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A Model for Positive Leadership in Argentinean Firms

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Two hundred years after its birth as a nation, Argentina is still a fascinating enigma for leadership and management scholars worldwide. Argentina has the 10th largest territory in the world, vast fertile lands and large reserves of strategic natural resources. However, for the past hundred years, Argentina has been entrapped in a vicious cycle of economic collapse and recovery, which prevented this nation from sustaining veritable growth. Is Argentina truly 'doomed to succeed', or does such cyclic failure just provide evidence of destructive leadership practices?

In this chapter, I will attempt an answer by applying recent developments in leadership theory to the Argentinean context. It is important to signal from the very start of this chapter one major caveat emptor; quantitative empirical research regarding leadership in Argentinean organisations is almost non-existent. Excluding some noteworthy exceptions (Omar & Salessi, 2016; Perugini, Laura, & Solano, 2013), Argentinean management scholars seem apathetic towards evidence-based management. Gantman and Fernández Rodríguez's (2008) review states that

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management scholars treat leadership as a somewhat trivial matter for organisations, and more appropriate for other social disciplines such as sociology and political science. My own review of the authentic leadership literature in Argentina agrees with Gantman and Fernández Rodríguez's (2008) conclusion. Not surprisingly, the studies that emerged from my literature review rely heavily on Weber's (1924) conceptualisation of charisma to explore, qualitatively, the attributes of both historical and contemporary political leaders such as Juan Manual de Rosas (Operé, 2010), Juan Domingo Peron (Decarli, 2015) and Ricardo Alfonsin (González, 1986). Similarly, Raigoza (2014) recently deconstructed the leadership style of former presidents Nestor and Cristina (Fernandez de) Kirchner. Furthermore, there are virtually no scholarly works aimed at organisational leadership in Argentinean firms. Thus, this chapter seeks to understand organisational leadership in Argentina and also provide Argentinean management scholars with a framework that guides future empirical research.

Given the importance that Argentinean scholars paid to leader charisma, in this chapter I will unpack charismatic leadership in Argentina, using both pseudo- and authentic transformational leadership theories (Barling, Christie, & Turner, 2008; Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999). Moreover, I propose as the main thesis of this chapter that in the past 70 years, Argentinean leadership has been 'intoxicated with power' (Owen & Davidson, 2009). To support this thesis, I will draw from Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser's (2007) 'toxic triangle' model, which consists of a conductive environment, destructive leaders, and susceptible followers. As antithesis, I will present the model of positive leadership developed by Monzani, Braun, and van Dick (2016) to propose a more positive leadership alternative adjusted to Argentinean context. The main idea behind Monzani et al.'s model is that authentic transformational leadership occurs when three 'spheres of virtue' overlap (i.e., personal, relational and organisational spheres). Thus, by opposing vice with virtue, I hope to give Argentinean leaders new insights on how to break the vicious cycle that keeps Argentina struggling with itself.

In this chapter, I first describe the Argentinean business ecosystem and how it is conductive for corporate Machiavellianism (Marshall, Baden, & Guidi, 2013). Second, I illustrate Argentinean destructive leadership in both public and private organisations. In Argentina, corporate and political life are so entangled that very frequently we find corporate leaders running for office to advance their corporate agenda, or political leaders who rely on frontmen to build conglomerates while in power to retain influence after they leave office (Losada, 2007). I shall adopt a neutral political view to describe the pseudo-transformational behaviours of two former presidents: Carlos Saul Menem and Cristina (Fernandez de) Kirchner and their respective 'frontmen' (Alfredo Yabrán and Lazaro Baez, respectively). Third, I will use insights from 'the romance of leadership' framework (Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985) and Identity Leadership theory (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Steffens et al., 2014) to theorise further about the susceptibility of the Argentinean population to such destructive leadership. I will conclude by applying Monzani et al.'s model of positive leadership to Argentina's business context.

Argentina: A Conductive Environment for Corporate Machiavellianism

'We are doomed to succeed' - Eduardo Duhalde (2009)

Marshall et al.'s (2013) notion of corporate Machiavellianism explains well the collective behaviour of key economic and political actors in the Argentinean context. In short, I define corporate Machiavellianism as the use of unethical means to attain a priori legitimate outcomes such as increasing corporate profits or protecting worker's rights. Corporate Machiavellianism is not limited to business corporations but includes other corporations as well, such as political parties and trade unions. Some examples of corporate Machiavellianism involve firms bribing governmental officials to become state contractors, fiscal evasion or even abusing a dominant market position to impose leonine fees on its customers. Examples of corporate Machiavellianism in trade unions involve using the threat of national strikes to impose a union's unilateral terms in a collective agreement, or even to encourage union members to engage in counterproductive work behaviours (e.g. sabotage, voluntary absenteeism, workplace bullying, or abusive supervision towards non-union members).

Unlike the United States, where the private sector operates with relative independence from the federal government, in several occasions throughout its history, the Argentinean federal government assumed a de facto role in the corporate governance of private firms. Such state interventionism occurred regardless of the government's political orientation, or even whether the government was democratically elected, or rose to power through a *coup d'état*. The latest episode of state interventionism occurred in 2008, as a result of a forced nationalisation of Argentine's private pension funds. Such funds held a significant volume of stock options in Argentina's largest firms as part of their investment portfolio. By seizing control of the pension funds, Cristina Kirchner exploited a legal loophole that enabled her administration to place 'representatives' on these companies' boards. Although per official discourse such representatives were there to hold 'corporate greed' in check, the opposing political factions referred to such representatives as glorified political commissaries with no real leadership expertise. Macroeconomic data for the period 2007-2015 show that this policy of state intromission in Argentinean firms profoundly harmed Argentina's industry and dynamited its business climate. Industrial production rates fell drastically and so did the volume of exported goods (Carmo, 2012). In turn, such reduction in exported goods decreased Argentina's central bank's strategic reserves (USD), unleashing a rampant inflationary spiral that devaluated Argentina's currency, which is still uncontrolled. It is to be noted, however, that Argentina's prior experiments with 'free market' policies (Friedman, 1962) did not result in sustainable growth, nor a spillover of wealth. Whenever unchecked, Argentina's largest firms turn to corporate Machiavellianism to increase their profit margins, at the expense of workers, and even its customers.

Another key difference from the United States, in which worker's unions are relatively independent of each other, is that Argentina's worker representation is centralised in the 'Confederación General del Trabajo' (or *CGT*). The CGT, in theory, exists to coordinate workers' demands across sectors and increase workers' collective bargaining power against management. Although its mandate resembles other national trade unions worldwide, the CGT is a powerful actor in Argentina's political ecosystem, with an agenda that exceeds labour relations and spills over into the political arena (Natalucci, 2015). The CGT's narrative sees this

corporation as 'the backbone' of the Peronist party (i.e. a party originally committed to protecting workers' rights). Ironically, during the past 30 years, the CGT's collective leadership behaviours can be truthfully described as 'lacking a backbone', as CGT's leadership compromised with whomever necessary to protect their selfish interests. For example, in the early 1990s, CGT's leadership forged an alliance with Carlos Menem (1989–1999), a neoliberalist president (Smith, 1991). The CGT remained idle throughout Menem's presidency, taking no collective action against a systematic erosion of workers' quality of work life (Fair, 2008). Similarly, CGT's leadership remained inactive during the positive economic cycle of Nestor Kirchner's term, but became increasingly active during Cristina Kirchner's presidency, when an impoverished administration was unable to appease its demands (Natalucci, 2015).

I posit that the unique context in which Argentinean firms operate, such as the frequent state interventions in private firms and the CGT's political manoeuvring, fosters a transaction-oriented culture (Burns, 1978; Bass & Avolio, 1994). In theory, under a transaction-oriented culture, economic actors (e.g., firm owners) seek to establish rational negotiations with other actors (e.g. workers, trade unions, the federal government) to negotiate the contributions of each actor to a common goal and a fair share of the rewards (Bass, 1985). Although a transactional culture in not a negative thing per se, whenever actors rely on corporate Machiavellianism to maximise their benefits by any means necessary, a climate of mutual mistrust will emerge. Thus, in such a climate of mistrust, organisational leaders (e.g., firm owners) are likely to assume that their followers are lazy, only motivated by rewards, and in need of constant vigilance. Similarly, in this climate of mistrust, workers are likely to assume that management only cares for selfishly seizing 'the surplus value' of their work. Whereas workers need to rely on collective action to protect their interests, if collective action is orchestrated by agencies that rely on corporate Machiavellianism to impose their political agenda, such as the CGT, everybody loses. Workers become a 'means to an end' and organisational leaders must bear unsustainable labour costs, increasing the mistrust between parties. Moreover, throughout Argentinean history, this climate of mistrust between organisational leaders and their followers enabled political leaders to use charisma to polarise such factions (the 'us vs. them' effect). Because such abuse of charisma can result in many different outcomes for their followers and society at large (Howell & Shamir, 2005), in recent years, leadership scholars raised concerns about the importance of distinguishing between positive forms of charismatic leadership (socialised charismatic, authentic transformational) and destructive charismatic leadership (personalised charismatic, pseudo-transformational; Barling et al., 2008; Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999). Although positive leaders utilise charisma to align their interests and their followers, destructive leaders use their charisma to exploit their followers' fears, highlighting ideological differences between actors, increasing their mutual mistrust.

Destructive Leadership in Argentina

Pseudo-transformational leaders use their charisma to impose their will on the followers and advance their self-serving agendas. More precisely, instead of embodying virtuous, pro-social values in their leadership behaviours, most pseudo-transformational leaders share the primary aspiration to become personal idols. Although pseudo-transformational leaders can be extremely inspiring to some of their supporters, such leadership inevitably has destructive consequences for the organisations (or countries) they lead. Thus, by the use of deceit and emotional manipulation, and also fear and intimidation, these pseudo-transformational leaders pursue the satisfaction of selfish needs instead of caring for the needs of the followers, or serving the common good (Barling et al., 2008).

Carlos Saul Menem's presidency (1989–1999) exemplifies well a neoliberal pseudo-transformational leadership. Menem's campaign slogan contained several promises that portrayed him as a messianic leader (Lasso, 2008). Menem invited voters 'to follow him as he would not disappoint' in leading them toward 'a revolution of productivity that significantly increases workers' wages' (Fair, 2008, p. 2). Once Menem rose to power, his administration quickly abandoned such promises and adopted Friedman's (1962) ideas by privatising virtually all state-owned companies, most of which, although extremely inefficient, provided affordable public services to society's marginal sectors (e.g., water, electricity, railroads, telecommunication). Furthermore, Menem's administration invited large multinational corporations to invest in Argentina, promising a de-regularised market with little or no state oversight (Treisman, 2003). During Menem's presidency, corporate Machiavellianism (as defined above) was commonplace in Argentinean private firms. Either by choice or calculated inaction, Menem's leadership allowed both local and multinational organisations to take advantage of Argentina's dire economic context and use it to severely erode workers' labour conditions (e.g., reduction in salaries, undocumented labour contracts, unpaid extra-time). Similarly, instead of using Argentina's strategic reserves to reinforce the local industry and protect it against the rising Asian giants, Menem's foreign trade policies enabled industrial dumping. In short, Menem's presidency was destructive as his calculated inaction led to an economic, political and even social meltdown that reached critical mass in 2001, once Menem had already left office (Carranza, 2005).

Although several Argentinean businessmen illegally benefitted from a 'friendship' with Carlos Saul Menem, Alfredo Yabrán was his biggest ally in Argentina's corporate environment. Yabrán was an obscure businessman whose fortune skyrocketed during Menem's administration. Operating within the shadows, Yabrán acquired many of the publicly owned firms that Menem privatised, such as the national mail system, which earned him the name of 'the postman' among Argentinean businessmen. Anecdotal accounts affirm that he exerted a highly personalised leadership, ruling his holdings through fear and intimidation. For example, the journalist who first exposed Yabrán's image, in an investigative article that denounced his illegal dealings with the state, was found dead shortly after the article was published. Ironically, a few months after Yabrán was declared as the main suspect in the journalist's murder case, Yabrán's body was found dead in very dubious circumstances.

The pseudo-transformational leadership of Cristina (Fernandez de) Kirchner (2007–2011; 2011–2015) is a paradigmatic case of neo-populism (Piva, 2013). Her husband, Nestor Kirchner, rose to power following Argentina's 2001 meltdown and ruled from 2003 to 2007. After his death, Cristina Kirchner followed him in office for the next two terms. Her administration continued and extended her late husband's policies. Both Nestor and Cristina Kirchner's campaign slogan gravitated around 'developing a productive matrix that fosters social inclusion and redistribution of wealth' (Messina, 2012, p. 77). However, the macroeconomic indicators for 2012 (one year after her first term concluded) showed that by the end of Cristina Kirchner's first term (2007–2011), Argentina had a steady increase in inflation and showed clear indicators of declining industrial activity (Trombetta, 2012). In other words, similarly to Carlos Menem, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner did the exact opposite of what they promised voters during their presidential campaign. Instead of fostering an 'inclusive, productive matrix', her administration centralised Argentina's economic activity, illegally benefitting a close group of businessmen, in what was termed by the opposition as 'friend-oriented capitalism'. However, unlike Carlos Menem's manipulative destructive style which minimised open conflict with other actors, Cristina Kirchner's government fostered a narrative of open aggression and hatred against anyone who opposed her world views. Such ideological persecution was executed by both the mainstream media (owned by her close colluders) and state agencies, using the 'us vs. them' effect to polarise the Argentinean society.

As Carlos Menem had, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner had a number of 'aligned' businessmen, but their closest corporate counterpart was Lazaro Baez. As it occurred with Yabrán, Baez's fortune grew exponentially during the different Kirchner administrations, making him one of Argentina's richest men to date. Baez benefitted from numerous construction contracts funded by taxpayers' money, on many of which he never delivered. Again, witness accounts of an on-going investigation state that Baez's destructive style involves using intimidation, threats and coercion towards their competitors, to the extent of forcing them out of business, or even to sell them their firms to him at a vile price per share.

To summarise, although the charisma of both Carlos Menem and Cristina Kirchner were undeniable, so was their destructive effect on the Argentinean society. Instead of using their charm and high levels of popular support to elevate the Argentinean society, both leaders chose to advance their personal agenda. Furthermore, instead of generating a sense of national identity that reconciled two opposing factions as Nelson Mandela did in South Africa (Crossan, Mazutis, Seijts, & Gandz, 2013; Haslam et al., 2011), Cristina Kirchner's legacy is an even more divided, polarised and violent society. Such destructive leadership deeply affected Argentinean organisational life. The disregard for the law of both Menem

and Kirchner and their colluders placed firm owners and organisational leaders between a 'rock and a hard place'; to survive in such a toxic business ecosystem, large numbers of otherwise honest firm owners had to either choose to 'play ball' or choose to go out of business.

Argentineans as Susceptible Followers

Padilla et al. (2007) distinguish two types of susceptible followers, *con-formers* and *colluders*. Conformers comply with destructive leaders out of fear or necessity, whereas the colluders actively participate in their leaders' destructive agenda. These two categories describe well the behavioural style of a vast number of the Argentinean population whenever a destructive leader was in power.

The three elements that characterise *conformers* are unmet basic needs, negative self-evaluations and psychological immaturity (Padilla et al., 2007). Unfortunately, before, during and after both Menem's and Kirchner's administration, a large majority of the Argentinean population remained under the poverty line, which means living with unmet basic needs on a permanent basis (i.e., high situational constraints, Becker, 1960). Living and growing in such a context of poverty will most likely result in negative core self-evaluations (Judge, Locke, Durham, & Kluger, 1998). Thus, instead of demanding veritable work opportunities, many Argentinean citizens settled with receiving material rewards (e.g., unemployment benefit plans) in exchange for their vote (an illegal form of vote buying, or clientelism; Brusco, Nazareno, & Stokes, 2004). For example, because the 1989 hyperinflation crisis devastated Argentina's poor and middle-class wealth, these sectors were thrilled to turn a blind eye to Menem's corrupt administration, as long as they enjoyed the spoils of an artificial, unsustainable exchange rate. Ten years later, a favourable global context for commodities allowed Kirchner's administration to implement welfare policies aimed at the most vulnerable sectors of Argentinean society (Pérez & Natalucci, 2010). Argentinean conformers showed their low maturity by entering a spending spree, drawing heavily on credit to live above their means, without considering the severe deprivation that the Argentinean society suffered as a result of both 1989 hyperinflation and the 2001 meltdowns. Although the government maintained

an artificially low US dollar, or provided unsustainable and dubious welfare benefits, conformers disengaged from the undeniably unethical behaviours of their pseudo-transformational leaders, providing enough leeway for corporate Machiavellianism to emerge.

Padilla et al. (2007) describe the *colluders* as selfish, ambitious, and also committed to the values and world views of their destructive leaders. As followers, the colluders are much more destructive than conformers, because whereas conformers only passively suffer their destructive leaders, the colluders take action to advance their leaders' agenda. Regarding ambition, during their time in power, Carlos Menem and Cristina Kirchner were surrounded by several colluders who profited significantly from the widespread corruption that characterised these two leaders' administrations. Some examples of Menem's colluders involve former ministers Jose Luis Manzano (Economy), Carlos Vladimiro Corach (Chief of staff) and Alfredo Yabrán as the main laundering agent. Similarly, examples of Kirchner's colluders involve former ministers Alex Kiciloff (Economy), Anibal Fernandez (Chief of staff), and Lazaro Baez as the main laundering agent. A distinctive trait of Kirchner's colluders was the elevated degree of aggression towards opposing factions, best embodied individually by her minister of Commerce, Guillermo Moreno, and socially by some of the social movements aligned with her administration. Not surprisingly, the colluders tend to derail alongside their destructive leaders. For example, when Menem lost power, his control over Argentine's supreme court weakened (Carrio, 2001). As a result, several previously blocked investigations could move forward, eventually finding several of Menem's colluders guilty of abusing taxpayers' money, awarding public contracts to 'friendly' organisations and illegally selling weapons to Ecuador, in a clear violation of a United Nations (UN) resolution. A decade later, Argentina's Federal Justice is investigating Cristina Kirchner and all the colluders mentioned above for almost the same charges for which Menem and his functionaries were sentenced (excluding the arms deals with Ecuador).

Despite the above accounts, the 'toxic triangle model' seems insufficient to explain why Menem's and Cristina Kirchner's conformers remained so loyal and obedient. I believe that such blind obedience could majorly result from what Meindl et al. (1985) termed as 'the romance of leadership'. In short, the 'romance of leadership' is a strong and irrational

follower fascination with their charismatic leader, which in many aspects resembles the infatuation stage at the beginning of a romantic relationship. When this phenomenon occurs, the followers tend to idealise their leaders and ignore their shortcomings, even when presented with clear evidence to the contrary (Monzani, Ripoll & Peiro, 2012). Similarly, empirical studies regarding the social identity model of leadership (SIMOL; Hogg, 2001) showed that when a leader is seen by the group that he or she leads as representing, embodying and advancing the shared unique characteristics of such group, the group members will empower their leaders giving them a certain amount of leeway. Some examples of such leeway include being more tolerant when a leader fails to deliver on their promises (Giessner & van Knippenberg, 2008) or acute breaches of procedural justice (Ullrich, Christ, & van Dick, 2009). I propose that leaders with dubious moral standards, such as pseudo-transformational leaders, will abuse such empowerment and use them to advance their selfish agendas, which most likely will result in hubristic leadership behaviours (Owen & Davidson, 2009) and their downfall. Thus, I posit that when theorising about what leadership looks like in the Argentinean context, the effect of leaders' 'identity work' in their followers (Haslam et al., 2011) should be taken into consideration alongside leaders' authenticity.

Rethinking Authentic Transformational Leadership for the Argentinean Context

If there is a victory in overcoming the enemy, there is a greater victory when a man overcomes himself. Jose de San Martin (1778–1850)

As Hofstede (1980) noted, when the context in which theory is applied differs drastically from where it was formulated, some adjustment is due. Thus, to 'calibrate' current leadership theories to the Argentinean context, I introduce Monzani et al.'s (2016) model of positive leadership (see Fig. 5.1). This model integrates authentic leadership with other leadership approaches such as leader–member exchange (LMX) and SIMOL (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Hogg, 2001), giving more importance to the followers and context (Haslam et al., 2011).




Fig. 5.1 Monzani et al. (2016) model of positive leadership

The first concern of authentic transformational leaders should be to reshape three connected *spheres of virtue* (Monzani et al., 2016). These three spheres are the counterpoint to Padilla et al.'s (2007) toxic triangle, mainly authentic leaders, eudaemonic organisations, and self-determined followers. The main outcome of such positive leadership should be a more virtuous corporate governance (Monzani, Cameron, Crossan, & Wright, 2015). It is to be noted that this model seeks to explain positive organisational leadership and was not designed for political leadership. However, future scholars could extend Monzani et al.'s (2016) positive leadership model to the societal level.

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The first sphere of virtue refers to leaders, and it contains (but is not limited to) leader's virtuous characteristics. For example, unlike pseudotransformational leaders, authentic transformational leaders are selfless and therefore use their idealised influence to mobilise followers towards pro-social goals aimed at ensuring the common good of the multiple stakeholders that compose an organisation (e.g. shareholders, employees, customers and society; Davis et al., 1997). Instead of trying to become idols in their followers' eyes, authentic transformational leaders focus on developing their close collaborators to bring the best out of them and prepare them to become leaders in the future (Gardner, Avolio, Luthans, May, & Walumbwa, 2005). As suggested by LMX theory (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995), such growth-enhancing relations should not only impact the followers positively but also the leaders (Ilies, Morgeson, & Nahrgang, 2005). For example, some evidence suggests that authentic transformational leadership leads to reduced leaders' work stress and higher satisfaction in the action of leading others (Lopez & Ramos, 2015). Finally, as suggested by Sosik (2006), adopting an authentic transformational leadership style may be a pathway to the development of leader character (Crossan, Gandz, & Seijts, 2012) and its associated organisational performance outcomes (Seijts, Gandz, Crossan, & Reno, 2015).

The second sphere of virtue contains (but is not limited to) those employee's individual characteristics that foster employees' constructive work outcomes (e.g., attitudes and behaviours). For example, trait authenticity (i.e., a psychological state expressing ownership of one's actions and thoughts; Kernis, 2003) positively relates to employee's self-determined behaviours (Ryan & Deci, 2001), such as employee voice (Knoll & Van Dick, 2013). Because authenticity evidences optimal levels of self-esteem, unlike the conformers, the authentic followers do not depend on their leaders to feel good about themselves or satisfy their needs. The authentic followers voluntarily trust and comply with their authentic transformational leaders, because they agree with the leaders' values, respect their ability, and acknowledge their benevolence (Burke, Sims, Lazzara, & Salas, 2007). Hence, whenever the leader no longer represents, nor acts in coherence with the values of the authentic followers, the followers can consciously choose not to comply. In this way, power flows first from the followers to the leader (and not vice versa) and returns to them if the leader no longer represents their collective interests. Furthermore, cultivating authenticity through self-awareness

and reflection prevents the followers from becoming susceptible to destructive leaders. Authentic followership is then an essential element of the checks and balances that should exist in any organisation, even when allegedly authentic transformational leaders are in charge. As Lord Acton stated, the exercise of power corrupts (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015), and not all leaders may possess the necessary strength of character to resist such temptation (Sturm & Monzani, in press). If the leaders succumb, it is up to the authentic followers to courageously 'speak truth to power' (Hsiung, 2011; Liu, Liao, & Wei, 2015) and refuse to conform to their pseudo-transformational leaders' agenda.

The third sphere of virtue 'Organisation' comprises organisationallevel constructs, both human and non-human. Among the human elements, I include a participative organisational culture (Morrison, 2012) and an overall positive work climate (Walumbwa, Avolio, Gardner, Wernsing, & Peterson, 2007) at different levels of the organisational hierarchy. Instead, I delimit as non-human factors those structural elements that ensure an adequate corporate governance, such as just policies and fair practices. As the non-human element of this model, a comprehensive body of fair policies and practices are essential to ensure that the organisation has mechanisms to prevent the rise of pseudo-transformational leaders, or that good leaders 'break bad' as result of their followers' conformity. Similarly, a just and fair system may prevent the followers from unethically advancing a pseudo-transformational agenda.

Our model also suggests that intersecting spaces connect these three spheres. For example, the organisational sphere of virtue connects with the employee and leader spheres of virtue through its culture and the values (and rewards) that an organisation holds as important. In most organisations, values permeate day-to-day operations so that managers and employees at all levels of the organisation can easily connect and identify with them. The leader sphere of virtue also connects with both the employee and the organisation spheres of virtue, because authentic transformational leaders can not only reshape organisational culture and values but also trigger the followers' authenticity through exemplary role modelling (Leroy, Anseel, Gardner, & Sels, 2015). Finally, the center space overlapping of all three spheres of virtue contains group-specific phenomena that foster excellent team performance (Cameron & Levine, 2006). Some examples are team identification (Riketta & Van Dick, 2005), psychological safety climate (Edmondson, 1999) and a climate for authenticity (Grandey, Foo, Groth, & Goodwin, 2012) understood as a work atmosphere that enables employees to self-express by 'speaking truth to power.' In short, a climate for authenticity allows the followers to raise concerns safely to their supervisors without the fear of a backlash, or negative personal or professional consequences.

Emerging empirical evidence partially supports the proposed positive leadership model. On one hand, laboratory data show that the authentic leaders can self-regulate their behaviour to complement shortcomings in their followers' individual differences and help them attain a more authentic way of functioning by activating their autotelic traits (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). A laboratory experiment showed that if leaders adopt an authentic feedback style instead of a transactional style, they can significantly increase their followers' performance and satisfaction, especially for those low in conscientiousness or emotional stability (Monzani, Ripoll, & Peiro, 2014b). Regarding attitudes, two complementary studies to the above reported that positive leader practices can elicit positive follower attitudes. For example, authentic leadership elicits a higher loyalty in the followers than transactional leadership, especially if the followers are less agreeable and extroverted (Monzani, Ripoll, & Peiro, 2014a). Similarly, if leaders adjust their goal setting type (directive vs. participative), they can increase their followers' trust in leadership (Monzani, Ripoll, & Peiro, 2015). Although these studies were conducted in Spain (and not in Argentina), both countries share profound cultural similarities, as Argentina was a former Spanish colony.

On the other hand, in a series of field experiments, authentic leadership influenced both the leaders' self-reported attitudes (organisational identification; Monzani, Hernandez Bark, van Dick, & Peiró, 2015) and the followers' behaviours toward the collective in which they belong (e.g., exit, neglect, loyalty; Farrell, 1983; Hirschman, 1970). Such findings are important for this work, because when individuals identify strongly with their organisations, their sense of organisational membership becomes a valued aspect of their self-concept (Van Dick, 2001). For example, when authentic leadership was combined with the follower's organisational identification, it negatively predicted withdrawal behaviours (see Monzani et al., 2016 for a detailed discussion of these findings). Unlike the prior studies, these field experiment studies were conducted in Germany, so it is unclear whether the results will generalise to the Argentinean context. Undoubtedly, more future empirical research is needed to replicate and extend these findings within an Argentinean organisational setting.

Extending Monzani's et al. (2016) Model into the Political Arena

Finding political leaders who can evidence strength of character and virtuous behaviours within the Argentinean context is extremely difficult, but not impossible. For example, many historians (national and foreign) agree that José de San Martín, one of Argentina's founding fathers, was an authentic transformational leader. His positive influence not only gave Argentina its freedom but also spread throughout Latin America, to earn him the name of 'The liberator of America' (Lynch, 2009). San Martin evidenced character strengths such as transcendence, courage, and drive, and also temperance, humanity and humility throughout, and after the Argentinean independence war (Lynch, 2009). More important for this work is that the integrity of San Martin has stood the test of time, as he managed to deal with the political intrigues of his time and overcome multiple situational pressures, either inside the field of battle or outside it. Hopefully, the rediscovery of Argentina's exemplar leader might inspire future political leaders to put the common good of the nation first, and remember they are only stewards of the res publica (the public goods of a nation). In the Argentinean political ecosystem, we would expect to find courageous followers in Argentina's legislative bodies (the Congress and the Senate), as the Congress is seen by politicians at best as a platform to jump into the executive branch. Therefore, to act with virtue, the legislators of a given party should show courage and integrity, 'speaking truth to power', providing advice or eventually halting the selfish agenda of a destructive leader in the executive office. Within a true democratic and republican nation, as Argentina claims to be, such legislative representatives should have some protection to do so. Similarly, an independent judicial system is paramount to ensure that the legislative branch does not collude with the executive branch. Finally, the Argentinean population needs to embrace a culture of democratic participation, where divergent thought is tolerated, analysed, and respectfully discussed.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored the vicious cycle that has entrapped Argentina for 200 years. I applied Padilla et al.'s (2007) toxic triangle model to illustrate how an environment tainted by corporate Machiavellianism, pseudo-transformational leadership, and both conforming and colluding followers kept Argentina from reaching its full potential as a nation. Although my theorising was targeted at the Argentinean context, I believe that Argentina is a paradigmatic case which may very well generalise into many other countries in which destructive leadership, under the mask of populism, is on the rise. In the second part, I presented a theoretical framework based on Monzani et al.'s (2016) model of positive leadership and extended it to the political arena. The positive leadership model results from connecting three spheres of virtue (authentic leaders, selfdetermined followers and ethical corporate governance). I concluded the chapter by presenting empirical evidence that partially supports the model. However, more research is needed to test the model in an Argentinean context. Hopefully, this model will contribute to the structuring of empirical research so that it meaningfully advances the conversation about Argentinean leadership; a discussion that Argentineans owe to themselves to flourish as a modern society.

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