

Chapter 8

Family Dynamics in the Context of Forced Migration

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8.1 Introduction

Marriage and family formation is one of the main areas which is affected in the process of migration. However, forced movement creates precarious situations by which family processes and patterns are changed and affected significantly. Prior to the discussion on the impacts of forced migration, it is necessary to briefly define and present the typology of refugee and forced migration.

As discussed in introductory chapters of this volume, forced migration refers to the coerced movement of a person or persons away from their home or home region. Migrating in the same country means the person is an internally displaced person (or IDP), and migrating to another country means the person is a refugee. The movement can be due to natural or environmental disasters, famine, and conflicts. Involuntary migration is different from voluntary migration because there is usually no prior intention or plan to leave. Forced migrants include refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people, and trafficked or smuggled people. Movements and family are mutually interconnected and influence and affect each other one way or another. This chapter elaborates the role of family and households in processes and dimensions of forced migration.

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8.2 Demographic Analysis at the Scale of the Family and Household

The family and households are the cornerstone of societies. Childbearing, caring for children, and providing support for the ill and the dependent aged are the main functions of families and households (Bongaarts 2001; Ryder Norman 1977). These units are usually the locus of joint decisions regarding consumption, production, labor force participation, savings, and capital formation (Becker 1991). Decision-making about migration and other aspects of the move are also made and affected by and within the household and family. Thus, analysis of the role of the household and residential family should be central in demographic analyses (Bongaarts 2001; Willekens 2009).

While social sciences have long recognized the importance of families and households, Bongaarts (2001, p. 3) argued that ‘demographers have neglected the quantitative dimensions of the size composition and change in households and their causes and consequences’. Burch (1979) and Berquó and Xenos (1992) described family demography compared to fertility and migration as ‘immature’ and ‘under-developed’. Conventionally, demographers consider individuals as their unit of analysis by which limited variables such as age and sex are controlled for testing theories explaining the ways in which these demographic variables are affected by vital events. In reality, however, vital events and particularly migration are influenced by a complex array of decisions and actions made and taken by the families and households and kin groups. Not only does every individual in these units have an age, sex, and marital status, but members are related to one another in a variety of ways (Bongaarts 2001).

The family is a strategic point from which changes in the lives of immigrants and their children can be analyzed (Hirschman 1997, p. 201). Family dynamics are crucial to the understanding of the degree to which immigrants progress economically and socially or integrate into mainstream culture (Goldscheider 2005; Arias 1998, p. 40). And, structural constraints and conditions that immigrants confront in their new environment easily shape their family arrangements, roles, and orientations (Foner 1997, p. 962). Despite the multi-dimensional impact of households and families on migration and the complexity of their relationship within such units with migration, most studies on migration have either been focused at the aggregate (community or state) level or alternatively at the individual level. However, recognizing the importance of family and household on migration, recent studies have shifted their attention to household and family level as unit of analysis (Massey and Espinosa 1997; Massey 1990, 2015; Sana and Massey 2005; Démurger 2015; Cindy Fan et al. 2011). This shift is important and strategic as the decisions for migration and particularly for forced migration are made by the family, and members of households have a role in determining *whether, when, where, how, and by whom* to move. The family is, mutually, affected by the movement of the whole – or some members of the family who may become separated, or settled in a new destination.

The livelihoods of family members in the new society, their return to and reintegration in the origin society are also affected in the process of migration.

There can be two approaches in studying the relationship between forced migration and family. One is to examine the role that family as a whole or members of the family as individuals have in the decision making and the process of migration. Alternatively, studies can analyse the impact of migration on family formation and dynamics. This chapter aims to do the latter.

8.3 Frameworks for the Analysis of Forced Migrations and the Family

Conceptualisation is a necessary precursor to effective measurement and analysis of populations. In this section, we will present a conceptual model of forced migration based on the pioneering work of the demographer Kunz (1973, 1981) which was based on refugees. He sought to produce a general model which included the fundamental elements of the refugee process from initial flight to eventual settlement. Kunz (1973) recognized three stages in the forced migration process – flight, asylum and eventual settlement. The spatial and temporal characteristics of each stage vary. For example, flight for safety is likely to be characterized by the search for a place of temporary protection or ‘safe haven’. This may be a camp in a secure location or flight may take forced migrants to harbor with friends, family or acquaintances in an area which is secure. The time spent in this situation varies. For some forced migrants, there can be a return to the home area once the physical or conflict situation has passed. For some, this can be settlement in the transit situation or movement to a third destination. These movements of refugees and displaced people inevitably involve the loss of property, jobs, and often even family or friends. After their resettlement, they have to re-accumulate such properties and belongings. This depends on the level of their integration into host society and that would be a major challenge (Falck et al. 2011).

Another typology conceptualises forced migration as having four distinct phases - pre-flight, flight, temporary settlement and resettlement (Ager 1999). Karunakara (2004, p. 7) modified this slightly by dividing the forced migration experience into three phases – home, transit, and refuge (Fig. 8.1). The duration and intensity of forced migration experience will vary greatly between populations. It would be, however, difficult to distinguish stages of forced migration where people are constantly insecure and have been forced to migrate several times.

Interplay of several factors in all the stages leads to disruption as a result of which their family will be affected. Loss or lack of income, food, and essential services (like health or education) all disrupt societies and are likely to force populations to migrate (Ager 1999). Lack of freedom, and state violence are also other strong predictors of forced migration (Zwi and Ugalde 1991). Conflicts urge families to




Fig. 8.1 Phases of Forced Migration (Source: Karunakara 2004, p. 7)

separate with adult men first. The more substantial second wave of migrants may comprise mainly women and children. The very old and the infirm may be left behind. It is likely that families with children are also more likely to migrate than those without (Martin and Tirman 2009). The *Refuge* phase does not necessarily lead to a safe settlement. A refugee and the family could live in camp situations for a long time. In the final phase, a refugee and the family could be integrated into the host country, resettled in a third country, or repatriated back to the origin place. Host country policies may not be in favor of migrants and can force them to become isolated from the host population (Ager 1999).

For refugees and other forced migrants, family unity cannot be taken for granted, as the situations that cause displacement commonly disperse families (Staver 2008, p. 3) in the sending, transit, and receiving places. Migration may affect the family in each of the stages of forced movement differently, and ideally family dynamics should be examined in all stages of migration to ascertain the degree to which the family has changed along the way. Forced migration affects all aspects of the family including age at marriage, family structure, family formation process and relationship with family members. These dynamics may also lead to the increase in female-headed households in sending or host countries. Biased age structure among migrant communities has also an impact on transnational- and inter-marriages. The issue of citizenship of family members and children of mixed marriages will also have consequences for children and families in the host community. Finally, as discussed in the Chap. 6 by Agadjanian (2017) forced migration impacts fertility behaviour. We now turn our attention to the hypotheses by which mechanisms and pathways by which migration influences the family are explained.

8.3.1 *Theoretical Framework for Explaining Migrants' Family*

Migration can affect family through *disruption*, *selectivity* and *adaptation/integration*. Each of these hypotheses tends to be more relevant to particular stages of migration. For example, the disruption hypothesis may be especially applicable in

the early stages of settlement whereas the adaptation hypothesis will have more relevance to longer term migration. Over time, the migrant community matures, second and later generations emerge, and most likely, with a prolonged exposure to the socio-economic conditions, norms, values and attitudes of migrants converge to those of the native-born in the destination place (Milewski 2010).

The *disruption* hypothesis suggests that during the period and after migration, immigrant's family formation and marriage is disrupted. Migration-related events like separation of the husband and wife and settlement problems can lead to changes in family structure and gender roles, relations and identities (Mertus 2003) and also cause disruption within family. Family separation can be due to a natural consequence of conflict and war. Staver (2008, p. 5) identified three major causes of family separation. Firstly, separation can be accidental, "with family members compelled to follow different routes or to flee based upon available opportunities or resources". Secondly, it can be a "chosen temporary strategy, such as helping a child escape military recruitment or sending a politically active member into hiding" (Sample 2007, p. 50; see also Jastram and Newland 2003, p. 562). Finally, separation can occur as family members are abducted or imprisoned. In addition, settlement stresses are compounded by worries and uncertainty about the safety of family members left behind (Barwick et al. 2002, p. 45; Staver 2008, p. 5), and this leads to further disruption of family formation and dynamics.

Forced migration presents a heavy challenge to the family as the family struggles to remain as a unit during asylum seeking. It is not a given fact that families should always live together – people commonly spend time away from their families for work or studies. However, refugee families do not choose separation. The uprooting is forced, and refugees usually "go to great lengths to re-assemble the family group" (Jastram and Newland 2003, p. 562). Furthermore, as Chambon (1989, p. 6) emphasized, the situation is often highly uncertain and impossible to predict the length of separation or even whether reunification will take place or not (Staver 2008, p. 5).

The family changes disrupted at the time of migration can either remain for a long time or be compensated with subsequent actions in midterm. The recuperation in family formation and relationships, however, might not be done either intentionally or unintentionally. If family members reject joining the displaced person, the reunification cannot take place. The limitation can also be enforced from the origin as there may be political issues that need to be resolved before refugee and forced migrant repatriation or family reunification can take place. Family separation for refugees can continue in the destination because of difficulties regarding reunification or family laws in refugee receiving countries. For example, the members of refugee families that include more than one wife should be settled in different locations in countries in which polygamy is legally and socially condoned (UNHCR 2011). This has happened for refugees from Middle East and North Africa to European countries.

One of the most important and relevant hypotheses which relates more generally to migration theory is *adaptation* (Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou and Bankston 1994; Portes 1996; Perlmann and Waldinger 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 2006; Berry et al. 2006; Farley and Alba 2002; Waldinger and Feliciano 2004;

Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2007; Berry and Sabatier 2009; Abbasi-shavazi and Sadeghi 2015). In general, immigrants' adaptation can be defined as a process of change that occurs among groups or individuals as a response to the demands of the social context (Ward and Kennedy 1993). Adaptation models in migration studies tend to theorize that as migrants adapt to the destination society, their behavior converges towards that of the natives (Hurr and Kim 1984; Foner 1997, p. 965). Several theories have been advanced to explain adaptation process of immigrants in the host society. *Classical assimilation* theory treats the process of integration in assimilation mode, as a linear shift from being un-assimilated to being fully assimilated to the host culture (for example, see Gordon 1964). Based on *segmented assimilation* theory (Portes and Zhou 1993), assimilation is no longer considered as a linear process because immigrants experience segmented assimilation in different spheres of life in the host society.

At the micro level, Berry's framework takes into consideration orientation to both origin and new cultures and societies; the degree to which people maintain their cultural heritage and identity; and the degree to which they seek involvement with the larger society (Berry 1992). Based on attachment to origin and host society, migrants' strategies in the host society can be classified into four categories: assimilation, integration, marginalization, and separation. *Assimilation* refers to rejecting the individual's cultural identity and accepting the host society's identity and culture. *Integration* occurs when individuals maintain a positive attachment to a new society as well as to their original culture and community. *Separation* refers to retaining original culture while rejecting the new culture. *Marginalization* involves non-adherence to either cultures.

This hypothesis links to wider migration theory regarding settlement and integration in the destination place (Bean and Stevens 2003). It advances that a change of environment may present migrants with a different set of factors or conditions, such as educational opportunities, labor force participation, and access to family planning, which can operate to change behavior regarding marriage and family.

In examining the adaptation of immigrants, two interrelated dimensions can be identified – structural and cultural. *Structural adaptation* refers to the extent to which immigrant groups are distributed across the socio-economic spectrum (e.g., in the educational, occupational and income levels) compared with the native population. The closer the immigrant is to the native distribution, the greater the adaptation and incorporation of the former into the host society. The second dimension of adaptation refers to the importance of cultural heritage. Unique norms and values (of immigrants) pertaining to family formation reflect the history and beliefs shared by members of an immigrant group regardless of socio-economic integration in the host society (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2000; Carter 1998; Hammel 1990; Sorenson 1985, 1988; Tang 2001; Thapa 1989). This model predicts convergence or divergence of immigrants' behaviors related to family to those of the natives according to structural and cultural integration. Taking migrant's family into account, if there are differences in family dynamic between native and immigrant women, they may be due to immigrants' low levels of (structural and cultural) adaptation. If, by controlling the structural socio-economic situation, immigrant–native differences

disappear, it can be concluded that they are due to inequality between the situation of immigrants and the native population. But if these differences still remain, it can be attributed to the low level of immigrants' cultural adaptation. Therefore, these two dimensions of adaptation theory are not mutually exclusive, but rather are complementary and interact together to explain immigrant-native family behavior differentials.

Adapting to a new situation for refugees and forced migrants is not as easy and straightforward as for voluntary migrants. Forced migrants normally lose their family members, job, belongings, and capital; they live in camps or other locations which normally are unpleasant and harsh; and attitudes in destination society might not be greatly in favor of refugees. While developments of social networks, family reunions and permanent settlements (Castles and Miller 2003) do occur, continued traumatization, anxiety about forced repatriation and uncertainties regarding resettlement make psychosocial healing almost impossible (Hauff and Vaglum 1995). It has been observed that refugees have higher psychosomatic stress than any other groups of migrants due to the involuntary, migratory and potentially temporary nature of their experience (Dona and Berry 1999). Therefore, adaptation may take longer than is expected in the case of forced migrants. Overcoming the problems can help the adaptation occur sooner. For the Sudanese refugees in Uganda, for example, access to some agricultural land and the availability of health and school services have made it easier to adapt to life in a new country and have served as incentives for refugees to interact with their hosts (Karunakara 2004, pp. 7–10).

According to the *selectivity* hypothesis, migrants at the destination will not be representative of the population at the origin but of a subgroup from which the migrants are drawn (Kahn 1988). Compared to voluntary migration, forced migrants are less selective. The selected refugees, however, may be from higher socio-economic strata and seek asylum because of political or religious beliefs. They can also be from a distinctive population located in border areas and special places facing war, disputes or natural disasters. Since they do not represent the total population they come from, any changes in their situation in the destination place cannot be solely explained by the move. They could have chosen the same living strategy in the origin even if they had not migrated.

The unique characteristics of forced migrants, compared to normal migrants, can distort the process of recuperation and adaptation. Forced migrants are normally less selected and the chance of their adaptation to lower socio-economic strata of host society is higher. Similarly, the chance of separation and marginalization would be higher for forced migrants. Living in camps and greater control of destination society can enforce such strategies. The self-settled refugees who have smaller population may adapt to destination society faster than those who are larger in population and live in camps or restricted areas. The chance of separation and marginalization could be also less for them.

Some refugees might enter the destination location as illegal migrants, and thus, they may not have access to resources in the host community which would otherwise facilitate their integration process. Although this might happen for voluntary migrants, the unpleasant effects of such clandestine life on family matters would be

higher for refugees than normal migrants. Refugees and displaced migrants are afraid of both illegal settlement in destination and persecution from the place of origin.

The situation of forced migrants in camps and restricted areas might be at times better than the situation in origin place and the situation of self-settled migrants. This is due to the supervision and control done by national and international bodies and organizations. Hynes et al. (2002) showed that refugees and IDPs in most post-emergency camps had better reproductive outcomes than their respective host country and country of origin. This can pave the way to faster and better settlement and adaptation.

The aforementioned hypotheses proposed to examine the relationship between migration and family have been mainly applied to the studies of voluntary migration. Of these hypotheses, disruption may be more relevant to forced migration as this affects forced migrant families more than other types of migrants. Displacement may lead to postponement of marriage prior to or after migration due to loss of job and belongings and financial constraints, loss of family members (environmental, war, conflict etc.), and/or separation of family members. Sometimes it takes a long time for family members to join each other in the destination. Living in camps also has implications for family formation. *Adaptation* may take a longer time than is expected in the case of forced migrants due to their socioeconomic isolation and exclusion. There will be generational change in the families of refugees. Their successive generations are likely to behave like the native born in the host society. The degree of similarity or dissimilarity of the origin to the destination place, can have implications for the speed of integration of migrants and refugees in the new place. The legal and structural situation may hinder or facilitate the adaptation processes.

Social networks among refugees also are driving forces of change. Although families live apart, they may be connected through social media and new technologies, and this may lead to continuity of family connections and relationships. Changes are taking place in countries of origin as well, and thus, these changes will lead to changes among diaspora and refugees. Population size and composition of migrants in the destination place also affects the level, trend and patterns of marriage. For instance, marriage squeeze is an important element of the marriage market and can influence the level of marriage, and affect the age of marriage. The degree of freedom for mate selection matters for arranged marriage versus love match. In what follows, we briefly review selected studies on forced migration and family.

8.4 Prior Empirical Research on Forced Migration and the Family

Studies on family changes among forced migrants and refugees are inadequate. The main reason for this is related to the limited availability and quality of data for forced migration. Studies are carried out at very small scales and cannot represent

the total population. However, the fertility of forced migrants has achieved more attention than other issues. Studies have shown that similar to voluntary migrants, refugees may have lower fertility during flight but they can also experience a catch-up action after settlement (Moss et al. 1993; Hill 2004; Hynes et al. 2002). For instance, Agadjanian and Prata (2002) found that war refugees in Angola had lower fertility during the war but their fertility increased afterwards. However, the catch-up action may not take place after the war and conflict as concluded by Randall (2005). The fertility decline during the early stage of the move can be attributed to spousal separation, stress which leads to a reduction in coital frequency and probability of conception, and uncertainty of living condition. For example, it was shown that the large fertility decline in Eritrea between the mid-1990s and the early part of the new century was due to a steep reduction in the proportion of women exposed to the risk of pregnancy resulting from the military mobilization and displacement associated with the 1998–2000 border conflict with Ethiopia. Part of this reduction was due to delayed age at marriage, but it was largely due to separation of married women from their husbands (Blanc 2004). In the time of conflict, it is more important to have social capital, education, and kinship relationship than having many children. Longer separation of refugees may lead to impossibility of adaptation and sustainability of high fertility. Insecure economic situation, however, may cause fertility decline (Hynes et al. 2002). Using data from a national survey covering 6420 former refugee and non-refugee households in Rwanda, Verwipm and Bavel (2005) found that refugee women had higher fertility but their children had lower survival chances. The findings of Woldemicael (2008), however, show that the decline was mainly due to fertility transition and the conflict only accelerated the decline. The impact of forced migration on fertility and reproductive behavior is discussed in the Chap. 6 by Agadjanian (2017).

One of the impacts of the war and conflict, and subsequent move is changing the head of household either due to loss or separation. Within conflict settings, women are far more likely to be widowed than men, particularly very young women (Hynes 2004; Martin and Tirman 2009), due in part to the larger numbers of male soldiers who die in combat (Hynes 2004). In Rwanda, for example, some 58,000 households were reportedly headed by minor girls post-conflict (Save the Children 2002). This was also confirmed by Cohen (1998) and Brun (2005) who reported that in conflict situations, many women are suddenly thrust into the role of head of household because the men are recruited to combat, stay behind to maintain land, or migrate in search of work. Comparing three population groups – Sudanese refugees, Sudanese residents and Ugandan nationals – Karunakara (2004) showed that female headship is high among refugee households but is even higher among residents. Resident households also tend to be larger than refugee households with significantly higher numbers of children orphaned by the war and cared for by their grandparents or older relatives.

Relations within the household may change during forced migration. Szczepanikova (2005) in a study on Chechen asylum seekers living in a refugee camp in the Czech Republic found that although the camp provides some opportunities for the increase of women's power in the family and men's involvement in

childcare and household duties, the assistance in the camp is based on an undiversified and gender-blind perception which sustains gendered violence.

Displacement can also increase the probability of divorce and marriage. Laliberte et al. (2003) showed that internal displacement in Chad increased the occurrence of divorce due to persistent chaos inside the country while it was not the case for refugees as their living conditions were better and did not dramatically affect their marital patterns. A study on refugees in Uganda (Refugee Law Project 2007) showed many refugee girls engage in early marriages for survival.

Family life for refugees and forced migrants who settle down in the transit or destination place is not stress free. Settlement stresses are compounded by worries and uncertainty about the safety of family members left behind (Barwick et al. 2002, p. 45; Staver 2008, p. 5). Forced migration presents a heavy challenge to the family as the family struggles to remain as a unit during asylum seeking. As family unity cannot always be maintained during refugee crises, its reestablishment is often dependent on family reunification programs or policies. Family reunification – the act of bringing together separated family members across international borders – is politically sensitive because it involves border-crossing (Staver 2008, p. 3).

In sum, family is usually affected by migration but the impact is more significant for involuntary movements. Families are affected differently in all stages of forced migration and among various groups of forced migrants. These changes also depend on socio-cultural and political contexts of the transition, host, and origin societies. Despite the importance of family in forced migration, there is a gap in our knowledge about family of refugees and forced migrants partly due to lack of data which is discussed in the next section.

8.5 Approaches to Research on Refugee and Displaced Families

Studying family change of refugees and forced migrants depends upon the degree to which their characteristics can be identified and analysed. Reed et al. (1998, p. 4) stated that forced migrants consist of various people who can be distinguished based on the ease of their identification. On the one hand, dispersed IDPs are most difficult to identify, their universe is unknown, and their geographical spread is wide. On the other hand, refugees whose status has been determined and live in camps are easily identifiable, their universe is known, and they have a defined geographical spread. There are other groups that lie between these two extreme categories, and for whom, some of their characteristics can be identified.

Considerable variations exist when different actors define IDPs, and it is not surprising that the numbers of IDPs are not known. Humanitarian data are collected at the time of crisis, and particularly when migrants cross borders and settle in camps or in the host society, or where IDPs are settled within their own country or region. However, humanitarian data do not include information on family

characteristics and relationships. Government and UN statistics usually collect data by age, gender and location. These data also suffer from incompleteness and inaccuracy. In addition, obtaining proof of marriage, for example, is not an easy process for those who are in transit or camps or it would be difficult for those who are undocumented within the host or transit country (See Hovy (2017), Chap. 3). Furthermore, longitudinal data are required to study family change. Since the status of displaced people changes, it is difficult to track them regularly and produce such data.

In order to study family change, there is a need for information on such issues as age at marriage, year of marriage, family size and structure, fertility, decision making within the family as well as other characteristics of family members, i.e. level of education, income, occupation, and marital status. Information is also required on the decision-making and process of migration, i.e. who migrated and with whom migration took place. Some of the information is usually available from various data sources including vital registration, census, and surveys. As noted by Hovy (2017, Chap. 3), in the early stages of a refugee crisis, registration usually takes place at the family or household level, which is limited to recording the name of the head, the size, and the address of the household. As the emergency phase is winding down, and as soon as conditions permit, individual-level registration is being instituted. These incomplete sources of data may be useful for identifying the number of families and household size, but would be insufficient to analyse family formation process and dynamics. Individual data files also may not be linked to the family and household data, and thus, it makes it difficult to study generational changes within the household. Data for those who are resettled in third countries requires significant registration, identification and documentation (see Hovy (2017), Chap. 3). If a family applies for resettlement, family relationships should be unambiguously established, and this may provide information for studying household structure and relationships.

Many refugees and forced migrants may not be enumerated by censuses, and therefore, they will be under-estimated in the census records. Surveys are the best sources of data for settled refugees (see Part I of this volume) who are either living in camps or in segregated areas, but again surveys would not cover forced migrants immediately before or after crossing the borders and displacement. It is possible to investigate issues related to adaptation process using survey data but there will be problems for generalization. Qualitative data collection techniques like in-depth interview and focus group discussion (FGD) provide more insights on family formation among migrants but again their limitation is that they cannot provide representative results that explain family change among refugees and forced migrants.

One of the important limitations of using administrative data for refugee statistics is inconsistent or incomplete coverage (Hovy (2017), Chap. 3). Low coverage of such data and statistics depend on the willingness of persons to come forward to seek protection, assistance or durable solutions. Some refugees prefer to remain unregistered because they fear deportation or they prefer to live outside designated camps. Also, undocumented refugees living in urban areas are heavily

underrepresented in refugee counts. These limitations are even significant for IDPs as opposed to refugees. Thus, the coverage and quality of data for different groups of forced migrants vary, and it would be difficult to study similar or comparative studies on family across groups.

Despite these shortcomings, the aforementioned sources can be regarded as complementary. Studies of family change and dynamics among forced migrants and refugees should be innovative and draw general conclusions from incomplete data but with cautious generalizations.

8.6 Migration, Adaptation, and the Family: The Case of Afghan Refugees in Iran

Iran has been one of the main destinations for Afghan refugees and migrants over the last three decades. Since 1979, Afghan migration to Iran has been primarily motivated by war, insecurity, threat to female honor, unemployment, and inflation. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan resulted in a massive influx of three million Afghans into Iran between 1979 and 1989. Despite fluctuations in the number of Afghan migrants in Iran in recent years, it is estimated that at least 2.5 million Afghans, including 1.5 million documented and another one million undocumented, are residing in Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi and Sadeghi 2016). Approximately 1.5 million migrants of Afghanistan nationality were recorded in the 2016 census, around half of whom were born in Iran, and can be considered as second generation. The majority (more than 70%) resided in urban areas, and only less than 3% lived in refugee camps.

The second-generation Afghans comprise a particular demographic group whose experiences and aspirations, while not homogenous, are different from their parents' generation, and from their counterparts in Afghanistan. Educational achievements, occupational skills, and economic opportunity in Iran (Abbasi-shavazi and Sadeghi 2015, 2016; Hugo et al. 2012), have inspired different values and aspirations. They have also been raised in an arguably more liberal social and religious environment, and exposed to values, attitudes and practices that are different from those of their parents (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2012, p. 829). Earlier analysis showed that the singulate mean at marriage of the second-generation Afghans in Iran was closer to the Iranian women than their first (parent's) generation (Fig. 8.2). Consistent with this pattern are changes in the fertility behavior of the second-generation Afghans in moving toward levels and patterns of fertility within the host society. Second-generation Afghans had lower level of children ever born (3.3) than the first generation (4.1) as compared to that (2.6) for Iranian women (Hugo et al. 2012, p. 285).

Given the long-term settlement of Afghans in Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005, 2007; Abbasi-Shavazi and Sadeghi 2015, 2016) and the emergence of second and third generation Afghans in the country (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008), Iran provides




Fig. 8.2 Singulate Mean Age at First Marriage (SMAM) among Iranian and Afghans by generation and sex, 2010

an ideal opportunity to examine the degree of integration and family change among Afghan refugees and migrants in their host society.

As indicated earlier, adaptation of migrants into the host society can be analyzed at both macro (societal) and micro (individual) levels. The degree of adaptation and integration of Afghans into the Iranian society is examined in the following sections.

The data comes from the 2010 Afghan Adaptation Survey conducted in Mashhad and Tehran. Selection of these cities as the field of study was due to the sizeable number of Afghan immigrants in the two cities. Based on the 2006 census, 32.7% of the Afghan population in Iran resided in Tehran province and 13.3% in Khorasan Razavi Province. Almost one-fourth (23%) of Afghans in Tehran province settled in Tehran city and more than four-fifths (84%) of Afghans in Khorasan Razavi Province settled in Mashhad city.

The target population consisted Afghan youth, aged 15–29 years including first and second generations. “First generation” includes those who were born in Afghanistan and immigrated to Iran, and “Second generation” includes those who were born in Iran from at least one Afghanistan-born parent. The sample size of this survey was 620 comprising 391 (63.1%) who were Iran-born and 229 (36.9%) who were Afghanistan-born. A structured questionnaire was used for data collection. Data were collected through face-to-face interviews by 14 trained Afghan men and women interviewers who were either university students or who had graduated from Social Sciences disciplines. A multi-stage sampling procedure was applied. First, neighborhoods were selected based on the density of the Afghan population and the socio-economic strata in the census tract. In the next step, using a sample frame (age, sex, birthplace, ethnicity, education, and marital status) and a stratified snow-ball sampling procedure, the samples in every neighborhood were selected.




Fig. 8.3 Family orientations of Afghan youth by generation, 2010

The index of family orientations is drawn from 24 items covering a variety of family dimensions. Based on the index score, respondents were classified into three groups of traditional, intermediate, and modern family orientations. Socio-cultural adaptation was also measured by 32 items and respondents were grouped into four categories; assimilated, integrated, separated and marginalized. Adaptation and family changes among migrants in the context of forced migration can be analysed using two approaches; inter-generational and intra-generational (Portes and Rumbaut 2001), and the following section presents the results using the two approaches.

8.6.1 *Inter-Generational Differences of Family Orientations*

As Fig. 8.3 illustrates, second-generation Afghans have more modern orientations toward family when compared to the first generation. Such consistent generational differences in family orientation have been attributed to the process of adaptation. Second-generation Afghans have grown up in Iranian society (Abbasi-shavazi and Sadeghi 2015) and it is not surprising that they experienced “modern” orientation towards family.

Not only had the first generation more orientation towards traditional family than the second generation, compared to the second generation they were less likely to have intermediate family values. This result clearly shows the adaptation of Afghan refugees toward the host society across generation.




Fig. 8.4 Family orientations (traditional vs. modern) of first and second generation Afghans by adaptation patterns, 2010

8.6.2 *Intra-Generational Adaptation Patterns and Family Orientations*

Afghans in Iran have experienced a variety of adaptation patterns and family orientations. This is shown in Fig. 8.4 indicating significant correlation between adaptation patterns and family orientations. Modern family orientations were common among those who were assimilated, while traditional family values and behaviors were observed among the separated group.

It is clear from this study that the first-generation Afghans continue to follow their traditional attitudes while the second-generation experience modern orientations towards family. The new generation is more educated than both the first generation and their counterparts in their homeland (Hugo et al. 2012). The first generation has not had opportunities at school and universities to interact with other Iranians as well as with second-generation Afghans who are from different ethnic, geographic, and socio-economic backgrounds. Such interactions exist for the second generation which in turn influences the marriage market and the range of choices that young Afghan men and women have for their prospective marriage partners. These forces have led to more changes in the process of marriage and family formation of Afghans in Iran.

The second-generation Afghans are experiencing a transitional period and are caught between two cultures with the same roots but in different stages of transition. Orientations towards family are influenced by their adaptation strategies, i.e. assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalization. As expected, the first generation who are more attached to the origin society (separated), preferred traditional

way of family, while those who are assimilated have more modern family type. There was a clear difference across generations. The first generation was oriented towards traditional values while the second generation preferred modern values. In conclusion, thus, generation and longer term residence in the host society will lead to adaptation of family behavior and attitudes of refugees and forced migrants.

8.7 Conclusions

Most migration scholars have focused analytic attention either at the aggregate (community/state/national) level or alternatively at the individual level in studying patterns, causes and consequences of migration. However, there has been a major shift in recent demographic studies by considering family and household as the effective unit of analysis. Decision making about migration and other aspects of the move are made and affected by and within the household and families. Migration and mobility also affect family formation and dynamics.

Conventionally, demographers had 'explained' variations in vital events at the level of the individual by controlling for demographic characteristics, largely age and sex. In reality, however, vital events and particularly migration are influenced by a complex array of decisions and actions made and acted upon within families, households and kin groups. There has been an expansion of perspective, however, to embrace this complexity and correspondingly a shift to consider family and/or households as the more appropriate focus. Decisions about migration and particularly for forced migration (i.e. *whether, when, where, how, and by whom* to move) are usually made by the family either as a whole or by its members. The family is mutually affected by the movement of the whole – or some members of the family who may become separated, or settled in a new destination. The livelihoods of family members in the new society, their return, and reintegration in the origin society, are also affected in the process of migration.

The relationship between forced migration and family/household can be approached from two directions. One is to examine the role that family as a whole or members of the family have in migration decision-making and migration processes. Alternatively, research can be conducted to analyze the consequences of migration for the formation of family and in household dynamics and characteristics. This chapter elaborated on the latter set of relationships, and has focused on the specific case of forced migration and the implications of displacement for family formation and dynamics and particularly on Afghans in Iran. Various hypotheses that explain family change among voluntary migrants can be applied to forced migration situations although the extent of the impact of each of these hypotheses varies across forced migrant groups. It was argued that there is insufficient data and information to examine family change in forced migration context. However, demographic scholarship on refugees and displaced families should be innovative in utilizing existing data sources; survey data on Afghan refugees and migrants in Iran has been presented to illustrate both the challenges as well as opportunities for

understanding changes in family orientations among refugees and migrants within the framework of intergenerational adaptation. Of course, care should be taken in the generalization the findings but the research presented here represents an informative example of the intersections between migration studies and demographic changes at the level of the family.

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