Rousseau on Citizenship and Education

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Abstract

This chapter examines the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the relationship between citizenship and education. The section "Citizenship in Rousseau's Thought" offers a sketch of Rousseau's political ideas and his understanding of the nature, requirements, and duties of citizenship. Section "Amour-propre and the Challenges to Citizenship" explains why education is required to form citizens. The chief reason for this turns on Rousseau's view of the passion of amour-propre, which, once inflamed, impedes the development of civic virtue and the performance of citizen duty. In Rousseau's thought, education has among its principal aims the prevention of amour-propre's development into its inflamed variant. Section "Rousseau's Educational Project(s): Domestic and Civic" outlines Rousseau's educational project and scholarly disagreements about how we are to understand it. One influential interpretation holds that Rousseau offers us two distinct models of education – domestic and civic – which are opposed to one another. A second, more recent interpretation holds that the two models can be read as parts of a single scheme. The section examines arguments for both

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interpretations before proceeding to discuss the details of Rousseau’s educational project under the second interpretation.

Keywords

Rousseau · Citizenship · Education · Amour propre

Introduction

In the middle of the *Discourse on Political Economy*, an *Encyclopédie* entry published in 1755, Jean-Jacques Rousseau tells the reader that “[t]he fatherland cannot subsist without freedom, nor freedom without virtue, nor virtue without citizens. You will have all these if you form citizens; without doing so, you will have only wicked slaves, beginning with the leaders of the state” (*PE* 154). In this statement, Rousseau not only reminds his readers of the great importance of virtuous citizens to a flourishing republic, he also puts forth an idea that would be central to his political philosophy, that citizens are not born but raised. The nature of, and relationship between, citizenship and education form the central concerns of this chapter. In what follows, we shall examine Rousseau’s views on citizenship and education more closely and highlight, whenever possible, some of the more contentious debates surrounding them in the vast and growing literature on the Genevan’s thought.

Citizenship in Rousseau’s Thought

Establishing Rousseau’s views on citizenship and education must begin with a sketch of his political ideas, which come most clearly to light in the *Social Contract*. The work contains Rousseau’s proposed solution to the problem of finding “a form of association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with all the common force, and by means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before” (*SC* I:vi, 138). The solution, at the most general level, involves a republican form of association constituted by a separation of the legislative and executive powers of the state. The executive branch of the republic – the government – is responsible only for interpreting and executing the laws defined by a general will (*volonté générale*) expressed through the legislative efforts of the sovereign body. The Sovereign, by contrast, is composed of the people actively exercising their law-making powers in concert; it is a moral being “to whom the social pact gave existence, and all of whose wills bear the name of laws” (*SW*, 73). It is not difficult to appreciate the radical nature of Rousseau’s project, for he wants to claim that since laws are the expressions of a Sovereign body constituted by members of the body politic on the one hand, and since no individual’s will can be represented on the other, *all citizens* are required to engage in the legislative functions of the state. Unlike representative democracies where

citizens typically vote in parliamentary or congressional representatives to make laws on their behalf, citizens in Rousseau's ideal republic must bear that responsibility themselves and must do so directly in their own persons.

Two central questions follow from the discussion above. Why does Rousseau require citizens to perform the arguably difficult task of lawmaking and what exactly does he mean by the general will? Let us take these questions in turn. Now, we have already seen that the social compact is, in part, Rousseau's proposed solution to the issue of how "each one, uniting with all, [can] nevertheless obey[] only himself and remain[] as free as before." Although Rousseau gives us varying accounts of what freedom consists in, the most relevant definition for our present purposes is that freedom involves *not being subject to the will of another*. As he describes it, "liberty consists less in doing one's will than in not being subject to someone else's; it also consists in not subjecting someone else's will to ours" (*LM*, 260–261). In a true republic governed by laws, citizens are not subject to the will of others but only to democratically agreed upon laws. Yet if laws are made only by a subset of the citizenry and applied to the rest, those not involved in the legislative project could be rendered subject to the former's will, leaving them without the very freedoms the social compact is supposed to actualize and defend. To avoid being subject to laws made by others and having those laws be externally imposed upon them (thus subjecting them to the wills of others), citizens must all participate in making the laws that are to govern the republic. Obeying a law I have made for myself, in short, leaves me free.

It is very important that in voting on the laws, citizens are not to vote in accordance with the particular or private interests they have as individuals; this would amount to a mere sum of individual preferences, the will of all. Moreover, because laws are general rules and apply to all members of the political association, voting on the lines of one's *private* interests can be seen as an attempt to subject associates to those interests. Rousseau's republican vision, devised as it is to circumvent these problems, requires individuals to vote as members of the sovereign body, purely in terms of their citizen identity. "Indeed," Rousseau tells us, "each individual can, as a man, have a private will contrary to or differing from the general will he has as a Citizen. His private interest can speak to him quite differently from the common interest" (*SC* I:vii, 140–141). The general will, in contrast to the will of all, looks to the *common good*. Because it tends to the common good – the good of every member of the republic (of which each is a part) – there is a vital sense in which voting in accordance with the *volonté générale* still aims at one's own good even when it runs counter to one's private interests. "In authentic acts of legislation," then, "*a citizen does not vote for all by voting for himself but* '*votes for himself by voting for all*'" (Gomes 2018, p. 203; Putterman 2010, p. 11). While this is so, placing the common good above one's own personal good is no simple undertaking, given especially the frailties of the human condition (to be detailed in the next section). It requires no small measure of effort and no small degree of virtue. If individuals in a republic are to place the common good above their own, they must possess virtue, that is, they must be *citizens*. And since civic virtue is not a natural endowment, citizens must be *made*. In making these associations, we are returned to

the statement posed at the beginning of this chapter and have accounted for why "t] he fatherland cannot subsist without freedom, nor freedom without virtue, nor virtue without citizens."

This said, we are still without an account of what the general will – the will of a republic expressed through the lawmaking activities of its citizens – consists in. David Lay Williams, in his inspired study of the *Social Contract*, remarks that "[a]mong the many potential frustrations confronting readers of the *Social Contract* is the simple fact that Rousseau never commits to spelling out the meaning of his most important concept, the general will, in anything approaching a straightforward or analytic fashion" (Williams 2014, p. 245). In their efforts to make sense of this vital concept, interpreters disagree strongly on "whether or not the general will is largely a formal or procedural concept on the one hand, or a substantive one on the other" (Williams 2014, p. 250). On the procedural reading, the content of the general will is determined by a set of procedures concerning how laws ought to be made (Sreenivasan 2000). The will, by itself, has no particular content and aims at no particular value or set of values. Certainly, Rousseau places a number of procedural constraints on lawmaking. He insists, for example, that the general will "should come from all to apply to all" (the double generality rule) where this means that all citizens must vote on rules that apply to every member of the republic. The general will "loses its natural rectitude when it is directed toward any individual, determinate object" (*SC* II:iv, 149). He requires, moreover, that deliberation occur in the absence of communication – citizens do not actually discuss their views on legislative proposals but reflect (deliberate) on them individually so as to avoid having their views be swayed by factions or private interests – and that they be asked "not precisely whether they approve or reject the proposal, but whether it does or does not conform to the general will that is theirs" (*SC* IV:ii, 201). The content of the general will is simply the result of lawmaking subject to these procedural constraints.

Conversely, other interpreters have argued that "while the formal criteria of the general will are necessary conditions for generating a general will, Rousseau also associates that will with specific substantive ideas" (Williams 2014, p. 254). According to Williams (2014, pp. 257–262), Rousseau's account of the general will encompasses three "tightly related" substantive values: "justice, goodness and equality." Justice consists in universal principles of morality prescribing standards of conduct governing right and wrong, good and bad. Rousseau is not, of course, blind to the cultural differences of the world, but he insists that in spite of these differences, the principles of right underwriting these culturally diverse societies are nevertheless similar. Justice, moreover, "is inseparable from goodness" and can be understood as "the love of order which preserves order" (whereas goodness involves "the love of order that produces order") (*E* 444). A true republic built on fraternal bonds where citizens are deeply attached to one another and to the republic constitutes one such order, and it follows from this that justice "involves the love of one's fellow citizens" (Williams 2014, p. 260). Finally, equality stands as a central element of justice. Justice as equality involves, on the one hand, recognizing the political and legal equality of citizens, and having "a commitment to economic equality" on the other. Economic equality is significant because vast disparities in wealth can not only lead

to the moral corruption of citizens, they also reveal, or make possible and likely, an environment of exploitation where the poor become subject to the tyranny of the wealthy (Williams 2014, p. 262). Now, given Rousseau's ideas concerning the great virtues of citizenship, the general will and a healthy republic, and their importance to freedom and justice, we might ask ourselves why Rousseau views the making of citizens and the establishing of republics as rare and difficult enterprises. His reason for this is that:

> It is too late to change our natural inclinations when they have become entrenched, and habit has been combined with amour-propre. It is too late to draw us out of ourselves once the *human self* concentrated in our hearts has acquired that contemptible activity that absorbs all virtue and constitutes the life of petty souls. How could love of fatherland develop in the midst of so many other passions stifling it? And what is left for fellow-citizens of a heart already divided among greed, a mistress, and vanity? (*PE* 155).

The problem, as Rousseau sees it, lies in the passions of the human subject. More precisely, it lies in particular with the passion of amour-propre. In the next section, we shall examine the passion in greater detail. Doing so will allow us to understand why citizens need to be formed through a process of education.

Amour-propre and the Challenges to Citizenship

To understand what amour-propre is, we need to first begin with Rousseau's clearest statement on the passion, which he contrasts with the innate passion of self-love (amour de soi-même):

> Amour-propre and love of oneself (amour de soi-même), two passions very different in their Nature and their effects, must not be confused. Love of oneself is a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to watch over its own preservation, and which, directed in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. Amour-propre is only a relative sentiment, artificial and born in Society, which inclines each individual to have a greater esteem for himself than for anyone else, inspires in men all the harm they do to one another, and is the true source of honor (*SD* 91).

There are, certainly, rather complex debates about the meaning and nature of amour-propre in Rousseau's works (Dent 1988; Cooper 1999; O'Hagan 1999; Neuhouser 2008; Kolodny 2010; McLendon 2014). Laurence Cooper suggests, for example, that the "great difference between it [amour-propre] and amour de soi is simply that in amour-propre, the desire for one's own good necessarily includes the desire to esteem oneself." It is "self-valuation, or the need for self-esteem" which "lies at the heart of amour-propre" (Cooper 1999, pp. 137–138). This reading, it should be said at the outset, does not have the deep textual support required to recommend it, if only for the reason that Rousseau never quite puts the distinction in those terms. At issue here is the rendering of amour-propre as a desire or need for *self*-esteem. In his immensely important and influential study of amour-propre in

Rousseau's thought, Frederick Neuhouser calls attention to the perceived error of Cooper's description, remarking that the passion is not mainly a matter of needing or desiring self-esteem. Rather, it is more suitable to understand the passion as the desire for the esteem or recognition *of others*, of those surrounding us in our inescapably social world. The great distinction between the two passions lies, then, not only in amour-propre's social sources in contrast to amour de soi's innate roots, but in the *relative* nature of the former passion, which, on the one hand, emerges in a "desire to have a certain standing in relation to the standing of some group of relevant others," where its satisfaction "requires – indeed, consists in – the opinions of one's fellow beings," on the other (Neuhouser 2008, pp. 32–33).

Rousseau never exempts the passion of amour-propre from the principal role it plays in our social and political pathologies. It is impressed upon his readers again in the *Dialogues* when he tells us that "amour-propre, the principle of all wickedness, is revived and thrives in society, which caused it to be born and where one is forced to compare oneself at each instant" (*D* II, 100). However, it is important to note that the passion of amour-propre is neither an inescapably nor a necessarily dreadful affect, that is to say, it is not unequivocally a bad passion. At one level, we have already indicated very generally why this must be so: if amour-propre is the passion that drives us to seek recognition, it surely cannot be the case that the desire that underwrites every attempt to win some form of social recognition is ill turned or ill conceived. The desire for equal recognition, whether socially or politically, or the desire to love and be loved, whether by our parents or by our partners, by our friends or by our acquaintances, are not, for example, in themselves unavoidably morally suspect or lacking in virtue. Neither do they, in themselves, lead always to undesirable outcomes. At another level, Rousseau himself does on occasion speak of the passion in positive terms. Not only can it be turned into a "sublime virtue," it is also responsible for some of the sweetest sentiments known to humanity (*E* IV, 389). In the light of this, scholars working on Rousseau, following the lead of Nicholas Dent's seminal observations and remarks on the subject, now commonly draw a distinction between amour-propre in its more general form and *inflamed* amour-propre, where the latter signifies a passion "turned to excess," of "having the character of a *strident* demand for superior position and title as the terms and conditions" of one's "being for others" (Dent 1988, p. 58). Although Rousseau does not make this distinction clear, it is nevertheless an important one to keep in mind. In other words, whenever Rousseau speaks of amour-propre in distinctly negative terms, which is not infrequently the case, or whenever he holds amour-propre responsible for the evils that plague the world, he is really talking about amour-propre in its *inflamed* form rather than the passion as it essentially is.

The principal aim of Rousseau's educational project is the prevention of amour-propre's development into its inflamed variant. But what, more precisely, does inflamed amour-propre consist in and how might it be clearly distinguished from its non-inflamed form? In his study, Neuhouser (2008, pp. 90–92) offers a detailed description of the varying ways in which the passion in its inflamed variant may be distinguished. A person's amour-propre is noticeably inflamed when it produces violent conduct and cruel behavior in her pursuit of recognition, when it overwhelms

the pursuit of her other “vital interests,” and when it becomes “restlessly imperialistic,” such that “nearly all of life’s activities” are transformed “into a quest for prestige.” It is inflamed, too, when freedom is willingly sacrificed for public approval, in the sense that conduct is determined less by an actor’s own judgments, values, and principles than by those fashionable in (what is, arguably, an already ethically corrupt) society. The drive for favorable opinion can further inspire “duplicity, pretense, and hypocrisy,” since the appearance of excellence, rather than the actual possession of it, is often enough to secure the high regard prized by each and sought after by all. In addition, amour-propre is inflamed “when a person has an exaggerated sense of the value of his own qualities and achievements and demands that the recognition he receives from others reflect his own inflated self-assessment, thereby ensuring not only his own dissatisfaction but also that of others (since he is then disposed to be as stingy in his recognition of others as he perceives them to be with respect to him)” (Neuhouser 2008, pp. 90–92). From servility to over-assertiveness and domination, from dependence to self-indulgence and hypocrisy, the source of our social and personal ills can, Rousseau believes, be traced back to an inflamed amour-propre, and it is securing this passion from turning into its inflamed variant that the work of education principally involves.

It is worth mentioning at this point that the problem of an inflamed amour-propre will not simply go away under a careful and rigorous upbringing. For the line separating a healthy and self-determined respect for public opinion and an over-reliance on it is easily crossed. We, as social beings, are all of us dependent on the court of opinion not only for the construction of ourselves and our identities but also for our internal sense of who we are and the value of our worth. The ceaseless effort to be worthy of consideration in the eyes of those who surround us, to possess considerable weight in their estimation, turns very quickly into a slavishness of spirit or an impulse to hurt in the absence of an educational project that continues past the careless exuberances of youth. In short, Rousseau thinks that insofar as our “sentiment of existence” is dependent on the views others have of us, we are always in danger of having our amour-propre inflamed. Any educational project that looks to prevent this occurrence must not therefore end as the learner reaches adulthood, but must go on, as it were, well into the later years of her life. It follows that the practice of citizenship can itself be understood as serving an educational function, where citizens learn and re-learn the ethics of civic virtue by engaging in the political practices constitutive of republican membership, for instance, by performing the duties required of citizens as specified by the participatory demands of a true republican association.

Rousseau’s Educational Project(s): Domestic and Civic

Having pointed out the interpersonal, social, and political problems arising from an inflamed amour-propre, our task now is to establish the main outlines of Rousseau’s educational project, a project that has as its principal aim the prevention of amour-propre’s development into its inflamed variant. But we are immediately

faced with the question of how we are to understand the general structure of this project. In dealing with this question, we find ourselves confronted with one of the most controversial issues in Rousseauian scholarship. The reason for this is that not only does Rousseau seem to present us with two philosophical visions in two distinct educational schemes, he also appears to present us with visions that are fundamentally opposed to one another. These seemingly competing visions can be found (perhaps most obviously) in the two works Rousseau published successively in 1762 – *The Social Contract* and the *Emile* – the latter of which is described explicitly as a treatise "on education." Can these alternatives be read together? Or does Rousseau really offer us two opposing systems of education that admit of no prospect for reconciliation? We shall now discuss two influential interpretations of Rousseau's educational project, beginning with the view that he offers us two distinct and opposed models. Following that, we shall discuss recent challenges to this view. On this second interpretation, Rousseau's seemingly opposed forms of education can be read as complementary rather than rival enterprises.

The first interpretation, which emphasizes the tension between the two models, has most famously been articulated by Judith Shklar in her study of the Genevan's social theory, arguably one of the best works written on Rousseau. In her view of things, "[w]hat is strikingly novel is his [Rousseau's] insistence that one must choose between the two models, between man and the citizen ... All our self-created miseries stem from our mixed condition, our half natural, half social state. A healthy man, the model for any system of education, would have to adhere consistently to a single mode of life." "Education," she goes on to say, "as a conscious choice is a social experience. The alternatives are therefore not nature or society, but domestic or civic education" (domestic education is the model found in *Emile*; civic education is the model described in the *Social Contract*). More expressly, if human beings are to "escape from" their "present disorientation and inner disorder," they must either be "educated against society, in isolation from and rejection of all prevailing customs and opinions," or they must be educated in a manner where their selves are entirely immersed in society, where they "lose [themselves] in a collectivity" (Shklar 1969, p. 5). Put simply, Rousseau provides us with two educational schemes. The first looks to raise an individual with the greatest degree of independence from the customs and opinions of society. The second looks to raise an individual wholly integrated into the mores, routines and conventions of a republic. Any attempt to raise an individual under the direction of both these educational schemes is incoherent and can result only in an unfortunate breach of "the psychic needs of men for inner unity and social simplicity" (Shklar 1969, p. 5). In her final assessment, however, Shklar suggests that the choice between the two educational schemes is a false one. As she describes it, "[w]hen he [Rousseau] called upon his readers to choose between man and the citizen he was forcing them to face the moral realities of social life. They were asked, in fact, not to choose, but to recognize that the choice was impossible, that they were not and would never become either men or citizens" (Shklar 1969, p. 214).

Setting aside the rather despairing note in Shklar's final assessment, her view of the distinction between man and citizen (and thus the two modes of education) has

been deeply influential in the ways in which readers have come to understand Rousseau's philosophy. Mira Morgenstern (1996, p. 154) repeats the idea that the two schemes are to be understood as opposing alternatives when she writes that for Rousseau, we "can be either individual men or citizens, but not both." Similarly, Margaret Canovan (1983, p. 288), in her delightful essay on Arendt and Rousseau, describes the Genevan not only as one "who claimed that upon each man's conscience were inscribed basic rules for individual moral conduct," but also as one who "did not think that these sharp rules sufficed for the citizen. On the contrary, he made a sharp distinction between 'man' and 'citizen'." And even more recently, Karen Pagani (2015, p. 3), in her study on the significance of anger and forgiveness in Rousseau's thought, speaks of the "impetus behind" her work as proceeding from "the observation that Rousseau's thoughts on both anger and forgiveness were deeply influenced by the very important distinction between man and citizen that underpins his political philosophy and the radically different ethical imperatives regarding how one could and should respond to conflict that resulted on account of it."

In spite of this rather broad consensus, some scholars have in recent times suggested that the rigid and sharp distinction drawn between the two schemes is mistaken. This second interpretation holds that Rousseau does not oppose these models to one another but is rather opposed to the simultaneity of their implementation. Neuhouser, who offers the most sustained defense of this interpretation, argues that the aim of the educational project of *Emile* "is to produce a 'man-citizen', an individual who possesses the capacities required to embrace the general will of his polity as his own – the virtue essential to citizenship – while at the same time embodying *a certain version* of the ideal of self-sufficiency that defines men: the freedom to 'see with one's own eyes', to 'feel with one's own heart', to be governed only by 'one's own reason' rather than being compelled always to conduct oneself, or to judge, as others see fit" (Neuhouser 2008, pp. 20–21). In defending this view, he urges us to pay careful attention to Rousseau's own statement on the matter, in which he announces that "forced to combat nature or the social institutions, one must choose between *making* a man or a citizen, *for one cannot make both at the same time*" (*E* I, 163, emphasis added). Rousseau's concern, as Neuhouser sees it, is neither to offer us a choice between two competing alternatives nor to dismiss the project of bridging the divide between raising men and citizens as a futile or hopeless endeavor. Rather his concern lies with the attempt to engage in both projects *simultaneously*, which if embarked upon, will surely fail. The educational project as detailed by Rousseau in *Emile* aims, then, at the "overcoming of that opposition," and it does so by creating "a successive system of education that proceeds first with the ideal of man and later with the ideal of the citizen" (Neuhouser 2008, p. 20, 172; Gomes 2018, p. 195).

Endorsement for this second interpretation has recently grown. Agreeing with Neuhouser that Rousseau's account of the man and citizen divide indeed centers on an objection to the simultaneity of implementing the two modes of education, Gomes points out in further support of this view that Rousseau not only speaks of "the possibility of fashioning men and citizens despite his initial repudiation of this

possibility" in *Emile*, he also describes the *Social Contract* and *Emile* as forming a "same" or "complete" whole (Gomes 2018, p. 196, 197). That Rousseau himself thought of these works as parts of a complete whole should give pause to anyone looking to defend the former interpretation which reads them as rival enterprises. However, although Neuhouser is "indeed correct to argue for a successive system of education," Gomes suggests (in contrast to Neuhouser) that "the making of a citizen is not completed in *Emile* but extends into the *Social Contract*." The problem with Neuhouser's view, according to Gomes, is that he does not consider "the crucial role the Lawgiver (*Législateur*) plays in the fashioning of citizens capable of discerning the general will." Since citizens in Rousseau's ideal republic are still required to see themselves in the first instance *as citizens*, that is, as selves whose identities are intimately bound up with the greater entity that is the republic, and since "an important aspect of the Lawgiver's work" – which Emile's tutor does not perform – "lies in 'changing human nature; of transforming each individual, who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole, into a part of a larger whole from which this individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being'," it is doubtful that the project of raising a man-citizen can be achieved by relying solely on the domestic mode of instruction found in *Emile* (*SC* II:vii, 155; Gomes 2018, pp. 196–197).

Given Rousseau's own commitment to reading *The Social Contract* and the *Emile* as a single whole, and given that a central objective of education is to raise individuals capable of performing the duties of citizenship, let us now turn to see how domestic or private education can be understood as a first step towards the goal of raising a citizen. As we have already seen, one of the express purposes of Emile's education is to prevent the inflammation of his amour-propre. Since this requires virtue, and since we are natural beings who first experience the world through sensory perception, part of his educational scheme must involve showing "how our capacity for sensation might be cultivated to develop the judgment and wisdom that distinguish the developed virtuous agent" (Hanley 2012, pp. 239–240). In Ryan Hanley's brilliant reconstruction of Rousseau's "virtue epistemology" (upon which the rest of this section on private education is based), the educational system found in *Emile* is best understood as a developmental one, which "requires progress through three discrete stages – first, sensation; second, judgment or reasoning; and third, conscience and willing – necessarily in this order," where "each stage [serves as] a necessary preparative for the next" (Hanley 2012, p. 241) (This section is based on Hanley's work. Errors and departures are mine. See also (Gomes 2018, 200–201).).

Rousseau thinks that any system of education must begin with sensory training. He makes clear that a child's "sensations are the first materials of his knowledge" since "memory and education are still inactive" at birth (*E* I: 193). Human beings come into this world neither stocked with innate ideas nor endowed with already developed cognitive abilities of reasoning, memory, and judgment. Because of this "our senses are the instruments of all our knowledge" and "it is from them that all our ideas come, or at least all are occasioned by them." To say that our senses are "instruments of all our knowledge" and that "it is from them that all our ideas come" or are occasioned is not to say, however, that sensory perception can by itself

provide us with certainty and knowledge of truths about the world. For "[o]ur senses are given to us to preserve us, not to instruct us, to warn us about what is useful or the opposite to us and not about what is true or false" (*ML*: 184). Nevertheless, since sensory perceptions constitute the first materials of a child's knowledge, it is important to "present them to him in an appropriate order" since this would "prepare his memory to provide them one day to his understanding in the same order." Or as Hanley describes it, "the indispensability of sensory education consists partly in the fact that the child's sense impressions ultimately form a 'storehouse of knowledge' that can later be employed and synthesized once the faculty for judgment and comparison is cultivated" (*E*: 193; Hanley 2012, p. 243; pp. 242–244).

The second stage of private education focuses on the "cultivation of judgment" which, "'in Rousseau's definition, is a developed capacity for accurate and legitimate comparison," a capacity that "requires engagement in the process of synthesizing discrete perceptions into systems of relations" (Hanley 2012, p. 246). Through her sensory faculties, a child receives only images rather than ideas, where the "difference between the two is that images are only absolute depictions of sensible objects, while ideas are notions of objects determined by relations" (*E* II: 243). In other words, our senses do not provide us with ideas. Rather, they give us images of things. Ideas are formed by making comparisons of the images obtained through the senses, by synthesizing and ordering them (and it is through comparison, synthesis, and ordering that relations are thus established). In this way, ideas are the result of and involve the activity of the mind. To be sure, ideas arising from the comparison, synthesis, and ordering of sensory images can themselves be put into a system of relations through the similar activities of reflection and judgment, the result of which is a more sophisticated and complex set of ideas. Now, it is certainly not the case that *any* relation of ideas or images will do; ideas and the relations between them or contained in them are not arbitrary and cannot simply be decided by the whims and fancies of any individual mind. Rather, they can be *properly ordered*. Improper reflection and judgment produce false relations and thus false ideas. The cultivation of a pupil's judgment must therefore involve training his "ability to compare and order the relations between sensations and ideas *correctly*, to see true relations as they are. This is an important stage in the development of the moral agent, since amour-propre is itself a comparative sentiment, and whether it becomes inflamed or not is contingent on our capacity to judge, and judge human relations accurately." (Gomes 2018, p. 200, emphasis added).

In the third stage, the pupil's "cultivated capacity for the judgment of physical relations" is transferred "to the judgment of moral relations; indeed Rousseau is explicit in insisting that the study of 'real material relations' is the necessary preparative for 'bringing him ever closer to the great relations he must know one day in order to judge well of the good and bad order of civil society'" (Hanley 2012, p. 255). The pupil must learn at this stage what the true relations of human beings consist in. "Men are not naturally Kings, or Lords, or Courtiers, or rich men. All are born naked and poor; all are subject to the miseries of life, to sorrows, ills, needs, and pains of every kind. Finally, all are condemned to death." This, in Rousseau's

opinion, "is what truly belongs to man," "what is most inseparable" from human nature, and "what no mortal is exempt from" (*E* IV: 373). The actual relations of human beings are not constituted by characteristics that distinguish and raise certain individuals above others or the struggle to attain a position of ascendency and privilege. They are to be understood in terms of the equality of human weakness and the likeness of their needs. To aid the student in gaining a clear picture of this, Rousseau relies on the lessons of history (Gomes 2018, p. 200). For "if the object were only to show young people man by means of his mask, there would be no need of showing them this; it is what they would always be seeing in any event." Instead, education must attempt to reveal men as they are "since the mask is not the man and his varnish must not seduce them" (*E* IV: 390). History allows the pupil to see intricacies of human deception and the evils human beings do to one another without being himself harmed by those acts: "It is by means of history that, without the lessons of philosophy, he will read the hearts of men" and see them as "a simple spectator, disinterested and without passion, as their judge and not as their accomplice or as their accuser" (*E* IV: 391–392). The results of this are worth stating in full:

> Casting his eyes for the first time on the stage of the world; or rather, set backstage, seeing the actors take up and put on their costumes, counting the cords and pulleys whose crude magic deceives the spectators' eyes. His initial surprise will soon be succeeded by emotions of shame and disdain for his species. He will be indignant at thus seeing the whole of humankind its own dupe, debasing itself in these children's games. He will be afflicted at seeing his brothers tear one another apart for the sake of dreams and turn into ferocious animals because they do not know how to be satisfied with being men . . . If he judges them well, he will not want to be in the place of any of them (*E* IV: 397; 400).

By coming to this understanding of the moral relations of humanity, by seeing that human beings are fundamentally equal, the pupil also develops her "innate principle of justice and virtue according to which, in spite of our own maxims, we judge our actions and those of others as good or bad," that is, her conscience (*E* IV: 452). As Rousseau explains elsewhere, "conscience develops and acts only with man's understanding. It is only through this understanding that he attains a knowledge of order, and it is only when he knows order that his conscience brings him to love it" (*LB*: 28). Once the student learns that the true order of humanity is one marked by relations of equality rather than privilege, her conscience will bring her to love it and work towards its preservation (Williams 2007; cf. Marks 2006).

It is worth stating at this point what domestic education does and does not do for the formation of citizens. On the one hand, it provides the student with an understanding of the truth of human relations – that we are fundamentally equal as moral beings – and aids in the development of his conscience through which he is impelled to preserve the fundamental order of human equality. Moreover, conscience is the sentiment by which the justice or injustice of human conduct is judged. In this way, domestic education helps prepare the student to discern the general will of his republic, since equality and justice form two of the substantive values embodied in that will. Moreover, private education prevents the inflammation of amour-propre, which makes it possible to "draw us out of ourselves." One of the consequences of

an inflamed amour-propre is the concentration of the human self in individual hearts. It is in Rousseau's view almost impossible to reform corrupted hearts that can look only at satisfying the narrow interests of the self. Because the citizen is one who is able to see his self as part of a larger whole, the prevention of the inflammation of amour-propre leaves the possibility of citizenship open to a student not yet enslaved by vanity and pride.

What a private education does not do, arguably, is make a citizen. For the student is at the end of his education a man in the first place; he does not see his life and his being as part of a larger whole. He has not yet developed the bonds of fraternity required of citizenship, and is as a result incapable of willing the general will. Moreover, the general will is not a universal will. Each republic has a general will unique to itself. In the absence of fraternal bonds and a love of country, and without coming to an understanding of the unique nature of the general will of the republic to which he will eventually belong, it is difficult to speak of him as an already formed citizen. Indeed, as Rousseau makes clear, the project of transforming an individual into a part of a larger whole is in great measure the work of the Lawgiver, a foreigner of eminent wisdom and virtue who is able to see the corporate will of a people he is tasked to form before they are even aware of it themselves. The Lawgiver's work does not happen in a private education and the student of this education is not yet a true citizen.

"One who dares to undertake the founding of a people should feel that he is capable of changing human nature, so to speak, of transforming each individual, who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole, into a part of a larger whole from which this individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being" (*SC* II:vii, 155). This is the foremost duty of the Lawgiver; his task lies in transforming individuals into citizens by making them cognizant of their corporate will. He is needed, moreover, because "in order for an emerging people to appreciate the healthy maxims of politics, and follow the fundamental rules of Statecraft" in the absence of guidance and instruction, "the effect would have to become the cause; the social spirit, which should be the result of the institution, would have to preside over the founding of the institution itself; and men would have to be prior to laws what they ought to become by means of laws" (*SC* II:vii, 156). He must therefore look to foster corporate unity "and the edification of a people's *moeurs* through the initiation of laws that attend to all the particular features of a nascent people," which include "all that is required by the location, climate, soil, morals, surroundings, and all the particular relationships of the people he was to institute" (Gomes 2018, p. 207; *PE* 147). He must do so because the general will is not universal but specific to each collectivity.

The lawgiver goes about his task by "initiating laws that mirror the general will, with ratification remaining the prerogative of the sovereign solely." Individuals develop civic virtue and an increasing knowledge of their corporate identity by voting on the laws, since it is precisely through the act of voting that each must in silent deliberation consider the common good and ask themselves if a proposed legislation conforms to the general will (Gomes 2018, 207). Given their lack of political experience and their as yet underdeveloped cognizance of their own

corporate will, the lawgiver cannot hope to convince citizens of his wise counsel by the use of reason alone. Nor can he simply use force to compel compliance. He must instead "appeal to the gods," "to win over by divine authority those who cannot be moved by human prudence" (Williams 2014, p. 91; *SC* II:vii, 156–157). Yet he cannot employ crude tricks – engraving tablets, buying oracles – to make an impression; these are acts any individual can perform. If the people are to believe that his wisdom and presence are indeed backed by divine sanction, then something more than questionable miracles is needed. In the end, the "Legislator's great soul is the true miracle that should prove his mission" (*SC* II: vii, 157). It is by the miracles of his own genius, wisdom, and virtue that he shall persuade the people of the divine force behind his undertaking, and thus persuade them to adopt his counsel (Kelly 1987, 325). If he is successful, a republic will be formed and citizens will be made.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we examined the question of citizenship and education, and the relations between them, in Rousseau's political thought. We also examined some of the major debates surrounding these issues in the growing literature on his ideas. We began by identifying and clarifying some of his central political ideas before proceeding to discuss the problem of inflamed amour-propre and the two educational schemes he offers to counter it. In closing, it would perhaps be fitting to end with some of Rousseau's own remarks, which summarizes the views and arguments expressed above: "Although men cannot be taught to love nothing, it is not impossible to teach them to love one object rather than another, and what is truly beautiful rather than what is deformed. If, for example, they are trained early enough never to consider their persons except as related to the body of the State, and not to perceive their own existence, so to speak, except as part of the state's, they will eventually come to identify themselves in some way with this larger whole; to feel themselves to be members of the fatherland; to love it with that delicate feeling that any isolated man feels only for himself, to elevate their soul perpetually toward this great object; and thereby transform into a sublime virtue this dangerous disposition from which all of our vices arise" (*PE* 155).

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