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## Securitisation in the Gas Sector: Energy Security Debates Concerning the Example of the Nord Stream Pipeline

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### 1 Introduction

This chapter compares the securitisation of transnational infrastructures in Germany and Poland through the example of the Nord Stream gas pipeline. The pipeline allows for direct natural gas deliveries from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea, bypassing the traditional transit countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland among them. Thus, its construction is one of the most controversial energy issues in German-Polish relations. It has caused an emotional debate about energy security in Poland and moved an economic infrastructure project into the realms

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of international politics—in the case of transnational gas pipelines, actions by one country are seen as a direct threat by the other. That is why Radosław Sikorski, defence minister of Poland from 2005 to 2007, linked the German-Russian pipeline agreement to the Ribbentrop-Molotov (Hitler-Stalin) Pact.<sup>1</sup>

Scrutinising the national debates about the Nord Stream pipeline, the chapter examines what kind of security debates have taken place, what risk/threat perceptions exist, and what kind of counter-measures have been proposed in Poland and Germany. Since discussions of energy security often move energy policy issues into the realms of strategic national politics, they carry the potential to securitise relations between the countries involved.

The chapter is structured as follows: after a brief description of the Nord Stream pipeline, the methodological approach of the analysis is presented. Then the Polish and German debates about the Nord Stream pipeline are analysed in detail. In a conclusion, the two national debates are compared and linked back to securitisation theory.

## 2 The Nord Stream Pipeline<sup>2</sup>

The construction of a wide gas pipeline network in the second half of the 1960s enabled the Soviet Union to become the world's largest exporter of natural gas. The centrepieces of this pipeline grid were the pipelines, 'Brotherhood' and 'Northern Lights', which connect Russia with Central Eastern Europe running through Ukraine and Belarus. These export pipelines were complemented by the Yamal-Europe pipeline which was opened in the late 1990s and was built through Belarus and Poland to Germany. However, plans for a second line of the Yamal pipeline (Yamal II) to double its capacity never materialised.

After repeated and protracted conflicts with transit countries on the territory of the former Soviet Union, especially with Ukraine in 2005–2006, 2009 and 2014–2015, which resulted in disruptions of Russian gas supplies to European customers, the diversification of export routes became an important part of Russia's natural gas export strategy.

The first Russian export pipeline to Western Europe which avoids transit countries is the Nord Stream pipeline. This 1,200-kilometre-long pipeline, consisting of two lines with a total capacity of 55 billion cubic metres per year, runs from the Russian town of Vyborg below the Baltic Sea to Ludmin, near Greifswald in Germany. The construction agreement between Gazprom, which, since 2006, has held a legal monopoly on Russian gas exports, and its German partners E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF, was signed in September 2005 with the explicit support of the German and Russian governments. Fierce criticism of the Nord Stream project was voiced primarily by Poland and, to varying extents, by the Baltic States which saw their energy security threatened by a pipeline that would bypass them. Sweden cited concerns for the ecology of the Baltic Sea as major reason for its opposition.<sup>3</sup>

The pipeline began operating at the end of 2011. However, due to the European Union's (EU) legal requirements (i.e., the Third Energy Package) Nord Stream has so far not been able to use its full capacity. This is because the connecting pipelines in Germany are subject to the EU's third-party access regulations. According to these regulations, which apply to the telecommunication, electricity, and natural gas sectors, production and transport have to be controlled by separate companies on EU territory. For gas pipelines, this means that 50 per cent of the pipelines' capacities have to be made available to competitors. As a result, only half of Nord Stream's capacity could be used in its first year of operation. After a second connecting pipeline was opened in November 2013, Nord Stream was able to increase its utilisation to 36 billion cubic metres per year, that is, two-thirds of its capacity.<sup>4</sup>

### 3 Operationalisation: Analysing Pipeline Debates

The analysis of the German and Polish debates about Nord Stream is based on a revised version of the securitisation theory developed by the Copenhagen School (see Chap. 2), which brings together debates about security with actual decision-making processes and postulates that a

state's perception of security threats—including energy security—is an intersubjective construction by key actors. Accordingly, the analysis focuses on debates of key actors—namely, political elites and the mass media (as proxies for the public debate). Additionally, the concepts of 'riskification' and 'security jargon' have been applied.

As outlined in Chap. 2, any securitising move (i.e., the appeal to 'security' based on threat) requires an existential threat, a referent object that is threatened, and the proposition of extraordinary measures to save the referent object (i.e., a plan to defend). These three elements are essential to identifying a securitising move and distinguishing it from 'riskification' or 'security jargon'.

'Riskification' refers to 'security' based on risk; therefore, it requires a risk, a referent object at risk, and precautionary measures (i.e., a plan to govern). 'Security jargon' refers to 'security' based on (no clear) existential risk or threat and proposes no precautionary or extraordinary measures (i.e., no plan of action).

In this context, the analysis focuses on the perception of the Nord Stream project in German and Polish debates about energy security. For the period from 2004 to 2014, German and Polish press reporting and parliamentary debates regarding the perceived risks and threats related to the Nord Stream gas pipeline have been examined, using a software-based but non-automated quantitative and qualitative content analysis. As the focus is on national public debates, only mass media with nationwide coverage addressing a national audience in the respective countries were included. The analysis has been restricted to quality print media because these outlets provide (potentially) a regular and more substantiated coverage. For both countries, the selection includes the most popular print media and the most important media for the major political camps. All articles with any meaningful reference to the topic and with a reference to energy security were included, based on multiple searches in electronic databases.

In order to identify the positions of important political actors, debates and inquiries in the German and Polish parliaments related to the Nord Stream pipeline have been analysed based on searches in the online archives of both parliaments, using the same technique as with media reporting.<sup>5</sup>

## 4 The Polish Debate About Nord Stream

In Poland, the discussion of the Nord Stream pipeline—in the media as well as in parliament and across party lines—has been overwhelmingly negative. Nord Stream is seen as politically motivated and a threat to Poland's energy security. It has been argued that Russia would be able to interrupt gas deliveries to Poland, without harming Germany and other West European consumer countries, as soon as the pipeline construction is finished. Additionally, the construction of Nord Stream would result in environmental damage, in a loss of transit fees for Russian gas presently transported through Poland via the Yamal-Europe pipeline, and in the blockage of the harbour entrance in Świnoujście for larger vessels (which in turn would hamper Poland's diversification of energy supplies through the import of liquefied natural gas, LNG).

There has been a remarkably large debate in the Polish parliament (resulting in 118 documents included in this analysis).<sup>6</sup> The main risks or threats linked directly to the pipeline were mostly of an economic nature (61 documents) followed by political risks (50 documents). Technical risks related to the potential blockage of the harbour entrance in Świnoujście were mentioned in 42 documents, while environmental risks were mentioned in 40 documents (see Table 3.4).

However, of these 118 documents, only four include a full securitising move (i.e., can be considered a securitisation in the sense of the theory laid out in Chap. 2), while 47 documents qualify as 'riskification' and the majority of 67 documents fall into the category of 'security jargon'. Thus, the majority of documents detail the risk/threat caused by the Nord Stream pipeline but do not propose any counter-measures to mitigate the assumed negative effects (see Table 3.3).

The key arguments made can be illustrated by the following quotes:

The realization of these plans means for Poland the omission of the construction of the Yamal II pipeline [through Poland], the loss of transit fees and, therefore, the deterioration of its economic position. Additionally, it would block the construction of a gas pipeline between Poland and Norway and, thereby, hinder a diversification of gas supplies. Experts point to

serious obstacles with intersecting underwater pipeline. (Deputy Adam Stanisław Szejnfeld, PO)<sup>7</sup>

The majority of public opinion in our country considers this investment an attempt by Russia to increase its influence in Central Eastern Europe. This opinion is shared by our current Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, who compared the construction with the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. [...] In my opinion, there is a real danger that after the Baltic Sea pipeline is finished Poland will be pressured by Russia. The gas conflicts between Ukraine and Russia are evidence that such blackmail is possible. (Deputy Jarosław Jagiełło, PiS)<sup>8</sup>

I want to remind you that the gas pact between Moscow and Berlin is not the first agreement in the history of these capitals that ignored Poland and that was against Polish interests. The Baltic Sea pipeline which connects Russia directly with Germany bypassing Poland is a political decision with strategic consequences for Poland. [...] Has the minister not heard of the economization of Russia's foreign policy, reaching its political goals by utilizing resource dependence? The Russians admit openly that gas transit has a political dimension, even a strategic one. If the construction of the Baltic Sea pipeline would be a purely economic investment, why would the investors be willing to pay four times the amount needed for the construction of the Yamal II pipeline? (Deputy Elżbieta Kruk, PiS)<sup>9</sup>

However, these documents—while stating the risk/threat caused by the Nord Stream pipeline—do not propose any counter-measures to mitigate the assumed negative effects. Thus, they can only be considered ‘security jargon’.

A ‘riskification’, on the other hand, has to propose a counter-measure to the risks/threats caused by the Nord Stream pipeline, such as the diversification of gas supplies:

We have to make a political decision of strategic importance. The Baltic Sea pipeline [...] connects Russia directly with Germany. Its construction harms our energy security; it also harms the energy security of Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Czech Republic and Slovakia and – considering the environmental damage – of Estonia, Sweden and Denmark. [...] Poland

needs Russian gas as well as a sensible diversification of supplies. We do not have an aversion against Russia but common sense requires us to diversify our suppliers. Energy security is one of the most elementary goals of any state. Thus, it is also a priority for the European Union. (Deputy of the European Parliament, Bogusław Sonik, PO)<sup>10</sup>

Another counter-measure would be an alternative pipeline for Russian gas to Europe:

For a proper judgment of the [Nord Stream, AH] pipeline project other factors are also important to consider: the risk of an ecological disaster [...] and the risk to the emerging common European gas market. The [Polish, AH] government considers at the moment a feasibility study for the Amber pipeline project in cooperation with the Baltic States and maybe with Germany. The feasibility study will be able to demonstrate the advantages of an onshore pipeline while highlighting the disadvantages of an offshore pipeline. (Under-secretary in the Ministry of Economy, Eugeniusz Postolski)<sup>11</sup>

Under-Secretary Postolski cites risks to the environment and the common European gas market caused by the Nord Stream pipeline and proposes a feasibility study which should convince the involved parties of the advantages of an onshore pipeline through Poland (i.e., the Amber project).

One of the few examples of a securitising move is the speech of the Deputies, Czesław Hoc and Joachim Brudziński (PiS) from early 2008. However, it makes only an implicit reference to counter-measures in the form of a supply diversification.

The realization of the Nord Stream project involves a range of negative consequences for the Republic of Poland [...]. The most important ones are: (1) A substantial degradation of Poland's energy security, (2) a high risk of an ecological catastrophe in the entire Baltic Sea, (3) a limitation of maritime traffic for Polish civilian and military vessels during the construction and operation of the pipeline, including chiefly the limitation of the fishing area [...]. [...] Considering Poland's energy security the construction

of the Nord Stream pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic Sea bypassing Polish territory is a fundamental threat to the Polish *raison d'état* and the Polish state. Any participation of Poland in its construction in any form is completely unacceptable. It is the strategic aim of the Russian Federation and the German companies to force Poland to participate in the realisation of the Nord Stream project and/or accompanying investments. The Russian Federation, majority owner of Gazprom, which is a key instrument of Russian foreign policy, aims to increase Poland's and other countries' dependency on Russian energy resources. The German companies aim to connect the Polish key energy consumers to their energy supply network on their terms. [...] In this context, it has to be resolutely stressed that any hint by the Polish government to receive any additional gas supplies from Russia, especially via the Nord Stream pipeline, is a critical threat for a successful diversification of Poland's gas supplies. (Deputies Czesław Hoc and Joachim Brudziński, PiS)<sup>12</sup>

A similarly large debate occurred in the Polish media (a total of 102 documents). In the media, the perception of the Nord Stream pipeline is as negative as in the Polish Sejm, with references to political risks (60 documents) followed by economic (45 documents), environmental (28 documents), and technical risks (14 documents). Table 3.4 provides an overview of the figures.

Nevertheless, of these 102 documents, none can be considered a securitisation in the sense of the theory laid out in Chap. 2; 71 documents can be considered a 'riskification', while 31 documents fall into the category of 'security jargon' (Table 3.3).

Although the Polish media corpus is dominated by 'riskification', insightful discussion is scarce. Only a few documents in the Polish media reporting include a discussion which puts Polish risk/threat perceptions into perspective or demands changes in Poland's diplomatic efforts in order to avert the pipeline's construction.

As the Swedish press announced the government will shortly approve the construction of the German-Russian gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea. [...] The Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb said [...] that if there are no serious environmental obstacles (which he does not expect) his government would too approve of the pipeline construction. Such result was to be expected from the beginning. The Baltic Sea pipeline does doubt-



lessly hurt our economic interests. But the maritime law of 1982 ensures not only the freedom of passage by ship and plane but also the freedom to lay subsea cables and pipeline. Aspects of environmental protection might limit these freedoms but in such cases only a redirection of the pipeline route would be necessary. The Nord Stream AG expressed its willingness to such redirections and on many occasions such changes have already been made. In Poland, as well as in Scandinavia, opposition to the pipeline has focused mainly on environmental aspects. However, we have often not been credible in our opposition. In an ecological seminar in Helsinki a high-ranking representative of the Polish environmental administration shocked the audience by claiming that the consequences of the pipeline construction would be worse than that of the explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima. (*Polityka* 2009)<sup>13</sup>

Another example is an article by Sławomir Debski, director of the Research and Analysis Office at the Polish Institute for International Affairs (Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, PISM):

Russia views Germany as its most important partner in Europe. The successful conclusion of the Russo-German contract for building the Nord Stream gas pipeline has emboldened the Russians so much that they intensified their efforts to pour sand into the gears of European integration and to break up European unity. This is promoted by offers to grant to Germany the status of Russia's privileged economic partner, especially with regard to the extraction and deliveries of fossil fuels. For the time being, offers of this kind produce effects contrary to those intended, by making Germany more wary in its contacts with Moscow. That is because the Germans would never risk enfeebling the European Union in return for the mirage of economic privileges touted by a partner with a dubious reputation who does not respect agreements. (*Gazeta Wyborcza* 2007)<sup>14</sup>

## 4.1 Applying Securitisation Theory to the Polish Debate

### *What Kind of Security Debate?*

In the Polish debate, there were only four securitising moves, all of which occurred in the Sejm. However, the debate in the Polish parliament is

dominated by ‘security jargon’, as the largest portion of the documents fall into this category (67 out of 118 documents, or 56.8 per cent); ‘riskification’ occurs in 39.8 per cent of the documents (47 out of 118). The situation is reversed in the Polish media; here, ‘security jargon’ accounts for only 30.4 per cent of the documents (31 out of 102), while ‘riskification’ dominates with 69.6 per cent of the analysed documents (71 out of 102).

Overall, the Polish debate is rather evenly split between ‘security jargon’ (45.0 per cent) and ‘riskification’ (53.6 per cent).

#### *What Kind of Risk/Threat Perception?*

In both parliament and media, the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline is viewed as an entirely negative development. While the Sejm considers the main risks or threats linked directly to the pipeline to be mostly of an economic nature (61 out of 118 documents, 71.7 per cent) followed by political risks (50 documents, 42.4 per cent), in the Polish media, political risks dominate the discussion (60 out of 102 documents, 58.8 per cent) followed by economic risks (45 documents, 44.1 per cent) (see Table 3.4).

In the Sejm, technical risks related to the potential blockage of the harbour entrance in Świnoujście were mentioned in 42 documents (35.6 per cent), while environmental risks were mentioned in 40 documents (33.9 per cent). In Polish media reporting, environmental risks are mentioned in 28 documents (27.5 per cent) and technical risks in 14 documents (13.7 per cent).

Overall, the Sejm considers the main risks or threats to be mostly of an economic nature, while, in the Polish media, political risks dominate the discussion. Both corpora show similar proportions for environmental risks; however, technical risks are much more prominent in the debate in the Sejm.

#### *What Kind of Counter-Measures?*<sup>15</sup>

Overall, the Nord Stream debate in the Polish Sejm has been rather short on counter-measures, reflected in the dominance of ‘security jargon’.

Both corpora rank the counter-measure, ‘new pipelines/ transit route’ first, with 25.5 per cent of the parliamentary documents and 31.0 per cent of the media documents mentioning this option. While the Polish media place ‘supply diversification’ as the second most frequently mentioned counter-measure (26.8 per cent of the documents), the Sejm cited the ‘deepening of the pipeline’ (23.5 per cent) more often than ‘supply diversification’ (15.9 per cent) (see Table 3.1).

**Table 3.1** Counter-measures proposed in Poland with a positive or neutral attitude (number of documents and ratio)

Sejm (51)		Polish Media (71)	
New pipelines/transit route	13 (25.5%)	New pipelines/transit routes	22 (31.0%)
Deepening of pipeline	12 (23.5%)	Supply diversification	19 (26.8%)
Supply diversification	8 (15.9%)	Connection to Nord Stream	16 (22.5%)
Legal processes and mechanisms/contracts	6 (11.8%)	LNG	14 (19.7%)
Common European energy policy	4 (7.8%)	Common European energy policy	12 (16.9%)
LNG	4 (7.8%)	Grid integration	9 (12.7%)
Connection to Nord Stream	2 (3.9%)	Deepening of pipeline	4 (5.6%)
Use of alternative energies	2 (3.9%)	Nuclear energy	3 (4.2%)
Market mechanisms/third EU energy package	1 (2.0%)	Clean coal technology	2 (2.8%)
Grid integration	1 (2.0%)	Development of existing gas transit network	2 (2.8%)
Cooperation with other countries/joint oppositional front	1 (2.0%)	Legal processes and mechanisms/contracts	2 (2.8%)
Clean coal technology	1 (2.0%)	Use of alternative energies	2 (2.8%)
Storage	1 (2.0%)	Energy saving	1 (1.4%)
Surveying of the Baltic Sea	1 (2.0%)	Market mechanisms/third EU energy package	1 (1.4%)
		Shale gas	1 (1.4%)
		Public supervision of Nord Stream construction	1 (1.4%)
		Common investment decisions within the EU	1 (1.4%)

However, the deepening of the Nord Stream pipeline at the harbour entrance in Świnoujście can be considered a necessary means of supply diversification (as it enables the import of LNG via larger vessels and the construction of a pipeline from Scandinavia). Therefore, these two counter-measures might be combined, amounting to 39.4 per cent of the parliamentary documents. For the media, that would result in a total of 32.4 per cent (even though the media did not consider technical risks very important).

In the Polish media, the 'connection to Nord Stream' is mentioned by 16 documents (22.5 per cent); on the one hand, in interviews with foreign politicians or businessmen, and on the other, in discussions about a solution for the perceived threat that Russia might interrupt gas supplies to Poland via the 'Brotherhood' or 'Yamal' pipelines.

In fourth place comes 'legal procedures and mechanisms/ contracts' against the construction of Nord Stream in the Sejm and the import of LNG in the media reporting.

In both corpora, the counter-measure 'common European energy policy' is ranked fifth. However, there are significant differences within the Polish discourse regarding cooperation on an EU level: while, in the Sejm, this counter-measure was mentioned in 7.8 per cent of the parliamentary documents, it occurred in 16.9 per cent of the media reporting. Thus, the Sejm does not consider 'common European energy policy' a suitable remedy against the Nord Stream pipeline. If the counter-measure, 'common European energy policy', is combined with the measures 'grid integration' (i.e., the integration of the European pipeline grid with interconnectors in order to allow for gas transportation across all EU member states with the exception of Malta) and 'market mechanism/ third EU energy package' (i.e., reliance on market mechanisms and increased competition within the EU in order to enhance energy security), the picture becomes even more skewed: cooperation on energy policy at the EU level was mentioned in only 11.8 per cent of the parliamentary documents, while these combined counter-measures cropped up in 32.4 per cent of the media reporting.

Cooperation with other countries is only mentioned with respect to opponents of the Nord Stream pipeline within the EU but not in connection to Germany and other countries benefiting from the Nord Stream pipeline.

## 5 The German Debate About Nord Stream

The discussion in Germany has been more positive towards the Nord Stream pipeline which has often been presented as an alternative transport route that avoids transit countries and, therefore, enhances Germany's energy security. Dissenting voices in the German debate point to the environmental risks involved in the pipeline's construction, the harm to relations with Poland and the Baltic States, which strongly oppose the pipeline, and the increasing dependence on Russian gas deliveries.

In the German parliament, there was only a minor discussion about the Nord Stream pipeline (leading to a total of 25 documents relevant for our analysis). Overall, as Table 3.4 shows, in German parliamentary debates, environmental risks (directly linked to the Nord Stream pipeline) and political risks were mentioned in eight documents, respectively, followed by economic (four documents) and technical risks (one document).

However, of these 25 documents, none includes a securitising move (i.e., can be considered a securitisation in the sense of the theory laid out in Chap. 2). Twenty-one can be considered a 'riskification', while four documents fall within the category of 'security jargon' (see Table 3.3).

The respective government coalitions (no matter which parties were involved), as well as parts of the opposition, were mostly in favour of the pipeline. The following examples of 'riskification' cite unreliable transit countries as the main reason for their positive view of the Nord Stream pipeline which is considered a counter-measure to this risk:

The dependency [on gas supplies from Russia, AH] will probably rise to more than 40 per cent. The import dependency for natural gas in the European Union is currently 57 per cent (from countries outside the EU) and it is expected to increase to more than 70 per cent. However, the

dependency from Russia is not problematic for Europe or Germany, respectively; it is a problem that 80 per cent of the gas is transported through pipelines crossing Ukraine. Thus, we will be constantly involved in the unresolved conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and so at risk of being held hostage every winter. As an alternative there are two additional pipelines [...]: on the one hand, the Nabucco pipeline carrying Caspian gas to Europe and, on the other, the Baltic Sea pipeline. It would be desirable if not only former statesmen would support these projects but also if Europe and the German government would foster these projects more strongly. (Deputy Manfred Grund, CDU/CSU)<sup>16</sup>

[...] around 80 per cent of the European natural gas imports are transported through Ukraine. Even after the completion of the Baltic Sea pipeline 'Nord Stream' this amount will only be reduced to 66 per cent. [...] The German Bundestag requests the government to: [...] (9) foster cooperation in energy issues among EU countries more strongly than before. The aim of a European energy community should not only include the setting of international standards but also coordinated reactions to supply interruptions. It is necessary to develop European standards for the storage of oil and especially gas reserves in order to initiate solidarity measures to protect all member states from the consequences of such interruptions. (Parliamentary group of the FDP)<sup>17</sup>

It was the Green party (in opposition since shortly after the pipeline contract was signed) which was most critical. Representatives of the Green party primarily cited the environmental risks involved in the construction and the harm for Germany's relations with Poland and the Baltic States as arguments against constructing the Nord Stream pipeline. Interestingly, these critical voices often employed 'security jargon':

The mustard gas grenades and other ammunition in the Baltic Sea that fishermen continuously haul out of the water are life-threatening and can cause ecological catastrophes. [...] At the bottom of the Baltic Sea lie 400,000 tonnes of ammunition and chemical weapons. [...] We Germans have a historical responsibility to solve this problem. We will not be able to do that alone but only in cooperation with other littoral states. (Deputy Rainer Steenblock, Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen)<sup>18</sup>

The planned Baltic Sea pipeline is an ecological and political questionable project. [...] Additionally, ecological concerns in the littoral states are growing against the background that several hundred thousand tonnes of ammunition lie on the ground of the Baltic Sea [...]. [...] Dumped into the sea after the end of the Second World War, mines, torpedoes, bombs and grenades endanger people at the beaches, fishermen, sportsmen as well as the maritime flora and fauna. (Deputy Rainer Steenblock, Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen)<sup>19</sup>

[...] the Nord Stream project is not beneficial for the diversification of European gas supplies but for Gazprom's monopolistic infrastructure from the production, via transport to the final customers. (Parliamentary group of Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen)<sup>20</sup>

In German media reporting (in total 51 documents), the pipeline was criticised for being a political project meant to exert pressure on transit countries for Russian gas and for harming relations with Poland and the Baltic States. The pipeline would also increase Germany's dependence on Russian gas imports, while risking environmental damage to the Baltic Sea, and be too expensive compared with alternative pipelines on land. As for the main risks/threats caused by the Nord Stream pipeline, the German media listed political (23 documents), environmental (15 documents), and economic risks (three documents). There was no mention of technical risks. Table 3.4 provides an overview of the figures.

However, of these 51 documents, only one includes a de-securing move.<sup>21</sup> It was uttered by the Russian Minister of Industry, Viktor Kristenko, in 2006, when he tried to refute arguments against the Nord Stream pipeline and the underlying risk perceptions (i.e., it can be subsumed under securitisation as laid out in Chap. 2); 47 documents can be considered a 'riskification', while three documents fall under the category of 'security jargon' (see Table 3.3).

An article from *Süddeutsche Zeitung* provides an example of a 'riskification', where the environmental risk is prescribed and counter-measures in the form of legal procedures are mentioned<sup>22</sup>:

The project has been highly controversial in the littoral states. The Baltic States and Poland were concerned about an expansion of the Russian

sphere of influence. In Sweden, too, politicians warned that Moscow might use the pipeline as a pretext for increasing its military presence in the Baltic Sea. Environmental organizations criticize that requirements are still not strict enough. In Germany [...] two environmental organizations filed a lawsuit. WWF and Bund Naturschutz [sic! Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Friends of the Earth, AH] want to make sure that the Nord Stream consortium will be obliged to make compensation measures if the pipeline causes any damage. (*Süddeutsche Zeitung* 2010)<sup>23</sup>

A counter-argument against the presented risk/threat perceptions was provided by former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. He now works for the Nord Stream AG, which builds and operates the pipeline, as Chairman of the Shareholders' Committee:

According to Schröder, [Nord Stream's capacity, AH] amounts to only a quarter of the additional demand needed in a few years. The limited capacity of the pipeline alone would prove that Nord Stream is not directed against any littoral states such as Poland or the Baltic States that are bypassed by the pipeline. 'We need additional transport routes' Schröder said. (*Spiegel Online* 2008)<sup>24</sup>

## 5.1 Applying Securitisation Theory to the German Debate

### *What Kind of Security Debate?*

In the German debate, there was only one securitising move (a de-securitisation move by the Russian Minister of Industry). Overall, the discourse in Germany was characterised by a dominance of 'riskification' (68 out of 76 documents, or 89.5 per cent). Of the total of 76 documents, only seven fall into the category of 'security jargon' which amounts to 9.2 per cent. 'Security jargon' is more prominent in parliament, with four out of 25 documents, or 16.0 per cent; in German media reporting, only three out of 51 documents fall into this category (5.9 per cent).

### *What Kind of Risk/Threat Perception?*

In German parliamentary debates, environmental risks (directly linked to the Nord Stream pipeline) and political risks were mentioned in eight docu-



ments, respectively (32.0 per cent each), followed by economic (four documents, 16.0 per cent) and technical risks (one document, 4.0 per cent).

In the German media reporting, political risks/threats dominate the debate with 23 documents, or 45.1 per cent, followed by environmental (15 documents, 29.4 per cent) and economic risks (three documents, 5.9 per cent). Technical risks received no mention (Table 3.4).

Overall, political risks are more prominent in the German media debate, while, in parliament, the economic risks were more extensively discussed (often with Nord Stream as a solution). Both corpora show similar concerns about the environmental risks of the pipeline construction. Technical risks do not play a role.

#### *What Kind of Counter-Measures?*<sup>25</sup>

In Germany, the first three counter-measures proposed by both parliament and media are similar (see Table 3.2): around half the documents propose ‘new pipelines/ new transit routes’ as a solution for perceived risks for German energy security. This counter-measure often includes the Nord Stream pipeline which is considered, in many documents, to be a solution to energy security risks (especially, the protracted Russian-Ukrainian gas conflicts). Thus, Nord Stream is the most often proposed counter-measure (in nine documents from the Bundestag and 16 from the media). Texts that consider the Nord Stream pipeline a problem for Germany’s energy security due to an increasing dependence on Russian gas supplies, for instance, often cite the Nabucco pipeline as a possible solution (two documents from the Bundestag and in five from the media).

This is followed by ‘supply diversification’ which receives more attention in the German media than in parliament (39.6 per cent to 28.6 per cent). Both corpora rank a ‘common European energy policy’ third (stronger in parliament with 28.6 per cent to 18.8 per cent).

The counter-measure, ‘connection to Nord Stream’, refers to Polish concerns about the pipeline which have been discussed in Germany. However, it is barely considered an option in the German media. The ‘new business model’ (i.e., a new payment model for Russian gas supplies to Ukraine) and ‘EU monitoring of gas transit’ counter-measures both

**Table 3.2** Counter-measures proposed in Germany with a positive or neutral attitude (number of documents and ratio)

Bundestag (21)		German Media (48)	
New pipelines/transit routes	10 (47.6%)	New pipelines/transit routes	24 (50.0%)
Supply diversification	6 (28.6%)	Supply diversification	19 (39.6%)
Common European energy policy	6 (28.6%)	Common European energy policy	9 (18.8%)
Connection to Nord Stream	3 (14.3%)	Grid integration	9 (18.8%)
LNG	2 (9.5%)	Use of alternative energies	7 (14.6%)
Storage	2 (9.5%)	Market mechanisms/third EU energy package	6 (12.5%)
Use of alternative energies	2 (9.5%)	Energy saving	5 (10.4%)
Grid integration	1 (4.8%)	Storage	5 (10.4%)
Market mechanisms/third EU energy package	1 (4.8%)	Legal processes and mechanisms/contracts	3 (6.3%)
Nuclear energy	1 (4.8%)	New business model <sup>a</sup>	3 (6.3%)
		Development of existing transit networks	2 (4.2%)
		Integration of EU and Russian energy markets	2 (4.2%)
		Nuclear energy	2 (4.2%)
		EU monitoring of gas transit <sup>a</sup>	1 (2.1%)
		Connection to Nord Stream	1 (2.1%)
		Shale gas	1 (2.1%)

Note: <sup>a</sup>These counter-measures also relate to the perceived risk/thread of the protracted Russian-Ukrainian gas conflicts for Germany's energy security

refer to the perceived risk of supply interruptions caused by disputes between Russia and Ukraine.

In summary, in the German debate, the Nord Stream pipeline is first of all treated as an industrial project which raises serious environmental concerns. The growing dependence on Russia as energy supplier is also an issue in the German debate. However, in Germany, the issue becomes politicised mainly through a reflection of political concerns in Poland. As a result, any search for solutions/counter-measures points in the direction of high environmental standards and diplomatic efforts to address the concerns of Poland and other transit countries. Overall, the German

media seems to have a more critical stand towards the Nord Stream pipeline than the parliament.

## 6 Comparing the Nord Stream Debate in Poland and Germany

In a final step, the debates in both Poland and Germany about the Nord Stream pipeline are now compared.

### *What Kind of Security Debate?*

Applying the theoretical framework developed in Chap. 2 leads to rather surprising observations. Despite a lot of security language, securitisation is a rare exception. Out of total of 296 documents, only five include what can be considered a securitising move. A total of 105 documents alone fall into the category of ‘security jargon’—even though they use threat rhetoric, they do not offer any counter-measures to avoid the predicted harm (Table 3.3).

Overall, ‘security jargon’ is considerably more prevalent in the Polish debate. It is especially common in the Polish Sejm where more than half of all documents belong to this category. The German debate largely abstained from ‘security jargon’; here ‘riskification’ dominates the discourse.

Thus, it can be concluded that the Polish debate is conducted in a much more emotional fashion than the debate in Germany. As the following analysis shows, this significant difference can be explained in terms of underlying threat perceptions.

**Table 3.3** Documents sorted by theoretical concept

	Polish Sejm	Polish media	German Bundestag	German media	Sum
Securitisation	4	0	0	1 <sup>a</sup>	5
Riskification	47	71	21	47	186
Security jargon	67	31	4	3	105
<b>Sum</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>296</b>

Note: <sup>a</sup>It was actually a de-securitising move

**Table 3.4** Perceived risks/threats linked to the Nord Stream pipeline by source (number of documents)

Nature of perceived threat/risk	Polish Sejm (118)	Polish media (102)	Poland (220)	German Bundestag (25)	German media (51)	Germany (76)
Political	50	60	<b>110 (50.0%)</b>	8	23	<b>31 (40.8%)</b>
Economic	61	45	<b>106 (48.2%)</b>	4	3	<b>7 (9.2%)</b>
Environmental	40	28	<b>68 (30.9%)</b>	8	15	<b>23 (30.3%)</b>
Technical	42	14	<b>56 (25.5%)</b>	1	0	<b>1 (1.3%)</b>

Note: Includes all three theoretical categories, 'security jargon', 'riskification', and securitisation

### *What Kind of Risk/Threat Perception?*

While all the Polish documents consider Nord Stream a severe threat to the country's energy security, only some of the documents analysed in the German debate perceive the pipeline as a threat to Germany's energy security as it would lead to an overreliance on one single gas supplier. Other critical German voices see the pipeline as a liability for the relations with neighbouring countries (first of all, Poland).

Supporters of the Nord Stream pipeline in Germany see the recurring gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine as one of the main threats to German energy security and, therefore, a diversification of import routes as a solution to that problem: Nord Stream would be able to mitigate the negative consequences of another gas conflict.

Poland, on the other hand, considers the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflicts only as a symptom of Russia's overarching intention to dominate Central Eastern Europe and to pressure the EU. This intention—according to the common opinion in the Polish debate—would only be strengthened by the Nord Stream pipeline.

These different threat perceptions make cooperation difficult. As Nord Stream is widely seen as a pure threat in Poland, German recommendations to join the pipeline (as a counter-measure) might be considered scornful by the Polish side.

The perceived risks/threats to the country's energy security can be grouped into four categories: political, economic, environmental, and technical risks/threats. In both the Polish and the German debate,

political risks receive the highest number of mentions: in 50.0 per cent of documents in the Polish case and in 40.8 per cent in the German one.

In Germany, there are only limited concerns for economic risks caused by the Nord Stream pipeline, while 48.2 per cent of the Polish documents mention this kind of risk (a close second to political risks). The proportion of documents that mention environmental risks are similar in both countries—around 30 per cent. While Poland fears for its access to the harbour of Świnoujście, technical risks are not a topic in the German debate.

#### *What Kind of Counter-Measures?*<sup>26</sup>

As expected, the counter-measures (with a neutral or positive attitude) reflect the prevailing risk/threat perceptions in the countries under study. The most often proposed counter-measure in all four corpora is ‘new pipelines/ transit route’. In Poland, this means everything but Nord Stream, especially the Amber pipeline project and the Yamal-Europe II pipeline. In Germany, however, Nord Stream is mostly seen as a solution to energy security risks (especially, in the context of the gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine). ‘Supply diversification’ comes second in both the Polish and the German debate (see Table 3.5 in the appendix).

There are significant differences regarding the counter-measure, ‘common European energy policy’, between the two countries; this is not immediately obvious as the counter-measure comes third in the German debate, while in Poland it comes fifth. However, while critics of the Nord Stream pipeline in Germany often call for more cooperation in the field of energy within the EU and warn of further unilateral decisions, this counter-measure plays only a marginal role in Poland (21.7 per cent of the German documents, 13.1 per cent of the Polish documents). If the counter-measure, ‘common European energy policy’, is combined with the related counter-measures, ‘grid integration’, and, ‘market mechanism/ third EU energy package’, the figure increases in Germany to 46.4 per cent of the documents and to 23.8 per cent of the Polish documents.

In Poland, the reason for the limited support for cooperation on the EU level might lie in the perception that the EU is only a club for big countries:

We agree and support the thesis that the development of the EU and the realisation of EU policies should be characterised by cooperation. How can in this context the economic pact between Russia and Germany, which agrees on the pipeline construction at the bottom of the Baltic Sea neglecting the interests of Poland and the Baltic States, be explained? The pipeline construction at the bottom of the Baltic Sea shows that the EU in practice has neither a common foreign policy nor a common security policy. The Polish protests against such actions will only be effective if they succeed in building a strong front of opposition that bundles the interest of the affected member states. It looks as if the new EU members are regarded mainly as a sales market and as a source of cheap labour; they are not treated as equals when political and economic interests are at stake. The pipeline case can become a trigger for resistance against the diktat of the great powers of old Europe and may lead to radical reconstruction of the Union in the spirit of solidarity. (Deputy Waldemar Starosta, Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej)<sup>27</sup>

In Germany, on the other hand, a common European energy policy is considered desirable:

Nobody really believes in the development of a common energy policy as proposed in the [EU, AH] Green Book. Since Germany decided—against the explicit will of its EU partner Poland—to build with Russia the Baltic Sea pipeline, it is more unlikely than ever that Europe will ever speak with one voice when it comes to energy. Regarding the supply security with energy—considered by all EU member states as essential—national egoisms probably will increase.<sup>28</sup>

The Baltic Sea pipeline—as partner in the red-green government coalition we were involved in its last phase—is not a cooperation project. This is not the way to conduct the Baltic Sea cooperation; the project only aggravates all cooperation partners in the Baltic Sea region. [...] If the Baltic Sea

cooperation is supposed to be functioning [...] it would be helpful that the question of pipelines is not solved bilaterally but within the cooperation framework and with the EU in the background. (Deputy Rainer Steenblock, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen)<sup>29</sup>

Surprisingly, the counter-measure ‘connection to Nord Stream’ was much more frequently mentioned in the Polish debate than in Germany (8.2 per cent to 5.3 per cent). ‘Connection to Nord Stream’ as a mitigation for Polish energy security concerns is proposed in four German documents (three of them from the Bundestag), while in the Polish media this is considered an option in 18 documents (it should, however, be noted that a positive attitude towards this option comes mostly from foreign authors or interviewees).

## 7 Conclusion: What the Debate Did Not Show

As the Polish debate has left no doubt that the Nord Stream pipeline constitutes a threat to Poland’s national security, one would have had expected:

- A very emotional debate steeped in history (i.e., using many historical references).
- A dominance of political risk/threat perceptions in the Polish debate.
- A large number of securitising moves, as the Nord Stream pipeline is considered an existential threat to Poland.

While the debate on the Polish side was emotional and rich in historical references,<sup>30</sup> other theory-based expectations, however, were not fulfilled.

Political risk/threat perceptions did not dominate the Polish debate; this category was on par with economic risks/threats. They did, however, dominate the much more sober German debate.

The most surprising result of the analysis has been so far that securitising moves did not only not dominate the debates about Nord Stream, but they were rare exceptions (only five out of 296 documents). ‘Security jargon’, threat-based security language that does not offer any solutions and counter-measures, dominated the Nord Stream debate in the Polish Sejm. The deputies trusted with producing legislation did not show much resolve to propose any solutions but seemed more interested in maintaining a high level of fear and hysteria. However, ‘riskification’, the more sober analysis of the problem and search for solutions, dominated the German debate, in general, and was also more common in the Polish media debate.

To summarise, the emotional Polish debate about the Nord Stream pipeline has clearly been focused on a threat perception which links most risks directly to fears of Russian-German rapprochement at the expense of Polish interests. However, the question remains: why are solutions and/or counter-measures so seldom discussed? Do politicians simply use populism as a strategy and play the ‘blame game’, that is, ascribe responsibility for the crisis to the opposing political camp and/or the predecessor government?

Examples of the ‘blame game’ are plentiful:

The Polish government does nothing, it even facilitated the realisation of this project [the Nord Stream pipeline, AH]. [...] In February 2003, vice minister Marek Pol signed a contract which made Poland completely dependent on gas deliveries. This contract alone has made Poland completely dependent on Russia. (Deputy Elżbieta Kruk, PiS)<sup>31</sup>

Finally, the compromising fact about Donald Tusk and his foreign minister Radosław Sikorski—their complete capitulation in front of the Russian-German investment of Nord Stream. Due to the prime minister’s lack of distinct opposition, Germany has built together with the Russians a gas pipeline through the harbour entrance of Świnoujście which will permanently hinder [...] the development of our harbour in Świnoujście. (Deputy Joachim Brudziński, PiS)<sup>32</sup>



There was a time when Poland was against the construction of the Baltic Sea pipeline. However, since the change of government in 2007 the opposition has been suppressed. It can be assumed that the defence of Poland's main interests is not a priority for the PO-PSL government. (Deputy Jadwiga Wiśniewska, PiS)<sup>33</sup>

After 2007, however, the Tusk government did not change decisions of the predecessor government regarding energy policy; it did not abandon the construction of an LNG terminal on the Baltic Sea coast. Before that point, it had been usual practice in Poland after every change of government between centre-left and centre-right for the incoming administration to renounce the energy projects initiated by its predecessor.<sup>34</sup>

Nevertheless, a continuation of the conservative energy policy by the Tusk government did not stop the opposition from using 'security jargon' to, so it seems, spread fear and disinformation:

Unfortunately, the Nord Stream pipeline will be built but it is not true that it will block the harbour entrance of Świnoujście. Your whole argument is based on the fact—and you abuse it—that not everybody knows that Świnoujście has two harbour entrances: the western channel and the currently not used northern channel. Through the western channel, where the pipeline will be built, ship traffic will reach Świnoujście as before, especially the LNG tankers. The discussion refers only to some corrections concerning the northern channel. Stop scaring and misleading the Polish public! (Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski)<sup>35</sup>

While from a theoretical perspective, 'security jargon' is something different from 'securitisation', their effects on political discourse are rather similar: in both cases, the use of security language results in depoliticisation. Contested issues/topics are removed from the field of 'normal' political discourse, leading to an insulation from critical discussion. While a particular perspective becomes locked in and dominates the discourse, other divergent positions are blocked, resulting in a stifling of political debate.

## Appendix

**Table 3.5** Proposed counter-measures in Poland and Germany with a positive or neutral attitude (number of documents and ratio)

Germany		Poland	
New pipelines/transit routes	34 (49.3%)	New pipelines/transit routes	35 (28.7%)
Supply diversification	25 (36.2%)	Supply diversification	27 (22.1%)
Common European energy policy	15 (21.7%)	Connection to Nord Stream	18 (14.8%)
Grid integration	10 (14.5%)	LNG	18 (14.8%)
Use of alternative energies	9 (13.0%)	Common European energy policy	16 (13.1%)
Market mechanisms/third EU energy package	7 (10.1%)	Deepening of pipeline	16 (13.1%)
Storage	7 (10.1%)	Grid integration	10 (8.2%)
Energy saving	5 (7.2%)	Legal processes and mechanisms/contracts	8 (6.6%)
Connection to Nord Stream	4 (5.8%)	Use of alternative energies	4 (3.3%)
Legal processes and mechanisms/contracts	3 (4.3%)	Nuclear energy	3 (2.5%)
New business model	3 (4.3%)	Clean coal technology	3 (2.5%)
Nuclear energy	3 (4.3%)	Market mechanisms/ third EU energy package	3 (2.5%)
Development of existing transit networks	2 (2.9%)	Development of existing gas transit network	2 (1.7%)
Integration of EU & Russian energy markets	2 (2.9%)	Energy saving	1 (0.8%)
LNG	2 (2.9%)	Shale gas	1 (0.8%)
EU monitoring of gas transit	1 (1.4%)	Public supervision of Nord Stream construction	1 (0.8%)
Shale gas	1 (1.4%)	Common investment decisions within the EU	1 (0.8%)
		Cooperation with other countries/joint oppositional front	1 (0.8%)
		Storage	1 (0.8%)
		Surveying of the Baltic Sea	1 (0.8%)

## Notes

1. Cf. for example, ‘Poland recalls Hitler-Stalin pact amid fears over pipeline’, *The Guardian*, 1 May 2006, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/may/01/eu.poland>. For a clarification by the Polish Ministry of Defence see: Paszkowski, Piotr (2006) Minister Sikorski o współpracy w dziedzinie energetyki, *Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej*, 30 April, available at [http://www.mon.gov.pl/artukul\\_wiecej.php?idartukul=1696](http://www.mon.gov.pl/artukul_wiecej.php?idartukul=1696). Speaking of a misinterpretation, the press release states: ‘The minister did not place the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and the pipeline agreement on the same level. He referred to painful historical events to explain Poles’ sensitivity to agreements made without their knowledge. He used the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact to picture emotions raised by the construction of the pipeline’ (all translations by the author unless stated otherwise).
2. For a more detailed analysis of Russian export pipelines see: Heinrich (2014).
3. Analytical overviews of criticism and underlying rationales are given by: Bouzarovski and Konieczny 2010; Larsson 2007; Lidskog and Elander 2012.
4. Meanwhile, the EU has revised its decision in October 2016 and allowed Gazprom to use up to 80 per cent of one of the connecting pipelines. However, Poland has challenged this decision in court and, as a result, it has been suspended. Cf., e.g., Yafimava 2017; Loskot-Strachota 2017.
5. For a detailed description of the media selection and the operationalisation of the research project see ‘Documentation of data collection’, available at: [http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de/UserFiles/file/04-Forschung/documentation\\_data-collection.pdf](http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de/UserFiles/file/04-Forschung/documentation_data-collection.pdf).
6. This chapter scrutinises only the theoretical aspects of the Nord Stream debate. For a detailed analysis of the arguments for or against the Nord Stream pipeline in Poland and Germany (which includes a larger number of documents, as it is not based on securitisation theory), see Heinrich and Pleines 2017.
7. Szejnfeld, Adam Stanisław (2004) *Interpelacja nr 6806 do prezesa Rady Ministrów w sprawie zwiększenia polskiego bezpieczeństwa w zakresie dostaw gazu dla ludności i gospodarki*, 28 February, available at <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/stenogramy.xsp>.
8. Jagiełło, Jarosław (2008) *Interpelacja nr 4634 do ministra spraw zagranicznych w sprawie budowy gazociągu północnego*, in: Sejm

- Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, *Kadencja VI: Aneksu do Sprawozdania Stenograficznego z 21. posiedzenia Sejmu w dniach 2, 3, 4 i 5 września 2008 r* [2.-5.9.2008], pp. 208–209.
9. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (2005) *Kadencja IV: Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 107. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 7 lipca 2005 r* [7.7.2005]. Informacja bieżąca, pp. 364–381, here p. 371.
  10. Sonik, Bogusław (2005) *Opinie: Gazowy szantaż, Rzeczpospolita*, 2 July, obtained via Factiva, Document RZEPOL0020050702e1720000f.
  11. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (2007) *Kadencja VI: Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 4. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 19 grudnia 2007 r* [19.12.2007]. Punkt 10. porządku dziennego: Pytania w sprawach bieżących, pp. 162–182, here pp. 166–167.
  12. Hoc, Czesław/Brudziński, Joachim (2008) Interpellation nr 826 do ministra gospodarki w sprawie budowy gazociągu północnego po dnie Bałtyku (koncernu Nord Stream AG), in Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, *Kadencja VI: Aneksu do Sprawozdania Stenograficznego z 8. posiedzenia Sejmu w dniach 6, 7 i 8 lutego 2008 r*. [6.-8.2.2008].
  13. ‘Pogoda dla gazociągu’, *Polityka*, No. 37 (2722), 12 September 2009, p. 11, available at: <http://archiwum.polityka.pl/wydanie/0,19680.htm>.
  14. Dębski, Sławomir (2007) Z Rosją – bez pośpiechu, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17 January, available at: <http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,3854024.html>.
  15. Only documents that fall into the categories of ‘riskification’ and securitisation are analysed, as per the definition, the category ‘security jargon’ proposes no counter-measures (the total number of documents from the Sejm is 51, and from the Polish media reporting, it is 71).
  16. Deutscher Bundestag (2009) *Stenografischer Bericht, 230. Sitzung*, Plpr-Nr. 16/230, 2 July, pp. 25699–25700.
  17. Deutscher Bundestag (2007) *Antrag der Abgeordneten Gudrun Kopp, [...] und der Fraktion der FDP—‘Energieaußenpolitik für das 21. Jahrhundert’*, Drucksache 16/6796, 24 October.
  18. Deutscher Bundestag (2007) *Stenografischer Bericht, 109. Sitzung*, Plpr-Nr. 16/109, 6 July, pp. 11333–11334.
  19. Deutscher Bundestag (2008) *Stenografischer Bericht, 160. Sitzung*, 8 May, p. 16968.
  20. Deutscher Bundestag (2007) *Entschließungsantrag der Abgeordneten Marieluse Beck (Bremen)[...]weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN und deren Antwort (Drucksachen 16/4932, 16/6241)—‘Aktuelle Entwicklungen in Russland und ihre Auswirkung auf*

*die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Russland*, Drucksache 16/7186, 14 November.

21. The Copenhagen School understands de-securitisation as moving an issue 'out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere' (Buzan et al. 1998: 4, see also p. 29). De-securitisation means to turn threats into challenges and security into politics again (Wæver 1995: 55, 60).
22. However, these counter-measures are envisaged only in the case of an accident causing environmental damage; they do not mitigate other risks/threats or try to prevent the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline (I thank Marco Siddi for his comment).
23. Herrmann, Gunnar (2010) Ostsee-Pipeline genehmigt: Finnland macht Weg endgültig frei für Bau der Gas-Röhre, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 13 February, obtained via Factiva, Document SDDZ000020100213e62d0000y.
24. Wittrock, Philipp (2008) Energiekonferenz des Umweltministers: Schröder singt Jubelarien auf Russland, *Spiegel Online*, 25 September, obtained via Factiva, Document SPGLO00020080925e49p0006c.
25. Only documents that fall into the categories of 'riskification' and securitisation are analysed; as per the definition, the category 'security jargon' proposes no counter-measures (the total number of documents from the Bundestag is 21, and, from the German media reporting, it is 48).
26. Only documents that fall into the categories of 'riskification' and securitisation are analysed; as per the definition, the category 'security jargon' proposes no counter-measures.
27. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (2005) *Kadencja IV: Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 5. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 16 grudnia 2005 r. [16.12.2005]. Punkt 25. porządku dziennego: Informacja w sprawie planu legislacyjnego Komisji Europejskiej na 2006 rok (druk nr 120)*, pp. 253–280, here pp. 262–264.
28. Fischer, Manfred/Wetzels, Daniel/Müller, Peter (2006) Europa hängt an der Pipeline: Auf dem Gipfeltreffen der Industriestaaten (G-8) in St. Petersburg steht die Energieversorgung Europas ganz oben auf der Tagesordnung. Doch die Gegensätze sind zu groß für einen Erfolg, *Welt am Sonntag*, 16 July, obtained via Factiva, Document WSONNT0020060717e27g00053.
29. Deutscher Bundestag (2007) *Stenografischer Bericht, 109. Sitzung, Plpr-Nr. 16/109*, 6 July, pp. 11333–11334.
30. For a more detailed analysis of historical references in Polish energy security debates see: Siddi 2017; Heinrich 2007.

31. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (2005) *Kadencja IV: Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 107 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 7 lipca 2005 r [7.7.2005]. Informacja bieżąca*, pp. 364–381, here p. 371.
32. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (2011) *Kadencja VII: Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 1. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 18 listopada 2011 r [18.11.2011]. Punkt 10. porządku dziennego: Przedstawienie przez Prezesa Rady Ministrów programu działania Rady Ministrów z wnioskiem o udzielenie jej wotum zaufania*, pp. 57–152, here p. 121.
33. Wiśniewska, Jadwiga (2012) *Interpelacja nr 10803 do prezesa Rady Ministrów w sprawie konsekwencji budowy Gazociągu Północnego Nord Stream*, 22 October, available at: <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/InterpelacjaTresc.xsp?key=26DA7771>.
34. Wielowieyska, Dominika (2009) *Gaz dzieli polityków*, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 8 January, available at: <http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80353,6130767.html>.
35. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (2011) *Kadencja VI: Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 87. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 16 marca 2011 r [16.3.2011]. Punkt 2. porządku dziennego: Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o założeniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2011 roku*, pp. 3–70, here p. 66.

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