Citizenship, Education, and Political Crisis in Spain and Catalonia: Limits and Possibilities for the Exercise of Critical Citizenship at School

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Abstract

The process of the independence of Catalonia has generated great interest on the part of international analysts as well as among a part of the citizenry while also producing disputes and controversy that have grown with the passage of time. This controversy lies, at first glance, in the opposition of interests defended by independentist sectors (who want the independence of Catalonia) and unionists (defenders of the unity of Spain). However, deeper analysis reveals another element of discord: the latent concept of citizenship.

This chapter deals with six aspects: first, it briefly addresses the concept of citizenship used in the chapter; second, it situates Catalonia within the framework of Spain; third, it analyzes the process of political recentralization and its consequences (citizen mobilization, referendum, and use of police violence by the

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State); and fourth, it addresses the issue of education and language as a weapon of political combat. This is followed by a section explaining the process of participation in favor of the right to decide and a presentation of the arguments used to counter the independence movement. The chapter concludes with a section devoted to analyzing the relationship between education, citizenship, and politics and a proposal to encourage political and citizen debate that can be framed beyond the Catalan-Spanish context.

Introduction

The ongoing independence process in Catalonia has generated a great deal of interest among various international analysts. The linguistic and educational reality in Catalonia, which is not without controversy and polemic, has been the subject of particularly noteworthy debate, as the Spanish government and unionist political parties (defenders of the unity of Spain) supported by the media have repeatedly accused Catalan schools and families of the political indoctrination of children. The main arguments employed include claims that the Spanish language is prohibited in Catalan schools; that families have taken their children to demonstrations to demand the referendum [on Catalan independence] held on October 1 2017; that inappropriate textbooks are used in schools and politics is being discussed in a biased and tendentious way; and that once the referendum was held, there were teachers who openly talked about what had happened with their students. In short, it has been said that both families and Catalan schools indoctrinate, though those making this charge do not ever specify the precise meaning of this term.

This chapter situates the process of independence of Catalonia, addressing the political and institutional crisis that has occurred from 2000 onward and which is related to the concept of citizenship generated in this context. By extension, the chapter examines debates concerning the teaching and learning of democracy, participation, and politics in Catalan schools. The chapter concludes with a reflection on how citizenship can be worked on both in the family and in school.

The Concept of Citizenship

"Citizenship" is one of the most used concepts in political science and political philosophy. It is routine to hear the concept in common parlance, whether by political representatives, the media, or in the wider population. However, as with many other concepts in the social sciences, there is a risk of using the concept in contradictory ways, as a "conceptual stretching" (Sartori 1970), due to citizenship's historical essence and polysemic nature. Thus, today, we find multiple

interpretations of citizenship: global, cosmopolitan, urban, sexual, cultural, etc. (Hampshire 2013).

For the purposes of this chapter, our concept of citizenship focuses primarily on identity aspects and, to a lesser extent, on legal aspects. Following Connor (1989) and Krauss (1996), in plurinational democratic states, it is just and appropriate for different nationalities to be recognized as such and for them to cooperate or remain united by choice and not by imposition. Plurinational states face the challenge of articulating, harmoniously and through free consent, flexible political-administrative structures that allow diversity of identity to be expressed satisfactorily. This approach, from our point of view, leads us to consider it pertinent that different nationalities, as sovereign political polities, have the right to exercise self-determination, that is, the ability to freely decide their future through referendums or other forms of democratic participation.

The translation of this concept of citizenship in the school encompasses three basic questions: to visualize and positivize diversity in a broad way (social class, sexual orientation, religion, cultural practice, geographical origin, cultural belonging, etc.) (Levinson 2012); to be able to talk about everything, without exception, with the only condition being not to disrespect anyone, especially minorities (Fox and Messiou 2004); and to promote the institutionalized and spontaneous participation of the entire educational community, especially referring to students (Susinos and Ceballos 2011).

Catalonia Within the Framework of the Spanish State

Catalonia is, for now, an autonomous community that, together with 18 other autonomous communities, is part of the Kingdom of Spain. This system was established by the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which is the first and only constitution that the Spanish State has had following the death of the dictator Francisco Franco who ruled Spain from 1939–1975. Throughout his dictatorship, Franco implemented an annihilative policy regarding any manifestation of democratic expression and civil liberties, including the attempted liquidation of the cultural and linguistic diversity inherent in the country, especially in the territories with more marked idiosyncrasies: Catalonia, Basque Country, and Galicia. With the so-called Spanish political transition (1975–1978) and the advent of democracy, Catalonia, as a historical community with its own language, history, laws, and institutions dating from medieval times, recovered its political institutions: the Parliament and the *Generalitat de Catalunya* [Government of Catalonia].

In contemporary times, Catalonia has consistently been, with more or less intensity, a controversial subject of political debate to determine, essentially, its degree of autonomy in the framework of the Spanish State (Fontana 2014). The Constitution of 1978 establishes four types of competences: exclusive competences of the State, exclusive competences of the autonomous communities (including Catalonia), concurrent jurisdiction between State and autonomous community, and shared competences. This question is "resolved" in a way that, now that we have a

certain historical perspective, has led to substantial confusion and dissatisfaction on all sides, namely, through a distribution of powers between the Spanish State and the Catalan government (hereinafter *Generalitat*) that in some respects can be considered confusing, unclear, and, above all, ineffective.

The ambiguity of the distribution of competences and the progressive emergence of new aspects (such as tax increases on sugary drinks or banks) that could either be attributed to the State, the Generalitat, or to both institutions, has entailed legal issues that have had to be resolved by the Constitutional Court (a court accused by many actors, including *Juezas y Jueces para la Democracia* [Judges for Democracy], of being highly politicized as magistrates are proposed by the different political parties according to their parliamentary quota in the Spanish Congress of Deputies). This situation generates a high number of appeals of unconstitutionality and conflicts of jurisdiction presented by both sides; 26 lodged by the Generalitat in the period from 2010 to 2013 and 8 by the Spanish government against the Catalan administration in the same period. However, it is worth mentioning that on certain occasions – albeit very few – a broad and flexible interpretation has been adopted, thus enabling higher levels of self-government to be achieved and, consequently, greater autonomy.

Education is a confusing sphere of competence because there is no legal text that clearly determines whether it is subject to concurrent or shared competence. Even so, examination of Catalan autonomic law affirms that the Generalitat can develop its own, although quite limited, educational policy (Prats 2015). This legislation gives the Generalitat full (but not exclusive) powers that are specified in the "regulation and administration of education in all its extension, levels and degrees, modalities and specialties," reserving to the central government the regulation of academic and professional qualifications, the promulgation of the basic norms that guarantee fulfilment of the obligations of public authorities toward education, and supervision and control (the so-called High Inspectorate) of the entire education system.

The Process of Political Recentralization in Catalonia and Its Consequences

Since 2000, and with greater visibility from 2010 to the present – a period in which Spain has been governed by the *Partido Popular* (PP), a neoconservative political formation advocating a traditional Spanish nationalism – Catalonia has suffered a far-reaching process of recentralization, with the subsequent reduction of a range of rights and powers that had already been integrated into the ordinary functioning of the country (Puigpelat 2016).

A major turning point in the recognition of rights and the concept of self-government of Catalonia took place in 2006 when the Government of the Generalitat and the political parties of the Parliament of Catalonia modified the Statute (equivalent to the constitution of Catalonia). In this year, Parliament passed a new regulatory framework (the previous one was from 1979) by an overwhelming majority (120 votes in favor and 15 against), which was substantially modified (more than 50% of its articles) when it was sent to the Spanish Parliament. After

tense negotiations, and reluctant acceptance of the suppression of concepts referring to the Catalan nation, among other aspects, the Statute was approved in the Spanish Parliament by a large majority. Subsequently, and as mandated by the Spanish Constitution, the new Statute was submitted to a referendum among the Catalan population, obtaining 74% of the votes in favor, 21% against, and 5% abstentions. Even so, the PP collected signatures throughout Spain to bring the Statute to the Constitutional Court, which, in 2010, invalidated certain key articles regarding identity, reducing still further the legal and symbolic value of Catalan difference. Throughout the duration of the process of the new Statute, there was a continued weakening of the recognition of a plurinational State and the diversity of the communities that coexist within it, as well as of the acceptance of the embodiment of historical nationalities and plural forms of citizenship, at the same time that political tension became increasingly evident (Castells 2017).

The progressive construction in Spain of a restrictive model of citizenship, when not directly exclusive and discriminatory, has had unexpected effects to the point that it has reached a kind of dead end that, from a strictly political point of view, brings into question the logic and viability of the policy. The fact that little by little – but in a persistent way – the concept of Spanish citizen has been built around a less plural and more homogeneous national identity has also contributed to the fact that a significant part of the Catalan population feels increasingly detached from Spain. For example, data from the *Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió* in February 2018 shows that 40.8% of the population supports the independence of Catalonia.

On July 10, 2010, shortly after the Constitutional Court cut back the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, a demonstration attended by one and a half million people took place in Barcelona (the capital and largest city in Catalonia) under the slogan "We are a nation, we decide." This demonstration was supported by all the political parties comprising the Parliament of Catalonia, except for Spanish nationalist parties contrary to the aspirations for greater self-government in Catalonia (Partido Popular of Catalonia and *Ciudadanos*). As of this moment, the institutional declarations appealed to "the moral exclusion of the Spanish Constitution" and every September 11 (national day of Catalonia), there have been massive demonstrations, always festive and peaceful, requesting the right to decide on, or directly calling for, independence. On September 11, 2017, approximately one million people from all over Catalonia filled the streets of Barcelona in one of the massive demonstrations that have been held on the national day of Catalonia every year since 2011.

The articulation in Catalonia of an increasingly large independence movement has been led by both civic and cultural associations of all kinds, most of which are characterized by being politically plural (within the broad pro-independence ideological spectrum), intergenerational, and peaceful. On the other hand, the movement has also been supported by those Catalan political parties that have always been pro-independence, as well as others that until this time had only been autonomists and that in some cases had even supported unionist parties to facilitate the formation of the government in Madrid.

The discontent of an important part of the population of Catalonia during these years (2000–2018) has not only come about because of the symbolic (although not

minor) issue, of the refusal of the Spanish government to grant legal recognition of a singular national identity. Discontent also stems from an economic issue: from 2000 onward there has been a constant breach of investment commitments by the State. It is not that the State has not invested sufficiently in Catalonia (although that too, in the opinion of many citizens) but that part of the investments planned and approved in the general State budgets in Parliament have not been implemented, thus hampering the development of certain infrastructures and services, many of which have affected and continue to affect the poorest classes. Furthermore, and as a demonstration of a clear exercise of lack of transparency, the State has repeatedly refused to publish the fiscal balances that account for the real economic contributions of Catalonia to the whole of the Spanish State.

The fact is that, since 2010 and amid this tense climate, a political confrontation has grown exponentially in which the national element and the latent concept of citizenship have played a central role. For some, the Spanish nation is singular and indivisible, and they call for a recentralization process to be launched in which the autonomous communities would have competences taken away, thus disempowering them while strengthening the role of the State. In fact, in recent years, the percentage of people in Spain who are in favor of a more centralized state has increased from 25% to 36% (from 2015 to 2017) (Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano (BRIE), 39 Oleada, January 2018. Available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org). This opinion is reflected in declarations by people in executive positions in the Partido Popular such as those of the Minister of Justice Rafael Catalá, who emphasized in November 2017 that, more than expanding competences, it is necessary that the *central government again assume control over essential public policies* (https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Gobierno-promover-regresion-autonomica-constitucional_0_706580002.html). On the other hand, in Catalonia, the support for independence among the population has increased from 19% in January 2010 to 40% in October 2017 (Baròmetre d'opinió política del Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió de la Generalitat de Catalunya. 3ª onada 2017. Available at: http://ceo.gencat.cat/).

Education and Language as a Pretext

In this context of political-national tension, the Spanish government of the Partido Popular, as well as a substantial part of the major statewide political parties and diverse mass media, has used education and language to try to influence public opinion. In the case of Catalonia, the complex linguistic reality of the country has been used as a battlefield by the PP and, above all, by Ciudadanos, a party that came into being in Catalonia and later extended throughout the rest of Spain with the aim of governing the whole nation.

It is important to note that the linguistic issue in Catalonia, although it has always been a sensitive subject and of concern, has not always been as controversial as it is now. So much is this so that in 1983 all the political parties with representation in the Catalan Parliament voted in favor of the law of linguistic normalization, a law that, if

we take into account policy development as well as the tacit political agreement between the Catalan and Spanish governments during certain periods, has allowed language immersion in Catalan schools to this day. In practical terms, this means that children are mainly taught in Catalan, with Spanish being progressively introduced so that at the end of the primary education cycle all students are competent in both official languages of Catalonia (Catalan and Spanish). This model differs from other autonomous communities such as the Basque Country, for example, where until relatively recently there were as many as four models of schooling based on how and when the Basque and Spanish languages were introduced (Turell 2007). While the Basque Country has tended to move away from using an immersion model, considering that it favored segregated school communities, Catalonia has maintained its immersion policy, especially after verifying that, even though the country has received an important contingent of foreign migrants, 12-year-old children are competent in both Catalan and Spanish. Moreover, objective testing of students in Catalonia has repeatedly shown that they are as (or more) competent in the Spanish language than students from other monolingual communities, according to data from the Ministry of Education on the results of university entrance exams in Spain in 2017 (https://www.mecd.gob.es/servicios-al-ciudadano-mecd/estadisticas/educacion/univer sitaria/estadisticas/estadistica-de-las-pruebas-de-acceso-a-la-universidad0/Ano-2017. html).

Nonetheless, the political struggle over the Catalan language in school and by extension in the whole of society has become evident. In 2010, as we have already commented, the Constitutional Court issued a sentence against the Statute of Autonomy and, in particular, against the fact that Catalan is the vehicular language in Catalan schools. The Court ruled that in those cases in which Catalan is considered normalized, schools must move toward having a similar percentage of classes in the two official languages.

The Minister of Education of Spain, by virtue of the implementation of the Organic Law for the Improvement of Educational Quality (LOMCE 2013), established that families residing in Catalonia that requested to receive primary education in Spanish would have to enroll in private schools and forced the Government of Catalonia to pay the costs of this schooling. This decision brought concern because Catalan teachers, academics, families, and unions considered that there was a partisan, instrumental, and political use of the language in the sense that it slowed the normalization of Catalan (a pending normalization, among other reasons, owing to the banning of this language during the periods in which Spain has been subject to dictatorial regimes) and laid the foundation for a sociolinguistic confrontation, nonexistent until then. Despite the fact that this decision was revoked by the Constitutional Court in 2018, both the current Minister of Education and the President of the Spanish State have publicly stated that in the 2018–2019 school year, Catalan families, when preregistering their children for school, must choose if they want to be schooled in Catalan or Spanish.

This dispute reveals, as we have said, different conceptions of citizenship within the framework of an unequivocally plural Spanish State in which there are territories with two official languages and with multiple and diverse identities. Everything

suggests that, while it may bring electoral benefits in Spanish national elections, the aspiration to diminish, if not completely silence, projects that seek recognition of individuality in territories such as Catalonia has little future. Moreover, seeking political, linguistic, and social confrontation between two sectors of the same territory is dangerous because of the increased tensions and social conflicts that are generated (Suselbeck 2008).

The Future of Catalonia: Civic and Participatory Processes

The process of recentralization we referred to above, the curbing of linguistic normalization that we have just described, the cuts in the Statute of Autonomy of 2006, the failure of the Spanish government to invest in Catalonia, the configuration of an imaginary in a plurinational state that fails to recognize plurality, the impossibility of establishing an egalitarian dialogue between Catalonia and Spain to see how the two realities can fit together, the systematic and repeated invalidation of laws of a social nature approved by the Generalitat, and other factors have increased independence sentiment among part of the Catalan population. This sentiment, both politically and socially, crystallized with the demand expressed in an outcry: "the right to decide" the future of Catalonia.

The "right to decide" was a social movement that was generated in 2013 and was specified in the National Pact for the Referendum at the end of 2016 on the grounds that 80% of the Catalonian public was in agreement with holding a referendum on the independence of Catalonia. This movement brings together diverse groups of people, associations, platforms, and political parties: ranging from independentist options to federalists and including unionists with strong democratic convictions. Despite repeated requests from the Government of the Generalitat of Catalonia, the Parliament, and Catalan civic entities, the Spanish government would not agree on the development of an official referendum, in contrast to Britain and the granting of a referendum on Scottish independence. Two consultation processes were carried out in Catalonia: the 9-N Consultation (November 9, 2014) was responded to by 2,305,290 voters, of whom 1,861,753 opted for an independent Catalonia and 104,760 for Catalonia to remain within Spain. In the Referendum of 1-O (October 1, 2017) 43.3% of the census participated, with 2,044,038 (90.18%) voting in favor of independence and 177,547 (7.83%) against it.

The two participatory processes were actively fought by the Spanish government and ended up being judicialized, to the extent that a considerable number of people are currently under investigation and many political leaders are either in prison or in exile. Moreover, the repression by the police and State on 1-O has been denounced by several international organizations, including Human Rights Watch, as a disproportionate violation of human rights. From the moment the polling stations opened, the Spanish police tried to prevent people from voting, and, failing to do so, a government order unleashed indiscriminate and brutal police violence against voters.

Hundreds were left injured, some seriously. Catalonia's Health Department estimated on October 2 that 893 people had reported injuries to the authorities. Spain's Ministry of the Interior said on October 1 that 19 National Police and 14 Civil Guards had required urgent medical assistance, and that an "innumerable number of others" were injured. Following the referendum, Human Rights Watch documented excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators by Civil Guards or National Police at a primary school in Girona being used as a polling station, and in the hillside villages of Aiguaviva (Girona province) and Fonollosa (Barcelona province). Human Rights Watch received other allegations and purported evidence of police ill treatment, which it has not been able to verify or examine in detail, along with instances of assaults on police officers by some demonstrators. (https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/12/spain-police-used-excessive-force-catalonia)

In the days following the referendum, there were many schools that spoke about the events of 1-O with their pupils. In some schools, the incidents were addressed because when the children entered the school they saw the damage and destruction (doors broken down, shattered glass, closets with their contents ripped apart, school material on the floor, etc.). In other cases it was talked about because the children asked to do so, if only to be able to express their anxiety or fear about what they had witnessed in person or saw replayed in the media or Internet on the day of the referendum. There were also schools that spoke about what had happened by decision of the teachers, simply because they are teachers who tend to talk about what happens in society, in their town, etc. or because, like so many other citizens, they felt outraged, harassed, humiliated, or beaten. For whatever reason, educators in many schools deemed it an appropriate time to talk about rights versus responsibilities, of violence versus peace, of democracy versus tyranny, and of citizenship and rule of law.

Arguments Accusing Families and Catalan Schools of Indoctrination

As noted in the introduction to this article, that several schools discussed what had happened on October 1 led the Spanish government to react by constructing a meta-narrative based on the "indoctrination" of children by families and the school. The main arguments of this narrative revolved around four ideas that, in summary, amounted to the following: *parents bring their underage children to pro-independence demonstrations and events, and this is unacceptable; many parents took their children to vote in a referendum declared illegal by the Spanish State, thus contributing to the ideologization of defenseless minors*; *separatism is advocated in Catalan schools, thus propagating a clearly indoctrinating and anti-Spanish ideology*; and to hammer the point home, *in Catalan schools it is prohibited to speak Spanish.*

The seriousness of the case is that these arguments, including those that are false, were constructed by commentators, mass media, and members of the government itself with the idea of creating a seamless monolithic public opinion that would legitimize the Spanish government. Next, we proceed to a detailed analysis of the

arguments that we have just described with a double objective: to explain whether they are true or false and, independent of that, the latent concept of citizenship they lead us to.

1. *Parents bring their underage children to pro-independence demonstrations and events, and this is unacceptable*. It is true that all the demonstrations related to the independence process have been attended by families with children of all ages. In fact, they have been demonstrations made up of a marked plurality of people, from both the political-ideological point of view (as already mentioned earlier) and the generational: children, adolescents, young people, adults, and large numbers of seniors have participated. It is important to emphasize that all these demonstrations have been overwhelmingly peaceful. In this regard, the authors of this article consider that an act like the one explained here is closely related to the concept of educating in politics and in and for democracy.

2. *Parents took their children to vote in a referendum declared illegal by the Spanish State, thus contributing to the ideologization of minors*. It is true that on the day of the referendum there were families who came to vote with their children, and it is likely that this fact would give rise to speak about why a referendum was being held, what its meaning was, the voting orientation of their parents and, who knows if also, other family members, etc. This act was criticized by some. The political culture of citizenship, especially that of children, is acquired in various spaces and areas of socialization, among which the family is of great importance. However, here we can see how some political parties strove to emphasize the conflict and tensions surrounding the socialization of children by questioning whether the family or the State is the "right" agent of socialization. Under our approach, these tensions should not be present in the public sphere if the conceptualization of citizenship were to be addressed from the republican model mentioned in the beginning of this chapter.

3. *Separatism is advocated in Catalan schools, thus propagating a clearly indoctrinating and anti-Spanish ideology.* There exists little evidence to suggest that this claim is actually true. Considering how primary schools and secondary schools teach history, political institutions, democracy, and citizenship, it is not possible for the Catalan school to indoctrinate. Neither the school curriculum, nor the educational competencies, nor the textbooks allow it. The Catalan school, if it infuses a national sentiment, does nothing more than schools in the rest of Spain or in democratic Europe. Here we would add an observation, one which is by no means unimportant: while schools in Catalonia teach about the history of both Spain and Catalonia and Spanish and Catalan political institutions, and children end up speaking and writing both languages equally, the same does not occur elsewhere in Spain.

4. *In Catalan schools it is prohibited to speak Spanish.* While this claim has been constantly repeated and disseminated by some politicians, it is not the case that speaking Spanish is prohibited; Spanish has never been banned in schools in Catalonia because, among other things, politicians, intellectuals, academics, and ordinary citizens who lived through the Franco dictatorship know all too well the

consequences of prohibition of a language. The Spanish Constitution, the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, the Law of Linguistic Normalization, and common sense have established that Catalan and Spanish, both, are official languages of Catalonia, and, as such, every citizen has the right and the duty to know them.

As previously mentioned, the regulatory framework and the political consensus around it (when it has existed, of course) has meant that in Catalan schools children are taught in Catalan with Spanish being progressively introduced, so that at the end of primary school students are equally familiar with both languages. Even so, there are primary and secondary schools, especially in the periphery of Barcelona (areas of significant Spanish immigration during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s of the last century) where there has not been any linguistic immersion in Catalan and schooling has been conducted exclusively in Spanish. Yet, despite this, nothing has happened, except the fact that these students have not learned Catalan. This situation, which could be considered anomalous and contrary to the spirit of normalization of the Catalan language, has not been denounced by the Catalan educational authorities nor by educational inspectors, labor unions, or pro-independence political parties. We might also add that beyond the schools and secondary schools where linguistic normalization has not been implemented, there are many educational centers where Spanish is spoken primarily or solely on the playground, being a reflection of the sociolinguistic situation of the neighborhoods where these centers are located. Moreover, as it cannot be otherwise, it is a question that has been respected always and everywhere. Consequently, Spanish has neither been prosecuted nor persecuted in Catalonia.

The Current Debate: The Relationship Between Education, Citizenship, and Politics

In line with our analysis so far in this chapter, and in the fundamental spirit of this publication, the purpose of this section is to frame the relationship between education, citizenship, democracy, and politics, focusing on both the role of the family and the school.

In a mature democracy, it is desirable for the family to be involved in the civic and citizenship education of their children (Prieto-Flores et al. 2018). To completely delegate political education to other socializing agents is not, from a holistic and integrative educational perspective, highly recommendable. How can a family educate their children to be citizens in the twenty-first century? Obviously, there is no single answer, especially when this education will depend largely on the political and ideological perspective of the family and the communities in which they live. Even so, if we look for fundamental and cross context guidelines that are compatible with the ideological diversity described above, perhaps we can consider the following recommendations appropriate: educate children to have a thorough respect for the opinions expressed within and outside the family unit; educate in the knowledge and practice of the rights and duties that, in accordance with children's age, can be

understood and practiced; educate in the experiential knowledge of the town, neighborhood, or city in which they live; educate in respect for human diversity present in the place where they live, as well as in other areas; etc.

Apart from what has just been mentioned, the fact that families encourage their children to actively participate in activities carried out in the territory facilitates and fosters citizenship education. In this way, children become, to the extent that it is possible, part of the associative, cultural, and recreational fabric of society, prioritizing, if possible, community-based activity (Biesta and Lawy 2006). As a derivative of this proposal, the authors of this chapter believe that it is important to accustom children to conscientiously participate in public life, attending political and social demonstrations that, apart from the experience itself, serve as a pretext to discuss issues that have to do with the shared community reality. A "good" education for citizenship within the scope that we are addressing also involves doing everything possible to prepare and form "good people," "useful people," that is, people interested and involved in community issues that in this way transcend the strictly personal or family space.

Regarding schooling, education for responsible citizenship, according to Edelstein (2011) and considering the contributions of the Demoskole Research Group, can be worked on (i) from the testimony of adults; (ii) from an appropriate modulation of the relationships and interactions among members of the educational community; (iii) from an appropriate teaching-learning methodology; and (iv) through the curriculum.

(i) The testimony of teaching professionals and other adults present in the school is essential to guide students toward a model of responsible citizenship. The adult who addresses students with respect, care, and attention; who sets reasoned boundaries, both reasonable and with love; who knows how to listen and is able to create a favorable climate to talk about whatever is necessary; who trusts their students and does not hesitate to allow them to speak and express themselves freely and respectfully; and who strives for their students to be able to speak with a voice of their own, etc., embodies a citizen model that encourages active and informed engagement. As stated by Max Van Manen (1998), the example of the educator, and their gestures, is crucial for students to incorporate certain values that, as if they were attitude-generating matrices, shape certain behaviors and patterns of interaction.

(ii) Appropriate modulation of the relationships and interactions among members of the educational community. The construction of respectful and flexible social relationships, accustomed to the diversity of ways of doing and feeling and radically opposed to any form of discrimination or violence, is conducive to the construction of an open, tolerant, and just citizen model (Hayward 2012). A democratic school concerned with forming responsible citizens should promote such relationships and should do everything possible to quickly detect any situation that goes in the opposite direction. In this regard, we believe that we must be very attentive to the standards of naturalized violence (taken as a matter of course and as inevitable) that occur in so many primary and secondary

schools – violence that, in many cases, is mistakenly seen as admissible because it is considered to be contingent on the tension that occurs in society. Needless to say, the acceptance of this violence does nothing other than impoverish the prototype citizen that is slowly being constructed while also lowering the fraternal aspirations of the human species.

(iii) The teaching-learning methodology also has to do with, although perhaps more indirectly, democracy and the model of citizenship propagated in the center. Although on many occasions the methodology employed in the classroom is considered a strictly technical issue, authors that have reflected on this from a critical point of view do not believe this to be so (Gimeno Sacristan and Pérez Gómez 1992; Contreras 2010). The way in which knowledge is transmitted and created in the classroom to the extent that a conception of learner and educator intervenes is objectified, in part, in a complex of interactions of power and domination (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970) projects different models of citizen, citizenship, and society. Even the most novice observer can discern the differences that may exist between a school based on traditional pedagogy and one that is based on active learning. The latter has to do with the postulates of the active school (De Zubiría Samper 2008) and, in a more transparent way, with the principles of free and respectful education (Wild 2002) and also with the broad spectrum of student-centered learning and green pedagogy that, as explained by Heike Freire (2011, p. 12), "stimulate a sense of deep connection with life, with oneself and others, and that fosters the capacity for empathy and responsibility."

(iv) A curriculum that is committed to citizenship must integrate, without reservations, aspects having to do with democracy, politics, and ideologies, among others (Giroux 2003; Guichot 2014). Democracy is something that is practiced every day and everywhere; it is something that is part of the school's DNA and is manifested, more than with grand discourses or classes, through the gestures and attitudes of teachers and educators. Politics and ideologies are worked on in all their extent and complexity, and, unlike what frequently occurs in the family environment, ideology is not guided, to begin with. In the event of doing so, the school or the teacher would be restricting the ideological freedom of the child, which would hinder the possibility of choosing. It is also true that we do not only subscribe to a simple description of different ideologies, like someone who presents different neutral "products" that can be consumed according to the tastes and impulses of consumers. Along with the presentation of different equal ideologies, we believe it is necessary to consider two fundamental questions: to enumerate the values that support them as well as the consequences involved in their implementation and, in addition, to also encourage students to raise fundamental questions precisely so that they can evaluate any and all ideologies, especially those the teacher most identifies with and that because of caution and especially ethics they would never explain.

Apart from what we have just said, citizenship and politics can also be worked on – and it is good that this is done – through a more structured curriculum that takes

into account diverse and complementary aspects. We consider the following points to be important: First, to deal with the rights and duties of the citizens, placing special emphasis on the different generations of human rights. Second, to make known the political institutions comprising the local, national, state, and international spheres, explaining their role or objectives, the functioning, and the decision-making process. Third, it is also necessary to speak of the different actors involved in politics, with, in our opinion, a special focus on noninstitutional actors that work for collective rights and causes. Fourth, it is appropriate to present the different systems of government, highlighting the role of the citizen in each of them as well as the rights that are recognized or denied. Fifth, it is desirable for students – when they are in a sufficiently advanced stage of maturity – to know political, social, and economic history, paying much attention to the problems and conquests in the aforementioned areas. And sixth, it is necessary to speak about linguistic, ethnic, or identity problems and how these are contained in constitutions and international norms that promote respect and tolerance for diversity. In line with what we have been explaining, it is clear that education for citizenship is a broad and transversal area full of possibilities.

Conclusion

We cannot finish this chapter without outlining how we can work effectively on a topic as far-reaching and complex as the one we have been exploring. Aiming only to introduce the subject, and taking as a starting point the guidelines of Barbosa (2000) and the Demoskole Research Group, it is desirable to treat aspects related to the area of citizenship from proximity, in other words, based on everyday issues that have to do with the reality experienced by students. By not doing so, we can easily fall into the mistake of imparting an excessively abstract curriculum and moving away from the interests and experiences of students.

Starting from the consideration we have just made, citizenship can be addressed through very different ways or systems. These include:

– Through a master class, the viewing of a film or documentary, focused and comparative analysis of the press, and by interviewing political actors and members of social movements that come to school
– From student visits to the headquarters of different actors
– Through service learning activities inside and outside the school
– From carrying out actions linked to the needs of the neighborhood, town, or city (worked on before school)
– Through participation in protest demonstrations, with prior work and consensus with families
– Through incorporating new democratic structures of participation that go beyond what is habitual – especially if they have democratic stumbling blocks that limit free expression

– Through the distribution of positions whose exercise has individual and collective repercussions
– By involving students and families in the ordinary life of the center
– By organizing shared directions between teachers and families
– By creating meaningful communities and therefore going beyond the rhetoric to which we are so accustomed, making use of active, nondirective, and free pedagogies
– Through embodying a consciously chosen ethos that is applied in a transversal way throughout the center

In summary, as explained by Feu and others (2016, 2017), we need to take into account governance, habitance, otherness, ethos, and pedagogical practice to make possible the development of free, responsible, critical, creative, and solidary human beings at the service of a more egalitarian and just society.

The fact that the Catalan school has addressed the central theme of the controversy – the process of independence of Catalonia, or aspects related to it including the referendum on October 1, the police violence, the previous and subsequent demonstrations, etc. – does not necessarily have to be a negative issue. In line with what we have said, talking about politics in school based on issues that are part of current political and social debate "vivifies" them and makes them easier to understand. Dodging them, pretending they do not exist, and leaving them outside the walls of the school does nothing but increase the existing divorce between society-politics and school while renouncing critical and informed citizen education.

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