

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN POPULATION

DEMOGRAPHY OF REFUGEE AND FORCED MIGRATION

Edited by

Graeme Hugo

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International Union for the Scientific Study of Population
Union Internationale pour l'Étude Scientifique de la Population
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Demography of Refugee and Forced Migration

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This book is dedicated to Graeme Hugo (1946–2015) and Charles B. Keely (1942–2014) for their contributions to the scientific study of international migration, their pioneering and enduring leadership on the demography of forced migration, and their roles as mentors to generations of migration and population scholars. Each in his own way served as moral and intellectual guidestars in our understanding of human migration.

Foreword

There are very few global issues today of greater complexity and greater urgency than the rapidly increasing numbers of people who have been subjected to forced migration. At the beginning of my term as president of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, I thought that it was most important for the Union to set up a scientific panel working on issues related to refugees and forced migration because of the rapidly increasing numbers of people that were subjected to forced migration. This was before the Syrian crisis which has added greatly to this major world challenge. While the main focus of the book as indicated by its title is the demography of refugee and forced migration, the book is not narrowly demographic in its approach as it ranges over political, economic, and environmental causes of forced migration and consequences for families, health, services, administration, and policy. In past times, there was a prospect that through international cooperation, the major refugee issues could be solved. It was possible to focus on the few specific groups for which there was a major problem. However, as this book demonstrates, the global number of refugees and the number of persecuted groups has expanded dramatically giving rise to a much higher degree of complexity. The largest numbers of forced migrants remain within their own region and territory having been displaced from their homes. It is more difficult for the international community to deal with internally displaced persons (IDPs) who remain in their own national territory than those who have fled to another country. The gaps between the number of refugees, on the one hand, and the resources available to support them and the opportunities for third country settlement, on the other hand, have never been greater. There is now a complexity of reasons that people have moved from their homes; the political, economic, and environmental causes of refugee movements are often intertwined. Now, the number of lives lost in transit has risen dramatically. Human trafficking has reemerged as a major issue. These are all matters that are discussed in this book.

The 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as a result, have been given the task of developing a global compact on refugees. The information and understanding arising from good research as we find in this book is an important component of progress.

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Preface

Refugees and other forced migrations have increased in scale, complexity, and diversity in recent decades. The number of “persons of concern” to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has increased from 21 million at the end of 2005 to nearly 65.6 million at the end of 2016. The large increase in the number of persons of concern has been due to the increase in the number of internally displaced persons from 4.2 million to 40.3 million over the same period. These figures are indicative of an iceberg as the number of migrants who are actually displaced is underestimated, and there is no evidence that the scale and severity of forced migration is being reduced.

These changes have meant that traditional approaches to the management and solution of refugee and other forced migration situations and protection of refugees have become less appropriate and are being questioned. Demography has an important contribution to make in this space and during times of change. While other disciplines (especially anthropology, law, political science, and international relations) have made major contributions to refugee and forced migration studies, demography has hitherto not contributed very strongly to this topic, in spite of the increased momentum within the population sciences to the study of international migration and mobilities. This book seeks to demonstrate the benefit of the scope and method of demography to the study of forced migration and refugees by applying a demographic lens to a range of topics in the field. Participating authors discuss how demography can contribute toward a better understanding of refugees by focusing on levels and trends of refugee and forced migration, characteristics of refugees, and pathways by which refugees and forced migrants are integrated/adapted to host/home societies. The issues of interest include but are not limited to the conceptualization of forced migration within a wider population mobility framework; the broadening of understanding of forced migration beyond refugees to include other types of forced and mixed migrations; the methodology for measuring forced migration; the relevance of existing migration theory to forced migration situations; the structure, scale, and spatial patterning of contemporary forced movements; the characteristics of forced migrants and internally displaced persons; the drivers of different types of forced movement; the dynamics of forced migration and its

interrelationships with fertility, mortality, and family change; as well as the return strategies and adaptation patterns of refugees to their home society. The importance of demographic research for developing relevant policy and program recommendations for providing protection for forced migrants, the solution of refugee and other forced migrant problems, and maximizing the benefits of such migration to origin and destination areas is also discussed. Various sources of data and information are used to address the abovementioned issues.

This book emanated from the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) seminar organized by its Scientific Panel on the Demography of Refugee and Forced Migration in May 2012 at the University of Tehran. Participants held expertise in the fields of demography and refugee and forced migration studies. The book includes 15 chapters. After an introductory chapter on advancing the demography of forced migration and refugees, the chapters have been organized into four main parts. Part I is devoted to the conceptualization and data sources of forced migration. Part II presents demographic perspectives by focusing on the relationship between mortality, fertility, family change, and forced migration. It also examines forced migration through the lens of gender. Patterns and dimensions of forced migration are discussed in Part III. Changing patterns of internal displacement, environmentally related international displacement, and the nexus between forced and irregular migration have been examined from a demographic perspective. In Part IV, the linkages between migration and security and the issue of return to home and the reintegration process have been discussed. International, regional, and national legal norms, policies, organizational roles and relations, and good practices related to refugee and forced migration have been presented. Future directions in demographic research on forced migration are offered in the epilogue, within the unfolding context of multilateral efforts to promote international cooperation and shared responsibilities for displaced persons in this century.

In engaging demographic analysis within a range of issues germane to population displacement, our hope is that the book is valuable for demographers and social scientists (sociologists, anthropologists, and economists) to understand the relevance of their analytic perspectives and tools for forced and refugee migration studies. We also hope that the collection is relevant to those who are interested in forced and refugee migration at national, regional, and international levels of analysis and a useful reference for students developing skills in developing research designs and data collection initiatives on forced and refugee migrations and displaced persons, families, and populations. Finally, and critically important, we hope that the papers, and the collection as a whole, will benefit the process of policy and program analysis regarding displaced populations and refugees. A positive outcome would be the request, invitation, and even demand by policy makers for the inclusion of demographic analysis in the development of evidence-based policies and programs concerning efforts to support and protect persons displaced, in flight, and resettled.

This book is the product of collaboration among the editors and authors over the last 5 years. We are indebted to many institutions, universities, and individuals whose creative contributions, generous support, and critical comments have been instrumental for the completion of this book.

The idea for the preparation of this volume originated from the initial discussions on the proposal for the Scientific Panel on the Demography of Refugee and Forced Migration that was approved by the Council of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population for the term 2010–2014. Members of the panel included Graeme Hugo, Jeff Crisp, Susan McGrath, and Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi (chair). Anastasia Gage served as the IUSSP Council liaison, and Paul Monet as the IUSSP Secretariat contact person. Each of these individuals exercised leadership at critical points in the process of moving the project forward.

The Department of Demography of the University of Tehran; the National Institute of Population Research, Iran; the Australian Demographic and Social Research Institute of the Australian National University; the Australian Population and Migration Research Centre at the University of Adelaide, Australia; and the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies Program, Colgate University, USA, have been the main institutions where the collaboration among the three editors has taken place. Hugo and Abbasi-Shavazi met frequently at the ANU and University of Adelaide in Canberra and Adelaide during 2010–2014 to discuss the planning of the IUSSP Seminar on Demography of Refugees as well as identify potential authors for various chapters of this book. We benefited from the stimulating and scientific environment at the two universities. After the untimely demise of Graeme Hugo in January 2015, Ellen Percy Kraly joined as coeditor who benefitted from the support and stimulating environment of Colgate University and its mission to promote interdisciplinary inquiry. We would have not been able to complete the manuscript of this book without the generous institutional support of these universities.

This book is based on the findings of the IUSSP seminar that was supported by the University of Tehran and partially funded by the then Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship. We thank Paul Monet of the IUSSP and Mohammad Ali Mousavi and Rasoul Sadeghi of the University of Tehran for their assistance in organizing the seminar. In addition, the results of various chapters of this volume were presented at conferences and seminars organized by the IUSSP, Asian Population Association, Australian Population Association, Population Association of Iran, International Association for the Study of Forced Migration, and Refugee Research Network, and we are indebted to many colleagues and participants of these scientific events for their valuable comments and questions. We have also benefitted from valuable comments received from anonymous reviewers of the manuscript.

Many people provided administrative and institutional support for the preparation of this volume. Assistance and support from Mary Ellen Zuppan at the IUSSP Secretariat and Evelien Bakker and Bernadette Deelen at Springer are greatly appreciated. Their patience and support contributed greatly to the quality of the book as with the extension of their deadline we were able to add more chapters and new findings into the book. Janet Wall at the University of Adelaide assisted Hugo's involvement in the project. The final manuscript was formatted by two assistants: Monireh Amirimoghaddam, editorial assistant, National Institute of Population

Research, Tehran, and Dženela Bečić, undergraduate studies in international relations and Russian studies, Colgate University.

The first collective and pioneering effort on fostering *Demography of Refugees* was made by a group of demographers and refugee experts who organized and participated in the National Academy of Science (NAS) workshop on demography of forced migration in Washington in 1997. Charles Keely had a major role in the NAS workshop and also participated at and greatly contributed to the IUSSP seminar in Tehran in 2012. Graeme Hugo's leadership in the formation of the IUSSP Scientific Panel on the Demography of Refugee and Forced Migration and his role during the early stage of the production of this volume was instrumental. The untimely demise of these mentors in December 2014 and January 2015 was a great loss to the scholarship of refugee and forced migration studies, but we are pleased that we were able to accomplish their goals by finishing this timely volume.

Our appreciation of the professional contributions of each of these scholars is dwarfed, however, by the personal gifts of each of these men. Graeme Hugo was the consummate colleague and gentleman – sharing good cheer, intellectual enthusiasm, and, always, his promotion of human welfare and environmental quality. We recall the wit and wisdom of Charlie Keely and his tenaciousness in pursuing truth and the life of the mind. Both men lived lives well and full, and so too their absence is ever felt by their community of colleagues and each of us.

The book is dedicated to Hugo and Keely.

Finally, we would like to appreciate our families for their continuing support over the last several years enabling us to complete this book.

Tehran, Iran
Hamilton, NY, USA
November 2017

Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi
Ellen Percy Kraly

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About the Editors

Graeme John Hugo (5 December 1946–20 January 2015) was an Australian demographer, academic, and geographer. An Australian Research Council (ARC) professorial fellow, professor of the discipline of geography, environment, and population, and director of the Australian Population and Migration Research Centre at the University of Adelaide, Hugo was considered one of Australia's leading demographers. Some of his studies focused on population issues in Australia and Southeast Asia, especially migration. In 2002, he secured an ARC Federation Fellowship over 5 years for his research project "The new paradigm of international migration to and from Australia: dimensions, causes and implications." He was the author of over 300 books, articles in scholarly journals, chapters in books, and a large number of conference papers and reports. He was elected a fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in 1987, and in 2012, he was honored as an officer of the Order of Australia (AO) for distinguished service to population research, particularly the study of international migration, population geography and mobility, and leadership roles with national and international organizations. He was a member of the Scientific Panel on the Demography of Refugee and Forced Migration of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), 2010–2014. Hugo and Abbasi-Shavazi initiated the production of this book and worked as coeditors during 2011–2015 and had communications about the book even while Hugo was in hospital a few days before his untimely demise on 20 January 2015.

Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi is Professor of Demography at the University of Tehran; Director of the National Institute of Population Research, Tehran, Iran; and Visiting Fellow of the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University (ANU), Australia. A graduate of the ANU Demography, he served as Head of the Department of Demography of the University of Tehran (2003–2007), and Research Fellow at the ANU Australian Demographic and Social Research Institute during 2010–2014. Abbasi-Shavazi's research has focused on areas such as Iran's population dynamics, family change and fertility, Muslim demography, and forced and refugee migration. He has published more than 100 scientific papers and project reports, and authored books and book chapters including the Springer coauthored book on *The Fertility Transition in Iran: Revolution and Reproduction*.

Abbasi-Shavazi is a founding member of the Asian Population Association and served as its Vice-President (2009–2010) and President (2011–2012). During 2010–2014, he chaired the Scientific Panel of Demography of Refugee and Forced Migration of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) and has recently been elected as a council member of the IUSSP (2018–2021). He was a member of Steering Committee of the Refugee Research Network at York University, Canada; and is a member of Migration Research Leaders Syndicate of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In addition to being Chief-Editor of the *Iranian Population Studies*, he is a member of the Editorial Board of several national and international peer-reviewed journals, including *Asian Population Studies*, *International Migration Review*, and *Demographia*. Abbasi-Shavazi has received four scientific awards including World Prize for the Best Book of the Islamic Republic of Iran (2010) and the 2011 United Nations Population Award, and in 2016, he was recognized as the Distinguished Researcher of the Year of Iran.

Ellen Percy Kraly is the William R. Kenan, Jr., professor of geography and environmental studies, Colgate University. She was editor-in-chief of the *International Migration Review*, a peer-reviewed journal published by the Center for Migration Studies (New York), 2011–2014. She was a member of the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Immigration Statistics and has prepared reports on topics including international migration data for the United Nations Statistical Commission, National Academy of Sciences, US Immigration and Naturalization Service, US Census Bureau, and US Commission on Immigration Reform. She has been a member of the Executive Committee of the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration. In preparation for the United Nations General Assembly Summit for Refugees and Migrants in September 2016, she participated in the Civil Society Committee as a representative of the demographic research community. Between 2006 and 2011, she served as director of Colgate's Upstate Institute, an initiative of Colgate University to promote community-based research and capacity building in the upstate region of New York. Her current research program has three themes: (1) refugee policy and forced migration; (2) ethical and human rights dimensions of the use of population data systems in policy and administration, with particular reference to Aboriginal affairs in Australia; and (3) population and community health in rural communities (in partnership with Bassett Healthcare Network). At Colgate, she teaches courses in population geography, international migration and refugee studies, medical geography, environmental studies, and research methods. In 2016, she was awarded an honorary doctorate from Curtin University in recognition of her role in the return of Aboriginal children's artwork to Western Australia.

Chapter 1

Introduction: Advancing the Demography of Forced Migration and Refugees

Graeme Hugo, Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, and Ellen Percy Kraly

1.1 Introduction

Refugee and other forced migrations have increased in scale, complexity and diversity in recent decades. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR 2017) estimates that in 2016 there were a total of 65.6 million displaced persons worldwide, of whom 22.5 million were refugees recognized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 40.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) within countries, around three million asylum seekers with their cases pending and another almost 10 million stateless people. In addition, it has been estimated that in 2014 approximately 19 million people in 100 countries were displaced by disasters, 184 million over the seven years prior to 2014, most triggered by climate and weather related events such as floods, storms and wildfires (Yonetani 2015). These large numbers of people constitute an important, but understudied, element of global population dynamics. Moreover, there is no evidence that the scale and severity of forced migration is being reduced.

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As a global process, forced and refugee migrations present major multinational, national, subnational and community challenges as many of those displaced are in need of assistance, often protection, and too often, desperately so. Yet the development of effective short term and long term responses is being hampered by our limited understanding of trends and patterns of the characteristics, causes and implications of forced migration. Perhaps because the underlying cause of movement is apparently self-evident in the term ‘forced migration’, there has not been as much attention given to it as there has been to so-called ‘voluntary migrations’. It is the contention of this book that the discipline of demography has a contribution to make in both advancing our understanding of forced and refugee migration and in developing effective responses to population displacement. The chapters presented in this volume, individually and taken as a whole, seek to demonstrate to scholars of refugees, forced migrants, and displaced populations the range of contributions of the population sciences and the demographic perspective to refugee and forced migration studies, and also to illustrate to population scientists how demographic analysis can serve knowledge generation for a range of topics of critical concern to refugee and forced migration scholars. The contributions of the participating authors are less ‘demographic’ in approach but rather more illustrative in making the case for the value of the demographic lens and method in revealing characteristics, dynamics and underlying causes of forced and refugee migration and displacement.

We introduce the collection of papers included in this volume by first examining the demographic contribution to the conceptualisation and classification of refugee and forced migration – an important prerequisite to understanding patterns, including emerging trends, in order to develop effective responses.

1.2 Conceptualising Refugee and Forced Migration

One of the strengths of demography as a social science is its emphasis on developing clear concepts of demographic phenomena and processes. Conceptualisation is a necessary precursor to effective measurement and analysis of populations. A full discussion and elaboration of the conceptualisation of forced migration is given in Chap. 2, but in this section, we will briefly present a conceptual model of forced migration based on the pioneering work of the demographer Kunz (1973, 1981) which was based on refugees. He sought to produce a general model which included the fundamental elements of the refugee process from initial flight to eventual settlement. An expansion to all forced migration and a variation of this model is presented in Fig. 1.1.

The model recognises three stages in the forced migration process – flight, asylum and eventual settlement. A fundamental difference in the first stage is the distinction between movers in response to a sudden crisis and those where there has been a gradual build-up of the pressure which eventually forces a person or family to move. Kunz (1973) differentiates between ‘acute’ movers where there is a sudden onset of cataclysmic events which impel the move and anticipating moves where




Fig. 1.1 A demographic model of forced migration (Source: Developed partly from Kunz 1973, 1981)

there is a build-up of pressure and people move in anticipation that they will not be safe in their place of origin. He also recognises a number of situations intermediate between acute and anticipating movers.

Crucially, the Kunz model recognises that after fleeing their home, the forced migrants will often move to a transit or temporary haven. This may be a camp set up to provide an initial safe haven for those fleeing or it can involve staying with a friend, family or acquaintance in an area which is safe. Kunz (1973) describes this as a ‘midway to nowhere’ situation which captures the anomie and uncertainty of transit contexts. The time spent in this situation clearly varies. For some forced migrants there can be a return to the home area once the physical or conflict situation has passed. For example, Groen and Polivka (2010) examine differences between groups in their propensity to return to New Orleans after they had fled Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In fact, return is not always possible and another long-term solution needs to be found. This can be settlement in the transit situation or movement to a third destination. While transit situations can occur in voluntary migration, they are an important differentiating characteristic of forced migration and have not been investigated sufficiently.

Forced migrations often take the form of waves initiated by particular events impinging on particular groups of people. This differentiates them from other migrations where there often is a steady flow of movers. Return migration can take place from third country destinations. However, studies of return migration in Australia have found that refugees are the least likely category of international migrants to return to their homeland (Hugo 1994).

One important feature of forced migration is that it may result in other forms of migration. A forced migration may create a migration corridor or channel along which other, non-forced migrants move. It can become the basis for the development of a social network linking the origin with the new destination of the forced migrants who send back information and perhaps assist others to move, especially family members.

1.3 Defining and Classifying Refugee and Forced Migration

Migration typologies differentiate migrants and migrations according to the relative permanency of the move, the distance traversed, the nature of the boundaries crossed, the causes of the move, the characteristics of the movers etc. One of the pervasive distinctions made between types of population movements is that between voluntary and forced migrations which dates back 60 years to Fairchild's (1925) migration classification. Perhaps the most frequently quoted typology of migration is that of Peterson (1958), in which one of the most fundamental divisions employed is the degree to which a move is 'forced'. However, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration is not as clear cut as it would appear at first glance. As Speare (1974, p. 89) points out:

In the strictest sense migration can be considered to be involuntary only when a person is physically transported from a country and has no opportunity to escape from those transporting him. Movement under threat, even the immediate threat to life, contains a voluntary element, as long as there is an option to escape to another part of the country, go into hiding or to remain and hope to avoid persecution.

On the other hand, some scholars of migration argue that much of the population mobility which is conventionally seen as being voluntary occurs in situations which in fact the migrants have little or no choice. Amin (1974, p. 100), for example, in his discussion of migration in Western Africa states that:

A comparative costs and benefits analysis, conducted at the individual level of the migrant, has no significance. In fact, it only gives the appearance of objective rationality to a 'choice' (that of the migrant) which in reality does not exist because, in a given system, he (sic) has no alternatives.

Indeed, the early typology developed by Peterson recognised this degree of overlap between voluntary and involuntary movement and distinguished an intermediate category. He differentiated between '... *impelled* migration when the migrants retain some power to decide whether or not to leave and forced migration when they do not have this power' (Peterson 1958, p. 261). These, in turn, are separated from voluntary migration in which the will of the migrants is the decisive element initiating movement.

Population mobility is probably best viewed as being arranged along a continuum ranging from totally voluntary migration, in which the choice and will of the migrants is the overwhelmingly decisive element encouraging people to move, to totally forced migration, where the migrants are faced with death if they remain in their present place of residence. In fact, most movements occur between the two extreme situations as illustrated in Fig. 1.2. The focus in this book is toward the right hand side of the continuum.

Efforts to identify different types of forced migration often begin with the term refugee. While refugee migration in some cases is used as a synonym for involuntary migration, others apply it only to a very restricted subset of all such movements. More than semantics are involved here since there is growing pressure to develop international and regional regimes to protect and provide support to types




Fig. 1.2 A continuum of migration

of forced migrants so that definitions will be critical in determining who is, and who is not, eligible for such protection (McAdam 2010). The contemporary refugee regime operates to provide assistance to people forced to flee their country within the context of international legal frameworks (see Keely and Kraly, Chap. 2, this volume). The 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention relating to the Status of Refugees provides a clear and operational definition of a refugee. Article 1 of the United Nations Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone who:

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his (sic) nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself (sic) of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his (sic) former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (United Nations, 1951, x).

As McNamara (2007, p. 13) points out, there are four main elements in this definition.

- A person must be outside of their country of nationality or former habitual residence
- The person must fear persecution
- The fear of persecution must be for reasons of race, nationality, religion, membership of a particular social group or political opinion
- The fear must be well founded.

The 1967 United Nations Protocol on Refugees considers a refugee as ‘every person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’ (Keely 1981, p. 6). However, this has been modified and extended in practice by both the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and individual Third World countries and regions. Nobel (1985, p. 44), after an exhaustive discussion of contemporary refugee determination in Third World countries concludes that the common elements can be listed as follows:

1. Cases of well-founded fear of being persecuted for any of the reasons mentioned in the Geneva Convention and/or the Statute for the Office of UNHCR.
2. Cases where lives, safety and freedom are threatened by events seriously disturbing public orders like external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, mas-

sive violations of human rights or generalised violence in the whole or part of the country of origin.

This definition, however, still only recognises migrants who are forced to move because of political pressures or conflicts. Other commentators have adopted wider definitions of refugee and forced migrations. A good example of such a definition is that provided by Olson (1979, p. 130).

Refugees differ from other, spontaneous or sponsored migrants, largely in the circumstances of their movement out of one area to another, and the effects these have on them in the settlement and adjustment phases of their relocation. Refugees are forced to leave their homes because of a change in their environment which makes it impossible to continue life as they have known it. They are coerced by an external force to leave their homes and go elsewhere.

This definition stresses the involuntary, forced nature of the move, the uprooting suddenness of most refugee moves and the externality to the mover of the force or forces impelling the move. It also implies a substantial degree of powerlessness among the movers in the decision to move and selection of destination. There is no consideration in this definition of the distance the refugees move or whether or not they cross an international boundary, although Olson points out 'these spatial factors do affect refugees' adjustment after flight'. This definition is clearly more holistic and sees refugee moves as a subset of all population mobility rather than of international migration.

The UNHCR was set up in order to assist mandated refugees but has recognised that significant numbers of people are forced to move owing to a well-founded fear of persecution but move *within* countries. Accordingly they have identified a separate category of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) which are defined as:

Persons or group of persons who have been forced to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of, armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border (OCHA 2004).

While the UNHCR has been an important provider of assistance to IDPs, they have not been subsumed under the refugee rubric and are considered as a quite separate category of forced migrant.

The UNHCR definition is also restrictive in that it refers only to persecution, or fear of persecution, as initiating refugee movement. Keely (1981, p. 6) points out that this excludes people fleeing the ravages of war, and who are usually considered refugees, although the broader definitions in wider use usually include such groups. More commonly, persons who are displaced by civil conflict or war are also categorised as refugees. Some writers, however, have extended the recognition of forces which create refugee movements even further and go beyond the conflicts created by human agents to include people displaced from their home areas by natural disasters. Olson (1979, p. 130), for example, identifies the following five types of external compulsions that alone or in concert create refugees:

- Physical dangers (e.g., floods, volcanic eruptions, etc.)
- Economic insufficiency (e.g., drought, famine)
- Religious persecution
- Ethnic persecution
- Ideological persecution

Particular attention in the last decade has focused on the term ‘environmental refugee’ coined by El-Hinnawi (1985, p. 4) to include:

those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life [sic]. By ‘environmental disruption’ in this definition is meant any physical, chemical, and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) that render it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life.

Subsequently there has been debate as to whether environmentally induced migration should be recognised as a separate international regime, whether it should be subsumed within the existing refugee regime or whether the concept of environmental migrants has had any validity at all. One conclusion shared by a majority of migration scholars (Castles 2002; Black 2001) is that it is preferable *not* to use the term refugee for environmentally forced migrations for the following reasons:

- The existing refugee convention is one of the few (if not the only) international migration regimes which works effectively. Any attempt to modify its basis could weaken the regime.
- Forced migration, indeed all migration, is often a result of a number of factors among which environment factors are only one.
- The bulk of environmentally induced migration occurs within nations.
- All environmentally induced migration is not forced in the same way as mandated refugees are forced to move. Migration which is associated with environmental impacts can be a precautionary adaptation mechanism as well as a displacement.

There would, however, appear to be a case for having some separate identification of ‘environmental displaced persons’ at the extreme forced end of the spectrum in Fig. 1.3 from the perspective of protection and arranging for provision of assistance to such migrants. In this context the UNHCR and IOM have identified a separate category of ‘Environmentally Displaced Persons’ (EDPs). This recognises that there is an emerging and important group of forced migrants who are not covered by the definition of refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). EDPs are defined as:

Persons who are displaced within their country of habitual residence or who have crossed an international border and for whom environmental degradation, deterioration or destruction is a major cause of their displacement, although not the sole one (UNHCR/IOM 1996).

The term ‘environmental refugees’ has caused much of the angst among migration analysts. Overall it would seem most practicable to use a term like ‘environ-




Fig. 1.3 Forced migrant populations of concern according to the ease with which they are identified and counted (Source: Reed et al. 1998, 4)

mentally displaced persons’ for those people who are forced to vacate their homeland by environmental events such as those associated with climate change.

The International Organisation of Migration (IOM 2007, p. 1) has proposed a working definition of environment migrants which has gained wide acceptance (Adamo 2008, p. 3):

Environmental migrants are persons, or groups of persons, who for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.

This definition represents a significant advance because it encompasses all forms of mobility which are initiated by environmental change, not only that which is *forced*. It extends the consideration of the environmental factor in migration beyond *displacement*. This is essential if the full range of the impacts of climate change on migration are to be considered, but will increase the complexity when attempting to define or attribute cause to migration.

1.4 Measuring Refugee and Forced Migration

One of the major elements in the demographer’s ‘tool box’ which they bring to the table in seeking a better understanding of forced migration relates to the considerable advances which have been made in the accurate and timely measurement of demographic phenomena and processes. Such measurement is of crucial importance since being able to establish the scale and characteristics of a phenomenon is a basic first stage to better understanding its causes and impacts and developing effective policy and programs to ameliorate its negative effects and exacerbate its

benefits. This issue has special importance in dealing with forced migration. This is because it presents immediate, pressing problems not just for the nation states but it often involves immense personal tragedy.

Issues surrounding measurement were a central theme in one of the four initiatives by demographers to contribute in this area which was initiated by the Committee on Population, Commission on Behavioural and Social Sciences and Education of the United States National Research Council (NRC)(Reed et al. 1998). In addition to the plethora of problems and issues associated with the measurement of migration broadly defined (Bilsborrow et al. 1997) the fact that forced migration occurs suddenly, without warning, under duress, in crisis situations which are often dangerous when there are immediate and pressing needs, not just to help people but to save their lives, it is not surprising that data collection is not accorded a high priority. Figure 1.3, which is derived from the NRC report, shows there are particular types of forced migration and points in the process of flight that there are more opportunities for counting than there are in others. In the last two decades, there have been considerable strides made in the estimation of the scale of forced migration and these are outlined in Chap. 3 of this volume.

1.5 Advancing the Role of Demography

Refugee and forced migration is multidimensional and complex in nature and there is a pressing need to deepen the evidence base in order to develop timely and effective policy interventions to minimise the personal and community costs incurred. Many disciplines have a contribution to make to this task and demography is one of them. What can demography bring to improving understanding of refugee and forced migration as the discipline which seeks to describe, explain and predict patterns and changes in the size, composition and spatial distribution of human populations? As mentioned in this introductory essay, demography's relatively discrete definitions and comprehensive typologies and rich arsenal of methods of analysis hold potential for the analysis of forced migration. The empirical orientation of the demographic perspective also yields grounding for the conceptualization of forced migration. The chapters of this book will illustrate these assets and will also reveal some critical constraints of the demographic perspectives.

It certainly is true, as Goldstein (1971) pointed out, that migration is the 'step-child' of demography in that less attention has been focused on measurement of migration than fertility and mortality and it is the least well measured of the three demographic processes. However, demographers have a well-stocked 'tool box' of *methods of measuring and modeling migration*, although this has only been brought to bear on forced migration to a limited extent. In particular, demographers have developed a range of strategies to collect data on population mobility (United Nations 1970, 1980; Bilsborrow et al. 1997). Although the spatial and temporary complexity associated with mobility presents many challenges to the measurement

task, there is a substantial body of knowledge and experience in measurement of stocks and flows of population movement (Shryock and Siegel 1976; Siegel and Swanson 2004).

The measurement task does not just involve ‘counting’ the numbers, although that is clearly important. A crucial element is establishing and analysing who migrates. Establishing and analysing *migration differentials* is a major component in the demographer’s tool kit which facilitates understanding of the causes and consequences of movement but also is important for targeting policy interventions, developing preventative strategies and assisting in crisis management. The selectivity of forced migration may differ from that of more voluntary migrations because the impact of crises may impinge on virtually the entire populations of an area. Nevertheless, there will be differences in their ability to respond to those crises.

Another dimension relates to the demographic contribution, with other social sciences, to better understanding the nuances of the *drivers of refugee and forced migration*. This dimension has been neglected since it is assumed that environmental or political crises fully explain the movement. However, increasingly it is being realised that these processes are more complex. The major statements of demographic theory on migration (e.g. Massey et al. 1993, 1998) barely mention refugee and forced migration. Yet the insights into the causes and consequences of migration yielded by these theories *do* have relevance for forced migration as well as that where movers experience some agency. Conceptual frameworks aligning with neo-classical economics, household economics, dual labour market theory, world systems analysis, social network theory, migration decision-making and systems, cumulative causation, transnationalism and institutional studies all yield insights which build knowledge concerning the causes, correlates and consequences of forced migration (see also Keely and Kraly, Chap. 2, this volume). Demographic perspectives on mortality and health transitions, the burden of disease and disability, and fertility and family transitions hold significant potential to understand the consequences of different forms of forced migration for individual, households and families, and communities of migrants (see contributions in this volume by Reed, Shiftel, and Behazin, Agadjanian, and Abbasi-Shavazi, Mahmoudian and Saheghi).

Some of the most interesting discussion of theoretical approaches to forced migration has come in the contemporary high level of interest in the relationship between climate change and migration. A major study by the United Kingdom government (Black 2001) argued that environmental factors only rarely are the only driver of migration. More frequently they operate through or together with other determinants – social, economic, cultural and political. Accordingly, there is a pressing need to examine forced migration within the broader framework of demographic theories of migration and migrants.

Another element in the contribution relates to understanding the *consequences and implications of refugee and forced migration*. Again, there is much to be gained by not considering forced migration as a totally separate phenomenon – it is best understood within the totality of all migration. Forced migrants often move very suddenly so they are not able to make any preparations for the move, are unable to bring their belongings and wealth with them and often are under significant duress.

This clearly impacts upon their ability to adjust to life at the destination (see case study of Afghans in Iran in Chap. 8) or reintegration of returnees to their home (for example, Mohammadi, Abbasi-Shavazi and Sadeghi, Chap. 13, this volume). Entry to housing and labour markets, education systems etc. in the destination accordingly is often more difficult than is the case for other migrants. Demographic analysis of the impact of migration on immigrants themselves, on origin communities and destination communities is well developed and needs to be brought to bear in the assessment of the impact of forced migration.

A final area where demography can contribute relates to the area of *policy analysis*. Within demography there has long been a strong emphasis on transacting relevant findings into meaningful policy and program messages. Demographers have played important roles in providing the empirical basis for policy making in areas such as family planning, family policy, preventative health initiatives but certainly in migration relevant areas such as urbanisation, regional development, international migration, labour mobility etc. Such a focus is valuable in the forced migration area where timely and effectively targeted appropriate intervention can be critical, not only in protecting the wellbeing of those affected but often their lives.

1.6 Dedicated Demographic Contributions

The issue of forced migration within population studies has attracted the attention of scholars in very recent decades. The first scientific attempts for the conceptualisation of forced migration was made by Kunz (1973 and 1981; see also Huyck and Bouvier 1983, and Gordon 1993), but the first collective and pioneering effort was made by a group of demographers and refugee experts supported by the National Academy of Sciences in 1997. A workshop on the Demography of Forced Migration was held during 6–7 November 1997 by the Population Committee, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences in Washington D.C.. The main purpose of the workshop was “to investigate the ways in which population and other social scientists can produce more useful demographic information about forced migrant populations and how they differ” (Reed et al. 1998, p. 3). The workshop focused its main attention on methods of data collection and its shortcomings. In terms of its coverage, attention was only made on forced migration other than environmental disaster or economic crisis, namely refugees, asylee, and internally displaced persons. Another Roundtable was also held on “Mortality Patterns in Complex Emergencies” in Washington, D.C., in November 1999, to explore patterns of mortality in recent crises and consider how these patterns resemble or differ from mortality in previous emergencies (Reed and Keely 2001).

Recognizing the increasing scale and complexity of forced migration, the IUSSP set up a Scientific Panel on the Demography of Refugee and Forced Migration during 2010–2014, chaired by Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, University of Tehran, and included four other demographers and forced migration scholars including the late Graeme Hugo, University of Adelaide, Susan McGrath, York University,

and Jeff Crisp, UNHCR.¹ The panel aimed to achieve three main objectives during its term. First, to organize an international seminar to discuss forced migration from various perspectives within the discipline of demography. Second, to publish an edited volume as a reference book on the demography of refugees that can be used by those who are interested in forced migration, and finally, to mainstream the topic within the discipline of demography.

This IUSSP seminar on Demographic Perspectives on Refugee and Forced Migration was held in Tehran, Iran, during 13–15 May 2012. The seminar was organized by the IUSSP Scientific Panel on Demography of Refugees in collaboration with the University of Tehran, Population Association of Iran, University of Adelaide, and the Australian Demographic and Social Research Institute of the Australian National University. Around 20 distinguished scholars with significant background in the field of refugees as well as representatives from the UNHCR, Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship, and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre attended a two-day seminar and presented their findings on cutting edge issues on refugee and forced migration. Participants also discussed how demography can contribute toward developing relevant policy and programme recommendations for providing protection for forced migrants, the solution of refugee and other forced migrant problems and maximising the benefits of such migration to origin and destination areas. The late Charles Keely who participated and took an active role in the previous (U.S.) National Academy of Sciences (NAS) workshops in the late 1990s, attended the IUSSP international seminar. His presentation and earlier draft of Chap. 2 on the conceptualisation of forced migration is a significant contribution to this volume.

Graeme Hugo and Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi initially planned the process of editing selected papers for the publication of a book titled *Demography of Refugees*. However, with the untimely passing of Graeme Hugo, Ellen Percy Kraly who participated in the Tehran seminar, was invited to join as an editor to continue the project. We are pleased that five distinguished participants of the NAS workshop in 1997 (Keely, Reed, Schmeidl, Martin and Hovy) have contributed to this volume.

With the publication of this volume, the main two objectives of the Scientific Panel have been successfully accomplished. In order to mainstream demographic perspectives on forced migration, targeted sessions on the demography of forced migration have been held at the meetings of the IUSSP International Population Conferences including South Korea in 2013 and South Africa in 2017, and the International Association of Studies of Forced Migration in Colombia in 2014. Similar sessions were organized at regional population conferences including the Asian Population Association Conferences in Bangkok in 2012 and in Kuala Lumpur in 2015. It is hoped that the present book will serve to encourage the introduction of a course on the demography of forced migration and refugees in various social science disciplines.

¹<https://iussp.org/en/panel/demography-refugee-and-forced-migration>

1.7 Organization of the Volume

The volume is organized to address and illuminate several analytic themes. The first group of chapters, Part I, consider the conceptualization and measurement of forced and refugee migration. Keely and Kraly (see Chap. 2) reflect upon the legal origins of the concept of refugee and consider theoretical opportunities for the development of operational definitions within the context of forced migration and refugee studies. Demography has become synonymous with counting populations. Although a demographic perspective involves much more than accounting, measurement and estimation of demographic (spatial and temporal) scale – it is nevertheless of fundamental importance. But as Keely and Kraly argue, the envelop of legal and administrative processes is thick; to serve both science and people, the dual imperative of forced migration studies, demographers must strive for conceptual clarity and validity in measurement. Hovy sets out the methodologies of data collection and approaches to analysis of forced migrations and migration and makes the case for population registration as an effective, efficient and essential foundation for the development of policy interventions that are grounded empirically. Hovy underscores the critical place of population registration in the both the experience of forced migrants in accessing international and national protection and assistance and in informing the scale and nature of national and international response. Abbasi-Shavazi and Kraly mine available international statistical resources to illustrate the assets of a comparative and regional perspective among countries using the changing landscape of UN ‘protocol’ refugees. Using the extensive geography of Asia as a case, these colleagues reveal the arc of trends and patterns in refugee migration since the origins of the UNHCR and how the picture varies at different scales of population geography.

The study of populations and population change involves an examination of population composition specifically by gender as well as integrated analysis of three basic demographic processes – mortality, fertility and migration, all within the context of family. Accordingly, Part II includes a critical analysis of interrelationships among forced migration, mortality and morbidity, and fertility in papers by Reed, Shiftel, and Behazin, and Agadjanian, respectively. Reed and her colleagues build upon seminal studies addressing the measurement of mortality and morbidity in complex humanitarian emergencies to engage in analysis of the challenges of chronic disease, nutrition, psychiatric and psychological disorders, and HIV/AIDS. The significance of population and community level analysis for refugee and migrant health response and programs is illustrated in the case of recent acute situations. The chapter by Agadjanian concerning fertility and reproductive health complements the analysis of mortality and health. Agadjanian embeds his consideration of refugee and forced migrant fertility within evolving theoretical perspectives on family formation and childbearing and very critically situates the analysis within the context of global and regional trends and patterns of fertility decline and change.

The dynamic nature of population change is a theme also embraced by Kraly in her reflections on a gendered demography of refugees and forced migration. She

also considers the potential of available international data sources such as the UN Population Division's international migration database and the Demographic and Health Surveys to support longitudinal and comparative analysis of changing roles and experiences of women and men, and girls and boys among refugees and forced migrants. Shifting to the family and household level of analysis, Abbasi-Shavazi, Mahmoudian and Sadeghi consider the implications of forced migration for family dynamics. Using results from surveys of Aghani refugees living in Iran this research team tests hypotheses concerning the implications of resettlement among generations of Aghans for attitudes and behaviors regarding marriage and family formation.

Part III of the volume interrogates the geographic boundedness of analyses of contemporary patterns of forced migration. In this, the movement of refugees is an important element. However, the international regime of refugees includes only persons displaced by conflict and political forces and movement across international boundaries. Schmeidl and Hedditch give emphasis to displacement within countries as well as displacement forced by regional environmental and land use changes. These scholars review the herculean efforts of the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) to characterize internally displaced populations in the face of uneven information systems. With particular focus on internally displaced persons located in urban areas, Schmeidl and Hedditch document methodological advances in estimation to reveal the many ways in which demography can serve to extend the scale and social and spatial characteristics of persons displaced within their own homelands. Adamo examines international environmentally-related displacement from a population perspective. Using key works of Graeme Hugo as guiding frameworks, Adamo brings forward the burgeoning field of scholarship concerning environmental dimensions of migration and provides critical assessment in relationship to migration and environmental policy issues. McAuliffe discusses demographic perspectives on irregular migration and the intricate and to a large extent unknown relationships between irregular and forced migrations. She documents advances in methods of measuring irregular migration and also underscores the critical gaps in understanding the extent and nature of risks and vulnerabilities among population groups to irregular migration status.

The final group of chapters, Part IV, addresses interrelationships among forced migration, programs, policies and the elusion of solutions. Koser considers the demographic dimensions of migration, displacement and security. Koser clarifies concepts of security in relationship to migration noting the multidirectional relationships. While speculation abounds, little research exists. He concludes by making explicit the ways in which demographers can work to build empirical bases for specifying and further understanding connections between human security and migration. Mohammadi, Abbasi-Shavazi and Sadeghi provide a careful lens on issues deriving from processes and programs of repatriation, providing conceptual specification of processes of reintegration among refugees into communities of origin. A case study of Afghan returnees from Iran illustrates social, economic and demographic challenges as well as opportunities for policy relevant social demographic research. Finally, Martin concludes with recommendations for a shift in the

suite of responses to forced migrations, migrants and refugees given the wide range of drivers of displacement and the increasing complexity in the nature of ‘crises’ that result in forced migration. Diversity in causes of forced migration has implications for the demography of the need for protection. Martin provides a comprehensive and evaluative perspective on the adequacy of international frameworks for responding crises, acute as well as slower onset, such as climate change. As the final substantive chapter, Martin recognizes the “... need for better understanding of how population density, distribution and growth as well as household composition affect vulnerability and resilience to the drivers of displacement.” In a brief epilogue, the editors conclude by pointing to ways forward within the population sciences to contribute to refugee and forced migration studies, drawing out the benefits, and perhaps *obligations*, of demographic analysis for international responses to displaced populations and both ongoing and emerging patterns of forced migration.

1.8 Bridging Thoughts

Refugee and forced migration is one of the major issues confronting the contemporary global community requiring nations and international organization to confront major challenges and creating immense personal tragedy, loss and costs. In meeting these challenges there is a need for greater political will among individual nations and multilateral organisations but there is also an important role for more complete, relevant and timely knowledge of the scale, causes and consequences of forced migration and population displacement. No single social science alone holds the key to evidence-based policy, programs of response, or likely theory. Greater understanding of forced migration will be benefited by concerted multidisciplinary, and collaborative research. In working across disciplines with shared concepts, data and methods, demography has a role to play, both in terms of its distinctive analytic contributions but also in working in tandem with other disciplines. The very project of this book is that of population scientists working in collaboration with scholars of refugee and forced migration studies to bring together critical domains of contributions and complementarities concerning our understanding of displaced persons and populations, their migrations and settlement.

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Part I
Forced Migration: Concepts, Data

Chapter 2

Concepts of Refugee and Forced Migration: Considerations for Demographic Analysis

Charles B. Keely and Ellen Percy Kraly

2.1 Introduction

It is useful on occasion to revisit familiar and taken-for-granted foundational concepts that shape and guide scientific enquiry. The subspecialty of demography that focuses on forced and refugee migration has received consistent attention in the past three or four decades, not only from demographers but from political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and policy analysts. This scholarly attention mirrored the policy attention from individual governments and various international organizations struggling with the issues surrounding persons forced to migrate for various reasons. The attention has two sources. First, State actors take notice because of the purported threats from forced migration in varying degrees to the order and operation of societies and international relations. Forced migrations also raise issues of human rights of concern to some States, international organizations, and civil society. Of importance to the history of this scholarly attention and policy concern is the fact that the phenomena have been observed over time using shifting defining concepts and opportunities for measurement. Changes in policy concern and in analytical apparatus have mutually influenced one another affecting both scholarly output and policy outcomes.

This chapter will attempt a narrative review of these scholarly and policy developments, their interaction and their implications for demographic analysis. As an initial attempt, our considerations will probably be both incomplete and not

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satisfactory to all readers – perhaps not traveling deep enough into social theory, perhaps not grounded enough in the realities of data collection. It can, nevertheless, be a useful exercise to recall the social, political, and scholarly sources that shape scientific concepts in order to stimulate discussion with a goal to understand and interpret results and conclusions garnered from the study of forced migrations in general and in particular cases or the subcategories of phenomena included under the rubric. We begin with a discussion of the historical and legal origins of the concept and category of refugee and the implications for refugee studies. A brief review of the emergence of forced migration studies is presented. Analysis of the implications of both policy analysis and theory for empirical research is presented followed by a discussion of operational definitions and measurement. Diversity in causes of migration is considered across these themes. The chapter concludes with reflections for demography and opportunities for analytic innovation.

2.2 The Construct of Refugee and Refugee Studies

Since the emergence of attention and program activity by the international community on behalf of politically displaced persons after World War I, the focus of demographic and other scholarly study for a long time was almost exclusively on those persons forced to migrate by circumstances surrounding war (Keely 1981; Holborn 1975, Vol. 1; see also Zetter 1991, 2007; Van Hear 2011). Some of the early focus was on political dissidents unwilling to return to their country of citizenship for fear of death or imprisonment after World War I. The other major focus was on ethnic groups who differed from the majority or at least the politically dominant group in nation states, many of them emerging from the political remapping of Europe with the collapse of empires in the period around the War. The mandates of international agencies developed by the League of Nations had great influence on the definition of the populations of interest. So began an important aspect of the study of refugees, the useful precision of a legal definition to define the category of study, and the awareness that very precision could at times miss populations with at least analogous circumstances. The conceptual driver was a legal concept with consequences for the persons included in the concept and obligations for states and international organizations acceding to or involved in an emerging international refugee regime (see Goodwin-Gill 2014; Hyndman 2000; Goodwin and McAdam 2007).

The international refugee regime developed in stages over a period of years within the context of Europe, from World War I responding to the sequelae of that War, interwar minority issues in Europe, the rise of the National Socialist regime in Germany, and then the displacements of populations due to World War II, again as in the World War I including those displaced by war, political dissidents, and ethnic minority status.

A major event in the development of the refugee regime was the series of agreements that established the still operational United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Statute (1951) establishing the UNHCR and the

Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951) provided legal definitions of the category, the scope of authority of the UNHCR, and the obligations of signatory States to the Convention in regard to refugees. A notable feature of the 1951 Convention was its temporal and geographical limitations. It applied to those in Europe affected by events due prior to 1945, i.e., the Second World War and before (see Goodwin-Gill 2014, 2007; Loescher 2001; Betts et al. 2011; Keely 2001; see also Martin, Chap. 14, this volume).

Most of the demographic and other scholarly study following these events focused and derived from the operation of the refugee regime. Who fell under the mandate of UNHCR was the universe of refugees. Even here some ambiguity emerged when UNHCR was called upon to use its “good offices” to organize assistance to persons of concern to the international community but not specifically included in its statute mandate or strictly defined as “Convention refugees”. Persons fleeing the Algerian war of independence beginning in 1954 were an early example of this exception. The interpretation that events in Hungary in 1956 that forced migrants out or left stranded Hungarian citizens outside the country at the time of the Soviet intervention was due to events stemming from World War II was a clear example that the realities of international politics, in this case the Cold War, could “create” refugees. Obviously, political circumstances and events could lead to interpretations of the Convention or statute that would exclude persons who by others’ understandings had a strong claim to refugee status and thus international protection and assistance. UNHCR under the 1951 Convention had the obligation to protect refugees as defined in the Convention, and thus a mandate to keep nations honest. It is debatable how effective such moral authority has been or could be in matters of international politics. In short, the seemingly strict legal definition of who was a refugee under international law soon was seen as not quite so clear since the interpretation of the concept was in some senses the responsibility of parties not always with consonant interests, most particularly UNHCR and the variety of nation states with widely differing interests.

In addition, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were long a part of the operating international refugee regime, providing assistance and protection of various sorts on the ground with resources from the private sector, from governments, and from international organizations, especially UNHCR and its predecessor international organizations. NGOs often had their own interpretations of the refugee definition, sometimes colored by their ethnic or other affiliations. Therefore, many opinions could and did exist about who was and was not a refugee, even as defined by international law.

The geographic and temporal limits of the 1951 Convention were removed by a 1967 Protocol that made the refugee definition universally applicable. Signatory States to the Protocol effectively acceded to the rest of the 1951 Convention. The international law definition is given in Article 1 of the Convention on the Status of Refugees, as amended by the 1967 Protocol to the Convention, as follows:

A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself

of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1969 in a convention covering its member states added:

Any person compelled to leave his/her country owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality.

The Cartagena Declaration adopted by Latin American governments in 1984 accepted similar language to the OAU Convention to include victims of war and generalized aggression. States agreed in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol to the Convention to cooperate with UNHCR, inform the Secretary-General about national legislation to implement the convention, and, most importantly for refugees, not to expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee to the frontiers or territory where he/she is threatened.

The fundamental legal definitions of a refugee, all-too-briefly reviewed here, provided not only the framework of international protection and assistance to refugees but also in general guided the work of demographers and other social scientists studying refugee migration. To be sure, studies often noted ambiguities in the application of the definition, especially in international and State-based court cases and decisions of the UNHCR’s Executive Committee (composed of Member States) clarifying the meaning of the Convention. Sometimes this led States and other parts of the international refugee regime actors to include hitherto excluded persons from the definition, such as women persecuted for reasons of gender (e.g., being subject to genital mutilation).

2.3 Migrants and Forced Migration Studies

The study of “forced migration” gained currency in the last 20 to 30 years or so because of the wider recognition of similarities of a variety of forced migrations to refugee movements (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014; Elie 2014; Loizos 1999; cf. Chimni 2009). The intellectual history goes back further. Fairchild (1925) discussed “forced” versus “voluntary” migration. Petersen’s typology (1958) includes “the degree to which a move is forced” (Hugo 1996). Olson (1979) broadened the definition of refugee to all those essentially coerced to leave their homes and move. He referred to migrants “coerced by an external force” (Kunz (1973, p. 130) and also infers coercion when he focuses on the reluctance to uproot as the difference between refugees and voluntary migrants. In the 1980s, Hinnawer (1985) and Jacobson (1988) both wrote about environmental refugees, referring to both violent disruption and gradual environmental degradation (see Hugo 1996, pp. 106–108; and 2008; Hunter et al. 2015; Adamo, Chap. 10, this volume). Zolberg et al. (1989) argued for deepened analytic attention to the historical and structural dimensions of population

displacement and flight (see also Zolberg and Benda 2001; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014, Part IV). In putting forward the ‘dual imperative’ for research on refugees, Barbara Harrell-Bond’s (1986) seminal work, *Imposing Aid*, framed the place of knowledge generation, both theoretical and empirical, within the lives – and agency – of displaced persons and forced migrants (see Jacobsen and Landau 2003; Van Hear 2011).

An additional impetus to the development of a subfield of “forced migration” was the dissatisfaction by analysts and some actors in the refugee regime (notably UNHCR and NGOs) of the analogous application of the term “refugee”, with its specific legal referent in international law, to other sorts of forced migration, such as “environmental refugee”, “internal refugee” for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and even “economic refugee” (see Hathaway 2007; Chimni 2009). The term “forced migration” now is used to include refugees, those internally displaced for reasons given in refugee law, people displaced by development projects, environmental migrants, and victims of natural disasters and man-made accidents, such as nuclear power plant failures. Critical focus on forced migrants versus forced migration has been considered in relationship to both critical theory as well as practice and interventions. As will be discussed below, the place of refugee and forced migration studies within broader migration studies continues as a vibrant scholarly domain (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014).

Advocates for human rights concerns found the protections offered forced migrants under the statute, Convention and Protocol regime too restricted (see McAdam 2014). Why should State and international protection be limited to forced migrants for political reasons and not those displaced by development projects and natural and man-made disasters? These latter events were not wholly unrelated to State decisions which can have different impacts on various segments of the population. Should not a State be held responsible for undeserved suffering caused at least in part by State action or inaction? The developing human rights movement began to suggest that State sovereignty included obligations as well as rights. The consequence of this view is that the international community, i.e., other States, would have a role in the protection of human rights of all persons everywhere (see, e.g., Nobel Peace Prize Lecture of Kofi Annan, 2001). This view requires a fundamental alteration of the concept of sovereignty that requires an absolute ban on the interference in the internal affairs of a State by another State or an international organization of States.

To summarize, for approximately the last two decades or so, the term “forced migration” came into wider usage to cover a variety of migration types as a sort of compromise. The term “refugee” could be reserved to refer only to those defined by established international law. The broader term, “forced migration,” would include them, but go further. For analysis, the wider term would allow comparison and contrast among sub-types of migration characterized by coercion. For human rights advocates, parallels among subcategories of forced migrants would facilitate bringing human rights claims on behalf of “victims” of forced migration to at least partially remedy harms and to prevent or mitigate future examples of undeserved and unnecessary suffering. For reviews of the history of refugee and forced migration studies, see Elie 2014; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014; Black 2001.

2.4 Considerations for Empiricism

Definition and, therefore, conceptual precision is important for at least three related reasons: application of law; developments of theory; and categorization of data (see also Bakewell 2008; Van Hear 2011; Black 2001). The development of law and its application in specific instances is not of direct interest for this analysis, but has some bearing because the international legal definition(s) have had and still have import for the study of forced migration and forced migrants (see Goodwin-Gill 2014). Not only did the refugee definitions influence the development of refugee studies conceptually, as discussed above, they also influenced the data available, collected by operating agencies and the UNHCR, that were used to analyze refugees and refugee movement. International law develops not only in regard to interpretation of specific law by case decisions, but also in regard to governing concepts such as sovereignty. The ongoing discussion of sovereignty and the changes in international behavior regarding interference in the internal affairs of States such as Kosovo and Libya mean that the legal framework for international relations itself can also change. Such change is reflected in the development of new institutions, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. International relations legal theory is undergoing a robust set of discussions and change, including the concept of sovereignty and the more concrete development of war tribunals and the ICC.

In practice, legal concepts long limited the universe of interest in the study of forced migrations. As noted, the analogous application of the term “refugee,” mainly by advocacy communities, led scientific analysts (and one might add legal scholars) to more careful delineations of other subcategories of forced migrants. The analogous feature of being “forced” was not the only point of similarity in all the additional subcategories of forced migration. Political causes are a shared feature of “refugees” and “internally displaced persons” and government action, whether persecutory or not, is involved in a number of subcategories. Legal definitions, therefore, crafted to articulate obligations of States, had impact on concepts used by social scientists and policy analysts who study forced migration. Advocates with political and social concerns employed rhetoric that challenged a narrow focus on refugees as defined in international law.

The advancement of theory also benefitted from the changes in definition (note the contributions of Bakewell 2008). The scope of study went from the more narrow focus on refugees to that of many types of forced migrants (see Elie 2014; Gibney 2014). The role of the State was clarified, as well as that of the UNHCR in the genesis and fate of refugees (Keely 1996). The difference between force and the reaction to it in individual decisions (voluntariness) has become clearer over time, which has allowed for more conscious focus on the level of analysis (individual versus group). Focus on natural disasters has led to insights about feedback mechanisms and their potential effects (e.g., preparedness, building codes). Definitional clarity has also allowed for development of typologies of causes (e.g., types of disasters, (Richmond 1983)), as well as seeing similarities and differences among types of forced migrations, e.g., the role of the state in causing or mitigating forced

migrations. These conceptual issues will be considered below using the case of environmentally induced displacement.

Conceptual clarity affects categorization of data by providing operational definitions that can more usefully count and describe types of people affected by displacement. In addition to data collected by international agencies with responsibilities for forced migrants of various sorts, censuses and surveys can be used to elicit information by asking explicit questions (more likely in household surveys) or by analytic techniques (Bilsborrow 2009, 2016).

2.5 Conceptual Specification

The definitions of “migrant” and “migration” have many issues, well known by demographers, such as the length of time needed to indicate change of residence and the importance of territorial boundaries. These will not be reviewed here. Essential to this discussion of forced and refugee migration, is the conceptual complexity of population displacement and the characteristics and motivations, a problematic term in itself, of forced migrants.

The quest for a precise and accurate definition, in the sense of a metaphysically correct definition, that included all items and only those items that “objectively” belong to a category, is a chimera. Like all scientific measurement, defining affects the thing defined, as well as the observer’s perception of the items included in a definition (see for example, Rodgers 2004; Schmidt 2007). As discussed above, the effects of legal meanings of refugee as defined by UN Convention suffuses the perception of a refugee. Likewise, it sets off other subcategories of forced migrants as different from other migration. The setting off as different and “other” can carry judgmental undertones, such as how deserving of protection and assistance one group is compared to another.

Even the seeming precision of legal definitions, with their important implications for obligations of States, proves elusive with the change of political events or the development of social meanings in other contexts. As alluded to above, the development of an understanding of sovereignty to include obligations as well as rights of states is a process still underway in contemporary international relations. One result has been the increasing acceptance of the idea that the internal displacement of people, considered below, unable to receive their government’s protection is a matter of international concern and appropriate action. This has led not only to international intervention, in Kosovo, to take one example, but also to an interagency agreement within the UN in 2005 that specified UNHCR as the lead agency for protection, assistance, and management of international activity on behalf of IDPs. This change in UNHCR mandated activities influences the perception of IDPs and validates to some extent international action on their behalf, thus elevating them to a topic of potential inter State intervention. This not only signals a change in the understanding of sovereignty, but also can radically alter the life chances of the

IDPs. It likewise affects the activities, funding, and presence of international agencies and the private sector partners in humanitarian activities.

Fundamentally, the degree of coercion, if any, required for the individual to move is not entirely clear. For example, the Protocol definition of refugee does not refer to force. It is implied that the absence of State protection allowed coercive forces to impel persons to move or flee. Even in cases of mass refugee movement, however, there are some who choose to stay, however small their number. Here the relation between forced migration and involuntary migration comes to the fore. “Involuntary” involves a psychological state of the migrant and is not necessary in order to have forced migration. A person may be willing to move, even prefer to do so as a personal choice, yet have no practical alternative (except perhaps death) if required by authorities or other circumstances. As an example, persons required to move because of a development project, such as a dam, may have contemplated resettlement elsewhere before the project because of inadequate water supply. The dam may not solve their problem, even if it does so for many others. But without the dam, they may have moved anyway due to water supply issues. They can, therefore, be forced to move, but not necessarily do so involuntarily. “Forced,” in this instance, does not refer to a psychological state of a free will act but rather to the practical requirement to move because authorities demand it and have the ability to “enforce” that demand. As in all migration, there is an element of will. In a natural disaster situation, a person may refuse an evacuation order and either be forcibly removed or allowed to stay to suffer the consequence of either death or survival. Those who flee the natural disaster are, nonetheless forced migrants. The matter of compulsion, while not absolute, is overwhelming in the situation. Likewise, a potential refugee could decide to remain and battle the forces of oppression. That may or may not be a wise choice. Those in similar circumstances who choose to flee and seek international protection and support are still refugees.

Even voluntary migration may have an element of coercion, such as difficulty in finding work due to economic circumstances in a place (see Jacobsen 2014). In contemporary China, for example, State policy and investment decisions result, along with other causes, in shifting job opportunities. Is contemporary “economic migration” in China “voluntary?” Unless a State relocated a population as part of an economic plan, e.g., requiring rural settlement, relocation to find jobs, even if influenced by massive State investment and other policies, is typically not thought of or classified as “forced migration” in current policy or scientific discourse (see Bakewell 2008; Betts 2009; Gibney 2014; McAdam 2014; see also Rodgers 2004).

One important emergent conclusion, we argue, is that forced migration ought not to be confused with involuntary migration. “Forced” refers to an overwhelming amount of coercion, such that a choice not to move could have dire consequences such as death, severe injury, or punishment from human actors or events beyond an individual’s control. Individual desire is not the operative issue. Forced migration is relocation because circumstances dictate that an ordinarily reasonable actor has to move to avoid negative consequences to life, health, or quality of life for self or dependents from man-made or natural causes. To use “voluntary” and “forced” as antonyms is misleading in a legal, human rights, or scientific context (see McAdams 2014).

The relationship of categories of forced migrations and migrants to underlying causes of displacement and flight is another dimension of conceptual specification worthy of consideration. The ever enlarging case of environmentally induced migration is illustrative and relevant for demographic studies (see Hunter et al. 2015; Fussell et al. 2014). Environmental migration as a category of forced migration is used to refer to conceptually different but related types of migration. On the one hand, it is used to refer to longer term changes in the environment, such as climate change or desertification, that coerce people to move from areas unable to sustain human habitation given technology and resources available to the affected population. It also refers to acute events, or natural disasters. Environmental migration can be anticipatory or reactive to an acute event. It often does not affect an entire country so that people can resettle in their own country. This option may be less likely in the future, if environmental changes destroy large areas of a country or the areas, such as coasts, that accommodate large proportions of a country's people (Hugo 2008, 1996, pp. 108–113).

Projections of environmentally induced migration into the future share the demands of all population projections for careful articulation of assumptions, clear definitions and attention to the reliability of baseline data. Reviews of estimates of environmentally induced migration due to climate changes vary widely and seem to be based on dubious foundations. Adamo (2008; also Adamo, Chap. 10, this volume), as an example, gives examples of those already displaced by environmental causes that vary by a factor of 24 million and 50 million. Likewise, she cites widely varying estimates of those “at risk” and “people estimated to become permanently displaced” by climate, sea-level rise, desertification, “floods, famines and other environmental disasters”. Even the variation in labels used to describe the estimates indicates both a conceptual fuzziness and a lack of consensus on operational definitions for data collection and estimation.

The subgroup of migration displaced by development-related environmental projects typically refers to forced migration because of individual projects adopted by a State as part of its economic development activities. Usually, discrete projects that involve population displacement are included in this class that provide strong inducements for population relocations. Perhaps a dam is the archtypical project because it usually involves forced movement from land that will be inundated by the waters behind the proposed dam. The State, using some form of eminent domain authority takes land and evicts residents. Often compensation of migrants is a matter of dispute. International lending agencies have adopted measures to include relocation costs in analysis, budgeting, and execution. Nevertheless, disputes continue over amounts of compensation, size of projects, and the wisdom of such projects in the first place.

An important planning issue of interest to the demographer is who is “forced” to move by such projects. People directly required to move who are assisted and compensated by authorities are relatively easy to calculate. Indirect effects on migration, however, are more difficult. Even more confounding is whether indirect effects inducing migration should be classified as “forced” or not. Indirectly induced migrants may wish to claim that they are forced, and therefore, deserve assistance

and compensation. This obviously is a situation that can get very complicated. Such cases, it would seem, are not decided on some abstract principles. This is a case where study of the migration and migrants should proceed on the basis of careful operational definition based on careful study and analysis of specific cases.

2.6 Operational Definitions and Data

A way to deal with problems of precision and shifting meanings in response to social and political changes is to focus on operational definitions. What is counted and why not only have practical implications (such as preparedness planning) but can also through combination and distinction make clear aspects of theory, explanation, and legality that hitherto might have been overlooked (cf. Jacobsen and Landau 2003; see also Zwi et al. 2006). Chapters by others in this volume (notably, Hovy, Abbasi-Shavazi and Kraly) consider major international sources of data on refugees and forced migrants, with particular focus on the resources of the UNHCR, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Richard Bilborrow (2009, 2016) has been of critical importance in making the case for survey methodology in population estimation of international migrations (see also Beauchemin 2014; Laczko 2016; Kraly, Chap. 7, this volume).

UNHCR's statistics section exists to provide data, reports, maps, and other information primarily for field operations and evaluation (see also Abbasi-Shavasi and Kraly, Chap. 4, this volume). Their purview includes refugees, returned refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, stateless persons and a category that includes "other persons or groups of concern" to UNHCR to whom the organization has extended protection or services for special reasons. On the internet, the resources section of <unhcr.org> provides precise definitions and data sources are given. As with any such census-like tabulation of populations, one must always expect inaccuracies of undercount, double count, or over count. Nevertheless, these data can be said to generally be an accurate reflection of this major international agency's planning numbers and the numbers given to States (and any interested party since they are on the internet) as their best public estimates and working numbers. They probably reflect those who at least have come to the notice of the international community, even if "in reality" others are waiting in the wings to finally be recognized.

The published refugee number is the total of Convention refugees, the OAU Convention refugees, those recognized under terms of the UNHCR Statute, and those given temporary protection or complementary forms of protection. In effect, the data reflect those to whom it mandated to extend refugee protection under apposite international law or UN directives. Like all census counts of populations from responsible collection agencies, UNHCR data have deficiencies and warrant evaluation. As implied above, the relationship between policy and program mandates and population coverage must be understood, specified, and from a demographic perspective,

measured. Internally displaced populations provide a critical test, and the displaced populations of Palestinians a relevant case in point.

For historical reasons, Palestinian refugees are under the protection of and receive assistance from a specialized agency founded before UNHCR and which continues its mandate of international protection and assistance. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) runs camps, provides services such as education and medical help to Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian refugee population changes due to births and deaths to a population that has existed with international protection since 1948. At the end of 2016, there were over 5 million registered Palestinian refugees in countries and regions of the Middle East including Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the occupied Palestinian territory (UNHCR 2017). The registered population is generally used as the estimate of Palestinian refugees. Mobility within the region and to points outside the Middle East means that the country by country count of registered refugees is subject to some distortion to an unknown extent.

As can be surmised from the previous discussion, States, as well as humanitarian organizations, found the legal definition of refugees lacking, especially regarding those not particularly targeted for persecution, but victims of war and generalized violence who cross international borders. The criteria of non-refoulement required not returning a person to a situation where he/she could be harmed because a government would not or could not protect them. Those fleeing from war should not be sent back to war-time conditions. In postcolonial Africa, victims of civil war, regime changes, and other serious civil disorder crossed borders with frequency. It was for these reasons that the OAU Convention was developed and adopted.

Similar concerns motivated the Cartagena Declaration that applied similar criteria to include victims of war and civil disturbance under international protection. These documents expanded the list of reasons and the required protection for people affected by war and civil unrest.

Not surprisingly, commentators and NGOs also asked why persecuted people, including those fleeing war, who could not get over an international border, should suffer with no action by the international community. This state of affairs seemed arbitrary and even capricious. The formal answer, of course, was that the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of a state was not only operative but determinative.

The UN Secretary General appointed a Special Representative, Francis Deng, a distinguished Sudanese diplomat, to analyze the situation and prepare a report on IDPs. Assisted by human rights scholar, Roberta Cohen, Cohen and Deng (1998) developed a strategy of articulating what existed in international law and published Guiding Principles for the Internally Displaced in 1998. Their strategy was not to develop new principles or law but to articulate from existing law and documents guidelines for how displaced persons should be treated (see also Schmeidl and Hedditch, Chap. 9, this volume).

Other events pushed rethinking of the principle of sovereignty to include not just the rights of states but also the obligations of states. Another way of stating this

rethinking is that States' rights are not absolute but are contingent. When a State does not act as a State is supposed to act, it could be liable to other States' acting to force it to change or to prevent harm to themselves from the offending State's irresponsibility. While this line of thinking is far from a settled question in international law, willingness of the international community has emerged to intervene in other State's affairs to prevent harm to the citizens of such a State. Kosovo and Libya are two recent examples. On the other hand, the case of Syria in 2012 revealed that some States do not agree that intervention, at least by military force, is always appropriate, especially for reasons of prudence in complex political and military situations. The criteria for appropriate intervention and the mechanisms to determine approval and an international mandate for States to intervene are far from settled. So far, the move from an absolute to contingent view of sovereignty provides not determinative guidelines but permissive ones. When States agree in a recognized international forum to intervene, they have done so. As in all permissive principle cases, a State individually or a collection of States will act if it is in their interest and the price or risks are not prohibitive.

The result of these events has been that internally displaced persons went on to the international agenda to the extent that the UN specialized agencies signed an agreement that UNHCR was to be the lead agency in the protection and assistance of IDPs. This taking the lead on the issue was opposite to a long held UNHCR position that its mandate did not and should not include IDPs.

As a result, UNHCR is the major data source on IDPs. In the case of IDPs, the UNHCR's agency mandate becomes very important. IDPs of concern to it in operational terms include cases where States or the international community invite or mandate it to provide its services. Obviously, there can be cases where events are emerging or obstacles exist to inviting the UNHCR to enter a country and provide services. Thus, the fluidity of the situation and the realities of an international agency entering a country can affect estimates. Data on IDPs from UNHCR, therefore, need careful evaluation about their accuracy and completeness.

In 1998 the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) established the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) based in Geneva. Besides running an online data base, IDMC advocates for durable solutions to internal displacement, as well as training for local actors to respond to the needs of international displacement populations and people.

IDMC estimates that as of the end of 2015, there were nearly 41 million persons displaced by 'conflict, violence and disasters,' with the displacement of nearly 28 million occurring in that year alone (International Displacement Monitoring Centre 2016). The fluid nature of events that produce IDPs and the existence of such disparate estimates, even accepting the different purposes of the organizations that publish the data, indicate that IDP data need to be approached with care. While country by country analyses will reveal different levels of reasonable confidence, the situation generally calls for caution, appropriate skepticism, and suitable warning to readers about the data issues.

2.7 Review and Reflection

This broad overview of types of forced migration generally of interest to the demographic and other communities analyzing forced migration includes a variety of events, with different causes and consequences, and different involvement of State actors. The telegraphic review of the emergence of the term “forced migration” and this summary of subcategories should make clear that the term did not emerge for reasons of scientific analysis. Its emergence and use are due to an interaction of forces involving politics, social concern, science, and policy studies. It would be serendipity indeed if it turned out that the concept was a powerful tool for analysis. While not useless, “forced migration” as a concept is of limited usefulness, mostly heuristic and indicative in its power for demographic analysis.

Nevertheless, in the absence of any other more useful concept and due to usage, it is probably here to stay as a descriptive term for various types of migration where some measure of coercion is involved, regardless of whether the migrants are willing to submit to the coercion or not. The study of forced migration can advance if analysts keep clearly in mind the distinction between migration as an individual characteristic of a person, with causes and consequences, and migration as a population parameter.

An analogy is in order. Judith Blake Davis and Kingsley Davis (1956) in a widely influential article introduced and identified what is termed the proximate determinants of fertility. These identify population parameters through which, and only through which, fertility is impacted in a population. Further work identified with John Bongaarts of the Population Council (Bongaarts 1978, 1982, 2015; Bongaarts and Potter 1983) determined that generally four proximate determinants could explain the large majority of the fertility level change in a population. These are: age at marriage; effective sterility, contraceptive prevalence rate; post-partum infecundity levels, due mostly to breastfeeding; and abortion rates. Using the techniques developed by Bongaarts, one can calculate with these data total fertility rates and gauge their change over time as there are changes in the proximate determinants. Other factors like education, degree of development, and so on can influence fertility, but only by changing behaviors regarding the proximate determinants. Note that we are talking here about a population and the changes in the fertility and the proximate determinants of the population. This is not aimed at explaining individual decisions about fertility or use of contraception, or any other proximate determinants.

In migration studies, too often it is not clear what the analyst wants to explain. One can use employment rates at origin or destination locations, for example, to explain individual decision making or rates of emigration of a population. A comparable set of proximate determinants of migration does not exist. Nor would one expect there to be. Migration, unlike fertility, is not a biological process. A migration, while a discrete event, can be canceled and reinstated many times, even over a short period. When the same person contributes more than one event to a numerator of a rate measured for a given time period, what is the appropriate denominator? This is crucial for population parameters.

But there is ongoing and emerging migration research that holds particular promise for understanding the social structural and behavioral dimensions of mobilities and migration and for the range of cases of forced and refugee migrations in particular. For example, multi-sited approaches to migration surveys, well-illustrated by the ethnosurvey of the Mexican Migration Project (Massey 1987, Durand and Massey 2004) and the MAFE (Migrations between Africa and Europe) Project (see Beauchemin 2014; cf. 2011) hold great potential for migration estimation and specification of characteristics, behaviors and experiences of migrants and migrant households. As members of the Project Group, 'Tracing Narratives of Flight and Migration.'

Trajectory Analysis as a New Approach in Research and Practice, Lipphardt, Schwarz and colleagues at the University of Freiburg are honing the methodological approach of trajectory analysis to trace "...the routes and experiences of people on the move across regional and national boundaries [to understand] the interactions between individual trajectories and different social and institutional contexts" (University of Freiburg). Migration scholars drawing on feminist and other critical perspectives, well represented in the scholarship of Wenona Giles and Jennifer Hyndman (Hyndman and Giles 2016; Giles and Hyndman 2004), return us to the micro-scales to underscore the lived experience of migrants and members of both communities joined as well as departed. Very recently, and responding to the need for evidence regarding new and emerging streams of forced migrations, Crawley and other members of the MEDMIG ('Unravelling the Mediterranean Migration Crisis') Project have been effective in documenting the diversity and dynamism of causes and characteristics of migrants seeking asylum in Europe through Mediterranean corridors. Results of these and other innovative research questions and methodologies carry implications for relating broader global and regional (historical-political-economic-environmental) processes and social structures to proximate dimensions of migration and mobility goals, decision-making and behaviors.

Perhaps as demographers we should return to the concept of forced migration for some indicators about how to proceed. The analysis presented above, informed by theory, policy and practice, makes clear that an essentialist definition of migration is not possible, and more importantly, not scientifically appropriate for the phenomenon of forced migration. Better to use carefully defined operational definitions, pursue as accurate measurement and estimating techniques as possible, and be clear what one is trying to understand, individual or group behavior.

Scientific skepticism is probably more needed than is apparent. Forced migration as a field is populated by many actors, from many social science disciplines, from operational organizations who need good data and science for their work, by advocates and decision makers. Demographic numbers are political and can have important implications. Thus, as is well known, sources need to be checked and verified if possible. But the past use of the refugee label for other types of migrants indicates that the availability of advantages because of State obligations, along with the existence in the past of a regime to assist refugees but not the internally displaced, means that labels matter. But clearly labels are not exclusive to legal or scientific or advocacy, or policy communities. Labels are shared by policy makers, researchers and migrants. Change the meaning or content and there are implications for policies, programs, science, and the experience of displacement, migration and settlement.

Demographers need to be clear which hat they wear because all human beings have multiple roles and interests. We conclude that the field of forced migration studies will not be helped very much by more detailed parsing of definitions or attempts at neologisms for their particular use. The field will continue to be untidy intellectually. What is required is clarity in research design, operational definition, measurement techniques, and openness to diversity and emergence in patterns, trends and characteristics. Then perhaps, further advances can be made in theory and explanation. We should not be overly negative. Progress has been made in migration studies. The incorporation of migration into population projection analysis has taught us new things and changes political discussion about immigration, for example. The application of the forced migration label has been useful to opening discussion to address issues of State action, coerced migration and coerced return, and so on. Much of this has had more impact on policy than on demography. But demography continues to have its place in understanding this particular aspect of human behavior and for understanding its causes and consequences, both demographically and for societies.

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Chapter 3

Registration – A Sine Qua Non for Refugee Protection

Bela Hovy

3.1 Introduction

Establishing the number and basic characteristics of refugees and persons in refugee-like situations, including internally displaced persons, is a key responsibility of host governments, supported by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, as necessary. Indeed, one of the core functions of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations entity created to protect refugees and to supervise the implementation of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, is “(O)btaining from Governments information concerning the number and conditions of refugees in their territories and the laws and regulations concerning them” (see United Nations General Assembly 1950, emphasis added).

Documentation and identification are the necessary complements to registration. Fundamentally, registration confirms someone’s particular status and associated rights to access privileges or services. Some form of identification normally precedes registration to ensure that the person being registered is entitled to these privileges or services. At the same time, registration also confirms the identification of identity. Documentation is proof that the bearer of the document has been properly registered and thus entitled to access a particular right or service. Without proper documentation, however, access to these rights or privileges is denied.

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In daily life, there are numerous events for which proper registration, identification and documentation is required. Proof of marriage allows a couple to legally adopt children. Confirmation of a particular indigenous status may grant preferential access to land. A passport confirms our citizenship, including our rights and obligations as a citizen of a particular country. A voter registration card allows us to exercise our right to vote in elections. A work permit allows us to access employment in a foreign country. A health insurance card confirms our entitlement to medical treatment.

The process of identification, registration and documentation establishes the parameters for the effective protection of, and assistance to, forced migrants, both international and internal, on the ground, forming the basis for immediate interventions and response. Indirectly, the registration process provides policy makers, program directors and researchers with an empirical understanding of the population dynamics of displaced populations, including the components of demographic change, which can inform strategic planning, policy interventions, and programme evaluation.

This chapter considers the relevance of administrative data systems, and specifically population registration, for the study of the demography of asylum-seekers, refugees and other forced migrants. The information presented in this Chapter is largely drawn from United Nations sources. I begin with a reflection on the interrelationships between human rights, protection and registration. An analysis of the process of registration in theory and in practice is then conducted to reveal both challenges and opportunities for the generation of valid and reliable demographic data through administrative procedures. We then consider registration in relationship to categories of forced migration and also the role of population censuses in forced migration research. The chapter concludes with reflections on progress to date, and on the potential of administrative data to further support demographic analysis.

3.2 Background: Human Rights, Protection and Registration

Two human rights that are closely related to one's legal identity and legal status are the right to a nationality and the right to be registered at birth. These two rights, which are highly intertwined, play a key role in the protection of refugees and stateless persons. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone has the right to a nationality. Nationality governs the relationship between citizens and the State, including the legal, economic and social rights and obligations associated with it. The same article also specifies that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality (see United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 1948).

The concept of nationality lies at the heart of the refugee problem. According to the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Article 1(e)) the term "refugee" applies to any person who "... owing to well-founded fear

of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country ...” (emphasis added). In the case of refugees, the link between the State and the citizen has been ruptured. As such, a refugee is a person who does not have effective access to the rights and privileges of the State of which she is, nominally, a citizen. At the same time, a refugee is not (yet) a citizen of another country. Given this legal limbo, this inability of refugees to exercise their fundamental rights as citizen in any country, the need for some form of alternative or intermediate international protection arises (see UNGA 1951; see also UNGA 1967).

The plight of a stateless person, that is, someone who is deprived of her citizenship within her country of residence, is similar to that of a refugee. A stateless person also suffers from a lack of effective access to the protection, rights and entitlements flowing from legal citizenship. In practice, stateless persons face barriers and discrimination in accessing higher education, formal employment and international travel because they cannot produce proof of citizenship. At the same time, the need of stateless persons for international protection may not be as evident as for refugees, given that stateless persons may not face the same level of persecution as refugees. Yet, as persecution of stateless persons is not uncommon, stateless persons may eventually end up becoming refugees seeking safety abroad.

Created just after the World War II to deal with refugee displacement in Europe, the main focus of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been on refugee protection. For decades, UNHCR’s attention to the plight of stateless persons was relatively limited, partly because of the difficulties in assessing the scope of the problem. More recently, UNHCR has started to realize that the problem of statelessness is much more pervasive and widespread than initially assumed and has actively pursued solutions for stateless persons and encouraged countries to sign and ratify the two relevant conventions. Given that stateless persons and refugees face many similar challenges, it is only natural that the international community decided to task one international organization, UNHCR, with implementing the relevant United Nations instruments governing refugee protection (see UNGA 1951, 1967) as well as the two international instruments dealing with the prevention and reduction of statelessness (see UNGA 1954, 1961).

The close link between the right to a nationality and birth registration is illustrated by the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC; see UNGA 1989), one of the ten core human rights instruments and one of the most universally adopted human rights treaties. In Article 7, the CRC prescribes that all children shall be registered immediately after birth. In the same article, the CRC encourages States to provide children, who are at risk of becoming stateless by birth, with access to citizenship. Further, in Article 8, the CRC calls on States to preserve the identity of children, including their nationality, and to re-establish the identity of children in case they were deprived of some or all elements of it.

The CRC, which was adopted in 1989, was not the first United Nations instrument stipulating the roles and responsibilities of governments in ensuring access to birth registration and a nationality for children. Indeed, the 1966 International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, another core United Nations human rights instrument, provides in Article 24 that every child should be registered immediately after birth and that every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

Most recently, the fundamental importance of birth registration for human development was affirmed by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (see UNGA 2015). The 2030 Agenda includes a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals, replacing the Millennium Development Goals. Providing legal identity for all, including birth registration, was included as one of the targets to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, to provide access to justice for all and to build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions (Goal 16).

3.3 Registration of Refugees and Displaced Persons and Access to Rights

Because a refugee is unable, or unwilling owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted, to avail him- or herself of the protection of the country of his or her citizenship, he or she cannot exercise the “normal” rights as a citizen. Not being able to receive the protection from his or her own country of residence, a refugee needs another “authority” to provide such protection. Ideally, such protection would be provided by the country to which the refugee has fled. However, it often takes many years and significant administrative hurdles before a country extends full citizenship rights to foreigners. In the interim, UNHCR provides a “surrogate” authority to fill this void.

3.3.1 Access to Rights

Fundamentally, a refugee has lost the protection of his country of origin and cannot yet enjoy the protection of his new country of residence, be it the country to which he fled – typically a neighbouring country that provides temporary asylum – or a third country, which lies generally farther away. Until such time that refugees have obtained full citizenship rights from another country, or have been able to return to the country they fled and thus re-availed themselves of the protection of their country of citizenship, refugees remain in a legal “limbo”.

During this intermediate state, refugees have access to some social and economic rights in countries providing temporary asylum. For instance, in many countries of first asylum, refugees have the right to free movement, that is, they can live where they wish, although in some countries refugees are required to live in designated areas such as refugee camps. Similarly, access of refugees to land and labour markets varies between countries. Not being able to work the land or to be employed in the formal labour market, refugees are often relegated to the informal sectors of the

economy, residing in squatter settlements in urban areas. As any other foreigner, refugees are not granted full political rights, such as the right to vote or to run for political office, given that such rights are reserved for citizens.

By extending temporary asylum to refugees, most countries respect the most fundamental right of refugees, namely that of non-refoulement – the right not to be sent back to the country refugees fled from before conditions are safe to return. Indeed, sending people back to their country where they face persecution is considered one of the most basic violations of international law.

3.3.2 The Need for Supranational Authority

While the rights of refugees are codified in international law, these rights are not always fully granted by host countries, even if they have acceded to the 1951 Convention. To ensure that refugees, who cannot exercise their fundamental rights as citizen, have recourse to their rights and in particular that of protection against non-refoulement, the General Assembly created UNHCR with the task to supervise the implementation of refugee protection by States. While many countries extend significant rights to refugees, including access to citizenship, UNHCR is the entity of last, and often of first, resort for refugees in case their fundamental rights are trampled upon. In view of this significant responsibility, UNHCR was granted a unique responsibility in exercising its functions and in supervising Member States in implementing the 1951 Refugee Convention (see article 35).

An early illustration of the need for the international community to create a “surrogate” authority to protect the right of refugees was the Nansen passport, issued to refugees by Fridtjof Nansen in his role as High Commissioner for Refugees serving under the League of Nations between the First and the Second World War. Recognizing that the lack of access to internationally accepted identity documents was one of the major challenges faced by refugees, the Nansen passport, while no longer issued, became the first legal instrument used for the international protection of refugees.

3.3.3 Registration: A Condition for Survival

Given the precarious situation of refugees, registration and documentation play a fundamental role in the life of a refugee:

- A refugee identification (ID) document, issued by the national authorities or by UNHCR, is often the only evidence that stands in the way of being deported and facing an uncertain future;
- A ration card is often the only means of survival for a refugee family, as it gives access to international aid in refugee camps;

- Refugees must provide documentary evidence in order to apply for durable solutions: voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement in a third country.

In the past few decades, the demands placed on refugees to document their asylum claims have grown exponentially, together with the surge in asylum-seekers. The inherent difficulties in demonstrating individual persecution, a requirement to obtain refugee status under the 1951 Convention, have been compounded by the growing reticence of asylum countries to grant full refugee rights to persons in need of international protection. The increase in the number of asylum-seekers and the growing xenophobia among host populations have resulted in the creation of complex refugee registration procedures leading to the granting of assorted intermediate or quasi refugee statuses. Obfuscatory terminology such as “persons in refugee-like situations”, “temporary protection”, “humanitarian status”, “humanitarian protection”, “B-status”, “allowed to remain” and “deferred deportation” all seek to convey that the person granted such status enjoys some form of protection, most notably against refoulement, but not the full array of rights and benefits enjoyed by refugees officially recognized under the 1951 Convention.

Determining the exact nature of the status to be conferred demands high levels of registration and identification by the competent authorities, usually the State. Demands for detailed refugee registration are fed by the policies of many host countries to clamp down on illegal border crossings, to combat the overstaying of visas, to suppress the hiring of undocumented migrant workers, and by other policies to combat irregular migration. The result of these measures is that by delaying access of foreigners to obtain citizenship, often in response to xenophobic tendencies among voters, the time for refugees to remain in "limbo" is extended, thus requiring the national authorities to keep longer track of asylum-seekers, refugees and persons in refugee-like situations. With the implementation of durable solutions, in particular local integration, being delayed, the number of persons of concern to the international community continues to rise.

3.4 Registration in Practice

The nature of refugee protection, the need for assistance, and the search for durable solutions requires registration during every step of the refugee’s “life cycle”.

Registration procedures exist for refugees when they cross an international border, when they arrive at the place of residence, when they access services, when they apply for individual refugee status, when they seek assistance to repatriate, when they apply for resettlement in a third country, or when they aspire to obtain citizenship in the host country.

Given that any form of documentary evidence can be a refugee’s lifeline, often in the most literal sense, proof of registration can take the most rudimentary forms. During emergencies, when crossing an international border “en masse”, refugees may be provided with a simple “token”, demonstrating that they have been in

contact with immigration authorities or UNHCR, providing access to life-saving services. In the early stages of a refugee crisis, registration usually takes place at the household level. As the emergency phase is winding down, a more comprehensive registration system is put in place at the individual level. When asylum-seekers need to undergo individual screening in order to obtain refugee status, when refugees apply for resettlement in third countries, or when they seek naturalization, the need for registration and documentary evidence multiplies. As part of the registration and identification process, asylum-seekers are being interviewed multiple times, their stories being scrutinized in great detail.

3.5 Individual Refugee Status Determination

The system most fundamentally connected to refugee protection is the so-called individual refugee status determination (RSD) procedure. Because refugee status is conferred on an individual basis, as per the definition of a refugee contained in the 1951 Convention, the status of each and every person claiming asylum should, in principle, be assessed on an individual basis. Once the refugee status of the applicant has been confirmed, the person is granted asylum or refugee status by the State.

The refugee status determination procedure is accompanied by an elaborate registration system. In addition to recording individual biographical characteristics, such as name, sex, date of birth, level of education, occupation or skills, relationship to the head of household and place of previous residence, the RSD process provides for recording the results of individual interview and background notes as well as elements to confirm the identity of the applicant (photo, fingerprints, iris scan, etc.) and scanned documents. The registration system normally includes a facility to print identity documents indicating the status of the applicant (refugee status applicant, recognized refugee, type of protection accorded, expiration date, etc.).

The implementation of refugee status determination procedures is an obligation once countries have signed the 1951 Convention. By ratifying the convention, governments take it upon themselves to implement an administrative procedure allowing for the adjudication of persons who apply for refugee status. For decades, UNHCR has provided technical assistance to countries in implementing these procedures. Such assistance can range from practically running the refugee status determination procedure in countries lacking any administrative capacity, to providing specialized legal advice in industrialized countries. In many developing countries, UNHCR officials are working closely with the competent national government ministry in adjudicating refugee claims. In industrialized countries, UNHCR may be practically absent from the RSD procedure, but may still provide specialized legal advice on a case-by-case basis, for instance by having a seat on a refugee appeals board. Even when UNHCR is absent from the RSD process itself, it continues to monitor the outcomes of the procedure in collaboration with specialized, non-governmental organizations. Administrative data on pre-screening, on the rate of recognition and on the duration of the procedure are critical in this regard.

In the absence of a properly functioning governmental process, UNHCR may also conduct refugee status determination as part of its statutory responsibilities, so-called “mandate refugee status determination”. Government and UNHCR procedures can also run parallel. In cases where the country maintains a geographical reservation to the application of the 1951 Convention, implying that the Government will only adjudicate asylum-seekers originating from Europe, UNHCR is often left with the responsibility of adjudicating claims submitted by asylum-seekers fleeing non-European countries. Persons recognized under this procedure are referred to as mandate refugees (see for example and discussion, Adelman 2001; McNamara 2007; Goodwin-Gill 2001; Cunliffe 1995).

In principle, the refugee status determination procedure involves three basic steps. First, a person applies for refugee status. Second, the application is being reviewed by the competent authorities. Third, the refugee claim is decided or adjudicated, leading to either an approval or a rejection of the application for asylum. Further, an appeal procedure is normally in place to allow rejected applicants to have their claim reviewed. This basic procedure is often in place in countries receiving few asylum claims or where UNHCR conducts mandate status determination.

In practice, the asylum process in industrialized countries has become a complex legal system which has become difficult to navigate without specific legal assistance, or even to gain access to. Before admitting asylum-seekers to the formal asylum procedure, many host countries nowadays conduct rapid eligibility screening in order to determine whether asylum claims are bona fide. Reasons for screening out asylum claims include when asylum-seekers originate from a country deemed “safe” or when asylum-seekers could have requested asylum in a transit country.

Once allowed to formally submit a claim, it may take years before it is actually adjudicated. If the applicant is in need of protection against refoulement, but cannot produce sufficient proof of individual persecution, he or she may be conferred a refugee-like status with some, but not all, entitlements provided for under the 1951 Convention. Nowadays, many countries have instituted several appeal procedures, one at the administrative level and one at the independent, judicial level, allowing rejected asylum-seekers to appeal the rejection of their claim several times.

As conditions in the country of origin may change, refugee status should be reviewed periodically. Once the country of origin is deemed safe, and the reasons for fleeing no longer to exist, the refugee or refugee-like status of the persons originating from that country may be lifted, as provided for in the 1951 Convention, through the application of the so-called cessation clause. The application of the cessation clause for a particular country is formally announced by UNHCR.

3.5.1 Group Refugee Status Determination

Registration systems in refugee camps in developing countries are not geared towards individual refugee status determination, but towards delivering basic legal protection and life-saving assistance, in particular the distribution of food and

non-food items as well as health services, basic education, etc. In most camp settings, refugees have been conferred so-called *prima facie* or group refugee status. Contrary to asylum-seekers, who require individual screening before granted refugee status, *prima facie* refugees have been given “the benefit of the doubt”. Because they fled generalized violence and left their country “en masse”, it is often impractical and not feasible to conduct individual refugee status determination procedures under those circumstances. The host Government sometimes restricts the movement of these *prima facie* refugees to designated areas such as refugee camps or reception centers.

Although the registration standards for *prima facie* refugees are significantly lower than those applying for individual refugee status, basic data on the individuals and households are still necessary in order to implement programmes. When refugees are dependent on international assistance, the purpose of registration is geared towards controlling the number of beneficiaries rather than establishing the legal identity of the persons fleeing or the credibility of one’s refugee claim. Information that is typically collected in refugee camps includes individual biographical characteristics, such name, age, sex, relation to head of household, household size, place of origin and address in the camp. Especially when food assistance is provided to individual refugee families, which is the case in many camps in developing countries, family size becomes a key driver for registration to ensure that families receive the accurate number of rations. When refugees are expected to live in refugee camps, registration is also focused on restricting refugee movements from a host country perspective. In such cases, refugees may require an exit permit in order to visit a hospital or an institution for advanced education located outside the camp.

Refugee registration is typically a gradual process that becomes more elaborate over time. During a mass outflow, a simple token may be sufficient to access basic, life-saving aid. In the early stages of a refugee crisis, registration usually takes place at the family or household level, which is limited to recording the name of the head of household, the number of persons in her household, and the address of the household. As the emergency phase is winding down, and as soon as conditions permit, individual-level registration is being instituted. In addition to biographical information, individual registration systems also collect the education and skills of refugees with a view to assessing the needs and identifying the resources available within the refugee community.

While the practice of conferring *prima facie* status to refugees is most widespread in developing countries, group protection status may also be accorded by governments in industrialized countries in situations of mass inflows. During the 1990s, for instance, several European countries decided that refugees fleeing the Balkan wars, which erupted following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, could not be admitted to the individual asylum procedure. Instead, these war refugees were granted temporary asylum as a group with the expectation that they would return to the former Yugoslavia after the end of hostilities. Those who were unable or unwilling to return to their region of origin following the war could apply for individual asylum.

In sum, group refugee status is most often conferred in relation to refugees fleeing war and generalized violence. In such cases, it is evident that these refugees cannot return to their country of origin, thus requiring protection against refoulement. At the same time, it may not be possible for these refugees to prove they were persecuted individually. Nor may it be practical or feasible to schedule lengthy refugee status determination interviews if thousands of people are streaming across the border. All these different scenarios give rise to different registration needs which, in turn, lead to the capturing of different biographical data.

3.5.2 Voluntary Repatriation

Both numerically and strategically, voluntary repatriation remains the preferred durable solution to the plight of refugees. Indeed, most refugees want to return home. Registration requirements for prima facie refugees who wish to return home are relatively straightforward. The main purpose of the registration process is to ascertain that the return is voluntary, to determine the number of household members returning as well as the exact location of their return. Further, the country of origin may need the registration list of applicants for voluntary repatriation in order to verify that all repatriates are indeed citizens.

3.5.3 Resettlement

Only a small portion of refugees have access to resettlement schemes in third countries. Although the number of countries offering refugee resettlement has steadily increased in recent years, the demand for resettlement slots significantly outnumbers the number of available spaces. Typically, resettlement is available to those refugees who have special protection or assistance needs, which cannot be met in the country of first asylum. While resettlement is traditionally “supply-driven”, the discussion on how resettled refugees can contribute to labour market needs in countries of settlement has increased in recent years. Within the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, UNHCR has called for so-called “alternative pathways” to admit refugees, which would also include labour market considerations.

Resettlement in third countries requires significant registration, identification and documentation. First, in order to qualify for resettlement, it should be established that the person is a genuine refugee, necessitating elaborate screening for refugee status. If a family applies for resettlement, family relationships should be unambiguously established. A third reason for extended processing periods of resettled refugees is due to lengthy time periods the immigration authorities of the country of resettlement may require in order to screen the prospective immigrant family. This screening has become particularly prevalent since “9/11” in order to prevent persons with links to terrorism from immigrating.

3.5.4 Local Integration

Although voluntary repatriation may be the preferable durable solution, many refugees end up staying in countries of first asylum for prolonged periods. Indeed, there is evidence that the number of “protracted” refugee situations has increased in recent years, both in number as well as in terms of duration.

Local integration implies access to (a) land, employment and other means of subsistence, (b) social protection, such as education and health, and (c) political rights. Policies of host countries for the local integration of refugees vary greatly. In general, however, many asylum countries are reticent to grant rights and privileges to refugees, based on the assumption that the longer the refugees stay and the more they integrate, the less likely they will eventually return to their country of origin.

Registration requirements for refugee seeking to integrate locally are relatively limited, given that local integration does not require the crossing of any international border as in the case of voluntary repatriation or resettlement. When the right to work exists, refugees should produce their refugee card in order to access formal employment. Similarly, if refugees have been granted freedom of movement in the host country, they can apply for a dwelling through the municipal authorities.

Access to political rights, however, requires significantly more registration and documentation, given that, in general, refugees need to obtain the citizenship of the host country in order to vote in elections or to run for office. The rules and procedures to access citizenship vary from country to country. Generally, however, it takes many years of documented residence, proof of self-sufficiency, language proficiency, absence of a criminal record, etc. before refugees can have access to naturalization procedures and, in the final analysis, can avail themselves as citizens of the full protection of the host country.

3.6 Registration as a Resource for Demographic Analysis

The annual Statistical Yearbook, produced by UNHCR since 2001, illustrates the richness of data, principally stemming from the administrative processes maintained by host governments and by UNHCR, as described above. The Yearbook documents fundamental demographic characteristics of categories of refugees, displaced populations and other persons of concern to UNHCR, including numbers of persons (population size), age and gender characteristics, countries of origin and settlement for internationally displaced populations, and locations of internally displaced persons. The array of data annually available for UN member states holds the potential to support detailed comparative analysis both geographically and over time.

In using administrative systems as a source of statistical data, however, both the strengths and limitations of administrative data should be kept in mind. Among the advantages of administrative data are their frequency and detail. As administrative

processes are continuous, so is their data production capability. Moreover, administrative data can be very rich, given that statistics can be compiled during every step of the administrative process. Given that administrative systems should be kept up-to-date, the data generated are generally current.

Important disadvantages of using administrative data sources from different countries are the differences in definitions being used. Given that administrative systems are implemented on the basis of a country's legal procedures, the data they produce are often difficult to compare with other countries. Yet, in the case of refugees these differences tend to be relatively minor given the widely recognized, adopted and implemented refugee definition contained in the 1951 Convention.

A more important limitation of using administrative data for refugee statistics is their coverage. Both government and UNHCR statistics depend a great deal on the willingness of persons to come forward to seek protection, assistance or durable solutions. There are many refugees, however, who prefer to remain unregistered because they fear deportation or they prefer to live outside designated camps. For instance, the number of undocumented refugees who often live in urban areas in developing countries, whose numbers are believed to be sizeable, are heavily under-represented in refugee counts. More generally, refugees who do not benefit from international assistance tend to be undercounted.

3.6.1 Refugees

For more than 150 countries in the world, the number of refugees, also known as the refugee population or "stock", is available at least once a year. The characteristic most widely available for the refugees is the country of origin, which is not surprising given the importance of this feature for refugee protection, as noted above. A second key distinction that is often available is the legal status of the refugees accorded by the host country: did the person obtain formal refugee protection under the 1951 Convention, a subsidiary form of protection, or do they fall under the mandate of UNHCR?

In addition to the total refugee population, both the "entries" into, as well as the "exits" from the refugee stock are documented. With regard to the entries, this mainly constitutes of physical entries in the form of new arrivals, that is, refugees who crossed the border during the year. A second category is the administrative entries into the stock or "status-changers", that is, asylum-seekers who were recognized as refugees during the year and who are subtracted from the stock of asylum-seekers and added to the stock of recognized refugees. As concerns the physical exits from the refugee stock, UNHCR publishes information on the number of refugees who repatriated as well as those who were resettled by a third country during the year. Information that is more difficult to obtain are the legal exits from the refugee stock, or "status changers", in particular through naturalization and cessation of refugee status.

Refugee camps administered by UNHCR provide an important subset of refugee population statistics, often with significant detail. Most importantly for the size of the refugee stock, and thus the amount of assistance to be provided, is the number of refugee births and deaths. In addition, these registration procedures provide information on the refugee population by age and sex, place of origin, level of education, and skills. In addition, sectoral programmes provide a host of other information. For instance, health information systems may provide detailed information on the prevalence of diseases, morbidity, health interventions, etc. In a similar vein, detailed data and indicators may be available on education, (mal-)nutrition, water and sanitation, shelter, etc.

3.6.2 *Asylum-Seekers*

The administrative procedures to determine individual refugee status provide a significant amount of statistical information. Most significantly, they provide information on the number of new asylum applications, the outcome of the adjudication process, the length of determination procedures, and the number of appeals. This information is generally available by country of origin of the asylum applicant. Thus, the data produced by these procedures provide key indicators about the efficiency (duration) as well as the outcome (rate of recognition) of the asylum process. Given that the number of asylum requests is generally available on a monthly basis, they provide an almost real-time source of information to monitor fast changing asylum patterns by country of origin and destination.

In its simplest form, the asylum or refugee status determination process provides statistics on (a) the number of new applications lodged during the period, and (b) the number of cases decided during the period. The decision can be positive (accepted) or negative (rejected). Given the sometimes significant number of persons that “disappear” during the adjudication process, also referred to as “no shows”, there is often a third category of decisions where the applicant’s file has been “otherwise” closed. Then, depending on the specific legal situation in the country, the number of positive (or negative) decisions may include a subcategory including the number of persons who did not receive full refugee status, but a subsidiary form of protection. If not all asylum requests are adjudicated during the year they were submitted, the system will record the number of cases pending at the end of the year.

A comparison of the number of positive with the number of negative decisions during the period, say one year, allows for the calculation of the “refugee recognition rate”. This percentage becomes particularly meaningful when disaggregated by country of origin as it may point to very different adjudication standards applied by different asylum countries for one and the same country of origin.

Taking asylum decisions in a speedy fashion curtails the waiting time for applicants, limits the costs of the procedure, and reduces the chances of “no shows”. An important indicator for the efficiency of the asylum procedure is the number of cases which are pending a decision, also known as the “backlog”. If we know the

number of cases that were awaiting a decision at the beginning of the year, we can determine the number that is pending at the end of the period by adding the number of new applications lodged during the period and by subtracting the number of decisions (positive or negative) that were made during the period.

The statistics described above are based using a “period-based” approach. While relatively simple to implement, it does not take into account the date when the asylum-seeker filed the application. In practice, the validity of an asylum claim from a particular country may vary greatly, depending on when the asylum-seeker left the country. Automated registration systems allow for cross-tabulating the number of applications by the date the application was received. This so-called “cohort-based” approach is more accurate when comparing recognition rates of asylum claims. One important limitation, however, is that cohort-based recognition rates can only be calculated once the claim has been fully adjudicated, which may take several years.

3.6.3 Internally Displaced Persons

The collection of socio-demographic data on internally displaced persons (IDPs) stands in sharp contrast with that of asylum-seekers and refugees. Although in recent years there have been attempts to compile the stock of IDPs, the coverage, quality and detail of these data remain partial at best. For instance, while new arrivals of IDPs are relatively well reported there is a dearth of information on exits from the stock, in particular returning IDPs. As a result, the quality of the figures on the IDP stock rapidly decreases over time.

The limited quality of statistical information on IDPs is due in large part to the fact that, as opposed to refugees, IDPs do not cross international borders. Given that they remain within their country of residence, there is no security interest of a country to register IDPs the same way as they register the entry of foreigners. Indeed, given that citizens can move freely within their own country virtually everywhere in the world, there are simply no systems in place to systematically record internal movements. Second, as opposed to refugees, there is no internationally agreed, legally binding definition of an internally displaced person. As a result, different countries may apply different definitions for IDPs. A third important reason is that IDPs tend not to receive the same level of material assistance, in particular food aid, as refugees. Because IDPs live as citizens within their own country, they continue to have access to some form of self reliance by cultivating land, employment, etc. As a result, IDP camps are not as common as refugee camps. Fourth, while the international community has generally access to refugees once they cross an international border, IDPs may face continued insecurity even at their destination, affecting efforts to count, register and document.

One of the most vexing questions in dealing with IDPs is “when is someone no longer an IDP?” While this question is relatively straightforward for refugees, given the existing legal refugee framework, it is far more difficult to answer this question

for IDPs. Under which conditions should someone no longer be considered an IDP at her new place of residence? How do we know whether the person has returned to her place of origin given that internal movements are not subject to control? All these uncertainties have a direct impact on the availability and quality of IDP statistics.

3.6.4 The Population Census: An Underutilized Source

Although most refugee and asylum statistics are available from specific administrative sources, other actual or potential sources of information exist.

A number of countries hosting large refugee populations have included a question on the reason for migration in their decennial population census with refugee status/asylum being one of the possible motives. While such a crude indication of refugee status may be insufficient from a legal perspective, as it does not require any documentary evidence or screening process, the advantage of including a refugee question in the population census is coverage: in principle, every person residing in the country on the date of census will be asked the same question, which offers an important opportunity to survey refugees who have not approached the national authorities or UNHCR.

Statistics on stateless persons are difficult to collect, especially when they have not crossed an international border. One underutilized source of statistical information is, once again, the population census. As the majority of countries are asking a question on the country of citizenship in their decennial census, stateless should be one of the answer categories for respondents.

The same case can be made for internal displacement. Most population censuses contain a question on internal migration, that is, the previous place of residence within the country. Countries with widespread internal displacement may consider including a question on the reason for internal migration in the census. Practically, however, such an exercise may be complex given that insecurity, the reason for displacement, often prevents the national authorities from conducting a population census in the first place.

In all three cases, that is, for refugees, stateless persons and IDPs, it would be worthwhile for those entities working on humanitarian issues to collaborate more closely with national census offices to ensure that the proper questions are being asked, that the enumerators are well-trained, and that the statistical information is fully processed and tabulated.

3.7 Discussion and Conclusions

There is no doubt that the quality and availability of refugee and asylum statistics have significantly improved in the past few decades.

In the early 1990s, the refugee statistics published by UNHCR were limited to a world map which included only a few countries with population figures. While more detailed statistical information could be found in protection and operational reports prepared for the UNHCR's Executive Committee, the statistical reporting in these reports varied greatly from one programme to the other and from one year to the next. A rudimentary annual statistical reporting requirement for all UNHCR offices, in place for several decades, was only utilized in the early 1990s as a source of historical refugee data.

The leading normative role of UNHCR in the field of global refugee protection allowed the office to implement a consistent system of annual statistical reporting from the mid-1990s onwards. By the early 2000s, these annual statistical reports were deemed of sufficient quality in order to publish the results in an annual Statistical Yearbook, starting in 2001. The results of the annual statistical report are launched on 20 June, on the occasion of World Refugee Day. By working on a daily basis with the competent authorities in most countries in the world, UNHCR's standards and guidelines in the field of refugee and asylum statistics have now been widely implemented.

The improvements of UNHCR's global data system coincided with the "asylum crisis", particularly in Europe. By systematically collecting the asylum data from industrialized countries, UNHCR became also the authoritative source on global asylum trends.

An important driver of better data has been the consistent effort to improve refugee registration. Since the mid-2000s, UNHCR has invested millions of US dollars to improve the registration, identification and documentation of refugees worldwide. One important innovation has been the introduction of iris scans to verify the identity of refugees.

Despite the progress made, more needs to be done to improve refugee registration and information systems.

First, more effort should be made to count and register refugees and other displaced persons who do not actively approach the host Government or UNHCR. In particular, it is recommended to systematically carry out household and needs assessment surveys in order to determine (a) the approximate size and characteristics of the displaced population, including stateless persons, who have not approached the competent authorities, (b) their protection and assistance needs, and (c) their future plans with regard to durable solutions.

Second, a more systematic collaboration between UNHCR and the national statistical offices is required. Especially in countries with significant refugee populations, UNHCR and other humanitarian partners should actively participate in committees that assist the host country in implementing national population censuses and national household surveys. This would include contributing financially to the censuses and surveys in order to include a question on the reasons for migration, to properly train enumerators, and to ensure adequate processing and tabulation of census results.

Third, UNHCR and relevant civil society organizations should work with host Governments to access the census and administrative data on citizenship as a

potential source of statistical information on statelessness. This includes working with the national census office in order to obtain detailed tabulations on the location and characteristics of stateless persons, as identified through the census question on citizenship.

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Chapter 4

Comparative Demographic Analysis of Forced and Refugee Migrations: An Illustrative Note

Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi and Ellen Percy Kraly

4.1 Introduction

In their editorial accompanying a special issue of *Nature* devoted to global migration, the editors state, “collecting reliable data on refugees and migrants is hard” (*Nature* 2017, p. 6). As several of the chapters included in this volume illustrate, both scientific analysis and the empirical basis for evidence-based policy concerning forced migrants and migrations and processes of population displacement are frustrated by the availability of data at each spatial scale, and over time. Inconsistencies in statistical definitions of forced migration and in implementation of methods of data collection, counts of movements versus individuals, population coverage, and comparability of data items are among the points of deficiencies most urgently recognized in international statistics on forced migrations and refugees.

Weaknesses in the coverage and quality of international migration statistics have a long history of documentation among population scientists (see Henning and Hovy 2011; United Nations 2016; Kraly and Gnanasekaran 1987); documentation of the specific requirements for forced migration and refugee data is gaining momentum (Laczko 2016; United Nation 2016) as are innovative proposals for improvement (see Bilsborrow 2016). To be sure, within the statistical and data

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operations concerning refugee and displaced populations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) resources are expanded to foster transparency and critical analysis of available data and sources of data (see UNHCR 2016a, b, c).

Comparative analysis of trends, patterns and characteristics of migration is one of the tools within the kit of demographers. Beyond the analytic goal to describe population change and dynamics, comparative demographic analysis, done well, aspires to reveal emerging patterns which may be different or new, with the potential to tap shifts in underlying processes (see for example Alba and Foner 2014). Comparative analysis is also wide open to scepticism regarding the inherent perspectives guiding assessments of contrast, similarities, trajectories and convergence (see Wimmer and Schiller 2003; Schiller and Çağlar 2009).

In this chapter we engage the statistical resources of the UNHCR to provide a cursory illustration of the analytic contributions of comparative demographic analysis for revealing differences and similarities in trends, patterns and characteristics of refugee and forced migrations globally during this twenty-first century, among major geographic regions, and finally within region of eastern Africa and potentially for suggesting emerging patterns and characteristics, new to the region and perhaps new to the global community. Regions, countries and communities in eastern Africa have experienced significant episodes of population displacement resulting from conflict, development projects, and economic restructuring and land use change during recent decades (see Keely and Kraly 2017; Martin 2017; Koser 2017, Chaps. 2, 12 and 14). Using the geographic frameworks of the United Nations, the region of eastern Africa was the origin of 60.4% of refugees and persons in refugee-like situations in Africa in 2016, and increase from 47.0% in 2011 and 40.0% in 2006. The region also provided asylum for 54.7% of this population of concern in 2016 (48.3% in 2011 and 51.2% in 2006) (see UNHCR 2007 and 2017). The emergence of South Sudan as a nation state, and as both an origin of refugees in recent years and also a location of asylum for refugees from its northern nation state of Sudan, illustrates well the emergence of new roles among nation states in the international refugee processes. Uganda serves as long standing recipient of refugees but stands in contrast to other countries of resettlement in the region with nearly half of its refugees living in urban areas (UNHCR 2017).

We begin with a brief review of international statistical resources relevant for the comparative demographic analysis of forced migrants and refugees available from the United Nations. Population data for recent years (2006, 2011, and 2016) are then presented at the world regional scale for groups of populations of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). We shift to a comparison of refugee migration by countries of origin and countries of asylum within East Africa, and also of levels of population displacement within selected countries. The characteristics of five countries of asylum, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania are described.

We present this analysis as an illustrative note that complements our previous analysis of forced migration in Asia (see Abbasi-Shavazi and Kraly 2017). Beyond illuminating trends and patterns of forced and refugee migrations within these large

regions of the world – at the end of 2016, countries in Africa and Asia were the origin of nearly four fifths, 78.9%, of the total population of concern to the UNHCR) and provided asylum to 77.4% of the total population of concern – we seek to illustrate how comparative demographic analysis widens spaces of inquiry concerning forced migration and refugees, and ultimately stimulates many more questions than answers!

4.2 Concepts and Comparative Data

Progress in the conceptualization of forced migration has benefited from studies, both quantitative and qualitative, on the particular groups of displaced persons and populations. International and interregional comparison of forced and refugee migrations, however, require data following common or at least comparable operational definitions and sources of data. An important literature has evolved concerning challenges, strategies and opportunities in social demographic data collection and measurement of forced migration, migrants and refugees and are expressed in chapters throughout this volume. We refer to the critical work of Jacobson and Landau (2003), Bakewell (2008), Schmeidel (1998) among many others. Issues of evidence (conceptualization and measurement) related to forced migration and refugees are also addressed by Abbasi-Shavazi and Kraly (2017) in relationship to migrations in Asian countries and in chapters throughout this volume.

The international refugee regime, embodied in the good offices of the UNHCR has provided data chronicling refugee and increasingly other groups of forced migrants according to country of origin, asylum and permanent resettlement since the early 1960s. In published reports and online, data collected from Member States, international offices and field operations and organized by the UNHCR provide statistical resources for demographic comparison of refugee and forced migrations (see Abbasi-Shavazi and Kraly 2017). As will be shown below, the evolution of the interactive ‘Population Statistics Database’ of the UNHCR further supports comparative analysis among countries and over time for particular groups of persons of concern. These data, particularly when coupled with social demographic data for Member State populations and the foreign born well organized by the UN Population Division provide further analytic assets.

The statistical resources of the UNHCR are organized in relationship to the geography of the Member States of the United Nations, the administrative structure (for example, Bureaux) and operations of the agency, and the persons and population groups served by the organization. These groups are shown and currently specified in Fig. 4.1 shown here.

As critically considered by many of the contributors to this volume, the statistical concept of ‘refugee’ within the policy, administrative and operational context of the United Nations is inherently an interpretation of international law and convention concerning refugees. As noted in the figure, the key elements of governance concerning refugees are the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees the

<i>Groups of People of Concern</i>	
1. Refugees	include individuals recognised under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognised in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; or those enjoying temporary protection. Since 2007, the refugee population also includes people in a refugee-like situation.
2. Asylum Seekers	are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined, irrespective of when they may have been lodged.
3. Returned Refugees	are former refugees who have returned to their country of origin spontaneously or in an organised fashion but are yet to be fully integrated. Such return would normally only take place in conditions of safety and dignity.
4. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)	are people or groups of individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters,
4. Cont..	and who have not crossed an international border. For the purposes of UNHCR's statistics, this population only includes conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance. Since 2007, the IDP population also includes people in an IDP-like situation. For global IDP estimates, see www.internal-displacement.org .
5. Returned IDPs	refer to those IDPs who were beneficiaries of UNHCR's protection and assistance activities and who returned to their areas of origin or habitual residence during the year.
6. Stateless People	are defined under international law as persons who are not considered as nationals by any State under the operation of its law. In other words, they do not possess the nationality of any State. UNHCR statistics refer to persons who fall under the agency's statelessness mandate because they are stateless according to this international definition, but data from some countries may also include persons with undetermined nationality.
7. Others of concern	refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of the groups above, but to whom UNHCR extends its protection and/or assistance services, based on humanitarian or other special grounds.

Sources: UNHCR Population Statistics Database:

http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga=2.112511820.936996612.1500476086-400255781.1498773620

Fig. 4.1 Definition of Groups of Populations of Concern to the UNHCR (Source: UNHCR Population Statistics Database http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga=2.112511820.936996612.1500476086-400255781.1498773620)

subsequent 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, which together yield the following definition of a refugee as a person who, “...owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR 1951).

Refugee status represents a legal/administrative process in which the UNHCR, Member States and nongovernmental organizations are involved (see Keely and Kraly (2017) and Martin (2017), Chaps. 2 and 14) and that is relevant only for persons who have left – fled – their country of origin or nationality. In recent years, the UNHCR has also recognized persons in ‘refugee-like situations’ for whom official refugee status has not been awarded. This group is defined/described by the UNHCR as “...descriptive in nature and includes groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained” (UNHCR 2017). Similarly, the UNHCR has expanded its operations concerning internally displaced persons within and hence the statistical documentation of this population group of concern within countries. (For a critical analysis of concepts and operational definitions of groups of forced migrants and refugees see Koser (2017); and Keely and Kraly (2017), Chaps. 12 and 2, and Abbasi-Shavazi and Kraly 2017).

Beyond time (selected data are presented monthly, mid-year and end of year) characteristics of groups of persons of concern include geographic (country of origin and asylum, type of accommodation, and urban/rural location) and social demographic characteristics (age and sex). These data are made available in a variety of forms and formats by the UN and UNHCR. The annual *Global Trends* report summarizes global, regional and national trends and patterns and includes detailed statistical annexes that available in spreadsheet format. Some comparisons over time are presented in these annual reports and compendia. The Population Statistics Database (<http://popstats.unhcr.org>) permits comparative analysis among population groups of concern to the UNHCR (see Fig. 4.1), countries of origin and countries of asylum,¹ and over time (years 1951 to present). These resources are engaged for the comparative analysis of forced migrants and refugees that follows.

¹ The Population Statistics Database does not currently accommodate regional analysis by defining regional groupings of countries as in the *Global Trends* reports and annexes tables and spreadsheets. This addition will serve in the analysis of the population geographical analysis of groups of forced migrants and refugees

4.3 Levels and Trends of Forced and Refugee Migration: Regional Comparisons

Presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are data comparing major population groups of concern to the UNHCR for years 2006, 2011 and 2016, and for major geographic regions. Table 4.1 shows region of origin of groups, and Table 4.2 is organized by region of asylum or location of migrant groups. UNHCR data are more often sequenced in reverse with relative emphasis on countries of asylum of population groups of concern, an emphasis appropriate for a focus on response and assistance. Classification by region and country of origin also provides a vantage on both causes as well as consequences – populations and communities left behind – of forced migration. Overall, these data reveal the increasing scale of forced migration and population displacement witnessed – and experienced – globally and regionally during the past ten years. Between (end of) 2006 and 2016, the global population of concern more than doubled from 32.9 million to 67.7 million; total refugees and persons in refugee-like situations increased from 9.9 to 17.2 million, or 74.0%; the global internally displaced population nearly doubled from 12.8 to 36.6 million.

Regions that are the origin of populations of concern are shown in Table 4.1. Changes in the level of refugee migration and displacement have resulted in shifts in the regional sources of the total population of concern to the UNHCR also shown in the middle panel of the table: in 2006, the total population of concern originating in countries within the regions of Africa and Asia were 30.8 and 33.8%, respectively, of the global population of concern; in 2016 these proportions were 31.5 and 46.4%, respectively. Referring to the data in Table 4.1, the proportion of the world's refugees and persons living in refugee-like situations originating in Africa and Asia increased from 88.0 to 94.1% between 2006 and 2016. Increases in the proportion of the population of persons seeking asylum originating from countries in Asia increased from 28.0 to 46.7% of the world's total in this area, reflecting in large part the surge in population displacement originating within the Syrian Arab Republic.

The third panel in Table 4.1 provides a profile of the changing composition of forced migrant groups by type of population of concern originating in major geographic regions. In 2006, less than one third, 31.1% of persons of concern originating Africa countries were identified as refugees or persons in refugee-like situations, compared to nearly half, 49.8% in Asia and 47.7% originating in Europe, and in comparison to the global proportion of 30.1%. These proportions decreased in 2011. Again, drawing from the base data in first panel of Table 4.1, in 2016, the proportion of refugees among populations of concern originating in Africa increased to 28.8%, decreased in Asia to 31.8% and significantly shifted within Europe to 15.1%. Relatedly, in 2006 over half, 53.0%, of the population of concern originating in Africa were internally persons compared to that in Asia, 34.9%, or the global share, 38.9%; in 2011 these proportions shifted to 51.5% for internally displaced originating in Africa, 33.9% in Asia, compared to 43.7% for the world as a whole.

Table 4.2 provides a complementary profile of changes in the size, distribution and composition of populations of concern to the UNHCR by region of asylum in each of the selected years. The total population of concern located in Africa and Asia

Table 4.1 Persons of concern to UNHCR by region of origin, end of 2006–2016

	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations	Asylum-seekers	IDPs protected/assisted by UNHCR, incl. People in IDP-like situations	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate	Others of concern to UNHCR ¹	Total population of concern
	Number					
2016						
Total	17,187,488	2,826,508	36,627,127	3,242,207	7,866,508	67,749,838
Africa	6,165,089	704,349	11,333,466		3,167,568	21,370,472
Asia	10,000,250	1,321,356	15,590,888		4,552,584	31,465,078
Europe	412,142	132,908	2,117,957		67,730	2,730,737
Latin American and Caribbean	420,783	321,343	7,584,816		37,742	8,364,684
Northern America	394	357	–		8	759
Oceania	1361	987	–		1	2349
Various/stateless	187,469	239,162	–	3,242,207	40,875	3,709,713
2011						
Total	10,404,806	895,284	15,473,378	3,477,101	5,189,559	35,440,128
Africa	3,511,640	294,995	6,961,093		2,757,091	13,524,819
Asia	5,772,713	187,702	4,254,311		2,329,601	12,544,327
Europe	467,387	45,695	369,665		102,838	985,585
Latin American and Caribbean	484,069	64,822	3,888,309		29	4,437,229
Northern America	3887	603	–		–	4490
Oceania	1890	359	–		–	2249
Various/stateless	163,220	301,108	–	3,477,101	–	3,941,429
2006						
Total	9,877,707	743,937	12,794,268	5,805,943	3,643,202	32,865,057

(continued)

Table 4.1 (continued)

	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations	Asylum-seekers	IDPs protected/assisted by UNHCR, incl. People in IDP-like situations	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate	Others of concern to UNHCR ₁	Total population of concern
Africa	3,156,133	174,713	5,372,962	–	1,429,735	10,133,543
Asia	5,533,303	208,340	3,879,140	–	1,482,423	11,103,206
Europe	762,938	56,909	542,166	–	238,777	1,600,790
Latin American and Caribbean	163,823	108,821	3,000,000	–	467,051	3,739,695
Northern America	1451	445	–	–	–	1896
Oceania	1849	330	–	–	–	2179
Various/stateless	258,210	194,379	–	5,805,943	25,216	6,283,748
Regional distribution of groups of migrants (%)						
2016						
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Africa	35.9	24.9	30.9	0.0	40.3	31.5
Asia	58.2	46.7	42.6	0.0	57.9	46.4
Europe	2.4	4.7	5.8	0.0	0.9	4.0
Latin American and Caribbean	2.4	11.4	20.7	0.0	0.5	12.3
Northern America	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Oceania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Various/stateless	1.1	8.5	0.0	100.0	0.5	5.5
2011						
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Africa	33.8	32.9	45.0	0.0	53.1	38.2
Asia	55.5	21.0	27.5	0.0	44.9	35.4

Europe	4.5	5.1	2.4	0.0	2.0	2.8
Latin American and Caribbean	4.7	7.2	25.1	0.0	0.0	12.5
Northern America	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Oceania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Various/stateless	1.6	33.6	0.0	100.0	0.0	11.1
2006						
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Africa	32.0	23.5	42.0	0.0	39.2	30.8
Asia	56.0	28.0	30.3	0.0	40.7	33.8
Europe	7.7	7.6	4.2	0.0	6.6	4.9
Latin American and Caribbean	1.7	14.6	23.4	0.0	12.8	11.4
Northern America	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Oceania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Various/stateless	2.6	26.1	0.0	100.0	0.7	19.1
	Regional composition for types of migrant (%)					
2016						
Total	25.4	4.2	54.1	4.8	11.6	100.0
Africa	28.8	3.3	53.0	0.0	14.8	100.0
Asia	31.8	4.2	49.5	0.0	14.5	100.0
Europe	15.1	4.9	77.6	0.0	2.5	100.0
Latin American and Caribbean	5.0	3.8	90.7	0.0	0.5	100.0
Northern America	51.9	47.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	100.0
Oceania	57.9	42.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Various/stateless	5.1	6.4	0.0	87.4	1.1	100.0

(continued)

Table 4.1 (continued)

	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations	Asylum-seekers	IDPs protected/assisted by UNHCR, incl. People in IDP-like situations	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate	Others of concern to UNHCR ₁	Total population of concern
2011						
Total	29.4	2.5	43.7	9.8	14.6	100.0
Africa	26.0	2.2	51.5	0.0	20.4	100.0
Asia	46.0	1.5	33.9	0.0	18.6	100.0
Europe	47.4	4.6	37.5	0.0	10.4	100.0
Latin American and Caribbean	10.9	1.5	87.6	0.0	0.0	100.0
Northern America	86.6	13.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Oceania	84.0	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Various/stateless	4.1	7.6	0.0	88.2	0.0	100.0
2006						
Total	30.1	2.3	38.9	17.7	11.1	100.0
Africa	31.1	1.7	53.0	0.0	14.1	100.0
Asia	49.8	1.9	34.9	0.0	13.4	100.0
Europe	47.7	3.6	33.9	0.0	14.9	100.0
Latin American and Caribbean	4.4	2.9	80.2	0.0	12.5	100.0
Northern America	76.5	23.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Oceania	84.9	15.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Various/stateless	4.1	3.1	0.0	92.4	0.4	100.0

Source: UNHCR *Global Trends*. (2007, 2012 and 2017)

Table 4.2 Persons of concern to the UNHCR by region of asylum, end of 1996–2016

	Total refugees and people in refugee- like situations	Asylum- seekers	IDP's protected/ assisted by UNHCR, incl. people in IDP- Number	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate	Others of concern to UNHCR ₁	Total population of concern
2016						
Total	17,187,488	2,826,508	36,627,127	3,242,207	7,866,508	67,749,838
Africa	5,531,693	537,609	11,333,466	715,108	3,170,852	21,288,728
Asia	8,608,597	456,116	15,590,888	1,959,562	4,552,915	31,168,078
Europe	2,300,833	1,147,920	2,117,957	565,077	79,207	6,210,994
Latin American and Caribbean	322,403	88,056	7,584,816	2460	63,534	8,061,269
Northern America	370,291	566,584	–	–	–	936,875
Oceania	53,671	30,223	–	–	–	83,894
2011						
Total	10,404,806	895,284	15,473,378	3,477,101	5,189,559	35,440,128
Africa	2,924,091	390,715	6,961,093	21,119	2,757,051	13,054,069
Asia	5,104,115	83,130	4,254,311	2,759,418	2,325,012	14,525,986
Europe	1,534,415	312,701	369,665	696,544	107,467	3,020,792
Latin American and Caribbean	377,784	49,677	3,888,309	20	29	4,315,819
Northern America	429,646	53,573	–	–	–	483,219
Oceania	34,755	5488	–	–	–	40,243
2006						
Total	9,877,700	743,900	12,794,300	5,806,000	3,643,400	32,865,300
Africa	2,607,600	244,100	5,373,000	100,100	1,427,800	9,752,600
Asia	4,537,800	90,100	3,879,100	5,026,900	1,377,000	14,910,900
Europe	1,612,400	244,000	542,200	679,000	352,900	3,430,500
Latin American and Caribbean	40,600	16,200	3,000,000	–	485,700	3,542,500

(continued)

Table 4.2 (continued)

	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations	Asylum-seekers	IDPs protected/assisted by UNHCR, incl. people in IDP-	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate	Others of concern to UNHCR _i	Total population of concern
Northern America	995,300	147,800	–	–	–	1,143,100
Oceania	84,000	1700	–	–	–	85,700
Regional distribution of groups of migrants (%)						
2016						
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Africa	32.2	19.0	30.9	22.1	40.3	31.4
Asia	50.1	16.1	42.6	60.4	57.9	46.0
Europe	13.4	40.6	5.8	17.4	1.0	9.2
Latin American and Caribbean	1.9	3.1	20.7	0.1	0.8	11.9
Northern America	2.2	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4
Oceania	0.3	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
2011						
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Africa	28.1	43.6	45.0	0.6	53.1	36.8
Asia	49.1	9.3	27.5	79.4	44.8	41.0
Europe	14.7	34.9	2.4	20.0	2.1	8.5
Latin American and Caribbean	3.6	5.5	25.1	0.0	0.0	12.2
Northern America	4.1	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4
Oceania	0.3	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
2006						
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Africa	26.4	32.8	42.0	1.7	39.2	29.7
Asia	45.9	12.1	30.3	86.6	37.8	45.4
Europe	16.3	32.8	4.2	11.7	9.7	10.4

Latin American and Caribbean	0.4	2.2	23.4	0.0	13.3	10.8
Northern America	10.1	19.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.5
Oceania	0.9	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
Regional composition for types of migrant (%)						
2016						
Total	25.4	4.2	54.1	4.8	11.6	100.0
Africa	26.0	2.5	53.2	3.4	14.9	100.0
Asia	27.6	1.5	50.0	6.3	14.6	100.0
Europe	37.0	18.5	34.1	9.1	1.3	100.0
Latin American and Caribbean	4.0	1.1	94.1	0.0	0.8	100.0
Northern America	39.5	60.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Oceania	64.0	36.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
2011						
Total	29.4	2.5	43.7	9.8	14.6	100.0
Africa	22.4	3.0	53.3	0.2	21.1	100.0
Asia	35.1	0.6	29.3	19.0	16.0	100.0
Europe	50.8	10.4	12.2	23.1	3.6	100.0
Latin American and Caribbean	8.8	1.2	90.1	0.0	0.0	100.0
Northern America	88.9	11.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Oceania	86.4	13.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
2006						
Total	30.1	2.3	38.9	17.7	11.1	100.0
Africa	26.7	2.5	55.1	1.0	14.6	100.0
Asia	30.4	0.6	26.0	33.7	9.2	100.0
Europe	47.0	7.1	15.8	19.8	10.3	100.0
Latin American and Caribbean	1.1	0.5	84.7	0.0	13.7	100.0
Northern America	87.1	12.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Oceania	98.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0

Source: UNHCR *Global Trends*. (2007, 2012 and 2017)

combined over doubled between 2006 and 2016, from 24.7 million to 52.5 million; the proportion of the global total increased slightly from 75.1% in 2006 to 77.4% in 2016 (see middle panel of Table 4.2), reflecting clearly the concentration of origins in these two regions. The importance of these two regions in global refugee resettlement is also shown in the increase of the proportion of the world's refugees located in this ten year period, gaining ten percentage points (72.3–82.3% 2006–2016). Europe witnessed a large increase in the number of persons seeking asylum from within the region, from 244,000 in 2006 to 1148 thousand in 2016, constituting 40.6% of the global total of asylum seekers. In striking contrast to these absolute and relative patterns, the number of refugees resettled in Northern America decreased during the decade, from nearly one million, 995 thousand, in 2006 to 370,291 at the end of 2016, or 10.2% of the world's refugees in 2006 to 2.2% in 2016.

The lowest panel of Table 4.2 reveals the shifts during this decade in the composition of groups of persons of concern within regions of asylum. In 2006 and 2011, Africa's composition of persons of concern had a lower proportion of refugees and persons in refugee-like situations, 26.7%, than the world as a whole, 30.1%, and a much higher proportion of internally persons (and persons in IDP-like situations), 55.1%, than globally, 38.9%; in 2011, the proportion of refugees among the total populations of concern in Africa declined to 22.4%, and then increased to 26.0% in 2016. Currently the relative composition of the population of concern in Africa is similar to that of the total population of concern globally.

The composition of the population of concern in Asia, Europe and Northern America varies. In 2006, just over 26% of the Asian population of concern was internally displaced; this proportion has increased over the decade to 50.0% in 2016. Similarly the proportion of the population of concern in Europe that is internally displaced has increased from 15.8% in 2006 to 34.1% in 2016; as suggested above, the proportion of asylum seekers in Europe has increased from 7.1% in 2006, to 10.4% in 2011, and again to 18.5% in 2016.

4.4 Levels and Trends of Forced and Refugee Migration: The Case of East Africa and Selected Countries Therein

In these next series of descriptive tables we move to a regional and national level of analysis within Africa. Table 4.3 presents UNHCR data on refugees and persons in refugee-like situations for 2006, 2011 and 2016 for world regions by region of origin and also the subregion of Eastern Africa and the nation states of Eastern Africa, according to United Nations statistical classification. It is helpful to reflect the relationship between locations of origin and of asylum. Data as organized Table 4.3 speak to issues of source and symptoms, and indirectly, of drivers of forced and refugee migration. By UNHCR definition, refugees cannot be located in countries of origin; below, we shift to an illustrative analysis of demographic dimensions of reception of these migrants within region and countries of asylum. The data presented in Table 4.3 for countries of origin are derived from the UNHCR Population Statistics Database and have been aggregated to form the region of Eastern Africa.

As noted above and shown previously in Table 4.3, the number of refugees (including persons in refugee-like situations) originated in countries in Africa increased from nearly 3.2 million in 2006 to 6.2 million in 2016. The size of the refugee population more than doubled during the decade, increasing from 1.3 million to over 3.7 million 2016, reflecting in large part the number of refugees originating in the emergent nation state of South Sudan. Review of the national data illustrates issues of classification and the statistical dimensions of geopolitical change. Sudan is a country of grouped within Northern Africa within the United Nations Population Division, and the country of South Sudan which gained independence in 2011 within Eastern Africa (UN 2017); The operational bureaux of the UNHCR place both Sudan and South Sudan within the administrative region, East and Horn of Africa. The number of refugees with origins in Somalia (over a million), Eritrea, Burundi, Rwanda and Ethiopia remain large in 2016. These data embody many issues concerning recent historical causes of forced migrations and population displacements.

The lower panel of Table 4.3 presents an additional vantage on these data concerning refugees originating in the region and countries of Eastern Africa. Using data from UN Population Division *World Population Prospects* (2017) we calculate the proportion of regional and national population that are refugees or persons in refugee-like situations for each of the selected years. To be clear, these metrics are not percents, for the refugee population is not included in the population base, and should be interpreted as ratios, as most out-migration measures should be. For example, the ratio of African-origin population that was outside of their *country* (not necessarily continent) of origin and considered refugees (or persons in refugee-like situations) by the UNHCR at the end of 2016 to the total population of Africa in mid-year 2016 was 0.5 per 100 population, an increase over the 0.3 per 100 population in 2011 and 2006, respectively. Certainly, a mouthful to express appropriately, but potentially a useful demographic comparison among geographies. The ratio of refugees to origin population was highest for Africa among other major regions of origin, and followed by the region of origin of Asia with 0.2 per 100 population. For specific countries of origin, the proportions vary widely. Nearly 12 per 100 of the South Sudanese population was outside South Sudan in 2016; over 9 for Ethiopia and 2.4 for Rwanda. These data provide a perspective on the scale of diaspora among persons in refugee status but do not speak to issues of year of departure nor integration. More detailed analysis of UNHCR (and UN population) statistical resources could consider the relative size of returned refugee groups for countries, over time.

Table 4.4 is organized similarly as the previous table and refers to UNHCR measures of internally displaced populations and persons in internally displaced-like situations for world regions and for Eastern African countries as a subregional illustration. Again, by definition, these persons are located *within* regions and countries of origin, and the proportions shown in the lower panel can be interpreted as percent of population rather than a ratio. These again describe changing processes of population displacement: in 2011, 0.7% of the Kenyan population was considered internally displaced and in 2016, according to UNHCR data, population displace-

Table 4.3 Refugees and persons in refugee-like situations by region of origin, and East African Countries of origin, end of 2006, 2011 and 2016

	2006	2011	2016
		Number	
Total	9,877,707	10,404,806	17,187,488
Africa	3,156,133	3,511,640	6,165,089
Asia	5,533,303	5,772,713	10,000,250
Europe	762,938	467,387	412,142
Latin American and Caribbean	163,823	484,069	420,783
Northern America	1451	3887	394
Oceania	1849	1890	1361
Various/stateless	258,210	163,220	187,469
Africa	3,156,133	3,511,640	6,165,089
Eastern Africa ¹	1,264,378	1,650,384	3,721,705
Burundi	396,541	101,288	408,036
Comoros	72	422	557
Djibouti	485	602	1417
Eritrea	193,745	251,954	459,390
Ethiopia	74,026	70,610	83,894
Kenya	5357	8745	7506
Madagascar	260	289	277
Malawi	113	222	407
Mauritius	80	42	101
Mozambique	231	155	33
Rwanda	92,966	106,833	286,033
Seychelles	61	42	5
Somalia	464,037	1,077,048	1,012,277
South Sudan		1	1,436,667
Uganda	21,751	5680	6189
United Republic	1668	1163	554
Zambia	204	240	246
Zimbabwe	12,781	25,048	18,116
	Distribution within region (%)		
Africa	100.0	100.0	100.0
Eastern Africa	40.1	47.0	60.4
Eastern Africa	100.0	100.0	100.0
Burundi	31.4	6.1	11.0
Comoros	0.0	0.0	0.0
Djibouti	0.0	0.0	0.0
Eritrea	15.3	15.3	12.3
Ethiopia	5.9	4.3	2.3
Kenya	0.4	0.5	0.2
Madagascar	0.0	0.0	0.0
Malawi	0.0	0.0	0.0

(continued)

Table 4.3 (continued)

	2006	2011	2016
Mauritius	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mozambique	0.0	0.0	0.0
Rwanda	7.4	6.5	7.7
Seychelles	0.0	0.0	0.0
Somalia	36.7	65.3	27.2
South Sudan		0.0	38.6
Uganda	1.7	0.3	0.2
United Republic	0.1	0.1	0.0
Zambia	0.0	0.0	0.0
Zimbabwe	1.0	1.5	0.5
Percent (%) of population within region/country			
Total	0.1	0.1	0.2
Africa	0.3	0.3	0.5
Asia	0.1	0.1	0.2
Europe	0.1	0.1	0.1
Latin American and Caribbean	0.0	0.1	0.1
Northern America	0.0	0.0	0.0
Oceania	0.0	0.0	0.0
Africa	0.3	0.3	0.5
Eastern Africa	0.4	0.5	0.9
Burundi	5.2	1.1	3.9
Comoros	0.0	0.1	0.1
Djibouti	0.1	0.1	0.2
Eritrea	4.8	5.6	9.3
Ethiopia	0.1	0.1	0.1
Kenya	0.0	0.0	0.0
Madagascar	0.0	0.0	0.0
Malawi	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mauritius	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mozambique	0.0	0.0	0.0
Rwanda	1.0	1.0	2.4
Seychelles	0.1	0.0	0.0
Somalia	4.3	8.7	7.1
South Sudan	0.0	0.0	11.7
Uganda	0.1	0.0	0.0
United Republic	0.0	0.0	0.0
Zambia	0.0	0.0	0.0
Zimbabwe	0.1	0.2	0.1

Source: UNHCR Population Statistics Database; UN Population Division (2017)

Table 4.4 Internally displaced persons and persons in IDP-like situations by region of origin, and East African Countries of origin, end of 2006, 2011 and 2016

	2006	2011	2016
		Number	
Total	12,794,268	15,473,378	36,627,127
Africa	5,372,962	6,961,093	11,333,466
Asia	3,879,140	4,254,311	15,590,888
Europe	542,166	369,665	2,117,957
Latin American and Caribbean	3,000,000	3,888,309	7,584,816
Northern America	–	–	–
Oceania	–	–	–
Various/stateless	–	–	–
Africa	5,372,962	6,961,093	11,333,466
Eastern Africa ¹	2,000,024	2,379,856	3,572,827
Burundi	13,850	78,796	141,221
Comoros	–	–	–
Djibouti	–	–	–
Eritrea	–	–	–
Ethiopia	–	–	–
Kenya	–	300,000	–
Madagascar	–	–	–
Malawi	–	–	–
Mauritius	–	–	–
Mozambique	–	–	15,128
Rwanda	–	–	–
Seychelles	–	–	–
Somalia	400,000	1,356,845	1,562,554
South Sudan	–	560,161	1853,924
Uganda	1,586,174	29,776	–
United Republic	–	–	–
Zambia	–	–	–
Zimbabwe	–	54,278	–
	Distribution within region (%)		
Africa	100.0	100.0	100.0
Eastern Africa	37.2	34.2	31.5
Eastern Africa	100.0	100.0	100.0
Burundi	0.7	3.3	4.0
Comoros	0.0	0.0	0.0
Djibouti	0.0	0.0	0.0
Eritrea	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ethiopia	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kenya	0.0	12.6	0.0
Madagascar	0.0	0.0	0.0
Malawi	0.0	0.0	0.0

(continued)

Table 4.4 (continued)

	2006	2011	2016
Mauritius	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mozambique	0.0	0.0	0.4
Rwanda	0.0	0.0	0.0
Seychelles	0.0	0.0	0.0
Somalia	20.0	57.0	43.7
South Sudan		23.5	51.9
Uganda	79.3	1.3	0.0
United Republic	0.0	0.0	0.0
Zambia	0.0	0.0	0.0
Zimbabwe	0.0	2.3	0.0
	Percent (%) of population within region/country		
Total	0.19	0.22	0.49
Africa	0.57	0.65	0.93
Asia	0.10	0.10	0.35
Europe	0.07	0.05	0.29
Latin American and Caribbean	0.53	0.64	1.19
Northern America	0.00	0.00	0.00
Oceania	0.00	0.00	0.00
Africa	0.57	0.65	0.93
Eastern Africa	0.65	0.67	0.87
Burundi	0.18	0.87	1.34
Comoros	0.00	0.00	0.00
Djibouti	0.00	0.00	0.00
Eritrea	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ethiopia	0.00	0.00	0.00
Kenya	0.00	0.71	0.00
Madagascar	0.00	0.00	0.00
Malawi	0.00	0.00	0.00
Mauritius	0.00	0.00	0.00
Mozambique	0.00	0.00	0.05
Rwanda	0.00	0.00	0.00
Seychelles	0.00	0.00	0.00
Somalia	3.73	10.94	10.91
South Sudan	0.00	5.36	15.16
Uganda	5.37	0.08	0.00
United Republic	0.00	0.00	0.00
Zambia	0.00	0.00	0.00
Zimbabwe	0.00	0.38	0.00

Source: UNHCR Population Statistics Database; UN Population Division (2017)

ment is not apparent, raising important questions about both resolution of issues as well as issues of concept and measurement. In contrast, nearly 11% of the Somalia population continues to be internally displaced, and over 15% of the current population of South Sudan.

Table 4.5 considers measures describing (selected) national experience within Africa concerning asylum, again for three points within the recent decade. Countries of Africa have been locations of asylum for an increasing proportion of the global population of refugees and persons in refugee-like situations from, 26.4% in 2006, 28.1% in 2011, to 32.2% in 2016. The region of Eastern Africa has provided asylum to over half of refugees located in African countries (51.2% in 2006 and 54.7% in 2016) and 17.6% of global refugees (percent not shown in table). To further set up the table, the proportion (%) of the total Eastern African population which is composed of refugees was 0.7% in 2016.

These comparisons (per refugee and per population) are also shown for selected countries of Eastern Africa in Table 4.5, along with the major countries of origin (shown for countries with more than 1000 refugees) within each country of asylum. Again, the Population Statistics Database serves as the source for these illustrations. These five countries, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania, provided asylum to over 2.7 million refugees in 2016, or 49.3% of all refugees in Africa. All countries except Kenya have experienced increases in the number of refugees within their countries in the past 10 years, with the largest number and relative increase experienced by Uganda. Proximity to source countries (which are not confined to the region of Eastern Africa) is a clear characteristic of the pattern of nationalities within these selected countries of asylum. It is interesting to also note that in each country of asylum, including Kenya (and likely Tanzania) the overall number of countries generating refugees in asylum has increased; for example, from 28 to 38 countries of origin in Kenya in the 5 years between 2011 and 2016; in Uganda from 20 to 33 countries of origin. The national and ethnic diversity of refugee populations in addition to overall scale of asylum and resettlement raises questions about national and local responses and responsibilities regarding the provision of asylum services and support.

Variations in forced migrant populations in age and sex composition for both countries of origin and countries of asylum can reflect a myriad of dynamics – survival; resilience and vulnerabilities before, during and after flight. Figure 4.2 displays percentage age composition by sex for the five Eastern African countries for the population of concern for which demographic data are available. These data are derived from the UNHCR Population Statistics Database, males and females are classified in five age groups: under 5 years; 5–11 years; 12–17 years; 18–59 years, and 60 years and over. These source data also support comparison of gender composition overall and by age. Sex ratios vary widely among these countries of asylum in 2016: Kenya had a sex ratio of 103 males per 100 females, the highest among this group, followed by Tanzania with a sex ratio of 100; the population of concern in Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia had the a great number of females than males with sex ratios of 96, 92 and 88, respectively.

Table 4.5 Refugees and Persons in Refugee-like Situations by Region of Asylum, and Selected East African Countries of Asylum, end of 2006, 2011 and 2016

	2006	2011	2016
Total	9,877,707	10,404,806	17,187,488
Africa	2,607,600	2,924,091	5,531,693
% of total refugees	26.4	28.1	32.2
Eastern Africa	1,336,010	1,411,787	3,025,641
% of refugees in Africa	51.2	48.3	54.7
% of total Eastern Africa population	0.4	0.4	0.7
Selected countries of asylum			
Ethiopia	96,980	288,844	791,616
% of refugees in Africa	3.72	9.88	14.31
% of refugees in Eastern Africa	7.26	20.46	26.16
% of total Ethiopia population	0.12	0.32	0.77
Number of countries	13	16	27
Leading origin countries			
Sudan	66,980	185,466	338,774
Somalia	16,576	54,896	242,014
Eritrea	13,078	45,286	165,548
		2454	39,896
			Kenya
			Kenya
			Yemen
Kenya	272,531	566,487	451,077
% of refugees in Africa	10.5	19.4	8.2
% of refugees in Eastern Africa	20.4	40.1	14.9
% of total population	0.7	1.3	0.9
Number of countries	11	28	38

(continued)

Table 4.5 (continued)

	2006		2011	2016
Leading origin countries				
Somalia	173,702	Somalia	517,666	Somalia
Sudan	73,004	Ethiopia	21,857	South Sudan
Ethiopia	16,428	Sudan	17,568	Ethiopia
Uganda	2810	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	5155	Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	2385	Rwanda	1505	Sudan
Rwanda	2335	Eritrea	1220	Burundi
		Burundi	1195	Eritrea
South Sudan			105,023	
% of refugees in Africa			3.6	4.7
% of refugees in Eastern Africa			7.4	8.7
% of total population			1.0	2.1
Number of countries			4	5
Leading origin countries				
		Sudan	76,845	Sudan
		Dem. Rep. of the Congo	22,186	Dem. Rep. of the Congo
		Ethiopia	4967	Ethiopia
		Central African Rep.	1025	Central African Rep.
Uganda	272,007		139,449	940,815
% of refugees in Africa	10.4		4.8	17.0
% of refugees in Eastern Africa	20.4		9.9	31.1
% of total population	0.9		0.4	2.3
Number of countries	16		20	33

Leading origin countries						
Sudan	215,675	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	81,487	South Sudan	639,007	
Rwanda	21,866	Sudan	18,268	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	205,363	
Somalia	3752	Somalia	14,023	Burundi	41,012	
		Rwanda	12,998	Somalia	30,689	
		Burundi	6687	Rwanda	15,231	
				Eritrea	4511	
				Sudan	2545	
				Ethiopia	2002	
United Republic of Tanzania	485,295		131,243		281,498	
% of refugees in Africa	18.6		4.5		5.1	
% of refugees in Eastern Africa	36.3		9.3		9.3	
% of total population	1.2		0.3		0.5	
Number of countries	4+		4+		4+	
Leading origin countries						
Burundi	352,640	Burundi	67,549	Burundi	230,850	
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	127,973	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	61,913	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	50,324	
Somalia	2086	Somalia	1530			

UNHCR Population Statistics Database




Fig. 4.2 Populations of concern by selected age groups (%) and sex for five Eastern African Countries: 2016 (Source: UNHCR 2017 Population Statistics Database)

The histograms shown in Fig. 4.2 underscore the variations in age as well as gender. Combining groups under 18 years together, Ethiopia had the largest proportion of youth, 63.4%, among these five countries, and also the largest proportion of females in the population of concern in Ethiopia. The population of concern in South Sudan was also relatively youthful, with 61.7% under 18 years. Tanzania had the lowest proportion of persons under 18 years, 49.9% and a relatively large proportion of persons over 60 years, 5.9%. Uganda had the largest proportion of persons over age 60, 5.8% in 2016. Again, these data may suggest alternative processes, for example, in the case of Uganda, earlier waves of refugees who have aged in place and/or the availability and accessibility of health care and support particularly beneficial to refugees in older age groups in comparison to the other Eastern African counties. These national age characteristics may also be compared to the total

population of concern which in 2016 was composed of 53% under 18 years, 43% between 18 and 59 years, and 4% 60 years and over (UNHCR 2017, Table 13).

The UNHCR statistical reports provide summary data on the locational characteristics of refugees within countries of asylum, in both published spreadsheets in tandem with the *Global Trends* reports as well as within the Population Statistics Database system. Table 4.6 provides selected indicators of the geographic circumstances of settlement with the five selected counties of asylum in Eastern Africa. The differences are noteworthy, and provide a vantage on the variations in response and accommodation among these critical players in refugee resettlement. While nearly half of the world's refugees are located in urban areas, refugees in asylum within these five countries were largely rural or dispersed in 2016 (total population of each country is also shown in Table 4.6). Over half of the refugees worldwide are living in private accommodation and just under one quarter, 23.3% are living in planned or managed camps. Among these selected counties of asylum, Uganda has a locational profile of refugees to the world as a whole although over a fifth of refugees in Uganda were in transit camps in 2016 reflecting proximity to both Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo. Uganda, however, stands in contrast to the other selected countries of asylum, each of which provides asylum in form of planned and managed camps for refugees and others. It is important to acknowledge that differences in the proportions of refugees and persons in refugee-like situations located in urban areas raise questions about comparability in definitions and measurement of urban and rural, and in the designation of types of accommodation among countries and bureaux.

To conclude these illustrative comparisons we can continue to use UNHCR operational data to provide age profiles of refugees in different types of accommodations at the subnational level. Adapting UNHCR data in the Population Statistics Database (and also available in annex spreadsheet tables of the *Global Trends* reports), Fig. 4.3 presents age and sex characteristics of three locations for refugees within Uganda at the end of 2016: the capital city of Kampala (individual accommodation), the long established Nakivale Refugee Settlement (individual accommodation) in the southwestern interior of Uganda, and the managed camps within the Adjumani District in the northern region of the country, bordering on South Sudan.

Using the source data for Fig. 4.3. Kampala City had the highest sex ratio, that is, the largest proportion of males within the population of concern, 109, in 2016 compared to that for Nakivale of 106. The population of concern in Adjumani District, which includes some refugee settlements established in 2016 or years just prior, has a higher proportion of female refugees (sex ratio of 85) and also the largest proportion of both children, 67.3% under 18 years, and the largest proportion of older age persons of concern, 2.8%. The City of Kampala had the smallest proportion of youth (38.6) among these three places, and the largest proportion of persons within the working ages (18–59 years) at 59.9%. The sex ratio within this age group in Kampala was 117 males per 100 females compared to Nakivale with 111 and Adjumani District with just 56 males per 100 females in 2016.

Table 4.6 Locational characteristics of refugees and in like situations, end of 2016

	Urban	[% of Total population urban, 2015]	Planned/managed camp	Collective center	Individual accommodation (private)	Self-settled camp	Reception/transit camp	Undefined/unknown	Total
					Number				
World			4,010,962	320,146	8,877,100	525,203	281,783	3,172,294	17,187,488
Ethiopia			633,060		112,390	10,101	33,985	2095	791,631
Kenya			407,966	–	43,133	–	–	–	451,099
South Sudan			200,711	–	3186	57,464	–	1199	262,560
Uganda			194,148	–	540,137	–	206,550	–	940,835
Tanzania			250,055	–	23,138	8305	–	–	281,498
					Percent				
World	49.7	54.0	23.3	1.9	51.6	3.1	1.6	18.5	100.0
Ethiopia	12.7	19.5	80.0	0.0	14.2	1.3	4.3	0.3	100.0
Kenya	9.6	25.6	90.4	0.0	9.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
South Sudan	5.0	18.8	76.4	0.0	1.2	21.9	0.0	0.5	100.0
Uganda	6.3	16.1	20.6	0.0	57.4	0.0	22.0	0.0	100.0
Tanzania	0.1	31.6	88.8	0.0	8.2	3.0	0.0	0.0	100.0

Source: UNHCR (2017); UN Population Division (2016)




Fig. 4.3 Refugees and persons in refugee like situations by selected age groups (%) and sex, three locations in Uganda: 2016 (Source: UNHCR 2017 Population Statistics Database)

4.5 Discussion and Conclusions

As our analysis in this chapter illustrated, due to the increasing trend of forced and refugee migrations in recent decades, the involuntary migration has not only become one of the main contemporary population issues, but it will be one of the continuing global and regional concerns in the twenty-first century.

Despite the persistence and large scale of forced migrations over recent decades, most studies on migration have been focused on voluntary movements, and little progress has been made towards understanding of forced and refugee migrations (See Hugo et al. (2017) Chap. 1, and Abbasi-Shavazi and Kraly 2017). One of the main reasons for this research gap has been the scarcity of a systematic body of complete and accurate data on various stages of the forced movements, the reasons behind the move, and characteristics of the movers. Indeed, studies on refugees and forced migrations have narrowly focused on either specific aspects of the movements or on isolated, localised and sporadic events.

Given the nature and evolvement of forced migration, as argued by Jacobson and Landau (2003), much of the research on forced migration needs to be strengthened in terms of research design, measurement and analysis. Furthermore, investment in more innovative, flexible and appropriate demographic research strategies for the study of forced and refugee migrations is warranted (see for example, Hugo 1987; Bilsborrow 2016; Laczko 2016). In addition, the dynamics of refugee communities, especially the adaptation patterns of refugees in the origin and host countries and

communities, are important areas of research and policy concern (Foley 2000; Abbasi-Shavazi and Sadeghi 2014, 2016). In this regard, incorporation of questions on reasons for migration within national censuses and surveys hold important potential for identifying characteristics, and over time, patterns of change, of resident refugees and forced migrant communities and populations (see Aalandslid et al. 2015; Abbasi-Shavazi and Kraly 2017). In addition to classic survey and registration data, there is a lot of evidence of the use of new technology, smart phones, by people on the move – planning their direction, connecting with family and friends and checking with online sources. Moreover, research needs to address the consequences of forced migration and movements for receiving communities, particularly given changes in international assistance and local responses to both voluntary and forced migrants (Boswell, and Crisp 2004).

Comparative demographic analyses will serve integrative efforts to build theory and inform practice and response. The comparative case presented in this chapter revealed the particular challenges to the study of forced migration and refugees in Africa and Asia. The proportion of the world's refugees and persons living in refugee-like situations originating in Africa and Asia increased from 88.0 to 94.1% between 2006 and 2016. The share of the population of persons seeking asylum originating from countries in Asia has increased from 28.0 to 46.7% of the world's total in this area partly due to the rise of those originating from the Syrian Arab Republic. The magnitude, patterns, and trends of forced movements call for collection of systematic census and survey data, and for comparative demographic analysis focusing particularly on regions experiencing large forced migrations.

The UNHCR data along with data from the UN Population Division provide valuable sources for such comparative demographic analysis. As we have sought to illustrate throughout this note, however, these comparative data raise far more questions than they answer and often point to contributing factors and processes concerning trends and patterns of forced migration that are in contrast, even contention with one another. Differences in characteristics of forced migrations among countries of origin as well as countries of asylum also reflect the composition, by age and sex, but also in groups of persons forms broad categories of forced migrants. We have previously underscored the critical importance of documentation of additional attributes of forced migrants and migrations (see Abbasi-Shavazi and Kraly 2017; also Monsuti 2008). Motivations for movement, characteristics of movement and journeys, health status, household and family composition of movers and persons remaining or lost exemplify genres of information relevant for comparison across circumstances, places and over time.

Our involvement with the two professional associations of demographers (the IUSSP) and forced migration scholars (IASFM) has led us to the conclusion that not only there is insufficient interest on forced migration studies among demographers but also a critical opportunity among forced migration scholars to engage demographic studies and research. Research in the two disciplines are too often carried out in non-intersecting spheres of analysis. Strengthening the demography of forced migration requires active engagement of demographers in studies of and promoting research and training in the field of forced migration. Training of, and investment in,

a new generation of scholars in the study of forced migration will not only lead to the generation of new knowledge, but also to better data collection, increasingly rigorous research methodologies, and more evidence-based interpretations concerning forced migrations at the global and regional levels. Research collaboration and dialogue between forced migration scholars and demographers will deepen the understanding of forced migration issues and expand the horizon and opportunities of each of the two disciplines.

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Part II
Demographic Perspectives on Forced
Migration

Chapter 5

Forced Migration and Patterns of Mortality and Morbidity

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5.1 Introduction

Mass forced migration as a result of wars, conflicts, and natural disasters often leads to premature death and poor health conditions. The levels, types and trends of elevated mortality and morbidity vary by context, type of complex emergency,¹ characteristics of the forced migrant group, stage of the emergency and the migration flow. In this chapter we review recent research on forced migration and health outcomes by analyzing and synthesizing the evidence base to identify patterns of mortality and morbidity in different types of forced migration scenarios among various populations and at different times. The review illustrates the application of a demographic perspective within the context of processes of forced migrations and the critical contribution of analyses conducted at the population and community scale for understanding the health and welfare of displaced people and populations.

¹The concept *complex emergency* is used in the field of public health and humanitarianism to refer to a particular type of large-scale disaster that affects a large civilian population through war or conflict, genocide or ethnic cleansing, and which leads to population displacement, deterioration of living conditions, and accompanying health problems and increased mortality.

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This chapter is, in many ways, an update and expansion of the introductory chapter of *Forced Migration and Mortality* (Keely et al. 2001) which was effectively the first systematic consideration of the place of demographic analysis in forced and refugee migration studies. Practitioners and researchers have learned much more during the past fifteen years. Unfortunately this additional knowledge is only possible because of new forced migration flows and complex emergencies. Although the optimal scenario would be no more wars, conflicts, disasters, and emergencies, this chapter at least aims to consolidate knowledge for future humanitarian efforts towards prevention, amelioration and reduction of the ill- health effects and deaths associated with forced migration emergencies.

The chapter begins with a brief introduction of important terminology and an overview of data collection and measurement issues. Mortality and morbidity levels and trends among forced migrant populations are not easily predictable only based on health indicators. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the political, geographic, socioeconomic, demographic, and epidemiological factors that produce these health outcomes, and to understand how these vary within a forced migration framework that includes a typology of emergencies, the stages of migration and crisis, and various types of displacement and resettlement. To that end, in the next section of the chapter, we develop a theoretical framework to incorporate all of these aspects at various levels of measurement.

Next the literature on mortality and morbidity are each reviewed, in turn, focusing on the types of measures and rates, data collection and methodologies, and levels and trends or major patterns. Demographic data collection and analysis are always challenging in crisis situations and among international migrants generally. This is particularly the case for forced migrant populations. Thus, most existing data do not come close to encompassing all of the factors described in the theoretical framework that we present. There are, however, continually evolving and improving techniques for data collection and analysis, which we also discuss. Moreover, we review what current knowledge suggests in terms of key public health interventions to reduce mortality and morbidity among forced migrants and conflict-affected populations. The chapter concludes by discussing some future research directions.

5.2 Definitions, Data Collection and Measurement

Forced migration can be defined as “the movement of refugees² and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development

²Refugees, under international law, are persons who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, [are] outside the country of [their] nationality, and [are] unable to, or owing to such fear, [are] unwilling to avail [themselves] of the protection of that country” (UNHCR 1951). Internally displaced persons are those who, for similar reasons are displaced within the borders of their own country.

projects” (*Forced Migration Review* 2017). Thus it encompasses many complex and wide-ranging types of migration. Forced migration events can range from short term to long range crises (e.g., displacement due to natural disasters vs. decades-long civil wars), can be caused by various factors, and the affected populations can also vary in terms of legal status or categories, settlement patterns, as well as socio-economic or ethno-racial characteristics. In the next section, a typology of forced migration events will be described at length. Legally, refugees are forced migrants who have been displaced across international borders and granted refugee status, asylum seekers are persons who have been displaced across international borders but whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are those who have been displaced within their own country. These distinctions potentially have important implications for mortality and morbidity, which will be discussed in the theoretical framework section below.

A complex emergency (sometimes called a complex humanitarian emergency or CHE) is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme,” (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 1994). A complex political emergency is “a situation with complex social, political and economic origins which involves the breakdown of state structures, the disputed legitimacy of host authorities, the abuse of human rights and possibly armed conflict that creates humanitarian needs. The term is generally used to differentiate humanitarian needs arising from conflict and instability from those that arise from natural disasters” (ALNAP 2003). It is important to recognize that not all populations affected by complex emergencies are forced migrants; thus, the term ‘*conflict-affected populations*’ has become common in the literature (Spiegel 2004; Hynes et al. 2002). In this chapter, we will sometimes discuss mortality and morbidity among conflict-affected populations, not just migrants, as data collection often encompasses not just those who have been displaced, but also host populations or others in the area.

Mortality refers to deaths in a population and can be measured in a number of ways, from simple death counts to various rates that are more defined. In the later section on mortality, different rates will be discussed in detail. Data collection for mortality is generally much more robust and rigorous than for morbidity, as death is a finite, measureable state, whereas illness often can be vague, may have different definitions and cultural interpretations, and is not always reported or diagnosed properly. Mortality—and in particular, the crude mortality rate (CMR) or deaths per 1000 population—is viewed by the public health and humanitarian community as the most important indicator of overall population well-being during and after a crisis (Toole and Waldman 1997). Nevertheless, there are still data collection and reporting issues related to mortality occurring during and after a complex emergency. In extreme and/or volatile crises, accurate mortality rates can be elusive simply due to the sheer volume of deaths occurring in a short period of time and the

challenge of getting an accurate population census of a highly mobile and vulnerable population for a rate denominator.³

As mentioned, morbidity, or ill-health or illness (comprehensively including: infectious/communicable disease, chronic disease and disability, and mental or psychosocial ill-health) is much more difficult to accurately assess, especially in a crisis setting. However, many more persons may be affected by ill-health than by death and disease rates are, some would argue, more important than mortality rates during a complex emergency, as the goal is to reduce morbidity, and in this way ultimately decrease mortality rates. Many epidemiological studies of forced migration crises, especially in tropical regions, have tried to measure key infectious disease rates (e.g., cholera, malaria, typhoid), in addition to mortality rates (e.g., Lam et al. 2017; Ozaras et al. 2016; Burki 2013; Brown et al. 1996; Boss et al. 1994; Goma Epidemiology Group 1995). Chronic disease, disability, and mental health have more often been measured among forced migrant populations in post-crisis settings (e.g., Barnes and Almasry 2005; Dookeran et al. 2010). The same denominator challenge remains relevant for morbidity rates.

5.3 Theoretical Framework

Now we turn to the development of a theoretical framework to guide our understanding of health and mortality among forced migrants. There are many dimensions to such a framework (see Fig. 5.1), including the type of emergency, type of displacement, stage of migration, geography, population age and sex structure, other socioeconomic and demographic factors, population epidemiological profile, and the health system. These are the major factors that may impact morbidity and mortality levels and patterns among forced migrant populations. In an attempt to summarize some of the important elements that contribute to observable levels of patterns of morbidity and mortality, Fig. 5.1 presents a simplified representation of the processes and factors that lead to various patterns of morbidity and mortality among forced migrant populations. As many of these factors affect one another as well as health patterns it is meant to provide a simplified framework for understanding a complex and always unique process. We also have very little evidence of the impact of some of these factors in emergency settings, which will be quite clear when we review the extant literature later in the chapter. Now we explain the factors and processes displayed in Fig. 5.1 in detail.

Typology of Emergencies, Types of Displacement, and Stages of Forced Migration There are many typologies of forced migration crises, but the periodical *Forced Migration Review*, classifies the three major types by their causal factors:

³The denominator used to calculate demographic and epidemiological rates is the total population at risk of an event (e.g., death) during a specified period of time (e.g., one year or one month). It can be difficult to have an accurate count of the actual population at risk when deaths are occurring with such rapidity.




Fig. 5.1 Forced migration and morbidity and mortality

conflict-induced displacement, development-induced displacement, and disaster-induced displacement (Forced Migration Review 2017). This chapter primarily focuses on conflict-induced displacement, as space limitations make it impossible to review all of the literature on all three types of forced migration and because much of our knowledge of complex emergencies comes from these types of crises.

Nevertheless, the three different types of displacement can produce different patterns of morbidity and mortality. For example, conflict-induced displacement will obviously produce some number of violent injuries and deaths (to combatants and civilians). Depending on the nature of the conflict and the context, these may be accompanied in some cases by morbidity and mortality due to famine and malnutrition, communicable disease, unmanaged chronic disease, psychological distress, and collapse of services. Development-induced displacement will likely have lower levels of mortality in the short-term, but may have long-range health impacts on displaced populations through increased poverty, environmental risks, and potentially disease. Finally, disaster-induced displacement may vary in terms of immediate levels of mortality (mostly due to injuries), but depending on the scope of the disaster and the rapidity of humanitarian response, may have short- or long-term health effects ranging from injuries, psychosocial effects, disruption of chronic treatment, environmental risks, or famine/disease.

The rapidity of the onset of a crisis may also be important. A rapid onset crisis (e.g., a civil war or natural disaster) can result in many immediate deaths in the crisis and post-crisis period, but if it is quickly contained and addressed, can have a lower overall loss of life. Meanwhile a slow onset emergency (e.g., famine or low-level sustained conflict) may have elevated but relatively lower death rates over

a long period of time, can potentially result in higher overall mortality and morbidity than a more rapid emergency.

In terms of migration, complex emergencies may result in various types of migration flows, both politically and practically. Politically, displaced populations are usually divided into internally displaced populations (IDPs)—those who are displaced from their homes, but remain within the borders of their home country—and refugees—legally recognized by international law, they are displaced from their homes across an international border. Another important dimension is whether or not displaced populations are settled in camps (organized by government or international agencies or NGOs) or self-settled among host populations. Much of the data that we have on mortality and morbidity comes from camp populations, which means that we know much less about the health of self-settled populations. There is a somewhat larger (although still incomplete) literature on resettled refugees in the U.S., Europe, or other settings, who are now legal permanent residents of a host country and less likely to return to their home country.

In Fig. 5.1, the center arrow is overlaid by a component of time—the stage of the crisis and displacement. Time is critical, as mortality will likely be highest during the crisis or immediate post-crisis periods. The rapidity, efficiency, and appropriateness of any humanitarian response and the length of time it takes for a crisis to subside will also contribute to the overall levels and the patterns of mortality and morbidity. How long a population is displaced (in addition to how they are displaced, repatriated, resettled, and integrated) also has a bearing on the levels and trends of health outcomes over time. This is further discussed in the review of mortality patterns below.

5.3.1 Geographical Factors

Geography may be an important determinant of health outcomes in a complex emergency as well. In the last two decades especially, the rapid urbanization of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (the regions where most crises occur) has contributed to different patterns of health and mortality outcomes. Some apparent socioeconomic determinants of health in forced migration settings may simply relate to the social class of the middle-income urban populations who are frequently affected by the conflict in many contemporary settings. The pattern of mortality and morbidity among this group of people may not resemble those of the low-income, often more rural populations who were more frequently affected in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. For example, mortality levels in the Bosnian and Kosovar cases were lower than mortality levels in emergencies in developing countries (Waldman and Martone 1999). The ongoing crisis in Syria has had high levels of war casualties, but morbidities and mental health issues are the largest areas of concern due to the ongoing breakdown of the health system (Taleb et al. 2015). And the epidemiological aspects, which relate to both the sociological and demographic profile of the displaced

populations and are measured by health indicators, affect the patterns of mortality and morbidity in a more urbanized context.

The regional context of displacement is highly relevant both in terms of the physical geography and climate and the political and legal context in which displaced populations exist. Physical geography can serve as a barrier to mobility for refugees; for example, land and water forms such as mountains, deserts, rivers, lakes, and seas—which often serve as political borders between countries as well—can make migration difficult and, along with harsh weather (snow, extreme heat, aridity, or extreme rains) may contribute to injuries, disabilities, the spread of communicable disease and ultimately, deaths.

Political and legal context is also somewhat geographically determined, primarily by regional cooperative organizations and their member states, which often aim to extend and help to enforce international refugee protection. Legally, according to the African Union (AU), for example, refugees located within AU member states are entitled to protection whether or not they meet the criteria of the UNHCR refugee definition; thus, populations fleeing from war are all considered refugees, whether or not they are in danger of persecution individually. However, in practice, the AU has not been very effective at enforcing its own mandates (Sharpe 2012).

5.3.2 Demographic and Socioeconomic Factors

The age and sex structure of a population is perhaps the most commonly reported determinant/correlate of morbidity and mortality. Conventional wisdom for many years held that most refugee populations were made up of women and children. This is often true, yet the population composition may differ from emergency to emergency, and by type and stage of crisis, geography, and perhaps most importantly, by the original population composition prior to conflict or disaster (Keely et al. 2001).

Undoubtedly, the age and sex composition of the population can affect morbidity and mortality patterns during a crisis. Children under age five have been documented as particularly vulnerable to disease and malnutrition in many poorer settings, and as such, they are a major focus for initial public health interventions. However, if disease and malnutrition are primary causes of death at the height of a crisis, then many children may die and later be absent from a population once humanitarian assistance arrives and is implemented (Keely et al. 2001).

On the other hand, in some populations, which have a higher proportion of middle-aged and older persons, the elderly may be particularly vulnerable in emergency settings. For example, in 1993–1994, adults aged 60 and older in Sarajevo, Bosnia, were documented to be the group most affected by undernutrition during the civil war (Watson et al. 1995). Other examples of crises in the last two decades affecting large percentages of middle-aged and elderly adults include Iraq and Syria.

Socioeconomic status is another critical, though often unmeasured, determinant of health and mortality patterns. Not surprisingly, poorer households and individuals are going to be most vulnerable in an emergency, because they lack the resources or social ties to escape before the crisis (which wealthier households may be able to do). They are also less likely to have cash on hand to use for bribes, trading, and other livelihood strategies in a refugee camp setting. However, depending on the level of hardship experienced during a crisis or immediate post-crisis setting, more affluent persons and households might be quite vulnerable as well, if they are used to a certain level of food, services, and health care, but are unable to access these. Increasingly, there are more and more urban displaced populations, which adds yet another dimension; urban populations who are displaced to rural areas may have difficulty adapting, while any population displaced to an urban area (or within an urban area) may be vulnerable due to the collapse of services and commerce. Household and kinship structures matter as well, as these help to determine how resources are allocated and shared amongst families, and these may be placed under pressure during and after a crisis.

Although such data are rarely available or collected, race or ethnicity and religion may also play a role in mortality and morbidity patterns if certain groups are discriminated against, targeted, historically excluded or not allowed access to services. This is more commonly documented in post-crisis and resettlement populations. Grove and Zwi (2006) refer to an ‘othering’ theory to describe how refugees are received in wealthier countries and consider the implications of this for the migrants’ public health. They identify a number of mechanisms through which refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants are positioned as ‘the other’ and are defined and treated as separate, distant and disconnected from host communities in receiving countries. This separateness can lead to isolation from health systems, psychosocial effects, and real physical health impacts.

5.3.3 Epidemiological Population Profile and Health Systems

Clearly the extant epidemiological profile of a population will impact its mortality and morbidity patterns during a crisis. Although certain infectious diseases can and do arise during crises, most of these diseases are already present in a population, but may be exacerbated under emergency conditions. If a population is already undernourished, then a crisis will likely cause an increase in this condition and its resulting morbidities. Individuals with chronic disease, such as high blood pressure or diabetes, will have elevated mortality risks during an emergency, as their treatment may be disrupted and chronic disease can compound one’s vulnerability. And, finally, the socioeconomic features of the host areas are important, as they may facilitate or hinder access to health care services for migrants. The health impacts of collapsed health systems in home regions and the establishment and/or availability of health services in resettlement areas should not be underestimated. Of course this is all related to the ongoing political situation and the responsiveness and capacities

of national and local governments, NGOs, international actors, forced migrants themselves, and other parties. Collapsed (or inadequate) health systems also make it more difficult to properly collect the data needed to estimate mortality and morbidity rates, as we discuss in the next section.

5.4 Data Collection and Methodologies for Mortality and Morbidity

The crude death rate (CDR) is the number of deaths in a given period of time divided by an estimate of the population at risk of dying during that period (Preston et al. 2000). Public health practitioners and epidemiologists who deal with emergencies frequently use a denominator of 10,000 people (population) per day to help capture the (potentially) rapid changes that occur in mortality rates during a crisis. Demographers more frequently use a denominator of 1000 population per year for non-crisis settings. One can convert the non-crisis mortality rate (crude mortality rate or CMR) to the crisis CDR by multiplying by 36.5. In other words, CMR (deaths per 1000 per year) $\times 36.5 = CDR$ (deaths per 10,000 per day) Baseline mortality is the “normal” mortality level in a given population.

Epidemiologists often refer to a “return to baseline level,” which indicates a stabilization of the situation and potential end to the mortality crisis. However, among displaced populations it is frequently difficult to define the baseline, because the population of comparison may not be clearly defined, populations may have chronically high mortality rates due to ongoing conflict and other problems, and surveillance may have started well into the period of elevated mortality (Keely et al. 2001).

Most humanitarian interventions attempt to at least collect data by broad age groups. Mortality by age indicators that are reported in the literature may include: the under-5 mortality rate (U5MR), the infant mortality rate (IMR), and the neonatal mortality rate (NNMR).⁴ In some cases, the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) and the proportional mortality rate (by cause) are reported.⁵

Complex emergencies are characterized by restricted access to the affected areas, insecurity, large and rapid population movements, poor infrastructure, and limited trained personnel. In the absence of reliable health registration systems in conflict-affected areas, demographic and health data may be neither accessible nor precise. Thus, it is not easy to determine mortality and morbidity rates of forced migrants, refugees or internally displaced populations. Ideally, a surveillance system will be rapidly implemented to integrate demographic, epidemiologic, socioeconomic and other vital registration data necessary to assist the planning and humanitarian pro-

⁴U5MR is the rate of deaths among children under five, IMR is the rate of deaths among infants under one, and NNMR is the rate of deaths among newborns within the first 28 days of life.

⁵MMR is the rate of pregnancy related deaths among the population and the proportional mortality rate is the proportion of deaths attributable to a particular cause among the population.

cess for displaced populations. In complex emergencies and forced migration scenarios, however, the situation is often far from ideal (Keely et al. 2001).

Efforts have been promoted by different actors to support preparedness, data collection and analysis. Although such initiatives can provide valuable information about the affected areas, identifying etiologic factors associated with increased morbidity and mortality among forced migrants requires more precise data.

Still, one of the key challenges in displacement settings is limited access to reliable data collection methodologies. Reliable estimates are not usually available and coverage for service providers is limited to collecting and reporting data. Gaps or multiple registries give rise to questions about the reliability of data. When a death is reported the cause of mortality may still need investigation. Consistency in reporting and defining cause of death is also crucial. Based on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reference manual for health information systems in emergencies, a single mortality register needs to be used in each health facility to record deaths in the facility and those happening in the community. In the case of multiple facilities, a central mortality register and a triangulation mechanism for information should be in place. A single reason should be recorded as immediate cause of death. Other underlying causes may follow this cause. The diagnosis of HIV/AIDS and malnutrition take precedence over other causes of death. Consulting case definitions for consistency and using notification forms to prevent under-reporting are other techniques recommended by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR 2010).

Different data sources may be available at the time of a crisis; however, each source may lack certain details. The place of origin census is one of the key sources. If surveys are conducted among forced migrants, that information can feed into the planning process for humanitarian assistance. Registration programs are not always comprehensive and at times the results may not be shared with different actors by the government institutions that conduct the registration. Studying mortality patterns in complicated emergencies such as conflicts is even more challenging with such limited access to the statistical and methodological details. In a meta-analysis of refugee populations, Guha-Sapir and Panhuis (2004) reported that only 37 out of 165 datasets which they reviewed had sufficient details for analysis.

The UNHCR recently launched a new initiative called the Twine project to combine streams of information using web-based applications to inform decision-making in the humanitarian sector. These data streams include Disease Outbreak Reports, Health Information System, Laboratory Evaluation Tool, Maternal Death Investigation, Nutrition Survey Database, Balanced Scorecard and WASH Report Card. Disease Outbreak Reports create a system for reporting active disease outbreaks in refugee and displaced population settings. Health Information System is a standardized system used to monitor public health and HIV programs in refugee and displaced settings. It includes an early warning system for the detection of disease outbreaks. Laboratory Evaluation Tool is a structured questionnaire designed to evaluate the quality of laboratory services in primary health care facilities in refugee settings. Maternal Death Investigation forms a system for reporting the findings

and recommendations of investigation into maternal deaths in refugee settings. Nutrition Survey Database creates a system for reporting the results of nutrition surveys conducted in refugee and displaced settings. Balanced Scorecard is a set of five instruments designed to assess the quality of care in primary health care facilities in refugee settings. WASH Report Card is a system for monitoring key water, sanitation and hygiene indicators at household and community level in refugee camps (UNHCR 2015).

In addition to mortality indicators, morbidity patterns are important indicators of the severity of a complex emergency situation. In most crisis and post-crisis settings, there is an emphasis on knowing the prevalence of various communicable diseases, HIV/AIDS and non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Data on morbidity in complex emergencies is even harder to collect than mortality data, although the systems put in place by UNHCR (as described above) have made some progress toward improving data collection, analysis and dissemination mechanisms.

To study mortality and morbidity trends among forced migrants, data from the Health Information System can be very helpful. However, there is always a risk of underreporting because for the health events such as births and deaths the Health Information Systems usually rely on facility-based reporting. One improvement can be to involve community-based actors to enhance reporting of health events in the community.

5.5 Review of the Research on Mortality in Recent Complex Emergencies (2000–2015)

As noted by Keely et al. (2001), mortality rates fluctuate depending on the stage of the complex emergency. Further, as outlined in the theoretical framework, the type of emergency impacts mortality. That said, a pattern of mortality in the form of an inverted U-shape can be generalized in many complex emergencies. At the outset of the crisis, mortality rates sharply increase (Phase 1) and reach an apex during the height of the crisis (Phase 2). As humanitarian aid arrives, mortality rates start to gradually decline (Phase 3) and ultimately stabilize (Phase 4).

Two-thirds of deaths occurring at the peak of excess mortality during the acute stage of a complex emergency are caused by communicable disease (Connolly et al. 2004). As such, medical interventions implemented in a timely and coordinated manner can significantly reduce the mortality at the peak. Further, malnutrition in combination with infectious disease can increase preventable mortality. Drawing on their work in international humanitarian aid organizations, Connolly and her colleagues (2004) point to evidence that interventions exist to prevent the spread of communicable disease and malnutrition in the context of complex emergencies but that the lack of prompt and coordinated intervention, especially in non-camp settings, is what leads to a significant proportion of deaths. Improved implementation substantially reduces mortality and morbidity rates at the acute stage of the crisis.

Degomme and Guha-Sapir (2010) found that overall mortality rates followed the inverted U-shape pattern in the case of the protracted conflict in Darfur. Specifically, over time as the acute phase of the conflict rescinded, mortality rates declined. However, in examining cause-specific mortality, they found that this decrease held for deaths related to violence as compared to those related to diarrhea. Further, over time, the reduction in the number of humanitarian aid workers led to higher mortality rates. This complicates the traditional conception that as the acute phase of a complex emergency ends, mortality rates steadily decline. There can be extenuating factors, such as the amount and effectiveness of aid.

As previously mentioned, certain subpopulations are at increased risk of mortality during complex emergencies. These groups are often already vulnerable under stable conditions and thus are at highest risk in times of crisis as well. Specific age groups are among the most vulnerable, with the youngest and the oldest exhibiting high mortality rates (Keely et al. 2001).

The under-five mortality rate is considered an important indicator of social welfare and overall health in general, but especially so in the context of crisis (Singh et al. 2005a). The impact of complex emergency on this age group differs according to the migration history of a child's mother. Employing indirect methods⁶ to measure under-five mortality rates of long-term⁷ forced migrants in specific regions of Uganda and Sudan as compared to host populations, Singh et al. (2005a) find that children of women who were displaced and returned home before the age of 15 had high mortality rates attributed to the adverse effect of "so many large-scale migrations at a young age, when they are still growing and developing," (Singh et al. 2005a: p. 758), impacting subsequent pregnancies. Children born to mothers who stayed in their region despite conflict also had medium to high mortality rates. The authors conclude that this may be a result of negative selection whereby those who stay despite turmoil are those who were physically unable or lacked the resources to move, which in turn impacts their children. Finally, they found that children born to those women displaced before the age of 15 had the lowest mortality rates and they conclude that this can be explained by the fact that these women migrated at an age that gave them enough time to acclimate to the host country before they had children.

Studying a cohort comprised of both former Mozambican refugee children settled in rural South Africa and native South African children in the same region, Hargreaves et al. (2004) found that until age one there was no difference in mortality rates between the two groups but that in the next four years former Mozambican refugee children had higher mortality rates. Further, former Mozambican refugee infants (until age one) living in refugee settlements had higher mortality rates than former Mozambican refugee infants living in more established villages. The authors conclude that higher mortality rates can be attributed to socioeconomic inequalities where former Mozambican refugee households generally have a lower standard of living than native South African households because of their often tenuous legal

⁶The Brass Method and the Preceding Birth Technique.

⁷At least 6–12 months.

status. Thus, childhood, but not infant, mortality was higher for resettled refugees than for children in the host society. Similarly but in a different context, studying the long term⁸ impact of forced migration on under-five mortality in Uganda and South Sudan, Singh et al. (2005b) found that South Sudanese refugee children did not have higher mortality rates than Ugandan host populations or those South Sudanese who stayed in South Sudan despite conflict. They attribute this finding, at least partially, to the fact that Ugandan hosts, Sudanese stayees (those who were not displaced) in South Sudan and Sudanese refugees in Uganda have similarly high poverty rates. They find that for all these populations, what is uniformly critical to reducing childhood mortality is access to cash, immunizations and clean water. This corroborates the fact that mortality patterns in crisis are similar to those under normal circumstances in developing countries (Keely et al. 2001).

Malnutrition on its own and in combination with other infectious diseases is a primary cause of mortality in conflict. For this reason, breastfeeding is a central means to decrease childhood mortality and has thus been found to be an important protective measure for young children in complex emergencies (Jakobsen et al. 2003, O'Conner et al. 2001). Studying the war in Guinea-Bissau in the late 1990s, Jakobsen et al. (2003) found that weaned children had a six times higher mortality rate than those who were still breastfeeding during the first 3 months of the war. Despite the fact that HIV can be contracted via breastmilk, during complex emergencies some even recommend breastfeeding among HIV positive mothers stating that in these situations the risk of dying of malnutrition is higher than the risk of death due to HIV infection as a result of breastfeeding (O'Conner et al. 2001).

On the other end of the age spectrum, the elderly represent a vulnerable population during complex emergencies (WHO 2003). Studying the conflict in Kosovo (1998–1999), Spiegel and Salama (2000) found that men aged 50 years and older had the highest risk of mortality from war related trauma. A similar finding pointed to malnutrition as disproportionately impacting the elderly during the conflict in Sarajevo in the early 1990s and leading to high levels of excess mortality (Watson et al. 1995).

Keely et al. (2001) use the Coale-Demeny West life tables in order to determine if the mortality pattern in complex emergencies follows a similar mortality pattern as under stable conditions. As noted, already vulnerable groups such as children and the elderly are particularly vulnerable to excess mortality during complex emergencies. Keely and colleagues found this to be true when comparing the mortality pattern for Rwandan refugees in 1994 in the Katale Camp in Zaire. Mortality rates for the impacted population as a whole were higher than for the stable population, but most elevated for the youngest and oldest age groups. Conversely, they found that for long term Cambodian refugees in camps in Thailand (in the late 1980s), while the age pattern of mortality was similar to the comparable Coale-Demeny West life table, the relative risk of dying for refugee females over the age of one year was less than for the stable population. The authors note that the long-term stability of the refugee camp in Thailand contributes to the decreased risk of mortality.

⁸At least 3–4 years after displacement.

Similarly, in a review of 37 datasets related to age specific mortality in the context of conflict Guha-Sapir and Panhuis (2004) find that in almost half of the studies the mortality rate for the under-five group during conflict was lower than the pre-conflict mortality rate of the same age group. They attribute this to the impact of humanitarian aid in conflict situations in lowering mortality of otherwise vulnerable populations. Comparable results were found by Hynes et al. (2002) in their study of reproductive health outcomes for refugees and IDPs. Specifically they found that refugees and IDPs had better outcomes as compared to host country and country-of-origin populations as measured by crude birth rates (CBR), neonatal mortality rates (NNMR) and percentage of newborns with low birth weight (LBW).

Like age-specific mortality patterns, women are often more vulnerable to excess mortality in complex emergencies. This is true for a myriad of reasons including the susceptibility of women to reproductive tract infections, pregnancy and birth related health complications (including unsafe abortions), sociocultural norms limiting women's access to financial resources, transportation and health services and the increased use of gender-based violence including, but not limited to, rape in conflict situations (Burnett and Peel 2001, Gasseer et al. 2004). Specifically in the case of Syrian refugees, Sami et al. (2014) found that Syrian refugee women are particularly vulnerable to risk factors for reproductive-health-associated morbidity and mortality. In Syria this is compounded by the limited access humanitarian organizations have to IDPs and overburdened health systems in countries (e.g., Lebanon) where Syrian refugees have settled.

5.6 Review of the Research on Morbidity and Nutrition Patterns in Recent Complex Emergencies (2000–2015)

Acknowledging the challenge and limitation of collecting morbidity data for IDPs relative to refugees in camp settings, Salama et al. (2001) report evidence of higher morbidity rates for IDPs than refugees. They posit that these higher rates of morbidity for IDPs can be attributed to difficulties in food provision to IDP populations dispersed over a large geographical area especially in the context of ongoing unstable security problems, as opposed to provision of food to refugees in camps. This leads to more instances of malnutrition for IDPs and thus increased morbidity.

That said, even those residing in refugee camps can suffer from malnutrition as a result of limited access to certain foods. This was found to be true for Bhutanese refugees who had spent more than twenty years in Nepalese refugee camps before relocation to the United States. They were found to have elevated levels of Vitamin B12 deficiency, resulting in hematologic and neurologic disorders. Although many factors contribute to this phenomenon, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that the main cause was that the provisioned diet in the Nepalese refugee camps lacked meat, eggs and dairy products (CDC 2011). The CDC also reported that in the case of Syrian refugees, both chronic malnutrition (stunting) and

anemia was higher for women and children residing inside the Zaatari refugee camp, the largest Syrian refugee camp in the Middle East, than those residing in Jordanian cities, towns and villages (Bilukha et al. 2014).

5.6.1 *Infectious Disease*

Refugees and IDPs have an elevated risk of contracting infectious diseases, of which malaria, tuberculosis, malaria, hepatitis B and C, HIV and intestinal and other parasites causing diarrhea are some of the most prevalent (Barnett 2004, Gushulak and MacPherson 2004). This is especially the case for refugees from developing countries as prevalence of disease among refugees often corresponds with that of their country of origin (Burnett and Peel 2001). In addition, the high incidence of these diseases among populations impacted by complex emergencies is a result of exposure and conditions during the migration process and high rates of transmission in camp settings (Barnett 2004; Clark and Mytton 2007). Conditions in camps are often characterized by high population density, poor sanitation, and inadequate shelter and health care. For these reasons the spread of communicable disease can lead to epidemics within camps (Connolly 2005).

Just as children are at high risk of mortality in the context of complex emergencies, so too are they at risk for high levels of morbidity. Analyzing data from 90 UNHCR refugee camps throughout 16 countries, Hershey et al. (2011) found that malaria, pneumonia and diarrheal disease accounted for 23, 17 and 10% of morbidity respectively and were also the primary causes of mortality for that population. The prevalence of HIV infection among refugees and IDPs is a disputed topic in the study of infectious disease and complex emergencies. There are those that hold that HIV infection is higher among those impacted by complex emergencies (Hankins et al. 2002, Salama and Dondero 2001, Save the Children 2002, Smith 2002). Salama and Dondero (2001) cite sexual interaction between forced migrant populations and the military, sexual violence, the increase in commercial sex work, psychological trauma and the disruption of preventative and curative health services as factors impacting the increased risk of HIV infection in these situations.

Others, however, question the finding that conflict-affected populations have a higher incidence of HIV infection (Mock et al. 2004; Spiegel 2004; Spiegel et al. 2007). Spiegel et al. (2007) reviewed research on the prevalence of HIV in seven countries affected by conflict (Democratic Republic of Congo, southern Sudan (now South Sudan), Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Burundi) and found that there is insufficient support for the claim that “conflict, forced displacement and wide-scale rape increase prevalence [of HIV] or that refugees spread HIV infection in host communities,” (Spiegel et al. 2007: p. 2187). Studying Sub-Saharan Africa, Mock and associates (2004) hold that the relationship between conflict and HIV is not as simple as often stated and involves many interrelated factors that can both prevent and promote the spread of HIV and thus lead to varied outcomes.

Taking a social ecology perspective, they present a framework to understand the interaction between the HIV infection and conflict which takes into consideration the level of population vulnerability and the level of exposure to HIV both during and just following the conflict. In this way they are able to illustrate that there are factors involved in complex emergencies that can both increase as well as decrease the risk of HIV infection.

Adherence to HIV treatment (taking antiretroviral therapy medicines regularly as prescribed) and outcomes among populations impacted by conflict also remains a contested area. Lack of language skills, unemployment and further displacement are cited as barriers to successful adherence to HIV treatment and effective viral suppression (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2008; UNHCR 2007). These concerns fuel some host governments' reluctance to provide treatment to displaced persons (Trippayya 2005). However, in their study of HIV positive refugees in Malaysia, Mendelsohn et al. (2014) found that these refugees had similar adherence levels and outcomes to treatment (specifically highly active antiretroviral therapy) as members of their host community. For both refugees and host populations, temporary migration and longer travel times to health clinics had an adverse impact on viral loads. Further, no evidence of adverse effects of language barriers or employment status on HIV treatment outcomes were found for either group. These findings support similar findings in South Sudan (Salami et al. 2010), Uganda (Garang et al. 2009) and South Africa (McCarthy et al. 2009) and counter the claim often made by governments that are reluctant to provide refugees with HIV treatment: because refugee adherence is low and outcomes are worse, HIV treatment to refugees may be withheld.

While infectious disease morbidity remains high and field conditions often complicate implementation of policies to reduce infection, in many cases best practices, including risk assessment and surveillance strategies, have been developed that lead to successful control of these diseases even in concentrated camp settings (Bodiang 2000; Kouadio et al. 2010). The World Health Organization has outlined five principles for the control of communicable disease during complex emergencies which include: (1) rapid assessment, (2) prevention, (3) surveillance, (4) outbreak control, and (5) disease management. When international organizations and governmental bodies take these steps in a coordinated manner, the spread of infectious disease can be prevented and those infected can be treated with effective results. HIV positive refugees should be integrated into the HIV/AIDS policies and programs of host countries. This will reduce stigmatization of refugees as spreaders of HIV. Spiegel and Nankoe (2004) show how the pervasiveness of systemic exclusion of refugees from HIV/AIDS National Strategic Plans undermines efforts to prevent the spread of HIV. HIV can quickly be a major challenge in a complex emergency, as described by the UNHCR in one of their handbooks:

In an emergency, many refugees will be exposed to insecurity, poor shelter, overcrowding, lack of sufficient safe water, inadequate sanitation, inadequate or inappropriate food supplies and a possible lack of immunity to the diseases of the new environment. Furthermore, on arrival, refugees may already be in a debilitated state from disease, malnutrition, hunger,

fatigue, harassment, physical violence and grief. Poverty, powerlessness and social instability, conditions that often prevail for refugees, can also contribute to increased sexual violence and spread of sexually transmitted diseases including the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) (UNHCR 2007).

5.6.2 Chronic Disease

While communicable diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and diarrhea are often associated with the study of refugee health, Guterres and Spiegel (2012) note that non-communicable chronic diseases (NCDs) like cardiovascular disorders, diabetes and cancer have become commonplace for many refugees. This is especially true when refugees and displaced persons are from middle-income countries where the share of older citizens is higher and chronic diseases rather than communicable disease are the primary causes of morbidity and mortality (Mowafi and Spiegel 2008). This was found to be true for Iraqi refugees in Jordan where a high prevalence of hypertension, visual disturbances, joint disorders and type 2 diabetes was found (Mowafi and Spiegel 2008). It was also the case for Iraqi refugees resettled in San Diego (CDC 2010) where a high prevalence of obesity and hypertension was found. As noted by the CDC, these chronic conditions can lead to serious morbidity among this population. In light of this, the paradigm for health care provision to refugees must be updated to meet the challenges of this phenomenon. This means investing in preventative and curative health services for refugees and in particular advocating for integrating refugees into existing health systems in the host country (Reed and Yrizar-Barbosa 2016; Guterres and Spiegel 2012; Mowafi and Spiegel 2008).

5.6.3 Psychiatric Morbidity

As a result of the often traumatic events associated with complex emergencies and the process of resettlement in new unfamiliar places, forced migrants are at an increased risk for psychiatric morbidity. Studies of refugees in the United Kingdom have found that one in six refugees has a physical health problem severe enough to affect their lives and two-thirds have experienced anxiety or depression. Common symptoms of psychiatric morbidity among refugees include anxiety, panic attacks, agoraphobia, symptoms of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), poor sleep patterns, and memory and concentration problems (Burnett and Peel 2001). The body of literature on refugee trauma and its impact on health status is often conflicting and challenging to interpret due to the fact that a variety of methods and instruments for data collection, analysis and reporting are used. Further, cultural differences and translation issues make measurement difficult (Fazel et al. 2005, Hollifield et al. 2002).

For these reasons, a number of review articles of existing literature employing meta-analyses have been undertaken in order to provide more conclusive findings regarding psychiatric morbidity among refugees and IDPs and to evaluate the data collection methods. Hollifield et al. (2002) reviewed 125 instruments used to evaluate refugee trauma and health status according to five criteria: (1) purpose, (2) construct definition, (3) design, (4) developmental process, (5) reliability and validity. They found that none of the instruments met all five criteria and only 12 of the instruments were developed specifically for refugee research and thus conclude that the research analyzing quantitative data on refugee trauma and health has limited or untested validity and reliability for the refugee population. In their review of surveys which included 6743 refugees from seven different countries, Fazel et al. (2005) found that post-traumatic stress disorder is about ten times more prevalent among refugees resettled in Western countries than the general populations in those countries. While finding significant intersurvey variability and methodological complications, Steel et al. (2009) were able to make conclusions about key risk factors contributing to refugee post-traumatic stress disorder and depression by employing a meta-regression analysis of 181 different surveys. After adjusting for methodological factors, the authors found that torture was the strongest risk factor for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), followed by cumulative exposure to potentially traumatic events (PTEs), time since conflict and assessed level of political terror. The strongest risk factor for depression was number of PTEs followed by time since conflict, reported torture and residency status. Porter and Haslam (2005) undertook a meta-analysis of 56 studies comparing the psychopathology of refugees and IDPs to non-refugee comparison groups to understand the factors that moderated mental health outcomes of those impacted by complex emergencies. They concluded that refugees had moderately worse mental health outcomes. This was especially true for those living in institutional accommodation, had limited economic opportunity, were IDPs in their own country or had been repatriated to a country from which they had previously fled, and those whose conflict, from which they had fled, was unresolved. Further, those refugees who were older, were more educated, had higher pre-displacement socioeconomic status and rural residence also had worse outcomes. Finally, women had worse mental health outcomes than men.

A number of studies look at the long-term psychiatric morbidity of refugees after specific complex emergencies. Roberts et al. (2009) found that in the town of Juba, South Sudan almost two years after the signing of a peace agreement ending a 20 year long civil war, over half of respondents met criteria for depression and over a third for PTSD. Multivariate logistic regression analysis showed that women were over twice as likely to have symptoms of PTSD and depression as men, those who were forcibly displaced two or more times (as compared to those displaced only once or never) had increased incidence of PTSD and depressive symptoms and those who were no longer married were more than twice as likely to have symptoms of PTSD than those who had never been married or were still married. In the context of Kosovo, Fernandez et al. (2004) found that two years after the bombing of Serbia and Kosovo 14% of those sampled in an emergency department based assessment

met the DSM-IV⁹ criteria for PTSD. Older people and women as well as those who had less education and those who had experienced more traumatic events were at increased risk for PTSD. Reporting results from the same study, Ahern et al. (2004) concluded that social support was an important protective factor for PTSD risk in general, and even more so for women. The long term psychiatric impact of forced migration was also found among Bosnia refugees. In their longitudinal study of Bosnian refugees who had remained in the region, Mollica et al. (2001) found that three years after initial assessment almost half of those who had met the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD, depression or both continued to meet the criteria and 16% of those who had previously been asymptomatic had developed PTSD, depression or both.

5.7 Discussion and Conclusion

Evaluation of interventions following complex emergencies have been undertaken in an effort to understand how best to reduce mortality and morbidity. Waldman (2001) notes that during complex emergencies it is critical to prioritize certain interventions over others in order to most effectively reduce mortality rates. Specifically, providing food, water, sanitation and shelter and then instituting programs to prevent the spread of diseases with epidemic potential such as measles, diarrhea, pneumonia, malaria among others must be the top priority of emergency relief. Barriers exist to implementing these priorities, including logistical and security constraints as well as cultural norms, but Waldman holds that these priorities, must be followed and additional research undertaken amidst complex emergencies to further understand how to improve health care delivery in these situations. Drawing on empirical data from a wide range of post-conflict countries, Kruk et al. (2010) point specifically to the importance of rebuilding health systems early on in the aftermath of complex emergencies as critical to improved health and reduced mortality. Moreover, they show how these health systems have far-reaching positive impacts more generally on state building and peaceful reconciliation.

Salama et al. (2004) look towards those forced migrants residing outside of camps. Applauding the important advancements made in the provision of humanitarian aid to refugees in camps since the 1990s as evidenced by significantly decreased case-fatality rates for severely malnourished children in camps, the authors indicate that this is not true of those affected populations residing outside camps (IDPs and international refugees outside camps). Using six different case studies from complex emergencies throughout the world they note specific steps that need to be taken to reduce the mortality (and morbidity) rate of those residing outside of camps. These include: (1) reviewing the mortality threshold and

⁹The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (1952), published by the American Psychiatric Association, offers a common language and standard criteria for the classification of mental disorders.

definitions of complex emergency phases to ensure that they are appropriate for displaced people outside of camps, (2) adapting programs to prevent communicable disease (vaccinations, water and sanitation interventions) for immediate implementation in non-camp situations, (3) developing equipment to measure micronutrient deficiency disorders that are appropriate for field work and ensuring that existing nutrition surveys are done according to guidelines, (4) determining clear and feasible strategies for reproductive health and mental health interventions and ensuring that there are sufficient field staff trained at these interventions.

A demographic perspective often leads to the consideration of the future in the form of projections, predictions and forecasts. Different geographical settings, socioeconomic, demographic and epidemiological conditions and health intervention challenges preclude our ability to predict trends of mortality and morbidity for forced migrants. Generalization of the findings on health indicators from one context to the other is not possible. Nevertheless, 'in nearly all cases, displaced people experience a significantly higher crude mortality rate (CMR) than non-displaced populations. They are particularly vulnerable due to loss of social networks and assets; lack of language, knowledge, and information on the new environment; reduced access to healthcare services; decreased food security; and often, inadequate shelter, sanitation, and access to safe water' (Keely et al. 2001). This is also true for morbidity in most cases. While these conclusions may not rise to the level of predictions deriving from social scientific theory, the patterns are evidence based and robust. They provide foundations to prepare for recurring vulnerabilities under conditions of flight, displacement and the search for safe haven.

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Chapter 6

Interrelationships of Forced Migration, Fertility and Reproductive Health

Victor Agadjanian

6.1 Defining the Field of Study

As in other aspects of the demography of forced migration, definitional ambiguities complicate research on forced migrants' fertility and reproductive health. The most common of these definitional challenges is to draw a clear conceptual and operational distinction between forced migration and voluntary migration. In fact, as has been argued by other contributors to this volume, both types of migration can be thought of as part of a spectrum rather than a dichotomy; whereas differentiating the two extremes of that spectrum is relatively straightforward, the differences become increasingly blurred toward the spectrum's middle. Thus, it can be argued that any migrant is at least to some extent "forced" into migration by his or her economic and social conditions or those of their households. The sudden and often violent circumstances of exit, which typically characterize exit from areas of overt ethnic, religious or political conflict, may not be present to the same degree in migratory moves resulting from simmering, low-intensity guerilla-type warfare or socio-political and ethno-religious tensions. Likewise while discrete natural disasters may trigger precipitous and massive exodus of the affected population, gradual environmental degradation may influence the decision to migrate by exacerbating socioeconomic predicaments that usually cause voluntary migration. True that unlike a sudden forced flight, voluntary migration typically involves some planning and preparation, but even so most migrants-to-be are faced with considerable uncertainties and their knowledge about the destination settings is often incomplete and inaccurate.

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These definitional challenges are further complicated by an often arbitrary attribution of the refugee status or internally displaced person (IDP) status by international agencies as well as by national and local agencies in the receiving settings. It is not uncommon that this formal recognition is granted only to a small proportion of migrants who are forced to abandon their permanent places of residence due to conflict or disaster, while leaving many members of these same communities who migrate for largely the same reasons and often to the same destinations outside the purview of refugee-focused activities and resources. The system of refugee and IDP camps, while greatly facilitating the management and protection of camp inhabitants, further reifies the exclusion of those who by choice or by fluke end up outside the camps' wall.

6.2 The Current State of Knowledge

There is a considerable cross-national literature that showing humanitarian crises produced by war or natural disasters affect fertility behavior (e.g., Agadjanian and Prata 2002; Blanc 2004; Clifford et al. 2010; Khlal et al. 1997; Lindstrom and Berhanu 1999; Winter 1992). However, studies focused specifically on crisis-triggered forced migration and fertility are relatively few. As in other aspects of the demography of forced migration, analyses of forced migrants' fertility and reproductive health are greatly constrained by the availability of adequate data. Because assessments of fertility and reproductive health of forced migrants are often commissioned by the agencies work with forced migrants' needs, such assessments focus uniquely on forced migrant groups and rarely involve comparisons with non-migrants and voluntary migrants (e.g., Hynes et al. 2002; Okalawon et al. 2010; Von Roenne et al. 2010). Moreover, many of these assessments typically deal with the time of crisis and flight and of their immediate aftermath; the economic and health conditions prevailing in communities before the onset of the crisis and the forced exit that this crisis triggers, are rarely considered even though some evidence points that post-flight fertility is strongly influenced by pre-flight nutritional status and related health characteristics (e.g., Holck and Cates 1982).

The forced migration cycle typically includes a relatively short stage of flight, a stage of varied length spent in refugee camps or other temporary safe havens, and a stage of repatriation or resettlement; the effect of forced migration on fertility may vary across these different stages as well as within the second and third stages if they are sufficiently long. In his review of the evidence on the effects of humanitarian crises on fertility, which commonly involve population dislocations, on fertility Hill (2004) distinguished among short-, medium-, and long-term effects and related these effects to different proximate determinant mechanisms. He concluded that fertility among forced migrants often declines in the immediate aftermath of the crisis and related dislocations. However, his review did not find support for increased involuntary fetal loss during forced migrants' flight to safety, and he attributed the decline mainly to spousal separation and stress that reduce coital frequency and

consequently the probability of conception. In the mid-term, fertility of refugees and displaced persons may be depressed by famine, economic hardships, and housing shortage; these conditions tend to reduce both exposure to intercourse and fecundability. Yet, even if fertility registers a decline in the short- and medium-term aftermath of the crisis and flight, it usually rebounds in the post-emergency stage so that lifetime fertility of forced migrants is typically comparable to that of the rest of the population. Thus long-term effects of forced displacement on fertility are rather limited (Hill 2004).

Due to the mentioned data limitations, few studies have systematically examined the effects of forced migration on fertility while also drawing comparisons with fertility and other reproductive health outcomes among forced migrants with those among non-migrants and voluntary migrants of similar backgrounds and looking at the trends over time. Several such attempts are worthy of note. Thus Randall (2005) examined fertility of Tamasheq (Tuareg) repatriated refugees in Mali. Despite minor fluctuations in fertility at the time of flight, which were mainly due to temporary changes in nuptiality, the group's fertility indicators barely changed throughout a prolonged period of residence in refugee camps. However, fertility dropped slightly and reproductive health indicators worsened after repatriation. A study by Avogo and Agadjanian (2008) used retrospective fertility histories collected through a survey in Angola's capital Luanda to reconstruct and compare fertility dynamics among forced migrants (i.e., those who left their places of origin primarily because of war), voluntary migrants (those who left for war-unrelated reasons), and non-migrants (Luanda natives). They found that war migrants had higher yearly probabilities of birth than either non-war migrants or urban natives, illustrating the more selective nature of war-unrelated migration. At the same time, their analysis also detected evidence of adaptation to the urban environment among both war-related and war-unrelated migrants manifested in declining probabilities of birth after arrival in the city; yet such adaptation proceeded more quickly among non-war migrants than among war migrants. An analysis by Williams et al. (2013) comparing long-term trends among Mozambican refugees and the local population in a South African site has documented a trend toward convergence of fertility levels between the two groups as Mozambicans were adopting fertility behavior of local couples. In fact, another analysis in the same South African site found that a stall in fertility levels in the area owed to a reversal in fertility decline among non-refugee women; at the same time, fertility of Mozambican refugees fell continuously (Ibisomi et al. 2014). Verwimp and Van Bavel (2005) compared lifetime fertility of former refugee and non-refugee women in Rwanda and found it to be higher among refugees. The authors explained this difference through the difference in child survival between the two groups: the higher fertility of former refugees was compensatory to a higher probability of child death in that group. Such comparative studies are generally more informative than those focused uniquely on forced migrants. However, they also have limitations, especially in their reliance on retrospective data, which are fraught with inaccuracies and omissions, and in their constrained choice of comparison groups.

6.3 Moving the Field Forward

The general models for the analysis of the association between migration and fertility can usefully inform research on the effects of forced migration on fertility, but they need to be tailored to the specific characteristics and circumstances of forced migrants. These models typically entertain the mechanisms of selection, disruption, and adaptation, which are said to affect both the distal and proximate determinants of fertility. The selection argument posits that migrants tend to be self-selected on individual or household characteristics, such as age, gender, health, marital status, education, occupation, and family type and composition, which set them apart from the rest of the population in origin area and make them more similar to people in destination areas or at least more receptive to demographic (including fertility) preferences and behaviors prevalent there. For example, migrants may have higher than average educational level and other socioeconomic characteristics that are conducive to lower fertility (e.g., Chattopadhyay et al. 2006; Farber and Lee 1984; Kahn 1988; Zarate and Unger de Zarate 1975). Thus, selection may be manifested in the tendency to postpone the onset of childbearing and to have a lower ideal/desired family size, and more generally, in greater openness to change, more flexible aspirations and better access to information about family and fertility norms in destination areas (Ribe and Schultz 1980). At the same time, international migrants in some contexts, such as that of Mexican migration to the U.S., may be positively selected on fertility as they often come from rural, i.e., higher-fertility, areas of Mexico (Choi 2014). Although, forced migration is unquestionably less selective than voluntary migration, selection factors and mechanisms may still be at play in some forced migration situations. Moreover, because forced migration is often a multi-stage process—e.g., an initial flight from immediate danger to a refugee camp, typically in a neighboring country, followed by a more or less orderly relocation to a distant destination, often in a developed country—the selectivity of forced migrants' characteristics may increase at each subsequent stage.

While the selection argument may seem least applicable to the analysis of forced migrants' fertility behavior, the disruption perspective, on the contrary, appears to fit their experience perfectly. In the general literature on migration and fertility, migration is said to disrupt migrants' life through spousal separation, and where no such separation takes place (e.g., family migration) through deliberate postponement of childbearing in the time preceding and following the move. The fertility of migrants is therefore expected to be lower than that of non-migrants, although the disruptive effect of migration is believed to be of short duration, unless it is perpetuated through continuous spousal separation (Goldstein 1973; Goldstein and Goldstein 1981; Hertz 1985; Jensen and Ahlborn 2004; Kulu 2005; Lindstrom and Saucedo 2002). It is important to note, however, that in the case of voluntary migration, the disruption of life by migration is typically anticipated and even planned for; in fact, in settings where migration is common, the disruption associated with it is normative and is built into the fertility regime (Agadjanian et al. 2011). The unanticipated and violent nature of the disruption of normality caused by forced migration

sets it apart from voluntary types of migration. The disruptive effects of forced migration on fertility therefore operate primarily through disruption of coital activity because of partners' separation or because of mental and physical stress resulting from the flight, as well as, possibly, from elevated risks of fetal loss (although evidence on increased risks of fetal loss due to forced migration is inconsistent) (Hill 2004).

However, as was pointed out earlier, the conditions that may adversely affect fertility may form and accumulate prior to the flight (e.g., Holck and Cates 1982). These conditions may linger in the post-flight circumstances as well. Deliberate postponement of fertility at that stage is also quite plausible and may, in fact, last longer than among voluntary migrants due to continuing hardship and greater uncertainty about the future. Yet, one can also argue that because such a disruption was not planned, forced migrant couples may be less prepared than voluntary migrants for controlling their post-migration childbearing and therefore have greater exposure to the risk of unwanted pregnancy. Likewise, fetal or child loss during the flight may trigger compensatory desires for a new pregnancy among forced migrants.

The third mechanism through which migrants' fertility may change is adaptation to the fertility regimes in areas of migration destination. Migrant streams are usually directed from rural to urban areas, or from less developed to more developed settings, where desired family size and fertility levels are typically lower and fertility regulation is more widespread than in origin communities. The destination environment presents migrants with new opportunities such as education and labor force participation, and challenges, such as elevated costs of childrearing; it may also offer them better access to family planning. As a result, migrants' reproductive behavior increasingly aligns with that of the host populations and migrants' long-term fertility is lower than that of non-migrants in origin communities (e.g., Choi 2014; Lee and Pol 1993; Rokicki et al. 2014). Adaptation mechanisms are likely to be at work among forced migrants as well, especially as their experiences in places of destination grow similar to those of voluntary migrants (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2015; Andersson 2004; Williams et al. 2013). However, several factors may delay or even derail the adaptation process. First, forced migrants' socioeconomic exclusion may be more pervasive than that of voluntary migrants. Their socioeconomic exclusion may be further reinforced by their spatial insulation in camps or other designated areas, or in ethnic neighborhoods in countries of resettlement, which hampers their interactions with local residents and their exposure to the reproductive information and services. Both socioeconomic exclusion and spatial separation can heighten the sense of temporariness of the current status and circumstances among forced migrants thus discouraging them from adjusting their reproductive aspirations and preferences (Rumbaut and Weeks 1986). In extreme cases, prolonged spatial, social, and political exclusion may work to encourage and sustain high fertility in refugee camps despite poor economic conditions that otherwise would be expected to depress fertility. High fertility in Palestinian refugee camps (Fargues 2000) is a frequently cited example of this apparent anomaly.

It is important to note that although the three perspectives on the association between migration and fertility can usefully inform the analysis of reproductive

implications of forced migration as well, the three perspectives are not mutually exclusive and therefore should be entertained simultaneously in conceptualizing and analyzing the effects of forced migration on childbearing.

6.3.1 Responding to the Changing Nature of Forced Migration

Whereas political violence that periodically erupts in different parts of the world and, increasingly, environmental degradation and catastrophes (e.g., Afifi and Jäger 2010; Beine and Parsons 2015) continue to push people into seeking refuge outside their communities and countries, the composition and direction of forced migration flows become increasingly diversified. This diversification further blurs the boundaries between forced and voluntary migration. Instant communication technologies, increasingly available even in most remote and impoverished parts of the world, help spread information about impending human-made and natural threats and allow time for individuals and households to prepare their responses to such threats, including the responses that involve moving (e.g., *Forced Migration Review* 2011). These responses, as voluntary migration choices, are part of family strategies: the decisions as to which family members should leave and where they should head are increasingly made on the basis of perceived threats to individual members and benefits of them migrating or staying for the family interests. And even though forced migratory moves often remain sudden and traumatic, forced migrants are not just fleeing *from* but also fleeing *to*. Family material and social resources increasingly guide the trajectories and destinations of forced migrants beyond immediate safe havens: for example, an Uzbek woman, who flees anti-Uzbek pogroms in southern Kyrgyzstan, may end up not among her co-ethnics in neighboring Uzbekistan but in faraway Russia's capital Moscow, where her husband has been working as a seasonal migrant for years. Similarly, a Malian displaced by a conflict in the north of her country, may prefer joining her relatives in France to the uncertainties of marginalized existence in Mali's capital Bamako.

The diversification of forced migrants' destinations also means that they may increasingly find themselves in contexts that are legally, socioeconomically and culturally very dissimilar from those where they originated. Legal regimes of the receiving context crucially shape forced migrants' opportunities, including their access to reproductive and sexual health care: more liberal and inclusive rules help improve this access while more restrictive and exclusionary policies produce an opposite effect (Hein 1993). The structure and size of employment niches available to forced migrants are critical for their incorporation in the host society as is their cultural (dis)similarity to (from) the host population. Common or similar language, religion or other aspects of culture may reduce anti-migrant stigma and facilitate their incorporation in the host society and access to reproductive health information and services. On the contrary, wide cultural gaps may slow down this process. A particularly important sociocultural aspect of a receiving context is the system of gender norms and relations that predominate in places of origin and destinations

(Indra 1998; Laurie and Petchesky 2008; Nolin 2006). Specifically, receiving settings with more egalitarian gender systems, where women's opportunities autonomy are greater, may be conducive to migrant women's better access to reproductive care, including access to contraceptive and abortion services, which in turn may affect their ability to regulate fertility. More gender egalitarian settings, by offering women greater employment and educational opportunities may also discourage continuing reproduction within marriage or lead to postponement of marriage and onset of childbearing. These increasingly complex dynamics of legal, economic, and cultural incorporation must be taken into account in the analyses of forced migrants' reproductive preferences and behavior.

Importantly, modern media and communication technologies, which, as was argued above, shape the process, composition, and destination of exit, also play a growing role in the processes of forced migrants' legal, economic, and sociocultural inclusion in the receiving context; the once impenetrable walls of refugee camps and migrant neighborhoods become increasingly porous allowing for ever greater contact of forced migrants with the outside world. Yet, at the same time, these technologies also facilitate migrants' connections with their communities of origins (Castles 2002; FMR 2011). Projected onto matters of childbearing, the spread of modern means of communication may therefore both catalyze the adoption of reproductive tastes and practices of the surrounding host society and help retain the traditional fertility preferences and behavior of the place of origin.

6.3.2 Accounting for Secular Changes in Marital and Reproductive Landscapes

The geographic dispersion of forced migrants poses new challenges for a systematic study of their reproductive behavior and outcomes. Another important challenge stems from changes in migrants' reproductive contexts. Most forced migration in the twentieth century involved developing countries with universal and early marriage and high fertility, and even today a large share of forced migrants originate from areas and communities with such characteristics. However, more recent cases of forced migration have involved settings characterized by postponement of and retreat from marriage and declining or low fertility. For example, massive population displacements following the disintegration of Yugoslavia have involved populations with already replacement- and below replacement-level fertility (Nikitović and Lukić 2009). The fertility-disrupting effects of forced migration on fertility in such populations may be muted compared to pre- or early-transitional high-fertility populations. As the fertility transition takes hold throughout the developing world, the share of forced migrants who leave low-fertility settings and arrive in settings where fertility is also low will further rise. Moreover, as selection plays an ever greater role in the process of forced migration, this migration is likely to become positively selective on lower-fertility families. Under these conditions, while forced

migration may still cause some postponement of marital union formation or postponement of birth within union, it is even less likely to have a discernible dampening effect on lifetime fertility than would be the case in higher-fertility societies. In fact, as contemporary voluntary migration increasingly shows, migrants' fertility in places of destination, where both economic opportunities and reproductive health care are typically better than in places of origin and where, at the same time, migrant groups tend to form socially isolated ethnic communities, may match or even exceed the levels among their counterparts left behind (e.g., see Frank and Heuveline 2005 for an analysis of fertility levels among Mexican-origin women in the USA). It is therefore plausible to expect increases in fertility among forced migrants in settings of arrival or resettlement not only above the levels predominant in those settings but also above the levels experienced prior to displacement.

6.3.3 Reproductive Health: Forced Migration and the Healthy Migrant Hypothesis

The accounts of refugee and IDPs' reproductive health typically paint a dire picture of disadvantage (e.g., Black et al. 2014; Kattagoda et al. 2008; McGinn et al. 2011; Okalawon et al. 2010; Von Roenne et al. 2010). Indeed, the hardships immediately before and during forced migrants' flight may work to worsen their general health and their perinatal and reproductive health outcomes in particular. Forced migrants' social isolation and limited access to reproductive care services may prolong their disadvantages (Agadjanian 1998; Ascoly et al. 2001; Halle-Ekane et al. 2016; Raheel et al. 2012). The importance of an effective response to these challenges has been widely recognized (Matthews and Ritsema 2004; McNab and Atieno 2010). In particular, the provision of emergency contraception for refugee and internally displaced couples has been proposed as a key element of such a response, especially in the immediate aftermath of the dislocation. At the same time, due to a diversity of fertility patterns and reproductive challenges among different refugee and internally displaced populations, no single recipe is appropriate (McGinn 2000). However, as in the case of studies of fertility, lack of adequate data often precludes robust comparisons between reproductive health challenges faced by refugees and IDPs and those faced by the general population (Gagnon et al. 2000).

As forced migration becomes increasingly self-selective, reproductive health outcomes may improve shortly after forced migrants find themselves in safe havens. The healthy migrant hypothesis, which posits that migrants, especially those recently arrived, tend to have better health outcomes than non-migrants (especially disadvantaged native minorities) due to both positive selection into migration on health and resilience and reduced exposure to health detrimental behavioral and nutritional practices in the host country (Markides and Coreil 1986; Marmot et al. 1984), may have relevance to the study of forced migrants' reproductive health trajectories (e.g., Rumbaut and Weeks 1996).

It has been observed that voluntary migrants' health indicators, including reproductive health outcomes, worsen with increased duration since migration (Ceballos and Palloni 2010; Hawkins et al. 2008; Rumbaut and Weeks 1996; Urquia et al. 2010). A similar trend may be expected among forced migrants. Forced migrants' socioeconomic disadvantage and social isolation may attenuate and even erase whatever selective health advantage that forced migrants may possess at the time of arrival, even if they are provided access to reproductive health services by host governments and international agencies. Yet, one can also argue that the relative isolation of forced migrants may help shield them from behavioral and nutritional practices that may be harmful to their health in general and their reproductive health outcomes in particular.

Finally, as is the case of voluntary migrants (Urquia et al. 2012), duration-dependent differences between forced migrants and their counterparts without an experience of forced migration, may manifest themselves in some reproductive outcomes but not others. Research on forced migrants' reproductive health should therefore distinguish among specific outcomes, such as morbidity during pregnancy, preterm birth, low birth weight, infant mortality, and post-partum depression, in examining the complex effects of migrants' economic and social, cultural, and institutional incorporation in the host society.

6.4 Conclusion

The forgoing overview of the current state and future directions of research on forced migration and fertility and reproductive health illustrates the importance of taking into account the complex and ever changing nature of forced migration. I argued that this research, while recognizing the distinctive aspects of forced migration and the relative paucity of adequate data, should consider parallels in causes, process, and outcomes between voluntary and forced migration in contemporary settings. Accordingly, the theoretical and analytic apparatus developed for the study of the relationship between voluntary migration and fertility should be adapted to the investigation of the consequence of forced migration for fertility and reproductive health. The mechanisms of selection, disruption and adaptation that the literature on voluntary migration and fertility typically entertain are also applicable—and perhaps increasingly so—to many types of forced migratory moves, and especially to those that take forced migrants beyond the place of immediate refuge. At the same time, the analysis of the interrelationship between forced migration and childbearing and reproductive health should take notice of the rapid demographic changes—and especially of the dramatic fertility decline—in both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving settings. Although migration triggered by political strife, military conflict, or natural cataclysms will continue to pose unique challenges for scholars and practitioners in the field of reproductive behavior and health, both the scholarship and policy will benefit from mainstreaming the topic of forced migration and reproduction into a broader discourse on mobility, family, and childbearing.

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Chapter 7

Behind and Beyond Disaggregation by Sex: Forced Migration, Gender and the Place of Demography

Ellen Percy Kraly

7.1 Introduction

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported the proportion of females among the 2015 global population of persons of concern as 49% of 63.9 million (UNHCR 2016). The conventions of social demographic analysis usually connect the numbers and proportions of adult women to those of dependent children to generate the relative, and relatively high, representation of women and children among refugee and displaced populations, often on the order of 75–80%. Issues of vulnerability, less often resilience, flow from these metrics. Reed et al. (1998), however, bring perspective to interpreting this metric:

A commonly quoted figure is that about 80% of most refugee populations are comprised of women and children under the age of 18. Although this proportion may seem high to the casual observer, it is really not very surprising. Emphasizing the proportion of women and children in the population may be important from a policy and relief standpoint, but demographically, a refugee population might look very similar to any population in the developing world (p. 14).

Deviations from this overall proportion in particular places and spaces, and at different times in processes of forced migration may provide some initial if forensic insight into the role of gender in forced migration and its demography (see also; Edwards 2010, p. 32; Fiddian-Quasmiyeh 2010; Kibreab 2003, pp. 312–317).

In this chapter I engage the ways in which (i) gender informs the understandings of the demography of forced migration and forced migrants, and conversely, (ii) demographic analysis can serve as a critical means to reveal the gendered dimensions of forced migration and the experience of migrants. Cultural values and social

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norms concerning women and men, boys and girls with a population and community are significant determinants of relative risk and exposure in complex humanitarian emergencies and environmental crisis which result in human flight, displacement, the search for safe haven and too often long term residence in refugee camps (see Hyndman and Giles 2011). Mazurana, Rven-Roberts and Parpart argue and ultimately demonstrate that:

... gender is a necessary analytic tool to recognize the causes and consequences of complex political emergencies, to critically analyze national and international interventions into these violent situations, and to move effectively from war to managing systems of chronic instability to reconciliation and reconstruction. ... peacekeeping operation and international humanitarian interventions that are not crafted and carried out with attention to the gender dimensions of the conflict and postconflict periods undermine a return to real peace, human security, and reconstruction – not only for women and girls but for society as a whole (2005b, p. 1).

Accordingly, failure to consider gender in the demography of forced migration weakens the relevance of demographic analysis for prevention of and response to complex humanitarian crises.

Moreover, a demographic perspective and approach to analysis can reveal the risks experienced by migrants and the degree to which risks, experiences and circumstances vary by gender following analytic principles of inclusion and representation (cf. Jacobsen and Landau 2003; Landau and Jacobsen 2005; Bakewell 2008; Bloch 2007). Demographic analysis may thus contribute to both knowledge concerning gender and forced migration, and also to the consideration of gender and diversity in the international refugee regime (see Martin 2010; Buscher 2010; Edwards 2010; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010; Nolan 2006).

The influence of gender on observed social demographic characteristics of migrants must be considered within the context of the “baseline”, that is relative to gendered social structures and processes in the homeland prior to displacement and migration, then, over time through spaces occupied by migrants, during flight, in temporary and transit camps, and countries of asylum and resettlement, and communities of repatriation. The demography of forced migration, particularly in the earliest stages of a crisis, has focused primarily on excess mortality as a critical outcome measure of crisis and hence humanitarian need. Research on women in conflict and environmental disasters, as well as long-term monitoring of refugee population, also direct demographers to gendered dimensions of nutrition, exposure, infectious and communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, sexual violence, reproductive health, and human trafficking (Martin and Tirman 2009). Each of these dimensions of human welfare and survival are worthy of careful consideration in each of the domains or spaces through with forced migration processes – from homeland to camp, to places of return or new residence (cf. Munt 2012; Mountz 2011; Hyndman and Giles 2011).

The ultimate goal of this chapter is to promote the collection and analysis of demographic information to yield scientific knowledge concerning the role of gender in forced migration processes, and the risks and assets faced by women and men and the people dependent upon them, as they experience flight and involuntary migration, and for some, long-term displacement.

The chapter begins with an outline of the documentation of gender within international statistics on refugees and displaced populations, and the implications for effective and relevant demographic analysis concerning gender and forced migration. Second, perspectives on gender and forced migration are presented with a goal to build conceptual bridges among literatures concerning gender, refugee and forced migration and the demography of forced migration. The third subsection considers the ways in which demographic data collection, measurement and analysis may be better informed by gendered perspectives on forced migration, and how demographers might approach measuring variations in the relationship between gender and migration over time and across space(s). The final section concludes with reflections on the value of a gendered demography of forced migration for the study of human population and for efforts to promote human welfare and well-being.

7.2 The Demography of Forced Migration and Disaggregation by Sex

Forced migration has a relatively recent history as a focus of inquiry among population scientists and social demographers (see for example, Reed et al. 1998; Reed and Keely 2001; Bloch 2007; Buscher 2010, p. 15). Much of the analytic discussion and empirical analysis begins with conceptualization and measurement of migrant population characteristics within the context of humanitarian crises and flight. Estimation of population size and relative proportion of vulnerable groups with migrant populations takes priority, with age groups, children under 5 years and the elderly of the first order. Burkholder has stated that “[o]ther critical information but of slightly less priority is information on gender, identification of at-risk groups (e.g. unaccompanied children, pregnant women) and average family/household size” (1997).

The UNHCR reports that at the end of 2015, approximately 46% of the global population of persons of concern to the UNHCR can be disaggregated by sex. This is a steep decline from the proportion of coverage recorded 5 years earlier, when gender composition was known for 62% of the total population of concern. This decline in coverage by gender illustrates the implications of rapidly emerging humanitarian crises for documentation; on the other hand, given the increase in scale of the population displacement worldwide, *more* displaced persons could be classified by gender: approximately 29 million in 2015 in comparison to 21 million in 2010. Coverage of the population of concern by broad age groups and sex is much lower, 33% in 2015 (compared to 41% in 2010). Data on gender composition varies significantly by UNHCR category of concern: Approximately 96% of persons in refugee-like situations can be differentiated by sex (in comparison to 73.3% in 2010). Age and sex of refugee populations can be described for only 31% (or about 9.3 million persons) compared to 65% of the smaller number of total refugees in 2010. The availability of data on sex, and age and sex, for persons of

concern to the UNHCR varies by broad category of concern and also by geographic region, reflecting to a certain extent the presence of UNHCR operations (see UNHCR 2016, 52).

Table 7.1 reveals the geographic variation in the demographic coverage of populations of concern and populations of refugees and in refugee like circumstances,¹ and also proportions female estimated regionally on the basis of available national data. Demographic coverage is relatively higher for persons of concern, and refugees and persons in refugee like situations in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and among refugees in countries in Africa. Gender composition for displaced persons in Europe is documented at relatively high proportions, but age and sex characteristics are not. The proportion of females among populations of concern and refugees is relatively high in Africa and Asia – although not at parity with males (see Abbasi-Shavazi and Kraly, Chap. 4 for analysis of sex ratios among forced migrants in Asia).

Measurement of total population size – the ‘population at risk’ — is the critical component for assessing levels and trends in mortality among populations of refugees and forced migrants, and critically trends in mortality as a crisis develops over time. The crude mortality rate, deaths per population per day per 10,000 is the conventional measure of relative mortality. A range of approaches to counting or estimating numbers of deaths within a population of forced migrants have been employed in the field (see Keely et al. 2001; Toole and Waldman 1997; Haaga and Reed 1997); the estimation of the denominator, the population(s) at risk, is challenged by the fluid nature of the stock of forced migrants and the flow of migration through a humanitarian crisis. Levels of mortality are interpreted in reference to the concept of ‘excess mortality,’ or the level of mortality observed in excess of baseline mortality within the population prior to the crisis. The goal of standardization of mortality rates by age and sex is emphasized by demographers, although such analytic specification may be difficult at the time of the crisis (Keely et al. 2001; Toole 1994, pp. 206–7).

Specific causes of death, as well as measures of morbidity, health status and access to health care are critical elements of health and demographic monitoring of populations of forced migrants particularly within transit and refugee camps. Infectious diseases such as cholera and typhus pose significant risks to migrants occupying relatively small spaces with limited sources of water (see Toole 1994). Indicators of health status include measures of reproductive health, maternal mortality, again, during flight and migration and within refugee camps. Critical indicators of health risks to female migrants are measures of sexual violence during flight and migration and within refugee camps (Martin 1998; Martin and Tirman 2009; Toole 1994, pp. 204–5; Mazurana et al. 2005a, b; Fisher 2010; Oxfam 2005). The empirical analysis of Hansch (2001) for five humanitarian crises (Afghanistan,

¹ This broad category includes UNHCR designated refugees and “... persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained” (UNHCR 2011, p. 65).

Table 7.1 Demographic coverage and percent female for UNCHR populations of concern and refugees, for regions: 2015

	2015	Total population of concern	Total refugee-like population	Total population of concern	Total refugee-like population	Total population of concern	Total refugee-like population	Total population of concern	Total refugee-like population
		Percent covered by sex	Percent covered by age/sex	Percent Female	Percent covered by sex	Percent covered by age/sex	Percent Female	Number	Number
Total	[2010]	45.7	96.1	33.0	30.5	46.1	23.6	63,912,738	30,422,429
		[62.5]	[73.3]	[41.5]	[64.7]	[49.0]	[43.3]	33,924,700	10,549,700
Africa		41.3	92.1	31.0	89.9	46.3	49.4	27,218,374	4,811,591
Asia		44.0	53.0	37.8	51.6	47.7	46.7	29,704,046	8,694,562
Europe		71.2	69.3	19.9	20.5	36.2	23.2	5,487,592	1,820,424
Latin America and the Caribbean		87.6	77.2	45.0	27.3	44.5	45.2	717,932	337,472
North America		41.0	66.8	2.6	0.0	48.7	33.4	714,900	409,090
Oceania		55.4	80.3	0.1	0.0	42.9	40.1	69,894	48,288

Source: (UNHCR 2016; UNHCR 2013, Annexes)

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, North Korea, and Sierra Leone) illustrates the specificity of health risks to the circumstances and characteristic of flight as well as the geography and history of the regions in which the crisis unfolds. Accurate data collection and demographic estimation of mortality, morbidity, reproductive health and sexual violence are challenged on the ground by realities of crisis, flight and places of safety and the balances among resources devoted to protecting migrants and supporting their survival and monitoring those very efforts (Argent 1997; Haaga and Reed 1997, p. 18). Argent raises the issue of vulnerability, with implications for women and caretakers, in relationship to data collection among forced migrants:

It is important to understand that for cultural or physical reasons, it is often the most vulnerable of refugees and displaced persons who may remain unidentified and unregistered. Female-headed household, the elderly, the disabled, unaccompanied children and others may not be aware of or may not understand the significance of fixing and registration exercises. In theory, persons involved in registration programs are on the look out for members of such vulnerable groups, attempting to ensure that they are not excluded (1997, p. 6).

Issues of respect and humanity are addressed with rigor and eloquence by Hyndman (2000, Chap. 5) and others (see Bloch 2007, pp. 244–245; Baines 2004, p. 8; Mulumba 2007). Hall also discusses the gendered structure and daily geographies of refugee camps and the degrees to which women are excluded from administrative systems and information resources (1990, p. 96, pp. 105–6; see also Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010).

The implications of gender biases in data collection are considered in more general terms by Jacobson and Landau in their critique and empirical review of the social science concerning refugees (2003). They observe a “...paucity of good social science, rooted in a lack of rigorous conceptualization and research design, weak methods and a general failure to address the ethical problems of researching vulnerable communities” (p. 187). Bakewell (2008) calls for an ‘oblique’ approach to refugee and forced migration research in which researchers avoid adopting without critical perspective the concepts and categories deriving from policies and programs concerning forced migrants. In a retrospective analysis of international efforts regarding refugee women, Buscher reminds us of the costs of poor data and analysis regarding gender and forced migration:

We have moved from near invisibility or benign neglect of refugee women and their concerns to concerted and strategic efforts by many organizations through multiple programming sectors to reach, include, and better serve displaced women. But are women really safer: Are they better protected? Have we saved one woman from being raped in Congo? Have we made a significant dent in maternal mortality among refugee women? With so little quantitative data on prevalence, trends in incidents over time, and the evidence about what works and what does not, the impact of our policies and programmes remains unclear and unsubstantiated (2010, p. 15).

In step with the goals of this volume, demographers have and can contribute to the development of data collection and estimation methods which are feasible, appropriate and respectful in respecting this balance of multiple and often competing tasks during a humanitarian crisis (see also Toole 1994; Schmeidl 1998; cf. Hyndman 2000, Chap. 5). The integration of methods of data collection concerning migrant

experiences with demographic measurement and analysis is an analytic strategy with great potential to illuminate the implications of forced migration by gender and during different points in the life course (Fisher 2010; Willis and Yeoh 2000, xii) and concurrently demographic dimensions of vulnerability and resilience.

7.3 Perspectives on Gender and Forced Migration, Towards Gendered Demography

In their introduction to the volume, *Gender and Migration*, Willis and Yeoh make the following statement:

Forced migration, whether due to environmental or political forces, represent a crisis point and presents possibilities of transformations in social relations (2000, xix).

This cogent statement is valuable in its expression of the relationship between population and society. Gender relations are among the most fundamental and significant social relations within all human populations and communities. While a critical analysis of conceptualizations of gender is beyond the scope of the chapter (and the critical capacities of this demographer), this section reflects upon the intersections between gender as a set of social relations and migration, processes of forced migration and the social demographic composition of refugee and migrant groups. Within this context, we draw from conceptualizations of gender implications for the demography of migration and migrant populations (see also Bailey 2010, 2005; Kraly 1997).

Mazurana et al. (2005a, b) specify the concept of gender as "... the socially constructed differences between men and women and boys and girls. Thus, gender is about the social roles of men, women, boys and girls and relationship between and among them" (p. 13). Gender and gender relations reflect culture, society (including social structure, economy and polity) and geography, and also vary within a given culture or society among groups by age, ethnicity and heritage, social class, etc.). Within circumstances of crisis involving flight and forced migration, the degree and manner in which power, authority, and conversely, dependency varies among men, women, and children will influence who migrates and survives.

Hyndman and her colleagues have called for a renewed, deepened, and focal feminist lens within refugee studies. In her introduction to the special issue of *Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography*, Hyndman asks, "[h]as 'gender' been 'mainstreamed' into the academic interdisciplinary field of refugee research? Or is it simply out of vogue?" (2010). Perhaps out of vogue, but certainly not mainstreamed, feminist perspectives hold critical value for understanding the causes and consequences of refugee and forced migrations and migrants. The gendered intersections among globalization, transnationalism and refugee and forced migrations are critically addressed in a series of studies of refugees and forced migrants in spaces within both the global north and south.

In this century, most nations and international and national organizations, including those working to respond to refugees and forced migrations, hold the values of gender equality and equal rights and opportunities for men and women, boys and girls (cf. Martin 2010; Buscher 2010; Edwards 2010). Gender balance and gender mainstreaming are identified by Mazurana, Rven-Roberts and Parpart as two operational strategies adopted by organizations such as the United Nations dealing with refugees and migrants. Gender balance connotes equal participation of men and women in policy-making and program activities (for critical and current perspectives, see also Baines 2004, pp. 53–60; Martin 2010; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010; Freedman 2010; Edwards 2010; for an excellent discussion of post-conflict issues, see Harris-Pimmer 2010). Gender mainstreaming integrates women's issues and perspectives into program planning, implementation and evaluation. Aspirations for gender balance and mainstreaming are also worthwhile for processes of demographic data measurement, collection and analysis regarding forced migration and migrants. For example, the participation of women in demographic research concerning forced migration not only provides professional and field opportunities for women, but also demonstrates to migrants that the collection of information from them is valued by both men and women. Mainstreaming gender into demographic analysis of forced migration and migrants is an essential argument of this chapter.

7.3.1 Perspectives on Women as Forced Migrants, Towards a Gendered Demography of Refugees and Forced Migration

A critical theme among perspectives on gender and refugee and forced migration is the contestation of depictions of the women migrants (see Baines 2004, 1–2; Kibreab 2003, 328). For example, scholars taking up this issue would argue that images of the large representation of women and children within refugee populations (and the metrics which initiated the narrative of this chapter) are presented as measures of vulnerability and need, rather than resilience and asset among migrants (see Oxfam 2005, p. 14; Hyndman and Giles 2011, p. 367). Kihreab (1998) argues that the interpretation of the proportion of women and children among refugees and within refugee populations, and even the inflation of that proportion serves to demonstrate the economic needs of households lacking male heads and to provoke the sympathies and ultimately donations among the international community.

Baines (2004) takes up the point of representation of women refugees in her analysis of gender and gender issues within the programs and operations of the United Nations *vis a vis* refugees (see in particular, pp. 36–39, pp. 46–47). She observes the tendency in international aid and fundraising efforts to focus on the risk women migrants face because of their sexuality and responsibilities as caretakers and hence the need for special protection by organizations such as the UNHCR (cf. Coomaraswamy 1994). Vulnerabilities are located in private spheres: the household,

the marriage, the family, the body (see also Mazurana et al. 2005a, b, p. 10). Further, Baines argues that:

Underscoring the universal vulnerability of refugee women, the local context of their situation is removed, and conceptually, refugee women are relocated to the global frame. Here problems facing refugee women are easily identified and practical policy responses can be defined (2004).

This statement holds significance for demographers and for demographic analysis of forced migration.² The role of gender in demographic processes and characteristics, and the roles of women within a displaced population and among migrants must be revealed within the specific social, cultural and geographic context of the crisis resulting in flight and migration. To do otherwise, following Baines, reduces the relevance of (demographic) information for understanding the characteristics and consequences of any particular forced migration or migrant population.

7.3.2 Dynamic Perspectives on Gender and Forced Migration, Towards Gendered Demographic Analysis of Refugees and Forced Migration

Critically consistent with demographic analysis are themes of social *change* within perspectives on gender and migration. The statement above directs us to consider the potentially disruptive effects of crisis for social relations among migrants and non-migrants (see Fisher 2010; Hyndman 2011a, b; Zlotnik 1995; Hall 1990, p. 104). As will be considered briefly below, empirical research on forced migration and refugees has revealed the transformative effects of processes of migration, asylum, return and settlement on gender roles and relations within families and households. Conceptualization and measurement of changes in social behavior is consistent with the analytic DNA of demographers concerning cohort and period effects on population processes of fertility, mortality and migration. Similarly, issues concerning the geographic scale at which analysis is conducted resonates with the demographic perspective on appropriate populations at risk, from region of origin, to the camp, the household, the body.

Feminist perspectives on forced and refugee migrations underscore the significance of changes in the experience and status of migrants and displaced person as they move through space and time in both flight and containment in refugee camps,

²The following statement in which Baines quotes Valji who in turn draws on the work of Enloe, resonates for demographic analysis:

Enloe notes the categorization of women eternally under the cliché *womenandchildren* serves several purposes. It identifies man as the norm, again which all other may be grouped into a single leftover and dependent category. Second, it reiterates the notion that women are family members rather than independent actors – that any reference to them must also refer to their domestic roles. Last, it allows for the paternalistic role of savior to be played out, in that ‘states exist...to protect women and children’ (Valji 2001, 31 quoted in Baines 2004, 37).

and asylum detention centers. Informed by the 'new mobilities paradigm' (see Sheller and Urry 2006), Hyndman and Giles alert us to the implications of the changing locales of forced migrants within the international refugee system for thinking about and hence understanding refugee and forced migration:

When individual refugees decide to divorce themselves from scripts of sedentarist camp life and move on, they become potentially threatening as 'asylum seekers' or 'migrants' who are seen as simply seeking a better life, not necessarily protection. The legitimacy of a refugee on the move, beyond such spaces, changes political valence dramatically, from innocent, helpless and deserving to politically dangerous, self-interested and underserving. Viewing refugees in long-term limbo from afar is a more comfortable and masculinist representation (Hyndman and Giles 2011, p. 367).

These scholars, along with others alert demographers to engage the significance of places and spaces in which data are to be collected as well as the implications for accurately representing the numbers, characteristics and experiences of women and men, girls and boys, within these places and spaces. Drawing on the critical contributions of Puar (2007) Mountz takes up theme of 'making' populations: "With detention, the process of subjectification intensifies geographically: *who* one is relates to *where one is located*. By hiding asylum-seekers in detention offshore, re-subjectification happens geographically. Through seclusion of their identities, detainees are homogenized as one detained group (2011, p. 386).

Dynamic interactions among gender, age and social status among migrants occupying different spaces is also relevant for demographic analysis. Clark-Kazak (2009) argues that social age analysis is particularly critical for the analysis of refugees and forced migrants and the communication of migrant characteristics such as knowledge, training, capacities, and health. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2010) illustrate age bias in representing refugee women leaders in Sahrawi refugee camps and notes the implications for measuring unmet needs among refugee women and populations in the camps.

Experiences and risks among refugee and forced migrant women during daily geographies also hold critical relevance for demographic analysis. The collection of fuel, most often firewood, more often by refugee women, and also refugee children, poignantly illustrates how health and security risks vary by gender (and age) during the daily routines which constitute survival strategies in space occupied by refugees and forced migrants migrant spaces (see Edwards 2010, p. 34). Scaling up and forward in time, migrant characteristics and experiences will vary as locations change, as migrants age, and as migrant administrative and legal status change (see Bloch 2007, p. 234). Gendered dimensions of spatial-temporal variation in refugee characteristics, experiences and risks can, and should be expanded to encompass other dimensions of gender based violence, environmental health, access to education, employment and income-generation, leadership and political participation (see Buscher 2010, pp. 15–20; Martin 2010). Such a dynamic analytic framework would contribute to the aspirations of Bakewell (2008) for refugee studies to contribute to building social scientific knowledge concerning social transformation and human mobility.

7.3.3 *Perspectives on Gendered Issues, Towards Gendered Demographic Research on Forced Migrants and Refugees*

Perspectives on gender, humanitarian crises and migration identify several domains of human welfare and security that emerge from the recent historical record of refugee producing events as significantly gendered. Beyond baseline mortality differentials by sex before a crisis which are also gendered – the following (inexhaustive) set of issues emerges, and holds intrinsic demographic relevance: armed conflict, sexual and gender based violence, human trafficking, reproductive health, environmental risks and infectious disease, and communicable disease including HIV/AIDS, access to education and opportunities for income generation, employment and political participation (see Martin and Tirman 2009; cf. Buscher 2010). Risks of survival and health which are gendered among forced migrants and displaced populations are fundamentally framed by culture, economies which emerge out of crisis (including war economies) and response of host states and the international communities, as well as local and regional geographies, water and fuel resources, and infrastructure (roads, telecommunication, etc). Kalipeni and Oppong have argued for a political ecological perspective on vulnerabilities among refugee populations and the importance of placing refugee and forced migrations within historical context of political and economic structures and change (Kalipeni and Oppong 1998; see also Van Near 2012).

A final, for the purposes of this chapter, and related set of conceptual resources concerning gender is the program of Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations accepted by the General Assembly in September 2015. As will be considered below, the program of Sustainable Development Goals gives consistent focus to social demographic dimensions of human welfare, well being and opportunity within the plan of action for sustainability of “people, planet and prosperity” (United Nations 2015, preamble). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) build on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) to “complete what they did not achieve” (United Nations 2015, preamble). Recall that gender equality and the empowerment of women was the explicit topic of MDG 3 and the reduction of maternal mortality was that of MDG 5. In some contrast to the Millennium Development Goals for 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development places each of the 17 goals within an integrated context of equity, environmental change, opportunities for economic growth, peace and security and effective international partnerships. The fundamental need for gender equity transcends all goals for sustainable development:

Realizing gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls will make a crucial contribution to progress across all the Goals and targets. The achievement of full human potential and of sustainable development is not possible if one half of humanity continues to be denied its full human rights and opportunities. Women and girls must enjoy equal access to quality education, economic resources and political participation as well as equal opportunities with men and boys for employment, leadership and decision-making at all levels. We will work for a significant increase in investments to close the gender gap and strengthen support for institutions in relation to gender equality and the empowerment of

women at the global, regional and national levels. All forms of discrimination and violence against women and girls will be eliminated, including through the engagement of men and boys. The systematic mainstreaming of a gender perspective in the implementation of the Agenda is crucial (United Nations 2015, paragraph 20).

Particularly in light of the goal and hence value of gender equality, each of the other goals concerning poverty, nutrition, child mortality and risks of HIV/AIDS imply global attention to sex differentials and gender dimensions of the interrelationships among health, opportunity and development.

7.3.4 Summary of Analytic Themes for the Place of Gender in the Demography of Forced Migration and Refugees

In 1990, Hall observed that empirical research on gendered dimensions of refugee and forced migration was quite limited (1990, p. 104; see also Kibreab 1995, p. 2). While this statement remains largely relevant, we do have the benefit of developments in social theory of gender and migration (selectively reviewed above) and empirical case studies of women's experiences in circumstances of crisis. The foundational work of Susan Forbes Martin, *Refugee Women*, must be credited in drawing critical focus to both issues of gender in the field as well as the need for gendered perspectives in protection, aid and mitigation (1992, 2010; Martin and Tirman 2009; see also Freedman 2010; Buscher 2010; Edwards 2010; Nolan 2006). Research on the role of gender as a tool of armed conflict and violence has also emerged to inform analysis of risk and response among forced migrants and refugee communities (Enloe 2005; Baines 2004; Mazurana et al. 2005a, b, p. 2). Field research of geographers has also revealed the gendered dimensions of response to population displacement and protracted refugee situations (see for example, Giles and Hyndman 2004). Accordingly, the identification of women and men, boys and girls within the context of responses to complex humanitarian crises emerges as a critical element of demographic analysis.

Research on gender, development and migration yields critical insight to the assets, vulnerabilities and experiences of women and men in processes of social and economic change in developing countries with implications for demographic change and processes. While a review of empirical literature on the social demographic dimensions of development is beyond the scope of this chapter, several themes emerge which can inform our thinking about the contexts of forced migrations and migrants, and hence baseline estimates of population characteristics within regions and countries of origin. We can search and draw from these literatures evidence for those key topics for gendered demographic research on forced migrants and refugees discussed in the previous section (see section B.iii), including gender differences in health, environmental health exposures and risks, population mobility including rural to urban migration, household roles and activities, education and labor force participation, etc.

Both theory and research on forced migrations and refugees anticipate diversity in both the effects of gender on demographic characteristics among migrants, as well as the effects of crisis and forced migration for gender relations and the status and experience of women. The research program of Gaim Kibreab concerning Eritrean refugees and returnees well illustrates each of these themes (Kibreab 1995, 1996, 2003; see also Al-Sharmi 2010; Johnson 2008). The experiences of Eritrea refugee women and men are studied and understood within the context of the nature of Eritrea society and cultures and how these vary between rural and urban geographies. Variations in changes in the roles of women and men within family and household economies and in patterns of adaptation and capacity emerged and embraced in the research and are structured by the opportunities or options available to families for survival and sustenance:

The impact of flight and exile on the Eritrean women refugees in the Sudan is varied. Among the rural refugees in the reception centres and settlements, patriarchal relations have clearly intensified and consequently women occupy positions inferior to those they possessed before. This is, among other things, due to the fact that rations and productive inputs (farm implements, seeds, land and other assistance) are issued to male heads of households and women are treated as dependents. Cash crop (sesame) production and participation in wage labour have also intensified men's control over the families' incomes. Unlike in rural Eritrea, where women's status was enhanced not only by participation in production but also by their control over food crops, in the reception centres and settlements women have lost control over the families' incomes and their role in production is discouraged by Islam. In the reception centres and settlements women also play a key role in maintaining and transmitting the traditional culture of the refugees. They are a source of continuity.

The experiences and the roles of the majority of the urban self-settled women refugees is different in several respects. First, unlike in the urban centres of Eritrea where women depended on men for their livelihoods, in exile not only is the responsibility of sustaining the refugee communities shared by the two sexes, the women refugees are bearing the greater part of the burden. However, in spite of increased participation in income-generating activities, they still occupy a subordinate position in their communities. This may suggest that the ability to earn an income is only one of the many factors that contribute to women refugees' empowerment (Kibreab 1995, p. 24).

Moreover, the empirical research of Kibreab challenges the canon of social demographic concepts such as households and headship and makes demands among social scientists to develop valid interpretations of social demographic characteristics based on an understanding of both culture and processes of social change and adaptation among refugee and migrants, families and households (Kibreab 2003).

Through a demographic lens, we can conclude, first, that population composition by gender and age, and gender and age differentials for selected topics concerning forced migration and refugee status are key elements of a gendered demography of forced migration and refugees. Second, efforts to document characteristics and differentials by gender and age within the context of origins of forced migrants are consistent with establishing baseline estimates to serve to illuminate the effects of flight, displacement and containment at different points in the humanitarian crises.

Third, changes in characteristics and differentials can be expected to occur over time (that is, the cohort and period effects experienced by women and men, boys and girls in flight and seeking safety) and across spaces occupied by forced migrants – transit camps, international refugee camps, countries of first asylum and permanent resettlement, homelands upon return and repatriation.

7.3.5 Demographic Data and Methods Concerning Gender and Forced Migration

Population scientists can and should draw on these conceptual and empirical resources to bring gender perspectives to the demographic analysis of forced migration. These literatures direct analytic attention to the role of gender and gender relations in structuring differences in each demographic process: mortality and morbidity, fertility and migration among persons, households and families and whole communities experiencing crisis and emergency. The collection and analysis of social scientific information by which to understand the relationships between gender and demographic processes and characteristics are framed by research design, the strategy by which to generate reliable and valid measures. In the situation of complex humanitarian emergencies, the choice of research design is determined by the very nature of the crisis: its proximate causes and characteristics, scale, timing, geography, national and international engagements.

As discussed in the previous section, the spaces of forced migrations, and the places through which forced migrants move are places of social and demographic change. For men and women, girls and boys among the migrants, these processes of change are likely to be different. The analytic rationale for measuring social demographic change among migrants during the process of migration is consistent with both theory and research; the challenges of data collection and measurement in the field are profound. As specified by other contributors to this volume, the circumstances of complex emergencies challenge longitudinal analysis of forced migrants and the changing characteristics, experiences and needs of forced migrant populations. The collection of life historical data through surveys is also challenged by the logistics and priorities during forced migrations and within transit and other refugee camps (cf. Zlotnik 1995, pp. 254–255). Moreover, interpretation of results are appropriately embedded in historical and secular contexts of change. In their study of fertility patterns among Central American refugees, Moss, Stone and Smith observed, “Longer [birth] intervals for Guatemalan women may reflect the historical pattern of economic migration by Guatemalan men (Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991) who now seek to protect their families while they risk occasional violence by seeking wage work in the native country. The superimposition of migration under duress over a historical pattern of economic migration may conceal some important differences in fertility patterns” (1993, p. 192).

Given his experience in the process of information gathering in the stages of complex emergencies, Burkholder argues for ‘creative demography’ in generating

demographic rates and ratios that are meaningful for the analysis of population processes and characteristics (1997). Measurement of the ‘population at risk’ – the denominator – is a fundamental challenge. In this regard, measures of the age and sex composition of international migrants developed by the United Nations Population Division may serve useful in estimating and also assessing the demographic composition of forced migrant populations (Henning and Hovy 2011; United Nations, Population Division 2012) thereby contributing to estimation and analysis of sex differentials in mortality and morbidity and migration, and potentially for changes in fertility and reproductive processes among forced migrant women and families.

Drawing from the preceding subsection, literatures on gender and forced migration serve to identify critical numerators for demographic analyses which seek to measure dimensions of gender in processes of forced migration: mortality, health and nutrition, sexual violence and reproductive health and control, exposure to infectious disease, etc. As introduced above, the Sustainable Development Goals also provide a focused set of conceptual and measurement tools for the demography of forced migration which are consistent with a gendered demography. To evaluate progress toward many of the targets, analysis of demographic information (age and sex) and social demographic information (education, occupation, income and geographic location) is required (see <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/>).

To illustrate, targets for Goal 2 (‘End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture’) include access to resources and food evoke disaggregation of levels of undernutrition and malnutrition by age and gender; Goal 3 targets the range of causes of death and sources of ill-health recognizing differences by age and sex; Goal 4 targets age and gender differences in education; Goal 5 gives focus to gender and age differences in economic opportunity. Goals 6 and 7 outline gendered and age dimensions of access to water and energy; access to water and fuel resources has implications for the survival of women and men, girls and boys within the context of flight, migration and refugee camps. Targets for Goals 8–11 demand analysis of differences in access and opportunities across several sectors by age and gender. Goal 13 requires analysis of engagement in climate change prevention and mitigation by women and youth.

Disaggregation by age and sex of the indicators outlined in Table 7.2 go a good way in informing demographic study of forced migration from a gendered perspective. But the demand of this chapter is to go beyond disaggregation by sex to provide an understanding of the role of gender in structuring the demographic characteristics of forced migrations, and also the effect of crises on gender and gender relations among migrants and non-migrants. Within a society or culture, gender analysis holds potential for our understanding of forced migration and the experience of migrants; conversely, the process of forced migration has implications for gender and gender relations. From the conceptual and empirical scholarship reviewed above we can derive the following illustrative research expectations concerning social demographic processes and characteristics within these two broad sets of relationships between migration and gender:

Table 7.2 Characteristics of demographic and health surveys for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and total population of concern by country of origin, 2015

		Gender related survey topics														Total
	Subsaharan Africa	Date of Survey(s)	Maternal mortality	Female genital cutting	Fistula problems	Domestic violence	HIV topics	Male circumcision	Child labor	Early childhood education	Men's survey	Women's status	Migration	Population of concern for country of asylum		
	Total		37	21	21	27	39	27	17	18	39	39	13	16,607,517		
1	Angola	DHS 2015/16				x	x			x	x	x	x	50,337		
2	Benin	DHS 2017–18/2011–12	x	x	x	x	x	y	y		x	y	y	708		
3	Botswana	DHS ^a 1988												2265		
4	Burkina Faso	DHS 2010/2003	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x		34,160		
5	Burundi	DHS 2010/1987	x			x	x			x	x	x	x	84,399		
6	Cameroon	DHS 2011/2004	x	y	x	x	x	x	y	x	x	x		459,650		
7	Cape Verde	DHS 2005			x		x				x	x		115		
8	Central African Rep.	DHS 1994–5	x	x			x				x	x		503,964		
9	Chad	DHS 20,014–15/2004	x	x	x	x	x		x		x	x		474,478		
10	Comoros	DHS 2012/1996	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		-		
11	Congo, Rep. of	DHS 2011–12/2005	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x		52,152		
12	Côte d'Ivoire	DHS 2011–12/1998–9	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		1,023,579		
13	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	DHS 2013–14/2007	x		y	x	x		x	x	x	x		2,699,037		
14	Equatorial Guinea	DHS 2011	x		x	x	x	x			x	x		-		

15	Eritrea	DHS	2002/1995	y	x				x						x	x	x	2557
16	Ethiopia	DHS	2016/2011	x	x	x			x		x				x	x	x	739,156
17	Gabon	DHS	2012/2000	x					x									2884
18	Gambia	DHS	2012															7854
19	Ghana	DHS	2014/2008															19,265
20	Guinea	DHS	2012/2005	x	x													9037
21	Kenya	DHS	2014/2008-09	x	x	x			x		y				x	x	x	615,112
22	Lesotho	DHS	2014/2009	x					x		x							35
23	Liberia	DHS	2013/2007	x	y	y			x									471,653
24	Madagascar	DHS	2008-9/2003-4	x					x		x							22
25	Malawi	DHS	2015-16/2010	x					x		x							23,489
26	Mali	DHS	2012-13/2006	x	x				x		x							135,816
27	Mauritania	DHS	2000-1	x	x				x									77,891
28	Mozambique	DHS	2011/2003	x					x		x							20,447
29	Namibia	DHS	2013/2006-7	x					x		x							4576
30	Niger	DHS	2012/2006	x	x				x									332,164
31	Nigeria	DHS	2013/2008	x	y				x									2,174,313
32	Rwanda	DHS	2014-15/2010	x					x		x							151,173
33	Sao Tome and Principe	DHS	2008-9	x					x									-
34	Senegal	DHS	2010-11/2005 ^b	x	x				x									17,511

(continued)

Table 7.2 (continued)

Gender related survey topics														
														Total Population of concern for country of asylum
	Subsaharan Africa	Date of Survey(s)	Maternal mortality	Female genital cutting	Fistula problems	Domestic violence	HIV topics	Male circumcision	Child labor	Early childhood education	Men's survey	Women's status	Migration	
35	Sierra Leone	DHS 2013/2008	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x		777
36	South Africa	DHS 2016/2003	x		y	x	x	x			x	x		1,217,708
37	Sudan	DHS 1989-90	x	x									x	3,735,966
38	Swaziland	DHS 2006-7	x	x			x	x	x		x	x		974
39	Togo	DHS 2013-14/1998	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		22,712
40	Uganda	DHS 2016/2011	x	x	x	x	x	y		x	x	x		694,158
41	United Rep. of Tanzania	DHS 2015-16/2010	x	x	y	x	x	x	x		x	x		382,620
42	Zambia	DHS 2013-14/2007	x		x	x	x	x			x	x		52,179
43	Zimbabwe	DHS 2015/2010-11	x			x	x	x		x	x	x		310,624

^aInformation is restricted

^bThe continuous DHS has been adopted in more recent years

Source: Adapted from <http://www.measuredhs.com/Where-We-Work/Country-List.of UNHCR Global Trends 2010, Table 7.2>

- (a) The effects of gender and gender relations on the demographic characteristics of forced migration:
 - (i) Risk of mortality and injury will vary by sex during a complex emergency;
 - (ii) Gender based and sexual violence may be critical components of the crisis which will be related to survival and health status of migrants;
 - (iii) Selectivity by sex among forced migrants will vary by groups of forced migrants over time (cohorts) and will reflect gender roles and social and economic responsibilities within families and households;
 - (iv) Health and nutritional status of persons during flight and displacement will vary by sex and status and roles within families and households; and
- (b) The implications of crisis and migration for gender and gender relations:
 - (i) Women and girls will be at risk of sexual violence and exploitation during crisis, flight, forced migration and displacement;
 - (ii) Flight and forced migration will result in changes in access to food and water will emerge within migrant households and families that will vary by age, gender, and gender roles;
 - (iii) Flight and forced migration will result in differences in access to health care by age, gender, and gender roles within migrant households and families;
 - (iv) Flight and forced migration result in changes in household social and economic responsibilities and roles between men and women (and girls and boys), including daily geographies of resource collection (water and fuel) and income generation.

Specification of these relationships within any specific crisis, however, demands ‘baseline’ understanding of the social and cultural characteristics of the populations at risk of forced migration prior to the humanitarian crisis – characteristics that are likely to be fluid within regions and communities vulnerable to conflict and crisis, and elusive as the crisis unfolds.

Extant literatures on gender, development and migration for countries and regions of origin may serve to provide baseline profiles of populations, and population dynamics, at origin. Existing social demographic datasets may be more germane, more accessible to population researchers working to assess the demographic effects of forced migration and comparison of population dynamics and characteristics among different stages of a complex humanitarian emergency. Toole notes the use of previously collected survey data within regions of origin are useful for comparison and rapid assessment of health and demographic characteristics of the populations of refugees and forced migrants (Toole 1994, pp. 201–202; see also Yusuf 1990).

In this regard the resources of the Demographic and Health Surveys may hold particular potential for understanding the intersections of gender and demography of forced migration. Evolving out of the World Fertility Survey project of the International Statistical Institute and the Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys of the 1970s and 1980s, MEASURE DHS (Monitoring and Evaluation to Assess and Use Results of Demographic and Health Surveys) supports the administration and analysis of these national representative surveys in over 90 countries in the global south on topics of health and demographic characteristics (see Vaessen and Le 2005).

The standard Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) includes: (i) the household questionnaire which collects data on household composition and assets, social and economic characteristics, and selected health indicators (for example, height and weight of women in child bearing ages and children under 5 years); and (ii) the women's questionnaire collects measures of maternal and reproductive health and more detailed social and economic characteristics of husband and wife, including reproductive history, marriage, use of contraception, maternal and infant health care, breast feeding, immunization, nutrition, and dimensions of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases. A men's questionnaire is available as a special module for adoption by counties and addresses a selection of similar topics. Other modules include maternal mortality, female genital mutilation, domestic violence, women's status, HIV/AIDS including dimensions of stigma, education of children, malaria, among others (see Vaessen and Le 2005, p. 498). Special survey instruments have also been developed concerning malaria and HIV/AIDS. Survey estimates for subnational geographies and urban/rural populations are available from DHS datasets.

Demographic and Health Survey data are accessible to researchers and, as with the UN data on the age and sex profiles of international migrants, offer researchers baseline and comparative insight for demographic analysis of forced migrant populations potentially for the regions of origin and relative to the region of asylum and settlement. Data on the health status and demographic characteristics of population in the country and region of origin of forced migrant populations can contribute to the assessment of the selectivity or survival among forced migrants and the degree to which there are health and other social demographic differentials between males and females in the migrant population. Moreover, to the degree to which the DHS in the country of origin gives special attention to issues of gender, the results of the survey may enlighten aid and health workers as well as researchers engaged in refugee and migrant assistance about dimensions of gender specific to the forced migrant population of concern.

Several modules of the DHS directly relevant to perspectives on gender include domestic violence, female genital cutting, fistula problems, maternal mortality, women's empowerment, and men's issues. Other topics which are also relevant for gender differences in health and welfare include the theme of child labor, male circumcision, knowledge and behavior regarding HIV/AIDS. Specific topics and questions concerning each of the themes vary among national survey instruments but comparison of general results is accommodated in the DHS system of summary

reports. For example, the theme of women's empowerment included in the survey module on women's status includes measures of the participation of women in wage employment and questions of women's role in household decision-making. Changes in the foci of special inquiries between demographic and health surveys for a country may provide signals to emerging issues or social and health priorities within the country of origin of forced migrants.

Table 7.2 illustrates these tentative ideas for those countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in which a Demographic and Health Survey has been conducted. Dates of the two (where applicable) most recent DHS studies are shown in the third column of the table. Ten themes of inquiry relevant to gender and gender relations are shown in subsequent columns and also the topic of migration.³ The frequency of the theme among the 43 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in which a DHS has been implemented is shown on the first row of the table; availability of detailed data on the topic for each country is shown in the body of the data with an "X" for the more recent survey; "Y" indicates that the theme was a focus in the previous survey but *not* the more recent. This analysis is illustrative and could be deepened for specific data items and for countries for which forced migrations occur.

Nearly half of the 43 countries included questions on female genital cutting (21), fistula (21) and male circumcision (27). Modules of questions concerning child labor and early childhood education have been implemented, by 17–18 countries. The topic of migration is pursued by 13 countries, although in two countries, not in the more recent survey. Most of the countries, 39, have devoted special attention to topics relevant to women's status, men's issues and level and knowledge of HIV; 37 countries measure material mortality in the DHS.

Data available from the Demographic Health Surveys may provide useful metrics on critical dimensions of gender, women's status and gender relations in countries of origin of forced migrations and displaced populations. The key analytical challenges are at the very least the collection of data among forced migrant populations in comparison to indicators of gender and social demographic characteristics in the region of origin and the analysis of those data *vis a vis* the relationships between changes in gender and gender relations and demographic processes. Furthermore, the experiences of females as members of a population or cohort of forced migrants in relationship to demographic characteristics and outcomes are also consistent with a gendered analysis of the demography of forced migrations. The impact of gender based and sexual violence among forced migrants is a critical case in point.

As introduced above, the analysis of changes in gender, status and gender relations for migrant women and men, girls and boys is ideally served by longitudinal data. It is not cost effective to consider panel data among forced migrants, and cross sectional historical data from surveys are similarly largely infeasible (see Zlotnik 1995), although Keely et al. (2001) demonstrate the feasibility of administering among refugee and migrant populations carefully prepared surveys within a care-

³ Only one country, Benin, conducted a special inquiry into migration in its (first) demographic and health survey in 2011–12.

fully planned sample design. Toole (1994) provides a very useful discussion of the collection of demographic and health data through surveys and other approaches for the essential stage of rapid assessment of health conditions among refugees and forced migrants.

There is an important role of qualitative data collection in yielding indicators of change in gender, gender relations and the experiences of men and women and among migrants (see Silvey and Lawson 1999). Principles of research design for qualitative data apply in the implementation of qualitative data collection (see Hennink 2009; Hennink et al. 2010) and analysis and interpretations of results require dedication of human resources. The combination of rigorous qualitative methods, group interviews in particular, with quantitative indicators of gender for different migrant population and population subgroups can yield effective insight into the interrelationships among gender, forced migration and demographic outcomes.

Similarly, collection of data on the particular vulnerabilities and resilience of refugee women is benefited by attention to the process of the crisis, flight and migration and comparison of experiences of women within different stages of the emergency. Efforts should be made to collect systematic information concerning persons not surviving flight as a result of gender based and sexual violence among other causes of death using multiplicity techniques. Documentation of gendered violence within different spaces occupied by forced migrant populations will serve to reveal much about risks faced by women and girls during the process of flight and migration and correspondingly the sexual health needs of women and girls within different contexts of protection (see WHO 2002). Similarly, the collection of qualitative data concerning both the vulnerabilities and strengths of women and the strategies adopted by migrant women to protect themselves and their dependents will inform programs of aid, support and treatment and reveal ways of involving migrant women and men in those initiatives (see for example, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. 2008; Oxfam 2005; Baines 2004; Martin 2004; Hall 1990).

As noted by Mazurana et al., these tasks, that is, comparisons of indicators of gender, the status of women, and gender relations between contexts of origin and those among migrant populations are best understood within the phases of flights and thus within the significant spaces occupied by forced migrants during the crisis:

Each phase of displacement affects people differently, included forced eviction, initial displacement, flight, protection, assistance, resettlement, and reintegration. Refugee, returnee, and internally displaced women and girls suffer discrimination and rights abuse based on their sex during refuge and throughout their journey to and from refuge. Sex discrimination, gender-related methods of persecution, or both often cause their flight, frequently in combination with discrimination and abuse on other grounds (such as ethnicity, religion, and class). During their flight, they confront sex discrimination and gender-related persecution – often in the form of harassment, sexual extortion, or physical and sexual violence (2005b, p. 8).

Thus measures of gendered dimensions of the demography of refugees and forced migrations deriving from a range of methods of data collection and estimation require comparative analysis.⁴ Presented in Table 7.3 is an illustrative table for selected indicators of gender, gender relations and the status of women and men for different groups of migrants and comparative populations, and considered geographically for different spaces of migrant experience and resources of assistance (cf. Hyndman 2000, 2011a, b; Hyndman and Giles 2011; Kraly 1997).

Table 7.3 illustrates a framework for relevant comparison among populations of forced migrants in relationship to selected social demographic processes and characteristics for which gender and gender relations are salient: health, security, environmental health and risks, reproductive health, education, income generation, labor force participation, political participation, etc. The geographies identified – the places – are also illustrative and must ultimately reflect the geography of the particular complex humanitarian emergency.

7.4 Conclusions Concerning a Gendered Demography of Forced Migration

This chapter has sought to describe the ways in which the demography of forced migration can be informed by a gendered perspective and also by perspectives on gender and gender relations within scholarship on migration, refugees and conflict. The intent has been to build bridges between and among several areas of inquiry to forge a pathway to demographic analyses which is made more relevant and effective in addressing complex humanitarian emergencies, forced migrations and migrants (see Toole 1994, p. 207).

Perspectives on migration and gender direct us to consider the significance of gender and gender relations in countries and communities of origin in shaping the demographic patterns and processes of flight, population displacement, and forced migrations, and hence the social demographic characteristics of forced migrant and

⁴Gordon has outlined several policy relevant questions concerning the demography of refugees that included: (1) How does the composition of a refugee population differ from, or resemble, the population of its country of origin. What does that show about the nature of the persecution encountered by that population and about the circumstances of their departure? (2) What “vintages” (Kunz 1973) exist in the refugee flow: What information is contained in knowledge of refugee vintages? (3) How do the refugees who are selected for resettlement from places of first asylum differ from, or resemble, the total population in first asylum? What does that show about the selection process? (4) How do refugee experiences such as persecution in the country of origin, trauma during the escape, or the length of time spent in first asylum affect adjustment? (5) What characteristics in the refugee community represent strengths that can contribute to a successful resettlement? What characteristics represent handicaps for which allowances must be made in resettlement? (1993, pp. 5–16).

refugee populations. These literatures also reveal the transformative implications of migration for the status, welfare and experience of women and men, boys and girls. Conceived as a dynamic process, forced migration and responses to forced migrants by receiving countries and communities and aid organizations have the potential and the probability to change the meaning and experience of gender and gender relations.

These perspectives and research on gender and forced migration have also directed us to the potential of international statistics resources including the age-sex distributions of international migrants organized by the United Nations Population Division and data available from the Demographic and Health Surveys to provide indicators of baseline social demographic characteristics and composition in countries and regions of origin of forced migrants and migrant populations for comparison with migrants and migrant populations as they move through time and spaces associated with flight, displacement, settlement and resettlement. Topics of social demographic inquiry may be informed by international goals for human welfare embodied in the Millennium Development Goals and extant perspectives and research on refugees and gender. If longitudinal analysis of refugee and migrant cohorts is challenged in the field, comparison among refugee and migrant populations may contribute to our understandings of change in gender differentials in social demographic characteristics in different points and places in processes of forced migration.

A demography of forced migration and migrants in which a gendered perspective is integrated will serve efforts to protect and assist all migrants in ways in which limited resources are most effectively utilized. The gendered dimensions of durable solutions and issues of gender in the choice of solutions will be informed with an empirically grounded analysis of the role of gender in the demography of forced migrations, and critically, the ways in which crisis and migration can change the role of gender and gender relations among populations and within societies.

Social scientists contributing to research on forced migration and refugee studies are reminded of the constraints of ‘policy-relevant’ concepts measured in the field (Bakewell 2008) and also the ways in which concepts operationalized in empirical research inform both policy and public discourse (Van Near 2012; see also Landau 2012). Enloe also encourages us – demographers – to reflect what may be ‘behind’ sex differentials in mortality and morbidity, vulnerability and resilience, and the value of a feminist perspective: “Patriarchy – in all its varied guises, camouflaged, khaki clad, and pinstriped – is a principal cause both of the outbreak of violent conflicts and of the international community’s frequent failures in providing long- term resolutions to those violent conflicts” (p. 281). Toole asks us to look ‘beyond’ and respond as effectively as possible to the consequences of crises: “If the international community is unable to develop effective mechanisms to prevent civilian populations for the violence of wars, the least that should be done is to protect civilians who flee those wars from preventable conditions such as communicable diseases and malnutrition. If promptly implemented and well targeted, a number of public health interventions will prevent the common causes of death that have been docu-

mented in past disasters” (1994, p. 207). Both theory and research direct us to investigate and thus document further the critical role of gender and gender relations in the demography of forced migrations and the survival, welfare, and well-being of migrants.

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Chapter 8

Family Dynamics in the Context of Forced Migration

Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, Hossein Mahmoudian, and Rasoul Sadeghi

8.1 Introduction

Marriage and family formation is one of the main areas which is affected in the process of migration. However, forced movement creates precarious situations by which family processes and patterns are changed and affected significantly. Prior to the discussion on the impacts of forced migration, it is necessary to briefly define and present the typology of refugee and forced migration.

As discussed in introductory chapters of this volume, forced migration refers to the coerced movement of a person or persons away from their home or home region. Migrating in the same country means the person is an internally displaced person (or IDP), and migrating to another country means the person is a refugee. The movement can be due to natural or environmental disasters, famine, and conflicts. Involuntary migration is different from voluntary migration because there is usually no prior intention or plan to leave. Forced migrants include refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people, and trafficked or smuggled people. Movements and family are mutually interconnected and influence and affect each other one way or another. This chapter elaborates the role of family and households in processes and dimensions of forced migration.

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8.2 Demographic Analysis at the Scale of the Family and Household

The family and households are the cornerstone of societies. Childbearing, caring for children, and providing support for the ill and the dependent aged are the main functions of families and households (Bongaarts 2001; Ryder Norman 1977). These units are usually the locus of joint decisions regarding consumption, production, labor force participation, savings, and capital formation (Becker 1991). Decision-making about migration and other aspects of the move are also made and affected by and within the household and family. Thus, analysis of the role of the household and residential family should be central in demographic analyses (Bongaarts 2001; Willekens 2009).

While social sciences have long recognized the importance of families and households, Bongaarts (2001, p. 3) argued that ‘demographers have neglected the quantitative dimensions of the size composition and change in households and their causes and consequences’. Burch (1979) and Berquó and Xenos (1992) described family demography compared to fertility and migration as ‘immature’ and ‘under-developed’. Conventionally, demographers consider individuals as their unit of analysis by which limited variables such as age and sex are controlled for testing theories explaining the ways in which these demographic variables are affected by vital events. In reality, however, vital events and particularly migration are influenced by a complex array of decisions and actions made and taken by the families and households and kin groups. Not only does every individual in these units have an age, sex, and marital status, but members are related to one another in a variety of ways (Bongaarts 2001).

The family is a strategic point from which changes in the lives of immigrants and their children can be analyzed (Hirschman 1997, p. 201). Family dynamics are crucial to the understanding of the degree to which immigrants progress economically and socially or integrate into mainstream culture (Goldscheider 2005; Arias 1998, p. 40). And, structural constraints and conditions that immigrants confront in their new environment easily shape their family arrangements, roles, and orientations (Foner 1997, p. 962). Despite the multi-dimensional impact of households and families on migration and the complexity of their relationship within such units with migration, most studies on migration have either been focused at the aggregate (community or state) level or alternatively at the individual level. However, recognizing the importance of family and household on migration, recent studies have shifted their attention to household and family level as unit of analysis (Massey and Espinosa 1997; Massey 1990, 2015; Sana and Massey 2005; Démurger 2015; Cindy Fan et al. 2011). This shift is important and strategic as the decisions for migration and particularly for forced migration are made by the family, and members of households have a role in determining *whether, when, where, how, and by whom* to move. The family is, mutually, affected by the movement of the whole – or some members of the family who may become separated, or settled in a new destination.

The livelihoods of family members in the new society, their return to and reintegration in the origin society are also affected in the process of migration.

There can be two approaches in studying the relationship between forced migration and family. One is to examine the role that family as a whole or members of the family as individuals have in the decision making and the process of migration. Alternatively, studies can analyse the impact of migration on family formation and dynamics. This chapter aims to do the latter.

8.3 Frameworks for the Analysis of Forced Migrations and the Family

Conceptualisation is a necessary precursor to effective measurement and analysis of populations. In this section, we will present a conceptual model of forced migration based on the pioneering work of the demographer Kunz (1973, 1981) which was based on refugees. He sought to produce a general model which included the fundamental elements of the refugee process from initial flight to eventual settlement. Kunz (1973) recognized three stages in the forced migration process – flight, asylum and eventual settlement. The spatial and temporal characteristics of each stage vary. For example, flight for safety is likely to be characterized by the search for a place of temporary protection or ‘safe haven’. This may be a camp in a secure location or flight may take forced migrants to harbor with friends, family or acquaintances in an area which is secure. The time spent in this situation varies. For some forced migrants, there can be a return to the home area once the physical or conflict situation has passed. For some, this can be settlement in the transit situation or movement to a third destination. These movements of refugees and displaced people inevitably involve the loss of property, jobs, and often even family or friends. After their resettlement, they have to re-accumulate such properties and belongings. This depends on the level of their integration into host society and that would be a major challenge (Falck et al. 2011).

Another typology conceptualises forced migration as having four distinct phases - pre-flight, flight, temporary settlement and resettlement (Ager 1999). Karunakara (2004, p. 7) modified this slightly by dividing the forced migration experience into three phases – home, transit, and refuge (Fig. 8.1). The duration and intensity of forced migration experience will vary greatly between populations. It would be, however, difficult to distinguish stages of forced migration where people are constantly insecure and have been forced to migrate several times.

Interplay of several factors in all the stages leads to disruption as a result of which their family will be affected. Loss or lack of income, food, and essential services (like health or education) all disrupt societies and are likely to force populations to migrate (Ager 1999). Lack of freedom, and state violence are also other strong predictors of forced migration (Zwi and Ugalde 1991). Conflicts urge families to




Fig. 8.1 Phases of Forced Migration (Source: Karunakara 2004, p. 7)

separate with adult men first. The more substantial second wave of migrants may comprise mainly women and children. The very old and the infirm may be left behind. It is likely that families with children are also more likely to migrate than those without (Martin and Tirman 2009). The *Refuge* phase does not necessarily lead to a safe settlement. A refugee and the family could live in camp situations for a long time. In the final phase, a refugee and the family could be integrated into the host country, resettled in a third country, or repatriated back to the origin place. Host country policies may not be in favor of migrants and can force them to become isolated from the host population (Ager 1999).

For refugees and other forced migrants, family unity cannot be taken for granted, as the situations that cause displacement commonly disperse families (Staver 2008, p. 3) in the sending, transit, and receiving places. Migration may affect the family in each of the stages of forced movement differently, and ideally family dynamics should be examined in all stages of migration to ascertain the degree to which the family has changed along the way. Forced migration affects all aspects of the family including age at marriage, family structure, family formation process and relationship with family members. These dynamics may also lead to the increase in female-headed households in sending or host countries. Biased age structure among migrant communities has also an impact on transnational- and inter-marriages. The issue of citizenship of family members and children of mixed marriages will also have consequences for children and families in the host community. Finally, as discussed in the Chap. 6 by Agadjanian (2017) forced migration impacts fertility behaviour. We now turn our attention to the hypotheses by which mechanisms and pathways by which migration influences the family are explained.

8.3.1 Theoretical Framework for Explaining Migrants' Family

Migration can affect family through *disruption*, *selectivity* and *adaptation/integration*. Each of these hypotheses tends to be more relevant to particular stages of migration. For example, the disruption hypothesis may be especially applicable in

the early stages of settlement whereas the adaptation hypothesis will have more relevance to longer term migration. Over time, the migrant community matures, second and later generations emerge, and most likely, with a prolonged exposure to the socio-economic conditions, norms, values and attitudes of migrants converge to those of the native-born in the destination place (Milewski 2010).

The *disruption* hypothesis suggests that during the period and after migration, immigrant's family formation and marriage is disrupted. Migration-related events like separation of the husband and wife and settlement problems can lead to changes in family structure and gender roles, relations and identities (Mertus 2003) and also cause disruption within family. Family separation can be due to a natural consequence of conflict and war. Staver (2008, p. 5) identified three major causes of family separation. Firstly, separation can be accidental, "with family members compelled to follow different routes or to flee based upon available opportunities or resources". Secondly, it can be a "chosen temporary strategy, such as helping a child escape military recruitment or sending a politically active member into hiding" (Sample 2007, p. 50; see also Jastram and Newland 2003, p. 562). Finally, separation can occur as family members are abducted or imprisoned. In addition, settlement stresses are compounded by worries and uncertainty about the safety of family members left behind (Barwick et al. 2002, p. 45; Staver 2008, p. 5), and this leads to further disruption of family formation and dynamics.

Forced migration presents a heavy challenge to the family as the family struggles to remain as a unit during asylum seeking. It is not a given fact that families should always live together – people commonly spend time away from their families for work or studies. However, refugee families do not choose separation. The uprooting is forced, and refugees usually "go to great lengths to re-assemble the family group" (Jastram and Newland 2003, p. 562). Furthermore, as Chambon (1989, p. 6) emphasized, the situation is often highly uncertain and impossible to predict the length of separation or even whether reunification will take place or not (Staver 2008, p. 5).

The family changes disrupted at the time of migration can either remain for a long time or be compensated with subsequent actions in midterm. The recuperation in family formation and relationships, however, might not be done either intentionally or unintentionally. If family members reject joining the displaced person, the reunification cannot take place. The limitation can also be enforced from the origin as there may be political issues that need to be resolved before refugee and forced migrant repatriation or family reunification can take place. Family separation for refugees can continue in the destination because of difficulties regarding reunification or family laws in refugee receiving countries. For example, the members of refugee families that include more than one wife should be settled in different locations in countries in which polygamy is legally and socially condoned (UNHCR 2011). This has happened for refugees from Middle East and North Africa to European countries.

One of the most important and relevant hypotheses which relates more generally to migration theory is *adaptation* (Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou and Bankston 1994; Portes 1996; Perlmann and Waldinger 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 2006; Berry et al. 2006; Farley and Alba 2002; Waldinger and Feliciano 2004;

Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2007; Berry and Sabatier 2009; Abbasi-shavazi and Sadeghi 2015). In general, immigrants' adaptation can be defined as a process of change that occurs among groups or individuals as a response to the demands of the social context (Ward and Kennedy 1993). Adaptation models in migration studies tend to theorize that as migrants adapt to the destination society, their behavior converges towards that of the natives (Hurr and Kim 1984; Foner 1997, p. 965). Several theories have been advanced to explain adaptation process of immigrants in the host society. *Classical assimilation* theory treats the process of integration in assimilation mode, as a linear shift from being un-assimilated to being fully assimilated to the host culture (for example, see Gordon 1964). Based on *segmented assimilation* theory (Portes and Zhou 1993), assimilation is no longer considered as a linear process because immigrants experience segmented assimilation in different spheres of life in the host society.

At the micro level, Berry's framework takes into consideration orientation to both origin and new cultures and societies; the degree to which people maintain their cultural heritage and identity; and the degree to which they seek involvement with the larger society (Berry 1992). Based on attachment to origin and host society, migrants' strategies in the host society can be classified into four categories: assimilation, integration, marginalization, and separation. *Assimilation* refers to rejecting the individual's cultural identity and accepting the host society's identity and culture. *Integration* occurs when individuals maintain a positive attachment to a new society as well as to their original culture and community. *Separation* refers to retaining original culture while rejecting the new culture. *Marginalization* involves non-adherence to either cultures.

This hypothesis links to wider migration theory regarding settlement and integration in the destination place (Bean and Stevens 2003). It advances that a change of environment may present migrants with a different set of factors or conditions, such as educational opportunities, labor force participation, and access to family planning, which can operate to change behavior regarding marriage and family.

In examining the adaptation of immigrants, two interrelated dimensions can be identified – structural and cultural. *Structural adaptation* refers to the extent to which immigrant groups are distributed across the socio-economic spectrum (e.g., in the educational, occupational and income levels) compared with the native population. The closer the immigrant is to the native distribution, the greater the adaptation and incorporation of the former into the host society. The second dimension of adaptation refers to the importance of cultural heritage. Unique norms and values (of immigrants) pertaining to family formation reflect the history and beliefs shared by members of an immigrant group regardless of socio-economic integration in the host society (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2000; Carter 1998; Hammel 1990; Sorenson 1985, 1988; Tang 2001; Thapa 1989). This model predicts convergence or divergence of immigrants' behaviors related to family to those of the natives according to structural and cultural integration. Taking migrant's family into account, if there are differences in family dynamic between native and immigrant women, they may be due to immigrants' low levels of (structural and cultural) adaptation. If, by controlling the structural socio-economic situation, immigrant-native differences

disappear, it can be concluded that they are due to inequality between the situation of immigrants and the native population. But if these differences still remain, it can be attributed to the low level of immigrants' cultural adaptation. Therefore, these two dimensions of adaptation theory are not mutually exclusive, but rather are complementary and interact together to explain immigrant-native family behavior differentials.

Adapting to a new situation for refugees and forced migrants is not as easy and straightforward as for voluntary migrants. Forced migrants normally lose their family members, job, belongings, and capital; they live in camps or other locations which normally are unpleasant and harsh; and attitudes in destination society might not be greatly in favor of refugees. While developments of social networks, family reunions and permanent settlements (Castles and Miller 2003) do occur, continued traumatization, anxiety about forced repatriation and uncertainties regarding resettlement make psychosocial healing almost impossible (Hauff and Vaglum 1995). It has been observed that refugees have higher psychosomatic stress than any other groups of migrants due to the involuntary, migratory and potentially temporary nature of their experience (Dona and Berry 1999). Therefore, adaptation may take longer than is expected in the case of forced migrants. Overcoming the problems can help the adaptation occur sooner. For the Sudanese refugees in Uganda, for example, access to some agricultural land and the availability of health and school services have made it easier to adapt to life in a new country and have served as incentives for refugees to interact with their hosts (Karunakara 2004, pp. 7–10).

According to the *selectivity* hypothesis, migrants at the destination will not be representative of the population at the origin but of a subgroup from which the migrants are drawn (Kahn 1988). Compared to voluntary migration, forced migrants are less selective. The selected refugees, however, may be from higher socio-economic strata and seek asylum because of political or religious beliefs. They can also be from a distinctive population located in border areas and special places facing war, disputes or natural disasters. Since they do not represent the total population they come from, any changes in their situation in the destination place cannot be solely explained by the move. They could have chosen the same living strategy in the origin even if they had not migrated.

The unique characteristics of forced migrants, compared to normal migrants, can distort the process of recuperation and adaptation. Forced migrants are normally less selected and the chance of their adaptation to lower socio-economic strata of host society is higher. Similarly, the chance of separation and marginalization would be higher for forced migrants. Living in camps and greater control of destination society can enforce such strategies. The self-settled refugees who have smaller population may adapt to destination society faster than those who are larger in population and live in camps or restricted areas. The chance of separation and marginalization could be also less for them.

Some refugees might enter the destination location as illegal migrants, and thus, they may not have access to resources in the host community which would otherwise facilitate their integration process. Although this might happen for voluntary migrants, the unpleasant effects of such clandestine life on family matters would be

higher for refugees than normal migrants. Refugees and displaced migrants are afraid of both illegal settlement in destination and persecution from the place of origin.

The situation of forced migrants in camps and restricted areas might be at times better than the situation in origin place and the situation of self-settled migrants. This is due to the supervision and control done by national and international bodies and organizations. Hynes et al. (2002) showed that refugees and IDPs in most post-emergency camps had better reproductive outcomes than their respective host country and country of origin. This can pave the way to faster and better settlement and adaptation.

The aforementioned hypotheses proposed to examine the relationship between migration and family have been mainly applied to the studies of voluntary migration. Of these hypotheses, disruption may be more relevant to forced migration as this affects forced migrant families more than other types of migrants. Displacement may lead to postponement of marriage prior to or after migration due to loss of job and belongings and financial constraints, loss of family members (environmental, war, conflict etc.), and/or separation of family members. Sometimes it takes a long time for family members to join each other in the destination. Living in camps also has implications for family formation. *Adaptation* may take a longer time than is expected in the case of forced migrants due to their socioeconomic isolation and exclusion. There will be generational change in the families of refugees. Their successive generations are likely to behave like the native born in the host society. The degree of similarity or dissimilarity of the origin to the destination place, can have implications for the speed of integration of migrants and refugees in the new place. The legal and structural situation may hinder or facilitate the adaptation processes.

Social networks among refugees also are driving forces of change. Although families live apart, they may be connected through social media and new technologies, and this may lead to continuity of family connections and relationships. Changes are taking place in countries of origin as well, and thus, these changes will lead to changes among diaspora and refugees. Population size and composition of migrants in the destination place also affects the level, trend and patterns of marriage. For instance, marriage squeeze is an important element of the marriage market and can influence the level of marriage, and affect the age of marriage. The degree of freedom for mate selection matters for arranged marriage versus love match. In what follows, we briefly review selected studies on forced migration and family.

8.4 Prior Empirical Research on Forced Migration and the Family

Studies on family changes among forced migrants and refugees are inadequate. The main reason for this is related to the limited availability and quality of data for forced migration. Studies are carried out at very small scales and cannot represent

the total population. However, the fertility of forced migrants has achieved more attention than other issues. Studies have shown that similar to voluntary migrants, refugees may have lower fertility during flight but they can also experience a catch-up action after settlement (Moss et al. 1993; Hill 2004; Hynes et al. 2002). For instance, Agadjanian and Prata (2002) found that war refugees in Angola had lower fertility during the war but their fertility increased afterwards. However, the catch-up action may not take place after the war and conflict as concluded by Randall (2005). The fertility decline during the early stage of the move can be attributed to spousal separation, stress which leads to a reduction in coital frequency and probability of conception, and uncertainty of living condition. For example, it was shown that the large fertility decline in Eritrea between the mid-1990s and the early part of the new century was due to a steep reduction in the proportion of women exposed to the risk of pregnancy resulting from the military mobilization and displacement associated with the 1998–2000 border conflict with Ethiopia. Part of this reduction was due to delayed age at marriage, but it was largely due to separation of married women from their husbands (Blanc 2004). In the time of conflict, it is more important to have social capital, education, and kinship relationship than having many children. Longer separation of refugees may lead to impossibility of adaptation and sustainability of high fertility. Insecure economic situation, however, may cause fertility decline (Hynes et al. 2002). Using data from a national survey covering 6420 former refugee and non-refugee households in Rwanda, Verwipm and Bavel (2005) found that refugee women had higher fertility but their children had lower survival chances. The findings of Woldemicael (2008), however, show that the decline was mainly due to fertility transition and the conflict only accelerated the decline. The impact of forced migration on fertility and reproductive behavior is discussed in the Chap. 6 by Agadjanian (2017).

One of the impacts of the war and conflict, and subsequent move is changing the head of household either due to loss or separation. Within conflict settings, women are far more likely to be widowed than men, particularly very young women (Hynes 2004; Martin and Tirman 2009), due in part to the larger numbers of male soldiers who die in combat (Hynes 2004). In Rwanda, for example, some 58,000 households were reportedly headed by minor girls post-conflict (Save the Children 2002). This was also confirmed by Cohen (1998) and Brun (2005) who reported that in conflict situations, many women are suddenly thrust into the role of head of household because the men are recruited to combat, stay behind to maintain land, or migrate in search of work. Comparing three population groups – Sudanese refugees, Sudanese residents and Ugandan nationals – Karunakara (2004) showed that female headship is high among refugee households but is even higher among residents. Resident households also tend to be larger than refugee households with significantly higher numbers of children orphaned by the war and cared for by their grandparents or older relatives.

Relations within the household may change during forced migration. Szczepanikova (2005) in a study on Chechen asylum seekers living in a refugee camp in the Czech Republic found that although the camp provides some opportunities for the increase of women's power in the family and men's involvement in

childcare and household duties, the assistance in the camp is based on an undiversified and gender-blind perception which sustains gendered violence.

Displacement can also increase the probability of divorce and marriage. Laliberte et al. (2003) showed that internal displacement in Chad increased the occurrence of divorce due to persistent chaos inside the country while it was not the case for refugees as their living conditions were better and did not dramatically affect their marital patterns. A study on refugees in Uganda (Refugee Law Project 2007) showed many refugee girls engage in early marriages for survival.

Family life for refugees and forced migrants who settle down in the transit or destination place is not stress free. Settlement stresses are compounded by worries and uncertainty about the safety of family members left behind (Barwick et al. 2002, p. 45; Staver 2008, p. 5). Forced migration presents a heavy challenge to the family as the family struggles to remain as a unit during asylum seeking. As family unity cannot always be maintained during refugee crises, its reestablishment is often dependent on family reunification programs or policies. Family reunification – the act of bringing together separated family members across international borders – is politically sensitive because it involves border-crossing (Staver 2008, p. 3).

In sum, family is usually affected by migration but the impact is more significant for involuntary movements. Families are affected differently in all stages of forced migration and among various groups of forced migrants. These changes also depend on socio-cultural and political contexts of the transition, host, and origin societies. Despite the importance of family in forced migration, there is a gap in our knowledge about family of refugees and forced migrants partly due to lack of data which is discussed in the next section.

8.5 Approaches to Research on Refugee and Displaced Families

Studying family change of refugees and forced migrants depends upon the degree to which their characteristics can be identified and analysed. Reed et al. (1998, p. 4) stated that forced migrants consist of various people who can be distinguished based on the ease of their identification. On the one hand, dispersed IDPs are most difficult to identify, their universe is unknown, and their geographical spread is wide. On the other hand, refugees whose status has been determined and live in camps are easily identifiable, their universe is known, and they have a defined geographical spread. There are other groups that lie between these two extreme categories, and for whom, some of their characteristics can be identified.

Considerable variations exist when different actors define IDPs, and it is not surprising that the numbers of IDPs are not known. Humanitarian data are collected at the time of crisis, and particularly when migrants cross borders and settle in camps or in the host society, or where IDPs are settled within their own country or region. However, humanitarian data do not include information on family

characteristics and relationships. Government and UN statistics usually collect data by age, gender and location. These data also suffer from incompleteness and inaccuracy. In addition, obtaining proof of marriage, for example, is not an easy process for those who are in transit or camps or it would be difficult for those who are undocumented within the host or transit country (See Hovy (2017), Chap. 3). Furthermore, longitudinal data are required to study family change. Since the status of displaced people changes, it is difficult to track them regularly and produce such data.

In order to study family change, there is a need for information on such issues as age at marriage, year of marriage, family size and structure, fertility, decision making within the family as well as other characteristics of family members, i.e. level of education, income, occupation, and marital status. Information is also required on the decision-making and process of migration, i.e. who migrated and with whom migration took place. Some of the information is usually available from various data sources including vital registration, census, and surveys. As noted by Hovy (2017, Chap. 3), in the early stages of a refugee crisis, registration usually takes place at the family or household level, which is limited to recording the name of the head, the size, and the address of the household. As the emergency phase is winding down, and as soon as conditions permit, individual-level registration is being instituted. These incomplete sources of data may be useful for identifying the number of families and household size, but would be insufficient to analyse family formation process and dynamics. Individual data files also may not be linked to the family and household data, and thus, it makes it difficult to study generational changes within the household. Data for those who are resettled in third countries requires significant registration, identification and documentation (see Hovy (2017), Chap. 3). If a family applies for resettlement, family relationships should be unambiguously established, and this may provide information for studying household structure and relationships.

Many refugees and forced migrants may not be enumerated by censuses, and therefore, they will be under-estimated in the census records. Surveys are the best sources of data for settled refugees (see Part I of this volume) who are either living in camps or in segregated areas, but again surveys would not cover forced migrants immediately before or after crossing the borders and displacement. It is possible to investigate issues related to adaptation process using survey data but there will be problems for generalization. Qualitative data collection techniques like in-depth interview and focus group discussion (FGD) provide more insights on family formation among migrants but again their limitation is that they cannot provide representative results that explain family change among refugees and forced migrants.

One of the important limitations of using administrative data for refugee statistics is inconsistent or incomplete coverage (Hovy (2017), Chap. 3). Low coverage of such data and statistics depend on the willingness of persons to come forward to seek protection, assistance or durable solutions. Some refugees prefer to remain unregistered because they fear deportation or they prefer to live outside designated camps. Also, undocumented refugees living in urban areas are heavily

underrepresented in refugee counts. These limitations are even significant for IDPs as opposed to refugees. Thus, the coverage and quality of data for different groups of forced migrants vary, and it would be difficult to study similar or comparative studies on family across groups.

Despite these shortcomings, the aforementioned sources can be regarded as complementary. Studies of family change and dynamics among forced migrants and refugees should be innovative and draw general conclusions from incomplete data but with cautious generalizations.

8.6 Migration, Adaptation, and the Family: The Case of Afghan Refugees in Iran

Iran has been one of the main destinations for Afghan refugees and migrants over the last three decades. Since 1979, Afghan migration to Iran has been primarily motivated by war, insecurity, threat to female honor, unemployment, and inflation. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan resulted in a massive influx of three million Afghans into Iran between 1979 and 1989. Despite fluctuations in the number of Afghan migrants in Iran in recent years, it is estimated that at least 2.5 million Afghans, including 1.5 million documented and another one million undocumented, are residing in Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi and Sadeghi 2016). Approximately 1.5 million migrants of Afghanistan nationality were recorded in the 2016 census, around half of whom were born in Iran, and can be considered as second generation. The majority (more than 70%) resided in urban areas, and only less than 3% lived in refugee camps.

The second-generation Afghans comprise a particular demographic group whose experiences and aspirations, while not homogenous, are different from their parents' generation, and from their counterparts in Afghanistan. Educational achievements, occupational skills, and economic opportunity in Iran (Abbasi-shavazi and Sadeghi 2015, 2016; Hugo et al. 2012), have inspired different values and aspirations. They have also been raised in an arguably more liberal social and religious environment, and exposed to values, attitudes and practices that are different from those of their parents (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2012, p. 829). Earlier analysis showed that the singulate mean at marriage of the second-generation Afghans in Iran was closer to the Iranian women than their first (parent's) generation (Fig. 8.2). Consistent with this pattern are changes in the fertility behavior of the second-generation Afghans in moving toward levels and patterns of fertility within the host society. Second-generation Afghans had lower level of children ever born (3.3) than the first generation (4.1) as compared to that (2.6) for Iranian women (Hugo et al. 2012, p. 285).

Given the long-term settlement of Afghans in Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005, 2007; Abbasi-Shavazi and Sadeghi 2015, 2016) and the emergence of second and third generation Afghans in the country (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008), Iran provides




Fig. 8.2 Singulate Mean Age at First Marriage (SMAM) among Iranian and Afghans by generation and sex, 2010

an ideal opportunity to examine the degree of integration and family change among Afghan refugees and migrants in their host society.

As indicated earlier, adaptation of migrants into the host society can be analyzed at both macro (societal) and micro (individual) levels. The degree of adaptation and integration of Afghans into the Iranian society is examined in the following sections.

The data comes from the 2010 Afghan Adaptation Survey conducted in Mashhad and Tehran. Selection of these cities as the field of study was due to the sizeable number of Afghan immigrants in the two cities. Based on the 2006 census, 32.7% of the Afghan population in Iran resided in Tehran province and 13.3% in Khorasan Razavi Province. Almost one-fourth (23%) of Afghans in Tehran province settled in Tehran city and more than four-fifths (84%) of Afghans in Khorasan Razavi Province settled in Mashhad city.

The target population consisted Afghan youth, aged 15–29 years including first and second generations. “First generation” includes those who were born in Afghanistan and immigrated to Iran, and “Second generation” includes those who were born in Iran from at least one Afghanistan-born parent. The sample size of this survey was 620 comprising 391 (63.1%) who were Iran-born and 229 (36.9%) who were Afghanistan-born. A structured questionnaire was used for data collection. Data were collected through face-to-face interviews by 14 trained Afghan men and women interviewers who were either university students or who had graduated from Social Sciences disciplines. A multi-stage sampling procedure was applied. First, neighborhoods were selected based on the density of the Afghan population and the socio-economic strata in the census tract. In the next step, using a sample frame (age, sex, birthplace, ethnicity, education, and marital status) and a stratified snow-ball sampling procedure, the samples in every neighborhood were selected.




Fig. 8.3 Family orientations of Afghan youth by generation, 2010

The index of family orientations is drawn from 24 items covering a variety of family dimensions. Based on the index score, respondents were classified into three groups of traditional, intermediate, and modern family orientations. Socio-cultural adaptation was also measured by 32 items and respondents were grouped into four categories; assimilated, integrated, separated and marginalized. Adaptation and family changes among migrants in the context of forced migration can be analysed using two approaches; inter-generational and intra-generational (Portes and Rumbaut 2001), and the following section presents the results using the two approaches.

8.6.1 Inter-Generational Differences of Family Orientations

As Fig. 8.3 illustrates, second-generation Afghans have more modern orientations toward family when compared to the first generation. Such consistent generational differences in family orientation have been attributed to the process of adaptation. Second-generation Afghans have grown up in Iranian society (Abbasi-shavazi and Sadeghi 2015) and it is not surprising that they experienced “modern” orientation towards family.

Not only had the first generation more orientation towards traditional family than the second generation, compared to the second generation they were less likely to have intermediate family values. This result clearly shows the adaptation of Afghan refugees toward the host society across generation.




Fig. 8.4 Family orientations (traditional vs. modern) of first and second generation Afghans by adaptation patterns, 2010

8.6.2 *Intra-Generational Adaptation Patterns and Family Orientations*

Afghans in Iran have experienced a variety of adaptation patterns and family orientations. This is shown in Fig. 8.4 indicating significant correlation between adaptation patterns and family orientations. Modern family orientations were common among those who were assimilated, while traditional family values and behaviors were observed among the separated group.

It is clear from this study that the first-generation Afghans continue to follow their traditional attitudes while the second-generation experience modern orientations towards family. The new generation is more educated than both the first generation and their counterparts in their homeland (Hugo et al. 2012). The first generation has not had opportunities at school and universities to interact with other Iranians as well as with second-generation Afghans who are from different ethnic, geographic, and socio-economic backgrounds. Such interactions exist for the second generation which in turn influences the marriage market and the range of choices that young Afghan men and women have for their prospective marriage partners. These forces have led to more changes in the process of marriage and family formation of Afghans in Iran.

The second-generation Afghans are experiencing a transitional period and are caught between two cultures with the same roots but in different stages of transition. Orientations towards family are influenced by their adaptation strategies, i.e. assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalization. As expected, the first generation who are more attached to the origin society (separated), preferred traditional

way of family, while those who are assimilated have more modern family type. There was a clear difference across generations. The first generation was oriented towards traditional values while the second generation preferred modern values. In conclusion, thus, generation and longer term residence in the host society will lead to adaptation of family behavior and attitudes of refugees and forced migrants.

8.7 Conclusions

Most migration scholars have focused analytic attention either at the aggregate (community/state/national) level or alternatively at the individual level in studying patterns, causes and consequences of migration. However, there has been a major shift in recent demographic studies by considering family and household as the effective unit of analysis. Decision making about migration and other aspects of the move are made and affected by and within the household and families. Migration and mobility also affect family formation and dynamics.

Conventionally, demographers had 'explained' variations in vital events at the level of the individual by controlling for demographic characteristics, largely age and sex. In reality, however, vital events and particularly migration are influenced by a complex array of decisions and actions made and acted upon within families, households and kin groups. There has been an expansion of perspective, however, to embrace this complexity and correspondingly a shift to consider family and/or households as the more appropriate focus. Decisions about migration and particularly for forced migration (i.e. *whether, when, where, how, and by whom* to move) are usually made by the family either as a whole or by its members. The family is mutually affected by the movement of the whole – or some members of the family who may become separated, or settled in a new destination. The livelihoods of family members in the new society, their return, and reintegration in the origin society, are also affected in the process of migration.

The relationship between forced migration and family/household can be approached from two directions. One is to examine the role that family as a whole or members of the family have in migration decision-making and migration processes. Alternatively, research can be conducted to analyze the consequences of migration for the formation of family and in household dynamics and characteristics. This chapter elaborated on the latter set of relationships, and has focused on the specific case of forced migration and the implications of displacement for family formation and dynamics and particularly on Afghans in Iran. Various hypotheses that explain family change among voluntary migrants can be applied to forced migration situations although the extent of the impact of each of these hypotheses varies across forced migrant groups. It was argued that there is insufficient data and information to examine family change in forced migration context. However, demographic scholarship on refugees and displaced families should be innovative in utilizing existing data sources; survey data on Afghan refugees and migrants in Iran has been presented to illustrate both the challenges as well as opportunities for

understanding changes in family orientations among refugees and migrants within the framework of intergenerational adaptation. Of course, care should be taken in the generalization the findings but the research presented here represents an informative example of the intersections between migration studies and demographic changes at the level of the family.

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Part III
Patterns and Dimensions of Forced
Migration

Chapter 9

Changing Patterns of Internal Displacement: The Art of Figure Skating

Susanne Schmeidl and Kaitlyn Hedditch

9.1 Introduction

According to the *New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants*, we are witnessing an ‘unprecedented level of human mobility’ on a global scale (A/RES/71/1, 3 October 2016, par. 3). One in seven people are on the move voluntarily, forcibly or for mixed reasons (IOM 2015a). Forced migration has been exponentially on the rise, with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reporting ‘the highest [levels] since the aftermath of World War II’ (UNHCR 2016, p. 5; see Fig. 9.1); a trend that continues unabated.

Demography helps to unpack key trends in this mobility phenomenon. Firstly, the act of crossing an international border (or not) differentiates the jurisdiction under which the mover falls. Despite more visible (international) migration crises receiving our overwhelming attention, a staggering 95% of those forcibly displaced remain in the ‘Global South’ (Zetter 2015, par. 3), of which 62.5% never cross international borders (UNHCR 2016). The increasing prevalence of internal displacement is a result of opposing forces: what forces people to leave (economic, demographic and political drivers), and a growing hostility toward migrants and refugees by receiving countries (Castles 2014, p. 190).

Secondly, forced versus ‘regular’ migration is usually distinguished by considering the willingness to move. This strict binary view has been recently challenged with arguments that any type of human mobility involves a certain degree of choice as well as compulsion (Martin et al. 2013; van Hear et al. 2009), but is very

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


Fig. 9.1 Overview of conflict-induced displacement 1989–2015 (The refugee figures exclude the 5.2 million Palestinian refugees registered by UNRWA. Source: UNHCR Population Statistics Reference Database)

persistent in policy circles. What remains undisputed, however, is that ‘from a legal perspective, refugees are fundamentally different from IDPs: as they cannot turn to their own government for protection’ (Kälin 2014, p. 166). This very clear legal differentiation has done little to calm the debate on the ultimate usefulness of looking at IDPs as a distinct category, particularly in contexts where some of the non-movers are equally vulnerable (Kälin 2014; ICRC 2009; Hathaway 2007).

Despite international advocacy efforts increasing awareness of the issue and the existence of *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* (1998), IDPs have been only ‘provisionally included’ in global policy thinking and making (Bilak and Ginnetti 2016). Furthermore, domestic responses to IDPs have been found lacking (Zetter 2015), with the former Special Rapporteur on Internal Displacement, Dr. Chaloka Beyani (2010–2016), describing them as ‘ad hoc, uncoordinated and, therefore, sometimes ineffective’ (cited in UNHCR, IDMC, and NRC 2016, p. 4). Even where ‘humanitarian reform has generally improved response mechanisms to IDPs, little has been done either to prevent new displacement or to find durable solutions for those displaced years (and too often, decades) ago’ (Ferris 2015a, par. 1).

Rather than engaging in the academic and policy debate on how to best classify IDPs, this chapter will examine internal displacement primarily from a demographic perspective. It starts with an overview of internal displacement globally, its drivers, and unpacks who is officially counted and not. It then considers the destination of IDPs and the contribution of internal displacement to rapid urbanisation. Next, the chapter breaks down what we know of the demographic composition of IDPs. It highlights where methodological advances in the counting of IDPs have been made,

where demography can still be of assistance, and where politics get in the way of a comprehensive understanding of – and by association, the development of solutions to – internal displacement. The chapter makes a case for the utility of a demographic perspective to better connect the dots of existing data sources to enable a more complete understanding of internal displacement and consequences of spatial and temporal changes due to birth, death, settlement, on-migration, and/or returning home. Demographic extrapolation techniques could be a particularly useful tool for hard-to-reach populations and ensure protracted displacement populations are accurately counted over time.

9.2 Global Internal Displacement – A Snapshot

In 2015, there were approximately 27.8 million new internal displacements across 127 countries resulting from conflict, violence and disasters. This equates to an average of 66,000 people being forced to abandon their homes on a daily basis (Jan Egeland quoted in Al Jazeera 2016). The sheer magnitude of the current internal displacement crisis has prompted the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) to speak of a ‘truly global crisis’ (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 1). The 2016 *Global Report of Internal Displacement* (GRID), the most comprehensive since 1998, profiles different types of displacements, methodological approaches and challenges that prevail. Conflict-induced IDPs are counted alongside those rarely included in global counts. The report makes the distinction between who is *on* the GRID, that is, officially recognized as displaced, and who is *off* the GRID, those not recognized or counted (see Fig. 9.2). As the discussion below shows, how we, perhaps at times artificially, conceptualise IDPs is counter-productive to assisting those in need and finding durable solutions. It also misrepresents the sheer magnitude of internal displacement.




Fig. 9.2 Overview of internal displacement in 2015 (Source: IDMC/NRC 2016a)

9.2.1 *On the GRID (Recognized IDPs)*

Conflict-Induced Displacement The most visible internal displacement is that caused by conflict, perhaps because it is intuitively associated with ‘force’. Internal displacement due to conflict has doubled over the last 15 years, reaching over 40 million (cumulatively) by the end of 2015. In 2015, an average of 14,000 persons per day were newly displaced due to conflict, leading to a cumulative total of 40.8 million conflict-IDPs. Countries in the Middle East (Yemen, Syria and Iraq) contribute more than half the global total of new displacements due to conflict (IDMC/NRC 2016a, pp. 8–9).

Rapid Onset Disaster-Induced Displacement Displacement caused by natural disasters has been receiving increasing attention for two reasons: its link to climate-change and its growing magnitude, slowly ‘out-growing’ those displaced by conflict. In 2015, new internal displacements as the result of natural disasters was double that of conflict-induced displacement: 19.2 million across 113 countries in contrast to 8.6 million conflict-induced IDPs (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 8). Among disaster IDPs, South and East Asia reported the highest absolute figures, with India, China and Nepal topping the list. Vulnerable coastal populations of small island developing states (SIDS) were also disproportionately affected. These figures, however, delimit their scope to rapid-onset disaster events such as ‘floods, storms, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, wildfires, landslides and extreme temperatures’, while those displaced due to slow onset disasters, especially droughts, are usually off the GRID (IDMC/NRC 2016a).

9.2.2 *Off the GRID (Not Officially Recognized)*

Slow On-Set Disaster-Induced Displacement Those displaced by drought or other environmental changes that develop over a longer period of time remain largely hidden due to outflows trickling in smaller numbers and the blurring of what is often considered ‘voluntary’ migration to improve livelihoods. The ‘force’ associated with forced displacement is frequently viewed as sudden, catalytic events, rather than creeping pressures that push people from their homes. Furthermore, the relative causation to environment versus man-made drivers is hard to disentangle (Brookings-LSE 2014a). This is illustrated by drought, one of the key slow-onset disasters that caused 18.5 million people to move internally in 2015. Often drought might be the ‘direct’ cause of displacement, as it impacts on food and livelihood insecurity as well as resource competition with conflict-potential (IDMC/NRC 2016a; also cf. Keely and Kraly, Chap. 2, this volume).

Not counting slow on-set disaster-induced displacement, however, seems counterproductive and only blurs the link to climate change and environmental degradation. In 2009, the UN General Assembly (Resolution 64/162) ‘recognized natural disasters as a cause of internal displacement and raised concerns that climate change could exacerbate the impact of both sudden and slow-onset disasters, such as flooding,

mudslides, droughts, or violent storms’ (Brookings-LSE 2014a, p. 1). The distinction also distorts the sheer size of the problem, with both types of displacements nearly en-par with the cumulative estimate of conflict-induced displacements: 37.7 and 40.8 million people, respectively.

The first report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1990 estimated that 150 million people could be displaced by ‘desertification, water scarcity, floods, storms and other climate change-related disasters’ by 2050 (Brookings-LSE 2014a, p. 1). In 2008, the estimate was updated to more than 250 million people displaced by extreme weather conditions by 2050 (Sunjic and Dobbs 2008). Since the first ‘conservative’ prediction, 203.4 million displacements have been recorded, which represents an average of 25.4 million each year, or the equivalent of one person every second (IDMC/NRC 2015a, p. 8, 2).

9.2.3 *Development- and Criminal Violence-Induced Displacement*

Two other groups of IDPs are ‘off the GRID’: those displaced by development projects and those by criminal violence. Neither of these groups is currently included by international actors in the official IDP headcount, which is linked to the debate on whether or not such displacements are considered as explicitly ‘forced’.

Development Induced Displacement Development-induced displacement and resettlement (linked to infrastructure projects or clearing of forests and farmland for commercial use), or DIDR, is a highly-contested topic within the development field, which ‘expresses the frequent tensions between local and national development needs’ (Oliver-Smith 2009, p. 4). It is also, at least in part, linked to differing conceptualisation of what constitutes ‘development’ and at what human cost. Those displaced in the context of development are too often treated as a form of relocation or resettlement and thus automatically linked a ‘durable solution’, making accurate estimations extremely difficult (Kälin 2014, p. 3). An estimated 15 million people have been displaced each year since mid-2000s due to development projects (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 44). According to Chavkin et al. (2015), the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists found that World Bank development projects – the only ones that provide displacement figures – have physically or economically displaced an estimated 3.4 million people between 2004 and 2013 alone (see also Galizia et al. 2015). Indigenous people and the rural poor especially are disproportionately affected.

Significant investment will continue to be made in projects, such as roads and dams in developing countries, especially to meet Sustainable Development Goal 9 on Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure. These projects are undoubtedly likely to cause population movements of varying scales. Development actors must therefore ‘rethink how they capture and confront displacement issues’ and how affected populations are cared and catered for in a sensitive and long-term manner (Reuters/Ngwenya 2016, par. 15).

Criminal Violence-Induced Displacement Internal displacement as the result of criminal violence is a ‘little studied and poorly understood phenomena (sic)’ (Cantor 2014, p. 1). The problem is only partially an enumeration challenge, given an unwillingness of governments to acknowledge and address this form of displacement. Amnesty International (2016a, p. 26) found that government officials in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador attributed population flows to the search for better economic opportunities or family reunions rather than violence. These countries often have extreme wealth disparities, recent experiences of civil war or conflict, and are caught in systems of protracted and self-perpetuating violence, which is ‘deeply rooted in transnational illicit trafficking and social and political structures’ (IDMC 2015, p. 6). Those fleeing the violent death of family or friends, direct threats of violence or a more general erosion of day-to-day quality of life, often do so suddenly, clandestinely, and in small groups, presenting a challenge to capturing their exact numbers. At the end of 2015, crime-induced displacement was estimated to have reached over one million people, largely from Central America, especially Mexico (Cantor 2014, p. 10; IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 45).

9.3 Lost in the City – Urban IDPs

There is increasing evidence that migration is becoming essentially an urban affair (IOM 2015b), with both refugees and IDPs increasingly pushing into cities where a reported 54% of the world’s population live. Urban IDPs comprise ‘a hidden population’ that aid agencies and governments struggle to identify, often unable to understand ‘their experiences relative to the host population amongst whom they live’ (Davies and Jacobsen 2010, p. 13). While there are no reliable global figures for the number of urban IDPs, a consistent estimate suggests that more than half of all IDPs live ‘outside formal camps in both rural and urban areas’ (Davies 2012, p. 4). Others argue that half of the world’s displaced population, both refugees and IDPs, especially those in protracted situations, live in cities (Landau 2014; Ward 2014). When combining the knowledge of the world’s demographic with that of urban demographics, then indeed a majority of urban dwellers in the Global South would be classified as from a displacement background (IOM 2015b; UNDESA 2012). However, the full ‘scope of the phenomenon’ is difficult to grasp, as surveying displaced populations dispersed amongst host communities is an incredibly challenging undertaking (Davies 2012; Montemurro and Walicki 2010).

One contributing factor to this demographic ambiguity is that many urban IDPs integrate into their host space, either through living with host networks, such as families and friends, or integrating into the wider community and becoming the new locals. For many IDPs, living with host families or friends and relatives is a coping mechanism that has received increasing attention. IDPs living within host communities or families typically ‘find greater opportunities for work, business, food production, education and socialization, among other advantages, than those confined to camps’ (Davies 2012, p. 10). Hosts therefore act as *de facto* or ‘silent

NGOs' and an 'informal instrument of humanitarian aid' providing accommodation, food and resources, and assisting with livelihood opportunities (Davies 2012, p.11). While not all IDPs have the opportunity to access hosting arrangements, this remains a strong preference as it is seen as 'physically, emotionally and spiritually' more secure (Davies 2012, p. 10; Boulton 2010) and decreases chances of marginalization or discrimination (Crisp et al. 2012, p. 24; Montemurro and Walicki 2010, p. 11). The choice to integrate or blend into host communities may also be the result of an absence of established camps, as the Colombian case – having one of the world's largest and most protracted IDP populations – indicates (IDMC 2014, p. 42).

On the downside, blending into the urban poor can lead to 'a certain degree of neglect by humanitarian actors' (Kälin 2014, p. 3), leaving many urban IDPs to struggle with limited access to essential services (e.g., health care, education, food and income insecurity) and limited ability to become economically and socially self-sufficient, which reinforces the risk of marginalisation (Haysom 2013). There is, however, a limit to what host populations can absorb without adequate assistance. UNHCR (2010, p. 2) acknowledged the preference of donors to contribute to more 'visible' crises, such as IDPs in camp settings, because of easier access (and by association, cheaper services) and community mobilisation to distribute assistance.

The increasing push of IDPs into cities has stretched limited resources and absorption capacities, with 'many cities [...] grossly unprepared for the multidimensional challenges associated with urbanization' (UN-HABITAT 2016, p. 5). Newly arriving IDPs, as well as refugees, 'further stress already inadequate water and sanitation infrastructure, shelter and access to land' (Tibaijuka 2010, p. 4). Concurrent with this rapid urbanisation is the expansion of informal settlements or slums. There has been a 28% increase in the number of those living in urban slums between 1990 and 2014, with 881 million urban residents living in slums by 2014 (UN-HABITAT 2016, pp. 48, 51). According to Zetter and Deikun (2010, p. 5), '[r]apidly growing, unregulated and under-serviced urban areas are high-risk locations rendering the majority of urban dwellers vulnerable to a range of disasters and crises'. This can range from 'evictions, disasters, violence and armed conflict' (IDMC/NRC 2016b, p. 2) to 'disease, sexual exploitation, and further displacement' (Zamudio 2015). Davies (2012), who studied the operational experience of different assistance methods to IDPs outside camp settings in 11 countries, found that an understanding of the urgency of supporting hosts before they and the IDPs fall into extreme poverty has only slowly filtered through to donors. Understanding support to hosting arrangements is complex and challenging but doable.

Effective strategies for enumerating urban IDPs are critical as 'urban planning, poverty reduction strategies, slum upgrading, and other community development interventions must take full account of new demographic realities' (World Bank and UNHCR 2015, p. 36). This would require a shift from the perception of urban IDPs as a burden to seeing them as 'social and economic agents with capacities for urban development' (IDMC/NRC 2016b, p. 2).

9.4 Understanding the Trees in the Displacement Jungle: Demographic Composition of IDPs

One often misses the forest for the trees. When it comes to internal displacement, however, it is usually only the larger forest we see, with limited information on its diversity. Information on age, sex, ethnicity or religion of IDPs is rarely available (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 66). According to Ong et al. (2016, n.p.) ‘only 20 out of the 53 countries and territories monitored in 2015 for internal displacement because of conflict and violence have IDP data disaggregated by sex and age (SADD): Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, El Salvador, Georgia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen’. These countries provide a mix of protracted and more recently displaced populations with no particular pattern as to why better data are collected other than international or domestic efforts. Often adequate data is only collected for those living in official camps (Ong et al. 2016). This highlights that data are still not systematically collected but too often reflect idiosyncratic processes on the ground. For IDPs fleeing disaster, demographic information is even sketchier. While this could be expected in situations where flight is ongoing and situations are volatile, demographic data is also hard to come by for protracted displacement situations and at times is only partially collected on a case-by-case basis (Ong et al. 2016). This is important, because demographic data is essential to providing fitting services and assistance to those in-need.

In many cases, the particular vulnerable categories are highlighted without putting them into an overall demographic context of IDP populations. According to the *Guiding Principles*, the most vulnerable that may have special needs are ‘children, especially unaccompanied minors, expectant mothers, mothers with young children, female heads of household, persons with disabilities and elderly persons’ (OCHA 1998, p. 6). Much advocacy has focused on identifying IDP women, with a frequently quoted figure that women account for approximately half of the world’s IDP population (Brookings-LSE 2014b, p. 1). This assumption has been surprisingly persistent since it was raised first in the Analytical Report of the Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons (E/CN.4/1992/23, 14 February 1992). These general figures do not distinguish between adult women and girls. It was not until much later that a special report on women in humanitarian situations broke the figure down by highlighting that of the ‘more than 100 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, one quarter are women and girls, ages 15–49’ (UNFPA 2015). To complete the 50% figure then, the remaining 25% must be girls under the age of 15.

The most overlooked category, however, are the elderly, estimated at making up 30–65% of IDP populations (HelpAge/IDMC 2012, p. 5; Ong et al. 2016). Older IDPs have different needs and protection risks to that of women and children. Like other overlooked vulnerable groups, they are ‘often not factored into assessments of need and fall between the cracks of registration systems’ (Calvi-Pariseti 2013, p. 76). People with disabilities are, however, often ‘the most neglected during flight,

displacement and return', with mostly anecdotal evidence on their plight (Shivji 2010). It cannot be overstated that the breakdown of the IDP population according to age and gender and recognition of different vulnerabilities is crucial and another reminder why demography is so important.

There are reasons why vulnerable groups (women, children) might be disproportionately represented in IDP populations while others are not (the elderly and the disabled). This is not to argue, however, that they do not exist at all. First, IDPs are at least in part a reflection of the demographic make-up of the countries within which they move. Indeed, the population in the Global South is disproportionately young, with about 40% under the age of 15 in least developed countries, and slightly higher in parts of Africa (UNFPA 2016, p. 105).

Furthermore, those above 65 are often demographically underrepresented (typically 3–5%) in the Global South. As they are also frequently the least mobile, they may be consequently left behind. Children in contrast are more likely to be taken along the journey, at least within a country.

Second, migration and refugee studies have long demonstrated that it is disproportionately young men who move across borders to open migration paths (Ferris 1987). Furthermore, in many conflicts, men constitute a majority of fighting forces, while women and children flee to safety (Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez 2002).

Essentially, young men, when not joining fighting forces, are the first group to move, while women and children, statistically speaking, are more likely to follow existing migrations paths. In this sense, the elderly and disabled are those most frequently left behind altogether when families assess who can make the journey.

Last but not least, volatile displacement situations make it particularly difficult to keep up with the profiling of populations and whether change in the IDP population (including demographic composition) is due to newly arriving IDPs, departures, or simple demographic events (births, deaths). Even in protracted situations, surprisingly little is known about these demographic events. IDMC has worked hard to improve this situation, but admits that when it comes to births and deaths, there is still a 'blind spot' that needs to be addressed (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 77). The organisation is currently shying away from extrapolating from national fertility and mortality figures, given that IDP populations often have higher instances of death due to lack of access to health care or poor maternal health. It seems this is an area where demographic methods and models could be particularly helpful.

9.5 Counting Internal Displacement – The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

A key issue for the protection of, and assistance to, IDPs is an understanding of their numbers, location, and demographic composition, given that certain demographic groups as discussed above (e.g., children, women, the elderly and disabled) have different needs. Less than two decades ago, the Global Survey of Internal

Displacement was published as the first systematic overview of the issue (Hampton 1998). In this issue, Schmeidl (1998, p. 24) provided a first comparative overview of IDPs covering the period of 1964–1996, and highlighted the problems of obtaining accurate estimates due to that fact that states resist counting IDPs while IDPs resist being counted. Two decades later, similar problems persist. Despite advances in making displacement figures readily available, the UNHCR Statistical Yearbook highlights a ‘growing concern about the availability and quality of statistical information about forcibly displaced persons, including refugees, asylum-seekers, and internally displaced persons’ (Aalandslid et al. 2014, p. 21).

To date, ‘there is no single source of data that provides comprehensive and reliable information about the volume, complexity and distribution’ of people flows, and some estimates come from entities that are not intended to track mobility, such as population registries (Stillwell et al. 2011, pp. 115–116). Often resources and attention are dedicated to addressing those displaced across borders, prompting the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to highlight IDPs as the ‘invisible majority of displaced people’ (OCHA et al. 2016, p. 1). Beth Ferris (2015b), the co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, even argues that ‘IDPs are less visible than they were a decade ago’, given the trend to lump them into larger groups of people in need (e.g., the urban poor), which mainstreams them ‘into oblivion’.

Schmeidl (2017) has used the analogy of an iceberg when looking at internal displacement, arguing that we often only acknowledge the tip, ignoring the far greater body that lies beneath the surface. This is already illustrated through the ‘GRID’ approach of the 2016 Global Report of Internal Displacement (IDMC/NRC 2016a). Although the report attempts to give as much shape as possible to internal displacement, it also acknowledges its shortcomings and challenges, and ‘constitutes an appeal for those who collect [data] to redouble their efforts to provide comprehensive and up-to-date information’ (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 4). The previous overview of IDPs already articulates some of the problems around enumerating internal displacement. This section discusses the advances that have been made in studying international displacement (the good), as well as the challenges (the bad) and persistent issues around the politicization of numbers (the ugly), borrowing from an analogy used by Schmeidl (2000) when discussing the accuracy of displacement figures writ large.

9.5.1 The Good – Efforts in Understanding and Profiling Internal Displacement

In the past, profiling was limited to national governments registering populations, and humanitarian actors profiling potential beneficiary populations. Today, there are more organizations involved in the profiling of internal displacement, such as IDMC/NRC, the UN Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the IOM, with more anecdotal and ad hoc information available

through research studies and media. Many employ demographers and statisticians to help with the task at hand.

IDMC has ‘monitored displacement associated with conflict and violence since 1998 and that associated with disasters since 2008’ (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 75). In their newest report, they clearly present their methodology and include a special methodological annex, outlining their data sources and how they deal with conflicting data from multiple sources and ‘outdated or decaying data’, which is closely linked to an understanding of when displacement ends (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 34; see Fig. 9.3). More often than not, IDMC uses conservative estimates, suggesting that the overall magnitude of internal displacement is far greater than what is presented.

Available displacement figures tend to be ‘end of year sums’ or ‘population stocks’, with limited focus on the change in the population due to demographic events, such as births (children born into displacement situations), deaths (of IDPs),




Fig. 9.3 IDMC’s displacement data model (Source: IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 35)

immigration (newly arriving IDPs into an existing population), and emigration (departure either by locally integrating, returning home or simply moving elsewhere). IDMC's Displacement Data Model has tried to partially address this issue by using 'an event-based methodology to estimate the number of people displaced by disasters during the course of the year, and derive aggregated figures for new displacement for each of the countries affected' (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 75). They also highlight the fact that they have employed the help of demographers to assist host states in more accurate enumerations.

Borrowing from demography, the organisation also provides a formula for calculating final figures, though they admit that 'the equation is technically incomplete because it does not take into account the 'counterflows' represented by failed returns, local integration and settlement elsewhere, or cross-border returns into displacement' for which data is rarely available (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 77).

Total number of IDPs: Dec 2015 = Total number of IDPs: Dec 2014 + [Births₂₀₁₅ + new displacement₂₀₁₅] – [Returns₂₀₁₅ + settlement elsewhere₂₀₁₅ + local integration₂₀₁₅ + cross-border flight₂₀₁₅ + deaths₂₀₁₅]

This formula provides for a more accurate estimate, as displacement more often than not is fluid. It also allows for the possibility to move out of a displacement situation, as well as perhaps be displaced more than once, which is a frequent occurrence in volatile situations where people move from one area to the next depending on the security situation. More, however, needs to be done to understand other changes in population, especially those due to births and deaths.

IDMC have also worked on methodologies in order to show how confident they are with the figures they are reporting, which is something not done frequently enough in a field where data is often politicized. For example, more recently in Afghanistan, UNHCR reported roughly 400,000 refugee returnees who did not return to their area of origin but moved to safer urban centres; hence, they technically could be considered secondary internally displaced (OCHA 2016). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) highlighted another 600,000 that returned undocumented and thus were not included in the UNHCR head count (Farivar 2016). In such a situation, a total number of one million might be a more accurate depiction of secondary displaced refugee returnees than the official 400,000, and also help better prepare for humanitarian assistance than 'official' and 'assisted' returns data would.

Over the past few years, other organizations have started to join IDMC in their efforts to provide a better understanding of internal displacement. IDMC falls under the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), an independent, non-government humanitarian organisation, which contributes to reports but also funds independent research on the issue. The IOM developed its own profiling tool – the *Displacement Tracking Matrix* (DTM) – after IDP assessments and monitoring exercises in Iraq in 2004, and continues to refine the tool for application in conflict and disaster settings. Currently they are covering approximately 24 countries, and are expanding their reach. Depending on the situation, they provide a combination of tracking refugee

returnee flows and IDP profiling (e.g., a study in Afghanistan by Samuel Hall Consulting in 2014).

In 2009, the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) was established as an inter-agency service providing assistance for profiling (mostly protracted) IDP situations (see JIPS 2015). Since 2010, the Feinstein International Centre began developing a methodology for profiling displacement in urban contexts (Jacobsen and Furst Nichols 2011). This was later fine-tuned by JIPS (Jacobsen and Cardona 2014; Chemaly et al. 2016). The Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI 2016) has also worked on understanding protracted displacement in general, and within urban contexts in particular, especially concerning issues linked to land.

Finally, UNHCR and increasingly OCHA are covering displacement situations. Furthermore, some in-country surveys, such as the National Vulnerability Assessment in Afghanistan, include coverage of internal displacement, although often relying on existing figures, especially those provided by UNHCR and OCHA. This suggests that increasingly more information on internal displacement is available. We only have to be mindful that unless methodologies are made transparent, and information is shared, it may create more confusion.

IDMC has acknowledged the challenge of how best to relate to data collected by other organizations (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 75). The current situation of understanding internal displacement is reminiscent of Rumi’s poem, “Elephant in the Dark”, with internal displacement (or forced migration more generally) being the elephant, and the different organisations that come into contact with IDPs being the men in the dark room trying to picture the animal by touching parts of it. In the end, none of the men are able to fully visualise the elephant, making conclusions about its nature from the small part they touched (Schmeidl 2016). The only way to resolve this situation is to share knowledge and information, or as JIPS suggest, to start any profiling effort with a survey of existing data and the resolve to fill in gaps. IDMC has already come a long way to eliminate the dark room and help us to understand the elephant that is internal displacement, notably through their work with national authorities. It is important, however, that cooperation between the different actors, especially IDMC/NRC, IOM, OCHA and UNHCR continues.

9.5.2 *The Bad – Unresolved Issues*

A key unresolved issue is how IDPs are conceptualised or defined, including when displacement ends and counting ceases. According to the *Guiding Principles* (OCHA 1998), IDPs are ‘persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border’. Although seemingly straightforward, as highlighted earlier, there are conceptual and political

disagreements regarding what ultimately causes displacement. A similar debate exists around when displacement ends.

The *Guiding Principles* note that displacement only ends when a durable solution is found. This is further refined in the *Framework for Durable Solutions* (Brookings Institution and University of Bern 2007, p. 10):

‘it is important to consider whether 1) the national authorities have established the conditions conducive to safe and dignified return or settlement elsewhere; 2) formerly displaced persons are able to assert their rights on the same basis as other nationals; 3) international observers are able to provide assistance and monitor the situation of the formerly displaced; and ultimately, 4) the durable solution is sustainable’. Often few of these conditions are met, resulting in protracted displacement.

9.5.2.1 Through the Conceptual Maze of Displacement Categories

Whether or not to classify displacement as forced or voluntary has been an age-old debate in migration studies, with the ultimate conclusion that strict binaries are no longer viable as nearly all types of human mobility involve a certain degree of choice as well as compulsion (Martin et al. 2013, p. 125; van Hear et al. 2009; McAdam 2010). Mixed migration drivers thus blur the boundary between what constitutes forced or voluntary migration (Monsutti 2008; de Haas 2010). How to decide which factor is the ultimate ‘cause’ of flight is often up to interpretation and hinges significantly on politics and the willingness of certain actors to acknowledge the element of force, which comes with the right for protection and assistance.

Although there are sudden, catalytic events that force people to flee their homes, there are often multiple underlying pressure points that increase the likelihood of flight. Catalytic events thus act as triggers, or the proverbial final straw that breaks the camel’s already overloaded back. IDMC/NRC (2016a, p. 44) calls this ‘a tipping point, where abnormal movement patterns indicate the breakdown of normal coping strategies under severely stressed conditions’. This is not necessarily a new discussion, as Clarke (1989) and later Schmeidl (1997) already modelled forced migration as involving three driver categories (in addition to the triggers of population flow): ‘root causes, proximate conditions, and intervening (or facilitating) factors’.

Root causes or predisposing factors (according to van Hear et al. 2012) are those that provide the context or structural foundations that increase the likelihood of mobility, yet are not seen as sufficient for causing forced displacement on their own. Traditionally, root causes were largely considered to be of economic nature, although Schmeidl (1997, 2003) and van Hear et al. (2012) also discuss demographic pressures (e.g., rapid population growth and urbanisation). Proximate factors, in contrast, are often seen as necessary and sufficient factors to cause flight and are often linked to the security, political or simply governance situation in a country, or how willing (or able) a national government is to address root causes. Many times, root causes and proximate factors are combined into migration drivers and grouped into distinct categories that reflect many of the displacement categories

discussed earlier, such as environmental, social, political and economic drivers (IDMC/NRC 2015b, p. 2).

Intervening (or facilitating) factors, later called enabling factors (McAuliffe 2013), are generally seen as shaping the size, direction and possibly form of migration, but rarely function as drivers in-themselves (Schmeidl 1997, 2003; Clark 1989; van Hear et al. 2012). These models highlight that displacement situations are rarely straightforward. Instead they are highly complex and associated with multiple, protracted and/or overlapping events (or drivers). IDMC/NRC (2015b) acknowledges that it is often very difficult to classify IDPs by these very specific events – or ‘tipping points’ – given that many drivers are interconnected. For example, what is the key migration driver in a situation where conflict destroys livelihoods, or political stress and insecurity exacerbates poverty? Similarly, violent conflict can ‘harm assets that facilitate [climate change] adaption’ but climate change can also ‘indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts [...] by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks’ as well as competition over scarce resources (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014, pp. 8, 20).

Acknowledging this interconnectedness of migration drivers, van Hear et al. (2012, p. 23) argue that individual migration drivers often form into ‘*complexes* or *configurations* which shape migration processes’ (van Hear et al. 2012, p. 22; emphasis original). One of these is ‘the political economy of conflict’ in which ‘political insecurity, economic inequalities and cultural and social expectations’ combine in a particularly complex way, such as when conflict destroys livelihoods or traps development (van Hear et al. 2012, 23, see also Collier 2007). This view is particularly pertinent for understanding climate-change displacement, but does not resolve the existing policy gap on addressing climate-induced migration and displacement and their protection needs (Wilkinson et al. 2016, p. 1).

In light of the above, the multitude of factors driving displacement and disagreement over what constitutes ‘force’ in this discussion has made it difficult to develop a comprehensive database on internal displacement. The recent move by IDMC to profile populations by categories regardless of whether they are on the official grid is certainly a step in the right direction. So is their push to employ demographers to help countries enumerate their populations on the move. Dispassionate and apolitical demographic methods that simply try to understand population dynamics should always be among the capacity building of national governments. This will ensure policy responses are developed *after* a better understanding of population dynamics has been achieved. Putting policy development before solid data collection puts the cart before the horse and can also lead to political inertia, as the Afghan example demonstrates. Afghanistan endorsed a National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons in 2014 (GIRoA 2014). The UNHCR consultant who assisted in developing the policy already noted the difficulties encountered during the drafting process, warning of similar obstacles for its implementation (Wiseberg 2014). To date, progress by the Afghan government has indeed not been promising (SIGAR 2016). Amnesty International (2016b, p. 7) highlighted the deteriorating situation for Afghan IDPs, arguing that it constitutes a ‘broken promise’ to the IDPs who live on the ‘brink of survival’.

9.5.2.2 Protracted Displacement Situations and When Displacement Ends

Protracted displacement situations, including Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Sudan and South Sudan have recurrently featured among the top ten largest displaced populations since 2003 (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 8). According to Jan Egeland (quoted in Edwards and Dobbs 2014, par.4), ‘... the average amount of time people worldwide are living in displacement is now a staggering 17 years’. It is here where enumeration becomes tricky, as lengthy displacement begs the questions as to when displacement ends and what counts as a durable solution. In Afghanistan, for example, Schmeidl et al. (2010, p. 17) found a mismatch between what was officially reported versus the perception of affected communities, both displaced and hosts. This results in some protracted displacement situations simply falling ‘off the radar’ (IDMC/NRC 2016a, p. 40).

9.5.3 *The Ugly – The Fog of Politics*

Conceptual disagreements aside, too often it is still the political sensitivities of a given situation that dictate how populations are classified, or whether IDPs are acknowledged and counted. In other words, the fog of politics has in some ways only become denser. As highlighted earlier, it often comes down to the judgement of those enumerating people on the move whether they are forced or voluntarily displaced. For example, IDMC found in Central America and Mexico that ‘limited resources, unreliable mechanisms of institutional cooperation, the indifference or negligence of state authorities, complicated or worsening access to crime-affected communities’ made for a poor understanding of the situation of crime-induced displacement (IDMC 2015, p. 8). As such, politics can prevent a push for better data collection.

Often, politics are in tension with humanitarian rights-based approaches, such as the one laid out in the 2007 *Framework for Durable Solutions* (Brookings Institution and University of Bern 2007), with political pressure and narratives trying to wish away IDP situations in order to skirt responsibilities. Rather than outright denial, however, it might simply be a case of insufficient funds to profile situations, especially where displaced populations blend with the urban poor. This is the increasing trend of lumping IDPs with other populations in need that Ferris (2015a) has cautioned against. It is important to recall that ‘internal displacement does not generally end abruptly, ... [yet] is a process through which the need for specialized assistance and protection diminishes’ (Brookings Institution and University of Bern 2007, p. 9). Sometimes, for long periods after return, those who have been displaced may find themselves in markedly different circumstances and with different needs than those who never left their home communities.

9.5.3.1 Box: Case Study Afghanistan – The Tip of the IDP Iceberg

Afghanistan is an example of a displacement situation where a mix of the good, the bad and the ugly has caused an undercounting of displacement figures (Schmeidl 2014, 2017 forthcoming). Using data from the Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS), Schmeidl (2017) identifies two groups of IDPs that are not officially counted, which when combined, amount to about six million individuals. The first group includes the 2.2 million that have migrated, mostly rural to urban, post 2002; many due to a deteriorating political situation. If one wishes to be conservative, one could halve this figure, assuming that some at least are economic migrants. This still would leave one million that should be counted as IDPs. The second group are secondary displaced refugee returnees. In 2013, UNHCR acknowledged that about 60% of returnees had faced difficulties upon return and 40% were estimated to have not successfully reintegrated, ‘resulting in significant secondary displacement, mostly to urban areas’ (UNHCR 2013, p. 28). The ALCS estimates that 47% of all returnees can be found living in Kabul City (Central Statistics Organization 2016, p. 49).

Combining these two estimates, the number of secondary displaced returnees could be anywhere between 2–4 million. The ALCS, however, warns that at least 35% of individuals among refugee returnees were born *after* return. Another one million refugees returned – a great majority forced – in 2016 (Farivar 2016), and many more are anticipated. This prompted OCHA (2016) to release an urgent appeal for assistance for the internal displacement crisis slowly spiralling out of control. Nangarhar province in the country’s east, already a site of internal displacement and conflict, will bear the brunt of returns from Pakistan. If one combines all these figures – even if using conservative estimates of one million uncounted IDPs, two million previously secondary displaced returnees and one million newly arrived returnees – with the official 1.7 million conflict-induced IDPs (1.2 million at the end of 2015 and the nearly half million during 2016; Schmeidl 2017), then as many as six million Afghans might be internally displaced in some form or fashion. This suggests that official figures are indeed only the tip of the iceberg.

9.6 Conclusion

The UN General Assembly recently noted ‘the need for reflection on effective strategies to ensure adequate protection and assistance for IDPs and to prevent and reduce such displacement’ (A/RES/71/1, 3 October 2016, par. 20). In February 2016, in the UN Secretary General Report for the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), Ban Ki-Moon articulated a core responsibility for the international community to ‘leave no one behind’, and to reduce forced internal displacement by a ‘measurable target of at least 50 per cent’ by 2030, stressing this must be done in a dignified and safe manner (A/70/709, 2 February 2016, par. 83). The *Agenda for Humanity*, the annex to the UN Secretary General Report for the WHS, reinforces

this commitment, insisting upon ‘greater efforts to establish a more accountable system for IDPs’ protection’ and recommending ‘a set of commitments to be made by governments and other parties involved in displacement response’ (IDMC/NRC 2016c, p. 1). This task is particularly pressing given that internal displacement is ‘often the precursor of cross-border movements and an early warning of the potential for subsequent refugee and complex mixed migration flows’ (Zetter 2015). To date, there are no international legal obligations that cover IDPs, with only non-binding *Guiding Principles* put forth in 1998 (OCHA 1998). Even though these Principles clearly define who an IDP is and for how long, they offer only a ‘normative starting point for developing [national] laws, policies and practices’ (Brookings and NRC 2010, p.7), and do not confer upon IDPs a special legal status like that of refugees (Kälin 2014, p. 2). Implementation of the *Guiding Principles* is thus left to the discretion of national governments, which in many cases remain ‘rhetorical statements that are not being used practically to improve the human rights situation of IDPs’ (Rae 2011, p. 34). While the UNHCR has made efforts to address the plight of IDPs, it acknowledges ‘[t]he exact scope and nature of the organization’s involvement in specific IDP situations will naturally be affected by the views of the concerned State...’ (EC/58/SC/CRP.18, 4 June 2007, par. 13). A promising development in this area is the Kampala Convention, which is an unprecedented regional effort to create a legally binding instrument to address and improve the situation of IDPs (African Union 2009).

Legal protection is only one piece of a highly complex displacement puzzle, which is only complete once we have achieved a more accurate understanding of both the scale and internal dynamics of internally displaced populations. This is a crucial task in which demographers can be of assistance by improving the evidence base that informs future policy and assistance frameworks through a more accurate count of internal mobility, regardless of the definitional debates that do little to change experiences on the ground. This puts the cart squarely behind the horse again and allows accurate data to drive the political discussion. The *New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants* emphasises the importance of accurate and improved data collection in various places (A/RES/71/1, 3 October 2016, e.g., par. 40), providing an important opening for demographers to assist in this task.

IDMC so far is a global leader when trying to understand internal displacement, and they are open to collaboration with other actors in order to eliminate the ‘elephant in the dark’. In early 2017, they issued a #IDTECT challenge on Unite Ideas to crowd-source a tool that could improve the monitoring of internal displacement (Ginnetti and Milano 2017). This, however, focuses exclusively on the digital space and is unlikely to be a sole solution for profiling IDP populations, especially where a team of trained demographers can be of assistance.

Despite advances made, as this chapter highlighted, there are still areas where more could and should be done, as any policy discussion on IDP assistance and protection needs to be evidence-based. Even when profiling is not possible, demographers could assist with establishing concrete rules about how to better estimate IDPs, especially those in protracted situations. As it is national governments that ultimately need to step up to the task of addressing internal displacement, more

capacity building with local population registries and relevant municipalities and ministerial departments needs to be considered, and which IDMC has started to prioritise. This, however, requires a commitment to putting demographers on the ground, ones that are skilled, thorough, and have a degree of apolitical integrity. Only once the fog of politics has been lifted through a clearer enumeration of IDPs and better understanding of IDP demographics can their protection needs be met, and discussions of finding tangible, achievable durable solutions be had.

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Chapter 10

Environmentally-Related International Displacement: Following in Graeme Hugo's Footsteps

Susana B. Adamo

10.1 Presentation

Sudden and slow onset environmental disasters displaced an estimated 19.3 million people in 2014 alone, and historical models indicate that the probability of being displaced by a disaster was 60 percent higher in 2015 than it was 40 years before (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 2015). Likewise, the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that climate change is likely to directly and indirectly increase population displacement (IPCC 2014, p. 73).

It is then understandable that the interest (and alarm) on the topic of environmental displacement has been on the rise (e.g. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2012), and accelerated sharply in the last decade amidst renewed concerns about the consequences of global environmental change for human well-being and population mobility, and the idea that this kind of population displacement has the potential for triggering governance and security challenges and conflicts. For the most part, this type of movement is considered to be internal (i.e. within a country's boundaries) but international environmental displacement is a reality that has been studied for example in Africa (related to droughts and floods) and in Central and South America (related to earthquakes and hurricanes) (Nansen Initiative 2015).

In this chapter, using the scholarly vision of Graeme Hugo as benchmark, the objective is to consider environmentally-related international displacement from a population perspective by looking at recent developments in the field of migration and environment studies. After a brief introduction based on Hugo's paper,

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“Environmental concerns and international migration,” published in the *International Migration Review* in 1996, I turn to the issues of definition and current trends in environmental displacement, followed by an overview of recent research, to finish with two examples of the presence of the topic in international policy forums, and a brief discussion and conclusions section.

10.2 Introduction: Setting the Stage

When there was still a lack of consensus about considering displacement due to environmental disasters as forced migration (Reed et al. 1998, p. 3), Graeme Hugo published his seminal paper on “Environmental concerns and international migration” (1996), which continues to be instrumental in advancing research on these issues within the field of population studies.

In this paper, Hugo analyzed international environmental displacement as *a form of population mobility* resulting from environmental changes and processes. Hugo aimed to answer two interrelated questions: To what extent have environmental factors been significant in initiating population mobility? If significant, what are the direct and indirect effects of environmental factors on human migration and mobility? In relation to the first question, he concluded that we are dealing with a recursive and complex relationship where other processes (economic development and demographic change, for example) also take part. In relation to the second question, he considered that this will depend in part on the type of movement, forced or voluntary. As these are not clear-cut types, Hugo adhered to the idea of a continuum crystallized in discrete categories:

Population mobility is probably best viewed as being arranged along a continuum ranging from totally voluntary migration, in which the choice and will of the migrants is the overwhelmingly decisive element encouraging people to move, to totally forced migration, where the migrants are faced with death if they remain in their present place of residence. The extremes in fact rarely occur, and most mobility is located along the continuum (Hugo 1996, p. 107).

Based on these concepts, Fig. 10.1 displays an illustration of the continuum centered on Hugo’s text and incorporating other authors’ suggestions.

Hugo emphasized that in *refugee-like situations* the defined characteristics are the involuntary forced nature of the move that results from the suddenness of most refugee moves, the (apparent) externality to the mover of the force or forces impelling the move, and the substantial degree of powerlessness among the movers in the decision to move and selection of destination, regardless of the distance that the displaced people move or whether or not they cross an international boundary (Hugo 1996, pp. 107–08). It could be argued that if the displacement is international then citizenship may also become a factor in increasing the degree of vulnerability of environmentally-displaced populations. Similarly and in parallel, environmental processes as drivers of migration can also be located in a continuum from being key factors (which would be the case in refugee-like situations) to contributors (in environmentally-driven displacement) to less or not significant (in migrant-like situations) (Hugo 2011, S28).

CONTINUUM FROM FORCED TO NON-FORCED MOBILITY		
<p>Refugee-like situations:</p> <p>very low level of control over the whole process and very high degree of vulnerability.</p>	<p>Environmentally driven displacement:</p> <p>compelled but voluntary; more control over timing and direction and less vulnerability than refugees; but less control and more vulnerability than migrants.</p>	<p>Migrant-like situations:</p> <p>greater control over the process and less vulnerability, even if people are moving in response to deteriorating conditions.</p>

Fig. 10.1 The spectrum of population mobility along the forced-voluntary axis (Source: Based on Hugo 1996; Bates 2002; Renaud et al. 2007)

Note: Renaud et al. (2007, p. 28) distinguishes the following categories: environmentally motivated migrants; environmentally forced migrants; and environmental refugees. Bates (2002, pp. 468–69) differentiates between environmental refugees (further sub-divided by category of disruption: disasters, expropriations and deterioration), environmental migrants and migrants.

In addition to forced vs. non-forced mobility, there are other important dimensions to take into account when considering environmental (including climate change) impacts on population mobility. Examples include: dramatic sudden impacts vs. slow onset change impacts; moving as a result of perceived vs. actual threats; movement as forced displacement vs. movement as adaptation to environmental impacts; situations where the environmentally-induced mobility is channeled along existing corridors of movements vs. those where new types and spatial patterns of movement are created; mobility within countries vs. cross-border mobility (Hugo 2010, pp. 16–18).

Hugo also suggested that environmental factors were likely to become more relevant in international displacement in the near future. One of the possible reasons was the influence of environmental factors in rural livelihoods in developing countries combined with reduced opportunities for relocation within the same country, and the preexistence of social and migration networks (family, friends) linking areas affected by environmental hazards to international destinations. Born out of the increase in international migration over the last decades, these networks act as facilitators that channel movements in a specific direction, including cross-border ones. Adding to this, there were also institutional factors, especially the “emergence and development of an international immigration industry”, which also act as facilitators (Hugo 1996, p. 119).

These early findings were reinforced in a 2010 paper focused on climate change (Hugo 2010, pp. 9–10). In it, mediations in the form of vulnerability, resilience, resources and community context interact with existent patterns of migration, while it is once again emphasized that other forms of *in situ* adaptation may very well be dominant.

While much of the debate focuses purely on forced population displacement as a result of environmental deterioration due to climate change, it is argued that there will also be *in situ* adaptation as well as mobility adaptation (Hugo 1996, p. 10).

In this paper, Hugo also includes a refinement of the characteristics of involuntary migration, regardless of the driver: involuntary migrants do not make preparations, maintain greater commitment to origin, are likely to be in a state of stress, are less likely to bring assets, and are less likely to have connections at destination (Hugo 2010, p. 12). At this respect, and within the same concept of continuum coined in 1996, it is important to distinguish between (a) *migration as strategy* for adapting to the impacts of climate change, and (b) *displacement when environmental deterioration becomes extreme* and people are forced to leave the area. This requires considering that environmentally-induced migration (a) includes a wide array of mobility strategies and types, not only displacement, and (b) at the same time is just one possible response among an array of potential mitigation and adaptation strategies.

10.3 Environmental Displacement as a Form of Population Mobility: Concepts, Measurement and Trends

From the point of view of population studies, several not-mutually exclusive dimensions are commonly used to characterize population mobility, among them: distance (long and short-distance); duration (permanent, temporary, seasonal, and so on); jurisdiction (internal and international); willingness to move (forced and voluntary, usually along the continuum described in the previous section); and cause (labor-related, family-related, etc.). In the case of environmentally-related international displacement, the main dimensions involved are jurisdiction: international; willingness: on the forced end of the continuum; and cause: environmental factors.

These features have points in common with the 2007 IOM definition of environmental migration¹:

Environmental Migrants [are] persons or group of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad (IOM 2007)

While this definition does include the international dimension, it is more explicit in the concept adopted by the Nansen Initiative, a 2012–2015 state-led and bottom-up consultative process on cross-border disaster displacement that aimed to identify best-practices and create consensus on key elements for protection and assistance needs (Kälin 2015) (the work of the Nansen Initiative is presented in Sect. 5):

Cross-border displacement in the context of disasters and the effects of climate change refers to situations where people flee or are displaced across borders in the context of sudden- or slow-onset disasters, or in the context of the adverse effects of climate change (The Nansen Initiative Definitions. <https://www.nanseninitiative.org/secretariat/>)

¹Hugo (1996, p. 108) had already proposed the term “environmental migrants” to group migrants forced to leave their homes due to natural disaster, those displaced by external compulsions such as physical dangers and economic insufficiency, and those victims of the ‘silent violence’ (drought, famine and severe food shortage associated with the deterioration of the environment)

Note that the term “refugee” is absent from these concepts, and this is because its use in environmentally-driven international displacement is at least problematic (Hugo 1996; Bates 2002; Morrissey 2012; Adamo 2010). Hence, there has emerged controversy concerning the concept of ‘environmental refugees’. The United Nations’ 1951 Convention related to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as “a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution (UNHCR 2011, p. 14) Those who consider the term, environmental refugees, an appropriate concept for environmental displacement emphasize two elements, the need to flee and the need for assistance, similar in some aspects to situations that fall within the legal definition of refugees (Renaud et al. 2011, e12). Instead, those that prefer not to use it focus on its legally non-binding status (Warner 2010, p. 404). As it stands today, the 1951 definition does not include people displaced internationally because of environmental causes. For example, refugee status is linked to certain rights in the host country (such as the right to housing, work and education) that may not apply to environmentally-displaced people.

Climate Refugee is often being used in the media to define a person displaced in the context of disasters like droughts, sea level rise as well as extreme weather events like hurricanes, tsunamis or earthquakes. This concept does not exist in international law and is not endorsed by the Nansen Initiative (Nansen Initiative Definitions. Disaster-induced cross – border displacement <https://www.nanseninitiative.org/secretariat/>)

According to Hugo (1996, p. 109), a critical first issue is that it is rare for environmental events to affect a whole country (except in the case of very small countries and/or geographically large events) and consequently environmentally displaced persons usually stay within their national boundaries. A second issue relates to causality: very often environmental displacement responds to a complex set of multiple pressures at different levels where environmental factors are just proximate causes. On this note, the term has been increasingly questioned on the basis that it leads to a reductionist view of the complexity of real-life situations (Tacoli 2009). Furthermore, affected people may not want to be identified as refugees because of the implicit hopelessness and defenselessness of the term (Mortreux and Barnett 2009).

Discussions about definitions matter because they impact how people in the move are categorized, thus leading to differences in measurement. This is clearly reflected in the large disagreements about the current and future magnitude of international environmental displacement (see for example Adamo and de Sherbinin 2011, pp. 183–184; Biermann and Boas 2007, p. 9; Gemenne 2011a) Fully acknowledging these challenges of specification and measurement, available evidence indicates that displacement related to environmental processes is on the rise, as was shown in the first section of this chapter (10.1 Presentation) (IDMC 2015), and it is expected to rise due to the expected effects of climate change (IFRC 2012, p. 16), particularly under certain more extreme scenarios such as a global warming of 4 °C (Gemenne 2011b).

Both slow- and sudden-onset environmental events could end up in displacement, and the distinction is relevant to understand the array of possible mobility responses or strategies (Hugo 2010, especially Table 3 in page 15). Renaud et al. (2007, p. 31) used the type of environmental degradation (gradual or sudden, direct or indirect) as one of the bases for their categorization of displacees. Sudden events include, for example, tsunamis, typhoons and flash floods, while examples of slow-onset events include droughts, desertification, and sea level rise.

Although there is agreement that most environmental displacement is internal (within national boundaries) (e.g. Hugo 1996, 2010; Obokata et al. 2014; Nansen Initiative 2015), nevertheless there have been several disasters that resulted in international displacement, be it immediately or in the aftermath. Examples include the 1998 Hurricane Mitch, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 2011–2012 Ethiopian droughts, the 2015 flooding in Southern Africa and the 2015 Katmandu Valley earthquake (Nansen Initiative 2015; Obokata et al. 2014; McLeman and Hunter 2010)² (Map 10.1).

From the point of view of countries of arrival, about 50 countries have received or have refrained from returning foreigners in disaster situations (Nansen Initiative 2015). In some cases, special status has been assigned to people displaced by environmental events in order for them to be able to enter the country in question, while in other cases legal status (visas) has been extended in the aftermath of the disaster.


10.4 Recent Research on International Environmental Displacement

As early as 1990, the IPCC³ First Assessment Report already stated three conditions under which displacement, migration or both could be expected:

Migration and resettlement may be the most threatening short-term effects of climate change on human settlements. People may decide to migrate in any of the following cases: loss of housing (because of river or sea flooding or mudslides); loss of living resources (like water, energy and food supply or employment affected by climate change); loss of social and cultural resources (loss of cultural properties, neighborhood or community networks, particularly in the case of a devastating flood) (Tegart et al. 1990, pp. 5–9).

²The Nansen Initiative's Agenda for the protection of Cross-border displaced persons in the Context of disasters and climate change-volume II, Annex 1, includes regional examples of environment-related cross-border displacement <https://nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-AGENDA-VOLUME-2.pdf>

³The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the international body for assessing the science related to climate change. The IPCC was set up in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to provide policy-makers with regular assessments of the scientific basis of climate change, its impacts and future risks, and options for adaptation and mitigation (IPCC Factsheet: What is the IPCC? http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/docs/factsheets/FS_what_ipcc.pdf)



Map 10.1 Examples of cross-border displacement in case of natural disasters (Source: Nansen Initiative 2015, Volume II, Annex 3, p. 51)

These remarks indicate that the probability of moving or leaving is not uniform within a population. Contrary to this important consideration, several crude estimates of potential environmental displacement under climate change are actually based on people at risk, in other words, the total population living in the area affected by the environmental impact. A more precise measurement and potential forecasting of environmentally induced displacement (internal and cross-border) would require an agreed-upon definition, as was already mentioned, as well as comparable methods (Biermann and Boas 2007; Gemenne 2011b). It would also have to solve the *attribution issues* (when is a move actually due to environmental causes?) through a better understanding of the mechanisms linking environmental stressors and migration decisions (Adamo 2013/2008). Recent conceptual models and empirical research are focused on these problems.

10.4.1 Conceptual Developments in Environmentally-Induced Migration Research

There is ample consensus in the demography and population studies fields that all forms of population mobility are shaped by a complexity of forces including social, economic, demographic and institutional (including political and cultural aspects) (e.g. Massey et al. 1993; Bretell and Hollifield 2008). New conceptual developments in migration and environment expand this idea to include environmental processes (Fig. 10.2), which means that environmental drivers of migration and displacement have to be analyzed among other drivers of migration as yet another element in the macro forces shaping household and individual decisions (Black et al. 2011).

As an example of recent developments, the conceptual framework in the diagram presents four basic components: (i) a distinction between different types of outcomes and different types of migration (the right hand side of the diagram); (ii) the




Fig. 10.2 Drivers of migration and the effect of environmental change (Source: FORESIGHT. Migration and Global Environmental Change 2011)

identification of five primary families of drivers of migration (the pentagon on the left hand side of the diagram), and the recognition that it is (actual or perceived) differences across space in these drivers which influence migration; (iii) the incorporation of agency in determining how drivers translate into outcomes, and specifically the representation of barriers and facilitators to movement; and (iv) the incorporation of environmental change as a direct influence on migration, through changes to environmental drivers, and also as an indirect influence through changes to the other four drivers.

10.4.2 Research Trends

In consonance with these conceptual developments and to move away from the oversimplification of the relationships between environmental change and migration, Hugo (2010, pp. 23–29) suggested that research on environmental displacement could benefit from some “*lessons from existing migration research of relevance for climate- change induced migration*”. These lessons would include: migration vs adaptation in situ; the role of migration networks; migration as a mechanism for households coping with change; previous experience regarding forced resettlement; migration as a gendered process; and the links between migration and development. Recent research seems to indicate that the field is moving to address these lessons.

For example, Obokata et al. (2014) reviewed empirical research on international environmental migration. Most of the reviewed articles (31 in total) found some evidence of the influence of environmental factors on international migration, although this was highly dependent on other non-environmental factors, once again confirming the multi-causality of migration (point also made by Findlay 2011). As Hugo before, they found that the impacts of sudden and slow-onset events on mobility were different, as they create diverse synergies with different factors. For example, drought, a slow-onset event, is likely to exacerbate economic distress, while a massive earthquake could trigger a surge in displacement with immediate governance consequences. In addition to a diversity of environmental drivers (from drought to deforestation), the authors found that their effects are highly contextual (i.e. they change from one country to another) as it is the interplay of agency and structure in migration decisions under environmental stress.

In this regard, Adams (2016) includes the role of agency and structure in migration decision-making processes in her analysis of no-migrant populations under environmental stress in the Peruvian Andes, highlighting that non-economic and non-environmental factors (for example preferences, affective ties or family obligations) are relevant to understand why an individual or household decides to stay or to leave a risky area. Results show that populations are heterogeneous in terms of both their attachment to the place where they live, and their ability to migrate, i.e. material resources and social capital, suggesting that “trapped populations exist along a continuum” (Adams 2016, pp. 443), and emphasizing that people may actually (freely and knowledgeably) decide to stay put despite the impact of environmental hazards.

In consequence, the role of environmental and non-environmental contexts at different levels (macro, households, individual, etc.) and scales (local, regional, national) is key to understanding different effects to similar impacts, “shaping environmentally-related migration outcomes across borders” (Obokata et al. 2014, p. 130). Critical elements in the non-environmental context are institutions (particularly the nature of programs dealing with disasters, their implementation, and their target groups, but also those related to the global governance of migration), social capital, livelihoods, class, gender and age (generations). Finally, the authors remind us of the importance of addressing the selectivity of migration by examining both migrants and non-migrants. They concluded that international environmental migration is not considerable at the moment, even when considering indirect effects of environmental factors, and that several barriers and constraints (institutions but also gender and class) exist.⁴ In addition, certain topics such as migrants in receiving countries and urban settings in general are underrepresented in the literature.

In agreement with this, Findlay (2011) emphasizes the importance of examining the destinations of environmental migration, including what are the factors that attract migrants to specific places. He identifies several elements, including the potential returns to human capital, social and cultural capital in destinations, transnational social networks, the fact that most people do not move, and that most moves are short distance.⁵ Overall, his review of the recent evidence-based literature on destinations of environmental migration and displacement led to the conclusion that “from the perspective of policy makers in western economies the key finding is that evidence-based research continues to uphold Hugo’s (1996, p. 118) claim of 15 years standing that ‘the bulk of migrants displaced by environmental disruption move within national boundaries and international migration has been very limited’” (Findlay 2011, S54). Nevertheless, the paper examines Europe as a potential destination of environmentally-induced mobility, and suggests that physical proximity and social networks could be two relevant factors. Crop failures and overall desertification in neighboring North Africa could be an example of the first factor (given its proximity to Southern Europe),⁶ and the impact of flooding and salinization on the livelihoods of coastal South Asian population of the second (given the colonial ties to the United Kingdom, for example).⁷ Overall, he concludes that the most likely effect of environmental change in the next 50 years would be the modification or amplification of existing migration channels, and these would shape destination selection by future environmentally-motivated migrants (Findlay 2011, S57).

⁴For a more in-depth analysis of migration, immobility and displacement related to extreme events see Black et al. (2013)

⁵As an example of this, Henry et al. (2004, pp. 446–47) found that the effect of environmental variables (rainfall conditions) only became significant when the type of destination (rural, urban or abroad) was added to the model.

⁶A non-European example of the proximity factor could be the trans-border displacement of Bangladeshi to India due to the catastrophic 2011 floods (Quencez 2012).

⁷Another example could be the 2010–2011 floods in Colombia and the temporary circular labor migration program organized with Spain (Rinke 2012).

Related to household livelihood strategies, Bylander (2015) examines mobility as a *replacement* for local livelihood strategies (basically agriculture) in a Cambodian community where environmental shocks (droughts and floods) and international migration (mainly to Thailand) have increased. In absence of irrigation, rain variability made farming highly uncertain. This and the lack of local alternatives resulted in households (poor and non-poor, landless and landlords) turning to international labor migration as a viable strategy to balance their livelihoods.

Finally, the role of social networks in shaping the climate change-migration nexus is examined by Nawrotzki et al. (2015) in the case of migration from rural Mexico to the United States between 1986 and 1999, in a context of water-related stress (because of both droughts and floods). More specifically, the authors asked if access to social networks facilitates or constraints climate change related migration. They tested two mechanisms: the amplification mechanism,⁸ which “proposes that, once established, a [migration] corridor reduces migration’s cost and even relatively small environmental strains may yield large-scale migrations”; on the other hand, the suppression mechanism suggests an alternative effect based on the role of social networks on adaptation strategies *in situ* (Nawrotzki et al. 2015, p. 468). Their results for this period of Mexican migration to the United States support the suppression mechanism, with community and household migration networks weakening the effect of environmental factors on cross-border migration. These findings add to Adamo (2015)’s findings related to non-migrant and immobile populations, and have important implications for policy-making in the adaptation arena.

10.5 Cross-Border Environmental Displacement in Policy Forums: Two Examples

10.5.1 *The Nansen Initiative*

As noted above, the Nansen Initiative was created in 2012 by a pledge of the governments of Norway and Switzerland with the aim of achieving a deeper understanding of cross-border displacement due to sudden-onset disasters including those related to climate-change impacts, of identifying best practices and of building consensus on how to assist and protect the affected population, and recognizing the ambiguities and gaps in current international legal frameworks (Kälin 2015).

The Nansen Initiative is a state-led, bottom-up consultative process intended to identify effective practices, drawing on the actual practice and experience of governments, and build consensus on key principles and elements to address the protection and assistance needs of persons displaced across borders in the context of disasters, including the adverse effects of climate change (The Nansen Initiative 2015. Vol.I:15).

The Initiative brought together academia (Graeme Hugo was part of the Advisory Committee), international organizations, national policy makers and NGO’s repre-

⁸ See also Bardsley and Hugo (2010) and Adamo and de Sherbinin (2011).

sentatives to achieve these challenging goals. After a series of regional consultations –in Central America, South Asia, South East Asia, Pacific and Greater Horn of Africa – the Initiative finalized its mandate on 2015 with the Global Consultation (October) and the presentation of the final document, the “Protection Agenda” (The Nansen Initiative 2015). This document addresses the protection and assistance needs of cross-border disaster-displaced persons by “exploring potential measures that States may voluntarily adopt and harmonize to admit such persons relying on humanitarian considerations and international solidarity with disaster affected countries and communities”. The Protection Agenda lists three priority areas for national, regional and international action. The first area is collecting data and enhancing knowledge on cross-border disaster-displacement. As was mentioned before in this chapter, lack of adequate data has been repeatedly pointed out as a serious deterrent for sound scientific knowledge on cross-border environmental displacement, despite important advances in the matter. Similarly, over the last years there have been important advances in conceptual developments and empirical research on environmental displacement and migration, but the Agenda cautions that more may be necessary to inform adequate policies, including a better understanding of population mobility in general (Nansen Initiative 2015, vol.I:45).

The other two areas are related to ‘translating’ knowledge into international and national policy-making and actions. The second priority area refers to international cooperation by enhancing the use of humanitarian protection measures for cross-border disaster-displaced persons, including mechanisms for lasting solutions, for instance by harmonizing approaches at (sub-) regional levels. The third priority area is the strengthening of the management of disaster displacement risk in the country of origin. The Agenda identifies effective practices to manage disaster displacement risk in the country of origin to prevent displacement, including (i) reducing vulnerability and building resilience to disaster displacement risk, (ii) facilitating migration out of hazardous areas before disasters strike, (iii) conducting planned relocation; and (iv) responding to the needs of internally displaced persons. The Platform on Disaster Displacement (<http://disasterdisplacement.org/>) was launched on May 2016 as the follow up of the Nansen Initiative.

10.5.2 The Warsaw Mechanism and the Inclusion of Displacement Due to Climate Change Impacts in the Paris Agreement (COP21)

The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts (http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/items/6056.php) was formally established in the ‘COP19’ (Nineteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties) in Warsaw in 2013. The Mechanism aims to be the main instrument – under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)–to address loss and damage associated with climate change

impacts in those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in a comprehensive, integrated and coherent manner (Adamo 2015). Some have argued that this agreement would be an example of the “adaptation turn” in the topics discussed at the COPs (e.g. Venturini et al. 2014). Issues related to environmental displacement fall under the purview of the Mechanism. Although there were doubts during the whole “road to Paris” process of the COP21, displacement related to climate change impacts was finally included in the section on “Loss and Damage” of the “Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties” (that, different from the Paris Agreement, does not require ratification of acceptance, and is not legally binding [Doelle 2016]), in the item 49, which states:

Also requests the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism to establish, according to its procedures and mandate, a task force to complement, draw upon the work of and involve, as appropriate, existing bodies and expert groups under the Convention including the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Convention, to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change. (<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf>).

While there is agreement that the inclusion of the topic in the final document is an advancement if compared with previous COPs (even if it was not included in the actual agreement), nevertheless there is a general feeling that more should have been done to ensure the protection of populations displaced by impacts associated with climate-change (e.g. Burkett 2016).

10.6 Discussion and Conclusions

This brief overview of recent research on environmentally-induced international migration shows that it is progressively incorporating empirical results from other areas of migration studies, as well as demographic theories of migration. One of such incorporations is the adoption of more complex conceptual models – and the gradual abandonment of simplistic, uni-causal models – that locate environmental factors as one among several other drivers of migration and displacement. This leads to the recognition that (a) causality or attribution paths are complex, and (b) environmental factors could have direct impacts but also indirect effects, for example climate change and disasters could be considered as part of the context of migration decisions, and not only as causes (Obokata et al. 2014; Findlay 2011; Kálin 2015). The conclusion that environmental factors are part of a complex web indicates that they cannot be addressed in isolation but as part of integrated policy frameworks, similar for example to the ones recommended by the Nansen Initiative.

A second insight is the recognition of the selective character of all forms of migration and displacement. The relevance of selectivity for environmental migration is twofold: in terms of who stays and who leaves (or mobile and immobile

populations) and in terms of the composition of the flows (for example by age, sex, human capital, and even citizenship). This diversity needs to be explicitly incorporated into any and all policies and actions looking to prevent and address international environmental displacement and to protect those in the move and those in the impacted area. Related to this, it is equally important to consider the consequences of international environmental displacement for the displaced population – particularly in the cases of sudden displacement and displacements located toward the ‘forced’ end of the involuntary/voluntary continuum – and for both the origin and receiving communities.

These developments have important implications for knowledge creation and for the translation of knowledge into specific policy responses for (a) the prevention of environmental displacement and for (b) the protection of people crossing international borders due to environmental impacts.⁹ It could be summarized in the idea of research results as inputs for “tailored responses”, which provide a clearer understanding of the nexus between environmental change and population mobility in place-, population- and country-specific situations (IOM 2007).

Twenty years ago, Hugo decidedly contributed to placing environmentally-induced mobility within demography when he defined it as a form of population mobility in his seminal paper “Environmental concerns and international migration”, where he also advanced critical conceptual considerations and suggested the policy relevance of the topic. This chapter presented an overview of recent developments in the field of environmentally-induced international displacement and migration through the lenses of Hugo’s work. The selected conceptual developments, empirical research results and policy-related initiatives discussed here, including those related to future migration scenarios under climate change, show the current and even future relevance of his early insights.

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⁹Oliver-Smith calls it the “redirection of research toward clarifying conceptual approaches and answering basic questions” (Oliver-Smith 2008, p. 102)

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Chapter 11

The Nexus Between Forced and Irregular Migration: Insights from Demography

Marie McAuliffe

11.1 Introduction

The examination and analysis of populations of forced migrants has long been a critical area of migration research, including as a means to define and refine the conceptualizations of forced migration, support humanitarian operations, underpin policy responses, promote the need for geopolitical solutions to displacement and help garner appropriate funding bases for crisis-response, and develop short and longer-term management strategies. As outlined in Hovy's chapter, a range of issues have sometimes plagued the collection of data for population-based analysis of forced migrants. There continue to be many challenges and necessary compromises, which are understandable given the dynamic nature of displacement and the often highly unstable environments in which it occurs. And yet the substantial investments of recent decades in gathering forced migrant population statistics, principally by UNHCR and its member states, have ensured that researchers, analysts and policymakers currently have the most complete data on forced migrant populations in history. Fundamental gaps in our knowledge remain, however, better data are needed, and demographic data are essential.

Developing a deeper understanding of the composition of forced migrant populations in need of assistance, including by age, sex and nationality, for example, has the capacity to facilitate better meeting the needs of displaced persons through the

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provision of adequate health, education and other services. There also remains an urgent need for demographic analysis and modelling of populations who have undertaken migration as well as of at-risk populations of potential migrants who face displacement and/or irregular movement, possibly involving high risk migration journeys. Often these latter populations straddle the forced-irregular migration nexus. The tens of thousands of unaccompanied minors who crossed the Mexico-US border in 2014 are one such population, and the movement of this population in just a few months took many by surprise. Likewise, the vast numbers of people who moved from Turkey to Greece in particular in 2015 including large numbers of families and children (IOM 2015), mean that specific services and facilities are required to support people on arrival and through claims processing, and then as part of integration into communities. Groups in origin and transit countries such as these tend to be ‘populations in the shadows’ and it is sometimes not until people move that we realise fully who they are in demographic terms. It is into these population shadows that more light needs to be shone.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of current conceptualization and research on forced and irregular migrant populations, and their interconnectedness. Demographers often begin with definitions, both conceptual and operational. Accordingly, the chapter begins with a discussion of what is meant by unauthorized migration within the context of forced migration. It then considers the intersection of unauthorized migration flows and irregular migrant populations, highlighting at-risk groups in origin, transit and destination countries, and noting that those susceptible to forced migration are most at risk. The chapter also contains several short illustrative case studies of discrete populations. It concludes by reiterating that there are few empirical demographic or other data available on key as well as emerging populations of forced and irregular migrants, and briefly discusses the implications for migration research, policy and operations.

11.2 What Do We Mean by ‘Forced Migration’ and ‘Forced Migrants’?

The study of forced migration stretches back several decades, with its scholarly, policy and normative roots firmly grounded in refugee studies. This field emerged in the aftermath of the two world wars and the subsequent 1951 Refugees Convention (Chimni 2009). The editors of a leading journal on the subject, the *Forced Migration Review*,¹ offer the following definition:

¹The *Forced Migration Review* is published by the Refugee Studies Centre in the Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford—See more at: <http://www.fmreview.org/#sthash.pCUV4XxB.dpuf>. The University of Oxford also publishes the long-standing leader in the field, the *Journal of Refugee Studies*.

Forced migration refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (displaced by conflict) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects.

‘Forced migration’, therefore, is said to involve movements under duress. Pivotal to the concept of forced migration is migrant agency and the degree to which people are free to remain sedentary and/or free to migrate. The concept of migrant agency has threaded its way through the long-running academic discourse on population movement since E.G. Ravenstein’s analysis of internal migration using census data in the United Kingdom, where he concluded that “it is a special feature of these temporary dwellers among strangers that many of them are migrants by compulsion not by choice” (Ravenstein 1885, p. 183). In more recent times it has become widely accepted that migrant agency is likely to operate along a continuum rather than as a binary forced-voluntary concept (Betts 2009; Castles and Miller 1998; Hugo 1996; Richmond 1993; Van Hear 1998). While the extreme ends of the continuum may be very distinct and readily distinguishable—from the Syrian family fleeing relentless shelling in Homs at one end to the millionaire Chinese manufacturer migrating to Australia in retirement at the other—the many migrant experiences that occupy the middle (or grey) area are often not perceptibly different from each other with regard to agency.

Readily recognizable populations of forced migrants are generally considered to include refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, environmentally or developmentally displaced persons and victims of trafficking (Betts 2009; Castles et al. 2014; Gallagher 2015). The inclusion of trafficked victims is acknowledged as being slightly more controversial, as trafficking can tend to be characterized as distinct from migration (see, for example, the ‘Migration versus Trafficking’ section in Martin 2014, pp. 21–22), and is often omitted from the forced migration discourse (see for example Betts 2009, pp. 4–10; Castles et al. 2014, pp. 221–2). Other schools of thought, however, place trafficking squarely within the confines of forced migration and alongside migrant smuggling (Chimni 2009; Gallagher 2015). For the purposes of this chapter, trafficking and trafficked victims are included.

11.3 Case Study Population 1: The Prawn Slaves of Thailand

The exploitation of forced migrants is highly prevalent in Thailand, particularly in the fishing industry. Migrants from neighbouring countries are promised attractive jobs in Thailand but are instead sold to Thai fishermen (Hodal and Kelly 2014; SBS Dateline 2014). These trafficked persons are referred to as ‘prawn slaves’ and are forced to work in arduous conditions for long periods out at sea at least until their debt is paid. While estimation is difficult and demographic data are non-existent, it is thought that up to 300,000 young men from Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos are working on Thai fishing vessels, most of whom have been trafficked (SBS Dateline 2014).

In the already dangerous enterprise of deep sea fishing, reports describe working hours of up to 20 per day, with men sleeping in cramped, filthy conditions and often suffering dehydration and malnutrition (World Vision 2013; SBS Dateline 2014). Reports also reveal men being forced to take amphetamines in order to stay awake (Winn 2012; World Vision 2013).

Local law enforcement, political parties and the courts not only ignore this wrongdoing but in some instances are also active players in it (ILO 2014). Corrupt police officers have been reported to be in collusion with brokers, demanding bribes and apprehending migrants who are then trafficked to fishing vessels. Corruption in the judicial system has resulted in long, drawn out investigations and very few prosecutions of traffickers, despite an increase in trafficking-related cases being brought before the courts (EJF 2014).

11.4 What Do We Mean by ‘Irregular Migration’ and ‘Irregular Migrants’?

The term ‘irregular’ can be difficult to define. The terms ‘irregular’, ‘illegal’ and ‘unauthorized’ are sometimes used interchangeably, or at least without due care, particularly in policy spheres and the public discourse. Each has a specific meaning and discussions can become confusing, particularly alongside parallel or overlapping conversations about ‘forced’ migration as well as those relating to migration flows (or movements) and migrant stocks.

In seeking to clearly distinguish between flows and stocks in this chapter, ‘unauthorised migration’ is used to describe a legal status derived from entering a country or territory without the express permission of the authorities (flows), and ‘irregular migrants’ is applied to a population whose members have undertaken migration and are in a country without any, or with inadequate, legal status (stocks). The term ‘illegal’ becomes particularly problematic if applied to some populations of forced migrants—*asylum seekers and refugees*—who may undertake unauthorized migration but who are not acting illegally when entering another country or territory without permission. For this reason the term ‘illegal’ is not used in this chapter.

Unauthorised migration involves entering a country without permission. It may involve moving clandestinely to avoid authorities and remain undetected, or it may involve actively seeking the attention of border or other officials shortly before or upon arrival. *Asylum seekers, refugees and victims of environmental or other disasters*, for example, would generally fall into the second category, whereas trafficked or smuggled persons and those people intending to live unofficially in the black or shadow economies of a country seek to evade authorities. In reality, however, movements may involve a mix of authorized and unauthorized migration during their journeys and prior to unauthorized entry. A recent example is that of around 7600 Iranian *asylum seekers* who entered Australia unauthorized by boat in 2013, and who generally travelled via Indonesia on legitimate visas (McAuliffe 2015). These

people engaged in unauthorized migration during the last leg of their journey, only after they had entered Australian waters.

Unauthorized migration can involve the use of agents, migrant smugglers and/or traffickers (Jandl 2007; Koser 2008; Pastore et al. 2006; Salt 2000). In more recent years there has been an increasing focus on smuggling and trafficking processes, networks and operations (Douglas and Schloenhardt 2012; Gallagher 2015; McAuliffe and Koser 2015; UNODC 2015), with some indications that growth in these areas is contributing to both overall movements and specific types of movements involving more vulnerable groups such as women and children (Kennedy 2014; McAuliffe and Laczko 2016). The processes of unauthorised migration therefore undoubtedly contribute to irregular migrant populations in destination countries, and potentially also to those in countries of transit (Kirisci 2004). Asylum seekers and refugees, however, are populations that do not necessarily become irregular following unauthorized entry because of their actions in claiming asylum, or being deemed to be refugees (such as is the case for acute, large flows of people escaping war or armed conflict).

Irregular migrant populations can be complex and an individual's status can vary over time. Countries with large irregular migrant populations can sometimes institute regularisation programs or 'amnesties', enabling irregular migrants to regularise their status. Argentina's *Patria Grande* program, for example, has enabled the regularization of more than 220,000 irregular migrants since it took effect in 2005 (GFMD 2010; Porembka 2013). A useful summary of the main categories of irregular migrants is provided in Table 11.1, which points to the complexity of irregular migrant populations (Gordon et al. 2009).

The interaction between unauthorized migration and irregular migrant populations can be said to be complex, hinging on legal policy frameworks that operate at both the international and national levels. From a range of perspectives—human rights, legal/normative, border management, social/sociological, demographic—identifying and understanding the populations that undertake unauthorized migration as well as the people who become irregular migrants is a critical area of research with important policy implications.

Table 11.1 Irregular migrant populations

1. Migrants who have illegally/irregularly entered the country, including by physically evading formal immigration control or presenting false papers.	
2. Migrants who have legally entered the country for a fixed period which has expired; they did not renew their permission to stay and are therefore unlawful overstayers.	3. Migrants who are lawfully entitled to reside in the country, but are in breach of some visa condition, notably by working more than their immigration status permits.
4. Asylum seekers who legally entered the country to pursue a case for refugee status, but who remain despite a final decision refusing them a continuing right to remain.	5. Children born in the country to 'irregular migrants', who also lack a right to remain although they are not themselves migrants.

Source: Gordon et al. (2009)

The demography of forced migration understandably has tended to focus on populations in immediate need of humanitarian assistance: refugees who have been displaced; internally displaced persons (IDPs) who are implementing a range of survival strategies but who may remain focused on eventually returning home; asylum seekers who have undertaken perilous journeys to arrive in a country of refuge and have applied for protection. There is a significant imperative, however, to harness new research methods and technologies to gain a better understanding of the nature of ‘at-risk’ populations who may be susceptible to (further) forced migration and those who live in the shadows of societies as irregular migrants. Some groups, such as Rohingya in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Malaysia, straddle both types of population, and could be said to be at the nexus of the forced and irregular migration constructs.

11.5 Case Study Population 2: The Rohingya of Cox’s Bazar

Myanmar has long regarded the Rohingya people as irregular migrants, and they have been the subject of long-term systematic discrimination. This is most pointedly demonstrated by the Rohingya’s inability to secure citizenship in Myanmar, rendering them stateless. In a country of around 51 million, Rohingya are thought to total 1–1.2 million. In the 2014 population census—the first in Myanmar in over 30 years—Rohingya were not included in the list of ethnic groups, resulting in around one million people being excluded from the census (Heijmans 2015; Snaing 2015). In 2012, following extreme anti-Rohingya violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine province, Myanmar’s President Thein Sein suggested the UNHCR resettle the entire Rohingya population. UNHCR rejected the President’s suggestion, noting that the Rohingya were located within Myanmar and had not crossed a border, so were not refugees (Naing 2012).

Bangladesh, along with Malaysia and Thailand, has received the majority of Rohingya unauthorized migration flows from Myanmar over many years. There are estimates of around 30,000 Rohingya living in UN camps in Bangladesh, with a further 270,000 irregular Rohingya migrants residing in the country (O’Connor 2014). The main Rohingya population in Bangladesh is located in an area bordering Myanmar’s Rakhine province, in and around Cox’s Bazar. The Rohingya of Cox’s Bazar are widely acknowledged as being an irregular migrant population at serious risk of displacement, although little information or data are available on them (Parnini 2013; Ullah 2011). Ultimately, their situation is extremely dire. They receive little government support and are not able to engage in paid employment. They remain stateless, and have limited access to support services.

In late 2014, a large-scale survey of 4757 households in Cox’s Bazar found that 94% of Rohingya respondents had at least one household member who wanted to migrate internationally on visas, but of these just 2% indicated that regular migration was likely (see McAuliffe and Jayasuriya 2016 for analysis of survey results). Unauthorised migration to seek asylum was considered much more likely by Rohingya respondents (46% had at least one household member who wanted to engage in this; 33% had at least one household member who considered they were likely to do so; 26% had at least one household member who was planning to do so),

in stark contrast to non-Rohingya respondents (3% had at least one household member who wanted to engage; 3% had at least one household member who considered they were likely to do so; 2% had at least one household member who was planning to do so). Rohingya were much more likely to be targeted by people smugglers, with at least one person in 27% of households surveyed having been approached by smugglers during the previous 12 months compared with 6% of non-Rohingya respondents. Demographically, the majority of Rohingya respondents had no or low education (89% with no education; 7% primary level), had been previously displaced (77%) and had family living in another country (71%). The average number of children per Rohingya household was four.

Unauthorised migration from Bangladesh and Myanmar has seen a marked increase in 2015 (UNHCR 2015). Smugglers have profited from the growing demand to leave Bangladesh and Myanmar, and have sought to expand their businesses. The May 2015 impasse that involved thousands of Rohingya and Bengali migrants stranded on boats at the hands of smugglers and traffickers, some having been reportedly pushed back by Thai, Indonesian and Malaysian authorities, signaled policy and operational failures in the region in terms of humanitarian protection, countering migrant smuggling, and the international community's ability to hold states to account in respecting the human rights of their resident populations (McAuliffe 2016).

11.6 Measuring 'Populations in the Shadows'

Understanding the scale, demography and nature of both unauthorized migration and irregular migrant populations over time is important, not only in national and regional contexts but also in a global context, as a means of identifying trends and patterns for a range of policy, economic and geopolitical reasons. There are, however, significant challenges in establishing reliable estimates with which meaningful analysis and useful comparisons can be made (Koser 2009; Kraler and Reichel 2011). A summary of the challenges in quantifying 'irregular' migration, for example, is presented in Table 11.2, which illuminates both the conceptual and definitional issues as well as the inherent difficulties in accurately placing the quantum and nature of 'irregular' migration in a broader context.

Research into the social demographic dimensions of forced migration (including decision making, factors underpinning movement, etc.) has historically also been difficult due to key methodological challenges, including those associated with interviewing individuals who have undertaken, or are planning to undertake unauthorised migration. Locating migrants can be difficult; migrants are often in high-risk locations (in origin, host or transit countries); there are interviewee sensitivities, vulnerabilities and confidentiality to safeguard; and fieldwork capability can be difficult to source.

Another challenge has been the 'forced–voluntary' conceptualization underpinning key aspects of international migration governance, and as part of this, the perception that, by definition, forced migrants who nevertheless may travel unauthorised

Table 11.2 Difficulties in measuring irregular [unauthorized] migration

Aggregating data	Tends to disguise the complexity of irregular migration, e.g. ‘mixed flows’ consists of economic migrants and those fleeing persecution
	Lack of comparable data both over time and between locations
Excessive media attention	Media tendency to focus on the highest available estimate
	Statistics can be used more to alarm than inform
Confusion in definitions	Irregular migration covers a range of people who can be in an irregular situation for different reasons, and people can switch from regular to irregular status, or vice versa
Stocks and flows	Can be difficult to differentiate between the two and discern what is actually being counted
	Flows usually only focus on entries, not exist or return flows
	Stocks assume permanence, when migrants can leave, change their status or die
	Impossible to combine both stocks and flows to gain a total estimate
Data accessibility	Often collected by enforcement agencies and not made publicly available
Sensitivities around human rights	There may be some non-disclosure of irregular migrants through:
	Apprehension at border crossings
	Workplace raids
	Criminal investigations of people smuggling

Source: Koser (2009)

are more passive than active. This has had the effect of rendering research on refugee and asylum seeker decision making largely irrelevant, although some scholars have noted that advances in research methods and theory make this topic one that is “poised for growth” (Fussell 2012, p. 39). Developments in technology to support research methods that are able to reduce response bias and non-sampling error, and that can be useful in researching vulnerable populations, have meant that the ability to access views on sensitive issues has been enhanced (Bowling 2005). The shift toward more sophisticated research technology such as computer assisted personal interviewing, for example, has been found to be effective in reducing social desirability effects and helping elicit honest, open answers to highly sensitive questions (Seebregts et al. 2009). In a survey on rape conducted in South Africa, for example, participants were asked questions relating to their experiences as both a perpetrator and victim of rape via a survey loaded onto a tablet device (Jewkes et al. 2009). The results showed that a substantial proportion of men acknowledged that they themselves had committed rape, in contrast to previous studies employing traditional research methodologies (Jewkes et al. 2009). Research methodologies that account for the specific vulnerabilities of refugees as well as ensuring validity of findings can be particularly challenging (Jacobsen and Landau 2003), and newer technologies offer potential to achieve greater rigor.

11.7 Shadow Populations and Shadowy Flows: How They Intersect

The tensions that exist between the forced-voluntary agency-related continuum and the longstanding policy-driven categories of irregular migrant populations in destination countries (see Gordon et al. 2009) become more acute when examining how they intersect with migration flows. It can be said that unauthorised migration flows comprise migrants along the forced-voluntary continuum—from the Syrian asylum seekers travelling by boat from Turkey’s coast to the Greek mainland through to Indonesian migrants seeking to enter Malaysia undetected in order to work as labourers in the informal economy.

The concept of ‘mixed’ migration flows, involving both forced and voluntary migrants who undertake unauthorised migration, was developed in part to better account for this tension, including as a means of advocating the need to *prima facie* operate on the basis that such flows involve forced migrants (Koser 2005, p. 6):

Asylum seekers and refugees may resort to migrant smugglers, and they may undertake irregular secondary moves. At the same time, people not in need of international protection may resort to asylum channels in the hope of gaining temporary or permanent stay abroad. As a result of these sorts of convergences, the line between irregular migrants and asylum seekers and refugees has become increasingly blurred.... What is important to reinforce, however, is that asylum seekers and refugees do not lose their protection needs and entitlements just because they are part of a mixed flow.

The ‘mixed flows’ concept provides the rationale for practices and procedures to assume migrants to be asylum seekers in the first instance, not unauthorised migrants seeking to enter another country undetected. In addition, UNHCR has highlighted that even though its formal mandate is limited to certain populations, it “recognizes that the phenomenon of mixed movements raises broader human rights and humanitarian concerns ... as a rights-based organization, UNHCR considers it appropriate to join with other actors in drawing attention to the plight of people who, in the course of their journey, find themselves in distress” (UNHCR 2007: paras. 17–18). The nexus between forced and irregular migration converges in unauthorized migration flows and their linkages to irregular migrant populations.

Following unauthorized (and sometimes authorized) migration, people who have not evaded detection are assessed, processed and determined to be in a category, which may involve them becoming part of the irregular migrant population. This is a dynamic and transforming process that may initially involve traditional forced migrants undertaking unauthorized migration to become regularized at destination (or eventually becoming irregular migrants). The interaction of migration flows with the migration stock of irregular migrants is depicted in Fig. 11.1.

Figure 11.1 shows how authorized migration can contribute to irregular migrant populations, although it is important to note that those who travel via authorized routes are known to authorities and so to varying degrees are counted as part of a population. Immigration and visa-related programs are often able to account for overstayers and, to a lesser extent, those who breach visa conditions. However, with




Fig. 11.1 Migration flows from ‘at-risk’ and potential migrant populations in origin/transit to irregular migrant populations at destination

the aid of modelling and improved administrative data capture, quantifying these populations can be said to be broadly achievable.

Other migrants who have entered unauthorized—namely, asylum seekers and refugees—are known to authorities through application processes, registration processes, employment, social security or other regulatory processes. In contrast, ‘at-risk’ populations susceptible to forced migration in *origin* or *transit* countries as well as the migrants who evaded authorities at entry (and are living irregularly) remain largely hidden. It is these populations in the shadows (marked in grey in Fig. 11.1) that often little is known about, including from a social demography perspective. It is sometimes only when a population is displaced across a border, or otherwise detected during unauthorized migration, that it emerges from the shadows. Without basic data on these populations (such as origin country census data or household survey data), modelling, projection or estimation is difficult to undertake. Even then, the nature and composition of these at-risk populations is usually less of a focus than their overall scale or potential scale.

11.8 Case Study Population 3: The Central American Unaccompanied Minors to the United States

During the spring and summer of 2014, more than 66,000 Central American unaccompanied children were apprehended by US border authorities as they attempted to cross the Mexican-US border without documents (Donato and Sisk 2015; Seghetti

et al. 2014). The surge took many by surprise and yet the apprehensions of unaccompanied minors (UAMs) first rose significantly in 2009 when Mexican minors began moving in large numbers. The 2014 surge was more related to a sudden jump in UAMs from three other countries, namely El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (Hernández 2015).

Media reporting as well as academic analysis tended to attribute the increases in movement to the perilous conditions faced by children in Central America (Hernández 2015, pp. 12–13):

...long-standing structural conditions in Central America causing people, in particular children, to flee north...includ[ing] crushing poverty, urban violence, organized crime, and ineffective government responses to these dangers. It's imperative that we address these conditions of displacement...

Other determinative factors were cited as being US immigration policies (Kandel et al. 2014), people smugglers' recruitment strategies (Kennedy 2014) and family unification (Kandel et al. 2014). Donato and Sisk (2015) offer analysis based on empirical data collected by the Mexican and Latin American Migration Projects. This shows that children's migration is strongly linked to that of their parents. Donato & Sisk (2015, p. 59) argue that "unlike other children who face similarly difficult (or worse) conditions in everyday life around the world, children from Mexico and Central America have access to migrant human capital in the form of their parents' US experience."

Some of the household data collected by the Projects goes back as far as 1983 and has been progressively built upon in terms of geographic and demographic scope (see Donato and Sisk 2015). The data cover authorised and unauthorised migration experiences as well as social demographic characteristics of potential migrant populations in a range of countries. This rich empirical evidence base is able to illuminate underlying factors involved in UAM movements that other analysis has not been unable to uncover.

The implications of not understanding who is in the shadow populations apply to policymakers as well as to researchers of forced migration, and in at least two significant ways. Firstly, the inability to adequately account for the demography of at-risk populations in origin/transit (and host countries) as well as the size of the population can reduce the capacity of advocates, international organisations, donor countries as well as neighbouring countries to argue for support of specific at-risk populations. In other words, if we do not know how big the population is, and its demographic characteristics, how can effective support be provided and changes to circumstances be successfully advocated? There are other important geo-political factors involved, of course, but an important component is basic demographic data. Researchers have a vital role to play in helping to gain a better understanding of the demography of at-risk populations as do regional monitoring projects (see Sect. 11.9 below).

Secondly, and following displacement of people at-risk of forced migration, demographic data and a more nuanced understanding of populations on the move are essential in meeting their needs during migration processes as well as during their integration into new communities. What can sometimes be depicted as a burden in receiving countries—particularly the services to support the resettlement of

refugee populations—can often equally be thought of as a long-term gain to communities in social and economic terms. What we know of the demography of the Syrian refugee population that has moved to Europe in 2015, suggests that some countries in Europe (Germany in particular) will benefit from an influx of educated family groups with good prospects for successful integration (Faiola 2015; Koser 2015). Integration programs, however, rely on understandings of demographic characteristics, particularly as they relate to age, sex, family status, health, education and other factors (Castles et al. 2002). Housing, health, education services as well as employment and income-generation opportunities and placements are largely assessed and implemented on the basis of demographic data. Perhaps a greater challenge is the development of a much better understanding of the demography of irregular migrant populations that are not known to authorities and are living in the shadows and face greater challenges in integrating successfully into communities. Without support and services, they may encounter marginalization and exclusion and have the potential to risk social exclusion in certain circumstances (Taran et al. 2009). More research on the demography of clandestine irregular migrant populations is needed, and demographers are well placed to assist, including as part of multi-disciplinary research projects.

11.9 Regional Monitoring of At-Risk Populations

The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, for example, based in Kenya monitors and conducts research on mixed migration from the Horn of Africa, including of vulnerable populations at risk of unauthorized migration (Horwood 2015). Supported by donors, refugee groups and international organisations, RMMS continues to make a valuable contribution to our understanding of unauthorized migration, migrant smuggling and migration exploitation and abuse in the region. Likewise, UNHCR's data drawing on the work of the Arakan Project on Rohingya in Myanmar and Bangladesh provide useful estimates of trends in maritime smuggling of Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants in Southeast Asia (UNHCR 2015). These two examples involve low-cost, high-impact models for the monitoring and reporting of discrete flows that are intertwined with exploitation and abuse of vulnerable migrants. Additional monitoring units could usefully be established in other regions, such as West Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

11.10 Conclusions

In this chapter I have sought to highlight the conceptual issues and intersections that have framed how the demography of forced migration has been defined. Considerable effort has been expended on collecting and reporting on forced migrant populations, albeit within temporally and spatially defined categories, with the greatest focus on

populations in immediate need (refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs). When flows as well as stocks and the forced-voluntary continuum are taken into account the nexus between forced and irregular migration presents complexities and considerable challenges. While many populations uneasily occupy this space, the Rohingya populations in South and South East Asia perhaps demonstrate these interconnections most pointedly, as well as the significant data and research gaps.

The central thread running through this chapter is that far more evidence, research, and analysis is required, and is potentially able to be gathered, in order to support a better understanding of populations at risk of becoming forced migrants and/or of joining the shadowy irregular migrant populations vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.

Deeper examination of ‘at-risk’ populations, involving qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods research, offers promise of additional perspectives on the dynamic and multi-faceted underlying demographic and other factors and processes within complex transnational settings. Research examining the social demography dimensions of at-risk populations can build on existing administrative data on forced migrant populations, and can serve to further highlight extremely vulnerable and other ‘at-risk’ communities in origin countries (such as children and marginalized ethnic minorities), the prevalence of smuggling networks, and how potential migrants assess and re-assess aspects of international migration. Such research would be squarely aimed at underpinning operational and policy responses to expand agency, thereby enabling populations to exercise choices to remain sedentary or migrate under less dangerous conditions. There is also a key need to understand the demography of irregular and forced migrant populations in assessing and implementing integration programs in destination countries.

Undertaken carefully, approaches to such research can create synergies between highly-skilled partners, successfully manage fieldwork in high-risk locations, yield robust evidence on sensitive groups and underpin models that can be replicated in different geographic locations. A more nuanced understanding of potential ‘at-risk’ migrant populations and the complexities inherent in migration processes can be formulated through the gathering of empirical evidence to inform policy and operational deliberations. Hopefully, this chapter has pointed to the importance and complexity of the task ahead, as well as to the utility such work can bring.

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Part IV
Processes and Policies Concerning Forced
Migration

Chapter 12

Migration and Security: Exploding the Myths and Understanding the Realities

Khalid Koser

12.1 Introduction

Viewing migration through the lens of national security is nothing new. German citizens resident in the United Kingdom (UK) were interned there during World War Two on the grounds that they may have been ‘fifth columnists,’ as were some Japanese residents in the United States of America (USA). Certain extremist members of Kurdish and Algerian diaspora groups were associated with terrorist attacks in Western Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, and more recently immigrants and the descendants of immigrants have been involved in terrorist attacks in major cities in Europe and in the United States.

But the perception of migration as a threat to national security has certainly heightened in recent years, and has reached a fever pitch around the arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers in Europe during 2015. Migration (especially irregular migration) for example, now figures as an issue of concern in many national security policies, in poorer as well as richer countries. There are concerns that asylum and irregular migration may import ethnic tensions; that a failure of integration may risk radicalizing some migrants and their descendants; that so-called ‘foreign fighters’ are becoming more active in conflicts around the world; and that migrant remittances may sometimes be used to fund illicit activities including terrorism.

The security agenda as related to migrants and migration has also widened, expanding beyond terrorism, conflict and other ‘hard’ security issues, to also include aspects such as the challenge of social integration, impacts on national identity, competition in the labour market, and impacts on social services. Such ‘soft’ security issues may not pose a direct threat to the nation-state, but they are seen as potentially destabilizing to economic prosperity and national welfare, and certainly

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generate considerable resentment among national populations (see Kasatkin and Avatkov 2014). Here in particular demographic research will be important. At the aggregate level, demographic analysis holds potential to reveal current and emerging trends, including changes in scale and direction, in forced migration and displacement as well as salient patterns of difference among population groups including migrants, non-migrants and host communities. When wedded with qualitative approaches, demographic research will serve to document the diversity of experiences among migrants in flight and in place.

How can these trends in ‘securitizing’ migration be explained? In part the answer is that the security agenda has become more prevalent generally across many aspects of policy especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In part it is probably also a function of the rapid rise in the number of international migrants. According to the United Nations Population Division, the number of international migrants was approximately 243.7 million in 2015 (measured by the foreign born population in countries of residence) or 3.3 per cent of the world’s population (United Nations 2016, p. 1). This represents an increase from 221.7 million in 2010 and 172.7 million in 2000. These aggregate figures also capture a certain proportion of the number of ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’ migrants, a population that has also increased worldwide, with estimates varying from 20 to 50 million worldwide (see Chamie 2016). Asylum-seeking is also at a new peak – according to United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) there were over 3.2 million applications for asylum worldwide at the end of 2015, and a tripling of the number of asylum applicants in the previous year (UNHCR 2016). Migration patterns have also changed, meaning that people with different ethnic and religious backgrounds are more regularly coming into contact and co-habiting than in the past (see Castles et al. 2014). A more contemporary and immediate factor is probably the aftermath of the global financial crisis, and especially high unemployment, which may have resulted in the ‘scape-goating’ of migrants.

Equally, there have been recent examples where migrants have posed – or been associated with – security issues both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’. In many industrialized societies a small minority of migrants appear to be susceptible to radicalization, as demonstrated through the new phenomenon of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’, and in some countries the incarceration rate of people of foreign origin is higher than that of the national population, although there may be other explanations. In some countries around the world the diaspora has provided funding and support that has generated or sustained conflict – although again in the majority of cases diaspora contributions and remittances have a positive impact on development. There are isolated examples of firebrand preachers who incite hatred; and of foreign nationals who fight abroad against the troops of the country of their settlement.

But labelling any issue a security risk has significant implications in terms of the laws, norms, policies, and procedures that become justified in response. It has been suggested that the idea that migration may pose a potential threat has for example been used to justify greater surveillance, detention, deportation and more restrictive policies; although equally it is argued that such measures are a legitimate element of migration management. Nevertheless, such responses in turn can impact the

migrants involved, for example, by denying asylum seekers access to safe countries, driving more migrants into the hands of migrant smugglers and human traffickers, and by contributing to a growing anti-immigrant tendency among the public, within the media, and in political debate in many countries.

In other words, when applied to migration (and many other contemporary issues), the security label needs to be used appropriately and sensitively, and the security lens focused accurately, if it is to be explanatory and provide the basis for better policy, rather than incendiary and provide fuel for misperceptions and media headlines. It needs to be based on research and evidence – including on the demography of migrants and the scale and spatial dimensions of the impacts of migrants and asylum seekers on both receiving and sending communities and more broadly, the society, economy and polity of nations. It is important to guard against generalizations, and avoid tainting all migrants when only a very small minority may have ill intentions. For example, what groups of migrants are of particular concern, and in what circumstances? Here, the analytic lens of demography gives focus to documenting difference, notably by gender, age, health status, stage in the life course, etc. (cf. Cochrane 2015). What exactly is the threat posed and how can it be counteracted? Is this just an issue for countries of destination, or are there also legitimate concerns in origin countries too? And how is security defined when analyzing its interaction with migrants and migration? For each of these issues, demographic analysis also serves to provide confidence about scale and levels of uncertainty.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of current research and analysis on the linkages between migration and security, underscoring in the process the role of demographic analysis and perspective in building knowledge about these linkages. The chapter begins with a discussion of definitions – illustrating that this is not only an issue of international migration, and introducing the concept of human security. It then considers how migrants and migration may pose a threat to national security first in destination countries and then in origin countries, before turning attention briefly to the human security of those migrants involved. The chapter concludes, however, by highlighting that there is actually very little empirical research on the linkages between migration and security, which is certainly needed to confirm or deny some of the common assumptions made about the effects of contemporary migration, and to develop effective policy responses. A role for population scientists to contribute to strengthening the empirical foundation for understanding the migration/security nexus is apparent.

A theme that pervades this chapter is the need for an objective debate on migration and security. Some advocates argue that even to discuss the security aspects of migration risks justifying extreme and unfounded assertions about migrants, their intentions and their impacts. A contrasting approach, which guides this chapter, is that whether we like it or not there is currently a perception that migration may be a security risk, and that the best way to counter this perception is to engage with the debate, review the existing evidence, and identify gaps in knowledge, including on the demography of migrants (Koser 2014). In other words we need to explode the myths and understand the realities: demographic analysis, well communicated, can contribute to public understanding and response.

12.2 Migration and Security

As alluded to above the limited research and analysis on migration and security has tended to focus in particular on irregular migration and to a lesser extent asylum. Whether this is an appropriate focus is itself an untested assumption that requires further research. It is true that irregular migrants have by definition breached administrative regulations either by entering or by remaining or working in a country without authority, but this is not necessarily correlated with breaching criminal regulations, far less with being a potential threat to national security, however defined. Similarly, while many asylum seekers arrive from fragile states or failed states or states in conflict, and in many cases may indeed not be fleeing persecution, this need not correlate with any direct threat other than the risk of overwhelming the asylum system where their numbers are great or the system is weak. There is no systematic research, demographic or otherwise, that demonstrates that irregular migrants or asylum seekers may pose any more of a threat to ‘hard’ security than other migrants (and for that matter nationals), and it is reasonable to suppose that they may pose less of a challenge to welfare or housing or health or education for example, because often they are excluded.

In keeping with the other chapters of this volume, this chapter focuses on international migration and geographic mobility, but in relationship to linkages with security. But this should not divert attention from the need for further research on other aspects of migration within a security context. Historically a number of countries have tried to control internal migration, to avoid exactly the types of threats often now ascribed to international migrants from occurring in cities – overcrowding, violence, criminality, pressure on resources and so on. The *‘propiska’* system in the former Soviet Union is a good example of an effort to manage internal migration. And certainly in contemporary China, as well as many large cities in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and South-East Asia, rapid urbanization is largely a function of rural-urban migration and is posing serious security challenges. Equally there is a limited social scientific literature that suggests there may also be security implications associated with large scale forced migration, whether within borders as internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Cochrane 2015; Ferris 2008) or across borders as refugees. There is some evidence, for example, that some people who find themselves in protracted refugee situations, such as from Afghanistan, may be at risk of marginalization and radicalization (Lischer 2008). There has also been evidence that some refugees may cross the border back into their home countries in order to take up arms – so-called ‘refugee warriors’ (Zolberg et al. 1989). Again it is important to avoid generalizations and to note an overall lack of research; but equally for analytical purposes it is important to note that the migration-security nexus is relevant in the context of a wide range of migration types, and not just irregular migration and asylum (see also Cochrane 2015; Jura 2012).

The concept of security is equally complex. The traditional approach in international relations has been to focus on the security of the nation state from external military threats from other states. From this perspective, migrants may be perceived

as ‘non-state’ actors who may pose a threat to the sovereignty and autonomy of the nation-state, although this is a conceptual standpoint which has no analogue in recent empirical reality. Another extension on traditional approaches to security, which does more legitimately extend the scope of security to include migrants, has been the ‘securitization’ approach of the so-called ‘Copenhagen School’, which broadened the range of threats to the nation state from the military to also include economic, political, environmental and societal threats (Buzan et al. 1998). Thus while migrants may not pose a direct military threat to the national security of a state, they may in certain circumstances impact employment rates negatively, heighten political tensions, and challenge national identity, all of which according to the Copenhagen School would comprise examples of security threats.

Another extension of the security concept which more comfortably and obviously applies to migration, at least in certain circumstances, is the idea of ‘human security’. In itself this is a nebulous concept with no single definition. It has emerged from at least three separate debates. One was concerned to focus development policies on the welfare of individuals (Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980). A second debate, also from security studies, was keen to demonstrate a link between the welfare of people, as for example indicated by income gaps between the rich and poor or ethnic and religious tensions, and the national security of states (Truong and Gasper 2011; UNDP 1994). The third and most recent conception of human security emerges from the report of the Commission on Human Security (2003). It defines the objective of human security as ‘to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment’. Its focus is on identifying and reducing threats to human security in particular through protection and empowerment.

The relevance of the human security concept for migration is spelled out in the Commission’s report, which highlights protecting people in violent conflict; supporting the security of people on the move; and protecting and empowering people in post-conflict situations. More broadly, human security clearly applies to, and is often lacking for, a range of contemporary migrants, ranging from irregular migrants without access to a source of livelihood, through migrants trapped in transit countries, to the victims of migrant smuggling and human trafficking.

Reinforcing another theme that pervades this chapter, namely a lack of systematic research on migration and security, it is worth concluding this short conceptual overview by noting an additional critical area where migration research is lagging. For many years the concepts of human and national security have been viewed as counterpoints; crudely depicted – while states focus on national security advocates focus on human security. More recently it has been demonstrated that in fact these concepts are inextricably linked, as illustrated by the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (especially Goals 10 and 16) which acknowledge that security underpins development (UN 2015). Again crudely, a lack of human security may undermine national security – as noted above disparities often drive conflict within states; while equally a lack of national security, for example in the form of a legitimate and functioning government, makes it hard to deliver human security.

This interaction of co-dependency has not yet fully been explored in the context of migration. For example, it is not unreasonable to assume that promoting the rights of migrants may allow them to become more fully engaged members of society, contribute to the economy in countries where they settle, and indeed contribute to development in their countries of origin. Human security for migrants may help underpin national security in affected states. This idea that the migration-security nexus may have positive and not just negative connotations is revisited in the concluding section of this chapter.

12.3 The Host Country Perspective

Recognizing the risk inherent even in posing the question, as alluded to in the introduction above, this chapter maintains that is still worth asking whether, and if so when, migration really does represent a threat to national security, starting with a focus on host countries.

Common responses to this question, certainly through student polls if not as a result of systematic research, are that migration can be a vehicle for importing terrorists and criminals, or for spreading infectious diseases. These perceptions are, at best, misleading. First, there is very little evidence from any country in the world that there is a greater concentration of terrorists, potential terrorists, or criminals among migrant populations than among local populations. Estimation of numbers of terrorists or potential terrorists can potentially be informed by the demographic methodologies that have been developed for the estimation of irregular and unauthorized populations at different geographic scales (Massey et al. 2014; Warren and Warren 2013, and see below). Certainly and as acknowledged earlier, some migrants have been associated with terrorist acts and involved in crime, but equally certainly they are in the very small minority. Similarly, only in very exceptional circumstances have migrants been found to be carriers of diseases that threaten to infect significant numbers of people; and one important reason is the effectiveness of International Health Regulations (IHR) in reducing the need to move during health crises (Edelstein et al. 2014). Advances in population health analysis and methodologies can be adapted to serve to illuminate this dimension of migration and security (see Reed, Sheftel and Behazin, Chap. 5, this volume).

Second, imputing migrants with tainted intentions without substantiation risks further antagonizing public attitudes towards migration and fostering the association between migration and insecurity. This is important especially in the contemporary European context, where there is a widespread anti-immigration sentiment emerging. Finally, focusing only on these extremes risks diverting attention from circumstances where migration can actually pose a threat to national security; in other words propagating myths rather than understanding realities.

It is critical to underscore the widening gap between perceptions and realities that appears to be emerging around migration. As suggested above, the commonly held view that migration poses a threat is in fact rarely supported by empirical evidence.

One reason, as already noted, is that migrants are easy to scapegoat especially during periods of recession. Another is a media tendency to focus on the negative, even if it is occasional, rather than the far more common positive. Thus asylum seekers committing crimes make the headlines but hard-working tax-paying migrants do not. In the European context in particular, as indicated previously, certain political parties are also making political capital from promoting anti-immigration sentiments (for comparison see Wunderlick 2013; Pinyol-Jimenez 2012). In this regard, well-designed national or regional social demographic surveys may serve to provide salient comparisons in the characteristics, particularly economic, of native and foreign born, in which longer-term and recent migrants are identified.

However, lessons should be learned from the debates about the scale and trends in unauthorized migration particularly in the United States. The corpus of demographic evidence has established both the decline in unauthorized migration from Mexico to the United States with net unauthorized migration approaching zero in recent years (Massey et al. 2014) and the corresponding decline in the size of the resident unauthorized population in United States (Warren and Warren 2013). These robust demographic estimates have failed to inform political debates concerning U.S. immigration policy reform. What is needed to counter these trends and fill out the gap between perception and reality is better empirical data, including on demography and demographic impacts, more courageous political leadership in supporting evidence-based policy analysis, and more responsible media coverage (Global Commission on International Migration 2005).

Noting these reservations, we turn to some critical areas in the context of the host country where the links between migration and security may be more legitimate and defensible than a focus on terror, crime or health. First, irregular migration may legitimately be viewed as undermining the exercise of state sovereignty, as any state has the right and responsibility to control who crosses its borders and is resident on its territory. It is worth noting that the majority of irregular migrants worldwide have probably not crossed a border without authorization, but rather remain or work without authorization, but still the government in a functioning state should know who is on its territory and in broad terms what they are doing. Second, the burgeoning migrant smuggling and human trafficking industries can pose a genuine threat to law and order, especially where they are related to organized crime and intersect with the movement of illicit goods, including weapons and drugs. In this case it is worth noting that it is not the migrants, but those who take advantage of them, who are criminals.

Third, the arrival of large numbers of migrants, especially from very different social or cultural backgrounds than the receiving communities can also pose challenges to integration and cohesion. This can have practical implications for states, for example regarding the allocation of resources; as well as more conceptual implications regarding models of integration and national identity. Irregular migrants specifically may represent a strain on scarce resources, especially where they are barred from using the full range of services available to citizens and legal migrants, meaning that already hard-pressed non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious bodies, and other civil society institutions are obliged to provide assistance, at times compromising their own legality.

Fourth, in certain circumstances, migrants can compete with locals in the labour market, especially during periods of recession. There was evidence from a range of countries during the global financial crisis, for example, that irregular migrants competed with legal migrants and local populations for work, especially in low-skilled sectors. Where they could not find work some turned to petty crime in order to subsist. Fifth, where significant numbers of people are settled in a restricted area for a long period of time, as is the case in some refugee and IDP camps, they can also have a detrimental effect on the local environment.

Perhaps the most significant way that migrants may pose a risk for states is that they can become a magnet for resentment. Even if this resentment is ill-informed and mis-directed it has important implications. It may spill over from specific migrant groups – for example asylum seekers or irregular migrants – to other migrants legitimately settled and working in host countries. There is even a risk that resentment may spread to settled ethnic minorities (Global Commission on International Migration 2005).

An associated risk is that public confidence in the integrity of government policy becomes undermined. This has significant policy implications. It is notoriously difficult to regain public confidence, and one way that many governments have tried in the migration realm is to become tougher on migrants and migration. A lack of public confidence also narrows the scope for forward-looking and proactive policy-making on migration, which is exactly what is needed to cope with emerging migration patterns and processes for example associated with the effects of climate change and demographic trends (IOM 2010).

We can envision several ways in which social demographic research can generate evidence to inform the nature and extent of these risks within countries hosting migrants and asylum seekers. Commitment to longitudinal studies addressing dimensions of social, economic and political integration of immigrants and foreign workers will serve nations in which immigration is both authorized as well as feared. The coupling of social demography surveys with ethnographic and other forms of qualitative research may prove even more powerful in yielding clearer understanding of the experiences, including human rights violations of migrants and their settlement motivations, return, and secondary migration.

In conclusion, migration can be a threat to national security, but not usually for the reasons normally assumed. The threat is not systematic, but instead arises in particular circumstances. This could be where migration is irregular, occurs on a large scale, brings together groups of people with very different backgrounds or little previous contact, takes place during a period of recession, and so on. Establishing the geographic and social variations in the consequences of migration and of groups of migrants within countries, a fundamental contribution of programs of social demographic research, will serve national interests in forming response and clarification for national priorities.

It is important to note here that the majority of the limited research and analysis on the linkages between migration and security has tended to focus on the perspective of host countries, and in particular on host countries in the industrialized world. Still there are reasonable grounds to assume that migration may pose even more of a challenge to poorer host states, for example in Sub-Saharan Africa, where labour

markets are less regulated; city, regional and national governments have limited capacity; and crime and corruption may be rife. The impact of migrants in poorer host states has been noted as a research gap in the migration and development literature (IOM 2013); and equally it is in the migration and security literature. Here demographic analysis and estimation holds potential to yield basic parameters of the size and characteristics, intra-national distribution and mobility experience (length of stay, etc.) among groups of migrants and in comparison to native populations. Tapping the resources of the Demographic and Health Surveys may provide an initial analytic step in understanding broad place of migrants in poorer host societies and labour markets (compare to Kraly, Chap. 7, this volume).

12.4 The Origin Country Perspective

Even less research has focused on the linkages between migration and security in countries and communities of origin. There are at least three ways where migration may be conceived as having security implications in these contexts, although again existing evidence is sporadic, inconsistent, and unsystematic.

A relatively strong evidence base has developed that addresses the influence of diaspora populations on the origin country. On the whole existing research demonstrates that diaspora groups – alongside other migrants groups and individual migrants – have a largely positive impact at home, by sending back money or influencing positive social and political change (IOM 2013). Nevertheless there is evidence that in certain circumstances – again the conditionality is important to stress – diaspora groups may have a destabilizing impact. A widely cited World Bank report, for example, found that the existence of an active diaspora group can be one of the top ten indicators for the risk of conflict recurring (World Bank 2003). While there is evidence that diasporas may promote peace – for example in East Timor and Somaliland; equally there is evidence that they may promote conflict, negatively impact peace processes, and contribute towards the re-emergence of conflict, for example in Eritrea and Sri Lanka (Stares and Smith 2007). The most direct way that diasporas may influence conflict is by sending back money to support one or other side in the conflict. There is research for example among refugee diasporas who support efforts to overthrow the regime from which they fled. Diasporas may also use their economic leverage to influence government policy, as has been the case in Eritrea in recent years.

A second security-related impact of migration on origin countries arises from the so-called ‘brain drain’, describing a process where there is a disproportionate outflow of migrants with particular training or skills. This has most obviously been a challenge within the healthcare sector in Sub-Saharan Africa. While recent demographic research has cast some doubt on the scale and actual impact of the ‘brain drain’ (see for example Skeldon 2009), nevertheless it seems reasonable to suppose that national capacities to deliver basic services such as health and education may be jeopardized by a significant exodus of workers with particular skills. More fundamentally, it has been argued that origin countries lose not just much needed skills

through this process, but also the outcome of significant investment of limited resources in the education and training of these personnel.

Less tangible but potentially equally important, is the concern that often during conflicts the first people to leave the country may be the most moderate, educated and well embedded in transnational networks. This has been reported to be the case during the conflict in Iraq and more recently in Syria. Resolving conflict and building a lasting peace is likely to be challenging in the absence of such moderating voices; but equally attracting them home is difficult. Answers to critical questions about levels and patterns of emigration by occupation and sector would benefit from comparative, if not global, data on international migration and bi-lateral international migration streams (see also Hovy, Chap. 3, this volume). Expanding the International Population Database of United Nations Population Division to include education and/occupation would go far to measure these impacts, and their nature.

Indeed the third interaction between migration and security in the origin country context concerns the reintegration of returning migrants. In Afghanistan, for example, concerns have been expressed about insecurity around the large-scale return of refugees and migrants from neighbouring Iran and Pakistan (Koser and Schmeidl 2009; see also Mohammadi et al., Chap. 13, this volume). The source of the problem is less with the displaced populations themselves, than with inadequate assistance and protection. They may be associated with urban unrest (for example in Kabul in 2006 and in Jalalabad in 2005); the narcotics industry; or cross-border trafficking of people, arms and drugs. In other contexts it has been suggested that internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returning refugees may be sympathetic towards or actively support insurgency groups, especially if they do not consider their government to be assisting them adequately (Parker 2008), or at least provide an easy recruitment ground for the insurgency (Schmeidl and Maley 2008).

Afghanistan also illustrates another way that migration may impact on security in origin countries, where migrants and refugees become ‘pawns’ in international relations. The situation of returning refugees in Afghanistan has put a further strain on already tense political relations between the Afghan government and its neighbours. Afghanistan is likely to resist repatriation to avoid further exacerbation of the sorts of problems outlined above; while Iran and Pakistan are equally determined to continue to send Afghans home. Herein lies an opportunity to wed national or regional survey design with more in-depth analysis of migrant experience and motivations. The chapter on “Return to Home” by Mohammadi et al., Chap. 13, in this volume provides a framework for a better understanding of the complex and dynamic process of return and sustainable reintegration of returnees in the country of origin.

12.5 The Migrants’ Perspective

No chapter on migration and security, however cursory, would be complete without acknowledging that migrants also confront human security challenges. As much as migrants may pose specific challenges, in variable ways, to states and

communities, migration management, and government policy, it is essential to embrace the myriad of risks to life and limb encountered by migrants during departure – or flight – and in transit and in host countries by unemployment, deteriorating working conditions, the transition from legal to irregular status, the rising incidence of violent attacks, and for some, the prospect of returning home to even greater poverty and insecurity. Both theory and evidence leads to the argument that risks to migrants are gendered, aged, and classed.

A number of trends have heightened the human security risks of migration. One is the growing ‘feminization’ of migration (see Castles et al. 2014). Traditionally migrant workers have been men. As an increasing number of countries have extended the right of family reunification to migrants, male migrants have been joined by their spouses and children. Family reunification is an important reason why almost half of the world’s migrants today are women. But an increasing proportion of the world’s migrant workers are also women (see Donato et al. 2011; United Nations 2016). The feminization of labour migration has occurred over the last few decades for three main reasons. First, the demand for labour, especially in more developed countries, is becoming increasingly gender-selective in favour of jobs typically fulfilled by women, for example in services, healthcare, and entertainment. Second, changing gender relations in some countries of origin, for example across the Maghreb, mean that women have more independence to migrate than previously. Third and especially in South-East Asia, there has been a growth in the migration of women for domestic work (sometimes called the ‘maid trade’); organized migration for marriage (sometimes referred to as ‘mail order brides’); and the trafficking of women into the sex industry (Koser 2007).

Another important consideration in any discussion of the human security of migrants is that a significant proportion is in circumstances of irregular or unauthorized migration. By definition irregular migrants are difficult to count and characterize; many of those included in the figures may not be workers, but rather family members (Koser 2010; See also McAuliffe, Chap. 11, this volume). Demographic analysis plays a role in meeting these challenges. With the advantage of multiple statistical systems, demographic estimation has served as a route to establish the size and population geographic characteristics of unauthorized populations. Using residual estimation techniques Warren and Warren (2013) estimated that there are between 10 and 11 million unauthorized migrants in the United States alone. Between 1.5 and 10 million irregular migrants have been estimated in the Russian Federation (Vitkovskaia 2004). In 2007, the Council of Europe reported an estimate of 4.5 million irregular migrants in the European Union which by then encompassed 27 states (Council of Europe 2007a, b). Turning finally to global estimates, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated in 2004 that between 10 and 15 per cent of the world’s immigrant stock were in an irregular situation (ILO 2004). Using UN measures of world’s foreign born population in 2015, this would amount to some 24 and 37 million irregular migrants; Chamie analyzed UN data on the foreign born and refugees to estimate the global population of unauthorized migrants at around 50 million (Chamie 2016).

Social and economic diversity among irregular migrants is critical to acknowledge. Some migrants are highly-skilled and work at the upper end of the labour market. Indeed there is growing competition for a limited pool of global talent among both states and private corporations. But most migrants (including some who are highly-skilled) work in low-skilled occupations, the informal sector, and engage in so-called 3D jobs that are dirty, dangerous, and difficult – for example in heavy industry, agriculture, mining, and forestry. This is particularly the case for irregular migrants. For discussion about human security, it is migrant workers at the lower end of the labour market who are most at risk of harm, unsafe working conditions and human rights violations.

Within this wide range of migrant worker profiles, certain categories are of particular concern with regards to the protection of their rights, especially children, domestic workers, and those involved in ‘forced labour’. Domestic workers, for example, are estimated to comprise up to 10% of total employment in some countries, and half of them are migrants, yet almost every country excludes domestic work from its national labour laws (see ILO 2013). The types of conditions of concern typically include threat or physical harm to the worker; restriction of movement and confinement to the workplace or to a limited area; debt bondage; withholding of payment or excessive wage reductions; retention of passports and identity documents, and threat of denunciation to the authorities where the worker has an irregular immigration status. Migrant workers with irregular status – including the victims of migrant smuggling and human trafficking – are especially vulnerable to exploitation in work. Women constitute a substantial proportion of the many migrants with irregular status. Because they are confronted with gender-based discrimination, female migrants with irregular status are often obliged to accept the most menial informal sector jobs. Such can be the level of abuse of their human rights that some commentators have compared contemporary human trafficking with the slave trade (O’Connell Davidson 2010). Sex trade workers in particular also face specific health-related risks, including exposure to HIV/AIDS. The gendered nature of migrant work and occupation demands analyses, both quantitative and qualitative, that disaggregates by sex and ideally broad age groups.

Besides the feminization of migration and the growth in irregular migration, the effects of the global financial crisis constitute a third trend affecting the human security of some groups of migrants (Koser 2010). Since 2008, job losses for migrant workers have been recorded around the world, especially in employment sectors that are most sensitive to economic cycles, such as construction, manufacturing, financial services, retail, travel and tourism. Unemployment rates for foreign nationals have increased in the Russian Federation, Spain, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States. In Malaysia and Singapore labour market policies have been put in place to encourage employers to retrench migrant workers first, and to replace them with unemployed nationals. More significant than unemployment, however, have been deteriorating working and living conditions for migrant workers. There have been press reports from the Russian Federation, Malaysia and Singapore of non-payment of wages for foreign workers; and reductions in wages, working days, and the availability of overtime. Sporadic instances of discrimination against

migrant workers and a rise in xenophobia have also been recorded, including in Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

Of course it is not just the migrants themselves who may be affected in this way: their families in destination countries will also suffer the consequences of a reduced income. Analysis at the household level is particularly important. In some cases changing regulations have made it more difficult for migrants to exercise their right to family reunion, thus extending periods of separation. As alluded to above even settled ethnic communities may become the target for growing anti-immigration sentiment and action. Impacts may also be felt by families and family members remaining in the country and community of origin. During the global financial crisis in 2008–2009, for example, a reduction in remittances had a wider impact, on families and sometimes entire communities, in countries of origin. In Tajikistan, for example, remittances have provided a lifeline for many families, adding on average USD 250 to the annual income of every household in 2008 (and also representing over 45% of national GDP). A heavy reliance on remittances, a poorly diversified national economy, and inadequate access to other sources of external revenue, make countries like Tajikistan and the people living there extremely vulnerable to the effects of economic crisis. And in the absence of adequate social safety nets, the poor are likely to be the hardest hit.

12.6 Conclusions

The overarching theme of this chapter has been that far more – and better – evidence, research, and analysis – including on demography and demographic impacts – is required to make justifiable claims about the linkages between migration and security and to inform effective policy. In the absence of such data, as has been demonstrated, there is a risk that misperceptions will abound and expand, with serious implications for migrants as well as the policy process. Parallel to providing a conceptual outline of issues concerning dimensions of relationships between migration and security, I have sought to offer illustrations of an increased role for demographic analysis in documenting, monitoring and reconsidering these relationships. Specific and illustrative research gaps have been identified serving to underscore the general challenge of the paucity of evidence concerning the interrelationships between migration and security. Social demography serves as a necessary analytic framework for developing in the first place descriptions of the connections among migration, migrant groups and security, and second, specification of relationships.

Several obligations from social scientists emerge from this exercise. First, we need to understand better how migration has come to be linked with security so unquestioningly by so many analysts and policy-makers, as well as members of the public. A second task is to develop a much more specific, nuanced, and conditional understanding of the links between migration and national security, for example examining whether certain migrants are more likely to pose a challenge than others, and if so in what circumstances. Social demographic research is fundamental to

generating this knowledge. Third, and at a more conceptual level, it has been noted that national security and human security are in fact inextricably linked and not polar opposites, and understanding these linkages in the migration context will be important. Fourth, a gap has been identified between perceptions and realities of migration and security, and this should be explained and narrowed. Fifth, it has been noted that within the overall shortage of research on migration and security, particular gaps pertain to the impact of migration on security in host countries in poorer parts of the world, as well as in origin countries. Considering these impacts at different geographic scales (migrants, households, communities and regions) is important. Finally, while there may be emerging evidence on the human security of migrants, this research serves only to highlight the pressing priority in policy to address the need for protection of vulnerable migrant groups.

Two other themes have arisen during the course of this chapter. One is the need to promote an objective debate on migration and security. The ‘securitization’ of migration may be ill-informed and deleterious, but it has occurred, and there is an onus on researchers to engage critically. Second, there is no need for this debate necessarily to be cast in negative terms. As alluded to in this chapter, there may be grounds to suppose that well-managed migration can enhance, not threaten, national security, by promoting economic growth, social diversification, and political democracy. Demographers, economists and other social scientists can shed balanced light on these issues through research that also reports the positive impacts of refugees for countries of origin and destination, for community development and human well being.

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Chapter 13

Return to Home: Reintegration and Sustainability of Return to Post-conflict Contexts

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13.1 Introduction

The return of migrants and refugees to countries of origin is one of the main issues related in the migration literature (King 1978; Gmelch 1980; Black and Koser 1999). In historical periods, industrialization led to displacement and migration of large groups of labor migrants between various countries. The most striking example of this can be seen in Western Europe in the nineteenth century. These movements of labor forces were considered by host countries as temporary, and when the economic downturns happened or the need for foreign workers was satisfied, they tried to send the workers back to their homes and prevent the entry of more workers. However, most of these attempts had failed and many foreign workers not only stayed in the host countries, but also brought their families. This situation is not particular to Europe and has been experienced in other world regions and countries (see Castles and Miller 1998; Castles 2000; Castles et al. 2015).

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In addition to labor migrants, forced and refugee migrations have increased in scale and complexity especially in the twentieth century. This is largely due to the political, social, and economic transformations which not only transformed the geopolitical map of the world, but also changed its socio-economic foundations. For example, the two World Wars, independence movements, anti-colonial uprisings and civil wars, all led to the displacement and massive population movements on an international scale. Initially return was not considered as the preferred solution for the problem of migrants and refugees. In fact, local integration and resettlement were viewed as the main options (Black and Gent 2006; Black and Koser 1999). After the end of the Cold War, the international community's position on refugees and migrants changed. Some northern countries enforced strict measures enacted to deal with refugees (Chimni 2002), and several return programs were initiated.

In the early 1990s, there was much optimism towards the end of the Cold War and its impact on the return of refugees. Some larger returns and repatriations happened than in previous decades as a result of which the 1990s was named the 'decade of repatriation' (Black and Koser 1999; Loescher et al. 2008). However, despite the mass return of refugees, total global refugee population increased immediately after the end of the Cold War. Civil conflicts and wars in other parts of the world (such as Yugoslavia, Libya, Angola and Afghanistan) added to the figures of refugees and displaced persons (Black and Koser 1999). The beginning of the twenty-first century coincided with 9/11 and US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. A few years later, due to widespread political turmoil in such Arabic countries as Libya, Syria and Iraq as well as the recent war in Yemen, new waves of refugees moved to neighboring countries and Europe.

Given the impacts of such conflicts and movements, it is not surprising that forced migration and refugees are currently among the most critical issues faced by governments and communities of both sending and receiving countries. Since the return of refugees and migrants is still a preferred solution to the issue (and actually in many cases, mass returns and repatriations happen after wars), this chapter aims to review the concepts of 'return' and its 'sustainability', and gives a more comprehensive definition of 'reintegration' as the key to sustainable return. Findings of a case study on the socio-economic reintegration of Afghan returnees from Iran will also be presented to better understand the social and demographic dimensions of return and reintegration processes of refugees.

13.2 Theoretical Approaches

Most mass returns and repatriations of refugees and displaced persons over the past decades have failed: returnees have faced poor socio-economic and political situations on the return and some refugees have preferred to re-migrate, either to the previous host country or to a third country. This is particularly observed on returning to post-war contexts. Thus, it is evident that the classical discourse of return/

repatriation¹ as a normal or expected solution to the problem of refugees is fraught with serious challenges (Hammond 1999), and that is why attention has been placed on the sustainability of returns. Here, sustainable return refers to the conditions in which the returnee is well integrated within origin community socially and economically.²

Migration scholars have adopted different approaches toward the concept of 'return migration' to identify the process and its determinants in order to improve the sustainability of returns. Theoretical frameworks toward return migration, according to Cassarino (2004), are mainly divided into two categories. The first includes neo-classical, new economics of labor migration and structural ones which usually consider return as the end of the migration cycle. The second includes transnationalism and social networks which see return not as an end, but one of the many stages of migration cycle. The former approach usually deals with the effects of micro and macro structural factors on countries of origin and host. The transnationalism and social networks approach gives a greater role to the returnee in the analysis and put his/her connection with his/her family and friendship networks (Cassarino 2004, pp. 254–268). Note should be taken that each of these approaches explains part of the issues returnees faced and none can claim comprehensive understanding of return migration trends and its determinants. The reason is partly due to the fact that return to different contexts has its own dynamics and challenges, especially in the case of post-conflict contexts, and thus, it cannot be expected that the same factors and policies, essentially achieve the same result in different contexts.

13.2.1 Return to Home, and Its Determinants

It is not easy to define 'return'. There exist several problems in the case of migrants and refugees' return to their 'home'. One of the main problems is the concept of 'home' in the classic discourse of return (Hammond 1999, pp. 227–229). In this discourse, the return is seen as a natural solution for refugees and migrants. In fact, people are bound to a geographical location, but in reality, on the return to home country, they usually face an environment which has undergone many social, economic, and political changes. Furthermore, in long-term migration, there are second-generation migrants who have not seen their motherland and the concept of

¹As Bovenkerk (1974, p. 6) argued, 'the concept of repatriation has a special status because it has a surplus meaning that cannot be detached from the return movement per se.' Repatriation in this chapter refers to those returns which happen under the assistance of governments or international organizations like the UNHCR. We refer to return and repatriation interchangeably as it is difficult to distinguish between the two easily. Our focus in this chapter is on the return and repatriation of refugees and forced migrants.

²Several definitions have been proposed for sustainability of returns considering different aspects of return, but one of the main challenges for defining sustainability is how it is measured. Black and Gent (2006, pp. 25–29) elaborated some of the definitions of sustainability of return and the problems they face in measurement.

'homeland' is irrelevant for them (Bakewell 1996). As Hammond (1999) expressed, it should not be assumed that return is somehow a restoration of natural connection with motherland, ethnic culture and identity. It is a new beginning rather than return to the past. Therefore, it is simplistic to give a general definition for sustainable return which ignores the feelings and opinions of returnees, and does not consider the socio-economic and political situations of the origin country.

Return has been categorized based on different criteria (Bovenkerk 1974; Cerase 1974; Preston and Solomon 1993; Bakewell 1996). For example, Cerase (1974), based on the success or failure of migration experience and the effect of returnees on the communities of origins, divided return into four categories: failure return, conservative return, retirement return, and innovative return. On *failure return*, migrants return to their home country because they fail to adapt in the host societies. Some migrants, prior to their departure, make plans for their return in a way that after gaining enough money, they can buy necessary means to satisfy their own needs. This type of return is called *conservative return*. Some people also go back in order to spend their old ages in home country (*retirement return*). *Innovative return* refers to the return of those migrants who, by using the money and skills they have obtained in migration, try to bring some changes in the home society.

Cassarino (2008, p. 11), based on the decision to return, describes "decided" and "chosen" returns. He believes that not all returns happen as part of a "calculated strategy" and may be a result of some unexpected situations and policies that make the migrants and refugees go home. At the same time, he distinguishes between these two returns and voluntary return. Despite all the categorizations, refugees and forced migrants experience different social, political, and security situations, and thus, the time, strategy, pathway, as well as success and failure of their return vary.

Migration is a complex process and does not always lead to return. In most cases, some refugees do not return to their countries of origin or if return takes place, it does not necessarily mean that it is sustainable. There are always some returnees who after their return decide to re-migrate to their host or to a third country. The question arises as to why some refugees return to their homeland, and some still remain in the host country. Many scholars have tried to explain the process of decision making among returnees (e.g. Stepputat 2004; Harvey 2006; Kaun 2008; Black et al. 2004; Koser and Kuschminder 2015). For example, Koser and Kuschminder (2015, p. 12) argued that return's decision fundamentally is influenced by comparison between political, economic and social factors at home and abroad. Based on their model, individual factors and social relations, as well as policy interventions, affect the decision to return at different levels.

Figure 13.1 is an illustration of a general model of return migration that can be adapted to the return migration of refugees and forced migrants. Generally speaking, several factors have been mentioned as determinants of the decision to return which can be briefly summarized in two groups of contextual/structural and demographic factors. The first group refers to the situation of origin and host countries such as security, occupational and educational structures, land or housing ownership, and family/friends networks. The second group includes such demographic factors as age, sex, education, occupation, and marital status. Here, we briefly




Fig. 13.1 Factors determining of the decision to return (Source: Black et al. 2004, p. 13)

describe some of these factors which have great importance in the decision to return, especially to post-conflict contexts.

13.2.1.1 Contextual Factors

Security In countries with experiences of civil unrest and war, security is the key issue for the governments to restore peace and revive the political and socio-economic structures. The experiences of post-conflict societies in recent decades show that the absence of security not only minimizes the possibility of return, but also those who returned earlier will attempt to re-migrate either to their host or to other countries. Many refugees who sought refuge in neighboring countries are waiting for the end of conflicts and re-establishment of security to return to their homelands (Preston 1999; Steputat 2004; Koser and Kuschminder 2015; IOM 2015; Turton and Marsden 2002).

Professional and Educational Structures of Origin and Destination Countries Immigrants and refugees, before making any decision for return, evaluate the job market in their host country and then compare it with economic opportunities in the country of origin. If the job market in the home country is not ready to attract and make opportunities to them, many will remain in the host country and even may encourage their family and friends to join them. On the other hand, in some cases, less developed societies which experienced a long period of war and conflict, have more job opportunities for refugees who have gained more skills and education in exile. However, due to the destruction and deterioration of the economic infrastructure of these countries, it takes time to bring about the conditions needed for return of many refugees with less education. In addition, if the educational system in the home country could not respond to the needs of returnees, the refugees may be hesitant about their return or at least postpone it until they (and their children) gain enough education and skills (Arowolo 2000; Setrana and Tonah 2014; Koser and Kuschminder 2015; IOM 2015; Kaun 2008).

Land and House Ownership In addition to material wealth and saving, owning land or house in the host and origin countries are seen as important factors influencing the decision of refugees to return to their homeland. On the return, often the first thing to do is building or finding a house. This means that many of those who return, in the first step try to buy land or house with their savings from the period of migration. Some of them may plan for their housing prior to their return by sending remittance. Migrants without savings or those without home or land in the country of origin are usually less likely than others to return (Arowolo 2000; Stepputat 2004; Setrana and Tonah 2014; UNCHR 2009).

Family and Friendship Networks Links and networks of family and friends are of great importance throughout the process of migration. Refugees tend to consult with their families and friends about the decision to migrate. Their evaluation of the economic situation, opportunities and shortcomings as well as their assessment of the level of security may encourage or discourage refugee's return to home country. Also, when refugees need financial or social and psychological support, they rely on their networks. Moreover, information which is critical in decision making about return, is obtained through these networks. Based on the information that they acquire about the possibility of return and the situation of home country, some refugees choose to return and others prefer to stay (Boyd 1989; Stepputat 2004; Setrana and Tonah 2014; IOM 2015).

13.2.1.2 Demographic Factors

As mentioned earlier, in addition to contextual factors, the process of return is influenced by demographic characteristics of refugees. For example, refugees who migrated at young ages and stayed in the host country for a long time, or those who were born of refugee parents (second generation), and if they become integrated socially and economically in the host society, their return is less likely. On the other hand, those refugees whose migration occurred during their adulthood tend to return

after the end of war or conflict. Women are also less likely than men to return, especially in post-war societies. Those who gained high education but are unable to find proper jobs in the host country usually return to get better opportunities in their country of origin (e.g. Black and Gent 2006; Koser and Kuschminder 2015, also see Kraly, Chap. 7, this volume).

13.3 Reintegration as a Baseline for the Sustainability of Return

Most social demographic studies on return migration have focused on the reasons behind and factors influencing the decision to return (Ruben et al. 2009; Stepputat 2004; Courtland 2006; Preston 1999; Black and Koser 1999; Setrana and Tonah 2014). Similarly, the main concern of many states, institutions, and organizations dealing with migrants and refugees has been the actual return of refugees and migrants, but they have not considered the situation and lives of refugees after return. This explains the gap in the literature on the life of returnees after their return. After the failure experiences of most returnees, ‘sustainability’ has become of great importance, and ‘reintegration’ has been increasingly considered as the key to sustainable return.

‘Reintegration’ is defined as the process of re-integration of the returnee into the home society. Some define reintegration as the resumption of life and social relations, similar to the situation before migration or asylum or similar to the situation of indigenous people (Annan et al. 2011). According to Eastmond (2006), reintegration corresponds with attempts to convert short-term assistance to longer-term development efforts; development involving the local people. Some consider this concept as a process that avoids the marginality of the returnee by removing all legal, linguistic and cultural barriers, as well as securing the ability of the returnee to take effective decisions about the future, and to use all the present opportunities to reintegrate in the society (Refugee Council 1997). UN High Commissioner for Refugees defined reintegration as: “the achievement of a sustainable return; in other words, the ability of returning refugees to secure the political, economic, legal and social conditions to maintain their life, livelihood and dignity” (UNHCR 2004, p. 4).

Despite the different definitions and criteria to assess the successfulness of returns, the aforementioned definitions are all loyal to the classic discourse of return (Hammond 1999). As indicated earlier, many returnees, such as second-generation refugees and immigrants or those who have moved to a new part of the country of origin, cannot be practically included in the definition of reintegration because they face an entirely new experience on return. Moreover, there are few studies that examine the lived experiences of returnees about their reintegration. For example, Kaun (2008) examines the perception of returnees about the concept of reintegration and provides two sets of indices (institutional and individual dimensions) for using the case of the reintegration of returnees in Angola. Kaun argues that to understand post-war reintegration, both institutional and individual dimensions of the

process should be considered. Returnees and “war-affected civilians are not helpless and should not be presented as such. Their own agency in reintegration process should be acknowledged and promoted” (Kaun 2008, p. 37).

Since refugees return in different conditions and to different contexts, it is critical to distinguish between various dimensions of reintegration. Usually, on issues related to reintegration, there are three dimensions – economic, social and political – which are most addressed (Koser and Kuschminder 2015). Other dimensions such as the cultural, psychological, legal, structural (Myers 1999) and physical (Schaffer 1994) integration are also investigated. For purposes of this discussion we give emphasis to the former set of dimensions: economic, social and political.

Economic Dimensions Economic reintegration is defined as “the ability of returnees to find a place in labor market of the country of origin after returning, along with good jobs and enough incomes, so that they can meet their livelihood needs properly” (Strand et al. 2008, p. 9). Detailed analysis of background characteristics of immigrants and refugees is the main precondition for the success of their economic reintegration. Such variables as skills obtained, reasons for migration, the type of job, and amount of money saved during migration, and access to land or housing are among these variables. The situation of labor market and job opportunities in the home country is another concern in this dimension that has direct effects on the reintegration of returnees. In the case of mass returns, ignoring these factors will result in unemployment, lack of resources and tension between locals and returnees (Arowolo 2000; IOM 2015; Kaun 2008).

Social Dimensions social reintegration requires understanding of the cultural context, both the country of origin and the country of destination (Arowolo 2000). This process can be very slow or with difficulties and depends on such factors as time away from home, age at the time of departure, the scale of integration in host country, and nature and intensity of ties with the home in exile (Black and Koser 1999). On the other hand, such demographic characteristics as age, gender, ethnicity, generation, duration of migration, marital status, and education are among factors determining reintegration. The outcome of social reintegration due to these factors may be the acceptance of returnees in the society or their marginalization.

Political Dimensions Usually refugees are politically playing a great role in the development of their communities (Arowolo 2000). Returnees who are equipped with high levels of education and political experience are more eager to enter the political circles because they have more material and human capital at hand. In some contexts, the political situation is not ready to accept returnees, especially in ethnically diverse societies, where return of a group may have political benefits to a specific ethnic group (Chimni 2004; Stepputat 2004).

It is important to note that economic, social and political dimensions are not mutually exclusive and the successful and sustainable reintegration of refugees in the home society is an interwoven process of these dimensions as elaborated in the following section.

13.3.1 *Factors Influencing Successful Reintegration*

As mentioned earlier, when returning to the country of origin – particularly in post-war societies – refugees are confronted with an environment that is completely new or different in many ways. Naturally, the current political, economic and social situations have significant effects on returnees. Moreover, the experience of the returnee before migration (in the country of origin) and during migration (in the host country) have their own effects on the process of reintegration (Cassarino 2004). However, few studies so far have been conducted to examine the reintegration process by considering all of these stages and factors together.

The following model is developed in order to find a better and comprehensive understanding of the reintegration of returnees. As depicted in Fig. 13.2, reintegration is not only influenced by the situation of country of origin, but also by the experience before migration, experience during migration, and the return experience itself as well as demographic and contextual factors. According to the model, reintegration is a process under the influence of all of the stages of the migratory and return experiences of the returnees. These steps are bound together and have affect each other. Considering each of these steps, without the effect it has from previous steps, and the impact it has on next steps, gives an incomplete, defective perspective toward reintegration. The ‘sum’ of the outcomes of these various stages determines the success of the socio-economic reintegration of the returnee, so that successful reintegration will lead to a stable economic situation and social acceptance, while failure will cause social exclusion and instability in job and income. The discussion on the impact of each of these stages and factors on the reintegration of refugees and returnees into the home society follows.

Experiences Before Migration One of the stages that often is neglected in investigating the reintegration of migrants and refugees, is the experience of one’s life before migration. For example, reintegration of a person who before migration had a higher education degree, through the effect it has on the next step, is different from someone who has no education. The same applies to the social and economic situation before migration. Some of the major variables related to this stage that must be taken into account in the assessment of reintegration of returnees are as follows: age at migration, urban-rural life, education, employment status, marital status, economic situation and welfare, as well as reasons to migrate. These factors are important particularly because of their effects through the success or failure of the migration experience in the host country.

Experiences of Migration in the Host Country Some studies have been conducted on the impact of migration experience in the host country over the process of reintegration (Carmon 1981; Setrana and Tonah 2014). As noted earlier, it is assumed that those who fled from their home due to war and insecurity usually return after the end of these situations. There are many factors that affect the decision-making process for return so that return may be postponed or never happened. For example,




Fig. 13.2 Stages and factors influencing reintegration

refugees who migrate at young ages or those who were born in exile (second generation), are less expected to return to their motherland if they can integrate socially and economically in the host community. On the other hand, refugees who migrate at older ages are more likely to return. Education, skills and capital obtained in exile are other factors that have direct effect on the reintegration after return. Returnees with considerable capital and skills, usually try to launch their own businesses in public or private sectors. The amount of material and human resources obtained in exile differs. Depending upon the situation and policies of the host country toward refugees, those who migrate sooner and have more migration experience are expected to have more resources upon return. Those who have spent more time in the host country are expected to have more resources for economic and social integration. Some of the important variables that affect the course of the process of reintegration are: length of stay in the host country, the reasons for migration, the host country's economic situation and welfare, employment status, social status and degree of adaptation to the host community, living in the city/village, type of proof of residence (legal or undocumented), as well as education and skills obtained in the host country.

Return Experiences and Decision-Making Process The decision to return is not a simple decision and needs preparation and the making of plans (Cassarino 2004). These plans and preparations mostly happen at the household level. During this decision-making process, women and children may not be happy about the decision to return, but some situations like being dissatisfied with the current situation, bad and improper treatment by the host society, and unemployment make them return. On the other hand, older people may be more eager to go back to their home country due to nostalgia, and high cost of living in the host country. Some youth may prefer to return in order to find better opportunities and have access to services which are not available to them in host societies. Some others, for the social networks they developed in migration or because of the improper situation in the home country, may remain in exile.

Demographic and Contextual Factors Such demographic factors as age, sex, education, ethnicity, religion, income, marital status, place of birth, generation (first or second generation) can affect the reintegration process. Selected contextual factors affecting reintegration include land/house ownership, the composition of neighbors (all returnees, non-returnees, or mixed), city/place of residence, satisfaction, perceived discrimination, type of return (voluntary or forced), length of stay in the host country, and length of return to the country of origin (see Turton and Marsden 2002; Stepputat 2004; Setrana and Tonah 2014; Koser and Kuschminder 2015; IOM 2015).

The model presented and discussed above provides a framework for considering the factors influencing the sustainability of return and gives particularly light on the degree to which policies are inclusive and integrative of processes of return and repatriation. A successful return and repatriation program should consider various stages of return, and different dimensions of reintegration.

13.4 Reintegration and Sustainability of Return of Afghans: A Case Study

During the last three decades, due to the Soviet invasion and civil war, Afghanistan produced one of the greatest refugee populations in the contemporary world. Afghanistan was on top of the list of refugee sending countries for three decades, and Pakistan and Iran were the two main host countries of Afghan refugees (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005; Glazebrook and Abbasi-Shavazi 2007; Abbasi-Shavazi and Sadeghi 2014, 2016). With the withdrawal of the Red Army in 1989, returns of Afghan refugees began, and during 1992–1995 around 1.3 million Afghans returned from Iran to their home country (Abbasi-Shavazi and Sadeghi 2014). However, due to civil war the return process slowed down. The rise of Taliban government (1996–2001) launched a new wave of forced migration, especially to Iran and Pakistan. In 2001, the fall of the Taliban followed by the establishment of the Hamid Karzai government led to the resumption of returns (McCleskey 2002), and by 2006, 883,317 Afghan refugees returned from Iran through Voluntary Programs, and 624,566 outside of the program (Mahmoudian 2007; See also Habibi and Hunte 2006). Despite these returns, around 2.5 million Afghan refugees and migrants still live in Iran including 950,000 Amayesh Card holders,³ 450,000 with passports, and another one million undocumented (Hamshahrionline 2015).⁴

Given the large number of refugees and their length of stay in Iran as well as political, social and economic consequences, the question of the repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran is of utmost importance for the Afghan government, host governments, and relevant international agencies. The return experience of Afghan refugees from Iran to their home country provides a suitable ground for exploring the issues and hypotheses about return, reintegration, as well as its determinants and sustainability.

The 2015 Survey of Afghan Returnees from Iran to Afghanistan was conducted in Afghanistan by the authors of this chapter to examine the process of their reintegration and sustainability of their return. The survey was conducted in the three cities of Kabul, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, that are the main destinations of returnees. The survey covered 425 returnees aged 18 years old and above who had the experience of migration to Iran.

The findings of the survey revealed that war, insecurity, and economic hardship situation were the main reasons for migration to Iran. The respondents referred to religious similarity, presence of family, relatives or friends, and security in Iran as the main reasons for choosing Iran as destination. They were mainly settled in the cities of Tehran, Qom, Mashhad, Isfahan and Shiraz. Of all respondents, 86.9% had some kind of document (i.e., Amayesh ID card, Passport, etc.) while the rest were undocumented. They were mostly employed in manual and construction jobs and

³A census carried out periodically by Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs (BAFIA) to identify foreign nationals.

⁴Figures released by the Interior Minister, Rahmani Fazli, at the Islamic Consultative Assembly is 2015.

service sectors. Around one fifth were illiterate, and the rest had different levels of education. While living in Iran, half of the respondents had regular contacts with their family members, relatives or friends in Afghanistan and even sent remittances to them.

On return, 34% of returnees returned alone and the other 66% returned with their family. Most of the returns occurred between 2002–2006 during the Karzai government in Afghanistan. Respondents referred to the end of civil war, restoration of peace and security in Afghanistan as the main reasons for returning to Afghanistan. Family members and relatives had the largest share in the decision-making process. They returned either through voluntary programs, spontaneous return, or forced return. Most voluntary returns happened during 2002–2006 and after that voluntary returns have declined. This is partly due to the worsening security situation and re-emergence of the Taliban in different parts of Afghanistan. The returnees settled in the cities of Kabul, Herat and Mazar-e Sharif mainly due to the presence of family members and friends as well as prospective job opportunities.

Economic and social reintegration of the returnees was assessed by using several related items.⁵ Respondents were classified in three categories of ‘low’, ‘middle’ and ‘high’ economic reintegration based on the measure. The results showed that 16.4% of the respondents had been able to fully integrate into Afghan society economically. On the other hand, 41% had low integration and were less able to find a good job or earn a good income. However, 43.0% of respondents had a relatively satisfactory life economically: i.e., they could find a respectable job and income and could afford to pay their living expenses, while occasionally facing financial challenges (Fig. 13.3).

The relationship between demographic (age, sex, education, ethnicity, religion, marital status, generation, and type of document), and contextual variables (length of return to home, neighborhood composition, housing ownership, structural satisfaction, return type, feeling of discrimination, length of migration in Iran, and city of residence) with economic reintegration were examined. The results showed ethnicity, education, type of document, structural satisfaction, return type, discrimination, housing ownership, and city of residence had significant impact on economic reintegration. The result shows that the level of economic reintegration also increases with the level of education. Respondents with college degree and diploma were more integrated economically than the rest of respondents. Illiterate respondents had the lowest level of economic reintegration; due to lack of expertise, they have to compete with the native workers (who generally have low education and are unskilled) in the labor market. Those who returned voluntarily had more opportunity to get prepared for return and bring resources with themselves to facilitate their reintegration while forced returnees did not have this chance and had a lower level

⁵To assess the economic reintegration levels, three dimensions were measured: stability and security of job, stability and security of income, and feeling of discrimination (in job and labor market). Then, 15 items were designed for these dimensions. To assess the reliability of each item, Cronbach’s alpha was used which was equal to 68%. Six dimensions were used for social reintegration levels consisting of 24 items. The reliability of the items was equal to 78%.




Fig. 13.3 Economic reintegration levels (%) of Afghan returnees from Iran to Afghanistan, 2015

of integration economically in Afghanistan. Having a house or land on return had direct impact of the level of economic reintegration. Those who did not own house/land on return faced more challenges with integration in the job market in Afghanistan. Also, returnees who had a higher level of structural satisfaction were the most advantaged and integrated group economically. In general, our multivariate analysis revealed that contextual variables have more impact on economic reintegration than demographic ones.

Furthermore, Afghan returnees were classified in three levels in terms of social reintegration (Fig. 13.4): high – (38%), middle – (31.5%), and low integrated (31%).

The relationship between demographic and contextual variables with social reintegration showed that all variables have impact on the level of social reintegration. Based on multivariate analysis, among demographic variables, age, sex, ethnicity, and education had strong relationships with social reintegration. Those in age groups 35–44 and 44+ years had higher level of social integration than other age groups which is partly due to their prior experience of living in Afghanistan. Younger age groups were mostly second generation with little or no experience of living in Afghanistan, and it is not surprising that they face challenges in social integration into Afghanistan society. Also, men were more integrated socially than women. Among the ethnic groups, Hazaras had the lowest levels while Pashtuns had the highest level of social integration. Those with lower level of education were more integrated in Afghan society socially, but those who had higher level of education found it more difficult to accept Afghanistan's values and customs.

Among the contextual factors, neighborhood composition, duration of migration, type of return, home ownership, and structural satisfaction were more significant. Those who resided in neighborhoods which mostly consisted of returnees had fewer opportunities to interact with others than those who resided in neighborhoods with locals and non-returnees. Also, returnees who were living in Iran for a long




Fig. 13.4 Social reintegration (%) of Afghan returnees from Iran to Afghanistan, 2015

time had a lower level of social reintegration as they were attached to Iranian values and culture. Those who were returned to Afghanistan voluntarily and returnees who had a house or land on return had higher levels of social reintegration. In addition, the level of social reintegration increases with increasing structural satisfaction.

13.4.1 Socio-economic Reintegration Patterns and Sustainability of Returns

As noted in the conceptual model, successful social and economic reintegration will lead to sustainable return. If the returnee could find a proper job in the labor market and gain a respectable income, they will remain and settle in the country and there will be less intention to re-migrate to the previous host or another country. Also, if the returnee could integrate socially in the society, feel attached to home, and the structural and contextual conditions are favorable to the integration process, they will be able to adapt to the values and behavioral norms of society of origin without major challenges. In such circumstances, the reintegration is successful and ‘sustainable return’ has occurred. However, if the situation deteriorates and the returnee fails to achieve economic and social stability, the possibility of sustainable return is reduced and migrants may re-migrate either to the earlier host or to a new destination.

Among Afghan returnees from Iran, 43% indicated that they want to stay in Afghanistan, 22% were still undecided and were waiting to see whether the conditions improve or not, and 36% had plans to re-migrate to Iran or to a third country (Fig. 13.5). Overall, more than half of returnees were planning to re-migrate or were not sure about their staying in Afghanistan.

As indicated in Table 13.1, most of those who desire to stay in Afghanistan are economically in good condition and have a high level of economic reintegration.




Fig. 13.5 Distribution (%) of Afghan returnees based on their future intention to stay or re-migrate, 2015

Table 13.1 Distribution (%) of respondents based on their future plans according to their social reintegration patterns

Reintegration		Staying in Afghanistan	Re-migrate	Undecided	N
Economic Reintegration Levels	Low	35.3	35.3	29.3	133
	Middle	39.7	42.6	17.7	141
	High	63.0	22.2	14.8	54
Social Reintegration Levels	Low	12.0	60.9	27.2	92
	Middle	37.9	36.3	25.8	240
	High	86.0	8.6	5.4	93

On the other hand, the greatest tendency to migrate to a third country is seen among those who have middle or low levels of economic reintegration. In fact, the better the economic situation of the returnee, the less intention he/she has to re-migrate. Thus, the economic situation has a direct impact on the willingness among Afghan returnees to stay or decide to re-migrate.

The results also reveal that those who are highly integrated socially are most likely to stay in Afghanistan. The low-integrated group had less desire to stay in Afghanistan and they want to emigrate to a third country or Iran. A considerable proportion of those with middle level of social reintegration also have a tendency to stay in Afghanistan or re-migrate. Indeed, those who are undecided about their intention for future are mostly among low levels of social and economic reintegration.

The results of our case study confirmed the plausibility and importance of our proposed model of various stages and factors influencing reintegration of refugees into the origin society. Despite social and political changes in Afghanistan in the recent decades, the country is still suffering from economic hardship and political instability (Katzman 2016; EASO 2016). The re-emergence of the Taliban in

Afghanistan has escalated the insecurity in recent years. They have expanded their activities to other parts of Afghanistan even in the north. For example, Talibs managed to take Kunduz city in September 2016 (Giustozzi and Ali 2016, p. 2). The hope that people of Afghanistan had during the Karzai government has not been realized, and the new government has not been able to provide a feeling of security and peace in the country.⁶ There are indications of ethnic cleansing in the society and even within the government. These factors influence the decision-making process for Afghan refugees in Iran and other countries who are willing to return to their country. The host countries are also under pressure not to implement the repatriation process. This explains why the return and repatriation process in these countries have slowed down in recent years.

The economic and political deterioration of the home society has not provided a positive ground for the reintegration of those who have returned or been repatriated to their home society. Lack or low investment caused by insecurity has led to high unemployment in Afghanistan, and particularly among returnees with less experiences in their home society. Furthermore, for those who lived in Iran and have had access to better education, health systems and other social services, it has been difficult to reintegrate into Afghanistan easily. Our results clearly showed that due to the unfavourable economic and social conditions in the country of origin, nearly half of returnees are reluctant to stay in the country or expressed that they intend to re-migrate. The majority of those who were willing to re-migrate to Iran and other countries experienced a low level of social reintegration. Security is a key issue that has a great role in post-war societies on the sustainability of returns. If security remains unstable, despite the relatively successful socio-economic reintegration, not only the returnees but the non-returnee population may also consider [re]migration as a survival strategy (see Monsutti 2008; Saito 2009); a case which is clearly seen in Afghanistan today.

In general, our results suggest that sustainable return has not occurred successfully among returnees in Afghanistan, and the process has partly failed. The high proportion of the respondents planning to re-migrate and move to third countries supports this claim.

13.5 Conclusion

Given the increased level and complexity of international migration and refugees, the return of refugees and migrants to countries of origin is one of the main topics of research and policy. Acceptance and adaptation of migrants and refugees in destination countries has been faced with many obstacles, and thus, their repatriation or return to the homeland is one of the main and important policies for the host and

⁶Even recent attempts of the government to make peace with the Taliban are not very optimistic. Afghan people are doubtful about these peace talks as no tangible results have been experienced and the insecurity and violence are growing (for more details about the attitudes of Afghans towards peace talks, see: Karimi and Ibrahim 2016).

home countries. However, the social, economic and security situation as well as capacity of the countries of origin are not generally favourable for absorbing returnees to their homeland. This calls for a comprehensive framework by which all dimensions and stages of the return are taken into account. In addition, instead of focusing only on the process of repatriation, the conditions and voices of refugees should be heard. Most of the research undertaken on the return and repatriation of refugees, ignore the attitude of returnees towards their return to their country of origin and, by focusing on return statistics, assessments are made on the success of return operations. However, when refugees are faced with difficult circumstances, they feel hopeless in coping with all social and economic problems. Emphasizing the concept of 'reintegration' in economic and social terms, this chapter illustrated that the return is not an end, but is rather one part of the migration process. The conceptual model of reintegration in this chapter provides a more comprehensive understanding of the process of return. In this framework, reintegration is the product of a process that includes the whole migration and return experiences of refugees.

A thorough analysis of the demographic, social and economic situations of refugees prior to, during, and after return to their homeland is vital in the understanding of the situation of refugees which will lead to their reintegration and sustainable return. Nevertheless, it should be noted that returns are not always successful, and some returnees may re-migrate due to various reasons. Further research on different dimensions of return could shed light on the difficulties and obstacles ahead of returnees and their sustainable return.

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Chapter 14

Forced Migration and Refugee Policy

Susan F. Martin

14.1 Introduction

Since 2011, the international refugee regime has faced dozens of both traditional and non-traditional challenges in identifying and implementing policies for the protection of refugees and displaced persons. The massive displacement in and from Syria has garnished the most attention but large scale movements in the context of conflicts in South Sudan, Central African Republic, Ukraine and elsewhere merit consideration as well. Earlier in the decade, the famine and long-term conflict in Somalia sent hundreds of thousands across the border into Kenya and Ethiopia while the crisis in Libya and political instability throughout North Africa caused more than one million to flee across international borders, some seeking asylum while others (mostly contract workers) tried to get to their own home countries as violence erupted in their destination countries. Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines displaced millions in 2013, leaving many in a situation of protracted upheaval.

Migration resulting from these natural and man-made events may correspond to current international, regional and national frameworks that are designed to protect and assist refugees—that is, persons who flee across an international boundary because of a well-founded fear of persecution—but often, these movements fall outside of the more traditional legal norms and policies. Yet, they have many characteristics in common with refugee movements. For example, they often take place in the context of political instability, countries of origin may not have the capacity or political will to protect their citizens from harm, an international response may be needed because of the scale of the migration, and the need for humanitarian assistance will likely overwhelm local capacities.

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This chapter focuses on international, regional and national legal norms, policies, organizational roles and relations and good practices that are applicable to the broader range of humanitarian crises that have migration consequences. The chapter examines movements stemming directly and indirectly from: persecution, armed conflict, extreme natural hazards that cause extensive destruction of lives and infrastructure; slower onset environmental degradation, such as drought and desertification, which undermine livelihoods; manmade environmental disasters, such as nuclear accidents, which destroy habitat and livelihoods; communal violence, civil strife and political instability; and global pandemics that cause high levels of mortality and morbidity. These crises lead to many different forms of displacement, including internal and cross border movements of nationals, evacuation of migrant workers, sea-borne departures that often involve unseaworthy vessels, and trafficking of persons. While the majority of those displaced from humanitarian crises move internally, a significant portion migrates cross borders to other countries.

The chapter will compare the paucity of legal, policy and institutional frameworks for addressing these other crises with the more abundant frameworks for addressing the consequences of refugee movements. Part 1 introduces the concepts of the chapter, defining the types of humanitarian crises that have migration consequences. It will have subsections discussing briefly the range of crises referenced above, describing the types of forced migration that occur as a result of each category of crisis. Part 2 focuses on the legal frameworks and policies available at the international, regional and national levels for addressing the migration consequences of these crises. Part 3 will discuss institutional arrangements for addressing the types of migration under review. Part 4 will present the conclusions of the chapter and discuss the policy implications of the findings. It also discusses the important role that demography can play in helping to improve responses to forced migration in the context of humanitarian crises.

14.2 Crises and Forced Migration

This section presents a typology for analyzing the nature of forced migration. The migration consequences—and the resulting policy frameworks—will differ along five principal dimensions: the precipitating drivers or *causes* of forced migration, the *intensity* of these drivers, the *geography* of the displacement, the *phase* of displacement, and the *affected populations* (Fig. 14.1).

First, forced migration-producing events differ by their *causes*. Some are primarily generated by natural causes whereas others are human made. In most cases, however, a governance failure is at the heart of the crisis whether the trigger is natural or human. Among examples of the drivers of displacement are:

- Persecution, torture and other serious human rights violations. The precipitator of forced migration that, as we will see, fits best into current legal and policy norms involves persecution of individuals or groups on the basis of such factors




Fig. 14.1 Typology of forced migration

as race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group (often used to address gender), and political opinion. Persecution can affect individuals or it can affect groups of people as defined by what are often referred to as immutable characteristics shared by large numbers of people. It often occurs in contexts in which there are no safeguards to protect racial, ethnic, religious, and other minorities who may be targeted by other groups. Persecution can involve serious physical or psychological harm (e.g., rape or torture), deprivation of one's liberty (e.g., imprisonment), forced removal or ethnic cleansing, severe economic deprivation, and other mechanisms that result in serious harm to the individual.

- **Armed conflict.** One of the principal drivers of forced migration is armed conflict. Although most displacement today occurs in the context of internal armed conflict, significant levels of forced migration accompany international armed conflict as well. Displacement may be a form of collateral damage as civilian populations get out of harm's way but in many conflicts forcing the relocation of civilians is an overt aim of one or another of the warring parties.
- **Political instability and violence.** The recent events in North Africa and the Middle East fit into this category, with millions fleeing violence perpetrated by the Islamic State (ISIS) and other terrorist and insurgent groups. Violence following contested elections in Kenya (2007), Zimbabwe (2008) and Cote d'Ivoire (2011) is another example of political instability that has generated violence that has resulted in large-scale displacement. Communal violence that does not rise to the situation of armed conflict, but nevertheless displaced large numbers, has occurred in and from the Karamoja region of Uganda, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and elsewhere. The violence can be between clans, ethnic groups, economic

competitors, religious groups or pastoralists claiming the same land. Violence can also be the product of drug cartels and gangs that fight each other or government authorities.

- **Natural hazards.** Recent examples of crises resulting from extreme natural hazards that have had migration impacts include hurricanes/cyclones (e.g., Hurricanes Mitch and Stan in Central America and Cyclone Nargis in Burma/Myanmar), tsunamis (e.g., Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Somalia in 2004 and Japan in 2011), flooding (e.g., Pakistan in 2010), earthquakes (e.g., Haiti in 2010); and prolonged droughts (Somalia in 2011). Generally, the hazard itself does not cause the crisis; a lack of national and local governance, lack of emergency preparedness, lack of adequate building codes, high levels of poverty and similar weaknesses in local and national capacity lead to crisis conditions. Experiences with mass displacement after Hurricane Katrina show that even very wealthy countries are not immune to such disasters, but stable, more economically advanced countries generally have greater capacity to assist their citizens. The differences in deaths and displacement from earthquakes in Haiti and Chile in 2010 are indicative. Although the seismic level of the Chilean earthquake was much greater than that in Haiti, the level of destruction was much greater in Haiti, which is one of the poorest countries in the world and suffered from decades of political instability. The 2012 earthquake in Mexico is another case in point. An albeit more intense earthquake in 1985 led to tens of thousands of deaths, but the recent experience demonstrated that new building codes, emergency preparations and timely response could reduce casualties to a handful.
- **Man-made environmental crises.** Man-made crises include nuclear/chemical/biological accidents and attacks, accidental or deliberate setting of fires, and similar situations that make large areas uninhabitable and cause displacement. The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in 1986, for example, resulted in the evacuation of more than 100,000 people within days. The earthquake and tsunami in Japan led to further crisis when nuclear power plants lost their capacity to cool reactors, forcing the evacuation of thousands.
- **Pandemics.** Recent experiences with the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), avian flu, and the H1N1 virus indicate that pandemics can pose serious migration consequences. First identified as a disease in 2003, the SARS virus causes a form of pneumonia that results in acute breathing difficulties and may result in death. Highly contagious, SARS infected more than 8000 people in two dozen countries in Asia, Europe, and the Americas within weeks of its discovery (CDC Basic Information about SARS, May 3, 2005). Although avian influenza A viruses usually do not infect humans, since November 2003, according to the Centers for Disease Control, “nearly 400 cases of human infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses have been reported by more than a dozen countries in Asia, Africa, the Pacific, Europe and the Near East.” Although transmission is from poultry to humans, epidemiologists are concerned that the virus may change and allow for human to human infection. Experience with the H1N1 virus demonstrates how quickly a pandemic could spread. In April 2009, the World Health Organization declared the outbreak of influenza from the H1N1

virus to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. By the end of the month, 11 countries had reported confirmed incidents. One week later, the number had grown to 22 countries and by the end of May, 53 countries officially reported 15,510 cases, including 99 deaths. By the end of the year, more than 200 countries had reported cases and the death rate exceeded 12,000.

This classification system, though useful in understanding the causes of crises with migration impacts, is not composed of pure types because there are often overlaps among the factors that create disasters. For example, an acute natural hazard and political instability may intersect to drive people from their homes. In fact, as stated above, an absence of good governance is almost always one of the factors that is present when forced displacement occurs. Demographic trends, while not usually directly linked to displacement, also intersect with each of these causes to increase or decrease a population's vulnerability or resilience. The demographic composition of the affected population also helps determine whether specific households or individuals will need to migrate. These may differ, however, depending on the causation. For example, adolescent and young men may be at particular risk of forced recruitment in conflict situations, necessitating flight if they do not wish to participate in the fighting. On the other hand, the elderly and young children may be at higher risk of starvation in the case of protracted drought, as discussed below.

A second dimension of the typology is the *intensity* of the driving factors. The division is broadly between *acute crises* and *slow-onset emergencies*. The former often lead to emergency displacements that are readily defined as "forced migration" because conditions in home countries or communities are seen as the primary reasons that people leave. By contrast, the displacement generated by slow-onset situations is often seen as voluntary and often anticipatory migration and may have elements of labor migration. Slower-onset crises arise in a number of different contexts. Prolonged drought is a principal cause of displacement for millions who are reliant on subsistence agriculture and pastoralist activities. Recurrent droughts undermine livelihoods when crops fail and livestock are sold or die because of inadequate rain and depletion of other water sources. When markets do not function in a manner that allows a redistribution of food to drought-affected populations, migration becomes one of the principal ways to cope with losses caused by the environmental change. Since many of the affected populations resemble others who migrate to obtain better economic opportunities, it may be difficult to distinguish those whose loss of livelihood is environmentally-related. In worse case examples, when (for example) drought combines with conflict or other political factors to preclude food distribution in communities of origin, famine may be in the offing. When affected populations have exhausted all of their other coping capacities, they may be forced to migrate or suffer starvation. Often, children, the elderly and those with pre-existing illnesses are among the first to succumb to famine in the absence of alternatives. They are also the least likely to be able to migrate without assistance. The third dimension is *geography*—where and how the displacement takes place.

In almost all of the situations that are discussed above, most migration is internal or into neighboring countries that share a contiguous border. A smaller proportion

of the movements are to countries outside of the immediate region of the crisis. Currently, those who cross international borders are designated as ‘refugees’¹ or ‘international migrants’ whereas those who remain within their national borders are ‘internally displaced persons’ or ‘internal migrants.’

How migrants leave their own countries, pass through transit countries, and enter destination countries also affect designations. Some migrants may have received permission to enter another country while others travel without documentation or otherwise on an “irregular” basis. Sea-borne migrants, particularly those in small, unseaworthy boats, face dangers not only from variability in the weather but also from pirates and others who prey on them. Migrants using smugglers may be routed through multiple countries before reaching their final destination. Those crossing difficult land terrains may find themselves endangered as they attempt irregular entry across deserts and mountains. While these irregular means of transit may be common when there is political instability or natural disasters, pandemics present another geographic challenge. Airports and seaports often become the focal point for action, especially when governments establish policies to quarantine those who may be carrying the disease.

The fourth dimension relates to *timing*. The migration consequences of crises take different forms and must be addressed through different mechanisms depending on the phase of displacement or movement and its duration. Some of the causes discussed above produce protracted crises whereas others lead to more temporary dislocations. For example, some cases of political instability are quickly resolved and new governments put in place but others drag on for years with no resolution in sight. Similarly, reconstruction after some extreme natural hazards moves ahead quickly and people are able to return to their homes with little loss of livelihoods, but in other cases, return is delayed or impossible because governments have too little capacity to implement reconstruction programs, there is such great likelihood of recurrence of the same type of natural hazard, and/or the home community has been damaged beyond repair. In extreme cases, an entire country may become uninhabitable (for example, Montserrat after the volcano and potentially, small island States as a result of climate change). In these cases, return may be impossible. These phases may play out differently for different populations affected by the same triggering event depending on their personal or household circumstances. They are also not necessarily linear; for example, those who return may find themselves engulfed in new crises and experience new displacements.

Needs and frameworks differ depending on the stage of the crisis. The first stage is pre-crisis, when actions to prevent, mitigate and help individuals adapt to the causes that may force them to move take place. Of particular importance is disaster risk reduction, which involves “systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal

¹ Refugees, as discussed below, have a specific status in international law. The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee defines refugees as persons who are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their home countries because of a “well- founded fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.”

factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events” (UNISDR 2009). Disaster risk reduction does not prevent the extreme natural hazard from occurring but it helps communities to cope with their damaging effects. In some worse case examples, the only option to reduce the risk of disaster may be relocation from fragile areas.

Identifying and addressing demographic and socio-economic vulnerabilities is essential since the “characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset ... make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard” (UNISDR 2009). Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals would have positive impact in enhancing the ability of people to cope with crises in situ. More broadly, economic, social and human development—with the aims of reducing poverty, increasing access to livelihoods, education and literacy, improving health outcomes, maintaining sustainable environments, etc.—will reduce long-term emigration pressures while giving people increased human security. Appropriate interventions will depend on the demographics of the affected populations.

Equally important, given the highly political nature of many of these emergencies, are efforts to improve governance in countries that are prone to crises. Effective governance not only helps mitigate the risks associated with natural and human made hazards (through such preventive actions as earthquake-resistant building codes or public health measures to lessen pandemic risks) but it also helps reduce tensions that can escalate into conflict. Early warning mechanisms can help trigger conflict resolution and mediation processes to reduce the potential for communal or political violence.

The second stage is the migration itself, with rights and needs differing depending on the form and stage of migration as well as the demographic and socio-economic composition of those who move. Those who have recently migrated will generally have greatest need for such basics as housing, employment, orientation to the social, cultural and political norms of the destination, and some knowledge of the host country’s language.² Over time, those who remain in the destination may have need for assistance to integrate more fully into the host community—for example, skills training to move up the economic ladder, language training and civics education if required for citizenship, services for their children, etc. Those who return to their home countries or communities may have needs very similar to what they had at the early stages of their movement. The decision as to whether return is possible involves a range of variables, including the extent, for example, to which the causes—either direct or through other channels—are likely to persist. Policies in the receiving communities and countries, depending on whether the migration is internal or international, will also affect the likelihood for return or settlement in the new location. In addition to immigration policies, the policies affecting return and settlement include land use and property rights, social welfare, housing, employment

²For more information and examples of the life cycle of crisis migration, see Susan Martin, Sanjula Weerasinghe and Abbie Taylor, eds. (2014) *Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences and Response*. Routledge.

and other frameworks that determine whether individuals, households and communities are able to find decent living conditions and pursue adequate livelihoods (Brookings Institution 2010).

The final stage of the life cycle involves (re)integration into the home community or new location. The issues outlined above regarding the potential for solutions will be key determinants of integration, influencing the access of displaced populations to housing, livelihoods, safety and security. These needs will vary depending on the demographic and socio-economic composition of the groups returning home or settling in new locations. Integration is also affected by plans and programs to mitigate future dislocations from the hazards that caused the movements, coming full circle on the life cycle to a focus on prevention, adaptation and risk reduction.

The fifth dimension of this typology refers to the *affected populations*. Responses may differ in terms of scale—that is, how many people are affected by the crisis. They also differ by the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the affected populations. Generally, those most vulnerable to the harms associated with crises of the type described are already in difficult economic situations, with few financial resources to get them through the crisis. Unaccompanied and separated children, women at risk of gender and sexual based violence, adolescents at risk of forced recruitment into gangs and insurgencies, ill and disabled persons, the elderly and other vulnerable groups may require specific approaches to ensure their safety. Trafficking in persons is often associated with crises, with criminal elements preying on the desperation of people who have lost their homes and livelihoods.

14.3 Legal and Policy Frameworks

This section focuses on laws and policies for addressing the migration consequences of the types of crises discussed previously. The section focuses on frameworks governing migration *across* borders, including general human rights instruments as well as migration-specific instruments. It also discusses legal frameworks for protection and assistance of internally displaced persons as they provide useful guidance for issues related to protection and assistance for those who move across international borders (Fig. 14.2).

14.3.1 *International and Regional Instruments*

States possess broad authority to regulate the movement of foreign nationals across their borders. Although these authorities are not absolute, States exercise their sovereign powers to determine who will be admitted and for what period. The authority of States is limited by certain rights accorded foreign nationals in international law.

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights—free mobility within States and right to leave and re-enter one’s own country; right to seek and enjoy asylum (no government has obligation to provide asylum or to admit those seeking entry)
- General Human Rights Conventions, including International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention on Racial Equality, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
- “Voluntary” Migration Conventions, including Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families International Labor Organization conventions (poorly ratified)
- Involuntary Displacement Instruments, including Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (strong ratifications), and Humanitarian Law (Laws of War) Common Article 3 on civilian protection (strong ratifications but poor enforcement). African Union (AU) Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees
- Both: Convention to Combat Organized Crime’s Protocols on Smuggling and Trafficking (strong ratifications but focus on enforcement, not protection)

Fig. 14.2 International and regional legal instruments

The principal constraints on state authority are the non-*refoulement* provisions of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol³ and the 1985 Convention against Torture. Some migrants in the scenarios described above may be covered under these instruments. The Refugee Convention defines refugees as persons who were unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their home countries because of a “well-founded fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.” States have no obligation to admit refugees, but they do have an obligation not to *refoule* (return) a refugee to “frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” In each of the crises discussed above, a subset of migrants may meet the refugee definition although the majority are unlikely to be able to demonstrate that they fear persecution on account of a protected characteristic (that is, race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion), rather than a more generalized harm.

The *refoulement* provision of the Convention against Torture applies to persons who face “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acqui-

³The protocol eliminated geographic (that refugees be from Europe) and time (pre-1951) time limits on the Convention, making it a universal document.

escence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Particularly in the situations in which political instability and violence precipitate displacement, a subset of migrants may well meet this definition even if the majority does not have a well founded reason to fear torture upon return.

In Africa, the scope of coverage for refugees is greater because the 1969 OAU (now AU) Refugee Convention includes those who, “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or *events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality* (emphasis added), is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.” The Cartagena Declaration (a non-binding agreement) offers a similar expanded definition of refugees in Latin America: “persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.” To the extent that a crisis involves generalized violence, massive violations of human rights or seriously disturbs public order, persons forced to leave their homes because of the crises described above may be covered under the AU and Cartagena instruments, while they would not be under the 1951 Convention. The new AU Convention on Internally Displaced Persons goes even further in specifying that those displaced by natural and human made disasters are covered.

Those who are forced to migrate, but who are not considered to be refugees or potential torture victims, have certain basic rights even if they are not covered under these specific instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, for example, define certain rights that accrue to all persons, not just citizens.⁴ Importantly, the Universal Declaration Article 13, which is enshrined in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, declares that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s own country.” The Universal Declaration Article 14 states that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” In neither situation, however, is there a corresponding obligation on the part of States to admit those who exercise their right to leave or to seek asylum. Other applicable human rights conventions include the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

⁴They include: the right to life, liberty and security; the right not to be held in slavery or servitude; the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State; the right to marry and to found a family; and the right to work, free choice of employment and just and favourable conditions of work. These rights are provided without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property or birth (Art 2 of the Universal Declaration).

These instruments and relevant articles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on armed conflict form the basis for the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Although not legally binding, the Guiding Principles provide a critical framework for defining and promoting IDP protection. Under the Guiding Principles, IDPs are described as:

persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized stated border.

The Guiding Principles identify the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of IDPs in all phases of displacement. They provide protection against arbitrary displacement, offer a basis for protection and assistance during displacement, and set forth guarantees for safe return, resettlement and reintegration. They also establish the right of IDPs to request and receive protection from national authorities, and the duty of these authorities to provide protection.⁵ African leaders adopted the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Africa at a summit in 2009. It went into force in 2012.

Forced migrants who use irregular means of exit or entry may be covered under the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, both of which supplement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and went into force in December 2003 and January 2004, respectively. Within a few years of their adoption, the trafficking and smuggling protocols have garnered considerable support, with more than 100 signatories and 67 and 59 parties, respectively. These instruments apply respectively to “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” and “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.” Trafficking requires coercion or deception as well as exploitation of the labour of the trafficked person, whereas smuggling is usually a voluntary agreement between the migrant and the smuggler in which the migrant gains irregular entry and the smuggler gains a financial benefit. Under certain conditions—for example, when the smuggled migrants is placed in bondage to pay off his or her smuggling fees—smuggling may turn into trafficking. Those affected by crises are often more vulnerable to exploitation by both smugglers and traffickers, particularly if they are desperate to leave dangerous places with few options to support themselves and their families.

⁵ Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, principle 3.

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea has provisions applicable to persons in distress at sea, which can include sea-borne migrants. Under the convention, “State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him; (c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at which it will call.” The convention also has provisions that outlaw piracy, defined as “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

- (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
- (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”

The rights of those displaced by natural hazards have not been spelled out in international or regional law as has been the case with those affected by political events. Nevertheless, UN guidance provided to state authorities regarding displacement due to natural disasters, while not binding international law, is relevant to the issues covered in this chapter. *Human Rights and Natural Disasters: Operational Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights Protection in Situations of Natural Disaster* (Brookings-BERN Project 2008), issued by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Secretary General’s Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, defines the conditions for the voluntary return of displaced persons:

...the return of persons displaced by the disaster to their homes and places of origin should only be prohibited if these homes or places of origin are in zones where there are real dangers to the life or physical integrity and health of the affected persons. Restrictions should only last as long as such dangers exist and only be implemented if other, less intrusive, measures of protection are not available or possible.

Conversely, those who are internally displaced by natural disasters (who have freedom of movement within their borders) should not be required to return to areas in which their safety may be compromised: “Persons affected by the natural disaster should not, under any circumstances, be forced to return to or resettle in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at further risk” (Brookings-BERN Project 2008).

Also relevant are the provisions of the *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction: 2015–2030* that encourages greater cooperation in reducing the risks associated with disasters. The disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies adopted in the Sendai Framework do not provide great specificity with regard to displacement from disasters aside from recommending that development actors include displaced

persons in efforts to “promote the incorporation of disaster risk management into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes, facilitate the link between relief, rehabilitation and development, use opportunities during the recovery phase to develop capacities that reduce disaster risk in the short, medium and long term.” (UNISDR 2015). Nevertheless, the overall concept of disaster risk reduction would significantly lessen displacement by providing the tools with which people could remain in situ or return quickly when acute natural hazards strike.

Progress was made in 2015 and 2016 in filling some of the protection gaps. In 2015, the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) authorized establishment of a Task Force with its processes to identify ways to mitigate and respond to displacement. The State-led Nansen Initiative on cross-border disaster displacement issued an Agenda for Protection that spells out actions that governments can take today to provide humanitarian relief to persons requiring either admission or non-return in these contexts. Its successor, the Platform for Disaster Displacement, funded by the German government, is helping willing states adopt some of the proposed policies and programs. Another State-led process, the Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative adopted principles, guidelines and effective practices to respond to the needs of non-nationals who are displaced by natural disasters and conflict. The 2016 UN High Level Meeting on Large-Scale Movements of Refugees and Migrants acknowledged the Nansen and MICIC Initiatives, recommending them as models for filling other gaps in protection for vulnerable migrants.

Taken together, however, the provisions in international law do not constitute a comprehensive framework for addressing forced migration that does not fit within the refugee context. They are particularly weak in reference to those who cross international borders during crises. Rather, each displacement tends to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Whether there should be a stronger international legal framework to address non-refugee forced migration is a point that would certainly generate debate. There are a number of reasons that such a framework would be difficult to achieve. Trying to identify legal standards for a broad range of potential drivers of forced migration which may have little in common with one another would present challenges, particularly in setting out appropriate criteria for determining who among forced migrants would merit specific forms of protection. See Conclusions for further discussion of these issues.

14.3.2 National Legal and Policy Frameworks and Practices for Addressing Forced Migration

The immigration policies of most destination countries are not conducive to receiving large numbers of forced migrants, unless they enter through already existing admission categories or meet refugee criteria. Typically, in non-crisis situations, destination countries admit persons to fill job openings or to reunify with family

members. Employment-based admissions are usually based upon the labour market needs of the receiving country, not the situation of the home country. Family admissions are usually restricted to persons with immediate relatives (spouses, children, parents and, sometimes, siblings) in the destination country. At the same time, most overtly humanitarian admissions are generally limited to refugees and asylum seekers. Many, if not most forced migrants, however, will be unlikely to meet the legal definition of a refugee since their lives are endangered for reasons that do not involve persecution on the basis of a protected characteristic such as race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.

Despite these limitations, there are both legislative and ad hoc policies that do permit governments to respond when there are crises that provoke migration. They fall into three categories: (1) policies that permit migrants already on the territory of the destination country to remain for at least a temporary period; (2) policies to respond to new movements of people leaving either directly or indirectly as a result of the crisis; and (3) evacuation of citizens and selected others from crisis affected countries.

14.3.2.1 Temporary Stays of Removals

Some countries and the European Union have established special policies that permit individuals whose countries have experienced natural disasters, conflicts, pandemics or other severe upheavals to remain at least temporarily without fear of deportation. The United States, for example, enacted legislation in 1990 to provide temporary protected status to persons “in the United States who are temporarily unable to safely return to their home country because of ongoing armed conflict, an environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions.” Environmental disaster may include “an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected.” In the case of environmental disasters, as compared to conflict, the country of origin must request designation of Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) for its nationals.

Those granted TPS are eligible to work in the United States. They are not considered to be residing under color of law, however, for purposes of receiving social benefits and they are not able to bring family members into the country to join them. Importantly, TPS only applies to persons already in the United States at the time of the designation. It is not meant to be a mechanism to respond to an unfolding crisis in which people seek admission from outside of the country. It also only pertains to situations that are temporary in nature. If an environmental disaster has permanent consequences, for example, a designation of Temporary Protected Status is not available, even for those presently in the United States, or it may be lifted. When the volcano erupted in Montserrat in 1997, TPS was granted to its citizens and was extended six times. In 2005, however, it was ended. US Citizenship and Immigration Services in the Department of Homeland Security explained “that the termination of the TPS designation of Montserrat is warranted because the volcanic activity caus-

ing the environmental disaster in Montserrat is not likely to cease in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it no longer constitutes a temporary disruption of living conditions that temporarily prevents Montserrat from adequately handling the return of its nationals. Similarly, the conditions are no longer “extraordinary and temporary” as required by section 244(b)(1)(C) of the Act.”⁶

Another significant factor is that the designation is discretionary, to be made by the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the Secretary of State. Countries or parts of countries are designated, allowing nationals only of those countries (or affected regions within them) to apply. A further issue is the difficulty of ending the status. Although some early proponents of TPS argued that it was temporary in the sense that it would allow time to determine whether those granted the status could return or should be granted legal permanent residence, the legislation makes it difficult for them to remain permanently with full rights of immigrants. If *individuals* granted TPS otherwise meet the criteria for legal admissions as an immigrant, they are eligible to obtain permanent residence without leaving the United States. If it were determined, however, that as a *group* they cannot return home, special legislation would be needed to allow them to remain permanently. The legislation specifies that such legislation would require a super-majority (three-fifths) of Senators for passage.

TPS has proven to be a flexible mechanism for responding to a range of crises, from conflict (Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen) to acute natural disasters (El Salvador, Haiti Honduras, Nepal and Nicaragua) to pandemics (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone). At the same time, lifting temporary protected status has proven to be very difficult as well. TPS was originally triggered by the earthquakes in El Salvador (2001) and Hurricane Mitch (1998) in Honduras and Nicaragua, meaning that some of the beneficiaries have been in ‘temporary’ status for almost 20 years.

Canada may declare a temporary suspension of removals “when a country’s general conditions (for example, war or a natural disaster) put the safety of the general population at risk.” According to regulation, “the guiding principle of generalized risk is that the impact of the catastrophic event is so pervasive and widespread that it would be inconceivable to conduct general returns to that country until some degree of safety is restored. The suspension order is lifted when country conditions improve and the public is no longer in danger.” For example, the suspension of removal was lifted in 2009 for nationals of Burundi, Rwanda and Liberia. Recognizing that some had been in Canada for an extended period, these nationals were given the opportunity to apply for humanitarian and compassionate consideration for permanent residence in Canada. Such considerations as the best interests of any child directly involved, establishment in Canada, integration into Canadian society, and other factors put forward by the applicant are taken into account in determining if an applicant will be permitted to remain in Canada. Canada also

⁶See USCIS, Termination of TPS for Nationals of Montserrat, July 6, 2004, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/MontserratQATPS_7_6_04.pdf

undertakes a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment in determining if persons denied asylum would be at risk of other serious harm if removed to their country of origin.

A number of other countries provide exceptions to removal on a group or case by case basis for persons whose countries of origin have experienced significant disruption because of natural disasters, conflict and violence. After the 2004 tsunami, for example, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Malaysia suspended deportations of migrants from such countries as Sri Lanka, India, Somalia, Maldives, Seychelles, Indonesia and Thailand. A number of governments announced similar plans after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (Martin 2012). Germany uses the “*Duldung*,” a toleration permit when emergent conditions preclude immediate return (Schönwälder and Vogel 2006). These actions are generally *ad hoc*, allowing governments to respond differentially to crises. The decisions to trigger such responses is based on a combination of factors, including the intensity of the crisis, geographic proximity, the assessment of whether stays of removal will become a magnet for new arrivals, the presence of a strong constituency group within the destination country that calls for stays of removal and other similar factors.

Return of migrants granted temporary stays of removal remains problematic in many crises. Protracted crises are common, particularly in countries without the fiscal resources and governance structures necessary to reintegrate their citizens after an emergency. Moreover, over time, migrants begin to integrate into the new destination country, developing equities and ties that make the decision to return difficult. This is particularly the case when migrants granted temporary stays have children who attend school, learn the host country language and develop friendships and ties with local populations. Some efforts have been made to facilitate or assist return when conditions permit. After the Dayton Peace Accord, for example, a number of countries offered aid to Bosnians who had been granted temporary protection if they chose or were required to repatriate. For example, Denmark and Sweden funded Bosnians to take ‘look and see’ visits home to determine if conditions had improved sufficiently to return permanently. These countries and other EU members provided financial assistance to help those who voluntarily returned and provided information services about the right to remain or return. Similar programs were used in assisting Kosovars to return home.

14.3.2.2 Addressing Mass Influxes and New Flows of Migrants

At the European Union level, the Temporary Protection Directive dated 20 July 2001 establishes temporary protection during “mass influxes.” With crises in Bosnia and Kosovo freshly in mind, the 1999 European Council meeting in Tampere urged swift action in addressing the issue of “temporary protection for displaced persons on the basis of solidarity between Member States.”⁷ The directive itself notes that “Cases of mass influx of displaced persons who cannot return to their country of

⁷See Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15 and 16 October, 1999 available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ef2d2264.pdf>

origin have become more substantial in Europe in recent years. In these cases, it may be necessary to set up exceptional schemes to offer them immediate temporary protection.” The purpose of the directive is twofold: to establish minimum standards for giving temporary protection and “to promote a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving such persons.” Temporary Protection applies to persons who have fled areas of armed conflict or endemic violence and persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or generalized violations of their human rights. Member States may apply temporary protection more broadly to other categories of persons affected by crises.

Unlike TPS in the United States, Temporary Protection in the EU is envisioned as a mechanism to address mass influxes, not to protect already resident migrants from removal. It can apply to those who spontaneously arrive as well as to those who are evacuated from situations in which they face serious harm. It is seen as a substitute for asylum in cases when “the asylum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation.” Since its adoption in 2001, Temporary Protection has not been invoked, at least in part because of different views among member countries concerning what constitutes a mass influx and of concerns about whether it will be practicable to return those granted this status when it expires.⁸ On April 8, 2011, the European Commission set out criteria under which it would ask for its use: “The Commission would also be ready to consider proposing the use of the mechanism foreseen under the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC), if the conditions foreseen in the directive are met. Consideration could only be given to taking this step if it is clear that the persons concerned are likely to be in need of international protection, if they cannot be safely returned to their countries-of-origin, and if the numbers of persons arriving who are in need of protection are sufficiently great.”⁹ However, in the context of the mass movements in 2015 from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, the EU refrained from triggering a response under this directive and sought, often unsuccessfully, to negotiate responsibility-sharing agreements outside of the framework (Akkaya 2015).

Nevertheless, some of the provisions of the directive are worth considering for future policymaking. Individuals who would be granted the status are to receive a residence permit for the duration of the grant. Member states are to ensure access to suitable accommodations, social benefits and education. Those granted temporary protection are eligible to work or be self-employed but States may give priority for employment to EU citizens, citizens of the European Economic Area and legally resident third country nationals who receive unemployment benefit. There is also

⁸Proposals were made to use the directive or otherwise share the burden across the EU when the number of Iraqi asylum seekers increased significantly after sectarian violence escalated in 2006.

⁹The European Commission’s response to the migratory flows from North Africa, MEMO/11/226, Brussels, 8 April 2011, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/226&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en>

access to family reunification as long as the family relationship predated the grant of temporary protection.

While the Temporary Protection Directive addresses mass influx situations, asylum law and policies govern individual applications for protection. EU Directive allows for subsidiary protection for a person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom “substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin ... would face a real risk of suffering serious harm.” Serious harm includes situations in which there is a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. Those granted subsidiary protection have a less secure status than those granted Convention protection (for example, their residence permit is for one instead of three years).

The EU-wide provisions do not explicitly address crises caused by natural or human made hazards but individual countries have adopted legislation that protects some categories. Sweden includes within its asylum system persons who are unable to return to their native countries because of an environmental disaster. The decision is made on an individual, not group basis. Although many recipients of this status are presumed to be in temporary need of protection, the Swedish rules foresee that some persons may be in need of permanent solutions. Similarly, in the Finnish Aliens Act, “aliens residing in the country are issued with a residence permit on the basis of a need for protection if [...] they cannot return because of an armed conflict or environmental disaster.” Finnish law also allows use of transit centres for a fixed term, not to exceed three months, if the number of displaced persons entering the country is exceptionally high, to give time to conduct thorough processes for registration. This provision has not yet been invoked.

Governments often anticipate departures during crises and establish policies to deter or intercept migrants leaving countries of origin or transit countries. A common response has been to impose visa requirements on nationals of countries in crisis. Visas help to screen out those who purport to be coming as tourists or business travellers but who intend to stay for longer periods. Air and other carriers have the responsibility to check that international travellers have proper documentation before they are permitted to board the plane or ship.

In numerous cases, migrants attempt to enter destination countries clandestinely, across land borders and by sea. The United States, Australia and countries in the European Union have intercepted boats that were headed for their shores during crises. In many cases, the boats are unseaworthy and the interception is justified on humanitarian as well as border control bases. What to do with those who are intercepted, particularly those who are rescued at sea, can be a complicated issue. Bringing these individuals to the territory of the states that interdict the migrants can serve as a magnet that encourages still more people to risk dangerous crossings. Returning them to dangerous situations in their home country could have equally deleterious humanitarian ramifications. Obviously, leaving them on unseaworthy vessels would be inhumane.

One option that governments have tried is off-shore protection for those who are intercepted. The United States, for example, used Guantanamo Naval Base in the

1990s to provide temporary protection to Haitians and Cubans, rather than returning them into unsettled conditions. In the case of Haiti, most of those provided temporary safe haven returned home when the elected President of Haiti was returned to office. By contrast, most of the Cubans were eventually resettled into the United States, but Cuba and the United States signed a migration agreement that provided alternative mechanisms for legal immigration from Cuba and a commitment from the Cuban government to curb boat departures. Australia has established off-shore processing centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea with the aim of curtailing access to asylum in Australia. Those found to have valid refugee claims would remain in those countries or be resettled elsewhere. The UN Human Rights Council, among others, has criticized the policy, especially for the harsh treatment and poor living conditions of asylum seekers in these other countries (Millar 2015).

14.3.2.3 Evacuation and Resettlement

A further range of policies pertain to people who are endangered in the countries in crisis or in neighbouring countries and who are evacuated to other states for safety. The most common form of evacuation is of citizens who are caught in the middle of a crisis. In recent cases, governments have evacuated their citizens from earthquake, tsunami, cyclone and flood affected areas (e.g., Japan, Haiti, Pakistan and Indonesia) or conflict zones (e.g., Cote d'Ivoire, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Yemen).

When governments evacuate their nationals, decisions must be made about accompanying family members who are not citizens of the evacuating country. Although many countries will evacuate non-national spouses and minor children of citizens, they will not necessarily feel a similar obligation to parents, siblings and other relatives of citizens. Nor do they necessarily evacuate persons such as household servants who may be highly dependent on the citizens for their protection and support. Immigration authorities use various *ad hoc* measures to admit the non-national family members to their territory.

In some cases, migrants are working in such countries and an international effort is made to evacuate them to their home countries, either from the country in crisis or a nearby location that they have reached. The 2011 evacuation of thousands of migrant workers from Libya and Cote d'Ivoire and their bordering countries are such examples. While the majority of these migrants were able to return safely to their home countries, a minority were unable or unwilling to return because of concerns about their safety in the country of origin. The evacuations share many similarities with other forced migration situations. Migrants evacuated home may face problems of reintegration and lost income. Those who are unable to repatriate because of unsafe conditions at home will be in need of relocation to other countries. If they do not meet Convention refugee criteria (that is, the unsafe conditions do not involve their own fear of persecution), neighbouring countries may be unwilling to provide asylum and there may be limited opportunities for resettlement in third countries.

In rare cases, evacuations of large groups of vulnerable persons have been supported by the international community. The clearest case was the humanitarian evacuation of Kosovars in 1998. In order to convince the countries of first asylum to keep their doors open to Kosovars, other countries agreed to bring some of them to their countries at least temporarily. With the assistance of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 90,000 Kosovars were evacuated to 28 countries. Many of the participating countries set up reception facilities for the evacuees. When the fighting ended and Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo, many of the evacuated returned to their homes. The Kosovars were admitted without determining if they individually met the refugee definition, distinguishing this program from refugee resettlement initiatives that have been used to support first asylum in other contexts.

There are fewer mechanisms for permanent admission of people during non-refugee crises. A number of countries accelerate or facilitate processing of visas during crises so that those who otherwise would be admissible for permanent residence are able to enter. Canada, for example, gave priority to processing visas for persons directly and significantly affected by the Haitian earthquake. It also established a satellite office in the Dominican Republic and sent additional visa and control officers to the region. The United States, Canada, the Netherlands, and France put in place special provisions that accelerated the entry of Haitian orphans who had been approved for adoption prior to the earthquake. In the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, the EU has been considering a humanitarian visa through which asylum seekers could enter a member state and have the application heard in situ (Neville and Rigon 2016).

Finally, a number of governments have permanently resettled discrete categories of vulnerable persons for humanitarian purposes. Australia, for example, introduced the locally engaged employee policy, which enabled the permanent resettlement of Iraqis and Afghans who had been employed by the Australian government in their home countries. The United States instituted similar programs that permitted resettlement without regard to whether the employee met refugee criteria. Australia and Canada also consider applications for humanitarian visas from other persons who consider themselves to be at risk. In Australia's program, the individual must show that they are subject to substantial discrimination.

14.4 Institutional Arrangements for Addressing Forced Migration

Just as the legal frameworks for addressing forced migration in all of its manifestations are weak, so are the institutional roles and responsibilities at the international level. With the exception of the refugee regime, in which clear responsibility is given to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, there is no existing international regime for managing international movements of people. This is not to say that

there is a total absence of governance. There are a plethora of international, regional and national organizations that have some responsibilities related to forced migration. The mandates and effectiveness of these institutions in addressing forced migration varies greatly.

14.4.1 Institutional Arrangements at the International and Regional Levels

At the international and regional levels, there is a lack of clear authority for addressing new forms of displacement that do not fit into existing mandates. The institutional arrangements differ somewhat based on whether the displacement is internal and can be addressed within the territory of the affected country or is cross border and affects other countries.

14.4.1.1 Internal Displacement

As discussed above, most displacement is internal. To the extent that institutional arrangements within countries affected by crises fail to provide adequate protection and assistance, cross-border movements may increase. Institutional arrangements to mitigate crises in situ are thus highly relevant to understanding how forced displacement might be mitigated. At present, the international response to humanitarian crises is based on the cluster approach. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees is the cluster lead for protection (focusing on conflict-induced displacement) as well as for the emergency shelter and camp management clusters. The International Organization for Migration has responsibility for camp management in the context of natural disasters. The situation is less clear cut with regard to protection of those displaced by natural disasters. UNHCR, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UNICEF have all been designated as having protection responsibilities in natural disasters (Global Protection Cluster 2017). In practical terms, IOM often takes on this responsibility because of its role in camp management.

Cluster leads have relatively little authority over other international organizations during these crises. The Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach explains; “the role of sector leads at the country level is to facilitate a process aimed at ensuring well-coordinated and effective humanitarian responses in the sector or area of activity concerned. Sector leads themselves are not expected to carry out all the necessary activities within the sector or area of activity concerned. They are required, however, to commit to being the ‘provider of last resort’ where this is necessary and where access, security and availability of resources make this possible” (IASC 2006). The Note recognizes that “The ‘provider of last resort’ concept is critical to the cluster approach, and without

it the element of predictability is lost” (IASC 2006). For agencies with technical leads (e.g., health, nutrition, water and sanitation), the ability of the lead agency to take on responsibility is straightforward. However, the Note is more circumspect regarding the leadership for cross-cutting areas such as Protection, Early Recovery and Camp Coordination: “The concept of ‘provider of last resort’ will need to be applied in a differentiated manner. In all cases, however, sector leads are responsible for ensuring that wherever there are significant gaps in the humanitarian response they continue advocacy efforts and explain the constraints to stakeholders” (IASC 2006).

The cluster approach has had mixed results in filling gaps in the institutional framework for addressing the full range of issues pertaining to those who are internally displaced by the type of drivers discussed above. Certainly, the willingness of UNHCR to be the ‘provider of last resort’ in the protection of conflict induced IDPs is a critical issue. The numbers demonstrate a clear increase in UNHCR’s involvement with IDPs. UNHCR reported that it helped 32.3 million of an estimated 38.2 million internally displaced persons in 2014, as compared to only 4.3 million out of an estimated 22 million in 1995 (UNHCR 2014; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2015). Nevertheless, there are continuing concerns about the nature of the response. For example, a Brookings Institution report concluded: “While humanitarian reform has improved operational short-term response, it has had little effect on either protecting people from new displacement or in finding solutions for those displaced. Questions of access and staff security continue to be the major limitations in protecting and assisting IDPs” (Brookings Institution 2014). The report called for reinvigoration of efforts to protect IDPs.

During this period, UNHCR also began responding, albeit in an ad hoc way, to forced migration stemming from causes other than persecution or conflict. Although UNHCR has limited its cluster leadership to conflict-induced internal displacement, it has nevertheless been drawn into providing assistance during several notable natural disasters. In the *State of the World’s Refugees*, UNHCR explained its involvement in tsunami relief: “The sheer scale of the destruction and the fact that many of affected populations were of concern to the organization prompted the move. Responding to requests from the UN Secretary-General and UN Country Teams, UNHCR concentrated on providing shelter and non-food relief. In Sri Lanka, UNHCR’s presence in the country prior to the tsunami allowed for a comparatively swift and sustained humanitarian intervention – including efforts focused on the protection of internally displaced persons” (UNHCR 2006, 21). UNHCR also assisted tsunami victims in Somalia and Aceh, Indonesia, pointing out: “The protection of displaced populations was especially urgent in areas of protracted conflict and internal displacement in Aceh, Somalia and Sri Lanka. Furthermore, there was concern for some affected populations whose governments declined offers of international aid, such as the Dalits (formerly known as untouchables) of India and Burmese migrant workers in Thailand; it was feared they might be discriminated against and their protection needs compromised” (UNHCR 2006, 21). UNHCR was also involved in the international response to Cyclone Nargis in Burma and China and Haiti’s earthquakes, providing shelter and supplies.

14.4.1.2 International Movements

UNHCR is the lead international agency with responsibility for refugees who have crossed international borders. Founded in 1950, UNHCR was charged from the beginning to find solutions for refugees, generally in the form of voluntary repatriation when conditions permitted, integration into a country of asylum, or resettlement to a third country. Because those solutions were often not forthcoming, UNHCR's day-to-day activity was generally to provide assistance to those who were unable to return, integrate or resettle.

UNHCR's responsibility for cross-border displacement has grown since its founding, from a focus on refugees and displaced persons from World War II and the emerging Cold War to a focus on delivering humanitarian aid to refugees in developing countries affected by international and internal conflicts. It continued to advocate for protection and solutions for refugees throughout the world. Its role has been limited, however, in addressing the situation of those who migrate internationally because of non-persecution or non-conflict reasons. UNHCR has, however, demonstrated increased interest in mixed migration. As stated in its 10 point plan, UNHCR recognizes that situations "in which people with different objectives move alongside each other, using the same routes and means of transport or engaging the services of the same smugglers, can raise serious protection concerns." The concept of mixed migration seems to be rooted in the assumption that the mix is between refugees and economic migrants and deals very little with other forced migrants. The 10 point plan does not address situations in which people are migrating for a mix of reasons that include extreme natural hazards, except for one mention of migrants from Aceh in Malaysia, or political or communal violence, except for one mention of Mexican migrants leaving because of domestic or other violence. In effect, it does little to help address situations in which crises precipitate movements that do not fit into the refugee framework but raise serious humanitarian considerations.

The potential for mass displacement from climate change is also an issue that occupied the then High Commissioner Antonio Guterres' attention: "When we consider the different models for the impact of climate change, the picture is very worrying. The need for people to move will keep on growing. One need only look at East Africa and the Sahel region. All predictions are that desertification will expand steadily. For the population, this means decreasing livelihood prospects and increased migration. All of this is happening in the absence of international capacity and political will to respond" (Guterres 2007). Then Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Erika Feller, summarized the dilemma before the Executive Committee: "New terminology is entering the displacement lexicon with some speed. The talk is now of "ecological refugees", "climate change refugees", the "natural disaster displaced". This is all a serious context for UNHCR's efforts to fulfill its mandate for its core beneficiaries.... The mix of global challenges is explosive, and one with which we and our partners, government and non-government, must together strike the right balance" (Feller 2008). Thus far, however, there has been no inclination on the part of the Executive Committee for UNHCR to become

involved with those who cross borders because of natural disasters or climate change. Instead, following the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of UNHCR, the governments of Switzerland and Norway established the Nansen Initiative to generate further discussion.

The international organization with the longest and most sustained focus on international migration is the International Organization for Migration. IOM's Constitution sets out its role as a service organization operating on behalf of states. Its first two purposes and functions pertain to its original role in making arrangements for the transfer of migrants, refugees and displaced persons. IOM provides, at the request of and in agreement with the States concerned, migration services such as recruitment, selection, processing, language training, orientation activities, medical examination, placement, activities facilitating reception and integration, advisory services on migration questions, and other assistance as is in accord with the aims of the Organization. It also assists in voluntary return migration, including voluntary repatriation.

IOM's constitution also gives it a role to provide a forum to States as well as international and other organizations for the exchange of views and experiences, and the promotion of co-operation and co-ordination of efforts on international migration issues, including studies on such issues in order to develop practical solutions. In respect to this last function, it has launched a policy dialogue with governments on policy issues. Importantly, the organization has expanded significantly in terms of both staff and membership, which includes more than 130 member states and observers. IOM has been a focal point for discussion of forced migration since 1992 when it co-hosted a series of consultations on the interconnections between the environment and migration, in the context of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. As discussed above, IOM has also taken on lead responsibility for camp management in natural disasters.

In the area of pandemics, IOM's health program offers Travel Health Assistance to manage conditions of public health concern as individuals move across geographical, health system and epidemiological boundaries. These include pre-embarkation checks and pre-departure medical screenings to assess a migrant's fitness to travel and/or to provide medical clearance. These measures also ensure that migrants are linked to and given appropriate referrals to medical services once they have arrived in their destination countries. Migrants who need medical assistance and care during travel are escorted by health professionals to avoid complications during transit. IOM works in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO), whose work is guided by Resolution 61.17 on the health of migrants, adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2008 (World Health Organization 2008). The resolution encourages WHO to improve understanding and capabilities to address issues related to the health needs of migrants.

Finally, IOM takes the lead role in the evacuation of migrants in countries that fall into crisis, as seen in its role in evacuating migrant workers stranded on the Libya-Tunisian border, Cote d'Ivoire, Yemen and elsewhere. It played a similar role in evacuating migrants from Kuwait and Iraq in 1991 and Lebanon in 2006. As

discussed above, in the majority of cases, IOM assists the migrants to return to their home countries, but it works with UNHCR in the relocation of those unable or unwilling to repatriate because of unsafe conditions in the country of origin.

Until 2016, IOM operated outside of the United Nations. In the context of the UN High Level Meeting on refugees and migrants in September 2016, IOM joined the UN as a related organization (that is, in a capacity similar to that of the World Trade Organization). As a result, IOM will now be more fully integrated into the decision-making on migration issues within the UN. Operationally, the organization was already a member of UN country teams and followed most UN security and other protocols.

There are a number of other international organizations that have responsibilities regarding migration. Among the more significant, the ILO has a specialized office, the International Migration Program, which “provides advisory services to member states, promotes international standards, provides a tripartite forum for consultations, serves as a global knowledge base, and provides technical assistance and capacity-building to constituents.” The UN Population Division in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) is responsible for collecting data on international migration and took the lead within the UN Secretariat for organizing the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development. The Division also hosts an annual meeting for coordination of data and research on international migration.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) supports the mandates of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants and the UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking and services the Committee on Migrant Workers, the treaty body supervising compliance with the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. The UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) coordinates activities related to human trafficking and human smuggling, as the key agency responsible for implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Crime and its smuggling and trafficking protocols. None of these agencies have evidenced a particular interest in the interconnections between climate change and the areas of their specific responsibilities. The UN Maritime Organization has responsibilities regarding the suppression of piracy at sea as well as the safety of persons rescued at sea.

Recognizing the complex set of organizational responsibilities, the Global Migration Group (GMG) was established to promote coordination and identify gaps in the international system. The GMG grew out of an existing inter-agency group, the “Geneva Migration Group”, established in April 2003 by the heads of the ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNHCR and UNODC. In 2006 membership in the Geneva Migration Group was expanded to include DESA, UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and the World Bank. Following a recommendation by the Global Commission on International Migration for strengthened coordination, the Group was renamed the “Global Migration Group” that same year and expanded to include the UN Regional Commissions, UNESCO, UNICEF and UNITAR. Other agencies have since joined. While some participants in the GMG have noted that the group has too large and diverse a membership to be effective, the GMG is missing repre-

sentatives that would be useful in gaining progress on issues related to forced migration. For example, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is not actively engaged.

Forced migration has not been a prominent issue on the agendas of regional organizations or regional consultative processes (RCPs), except in the area of refugees and asylum-seekers. The European Union is a notable exception, particularly in regard to the Temporary Protection Directive. Several regional groups have discussed related issues. The Inter-governmental Authority on Development Regional Consultative Process on Migration (IGAD-RCP), established in 2008, includes mixed migratory flows, environmental migration, and movements of pastoralists on its agenda. The Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) has also focused attention on mixed migration. The Inter-Governmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons And Migrants (APC) was established in 1996 to “provide a forum for the discussion of issues relating to population movements, including refugees, displaced or trafficked persons and migrants.” The aim of the consultations is to “promote dialogue and explore opportunities for greater regional cooperation” (APC 2008). Although not regional, the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Refugees and Asylum (IGC) brings together 17 Participating States¹⁰, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration and the European Commission to discuss forced migration, among other issues.

Generally, the RCPs are not forums for discussion of emerging crises, even when these crises are within the region of the consultative body. Although Libya, Egypt and Tunisia are members along with European countries of the MTM, it does not appear that a meeting was called to discuss the evacuation of migrant workers or the increase in boat departures that corresponded with political events in Libya. A 2012 expert meeting in Malta did address issues related to irregular migration.

14.4.2 Institutional Arrangements at the National Level

Addressing forced migration at the national level generally requires a ‘whole of government’ approach because of the complexities involved. Often, institutional responses are ad hoc, designed for a specific crisis. They may differ significantly depending on geographic considerations (e.g., the extent to which migrants are likely to reach the shores of the destination countries), the causes of the crisis (e.g., natural hazards versus political instability), the domestic political and economic climate, the extent of humanitarian need, and other similar factors.

¹⁰The countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

This presents challenges, particularly related to coordination across ministries and departments that do not necessarily have ongoing reasons to communicate or cooperate in managing movements of people.

Policies on and responsibilities for implementation on immigration issues generally fall to interior or homeland security ministries or dedicated immigration or border security agencies in destination countries although foreign ministries play important roles. A much wider set of government agencies become involved in responding to humanitarian crises. Which ministries are involved depends largely on the type of crisis, but it is not unusual for large scale crises to bring defense, foreign ministry, development, health, emergency response and other ministries into the process. Again depending on the nature and scale of the crisis, governments may establish a taskforce within the Prime Minister or President's office to coordinate actions across multiple ministries.

Situations vary but the ministries responsible for immigration issues may not initially be part of these taskforces, particularly if the migration ramifications are not clear at the start of a crisis. For immigration ministries that are addressing the impacts of pandemics, natural disasters, and political instability, gaining needed information about, for example, the need for quarantine of travelers or need for temporary protection can be difficult. Similarly, migration ministries may not be part of discussions taking place on climate change adaptation funding even though there is increasing recognition that migration is an age-old way in which people adapt to environmental changes.

14.5 Conclusions and Policy Questions

Forced migration is unlikely to disappear in the future. In fact, the number and frequency of crises that generate large scale displacement may well increase substantially in the years ahead. Climate change is expected to generate substantial internal and international displacement from increases in the intensity and frequency of natural hazards, rising sea levels, persistent drought and desertification, and, potentially, new conflicts over scarce resources. At the same time, recent events demonstrate that the process of political change taking hold in many parts of the world can be destabilizing, causing new movements of people. Increased mobility also means greater potential for pandemics to spread quickly throughout the world, as was seen in the SARS and H1N1 cases, and for governments to make decisions regarding non-return, as seen in the Ebola crisis in West Africa. All of these trends mean that governments will likely be facing recurrent crises that spark migration and accompanying humanitarian needs. Although much of this forced migration will be internal to countries facing emergencies, movements across borders are likely as well.

This review of laws, policies, practices and institutions reveal weaknesses and challenges in the current capacities to respond effectively, efficiently and humanely to the challenges presented by forced migration. Although many countries have advanced and tested systems to respond to refugees and asylum seekers, responses

to migration emanating from other crises—natural disasters, political instability and violence, pandemics, human made disasters—are ad hoc and, in many cases, untested. Most countries have mechanisms to provide temporary suspension of removal if conflicts or natural disasters preclude immediate return. With little underpinning from international and, sometimes, national law, the application of these provisions tends to be uneven and often dependent on factors that have little to do with immigration or humanitarian considerations or the balancing of these two factors. Crises that generate greater visibility, such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti or Ebola pandemic in West Africa, may result in suspensions of removal whereas less known but potentially equally dangerous situations may not yield this response. When taken into account, immigration issues can work in different directions in determining whether to suspend removals or provide temporary protection. In some cases, concern that temporary protection may spur new movements of people is determinative in not granting suspension or triggering temporary protection, whereas in others, flow of remittances to countries in crisis may push a government towards the decision to grant the status and provide work authorization.

Once granted, temporary protection and suspension of removals have proven to be problematic vehicles to manage forced migration. Once granted, it is very difficult to lift the designation even if conditions change sufficiently in home countries to permit return. Often, the conditions do not change and the temporary grant of protection becomes a protracted one. In the absence of durable solutions, the forced migrants may end up in limbo for many years. As the stay prolongs, return becomes even harder as those granted permission to remain develop equities and connections to the country in which they are residing.

Temporary protection is an especially weak policy instrument when the conditions that cause flight are permanent. This may be the situation that arises in the context of climate change. Nationals from some low-lying island countries may be unable to return to their home countries if some of the projections of rising sea levels prove to be accurate and their countries are submerged.

Even weaker than policy frameworks for temporarily suspending removals of migrants already in the country are those for dealing with mass migration resulting from crises. As discussed, the European Union passed a Directive on Temporary Protection with new flows in mind but it has never been used. The United States had experience with such movements from Haiti and Cuba in the 1990s, using Guantanamo Naval Base to house the migrants until a determination could be made on their status. The aim of policies adopted in 1994 was to provide safe haven but no access to U.S. territory. Mixed migration is a challenge in handling mass movements in the context of humanitarian crises. Some of those leaving may be bonafide refugees deserving of asylum, others may have serious reasons to fear for their safety though they do not meet the refugee criteria, but still others may be leaving to seek better economic opportunities. Distinguishing among these groups is always challenging and, in the context of a mass migration emergency, even more difficult.

The absence of effective policy tools is especially troubling because these crises have implications that go well beyond immigration and touch on basic humanitarian

and human rights interests. Just as refugees are at risk of serious harm if returned to their home countries, migrants from countries experiencing crises may face life threatening situations. They may also have immediate need for humanitarian assistance, including shelter, health care, food and other basic items.

The promulgation of guidelines and the development of policies to respond to forced migration will require new modes of international cooperation. Given the potential for significant increases in such migration, efforts to build an effective toolkit should begin now. Whether a new convention on forced migration is desirable, or, for that matter, is feasible, are questions that beg easy answers. The history of international conventions related to migration is a mixed one. While the refugee convention and trafficking protocol are widely ratified, the conventions on labour migrants have had very low levels of ratification. Because the complex categories of forced migration discussed herein will likely have elements of both forms of migration, depending on whether the trigger is slow or rapid onset, the future of such a convention would be questionable.

Beyond feasibility, a number of other issues would need to be addressed before determining that a new Convention is the best way to improve policies to respond to forced migration. First, to what extent can existing legal frameworks be stretched to include a wider range of people who are forced to move? How should forced migrants be defined? For that matter, what term should be used in categorizing this form of migration; this paper has used forced migration and displacement as short hands. In other contexts, the terms crisis migrants and survival migrants have been used to describe those who do not fit current legal categories. Even more important, a new framework for protection—whether a new convention or stretching of existing ones—would need to specify who among forced migrants are deserving of international protection—as distinct from those who can rely upon the protection of their own countries. And, the list goes on.

In the end, though, international agreements—whether binding or soft law—will not be a substitute for national action. States should prepare for future crisis responses by preparing a menu of policy options that they could choose to implement in the event of large scale displacement that does not fit into current refugee frameworks. This process is already underway with the Nansen and MICIC Initiatives and the similar State process on other vulnerable migrants recommended by the High Level Meeting. These are forms of what Sir Peter Sutherland, the former Special Representative of the Secretary General on International Migration has called mini-multilateralism, that is, initiatives by a small set of representative governments to build norms and identify good practices to be adopted more universally. A further opportunity is negotiation of a Global Compact on safe, regular and orderly migration, an outcome of the High Level Meeting. Sir Peter Sutherland, in his final report as the Special Representative of the Secretary General, stated that a principal aim of the compact should be to identify mechanisms for “managing crisis movement and protecting migrants in vulnerable situations.” (Sutherland 2017).

In developing an appropriate set of policies for responding to forced migration, consideration needs to be given to the following questions:

- What policies and practices are needed to address the situation of migrants already in destination countries when return to home countries may be life-threatening or otherwise inadvisable? What are the criteria for determining to suspend removals? For how long should the suspension be granted? What criteria should determine if the suspension should be renewed or revoked? What information is needed and from whom to make these determinations?
- What policies and practices are needed to address individuals arriving from countries in crisis? Should individual determinations be made as to whether to allow them to enter or should decisions be made on a group basis?
- What policies and practices are needed to address mass migration flows? Under what circumstances is interdiction appropriate? What criteria should be used in determining whether to return or relocate interdicted migrants? What criteria should be used in determining whether to admit such persons on to the territory of other countries? What information is needed and from whom to make these determinations?
- If new policies are put in place for forced migration, how should these intersect with established refugee and asylum policies and systems?
- If there is a determination that conditions have changed and forced migrants can return safely, what if any assistance should be provided? If there is a determination that return will not be possible for an extended period, what steps should be taken to find durable solutions? Should third country resettlement, for example, be part of a policy toolkit for addressing the broad range of forced migration discussed herein? If so, what criteria should be used in determining who should be eligible for resettlement?
- Should forced migrants be granted work authorization? Should they have access to social benefits? Under what circumstances should authorities use reception centers or camps to provide initial or longer term accommodation? What forms of documentation and registration are needed in managing forced migration?
- How should authorities address potential for fraud and security risks resulting from forced migration?
- Which agencies within government need to be involved in decision making on forced migration? Which international and regional organizations should be involved?
- What forms of responsibility sharing among countries would be appropriate in managing forced migration? What are the appropriate forums for negotiating such arrangements?

Finally, governments should also be reconsidering the ways in which they conceptualize, fund and implement programs to help vulnerable populations adapt to changing conditions that may trigger large scale displacement. In these contexts, migration is not just a problem to be addressed. It may also be a solution for many of those who are affected by climate change and other problems. Too often, migration is forced because there are no alternatives for those who anticipate future harm but are unable to move in a safe and orderly fashion. They may lack the financial,

human and social capital to relocate to where there may be greater long-term opportunities, or government policies do not accommodate their movements. As governments consider National Adaptation Plans and Disaster Risk Reduction strategies, more attention is needed to ways to incorporate migration as a potentially positive response to pending emergencies.

Demography can play an important role in improving responses. Too little is known about the determinants of forced migration, especially beyond traditional refugee flows. There is consensus among researchers that no one factor—economic, social, political, environmental or demographic—is determinative but how the various drivers interact to produce one form of movement versus another is largely unknown. In this context, demography is important in two respects. First, demographic trends are themselves drivers of displacement in conjunction with other factors. This can play out in two ways—demography as a macro-level factor and demographic composition as a micro-level driver of movement. For example, in the context of slow onset climate change, there is need for better understanding of how population density, distribution and growth as well as household composition affects vulnerability and resilience to environmental change (Martin and Bergmann 2017). Understanding the ways in which these demographic and environmental factors intersect with each other and with political and economic drivers would be useful in assessing likely need for planned relocation as environmental conditions worsen.

Second, the demographic profile of forced migrants often affects the efficacy of policy and programmatic responses. Data on demographic as well as socio-economic characteristics of forced migrants are weak in general and, in the case of many types of forced migrants, non-existent. While some progress has been made in compiling aggregate numbers of persons who are displaced by natural disasters (see, for example, IDMC's data (IDMC 2015)), there are no comprehensive sources of data broken down by age or sex. Even in the case of refugees and conflict IDPs, the demographic breakdowns are lacking, particularly when they spontaneously settle and may not register with UNHCR. UNHCR reports that it has sex disaggregated data on 56% of those persons of concern, with sex disaggregated data on refugees at 72%, IDPs at 56% and stateless at only 8%. Age disaggregated data were available for 42% of the population of concern; while it was available for 64% of refugees, it was available for only 26% of IDPs of concern (UNHCR 2013).

Improving sex and age disaggregated data on all forms of displacement would help ensure that policies and programs are appropriate for all of those who are forced to move. It is difficult to plan for protection or assistance programs in the absence of such data. This is true in both acute and protracted phases of displacement. An absence of such data is particularly harmful with regard to needs linked to gender and age, including those related to health, education, food distribution, access to livelihoods and gender and sexual violence. Demographers could play an extremely important role in helping governments, international organizations and NGOs to collect basic data on forced migrants and thereby, improve protection and assistance for some of the world's most vulnerable persons.

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Chapter 15

Epilogue: Advancing Demographic Analysis of Refugee and Forced Migration

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Taking the years 2011–2016 to frame the initiatives of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) concerning the demography of refugees and forced migration and the preparation of this volume, the world's population of forcibly displaced persons has nearly doubled, from 35.4 million to 67.8 million persons of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2012, 2017a, b); the number of persons identified by the UNHCR as refugees has increased by over two thirds, from 9.8 to 16.3 million and the number of internally displaced persons has increased from 15.5 to 36.6 million, 137% over this half a decade. Increases in the world's refugee population have been witnessed at the largest relative scale in Europe, increasing from 1.56 to 5.15 million, and in Africa (excluding northern Africa), from 2.7 to 5.1 million. The most dramatic increases in persons displaced within their own countries has been witnessed within states in the Middle East and North Africa, from 1.8 million at the end of 2011 to 12.1 million at the end of 2016. With these changes comes shifts in the regional distribution of the global population of concern: in 2011, 16% of the world's refugees were hosted in Europe; in 2016 this share had increased to 31%, relative parity with the proportion hosted by the total of countries in southern Africa. While the number of IDPs in southern Africa has increased from 6.9 to 11.2 million, the

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region's share of displaced persons worldwide decreased from 44% in 2011 to 31% in 2016, reflecting the large-scale flight of persons within countries in the Middle East, notably Syria; a thirds of the world's internally displaced population remains within countries within the Middle East and North Africa at the end of 2016 (UNHCR 2012, 2017a).

These metrics provoke consideration of issues deriving from the 'complexity and urgency' of persons subject to forced migration throughout our world heralded by Peter McDonald in the Preface to this volume. McDonald calls for the attention of population scientists to people, to populations and to processes in informing population policies concerning human migration and mobilities, and critically, forced migration and mobilities. The project of this volume has been to provide the argument for, and the scope and methods of demographic contributions to these very topics. We and our colleagues have sought to encourage the generation of knowledge, evidence and understanding of population displacement, forced migration and the production of refugees in this twenty-first century.

It has been our intent to articulate and illustrate the assets of demography – using the terms of Shryock and Siegel (1973; Swanson and Siegel 2004) – the *materials and materials* of demography – for the study of and response to forced migration. Our colleagues have addressed the importance of legal and historical context for concepts of forced migration, and the ways in which demographers can serve in conceptual specification, measurement and data collection, themes that have cross cut the chapters. Demography embraces critical consideration of relevant units of analysis, for example, the individual, family, and household. Internal population displacement and irregular migrations emerge as significant foci for demographic research. The relevance of demographic lens for the analysis, both descriptive and explanatory, has been illustrated for an *inexhaustive* range of issues including environmental, security, and gendered dimensions of forced and refugee migration and processes of return, integration, assimilation and contributions of forced migrant groups. The survey of analytic themes and topics has not been comprehensive but serves to introduce and reveal the realm of opportunities for demographic contributions to collaborative, interdisciplinary and potentially transdisciplinary research. The role of demographic analysis in evidence-based policy making is underscored as our colleagues have worked up and down analytic scales to reflect upon international, regional and state and local level responses to refugees and forced migrants, and to address the causes and consequences of forced population movements.

To say that the engagement of population scientists with these issues, and the incorporation of demographic data and methods within the study of refugee and forced migration is well timed is far too benign and passive a statement. The engagement of social scientists is critical and is essential at this moment in international governance concerning the movement of people. The Summit for Refugees and Migrants was convened by the United Nations in September 2016. In adopting the "New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants," the UN General Assembly has committed itself to a process to improve "...the way in which the international community responds to large movements of refugees and migrants, including protracted refugee situations" (UNHCR 2017a, b; see also UN General Assembly 2016).

The Declaration endorses preparations for the development of a global compact on refugees, to be considered in 2018, in which responsibility is shared among Member States within a ‘comprehensive refugee response framework.’ The objectives of the framework ((a) ease pressure on host countries; (b) enhance refugee self-reliance; (c) expand access to third country solutions; and (d) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity (UNHCR 2017b)) will be implemented through a ‘programme of action’ informed by evidence, knowledge and best practices in four thematic areas of refugee and forced migration processes: reception and admission; support for immediate and ongoing needs; support for host countries and communities; and durable solutions (UNCHR 2017b).

Consider the demographic dimensions of each of these four themes: Reception and admission requires population levels, trends and distribution; support for needs requires measures of vulnerabilities and resilience varying by age, gender (as one of our reviewers noted: “... recognition of different vulnerabilities is crucial and another reminder why demography is so important”); support for host communities begs an understanding of population composition and components of population change, processes of integration and social and economic reproduction, etc.); and durable solutions assume an understanding of the causal drivers – proximate and ultimate – of forced migration and population displacement. As population scientists we must consider the time is fully right for active participation in and advocacy for the scientific study of refugee and forced migration.

It is our sincere hope that this volume will contribute to provoke participation and advocacy for renewed engagement in the demography of refugee and forced migration. Our efforts have sought to argue and illustrate. The demography of refugee and forced migration will be advanced with application of the scope and methods, the ‘methods and materials,’ of the population sciences to empirical populations of forced migrants, that is, to groups of people, women and men, boys and girls, seeking, or in, refuge and safety.

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