

Jutta Lindert · Armen T. Marsoobian
Editors

Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Genocide and Memory

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*To my husband and my children for their
support and love*

J.L.

*To the memory of my parents, survivors of
the Armenian Genocide, who brought love
and joy into this world*

A.T.M.

Foreword

In June 2016, in a court in Detmold, Germany, 94-year-old Reinhold Hanning, a former guard at Auschwitz, was sentenced to 5 years in prison. Although two further cases against other concentration camp guards are pending, it is likely that Hanning's will be one of the last trials ever of those complicit in the Holocaust.

At first, Hanning refused to testify, prompting anger among those who gave evidence against him. One, Angela Orosz, now living in Canada, demanded "You know what happened to all the people. You enabled their murder. Tell us! Tell us!" Another, Leon Schwarzbaum, from Berlin, confronted him, saying "Mr. Hanning, we are virtually the same age and soon we will face our final judge. I would like to ask you to tell the historical truth here, just as I am" (Connolly 2016).

Even though the events took place over 70 years earlier, the memories of those who gave evidence remained fresh. From Jerusalem to Washington, from London to Berlin, Holocaust museums bear testimony to the suffering of those who experienced this dark period in European history. They draw on many sources, from contemporary records that are as diverse as photographs, diaries, newspapers and even railway timetables. But above all, they draw on the memories of those who survived.

Initially, many of those who survived did not want to remember. The pain was too recent, and, in some cases, it was accompanied by a feeling of guilt as they asked why they had survived while so many others did not. Sybil Milton, in her photographic study of Holocaust memorials, notes how, in the decade after 1945, there were few if any physical memorials (Milton 1991). It took until the 1960s for a new generation of West Germans to challenge what many saw as reluctance to confront what had happened in the 1930s and 1940s. She then described a third period, after the screening of a television series entitled *Holocaust* in West Germany, coupled with the opening of borders in Eastern Europe, surrounding countries where the suffering of the Jews and some other groups had received scant attention. Although Yad Vashem had been established in 1953, it had taken almost 50 years of other Holocaust memorials to appear, such as that in Washington, in 1993, and that in Berlin, in 2004. This contrasts markedly with the situations in Cambodia and

Rwanda, where physical memorials were constructed within a few years of the end of the genocides.

Memories of genocide fulfil many functions. They may help victims to create a sense of shared identity and, in some cases, may promote healing. They may provide the basis for accountability, including bringing the perpetrators to justice. And they serve as a reminder to others, faced with politicians who preach hatred to audiences that see “others” as less than human. The contemporary relevance of this cannot be overlooked. In 2016, advocates of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union used images of refugees fleeing the war in Syria that closely resembled Nazi posters from the 1940s.

But memories can also be used for other purposes. Psychologists have shown how those who observe an event may, within minutes, recall slightly different versions of what happened, something that can be exploited by Holocaust deniers and others. Memories may also be shaped by how the events in question have been represented, even to the extent of whether mass killings amount to genocide per se. Over a century later, the events in Armenia continue to be denied as a genocide by the Turkish government. More recently, in Bosnia, the representation of events as just another episode of tribal conflict in a long troubled area may have delayed intervention. In Rwanda, the government has promulgated an official narrative that has minimized the role of ethnic identity and constrained what can be said in public spaces.

Reflecting the many ways that genocide has been represented and the many roles that memories play, this book takes a broad interdisciplinary perspective. It ranges from architectural to literary memorials and from individual to collective memories. It draws on newsreel footage, poetry and art. It explores the complexity of these issues, showing that, in this area of study particularly, few things are simple. But, above all, it reminds us of the reasons why we should never forget what we, as humans, are capable of doing.

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Chapter 1

Editors' Introduction

Jutta Lindert and Armen T. Marsoobian

This book targets a readership of researchers, and members of the interested general public. It provides an update on recent advances in our conceptual understanding of memory in the context of genocide, as well as on the latest research on the neurobiological and psychosocial correlates of memory in those affected by genocide. Research on memory has been struggling with differences in definitions and diverse approaches; yet now is exactly the right time to provide not only a summary of what is already known but to outline directions for future research that bring together science, philosophy, history and art. Consider the enormous impact of genocide on affected populations and their offspring. This impact created an urgent need for a book that addresses inquiries from researchers, scholars, and artists, one that broadly presents up-to-date information about memory construction and functioning, the newest data on neurobiology of memory, and the latest approaches to the philosophic understanding and artistic representation of memory. This knowledge is especially timely because we often are faced with the consequences of current political actors, who increasingly use genocidal tools and practices to achieve their evil ends. Sadly, we daily learn of on-going large-scale atrocities around the world.

This volume will increase researchers', artists' and laypersons' literacy about recent research findings, broaden their perspectives, and enhance their powers of observation. It can help them integrate arts and science. A key difference between this volume and other publications is that it brings together (1) a wide variety of artistic representations, (2) the latest neuroscientific discoveries, and (3) the issues most relevant for affected populations to understand memory and the memorialization

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process. Why is this book necessary? Often arts, humanities and science follow their own path in trying to investigate, analyze and understand the relationship between genocide and memory. Yet, an in-depth understanding of genocide and memory will benefit from the diverse perspectives on offer in this volume. Such an approach to memory has seldom been done before. In fact, we are not aware of any other book in the field of genocide and memory that brings together such a diversity of complementary perspectives.

This book was only possible because the two editors, Jutta Lindert and Armen T. Marsoobian, respected each other's approach from the beginning of this project. We were curious what we could learn from each other. As our curiosity grew, we included further authors into this process. As with most such edited volumes, not all the views expressed in these chapters are ones that the editors fully endorse. While a truly comprehensive volume would have been much larger, we are pleased with the breadth of perspectives captured here. Surely, we could not cover all aspects of genocide and memory but we were successful by including a great variety of disciplines.

We have chosen to divide the volume into four parts though the lines of demarcation between them are not rigid. "Part I: The Concept of Genocide and the Role of Memory," begins with Steven Leonard Jacobs' chapter, "Definitions and Concepts of Genocide: Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide," that lays out the origins of the concept of genocide in Raphael Lemkin's writings and activism. More than simply a biographical treatment, Jacobs raises intriguing questions about Lemkin's personal experiences with prejudice and violence that marked his upbringing in Eastern Europe during the early decades of the twentieth century. How these experiences may have fueled his scholarship and activism, leading to the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, play a significant role in his chapter.

In the second chapter, "Conceptions of Genocide and the Ethics of Memorialization," the philosopher Jeffrey Blustein provides a strong argument for the claim that the distinctive moral evil of genocide can only be understood if we see genocide as a crime committed against a group and not just an aggregation of individuals. The crime of genocide is not a crime of numbers. On this basis, Blustein analyzes the range of practices that characterize how genocides are memorialized and argues for the ethical value of such memorializing. Memorials and the practices accompanying them express important group attitudes that are valuable in their own right. When the perpetrator group is involved in practices of memorializing, whether in the creation of memorials or public acts of remembrance, these acts must acknowledge the group harm the crime has inflicted. Harm to the community, not just harm to individuals must be acknowledge and memorialized. Under this conception, merely acknowledging the individual loss of life, no matter how great in number, is inadequate and in some cases is tantamount to a denial of the crime of genocide itself. This chapter provides a good conceptual background for the memorial practices and sites discussed later in the book, especially the chapters dealing with the Vienna Project by Karen Frostig, and the Berlin Memorial and memorialization of the Armenian Genocide in Turkey by Armen T. Marsoobian.

Sociologist Shulamit Reinharz, in her chapter "Jewish Social Memory and the Stages of Genocide," expands upon the ground-breaking work of one of the founders

of the field of genocide studies, Gregory H. Stanton. Reinharz illustrates Stanton's ten stages of genocide and argues for their augmentation. She claims that the "silencing of dissent," endemic of almost all authoritarian/totalitarian regimes, is central to the process by which the groundwork for genocide is prepared. Such silencing is easier to accomplish under wartime conditions as was the case for the Armenians in World War I and the Jews and other victim groups in World War II. War, even on a smaller scale such as the guerilla war in Guatemala, often serves as a cover for genocide. Reinharz further suggests that the genocidal process often entails the formation of alliances between perpetrator groups. She cites as her prime example the collusion of some in the Catholic Church hierarchy with the Hutu perpetrators of the Rwandan Tutsi Genocide. Finally, she proposes a stage she identifies as "the public apology." These apologies, when insincere, actually can be seen as sophisticated forms of genocide denial. Care must be taken in analyzing such so-called apologies. An apology that does not acknowledge culpability is not an apology. A genuine apology must be followed by deeds, as was the case with Germany in regard to the Holocaust. We are seeing some progress with regard to the indigenous genocides in Canada and Australia, while the United States has lagged far behind. Sometimes governmental statements acknowledging the loss of life of a victimized minority group get falsely portrayed as apologies when in actual fact they fit perfectly into Stanton's Tenth Stage, that of denial.

"Part II: Genocide, Memory and Health" directly addresses the traumatic effects of mass violence on the survivors and their descendants. Daniel Eduardo Feierstein in "Terror and Identity: The Case of Argentina and the Importance of the Different 'Representations' of the Past," argues that memory processes are shaped and transformed by massive traumatic events. He analyzes the different aspects of memory systems, including the latest findings in neuroscience. Additionally, he describes how genocide attacks social relations in the affected societies.

In their chapter, "Genocide and Its Long Term Mental Impact on Survivors – What We Know and What We Do Not Know," Jutta Lindert, Haim Y. Knobler, and Moshe Abramovitz examine the impact of genocide on the health of survivors and their offspring. They critically review the research on the impact of genocide on health and memory functioning. Memory functioning is associated with psychopathologies, such as posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, somatization and substance abuse. Psychopathologies might be looked at as disorders of memory. In their second co-authored chapter, "Survival and Resilience versus Psychopathology: A Seven-decade Perspective Post-Holocaust," Haim Y. Knobler, Moshe Abramovitz and Jutta Lindert demonstrate that the study of the impact of genocide on memories needs to include studies on resilience and determinants of resilience in the aftermath of genocide.

The chapters in "Part III: Genocide, Representation and Memorialization" explore the many facets of cultural response to genocide and its aftermath. Historian Jay Winter in his chapter, "The Face of War and Genocide," explores how the marriage of genocide with war is reflected in the evolution of twentieth-century artistic representations of mass violence. Winter claims that mass violence against civilian populations became an increasingly integral part of the manner in which international war

was waged post-1914. The Holocaust and violence explicitly directed against civilians in Europe, along with Japanese atrocities in Asia, came to mark the Second World War in ways unique to warfare. Genocide along with the industrialization of warfare has led to what Winter terms, “the effacement of war,” that is, the loss of a human face in the representation of war. This development is traced through a nuanced examination of the artistic works of Otto Dix, Pablo Picasso, and Anselm Kiefer. The erasure of figuration and the resulting abstract and more strongly conceptual nature of much post-Holocaust artistic representation are the focus of this chapter.

Art historian Batya Brutin in her chapter, “When Past and Present Meet in Israeli Art: Memorialization of the Holocaust,” examines the role that the Holocaust has played in Israeli art since Israel’s founding in 1948. She argues that there are identifiable phases in the way Israeli artists reference the Holocaust. The initial phase often employed biblical and more direct, figurative images to capture the memory of the camps and the destruction they wrought. This art, often made by Holocaust survivors, was in tension with mainstream art that was trying to forge a new positive Israeli identity. According to Brutin, second- and later-generation artists were concerned with both memorializing the victims and with exploring the meaning of the Holocaust for present-day Israelis whose geo-political context was hostile to their very existence. Memorializing the victims without perpetuating a sense of victimhood was essential to these artistic endeavors. Brutin analyzes a number of specific works by a range of important Israeli artists.

Armen T. Marsoobian in his chapter, “How Do We Memorialize Genocide? The Case of the German Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe,” examines the challenges of memorializing the victims of genocide on a national level through public memorials. Public monuments, such as the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, have multiple stakeholders whose concerns and sensitivities need to be taken into account. The Berlin Memorial, a rare instance of a memorial constructed by the heirs of a perpetrator nation, raised many moral and aesthetic concerns. As a public memorial, it has an important social and educational function, but as an instance of public art, it must be aesthetically coherent. Marsoobian explores the tension between these two functions of memorial art. The debate over the construction of the Berlin Memorial is placed in the context of other genocide memorials, such as the one to the Armenian Genocide in Yerevan and those in Germany that have come to be known as counter-monuments. Karen Frostig in a later chapter of our book takes up related issues of public Holocaust memorials and the counter-monument movement in Europe.

An analysis of public memorials, this time in the context of the Bosnian Genocide, is taken up by David Pettigrew in his chapter, “The Suppression of Cultural Memory and Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Prohibited Memorials and the Continuation of Genocide.” He provides a detailed narrative of a series of genocide denial actions carried out by the authorities of the Republika Srpska, the self-declared Serbian “republic” that emerged during the Bosnian War. These actions prohibited Bosniak victims from erecting memorials at important sites of genocidal violence. Most Bosniaks have been unable to return to their homes in Serbian-controlled regions despite international guarantees of the right of return. The status quo on the ground

serves to legitimize the perpetrators' crimes. Despite the arrests and convictions of many of the important perpetrators, the current Bosnian-Serbian leadership perpetuates a mythic narrative of a war of liberation that erases the memory of genocide and glorifies the perpetrators. Drawing upon Raphael Lemkin's original writings on genocide, Pettigrew demonstrates that the activities of the Republika Srpska constitute a continuation of the genocide by "the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor" upon the targeted population.

The conflict in Bosnia is also taken up in Charlotte McKee's contribution, "British Media Representation of the War in Bosnia Herzegovina: Avoiding the Duties to Prevent and Protect." She argues that political discourse and media representations of the war helped reinforce a perception in the British public and the power elites that the genocide taking place was part of a long-established Balkan ethnic conflict that warranted no direct intervention as required by international law. McKee contends that "while the media were often critical of the lack of a response by the British government, the dialogue used actually helped to maintain a dominant paradigm in which policies of non-intervention could continue." Tensions between what counted as "European" or "the other," that is, Muslim and eastern, all played a role in determining public and political perception of the conflict. Sadly, similar tensions mark the debates about migrants in Europe and in the United States.

The chapters in "Part IV: Bearing Witness to Genocide in the Arts," offer a unique perspective on the memory work taking place with regard to the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust. The practitioners themselves, a poet, a conceptual artist, a visual artist and a philosopher-turned curator, describe their motivations and the work they created. Pulitzer Prize-winning poet Peter Balakian in "Some Notes on My Poems and Armenian Memory," explains how he came to write his poems as a response to his childhood memories of his grandmother, a genocide survivor. A particularly influential moment in his creative process was his discovery of a legal document prepared by his grandmother in which she made a claim against the Turkish government for her losses – both material and human – during the genocide. This collage poem, included here in our volume along with others, is centrally important to Balakian's creative process.

In a similar fashion, Hans Guggenheim describes how his early encounters with the enormity of the Holocaust and the personal losses it entailed, became the focus of his art-making. His own visits to the death camps played an integral role in his sketches and ink drawings that are illustrated and discussed in his chapter, "My Artistic Explorations of the Holocaust." We follow Guggenheim's personally-painful journey of artistic creation and cannot help but admire the revelatory humanity of his vision of this tragic past.

Karen Frostig in her chapter, "Coming to Terms with the Past: The Vienna Project as an Interactive, Interdisciplinary Model of Memorialization," describes the genesis and development of a year-long project of public memorialization of the Holocaust in Vienna, Austria. Unlike the Berlin Memorial or other permanent Holocaust memorials, this project was developed as a "temporary, social action, public art memorial." It opened in 2013 and closed a year later. Frostig was the conceptual artist who conceived of the project and directed its many components.

The project encompassed multiple victim groups, not just the Jews of Austria. Her efforts address the collective memory of the Austrian people by actively engaging her audiences.

In the last chapter of our volume, “Collective Memory, Memorialization and Bearing Witness in the Aftermath of the Armenian Genocide,” Armen T. Marsoobian describes a multi-year on-going project of memorialization, whose ultimate objective is to combat the denial of the Armenian Genocide in Turkey. Employing his large and unique family photography archive, he has told his family’s story of loss and survival in photography exhibitions and publications accessible to a general Turkish audience. Partnering with a Turkish NGO and local activists, he has identified memory sites that he hopes in the future will publicly acknowledge the lost Armenian heritage in Anatolia. Marsoobian explains the conceptual background of his work and the strategies and difficulties encountered by his project.

In preparing this book, we are aware that memory and memorialization may serve political ideologies and might even perpetuate hatred. Sadly, individuals and groups often become stuck in the memory of genocide, the consequences of which can be destructive. In contrast, our authors stand back to reflect constructively upon memory, employing different but complementary approaches to its study. These efforts attempt to overcome the tyranny of the past by rejecting the notion that memory is some sort of fixed entity. Memory and memorialization come in many forms and can serve many purposes. By bringing together these diverse disciplinary approaches to memory, we hope to foster a better understanding of the complex role that memory plays in the aftermath of genocide.

We dedicate this book to Elie Wiesel, who employed his own memories in the fight to overcome hatred.

Part I
The Concept of Genocide and the Role
of Memory

Chapter 2

Definitions and Concepts of Genocide: Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide

Steven Leonard Jacobs

Memory is never seamless, but always a montage of collected fragments, recomposed by each person and generation.

James E. Young (1994, 219)

A genocide that happens “at home” evokes fear rather than the will to remember.

Katarzyna Szurmiak (2013, 202)

Abstract The Polish-American-Jewish international lawyer and scholar Dr. Raphael Lemkin (1900–1959) coined our word “genocide” and was the motivating force behind the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (commonly referred to as the Genocide Convention). He is also the scholarly parent of the emerging field of Genocide studies, an outgrowth and expansion of the earlier field of Holocaust studies. In examining his biography, one incident looms large: of a teenage boy who reads a novel about the Roman emperor Nero’s (37–68) horrendous treatment of the Christians in his realm, and, living in the world of pre- and post-World War I antisemitic Poland, begins a reading journey that will cause him to discover other examples of genocide throughout human history (e.g., the Armenian Genocide). Coupled with Lemkin’s escape during World War II and the tragedy of the Holocaust, tantalizing questions suggest themselves: What impact did his studies have upon him and his life’s work coupled with his own lived experiences? What role did his filtered memory of those events have upon his thinking? To what degree did they shape his commitment to international law as *the* vehicle to eliminate the scourge of genocide? These and other questions are explored, including the author’s own thinking vis-à-vis the relationship between genocide and memory.

For further discussion of Poland and the Shoah/Holocaust and relevant to Lemkin’s own historical reality and memory, see Orla-Bukowska 2004; Duszak 2013; and Irwin-Zarcka 1989.

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Introduction

The role, place, and function of memory, not only in the individual—in this case Raphael Lemkin (1900–1959)—but in the collective as well, are both a highly complex and highly complicated area of study. For example, how an individual remembers *any* event of the past, either positively *or* negatively, becomes a determinant of later and ongoing behaviors. Such memories influence places of residence, choice of partners, and career choices, as well as physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being. The same can be said of nation-states and other groups, especially those who have experienced genocide. Thus, we begin this exploration with the following initial understandings: According to Carla De Ycaza and Nicole Fox, specifically concerned with both Rwanda and Uganda in the aftermaths of their own genocidal tragedies:

How a country remembers its past structures the possibilities for both reconciliation and future violence. National memory projects often shape national and communal group identity politics, processes of transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction. (De Ycaza and Fox 2013, 349)

Thus, for Raphael Lemkin, as will be explained below, the “solution” to the past tragedies of genocide was to be found in international law as *the* preventative of future genocides, and obsessively energized him to the point of physical exhaustion and hospitalization from what he said in his autobiography, *Unofficial man*, was a case of “genociditis” (Bińczyk-Missala and Debski 2010; Cooper 2008; Eshet 2007; Lemkin 2013; Korey 2001; Schaller and Zimmerer 2005). However, his concern with prevention, reconciliation, and reconstruction in the aftermath of World War II and what we now know as the Holocaust (Hebrew, *Shoah*, “Devastation” or “Destruction”) would lead to the United Nations’ passing on December 11, 1948, of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Further, according to Catherine Fournet, in the introduction to her book *The crime of destruction and the law of genocide: Their impact on collective memory*: “Past occurrences of genocide do not belong to the past but are, on the contrary, extremely current. They have shaped our societies into post-genocidal societies in which the trauma of these genocides is very much present” (Fournet 2007, xxx). Lemkin began his own exploration of these group tragedies while a teenager in Poland, and those horrors never left him. In this context, one cannot easily or readily dismiss the factor of antisemitism (simply defined here as “hatred of Judaism and the Jewish people”), which was normatively a part of Lemkin’s growing up reality in early twentieth-century Poland. But, more importantly and significantly, they played a role in his choice of occupation (lawyer and later international lawyer) and his choice of partner (according to him, his commitment to the passage of the U.N. Genocide Convention prevented his giving honest attention to a wife and children)

(Jacobs 2002). The German invasion of Poland in 1939 forced his ultimate relocation to the United States in 1942, though it would be difficult if not impossible to conclude that, had the Second World War not intervened, he would have emigrated to further his personal agenda anyway.

Furthermore, in her challenging and provocative assessment of Israeli Holocaust historian and survivor Otto Dov Kulka (b. 1933), entitled “Israeli Historian Otto Dov Kulka Tells Auschwitz Story of a Czech Family that never Existed,” Anna Hájková makes the following observation:

No one remembers things the way they happened; human memory is like a muscle, shaping memories to be more logical, to endow us with more agency, toward what we wish had happened, incorporating books we have read and movies we have seen, and shaping the past in a way that makes it seem more unique. (Hájková 2014)

For Lemkin, his reading and thinking over many years about the mass-atrocity crime he would later name genocide, coupled with his own escape from the Nazis and the loss of his family, played a larger-than-life role in further shaping him into the human being he would prove to be, and shaped his own memories of his own and others’ pasts. Seminal to those memories and the internal psychological and intellectual reformulations of his past was the part played by the trials of Soghomon Tehlirian (1896–1960) and Sholom Schwartzbard (1886–1938), discussed below. Without attempting to overpsychologize Lemkin, one lesson to be derived from these events was the all-too-often trite but honestly true cliché “one human being *can* make a difference.” Lemkin would prove to be that human being.

Finally, Valérie Rosoux’s observation applies fully and totally to Lemkin, his authorship of our word “genocide,” and his legacy of the U.N. Genocide Convention: “The question raised in the aftermath of conflict is not only ‘how are we going to handle the future?’ but ‘how are we going to handle the past?’ (Rosoux 2004, 4; Lemarchand 2006–2007, 613). Again, for Lemkin, it was his growing knowledge of the historical genocides of the past, coupled with the present reality of the Second World War in Europe and the Holocaust against the Jews, that caused him to travel the journey that was uniquely his own, all the while framed and shaped by the memories of his own, his people’s, and others’ genocidal tragedies.

Who, Then, Was Raphael Lemkin?

The first question thus becomes: Who was this singularly unique man, who, by dint of his own vision and understandings, became the motivating and obsessive force behind the United Nations 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, who coined the word “genocide” itself, and whose contributions to the world community and international law were largely ignored in the years following his death (in 1959), but who, more and more, is slowly coming into his own? (Jacobs 2009).

Lemkin was born on June 24, 1900, one of three sons, to Joseph and Bella Lemkin in Bezwodne, Lithuania, then part of eastern Poland in an area known as the “Pale of [restricted Jewish] Settlement” under Czarist hegemony. His father and uncle co-owned a farm, somewhat in violation of Polish legal norms, and, by all accounts, his was a happy childhood, playing with his brothers, cousins, and the children of the farmhands. His mother, Bella, was his intellectual mentor, supplying him with a love of languages, literature, and philosophy. Only Lemkin himself and his brother Elias and Elias’s family would survive the Holocaust/Shoah; 49 members of his family, including his parents, would not. (Lemkin’s youngest brother, Samuel, died, it is believed, of tuberculosis before the start of the First World War.)

At some point during his teenage years—Lemkin does not tell us when—he acquired and read a copy of the immensely popular book *Quo Vadis?* by the Polish Nobel laureate Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846–1916), which, in novelized form, detailed the horrific persecutions and murders of the early Christians in the Roman Empire under Emperor Nero (37–68). Appalled at his reading, as Lemkin relates it in his autobiography, *Totally unofficial*, he asked his mother why the police did not step in to help, and said she responded: “What do you expect from the police!?!” As he leads us to understand, that moment and that reading began his lifelong pursuit of other cases of genocide, including, for example, that of the Huguenots under the French, the Catholics under the Japanese, the Muslims under the Spanish, the Armenians under the Turks (more on this below), and his own people under the Russians (more on this as well).

Consistent with the Jewish religious tradition in which he was raised and to which he remained committed, at least early on, he saw in the law *the* answer or solution to this enormous problem of group mass murder and the punishment of those guilty of this crime (Jacobs 2010a, 2015b, 2016).¹ Two important and significant trials impacted him greatly and resulted in his own decision to enter the field of law, later including international law as well. Lemkin received his Doctor of Law degree from Lvov University, Poland, in 1926. One of the trials preceded his degree; the other shortly thereafter.

On March 21, 1921, Soghomon Tehlirian (1896–1960), a survivor of the Armenian Genocide, assassinated Talaat Pasha (1874–1921), the Turkish interior minister and one of the three pashas responsible for that genocide, in Berlin, Germany. After a two-day trial—June 2–3, 1921—Tehlirian was acquitted by the German court on the grounds of what we would perhaps today term “severe mental anguish and emotional distress,” the result of his own and his family’s victimization.

Lemkin, in his autobiography, notes that he challenged his professors as to how the murder of one person by another is a crime, but that of one group by another is not. As he records it:

In Lvov University where I enrolled for the study of law, I discussed this matter [the Tehlirian trial] with professors. They invoked arguments about the sovereignty of states.

¹In Jacobs 2016 I also discuss six other related Jewish values reflected in Lemkin’s work: (1) family, (2) education, (3) life and death, (4) justice/righteousness, (5) community, and (6) peace.

“But sovereignty of states,” I answered, “implies conducting an independent foreign and internal policy, building of schools, construction of roads, in brief, all types of activity directed toward the welfare of people. Sovereignty,” I argued, “cannot be conceived as the right to kill millions of people.” (Jacobs 2013b, 282; 2003; 2008; 2010b)

This is, perhaps, the *first* instance of Lemkin’s thinking concerning the problem and resolution in the context of the legal tradition.

On May 25, 1926, and close to the time of his receiving his degree, in Paris, France, Sholom Schwartzbard (1886–1938) assassinated Symon Petlyura (1879–1926), head of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic and head of the Government-in-Exile of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, holding him personally responsible for the pogroms (Russian, “massacres”) against Jews, which claimed his own family, and for not doing enough to bring the perpetrators to justice. Brought to trial on October 18, 1927, Schwartzband was acquitted eight days later, on October 26, 1927, on grounds similar to those of Tehlirian’s acquittal.

Thus for Lemkin the two trials were of singular individuals responsible for the deaths of two other persons, who were both symbolically representative of genocidal crimes within their own nation-states without the states themselves being brought before any international court whatsoever for their acts. And both perpetrators *were* acquitted.

By 1929, Lemkin had been appointed deputy public prosecutor in Warsaw and had already expressed a strong interest in penal law, as evidenced by his attending the International Bureau for the Unification of Penal Law and his role as secretary-general of the Polish Group for the Association of Penal Law.

In 1933, Lemkin hoped to attend an international conference in Madrid, Spain, hosted by the League of Nations on Penal and Criminal Law, and had prepared a paper on two crimes—“barbarity” (the victimization of peoples) and “vandalism” (the victimization of cultures); he was, however, prevented from delivering his paper by an antisemitic backlash. Though his paper was presented (i.e., read), no action was taken whatsoever in response, possibly in an early attempt at Polish-German rapprochement as the Nazis began their drive to power.

With the start of World War II and Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Lemkin initially participated in military resistance, only to flee Poland after first seeing his family one last time in Lithuania. Traveling via Sweden, Russia, Japan, and Canada, he arrived in Seattle, Washington, in 1941, and immediately moved to Durham, North Carolina, to teach at Duke University Law School. In 1942, he joined the Board of Economic Warfare in Washington, D.C., and in 1945 he joined U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson’s (1892–1954) legal team at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Germany, the war-crimes trials of the Nazi leadership. Though he was originally successful in inserting the crime of “genocide” into the drafts of a number of relevant documents (*seventeen* times to be exact), it was *not* part of the *official* proceedings, because this “crime without a name”—to use Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s (1874–1965) phrase—was not yet part of international law.

Prior to leaving for Nuremberg, Lemkin had already published a massive tome, *Axis rule in occupied Europe: Laws of occupation, analysis of Government,*

proposals for redress. In that rather large text, Chapter IX (pages 79–95), a provocatively small chapter, is entitled “Genocide,” and it is here we encounter the word for the first time.² As Lemkin states it:

New conceptions require new terms. By “genocide” we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice in its modern development, is made from the ancient Greek word *genos* (race, tribe) and the Latin *cede* (killing), thus corresponding in its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homicide, infanticide, etc. Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is rather intended to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, safety, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group. (Lemkin 1944, 79)

Here, in this opening paragraph, we already see Lemkin’s concern that genocide is *both* physical *and* non-physical, that is, cultural in its widest understanding, as had been the case all along. From there, Lemkin goes on to explore what he labels “techniques of genocide” in various fields (82–90)—political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral. He then concludes this short chapter with two succinct “recommendations for the future”: (1) prohibition of genocide in war *and* peace (my emphasis), and (2) international control of occupation practices.

From the end of the Nuremberg war-crimes trials in 1946 until July 1948, when he was informed that the United Nations Economic and Social Council would take up the idea of a convention on genocide at its upcoming meeting, his energies were directed in two avenues: (1) a one-man media campaign, writing articles, speeches, interviews, and letters urging any and all to vote in favor of the proposed legislation, and (2) working tirelessly to draft the actual legislation, and being intimately involved with the continual process of revision. In August 1948, he would travel to Paris, France, where the Security Council would take up the resolution.

On December 9, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly, with the support of the Security Council, began its deliberations. Two days later, on December 11, 1948, it passed unanimously, with the 22 member nations signing the Genocide Convention and moving it forward to ratification by their own nation-states. The following day, Lemkin was admitted to the hospital in Paris, suffering from exhaustion, or, in his own words, “genociditis, exhaustion from working on the Genocide Convention” (Lemkin 2013). He never returned to full health and was repeatedly hospitalized upon his return to the United States. He died on August 28, 1959, of a

²What has been regularly overlooked in this chapter is the first footnote: “Another term could be used for the same idea, namely, ethnocide, consisting of the word ‘ethnos’—nation—and the Latin word ‘cide.’” Lemkin 1944, 79.

heart attack in the public relations office of Milton H. Blow in New York City. Only seven people attended his funeral.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide had been put into effect by the United Nations on January 21, 1951. Sadly, and perhaps somewhat tragically, it was not ratified by the United States—Lemkin’s beloved adopted country—until October 4, 1988, and was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) on November 4, 1988, almost three decades after Lemkin’s death (Cooper 2008; LeBlanc 1991).

Sidebar: Lemkin on Genocide

Had it been completed *and published*, Lemkin’s three-volume *History of genocide* (I Antiquity, II Middle Ages, III Modern Times) would have been his intellectual legacy and magnum opus, just as the Genocide Convention remains his moral legacy.³ As outlined by him, it was to have consisted of 63 chapters, as follows:

I Antiquity: 1. Biblical Genocide, 2. Assyrian Invasions, 3. Genocide against the Early Christians, 4. Genocide against the Pagans, 5. Carthage, 6. Genocide in Gaul, 7. Genocide against the Celts, 8. Genocide in Egypt, 9. Genocide in Ancient Greece. (*Only Chapter 2 was completed.*)

II Middle Ages: 1. Genocide against the Albigensians, 2. Charlemagne, 3. Genocide in Medieval England, 4. Genocide by the Goths, 5. Genocide by the Huns, 6. Genocide against the Jews, 7. Genocide by the Mongols, 8. Genocide against the Moors and the Moriscos, 9. The French in Sicily, 10. The Spanish Inquisition. Jews in Spain, 11. Genocide against the Waldenses, 12. Genocide by the Vikings, 13. The Crusades. (*Only Chapters 1, 7, and 8 were completed.*)

III Modern Times: 1. Genocide by the Germans against the Native Africans, 2. Assyrians in Iraq, 3. Belgian Congo, 4. Bulgaria under the Turks, 5. Genocide against the Greeks, 6. Chios, 7. Greeks under Franks, 8. Greeks in Exile from Turkish Occupation, 9. Genocide by the Greeks against the Turks, 10. Genocide against the Gypsies, 11. Hereros, 12. Haiti, 13. Hottentots, 14. Huguenots, 15. Hungary against the Turks, 16. Genocide against the American Indians, 17. Ireland, 18. Genocide by the Janissaries, 19. Genocide by the Japanese against the Catholics, 20. Genocide against Polish Jews, 21. Genocide against Russian Jews, 22. Genocide against Jews in S.W. Africa, 23. Genocide against Romanian Jews, 24. Korea, 25. Latin America, 26. Genocide against the Aztecs, 27. Yucatan, 28. Genocide against the Incas, 29. Genocide against the Maoris of New Zealand, 30. Genocide against the Mennonites, 31. Nuremberg Trials, 32. Farsis, 33. Serbs, 34. Slavs, 35. Smyrna, 36. South Africa, 37. Genocide against the Stedinger, 38. Tasmanians, 39. Armenians,⁴ 40. S.W. Africa, 41. Natives of Australia (*Only Chapters 1, 2, 6, 11, 14, 15, 19, 20, and 28 were completed.*). (Jacobs 1999, 2013a)

³On August 19, 1958, Lemkin received a response from Charles A. Pearce of Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, Inc., Publishers, New York, regarding this proposed book project, informing him that “it would not be possible for us to find a large enough audience of buyers for a book of this nature.” What Lemkin did complete has now been published; see Jacobs (ed.) 2013a.

⁴A 120-page stand-alone untitled manuscript addressing the Armenian Genocide was found among Lemkin’s papers. It has now been published in its entirety: *Raphael Lemkin’s dossier on the Armenian Genocide*.

Lemkins was fluent in a number of languages (e.g., Polish, Russian, Hebrew, Yiddish, Spanish, French, etc.), and we also know that he employed a number of graduate students and researchers to help him with this project; we would assume that he reserved the right as overseeing author and editor to correct, emend, and insert data based on his own readings. Unfortunately, however, among his more than twenty thousand pages of material, there are *no* listings of those he employed (with only one exception: a note requesting immediate payment and apologizing for her inability to read French!), and *no* compilation of those uncompleted chapters. Thus, one can only assume that these materials, in whatever stages of completion they existed, remained with those unnamed assistants.

More to the point, however, though Lemkin does not address it directly or even indirectly in his autobiography *Totally unofficial*, we now know that the cumulative effect of his expended energies directed primarily toward the successful ratification of the U.N. Genocide Convention took its toll on his physical health and may have, realistically, hastened his early death at the age of 59. Long hours, poor eating habits, lack of proper sleep, anxieties and worries over whether or not there was something more he could do (in addition to literally writing hundreds of letters in a multiplicity of languages urging *everyone*—ambassadorial, governmental, religious, cultural, and business leaders—to support the proposed Convention, as well as cajoling U.N. nation-state representatives in their halls, offices, and cafeterias), as well as time spent in the drafting and redrafting of the legislation itself, and observing the political machinations involved in bringing such a document to a vote, led to his mental and physical exhaustion and impaired his subsequent overall well-being, reflected in his autobiography and his early death.

Without specific reference, it is most likely that Lemkin's *History of genocide* was begun *after* the U.N. passage of the Genocide Convention and was worked on, somewhat intermittently, between 1949 and his death in 1959. Having now "won" this first major battle and hurdle, Lemkin redirected his energies, together with the U.S. Committee for the Genocide Convention led by New York attorney James Rosenberg, toward U.S. confirmation. At its passage by the United Nations, President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) supported it and encouraged both the Senate and the House of Representatives to do the same—*which they did not*. There is no evidence *among his papers* of Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969), whose presidency exceeded Lemkin's death (1953–1961), supporting the Genocide Convention, though, historically, we do know that *all* subsequent presidents up to an including Ronald Reagan did so to a greater or lesser degree. One could thus argue that the failure of Lemkin's adopted and beloved country of the United States and his inability to right this wrong further contributed to his diminishing physical and mental abilities.

Even more, one can speculate as well about the cumulative effect of examining, researching, writing about, and thinking about all these genocides on Lemkin's overall mental health. He lived with these tragedies daily, and even though, according to his attorney the late Maxwell Cohen (in a conversation with me), he used to spend his Sundays traveling to Long Island, N.Y., and participating in the Cohen family barbecue, where he was affectionately known as Uncle Rafi, a more than fair

psychological assessment would grant him a reasonable if not clinical amount of depression as his memory of these events took their toll as well.

Reflections on Genocide and Memory: Inherited Terror

Though offered in a different setting—my own as the child of a now-deceased survivor-escapee of the Holocaust/Shoah of the Second World War—the idea of “inherited terror,” coined by my wife, Dr. Louanne Jacobs, felt both by those who directly experienced the horrific and traumatizing effects of a given genocide and by those who, having repeatedly been told those stories by those same family members, and who themselves continue to experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), may have special relevance in this context (Jacobs 1994; Balakian 1997; Rosensaft 2015).⁵ Like much else in the human journey, memory too becomes an inheritance of those who directly experience these dark realities and, coupled with imagination, also becomes an inheritance of those born after these same events are over. Add to this heady brew continuous interaction with these survivors by those who are their progeny—themselves the “living witnesses” of their parents’ and grandparents’ successes and victories over death, extermination, and annihilation—and one begins to grasp the reality that genocide itself is not momentary and ends when the physical and historical events themselves are concluded, but acquires a life of its own far beyond whatever “ending dates” are suggested by others (e.g., scholars, governmental officials, military leaders, international organizations, etc.).

For Lemkin himself, this “inheritance” was multidimensional: the impact upon an impressionable teenager of genocidal behavior in history framed by a lived environment of hatred and the potential for violence; a program of reading and remembering of countless genocides; a questioning mind raised with respect for a Jewish communal legal tradition (Hebrew, *halakha*) with seemingly no applicability in or carry-over to modern nation-state international law; limited personal exposure to but increasing knowledge of the increasing ferocity and barbarity of the annihilatory Nazi regime; his own perilous escape coupled with the loss of his parents and other family members; his prewar, wartime, and postwar decision to see in law the *only* solution to the crime he would later come to name “genocide”; his evolving obsession to hold the international community (i.e., the newly created United Nations, successor to the League of Nations) to the highest standards of human morality by translating ideas and words into legally enforceable standards—all these factors

⁵Children of Holocaust survivors are known as the “Second Generation,” and grandchildren of those same survivors as the “Third Generation.” While I am familiar with a rather vast literature addressing both cohorts, I am not at all familiar with a similar literature addressing the children and grandchildren of, for example, Armenian Genocide survivors, other than Balakian’s well-known 1997 text. Other so-called modern genocides (Herero, Guatemalan, Cambodian, Rwandan, Kurdish, Bosnian, East Timorese, Darfurian/Sudanese) are, perhaps, too new to the conversation to have generated the kinds of introspective and insightful literature thus far produced in the aftermath of the Holocaust/Shoah.

(and others, perhaps, unknown) became interwoven into his own “storehouse of memory” and energized him to engage in the very activity that would become his enduring legacy, the Genocide Convention, which, despite its own flaws, yet remains the *only* international instrument for addressing mass murder and mega-death. Thus, for Lemkin, his inherited terror was that of the lived experience of a victim, to a greater and lesser degree, coupled with a singular determination to address the crime and seek an appropriate solution.⁶

Genocide and memory thus have the potential to move both those who experience these tragic events and those who study them in two different, but not necessarily contradictory, directions: either mental and physical paralysis or impotence in the aftermath of experiencing such brutalizing behaviors, and/or activism (scholarly, political, societal) and the obvious determination both to seek redress/reparation and put in place mechanisms to prevent or curtail further repetitions. Thus memory of the genocides experienced either by one’s own community (Armenians, Jews, etc.) or by others, would seemingly demand “networking” to collectively address such grievances, for example, Jews and Israelis standing in solidarity against the continuing denial of the Turkish state to acknowledge its historical (not contemporary!)⁷ responsibility, or Jews leading the drive to demand U.S. congressional responsibility to memorialize the Armenian Genocide through appropriate commemorative resolutions, having already achieved victory with the annual Days of Remembrance of the Victims of the Holocaust.⁸ And, given their own experiences, both groups need to “step up” and lead the United States to address the ongoing tragedy of U.S. Native Americans and Canadian First Nations, and what also appears to be, at least in the United States, the increasing racial divides among Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, and White Americans (Jacobs 2015a, 2016). One notes here too that Lemkin’s own vision was not a parochial one, concerned only with Jews and the Holocaust/Shoah, but a global one as evidenced by his proposed massive if sadly incomplete three-volume *History of genocide*. One would thus like to imagine that, had he lived, Raphael Lemkin—coiner of our word

⁶ Interestingly enough, Lemkin also records in his autobiography, *Unofficial man*, that his all-consuming drive to ensure the passage of the Genocide Convention was his memorial tribute to his late mother, Bella, one fully in accord with the highest dictates of the Jewish religious tradition.

⁷ What is meant and understood here is not blaming contemporary Turks for the genocide of their predecessors but, rather, embracing the past, warts and all, flaws and all, with a full eye to telling the story and learning whatever can be learned from such a dark stain. The post–World War II modern nation-state of Germany remains the example of fully acknowledging its own evil past and, today, is home to the largest and fastest-growing Jewish community on the European continent, and a stalwart friend to the state of Israel.

⁸ The Days of Remembrance of the Victims of the Holocaust is an annual eight-day period designated by the [United States Congress](#) for civic commemorations and special educational programs that help people remember and draw lessons from [the Holocaust](#). The annual event normally begins on the Sunday before the Jewish observance of [Yom Ha-Shoah](#), Holocaust Memorial Day, and continues through the following Sunday, usually in April or May, and includes national, state, and city ceremonies and programs. Then, too, there is the governmental-nongovernmental partnership, which continues and resulted in the building of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.

“genocide” and prime instigator of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide—would have been at the forefront and a leading voice of these movements for social change and social betterment. Perhaps, then, his ultimate legacy has yet to be realized.

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Chapter 3

Conceptions of Genocide and the Ethics of Memorialization

Jeffrey Blustein

Abstract Conceptions of genocide can be broadly divided into individualistic and collectivistic. According to the former, genocide is essentially a crime against (many) individuals; according to the latter, it is a crime against a group, which is not reducible to an aggregate of the individuals who belong to it. This chapter argues for the latter on the grounds that it is necessary to capture the distinctive moral evil of genocide. It also argues for a non-consequentialist way of accounting for the ethical value of memorializing genocide. This is called an expressivist approach and three attitudes that memorials may express are highlighted and explored: respect, self-respect, and fidelity to the dead. Different accounts are then presented to explain how these attitudes can belong not only to individuals but also to groups and how, therefore, an expressivist ethic of remembrance for groups is possible. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the principle of warranted self-testifying, according to which those who suffer harm are in an ethically privileged position to testify to it. This principle is applied to group memorialization of genocidal harm, conceived as a group practice.

Keywords Genocide conceptions · Expressivism · Respect · Self-respect · Fidelity to the dead · Principle of warranted self-testifying

Introduction

The distinctive character of genocide, according to Raphael Lemkin who invented the term, is that it targets groups for destruction, rather than individuals. “The objectives of [genocide],” he said, are the “disintegration of the political and social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups” (Lemkin 1944, 79). The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, though departing from Lemkin’s

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characterization of genocide as involving both physical as well as cultural violence, nevertheless retained the basic understanding of genocide as a coordinated plan of actions directed against the very existence of groups. One of the main aims of this chapter is to make sense of the claim that groups, not individuals, not even individuals insofar as they belong to a particular national or other group, can be targeted for annihilation. Not all coordinated plans of actions aimed at destroying large numbers of individuals count as genocide, on this conception. But some plans do have this as their aim: these are genocidal plans and I want to understand what distinguishes these from plans of mass killing.

This understanding of genocide, I acknowledge, is not uncontroversial (genocide has even been called an “essentially contested concept”;¹ see Powell 2007): there are proponents of both, group-based and individualistic, conceptions of genocide.¹ However, I do not think that individualistic accounts are satisfactory. While genocide certainly harms individuals because they belong to a disfavored group, this is an incomplete account of the crime. In my view, it misses something distinctive about the harm of genocide, what Lemkin tried to capture in his talk about targeting groups. Rather than reject this characterization as confused or misleading or careless or merely figurative, I want to see how we can make sense of and preserve it. Thus, although admittedly my conception of genocide does not exactly track how the term is used in international law and the genocide literature, I believe that a group-focused or group-based conception of genocide is worth developing in its own right because it marks a kind of harm that is conceptually and morally different from the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings.

Another major aim of this chapter is to explore a particular response to the crime of genocide by those who survive it as well as by others, namely, memorialization. I will argue for a way of understanding the ethics of memorialization that is non-consequentialist, one that is broadly speaking expressivist in that it locates the ethical value of memorial activities and practices in the evaluative attitudes they express, rather than in the consequences they bring about. Further, these evaluative attitudes can be those of individuals, aggregates of individuals, and non-aggregative social groups, and accounts will be presented that explain how the latter is possible. Accounts of social groups have a double purpose here: they explain the distinctive harm of genocide as well as the group expression of morally significant evaluative attitudes.

There is a particular connection between the distinctive harm of genocide and the group evaluative attitudes that I will propose: a normative one. I mean by this that, given the nature of the crime, it is especially fitting that it be memorialized by *group* evaluative attitudes. For a group crime, it seems, is appropriately and rightfully memorialized in practices expressing group attitudes that properly respond to it. A wrong has been committed against the group as a single entity, and the group responds to that wrong and its effects with attitudes that are collective in nature. By contrast, if genocide is a crime committed against individuals, then the group to

¹Dirk Moses’s distinction between a “post-liberal” and “a liberal” conception of genocide roughly parallels the distinction between group-based and individualistic conceptions respectively. (See Moses 2002)

which they belong would not be commemorating a crime committed against *it*, and one would need a different explanation of the authority it has to do so. This is so because there is no obvious and direct link between an individualistic crime and group practices memorializing it, and between an individualistic crime and group attitudes that explains why group memorial practices are morally valuable activities. To be clear, I do not argue that the collective expression of evaluative attitudes is *only* appropriate or justified in response to wrongs that have harmed the group in one of the senses I discuss. My claim is just that it is especially fitting in this case, since a basic moral principle concerning testimony about wrongdoing is that those who are wronged are entitled to testify to their experience of it, while third parties may or may not be entitled to testify to wrongs committed against others.

In summary, I will make a number of claims pertaining to groups: (a) the distinctive moral character of genocide, the feature that sets it apart from other crimes against humanity, is that it eliminates (or intends to eliminate) groups, not only individuals or even aggregates of individuals; (b) morally valuable attitudes of various sorts can be expressed by social groups as well as by individuals; and (c) with respect to genocide it is appropriate for and a right of groups (specifically survivor communities) to engage in practices of memorialization that express these attitudes, practices that are ontologically and morally different from the memorial practices of individuals and individual survivors of genocide.

I begin by discussing the morally significant attitudes that can be expressed by memorial activities and practices. I focus on three: (1) respect for persons, (2) self-respect, and (3) fidelity to the dead. Then I turn to the different conceptions of genocide, both group-focused and individualistic, and argue for the former. The next section takes up issues in social ontology raised by conceptions of genocide and the group expression of fitting evaluative attitudes. Here, I focus on how two influential philosophical accounts of group agency, those of Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman, explain and illuminate the nature of group attitudes, and I clarify the differences between group and individual attitudes. (I do not claim that these are the only accounts that can we draw on to make sense of group-based conceptions of genocide.) Finally I explore the normative relations between conceptions of genocide and memorial practices and attitudes. Roughly speaking, group-based conceptions of genocide are correlated with group memorial practices and attitudes, according to what I call the principle of warranted self-testifying, whereas individualistic conceptions are correlated in the first instance with individual ones.

Remembrance and Its Evaluative Attitudes

There are some events and some people from the past in relation to which and toward whom there are moral duties of remembrance. By this, I mean only that it is morally imperative that they are remembered (or alternatively, not forgotten), by somebody, sometime, in some form, and in some circumstances. Why this should be so is, of course, a complicated question to which there are many different answers, but the

general proposition I take it is widely accepted and relatively uncontroversial. A particularly compelling instance of the general proposition concerns genocide: the evils of genocide are regarded as obvious candidates for objects of memorial duties. Arguably these are incumbent on humanity as a whole and they are discharged by practices that are in part public and social in character.

It might be objected that memories cannot be subject to the immediate control of the will, which is what the concept of duty requires. But this is only partly true: indirect control is sufficient. Remembrance, therefore, is not disqualified from being a duty on this ground. Related to this, remembrance can also be a *morally significant* practice. This is the case when there are objects of moral value or goods that are expressed by, embodied in, or promoted by activities and practices of remembrance. To take a rather ordinary example to make the point, one might argue that though I have no duty to remember my beloved parents after they die, the relationship I had with them gives me *reasons* to do so and, what's more, I do something morally valuable and to my moral credit by remembering them. Although they have died, my remembering them signifies that I have not allowed their death to alter the content of the attitudes and dispositions that were constitutive of our relationship in the first place. And, after all, why should it? Death obviously alters our relationship in numerous ways: it becomes essentially something belonging to the past. But it need not vanish from my moral life.

Practices memorializing the evils of genocide, I have said, are morally mandatory – at least if any memorial practices are – but we can only fully understand why they are so if we reflect on what makes them morally valuable activities and on the reasons of a moral nature that those atrocities provide the living for remembering them. This is true for any putative case of a memorial duty, of course, not just the duty of genocide remembrance.

The familiar move at this point is to appeal to the desirable projected consequences of remembering recent and more remote genocides: it is only by remembering the atrocities of the past (e.g. the Holocaust, Rwanda, etc.), it is said, that we can prevent them from happening again now and in the future, and it is a good thing that we do so. When victims are not publicly remembered, more will follow sooner or later. Now I do not want to deny that memorializing genocide may go some way toward preventing or impeding its recurrence. However, cynics and students of *Realpolitik* may pounce on this explanation to discredit the practice. How much have we really learned from the past? they may skeptically ask. Santayana might have been right that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” But it does not follow, either logically or practically, that those who *can* remember the past are *not* condemned to repeat it. And indeed, as history has shown, the cynics will tell us, “never again” is more often a pious slogan than a real commitment to take bold steps to intervene in the genocidal practices of states.

Even if we are not as cynical as this about the effects of memorialization and think that it has in fact prevented or stopped genocides or at least made them less likely, there are also other reasons of a moral nature for engaging in it, and these are my focus in this chapter. Among these are reasons of especial importance to the survivors themselves. Survivors worry about the welfare of future generations when

they memorialize genocide. But at least as important to them, and perhaps of more immediate concern, is what memorials convey about their relationship to the dead and to the community that has been devastated by genocide. It is common for survivors to regard memorial practices as acts of solidarity with and respect for the victims and the intergenerational community to which they and the victims belong. Forgetting the victims is taken to be a kind of betrayal, not just of their memory but of *them*.

Moreover, as is often the case with genocide, a number of community members may survive who work together in an attempt to restore and preserve the community's traditions, culture, and values. Memorialization is one of the processes by which they do this, since memorials can be an aid in the service of community reconstruction. Of course, they may not succeed: the surviving remnant may be too small or dispersed to restore the social bonds of the community and its traditions. But those who are engaged in memorial work typically find value in the effort to preserve their community and to sustain a socially meaningful connection to it nonetheless, because the value of their labor is not exhausted by the good it produces. It is how their sense of belonging and rootedness, and of the value of their community and of themselves as members of it, expresses itself against great odds. Furthermore, there *is* value in the attitudes expressed in the practices of remembrance by those who are engaged in them, such that remembrance may count as a morally admirable activity. These are partly affective and include attitudes of honor, loyalty, respect for self and others, pride, love, and hope, among others – and the value is not lost simply because memorialization does not rouse the conscience of the world sufficiently to prevent future genocides.

Practices of remembrance have consequences, good or bad, but they also embody and express attitudes and emotional attachments whose value is intrinsic to them. The value of honor, for example, does not (just) consist in what it brings about in the world, but in being an appropriate and fitting attitude to express toward persons who were the innocent victims of wrongdoing, or who were our teachers or our parents, among other reasons. Alternatively, we might say that they deserve this particular sign of recognition and appreciation from us in virtue of what was done to them, what they did for us, or what they meant to us. Several of the other attitudes mentioned above can be explained in a similar way. They are, to use Elizabeth Anderson's expression, "modes of valuation" (Anderson 1993, 10)² of persons the value of which resides in being appropriate and fitting ways to express recognition of the value of persons, and these attitudes can take as their object both others and oneself (and, as I shall argue, ourselves as a group). Famously, Kant argued for the obligatoriness of respect and self-respect on these grounds. But respect and self-respect are only two of the many ways of valuing persons and of appreciating their intrinsic value.

Memorialization can express a number of different morally valuable attitudes, sometimes more than one at once, and the process partly derives its moral value as a personal and social activity from them. In what follows I will focus on three such

²I do not necessarily accept Anderson's "rational attitude theory of value" in its entirety. See also Anderson 1997 for a brief exposition of her view.

attitudes, respect for persons as an interpersonal attitude, self-respect, and fidelity to the dead, and I will treat them not only as attitudes of individuals but possibly of groups as well. I do not claim that these are the only attitudes of moral importance that activities of remembering express, that all these attitudes are always engaged in cases of collective remembering, or that these are the only reasons that genocide gives the living to show appreciation of victims and damaged communities. But I do think that they or something akin to them are among the ones that the survivors themselves and the larger society most commonly invoke to explain why it is both desirable and imperative to remember wrongdoing.

Two of the attitudes I discuss – *self-respect* and *fidelity to the dead* – pertain especially to survivors and survivor communities. But attitudes of respect that are expressed by memorial practices and explain their moral significance are not limited to survivors and are appropriately widely shared. Those among the living who were not the victims of genocide also do, and should, participate in memorial activities respectfully commemorating what was done to some of their fellow countrymen. Of particular note, of course, are the perpetrators and perpetrator communities who have a special responsibility to remember the victims of their crimes. But given the heinousness of genocide, even those who were not the victims' fellow countrymen, who may live in other countries, arguably have some responsibility to remember them. Thus, while there are attitudes expressed by survivors that may not be expressed by or be appropriate for those who were not victims, there is also some overlap between survivors and the society at large.

Respect

The notion of respect for persons, its basis, scope, and requirements, has a long and varied history, and I shall not try to summarize it here.³ Whatever it's specific meaning and grounding, however, it may seem like an unsuitable candidate for an attitude expressed in memorializing the dead. For respect is normally thought to have something to do with recognizing and not violating the rights and needs of others, and it is too late to do this for the victims who have not survived. This is a problem about which I will say more shortly, but I want to begin to address this problem by introducing a conception of respect that has been elaborately developed and defended by Stephen Darwall and that I believe has important implications for the process of memorialization. What is fundamental to his conception of respect is its relational, second-personal quality. It is grounded in the authority of individuals to *demand* that others comply with moral norms and to hold them *accountable* for failures to adhere to them, and it is enacted when this authority is recognized and given standing in relations with them. Adherence to moral norms, such as respect for the rights of others or their autonomous choices, is not sufficient for respect in the second-personal sense, since it does not entail recognition of the authority of others to

³For an excellent discussion of this history, see Schneewind 1998.

demand compliance with these norms (Darwall 2004, 43–59; 2006; Blustein 2014, 187–188).

The problem just mentioned stems from the fact that second-personal respect, as well of course as adherence to first-order moral norms, cannot be shown directly to the non-surviving victims of genocide. One of the reasons respect is so important is that people are alert to being treated with respect or disrespect and are hurt and offended by the latter, but the dead cannot be alert to how they are treated by acts that take place after their deaths, nor are they in a position to hold perpetrators accountable for their crimes. Can the respect that has been denied be shown after the fact, as it were, after individuals have been slaughtered, raped, and tortured, and their communities devastated, and if so, how? And if so, can these new or renewed signs of respect help to make amends for the wrongs that have been committed? There are various ways to do this, but whatever measures are taken to make amends, they do so only as a consequence of the message those measures carry (Blustein 2014, Chap. 6). In particular, memorialization can help in this regard; indeed its impact on survivors and non-victims can be profound. However, for it to exemplify specifically second-personal respect, merely erecting monuments with good intentions is not sufficient. The process must also have a relational quality that (symbolically) substitutes for the quality that was lacking in the treatment the victims received. This occurs when second-personal respect for the dead is symbolically enacted by according survivors an authoritative role in deciding how, whether, and when, the dead shall be remembered. The survivors, in other words, must be consulted around issues of memorialization and involved in selecting what deserves to be remembered and in the design and implementation of memorial projects. And the survivors themselves respect the dead, in the second-personal sense, by dutifully and conscientiously fulfilling their responsibilities as representatives of or surrogates for those who did not survive.

Moreover, to return to an earlier point, what makes genocide a distinctive sort of crime against humanity is its group-oriented character. Therefore, any memorial projects undertaken by the larger society in honor of the victims of genocide must be sensitive not only to the harm done to individuals but to whatever harm has been suffered by their community. This may require, for example, special efforts to involve the entire survivor community, or those who speak for it, in the planning and execution of memorials.

Respect for the victims of genocide is an appropriate attitude to have toward them. After all respect is precisely what they did not receive. More strongly, the value of persons morally *demand*s respect. Furthermore, it is appropriate irrespective of whether one has been complicit in harming them or has failed to prevent harm when one could have, so it is an appropriate attitude for those who bear no responsibility for genocide to have as well as for those who are responsible, including perpetrators, collaborators, and bystanders whose willful blindness allowed perpetrators to carry out their work. How respect ought to be shown, and what forms it can take will naturally vary, since genocide has many different causes, agents, and manifestations, and victims, perpetrators, and others stand in different moral relations to it. Recovery from genocide, if such is possible, also imposes context-specific

demands on post-genocide societies. Creating memorials is not the only way to express respect for victims, and if social resources are limited and there are many competing needs from the victims' perspective, memorial efforts may have to be scaled back to meet these other needs.

Groups large and small – and not only individuals, singly or in aggregate – can have and express respect for the victims of genocide and fulfill their surrogate role. They can do this through supporting and participating in memorials, monuments, ceremonies, education, the media, and social discourse. Survivor communities may join with others in broad-based, nation-wide memory work that signifies respect for the victims, but they are not likely to be at ease participating in a world of recollection that they regard as largely constructed by others. They are therefore likely to engage, or to want to engage, in modes of recollection that are turned inward and that express a commitment to the continued vitality of their own traditions and culture, despite the devastation wrought by genocide. These modes may even take oppositional and self-protective forms, as survivors try to mark out a separate social space for themselves through their memory work.

Tricia Logan comments on the role of memorialization among indigenous peoples:

Lee and Thomas note that groups that are denied agency or representation in public or popular media may have been discouraged from remembering their histories or atrocities committed against them. Asserting a 'right to memory' creates space and agency for groups historically or politically marginalized by their nation-state; providing voice and agency to survivors thereby becomes part of post-atrocity repair. (Logan 2014, 115)

The point applies to the victims of genocide generally. Groups against which atrocities have been committed often want to control how their histories and cultures are depicted in public memory by constructing their own memorials. And the larger society shows respect for the victims in large measure by making space for the survivors to do this. Within this space, survivor communities not only memorialize genocide but may also attempt to practice and revitalize their traditions and customs. Or rather the two are intertwined, the memorialization and the revitalization. Memorialization becomes an act of collective reaffirmation of the value of what genocide attempted to destroy.

Self-Respect

Whether victims are chosen indiscriminately or, as in genocide, as members of a particular group, the actions of the perpetrators make a claim. They say, in effect, "I count and you do not, and I may use you as a mere thing" (Murphy 2002, 44). It is a false claim about one's moral status, an unacceptable moral presupposition by the wrongdoer, and individuals whose self-respect is intact will normally resent it. Accepting or tolerating it is not an option for them since it would constitute evidence that the claim is not false after all. Rather, they will view it as a threat that

needs to be challenged, and even if there is little they can do to punish the wrongdoers or to prevent further wrongdoing, at least they can signify by their resentment that they will not passively acquiesce in the treatment they have received. Their resentment constitutes a type of protest with multiple relations to self-respect: it flows from self-respect, manifests it, and provides them with assurance that despite the treatment they have received, they still possess it. (Blustein 2014, 47–62; Boxill 1976).

Remembrance can also be related in these ways to self-respect, that is, remembrance of injustice one suffered, even if the memories are not imbued with negative emotions of resentment or anger.⁴ The passage of time does not necessarily make the original offense any less wrong, although it may lessen the pain associated with it, or make it less worth remembering. One indication of a lack of self-respect is when someone seems too hasty to forget that she was mistreated and to let bygones be bygones. Remembrance of undeserved treatment *as* undeserved can thus be taken as a sign that the one who was wronged has self-respect. More than this, it is essential to having a conception of oneself as an individual who is deserving of moral respect, since one deserves moral respect in virtue of moral entitlements that persist through time. As with resentment, one way to assure oneself that one still has self-respect, despite the demeaning and degrading treatment one has received, is by not allowing oneself to forget that one did not deserve to be treated in this way. Indeed, the very act of remembering can itself be a kind of protest: a continuing challenge to the claim implicit in the wrongdoer's actions, an ongoing refusal to permit it to be *as if* they never happened, to permit their wrongness to be undone by the passage of time and the work of human manipulation. And of course, remembering can challenge the claim implicit in the mistreatment suffered by others as well.

One can thus understand why participating in public and private practices that memorialize genocide matters to the individuals who have been harmed by it. It matters to them as and to the degree that their self-respect matters to them. But in practices memorializing genocide self-respect also has a collective aspect in that it is not just expressed by large numbers of individual survivors. (This was suggested by my earlier remark that memorialization can be an act of collective reaffirmation.) We can begin to clarify this by noting that among the members of survivor communities, the very foundation of whose communal life was attacked, there is not only a relation of one to another, but a relation of each to the group as a whole. Each sees herself sharing with others a relationship to something that includes them all and that is intact enough to act as their collective agent, namely, the group. This relation constitutes identifying with or, in Karen Kovach's apt expression, "aligning oneself" with the group (Kovach 2006, 337–338). Because of this alignment their self-respect is bound up with how well their group as a whole is doing, with whether and to what extent it has been able to recover from the genocidal assault against it. However, we don't yet have an explanation of the phenomenon of a group possessing self-respect as a single body, a unit: the aggregation of all persons whose self-

⁴As I argue in *Forgiveness and Remembrance*, Chap. 1, the negative emotion need not be resentment or anger.

respect partly depends on the condition of their group does not give us this. It is only when there is a shared identification with the group as a whole and this shared identification, commonly known, is a source of self-respect for its members that we can properly speak of the group's self-respect. When these conditions are not met, the self-respect of the group is imperiled or lacking. There may in fact be no survivorcommunity to speak of.

Genocide, as defined by the 1948 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, involves the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part" a certain type of group, and the intention may or may not succeed (UN CPG 1948). If it is not entirely successful, there may be survivors who together can reconstitute their community and revitalize their customs and traditions. They can, as a group, (re)assert their violated rights and publicly claim and proclaim their self-respect. Memorialization of the victims of genocide by survivors can be, and often is an important part of a process of moral repair, a declaration of self-respect by a damaged community that is intrinsically valuable. In the worst case scenario, however, there is a complete destruction of the targeted group, so while there may be individual survivors, the basis of their life-in-common is destroyed. Whatever self-respect they may be able to salvage from the atrocities they have suffered may or may not be joined with that of other survivors. And whatever acts of memorialization survivors engage in, while they may possibly be public, they will not be broadly communal. Individual survivors in these circumstances will face enormous challenges in reconstructing their shattered lives, for the group that may have been a vital ingredient of their individual self-respect no longer exists.

Fidelity to the Dead

According to Edward Casey, citing Freud, memorialization or commemoration is "a way of coming to terms with ending and ... it succeeds to the extent that it refuses to succumb to the sheer pastness of the past – its facticity, its 'frozen finality,' its severe 'It was'" (Casey 2000, 256). The refusal to succumb to the pastness of the past is a psychological protest against our own vulnerability – to the passage of time and the various forces, political, cultural, and social that erode our grasp of the past. Similar sentiments lie behind the creation of public monuments and the establishment of commemorative ceremonies, and when genocide and its victims are being commemorated, the refusal by survivors to let the past slip away is concerted and insistent. Psychologically speaking, memorializing the dead "transform[s] something 'frozen in the finality of *rigor mortis*' into a re-living presence, alive in the minds and bodies of its commemorators" (ibid). And especially in the aftermath of atrocity and human rights abuses, where feelings of grief, rage, despair, and impotence are so intense, memorialization sustains a bond with the dead that enables the survivors to deal with the horror of what has occurred. Michael Ignatieff calls this "keeping faith with the dead" (Ignatieff 1988, 188). Memorialization in these circumstances, and in more ordinary circumstances as well, is a kind of symbolic pact

with the dead (or those suspected of being dead) that they will continue to play a central role in the lives of the living, the failure to fulfill which is experienced as a kind of betrayal.

The response to traumatic events like genocide has both healthy and unhealthy manifestations, and so do public and private acts of memorialization that are rooted in a desire to keep faith with the dead (and self-respect as well for that matter). They are unhealthy insofar as they involve a persistent inability to deal constructively with the reality of loss. Vamik Volkan borrows the term “regression” from individual psychology to characterize how groups respond to trauma, stress, or threat, including genocide:

Regression in large groups (such as ethnic, national, or religious groups)...takes place when a majority of group members share certain anxieties, expectations, behaviors, thought patterns, and actions that can be explained by the concept of regression. (Volkan 2004, 58)

The inability to accept the reality of loss underlies a cluster of problematic symptoms, including loss of individuality, an almost blind obedience to a leader, and a sharp division between “us” and “the enemy” (60). Fidelity to the dead is unhealthy to the extent that it is expressed in ways that exhibit these and other symptoms.

The importance to survivors of keeping faith with the dead, and its complex relationship to memorialization, is brought out strikingly in Berber Bevernage’s account of the human rights activism of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo on behalf of their disappeared children. The Madres, as Bevernage relates, attributed “an almost spectral status to the *desaparecidos*” (2012, 32). They opposed efforts to exhume the bodies of their children as well as monuments and museums to posthumously honor their memory, because in their view to support them would symbolically close the book on their disappearance and signify complicity with a government strategy to forget the past and allow the perpetrators to avoid accountability. In my terms, this was how they kept faith with the disappeared, with those who in most cases were already dead and whose deaths the Madres may have suspected but would not publicly avow. It may seem that therefore the Madres were opposed to any sort of memorialization of the disappeared. However, Bevernage makes the extremely important point that what they opposed was not memorialization per se but rather a particular way of memorializing, or memorializing with a particular meaning. They wanted to remember the disappeared, but it had to be a sort of memory that promoted justice for them, not the kind that impeded its pursuit. It was only this kind of memory that in their view truly kept faith with them:

The Madres definitely resist oblivion, but it is striking how remembrance for them always has to serve justice and should never be considered a goal on its own.... The central opposition, moreover, according to the Madres, is not between remembrance and oblivion but between oblivion and a certain kind of memory that they call *memoria fértil* (‘fertile memory’) – a memory that feeds the thirst and hunger for justice (2012, 37).

The behavior of the Madres is a remarkable example of what survivors will do (in this case cooperatively) in order to keep faith with the dead, despite social and other pressures to abandon them. But even in less extreme ways, memorial activities show the persistence of a bond between the living and the dead. The moral argument in

terms of fidelity takes seriously this deep psychological fact about the meaning that memorialization has for survivors: indeed, it rests in part on this. But it does not treat this as something that is immune to moral assessment. Rather, it allows only certain attachments to the dead, with certain outcomes, to count from a moral point of view. Fidelity to the dead, like fidelity to friends, family members, and associates, cannot be defended without qualification: it can lead someone to set aside good judgment and disregard the interests of others who may have a greater claim to his assistance. But while fidelity may be misguided and may attach to unworthy causes, it does not thereby lose its claim to be a good quality for persons to possess.

There are two interconnected ways to explain its significance. First, following Michael Slote, we can categorize fidelity as a *dependent virtue*. A dependent virtue is one whose value, or status as a virtue, depends upon the presence of other valuable traits (Slote 1983, 63–64). Fidelity can exist apart from good judgment and decent impulses, for example, but it can also manifest them. It is when it manifests these or some other good traits, and only then, that fidelity has value as a virtue. Second, we can classify fidelity as an *executive virtue*, that is, as a virtue that keeps us from doing wrong but that is not itself a way of doing right, unlike generosity, for example. Fidelity keeps us from abandoning our commitments and obligations because of the inconvenience and risk involved in adhering to them. But here too the commitments must at least be morally permissible ones if fidelity is to redound to our moral credit.

Fidelity to the dead and self-respect are linked evaluative attitudes. Survivor communities maintain their self-respect by keeping faith with their dead, and communities that do not keep faith with their dead have likely lost a meaningful connection to their traditions and cultures which are a source of self-respect. Conversely, it is partly through maintaining such a connection that the dead are included along with the living in a common moral community and that the living keep faith with them. Genocide poses a danger to targeted communities since, in addition to physical extermination; it threatens their self-respect and their connections to the dead.

These are aspects of what has been called *cultural genocide*. The loss of self-respect that accompanies, constitutively or causally, not keeping faith with the dead is experienced by individuals, for a group only exists in and through the individuals who make it up. But it is the group that has or lacks self-respect, that keeps or does not keep faith with the dead, and these group attributes are not reducible to some set of claims about individuals taken one at a time.

Conceptions of Genocide

Steven Lee usefully distinguishes between two sorts of conceptions of genocide, which he calls collectivistic and individualistic (Lee 2010, 335–356; also Ferreira 2013). According to the latter conception, the primary objects of genocide are individuals, to be sure individuals in virtue of their group membership, but individuals nonetheless. What is ethically distinctive about genocide on this type of account is

that individuals suffer a particular kind of harm—the harm of being singled out for abuse because they have or are believed to have certain characteristics—not that groups suffer harm. It is not *who* or what suffers the harm but *what sort* of harm is suffered, that distinguishes genocide from other crimes against humanity and that makes genocide especially heinous or that puts it in a moral category of its own. This leaves us with the task of explaining how, on an individualistic account, genocide is morally distinctive. There is mass murder of individuals, either chosen indiscriminately or chosen systematically but not on the basis of group membership, and mass murder of individuals, chosen on the basis of group membership. What makes these *morally* different?

A collectivistic account, by contrast, according to Lee, says that genocide aims to harm or harms the group, and that while individuals are killed, raped, tortured, etc., it is their group that is harmed through harming them. For a proponent of such an account, harm to individual members is a means to, a consequence of, or constitutive of, harm to the group. As Lee puts it, on collectivist accounts harm to a group is “supervenient” (2010, 336) on harm to individual members of the group. It is this sort of account that Lemkin proposes. For Lemkin,

the objectives of [genocide are the] disintegration of the political and social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups....Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group. (Lemkin 1944, 79; Short 2010)

A collectivistic account does not explain the moral distinctiveness of genocide by the sort of harm it causes or intends to cause to individuals. Whereas on an individualistic account one has to make moral distinctions among types of harms to individuals, on a collectivistic account the distinctiveness of genocide is explained by having a special object, however this is to be explained.

Lee defends an individualistic account because as he sees it a collectivistic account faces “ontological troubles” (2010, 336). “Does it make sense to say that a group has moral value, not reducible to the value of its individual members?” he asks. “How should the existence of groups be understood? Can everything one wants to say about harm to groups be taken as shorthand for what can be said about harm to their individual members?” (341) Lee gives an affirmative answer to the latter question (I would give a negative one): talk about harming groups is, if not illegitimate, at least unnecessary.

Another proponent of an individualistic account, with which Lee has some sympathy, is Claudia Card. What distinguishes genocide from non-genocidal mass murder, in her view, is the particular character of the harm genocide inflicts on *individuals*, “although it is convenient shorthand to speak of targeting groups” (Card 2003, 68).⁵ The harm is what she calls “social death”:

⁵A similar individualistic account, not of genocide but of harm against women, is found in Lamb 2006.

Specific to genocide is the harm inflicted on its victims' social vitality. It is not just that one's group membership is the occasion for harms that are definable independently of one's identity as a member of the group. When a group with its own cultural identity is destroyed, its survivors lose their cultural heritage and may even lose their intergenerational connections. (2003, 73)

It is the destruction of individuals' cultural identity and with it the sense of the meaningfulness of their lives that is the distinctive harm of genocide. Lee thinks that Card's account is on the right track, but faults it for not being "sufficiently individualistic." This is because it contains "a reference to the group," where "group" is conceived as "a collection of individuals that, because of their social interactions, have certain characteristic effects on each other, some of great individual value" (Lee 2010, 345). Lee's own account of the moral distinctiveness of genocide, which expunges all reference to the group to which victims belong, is problematic:

When we impose harm... on someone due to a non-elective characteristic, part of what we have done wrong is to abuse that person without respect for her choices. When such harm is severe, it is genocidal. (2010, 351)

And "a genocide is composed of genocidal harms" (342). But what on this view distinguishes genocide from mass murder of individuals chosen indiscriminately? (In my view, one criterion of a successful or at least an interesting account of genocide is that it enables us to draw this distinction). These too, it seems, are severely harmed without respect for their choices, on the basis of just being convenient or readily disposable targets of murder, characteristics that are surely non-elective. If we are to adopt an individualistic account, Card's view seems the better of the two.

Card's individualistic account of genocide has two key features. First, genocide is distinguished from other crimes against humanity by the harm it does (*actus reus*), not by the intention with which the harm is done (*mens rea*). Thus, it is not an instance of genocide if there is an intention to cause a particular type of harm but the harm does not result. Second, the particular type of harm is social death, which means not or not just physical death but, as Card explains it, the destruction of any meaningful connection to the traditions and culture of one's community as a constitutive ingredient of each member's individual identity. This is because the survivors of genocide no longer have a lived relationship to each other that is mediated by a shared conception of the social whole to which they belong, a whole that makes the particular character of their relationship possible.⁶ What has happened, in short, is the destruction of community and its replacement by some number of individuals without a sense of belonging or of connectedness to each other. Genocide, for Card, just is cultural: the term "cultural genocide" is redundant. And the devastation of the group is complete, the destruction of a group's social and integrative functions.

⁶The discussion by Poole is relevant here, distinguishing between social relations in which "a representation of the community is a constitutive presence in the relations" and those "which do not depend upon an understanding of the network as a whole" (1999, 11).

In light of these facts, Card's reference to "targeting groups" as merely "convenient shorthand" for some set of claims about individual harms seems unduly dismissive. Let me state my own position by distinguishing between two ways that groups enter into conceptions of genocide. The first is via their role in explaining the particular harm suffered by individual group members. According to this explanation, individuals are harmed by genocide because "the social relations, organizations, practices, institutions of the members of the group are irreparably damaged or demolished" (Card 2003, 69). Since this is an individualistic account, talk of the group being harmed is only shorthand for when a majority of group members are harmed in this way. The second explanation – and this is the one I shall say much more about below – conceives of groups as more than or other than the sum of the individuals who belong to them, as having a common character and culture, as being partly constituted by collective memory, and as having a complex collective intentional structure. Genocide is the intent to destroy or the destruction of the group thus conceived. Here, unlike in the previous explanation, the group is conceived of as a network of social relations, practices, etc., and what is irreparably damaged or demolished are the conditions that make it possible to maintain this network, now and across future generations. The group here is not a mere aggregate, and the harm to the group is therefore not an aggregate of harms to individual members.

Genocide intends or causes harms of both types and it is important to mark the difference between them. It does not only harm many individuals, even if they all have a certain characteristic in common, such as ethnicity, race, or religion, but damages or destroys the "glue" that holds them together.⁷ Moreover, while both explanations of genocide distinguish it from mass killing that is not dependent on group membership, it is only in the second, as Card herself notes, that the harm of genocide is morally distinctive in virtue of being directed at a different kind of victim from other crimes against humanity. A satisfactory account of genocide should explain this distinctiveness, and a conception of genocide that does not include harm to groups can only provide a partial account of its distinctive evil.

Under the circumstances envisioned in Card's conception of genocide, there is no survivor community that can have group attitudes. However, by switching from *reus* to *mens rea* and defining genocide in terms of intent, we create the logical space for failed genocides, that is, for genocides that intend the total destruction of the group but that leave enough of it intact so that its members can reconstitute it in some meaningful fashion. Moreover, as part of this reconstitution, they may establish museums, monuments, and rituals of remembrance to collectively commemorate those of their community who could not join with them in that reconstitution.

⁷As we will see below, there are different philosophical accounts of what this glue consists of. The glue may be what traditions and culture provide, but it can have other explanations as well. As I also note, genocide can create the glue that is otherwise lacking.

Group Harms and Group Attitudes

Group-based conceptions of genocide require an account of the nature of social groups, an account that does not reduce claims about groups to claims about the individuals who compose them. The question needing an answer is, what is there about a group of people that makes it susceptible to the harm of genocide, as genocide is understood according to group-based conceptions? I shall first mention a few sociological accounts and then will discuss two philosophical ones – those of Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman – that I think are especially useful in understanding the nature of group evaluative attitudes.

The groups that are vulnerable to genocide might be classified as *social groups*, in the sense that Iris Marion Young gives the term (Young 1989, 250–274). A social group, she stipulates, is different from an aggregate and an association. An aggregate is merely a grouping of persons according to some characteristic; an association is a collectivity of persons who come together voluntarily. A social group, by contrast, is not defined by common attributes but in relational terms: people are united by feelings of affinity for one another, where feelings of affinity can range from the close bonds of friends and colleagues to the more remote associational ties of fellow citizens. In addition, social groups are not constituted by contract or mutual agreement. Hence, belonging to a group is a matter of finding oneself to be a part of it, and the sense of belonging that comes from this furnishes one's personal identity with a collective dimension.

The groups that are vulnerable to genocide might also be classified as *encompassing groups*, as Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz characterize them (Margalit and Raz 1990, 439–461). Like Young, they stipulate that membership in such groups is important for one's self-identification, and they include a number of other features as well. The groups have a common character and culture that encompass many important aspects of individual lives and that mark those who grow up in them. And reminiscent of Young's distinction between social groups and associations, encompassing groups do not assign roles or positions on the basis of any accomplishment on the part of the individual.

In terms of these characterizations, genocide typically destroys or intends to destroy a group's common culture, the shared identity that is dependent on it, and the affective bonding in which people feel some attachment to one another. Not every group is a social group in Young's sense or an encompassing group in Margalit and Raz's sense – a professional or occupational group would likely not qualify – so destruction of those groups would not amount to genocide.

I turn next to Gilbert and Bratman, both of whom conceive of groups as agents with a complex intentional structure. Gilbert develops and defends a view that might be called holistic non-reductionism; and while Bratman is not a non-reductionist, he does hold that the nature of group activity cannot be explained in terms of the attitudes of individuals alone. Both accounts agree in distinguishing themselves from dubious metaphysical views about super-agents and group minds. In this way, they avoid at least some of the "ontological troubles" that loom so large for Lee and dis-

sueded him from embracing a collectivist account of genocide. Moreover, these accounts have different implications for how we are to explain group attitudes. Again, however, on neither view is there a single group mind consisting of some fusion of the minds of individual group members that explains this, or that is needed to explain this.

Gilbert is well known for what she calls plural subject theory (Gilbert 1989, 2000, 2001, 2002). A genuine collectivity, in her view, is a group of people who constitute a plural subject by virtue of jointly committing themselves to intending, doing or feeling something as a “body”. These joint commitments are understood to have normative force, that is, each participant to the joint commitment has associated obligations to act and entitlements to rebuke other participants for failure to act. If collectivity is explained in terms of joint commitments to intend, to act, and to feel, and if her account of collectivity can be applied to the sorts of groups targeted by genocide, then on a group-based conception of genocide it is distinguished from other crimes against humanity by the harm it does, or intends to do, to individuals by way of the joint commitments that constitute them as a plural subject.⁸ This is how genocide harms the group when it is conceived holistically as Gilbert does. It harms the group across a wide range of social interactions by making it impossible for individuals to intend, do, and feel as a unit, most obviously, by eliminating those who are parties to them; by destroying the material, social and institutional conditions that make it possible for individuals to come together as a body and be bound to one another; by attaching serious penalties to failing to fulfill their obligations to act as one with others; by preventing the dissemination and sharing of information that are required for joint commitment; by depriving individuals of the hope and sense of purpose that formerly motivated them to act in the ways required by their joint commitment; and so on. In general, what counts as genocide on this view is the ensemble of actions and plans that damages or destroys group cohesiveness grounded in joint commitment, or the possibility of it, the joint commitment that constitutes a single genuinely collective subject of intention, action, and feeling.

Plural subject theory also provides an account of group attitudes and, specifically, attitudes of respect, self-respect, and fidelity to the dead among the survivors of genocide, assuming that the survivors constitute a single subject of these attitudes. Referencing Gilbert’s work, Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes argue that her “account suggests a general formula for what it means for a collective to have purpose, attitude, belief, principle for action, or other mental state: A group G, has mental state M if and only if the members of G are jointly committed to expressing M as a body” (Anderson and Pildes 2000, 1517). Her account, in their view,

⁸Bratman distinguishes between two plausible readings of Gilbert’s notion of plural subjects. According to the first, “talk of a plural subject is sufficiently analogous to our talk of an individual subject that it engages the idea of a center of a moderately holistic mental web.” According to the second, “talk of a plural subject is only a shorthand for talk of a set of persons who are, in her sense, jointly committed with respect to a specific joint action.” On the second interpretation, “Gilbert is not claiming that there is a plural subject over and above specific joint commitments” (Bratman 2014, 128). To make the contrast between Gilbert and Bratman sharpest, I interpret Gilbert’s talk of plural subject in the first way.

convincingly explains how groups can have “all the mental capacities needed to have attitudes toward people” (1519). Applied to the attitudes embodied in processes memorializing the victims of genocide, a group has these attitudes just in case its members are jointly committed through engaging in memorial practices to expressing respect, self-respect, and fidelity to the dead as a body. For a group to have the relevant attitudes is for its members to be jointly committed to expressing them, but a joint commitment does not ensure that they will succeed in their purpose. Thus, memorial practices can misfire if, for example, outside interference obstructs them. Further, by jointly committing themselves to this, each member of the group at the same time acknowledges an obligation to the others to act in concert with them to achieve the goal of expressing these attitudes.

Anderson and Pildes, following Gilbert, take the general formula to apply to collective emotions and feelings among other mental states. Indeed, this would seem necessary if plural subject theory is to provide a complete account of the memorial attitudes of respect, self-respect, and fidelity, since these are partly affective in nature, involving dispositions to have feelings of various sorts. But the joint commitment by a plural subject to have collective feelings as a body seems at best a precondition of collective emotions, not a fully adequate account in itself. What is missing is the phenomenological or affective component of these attitudes. A plural subject, for Gilbert, does not feel as a body: rather, it is *committed* to feel as a body. Yet arguably an integral part of everyday attributions of collective or group feelings is that feelings are widely enough shared among the members of the group that they can be considered the feelings of the group, not just of an aggregate of individual group members. Gilbert has no explanation for group feelings in this sense, and doesn’t think one is needed.

Whether and how emotions will be shared depends to some extent on the size of the group in question. Small groups, many of whose members know each other or encounter each other face to face, possess features that are more predictive of shared group emotions than those of dispersed groups most of whose members never meet each other or even know who their fellow-members are. However, group emotions are not limited to groups of the former sort. Even large groups can have group emotions, if there is convergence toward the same profile of emotions among individuals because membership in the group is salient for them and they identify with the group, and these individuals are cognitively linked by common knowledge of their shared profile.⁹

Bratman provides an alternative to Gilbert’s holism (Bratman 1992, 1993, 2014).¹⁰ Eschewing talk of plural subjects, he offers instead an account of shared agency – or modest sociality, as he calls it — that he says is “broadly individualistic in spirit” (Bratman 1992, 341). Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which, though not holistic, it is nevertheless non-reductionistic. He focuses on what he calls “shared cooperative activity” (SCA), which he explains as “consisting primarily of appropriate attitudes of each individual participant *and their interrelations*”

⁹For a discussion of group-level emotions in the social psychology literature, see Smith et al. 2007

¹⁰This assumes the first reading of Gilbert’s notion of plural subject. See footnote 8.

[italics added] (Bratman 1993, 99). The interrelations are characterized as having a number of features, and it is because of them that there is no reduction to the contents of an individual's attitudes alone. First, in SCA, each participant is committed to performing a joint action, J, and this means in part that "each agent intends that the group perform J in accordance with sub-plans that mesh" (Bratman 1992, 333). Each agent has as his or her final aim the doing of something together, but to accomplish this, their more specific aims and intentions must mesh, that is, must not disagree and must be mutually realizable, and they must be committed to this. Second, to be truly cooperative activity, the meshing of sub-plans must not be coerced but must result from each participant intending that the other's intentions be effective, that is, from each participant respecting the other's freedom to choose whether or not to engage in the joint activity with him or her. Third, it is common knowledge between them that each participant intends this. Finally, in SCA each is committed to assist the other in ways that promote successful joint activity, if such support should be needed.

A conception of genocide employing this account of sociality extends it to cases of large-scale shared agency.¹¹ It conceives of the harm of genocide in terms of damage to the multi-faceted web of shared plans that constitutes broad-based cooperative activity within socially and institutionally structured groups. On this view, the groups that genocide aims to destroy are harmed, as groups, as a consequence of serious, possibly irreparable disruptions or blockages of the shared plans that enable individuals to engage in cooperative activity with one another across a wide range of social contexts. The harm of genocide is an especially damaging and devastating harm, not only because it violates the human rights of individuals, but also because it destroys or intends to destroy the conditions that make sociality within targeted communities possible.

The harm done to individual members of the group is profound. They may be murdered, tortured, raped, abducted, or forcibly displaced. But there is also the harm that Card emphasizes, the harm of becoming "socially dead." If this is the result, they can no longer meaningfully connect to the traditions and culture of the group to which they belonged and around which they arranged their lives. Though they may not suffer physical harm, their individual identity based in part on identification with a particular group has been shattered. These are harms to the individual members of the group, some of which (unlike murder and rape, for example) are harms due to membership because they cannot be explained without reference to their group affiliation. They are not harms to the group as such, even if all them are added together. Nor does the aggregation of these group individual harms explain the distinctive moral harm of genocide. For even if there are large numbers of individual genocidal harms, their mere addition would not sharply enough distinguish genocide from mass murder.

There are two objections, however, to using the conceptions of *group agency* developed by Gilbert and Bratman to clarify the nature of genocidal harm to groups.

¹¹ Bratman has not yet worked out how his account of modest sociality can be extended to structured social groups of the sort that may be targeted for genocidal destruction.

According to the first, the application of these conceptions yields an overly broad characterization of genocidal harm. This is because there are groups that satisfy Gilbert's and Bratman's criteria of group agency but whose destruction would not count as genocide. For example, professional, occupational, and (some) political groups may be group agents in Gilbert's and Bratman's senses, but their deliberate elimination does not amount to genocide, at least as genocide is normally understood by collectivists and individualists alike. In response, in drawing on the accounts of collectivity or sociality given by Gilbert and Bratman, I am not suggesting that they can be used to provide sufficient conditions for groups whose destruction consists in genocide. Other criteria will have to be introduced to narrow the field of genocide-eligible groups, and here the accounts of Young and Margalit and Raz, to name two, may be helpful. Card's notion of social death also suggests additional criteria for inclusion in a group-based account of genocide.

The second objection is that the kinds of groups that Gilbert and Bratman are describing as engaged in group action fail to include many groups whose elimination would count as genocide. In other words, the conceptions of genocide-eligible groups derived from their notions of collectivity and sociality are too narrow. I have a number of responses. First, the genocide literature does not always distinguish between mass killing and genocide as I have done, so there may be instances of what is called genocide that would not be explainable as the destruction of groups in either Gilbert's or Bratman's sense. Mass killing of individuals counts as genocide, in my view, only if there is some social glue that binds the members together, if they share a common identity in virtue of understanding themselves as members of a collective, and so on, although on an individualistic conception of genocide this would not be necessary.

Second, there are many cases of so-called genocide that destroy or grievously harm a group by destroying or obstructing the possibility of its exercising group agency (among other things). Genocide of indigenous peoples and what Kovach calls "ethnic identity groups" (Kovach 2006, 342) are prime examples. Gilbert offers an account of shared intentions that illuminates aspects of group agency in both small face-to-face and larger social groups, and arguably Bratman does so as well. These accounts can be useful in explaining the nature of genocidal harm in those cases where, among other things, it consists in making it extraordinarily difficult or impossible for numbers of people to cooperate or continue to cooperate in joint action.¹² In some instances, genocide consists in a coordinated set of actions and policies aimed at the systematic destruction of numerous geographically dispersed communities sharing a common identity; in others, genocide targets a single community within a limited area. In each case, the effect of genocide, *inter alia*, is to impair or destroy the ability of communities to exercise group agency.

Finally, what Peter Digeser calls "nonrandom aggregates," common examples of which are "individuals who are grouped by ethnicity, gender, religious affiliation, physical characteristics, and so on" (Digeser 2001, 112), may become collectivities

¹²For another group-based account of the conditions that make a group susceptible to the harm of genocide, see Abed 2006.

as a result of being treated as targets of genocidal policies. The members may come to be joined together by shared intentions and joint commitments, if by nothing else, the shared intention and joint commitment to survive. For example, the assimilated Jews of Western Europe prior to World War II may not have wanted to identify as Jews, so did not count as constituting a group in either Gilbert's or Bratman's sense. But they came to identify as Jews when their enemies, using racism, labeled them as such. The glue that then held them together was rarely Jewish tradition but rather awareness of how vulnerable they were and of the fiction that they were equal citizens of their political communities.

What about the group expression of memorial attitudes? For Bratman, the attitudes that Gilbert would attribute to plural subjects are rather attitudes of individuals. In the case of the three memorial attitudes of respect, self-respect, and fidelity to the dead, they would not be the product of a joint commitment among the members of a group to express these attitudes as a body. Their group character would be explained differently, along the following lines. Consider these first as attitudes of individual members of a group. They do not express these unreflectively. Rather, they respond to reasons for having these attitudes and form intentions to act on the reasons these attitudes give them, reasons to memorialize the victims of genocide in ways they regard as appropriate and adequate expressions of these attitudes. In various ways, the expression of individual attitudes exhibits elements of intentional human action.

But in the case of genocide and other crimes against humanity, there are also intentions of another sort, namely, intentions to memorialize that are public and shared among large numbers of people, for example, among the members of a survivor community. Insofar as it is a community effort, survivors deliberate together about what counts as an appropriate and adequate expression of these attitudes. They also coordinate their planning and action, so that the expression of these attitudes in the process of memorialization is a shared cooperative activity. At each stage, from deliberation, to planning, to execution, commemoration exhibits the structure of shared intentions. And the attitudes it expresses are group attitudes because the members deliberate together about what and how they should be expressed and because each seeks to calibrate the expression of these attitudes to what others are doing, knowing that they seek to do the same. These are not normative claims – this is taken up in the next section – but descriptive ones. They (partially) characterize what is involved in the members of groups targeted for genocide remembering together in contrast to individual survivors engaging in memorial activities only loosely related to each other.

Note further that “feelings” are not simply the same as mere bodily sensations. Some have intentional content and because of this can be shaped by integrative processes that are characteristic of shared intentions. These are the feelings associated with the group memorial attitudes. Thus, we do not need to invoke the notion of a plural subject committed to feeling an emotion as a body in order to explain how emotions and affective attitudes like respect, self-respect, and fidelity can belong to a group. Moreover, unlike Gilbert's account, we do not have to sacrifice the phenomenological component of feelings in order to explain how groups

can have them. This, it seems to me, is an advantage of an account like Bratman's applied to the affective attitudes embodied in and expressed by memorialization.

What is the relationship between group memorialization of genocide and the individual memories of genocide that the group's members have? "A critical feature of genocide remembrance," according to Nigel Eltringham and Pam Maclean, is "that individual memory [of trauma] is appropriated for the 'group' of which the survivor is a member" (Eltringham and Maclean 2014, 1). This appropriation is a process through which spokesmen for the group deploy individual memories of genocide to stand for or illustrate a broader group memory. Individual memories are not just deployed, however. They are also transformed by being woven into a broader group memory. This group memory is created and sustained by joint and coordinated activities on different levels and in different ways, from the design and execution of memorial projects to participation in ceremonies and rituals of remembrance by means of which survivor communities remember their past together.¹³ It is also, crucially, created and sustained by an inclusive consultation process with survivor groups and community buy-in by the affected communities, for without this memorial projects are not owned by the communities with the greatest need for memorialization. In these ways, memorialization becomes a communal project that exhibits shared intentions and embodies group agency, agency that may express and communicate evaluative attitudes of different sorts.¹⁴

The case for using Gilbert and Bratman to illuminate the group expression of evaluative attitudes by group memorial practices is strong, even if one understands genocide to include cases of targeted groups that are not the sorts of groups Gilbert and Bratman are talking about. Those devoted to memorializing the victims of genocide, whether survivor communities or those who belong to society at large, do seem to be engaged in some kind of joint activity that we can make better sense of with their accounts. I suggest that their accounts help us to understand the nature of genocidal harm as well, because many uncontroversial cases of genocide can be characterized in part as an attack on the agency of social groups.¹⁵ But

¹³ It is common for indigenous and ethnic communities to remember together by engaging in communal ceremonies that commemorate the departure of loved ones, relatives, or community members.

¹⁴ The District Six Museum in Cape Town, South Africa, is an example of a memorial initiative that is communal in nature. The museum helps the displaced community of District Six organize their memories and become a remembering community. Moreover, as a means of social and community empowerment, the museum is a resource through which residents of District Six can reclaim their self-respect. See Ereshnee Naidu, *Symbolic reparations: A fractured opportunity*, available at <http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papnaid2.htm>. Last accessed 11/12/2014.

¹⁵ See Short 2010, 840: "If the *genos* in genocide is a social figuration—made up of a fluid network of consensual practices which form a comprehensive culture, from which an exit would be arduous—then genocide is the forcible breaking down of such relationships—the destruction of the social figuration, which can be achieved in a variety of ways not restricted to physical killing." Here Short follows Christopher Powell (2007, 538–539): "First, given that a *genos* is a network of practical social relations, destruction of a *genos* means the forcible breaking down of those relationships.... Second, given that a *genos*, like all social institutions, is a process of change and transformation, the effect of genocide is to disrupt that process." I regard this "network of practical social relations" as a manifestation of group agency.

their usefulness in explaining the nature of group memorialization is not dependent on whether they provide a fully adequate account of genocidal harm.

To sum up this section, I have discussed two accounts of collectivity or sociality, using them to explain both the distinctive character of genocidal harm and the group character of the affective attitudes expressed in practices memorializing it. Agents of genocide intend to harm (or actually harm) groups as such and survivor communities memorialize genocide by engaging in practices through which they express morally significant group attitudes. In neither context is “group” merely shorthand for an aggregation of individuals whose individual identities are bound up with their membership in the group.

Groups, Individuals, and Self-Testifying

I have argued that the moral value of memorialization cannot be fully explained by tracing connections between it and certain intrinsically desirable consequences, such as reduction in the frequency of genocides. These outcomes may or may not occur as a result of memorializing genocides of the past, but even if they do not, memorialization has not thereby become a pointless activity. One way to explain why is that memorialization might still express attitudes that are intrinsically morally valuable because they are ways of caring about people who are themselves intrinsically valuable. Adopting this non-consequentialist approach, I have identified three such attitudes. These attitudes can be expressed by individuals who engage in their own personal and private acts of remembrance. But when the events that are memorialized affect many people in more or less similar fashion, whether positively or negatively, and they to some extent think of themselves as a group, there is likely to be some mutual adaptation and coordination of these attitudes such that they become the attitudes of a group of co-rememberers. The attitudes become trans-individual in their scope and function. This is illustrated by the memorialization of past events that are a source of pride for an entire community – or of shame, humiliation, or grief. It applies of course to genocide. Genocide affects groups and their members commonly register together their suffering by memorializing what was done to them, assuming, of course, that community can to some extent be reconstituted after genocide. They express attitudes of respect, self-respect, and fidelity to the dead that give moral point and value to group memorial practices just as individual attitudes do that for individual memorial practices. Here I want to ask if the connection between group harm and group memorial practices and attitudes is only a sociological generalization, or if there is also something especially fitting about it from a moral standpoint. I believe that there is.

I take the following to be a basic moral and epistemic principle concerning testimony about wrongdoing. Call it the *principle of warranted self-testifying*: it is both appropriate for victims to testify to the wrongs from which they suffered or continue

to suffer and something that they have a right to do. (They may have a right to testify to the suffering of others as well, but I focus on the more straightforward case.) It is appropriate for them to testify to their own suffering because it is, after all, *their* suffering, and because it is theirs, they are well-qualified, possibly uniquely well-qualified, to speak about it. This does not mean that their testimony will necessarily be more reproductively faithful to the original event than the testimony of those who did not suffer themselves. It may not be. But testimony about one's suffering is not judged by this criterion alone.¹⁶ Rather, it is also judged by whether it accurately conveys the *significance* of the original event, and while reproductive fidelity may sometimes be needed, the first-personal perspective of those who experienced it is centrally important in conveying its significance, even if they do not possess the best reportorial skills. In addition, victims have a right to testify to their own suffering because they are entitled to be treated with respect, and they are not treated with respect if they are not allowed to testify to the ways in which they have been wronged. They are respected, in a second-personal sense, only if they can hold others accountable for their wrongdoing, and they cannot do this if they cannot testify to what they suffered at their hands. In other words, they have a right to testify to their own suffering because it is disrespectful to disallow them from doing so, and others have a duty to heed their testimony with respectful attention. This right is linked to affirming and securing the moral, civil, and political dignity of the testifier, and its recognition is especially important for those who have not been permitted to give voice to their suffering or who have been discredited when trying to do so.

This principle of warranted self-testifying can be applied to group testimony as well, and it is relevant to the question asked above about the normative connection between group harm and group memorial practices. It is relevant because memorialization of wrongdoing by those who experienced it first-hand is a way of testifying to it, and group practices memorializing harm done to the group is one important way in which the group testifies on its own behalf to what it has undergone.

The connection to genocide is straightforward. Genocide, I have argued, is a crime against a group as well as against individual members of it, and the group suffers harm just by being chosen for eradication, even if the intent to eradicate is unsuccessful. As a victim, the group is entitled, by the principle of warranted self-testifying, to testify through group memorial practices to what it, as a group, has experienced and to establish memorials that express attitudes it regards as fitting acknowledgments of that suffering. And as with individual self-testifying, this entitlement secures the moral, civil, and political dignity of those who are joined in shared membership in the group. Literally and not just as a kind of shorthand, it secures the dignity of the group as a single social body. Groups can be silenced or discredited as testifiers to their own suffering, either directly or indirectly through silencing or discrediting their representatives, or alternatively, treated respectfully as entitled to testify to it, through acknowledgment of the legitimacy of their memorial efforts as well as in other ways. The right to memorialize secures for groups what it secures for individuals, namely, their moral, civil, and political dignity. And

¹⁶Sue Campbell argues this point effectively in Campbell 2014

again in the case of memorializing genocide, the principle of warranted self-testifying applies when the character of the testimony mirrors the group character of the intended or effectuated harm.

If we adopt an individualistic conception of genocide instead, the principle of warranted self-testifying cannot in the same way authorize group memorial practices that testify to genocidal harm. For on a conception of this sort, it is not the group that is the primary target and that is harmed, but the individuals who make it up, and talk of group harm is only shorthand for harm to a sufficiently large number of group members. So a group memorializing genocidal harm is not, on this conception, memorializing harm to itself, and the principle of warranted self-testifying would not or would not straightforwardly warrant its doing so, as it does with group-based conceptions. It would be appropriate under this principle for individuals to engage in individual practices of memorializing genocidal harm, and it would be their right to do so. But if their group as such memorializes, there is a mismatch of the victim of genocidal harm and the agent that testifies to it through memorialization. Is there a way to bring these more closely into alignment with each other?

There may be various ways to do this, but I will mention only one without trying to work out all the details. Rather than think of the group as the *object* of genocidal harm, suppose we regard it instead as the *custodian* entrusted with, broadly speaking, safeguarding the welfare of its individual members. This may be due to an explicit transference of the right to safeguard their welfare or it may have some other source. In any case, it is a plausible view to take about some groups. If individualistic conceptions of genocide do not reflect a general commitment to reductionism about groups, then proponents of both individualistic and group-based conceptions of genocide can agree that groups may have this function.

As custodian, a group arguably has a further function: to testify to the wrongs committed against those of its members whom it was collectively unable to protect, and this includes creating objects and events that serve in remembrance of them and the wrongs they suffered. The group memorializes what they – the members for whom it is responsible – suffered by engaging in practices that express group memorial attitudes that have them as its objects. (Note that a group can both memorialize harm done to itself and harm done to its individual members.) It is not testifying as the victim of harm, but as the custodian of those who were harmed. The principle of warranted self-testifying does not apply, but perhaps something close to it does: it is bearing witness to what one of its own suffered, where “one of its own” has the sense of one for whom it has custodial responsibility.¹⁷

Finally, however, there is one important caveat. Surviving victims and their families must have an opportunity to refuse the larger group’s memorial efforts on their behalf, and they must not be given grounds for believing that their right to memorialize is being usurped by it.

¹⁷For a lengthy discussion of bearing witness and its relationship to remembrance, see Blustein 2008, 301–364.

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Chapter 4

Jewish Social Memory and the Augmented Stages of Genocide

Shulamit Reinharz

Abstract This chapter has several parts: Social Memory of Genocide as a Jewish Responsibility; Genocide as a Continuing Phenomenon; Genocide as an Area of Research; Genocide Stage Theory; Three Innovations for Genocide Stage Theory; Augmenting Stanton's 10 Stages; and a brief Conclusion. Religious texts and annual holidays within Jewish life reinforce the importance of remembering Jewish history. The Holocaust is the focus of much, but not all, of this memory work. Remembering the Holocaust assiduously, however, has not prevented the occurrence of numerous genocides since the end of World War II. Genocide analyst, Gregory Stanton's stage theory describes how genocide unfolds. This chapter augments his model with three additional ideas: silencing dissent, forming alliances, and apologizing publicly.

Keywords Social memory · Gregory Stanton · Stages of Genocide · Holocaust · Second generation · Political apologies · Jewish responsibility

Social Memory of Genocide as a Jewish Responsibility

I was raised on the stories that my Holocaust-surviving parents told me about how they grew up in Weimar Germany, which became Nazi Germany, and then how as teenagers they escaped to the Netherlands where they hid for the duration of the Nazi occupation of that country. Little did I know that their stories were giving me the opportunity to participate in the creation and later dissemination of Jewish social memory. My birth in Amsterdam in 1946 automatically made me part of what is called "the second generation," i.e., the offspring of people who survived the Holocaust (Berger 1997; Berger and Berger 2001; Hass 1990). Although every survivor's family is unique, members of the second generation generally have a special interest in perpetuating the memory of the Holocaust, sometimes even if their

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parents attempt to push their own memories aside or actually deny their own Holocaust experience.

My family history and subsequent education as a sociologist have led me to think regularly about what the Holocaust means and to question if it will be remembered in years to come. Sadly, post-World War II events in the USSR and elsewhere, as well as current world conditions characterized by murderous acts against Jews in Israel, Europe and elsewhere, lead me to wonder if another Holocaust is inevitable (Dumalaon et al. 2014). All commentary I have read on the topic states that it is not only possible but rather, probable – once a phenomenon has occurred, it can recur. I believe that my parents had a subliminal belief that the Holocaust will recur, which helps explain that they would sometimes suggest to whom I should turn if I ever needed to hide or would point out where I could find a good hiding place.

In addition to my parents immersing me in stories about their Holocaust-related experiences and losses, I also learned from them, subtly at first but then in a more explicit way, that each Jew must take upon her/himself the responsibility for the future of the Jewish people and its culture. This is not to say that we can protect ourselves without the aid of others. Rather, we must start with taking responsibility by ourselves and for ourselves. The ancient saying of Hillel that many Jews live by is, “*Im ein ani li, mi li? U’kh’she’ani le’atzmi, mah ani? V’im lo akhshav, eimatai?* [Hebrew] If I am not for myself, then who will be for me? And when I am only for myself, then what am I? And if not now, when?” (Pirkey Avot, 1:14). As this revered set of questions states, first and foremost is Jews’ attitude toward other Jews. A Jew must teach her or his children (or other children) about Jewish culture/history and Jewish responsibility. This responsibility for creating “social memory” extends beyond the family. At the same time, a Jew may not be selfish or ethnocentric and think only about the concerns of Jews. Rather, each Jew must give charity to anyone in need and must care about the “other” And must do it now.

The Talmud (Shevuot 39a) instructs, *Kol yisrael arevim zeh bazeh* [Hebrew], meaning that all of Israel (i.e., all Jewish people) is responsible for one another. Jews have individual responsibility, family responsibility, communal responsibility and ultimately, worldwide responsibility. Responsibility is shaped by family culture, law, and social memory, and in turn, builds them. The individual responsibility that each Jew is supposed to assume is not a suggestion, it is Jewish law. This responsibility, in practical terms, means that each and every Jew must ensure that other Jews have food, clothing, and shelter, or a way to earn these through employment. “Simply by virtue of being a Jew one is responsible for the well-being of other Jews, and vice versa” (Staff 2016). It is through this lens that I understand the relation between social memory and genocide.

Even a cursory look at Jewish history reveals that Jews have suffered repeated instances of genocidal intent from ancient times, through the Middle Ages, until the modern period. Jews are obligated to preserve the memory of these events, even though this may seem morbid to others. The Hebrew word “*zachor*” relates to this concept and is the imperative form of the infinitive – “*lizkor*” – to remember. *Zachor* is a call to the creation of individual and collective social memory. As the Zachor Holocaust Foundation states, “The souls of our dear departed ones, all six million of

them, are crying out to the world in a single word: “ZACHOR.” Instead of dealing with the past by putting it aside so that survivors can live a less complicated and less troubled life, Jews want the Holocaust to be remembered. Jews want to teach others about their pain and warn them about the possibility of repeated Holocausts. This is the *raison d’être* of many organizations including the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s speaker’s bureau that arranges talks by survivors upon request (Museum 2016c) so that listeners can learn to remember. Other organizations, such as the Anne Frank Center, and Facing History and Ourselves, provide Holocaust-related curricula for classroom use so that young people can learn about this horrific past (Facing History 2016). Some people are willing to listen to these talks, but many are not. At the extreme are those adults who deny the Holocaust and other genocides altogether, saying that the so-called memory is false and “remembered” events did not occur (Lipstadt 1994). Thus the task for the contemporary Jew is both *Zachor* (remember) and prove (when challenged)! Jews learn about Jewish responsibility through the study of written texts, classroom education, films, travel to Israel, visiting museums and memorials, and discussions with families and friends. At the same time, some Jews do not have these opportunities or are not interested. Jews are not a homogeneous community.

An aid to memory is the cycle of Jewish holidays. Within the annual Jewish calendar, social memory and responsibility are reinforced by holidays that focus on potential or actual communal catastrophes and their outcomes. These holidays are Chanukah (commemorating genocide at the hands of the ancient Greeks, particularly in Jerusalem), Purim (commemorating the aborted Jewish genocide at the hands of the Persians), Passover (commemorating enslavement at the hands of the ancient Egyptians and the eventual liberation led by Moses and his sister, Miriam), and Tisha B’Av (which mourns all who died and all that was destroyed because of Jew-hatred throughout the ages). In addition, specific annual commemorations of the Holocaust include Holocaust Memorial Day [Yom Ha’Shoah], which occurs in May and is widely observed, particularly in Israel, as a national day of mourning; the anniversary of Kristallnacht, the night of destruction of Jewish property that occurred on November 9, 1938 throughout Germany; and January 27 of every year, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, established by the U.N. in 2005.

In the Purim story, for example, which some historians claim occurred in the fourth century B.C.E. and others say did not occur at all, Mordechai, the Jewish uncle of Esther, tells her that she has a responsibility to save the Jews of Persia, even though she is frightened and overwhelmed by the prospect. This dramatic story becomes part of Jewish social memory even though it is not a remembered experience of today’s Jews. The message is that a near catastrophe, genocide, is averted by individual bravery. Jewish children hearing the Purim story year after year want to be brave, as well. Even though the children seem to be participating simply by wearing costumes, eating holiday-appropriate sweets, and making holiday-appropriate noise, they are learning subliminally that as a Jew they might be called upon to “save the Jewish people.” The boys typically dress up as Mordechai and the girls as Queen Esther, and they know what these figures did in the Purim story. They are finding their place in social memory.

Similarly, on Passover, Jews remember and symbolically re-enact the exodus from enslavement in Egypt. In the story, genocide was averted when the Reed Sea closed in on the Egyptian warriors. As families sit at the Seder table, they retell the story they learn from the Hagaddah, the book read together on Passover: “In every generation one is obligated to view himself as though he came out of Egypt.” In every generation! The story must be told over and over. As one commentator wrote, “If we act out the story, then we will see ourselves as players in that very same story” (Weitzman 2016). Jews preserve social memory and reconstruct it at the same time. In this way, even though Jews were killed in large numbers from generation to generation, they remain alive in part by remembering what happened to them.

The question then emerges about how the memory of Jewish genocide can be perpetuated without becoming incapacitating. And if Jews have arrived at a way of memorializing the Holocaust, what should they do about all the other cases of genocide that are occurring now? I propose that Jewish culture and values require Jews to learn about genocide in general rather than confine their attention to the Holocaust exclusively. Thus, a Jew should ask, “What is genocide in general? Are there ways in which social memory can help avert genocide?”

Genocide as a Continuing Phenomenon

The three major purposes for creating social memory pertaining to Jewish near-extinction are to *respect* the dead; to *teach* the living, especially the young; and to *prevent* similar actions from occurring. While the first and second goals may have been achieved to a certain extent in the years since the Holocaust, the third has not had much success. The cry, “Never Again!,” although popular and perhaps inspiring, has not been heeded. Instead, throughout the twentieth century, and especially since the end of World War II, genocide has been perpetrated repeatedly in Africa, Europe, Southeast Asia, South America, and the Middle East.

Prominent examples in Africa include the murder from April to July 1994 of 800,000 people mostly of the Tutsi minority by the Hutu ethnic majority in the east-central African nation of Rwanda; ethnic cleansing by Christians of Moslems in the Central African Republic in December 2013; the “Darfur Genocide” that began in 2003 and consists of mass slaughter and rape of Darfuri men, women and children in Western Sudan, rendering the Sudan crisis the first genocide of the twenty-first century.

In Europe and Asia Minor, Turks carried out genocide of Armenians in 1915, the first non-colonial genocide of the twentieth century; and Serbs carried out the “ethnic cleansing” of Bosnian and Croatians in Serbia, the most famous incident of which was the genocide at Srebrenica, a Bosniak-dominated town under weak UN protection in July 1995, creating the single largest massacre in Europe since World War II. This particular war created the concept of rape camps that were established both for sexual exploitation and for creating pregnancies.

In Southeast Asia there have been two recent genocides: Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer Rouge (KR) regime led by Pol Pot killed between one and a half to three million of their own people, or approximately one quarter of the total population. These atrocities were carried out in part in “killing fields,” a new term in the genocide lexicon. A second genocidal Southeast Asian massacre occurred in East Timor beginning in 1975 when the Indonesian military invaded the country.

In South America between 1976 and 1983, the Argentinian government waged *The Dirty War* against suspected “dissidents and subversives.” From this campaign we inherited the word “disappeared,” people who were taken to secret government detention centers to be tortured and killed. Pregnant women were compelled to give birth in these camps and their children were “adopted” by military families.

In the Middle East today, the Turkish government has created policies to rid itself of the Kurds; and ISIS is intent on destroying entire towns in Syria and Iraq. The Syrian situation began in early 2011 when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad initiated a brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters throughout the country. Whether this conflict is labeled genocide or a civil war, it has led not only to massive numbers of deaths but also to approximately three million refugees. In the final stages of the Iraq/Iran War, [Ali Hassan al-Majid](#) waged a genocidal policy, known as the Al-Anfal Campaign, the Kurdish Genocide Operation Anfal or simply Anfal, against the Kurds and others in northern Iraq. In addition to the Kurds, the campaign also targeted Iraqi minorities including Assyrians, Shabaks, [Iraqi Turkmens](#), [Yazidis](#), and [Mandaeans](#). Various countries and terrorist groups in the Middle East regularly advocate but have not been able to implement the complete destruction of the Jewish State of Israel in order to eradicate the country and its people. These threats are sometimes dismissed as rhetorical, but in my view, every genocidal statement must be taken seriously, in part, because so many genocidal acts have materialized in the last 70 years or so.

With the advent of atomic weapons, the means for carrying out genocide may be more attainable than ever. From a social scientific perspective, the plethora of genocidal acts since World War II has made it possible to trace a pattern, or as Max Weber suggested, to sketch the dimensions of an “ideal case” that characterizes the entire group of genocidal instances.

Genocide as an Area of Study

In the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust, publications about what had occurred took the form of novels, memoirs, and vivid descriptions. As time passed and Holocaust-related institutions and academic positions were created, more analytic works began to appear. In 1981, the sociologist Leo Kuper wrote, “The word is new, the concept of genocide is ancient,” giving birth to genocide studies. For the previous 30 years, scholars hardly used the term “genocide,” but in the 1980s and 1990s, scholarly definitions of genocide proliferated (see the work of Peter Drost, Irving

Louis Horovitz, Leo Kuper, Yehuda Bauer, Helen Fein, Barbara Harff, Martin Shaw and others).

That genocide is an increasingly compelling research area attests to people's desire to prevent genocide and to the fruits of decades of data gathering and archival collection. Institutes for the study of genocide are multiplying as are museums and archives of various sorts dedicated to the study of a particular genocide. The first living memorial dedicated to the Holocaust is Kibbutz Lohamei Haghetatot (Ghetto Fighters Kibbutz, Hebrew) with its Ghetto Fighters' House (Museum), located in Israel's Western Galilee, established in 1949 (Kershner 2017). This was followed by Yad Vashem (1953), located in Jerusalem as "Israel's official memorial to the victims of the Holocaust" with additional goals of "honoring both those Jews who fought against their Nazi oppressors and the Gentiles who selflessly aided Jews in need, and researching the phenomenon of the Holocaust in particular and genocide in general, with the aim of avoiding such events in the future" (Yad Vashem). These goals have not changed in 64 years. Yad Vashem stands as a symbol of the early institutionalization of Holocaust memory.

The first 40 post-Holocaust years saw the establishment of museums and memorials throughout the world, in large places and small. In the 1990s, universities began to organize research institutes on the topic of genocide. For example, the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University's MacMillan Center for International and Area studies was founded in January 1998 with the purpose of expanding the work begun in 1994 by Yale University's Cambodian Genocide Program. The expanded Yale Program "conducts research, seminars and conferences on comparative, interdisciplinary, and policy issues relating to the phenomenon of genocide, and has provided training to researchers from afflicted regions, including Cambodia, Rwanda, and East Timor" (Cambodian Genocide Program).

Also founded in 1998, the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies (at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts) claims to be the only Ph.D. granting institute of its kind. At the core of their research is the description and understanding of genocide, mass atrocities, crimes against humanity and their prevention. These centers, institutes and programs are sites of productive research published in peer-reviewed books and journals, including *Genocide Studies and Prevention*, *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, *Journal of Genocide Research*, the *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence*, and many more.

An overview of these institutes suggests that three major tasks engage genocide researchers: (1) documenting the genocides that occurred, using agreed upon definitions, making this documentation available in numerous languages, and where possible, incorporating survivors' testimonies; (2) investigating, evaluating, criticizing, and dismissing false reports and testimonies (as in Holocaust denial and in conflicting reports about the Armenian genocide in Turkey); and (3) through comparative analysis, attempting to develop overarching theory or theories concerning genocide. These theories range from psychological (e.g. the mad dictator, sadism, vicious misogyny), to medical (drug addiction), to geopolitical (e.g. ethnic cleansing), to economic, religious and many more frameworks. These theories have numerous, specific policy implications.

Finally, because of improved and accessible technology, and because even horrific genocidal activity typically produces some survivors, it is likely that genocide research in the future will provide new types of data and questions. For example, with the widespread availability of cell phone photography and videography, researchers can expect to be able to examine recordings of events as they occur. The use of the Internet to spread genocidal messages and propaganda will be a source for investigation, legal proceedings and prevention efforts. The study of survivors' descendants will increase – as evidenced in this book – as people will understand the significance of intergenerational transmission of trauma and guilt. Most important, however, is the validation of information and the testing of theory so as to make progress in scientific understanding. As eminent scholar of genocide, Gregory Stanton, famously concluded, “genocide is predictable.”

Not all analysts of genocide research concur with Stanton's belief that such research can have positive consequences in preventing genocide. In an article published by the Social Science Research Council titled “Why the Discipline of ‘Genocide Studies’ Has Trouble Explaining How Genocides End?” Dirk Moses, professor of modern history at the University of Sydney, claims that no amount of moral breast-beating or research has ever ended genocide (Moses 2006). Only force against perpetrators has done so.

Genocide Stage Theory

Gregory Stanton, the president of Genocide Watch, developed a stage theory of genocide based on cases since 1945 (Stanton 2016). My research augments his theory in two ways: first, by showing how acts of halting the stages of genocide build on different “types” or “stages” of social memory work; and second by adding overlooked stages in the genocidal process. The stages of genocide bear enumerating briefly:

1. *Classification* of people into subgroups. In this stage, the culture or people in power differentiate people into types, with one or more groups become the more powerful and the others the more vulnerable. This problem can be reduced if people adopt the political view that “all humans are created equal,” or the religious view that “all humans are created in the image of God.” Since there is probably no society that is entirely free of differentiated classification of its members, genocide is possible anywhere.
2. *Symbolization* refers to naming these subgroups and assigning them such symbols like the “yellow star.” This problem is exacerbated when governments assign unique identity cards or license plates to each group. Christian Vilhelm, King of Denmark from 1912 to 1947, stated that if the Nazis would compel the

Danish Jews to wear a yellow star, he would urge all Danes to do so thus *preventing* the symbol from signifying differences among groups. The symbolization of Jews has a long history, with differentiation particularly pronounced during the Middle Ages when Jews were forced to wear special headgear and clothing.

3. *Discrimination* follows upon classification and symbolization as power is centralized in the hands of the dominant group. The group-in-power then uses law, custom, and political power to deny rights to the other groups. Discrimination characterized the lives of blacks in the United States both during and after slavery and in some form, until today, as it did and still does the lives of blacks in South Africa. The widespread practice of lynching in the US sustained a culture of fear and violence. Neither of these cases – the U.S. South or South Africa – evolved into genocide in large part because the blacks had value as workers.
4. *Dehumanization* occurs when one group denies the humanity of the other group. Hitler, for example, considered Jews to be less than human, calling them *Untermenschen*, swine and vermin. Dehumanization becomes the forerunner of murder because the internalized prohibition against killing of animals and insects is weaker than that of people. This theme is developed in literary works such as William Golding's 1954 novel, *Lord of the Flies*, where the child nicknamed Piggy is eventually killed as "a pig."
5. *Organization*. Stanton claims that genocide is always organized rather than spontaneous. For example, historical research has shown that Kristallnacht, which occurred "spontaneously" on the evening and night of November 9, 1938 throughout Germany, was actually carefully orchestrated (Museum 2016a).
6. *Polarization* is a phenomenon that Stanton differentiates from the other processes but is closely enough linked to *discrimination* and *dehumanization* that it may not be distinct. *Polarization* refers to laws forbidding intermarriage, residence in the same neighborhood, or interaction between the privileged and despised categories of people. Given that under these conditions people are not allowed to come together, they have a difficult time seeing each other's humanity. All three examples Stanton offers for polarization were components of the Nuremberg Laws initiated on September 15, 1935 (Museum 2016b).
7. *Preparation* may be a separate phase or a component of organization. Hitler's decision to implement "the Final Solution" required amassing the tools needed for carrying out the genocide. 15 of the highest-ranking Nazi officials met on January 20, 1942 in the Berlin suburb of Wannsee to plan "the Final Solution" to the so-called "Jewish question." Six months earlier, an order had been given to prepare a comprehensive plan for this "final solution" (Berenbaum 2016).
8. *Persecution* occurs right before the actual murders take place. Death lists are drawn up and large numbers of people are slated for murder.
9. *Extermination* is the phase when the killings occur. It is crucial to understand that extermination occurs after a set of clearly identified steps, some of which can be intercepted.
10. *Denial*. Stanton's claim that "denial" is an integral part of genocide suggests that the genocidal process is not over when victims have been massacred. In

fact, in many cases, denial occurs not only *after* the killings but from the very beginning of the process. Erasures of the deed and of the dead follow. Genocide perpetrators try to cover up evidence and intimidate witnesses. They deny committing crimes and often blame the victims. They use vague, elusive language to describe the events. They block investigations and continue to govern until driven from power. In anticipation of current and future denial, many soon-to-be victims of genocide try to find ways to provide evidence of what has occurred. Trapped in the Warsaw Ghetto, for example, Emanuel Ringelbaum and other Jewish writers, scientists and ordinary people, collected diaries, documents, posters and decrees that documented the doomed community. The approximately 25,000 preserved sheets of paper also contain detailed descriptions of the destruction of ghettos in other parts of occupied Poland, the Treblinka and Chelmno extermination camps and scientific reports on the effects of famine in the ghettos. On a smaller scale of witnessing and diminishing “deniability,” inmates scratched their names and dates on the walls of Auschwitz. Denial “always follows and pervades a genocide,” but social memory and documentation can pre-empt and combat denial.

Three Innovations for Genocide Stage Theory

My study of genocides suggests at least three additional stages or components: *silencing dissent*; *forming alliances*; and *apologizing publically (although not necessarily sincerely)*. [Another phenomenon – providing restitution – occurs infrequently.]

The first, *silencing dissent*, occurs when, from the start, through terror or other means, the group-in-power suppresses views not in line with the genocidal rhetoric. By silencing the larger population, those who are on the path to perpetrating genocide produce a nation of by-standers. Moreover, when other people do not see dissenters, they assume everyone agrees, and so, they too, agree. The *silencing of dissent* makes it appear that everyone supports the genocidal intentions of the rulers. The courageous White Rose members were a rare exception. An anti-Nazi student protest group, the White Rose functioned at the University of Munich in 1942 and 1943, but was silenced when all members of the group were captured and executed. The disastrous end to this group communicated to all potential dissenters that when caught, they, too, would be punished severely (Scholl 1953). Dissent or protest can be quashed by arrest, kidnapping, destruction of property, and more, and requires sustained effort on the part of the perpetrators. The deliberate silencing of dissent takes the form of closed newspapers, censorship, and the prohibition of book publishing. When freedom of expression ends, the possibility of genocide increases.

Forming alliances refers to building partnerships with other groups that will benefit from the genocide. Examples are the alliance between a political group bent on perpetrating genocide and a religious group or a business group, even one in another society. A significant instance of the collusion between those who committed

genocide and the Roman Catholic Church, for example, occurred during the Rwandan Tutsi Genocide of 800,000 Tutsis in 1994. The case of Father Athanase Seromba, who ordered the bulldozing of his church with 2000 Tutsis trapped inside seeking refuge, is instructive. Those Tutsis who survived were shot (Kimani 2010). Catholic monks brought the priest to Italy, changed his name and enabled him to serve a parish in Florence. Yet another Rwandan priest brought to Italy is facing charges of overseeing the massacre of disabled Tutsi children. The Vatican has maintained that, while individual clergy were guilty of terrible crimes, the church as an institution bears no responsibility. The Vatican avoids confronting these partners in genocide lest it reveal the church's complicity in mass murder. Tutsi survivors regard the church as allied with the killers. Survivors believe that collusion began at the very top of the Catholic hierarchy in Rwanda. The death of so many Rwandans could not have been accomplished without the collusion and cooperation of the Church, they say. The Organization for African Unity's report on the genocide described the church in Rwanda as carrying a "heavy responsibility" for failing to oppose, and even promoting, ethnic discrimination. It said the church offered "indispensable support" of the Hutu regime during the killing (*American Society of International Law* 2000; Kimani 2010). Social memory keeps the genocide alive, which in turn, leads to pressure on the courts to prosecute perpetrators.

Public apology or reversal of policy may occur long *after* Stanton's stage 10. As Rwanda marked the 20th anniversary of the genocide, for example, Pope Francis was beseeched to apologize for the part played by the clergy in turning churches into extermination centers. A 2014 *New York Times* article by Ilan Stavans, Professor of Latin American and Latino Culture at Amherst College, reported that the descendants of Sephardic Jews who were expelled from Spain by the Alhambra Decree of 1492 would be offered Spanish citizenship without being required to move to Spain and/or renounce any other citizenship they may have (Stavans 2014). This gesture came more than 500 years after the fact. Because social memory had enabled the Inquisition and the expulsion to remain alive in Jewish consciousness, the ground was always ready for a dramatic change in policy. The same article, however, mentioned that similar gestures had been made before and were only half-hearted. Yet, the article continued, for those Jews in Caracas (Venezuela) or Istanbul (Turkey) who need to leave their countries because of antisemitism today, Spain may now provide an option in addition to Israel. Unlike the Turkish "pseudo-apology" that focused on the victims resting in peace, the Spanish actual apology took the form of an invitation to return "home."

Andrew Meldrum published an article (Meldrum 2004) in *The Guardian* describing a clear example of a governmental apology for genocide. Meldrum reported on Germany's unequivocal and unprecedented plea for forgiveness on August 14, 2004 in reference to a colonial-era genocide that killed 65,000 Herero people in what is now Namibia: "'We Germans accept our historic and moral responsibility and the guilt incurred by Germans at that time,' said Heidemarie Wiczorek-Zeul, Germany's development aid minister, at a ceremony to mark the 100th anniversary of the Hereros' 1904–1907 uprising against their rulers. 'The atrocities committed at that time would have been termed genocide,' she said, according to the Associated

Press. ‘Everything I have said was an apology from the German government,’ Mrs. Wieczorek-Zeul said to the delight of a crowd of 1000 people.... Hifikepunye Pohamba, Namibia’s Minister of Land also welcomed Germany’s gesture. ‘That is what we have been waiting for, for a very long time,’ he said, noting that the apology came on the spot where the conflict ended. The German development minister was quick to mention, however, that this apology did not obligate Germany to make reparation payments.” Similarly, President Obama apologized for the horrors of slavery but emphasized that his statements do not imply any obligation for financial restitution. Willingness to compensate descendants of victims would certainly strengthen the force and veracity of an apology, but offers of restitution are exceedingly rare.

Public apology can be sincere or fictive. British Prime Minister David Cameron apologized before the House of Commons for the 1972 “Bloody Sunday” killings of 14 unarmed protesters in Northern Ireland (BBC 2010). German leaders have apologized on numerous occasions for the crimes committed against the Jews during the Holocaust (Times Wire Services 1990), beginning in 1970 when West German Chancellor Brandt knelt in Warsaw before the Holocaust memorial (Understanding Germany 2016). On March 24, 2004 the Argentinian government issued a public apology for Argentina’s *Dirty War* in Buenos Aires (Fastenberg 2010b). Many of these apologies are complicated by the desire of the individual apologizing to separate himself personally from the crimes, as in the case of DeKlerk, former president of South Africa (Fastenberg 2010a). A recent example of the significance of a public apology was found in Joe Cochrane’s report in the *New York Times* on Tuesday, April 19, 2016. Titled “Indonesia Rules out Criminal Inquiry of Atrocities in Anti-Communist Purges,” the article states Indonesia’s Security Minister said he would “consider an unprecedented ‘expression of regret’ to victims of the mass atrocities committed half a century ago during anti-Communist purges in the country...but ruled out an apology by the present government to hundreds of thousands of purge survivors who were imprisoned for years without trial or to the descendants of victims whom the state ostracized.” According to Cochrane, the retired general who made the announcement said the government was “still looking for the exact wording.” Historians have called the Indonesia genocide one of the worst mass atrocities of the twentieth century (Cochrane 2016). In addition to these three innovations, many elements of the theory of stage development need further attention, including the use of propaganda as an underpinning of the first few stages, including the introduction of propaganda in the school systems, thereby destroying humanistic education.

Conclusion

Although the phenomenon of genocide does not seem to be diminishing, the occurrence of public apologies may represent a change of some sort. Discriminatory language is becoming socially unacceptable and politically incorrect. The concept of

stages is helpful, as well, in defining how “social memory work” may pre-empt, reverse or reinforce each stage. On the other hand, deeply-rooted concepts such as the significance of skin color, the status of dhimmi (Ye’or and Maisel 1990) or the notion of “protected second class citizens,” are difficult to eradicate.

Given that particular stages can be identified, each can be the target of intervention before the next stage appears. For example, those who are imbued with the passion to “always remember” and never let such a tragedy occur again can take action against early stages of classification, symbolization, and discrimination. Jews as a social group are committed by the very essence of their religion and culture to keeping social memory of genocide alive as an antidote to future genocide, all the while knowing that their efforts may be in vain.

The essential requirement for a group to carry out genocide is the power and means to carry it out. This power and the means are ubiquitous. We can take some comfort, however, in the wisdom of individuals who have combatted the early phases of genocide development, such as symbolization. As Stanton wrote, “If widely supported ... denial of symbolization can be powerful, as it was in Bulgaria, where the government refused to supply enough yellow badges and at least 80% of Jews did not wear them, depriving the yellow star of its significance as a Nazi symbol for Jews” (Stanton 2016). Clearly, the idea of phases leading to genocide and the continuous fostering of social memory can guide individuals and societies to engage in some of these positive interventions. Research should continue to identify additional phases.

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Part II
Genocide, Memory and Health

Chapter 5

Terror and Identity: The Case of Argentina and the Importance of the Different ‘Representations’ of the Past

Daniel Eduardo Feierstein

Abstract This chapter analyzes the ways in which mass violence destroys social ties through the traumatic effects of terror, transforming the identity of the survivors and their societies. Questioning the notion that the perpetrators are motivated by hatred or evil, or that they seek to eradicate population groups for ideological reasons alone, it examines the functionality and effectiveness of mass violence over time and attempts to determine why its effects are so enduring. Taking the Argentine state violence from 1976 to 1983 as an example, it examines the implications of different types of memory for processing the traumatic consequences of terror. To this end, it revisits Raphael Lemkin’s pioneering concept of genocide as the “destruction of the national identity of the oppressed group” in the light of contemporary developments in neuroscience, psychoanalysis, and social sciences.

Keywords Genocide · Memory · Identity · Collective identities · Social fabric · Argentina

The fundamental assumption of this work was in fact first presented more than half a century ago by Raphael Lemkin, the originator of the concept of genocide. Lemkin defined the twin goals of genocide as the “the destruction of the national identity of the oppressed group” and “the imposition of the national identity of the oppressor” (Lemkin 1944, 79).

This chapter seeks to put Lemkin’s intuitions on a more scientific footing by appealing to evidence from neuroscience, psychoanalysis, and the social sciences. The effectiveness of terror for transforming identity and behavior is explained by

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considering human memory as an evolutionary and adaptive mechanism whose primary objective is the survival of the organism in which it resides.

Trauma cannot be overcome, nor identities reconstructed, without an understanding of how traumatic memories shaped by terror work in practice. In this sense, factual accounts of historical events are much less important than the way events are interpreted.

The Comprehension of the Ways in Which Memory Works

One of the fundamental and recent contributions to the study of memory processes has been Eric Kandel's research into how short-term memory is transformed into long-term memory.

Kandel (2006) discovered changes in gene transcription resulting in protein synthesis in the nucleus of sensory neurons. This protein allows for the growth of synaptic endings, establishing new synaptic connections in a process controlled by complex interactions between different regulators of gene transcription.

The precise details are complex, but, in simple terms, regulators can be divided into two main categories: activators, which increase transcription by a gene or set of genes, and repressors, which do the opposite. The need for certain genes to be switched on as others are switched off, however, slows the conversion of short-term memory into long-term memory. Only experiences that manage simultaneously to generate this double process in the cell nucleus (activation of certain genes, disabling of others) are encoded into long-term memory.

The principle that repetition improves long-term memory is well known. Although the learning of skills (procedural knowledge) is different from the learning of facts (declarative knowledge), repetition is necessary for acquiring the motor routines needed to drive a car or play a musical work as well as for reciting multiplication tables. Repeated stimulation of the same synaptic connection not only releases proteins that switch different genes on and off but also helps make a new protein and a new synaptic connection.

This need for repetition can be considered adaptive in that it ensures that only important memories are retained. There is, however, a second and equally adaptive way of encoding long-term memories that bypasses this need. Here it is in Kandel's own words:

In principle, however, a highly emotional state, such as that brought about by a car crash, could bypass the normal restraints on long-term memory. In such a situation, enough MAP kinase molecules would be sent into the nucleus rapidly enough to inactivate all of the CREB-2 molecules, thereby making it easy for protein kinase A to activate CREB-1 and put the experience directly into long-term memory. This might account for so-called flashbulb memories, memories of emotionally charged events that are recalled in vivid detail... as if a complete picture had been instantly and powerfully etched on the brain. (Kandel 2006, 204-205)

Without going into the details of the genetic and biochemical processes involved, two points are clear in the above quotation. First, two factors enhance the storage of information in long-term memory—repetition and emotional salience. These factors, however, work differently at the physiological, biochemical, and genetic levels. Emotional salience and repetition generate types of encoding involving different areas of the brain, with a predominant use of the hippocampus in repetition and the amygdala in emotional conditioning.

Terror is one form of emotional conditioning for creating long-term memories. This mechanism is clearly adaptive, and all living organisms are programmed to modify their behaviour immediately in life-threatening situations.

Memory as the Construction of Meaning

Action precedes understanding (Piaget 1974). We do many more things than we are aware of and we know much more than we think we know. Modern neuroscience distinguishes an ever-growing number of memories, ranging from those related to sensory perception (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile memories) to those linked to sensory-motor coordination, procedural knowledge (i.e., skills), or language. These, in turn, can be classified functionally as episodic and semantic memories. Semantic knowledge is general knowledge we have about the world, whereas episodic knowledge includes personal memories for the events in our lives.

It is likely that new memory systems and subsystems will continue to be discovered with different levels of coordination and integration. These more or less physically locatable memories, however, are disconnected, chaotic, and meaningless. None of them amounts to a “representation,” and they are not what is usually understood by social scientists or historians as “memory” but are simply primitive fragments of it.

Consequently, what I will call here *memory processes* are attempts to impose meaning on the chaos of perceptions and memories in the various subsystems, creating a “remembered present” through the process of constructing *scenes*. A *scene* is a reconstruction in which groups of perceptions and stimuli are linked together and given a *meaning*—a coherence that is not found as such in reality or in the person’s experience of reality. On the contrary, its purpose is to integrate groups of stimuli and perceptions with a given set of actions that are also registered in sensorimotor subsystems.

From this perspective, memory is not simply a “video-recording” of past events to be passively replayed; it is a profoundly *creative* activity. Every act of memory is an act of imagination. Memory is a creative and radically new act that attempts to give coherence and meaning to the chaos of stimuli that are located in certain physical substrates of brain functioning.

In technical terms, one could hypothesize that *meaning* is created when various subsystems of perceptions, stimuli, and motor activities are brought together and given a coherent explanation that they do not possess separately. This “narrative” meaning makes action more efficient by providing goals and a degree of stability

and permanence to the processes of identity formation, which—as the term “identity” suggests—require high levels of internal consistency.

The idea of memory as an “inscription” or “imprint” has a long history in philosophical thought, going back to Aristotle. It has also influenced psychoanalytic thinking through the idea of the “memory trace.” However, the common assumption in psychology and psychiatry that trauma involves the “literal inscription” of the traumatic event as an “imprint” is questionable.

This widely accepted view of memory traces in PTSD is found in Sherin and Nemeroff (2011)—but the authors recognize that as an assumption rather than a fact.

The biologist Gerald Edelman uses a metaphor to describe memory that is extremely rich and powerful: “Memory is more like the melting and refreezing of a glacier than it is like the inscription on a rock” (Edelman and Tononi 2000, 93). In other words, memory is not an indelible or permanent trace but a process repeated again and again, each time creating a different product, even when composed of similar materials. When I recall a scene, it appears as a “remembered present”; but if I return to it again, I am in fact returning to this latest memory of the scene, the latest act of remembering, and not to the scene’s original elements. The glacier melts and freezes each time the scene is recalled, but the materials from which the scene is reassembled come from the last melting. They are derived from the original elements but are also slightly different from them. Previous meltings configured strata that can no longer be accessed once a new remembering has occurred.

To summarize, we can define *memory processes* as the imposition of meaning and coherence on stimuli and sensations scattered across different perceptual systems. But the meaning thus produced is also linked to present actions and interactions with other people. For this reason, constructing a memory simultaneously involves constructing an identity. From the many disconnected elements from the past, the conscious subject builds a scene—a “remembered present”—in which a “narrative of the self” appears to explain the subject’s journey through the social world.

Traumatic Experiences

Laplanche and Pontalis define trauma as “an event in the subject’s life defined by its intensity, by the subject’s incapacity to respond to it adequately, the inability of individuals to respond to it properly and by the upheaval and long-lasting effects it brings about in the psychical organization” (1988, 465).⁴

Explaining the overwhelming nature of trauma in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud writes:

Such external excitations as are strong enough to break through the barrier against stimuli we call traumatic. In my opinion the concept of trauma involves such a relationship to an otherwise efficacious barrier.... The flooding of the psychic apparatus with large masses of stimuli can no longer be prevented: on the contrary, another task presents itself—to bring the stimulus under control, to bind in the psyche the stimulus mass that has broken its way in, so as to bring about a discharge of it. (Freud 1922, 34)

As I mentioned earlier, Freud's theory of the memory trace should be actualized by the knowledge produced in neuroscience. Nevertheless, this passage is useful for understanding the impact of trauma on identity formation once the ego-protecting boundary has been broken.

The question remains, then, how trauma affects psychic organization, and the nature of the long-lasting effects emphasized by Laplanche and Pontalis. These questions have led to numerous theories, from contemporaries of Freud, such as Sandor Ferenczi and Morton Prince, through William Brown and William Sargant, who treated shell-shocked soldiers during World War I and II, respectively, to the modern psychiatric concept of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which was partly developed to treat delayed stress reactions in U.S. veterans of the Korean and Vietnam wars. Similarly, numerous studies of trauma among Nazi concentration camp survivors have been published, and there are some studies of survivors of Latin American dictatorships (Bermann et al. 1994; Kaës and Puget 1991; Danieli 1998).

What these different studies suggest is that what is recorded in the unconscious is not a *literal* imprint of the traumatic experience but the *affect* produced by it—the feeling of impotence, helplessness, and the overwhelming of the ego. In other words, what is recorded is not *the experience itself* but a sort of first rough impression of the experience that *fails to become a narrative* because of the devastating effect these feelings would have on the individual's identity. Because of this, this "rough impression" is locked in the unconscious, unable to be integrated into a "representation." Nevertheless, the repressed material continues to affect the other subsystems indirectly, while remaining outside conscious control and awareness.

The typical response to memories of a traumatic experience is to block them from consciousness. What is repressed is only the subjective experience of the event that took place, not the event itself. But the feeling remains and it cannot be modified because the memories are never recalled and processed in narrative form. However, the repressed feeling tends to disrupt the coherence of narrative identity precisely because it cannot be integrated into a coherent narrative within episodic memory.

Referring to trauma produced by state violence in Latin America, René Kaës observed:

Just as the first thing torturers always do is to break the fundamental temporal rhythms of life, the first act of catastrophic social violence is to establish terror by dismantling thought processes. It is for this reason that the abolition of the symbolic order gives the maddening status of a phantasmal representation in the psyche to the object that has disappeared. The anxiety aroused by terror cannot be repressed or projected, or linked to representations of things and words, or find representations and objects in linguistic and social symbols. (Kaës and Puget 1991, 167)

Kaës's example introduces another key element into the equation: *trauma occurs and is renewed as a historical, social experience*. The subject does not experience a trauma in isolation; both the experience and the feeling it produces happen within the context of meaningful relationships with others. The shame, pain, and terror are felt in terms of other people, whether these are external or internalized.

The members of the Argentine Psychosocial Work and Research Team (in Spanish, Equipo Argentino de Trabajo e Investigación Psicosocial, or EATIP) explain this idea quite precisely:

We consider that the term “psychic imprint” refers to the point where trauma (as an event whose intensity and quality is potentially pathological, depending on the subject’s psychic development and defence mechanisms) meshes with the subject’s narcissistic sense of self (which involves the past history of the subject’s personal identity formation and interactions with significant others). (CINTRAS et al. 2009, 162)

They go on to say:

The issue of trauma is linked not only to the degree of destructuring caused by the stimulus, but also the meaning the stimulus acquires for each person, and his or her ability to find or maintain adequate support for the psyche. But both the individual meaning of trauma and the ability to maintain or obtain adequate support are linked in these cases to the social understandings of the traumatic situation. And of course these are linked to the subject’s complementary series. The traumatic effect occurs because there is still a residue of unsymbolized anxiety. (CINTRAS et al. 2009, 163)

In short, trauma is experienced and can be understood only in a social context. It will remain “activated” in the present for as long as the conditions continue to exist that made the feeling traumatic. To put it another way, memory processes clearly occur within the mental apparatus of one or more subjects and not within social groups (hence the problematic nature of concepts such as “social trauma” or “collective trauma”). Nevertheless, they are linked in various and complex ways to historical and social factors either in the past, where the trauma occurred, or in the present, where it continues, or both. And social influences are both direct (real interactions with significant others) and indirect (symbolic interactions with internalized others).

Desensitization, Repetition, and the “Denegative Pact”

Socially, the *repression* of trauma that occurs within each subject is related to a transsubjective phenomenon Kaës calls the “denegative pact,” that is, an unconscious social agreement not to mention the traumatic event (Kaës and Puget 1991). The denegative pact also plays a part in transsubjective or group repression memory formation; its unspoken formula could be: do not remember that which could endanger our relationship, which is more precious than the memory of what happened, because what happened has already happened to us all. In this context, the denegative pact maintains the narcissistic contract and contributes to the formation of shared screen memories and myths, [the latter being] the screen memories of [whole] peoples. According to the art critic and scholar Rachel Furnari,

Freud characterized screen memories as “mnemonic residues” which take on a compulsive quality as they act to protect the subject from repressed trauma or desire. In his account the screen memory may have little or no correspondence to external reality and may in fact leave the subject in complete opposition to reality.... The displacement of meaning from the “real” but foreclosed trauma to the imaginary and symbolizable screen memory enables the subject to maintain the fiction of stable identity. (Furnari 2002)

Kaës and Puget further elaborate on the nature of this denegative pact:

The denegative pact is also a part of the repetition through which catastrophic experiences and traumas are expressed. Couples, families, groups, institutions and societies each have their own kind of repetition mechanisms. Consequently, each manages the psychic repetitions at their own particular level and preserves them. (Kaës a Puget 1991, 177)

The *denegative pact* is part of the logic of repetition, yet it establishes an unspoken consensus to favor more repression. This operates by extending what cannot and should not be said to the whole community and silencing those who attempt to speak out. Trauma operates on individual subjectivity, destroying any vestige of self-confidence that those involved in the pact may have retained previously and preventing them from appropriating their own history. The pact alienates individuals not only from their own experience but also from any narrative account of the traumatic event. They remain detached and unable to relate such stories to their *own experience*.

At the same time, trauma produces a *desensitization* that, like repression, operates at the individual and subjective level but also has cumulative social and historical effects. One mechanism to face a traumatic event is to disguise the loss of feeling behind a general desensitization, by disconnecting the psychic apparatus from most of the sensations produced by the environment. This attempt to escape from anxiety, similar to the action inhibition described by Laborit (1983), is an adaptive response, a reaction to a pain that cannot be avoided or confronted.

This *desensitization* is accompanied by a *lack of meaning* arising from the alleged impossibility of understanding the traumatic event. Here, a deliberate and ideologically justified refusal to seek one's own identity will be called the *ideology of nonsense*. The *ideology of nonsense*, which may be accompanied by cynicism or nihilism, satire or ridicule, is a *more advanced stage of repression* because, far from challenging the denegative pact, it seeks to voice it at a conscious level. By giving the pact a narrative solidity, it seeks to restore some sort of coherent identity by denying the very existence of the self that was previously destroyed.

In sum, the *ideology of nonsense* attempts to compensate for the loss of identity—an identity destroyed by terror—by pretending it never existed. If both past and present are nonsense, this at least allows the ego to regain a sense of self-coherence.

Terror as a Tool for Reformulating Social Relations

As the Polish-Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin observed in the 1940s, genocide aims to destroy the identity of the society in which it is carried out (Lemkin 1944). Now, it may seem pointless to destroy the identity of a group of people if one is already destroying them physically. Lemkin does not see these two types of destruction—bodily and cultural—as contradictory because, in his view, genocide—as opposed to the massacres of the ancient world—does not target those who are annihilated so

much as the survivors. For the perpetrators, what matters is the effect these deaths will have on *those who are left alive*.

In modern genocide, annihilation is not the end but only the means. As Lemkin himself pointed out in 1944: “Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group, the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor” (Lemkin 1944, 79). Lemkin was a Polish Jew, and he was thinking of the ways in which the Nazis had destroyed identity—both in Poland and in Germany. This is something that his advocates usually forget. As a Polish government official, Lemkin was of the considered opinion that Polishness would inevitably be transformed without the contribution of the Jews, just as Germanness would become different without the Jews, the Gypsies, and other victims of Nazism.

When Lemkin made these observations, the study of memory and identity were still in their infancy. He was thus unable to see that the identity of a people not only depends on ethnic, cultural, and religious elements, it is also the product of different political organizations, labor unions, gender, sexual-orientation, or disability groups. To annihilate these or any other social groups is equivalent to erasing the historical processes shaping national identity.

Nevertheless, Lemkin’s genius was to observe the functional nature of modern state-sanctioned atrocities: their use as a tool to spread terror and transform identities by eradicating the identity of the oppressed group and imposing the identity of the oppressor. Lemkin was the first to comprehend a technology of power that had begun with the Inquisition and the persecution of heretics and witches the late Middle Ages.

How are social relations reformulated through terror? We have already examined some ways in which memory and identity are created. The use of terror for reorganizing identity in genocidal social processes is through a sequence of *interrogation*, *confession*, and *betrayal*, a social process created by the Inquisition and perfected within the crucial institution designed for modern genocide: the concentration camp. But this process is only possible because it exploits the linkages between the twin processes of memory creation and identity formation.

The Case of Mass State Violence in Argentina and Its Memories

When considering how best to describe systematic state violence in Argentina—or indeed anywhere in the world—the main issue is not simply to establish the truth of what happened. It is not just a question of establishing the facts about the number of murders, tortures, disappearances, abductions of minors, or rapes. The value of a theoretical description also depends on how it affects memory and representation. It may encourage, facilitate, or block memories from the past, allowing us to own our memories or to alienate ourselves from them, with all the implications these two alternatives have for present and future behavior.

Concepts are not facts. Concepts are symbolic, narrative constructions used to *make sense of the facts*. Accordingly, memory is chaotic and coherence is created through different narratives. Thus, debates about whether a given event was a war, a massacre, or a genocide cannot be resolved by appealing to numerical details (number of dead, missing, and wounded; or skirmishes, kidnappings, and rapes; and so forth), since the appropriateness of a concept depends not only on whether events really occurred but also on how they are interpreted and whether a given society accepts both the facts and their interpretation.

Because of their contested nature, concepts cannot be turned into observables by empirical studies. Scholars may identify the same observables and agree on the same factual truths but explain them in quite different ways. To evaluate different ways of conceptualizing facts and events we can analyze the effects produced by their different narratives in the links between memory and identity.

Brief Review of Concepts Used in the Argentine Case

Although large-scale state violence can be represented in numerous ways, such events in Argentina tend to be classified into three basic representations: war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Although these three categories are not mutually exclusive, arguments emphasizing any of these three concepts lead to different patterns of understanding and different ways of working through the trauma.

The discourse of war comes in many different forms, some of them politically and ideologically incompatible. However, to describe as war the massive state violence perpetrated by the last military dictatorship in Argentina (1976–1983) is a relatively marginal approach in the country. In Argentina, it is found only among sectors related to the perpetrators, among a minority of survivors who belonged to armed, left-wing organizations, and among very small groups within the academic world. These very different approaches use adjectives as diverse as *antisubversive*, *dirty*, *revolutionary*, *counterrevolutionary*, *counterinsurgency*, and *civil* to qualify the term *war*. It is remarkable that the concept of dirty war created by the perpetrators and used only by them in Argentina has dominated foreign literature on the Argentine case, particularly in English.

All the different discourses of war agree that mobilization for war began with the social and political agitation of the late 1960s. The military together with its civilian accomplices and sympathizers believed that foreign subversion, atheistic communism, and Freemasonry were challenging Argentina's core values as a nation, while armed left-wing organizations saw the outbreak of war as an inevitable reaction by the ruling bloc to the radicalization of popular sectors of society and the emergence of militarized vanguards of Peronists or Marxists. For the latter, the military coup was a counterrevolutionary attempt to prevent socialism in Argentina, which would have arisen from a combination of Peronist resistance and the success of the Cuban Revolution.

The concept of dirty war used by the perpetrators reflects the fact that the fighting was not out in the open. In accordance with the French counterinsurgency doctrine

applied in Indochina and Algeria and later spread by the United States in the School of the Americas, guerrilla movements and irregular insurgent forces could only be defeated by targeting their supporters as well as their military cadres.

In contrast, genocide describes a process whose fundamental purpose is to spread terror throughout society as a whole. In Argentina, terror was not an unintended effect of “excesses” committed against civilians while repressing armed leftist groups, nor was the primary purpose of torture and murder in Argentina’s concentration camps to defeat armed groups. Rather, it was to transform the nation and society as a whole. Tellingly, the perpetrators left the identity of the persecuted open-ended, even going so far as to say in one particularly sinister statement that “subversive criminal” could mean “the rebels, accomplices, supporters, the indifferent and timid.”

Those who argue that what happened in Argentina was genocide trace its origins back to the National Security Doctrine (NSD), a painstaking proposal for reorganizing society through terror (see Feierstein 2014). Indeed, the NSD was implemented throughout Latin America, independently of the military capability of insurgent organizations or the degree of threat from allegedly revolutionary projects. This is obvious from the fact that it operated equally in situations of armed conflict in which insurgents occupied territory (e.g., El Salvador) and where insurgent forces had no open combat capability (e.g., Guatemala and Argentina), and even in situations where there were almost no armed leftist organizations (e.g., Chile and Bolivia).

Finally, descriptions of repression in Argentina as crimes against humanity assume a “terrorist state” on the one hand and a group of “citizens” of the other. The big difference between genocide and crimes against humanity is that the latter see the victims not as members of a persecuted national group but as politicized individuals who have suffered the violation of individual rights to life, integrity, or security and have been persecuted for their “convictions.” These convictions are viewed as a form of self-chosen or “voluntary” identity (as opposed to an assigned or “involuntary” identity, such as ethnicity or nationality).

Identity, however, is a dynamic process that seeks to unify different stories and activities over time. Identity—whether it is ethnic, religious, national, or political—is never fixed.

Ways of Constructing the Victims

The criminal legal system uses the term “victim” to describe people affected both directly and indirectly by criminal actions. The concept of *indirect victim* will be useful for examining the effects of different narrative approaches used in Argentina to construct people as victims, as well as for clarifying possible relationships between direct and indirect victims.

1. When events are described as war, the people most clearly entitled to legal redress are those who did not participate in the conflict in any way and were

victims of state terror. Perpetrators of *war crimes* face punishment and their victims are entitled to claim compensation. Those who see themselves as combatants, however, do not usually define themselves as victims (either direct or indirect) or the events they take part in as crimes.

2. When events are described as genocide, it is understood that genocide is mainly intended to harm an indirect victim—the *Argentine national group*—rather than individual citizens or specific individuals. This is what genocide means: measures carried out “with the intent to destroy a group, either in whole or in part.” By focusing on the group, this approach recognizes that even the perpetrators are affected in some way. Torture and murder leave indelible marks, producing irreparable tears in the social fabric different to those produced by any other conflict.
3. When events are described as “crimes against humanity,” there is no confrontation between more or less evenly balanced forces as there is in the discourse of war. Instead, the state attacks citizens it is supposed to protect and deprives them of rights it is supposed to guarantee. The victims are seen, however, as individuals whose rights have been violated in different ways and not as members of a group, as in genocide.

Constructing the Meaning of Events

The discourse of war is constructed mainly around the binary opposites of victory and defeat. Those who use this discourse in Argentina agree that the war was won by the military government. Depending on which side people took in the conflict, they describe the consequences as positive or negative.

In contrast, the meaning of these events for those who subscribe to the discourse of genocide goes far beyond defeat. After a military defeat, the emphasis is on analyzing issues such as strategy, morale, and weaponry. After genocide, the problem is to understand the ways in which social relations and the group (in this case, the Argentine national group) has been transformed. In this view, the perpetrators’ main objective was not to obtain a military victory or destroy a particular sector of society (although these were important secondary objectives) but to radically transform the way the whole of Argentine society behaved.

Lastly, for those who adopt the discourse of crimes against humanity, meaning is constructed around the relationship between the individual and a state supposedly founded on respect for freedoms and rights. State-sponsored violence is linked to the concept of the violation of rights by a state that has become an oppressive apparatus attempting to stifle expressions of individual autonomy and produce diminished individuals unable to express their individuality.

The Question of Analogies (The Use of the Past in the Present)

An important point to consider is the relationship between memory and the present. Whichever account of a particular event prevails, people will use it to shed light on more recent events. In this sense, the events of the past have real implications for action in the present and policy prescriptions for the future. Analogy is the fundamental link between past and present.

Civil wars are often waged to bring about revolution, and the discourse of war links events ranging from the Russian Revolution (1917) to the revolutions in Cuba (1959), Nicaragua (1979), and El Salvador (1980). But an exclusive focus on war and revolution tends to lose sight of the systematic nature of the annihilation in cases where there was also massive state violence, even though the latter is one of the keys to understanding such events. Unfortunately, those who use the discourse of war to explain events in El Salvador tend to explain away the annihilation of people as a by-product of a revolutionary struggle instead of examining the specific nature of the destruction more carefully. On the other hand, revolutions do not necessarily involve mass annihilation, a fact shown by the Cuban Revolution, which was a seminal event in modern Latin American history. In short, even though other instances of state violence in Central America combined revolutionary war and genocide, privileging one of these aspects tends to make the other invisible.

The discourse of genocide tends to refer back to the Holocaust as a landmark. Analogies between state violence under the Nazis and in the Argentina of the 1970s have strengths and weaknesses. One obvious weakness is that destruction processes in Latin America and Argentina were not essentially racist, and so analogies along these lines can be misleading. For example, the frequent emphasis on the annihilation of the indigenous population in Guatemala tends to obscure the fact that these people were killed for political rather than ethnic reasons (see Rostica 2013 and 2015).

The notion of a “partial destruction of the national group,” however, has the potential to transform all of the memories of annihilations during the modern period. It affects processes of appropriation and alienation by reminding us that when people are murdered by the state, the whole of society suffers indirectly. It also encourages collective questioning of the different responsibilities for and consequences of genocide—the consequences not only for the direct victims of persecution but also for the indirect victim, which is society as a whole. This is crucial issue for any type of working through in a post conflict society.

In Argentina, one important impact of the analogy with the Nazi era on memory processes has been to strengthen the concept of state mass violence as a crime for which there can be no impunity. A popular slogan threatening to hunt down the perpetrators “like Nazis” expressed this clearly in the final years of the military dictatorship. Although the trials of Nazi criminals have been neither as far-reaching nor as fair as many believe,¹ what matters is that the notion that impunity as not

¹Even if the numbers are not clear enough, a few hundred Nazis were convicted in all the processes all over the world over decades, which means that only a tiny number of the real perpetrators of the Nazi Genocide throughout Europe were brought to justice.

acceptable has been a driving force in the struggle for justice in Argentina. The use of the concept of genocide and the analogy with Nazism in Argentine have played a crucial role in the justice process despite those who reject any sort of comparative analysis between the Holocaust and state-sponsored violence in Argentina.

In contrast, narratives built around the concept of crimes against humanity refer less clearly to the past and more to the future through the creation of new and increasingly broader international laws and institutions, such as the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and the International Criminal Court.

This has been a very positive development because it allows us to observe the continuing nature of state violence in post dictatorial democratic contexts, through police abuse, torture, or various persecutions. Although these abuses are different from those that occurred in dictatorial contexts, many of them can be described as crimes against humanity. This realization perhaps helps us to understand and confront such violence in the present.

International criminal law is, however, currently being reshaped as a tool for neo-imperialism using human rights discourse, a trend reflected most clearly in the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011. This will inevitably lead to contradictory analogies. Among other things, genocidal past experiences may well be used to legitimize international interventions at a time when other pretexts, such as the crusade against communism or the war on terror, seem less than legitimate. Herein may be the main risk of “humanitarian” military interventions, which often seek to legitimize the neocolonial occupation of territories rich in oil and gas, as in the case of Iraq and Libya.

Effects of Representations of the Past

A final and no less important point to reflect on is the effects of different representations of the past on the next generations. The second generation maybe is affected by discourses of war and of crimes against humanity. The discourse of war constructs the dead or missing as heroes—a construction that tends to be linked to a melancholy type of mourning. The descendants live a state of permanent failure, unable to do anything except worship those who are no longer by their side. The discourse of crimes against humanity, abstract condemnations of violence in general, lead to psychological detachment and skepticism that explains all types of violence indiscriminately in terms of “human nature.”

Most Argentines no longer think of social conflicts in military terms or see state repression as legitimate. Consequently, the discourses of war and state terrorism produce visions of the past that are not easily appropriated by a younger generation that has never known war. Despite all the shortcomings of Argentine democracy, the generation under 30 years of age has always lived under democratically elected governments. Freedom of expression is no longer restricted by the state apparatus.

Nowadays its limits are defined by corporate media and other economic groups. It is less clear how the interpretation as genocide is affecting the new generations.

These different types of interpretation—and mainly war and crimes against humanity—tend to create an increasingly alienated attitude in the second generation. The terror of the 1970s becomes just another chapter in Argentine history, a story that belongs to their parents but has little to do with their own experience.

Deprived of their intergenerational legacy, the children of the direct victims have been affected in various deep and complex ways. The problems they have faced—and still face—can be seen, for example, in the exposure protests carried out during the years of impunity by the group HIJOS (the Spanish word for children) against the perpetrators. Protests consisted of demonstrations outside perpetrators' homes, throwing rotten food at them, or barring them from restaurants, nightclubs, and so on.

These protests were a sign that members of the younger generation did not accept a break in their intergenerational legacy and demanded explanations. With this cry of rebellion, they sought to connect not only with their missing parents as *desaparecidos* but also with a whole generation that had failed them as “givers of law and justice.” The exposure protests were a demand for the state to take responsibility: “Because there is no justice, there are scratches” (this kind of protest by HIJOS). Although addressed to the state, their demand was directed primarily at a whole generation that had surrendered its parental authority role by tolerating impunity.

Such interpellations can be identified also in much of the literary or artistic production of the second generation, in the form of interrogation or confrontation. Sometimes these come directly from the children of the disappeared; in other cases, they come from members of a generation of “children” of those who lived through the terror in Argentina.

The poems of Juan Terranova (2004) reproach members of an entire generation that cast themselves in the role of victims, whose role would be to receive compensation, while ignoring their responsibility to their peers and, more seriously, to their children's generation. For Terranova, this inability to take a generational route is what prevents them from sacrificing their current positions, their time, and their own wishes in order to make way for their successors. The inability to accept their own legacy, combined with the traumatic effects of terror, prevents the older generation from transmitting this painful but necessary legacy.

The need to understand how social practices are permeated and shaped by terror is a challenge for both generations. And it requires an intergenerational dialogue that looks pain, shame, and guilt squarely in the face. Only this can open a door to constructing a possible legacy that will include the dreams, successes, problems, and doubts of a generation—a generation that dreamed of a better world but was made prey to terror and its consequences, and is still suffering them. This terror sought to destroy the meaning in people's lives, smashing any possibility of rebellion, and reorganizing ways of conceptualizing the self and relationships with others, even with loved ones, even with their own children.

Conclusion

The fundamental objectives and possible consequences of state mass violence such as that which took place in Argentina are *desubjectification* and *desensitization*, affecting not only the direct victims but also the social group at which the violent practices are indirectly aimed: the *national group* and its network of social relations. The effectiveness of such practices is derived from the effectiveness of terror in creating long-term memories, but these tend to operate at an unconscious level. Traumatic events that question a person's narrative identity tend to be repressed and replaced by explanations of the past—narratives or screen memories that will keep the repressed anxiety at bay.

In societies emerging from acts of terror, the three concepts outlined above—war, genocide, and crimes against humanity—each create different memory systems and thus different identities. And this debate cannot be resolved by focusing solely on definitions. Those who attempt to clarify a morass of definitions and classifications but fail to notice the psychological transference between their own traumas and the subject they are discussing may also fail to understand that the real debate is about how our vision of the past affects us and our children.

Terror is a particularly effective instrument of social engineering because our main goal as human beings is to survive. Collective terror forces us to reshape our identities in order to maintain a coherent self-narrative that weaves together past and present while avoiding knowledge harmful to our ego. These social practices create societies of survivors—and these societies must learn to deal with the survivor's sense of dread.

An important question, then, is the role different narratives or discourses can play in helping to overcome such trauma. How can the social sciences and other disciplines create different representations of the past and the present that will allow the traumatic consequences of terror to be worked through and overcome?

Of course, no discourse can magically reinstate the repressed feelings overnight. Our job as scholars is to help build increasingly more complex memories that will gradually bring traumatic experiences into consciousness. This will allow us to reconstruct our identity as individuals and as a society—an identity that takes account of the terror we have experienced and our responsibility for dealing with its consequences.

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Chapter 6

Genocide and Its Long Term Mental Impact on Survivors – What We Know and What We Do Not Know

Jutta Lindert, Haim Y. Knobler, and Moshe Z. Abramowitz

.....Sometimes, things I'd seen during the war would slip through from walled-in basements of memory, demanding the right to exist. But they did not have the power to bring down the pillars of oblivion and the will to live. And life itself said then: Forget! Be absorbed!

Aaron Appelfeld, The Story of a Life (2004).

Abstract Little is known about traumatic memory after genocide over time and the extent to which the memory of genocide predicts physical and mental disorders or resilience. Specifically, is memory recall associated with the health of survivors? Do memories vary over time? We will tentatively answer these questions by means of a review (A scoping review is a gathering of literature in a given area where the aims are to accumulate as much evidence as possible and map the results) of non-clinical studies on long-term impact of genocides on survivors and on their offspring's mental health. For sure, we do not capture the whole wealth of literature in this chapter. We investigate changes in memory associated with genocide. Traumatic memories are prone to change, giving a sense of newness of the past, in some instances. Such changes in memory can have an impact on mental health of genocide survivors. This impact on survivors' mental health may include posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, somatization and substance abuse. Conversely, it may lead to

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increased resilience. We review research findings showing that that changes in memory are a key feature affecting health and well-being. The empirical longitudinal assessment of memories of genocide survivors and how they vary over time might be an important step in furthering genocide and health studies.

Keywords Genocide · Memory · Health · Survivors

Introduction

Little is known about traumatic memory after genocide over time and the extent to which the memory of genocide predicts physical and mental disorders or resilience. Genocide survivors, as a rule, experienced as children, adolescents, adults or older persons massive, prolonged and horrific atrocities, and life-threatening and humiliating traumatic events. They lived unimaginable physical and psychological hardship and horrific experiences. Early research on genocide and the way “how genocide gets under the skin” of survivors investigated mainly vulnerability. This research focused on case reports and on treatment seeking groups of survivors and offspring of survivors (Lindert et al. 2017). However, treatment-seeking individuals are systematically different from non-treatment seeking individuals. In further epidemiological studies the long term effects of genocide on health of survivors were investigated. While the research on treatment-seeking genocide survivors is abundant, relatively fewer studies have investigated the health impact of genocide on non-treatment seeking individuals. Some of these studies investigated not only vulnerability but also resilience in Holocaust survivors. Yet, the literature is mixed in relation to memory, genocide and health. On the one hand, memories and purposive memorialization may be an important factor in mitigating the effects of the genocide trauma among survivors. On the other hand, there are data suggesting that memories, especially spontaneous memories are associated with decreased mental health and increased symptoms.

Overall, there is considerable inconsistency of findings across community-based empirical studies in the understanding of memories and health of survivors (Sagi-Schwartz 2008; Sigal 1998; Shrira 2011; van Ijzendoorn 2013; Weinberg 2013d). Thus, a meta-analysis of Holocaust survivors reported that Holocaust survivors, compared to controls, showed good adaptation in many aspects of daily functioning (Barel et al. 2010). Some of those studies found survivors to be better off in specific aspects, such as hope and life expectancy. (Sagi-Schwartz et al. 2013).

In this chapter We will summarize and review empirical knowledge and neuroscientific theories of memories and traumatic events (*part one*). Based on this introduction, We will present a review on empirical studies on *genocide, memory and mental health* of survivors (*part two*) and on *genocide, memories, and health of offspring of survivors’ offspring* (*part three*). This will be followed by a part which discusses potential explanations. In *part four* the domains identified in the studies will be summarized and discussed. Finally, in *part five*, We summarize the empirical evidence highlighting the impact genocide has on the memory system of survivors.

Part 1. Traumatic Events and Memories

Much of the debate on memory has been shaped by the view that remembering is a virtue and that forgetting is necessarily a failing. This view might be challenged by empirical findings on the impact of memory on health.

The scientific study of the impact of traumatic events on health and memory started at the end of the nineteenth century. At the end of the nineteenth century, Jean Martin Charcot (1825–1893) and Pierre Janet (1859–1947) studied mental health after traumatic events. Charcot observed that traumatic events brought on an unusual mental state which he described as dissociative. Pierre Janet, discovered that traumatic memories are split off from consciousness, resulting in involuntary reminiscences (van der Kolk and van der Hart 1989). As such, he recognized that characteristics of these involuntary memories are uncontrollable, have strong sensory impressions, and give the survivors the sense of “nowness” of these experiences, which in fact happened in the past (Brewin et al. 1996; Ehlers et al. 2004). Accordingly, it is important to examine not only the “why” of remembering but the “why” of forgetting and the “how” of forgetting and remembering. The idea that forgetting helps people cope with negative experiences was suggested by Bruer and Freud. The basic idea is that often it is adaptive to forget negative memories. However, the conceptualization of memory remains highly controversial.

The memory system can be roughly divided into an explicit (or declarative) and implicit (or non-declarative) memory (Catarino et al. 2015; Squire and Dede 2015; Grossberg 2015). Explicit memories can be retrieved voluntarily. The contents of these explicit memories are available and can be verbalized. On the contrary, implicit memories are not conscious. These memories are not easily verbalized, the information being emotional. Implicit and explicit memories constitute the memory system. The memory system has a variety of functions such as encoding, consolidation, retrieval, forgetting, and plasticity of information.

In the memory system autobiographical memory (AM) and episodic memory (EM) are intertwined and have distinctive functions. AM contains *autobiographical knowledge*, e.g. personal factual knowledge about events and cultural knowledge. It also contains *episodic memories*, e.g. knowledge derived from personal experiences. As such AM is a knowledge base in which new experiences are received. EM is thought to depend on focusing attention on events such that events are bound together to create contextualized memories that can be voluntarily retrieved or inhibited. It is supposed that during traumatic events, however, attention tends to be restricted and focused on the main source of danger, so that sensory elements will be less effectively bound together, producing fragmented and poorly contextualized memories that are difficult to control. Accordingly, alterations in EM compromise the ability to suppress retrieval, causing difficulties with involuntary memories and forgetting (Catarino et al. 2015). On the contrary, suppression-induced forgetting reflects mechanisms contributing to memory control in daily life (McNally et al. 1998). Taken together, studies suggest that difficulties in suppressing memories of traumatic events may be related to difficulties controlling memory recall.

Neurobiological findings highlight the importance of memory on specific brain regions. According to this research, three main brain regions are affected by traumatic events: (1) the amygdala, and its interactions with (2) the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and (3) the hippocampus (Sherin and Nemeroff 2011). These regions are stimulated by traumatic events such as genocide (Anderson et al. 2004). This stimulation leads to increased activation in the amygdala due to a diminished ability of the vmPFC and the hippocampus to control the amygdala responsiveness. This inability to control and the hyperactivity in the amygdala is related to the emotional quality of involuntary memories. Involuntary memories are those from which it is impossible to move attention away. The attention as such might be involuntarily. Taken together, these involuntary memories are powerful, decontextualized, emotional, and fragmented (Bryant et al. 2011). As such involuntary memories make it difficult to forget.

Findings from **clinical psychology** highlight that potentially two different forms of memories co-exist (Dalgleish and Brewin 2007). One form of memory is abstract, and contextually bound, and the other form of memory is sensory, and not contextually bound. In *voluntary memory*, these two representations of abstract and sensory representations are connected. However, in *involuntary memory* a strong sensory representation that is not connected to context was found. This characteristic allows involuntary memory to be easily triggered by experiences. Relating these two concepts of voluntary and involuntary to neural mechanisms, Brewin et al. suggest, that involuntary memories occur due to hyper-activation in parts of the brain (Brewin 2007). In accordance with these theories, involuntary memory may affect the mental health of genocide survivors. This is in line with research suggesting that alterations in the memory system, especially involuntary recollection of memories and inability to forget, are found in many forms of psychopathology (Brewin 2014) (Table 6.1).

Further knowledge on memory and health comes from **gerontology** and the development of an empirically validated taxonomy of eight distinct reminiscence functions such as self-positive functions (identity, problem-solving, death preparation); self-negative functions (bitterness revival, boredom reduction, intimacy maintenance); and prosocial functions (conversation, teach/inform others). This tripartite model has been tested in Israeli Holocaust survivors and elderly Canadians. In this study, survivors reported higher levels of anxiety and depressive symptoms; how-

Table 6.1 Nondeclarative and declarative memory

Nondeclarative memory	Declarative memory
Automatically triggered by certain events	Intentionally accessible
Sensory perceptions	Knowledge about the event in context
Emotional perceptions	Knowledge about stages of life
Physiological reactions	Knowledge about general events
“Nowness”-feeling	“Pastness”-feeling
Fragmented content	Chronological report
Event specific emotional network	

Adapted from Schock and Knaevelsrud (2013)

ever, life satisfaction did not significantly differ across groups. Additionally, this study demonstrates a robust link between reminiscence functions and health.

Another important finding in memory research is that human memory changes over the years. Memories, their modulation, and conversion are social processes (Brockmeier 2015). As social processes they are dependent on the social context, that is, how events are discussed in groups and in societies. According to this approach, memory is both, constantly in motion and permanently recomposed.

In contrast, early empirical studies on genocide and memory were influenced by the paradigm of memory as storage of experiences and events and the notion that forgetting is a failure. The topological storage model has been replaced by a much more dynamic and flexible view of remembrance and memory. Today, we no longer regard memories as being stored like a trace in a memory stick in order then to be reawakened by recall and to return into consciousness. The remembrance process involves a more complex interaction of present life circumstances, that which we expect to remember, and the material that we have retained from the past. Cognitive researcher Schacter writes:

Our memories work differently [from the way a camera records]. We extract key elements from our experiences and store them. We then recreate or reconstruct our experiences rather than retrieve copies of them. Sometimes, in the process of reconstructing we add on feelings, beliefs, or even knowledge we obtained after the experience. In other words, we bias our memories of the past by attributing to them emotions or knowledge we acquired after the event. (Schacter 2001, 9)

Accordingly, the paradigm of memory as a “storehouse”, which suggests that memories are accurately and orderly stored and retrieved, may have hindered a more functional approach to understanding memories.

Traumatic Memory After Genocide

Genocide may lead to changes in the central memory functioning and might result in the formation of a fear structure in memory. Fear structures contain emotional experiences, emotions, behaviors, and physiological sensations recall. (Foa and Kozak 1986). Supporting these findings are studies that show that suppression-induced forgetting is diminished in individuals with psychopathological symptoms compared with suitable comparisons. This finding is reflected in studies which show that more frequent involuntary memories and intrusions are associated with more psychopathological symptoms (Ehlers et al. 2012). Apparently, in daily life there is a suppression-induced forgetting. This suppression-induced forgetting enables memory control and voluntary recall of memories.

Research into traumatic memories evolved after the Holocaust (1933–1945). Mental health professionals who treated Holocaust survivors identified a variety of symptoms among their patients, such as anxiety, depression, guilt, changes in memory and concentration. To address the specific symptoms of these genocide survivors they coined the term *concentration camp syndrome* (Eitinger 1962) and later,

the *survivor syndrome* (Niederland 1988). Following these early studies, in 1980, the term posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was introduced into the psychiatric diagnostic system, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The term trauma (Greek word for “wound” or “injury”) describes in colloquial language a stressful life event, in relation to health; however, the term describes a clearly defined event (Table 6.2). The event can be experienced or observed happening to others.

When PTSD was first introduced into the DSM in 1980, the traumatic event was conceptualized as a stressor that was “outside the range of usual human experience and would be markedly stressing to almost anyone.” The rationale for this definition was that the term traumatic events should be restricted to catastrophic events such as torture and genocides. In the following years the definition was revised and broadened. In 2015, the 5th revision of the DSM, the DSM 5 revised the original conceptualizations of PTSD (Stein et al. 2014; van Emmerik and Kamphuis 2011; Morina et al. 2014). In this most recent version of the DSM (DSM 5), an event is understood as traumatic when it is associated with a real or a potential threat of death, serious injury, or threat to physical integrity. Based on the recognition of a variety of symptoms following traumatic experiences a new class of conditions “trauma and stressor-related disorders” was created.

To meet the related criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD following a traumatic event the individual has to suffer from four clusters of symptoms: intrusion (e.g., re-experiencing the traumatic event via intrusive thoughts or dreams, short visual fragments, thoughts or as bodily sensations which might evoke a sense of “nowness” of the event (Criterion B), avoidance (Criterion C) (e.g., avoidance of people or situations that represent the event), negative alterations in cognitions and mood (e.g., persistent and distorted blame of others (criterion D) and alterations in arousal and reactivity (e.g. reckless or destructive behavior) (Friedman et al. 2011).

A crucial symptom in PTSD is the change in memory and the perception that the event is happening now even if it occurred years or even decades ago. Survivors of traumatic events have fragmented memories and are suffering from unintentional and uncontrolled retrieval of elements of the traumatic event (symptom complex “re-experiencing”). At the same time, voluntary memories are often disorganized and fragmented. Accordingly, survivors can hardly control their memories.

As described above the sense of “nowness” (Table 6.1), that the person believes to be in the traumatic situation in the present, can last from seconds up to several minutes or hours and can involve a complete loss of awareness of the surroundings. Hence this sense of “nowness in which involuntary memories are regarded to be a core symptom of psychopathology that can be distinguished from voluntary memories. Accordingly, PTSD can be understood primarily as a disorder of memory, with involuntary recall of events and involuntary memories.

Changes in memories can co-occur not only in PTSD but in other disorders including depression, substance abuse, anxiety and psychosomatic disorders, as well as personality disorders. Yet, it is still under discussion (1) whether all individuals who are survivors of genocide suffer long-lasting psychopathology; (2) which sociodemographic (e.g. gender, education), event characteristics (e.g. sever-

Table 6.2 Development of the criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) 1954–2014

DSM	Term	Event definition	Diagnostic Criteria						
			B	C	D	E	F	G	
I (American Psychiatric Association 1952)	Gross stress reaction	Catastrophe							
II (American Psychiatric Association 1968)	Transient emotional disturbance	Overwhelming stress							
III (American Psychiatric Association 1980)	Posttraumatic stress disorder	Catastrophic stressor	Re-experiencing	Numbing	Diverse				
III-R (American Psychiatric Association 1987)	Posttraumatic stress disorder	Traumatic event	Re-experiencing	Avoi-dance/numbing	Arousal				
IV (American Psychiatric Association 1994)	Posttraumatic stress disorder	Extreme, life-threatening, and intense reaction	Re-experiencing	Avoi-dance/numbing	Arousal		<1 month		
V (American Psychiatric Association 1952)	Posttraumatic stress disorder	Arousal or threatened death, serious injury, sexual violence	Re-experiencing	Avoidance	Alterations in cognition and mood, pervasive negative emotions		Arousal, reckless/aggressive behaviour	<1 month	Distress/impairment

ity), and psychological factors (e.g. subjective responses) might determine a susceptibility to the development and maintenance of psychopathology.

An important aspect in suffering from genocide is not only how the genocide is kept in memory but that it is constantly, involuntarily kept in memory. Herewith, it has been found that the impossibility to forget is critical for the health impact. Memory is apparently not always beneficial, having both positive and negative functions. For example, memory frequency predicts depression (O'Rourke et al. 2015a).

New Concepts in PTSD Neuropathology Research (and Possible Future Therapies)

Recent studies have identified impaired fear extinction learning and memory to be a significant predictor of PTSD, and extinction deficits are associated with the disorder. Impaired fear extinction may be involved in all risk factors associated with PTSD. The risk factors include genetics, hormones, cognition, and sleep disturbances (Zuj et al. 2016).

Despite the immense social and economic ramifications of PTSD, there has been relatively little recent development of new pharmacotherapies. Exciting developments include research into PTSD-related abnormalities associated with dysregulation of adrenergic, hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical, monoaminergic, peptide, glutamatergic, GABAergic, cannabinoid, opioid, and other neurotransmitter and neuroendocrine systems (Friedman and Bernardy 2016).

Lately, much attention has been directed to cannabinoid drugs, because of their dual ability to modulate memory processes for emotional experiences on one hand, and to reduce anxiety on the other. Moreover, literature evidence demonstrating alterations of the endocannabinoid (EC) system in PTSD patients is increasing (Berardi et al. 2016).

It is suggested that ECs from synaptic spines of extinction neurons in the amygdala – a primary brain site mediating stress – have a major role in the prevention of PTSD (Bennett et al. 2017).

A reduction of nightmares and a general sleep quality promotion is frequently reported by PTSD patients who began either to consume or to be treated with cannabis derivatives. It is now widely accepted that consolidation and reorganization of different kinds of memory occur during sleep. Therefore, it is tentative to speculate that cannabinoid stimulation during sleep may affect the reorganization of the traumatic memory, reducing trauma-related nightmares and possibly gradually reducing the distressing impact that traumatic memory exerts on behavior and mood (Berardi et al. 2016).

Part 2. Empirical Studies on Genocide and Health of Survivors

Some reviews of early studies on the health effect of the Holocaust on survivors have been published (Kellermann 2001; Sigal 1995; Barel et al. 2010). In 2010, a review from Barel et al. suggested that in the 1950s and 1960s studies on the impact of the Holocaust were done mainly by psychiatrists or clinical psychologists who treated patients. These studies focused on clinical populations who came to their attention. However, up to now (2016), no comprehensive review on health impact of different genocides on respective survivors has been done. Table 6.1 presents an overview on studies investigating the health impact of genocides on survivors since 2010.

Methods

Relevant studies were collected systematically according to the PRISMA guidelines (Liberati et al. 2009; Moher et al. 2009). Articles that examined the effects of genocides on survivor's health were sought in PubMed/MEDLINE (NCBI); Embase (Elsevier); PsycINFO (EBSCO); Sociological Abstracts (ProQuest); Web of Science, including the Science Citation Index, Social Sciences Citation Index, and Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters); and the Published International Literature on Traumatic Stress (PILOTS) Database (ProQuest). We applied no date or language limits. The final search was carried out during March 2016 (Table 6.3).

For the impact of genocide on survivors' health we found no consistent positive association. This is in line with meta-analyses (Barel et al. 2010) which found that early studies tended to focus on psychopathology of a clinical population.. Studies of the effects of genocides on survivors show that most were able to lead normal lives, with high quality of life in the case of Holocaust survivors. Accordingly, more recent research focused on resilience and how reminiscences serve resilience.

It is possible that the survivors are a special group due to the extent of the atrocities they suffered from. An example might be the Holocaust in which at least six million Jewish people were murdered. During the Holocaust it is probable that the most vulnerable individuals were unlikely to survive the multiple severe assaults. It may well be that the most vulnerable persons were likely to have been murdered in the Holocaust. Therefore it might be that the embodiment of memories in the "strong" less vulnerable survivors is different from the embodiment in the more vulnerable.

Table 6.3 Empirical studies on genocide and its long term health impact

Author(s)	Genocide	Study population	Design	Health outcomes	Assessment of confounders	Results	Investigates memories
Carmel et al. (2016)	Holocaust	Israel, Canada	Cross-sectional study	Subjective well-being, anxiety, depression	Education, country	Country effect on anxiety, survivor effect on depression among women, no differences in SWB	Reports case studies of memory perceptions.
Levine et al. (2016)	Holocaust	Israel	Register based follow up study	Suicide risk	–	Elevation of female suicide risk when exposed at age 13, reduced risk for males	–
Levine et al. (2014)	Holocaust	Israel	Register based follow up study	Schizophrenia	–	HC group had higher risk for schizophrenia HR: 2.28 (95% CI 2.00, 2.60)	–
Rugema et al. (2015)	Rwanda	Rwanda	Cross-sectional study	Depression, suicidality, anxiety disorder	Lifetime trauma, poverty, spousal violence	Men: RR** : 3.02 (95% CI 1.59 to 5.37) for MDE; RR: 2.15 (95% CI 1.21 to 3.64) for suicidality. Women: RR 1.91 (95% CI 1.03 to 3.22), for suicidality, RR 1.90 (95% CI 1.34 to 2.42) for anxiety	–
Keinan-Boker et al. (2015)	Holocaust	Survivors in Israel	Cross-sectional study	Hypertension, diabetes mellitus, vascular disease, metabolic syndrome, cancer, osteoporosis	Hypertension, diabetes mellitus, vascular disease, metabolic syndrome	Hypertension (OR = 1.52), diabetes mellitus (OR: 1.60), vascular disease (OR: 1.99), metabolic syndrome (OR: 2.14)	–

Bercovich et al. (2014)	Holocaust	Survivors in Israel	Cross-sectional study	Body mass index (BMI), hypertension, dyslipidemia, diabetes, angina pectoris, congestive heart failure, cancer, peptic ulcer disease, headaches, anxiety/depression	–	Hypertension (62.9% vs. 43%, P=0.003), dyslipidemia (72.9% vs. 46.1%, P < 0.001), angina pectoris (18.6% vs. 4.8%, P=0.001), cancer (30.0% vs. 8.7% P < 0.001), peptic ulcer disease (21.4% vs. 7%, P=0.001), headaches (24.3% vs. 12.6%, P < 0.001), anxiety / depression (50.0% vs. 8.3%, P < 0.001)	–
Carmel et al. (2016)	Holocaust	Survivors in Israel	Cross-sectional study	Satisfaction with life, depression, anxiety	Country, gender	No effects on life satisfaction, more depression among women survivors	Investigates memories
Lis-Turlejska et al. (2008)	Holocaust	Survivors in Poland	Cross-sectional study	Post-traumatic stress disorder, depression	Age at exposure, ethnicity, social isolation, loss of a parent	Genocide survivors had more PTSD symptoms than non-genocide survivors	–
Sagi-Schwartz et al. (2013)	Holocaust	Survivors in	Cross-sectional study	Mortality	Age at exposure	HC survivors lived 6.5 months longer than no HC.	–
Rieder and Elbert (2013)	Rwanda	Child-parent survivors dyads	Cross-sectional study	PTSD, depression, anxiety	Recent violent events, child abuse	Increased rates for depression and anxiety associated with recent exposures to traumatic life events	–
Mollica et al. (2014)	Cambodia	Survivors in Thailand	Cross-sectional study	PTSD	Recent violent events	Recent and past violence was associated with PTSD symptoms.	–
O'Rourke et al. (2015a, b)	Holocaust	Survivors in Israel, Canada	Cross-sectional study	Life satisfaction, memories, depression, anxiety	Country specific effects	Less negative thinking among HC survivors	–

Genocide and Physical Disorders of Survivors

According to the literature review, in community samples, the health of genocide survivors was heterogeneous. In general, Holocaust survivors showed increased longevity compared to individuals who had not survived the Holocaust. This finding highlights the emphasis on their resilience, since in most of smaller studies Holocaust survivors had *more* physical illness! Also in other studies genocide survivors showed more physical health related symptoms. It might be that the impact changes over the years as those who are affected most have a higher risk of mortality, making the resilience of the Holocaust survivors unique.

A majority of studies on traumatic events and pro-inflammatory markers supported a model of early senescence and accelerated aging (biomarkers of senescence, senescence-associated medical comorbidities, and mortality rates) for those who suffer after traumatic events. In our review it cannot be confirmed that genocides can contribute to accelerated aging. The pathways by which senescence-related processes could be maintained after the initial trauma are unknown, but could involve increased allostatic load, where neural mechanisms are utilized to maintain optimal functioning under changing stressors (Danese and McEwen 2012). The sum of the changes in allostatic mechanisms (including blood concentrations of cortisol, norepinephrine, epinephrine, cholesterol, and blood pressure and heart rate variability) in response to anticipated stressors is called allostatic load. Allostatic mechanisms are utilized to anticipate the effects of stressors and address them to preserve optimal functioning of the individual. Yet, in the studies these effects are diverse.

Genocide and Mental Disorders of Survivors

Our review suggests diverse effects of genocide on onset, duration and severity of mental disorders. A study by Levine et al. suggests that survivors exposed early in life might show symptoms of schizophrenia in case they were exposed pre- and perinatally. Further studies on mental disorders in non-selected samples in other genocides suggest an increased vulnerability to PTSD and further psychopathologies (Levine et al. 2014).

Genocide and Resilience

Our findings from the empirical studies have several possible explanations. In contrast to early studies of survivors mainly done in clinical samples which mainly focused on psychopathology, more recent research tends to emphasize the strength and resilience of genocide survivors.

Resilience theory states that genocide survivors remember what they remember because these memories allow them to make sense of the past and live and cope with the present situation (Grossberg 2015). Resilience is as such not a personality trait but interrelated with individual development and societal processes. Resilience might be understood as a pervasive belief that one can rebound effectively from horrific events. According to this understanding of resilience, memories apparently do not necessarily predict psychopathology among survivors. Rather than playing down the importance of suffering genocide and being a survivor, these findings emphasize the complexity of health reactions to genocide (Barel et al. 2010; De Vries et al. 2005; Suedfeld et al. 2005; O'Rourke 2015b).

Many factors, including strong family support, religion, or community cohesion can contribute to resilience among Holocaust survivors and their offspring (Giladi 2013; King 2015; Letzter-Pouw 2013; Sigal 1998). There is still research to do to better understand the factors contributing to resilience – even in face of horrendous genocidal events. Furthermore, it is contested whether forgetting is an important component of resilience. Thus far, empirical knowledge comes from war affected populations – not from genocide affected populations. This research suggests that the impact of war depends upon whether it is possible to make sense of it and the nature of postwar social experiences. In the face of genocide it is agreed that it is impossible to make sense of it.

Part 3. Explanations

Explanation 1: Trajectories

Empirical and conceptual studies suggest that memories of trauma are inconsistent over time and that there are substantial differences in the longitudinal patterns of posttraumatic stress (PTSD) trajectories. On a conceptual level, Bonanno (2004, 2012) offered a model of health trajectories following traumatic events. He hypothesized four symptom trajectories after traumatic events: chronic, delayed, recovery, and resilience. Resilient individuals are proposed to never exhibit a significant disruption in functioning, whereas those in the recovery trajectories demonstrate an acute reaction, followed by a gradual decline in symptoms over time. The delayed response trajectory is proposed to consist of a sub-syndromal response, followed by an increase over time. Chronic trajectories are categorized as having the most severe initial symptoms in the acute stage, and demonstrate persistence in symptomatology over time. Late onset trajectories are those which do not show symptoms initially, rather years or even decades after the genocidal trauma. So far, we do not have information from longitudinal studies on trajectories as there are no empirical longitudinal studies.

Empirical longitudinal studies identified four (Panter-Brick et al. 2015) or three different trajectories over a period of four year (Fink et al. 2016): a low-consistent symptom trajectory (the largest), a borderline-stable trajectory (the second largest) and a chronic high trajectory (Fink et al. 2016) in civilians and in the military. For genocide survivors knowledge comes from two longitudinal studies (Stessman 2008; Labinsky 2006) which found no evidence to support the hypothesis that the delayed effects of the trauma of the Holocaust negatively influence physical health, health trajectories, or mortality. Yet, typical or average trajectories can be changed. The changes call for investigating those factors that influence trajectories. These factors can be investigated as proximal life events, including resilience-evoking and vulnerability-increasing recent, proximal life events. These proximal life events are often not assessed in genocide and health studies.

Explanation 2: Proximal Life Events

A number of family-, society- and individuum factors have been found to modify trajectories of health after genocide. New traumatic events may have an impact on the symptoms and the symptom course of mental health in survivors after the genocide trauma (Opaas and Varvin 2015; Mollica et al. 2014). More pre-flight events such as torture, lack of food, discrimination in the home country related to war and HRVs were significantly related to more symptoms of PTSD. The association however was specific: The number of traumatic events during war was significantly and positively related to PTSD-Total and to PTSD-Reexperiencing symptoms, but not for anxiety, depression, or quality of life. Additionally, adverse events experienced during childhood were significantly and positively related to PTSD-Total and to PTSD-Arousal and PTSD Avoidance symptoms. Likewise, these events were significantly and negatively related to social relationships. This goes in line with findings of Robinson, who studies the impact of missile attacks on Holocaust survivors in Israel. In this study, the content of involuntary memories referred to the Holocaust as well as to the new event. Furthermore in genocide survivors with life threatening illness significantly more symptoms of PTSD and memory changes were found (Hantmann 2007). New threatening events may induce a partial activation of the memory system and may subsequently lead to an increase in symptoms; on the other hand attachment might mitigate the impact on health.

A further field of research might evolve in the future as we know that attachment and optimal parenting practices involving love, structure, and consistent supportive care protect from the negative impacts of war or mitigate the effects. For the relationship between genocide and attachment as protective factor we have little empirical evidence so far.

Explanation 3: Methods

There is much diversity between the studies with respect to key methodological features such as selection of the target population and nature of sampling. A challenge is the appropriate sample size, appropriate selection mechanisms of the target population, the survivors, and the sampling procedures. If the sample size is too small the results may not be valid. The criteria for defining survivors vary. For example, in Holocaust research, some defined Holocaust survivors as those who survived concentration camps (Levav 1984; Nadler 1989), whereas others studies have investigated survivors as one undifferentiated group (Amir 2003; Cohen 2001). Likewise crucial was whether clinical or nonclinical populations were sampled. In nonclinical samples symptoms of psychopathology tend to be lower. A serious limitation might be that up to now there is no prospective study in the literature on genocide and health, as it is known that rates and reporting of psychopathology is higher in prospective than in retrospective studies (Moffitt et al. 2010).

A further methodological explanation for the heterogeneity in findings is the lack of inclusions of comparison groups and changes in the cultural context of memories across generations and between genocides and countries. It might be that potential influencing factors (confounders) have been overlooked, such as, participants age. Participants' age is related to the time since the end of the genocide act. In research close to the genocide occurrence, children, adolescents and young adults are typically studied; in research after decades these survivors have reached later life. Across countries and populations, levels of psychopathology generally peak in midlife (30–50 years) and decline in later life, partly due to survivor effects (Healthy survivors' effect) (APA 2013). Accordingly, most participants in early research were young and middle – aged adults, whereas only recently older genocide survivors were recruited (Carmel et al. 2016) (Table 6.4).

Explanation 4: Conflation of Past and Present, Memories Over the Life Course

A further explanation of the heterogeneous findings in studies on memory and health might be linked to the evolving knowledge that memory is an activity, a social and cultural practice and that the brain is more precisely defined by its plasticity. It is increasingly evident that memories combine elements of experience from the past with elements of experience from the present. If we understand remembering as a creative event occurring in the present this might explain why findings of the health impact of genocides are so heterogeneous, as memories are created over time and in different contexts these memories can have diverse effects on individuals.

In light of neurobiological empirical studies on memory systems it becomes clear that memories can have both positive and negative effects on health. This

Table 6.4 Limitations of studies on genocide and health due to methods

Limitation of studies on genocide and health	Potential bias
Small sample sizes	Limited generalizability
	Limited statistical power
Cross-sectional design	Limited knowledge on trajectories.
Convenience sample	Limited representativeness
Exposure definition	Exposure misclassification might introduce bias
Lack of suitable comparison group	Limited knowledge on specificities of the exposed group
Lack of adjusting for potential confounders	Lack of the perspective that memorialization is a social activity

seems to be especially true for involuntary negative memories. It might be that genocide memories for survivors change over the life course. In older age integrating memories as part of their life defines a life of resilience. This observation is consistent with empirical studies (Coleman 1999; Davison et al. 2016; O'Rourke 2015b) and with developmental theories such as Erikson's.

This might add a “post-mechanistic view” to the contested issue of impact of genocides on health. The post-mechanistic view might explain the diversity of findings on the impact of genocide on health. The impact of genocide on memory and of memory on health is a dynamic rather than a static process.

Part 4. Conclusion and Outlook

This chapter highlights the importance of methodological concerns in the field of genocide, memory and health studies. Additionally, it highlights the importance of taking a longitudinal perspective to understand how memory and health change or remain constant over time. Within this context, longitudinal studies through which we could explore trajectories in memory and health after genocide are highly needed. Investigating trajectories of memory, health, would include symptoms of depression, generalized anxiety, substance abuse, and physical symptoms, providing insight into a broader range of health responses to genocides. Future research is needed to investigate the complex processes through which risk and protective factors interact. We have shown that survivors of genocide in most cases learn to live with the past – with resilience and subjective well-being. Additionally, we have shown that offspring of survivors learn to live with their parents' past.

We set out here a framework that considers the health of genocide survivors in the context of individual memory. The results of the research summarized in this chapter demonstrate that, although the majority of offspring of genocide survivors and their offspring exhibit low levels of long term health impact, a sizeable minority experience health symptoms. We also showed that longitudinal studies on random samples are needed to better understand vulnerability and resilience in the face of extreme adversity.

If we are to understand the evolution of resilience from traumatic memories, we need to understand memories at the individual level and at the sociocultural level. Memories, especially traumatic memories, are intimately linked with the societies in which people live after the genocide. Memorialization and memorials may help survivors and their offspring to develop the story in the way they want the story to be told, developing a meaningful narrative. Memories of survivors, however, are embedded in social experiences.

Overall, the impact of genocide memory on health still remains unexplored. It is believed that avoiding distressing memories exacerbates psychopathology by keeping suppressed memories accessible. What is the interrelation between individual and collective memories? How can memories lose their negative consequences? Is retrieval suppression beneficial for survivors? What would be a culture of helpful memories and beneficial forgetting? These are questions for future research. It might be necessary to conclude this chapter with a call to improve methods in genocide and health studies. The body and spirit remember and forget – and the mechanisms are still largely unknown.

Genocide survivors remember what they remember because these memories have functional value of personal and interpersonal importance. In case these memories are of national or international importance, genocide survivors can understand themselves as symbols of survival, endurance and resilience (Abramowitz et al. 1994). Borrowing from Sales et al. (2013), for those who have experienced genocide “it may be healthier not to reason about their past lives . . . and simply move forward and assume one can change the future rather than to try to make sense of a past that may simply be senseless” Sales et al. (2013). Nevertheless for those who have not survived genocide directly it may be healthier to remember and to reason about genocide – herewith choosing memories to take over responsibility of the past. Memorialization begins at the embodied level of survivors and requires performance in the form of texts and art to give a representation and a language in which survivors embodied memories are represented.

Therefore, we bring together in this book different disciplines to make a small contribution to transition of memories from the past to the future. Forgetting is impossible as we saw for the survivors and remembering might be essential for the health of societies.

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Chapter 7

Survival and Resilience Versus Psychopathology: A Seven-Decade Perspective Post-Holocaust

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Abstract A seven-decade perspective post Holocaust reveals a significant change in attitudes, from an initial emphasis on the survivors' (even their offspring's) psychopathology, to the underscoring of their resilience including new findings of their surprising longevity and the low rate of their current post-traumatic symptomatology. At first, most psychotherapists who treated Holocaust survivors found them post-traumatic, seen as the common response to experiencing the horrors of the Holocaust. Later on, studies on the influence of Holocaust trauma on the survivors' children described these offspring as the "Second Generation," alluding to how they were deeply affected by their parents' chronic post-traumatic state. In parallel, researchers found that the survivors served as a model for post traumatic growth, resilience, and an inspiration for Antonovsky's salutogenic theory. Recent meta-analytic studies have found no proof of "transgenerational transmission" of post-traumatic psychopathology to the second or the third generations. Surprisingly, the data now shows that Holocaust survivors live longer than non-survivors and have less post-traumatic symptoms.

Some of the more elegantly designed nonclinical studies were done in Israel, due to the presence of a large number of survivors and of their offspring, and due to the existence of appropriate control groups.

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Introduction

Research of post traumatic mental disorders, especially due to man-made trauma, is often difficult and delicate, being burdened by emotionally and politically charged issues.

The study of the mental consequences of the Holocaust on Jewish survivors and their descendants, was, and still is, loaded with sentiments. In Israel, the general attitude towards the survivors has evolved over the years. This change has contributed in many ways to the research; first of the survivors, and then of their offspring. Also, fundamental differences between the Holocaust of the Jewish people and other genocides were ignored. This may have resulted in a misreading of the state of the survivors and their offspring, and also possibly in misunderstanding the terms “resilience” and “post traumatic growth.”

Early researchers believed they faced a new mental condition in civilians, similar to soldiers’ post traumatic responses, for which they had no accepted definition. Lacking literature on the post-traumatic stress disorder, a term that became widespread only years later, the term *Konzentrationslager* (concentration camp) syndrome was coined explaining for the psychological symptoms identified among survivors (Eitinger 1961; Chodoff 1963). This syndrome was attributed to the cumulative effects of traumatic adversity on the individual, the family, and the community (Eitinger 1972).

Most psychotherapists who treated Holocaust survivors, found them as post-traumatic, and this was seen as the common response to experiencing the horrors of the Holocaust. Yolanda Gampel, a leading Israeli psychoanalyst, working with survivors and their offspring, coined the term “radioactive identification” of the victims – a mental radioactivity emerging from the social violence that penetrated the victims, and that was transferred subconsciously to the next generation (Gampel 1996).

Over the years, Holocaust survivors have been studied as examples of genocide survivors, however, many of these studies did not take into account the fact that the Holocaust was a different kind of genocide. As opposed to other genocides, the Holocaust did not result out of a civil war, or a national or political conflict – since the Jews did not attack or harm Nazi Germany in any way; Jews in occupied Nazi territory during the last years of WWII were all subject to a specific death threat, just because they were Jewish; most of them suffered famine and starvation, poor hygiene, inflammatory diseases, slave labor, severe trauma and grief. Jews who survived such horrors had to have special personal traits, physical and psychological, which enabled them to adjust and persevere through a long-lasting horrific experience. For almost 50 years this plain truth – that the survivors were a *selected* group of people – was not confronted, partly because of the pejorative nature of the term

“selection,” the infamous Nazi practice performed in death camps selecting who would live or die. Thus the positive traits of the survivors, traits that they could inherit to their offspring, were not addressed. Ironically, the selection procedure was done by Nazi doctors, most notably the notorious Dr. Mengele, as if it were a standard medical practice.

Studies on Concentration Camp Survivors in Poland

Polish non-Jewish prisoners in Nazi concentration camps are a remarkable comparison population to the Jewish Holocaust survivors, and such a comparison is possible due to the extensive research done in Poland. Polish non-Jews were also victims of genocide; about 3,000,000 of the 6,000,000 Poles who were killed by the Nazis during WWII—about 10% of the Polish population at that time—were Catholics. However, they did not face the same absolute life-threatening destiny of Jews in the Holocaust, and in concentration camps they did not face the same continuous and certain death threat. A leading group of physicians, most of them psychiatrists from the Medical Academy of the Jagellonian University in Krakow, led by Antony Kepinski, studied Polish Auschwitz survivors from the end of the 1950s, and published their findings in the “Medical Review – Auschwitz” (Ryn 2005). These studies revealed extensive psychopathology, as well as chronic physical conditions among the survivors. One of the groups, studied by Adam Szymusik, consisted of a hundred individuals, examined during the years 1959–1961. Psychological disturbances were found in 64 examinees, and 48 of these cases were clearly related to incarceration in the concentration camp. The psychiatrist Maria Orwid (1930–2009) studied the post-war problems experienced by these survivors (Bomba and Orwid 2010). She found that their main reference group for the survivors was their co-prisoners, and that their post-war adjustment seemed to be more difficult than their adjustment to the camp. The Krakow Auschwitz study concluded that surviving the extreme stress of imprisonment in a concentration camp required specific adaptation mechanisms, and that these resulted in a chronic disorder of adaptation mechanisms to life after liberation accompanied by a severe deterioration in health.

Another longitudinal study was a retrospective study carried out in Wroclaw (Poland), looking at medical records of 250 former prisoners in 1950, and 120 records in 1975, and compared them with medical records of a control group (Jablonski et al. 2015a, b). Compared with the control group, former prisoners manifested multi-comorbidity, premature aging, and a dramatic increase in mortality rate. The multi-morbidity mostly affected older prisoners who stayed at a camp for a longer time period (Jablonski et al. 2015a). The interrelated somatic and psychological symptoms profile – “concentration camp syndrome” – was found among 58.8% of former prisoners 5 years after leaving the camp, and in 77.5% after 30 years (Jablonski et al. 2015b).

Psychiatric studies of Jewish Holocaust survivors living in Poland and their children started with the founding of the *Association of Children of the Holocaust* in

Poland in 1991. Children of Holocaust survivors reported a high rate of anxiety states in early childhood, and almost all had identity difficulties, due to the “double taboo” they experienced – the Holocaust and their Jewish origin (Bomba and Orwid 2010).

“Second Generation” as a Psychological-Cultural Phenomenon

Studies on the influence of the trauma of the Holocaust on the survivors’ children have been published in Israel since the 1960s. Most of these studies described the “Second Generation” by illustrating their parents’ behavior; their inability to grieve over their lost loved family members, their guilt feelings, their longings, and their feelings of abandonment. All these affected the construction of their post-Holocaust families and their attitudes towards raising their children (Rakoff 1961; Nathan et al. 1964; Klein 1972; Kellerman 2001).

However, many such studies described populations in clinical situations or in mental treatment – survivors and “Second Generation” patients – and therefore were selection-biased. One of the principal researchers in the field was Hillel Klein (1923–1985), a leading Israeli psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, and a survivor himself. Lately, his studies of Holocaust survivors and their families in Israel and the Diaspora were re-published (Klein 2012). In a study among Second Generation subjects in a kibbutz of many survivors, Klein found that the survivors’ children were not interested in the history of the Holocaust more than other children in their group (Klein 1972). This finding, however, was not given emphasis at the time.

A pivotal study that focused on the Second Generation was published in the *Children of the Holocaust*, written by the Second Generation writer, Helen Epstein (Epstein 1979). In this study, survivors’ children talked about their views on the influence of the Holocaust on them. They talked about the influence of their parents’ silence, on their responsibility to cherish the memory of the lost relatives, and on topics that were not discussed until then; their shame in their parents who were different from other parents, their parents’ over-protection, their anger toward Nazi crimes and their anger in becoming a “replacement” instead of the lost relatives for the parents. Some of them identified with the Holocaust victims, and felt as if they were in the Holocaust themselves.

Mental Difficulties Among Second Generation Holocaust Survivors, or “Transgenerational Transmission of the Holocaust Survivor Syndrome”

Mental health therapists who treated members of the Second Generation tended to attribute the mental health problems of their patients to having been raised by mentally afflicted parents and to the “transgenerational transmission” of symptoms

related to their parents' trauma during the Holocaust. Thus, the research literature was based mostly on few clinical cases, not representative of the Second Generation, but rather only representing the clinical sub-group which sought psychiatric help. This led to a tendency to focus on the pathology of the few, rather than examining more representative cohorts of offspring of survivors. van Ijzendoorn et al. (2003) tested the hypothesis of secondary traumatization in Holocaust survivor families, through a series of meta-analyses on 32 samples involving 4418 participants. In a set of adequately designed studies, no evidence for the influence of the parents' traumatic Holocaust experiences on their children was found. Sagi-Schwartz et al. (2008) did not find tertiary traumatization (of the third generation) in a meta-analysis of 13 non-clinical studies involving 1012 participants.

The primary "clinical" approach of "Transgenerational Transmission" also reflects the emphasis of most therapist-researchers, who focused on the psychiatric symptoms of a minority of survivors rather than on the success of the majority, who managed to survive the Holocaust, and establish a social and professional life. Only a few scholars, such as Hillel Klein, stressed these "healthy" areas (Knobler et al. 2015).

Only later did the literature begin to concentrate not on the negative effect of trauma and the vulnerability of those who survived the Holocaust, but rather on their resilience in the face of overwhelming traumatic events, and on their ability to overcome the trauma and grief – their post-traumatic growth (Sigal 1995; Baron et al. 1996).

Survivor Resilience as an Inspiration for the Salutogenic Theory

Aaron Antonovsky (1923–1994), a medical sociologist, studied Holocaust survivors in Israel and found that many of them *did not* demonstrate overt psychopathological signs (Antonovsky et al. 1971). This finding led him to coin the term "salutogenesis" (as opposed to pathogenesis), involving the description and examination of factors responsible for the formation and the maintaining of health. For that purpose, individuals and communities need "a sense of coherence", consisting of three factors: a sense of comprehensibility, a sense of manageability, and a sense of meaningfulness (Antonovsky 1979, 1987). For empirical studies he formed the *Sense of Coherence Scale*, that has since been used in hundreds of studies (Eriksson and Lindstrom 2006). Shamay Davidson, a leading Israeli psychiatrist, was also among the few who pointed out the ability of the survivors to outlive the Holocaust and its aftermath helped by their group's support, during the Holocaust and later in Israel (Davidson 1973).

Resilience is understood today as the process of overcoming rather than succumbing to the effects of adverse experiences such as genocides and mass atrocities (Rutter 1987; Masten and Narayan 2012; Reed et al. 2012). "Post traumatic growth" is the term coined by Calhoun and Tedeschi (Calhoun and Tedeschi 2014) for the

development of positive outcome following trauma: better interpersonal relationships, making changes in one's life, gaining a higher appreciation of life, building resilience and self-empowerment, and spiritual/religious growth.

Progress in Research: Community-Based Epidemiological Studies

The early studies, conducted at a time when psychiatric epidemiology was in its infancy, suffered from a number of weaknesses, including selection bias, unmeasured confounding, and limited analysis of sub-groups (Solkoff 1992).

The first large scale population based study was carried out in Israel in the early 1980s, not on survivors, but on their offspring. This pioneering study, by Schwartz et al. (1994) was conducted by a research group from Columbia University in New York, represented in Israel by Itzhak Levav. This extensive community-based epidemiological study analyzed a representative sample of second generation offspring of *two parent survivors of the death camps*, compared to descendants of former Europeans who had not been in the Holocaust.

No evidence of higher symptom scale scores or higher rates of current psychiatric disorders were found among the children of Holocaust survivors. Moreover, in their report, the authors began with the obvious: Holocaust survivors undoubtedly experienced severe trauma over a lengthy period, and growing in the shadow of such parents left its mark on their children's characters. However, Holocaust survivors were also clearly gifted with unique characteristics which helped them survive. Since a significant part of these characteristics was passed on to their children, this should also be taken into consideration when evaluating the personality and the mental state of the second generation.

Today it has become clear that this evaluation is even more complex than previously believed, in light of recent data on *epigenetic* heredity whereby it is not only genetic qualities determined by one's genome that are passed on to future generations, but also acquired characteristics that can be inherited. [Transgenerational epigenetic inheritance is the transmittance of traits from one generation to the offspring without alteration of the primary structure of DNA.] Epigenetic studies have the potential to improve our understanding of the etiology of human behavior and mental disorders by bridging the gap in knowledge between the exogenous environmental exposures and behavior and pathophysiology. The current literature on epigenetic regulation of anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorders, possibly relevant in this discussion of survivors, is just emerging, and is not reliable yet (El-Sayed et al. 2012; Mahgoub and Monteggia 2013). Additionally, these studies need control groups to better understand what might be the epigenetic effect.

It may not be surprising, due to the delicacy of the research topic, that unbiased large scale epidemiological community-based studies of Holocaust *survivors* were not done at all, until the beginning of the twenty-first century. A first such study

conducted during the years 2002–2004 was led in Israel by Itzhak Levav, as part of the Israel World Mental Health Survey. It included a similar comparison, this time of the two generations: survivors vs. non-survivors, and second generation of survivors vs. others. The findings among the second generation resembled those of the first study: no statistical differences were elicited on several measures of psychopathology between a group of offspring of Holocaust survivors ($N = 430$) to a comparison group of 417 offspring of Europe-born parents who did not reside in Nazi-occupied countries (Levav et al. 2007). The findings among the survivors were quite surprising; the survivors' lifetime and 12-month prevalence rates of anxiety disorders, their current sleep disorders, and their emotional distress were higher than the control. In spite of this, they *did not have higher rates of depressive disorders or post-traumatic stress disorder* (Sharon et al. 2009).

This finding is exceptional, considering the unique trauma and grief the Holocaust survivors had suffered in contrast to all other victims of genocide and mass trauma. It is even more outstanding comparing the rates of PTSD symptoms and depressive symptoms with other victims. Whenever and wherever other genocide survivors were evaluated, an (expected) high rate of such symptoms was found. Such findings were manifest in the effects of war that included genocide: in Rwanda (Pham et al. 2004), in Cambodia (Marshall et al. 2005; Sonis et al. 2009), or in former Yugoslavia (Basoglu et al. 2005).

Indeed, high rates of PTSD and depression are *always* found among populations exposed to mass conflict and displacement: Steel (Steel et al. 2009) found in a meta-analysis of 5904 studies of surveys involving refugees, conflict-affected populations, or both, that after adjusting for methodological factors, exposure to torture and other potentially traumatic events account for higher rates of reported prevalence of PTSD and depression. Another population with reported high rates of PTSD and depression are prisoners of war. Former prisoners of war (ex-POWs) are at high risk of developing psychiatric disorders (Ursano and Rundell 1990). Among them the prevalent disorders are PTSD (e.g. Solomon et al. 2008) and depression (e.g. Page et al. 1991). This discrepancy is even more remarkable taking into account the incomparable degree of horrors and atrocities experienced by the Holocaust survivors, who were apart from everything else, both prisoners of war, and civilians, not trained soldiers.

The Longevity of Holocaust Survivors

Poor health, including poor mental health, is ultimately associated with a shorter life span. Since both were reported extensively on Holocaust survivors, the common logic was that they perished earlier than non-survivors. However, for a long time this conception was never examined even though this could be easily done in Israel using existing state records.

Two separate studies done in Jerusalem, each study populations comprising several hundreds of elderly people in protected housing, found that Holocaust survivors did *not* have a shorter life span (Collins et al. 2004; Stessman et al. 2008).

A first population-based retrospective cohort study of the Holocaust, based on the entire population of immigrants from Poland to Israel either before or after the Second World War, was published by Sagi-Schwartz et al. (Sagi-Schwartz et al. 2013). Holocaust survivors lived on average 6.5 months longer than non-survivors. Male survivors who were aged 10–15 at the onset of the Holocaust lived 10 months more, while male survivors who were 16–20 lived 18 months longer. The authors suggested two explanations to the surprising findings: “differential mortality” during the Holocaust (i.e. the selection process by the Nazis during the holocaust determining many of the survivors), and “Post-traumatic Growth,” associated with protective factors inherent in the survivors or in their environment after the Holocaust.

Another remarkable comparison in Israel is with Israeli prisoners of war (POW’s). Solomon et al. (Solomon et al. 2014) studied 154 Israeli ex-prisoners of war and a matched control group (N = 161) of combat veterans 18 years after the 1973 war, and 35 years after the war. Captivity was associated with premature mortality, more health-related conditions and worse self-rated health. The relative risk for mortality in the ex-POWs group was 2.95 times higher than that of controls: 9.2% died from various causes up until 2008, compared with 3.1% of controls.

Studies in which Polish concentration camps survivors and Israeli prisoners of war had shortened life expectancies, whereas Holocaust survivors in Israel live longer, may strengthen Sagi-Schwartz’s (Sagi-Schwartz et al. 2013) selection hypothesis, namely that Holocaust survivors are a unique group of people that had special characteristics that enabled them to endure extreme atrocities and constant stressful conditions such as slave labor, torture, mental trauma and humiliation, starvation, cold, and infectious disease.

As Schwartz (Schwartz et al. 1994) pointed out, Jews who suffered from acute post traumatic reaction or disorder during the Holocaust perhaps could not survive. The uniqueness of the Holocaust survivors was emphasized by Yoram Hazan (1949–2011), a leading Israeli psychoanalyst and a favorite student of Hillel Klein, by the expression “there is no second generation of the Holocaust” (Hazan 1987) and later “there will not be any next generations of the Holocaust”: the generation of the Holocaust survivors will be remembered forever as those who survived – similar to the generation of the Jewish people during the exodus from Egypt, or the expulsion from Spain in 1492.

Further Implications for Research and Treatment

Studies on Holocaust survivors must be done nowadays without delay, due to their sadly dwindling number. The living survivors at the present time are mostly those who were child survivors and grew up and developed their mature personality

during the Holocaust. Therefore, the impact of the Holocaust on them could be different, and their resilience could be different and worth studying. Even today, psychopathology oriented research is still prevalent, finding excessive psychopathology among these survivors. For example: a recent study in Israel displayed a higher rate of psychiatric admissions due to schizophrenia among patients who were child survivors (Levine et al. 2016). This study used the Israeli national psychiatric admissions registry as a “national psychiatric case registry,” disregarding the fact that child survivors of the Holocaust who immigrated to Israel must have had lesser family support, leading to higher rates of psychiatric hospitalization, as seen (even in higher rates) among other immigrant communities.

Future research on resilience and post traumatic growth must consider the difference between the outcomes of Holocaust survivors, especially in Israel, with that of survivors of other genocides. Scales that were formed using the experience of Holocaust survivors, such as Antonovsky’s sense of coherence scale (Eriksson and Lindstöm 2006) must be used accordingly.

The surprisingly positive outcome of Holocaust survivors in Israel requires further exploration. The opportunity of the survivors in Israel to be in contact with survivors like themselves, thus getting social support, and their ability to be a part of the building of the state of Israel, may be one of the reasons for their resilience. One result of this understanding was helpful in planning PTSD prevention programs in the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces); the fact that survivors could discuss their past freely with other survivors and the help they gained by that, pointed to the need to treat post traumatic soldiers inside their units taking advantage of the cohesion.

And finally, when Holocaust survivors are studied together with post-traumatic populations, the erroneous opinion that similar findings are expected must be discounted. The differences between the Holocaust and other genocides are obvious, forming the difference between such groups. Even though this subject is sensitive, delicate and painful – we propose that it must be confronted.

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Part III
Genocide, Representation and
Memorialization

Chapter 8

The Face of War and Genocide

Jay Winter

Abstract The transformation of war in the twentieth century has had two facets: the industrialization of killing and the obliteration of the distinction between civilian and military targets. Consequently, war and genocide have become braided together in new and appalling ways. Representations of both in the visual arts have changed as well since 1914, when the icon of war was the face of the individual soldier. Over time, war has lost its human face, in part due to the introduction of new weapons and in part due to the disappearance of entire peoples, whose murder was an intentional object of war. It is therefore possible to speak of the effacement of war over the past 100 years, its loss of a human face in the century of total war.

Keywords Warfare · Genocide · Soldiers' art · Aerial bombardment · Effacement · Void

Introduction

What is it that we look for when we look for genocide? Whatever we seek, we are unlikely to find it, for its essence is absence, void, emptiness. The vastness of destroyed Armenian communities in Anatolia, of Auschwitz-Birkenau, of the killing fields in Rwanda or Cambodia: each is a landscape of what is not there, what is hidden, what has been effaced.

The Latin origin of effacement means undoing. But the English language (alongside others) has added other connotations: to suppress, to make disappear, to obscure, to hide. I want to go one step further and take effacement as a homonym and define it as the disappearance or absence of the human face.

One central pathway toward genocide has been that of international warfare. To be sure, civil war and domestic repression have led to genocidal practices too, in North America, in Central America, in Africa and Asia, and in Australia. But the

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foundational events that led Raphael Lemkin to coin the neologism “genocide” were the two World Wars.

My central argument is not about the linkage between war and genocide but about representations of both. I want to suggest that both international war and the genocidal campaigns that arose directly out of them were “effaced” in the twentieth century. My claim is that seeing genocide today is very difficult, in part because seeing war is difficult, and this difficulty has deepened over the past 100 years.

In painting, sculpture, and installation art in many parts of the world today, war is no longer configured through the human face. In part this is a reflection of internal changes in the arts, but in part it is a reflection of the changing nature of war. In 1914, war had a human face—the face of the generation of soldiers who fought and died on the battlefields of the Great War. But over time, the faces of those who have fought in war and at times of those who have become its victims have faded slowly from view, after the moment when war and genocide came together. The way many of us see war today, I believe, is very different from the way the men and women of 1914–1918 saw it, in part because of genocide. And since, with some exceptions, what we see matters much more than what we read, it is of some importance to trace the nature and consequences of this flight from figuration, this occlusion of the human face and form, in representations of war and genocide in the twentieth century and beyond.

Another way of putting the point is to say that what we have witnessed is the braiding together of war with terror over the past three generations. To be sure, this is in no sense a twentieth-century innovation. Goya’s *Disasters of War* left hardly anything about human cruelty to the imagination; and the art of photography accompanied both Sherman’s march to the sea in the American Civil War and the bloody suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China at the turn of the twentieth century.

What the visual arts were able to convey in the twentieth century were central shifts in the targets of war, and hence in war’s killing power. The terror in total war rests in part on the industrialization of violence, and in part on the fact that the reach of the state was greater than ever before; consequently, in wartime, no one was ever safe. After 1914, a new kind of assembly-line destruction emerged, mixing high-explosive shells, poison gas, and by the 1930s air power as well as toxic forms of ideology in different deadly amalgams. As a result, war and mass terror became virtually synonymous.

The nature and rules of war itself shifted in significant ways too. In 1914–1918, the rules of engagement on the battlefield changed, in such a way as to open the door to many war crimes, including genocide; in the interwar years, the bombing of civilian targets became for the first time a centerpiece of armed conflict; after 1941, genocide became an integral part—some would say the defining part—of the war the Nazis waged. In each case, though in different ways, terror became the unavoidable face of war, and artists were there to configure it, to give terror a face, a name, and a place. This chapter sketches some of the ways artists created enduring representations of the twentieth-century degeneration of warfare into genocide, into inescapable terror. The individuals whose work I focus on particularly today are these three: Otto Dix, Pablo Picasso, and Anselm Kiefer, though I will refer to other individuals and forms of configuration of the victims of war as well.

All three artists are well known, but putting them together may help us see more clearly both the changing link between history and terror and changing strategies of configuring war and genocide over the past century. The evolution of visual representations of war shows us how images change when targets, or if you will, victims, change. In the Great War, terror had a face, and it was that of the soldier. There were tens of millions of victims, but the ones to receive iconic status both during the conflict and in its aftermath were the men at the front. There were other nominees we could name. The victims of the Armenian Genocide were there; but the political conflict over their treatment went on and on, and made their genocidal fate contested terrain. But no one doubted at the time that the enduring images of industrial killing in the 1914–1918 war returned again and again to the men in the trenches, the men we still call the “lost generation.”

Aerial bombardment came to both Europe and the world with a vengeance in the 1930s. Both the Japanese and the Italians used poison gas in warfare in China and in Ethiopia, and the Turkish government bombed Armenians and Kurds in Dersim from the air in 1937–1938, but it was aerial bombardment in Europe that presented another enduring set of images, this time of the plight of innocents in wartime. Here the iconic figures were civilians, townspeople, farmers, and their animals, under indiscriminate and devastating bombardment from the air.

When we turn to the 1939–1945 war, any interrogation of the linkage between war, terror, and history must consider the Holocaust. And over time, the Holocaust has come to occupy a larger and larger place within the history of the Second World War (1939–1945). Still, the Holocaust was by no means the only wartime instance of mass murder and butchery of people not for what they did but for who they were. The Rape of Nanjing in 1937 and the Ustasha-led genocide in Yugoslavia both deserve our attention here, as does the terror induced by the “conventional” firebombing of Tokyo and Dresden and the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan (August 6th 1945 on Hiroshima and August 9th on Nagasaki). These acts of war unleashed a debate about the use of terror that echoes down to our own times.

My first point is a simple one: as war and terror have changed, so have their artistic configurations. The second point I want to make is more formal in character. That is, when we move from the Great War to the interwar years and then to the Second World War, we can see that the partial occlusion of the human face in the configuration of terror is one of the most striking features of changing European representations of war and of genocide within war. There are exceptions, both in Europe and in other parts of the world, to be sure, but on balance, the move I try to document in this chapter is one away from a naturalistic representation of the human face and figure. Thus the images in Otto Dix’s Great War paintings, done from 1914 to 1940, are still life-size and identifiably human, though the soldiers so represented faced monumental horror on the field of battle. The terror of the victims of the destruction of *Guernica* in Picasso’s painting (1937) is inscribed in part in facial features, and in part in the cruciform and symbolic elements of the ensemble. In contrast, there is a much more complex set of choices in artistic representations of the Second World War in general and of the Holocaust in particular. There have been many nonfigurative images used metonymically to stand for the monstrous whole.

Many representations of the organized destruction of synagogues in Germany in November 1938 are void of figures; this was true of much, though not all, photography at the time. It remains true in later representations of this iconic act, as in Anselm Kiefer's *Breaking of the vessels* (1990),¹ to which I will return in a moment, and Kiefer's more recent *Language of the birds* (*Birdsong*), displayed in 2012 at the White Cube gallery in London, United Kingdom.

A different set of problems emerged when artists approached the task of representing the emptying of a whole discrete world, the Jewish world of Central and Eastern Europe, an entire population, its language, its culture, its presence, now almost entirely gone. The dimensions of this, the essential victory registered by Hitler, are in their magnitude terrifying. And yet this terror has been made visceral first in art by portraiture, in prose, and in poetry, and then later by the effacement of figuration itself. Consider first the face of Anne Frank on the cover of her published diary, or her conventional, and at times, sanitized, representation on the stage and in film as one end of the spectrum. Then consider the work of Anselm Kiefer or the architecture of Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum in Berlin as an alternative. We should recall that that face, and the diary Anne Frank wrote, was certainly part of the story of the Holocaust. But we do not see nor do we hear of what happened when she was incarcerated, when she became ill, when she died. Her witness is in the antechamber to the Holocaust. Primo Levi's extraordinary memoir, *if this is a man*, now available in 48 languages, has—to the best of my knowledge—appeared most of the time with an abstract cover and not one with Levi's face on it. Primo Levi's voice has replaced his face.

I do not wish to make a strict division here, but my point is that this flight from figuration is not particularly evident in the case of the Great War or of the Armenian Genocide. It is not evident in the representation of warfare and horror in the 1930s. Only after the Holocaust, and perhaps in part because of the Holocaust, has abstraction come into its own as an indispensable way of representing the links between war, terror, and history. Another way of making the point is this. Putting a human face on the Holocaust may have been impossibility, not because the crime was indescribable, but because its enormity seems to have undermined certain currents of humanistic thinking that return to the face as the source of our knowledge of ourselves and others. Look at a Rembrandt self-portrait and you will see what I mean. Here is Emmanuel Levinas's phrasing of the issue. "The face," he writes, "a thing among other things, pierces" the frailty of our existence. "The face speaks to me and thereby invites me into a relationship with another, a relationship without parallel, leading either to fulfillment or to recognition" (Levinas 1961, 172).² The Holocaust erased or blotted out that face, that relationship, that recognition. In that sense, it had no face, and thus no meaning. Facelessness is a language of post-Holocaust art.

I want to offer a snapshot of my interpretation in the juxtaposition of two works of art: one by Paul Klee in 1919 and another by Anselm Kiefer in 2012. My argument is captured here, and I am tempted to simply stop here. The two works said it all. In what follows, my aim is to trace the shift from Klee's *Angelus novus* (*Angel*

¹ St. Louis Art Museum, St. Louis, Missouri, USA.

² I owe this reference to Paul Gradwohl.



Fig. 8.1 Paul Klee, *Angelus novus* (*Angel of history*) (left) and Anselm Kiefer, *Sprache der Vögel* (*Language of the birds or Birdsong*) (right)

of history), to Kiefer's *Sprache der Vögel* (*Language of the Birds* or *Birdsong*) (Fig. 8.1). The contrast in front of us reinforces my claim that over the past century war and genocide have had a history in the visual arts and in the arts of representation just as much as they do in the very material and lethal practices of organized violence. I want to offer a few thoughts on this matter and to suggest that, in contrast to the terror of trench warfare in 1914–1918, or of the destruction of towns and ordinary people under the bombers in the interwar years and after, there emerged a different kind of nonfigurative configuration of war and terror after Auschwitz. And yet the human face, that profile which Primo Levi asked us to consider “if this be a man,” did not vanish completely. If conventional figuration seemed inadequate to the task at hand, many jurists, survivors, artists, and healers turned to a different kind of portraiture, to a different field of force, this time one with voices attached to them. Conjuring up the Holocaust has turned to the human voice more and more, in an effort to capture the shape and sentiment of the six million who vanished during the Shoah and of the men and women who survived the slaughter. Voices are speech acts to which we attach faces, as any radio listener can attest. In this context, auditory memory may have a force that visual memory lacks.

To be sure, this contrast between figuration before Auschwitz and alternative auditory configurations after Auschwitz needs to be qualified and nuanced. Cultural history is messier than that. The images of grotesquely joined piles of corpses being shifted into mass graves by bulldozers were captured by British and American troops almost immediately after the liberation of the camps. Thereafter, the faces of skeletal prisoners in striped uniforms were seared into our minds, and alongside other images, for instance of children surrendering amid the ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto, these portraits in extremis informed and still inform our sense of the terror of the Shoah.

A more precise way of putting the point is to say that the Shoah made ambiguous a return to the human form as a metonym for mass suffering, as occurred in art dedi-

cated to capturing some sense of the terror of war in 1914–1918 or of warfare in the interwar years. Instead representations of the terror of the Holocaust describe a house of many mansions, most of them ruined. Some employ figuration—for example, in Alain Resnais’ 1955 masterpiece, *Nuit et brouillard* (*Night and fog*), in the close-up photography and voices of Claude Lanzmann’s *Shoah*, and in the video portraits, preserved in Holocaust survivor archives around the world, to recapture the face of terror in the faces of those who survived it. At the same time, other artists have used more abstract metonyms, or gestures toward the terror in the art of ruins—here Kiefer is a central figure—of what James Young has termed “anti-monuments,” those which fall apart or disappear (Young 2000). There are other choices I could have made, but I will discuss this shifting landscape of the representation of the terror of the Holocaust primarily through the installation art of Anselm Kiefer.

Choosing Kiefer is problematic, in another sense, in that he was born, as I was, in 1945, and his work is filtered through later German history as much as it bears witness to the terror of the Holocaust. But one of the features of the representational universe surrounding the Shoah is its slow transformation over the second half of the twentieth century and beyond. We need to go well beyond 1945 to see this phenomenon clearly. After what may be termed a latency period, when the faces and voices of the survivors were occluded, for instance in the Nuremberg trials, they returned into our auditory and visual fields after the Eichmann trial, and in the 1970s and after.

Voices now had listeners, an audience that has grown exponentially. Primo Levi’s masterpiece, *If this is a man* (*se questo è un uomo*), was completed in Italian in 1946; it sold 1500 copies and then faded into obscurity. It was reprinted in English, 1961 in German and later captured an exponentially growing reading public. Since the 1970s, it has become, as I have already noted, an international best seller. Why people wanted to hear his voice at one moment, and why they did not at an earlier moment, is a central question I wish to address.

One answer is that over time, memory became tied up in law, and both became performative. The witness has a voice, and the witness demands to be heard. She testifies. Another answer is that the emergence of the Holocaust witness coincided with the rebirth of human rights as the signature of the European experiment. It was a coincidence, to be sure, but through the Helsinki Accords (August 1, 1975), international agreements guaranteeing the Western borders of the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s, Human Rights Watch and other groups earned the right to survey, hear, and defend the voices of Soviet dissidents, the voices of Charter 77 in Prague, and other voices around the world. Which is cause and which is effect is hard to say; both Holocaust testimony and human rights activism were acts of witnessing, and powerful acts at that.

We need to note too that technical change made a difference, though of a facilitating rather than a creative kind. Over the same years, audio cassettes were complemented by cheap video cassettes and recording technology, and both were amplified by the Internet in their ability to preserve the voices (and faces) of witnesses of all kinds. The impulse was there; the audience was there; the new technology of the 1970s and 1980s brought them together, and there they remain to this day.

A quick caveat or two must be offered at this point. The distinction I make between privileging the voice and privileging the face in representations of terror

and its victims is a heuristic one. Both have had their place in the representation of war and terror. Still, my instinct is to say that there has been a change, in the sense that voices matter more now after the end of the twentieth century than at its beginning. The cry of wounded men on the Somme is something we can never hear; the drone of the bombers or the voices of those under the Condor Legion's attack in Guernica are not available to us; but the voices of those who survived the camps are with us; they are powerful and perhaps unique. I want to suggest that auditory commemoration is now a pillar of remembrance; it has developed in museums, in archives, in film, on the Internet, and in the court room as a complex complement to the earlier facial and figurative representation of terror in wartime. We now hear what war and terror were and are, and perhaps through hearing them, in a way we can "see" them or imagine them more profoundly as well.

What we hear, after all, when affect is attached to a voice, configures visual images in powerful ways. I am reminded of the remark of the great British journalist Alistair Cooke, whose *Letter from America* was broadcast in Britain on BBC radio every Sunday morning for 40 years (1946–2004). He was asked one day why he preferred to work in radio. His answer was the pictures are better.

The second caveat is that we must resist a form of contextual reductionism in understanding the visual arts. They have their own rules and rhythms, and their autonomous unfolding can never be reduced to a mechanical process in which superstructure follows base as night follows day. Still, we should not reify the arts either, as if those who produce them live in a cocoon, until that moment when they emerge as beautiful creatures and fly their own way. They are among us.

The third caveat is this. I can only refer in the most cursory fashion to a field much, much larger than my capacity to analyze it. All I want to suggest in a preliminary manner is that capturing not the faces but the voices of the survivors has become one essential way of making present in our lives the catastrophic encounter of war, terror, and history on which we reflect in this book.

Fourth, I believe the distinction to which I point here is one most clearly visible in Europe east of the river Elbe. Heroic histories and images, fully visible and figurative, dominated the Soviet empire until its collapse in 1991. The figuration of war and the victims of war has not faded in Poland, Russia, the Ukraine, and elsewhere in the intervening decades,³ nor has it diminished in parts of the United States or Australia where the face of the soldier past and present is a common point of reference.⁴ The purchase of my argument is strongest, I believe, in Western and Central Europe, where the European Union has grown precisely at a time when the presence and political and cultural significance of the military has diminished radically. When James Sheehan asked in the title of a history of twentieth-century Europe

³I acknowledge here the work of Sasha Etkind and colleagues in the Memory at War project of the Cultural Reconstruction in Conflict project (CRIC), both based at the University of Cambridge.

⁴See the project organized by Bruce Scates of Monash University on the history of Anzac Day, and Marilyn Lake et al., *What's wrong with Anzac? The militarization of Australian history*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2008.

“Where have all the soldiers gone?” he was making a statement cultural historians need to attend to more and more as time goes by (Sheehan 2008).

Mediations: Otto Dix and Trench Warfare

All art is a form of mediation, and the notion that experience is captured in some pristine form by the artist is a conceit long since repudiated by producers and consumers alike. Images of horror are mediated images, and to show the differences in such mediation is to do much to unfold some of the differences of early and later nineteenth-century images of terror in war.

Otto Dix’s etchings of the war and the Western Front are a case in point. Dix served on the Somme in 1916, in Champagne in 1917, where he was wounded three times, and on the Russian front. As a noncommissioned officer and machine gunner, he saw some of the worst fighting of the war. When in 1924 he sought to return to this landscape, he did so through photography. Why this distanciation? In part it was the heaviness of his personal memory of the war.

Like many other veterans, Dix was haunted by images of trench warfare. He spoke of a recurrent nightmare in which he crawled through destroyed houses forever. He never lost sight of the fact that living in the front lines was like living in a noisy, filthy maze. He had volunteered in 1914 but quickly lost his youthful illusions about military service. He painted the face of war in 1914 (Fig. 8.2) before he found out how mistaken he was about it.

Already inclined to mythical and decadent themes prior to the war, Dix found on the Western Front a diabolical landscape, beyond his worst imaginings. He summed up his experiences of trench life in these words, recorded in his war diary in 1916: “Lice, rats, barbed wire, fleas, shells, bombs, underground caves, corpses, blood, liquor, mice, cats, artillery, filth, bullets, mortars, fire, steel: that is what war is. It is the work of the devil.”⁵

The work of the devil was visible in the faces of the men who killed and who faced the risk of mutilation and death every day they were in the trenches. The range of horrors was evident in Dix’s *Der Krieg* (The War) etchings (Figs. 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, 8.8 and 8.9). In Fig. 8.3, one dead soldier has taken his life; look at the angle of his rifle pointing at his own face. This may have been staged, since a shot from his rifle would have blown his head off. And yet, the image tells us what we need to know about living and dying in the trenches.

In Fig. 8.4, the men descending a slope with machine gun equipment are framed by what appears to be a landslide of corpses.

In Fig. 8.5, the living rest alongside and are braided together with the entrails of men and the roots of trees. Here is a crucifixion of living things and humans alike,

⁵Otto Dix, War diaries, 1915–1916 (Albstadt: Städtische Galerie, 1985), 25. As cited in Karcher 1987, 14.



Fig. 8.2 Otto Dix, *Self-portrait as a soldier* (*Selbstbildnis als Soldat*), 1914

a clear reference to the Isenheim altarpiece of Matthias Grünewald, a classic of German Renaissance art.

Figures 8.6 and 8.7 tell us about other terrors of combat, through the gas-mask-covered faces of storm troopers and the unmasked and unhinged face of a wounded trench soldier.

Figure 8.8 is similarly configured; a blackened boyish figure grins in front of a scene of total devastation.

Figures 8.9 and 8.10 return to the theme of the monstrous deformation of the bodies of dead men and dead horses.



Fig. 8.3 Otto Dix. *Der Krieg*

Figure 8.11 is entitled *Totentanz* (dance of death). Figure 8.12 introduce other elements of terror.

The first is at one remove from the trenches, and shows the faces of terrified civilians under air attack; the second is on a theme Dix developed in his later work. It is the terror etched into the faces of mutilated men. This last selection from the series of etchings entitled *Der Krieg* is entitled *Transplantation*.

Once more the notion of the human face as the measure of terror extends from the living to the dead, from the mad to the mutilated. If we do not look at the face of the warrior, Dix tells us, we do not know anything about war, nor do we know about the terror it spread among the millions of men who endured it.



Fig. 8.4 Otto Dix. Der Krieg

Death Descends from the Skies

I have included one image of Dix's classic sequence of 53 etchings on war that points to the second part of this chapter. It is that war and terror were redefined by technology; that is, the emergence of bombers capable of reaching any city in Europe with a load of explosives made the terror of war move from trenches to cities. Stanley Baldwin, the British prime minister, famously asserted that the bomber will always get through. From 1936 on, the notion circulated very widely that the outbreak of war in Europe was bound to mean civilian deaths on a hitherto unknown scale. Even though this catastrophe did not happen in September 1939 when war broke out, its contours were already well known.

In part, that shift of the image of terror from trenches to cities was a function of newsreels. But once again, while newsreels brought the facts of war to millions virtually at the same moment the violence happened, it was art mediated by newsreels that provided us with iconic images of terror. I refer to Pablo Picasso's *Guernica*, painted in a fever in the 4 weeks following the Condor Legion's attack on the Basque city on 26 April 1937. Here was what contemporaries termed "terror bombing," the purpose of which was not to move the line to the advantage of one side in the war but to destroy the lives of noncombatants behind the lines.



Fig. 8.5 Otto Dix. *Der Krieg*

This obliteration of the distinction between civilian and military targets had begun in 1914, when Belgian and French civilians were targeted or executed by advancing German troops. This degeneration of the rules of warfare was evident in the case of Russian atrocities in Galicia in 1915, and in the expulsion and murder of more than one million Armenians from Ottoman Turkey, begun in the same year. Civil wars throughout Eastern Europe and what was termed euphemistically by diplomats “population exchange” in Greece and Turkey after the war made everyone the target of military or paramilitary violence. But it was air power that transformed the face of war, and began to change the way the human face itself was represented in the visual arts.

Picasso’s *Guernica* is instructive here. It is probably the most celebrated and perhaps the most circulated image of war in our times or at any time. Attention to its



Fig. 8.6 Otto Dix. Der Krieg



Fig. 8.7 Otto Dix. Der Krieg



Fig. 8.8 Otto Dix. *Der Krieg*

configuration can tell us much about configurations of terror in the time when death came from the skies. The composition is marked, even framed, by newsprint, and by the black and white of newsreels. There are two clusters of faces. Three on the right, terrified faces of people, are moving to the center of the scene; three on the left are victims: one man, probably a soldier, broken sword in hand, is prostrate, indeed cruciform in shape, with a frozen cry on his face; his eyes still see, but not those of the child to his left. His dead body is cradled by his mother. In the center are two animals: an immutable *toro* and a terrified horse, above which an electric light shimmers.

I have puzzled over this light bulb, and determined, using Ockham's razor, that it is precisely that—a light bulb, drawing ironic attention to the power of electricity to deliver terror from the air. Why ironic? Because Picasso painted the *Guernica* canvas to be displayed in the Spanish pavilion within the Exposition Internationale des



Fig. 8.9 Otto Dix. *Der Krieg*

Arts et des Techniques Appliqués à la Vie Moderne (Expo), which opened in May 1937. And that Expo was a celebration of science—in particular, of electricity—which turned Paris into the city of lights, of illumination promising a cornucopia of benefits to humankind. Raoul Dufy, an artist whom Picasso detested, painted for the expo the biggest mural ever made. It was entitled *La fée électricité*, and expressed this bold and naïve view of science as beneficent (Fig. 8.13).

It was in gazing at this fair that the philosopher and critical theorist Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) began the meditations that arrived in his celebrated *épigramme* that there is no document of civilization that is not at one and the same time a document of barbarism. Picasso, casting a jaundiced eye at Dufy’s mural, painted that document of barbarism. Terror here had a human face, but it was one detached not only from platitudes about science but also from prior representations of warfare. Picasso was the artist of angular planes, of body parts decomposed, or rather recomposed to express something figurative art could no longer embody (Winter 2006, chap. 3).




Fig. 8.10 Otto Dix. *Der Krieg*

I prefer to see Picasso as a liminal figure, in which configurations of terror are visible, but not in the kind of composition Otto Dix and his contemporaries knew. Both Dix and Picasso constructed images of terror mediated by prior visual images; photos in the case of Dix, newsreels in the case of Picasso. The question I want to pose is how were the horrors of the Second World War, in particular of the Holocaust, configured? My response is a mixed one. There were conventional and figurative images of war and genocide available at the time. But what we see in the art of terror that followed the Holocaust is a set of images in which the human figure is either absent or marginal.

Empty Spaces

I want to take a tentative step toward framing an argument that cannot be definitive. Why not? Because the more we look at the Holocaust, the less we tend to see. This is a claim made by Inga Clendinnen, and it is one I want to explore. By this claim, I do not mean that we miss the traces, or cannot find sites of remembrance. On the contrary, they are not hard to find. My claim is rather that when we see the topography of terror not only in Berlin but also in the concentration camps Mauthausen,



Fig. 8.11 Otto Dix, *Totentanz*

Majdenek, Theresienstadt, Dachau, Buchenwald, or Auschwitz, we see elements of a story the full contours of which tend to escape us. Metaphors seem to lack their conventional power, as to a degree did photographs.

Human faces and bodies predominated in photos immediately after the war.

Figure 8.14 shows men who survived treatment in the sub-camp of Ebensee at Mauthausen. The British and the Americans were so shocked at what they found that they turned these images into documentary newsreels, and in many cases forced German civilians to see them.

This phenomenon is well documented, and so was the use of documentary images in the justly celebrated film by Alain Resnais *Nuit et brouillard*, released in 1955. Resnais worked with two survivors, Jean Cayrol, who wrote the script, and Hans Eisler, who composed the music. Resnais aimed at a kind of desolate tranquility in his presentation of the landscape of terror, but he ran into censorship problems when he showed the faces of French policemen who guarded Jewish deportees on their way to Drancy, and then Auschwitz. In order to get the film shown commercially, Resnais had to efface the policemen so that no one in the audience could see a single French *kepi* in the film; thus French responsibility for the Shoah literally would be effaced (Lindeperg 2007).



Fig. 8.12 Otto Dix, *Transplantation*

I want to use this instance of effacement to raise a more general point about the representation of war and terror after the Holocaust. My claim is *not* that the Holocaust is beyond representation; it is rather that the focus on the single human face, so striking in both Dix and in different and liminal ways in Picasso, is missing in what we now term Holocaust art. Yes, this in part reflects movements toward abstraction or toward conceptual art. But it may also be a statement of puzzlement on the part of artists themselves as to how to represent something as vast as the Holocaust.

I want to explore this point with respect to the work of Anselm Kiefer, and make some very brief references too to the architecture of Daniel Libeskind. The reason for doing so is both their standing in the world of art and architecture and what I would like to term their strategy of effacement in representing the Holocaust. Perhaps nine million men died on active military service during the First World War, but no one to my knowledge tried to represent this immense absence through what I have termed effacement, or perhaps more simply stated, through making us aware




Fig. 8.13 Raoul Dufy, *La fée électricité*



Fig. 8.14 Sub-camp of Ebensee at Mauthausen

of this vast disappearing act called war by making the human face disappear from their canvases. During the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath, millions of men and women died; one estimate has it that more than one million Republicans died after the formal end of the fighting in March 1939 (Graham 2006). And yet our images of the war are still figurative, visual, and—what I would term for purposes of argument—facial. Even Dix's art of disfigurement draws us back to the human face.

For a host of reasons, many artists came separately to the conclusion that what happened thereafter in Germany and throughout Europe was not possible to *configure*, if I may decompose the term. Instead, and with its own dynamics, abstraction took the place of the human form. Let me show you how this operates in the work of these two artists, Kiefer and Libeskind.

First Kiefer. Born in 1945, educated in Düsseldorf, he encountered the circle of artists formed around Joseph Beuys. Beuys's trajectory was all too familiar. Born in 1921, Beuys joined the Hitler Youth, attended a Nuremberg rally—his face could have been one of those delirious young men when they were in the presence of the Führer. He volunteered for the Luftwaffe (air forces) and fought as a rear gunner in a Stuka detachment. His plane was shot down over the Crimea in March 1944. Beuys attributed his survival after severe burns to care by nomadic Tatar tribesmen who covered him in animal fat and felt. Whether or not this actually happened is neither here nor there. Beuys recovered and was redeployed as a paratrooper on the Western front, where was wounded a further five times. If ever there was an artist who knew the face of war and the terror it conveyed, it was Joseph Beuys.⁶

Beuys later constructed an abstract design for a Holocaust memorial at Auschwitz, but his project was not accepted. In 1961 he became Professor of Monumental Sculpture at Düsseldorf University, Düsseldorf, Germany; he lasted for 11 years, during which he accepted anyone who wanted to study with him. One such student was Anselm Kiefer.

Kiefer, like me, was a child of the last months of the war. He studied with Beuys in 1970 and developed some of Beuys's approaches to the use of natural materials—trees, glass, straw, wood—in painting and sculpture. But unlike Beuys, he was never accused of avoiding the Holocaust or his own past. These critiques—mostly without any foundation—surrounded Beuys in his later years, and it is important not to draw too direct a line between Beuys and Kiefer. Here there are clear affinities, but dissimilarities too. Both have mystical elements in their work, but in the case of Kiefer, it is Jewish mysticism, as well as numerous biblical texts, both Old and New Testament in origin, which have been at the center of his art in recent years.

Kiefer has addressed the Jewish-German embrace in a host of ways, but to the best of my knowledge, rarely through the human face. He uses some figurative elements in his work, but most of the time the face is effaced. There are notable exceptions. In his early years, he used photography to attack the smugness of Germany after the economic miracle brought it back to the center of European life and world

⁶Joseph Beuys, Joseph Beuys: In memoriam Joseph Beuys: Obituaries, essays, speeches. Translated by Timothy Nevill (Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1986); Claudia Mesch and Viola Michely (eds.), Joseph Beuys: The reader (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007).




Fig. 8.15 Anselm Kiefer, *The ways of worldly wisdom: Arminius's battle*

affairs. He famously photographed himself giving the Nazi salute in front of a military sculpture or other site. In addition, on some rare occasions, he used portraits for ironic purposes.

Here in Fig. 8.15 is his *Ways of worldly wisdom: Arminius's battle* (1978). This oil on woodcut mounted on paper is a collage of German romanticism, using the faces of notables in German cultural life to question the still-present danger of the national idea and the myths of Germaneness surrounding it.

In his youth, when Kiefer photographed or painted the face and figure, it was in a savagely ironic manner. The face of war was the face of those giving the Nazi salute. Figures 8.16 and 8.17 are images from 1969, images that Kiefer has integrated into later work.

They represent what was no longer possible to configure—the human form frozen in worship of the Führer. The question Kiefer has posed ever since is how to go beyond the figurative and the facial in artistic meditations on the catastrophic century in which he and I were born.

In Kiefer's later work, the human figure is by and large absent. Could it be, I wonder, if he has taken to heart the teachings of the Kabbalah that we must never reproduce the human face, because that puts us at risk of reproducing the face of God, something entirely forbidden in orthodox Jewish tradition? This may be indi-



Fig. 8.16 Anselm Kiefer, Face of War

rectly evident in a theme Kiefer has returned to time and again: the cabbalistic story of the breaking of the vessels.

In short, the cabbalistic answer to the question posed by theodicy—How can evil exist in a world created by an omnipotent and benevolent God?—is that when God created the universe, he withdrew in space in order to create the void in which the universe was born. The creative material out of which the world came was contained in vessels, which broke into shards through the force of divine creation itself. Those shards fell to earth, and jagged and dangerous, they remained here, as evil in the world.

Have a look at Kiefer's installation in the St. Louis Museum of Art entitled *the breaking of the vessels* (Fig. 8.18). The same theme is there in many other installations on the same theme Kiefer has created (Fig. 8.19). What we see is *Kristallnacht*, the shards of glass, the burnt library of a destroyed synagogue, framed by the cabbalistic signs of the zodiac as a kind of rainbow after the flood.

Now I ask you to have a look at a photograph of the London library after the Blitz (Fig. 8.20). The iconic images of destruction or of the ruins of libraries and the piles of burned or damaged books clearly emerge from sources other than the Holocaust. But such images take on a metonymical function when the Holocaust is located centrally within the destruction wrought by the Second World War.

When I started work in the field of the cultural history of war 50 years ago, the Holocaust was not at the heart of narratives of the Second World War. Now it is, and that development is not simply a historiographical matter; public institutions have elided the two. There is now a powerful Holocaust exhibition permanently placed on top of the large displays on the Second World War in the Imperial War Museum.



Fig. 8.17 Anselm Kiefer, Face of War

The same elision is evident in other war museums, including the Auckland War Memorial Museum in New Zealand. This instauration of the Holocaust within war narratives is now a global phenomenon.

Consequently, it is hardly surprising that a photograph from the London Blitz was one source for another important visualization of the Holocaust that has dispensed entirely with the human Fig. I speak of the design of the Jewish Museum in



Fig. 8.18 Anselm Kiefer, *The breaking of the vessels*

Berlin by Daniel Libeskind, a Polish-born child of Holocaust survivors, who at the age of 13 moved from Poland to the United States.

To be sure, a comparison of installation art and of architecture is both necessary and difficult. Architecture has abstract elements in it by definition. What interests me in Libeskind's work is the transformation of photography into architecture. Have a look at the internal design of the Holocaust museum in Berlin (Fig. 8.21).

It presents visitors with the crossing lines of the broken and burnt beams of a synagogue destroyed 70 years ago in *Kristallnacht*. And it has a sense of an absence, a never to be filled void, which is both uncanny and very troubling. Each time I have visited the museum, I have felt ill. Partly it is due to the lack of straight lines; partly to the incline of all planes. In part it is due to the absence of the human face.

In recent years, the curators of the museum have filled it with faces. It contains a rich and varied collection of the history of German Jewry over a 1000 years. I must admit that this collection, admirable though it is, leaves me cold. This is not because of its design or its meticulous presentation of a world that has vanished. It is because the building overwhelms its contents. The void sucks into it whatever objects come to fill it. It is its lack of representational elements that gives the building its force to act as a work of art.



Fig. 8.19 Anselm Kiefer

En guise de Conclusion

The first point I would like to draw from this brief and incomplete discussion is that terror has a history. It is a history filtered through images that changed over time. In the Great War, terror took on the face of the *Frontsoldaten*, the *poilu*, Tommy Atkins, those unfortunate men who lived and died in a trench system stretching with various intervals across Europe, from Calais to Caporetto and beyond. Those who withstood the terror, who stood their moral ground, as it were, and remained recognizable human beings, like many of the Anzacs, these men could indeed be seen as heroes. And yet over time when war lost its human face, so too did the hero. The cult of the military hero is one of the casualties of the changing face of warfare over the past



Fig. 8.20 Bombed libraries at Holland House, Kensington, London, 1940

century. This is not to diminish the extraordinary bravery of men and women in the Resistance or in later conflicts; it is simply to register a change in both the way war has been waged and how it has been represented.

In the interwar years, the killing power of the bomber separated those who killed from those who were killed, at least in Europe. Slaughter in China after the Japanese invasion of 1931 and the murderous campaigns of 1937 and after took on older forms. But the bomber changed perceptions of war and broadened the pool of victims trapped by the new technology of destruction.

In the Second World War, the face of victimhood changed again. This time there were millions of foot soldiers who died in combat, and millions more civilians who died either under aerial bombardment or in extermination camps. Those who vanished in the Shoah, those who were fed into the machines of assembly-line murder, were the victims of a technology of killing if not new, then one refined and perfected by a kind of demonic Taylorism, to an end almost beyond our imagination. When the liberators of the camps disclosed the remains of those trapped in the terror we now call the Holocaust, there were photographs and newsreels to record the moment. We have film and photos of this encounter between Allied soldiers and the strange, unearthly creatures that emerged from the camps. But over time the visual record of what Primo Levi termed the actual injury, the insult to humanity, began to fade.

There followed a period when the victims of the camps went into the shadows. As Pieter Lagrou has shown, their face was occluded by the face of the Resistance, whose bravery was undoubted, but whose story of active defiance and struggle con-




Fig. 8.21 Daniel Libeskind, Jewish Museum in Berlin, internal design

trusted with and superseded that of the survivors of the Holocaust (Lagrou 1999). Only by the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the political reconstruction of Europe was complete, was it possible for there to emerge an audience to hear and to see the survivors of the camps.

In all three cases—after the Great War, at the time of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), and in the aftermath of the Second World War, the image of the victim engraved by very different artists was mediated by the visual technology of the day. Photographs provided Otto Dix with the face of war he then transformed into his own vision. Newsreels gave Picasso what he needed to fire his imagination in such a way as to produce the painting of the century in four short weeks. Those

meditating on the Holocaust initially had the film shot by liberators of the camps and the human wreckage left in them.

Over time, though, the face of the victim of the Holocaust receded from the headlines and the newsreels. It took 25 years for them to reemerge, but by the 1970s and after, there unfolded a different problem. Those who visited the camps, and the killing fields of occupied Europe, saw the buildings and the material traces of the Holocaust. But the event was so vast and so hard to grasp that there remained a sense of puzzlement; where do you look in Auschwitz when you try to see the Holocaust?

Artists like Anselm Kiefer and architects like Daniel Libeskind reflected a more general tendency to focus less on the faces of the survivors than on the void left by those who did not survive the Holocaust. Here again, there were parallels with the destruction of the Armenian world in Anatolia. And yet there was a short-lived Armenian republic, transformed into a Soviet republic by 1923. And further separating the two cases was the emphatic and perverse denial by sequential Turkish governments that the genocide had taken place at all.

Clearly there are multiple explanations for the shift within the work of artists and architects from one set of signifiers, focusing on the human face, to another, focusing on ruins and voids. Art has its own rhythms and its own tensions. Clement Greenberg offered an internal explanation of the movement of art toward abstraction in the twentieth century (Greenberg 1986). A sense that the figurative realm had been exhausted did move artists to experiment with abstraction in the same way that 12-tone or atonal music emerged with the recognition that it was pointless to try to write Beethoven's Tenth Symphony.

Let me summarize the position I want to advance here. My first claim is essentially a simple one: as war changed, so did artistic configurations of terror and the victims of terror in wartime. The second point I have made is more formal in character. When we move from the Great War to the interwar years and then to the Second World War and beyond, we can see that the partial occlusion of the human face is one of the most striking features of changing Western representations of war and terror. There are major exceptions here, to be sure, but on balance, the move I have tried to document here is one initially away from a naturalistic or expressionistic representation of the human face and figure in artistic meditations on war and terror.

I have acknowledged that this turn is not universal. In the history of the Vietnam War (1955–1975), there are many iconic images of a figurative kind, especially in photography or documentary film. These are not the same as art, but their presence needs to be acknowledged. My sense is that European and American notions of war have diverged over time, and so have the images and forms artists in Europe and America have used to configure it.

My third claim is more speculative. It is not only abstraction that frames this shift; it is also a change in the stance of the victims of terror. From the 1970s on, the voices as well as the faces of the victims became central to their representation. This was in part due to the judicialization of memory, and in part it is a function of the appearance of forms of cheap and reliable technology enabling the capturing and preservation of both the voice and the face of the witness. We may not be able to “see” the Holocaust, but we can hear the stories of those who saw it from within.

Thus we come full circle. The construction of dozens of Holocaust archives, starting with the first, in 1982 at Yale University in the United States, has made a difference in the human cartography of terror. Here is my central argument: the face of suffering in times of terror and genocide has faded from artistic representations in the century since 1914. But in recent times, the voices recording terror, and the faces of the men and women who recall it, have been preserved. These voices penetrate the void, people it, and give us some elements of the story and some ways to tell it. Perhaps we can hear what we cannot see; perhaps spoken words or voices convey images unavailable to us in other ways. If so, we must reflect on the fact that the history of terror has been traced sequentially, first through the faces and then through the voices of those who knew it from within. The mixture of the two in Yale's Fortunoff archive helps account for its astonishing power.⁷

To be sure, this framework of interpretation leaves out so much. One element in particular requires separate treatment. Why have I not, critics have asked, incorporated material on the spiritualization of art, and the return to sacred forms in the Second World War, in particular in the work of Henry Moore or of T. S. Eliot in Britain? Fair enough; this subject tends to reinforce my view that the Second World War was a moment of crisis, when older modes of representation flared up, as Benjamin put it, just before their disappearance in a secularized culture.

Why have I not, other critics point out, incorporated the very substantial figurative work done by Holocaust survivors themselves, whose art is full of the faces of those who went through the catastrophe? Fair enough as well; but here, too, there is a problem that needs to be elaborated at length.

The art created by survivors is moving and enduring testimony to the astonishing tenacity of men and women to cling on to their dignity and their vision of humanity even or especially at a moment when humanity was obliterated. Their vision must be included in any account of this subject. The problem arises from the fact that the majority of those killed in the Holocaust were Jews from the great centers of Jewish life in Poland and Eastern Europe. My family was among them. Their vision of the world was mythical rather than historical, and many of them completely rejected as blasphemy images of the human face or form. These were created in the image of God and therefore were not for us to conjure up as documentation, nostalgia, or entertainment. It is no accident that great artists—Chagall, Zadkine, for instance—emerged from this world, but the key point is that they rejected it. To use the art of Holocaust survivors to “speak for” the victims is both necessary and deeply problematic. Legends, not images, captured the mentality of the disappeared Jewish world of Eastern Europe, and it is with one such legend that I want to close.

Let me return to the image with which this chapter began. Here are two sculptures: one by Paul Klee and a second by Anselm Kiefer. They are separated by a century. The first is entitled *Angelus Novus*, and was given by Klee to Walter Benjamin, who, reflecting on it, wrote his celebrated ninth thesis on the philosophy of history. Here is the angel of history, unable to even close his wings, facing the

⁷Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimony, Yale University Library. See: <http://web.library.yale.edu/testimonies/about>

catastrophe of history, the detritus of which rises to the sky. He cannot stem its tide; he is no guardian angel, and cannot protect us. All he can do is look and bear witness (Benjamin 1968, 130).

Klee's angel of 1920 had a face; Kiefer's earthscapes a century later are devoid of them. Kiefer's winged creatures are faceless, with burnt books where their faces would be. Klee's angel of history cannot turn away from this terrifying sight. Nor can we.

And yet in Kiefer's latest work, there are so many continuities. Seeing his *Sprache der Vögel*, which I have liberally translated as *Birdsong*, do you not share my sense of the uncanny echo of Heine's warning that first they burn books and then they burn people? And is it not possible that you hear what I do; I hear an echo of Jewish legend, of the story of Hanina ben Teradion, burned at the stake for teaching the Torah. When asked by his students, "What do you see, Rebbi?" he answered, "The parchment is burning, but the letters are taking wing." Perhaps the redemptive thrust of this legend now, after the Holocaust, is out of our reach, but it is not out of sight. Kiefer, like Klee, gives us this gift: a chance to see the era of total war and genocide for what it has been, a time when angels are paralyzed in flight or are buried under a pile of ashes and debris entirely filling the sky.

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Chapter 9

When Past and Present Meet in Israeli Art: Memorialization of the Holocaust

Batya Brutin

*I vowed everything to remember
Remember all and forget nothing*

“Vow” – Avraham Shlonsky (1943)

Abstract Memorialization of the Holocaust in Israeli art appeared from the establishment of the State in 1948 and onwards. It was influenced by Israeli society, Israeli art’s institutional attitude towards the subject and by local historical events such as wars, Nazi criminals’ trials, and the conflict between the Israelis and the Arabs since 1948.

For the first three decades of the State of Israel (1948–1967), survivor artists created artworks relating to their memories from the Holocaust period. In the late 1970s the artistic creation on the subject of the Holocaust intensified with the emergence of “Second Generation” artists responses. During the 1980s onward the Holocaust gained the recognition of the artistic establishment as a worthy topic for Israeli art and it is at the center of the Israeli artistic consciousness ever since in the form of memorialization. The phenomenon spread to Israeli artists with no personal relations to the Holocaust. Some artists used images from the Holocaust to refer to current events. From the 1990s onward, the duality between victim and aggressor became a central theme in Israeli art following the occupation of the West Bank and territories after the 6 day war and the first Intifada (1987–1991).

Keywords Memorialization · Holocaust · Israeli art

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Introduction

In the poem “Vow”, written in *Eretz Israel*¹ in 1943 when the Holocaust occurred in Europe the poet Avraham Shlonsky (1900–1973) commanded to “remember all and forget nothing.” This expression accompanied the personal as well as the national Israeli consciousness ever since.

Memory is the ability of humans to collect, store and mend in their consciousness the pieces, tears, crumbs and words that have been collected from their life experiences and the past. We distinguish between private memory, which is the personal story of each person, and the collective, historical memory of a nation, upon which the spiritual and moral meanings are written and sealed. For children of Holocaust survivors, the Holocaust legacy, which was passed down to them from their parents and from the surroundings in which they were raised, is a dominant component in the creation of their personal memory (Brutin 2008).

Memorialization is the act of remembering an event, a personality or a group of people. Memorialization usually uses tangible means such as monuments, headstones and works of art. Non tangible forms of memorialization include poems and literary works. The horrific Holocaust events left in Holocaust survivors’ souls an enormous emotional space of destruction, death, loss and deep grief. Inevitably, it became a prominent component through which they perceive the world and their lives after the Holocaust. The definition of “Holocaust survivor” in most of the research literature is the following: “those who lived in Nazi-occupied Europe and suffered from the Nazis in the ghettos and camps, in hiding, in flight or as partisans” (Yablonka 1994; Hass 1995). The circumstances in which survivors, among them survivor artists experienced the events during the Holocaust were different from one artist to another. Nonetheless, the need to cope with the traumatic past in their inner world after the Holocaust was common. Upon their arrival to *Eretz Israel*, Holocaust survivors operated in two directions. One direction was preserving the memory of the Holocaust and memorializing it. The survivors told the story of the Holocaust both orally (for example Hanneli Goslar) and in writing (Bat Sheva Dagan, Halina Birenbaum and others). They initiated the laws of remembrance of the Holocaust (for example *Nazis and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law*, 1950, Book of Laws 57, p. 281; “*Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust and Heroism*” 1959, Book of Laws 280, p. 112) and initiated and erected monuments in memory of the Holocaust at Yad Vashem (Buki Schwartz, *The Pillar of Heroism*, 1967–1970; Nathan Rapoport, *The Ghetto Warsaw Uprising Monument*, 1975–1976 and others) in city centers and towns (for example Fred Kormis, (1894–1986) *The Weeping Harp*, 1979, Kiryat Gat) and in or near cemeteries (*To the memory of Kraśnik community*, 1983; *To the memory of Pulawy community* 1985, *To the memory of Kleck community*, 1984 all at Holon cemetery) (Brutin 2005b). They built museums (“The Ghetto Fighters House” museum, “Massuah” museum, Yad Vashem – The Holocaust History Museum) and promoted educational journeys to Poland.

¹The Land of Israel prior to the establishing of the State of Israel in 1948.

The other direction was fostering their new Israeli identity by contributing to the settlements, the military, the industry, the economy, the legal system, the academia and was a significant factor in shaping Israeli culture: theatre, literature, cinema, performing arts and visual arts. The artists among Holocaust survivor were active in both directions (Brutin 2014).

The subject of the Holocaust appeared in Israeli art from the establishment of the State in 1948 and onwards. The integration of the Holocaust in Israeli art through the years was influenced by Israeli society, Israeli art's institutional attitude towards the subject and by local historical events such as wars (Suez Crisis 1956, Six-Day war 1967; Yom Kippur war 1973, First Lebanon War 1982, Second Lebanon war 2006), Nazi criminals' trials (Adolf Eichmann 1961–1962; John Demjanjuk 1987), and the conflict between the Israelis and the Arabs since 1948.

For the first three decades of the State of Israel (1948–1967), survivor artists created artworks relating to their memories from the Holocaust period. In the late 1970s the artistic creation on the subject of the Holocaust intensified with the emergence of “Second Generation” artists responses. These responses used Holocaust imagery but since they did not experience the Holocaust their artworks are a form of memorialization. During the 1980s onward the Holocaust gained the recognition of the artistic establishment as a worthy topic for Israeli art and it is at the center of the Israeli artistic consciousness ever since in the form of memorialization. The phenomenon spread to Israeli artists with no personal relations to the Holocaust (Honi ha-M'agel Itzkowitz, Avner Bar Hama and others). Some artists used images from the Holocaust to refer to current events (Guy Morad, Moshik Lin and Jacob Gildor).

From the 1990s onward, the duality between victim and aggressor became a central theme in Israeli art following the occupation of the West Bank and territories after the 6 day war and the first Intifada (1987–1991).² These artworks deal with the identity reversal from victim to aggressor in both individual and collective Israeli identity. They show the potential in each individual to be both.

In this chapter, I discuss the references toward the Holocaust in Israeli art since 1948 by presenting the variety of visual expressions and their link to Israeli historical events.

Remembering the Horrors of the Holocaust

In the early years of the State of Israel, some survivor artists felt a tremendous need to express immediately in their work the horrors and difficult experiences they endured during the Holocaust (Moshe Bernstein, Samuel Bak and many others). They responded to the atrocity and trauma they experienced by describing the horrors and expressing their pain. Their goal was to show the brutal actions of the Nazis and their collaborators who harmed them simply because they were Jews, and to

²Intifada was a Palestinian violent uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, which lasted from December 1987 until the Madrid Conference in 1991.



Fig. 9.1 Moshe Bernstein, *the Cry (Auschwitz)*, 1950–1951

deal with the fact that Nazi Germany wanted the eradication of the entire Jewish people. The artists depicted the atrocities the Nazis inflicted on the Jews in ghettos and camps from a personal and collective perspective alike. “We wanted to tell, to talk about what we have been through, but people did not want to hear us and we grew silent, until the Eichmann trial” said Yehuda Bacon.³ Influenced by the Eichmann trial (1961–1962) survivor artists felt legitimacy to deal with the Holocaust in their works due to the exposure of Holocaust atrocities through testimonies of survivors (Brutin 2005a).

Israeli society and art had rejected the survivors’ artworks since they dealt with a difficult subject matter and the depictions were difficult to look at, also the artworks were not consistent with the mainstream style of the era – an abstract international style (Manor 1998; Brutin 2000, 2005a). These artists used descriptions such as corpses and crematorium chimneys and biblical images and symbols such as Job and sacrifice of Isaac.

For example, Moshe Bernstein (1920–2006), expressively described an emaciated, tortured and exhausted man from Auschwitz in despair (Fig. 9.1). He stares at us directly forcing us to confront his emaciated body, the blurred number on his arm and his scream. Bernstein, who knew that men called “Muselmann”, reached skeletal condition with a no-expression stare. These “Muselmanns” were apathetic to their surroundings and unable to stand steady on their feet. Bernstein also knew that the camp prisoners usually wore striped clothes, but this description replaced them

³ Interview with Yehuda Bacon, Jerusalem, 14 January 2000.

with a fringed undergarment - “*Talit Katan*” to emphasize his Jewish identity and to express the fact that he was imprisoned in Auschwitz and tattooed. This symbolic description combines tremendous personal pain of the death of the artist’s family, with collective reference expressed by a cry of despair for the disaster of the Jewish people that the world turned their back on them and came not to help them (Basok 1986; Brutin 2000).⁴

In his exhibition catalog from the 1960s Bernstein wrote, “Over twenty-eight years ago my life was shaken; I witnessed the tragic spectacle – my people slaughtered! From that day on, came a change to the course of my thoughts and content of life, and on my way forward as an artist, I devoted and still devote to the subject of the *Shtetl* (Jewish town). Millions of eyes accompany me in this way, eyes of Jews reflecting the depth of the special sadness....” (Bernstein n.d.). In another interview Bernstein said: “I live the Holocaust every day. It is in my mind and all around me all the time and it is with me where ever I go. I do not want to forget.”⁵

Itzchak Belfer (b. 1923) depicted a group of camp prisoners with striped uniform seen in an angle showing only half of their body (Fig. 9.2). The front character appears with a shaved head, mouth open and eyes wide open looking terrified. The other prisoners are wearing striped hats, with their faces expressing suffering and fear, all introspective and with gazes down. The figures are gathered closely, their skinny bodies’ volume is hardly substantial, and the unified description of the striped garments causes them to merge. The multitude of stripes in the clothes and hats conveys a sense of loss of personal identity and a message of a mass of people with a common fate. In this work Belfer seeks to tell the story of many Jews whose personal identity was stolen from them, they were humiliated, tortured and killed, and the world has given a hand to that in its silence (Belfer 1995; Brutin 2016).⁶

Liberators of the death camps saw piles of bodies scattered around the camps. Photographers and artists rushed to record these images. The horrific photographs that were published in the media, the newspapers and film journals turned the corpses to a central image in Holocaust depiction and left a profound and lasting mark. Additionally, artists sought to translate these photographs into art (Amishai-Maisels 1993).

An example is a sketch by Moshe Hoffman (1938–1983); he himself was a Holocaust survivor. Although Hoffman was not in the camps and did not see the bodies himself, he was influenced by the many published photographs of the liberation of the camps and drew a pile of skeletal figures in the series “6000001” of 1966 (Fig. 9.3). On one of the skeletons, he wrote the number 6000001: An extra victim to the six million victims of the Holocaust. In Hoffman’s version, it is God, because faith in him was lost due to the Holocaust (Hoffman 1989; Brutin 2000).

Additionally, Jewish artists used biblical imagery in the context of the Holocaust, not only because all know it and so their message will pass on clearly, but also because they had been brought up on the concept of the identification between past and present (Amishai-Maisels 1993).

⁴ Author’s Interview with Moshe Bernstein, Tel Aviv, August 1999.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Author’s interviews with Itzchak Belfer, Tel Aviv, July 1999.



Fig. 9.2 Itzhak Belfer, “Muselmann” in prisoners uniforms, the 1960s

For example, Job’s image was used to describe the suffering of Jews in the Holocaust and through him; they defy and demand an explanation for the Holocaust (Amishai-Maisels 1993; Brutin 2000). In another example, Nathan Rapaport in his statue *Job* (1968) (Fig. 9.4), shows the image of Job wrapped in a Jewish prayer shawl; he folds his hands on the table of his heart, his head turned toward the sky. On his left forearm, an inmate’s number is engraved. His whole body conveys suffering and his head defiance. Rapaport uses the character of Job for a dual purpose: First,



Fig. 9.3 Moshe Hoffman, *Corpses* from the series “6000001,” 1966

the suffering Job as a symbol of the Jews who suffered the horrors of the Holocaust. Second, the artist uses the figure of Job as defying God, to express outrage for letting this terrible Holocaust happen without doing something to save his people.

Continuation of Victimhood

The catastrophe which befell the Jewish people and the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe clearly demonstrated the urgent need to solve the problem of the Jews' homelessness by re-establishing the Jewish state in Eretz-Israel. This would open the gates of the homeland wide to all Jews and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the comity of nations. Survivors of the Nazi Holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of the world, migrated to Israel, undaunted by difficulties and restrictions, and never ceased to assert their right to dignity, freedom, and honest toil in their national homeland. [The declaration of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948 (5 Iyar 5708)]

According to this declaration, the solution to the problem of exile is a rebirth of the Jewish people in their homeland. Indeed Jews fought fiercely for the establishment of the State of Israel. The struggle for international political recognition and the military campaign to establish the state gave to the Jews, according to this approach, compensation for powerlessness and helplessness that they were subjected to during the Holocaust, when they could not influence their fate. During the struggle for

Fig. 9.4 Nathan Rapoport,
Job, 1968



Jewish statehood, the Jews demonstrated their political ability and military power (Zertal 2002; Salomon 2007). However, alongside their success they paid a high price of loss of many lives in the struggle and wars along the years of existence which in the national consciousness was perceived as continuation of victimhood. Israeli artists depicted this national idea of continuation of victimhood in their artworks by using biblical imagery and self-portraits.

Naftali Bezem (b. 1924) painted the “Sacrifice of Isaac” (Genesis, 22, 1–19) (Fig. 9.5) out of a sense that the Holocaust led to the establishment of the state of Israel (Bezem 1972). Bezem describes Isaac as a Diaspora Jew lying on the altar representing the Holocaust victims who perished and the pyramidal structure alongside his head symbolizes their commemoration. The pyramid is an accepted symbol



Fig. 9.5 Naftali Bezem, *Isaac sacrifice*, 1968

for commemoration since the erection of the Egyptian pyramids in the third millennium BC (Levin 1983). The plant he is holding in his hands implies renewal and life. Thus, the shroud enveloping his body becomes the cactus plant, which is a symbol of the Israeli sabra.⁷ The Sabra itself is a symbol of hope. The message in this description is that out of the ashes of Holocaust victims, who are a generation of exile, arises Israel's new generation that represents the renewal. However, one cannot ignore the fact that Isaac is lying on the altar, and it was made after the Six-Day War. In his interpretation the Jews born in Israel continue to make sacrifices in wars for the existence of the Jewish people in its sovereign state.

Pál Fux (1922–2011) also deals with the continuation of victimhood. He refers in *Abraham and Isaac* (Fig. 9.6) to the first Lebanon war without a personal connection. He represents Abraham as an Auschwitz survivor with a number on his arm dressed in white to highlight his purity and to emphasize him as the victim of the past. Abraham's hand touches a helmet that contains both a young soldier's face and a lamb to symbolize the victim of the present. This work integrates the victims of the Holocaust with the fallen soldiers of Israel's wars representing them as having sacrificed their lives for the nation.⁸

Artists represented their perceptions in various ways. For example in *Self Portrait with Father's Face* from 1986–1987 (Fig. 9.7) Haim Maor (b. 1951) represented his nude self-portrait to express his identification with Holocaust victims: On a cross-

⁷ Sabra is an informal slang term that refers to any Israeli Jew born on Israeli territory.

⁸ Author's interviews with Pál Fux, Jerusalem, October 1999.



Fig. 9.6 Pál Fux, *Abraham and Isaac*, 1982

shaped format he placed his own figure at the center, on both sides he showed his father's portrait, in profile on the right, a frontal image on the left. Accordingly, Maor refers to himself as a victim in his work on two levels: on the first personal level, he represents himself nude, covering his nudity in the same way the victims who were led to the gas chambers or the death pits hid their nudity and in this way he represents himself as one of them. Furthermore, the link between the father's



Fig. 9.7 Haim Maor, *Self Portrait with Father's Face*, 1986–1987

portrait, once in profile and once frontal, reminds us of prisoners' photos from the Nazi concentration camps.⁹ Maor explained his picture:

⁹The Nazis photographed the arriving prisoners in three positions: profile, frontal with uncovered head, and at slight turn with covered head. Maor chose only two of them because he wanted the message and the meaning of this description and its association with the Holocaust to be indirect (Interview with Haim Maor, Kibbutz Givat Haim, (Meuhad), winter 1998).

I resemble my father. By displaying my own portrait as a young man I display my father as a young man, as he looked during the time of the Holocaust. Placing my self-portrait at the center suggests the continuity of “the victim”. Because I might just as well be the next victim. During the 1973 war (also known as “The Yom Kippur War”), I was a reserve soldier, waiting in the Tzrifin military base, the news came of the fall of the Bar-Lev defensive line. Then I thought that there was going to be another Holocaust and I was afraid that I wouldn’t pull through, like my father did, and that I’ll become a victim.¹⁰

This apocalyptic feeling Maor felt is further emphasized by the fact that he failed to complete the painting of the blue background behind his self-portrait, emphasizing the coming calamity. On the other level, putting his own portrait and his father’s portrait on a cross raises the image to a universal level and represents the Jews as the quintessential victims. Maor does not use in this piece the familiar scheme of the crucifixion, however he alludes to the concept of the crucifixion by using the shape of the cross and by placing his father’s and his own figures on it. He uses the descriptive scheme of the crucifixion like many other artists, as a symbol describing the suffering of the Jews in the Holocaust and as a symbol of the murder of the Jews by the Nazis (Amishai-Maisels 1982, 1993).

In order to deal with Israel’s fight for its survival and continuing victimhood, artists used images from the Holocaust, integrated, and compared them to the local conflicted reality, which continues to claim victims. For example, Jacob Gildor (b. 1948), a *Second Generation* artist as well, deals with the victim – perpetrator duality in some of his works, starting in 1991 – following the Gulf War, which brought the issue of the Holocaust back to Israeli society’s consciousness. For him, this war resulted in dealing with the Holocaust from a different perspective; he deals with the continuation of the struggle for existence of the Jewish people (Brutin 2009).¹¹

In *Target* created in 1993–1994 (Fig. 9.8), Jacob Gildor described how the duality of victim-perpetrator exists within him. The work was made from an IDF (Israel Defense Forces) shooting range target, on which a general image of a soldier, without any special identifying marks, is emphasized, and an image, which is used in so many of Gildor’s works from those years, is painted over it. The target is thoroughly perforated by bullets, with a concentration of holes where the image is located, causing it to appear shot and injured, increasing the feeling of being a victim. This combination with the soldier teaches us about the conflict in the artist’s inner world, between his identification with victims, and Israeli identity, which requires him to participate in military activity. As a person who grew up in Israel and served in the IDF, he also naturally takes part in the IDF’s militaristic aggression. This picture represents both identities, which he perceives. He shows that within the identity, which seems aggressive on the outside (the soldier), the Holocaust victim’s image is hidden (Brutin 2009).

¹⁰Interviews with Haim Maor, Givat Haim (Meuhad), winter 1998.

¹¹Author’s interview with Yaakov Gildor, Tel Aviv, January 1998.

Fig. 9.8 Jacob Gildor,
Target, 1993–1994



Establishing Israeli Identity Through Holocaust Imagery

The new state of Israel gave hope to the Holocaust survivors. The reality in Israel when Holocaust survivor artists arrived was that of a society wishing to start a “new page” (Brutin 2000). Survivor artists showed this notion in their works, depicting images of workers of the land. Holocaust imagery in these works is subtle conveying the message that the Holocaust is now a memory that needs to be put aside in order to build an Israeli identity.

Some artists described the integration of Holocaust survivors in Israeli society, in establishing communities and protecting them. Naftali Bezem shows in the work *A*



Fig. 9.9 Naftali Bezem, *A Jewish Stonecutter*, 1953

Jewish Stonecutter from 1953 (Fig. 9.9) his vision to integration in Israeli society after the Holocaust through labor by painting a figure of a pioneer who is holding a cutting tool in his hand. The pioneer has a prisoner number tattooed on his arm. In this work, Bezem points to an optimistic result of the Holocaust: the remains of the Holocaust came to Israel and despite all they endured, rebuilt their life and built a state (Bezem 1953; Amishai-Maisels 1986, 1993). While the number on prisoners' arms was tattooed on the left arm, in Bezem's depiction it is tattooed on the right arm holding the cutting tool. It is customary to refer to the right side as a positive: thus the phrase "stood to his right" is interpreted as support or starting something "on the right foot" is interpreted as a good start. Bezem, by depicting the number on the right arm strengthens the positive idea he brings up in this work and it connects well to Bezems' own wish as a refugee to integrate into Israeli life.

However, the cutter's sad gaze is prominent, reflecting the difficult past hidden in his inner world, and his closed mouth implies to his powerful silence in effort to remember the past while coming back to life in the present.¹² The role of the red color in the background is to describe the past from which the cutter "emerged." The choice of red is to symbolize powerfulness and aggression, destruction, death and blood. The uniform red color in the background against the formal description of the cutter highlights and enhances the description and emphasizes the connection to the

¹²The sealed mouth motif appears in many artworks in order to express speechlessness following the Holocaust, an inability or lack of desire to speak about the past trauma of the Holocaust.



Fig. 9.10 Pinchas Sha'ar, *A Farmer plowing the land at the foot of the Judean Mountains*, 1957

Holocaust. Bezem emphasizes here that survivors put aside the trauma of the Holocaust and actively participated in the establishment of the State of Israel and its development out of the understanding that only the Jewish state can protect them from another disaster if it will happen.

Pinchas Sha'ar (1923–1996) dealt with rooting in the land of Israel by cultivating the land. He shows in his work *A Farmer plowing the land at the foot of the Judean Mountains* from 1957 (Fig. 9.10) a farmer plowing his land at the foot of the Judean Mountains, wearing a round brimless hat to symbolize his Israeliness. The cypress trees characteristic of Israel are seen at the foot of the mountains and they symbolize the connection to the land and its landscape. In many art works from the nineteenth century, the cypress tree is seen alongside the Western Wall as a symbol to the connection of the Jewish people to their homeland. Sha'ar's depiction of the cypress tree at the foot of the Judean Mountains, where Israel's capital Jerusalem lies, conveys the message of return to the homeland and the plowing symbolizes the hold on it. The image of the cock on mountain tops is an ancient Jewish motif that symbolizes manhood. The call of the man as a Cockcrow symbolizes renewal and awakening, thus implying to the renewal of agriculture in Israel by the Jews that arrived after the Holocaust. The color scheme in this work, The greens of the field, yellow of the sun and red of the land, symbolizes the joy of fieldwork.



Fig. 9.11 Shraga Weil, *The Planter*, 1954

Pinchas Sha'ar highlights the necessity for cultivation as a message of belonging to the land, a work they were banned from in Europe.¹³

Shraga Weil (1918–2009) presents another way of creating a connection with the land in his work *The Planter* from 1954 (Fig. 9.11) by depicting a farmer digging the land.

The planter is busy with his work and his face is hidden to conceal his emotion, sadness and pain following his Holocaust experiences blended with the joy of planting. Weil highlights the planter's focus on working the land (Brutin 2014).

¹³Pinchas Sha'ar has decided to create a positive and colorful art about life and joy. An interview with his brother Mr. Joseph Schwartz and his former wife, Mrs. Eli (Elisheva) Sha'ar, January 2000.



Fig. 9.12 Honi ha-M'agel Itzkowitz, *Scapegoats*, Acre Festival, 1989

Holocaust and Political Messages

Some artists used Holocaust imagery to give political statements such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conflicts within the Israeli society and other threats to the State of Israel.

Honi ha-M'agel Itzkowitz presented a performance at the Acre Festival (1989) called *Scapegoats* (Fig. 9.12) in which he tried to recreate and to experience solidarity with the humiliated tortured and suffering Jewish victim, while identifying with the brutal Nazi soldiers. For the performance, he dressed one group of actors in white garments (presenting the Jewish victims) and the other in uniform and helmets (presenting Nazi soldiers). The crowd stood passively, watching the brutal encounter between both groups without being able to intervene. The performance brought back the events of the Holocaust. However, because the work was done 2 years after the outbreak of the Intifada, he also alludes in this performance to the occupation and the violence that accompanies it.¹⁴

Guy Morad (b. 1975) and Moshik Lin (b. 1950), two Israeli caricaturists, used the iconic photograph of the so called “Warsaw boy” (Raskin 2004) to convey a

¹⁴Author’s interview with Honi ha-M’agel Itzkowitz, Tel Aviv, October 2001.



Fig. 9.13 Guy Morad, *Find the Differences*, 2012, caricature (Yediot Aharonot, 2 Jan. 2012, p. 21)

political message concerning the demonstration by ultra-Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem on Saturday.

The protesters, especially the children, wore a yellow Star of David (Fig. 9.13). According to the organizers, the protest was about what they named “communicative incitement” against the ultra-Orthodox Jews following the exclusion of women from Jerusalem’s public spaces (Somfalvi 2012). They also said that the use of the yellow Star of David reflects the ultra-Orthodox community’s feelings that the secular population behaves “like Nazis” towards them.¹⁵

The use of Holocaust symbols by the protesters led to harsh criticism in Israeli society and the political system (Haaretz 2012; AFP 2012). In *Find the Differences* of 2012, Morad shows two situations: one from the Holocaust, when the Nazi soldier aimed a gun at the little Jewish child to kill him, and the other from the present, when the little Jewish ultra-Orthodox boy, positioned exactly like the Warsaw boy, points his finger at the unarmed Israeli policeman, accusing him of being a Nazi.¹⁶ The artist presents the point of view of both sides: secular Jews remember what the

¹⁵Yehudim Be’germania al Hafganat Ha’charedim: “mitbayshim” (Jews in Germany about the ultra-Orthodox demonstration: “we are ashamed”) <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4170817,00.html> (Hebrew).

¹⁶Published in *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 2 Jan. 2012, 21; author’s telephone conversations with Guy Morad, Feb. 2012.



Fig. 9.14 Moshik Lin, *Zionazis*, 2012, caricature (Ma'ariv, 2 Jan. 2012, p. 23)

Nazis did to all Jews during the Holocaust while the ultra-Orthodox public likens the representatives of the Jewish secular state to Nazis (Brutin 2015).

Lin uses the famous photograph of the Warsaw boy and changes it in *Zionazis* of 2012 (Fig. 9.14). On the left, the Warsaw boy is seen apart from the crowd behind him, not with his hands raised but covering eyes. On the right side, instead of the Nazi soldier stands an ultra-Orthodox Jew with a Yellow Star of David on his coat holding a sign that reads: “Zionazis.” The artist uses the dichotomy created in the original photograph: the good – the helpless Jewish boy, and the evil – the Nazis, to convey his own message. The Warsaw boy represents the secular Jews who are, in the artist’s eyes, the real Jews. He covers his eyes in shame because he does not want to see a Jew calling another Jew “Zionazi.”

Both artists used the image of the boy and the memory because it is well known.

Another artist, Avner Bar Hama (b. 1946), used the photograph of the Warsaw boy to convey a political message concerning Holocaust denial (*The Price of Denial*) (Fig. 9.15). The background of this work features a blurred image of the entrance gate to Auschwitz. The Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from 2005–2013, who has repeatedly, denied the Holocaust; occupies the foreground of the image; his left hand is raised up in the air, while his right hand covers his genitalia.



Fig. 9.15 Avner Bar Hama, *The Price of Denial*, 2009, photomontage

Ahmadinejad's figure overlays the figures seen in the original photograph, while the image of the boy himself merges with the Iranian leader's jacket. The visual emphasis in this image is on the position of Ahmadinejad's hand, on the woman in the crowd of Jewish deportees, and on the boy with raised hands. By conflating these images with one another, Bar Hama confronts Ahmadinejad's denial of the Holocaust with evidence of its horrors. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad's raised arm is reminiscent of photographs of Hitler gesturing in his hatred-filled speeches. In this manner, the artist states that the only way to fight Holocaust deniers is to study and commemorate this historical event (Brutin 2013).¹⁷

Conclusions

The memory of the Holocaust is integrated into the present in Israeli art by Holocaust survivors, "Second Generation" and other artists. Through their art they remember and memorialize the Holocaust. The survivors' generation that experienced the Holocaust commemorates its memories from that time by referencing images from

¹⁷The author's interview with Avner Bar Hama, March 2010, November 2011.

the Holocaust in order to remember. Second Generation artists and other artists with no personal connection to the Holocaust use Holocaust imagery in order to memorialize it and at the same time deal with current events as lessons learned from the Holocaust.

Artistically, some use the imagery in an obvious and direct manner while others insinuate to it. In both cases, Holocaust imagery aids them to commemorate it for future generations. In order for the artists to succeed in this task, they use a variety of media: drawing, painting, sculpture, installation and caricature, each in his own way.

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Chapter 10

How Do We Memorialize Genocide? The Case of the German Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe

Armen T. Marsoobian

Abstract We often acknowledge and memorialize events of human suffering through works of art. This sometimes begins as a personal statement, as was the case with Picasso's *Guernica*. Oftentimes such acknowledgments take the form of a national statement, such as the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas) in Berlin. The Berlin memorial raises challenging moral and aesthetic questions regarding the memorializing function of such public monuments. What sorts of experiences are such memorials intended to evoke in the viewer? Is there a tension between the aesthetic experience and the "real" emotions such memorials engender? Does the didactic nature of such works rest comfortably with their aesthetic function? Are these functions mutually exclusive? Such questions are addressed in this chapter.

Keywords Public memorials · Jochen Gerz · John Dewey · Noël Carroll · Holocaust · Counter-monument · Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe · Aesthetics · Modernism · Marian Marzynski · Peter Eisenman · James E. Young

Memorial art brings into sharp focus a tension prevalent in much art and art talk since the rise of Modernism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This is a tension between theories of art that claim art's primary defining function is to engender aesthetic experience and those theories that claim art has a broader social function, one in which cultural and moral values are transmitted or critiqued. The former has been called the aesthetic theory of art, while the latter the social utility theory of art. The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden

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Europas) in Berlin serves as a test case for issues that arise from collective endeavors to memorialize the victims of crimes against humanity such as genocide.

Roughly speaking, the aesthetic theory of art maintains that something is an artwork if and only if it is created for the purpose of affording experiences that are valuable for their own sake. The social utility theorists claim that art plays a fundamental role in the reproduction of a culture, that is, in the transmittal of a society's beliefs and values. Art is not the only means for this reproduction, as religion, education, and political institutions also play important roles. Nor does art simply reproduce the values and beliefs of a community, as it is an important catalyst for change and reform of those beliefs and values. Art may do other things, and it often does, but art enculturates and does so exceedingly well. Without art there would be little or no cultural identity and subsequently a rather impoverished self-identity.

This tension between the aesthetic experience approach and the social utility approach to art is evidenced in debates about the function and role of art. Early in the twentieth century, the American philosopher John Dewey engaged in active debates about the nature of art. One impetus behind Dewey's seminal work *Art as experience* was the desire to reconstruct the notion of aesthetic experience in order to rescue it from the clutches of what Dewey calls "the museum view of art," a view typified by the motto "art for art's sake." Dewey's claims can be characterized by reversing the words in the title of his book: that is, art as experience can readily become experience as art. Experience as art is not a call for an aestheticized view of life in the manner of an Oscar Wilde. Such an elitist view of both art and human experience is one that Dewey strongly criticizes. He devotes many pages to attacking aesthetic formalism and the art for art's sake movement that characterized the High Modernism that was gaining prominence in the decades following the First World War.¹ Yet even in a thinker such as Dewey, the tension I have identified exists.

One of the primary ways in which we memorialize the crime of genocide is to create art. Some do this on a personal, individual scale, creating intimate works that have a unique relation to the tragic events in their own lives, such as Arshile Gorky's *Portrait of the artist and his mother* (c. 1926–1936). Others begin as individual statements about public events but soon take on universal significance, as was the case with Pablo Picasso's *Guernica*. Still others go through a collective process of selection and debate, as was the case with the Berlin Memorial. Memorial art, in particular memorial art that commemorates events of large-scale human suffering, such as national memorials to genocide, highlight the tensions identified earlier. My contention is that the aftereffects of the Modernism that Dewey railed against in *Art as experience* continues to prejudice much of the art talk of both art theorists and the general public. These aftereffects are evidence in the documentary film *A Jew among the Germans* (Marzynski 2005), which chronicles the controversy

¹ The distinction between "High modernism" and "Modernism" is a tricky one. In the visual arts, some would like to restrict High Modernism to post-World War II art, in particular Abstract Expressionism and all that followed; in literary studies, the term applies to the period between the wars. Arthur C. Danto in chapter 1 of *After the end of art* (1997) employs Clement Greenberg's definition of the term "Modernism" in discussing visual art post-Manet and Cézanne.

Fig. 10.1 The Memorial is centrally located near the Brandenburg Gate and the Reichstag



surrounding the German government's attempt to build a memorial in Berlin to the murdered Jews of Europe.² The Memorial (Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas) was dedicated on May 10, 2005, 2 days after the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. There were myriad issues surrounding the German government's desire to build this memorial and the two public competitions that were held to select its design. I will focus only on the tension between the aesthetic function and the social utility function identified earlier (Fig. 10.1).

A Jew among the Germans was made by Marian Marzynski, a Polish Holocaust survivor. It chronicles his personal quest to understand the process by which the Germans are planning to design a memorial to the six million Jews murdered during the Holocaust. The portion of the film that best illustrates my claim is the exchange that takes place after the winner of the second design competition for the memorial has been announced. The winning proposal is that of the Americans Peter Eisenman

²Portions of the film can be viewed at the following website: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/germans/>

and Richard Serra, but because of the government's demands for alterations from the original proposal, Serra will later drop out of the project. In the film, Marzynski expresses his fear of the "aesthetic" function of the memorial that is implied in the words spoken by the city architect and coordinator of the memorial project, Günter Schlusche.

In the context of discussing a newspaper headline saying "The Memorial will be a thorn in the flesh," Schlusche acknowledges that the experience one will undergo in encountering the memorial will "not be very pleasant," since it "deals with the murder of a million Jews." He further remarks that the memorial should cause "a little pain. A little, not a big pain." He concludes by stating, "The Memorial should be a piece of art." The sea of waving concrete pillars can, in Marzynski's words, "create an abstraction out of memory." Fear of this aesthetic function is given voice here. Abstract aesthetic formalism blunts memory. There is no social utility, no "thorn in the flesh" that is created by such an aesthetic experience.

Let me digress back to Dewey's criticisms of formalist aesthetics, or what he often called the "esoteric theories of art." High Modernism and its formalist aesthetic theory was a reaction against traditional representational theories of art. This was an aesthetic theory that had an inherent antipathy to all forms of memorial, historical, or commemorative art—among which we find examples in those dreary Victorian statues of great statesmen and war heroes that stand in our public squares. Reflecting my earlier claim, the formalist maintains that something is a work of art if and only if it is created for the purpose of affording experiences valuable for their own sake, that is, experiences that are primarily aesthetic. According to Clive Bell, one of the chief advocates of aesthetic formalism, the representative content in a work of art is irrelevant. He contends that "to appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions" (Bell 1913, 27). Art, according to Bell, "transports us from the world of man's activity to a world of aesthetic exaltation" (27). Formalism claims that aesthetic value derives solely from the "significant form" in a work of art. Bell illustrates this when he writes that "significant form" in painting is "a combination of lines and colors... that moves me esthetically" (30). For sculptural art, such as the wave-like stelae of Eisenman's Berlin memorial, shape and texture are added to this mix known as "significant form." Roger Fry, the influential English art critic, maintained that the truly aesthetic emotion that artworks engender is not "about objects or persons or events" and that a sharp line could be drawn "between our mental disposition in the case of esthetic responses and that of the responses of ordinary life" (Fry 1926, 6). Berlin's city architect, Schlusche, captured in the documentary film, is in the thrall of the aesthetic emotion created by Eisenman's design. This is why he feels "a little pain, not a big pain." Marzynski is appalled and wants the memorial to engender an emotional response about "persons or events"—the murder of six million Jews in the Holocaust.

Dewey was highly critical of any attempt to draw a sharp line between aesthetic responses and responses in ordinary life. He rejects the "museum notion of art" that is inherent in aesthetic formalism. The motto "art for art's sake" serves only to isolate the individual from the greater community, leading to a fragmented and compartmentalized sort of existence. Dewey's goal is to highlight and advocate for

the continuities between the workplace and the art place, be it the museum or wherever else we might encounter art. There is no separate or unique set of perceptual and mental capacities that must come into play if we are to experience an artwork as truly an artwork. Our life encounters with ordinary objects and events employ the same capacities as those employed when we encounter artworks. Dewey is not afraid to instrumentalize art if art can serve as a means and a model for making life better. We bring art to the ordinary in order to infuse value into the mundane. Dewey uses such phrases as “*an* experience” and “consummatory experience” to characterize the sort of aesthetic response that is available to all of us once we break down the walls surrounding art. Consummatory experience is the cure for the humdrum, the routine, and the mundane in life.

Yet does this help us deal with the tension highlighted in Marzynski’s film? Are we to have “*an* experience” of this consummatory sort when we encounter the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe? Let us probe Dewey’s notion further to see if it is of any help in the dilemma we have encountered with memorial art. Central to Dewey’s notion of life as art are the generic traits of completeness, uniqueness, and qualitative unity that characterize “*an* experience.” The human “live creature” in constant interaction with its environment—in a constant tension of doing and undergoing—has moments of fulfillment. In an often-quoted passage, Dewey writes:

We have *an* experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences. A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; a game is played through; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is *an* experience. (Dewey 1987, 35)

Such consummatory experiences have an emotional element that Dewey calls their “esthetic quality,” a quality that “rounds out an experience into completeness and unity” (41). When experience fails to achieve such consummations we say that the experience was “anesthetic” or “non-esthetic.”

In contrast to the formalists, Dewey claims that aesthetic form is not the “exclusive result of the lines and colors” but “a function of what is in the actual scene in its interaction with what the beholder brings with him” (Dewey 1987, 93). For Dewey the aesthetic emotion that is stirred by aesthetic form is not divorced from the emotional life of the artist or the audience. Yet this poses a problem for memorial art. What if the beholder brings nothing from his emotional experience that connects with this aesthetic form? As the number of Germans who personally experienced Nazism decreases and the last remaining Holocaust survivors pass away, what sorts of experiences will visitors bring to the Berlin Memorial? Given the memorial’s highly abstract and symbolic structure, that is, its nonrepresentational nature, will third- or fourth-generation Germans experience it in a more and more aestheticized manner? Will the memory that lies at the core of memorial art be lost? And with this loss, will the memorial either lapse into an object of pure art in the



Fig. 10.2 Children playing on the stelae of the Memorial

sense of art for art's sake or into non-art? Is it fated to become an enormous playground space in which children can play hide-and-seek behind the stone stelae? Is this the fate of all memorial art? (Fig. 10.2)

Is the Berlin Memorial to be relegated to the fate of those forlorn statues that sit in our public spaces and serve as perches for pigeons or as climbing challenges for young children? Or will the aesthetic function of new nonrepresentational memorials protect them from this fate because they are aesthetically alive and constantly engage the viewer in new and surprising ways? But in what sense will this engagement with the Berlin Memorial be an engagement with the memory of the Holocaust?

Given the problems with aestheticism, should we give up altogether on memorial art and no longer treat it as art? Maybe the formalism of High Modernism was on to something. Isolating art from social utility may have been a justified reaction to the misuse of art by the nation-state for the purposes of propagating certain national, ethnic, religious, or cultural myths: evidence the social realist art of Soviet Communism or, for that matter, the so-called non-degenerate art of National Socialism. Manipulative art is bad art, so why don't we expel it altogether from the realm of art?

Let me restate the dilemma that is generated by the tension between the aesthetic and social utility views of art. How can memorial art that tries to evoke the loss of six million Jews respect the individual spectator's response to the artwork and not manipulate that response, while at the same time guarding it against easily lapsing into a purely aesthetic response? To understand how artists have responded to this demand we must return to *A Jew among the Germans*, in particular to the discus-

sions Marian Marzyński has with the winning architect Peter Eisenman and the artist Jochen Gerz, whose proposal for the memorial was ultimately rejected. Eisenman tries to explain what visitors to the Memorial should feel when they wander through the field of stelae: “You go and walk in it and you feel uncertain... these things are tilting, I don’t know where I am going and you get lost, you are alone, you can’t hold anybody’s hand and that, when they get done, was what it felt like to be a Jew in Germany in the 1930s.” Eisenman implies that somehow the visitor will experience something akin to the “content” of the Holocaust, that is, something akin to being a Jew in Nazi Germany. Given the abstract nature of the memorial, it is easy to doubt whether these intended experiences will actually be the experiences of the majority of its visitors.

In contrast, Jochen Gerz proposes a different solution to the dilemma I have identified. He believes that art cannot express the content of the Holocaust. In this sense, the memorial has no social utility if we approach it as a work of art. Gerz identifies the conflicting intentions behind the whole project. If the German people’s relationship to the Holocaust is highly conflicted, how is this memorial supposed to work? Will it be a “masochistic monument” that will cause pain in the spectator? Gerz believes that the German government would like the memorial to evoke the pain of guilt but at the same time work as art—or as he terms it—as an “aspirin” that cures the guilt. He does not believe that this is possible. He would rather build a purely educational memorial that is not a work of art. His proposal focuses on each individual’s unique response to the event of the Holocaust. Gerz would construct a Shoah educational center that allows the visitor to respond to the question “Warum?” (“Why?”) in the 31 languages spoken by the Jewish victims of the Holocaust. This is accomplished by providing a robotic means by which each memorial visitor can etch his or her own words on a stone floor. There is no art to respond to here, merely the thoughts of the memorial visitor. Gerz fears that his proposal will not be selected, and he is correct.

Jochen Gerz’s response, while not unique, is not necessarily representative of all German and Jewish artists making art after Auschwitz. Many of these second- and third-generation artists have had no direct personal memory of the events of the Holocaust. For many younger Germans the intentional silence of their parents’ generation is what motivates their art. Theirs is a vicarious memory. The Judaic studies scholar and art critic James E. Young, who is interviewed in the film lauding Peter Eisenman’s design, writes the following about this generation of artists:

What further distinguishes these artists from their parents’ generation, moreover, is their categorical rejection of art’s traditional redemptory function in the face of catastrophe. For these artists, the notion either that such suffering might be redeemed by its aesthetic reflection or that the terrible void left behind by the murder of Europe’s Jews might be compensated by a nation’s memorial forms is simply intolerable on both ethical and historical grounds. At the ethical level, this generation believes that squeezing beauty or pleasure from such events afterward is not so much a benign reflection of the crime as it is an extension of it. At the historical level, these artists find that the aesthetic, religious, and political linking of destruction and redemption may actually have justified such terror in the killers’ minds. (Young 2000, 2)

For this generation of artists, the modernist aesthetic posed an ethical dilemma. Unlike the artists of the generation that came after the First World War, these artists could not look to art as a form of redemption. The revolutionary innovations in the fine and the performing arts in the first three decades of the twentieth century had “redeemed” art from the social and cultural values that had stifled the creative freedom of prior generations, or so the artistic rhetoric of this period claimed. Symbolic of these early decades of the twentieth century was Picasso’s move from tradition-bound Spain to the modernist ferment of Paris in 1904. The conservative values of the old order were rejected by many among this new generation of early modernist artists. They believed that the conservative old order and its values had led to the Great War and that their art could “redeem” the world. For the post-Holocaust generation of European artists, this was not to be the case.

James Young and others have identified an anti-redemptory aesthetic in many of these artists. For those in this generation who are willing to grapple with the enormity of the Holocaust and the conundrum of memorializing the missing Jews of their national landscape, the alternatives are starkly non-aesthetic given, what I have sketched so far. Neither High Modernism’s aesthetic formalism nor Dewey’s reconstructed aesthetic experience will do. This new, anti-redemptory aesthetic insists upon incompleteness, openness, absence, impermanence, participation, and context. While the latter two traits play a role in Dewey’s notion, his characterization of consummatory experience as complete, having a heightened sense of unity and harmony, does not provide a space for the memory artists of Germany. Germany’s memorial problem has led to the advent of what have been called “counter-monuments.” In the words of Young, these are “painfully self-conscious memorial spaces conceived to challenge the very premises of their being” (Young 2000, 7). Prime examples of these works include Gerz’s 1986 collaboration with Esther Shalev-Gerz, the Monument against Fascism (Mahnmal gegen Faschismus) in Hamburg-Harburg, Germany,³ and Daniel Libeskind’s empty room in the Holocaust tower in the Jewish Museum in Berlin.⁴ The counter-monument movement is counterpoised to what typically falls under the notion of an aesthetic experience, even one that is reconstructed in a Deweyan sense (Figs. 10.3, 10.4, 10.5 and 10.6).

At this point I am not ready to accept the dichotomy between the aesthetic and the utility function that this dilemma presents. The problem lies with the assumption that there is just one primary function of art. Whether the narrow formalist “aesthetic emotion,” as exemplified in Bell and Fry, or the more experientially rich and diverse moment of Dewey’s “*an* experience,” we are left with essentialist and, as a result, exclusionary definitions of art. I propose that we deny this assumption. Art can have multiple functions. The affordance of aesthetic experience may be one of these functions, but as the example of the Berlin Memorial has shown us, it is not always, nor should it be, the primary function. While Dewey recognizes that art can

³A description of the monument can be read on Gerz’s website: www.gerz.fr

⁴Information about the museum and its design is available at www.jmberlin.de/site/EN/05-About-The-Museum/03-Libeskind-Building/06-Holocaust-Tower/holocaust-tower.php

Fig. 10.3 Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz, *Mahnmal gegen Faschismus* (Monument against Fascism), Harburg – Hamburg, 1986. Dimensions: 12 m × 1 m × 1 m. Media: Column of galvanized steel with a lead coating, signatures. © Jochen Gerz, VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2016 (Images 9, 10 and 11 courtesy of the Gerz studio. Photographer credit: Kulturbehörde, Hamburg, and Hannes Schröder)



function in multiple domains of human activity, his palette of aesthetic traits is limited by his characterization of “an experience.”

Let us step back for a moment and bracket the Berlin Memorial to look at public memorial art more generally. One function of such art is to commemorate the past for the present, to recall to mind significant events and persons and to interpret their significance to the ongoing culture. In this sense public memorials are as much about the present as they are about the past. This was abundantly evident from the example of the controversial Berlin Memorial as evidenced in Marzynski’s film. Clearly, what I am identifying here is a social function. The philosopher Noël Carroll has argued that “memorial art transmits the ethos of a culture” (Carroll 2005, 5). He contends that art in general—memorial art in particular—is a necessary condition for the reproduction of culture and society because it helps define a people’s beliefs and values. He argues:

Art, including memorial art, executes this social function exceedingly well. By simultaneously addressing, often, but not always, pleasurably, the perception, imagination, memory, emotions, and cognition with concrete images.... By mixing sense and sentiment, feeling



Fig. 10.4 Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz, *Mahnmal gegen Faschismus* (Monument against Fascism) 1986. The monument was lowered into the ground in six stages between October 10, 1986, and November 10, 1993. © Jochen Gerz, VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2016

and information, art renders the ethos of the culture accessible to its citizens and eminently retrievable for memory insofar as it has been encoded across multiple faculties. It makes values perceptible or, in the case of literature, it describes them in powerful, arresting, memorable images. (Carroll 2005, 6)



Fig. 10.5 The monument in its final stage, November 19, 1993. © Jochen Gerz, VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2016

While I have some reservations with Carroll's formulation, I do think there is some truth here. Carroll himself qualifies his claims about the effectiveness of this transmission of an ethos by stating that one must have "appropriately prepared recipients" (Carroll 2005, 6). For such recipients the perceptual, emotional, and



Fig. 10.6 Libeskind's empty room in the Holocaust tower in the Jewish Museum in Berlin

imaginative encounter and interaction with the artwork strengthens and deepens the social utility of the memorial. The aesthetic experience is in the aid of the social function (Fig. 10.7).

For an example of where I think the aesthetic function has worked to enhance the social function, let us look at the Armenian Genocide Monument at Tsitsernakaberd in Yerevan, Armenia.⁵ In citing this example, I am of course dodg-

⁵More pictures of the monument can be viewed on the website of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute: www.genocide-museum.am/eng/memorial_complex_photos.php and on the website of the Armenian National Institute: www.armenian-genocide.org/Memorial.28/current_category.52/offset.20/memorials_detail.html



Fig. 10.7 The Tsitsernakaberd memorial complex in Yerevan, Armenia

ing some of the more difficult issues raised by the Germany's Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe. With the Armenian Genocide Monument we have a more typical example of a genocide memorial, for here we find a victim group raising a monument on its own soil. This is not a monument raised by the Turkish state on the soil of the historic Armenian homeland where the bulk of the killings took place. Those lands now lie in the eastern half of the Turkish Republic that was once known as the Armenian Plateau or Highland. Like the Berlin Memorial, the Armenian Genocide Monument is very abstract and modernist in design. On the Monument website we read:

At the center of the Monument stands the circular Memorial Sanctuary. Its unroofed walls consist of twelve, tall, inward-leaning basalt slabs forming a circle. The shape of these walls simulates traditional Armenian *khatchkars* [carved stone gravestones], which are stone slabs with large carved crosses at the center. These slabs also suggest figures in mourning. The level of the floor of the Genocide Monument is set at one and a half meters lower than the walkway. At its center, there is an eternal flame which memorializes all the victims of the Genocide. The steps leading down to the eternal flame are steep, thus requiring visitors to bow their heads reverently as they descend.⁶

The name Tsitsernakaberd means Citadel of Swallows, symbolic of the fact that swallows always return to their nests, even if their home has been destroyed. The tall needle-like shaft symbolizes the rebirth of the nation, but the shaft is split down

⁶ Accessed July 7, 2016, at: http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/Description_and_history.php

the middle, symbolizing the lost lands of historic Armenia, now in present-day Turkey.⁷ These are all very potent symbols that resonate with the Armenian public, both in the homeland and in the diaspora. Unlike the situation in a perpetrator state such as Germany, there is very little ambiguity about the historical past and how to respond to it in the present. This is not unique to Armenia, being true of public memorials in many victim societies. The continuing potency of the symbols in the Armenian memorial is heightened by the sense of continuing victimization of the Armenian people as a result of the systematic campaign of genocide denial by the Turkish state. When Armenians or individuals of Armenian descent approach this memorial they are, for the most part, in Carroll's words, "appropriately prepared." The values and beliefs of this victim society have achieved a high degree of consensus regarding its historical past. A cultural and national identity has been forged by the memory of genocide. Accordingly, the memorial makers of the Armenian Genocide Monument (architects Artur Tarkhanyan and Sashur Kalashyan and artist Ovannes Khachatryan) had available to them all the images from the visual and tactile vocabulary of their nation's past. This cannot be true for the makers of the Berlin memorial (Fig. 10.8).

This latter remark is borne out by the 17-year controversy surrounding the construction of Germany's memorial. The winners of the first competition for the memorial, held in 1994 and 1995, were a group of artists headed by Christine Jackob-Marks, a Berlin painter. Their idea was for a huge concrete slab inscribed with the names of millions of Jews who died in the Holocaust—as many names as could be found. The slab would also be dotted with small boulders from Israel, symbolic of the stones placed on headstones in Jewish cemeteries. Some of the critics at the time argued that this memorial was too monumental, too big and heavy-handed, filled with badly mixed metaphors, even "too German." This long list of Jewish names reminded some Jews of "Nazi death rosters." This simple listing of names is a culturally significant gesture in the context of German history and Jewish identity (Fig. 10.9).

In contrast, think of the 58,195 names etched into the reflective black granite wall of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C. The names in the case of the Vietnam memorial personalize the tragedy of the war and create a space for individual contemplation. As with the Berlin Memorial, the Vietnam memorial commemorates a very conflicted history. American attitudes about the Vietnam War are no less complex than contemporary German attitudes to the Holocaust. I am not claiming any equivalence here, moral or otherwise, but simply pointing out the lack of a consensus as to how and for what purposes a nation should reflect upon its past. In the case of the Vietnam memorial there was certainly no consensus as to the meaning of the war in 1981 when the design competition took place, yet there seems

⁷"As part of the monument, an arrow-shaped stele of granite, 44 meters high, reaches to the sky, symbolizing the survival and spiritual rebirth of the Armenian people. Partly split vertically by a deep crevice, this tower symbolizes the tragic and violent dispersion of the Armenian people, and at the same time, expresses the unity of the Armenian people." See more at: http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/Description_and_history.php#sthash.yd7wctec.dpuf



Fig. 10.8 Eternal flame surrounded by inward-leaning pillars at the Monument

to be a consensus regarding the success of Maya Lin's design. I will not discuss her design in any detail here. What I can say is that her design affords an aesthetic experience, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the social value or utility of healing a divided nation. This is what I meant earlier by my claim that the aesthetic function is in the aid of the social function. These functions are mutually reinforcing. The belief that the aesthetic function or aesthetic experience is somehow necessarily diminished by the social utility of the artwork is a modernist prejudice that seems to die hard. What is often lacking in art talk, whether that of professional philosophers or that of those in the art world, is an anti-essentialist conceptual framework with



Fig. 10.9 The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Washington, D.C.

which to deal with these multiple functions of human production. With the rare exception of some work that falls under the rubric of pragmatist aesthetics and the innovative yet neglected work of Justus Buchler, little theoretical progress has been made in this regard.

Public memorial art and the tensions it generates can serve as a salutary impetus to rethink these multiple functions of art. Most art, whether on a public scale or on an individual level, is about memory, both personal and collective. Collective memory is important for human moral progress, and accordingly art plays a central role in it. George Santayana in an often-quoted (or misquoted) passage recognized the importance of collective memory: “Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. When change is absolute there remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement: and when experience is not retained,... infancy is perpetual. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” (Santayana 1924, 284). One of the lessons learned by those who study wars and genocides for the purpose of preventing their recurrence is the undeniable fact that how one remembers the past, whether individually or collectively, is a crucial factor in either fueling or breaking cycles of racial, ethnic, or religious violence. Art in its many forms plays an important role in how the past is remembered, be it for good or for evil.

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Chapter 11

The Suppression of Cultural Memory and Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina

David Pettigrew

Abstract This chapter identifies an orchestrated effort in “Republika Srpska”—an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina that was recognized by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement – that is designed to prevent survivors of the genocide from erecting memorials to the victims in such locations as Višegrad, Prijedor, and Foča. While memorials for victims have been prohibited, and survivors have been prevented from using the term “genocide,” memorials to the perpetrators have been installed in the center of Višegrad, and near the Trnopolje concentration camp in Prijedor Municipality. In the hills above Sarajevo, in a location from which the city’s residents were attacked during the siege, a plaque honoring indicted war criminal Ratko Mladić has been installed. Accordingly, this chapter considers the extent to which the discriminatory practices regarding memorials in Republika Srpska constitute a violation of human rights. Further, the chapter argues that, following Raphael Lemkin’s definition of genocide, the prohibitive policies in Republika Srpska with respect to memorials and commemorative practices constitute nothing less than a continuation of the genocide, a second phase of the genocide designed to ensure the permanent erasure of a world that was destroyed. These human rights violations and the continuation of the genocide are a troubling testament to the failure of the international community in Bosnia, and to the problematic legacy of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Keywords Apartheid · Cultural memory · Human rights · Prohibited memorials · Raphael Lemkin, Dayton Peace Agreement

This chapter addresses an orchestrated effort to prevent the free expression of cultural memory and identity by Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and other non-Serbs within the territory of “Republika Srpska.” Republika Srpska declared itself to be an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina on January 9, 1992. The declaration of Republika Srpska entailed a linguistic violence, since the self-designated “Serb

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Republic” incorporated an area that was multicultural and that was, in some areas, almost 100 percent Bosniak. The founding of Republika Srpska was followed, tragically, by a concerted effort to eliminate any non-Serbs from within its territory. Radovan Karadžić, the founding president of Republika Srpska, was charged, for example, with seeking to “permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory in BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina]” (ICTY/Karadžić 2009b).¹

Given this stated goal, the Bosnian Serbs began to pursue a strategy of genocidal aggression, ranging from the murder and forcible displacement of civilians in Višegrad to the detention, torture, and murder of civilians in Prijedor in concentration camps, and to the siege of civilian centers such as Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Bihać through murderous shelling and sniper fire. Republika Srpska was subsequently recognized and legitimized by the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995.²

In the wake of such atrocities, it would seem that the survivors of this genocide should have the right to establish memorials and commemorations in order to remember and mourn the victims. In the years following the genocide, however, survivors have actually been prohibited from installing memorials to the victims in a number of locations within Republika Srpska.

In 1992, for example, with the beginning of the Bosnian Serb aggression in eastern Bosnia, atrocities occurred in the Municipality of Višegrad. These atrocities have been well documented, and perpetrators have been convicted, including upon appeal (ICTY/Milan and Srejski Lukić 2012). Many of the victims were murdered on the well-known Mehmed Paša Sokolović Bridge and then cast into the Drina River. The perpetrators thought the victims would never be found. In the summer of 2010, however, work on a nearby dam caused the river level to fall. The experts from the Bosnian Missing Persons Institute and the International Commission on Missing Persons knew that there would be a chance, perhaps a last chance, to exhume the victims of Višegrad from the riverbed. I was invited to accompany the government exhumation team. I witnessed and documented the exhumations of the victims. In the months that followed, approximately 96 victims were exhumed, and about 60 victims were identified and buried in the Stražište cemetery, a private Muslim cemetery in Višegrad, in May 2012.

At the time of the burials, the survivors installed a memorial in the Stražište cemetery that bore an inscription in memory of the “victims of the Višegrad genocide”. Immediately after the installation of the memorial, however, the Bosnian

¹These abbreviated parenthetical references refer to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Accused in each case. Radovan Karadžić was convicted on ten of eleven counts on March 24, 2016 (ICTY/Karadžić 2016a, § 6071). The phrase that refers to the objective—“to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed territory”—is repeated numerous times in the Judgement. The Chamber found, moreover, that “starting in October 1991, the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership agreed on how they would respond to the declaration of sovereignty in BiH and the measures they would take to create their own ethnically homogeneous state” (ICTY/Karadžić 2016a, § 3447, my emphasis).

²Article III of the General framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina names “Republika Srpska” as an “Entity” with a “boundary demarcation” (Dayton 1995).

Serb authorities decided that the memorial should be demolished. The local activists asked me to write a letter in support of the memorial. My letter, which was addressed to the High Representative, was released to the press and brought some public attention to the issue (Pettigrew 2013a).³ In the letter, I pointed out that although the authorities had called for the removal of the memorial in the private Muslim cemetery, the Bosnian Serb perpetrators of the atrocities in Višegrad had been memorialized with a statue in the middle of the town of Višegrad. This seemed like a clear case of discrimination. Accordingly, in my letter I referred to Republika Srpska as an “apartheid entity”:

The Municipality’s plan to destroy the memorial is consistent with the genocide denial that is endemic to the political culture of Republika Srpska. In addition, the removal of the memorial is discriminatory, as well as a form of persecution that is a crime against humanity. Such a wanton act of desecration would only serve to confirm that the entity of Republika Srpska has become an apartheid entity. (Pettigrew 2013a)

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court identifies “Apartheid” as inhumane acts “committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial (or ethnic) group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime” (Rome Statute 2002, part 2, art. 7). The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, for its part, condemns “any legislative measures and other measures *calculated to prevent a racial group or groups from participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and the deliberate creation of conditions preventing... the right to freedom of opinion and expression*” (ICSPCA 1976, my emphasis). Hence, the term “apartheid” seemed particularly appropriate in this case, given the discriminatory nature of the prohibition of the memorial that was arbitrarily imposed by the Bosnian Serbs upon Bosniaks. The Bosnian Serbs’ demographic majority in Višegrad and their ability to impose such prohibitions with impunity are a direct consequence of the genocide. Such discriminatory practices seem designed, moreover, to discourage Bosniaks—who were forcibly displaced by the genocide—from returning to Višegrad, precisely in the interest of maintaining the demographic majority and attendant political power of the Bosnian Serbs. Such efforts to prevent refugee return would be in violation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The text of the Agreement affirms that “All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin... without risk of... intimidation, persecution, or discrimination, particularly on account of their ethnic origin” (Dayton/Annex 7, 1995). Further, the term “Apartheid” seemed appropriate because the municipality’s plan to destroy the

³The letter was endorsed by a number of academics and activists, including Hariz Halilovich, Emir Ramić, and Sanja Seferović-Drnovšek. The Office of the High Representative “is an ad hoc international institution responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The position of High Representative was created under the General framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, usually referred to as the Dayton Peace Agreement, that was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995” (OHR 2015).

memorial clearly infringed on the right of Bosniaks to engage freely in cultural practices of mourning and memorialization.

In anticipation of the demolition of the memorial, I organized an international coalition to lay a wreath at the memorial in the Višegrad cemetery and released a public statement in an attempt to preserve the memorial. In the statement I asserted:

Today we condemn and we resist the culture of genocide denial in Višegrad and in Republika Srpska by laying our wreath at the memorial in the Stražište cemetery. Our wreath reads: “To the Memory of the Victims of the Višegrad Genocide: May Truth Lead to Justice.” We would also like to recognize and honor the citizens and activists who created this memorial in the cemetery in order to tell the truth about the genocide. These citizens and activists have inspired us because they have kept their hearts open to the hope that the truth will lead to justice. We thank them for their courage. By our presence we stand with them and we affirm the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes without risk of intimidation, persecution or discrimination. (Pettigrew 2013b)

Nonetheless, in January of the following year, 2014, the local authorities forcibly entered the cemetery, broke the lock on the gate, and callously ground the word “genocide” from the memorial. The memorial was not destroyed, but the word “genocide” was removed.

The suppression of the word “genocide” and the prohibition of memorials is not unique to Višegrad. In Prijedor Municipality, survivors and activists have been forbidden to install a memorial and to use the word “genocide” in public gatherings. Prijedor is the municipality in which Vojislav Šešelj stated, in the spring of 1992, that Serbs were “foolish” to “live with non-Serbs” (Neuffer 2011, 34). Šešelj’s visit to Prijedor was just one part of a coordinated campaign to turn Serbs against non-Serbs. Elizabeth Neuffer writes that in March 1992, “the only news available was inflammatory, anti-Muslim, anti-Croat diatribes out of Belgrade.... The not so subtle message was that the Serbs were to join together and arm themselves because the Muslims were going to attack” (Neuffer 2011, 34). In May 1992, Bosnian Muslims were forced to wear white armbands so that they could be identified for deportation to concentration camps in the municipality. The camps included Omarska, Trnopolje, Keraterm, and others. More than 3000 civilians perished in the camps and in the deportations and executions of civilians from surrounding villages (*Knjiga Nestalih* 2012, 3).

The abovementioned camps were all located within what is now the territory of Republika Srpska. In October 2013, the largest mass grave—in terms of square meters and depth—was found in Prijedor Municipality in a locality known as Tomašica (*BBC News* 2013). Those initially exhumed from the mass grave were buried in July 2014 in the town of Kozarac, which is also located in Prijedor Municipality. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared a day of mourning to honor the victims, but Republika Srpska did not. Each year, survivors hold commemorative gatherings in May to remember the white armbands, the atrocities, and the victims. Although they have been prohibited from using the word “genocide” at the gathering, one year the survivors and activists arranged children’s backpacks to spell out the word “genocide” in the town square. In 2014, parents collected signatures in a petition seeking the right to install a memorial in memory of 102

children who were killed. The site of the former Omarska concentration camp is located on the grounds of the Arcelor Mittal mining complex. Survivors are permitted to gather there to mourn the victims only one day each year, on August 6.⁴ In the absence of a memorial, the survivors themselves are the memorial—an embodied memorial—as they gather and release white balloons into the sky. The names of the victims are attached to the balloons.

As in the case of Višegrad, efforts to remember the victims in Prijedor have been subject to a discriminatory policy. While survivors have been prohibited from installing a memorial at Omarska, for example, the Bosnian Serbs have installed a memorial near the Trnopolje concentration camp. The memorial commemorates the “soldiers who embedded their lives in the foundations of Republika Srpska.” One wonders how the perpetrators of a genocide justify the suppression of memorials to the victims but permit memorials for those who committed the atrocities. One explanation is that Republika Srpska has recast the narrative, rewritten history, and actually created a law permitting memorials for prominent members of the military who perished between 1992 and 1995. The law allows for memorials commemorating “the War of Liberation.”⁵ This law points to a policy in Republika Srpska that not only denies the genocide but even refers to it as a “liberation.”

In this context, in May 2014, we learned that a commemorative plaque honoring Ratko Mladić had been installed in Republika Srpska in the hills above Sarajevo. The plaque was installed on Vraca Hill, alongside the Memorial Park for those who perished in World War II due to Nazi aggression. Vraca Hill was precisely the high ground seized by the Bosnian Serbs at the outset of the siege in April 1992. During my investigations, I learned that the plaque is located between a former tank position and a former sniper position, positions from which the citizens of Sarajevo were targeted. It bears mentioning that in April 1992 the Bosnian Serbs seized the Vraca Police Academy and secured Grbavica, below the hill, for what was perhaps their most dramatic strategic incursion into Sarajevo during the siege. This is precisely what John Burns called, in an October 6, 1992, *New York Times* article, “a principal Serbian salient into the city” (Burns 1992).

Further, it should not escape our attention that this plaque glorifies an indicted war criminal who, as part of an “overarching joint criminal enterprise,” sought “to spread terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo through a campaign of sniping and shelling” (ICTY/Mladić 2011). A relevant International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Judgement states:

Evidence on the record also indicates that other senior members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, alleged to have been members of the JCE [Joint Criminal Enterprise], possessed genocidal intent. For example, in discussing Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, Ratko Mladić, the Commander of the Army of the Republika Srpska Main Staff, is alleged to have said that “[m]y concern is to have them vanish completely.” (ICTY/Karadžić 2013)

⁴August 6 is the day that marks the closing of the Omarska concentration camp in 1992 (Hodžić 2012).

⁵Personal meeting with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Legal Team, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, March 17, 2014.

Hence, the commemorative plaque honoring Mladić is a brutal provocation directed at all Bosniaks and non-Serbs, and, given its location, is an insult to the memory of those who were the victims of the siege of Sarajevo, a siege that murdered more than 11,500 persons, including more than a thousand children.

This glorification of Ratko Mladić in East Sarajevo is not, however, an isolated incident. On July 9, 2014, when 175 coffins containing the human remains of the victims of the Srebrenica genocide arrived in Potočari in preparation for the commemorative burials on July 11, a statement was released by Milorad Dodik, the president of Republika Srpska, in which he denied the ruling of genocide for Srebrenica, declared that Mladić and Karadžić were leaders in the Serb “fight for freedom,” and insisted that the Serbian people would continue to honor them in the years ahead (*klix.ba* 2014). Perhaps the commemorative plaque for Mladić takes its place in a tradition that includes the glorification of Gavrilo Princip, who, in the opinion of the Bosnian Serbs, was a freedom fighter and hero. A park and statue honoring Princip was dedicated recently, also in East Sarajevo (b92, 2014).

These memorials to Mladić and Princip should not be understood simply as part of a Bosnian Serb “counter narrative”, as though the memorials represent “one side” and the other side or sides have their own narratives. To suggest that there are two or three equivalent narratives is reminiscent of the assessments during the genocide that there were two or three warring sides whose violent acts were morally equivalent. Such an assessment was morally repugnant because it was a betrayal of the truth, and because it contributed to the policy of nonintervention and inaction on the part of the international community, inaction that led finally to the genocide in Srebrenica.

Far from its being a counter narrative, we can think of this phenomenon as a human rights violation. Much like the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, mentioned earlier, the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, part I, article I (1), states: “The term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on... ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,... exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life” (CERD 1969). In other words, it is evident that international human rights law provides the right to participation in the cultural life of the community, free of suppression of that free expression and free of discriminatory practices in relation to that right. Thus, far from being a clever counter narrative, such acts of suppression and discrimination are violations of international humanitarian law.

In addition to being a violation of human rights, the plaque glorifying Ratko Mladić, the statue in the center of Višegrad, and the memorial to the perpetrators near Trnopolje concentration camp can be understood, most significantly, as nothing less than a continuation of the genocide that was perpetrated from 1992 to 1995. Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term “genocide,” wrote that genocide has two phases: “one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor” (Lemkin 1944, 79). The

commemorative plaque in honor of Ratko Mladić is exactly this sort of imposition, involving the public glorification of a man who was responsible for so much suffering, an imposition with no concern for the feelings of the survivors, no shame, and no sense of human decency. The same could be said of the statue in Višegrad, which was erected to the “brave defenders of Republika Srpska.” It was not a genocide, the statue states, it was a “defense,” and it was not a genocide, the law in Republika Srpska argues, it was a “war of liberation.” The imposition of the national pattern of the genocidal oppressor, through such memorials, assumes that the first phase of genocide has been successfully accomplished. In other words, it assumes that the multicultural world that existed in the past no longer exists, and assumes further that the ultranationalist cultural narrative of the Bosnian Serbs can now be imposed on the terrain with impunity, thereby continuing to actively negate the world that once was.

The glorification of war criminals and perpetrators continues unabated in Republika Srpska. A number of examples spanning 2016 and 2017 can be briefly mentioned. On March 20, 2016, a student dormitory in Pale was dedicated to Radovan Karadžić, several days before he was to be convicted of genocide (Sitocucic 2016). That same week, billboards appeared in East Sarajevo (Republika Srpska) bearing the images of Radovan Karadžić and Vojislav Šešelj and declaring them to be “Serb Heroes” (Maccarty 2016). On October 24, 2016, the 25th anniversary of the founding of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, Nedeljko Čubrilović, President of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, presented certificates of appreciation to convicted war criminals Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, and Momčilo Krajišnik (*Daily Sabah* 2016). On April 12, 2017, a Russian cross was erected on a hill in Višegrad to commemorate the Russian volunteers who had served in the Army of Republika Srpska, the very troops who committed atrocities in Višegrad and across the territory of Republika Srpska, 1992–1995 (Kovacevic 2017).

Furthermore, “the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor,” to follow Lemkin’s expression, is not limited to memorials. Another example of the imposition of such an exclusionary cultural pattern—a negation of the world that once was—involves the construction of Serb Orthodox churches in Bosniak villages in Republika Srpska. A church has been constructed in Budak, for example, a village of Bosniak returnees within the Srebrenica Municipality, next to a secondary mass grave that has been exhumed, on the route of the annual peace march, and situated in such a way that the steeple looms in the distance over the Potočari Memorial Cemetery (Remikovic 2013).

Perhaps nowhere is the impulse to impose a separatist culture of genocide denial more obvious than in Višegrad, where, having removed the word “genocide” from the memorial, the local authorities are seeking to raze the Pionirska Street house where approximately 60 women, children, and elderly persons were burned alive. They wish to destroy the building in order to erase the traces of the heinous crimes, to recast the landscape, and to rewrite history in order to say that it never happened. In spite of such historical consequences, the authorities in Republika Srpska have nonetheless designated the Pionirska Street house for demolition as part of a munic-

ipal road construction project, even though the foundation of the house is quite obviously far removed from the adjacent roadbed. A “red tape” was placed around the house by the authorities, announcing the condemnation of the property and prohibiting access (*Al Jazeera Balkans* 2013).

In response to the plans to destroy the house and to erase any evidence of the crimes, Mrs. Bakira Hasečić, president of the Association of Women Victims of War, organized an effort to restore the Pionirska Street house, a restoration that was to include a memorial museum for the victims in the basement where they were viciously murdered. Mrs. Hasečić’s efforts, however, led to her being the target of criminal investigations for “illegal construction,” and for crossing the “red tape,” or what could be termed the “red line.”

The final appeal to prevent the destruction of the house has been exhausted, and Mrs. Hasečić has been targeted for investigation and prosecution. Thus, Mrs. Hasečić has been targeted and persecuted a second time: she was first targeted and persecuted in 1992 as a result of the genocidal policies of Mr. Karadžić, and she has been targeted and persecuted once again as part of the apartheid politics of Republika Srpska—apartheid politics masquerading as the “rule of law.”

On March 18, 2014, I crossed the red line of the red tape at the Pionirska Street house in solidarity with Mrs. Hasečić and in order to respect and honor the memory of the victims of the crime, one of two crimes that, the ICTY Judgement insisted, stand out “for the viciousness of the incendiary attack, for the obvious premeditation and calculation that defined it, for the sheer callousness and brutality of herding, trapping and locking the victims in the two houses, thereby rendering them helpless in the ensuing inferno, and for the degree of pain and suffering inflicted on the victims as they were burnt alive” (ICTY/Milan and Srejode Lukić 2009a). The question now, given the fact that upon his provisional release from detention at The Hague, “due to the deterioration of his health,” ultranationalist Vojislav Šešelj received a hero’s welcome in Belgrade and affirmed the ideology of a “Greater Serbia”, is whether the international community will find the resolve to support Mrs. Hasečić and save the Pionirska Street house from demolition (ICTY/Šešelj 2014).

The threat to destroy any traces of the Pionirska Street house is sadly reminiscent of the destruction of the two houses in Višegrad in 1992 in which civilians—women, children, and elderly persons—were burned alive, and of one house (in Bikavac) that was already completely destroyed at that time, leaving almost no traces. Indeed, in the ICTY Judgement for Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić just cited, the court emphatically condemned the efforts of the perpetrators to obliterate the traces of the victims and thus of the crimes:

In the all too long, sad and wretched history of man’s inhumanity to man, the Pionirska street [June 14, 1992] and Bikavac fires [June 27, 1992] must rank high.... By burning the victims and the houses in which they were trapped, Milan Lukić and the other perpetrators intended to obliterate the identities of their victims and, in so doing, to strip them of their humanity. The families of victims could not identify or bury their loved ones.... *There is a unique cruelty in expunging all traces of the individual victims which must heighten the gravity ascribed to these crimes.* (ICTY/Milan and Serodje 2009a, § 740 and § 1062, my emphasis)

The perpetrators carried out such atrocities to be certain that Republika Srpska would be ethnically homogeneous. Through acts of murder and the destruction of homes and mosques, the perpetrators did everything they could to ensure that the world that once existed had been destroyed. Vojislav Šešelj was charged with, among other crimes, the “deliberate destruction of homes... cultural institutions, historic monuments and sacred sites” (ICTY/Šešelj 2007).⁶ Tragically, without some form of unified action, the anticipated demolition of the Pionirska Street house will be nothing less than the cruel reenactment, in our time, of the genocide that occurred in 1992–1995. The destruction of the Pionirska Street house will reenact the Bosnian Serb army’s practice of destroying homes, mosques, and cultural institutions in civilian towns and villages, as occurred from Kozarac (in Prijedor Municipality) to Klotjevac (in Srebrenica Municipality) and in many other locations. One such village is Klotjevac, which was 97 percent destroyed.⁷ Only a few families have been able to return to live in the village. Now, approximately two decades after the genocide, the leadership in Republika Srpska is doing everything in its power to be certain that the world that was destroyed will not be restored.

Hence I have identified the suppression of memorials to the victims of the genocide in Republika Srpska as a violation of international human rights. What is the meaning of a human right, if the right to freely participate in the cultural life of one’s community does not signify or include the right to engage in cultural practices of mourning for and memorialization of those who were murdered in acts that have been ruled as a crime against humanity or as genocide under international law? Further, I have identified the discriminatory imposition of memorials to the perpetrators as a continuation of the genocide in the context of Raphael Lemkin’s description of the second phase of genocide. The apparent failure of the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo, and of the international community, to respond to the provocations, the human rights violations, and the continuation of the genocide in Republika Srpska is a matter of great concern. Will the international community join me in crossing that red tape imposed by the Višegrad police, a red line that represents, if you will, the prohibition of memorials, genocide denial, hate speech, discriminatory practices against non-Serb survivors and returnees, psychological intimidation, and dehumanizing exclusion? The red line is not only a prohibition of

⁶On March 31, 2016, an ICTY Trial Chamber acquitted Vojislav Šešelj of all nine counts of his Indictment. While the Judgement Summary details inflammatory speeches—including eliminationist rhetoric—that were delivered by Šešelj, as well as crimes committed by those he recruited or inspired, the Chamber found that “the Prosecution... failed to show a causal link between Vojislav Šešelj’s speeches... and the crimes committed.” The Chamber was not able “to qualify Vojislav Šešelj’s speeches... as physical acts of incitement.” The Chamber also found that as a politician or ideologue Šešelj was not part of a Joint Criminal Enterprise, and that he had no direct military role or authority. (ICTY/Šešelj 2016b). On April 6, 2016, ICTY Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz announced that he would appeal the acquittal (Sekularac 2016).

⁷In his book *Places of pain: Forced displacement, popular memory and trans-local identities in Bosnian war-torn communities*, Hariz Halilovich details the “annihilation” of the community of Klotjevac and addresses the many challenges to memory, memorialization, and collective identity in the wake of the genocide and the forcible displacement of the population of Klotjevac. (Halilovich 2013, 21–54).

memorials but also a prohibition against the restoration of the world that once was, the very world that the perpetrators tried to erase: the red tape places a final seal on that erasure. What is at stake for humanity in crossing and defying the red line, in solemn remembrance of the victims and in solidarity with the survivors, is the possibility of a reopening of the world that was destroyed. The right to such an opening or restoration of the world for the survivors, through the cultural practices of mourning, memorialization, and remembrance, would be a matter of justice.⁸ The memorialization of the victims of a genocide reopens, in a sense, a world that the perpetrators of that genocide tried to obliterate. In that act of memorialization, the struggle for the restoration of a world that was destroyed defies the dehumanizing erasure that occurred and resists genocide denial, thereby seeking to open a discursive space for truth and justice.

The survivors of the genocide in Bosnia have kept their hearts open to the hope that the truth will lead to justice. The question, finally, is whether the international community will honor that hope.

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⁸The thought of the opening or restoration of a world as a matter of justice is inspired by Jean-Luc Nancy's *The Creation of the World or Globalization* (2007). Nancy writes: "To create a world means: immediately, without delay, reopening each possible struggle for a world". That struggle against "injustice" involves the "insatiable and infinitely finite exercise that is the being in act of meaning brought forth in the world [mis au monde]" (Nancy 2007, 54–55).

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Chapter 12

British Media Representation of the War in Bosnia Herzegovina: Avoiding the Duties to Prevent and Protect

Charlotte McKee

“I hope that the military commander who ordered the firing on Srebrenica burns in the hottest corner of hell... for the soldiers...I hope their sleep is forever punctuated by the screams of the children”—Larry Hollingsworth, an official for the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), speaking after the shelling of Srebrenica in 1993, which resulted in the town being declared a United Nations Safe Area.

Abstract The Bosnian War in the 1990s constituted one of the worst atrocities to occur in Europe since the Second World War, resulting in the internal displacement of an estimated 1.3 million people, it also constituted a glaring warning that the hoped for ‘new world order’ would not be as harmonious as post-Cold War optimism had suggested. It occurred at a time when news media outlets were perceived to have increased dramatically in importance and independence. British news media was often highly critical of the aid supplied by its government to Bosnia and this chapter seeks to understand whether news media utilised language and frameworks of representation to support continued government inaction, by presenting the war as horrific, but distant to British concerns. It focuses on media representation of the geography of Europe and Bosnia, representation of the type of war that was occurring, and on the practicalities of reporting at the time that may have shaped the focus of British reporting.

Keywords Media · Bosnia · Representation

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Introduction

In 2001, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia determined that the events that took place at Srebrenica in July 1995 had constituted genocide, in a ruling that held Serbia responsible for failing in its duty, under the Genocide Convention, to prevent the killings at Srebrenica and, subsequently, for failing to try or transfer those responsible to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The significance of this decision cannot be underestimated; before the occurrence of genocide in Darfur (Glanville 2009), governments that were signatories to the Genocide Convention had avoided the use of the term “genocide” for many reasons, including the duty imposed on the international community, under the Convention, to protect those affected. This fear of the potential political consequences of the word “genocide” was clearly illustrated by the actions of the Clinton administration in 1994, when it went to great lengths to avoid describing events in Rwanda as genocide, instead stating only that “genocidal acts” had occurred (Glanville 2009).

It is now estimated that, during the entirety of the war, more than half of the total population of Bosnia were displaced, with an estimated 1.3 million of the pre-war population of 4.4 million internally displaced while approximately 500,000 refugees fled to neighboring countries and approximately 700,000 refugees had gone to Western Europe (Young 2001). Between 700,000 and 1 million Bosnian Muslims were expelled from their homes in Serb-controlled areas (Burg and Shoup 2000). While estimates of the number of deaths vary greatly, and have been highly contested (Petersen 2011), the most extensive and authoritative study identifies a minimum of 97,000 deaths, 65% of whom were Bosnian Muslims (Ahmetasevic 2007). These events, which resulted in mass displacement and deaths, and which clearly had the potential for genocide, were not hidden from the British government and public by the media, by then able to provide real-time coverage via satellite television.

As this chapter will show, while particular events that indicated the potential for genocide in Bosnia, such as the shelling of the UN safe area in Srebrenica in 1993, cited in the quote that introduces this chapter, was followed by stronger language from Western governments and others, even, as in the “breadline massacre” in 1992 (Jurich 2011), leading to the imposition of sanctions, the British government continued to avoid the use of the word genocide.

This reluctance to cross the threshold that would have required them to act was given a degree of legitimacy when, in March 1993, 11 months into the conflict, Bosnia charged Serbia in the International Criminal Court, with violating the Genocide Convention. This was before the events at Srebrenica that eventually stirred the international community to act but the charge was unsuccessful. Yet, notwithstanding this setback, the duty placed on the international community is not only to halt genocide but also to prevent it and, although now with the benefit of hindsight, it can be argued persuasively that there was little justification for those at the time to claim that they were unaware of the potential for genocide in

this conflict.¹ The implication of this decision by the International Criminal Court was that, almost five decades after the signing of the Genocide Convention, the international community was yet to establish a means for its successful implementation, supporting Procida's argument that the Convention had shifted from a declaration of law to a statement of moral persuasion (Procida 1995).²

This chapter begins from the assertion that the international community of nations failed to meet their obligations under the Genocide Convention. It takes as given the view that inaction cannot be excused because "we did not know," the justification often given for the failure to direct action against the Nazi concentration camps. Instead, as Cushman and Meštrović have persuasively argued, "we knew too much" and so could plead confusion and uncertainty (Cushman and Mestrovic 1996). Yet it took care with its use of language, with politicians repeatedly using the phrase "ethnic cleansing," initially borrowed from Bosnian Serb leaders, which allowed it to express sufficient outrage at the crimes taking place, but conveniently did not place legal responsibility on it act, thereby redefining these crimes as what has been termed "genocide-lite" (Schindler 2007).

Among the states that can be considered culpable was the United Kingdom, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and one of two leading military powers in Europe, which contributed one of the largest peacekeeping forces to the United Nations peace effort in the Former Yugoslavia, which by 1994 had become the largest ever peacekeeping force deployed by the United Nations (Gow 1997). However, for most of the conflict, the British government successfully avoided deploying its ground troops to use force to protect the victims of the war. This occurred despite the presence of British soldiers already in the theatre of war, and despite it being apparent that the events in question constituted war crimes, if

¹This point has given rise to considerable debate with Schabas (Schabas 2000) suggesting that the word "prevent" has been "perhaps the greatest unresolved question in the Convention" (Glanville 2009) as while the Genocide Convention, is officially titled 'The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide' the only other mention of the duty to prevent occurs in Article VIII which states that "any contracting party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide." However, it is important to consider the circumstances in which the Genocide Convention was drafted, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, when the failure to prevent after warning signs such as Kristallnacht was fresh in people's memories. For this reason, the importance given to prevention was understandable, even if the means of doing so were less clear.

²The changing power of the word "genocide," along with understanding of the threshold for genocide to be deemed to have occurred has been debated. There is general agreement that, even in the 1990s, the perceived duties imposed on states by the Convention remained ambiguous (Mayroz 2012). Procida's assessment gains further support from the concluding judgement in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina v. the Former Yugoslav Republic, that while the law established a duty to prevent genocide by all parties, state practice indicated a "permissibility of inactivity" (International Court of Justice 2015). However, even if some of the legal implications of the Genocide Convention were debated, the word "genocide" itself, and the the implications that arose from its use, still carried "ideational power" (Glanville 2009). It has been argued that this has been lost since the beginning of the twenty-first century, as governments now use the word "genocide" much more freely, almost as if acknowledging genocide's occurrence satisfies public demand to "do something."

not yet amounting to actual genocide (Fisk 1993). Instead, they acted as passive observers, documenting the unfolding atrocities and, where it could be achieved without intervening in the actual fighting, providing humanitarian relief.

This chapter seeks to contribute to understanding of why the United Kingdom failed to act despite the accumulating evidence that genocide was likely. Drawing on press and television news reports, as well as political speeches, interviews, and proceedings of the British Parliament, I argue that while the media were often critical of the lack of a response by the British government, the dialogue used actually helped to maintain a dominant paradigm in which policies of non-intervention could continue.

In this chapter I shall examine four themes that can be discerned in studying media representation of the conflict. The first is geographical. Was Bosnia a part of “Europe,” whereby the European powers should assume some responsibility for dealing with events there or was it a manifestation of a distant ‘Balkan’ conflict that should not concern them? This echoed Chamberlain’s notorious description of the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia as “a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing” (Goldstein 1999) or the quotation widely attributed to Bismarck that “Der ganze Balkan ist nicht die gesunden Knochen eines einzigen pommerschen Grenadiers wert” (“The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier”). As Simic has argued, this perpetuated the widespread western view in the early twentieth century of the Balkans as “a mystical region ruled by dark forces and melodramatic despots” (Simic 2013). The conflict was taking place just when the European Community was being transformed into the European Union following the Maastricht Treaty. Although the Treaty set out the intention to develop a common foreign and security policy, the form that it might take was still very uncertain, with the member States still coming to terms with the new Europe that had emerged following the fall of the Berlin Wall (Taylor 1994).

The second theme relates to the nature of the conflict. Were the Bosnian Muslims the victims of a war of aggression, waged by the Serbs or was it a civil war in which all sides were, to some degree culpable? The latter Balkan discourse drew on the idea, described by Davis, that Bosnians were ‘tribal haters’ (Davis 2014). Hansen developed this idea, showing how, even when supporting humanitarian intervention, politicians used elements of balkanised discourse to encourage the view that little could be done to bring peace to a naturally warring people (Hansen 2013).

The third theme, which is related to the second, addresses the extent to which representation was shaped by experience of recent conflicts. For the United Kingdom, this is a reversal of the adage that “generals always fight the last war, especially if they have won it.” British views were especially influenced by the experience of Northern Ireland, another example of what was portrayed as an intractable ethnic conflict that, which by then had been continuing for almost 25 years with little prospect of an end in sight. As Sir Percy Cradock, a senior British diplomat, argued, “there would be no domestic tolerance for engaging British troops on such terms in a Balkan equivalent of Northern Ireland” (Cradock 1997; Dixon 2000).

The fourth theme relates to the practicalities implicit in television war reporting, and the resulting simplistic and potentially one-sided representation of the conflict that many British viewers received. The use of television reporting as the main source of information in this conflict meant that the majority of reporting could only occur in places where cameramen and journalists could be sure of a significant level of safety. This reasoning has been used to explain the emphasis that was placed upon the daily suffering of Bosnians that could not be attributed directly to violence, such as the harsh winters. Furthermore, the practicalities relating to television news reporting can be used to explain the focus of much reporting on Sarajevo, where, although its citizens were clearly suffering inhumane conditions, they were not the victims of the ethnic cleansing that was happening elsewhere in Bosnia, often out of direct sight of the television cameras. It is at least reasonable to consider the extent to which this incomplete view of the conflict could have affected British understanding of the scale and nature of violence in the rest of Bosnia. The focus on Sarajevo is also important, because of the way in which it provided a simplistic representation of the violence as being perpetrated entirely by Bosnian Serbs. Perhaps the most notorious example was the difficulty that the media experienced in accessing Mostar, then under siege by Croats, even though those journalists coming into Sarajevo virtually all came in on flights from Zagreb.

I will then examine the evidence on whether media representation actually influenced the policy of the United Kingdom. The media were often critical of the actions of the (United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and often appealed to popular emotions, in attempts to increase pressure for intervention (Burg and Shoup 2000). Robinson has argued that, at this time the ‘CNN effect’ overturned the established convention that national media should support government policy during wartime as rolling news coverage meant that the news media increasingly and much more effectively criticized government policy (Robinson 2005).

Representing Bosnia: At the ‘Heart of Europe’?

The first issue to be considered in the representation of the war in Bosnia concerns its political geography. Put simply, what was its relationship to “Europe”? Underlying this question is a deeper one. Where do the borders of Europe lie? Bosnia has historically been seen as a border between east and west (Gow 1997) and, even in the final years of the twentieth century, its position was still viewed with uncertainty. This uncertainty about its positioning in relation to Western Europe was utilised both by those advocating further western intervention and those resisting it, as those at different ends of the spectrum sought to portray it as either of or apart from Europe. This, in turn, determined whether it could be considered as falling within a European sphere of protection and obligation.

This confused understanding of where exactly Bosnia lay in relation to Western Europe was illustrated by how, while it was possible for some to represent it as barely part of Europe, it was also possible for United States Secretary of State James

Baker to describe the war as “a humanitarian nightmare at the heart of Europe,” suggesting that it was more than just a country under the sphere of protection of the countries of Europe. It was in fact, one of them.

In the United Kingdom it can be seen how many of those advocating further intervention attempted to depict Bosnia as essentially European, and therefore the responsibility of the rest of Europe. This drew heavily on images emerging from the reporting of events in Sarajevo.

Sarajevo was often portrayed as a cosmopolitan European city, particularly in television news media, encouraging British viewers to identify with its besieged inhabitants (Robison 2004). This, after all, was the city that had hosted the Winter Olympics less than a decade earlier, providing the backdrop for the Gold Medals for the British skaters Torvill and Dean, the first ever to achieve perfect scores. In an ITV News at Ten report from October 1993, city workers were seen removing rubbish from the streets and repairing the tram system.

These images were all reminiscent of sophisticated Western European cities, far away from the otherwise dominant, if simplistic narrative of Bosnia as a country in the grips of an ancient, deeply-rooted conflict. The image of these depictions was commented upon in the British press at the time, as in an article in *The Guardian* in 1995 that noted how “The West is obsessed with Bosnia and forgetful of Rwanda or Zaire or the Sudan because such tragedies don’t involve people like us, people who share our aspirations and development and Eurovision song contests” (P. Preston 1995).

Reporting also encouraged the British public to identify with Bosnian victims by its focus on individual stories of suffering. Robison has noted how this style of reporting differentiated the representation of Bosnia from that of other countries experiencing atrocities at this time (Mermin 1999; Robison 2004). These personal stories of individual suffering were brought into British living rooms by empathetic television and print media reporters who helped the public to identify with the victims in ways that did not occur in more distant conflicts as, for example, had occurred during the Gulf War (Robison 2004).

An emphasis on the proximity of Bosnia to Europe was also used to exert pressure on policy makers, by presenting this war within Europe’s boundaries as a test for, and consequently a failure of, the beliefs underpinning European integration that were developing at the time. Not only was it the case that Bosnia was portrayed as a part of Europe; the representations of cities such as Sarajevo as cosmopolitan and diverse, and Bosnia as a multicultural, multinational and multi-ethnic state, suggested, according to Robison, the idea that it actually represented a microcosm of Europe. Consequently, there was a clear contradiction between how Western European politicians were working to create a federal Europe, European-sponsored peace plans were simultaneously encouraging the breakup of Yugoslavia along ethnic and nationalist lines (Robison 2004). This argument had particular traction with some politicians, particularly in the United Kingdom, which was holding the EU Presidency in the second half of 1992. The debate on the nature of this new Europe was particularly challenging in the United Kingdom, as always struggling with its European identity. Struggling to achieve support within his own Conservative party

for the Treaty of Maastricht, Prime Minister John Major, in 1992, set out a vision of the new role of Europe as one to preserve “the peace and stability of a continent, ravaged by total war twice in this century” (Major 1992). Yet by this time it was already clear that Europe was less than keen to accept its responsibility for Bosnia, as was noted in an editorial in *The Economist* in 1993 discussing the Siege of Sarajevo, which opened with the words “the strangulation of Sarajevo is Europe’s shame” (The Economist 1993).

While the media representation of those in Sarajevo appealed to the desire to help “people like us,” there were others seeking to avoid, or at most support only the most minimal British intervention. They sought to represent Bosnia as geographically distant or isolated, portraying it as part of regional grouping with a distinct ‘Balkan’ identity. However, this collective term allowed those resisting intervention to appeal to history, even if it was long ago, in support of their arguments. From this perspective, particular geographic interpretations were used to promote the idea that those affected by the war, instead of being citizens of Bosnia, constituted a people of the Balkans who were stuck in intractable conflicts, which was almost inevitable given their physical surroundings. This was apparent in a statement to Parliament by Douglas Hurd, the then United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, and controversially later an advisor to the Milosevic government in Serbia (Traynor 2001), when he argued that the war was caused by “fault lines that run through that part of Europe today, as they have for centuries” (Hurd 1995).

This ‘Balkanisation’ of the country succeeded because it did not directly engage with the question of whether Bosnia was European, but rather isolated it geographically in a way that suggested that this question was irrelevant to an area that was populated by a people who were naturally aggressive. Hansen argues that this discourse also helped to encourage the government in pursuing its policy of only providing humanitarian aid as it suggested an imperialist relationship between Britain and Bosnia, whose backwardness and resulting suffering, “the West” should alleviate, if not engage with, because “the Other” lacked the civilisation for diplomacy (Hansen 2013).

By framing Bosnia within its Balkan identity, non-interventionists also used a ‘Balkan’ history to warn of the unsubstantiated potential dangers of international intervention. This was most commonly seen in allusions to the Balkan origins of the First World War. In a statement given to Parliament a few months before the Srebrenica massacre, John Major felt it necessary to remind the House that “The Balkans have often enough been a tinderbox in history, and war memorials throughout the United Kingdom testify to the price paid in British blood for past Balkan turbulence” (Major 1995). This statement is indicative of the view often conveyed in Parliament that by involving itself in a “Balkan” conflict “the West” risked drifting into a much larger war with international consequences. This framing of the conflict was also seen in media representations, although this mainly occurred at the outbreak of the war, as in an article appearing in *The Times* in 1991, claiming that “Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, is once again bracing itself for the shot which would plunge it into a civil war” (McElvoy 1991).

As a postscript, the enduring legacy of this representation of the conflict was seen in a BBC television programme about the English civil war of the seventeenth century, which represented that conflict as a war of religion, between the supporters of the established Anglican Church and the Puritans, and which employed footage from Bosnia and an interview with the journalist Fergal Keane, a veteran of Bosnia and Rwanda, to draw direct parallels between each of the conflicts (Jackson 2014).

A War, But What Type?

A second way in which the war was represented in conflicting ways was whether it was depicted as a civil war or as one of aggression. Often those who sought to support the United Kingdom government policy to minimise its engagement in conflict represented events in Bosnia as a civil war, in an attempt to share the blame for violence equally amongst all parties.

This equalising discourse sought to eliminate the notion of victims, and in this way to minimise pressure on the British government to act. This was often done by employing ethnic descriptors to describe those involved in the conflict, such as ‘Serb,’ ‘Croat’ and ‘Muslim’. Conversely, those wishing to promote further intervention emphasised Bosnian Serb aggression and the political nature of the conflict, seeking to depict it as a war of aggression by a foreign power. In this way they emphasised the international obligation to act to protect Bosnian citizens.

However, particularly in the case of those advocating intervention, the desire to appear neutral in the face of uncertain policy meant that this diversity of representation was not always clear. Thus, for example, news reports that were reporting on the suffering of Bosnian civilians, would accept statements about the causes of the violence by the Bosnian government as equally valid as those by Bosnian Serbian military leaders, despite the Bosnian spokespersons representing an internationally recognized government. Furthermore, there is evidence that, in the final years of the war, even those supporting further intervention utilized ethnic descriptors of those involved. This suggests that, perhaps as a result of the mass public conversation about the war, discourses that had initially been used to minimize the seriousness of the war had become part of a general public discourse, suggesting a popular adoption of a subconscious understanding of the war as ethnic in nature.

Throughout the war, although particularly at the beginning of the conflict, many politicians wary of British intervention encouraged the idea that, although terrible, the war in Bosnia was a civil war. They persisted in this view despite clear evidence that the Serbian government provoked the Bosnian Serbs, using the Federal Yugoslav Army for this purpose (Gow 1997), at a time when Bosnia had gained international recognition as an independent state. In his leader’s speech in 1992, Prime Minister John Major twice referred to the war in Bosnia, both times describing it as a “civil war” (Major 1992), a description which reinforced the idea that this was a conflict occurring within state borders and thus one for which the United Kingdom had little responsibility. This position was further emphasized by Foreign Secretary Douglas

Hurd in a statement to Parliament in 1993, in which he stated that “no side has a monopoly on evil” when discussing the extent of blame that should be attributed to the Bosnian Serbs (Hurd 1993a). It is evident that these attempts at using discourse to shape public understandings of the nature of the war were, to some extent, successful. When discussing the Siege of Sarajevo, Kent has observed that in the press and television media, the term “siege” was only actually used to describe events there in about 20% of cases; all other mentions tended to refer to a vague notion of fighting, conveying the activities of each side as being essentially equivalent (Kent 2006). He further notes how, when the BBC, known for its continued quest to maintain neutrality, reported a statement by a U.S. official that “the vast majority of ethnic cleansing can be attributed to Bosnian Serbs, and Muslim and Croat forces in Bosnia were responsible for isolated atrocities” as “an American official said that Croat and Muslim forces had also carried out atrocities” (Kent 2006). This indicates how an equalized understanding of the war had become a part of both political and popular discourse. The extent of this skewed representation of the war was highlighted in a 1995 debate in parliament in which the war is continually labelled as a “civil war,” with speakers emphasizing that “there have been atrocities on both sides” (Mahon 1995).

Those attempting to represent all sides of the conflict as equal repeatedly referred to the war in ethnic terms, in a continuation of the Balkan discourse that circulated from the beginning of the conflict. This use of discourse to equalize blame can again be argued to have been successful in the way in which it filtered into a public consciousness. This can be seen in the many books published on Balkan history for English speaking audiences around the time when the war was taking place, most notably Robert Kaplan’s *Balkan Ghosts* (Kaplan 1993). The acceptance of this language was also seen in a 1993 interview with Paddy Ashdown, previously leader of the United Kingdom Liberal Democrat party and then High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina who refers to the Bosnians under siege in Sarajevo as “Muslim armies,” “Muslim defenders,” and “Muslim forces,” therefore indicating his preference for religious descriptors rather than the political descriptor of ‘Bosnian’ (Ashdown 1993). In this way it can be seen how someone, who was a vocal critic of government inaction, had adopted terms used by the Major government to support its policies, indicating how this equalizing discourse had been popularized successfully. In this way, while supporting intervention, Ashdown was inadvertently using the government’s arguments for its non-intervention.

Despite the form that this discourse took, with some exceptions the view of Bosnian Serbs as aggressors did gain currency in the British media and to an extent with British politicians later in the conflict. A breakthrough in the promotion of a genocidal discourse came with the 1992 ITV News report by Penny Marshall of a Bosnian Serb run detention camp holding Bosnians in Omarska and Trnopolje (Marshall 2012), and particularly as a result of a highly controversial image of an emaciated Bosnian man standing behind barbed wire, an image which ÓTuathail has claimed “revived Holocaust images” (ÓTuathail 2002). However, Hansen in his analysis of political discourse during the war, suggests that the growing dialogue alluding to genocide was incorporated into the government’s

humanitarian discourse, in which politically neutral victims were being terrorised by separate and warring “factions” or “parties.” From this perspective, while the West had an obligation to help these neutral victims because of the humanitarian imperative, little could be done to change their situation while those responsible, their leaders, remained uncooperative and unwilling to engage with diplomacy (Hansen 2013).

In these ways it can be seen that language played a key role in framing British understandings of the nature of the war in Bosnia, portraying it as an intractable civil war and continually promoting the idea that it was caused by religious and ethnic differences. This ignored the political manipulation of former Yugoslav countries that was taking place but enabled those wary of intervention to implant successfully the idea that the conflict in Bosnia could not be fixed by outsiders, to the extent that by 1995, when it had become unequivocally clear that instances of ethnic cleansing had taken place and there was a very real threat of genocide, politicians still considered it relevant to debate the extent to which the all ‘parties’ were to blame for violence.

Analogy with Northern Ireland

The third issue relates to the specific meaning that the portrayal of the conflict as an ethnic civil war, and consequently attitudes to intervention in such conflicts, had in the United Kingdom. For almost a quarter of a century, the United Kingdom had been involved in a protracted struggle between Unionists and Republicans in Northern Ireland where, despite the conflict being essentially one over territory and nationhood, it was often portrayed in the British media and by politicians as one about religion, in which both sides were prepared to use extreme violence and neither was prepared to negotiate. As such, when discussions of Bosnia framed events in Bosnia using ethnic and religious terminology, it was inevitable that parallels would be drawn in the popular consciousness between that portrayal of ethnic violence, and the more immediate one, that many of the British public had come to see as almost unending and unsolvable, in Northern Ireland.

All states look to past conflicts to understand present ones, as can be seen from the history of calls for humanitarian intervention in the latter part of the twentieth century. This was an area where international law and practice were evolving rapidly, challenging traditional ideas of sovereignty. A well-known example is the American reluctance to intervene in Rwanda so soon after the public revulsion following the Battle of Mogadishu, in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, when images were broadcast of their bodies being dragged through the streets. This event had a profound impact so that, as Wheeler has argued, the discussion about sending troops into Rwanda was characterised by the extreme reluctance by the UN to cross the “Mogadishu-line” (Wheeler 2000). Going further back, the role of past military failures in informing contemporary military decisions can be seen in the continuing effects of the Vietnam War on American foreign policy, particularly as a result of the

development of ‘body-bag syndrome’ in which governments fear a public backlash that they believe would be the inevitable result of military casualties suffered in a foreign war (Piiparinen 2007). Indeed, from 1991 until 2009 there had been a ban on media coverage of the repatriation of American war dead at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware (McIntyre 2009).

Similar beliefs about Northern Ireland can be seen to have influenced support for intervention in Bosnia among both the media and politicians in the United Kingdom. Politicians noted the low level of support for military involvement in Northern Ireland after the deaths of soldiers and, especially, by campaigns such as the “Bring Back the Boys from Ulster” campaign, led by relatives of serving soldiers (Dixon 2000), in the belief that, according to Badsey, “any casualties suffered in military intervention would lead to the collapse of public support” (Badsey 1994). This fear of unpredictable consequences of intervention in Bosnia was voiced by Tony Benn, a former Labour cabinet minister and subsequently president of the Stop the War coalition, in a House of Commons debate on Bosnia, in which he called upon his fellow parliamentarians to take into consideration the casualties of Northern Ireland before they allowed NATO to “stumble into a civil war in Bosnia” (Benn 1994).

It is also clear that the media were susceptible to the drawing of these parallels between the two settings. This was manifest as a depiction of Bosnia as an intractable conflict based on religious divisions, similar to the way that they perceived Northern Ireland. This can be seen in the many articles that discussed both conflicts in tandem, as well as by examples such as an article from *The Independent* in 1995, in which the author, after first identifying Northern Ireland as divided along religious lines, reflects that “neither side could find a way to mend their sense of hurt and grievance, any more than Muslim and Christian can in Bosnia” (Furlong 1995). This suggestion that little can be done to heal religious divisions, even in an article that is sympathetic to the plight of Bosnians, suggests that those supporting the representation of events in Bosnia as a civil war had been successful, not only in popularizing an understanding of equality of blame and of victimization, but in encouraging a comparison with a conflict that, in the eyes of many in Britain, had become a benchmark for intractable conflicts. This indicates the crucial way in which the war in Bosnia was misrepresented. Although there was extreme violence and widespread terror in both Northern Ireland and Bosnia between groups with different political aims, the conflict in Northern Ireland was very different to that in Bosnia, in terms of the scale of suffering and very real potential for genocide, and the involvement of an external aggressor, the Serbian government. Therefore, even when this parallel was drawn in an attempt to encourage sympathy for Bosnia, as in a 1993 article in *The Independent* in which it is claimed that “it is as important for Europe that violence and terror do not succeed in the Balkans as it is for Britain in Northern Ireland” (MacDonald et al. 1993), it had the effect of belittling the violence that was occurring. This meant that, because the threshold of violence needed for intervention in a foreign sovereign state was much higher than in a part of its own territory, the United Kingdom government could draw support for its policy of non-intervention.

The Focus on Sarajevo

A fourth issue relates to the way that, despite the huge technical advances in war reporting that had taken place in the decade before hostilities broke out in Bosnia, restrictions on the movement of reporters meant that the conflict was often presented as a somewhat one-sided narrative. This was particularly so in the case of television news reporting which, as Kent has argued, was the most influential medium through which the war was represented to the world (Kent 2006). Following the transfer of Sarajevo airport from Bosnian Serb control to that of UNPROFOR on June 29 1992, reporters and politicians had relative ease of access to the capital city of Bosnia, even if they did have to cross the front line, so that much of the reporting of events in Bosnia from then until the end of the war was focused on the capital city. As a consequence, understanding among the British public of the situation in Bosnia was largely confined to what was happening in Sarajevo. Although, in time, this came to reflect the sympathy of western audiences for the besieged people of Sarajevo, whose terrifying daily experiences attracted great public interest in the United Kingdom, the focus on Sarajevo initially reflected considerations of practicality and safety for journalists, who were relatively protected when staying in Sarajevo or, when they ventured outside the city, by their proximity to the UNPROFOR troops (Gow et al. 1996). These safety considerations when reporting on the conflict led to an emphasis on the daily reality of civilian life under siege and the consequent human suffering, rather than on the military campaign because of the difficulties in taking cameras to areas where fighting was taking place, which has led to criticism of media coverage of Bosnia as “social, rather than war reporting” (Gow et al. 1996).

This incomplete perspective, where by many journalists was essentially limited to Sarajevo, had a major impact upon how the British public understood the conflict. This was a city in which, unlike other areas of Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs were clearly acting as aggressors, committing war crimes by continually targeting civilians. Indeed, it has been argued that the atrocities witnessed by journalists in Sarajevo evoked sufficient sympathy for the Bosnian cause as to lead, in some extreme cases, editors to suppress information that was inconsistent with narrative in which the Bosnian Serbs were aggressors (Burg and Shoup 2000). One example of how this focus limited popular understanding of what was happening was the lack of coverage of the atrocities being committed in Mostar by Croat forces, who were largely spared the widespread vilification by the British public and press of the Bosnian Serb forces, despite the shock conveyed by footage of the destruction by Croat tanks of the old bridge (Stari Most) that gave the city its name and symbolized the state of Bosnia. The dangers facing journalists leaving Sarajevo were highlighted by John Owen who reported anecdotal evidence that in Mostar in 1993 “it was rumored the Bosnian Croat militias put a price tag of 50 Deutschmarks on the head of every journalist’ (Owen and Purdey 2009).

The focus on stories of civilian suffering in Sarajevo meant that attention was concentrated on the indirect consequences of the siege on civilians, such as the lack

of food or fuel, particularly during the very cold Sarajevo winters. For example, in a 1993 ITV News at Ten report, the majority of footage concerns children and the elderly who are all “victims of the fight against winter,” while direct violence in the form of Bosnian Serb shells, is only mentioned once, and then indirectly, and while “besieging armies” are mentioned, there is only a vague description of what they are actually doing (ITV 1993).

Although the humanitarian angle played an important role in encouraging sympathy for citizens of Sarajevo, and in promoting understanding of the civilian cost of the war, it also had the effect of lessening British understanding of the extent of violence. Although there were many examples of severe and gratuitous violence in Sarajevo, the Bosnian Serb aggressors were mostly positioned in the hills surrounding Sarajevo firing artillery shells at the city and there were none of the massacres that took place elsewhere in Bosnia. The terms of the Genocide Convention meant that the British government had no duty to intervene until a very high threshold of violence had been passed. Consequently, although the reporting of Sarajevo, with the daily struggles of civilian against adversity, helped to personify the Bosnian victim in the minds of the British public, it did not create any direct pressure on the British government to act against those committing the violence.

Did the Media Matter?

To what extent could the media actually influence government policy or popular understanding of the war in Bosnia? Historians are largely divided on the actual effect that media representation had on government policy, with Kent arguing that the media was influential (Kent 2006), while Gow et al. argue that media coverage almost never compelled politicians to act, even if ‘sound-bites’ used to placate the public suggested otherwise (Gow et al. 1996), while Conversi argued that the public became “saturated with images of violence” to the extent that their emotional responses became numbed (Conversi 1996). However there is a general agreement that pressure from the media provided a climate that exerted pressure on the government to ‘do something’ or at least always to justify their decisions.

Research on interventions by Western governments during the 1990s has given rise to the idea of the ‘CNN effect,’ described by Robinson as “the ability of real-time communications technology, via the news media, to provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to both global and national events.” A major factor was the changed global political context that released reporters from the “prism of the Cold War,” thereby giving them greater freedom to criticize foreign policy of their governments (Robinson 2005). There was clearly a perception among politicians that media pressure was having a substantial impact on their policy, indicated by a series of criticisms of Kate Adie, the chief news correspondent for BBC News by Members of Parliament (MP). Thus, in 1995, a senior Conservative back bench MP complained that “it is less than satisfactory to have our foreign policy dictated by Miss Kate Adie” (Tapsell 1995), while another asked “Are we

really prepared to face the scenes of panic and mass slaughter which would be shown on our televisions night after night, with Kate Adie drawing attention to all the blood and gore?" (Arnold 1995). Conversely, those seeking to draw attention to other foreign policy issues complained that their inability to stimulate a government response reflected the lack of media attention to their cause, as in a 1993 discussion of terrorism in India in which Conservative MP Terry Dicks claimed that "Because Kate Adie does not go to the Punjab, there are no headlines telling us about India's state terrorism. She goes to Bosnia, so Bosnia becomes a major international issue" (Dicks 1995).

Outside of the British Parliament it has been argued that the Bosnian government itself perceived Western media outlets as having great importance over government policy. Thus, Burg and Shoup have argued that they attempted to influence media both in Bosnia and through public relations companies in Britain (Burg and Shoup 2000).

The 'CNN effect' does not necessarily take into account public opinion, as it often seeks to explain the direct relationship between reporting and policy-makers, focussing on the reliance by political elites on media sources to understand public opinion, rather than on more direct sources of public opinion such as opinion polls (Robinson 2005). However, it is clear that public dissatisfaction with government policy in relation to Bosnia did grow in line with, and reflect, presentations of media dissatisfaction, although there is limited evidence of a causal link, or indeed of the direction of causation. According to surveys conducted in 1993 and 1995 by the polling company Ipsos MORI on popular attitudes to Bosnia, there was considerable, and growing public dissatisfaction with the way the government and the UN were handling the crisis in Bosnia (between 60–65% and 58–67% respectively), and considerable support for sending armed troops (52%), in a direct contrast to government policy, although this support did decrease when respondents were reminded of the adverse consequences a drawn-out war, with the accompanying flow of casualties (Ipsos MORI 1995). These figures suggest that public attitudes and media reporting were consistent, with seeming to favor a greater degree of military intervention in Bosnia. However, while politicians at the time made statements that suggested a belief that the media was influencing foreign policy, and retrospectively they admitted to being influenced by the media, many historians disagree with the argument that news media had any great effect on the actual actions of policy-makers. Robinson, in his analysis of the 'CNN effect' concludes that "the limited attention span of media reporting does little to encourage the kind of long-term response requires to facilitate both ideal humanitarian action and conflict prevention/resolution" (Robinson 2005). This argument is supported by statements by Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom (UK) Douglas Hurd to the House of Commons in the UK in 1993 that "it would only be a pretence, to suppose that we can intervene and sort out every tragedy which captures people's attention and sympathy" and "decisions cannot be based either on false analogies or on a desire to achieve better headlines tomorrow than today" (Hurd 1993b).

In general it seems to be agreed that media coverage of the war did have some effect on government policy, either by virtue of how it pressured policy-makers to

‘do something,’ or through a few examples of intense coverage of particular events, such as the media revelations of Serb-run detention camps in 1992.

Gow et al. have argued that the absence of a clear policy agenda in relation to Bosnia made it vulnerable to certain levels of media influence, because “in the absence of policy, there was debate, and much of that debate was held in the news media” (Gow et al. 1996). However, although it is probable that media images made complete inactivity difficult for politicians, they only really led to demands for greater humanitarian efforts and so did not play a great role in pressurizing policy-makers to address the potential for genocide. Furthermore, it has been argued that the intensity of media portrayals of the war in Bosnia meant that “complication led to confusion and then apathy” (Kent 2006), suggesting that, as well as failing to effectively petition governments for change, media representations of the war actually numbed the public to images of horror and suffering.

For these reasons, when analyzing the importance of media representations, it seems that although the media had a clear effect on public understanding of the war, and was instrumental in making it a key topic of debate among politicians, there is limited evidence to suggest that it ever acted to change the minds of policy-makers in any direct way. Thus, despite its pleas for more action, this rarely increased political will to intervene in Bosnia. Instead, the terminology adopted was effective in a subtle, but constant way, in supporting the core British political understandings of Bosnia, which in turn provided support for government policies.

Discussion

This chapter builds on a considerable body of literature on media representation of conflicts and how it influences how people respond to them. William Howard Russell, who wrote for *The Times* of London and who was arguably the first modern war correspondent, is widely credited with bringing to public attention the horrendous conditions in hospitals in the Crimea, with his reports, by her own account, leading Florence Nightingale to travel to Turkey where she reformed the treatment of soldiers injured in the conflict there (Sakula 1990). Accounts in the British media of what was termed “the rape of Belgium,” which while characterized by many mass atrocities, such as the destruction of Leuven, emphasized and frequently exaggerated acts of sexual depravity and, as a consequence, were influential in garnering working class support for the war and, subsequently, support for entry to the war by the United States (Grayzel 2002). Accounts of the Spanish Civil War by correspondents such as Martha Gellhorn and Ernest Hemingway served as recruiting aids for the International Brigade (Moorehead 2011; Sanders 1960), although the challenges involved in conveying information through the fog of war were illustrated by the tendency of pro-Catholic sub-editors on the *New York Times* to alter stories that portrayed Franco in an unflattering light (Paul Preston 2009). The publication, in June 1969, of the pictures of all 242 American soldiers who died in a single week in Vietnam, is widely credited with undermining support for the war (Patterson 1984).

The nature of media representation changed enormously in the mid-1980s, with satellite technology and mobile telephones creating an immediacy that was previously absent. Just over a decade before the Bosnian conflict, people in the United Kingdom received news of in the Falklands conflict from evening statements read out on television by Ian McDonald, a Ministry of Defence spokesperson who, as the then Defence Minister commented, was perfect for the job because he was “extremely dull and boring” (Edwardes 2002). However, Bosnia was different and has been described as “the first true television war” (Gow et al. 1996), with real time coverage that forced politicians to respond (Kent 2006).

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed a series of inter-related themes arising from media and political representation of the war in Bosnia in the United Kingdom in the quest to understand why, despite clear warnings of looming catastrophe and the risk of genocide, the British government failed to intervene against those who would ultimately perpetrate mass killings.

A key issue dividing those in favor of military intervention and those not was the question of whether those at risk were “people like us.” Were the Bosnian Muslims actually European? If they were viewed as such, then this created a common bond of solidarity. If they were viewed otherwise, the willingness to intervene seemed much less. The answer was complicated by their geography, on what had historically been considered as Europe and had, for many years, been part of the Ottoman Empire, and their religion. The challenge of creating solidarity among groups who are demonstrably different, for example in their dress, skin color, or adoption of religious symbolism, has been discussed at length by Alesina, who has shown how it is difficult to adopt and implement collectivist policies in societies divided by religion, ethnicity, and language (Alesina et al. 1999).

Ethnic and religious fractionalization also played a role within Bosnia, making it easy to portray external aggression as simply the latest stage in a centuries old conflict between groups unfortunate enough to inhabit the same territory but seemingly unable to live with each other. Yet this is a simplistic representation as the three main groups, as well as other minorities such as the Jews of Sarajevo, had lived in peace for most of the post-war existence of Yugoslavia, often in mixed communities. On the other hand, intermarriage remained relatively uncommon (Botev and Wagner 1993) and there is some evidence that problems were accumulating as population changes exacerbated ethnic competition from the 1960s onwards (Slack and Doyon 2001). In other words, it can be argued that the war in Bosnia represented an act of external aggression superimposed on an ethnic and religious conflict.

Another important issue was the extent to which the victims were made visible by the British media visible. The Bosnian conflict preceded mass ownership of smart phones and the Internet, which have enabled almost anyone to record atrocities and post them online within minutes. The visibility of victims of the Bosnian

War was often confined to official images of Bosnian Muslim victims, which had the effect of narrowing British public understanding of the complexities of the conflict. These images in many ways promoted a one-sided view of the conflict, and opened media representation of the war and pleas for government action up for criticism, diminishing their effect and in some ways easing government avoidance of intervention.

This chapter suggests that media and political discourse were allowed to shape the British response to the war in Bosnia, not international law. Almost 50 years after the signing of the Genocide Convention, there does still appear to have been a “lack of will” (Gow 1997) by the British government to fulfil its obligations under the convention, and there was, and still is, international acquiescence with this denial of responsibility.

Twenty years on, in another part of the world, Iraq, many of the same issues can be seen. A British government is faced with evidence of atrocities. This time, there seems less reluctance by commentators and the media to use the term genocide. However, it remains reluctant to intervene militarily except to bring humanitarian aid. Once again, there is debate about whether the conflict is a civil war, between Sunnis and Shias, with Christians and Yazidis caught up in the wider conflict, or whether this is in effect a war of aggression, with the regional powers, Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and Qatar on the other, fighting what is in effect a proxy war. And debate continues about the role of the media, with a Church of England bishop complaining that the United Kingdom government lacks any coherent policy in the Middle East, with its actions instead being driven by “the loudest media voice at any particular time” (Townsend 2014).

The process of disseminating information of international conflicts to the British public has changed dramatically since the Bosnian War, with the coming of age of the Internet and the emergence of social media contributing to a democratization of information. These media fora have given those suffering through conflict the ability to create and share images of violence and oppression, which would not be nearly as accessible to foreign journalists and camera crews, while in some cases introducing less objectivity and shifting focus away from the perceived central elements of the conflict (Poell and Borra 2012). This was particularly noticeable during the Arab Springs of 2011, named the “Twitter Revolutions,” which occurred at a time when one third of the world population had access to the Internet (Joseph 2012). However, while these new technologies have vastly increased the volume of information available, it is the conversations and analysis that results from this information that appears most important (Joseph 2012). Furthermore, it is not yet clear that there has been a complete shift from the dominance of broadcasting and press corporations as the primary filters through which Western domestic populations access this information (Hujanen and Pietikäinen 2004). Therefore, understanding media framing of international conflict remains very important to understanding how international conflict and genocide is represented to the Western public, while also forming a comparative framework against which the representation of conflict through these new forums can be analyzed.

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Part IV
Bearing Witness to Genocide in the Arts

Chapter 13

Some Notes on My Poems and Armenian Memory

Peter Balakian

Abstract I briefly describe how I came to write my poems that relate to the Armenian Genocide, in particular the pivotal role played by my collage poem “The Claim.”

Keywords Post memory · Collage · Poetry

In the late 1970s I began writing a few poems that were dreaming back, to riff on Yeats’ phrase, to a history that preceded my life. That history was animating me largely through my knowledge of the experience of my grandmother’s Armenian Genocide survivor story, an experience that had been conveyed to me in various indirect ways or veiled gestures and forms such as my grandmother’s folk tales and dreams. No one in my family talked about this history openly so I grew up in a family in which silence shrouded the past.

As I grew to understand the factual history of the Armenian Genocide in my twenties by reading history and survivor and bystander narratives as well as listening to survivor testimony, I came to fill in some of the blanks about my grandmother’s experience. I learned, as well, that my grandmother’s entire family—the Skekerlemedjians (except for her half brother who was in the United States), wealthy merchants in Diyarbakir, southeastern Turkey – had been killed en mass by the Ottoman killing squads during the first week of August, 1915. And I came to discover that some of the details of that moment were written down in in a human rights lawsuit, which my grandmother filed upon her arrival in the United States in 1920. This legal document entitled “Claims Against Foreign Governments” was shown to me by my Aunt Gladys sometime around 1980. I learned that my grandmother was able to file such a claim because her late husband Hagop Chilingurian was a naturalized U.S. citizen, and thus as her widow, she had the legal right to make a claim against a foreign government (Ottoman Turkey) for losses incurred by that government’s criminal actions. Her husband Hagop, whom she saw die on the

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death march, had resettled to Boston and had come back to Diyarbakir in 1915 to get my grandmother and aunts to take them to America. They got caught. “The Claim,” contains my grandmother’s condensed narrative about what happened to them in August 1915; and the document also includes the names of her murdered family and their ages—from her father and mother Karnig and Lucine who were 75 and 50 years old to her brothers and sisters and nieces and nephew, some of whom were 5-year-old and 2-year-old children.

When my aunt pulled that document out of an old desk drawer and handed it to me 60 years after it had been filed, it had a big impact on me. It brought to me, a young poet, a certain kind of news about the meaning of history for the literary imagination. I felt then, in various ways, that the poem could ingest, respond to, and transform dimensions of history and its aftermath—even a violent and unspoken history. My early poems came out of the intersecting influences of Yeats and Eliot’s Modernism with their particular notions of history and the 1950s confessionalism of Lowell, Roethke, and Plath. And, of course, I was—and still am—taking on all the things poets take on: love, death, war, sex, trees, oceans, paintings, music, art and God.

But, even before I had encountered “The Claim” I had written some poems about the Armenian Genocide past, in which I hoped I could capture something about my grandmother’s death march experience and her PTSD aftermath. These poems such as “The History of Armenia,” “Granny Making Soup,” “The Road to Aleppo,” “For My Grandmother Coming Back” were published in literary journals in the U.S. in the late ‘70s, and it was liberating and affirming for me to see that editors across the diverse American map were interested in what I was doing with history. After reading my grandmother’s legal claim, I wanted to do something with the document, make a poem out of it, create a collage out of it. This would be the first of various collage poems I would write over the years, and for this reason as well, it was important for me. Because it was a poem of multiple voices and layerings with inclusions of documentary text, it allowed me to explore the relationship between history, a more expansive form of the lyric poem, and a personal encounter with the past; it allowed me to find the creative tension between the aesthetic, the documentary and the real. The poem which I called “The Claim,” appeared in my second book of poems *Sad Days of Light* (1983).

In writing poems that engage what Marianne Hirsch would later come to call in the 1990s “post memory,” (a term I did not have in my head till I read her work decades later) I was free from some of the confinements of mimetic realism. I drew psychic and emotional energy from the life of my grandmother whose survivor story haunted me. In some of these poems I was imagining the Armenian Anatolian culture and land that my grandmother and her family lived in before the great catastrophe. In others I was interested in blending textures of realism with elements of dream and what I would call surreal-like dislocations, as in “The History of Armenia,” in which the nervous breakdown trauma of my grandmother’s genocide aftermath collides with the peaceful post war suburban landscape of East Orange, New Jersey and the nearby city of Newark, as the Eisenhower highway of the Garden State Parkway was being built. Or, I made symbolic and allegorical tropes in poems like “Granny Making Soup,” and “For My Grandmother Coming Back.”

Over the years my post memory orientation has preoccupied me as poet and memoirist, not in every book or every chapter of my career, but at various junctures. My hope has been to engage that past and its textures and its violence with my own poetics, which has grown out of my intellectual map and various cultural forces that our age offered me. The poems I've mentioned here are from *Sad Days of Light* (1983), and the others are from the mid '80s and '90s, and all of them are collected in *June-tree: New and Selected Poems* (2001). I hope my poems might suggest things about how a traumatic history can be received across generations and energize the poetic imagination and the music-cadences of language.

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Chapter 14

Poems

Peter Balakian

After the Survivors Are Gone

I tried to imagine the Vilna ghetto,
to see a persimmon tree after the flash at Nagasaki.
Because my own tree had been hacked,
I tried to kiss the lips of Armenia.

At the table and the altar
we said some words written ages ago.
Have we settled for just the wine and bread,
for candles lit and snuffed?

Let us remember how the law has failed us.
Let us remember the child naked,
waiting to be shot on a bright day
with tulips blooming around the ditch.

We shall not forget the earth,
the artifact, the particular song,
the dirt of an idiom—
things that stick in the ear.

Parable for Vanished Countries

The mountain was close.
Far. Then closer.
Rivulets of light ran across it.

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Lakes were white circles,
 then canyons,
 then empty eyes.

The sky was a field of burning stones.
 It was neither day nor night.
 It was jasmine, and fires went out

over my head. The closer I got,
 the farther it was.
 Rivers pooled like green wax,

and the orchards and vineyards
 on its flanks flared
 like the wings of a scarlet tanager.

The trees glared like shepherds' crooks
 in the brass light; crows roosted on them,
 and the mountain rose into the sky,

until it was a cloud
 shimmering in black air.

Ellis Island

The tide's a Bach cantata.
 The beach is the swollen neck of Isaac.

The tide's a lamentation of white opals.
 The beach is free. The Coke machine rusted out.

Here is everything you'll never need:

hemp-cords, curry-combs, jade and musk,
 a porcelain cup blown into the desert—

stockings that walked to Syria in 1915.

On the rocks some ewes and rams
 graze in the outer dark.

The manes of the shoreline undo your hair.
 A sapphire ring is fingerless.

The weed and algae are floating like a bed,
and the bloodless gulls—

whose breaths would stink of all of us
if we could kiss them on the beaks

are gnawing on the dead.

The Oriental Rug

I

I napped in the pile
in the brushed and bruised
Kashan on our living room floor
an eight-year-old sleeping

in vegetable dyes—
roots and berries,
tubers, shafts, dry leaves

the prongy soil
of my grandparents' world:
Eastern Turkey, once Armenia.

The wine-red palmettes
puckered with apricot buds
and fine threads of green
curling stem-like over my cheek

leaving a shadow like filigree
on my eye as I closed it.

The splintering green wool
bled from juniper berries
seemed to seep, even then,

into the wasp-nest cells
breathing in their tubular ways
inside my ear and further back.

*

On certain nights
when the rain thrummed
against the clapboard

and my father's snoring issued
 down the hall, I slept on the rug
 curled and uncovered
 and the sea of ivory

between the flowers
 undulated as if the backs
 of heavy sheep were breathing
 in my mouth.

The prickly cypress
 down by the friezed border
 spiraled in my night gazing.
 Armenian green:

dwarf cabbage, shaded cedar,
 poppy stem, the mossy pillow
 where my grandfather
 sat in the morning dark

staring at the few goats
 that walked around the carnage.
 Outside my house the grass
 never had such color.

II

Now I undo the loops
 of yarn I rested my head on.
 Under each flower
 a tufted pile loosens.

I feel the wool give way
 as if six centuries of feet
 had worn it back to the hard
 earth floor it was made to cover.

Six centuries of Turkish heels
 on my spine-dyed back:
 madder, genista, sumac—
 one skin color in the soil.

I lose myself
 in a flawed henna plant
 jutting toward the scroll.
 Its rose-pink eyes burst

off the stems.
 The auburn dust
 which reddens the women
 returns with a sharp wind.

The vine of lily-blossoms winding
 by the fringe once shined
 like fur when a spray of sun
 flushed through a curtain—

that gracious shape hardens now
 like a waxy twig at summer's end.

I hear wind running
 through heart-strings.

I hear an untuned zither
 plucked by a peacock's accidental strut.

Warp and weft come undone;
 sludge spills back to the earth

(my liver's bitter
 as the pomegranate's acid seed).

III

The heavy mallet a Parsee boy
 once used to beat the knots
 beneath the pile so
 the weft would disappear

vibrates in me
 as a knelling bell
 over the Sea of Marmara
 once rang toward the West.

I pitch myself
 into the spinning corolla
 of an unnamed flower

coral, red, terra-cotta,
 get thrown down a lattice of leaves

to the dark balm
 of the marshy hillsides

of my faraway land—
 the popped acres
 of Adoian's hands.

IV

I pry my way
 into a rose—
 undoing its blighted cliché.

I strain for the symmetry
 of its inflorescence,

slide along the smooth
 cup of a petal
 till I rush headfirst
 down the pistil

feeling the tubey walls
 muscle me to the ovary
 where a bee was swooning
 on some pollen.

Wrapped this tight
 I suck my way into the nectaries;
 feel a hummingbird's tongue
 and the chalky wing of a moth.

That wet, I wash
 to the cool leaflets,
 rim their toothed edges,
 then back-rub

the remains of sepals
 which kept the rose alive
 in blighted April when Adana
 and Van were lopped off the map.

I come apart in the thorn
 (the spiky side that kept the jackal out)
 and disperse whatever's left
 of me to the earth.

V

I walk with a rug on my back.
 Become to myself a barren land.
 Dust from the knots
 fills my arms

and in the peaceful New World sun
 becomes fine spume.

A sick herbalist
 wandering in a century
 mapped by nations wandering.

The dyes come through the wool,
 break the grid of threads
 holding the shapes to form:

safflower, my Dyer's Thistle,
 carry me on your burr
 so I may always feel
 dry gusts on my neck.

Kermes, dried like a scab,
 crush me to your womanly scarlet chest.
 I feel your scales
 flutter in my eyes.

Madder root—
 Which makes the red of Karabagh
 bleed along one long hallway.

Tyrian purple, from a mollusk shell
 lodged in Phoenician sand—
 gurgle all your passion in my ear.

for my daughter, Sophia

World War II

My mother worked
 for Irvington Varnish
 south of Newark where
 her sister lived

in a room writing
like Katherine Anne Porter.
My mother wore goggles
and a white coat

to earn college tuition.
In Budapest Eichmann mulled
over 200 tons of tea,
2,000 cases of soap;

Jews for supplies.
My mother was gloved past
her wrists rigging
polyester for parachutes.

The shadow of a poplar
on the wall was the hand
of the Turkish wind.
My grandmother feared

my mother would disappear
into the brick buildings
of the college catalog.
Topf & Sons made vans

in '43, and the waste
was slight as it slid
into the Bug River.
Bucknell University

was a dark copse
past the Delaware Water Gap
where Turkish gendarmes
emerged in the daylight.

My mother boxed khaki
and flint; a hand
placed electrodes on
my grandmother's head,

and the grackles
in Upper Silesia ate
powdery ash on the oaks.

Ions: a convulsive seizure,
ECT they called it,
and my aunt slept on
A Ship of Fools in a run-

down room in Belmar.
On cool sheets in the evening
when the poplar shadow
disappeared, my grandmother rested

and my mother returned
from work, when the sun
on the oil drums of the Pike
was pure acetylene

like a road out of Armenia,
out of Turkey, out of Treblinka
out of New Jersey.

The History of Armenia

Last night
my grandmother returned
in her brown dress
standing on Oraton Parkway
where we used to walk
and watch the highway
being dug out.
She stood against
a backdrop of steam hammers
and bulldozers,
a bag of fruit
in her hand,
the wind blowing
through her eyes.

I was running
toward her
in a drizzle
with the morning paper.
When I told her
I was hungry, she said,
in the grocery store
a man is standing
to his ankles in blood,

the babies in East Orange
have disappeared,
maybe eaten
by the machinery
on this long road.

When I asked for my mother
she said, gone,
all gone.

The girls went for soda,
maybe the Coke was bad,
the candy sour.
This morning the beds
are empty, water off,
toilets dry.
When I went to the garden
for squash
only stump was there.
When I went to clip
parsley
only a hole.

We walked past piles
of gray cinder and cement
trucks; there were no men.
She said Grandpa left
in the morning,
in the dark;
he had pants to press
for the firemen of
East Orange.
They called him
in the middle of night,
West Orange was burning,
Bloomfield and Newark
were gone.

One woman carried
the arms of her child
to East Orange last night
and fell on her uncle's
stoop, two boys came
with the skin
of their legs

in their pockets
and turned themselves in
to local officials;
this morning sun
is red and spreading.

If I go to sleep
tonight, she said,
the ceiling will open
and bodies will fall
from clouds. *Yavrey*,
where is the angel
without sword, *Yavrey*,
where is the angel
without six fingers
and a missing leg,
the angel with news
the water will be clear
and have fish.

Grandpa is pressing pants.
They came for him
before the birds were up—
he left without shoes
or tie, shirt or suspenders.
It was quiet.
The birds, the birds
were still sleeping.

Road to Aleppo, 1915

A flame like a leaf eaten
in the sun followed you—
a white light rose higher
than the mountain,
singed the corner of your eye
when you turned to find
the screaming trees
dissolving to the plain.

Even when the sun dropped,
the ground was heat and bayonets,
and in the Turkish wind
the throats of boys
kept ringing in your ears.

Your breath like horizon
settled into black.
You stuttered every mile
to your daughters'
shorter steps.

The air, almost gone,
filled inside your dress.

Post-Traumatic Shock, Newark, New Jersey, 1942

Shirts hang in the glass showcase
behind the gold *French Cleaners*,

when I open the door,
naphthalene rises
into the no-legs.

Delphiniums are blue like
the decanters of cologne from Paris.
That's my brother's house.

God's face on a wooden belfry.
God's lips. God's nose.
God's innocent little prick.

At the butcher's those are cow's eyes
with the visionary gleam of things
in the dead sand.

I'm the star of a Jew
rising from the beery foam
of Chaplin's moustache.

It was a dirt road
like the head of an elk
or these hanging ribs.

Figs at Delaney's all
the way from Smyrna
like shit in cellophane.

On the road. We were going there,
and then Hawaii turned into white light
on the screen of the Philco.

Kamikaze metal.
 A runway of gin and broken glass.
 Naphthalene of the Red Cross nurses.

*Yes, yes, the child's mine.
 No Armenians left?*

Jimmy Stewart you bastard
 I'm here with some shopping bags.

The Claim

APPLICATION FOR THE SUPPORT OF CLAIMS AGAINST FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

May 15, 1919, Department of State

*Light perfumed wind
 off the Park, the chestnuts arched
 over Fifth Avenue.
 I'm the age she was in 1915.*

Q.1. Give the (a) name, (b) residence, and (c) occupation
 A.1. (a) Nafina Hagop Chilinguirian (born Shekerlemedjian)
 (b) Ghuri St., Aleppo, Syria (c) Tailoress.

A.2. (a) complete ownership (b) since August 1915
 (c) From my husband Hagop Chilinguirian, the
 original claimant who was a citizen of U.S.A.
 beginning his minority till the year 1909 A.D. when

*History is a man's breath.
 Whatever I take in I give out,
 mother of my mother*

*her wobbly skeletal frame,
 the high-pitched calcium
 of the bones
 in the air I breathe*

*my head feathery
 in the hot June wind.*

he returned in order to arrange his affairs but he
 died during our deportation

*My grandmother used to say:
they went there—
they were going
to the river Tigris.*

—family who are perished on account of the deportation
leaving me and my brother Thomas Shekerlemedjian
now residing at

U.S.A.
Box 125 West Hoboken, New Jersey

(Answer Question 15 c)

I, Lucia Der Hovsepien, 45 years old, born in Diarbekir
Turkey, residing in Zeki st., Aleppo, Syria, occupying
by domestic works residing before the deportation in
Diarbekir, do solemnly affirm that Nafina Hagop Chilinguirian
had her birth certificate

all over Central Park today hydrangea opening

but it was lost during the deportation;
that she is born in Diarbekir, Turkey, at 22nd October 1890
of the parents Hagop Shekerlemedjian and Lucia Nadjarian

*who deprived me of my ripe years? who?
I heard her say this once behind closed doors*

*but when I walked into
the room no one else was there
Walls. No moldings. Floating prayer rugs
flowers on sand/ running vines/ a medallion swinging in the wind*

(A) GENERAL QUESTIONS

14. State race to which claimant belongs—
Armenian, white

22 October 1890 Diarbekir, Turkey
my birth certificate was lost
attached the affidavit for

*She filed the claim after she arrived in New Jersey—
A law firm in Newark—right through to the State Dept.*

*my aunt said; nothing happened
for sixty years in the third drawer of the dresser*

I, Père Harutiun Yessayan, the Prelate of Armenians
in Aleppo . . . do hereby certify that I have no
interest in the claim

PRELATURE ALEP 1919

*On this steamy island
I smell the oil rags of women*

We the undersigned of this affidavit
do solemnly affirm that Hagop Chilinguirian
the husband of Nafina
is of the U.S.A.

*I used to roll grape leaves
with her Sunday after church
we washed off the brine
cut the thick part of the stem out*

SECTION V FACTS REGARDING CLAIM

Q.55. Give an itemized statement of property entirely lost
description of damage value in dollars American losses

2500 kg. of sugar a 3 p. gold	750 Ltq.
household furniture	250
goods left at my husband's shop	
1000 kg. of sugar	500
5000 kg. of coffee a 15 p. gold	750
2000 kg. of hemp-cords	100
1000 parcels of sacks	250
1000 curry combs a 5 p. gold	750
25,000 kg. of rice	750
6000 kg. of gall-nut	100

*spice mountain
spice mountain*

*the nose becomes powder
the hair dust*

Ready money robbed on the way by the Turks
 the money necessary to rear my two daughters,
 Gladys 7 years old and Alice 5 years old,
 till their marriage 2000

*Carrion of a soup
 coppery urine on my fingers;*

horse screams go back
 curry combs mane meat stink

*my grandmother's voice
 reverberations off the walls
 walls where nations disappear
 the walls around Diarbekir
 walls around around
 walls a trellis of grapes*

TOTAL IN GOLD 5900 Ltq.
 in American dollars at the rate of 1915 A.D. 68,750 dollars

The aphrodisiac privet along the Park

*the ripe years a bowl of pears
 a sack of peaches a body*

 list of the losses and injuries come down
 by inheritance from our relatives indicated below

My brother Harutiun Shekerlemedjian, merchant
 had at Karadja Hagh, a village in Diarbekir,
 150 tons of rice kept in three wells captured
 by the government 3500 Ltq. in his shop at the market-
 place goods: calicoes, clothes, silken clothes
 at the shop at Iz-ed-din:
 cotton-clothes, calicoes, leathers

500 sheep village Talavi 150 tons of rice in three wells
 jewels and money kept under the ground in a box

The blood value for a person was ordered to be 350 Ltq.
 by decree of the Sultan

*I feel the jackal
 in my pants*

My sister Hadji Anna captured by a Turk named Hadji Bakkar

*take nothing house
burning horse-flame*

C) My father Hagop Shekerlemedjian, 75 years old,
killed by Turks

My mother Lucia Shekerlemedjian, 50 years old,
killed by Turks 350

My brother Dikran Shekerlemedjian, 35 years old,
killed by Turks 350

His son Karnig Shekerlemedjian 7 years old
killed by Turks 350

*this is good for you, she said,
the olive oil virgin
the leaves baby green*

His son Diran Shekerlemedjian, 4 years old
killed by Turks 350

My brother Harutiun Shekerlemedjian, 30 years old
killed by Turks 350

His son Levon Shekerlemedjian, 2 years old
killed by Turks 350

His daughter Azniv Shekerlemedjian, 5 years old
killed by Turks 350

My sister Hadji Anna Derhovsepian, 28 years old
killed by Turks 350

My sister Arusyag Berberian, 25 years old
killed by Turks 350

*By the lofty cedars of Lebanon
and the oaks of Bashan
there I used to lie
when I was a girl*

We the undersigned of this affidavit, Thomas Alchikian, 50
years old, Armenian shoemaker, and Yervant Ekmekdjian, 35,
Armenian blacksmith, solemnly affirm that Nafina Hagop

Chilinguirian
is the very owner

lamb-tongue cow-foot human eye

*The tulips are blinding
along 64th Street*

My husband in spite of that he was a citizen of U.S.A.
was forced. . . as he was feeble and indisposed being subjected to

such conditions
and seeing our relatives killed
inhumanly, he could not support the life

leaving me a widow with my two orphan daughters
Gladys 7 and Alice 5

We the remaining deportees, women and children
were forced to walk without being allowed even
to buy some bread to eat. Frequently we were
robbed by Turks as if they would carry us safely
to our destiny which was entirely unknown

So for thirty days we were obliged to wander
through mountains and valleys fatigue and hunger
enforced by the whip of the gendarmes diminished
the number of deportees

*my brothers' heads are
on the vine, on the vine;
what rots is in the pot*

After many dangers whose description would take
much time a few women and children included I myself
arrived at Aleppo Syria beginning September 1915

that the Turk people plundered and captured
that they are all killed by the Turks
during our deportation

*a peak where Noah landed
dove come back
with a twig*

QUESTION 63

1 August 1915 our parish in Diarbekir was besieged by the gendarmes
. . . the same day with the menace of death
they removed us, the Armenians

*red unguent crow-beak anise
leave by the stable the lake is fire*

the Turk people plundered and captured our goods the deporter
gendarmes separated the men from the women
and binding them to each other,
they carried all of us to an unknown direction

Sunday her coat like incense

After three days, they killed one by one the man deportees
of whom only a few were saved. So were killed mercilessly my
brothers and sisters and

*in Armenian we do not say
for ever and ever; Amen.
It means unto the Ages of Ages.*

Since then I am supported by the Hon. Consulate
of U.S.A. at Aleppo

*I remember when
she helped me blow
the candles out,
my fifth birthday;
no light, only curls
of smoke in the kitchen.*

The deportation and the fiendish steps taken
against the Armenians in general being well
known by the civilized world, I do not mention
other evidences concerning this matter

Only

I assert that:

*how long will they cook the eyes the eyes of men
where is the Black Sea is the sea Black?
why do women wear black to church?*

I am a human being . . . it was impossible to
have by me the documentary evidence concerning my
losses but my co-deportees saved from death
witness that

I am

I am human herewith affidavit.

For My Grandmother, Coming Back

For the dusty rugs
and the dye of blue-roots,
for the pale red stomachs of sheep,
you come back.

For the brass ladle
and the porous pot of black
from your dinner of fires,
I call your name like a bird.

For the purple fruit
for the carrots like cut fingers
for the riverbed damp with flesh,
you come back.

For the field of goats
wet and gray,
for the hooves and sharp bones
floating in the broth,
I wave my arms full of wind.

For the tumbling barrel
of red peppers,
for the milled mountain of wheat,
for the broken necks
of squash fat and full of seed,
I let my throat open.

For the lips of young boys
bitten through,
for the eyes of virgins brown
and bleating on the hill,
for the petticoat of your daughter
shivering by the lake,
for the yarn of her arms
unwinding at her father's last shout.

For the lamb punctured
from the raw opening
to his red teeth,
for the lamb rotating
like the sun

on its spit,
 for the eyes that fall
 into the fire,
 for the tongue tender and full,
 for the lungs smoldering
 like leaves
 and the breasts spilling
 like yellow milk
 and the stomach heaving
 its fistful of days
 like red water falling
 into the stream,

I wave my arms full of birds
 full of dry gusts
 full of burning clothes,
 and you come back,
 you come back.

Granny, Making Soup

In its stone pores
 this pot holds
 what's left of time—

early mint, dill, walnut-root,
 the dust of the rusty stick of cinnamon
 we pass from generation
 to generation;

run your finger along
 the curve, it's soft
 like a fine shell,
 smell the bottom,
 it's stronger
 than when my grandmother
 rubbed it with her palm.

*

I break the shoulder bones
 apart, no knife, nothing metal—
 the white ball of the joint
 we'll all chew later.
 Now, the socket

from which it is pulled
is the empty round
where we join.

I hacked three times a week
a lamb like this
for market—

and I knew when
their blue throats
swallowed in my hand,
how close we were to soup,
and when the pink-gray skin,
shaved and glowing
in the sun
was slit and wheezing
and crying out its guts,
I took a fingerful
of blood.

*

Here, the white string
the teeth can't cut
must be left.

You must take the tendon
and give it to the water
of the soup.

When I see it
in the cauldron
like a frazzled strand of fish,
I think how like
the body fiber
is the ankle of a goat
who wanders
on the dry steppe
for weeks and weeks
till from some small cave
there is water
thin and clear singing
along the sand

and we drink
we all drink.

*

When the water rises
in this pot
and a slow steam comes
over the clean bones
and shoulder fat,
there's a low gurgle
and the marrow moves.
The flecks of basil open
like small leaves
and the celery grows dark,
bends its head
for bottom.

I've watched this, Peter,
in the black
of the cauldron
when there was no light—
a first steam started.
I could hear the grain
in my spoon settle
and my hair tightened
as in August
on the wharf.

In an hour the girls
will sneak in to taste,
Grandpa will loosen his tie,
the plants will droop,

but for now
it's all at bottom.

*

Always in afternoon
you let the pot alone

the water will take
from the bones
what the lamb takes from the earth,

the water will take
from the marrow
what the lamb's mouth
takes from the low hills:
some high grass
beyond the wet meadow
and the weeds around
the eucalyptus
and in night
when the lamb takes
the fig and breaks it open—
so the seed covers ground—

this too
the water takes
from the bones.

And when the lamb
wanders beyond the steppe
to the first ledge
of the mountain
and the wildcat pins
him to the dust
and dry red shale,
and tears him
almost woolless
until the bleat
of his throat is hushed,
and his organs are gnashed
to nothing,
and he is open
and clean of everything

but the long bones
of his back
thinner than the cat's teeth,
and the blood
dries on the skin
and the feathers
of gray wool are left
for the birds—

this too
the water takes
from the bones.

*

And when we return
in evening,
the water will be full
of the stone
and like a voice
it will moan
with its tendon, fat, and bone,
and with the little meat
we've left for our own teeth,

and then, Peter,
we'll have broth—

and when you
take it to your lips
you'll take it
all in.

Chapter 15

My Artistic Explorations of the Holocaust

Hans Guggenheim

Keywords Holocaust · Sketches · Biography

When Jutta Lindert invited me to contribute to this volume on genocide, I recalled that I first heard the term that was coined in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin when I was eighteen, living in Guatemala and dreaming of becoming an artist. After the liberation of Auschwitz by the Russian army in January 1945, my parents began to talk in low voices about the fate of my grandmother Pauline Davidson Guggenheim, who perished at Theresienstadt, and of my father's brother Herbert Guggenheim, whom I loved listening to playing Chopin in my parents' living room in Berlin and who was murdered at Auschwitz. Somehow the word "genocide," and even more specifically the concept of the "Holocaust," introduced by Eli Wiesel, helped us cope with information emerging from German death factories about the tragic suffering and death of millions of victims.

I was already living in New York when I still thought that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 9, 1948, spelled the end of genocides, and that the activities described in the resolution were banned and banished forever from the world. The convention came into effect on January 12, 1951, but was not ratified by the U.S. Senate until February 19, 1987. It defines genocide as follows:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Article 2)

The world's beliefs and hopes that the convention would lead to the end of genocide were naively and sadly mistaken.

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A visit to the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York while Picasso's *Guernica* was on display might have warned us that the fantasy of totally obliterating innocent human beings and whole nations has not yet been erased from the minds of men and women. In 1950, I was studying Goya's *Disasters of War* with Professor Jose Lopez-Rey at the Institute of Fine Arts and thinking about Picasso's *Guernica* at MoMA. There are significant differences between the Spanish war against Bonaparte that Goya witnessed and recorded in eighty-one aquatints known as *Disasters of war (Fatales consecuencias de la sangrienta guerra en España con Buonaparte. Y otros caprichos enfaticos, 1810–1814)* and the German-Italian terrorist bombing of Guernica transformed by Picasso into a universal icon standing for all murderous crimes against humanity. Picasso as well as Goya succeeded in forging from private emotions messages that transcend both time and space because they evoke in us a sense of empathy for victims of violence. But neither Goya nor Picasso was yet aware of genocides. My friend Jonasz Stern, a Polish-Jewish artist, who had been left for dead by the Germans after a mass execution in a courtyard, managed to escape, and after the war guided Picasso through Auschwitz. When I asked him what Picasso had said, he answered: "Nothing, what was there to say?"

In 1951, one could not imagine that in 1994 in order to avoid getting involved in the slaughter in Rwanda, European nations and the United States would be able to ignore ethical and moral obligations to intervene on behalf of the victims, and that the United Nations would refuse to label as "genocide" the Hutu government's carefully planned and organized 100 days of murder with the intent of completely and totally eradicating the Tutsi population. At the beginning of that genocide and under pressure from Belgium and the United States, the United Nations withdrew most of the twenty-five hundred members of its peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) from Rwanda, ignoring the pleas of its commander, Roméo Dallaire.

Raphael Lemkin, who not only coined the term "genocide" but dedicated his life to struggling for the acceptance of the Genocide Convention at the United Nations, would not have been surprised. He was well aware of the strong opposition to interfering with state sovereignty and was deeply pessimistic regarding the future of genocide prevention. He wrote: "After the ceremony I issued a statement for the press.... It was heavy with my worries, depressions and fears, and not jubilant enough for the occasion. I could not lie. But it served the purpose. The next day the entire world read that the U. N. had signed a protocol bringing the Geneva Convention into force. People in all corners of the globe believe in what they read: that the U. N. was bringing into force an actual law for the outlawing of slaughter of the innocent. I hoped they rejoiced. That was enough" (Lemkin 2013, 212). It wasn't.

Memorial as Metaphor

Set in a beautifully groomed landscape, a memorial was opened in Kigale in 2004, a short ten years after the genocide swept across Rwanda. The memorial's structure is a study in light and dark, juxtaposing Rwanda's bright hopes for the future with

its dark genocidal past. Two stained-glass windows were created by Roman Halter. Colored light pours from the first window onto a staircase with steps leading almost but not quite up to it in a section describing Rwanda before the genocide. These missing steps have been interpreted as metaphors for missed steps that could have been taken to avoid the tragedy.

The exhibition provides glimpses of the remains of exhumed victims and walls bearing the names of the dead, as a ray of light and hope falls on them from the second window. The iconography of this second window makes one recall El Greco's *Burial of the Count Orgaz* in Toledo (1586–1588), in which the count's tiny pale soul is shown rising to an assembly of saints in heaven, reminding us of the mortality of every individual human being. But in sharp contrast to the burial of the Count of Orgaz, the white skulls seen against a scarlet red background at the bottom of the stained-glass panel represent not one soul but a million. Immediately behind the skulls in the lower part of the composition one can see dark steps leading upward, to be succeeded by smaller ones of brilliant white light leading the eye further upward as they reach a heaven composed of abstract colorful shapes. There is no ladder in El Greco's painting, so where does the artist's inspiration for a ladder come from? It most probably came from Jacob's dream in the Old Testament, Genesis 28:12: "And he dreamed, and beholds a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven: and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it." The white light falling through the skulls painted on the stained glass serves as a metaphor illuminating the insanity of human destructiveness in the genocide committed against the Tutsis as well as the genocide committed at Auschwitz.

Jacob's ladder was a popular theme in the sixteenth century, painted by Rafael Sanchi and by Lucas Cranach. However, the iconography of the stained-glass panel has a different source, one which is part of the artist's personal experience. The artist, Roman Halter, was the youngest of seven children in an orthodox Jewish family in Chodescz, a small town in western Poland. He was twelve in 1939 when the Nazi army invaded, immediately murdering many of the eight hundred Jewish inhabitants and taking the remainder to death camps or slave-labor camps. Roman, together with his parents and his sisters, was carried off to the Lodz Ghetto and later to Auschwitz, where all the other members of his family were killed. Miraculously he survived and eventually made his way to England to become an architect and an artist. Halter recounts in measured, detached tones the horrific scenes of murder he witnessed during the Holocaust in his autobiography *Roman's Journey* (Halter 2007). Halter's Rwanda memorial, *Genocide and the Possibility of Hope*, expresses the same unshakeable faith in humanity and hope that shines through the glass he designed for Israel's Holocaust memorial at Yad Vashem: "If genocide is to be prevented in the future, we must understand how it happened in the past—not only in terms of the killers and the killed but of the bystander" (Morse 1967).

My Auschwitz Sketches

Visualization as an Instrument of Genocide Memorialization

Fear is an emotion that is difficult to experience second hand, and difficult to convey. When I was twelve in Berlin I feared swastikas, the color red, and swastika flags, SS uniforms, monstrous German Nazi architecture, the uniforms worn by Hitler Youth marching on my street, and the *Litfaßsäule* displaying the *Der Stürmer* paper with obscene caricatures supposedly of Jews. But the images I feared were precisely those that were designed to inspire courage, a sense of belonging and pride, a belief in a common destiny in the kids in my school and, in fact, in much of the German population. This visual cohesion included a taste for long blond tresses on girls, nineteenth-century sentimental art, marching columns singing the *Horst Wessel* song about Jewish blood spurting from their knives. And of course, seeing the Hitler salute, “*Heil Hitler*” (Salvation to Hitler) with outstretched arms creating a sense of visual solidarity among thousands of true believers.

The powerful visual marketing tools of Nazi ideology created a tolerance for the expulsion of everything and everyone who did not fit into Adolf Hitler’s fantasy and prepared the groundwork for the genocide. Yes, there were some people who were not deceived. Among my personal friends there was the family of the Grafen von der Decken, who did not allow the Hitler salute even on their phones, and there was my friend Friedelind Wagner, who was forced to live with her mother and Hitler until she was able to escape to England shortly before the war. But as happened in Rwanda, the members of the small elite who resisted were rapidly and brutally silenced, erased from the picture of uniforms and uniformity painted by the Nazi propaganda machine.

Sketching with Closed Eyes

Some moments turn into memorials in the mind, and I shall never forget my visit, in 1983 in Krakow, to my friend, the artist Jonasz Stern (1904–1988). Jonasz lived in a tiny apartment with a tall stove covered in green tiles in one corner, a couch, and a black cat. “Do you speak Yiddish?” he asked me. “No,” I responded, and we continued in English as we looked at his latest work, compositions made of animal bones, which, he explained, gave the animals a new lease on life, a second life, a foot bridge into immortality. It was his Jewish response to Auschwitz as well as his autobiography (Fig. 15.1).

Jonasz had been left for dead by a Nazi firing squad, and because the German guards had been drunk, he had managed to crawl away and escape. He asked me again: “Do you speak Yiddish?” I apologized: “No, I don’t.” Jonasz hesitated, then got up and walked over to the chimney and picked up a piece of black soap. “Do you know what this is?” I said nothing. “It was made by Germans at Auschwitz, of Jews



Fig. 15.1 Jonasz Stern, *Untitled*

they had murdered.” Although he did not ask me, I said again, “I am sorry, I don’t speak Yiddish.” Jonasz then gave me the print he described as a representation of absolute evil, a print that I have misread for a long time but that, once it is understood, is one of the most horrific works of art that I know. It shows a human being curling up in smoke above the crematoria of Auschwitz, and determined, vigorous white lines seeking to erase even the last remaining trace of his memory on earth.

When he asked me, “Have you been to Auschwitz?” I told him that I was afraid to go. “Do you think that those who were packed into trains and sent there were not afraid? I will arrange a car for you.”

The first time I walked through the infamous sardonic arch “Arbeit macht frei” erected by the German Nazis at the entrance to the camp and past the corner where Jewish prisoners were forced to perform music as men returned from slave labor, I was astonished to see a street of small row houses lined with stately tall poplar trees, not knowing that they had been planted by the Germans to fool allied bombers in case of an attack. I had a vague fear of Auschwitz, but in my family, as in many other German-Jewish families, we hardly talked about it before the Eichmann trial and before much of the Auschwitz-focused research we have today had been published. I raced from block to block, from exhibit to exhibit. When I arrived in Building V, I saw a group of tense young German volunteers as they displayed the luggage of the victims, and I realized that the only way I could bring myself to face the reality of the remnants was to return to Auschwitz and to sketch, because in order to sketch I would have to stand and look for a long time. Gradually, I started to feel at home among the shoes and the eyeglasses and the dolls at Auschwitz. Thus my sketches served a selfish purpose, and they were not like art of the Holocaust created in one of the camps under great danger or memories of horror observed by those who had been there.

Emile Fackenheim, who was arrested on Kristallnacht and sent to Sachsenhausen for several months, wrote in an essay of “the need for a 614th commandment, one more than exists in traditional Jewish theology.” He asks: “Can we confront the Holocaust, and yet not despair?”—a question that hangs heavily in the air as one

makes one's way though Auschwitz. His response, "The authentic Jew of today is forbidden to hand Hitler yet another posthumous victory," seems to call for some kind of action, but what action is possible? (Fackenheim 2007, 433). Eliezer Schweid provides an answer: "Prior to the methodical attempt to murder their victims, the Nazis tried to destroy their humanity by making them victims of the cruellest and most degrading torment possible" (Schweid 2007, 222).

Tagging the Jewish population of Europe with numbers at Auschwitz, eradicating their names, and forcing them to wear a yellow star were instruments of degradation to deprive human beings of their identity and culture, dreamed up by Nazis as first steps to murder. This was clearly understood by many artists who responded, often at great risk, by creating images that attempted to defend the rights of victims in the camps to their humanity and to record the suffering. Janet Blatter writes: "Yet Maria Hizpansk-Neumann in Ravensbrueck depicted women who, forced to carry heavy stones, assisted one another, surviving the Holocaust by preserving a central goodness" (Blatter and Milton 1981, 30).

Perhaps art can help us distill the spirit of the individual from the mass of shoes, eyeglasses, and whatever else survived by chance at Auschwitz and elsewhere (Fig. 15.2).

Yes, frankly, I was terrified before my first visit to Auschwitz, but when I confessed my anxiety to Jonasz Stern, the outstanding Polish Jewish artist who had miraculously survived a German firing squad by pretending to be dead, he asked me: "Do you think the people on the trains to Auschwitz were not afraid? I was on such a train, and jumped off, but nobody wanted to jump with me."

Auschwitz offers a glimpse into the suffering of the victims and the bestiality of the perpetrators, but for many people a visit creates the illusion that it constitutes the entire genocide planned by the Nazis. The Germans established their killing centers in Poland partly to hide them from the view of most Germans and because Poland had a large Jewish population. In December 1941, the Nazis opened Chelmno, the first killing center, where Jews and Roma were gassed in mobile gas vans. In 1942, they opened the concentration camps Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka killing centers to systematically murder the Jews of Europe. Obsessed by their culture of efficiency, the Nazis constructed gas chambers to increase the speed of killing and to make the process less painful for the perpetrators. At the Auschwitz camp complex, the Birkenau killing center had four gas chambers. During the height of deportations to the camp, up to six thousand Jewish men and women were gassed there each day. Children were often thrown live into the flames of the crematoria, which was judged by the Nazis to be the most practical way of preventing them from growing up.

Characteristic of the perverse Nazi sense of "humor" was that they started their assault on the Warsaw Ghetto on the eve of Passover, April 19, 1943. Several thousand German Nazis entered the ghetto under field commander Jürgen Stroop to launch the final battle for it, burning and blowing up the ghetto block by block, rounding up and murdering anyone still alive. Not only the German police and the SS but also the German army participated in the assault, which followed the instructions of Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler given on February 14, 1943: "An overall plan for the razing of the ghetto is to be submitted to me. In any case we must




Fig. 15.2 Self-portrait in sketchbook before my first visit to Auschwitz. June 18, 1987

achieve the disappearance from sight of the living space for 500,000 sub-humans (Unter-menschen) that has existed up to now, but could never be suitable for Germans, and reduce the size of this city of millions—Warsaw—which has always been a center of corruption and revolt” (Arad et al. 1999, 292).

Mordecai Anielewicz writes in his last letter from the Warsaw Ghetto as revolt commander on April 23, 1942 (written to Yitzhak Cukierman): “The dream of my life has risen to become a fact. Self-defense of the ghetto will have been a reality. Jewish armed resistance and revenge are a fact. I have been a witness to the magnificent, heroic fighting of Jewish men in the battle” (Arad et al. 1999, 216).

Organized Jewish resistance ended on April 23, 1943, and the Nazi operation against the unarmed Jewish population concluded with the demolition of the Great Synagogue of Warsaw on May 16, 1943. According to a German report, at least

56,065 Jewish persons were killed in the Warsaw Ghetto or deported to German Nazi death camps. The Nazis gloated with pride at the destruction of the Jews of Warsaw and the final annihilation of the Warsaw Ghetto as a step to their ultimate goal, the murder of some three million Jewish citizens of Poland.

We owe the objects in the Auschwitz Museum in Oswiecim to chance. After the last train with prisoners arrived in Auschwitz and all those inside the train were murdered in the gas chamber, the SS members panicked that they would not have enough time left to sell or destroy all of the murdered Jews' personal property before the Russians liberated the camp on January 27, 1945, and they abandoned the material evidence of their crimes. These objects, eyeglasses, prostheses, luggage, and shoes are now carefully preserved in the Auschwitz Museum and allow us to gain some insights about the people who perished and to confront the myths of the Holocaust deniers.

Changing Goals and Purpose of the Auschwitz Museum

One major purpose of the Auschwitz Museum will always be to serve as a memorial in honor of the victims murdered by German fascists, victims not only from Germany and Poland but from all over Europe. Under the leadership of Piotr M. A. Cywiński, the Auschwitz Museum in Oswiecim does its job with great dignity and respect for the victims with the limited means at its disposal. Even though the museum is fulfilling its purpose as a memorial, what should be a primary goal is to teach the world that "never again" has not been achieved and genocides are continually attempted around the world. I am, therefore, proposing that an Auschwitz Research Center for the Prevention of Genocide be built at Auschwitz. Such a center could have an advisory board of directors from a range of international institutions, including Yad Vashem, the Holocaust Museum in Washington, which has an important Center for the Prevention of Genocide of its own, Genocide Watch, Jagiellonian University Krakow, the National University of Rwanda, the University of Cambodia, and UNESCO. It is important that the proposed center have a recognized doctoral degree program in order to develop specialists who can make the prevention of genocide their major mission in life. Courses could be developed at Auschwitz with a focus on the role played by visual imagery in the propaganda of perpetrators of genocide as well as in the art created by those who resisted. But I believe that Auschwitz should also make use of the therapeutic possibilities of art and create a facility where people, under the impression of what they have seen, can rapidly draw or paint emotions for which they have no words.

My Sketches

On my first visit to Auschwitz, I had no intention to sketch anything and brought neither a pen nor paper with me. I did not know that I would flee from each exhibit in horror. The thought came to me that, when I returned, I would begin to sketch so

that I could neither run away nor hide from what I needed to face. From then on, in order not to run, I would force myself to draw as carefully as I could the silent objects behind glass, eloquent witnesses to the crimes that had been committed.

Although I was not prepared for it at all, I fell in love with the mystic presence of those who were the original owners of the objects, and above all, a little girl, the owner of the Auschwitz doll, a doll I followed on my visits as it was moved from one exhibit case to another, forever sketching it.

The term “genocide” evokes not only killing of individuals but the extinction of an entire group of people, whereas murder suggests the taking of life of an individual, usually by another individual. Auschwitz shows that these distinctions can be blurred. The roles of the SS doctors at Auschwitz and the sanctimonious statements of regret by individuals such as Rudolf Hoess (the longest-serving commandant of Auschwitz) for the benefit of themselves, their families, or their place in history have been presented in detail by Robert J. Lifton and Hermann Langbein. Lifton discusses the tactic of “extraterritoriality; that what happened there did not count” and provides a diagnosis of the doctors’ “schizoid” behavior (Lifton 1986, 210). Lifton writes: “There were gradations depending upon a doctor’s attitude toward selections; Rohde ... ‘hated it’ and drank heavily, König ‘was extremely disciplined. ... Considered it a duty’; Mengele ‘was detached like he would exterminate vermin’ and Klein ‘enjoyed it, the bastard.’ Tadeusz S. characterized Horst Fischer and Friedrich Entress, as the worst murderers, ... [who] had faces like a priest, but were very cold” (Lifton 1986, 210).

Langbein gives a detailed account about Johann Paul Kremer, who had people starved and then placed on a dissecting table, where he interrogated them with questions regarding weight before imprisonment, weight loss in the camp, and medicine taken recently and had them photographed. After that, he would order a medic to kill the patient with a phenol injection, and right after the inmate had died, have the liver and pancreas removed and put into a receptacle containing a preservative liquid. Langbein then lists the material possessions Kremer looted from the people he had ordered killed. “When asked, Kremer responded: ‘They stuffed my pockets I could not ward them off’” (Lifton 1986, 292).

The distance from the Hippocratic Oath to the crimes committed by the medical doctor Joseph Mengele at Auschwitz is immeasurable. The literature and documentation on Mengele’s role at the selection ramp in Auschwitz and his experimentation and murder of both Gypsies and Jewish children whose eyes were left has been described in detail by Helena Kubica. Lifton concludes his article on Mengele by writing that “he reveals himself as a man and not a demon, a man whose multifaceted harmony with Auschwitz can give us insight into—and make us pause before—the human capacity to convert healing into killing” (Lifton 1986, 383). I believe that attempts to humanize Mengele are misplaced and an insult to his victims, and that his affection for his dog and his life after the war are irrelevant. We need to commission Hieronymus Bosch to paint him for eternity in the deepest hole in hell.

My sketch of the white coats of the doctors hanging at Auschwitz is a reminder that the white wash won’t work (Fig. 15.3).




Fig. 15.3 The immaculate white coats of the Nazi-killers in the laboratories of death in Auschwitz

Birkenau

In Birkenau one is confronted by what is typical of most remaining sites left by the Germans after the Holocaust, a vast empty space projecting nothing but Nothingness. At the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum many visitors experience switching from one emotion to the other. In front of the exhibits our minds can cling to concrete objects that help our imagination to conjure up the presence of the victims, but at Birkenau there are no objects; one can see a few graffiti scrawled on the walls of a barrack, a memorial stone adorned with some wreaths left by visitors, and the remains of a crematorium. As early as 1943, Jewish prisoners had formed a small organization of resistance that managed to have a few of them escape to tell the world about the murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews transported from Hungary between May and July 1944. The world shrugged. After Rwanda we know it is likely to shrug again in the future.

Birkenau Crematorium IV, blown up by members of a Jewish Sonderkommando who were forced to work for the SS in the gas chambers and crematoriums, remains as a witness. On October 7, 1944, these men attacked the fully armed SS troops with makeshift weapons: stones, axes, hammers, and whatever they could use, including some precious handmade grenades. They overpowered the SS members and blew up Crematorium IV with explosives smuggled to them by Jewish women forced to work in a weapons factory. Their attack was joined by prisoners at Crematorium II, who also overpowered the SS troops. All those who participated in this historic revolt were killed, but their glorious action will never be forgotten (Figs. 15.4, 15.5 and 15.6).



Fig. 15.4 Ruins of Crematorium IV, blown up in the revolt



Fig. 15.5 Evidence of the Third Reich's preferred method for industrialized genocide, the empty cans of Zyklon B poison-gas pellets that were used to murder roughly 1.2 million human beings—Jews, Poles, and Roma—at Auschwitz-Birkenau and Majdanek

The Evidence of Numbers

When Russian troops entered Auschwitz they found 348,820 men's suits and 836,255 women's garments. Garments can be counted, but the people gassed in the chambers and killing facilities could not be accounted for with precision. The Nazis destroyed as many records as they could before fleeing the Russian advance. The numbers of Jews murdered at Auschwitz and Birkenau given by Himmler, Hoess, and other Nazis officials were deliberate lies, concocted for self-serving purposes. Scholars have since established fairly accurate estimates ranging from 900,000 to 1.4 million Jewish men, women, and children. Numbers of Poles range from 140,000 to 150,000, and the number of Roma is around 25,000.

The Nazi bureaucracy loved to play with numbers and tattooed a number on many of the prisoners before killing them, a practice mocked by Art Spiegelman in his well-known cartoon strip *Mauss*.

Walking through Birkenau and Auschwitz one should not try to understand the numbers, because the numbers are beyond meaning. It may be helpful to think of the suffering of each individual, to imagine his or her suffering, to think of each as someone one loves. In his book *Survival at Auschwitz*, Primo Levi cites genocide



Fig. 15.6 Exterminating people can be not only be profitable but also fun. SS perpetrators enjoying themselves. Portraits sketched after an exhibit at the Auschwitz Museum

statistics seen from the perspective of prisoners in the camp: “Alberto and I often ask ourselves these questions and many others as well. We were ninety-six when we arrived in the Italian convoy of 174,000; only 29 of us survived until October, and of these 8 went in the selections. We are now 21 and the winter has hardly begun. How many of us will be alive at the new year? How many when spring begins?” (Levi 1959, 136).

Funkenstein cites Primo Levi as someone who refuses to see the concentration camp experience as meaningless: “We are in fact convinced that no human experience is without meaning or unworthy of analysis, and the fundamental values, even if they are not positive, can be deduced from this particular world which we are describing” (Funkenstein 2007, 639). Funkenstein then quotes Levi when drawing

a portrait of what was once a human at Auschwitz: “They crowd my memory with their faceless presence, and if I could enclose all the evil of our time in one image, I would choose this image which is familiar to me: an emaciated man, with head dropped and shoulders curved, on whose face and in whose eyes not a trace of thought is to be seen” (Funkenstein 2007, 639). Funkenstein’s portrait is intensely human. He argues that the focus on the religious-theological implications of the Holocaust is intrinsically the wrong focus, and that the question we need to ask is what it teaches us about human beings, their limits, their cruelties, their creativity, and their nobility. Funkenstein’s argument is valid not only for the Holocaust but for all attempted genocides. By rejecting the notion that the Holocaust and other genocides are incomprehensible, he opens up the possibility of forestalling and preventing future attempts at mass murder. What will be needed is not divine intervention but human willingness and sense of responsibility to not turn one’s head the other way, and to act in a timely and coherent fashion (Fig. 15.7).

Shoes

There are shoes in the display case in Block 5 at Auschwitz Museum: when the Soviet Union liberated Auschwitz-Birkenau on January 27, 1945, there were 43,000 pairs of shoes in the camp. Behind a long glass wall thousands of shoes are slowly disintegrating, inexorably falling apart, their color long since gone, their leather eroded by time and, in many cases, by exposure to cyanide. Crowds of visitors anxiously push past the exhibit’s ghostly images of remnants of what once were shoes.

In a different building the curators are working desperately to stem the decay, to prevent present and future time from obliterating the past. Will they be able to do it? It is a priceless heritage belonging to all humankind.

I came across one shoe placed by the curators on a ledge close to the glass pane, a slipper with a red pom-pom, and I was thinking I might sketch it when I thought I heard it say: “I am the truth. I cannot be denied, I am evidence. I belonged to a young girl, her name was Miriam. She was just sixteen. She was forced to leave me when she was driven, naked and with bare feet, into the gas chamber to die in agony. She dissolved into blue smoke in the yellow gray sky over Auschwitz, and I see her dance in heaven with red slippers on pink clouds.”

I said: “Slipper, look at yourself, you have fallen apart, how can she dance with you?” It replied: “Artist, draw me with care to make me as beautiful as I looked when Miriam proudly wore me at her birthday party. She loved my pink pom-pom; she pointed it out to all her guests” (Fig. 15.8).

I attempted to sketch Miriam’s slipper in its past glory, to try to at least resurrect one pair of shoes out of the featureless mass behind the glass, but stopped drawing when I heard voices and laughter and turned around. I saw a crowd of young students and old visitors speaking in many different languages sketching shoes, beautiful shoes, the whole huge undifferentiated dark mass of the exhibit emerging as shoes again, shoes that preserve and honor the memory of those who had walked in them through life.




Fig. 15.7 Untitled



Fig. 15.8 Miriam's red pom-pom slipper

Eyeglasses

Soon after the liberation of Auschwitz by the Soviets, a Polish photographer, Stanisław Mucha, shot a picture of the remnants of eyeglasses confiscated from people destined to be killed in the gas chambers the very moment they arrived at Auschwitz. The photo shows a huge mountain of twisted metal and circular lenses with a cat prowling around, before a small number of these glasses could be rescued to bear witness in what would become the Auschwitz Museum. I have attempted many times to sketch them and wish at least some of the glasses, once so treasured

by their owners, could be extricated from the pile of oblivion and be displayed individually, lovingly in honor of those who can no longer see (Figs. 15.9, 15.10 and 15.11).

Luggage

In the fall of 1941, SS private Oskar Gröning, at that time a firm believer in Nazi ideology, was put in charge of collecting the luggage taken from Jews as the deportation trains arrived in Auschwitz (Fig. 15.12).




Fig. 15.9 Eyeglasses extricated from the pile of oblivion




Fig. 15.10 Eyeglasses 1 in Auschwitz

Lorchen

My name is on a piece of luggage there in Auschwitz, but though I shall never learn how to read, I know it must be there. Perhaps you can find it for me.



Fig. 15.11 Eyeglasses 2 in Auschwitz

My birthday is in July. I was five and a half when they shaved my hair and stripped me of my clothes.

Why did they do that? You can find my shirt in one case, nicely laundered.

And in another, my braids. They were blond but now they are gray. Ugh.

Yes, I know, they are in the hair-mountain, Building XII, hard to recognize.

My shoes? Behind glass. Building XVIII. Yes, they were shiny red lacquer, the red is faded, the lacquer split open. My mother bought them for me on my fifth birthday before they took her away. We are together now.

Yes! That is my doll. Lorchen. I had to drop her in front of the crematoria.

They incinerated me. I became ashes and smoke. When you see my Lorchen, tell her I love her. Even though her head is smashed, I shall love her forever.



Fig. 15.12 Luggage

Marie Kafka

Yes, Marie Kafka, not Ottla, Franz Kafka's sister. I only know her from her luggage label in the exhibit at Auschwitz, but her fate was similar to that of Ottla. About Ottla, H. Zylberberg writes:

She found herself in the Terezin ghetto. One day a transport of Jewish children arrived who reacted with hostility to all attempts to keep them quiet. Ottla and a few doctors gained the children's confidence—in their eyes one could see fear caused by the torture that their parents had been subjected to. They were very distrustful. The Nazis came up with a devilish idea: they informed the worried guardians that they would organize a special transport in order to send those orphans and their guardians abroad; a plan of the expedition was agreed

to, the children were given new clothes and cared for with great care. Full of hope Ottla wrote her husband that she was happy because she could help these orphans who needed kindness so much; and that she would go with them to Sweden and Denmark. However, we know that prisoners from this transport were not given freedom but went to Auschwitz, no farther than the crematoriums. (Zylberberg 1946/1947)

The quote from Zylberberg requires explanation. Ottla divorced her husband, after the persecution of Jews had started, in order that he “would not have to share the suffering of her people.” In Terezin she volunteered as a guardian of the children in the transport. According to the *Auschwitz Chronicle, 1939–1945* (Czech 1990, 35), on October 7, 1943, a transport from Terezin arrived at Auschwitz, consisting of 1,260 children and fifty-three guardians. On that same day, all prisoners from the transport were killed in the gas chambers of the camp. Thus we can say with certainty that the final journey of Franz Kafka’s youngest sister ended on October 7, 1943, in Auschwitz. Franz Kafka wrote in “Prometheus”: “There remained the inexplicable mass of rock. The legend tried to explain the inexplicable. As it came out of a substratum of truth it had in turn to end in the inexplicable.” (Kafka 1979, 152).

The Prostheses Exhibit

A sketch cannot convey how the disabled and helpless were robbed of their prostheses and orthopedic aids before being murdered. But some 60 years after the representatives of the Third Reich attempted to destroy the evidence of their abominations at Auschwitz and Birkenau, a team of Polish scientists from the University of Gdansk have been able to reverse the process of entropy in the tangled web of metal, wood and leather of broken prostheses and orthopedic devices on exhibit at the Auschwitz Museum by studying and publishing this historic material. Their research helps us understand the significance of these devices for their owners, who were left helpless without these aids when they were deprived of them before being murdered. The devices represent a 100-year-old—perhaps not very efficient—technology but one designed with the purpose of helping people, and they inspire the hope and faith in humanity lacking in the Third Reich. The work of the Gdansk team suggests that a similar scientific research effort should be organized with other objects in the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum collection. Such descriptions and information would be invaluable for our own understanding of the past, and of increasing importance for future generations (Fig. 15.13).

It can be a traumatic experience to walk along a thirty-foot-long exhibit filled with what the Polish research team from the University of Gdansk describes as follows: “A group of items which carries exceptional symbolism is a collection of prostheses for the upper and lower limbs, callipers, corsets, as well as canes and crutches, numbering 424 items in total” (Przeździak et al. 2011, 618). It is close to impossible to imagine the feeling of depending on one of these objects and then having it yanked away, leaving one helpless, before being shoved into the gas chamber.



Fig. 15.13 Protheses

Pots and Pans: Entropy

Small stoves, cooking pots, pans, and jars at Auschwitz. We can no longer tell which pots were used for meat, which for vegetables; which were kosher for Passover, which not. Which belonged to Hungarian Jews, which to Greek Jews, which to Polish, German, or Dutch Jews. And what would now be the difference? That is entropy (Fig. 15.14).

Auschwitz: Hair

An estimated 1.9 tons of hair shaved of the heads of women before as well as after they were pushed into the gas chambers were found in paper bags by the Soviet army when it liberated the camp. Traces of Zyklon B were found, which are thought to have caused the decay of much of the hair. The hair was packed in bolts and sold by the SS to companies like Schwaefler in Kirtz and Alex Zink in Bavaria, to be processed into cloth and other products. The SS was not a nonprofit organization (Fig. 15.15).



Fig. 15.14 Pots and pans

The Auschwitz Doll

My doll ritual? Anthropologists believe that rituals preceded myth. I run to see the doll whenever I go to Auschwitz, and follow her from one exhibit case to the next. The doll is the only three-dimensional image of a human being in the camp. Sketching the doll has become my ritual—we greet each other, we have become friends, the doll and I (Fig. 15.16).




Fig. 15.15 Rolled bags of hair



Fig. 15.16 Auschwitz doll 1



Fig. 15.17 Little girl and father viewing Lorchen

The other day, a few years back, a little girl came with her father while I was sketching the doll. She wanted to play with it, but her father yanked her away.

The doll was found outside the crematoria more than 60 years ago. That child must have cried bitter tears when she was forced to drop her (Figs. 15.17, 15.18 and 15.19).

The Netherlands

The Netherlands does not yet have such a place of remembrance.

When one leaves building XV, its dark tragic exhibits, broken cement floors, its threatening atmosphere, and walks under the trees to the building that contains the Dutch exhibit, one may be shocked by the change of atmosphere, the bright lights, the clean, pristine space and the professional twenty-first-century look. This feeling of relief may well last only until one gets to the glass-protected panels of sixty thousand names of Dutch Jews who were sent by the occupiers of Holland to Auschwitz to be killed, and then to learn that these sixty thousand represent only little more



Fig. 15.18 Auschwitz doll 2

than half of the 110,000 Dutch Jews that were murdered. On this wall the anonymity of the shoes and pots and pans melts away, individuals emerge with their full names; I can point my finger to the names of my relatives, to the name of my friend's brother Ullie, and suddenly the bright lights sharply illuminate the tragedy and the crimes.

All sixty thousand names were read in the Netherlands in 2015 when the Netherlands Committee for Auschwitz opened its pavillion. The organization is seeking support to create a memorial with names in the Netherlands as well (Figs. 15.20, 15.21 and 15.22).

My family comes from Gailingen, Germany, and my grandfather was born there. In 1939, the Nazis forced the last remaining 230 Jews, many of them elderly people in an old-age home, into trucks and deported them via southern France to Auschwitz, where they were murdered. There were also many children, who were separated from their parents, among them Herbert Seligman, aged five. The little boy was murdered at Auschwitz.



Fig. 15.19 Boy, toy horse, and several women being processed by the occupiers in Amsterdam to be shipped to Auschwitz, where they will be killed by gas on arrival

The Jewish Arts Festival of Krakow

Since 1988, every year in June and July, the Jewish Culture Festival in Kraków (Polish: Festiwal Kultury Żydowskiej w Krakowie, Yiddish: פֿעסטיוואַלקולטור-ייִדישער (קרֶאָקע אין קראָקע) has been the Polish Jewish response to Auschwitz, to the Holocaust, a euphorious declaration that the Nazis failed (Fig. 15.23).

Conclusion

Michel Kimmelman writes in the *New York Review of Books* that Hitler and Goebbels's Degenerate Art Campaign was a prelude to extermination. Alan E. Steinweiss in his analysis of the role of the arts and the artists in Nazi Germany discusses the purge of Jewish artists as well as the theft of their works and art collections. He writes: “‘Silence in the face of purification’ represents the greatest failure of German artists in the Third Reich. Aryan artists like Wilhelm Furtwängler who actually spoke up on behalf of their Jewish colleagues were far outnumbered by those whose passivity accepted what was taking place, whether out of



Fig. 15.20 Broken toys

indifference, professional opportunism, fear, or sympathy for the regime's anti-Semitic goals" (Steinweiss 1993, 176).

The Nazi war of extermination waged against art failed, just as ultimately the Nazi genocide against the Jews failed, and Judaism and Jewish culture have survived. The Turkish genocide against the Armenians succeeded only in killing, not in eradicating, the Armenian people, and even in Rwanda the genocide could murder close to 90 percent the Tutsi population but not extinguish their will to live or their culture. The victims of genocide—the Armenians, the Rwandans, and the Jews—and lastly creativity in art returned to their role as tragic heroes in the show (see Kimmelman 2014, 25).

The disturbing and sobering fact is that, in spite of the good news, humanity continues to be at a stage of development at which future genocides, or attempts at genocide, are not only possible but highly probable (Fig. 15.24).




Fig. 15.21 Auto-da-fé of toys of a hundred thousand children



Fig. 15.22 The separation of parent and child



Fig. 15.23 Cantoral music is performed in one of seven synagogues of Kazimierz, and klezmer music fills Ulica Szeroka, the main street of the Jewish part of Kazimierz




Fig. 15.24 Untitled

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Chapter 16

Coming to Terms with the Past: The Vienna Project as an Interactive, Interdisciplinary Model of Memorialization

Karen Frostig

Abstract Issues of representation following mass atrocities remain one of the greatest challenges for artists working with histories of genocide. The Vienna Project was developed as a temporary, social action, public art memorial project, marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Anschluss in Austria, when Austria was annexed into Greater Germany. After the war, allied occupation in Austria ended in 1955, followed by state sovereignty. “Coming to Terms with the Past: The Vienna Project as an Interactive, Interdisciplinary Model of Memorialization” features a comparative discussion of major memorial development in Vienna, the capital of Austria, between 1955 and 2014. Introduced as a post-conceptual model of memorialization, The Vienna Project opened in 2013 and closed 1 year later. The Project combined research with participatory methodologies and became the first national memorial of its kind in Europe to include multiple victim groups in a single presentation, while preserving differences between the groups. The chapter situates the project within a continuum of memorialization in Vienna and captures the author’s role as conceptual artist, cultural historian, and founding director of The Vienna Project.

Keywords Holocaust · Memory · Public art · Austria · Art activism · Citizenship

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Introduction

National monuments typically communicate national pride. Memorials, however, have different agendas, assigned to bridge a gap between history and memory, between knowing and feeling the past.¹ Residing in the public space, memorials typically address ideas about loss that touch upon personal and collective spheres. Historic information must be accurate, and attention must be given to historic grievances. Site location is another consideration. Marking a spot where crimes occurred can be a quick action. Developing a memorial project, however, can take many years.

Memory artists are adept at using the language of metaphor to reveal disturbing discrepancies between a nation's idealism and its historic record. Often acting as critical agents, artists use symbolic materials and ideas about form, scale, space, and time to invite the public to investigate the past.

Issues of representation following mass atrocities remain one of the greatest challenges for memorial artists working with histories of genocide. A number of questions arise regarding content and presentation, such as: Who is regarded as a victim? Are the identities of victims important? Should different memorials be developed corresponding to the different victim groups? What issues arise when one memorial represents multiple victim groups? Who pays for memorial projects—representatives of the victim groups, the perpetrators, or the nation-state held responsible? Are answers to these questions fixed or might they evolve, much like memory evolves, over time?

History of genocide is ideally tied to scientific methods of data collection, suggesting a degree of stability regarding historic content. Memory, on the other hand, represents a fluid state of mind. It is cultivated as a humanizing force galvanizing a mix of emotions ranging from sadness to anger, guilt to shame, peace to confusion, and solidarity to yearning. While historic facts are presented with a great deal of care, and these facts can change over time, ideas about collective responsibility are broadened in an effort to reach diverse audiences engaged at different levels of consciousness.² According to Katherine Hite, "Memorializing is a conjunction of affect and awareness" (Hite 2012, 57).³ Many memorials strive to achieve closure, but memorials may also open old wounds.

Collective memory of traumatic histories can be transmitted through different kinds of triggers that prompt a range of personal associations. When traveling to Vienna in 2006, I searched for "memory triggers," traces of my family's narrative embedded in the larger narrative of destruction that took place under National Socialism between 1938 and 1945. The Vienna Project was developed to address a

¹"We rely on memories to orient our understanding of the present," writes Katherine Hite (2012, 1).

²Klaus Neumann refers to the "variety of 'German' public memories" (2000, 4).

³Geoffrey Hartman remarks, "Art expands the sympathetic imagination while teaching us the limits of sympathy." (qtd. in Hite 2012, 57).

troubling gap between what happened between 1938 and 1945 and how that history was documented in public spaces in Vienna.⁴

Personal memory corresponds to individual histories, whereas collective memory represents a more complex composite of memory that links larger histories to individual narratives. According to Klaus Neumann, “Memory is never just there already—as if only temporarily in storage. It needs to be invoked, conjured, made” (2000, 8). Oliver Rathkolb, a leading Austrian historian, suggests that collective memory accumulates in a variety of places and on different occasions:

Memory sites are symbolic representations of what is stored in the collective memory of a society: events, personalities, artifacts, buildings, squares, topographical spots, in the most diverse forms, contents and functions (such as memorial days, anniversaries, monuments, death rites, street names, etc.). There are different methods for identifying and decoding these memory sites, whose significance is in a perpetual state of flux. (Rathkolb 2010, 201)

I begin my discussion by noting the changing landscape of public memory in Vienna following Austria’s emergence as a sovereign state in 1955 up to my return in 2006. I then offer a developmental analysis of public memory in Vienna. This discussion sets the stage for the presentation of The Vienna Project, with a special focus on the animated Sidewalk Stencil Installation program.

Departing from a singular, static memorial plan, The Vienna Project was hybrid by design, incorporating a variety of art forms staged in different locations around the city, intended to unfold over the course of a year. “Hybrid” and “hybridization” are postmodern constructions that emphasize ideas about decentralization, fragmentation, and disintegration. Developing 38 locations in 16 districts as sites of remembrance had the overall effect of dispersing memory. The multiple sites conveyed the sentiment that Nazism was everywhere, pervading every aspect of public life.

The project was conceived as a temporary memorial installation, encompassing multiple modules located in 16 districts and addressing a national history of murder, expulsion, genocide, and rescue under National Socialism. The Vienna Project was construed as a “performance of the archives,” focusing on archival data as memorial content.

Background

Do cities evoke the past or does memory pertain only to the human capacity to remember? Do buildings or streets evoke memory? Is memory a consensual matter? What role do artists play in preserving dystonic memories, articulating history in new and engaging formats and forging a contingent relationship between the past and the future? The four currently existing,⁵ post-1955 memorials encountered in

⁴The presence of memory in Vienna has evolved since 2006. Plans for The Vienna Project began in 2009 and reflect the status of public memory at that time.

⁵The 1951 version of the Morzinplatz memorial was removed in the 50s. See description with footnote # 33.

Vienna in 2006 appeared tucked away,⁶ and the numerous wall plaques vanished into the landscape, rendered invisible over time. While many Austrians claimed that current representations of public memory were sufficient, I contended that Vienna appeared to be a city steeped in nostalgia, but without public memory.

In Vienna, time reads as a dynamic entity. Efforts to renovate and preserve Vienna's past intersect with activities to contemporize the cityscape (Jahr 2009). Mark Crinson describes urban memory in the city as "a physical landscape and collection of objects and practices that enable recollections of the past and that embody the past through traces of the city's sequential building and rebuilding" (Crinson 2005, xii).⁷

Starting with the splendor of the Habsburg Empire, dominating Europe from the twelfth century until its defeat in 1918 (Rathkolb 2010, 1), followed by the dark years of National Socialism ending in its collapse in 1945,⁸ to today's cutting-edge design technologies grafted onto the city's majestic facades, Vienna has evoked a tantalizing dichotomy of both remembering and forgetting the past. While the glory of the Habsburg monarchy with its concurrent tableau of multiculturalism (Ibid., 18, 26) prompts the sweetness of nostalgia, the memory of National Socialism, largely defined by racist ideologies and legacies of genocide, induces the urge to forget.

The second Republic of Austria was established in 1955 when the last occupying soldiers left the country and Austria once again became a sovereign state. The Moscow Declaration of 1943 named Austria "Hitler's first victims," and also noted Austria's responsibility for "participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany" ("Moscow Conference," 1950; Lillian Goldman Law Library 2008). The latter clause was simply ignored for the first 45 years following Austria's independence, starting with the provisional government established on 27 April 1945 under Chancellor Karl Renner. Renner proclaimed that "rapid restitution of stolen property was undesirable, lest the 'Jewish masses' flood back" (Rathkolb 2010, 23). This statement served to officially discourage survivors from returning to their homes and to shield Austrians from reparative action. "Austrian economic policy in the first years after 1945, largely, indirectly continued the 'Aryanization' policy of the Nazi regime in its structural effects" (Ibid., 61). What is now referred to as the "victim myth," combined with the claim that Austria did not exist between 1938 and 1945, allowed Austria to evade responsibility for an unprecedented record of crimes committed against humanity under National Socialism (Ibid., 237.) A postwar deNazification purging of national history was minimized under such claims,⁹ as were any efforts toward restitution (Ibid., 260). The sobering reality was that "one in every

⁶Morzinplatz (1951/1985), Albertinaplatz (1991), Judenplatz (2000), and Steine der Erinnerung (2006).

⁷Emphasis on the future is underscored through Vienna's investment in a high-tech infrastructure. <https://www.mobility.siemens.com/mobility/global/SiteCollectionDocuments/en/integrated-mobility/mobility-consulting/sustainable-urban-infrastructure-vienna.pdf>

⁸8 May 1945 represents Victory Day in Europe and Germany's defeat.

⁹See Garscha, Winfried R., and Claudia Kuretsidis-Haider (1997). "War Crime Trials in Austria." From http://www.doew.at/cms/download/a184m/en_war_crime_trials.pdf

five concentration camp guards had been Austrian” (Ibid., 264). By promoting art and culture at the end of the twentieth century as constituent elements of a core national identity (Ibid., 18), Austrians attempted to finesse the history of National Socialism as an aberration in what would otherwise be a continuous story about art, culture, and refinement.

A number of events, starting with the Waldheim Affair in 1986, made those claims untenable.¹⁰ New research indicated that not only did Austrians welcome the Nazi takeover in 1938 but, according to historian David Art, Austrians were generously represented within Hitler’s Reich. Art continues, “Austrians comprised only 8 percent of the population of Hitler’s Reich, and over 13 percent of SS members, 40 percent of the staff at the Nazi death camps and over 75 percent of Nazi commandos were Austrian” (2006, 43). Austrian playwrights and artists, beginning with Thomas Bernhard’s *Heldenplatz* and Curt Stenvert’s *Stalingrad*, and Austrian historians such as Robert Knight, Gerhard Botz, and linguist Ruth Wodak, collectively helped to usher in a period of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, which refers to an elongated process of “dealing with the past.” The international community also began to demand public accountability regarding Austria’s historic record of brutality and genocide, as well as its failure to comply with restitutional law. As early as 1945, Renner stated that “compensation for the stolen property” would come with a “time lag and through shares in a fund, not through restitution in kind. For this reason, it took a while before the restitution legislation was passed, under pressure from Western Allies” (Rathkolb 2010, 62). Prized collections of looted art, identified as national treasures placed on display in the country’s leading museums, began to draw international attention. Heirs of survivors contested the state’s ownership of such works. These trials turned into public battlegrounds, shedding light on Austria’s long history of deflecting responsibility for crimes committed.¹¹ Recently, the trial between Maria Altmann and the government of Austria regarding a series of Gustav Klimt paintings turned into an international event. The trial concluded in 2006, returning the paintings to Altmann. A blockbuster movie, *Woman in Gold*, was based on these events.

Memorials communicate a nation’s public record of consciousness regarding difficult histories. Memorials tell stories about how a nation treats its citizens, especially its minority groups: who is remembered, and who is forgotten. Emphasis can change radically over time. Vienna’s memorial projects spanning 59 years reveal a progression of ideas concerning the history of National Socialism, and the nation’s pace of memorializing this history.

¹⁰A leak to the U.S. and Austrian media indicated that the ÖVP presidential candidate, and former U.N. secretary-general, Kurt Waldheim had covered up his wartime past as a soldier and intelligence officer in Germany’s army. The public scandal was dubbed the “Waldheim Affair” (Rathkolb 2010, 20).

¹¹Robert Knight (2011). “Austria and Nazism: Owning Up to the Past.” From http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/genocide/austria_nazism_01.shtml#six

Changing Dynamics of Memorialization

History is written to reflect a particular perspective. Traditionally, memorials are commissioned by the state and built by architects to endorse the established national narrative. Erika Doss constructs a correlation between the statue mania gripping the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States and Europe—which she contends was a response to “rising anxieties about national unity, modernism, immigration, and mass culture”—and today’s memorial mania (2010, 27). Based on this analysis, the current memory boom and the palpable rise of nationalism in Europe and the United States may be understood as an orchestrated response to an increased presence of fundamental extremism, right-wing fanaticism, and heightened rhetoric about national identity. Government officials must periodically update the narrative by creating a new set of lenses through which to view and integrate difficult histories into an elevated state of collective consciousness.

In recent years, artists have become increasingly active in developing new approaches to memory work.¹² Using a conceptual framework, the work of artists has become more abstract and inventive, sometimes challenging viewers to engage with multiple narratives at once, emphasizing new perspectives or new methods of re-presenting established perspectives. This trend, reflective of postmodern sensibilities, should not be confused with “revisionist” thinking, that leads to “rewriting” history. These artists incorporate historical data while expanding opportunities for engagement, inviting audiences to participate in an active process of reflection and self-examination regarding the historical record. This is consistent with Walter Benjamin’s premise that the “authenticity of memories is moored in the typography of the present rather than the elusive past” (Spieker 2008, 19). The explosion of new technologies introduces additional strategies of how contemporary artists work with memory in the public arena. In this chapter I look at the evolution of public memory in Vienna regarding Holocaust history and National Socialism, and establish a conceptual link between understanding memory culture in Vienna and the design of The Vienna Project.

Memorializing the Holocaust in Vienna follows international trends first established in Germany to remember individual victim groups one at a time, starting with Jewish victims. To date, permanent public memorials in Austria recognize communist victims at Morzinplatz in Vienna, Jewish victims at Judenplatz in Vienna, deserters of the Wehrmacht army at Ballhausplatz in Vienna, victims of euthanasia at Otto Wagner Hospital in Vienna, homosexual victims at Heinz Heger Park at Zimmermannplatz in Vienna, Carinthian Slovenes at Peršman farmstead in Carinthia, and Austrian victims murdered on political grounds at Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Roma and Jehovah’s Witness victims have yet to be recognized in Austria through permanent memorial development.

¹² KOER is a municipal foundation established to fund temporary art projects in the city of Vienna. Many Austrian artists use this source of funding to present new ideas about memory to the public. For an overview of artists and projects, visit Kunst im öffentlichen Raum Wien. From <http://www.koer.or.at/en/index/>

Following a national history of murder and genocide, the process of mapping collective memory often begins by recognizing individual victim groups. Creating a series of individual site-specific memorials, aimed at remembering one group at a time, becomes a starting point. However, when collective memory remains partial, remembering one group while inadvertently forgetting about the other groups, ethical issues about contemporary practices of memorialization pose new questions. Strategies of selective memory miss opportunities to stir empathic regard for multiple groups of victims targeted by the same hateful regime. Memorializing individual groups one at a time brings into question new examples of erasure and denial that are at odds with the very act of remembrance. It is therefore useful to consider “consciousness” as the product of memorialization, and memorialization as producing a new set of social competencies that must be practiced and reworked again and again before achieving mastery. Memorialization, often misconstrued as a vehicle for attaining closure, can be reframed as a method for *resisting* closure while preserving a commitment to seek, but never fully realize, mastery over memory. Walter Benjamin writes that a “work of the past should not be regarded as done.” In a longer narrative, Klaus Neumann suggests that Benjamin puts forth a rejection of closure in regard to memory (2000, 6–7).

Once acclimated to memory culture in Vienna, I began to consider developmental processes shedding light on patterns of memorialization in a city that was still coming to terms with its past. Referencing Jean Piaget’s formulations of cognitive development as a cumulative progression of discrete stages (LeFancois 1993, 58–63),¹³ I develop a series of stages to explain evolving representations of memory on the streets of Vienna. Using seven monuments in Vienna to depict stages of memorial development, my hypothesis suggests that the stages reflect a constellation of ideas. These ideas reveal a continuum that integrates stages of cognitive development with corresponding movements or genres of art, to stages of remembrance tied to a nation’s readiness to address conflicted historical narratives.

“Developmental Stages of Memorialization” (See Table 16.1), suggests a new formulation of memorial development based on theories of cognitive development. Grounded in the science of developmental theory, this progression references Piaget’s (1936) formulation of cognitive development as a progression of discreet stages (Ibid., 58–63), with Viktor Lowenfeld’s (1947, 1987) ideas about stage progression in artistic development. Howard Gardner (1982), together with Suzi Gablik, offer an analysis of Western art that correlates art movements containing “transformative modes of thinking” with Piagetian theory of cognitive development (252–253). These ideas are applicable to evaluating transformative changes within memorial culture. While these changes suggest a progression, new memorials responding to different narratives under construction within a single city can indicate different stages of development occurring at the same time. Therefore, it is a consensual understanding of the specific *narrative* under development, which

¹³ Cognitive development explains changes in the way a child thinks during the formative years. Piaget’s stages of cognitive development include: sensorimotor, preoperational, operational, and formal operations (LeFrancois 1993, 58–63).

Table 16.1 Developmental stages of memorialization

Stage	Description	Period
Pre-conceptual	Early discussions about collective memory by one or more groups regarding a particular historic event. Process to determine a coherent idea, site, and audience.	Can occur at any phase, foreshadowing memorial development.
Literal	Basic markers of place, such as a rock inscribed with a date, located at a relevant site. Referencing traditional, western culture burials with an emphasis on permanence.	Early practices of public memory extended into mid-twentieth century practice.
Concrete	Using symbolic materials to depict an historic event occurring at a specific site. Presented in a recognizable form to deliver a coherent message about an historic event.	Mid-twentieth century work correlated with modernist principles.
Abstract	Using materials, form, scale, and site specificity to create and contextualize an abstract representation of an historic event. Presentation adheres to a single narrative; however, the form invites interpretation. Additional clarifying text may be available at the site.	Mid to late twentieth century practice.
Conceptual	Focus is on idea development and critical thinking, introducing new perspectives about the history. This phase of memorial development is aimed at engaging new audiences with questions about the meaning of memory in relation to ideas about social responsibility.	Post-modern practice starting at the end of the twentieth century. Often referred to as the “counter-monument” movement.
Post-conceptual	A generative model of memorialization that is defined by an idea and an animated plan of execution. Increasingly interactive by design, the memorial can take the form of an enduring performance, a ritual, or installation that engages the public in a participatory mode of interaction. Retains site specificity or may depart from earlier models to be developed as a virtual memorial, using new media to reach international audiences.	Post-modern practice located at the start of the twenty-first century, often infused with new technologies that graphically link the past to the present and the future.

progresses as a conceptual transformation and is then captured and correlated with advances in memorial methodologies.

Risk and cultural transformation are present in each of the stages. “Risk” in this context refers to the pace of artistic innovation and representation, and changing discourse surrounding the history, that points toward cultural transformation. Based on today’s memory culture, I propose six progressive stages of memorial development.

In this chapter I consider five permanent memorials erected in Vienna prior to 2006 and a new memorial that had been approved for funding in 2009, before The Vienna Project was actually realized. Although the Deserter Memorial was unveiled

a few days after The Vienna Project had closed, the memorial fits an earlier stage of memorialization and therefore warrants inclusion in this developmental overview. A brief description of The Vienna Project's Sidewalk Stencil installation, memorializing thirty-eight sites and highlighting participatory methodologies, follows. The chapter concludes with an overview of The Vienna Project's Naming Memorial.

Post-1945 to 2014 Public Art in Vienna

Morzinplatz (1951)

Morzinplatz is located at the site of Hotel Métropole, the Gestapo's headquarters from 1938 to 1945, destroyed by allied bombs in 1945. Hotel Métropole was an elegant baroque hotel, established in 1873 and converted to Vienna's Gestapo headquarters for the Secret State Police on 1 April 1938. The site served as an interrogation prison where as many as fifty thousand victims were tortured and then deported (Anderson 2011).¹⁴

Representing the first public image of a memorial regarding National Socialism, the memorial was represented by a simple square, block of cement, cast and imprinted with text and planted horizontally into the ground. The cement block depicted a "literal" representation of the war, using location and a series of dates to consolidate and communicate the range of events taking place between 1938 and 1945.

The memorial was "built and unveiled without any official authorization in 1951 by the concentration camp association closely associated with the KPÖ (Communist Party of Austria)." Following the enactment of Austria's sovereignty in 1955, anti-Fascist sentiment was replaced by vehement anti-Communism. Monuments built during this period were often labeled "communist propaganda" (Documentationarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes 2014).¹⁵

Fabricated from a block of cement, the memorial relies on eyewitness reports and early data to convey the scope of human tragedy, constituting this period of history. When the memorial was installed in 1951, the number of victims and the status of Austrian involvement in the machinery of genocide, was not fully known. In keeping with Communist practice denouncing religious identification, no mention of Jewish victims (the largest victim group) appeared in the text. While the commemorative stone was intended to read as a permanent marker, it no longer exists. The government removed the stone in 1985, in order to build a new monument, *Victims of the Nazi Tyranny*.

¹⁴From <http://www.viennareview.net/on-the-town/city-life/scenes-of-vienna/crossing-the-threshold-of-painful-memory>

¹⁵Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance. [http://en.doew.braintrust.at/index.php?b=225&hl=Morzinplatz%20\(1951\)](http://en.doew.braintrust.at/index.php?b=225&hl=Morzinplatz%20(1951)).

Victims of the Nazi Tyranny (1985)

In 1985, the city of Vienna financed a new memorial at Morzinplatz, dedicated to the “victims of the Nazi tyranny” to replace the original commemorative stone installed under Communist occupation. Designed by Leopold Cruel and situated on the square in front of the former Hotel Metropole, it was unveiled by the Austrian federations of concentration camp survivors and resistance fighters. Incorporating the text of the original stone, the memorial was expanded to include a bold and defiant generic bronze figure, used to symbolize the fate of all victims. The text inscribed in a slab of granite taken from the Mauthausen Camp quarry reads: “Here stood the House of the Gestapo. To those who believed in Austria it was hell. To many it was the gates to death. It sank into ruins just like the ‘Thousand Year Reich.’ But Austria was resurrected and with her our dead, the immortal victims.”

A product of the modernist era, the memorial reads as a “concrete” representation of the historic record. A stoic representation of memory and closely correlated with the national narrative of that time, the memorial text suggests that Austrians were victims and fighters, not perpetrators. The Mauthausen Concentration Camp, Austria’s most formidable concentration camp, was situated on a granite quarry. It should also be noted that there were many satellite camps in Austria, as well as transit camps, detainment camps, deportation centers, and prisons that carried out a record number of murders.

The introduction of “symbolic” representation can be seen with the metaphorical use of materials. Built with stones taken from the quarry, the memorial references two sites: the immediate location marking the Nazi headquarters at the Hotel Metropole in Vienna, where murder and torture were carried out over a period of seven years, and the Nazi concentration camp at Mauthausen. The memorial was dedicated to memorializing unnamed resisters and victims side by side. The practice of naming victims without identifying information is consistent with Soviet practices of memorialization (which did not recognize religious or ethnic differences) and the renovated Naming Hall at the Mauthausen Concentration Camp. The red triangle references the Communists, the first to be arrested, and the yellow triangle references the Jews, some of whom were also identified as Communists. Located on the edge of the first district, the memorial looks neglected. The area is cited for renovation.

Against War and Fascism at Albertinaplatz (1991)

Against War and Fascism at Albertinaplatz, designed by Alfred Hrdlicka in 1988 and located at Helmut Zilk Square, is a national memorial situated on the site of the Philipphof House. In 1945, three hundred Austrians were buried in debris from allied bombing (Childs 2009). The memorial uses abstract language to create a symbolic representation of war and the toll of fascism. A column of white marble figures

placed on granite pedestals harvested from the Mauthausen quarry applies the formal language of “abstraction” to present a vertical display of writhing bodies, depicting the agony of war. The religious “street washing” Jew is set apart and below the sculpted masses of bodies, forced to clean the cobblestones in a public act of humiliation, specific to Austria’s extreme history of sadism under National Socialism. The practice of forcing Jews to clean the streets with toothbrushes or a tallit (a Jewish prayer shawl) was a form of public humiliation that occurred only in Vienna (Laqueur and Baumel 2001, 44–45).¹⁶ The image breaks with the code of silence surrounding this period and brings to light issues of accountability. Anti-Semitism is no longer regarded as a distant abstraction but rather as a chilling reality occurring on the streets of Vienna. Once installed, barbed wire referencing a Christian motif of suffering was added to the back of the Jew to prevent tourists from using the Jew as a public bench.

While the objective was to represent history as it happened, the explicit and demeaning presentation of the Jew positioned close to the ground, in contrast to the elevated and aesthetically chiseled bodies, is jarring to the eye. Perpetuating an image of degradation, the memorial represents a static depiction of the past, frozen in time. The Austrian Declaration of Independence is carved into the stone in an effort to link an antifascist memorial to ideas about freedom and responsibility regarding Austria’s record of racial hatred.

Initially, I experienced the memorial as a failed monument, isolating and branding the Jew as “other” and equating casualties from allied bombing with the victims of National Socialism, subjected to racial persecution. Over time, I came back to this memorial with a renewed appreciation of its power to name Austria’s virulent expression of anti-Semitism. The humiliated Jew provides a stinging reminder of what took place on the streets of Vienna, starting in 1938.

Judenplatz Holocaust Memorial (2000)

The Judenplatz Holocaust Memorial conceived by public artist Rachel Whiteread unfolded as a highly controversial project. Preparing the site for construction, workers discovered the fourteenth-century temple that lies beneath the site—the remains of the first expulsion of Jews from Vienna. This was an uncanny coincidence, to find an earlier representation of anti-Semitism at the very site that was undergoing preparation to commemorate the Jewish victims of the Holocaust. The project was delayed so proper excavation could take place (Young 2000, 110–111). During the prolonged waiting period, heated debates erupted between the different factions of

¹⁶Initially, Austrian Jews were forced to scrub Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg’s slogans, painted on the streets of Vienna, in the form of a plebiscite (a democratic vote of yes or no) for an independent Austria. Humiliating Jews on the streets in Vienna soon became a public pastime. Accessed 14 July 2016 and taken from <https://furtherglory.wordpress.com/2010/11/04/why-were-jews-forced-to-scrub-the-sidewalks-of-vienna/>

the Jewish community and other politicized groups regarding the idea of a public memorial exclusively dedicated to commemorating the Jewish genocide, in a country that still harbored a stronghold of neo-Nazis.

Rachel Whiteread's memorial represented a conceptual depiction of memory, using the trope of absence to convey loss. Jews are characterized as a "People of the Book." The overall concept is aligned with the late twentieth-century counter-memorial movement (Young 2000, 113), aimed at provoking the viewer's response to a library without books or access. Cast in concrete, the memorial is evocative of a voided space, referencing a country devoid of Jewish culture. Aesthetically pleasing, the memorial also reads as a visual irritant, a reminder of the past, amid the elegant baroque facades of the surrounding buildings.

Despite its imposing size, the formal presentation of the memorial creates a mood of containment within the containment of the square itself. The names of concentration camps are inscribed onto the base of the memorial, while the terror and horror of what took place at the camps is as absent as the titles on the books. The anonymity of the memorial echoes the depersonalization of the camp experience. The choice to name the camps and not the murdered victims was, to my mind, a missed opportunity to make the loss personal. To date, there are no permanent and public naming memorials in Vienna. The Jewish Museum, adjacent to the square, preserves the remains of the fourteenth-century temple in an interior exhibition space, out of public view.

Steine der Erinnerung/Stones of Memory (2006 to the Present)

The Vienna-based memorial *Stones of Memory* was inspired by the German artist Gunter Demnig's *Stolpersteine* project,¹⁷ and adapted by Elizabeth David-Hindler, chairwoman of the Austrian *Verein*, to reflect Vienna's history of remembrance under National Socialism (Hindler 2014). As with Demnig's *Stolpersteine*, cobblestones are replaced by brass plaques, situated on the sidewalks and sometimes on buildings, marking addresses where victims lived before deportation to the camps. The brass cobblestones also include sites where victims were publicly humiliated, forced to wash the streets, or *Judenhausen*, where groups of Jews were relocated before deportation. *Judenhausen*, or "collection flats" (Nosenko 2008), was a term used to describe apartment houses in Vienna designated as temporary housing for Jews before deportation to the east. When the houses were emptied, they would be routinely refilled with a new group of Jewish families before their deportation to the camps. *Judenhausen* were primarily located in Vienna's second district, thus centralizing Jews in one small area of the city. This was the "orderly" process in place, designed to expeditiously rid the city of its Jews.

¹⁷ *Stolpersteine* is a "decentralized" monument that was begun in Berlin 1996 by Gunter Demnig (See Demnig 1996).

The project began as a commemoration of Jewish victims and Jewish life in the second district, where 40% of Leopoldstad's residents were Jewish (Nosenko 2008). In 2006, there were three locations for clusters of stones, located in the second district. The project has expanded to include multiple victim groups, with stones located in 14 districts.

While *Steine der Erinnerung* look similar to *Stolpersteine*, providing the name, date of birth, date of deportation, and death-camp destination, the process of securing a stone is markedly different from what happens in Germany. In Vienna, the process must be initiated by a family member and paid for by the family (a fee of 670 euros) unless there is sufficient proof of financial hardship.¹⁸ In such instances, families can apply for financial assistance. In Germany, *Stolpersteine* are typically initiated by the building's residents. A fee of 120 euros is paid by private donations and sponsorships.¹⁹ While these differences may appear minor, they change the conceptual framework of the two projects.

Stolpersteine reflects a "conceptual" idea congruent with the counter-memorial movement, developed as a collaborative project, tackling issues of social responsibility. *Steine der Erinnerung* represents literal memory, marking a site with basic historic information. As a collection of sites, it begins to narrate a city's history, but it does not cross borders or reflect the inspiration of a city sponsored project dedicated to remembering the victims of National Socialism.

Deserter Memorial (2014)

Six days after the closing of The Vienna Project at Josefsplatz, a new memorial project for deserters was unveiled four hundred meters away at Ballhausplatz, opposite Austria's federal chancellery building. Deserters had been labeled "traitors" after the collapse of the Wehrmacht (Rathkolb 2010, 249). Acknowledging the legitimacy of resisters goes hand in hand with acknowledging the criminality of Austria's Nazis.

The Deserter memorial entailed decades of debate. At stake was the very idea of what it means to be a citizen. While many argued that deserters were traitors abandoning their comrades and therefore not eligible for national recognition or compensation, a growing tide of support for these individuals prevailed (Deutsche Welle 2014).²⁰

¹⁸Sometimes stones are initiated by the organization itself, to commemorate sites where collective crimes took place. For expenses related to individual histories of commemorative documentation, see <http://steinedererinnerung.net/en/my-contribution/my-stone/>

¹⁹"For 120 euros, anybody can sponsor a stone": see <http://www.stolpersteine.eu/en/technical-aspects/#c342>

²⁰Apparently, widows of Nazi soldiers who carried out criminal acts of terror received compensation, but not widows of deserters. An estimated 1500 Austrian national resisters were executed as traitors under the Nazi regime. From (<http://www.dw.de/austria-inaugurates-memorial-to-wehrmacht-deserters-killed-by-the-nazis/a-18019168>)

In 2009, the Austrian government voted to decriminalize Austrian nationals who had deserted from the Wehrmacht, and plans for a memorial ensued soon after.²¹ The German artist Olaf Nicolai was the winner of a public competition. Developed as a traditional monument, fixed, permanent, and monochromatic, the Deserter Memorial subscribed to the abstract formula of namelessness as an inclusive gesture, used metaphorically to represent all deserters. The “X” symbolized opposition to the government and also signified the “X” of anonymity, inserted into Nazi records.²² Names and dates of defection were not indicated.

The memorial ascribes to a counter-monument formulation of remembrance. Personifying the authority of one artist’s vision, the memorial used the theme of isolation tethered to the solitary nature of resistance to remember one victim group in isolation. Following the established formula of remembering one group at a time, the memorial broke through a ceiling of silence and provided the government with a means of distancing itself from the Nazi regime. It did not, however, move the conceptual process of memorialization forward, and therefore it precedes The Vienna Project along a developmental continuum of memorialization.

By considering these six memorials as a collection of memorials that paved the way for the design of The Vienna Project, we can begin to appreciate a developmental process that is inherently transformative, and that has not previously been articulated. An overview of Vienna’s memorials dealing with National Socialism demonstrate how cognitive transformations dealing with the understanding of memory mingle with the formal domain of public memory, and with the artistry of memorialization that has advanced over the past century.

This century has witnessed more genocides than any other period in history. Paralleling changes in the art world, twenty-first-century memorials are becoming increasingly preoccupied with audience participation. Permanence, which was paramount in the earlier stages, becomes less important, replaced by documentation. With enhanced technologies on the rise, radically new approaches to memorialization are likely to ensue, impacting how artists working with historians think about collective memory and audience participation in the years to come. Developed as a “post-conceptual” formulation of memorialization, The Vienna Project introduces a number of fresh concepts regarding remembrance that includes ideas about inclusion, collaboration, and participation.

²¹Elke Weilharter (2014). Olaf Nicolai: Memorial for the Victims of Nazi Military. See KOER. <http://www.koer.or.at/cgi-bin/page.pl?id=493&lang=en>

²²Defectors from the Wehrmacht had their records converted to an “X.” <http://www.koer.or.at/cgi-bin/page.pl?id=493&lang=en>

Theoretical Framework for the Vienna Project

The Vienna Project, a twenty-first-century memorial project, follows a postmodern paradigm that contests ideas about power, authority, elitism, and privilege. The project subscribes to a postmodern framework:

The postmodern condition manifests itself in the multiplication of centers of power and activity and the dissolution of every kind of totalizing narrative which claims to govern the whole complex field of social activity and representation. The waning of the cultural authority of the West and its political and intellectual traditions, along with the opening up of the world political scene to cultural and ethnic differences, is another symptom of the modulation of hierarchy into heterarchy, or differences organized into a unified pattern of domination and subordination as opposed to differences existing alongside each other without any principle or commonality or order. (Connor 1989, 8)

Accordingly, The Vienna Project reads as a critique of the counter-monument movement, whereby one or two artists retain control, and sites remain ostensibly fixed, rendering conversations relatively static and repetitive. James Young characterizes the counter-monument movement in the following manner: “Not to console but to provoke; not to remain fixed but to change; not to be everlasting but to disappear; not to be ignored by its passerby but to demand interaction; not to remain pristine but to invite its own violation; not to accept graciously the burden of memory but to throw it back at the town’s feet” (2000, 7–8). These claims are only intermittently fulfilled. Interaction is limited and audience engagement falls short of actual participation.²³

The counter-monument movement flourishes in Berlin, the capital of Germany, German hegemony, and, many would claim, the “capital” of Europe (Werbowski 2013).²⁴ The post-conceptual memorial movement, on the other hand, flourishes in Vienna, the capital of Austria, which many might refer to as “café central” of Europe. Germany invests heavily in memory. By comparison, Austria, a smaller country with a smaller budget, is more cautious and perhaps more ambivalent about memory. The city of Vienna is likely to fund small artists’ initiatives. These projects, often taking the form of exhibitions, panel discussions, and small temporary installations, appear and disappear all over the city, sponsoring a variety of conversations, resembling the varied discourse of café culture. While power and authority, disguised by a reduction of scale, are maintained in the counter-monument movement, temporary memorials tend to represent experimental investigations of an idea about memory from one or more vantage points. Such is the case with The Vienna Project.

The Vienna Project, described as a “performance of the archives,” integrates a number of theoretical frameworks. The project is informed by the trajectory of performance art, beginning in postwar Austria in the late 1950s. The critical nature of

²³The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe by Peter Eisenman is an excellent example of the counter-monument movement in Berlin; see <http://www.stiftung-denkmal.de/en/memorials/the-memorial-to-the-murdered-jews-of-europe.html#c694>

²⁴“Germany’s Dominant Role in the European Union.” <http://www.globalresearch.ca/germanys-dominant-role-in-the-european-union/5326785>

these mid and late-twentieth century movements is reflected in the larger design of The Vienna Project.

Growing out of the Dada movement, a group of artists led by Otto Muehl and Hermann Nitsch, known as the Viennese Actionists, appeared in the early 1960s, following Austria's bid for statehood. This group indulged in radical behavior, producing a series of self-mutilating actions performed in public spaces, as a revolutionary practice. In fact, many of these artists engaged in "anti-society" behavior that bordered on criminal activity, ironically labeled "antifascist art." Art became a social tool used to critically examine political, antifascist ideas about power, and to rethink the hierarchical composition of artist and audience.²⁵ The Fluxus movement, followed a different trajectory—Futurism, Dada, and Surrealism—also emerging in the early 1960s (Friedman 1998, 217). Led by George Maciunas, this diverse group of experimental and like-minded artists worked in loose affiliation, collaborating on projects and international performances. Their work emphasized an intermedia approach, and attempted to bridge the dichotomy between art and life (Ibid., 49). Josef Beuys, a member of this group, introduced a theory of "social sculpture," a dialogic form of art making that emphasized the social nature of art. This work sponsored another genre, expressed as a series of "Happenings" or interactive events developed by Allan Kaprow (Ibid., 224). The new "performative action art" inspired yet another group of performance artists of the late 1960s, who honed performance art into a feminist critique of patriarchy. Working primarily in the United States during the 1970s, many of these artists (i.e. Marina Abramovic, Cindy Sherman, Tracey Emin, Jenny Holzer, Suzanne Lacy, Anna Mendieta, Adrian Piper, Carolee Schneemann, Nancy Spero, and Hannah Wilke) are represented in Uta Grosenick's anthology (2001).

Artists from these various groups were preoccupied with sociopolitical issues dealing with power. Intent upon deconstructing art and critiquing life, many of these artists performed in public spaces, issuing a series of independent manifestos aimed at explicating interrelated ideas about power, money, art, violence, and war.²⁶ The Vienna Project grew out of this era, combining a heightened integration of politically charged performance art with socially inspired work that promoted "participation, conversation, and civic action" (Jordan 2013, 145).

Primarily defined as an inclusive, interactive memorial, The Vienna Project used a variety of interventions in an effort to remember multiple victim groups, without diminishing differences between the groups. Designed as an interdisciplinary and collaborative experience, the project critiqued traditional approaches of memorialization that subscribed to a modernist hierarchy, privileging science over art, history over memory, and data over narrative.

²⁵Taylor 1995, 28–30; Falconer (2015). "Overview of Viennese Actionism." From <http://www.theartstory.org/movement-viennese-actionism.htm>. In 1991, Otto Muehl, founder of the Friedrichshof Commune, was convicted of sexual and drug offences with minors and was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment. From <http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1999/oct/08/features11.g21>

²⁶The Vietnam War began in the early 1960s, fueling widespread antiwar sentiment.

The Vienna Project with its postmodern bias toward horizontally organized structures favored ideas about inclusion and difference as mutually dynamic entities and sources for material development. Identified as an “enduring performance,” the project produced a “post-conceptual” framework of performance art that was both innovative and generative. Made by the people for the people, The Vienna Project represented a diverse expression of memory, while heeding the historic record.

The Vienna Project

The Vienna Project was conceived as a spirited temporary memorial that would evolve as a collaborative practice, situated on the sidewalks of Vienna in sixteen districts. The Project was the first European memorial of its kind, committed to remembering multiple groups of persecuted Austrian victims at the same time, murdered under National Socialism between 1938 and 1945. Developed as a national narrative about the Austrian people, the project represented a new model of memorialization that joined rigorous research with contemporary cultural production. As founding director, I held the overall vision and design of the various components of The Vienna Project. I hired an international team of Austrian and U.S. artists, designers, historians, and technologists to co-produce the content under my leadership.

Adhering to a multi-vocal approach, I invited participation from a variety of sources, and created the conceptual framework for eight different actions to occur: “Parcours des Erinnerns,”²⁷ research and identification of 38 memory sites, the creation of a memory map, the performance art program, the oral history program, the guided tour program, the new Holocaust curriculum, and the reading marathon. Fusing art with memory, participation took many forms: video art installations, stencil sprays, art installations, street performances, oral history interviews, community tours and conversations, and letter readings. The project formalized a relationship between the project axiom “What Happens When We Forget to Remember?” and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (by United Nations General Assembly in 1948).²⁸ Developed as a social action memorial project, the project’s various components entailed a year-long investigation of racial persecution in Austria under National Socialism, alongside a fresh look at the treatment of Austria’s minority populations in today’s diverse communities.

²⁷“Parcours des Erinnern” was developed by graduate students from the Transmedia Department at the University of Applied Arts, under the leadership of Univ.-Ass. MMag.art Elisabeth Wildling.

²⁸The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a “milestone document in the history of human rights, was drafted by representatives with different legal and cultural backgrounds from all regions of the world. The Declaration was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, [General Assembly resolution 217 A](#), as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations.” From <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>. See Roosevelt et al. 1948.

38 Memory Sites

The interactive plan for the 12-month memorial project provided multiple entry points to various communal activities of remembrance. The memorial project began (see Fig. 16.1) with stencil sprays at thirty-eight memory sites by students from the University of Applied Arts under the direction of Waltraud Jungwirth, which featured the project's axiom "What Happens When We Forget to Remember?" The question, translated into ten languages, was sprayed in sixteen districts, starting with the Parliament, the University of Vienna, the State Opera, the Natural History Museum, hospitals, parks, deportation collection points, former sites of synagogues, and many more locations identified and researched by historian Jerome Segal. The thirty-eight sites, corresponding to 1938, represented places where criminal activity, exclusions, and humiliations occurred, as well as sites of rescue and resistance. Staged over a year's time, the different sites became the locus for artists to perform and engage passersby.

The Naming Memorial

The closing ceremony took place at the Austrian National Library at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna's first district, followed by the Naming Memorial at Josefsplatz in the courtyard outside the library. I conceived the Naming Memorial in 2009.



Fig. 16.1 "38 Memory Sites, the Parliament" (Photo credit: Christian Wind)

The original plan was revised numerous times in response to budgetary constraints, and changes in location for the projections. Over the course of a few years, I retrieved the 91,780 names of victims murdered under National Socialism between 1938 and 1945 from six different archives and seven databases, created a detailed conceptual plan for the design of the Naming Memorial, and secured site permissions. In 2014, I hired Elisabeth Wildling, an Austrian video artist, to assist in developing the slides and video, and hired PANI GmbH to produce the slides and stage the projections.

My intent was to create a memorial event that seamlessly combined new media with the historic record. Design strategies regarding font and spatial arrangement were used to present ideas about difference, while maintaining a nonhierarchical representation of the victim groups. These groups included Jews, Roma and Sinti, mentally ill and physically and mentally handicapped people, homosexuals, persons persecuted on political grounds, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Carinthian Slovenes.²⁹ The Naming Memorial became a stunning and easily replicable concept of memorialization that included different victim groups, exhibiting different histories of persecution.

Conclusion

The Vienna Project marked a new era of memorialization in Vienna whereby memory and criticism converged, sanctioning new thresholds of solidarity between the different victim groups. By preserving the historic record at the thirty-eight sites while creating a series of public performances at the sites, the Project was able to reach a wide range of audiences of various ages. In addition to public participation, the project employed 22 dedicated and talented professionals over the course of a year.

Memory about genocide remains a controversial topic. Often working within the constraints of a divided public, memorials must bear the responsibility of opening up new conversations about national narratives. In the face of silence and denial, memory and inventive methodologies of memorialization can inspire imaginative responses to dark histories that continue to fester under the surface. Encountering a thoughtful and visually inspired memorial project can prompt a personal response and a collective expression of reflection. In these highly cultivated spaces, a heightened awareness of where one stands in relation to a larger history can take shape. These bridges across time help us to pause and wonder about the human condition.

²⁹The different archives determined the number of victims assigned to each group: Jews 63,800, Roma 9421, Mental Illness and Physical Disability 10,468, Dissidents 7992, Carinthian Slovenian 544, and Jehovah's Witnesses 155, totaling 91,780 victims.

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Chapter 17

Collective Memory, Memorialization and Bearing Witness in the Aftermath of the Armenian Genocide

Armen T. Marsoobian

Abstract This chapter describes and analyzes an ongoing project of memorialization of the Armenian Genocide in Turkey. It explores the importance of memorialization for collective historical memory, especially in situations where historical memory has been subverted by genocide denial. Among many aspects of memorialization, its role in bearing witness is explored and highlighted. Three components of the memory project are described: (1) the photography exhibitions, (2) the publications, and (3) the creation of memory sites. The project centers on the story of the Dildilian family in Ottoman Turkey before, during, and after the genocide, covering the years 1872–1923. A microhistory of the life of the Armenian minority is chronicled by means of the personal memories and stories of members of the family. The history is richly illustrated with photographs and drawings that serve as the basis of the photography exhibitions and books. Exhibitions and associated talks and panels have taken place in Istanbul, Merzifon, Diyarbakir, and Ankara. The chapter describes and analyzes the reaction of the Turkish public to the project.

Keywords Armenian Genocide · Bearing witness · Collective memory · Genocide denial · Memorialization · Turkey

Introduction

An integral component of many modern genocides is the systematic destruction of cultural artifacts of the targeted population. Whether it is the destruction of synagogues in Nazi-occupied Europe, mosques in the Serbian-appropriated lands of Bosnia, or churches in the historic Armenian lands of modern Turkey, the perpetrators or their heirs attempt to minimize their crimes by wiping the landscape clean of any reminders of their victims. Great time and effort go into engineering a collective

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amnesia that contributes to the national narrative that is used to justify and glorify the actions of the perpetrators. In the case of the Armenian Genocide much attention has been paid in recent years to efforts to have the genocide recognized and its denial criminalized by nation-states. Such efforts have had little or no positive impact on the status quo in Turkey. On the contrary, some may argue that such efforts have had a negative effect, hardening the nationalist rhetoric of denial and making even more precarious the already difficult lives of Armenians in Turkey. I shall not enter this debate but shall explore an alternative approach that attempts to chip away at Turkey's collective amnesia.

Projects to combat genocide denial in its many forms are under way by the joint efforts of Armenians and Turks within Turkey and in the international cultural arena. The Center for Truth, Justice and Memory, the Hrant Dink Foundation, Durde (Say Stop to Racism and Nationalism), and the History Foundation are some of the groups at the forefront of these efforts. In this chapter I describe one such initiative I undertook in partnership with Anadolu Kültür, a Turkish NGO that employs the arts in the service of social justice. Depo, a gallery space for critical debate and cultural exchange in Istanbul, was the launching pad for our first joint effort to reverse the collective amnesia regarding the Armenian Genocide. We have organized photography exhibitions that tell the story of one extended Armenian family—my family, the Dildilians—in Ottoman Turkey from the 1870s to their expulsion in 1922. Members of the Dildilian family were photographers who documented their lives and their community both with photographs and with extensive written and oral memoirs. Their story is told and richly illustrated in hundreds of photographs that survived the genocide and its aftermath. Much of the family's photography and writings can be seen as an attempt to bear witness to the suffering they underwent as an oppressed minority in Turkey. For the most part these photographs do not directly depict the suffering, though some do. What they do bear witness to is the loss of the once vibrant and culturally advanced Armenian nation.

The concept of "bearing witness" was central to my family's efforts a century ago, and is central to our efforts today. When one bears witness one addresses an audience, sometimes multiple audiences. The audience toward whom the witnessing is directed is in need of the witness's story. The audiences lack something vital in their understanding of the world they live in. My family's early efforts to bear witness were primarily directed at their descendants, at the Armenian diaspora in general, and in some cases to the Western powers who failed to render justice in the wake of the genocide. But our project has an important new audience, the citizens of the current Republic of Turkey. In the second part of the chapter, I describe some of the specific objectives of the exhibition project and its associated activities. While inevitably controversial, this project is intended to have a positive impact on the highly contested arena of memory politics within Turkey.

Collective Memory and Bearing Witness

I began this chapter by highlighting the collective amnesia engineered by those who deny the crime of genocide in the Armenian case. Amnesia is an erasure of memory—in the Armenian case, the erasure of Armenians from the collective memory of Turkey. First let me state what collective memory is not. Collective memory does not imply a belief in the reality of a group mind or some mental entity that exists independently of individual human beings. Neither is collective memory merely the aggregation of individual personal memories. While it is impossible to have personal memories devoid of social or situational context, this does not account for the truly collective nature of the memory of which I speak. Collective memory in this aggregate sense fails to capture the socially constituted nature of collective memory. In contrast to the aggregate view, collective memory is a form of remembering together. Remembering together is a common activity of groups and is self-constituting and re-constituting. Whether it is the shared memories of family members at a family reunion or the communal activities of ethnic groups who come together to memorialize wrongs perpetrated against their ancestors, as Armenians do in their April 24th genocide commemorations, these conjoint activities both reflect and construct collective memory. The philosopher Jeffrey Blustein writes, “Members of a community jointly recall and jointly reconstruct the past and through these joint activities bind themselves together in particular ways” (Blustein 2008, 183). Blustein nicely captures this phenomenon of collective memory with the phrase “a community of memory.” This phenomenon is especially evident in those instances where such memories have broad reach and long endurance. Such a community of memory does not require personal first-hand experience of an event that is collectively recalled. Often through symbolic, artistic, or literary reenactments of the trauma of others, one may personally have an emotional response that is not significantly different from the response one might feel in recollecting a painful personal event in one’s own past. One may cry, as I did, in front of the names etched on the polished black granite of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., even though one did not know the individuals there memorialized. The collective memory of that war deeply marked a generation of Americans despite a lack of consensus as to the war’s meaning.

The collective memory of a suffered wrong, especially when wide-scale and life changing, can have a persistence that endures for centuries. Blustein describes this intergenerational character of memory: “Collective memory can also be passed down through many generations, with each generation creating a new context and content for what will be jointly recalled by subsequent generations” (Blustein 2008, 183). A prime illustration of such persistence can be found in the symbolic role that the Battle of Kosovo plays in the collective memory of the Serbian people. This was a battle that was fought and lost by the Serbian kingdom in 1389 during the Ottoman invasion of the Balkans. The battle found “a new context and content” 600 years later when it was employed by Slobodan Milošević in his infamous Gazimestan speech to sow the seeds of ethnic hatred that would eventually break apart Yugoslavia.

Ethnic and religious hatred were marshaled in the nationalist cause of a greater Serbia and led to the genocide in Bosnia and the crimes against humanity that followed upon it in Kosovo. The fourteenth-century Battle of Kosovo came to take on a powerful symbolic importance in the collective memory of the Serbs. Serbia had sacrificed itself defending Western Christian Europe against the Muslim Turks. The Kosovo myth became part of the nationalist rhetoric that attempted to justify the cleansing of the Serbian “homeland” of its “alien” Muslim population.

In what sense am I employing the concept of myth, and how is it related to collective memory? There are many varieties of myth and accounts of the role myths play in society. The one I am particularly concerned with is often referred to as a nation’s “foundational myth.” Such a myth serves a unifying function and often identifies common originary events that establish group identity. Blustein has elaborated on the social function of these types of myth by identifying three important features:

Myths of this sort [foundational myths] provide symbolic resources for underwriting present identity-constituting values, institutions, ideals, and so forth; they connect a group to its own past and help to distinguish it from other groups in the eyes of group members; and they embody norms that serve as organizing principles of social life, norms that are capable of generating not only intellectual assent but emotional commitment. These features are all essentially independent of the historical truth of what the myths relate, and they explain both the value and the peril of collective memory. (Blustein 2008, 198)

Self-identity, group identity, and social norms are buttressed by these foundational myths. In short, who we are, what we believe, and what we aspire to are all strongly influenced by our community’s foundational myths. None of these features is necessarily connected with what, in a social science sense, we call critical history. Such history, by contrast, is governed by a methodology whose focus is upon establishing the truth about past events.

For nearly a century the foundational myth of the Turkish state has been propagated by state institutions, effectively suppressing critical historical reflection on the violence of 1915 and the years that followed. The highly centralized educational system in Turkey reinforces the nation’s foundational myth. The curriculum and textbooks are all uniformly produced by the Ankara bureaucracy, and history teachers are vetted to ensure that students are not exposed to alternative accounts of the nation’s past. History can only be taught by ethnically “pure” Turks, even in the dwindling number of Armenian and Greek minority schools that were mandated in the often-violated Treaty of Lausanne (1923) that formally ended the First World War for Turkey.¹

Another danger we find in the centralized and uniform curriculum of the Turkish state is the misuse of biography in the teaching of history. While the use of the biographies often brings alive historic episodes that would otherwise be dull and

¹Two important articles that analyze Turkish curriculum and textbooks are: J. M. Dixon (2010), “Education and national narratives: Changing representations of the Armenian genocide in history textbooks in Turkey”; and K. Çayır (2009), “Preparing Turkey for the European Union: Nationalism, national identity, and ‘otherness’ in Turkey’s new textbooks.”

uninviting to school-age children, there is a danger of sugarcoating these stories in order to make the past easier to swallow. This was the case even in the United States, where the “founding fathers” were once depicted as flawless “great men” whose idealism established the nation. We now approach this history and its key players more critically. Thomas Jefferson, the chief architect of the Declaration of Independence, was a slaveholder who fathered a child with one of his slaves. Needless to say, modern Turkish history’s hagiographic treatment of Atatürk is central to the foundational myth of the Republic and has been exempt from critical scrutiny. Mustafa Kemal’s own recounting of the war of independence in his 36-hour speech to the Grand National Assembly in 1927, known as the Nutuk (Speech), was central to this mythic construction. Since 1951 a variety of Turkish laws, most recently penal code 301, have made it difficult to critically examine this mythic history. Denigrating Atatürk, Turkishness, and the institutions of the state have all been criminalized in one form or another over the past 50 years. The Nobel Prize-winning writer Orhan Pamuk stands out as one of the many individuals prosecuted under this law. Tragically, the crusading Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor and journalist Hrant Dink was prosecuted under this same law, exposing him to a radical nationalist conspiracy that led to his assassination in 2007.

Let me conclude this examination of collective memory by highlighting two important ways in which it is transmitted from one generation to the next: memory activities and memory places. These are important for the practices I describe in the second half of this chapter and are much discussed among scholars who study collective forms of memory. Memory activities and memory places are non-discursive forms of collective memory transmittal. Traditional practices, whether of a religious or a secular kind, embody collective memory. Public commemorative ceremonies, pilgrimages, and historical reenactments are all forms of memory activities. These activities are often tied to memory places. Archives, museums, and libraries are places that serve the explicit function of collecting and preserving memory. But they often can be used to manipulate and distort memory, as has been the case with the Turkish government’s cleansing of the Ottoman archives of all evidence of the Armenian Genocide. Some memory places, such as historical monuments and plaques, are intentionally created in order to keep us from forgetting important community events. Architectural edifices such as public buildings, historical homes, places of worship, and cemeteries are places of memory. Even street names, neighborhood names, and the names of towns and cities can all have a memorial function. The Turkish state has engaged in a long-standing practice of changing geographical names of Armenian or Greek origin into Turkish names in order to ensure the collective amnesia of future generations. During the Armenian Genocide, the minister of war, Enver Pasha, issued a *ferman* (an edict) declaring:

It has been decided that provinces, districts, towns, villages, mountains, and rivers, which are named in languages belonging to non-Muslim nations such as Armenian, Greek or Bulgarian, will be renamed into Turkish. In order to benefit from this suitable moment, this aim should be achieved in due course. (Enver Paşa 1915)

The Surname Law of 1934 took this effort even further with the stipulation that all citizens had to have surnames that were in the Turkish language, thus forbidding names of foreign or ethnic origin.

Against this backdrop of denial and erasure, our project of symbolically restoring or “re-imaging” the lost Armenian past of Turkey takes on great challenges and risks. Our memory work and the art it employs, the photographic art of my ancestors, are the means by which my partners and I are attempting to change Turkey’s collective memory. Memorials and memorial art can serve many functions. They can be addressed to a small audience, such as family and friends alone, or to a wider public audience. Not all memorialization entails bearing witness. Crucial to the concept of bearing witness is the idea of testimony. Witnesses are supposed to seek to uncover the “truth” about what happened or is still happening. This is especially important in the case of the Armenian Genocide because of the continuing campaign of denial by the Turkish state. Needless to say, there has been a 100-year history of denial of the suffering of the Armenian people. Those who bear witness have a moral responsibility to find out the truth, and to tell it, warts and all. The imperative to speak the truth in the context of bearing witness adds a greater burden on those who engage in memory work in hostile or indifferent societies. Memorial art can, and often is, propagandistic. Memorial art that seeks to speak the truth—to bear witness—must avoid the trap of responding in kind to those who perpetrated acts of unjust suffering.

While some acts of bearing witness address a relatively small audience and may soon be forgotten, others, such as Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, have a larger public audience and take on wider historical importance. In the case of the Holocaust, digital archiving and the Internet are being employed by the Shoah Foundation at the University of Southern California to forever preserve the witnessing testimony of the survivors of the Nazi concentration and death camps. These acts of witnessing become part of the public record and may shape and be incorporated into the collective historical consciousness. As suggested at the beginning of my chapter, the primary goal of our memory project is to begin a process of gradual change in the collective memory of the Turkish people, a change that is required for building a democratic way of life. Understanding the nature of our audience has been crucial for our project. Within Turkey we have multiple audiences. If we are going to succeed in positively affecting Turkish historical consciousness, in whatever small way we can, then we must be nuanced in our approach to our audience. In communicating our message, our exhibition project has to be open and inviting. This is certainly the case in Turkey, where direct censorship by the state is buttressed indirectly by economic interests doing the state’s bidding. This is especially true with the news media. News organizations struggle to maintain their independence; often they are the victims of being part of a corporate ownership whose other business interests depend upon government largesse. Thus our project needs to be careful in crafting the testimony our witnessing provides. Care has been given to avoiding stereotypes, crude or vulgar language, and overgeneralizations in the narrative we have written that accompanies the photography. This is especially important because we are often quoting directly from the witnesses whose memoirs serve

as the basis of the family story. Marking and stigmatizing a whole population on the basis of the actions of its leadership and the actual perpetrators must be avoided. General claims such as “Turks did this ...” and “Armenians were ...” are to be avoided or must be qualified. Yet the witnessing testimony must not be sanitized to the point where it does not reflect how the witness experienced the suffering. I highlight some instances of this when I discuss the details of the exhibition.

Unlike other forms of remembrance, bearing witness may effect the psychological healing of the witness-rememberer. Such testimony can be reparative of the mental well-being of the witness as well as the audience. When the trauma of loss and suffering is passed down to the next generation, the memorializing function can continue to have this healing effect. In the case of the Armenian Genocide the trauma has in some cases become multigenerational. For Armenians living in Turkey, the fact that generations of survivors could not grieve in public has added an extra salience to the healing effect of the memorializing work that has been taking place during the past 10 years. Aside from the first few years immediately following the Ottoman defeat in the First World War, there had been no public commemoration of the Armenian Genocide until April 24, 2010.

I conclude this part of my chapter with one last but important aspect of the moral value of bearing witness. This is the restorative aspect of bearing witness. I use restorative not in any psychological sense or in any material sense, since such losses can never be fully compensated. What is restored is the moral order and the ethical norms that were violated in the wrongdoing. Blustein highlights the importance of this aspect of witnessing:

Bearing witness to the suffering of victims of wrongdoing may be understood (in part) as a symbolic act whose moral value consists in its expressing one’s intrinsically valuable allegiance to the good and/or repudiation of the bad.... Bearing witness to the suffering of those who were wronged, like punishing those who wronged them ... cannot restore the victims to their former state, of course. But bearing witness to the suffering of those who were wronged can symbolize one’s commitment to the moral order that was upset by, or the moral norms that were breached by wrongdoing and undeserved suffering, and it can symbolize this long after there are no perpetrators left to punish. (Blustein 2008, 332–3)

Thus bearing witness symbolically asserts the moral status of the victims and their membership in the moral community, by giving them and their suffering a *voice*. When we heed that voice, we reaffirm that moral status, however belatedly. The victim’s voice may have been silenced in the past, but now there is someone who speaks for them and of all the suffering they endured.

Memory Work in Turkey

In this second part of my chapter I describe the memory work that my partners and I have engaged in since 2010. There are three related aspects to this work. For convenience, I identify them as: (1) the photography exhibition; (2) the publications;

and (3) the memory sites. For the purposes of this chapter, I can only highlight some aspects of the memory work and the responses we received.

I have already partially described the content of the photography exhibition. The exhibition was entitled “Bearing Witness to the Lost History of an Armenian Family Through the Lens of the Dildilian Brothers, 1872–1923” (in Turkish: “Bir Ermeni Ailesinin Yitik Geçmişine Tanıklıklar: Dildilian Kardeşlerin Objektifinden, 1872–1923”). The exhibition opened at the Depo gallery (Tütün Deposu), a converted tobacco warehouse in the Tophane neighborhood of Istanbul, on April 25, 2013. The date of the opening was chosen to closely coincide with the symbolic start of the Armenian Genocide but not conflict with the public memorial activities taking place in Taksim Square and other sites in Istanbul on April 24, the traditional Armenian Genocide commemoration day. The exhibition was one of the largest and best-attended exhibitions hosted by Depo.² More than 150 photographs were reproduced in panels and wall displays across two floors of the gallery. A narrative history richly illustrated with photographs and drawings produced by my grandfather Tsolag and his brother Aram covered the walls of one floor of the gallery. A talented Turkish-Armenian writer Anna Turay divided the narrative into twenty-seven vignettes each illustrated with relevant photos and drawings. The narrative began with the Dildilian family’s early years in the 1870s in their ancestral home of Sebastia (modern-day Sivas) and concluded with their forced exile to Greece in 1922. The wall texts were in Turkish, with a free booklet containing the English translation for non-Turkish speakers. The photos were captioned in both Turkish and English. Our goal was to place the events of the genocide within the larger context of the life of the family and the Armenian community. The emphasis was on the loss, not the violence, of the events of 1915. We made the conscious choice to use the word “genocide” (in Turkish, “soykırım”) sparingly, with only one instance in the wall narrative and another, a passing reference, in my introductory essay to the exhibition (Fig. 17.1).

For those who wanted to explore the genocide further, detailed informational panels were created for the second floor of the gallery. Understandably, the word “genocide” could not be avoided here, but still, it was sparingly used, with the section devoted to the genocide entitled “Date of Death: 1915.” The second floor was primarily devoted to thematic displays that provided more information and photos portraying different aspects of Armenian community life. Anatolia College, the American missionary school that played a central role in the life of the family and the Armenians of central Anatolia, was given prominence. The college, founded through the efforts of Armenians in Marsovan who desired a modern Western-based education, still exists today, but in exile in Thessaloniki, Greece, and is symbolic of the Armenian diaspora that resulted from the genocide. A section highlighted the Armenian role in the development of photography, displaying examples of the studio work of the Dildilian brothers. There were also many photos of orphans after the war. The family founded an orphanage and helped the American-led humanitarian efforts in the region, working primarily for Near East Relief.

²A illustrated description of the exhibition can be found on Depo’s website: http://www.depoistanbul.net/en/activites_detail?ac=88



Fig. 17.1 Opening panel of the Istanbul exhibition, April 2013

A conscious effort was made to provide spaces for people to sit and reflect on the story they were experiencing. The designer of the exhibition, Kirkor Sahakoglu, a Turkish Armenian whose family was forced to Turkify its surname, created a darkened space, set off from the main exhibition, for people to light candles in memory of those who were killed. The room contained dozens of portraits of members of the family who did not survive the death marches. Large group photos of Armenian intellectuals and educators who perished in 1915 were also displayed. A musical soundscape created from the Armenian liturgical requiem for the dead played softly in the background (Fig. 17.2).

Another vital component of the exhibition was the direct testimony of the Dildilian family survivors. I was fortunate to have more than three hours of a video interview recorded in 1986, in which my mother recounted memories of her childhood in Marsovan. In addition, in 1968 her older brother Ara had recorded an audio interview, which was only recently discovered. Between the two recordings we had seven hours of testimony, which we edited down to about twenty-two minutes. We subtitled the video in Turkish and played it in a continuous loop in a specially created alcove of the gallery. Ara, the older sibling, had first-hand experience of the deportations, having been eight years old at the time. Since his was an audio interview, we illustrated his words with additional photos from the collection. At one point in the interview, Ara provides a very emotionally distressing account of watching his neighbors being deported by oxcart. He is handed their soon to be orphaned young child, a child he babysat in the past. Our family kept this orphan for the rest of the war years. In contrast, we selected segments of my mother's interview in which she describes happy memories of her childhood in the warm and loving fam-

Fig. 17.2 Memorial room for the victims of the Armenian Genocide, Istanbul exhibition



ily environment of her home in Marsovan. A leading Turkish newspaper *Radikal* and *Hürriyet* TV posted the videos on the Internet, and both have been viewed thousands of times. The media coverage was extensive both in terms of the mainstream media and more progressive outlets. *CivilNet*, an online Armenian news media outlet in Yerevan, covered the exhibition and a discussion panel we had organized. School groups, primarily from the Armenian schools of Istanbul, were given tours, and I was privileged to lead one such group.

In October of 2013 we opened a redesigned exhibition in Merzifon, the hometown of my family for nearly 30 years before their expulsion in 1922. Known to Armenians as Marsovan, much of the Dildilian photographic work took place there. Marsovan was also the town where my grandparents' immediate family members survived the genocide. They were exempted from the deportation because, as photographers, they were essential to the army's war effort and the local government. Yet they were still required to "convert" to Islam and were given Turkish names and identity papers. During the early years of the genocide, they heroically rescued and



Fig. 17.3 Merzifon exhibition in a sixteenth-century Taşhan

hid young men and women in their homes. Merzifon today is almost exclusively an ethnically Turkish town, with little that remains as a reminder of its once large and vibrant Armenian population. Unlike Istanbul, it is a more religiously conservative and nationalistic community. Yet even here I met progressive Turks who were willing to work with us to bring the exhibition to their community. A redesign of the Istanbul exhibition was necessary because the Merzifon exhibition space was a recently restored historic sixteenth-century Taşhan, a building traditionally used as lodging and a market for traders. The local chamber of commerce was approached for financial support and sponsorship. Surprisingly, they agreed (Fig. 17.3).

In addition to design changes warranted by the venue's configuration, we agreed with our local hosts that the word "genocide" ("soykırım") would not be used in the wall panels. We wanted to avoid any undue controversy, for it was more important to have the story told in as frank and open a way as possible. The three main memoirs that were the basis of the narrative did not employ the term. Either the word had not been coined at the time or was not in common use. We inadvertently failed to catch one reference to the word in an important panel. We had attempted to substitute the term "Medz Yeghern" ("Great Calamity/Crime"), an older term that had once been used by some Armenians to characterize 1915, but in the revision process both terms were used. The panel, entitled "1915: Death March on Naked Feet," contained the following passage: "April 24th is indelibly marked in the memory of Armenians as the 'Medz Yeghern (Great Calamity/Crime),' becoming the date on which they will commemorate the 'Armenian Genocide' for generations to come." (Translation of the original Turkish panel.) The panel in Istanbul was more straight-

forward: “April 24th is indelibly marked in the memory of Armenians, becoming the date on which they commemorate the Armenian Genocide for generations to come.” (Original Turkish: “Bu tarihten itibaren 24 Nisan, kuşaklar boyunca Ermenilerin belleğine ‘Ermeni Soykırımını Anma Günü’ olarak kazanacaktır.”) The discovery was made the evening before the opening, so after hasty consultations with our hosts we agreed to cover over the offending word with some black tape. Given that the panels for 1915 had a black background with white lettering, we thought that this was the best solution at the time. Ironically, the tape drew people’s attention to the absence of the word. “Genocide” was more present in its absence than it would have otherwise been.

Members of my family traveled from the United States and France for the opening. Local media coverage of the exhibition and my family’s visit to the town was, for the most part, laudatory but skirted the issue of the genocide. A reporter from a national newspaper, *Taraf*, spent a day traveling with and talking to the family. This included a visit to the Dildilian family home that is currently occupied by a very warm and welcoming Turkish family whose grandparents moved into the house soon after our family was forced to leave in 1922. They came from Greece during the population exchange between the Greeks and Turks that marked the end of their conflict. An extensively detailed article was published with the front-page headline: “In the house of the Grandfather who was forced to become Muslim” (“Müslümanlaştırılan dedelerinin evinde”). What was even more striking and in many ways ground-breaking, was the first line of the article: “The Merzifon Dildilian family that left 8 years after the Armenian Genocide has returned with photographs.” The article used the “genocide/*soykırım*” word with no attempt at a qualification, for in Turkey today “the 1915 events” are often referred to as the “so-called” or “alleged” Armenian Genocide.

We were pleased with the local turnout and the warm reception we received at the opening. Many educators and local officials attended. I was especially pleased to see many students in attendance. I had met some of these students in their English-language classroom on an earlier visit to Merzifon. Their school building had once been the hospital that was a part of the original Anatolia College. Besides being the photographer for the college, my grandfather operated the x-ray machine in the hospital.

Unfortunately, two negative opinion articles soon appeared in the local newspapers denouncing the pro-Armenian theme of the exhibition. The exhibition ran for three weeks, but the local sponsors gave up their attempt to extend its run because of the negative publicity in these articles. On subsequent visits to the town I was shown fine hospitality and was greeted by the new mayor. These are tentative yet positive signs that Merzifon is open to incorporating its Armenian past into its collective memory.

Our third exhibition opened in Diyarbakir, in Turkey’s troubled Kurdish southeast, on April 20, 2014. The venue was the recently restored Armenian Apostolic church of Surp Giragos, considered to be the largest and most important church in the Middle East. Diyarbakir, known to Armenians as Dikranakert, was at one time home to one of the largest and wealthiest Armenian communities in the Ottoman Empire. The nearly complete destruction of its Armenian population was one of the

most cruelly violent events of 1915. Some local Kurdish tribes played a significant role in the exterminations. But today local Kurdish leaders have reached out a hand of reconciliation to Armenians in both Turkey and the diaspora. Public apologies have been made and commemorations undertaken. The local municipality even provided some funds for the church restoration. The municipality has also undertaken to reintroduce the languages of the ethnic communities who once lived in Diyarbakir.³ In keeping with this effort, our introductory panel used three languages, Armenian, Kurdish, and Turkish. A small Armenian community is reemerging in the area. Some of these individuals are considered the “hidden Armenians” of Turkey, for they have either recently discovered their Armenian ancestry or feel more comfortable living openly as Armenians because of changes in the southeast. We opened the exhibition on the same day as the first Easter service celebrated in the church since its restoration. It was also the beginning of a week of events marking the 99th anniversary of the genocide. Even though the photos on display did not relate directly to this region of Turkey, the overall reception was very positive. Local press coverage was uniformly positive. This can be attributed in part to the fact that the destruction of the Armenian population was a precursor to the persecution of the Kurds. Kurdish ethnic identity has been a target of the state’s nationalist project of creating an ethnically homogenous Turkish homeland. Deportations and massacres have marked this project, though, unlike the Armenian case, Kurdish identity has not been erased from the landscape. Based on long and heartfelt conversations with local people, it is clear that the collective memory in this region encompasses memories of its former Armenian inhabitants. A strong oral tradition of historical memory transmittal may account for the fact that the state has not succeeded in sanitizing the Kurdish collective memory of the last century (Fig. 17.4).

Our fourth exhibition opened on November 3, 2015, in the Turkish capital of Ankara. The venue and the timing were significant in a number of respects. This was our first exhibition in a public, that is, government-owned, gallery. The earlier exhibitions were in privately owned spaces. Çankaya Municipality Contemporary Art Center, operated under the local mayor’s office, is in a central district of the city where the Grand National Assembly (Parliament) and most government buildings are located. Sanart, the Association of Aesthetics and Visual Culture, an academic professional association, agreed to be the local organizer in cooperation with Anadolu Kültür.

As in Merzifon, we limited the use of the word “genocide” but removed the black tape covering the word on the 1915 panel. We also included a controversial photo of the Armenian Anatolia College professors who were murdered in 1915. An introductory panel in Armenian was again included. A large and diverse audience attended the opening. Academics, artists, politicians, and members of the diplomatic community were present. Surprisingly, one member of Parliament from the Kemalist CHP party was also in attendance.

³These sentences were written before the resumption of the violence between the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and the Turkish state in the summer of 2015. Many of these Kurdish leaders have been removed from office and jailed. The neighborhood around the Surp Giragos church has been heavily damaged and the church expropriated by the government. No access to the area is allowed.



Fig. 17.4 Interior of Surp Giragos Church, Diyarbakir

Over the next few weeks we received many positive comments about the exhibition, especially in social media. Inevitably there were also some negative responses. Two newspapers published articles condemning the exhibition. Most of the vindictiveness was directed at the mayor for allowing such a scandalous exhibition to take place. The ruling AKP party's newspaper ran the headline "CHP Municipality Exhibition Scandal!" The mayor's office released a press statement distancing itself from the content of the exhibition but highlighting the fact that over the years diverse opinions have been represented in the gallery. While somewhat tepid in its lan-

guage, freedom of expression was defended. Despite the charged political atmosphere created by the renewed violence in the southeast, the Syrian crisis, and the elections that saw the AKP party lose and then regain its parliamentary majority, the exhibition, as originally planned, concluded its three-week run without incident.

Let me now turn to the two remaining components of the memory project, the publications and the memory sites. Two 34-page booklets, one in Turkish and the other in English, containing the text of the exhibition were given away free of charge to those who attended. The booklet was richly illustrated. A copy can also be downloaded from the Internet. We subsequently produced an Armenian version to accompany a similar exhibition that I organized in Yerevan, Armenia. My book *Fragments of a lost homeland: Remembering Armenia*, a detailed but highly readable history of the Dildilian family based upon memoirs and a host of primary sources, was published first in English in 2015 (Marsoobian 2015a) and will soon appear in a Turkish translation. *Dildilian brothers—Memories of a lost Armenian home: Photography and the story of an Armenian family in Anatolia, 1888–1923*, a bilingual Turkish-English photography book that includes nearly 200 photos and a condensed history of the family was published in Istanbul in 2015 (2015b). Copies have been distributed to libraries, and it is our hope that they will contribute to the public discourse about the fate of the Armenians in Turkey.

The final component of our memory work is the creation of memory sites. I have traveled extensively in the Merzifon, Amasya, Samsun, and Sivas regions of Turkey. This is primarily the region where the extended Dildilian family lived and worked up until the genocide and their expulsion in 1922. Important locations in the family narrative have been identified. While much has been destroyed, some remnants of the Armenian presence remain. Our goal is to make these sites more visible both to the local population and to Armenian visitors who in recent years have been making what have been called “pilgrimages” to historic Armenia. While not a significant part of the tourist industry, there may be a convergence of interests of the local authorities and Armenian groups that should encourage more such exchanges. One should never discount economic self-interest as a motivator for greater tolerance. For the most part, these pilgrimages have been positive though emotionally difficult experiences for visiting Armenians. The Armenian Apostolic churches of Merzifon are gone, but the Catholic and Protestant churches remain, though radically altered. One is a municipal art center and auditorium and the other is a private facility for wedding receptions. Some of the buildings of Anatolia College still remain, including the hospital that I mentioned earlier. Many of the Ottoman-era homes of the Armenians are still evident, though most are in various states of decay. An important monastery outside the town has one remaining building, which is now used as a barn. Much has been identified, but the public recognition of these sites is yet to be accomplished. Tentative initial steps have been taken, and much still remains to be done.

After meeting with the director and staff of the school that now occupies the hospital where my grandfather once worked, it became clear to me that there was no knowledge of the building’s prior incarnation. After speaking with students in an English-language class and telling them about my family connection to the building, I broached the idea with the director of providing him with enlarged reproduc-

tions of old photos of the hospital that could be hung on the walls. He heartily agreed, and now these photos are on the walls of the hallways and classrooms of the school. It was important that they be properly captioned in Turkish so that a small but important part of Merzifon's history could be restored. My grandfather is acknowledged in the captions as the photographer. He has now symbolically returned to his old and long-forgotten place of work.

Discussions are under way with the municipality and the local hosts of the Dildilian exhibition to create wall plaques that identify some of the important buildings and houses formerly related to the Armenian community. The mayor has a redevelopment plan for the former Armenian quarter that we hope will include wall plaques naming the former Armenian owners who built these houses. We also hope to stabilize and protect the crumbling barn that was once the important monastery outside the town. The final but important component of our project is to have a permanent site where copies of the photos can be displayed. Our local partners have identified a former Armenian residence that they hope to buy and convert into a guest house and museum, a place of memory where photos and artifacts of the town's recovered collective memory can be displayed.

It is hard to gauge the progress we have made with our memory work, but the work continues with the hope that incremental change has taken place and will continue to do so. No one, especially my partners, underestimates the obstacles that face us. Collective memory is difficult to change even in more open societies. Despite inevitable setbacks, an opening has been made into a closed past—a past that once opened can never be fully closed again.

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