Chapter 8
Africa's Governance Travails After More Than Two Decades of Democratic Experiments

Madalitso Zililo Phiri

Introduction

The end of the Cold War signaled the beginning of a new era in democratic experiments across the world and particularly for African countries. Yet for millions of Sub-Saharan African citizens the gains of democratic governance have not resulted in the realization of freedom, justice and equality. This chapter answers the following question: What conditions and ideas have led to Sub-Saharan Africa's failure to deliver on a new social contract for its citizens? The anti-colonial struggles against colonial and imperial rule degenerated into one-party states, extra-judicial killings, violent civil conflicts and coup d'états. Taking into consideration development and socioeconomic indicators, most African countries lost the economic prowess that had pioneered growth and development between the 1960s and 1970s (see Cooper 2002). Scholarly literature on Africa's governance trajectory caricatured the continent as 'neopatrimonial', confirming the failure of Africa to adapt to conditions of modernity. This theoretical framework misses out on foundational ideas, historical events, and the constraints of the global imperial knowledge regime that have played a significant role in shaping Africa's democratic governance debates. This chapter departs from the neopatrimonial school because, as Mkandawire has argued, "the language of neopatrimonialism has permeated news coverage of African affairs so much that the flow of ideas and 'facts' between research results and the media has created a self-reinforcing discourse" (Mkandawire 2015). Governance is defined as the provision of the political, social and economic goods that a citizen has the right to expect from his or her state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2016a).

M.Z. Phiri (✉)
Archie Mafeje Research Institute (AMRI), College of Graduate Studies, University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: madalitsophiri1@gmail.com

O. Akanle, J.O. Adésìnà (eds.), *The Development of Africa*, Social Indicators Research Series 71, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-66242-8_8

Throughout the 2000s the discourse around democracy and development fitted the neoliberal paradigm which championed the effectiveness of policy implementation through Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP); 'good governance', managing debt through the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiatives; sound management of fiscal and monetary policies; and deregulation of the state (Collier 2007; Sachs 2005). It came as no surprise that even under the guise of these 'democratic values' donor governments supported pseudo-democratic regimes, and authoritarian politics in the name of promoting good governance, i.e. Mozambique and Angola (see Hanlon and Mosse 2010; Hanlon 2009; Vines and Campos 2010). In the last 15 years of the twentieth century African countries like Zambia, Nigeria and Angola saw a resurgence of growth dubbed the 'Africa rising'. Powered by a commodity boom and China's growing influence across the continent some African countries sustained positive economic growth rates, attracted venture capitalists, and experienced a slight increase in infrastructure investments (Cheru and Obi 2010), although slowing growth in China and sluggish European recovery has also led to recessions across the continent. As the African Development Bank (2016) suggests, the continent's economic performance held firm in 2015, amid global headwinds and regional shocks. Growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016 was estimated at 3.6%, higher than the 3.1% for the global economy and 1.5% for the Euro area. Africa remained the world's second fastest growing economy after East Asia. In 2015, Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) grew faster than the continental average, at 4.2%, with East Africa leading the way at 6.3%.

Simultaneously, millions of people across Sub-Saharan Africa have not benefited directly from these growth spurts as the negative effects of poverty, inequality, social exclusion, violent civil conflicts, terrorist attacks, internal and external refugee crises and new territorial contestations are evident (Hammar 2014; Murungu 2014; Sembene 2015). Between 1999 and 2011, the increase in the number of poor was barely 30 million, equivalent to only 5% of the total population increase that took place in the region over the same period (Sembene 2015). Poverty headcount ratios have continued to decline since the mid-1990s after reaching a record high of 60%. However, this change has also taken place at a time when poverty incidence still remains high with almost one out of every two Africans living below the poverty line. In pursuit of alternative development paradigms the World Bank also experimented with social policies aimed at reforms that led to Africa's lost decades during the 1980s and 1990s (World Bank 2009); yet the ubiquitous nature of policy failures is currently manifest in almost all African countries. Policy analysts have argued that although African countries have reduced the number of people living in absolute poverty, simultaneously inequality had been on the increase (Sembene 2015; Bigsten 2014).

Taking into account international instruments agreed to reduce poverty, most African countries did not meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as had been envisioned, in spite of the adoption of the PRSP, casting doubt on whether the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will also be met (Sembene 2015; Bigsten 2014). Ravallion and Chen (2012) computed estimates of inequality on the basis of 850 household consumption surveys for 1979–2008, covering 125 developing

countries. They show that Sub-Saharan Africa has higher inequality than other regions with the exception of Latin America and the Caribbean. However, according to Sembene (2015), inequality increased in about half of the sample of PRSP and non-PRSP countries, even though the latter experienced relatively more cases of improved Gini indices. Greater income inequality thus appears to be associated with higher poverty incidence in PRSP countries. At the same time, only modest increases in the income share were secured for the poorest quintile in less than half of these countries (Sembene 2015).

The Arab Uprisings that began at the beginning of the decade highlighted neglected questions of whether authoritarian governments in the Maghreb region and democratic polities across the African continent could coexist with inequality. Inspired by new social movements and citizenship demands, the ideas of the imagination of a new social contract became central to the overthrow of totalitarian regimes that had been in power for almost four decades (Khatib and Lust 2014; Achar 2013). For some scholars the Arab Uprisings signaled a new era where first impression suggested that what happened may not have overturned the political order of the MENA region but was nonetheless profound; as the fall of these *ancien regimes* would have consequences for the future of the region, and beyond (Pollack et al. 2014). This chapter aims to analyze these developments through a historical framework of an African theory toward democratic governance. Key to unlocking these debates is that democracy and development have always been central to Africa's intelligentsia even before the wave of democratization in the 1990s. The political transformations across the African continent need to be understood through the lenses of history and analogy, as Mamdani (1996) has argued. It is impossible to comprehend democratization and development without a re-examination of the postcolonial state as a creation of colonial violence and domination that is tied to the teleological goal of Western modernity. As Mamdani (2003, 132) suggests that "the modern political sensibility sees political violence as necessary to historical progress. Ever since the French Revolution, moderns have come to see violence as the midwife of history".

The first section of this chapter provides a conceptual framework for understanding the intellectual discourses of colonial violence (Cesaire 1972; Mamdani 2003) juxtaposed with neopatrimonialism. This section further locates the Arab Uprisings in their conceptual framework as they pertain to debates on democratization across the Sub-Saharan continent. The second section traces the ideas of democracy and development across the African continent by engaging the ideas of pan-Africanists like Mafeje (1995, 2002), Mamdani (2003) and Mkandawire (1989, 2015) to neglected dimensions of African voices on the democratization process on the continent. The third section follows the evolution of discourses on democracy and development in three countries across Sub-Saharan Africa: South Africa, Mozambique and Rwanda. All three countries have encountered different levels of violence that are birthed in a global imperial and colonial imagination. Further, the three countries have moved from violent civil conflicts to forge 'democratic governments' that champion equality, freedom and justice, yet these yardsticks are questioned. The chapter concludes that crucial to the reconfiguration of discourses on

democracy and development is to understand the political economy of colonialism's physical and epistemic violence, whilst simultaneously committed to principles of an New African Democracy premised on a 'radical humanist' agenda. As Mamdani (2003, 132) further suggests, "what horrifies modern political sensibility is not violence per se, but violence that does make sense. It is violence that is neither revolutionary nor counter-revolutionary, violence that cannot be illuminated by the story of progress that appears senseless to us. Not illuminated paradigmatically, non-revolutionary violence appears pointless".

Towards an African Revolutionary Theory of Democratic Governance

There is a singular narrative that attempts to understand the process of democratization and development on the continent. As Hammar (2014, 12) has suggested from assertions of 'its' historical and continued marginalization and 'failure' (Van de Walle 2001); to culturalist presentations of a socially embedded 'moral economy' of different shades (Olivier de Sardan 1999), marked not least by pervasive neopatrimonialism (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Kelsall 2008); to images of a continent whose economic form and fate are largely defined by violence, war, chaos and criminalization (Bayart et al. 1999); to the recent more optimistic soundbites of 'Africa rising' and its new value in the global economy linked to growth in (China-led) demands for natural resources and for land for biofuel and food production. Whichever position is adopted, little importance is placed on Africa's democracy and development discourse which focuses on the evolution of the continent's historical sociology that has shaped past and contemporary democratic trajectories. The struggle to topple imperialist and colonial governments, predicated on democratic aspirations degenerated into one-party states, totalitarian rule leading to social and economic malaise. The late 1980s and 1990s witnessed the resurgence of democratic aspirations, powered by global events and local conditions that were ripe for multiparty politics (see Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Van de Walle 2001). Although the Western mantra of supporting authoritarian politics as a Cold War tactic evolved to a recognition and promotion of human rights, 'good governance', rule of law, civil liberties and democratic aspirations based on the concept of liberal democracies, democracy has been imposed at gunpoint across the world, and some scholars have suggested that international pressure can help to create more stable democratic institutions (Carter 2016). It is assumed, as had been predicated by the neoconservative theorist Fukuyama (1992), who declared the 'end of history', that democratic institutions modeled on Western 'egalitarianism' would usurp traditional African values and bring about a homogenous world order.

In contemporary times the same democratic experiments that had been envisioned to deliver on a new social contract have also produced and reproduced several crises; political, social, economic, environmental, rooted in residues of colonial

and postcolonial state configurations. The neopatrimonial school, as it became commonly understood, vilified and caricatured the African leader and state, arguing that African societies were incapable of achieving a rules-based liberal democracy. Yet neopatrimonial theorists exaggerate institutional malaise, and fail to theorize to understand the binaries of authoritarian and progressive politics across the continent. The argument is simple, just as the African continent has produced dictators like Mugabe and Idi Amin, it has also produced progressive politics through Mandela and OR Tambo. It is pivotal to understand the evolution of state relations and the quest for progressive politics in the historical and sociological contexts in which both leaders and states have been produced. This, however, requires a rejection of the imperial and colonial theories that have given distorted views of the African continent in general. It is also important to turn to the Arab Uprisings as a significant moment where discourses around democracy and democratization have been brought to the fore.

The Arab Uprisings that began in Tunisia, spreading to Libya, Egypt and parts of the Middle East, reinvigorated debates on freedom, equality and justice. However, there have been several revolts and 'revolutionary processes' for example in Egypt that can be described more as a revolution than present events. The 1952 coup of the Free Officers led by Gamal Abdel-Nasser unquestionably led to a transformation of Egypt much more radical than anything that has so far resulted from the Revolution of 2011 (see Achar 2013; Hanieh 2013; Mitchell 2011). Indeed, we might go so far as to say that the passive counterrevolution led by Anwar al-Sadat after Nasser's death in 1970 also brought about deeper socioeconomic changes than those seen in Egypt since the downfall of Hosni Mubarak on 11 February 2011. Yet the immense uprising that began on 2011 constitutes a bursting of the masses onto the political stage that had no precedent in the very long history of the land of the pyramids (Achar 2013). The following is further proposed, providing a different account of revolutionary violence:

> The 1952 coup led to the overthrow of a dynasty, the abolition of the monarchy and parliamentary regime, the creation of a republican military dictatorship, the nationalization of foreign assets, the subversion of the old regime's property-holding classes (big landed property, commercial and financial capital), a major drive to industrialize, and far-reaching progressive social reforms. These changes certainly better deserve to be called a 'revolution' than do the results of the uprising set in motion in January 2011, which so far has led only to the overthrow of the small clan that dominated the state, and the democratization of the semi-presidential regime, pending a change in the constitution by means that seek to maintain juridical continuity with the old institutions (Achar 2013, 16).

Western media treated these events and transformations, which are also desperately needed across the African continent, as pivotal moments that would redefine social and political conditions. Some pundits have predicted an Egyptian-style revolution in light of rising inequalities and state repression in South Africa in 2020 and the overthrow of Mugabe in Zimbabwe. However, as Achar (2013) has argued, "the Tunisian and Egyptian political revolutions have, nevertheless, left the state apparatuses of the fallen regimes essentially intact; only in Libya was the old state machine largely dismantled by a civil war." These sweeping generalizations do not pay

attention to history and analogy and thorough theoretical attempts to understand the course of revolutionary violence on the continent. Mamdani (2003) suggests, "faced with political violence that arises in a modern context but will not fit the story of progress, theory has tended to take refuge in theology by branding violence as evil to be understood outside historical time." He further suggests that "there is a huge resistance, moral and political, to thinking through this violence by locating it in a historical context". In retrospect, as Achar has argued, none of the Arab countries has yet experienced a social revolution in the sense of a thorough transformation of its social structure. Only factions at the pinnacle of the social hierarchy—big or small, depending on the case—have been affected. Nowhere has that hierarchy itself been modified.

In a similar vein the democratic transformations that swept across Sub-Saharan countries in the 1990s produced and reproduced despotic regimes, pseudo-democracies and unconstitutional changes of power that at times failed to deliver on citizenship demands for most citizens. It is tempting to accept the imperial and colonial theories like neopatrimonialism to explain de-democratization, social alienation, de-development and all kinds of crises. However, state formation on the African continent was predicated on the imagination of colonial violence which produced an anti-democratic, anti-human, anti-development state artifact. The anti-colonial leaders were therefore products of a violent state, whereby the rubrics of society were predicated on exclusive citizenship rights for the European to the exclusion of the native. If this is the case, how is it possible then that an anti-democratic, anti-human project state and leader would be expected to bring about a more just, fair and equitable society?

In order to arrive at a revolutionary theory on democracy, Cesaire's (1972) *Discourse on Colonialism* is crucial to the arguments. The modernist concepts were predicated on violence and the elevation of the European as the 'total human' in its civilizing mission. Cesaire argues that a clinical account of the colonizing mission should be taken to understand the very contradictions of Euro-modernity. He suggests that the steps taken by Hitler and Hitlerism reveal to the very distinguished, very humanistic, very Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century that without his being aware of it, he has a Hitler inside him, that Hitler inhabits him, that Hitler is his demon; what he cannot forgive Hitler for is the crime against the white man, the humiliation of the white man, and the fact that he applied to European colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the coolies of India, and the blacks of Africa. Cesaire therefore deals with these binaries, how is it possible that a civilization that purports itself to be the 'total human' revives itself to make universal democratic claims about belonging to the civilized world. As Cesaire himself notes that to gain a clear picture of our modern conditions, we must study how colonization works to *decivilize* the colonizer, to brutalize him in the true sense of the word, to degrade him, to awaken him to buried instincts, to covetousness, violence, race hatred, and moral relativism. Recognizing the wanton destruction that Europe inflicted on the psyche of the colonized Africa, Cesaire concludes that the only hope lies in the death of a world that is predicated on anti-black racism or in other words, class suicide. He suggests the following:

> … and since you are talking about factories and industries, do you not see the tremendous factory hysterically spitting out its cinders in the heart of our forests or deep in the bush, the factory for the production of lackeys; do you not see the prodigious mechanization, the mechanization of man; the gigantic rape of everything intimate, undamaged, undefiled that, despoiled as we are, our human spirit has still managed to preserve; the machine, yes, have you never seen it, the machine for crushing, for grinding, for degrading peoples? … which comes down to saying that the salvation of Europe is not a matter of a revolution in methods. It is a matter of Revolution- the one which, until such a time as there is a classless society, will substantiate for the narrow tyranny of a dehumanised bourgeoisie the preponderance of the only class that still has a universal mission, because it suffers in its flesh from all the wrongs of history, from all the universal wrongs: the proletariat (Cesaire 1972, 23)

The anti-colonial leaders were therefore incapable of producing a 'radical humanist society' as the system that birthed them is predicated on colonial violence. There were attempts to transcend colonial violence and imaginations; Nkrumah's call for African unity, Kaunda's African humanism, Nyerere's Ujamaa projects, and Machel's '*Novo Homem'*. With noble intentions, these democratizing projects degenerated into authoritarian politics and the vilification of dissidents. To understand the mindset that conceived the postcolonial state we need to return to political identities crafted by modern imperialism, the settler and the native, as Mamdani (2003, 1996) has argued.

Until recently, emphasis was placed on the agency of the settler, but not on the agency of the native. It is not just the settler; the native too is a product of imperial imagination. Framed by a common history, they define two sides of a relationship. Unless they are transcended together, they will be reproduced together (Mamdani 2003). Fanon in the *Wretched of the Earth* (1967) noted the contradictions that would engulf the 'anti-colonial' ruling elite as being trapped in the state apparatus of the colony. As Mamdani himself has noted, while Fanon was recognized as the prophet of decolonization on the publication of this monumental study, he was also a critique of decolonization. Fanon (1967) argued that "[t]he colonized man liberates himself in and through violence". Mamdani's expository account therefore becomes central to understanding the violence for Fanon's thesis was at the same time a description, a claim and a problematization. As Mamdani (2003) suggests, firstly Fanon's thesis was a description of the violence of the colonial system, of the fact that violence was key to producing and sustaining the relationship between the settler and the native. Second, it was a claim that anti-colonial violence is not an irrational manifestation but belongs to the script of modernity and progress, that it is indeed a midwife of history. Thirdly, it was a problematization, of a derivative violence, of the violence of victims turned into killers. As Mamdani (2003, 135–136) further suggests:

> It is in Fanon himself that one finds the premonition of the native turned perpetrator, of the native who kills not just to extinguish the humanity of the other, but to defend his or her own, and of the moral ambivalence this must provoke in other human beings like us. Native violence, Fanon insisted, was the violence of yesterday's victims, the violence of those who had cast aside their victimhood to become masters of their own lives. He of whom they have never stopped saying that the only language he understands is that of force, decided to give utterance by force … The argument the native chooses has been furnished by the settler, and by an ironic turning of the tables it is the native who now affirms that the colonialist

> understands nothing by force. For Fanon, the proof of the native's humanity consisted not in the willingness to kill settlers, but in the willingness to risk his or her own life. If the outcome was death, natives killing settlers, that was still a derivative outcome. The native who embraces violence to safeguard his and her freedom is the victim-turned-perpetrator.

Neopatrimonialism theorists seeking to understand the democratic trajectory of African countries undermine the extent to which colonial modernity was predicated on the decimation of the natives. Colonial genocide is the foundational philosophy of the state itself. In other words, colonial state configuration is anti-democratic as the native existed as a figment of its imagination, to serve a violent state that had rendered ideas of inclusion, belonging and citizenship exclusively reserved for the European. Mkandawire (2015) suggests that most scholars agree with Clapham's (1985) concise definition of neopatrimonialism as "a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers … as a form of private property". Neopatrimonialism is, then, a marriage of tradition and modernity with an offspring whose hybridity generates a logic that has had devastating effects on African economies (Mkandawire 2015). The past therefore becomes central to understanding the present especially postcolonial predicaments that engulf our world as Said (1993) argued. Further, Mafeje (2002) also noted that "while in reality there cannot be any clean break with pre-existing forms of social organization, politically it is arguable that the present states in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding Ethiopia which fits in the Oriental model) are a derivation of the colonial state *par excellence*".

Liberalism or New African Democracy on the Continent

So far the argument that has been made is that state configurations across the African continent are predicated on colonial violence that produces an anti-human, anti-democratic, and anti-development postcolonial project. A cursory examination of colonial violence therefore demystifies 'Arab exceptionalism' that had been propagated by Western pundits. Most Maghreb countries are even latecomers to the discourses on democratization if followed from the teleological goal of building Western democratic institutions since the inception of the Third Wave. As a point of correction, it was the Maghreb countries that had a lot to learn from Sub-Saharan Africa discourses, especially on how fragmented states that had dealt with democratic polities after the 1990s could coexist with religious difference, tolerance and inclusivity. Yet, these lessons are couched in universal experiences that perpetuate the myth of Sub-Saharan Africa as a dark region, where despotic governments have thrived and failed to build democratic institutions that safeguard the interests of its citizens. This too is theoretical imperialism, which was concretely dispelled in Said's (1978) initial laments in "*Orientalism*".

It was Mafeje (1995, 1999, 2002) who raised pertinent theoretical questions on the meaning of democracy across the continent. Mafeje's exposition asked "does democracy mean freedom; or is it 'human rights', a celebration of anthropology of all humanity, or is it self-glorification by the West at its moment of absolute triumph, an affirmation of its discretionary power which allows it to pick and choose in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, South Africa, the Congo, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Palestine, Afghanistan, and Kosovo?" In asking this question he was bringing an indictment on the continued colonial violence of modern state crafting which disguises itself in forms of universalism. Since the inception of Euro-modernity a universalism paradigm defines all experiences of the 'human' to be Western. In this teleological goal, Western concepts can give full expressions of liberty, fraternity and equality as enshrined in the French Revolution, yet the framings of these allude to the human as a 'Western subject'. Even when one takes it further to the American Revolution, 'all men are created equal, to pursue life, liberty and happiness', the liberal values and ideals are hypocritical. This is not a polemical statement, for at every stage of the evolution of Western ideas of inclusion, they coexisted with social and political exclusion; women, non-property owners and the descendant of slaves.

When Mafeje raised the questions above, he was in effect asking where the 'human' is in the democracy discourse. This therefore requires a rejection of the very liberal ideas and the values it purports. It is not enough to suggest liberalism has self-correcting mechanisms, for in this philosophy lies the ideas that can enslave, justify democratic imposition and moral superiority. As Mafeje (1999, 2) further noted:

> [A]part from the obvious political implication and unmistakable cynicism, this is an indication that these concepts, despite their universalistic pretensions are subject to more than one interpretation i.e. they are subject to manipulation … Fraudulent and hypocritical interventions must be exposed for double standards cannot at the same time serve as the basis for universal claims. Indeed, even without such duplicity, it is very doubtful philosophically if at the level of values there can be any universalism. It is significant that the leaders of the "free world" namely, the Americans, unabashedly justify committing atrocities outside the West by putting a premium on their values and way of life. Far from affirming any kind of universalism, this pits one universalism against all other … While purporting to represent universal moral principles, even such codes of conduct are not by any means an epitome of universalism … The West (Americans in particular) does not only treat its type of democracy as a universal principle but also arrogates itself the moral right to impose it on others when it suits it politically.

In retrospect, if liberalism, and the democratic values and principles it purports are problematic, it requires a rejection of imperial theories and ideas that have sustained it. Liberalism is couched in a theoretical imperialism which has constructed the modern world as it is to benefit the West. Mudimbe in both the *Invention of Africa* (1988) and its sequel, *The Idea of Africa*, tasked himself with understanding the colonial imagination and noted that "the colonising structure undertook the domination of space, the integration of local economies into the capitalist system, and the re-forming of the natives' minds". This was further elucidated by Said (1993) who noted "'imperialism' means the very practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory." Against this background most pan-African scholars like Mafeje, Anyang'

Nyong'o and Mkandawire committed themselves to finding heuristic models to explain democratic conditions on the continent. After a preoccupation with debates on dependency theories, capitalism versus socialism, the African intelligentsia sought to articulate its own voice on democratic processes. It became obvious that African countries not only failed to deliver, but also after decades of independence their economies had overwhelmingly fallen into a political abyss. It is fair to say that these scholars, as Mafeje (1999) suggests, were not unduly worried about the 'one party state' or *parti unique*, but more about the failure of African states to deliver what had been promised at independence, namely, freedom from the oppression and exploitation that were the hallmark of the colonial state. However, there were diverging voices within these discussions which become pivotal to this conceptualization.

Mafeje (1999) suggests that Anyang' Nyong'o's positions were interrelated. First, he noted that the disintegration of the national alliance that led to independence ushered in a phase of dictatorships. Second, the resultant lack of democracy in Africa is the root cause of the lack of development, that is, there cannot be democracy in Africa without development. Mafeje further elaborates that in the spirit of independence, Anyang' Nyong'o (1988) was less interested in elaborating a formal definition of 'democracy' than in determining the extent to which the general populace was free to participate in national reconstruction and thus guarantee development. Anyang' Nyong'o was accused by Mkandawire of instrumentalism, who argued instead that democracy is an absolute value. Mkandawire (1989) succeeded in undermining Anyang' Nyong'o's position by citing historical cases such as Germany, Japan and, more recently, the South East Asian countries, where development occurred without any real democracy—meaning vaguely liberal democracy. Yet, in Mkandawire's (1989) rebuttal as Mafeje (1999) has suggested, he relativized his concept of democracy by submitting that liberal democracy is better than nothing—a not uncommon argument but mistaken in principle. It becomes clear in these debates that what was at stake were the very ideas that constitute 'democracy'. As Mafeje himself had noted, instead of maintaining the discourse on the conceptual plane, a number of protagonists began to fasten on single items such as the four classical freedoms, the right to opposition and the rule of law. Involved in this juristical liberalism were noted radical African scholars such as Mkandawire (1989), Mamdani (1990) and Mandaza (1991). The debates were inconclusive as they represented in actuality a disagreement within the left about political realities and strategies rather than ideological preferences (Mafeje 1999).

It was Shivji (1980, 1989) who contemptuously referred to "compradorial democracy" to the irritation of his more pragmatic colleagues, who in his opinion were being influenced by the "fashionable bandwagons" of the West. Shivji's case was vindicated by the fact that in the new "democratization" in Africa the popular masses who initiated the process were usurped or their movement was hijacked by their class enemies and liberal democracy remained a sham. Further debates saw those on the left as radical African nationalists. Ake (1996), for example, rejected the liberal thesis. He further articulates this rejection in his last testimony that Africa requires something more than the impoverished liberal democracy that prevails in

the industrialized countries. As Mafeje (1999) argues, his outright rejection of liberal democracy is "inimical to the idea of the people having effective decision making power". In contradistinction, Ake advocated: "a social democracy that places emphasis on concrete political, social and economic rights, as opposed to liberal democracy that emphasizes abstract political rights." However, it was left to Wamba dia Wamba (1992) to carry his Afrocentric perspective to its logical conclusion by calling for an African democracy that relied on traditional mechanisms such as village palavers and lineage assemblies. Mafeje (1999) rebuts by suggesting that we need to guard against reversion to the past with its pitfalls or relapse into uncritical cultural revivalism.

The discussion above seems to suggest that what African countries face is an impasse to theoretical alternatives. In search for alternatives it is not enough to think only theoretically, but to think with theory, or what Adesina (2006, 2008) termed "epistemic rupture". There can be no reversion to a romanticized African past and yet the liberal ideas present existential difficulties for continental realities. However, for the African scholar this requires a new imagination beyond liberalism, as a sociologist like Rabaka (2010) has called it, *Against Epistemic Apartheid*. A new theoretical paradigm in Africa's democracy needs to be cognizant of both the physical and 'epistemic' violence that were the hallmarks of colonial modernity on the African psyche; in conjunction with the substantial freedoms, justice that goes beyond the parameters of colonial territorial constructions like states. In other words, the emergence of a 'new African humanity' can only be achieved once imperialist theories that make universal claims about Africa's ontological, existential, social and political realities have been transcended. It was Mafeje (1995, 1999, 2002) who insisted that African people should be their own "theoretical interlocutors."

In his critique of the neopatrimonial school that views Africa as prone to dictatorship because of an authoritarian past, Mafeje (1995, 2002) notes that this is anthropologically at variance with facts—African societies featured kingdoms, chiefdoms, uncentralized societies or the so-called 'acephalous' societies, clan and lineage societies—there is no political mode that could be described as having been characteristic of its historical past, as Africa has more than one past.[1] Yet a new theoretical paradigm would also need to transcend state configurations of the African state imagination itself. Mafeje engages with the basic presupposition that the African

[1] Cheik Anta Diop (1981) wrote a monumental treatise to usurp imperial historiography that views Africa as having one past. In *Civilization or Barbarism*, he makes a strong case for the blackness of the Egyptian civilization. His thesis moves from the negated history to an affirmation of Egypt's place in the history of Africa. His point is not that Africa should return to this romanticized past, rather he points out that Africa's rebirth will require the centrality of Egypt in its ontological imaginations. He argued that since the birth of Egyptology, most Egyptologists committed their well-known crime against science by becoming guilty of a deliberate falsification of the history of humanity. The new Egyptological ideology, born at the opportune moment, reinforced the theoretical bases of imperialist ideology. These positions drowned out the voice of science by throwing the veil of falsification over historical truth. Imperialism first killed the being spiritually and culturally, before trying to eliminate it physically. The negation of the history and intellectual accomplishments of Black Africans was cultural, mental murder, which preceded and paved the way for their genocide in Africa and the world.

state and economy are a continuation of the colonial state and as such can deliver neither political democracy nor social democracy. The colonial and postcolonial states are therefore antithetical to the existence of democracy, as both present contradictions that need to be overcome. With regard to the colonial state, Mafeje (2002) asserts that it was a creation of the colonial powers for their purposes. As such it exhibits specific characteristics that are not found in the metropolitan state, which are (i) an imposition from outside; (ii) contrivance meant to administer not citizens but colonial peoples or natives, i.e. to administer not subjects but objects; (iii) not accountable to those who are administered but to itself and ultimately to the metropolitan power; (iv) arbitrary use of power and lack of transparency; (v) highly extractive, especially with regard to the peasants; and (vi) disregard of all civil liberties in the colony.

The violent colonial state therefore produced and reproduced its violent other, the postcolonial state. After an expository account of the postcolonial state, Mafeje concludes that the neocolonial African state is characterized by authoritarianism and callous disregard for civil liberties and, further, is a degenerate derivative or poor reproduction of the colonial state mechanism. He suggests that given that no prototypical state model exists in Africa, then the question that has to be answered is whether or not the neocolonial state in Africa can be democratized. While this chapter partially agrees with this argument, this paradigm may also limit other dimensions. Mafeje suggests Africans should not do away with idea of the state in Africa, as it is still potentially the most important single actor in the political and economic arena in Africa, especially under threat of globalization. He suggests that the problem is how to reconcile democratic pluralism with the integrity of the state, however defined. The argument in this chapter is that the whole world is predicated on anti-black racism and extermination. It therefore calls for a re-imagination of the only way out of the trappings of colonial modernity as its own death, as Cesaire suggests.

While Mafeje's ideational sophistication is cognizant of no permanency in the history of the world his paradigm is still trapped in colonial modernity. This is not an indictment of Mafeje as "colonial"; rather he exists in the "colonising structure" as Mudimbe (1988, 1994) noted; a reality that confronts both past and present pan-African scholars. Mafeje (2002) notes the contradictory ideas of the 'good governance' debates across the African continent as he argues that on the one hand this paradigm called for democracy and 'good governance' while it fought battles with governments that were supposed to be democratizing in Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, and Ghana. On the other hand, he also notes that this paradigm demanded that African states take a back seat in development as it wanted 'strong states' or authoritarian governments to implement its unpopular programs. It is a contention of mine that liberalism cannot address its contradictions; it is ethically, spiritually, morally and politically bankrupt. A more democratic world requires the death of the nation-state mentality, whose thought has evolved to privilege the West's existential, ontological and political aspirations as universal realities, and in doing so the primacy of the state as a monopoly of violence. This requires a social death of anti-democratic, anti-human, anti-development articulations, which are deeply embedded in the idea of the state and can therefore not be democratized. Mafeje (2002) falls back on the

concept of a "social democracy" for Africa, which he argues can be subsumed under the "New Democracy". He concludes that while the former cannot be used as a basis for national liberation, the latter can; this confronts the African with an awkward question. In our circumstances, would this constitute a radical departure from what came to be popularly known as 'independence' or a continuation of an unfinished revolution? Africa is pregnant with new meanings but its problem is agency, Mafeje (2002) suggests. For a further application of this, the three case studies of South Africa, Mozambique and Rwanda need to be considered.

Democracy and Development in Comparative Perspective: South Africa, Mozambique and Rwanda

The 'democratic' transitions that swept most African countries in the 1990s had different effects on the polities of South Africa, Mozambique and Rwanda. Through a negotiated settlement, in 1994 South Africa embarked on the path of overcoming violent conflict to build a more inclusive and tolerant democracy that would do away with racial hierarchies (Bond 2000, 2001). Mozambique overcame two conflicts, one against colonial domination and a civil conflict rooted in Cold War rivalries; culminating in a peace agreement in 1992 that led to democratic elections in 1994. Rwanda embarked on democratic reforms after a brutal civil conflict between 1990 and 1994, which culminated in the genocide of 1994 (Melvern 2000). In all three countries, 'liberation parties' that saw themselves as safeguarding the interests of all their citizens won contested elections to become governing parties in their own right, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda. While literature has concentrated on understanding the nature of these transitions in their global importance, more attention needs to be paid to the sociological dimensions that have raised questions on how to make sense of the governance of 'post-genocidal democratic' polities.

All three countries became the beacon of hope for most African countries. There was a sense of triumphalism and belief in the forging of new democratic institutions that could overcome civil conflict to build tolerant and inclusive societies. In a continent-wide analysis between 2000 and 2015, the Mo Ibrahim Governance report (2016a, b, c) found that ten countries out of 54 moved up a band of "overall governance"; five from "medium-low" in 2006 to "medium" in 2015 (Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Togo and Zimbabwe); four from "medium" to "medium-high" (Kenya, Morocco, Rwanda and Uganda); and one – Seychelles – from "medium-high" to "high". These countries cover 15% of Africa's population and 18% of Africa's GDP. Rwanda, one of the ten countries mentioned, under the leadership of the RPF has aimed at sustaining growth, becoming a leader in telecommunications and agriculture. Kagame has made it a priority for Rwanda to become a middle-income country by 2020. In South Africa, the 'rainbow nation' project dominated the myth of transition in the first decade of democratization. In Mozambique,

donor governments promoted the mantra of 'a development miracle', where before the meltdown in 2015, economic growth was seemingly trickling down to reduce poverty and underdevelopment. Figure 8.1 below illustrates overall governance[2] across the three countries. The highest score that was captured for South Africa was 71.5 which is a record since the inception of the Mo Ibrahim Index in 2000. While the country still ranks in the top ten for 'overall governance', the average rating in the last 5 years has been deteriorating. Between 2010 and 2015 the average rating for 'overall governance' captured was 69.5, a score which was last recorded in 2002. In a similar vein, 'overall governance' in Mozambique has deteriorated since 2000 with two consecutive record lows of 52.1 in both 2013 and 2014. Average 'overall governance' between 2010 and 2015 was 53, which was last captured in 2001.

On the other hand, Rwanda has seemingly made progress, recording its highest score for 'overall governance' in 2015 at 50. Between 2000 and 2015 the increment in shift of score was minute, calculated at 1% in the entire period. Between 2000 and 2015, Rwanda's 'overall governance' in terms of ranking saw a recorded increase of 3.3%. However, average 'overall governance' between 2010 and 2015 was 49.7, which is equal to the continental average of 49.7, as reported in the Mo Ibrahim Governance Report. In actuality, 'overall governance' has deteriorated in six countries to a downward movement in band: Algeria, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique and South Africa. Of these, South Africa has fallen from the "high" into the "medium-high" band of countries; Algeria, Mali, Madagascar and Mozambique from "medium-high" to "medium"; and Libya from "medium" into the "medium-low" band (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2016a, b, c).

These achievements mask the failures of the three countries as 'democratic polities' to imagine a new social contract. Under the leadership of the ANC, South Africa has birthed political, social and economic crises. The party has been criticized for an authoritarianism from below that has defined state, economy and party relations (Southall 2013). Some on the left have characterized South Africa as a 'suspended revolution' (Habib 2013). Economically, South Africa moved from being Africa's largest economy to witnessing little or no growth, a global ratings downgrade, high inflation zone, unresolved labor disputes and high unemployment rates. Socially, South Africa has witnessed levels of intolerable state violence as exemplified in the Marikana massacre of 2012, student protests for free education and decolonization, and rising inequality. The ANC prides itself on being a vibrant democratic institution within all echelons of the party, yet it is increasingly difficult

[2] Given that the data utilized in the construction of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) come from 34 separate data providers that present their data on different scales, all data are standardized. This is done through a statistical process called normalization whereby raw data for each indicator are transformed by the min-max normalization method. This process allows all scores to be published in common units and within the same bounds of 0–100, where 100 is always the best possible score. The application of this normalization method means that a score of 100 relates to the best possible score within the group of 54 African countries between 2000 and the latest data year. The Foundation publishes standard errors and confidence intervals alongside the composite IIAG and category scores to reflect degrees of uncertainty, which are available on the Foundation's website (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2016a, b, c).



Fig. 8.1 Governance in South Africa, Mozambique and Rwanda (2000–2015) (Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2016b))

to ascertain whether it still represents the political aspirations of working class communities. South Africa is overdue for a credible leftist party (Phiri and Macheve 2014) and a true democratic revolution that will deliver on a democratic polity not predicated on coercion, violence and torture and a classless society. It will not come in self-proclaimed Marxist-Fanonist parties like Malema's Economic Freedom Front (EFF). The EFF's rise has added vibrancy to South Africa's nascent democracy, promoting the idea that coalition politics will be possible (Phiri and Macheve 2014). However, the party remains an opportunist pseudo-democratic movement in South Africa's turbulent political dispensation. South Africa needs a democratic revolution that is committed to social justice and humanism, which will mean going beyond the 'politics of anger' to the 'politics of the governed'. In the realms of the economy, given its turbulent history and the aspirations of its labor and citizens, nationalization may be a necessity. However, the country can learn from a myriad global successes and failures, like the Norwegian oil miracle, Brazil with Petrobras and the role of the Workers Party (PT), and the Chinese Communist Party's insistence on growing their economy under state owned enterprises (SOEs). The answer lies in between these examples, it is not an either or question.

In times of crisis, it is tempting to see forms of 'developmentalism' in Rwanda as a model for development and democracy across the continent. South Africa, Mozambique, and Rwanda oscillate between institutional inertia and a failure to transform colonial states predicated on violence to postcolonial political aspirations

of a more humane social contract. For critics the transformation to a democratic polity that is more human remains an abstract political and social reality. The antidote, however, is that 'democratic politics' premised on force, coercion and the exclusion of weaker members of society is anti-human. Figure 8.2 below illustrates how 'political violence' has been on the increase in the past 5 years, especially since the 1994 post-conflict settlements. South Africa recorded its worse rating since the inception of democracy at 33.5 in 2012. Between 2010 and 2015 the average score for 'political violence' stands at 57.5 which is almost the same as the 2014 figure of 56.9. The average score over a 15-year period between 2000 and 2015 is 67.5 which is equal to the 2001 score. Rwanda's worse score was captured in 2011 at 39.8. Mozambique's highest score was 75 which is higher than the average score that South Africa has been rated over a 15-year period. These scores explain the broken social contract where a dehumanized citizenry has resorted to violent acts, xenophobic attacks, 'fees must fall', and pre-election violence in 2016. Simultaneously, the state apparatus has resorted to violence, manifested in the vilification of political dissidents and the silencing of oppositional politics, which is in itself a failure of the postcolonial state to go beyond the artefacts of colonial violence itself.

Mozambique's political, social and economic structure remains broken. The peace agreement has come under attack by Dhlakama's RENAMO. FRELIMO under Chissano and Guebuza, and now Nyussi, three pertinent stakeholders, party, civil society, and the economy (see Phiri and Macheve 2014; Hanlon 2009; Hanlon and Mosse 2010), are in perpetual conflict. Mozambique's social pact also remains fragmented, where growth that was fueled by a mineral resource sought by China has not directly resulted in the equalization of the social contract for all its citizens (Hanlon and Cunguara 2010; Hanlon and Mosse 2010). Inequality is on the increase, and government has attempted to adopt 'progressive social policy' reforms in the form of cash transfers to reduce inequality (Hanlon and Cunguara 2010). There are similarities between South Africa and Mozambique as citizens' demands have become the 'poli-



Fig. 8.2 Political violence in South Africa, Mozambique and Rwanda (2000–2015) (Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2016c))

tics of the ungoverned', a trend that has defined Southern Africa's liberation movements like the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in Zimbabwe. Undoubtedly, Rwanda has managed to achieve stable economic growth rates and has banned the use of colonial ethnic identification (Hutu/Tutsi) in its constitution, yet the latter is questionable. The resort to non-ethnic identification may seem to be progressive; however, it masks the theoretical dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and the reconfigurations of the postcolonial state. A careful consideration of colonial cartography to understand present-day predicaments becomes key. As Mamdani (2003) has suggested the colonialists did not identify "tribes" but races—Hutu as Bantu and Tutsi as Hamites. The Bantu were presumed to be uncivilized, and the Hamites a civilizing agent.

Throughout the twentieth century, academic writing on Rwanda had been dominated by sympathy with the Rwandan Revolution of 1959, as several authors have argued (Melvern 2000; Mamdani 2001, 2003; Desforges 1999). Mamdani further suggests that "unable to see the dark underbelly of the Revolution, and thus to grasp the link between the 1959 Revolution and the 1994 genocide, this kind of writing portrays the genocide as exclusively or mainly a state project of a narrow ruling elite." It is unquestionably the case that under the leadership of Kagame, aspirations for a 'new Rwanda' remain committed to a politicized, factionalized, Tutsi project to usurp the Hutu nationalism that dominated politics throughout the twentieth century. This is not an attempt to create a new postcolonial state project that goes beyond the ethnic categories of colonial modernity. This could be the reason why even under the guise of developmentalism, an authoritarism from below has emerged to vilify political dissidents and those on the margins of this social project. There are little or no guarantees that developmentalism will not use extractive means to safeguard its own constituency especially in a context where political leadership is embedded in a personality cult. The imagination of a new social contract needs to be understood in these racialized identities. In portraying racism and racial identities as exclusively state defined and state enforced, these positions fail to explain how the same identities became socially embedded and were reproduced socially (Mamdani 2003).

The three examples expounded above point to a failure of political projects, under the guise of 'liberation parties', to imagine a 'New African Democracy'. As Mafeje (2002) noted, Mbeki's inaugural speech as ANC president proclaimed that in South Africa "the revolution is as yet incomplete". After recent reversals in Egypt, Ethiopia and Zambia and upheavals in Zimbabwe, the same could be said. In the next round, what is it going to be? What is to be done or can be done under the determinate conditions in Africa?

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to offer explanations why Sub-Saharan Africa has failed to re-imagine the ideas of the social contract for its citizens. Present democratic struggles ought to be anchored in both the theoretical and empirical discourses of democracy and development across the continent. Democracy and development cannot be framed in the universal experiences of imperial theories. At the same

time, Africa as a continent cannot be studied, let alone understood, outside imperial and colonial imaginations. The Arab Uprisings brought to the fore democratic debates across the continent, yet these transformations left most of the state apparatuses intact. Since the coining of the 'Africa rising' narrative there has been a wave of optimism that economic growth would trickle down, leading to the equalization of the playing field for all citizens across Sub-Saharan Africa. However, millions of people across the region continue to be poor, and the neoliberal policy agenda emphasizes poverty reduction to the neglect of inequality. In a true sense, poverty and inequality are produced and reproduced by forms of physical, epistemic and structural violence that are embedded in the imaginations of colonial and postcolonial statecraft. Africa is in desperate need of a social revolution as the three case studies of South Africa, Mozambique and Rwanda have shown; this needs to be predicated on transcending imperialist theories and imaginations and the realization of substantial freedoms, justice and equity.

The democratic transitions of the Third Wave have in retrospect produced and reproduced different crises in contemporary times. This chapter has argued that to understand the crises that engulf the democratization project(s) across the African continent, scholars and practitioners alike should reconsider the theoretical paradigms that have been adopted to understand democratic relations across the continent. Discourses on democracy and development ought to incorporate both the physical and colonial violence that produced and reproduced a postcolonial state that mimicked its colonial other. As Mamdani (2003) suggests, you can turn the world upside down, but still fail to change it. To change the world you need to break out of the worldview of not only the settler but also the native. Unless we break away from this worldview postcolonialism will remain a purgatory punctuated by non-revolutionary violence. More than any other contemporary event, the genocide in Rwanda poses this dilemma more sharply than ever before. The colonial state was therefore anti-human, anti-democratic and anti-development. The reconfiguration of democratic relations will require an epistemic death of imperialist theories like the neopatrimonial school that has been popularized for over two decades to understand governance, state relations and development on the continent. As Mkandawire (2015, 598) has suggested,

> … the policy failures of African states are never inadvertent or the by-product of diffusion; they are ineluctably linked to rent seeking and neopatrimonialism, which leaves no room for learning or the interplay of ideas. However, the neopatrimonialism school of thought seeks to give agency to Africans by permitting them choice about development trajectories, its approach is predisposed to downplay ideas (Mkandawire 2015).

References

Achar, G. (2013). *The people want: A radical exploration of the Arab uprising*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Adesina, J. (2006). Sociology, endogeneity and the challenge of transformation. *African Sociological Review, 10*(2), 133–150.

Adesina, J. (2008). Archie Mafeje and the pursuit of endogeny: Against alterity and extroversion. *Africa Development, 33*(4), 133–152.
African Development Bank (AfDB). (2016). *African economic outlook: Sustainable cities and structural transformation*. http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/. Accessed 7 Oct 2016.
Ake, C. (1996). *Democracy and development in Africa*. Washington, DC: Brooking Institution.
Anyang' Nyong'o, P. (1988). *Popular struggles for democracy in Africa*. London: Zed Books.
Bayart, J. F., Ellis, S., & Hibou, B. (Eds.). (1999). *The criminalization of the state in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey.
Bigsten, A. (2014). *Dimensions of African inequality* (WIDER Working Paper 2014/050). Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research.
Bond, P. (2000). *Elite transition: From apartheid to neoliberalism in South Africa*. London: Pluto Press.
Bond, P. (2001). *Against global apartheid: South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and international finance*. Cape Town: UCT Press.
Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1994). Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa. *World Politics, 46*(4), 453–489.
Carter, B. L. (2016). The struggle for term limits in Africa: How international pressure can help. *Journal of Democracy, 27*(3), 36–50.
Cesaire, A. (1972). *Discourse on colonialism*. New York/London: Monthly Review Press.
Chabal, P., & Daloz, J.-P. (1999). *Africa works: Disorder as political instrument*. London: James Currey.
Cheru, F., & Obi, C. (Eds.). (2010). *The rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, opportunities and critical interventions*. London/Uppsala: Zed Books/Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
Clapham, C. (1985). *Third world politics: An introduction*. London: Croom Helm.
Collier, P. (2007). *The bottom billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cooper, F. (2002). *Africa since 1940: The past of the present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Desforges, A. (1999). *Leave none to tell the story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Diop, C. A. (1981). *Civilization or barbarism: An authentic anthropology*. Paris: Presence Africaine.
Fanon, F. (1967). *The wretched of the earth*. London: Penguin.
Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. New York: Penguin.
Habib, A. (2013). *South Africa's suspended revolution: Hopes and prospects*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
Hammar, A. (2014). Displacement economies: Paradoxes of crisis and creativity in Africa. In A. Hammar (Ed.), *Displacement economies in Africa: Paradoxes of crisis and creativity*. London/Uppsala: Zed Books/Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
Hanieh, A. (2013). *Lineages of revolt: Issues of contemporary capitalism in the Middle East*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
Hanlon, J. (2009). *Mozambique's elite: Finding its way in a globalised world and returning to old development models*. Paper presented at a Crisis States Research Centre Seminar. London: London School of Economics.
Hanlon, J., & Cunguara, B. (2010). *Poverty is not being reduced in Mozambique* (Working Paper no. 74, Crisis States Working Paper Series No. 2). London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.
Hanlon, J., & Mosse, M. (2010). *Mozambique's elite: Finding its way in a globalized world and returning to old development models*. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER (United Nations University – World Institute for Development Economics Research).
Kelsall, T. (2008). Going with the grain in African development? *Development Policy Review, 26*(6), 627–655.
Khatib, L., & Lust, E. (Eds.). (2014). *Taking to the streets*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mafeje, A. (1995). Theory of democracy and the African discourse. In E. Chloe & J. Ibrahim (Eds.), *Democratization processes in Africa: Problems and prospects*. Dakar: CODESRIA Book Series.
Mafeje, A. (1999). *Democracy, civil society, and governance in Africa*. Addis Ababa.
Mafeje, A. (2002, April 26–29). *Democratic governance and new democracy in Africa: Agenda for the future*, Prepared for presentation at the African Forum for envisioning Africa, Nairobi, Kenya.
Mamdani, M. (1990). *Reconceptualising the birth of state nationalism and defeat of popular movements*. Proceedings of the sixth general assembly of CODESRIA.
Mamdani, M. (1996). *Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mamdani, M. (2001). *When victims become killers: Colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mamdani, M. (2003). Making sense of political violence in post-colonial Africa. *Socialist Register, 39*, 132–151.
Mandaza, I. (1991). Democracy in the African reality. *SAPEM* 11 September.
Melvern, L. (2000). *A people betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda's genocide*. London: Zed Books.
Mitchell, T. (2011). *Carbon democracy: Political power in the age of oil*. London: Verso.
Mkandawire, T. (1989). Comments on democracy and political instability. *CODESRIA Bulletin* 1.
Mkandawire, T. (2015). Neopatrimonialism and the political economy of economic performance in Africa: Critical reflections. *World Politics, 67*(3), 563–612.
Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF). (2016a). *2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: A decade of African Governance, 2006–2015*. http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/. Accessed 4 Oct 2016.
Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF). (2016b). *Governance in South Africa, Mozambique and Rwanda, 2000–2015*. http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/. Accessed 4 Oct 2016.
Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF). (2016c). *Political violence in South Africa, Mozambique and Rwanda, 2000–2015*. http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/. Accessed 4 Oct 2016.
Mudimbe, V. Y. (1988). *The invention of Africa: Gnosis, philosophy, and the order of knowledge*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Mudimbe, V. Y. (1994). *The idea of Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Murungu, C. B. (2014). International crimes that trigger article 4(h) intervention. In D. Kuwali & F. Viljoen (Eds.), *Africa and the responsibility to protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union constitutive act*. London: Routledge.
Olivier de Sardan, J. P. (1999). The moral economy of corruption? *The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37*(1), 25–52.
Phiri, M., & Macheve, A. (2014). Mozambique's peace decades since the end of the conflict: Inclusive or managed democracy? *African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 14*(1), 37–62.
Pollack, K., Byman, D. L., Al-Turk, A., Baev, P., & Doran, M. S. (2014). *The Arab awakening: America and the transformation of the Middle East*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Rabaka, R. (2010). *Against epistemic apartheid: W.E.B. Du bois and the disciplinary decadence of sociology*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Ravallion, M., & Chen, S. (2012). *Monitoring inequality*. Mimeo. https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/files/developmenttalk/monitoring_inequalit y_table_1_.pdf. Accessed 7 Oct 2016.
Sachs, J. (2005). *The end of poverty: Economic possibilities of our time*. New York: Penguin Books.
Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism*. London: Penguin.
Said, E. W. (1993). *Culture and imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books.
Sembene, D. (2015). *Poverty, growth, and inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa: Did the walk match the talk during the PRSP approach* (IMF Working Paper, WP/15/122). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Shivji, I. (1980). The state in the dominated social formations of Africa: Some theoretical issues. *International Social Science Journal, 32*(4), 730–742.
Shivji, I. (1989). The pitfalls of the debate on democracy. *CODESRIA Bulletin*, p. 13.
Southall, R. (2013). *Liberation movements in power: Power and state in Southern Africa*. Woodbridge/Scottsville: James Curry and the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press.
Van de Walle, N. (2001). *African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979–1999*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Vines, A., & Campos, I. (2010). China and India in Angola. In C. Fantu & C. Obi (Eds.), *The rise of China and India in Africa*. London: Zed Books.
Wamba dia Wamba, E. (1992). *Africa in search of a new historical mode of politics*. Proceedings conference on democratization process in Africa of CODESRIA, Dakar.
World Bank. (2009). *Conditional cash transfers: A World Bank policy research report*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Madalitso Zililo Phiri is a Doctoral Research Fellow in Sociology at the University of South Africa's (UNISA) DST/NRF SARChI Chair in Applied Social Policy, College of Graduate Studies. He is also a Dissertation Completion Fellow (2016–17) through the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), New York, United States of America (USA); Dissertation Completion Laurate through the Council for the Development of Social Science in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal; and a recipient of the African Pathways Doctoral Scholarship through the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Science (NIHSS) and CODESRIA. His publications include book chapters and refereed journal articles in Innovation and Development, the Journal of Conflict Resolution (AJCR) and the South African Journal of International Affairs (SAJIA).