 1970). Traditionally, it was common for men and women to live apart, each spouse with his or her family (Fortes 1950). Such multi-local residence was practiced in both matrilineal and patrilineal descent groups (Oppong 1970). Customarily, husbands and wives also did not jointly possess land, as both accessed land through their respective lineages (Coe 2011). Even today, couples generally do not pool their resources, and joint bank accounts are a rarity in Ghana, where men and women keep their incomes separated (Manuh 1999, 2001; Wong 2006). Keeping separate accounts also facilitates fulfilling financial obligations towards their own families. In the current context of international migration, it is important to consider the commonly practiced multi-local residence in

Ghana because it may contribute to international migration having different effects on marital relationships and transnational family life than in contexts where proximity is viewed as a necessity for family life.

12.2.1.2 The Child in the Ghanaian Family: Fostering and Social Parenthood

The birth of a child is seen as a communal affair. The upbringing, socialization process and rites of passage of a child are seen as the responsibility of the extended family. This belief, though losing currency in recent times, accounts for the practices of child fostering and social parenthood. Fostering involves giving children to other relatives, to be raised apart from their biological parents. The foster parents are likely to be relatives from either maternal or paternal sides who have a claim to the child or children involved. Fostering can be practised due to crises such as the death of a parent or voluntarily with a specific purpose, such as giving a rural child to an urban family member to further their educational or apprenticeship possibilities or to an elderly family member for companionship and labour (Ardayfio-Schandorf and Amissah 1996; Goody 1982). In contrast to Western societies, where child fosterage tends to occur in response to an extraordinary familial crisis, in many parts of West Africa, including Ghana, the care of children by relatives and nonrelatives is widespread and is not stigmatized (Alber 2003; Bledsoe 1990, 1993; Goody 1982).

It is important to take these family norms into account when interpreting our findings. For example, the fact that divorce is quite common in Ghanaian society means we need to be cautious in associating migration with divorce. Likewise, the common practice of fostering children may facilitate parents' decisions to migrate, as they can ask someone at home to take care of their children while they migrate to Europe — a receiving context that is restrictive with regards to family migration for many potential Ghanaian migrants. At the same time, however, international migration presents quite different conditions than the traditional child fostering situations. Fostering during international migration, in contrast to traditional fostering, involves continued involvement of the migrant parent and economic opportunities abroad create a different set of expectations on the migrant parent to remit and on the caregiver to provide top quality care giving (Dankyi 2012; Mazzucato 2011), than is typical of traditional fostering. It is therefore important in studies of the effects of migration on family life to be able to compare those families with migration experience to those without. The MAFE dataset provides this kind of comparative context.

12.2.2 Ghanaian Transnational Families in the Netherlands and the UK

There were 21,376 Ghanaians registered in the Netherlands in 2011 (CBS 2011) Of these Ghanaians, 62% are first-generation immigrants. The other 38% was born in the Netherlands and therefore belongs to the so-called second-generation. The division between men and women is, and has been, almost equal. Since these official statistics exclude undocumented migrants, these figures are likely to be an underestimation. In 2000, Ghanaian migrants were estimated to be at least double those of official figures (Mazzucato, 2008a). The Ghanaian population in the Netherlands is young, with 37% being younger than 20 years old. 60% of the population is between 20–60 years of age and only 3% is 60 years or older (Amsterdams Centrum Buitenlanders (ACB) 2011).

Migration from Ghana to the Netherlands is a quite recent phenomenon, mostly situated in the last decades of the twentieth century. As described in Chap. 10, Ghanaian migrants to the Netherlands are essentially economic migrants. They started arriving in the 1980s when the economies of Ghana as well as Nigeria, where many Ghanaians were working, were experiencing an economic downturn. From the '90's onwards, chain migration and family reunification become the most important factors for migration to the Netherlands (Mazzucato 2008a).

In 2010, around 84,000 Ghanaians were registered as living in the UK and as such, the UK has the largest population of Ghanaian migrants in Europe. Ghanaian migration to the UK has a longer history than Ghanaian migration to the Netherlands and other European countries. Colonial history, the use of English as the official language, a similar educational system, and the need for medical staff in the UK has facilitated the migration of many students and professional workers, such as nurses and doctors. Even though immigration controls tightened for African migrants (as opposed to more liberal approaches towards migrants from Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s), Ghanaian migration continued to grow (Chap. 10).

Family migration policies have become stricter in the UK, particularly for non-EU citizens, resulting in a decrease of family migration to the UK (Sibley, Fenelon and Mole 2012). Moreover, Ghanaian migrants in the UK have experienced downward mobility, both economically and socially. However, a recent study on the labour market outcomes of Ghanaian migrants reported a more optimistic scenario. Ghanaians in the UK have acquired highly skilled occupations, and women in particular have experience occupational mobility (Chap. 11) (Asima 2010). More information on the general characteristics of Ghanaian migration to the two European countries can be found in Chap. 10.

An important finding from Chap. 10 regarding Ghanaian family life in the context of international migration is the evidence of transnational lifestyles among

Ghanaian migrants. Ghanaian migrants frequently return to Ghana for both longer stays as well as shorter visits, and maintaining familial relationships back home can be facilitated through these visits. Importantly, opportunities for transnational lifestyles are not equally distributed among migrants, and these opportunities are closely linked to the financial situation and educational level of the migrant.

However, very few quantitative data exist on (transnational) family life in either the Netherlands or the UK. There are no figures on the number of people who have nuclear family members in the country of origin or in third countries. The MAFE data make it possible to give a more complete picture of the various family arrangements amongst migrants and their family members both in Europe and back home in Ghana.

12.2.3 Family Reunification Between Ghana and Europe

Family-related migration has become one of the main legal means for people to gain admission to Europe. Yet, in countries such as the Netherlands and the UK, family-related modes of migration are more and more subject to restrictions (Kraler 2010). Family-related forms of migration gained importance after the 1973 oil crisis, when labour recruitment in European countries was brought to a halt and increased restrictions were placed on labour migration. However, after an initial relaxation of family migration criteria (for example, permitting partnerships and same-sex couples to apply for family formation), new family reunification restrictions have been imposed in the last decades, including higher income and language requirements for new migrants.

Two main types of family migration can be distinguished: (1) Family reunification, in which pre-existing family members join migrants in the receiving country and (2) family formation, in which a new migrant joins a settled migrant to form a new family (marriage migration). In general, family-related admission is limited to nuclear family members: spouses and dependent children below a certain age. However, differences in criteria exist between countries, but admission can also change within countries over time. For example, whereas in the UK a potential spouse needs to be 18 years old, in the Netherlands this threshold was raised to 21 in 2005 through the Integration Abroad Act.

Assumptions underlying state policies do not always recognize the complex reality of family migration. For example, as described in Sect. 2.1 above, extended family members may be just as important as nuclear family members. Yet in the Netherlands, only spouses and children can qualify for family reunification and in the UK, although elderly parents and other extended family members might be granted family reunification, criteria are stricter than for nuclear family members and are based on dependency on the sponsor.

Family reunification has become a major concern for policy makers as it is viewed as the primary pathway for migrants to enter Europe. This is reflected in the issues that Ghanaian migrants experience during their stay in the Netherlands. In a 2001 study on Ghanaian migrants (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2001), respondents state that difficulties with family formation

and reunification procedures and the related difficulties in having their documents verified and legalized are among the main problems they face in the Netherlands. Since documents are often not accepted, there is a feeling amongst Ghanaian migrants that the Dutch government mistrusts them and many spend a great deal of time and money on legal issues related to residence and work permits and family reunification (Mazzucato 2008a).

Additionally, in Dutch political debates, the migrant family is seen as a potential barrier to integration. Compared to other EU countries, family migration policies in the Netherlands are among the most stringent (Bonjour 2008). In particular, these policies have become stricter since the 1990s, and especially the period between 2002 and 2006 has been characterized by restrictive reforms (Bonjour 2008; De Hart, Strik and Pankratz 2012). Since 2006, family members are required to take a computerised test on language proficiency and knowledge of Dutch society at the Dutch embassy/consulate in their sending country as part of the visa application for family migration in line with the Integration Abroad Act (Bonjour 2008). Combined with other recent requirements, such a high-income requirement (120% of the minimum wage) for the migrant, family reunification and formation have become increasingly difficult in the Netherlands.[1]

In the UK, family migration policies have been restrictive during the 1980s and 1990s (Bhabha and Shutter 1995), but experienced a period of relative liberalization in the late 1990s. More recently, instead, the UK has become stricter again. Debates on family migration currently focus on the abuse of the system, particularly through 'scam marriages', and policies have been implemented to impede such marriages (for example through the Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999). Furthermore, since 2010, a pre-entry test has been instituted for family migrants (Kraler 2014).[2]

In general, nation states tie family reunification rights to a series of conditions, most importantly the legal status of the sponsor and their ability to provide secure income and housing. As such, family migration polices are socially selective, particularly excluding more vulnerable groups from the right to family reunion and formation (Kraler and Kofman 2009). Moreover, the consequences of requirements are highly gendered. Kraler (2010) shows that in all European countries covered by his study, it was more difficult for women than for men to meet family migration requirements such as the income criteria.

[1] The Netherlands was the first country to introduce a pre-entry integration test (i.e. the Integration Abroad Act, 2005). Additionally, the income requirement (which was 70% net of the social welfare level in 1993, and rose to 120% in 2004) and relatively high cost for residence permits, spurred significant debate both within the Netherlands and internationally. For a detailed overview of the changes in Dutch family migration policies see e.g. Bonjour (2008), Groenendijk, Fernhout, Van Dam, Van Oers and Strik (2007), De Hart et al. (2012), and Strik et al. (2013).

[2] For a detailed overview of the changes in family migration policies in the UK see e.g. Kofman et al. (2008), Sibley et al. (2012) and Strik et al. (2013).

12.3 Ghanaian Households and Their Migrant Family Members

The first part of our analysis focuses on the prevalence and composition of transnational families from the perspective of the migrant-sending country, Ghana. We explore the extent to which households in Ghana are transnational by looking at which family members are currently living abroad and where they reside. Furthermore, we examine which type of transnational practices are common (sending remittances, paying visits, being in contact), and which of the households' contacts (nuclear family members, extended family, and non-kin) are involved in transnational relationships. We will see that extended family members and also non-kin relations play an important role, highlighting the importance of looking beyond the nuclear family.

Section 12.3.1 describes the prevalence of Ghanaian households with migratory contacts, the relationship between the migrant abroad and the household head, and the whereabouts of these migrants. In Sect. 12.3.2 we discuss the functioning of these transnational families by looking at the support migrants received from the household, as well as the contribution migrants make to the households, in the form of monetary and in-kind remittances. Additionally, we present the different modes and frequency of contact between Ghanaian households and their migrant household members.

12.3.1 Ghanaian Families: Household Living Arrangements and Migratory Contacts

When examining Ghanaian families, it is important to keep in mind, as discussed in Sect. 12.2.1, that family practices in Ghana can be quite different from the Western nuclear family model that presumes the primacy of geographic proximity. Ghanaian families extend beyond the nuclear family and they are often characterised by multi-local residence. The MAFE project employed a classical definition of the *household*: a group of individuals who live together and share all or part of their resources to satisfy their essential needs (housing, eating). But to further capture the complexity of Ghanaian family life, the MAFE household survey includes not only household members in this sense, but also individuals whom the household head considers to be part of their household but who live outside the household, whether elsewhere in Ghana or abroad. Migratory contacts are people who are living abroad and are either children/spouses of the head, partner(s) of a member of the household, or relatives of the household head or of his/her partner, and who have been in regular contact with the household over the past 12 months (for further details about the definitions of households and their migratory contacts see also Chap. 6, Box 6.1). We examine different categories of household members and their migratory

contacts: the household head, his/her nuclear family members (spouse and children), his/her siblings, other relatives (e.g. grandparents, uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews), and non-kin.

In total, 1,246 Ghanaian household heads living in Kumasi and Accra were interviewed. Almost half of these household heads declared having at least one migratory contact (46%). This high proportion of households with contacts abroad shows the pervasiveness of households with migratory contacts in Ghana (see also Chaps. 6 and 10). Moreover, households with such contacts are, on average, in touch with more than one migrant.

Most household heads (71%) are currently married or in a consensual union and have at least one biological child (80%) including adult children. Further highlighting the transnationality of Ghanaian households, 10% of household heads had a spouse that lived abroad at the time of survey, and 12% had at least one biological son or daughter living abroad (Table 12.1). Many of these household heads also have more than one child living abroad (1.9 on average).[3] Household heads also had contacts with extended family members and non-kin relations abroad. One-third of the heads declared having at least one such contact. Migratory contacts outside the nuclear family were mostly former household members, although some were individuals who had never been part of the household, but with whom there was regular contact. This stresses the importance of looking beyond the nuclear family when considering the contacts that households have with people living abroad.

Table 12.1 Ghanaian households and their migratory contacts

		n	%
Married household heads that have…	…no spouse abroad	717	90
	…at least 1 spouse abroad	151	10
	Total	868	100
Household heads with children that have…	…no children abroad	853	88
	…at least 1 child abroad	144	12
	Total	997	100
Household heads that have…	…no migratory contacts	596	57
	…nuclear migratory contacts only	185	11
	…other migratory contacts	465	32
	Total	1246	100

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted frequencies; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Household survey
Population: Married Ghanaian household heads (n = 868); Ghanaian household heads with children (n = 997); All Ghanaian household heads (n = 1246)
Interpretation: Of all married Ghanaian household heads, 10% have at least one spouse living abroad

[3] Of households with children living abroad, only 0.5% (13) of household heads have children under-18 living abroad. These 13 households have a total of 19 children living abroad. Due to the small number, we do not look at this category separately.

Table 12.2 Whereabouts of household's migratory contacts, by relationship to the household head

	Migrant spouses		Migrant children		Other migratory contacts	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Africa	15	6	39	11	90	9
Europe	62	32	111	41	405	49
N-America	57	29	112	40	312	38
Other	10	5	11	8	35	4
Unknown	2	28	0	0	6	0
Total	146	100	273	100	848	100

Note: weighted percentages & unweighted frequencies; For all three categories, the number of migrants is higher than the number of household heads that declared having migratory contacts in Table 12.1 above. For spouses, this is due to a small number of household heads with polygamous relationships. For both children and other contacts, the household heads declared on average having more than one such contact abroad. Source: MAFE-Ghana – Household survey
Population: Ghanaian household head's migratory contacts (n = 1272); 5 missing observations are not reported
Interpretation: Of all Ghanaian migrant spouses, 6% live in Africa

Table 12.2 presents an overview of the whereabouts of migrant spouses, migrant children and other migratory contacts. When looking at the destinations of these migratory contacts, we distinguish between four categories: Europe, North America, Africa, and other countries. Chapter 10 already revealed that Europe has been by far the most popular destination for Ghanaian migrants since the 1990s. We find this to be true for spouses, children and other migratory contacts alike. North America is the second most popular destination while African countries and other countries (such as Asia or Middle East) are far less popular among these migratory contacts (see also Chap. 10). While migration within Africa is an important phenomenon among Ghanaians (Ghana Statistical Service 2012, pp.38), the fact that our figures show such a prevalence of European and North American contacts most likely reflects the fact that our survey was conducted in the two largest urban centres in Ghana, Accra and Kumasi, from which many migrants depart when migrating to the Global North.

In sum, it is important to take the often complex nature of Ghanaian families into account when studying international migration. The family goes beyond nuclear family ties; relationships exist with other relatives as well as non-kin abroad. We have shown that a large share of households maintains regular contact with migrants abroad. In the next section, we examine the functioning of these families across borders

12.3.2 Families Functioning Across Borders: Support, Remittances and Visits

The migratory contacts we identified in the previous section may be involved with the household in Ghana in various ways: through financial remittances, home visits, and virtual communication. In this section we address the contributions migrants

make to households in Ghana. There are two points made here: (1) contributions from migrants to households in Ghana are not exclusively from nuclear family or kin group members but encompass a wider range of relationships, once again emphasising the importance of challenging Western notions of the family in an African migration context; and (2) it is important to include the types and frequency of migrants' contacts with their households in the home country. It is through such contacts that migrants and their households can influence each other in non-material ways, such as via ideas, norms and ways of doing things, which are often termed 'social remittances' (Levitt 1998).

At the same time, it is important to pay attention to what families do for migrants. Remittance literature tends to emphasize the remittances that migrants send home. Yet equally important are the reverse remittances in the form of 'help' that migrants receive from their families back home, especially in the first phase of their migration (Mazzucato 2009). Below, we examine one particular type of 'help' migrants receive from their households at home: the assistance they receive for making their journey abroad (*Households contributing to migrant's departure(s)*). Next, we examine the financial contributions migrants make to the household in the form of remittances (*Economic remittances*). We also assess the extent to which remittance sending (material and non-material) is related to the support migrants received from the household for their migration. Finally, we look into the non-material ways households and migrants maintain contact (*Contact between Ghanaian households and migrants)*.

12.3.2.1 Households Contributing to Migrant's Departure(s)

Migrants often received some form of support for their migration trip from their households in Accra and Kumasi. Support can be provided in different ways. For example, households may help with preparations for the trip or by paying for the trip, or both. In this section we study the prevalence of support received by migrant household members.

Receiving support from family members seems not to be common practice (for definitions of receiving support and sending remittances, see Chap. 6, Box 6.2). Of all migratory contacts, only 19% received some form of support (see Fig. 12.1). Theories of remittance behaviour that conceptualize the sending of remittances as a way of repaying an initial investment in his or her trip do not seem to explain what we observe in Ghana (Stark and Lucas 1988).

There is a difference between male and female migrants when it comes to receiving support. Of all male migrants, 16% received support, compared to 23% of all female migrants (not shown in Fig. 12.1). This shows that even though in general, most migrants do not receive support from their households, being a female migrant increases the likelihood of having received some form of assistance with their migration trip.

Different types of migratory contacts also have different likelihoods of receiving support for their migration trip. We distinguish between household head's spouses,



Fig. 12.1 Household's migratory contacts having received support from the household

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Household survey
Population: Ghanaian household head's migratory contacts (n = 1272); 5 missing observations are not reported
Interpretation: Of all migrant spouses, 29% received support for their migration trip
Statistical significance: Receiving support differs significantly by type of relationship to the household head ($p < 0.000$, Design-based F-test)

children (all ages), siblings, other relatives, and non-kin (this latter category is small, and should therefore be interpreted with caution). Figure 12.1 shows that children are most likely to be supported (44%) followed by spouses (29%). While in general support for migratory trips from the migrants' origin households is low, those that receive such support are overwhelmingly from the nuclear family. However, extended family members are not necessarily excluded from support. Of all siblings, 10% received support and of all other relatives, 11% received support for their migration.

12.3.2.2 Economic Remittances

While remittances are normally discussed in relation to home country development, they are also a way for families to enact family life across borders. Remittances are used to fulfil gendered kinship obligations (Wong 2006) and intergenerational reciprocity (Mazzucato 2008b). Mazzucato, Van der Boom, and Nsowah-Nuamah (2008), in analysing nationally representative data, found that in Ghana most senders of remittances are children or siblings of the household head. However, those who remitted the largest amounts of money were spouses of the household head.

Remitters from outside Africa donated the largest yearly average amount. Chapter 11 showed that a high proportion (around two-thirds) of Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands and the UK send remittances, and that remittance-sending behaviour is closely linked to duration of stay at destination, educational level, and occupational status.

Here we focus more generally on all migrants that are in contact with households in Ghana. In general, we find that sending remittances is more common for migrants than receiving support. A little more than half of all migrants had sent monetary remittances to their household in the preceding 12 months (see Fig. 12.2). Importantly, and contrary to some of the literature on gender and migration which reports that women are more likely to send remittances back home, we find no gender differences with regard to remittance-sending behaviour (not shown; see also Chap. 11). However, there are clear differences in remittance-sending behaviour according to type of relationship (Fig. 12.2). Spouses are the most likely to remit, followed by children. Even though nuclear family members are the most likely remitters, the importance of remittances from extended family members should not be underestimated. Almost half of all siblings abroad remitted and just over half of all other relatives did so.



Fig. 12.2 Household's migratory contacts having sent remittances to the household

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Household survey
Population: Ghanaian household head's migratory contacts (n = 1272); 5 missing observations are not reported
Interpretation: Of all migrant spouses, 80% sent remittances to the household in the past 12 months
Statistical significance: Sending remittances differs significantly by type of relationship to the household head ($p < 0.000$, Design-based F-test)

Monetary transfers are not the only form of remittance. Migrants also send remittances in the form of goods, called 'in-kind remittances'. In our sample, in-kind remittances are sent by a little less than half of all migrants (41%). Female migrants are more inclined to remit in-kind than their male counterparts: 49% and 37%, respectively.[4] Taking both kinds of remittances together, we find that almost two-thirds of all migrants had sent monetary and/or in kind remittances in the previous 12 months.

While the above shows that sending remittances is a common phenomenon, it does not say anything about the magnitude of these remittances. We therefore look at the share of household expenditures covered by remittances. Respondents were asked to estimate the share of their household expenditures, such as food, medicine, transport and housing that was covered by remittances. Of all migratory remittances, 28% cover a large to very large share of the household's expenditures. Spouses and children are most likely to remit large shares of the household's expenditures, but remittances from extended family members are also often substantial. As for difference by gender, more male migrants accounted for a large share of the household's expenditures (35%) than female migrants (17%). While men seem mostly to cover either a large or a small share, women tend more to cover a moderate share (34% for women, and 27% for men).[5]

One of the reasons why migrants remit is to 'pay back' the investments that families made to finance their migration trip (Stark and Lucas 1988). We investigate this hypothesis within our sample by looking at whether migrants who received support are also more likely to send remittances. Indeed, we find that migrants who received support from their household in Ghana were more likely to send monetary remittances (65%) than those who did not receive support (54%).[6] Yet there are two important caveats. First, as stated above, more than half of the migrants who did not receive support do remit. Secondly, the significant and positive relation between receiving support and remitting only holds for financial remittances and not for in-kind remittances. This suggests that repaying a household's investment in facilitating a member's migration is not the only reason for remittance sending, and that other factors are involved (Mazzucato 2009).

[4] The difference between men and women in terms of sending in-kind remittances is significant ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test).

[5] The difference between the type of relationship to the household head and the share of expenditure covered by remittances is significant ($p < 0.001$, Design-based F-test), and the difference between men and women in terms of the share of expenditures their remittances cover, is significant ($p < 0.10$, Design-based F-test).

[6] The relationship between receiving support and sending monetary remittances is significant ($p < 0.05$, Design-based F-test).

12.3.2.3 Contact Between Ghanaian Households and Migrants

Migrants are in contact with their households 'back home' in a variety of ways, in addition to sending monetary or in-kind remittances. We examine here visits migrants make to their households and the means and frequency of contact while they are abroad. Through these contacts, migrants and their households can share information, ideas, norms and ways of doing things that affect the way families function across borders. It is therefore important to take this non-material exchange into account when studying the functioning of families across borders.

Visits to the household in Ghana in the previous 12 months are relatively common (see Fig. 12.3). This is in line with the mobility patterns of Ghanaian migrants (see Chap. 3), who return relatively frequently to Ghana for longer or shorter visits. Looking more closely at the relationships of those who visit, we see that the difference between nuclear and extended family members is small.

Aside from visits, migrants also maintain contact with their household left behind in other ways, such as through telephone calls: only 1% of all migrants had no contact with the household in the past 12 months. Telephone calls are by far the



Fig. 12.3 Household's migratory contacts having visited the household

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Household survey
Population: Ghanaian household head's migratory contacts (n = 1272); 5 missing observations are not reported
Interpretation: Of all migrant spouses, 16% visited the household in the past 12 months
Statistical significance: In terms of visiting the household, there is no significant difference by type of relationship to the household head ($p > 0.10$, Design-based F-test)

most popular way of staying in touch. Other means of contact, such as mail or Internet, are less used. This reflects the well-developed mobile telephone infrastructure in Ghana and the relatively less developed Internet infrastructure, as well as the fact that most people in Ghana neither own a computer nor have access to one. Contact with the household is also frequent: 40% of migrants are in contact at least once a week, and 35% at least once a month. Only 20% are in contact on a less than monthly basis. There are differences in frequency of contact according to the type of relationship with the household head. Almost all migrant spouses and the majority of migrant children are in contact at least once a week with the household. Although to a lesser extent, extended family members are also in contact on a weekly basis: 27% of siblings and 40% of other relatives.[7]

In sum, Sect. 12.3.2 has shown that even though most migrants did not receive support in any form for their migration trip, a large majority did send remittances, either in money or in kind. Remittance sending is by no means restricted to nuclear family members. Even though spouses and children seem to be the most likely remittance senders, the majority of siblings and other relatives also remit. In the same vein, while migrant nuclear family members remit the largest share of household expenditures, most extended family members also remit moderate to large shares. Finally, Ghanaian migrants stay in touch with households at home, especially through (mobile) telephones, but also through short return visits.

12.4 Family Life: Ghanaian Migrants in Europe

In the previous section, we focused on families in large cities in Ghana (Accra and Kumasi), and their relations with migrants. In this section, we will focus on Ghanaian migrants in Europe (Netherlands and UK). First, we will assess the prevalence and composition of transnational families of Ghanaian migrants in Europe, using the *European biographical surveys* from the Netherlands and the UK. Secondly, we will examine whether transnational families differ from families that live together concerning some key demographic and socio-economic characteristics, as well as characteristics relating to their migration experience. In this section we will compare the characteristics of the different family arrangements.

There are some important similarities and differences between Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands and in the UK to keep in mind when considering the analysis presented below. The two groups are similar in terms of sex and age, but differ significantly in terms of education. Ghanaian migrants in the UK are more highly educated than those in the Netherlands. Both the UK and the Netherlands practiced active recruitment of nurses and medical personnel in Ghana and other African countries, so this difference is more likely to be connected with the fact that English is the official language of education in Ghana, making it easier for highly

[7] The relationship between the frequency of contact and the type of relationship to the household head is significant ($p < 0.05$, Design-based F-test).

skilled migrants to practice their professions in the UK than in the Netherlands. There is also some evidence that the Netherlands has stricter rules regarding the recognition of foreign diplomas and certificates (Mazzucato 2008a). A full overview of the demographic, socio-economic and migration characteristics of the two groups is provided in Chap. 11.

12.4.1 Living Arrangements of Ghanaian Migrants in Europe

There are various nuclear family configurations among Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands and the UK, reflecting the complex nature of transnational nuclear family ties. We use a typology based on the combination of two variables: (1) the whereabouts of the interviewed migrant's children, sub-divided into four categories, and (2) the whereabouts of the interviewed migrant's spouse, again sub-divided into four categories.[8] For an overview of the distribution of these two variables, see Table 12.3 in Appendix A. These variables are combined to arrive at the following typology (for details about this typology, please see Table 6.8 and Box 6.3 in Chap. 6): (1) *no nuclear family,* (2) *totally unified family (all members have always lived together and are living together in one country at the time of survey)*, (3) *reunified family (at least one member was living in a country other than the migrant's and has reunified at the time of survey)*, and (4) *partially or totally transnational family (one or more members are living in a different country to the migrant)*.

In Table 12.4 in Appendix A, we present an overview of this typology for all Ghanaian migrants and by survey country. It is important to note that 27% of the total sample of migrants in the UK and the Netherlands are not in a nuclear family (they have no spouse or children, either at origin or at destination) (Table 12.4). The remainder of the analysis below will focus on migrants who are in a family. Because of the differences between the two survey countries, and in order to better interpret the findings, we focus the analysis of this section on the two countries separately.

In Fig. 12.4 we present the distribution of these three family types for migrants in the Netherlands and the UK. Transnational family life is more prevalent among Ghanaians in the Netherlands than among Ghanaians in the UK. In the UK, it is by far more common to be in a totally unified family, which includes families that were formed at destination and families that migrated together. In both countries, the reunified family is the least prevalent type of family arrangement, reflecting the restrictiveness of reunification policies in both countries in the past decades (Kraler 2010). In the following sections, we examine whether these different types of family

[8] In this sample of Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands and the UK, there are 7 polygamous unions in 2008. For each case we selected only one union for analysis. This means that in the case of polygamy consisting of one marriage and one union, we took the marriage into consideration. In the case of polygamous unions, we considered the last relationship. No cases of polygamy with more than one marriage were reported.



Fig. 12.4 Distibution of family arrangement typology of Ghanaian migrants in Europe

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants with families in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 289)
Interpretation: 58% of Ghanaian migrants with families in the UK are living in a totally unified family, and 32% of Ghanaian migrants with families in the Netherlands are living in a totally unified family
Statistical significance: The distribution of this family arrangement typology differs significantly by country ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test)

arrangements are associated with migrants' particular socio-demographic, socio-economic and migration-related characteristics.

12.4.2 Characteristics of Ghanaian Transnational Families in Europe

The Ghanaian migration pattern shows almost equal proportions of women and men migrating (Chap. 10) to Europe and North America. Figure 12.5 shows that in both the UK and the Netherlands, female migrants are more often in *reunified* families than men, but these differences are not significant. When it comes to *totally unified* families and *transnational* families, there is vey little difference between male and female migrants.

In general, migrants in any of the three types of family arrangements are on average older in the Netherlands than in the UK. In both countries, migrants in transnational families are on average younger (Fig. 12.6). Migrants in totally unified families are less likely to be highly educated in the Netherlands, but more likely to be highly educated in the UK (Fig. 12.7).

Figure 12.8 shows the occupational status of Ghanaian migrants in the two destination countries using the ISEI-index. ISEI is a continuous indicator of occupa-



Fig. 12.5 Family arrangement typology, by sex of the migrant

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants with families in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 289)
Interpretation: 52% of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the UK are male, and 53% of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the Netherlands are male
Statistical significance: The distribution of this family arrangement typology is not significantly different by sex in either the UK or the Netherlands ($p > 0.10$, Design-based F-test)

tional status, with index scores derived from education and income, and with higher scores referring to higher occupational status. Among migrants in the Netherlands, the range of ISEI scores lies between 16 and 71, and in the UK between 16 and 76. While the range is similar in the two countries, migrants in the Netherlands have, on average, much lower ISEI scores compared to migrants in the UK (see also Chap. 5). Furthermore, reunified families have the lowest ISEI score of all three family types in the Netherlands, while they have the highest ISEI score in the UK. The difference between family types in the Netherlands is statistically significant whereas in the UK it is not.

Migrants were asked to give a subjective evaluation of their wealth status by answering the question whether they felt that they currently had enough to live on. The response categories were *'Yes, absolutely'*, *'It depended'*, or *'No, not at all'*. Figure 12.9 below shows the differences between families concerning their subjective wealth status. Most migrants in both countries feel they absolutely have enough to live on. For both countries, the differences between family types are small and not significant. Yet, interestingly, migrants in the UK are on average more highly educated and have higher occupational status, but appear to be less satisfied with what



Fig. 12.6 Family arrangement typology, by average age of the migrant

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants with families in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 289)
Interpretation: The average age of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the UK is 38 years, and the average age of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the Netherlands is 43 years
Statistical significance: The average age does not significantly differ between family arrangement types in the Netherlands ($p > 0.10$, Design-based F-test), but does significantly differ in the UK ($p < 0.10$, Design-based F-test)

they have to live on. This possibly reflects the higher cost of living in the UK compared to the Netherlands.

Finally, we study variables related to the migration experience: age on entering current country of residence, duration of current stay abroad and legal status in country of current residence. Migrants in unified families arrived when they were quite young, both in the Netherlands and in the UK, especially compared to migrants in the other two family types (Fig. 12.10). This might indicate that most migrants in unified families started family formation after entering the country of destination.

In general, migrants have been in the UK longer than in the Netherlands (see Chap. 10). And if we look at the differences between family types, we see that those in unified families have, on average, the longest stay compared to the other family types (Fig. 12.11). It are transnational families that have been at the current destination for the shortest amount of time. This could be because migrants in transnational family arrangements have not yet had the opportunity to reunite or possibly do not desire to become reunified, or that they hope to return to their country of origin.



Fig. 12.7 Family arrangement typology, by educational level of the migrant

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants with families in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 289)
Interpretation: 40% of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the UK have primary education, and 14% of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the Netherlands have primary education
Statistical significance: The distribution of educational level between family arrangement types is not significantly different in the UK ($p > 0.10$, Design-based F-test). It does significantly differ in the Netherlands for tertiary level education ($p < 0.10$, Design-based F-test)

However, increasingly restrictive migration policies in both countries could also be driving this result.

We investigate migrants' legal status by distinguishing between (1) migrants who do not need a permit (e.g. due to citizenship), or who have a longer-term permit (such as a residence permit), (2) migrants who have a temporary permit, such as a visa, and (3) migrants who have no residence permit at all. In both countries, the majority of migrants do not need a residence permit or have a long-term permit (Fig. 12.12). Similarly, we see in both countries that there is a difference between family types, and that migrants in transnational families are more likely to have no residence permit. In the Netherlands, almost one-third of those in a transnational family are without a residence permit. As was also shown in Chap. 10, more migrants in the Netherlands lack a permit compared to the UK. On the other hand, we see that in the UK it is more common to have a temporary permit such as a visa.

In sum, the pattern of Ghanaian migrants' family types differs between the Netherlands and the UK. In the Netherlands, undocumented status is strongly related to being in a transnational family, while this association is not significant in the UK, although this latter result may be due to a small sample size (in the UK, we



Fig. 12.8 Family arrangement typology, by ISEI score of the migrant

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants with families in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 289)
Interpretation: The average ISEI score of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the UK is 43, and the average ISEI-score of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the Netherlands is 31
Statistical significance: The average ISEI does not significantly differ between family arrangement types in the UK ($p > 0.10$, Design-based F-test). It does significantly differ in the Netherlands ($p < 0.05$, Design-based F-test)

have only a few migrants with undocumented status) and should therefore be interpreted with caution. Additionally, in the Netherlands, transnational family life is associated with a higher level of education, while we see the opposite relationship for the UK. Although our data cannot fully explain the differences between the two countries, based on our findings we expect that migrants in the Netherlands are less inclined to bring their families over owing to the difficulties children might have in school (not speaking Dutch), the fact that it is more difficult to have one's educational credentials acknowledged in the Netherlands than in the UK (Mazzucato 2008a), and the difficulty of meeting family formation and reunification requirements in the Netherlands.



Fig. 12.9 Family arrangement typology, by subjective wealth status of the migrant

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants with families in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 289)
Interpretation: 62% of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the UK feel they have absolutely enough to live on, and 79% of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the Netherlands feel they have absolutely enough to live on
Statistical significance: The distribution of subjective wealth status does not significantly differ between family arrangement types in the Netherlands ($p > 0.10$, Design-based F-test). It does significantly differ in the UK for those indicating that they have not at all enough to live on ($p < 0.10$, Design-based F-test)

12.5 Transnational Families and Reunification

In this section, we take a closer look at the relationship between international migration and living arrangements between spouses and parents and children, from the perspective of Ghanaians who have migrated to the Netherlands or the UK. We examine these families' living arrangements and the prevalence of transnational arrangements. Next, we study to what extent these transnational families reunify, looking at couples and parent-child dyads separately.



Fig. 12.10 Family arrangement typology, by age at arrival in Europe

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants with families in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 289)
Interpretation: The average age at arrival in Europe of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the UK is 31, and the average age at arrival in Europe of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the Netherlands is 34
Statistical significance: The average age at arrival in Europe differs significantly between family arrangement types in both the UK and the Netherlands ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test)

12.5.1 Marriages

When the Ghanaian migrants in our sample were preparing to depart to either the Netherlands or the UK,[9] a little less than half were married, with little difference between migrants in the Netherlands and migrants in the UK (Fig. 12.13). In total, about one quarter of migrants were in a consensual union, but that is much more common in the UK than in the Netherlands. Divorce rates are higher for migrants in the Netherlands.

Of those who were married at the time they left Ghana, almost half had spouses already at destination (Fig. 12.14). Migrating together is not very common for these Ghanaian migrants in general, but it is more common in the UK than in the

[9] In the case of polygamous marriages we included first marriages in the category "marriage". When the first relationship is a union, and the second a marriage, we include the marriage. In the case of polygamous unions (so no marriages), we include the first union in the category "union".



Fig. 12.11 Family arrangement typology, by duration of stay in Europe

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants with families in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 289)
Interpretation: The average duration of stay in Europe of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the UK is 6 years, and the average duration of stay in Europe of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the Netherlands is 8 years
Statistical significance: The average duration of stay in Europe differs significantly between family arrangement typologies in both the UK and the Netherlands ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test)

Netherlands. In the Netherlands, it is much more common for migrants to arrive having left their spouses in Ghana.

These processes are highly gendered, as there are significant differences between the sexes and between countries (Fig. 12.15).[10] Migrating and leaving one's spouse behind is more common among male migrants. This difference is especially prevalent in the Netherlands, where 70% of the male migrants left their spouses behind, compared to 30% of the female migrants. Reunifying with one's spouse at destination is more common for female migrants: 78% of the female migrants in the Netherlands migrated to reunify with their husbands at destination, and 70% in the UK.

[10]These findings seem to point to interesting differences both between gender and between countries, but the UK results especially should be read with caution due to small sample size.



Fig. 12.12 Family arrangement typology, by legal status of the migrant

*The category "other" includes missing values: in the Netherlands, 1 "other" + 2 "missings", in the UK, 3 "other" + 3 "missings"
Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants with families in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 289)
Interpretation: 47% of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the UK have a residence permit, and 62% of Ghanaian migrants with transnational families in the Netherlands have a residence permit
Statistical significance: The distribution of legal status between family arrangement types is not significantly different in the Netherlands or the UK for residence permit ($p > 0.10$, Design-based F-test). It is significantly different in the UK for having a visa ($p < 0.05$, Design-based F-test), and it is significantly different in the Netherlands for being undocumented

12.5.2 Couples: Time to Reunification

Figure 12.14 shows that 40% (29% and 11%) of married migrants were living separated from their spouse at the time of their first migration to the Netherlands and the UK ("All countries" bar in Fig. 12.14). Here we look at how much time these couples spent living apart, and how many of these couples end up reunifying at destination. In Box 12.1 we provide a methodological note on methods and samples used. Figure 12.16 shows the time to reunification in the current destination country, the Netherlands or the UK. Of migrants still living in Europe, almost half the couples have reunified within 5 years of their separation. And after 10 years, we see that in total 66% had reunified. Figure 12.17 examines the same probabilities, but distinguishes by sex of the migrant. No significant gender differences appear; men and women follow similar patterns of reunification at destination.

Box 12.1 Examining Couples' Reunification

Kaplan-Meier survival functions are used to examine spousal separation from the perspective of migrants in the Netherlands and the UK, seeing to what extent Ghanaian migrants are reunified with their spouses in Europe, and how long they stayed separated from their spouses. All Kaplan-Meier estimates are shown using sampling weights. Using the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates to examine the proportion reunified, we show plots that consist of a series of horizontal steps of decreasing magnitude, representing the proportion separated. This proportion decreases as time passes, since more migrants reunify.

In order to carry out this analysis, we defined our sample by looking at who is 'at risk' of reunification. For the first two Figs. 12.16 and 12.17, the analysis was restricted to Ghanaians currently living in Europe, who, at the time they started their current migration, were married and had their spouse living in Ghana or in another country (n = 82). The event is defined as *reunification* when couples start living together at the current destination. The plots show the total proportion of reunified migrants after a 10-year period. In total, 25 couples reunified within this time period (17 male migrants and 8 female migrants). When individuals have not reunified before the year of survey (2008), or when they divorce or become widowed, they are no longer considered in the analysis.

While Figs. 12.16 and 12.17 concentrate on reunification in the country of destination, we also investigate whether reunification takes place in the origin country (Fig. 12.18). To examine this, we add to our sample those migrants who have returned to Ghana and who, at the time they started their first migration to the UK or the Netherlands, were married and had their spouse living in Ghana or in another country (n = 21, increasing the total sample for Fig. 12.18 to n = 103). The event is defined as *reunification* when couples start to live together at *either* the destination country *or* the country of origin. For each situation, we estimated a separate survival function, using a *competing risks* approach. When we examine reunification at origin, reunification at destination is censored, and vice versa.

In Fig. 12.18 we see the difference between Ghanaian migrants who reunify at destination and those who reunify at origin. After 10 years, 25% of Ghanaian migrants had reunified at destination, while 52% had reunified in Ghana. This shows that reunification at the destination might not always be the preferred or feasible option, and reunification also often occurs through the migrant returning home.

These findings reveal that transnational marriages can be long-lasting arrangements, which may be a consequence of stricter policies that make it difficult for couples to reunify, or of cultural practices in Ghana, where multi-local residence among spouses is common, making geographical separation a preferred option over reunification (Caarls and Mazzucato 2012).



Fig. 12.13 Marital status at the time of their 1st migration to current country of destination

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 410)
Interpretation: 27% of Ghanaian migrants in the UK were single at the time of their 1st migration to the current destination, and 30% of Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands were single at the time of their 1st migration to the current destination
Statistical significance: The distribution of legal status between family arrangement typologies is significantly different between the Netherlands and the UK ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test)



Fig. 12.14 Living arrangements of married spouses at the time of their 1st migration to current country of destination

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Married Ghanaian migrants in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 172)
Interpretation: 27% of Ghanaian migrants in the UK were living apart, with their spouse left behind in Ghana, at the time of their 1st migration to the current destination, and 42% of Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands were living apart, with their spouse left behind in Ghana, at the time of their 1st migration to the current destination
Statistical significance: The distribution of living arrangements differs significantly between the Netherlands and the UK ($p < 0.10$, Design-based F-test).



Fig. 12.15 Living arrangements of married spouses at the time of their 1st migration to current country of destination, by sex of the migrant

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Married Ghanaian migrants in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 172)
Interpretation: 57% of Ghanaian migrants in the UK that were living apart, with their spouse left behind in Ghana, at the time of their 1st migration to the current destination were male, and 70% of Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands that were living apart, with their spouse left behind in Ghana, at the time of their 1st migration to the current destination were male
Statistical significance: The difference between these living arrangements by sex is significantly different in the Netherlands ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test), but not in the UK ($p > 0.10$, Design-based F-test)



Fig. 12.16 Time to reunification between Ghanaian couples

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants currently living in Europe, who, at the time they started their current migration, were married and had their spouse living in Ghana (n = 82);
Interpretation: Five years after their separation, 44% of these couples have reunified in Europe. After 10 years, we see that in total 66% have reunified



Fig. 12.17 Time to reunification between Ghanaian couples by sex of the migrant

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants currently living in Europe, who, at the time they started their current migration, were married and had their spouse living in Ghana (n = 82);
Interpretation: Five years after their separation, 47% of the male migrants in Europe have reunified, as have 41% of the female migrants in Europe
Statistical significance: The difference in reunification according to the sex of the migrant is not significant ($p > 0.10$, log rank test)

12.5.3 Children

Similarly, we examine parent-child separations and reunifications. Since children need to be 18 years or younger to be eligible for family reunification, we focus on parents with children aged 0–18 at the time of their first migration.[11] First, we look at how many migrants had children **at the time of their first migration to the current destination**, either the Netherlands or the UK (Fig. 12.19). Most migrants had no children when they migrated to their current destination. This holds especially for migrants currently in the UK, where two-thirds of migrants had no children when they migrated; in the Netherlands, this is the case for almost half of all migrants. Looking at the sub-set of migrants who had at least one child under 18 years of age when they moved to their current destination, 76% left all their children in Ghana.

[11] This means that migrants with no children and migrants with *only* children over 18 are excluded here. Migrants with *at least* 1 child under 18 are included.



Fig. 12.18 Time to reunification between Ghanaian couples origin and destination reunification

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants currently living in Europe, who, at the time they started their current migration, were married and had their spouse living in Ghana + those migrants who have returned to Ghana and who, at the time they started their first migration to the UK or the Netherlands, were married and had their spouse living in Ghana (n = 103);
Interpretation: Five years after their separation, 46% of Ghanaian migrants have reunified at origin; 17% of Ghanaian migrants have reunified at destination.
Statistical significance: Comparisons of confidence intervals of cumulated incidence curves indicate they are not significantly different

12.5.4 Children: Time to Reunification

In this section, we examine the time parents and children spent living apart, and the proportion of parent-child dyads that reunify at destination. Kaplan-Meier survival functions are used to examine parent-child separation from the perspective of migrants in the Netherlands and the UK, seeing to what extent Ghanaian migrants reunify with their child in Europe, and how long they stay separated from their children. We use the same method, Kaplan-Meier survival functions, as explained in Box 12.1. For a methodological note on the specific parent-child sample used, see Box 12.2.

Figure 12.20 shows the time to reunification in the current destination country for Ghanaian immigrants in Europe (the Netherlands and the UK) with their left-behind children in Ghana, who were under 18 at the time of the migrant's departure. After 5 years, 19% had reunified with their child, and after 10 years, this had increased to 28%. Figure 12.21 shows the difference in reunification between migrant fathers and mothers. Migrant mothers were somewhat more likely to reunite with children than were fathers, but this difference is not significant.



Fig. 12.19 Parental status at the time of their 1st migration to the current destination

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 410)
Interpretation: 63% of Ghanaian migrants in the UK had no children at the time of their 1st migration to the current destination, and 48% of Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands had no children at the time of their 1st migration to the current destination
Statistical significance: The distribution of parental status differs significantly between the Netherlands and the UK ($p < 0.01$, Design-based F-test)

Box 12.2 Examining Reunification Between Parent-child Dyads

Kaplan-Meier survival functions are used to examine parent-child separation from the perspective of migrants in the Netherlands and the UK, seeing to what extent Ghanaian migrants reunify with their child (always referring to biological children aged under 18 at the time of the survey) in Europe, and how long they stay separated from their children.

The analysis was restricted to Ghanaians currently living in Europe, who, at the time they started their current migration, left their children behind in Ghana. The sample was further restricted those children who were under 18 at the time the migration started. Each parent-child dyad is one observation (n = 226). The event is defined as parent-child *reunification at destination* (n = 41 reunified dyads), with parent-child dyads living together at the current destination. When parents have not reunified with their children before the year of the survey (2008), when the child is deceased, or when the child reaches the age of 18, they are treated as censored. Similar to the plots on couple reunification presented above, we show in the plots below the total proportion of reunified migrants after a 10-year period of separation.

When we examine reunification in both country of origin and destination, we examine these competing 'risks' by including returned migrants from the two European survey countries.



Fig. 12.20 Time to reunification between Ghanaian parent – child dyads

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants currently living in Europe, who, at the time they started their current migration, had their child under-18 living in Ghana (n = 226);
Interpretation: Among migrants still living in Europe, 19% of parent-child dyads have reunified within five years of their separation. After 10 years, we see that in total 28% have reunified



Fig. 12.21 Time to reunification between Ghanaian parent – child dyads by sex of the migrant parent

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants currently living in Europe, who, at the time they started their current migration, had their child under-18 living in Ghana (n = 226);
Interpretation: Five years after their separation, 15% of the migrant fathers in Europe and 26% of the migrant mothers in Europe have reunified
Statistical significance: The difference in reunification according to the sex of the migrant is not significant ($p > 0.10$, log rank test)

Fig. 12.22 Time to reunification: origin and destination reunification

Note: weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographic survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants currently living in Europe, who, at the time they started their current migration, had their child under-18 living in Ghana + those migrants who have returned to Ghana and who, at the time they started their first migration to the UK or the Netherlands, had their child under-18 living in Ghana (n = 299);
Interpretation: Five years after their separation, 37% of the migrant parents have reunified in Europe and 9% of the migrant parents have reunified at destination
Statistical significance: Comparisons of confidence intervals of cumulated incidence curves indicate they are not significantly different

Again, reunification can take place either in the country of origin or at destination. So for parent-child dyads also, we examined these competing 'risks' by including returned migrants from the Netherlands and the UK (Fig. 12.22). We see that, after 10 years, 12% of migrant parents had reunified with their child at destination, compared to 50% that had reunified at origin.

Transnational living arrangements are even more prevalent for parent-child dyads than for couples, and these arrangements are long lasting. The reasons why parents leave their children behind include the difficulties some parents have in meeting the legal requirements for reunification with their children, but also the fact that some parents prefer the Ghanaian educational system and also that keeping their children in Ghana is a way of enabling them to grow up in a more culturally appropriate way (Bledsoe and Sow 2011; Mazzucato and Cebotari 2012).

12.6 Conclusion and Discussion

When interpreting the trends regarding families and international migration presented in this chapter, it is important to take into account the extended family and geographic dispersal of family members that are characteristic of Ghanaian family systems. Even though modernization processes are bringing changes in the roles of the extended family, this type of family continues to play an important role in marriages, child raising and the rights and responsibilities that govern familial relationships. Ghanaian families are also characterized by geographic dispersal. Even nuclear family members commonly live apart due to high levels of internal migration and also to the practices of child fostering and social parenthood, where children are placed outside the household to be raised by extended family members.

With this background in mind, family structures under conditions of international migration can be seen as a continuation of certain characteristics of Ghanaian family systems while at the same time presenting new dimensions particular to the international context. In the urban contexts surveyed in Ghana, almost half of the households had at least one household member overseas, which can be seen as a continuation of the multi-local family as already practiced in Ghana. These migratory contacts were to a large extent from the extended family, attesting to the importance of extended family members in understanding relationships between migrants and households back home. Nuclear family members were particularly important in terms of receiving support for their migratory trips but, importantly, those who received support were not the only ones who sent remittances to the household. This indicates that 'pay back' is neither the only nor the main reason for remitting as has been supposed by some migration studies. Most migrants migrated without help from their households and they send remittances irrespective of whether they received help to migrate. Transnational family life, therefore, takes place within a diversity of relationships within the extended family.

International migration can impact the forms that families take. In European countries, some nuclear families reunite in the destination country. But at times, either due to restrictive policies or by choice, nuclear family members of migrants live in the country of origin or in a third country. Other nuclear families may migrate together or be formed at destination. In the second part of our analysis we focused on the forms that migrants' nuclear families take. We investigated whether, when and where families live geographically separate from each other and reunify. There are several salient findings in this regard. First, 27% of all Ghanaians who migrated to the Netherlands or the UK were not married and had no children (or no children under 18) at the time of their migration, and therefore do not fall under the category of migrants who can potentially move as a family or reunify after one member migrates. This is important because, at the European level as well as in the Netherlands and the UK, public and policy discourses centre around the idea that family reunification is the way for most migrants to enter European countries.

Second, the country of destination makes a difference for family life. Being in a transnational family is more common amongst Ghanaians in the Netherlands than

in the UK. In the UK, being in a transnational family is related to lower levels of education than those living with their families, and to having arrived recently. In the Netherlands, migrants in transnational families have higher educational attainment than those living with their families, and have also arrived more recently.

These findings point to two contending explanations as to why migrants live in transnational families. For some migrants, living in a transnational family arrangement may be a matter of *choice*. In general, Ghanaian migrants in the UK are more highly skilled and occupy professions with higher status than in the Netherlands, making it possible for them to support a family in the UK. Furthermore, the UK and Ghanaian educational systems share the same language, making it easier for Ghanaian children to transition from Ghanaian to British schools. These conditions favour migrating together as a family or reunifying in the UK. In the Netherlands, by contrast, where Ghanaian migrants are on average less educated than their UK counterparts and have lower occupational status, and where the school system is in Dutch, Ghanaian parents may prefer to keep their children in Ghana in order for them to complete their secondary education, thus operating as transnational families. This suggests that in some cases living in transnational families may be the preferred *choice* for migrants given the context of their migration.

A second explanation for transnational family forms is that families are *constrained* by policies in the receiving countries. In both the UK and the Netherlands the past decade has been one of increasing restrictions in the form of more and higher criteria required for family reunification. In both countries, we see that migrants in transnational families have arrived within the past decade. While the relatively short time they have been in the country may not have given them the chance yet to settle and reunify, it could also be a reflection of increasing restrictions imposed in both the Netherlands and the UK. Rights to family reunification are tied to a series of conditions, most importantly the legal status of the sponsor and their ability to provide secure income and housing. In fact, in both countries we see a relationship between legal status and family type, with the undocumented and those with only a visa (short term permit) being mainly in transnational families. This implies that family migration polices are socially selective, particularly excluding more vulnerable groups from the right to family reunification. This indicates that for some migrants, especially the most recently arrived and more vulnerable, being in a transnational family may *not be a choice* but the result of stringent policies. Gaining a greater understanding of when transnational family formations are a preferred choice (driven by individual characteristics) and when they are imposed (due to stringent policies) would be a fruitful avenue for future research.

Finally, focusing on those that do reunify, our multi-sited data collection allows us to look at where families reunify. This is a new area that the MAFE project has investigated, as most research on reunification only focuses on the migrant-receiving country. Importantly, we show that reunification between migrants and their spouses and/or children happens to a large extent also in the migrant-sending country.

Appendix A: Living Arrangements of Ghanaian Migrants in Europe

Table 12.3 Living arrangements of Ghanaian migrants in Europe, children & spouses

Full Sample					
Ego's children	*n*	%	Ego's spouse	*n*	%
No children(under 18)	200	43	No spouse	187	46
Cohabiting children (always unified)	123	39	Cohabiting spouse (always unified)[a]	98	31
Cohabiting children (after period of separation)	23	7	Cohabiting spouse (after period of separation)	66	15
Non-cohabiting children abroad	64	11	Non-cohabiting spouse abroad	59	8
Total	410	100	Total	410	100
The Netherlands					
Ego's children	*n*	%	Ego's spouse	*n*	%
No children (under 18)	128	41	No spouse	113	39
Cohabiting children (always unified)	70	30	Cohabiting spouse (always unified)[a]	53	20
Cohabiting children (after period of separation)	15	7	Cohabiting spouse (after period of separation)	47	20
Non-cohabiting children abroad	50	22	Non-cohabiting spouse abroad	50	21
Total	263	100	Total	263	100
The UK					
Ego's children	*n*	%	Ego's spouse	*n*	%
No children (under 18)	72	44	No spouse	74	47
Cohabiting children (always unified)	53	41	Cohabiting spouse (always unified)[a]	45	33
Cohabiting children (after period of separation)	8	6	Cohabiting spouse (after period of separation)	19	14
Non-cohabiting children abroad	14	9	Non-cohabiting spouse abroad	9	6
Total	147	100	Total	147	100

[a]We look at cohabitation/non-cohabitation of ego with his/her spouse from the time they were married (i.e. not from the time the union started)

Notes: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey

Population: Ghanaian migrants in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 410)

Interpretation: 43% of Ghanaian migrants in the UK and the Netherlands have no children (no children at all, or no children under 18), and 39% have cohabiting children (always unified)

Table 12.4 Family arrangements typology of Ghanaian migrants in Europe

Full sample				
Ego's spouse[a]	Ego's children[c]			
	No child(ren) <18	Cohabitating child(ren) (always unified)	Cohabitating child(ren) (after period of separation)	Non-Cohabitating child(ren)
No spouse	121 (27%)	31 (11%)	8 (2%)	27 (6%)
Cohabitating spouse *(always unified)*[b]	27 (7%)	61 (21%)	4 (1%)	6 (2%)
Cohabitating spouse (after period of separation)	28 (6%)	20 (5%)	9 (3%)	9 (1%)
Non-cohabitating spouse	24 (3%)	11 (2%)	2 (0%)	22 (3%)
The Netherlands				
Ego's spouse[a]	Ego's Children[c]			
	No child(ren) <18	Cohabitating child(ren) (always unified)	Cohabitating child(ren) (after period of separation)	Non-Cohabitating child(ren)
No spouse	74 (23%)	15 (6%)	5 (2%)	19 (8%)
Cohabitatingspouse *(always unified)*[b]	15 (5%)	32 (13%)	3 (2%)	3 (1%)
Cohabitating spouse (after period of separation)	19 (6%)	14 (7%)	5 (2%)	9 (5%)
Non-cohabitating spouse	20 (7%)	9 (4%)	2 (1%)	19 (8%)
UK				
Ego's spouse[a]	Ego's children[c]			
	No child(ren) <18	Cohabitating child(ren) (always unified)	Cohabitating child(ren) (after period of separation)	Non-Cohabitating child(ren)
No spouse	47 (27%)	16 (12%)	3 (2%)	8 (5%)
Cohabitating spouse *(always unified)*[b]	12 (8%)	29 (22%)	1 (1%)	3 (2%)
Cohabitating spouse (after period of separation)	9 (6%)	6 (4%)	4 (3%)	0 (0%)
Non-cohabitating spouse	4 (3%)	2 (2%)	0 (0%)	3 (2%)

[a]Informal unions are not considered, i.e. "spouse" always refers to marriage, and conversely, "no spouse" also includes those within an informal union

[b]We look at cohabitation/non-cohabitation of ego with his/her spouse from the time they were married (i.e. not from the time the union started)

[c]Children over 18 (and their whereabouts) are not considered, i.e. "no child" also includes those with only children over 18; In the case of migrants with children under 18 who are living at different locations, we consider this migrant as "non-cohabiting" when at least 1 child under 18 is not living with ego

Note: unweighted numbers & weighted percentages; Source: MAFE-Ghana – Biographical survey
Population: Ghanaian migrants in the UK and the Netherlands (n = 410)
Interpretation: Of the Ghanaian migrants in the UK and the Netherlands, 27% have no spouse and no children. 11% have children with whom they are living together but do not have a spouse

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Part IV
Senegalese Migration

Chapter 13
From Senegal and Back (1975–2008): Migration Trends and Routes of Migrants in Times of Restrictions

Cris Beauchemin, Papa Sakho, Bruno Schoumaker, and Marie-Laurence Flahaux

13.1 Introduction

At the turn of the twenty-first century, public opinion in Europe expressed great concern about sub-Saharan migration: media images of migrants assaulting the Spanish Ceuta and Melilla enclaves in Morocco and of packed pirogues barely arriving on the Spanish coasts raised fears of "invasion". Senegalese migration was closely linked in the public imagination to these images of desperate migrants flooding into Europe. Many pirogues did depart from Senegal and its close neighbours, Mauritania and Gambia. But despite the power of frightening images of migrants dying or fighting at Europe's borders, previous research has shown that the feared invasion is nothing but a myth: Sub-Saharans form a minority of migrant stocks and

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flows in Europe, even when estimates of irregular migration are included (de Haas 2008; Lessault and Beauchemin 2009).

This chapter brings new evidence on the migration patterns of one group – the Senegalese – that somehow embodies this fear of African migration. Using the retrospective survey data from the Migrations between Africa and Europe project (MAFE), complemented by other available statistical sources, we reconstruct the recent history of Senegalese migration. The period of interest in this chapter (1975–2008) covers what can be considered a period of increasingly restrictive European immigration policies. Historically, labour migration from Senegal mainly targeted France, though other African countries were also destinations. In 1974, France decided to stop this. In this chapter we analyze how Senegalese migration has evolved in a context of growing restrictions, not only in France but also in the rest of Europe. Without analyzing – strictly speaking – the effects of immigration policies, we test the hypothesis put forward by de Haas (2011) that the effectiveness of stiffening policies is hampered by a number of "substitution effects", whereby migrants adapt their behaviour in the face of restrictions, to finally realize their migration projects.

Taking advantage of the richness and originality of the MAFE household and biographic surveys,[1] the chapter examines several aspects of migration patterns that are overshadowed in studies using conventional data such as censuses or official data on immigration flows. After this introduction, Sect. 13.2 provides an analysis of trends in departure and return. Section 13.3 studies the changing geography of Senegalese migration, looking at the influence of both policies and migrants' social networks in destination countries. Section 13.4 is dedicated to what we call "the frustrated desires of migration", a notion that covers both migration "attempts" (or rather steps taken towards migration) and the experience of irregular migrants. Finally, Sect. 13.5 concludes the chapter by summing up its results and discussing the relevance of the "substitution effects" hypothesis in the context of Senegalese migration.

13.2 Leaving, Returning (1975–2008)

13.2.1 A Short History of Migration Out of Senegal

The contemporaneous history of international migration in Senegal starts in the early twentieth century. From that time, out-migration followed two directions: Europe, especially France, and other sub-Saharan countries. Historically, international migration first developed in the Senegal River Valley along the border with

[1] Data sources of all statistics are presented below the figures and tables. All results are weighted. Readers should bear in mind that the samples used in the analyses vary from one table or graph to another, which can substantially affect the results interpretation. For more information see Chap. 2, which provides all details on MAFE samples.

Mali and Mauritania. According to Tall and Tandian (2011), migration was reported as early as 1900 among the Soninke and from about 1910 among the Tukolor (Halpulaar). A culture of migration developed among the people of North and East Senegal, as a strategy to break out of economic isolation in this landlocked region excluded from development under colonialism and since (Sakho 2005; Tall and Tandian 2011). The introduction of monetary taxes by the French colonial administration encouraged temporary migration to places where migrants could earn wages and so pay their taxes. They moved either to groundnut plantations within Senegal or out of Senegal, towards other French colonies in West and Central Africa, such as Côte d'Ivoire or Gabon, where they worked in the administration, in trade or building railways.[2] At the same time, migration to Europe was initiated by recruitment to the French merchant marine (Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2004). World War I gave a new momentum to out-migration. Senegalese soldiers in the French army left to fight in Europe. Some remained there and were followed, after the war, by migrants answering a call for labour in Metropolitan France, where reconstruction was under way.[3] Around 1925, poor harvests coinciding with a tax increase prompted many to leave in search of a cash income (Tall and Tandian 2011). In the 1950s, small Senegalese communities became established in a number of African cities (Bredeloup 2007).

During World War II, battalions of *tirailleurs sénégalais* fought again in Europe. After the war, recruitment to the French merchant marine continued and some Senegalese migrants settled in French port cities such as Marseille, le Havre, Dunkirk Bordeaux, Toulon (Manchuelle 1997). Most importantly, the reconstruction economic boom in France prompted authorities to establish recruitment offices in the Senegal River Valley in the 1950s, in order to hire temporary workers for France's flourishing industries (mainly automobiles, textiles and hotels). Circular migration was the norm, with Senegalese migrants remaining in France only a few years before coming back to resettle in their origin country: migration was predominantly conceived as a family strategy to provide the origin community with funds (Barou 1993; Guilmoto 1998). This recruitment policy was maintained after Senegal's independence in 1960 and was facilitated by special agreements between the newly independent country and its former metropolis. As early as 1960, a treaty (*Convention d'établissement*) established a bilateral freedom of entry and residence and free exercise of economic activities for Senegalese and French citizens. This was confirmed in a bilateral treaty signed by France and Senegal in 1964 (Vickstrom 2013). Until 1974, date of a new bilateral agreement, Senegalese migrants were thus exempted from residence permits and tourist visas. Exemption from the latter was even maintained until 1986 (Mezger 2012). France thus became a major destination for Senegalese migrants who responded to the call for labour. At the same time,

[2] On the role of colonial taxes in the development of migration in West Africa, see S. Amin (1974) and Cordell et al. (1996).

[3] In 1919, the French Minister for Agriculture and Supplies suggested recruiting migrant workers from the colonies (declaration of the Minister for Agriculture and Supplies, *Journal Officiel*, parliamentary debates, 29 January 1919).

migration to other African countries remained high. The cocoa and coffee boom in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, the petroleum boom in Gabon and the emerging diamond trade in Central Africa (Congo and Zaire) enhanced inter-African migration throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Bredeloup 2007).

Conditions in Senegalese destination countries changed dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. On one hand, France officially put an end to labour migration in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis. At the end of the 1970s, measures were implemented to encourage return and further restrictions on immigration were imposed, firstly regarding students and later (in the late 1980s) family reunification (Mezger 2012). In the 1990s and 2000s, Italy and Spain started to attract Senegalese migrants. While there is some speculation that the first Senegalese immigrants to these countries were attracted by extensive regularization programs[4] (Kaag 2008; Fall 2005; Tall 2008), both Spain and Italy adopted increasingly restrictive approaches to immigration through the 1990s and 2000s (see Sect. 13.3). On the other hand, African destinations became less attractive: economic slowdown in the 1980s and political conflicts in the following decade were coupled with a rise in xenophobia in various former destinations of Senegalese migrants (Blion and Bredeloup 1997; Tall 2002).

At the same time, Senegal was facing major economic difficulties. A series of droughts, especially severe between 1978 and 1983, hurt the agricultural sector, which was furthermore hit by the collapse of the world market for peanuts, Senegal's main agricultural product since colonial times. In order to reduce the country's debt, in the 1980s and 1990s Senegalese governments agreed to implement the structural adjustment plans supported by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. This period of drastic economic liberalization did not produce the expected results: urban poverty was aggravated and economic growth remained much lower than the world average (Duruflé 1988; Mezger 2012). Downsizing in the public sector especially affected Dakar, the capital city. Social unrest was emblematized by student strikes in 1988 and 1993 that led to the government cancelling entire study years. According to qualitative studies, this prompted some students whose education was interrupted to migrate, mainly to Italy (Tandian 2008; Riccio 2005). Although the devaluation of the CFA franc (Senegal's currency) in 1994 generated an economic recovery (with a moderate increase in GDP per capita and a fall in urban poverty), most of the Senegalese population did not perceive any positive change in their well-being (Mezger 2012). The next sections show how international migration evolved in this context combining crisis in the origin country and border closure in destination countries.

[4] Italy regularized 217,000 migrants in 1998, 650,000 in 2002 and 350,000 in 2006; Spain regularized 200,000 migrants in 2000, 230,000 in 2001 and 580,000 in 2005. Note that Sub-Saharans were a small minority among the regularized migrants: in Italy, 14% in 1998 and 5% in 2002; in Spain, 14% in 2000 and 6% in 2001. France regularized 80,000 migrants in 1997–1998 and 7000 migrants in 2006, in addition to 122,000 migrants who were regularized through a case-by-case procedure between 1999 and 2006. Sub-Saharan migrants represented 40% of those regularized in France in 1997–1998 and 31% in 1999–2006. Sources: Lessault and Beauchemin (2009) and Kraler (2009).

13.2.2 No Surge in Out-Migration at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century

International migration in Senegal became a major subject of research in the 1990s and 2000s. In a review of the abundant literature, Lessault and Flahaux (2014) found that most of this research was based on regional and qualitative approaches and, overall, painted a contradictory picture of out-migration. While some authors stressed the rise of out-migration to Europe, other authors qualified this view of a Senegalese exodus, insisting on the significance of inter-African migration and circulation. Using two sets of nationally representative data, Lessault and Flahaux (2014) put an end to this contradictory picture of migration trends in Senegal. Comparison of the 2002 Census and the 1992 Survey on Migration and Urbanization (EMUS, *Enquête sur les migrations et l'urbanisation*) does indeed show that the propensity to out-migrate remained stable between 1992 and 2002, at a level of 7 recent migrants (out of Senegal since less than 5 years, Table 13.1) per 1000 inhabitants within the country (Lessault and Flahaux 2014). Other data confirm the same pattern. At the country level, the data on international migrant stocks assembled by the World Bank confirm that international out-migration stalled at the turn of the twenty-first century: the total number of Senegalese migrants in the world increased slightly between 1990 and 2000, but at a much slower pace than in the previous decades (Table 13.2).

However, national figures mask regional specificities: while international migration tended to diminish in the old regions of out-migration (e.g. the Senegal River Valley), it grew, albeit moderately, in other areas such as Dakar, the capital city, with a rate increasing from 6 to 9 recent migrants per 1000 Dakar residents (Table 13.1).

Table 13.1 Recent out-migration from Senegal and Dakar (1992–2002)

		1992	2002
Number of recent out-migrants[a]		120,575	159,958
Rate of out-migration[a]	Senegal	0.7%	0.7%
	Dakar	0.6%	0.9%
Percentage of migrants living in Europe	Senegal	44%	48%
	Dakar	57%	61%
Percentage of migrants living in North America	Senegal	2%	7%
	Dakar	5%	13%
Percentage of migrants living in West Africa	Senegal	40%	23%
	Dakar	27%	11%

Sources: 2002 Census and 1992 Survey on Migration and Urbanization (EMUS, *Enquête sur les migrations et l'urbanisation*), computed by Lessault and Flahaux (2014)

[a]Definitions:

Recent migrants are persons declared by households as former household members who have been living abroad for less than 5 years at the time of the survey/census. All figures in the table relate to recent out-migrants

The rate of out-migration is the number of recent out-migrants as a percentage of the population of the Country/the Dakar region

Table 13.2 Number of Senegalese international migrants in the World (1960–2000)

		1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
World[a]		79,598	127,443	213,314	313,544	335,948
African countries	Gambia	19,077	23,284	40,150	68,127	98,366
	Mauritania	7544	12,615	21,095	36,662	40,517
	Côte, d'Ivoire	10,550	16,310	20,916	21,962	24,478
	Gabon	1121	2770	5194	9585	14,586
	Mali	15,258	14,978	14,703	14,433	11,380
	Congo, Dem., Rep.	6	24,265	15,268	10,551	8638
	Guinea-Bissau	5734	6028	6337	6669	6407
	Total[a]	59,290	100,250	123,663	167,989	204,372
Western countries	France	2183	5231	53,476	70,016	3682[b]
	Italy	583	893	3888	42,592	49,590
	Germany	734	826	723	1202	17,526
	USA	116	344	948	2786	10,262
	United Kingdom	250	914	1837	137	9530
	Spain	–	–	–	720	9192
	Total[a]	3866	8208	60,872	117,453	99,782

Countries with more than 5000 Senegalese immigrants in 2000
Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database, Last Updated: 06/28/2011. Retrieved from the MAFE Contextual Database
[a]The number of Senegalese migrants in the world is the one reported by the World Bank, without correction for any possible misreporting at the country level
[b]The number of Senegalese migrants in France in 2000 seems to have been misreported in the Global Bilateral Migration Database. In line with the French Census data, the OECD database (DIOC) counts 54,000 Senegalese migrants in France in 2000 (see also Fig. 13.3)

The MAFE data suggest rather that the propensity to migrate internationally out of Dakar remained constant over time (Fig. 13.1).[5] In any case, statistics agree in showing that there was no sudden exodus out of Dakar or more generally out of Senegal, even in the 2000s when media attention was captivated by pirogues loaded with sub-Saharan migrants reaching the Spanish coasts. That this stalling of out-migration (rather than an increase) is due to restrictions in immigration policies in Europe is not impossible, but is not clearly attested. In any case and at all times, for migrants from Dakar, Europe happened to be more attractive than other countries: in the 2000s, the rate of departure to Europe was twice as high as the rate of departure to the rest of Africa.

[5] Note that the migration trends (departure and return) presented in this chapter are somewhat different from those presented in Flahaux et al. (2013), who used a different computation method. For a presentation of the method used in this book, see Chap. 3. And for a deeper methodological discussion of trend computation using retrospective data, see Schoumaker and Beauchemin (2014).



Fig. 13.1 Departure trends. Lifetime probability of migration from Senegal, by destination (1975–2008)

Data: MAFE-Senegal, Household data, 2008
Note: weighted figures, 90% confidence intervals
Population: Children of households heads, aged 18–39. Migration only measured at 18 or over
Interpretation: Each bar represents those who left Senegal as a proportion of those who were living there during the period in question

13.2.3 Returns

Differences between Europe and Africa are also striking as regards return migration registered in the Dakar region: the probability to returning to Senegal is much higher for migrants who moved within the continent than for those who went to Europe (Fig. 13.2). In short, since the mid 1970s, out-migration to Europe has been more common and return from there less frequent. There are many reasons to explain the apparent appeal of Europe. It could be basically related to the wide difference between economic conditions in Africa and Europe: earnings, living conditions, social benefits, etc. could explain why migrants tend to prefer to head to European destinations rather than other African countries and to remain there for the same reason. This explanation fits the neo-classical theory of migration determinants quite well (see Chap. 4). It could be also that there is a process of initial selection into migration, with migrants intending to return more likely to move to neighbouring destinations, while those who aim to move for good would prefer Europe.[6] There might also be a policy explanation. Even though circulation is not entirely

[6] For a discussion on the potential effects of distance on migration determinants, see Gonzalez-Ferrer et al. (2014).



Fig. 13.2 Return trends. Probability of returning within 10 years of first departure, by destination (1975–2008)

Data: MAFE-Senegal, Household data, 2008
Note: weighted figures, 90% confidence intervals
Population: Children of heads of households, aged 18–39, who left Senegal aged 18 or over
Interpretation: Each bar represents those who returned to Senegal as a proportion of those who left Senegal for the first time during the observed period

free on the African continent, immigration is clearly less controlled in most African countries than in Europe, and this observation applies especially to Senegal, which is involved in the free movement protocol of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Previous research has shown that tighter control is associated with less return (Flahaux 2014; Massey et al. 2002): when the cost of departure is high, migrants already at destination tend to delay or avoid returning because they know a new departure would be difficult if not impossible in case of failure in their project of reintegration at home. This mechanism is viewed by de Haas (2011) as one of the possible substitution effects (called "reverse-flow substitution") that can limit the effectiveness of restrictive immigration policies (in that the decrease in return tends to limit the impact of restrictions on *net* migration).

The fact that destination countries develop policies to promote return (from pay-to-go programs to deportation) when they adopt a restrictive approach to migration is never mentioned in the literature as a factor that significantly increases rates of return: the number of "managed" migrants is too small, most of the return flow consisting of "spontaneous" migrants who decide to move on their own. Indeed, when asked in the MAFE biographic survey about the motives for their return, migrants back in Senegal mainly reported family reasons (34%), the second most frequent reason being the completion of their studies (15%). Returns linked to

"problems with legal status" concerned just 11% of returnees from Europe. Not all of these were expulsions: respondents' detailed answers show that some undocumented migrants decide to return home on their own initiative (Flahaux et al. 2014).[7] Furthermore, there is also some evidence from the MAFE data suggesting that forced returns are followed by new departures to Europe. On the one hand, in an event-history analysis of repeated migration (i.e. a second migration to Europe after a return in Senegal), Flahaux showed that unintended returned migrants (i.e. who had no intention of returning when they arrived in Europe) are significantly more likely to move back to Europe than those who originally had a return project. On the other hand, in his study of pathways into irregular status among Senegalese migrants in Europe, Vickstrom (2014) showed the cumulative nature of entering Europe with no visa: migrants who had a prior experience of illegal entry (and so were at risk of being deported) are more likely to follow this irregular path of entry than those who had no migration experience at all. All in all, studies of Senegalese migration confirm that "managed" returns certainly have little effect on *net* migration in Europe. But, overall, taking account of both "managed" and "spontaneous" movements, do trends in return confirm the above-mentioned "reverse-flow substitution" hypothesis?

If the hypothesis is valid, we should observe a decrease in the propensity to return from Europe over time as policies are tightened. At first sight, this is not confirmed by the MAFE household data: trends in return, as measured from the migratory behaviour of household heads' children, show a stall rather than a decline since 1975 (Fig. 13.2). In fact, variations over time are too tiny to comment on with statistical confidence. Analyses are here hampered by the small sample size. Unfortunately, and as in most other countries in the world (Beauchemin 2014), there are – as far as we know – no other statistical source that would allow us to measure how return migration to Senegal has evolved over time.[8] However, the MAFE project provides an alternative measurement that tends to confirm the "reverse-flow substitution effect" hypothesis.

In the MAFE biographic survey, migrants (whether living in Europe or back in Senegal) were asked how long they intended to stay at destination at the time of their arrival in each receiving country. The question was both retrospective and sub-

[7] Results on the determinants of return point in the same direction as they show that undocumented Senegalese migrants are not more likely to return that those living in Europe with proper documents (see Chap. 4).

[8] However, it has been established that return to Senegal is a significant phenomenon. According to the Push-Pull data (1997–1998), more than a quarter of the households surveyed in the capital city (27%) contained at least one returnee. These returnees may be involved in circular migration: barely 50% of them declared that they had return for good, and more returnees than non-migrants declare an intention to move abroad (Robin et al. 1999). Furthermore, 30% of migrants living abroad were reported (by the interviewed household heads) to intend to return, this figure being higher among the more recent migrants and among those currently in Italy (compared to those in France or in Senegal's neighboring countries, no results being available for Spain). In addition, 16% were said to be indecisive whether to come back or stay abroad. These figures are not representative of the Dakar region, but they illustrate quite well that return migration was a significant phenomenon at the end of the 1990s in the capital city.

Table 13.3 Intentions of stay, on first arrival in the MAFE countries, by period of first arrival – % of migrants

		Period of first arrival in country			
Origin and destination	Intended duration of stay	1975–1990	1990–1999	2000–2007	1975–2007
France, Italy, Spain	Less than 3 years	14	10	6	9
	3–9 years	24	12	12	15
	10 years and over	62	78	82	76
	N	162	244	297	703

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic survey in Europe and Senegal, 2008
Population: Sample includes first long stay in a destination country of all migrants still living in a MAFE country or back in Senegal. All migrants left Senegal at age 18 or over in 1975 or later
Note: Weighted percentages, unweighted numbers. People intending to stay permanently are included in the category '10 years and over'
Statistical significance: differences across periods are significant (F-test, $p < 0.01$)

jective and thus potentially subject to ex-post revision. Over the 1975–2008 period as a whole, a quarter of migrants going to France, Italy or Spain intended to go back home within 10 years (Table 13.3). Although the majority envisaged staying longer (which does not mean permanently), this result reminds us that a significant proportion of migrants considered themselves as temporary migrants. A rich socio-anthropological literature has analyzed Senegalese migrants' strategies and shown how return is an intrinsic part of the departure project (Castagnone 2010). As mentioned in Sect. 13.2.1, historical migration out of the Senegal River Valley was conceived as a circular movement and it seems that the new migration that developed out of other parts of Senegal also rests on a strong attachment to the home country. However, at the turn of the twenty-first century, socio-anthropologists pointed to a new attitude to return among communities of Wolof in Italy and of Tukolor and Soninke from the Senegal Valley in France (Sinatti 2009; Sarr et al. 2010): return seems to be continually postponed as conditions in host countries make it increasingly difficult to fulfil hopes for economic success, which is a precondition for fulfilling family obligations and for a socially successful return home.

Our quantitative analyses of the MAFE data also show that intentions to return evolved over time. The proportion of migrants intending to return within 10 years shrank by half, starting at 38% in 1975–1990 to stabilize at around 20% in 1990–2000 (Table 13.3). To some extent, this decrease matches the trend towards tighter border control and tends to support the "reverse-flow substitution" hypothesis. In line with these results, Marie-Laurence Flahaux has shown in bivariate and multivariate analyses using the MAFE data that intentions to return also became less and less predictive of actual return over time: as immigration policies became more restrictive, Senegalese migrants in Europe revised their initial intention to return, postponing if not cancelling it (Flahaux 2015).

13.3 A New Geography of Migration Flows

13.3.1 Africa vs. Europe

MAFE results in Sect. 13.2 have shown clearly that international migration in Dakar shows a strong attraction to Europe. But what is observed in the capital city is not really representative of the migration geography of the whole country. According to the 2002 Census, 61% of all recent migrants declared by households of the capital city were living in Europe, against 48% of all migrants reported for the whole of Senegal (Table 13.1). Migration to North America is even more overrepresented in Dakar compared to the rest of the country (13% against 7%, Table 13.1). This overrepresentation of Western destinations among migrants from Dakar was already noticeable in 1992, when recent migrants from the capital were already a majority of those living in Europe (57%, Table 13.1). Several factors may explain this feature. It may result from a higher exposure to the Western world[9] and also from a greater ability to migrate there. Households in Dakar are wealthier, allowing for more costly migration. Individuals are also more educated, which can enhance their migration project. The centralization of higher education institutions in the capital also makes international migration for study purposes more likely from there than from other parts of the country.[10] Finally, the fact that migrants from Dakar are less oriented towards other African destinations is also linked to the establishment of social networks. Much of the migration to Africa is to neighbouring countries such as Mauritania, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, or Gambia (Table 13.2); these flows are actually local flows within ethnic regions split by national borders a long way from Dakar. Flows to other African countries such as Côte d'Ivoire or Gabon first developed in rural regions, especially the Senegal River Valley, so that most migrants' networks are not located in the capital (Bredeloup 2007). Historically lower than in the rest of the country, migration from the capital city to these African destinations declined in the 1990s (Table 13.4), reflecting changing reception contexts. Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon, hit by economic decline, adopted policies in favour of their own citizens, and a xenophobic social ambience discouraged immigration and even encouraged return (Ba 1997; Blion and Bredeloup 1997).

In contrast, for Senegal as a whole, international migration remained predominantly oriented towards African countries, with the number of Senegalese migrants in Africa being approximately twice the number of those in Western destinations (Table 13.1). However, even at the national level Senegalese migration has become increasingly European over time: in 1960 migrants in Western countries were about 15,000 times less numerous than migrants in Africa, while by 2000 they were "only"

[9] This exposure also results from migrants' investments in the city. Tall (2008) suggests that massive (and thus visible) investments in real estate by migrants located in Europe contributed to the creation of a "culture of migration" that has increased emigration pressures.

[10] According to the 2002 Census, 19% of the recent migrants who left Dakar had gone to study, this proportion being only 10% at the national level (Baizan et al. 2013).

Table 13.4 Top ten destinations from Senegal (1975–2007), by period – 1st migration

1975–1989		1990–1999		2000–2007	
Country	% of migrants	Country	% of migrants	Country	% of migrants
France	29%	France	39%	Italy	24%
Côte d'Ivoire	12%	USA	13%	France	23%
Mauritania	12%	Italy	11%	Spain	12%
Gabon	8%	Côte d'Ivoire	8%	Mauritania	8%
Gambia	6%	Gabon	8%	Tunisia	4%
Mali	5%	Mali	5%	Gambia	4%
Italy	4%	Gambia	4%	USA	4%
USA	4%	Mauritania	3%	Morocco	3%
Morocco	4%	Spain	1%	Guinea	3%
China	3%	Algeria	1%	Saudi Arabia	3%
10 countries	87%	10 countries	94%	10 countries	88%
N	114	N	139	N	199

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Household survey, 2008
Sample includes first migration of heads of households, their spouse(s) and their children, who left at age 18 or over in 1975 or later
Interpretation: 29% of migrants who left Senegal between 1975 and 1989 went first to France
Statistical significance: The percentage of migration to specific countries varies across periods (F-test). France ($p < 0.01$), Italy ($p < 0.001$), Mauritania ($p < 0.001$), USA ($p < 0.001$), Côte d'Ivoire ($p < 0.001$), Spain ($p < 0.001$), Gabon ($p < 0.01$), Gambia ($p > 0.10$), Mali ($p > 0.10$), Morocco ($p > 0.10$)

two times less numerous (Table 13.1). As can be seen in the same table, this dramatic change is not due to the decline in the number of migrants in Africa. It rather reflects the diversification of Senegalese migration and the rise of extra-continental mobility. The devaluation of the CFA franc (which doubled the value of the French franc) probably played a significant role in this renewed attraction of European destinations.

13.3.2 New Destinations in the Western World

As the former metropolis of Senegal, France is the historical destination of Senegalese migrants in Europe. New destinations emerged at the end of the twentieth century, however. Table 13.2 shows that Italy became a major destination in the 1980s, with its number of Senegalese migrants growing from about 4000 in 1980 to more than 40,000 in 1990 (i.e. before the mass regularizations of the 1990s). Figure 13.3 shows both that the Senegalese population continued to grow in Italy in the following decades and that Spain also became a major destination in the 1990s, reaching 34,000 in 2008.

Dakar was at the forefront of this diversification of migration flows to Europe and exemplifies the changed position of France. Table 13.4 presents the trend for the top 10 destinations of migrants reported in the MAFE household survey in Dakar. Until the 1990s, France was by far the top destination, receiving up to 39% of all



Fig. 13.3 Senegalese migrant stocks in France, Italy and Spain

Sources: Reproduced from Mezger (2012). United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD): France 1982, 1990; Spain 1990; Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques: France 1999, 2005, 2007; Istat: Italy 1992–2008; Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigracin a partir de datos suministrados por Ministerio del Interior: Spain 1996–2008
Definition: Senegalese migrants are defined as people born in Senegal

migrants reported as having left in the 1990–1999 period. But over time, Italy surpassed it: attracting only 4% of all migrants in 1975–1989, it was the destination of a quarter of those who left Senegal in the 2000s (24% against 23% for France). The progress of Spain is also striking: absent from the top 10 destinations in 1975–1989, it ranked third after 2000. The first decade of the twenty-first century was also when new destinations outside Africa and Europe emerged, such as Saudi Arabia and the USA (Table 13.4).

This redistribution of migrants' geographical preferences reflects the evolution (alteration, closure or opening) of opportunities in destination areas. In Mediterranean countries, migrants responded to the need for manpower in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The United Stated appear as another good example of an opportunity opening up: the creation in 1990 of the Green Card Lottery, also known as the Diversity Immigrant Visa program, which aims at providing permanent resident visas to natives of countries deemed to have low rates of immigration to the USA, certainly gave some momentum to Senegalese migration to North America (Thomas 2011). In contrast, as explained above, France exemplifies closure in matters of immigration policy.

Interestingly, the timing of the shift in destination rankings in Table 13.4 shows a lag in migrants adjusting their choice of destination to changing immigration rules.[11] While

[11] For details on the methodology used to code policies in the ImPol database and on results interpretation, see Mezger (2012) and Mezger and Gonzalez-Ferrer (2013). Vickstrom (2013, 2014) also provides a very detailed analysis of immigration policies in Spain, Italy and France.



Fig. 13.4 Migration policy trends in France, Italy and Spain (with respect to Senegalese migration)

Source: IMPOL Database – Reproduced from Mezger and Gonzalez-Ferrer (2013)



Variables included in the synthetic indicators:

• **Immigration policy concerning irregular entry/residence:** Readmission agreements signed/in force with Senegal; readmission agreements signed/in force with main transit countries; maximum duration of stay in administrative retention centres; extraordinary regularization (application process ongoing); permanent regularization

• **Short stay entry policy:** Tourist visa exemptions; motivation of visa refusals; economic resources requirements; housing requirements; health insurance requirements

• **Family reunification policy:** Legal protection of family reunification; duration of residence requirements; economic resources requirements; housing requirements; eligibility for family members in the ascending line; prohibition in case of polygamy; sequential reunification possible

• **Policies on entry for study :** Requirements in terms of admission; economic resources; health insurance

• **Work immigration policy :** Restrictions on work immigration (-1: national employment clause; 0: list of occupations, true quotas, or authorization necessary prior to entry; 0: more open conditions); access to the labour market for family members and students (during studies; after studies)

Fig. 13.4 (continued)

the tightening of migration policies in France started in the mid-1970s, it was only in the 1990s that new destinations emerged in Europe and France started to lose rank. At that time, Italy and Spain, the emerging destinations, followed France in its restrictive stance in most areas of migration regulation (Fig. 13.4), and it was only in the following decade that new destinations outside Europe appeared among the top ten destinations.

13.3.3 Network Effects in Europe

The time lag between the imposition of restrictions and a reorientation of destinations may be at least partly due to the pre-existence of social networks in established destinations. In the context of Senegalese migration as well as in other parts of the world (Massey et al. 2001; Liu 2013; Toma and Vause 2014), it is well established that migrants at destination exert a dual influence on would-be migrants. On one hand, migrants abroad contribute to the spread of a culture of migration in sending areas and so tend to arouse migration aspirations. Also, and more importantly regarding destination choices, they can help would-be migrants realize their migration project and integrate into the host society. These network effects are generally supposed to be especially strong in cases where migrants leave behind their close relatives (spouses, children): the right to family reunification, granted in all democracies (though with more or less liberal approaches), is a vector for continuing migration even when policies are restrictive (Boyd 1989). These social mechanisms ensuring continued migration are perceptible in many of the MAFE project's results.

When asked the reasons why they chosen their destination in Europe, 31 to 44% of migrants interviewed in France, Italy and Spain said they had social connections there (Table 13.5). Interestingly, the MAFE data allow us to distinguish different sorts of social ties. Going beyond previous research on networks, Toma and Vause (2014) and Liu (2013) have analyzed how the effects of networks on Senegalese out-migration vary depending on the network source (i.e. whether the connection abroad is a spouse, a former co-resident, a friend or a relative from the extended family). Network effects are gendered. Friendship appears to be more effective in stimulating male migration, while female migration is more driven by spousal relationships (Table 13.6). However, this does not mean that all migrants in Europe reunify. On the contrary, Senegalese migrants in Europe tend to live apart from their spouses and children for long periods (González-Ferrer et al. 2012; Baizán et al. 2014; Beauchemin et al. 2014).[12] In fact, transnational family arrangements are quite common among Senegalese migrants, even more than among other African groups (see Chaps. 6 and 15).

[12] In line with the view that reunification did not become a major channel of entry among Senegalese migrants, Toma and Vause (2013) have shown that the likelihood of female migration increased very moderately over time.

Table 13.5 Motives of choice of destination among migrants currently living in France, Italy and Spain first migration (long stay) after age 18 (1975–2007) – % of migrants

	Country			Gender	
	France	Italy	Spain	Male	Female
Work	9	34	38	30	9
Family/friends	40	44	31	33	54
Studies	7	0	0	3	3
Transit	1	0	3	1	0
Facility/papers	10	6	11	10	7
Language	14	0	2	13	7
Qualities of country	11	11	12	4	13
Others	10	5	4	6	6
N	184	197	191	314	258

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic survey in Europe, 2008
Population: Sample includes all migrants still living in France, Italy or Spain at the time of the survey. All migrants left Senegal at age 18 or over in 1975 or later
Note: Weighted percentages, unweighted numbers
Interpretation: 9% of migrants in France declared the choice of their 1st destination was grounded in a work motive
Statistical significance: differences between countries are significant (Design-based F-test: $p < 0.001$); Differences by gender are statistically significant for each country and for the three countries together (F-test, $p < 0.01$)

Migrants' network configurations vary by destination country. MAFE results show, unsurprisingly, that the younger the history of Senegalese immigration in a given country, the weaker the social ties of new migrants in that country. Half of the Senegalese people who arrived in Spain, the newest destination country, knew nobody before migrating there. That proportion is significantly lower in older destinations such as Italy and, even more so, France (Table 13.6).[13] Friendship[14] appears as the commonest type of social connection for migrants arriving in Italy, which is an intermediary destination in terms of migration history (neither the oldest destination nor the newest). And migrants with strong ties (a spouse and/or other relatives) are more than five times more numerous in France, the historical destination, than in Spain or Italy (Table 13.6).

The role of family reunification in the persistence of migration to France appears also in the motives for migration: overall, between 1975 and 2007, 29% of migrants arriving for the first time in France declared they came for family reasons, against

[13] Note that this type of pioneer migration is largely but not exclusively a male experience: 41% of male migrants in Europe declared they knew nobody, against 20% among women (Table 13.6). For a discussion of the autonomy of female migration, see Toma and Vause (2013). Migrants with primary education or none at all are also more likely to be pioneers (i.e. to know nobody at destination) than those who are more educated (43% against 29%), the latter relying more on kinship (siblings: 26% against 17%; other kin: 22% against 15%).

[14] Here friendship also probably refers to religious networks, which are especially important in Senegalese migration, especially among migrants from the Murid brotherhood (Ebin 1993; Bava 2003; Tall 2007; Gabrielli 2011).

Table 13.6 Contacts in destination country prior to first arrival on migration to France, Italy and Spain (1975–2007), % of migrants currently living in these countries

	Country			Gender	
Contact in destination country	France	Italy	Spain	Male	Female
Nobody	26	36	51	41	20
Spouse/partner	28	8	7	4	48
Child/children	3	0	0	0	4
Mother/father	5	1	3	3	3
Brother/sister	27	19	16	21	24
Other parents	24	14	16	18	20
Friend	15	35	11	24	10
Other people	3	0	0	0	3
N	185	199	199	318	265

Source and Population: see Table 13.5
Note: Weighted percentages, unweighted numbers. The sum of percentages may be greater than 100% because respondents could mention several types of contact in the destination country
Interpretation: 26% of migrants in France declared they knew nobody when they first arrived in France

only 13% and 6% respectively in Italy and Spain (Table 13.7).[15] France's particular status for family migration also appears in its overrepresentation of migrants moving with children: they amount to 10% in France, five times the percentage in the two new Mediterranean destinations (Table 13.8).[16] Student migration is another particularity of France as a destination country: 21% of Senegalese migrants in the former metropolis declared they migrated to study, whereas this motive is barely cited in Spain or Italy (Table 13.7). In this regard, social networks may play a role, but institutional factors are of tremendous importance: in Senegal, formal education is given in French and the education system is modelled on the French one. As a result, it is easier for Senegalese students to have their diplomas recognized in France than in other countries. Conversely, diplomas obtained in France are certainly better recognized back in Senegal than those from Spain or Italy. The role of language in the choice of destination is illustrated in Table 13.5.

Social networks also influence the routes migrants follow to reach Europe: trajectories are more likely to be direct when migrants have social connections at destination, and indirect when they don't. This hypothesis is supported by the MAFE data. Migrants in France, the country with the largest Senegalese community, arrived without transiting through another country much more often than migrants who headed to Italy and Spain (79%, against 69% and 64%, Table 13.9). It could be argued that this result reflects the fact that migrants in Spain and Italy more often entered as undocumented migrants and for that reason took complex routes through

[15] As in many other contexts, family migration is a strongly gendered phenomenon: among the Senegalese interviewed in Europe, 42% of women declared family as a motive for migration, while the proportion was only 6% among men (Table 13.7).

[16] This type of migration is also highly gendered: 19% of female migrants in Europe travelled with a child or children, compared to 0% of male migrants (Table 13.8).

Table 13.7 Motives for migrating to France, Italy and Spain (1975–2007) among migrants currently living in these countries – % of migrants

	Country			Gender	
Motives[a]	France	Italy	Spain	Male	Female
Work/living conditions	40	81	69	83	41
Family	29	6	13	6	42
Studies	21	1	0	13	17
Other	10	12	18	2	7
N	186	198	190	480	216

Source and Population: See Table 13.5
Note: Weighted percentages, unweighted numbers. The sum of percentages may be greater than 100% because several motives could be mentioned
[a]Illustration of most frequent migration motives: Work/living conditions: Looking for work, found a job, business matters, wages too low, find a better life, economic problems, etc . – Work/living conditions: Looking for work, found a job, business matters, wages too low, find a better life, economic problems , etc. – Family: Marriage, join spouse, join another family member, divorce, etc. – Family: Marriage, join spouse, join another family member, divorce, etc. – Studies: To study, internship – Other: Health reasons, political reasons, adventure, etc.
Statistical significance: Differences in motives between countries are significant (Design-based F-test: $p < 0.001$). Differences in percentages across gender were tested for each motive. Differences are statistically significant for work ($p < 0.01$), family ($p < 0.01$), studies ($p < 0.05$) and Other ($p < 0.05$)

Table 13.8 Co-travellers on the journey to the MAFE countries (first arrival), % of migrants currently living in these countries, by gender and country

	Country			Gender	
Co-traveller at some point during the journey	France	Italy	Spain	Male	Female
Alone during the whole travel	72	68	65	73	60
Spouse	3	2	0	1	5
Children	10	2	2	0	19
Other parents	6	6	7	4	3
Friend	4	17	24	15	3
Group (official, sport, music)	3	0	0	0	1
Smuggler	3	9	11	8	3
Other people	6	2	3	2	4
N	185	199	199	320	265

Source and Population: See Table 13.5
Note: Weighted percentages, unweighted numbers. The sum of percentages may be greater than 100% because several types of co-traveller could be mentioned
Statistical significance: For each type of co-traveller, differences were tested across countries (Design-based F-test)
Alone (ns); Spouse ($p < 0.10$); Children ($p < 0.001$); other parents (ns); friend ($p < 0.001$); group ($p < 0.10$); smuggler (ns); other people (ns). Differences in percentages across genders are significant for all categories (Design based F-test, $p > 0.1$)

Table 13.9 Top five migration routes from Senegal to France, Italy and Spain (1975–2007), % of migrants

		Men	Women	All
Trajectory from Senegal to France	Senegal-France	75	85	79
	Senegal-Spain-France	4	4	4
	Senegal-Morocco-France	3	2	3
	Senegal-Maurit.-France	0	3	2
	Senegal-Mali-France	1	1	1
	N	99	86	185
Trajectory from Senegal to Italy	Senegal-Italy	66	90	69
	Senegal-France-Italy	16	6	15
	Senegal-Spain-Italy	4	3	4
	Senegal-Spain-France-Italy	3	0	3
	Senegal- Belgium-Italy	2	0	2
	N	121	78	199
Trajectory from Senegal to Spain	Senegal-Spain	60	86	64
	Senegal-Morocco-Spain	10	2	9
	Senegal-Italy-Spain	5	0	4
	Senegal-France-Spain	3	6	3
	Senegal-Italy-France-Spain	3	0	3
	N	98	101	199

Data: MAFE Senegal, Biographic Survey in Europe, 2008
Population: Sample includes short and long stays outside Senegal (for settlement or transit) before the first long stay in country, at age 18 or over (after 1975), among migrants still living in host country at the time of the survey
Note: Weighted percentages, unweighted numbers. Five most frequent categories are represented

transit countries in Africa (9% to 11% of them declared having travelled with a smuggler, as against 3% of migrants to France, Table 13.8; see also Sect. 13.4). However, although it is often believed that transit countries are only located in African countries (Castagnone 2011), it is interesting to note that France is also a transit country for migrants heading to Southern Europe: 15% of the Senegalese migrants in Italy entered Europe through France, the proportion being much lower in Spain (3%, Table 13.9). The interpretation is easy: when France became inhospitable to Sub-Saharan migrants, they continued to enter Europe through their former metropolis where they had social connections and then moved on to more open destinations. Importantly, few migrants arrived in France after a transit in Italy or Spain: only 4% came there after a stay in Spain, and Italy does not even appear among the top five routes to France.[17] This means that, at least until the time of our survey, Southern European countries had not become mere gateways to other, more restrictive, countries of the free-movement Shengen area: they were real destinations and not merely transit countries, because they were the places where migrants

[17] These percentages were computed for the whole 1975–2007 period and so also reflect the migration routes observed in the more recent period (2000–2007), when Spain and Italy became more significant destinations of Senegalese migrants.

could find work (barely cited for France, work is a major motive for migration to Spain and Italy – see Table 13.5). Fears expressed by other European governments (especially in France) that massive regularization programs in Spain and Italy[18] would lead afterwards to the spread of migrants into the rest of the EU is not verified as far as Senegalese migrants are concerned. Migrants' answers about the reasons for their choice of destination suggest the same (Table 13.5): the facility of obtaining papers (i.e. a legal status in the host country) is not cited more often in countries were mass regularization programs were implemented (Spain and Italy) than in France where regularization has been more parsimonious.[19]

13.4 Frustrated Desires of Migration

Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, media coverage and political discourse on the "new", "growing", "mass" migration of desperate Africans to the El Dorado of Europe prompted experts to investigate irregular migration. The resulting studies suggest that, in response to more restrictive policies, routes have shifted, diversified and become more complex, with the "help" of the smuggling industry (Ba and Ndiaye 2008; Bredeloup and Pliez 2005; de Haas 2008). Because irregular migration is, by definition, invisible in official statistics, most of this research relies on qualitative data. By contrast, one of the contributions of the MAFE project is to provide quantitative insights on these aspects of migration, which are usually overlooked.

The objective of this section is to study two aspects of what we call the "frustrated desires of migration". The first relates to uncompleted international migration projects captured through the practical steps that would-be migrants have undertaken without managing to actually leave Senegal for the country they targeted (at least until the time of the survey). The second aspect relates to the experience of migrants who entered illegally and/or became irregular migrants in Europe. The MAFE data provides very little information on a third aspect of "frustrated desires of migration", i.e. the experience of those who have been deported from Europe. We only know that migrants who declared "problems with papers" in Europe as a motive for return were a minority (see Sect. 13.2.3). Unfortunately, the biographic MAFE data are also short on information about the experience of migrants who actually departed from Senegal but could not enter Europe, having either remained stuck in transit countries[20] or died on the way (Carling 2007).

[18] These fears were notably expressed during the preparation of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (2008).

[19] On regularization numbers, see note 4.

[20] Because of the way the samples were constructed, migrants who were in transit countries (for instance in Morocco) at the time of the survey are absent from the biographic MAFE survey. The Senegalese sample may include returnees who have failed in their journey to Europe (e.g. migrants who went to Morocco, stayed there, were unable to cross the sea and finally returned to Senegal).

13.4.1 Aspiring Migrants: Now or Never

A module of the MAFE biographic questionnaire was dedicated to migration "attempts", as the questionnaire called them. Rather than registering attempts to physically cross border(s), the module registered practical steps that would-be migrants had undertaken with the intention of moving out of Senegal. Such steps include saving money and asking for or obtaining the necessary travel documents such as passports, visas, accommodation certificates, registration at a university, authorization to leave,[21] etc. (Table 13.10). In short, the MAFE survey registered situation beyond mere intentions to move but short of actual migration attempts. With these data we can identify candidates for migration, "adding some objectivity to the measure of migration intention" (Mezger 2012).

One striking result is a surge, at the turn of the twenty-first century in the Dakar region, in the probability of undertaking steps towards migration: while in the 1970s and '80s only one Senegalese in ten took such steps, during the 2000s one Senegalese in three started trying to fulfil the conditions to leave (Fig. 13.5). Since the question is retrospective, the proportions may be underestimated, especially for attempts that did not get far. Be this as it may, this trend is largely driven by aspirations to migrate to Europe: more than a quarter of the capital city population aged 18–40 took some kind of steps to prepare a departure towards Europe in the 2000s (Fig. 13.5). In line with images conveyed by media at that time, Spain was then the first target of would-be migrants, followed by France and Italy (Table 13.11). In the same period,

Table 13.10 Steps taken for emigration by would-be migrants in Dakar, by destination (1975–2007)

	Africa	Europe	Other
Documents (asked for and/or obtained)	(14)	29	47
Green card lottery	(0)	1	22
University registration/scholarship (asked for and/or obtained))	(0)	5	14
Guarantee of care and provision (asked for and/or obtained)	(8)	25	19
Saved money	(49)	34	18
Other	(4)	15	24
N	11	128	42

% of the population living in Dakar
Source: MAFE-Senegal, biographic survey in Senegal
Population: Sample includes people currently living in Senegal (regardless of their migration status), who were born in Senegal (attempts from 1975 onward)
Note: Weighted percentages, Unweighted numbers. Percentages computed for numbers lower than 30 are in brackets. The sum of percentages may be greater or less than 100%. Several steps can be mentioned or no steps may be mentioned in some cases
Statistical significance: Differences in percentages across regions were tested for each category (F-test). University registration ($p < 0.10$), guarantee ($p > 0.10$), documents ($p < 0.10$), saved money ($p > 0.10$), Green card ($p < 0.01$), Other ($p > 0.10$)

Numbers are likely to be tiny. These cases could however be investigated in future research.

[21] The need to obtain a permit to leave the country was abolished only in 1981.



Fig. 13.5 Lifetime probability of taking steps towards migration (between ages 18 and 40) from Senegal, by period (1975–2007)

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic survey in Senegal, 2008
Population: sample includes persons aged 18 to 40 living in Senegal at the time of the survey
Interpretation: Lifetime probability indicates the likelihood of taking at least one step towards emigration in one's lifetime, if the rate of steps taken by same age group for the period remains constant

Table 13.11 Top five destinations of migration steps taken in Senegal (1975–2007), by period

1975–1989		1990–1999		2000–2007		1975–2007	
Country	% of steps	Country	% of steps	Country	% of steps	Country	% of steps
Italy	(33)	France	26	Spain	28	France	25
France	(33)	Spain	19	France	23	Spain	23
USA	(10)	Italy	18	Italy	16	Italy	18
Spain	(3)	USA	18	USA	11	USA	12
Germany	(2)	Germany	2	Germany	5	Germany	4
N	15		44		121		180

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic survey in Senegal, 2008
Population: sample includes individuals aged 18 and over living in Senegal at the time of the survey and who had taken steps towards migrating from Senegal
Statistical significance: Percentages computed for numbers lower than 30 are in brackets. Migration steps to specific countries vary across periods (F-test). France ($p > 0.10$), Italy ($p > 0.10$), USA ($p > 0.10$), Spain ($p < 0.05$), Germany ($p > 0.10$)

other destinations also started to be popular, especially the United States (Fig. 13.5 and Table 13.11), which started their diversity programme (also known as the Green card lottery) in 1990 and became a desirable destination for students (Table 13.10).

On the contrary, steps taken to migrate to other African countries did not take off and remained remarkably low (Fig. 13.5). Whatever the period since 1975, Africa is absent from the top five destinations (Table 13.11). This reflects the fact that migrating to Africa is much less costly both in terms of money and administrative procedures than migrating to Europe (or other destinations such as the US). Thanks to loose border controls (especially within West Africa), would-be migrants do not have to take many administrative steps before they can actually migrate. As a result, saving money is the main concern for those who aim to move within Africa (Table 13.10). The fact that trends in steps towards migration and actual migration to Africa are equally flat (Fig. 13.1 and Fig. 13.5) reflects the fact that the cost of intra-continental migration remained constant over time.

By contrast, the sharp increase in the probability of taking steps to move to Europe (Fig. 13.5), while actual migration remained stable (Fig. 13.1),[22] mirrors the rising cost of immigration to this part of the world. As immigration policies became more restrictive, would-be migrants had to take more and more steps to prepare for their (potential) departure. The surge in steps taken towards migrating to Europe could also partly signal a "now or never" logic whereby, in contexts of growing restrictions, would-be migrants accelerate their migration project to avoid the even stiffer policy measures that might arise in the future. In such contexts, even people with very vague migration projects may be tempted to take steps towards migration. This process was conceptualized by de Haas as an unintended "inter-temporal substitution effect" of restrictive policies (de Haas 2011). Mezger's longitudinal and multivariate analysis (2012, Chap. 3) of the determinants of attempts (i.e. steps to migration) suggests that such an effect is at play concerning Senegalese migration to Europe. She shows that fewer restrictions in policies to combat illegal immigration in France, Italy and Spain (as measured in the ImPol database (see Fig. 13.4)) tend to diminish the probability of taking steps to out-migrate to Europe. Apparently paradoxical but already observed in the context of illegal Mexican migration (Massey and Espinosa 1997), this result actually suggests that when policies are getting more restrictive would-be migrants react by making greater efforts to migrate, in anticipation of even stricter policies in the future.

[22] Trends have been computed using different sources. Figure 13.1 (actual migration) is based on a sub-sample of the household data (children of households heads in Dakar), whereas Figure 13.5 (steps to migration) is based on the biographic data collected among all individuals in Dakar. As they refer to the same periods, the same place (Dakar) and the same destinations, we believe that a comparison between these trends is acceptable.

13.4.2 Irregular Migration

In addition to the three substitution effects already mentioned in this chapter as being able to limit the effectiveness of restrictive migration policies (spatial, reverse-flow and inter-temporal), de Haas (2011) also hypothesizes a "categorical substitution" effect, whereby entry channels that become subject to growing restrictions are replaced by other channel(s). The growth in undocumented migration could be related to this kind of substitution effect, with irregular migration at least partly replacing regular migration. This hypothesis is in line with Vickstrom's theory (2014) that "irregularity is legally produced by immigration policies". His empirical analysis of laws, specifically in connection with Senegalese immigration in France, Italy and Spain, reminds us, for instance, that entering these countries *without* a visa was the legal norm until 1986 in France and 1990 in Italy. Before these dates, illegal entry was a non-existent concept: Senegalese migrants could enter Europe without any restriction (i.e. without having to apply for a visa prior to departure) and, in practice, were expected to regularize their administrative situation after finding a job (Vickstrom 2014).

The introduction of visa requirements prompted Senegalese migrants to adapt in two ways. Some were able to obtain the proper documents to migrate, thanks to various resources they could mobilize (such as networks at destination able to provide guarantees (see Sect. 13.4.1). Unable to obtain a visa, others maintained their migration project, taking a route that avoided border control points in Europe and using smuggler services. Figure 13.6 shows how the percentage of migrants who travelled with a smuggler increased at the turn of the twenty-first century, when visas started to be required, from zero before 1990 to 8% in France, 11% in Spain and 17% in Italy after 2000. Table 13.12, showing the transport means used by migrants, provides an indirect measure of irregular migration. Although crossing by boat is not a totally new phenomenon among Senegalese migrants (see the historical role of seamen in Sect. 13.2.1), it took new forms and a new order of magnitude in the early twenty-first century when migrants started to use *pateras* and pirogues to reach the Spanish coasts, especially the Canary Islands. Among Senegalese migrants who entered Spain between 2000 and 2007, up to a third used such a boat in his or her journey to Europe (Table 13.12).[23] Despite its significance in Spain during this particular period, it is important to keep in mind that the vast majority of migrants travelled by plane: 97% of migrants in France in 2000–2007, 79% in Italy and still 70% in Spain (Table 13.12).[24] That most migrants enter legally is confirmed by estimates in other studies (Triandafyllidou 2010).

[23] This figure only concerns those who were actually able to immigrate to Spain: those who were apprehended and whose entry was refused are not counted here. Numbers of aliens refused in European countries (aggregates of all origin groups) can be consulted online in the MAFE Contextual Database.

[24] Plane was especially predominant among women: 97% of them used a plane, against 81% among men (all countries and periods combined). By contrast, the use of pirogues or pateras is almost exclusive to male migrants (10% against 1% for women). Means of transport also vary by educa-



Fig. 13.6 Percentage of migrants who travelled with smugglers at some point on their journey to the MAFE countries (first arrival), among migrants currently living in these countries, by period of first arrival and by country

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic survey in Europe, 2008
Population: Sample includes all migrants still living in France, Italy or Spain at the time of the survey. All migrants left Senegal at age 18 or over in 1975 or later
Note: Weighted percentages, 90% confidence intervals

Entering legally does not completely protect people from experiencing periods of irregularity, as there are "multiple paths into irregularity" (Vickstrom 2014): migrants may enter with a visa and remain in Europe after it has expired, thus becoming "overstayers"; others may experience "befallen irregularity" when their residence permit is not renewed.[25] Overstaying is quite a common path to irregularity. Vickstrom's multivariate analysis of the factors associated with the different pathways into irregularity has even shown that entering Italy or Spain with a visa is actually a strong predictor of irregularity.

Generally speaking, irregularity[26] was much more common in Spain and Italy than in France: between 1975 and 2007, up to 49% of Senegalese immigrants in Spain had no residence permit during their first year of stay, compared to 38% in

tion, with the more educated (secondary or higher education) being more likely to use a plane (94% against 75% for those with primary education or none at all) and less likely to use a pirogue or patera (1% against 16%).

[25] For further explanation of the institutional conditions explaining this type of change in administrative status, see Vickstrom (2014).

[26] In the rest of this section "irregular migrant", "irregularity" etc. should be taken to refer to those whose status had been irregular status at some point during their first year in the destination country.

Table 13.12 Means of transport used at least once on the journey to the current country of residence in the MAFE countries (first arrival), among those still in the country, by period of arrival

		Period of first arrival in country			Significance	All
Current residence	Means of transport used at least once during the journey	1975–1989	1990–1999	2000–2007	Difference across periods (F-test)	1975–2007
France	Plane	96	97	97	Ns	96
	Bus/train	5	12	9	P < 0.10	7
	Car	9	6	9	Ns	8
	Boat	4	4	0	Ns	3
	Pirogue/Pateras	0	2	2	Ns	1
	N	55	56	74		185
Italy	Plane	64	82	79	p < 0.10	78
	Bus/train	27	30	26	Ns	27
	Car	4	11	7	Ns	8
	Boat	22	12	11	Ns	13
	Pirogue/Pateras	5	2	3	Ns	3
	N	28	78	93		199
Spain	Plane	100	86	70	p < 0.01	75
	Bus/train	21	17	17	Ns	17
	Car	8	13	0	p < 0.01	3
	Boat	0	13	5	p < 0.10	6
	Pirogue/Pateras	0	4	33	p < 0.01	24
	N	19	68	112		199

% of migrants
Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic Survey in Europe, 2008
Population: Sample refers to the first long stay in country, at age 18 or over (after 1975) among migrants still living in France, Italy or Spain
Definition: Means of transportation include all means cited at least once during the journey from Senegal to the current country of residence (first arrival). Means of transport used to reach intermediate countries (for short or long stays) are also included
Interpretation: The sum of percentages may be greater or less than 100%. Several means can be mentioned in some cases
Statistical significance: Differences across periods in each country are reported in column 6. Differences in percentages across countries were tested for each means of transport for the "all" column (F-test). Plane ($p < 0.01$), Bus/train ($p < 0.01$), Car (ns, $p = 0.22$), Boat ($p < 0.01$), Pirogue/pateras ($p < 0.01$)

Italy and only 7% in France (Table 13.13).[27] The proximity of Spain and Italy with the African continent facilitates illegal entry, but this is not the only reason. Irregularity is also linked to the structure of the national economy in these countries. Since residence permits can only be obtained by migrants who can produce a work contract, the high level of informality in the job market is part of the explanation

[27] On average, 30% of Senegalese migrants in France, Italy and Spain were "irregular", with higher proportions among men (37% against 12% among women) and the less educated (38% among those with primary education or less, against 24% for those with higher education).

Table 13.13 Legal status during the first year in France, Italy and Spain (1975–2007) % of migrants currently living in these countries, by period

		Period of arrival			
Current residence	Previous country	1975–1989	1990–1999	2000–2007	1975–2007
France	Residence permit	69	93	88	8
	No residence permit	14	2	10	9
	No residence permit needed	14	6	1	7
	Unknown	3	0	0	1
	N	55	56	74	185
Italy	Residence permit	39	60	56	55
	No residence permit	40	32	42	38
	No residence permit needed	21	4	0	5
	Unknown	0	3	2	2
	N	28	78	93	199
Spain	Residence permit	57	66	42	49
	No residence permit	34	29	57	49
	No residence permit needed	4	1	0	1
	Unknown	5	4	1	1
	N	19	68	112	199
Three countries	Residence permit	61	75	61	65
	No residence permit	22	19	38	28
	No residence permit needed	15	4	0	5
	Unknown	3	2	1	2
	N	102	202	279	583

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic Survey in Europe
Population: Sample refers to migrants who arrived after 1975 in Europe at age 18 or over and were still living in France, Italy or Spain at the time of the survey
Definition: Legal status is defined by the type of residence permit during the first year. No residence permit means the person has declared that at some point during the first year, he/she did not have a residence permit. A person may have had a visa that expired, and be classified in "no residence permit". "No residence permit" in the first year is not synonymous with illegal border-crossing
Statistical significance (Design-based F-tests): for the three countries together, differences by period are significant ($p < 0.01$). Differences across periods are significant in France ($p < 0.01$), in Italy ($p < 0.01$) and in Spain ($p < 0.05$)

(Vickstrom 2014). The length of Senegalese migration history in destination countries is also an explanatory factor: the pre-existence of a significant Senegalese community in France when more restrictive policies were implemented made it more likely that regular immigration would continue in the form of family reunification, a classic phenomenon that can also be considered a "categorical substitution" effect.

Although similar in their levels of irregular immigration compared to France, Spain and Italy differ in the characteristics of their undocumented migrants. The

Table 13.14 Means of transport used at least once on the journey to Spain and Italy (first arrival) % of "irregular migrants" (during the first year after arrival)

Means of transport used at least once during the journey	Italy	Spain
Plane	69	53
Bus/train	39	20
Car	13	1
Boat	16	8
Pirogue/pateras	8	50
N	63	73

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic surveys in Spain and Italy
Population: Migrants living in Spain and Italy at the time of the survey who had no stay permit during their first year of stay in these countries. Sample includes short and long stays outside Senegal (for installation or transit) before the first long stay in country, at age 18 or over (after 1975) among migrants still living in the country
Definitions: "Irregular migrants" are those who declared they had no residence permit at some point during the year of their arrival. France is not included because of the small number of irregular migrants (N = 17). – Means of transport include all means used at least once during the journey from Senegal to their current country of residence (first arrival). Means of transport used to reach intermediate countries (for short or long stays) are also included

Table 13.15 Top five routes of "irregular migrants" from Senegal to Italy and Spain (1975–2007)

Senegal to Italy		Senegal to Spain	
…-Italy	64	…-Spain	63
…- France-Italy	21	…-Morocco-Spain	11
…-Spain-Italy	2	…-France-Spain	4
…-Morocco-Spain--Italy	2	…-Gambia-Spain	4
…- Belgium-Italy	2	…-Gambia-Mauritania-Spain	4
N	69	N	74

% of "irregular migrants"
Source, Population, Definitions: see Table 13.14 (Total Ns are different because of missing values)
Note: Only the five most frequent categories for the whole period are represented

means of transport used by irregular migrants suggest that overstayers are more frequent in Italy than in Spain: those flying at least part of the way by plane and so subject to border control amount to 69% of the total in Italy and 53% in Spain (Table 13.14). On the other hand, irregular migrants crossing by sea at some point on their journey, whatever the type of boat, amount to 58% in Spain and only 24% in Italy (Table 13.14). That illegal border crossing was more common in Spain than in Italy is also reflected in migrants' itineraries. Routes involve African countries (other than Senegal) much more frequently among migrants in Spain than among their counterparts in Italy, for which intra-European mobility is more common (Table 13.15).

Senegalese irregular migrants in Italy more commonly entered Europe through countries where they had social connections to help them migrate, such as France or (to a lesser extent) Belgium, before moving south and becoming overstayers.

13.5 Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to analyze the changing patterns of Senegalese migration since 1975, i.e. since migrants began to be confronted with increasingly restrictive immigration policies in Europe and also, more recently, at a time when Senegalese were increasingly perceived as a vast flow of unwanted migrants sneaking illegally into Europe. Our results on departure trends have clearly shown that migration out of Senegal has not greatly increased since 1975 in relative terms. It is true that numbers of Senegalese migrants around the world have grown significantly over time, but as the population of Senegal also grew at the same time, the propensity to out-migrate remained constant. Even though Senegalese migration remains predominantly intra-continental, Europe has increasingly become an objective over recent decades. Western destinations are over-represented in Dakar compared to other parts of the country. In short, between 1975 and 2008, while France (the historic destination of Senegalese migrants outside Africa) officially decided to limit immigration, there was neither a surge in out-migration (contrary to the widespread belief in an African invasion of Europe) nor the decline that might have been expected if restrictions had been effective.

In fact the MAFE results tend in many ways to support the hypothesis that the effectiveness of restrictive policies is hampered by a series of "substitution effects" (de Haas 2011).

1. The decline in return intentions coupled with the fact that intentions became less predictive of actual return signals a "reverse-flow substitution" effect, whereby immigration restrictions actually discourage return migration and so weaken the impact of the new restrictions on net migration. This effect is not compensated for by managed returns.
2. The changing geography of Senegalese destinations in Europe also attests to a "spatial substitution" effect: exposed to restrictive measures (implemented in times of economic recession), migrants head to new destinations with better economic opportunities and more open migration policies. MAFE results show that this reorientation happens with some lag, as social networks tend to insure the continuance of migration to former destinations, which can act as redistribution places; for instance, with France serving as a transit country for Senegalese migrants heading to Italy. The timing of Senegalese immigration to Spain and Italy also suggests that migrants were not primarily attracted by the generous regularization programs they implemented in the 1990s and 2000s (when the Senegalese communities had already significantly grown in these countries), but rather by the call for manpower.

3. Another reason for the continuance of migration to Europe concerns two kinds of "categorical substitution" effects, whereby entry channels subject to restrictions are replaced by new ones. One, already quite well documented in the literature, concerns family reunification, which developed as a new channel of entry for Senegalese migrants when labour migration was stopped in France. The other "categorical substitution" effect observed in this chapter concerns the development of irregular migration in place of regular migration, when visas were introduced. The migrants' trajectories registered in the MAFE data were especially useful in showing the diversity of the pathways into irregularity and the inefficiency of border controls for preventing irregularity. Both kinds of channel substitution entail ripple effects, in that they tend to decrease return migration and thus to fuel the above mentioned "reverse-flow substitution" effect. On the one hand, family reunification is a factor for migrant settlement at destination (see Chap. 4). On the other hand, irregularity often encourages migrants to delay returning home (Flahaux et al. 2014; Vickstrom 2014).
4. Finally, the trend towards ever more restrictive policies in all European countries creates an "inter-temporal substitution" effect, whereby would-be migrants anticipate further restrictions and increasing costs of migration and so accelerate their migration project. The sharp increase in steps towards migration taken by people living in Dakar at a time of growing restrictions is an indication of this substitution effect. During the same period, the development of a culture of migration among Senegalese youth, in which travelling to Europe became a sort of initiation rite including painful ordeals (as illustrated by the popular motto "Barça ou Barszakh" which could be translated in "Barcelona or Die"), also indicates that more restrictions lead to more migration aspirations.

The results presented in this chapter cannot be considered a rigorous assessment of migration policies. They do however converge very firmly towards the idea that the increasingly restrictive policies in Europe were met with a stream of unintended effects. Lastly, the fact that Europe was not invaded by hordes of African migrants when its borders were open, i.e. when entering Europe was not conditional on prior possession of a visa, also questions the rationale for strict border control.

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Chapter 14
Migrants' Economic Participation in Origin and Destination Countries: The Case of Senegal

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14.1 Introduction

Labour migration is a longstanding concern both for destination countries, which are confronted with growing labour shortages and the challenge of migrants' integration in the receiving society, and for sending countries, which see their migrants as potential agents of development.

However, as argued in Chap. 5, when looking at migrants' labour outcomes at destination, current research tends to focus either on single life course events or states (e.g. finding employment, being employed, etc.) or on summary performance measures, mainly taking a cross-sectional approach. Occupational outcomes are

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seldom considered from a longitudinal and transnational perspective (Lubotsky 2007; Duleep and Dowhan 2008), i.e. considering long-term occupational outcomes and looking at labour trajectories before leaving, during migration and upon return. Even more rarely have such longitudinal studies taken a comparative approach, though this is important for disentangling specific features of employment performance that may help to explain differences in immigrant labour market outcomes across EU countries.

A longitudinal, transnational, comparative approach is crucial if we are to have a full picture of the migration process and of long-term labour trajectories and understand why we find different migrant profiles in different destinations in Europe, how they integrate in different contexts and how they eventually re-integrate in their origin country if they return permanently.

Migrants have been increasingly discussed as potential agents of development, contributing to their communities of origin either while abroad or as returnees bringing back their skills and knowledge (Black and King 2004; Van Hear and Sørensen 2003; Sjenitzer and Tiemoko 2003; Beine et al. 2013). However, the literature and policies on migration and development that have proliferated in the last decade have almost overlooked how migrants' transnational economic behaviour and eventual re-settlement in their origin country relate to their level of integration in the receiving countries.

The aim of this chapter is to explore the labour trajectories of Senegalese migrants in Spain, Italy and France, and of returnees in Senegal, looking at different stages in the migration process and considering migrants' occupational situations before leaving, on arrival in Europe, while living there and upon return. This chapter will also consider how different patterns of transnational engagement with the origin country relate to economic and legal integration at destination.

After a brief overview of the economic, institutional and political frameworks in France, Italy and Spain as receiving countries, the first part of the chapter focuses on the profiles of Senegalese migrants in each of these countries, looking at the skills composition of the Senegalese community surveyed there and their labour trajectories across the first ten years of stay in Europe, comparing their outcomes by host country and by gender.

The second part explores migrants' economic contribution to their country of origin during their stay abroad, focusing particularly on individual investments, the sending of remittances and contributions to diaspora associations. The aim here is to see how these different forms of transnational engagement change over time according to migrants' gender, education and occupational and legal integration in the host countries.

In the third part, after profiling returnees' characteristics, the chapter will look at their labour outcomes in the Senegalese employment market, comparing their outcomes retrospectively before migrating, before returning, upon return to Senegal and at the time of the survey. Their occupational performance and living conditions will be compared with those who did not migrate. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn from the results of the analyses.

14.2 France, Italy and Spain as Labour Migration Receiving Countries

European countries differ widely in their patterns of migrant worker inflow in terms of national origin, timing and magnitude. Migrants' economic integration outcomes are closely tied to labour market structure and immigration law and regulations in each host country.

Among the three European receiving countries selected, France can be considered a "mature" or "old" migration country in North-Western Europe, while Spain and Italy are "new" immigration countries in southern Europe.

Migration into France has been strongly influenced by its colonial legacy. It is also the Western European country with the longest tradition of recruiting permanent foreign workers. France started bringing in migrant workers in the nineteenth century, when industrialisation and population decline had led to labour shortages. At the beginning of the 1930s, France was second only to the USA as a migrant receiving country in terms of absolute numbers. During the immediate post-war reconstruction period and subsequent economic growth, the French public authorities pursued an active recruitment policy to attract a foreign workforce – mainly male workers from other European countries and former colonies in Africa. As well as citizens of the former colonies, France also received returning settlers, soldiers and civil servants over the course of the decolonisation process (Peixoto et al. 2012).

Later, in response to the economic crisis of the early 1970s and following the example of other European countries, in 1974 France stopped all recruitment programmes for foreign workers and introduced external and internal controls (visas and residence permits). As a result, inflows of foreign non-seasonal workers dropped dramatically. Seasonal labour migration continued and remained significant until at least the early 1990s, with 64,200 seasonal workers entering between 1981 and 1987. Family members of migrants residing in France accounted for an increasingly substantial proportion of new migrants. By the early 1990s these were the largest category (Devitt 2012: 6), family reunification becoming the main channel for immigration.

Although most migrants employed in the French labour market today have not come through the direct labour immigration channel, France has never stopped being a country of labour immigration. A huge proportion of migrants who enter France through family reunification or other non-labour channels participate in the labour market and are thus, indirectly, migrant workers (Devitt 2012). In addition, the vast majority of immigrants who use the official labour immigration channels were already residents in France before being issued a work permit, many of them being foreign graduates of French universities.

Spain and Italy, on the other hand, share some traits as more recent, southern European destinations for migrants. Becoming host countries and labour importers more recently, they have recorded the highest growth rates in this regard in the last decade. While the foreign population increased by 34.1% on average in Europe between 2000 and 2009, that rate was 265% for Spain and 194% in Italy (OECD 2011).

In contrast to the most recent trends in France, entry and residence policies in Italy and Spain have favoured economic migration. Their economies, more than those in north-western Europe, are dominated by labour-intensive, low-productivity, low-technology sectors, still largely based on traditional production systems and heavily reliant on low-cost labour. Growing labour shortages in low-skilled, low-paid and socially low-status occupations, increasingly deserted by native workers, have generated demand for a cheap, flexible foreign labour force mainly concentrated on the lowest rungs of the occupational ladder.

A huge proportion of migrants entering the two Southern European countries did so without a proper residence permit, or overstayed their temporary visa period. Unauthorized migrants entering Italy and Spain are able to live and work without necessarily having a worker's residence permit. After a period (short or long) of unauthorized stay and unregistered employment, they then obtain a legitimate permit through one of the frequent regularisation schemes (Salis 2012; Reyneri 2007; Arango 2012). As Reyneri and Fullin suggest (2010), the underground economy, with its strong attraction effect, has played a crucial role in shaping migration patterns and the medium- and long-term labour outcomes of migrants in southern Europe.

14.3 Senegalese Migrants' Integration into the European Labour Market

Migrants' occupational outcomes are subject to dispute and depend on a number of individual characteristics, such as gender and education, and on the situation in the destination country: policies governing entry, the entitlements required to access the labour market, the structure of the economy and the economic sectors where demand for foreign workers is concentrated. Integration into the labour markets at destination also varies with duration of stay in the host country.

One of our main purposes in this section is to understand the performance of Senegalese migrants in the labour markets of the three European destination countries in the study.

The first step is to consider the occupational statuses of migrants heading to these three countries, in the year prior to departure. It is widely recognised in the literature (Hatton and Williamson 2002) that there is a self-selection process at work, affecting both the decision to migrate (rather than remain in the origin country) and the composition of the migrant group heading to each European destination (de Haas 2011). Selection relates to educational level and occupational skills, but also depends on the period of departure and networks in the destination countries.

The next step is to analyze labour outcomes of Senegalese migrants by looking at their occupational trajectories across their first ten years of stay in Europe, comparing the destination countries and focusing on gender. The analysis is based on dynamic data on the labour status of Senegalese migrants sampled in 2008 in

Spain, Italy and France in the year prior to departure and up to their first ten years of continuous stay in Europe (i.e. interruptions for returns into the country of origin or to extra European countries were not accounted for in the analyses).

14.3.1 Profiles of Senegalese Migrants Prior to Departure

Looking at Senegalese migrants' occupational statuses prior to departure will help not only to trace their labour trajectories but also to define the labour composition of the groups going to the different European destinations and to understand the nature of Senegalese migration in each receiving country.

As shown in the column on the far left of each graph in Figs. 14.1 and 14.2, showing Senegalese migrants' occupational statuses in the year before leaving, overall, a high proportion of Senegalese migrants are unskilled, albeit with some relevant differences between the three countries.

The majority of Senegalese interviewed in Spain and Italy had been unskilled at the time of departure: 72% and 61% respectively, compared to 34% in France. A markedly higher proportion of those residing in France had been skilled or students before leaving (in France 15% skilled and 28% students, compared to 8% and 5% respectively in Spain and 7% and 11% in Italy).

The results show that, historically and still today, Senegalese leaving their country as skilled workers or as students have mainly gone to France. This should be interpreted in the light of the historical, cultural and institutional links between France and its former colony Senegal. Colonial connections, including a shared official language and similar educational systems (implying easier recognition of diplomas obtained in the country of origin), remain a major factor shaping the composition of migration flows and the structure of opportunities available to citizens from former colonies. Furthermore, France being an old destination for the Senegalese, more recent migrants can rely on long-standing networks of co-nationals there, either studying or already integrated into skilled positions in the workforce (OECD 2010: 157).

France is also the country with the highest incidence of migrants who were inactive prior to departure (31% vs. 11% in Italy and 3% Spain). They are mainly women, as Fig. 14.2 reveals, who did not participate in the labour market in Senegal and most of whom left to follow their husbands. While women migrating independently from Senegal seem mainly to head to Italy and Spain, the new destinations, female migration to France is still predominantly based on family reunification (Tandian- Coulibaly 2008; Tall-Tandian 2010) (see Chap. 3). The proportion of women who came for work reasons is twice as high in Italy and Spain (40%) as in France (20%) (unshown results).



Fig. 14.1 Occupational status in the last year in Africa and in each year of stay in Europe (for the first ten years), by country of destination

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain; weighted data
Interpretation: The figures show the distribution of the last occupational status of Senegalese migrants before they left (first column on the left) and their occupational status in each year of their stay in Europe, for the first ten years of residence, by receiving country (set of columns on the right, showing year 1, 2, 3, etc. after entry to Europe). We have only considered 10 years after arrival in order to make comparison easier, since length of stay differs widely between individuals
Significance
Difference in occupation between the last year in Africa and the first year in Europe is statistically significant in Spain ($p<0.01$), in Italy ($p<0.01$), and in France ($p<0.01$)
Difference in occupation between the first year in Europe and the tenth year in Europe is statistically significant in France ($p<0.01$) and Italy ($p<0.01$), and not significant in Spain ($p>0.1$)

14.3.2 How Labour Market Trajectories Unfold in the European Destinations

Given the differences in profile upon arrival, what are the subsequent outcomes in terms of access to the labour market and the long-term performance of Senegalese in the three destination countries?

While the figures above do not allow us to track individual labour mobility, by showing the proportion of migrant groups in the different labour categories for each year, Tables 14.1 and 14.2 provide additional information on the dynamic labour



Fig. 14.2 Occupational status in the last year in Africa and during each year in Europe (for the first ten years), by gender

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain; weighted data
Interpretation: same as for Figure 2.1, but according to gender
Significance
Difference in occupation between the last year in Africa and the first year in Europe is statistically significant for men ($p<0.01$) and women ($p<0.01$)
Difference in occupation between the first year in Europe and the tenth year in Europe is statistically significant for men ($p<0.01$) and women ($p<0.01$)

Table 14.1 Five most frequent occupational status sequences of migrants during their stay in Europe, by country of residence

Spain		Italy		France		3 Countries	
Sequence	%	Sequence	%	Sequence			%
Unskilled	68	Unskilled	64	Unskilled	36	Unskilled	52
Unskilled.-Unempl.	8	Unempl.-Unskilled	11	Inact.-Unskilled	12	Unempl.-Unskilled	6
Unempl.-Unskilled	5	Unskilled-Skilled	4	Student-Skilled	9	Inact.-Unskilled.	6
Inact.-Unskilled.	4	Inactive	3	Student	8	Student-Skilled	4
Unemployed	4	Student-Unskilled-Skilled	2	Student-Unskilled	5	Student	4
Total	**87%**		**85%**		**69%**		**88%**
N	199		203		200		602

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain; weighted data
Interpretation: The table shows the most frequent occupational status sequences (possible statuses: unskilled, skilled, unemployed, inactive, student). Horizontal mobility (involving changes within the same status) is not tracked here, e.g. if an individual has changed unskilled jobs, his/her trajectory will remain "unskilled". Note that only the "main activity status" is registered for each year, which may result in an underestimation of short-term unemployment, spells of inactivity and short-term jobs

Table 14.2 Five most frequent sequences of migrants' occupational statuses during their stay in Europe, by gender (possible statuses: unskilled, skilled (intermediate to high), unemployed, inactive, student)

Men		Women	
Sequence	%	Sequence	%
Unskilled	61	Unskilled	64
Unempl.-Unskilled	8	Inact.-Unskilled	11
Student	4	Inactive	4
Student-Skilled	4	Student-Skilled	3
Unskilled.- Unempl.	4	Inactive.-Unskilled.-Inactive	2
Total	**81%**		**70%**
N	330		273

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain; weighted data
Interpretation: The table is based on sequence analysis and shows migrants' five most common trajectories (sequences of labour statuses from entry to Europe to survey time), by gender. Single-status trajectories (e.g. "Unskilled", "Student") may indicate either continuity in the same unskilled job (indicating stagnation) or changes of job within the unskilled category ("lateral mobility"). Most of the trajectories involve one or two statuses, while a minority involve more changes, as with women's "Inactive-Unskilled-Inactive" trajectory

paths of individuals in the three European receiving countries, showing *what types* of labour trajectories Senegalese migrants most frequently took, depending on destination country and gender.

The low level of qualification of Senegalese migrants going to **Spain** and **Italy**, where the demand for foreign labour is mainly concentrated in unskilled jobs (see Sect. 14.2), strongly determines their subsequent economic integration in the two countries' labour markets, with more than 60% of individuals continuing in unskilled jobs in both countries (see Table 14.1, 'unskilled' sequences).

However, while we find a stubborn core of unskilled workers in Spain and Italy, the occupational trajectories of skilled workers surveyed in these two countries show different trends. In Italy, qualified Senegalese are subject to under-employment considering their qualification upon arrival (a typical downward occupational move), but some are able to "catch up" in subsequent years, gradually recovering skilled status over the duration of their stay (4% unskilled➔skilled; see also Fig. 14.1). In Spain, immediate and irreversible downward mobility is observed, with almost the majority of workers remaining in low positions throughout (see Fig. 14.1).

For students too, the situation differs between Spain and Italy. Among migrants who left Senegal as students, a slightly higher proportion was surveyed in Italy than in Spain. Once in Italy, a proportion of them managed to continue their studies and later gain access to skilled jobs ('student➔unskilled➔skilled' sequence in Table 14.1), whereas in Spain we find almost no-one in education (see Fig. 14.1).

The picture in **France** is very different. Only slightly more than 30% of the workers who migrated to France were low- or unskilled workers before leaving. In

France, over time, that percentage increases, mainly as a result of some inactive migrants entering employment (12% of the trajectories in Table 14.1), most of these being women (see Table 14.2).

In France we also find the highest proportion of migrants arriving with skills. Their employment status is routinely downgraded on arrival (Fig. 14.1), with fewer migrants in intermediate to high positions than before they left home. The proportion of skilled workers increases over time, however (Fig. 14.1). This increase is mainly produced by the entry of students into the labour market in qualified positions after completion of their studies, accounting for 9% of the overall occupational trajectories (see Table 14.1).

Foreign students already living in the destination countries represent the main reservoir of highly qualified foreign workers (Hawthorne 2008). This situation can be beneficial to the receiving countries, which draw from a pool of candidates who have been at least partly educated (and socialised) in the host country. These young, educated former students are more likely to overcome many of the problems that beset immigrants arriving to seek work directly, since they are more likely to have advanced host-country language skills, training and/or relevant experience for the labour market. In addition, local employers can better understand and assess their credentials in comparison to host country diplomas (*ibid*.).

All these factors not only affect students' careers, they also play a crucial broader role in the labour outcomes of migrants in destination countries. Students and skilled migrants will accordingly prefer France as destination, with an obvious selection effect. On the other hand, the structural opportunities offered by the receiving countries will inevitably shape the migrants' integration into the domestic labour market. The data in Chap. 13 on motives for migration confirm that "studies" rate high among the main reasons for migrating to France (20% of migrants living in that country, compared to fewer than 2% in Italy and 0% in Spain).

14.3.3 Gendered Migration and Labour Trajectories

The literature highlights the scale of gender differences in patterns of international migration (Pessar 1999; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Boyd and Grieco 2003). Men and women differ in their motives for moving to another country and in their socio-economic integration paths in the destination country. Cultural values, normative expectations and social institutions as well as historical and structural factors play a crucial role in migration choices and conditions (Cerrutti and Massey 2001). Gender can either constrain or favour mobility; it can affect access to the job market for new migrants, as well as integration and social mobility thereafter. In turn, migration can influence traditional gender roles and labour market participation.

Senegalese migration is traditionally and prevalently undertaken by men, with women very much relying on families to determine and organise their migration plans (Toma Vause 2011). Migration of unaccompanied women from Senegal was discouraged until very recently, especially over long distances and without the sup-

port of family members at destination. Reunification with husbands or other male relatives, rather than economic motives, has been their main migration driver (see Chap. 13).

Given the predominantly non-economic nature of Senegalese women's migration, how do their labour trajectories in Europe unfold upon arrival and in the long run? Evidence from earlier projects shows that so-called 'non-economic migrants', i.e. those who came to Europe as family members, students or refugees, play an important and often neglected role in European labour markets, as they often join the labour market either upon arrival or at a later stage (Cangiano 2012).

The occupational composition of migrants prior to migration shows significant differences by gender. In particular, one woman in three (about 30%) was inactive before leaving, compared to only one out of twenty men (about 5%) (Fig. 14.4).

Subsequent labour market outcomes are also strongly marked by gender. On arrival in Europe, we find a polarization of occupational status among women, following a diverging trend: the increase across the different occupational categories of those inactive and of those employed in low-skilled jobs. The underlying phenomena are (a) the entry of a proportion of women into the labour market, almost exclusively in unskilled positions, (b) deskilling of those who where in skilled occupations in Senegal and join the European labour market in unskilled jobs (Fig. 14.4), and (c) the exit from the labour market of women who were previously in employment. Further analysis would be needed to disentangle the determinants of these two opposite trends (Fig. 14.3).

As time passes, migration seems to have a positive effect on female participation in the labour market. Although the female inactivity rate grows in the first years of arrival, it decreases over time compared to entries into the labour market, mainly in unskilled occupations (see Figs. 14.1 and 14.4 and Table 14.2).

We find a similar pattern of men and women who were students or skilled workers prior to departure being subject to immediate and persistent deskilling at their entry into the European labour market (but with a slightly higher rate among women). As shown in the previous graphs (Fig. 14.1), the subsequent increase in skilled workers is mainly due to students entering the labour market (4% of occupational sequences among men and 3% among women (Table 14.2), rather than to upward mobility (transitions from unskilled to skilled jobs) (see Fig. 14.2 and Table 14.2).

Migration has a positive effect on participation in the labour market over time, with unemployed men finding work (8%) and inactive women becoming employed (11%). As regards students, some men are students throughout (4% of men but no women) and some transition from studies to skilled jobs (4% of men vs. 3% of women).



Fig. 14.3 Men's transitions from last occupational status in Senegal before leaving to first occupational status in Europe (% in any of the three countries, Spain, France or Italy)



Fig. 14.4 Women's transitions from last occupational status in Senegal before leaving to first occupational status in Europe (% in any of the three countries, Spain, France and Italy)

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain; weighted data
Interpretation: The graphs 14.3 and 14.4 compare migrants' labour statuses at two points in time: the year before migrating and the first year upon arrival, for men and women. E.g. Figures show the proportions of male/female migrants who left as students, inactive, unemployed, skilled or unskilled workers and their labour status upon entry to Europe

14.4 Migrants' Economic Contribution to the Country of Origin

The active role migrants play in supporting the development of their homeland has been the subject of growing interest among international agencies, policymakers and scholars. How do they in fact contribute economically to their home country? This section explores three different forms and levels of Senegalese migrants' economic transnationalism, i.e. contributions made by migrants to their home country while they are abroad: investment in assets such as land, housing and businesses in Senegal (individual level), the sending of remittances (household level), and participation in development initiatives in the country of origin through diaspora organisations (community level). Further analysis will explore how such forms of transnational engagement change over time and differ according to migrants' gender, educational level and legal and occupational status in the destination country. The results show that transfers to the household of origin are the main type of contribution, ahead of economic investments and contributions to diaspora organisations. This hierarchy in economic relations with the country of origin may be due to the family aspect of migration, the desire to minimise the risks of managing origin country investments at a distance, and a lesser attachment to territory among migrants who have increasingly been leaving from urban areas, particularly Dakar.

Overall, between the time of entry into Europe and the time of the survey (2008), the number of migrants living in the three countries who were sending remittances or who owned businesses, houses or land in Senegal grew markedly. The proportion of migrants sending remittances rose from 40–45% upon entry to Europe to 75–80% at the time of the survey, depending on country of residence.

Migrants' ownership of assets increased even more dramatically over the duration of their stay abroad. Of migrants in France, for example, the proportion owning assets was 20% on arrival and four times higher in 2008. The situation was similar for migrants in Italy. In Spain, where the migrant subsample owning assets at arrival was smallest, the proportion of migrants owning in each year of their stay in Europe assets in Senegal increased from 18% to 50%. These results are understandable, since it takes time for migrants – particularly those in low-skilled jobs – to save enough in their country of residence to invest in assets back home. In addition, migrants are often concerned to secure the home-country household's living conditions before investing in assets.

A small proportion of migrants contribute financially to diaspora associations: fewer than 10% upon entry to Europe and fewer than 30% in 2008. The marked differences between countries (Fig. 14.5) may be due to differences between migratory cultures. The first Senegalese migrants to France, who came from the Senegal valley, established a strong tradition of "hometown" associations, set up to maintain links with the home village and invest in community projects such as health centres, schools and irrigation schemes. By contrast, most migrants in Spain and Italy are from urban areas in Senegal, where hometown associations are not common. Numerous authors have shown a very high rate of participation in Senegalese asso-



Fig. 14.5 Proportion of migrants sending remittances, owning asset(s) and paying contributions to diaspora associations at the time of the survey, by country of residence, upon arrival in Europe and in 2008

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain; weighted data
Interpretation: The graph shows the percentage of individuals sending remittances, owning assets, and contributing to associations at two points in time (upon entry to Europe and in 2008), by country of residence in 2008
Significance: Difference in remittances between the first year in Europe and the year 2008 is statistically significant in France ($p < 0.01$), in Spain ($p < 0.01$) and in Italy ($p < 0.01$); difference in mean number of assets between the first year in Europe and the year 2008 is statistically significant in France ($p < 0.01$), in Spain ($p < 0.01$) and in Italy ($p < 0.01$); difference in contribution to associations between the first year in Europe and the year 2008 is statistically significant in France ($p < 0.01$), in Spain ($p < 0.05$) and in Italy ($p < 0.01$)

ciations in Europe (Ceschi and Stocchiero 2007; Castagnone 2007; Navarra and Salis 2010), but these are mainly associations formed to promote socioeconomic integration, mutual aid and cultural promotion in Italy, rather than associations active in Senegal, which is the type observed in the MAFE data.

14.4.1 Remittances Over Time

Remittances often depend on strategy, and this can vary over time according to gender, education, employment situation or legal status (cf. Fig. 14.6).[1] An analysis of gender relations shows that throughout the stay in Europe men are slightly more

[1] For a study of the factors associated with remittances at the time of the survey in Senegal see Rakotonarivo, A. and M. A. Mangalu (2013). "Envoyer et recevoir: les transferts de migrants vers les régions de Dakar et Kinshasa" in *Migrations africaines: le co-développement en questions. Essai de démographie politique*. C. Beauchemin, L. Kabbanji, P. Sakho and B. Schoumaker. Paris, Armand Colin**:** 127–158.



Fig. 14.6 Proportion of migrants sending remittances to Senegal, during each year of their stay in Europe (for the first ten years)

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain; weighted data
Interpretation: Proportion of sampled migrants sending remittances in each year of stay in Europe, for the first ten years of stay

likely than women to send remittances, especially during the first four years, when nearly 80% of men already do, compared to slightly more than 60% of women (cf. Fig. 14.6, by gender). This behavioural difference is probably linked to the structure of the Senegalese family, in which the man is traditionally responsible for providing financial support (Abdoulaye Bara Diop 1985). After the first few years of living abroad, however, the proportion of female migrants sending remittances increases quite markedly (from 60% to nearly 80% after the first ten years). This finding hints to a differential in participation to employment (thus income availability) by gender (which lowers over time, see Sect. 14.3.3) than to gendered role expectations.

As regards level of education at the time of the survey, the more highly educated migrants are generally less likely to send remittances during their stay abroad than those with lower education (ranging from no schooling to secondary school) (cf. Fig. 14.6, by level at time of survey). This could be partly due to the fact that a part of the higher educated were still students after they arrived and their contributions increased once they entered the labour market and witnessed the convergence of the curves over time.

After the first year abroad, the probability of sending remittances increased considerably for those who were employed. For those not in employment, however, the slow pace of the first years quickened after a few years of living abroad (cf. Fig. 14.6 by employment status). The difference in remittance behaviour over time can be explained by the steadiness of employees' earnings compared to the less regular income of the predominantly unemployed.

Remittance behaviour seems not affected by legal status (cf. Fig. 14.6, by legal status). This could be because contrasting forces cancel each other out. Irregular migrants may send less money home because their vulnerable legal status often also means greater economic insecurity, but they may also want to make more transfers and investments to insure their incomes against the risk of deportation.

14.4.2 Investments in the Country of Origin

Investments in assets (houses, land or businesses) in Senegal by migrants in Europe were analysed according to length of stay abroad and by gender, educational level, employment status and legal status on arrival (cf. Fig. 14.7).

On departure from Senegal, men possessed 0.2 assets on average. In other words, there is one asset for five departing male migrants, the ratio being slightly lower among women. The proportion increases over time, suggesting that migration is a factor for investment in Senegal, as previously demonstrated by Mezger and Beauchemin (2014). This trend also shows that migrants' economic links with their home country do not fade over time. The longer the stay abroad, the faster the increase in the mean number of assets possessed.

Investment behaviour is not significantly different according to educational level or legal status, but is affected by employment status (Fig. 14.7, employment status). After eight years in the country of destination, there is one asset for every two migrants in employment but only one asset for every 5 unemployed migrants. It is possible that when unemployment lasts a long time, migrants adopt a survival strategy involving reselling previously acquired assets. Legal status at entry, on the other hand, does not affect asset ownership statistically. We would have expected the opposite, i.e. that given their situation, irregular migrants would be more concerned than legal migrants to secure their available income. Results suggest that irregular migrants are not more deprived than regular migrants, either at the time of migration or later.

14.4.3 Participation in the Origin Country's Development Through Diaspora Associations

After the first ten years in the country of residence, between 20% and 25% of Senegalese immigrants to Europe, at the very most, help their home country's development by contributing to hometown associations (Fig. 14.8). However,



Fig. 14.7 Mean number of assets in Senegal per migrant in each year of their stay in Europe (for the first ten years)

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain; weighted data
Interpretation: Mean number of assets owned in Senegal by migrants in each year of stay in Europe, for the first ten years of stay

behavioural changes over time differ according to the migrant's gender, level of education, employment situation and legal status on arrival.

The percentage of men who pay contributions increases, mainly in the first years and more slowly as their stay continues. Women contribute less at first but after six years of stay the percentage increases. Their later entry into the labour market and their position within the household may explain this (Sarr et al. 2010).

In terms of education, migrants at both end of the spectrum (i.e. high and low levels of education) contribute similarly to diaspora associations (cf. Fig. 14.8 by educational level). Later in their stay abroad, at around the seventh or eighth year, the trends change. The curves for those with low and medium educational levels converge (the low-education curve levels off and the medium level catches up), while the proportion of highly-educated migrants who contribute continues to rise.



Fig. 14.8 Percentage of migrants contributing to diaspora associations, during each year of their stay in Europe (first ten years)

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain
Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain; weighted data
Interpretation: Proportion of sampled migrants paying association contributions during each year of their stay in Europe, for the first ten years

As regards legal status on arrival in the country of destination, as many documented as undocumented migrants contribute financially to diaspora associations, with the proportion growing over the early years (Fig. 14.8, legal status). The trends only begin to diverge after six years of residence in the new country: the proportion of undocumented migrants contributing to an association falls, eventually to fewer than 10%.

All in all, transfer and investment behaviour patterns follow the same time trend, increasing with length of time in Europe with little divergence between migrant profiles or countries of residence. There is comparatively more such behaviour among less educated and unskilled migrants than among the highly-educated and skilled. Some of the latter join the labour market late, after starting out as students; some may be less obliged to transfer money home because their household in Senegal needs it less. The similarity in remittance behaviour between regular and irregular migrants seems surprising and calls for further investigation, particularly as regards the economic integration of irregular migrants.

14.5 Reintegration of Returnees into the Senegalese Labour Market

It is not only while they are abroad that migrants participate in the economic life of their country. They also contribute after coming home. Several studies have shown that migrants are subject to various constraints that sometimes hamper them from realizing their initial plans to return (Bruzzone et al. 2006; Sinatti 2009). Chapter 13 showed that return migration is becoming less frequent. In this section we look at the economic outcomes of migrants returning from Europe. We analyse their trajectories by comparing their situations at key moments: the year before leaving home, the last year in Europe, the first year after returning to Senegal, and at the time of the survey. This analysis covers migrants who have returned from France, Spain, Italy and other European countries (66%, 14%, 20% and 6% of return migrants respectively).

The overwhelming majority of returnees (89%) had residence permits before leaving their country of residence in Europe. In this connection, the literature shows that an insecure legal status, subject to periodic and uncertain renewals in Europe, inhibits migrants' plans for a permanent return, as it would hinder any future re-departure, if needed or desired (Flahaux et al. 2013; Megzer and Beauchemin 2010; Castagnone 2011). It is clear that most returnees are willing migrants and not deportees. As regards the link between length of stay abroad and return, four out of five returnees returned permanently to Senegal after fewer than ten years in the destination country (20%). More than half went back after fewer than five years (55.5%) and a quarter (25.5%) after between five and ten years. The main motive for return is family reasons, which are cited by a quarter of returnees (25.5%). This finding appears to show the considerable impact of family in the country of origin on how people manage their migration (Flahaux et al. 2011).

The sampled returnees' employment statuses before coming back to Senegal were as follows: 64% unskilled workers, 4% medium to highly skilled workers, 17% students and 15% unemployed/inactive (Fig. 14.9). It should be borne in mind that in moving from Senegal to Europe, migrants often ended up in jobs below their qualifications, as shown in the first part of this chapter. After this forced deskilling in Europe, a higher proportion obtained skilled positions in Senegal: an increase from 4% in the last year in Europe to 22% in the first year back in Senegal, slightly more than the rate when they first left (19%). This represents a "brain regain", but not a major gain compared to the rate prior to departure. Over time, the percentage increases further, which suggests that a period of reintegration is required for positive performance. This seems to be a period for readjusting and finding new points of reference after several years of absence. At the time of the survey, experience abroad was already having a favourable impact in comparison with the situation of non-migrants. Returnees were fewer in unskilled jobs, twice as likely as non-migrants to occupy a skilled position and less likely to be inactive.

In the first year back in Senegal, the proportion in unskilled jobs was slightly greater than that at the time of departure (39% versus 34%). The dominant trend is for returnees to remain active in the same occupations (44%).



Fig. 14.9 Occupational status of returnees from Europe at four points in time during their migratory life, and of non-migrants in 2008 (%)

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal
Population: Migrants having returned to Senegal from France Italy and Spain, and non-migrants(weighted data)
Interpretation: Distribution of returnees by occupational status at four points in time, and of non-migrants
Statistical significance
Difference between…
… last year in Africa and last year in Europe: $p<0.10$
…last year in Europe and first year in Senegal after return: $p<0.05$
… last year in Africa and first year in Senegal after return: $p<0.05$
… first year in Senegal after return and survey time in Senegal (2008): n.s. ($p>0.10$)
… non-migrants and return migrants at survey time: $p<0.10$

Among students who migrated (33%), half had already changed status by their last year abroad (17%). Back in Senegal, 10% went back to school, probably in order to improve their qualifications or because they were unemployed or inactive during the first year of return.

In all occupational categories, the situation among returnees is found to be better than among non-migrants, partly because of initial selection, since better-educated and more qualified people are more likely to migrate (see Chap. 4). In 2008, returnees were proportionally less present in unskilled jobs than non-migrants (44% versus 52%, Fig. 14.9) and twice as likely to be in skilled jobs (21% versus 10%). They experienced less unemployment (3% versus 5%) and inactivity (16% versus 29%).

At all points in time considered, trade and services are the sectors in which Senegalese migrants are the most active in the different labour markets, especially while they are living abroad (70%, Fig. 14.10). Once they return, half of all migrants



Fig. 14.10 Employment sector of returnees from Europe at four points in time during their migratory life and of non-migrants in 2008 (%) (working population)

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal
Population: Working population among migrants having returned to Senegal from France Italy and Spain, and non-migrants (weighted data)
Interpretation: Distribution of returnees by employment sector at four points in time and of non-migrants
Statistical significance
Difference between…
… last year in Africa and last year in Europe: p<0.0.5
…last year in Europe and first year in Senegal after return: p<0.05
… last year in Africa and first year in Senegal after return: p<n.s. (p>0.10)
… first year in Senegal after return and survey time in Senegal (2008): n.s. (p>0.10)
… non-migrants and return migrants at survey time: n.s. (p>0.10)

work in this sector, where are they are proportionally twice as numerous as non-migrants (27%). The already high percentage of returnees who had been active in trade and services before emigrating from Senegal (49%) as well as during their stay in Europe, support the hypothesis that small-business people have a greater propensity to out-migrate and then resettle in Senegal.

The very slight representation of the agricultural sector in the findings is certainly linked to the survey site (the Dakar region – see Chap. 2). However, given the importance of urban and peri-urban agriculture in the capital and its earning opportunities, the number of returnees working in that sector seems low (almost 0%).

The impact of the financial capital accumulated by migrants on their reintegration is confirmed by the type of employment they perform upon return (cf. Fig. 14.11). While the majority left as employees (59%), more migrants return as independent workers (62%). This result could also be read as a sign of difficulty in their socio-economic reintegration in the local labour market upon return: many of

Fig. 14.11 Type of employment of returnees from Europe at four points in time during their migratory life and of non-migrants at 2008 (%) (working population)

Source: Biographic survey in Senegal
Population: Working population among migrants having returned to Senegal from France Italy and Spain, and non-migrants (weighted data)
Interpretation: Distribution of returnees by type of employment at four points in time and of non-migrants.
Significance
Difference between…
… last year in Africa and last year in Europe : n.s. (p>0.10)
…last year in Europe and first year in Senegal after return: n.s. (p>0.10)
… last year in Africa and first year in Senegal after return: n.s. (p>0.10)
… first year in Senegal after return and survey time in Senegal (2008): n.s. (p>0.10)
… non-migrants and return migrants at survey time: n.s. (p>0.10)

these independent workers are in fact running very small-scale businesses in the informal sector (Mezger and Flahaux 2010).

Another way of grasping migrants' labour market trajectories is by comparing their occupational status at several points in time. Figure 14.12 shows that the International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status (ISEI)[2] score is higher after their return. This is largely due to the fact that a significant proportion were students before departure (therefore not in employment and not included in the ISEI score), and held high-level employment after their return (light grey curve). If only those who were working in the last year before departure are considered, the ISEI scores are only slightly better after return (dark grey curve).

[2] For more details on the ISEI score and its relation to migration experience among Senegalese in Europe, see Obucina (2009).



Fig. 14.12 Mean ISEI score among working people in their last year in Africa, their last year in Europe and every year since their return to Senegal

Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal
Population: Working population among migrants having returned to Senegal from France Italy and Spain, and non-migrants (weighted data)
Interpretation: The graph presents average occupational scores (ISEI scores) in the last year in Africa and for the first ten years in Europe. The average score is measured among working people (whose composition may change over time) and shows aggregate changes
Statistical significance (all working returnees)
Difference between…
… last year in Africa and last year in Europe: n.s. (p>0.10)
…last year in Europe or in Africa and first year in Senegal after return: n.s. (p>0.10)
… first year in Senegal after return and ten years since return to Senegal: n.s. (p>0.10)
Significance (working returnees who were working in their last year in Africa before departure)
Difference between…
… last year in Africa and last year in Europe: n.s. (p>0.10)
… last year in Europe or in Africa and first year in Senegal after return: n.s. (p>0.10)
… first year in Senegal after return and ten years since return to Senegal: n.s. (p>0.10)

14.6 Conclusions

The first section of this chapter explored the occupational profiles of migrants surveyed in Spain, Italy and France, the three selected host countries, and their economic integration patterns upon arrival in Europe and across the first ten years of their stay abroad. As the analysis has shown, the different labour outcomes are primarily influenced by the composition of the migrant groups upon arrival, in terms of educational and labour profiles. The evidence shows how, among Senegalese migrants in Europe,

the least educated and the unskilled are more frequently found in Spain and Italy, while students and qualified workers still mainly choose France as a destination.

There appears to be a self-selection process shaping destination choices according to migrants' profiles prior to departure, with an impact on the composition of the flows. Structural socioeconomic contexts in each host country give rise to particular demands for migrant labour, while and migration systems, available facilities, entry conditions and labour market access (e.g. visas, studentships, linguistic affinity, recognition of diplomas, networks of co-ethnics, available jobs, etc.) attract particular profiles of migration candidates. The strength of labour demand and the degree to which it is met by immigrant workers may affect public perceptions in the countries of origin and of destination, so influencing destination preferences on one side and admission policies on the other. It has been mentioned how labour market structure (in terms of sectorial composition, company size, the role of the shadow economy, etc.) and the regulatory frameworks in place in the host country (in terms of policies governing foreigners' entry and access to work) help to shape migrants' economic integration in the destination country.

Our findings have highlighted differences in outcome between the three selected destination countries. As expected, a wide gap was found between France, as a former colonial power and an older destination country for the Senegalese, able to attract and better integrate qualified workers, and Spain and Italy, more recent, southern European destinations where mainly unskilled workers concentrate.

Interestingly, the MAFE data go beyond this common perception by shedding light on important dissimilarities between Spain and Italy. Our analyses provide evidence of the different distribution of migrants, according to their destination countries, and of different labour performances over the medium term, with Spain showing worse results in terms of Senegalese migrants' economic integration, with a strong majority entering at the lowest level of the labour market and remaining there, almost no students continuing their studies once in Spain, and a dramatic downward mobility for medium- to highly-skilled workers. The economic integration of Senegalese migrants in Italy shows slightly better results, with a very high proportion of unskilled individuals stagnating in low-skill positions, but a small share of migrants pursuing their studies, an increasing proportion of workers employed in medium to high positions and the number of unemployed migrants decreasing over time.

Integration of Senegalese into the labour market in Europe is strongly affected by gender. Women show a much higher risk of inactivity, especially in France, where female migration is strongly based on family reasons, while Spain and Italy, where migration is more recent, show higher rates of female participation in the labour market. This could be due to various factors. For example, vulnerable conditions for families in destination countries with little social protection may encourage women to join the labour market and alter roles within families.

The second section highlighted how economic transnational engagement towards Senegal (observed more as remittances and investment in assets than through diaspora associations) grows over time. The proportion of senders increases more among men than women; more among migrants with low/medium education than among those with higher education; as much among the undocumented as among the documented;

and more among those in work than among the unemployed. The analysis indicates that remittance behaviour is linked to gender relations within Senegalese society. Women have often lower attachment to the labour market, thus are less to be able to remit. It would be interesting to observe if, controlling for participation into employment, the gender differential would disappear. A woman is freer to use resources as she wishes than a man, who must contribute to the maintenance of the family. Men also begin sending remittances sooner than women. This can be explained also by the fact that women access employment and income later than their counterparts. The differences in remittance behaviour between the least and most educated and between the employed and unemployed can likely be explained by social constraints, the economic status of the family at home, and economic insecurity.

As for investments in the country of origin, the data show that the longer the stay in the destination country, the higher the mean number of assets owned by migrants. Few, however, contribute financially to the activities of migrants' development associations. This can perhaps be explained by the urban origins of the migrants in the sample (most come from Dakar), the sense of community being weaker among town-dwellers than in rural areas, or by a lower perception of the needs/capacity to influence on the local economy.

In terms of migrants' strategies for re-entering the local labour market upon their return, they seem to privilege the sectors in which they can make the most of the financial and/or human added value gained through migration and their stay abroad: trade and services. Our analysis of returnees' reintegration into the labour market, although based on a limited number of cases and almost entirely on migrants who returned from France, provides evidence of positive outcomes over time, in terms of both labour market participation, with lower rates of unemployment and of inactivity, and of the status of the jobs obtained, with a higher proportion of individuals in skilled positions.

Senegalese migrants' economic contribution to destination and origin countries illustrates how social and economic agents manage to integrate into the labour market at destination, starting at the bottom end, to earn enough to meet their households' needs and ensure their own promotion in the home country by working, in whichever country, mostly in a "safe" sector: that of trade and services.

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Chapter 15
Senegalese Families Between Here and There

Cris Beauchemin, Kim Caarls, and Valentina Mazzucato

15.1 Introduction

Family reunification has become the main legal means foe migrants to enter Europe. Both at the European and national levels, family reunification has become a major concern for policy makers who design increasingly constraining policies in this domain. The belief that African immigrants, among others, overuse their right to family reunification is widespread in Europe (European Migration Network 2012). In France in particular, sub-Saharan migrants and their families – among whom Senegalese migrants form one of the largest groups – have been particularly stigmatized in the 2000s. They are often presented as poorly integrated and were publicly blamed for the 2005 riots. In the following years, family reunification was labeled as *migration subie* (i.e. unwanted, although legal, migration), as opposed to *migration choisie* (i.e., chosen migration, thanks to the selection of working adults).

These views conflict with the findings of recent socio-anthropological studies on West African migrants, especially Senegalese migrants, which show that they are reluctant to reunify in France, Spain or Italy and that they often maintain transnational lives, involving comings and goings and based on a multi-sited distribution of

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family members (Barou 2001; Riccio 2006). Conventional data are not suited to measuring these kinds of family arrangements. Most of the figures available on family migration are administrative data on family reunification. They count the close relatives – spouses and children – who enter European countries to join a prior migrant, but give no account of relatives who stay in their origin country. As a result these data say nothing about transnational families, i.e. those families whose members live in different countries. In addition, since data on out-migration from European countries are quite rare, there is also no information on family reunification in the origin countries, i.e. reunification resulting from the return of a migrant to their home country, where they meet up again with their family.

The data of the MAFE project make it possible to give a more complete picture of the various family arrangements among African migrants. The aim of this paper is to assess the extent of transnational vs. reunified families among Senegalese migrants, adopting a dual viewpoint based on the use of data collected both in Europe (France, Italy and Spain) and in Africa (Senegal). The second section will provide an overview of the existing literature on Senegalese families and will show that living apart is quite a common arrangement in the Senegalese context. This leads to the hypothesis that transnational families are, to a large extent, an extension of this way of life, although they may also result from policy restrictions aimed at curbing family reunification. The third section uses the MAFE data to look at the extent to which households in the Dakar region are indeed involved in transnational families. The next section turns to a European view of transnational families (their numbers and socio-economic characteristics), using individual and biographical data collected among migrants in Europe. And, finally, the last section – before the conclusion – examines how transnational families are formed and how they evolve (or not) into reunified families.

15.2 Migration and Family in Senegal: A Literature Review

15.2.1 Multi-residence as a Common Family Arrangement in Senegal

Senegalese families are very different from the nuclear family model with mother, father and minor children living together in a household of limited size. Senegalese households are among the largest in West Africa, with an average number of 9.5 people in rural areas in 1997 and 8.2 in urban areas, where 44% of all households consist of nine individuals or more (Locoh and Mouvagha-Sow 2005).[1] Household composition is particularly complex, both because polygamy is common and because families quite often function under a multi-residential system in which fathers, mothers and children live in separate places. In this section, we briefly and roughly describe family arrangements in Senegal, with a special focus on the location of family members.

[1] After Senegal, the highest proportion of extended households in the region is 24%, in Guinea. This wide gap between the two countries with the highest proportions clearly illustrates the prevalence of large extended families among Senegalese family structures.

This very general description of Senegalese family functioning does not do justice to the diversity of family arrangements in Senegal, which vary from one region to another and evolve over time, especially in a context of growing urbanisation and increasing availability of formal education. However, it does provide some clues for understanding how some Senegalese families become transnational families.

"Living Apart Together" Partners For various reasons and as in many other sub-Saharan countries, it is quite common in Senegal for spouses to "have marriages where the level of conjugal interaction is quite low" (Findley 1997). In daily life, husbands and wives take their meals separately, rarely socialize together and have separate rooms, if not separate houses, as it is often the case in Dakar among polygamous families (Marie 1997). This can be explained by the fact that choosing a partner is not a personal matter: matrimonial unions are more often alliances between families than individual companionships, and decisions are often highly influenced (if not actually decided) by the elders. Family-arranged marriages remain a social norm, even among families with migrants in Europe (Mondain 2009a, b). Polygamy and age differences – 10 to 15 years in Dakar in 2001, depending on generation (Dial 2008) – tend also to impose a certain distance between spouses. This "weakness of the conjugal bond" (Findley 1997) is a way to reproduce the lineage-based organisation of society: too much intimacy between spouses could lead the couple to want more independence and could weaken the extended family (Poiret 1996). In short, couples have to "lack consistency" in order to respect and reproduce the social order (Barou 2002). This social distance between Senegalese spouses tends to make spatial separation easier. In Senegal even more than in other African countries, there quite a high proportion of spouses live in separate places: "in areas [of sub-Saharan Africa] where this pattern is found, around one-third of wives stay behind while their husbands go to cities or other rural areas to work", with the highest rates (43 to 68%) being registered in Senegal (Findley 1997).

Fostered Children Living apart is not only frequent within couples. Children also quite frequently live away from their parents. Senegal is the country with the highest proportion of fostered children aged under 15 in West Africa, with 28% in rural areas and 35% in urban areas (Locoh and Mouvagha-Sow 2005). In Senegal, as in other West African countries, no stigma is attached to fosterage; it is a widely accepted practice. Again, this can be explained by the role of the extended family; the children "belong" more to their lineage than to their biological parents. Moving children between households is part of the social system in a culture where direct biological links are not considered the most important. In matrilineal ethnic groups, a child's links with their father are weaker in matters of authority and inheritance than their links with their maternal uncle (mother's brother). Thus, the well-being of the child does not depend necessarily on proximity with their biological parents (Bledsoe 2008). Fosterage is organized not only in cases of decease or when the parents are overloaded. Living in a different household is part of a child's education. It is considered by all to be a form of training for social life in a large group. For some, fosterage is synonymous with early work apprenticeship. For others, especially children born in rural areas and sent to town, being fostered provides a chance to go to a (better) school (Locoh and Mouvagha-Sow 2005).

Ubiquitous Families With couples whose level of interaction is low and children whose education can be entrusted to relatives other than the parents, members of the same nuclear family can be scattered around several places. More often than not, such residential patterns reflect economic strategies defined within the extended family, usually by the elders. Scattering individuals around different places to share resources and risks is a form of organisation that fits the family model of NELM theories quite well (Stark 1991). The extended family continues to function as a social and economic unit across geographical distance. Thus the Senegalese family functions as a "ubiquitous" organization, as it has been called in other sub-Saharan countries (Dupont and Dureau 1986; Lututala 1989). Since the 1990s, this kind of multi-residential system has received a boost from the economic crisis: families increasingly try to simultaneously take advantage of the opportunities offered by different places in order to overcome their financial difficulties (Chaléard and Dubresson 1989; Findley 1997; Potts 1997). These family arrangements are not limited by state borders: families also take advantage of opportunities offered in foreign countries. Members of the same family may be spread across several countries and thus form what can be called a "transnational family".

15.2.2 Family and International Migration: A Short History

Although migration to Europe, and especially France, started in the early twentieth century in Senegal, it became a significant movement only in the early 1960s. Since then, though migration has always been a family matter, the roles of the various family members has evolved over time. This section summarizes that evolution.

Young Male Migrants Under Control The first significant wave of out-migration from Senegal started in the early 1960s in the Northern part of the country, among Soninke and Toucouleurs of the Senegal River Valley. At first, international and domestic migration were clearly a community matter and were organised as a collective system dominated by the elders (Quiminal 1991; Timera 1996; Guilmoto 1998). Young single men were sent to France on a temporary basis. They were expected to come back a first time after about 10 years to marry a young woman chosen by the elders. Then they left again for a two or three year period, with visits to the home village in between that allowed them to take a new spouse (or several) and insure the reproduction of the family. When they finally returned for good, they were well-to-do polygamous men and new migrants were sent to France in their place. During husbands' absences, wives and children were left behind with the migrants' families, which offered several advantages to the elders: it ensured that migrants would send remittances (especially as most migrants had no family burden at destination); it offered a workforce to the extended family (all the more necessary since young men were absent), and it ensured that migrants would come back to the home village in the end. For all these reasons, the elders were opposed to any form of "family reunification" as conceived in Europe, i.e. implying the out-migration of

wives and children. In destination regions, hometown associations helped to maintain this social order.

The Gradual Onset of Family Reunification in France In the mid 1970s, the economic crisis made a breach in this well-oiled system (Barou 2001). Circulating between Europe and Africa became much more complicated, both because of government regulations (French borders were closed to new international labour migrants in 1974) and for economic reasons (it was becoming much harder to quit a job in France for a sojourn in Senegal and find a new job on coming back). Basically, migrants had to stay long-term in France or go back for good. In 1976, new legal measures clarified the possibilities for family reunification in France. Despite opposition from the elders, some migrants took this opportunity to bring their spouse(s) to France, and also – sometimes – their children. Thus Senegalese female immigration started in the late 1970s, quite late compared to other groups (Timera 1996; Barou 2002). Senegalese reunified families soon came up against various difficulties. The polygamous ones particularly encountered integration problems and serious housing difficulties. At the same time, new relationship problems arose within the reunified families. Their isolation from the extended families strongly disrupted the usual forms of social organisation and control: the dominant role of the father and husband started to be contested and divorces multiplied (Barou 2002). The idea that French law was too favourable to women spread among the Senegalese community, so that males started to fear family reunification, a feeling fuelled by the elders in the home villages (Azoulay and Quiminal 2002). Finally, a new legal obstacle appeared: in 1993, a law forbade reunification of polygamous families. For all these reasons, family reunification at destination never became a universal goal for Senegalese migrants. It even happens that wives and children are sent back to the home country.

New Migrants in Spain and Italy Spain and Italy became new destinations for Senegalese migrants from the 1980s onwards. For various reasons, the migrants who head towards these countries are not entirely similar to those who left for France. Although they are enmeshed in the same kind of social constraints, especially regarding generational and gender relationships, most of them being of Wolof origin, a patrilineal group like the Soninke and Toucouleur of the Senegal River Valley, they differ in several respects. Firstly, they left more recently, at a time when the elders' control had weakened. Although their departure could generally not be decided without their parents' consent, this new generation of migrants tends more often to move without parental permission (Lalou and Ndione 2005; Riccio 2008). Secondly, a significant number of them originate from urban areas (including Dakar), while the bulk of the Senegal River Valley migrants were of rural origin. Third, migrants in Italy and Spain are more often than in France involved in the Murid brotherhood, a very structured religious group that strongly encourages international migrants to keep a strong attachment to Senegal (Riccio 2006).

Senegalese migrants in Italy are labelled "transmigrants" in recent socio-anthropological studies (Riccio 2006; Sinatti 2011) that emphasize their attachment to their home country and describe how they organise their working life so that they

can come and go between Europe and Senegal. In a context where family reunion is legally possible,[2] Riccio refers to their "resistance to family reunification" and interprets it as both an economic choice (relatives are more expensive to maintain in Europe) and a social option. "For Senegalese, [family reunion] can become a source of stigmatisation expressed through the fear that children may lose their cultural and religious bearings by living abroad" (Riccio 2008). The matrimonial pattern of these new migrants is very similar to the model described above: marriages are arranged by the elders, spouses have usually no interactions before they wed, unions are sealed quickly during migrants' visits, and the wives are then left to their in-laws (Mondain 2009a, b).

15.2.3 Transnational vs. Reunified Families: Previous Statistical Evidence

All in all, the socio-anthropological literature on Senegalese migrants in Europe suggests quite clearly that they are not very prone to family reunification, whatever country they are living in. However, this literature is mainly based on case studies and does not provide any measure of the numbers of transnational families, i.e. families whose members (spouses and children) live across borders, one member being in Europe. Although, in general, few quantitative data are available on transnational families (Mazzucato and Schans 2011), two nationally representative surveys in France and Spain provide some evidence in the matter (no equivalent survey is available for Italy). In France and Spain, sub-Saharan migrants – and especially those from Senegal – appear to have a stronger tendency than migrants of other groups to maintain a dispersed type of family. This appears to be especially true of the parent-child relationship (Eremenko and Gonzalez-Ferrer 2012). In France, according to the TeO Survey (2008-2009), only 25% of the children left behind by at least one of their parent(s) had joined them 5 years after separation. In Spain, according to ENI, after a similar separation, the proportion was even lower, with only 10% of reunified children among Senegalese, while the proportion was almost 50% among Eastern Europeans and South Americans and 40% among migrants from North Africa. As regards couples, so far results are only available in Spain, for sub-Saharan migrants as a whole, who also emerge as a particular population: 19% of all African men (excluding Morocco and South Africa) in Spain are engaged in transnational unions (i.e. they were in a union before entering Spain and their partner was still outside Spain at the time of the survey). This compares with only 8% on average for all immigrants (Esteve and Cortina 2009). And this special feature remains when controlling for education, period of entry and age at the time of

[2] Family reunification is governed by a law passed in 1998 in Italy and a royal decree of 1996 in Spain. Even though reunification rules were defined later in these two new countries of immigration than in France, the criteria used to grant the right of reunification are very similar in France, Italy and Spain, the three European countries in our study.

immigration. How is this particularity – this way of living as a dispersed family – to be interpreted?

It is probably not the result of selection by governments. Although Spain and France have indeed introduced increasingly stringent reunification policies, in principle, no government selects candidates for reunification according to their origin. A more credible explanation is to do with migration history: sub-Saharan people in both countries arrived quite recently compared to other groups and it may be that reunification happens more quickly when a group is more settled and the opportunities for integration more diverse. This would, for example, explain why reunification of Senegalese children is less common in Spain than in France, where Senegalese immigration is older. Another explanation is socio-cultural and is related to the differences in migrants' tendency to reunify with their family according to origin. The way family life is organized in Senegal, on an extended mode, with spouses and children commonly living apart, helps to explain why Senegalese migrants would tend to postpone, or even avoid, family reunification in Europe. Some of them may even prefer to reunify in Senegal, after a temporary stay abroad. This option is consistent with the indications of a substantial tendency to return. Ten years after their departure, about 25% of migrants who had left to go to a Western country (mainly Europe) were back in their home country (Flahaux et al. 2013) (on return migration, see also Chaps. 3 and 13 in this book). Nonetheless, some Senegalese migrants decide to reunify at destination in Europe while others do not. Why is that? Two studies using the MAFE data to focus on the factors for reunification with spouses and children among Senegalese migrants have shown that they are less likely to reunify in Europe (a) when their family model departs from the Western nuclear model (when they are polygamous, with larger numbers of children, a stronger dependency to the elders, etc.) and (b) when their socio-economic integration at destination is weak (González-Ferrer et al. 2012; Baizán et al. 2014).

15.3 Migrant Families: A View from Senegal

The purpose of this section is to assess the extent to which households in the Dakar region are involved in transnational families (see definitions in Chap. 6, Box 6.1). This means finding out firstly whether and to what extent household heads have relations living abroad as migrants, and secondly to what extent households have links with international migrants through social and economic remittances.[3] This question is important from a policy standpoint, for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is related to migration management issues since migrants' spouses and children under 18 have the potential to move to Europe through reunification procedures, although not all of them will do so, as is shown in a following section. Secondly, it connects with the issue of what contribution international migration makes to poverty

[3] Social remittances are the non-material contacts through which migrants and their households at origin can influence each other, for instance in terms of ideas, norms and ways of doing things.

alleviation and to social and economic development, a question of major interest for most governmental and non-governmental bodies involved in international migration. Basically, our analysis will provide a measure of the proportion of households that receive a material benefit from international migration. More generally, we will study the various kinds of relationships that migrants have with households left behind and which make it possible for families to live apart across borders.

15.3.1 An Account of Those Left Behind in Dakar

A first important result of the MAFE survey is that many households living in Dakar are involved in transnational families: almost half of them (47%, Table 15.1) declared at least one relative living abroad. To some extent, this high percentage is due to the fact that all kinds of family relationships are taken into account in the figure. However, only migrants who had regular contacts with the surveyed households over the previous 12 months were registered, and a majority of these used to live within the household. 47% is thus a correct, albeit high estimation of the proportion of transnational families in the Dakar region. In more detail, it emerges that 6% of the married household heads (N = 848) are involved in a transnational couple since they have a spouse abroad. More commonly, among household heads who have children (N = 1032), one in five declared at least one child living abroad, most of these being adult children. And of all household heads (N = 1141), almost a third

Table 15.1 Households with migrants abroad

	%	N[a]
Married heads with spouse(s) abroad[b]	6%	848
Heads with child(ren) abroad, including …	21%	1032
… heads with at least one child <18 living abroad	2%	
Heads who have other relatives (neither spouse nor child) abroad, including[c] …	30%	1141
… heads with at least one contact abroad who lived within the household (at least 6 months)	22%	
… heads with contacts abroad who never lived in the household	9%	
Heads who declared at least one contact abroad (whatever the relationship)	47%	1141

Interpretation: There are 848 married heads in our sample, of whom 6.0% have at least a spouse abroad (weighted percentage)
Source: MAFE Senegal, household survey
Notes:
[a]N corresponds to the total unweighted number of individuals from which the percentages are computed. Percentages are weighted
[b]In the case of polygamous marriages, we look at those household heads with at least one spouse abroad
[c]This category includes all relatives of the head or of his/her partner (other than children) who are living abroad and who have been in regular contact with the household over the past 12 months. This category includes heads who have child(ren) and/or spouse(s) abroad as well as other relatives

(30%) declared other relatives abroad (possibly in addition to spouses and/or children), this proportion being reduced to 22% if only those who used to live in the household are taken into account.

Bearing in mind that Senegalese international migration is predominantly male (see Chap. 13), it is not surprising to find that left-behind spouses are mostly women. While only 2% of the male married heads interviewed in Dakar have their spouse abroad, this is the case for 23% of the female heads living in Dakar (Table 15.2). In other words, almost a quarter of married female heads living in Dakar have their spouse abroad. In addition, 44% of them declared that their husband was living in another household in Senegal (possibly in Dakar), which matches what was found in the literature review: it is common in Senegal for couples to live apart (i.e. in separate households). Again, many more female heads than male declare that they do not live with their spouse (spouse living in Senegal) (9% against 44%). This gender difference can be explained by polygamous arrangements in which each wife has her own dwelling while the husband rotates from one wife/dwelling to another. In any case, this result reminds us that transnational couples are just one form of living-apart couples in a context where the spatial proximity of the spouses is not a prerequisite for family life.

15.3.2 Families Functioning Across Borders

Quantitative data are not the best suited to showing the complexity of the relationships between family members who live at a far distance. They can however give some insights into the variety of the contacts between migrants and their origin households. They show, for instance, that the functioning of families spread across

Table 15.2 Spousal living arrangements of household heads, by sex

	Total		Sex of the head			
			Male		Female	
	f	%	*f*	%	*f*	%
Household heads live …						
With their spouse	633	78	580	89	53	33
Apart, with spouse abroad	74	6	16	2	58	23
Apart, with spouse in Senegal[a]	141	16	60	9	81	44
Total	848	100	656	100	192	100

Note: unweighted numbers & weighted percentages; Time of Survey: 2008
Population: Senegalese married household heads (n = 848)
Interpretation: 78% of married household heads live together with their spouse
Statistical significance: The difference between male and female household heads is significant (p = 0.000, Design-based F-test)
[a]The category "living apart, with spouse in Senegal" consist of: (1) heads who listed their spouse(s) and indicated they were living outside the household, and (2) heads who did not list a spouse, but indicated being married and having a spouse, and that this spouse was not abroad

borders rests on various sorts of relationships: migrants combine several types of contacts with their origin household, the variety of these contacts being greater for those who are closer to the head, especially spouses (Table 15.3). Distance communication (by telephone, mail, email etc.) is by far the most common type of relationship (declared by 94% of all households with migrants, Table 15.4), followed by monetary transfers (60%), visits (51%) and in-kind remittances (33%).

Interestingly, *not all households who declare migrants abroad receive a direct economic benefit from migration.* Among the households who declared at least one migrant abroad, only 60% had received money in the previous 12 months and only 33% had received goods (Table 15.4). Another interesting result is that *those migrants who contribute to the domestic economy of the Dakarian households are not only those most closely related to the heads.* Only 7% of those who sent monetary remittances and 9% of those who send goods are spouses (Table 15.4). And their contribution to the households' economy is quite moderate: 29% (Fig. 15.1) of the spouses living abroad provide a "very large" or "large" share of all the household's expenditures, a proportion which is below the average for all migrants regardless of relationship to the head (31%, Fig. 15.1). It remains that spouses are more

Table 15.3 Composition of the migrant population by type of contact (over the previous 12 months) and type of family relationship

	Type of contact						
				Distance communication			
Relationship to head	Monetary remittances	In-kind remittances	Visits	Once a week	Less than once a month	Average number of contacts[a]	Composition of the migrant population
Spouses	7%	9%	7%	9%	3%	2.6	5%
Children 0-18	1%	1%	0%	1%	4%	1.0	3%
Children >18	37%	36%	27%	38%	17%	1.8	30%
Siblings	23%	27%	24%	23%	30%	1.8	24%
Other	31%	28%	40%	28%	47%	1.6	38%
Missing	1%	1%	1%	1%	0.0%	–	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	1.8	100%
N	648	336	471	507	228	1227	1227

Note: unweighted numbers & weighted percentages; Time of Survey: 2008; Population: Senegalese households' migratory contacts who sent monetary remittances (N = 648), or in-kind remittances (N = 336), or who visited their origin household (N = 471), etc

Interpretation: 7% of the migrants who sent money are spouses of a household head

Statistical significance (F-test, one-way anova): The differences in percentages by type of relationship is significant for each type of contact (in all cases, p = 0.000)

[a]This number is computed as a score adding 1 point for each of the following contacts: visit, in-kind remittance, monetary remittance, at least an annual distance communication. A score of 0 means that the migrant had no contact at all with the household. A score of 4 means that the migrants combined all kinds of contacts

Table 15.4 Contacts over the 12 months between the households (with migrants) and their migrants

	% of households with migrants who …	Average number of migrants with contacts per household
… received monetary remittances	60%	1.6
… received in-kind remittances	33%	1.4
… received at least one visit by a migrant	51%	1.4
… communicated with at least one migrant	94%	1.9

Note: weighted percentages; Time of Survey: 2008; Population: Senegalese households with migratory contacts (N = 617)
Interpretation: 60% of households with migrants received monetary remittances



Fig. 15.1 Share of household expenditure, by type of relationship with household migrants: relative importance of contributions

Note: unweighted numbers & weighted percentages; Time of Survey: 2008; Population: Senegalese households' migratory contacts who contribute (n = 773)
* The "All migrants" category includes spouses, children over 18, siblings and other kin, and also children under 18 and migrants whose relationship with the head is unknown
Interpretation: Among the migrants who are heads' spouses, 7% contributed a very large share, 22% a large share, 50% a moderate share, etc. of household expenditure over the last 12 months. Answers to the question "What share of the household's expenditures on food, medicine, housing, transport, etc. have been covered by the money and in-kind transfers you have received from "Name" over the last 12 months?"
Statistical significance: The difference by type of relationship is significant (p = 0.040, Design-based F-test)

likely than others to remit: 73% of them had sent money over the previous 12 months, against 49% on average for all migrants (Fig. 15.2). Children, once they are adult, have a lesser propensity to remit (Fig. 15.2), but they make a bigger economic contribution than the spouses: they are the most numerous remitters (37%, Table 15.3) and it is they who contribute in the largest share to the expenditures of their origin household (Fig. 15.1). Beyond spouses and children, other relatives also play an important role in the economic life of the households in Dakar. Although their rate of remittance is lower than those of spouses and children (Fig. 15.2), they represent



Fig. 15.2 Remittance rates by sex and relationship to the head, according to type of remittance

Note: Weighted percentages; Time of Survey: 2008; Population: Senegalese households' migratory contacts (n = 1227). Children <18 and migrants whose relationship with the head is unknown are not represented
Interpretation: Of migrant spouses, 73% remit money and 42% send goods (in-kind remittances)
Statistical significance: In-kind remittances: the difference by type of relationship is significant (p = 0.000, Design-based F-test); the difference by sex is not significant (p = 0.358, Design-based F-test) – Monetary remittances: the difference by type of relationship is significant (p = 0.000, Design-based F-test); the difference by sex is significant (p = 0.079, Design-based F-test)

more than half of all contributors, in terms of both money and goods (Table 15.3), and the amount of their contribution is quite significant. 28% of the siblings and 26% of other migrants contribute a "large" or "very large" share to the household's expenditures, which is hardly less than the spouses' share (Fig. 15.1).

These results show quite well that Senegalese families function on an extended basis and that a Westernized view of the family, restricted to its nucleus, is not appropriate for measuring the prevalence of transnational families or for understanding the social and economic effects of migration. Interestingly, our results also show that *remitting is not only determined by a preliminary contract between the migrant and his/her household of origin.* Indeed, it appears that 27% of all migrants had received some kind of support for organizing their migration from the household that declared them. Of these, only 50% had remitted money in the previous 12 months. The proportion is similar (53%) among those who had not received any support (unshown results). This suggests that supporting a migrant with his/her migration trip does not increase the chance of receiving remittances. In the end, it appears that some migrants, some closely related to the head of their origin house-

hold and even some who have received help for organizing their departure, do not remit. Is this because they cannot or because they are engaged in an individual migratory project? More analysis is needed to answer this question and to further explore and disentangle the role of family in migration rationales.

15.4 Migrant Families from the European Viewpoint

Transnational families consist, by definition, of people living in different countries. It is thus theoretically possible to adopt more than one perspective to study them, i.e. the viewpoint of the origin country and the viewpoints of the destination countries. In the previous section, Senegalese families were studied with the perspective of the sending country, using data collected from households at origin. In this section, we adopt the reverse viewpoint, using data collected among migrants in Europe, specifically France, Italy and Spain. Since family reunification with spouses and children is a concern for European governments (very few of which give the possibility of reunification to other relatives), in this section we adopt a nuclear approach to family. Using a typology fully explained in Chap. 6 (Table 6.19 and Box 6.1), we distinguish migrants in Europe according to the location of their spouse(s) and children under 18 (apart from migrants who have no nuclear family). This typology forms a gradient from "totally unified families" to "totally transnational families", with possible intermediary situations ("totally reunified families" and "partially reunified families"). We first assess the amount of transnational vs. other types of families, and then study to what extent these families differ from one another in terms of their socio-economic characteristics.

15.4.1 Prevalence of Transnational vs. (re)Unified Families

Transnational Life: The Most Frequent Family Arrangement The most striking result when looking at the family arrangements of Senegalese migrants in Europe is the high proportion of transnational families. *Almost half of all Senegalese immigrants in France, Italy or Spain (44%,* Fig. 15.3*) live in a different country than their spouse and/or minor child(ren),* most of whom remained in Senegal. This proportion includes 6% of partially transnational families, i.e. families in which the migrant lives in Europe with some members of his/her nuclear family, others being left behind in Senegal. These partially transnational families are thus also partially reunified families. The totally reunified families, which account for only 13% of migrants in Europe. The rest of the migrants have always lived in the same country as their spouse and children (19% of "always and totally unified family"), or have no nuclear family at all, i.e. no spouse and no minor child at the time of the survey (24%).
The most common case (25% of all family arrangements) is where the migrant is separated from both spouse and children. The other cases are very varied, with the



Fig. 15.3 Incidence of (re)unified vs. transnational families among Senegalese migrants in Europe

Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Time of the survey: 2008; Senegalese migrants in Europe (N = 200 in France, 200 in Spain, 203 in Italy)
Definitions: see Chap. 6, Table 6.19 and Box 6.1
Notes: Weighted percentages
Interpretation: 24% of Senegalese migrants living in Europe (Spain, Italy and France) have no nuclear family, i.e. they have no spouse and no child under 18
Statistical significance: the difference by country is significant (p = 0.000, Design-based F-test)

migrant living in Europe either with his/her spouse or his/her child(ren), taking into account that some have children but no spouse and some the reverse. When looking separately at spouses and children, it appears that those who live apart are more numerous than those who live united (Fig. 15.4). While 31% live with their spouse at the time of the survey (after a joint migration or after reunification), 36% are not in the same country (34% having no spouse). And while 27% live with their minor child(ren) in Europe, 33% left their child(ren) behind (40% having no child under 18).

These results reflect the average situation of Senegalese migrants in three European countries. In fact their family arrangements vary from one country to another. While Senegalese migrants in Spain and Italy are more often than not living in transnational families (respectively 56 and 66% of all family arrangements, Fig. 15.3), this is the case for only a quarter of those living in France. The very high proportion of transnational families among Senegalese migrants in Italy is consistent with the qualitative literature, which stresses transnational practices much more in this country than in Spain or, especially, France. In the latter country, compared to the other two, reunification appears to be quite common (24% partially or totally reunified, as against 16% and 15% in Spain and Italy). The timing of migration mostly explains this cross-country difference. First, it impacts the policy context: the family reunification policy started to be implemented in France in the 1970s when Senegalese immigration had not yet started in Spain or Italy. Second, for the migrants, reunifying takes time. The Senegalese migrants in France



Fig. 15.4 Migrants, their spouse and children: living in the same country or apart, across countries?

Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Time of the survey: 2008; Senegalese migrants in Europe (N = 200 in France, 200 in Spain, 203 in Italy)
Notes: Weighted percentages
Definitions: see Chap. 6, Table 6.19 and Box 6.1
Interpretation: 34% of Senegalese migrants living in Europe (Spain, Italy and France) have no nuclear family, i.e. they have no spouse and no child under 18. 18% of them have always lived with their spouse since their marriage
Statistical significance: the difference in residential arrangements by country is significant for spouses and children (in both cases, p = 0.000, Design-based F-test)

arrived earlier and had more time to prepare for their reunion with their spouse and/or children (Table 15.6).

The timing of migration also explains why the most common family type in France is the family that was never split. Theoretically, these families may result either from a joint migration (members left Senegal together) of from formation at destination. Two facts tend to justify this second possibility. Firstly, the Senegalese community in France is older, larger, and more sex-balanced than in the other countries (Table 15.5), which helps to create a larger matrimonial market at destination. Secondly, migrants in France have, on average, been at destination for longer and so have had more time to form a family there.

These results contrast with the belief widely shared in Europe that family reunification is the normal path followed by most migrants. It also contrasts with the Westernized view of migration, in which members of a family nucleus – the mother, the father and their children – live together.[4] *However, considering how Senegalese families function, these results appear much less surprising.* As explained in the introduction of this paper, multi-residence (of husband vs. wife, of parents vs. children) has long been a common family pattern in Senegal. The development of international migration has extended this residential pattern beyond the country's borders. It may also have reinforced it to some extent, in two ways. Firstly, some migrants explicitly reject the idea of reunification for socio-cultural and economic

[4] In fact this idealized view of the Western family is also increasingly contradicted by the growing complexity of family arrangements in European populations.

Table 15.5 Senegalese population in France, Italy and Spain

	Spain (all ages)	Italy (all ages)	France (aged 25 and over)
Men	30,234	41,048	52,997
Women	5641	6037	45,530
Total	35,875	47,085	98,527
Percentage of women	16%	13%	46%

Sources: Spain: 2008, Padron; Italy: 2006, Permessi di soggiorno Senegalesi al 1° gennaio; France: 2006, Census data (RRP2004–2007)

reasons (Riccio 2001; Sinatti 2011). Secondly, governments help to keep families transnational by multiplying the restrictions they place on family reunification. *The high prevalence of transnational families is certainly the mixed product of personal (individual or family) choices and policy constraints.* Our data do not provide the basis to clearly disentangle how far transnational arrangements are due to government regulations and how far to personal choice.

15.4.2 Are Migrants in Transnational Families Different from the Others?

The results of the previous section have shown that Senegalese migrants are quite commonly engaged in transnational families. Is this family situation just a question of timing, a transitory state before reunification? Or are these migrants different in some way from other migrants? To answer this question, we now compare migrants' characteristics according to family type at the time of the survey (reunified vs. transnational), while the next section explores the timing of reunification.

As migrants living in totally reunified families (F2 in Table 15.6), most "transmigrants"[5] (F3) formed their families before they migrated. Thus they left Senegal at a later age than those in an always and totally unified family at the time of the survey (F1), most of whom formed their families at destination. Otherwise, compared to reunified migrants, transmigrants have very specific profiles in two respects. Firstly, far more of them had received some support from their parents (except for those in Spain), which is probably an indicator of their being involved in a community form of migration, which is also known to be associated with a family lifestyle in which living apart is common (see the literature review). Secondly, transmigrants are much more likely than other migrants to be undocumented (18% on average, as against fewer than 1% for the rest, Table 15.6); they are thus not eligible for legal family reunification schemes.

[5]This term was proposed by Riccio (2001) to refer to migrants engaged in a transnational life. Here, we use it to refer to migrants who are part of a transnational nuclear family.

Table 15.6 Conditions of migration among Senegalese migrants in Europe, by country and type of family arrangement

	All countries	France	Spain	Italy
Age at arrival (mean)				
F1. Always and totally unified family	26	26	25	25
F2. Totally reunified family	30	31	29	29
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	29	30	30	29
Statistical significance (F tests, one way anova): The age differences between migrants according to their family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.000), for migrants in France (p = 0.001), for migrants in Italy (p = 0.057) and for migrants in Spain (p = 0.026)				
% of migrants who received some support from their mother and/or father to migrate				
F1. Always and totally unified family	16%	17%	4%	20%
F2. Totally reunified family	2%	2%	0.0%	3%
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	10%	15%	1%	14%
Statistical significance (F tests, one way anova): The differences in percentages between migrants according to their family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.001) and for migrants in France (p = 0.090), but not for migrants in Italy (p = 0.380) or for migrants in Spain (p = 0.224)				
% of migrants who did not have a residence permit at the time of the survey				
F1. Always and totally unified family	0%	0%	0%	0%
F2. Totally reunified family	0%	0%	1%	1%
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	18%	11%	25%	16%
Statistical significance (F tests, one way anova): The differences in percentages between migrants according to their family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.000), for migrants in France (p = 0.000), for migrants in Italy (p = 0.001), and for migrants in Spain (p = 0.000)				

Note: weighted percentages
Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Time of Survey: 2008; Population: Senegalese immigrants in France (n = 146), Italy (n = 163), and Spain (n = 167), excluding "no nuclear family"). All countries, n = 476
Interpretation: Migrants in an always and totally unified family arrived in Europe at a mean age of 26

The vulnerability of transmigrants is not only legal. It is also reflected in their socio-economic characteristics. They are poorly educated: on average (all countries combined), only 8% of transmigrants have received tertiary education, compared to 20% of reunified migrants (F2) and 36% of those who have never been separated from their nuclear family (F1, Table 15.7). Their low level of education is correlated with their low economic statuses (ISEI) and, quite logically, to poor scores for subjective well-being (Table 15.8). While more than 80% of never-separated (F1) and reunified migrants (F2) declared "yes, absolutely" when asked whether they had enough to live on during their stay in their current country of residence, only 70% of transmigrants gave that answer. *Although these descriptive results do not allow us to infer causality, they tend to corroborate the hypothesis that reunification is more likely to occur among better integrated migrants in Europe* (González-Ferrer et al. 2012; Baizán et al. 2014). And, again, this may result from a dual selection

Table 15.7 Socio-demographic characteristics of Senegalese migrants in Europe, by country and type of family arrangement

	All countries	France	Spain	Italy
% of women among migrants, by family arrangement type				
F1. Always and totally unified family	49.7%	53.8%	48.9%	24.8%
F2. Totally reunified family	58.1%	57.0%	64.3%	55.8%
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	9.0%	21.3%	5.3%	5.1%
Statistical significance (F tests, one way anova): The differences in percentages between migrants according to their family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.000), for migrants in France (p = 0.001), for migrants in Italy (p = 0.001), and for migrants in Spain (p = 0.000).				
% of migrants with a tertiary level of education				
F1. Always and totally unified family	35.7%	43.0%	2.7%	20.2%
F2. Totally reunified family	20.5%	22.0%	3.2%	34.3%
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	8.0%	13.3%	3.1%	8.7%
Statistical significance (F tests, one way anova): The differences in percentages between migrants according to their family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.000), for migrants in France (p = 0.002) and for migrants in Italy (p = 0.011), but not for migrants in Spain (p = 0.996).				

Notes: weighted percentages
Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Time of Survey: 2008; Population: Senegalese immigrants in France (n = 146), Italy (n = 163), and Spain (n = 167), excluding "no nuclear family"). All countries, n = 476
Interpretation: 50% of the migrants in an "always and totally unified family" are women

process. On the one hand, government regulations certainly play a role in limiting reunification. This explains, for instance, why reunified migrants almost always have regular legal status, while transmigrants are often undocumented. And since France, Italy and Spain use socio-economic criteria to grant reunification, the differences in the socio-economic characteristics of the various types of migrants may also reflect some effects of government selection. On the other hand, the specific profile of the transmigrants may also indicate the fact that they have distinct migratory rationales and that they (or their families) choose to not reunify. At least some of them have decided to transfer to the international level the family habit of living apart that is already quite common within Senegal. This does not mean, however, that they are the only ones to maintain ties with their origin country. Remitting money is a quite common behavior among migrants in Europe, whatever their family arrangements (Table 15.8), which reminds us – again – of the extended nature of the Senegalese family: even when living with their spouse and children in Europe, migrants continue to send money to their other relatives in Senegal.

Table 15.8 Socio-economic situation of Senegalese migrants in Europe, by country and type of family arrangement

	All countries	France	Spain	Italy
Occupational status				
Average ISEI (International Socio-Economic Index). ISEI ranks occupations by averaging status characteristics of job holders (education, skills, employment status…)				
F1. Always and totally unified family	37.6	39.0	29.8	35.5
F2. Totally reunified family	32.4	34.8	25.2	29.5
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	28.7	30.2	23.6	31.4
Statistical significance (F tests, one way anova): The differences in the ISEI score between migrants according to their family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.000), for migrants in France (p = 0.015) and for migrants in Spain (p = 0.003), but not for migrants in Italy (p = 0.313)				
% of migrants declaring "yes, absolutely" to the question "would you say that during this period you had enough to live on?"				
F1. Always and totally unified family	82.0%	84.4%	55.8%	90.5%
F2. Totally reunified family	85.8%	94.4%	44.7%	98.8%
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	70.4%	78.4%	41.9%	86.4%
Statistical significance (F tests, one way anova): The differences in percentages between migrants according to their family type are significant when all countries are combined (p = 0.003), but not in specific countries (France, p = 0.127; Italy, p = 0.380; Spain, p = 0.530)				
% who answered that they regularly send money during their stay in their current country of residence				
F1. Always and totally unified family	92.6%	96.0%	85.9%	77.7%
F2. Totally reunified family	89.5%	96.1%	80.9%	72.8%
F3. Partially or totally transnational family	89.7%	100.0%	86.8%	86.3%
Statistical significance (F tests, one way anova): The differences in percentages between migrants according to their family type are not significant (all countries, p = 0.637; France, p = 0.733; Italy, p = 0.320; Spain, p = 0.769)				

Note: weighted percentages
Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Time of Survey: 2008; Population: Senegalese immigrants in France (n = 146), Italy (n = 163), and Spain (n = 167), excluding "no nuclear family"). All countries, n = 476
Interpretation: 80.5% of migrants in an always or totally unified family were economically active at the time of the survey

15.5 The Formation and Evolution of Transnational Families

In this last section, our aim is to give an account of the process of family formation in a context of international migration. We set out to answer to two basic questions. How are transnational families formed? And how are they transformed into

reunified families? Our analyses are again restricted to family nuclei, i.e. to the migrants' spouses and children aged under 18, since these two categories correspond to those who are eligible for formal family reunification under the laws of most European countries. For the sake of clarity, we look at couples and children separately.

15.5.1 Couples

For a start, it is important to stress that most adult migrants are not married when they first out-migrate (analyses are limited to migrants aged over 18 at the time of migration). On average, two thirds of male migrants are single when they leave Senegal, with some variations according to destination country (73% of unmarried men among those arriving in France but only 49% in Italy (Fig. 15.5)).[6] Men without any family commitments can probably move more easily; further, migration is sometimes seen as a way to accumulate the necessary money to start a family in Senegal. More surprisingly in a context where social control over women is strong, a high proportion of female migrants are also unmarried when they leave Senegal for the first time, with proportions of unmarried women varying from 35% in Spain to 53% in France (Fig. 15.5). Among the average proportion of 51% unwedded women (taking the three destination countries as a whole), only 5% are engaged in a consensual union, the others being single (34%), divorced (11%),[7] or – more rarely – widowed (1%, Table 15.9). Whether these results reflect the development of "autonomous" female migration in Senegal is uncertain. In any case, it shows that female migrants are far from being only reunified wives.

Among those who were married before migration, very few moved jointly with their spouse (only 9% of female migrants and 1% of male, Fig. 15.5). In married couples, husbands typically moved abroad leaving their wife behind. 37% of all male migrants were in this situation when they left Senegal for the first time, while 39% of female migrants to Europe moved there to joint their husbands. The reverse configuration is not completely impossible: 5% of female migrants in Italy and 6% of those in Spain were the first movers in their couple and left their husband in

[6] At least two things can explain the high proportion of bachelors among Senegalese men arriving in France. The first is related to the organization of migration among the first wave of migrants: origin communities deliberately organized the departure of young male migrants (see above the literature review). The second concerns the more recent waves of migrants, among whom students are increasingly numerous (see also Chap. 13).

[7] Interestingly, the proportion of divorced women is much higher than the proportion of divorced men at the time of migration (11% against 2%) and also increases after migration. This suggests that there is a significant relationship between the experience of international migration and the social status of women in Senegalese society.



Fig. 15.5 Marriage and migration at the time of 1st migration

* Not married includes: singles, informal unions, divorcees and widowed
Note: weighted percentages
Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Population: Senegalese immigrants in Europe (n = 603); Time of survey: 2008
Interpretation: At the time of 1st migration, 65% of men and 53% of women were not married
Statistical significance: Differences between countries are significant among women (P = 0.0006) and men: (P = 0.0044); differences between men and women (all countries) are significant (P = 0.0000). Design-based F test

Table 15.9 Marital status of Senegalese migrants in Europe, by sex

	Male migrants		Female migrants	
Marital status	At the time of 1st migration	At the time of the survey	At the time of 1st migration	At the time of the survey
Single	52%	19%	34%	26%
Consensual union	7%	7%	5%	4%
Married	39%	63%	49%	46%
Divorced	2%	11%	11%	17%
Widowed	0%	0%	1%	8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	330	330	273	273

Notes: weighted percentages & unweighted numbers
Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Population: All Senegalese immigrants (n = 603)
Interpretation: 52% of the male migrants in Europe were single when they first migrated. Only 19.1% were still single at the time of the survey (2008)
Statistical significance: Male-Female differences are significant at time of 1st migration (P = 0.000) and at time of survey (P = 0.000). Design-based F test

Senegal. Albeit small, these numbers are maybe a sign of the emergence of autonomous female migration. Transnational couples can thus be formed when either one or the other spouse leaves Senegal to go abroad. In these cases, the marriage occurred before migration. But transnational couples can also be formed when the marriage occurs after migration; this is the case when a migrant already at destination marries somebody in his/her origin country. It is actually a quite common phenomenon among Senegalese migrants: 50% of transnational couples (married or not, i.e. consensual unions included) registered in MAFE were formed this way (Baizán et al. 2014).

To what extent do transnational couples become reunified couples in Europe? Conventional data in destination countries give usually few insights on this question because they are more often than not focused on migrants at destination, which creates two limitations. Firstly, they rarely contain information on those left behind, so that they cannot be used to compute the proportion of reunified vs. transnational couples. Secondly, they record no information on migrants who have returned and so cannot be used to give an account of reunification at both origin (Senegal) and destination (Europe). Furthermore, they are usually cross-sectional and so do not allow a study of how couples evolve over time from a transnational to a reunified state. The transnational and longitudinal nature of the MAFE data overcomes these limitations. Basically, what the MAFE data allows is to broaden the focus on family reunification. Rather than legal reunification, we look at *de facto* reunification. Reunification is thus defined as the fact of living together again (in the same country) after a period of separation due to international migration, regardless of legal channel for immigration to Europe (the legal status of the reunified migrant could be "student" or "worker" or any other status, and not only a status linked to legal reunification). Furthermore, with the MAFE data, reunification is not only seen from the European point of view: we also look at reunification at origin (i.e. in Senegal) to test whether the common wisdom that all migrants aim to regroup their family in Europe is accurate or not.

Figure 15.6 shows the proportion of transnational couples (i.e. couples composed of two spouses living in different countries, one at destination in France, Italy or Spain and the other in Senegal) who evolve into reunified couples in Europe. (On the computation of survivor functions, see Box 1 in Chap. 6). We examine at what rate couples reunify (or not) over a period of 10 years after their geographical separation. After 5 years of separation, approximately 7% of the migrants had reunified with their spouse (i.e. 93% are still separated on Fig. 15.6); after 10 years, the proportion reaches 18%. *This shows clearly that living apart across borders is, in most cases, a long-standing couple arrangement.* Interestingly, there are almost no differences in the timing of reunification according to the sex of the migrant: when they are the first to migrate in their couple, the wives do not "call" their husband over much sooner than husbands do when they are the first to move (gender differences in Fig. 15.7 are not significant).



Fig. 15.6 Time to reunification in Europe of Senegalese couples (survivor function)

Note: Weighted results
Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Population: Senegalese migrants living in Europe at the time of the survey who have experienced a period of separation from their spouse because of migration (they moved out of Senegal, leaving their spouse behind). Note that the sample used here does not include migrants who, after migrating, married someone who was still living in Senegal (n = 154)
Interpretation: The figures measure the duration between time of a married couple's separation and their time of reunification in Europe. After 2 years, 99% are still separated, this proportion being 93% after 5 years and 82% after 10 years. Statistical significance: Differences between men and women are not significant (Wald chi2(1) = 0.44; Pr > chi2 = 0.5077)

Do Senegalese migrants reunify more often (and more quickly) in Europe than in Senegal? In Fig. 15.8, we examine the difference between the chances of reunifying at destination (i.e. in Europe) and the chances of reunifying at origin (i.e. in Senegal), among migrants who either still reside in Europe or used to live there before returning to Senegal. In our sample of 172 migrants who live or used to live in Europe, and who were separated from their spouse because of their departure from Senegal, 21 reunified at destination and 16 at origin. Observing the timing of reunification, it appears that reunification at origin (i.e. in Senegal) is a quite short-term process, likely to occur within the five first years after the couples' geographical separation, with the proportion of reunified couples reaching 13% after 5 years (followed by a slow increase to 14% after 10 years). Reunification in Europe appears to be a longer process: after 5 years of separation, 7% of transnational couples have reunified at destination; the proportion keeps rising, reaching 16% after 10 years. In other words, over the long term, married couples are more likely to reunify in Europe, which is consistent with the fact that return is much more likely to occur within a decade after migration (Baizán et al. 2014). In any case, it remains that *reunification at origin is a significant phenomenon which contradicts the common wisdom that all African migrants in Europe come for good and to be joined by their whole family.*



Fig. 15.7 Time to reunification of couples, by sex of the migrant

Note: Weighted results
Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Population: Senegalese migrants living in Europe at the time of the survey who have experienced a period of separation from their spouse because of migration (they moved out of Senegal, leaving their spouse behind). Note that the sample used here does not include migrants who, after migrating, married someone who was still living in Senegal (n = 154)
Interpretation: The figures measure the duration between time of a married couple's separation and their time of reunification in Europe. After 2 years, 99% are still separated, this proportion being 93% after 5 years and 82% after 10 years. Statistical significance: Differences between men and women are not significant (Wald chi2(1) = 0.44; Pr > chi2 = 0.5077)

15.5.2 Children

Most migrants being unmarried at the time of their first migration, not many of them have children when they leave Senegal. Again gender differences are discernible in several respects. More women than men have children before migrating, although the proportion of mothers remains low among migrants (16%, as against 13% of fathers among male migrants, Fig. 15.9). Compared to male migrants, female migrants' family situations vary more between destination countries: the percentage of women with minor children ranges from 12% in France to 33% in Italy, but the corresponding percentage of men varies only between 7% in France and 17% in Italy. The family situations of women with children are also more varied than for men: while almost all fathers leave their child(ren) in Senegal, more migrant mothers move with them (7% of all women migrants leave their child(ren) behind, and the same proportion migrate with them, Fig. 15.9). Italy emerges as an exception, with female migrants adopting transnational strategies much more often than in the other European countries: a quarter of them leave their child(ren) behind, as against



Fig. 15.8 Time to reunification: couples, by country of reunification

Note: weighted results
Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Population: Senegalese migrants living in Europe or back in Senegal at the time of the survey who have experienced a period of separation from their spouse because of migration (they moved out of Senegal, leaving their spouse behind) (n = 172). Note that the sample used here does not include migrants who, after migrating, married someone who was still living in Senegal
Interpretation: The figure measures the duration between time of married couples' separation and time of reunification either in Europe (at destination) or in Senegal (at origin). After 2 years of separation (i.e. after one of the partners has moved to Europe), 1% have reunified at destination and 3% at origin. After 5 years, 7% have reunified at destination in Europe, this proportion being 16% after 10 years. After 5 years, 13% have reunified at origin in Senegal, this proportion being 14% after 10 years

4% of the women in France (Fig. 15.9). The phenomenon of "transmigration" described in the literature on Senegalese male migration in Italy (Riccio 2006; Sinatti 2011) also applies to women (Fig. 15.10).

Finally, when migrant mothers do not move with their children, they are significantly more likely to reunify than the fathers, and they do so much sooner (Fig. 15.11). As with couples, it is important to bear in mind that reunification between parents and children does not only occur in Europe. In fact, *reunification with children occurs sooner and more often in Senegal, with the migrant returning, than in Europe with children joining their parent at destination*. After 5 years of separation, 7% of the parent-child dyads have reunified in Europe, as against 14% in Senegal. And after 10 years, the probabilities of reunification are 10% in Europe and 23% in Senegal (Fig. 15.12). Again *these results show that reunification in Europe is not always the preferred option of Senegalese migrants, even though family reunion has become the main legal channel of entry into Europe.*



Fig. 15.9 Children and migration of Senegalese migrants currently living in Europe, at time of first migration

*Children over 18 are not included in the analyses
Note: weighted percentages
Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Population: Senegalese immigrants in Europe (n = 603); Time of survey: 2008
Interpretation: At the time of 1st migration, 87% of men had no minor children. For women, this was 84%
Statistical significance: Differences between countries are significant among women (P = 0.0006) and men: (P = 0.043); differences between men and women (all countries) are significant (P = 0.0000). Design-based F test

15.6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have used the MAFE data to study the relationships between migration and family in the context of Senegal and Europe. While most previous quantitative studies are biased because they offer a view limited either to origin or to destination, we took advantage of the transnational nature of the data to offer a dual viewpoint on families, from origin *and* destination countries. This led us to a first important result: *transnational families are very common*. Using the data collected at origin, we have shown that half of all households from the region of Dakar declared migrants abroad (whatever their place of residence) and that they have strong connections with them through various channels (social contacts, money or other material remittances). Importantly, these contacts do not only concern spouses and children but also members of the extended family. Even when adopting a restrictive (and European) perspective on family, by focusing on nuclear rather than extended families, transnational arrangements remain a common fact. Using the



Fig. 15.10 Time to reunification: parent-child dyads

Note: weighted results
Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Population: Senegalese migrants living in Europe at the time of the survey who have experienced a period of separation from their child(ren) because of migration. N = 569 parent-child dyads consisting of migrant with children aged under 18 at the time of migration. These dyads are distributed across 221 migrant parents, who have on average 4.05 (sd 2.2) children (range 1-12). Note that the sample used here does not include children born in Senegal after the first departure of one of the parents (usually the father)
Interpretation: The probability of staying separated is 99% after 2 years, 92% after 5 years and still 88% after 10 years. In other words, after 2 years of separation, 1% of the migrants had reunified with their child, the proportion being 7% after 5 years and 12% after 10 years. For men, the proportion of separated dyads is 100% after 2 years, 97% after 5 years, and 94% after 10 years. For women, the proportion of separated dyads is 96% after 2 years, 84% after 5 years, and 74% after 10 years
Statistical significance: Differences between men and women are significant (Wald chi2(1) = 33.91; Pr > chi2 = 0.0000).

data collected in Europe among Senegalese migrants, we have shown that transnational families are clearly more numerous than (re)unified ones. We have further demonstrated that *living apart across borders is quite often a long-lasting arrangement for Senegalese couples, as well as for their children*.

A second very important finding is that *reunification is not a one-directional phenomenon*. In line with the MAFE results showing that return migration is a significant phenomenon, although on the decrease in recent decades (see Chap. 13), we wanted to test the hypothesis that reunification can occur at origin (i.e. in Senegal) and not only in Europe. We thus rejected a legalistic view of reunification based on spouses' entry into Europe, adopting instead a factual definition, simply comparing



Fig. 15.11 Time to reunification: parent-child dyads, by sex of the migrant

Notes: see Fig. 15.10

the places of residence of the migrant and his/her spouse and child(ren). Observing them over the life course, from the time of separation (when the migrant moved out of Senegal, leaving his/her family behind) until the time of reunification (or the time of the survey if they were not reunited by that time), we have shown that *reunification at origin is a quite common phenomenon both for spouses and for children*. It is only when migrants have stayed in Europe a significant number of years (6 years of separation from partners, 10 years of separation from children) that reunification becomes more likely at destination, although reunification in Senegal remains an option.

The big remaining question is: what makes some migrants remain separated from their family long-term, others reunify in Europe and others again go back in Senegal to meet up there with their spouses and children? This question cannot be answered with the results presented in this paper. Other research has shown that migrants with higher odds of reunifying in Europe are the more Westernized ones (in terms of social norms) and the more economically integrated (González-Ferrer et al. 2012; Baizán et al. 2014). It is still not entirely clear whether this is the result of personal choice or of contextual opportunities connected with the legal framework for reunification in Europe. The anthropological literature suggests that living apart is a common fact for Senegalese families even in the absence of international migration. It could be that transnational families are at least partly the result of an internationalization of this habit. On the other hand, the fact that undocumented migrants are likely to be in transnational families suggests that the policy context cannot be ignored. The differences observed between countries (with a higher proportion of transnational families in Italy, for instance) also call for further



Fig. 15.12 Time to reunification: parent-child dyads, country of reunification

Note: weighted results
Source: MAFE-Senegal data; Population: Senegalese migrants living in Europe or back in Senegal at the time of the survey who have experienced a period of separation from their child(ren) because of migration. In all, there are 673 parent-child dyads (parents with children aged under 18 at the time of migration). These dyads are distributed across 246 migrant parents, who have on average 4.39 (sd 2.4) children (range 1-14). Note that the sample used here does not include children born in Senegal after the first departure of one of the parents (usually the father)
Interpretation: The figure measures the duration between time of separation of parent-child dyads and time of reunification either in Europe (at destination) or in Senegal (at origin). At destination: after 2 years, 0.6% reunified; after 5 years, 7.5% reunified; after 10 years, 9.7% reunified. At origin: after 2 years, 1.4% are reunified; after 5 years, 13.6% reunified; after 10 years, 22.6% reunified

research to take into account the effects of national policies on the reunification process. To what extent is reunification in Europe or in Africa self-selected and to what extent the result of official selection? This is the next question to be solved.

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