THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF URBAN ETHNOGRAPHY

Edited by
Italo Pardo and Giuliana B. Prato

The Palgrave Handbook of Urban Ethnography

"The ethnographic studies collected in this fascinating volume offer deep insights into important aspects of contemporary urban experience. They span the globe, covering a rich variety of urban settings, theoretical approaches and topics. The case-studies demonstrate the power of ethnographic concepts and strategies for uncovering and making sense of the tensions, socialities, civilities, mobilities, ethnicities, lifestyles and politics that characterise today's complex urban worlds. This book will be a wonderful companion for those embarking and reflecting on their own urban studies as well as for students seeking a comprehensive and exciting introduction to the growing field of urban ethnography."

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—Alan Smart, *University of Calgary, Canada*

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Introduction: Urban Ethnography Matters— Analytical Strength, Theoretical Value and Significance to Society

Italo Pardo and Giuliana B. Prato

Urban Ethnography Today

Urban ethnography, the product of long-term in-depth research, is attracting increasing attention among academics, professionals and decision-, law- and policy-makers. Clearly, the in-depth study of urban settings and attendant complex dynamics is timely and of great importance. Recent publications have brought out the range of novel analytical and theoretical insights that urban ethnography can offer as it adopts—and adapts—methods from classic anthropology and qualitative sociology, according to specific research perspectives, aims and geographic locations. Key paradigmatic challenges have been highlighted by works such as *Anthropology in the City: Methodology and Theory* (Pardo and Prato 2012) and the Special Issue of *Diogène* on *Le positionnement de l'anthropologie urbaine* (Pardo et al. 2015),[1] by the epistemological reflections developed in the Forum on 'Urban Anthropology' (*Urbanities* 2013 and 2014)[2] and by the substantial body of publications in the Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology series,[3] and, before that, in the Ashgate Urban Anthropology series,[4] now published by Routledge. Among others, these sources of intellectual engagement at once testify to the vibrancy of this field and invite further engagement.

The present *Handbook* springs from this debate. It brings together thirty ethnographically based studies of diverse urban experiences across the world to offer a contested view of state-of-the-art research in this area of study and stimulate

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a more empirically grounded reconceptualization of urban theories. Collectively, the specially written chapters collated here identify ethnography as a powerful tool to understand life in our rapidly changing, complex cities. They also robustly stress the point (Pardo and Prato 2012, 3) that while there is no need to fetishize fieldwork—certainly not as an end—its unique value cannot be overstated. A strong field of actively engaged researchers have produced up-to-date readable contributions that avoid abstract generalities while engaging with the analytical complexity of ethnographic evidence. Taken together, the chapters that follow prove the great value of knowledge produced by long-term fieldwork to mainstream academic debates and to society more broadly.

The discussions benefit from the contributors' active participation in meetings and intense correspondence.[5] Most are familiar with each other's work and many have met and thoroughly debated the central issues in this *Handbook*. In terms of formal disciplinary belonging, they would be called anthropologists or sociologists. Pointless academic labelling and jostling aside, in real, hands-on scientific terms, they are committed ethnographers who recognize the methodological significance of ethnographically based analysis to theoretical development. This anthropology–sociology pattern is mirrored in a growing number of high-quality publications,[6] workshops and conferences,[7] suggesting that a shared commitment to ethnographic soundness promotes fruitful contaminations.

Combined with specific research objectives, the application of ethnographic methodology to the urban field leads to a great variety of approaches and to new paradigmatic challenges. As the contributions offered in this volume suggest, ethnographers can engage productively with these challenges. Field research is, after all, an 'art of the possible', and in cities there are many possibilities. There is indeed absolutely no need for the complexity of urban life to translate into academic complication or disciplinary insecurity. Like cultures, scientific disciplines are not static. They are dynamic entities, continuously changing and developing. They modify their identity, though they always do have an identity. Thus, new collaborations arise. Cooperation and exchange of knowledge is of critical importance in gaining an informed, adequately articulated understanding of the complexity of the world in which we live.

Of course, the significance of ethnography to the development of new theoretical approaches is not a new discovery. A huge amount of high-calibre work produced by classic anthropologists has amply demonstrated the value of the ethnographically based comparative study of human beings in society to the development of theoretical frameworks that powerfully show up sterile arguments on the allegedly atheoretical bias of ethnography, as opposed to theoretically oriented anthropology, or indeed sociology. Bluntly, it is precisely ethnographic knowledge that gives scientific grounding to socio-anthropological theorization.

We all recognize the importance of the 'armchair' phase of our investigation; the stage in our research project when we study the relevant literature, archival, statistical, historical and other documentary sources (these days including, of course, online sources) and engage theoretically with the relevant

debates on the research topic. It is also obvious that we need to take into account data that traditionally are 'allocated' to a variety of social sciences and to the humanities. From experience, most of us subscribe to the application of participant observation as the basic method of empirical enquiry, in conjunction with the collection of case material on significant people, circumstances and events. This apparently obvious methodological stance cannot always, however, be taken for granted in urban research. Here we will summarize the main aspects of this complicated story, referring the interested reader to the literature that we mentioned in our introductory paragraph.

A Bumpy Story

Since the second half of the twentieth century, the almost autonomous, 'resilient' and self-sufficient city has resurfaced as a key administrative, economic and political entity in the dynamics of regional, national and world politics. The centrality of the city has then continued to gain importance. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, substantial funding has supported sustainable urban development and the promotion of so-called 'smart cities'. Half of humanity is now living in urban settings and that proportion is expected to grow to two-thirds in the next fifty years or so. Society—Western and non-Western—is fast becoming urban and even mega-urban. Large cities and a growing number of smaller towns are set on a path of demographic and spatial expansion, also due to intakes of native and foreign migrants.

It should go without saying that urban and urbanism do not necessarily equate to urbanization, particularly if intended in terms of the size of the built-up environment and population density. What constitutes a city and what is meant by urban are differently understood in different parts of the world, and by different scholars. In this volume, Prato expands on her previous work (2015) to address the problematic of incommensurability, pointing out that this key issue in the philosophy of science is central both to urban anthropology and to cross-disciplinary debate among the social sciences. Stimulated by Max Weber's insights (1958), she argues for a view of the city that encompasses the meaning of *urbs*, *polis* and *civitas*; that is, respectively, built-up areas, the social association of citizens and the political community. In this line, we maintain that our analysis cannot be reduced merely to a question of numbers. It would be misleading to elevate to centrality the categories of size and demographics. Eschewing such a temptation, we should endeavour to grasp the political, economic and sociocultural complexity of urban life.

While the definition of city is varied and culturally and politically specific, urban settings are widely identified as hubs of cultural and ethnic interaction as well as challenging settings for future sustainable development. Worldwide, enlightened decision-making bodies have embraced the view that the future of humankind is urban and that the world's most pressing challenges—from environmental to political, from the draining of sustainable resources to the management of security—will continue to arise and to be addressed in cities.

Given anthropologists' prominent role in the ongoing debate on urban ethnography, it may be useful to summarize key aspects in the development of anthropological research in the city—'urban anthropology' for short—and its comparative relevance. For reasons that we have explained at length elsewhere (Pardo and Prato 2012; Prato and Pardo 2013) and will summarize here, it is only relatively recently that urban anthropology has achieved legitimate status within sociocultural anthropology. The obvious question to ask is why it has taken so long for anthropologists to come to grips with studying, describing and conceptualizing urban social formations in Western society.

Since the first half of the twentieth century, geopolitical changes stimulated some anthropologists to address processes of urbanization in developing countries, especially in Africa and Latin America. Such research did not, however, significantly contribute to the development of urban anthropology. Notwithstanding promising early work, such as that of Dumont (1951), Redfield and Singer (1954) and Firth (1956), and US cultural anthropologists' work on community problems to which we refer briefly below, most anthropological research stayed away from the Western urban setting *as a field of research in its own right*; the mainstream focus was on tribal societies, village communities or processes of modernization in colonial and post-colonial contexts. One reason for such a choice drew on rigid disciplinary boundaries rooted in late nineteenth-century disciplinary divisions, whereby cities, especially in Western industrial societies, were the designated realm of sociological enquiry. Accordingly, urban research in Western industrial societies was not seen as 'proper anthropology' and until the mid-1980s was left out of the mainstream disciplinary agenda. As we have explained elsewhere (Prato and Pardo 2013; also Chap. 3 in this volume), this was particularly the case in British anthropology.

Only in the late 1960s did the anthropological establishment, especially in the USA, cautiously begin to acknowledge the relevance of urban research and focus on 'problem-centred' studies: poverty, minorities—including ethnic minorities—and urban adaptation (see, for example, Hannerz 1969). Interestingly, this key development was both stimulated and influenced by the work of the qualitative sociologists of what has become known as the Chicago School. Key to that new development was Louis Wirth's *Urbanism as a Way of Life* (1938), which was later criticized for focusing on a kind of urbanism that was culturally and historically specific to the North American city and to the capitalist economy of his time (see Fox 1977, 58–9; Hannerz 1980, 68 and 74). Perhaps more importantly, the work of Carolyn Ware (1935) and William Foote Whyte's masterpiece, *Street Corner Society* (1943), exemplify a key methodological approach whose influence continues today. The 1970s saw the publication of several books and articles debating the conceptual and theoretical definition of 'urban' and the extent to which 'urban' anthropology differed from 'traditional' anthropology. Some endeavoured to define the city as a specific 'social institution' with its dynamics and social, economic and political relations, thus maintaining that urban anthropology is anthropology *of* the city.

For others, urban anthropology was 'simply' anthropological research carried out *in* urban areas.[8] We do not make such a sharp opposition between the two approaches. We simply aim at highlighting the danger of abstract theorization that an 'anthropology *of* the city' has too often produced.

Again, we note, abstract theorization has tended to develop 'generalizing' models of cities and, worryingly, perhaps consequently, of adverse 'policies for the city'. It has also produced a misleading butterfly-collection-style classification of world cities of the kind that Edmund Leach would sorely castigate. In both cases the resulting abstractions have not properly taken into account significant cultural, political, environmental or economic differences.

As Prato (2015) has noted, worldwide there are perhaps as many culturally and politically influenced ways of conceiving what a city is as there are cities, and thus attempting abstract classifications of cities, urbanism, urban life and so on may well be a pointless exercise. To recognize that categorical assumptions that initially looked good later proved to be weak and misleading may help us to wade through this intellectual morass. For a while, we note, certain expressions may become fashionable as they hold political—as opposed to intellectual—value. In some cases, careful scrutiny has shown fashionable turns of phrase, as for example 'global cities', and associated assumptions, to be perhaps pleasant to the ear but empirically baseless, therefore theoretically irrelevant. How usefully comparable in political, economic and financial, let alone cultural terms are, say, London, New York City, Hong Kong, Paris, Shanghai, Tokyo, Beijing, Sydney, Mumbai, Milan, Moscow, São Paulo, Frankfurt, Rome, Toronto, Los Angeles and Mexico City? What—and how much—do they have in common? As we have pointed out (Prato and Pardo 2013, 97), ethnographic evidence brings out the indisputable fact that cities vary from one epoch to another, and from one society to another—whether 'sacred', industrial, post-industrial and so on, each city is different. This may seem obvious to the ethnographer's worm's-eye view, even to the educated tourist. It does not appear to be obvious to the debaters. The point is, of course, that there is no need to get embroiled in futile discussions over what might be fashionable at one point in time but not very significant in the long run. Serious scholarship based on rigorous work—in this case, ethnographic fieldwork—is, we believe, what matters. Fashion, including intellectual fashion, comes and goes.

It is precisely urban vernacular specificity that comparative ethnographic methodology both recognizes and builds upon.

Comparative ethnography is usefully seen as a processual effort to establish an informed conceptual grasp of different sociocultural contexts that avoids the kind of misunderstanding (a dialogue among the deaf) that is often generated by abstract categorizations. This allows a better grasp of how, for instance, the politics of the city and for the city affect urban dynamics engendering urban change; the kind of impact that these policies have on the environment—which includes non-human agents—on urban communities and social relations, and so on; *and* vice versa, how the specific needs and organization of a particular city require specific adjustments and adaptation of 'globalizing' urban projects.

Thus, the ethnographic study of economic, political, demographic and cultural topics in a given urban context contributes substantially to shedding light on the impact (negative or positive) of urban planning and of governance, as well as the essential inequalities of urban life.

In short, the awareness is spreading in intellectually engaged international circles that abstraction has little value in understanding life in today's world. Social scientists of various disciplinary persuasions are all asking the key question: 'Does what I do matter?' For those who are equipped to give it, the answer is: 'Yes, it does matter because the analysis that I produce is ethnographically based.' We feel that this is the direction that the social, political and economic sciences will be taking in the future.

In many ways this *Handbook* tallies with the epistemological stance that, since the 1990s, has motivated some of us to define our work as anthropological research in urban settings. This stance reflects a shift in focus from the community studies inspired by the 'urban ecology' model of the Chicago School and the processes of urbanization in post-colonial societies to political economy, city planning, the legitimacy of grassroots action and of governance, the relationship between the local and the supra-local and their significance to urban dynamics. The rest of the 'urban anthropology' story encapsulates this key issue.

Back in the 1980s, as anthropological research in urban areas started to grow, concern among the disciplinary establishment engendered a paradoxical situation. While sociologists became interested in the ethnographic method, senior British anthropologists openly questioned the applicability of participant observation in Western urban settings. By extension, such a methodological position justified the objection that anthropology could not be done in the Western industrial city. So, for a while, the danger of this subfield being dismissed altogether was very real. However, a new generation of British-trained anthropologists convincingly proved that the classic anthropological paradigm could be successfully applied in urban Europe (Pardo 1996). Such pioneering work not only emphasized that a combination of tried and tested anthropological methods with new techniques in the construction of case studies produced findings that had broad theoretical relevance, but pointed to the important fact that a holistic analysis and attention to the relationship between micro- and macro-processes raise no questions about the validity of traditional fieldwork.

From the 1990s to the present day, new developments in urban anthropology have led to the investigation of the relationship between ordinary people and the ruling elite, as well as the legitimacy of governance, marginalization, corruption, violence and conflict, and movements of resistance. In the early twenty-first century, a time marked by the re-emergence of localism, transnationalism and populist stances fuelled by the failed politics of multiculturalism, this trend addresses the urgent need to understand the city as a crucial arena in which citizenship, democracy and, by extension, belonging are critically negotiated and the morality of law and politics are questioned and scrutinized.

These issues are increasingly relevant in Western and non-Western societies. There is much interest in ethnographically based analyses of urban change in Africa, Latin America and post-socialist countries, mega-urbanization in India and China and urban conflict in the Middle East and South-East Asia.

Anthropology has come a long way since legitimate ethnographic research took place in exotic, rural locales. Today, more anthropologists than ever before carry out their research in cities—including Western cities—producing rich and detailed empirically based analyses. Contemporary urban anthropology is intrinsically transdisciplinary, and it often gets very close to or draws from related disciplines such as sociology, history and geography (to name a few), which, we reiterate, need not be cause for concern. We should simply recognize that anthropologists and their methodological apparatus are well positioned to cast light on the evolution of our urban world and its political, economic and cultural dynamics.

To put our main point in a nutshell, as classically trained social anthropologists who undertake research in cities, we believe that an empirically based, holistic analysis has a unique contribution to make to our understanding of our evolving urban world. There is, of course, a clear line to be drawn between the belief that individual lives are *uniquely* shaped in the city and a view that would relegate the city to mere context. However, as the theoretical insights that have emerged from urban ethnography are becoming drivers for disciplinary innovation, it may be reasonably argued that inevitably the future of social sciences, including anthropology, is in large part urban-bound. This *Handbook* both recognizes and brings to the fore the ruddy complexion, the epistemologically healthy state of this field of research, which promises to play an increasingly central role within and without the academic boundaries. Urban research, we suggest, may well be key to the future quality of urban life.

Ethnographers at Work: Analytical Strength and Theoretical Value

This Introduction is followed by 30 chapters grouped under seven broad headings: Paradigmatic Reflections, Everyday Practices and Challenges, Coping with Economic and Political Agendas, Urban Planning and Local Instances, Change and Grassroots Dynamics, Transnational Urbanities, and Urbanity beyond the City. Produced by scholars at various stages of their careers, the chapters address critical issues such as the gap between citizenship and governance with reference to bureaucracy, administration and decision-making, including the legitimacy of policy and of the law; the ways in which conflicting moralities across the social, cultural and political spectra take shape in the urban field and affect the broader context; the problems raised by internal and international migration and its relationship to religious and cultural differences and integration; urban development (economic and otherwise), consumption, sustainability and the impact of global restructuring and neoliberal policies; urban conflict; heritage; and the marketization of cities and city life. Cross-chapter

topics range from work, employment and informality to everyday life and community relations, to marginalization, gender, family, kinship, religion and ethnicity; from political strategies to social movements in historical and transnational perspectives.

The opening part addresses the scope and challenges of urban ethnography through the discussions offered by four experienced field researchers, three social anthropologists and a sociologist. Re-examining the different social issues (for instance, national conflict, immigration, sexuality and so on) and changing fieldwork circumstances and research strategies throughout a 40-year anthropological journey from Jaffa to New York, Moshe Shokeid develops an analysis of some of the many facets of contemporary urban anthropology. This important theme is central to Pardo's discussion of his long-term anthropological research among ordinary people and elite groups in Naples. He offers a descriptive analysis of a grassroots entrepreneurialism that is both strong and frustrated by normative complication and distorted policies, particularly regarding access to credit and therefore capital, on the one hand, and by the double standards applied by a local governance that panders to the selective interests of their constituency—made up by small but aggressively vociferous lobbies—on the other. Pointing out that, in democracy, rulers' recognition—in policy and legislation—of the structural value of grassroots culture and actions qualifies both participation and representation, he shows that these two fundamentals remain unfulfilled in Naples. Bleakly, he concludes that the gap between governance and citizenship appears to have become unbridgeable. Along the analytical lines that we have mentioned in the previous section, Prato advocates a rethinking of the city in terms of 'urban community' in the Weberian sense, as an ideal-type that embraces the meanings of *urbs*, *polis* and *civitas*. She argues that, taken together, these three analytical categories would bring out the complexity of contemporary cities and promote both political and civic participation and an environment functional to good government. Although such an ideal-type may be possible only in free democratic society, she adds, its comparative potential may well provide the basis for a theoretically relevant ethnographic analysis that makes commensurable the apparently incommensurable. In this theoretical context she addresses the significance of political programmes and grassroots action to urban socio-economic life, looking at two urban realities that were affected by the changes occurring in Europe between the late 1980s and early 1990s; they are, respectively, Brindisi in Italy and the Durrës–Tirana metropolitan region in Albania. These cases highlight how ethnographic research can contribute significantly to our understanding of the complex ways in which abstract development models are negotiated at the local level.

For Shokeid, Pardo and Prato, the ethnographic method applied in the urban context by the 'lone anthropologist' continues to represent the methodology and research benefits associated with the discipline's founding tradition of fieldwork that engages the 'whole community', and it might contribute to the discourse about the professional 'identity' of urban anthropolo-

gists among the wider texture of anthropology and sociology. From a similar perspective, Jerome Krase argues in favour of the utility of traditional and more recently developed ethnographic techniques for the study of contemporary cities. Each, he says, has unique strengths and weaknesses and in combination with each other they are invaluable in the service of documentation, analysis and illustration of complex social activities and physical environments. Krase shows how the abstract ideas of urban theorists are made more explicit by close-up empirical accounts, the vivid descriptions of ethnographers adding necessary texture to their broader sweeps of urban life and rendering the scenes more understandable. He gives examples of ethnographic practices employed to examine race, class and gentrification in Brooklyn over four decades and considers the opportunities for innovation offered by technological advances in data collection, analysis and presentation of findings.

The part that focuses on 'Everyday Practices and Challenges' brings together five ethnographically varied analyses that, linking to the chapters in the first part, highlight the importance of understanding the micro-level—the local community—in order to comprehend the impact of broader processes. In contrast to an overemphasis on caste, class, ethnic or religious identity at the cost of other influences, Janaki Abraham draws on her fieldwork in the Indian cities of Bikaner and Thalassery to study neighbours as guardians of local norms and rules who exercise considerable social control. Moving away from a focus on social problems and poverty, she explores the implications of a proximity that allows various kinds of face-to-face interactions and sensorial interactions. She analyses everyday practices that make up the web of relations that constitute the neighbourhood—social control, social approval, legitimacy and support—with a focus on how gender relations are produced in everyday neighbourhood life. The neighbourhood is a central setting in Gary Armstrong and James Rosbrook-Thompson's four-year ethnographic study of inner city diversity. They point out that while following the conventions of the ethnographic method—combining observation, participant observation and in-depth interviews—their field research has benefited from their association in the neighbourhood beyond the academic by virtue of one of them living on the estate for four years and the other being employed by the local authority for some twenty years as the area's youth worker. They address life in a 'super-diverse' London housing estate, examining intra-group differences in an attempt to make sense of the encounters, solidarities and tensions experienced by residents, who now include tenants of over fifty years' standing, recent arrivals from within the EU and further afield, undergraduate and postgraduate students unable to find accommodation within university halls of residence, drug-dependent tenants and other people at the margins who may otherwise be homeless, and young professionals in search of affordable housing. Rosbrook-Thompson and Armstrong offer a thick descriptive analysis of how these residents live in proximity to one another and how their lives intersect, often in unexpected ways, urging us to think beyond the ethnic patchwork and consider how a host of social and cultural categories cut across ethnicity.

The dynamic quality of urban life is at the core of Timothy Shortell's chapter. He notes that everyday mobility has always been an essential part of cities, and that walking remains the most important form of mobility because its pace is slow enough to allow a multisensory experience, and because it permits communication and interaction in public spaces. Inevitably, he maintains, walking plays an important role in the study of everyday urban life and culture. Based on ethnographic research in Brooklyn, London and Paris, Shortell uses images and observational field notes to describe some of the ways that urban dwellers encounter difference in their everyday routines of walking and using public transportation. He suggests that even if everyday civility in these spaces does not have a large impact on evaluations of groups, cosmopolitan canopies play an important role in the production of tolerance, to conclude that this may serve as the basis for more inclusive urban places. The problematic shift of neighbourhood life from normality to dangerous emergency marks Fran Markowitz's ethnographic exploration of the lived and narrated practices of Beer-Shevans as they negotiate their everyday experiences. During the latter part of the twentieth century, when Israelis in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were frequently the target of suicide bombings, she notes Beer-Shevans often joked that 'we are just too insignificant' for Palestinian militants to waste manpower and materials. But that complacency-in-the-periphery was shattered first in 2004 with a suicide attack and then in 2008 by the development of new long-range missiles in Gaza that reached Beer-Sheva. Ever since, the city and its surroundings have become part of the brutality that has always characterized the Middle East conflict. Told from the perspective of a researcher-citizen, this chapter illustrates how Beer-Shevans have been adjusting their perceptions and practices of time and space as they go about their daily lives in a steady, yet fluctuating, state of in-betweenness, between peace and war.

Manos Spyridakis, Judy Arnold, Judith DeSena, László Kürti and Corine Védrine analyse in their respective chapters the complex ways in which people cope with top-down economic and political agendas. Spyridakis studies the devastating effects of the movement of industrial capital as it empowers specific places and groups at the expense of others. He draws on long-term ethnographic research on the slow decline of the shipbuilding industry in urban Perama-Piraeus since the 1990s to examine the effects of changing priorities in international shipping on local people's material and cultural daily life. Although capital might seem to have total power over the use of space, he suggests, there is a complex articulation of forces, projects and actors operating at different levels that should be considered when dealing with global urbanism and urban dynamics. Spyridakis shows how, in trying to cope with the destruction caused by remote processes of decision-making, local people follow ethical and rational codes of practice that take into account contextual limits and opportunities. This links to Arnold's ethnography of unemployment in the USA. She offers a detailed examination of the resources needed for the jobless to navigate a world of unemployment that has been made so difficult by the United States Congress that many deserving candidates for benefits have dropped by the wayside. She

tells the stories of four different groups who qualify for unemployment. The first group are professionals who feel shame at being eligible to apply for unemployment benefits. The next group object to applying on political and cultural grounds. The third set are temporary workers who are periodically unemployed between jobs. The fourth group come from a poverty culture where social services are the norm and know how to navigate the system; they want to get away from the 'stigma' of social services but do not trust the government and do not want to be involved in government programmes. The critical issue of top-down politics and interests and on-the-ground responses is brought out equally vividly by Judith DeSena's chapter. DeSena focuses on the once predominantly working-class neighbourhood of Greenpoint in northern Brooklyn to examine how it is being destabilized by gentrification. Moreover, as gentrification is assisted by the large-scale development of luxury housing, upscale retail establishments and trendy entertainment venues, the cost of living continues to escalate, outpacing the economic resources of its working-class residents. Through the 'stories' of such residents, DeSena examines their perspective on gentrification, the effect that it has had on them and their strategies for maintaining a place in their neighbourhood. The ethnography suggests that the working class exercises its activism through informal social networks and local traditional institutions.

The vagaries of political activism are central in László Kürti's analysis of key changes in local politics in a Budapest neighbourhood that used to be known as 'Red Csepel'. Drawing on anthropological fieldwork, Kürti examines the retrenchment of state authority and the emergence of right-wing political organizations and parties, which have contributed to the institutionalization of asymmetrical relations of power and influence, with important consequences for local political processes, participation and welfare. A working-class movement and culture contributed to the image of Red Csepel, and until 2010 it supported the liberal-left political parties. Then attitudes and values changed and many young workers began to question their parents' politics. In 2010, the leftist candidates received a major blow at the polls as Csepelers turned right. This was repeated in 2014. Understanding why this happened contributes to our understanding of (geo)political processes. The impact of such processes on local dynamics, the superimposition of extra-local agendas on the local, are important concerns of today's social research. The powers-that-be's manipulation of both employment and the workers' lives is brought to life by Védrine's case study of Clermont-Ferrand. She examines its progression from an industrial town where enjoyment was banned to an urban setting where enjoyment is encouraged. Michelin's influence, Védrine notes, is stamped on Clermont-Ferrand. In 1832, the Michelin Company turned the town into an industrial city with four factories and many social facilities—housing, schools, hospitals and so on—that embodied a paternalistic spirit aimed at winning the loyalty of the workers. Unlike other French cities, in recent times Clermont-Ferrand has not experienced deindustrialization. Michelin still is the foremost local employer, property owner and taxpayer. Today, however, the Company needs

less manual workers and more white-collar workers, whom it attracts by promising quality of life. Védrine examines how the production of spaces where the lives of the workers were tightly controlled has been replaced by the production of new spaces where the managers' enjoyment is ensured through leisure, culture and aesthetic displays.

The discussion of the complex relations between urban planning and local instances brings together ethnographically based studies of rapid transformation in Beijing, local commitment to intangible heritage in France, a local urbanists' conundrum in West Africa, problematic urban regeneration in London and changes in urban lifestyle in China. Florence Graezer-Bideau's study of the Beijing neighbourhood of the Bell and Drum Towers, commonly called Gulou, calls our attention to the shaping and reshaping of local inhabitants' collective memories in the changing urban landscape. Located to the north-east of the Forbidden City, this popular traditional area, generally seen as a microcosm of the broader city, is currently undergoing a rapid and radical transformation with a high possibility of gentrification. Graezer-Bideau looks at the role played by three main groups of stakeholders with regard to the preservation of the site: local authorities, heritage preservationist groups and local communities. She examines the challenges raised by everyday heritage-making aimed at maintaining historic characteristics and protecting the sociocultural set-up. By offering insights into the strategies of resistance employed for the appropriation and representation of space in relation to individual and collective memory, she sheds light on the current debate on Chinese urban built environment and heritage conservation. Interestingly, this meets aspects of Michel Rautenberg's discussion of the relationship between the current context of strong heritage policies and local passions and interests, which he calls 'weak heritages' because of their very low level of institutionalization. He discusses two ethnographies: Villeurbanne, a town near Lyon that has traditionally hosted refugee and migrant associations, and Villeneuve d'Ascq, in the north of France, where a pioneers' utopia of a country town was established in the 1970s. In both cases, in opposition to official policies, 'weak' local heritage has succeeded in preserving local practices and parts of landscapes to which people are attached. Both cases involve what Rautenberg calls 'social heritage', whose strength, he argues, lies in its plasticity. In both cases opposition does not belong to anybody, can appeal to a wide range of new social arenas and make people feel that they are the inheritors of a history.

Tangible and intangible complexities of urban planning are highlighted in Dolores Koenig's chapter. She focuses on urbanists in three West African cities: Dakar, Bamako and Ouagadougou. Urbanists are members of a bureaucratic class and citizen-residents of the cities they plan, run and criticize. Koenig draws on interviews with urbanists in the three cities and participant observation in Bamako to show that urban specialists follow at least three different logics: the logic of planners, the logic of economic and political realism, and the logic of urban citizenship. As planners, they attempt to put their own imprint on the city based on their technocratic understanding of city systems.

As realists, they position themselves as members of developing countries with limited resources and subject to corrupt practices. As residents, they act like their non-urbanist co-citizens, sometimes in ways counter to what they believe as rational planners. Koenig concludes that this multiple positionality reflects the contradictions and the political–economic stresses of rapid urban growth. Iain Lindsay's chapter points specifically to the contradictions between planners' and local people's interests as he looks at the way large-scale developmental initiatives are linked to high-profile sporting mega events, which are thus turned into powerful transformative mechanisms. Drawing on extensive ethnographic research conducted over East London's seven-year delivery phase of the 2012 Olympic Games, Lindsay explores the empirical dynamics of sport-enabled 'super-sized' and 'super-speed' regeneration. He offers a critical examination of the experiential realities of those who, by choice or circumstance, were directly affected by the reclamation of space. Lindsay contributes to the theoretical and methodological debate on how to map the rhetoric and realities of urban regeneration, explaining how a nuanced ethnographic approach has helped to adequately address spatial and social change on this scale. That the experiments of urban planning make good ethnographic cases is further illustrated by Kamel Labdouni's study of the experience of the attendant politics that people living in a poor area of Harbin have acquired over time. Situated in the north-east region of China, and more exactly in the Heilongjiang province, Harbin became a laboratory for the urban policies of Maoist communism during three decades (1950–1980). Based on his recent fieldwork there, Labdouni examines the influence of government policies of urban transformation on a local community that proves to be flexible and adaptable as opposed to structurally rigid local institutions of power.

The fifth part addresses change and grassroots dynamics through ethnographically based analyses from Africa, the USA and Turkey. Lucy Koechlin and Till Förster observe that while for decades the capital cities of African countries dominated developmental and academic interest, secondary cities are now attracting increased attention due to their rapid growth and increasing social, economic and political significance on regional and national levels. Förster and Koechlin draw on their ethnography from Korhogo (Côte d'Ivoire) and Kisumu (Kenya): two cities that play important roles in national politics and have experienced conflict and violence. Their comparative analysis seeks to tease out general insights into the formation of specific urbanities in secondary cities and their effects on social agency and democratic politics, as such cities are becoming important sites of social and political transformation. They address the changing nature of social interactions and examine the question of under what conditions they create inclusive, peaceful social spaces, and how and when political articulations tip into violence and exclusion. Motoji Matsuda discusses urban organizations with a focus on Nairobi, Kenya. He examines those promoted by international aid agencies, national governments or large non-governmental organizations (NGOs), led by highly educated individuals and based on internationally recognized principles—such as democracy, trans-

parency and an audit system—and those formed from within communities, without any special leadership or formal principles and based on local residents' everyday knowledge and wisdom. Organizations of the first kind are well structured and may deal with large-scale development projects. Organizations of the second kind tend to emerge almost spontaneously and are inherently unstable; as they usually lack a set philosophy and a clear structure, they arise and disappear as core issues arise and are settled. Matsuda studies the limits of the first type and the creative potential of the second type, and attempts to evaluate the potential effectiveness of each.

The voice of people at the grassroots is an important theme which cuts across this *Handbook* and which ethnographic analysis is well equipped to address. This issue is at the centre of Cynthia Gonzalez's chapter. She argues that the dynamics of urban life require a reconceptualization of 'the field' as a knowledge-filled space, which now includes people's knowledge about themselves. Spatial distribution and social interaction in urban areas are significant aspects of urban ethnography that account for people in the margins. Gonzalez engages with empirical evidence on marginalized communities living in urban areas to challenge injustice. While anthropology remains usefully embedded in participant observation and the study of the intersections of the political, social and cultural, she notes, it welcomes knowledge from the people in the communities under study, through ethnographic accounts and participatory research, including ethnographic accounts written by scholars studying the urban settings where they come from. Fotini Tsibiridou's chapter highlights the creative potential of local practices and their critical relationship with political agendas. In the belief that urban anthropology needs to establish a dialogue with art, architecture and other social sciences, Tsibiridou argues for building bridges with key informants such as artists, authors, performers and activists, who are engaged in reflecting on their own society and producing 'texts' that, alongside participant observation, can contribute to shedding light on the politics of dissent that oppose authoritarian rule and old and new hegemonies. She describes activism in a neighbourhood at the heart of Istanbul that, since Christian minorities withdrew in the 1960s, has hosted people from the margins, such as leftist activists, internal migrants, black Turks and Kurds, and is now marked by art production, Western-style consumerism and entertainment

Part VI addresses 'Transnational Urbanities' through the ethnographic research of Robyn Andrews among Anglo-Indians, Vytis Ciubrinskas among Eastern Europeans in Chicago, Sidney A. da Silva among Haitians in Manaus and Christian Giordano in Malaysia and Singapore. Andrews focuses on Asansol, a small industrial city (coal, iron and steel) by Indian standards but one of the fastest growing in the state of West Bengal. Its significant railway junction in particular accounts for the presence of an Anglo-Indian community, whose members, unlike those in other parts of the state, tend to own their homes and put down roots in India. Andrews' ethnographic investigation tests the idea that, at least in part, this is a result of a growing sense of citizenship in the local Anglo-

Indian community. She asks whether they are involved in any level of governance, administration and decision-making and whether the minority status of their cultural and religious affiliations is still significant. The discussion illuminates various aspects of 'modern' India, such as a transnational workforce; economic changes, including property speculation and development; and the effect of cultural and religious differences. Andrews then analyses the impact that these processes have had on this community. Ciubrinskas, too, looks at an established immigrant community. He draws on long-term fieldwork in Chicago among Chicagoans with a Lithuanian background to argue for a grassroots understanding of transnationalism which addresses intra and interethnic relations among Chicagoans with an Eastern European background who want to share 'common' cultural citizenship and (post-)socialist social capital. He explores two kinds of social enactment of difference—one based on identity politics and directed towards homeland nationalism and the other addressing post-socialist interethnic networking as a (post-)socialist legacy transplanted from Eastern Europe.

The study of established immigrants extends to key parts of da Silva's ethnography of Haitians in Manaus. The local government initially saw their arrival in 2010 as a transitory event. While their influx has decreased since 2014, they have taken root in Manaus and in other Brazilian cities. This migration process has had consequences, such as the transformation of humanitarian visas into permanent visas, family reunification and a sociocultural insertion process. Cultural elements, da Silva suggests, play a diversified role in the construction and affirmation of identity. In this 'symbolic struggle' for recognition of their differences and rights, immigrants' forms of cultural and political organization are essential in the search for broader exchanges and in overcoming different types of discrimination and social exclusion that multicultural policies might impose on them in the name of defending diversity. This part ends with Giordano's empirically informed perspective on diversity. He takes stock of Penang's policy of consociation. When Malaysia and Singapore became independent, a modus vivendi satisfactory for all needed to be found. A compromise between different ethno-cultural components was achieved, he notes, by discarding the European-like political model of a national state and adopting a model in which both the autochthonous population and the immigrants are regarded as members of a consociation characterized by power sharing and by a differentiated citizenship. Giordano shows that in a situation marked by highly conspicuous ethno-cultural differences, power sharing and a policy of 'unity in separation' stemming from the political principle of differentiated citizenship have generated forms of social cohesion characterized by constant tensions and, at times, open conflict, but also by social practices of respect towards cultural diversity.

The four chapters in Part VII examine dynamics of urbanity in and beyond the city. Bringing out the importance of a holistic approach, Liora Sarfati's ethnography highlights the complex ways in which the diverse and extensive presence of vernacular religion in Seoul makes even controversial practices, such as spirit mediumship, an inseparable part of the experience provided by

the city. Sarfati draws on detailed material regarding Seoul's religious urban landscape, collected through participant observation and in-depth discussions and interviews, to explore the relationships between religious belief and spatial considerations influenced by fast urbanization, including a hike in land prices and professional zoning. She examines the impact of vernacular religion on the urban landscape through three cases of interaction between urban dwellers and religious practices. She looks at divination tents in central downtown spots, at shamanic shrines on the hills and mountains around Seoul that become a debated ground when the city extends and encapsulates their sites, and at the representation of vernacular religion in the Korean media. The rural–urban axiom is detailed by Andrea Boscoboinik in her examination of a process of urbanization that is taking place in a Swiss Alps village. She contextualizes these transformations theoretically by looking at the decreasing value of dichotomies such as rural–urban and centre–periphery. She discusses the influence of new forms of mobility, multi-local dwelling and tourism in the rural–urban transformation. Then, bringing to mind other contributors' analyses of processes of gentrification in traditionally urban settings, Boscoboinik discusses rural gentrification as a tool that helps us to understand how peripheral regions become new centres. Intriguingly, she shows how the city has been exported to rural and mountain areas, how places attractive to urbanites for their natural elements have become increasingly urbanized. As a result of upper-class urbanites exporting their way of life, the natural landscape is being aggressively built up and small villages are becoming cities. On the other hand, Margarida Fernandes looks at the interaction between Lisbon, its surrounding areas and the rest of the country, with particular emphasis on the relations between town and country. Based on fieldwork, she suggests the variations in the urban and rural settings may be an artifice because they impinge inevitably on each other. The ideas of tradition, heritage, community and culture in each setting, as well as the experience of community life, are probably not significantly different in the way they are understood, even if they may be different in the ways they are expressed. The intensity of the feelings of belonging are a measure of face-to-face relations and dense social networks. Finally, Talbot Rogers draws on his wealth of knowledge as a vastly experienced educator and on his ethnographic research to offer a stimulating counterpoint to analyses focused on rural people's adjustment to urban life. He shows how young adults with an urban background find difficult to adapt to a small-town lifestyle. Through observation and in-depth interviews, Rogers examines the experience of undergraduate African-American students attending a southern Appalachian University. They all come from cities which are much larger than the town that borders the university. They enjoy their classes, feel little of the effects of racism typical of the South of a few decades ago, but uniformly find themselves bored. Most of the other students leave campus for their homes nearby, but these students do not, by and large, own automobiles and must stay on the campus. They find themselves isolated and unable to make new friends and, as a consequence, some plan to drop out of university.

Ethnography Matters

In his remarks on 'the theory of the city', Don Martindale maintained that 'the age of the city' as described by European theorists seemed to be at an end (1958). By this he meant that the size and number of urban settlements had grown and would continue to grow gradually, bringing to an end the rural–urban divide which had allegedly characterized industrial society up to the mid-twentieth century. Society, he argued, had become urbanized. This view was shared by those who saw urbanization as the growth of built-up, densely populated areas, given that the so-called metropolitan areas have grown exponentially across the world. However, as we have pointed out and many contributions to this *Handbook* clearly show, the 'urban' extends beyond the administrative boundaries of the city not only in terms of built-up area but also in terms of lifestyles, behaviours, social interactions, economic activities and so on. Modern transport and communication, including the Internet, have contributed to this process. Moreover, while it could be said that the 'urban' has been delocalized as people have moved to the suburbs to live or work, and as urban demographics have been boosted by rural–urban migration and, especially, by ever-growing foreign immigration. As has been noted,[9] these new migrations have engendered conflict but also forms of cooperation with the autochthonous population.

This is an ongoing process, for the 'urban' continues to be transformed. As we have indicated, paraphrasing Weber, it could be said that it is not the city as *urbs* that produces the distinguishing qualities of urban life; rather, it is new historical conditions that determine the emergence of new meanings of 'being urban', influencing our conception of the common good and of associated life in a shared 'urban space' as a whole, comprising the physical built-up space of the *urbs*, the social space of the *civitas* and the political space of the *polis*. What role has ethnography in this?

The chapters collected in this *Handbook* may reasonably be seen as a coherent effort to argue the point that ethnographic analysis matters to our understanding of our urban world and offers vivid, well-informed contributions to decision-makers interested in making it better. We hope that the reader will enjoy the ethnographic analyses and the theoretical insights offered here as much as we enjoyed bringing them together and editing the resulting collection.

Notes

1. In keeping with *Diogène*'s tradition, the English version of this Special Issue (251–252) is being published by Sage as *Placing Urban Anthropology*.
2. This peer-reviewed open-access *Journal of Urban Ethnography* was established in 2011; 13 issues have been published to date. Available at: http://www.anthrojournal-urbanities.com.
3. For details on the mission of this series, see: https://www.palgrave.com/in/series/14573.

4. Available at: https://www.routledge.com/Urban-Anthropology/book-series/ASHSER1320.
5. As standard practice, a draft introduction and outline of the volume were also circulated, alongside reviewers' comments, among the contributors, who were aware of their inclusion in specific sections and were encouraged to engage with this information.
6. For example, the aforementioned Special Issue of *Diogène* and the seminar from which it sprang benefited from this kind of cross-disciplinary collaboration. The journal *Urbanities* has developed under the joint editorship of a social anthropologist and a qualitative sociologist. Formally, its book reviews and film and video reviews editors are, respectively, a sociologist and an anthropologist, and its scientific Board includes sociologists and anthropologists who actively contribute to the journal.
7. Good examples, among others, are given by the activities of the International Urban Symposium—IUS (http://www.internationalurbansymposium.com) and the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (IUAES) Commission on Urban Anthropology.
8. For a detailed assessment of this debate, see Prato and Pardo (2013).
9. See Pardo (2009) and Chap. 3, and Chap. 7, Chap. 24, Chap. 25 and Chap. 26 in this *Handbook*.

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Paradigmatic Reflections

From Jaffa to New York: The Scope of Urban Anthropology

Moshe Shokeid

This chapter will document the author's changing choice of fieldwork sites in various urban locations, attempting to comprehend the professional-thematic link connecting this apparently disparate selection of social groups and research issues, as well as the shifting methodological apparatus. This personal journey might shed some light on the scope and the potential contribution of ethnographic work in the kaleidoscopic and the continually changing construction of contemporary urban environments. In retrospect, the following record of field studies seems to encapsulate the volume editors' introductory exposition of the circumstances and transformations that generated the present disciplinary domain of urban anthropology (Prato and Pardo 2013; see also Forum 'Urban Anthropology' 2013, 2014).

I started my anthropological career in the late 1960s under the supervision of the Africanist Max Gluckman, who was leader of the Manchester School famous for its rigorous fieldwork methods, the 'extended case method' in particular (for example, Van Velsen 1967; Burawoy et al. 1991). Transferring from the study of sociology, I went through a short period of training in Manchester and left for the field—a village of Jewish immigrants from the Atlas Mountains settled in the Israeli semi-arid Negev region (Shokeid 1971a/1985; Deshen and Shokeid 1974). However, although in the convention of community studies, that project, conducted by an Israeli student, represented the somewhat new genre of 'anthropology at home', engaging the researcher in issues close to his own social environment (Shokeid 1971b). My observations revealed the complex process of immigrants' absorption into their new sociocultural environment, their accommodation with modern agriculture practised within the

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framework of a cooperative communal organization, and, particularly, the continuity and change of the immigrants' system of beliefs (such as the cult of saints). The analysis was developed in terms of the functionalist theories of modernization typical to the studies of that period among Third World societies.

ARAB ENCLAVE IN TEL AVIV-JAFFA

My next ethnographic project engaged me in research even closer to home. It followed a meeting with an Israeli Arab student who attended my anthropology introductory course at Tel Aviv University (TAU) and who was a resident of Jaffa, the major Palestinian city annexed to Tel Aviv since the 1948 war (which triggered a Palestinian exodus, the Nakba). After the majority of its inhabitants (about 90,000) evacuated Jaffa, only a small minority (about 8000) stayed behind, concentrated in the coastal suburb of Ajami, though not separated from Jewish neighbours. While most Palestinians who remained in Israel after 1948 were village residents (see Cohen 1965), a few groups continued living in what became known as 'mixed-towns' (see, for example, Weingrod 2011), as well as in Nazareth, the major Arab Christian town in Palestine. Naturally, I accepted the student's invitation to attend Christmas mass at his Catholic Jaffa church.

That late discovery of a group of people representing the dramatic outcome of the Israeli/Arab national conflict residing 'next door'—within the borders of my hometown—immediately raised a mix of professional curiosity and an emotional response. I was soon convinced I had found my new anthropological mission, despite the fact it was taking me away from the 'classical' programme of a rural/tribal small, clearly bordered compact community field site. As a sign of my passionate decision, I rented a room with the family of my Jaffa student. I soon comprehended the complexity of the local Arab society, which included various Christian denominations and a larger group of Muslims. Meanwhile, it became clear I could not continue to reside with my Christian hosts and maintain a neutral position. As my own home was nearby, I instead commuted to Ajami on a daily basis, mostly in the afternoons, attending meetings, interviewing and spending many hours with Arab friends in local coffee shops until late in the evening. I was aware that earlier pioneering urban ethnographies were often conducted without the ethnographer residing at the site of research but in close geographical proximity. Consequently, without prior planning and preparation, I realized I was undertaking research in a fashion similar to that displayed in recent works among urban ethnic enclaves—starting with Whyte's seminal *Street Corner Society* (1955).

For two years, 1972 to 1974, I carried out observations among groups of Christians and Muslims, studying various facets of social life. However, I concentrated on issues of communal life, searching my subjects' response to the loss of their traditional leadership, among the latter in particular. The Christians, members of various denominations, retained their churches' clergy, often of

foreign nationalities, who preserved some elements of ordinary communal life. Also, the socio-economic circumstances of the Christian constituency seemed somewhat improved compared with that of the Muslim residents. My major thesis demonstrated the impact of the Arab code of honour on family and political life under the constraints of Israeli control and dealing with the deterioration of local communal organization (Shokeid and Deshen 1982). My observations revealed a difference in the position of women separating these two major religions. Christian women were more often engaged in the occupational domain outside their homes and their men did not complain about corruptive impact of Jewish culture on their comportment. Muslim men, however, displayed a more traditional viewpoint towards their women, and were worried they were being influenced by Jewish neighbours. My conclusions tried also to explain the belligerent–competitive relationships that often dominated personal affiliations between the Muslim men I observed. I interpreted that display of more traditional family relationships and conflictual public behaviour as related to the breakdown of communal life. At the same time, however, I suggested such behaviour also revealed a symbolic expression of belonging to the wider Arab world, projecting the tenets of the Arab-Muslim code of honour.

However, on completion of my task I realized that the ethnographic narrative and manner of analytical interpretation did not substantially differ from my earlier study of a 'whole community' separated from a wider social context, with the researcher a 'full-time' resident on the premises. Moreover, it became clear I had also employed, for some parts of my analysis, the extended case method when recording the history of the intricate personal relationships and series of events I followed for many months among the Muslim participants in particular.

Israeli Immigrants (Yordim) in New York

I was planning a sabbatical leave in the early 1980s, at a time when the Israeli media and public discourse were often engaged with the phenomenon of Israeli citizens who had left Israel for the USA in particular; such persons were derogatively nicknamed Yordim—those who 'go down' (compared with the Olim, those who 'go up'—migrating to Israel). That public attitude expressed a notion of disdain mixed with worry about the welfare of Israel, when citizens born and raised there prefer to give up any responsibility and commitment to their homeland for the sake of opportunistic economic advantages abroad. I was intrigued by the atmosphere of stigmatization, fuelled by the memory of PM Rabin publically calling the Yordim 'the leftover of failures' (*nefolet shel nemushot*). I felt a mix of curiosity about the national moral panic, as well as about the 'character' of the individuals reviled and the circumstances that triggered that 'betrayal' by compatriots who seemed to be progenies of my own generation.

I made arrangements to stay in New York when I was appointed Visiting Professor at Queens College. New York had a reputation as a major attraction

for Israeli migrants and the borough of Queens saw their main concentration at that time. My wife and I rented an apartment in proximity to other Israeli families and our young children went to a Jewish school recruiting Israeli pre-schoolers. We stayed for two years (1982–1984), socializing mostly with 'Yordim'. I attended weekly meetings in an Israeli social club as well as other Israeli public cultural activities. I developed close relationships with single men, women and families, neighbours and participants in various venues attracting Israelis as customers and clients. My spouse and young children played an important role in that semi-ethnic environment. We were warmly received by those compatriots who had shared a similar sociocultural background in Israel, mostly middle-class professionals engaged in various occupations, but also business people and technical operators. We seemed, to many among them, candidates for staying on in the USA, as they had observed many other similar visitors, academics included, who had not planned to permanently emigrate on arrival, change their minds. In sum, we were treated as 'members of the tribe' and as potential Yordim. Although this impression was erroneous, we contin-ued to meet with our New York friends for many years during their visits to Israel and my own ongoing New York sojourns conducting the follow-ing research projects.

My conclusions were succinctly expressed in the title of the ethnography *Children of Circumstances: Israeli Emigrants in New York* (1988). Most Israelis I met had not planned to emigrate. They went abroad as tourists or students, to visit relatives or to temporarily relocate as representatives of government or other public or private agencies, and expected to return on the conclusion of their mission. They were not 'political refugees' and often held far more nation-alistic views compared with my own leftist position. However, 'we were stuck' (*nitkanu*) was the 'mantra' repeated in many conversations and public dis-courses. Various developments and constraints of life and work situations first postponed their return and later became impossible to change and allow them to go back. For example, students were offered attractive employment posi-tions soon after graduation, single men and women who arrived as students or tourists met local spouses, representatives of Israeli agencies were reluctant or unable to take on their previous jobs in Israel, while no other promising employment was available to them immediately on their return to Israel. Sometimes their children were enrolled in educational programmes they were reluctant to terminate before completion.

A few years abroad often changed their viewpoints about professional pros-pects and the daily life circumstances in Israel compared with their experiences as sojourners in the USA. In sum, as much as they wished to return, the longer they stayed on the less going back seemed a feasible option. Actually, they often regret-ted the circumstances that made them relinquish the close company of family and friends as well as the more attractive features of social life in Israel. However, New York offered the options of successful integration not only occupationally but also socially. Israelis were no different in their appearance and manners from mainstream white New Yorkers. They tended to reside in neighbourhoods popu-

lar among Israelis, but these did not turn into segregated enclaves compared with other ethnic newcomers' residential concentrations in the city.

No doubt my observations among the Israelis in Queens differed greatly from my experience in Jaffa. The immigrant Israelis I encountered lacked any feature of past or present communal organization or shared local interests. They arrived in Queens with no prior mutual relationships and met sporadically as participants in cultural events, as clients and neighbours. I met them as individuals (singles or families) with no series of connecting social events to be analysed in terms of the 'extended case method'. I described their ethnic/national collective presentation as 'one-night-stand ethnicity'.

My conclusions in what became the first ethnography that presented the Israeli American diaspora seemed to contest popular assumptions and stereotypes about the Yordim. Instead of their portrayal as pathetic cab drivers and other low-class employees, they were described in my text as mostly successful migrants who left Israel not because of opportunistic greediness, nor for any wish to escape the responsibilities and the dangers facing citizens in a country continually under the vestiges of war. Moreover, I argued the majority will not return disillusioned by their prospects in the USA. My portrayal, however, seemed to irritate the editors of a few Israeli publishers to whom I forwarded the English manuscript. One in particular claimed my research population did not represent the 'totality' of Israeli Yordim in the USA (assuming that most others immigrants are less successful and might return). Disappointed by that response, I lost interest investing time and energy preparing a Hebrew version (demanding a somewhat more nuanced perspective considering the Israeli readership stance) without the assurance of a supportive publisher. However, I published a comprehensive article in *Megamot* (1991), the leading Hebrew social sciences journal.

THE GAY SYNAGOGUE (CBST) IN NEW YORK

Even before returning to Tel Aviv I was contemplating the options of my next ethnographic venture in New York. I could pursue my Yordim research in the borough of Brooklyn, which seemed to attract a changing constituency of Israeli migrants. However, during my research of the Yordim in Queens I was asked by a colleague at Queens College to join him advising a graduate student who was conducting an observation study at Congregation Beit Simchat Torah (CBST), the New York gay synagogue located in Manhattan's West Village. I was curious to discover that 'exotic' institution challenging the rules and ethics of Jewish traditional dogma and in confrontation with the major bodies of the Jewish establishment in America (the Orthodox movements in particular). I visited the congregation in the company of the student, who seemed unable to complete his project, handicapped by some personal difficulties. I was impressed by the friendly atmosphere and the social ambiance of a mixed crowd of mostly young, educated men and women. I considered that encounter one more fascinating experience in the kaleidoscopic urban tapestry of New York city. But,

on my return to New York in 1988 as Dorot Visiting Professor at New York University (NYU), I lost the urge to continue my research among the Israeli migrants. I felt I had already made a major observation, revealing the elements affecting the existential situation of many of them at that time. At the same time, however, I discovered the student I tried to help had given up his research at CBST. I felt an impulse to revisit that site and try comprehend the drive compelling these men and women to join an institution and a cultural tradition that stigmatized their sexual/social identity and way of life.

It took some time before I realized I was on the verge of conducting a new ethnographic project. I was gradually integrated into the scene, attending services, social events and meetings of various committees open to the membership, getting acquainted with and developing friendships among the congregants, and so on. It was the first time I had conducted observations outside the representation of a society clearly identified by the marks and borders of a residential location. Instead, I was concentrating on an institution offering a meeting site for individuals congregating intermittently, coming from various geographical locations, seeking confirmation for their gender, sexual, ethnic and spiritual identity. It seemed a radical departure from the tradition and ethos of my professional training, implemented in field sites and revealing some shared characteristics of community studies conducted in rural or urban settings. I questioned whether it was an anthropological undertaking in the real sense of the term?

However, my association with CBST became a major occupation beside my teaching tasks at NYU. I soon dismissed hesitations about the 'legitimacy' of my new ethnographic endeavour and after concluding the NYU engagement I took a sabbatical leave from TAU and returned to New York to continue my research, intensely studying the institution, its membership, leadership and cultural programme. My fieldwork coincided with the peak of the tragic spread of the HIV virus and the mounting numbers of AIDS victims included or impacted on many of my close CBST friends (Shokeid 1995). For a few years during the 1990s I continued visiting CBST on sabbatical trips, or attending conferences that enabled me to follow up changes in the composition of its membership and the structure of leadership in particular (Shokeid 2001, 2003). Thus, I witnessed the dramatic expansion of the female constituency and the development of a bureaucratic structure headed by formally appointed rabbis and other paid officers replacing the volunteer organization I had observed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I continued visiting CBST more sporadically in later years, witnessing its growth and success, culminating in the purchase of a site in midtown Manhattan and the establishment of an attractive and spacious synagogue (inaugurated in April 2016) for the leading lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) Jewish congregation in the USA. However, it has now become a different institution in structure and membership from the intimate social organization, led mostly by men with limited public visibility, that I came to study nearly 25 years earlier. In any case, the CBST ethnography study coloured my professional reputation, shrouding my earlier ethnographic projects.

LGBT Community Services Center in New York

However, during my association with CBST I had become acquainted with the LGBT Community Services Center, also in West Village, whose first founding chair was a leading CBST congregant. The 'Center', located in an abandoned school building, became home to over a hundred organizations and other public social activities representing a wide panorama of sexual interests and social needs appealing to LGBT people. I was soon fascinated by this vibrant world of queer life concentrated in one compact urban site, but inviting in participants from all walks of life, ethnicity, religion and geographical location. I was 'hooked', as had happened to me a few years earlier with CBST, and gradually I started attending a variety of weekly meetings and other public events.

During the late 1990s and 2000s I spent my sabbaticals and other academic engagements in New York and nearby locations (for example, the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study), regularly observing sessions and other activities programmed by a few social groups that particularly seemed to attract my interest. The published ethnography (2015a) included a detailed picture of social activities in six organizations (mostly affiliates of national networks) based in the Center, as well as a few Christian gay congregations located in downtown Manhattan and Brooklyn. I reported only on those groups where I thought I had observed their activities long enough to enable a reliable ethnographic presentation (about six months or more). These included, for example, senior gay men, sexually compulsive men and women, bisexual men and women and interracial gay men. The published work also presented a few intimate portraits of close 'informants', thus introducing the life experiences of gay men as full persona. As suggested by reviewers coming from the LGBT community (Phillips 2016), the book offered a penetrating observation of present-day urban gay life by an outsider (non-American and non-gay), enabling an in-depth view of personal conduct and social settings unnoticed by insiders.

My engagement with Christian and Jewish gay religious congregations, as well as the voluntary associations offering gay people a safe space to reveal and express their socio-sexual identity and find mates for conjugal, erotic and social relationships, represented field sites unique to the urban environment. These locations and organizations introduce the soothing part of Bech's verdict (1997, 98): 'The city with its crowds and mutual strangers, is the place where the homosexual can come together with others: and—at the same time for the same reasons—it is the place that confirms his loneliness.'

Ethiopians, Foreign Labour and Refugees in Israeli Neighbourhoods

I ended my voyage in urban sites by closing a circle, returning to the realities of present-day Israeli society. I have been focusing lately (2011–2014) on the emergence of a new type of social minority concentrating in Israeli cities (reminiscent of similar processes in European major urban sites). I was first invited

to join a team of interdisciplinary experts investigating the frequency of sui-cides among Jewish immigrants from Ethiopia—residents of poor ethnic enclaves in a few Israeli towns. Our conclusions reported on older men in particular, migrants from a rural background in Ethiopia who, under the vicis-situdes of immigration, have lost their leading position in the family and the community and consequently committed disparate acts, suicide included (Youngmann and Shokeid 2012). No doubt Ethiopian immigrants would have experienced far less difficulties had they arrived in the 1950s or 1960s, when Jewish newcomers from the Atlas Mountains and other Third World countries were settled in farming communities. That compared with their striking inferi-ority and bleak prospects as unskilled workers displaced from their native com-munities, residents of poor urban neighbourhoods.

Sometime later I conducted a survey of a Tel Aviv municipal agency (Mesila) offering various services to foreign labourers, refugees and asylum seekers (mostly from Sudan and Eritrea) concentrated in downtown Tel Aviv (in neighbourhoods adjacent to the old and new central bus station). The foreign labourers and asylum seekers in particular face the hostile reactions of their Israeli neighbours, who blame them for the deterioration of the security, the physical conditions and the reputation of their neighbourhoods. These two new distinctive populations in the tapestry of present-day Israeli urban society have raised different dilemmas and different conclusions (Shokeid 2015b). However, they both attest to the changing construction of the Israeli social urban landscape.

Discussion

In sum, my history of research in 'the city' included: the Jaffa Arab minority meshed into Jewish Tel Aviv; the Israeli immigrant enclave in New York; the gay synagogue, the gay churches and the gay voluntary associations in New York; the experience of Ethiopian immigrants in Israeli urban ethnic niches; and last, the concentration of foreign labour and refugees in downtown Tel Aviv. We confront now the following queries: Is there any experiential or analytical thread connecting these discrete ethnographic projects conducted in urban locations? What is the disciplinarian expertise of the researcher? Is this the result of a personal eccentric choice based on some whim of the moment? How does the practice of picking field sites legitimate my claim to represent the domain and method of 'urban anthropology'?

I clearly did not have a research scheme articulated in advance to guide my field-site choices and their order in time. These were all the result of impromptu circumstances that gained my enthusiastic engagement. I assume there were other research options of similar importance that did not instigate my curiosity and willingness to invest time and energy in their further exploration. I am reminded of Ulf Hannerz's report on a similar research history: 'We seize on experiences and openings which somehow come in our way, and we are vulner-able to happenings in the world over which we have no control' (2010, 70). In

retrospect, I can identify a shared motif connecting my choices: the existential condition of people enthralled in the predicament of their problematic position as social minorities, often confronting the hostility revealed by an inimical host society or stigmatized for their personal identity (including the case of the Israelis disparaged by their compatriots at home). All these, however, have been social and physical/territorial configurations emerging under circumstances unique to each specific urban environment.

Trained in a school of rigorous fieldwork methods, I tried to implement its ethos and practice under the changing context and conditions of my urban research locations. In this sense, my research could be described as 'anthropology *in* the city' (Prato and Pardo 2013). I lived in a nearby neighbourhood, visiting daily for many months my Muslim and Christian friends in Jaffa. I stayed with my family for two years in a Queens neighbourhood hosting many Israeli migrants, where I attended Israeli sociocultural activities, my children went to school with other Israeli kids, and we developed close relationships with numerous Israeli individuals and families. I regularly attended all services and committee meetings, and nurtured close relationships with male and female congregants at the gay synagogue, and later at the gay churches (the Metropolitan Community Church in particular). I regularly went to the LGBT Center weekly meetings and other activities organized at the six associations reported in the ethnographic text, and developed close personal relationships with several participants in these groups. I taught a class of Ethiopian students and, together with a colleague, a psychologist, we interviewed Ethiopian community leaders, met with professionals serving Ethiopian patients, analysed records of individuals who had committed suicide and conducted focus group sessions with representatives of the Ethiopian constituency, discussing the circumstances of migration from Ethiopia and their life experiences in Israel. And, lastly, I attended daily patients' intake encounters and the weekly staff meetings at a municipal organization (Mesila) providing services to the community of foreign labourers and refugees, attended meetings of a team of African communal leaders and developed friendly relationships with several individuals (for example, an Eritrean food store proprietor).

In sum, I tried to participate in vivo or conduct observations as closely as possible to the arena of the investigated groups' public display, and examined the personal conduct of individuals representing these groups in detail. There is no doubt I have been unable replicate in all urban ethnographies the strategy of the 'extended case method' generated in the reality of community studies, as experienced in my first ethnographic project in a village of Moroccan immigrants and to some extent among the Arabs in Ajami/Jaffa. My professional experience demonstrates the immense changes that have taken place in recent decades in the practice of fieldwork observations and ethnographic textual reports: from observing 'whole communities' to multi-sited and other fluctuating forms of ethnographic engagement (e.g. Hannerz 2010; see also Falzon 2009; Hannerz 2009). I articulated that transformation under the suggestive title 'from the Tikopia to polymorphous engagements' (2007).

Nevertheless, throughout that course of changing field sites, my position and role as the lone anthropologist (except for my part in the study of suicides among Ethiopian immigrants) most visibly remained, as I conducted research in the composite, crowded and borderless urban arena. I am aware of the somewhat ironic comment: 'how can the "deep hanging out" of a lone ethnographer yield compelling analysis of these broader social dynamics?' (Barker et al. 2013, 166). However, as reported also by other practitioners, this 'deep hanging out' in fieldwork situations attest to the significant contribution of the lone ethnographer exploring the urban environment versus the sociological methodological convention of formal research methods (of interviews, surveys, statistical analysis etc.) In any case, my research strategies focused on participant observation as a method of uncovering and explaining the adaptations and accommodations of urban populations to the micro-environments under investigation (Low 2001, 15999).

And last, why do I consider the mixed list of my research assignments as representative of the field of 'urban anthropology' (Prato and Pardo 2013)? As indicated earlier, I was not trained in disciplinary venues nor directly engaged with the growing volume of treatises exploring issues of theory and practice in urban anthropology (Sanjek 1990; Low 2001; Anderson 2001). No doubt I was inspired by the early ethnographic studies conducted in urban locations under the leadership of the Chicago School (Park et al. 1925/1967) and a few later memorable works in particular (Whyte 1955; Mitchell 1956; Lewis 1967; Hannerz 1969). I moved on spontaneously from one field site to the next in New York and Tel Aviv. I believe the subjects under observation and the social issues of my reporting were both the results of the circumstances and the social transformations emerging in the urban context representing the currently dominant research trends in urban anthropology, investigating ethnicity, race, class and gender in particular (see, for example, Prato and Pardo 2013, 92–93 and 97–100). Probably not a popular assessment, I compared urban anthropologists with medical 'general practitioners' who assess and treat many different conditions, though s/he may develop deeper expertise with regard to some specific organs and symptoms. Thus, I moved along themes of immigration, ethnicity and sexuality.

The socio-economic–political situation of the Arab minority in a Jaffa neighbourhood annexed to Tel Aviv was quite different from that experienced by the majority of their compatriots who stayed on in villages around the country (Cohen 1965). The Israeli migrants were attracted to the rich occupational opportunities in New York where, similarly to other new ethnic migrants, they could maintain a semi-Israeli lifestyle not available in smaller locations (Foner 2013). The same conclusion applies to the less fortunate foreign labourers and refugees concentrated in downtown Tel Aviv, a phenomenon anthropologists have observed in other Western metropolitan cities (Eksner 2013). The Ethiopian immigrants, although favoured Jewish Olim, were adversely affected by their incompatibility to modern city life (Offer 2007). The gay synagogue, the gay churches and the variety of gay sexual and social organizations I observed in New York were all

outgrowths of the sexual and lifestyle freedoms that had evolved in recent years in metropolitan cities in the USA and Western Europe (Murray 1996).

In conclusion, it is the plethora of singular social issues originating in the urban texture that guided me in the choice of research engagements I label 'urban anthropology'. Have I really changed the ethos, the drive and the habitual involvement with the group under study, effectively empathizing with them while moving away from the study of a 'whole community' and relocating to my 'polymorphous' urban engagements? In my experience, the city of today represents the African continent that absorbed the energy and imagination of my teachers in Manchester before the proliferation of specialized subfields. I remain a committed ethnographer intrigued by the rainbow of the human condition in the context of the urban mundane affecting the lives of the majority of present-day citizens in most countries.

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Between Stereotype and Bad Governance: An Italian Ethnography

Italo Pardo

FOR ETHNOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS

I am committed to an ethnographically based analysis because, though wary of narrow empiricism, I share the anthropologist's 'natural' aversion to unjustified abstraction (Leach 1977, xviff.; Harris 1986, Chap. 1). Throughout my professional career I have heeded the methodological *sine qua non* that serious research must address the complexity of real life, steering clear of conceptual superimposition. Here, I mean to illustrate this point.

Taking stock of a diachronic view gained through over thirty years of ethnographic enquiry, I recently reflected on the twisted role played by the stereotyping of ordinary people. 'Bogging down a stigmatized people in a stigmatized region of Europe'[1]—I noted—such stereotype

> 'pays lip service to the tabloid view of Southerners and the attendant rhetoric, which may help to sell newspapers and make lucrative television viewing but, as is disturbingly suggested by the ethnography, … it serves the interests of certain dominant groups with critically adverse consequences for a very large part of ordinary Italians' (Pardo 2012, 55).

As a classically trained social anthropologist, I have direct experience of the unique contribution that the discipline's paradigm can make when casting light on our world and its political, economic and cultural dynamics. I bear witness to its power in deconstructing the stereotypes and prejudices on which political instrumentalism and bad governance thrive, and to its significance to questioning

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overly structured analyses of relations of power in contemporary society. I testify to its value to informed engagement in public debate. In short, the importance of ethnographic knowledge cannot be overemphasized.

As there seems to be some—unwarranted—confusion in the current literature regarding the word 'ethnography', it might be worth expanding on what I have just said. To me, the ethnographic methodology that characterizes the classic anthropological paradigm means that the fieldworker will become involved in depth in local processes over an extended period of time. S/he will investigate the interactions between the social, the economic, the political and the cultural through the systematic application of the tried and tested methods of participant observation and the in-depth case study of people, groups, situations and events, and, if required, will devise new field techniques. S/he will, in synthesis, engage in a holistic study of the chosen setting.[2]

The foregoing applies to urban as to rural arenas. While I have conducted most of my work in Western urban settings (London, Naples, Palermo, Florence and Prato), I have applied the anthropological paradigm to my research in rural south Italy, and in Kent and Sussex, Burgundy and Latium. Of course, in such diverse settings empirical methods needed to be adapted. The methodology and the paradigmatic framework remained, however, unchanged. With reference to my urban work, this is basically why I insist on describing myself as a social anthropologist who undertakes research in the city (Pardo 2012).

Like contributions to journals such as *Urbanities* and in the series on 'urban anthropology' published by Palgrave Macmillan and Routledge, my own work in the urban West is ethnographically based and holistic. Elsewhere I have discussed in detail important aspects of anthropological fieldwork (1996, Chap. 1; 2012), such as the definition of and entry into the field, the selection of informants and of case studies, the in-depth investigation of links and networks, the problem of cross-referencing information provided by informants, the complex relationship between objectivity and subjectivity,[3] confidentiality and professional ethics,[4] and so on. In keeping with the topic of this *Handbook*, I will limit the present discussion to aspects of my ethnographic journey through an urban situation where ordinary people are diachronically caught between stereotype and a governance that, marred by high rhetoric, low delivery and double standards, lacks authority. Urban ethnography, over time, helps to illuminate this problematic and its broader sociological significance.

Introductory Remarks

The authoritative Associazione per lo Sviluppo dell'Industria nel Mezzogiorno (SVIMEZ, Association for the Industrial Development of South Italy) has documented in statistical detail south Italy's economic stagnation and has identified key processes for the region's economic improvement (2016). The challenge is to implement policies that encourage local entrepreneurialism and urban regeneration, and the efficient management of immigration from outside the EU.

The anthropological analysis of the situation in Naples and its region, Campania, has engendered similar conclusions (Pardo 1996, 2000a, 2000b, 2009, 2012). I have illustrated how an in-depth understanding of the moral complexity and social value of individual action has helped to gain a better view of current economic processes and, more broadly, of key dynamics of legitimacy and legality in the relationship between citizenship and governance (Holston 2009; Pardo and Prato 2011) in the fields of social policy, legislation, integration and access to rights. Drawing on long-term anthropological fieldwork, the discussion that follows will summarize those findings to offer reflections on the empirical dynamics that make it difficult for the aforementioned challenge to be met in today's scenario. I address the impact of slanted policies and bad governance on local life. I conclude, bleakly, that this adverse combination frustrates local entrepreneurialism and culture, in the process crippling the democratic contract.

The Background: A Summary

Up to the early 1990s, the south of Italy was the object of central government 'extraordinary intervention', primarily through the Cassa del Mezzogiorno (literally, Fund for the South). Established in 1950, the Cassa was intended to stimulate economic growth through the development of the infrastructure—roads, bridges, aqueducts and so on—and through credit subsidies and tax advantages. However, while large companies (many based in the north) benefited, most local small and medium enterprises did not. The Cassa was discontinued in 1984. In 1992 all *extraordinary* intervention ceased, with a view to curbing the perverse use of public resources; this result, as we shall see, was not achieved.

The Cassa was supposed to address, and solve, what has become known as the 'Southern Question'; that is, the economic underdevelopment of the south, which for some, after Gramsci (1966), is a result *also*—many in this camp say, *primarily*—of its alleged cultural backwardness. For subscribers to either or both of these views a key part of the 'Question' was that corruption in public life was geographically limited to the south, due to the power of the Christian Democratic Party, as opposed to the virtuous north, mostly governed by the left.[5] Beyond political instrumentalism, spin and fake news, there was a remarkably different and uglier reality, which, as anyone who follows Italian affairs knows only too well, took many years to emerge.

In Italy, the ethnographer's task is notoriously complicated by recurrent reshuffles in the distribution of power and by intense judicial activity. A typical example of both is given by the *tangentopoli* (literally, bribesville) enquiries. Starting in the northern city of Milan, those judicial investigations quickly spread throughout the country. Raising issues on significant anomalies in the Italian system (Pardo 2012, 66), they destroyed the political system, leaving untouched what was the largest Communist Party in the West and the tiny, inconsequential Neo-Fascist Party.[6] Interestingly, since the early 1990s, most of the south has been ruled by leftist administrations that, as in much of Italy, keep making the headlines for corruption and abuse of office.

What I have outlined should be read in the context of a historically weak, fragmented industrialization which has led to a prominence of non-industrial and post-industrial values. Here, official unemployment is high, reaching 40 per cent among the young. It is widely accepted, however, that only a small proportion of the officially unemployed do not work[7]; many engage in activities that show a strong entrepreneurial spirit and, though strictly illegal, are seen as licit by the actors and their significant others (Pardo 1995). Very few get involved in crime.[8]

Local Entrepreneurialism: A Worm's-Eye View

I did my original urban field research in the mid-1980s among the *popolino* of a typical *quartiere* (neighbourhood) in central Naples,[9] and have since updated my ethnography through periodical two- to six-month field trips up to 2016. Naples, I knew, 'confronts the observer with a difficult decision—whether to dismiss it as a chaotic and anarchic place doomed to suicidal extinction through resignation to deprivation, marginality and ruin or to ask whether there is a rationale for its appearance that might explain things differently' (Pardo 1996, xi). I thought that a sociologically rooted ethnography could help to address this conundrum.

As per disciplinary tradition, before going into the field I conducted a thorough study of the existing literature, reputable media reports and statistical and documentary sources. This armchair phase detailed a stereotype of southern Italians that met a certain rhetoric of power. Promoted since the unification of the country (1861), it has been endorsed by generations of Italian and international writers, underscoring more or less implicitly, as I have explained (Pardo 1996, Chap. 1), the critical opposition between independent analysis and analysis that is *organic* to vested interests.[10] According to much of the literature, southerners, bogged down by lack of trust in each other and by their 'amoral familism', are politically and socially backward individualists who lack social responsibility and cannot be trusted. In particular, the *popolino* were collectively described as amoral and ungovernable people, dubbed as a dangerous underclass—a deprived and oppressed *sottoproletariato* (lumpenproletariat), as they were called in dominant Marxist parlance.[11] Even at that initial stage I was suspicious of a view that carried such ugly classist and racist undertones. My suspicions proved justified, as a very different picture of life and culture in central Naples emerged from anthropological field research. A few basic considerations are needed.

What smacked—to me—of cultural determinism has been convincingly exposed as obnoxious to reason and reality by countless events. Yet this stereotype continues to undermine southerners' citizenship in a scenario where the general economic and financial crisis combines with an enormous public debt (over four fifths of the annual regional budget). It continues to drive the approach of influential elite groups to important processes of inclusion and exclusion, and to justification of expedient legislation, lack of investment and

adverse credit policies that punish local business, particularly at the micro- and small level.

Once in the field, I adapted classic anthropological methods to my research setting and developed some new techniques. For example, alongside participant observation, specially devised network and affective diagrams and diagrams for the construction of structured work and life histories helped to map activities, exchanges and informants' significant moral and social universes. That field research emphasized that the application of the anthropological paradigm in Western urban settings can produce findings that have broad theoretical relevance, endorsing my earlier point that a holistic analysis and attention to the relationship between micro- and macro-processes raise no question about the validity of traditional fieldwork (Pardo 1996).

If one is lucky, in the field—wherever that may be, including the urban West—one will meet one's own 'Doc' (Whyte 1955), as I did soon after I started my research. My Doc, whom I have called Lino, was a locally well-connected, formally low-educated, highly intelligent micro-entrepreneur born and bred in the *quartiere*. Like other local people, he had a formal job and ran a profitable stall in a local street market, registered in an officially unemployed kin's name.[12] Having taken his time checking and assessing me, Lino more or less adopted me and my research task. From there, my local network and the research findings snowballed, initially slowly but gradually growing in quality and quantity. Lino patiently helped me throughout the 20 months I spent there, motivated—he said—by his curiosity and by a 'growing respect' for my commitment and aims. We have met regularly ever since during my updating trips to Naples and the pursuit of new fieldwork, both enjoying our exchanges and friendship.

My fieldwork was geographically focused. I spent most of my time in the *quartiere* as it was there that most *popolino* informants lived and carried out their economic and social activities. However, I also followed many of them as they worked, shopped and socialized across the city and beyond. In this simple sense it could be said that part of this fieldwork, like part of those I later carried out among the elite (see later and Pardo 2012), was 'multi-sited'. As I became accepted in the local society, I participated in my informants' socialization and economic activities.

Anthropological fieldwork is a full-time, full-immersion affair. It was through intense long-term engagement that I gradually built an in-depth, articulated picture of local life that, as I have mentioned, disagreed substantially with the established views. The ethnography of ordinary Neapolitans' entrepreneurialism, their hard work within and mostly without the domain of formal employment, their morality and culture firmly nudged my analysis onto uncharted territory.

I found that here the ethics of work, family and neighbourhood exist in complex relationship with the power and limitations of law, bureaucracy and government. Many of the officially unemployed aspire to a secure public-sector job for obvious reasons, but also because they identify such employment as allowing free time to pursue informal 'side-activities'. I also found my informants to be bearers of a culture of *sapé fa* (literally, cleverness) that

emphasizes pooling *all* personal resources in the pursuit of goals and of better-ment—an entrepreneurial culture strongly influenced by the belief that 'God helps those who help themselves'. It is as a direct consequence of this cultural make-up that their social and political relations can be understood as belonging to a 'moral climate', a 'way of doing things', a rationality that cannot be dis-missed as casual *arte di arrangiarsi* (art of getting by) or summarily cast in the simple logic of maximization of profit, explained as driven by a predatory instinct, a proneness to succumb to corruption and clientelism.

This last point in particular deserves expansion, considering that in Italy all too often the administrator and the bureaucrat (especially when connected with political bosses) prevail over the office. Thus, frequently both the office and relations with citizens are personalized and/or privatized, which goes a long way to explaining why rights are turned into privileges. We also need to understand, however, that among the likes of Lino the knowledge that 'con-tacts with saints will get you to heaven' is firmly underscored by the commit-ment 'I don't want to be subject to anyone' and the belief that 'If you behave like a sheep, you'll become a wolf's meal.' Knowing this, I found it hard to believe that local people's actions should be inevitably manipulated by patrons (or patron-brokers) who held financial power and useful contacts, extending to government agencies at the regional and national levels. This would make it necessary to treat command over resources and benefits and command over people and actions as a single category. Maintaining, instead, the separation of these aspects of power helps to make sense of their actions. It helps to make sense of an approach deeply rooted in the rationality of a *strong continuous interaction* between material (money, possessions, the body itself) and non-material (encompassing the moral and the spiritual, the mundane and the supra-mundane) aspects of their universes, between the symbolism of personal identity and the ethics of entrepreneurial management of existence. This is a key point because this interaction distinctly qualifies the social, cultural and political make-up of local life (Pardo 1996, Chap. 1).

> It 'profoundly informs the actors' sense of the relationship between action and results in all spheres of their lives, with an emphasis on the role of the significant others (living and dead, through belief in a relationship of mutual influence) in the individ-ual's entitlement to feeling worthy and therefore fulfilled in the broad sense—non-materially as well as materially—and in the long term' (Pardo 1996, xii).

It was in this light that I took on the challenge of a normative understanding of work and entrepreneurship (Harrell 1985; Pardo 1996; Williams and Round 2007) beyond the unlikely (Breman 1994) 'dual economy' view. My empirical experience has demanded attention to the relationships between the formal and the informal (Pardo 1996, 2009, 2012) and a healthy distance from a naive distinction between work and employment. It has brought out the weak-ness of viewing informal work activities as a separate mode of production or, most important, as belonging to some 'casual economy'.

Over time, the study of local people's informal economic activities and of their engagement with what scholars have called the 'moral economy' of work (Murphy 1993) produced good analytical dividends. Clearly, Parry and Bloch's insights (1989) on the interaction between the moral and the monetary and Wallman's (1984) on the importance of resources such as contacts, information, time and identity were helpful at the start of my journey,[13] as was my belief that superimposing categorical distinctions on the empirical situation may give a neat look to our production but is misleading. I knew that to stay true to my ethnographic experience I needed to heed my instinct and stay away from pointless classification and subclassification of moralities and behaviours.

At risk of labouring the point, let me be insist that I have found no dichotomy between morality and interest in the way in which my informants negotiate their lives in this complex and changing urban environment. Their outlook points to the significance in today's world of the blurring of the boundaries between the categories of the modern organization of labour and between the formal and the informal. Their approach embodies the important concept that 'individual-oriented' does not necessarily mean individualistic. An astute analysis must avoid confusion between individuality and individualism in the economic sphere, and beyond.[14] This greatly helps us to understand that, contrary to pessimist claims, controlled forms of trust (Pardo 1996, 2001; Pardo and Prato 2011) do mark the lives and careers of my informants through enterprising modes of exchange—often, most significantly, long-term oriented.

Their ethnography has brought out gradations of entrepreneurialism that draw on access to community resources beyond official definition and allocation, in defiance of attempts of the state to regulate, control and extract revenue from the production, circulation and consumption of goods. The 'informal' activities that I have documented may not always be strictly legal and may not always agree with the 'laws' of market capitalism, but they must not be misread as evidence of marginality or of an anti-market culture.[15] As the opposite is the case, it is critical to recognize that this grassroots entrepreneurialism is frustrated by normative and bureaucratic complications that combine with a distorted banking system to make access to credit—a basic right of citizenship (Marshall 1950; Barbalet 1988; Bulmer and Rees 1996)—exceedingly difficult for ordinary people. It is ironic that in a city where efficient micro-credit measures to combat usury (Monte di Pietà) date back to the mid-1500s, small and micro-entrepreneurs' access to credit should today be frustrated by overpriced banking services, property-based guarantees demanded by credit institutions, comparatively higher interest rates on banking loans and dubious dealings.[16] Let me be specific. In order secure a bank loan, entrepreneurs must prove ownership of private property, the value of which is set against the loan. In the south, interest rates are between 2.5 and 5 per cent higher than in the centre-north. These difficulties and restrictions combine with more ordinary problems people usually face in starting, running or expanding a business. When my informants cannot borrow money officially, they borrow at low or no interest

from friends and family. Only in desperation will they consider borrowing from loan sharks. Here, the considerable risks implicit in usury are recognized across the social spectrum (Pardo 1996, Chap. 5; 2000a) and, whether illegal (loan-sharking) or legal,[17] they are identified as risky and avoided whenever possible. Caught in a context marred by the practical ramifications of the aforementioned stereotype and exclusion both from the formal 'sector' of the economy and from important rights of citizenship, ordinary Neapolitans have long had reason to feel that they are treated as second-class citizens. This feeling finds justification in other forms of discrimination, too.

Over the past 30 years, growing immigration from outside the EU has crystallized added complications. Case studies and participant observation among native Neapolitans and immigrants, their dealings throughout the city and beyond, their interactions with each other and with the wider system have brought out informal processes of integration and revealed that it is in the context of the failed full integration of native people that the broader integration or failed integration of many immigrants must be understood (Pardo 2009).

Double standards in the exercise of power exacerbate this problem. On the one hand, heavy fiscal demands, bureaucratic complications and the strict imposition of rules are applied to formal businesses (workshops, shops and stalls). On the other hand, illegal workshops thrive and a blind eye is turned to the illegal street vendors and peddlers—most of foreign origin—who are omnipresent in ever larger numbers across the city.

My field notes document how these double standards are breeding conflict in a social, economic and cultural context traditionally oriented towards hospitality and tolerance; how they are turning grassroots Neapolitans' traditional welcoming of 'the other' into toleration and, lately, growing intolerance. Lino and I once discussed this issue over lunch, in a *trattoria*. We were overheard and rapidly joined by several other people who were eating there. Lino pointed to a weakening of ordinary people's right to justice (Marshall 1950; Dahrendorf 1996); as he remarked, 'every day we have to contend with the authorities' laissez-faire attitude towards immigrants' illegal practices, their punishing application of the law to us Neapolitans and their sly (*furbo*) manipulation of its loopholes when it comes to the rulers' and other big shots' (*pezzi grossi*) own criminal convictions'. 'Well', the thirty-two-year-old son of another informant said, 'the powers-that-be live in the *quartieri bene* (wealthy neighbourhoods) and see immigrants only on TV. Their friends write the Law and its loopholes. If they are caught, they can afford the sneakiest, cleverest lawyers or can easily bribe their way out of trouble, can't they?' The group, now including the proprietor and his daughter, nodded in agreement and some joined in, relating their own similar experiences.

The focus gradually shifted to the 'reality of making a living in today's Naples', as a recently married young couple put it. Their remarks brought to mind the activities of Lello, a local trader in his late fifties whose career I have followed ever since we met in the 1980s. Inviting reflection on a classical theme

in economic anthropology (Smith 1989, 309ff.), they, like Lello and most micro- and small entrepreneurs whom I have met, including some of foreign origin, said that they operated informally (therefore, 'semi-legally' or illegally) but would like to move 'into the sunlight' because informality is too costly, monetarily (the need of engaging in bribery was recurrently cited as a considerable drawback), morally and in time and worry. In their case, the informal aspect is limited to fiscal matters; in other cases, it extends to employees, including immigrants.[18]

The case of Lello is typical. He was thirteen when he left school and started working (illegally, of course) as an all-round assistant in a local clothes shop. Later, he found regular employment in one of a chain of large shops where his sales skills and good relationships with suppliers were soon noticed by the management. While staying in formal employment, Lello used the contacts he had made through this job to start a small business on the side, which he ran in the evenings and over the weekends, selling ever larger quantities of informally produced good-quality clothes to shop- and stall-keepers across Naples and the region. He dealt in cash to avoid paying tax on transactions, which suited him and his suppliers and clients. Within five years, he left formal employment to open a small shop in Naples. There, he sold legally produced clothes, keeping the informal part of his business sufficiently small to escape the attention of the law. Later, Lello invested his savings in larger premises and involved his wife in the expanded business. All along, he continued to travel throughout Italy. As he raised sufficient capital, he started in a tourist resort a second shop run by his children, who speak several languages. Lello has recently employed trusted assistants in the Naples shop (a Pole and a Ukrainian), to be free to invest time and money in starting a third upmarket shop specializing in luxury clothes. It took him three years to raise the necessary capital, for he could not borrow from banks.[19] The increasing presence of immigrants and changes in the market have played a key role in his new venture. Chinese products have played a similarly important role.

Lello's *sapé fa*, contacts and knowledge of the market made him quickly aware of key changes. He saw an opportunity to raise money through the expansion of his informal activity. Having met what he describes as 'reliable and hard-working immigrants', Lello bought several vans and employed (informally) two Ukrainians and a Pole to deliver to his expanding custom of shops and stalls. Having diversified his suppliers, Lello now meets the demand of two different sections of the market. He sells good-quality clothes in his Naples shops but, having found that stall-keepers especially struggle with keeping up with the demand for cheap clothes, he has established profitable relationships with a number of Chinese entrepreneurs who run workshops in the periphery.[20] Modified versions of the better-quality Chinese-produced merchandise find their way to his shop outside Naples and to traders throughout Italy.[21] Thus, Lello has managed to accumulate the sufficient funds to start his new upmarket shop.

Let us now look in more detail at a second order of inhibiting processes.

Ruling by Double Standards: The Decay of the Democratic Contract

In other works I have examined a local style of governance that has at once engendered and thrived on the blurring of the dividing line between what is legitimate and what is not in public life. Drawing on the extensive field research undertaken since 1991 among elite groups in Naples and its Region, I have discussed at length how powerful, tightly networked groups, inspired by an elitist philosophy of power, have been hard at work to gain and keep power, while losing trust and authority.

Here, political power has long been observably obnoxious to ordinary people's culture and way of life. A typical example is given by Naples leftist rulers repeatedly using the stereotype that southern companies are unreliable and corrupt to justify their choice to allocate contracts for public works to companies based in the politically friendly centre-north. These 'virtuous' companies have, then, regularly proceeded to subcontract the actual work to local firms (Pardo 1996, 2012). Moreover, as the general economic crisis has gradually translated into joblessness for many traditionally unemployed hard workers (Pardo 1996, Chap. 2; 2012; SVIMEZ 2015, 6–12; ISTAT 2016), local rulers have practised an interesting combination of selective actions and targeted inaction which has further penalized local economic activities and further discredited governance.

A short field research study conducted in 1991 on socialist rule in Naples in the 1970s and 1980s (Pardo 1996, 2001) engendered a long-term project, as it brought out ethnographic ramifications that deserved to be investigated more fully (2012, 61ff.). Motivated by an interest in investigating empirically the legitimacy of governance in light of the complex relationship between power and authority (Weber 1978),[22] I have since carried out ethnographic research among people who are prominent in important 'sectors' of society: politics; the judiciary; small- and medium-sized businesses; the trade unions; the media; the banking, medical and legal professions; and the intelligentsia. I wanted to study the morality and behaviour of people within these sectors, with the aim of gaining new knowledge on how dominant groups, particularly in the public realm, manage power, how they deal with responsibility and accountability, and how their rhetoric and actual behaviours are received in the wider society. My primary interest was in the relationship of their actual practices to ordinary people's culture and actions.

I did my research in phases, group by group. Each phase of fieldwork (ranging from 12 to 14 months) focused on one specific group, naturally extending, in a controlled fashion, to their relevant networks, including through kinship, marriage, godparenthood and membership of professional and leisure associations. These complex networks extended, of course, into other groups, and following the threads engendered a productive snowball effect. Throughout, I used a combination of research on documentary and quantitative sources,[23,24] observation, prolonged semi-structured interviews

and informal conversations with key witnesses. When possible, I participated in relevant events, formal and informal, private and public.[25] Seldom applied to the study of the elite, such a combination has produced good ethnography.

I found it interesting that I was also lucky enough to meet and establish strong relationships with 'Docs' also among many of the listed elite groups. I have described in previous publications some of the close relationships that gave me access to highly valuable information. For example, a judge whom I have called X (Pardo 2000b) played an invaluable role in my understanding—again, through participation, observation and the construction of several case studies—of key dynamics, beliefs and behaviours among the judiciary, and of their networks, reaching far outside the strictly defined professional circles. Again, X's collaboration in my research and introduction to his wide network snowballed, producing remarkably dense findings. Similarly, when I engaged in fieldwork among other elite groups, I gained invaluable help from those among the medical and legal professions, business, politics, banking, the trade unions and the media (see, for example, Pardo 1996, 2001, 2012). Each fieldwork also yielded in-depth material on problematic dynamics, as for example those linked to illegal and legal corruption in settings—such as the health service (Pardo 2004)—that are fundamental to our life. Each fieldwork pointed to Naples' problematic version of the difficult relationship between politics, civil society and the law that in Europe marks the gap between rulers and the ruled, critically between citizenship and governance.

The study of local rule over almost three decades has highlighted a serious *crisis of legitimacy* (Weber 1978, 213). I have observed how power without legitimacy becomes power without authority as rulers' approaches are received as unjust and morally illegitimate in the wider society. A review, however rough, of the long story of bad governance in Naples ought to address at least two major issues. First, the dichotomy between ordinary people's entrepreneurial spirit and the left's interest in the formalization of social relations which was supposed to find implementation through the industrialization of the south and the consequent proletarianization of southerners. Second, the bias generated by central government assistance implemented through local potentates: to the resentment of many southerners, when public funds have not been misappropriated through corruption, they have been systematically used for instrumental short-term goals; that is, they have been largely used for assistance, as opposed to structural investment (Prato 1993; Pardo 1996). Large funds, recently also from the EU, have been used to implement weak development schemes, contributing to official poverty while fuelling cleverly revised forms of clientelism and corruption. Systematically practised by the Christian Democrats (also well versed in using 'organic intellectuals') in the 1960s and 1970s, such tactics have been later perfected by leftist administrators (Della Corte 2007; Di Feo 2008), who have nurtured clienteles among powerful sections of society. Local rulers of both the centre-left and the centre-right have consistently responded to Gramsci's argument that popular culture should be

taken seriously, investigated and, then, uprooted, to be replaced (ideally, with its bearers' cooperation) by a superior, enlightened conception of the world (Gramsci 1966, 216–218). While rhetorically opposing assistance and clientelism, and practising both (Della Corte 2007; Demarco 2009), they have pursued selective policies and have misappropriated public funds through corruption, for which they are on trial.

To the unbiased eye, ordinary citizenship remains under the undue pressure of non-governance and ruling by double standards. It is hindered by a ruling style that delivers little of substance for the city's associated life and, substantially undermining the democratic contract, panders to the selective interests of small but aggressively vociferous and well-organized groups. In a context of considerable municipal deficit,[26] some contrasts strike my informants across the social spectrum as unacceptable. High-fliers in public office, they note, get their overblown salaries regularly paid and employees who are trade unionists make the headlines (Roano 2017) as they (legally) use the system to get paid full salaries while working a fraction of the time. On the other hand, employees in the public sector—such as transport workers, rubbish collectors and street cleaners—are often on strike because of unsafe working conditions and delays in getting paid. Ironically, the 2016–2018 municipal plan includes cuts for 130 million euros across the social services and the 2017 budget disregards the poor and the most vulnerable (Discepolo 2017).

Life in Naples has become notable for three connected reasons. It is dangerous; it is polluted, as I have indicated, by administrative double standards, rubbish and vermin; and is marred by a 'bread, circus and gallows' approach to rule (Pardo 2012, 67–68).

Shootings and deadly gang fights take place across the city with alarming regularity and bag-snatching is on the increase. The surface of most roads is hazardous, pocked with potholes (many very deep and large) that are procuring huge business opportunities for local garages and headaches to insurance companies. Pieces of badly maintained public and private buildings keep falling on pedestrians. Walkways in the city centre and the periphery are broken or uneven. ER personnel tell of treating countless gunshot wounds and mugging injuries. Their colleagues in the orthopaedic departments of local hospitals have to deal daily with broken bones resulting from accidents in public spaces.

Displacement of responsibility in public office appears to be entrenched. Obnoxious problems are engendered by the manipulation of rules to fit spurious interests and by double standards in the exercise of power. Alongside those described earlier, one such problem is that arbitrary, unfair actions are undertaken that belong to a general pattern of personalization of politics and legal but—in the eye of my informants—illegitimate use of public office and resources to the advantage of the radical organizations and fringe interest groups that account for much of the rulers' constituency. Public money is legally but illegitimately allocated to friendly interest lobbies. Radical groups' illegal occupation of public buildings—including buildings of historical value—is tolerated (Fazzo 2017). In some cases, it becomes legalized through ad hoc

municipal decrees that overemphasize the moral relativism of law (Pardo 2000b; Pardo and Prato 2011). The case of the Asilo Filangieri makes a good example.[27] This important historical building was restored at public expense to be used as a venue for international cultural events. It was, however, illegally occupied by radical groups and has since deteriorated (*Il Mattino*, 12 March 2016).[28] Recently, a municipal decree has turned those illegal occupants into legal occupants (*Corriere del Mezzogiorno*, 4 January 2016).

This depressingly degraded scenario stands on a shallow but effective consensus-building tactic that, in a revised version of the approach examined earlier, treats ordinary Neapolitans as immature people easily pacified by the provision of free fun. Local critics note that, despite several years of administrative control over this large city's administrative machine, material resources and extensive network of power, local rulers continue to wallow in an anti-establishment rhetoric that rides ordinary people's pervasive sense of grievance.[29] This, as they say, may be paradoxical and may have corresponded with little or no change in the difficulties of everyday life experienced at the grassroots, but it has produced sufficient electoral support for its practitioners to gain and retain power.

Accordingly, the local dominant elite lose no opportunity to utter politically expedient platitudes for the benefit of their supporters—among others, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and associations that receive public funding to look after immigrants.[30] Their environmentalism is exemplified by highly symbolic but empty claims and actions. Let me give three examples, among many, that my informants have asked me to note. The seaside promenade was initially closed to traffic—the rhetorical claim was that it had been 'given back to citizens'; three years later only a small area remains traffic free. During the 2011 electoral campaign the appealing promise was made to achieve 80 per cent recycling across the city within two years; today's reality shows little or no recycling. Public funds have been used to draw bicycle pictograms on unlikely roads, walkways, under outdoor restaurants and bar tables and even on stairs throughout the city, amid rubbish and vermin.

Conclusion

Current events in Naples graphically mirror a Europe-wide problematic. Perhaps predictably, the implosion of the powerful governance that hegemonized the local scene from the early 1990s to the early 2010s has not resulted in the end of power without authority. It has resulted, instead, in a cleverly revised version of a management of power that skirts the precise responsibilities that define democratic governance, rides roughshod over the instances of citizenship and delivers little—but survives nonetheless, standing on a shallow rhetoric and a well-managed concoction of questionable actions and spin.

It is ethnographically interesting that in the absence of credible political programmes such power without authority has been achieved by default. Italy is traditionally known for high turnout at the polls. Yet, replicating what

happened in 2011, in 2016 only 50.37 per cent of Naples registered voters cared enough to vote. The new mayor was re-elected by 65 per cent of those who did vote; a little less, that is, of 33 per cent of the total electorate. Two factors played a non-negligible role in this political debacle. On the one hand, most citizens' justified disillusionment with politics and distrust of key democratic institutions materialized in the very low electoral turnout. On the other hand, reaping observable benefits, small groups and lobbies staunchly supported the present establishment electorally and through vociferous, even aggressive, actions of various kinds. This underscores a serious problem.

Informants from all walks of life intensely wish but despair to see the end of the stereotype of southern Italy and its ramifications, and their city restored to the sobriety and productivity of responsible rule, in policy and legislation. This condition of democracy qualifies both participation and representation, two fundamentals in the relationship between the individual and the system. As both remain unfulfilled in today's Naples, the morphology of the growing gap between governance and key instances of citizenship raises the question whether such a gap has become unbridgeable.

The Neapolitans whom I have met struggle to manage the increasing difficulty of their urban life. We have seen that many no longer vote. As an ethnographer and a democrat, I find it depressing that the Linos, the Lellos, their wives, their children, like many among the elite, should have reason to lose faith in 'the system'.

As recent events across Europe worryingly indicate, the implications and ramifications of the kind of grassroots disillusionment and distrust that we have studied in the Naples case reach far beyond the implosion of some specific elite group. Their empirical understanding sheds light on the danger they pose to the democratic order. The Naples case exemplifies the unique contribution that anthropology has to offer, suggesting that there are indeed good reasons—theoretical and practical—to stay committed to an ethnographically based analysis.

Notes

1. As an example of the politicking that feeds on this stereotype, see the recent remarks made by Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Dutch Finance Minister and President of the Eurogroup, in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*FAZ*) and reported internationally (*Financial Times* of 21 March, and *El País* and *Corriere della Sera* of 22 March).
2. When possible, and within ethical limits, s/he will also build a visual and aural ethnographic record of the most significant processes.
3. Naturally we cannot disengage from our personal experiences and personalities. However, as a Neapolitan doing research in Naples, I have found that this need not inhibit our sense of the problematic. On the contrary, an informed management of this aspect may well help us to fulfil the basic requirement of achieving an empathic grasp of the situation.
4. This issue is well addressed by protecting the identity of my informants when necessary, through controlled scrambling of identities and situations.

5. Pardo and Prato (2011, 3–9) have deconstructed this Lombrosian view, offering an analysis of the critical literature.

6. Elsewhere, I have developed a detailed analysis of that affair and of the ratio between the many who were investigated—and publicly disgraced—and the relatively few who were convicted (see also Cionti 2015).

7. The nature of the informal 'sector' makes a quantitative assessment extremely difficult. In 2010, roughly 6 million southerners of working age were estimated to be involved in the informal 'sector' of the economy (SVIMEZ 2010, 8). A 2011 Parliamentary Inquiry (available at: http://www.parlamento.it/documenti/repository/commissioni/bicamerali/antimafiaXVI/Relazione-Doc.%20XXIII%20n.%04/Relazione%20DEFINITIVA.pdf) confirmed these data and pointed out that the informal 'sector' is larger in the centre-north.

8. I have explained that here criminals are disliked and generally avoided (Pardo 1996, Chaps. 2 and 3). The size of criminal employment is highly debatable and, in my view, far from justifying the overinflated headlines that sell books, newspapers and television programmes.

9. *Popolino* is what ordinary Italians are often called. My informants traditionally described themselves thus, rejecting the word's derogative meaning (see later and Pardo 1996). Now, having learned of their stereotype through the media, they say they proudly identify as *popolino*.

10. Gramsci's ideas (1971) on the role of the 'organic intellectual' in establishing hegemony of his or her party (political and otherwise) in key domains of power and culture have been influential across the Italian political spectrum.

11. For an articulated criticism of this literature, see Pardo (1996, Chap. 1); also Stewart (2001) and Schneider (2002) and Pardo and Prato (2011).

12. Later, he opened a shop in his wife's name (Pardo 1996, Chap. 2).

13. There is a growing literature on these issues. See, for example, Portes et al. (1989) and Spyridakis (2013).

14. See, for example, Parry and Bloch (1989), Harris (1986), Pardo (1996).

15. See Pardo (1996). Jane Schneider (2002) has convincingly challenged such a dichotomy.

16. Some bank officials refer unsuccessful applicants to private credit agencies that grant credit easily and at high interest (Pardo 2000a). Informants describe official attempts to address this situation as weak.

17. Some banks and other financial institutions practise more or less 'hidden' forms of usury (Bortoletto 2015). Officials of the Monte dei Paschi di Siena, a northern-based bank, and of the southern Banca della Campania, are on trial charged with the crime of 'banking usury' (Law 108/96, art. 44). They are accused of imposing usurious interest rates in the south (*Il Giornale*, 22 March 2017; *Corriere del Mezzogiorno*, 22 March 2017).

18. Italy, traditionally a country of emigration, is experiencing ever-growing immigration.

19. He and his wife and children do not own property and cannot provide the guarantees demanded by the banks.

20. The large number of Chinese enterprises is obvious. According to the Association of Chinese Commerce, around 15,000 Chinese people are active in Naples, of which 3000 operate in the centre and a similar number trade wholesale at the immediate periphery. Resonating with central themes in the literature (Harrel 1985), the rest operate in workshops located in the province. Many of these workshops are illegal.

21. Like other entrepreneurs, Lello has this merchandise modified in a local workshop in order to meet customers' tastes.
22. As, of course, most prominent people are networked nationally and internationally, my ethnography expanded accordingly.
23. I studied relevant speeches, historical documents, briefs, media and judicial files, as well as unpublished material, such as research reports and private archives.
24. This included demographic and other statistical data, census returns and surveys.
25. Informants' concern with confidentiality found a satisfactory answer in my promise (and proven practice) to use fictitious names and, when necessary, controlled scrambling of the most recognizable situations.
26. In 2016, the Corte dei Conti (Auditing Office, Report No. 13 February 2016) found substantial irregularities in the official financial accounts of the Naples municipality, which is assessed to be close to default (*Il Denaro*, 25 March 2017, p. 9).
27. While ad hoc changes in rules and regulations are legal, the arbitrary allocation of public premises to friendly groups and the political manipulation of public contracts are the object of indictments across Italy. For a current case in Naples, see *Corriere del Mezzogiorno* (24 March 2017) and Festa (2017).
28. In many cases, these illegal occupants do not pay rent or utility bills.
29. Since the electoral campaign of 2010–2011, Naples has experienced claims that it enjoys an 'orange revolution', the scope and aims of which remain interestingly elusive (Chiocci and Simone 2013).
30. Some of these associations stand accused of misappropriating public money for private gain (see *Corriere del Mezzogiorno*, 23 May 2015, and *Il Mattino*, 24 May 2015).

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Rethinking the City as Urban Community: Views from South Europe

Giuliana B. Prato

In a recent debate on the contemporary placement of urban anthropology, I have argued that the story of this field of study has been afflicted by an unstated problematic of incommensurability (Prato 2015). I pointed out how the initial disagreement on how to define a city led to unsatisfactory abstract theorizations on the nature of urbanism and urban life. In this chapter, I expand on this argument to discuss new ways of 'thinking' the city. I do so focusing on the significance of political programmes and grassroots action to urban socio-economic life. I consider two urban realities on either side of the Adriatic that were affected by the changes occurring in Europe between the late 1980s and early 1990s; they are, respectively, Brindisi in Italy and the Durrës–Tirana metropolitan region in Albania. I suggest that a diachronic analysis shows how, over time, grassroots approaches to the city have been hijacked by political and corporate interests in attempts to satisfy national policies in the context of new Pan-European programmes. In contrast to meso- and macro-vested interests, these two urban ethnographies indicate that if we accept that the future of our planet is intrinsically linked to the futures of our cities then urban policies should address the city in terms of 'urban community', as an ideal-type in the Weberian sense (1958)—that is, the city conceived as a social body of citizens united by shared values and laws that demand the fulfilment of their civic responsibility for the accomplishment of the common good but also, and fundamentally, grants them rights. It could be argued that this urban 'ideal-type' would only be possible in a free, democratic society and that it could not be accomplished in contexts where ideological or religious fundamentalisms

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prevail. However, as historical and contemporary events testify, even in those contexts such an ideal-type might have a strong appeal at grassroots level. I maintain that it is precisely this contemporary appeal that makes such an ideal-type analytically significant. By bringing out similarities and differences, it might provide the basis for a comparative and theoretically relevant ethnographic analysis that makes commensurable the apparently incommensurable.

On Cities and Urban Taxonomies

In the mid-1990s, I was unwittingly—and rather unwillingly—drawn into an 'academic' discussion about the nature of urban anthropology and how to define a city. That discussion took place in the senior common room of my university and involved several anthropologists and scholars from various disciplines. It did not yield fruitful results but only strengthened the common-sense view that there is indeed a truth in the expression 'academic talk' to indicate abstract arguments disconnected from reality (hence the inverted commas at the beginning). More to the point, I left the discussion concluding that the different definitions of cities and the suggested approaches to how to study them seemed to be significantly influenced by the urban traditions of the country of origin of the researchers and of the society in which they had done their fieldwork. Although I did not give further thought to this, subconsciously that discussion did remain dormant, only to resurface more recently, stimulating the aforementioned reflection on the question of incommensurability in urban anthropology and in the philosophy of sciences more broadly (Kuhn 1962).

Social anthropologists have long been familiar with the problematic of incommensurability and 'cultural translation'. In particular, the anthropological debate on systems of thought has led to questioning whether scientists from different schools 'think differently, speak a different language, live in a different world' (Polanyi 1958, 151). Significantly, Kuhn's analysis of incommensurability and his argument that different paradigms may produce different ways of seeing the world have been influenced by this anthropological debate. Of course, as Kuhn argued, incommensurability goes well beyond semantics. Indeed, his definition in taxonomic terms appears to be most relevant to the urban anthropology debate. Having said that competing paradigms—all allegedly conducive to scientific truth—group concepts in different ways, Kuhn claims that it is this different categorization that causes fundamental problems of communication. Then he adds that these categories cannot be learned through 'simple' definitions but through scientific training and prior research experience. Thus, because conceptual differences precede the application of language, it would be analytically misleading to equate translation and interpretation. Translation of 'words' is an almost mechanical activity. Instead, interpretation of 'concepts' is a process that implies the development of translating hypotheses.

Kuhn's concept of incommensurability problematizes the very idea of a neutral language of comparison, which would allow one to choose the theory with

the greatest empirically verified contents. It is precisely the problematic of incommensurability in the taxonomic sense and of language neutrality that has afflicted the history of urban anthropology. While eventually agreeing that the size of a settlement is a poor indication of 'urbanity', anthropologists have failed to agree on whether there are universal parameters that define 'urbanism'. At the same time, in an attempt to provide universal models and explanations on the essence of urbanism, the initial debate did not seem to take fully into account the sociologically significant diversity of urban traditions across the world. The wide range of urban variation that had been brought to light by archaeological excavations had shown that some cities were densely populated; others, though small in size, were important political, religious or trade centres. Nevertheless, most theories were fuelled by the monistic, and reductive, principle that equated urbanism to urbanization. Anthropologists, like other Western scholars of the time, were influenced by nineteenth-century sociological theories that focused on the European urban expansion linked to industrialization (see Prato and Pardo 2013). These theories aimed at understanding social life in the industrial city; the city, that is, of *anomie*, of the *flâneur*—the individualistic *gesellschaft*. Most important to the study of contemporary cities, they all analysed the city as subordinate to a larger territorial and political unity: the nation-state. However, if we agree that different historical conditions along with different cultural values engender different city types (Weber 1958), as social scientists we should be daring enough to break away from established and mainstream theorizations and be open to alternative approaches that, instead, help to understand such diversities. It is my contention that Weber's methodological approach may well provide new analytical tools to aid the study of contemporary cities.

Although Weber essentially drew on the example of the European medieval city to describe the urban 'ideal-type', he did recognize the empirical relevance of looking comparatively at different urban traditions in their specific historical contexts. Apart from rejecting a definition of the city solely in terms of size and population density, Weber saw economic, political, administrative and military organizations as key elements of a city. From such a perspective, he appears to have provided a more comprehensive and neutral language for comparative analysis than other urban theorists.

The Weberian city ideal-type is described as a free and autonomous community composed of self-determining citizens who participate to various aspects of the decision-making process. Citizens' participation, we are warned, may be exercised directly in small communities, but in larger realities it inevitably becomes an indirect participation through elected representatives. For Weber, such a city ideal-type represents a truly 'urban community' if, apart from relative economic independence, it exercises a partial political autonomy, has an autonomous elected administration and partially autonomous law, is militarily self-sufficient for the protection of its citizens (in contemporary society, this would be represented by different forms of policing) and has forms of association or organizations that promote social and civic participation. Weber

argued that, in this sense, the city appeared as an 'urban community' only in the West and occasionally in the Near East. This does not mean that he disregarded the relevance of other urban traditions; rather, he was pointing out that city citizenship is not always considered a special status of the urbanite. In his view, oriental urban traditions, for example in India and in China, seemed to be restricted by caste and guild relations that overrode free urban associationism.

Weber's emphasis on the various aspects of urban autonomy and freedom should be read in relation to his assessment of the pressing forward of bureaucracy, which he famously described as an 'iron cage', and its effects on social and political life. In contrast, his urban ideal-type stemmed from an analysis of two ancient antecedents that had contributed greatly to the development of Western democratic institutions; specifically, the Greek *polis* and the Roman *civitas*. They indicated a social body of citizens (*polites* and *cives*) united by laws that gave them both responsibilities and rights. Weber refers to the *polis* in the Aristotelian sense; that is, to a political community that bridges the gap between the private sphere (the household economy) and the public sphere (the common good). At the same time, the ideal-typical *civitas* is intended as an urban community of free (a historically contextualized freedom, of course) and self-determining citizens who participate, through the election of their representatives, to the decision-making process.

To sum up, the Weberian city ideal-type does not refer simply to demography or physical space. It refers to qualities characterizing urban dwellers; most importantly, citizenship, in the sense of 'individual' civil, economic and political rights. Focusing only on one of these aspects would be inexcusably reductive. Equally important, in such urban ideal-type, the individual does have rights in so far as s/he contributes to the common good. However, both in the Greek *polis* and in the Roman *civitas* the private does not disappear; it becomes part of that 'public' realm that the Romans have called the *res publica*. From an anthropological perspective, this urban *res publica* could be seen as a *whole* that encompasses politics, law, economy and culture—including religion and material culture, as well as those institutions that are meant to safeguard both the individual and the common good.

We should ask whether, and to what extent, the categories of *urbs*, *polis* and *civitas* can help social scientists to understand urban realities in the twenty-first century. Let me illustrate their analytical relevance through ethnographic cases.

Promoting Politics in Brindisi

The Italian ethnography that I analyse here was collected in the city of Brindisi in classic anthropological fashion over more than three decades.[1] When I began my research there in the mid-1980s, I was interested in investigating the political changes that were occurring in Italy.[2] In particular, I was intrigued by new political formations that were most unusual at the time, but were later hijacked

to provide a platform for new, powerful models of party organization. One of these formations was called Cattolici e Laici per il Cambiamento (Catholic and Lay People for Change, CLC). Established as an electoral List on occasion of the 1985 administrative election for the city council, CLC brought together political actors with apparently incompatible political stances. They were a Catholic group called Presenza Democratica (Democratic Presence, DP), the extra-parliamentary leftist party Democrazia Proletaria (Proletarian Democracy) and splinter green politicians, most of whom were former socialist party members who had joined the nationwide environmental association Legambiente (League for the Environment). These three groups had initially carried out their activities—both individually and jointly—outside the institutional arena. They felt, however, that without an 'institutional voice' their message would most likely remain unheard or not taken seriously. They were partially right. In spite of having gained only two of the 40 council seats, for many years CLC played a significant role in local politics. They became particularly influential when, in 1987, they supported a ruling coalition formed by the Communist, Christian Democrat and Republican parties.[3] On that occasion, however, Democrazia Proletaria left CLC.

Significantly, CLC was not an isolated local phenomenon. It drew on the experience of the so-called 'Civic Lists' that had emerged in Italy in the mid-1970s, mainly in opposition to a system of party rule known as *partitocrazia* (partyocracy) but also to promote specific social and civic issues. Established political parties strongly criticized these Civic Lists, labelling them as too territorially partisan and, therefore, potential threats to the harmonious government of the country as a whole. Against such criticism, these Lists argued that good local governance would be the driving force for the renewal of national politics.

This emphasis on the need to 'rediscover the meaning of politics' starting from the local level acquired increasing significance during the 1980s, especially as locally based groups throughout Italy tried to draft a common national programme. They described themselves as 'urban political movements' and involved mainly Catholics who did not feel represented by the Christian Democratic Party. In Brindisi they formed the DP group. These movements found original inspiration in a political coalition established in Palermo in 1980, significantly called Città per l'Uomo (City for Man—'man' is here intended to mean human being). They argued that Italy was predominantly urban and the shortcomings and contradictions of the traditional parties and their programmes were particularly visible in the urban context. Thus, the 'politics of the city' and the 'policies for the cities' were bound to give political guidance to the whole country. They also argued that, while their political roots were 'in the cities' because they reflected different local situations and needs, their aim and scope were national.

In spite of rejecting the label of Civic List, CLC was very much in line with this approach. It was territorially based but addressed issues that went well

beyond the local level. The main themes shared by CLC's three original components were basically an anti-capitalist ideology, a stress on environmental issues and a strong criticism of the existing political system. All these themes were clearly expressed in CLC's programme. In order to understand it, we should briefly contextualize their formation in relation to the economic policies of development for south Italy and the local economic situation.

Brindisi was one of the southern Italian cities targeted by the economic policies of the 1960s, which aimed at boosting the lagging economy of the south and solving the so-called Southern Question. A major aspect was the industrialization of the south. However, by the early 1980s, Brindisi was experiencing industrial decline and a high rate of unemployment. Its urban identity was also seriously challenged by the proposed construction of a new coal-fired power station at its periphery, which would undermine the commercial and touristic activities of the port, historically a major economic asset of the city. The power station would be built by Ente Nazionale per L'Energia Elettrica (National Board for Electricity, ENEL), which, at the time, was the Italian public body for the manufacturing and distribution of energy.[4] CLC identified the construction of the power station as evidence of Brindisi's 'institutional, administrative, political, moral, economic, social and environmental crisis' (CLC 1985). Together, they claimed, they would fight for the 'real' participation of citizens in the government of their city, in order to 'overcome the party bureaucracy and give the city a real chance of development' (CLC 1985). They felt that their message should be conveyed by a symbol that represented the city's tradition. They choose a seagull as a symbol of the sea and, by extension, of Brindisi's port. The stress on local identity, it was felt, would also transcend a class ideology which, in a complementary way to capitalism, aims at privileging the interests of particular sectors of the society. CLC did not propose themselves as the representatives of a particular social or economic group; their ideal was to represent 'all the citizens who feel betrayed by the local administration and by the unsatisfactory and distorted way in which traditional parties perform their representative role' (CLC 1985). Local identity and historical and cultural roots were also symbolized in the poster for the electoral campaign. It reproduced the Roman column that in Brindisi marked the end of the Via Appia.[5] The column was portrayed as a power-station chimney; above the column, slogans demanded an immediate solution to pollution, unemployment and social inequalities. At the bottom of the poster a few lines stigmatized the opposition between CLC and the previous local administrators:

Somebody has prepared a black future for our city.
We offer you a Green Alternative.

Taken together, the poster and the List's logo sent an immediate and clear message to the electorate. While the ancient column appealed straight to the heart of Brindisini (Brindisi's inhabitants), highlighting the city's glorious past, the two

symbols aimed to stress that its traditions would be destroyed by the new industrial development plan. The new power station would not only increase atmospheric pollution; it would also endanger both the historical heritage and the traditional economic activities (agriculture in the countryside, and tourism and the trade activities of the port). CLC's key message was that the future of Brindisi was linked to its traditions as well as to the rational use of local resources, and that its citizens should not be blinded by false and misleading promises.

In spite of initial success, CLC was dissolved in 1990. Elsewhere, I have discussed at length their activity, political programme and the main reasons for their dissolution (Prato 1993, 1995, 2000). Here, let me highlight a key methodological and theoretical question. Although my initial aim was to study political change, I soon realized that in order to understand the local political dynamics I had to take into account other aspects of urban life, such as economic and social processes and the relationship between the micro- and macro-level. This approach was not new in anthropology. As regards urban Europe, Pardo's book *Managing Existence in Naples* (1996) is an example of an anthropological 'holistic' study of a European city that takes into account political, economic and cultural aspects. Most importantly, Pardo suggests that these aspects should be studied processually, looking at the relationship between individual agency and the system and examining how the individual's purposeful and rational action may influence changes in the structure. Stimulated by this approach, when I began my research in Brindisi I sought to understand to what extent political change might be influenced by individual political actors and civic associations of individuals; I looked both at people who operated within the system and at those who operated at the margins of, or outside the system. At the same time, being interested in the relationship between citizens and their elected representatives, I asked to what extent the system allowed the full participation of citizens to the government of the *res publica*; in other words, I asked whether the city was ruled democratically. It emerged that frequent infringement of democratic procedures was a major issue throughout the country—not just in Brindisi. In fact, this was one of the problems that, in time, led to changes in the Italian party system.[6] The real impact of these 'changes' is questionable (Pardo 2012), for it seems that their apparently revolutionary input has merely scratched the surface while institutionalizing a de facto code of practice that was seriously threatened by the opposition of Lists like CLC. As I have explained elsewhere (Prato 2000), the Italian political changes seem to reflect a process of double institutionalization, whereby a shared normative conduct becomes institutionalized, and therefore legally binding, when it begins to lose consensus. The formation of Lists like CLC was the tip of an iceberg that would soon strike at the core of the political establishment with the aim of sinking it. The Lists' scope, however, was soon to be hijacked by some traditional parties in a trial run for what has now become a common pattern of Italian political coalitions.

Hijacking a New Approach to Politics and to Urban Policies

Over time CLC's unity was weakened by several internal disagreements; among them, DP's opposition to Legambiente joining the Green Party at the national level, and by the Communists' approach to Catholic groups across Italy. When the DP left CLC, the changes occurring in the Italian Communist Party (PCI) had become central in their political analysis. The PCI's national secretary, Occhetto, had justified the need to revise the party's mission and organization in view of the changes that were occurring in Europe in the field of real socialism. According to Occhetto, the party needed an overhaul in order to meet the challenges brought about by the new political context and 'bring together the traditions of the whole Italian Left'. The importance given in this argument to the Christian roots of Marxism and the socialist tradition generally encouraged a remarkable response from many Catholic groups throughout Italy, including DP. In agreement with the changes proposed by Occhetto, the PCI in Brindisi decided to fight the 1990 administrative election in an 'open List' with DP, following the failed attempt to involve CLC as a whole in their project. Dantonio, a charismatic local politician, had made this proposal informally the previous November, before CLC was dissolved.

Dantonio had been elected in the Communist List as an independent councillor, and later served as mayor with the support of CLC. In spite of his good relationships with some senior environmentalists in CLC, his attempt to cooperate failed because they felt that the Communists' ultimate aim was to annihilate all the alternative leftist forces. Once the Communists, the Independents led by Dantonio and the Catholics agreed to form a joint electoral List, they drafted a common programme and selected a name and logo for the new coalition. Apparently, a negotiated balance of power was soon accepted by all three components. The Catholics seemed happy with the way in which they were influencing (or so they thought) the PCI's stance on the power station. They were also invited to internal debates on the nature and programme of the possible new leftist party (what would become PDS, Democratic Party of the Left). The three components of the List agreed that their programme should address the problems caused in the city by a 'corrupt and self-interested administration', a programme with which all Brindisi citizens could identify. With such an objective in mind, it was decided that the name of the List should be simply 'Together for the City' (Insieme per la Città, IpC). As for the symbol, the Communists more than the others seemed to be aware that in order to obtain consensus it was necessary to focus on something that would give palpable immediacy to the new political project. Once again, reference was explicitly made to local tradition. Two symbols were suggested: one representing the Roman column, the other representing the peculiar and unique shape of the port of Brindisi; that is, a stag's antlers. The second proposal was almost immediately dismissed with jokes on the probable, and damaging, symbolic identification between the stag's 'horns' and the cuckold, with particular reference to

the candidates[7]; as a member of the List observed, people might wonder about them 'being together'. Instead, with its phallic symbolism, the other logo would stress the aggressive and active connotation of the political action the group intended to perform. It must be pointed out that, by the time of the 1990 election, a generalized fight had developed on the adoption of local symbols in the logos of an increasing number of locally based Lists. Pre-electoral competition saw different groups claiming exclusive rights over the city's symbols, as they all endeavoured to present themselves as the true guardians of Brindisi's urban identity.

The Communists' claim of having a monopoly over the most important symbol of Brindisi's identity was also a tautological attempt at self-legitimization: if they could be seen as entitled to claim the right over such a symbol, then they could be regarded as the only legitimate representatives of the city's inhabitants. Their claim, however, lacked public support. While the independents and the Catholics managed to achieve a relatively successful electoral campaign, the Communists' performance was fraught with criticism and infighting—a pattern that is now repeated at national level. The loss of electoral support at the polls was a clear evidence of the frailty, and indeed illegitimacy, of their pre-electoral claim.[8]

Having maintained that their logo would include the Roman column, IpC's candidates publicly explained that the List aimed at 'establishing a link with the history and tradition of the city and with its citizens'. Their aim, they said, was to 'link [their] political action to the contemporary problems of the city'. Their programme addressed Brindisi's most pressing problems: increasing criminality, the power-station affair, environmental issues, the redevelopment of the industrial area, unemployment, housing and so on. Stress was put on past bad administration and on the urgent need to establish a 'clear, honest government based on a renewed relationship between citizens and local institutions' (IpC 1990). The formation of this new List was presented by the Communists not as a challenge to the party's political identity, but as a way to test the possibility of 'constructing a new, human and democratic Socialism'. The declared purpose of this kind of political alliance was to 'go beyond the old logic of party-rule'. The new 'Social/Liberal Democrat' programme of the PCI shared with DP an environmental concern—in particular, the transformation of industrial society in an ecologically aware society—and a commitment to international peace and fairer relations between the North and the South of the world. The Catholics, too, publicized their motivations in establishing a political alliance with the Communists. As a DP member said, they 'were not renouncing their faith' but saw in the open List a real possibility 'to accomplish the Church's teaching and human progress, in the economic and ethical fields and in social life generally'. The PCI's rediscovery of its Christian roots facilitated the Catholics' sympathetic attitude. The Communists had explained their alliance with the Catholics on two levels. Not only did they emphasize the similarity between Christian values and those implicit in the Marxist ideology, they also stressed a shared sense of 'duty' with the Catholics in performing political

action. For the Catholics it was their duty to accomplish the Gospel's message; for the Communists it was a 'moral and political obligation' both towards themselves and 'towards the Italian and European democracies'. From such a perspective, the Communists also justified their changed attitude towards electoral Civic Lists.

In the past, the Communists had strongly criticized the formation of Civic Lists, especially those linked to 'urban political movements', as a form of political irresponsibility because such Lists could lead to a dangerous fragmentation of electoral consensus. Now, they argued that their moral and political duty could be accomplished by fighting the corruption and decadence of contemporary society, which is most evident in urban life; hence, the formation of local Lists of the IpC kind, which should, however, remain linked to the party's international role.

In proposing themselves as representatives of a new way of doing politics, both CLC and IpC emphasized local identity and historical and cultural roots. Thus, they established the value of continuity while proposing change. Reference to immediately recognizable symbols which marked local electoral Lists extended to national politics. The 1990 ceremony held in Brindisi for the annual celebration of Liberation Day (25 April) provided a clear example of how tradition is called upon to legitimize change. D'Alema, then national deputy secretary of the PCI and later the national secretary of the PDS and Italy's prime minister, was the main speaker. He focused on the meaning of that day— the victory, that is, of democracy over dictatorship—arguing that in the current Italian and European climate the formation of new party organizations such as IpC was necessary to ensure that this victory could continue to be celebrated in the future. This event was also an opportunity to stress publicly the values shared by the components of the new List (IpC). During the ceremony, IpC was presented as the 'new PCI'.[9] It was also argued that the IpC List was, in fact, an attempt to rid the political system, and Italy generally, of 'party's interests, and give the Country back to the citizens'.

Elsewhere (Prato 1995, 2000), I have addressed at length the changes that have occurred within the PCI (see also Pardo 1993) and the ups and downs of the IpC List. Here I reiterate that heterogeneous political formations such as CLC and IpC can be seen as the early attempts, later developed into full-blown parliamentary coalitions, to constitute a new party organization with the aim of overcoming the old ideological rigidity. It is not surprising that such attempts to 'rediscover' the meaning of politics started as a debate over the provision of good policies for the city: the locus where the corruption of the old system and the demands of a pluralist society become more evident. However, as later events have shown, these new formations have not always been able to provide answers to the shortcomings of urban life as they have had to take into account supranational interests and policies.

Over the years, many of the actors who were initially involved in the CLC group have continued to campaign for the 'rediscovery' of politics starting from the local level; again through a 'politics of the city' and 'policies for the

city'. I have recorded their activities during my periodical updating field trips. Among them, the new protest group named '8 June' has produced a dossier on the environmental impact of the power station that some local administrators have used to take legal action against ENEL. However, I realized that my research needed to incorporate new elements if I wanted to understand the current urban situation of Brindisi. In particular, it has been critical to assess the extent to which the 'politics of the city' and 'policies for the city' have had to take into account new EU legislation on urban areas as well as processes of 'marketization' of the city.

As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, among these supranational interests, some EU programmes that have been implemented after the collapse of real socialism have played a central role, linking the future of Brindisi to a region on the other side of the Adriatic: in particular the Durrës–Tirana metropolitan area, which I address in the next section.

Becoming Free Citizens in Post-Socialist Albania

My initial research in Albania addressed the effects of regime change at various level of society.[10] On the one hand, I focused on processes of democratization at institutional level, such as the introduction of a pluri-party system and the separation and distribution and power.[11] On the other hand, I wanted to understand how people respond to change and adapt or reject new parameters of action, and, given the interest of the international community, how society responds to macro-policies linked to external, mainly EU, programmes aimed at bringing stability in the area. Before going into the field, I collected background information on these programmes through official charters, international monitoring reports and legislative documents. As well as carrying out participant observation, I interviewed representatives of key Albanian and foreign institutions and constructed representative case studies of individuals to illustrate how people coped with life-crisis situations, gained access to resources and avoided being caught in the web of corrupt practices, which, according to international observers, pervaded Albanian society. I have discussed this ethnography and the attendant methodological issues elsewhere (see, for example, Prato 2011, 2012). Here, I shall address dynamics of urban change and changing approaches to urban policies, focusing on the Durrës–Tirana area, the fastest-growing region in Europe. This area spans two counties (*qarku*) and includes Albania's capital city, its main port, over a quarter of its population and almost two fifths of its economy.[12] It plays a crucial role in international programmes like the Pan-European Transport Networks (TEN-T), including Corridor VIII, which extends to Brindisi on the western Adriatic shore, which I shall discuss in the next section. This is also one of the Albanian settings most affected by urban expansion.

After the collapse of the Communist regime in 1990, Albania has been transformed from a rural to an urban society. Almost 60 per cent of the population now lives in urban areas. Internal migration and increasing numbers of

foreign residents have been major causes of demographic growth and the rapid urban expansion (Prato 2016, 2017). More generally, these dynamics could be seen as the outcome of the newly acquired freedom of movement, rights to private property and business, and access to communication. This was a dramatic change from the decades of isolation experienced during one of the harshest Communist regimes and from the anti-urbanization policy implemented since the 1960s.

The Communist anti-urbanization programmes had a threefold aim: to foster the development of rural areas and of the suburban industrial districts; to control urban growth; to control demographic mobility (Prato 2016). The ideal demographic distribution was one third in urban areas and two thirds in rural areas. Accordingly, urban areas were delimited by the so-called 'Yellow Lines'; once a city's expansion reached the Yellow Line, the excess population was forced to move to other, less populated cities or to newly created towns.

Perhaps the most symbolic aspect of people's free movement is having gained access to previously forbidden urban areas, such as the Blloku in Tirana. During Communism, the Blloku (blocked area) was an exclusive and secluded residential area for the party's leadership, constantly patrolled by armed guards to prevent trespassing. The Blloku is now an upmarket neighbourhood with luxurious apartments, elegant shops, trendy bars and restaurants. However, in spite of being physically accessible to all, only the new Albanian elite and rich foreigners can afford its expensive bars, restaurants, nightclubs and casinos. The transformation of this neighbourhood has matched the renewal of other inner city areas as part of the programme of 'Urban Renaissance', promoted in 2000 with the aim of making Tirana a dynamic 'world-class' city comfortable for foreigners and the Albanian elite and attractive to investors.

Another significant aspect of the newly acquired freedom of movement is the internal migration from poor mountain areas to major urban centres, especially to the central coastal region (mainly in the Durrës–Tirana area), in the hope of making a better life in the city. As most migrants are unable to afford to pay rent in the city, they have occupied illegally the land of former agricultural cooperatives and state industries outside the official boundaries marked by the Yellow Line. In the metropolitan area of Tirana, the informal zones account for 40 per cent of the urban expansion. Significantly, the strongest expansion occurred in the north-west of the city, along the planned Corridor VIII.

Durrës has witnessed a similar process of informal urbanization. This maritime city has played a key role in the history of the country. Today, its port constitutes Albania's most important node. It is the starting point of Corridor VIII and the terminal on the eastern shore of the Adriatic of the oil and gas pipelines of the Adriatic–Black Sea itinerary.

In both cases the informal zones are 'self-regulating systems' where legitimizing moralities (Pardo 2000) allow people to operate and to make a living. Borrowing from Pardo, we could say that, faced with continuously changing laws and bureaucratic delays, people have engaged in informal transactions that

have become part of a system of exchange based on broadly defined social and moral norms that cannot be addressed solely in relation to a set of legal rules. Paradoxically, politicians across the spectrum initially encouraged this process in order to secure electoral support and consolidate their power (Bardhoshi 2011; Prato 2011). Today, the future of cities such as Durrës and Tirana is linked to the legalization and the sustainable development of these informal areas. Their urban development and municipal territories are objects of constant monitoring, especially by those international organizations that have invested considerable resources in the accomplishment of infrastructural projects and are pressing the Albanian government to find efficient solutions to the problems associated with informal urban sprawl.

Under international pressure, in 2006 the Albanian government established the Agency for the Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of Informal Areas/Constructions. This special body of the Ministry of Urban Development was meant to cooperate with international investors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private stakeholders in various projects that targeted informal areas across the country. Given the strategic, economic and demographic relevance of the Durrës–Tirana region, special attention has been paid to addressing swiftly the problem there.

Since 2009, a new planning system has become a priority for the national government. Fully implemented in 2011, it includes the socio-spatial integration of the informal areas in the city, thus eliminating the 'dual-city' phenomenon (Prato 2016) that has made people feel like second-class citizens and outsiders in their own country. Several NGOs are now involved in these programmes. In particular, by advocating 'participatory planning' they are facilitating the participation of the local communities in schemes of private–public partnership (PPP) and the relationship between local residents and the municipal authorities. In a sense mirroring processes of urban development and gentrification in other world cities, these NGOs are providing a 'view from the street' that is often missing from abstract urban planning and politicians' approaches.

The Urban Community and the Effects of EU Projects: Corridor VIII

The construction of the TEN-T provides a significant point of debate on the extension of the EU sphere of influence. These new routes of trade, transportation and cultural exchange are represented as beneficial to both post-socialist and Western countries, leading in theory to economic, political and cultural unification.

The current map of Europe is divided into several road and railway corridors that constitute the TEN-T, including ten major Pan-European Corridors. The TEN-T Network aims at making the movement of goods, people, oil and other energy supplies easier between the EU and East and South-East Europe, expanding to Central Asia and the south Mediterranean through 'Corridors of the Sea'.

The backbone of the Network is an integrated system of high-speed trains for both passengers and freight traffic, roads and waterways.

Corridor VIII is one of the Balkan Corridors designed within the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe of 1999. It connects the Adriatic and the Black Sea. It starts from the southern Italian ports of Brindisi and Bari and continues to the port of Durrës in Albania. From there, it continues through Tirana, Skopje and Sofia, ending at the Black Sea ports of Burgas and Varna. The overall project is supposed to become part of the so-called 'system of the three seas' (Mediterranean, Black and Caspian Seas), allowing access to the energy reserves of the Caspian region.

As some TEN-T routes are built along ancient itineraries, history is often used to stress a past identity and a rediscovered belonging, and to legitimize the policies involved in the process. Corridor VIII follows the Via Egnatia, built by the Romans in the second century BC as a continuation on the east Adriatic coast of the Via Appia that linked Rome to Brindisi. It was one of the most important roads of the Roman Empire, running 790 km from Dyrrachium (Durrës' ancient name) to Constantinople, across Illyria, Macedonia and Thrace; these ancient territories correspond to contemporary Albania, Greece, the Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Turkey. This trade and military route has played a significant role in Roman, Serb and Turkish history, making Brindisi and Durrës two focal points in the link between East and West.

As I have said, the Durrës–Tirana region plays a central role for the successful development of this route and is regarded as EU's gateway to the East. It is expected that all infrastructures and the multi-modal transport system of Corridor VIII (including sea and river ports) will be completed by 2028. Apart from this West–East axis, a North–South axis will pass through Durrës as part of the TEN-T expansion. This is often referred to as the Adriatic–Ionian motorway that connects Croatia to Greece along the Adriatic and Ionian coastline.

The project of Corridor VIII started somewhere between dreams and interests. It has been described as the largest infrastructure project on the Balkan Peninsula and has attracted funds also from agencies outside the European continent (for a detailed analysis, see Prato 2014). The construction of Corridor VIII has been regarded as an historical opportunity for Albania. Its supporters have argued that it would facilitate breaking free from long-standing isolation, contribute to new geopolitical significance and launch Albania towards East European markets. But that is not all. The roads, railways, ports, logistic infrastructure and subsidiary services have attracted enormous investment from the West. There is also great interest in the management of the oil, gas and water pipelines from the Caspian Sea, the most important of which are between Burgas and Durrës. All these aspects are used in the official rhetoric to argue that, once again, history has decided to pass through Albania.

Italy, too, has been strongly committed to this Corridor. In 1998, the then Italian Prime Minister Prodi stated that Corridor VIII was of paramount importance for the development of south Italy, as it would open up a path to new markets, particularly in the Balkans. As Brindisi was the planned terminal

on the western Adriatic coast, the local Chamber of Commerce outlined a Plan of Regional Cooperation in line with the 2007–2013 Programme of European Territorial Cooperation, and proposed to lead East–West regional cooperation. However, while on the Albanian side the project seems to have a positive impact on the interested cities, the situation in Brindisi has taken a negative turn. Let me explain.

Over time, the Italian branch of Corridor VIII has become split between Brindisi and nearby Bari (both, of course, in the region of Apulia). Conflicting political interests have determined a progressive decline of the importance of Brindisi and of the Salento area generally, while giving a new impetus to the development of Bari. As a consequence, the touristic facilities of the port of Brindisi have been drastically downsized and the industrial facilities expanded. In contrast, the Bari metropolitan area has been equipped with new infrastructure to accommodate the maritime and air touristic traffic. Significantly, until relatively recently, Brindisi had the only civil airport in Apulia. Meanwhile, the coal power station has had a disruptive impact on the city's quality of life, and on the surrounding woodland, the coastal areas and agricultural production. As I explained earlier, several local administrations have joined grassroots protests in a legal action against ENEL.

Conclusion: Bringing Together *Urbs*, *Civitas* and *Polis*

The Italian and Albanian ethnographies highlight the need to rethink the city as a urban community *à la* Weber. Conjoined, the analytical categories of *urbs*, *polis* and *civitas* would recognize the complexity of contemporary cities, and might encourage political and civic participation and provide an environment functional to good government. As Pardo argues (2000), good government is not simply about exercising power; fundamentally, it is about authority and the socially recognized legitimacy of such authority. It is ultimately based on responsibility, accountability, participation, democratic decision-making and effectiveness. From such a perspective, we should recognize that municipalities have a key role to play in sustainable territorial and urban development.

Making local administrations responsible for territorial governance might be a recent phenomenon in the Albanian scenario, but it should not be a novelty in Italy. Empowering local administration is an essential aspect of democracy, as it facilitates (or should facilitate) citizens' participation in decision-making. The establishment of this level of responsibility in running local affairs is essential to a governance that nurtures the connection with citizens' values, needs and expectations (Pardo 2000).

If we accept that the future of our world depends on environmental sustainability and urban resilience, then we should recognize that these aims cannot be accomplished through the application of abstract models and the overbureaucratization of life. Ethnographic research can contribute significantly to our understanding of how such abstract models are negotiated at the local level. Failing to achieve this level of understanding would mean setting out on a path towards a dystopian future.

Notes

1. In brief, I collected my ethnography through participant observation and the construction of case studies of relevant people and events.
2. I did six months of preliminary fieldwork between 1987 and 1988; 15 months extended fieldwork in 1989–1991, several updating field trips at regular intervals, and undertook new extended field research in 2012.
3. Following the judicial enquires of the 1990s into *tangentopoli* (bribesville), most established parties fell apart. Only the Communists and Movimento Sociale (Social Movement) remained unscathed; they were renamed respectively Democratic Party of the Left and National Alliance. Since then the names and compositions of political coalitions have continuously changed. The names of political groups used in this chapter refer to the pre-*tangentopoli* parties, unless otherwise specified.
4. ENEL was privatized in 1999, following the liberalization of the electricity market in Italy. It is now a multinational and, as of 2015, the Italian government owns 25.5 per cent of shares.
5. Brindisi has been an important commercial and military port since Roman times. This is reflected in the city's emblem, which reproduces the Roman column and the antlers of a stag. The name of Brindisi is said to derive from the Messapic word *brunda* for deer; the stag's antlers reflect the natural shape of the port.
6. For example, the Brindisi city council was not consulted in the decision-making process regarding the construction of the new power station. Moreover, the outcome of a popular consultation on this matter was disregarded by the regional and national governments.
7. The Italian word *cornuto/a* (horned head) is a metaphor for cuckold.
8. At the previous election of 1985, the Communists had won six seats in the town council. In 1990, the IpC List managed to elect five town councillors, of whom only two were from the Communist component.
9. Tellingly, on this occasion, the logos of IpC (for the town council election) and of the PCI (for the election of the province council and the regional assembly) were branded together under the motto, 'Vote the new PCI'.
10. I carried out preliminary fieldwork in Albania in 1999 and more extended fieldwork in 2000, 2003 and 2006, followed by several updating field trips.
11. Administrative decentralization is a key aspect of the distribution of power (Prato 2011).
12. Thirty-five per cent of Albania's enterprises are located in the Durrës–Tirana region, 60 per cent of foreign investments are made in this area, and it is estimated that 1 million people live there.

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The Multitude of Approaches to Urban Ethnography: Blessing or Curse?

Jerome Krase

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the first large-scale urban settlements were established some 6000 or so years ago, their component, segmented neighbourhoods have been dynamic social environments and paradigmatic sites for competition, conflict and cooperation between the people who live and work within them. In the twenty-first century, the contradictory forces of neoliberal globalization have created bewildering scenes of class and cultural diversity in public and private urban spaces. Some of the most common scenarios in recent decades are the concentrated and diffuse ethnic transformations produced by regulated as well as unregulated migration. Another increasingly frequent urban scene is the upscale development and gentrification of once socially marginal areas, which in turn has displaced vulnerable residents and businesses.

Social scientists of many stripes are employing their skills and knowledge in order to make sense of these increasingly complex social realities. The results of their valuable research inform local and global urban policies. Large-scale and otherwise quantitative methods such as demographic and random sample surveys are the most ubiquitous approaches in urban studies. In contrast, this chapter seeks to demonstrate the utility of smaller-scale traditional and other more recently developed ethnographic approaches for the study of contemporary cities, or perhaps better phrased 'urban scenes' (Krase 2016). From Appadurai (1996), Roland Barthes (1985) and Henri Lefebvre (1991) to Georg Simmel (1908), attention to what can be seen on street has been central to urban analysis. In various combinations, many complementary research

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methodologies can be invaluable in the service of documentation, analysis and illustration of complex social activities and physical environments that reflect changing cultural and class identities. The more distant abstract ideas of Manuel Castells (1983), David Harvey (1989), Richard Sennett (1990) and Saskia Sassen (1998), for example, are made explicit by close-up lenses focused on competing spatial practices in residential and commercial environments. The rich, almost palpable, ethnographic prose of Herbert J. Gans (1962), Erving Goffman (1959), William Foote Whyte (1955) and Elliot Liebow (1967) have added the texture necessary for understanding the broad sweeps of urban theorists.

Ethnographers are often seen as providing the 'colour' for the rather grey descriptions of urban life provided by quantitative studies. Unfortunately, richly described small-scale case studies are often dismissed as 'journalistic' that, at best, might be worthy of further, quantitative, investigation. Michel de Certeau wrote of creating the city by the act of walking (1985, 129). In a similar way, ethnographers recreate the city by weaving critical ideas into narratives of the places through which they pass. Attention to mundane spatial practices makes social agency visible and contributes a different kind of social scientific data. Ethnography also provides what George Psathas might call a phenomenological bridge between what ordinary people do and what social scientists say about this (1973, 16). Most ethnographers would agree with Clifford Geertz that the ultimate goal of their endeavours is the production of 'thick' descriptions, to get at the meanings behind enactors' social behaviour (1973; also Psathas 1973). For social scientists such capturing of meaning is not for its own sake. As David Collier and colleagues noted: 'In addition to thick description, many forms of detailed knowledge, if utilized effectively, can greatly strengthen description and causal assessment' (2004, 73). Although the ultimate goal of ethnography is to reduce the distance between the researcher and the subjects of the research, the post-modern critique aims to eliminate the 'privileged' position of the researcher her or himself. As to ethnography in general, I agree with Douglas Harper's extended vision of visual sociology, which takes into account post-modern and other critiques of scientific sociology; at base he argues:

> Visual sociology should, I think, begin with traditional assumptions of sociological fieldwork and sociological analysis. The photograph can be thought of as 'data'; in fact the unique character of photographic images force us to rethink many of our assumptions about how we move from observation to analysis in all forms of sociological research. But note that I suggested that image making an analysis begins with these and other traditional assumptions and practices. It does not end there! (1998, 34–35)

Harper's *Changing Works: Visions of a Lost Agriculture* (2001) has become a model for visual community research. In order to study the ecology and soci-

ology of dairy farmers in upstate New York he experimented with and adapted visual methods to demonstrate how different kinds of visual data can be integrated with observation, interviews and surveys to create a comprehensive and sensitive portrait.

Beyond methodological and theoretical considerations, in American sociology at least, common ethnographic practices such as participant observation are seen as having an ideological cast. Of special note is Alfred McClung-Lee, who argued in *Sociology for Whom?* (1976) that participant observation was an especially important method for demystifying social thought and increasing public participation. With his wife, Elizabeth Bryan Lee, he co-founded the Association for Humanist Sociology, whose journal, *Humanity & Society*, defines 'Humanist Sociology' as 'a sociology that contributes to a more humane, equal and just society' and 'views people not only as products of social forces but also as agents in their lives and the world'.[1]

A Plethora of Ethnographies: Blessing or a Curse

Despite its complexity, ethnography is generally simply described as a scientific practice designed to study, systematic record and accurately describe the customs of individual peoples and cultures from their own point of view. As Gans notes, it allows the researcher to 'observe people's actions and interactions as well as the larger contexts within which these take place … Face-to-face interview studies which enable the researcher to probe intensively into people's activities can also fit under the ethnographic tent' (2010, 98).

Few social scientists today would dispute the validity of the label of 'ethnography' for the classical or nearly classical works of urban ethnographers. Given the admonition of Italo Pardo and Giuliana Prato (2012) in reference to 'urban anthropology' being a misnomer, perhaps the better term would be 'ethnography *in* the city'. However, due in part to the penchant in the academic word to be credited for naming things and coining phrases, there is a growing collection of 'ethnographies' of one sort or another. A partial list of these more or less innovative ethnographies follows in alphabetical order: Auto (Ellis et al. 2011), Critical (Madison 2011; Rose 2015), Digital (Pink et al. 2015), Discursive (Linstead 1993), Duo (Ngunjiri et al. 2010; Sawyer and Norris 2015), Flash (Borer 2015), Focused (Wall 2015), Institutional (Smith 2006), Interpretive (Harper 1989), Public (Gans 2010), Short-term (Pink and Morgan 2013), Virtual (Domínguez et al. 2007) and Visual (Pink 2005; Schwartz 1989).

Common discourse about ethnography seems to focus on two broad criteria for the method designed to best capture the meaning of social events as understood by the actors in them. The first of these has long been actual proximity, or closeness, to the subjects of study, as per Bronisław Malinowski's view of participant observation as a way 'to grasp the native's point of view' (1922, 25). With the advent of the Internet and related digitalization of observational data

the time-honoured dimension of actual proximity has been modified to include what might best be called 'virtual' proximity. As noted by Domínguez and colleagues:

> The methodological approach of virtual ethnography has been broadened and reformulated through new proposals such as digital ethnography, ethnography on/of/through the Internet, connective ethnography, networked ethnography, cyberethnography, etc. Each of these maintains its own dialogue with the established tradition of ethnography and formulates its relation to this tradition in different ways. (2007, 1)

Until recently, the second classical dimension of ethnography has been length of time spent in the field. In the past, purely observational as well as 'innovated' participant observation studies involved long periods of intensive fieldwork such as those in anthropology by E. E. Evans-Pritchard on the Nuer in North Africa (1940), Margaret Mead in New Guinea (1977), and by Herbert J. Gans (1962) and William Foote Whyte (1955) in Boston. In all these studies, close-up data gathering took place during periods of varying lengths, but usually measured in months if not years.

Michael Borer (2015) has argued that the exalted value of this temporal dimension has been almost 'fetishized':

> Developments and advances in ethnographic research have challenged positivistic or realist tales that purport to uncover the Truth of a group, culture, or social world preferring flexibility over rigidity, reflexivity over objectivity and process over causality … Such a taken-for-granted belief in the longevity of immersion into everyday lives of social actors implicitly limits researchers' fields of inquiry and ignores the naturalistic boundaries and constraints of time.

Every major and minor version of ethnography has been affected by new, especially visual and virtual, technologies. Among the many techniques I employ in my own research, visual ethnography has had the most permutations and combinations (Krase 2012a, 2012b). These have been made even more varied by technological considerations as to methods for capturing, analysing, displaying and archiving visual contexts (Prosser and Loxley 2008; Pink 2005). A few examples of these visual ethnographic strains are participatory (Wilson and Milne 2015; Spivey 2015) and even poetic (Maynard and Cahnmann-Taylor 2010; Clifford and Marcus 1986). Still photography, film and video have long been used in architecture and urban planning. In my own work I employed architectural survey techniques to collect visual data for studies of housing and building conditions and community-organizing purposes.

Some recent practices are defined by the apparatus used to collect data, as well as the medium of presentation such as video ethnography, which even has its own journal (http://www.videoethno.com). Citing the pre-eminence of

observational ethnography, Wesley Shrum and Gregg Scott note ethnographic movies or 'ethnografilms' have been around since the start of filmmaking. Video ethnography however is only three decades old as a consequence of the increase in portability, sound and picture quality and ease of use of audiovisual technologies for collecting social analytic data. At the same time, communication technologies have quickly evolved with the spread of the Internet and mobile technologies (2016; also 2015).

To get at the heart of social and cultural matters, mixed or multi-methods are always best. However, as in all data collection, it is imperative to choose from among the growing array what is most appropriate for the situation. In my own scholar-activist role, all are paired with one or another 'critical ethnographic' sensibility. According to Jeff Rose

> Ethnographers generally have two goals: to describe a culture of interest in the context of a particular theoretical outlook and to contribute to ongoing development of an applicable theory. Critical ethnographers, however, have goals above and beyond these traditional academic trajectories, making ethnography more than a method: in their hands, ethnography becomes a tool for social justice. (2015, 131; also Fairbanks et al. 2011)

Participatory methods are a major expression of this critical approach. For Milne et al. (2012; Wilson and Milne 2015) visual methods can be employed to improve social services and promote social change. For example, community based or 'participant' video making such as nongovernmental organization (NGO) collaborations in visual research. Eric Margolis especially (1994, 1988) has used visual methods to both study and facilitate community organization, information and participation. Prosser wrote this

> shift toward collaborative and participatory modes of research, has been informed by a growing interest across social science disciplines to undertake research which is more equitable in relations to the distribution of power and knowledge between researchers and participants. By literally placing cameras in the hands of participants, it can be argued a different visual modality is generated. (2008, 30–31)

Most notable is Caroline Wang and Mary Ann Burris (1994) visual method, *Photovoice*, partly based on Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1972) has grown into a global movement

> to build skills within disadvantaged and marginalised communities using innovative participatory photography and digital storytelling methods so that they have the opportunity to represent themselves and create tools for advocacy and communications to achieve positive social change. (http://www.photovoice.org/, also Vincent O'Brien http://www.visiblevoice.info/VisibleVoice/Home.html)

Noting that the interests of the observer and observed are seldom alike, Mario Small added some frank comment about the rise of participatory ethnography as a form of compensation.

> In fact, the hard if unpleasant fact is that the observer will almost always get more from the relationship than the observed. The observer gets a dissertation or a book, a job or a promotion, tenure or a raise, respect, national attention and even fame. The observed, nine times out of ten, gets nothing but the chance to continue to maintain their low station in life. (2015, n. 2)

As a predominately African-American and Afro-Caribbean neighbourhood in the 1970s, the Prospect Lefferts Gardens neighbourhood was stigmatized. To combat the perception that the stable mainly middle-class community was a deteriorating slum, a local neighbourhood association joined in city-wide preservation and stabilization efforts. One technique to directly counter the image was public showings of a slide show of the area's attractive tree-line streets and well-kept homes. These were presented at neighbourhood preservation and real estate promotion gatherings such as the Brooklyn Brownstone Fair and Brownstone Revival Committee events. The slides were also used to promote local events and were shown at community meetings. In addition, videotapes and 8 mm films of community activities in Prospect Lefferts Gardens were collaboratively produced by Brooklyn College students and local activists (Fig. 5.1).

Fig. 5.1   Brooklyn college students interviewing community leaders. May 1978. Photo by Jerome Krase

Visual Ethnography

There has been a great deal written under the banner 'visual ethnography'. Given the wide variety of more and less informed discussion on both the method itself, as well as its scientific value, it is difficult to choose the kind of definition or description that would serve in this essay. The most basic, and therefore the least contested, was provided by Donna Schwartz in her pioneering visual ethnographic work on rural farm community life. Her pragmatist orientation is also the most useful for humanist sensibilities. Schwartz noted that in the 'emergent traditions' of visual social science practice two principle areas predominated. To generalize: the first was the use visual technology as a methodological research tool and the second a means of presenting research results. She suggested however,

> It is not the photographs themselves that inform, but rather, the analysis of them. The photographs show concrete details of everyday events, activities and the contexts in which they occur and provide data about community life. The analysis of the images is informed by insights gained through ethnographic fieldwork and informants' responses to the photo-sets. (1989, 152)

Timothy Shortell and I have conducted many photographic surveys to collect data for further, often semiotic, analysis and illustration (Shortell and Krase 2011, 2013; Krase and Shortell 2013, 2015). During this straight forward process photographs are taken without regard to particular content or aesthetics. The selection of frames is neither pre-determined nor limited to scenes of momentary interest. In this way, the technique addresses the most frequent shortcoming of studies using researcher-produced data, which is sampling bias.

In 2014 a new group, The Movement to Protect the People (MTOPP), entered the scene in Prospect Lefferts Gardens. It was formed largely in response to a large-scale rezoning project for a deteriorated broad commercial street that also included high-rise residential development. As one of the most militant and vocal groups in the area, MTOPP engaged a well-known activist urban planner to develop an alternative, community-based development plan that would respect the integrity of the nearby small-scale residential streets. At the start of their grass-roots project MTOPP conducted a walking tour for the planner, supporters and the press of the potential development site and vulnerable areas. While conducting a photographic survey during their tour, it was relatively easy for me to see why local homeowners and renters feared the project. Tall buildings would cast imposing shadows on small backyard gardens and sitting areas. Both high-rise, high-density residential buildings as well as large-scale commercial development would overwhelm the quiet, low-density neighbourhood. A related fear was that the pro-development New York City government approved plan would accelerate the displacement of poor and working class, mostly African American, long-term community members (Fig. 5.2)

Fig. 5.2 Prospect Lefferts Gardens Sterling Street Streetscape. March 2015. Photo by Jerome Krase

Short-Term and Auto Ethnography

As noted by Borer (2015) the requirement of long-term field studies to qualify as legitimate ethnography is more of a fetish than a scientific requirement for validity. However, those, like myself, who practice Short-Term and Auto Ethnography continue to feel a need for defence. Sarah Pink and Morgan provided an excellent argument for Short-Term Ethnography as as an 'intense route to knowing'. After discussing both the strengths and potential weaknesses such as in 'Rapid Ethnography' (Millen 20) and 'Focused Ethnography' (Knoblauch 2005), they suggested a method that

> both maintains the first hand involvement of the ethnographer as a core element in the way that she or he comes to know about other people's lives and experiences, takes a more deliberate and interventional approach to that of long-term participant observation and is also theoretically engaged. (2013, 353)

In a similar vein, Autoethnography, despite becoming increasingly common in academe, has often been criticized as less than rigorous. As Sally Denshire noted, academics seem to place it somewhere between Anthropology and Literary Studies (2013). Although there are many useful descriptions of the technique, Elizabeth Chaplin's treatment of Visual Autoethnography is most

pertinent here. While discussing the value of a visual diary for ethnographers she outlines how the researcher and the subject blend reflexively.

So the narrative starts with the self and proceeds in the first person singular; and in it, the author takes the reader on a journey—mental, physical, real, metaphorical—into and through her own social world. The journey and the telling of it constitute the research project. (2011, 5)

For Leon Anderson auto-anthropology, auto-biographical ethnography or sociology, personal or self-narrative research and writing, as well as evocative autoethnography are linked to: 'the turn toward blurred genres of writing, a heightened self-reflexivity in ethnographic research, an increased focus on emotion in the social sciences and the postmodern scepticism regarding generalization of knowledge claims' (2006, 372). To ground it more solidly in social science methods, Anderson (2006) proposed an 'analytic' version in which the researcher is a full member in the research group or setting, visible as such a member in published texts and committed to developing theoretical understandings of broader social phenomena. By these criteria, much of my urban community research, such as the following, would be classified as visual or another sort of 'autoethnography'.

On 14 September 2015 I received an e-mail invitation to join a Brooklyn Anti-Gentrification Network (BAN https://bangentrification.org) 'Take Back Our Community' City Hall Press Conference on Thursday, September 17 at 2:30 PM. It was part of a 'NYC Day of Action against Racism, Gentrification and Police Brutality' (http://equalityforflatbush.tumblr.com/post/128973569067/schedule-and-endorsers-of-s-17-nyc-day-of-action). It was the fourth anniversary of the start of Occupy Wall Street. The Movement to Protect the People played a central role in the event. As a supporter of MTOPP when I arrived early Alicia Boyd, MTOPP's leader asked me to help hold our group's banner while standing on the steps along with the other groups. The goal of the rally was to gain the attention of the city-wide press corps, as well as elected municipal officials, such as the Mayor and members of the City Council who work at City Hall. Unfortunately, only one reporter, for an on-line newspaper, was there to cover the story. Also, while only one elected official came out to join us, we did get the attention of the head of security who came out of the building several times to tell us where we could and could not stand. About fifty people were there and half stood on the steps with banners. Alicia Boyd was the rally leader and introduced all the speakers in turn. A broad range of race and ethnicity was visible among the demonstrators. The organizations, from Brooklyn, The Bronx, Manhattan and Queens, ranged from Anti-Gentrification and Anti-Displacement groups to those opposing the closing of public libraries (Flores 2017).

Although BAN was unsuccessful in attracting major media coverage, quite by accident a group of international students studying journalism at Columbia University were there. Having worked with Columbia journalism and faculty in

Fig. 5.3 Anti-gentrification demonstration at New York City Hall. September 2015. Photo by Jerome Krase

the past, I walked over and suggested that they might be interested in the rally. When the demonstration ended, the groups marched over to protest at the nearby Office of City Planning and then disrupted rush-hour traffic by parading across the Brooklyn Bridge to join with other groups at further demonstrations across the East River in Downtown Brooklyn (Fig. 5.3).

Digital and Virtual Ethnography

Even though historically critical of 'normal' social science research methods, discursive, post-modern, ethnomethodological and otherwise phenomenological approaches to ethnography are quite similar as to purpose (Hill and Crittenden 1968). Ironically, ethno methods themselves were especially anti-method and often presented detailed descriptions of social behaviour seemingly for its own end. Just like earlier innovations in social science observational practice, such as Malinowski's participant observation, all attempted to get closer to the meaning of events by removing the distance between the observer and the observed. But, as argued earlier, for social scientists such capturing of meaning is not for its own sake (Psathas 1973; Collier et al. 2004). Although images are often used in urban ethnography as decorations for words, more importantly they can serve to demonstrate connections between structural and cultural theorizations about urban society.

When I conducted my first research on Prospect Lefferts Gardens and Crown Heights in the 1960s and 1970s one of the most powerful research methods available were intensive interviews which I used to plumb the depths of individual feelings about living in a stigmatized neighbourhood. Each subject was interviewed for a total six to twelve hours. Each session lasted one and half to two hours. The material provided data for content analysis that informed both my New York University doctoral dissertation, 'The Presentation of Community in Urban Society' (1973) and a book, *Self and Community in the City* (1982), as well as several articles and papers. Below is an example of 'Activist 3', who was a white female. Whites who moved into Prospect-Lefferts Gardens in the 1970s often became intensely involved in local neighbourhood groups. Given the prevalence of anti-Black sentiment at the time, as expected, white families had to deal with social and psychological problems engendered by their choice of living in a stigmatized community. This was demonstrated by their concern with how their friends, relatives and other outsiders evaluate their choice. To outsiders, white activists in nominally black neighbourhoods were out of place.

> Everything was good [after they moved in]. Although the reactions one gets from Queens [a suburban fringe borough of New York] residents when one says that one is moving to Brooklyn are so horrendous, and so depressing. And ninety percent of them are euphemisms for one thing [blacks]. From the postman to the man in the delicatessen: 'Brooklyn? What kind of neighbourhood?' 'How is it over there?' And just constant, everywhere we went we got that. The guy who took down the lighting fixture: 'Is it all right over there?'
>
> [Reactions of friends:] 'They have all been very impressed and we think we scored a few points. They're impressed with the block. Of course, we made a big issue of showing them the block. And they are impressed obviously with: number one the house, number two the price, number three the block and number four the fact that our child is in public school and that the whole neighbourhood seems to be working and maybe it isn't quite a blackboard jungle or whatever. (1982, 180)

In more recent years, obtaining access to discussions about the deep feelings of past and present residents of Prospect Lefferts Gardens has been made easier by the World Wide Web. On the electronic highway the text of individual blogs, list-serves, discussion and interest groups are presented with varying degrees of restricted entre. Some are read-only, but many others allow, if not invite, comment and wider sharing. This digital, or virtual, phenomenon provides ethnographic researchers with the opportunity for a variety of discourse, content and conversational analysis of on-line discussions as well as other equally rich (such as visual and audio) content. It should be noted that, as did the telephone, the new technology also makes possible intensive and other types of interviews via e-mail, Skype and Facetime. For many, the geospatial proximity of interviewer and interviewee, or observer and observe for that matter, has become almost irrelevant.

In and about Prospect Lefferts Gardens there are several more and less widely shared community forums where actual and virtual 'locals' debate, sometimes contentious, issues. For example, Tim Thomas wrote on his blog 'The Q at Parkside': 'Despite generations of racism, poverty, injustice, malnourishment, bad education, drug epidemics, mass displacement, profiling, getting shot by cops while unarmed and one after another misplaced do-goodism by people who don't know what the f*ck they're doing, black Brooklyn is disappearing' (2014).

One virtual place on the Internet that has been especially valuable for revisiting the experience of current and past residents is the 'Prospect Lefferts Gardens Friends and Neighbors' Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/groups/prospectleffertsgardens/). During an extended discussion on the October 3, 2015a, 1970s white 'pioneer' explained his reasons for moving in and out of the neighbourhood.

> It was the only place we could afford. We bought an old, broken down, literally falling apart building that some 'narrow minded' cough, cough people would have run away from screaming. We bought it with $2000 down, our entire savings. We worked and sweated and cleaned and did electrical, plumbing, wallpaper removal and re-hung new paper. All on our own. We sometimes traded skills with neighbours. I hung wallpaper for one neighbour and he replaced the solid lead water pipes in the house with brass.
>
> We would still be there if it was safe for our child. He wanted to play out on the sidewalk with his (multiracial) friends, which we loved. BUT, a-holes driving by would toss beer bottles out of their windows at the sight of this. Every neighbour we knew had been mugged, burglarized or shot at (at least once). We couldn't afford private school so we chose to trade in our spectacular 1898 brownstone for a shit box in the suburbs just so the kid could be safe and have a good education.

As already discussed and demonstrated, the Internet has created opportunities for new expressions of activism and has radically changed the way that local community groups operate, and especially the way they communicate. Almost all contemporary groups have newsletters, blogs, *Facebook* pages, Twitter accounts, etc. that put like-minded people into contact with each other. Of course, proximate, live face-face meetings and other activities continue but are often also technologically enhanced.

Today the Prospect Lefferts Gardens Neighborhood Association continues its mission of 'Working Together to Make PLG a Better Place to Live' but without a rented office, paid staff and grant money. As opposed to the 1970s, it is no longer an extension of social service and other governmental agencies but instead employs modern web technology to bring people together and to keep them informed of important issues (http://plgna.org/). In the 1970s, some friends, along with my wife and I created and published The Prospect Lefferts Gardens Neighborhood Association's newsletter *The Good News*. It,

and the Lefferts Manor Association's newsletter *The Manor Echo* were printed on paper and distributed door to door by hand.

As I had written more than forty years ago, the Lefferts Manor Association which represented an elite single-family only section of the neighbourhood, was the 'key' to understanding how the wider neighbourhood withstood the plague of urban blight in central Brooklyn (Krase 1982). However, despite obvious continuities the interests of this organization have changed significantly over its own century-long history. This is indicated by two official communications that follow. The first is a 1978 Message from the President of the Lefferts Manor Association in it's the printed newsletter, *The Manor Echo*.

> Lefferts Manor is a very special neighbourhood. It is special because it is a neighbourhood which, in the midst of much change and turmoil in the borough, has held itself together by working together.
>
> The beauty, charm and stateliness which is Lefferts Manor today is no accident. It is the happy, planned result of neighbours working together and helping one another year after year in an intelligent and common-sense way.
>
> We on the Board of the Lefferts Manor Association want to blend the successes and traditions of the past with the changes and challenges of the future. We recognize that Lefferts Manor must increasingly concern itself with the problems of adjoining areas, both commercial and residential. And that's what we are doing now and with your help hope to continue to do in the future … Remember, *all* of our support comes from within the community and not from outside foundations or agencies. And that's very important. It means that you, our contributors and workers, are the *only* ones to whom we have to account in justifying our various projects for the community. (*Lefferts Manor Echo*, Autumn 1978)

Like most community organizations, today the Lefferts Manor Association maintains a significant presence on the Internet. The second official message is from its current website. While paying homage several times to the restrictive covenant, it describes in more detail its regular functions and activities such as representing the community to elected officials, city agencies and other organizations and work on quality of life issues. It sponsors the Prospect Lefferts Gardens House and Garden Tour, a neighbourhood party in December, two annual general meetings, publication of the *Lefferts Manor Echo*, spring flower barrels and holiday wreaths in December. The *Manor Echo* is now published on line (http://www.leffertsmanor.org/tag/the-echo).

Most important for historical contrast is the stress placed on the current diversity and openness of the community as compared to its less recent past when it was accused of using its one-family only covenant to keep members of a variety of 'undesirable' groups out.

> LEFFERTS MANOR IS A LANDMARK NEIGHBORHOOD in Brooklyn of beautiful homes on tree-lined streets, friendly people and convenient transportation, surrounded by Prospect Park, The Brooklyn Museum and Brooklyn Botanic Garden. It is like living in a small town in a big city—neighbours know each

other, while downtown or midtown Manhattan is a half-hour subway ride away. Its row houses and freestanding homes reflect fine examples of divergent architectural styles including neo-Renaissance, Romanesque Revival and neo-Federal. … Its people are diverse. They represent all races. They work as lawyers, physicians, managers, teachers, artists and civil servants. Some residents have lived here all their lives, others have relocated from apartments in Manhattan and Park Slope. Many residents are involved in different neighbourhood associations and work with local officials to make Lefferts Manor a strong, desirable community in which to live and raise families. (http://www.leffertsmanor.org/about Accessed September 17, 2015)

PUBLIC ETHNOGRAPHY

The last of the various 'ethnographies' to be discussed here is perhaps the grandest of all. In recent years almost all the disciplines in the Humanities and Sciences have created 'public' expressions of themselves. Many, for example, regularly publish journals or rather, magazines, such as *Psychology Today* for general audiences and otherwise engage in marketing and outreach efforts to interest the general public in their work. In the United States of America, The National Endowment for the Humanities has created a 'Public Scholar' Grant Program Supporting Popular Scholarly Books in the Humanities

> … that might present a narrative history, tell the stories of important individuals, analyze significant texts, provide a synthesis of ideas, revive interest in a neglected subject, or examine the latest thinking on a topic. Most importantly, they should open up important and appealing subjects for wider audiences by presenting significant humanities topics in a way that is accessible to general readers. (http://www.neh.gov/news/press-release/2014-12-01)

A similar appeal was made by Michael Burawoy in his 2004 American Sociological Association Presidential Address, 'For Public Sociology'. In his address he noted the growing distance between the ethos of the discipline and the peoples it studies. As a consequence of this widening gap, he strongly urged professional sociologists to 'engage multiple publics in multiple ways' … as a way of invigorating 'the discipline as a whole.' (2005) According to The Editors of a special edition of Qualitative Research on Public Ethnography (2013) 'The true definition of public ethnography hinges on the measure of its communicative success … Essentially, if the outcomes of ethnographic research are brought to the attention of a non-academic audience, then that particular study can be said to be a public ethnography' (2013, 392). Herbert J. Gans firmly connected Public Ethnography to the broad appeal of participant observation studies that go backstage to 'discover the forces and agents of malfunction and malfeasance'. Although he argues that public variety must meet the same research standards as its academic sibling, he recognized that the public impact of ethnographic research is greater when written in non-technical language. In his view, the prime audience for Public Ethnography is the college-

educated and not necessarily the general public (2010, 97–99; see also Burawoy 2005). In the context of his discourse he mistakenly contrasted sociologists to anthropologists who do '… most of their work in preindustrial and other endangered sites and too often report it in an even more technical language than sociologists' (2010, 99).

Over the decades I have had many opportunities to share my ethnographic research and related insights with various 'publics'. Most, as suggested by Gans, have been the college-educated 'prime audience' such as an essay I crafted for a special issue of *Another Side: Journal of the Michael Harrington Center for Democratic Values and Social Change*. After briefly outlining notions of David Harvey and Antonio Gramsci, in my 'Narrative of a Reformed Community Organizer', I warned of the hidden pitfalls of accepting funds for community-organizing efforts.

> During the period of time considered by most observers as an era of a most liberal democracy, community groups were naively asking for and receiving funds and having little or no understanding of how those funds would impact on their communities and their individual life chances. A mundane case in point were the members of community organizations writing narratives and submitting applications who become the 'grant writers', and ultimately links in a long chain of institutionalized interactions between the agency and recipient. In fact, these routines created a sub-field in the community organization profession which itself was given a tremendous boost by the creation and expansion of federal efforts such as the 'Great society' initiatives of Lyndon B. Johnson. Ordinary community residents seldom understood that behind the seemingly innocuous 'paternalistic or maternalistic' provisions of funds by faceless bureaucrats were hidden economic, bureaucratic, political, ideological and partisan motives (1997, 18; see also Krase 2004).

The efforts of urban ethnographers to reach out to the much greater number of more less-educated publics are less likely be appreciated by members of Academe. Nevertheless, from the point of view of urban activism, it is equally, perhaps even more, valuable to share insights from theories and research findings with the general public, whether or not they are directly the subjects of one's own research. Much of my own Public Ethnography work has been in the form of 'citizen' or 'alternative' journalism that has resulted in opinion pieces and general reportage for local and city-wide newspapers. For example, while serving as an officer and board member of the Brownstone Revival Committee of New York City, I wrote an 'Urban Issues' column for its newsletter *The Brownstoner*. I believe the following titles are a good indication of how social science can be reframed for broad public consumption: 'The "Catch-22's" of Housing Integration', March 1988; 'Yuppies and the Market Crash', December 1987; '"Taking" the Fifth', September 1987; and 'Displacement: Good, Bad and Inevitable', 1987. Since 1989, I also have been writing on Politics, Ethnicity and Community in *The Free Press*, Brooklyn, New York. At first it was a limited circulation (20,000) city-wide print newspaper. Due to the difficult economics of print journalism for both small and large-scale publishers, it

moved to on-line publication; first as The *NYC Free Press* and since 2007 as *Your Free Press* (Yourfreepress.blogspot.com).

The advancement of analogue to digital technology has further transformed electronic media, thereby enabling more voices to be heard. However, at the same time the Digital Revolution has become more difficult to separate the informational dross from the silver. In addition, traditional media giants have slowly recaptured their hegemony. It must also be noted that there are some dangers at being a naïve Public Scholar. For example, the title was changed by the editor of *The New York Sun* for an 'objective' article I was commissioned to write for about a large scale development project in downtown Brooklyn. Although I wrote that there were more negatives than positives about the project, it appeared in print as 'Yes! in my Backyard' (2004). My title for the article was 'Fugeddaboudit—a Brooklyn slang version of 'Forget about it' made popular at the time by Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz.

Public Ethnography can also be practiced via public speaking with live audiences or other more technologically advanced forums. Basic audio and visual recording technologies have been greatly enhanced by advances in digital and electronic technology. As a result, the same public outreach project can have many iterations. For example, in the Fall of 2014 Brooklyn College hosted a panel to discuss 'Bed Stuy in Crisis', about racial injustices in the rapidly gentrifying Brooklyn neighbourhood of Bedford-Stuyvesant. The write-up for the event stated: 'Many believe Bed Stuy is in fact dying' as 'black renters are being forced out and black homeowners are tempted to sell' while 'optimists say many middle class blacks are also moving in and will help make Bed Stuy a special multiracial venue' (Rebecca 2014).

The panel was moderated by Brooklyn College journalism professor Ron Howell, who had written a controversial essay 'Goodbye, my Bed Stuy' (2014). Speakers included other long-term black residents of the neighbourhood: Richard Flateau, owner of Flateau Realty Corp. and Chair of the local Community Board's Economic Development Committee; Mark Winston Griffith, a community organizer and executive director of the Brooklyn Movement Center, former Family Court Judge Betty Staton, President of Legal Services NYC who helps Bed Stuy renters being illegally forced out of their and Lupe Todd, the communications director for Brooklyn District Attorney Ken Thompson. I also was on the panel and billed as a 'sociologist and activist'. The well-attended live event provided opportunity for traditional ethnographic description and analysis but it's on-line, audio, version also provides a continuing opportunity for further digital ethnography. The audio recording of the meeting including, explosive commentary by members of the audience, can be found at the *Brooklyn Ron* Website: http://www.brooklynron.com/2014/11/bed-stuy-will-live-come-to-bed-stuy-in-crisis-nov-6-630-to-8-pm-brooklyn-college.html and as a City University of New York podcast at: http://www1.cuny.edu/mu/podcasts/2014/11/18/bed-stuy-in-crisis/

Furthermore, the on-line comments pertaining to the panel on *The Brownstoner* webpage provide an excellent opportunity for digital discursive analysis as per a sample of some of the forty-four enlightening remarks:

4 November 2014 at 4:21 pm

Wow, unvarnished racism. From the write up "the complexion of the community has been changing at an astounding clip". Yes that is surely a crisis if you are racist.

4 November 2014 at 4:23 pm

Though it was thoughtful of them to put a token white person on the panel.

4 November 2014 at 10:04 pm

umm, this program is incredibly racist. Community "leaders" like Lupe Todd and Richard Flateau should be embarrassed to participate in something so hostile and divisive. I am actually embarrassed for them.

4 November 2014 at 11:03 pm

I've recently moved into this beautiful and historic neighbourhood, a very friendly and respectful community of which I am proud to be an active member. I call Bed Stuy home to me and my family.

The text that saddens me, says: "the complexion of the community has been changing at an astounding clip"

That's only a bad thing if you don't like other complexions, or if you inherently distrust people who are different from you. Let's forget complexions and differences and look at the commonality within us and the quality of the person arriving into this community. Nothing more than that.

To lump all newcomers who happen to be white, into one group and paint them with the same brush and see them as having the same motivations and behaviours, is indeed a very racist way of viewing life and of viewing people different from yourself.

This "forum" being held on Thursday is a thinly veiled "anti-white" backlash, against people of a different skin colour, moving in to Bed Stuy. Let's all be honest about the real message that is being sent out to these newcomers, who are simply wishing to help make Bed Stuy a harmonious and diverse community in which to live and build a family. (Rebecca 2014)

Summary

In this essay an attempt was made to demonstrate the problems and prospects of both new and old ethnographic techniques through the experiences of one ethnographer in one urban location. As was shown, different methods make possible close-up looks at how people deal with diverse issues in their challenging life worlds. While the methods and techniques for capturing, recording, creating descriptions of social and cultural life may be different, especially those enabled by new technologies, the issues of validity, reliability as well as ethics remain the same and continued to be determined by both the source of the information as well as the social and cultural context. For example, the ease of access to the words and images of people expressing themselves on the Internet create special ethical issues such as acquiring permissions for their use. It is obvious that in our virtual digitalized urban worlds today there is a need to find ways to integrate data gathered via diverse techniques. In various combinations, these complementary ethnographic approaches are invaluable in the service of documentation, analysis and illustration of complex social activities and physical environments that reflect changing cultural and class identities in increasingly complex urban worlds.

Note

1. http://www.humanist-sociology.org/#!journal/c1p6t

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Everyday Practices and Challenges

The Lives of Others: The Production and Influence of Neighbourhood Cultures in Urban India

Janaki Abraham

'What will the neighbours say?' was a comment I often heard when doing field-work in both Bikaner in Rajasthan and in Thalassery, North Kerala, India. People would relate stories in which neighbours censured, commented, gossiped or advised. Neighbours appeared as strong guardians of local norms and rules and exercised considerable social control. They were also important players at weddings, at the time of a death or in everyday life when support was needed. In Bikaner, I was struck by the stark difference between neighbourhoods in relation to women's education, employment and practices of veiling. In contrast to what seems to be an overemphasis on caste, class, ethnic or religious identity at the cost of other influences, in this chapter I argue that neighbourhoods need to be taken seriously as a social formation crucial to social life and as an important arena of social and cultural influence.

The disciplines of anthropology, sociology, geography and urban planning have long traditions of neighbourhood studies that go back to the late nineteen century (Sanjek 1999). The Chicago School, also known as the Ecological School in urban studies, is best known for its focus on neighbourhoods. Scholars such as Robert Park and Ernest Burgess (1925) argued that the city could be likened to an ecosystem and that both social structure and the physical environment influenced human behaviour. With the creation and growth of several cities in the USA in the first half of the twentieth century, scholars became concerned about the changes in the quality of neighbourhoods in urban areas and the implications of this (Wirth 1938). One strong strand of

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work lamented the loss of community in new urban neighbourhoods (for a review, see Prato and Pardo 2013; see also Schwirian 1983). While some ethnographic studies of the time such as Foote Whyte's 1943 classic ethnography focused on a particular neighbourhood and its distinctive characteristics, the majority of studies have been preoccupied with 'social problems' in urban areas such as crime, robbery and assault, and traced their roots to the neighbourhood. This scholarship has most often focused on poor neighbourhoods and poverty and addressed issues of policy to deal with the 'problems' that arose out of the neighbourhoods (see Sampson et al. 2002).[1] Thus, much of the discussion on 'neighbourhood effects'—what is described as the various social, structural, cultural and demographic conditions of the neighbourhood—has concentrated on poor neighbourhoods, with a strong focus on children and adolescents and their development (Sampson et al. 2002).

In contrast to the 'problem-centred approach' (Prato and Pardo 2013, 85) and the focus on poverty and poor neighbourhoods, this chapter concentrates primarily on middle-class neighbourhoods. Writing in 1972, Richard Fox argued that 'in much contemporary urban anthropology, the city appears only as a location of research rather than as the fundamental social institution under study' (1972, 205). In a similar vein, I would like to argue that in much literature the neighbourhood has been seen as a default location rather than a space which is analytically and conceptually distinct, especially when it comes to the consideration of those who are not poor. If we take seriously the idea of the 'power of place' (Massey 1994; Mc Dowell 1999; see also Sampson 2012) we will see neighbourhoods not as default places, but as ones that are of critical influence in people's everyday lives.

Looking back at scholarship in India, it is clear that the colonial anthropological focus on castes, tribes or religious groups and particularly on those who were the 'exotic' others, has had long-standing implications. The tomes of work produced by colonial officials on the 'Castes and Tribes' of different parts of India gave a primacy to these identities and saw the population of India as constituted by these categories. In post-Independence India, caste, tribe and religious groupings remained salient, along with a focus on understanding the village, its social organisation and transformations. In the literature on caste sociality the neighbourhood tended to be a default locale. The shift from the village to the city did not necessarily bring with it commensurate categories of analysis, and what was considered the 'primordial ties' of caste, kinship, community and region remained. Interestingly, it was labour historians such as Rajnarayan Chandavarkar who argued for a new focus on neighbourhoods as a response to the arguments about continued rural ties: workers' lives were 'also informed by work and by politics, and indeed, by the daily struggles of workplace *and neighbourhood*' (1997, 187, emphasis added). Rather than discounting the ties of caste, religious community or region in the city, Chandavarkar noted the important transformations that were enabled in the neighbourhood, which was a hybrid of inherited ties, and new networks of power and sustenance. However, I should add here that the importance of neighbourhoods was clearly recognised by policy makers. It is interesting that after independence

Nehru called in the Ford Foundation to advise on the design of new neighbourhoods in Delhi (Hull 2011). This was clearly based on an understanding that the design of neighbourhoods could herald in the Nehruvian dream of modernity.

In this chapter I turn my attention to a discussion of everyday life in neighbourhoods in two towns in India—Thalassery in North Kerala and Bikaner in Rajasthan.[2] Towns have received inadequate attention within urban studies in India. While there were some studies on towns in the 1960s and 1970s (for example, Doshi 1974, Fox 1967, Vatuk 1972 and some essays in Rao et al. 1991) this focus was an aside to what was still a predominant focus on Indian villages. The focus on towns was further marginalised by the interest in globalisation after the 1990s, which brought with it a focus on large metros.[3] This 'metrocentricity' (Bunnell and Maringanti 2010) has been at the cost of towns, small and big. Since the beginning of this century, there has been an increasing academic interest in the different social processes and transformations taking place in towns in India.[4]

In India, towns have been the site of tremendous social change in an increasingly globalised economy, with the growth of industries, job opportunities, an international media and most importantly a booming consumer culture. In addition, in recent years the focus of the Indian government has moved from a vision that its big metro cities could be modelled on Shanghai and Singapore to one in which towns are the focus of large infrastructural investment.[5]

Based on intensive fieldwork in neighbourhoods in two towns, in this chapter I explore the implications of people living close to each other with the proximity that allows for face-to-face interactions of varying kinds, and sensorial interactions—of sights, sounds and smells. I focus in particular on everyday practices that make the place of the neighbourhood—social control, social approval or legitimacy, support and also the way the neighbourhood is in everyday life—a place in which gender is produced. In doing this, I am concerned with the tremendous social and cultural influence of the place of the neighbourhood.

Gender, Social Approval and Control in Two Neighbourhoods in Thalassery

The town of Tellicherry (now Thalassery), famous for its pepper and history of trade, lies on the northern coastline of Kerala. The town has areas with concentrations of people belonging to particular castes and communities. This concentration tends to be particularly pronounced in areas around a place of worship associated with a particular caste or religious community: a temple associated with a particular caste, or a mosque. Dramatic changes have taken place in the town in terms of housing, which in turn has led to further transformations in neighbourhoods. In more recent times, several high-rise apartments and gated communities have been built to cater to the affluent, many of whom worked (or continue to work) outside Kerala, often in the Persian Gulf.

From 1996 I carried out intensive fieldwork in two older neighbourhoods: one, Pattamkunnu, in the muncipality area of Thalassery, was predominantly middle class and comprised houses belonging to people of different castes and religious groups; the second was adjacent to the town, in what is technically part of a village area governed by a *panchayat* (local governing body). It is far more mixed in terms of class but has a majority of Thiyya[6] households. In this neighbourhood, there are strong kinship networks as a result of the partition of property among kin over several generations. A comparison of the two areas helps draw out the distinctiveness of each neighbourhood space.

The layout of houses in the two areas differed significantly and had a bearing on the nature of the neighbourhood. In Pattamkunnu, houses tended to be set apart, built on raised ground (often 4–8 feet above the road) with an area sur-rounding the house. They also typically had compound walls and an indepen-dent entrance from the road or lane with an iron gate. However, there was no uniformity in either the size of plots or the distance between houses. In some pockets small plots of land and houses were interconnected both spatially and through close kinship ties.

In Devaloor, houses were, by and large, closer to each other, and in the 1990s very few had compound walls, and paths often passed immediately in front of houses, resulting in greater visibility and greater interaction. When a person walked past houses they generally greeted those sitting outside on the veranda or just inside saying '*varate*' or '*pote*' (asking permission to go and return). Even though there has been a dramatic increase in the construction of houses in both areas, Devaloor still boasts of some open tracts of agricultural land on which different kinds of gram, vegetables and rice are grown.

In both neighbourhoods, neighbours were often friends and considerable everyday interaction took place. Women from neighbouring houses were often seen (and heard) standing at the side door to the kitchen, exchanging everyday news. They may have stopped on the way back from the local shop or else-where, or may have dropped in to buy a few coconuts, drum sticks (a vegeta-ble) or red spinach growing in their neighbour's garden. Children ran in and out of neighbours' houses, as would young adults to see a friend. In the part of Pattamkunnu where the houses were more set apart and neighbours did not have to walk in front of the front door to enter their house, interaction was less frequent and was often over the back wall, or by visiting.

In the town area of Pattamkunnu, people spoke about the number of large *tharavads* that have been partitioned, sold or were left locked up, and old people in particular lamented the eroded kinship and friendship networks. The sense of isolation was often explained by pointing out that a large number of houses were being sold in the open market, resulting in a diminishing number of kin or fellow caste members living in proximity. Yet there was a strong sense that neighbours were important, and worth maintaining good relations with, if nothing else for those moments of crisis when they would be the closest. Such interdependence generally cut across religious lines.

While some neighbours were of course closer to each other than others, by and large there was a sense that demands could be made on neighbours. Madhavi in Pattamkunnu, for example, would call her neighbour from the house behind to tie up a coconut tree that was leaning dangerously over the house. And in Devaloor, Narayani took with her a neighbour's young son to deliver invitations to houses in the neighbourhood, in keeping with the convention that only men could invite men, and women invite women. Neighbours help a lot during weddings or at the time of a death, although several functions that neighbours (and relatives) used to perform have now been taken over by professionals. For example, professionals are now brought in to put up a canopy outside the house and to cook and serve food. At the time of a death in a house, neighbours help with arrangements that need to be made and often take turns to cook food to send to the house in which a death has taken place.

In addition, prior to the availability of loans from financial institutions of different kinds, neighbours would often play an important role in helping someone raise money to finish building a house. Neighbours would be invited to a *payattu*, a gathering at which financial assistance was sought. Those who attended gave whatever they could afford. This was written down and when another person held a similar gathering, earlier beneficiaries were obliged to reciprocate with at least as much, if not more. Such gatherings were no longer visible in the 1990s.

What was clear in the late 1990s was that the space of the neighbourhood had changed dramatically. In Pattamkunnu, several old houses had been sold and/or demolished and some pockets of the neighbourhood were no longer spaces in which people knew each other well or had a shared history in the neighbourhood. In Devaloor, there was still a strong network of people belonging to the same caste, and kinship networks remained strong. However, what had changed was the marking out of individual property with compound walls and gates. This made old paths leading to someone's house through another property, appear as trespassing. However, walls tended to be taller when separating a property from the road and shorter for those bordering a neighbour's plot, enabling the continuation of the to-and-fro movement between neighbours. A significant feature is that a history of matriliny among a majority of people in these neighbourhoods has meant that a woman may continue to live near her kin even after marriage, since women inherit property and continue to have a right to residence in their natal homes.[7] This is in sharp contrast to the situation in Bikaner where women rarely inherit parental property and it is unheard of, or at least rare, for a man to set up house in the neighbourhood of his wife's parents.

Let me now turn to analyse the neighbourhood as a space in which social approval is sought and social control is exercised. Neighbours are an important presence at marriage negotiations. At the marriage ceremony, when there was no priest,[8] the *nattu mukhyasthan* (literally the village headman or an elder in the neighbourhood) conducted the marriage.[9] The presence of neighbours was important in legitimising the marriage ritual. Even prior to the wedding, at the ceremony

establishing the intention to marry and fixing a date, at least one neighbour who was not a relative would be present. While it was considered important to get the approval of certain relatives prior to finalising a marriage alliance, it was also important to inform and seek the approval of close neighbours.[10] These practices underline the importance of the neighbourhood in everyday life.

However, the way in which norms and rules have been enforced has changed significantly. Until about the 1930s or 1940s, there were caste groupings in clusters of administrative units in which the eldest male from large and prestigious matrilineal joint family *tharavads* (houses or kin groups) would gather and hear cases. Depending on the nature of the offence, people were fined, punished or in some cases excommunicated. In this sense, the effective unit of caste control was the local level—the geographic size of the unit deciding the case seems to have depended on the nature of the case (Mayer 1960).

The *kutil*, a place in Devaloor designated for dispute settlement, is now only used for one ritual during the annual temple festival. The old system of dispute settlement has been undermined by other institutions and players, most notably government-run courts. However, in some cases there is an attempt to resolve problems at the local level and party leaders play an important role in this. In Kerala the neighbourhood has been an important unit for political organisation and this has been strengthened by the fact that Kerala has one of the best established systems of local government in the country. In recent years the government has implemented a neighbourhood poverty eradication programme called Kudumbashree centred on women. Although I cannot elaborate on this here, I would like to stress that houses in a neighbourhood are united not only in their relationship to, say, a local temple, as in Devaloor, but also in 'secular' aspects of everyday life such as politics and the role of local-level political players in settling disputes or garnering support by providing assistance of different kinds.

In everyday life, the potential control that the neighbourhood exercises is expressed in the comment '*natkar enthu parayum?*' (what will the neighbours say?). I often also heard the comment '*nattukar verude parayum*' (they will talk unnecessarily). Social behaviour is controlled by the fear of 'comments' or rumours in the neighbourhood. One day, while talking to Priya, an unmarried woman in her thirties, about how beautiful the *chuttuvilakku* at the local temple was (when all the oil lamps are lit), she said she and her sisters had once gone to see it at night. They were the only women there and were asked more than once if they were sponsoring the *chuttuvilakku* ('*ningal kaipikan ondo?*'). She expressed a sense of shame at that question: '*namukku kuravu ayi poyi*' ('this made us feel small … feel shame'). The implication of the question, as was further explained to me by someone else later on, was that women would be there at night only if they were sponsoring the lamps being lit in the temple. In other words, what was being questioned was why these women were there at night—a clear articulation of the boundaries that women should not cross.

A strong normative idea of dress and adornment, body language and interactions has shaped the production of the 'respectable woman' in everyday life

in Kerala.[11] The importance of such a performance of respectability in the neighbourhood was underlined by the fact that a large number of marriage proposals emanated through different people in the neighbourhood.

Furthermore, gossip is one of the mechanisms by which social control is garnered in a close-knit neighbourhood characterised by frequent interaction. I was often witness to hushed conversations about someone or another. Sometimes it was news that a young unmarried woman had been seen at a bus stand speaking to three men! This gossip is strongly gendered since the performance of respectability is far more important for women than for men.

The neighbourhood is the site of the production of gender in other ways. Devaloor is centred on a temple which hosts an annual festival devoted to the epic Ramayana. The festival is seen as centred on men, even though women's work is critical in preparing the house for the festival and for receiving several visitors. Men are supposed to observe abstinence during this time, live in a hut constructed in the compound of the house, and cook their own simple food. For the four days of the festival when there are *theyyam* performances,[12] men circumambulate the temple carrying a long wooden stick, representing Rama's bow and arrow and clearly symbolic of Rama's masculinity. Even very young boys are carried around on someone's shoulder with a stick. A day prior to the four days when this is done, young and old men with oiled bodies and little more than a loin cloth take on the role of Hanuman's monkey army. This annual temple festival is central to the neighbourhood's shared identity. It is simultaneously critical to the ways gender norms are constituted in the neighbourhood.

Neighbourhoods are thus constituted through a variety of practices: reciprocity, friendship, worship, control or violence.[13] The circle of who one considers a neighbour varies, so that in fact neighbourhoods need to be seen as entities that are constituted at specific times and around specific everyday and non-everyday events. Most important, it is the proximity of living that is characteristic of neighbourhoods. This is a proximity which entails a sensorial engagement with the lives of others. An engagement which may include face-to-face interaction, but critically includes an engagement with sights, the smells of food cooking,[14] or of sounds heard—the beating of clothes on a washing stone early in the morning, or the pounding of rice at night (now replaced by the sound of the food processor in the morning), or the sounds of arguments or violence. It is this sensorial intimacy and equally a shared sensorial landscape in everyday life that makes the neighbourhood such a powerful influence in people's lives.

THE PRODUCTION OF GENDER AND NEIGHBOURHOOD CULTURES IN BIKANER

Bikaner's walled city is organised by caste and religion. Of the Hindu castes, Brahmins and Baniyas (traders) including Jains live in the walled city, and the *mohallas*[15] are named by their caste or caste-lineage. The Muslim *mohallas* are

named after occupational groups.[16] Dalits, or former untouchables, live just beyond the walled city in different settlements. Rajputs live outside the walled city, in and around the fort where the Rajput Maharaja lived and where his family continues to live. Jats, a caste group which works primarily in agriculture, also live outside the walled city in what used to be village or *panchayat* areas. Since independence, new colonies have been formed, erstwhile *panchayat* areas have become part of the municipality and several large complexes of apartment buildings modelled on global apartments have been built on the outskirts of the city. Some of these areas are now incorporated into the expanding municipality area. These new colonies are far more mixed in social composition. However, they vary considerably by the combination of class, caste, religion and the degree of cosmopolitanism.[17]

The neighbourhoods within the walled city are substantially different from those in the colonies in a variety of ways. Not only do the *mohallas*, unlike the colonies, have an identity of the caste/caste-lineage for Hindus and the occupational group for Muslims, but the history of social intimacy is dramatically different, so that it is possible that generations of families have lived together as neighbours. One critical difference is with the geographical layout of the *mohalla*. In most of the *mohallas* within the walled city there is a central *chowk* or neighbourhood square, unlike in the colonies which have been designed with broad roads and rows of houses.[18] In addition, a distinctive feature of Bikaner is that Hindu *mohallas* in particular have at their centre *patas*, raised wooden platforms on which men of the neighbourhood sit.

A distinctive culture surrounds the *patas*. These platforms are exclusively available to men and as such mark out the *chowk* as a predominantly male space.[19] Until fairly recently the *patas* were governed by strict rules concerning who could sit on them and where. Access to the *pata* has been based not only on gender, but also on caste and age. Men from the caste of the *mohalla* and other equivalent castes and of equivalent status sit on the *pata*. In addition, the space of the *pata* is organised by age and status such that older men of higher status sit at the centre of the *pata* while younger men generally sit on the periphery and only over a period of several years begin to move closer inwards. Often younger men are seen sitting on the periphery of the *chowk* on a *pata* in front of a house playing cards or a dice game. However, the system of the *pata* is undergoing considerable changes. Nevertheless, the codes surrounding the *pata* are another way in which the caste identity of the *mohalla* is reproduced, and further is a critical way in which the extremely gendered space of the neighbourhood is produced.

While all Hindu and Muslim *mohallas* are gendered spaces in which men occupy central spaces, observing the comings and goings of people, how women experience neighbourhoods is critically tied to the kinship relationship that a woman has with the neighbourhood. This is manifest in the culture of Hindu women's veiling (*gunghat*).[20] The critical feature of Hindu veiling is that only married women veil their faces, in the presence of their husband and elder in-laws and in the neighbourhood of their in-laws

(*sasural*). Veiling is an expression of deference and a 'means of controlling the behaviour of in-marrying women' (Sharma 1978, 219). Thus, what emerges is that for Hindu women, irrespective of caste, the kinship relationship of the woman to others in a neighbourhood is critical to the observance of veiling.

Walking with a woman through the walled city, one can observe the shifting relationship that she has with different 'public' spaces and different neighbourhoods. On a number of occasions, for example, when walking with Radha, a Brahmin woman in her thirties and the mother of two school-going boys, I observed the sharp shifts in the observance of veiling and also in her body language as we walked through different neighbourhoods. She would ensure that her head was well covered when she stepped out of her husband's house,[21] and constantly re-covered her head when her sari *pallu* slipped off.[22] However, when we entered the neighbourhood of her *pihir* (her parent's house) she didn't bother to pull the sari *pallu* back up to cover her head. Not only this, her whole persona seemed to change—she talked openly and animatedly with people she met on the road including men, both younger and older. In this neighbourhood, she was a daughter and a sister—fictive or otherwise. The only situation in which a woman veils in her parent's house is when her husband or an elder in-law is with her, signifying deference to her husband. Thus, in the walled city in Bikaner, where marriages often take place within the town but across neighbourhoods, whether a woman is a daughter (*beti*) or a daughter-in-law (*bahu*) determines whether or not she is veiled, and in turn inflects her whole being, her body language, who and how she speaks or whether she speaks at all, who she makes eye contact with and so on. Further, when walking with different women I noticed that in marketplaces a woman's sari *pallu* covering her head would often slip off and stay on her shoulder, until she saw a relative of her husband or approached a shop run by her husband's relative or family friend (by whom she is identified as a daughter-in-law). Hindu veiling practices,[23] then, were not marked by a divide of 'public' and 'private' but by the nature of kinship relationships in a particular space.[24] Further, temporality is critical to an understanding of how spaces are gendered, and how this changes over the course of a day (see Ranade 2007 on Mumbai).

However, neighbourhoods are gendered in other ways. During my fieldwork in Bikaner, while studying gender and space in the town, I found two contrasting, predominantly Muslim *mohallas*. In one, the Choongaraon *mohalla*, there was 100 per cent literacy, and a very large number of women who had finished school, completed teacher training courses and had become school teachers. In the other *mohalla*—the Churigarh *mohalla*—most girls had only studied till the eighth grade and then waited to get married. There was a corresponding difference in the veiling regimes of both *mohallas* in terms of clothing and of seclusion. This difference between the two neighbourhoods indicated the sharp differences in the influence of neighbourhoods particularly in determining how gender is performed in a town. This is important not only for an understanding of neighbourhood cultures, but also for the differences in

veiling regimes. Discussions of varying *purdah* practices based on the different sects and regional communities of those who follow Islam have been pointed out (Jeffery 1979; Khan 2007; Vatuk 1982), as have variations in wealth (Jeffery 1979), yet differences based on the history and culture of a neighbourhood have received little attention.

The culture of the Choongaron *mohalla* that stresses education for women is traced back to two women known to have been the first Muslim girls to go to school in Bikaner and then, as adults, the first to get jobs as teachers. The example they set was followed by many women in the *mohalla*.[25] Sakina Begum, born in the late 1920s, recalled how her mother fought opposition to ensure that she went to school and continued to study at a time when Muslim girls were not encouraged to go to school. She said that her mother would tell her that she should cover her head so that 'no one will speak' (that is, gossip and/ or object to her going to school). Her mother would send her to school through the by-lanes so that few people would observe her going. Sakina Begum said she had always covered her head—as a student and a teacher. It was a strategy to open up spaces to study and work while preventing people from gossiping. However, she told me more than once that she never forced her daughters or daughters-in-law to cover their head.

Sakina Begum passed her matriculation examination in 1945 and soon after got a job in one of the best schools in Bikaner. Later, in the 1950s, she went on one year's paid leave to the Rajasthan state capital, Jaipur, to obtain the Senior Teaching Certificate (STC). Following this, while teaching at the school, she did her BA in English literature and then her MA. In the 1970s, Sakina Begum was involved with adult education in Bikaner. She conducted voluntary literacy classes at night in the *mohalla* and encouraged and helped many girls and women to receive an education and get jobs as teachers. Some of the women she taught were young Hindu widows in the *mohalla* who were struggling to bring up their children with no independent income. She told me that the lives of these women were transformed through education and subsequent employment.

Amina Begum, a year younger than Sakina Begum, recalled seeing Sakina Begum go to school and decided that she wanted to go as well. It was this possibility of observing a neighbour's everyday life, which led Amina to follow Sakina to school at the age of seven or eight years old. She and Sakina would go together to school and gradually other girls joined in. Amina was married the year she passed Class 8. Her husband's family was quite poor and since she was educated, someone known to the family encouraged her to get a job as a teacher. In 1948, she became a school teacher in Bikaner and at the same time, started tutoring young children in her house. Many young girls would stay with her while they studied. In 1953, Amina went with Sakina Begum to Jaipur to obtain the certificate course. Ten years after she got her job, Amina passed the Class 10 examination as a private student. Amina Begum encouraged her children and many other young girls and women to study. More recently, she

supported her granddaughter's education and when she got a job as a teacher, she even travelled with her to the places where she was posted.

Both Sakina Begum and Amina Begum became active role models for many in the *mohalla*. Their getting an education and employment opened up this possibility for many women. Girls and young women and their families saw that with education a woman could get a 'good' and 'respectable' job as a teacher. This then caused the snowball effect that has contributed to a neighbourhood culture in which women's education is now the norm, as is women being employed as teachers in schools. This *mohalla* stands out as a contrast to other *mohallas* (both Hindu and Muslim), not only in terms of the education and employment of women, but also in the culture of veiling as clothing and seclusion.

By contrast, in the Churigarh *mohalla* in the walled city, in 2008 young girls often did not study beyond Class 8, and the two young women I came to know well were both engaged to be married fairly young (at 17 and 20 years old) and did not leave the house often. In fact, they said they rarely even visited their aunt's house across the main square near the *mohalla*, and, only once a year before *Eid*, did they go to the Bada Bazaar (main market) in Bikaner. When I spoke to Sara Bano, who was 20 years old, and her mother about the Choongaron *mohalla* and the large number of women teachers there, they said, '*Is mohalla me log jalil hai, anpad hai*' (this *mohalla* is full of uneducated people). For them, clearly the lack of 'educated people' in their neighbourhood meant that education, especially for women, was not encouraged. The neighbourhood was clearly seen as constraining choices and of setting a culture of what women could or could not do, including how *purdah* was practised.

This is not to say that the culture of the neighbourhood is produced within this limited locale. Instead, the production of the neighbourhood culture results from multiple influences and processes of transformation—local, national and global—which intersect and are negotiated and articulated in rules and in everyday practices—what Arjun Appadurai (1996) refers to as the 'production of locality' or geographers have referred to as 'place-making' (Massey 1994; McDowell 1999). Simultaneously, it is important to stress that the constraining effects of a neighbourhood are negotiated by people differently.

Thus, while neighbourhoods may be divided by caste and religion, they are further differentiated by their particular culture. While this differentiation may be seen between the walled city and the newer more cosmopolitan 'colonies' in Bikaner, different *mohallas* within the walled city are differentiated on the basis of their history, the culture of women's education and veiling practices. Correspondingly, while veiling practices may differ across community, caste and class, they also critically vary across neighbourhoods. Therefore, the ways in which spaces in a town are gendered and how gender is produced in everyday life is critically tied to the culture of the neighbourhood.

Taking Neighbourhoods Seriously

This chapter is an attempt to underline the importance of neighbourhoods through an ethnographic discussion of two towns in India. In contrast to the overemphasis on identities that has so influenced both our academic life and our political life in recent decades, I argue that it is critical to look at cross-cutting influences in social life such as that of the neighbourhood. These spaces and the relationships within them have the potential of exercising tremendous social and cultural influence.

Neighbourhoods are spaces in which people live together and where there is face-to-face interaction. In the neighbourhoods I describe in Thalassery and Bikaner, there was an overlap between caste and/or religious identity and the neighbourhood, although in varying degrees. In these neighbourhoods, neighbours played a critical role in everyday life and in important events such as marriage and death. The neighbourhood was also a site in which legitimacy was sought and in which control was exercised. The strong influence of neighbourhoods emerges precisely from the proximity of living and the everyday sensorial interactions between people—the sights, sounds and smells.

In the discussion of the contrast between two neighbourhoods in Bikaner, I highlight the way the sight of a girl going to school, performing respectability by covering her head and walking through by-lanes, inspires others to join her. In Thalassery, a similar influence can be seen in relation to the choice of subjects for higher education for women. Since roughly the beginning of this century there has been a dramatic increase in the number of young women attending engineering college, fuelled no doubt by the very marked expansion of private engineering colleges in south India from the late 1990s. However, when I asked an elderly woman in Devaloor why her son-in-law had considered sending his daughter to engineering school, especially when she did not like science much, she replied in Malayalam something that would translate as 'when the neighbour's daughter is going to engineering college, you don't want to be left behind'. Neighbours then may present new possibilities; possibilities that can be aspired to. Capturing this quality of neighbourhoods, a popular television brand ran a nationwide advertisement campaign a few years ago, in which it labelled the TV 'Neighbour's envy'. In Thalassery the influence of neighbours concerning home improvement and consumer products (aided no doubt by aggressive advertising) was tangible when I walked around the neighbourhood. The choice of paints for the exterior, stainless-steel railings for a balcony or staircases, or a new kind of flooring followed the latest trends. Thus, neighbourhoods have the potential of exerting strong influences, on taste in clothing or home improvement, on women's education and on cultures of seclusion.

Simultaneously, neighbourhoods are spaces in which identities are produced in everyday life. In this chapter I have sought to discuss the ways in which neighbourhoods may produce distinct gendered cultures. Equally class, caste, ethnicity and religious identity are produced in everyday life, often through practices of exclusion or discrimination.[26] Neighbourhoods produce political subjectivities (Donner 2011),[27] and may also be characterised by uncertainty,

factions or conflict (see, for example, Pardo 1996).[28] There is a rich literature on how violence reconstitutes neighbourhoods in multiple ways (see, for example, Das 1990; Chatterji and Mehta 2007) and how neighbourhoods come to be constituted through memory post-violence (Arif 2009). Chatterji and Mehta, for example, describe the ways in which the communal violence of 1992–1993 in Mumbai 'reconstituted the neighbourhoods on the basis of religious affiliation, emptying them of occupational and religious solidarities' (2007, 16). Both at the time of a riot or pogrom and otherwise, neighbourhood spaces are critically produced by state power and the practices of non-governmental organisations (Chatterji and Mehta 2007).[29]

I would like to end by stressing that part of the importance of recognising neighbourhood cultures is of accepting and understanding their diversity. This is why the neighbourhood may not be commensurate with class/caste/religion—categories that are often reproduced by marriage and kinship patterns. However, neighbourhoods are simultaneously shaped by kinship practices, whether in terms of the relationship a woman has with those in the neighbourhood (as a daughter or daughter-in-law as in Bikaner) or as a result of residence and inheritance regimes (as in Thalassery.) Neighbourhoods attain their quality from these relationships, as also from the shared sensorial space of everyday life.

Notes

1. One exception was Massey's study (1996) in which he discussed urban concentrations where the poor would be exposed to crime, disease and violence as well as concentrations of affluence which 'enhance the benefits and privilege of the rich' (p. 395).
2. I draw on fieldwork carried out at various times and as part of different projects. The fieldwork in Thalassery in North Kerala in south India focused on a particular caste group (the Thiyyas) and its history of matrilineal kinship and inheritance. In Bikaner, the focus was on the gendering of spaces in the town.
3. See, for example, Patel and Deb (2006) and studies on large Indian cities such as Nair (2006), Roy (2003) and Srivastava (2015).
4. See, for example, Duncan (2014), Lahiri-Dutt and Sil (2014), Scrase et al. (2015); Sharma (2003) and contributions in De Neve and Donner (2006).
5. The allocation of funding for the development of small and medium-sized towns dates back to 1979–1980 (Scrase et al. 2015). In April 2016, the Modi government announced large investments in urban infrastructure in towns.
6. The Thiyyas are an in-between caste, who suffered untouchability and have been known by their traditional occupation of toddy tapping and coconut tree climbing. Educational and occupational opportunities made accessible through the Basel German Mission and the British, led to the formation of a sizeable elite among the caste during colonial rule. Thiyyas today are classified as 'Other Backward Classes' by the state and those with modest incomes are the beneficiaries of positive discrimination in educational institutions and government jobs.
7. Writing about Naples, Italy, Pardo suggests that the proximity in which parents and children live not only contributes to strong bonds among them and between siblings and in laws, but also affects the 'moral and socio-economic composition of the neighbourhood' (1996, p. 97)

8. Prior to Sree Narayana Guru's reforms in the early part of the twentieth century.

9. While the *nattu mukhyasthan* was a neighbourhood elder from the same caste, in Tamil Nadu during the anti-Brahman movement this changed. Kathleen Gough (1971) describes how by the 1950s it was the headman of the street, and not the headman of the caste, who would witness the exchange of gifts and so on at weddings. This shift was despite the fact that each caste remained endogamous (Gough 1971, p. 41).

10. Even when a decision had been made, it was presented as though seeking approval. This was one way of showing respect and seeking a person's involvement.

11. For a visual flavour of both sex segregation in everyday life and the performance of respectability see Mukhopadhyay (2007). For a discussion of the play of respectability in the political life of women see J. Devika and Benita V. Thampi (2010); see also Phadke (2007) for a discussion of Mumbai.

12. This is a performative ritual form of worship characteristic of the North Kerala region.

13. How the neighbourhoods of Devaloor have been constituted through violence between members of the opposing political parties is the subject of another paper. For a discussion of competing political communities and political violence in North Kerala, see Ruchi Chaturvedi (2015).

14. A pleasurable sensorial experience in both neighbourhoods was walking around just after noon with the smells of frying fish emanating from houses.

15. This is the Hindi/Urdu word for an urban neighbourhood.

16. Of course, not everyone in these neighbourhoods is or has been engaged with these occupations; rather, the names indicate *biradiri* (extended kin) or *jati* (caste) groups among Muslims.

17. For example, women spoke about how one of the new suburbs was just an extension of the walled city—a neighbourhood that people had moved into when there was a shortage of space in the house within the walled city. For women, this meant continuities in veiling regimes.

18. See Sanjeev Vidyarthi (2010) and Mathew Hull (2011) for a history of the concept of the neighbourhood unit in town planning in post-Independent India.

19. In Bikaner older women may be seen sitting outside their houses on the periphery of the neighbourhood square or on a side lane with their heads covered.

20. A more detailed discussion of this can be found in Abraham (2010).

21. Women also observe *ghunghat* when sitting at the window in the front room, visible to everyone on the road, or on their terrace when again visible to others on their terraces.

22. In-law women were earlier meant to not only veil but also remove and carry their slippers when walking through the *chowk* (square). Women would also cover themselves with an additional cotton shawl when entering the *chowk* of their husband's *mohalla*. This custom is still followed by older women.

23. This is true for Muslim women as well, who may also use the word '*gutan*' to describe their experience in the space of their in-laws' house (*sasural*)—the place where a woman has to veil, and where she is constrained and subordinated. For example, when I met Ayesha, a Muslim woman in her mid-twenties, at non-governmental organisation in Bikaner a few days after she had joined, I asked her how she was liking it and she replied in Hindi 'very nice—I feel like I am in

my natal home—that I have come out of the suffocation of the house and neighbourhood of my in-laws'.

24. However, widespread migration from the town of Bikaner has altered the quality of neighbourhoods and also the practices of veiling such that a woman who lives outside Bikaner may choose not to veil when she visits Bikaner, or a mother-in-law may tell a visiting daughter-in-law that she need not observe *gunghat* since 'no one has remained in the neighbourhood'.

25. Jeffery et al. (2006) write about a similar 'educational environment' in the North Indian town of Bijnor, in Uttar Pradesh, in which 'reliable electricity to let children study in the evenings, good tutors to supplement what is learnt at school, as well as the more diffuse effects produced when all the neighbours' children regularly attend school' (p. 116).

26. See, for example, Srivastava (2015) for a discussion of anxieties in gated communities and of keeping out those perceived as the 'other'.

27. Donner highlights the way neighbourhoods 'provided a space for coalitions and cooperation across a wider spectrum' (2011, p. 21) in the context of Maoist politics in West Bengal.

28. Pardo's (1996) detailed ethnography of the twists and turns of everyday relationships in a neighbourhood in Naples brings out vividly not only everyday conflicts but also uncertainties that characterise neighbourhoods.

29. Borneman's study (1992) of East and West Berlin chronicles the dramatic changes in the quality of neighbourhoods in East Berlin with the state security or Stazi spying on people.

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The Beginnings and the Ends: A 'Superdiverse' London Housing Estate

James Rosbrook-Thompson and Gary Armstrong

A Living Tapestry?

In the summer of 1951 a national exhibition was held at venues throughout the UK. The Festival of Britain,[1] as it was known, was designed to cultivate a sense of national recovery in the aftermath of the Second World War by showcasing key British contributions to science, technology, industrial design, architecture and the arts. One of the exhibits was a newly built housing estate in Poplar, East London. The estate was home to more than 1500 people (housed in 440 units) and named after the former MP for Bow and Bromley (and former Leader of the Labour Party), George Lansbury, who was popular locally because of his campaigns for social justice.[2] The design of the Lansbury Estate was described by the American sociologist Lewis Mumford as 'based not solely on abstract aesthetic principles, or on the economics of commercial construction, or on the techniques of mass production, but on the social constitution of the community itself, with its diversity of human interests and human needs' (quoted in Blanton 2016, 21). Others concurred, seeing the estate as successfully avoiding the design flaws of public housing constructed elsewhere in the interwar period, collectively dubbed 'tenement town' (Hanley 2007).[3] The Lansbury was lauded as the finest example yet of what Minister for Health Aneurin Bevan had called 'the living tapestry of a mixed community' (quoted in Goodchild 2008, 85), with solidly built dwellings of different sizes existing

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alongside vibrant street markets and transport nodes. There were no special requirements for living on the estate, but it came to be dominated by the area's local working-class population; 90 per cent of the estate's principal wage earners had manual jobs, while 28 per cent had found employment on the East End's docks or in ancillary trades (Municipal Dreams 2013).

The Pursuit of the New Society

In this context, the term 'mixed' was addressed more to the function of a particular estate than the demographic characteristics of its residents; its design took careful account of residents' access to schools, retail outlets, transport hubs and places of worship. However, meeting a seminal debate in 'urban anthropology' (Prato and Pardo 2013), in contemporary London many estates are more mixed in terms of social class, ethnicity, nationality and age than they are in terms of function. The diversification of such estates along demographic lines has had little to do with the political logic espoused by Bevan, which sought to re-order the national landscape according to the egalitarian principles that typified the Labour government of the day.

Times change but housing remains a political issue. Some 30 years later, in pursuit of what Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher termed a 'property-owning democracy', the 1980 Housing Act had far-reaching consequences for the social complexion of Britain's housing estates. Critics have laid the blame for Britain's chronic shortage of affordable housing at the door of 'Right to Buy', seeing in the policy all that is wrong with the neoliberal ideology promoted by Thatcherism (Beckett 2015). Indeed, it is interesting that in qualifying the remark so often taken to encapsulate her creed of individual responsibility, Thatcher (speaking in 1987) reached for the same phrase that Bevan had used back in the 1950s:

> There is no such thing as society. There is living tapestry of men and women and people and the beauty of that tapestry and the quality of our lives will depend upon how much each of us is prepared to take responsibility for ourselves and each of us prepared to turn round and help by our own efforts those who are unfortunate. (Quoted in Seawright 2010, 36)

While it would be unfair to identify the 'Right to Buy' scheme exclusively with the Conservative government under whose auspices it was passed—the cross-party resonances of the scheme are underplayed by many commentators (Hanley 2007)—its elevation to a national level was a bold move. In line with Margaret Thatcher's Hayekian endorsement of individual responsibility and entrepreneurship (which entailed a corresponding scaling down of state services), the 1980 Housing Act allowed council tenants to buy their property at market value minus a discount based on length of tenancy. This would quickly change the face of many inner-city estates and in many ways its implications are still being realised.

Enterprising residents of estates situated in prime locations stood to make tens of thousands and, if they were particularly lucky and held their nerve, hundreds of thousands of pounds, by purchasing their property and selling during 'booms' in the housing market.[4] Concomitantly, in many parts of London ex-local authority housing stock became the only affordable option for the aspirant middle classes, a fact reflected in the number of young middle-class professionals who have made their home on inner-city estates over the last 20 years.

More recent legislation on council housing has paved the way for a further round of privatisation. The 2016 Housing and Planning Act, the Conservative government's attempt to boost levels of homeownership and house-building, proposed that so-called 'high value', vacant council properties be sold off as part of an extension of Right to Buy. In parts of London this could result in nearly 50 per cent of public housing stock being held in private hands (Murphy 2016).

The 1980 Housing Act has been instrumental in broadening the social base of numerous housing estates. In 1979, more than 40 per cent of Britons lived in council-owned property. Today this figure stands at under 8 per cent (Harris 2016).[5] With 9600 dwellings having been sold off by Northtown Council via the 'Right to Buy' scheme since 1980, the borough is consistent with other Inner London local authorities. However, most of these sales have been concentrated in a handful of estates seen as desirable because of their size (broadly speaking, estates comprising fewer than 200 units), configuration and location. The estate that we call LG is one of the latter.

THE PEOPLE OF PROVIDENCE: INVESTING AND RETURNING

LG is located in one of the most diverse areas in the UK in terms of ethnicity. The push and pull dynamics of international migration and, relatedly, the vagaries of geopolitics, have played a role in making LG so ethnically diverse. On the completion of building work in the mid-1960s LG became home to first-generation Irish, Portuguese and Greek Cypriot migrants and their descendants, as well as members of the local white working class. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s a number of migrants from the 'new common-wealth'—more specifically, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the West Indies and West Africa—also made their home on the estate, exercising their right as British subjects. Working locally and originally remitting a sizeable proportion of their savings, they would in many instances be joined by relatives over the next 20 or so years who also sought accommodation nearby (and if possible on the same estate). The 1990s saw new, asylum-seeking arrivals from Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan, Kosovo, Bosnia and Albania (among other places), while the years following Poland's accession to the European Union saw a handful of Poles make their home on LG.

Because it is relatively small, low-rise and brick-built, LG's 148 units have proved popular with tenants seeking to purchase their flats.[6] As a result, over

35 per cent of its dwellings are privately owned, and this figure is set to rise to over 50 per cent with the passing of the aforementioned 2016 Housing and Planning Act (Denton 2015). The majority of newly minted homeowners have since moved on, buying from the council in the late 1980s and early 1990s and subsequently selling for substantial profit. This was then used to purchase houses some 25 to 30 miles outside London in counties such as Hertfordshire, Essex and Kent.[7] Today the private dwellings on LG are owned mainly by middle-class professionals unable to afford anything 'better' and buy-to-let landlords, some professional in having a portfolio of properties. A handful of ex-tenants inadvertently became landlords after purchasing their property via the 'Right to Buy' scheme. The number of university students living on the estate has increased dramatically since the early 2000s. In the lead-up to the 2001 general election former Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair pledged that more than 50 per cent of young people would attend university before the end of the decade. Though this target wasn't reached, its pursuit led to an unprecedented increase in the number of university students in the UK. These students, of course, needed to be housed, with many towns and cities seeing a boom in the rental market and the encroachment of large private providers of accommodation. The influx of students also stimulated local economies all over the country. The borough of Northtown was home to more than 15 universities and colleges and had benefited from the emergence and growth of many student-related markets.

Young professionals on LG bemoaned the increasing clout of landlords in the local property market, accusing them of crowding out home-makers and driving up the cost of rent. 'It's crazy', said 27-year-old teacher, Jess. 'We've tried to get a bigger place, but as soon as one of these landlords is in the running, forget it. The (estate) agents don't take you seriously when you're up against that lot … many of them are cash buyers and have deals going with agents in the area.' Landlords themselves, arguing that 'the market wins', are attracted by the return of high rents paid by reliable tenants: young people studying at local universities. With only one year in university-owned accommodation guaranteed by most of the capital's higher education institutions, and with eye-watering rates charged by private providers of student residences in central London, private landlords have tens of thousands of room-seeking students at their disposal.

This element of the marketisation of cities is often overlooked by scholars and commentators. The fact that so many university students in cities such as London now rent rooms in former council property is obviously one of the downstream effects of Right to Buy. But the 'push' factor here is the selling off of university-owned accommodation to private providers.[8] One such company, *Unite*, now offers student accommodation in more than 20 sites across London. Their services have proved popular with international students seeking the security, comfort and customer service boasted of in the company's advertising (www.unite-students.com). These luxury citadels have not been popular with all residents, with stories emerging over the last few years of halls being

'unliveable' and students paying eye-watering rents of up to £400 per-week (Bischoff 2014). Unsurprisingly, such rates have proved unaffordable to many students, hence their willingness to live among people they had in most instances never lived among before. Such a new—inadvertent—pattern of living arrangements saw social classes and diasporas of the dispossessed sharing space and, to a degree, living together. It was a tapestry no one had designed.

Rubbing Along: Proximity and Understandings of Difference

LG certainly met any criteria for hyperdiversity and superdiversity. What was in the 1960s a 'white' working-class estate had changed in complexion by the mid-1990s. Home to people drawn from a bewildering array of ethnic groups, with many having been born abroad, internal migration also contributed to the estate's diversity. Sandra was a 51-year-old teaching assistant who moved to London in the mid-1980s. She spoke about her experiences since arriving in Northtown:

Sandra: I was twenty when I arrived. I did the classic northern thing and got a job as a nanny via *The Lady* magazine. I had to have somewhere to sleep on my first night in London and a job and money guaranteed. It was a big posh house a few miles from where we live now and I looked after a film star's two kids. You had to be discreet with people and the working hours could be long. But it was better than what I'd known and the neighbourhood was lovely. You don't want to do that forever though and I met Tom—he's a northerner too from the North East and had just left the Navy when I met him in London. We got married and had three kids and we got a council flat as tenants when flats were not hard to get and we later bought it with the Right to Buy. We've now paid for it … Twenty years ago my accent stood me out among the mainly white, local-born mums at the school gates. Now English as a mother tongue is rare against the number of mums who have barely a word of English, or English as a second language. Northerners now are not considered 'migrants'; that word is for them who come from thousands of miles away! It's interesting to think how many of us might all those years ago (have) been considered that generation's 'economic migrants'.

Long-term council tenant Ronnie, an 83-year-old former market-stall trader, talked us through the effects of external migration.

Ronnie: The area changed. It was slow at first. In the 1960s and 1970s there was an Asian family, then a Nigerian one. No one really cared. The 1990s saw changes. The war in Yugoslavia saw thousands of Bosnians and Kosovans and Albanians appear. They must have been considered

as refugees 'cos some got council flats. Then other wars in Somalia and Africa brought more seeking safety I suppose. They too got flats. So, you woke up some mornings to a family from East Africa and another from Guinea–Bissau. What remains here is quite interesting; if you are white you are either elderly and stayed on, or young and studying and will be moving on soon. Or you are from what used to be Yugoslavia and have a job and kids in local schools. There's little that unites in terms of when we all might get together. The best you hope for is a quiet life and no disruption and a nod of the head of a morning.

There was also variation within the ethnic groups who together comprised the population of LG. The ethnic category, 'white', for example, was fractured into numerous sub-groups including Greek, Greek Cypriot, Kosovan, Irish and Portuguese. Similar fault lines could be drawn among 'Asian' and 'black' residents when it came to nationality, channel of migration, legal status, religion, culture and gender politics. It was encounters across these ethnic and sub-ethnic divides which underlined the realities of living amid such diversity.

Well placed to comment by virtue of teaching the children of many of their neighbours, were Ann and Terry. Teachers at local secondary schools located within ten minutes' walk of LG, they spoke of instances in which they had learned about ethno-cultural differences. They lived in a ground-floor studio flat below Bengali couple Abdi and Sheena and their two sons. Abdi was a cab driver who would return home each evening around 10 p.m., whereupon the family would eat together. Ann and Terry spoke of their frustration at the noise these late-night meals generated.

Ann: It can be really loud. And what's really weird is that the kids will go to bed for a couple of hours around 8 p.m., then get up again for dinner. So initially it kind of lulled us into a false sense of security, you know, 'maybe it'll be different tonight'. But up they would get and the noise starts … In fact, it's got worse over the years as the kids have got bigger. They really charge around up there.

Terry: Yeah, then the dad will start shouting to get them to settle down which we appreciate, as we've mentioned the noise to them, but can be really startling if you're trying to sleep. Then there's Ramadan, when we know they could be eating twice, once around their normal time and again even later just before the fast begins for the next day.

The couple had spoken with Abdi but, after the noise had subsided for a half an hour or so, normal levels were resumed.

Terry: It's tricky. We have asked them to be quieter if they can. And he does try—we can hear him shouting at them to sit down and eat.

But it doesn't last. Ann has to sleep with earplugs in and I normally fall asleep listening to the radio through headphones. Unfortunately it's not just late mealtimes. Sometimes you hear Abdi speaking on the phone or Skype in the middle of the night. Guessing to family back in Bangladesh; time zones you see. But what can we do besides try to block out the noise? We're not going to get environmental health onto them for having a family meal every day or staying in touch with folks back home. Besides, they never, ever, say anything to us when we have friends back here after a night out. Sometimes till really late.

Ann: Yeah, we try and take the rough with the smooth. Like with *Eid*, we know as teachers we'll effectively get a day off work anyway because our schools will be deserted!

Abdi had his own version of events:

Abdi: It's hard, because we can't hear what they hear downstair(s). I do everything I can. But I have just reached (returned) after work all day. So I'm tired and just want to eat and forget things … My wife says she hears them making noise sometimes but would never down go to say (anything) when I'm not here. So it's on both sides.

Ann and Terry recalled another curious episode involving students from the Far East living in a flat next door for the duration of a ten-month contract.

Ann: Terry was out late with some work friends and I had an old colleague over. When she left we could smell gas, it was really strong. So we called the gas board and within an hour or so they had come out. I thought the man would find the leak fairly quickly and just hoped we wouldn't be without hot water for too long. But he couldn't find anything.

Terry: Yeah, it was late when I got back so Ann went to sleep and I carried on with the gas man. He was baffled because his detector—which apparently is really sensitive—couldn't pick anything up. Said he thought it was coming from the students' flat and after going in to see them said it could be something they had been eating. Anyway, the next morning the smell was still there, so we were on the verge of calling the gas board again when one of the students came out with the remnants of this fruit, which was definitely the culprit as it absolutely stunk! Durian I think it was called.

Ann: That was it! It was a relief to know it wasn't gas, but the whole thing was a bit strange. Though I guess tolerating smelly fruit is part of multicultural living!

Commonplace Saturation: 'No One's from Here'

The scenarios recounted above are illustrative of what Susanne Wessendorf (2014), drawing on Vertovec's concept of superdiversity (2007), has called 'commonplace diversity'. In documenting her fieldwork in Hackney, East London, she argues that a 'normalcy of diversity … results from a saturation of difference whenever people step out of their front door' (ibid.: 2–3). Though commonplace, such diversity is nevertheless modulated differently across public, private and parochial spheres. These spheres, which can be described as 'social territories defined by specific relational forms' (Wessendorf 2014, 12), are subject to differences in the nature and level of engagement with the 'multiplex differences' which make Hackney superdiverse. The public realm, places like bus-stops and corner-shops, evidences a 'civility towards diversity' conditioned by the assumption that because everyone most likely comes from elsewhere, the issue of diversity isn't worthy of mention. The parochial (or semi-public) realm, however, which includes places such as schools and sports clubs, demands more concrete acknowledgement of, and interaction across, categorical differences. The friendships constitutive of the private realm are for the most part characterised by shared social class and ethno-national status. The instances witnessed and described on LG may allow us to embroider Wessendorf's typology. Here we deal with the three spheres in turn.

Relations in LG's public realm were to a large extent typified by the encounters which took place at a local convenience store situated on the estate's periphery. Its proprietor was Imran, a Turk who had moved to London in the 1990s. A 'civility towards diversity' was observable in the store. Though the business sold day-to-day necessities such as milk, painkillers and toilet roll, it made the majority of its money by selling alcohol, primarily to residents of LG. Imran realised that his livelihood depended on people's drinking habits and that these drinkers came from a variety of backgrounds.

Imran: All sorts come in. The teachers (Terry and Ann) will come in at six in the evening and buy beer and wine—four cans and maybe a bottle of red wine. Maybe four times in the week. At the weekend not so much. But the real drinkers come in here from nine in the morning and buy one can, then come back every hour for six or eight hours to buy another. They want cold beer. Some are on benefits and sit at home all day, some are in hostels and sit in (the) park. They don't want drink to be in a bag getting warm.

The council had given some of these 'real drinkers' accommodation on LG on the basis that they constituted a 'medical priority' (in many cases they were also dependent on class-A drugs). Terry spoke about his trips to the store:

Terry: Not sure I go there as much as the fella (Imran) says! But you do see all sorts. There's a guy I used to drink with in the pub. He was a pot-washer—Egyptian originally, I think. It's sad because I see him in there (a small park located nearby) now. Says he can't afford to

drink in the pub anymore as it's too expensive. Just drinks cans in the park now. Actually made me see that lot (the park drinkers) in a different way.

His recollection of the Egyptian street-drinker prompted him to reflect on the diversity of LG and Northtown in general.

Terry: It's true that everyone here is not from here—you know, originally—but when I moved here all those years ago it slowly dawned on me that neither was I, you know?! In meeting all these people I thought more about my own background. (I) wouldn't have done that before. So then on the odd occasion when somebody asks in 'the ends', as the kids at school call it, or one of the kids themselves, I can reply that my family's Scottish with some French in there as well … But then that's part of me now. It's not just saying it. Before this I was from some small white seaside town.

This was interesting, in that moving to Northtown had led Terry to question his own status as 'native'. And whereas at first the results of his enquiries into his background simply provided something interesting to say in 'convivial' exchanges (Gilroy 2004), they had now been woven into his identity. On arriving in the area he had evidently posed as foreign in order to strike a chord of commonality, then through seeking an alibi for this had realised that he actually was 'from elsewhere'. Indeed, this realisation seemed to be part of a superdiverse, 'settler' sensibility, at once extending and widening the horizons of one's genealogical imagination (Tyler 2005) and thereby complicating the notion of 'nativity'. Put more simply, white urbanites are no longer exempt when it comes to the question of where they are 'really from', and this has some potentially profound implications for their understandings of ethno-racial difference. Their attitudes to 'immigrants' and 'refugees' may also be affected.

AXES OF DIFFERENTIATION

It was perhaps the local secondary school and a handful of local pubs which were most illustrative of social ties in the parochial realm. These places witnessed lots of accommodation of and negotiating across the categories of difference which were only rarely pointed up in the public realm. In discussing the diversity of the clientele at his favourite local pub, university professor Barry, who once owned one of LG's maisonettes but now lives on a private street adjacent to the estate, alluded to a number of intriguing issues.

Barry: Yeah, lots of different types of people down there—though at the times I go in (late at night), it's mainly men. From all over: Ireland, Portugal, Brazil … I speak to lots of people from the estate: Steve, the caretaker; Mike, the postie (postman) … Never arrange to meet them. Just see them in there most nights. They're drinking mates, I suppose.

Here the characteristics of the parochial realm in and around LG tallied with those described by Wessendorf. Though important commonalities were formed between residents of the estate through their exchanges in the parochial sphere, differences associated with social class seemed to preserve a degree of social distance. The familiarity and camaraderie forged during such routine encounters did not often lead to orchestrated meetings or get-togethers. In other words, the relationships created and developed in the public and parochial realms did not graduate to the private realm, where for the most part relational dynamics were defined by shared class background.

Indeed, residents tended to use knowledge about their neighbours' ethno-racial backgrounds gleaned in the parochial realm to create and sustain private space. So while 'contact' (Allport 1958) between members of different groups did further their understanding of one another's cultural repertoire, this did not rule out assertions of ethno-racial difference being made which could be deemed offensive. For example, Ann spoke about the challenge of teaching some of the girls who live on the estate:

Ann: It's tricky because obviously I see them here—at work and at home, if you like! But I've learned a lot about the culture of these families. The parents in which families are likely to side with you on Parents' Evening, and the ones who will back their child. Also, I know families like the one upstairs who will tend to keep the elder lad back from school quite a lot. And, people might just think that's, you know, really wrong—and I don't really agree with it—but that's Bengali culture. Particularly the families from Sylhet (a region in north-east Bangladesh) who live here. He's needed to help out at home. It's not as simple as being 'Asian'.

This kind of statement was echoed elsewhere and might be characterised as an instance of what have been called 'granular essentialisms'. These are assertions about ethno-racial difference that draw on day-to-day experience and attempt to take stock of intersections across the axes of differentiation bound up with superdiversity (Rosbrook-Thompson, 2016). Such statements were more informed and textured than the stereotypes which typically circulate about ethnic groups outside superdiverse areas. Though less likely to be flagrantly racist and prejudicial, however, such statements could still be offensive and discriminatory. This was indicated by the fact that most residents would only air 'granular essentialisms' when at home or somewhere considered 'safe'. Indeed, in many ways these essentialisms were the shibboleths of private space on LG. Spaces qualified as private if these kinds of statement could be made in them. Such a dynamic represented a challenge for us as white, male ethnographers. By uttering these statements people indicated that they were speaking privately and discreetly, and in our asking them as to whether they would be happy for their statements to be reported, residents responded that some could be noted, but not others. By posing the question itself the space in which a conversation took place was immediately disqualified as 'private'.

These essentialisms also allowed middle-class residents to showcase the cultural capital they had amassed in engaging with neighbours across ethno-national (and social class) divides. It was perhaps no coincidence that Ann signed off her comments above with the remark, 'It's not as simple as being "Asian".' This indicated that the granularity of her assertions about ethnic differences was hard-won. It had been etched during numerous cross-ethnic exchanges and encounters. However, though she identified with the spirit of superdiversity in setting 'Sylheti culture' apart from a wider South Asian set of cultural practices, and her comments hinted that intra-group differences rendered assertions of group difference problematic in themselves, she (and others) still made such assertions. As ethnographers, this pride in mixing across ethno-cultural lines expressed by middle-class residents could be harnessed. While reluctant to unpack statements about ethno-racial difference, they were far less inhibited when it came to telling stories about the engagement across ethnic and class boundaries which these statements were predicated on.

Orderly Occupations? Employment and Opportunities

It would be fair to say that, historically, residents of the estate—and until the 1980s these were exclusively council tenants—had ridden waves of globalisation, but hardly at the crest. They had made the most of something similar to what Gordon Matthews (2011), in his fascinating study of a mixed-purpose tower-block in Hong Kong, has called 'low-end globalization'. This globalisation concerns 'the transnational flow of people and goods involving relatively small amounts of capital and informal, sometimes semi-legal or illegal, transactions commonly associated with "the developing world"' (Matthews 2011, 19–21). Though the developing world was not as explicitly represented in the processes and transformations which afforded opportunities to people on LG—though, as we will see, it was certainly present in the guise of labour migration and networks of production and exchange—their jobs and activities are broadly consonant with Matthews' description. If the 'low' in 'low-end globalization' signals a scaled-down version of larger shifts whose nodal points are situated in the developed world, enterprising tenants on LG had to actively seek out pockets of demand for labour which in many cases were a by-product of more profound, capital-driven bouts of time–space compression (Harvey 1989). Indeed, the estate's positioning in relation to various hubs of globalisation and urban development was certainly propitious.

Retired labourer Hughie, a 74-year-old Irishman, described the underground labour market which had operated locally for four decades:

Hughie: From the late 50s until the late 1980s the Irishmen who arrived in the area laboured. They were the muscle behind building, be it property development, office block building, roads and motorways and tunnelling of any type. The work was long and often dangerous and by any standards quite brutal. The Irish—many from the poor, West of Ireland counties—were perfect for this. They were stoical

and took pride in working in awful conditions. They were men who needed a job and shelter, and the area could provide that. What you had was a network of Irish contacts. The Irish pubs were informal work agencies. Someone would 'have a word' with someone who was employing and the next thing was you were to be outside the tube the next morning at seven 'o'clock in work gear. Various vans would pull up and men would be invited to get in … The vans today are still there picking up in the morning but the only Irishman is likely to be the owner of the property that he wants doing up. He has the pick of East European migrants to labour for him.

Three of London's (and, indeed, Britain's) busiest and most iconic railway termini were located within 15 minutes' walk of the estate. Indeed, many local families owed their presence in the district and, furthermore, their Celtic heritage, to the hostels made available for tired Scottish train-drivers in need of rest before their return journeys. A number ended up either settling in the borough or unwound by striking up short-lived relations with local women, with predictable consequences. More recently, these stations have been a source of employment in roles as varied as ticket guard, shop assistant and cleaner.

The two hospitals situated within a one-mile radius were important for more than their medical services. As well as the fact that a significant number of LG's residents had been born in one of the two, these hospitals offered job opportunities to some of the borough's residents during a time when the possibilities of employment were beset with racial and ethnic discrimination. This was occasioned by the disintegration of the British Empire (which took place largely between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1960s), with global forces once again adding to the diversity of the area. Many first- and second-generation migrants from the 'New Commonwealth'—and, more specifically, the West Indies, South Asia and West Africa—settled in Northtown after landing jobs in the National Health Service (NHS). The same was true of arrivals from Cyprus and Portugal. Though they first lived within other council-owned flats and houses, some these migrants—and a number of their offspring—took up residence in LG after its construction in the mid-1960s.

Another boon for those of an entrepreneurial bent was London's famous West End, situated around two miles away. The many establishments which together constituted 'theatre land' had a long history of providing employment to residents of Northtown. A one-time thriving piano-making industry and a manufacturer of bespoke stage costumes both answered theatre-related demand. Though these businesses have since closed down—in one instance making way for a duo of internationally renowned fashion houses—the trade in theatre tickets remains. Indeed, a handful of ticket touts (one of whom, Jimmy, lived on LG) operated in a more diverse market that involved providing tourists with tickets to Premier League football matches and West End shows and music gigs. The shadowy entrepreneurial status of this trade mirrored other features of LG's occupational culture which, in turn, had a bearing on issues of order and disorder.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: ADORNMENT AND NEGOTIATION

Issues of security and the maintenance of order were immediately apparent to visitors of LG. Time-worn 'Neighbourhood Watch' signs were accompanied by the occasional CCTV camera and brightly coloured burglar alarm. Those with a real concern about unwanted intruders had tried to combine fortification with adornment. The design of their heavy-duty security doors—installed in front of their wooden front doors—saw straight bars interspersed with a mixture of geometric flourishes. Form never quite triumphed over function; the decorative quality of lattices, spirals and incomplete figures of eight might distract visitors only momentarily from the fact that these elegant shapes were traced in wrought iron and ultimately there to exclude.

Matters of security and disorder were much more complex than a concerted attempt to banish any forms of criminal activity from the estate or one's front door. Drugs and stolen goods changed hands. Illegal satellite dishes were mounted. Jobs ranging from carpentry, to childcare, to academic tutoring were done 'cash-in-hand' to avoid the recipient paying tax. And though it was difficult to map class difference against levels of involvement in crime it was easy to identify a threshold in terms of seriousness of criminal activity which residents were unwilling to move beyond. What concerned people was the possibility that signs of serious disorder would be observable to neighbours, visitors and passers-by. Families, markets and investments needed to be nurtured and protected. This also worried long-term council tenants who had seen improvements in safety and security over the years and were keen for this upward trend to continue. All residents were aware, though, that in their efforts to fight crime, they may have to be strategic and indeed tolerant of certain movements.

In the early 1990s the local council along with the Metropolitan Police waged a concerted battle against the street prostitution which had taken root in the immediate environs of a nearby railway terminus some 20 years before. Their efforts succeeded in displacing, rather than removing, the problem. Indeed, the market for prostitution moved to an area encompassing LG. Prostitutes would use another local estate and its quiet walkways and stairwells as a place to both solicit business and consummate it via sex acts. Located one hundred meters or so west of LG, Smithson Place was suited to illicit liaisons, with its underground network of garages and parking spaces originally built for council tenants but many of which laid empty. Due to the basement being utilised for prostitution and drug-dealing these garages were closed in the early 2000s amid another 'crackdown' on street prostitution and dealing. The council attempted to substitute a legal for an illegal market; today the spaces are owned by a storage company and private car-park operator, respectively. One might think that drug-dealing was something residents would unite in condemning. The reality, however, was more complicated.

Serving Up Tranquillity

The conflicting moralities of residents were most apparent when it came to Carl. Most respondents who lived within two streets of Carl's home were aware that he 'served up' (local slang for selling drugs). Living in a 30-square metre studio flat, Carl displayed little in the way of extravagant or brash behaviour. Indeed, it was this which had won him the qualified approbation of some of his neighbours. Barry spoke about the pros and cons of having a drug-dealer living nearby.

Barry: The boy—I say boy because I saw him grow up—he's 30 now—sells drugs. He lives in his mum's flat. She left London with a new fella years ago. Everyone knows what he does. He has people coming to the door all the time—well, 'drug-time'—namely late afternoon till the early hours. They have a mission—to buy their drugs—it's marijuana and cocaine from him. They do the deal then go. It's cash on delivery and neither party wants to draw attention to themselves. It also means the street is monitored at night. The dealer wants to know that there are no plain clothes cops in cars watching him so he knows all the vehicles on the street and takes an interest in anyone walking by in the hours of darkness. I've always taken the view that as long as he keeps the trouble from my door, from my family and my kids, then he can get on with it. He knows that if any serious stuff happens here then he's getting nicked. He's got a market to protect. If the police are here or if there are addicts loitering outside his door, it could be game over. So he has to keep things sensible. He's at home all day every day and in good weather sits on his front door happy to chat with any neighbour … Like the de facto Neighbourhood Watch. We don't need a weekly rota!

Eighteen-year-old Hiba, whose Somalian parents had settled on LG in the 1990s, reflected on whether Carl's presence offered greater security.

Hiba: In a weird way, I guess it does. Growing up here, you're not proud saying to others, 'Look, that's where the dealer lives'. But then what if he didn't live here? The real problems could start. Besides, everyone's 'ends' has a dealer, right?

Undergraduate students Sheena, Sheri and Amy lived almost directly above Carl, in a flat rented from a landlord who also lived locally. They admitted to being conflicted about his trade, partly due to the fact they would occasionally avail themselves of his services. Sheri's remarks also indicated that when middle-class customers were involved, Carl preferred goods to be delivered via a third party.

Sheri: Look—we're students. We will smoke the odd zoot (joint) now and then. And to be honest we know where we're getting it from. But it's not like we're knocking on his door. We have a number to ring

and somewhere to meet to pick up. He has two or three runners and one of them will be there. To be honest I've never really spoken to him. Just say hello when we pass by.

This group of 'runners' was a curious sight. They seldom actually travelled on foot, shuttling from Carl's flat to various delivery points at the seat of cheap mountain bicycles. A signature accoutrement was the small 'man bag' strapped diagonally across back and chest; runners usually carried drugs in volumes only deemed sufficient for 'personal use'.[9] These bags proved popular with local schoolboys; in blurring the line between crime and fashion, the trend also made it harder for police officers to single out Carl's runners.

THE PROFITS OF EMBOURGEOISEMENT

Carl (and those further up the food chain) had done very well out of the steady encroachment of students into Northtown. This, along with an influx of young middle-class professionals struggling to leave elements of student life behind, had changed the complexion of his market for the better. His middle-aged Portuguese neighbour, Stefan, spoke about the implications of this shift.

Stefan: I mean, look at who's buying this stuff now. I live next to and under students, teachers, people that have good jobs and everything. You can smell it coming over. They're probably buying it from him. The police come hardly ever … Why should they bother when it's mainly these kind of people that are his customers?

In speaking about Carl's activities, Barry also mentioned the issue of noisy neighbours.

Barry: Someone once said to me, 'It's not how much noise, but who's making the noise.' And that's what happens here to an extent. If it's students having a blow-out at the weekend or at the end of exam season, that can be irritating. But it could also be a hell of a lot worse.

In an extension of Barry's maxim about noise, it wasn't so much what was being sold that was important, but rather who was buying it.

Stefan: I mean, it's similar with us. Years ago there was problems with crack-houses here. These people were squatting and serving up all day and night. You'd hear noise every day and then eventually police would raid, nick them all then board doors up with those big iron doors. That looked crap as it was empty for months until new tenants moved in. Now it's (mainly) students and young people—students, the teachers—having parties, making noise. So it can still make you angry, but it's different and not a real threat. To us or to police, really.

Another reason for the tolerance of their shenanigans was the fact that students also offered more legitimate revenue streams, as explained by Ronnie.

Ronnie: From the early- to mid-2000s on many (students) came from small, posh towns and now many come here from abroad. They needed accommodation and this meant them who'd bought their council flats and were about to retire turned into landlords. They would give the flat over to a letting agency and go and live in Spain. The rent they got from the students more than paid for what they needed over there.

Here, again, we see the operation of 'low-end globalisation', with homeowners making the most of their freedom of movement with the European Union and the groundswell of room-seeking students—a sizeable proportion of whom came to study in the UK from foreign shores. These global networks, as well as the varying channels of migration which accounted for the presence of other LG residents in London, gave a cosmopolitan feel to the estate and the legal, semi-legal and illegal activities which took place there.

The Tapestry Unpicked

The stories told above reflect the staggering level of diversity evident on mixed-occupancy estates such as LG. This mixedness in terms of ethnicity and class is the result of waves of migration and the effects—intended and unintended, immediate and more remote—of various pieces of housing legislation. The day-to-day realities of life on LG can also be traced to numerous (related) processes of marketisation, urban development and the time–space compression that global processes have brought in the past 50 years. In proclaiming that estates like this are laboratories for the study of 'hyper-' and 'superdiversity', we should not fall into the trap of arguing that all is rosy in the garden—that regular cross-ethnic contact will put an end to people appealing to group differences in a potentially offensive manner. Though it was difficult to point to any instances of overt racism, in many cases residents' attitudes to migration-related diversity were ambivalent.

For the people who found themselves there, LG was home. In this superdiverse setting, however, somewhere called 'real home' was often mentioned in conversation, often for decades after arrival in Northtown. At times this was a source of comfort. When London was too chaotic, lonely or complex there was—in the mind at least—a place less complicated to retreat or return to. Few took this route, however. In its entertainments and opportunities this pocket of London was seductive and energising, albeit it could be manic, confusing, tiring, infuriating and unsentimental. Perhaps all extended families might be described in such terms—even those who celebrated such diversity used 'granular essentialisms' to make sense of the behaviour of their neighbours. It was the utterance of these essentialisms which seemed to qualify spaces as

authentically private. The human quality of trust was integral in these encounters. Though the public and parochial realms were characterised by a host of cross-class and cross-ethnic encounters and exchanges, in the private realm it was commonality along the lines of class which shaped the forging of relationships. That said, there were signs that the complexity of their surroundings had led some white residents to question the basis of 'nativity' and develop a superdiverse, 'settler' sensibility. If everyone was from elsewhere, it was likely that one's own ancestral trail would similarly lead to foreign origins, and this could be used to build bridges of commonality in convivial exchanges which took place in the public and parochial spheres.

In the most mercantile of cities, income streams could be sought out and forged in many different ways. As with its ethno-racial composition, people's patterns of employment were complex. Whether residents worked in the public, private or shadow sectors, the tangle of legal, semi-legal and illegal activities witnessed on the estate cut across class boundaries and correlated with curious—fluid—attitudes to crime and disorder. More specifically, many respondents were more concerned with the relationship between crime and manifestations of disorder than criminal acts per se. Subtle indicators of disorder were tolerated providing they did not presage serious signs of urban decay. The noise generated and anti-social behaviour exhibited by middle-class students were an indicator of progress against a background narrative of continuing improvement.

NOTES

1. The Festival, which ran from May to October, was funded by the British government and directed by newspaper editor Gerald Barry (with the *Daily Express* and the *Saturday Review*, among others).
2. Lansbury was Chairman of the Labour Party between 1927 and 1928, and led the party between 1932 and 1935. He campaigned on issues as diverse as workhouse reform, women's suffrage and working conditions in the colonies and protectorates of the British Empire.
3. Though the term 'tenement' strictly refers to an apartment or room rented by a tenant, it has come to denote a poorly maintained and overcrowded block of apartments situated in a poor, inner-city area.
4. A decline in the number of council homes being built is important here. Whereas Clement Attlee's Labour government of 1945 to 1951 sought to replace homes destroyed during the Second World War by constructing more than 1 million homes—80 per cent of which were council houses—of the 2.63 million homes built under the New Labour government in office between 1997 and 2010, just 0.3 per cent were under local authority control.
5. More than 1.8 million council homes have been sold to tenants at sub-market rates since the introduction of Right to Buy (Foster 2015).

6. Estate agents and mortgage lenders play a role here. Mortgages are easier to obtain for flats situated in blocks that are under six storeys high and constructed using bricks rather than reinforced concrete. Being five storeys high and brick-built, LG was classed as 'prime ex-local authority' housing stock by nearby estate agents.
7. For a detailed analysis of 'white flight', see Frey (1977).
8. Where universities have been less inclined to divest themselves of their estates, and/or when companies identify a market for luxury student accommodation not catered for by official halls of residence, these companies have bought up land and former office blocks in order to create rooms and self-contained flats for students.
9. In British law there is a distinction between possession of an amount of drugs consistent with personal use and intent to supply, respectively. Police officers infer intent to supply from a number of factors including possession of a variety of drugs and a substantial amount of drugs divided into individual denominations. The penalty for possession of a quantity consistent with personal use is police caution (though in many instances individuals are let off altogether), while for intent to supply the maximum sentence for class-A drugs is life, and class-B and -C drugs 14 years.

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Everyday Mobility: Encountering Difference

Timothy Shortell

A majority of the world's population lives in cities and the proportion is growing rapidly. Since the nineteenth century, researchers of cities across the social sciences have extensively examined the dynamic quality of urban life. However, as Pardo and Prato (2012) explain, anthropology for a long time remained ambivalent about studying cities. The pace of the city is strongly tied to forms of urban living and, as a result, of the impressions urban dwellers form of themselves, of others and of urban space. Everyday mobilities have always been an essential part of cities and walking has been and remains the most important form.

Walking is generally associated with everyday life. As such, we tend to view it as an activity that is instrumental and habitual, as so many everyday routines are. Public places in cities almost always contain a mixture of walking practices, some fast and some slow, some with purpose and others meandering. In the usual everyday mindset, urban dwellers who are themselves mobile generally do not take note of the presence of other pedestrians as distinct figures. Instead, we see mobile others as an element to be incorporated into our calculations of a route from place to place. It is not that we, in our own movements, do not perceive other pedestrians and others engaged in ordinary forms of mobility, but rather, that they form part of the background rhythms and patterns of urban public space. They are part of the environment in which we get around.

Walking is a significant urban activity, in part because its pace is slow enough to allow a multisensory experience, but also because it permits communication and interaction in public spaces. Walking is often connected to other forms of everyday mobility, such as public transportation, as well as many forms of everyday behaviour, such as shopping, socializing and leisure.

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Walking contributes to the culture of local places. In some places, such as the USA, there is a 'car culture'; in others, such as Denmark, there is a distinct walking culture (Vestergaard et al. 2014). People choose to walk as a part of their experience of the city, often intentionally, but also habitually. Public transportation is also related to the mobility culture of places. Some choose to avoid public transportation in order to escape the necessity of sharing space with strangers and others choose it for this very reason (Mattioli 2014).

Everyday mobilities, including walking and public transportation, are the most important context of encountering group differences in urban space. Even when walking is habitual, urban dwellers are skilled at reading the social landscape. We form a sense of place by interpreting signs of group identities as we move through public and semi-public spaces. We always see urban places within the web of group affiliations. As Blommaert (2010, 6) explained, 'Movement of people across space is therefore never a move across empty spaces. The spaces are always someone's space, and they are filled with norms, expectations, conceptions of what counts as proper and normal.'

Simmel's (1955) notion of 'web of group affiliations' remains particularly useful in urban studies. In premodern communities, he noted, social identity is compulsory rather than voluntary, limiting individuality and, by extension, generating suspicious of cultural differences; in contrast, in modern societies, social identity is more open and flexible. The modern structure may provide less security, because of those cultural differences, but encourages a more abstracted form of trust. Urban dwellers rely on norms of public behaviour to fill in the gap resulting from the lack of biographical knowledge.

Urban dwellers are continuously navigating public spaces with people whose identity must be read based on visible signs. These signs are not only in our appearance but also in our behaviour and sometimes through proximity to others in the same group. Sometimes we read these signs as indicating a common identity because we share a cultural affiliation, be it racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, gender, class and so forth. At other times, we read these signs as indicating the presence of strangers, people with whom we do not share group affiliations. Quotidian mobilities cannot be separated from the interpretation of signs of social identity.

In different situations, our social identity orients in a particular way, making aspects of our sense of group belonging salient to various degrees. Properties of the situation, including the nature of the spaces we inhabit and the forms of interaction that take place in them, draw out aspects of our social self. For urban dwellers, one of the most important properties is the visibility of the majority and of ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious minorities.

We make attributions about urban spaces, especially public spaces, based on what and who can be seen in them. Our experience of 'us' and 'them' is mainly determined by visibility as socially constructed and attached to specific places. A place is 'ours' or 'theirs' (belonging to a specific 'them' or a generalized 'not us') based on the way it meaningfully appears. In some spaces, these attributions

are more enduring and in others they may be temporary, based on the attributes and behaviours of those currently occupying them.

The movement of people, ourselves and others, makes our identity performances mobile, but they remain fundamentally place-based. Quotidian mobility ensures that urban dwellers will routinely encounter cultural strangers—that is, members of various out-groups, some of which are farther 'out' than others. Since mobility in space is related to passage of time, we always carry with us the accumulation of prior experience with a variety of out-groups.[1] In everyday life, we are frequently goal-oriented and, as Schütz (1967) pointed out, our own goal-oriented behaviour leads us to assume that others are goal-oriented as well. This tends to encourage an instrumental logic in everyday group interactions, especially in contexts where the achievement of goals requires some form of social cooperation.

This instrumental orientation generates a specific kind of urban place, where difference is expected and, to a large extent, tolerated. Anderson (2011) called such spaces 'cosmopolitan canopies'. In his analysis of Philadelphia, Anderson notes the fragility of these canopies. Ethnic and class differences reflect power hierarchies and there are instances in which members of the more powerful group try to exercise their privilege to control public space. Just as inequality gives some urban dwellers more mobility choices, it also gives them more strategies for the use of public space. Advantages in the one are related to advantages in the other.

Despite this, Anderson explains, when cosmopolitan canopies function, they are essential to the public life of the city. Public parks and shopping malls allow members of different social groups, across racial and class hierarchies, to engage in similar patterns of everyday mobility. Based on my own research, I would suggest that sidewalks (including pedestrian-oriented businesses) and public transportation are also important forms of the cosmopolitan canopy.

The co-presence and shared use of space may occur without substantial verbal inter-group interaction. DeSena (2012) uses the concept of 'parallel play' to explain how the gentry and working class get along, for the most part without assimilating. In Greenpoint, Brooklyn, 'The gentry create a parallel culture that coexists with the established local culture of immigrant and working class residents' (DeSena 2012, 82). But even in this context, of parallel groups and forms of sociability, urban dwellers are reading the presence (and, sometimes, absence) of others in the in-group and out-groups.

In this auto-ethnographic study, I want to explore how urban dwellers encounter cultural differences, marked by group boundaries, through everyday mobility. Like all urban dwellers, I occupy a specific social location and am embedded in a web of group affiliations. But unlike most urban walkers, I have intentionally used walking as a method for observing the group dynamics and the formation of a sense of place. As I walked and rode public transportation in Brooklyn, London and Paris, I was attentive to patterns of inter-group interaction; I use this as a basis for drawing some conclusions about how urban

dwellers experience public space and form attachments, positive and negative, to specific places. Following Simmel ([1903] 1997, [1908] 1997). I argue that this is an essential part of urban life.

URBAN ETHNOGRAPHY OF QUOTIDIAN MOBILITY

Krase (2012a, 2012b, 2014) brings a phenomenological perspective to urban ethnography. As people practise their culture, they transform the built and social environment with traces of their culture, both material and symbolic. In his study of immigrant neighbourhoods, Krase (2012a, 2012b) has argued that 'glocal' practices are authentic to the pluralism of the host neighbourhoods. The meanings that places hold for urban dwellers depends, in part, on the visibility of diverse cultural practices and the people who enact them.

Krase (2014) examined visual indicators of cultural identity in a series of auto-ethnographic walking trips around immigrant neighbourhoods in Oslo, Paris and Naples. He found that commercial spaces are important locations of the visual signifiers of social identity. In immigrant neighbourhoods, ethnic identity intersects with class identity in visible ways. This visual information is used by urban dwellers to make sense of the place. I have employed a similar method in the present research.

Walking to study urban places is not a new phenomenon. For Baudelaire, *flânerie* was a way of encountering the vitality of the city; it was a way of reading and understanding urban space (Short 2012). It is a prototype of the auto-ethnography I have employed. Nuvolati (2014) compared the ethnographer and the *flâneur*, recognizing both similarities and differences. The most significant of these differences concerns the kind of knowledge of the city produced by their instrumental walking. The *flâneur* can be poetic; in contrast the ethnographer strives for scientific description. This means paying attention to patterns and not just what seems amusing or unusual.

Perhaps the most important ethnography of urban mobility, from my perspective, is Augoyard's (2007) study of the walking patterns of a group of residents of public housing in Grenoble. Augoyard's application of rhetoric to walking is novel. He uses rhetoric to explain the narratives of urban dwellers based on their routine walks.

Augoyard asked his respondents to take notes about their routine walks and then interviewed them. He is not concerned with the rhetoric of their reporting as such, but rather sees elements in the patterns of their journeys that can be analysed like language. This works, because Augoyard conceives of walking with respect to space as the same as writing with respect to language. 'Through the practice of one's walks, everyday life seems to take on the look of a language. The steps taken would expound spatiotemporal actions whose overall configuration would have a *style*' (2007, 26; emphasis in the original).

The elements of style in everyday mobility can reveal aspects of the meaningfulness of place. For example, Augoyard described figures of exclusion and combination that relate to the kinds of attachments to a place that we form as

a result of our routines. Augoyard suggests that in our everyday walking our sense of the spaces we occupy contains gaps, which he calls ellipses. We avoid certain areas; we take alternative routes; we make substitutions. These figures connote a negative attachment to the spaces skipped over. They do not contribute to the meaningfulness of place, except in their absence. The gaps are examples of 'not home'.[2]

At the same time, our walking routines include meaningful combinations. We repeat patterns and we sometimes include a kind of playfulness in our walking, even when we are engaging in instrumental mobility. These modes of combination are an important form of appropriation of space. The figures of combination connote a positive attachment to places. These are places where we invest emotional energy, where we apply our attention, even if we would not necessarily consider them 'favourite places'.

In the places where inter-group interaction occurs with regularity—the cosmopolitan canopies—urban dwellers experience cultural differences. These are like figures of combination, where repetition is important.[3] The places where people avoid inter-group interactions are like the figures of exclusion. The valences that adhere to places are the result, in part, from these rhetorical figures of mobility in the context of group dynamics.

Method and Data

The complexity of meanings in urban space results from the nature and distribution of signs of group identities and their relative statuses. In this research, I use a spatial semiotic analysis of visual data from urban spaces, collected as a participant observer in modes of everyday mobility, on foot and using public transportation. I used a Situationist-inspired *dérive* technique to record observations about the flows of people in typical immigrant neighbourhoods in Brooklyn, London and Paris.

The main concern of the artists of the Situationist International was how urban public life was changing as a result of mass consumer capitalism. A key practice in their work toward a new urbanism was the *dérive* (urban drift), 'a technique of rapid passage through varied ambiences' in which urban dwellers 'let themselves be drawn by the attractions of the terrain' (Debord 1958, np). I modified the practice to make it more standardized for ethnographic research, mindful of Nuvolati's (2014) comparison of the ethnographer and the *flâneur*.

I decided to conduct the research across multiple sites specifically for the purposes of comparison. The immigrant groups living in the neighbourhoods I studied are largely different, as are the local host cultures. Thus, if the patterns of interaction in the public spaces of the three cities are similar, I can conclude that these are properties of spaces of difference rather than aspects of particular local cultures.[4]

In Brooklyn, I walked south on Coney Island Avenue from Church Avenue to Brighton Beach Avenue.[5] The American Community Survey's estimates for

the period 2008–2012 show the Census tracts along Coney Island Avenue, with an average of 49 per cent foreign-born and an average difference of about 14 per cent.[6] In the tracts at the northern end of Coney Island Avenue, West Indians are the largest group; moving south, South Asians and then Eastern Europeans become the dominant group. In a couple of tracts, Central Americans are the modal group. In one tract, East Asians are the largest group.

In London, I studied two separate routes, which reflect different kinds of 'immigrant places'. One route, on foot, was in Chinatown; the other was from Dalston to Islington on the 38 bus and along Upper Street on foot. The Chinatown neighbourhood in London is located just north of Leicester Square in the West End. It is centred on Gerrard Street, which is now a pedestrian mall. Chinese businesses dominate Lisle Street as well as Leicester Street between Gerrard and Lisle. Several smaller connecting streets and lanes are included in the neighbourhood. The name 'Chinatown' has referred to different places in London; the present neighbourhood dates from the 1970s. This is an immigrant neighbourhood largely oriented toward consumption.

Upper Street in Islington (part of the A1 road) is the main commercial area of the contemporary neighbourhood. It runs from the Angel Tube station to the Highbury & Islington station. Toward the southern part, the street is lined with restaurants, pubs and shopping. Toward the north, it is more working class and includes supermarkets and fast food chains. There are several green spaces along the route, including Islington Green, the lot of Saint Mary's Church and Compton Terrace Gardens. About two-thirds of the way up from Angel, the borough hall sits behind a modest paved square with a few benches, opposite a popular wine garden. Pubs have long played an important role in the neighbourhood (Ackroyd 2009). The area has been a site of intense gentrification since the 1960s. Despite this, it remains one of the places of highest density in London.[7]

Vertovec (2007) describes London as a place of 'superdiversity'. One of the most important aspects of this 'diversification of diversity' is the fact that immigrants are coming to London from a greater variety of places, expanding beyond the colonial relationships which established earlier flows. He notes that 'there are populations numbering over 10,000 respectively from each of no less than forty-two countries' (2007, 1029).

My *dérive* in Paris took place in Belleville. Belleville, split between the 19th and 20th arrondissements, has long been an immigrant neighbourhood. A working-class neighbourhood with a long history of radical politics, the neighbourhood attracted first Tunisian Jews, and then Algerian and Moroccan Muslims in the post-colonial period (da Rocha Pitta 2007; Prioux 2007; Gordon 2009). In the 1980s, the neighbourhood became a predominantly Chinese enclave, though it is truly pan-Asian, including Koreans, Vietnamese and others from the former French Indochina. Recently, the area has become home to a large sub-Saharan African population (Simon 2000).

DÉRIVES IN BROOKLYN, LONDON AND PARIS

Brooklyn

Walking south on Coney Island Avenue toward Church Avenue, there is a feeling of spatial emptiness which is enhanced by the presence of two parking lots at opposite sides of the intersection. There are not many pedestrians. Most of the people I noticed here were waiting for the bus. A few blocks south, near Beverly Road, the mixture of businesses at the street level starts to change in favour of walkers. On the right, there is a storefront mosque and a travel agency, reminding me that this is Little Pakistan. Approaching Cortelyou Road, I pass several women carrying shopping bags. There are small groceries, bakeries and delis here, all of which have Arabic script on the façades and signage. Most of the people I see appear to be South Asian, by dress and by physical appearance.

Past Cortelyou, there is another storefront mosque. It has an elaborate awning that stands out on the visually busy street level. The building was not built to house a mosque, so the awning suggests the architectural details of what would be a traditional building, with a dome and minarets. I realize that most of the signage for the mosques is in green and white. I see several South Asian men in traditional dress on the block. It occurs to me that I have seen men and women (often with children) on this walk, but not together or interacting in this neighbourhood.

Farther along, the intersection at 18th Avenue is wide open because of the parking lot and gas station on one side and the especially wide sidewalk on the other. I often see small groups of Latino men standing and talking near a rare public phone in front of a deli. They seem to be waiting for something. As I walk past, I wonder if it is a gathering place for day labourers in the groundskeeping businesses that are common in the residential neighbourhoods in Ditmas Park and Midwood.

There are once again many street-level businesses oriented to the pedestrians and I notice more people walking, including people who appear to be South Asians, Latino/as, whites and African Americans. The businesses, though, tend to be mainly South Asian. There is another storefront mosque. I notice the awning with American and Pakistani flags in an arch over what appears to be an eagle.

Across Avenue I, I encounter the largest house of worship along Coney Island Avenue. It is a large, beautiful synagogue. Because the building stands on the corner, it is even more visually prominent. This is Midwood, the centre of one of the main Jewish neighbourhoods in Brooklyn. Most of the people on the street appear to be Jewish, based on their style of dress and headwear. Like in the Muslim neighbourhood to the north, men and women are less likely to interact. I see groups of Orthodox men and groups of Orthodox women, often with children, but fewer groups of men and women together.

As I walk, I start to notice a shift in the scripts on the signage. Next door to a Georgian restaurant is a diamond business. Across the street is a Ukrainian restaurant. At the end of the block is the large building of the Jewish Board of

Family and Children Services. Conn (2012) noted that a large majority of immigrants from the former Soviet Union who arrived in the fourth wave of (post-Soviet) immigration ended up in Brooklyn. The farther south one goes, the more concentrated these Eastern European neighbourhoods become.

Quentin Road is a commercial street and forms an interesting triangle with Kings Highway. I walk a loop around, following the crowds. The businesses are targeted to the pedestrians. Many of the men I see are wearing a *kippah*, but there are more sporting a baseball cap. The population here is very diverse. The businesses include many large chains and the shoppers seem to be a general cross-section of the borough.

On Kings Highway, I notice a group of people waiting for the B7 or B82 bus (both stop at the corner). I observed a familiar pattern, as shown in Fig. 8.1. People waiting for the bus must stand relatively proximate to the stop, so that the bus driver will recognize that people want to board. But at the same time people want to maintain their own private space. There is an interesting self-sorting that happens, where people will choose to stand closest to others that they interpret as in-group members.

The segment of Coney Island Avenue below Neptune Avenue runs through the Brighton Beach neighbourhood. There are more Mexican businesses here. More of the people I see on the street or in the small yards appear Latino/a. There are more Hispanics in Brighton Beach, compared to Homecrest and Midwood to the north; among them, Mexicans are the largest Hispanic group. There are also more young people on the streets. Toward Brighton Beach Avenue, the signage

Fig. 8.1 Bus stop at Kings Highway and Coney Island Avenue in Brooklyn

and the population become more heavily Eastern European again. There are more immigrant services businesses, such as travel agents, money transfer and package services, here than in Midwood. Many of the signs are old, but there are more newer awnings the closer one gets to Brighton Beach Avenue.

There is a bus stop on the corner of Coney Island Avenue and Brighton Beach Avenue; there is a subway stop here as well, so this is a hub of activity. There are as many people on the streets here as at any other place along my route. Most of the shops along Brighton Beach Avenue are Ukrainian and they are very much oriented toward pedestrians. Many of the groceries have sidewalk displays and the shops all have large windows with products facing the street. Because of the public transportation, the population on the streets is quite diverse. As I walk, I hear conversations in English, Spanish, Chinese and Ukrainian.

London—Part 1

I approached Chinatown, like most tourists, from Leicester Square.[8] As I walk up Wardour Street, I immediately notice the festive red lanterns and pennants strung from the street lamps. A crowd walks toward Gerrard Street. Turning left on Gerrard, I am standing directly in front of a traditional gate. This is a common marker of tourist-oriented Chinatowns; I've seen similar in many cities in the USA and the UK. The street is closed to traffic, so the gate marks the entrance to the pedestrian mall.

The streetscape is dominated by flows, despite the repaving work that is going on, which has the effect of squeezing the pedestrians to opposite sides of the street. People are entering Gerrard Street from both ends, at Wardour Street and Newport Place. There are gates at both entrances. I mix into these flows, walking back and forth several times watching the tourists, many of whom appear to be East Asian, and observing the businesses. There is a great deal of interaction, as most of the people walking around are in groups. There are the routine commercial interactions to be expected in restaurants and souvenir shops. The scene is demonstrated in Fig. 8.2.

The shop windows include a lot of Chinese writing, but the signs are all in English as well; non-Chinese speakers have no problem shopping here. Indeed, the signs include lots of inducements to English-speaking tourists looking for an ethnic experience. Much of the Chinese on the signage looks to me—a non-speaker—decorative as much as declarative. At any rate, there are many other non-linguistic signs of the nature of the businesses.

Although less visibly obvious, there are other businesses here too: travel agents, communications services (phone cards, mobiles and so on), a shop selling DVDs, a printer, an acupuncturist, a Chinese doctor, a hair salon, a community centre. A few businesses, particularly on Dansey Place and Lisle Street, have signage in Chinese only. I observed some workers loading pallets. The tourists tend to walk past these places without paying much attention.

The neighbourhood is not large; it includes the main pedestrian mall on Gerrard, Lisle Street from Wardour Street to Leicester Street and around the corner to Newport Place, and the little alley, Dansey Place, that connects

Fig. 8.2 Entrance to the Chinatown Plaza in London

Wardour and Shaftesbury Avenue. There are some Asian businesses on Shaftesbury, but they are mixed in with theatres and other non-ethnic businesses; the pedestrian and vehicle traffic make the street feel like much of the rest of London. Because of the compact nature of Chinatown, the area seems especially crowded during the weekdays.

London—Part 2

I boarded the 38 bus at the corner of Dalston Lane and Kingsland Road. I was returning to Islington from a show at The Victoria Pub on Queensbridge Road. I wanted to experience London's public transportation in the context of the city's rowdy nightlife. When I got on, most of the other passengers appeared to be white. As the bus gathered passengers on its way to the Angel Tube stop, the mixture began to shift.

After a few stops, a young man jumped on the bus and bounded up the stairs to the top deck without paying a fare. It was not the first time I had witnessed such a transgression, having lived in New York City for 20 years, so I did not make much note of it until he returned down the stairs a couple of minutes later, before the bus reached its next scheduled stop. He explained to the driver that he 'thought his cousin was on the bus' but it turned out to be someone else.

He tried to persuade the driver to let him off the bus so that he would not have as far to walk back to where he boarded. The driver refused (I imagine this is standard policy). The young man grew increasingly belligerent as a result. He tried to pull the emergency stop above the back door, near where I was sitting, to no effect. Soon after, the bus arrived at the regular stop and he exited, cursing.

As this episode was unfolding, I could feel tension rising. I suspect that the folks sitting in the lower deck with me reacted similarly. It made me think of similar kinds of behaviour on the New York City subway. Suddenly, riders are aware of the violation of the norms of public space. We feel anxious, but are eager not to react. We conspicuously continue to do whatever we were doing, without making eye contact. I watched the action looking at the reflection in the tinted window of the bus, giving the impression that I was just watching the city pass.

After the episode ended, I noticed that most of the passengers around me were older and white, like myself. The young man was black, as were several passengers in the upper deck—there seems to be a generational sorting in London buses: younger on top, older on bottom.

I disembarked the bus and walked back to my hotel along Upper Street. There is a lot of activity along the main commercial street in Islington even at this late hour. I stopped off at Le Sacre Coeur for a glass of wine. I have been dining there daily on this trip and chatted with the waiter, who was French, about the neighbourhood. There were more immigrants in the area before gentrification altered the housing market.

There is a great deal of street life in the evening on Upper Street toward Angel. Most of the patrons of the restaurants and pubs were white, as were most of the workers (servers and bartenders). Most of the patrons seemed younger than me.[9] I had seen a greater number of older folks on the street during the day, shopping and, especially, at the bus stops.

Like in Brooklyn and Paris, the public transit spaces are places where people have to be in proximity to others across group boundaries. I observed the familiar kind of self-sorting at the bus stop shown in Fig. 8.3.

One prominent manifestation of gentrification is the rapid turnover of rental housing. The 'to let' signs are ubiquitous. There are also numerous 'for sale' signs, indicating a shift in the housing stock. Significantly, where there is turnover in housing, there is construction. This strikes me as a conspicuous sign of change. I have felt it in my own neighbourhood in Brooklyn. It is not always easy to tell how the neighbourhood is changing, just that it is in flux.

Paris

I first visited Belleville, travelling there from Gare du Nord by Metro, emerging at the Belleville stop, at the busy intersection of Boulevard de Belleville and Rue de Belleville.[10] It was a swarming mass of people in the morning. Most people were in motion; many were working or shopping as far as I could tell. Small groups were stationary, in the cafés or socializing on the sidewalks, which are wide along the Boulevard. I was drawn into a flow of people up the hill on Rue de Belleville.

The food shops immediately caught my eye. On most of the restaurants' and markets' signage, the writing is primarily Chinese. These are not the sort of businesses that one often finds in Chinatowns oriented toward tourists. Most of the shoppers, but not all, appeared to be East Asian. Many of the pedestrians

Fig. 8.3 Bus stop on High Street in Islington, London

appeared to be majority French, especially toward the bottom of the hill, near the Metro station and several bus stops.

Farther up the hill past Rue Julien Lacroix, the streetscape is less intensely Chinese. I noticed more variety of signs of immigrant identities, both in the built environment and in the social landscape. The tempo is also slower, less dominated by commerce, more residential. There appear to be more people strolling, rather than hurrying to their destination.

I followed an African man who was carrying a baguette and a litre of milk as he walked up Rue Levert. After half a block, I doubled back toward the square. I cut across to Rue du Jourdain and walked north. The sidewalks are wide here. On one side of the street there are several restaurants with outside tables. On the other side of the street there is a school and I heard the distant sounds of children playing. Continuing up the street, past a bookshop, I notice that the street leads to the front of a large church, Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Belleville. Because of the tree-lined streets, the little square in front of the church almost sneaks up on you as you walk. I imagine that when the church was constructed it dominated the landscape more than it does today; it has a magnificent façade.

I turned left and walked down the hill on Rue de Belleville. A North African young man approached and extended his hand. We shook hands and he told me that he admired my style (I was wearing a grey suit and a grey fedora at the

time). I smiled and laughed; 'thanks!' I said as he walked up the hill. It made me realize that most of the people on the street were more casually dressed at this hour, near midday. It was also a rare encounter, involving a verbal interaction with a stranger outside of a commercial transaction.

Further down, there is another Chinese restaurant; across the street there is a small Turkish restaurant, mixed in with more upscale clothing stores, a few beauty salons, a couple of bakeries and a higher-end *epicurie*. Continuing south, there is another school. I noticed more children (with adults) on the street at this end of Rue de Belleville. It may be because the pedestrian traffic is less dense that families are easier to notice here. The people on the street here are mainly white. I made a note of the patrons sitting outside at the cafés between the Jourdain and Pyrénées Metro stops; on this occasion all of them appeared to be majority white.

There are many public markets in Paris, usually selling mainly produce and meat or seafood, though the one on Boulevard de Belleville also had many vendors selling clothing and fabrics. This is the largest of the public markets I have observed in the city. Most of the vendors were North African but the shoppers included majority French, East Asians, Turks and West Africans as well as North Africans.

This market is very crowded, particularly in the sections selling produce and meat. There are lots of interactions across group boundaries. People seem for the most part pleasant but, of course, that does not provide any reliable indicator of the affective state of the vendors or shoppers. As Anderson (2011) suggests, the cosmopolitan canopy is not necessarily a place that celebrates diversity. Rather, it is tolerated: it is understood that this is a place where one will encounter 'cultural strangers' and that everyone must get along for the sake of commerce. In this sense, the space belongs to everyone.

At the periphery of the official public market, which occurs in the wide median, a few people have spread out items for sale on blankets on the sidewalk. These vendors are exclusively North African, as far as I can tell, and there are more women than men. The products appear to be used clothing and a few items of luggage. In Fig. 8.4, the crowds entering and leaving the public market walk past these unofficial vendors. In this scene, all of the major ethnic groups in Paris are present: majority French, North African, East Asian and West African.[11]

Doubling back and walking north on Boulevard de la Villette from the Belleville Metro stop, there are many Chinese signs, but I notice the pan-Asian nature of the businesses. The closer one gets to Place du Colonel Fabien, the less visible the signs of immigrant identity. The area around Parc des Buttes Chaumont is a middle-class, mostly majority French neighbourhood—later I discovered that it is also one of the Orthodox Jewish neighbourhoods. From Rue Rebeval to Rue de Belleville, and in the side streets that connect them, the edge of the immigrant neighbourhood can be seen. It is a liminal space.

Fig. 8.4   Near the public market in Belleville, Paris

Old and New Challenges in Researching Everyday Mobility

Pardo and Prato (2012) have addressed the debate in the social sciences on the definition of 'urban'. With reference to anthropology, they also point out how this debate led to different interpretations on the nature of what many considered to be a new sub-discipline: 'urban anthropology'. The two main approaches can be summarized as those who interpreted urban anthropological research as an investigation *of* the city and those who interpreted it to mean, more or less, classical ethnography *in* the city.

For the purposes of this chapter, I would like to focus on the meaning of 'urban' more generally and employ the definition of urban suggested by Lofland (1985, 1998)—that is, urban as a place of strangers, where people interact regularly with others whom they do not know personally. Social life in cities, even at the scale of neighbourhood communities, is permanently structured such that urban dwellers effectively cannot escape this form of sociability. As a result, the norms of urban life govern, in part, how to behave and what to think and feel in such circumstances. From this perspective, urban ethnography seems to be closer to the interpretation of urban research as ethnography *of* the city, even though it is not necessarily of the entire city.

It is not only the relative distribution of signs of social identity in the social and material environment that makes a local geographic area into a place. Urban dwellers become used to the rhythms as well. Both spatial and temporal patterns, both when and where one goes, make a place into 'home'. In her

study of Sydney, Williamson (2015, 31) noted, 'For local residents and shop-keepers, the predictability of everyday rhythms of mobility along the street—demonstrated through a largely unconscious, normative knowledge of the activities along the street—constituted their localness.' I observed in Brooklyn, London and Paris the same kinds of quotidian flows that Williamson described.

The more energetic the mobility, the less intimate the feeling of the space and the more likely that these places become figures of exclusion in the mobility rhetoric of urban dwellers. Movement that is faster or briefer may be experienced as less threatening, but that does not mean that these places are overlooked. The exclusion is often in the form of avoidance. As Palumbo (2014) demonstrated in her study of Barbès/La Goutte d'Or in Paris, urban dwellers often referred to these places as dirty, disordered or dangerous.

Everyday mobilities generate signs of identity with regard to place. We read identity information in our quotidian routines not only from others but also from the spaces themselves, so that in addition to interpreting signs of 'them' we are also reading places as 'theirs'. Quotidian mobilities are what make micro-segregation of urban spaces fuzzy. Even in ethnic enclaves, everyday mobilities result in some contact with out-groups, even if it is in the form of sharing public space.

The commerce of the cosmopolitan canopy does not involve, in its usual manifestations, any substantial inter-cultural exchange. The verbal interaction is largely confined to the transaction and, when it strays, is usually the kind of pleasantries that can easily be exchanged with strangers. Whatever cultural understanding is being fostered it is more likely the result of passive rather than active processes.

It is important to acknowledge that everyday cosmopolitanism is not in and of itself a solution to inter-group conflict. As Valentine (2007, 2013) has demonstrated, experience of everyday urban difference does not always reduce prejudice. As she explains, 'The reason that such individual everyday encounters do not necessarily change people's general prejudices is because they do not destabilize white majority community-based narratives of economic and/or cultural victimhood' (2007, 333).

Cosmopolitan canopies create a field in which tolerance can grow, but the field is weak and subject to disruption by other forces.[12] One of the reasons that urban encounters do not have a large predictable effect on group evaluations is because we have a tendency to see deviations from stereotypes differently across group boundaries. So positive encounters with out-group members are typically dismissed as exceptions: this particular 'them' is not so bad, but the rest of 'them' are awful as everybody knows.

What we think about each other, across group boundaries, may affect how we act toward one another, but it is not the only factor that governs social interaction. How we act toward each other, I argue, has a larger impact on community building than what we think about each other. So the importance of routine interpretations of signs of difference is more than a modest impact on stereotypes or prejudice. Through everyday mobility, we reinforce norms of

civil cooperation in some kinds of public space. This is the basis, I believe, for more inclusive cities. The challenge is examining the details of these inter-group interactions more closely, including, where possible, walk-along interviews; the question to ask is how using cosmopolitan canopies relates to a sense of social identity and belonging.

Even in highly commercialized spaces, such as London's Chinatown—which is effectively an outdoor shopping mall for commodified ethnic experience—the presence of signs of difference socializes urban dwellers. The visibility of a group in public space is a claim to belonging. In this way, cosmopolitan canopies function as a manifestation of the public sphere. At times of rising nativism, which is certainly the case currently in the USA, the UK and France, visibility can lead to conflict and even violence. But even in troubling times, encounters with difference in urban public spaces exert their socializing effect. This might be the most effective counterweight to the discourse of ethnic nationalism.

However ambivalent urban dwellers are to group differences, the regularity of encountering differences in the context of everyday mobility normalizes civil group dynamics. Nativists, and all those less cosmopolitan in their orientation, may complain about 'those people' invading their neighbourhood or their city, but repetition produces a mobility rhetoric of combination. This generates a form of collective toleration. In all of my field observations in these three cities, I never witnessed any overt aggression based on group boundaries. That is not to suggest that it never occurs in New York, London or Paris; but only that it is, in the scale of the everyday, quite rare. People adhere to the norms of the cosmopolitan canopy. Some may even come to value certain urban spaces for their diversity as a result.

Notes

1. These memories of others are often more mythical than historical. Our prior knowledge comes not only from previous experience but also from socialization and the media.
2. For clarity, I am using notions of 'home' and 'not home' but I am not arguing that attachments to place constitute a strict binary. There are lots of kinds of 'not home' places. It is also worth considering the existence of non-places, characterized by the absence of affective judgements. As Augé (1995, 63) puts it: 'If a place can be defined as relational, historical and concerned with identity, then a space which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity will be a non-space.' There may be such spaces in cities, but I see these as part of the continuum of places in which we do not feel at home, because home is always relational, historical and concerned with identity. Most 'not home' places are too.
3. I want to be clear here that I am not suggesting that figures of combination do not occur in places of cultural homogeneity. Surely they do. But my focus is on encountering difference and the distinction between figures of exclusion and combination is useful.

4. New York, London and Paris do share some key attributes, of course. They are major metropolises in the capitalist West, all with long histories of migration and large class differences.

5. The narratives I offer here are collages of multiple trips. For readability, I have combined the parts into a single trip in each city. I have been conducting participant observation in Brooklyn since 2010, in London since 2012 and in Paris since 2007.

6. The figure of 14 percent is a standard deviation, the average difference in terms of the percentage of foreign born among the Census tracts. About two-thirds of the tracts have percent foreign born between 63 and 35.

7. Islington has been an important area for the Labour Party. The northern constituency is currently represented in Parliament by Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the party since 2015.

8. The field notes for this section come from a study of Chinatowns in global cities (Shortell and Aderer 2014).

9. I am in my early fifties.

10. The field notes for this section were collected for *Everyday Globalization* (Shortell 2016).

11. I have blurred the faces in the photographs for privacy, so it is difficult to tell from the images alone the identity characteristics of those present. I have, in addition to the photographs, my field notes to guide my interpretation.

12. Prato draws a distinction between 'tolerance' and 'toleration', referring to the works of Gutmann, Pardo and Walzer (Prato 2009, 13–14). Krase (2012a) develops a similar argument, suggesting that tolerance refers to an attitude of respect for others, a recognition of difference that grants others the same right to public life. Toleration, in contrast, is a practice of coexistence, made possible by institutional arrangements.

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Betwixt and Between in Beer-Sheva: Consumption and Chronotopes in the Negev

Fran Markowitz

Look at any map of the Middle East and you will see that the city of Beer-Sheva is located in the centre of the state of Israel. But, then again, Beer-Sheva, Israel's seventh most populous city and fourth largest metropolitan area might not even appear on that map. It will highlight Jerusalem, the historically rich and religiously significant capital, which is just 50 miles to Beer-Sheva's north-east, and Tel-Aviv, the coolly sophisticated 'first Hebrew city' 65 miles north-west on the Mediterranean coast. Despite the vibrancy of its diverse population of some 300,000, Beer-Sheva often comes up short as a city. Israelis are wont to invoke it as a crude desert town simultaneously in the throes of dramatic urban growth and disgraceful deterioration (Markowitz and Uriely 2002; Avni et al. 2016).

Israel's densely packed Tel-Aviv–Jerusalem corridor is always referred to as ha-Merkaz, or the centre of the country. By contrast, even if physically located in the middle of Israel, everyone knows that Beer-Sheva is in the south. Dubbed the gateway to, or the capital of, the Negev, the city and the southern region are metonymically linked. In fact, they are often used interchangeably to denote marginality, for even though Israel's Southern District encompasses 64 per cent of the country's landmass, only 14.3 per cent of the populace resides there. Moreover, in contrast to the centre, in Beer-Sheva and throughout the Negev,

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Mizrahim (Jews of North African and Middle Eastern descent), Arab Bedouins, and recent immigrants primarily from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, together outnumber Israel's blander, yet more prosperous and influential, Ashkenazim (European Jews).[1]

Certainly Beer-Sheva's topography and, from the standpoint of those in the Merkaz, its somewhat exotic, Third World-ish ethnoscape are prime reasons for the city's placement in the South. Even more compelling, perhaps, is the long-term association of Beer-Sheva with the Kingdom of Israel's southernmost boundary. The phrase 'From Dan to Beer-Sheva' appears nine times in the Bible (in Judges, Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles) to delineate the extent of land settled by the tribes of Israel from north to south.

Beer-Sheva, however, predates the Israelite kingdom by several centuries, and archaeological evidence demonstrates agricultural settlements in the region from as early as 4000 BCE (Berman 1965, 308–9). Its first mention in the Bible has nothing to do with geographical placements but attributes the name Beer-Sheva to the site of a well where the first Hebrew patriarch Abraham swore an oath of friendship with Avimelech, a local king (Genesis 21:31). Isaac, the second patriarch, also sojourned in Beer-Sheva, and Jacob later stopped there with his sons on their way down to Egypt. All three Hebrew patriarchs pitched tents in Beer-Sheva, but they did not remain there long enough to make it their permanent home or their final resting place.[2]

During the reign of the Israelite kings, Beer-Sheva was a thriving town, an administrative and religious centre (Gradus 1978, 521), which was abandoned following the kingdom's fall. After the Arab conquest in the eighth century, Beer-Sheva and other settlements in the area were destroyed (Berman 1965, 314), and for 1200 years the ancient city site served only as a desert crossroads and seasonal meeting point (Avni et al. 2016, 20).

Beer-Sheva's modern history began at the dawn of the twentieth century when the ruling Turks of the Ottoman Empire decided, for purposes of fortification and taxation, to constitute a separate administrative district in the Negev between Gaza and Jerusalem. They did this by rebuilding the city of Beer-Sheva near its ancient site, which was by this time empty desert (El-Areff 2000 [1937]) and then connected it by railroad to Jerusalem. Differentiating it from the serpentine pattern of winding, narrow alleys characteristic of most Middle Eastern cities, the Turks commissioned German and Swiss architects to build Beer-Sheva on a grid, characteristic of a modern, rational city. Beyond broader economic and security concerns, the Ottomans' immediate goal was to make the nomadic Bedouin of the region dependent on city services (Avni et al. 2016, 20) and to lure their most promising sons to learn trades and professions, and settle down. By 1922, newly constructed Beer-Sheva had a population of about 2500—2356 of which were mostly Muslim Turks and Arabs, 235 Christians, and 98 Jews (cited in Gradus 1978, 522).

The wars of the twentieth century disrupted the flow of daily life when British and Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) forces fought the first battle of Beer-Sheva (October, 1917), which pushed the Ottomans out

of Palestine, and in October 1948, when the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) fought against Egyptian troops in the second battle of Beer-Sheva.[3] After the Israeli victory, most of the city's Arab residents fled or were driven out while Beer-Sheva expanded as 'a calculated rational project' (Avni et al. 2016, 20) to consolidate the Negev as part of the new state, and to provide homes and employment for thousands of needy Jewish immigrants (called *olim*, ascenders to Israel) who had fled post-World War II Europe and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (Berman 1965, 309).

According to geographer Yehuda Gradus (2008, 522), 'The development of the Negev and that of Beer-Sheva have been interlinked … giving it an obvious advantage over most of the other [newly-built] towns'. Beer-Sheva was given first priority in the 1950s, preceding the government's directive to build 28 new towns in northern and southern 'peripheral regions' (Yiftachel 2000, 418–20). Unlike these towns, Beer-Sheva's role was to serve as the Negev's residential, administrative, employment, healthcare, educational and cultural capital (Gradus 1978, 2008; Yiftachel 2000, 421). All that notwithstanding, in a 1963 speech, the charismatic Israeli general and Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan mentioned the city along with Israel's 'development towns' when he urged *olim* to resettle in 'Beersheva, Ashdod, and Dimona' (cited in Yiftachel 2000, 425). It is difficult to know if Dayan thereby set the tone for, or simply mirrored, public opinion that blurred the line between Beer-Sheva as an opportunity-filled metropolis and all the hastily built peripheral towns that offered little in the way of upward mobility.

In the early 1950s, 6500 new immigrants, mainly from the Middle East, were sent to Beer-Sheva, and in the years that followed were joined by many thousands more, including newcomers from Romania, Hungary, Poland, Morocco and Tunisia. In the first years of the 1970s, several thousand *olim* from the Soviet Union were also resettled in Beer-Sheva, where they found housing and employment in the growing city. Oren Yiftachel reports that after a few years most Ashkenazim left Beer-Sheva and its surroundings for the Merkaz, while 'the newly arrived Mizrahi Jews from a low socioeconomic background were left with little option but to settle in peripheral and relatively affordable locations' (2000, 423; see also Meir-Glitzenstein 2015, 108).[4] During my first visit to Israel in 1987, I met three (formerly) Soviet Jewish families who had resettled in Beer-Sheva during the early 1970s. Two of these three families soon exited Beer-Sheva to live out their lives in Jerusalem and Netanya (north of Tel-Aviv). I often heard the parents laughingly call their Beer-Sheva-born daughters, 'little Bedouins' when they displayed untoward or undignified behaviour. The family that remained in Beer-Sheva quickly mastered Hebrew and mounted the socioeconomic ladder. By the mid-1980s they moved from an apartment in the city to a newly constructed home in an upscale suburb.

The Romanian and Hungarian families I know also established comfortable homes and good careers in the army, in government, in local industries and in the professions. Many of my Mizrahi acquaintances, whose parents hailed from

Iraq, Morocco and Tunisia, are self-employed contractors in the building trades, government employees, small business owners or taxi drivers, proud of their children and of their homes, and fiercely loyal to Israel.

One evening in the autumn of 2015, as we headed home from the airport, my taxi driver Ovadia and I expressed delight at the newly placed lights and other improvements made to what had been a horribly hazardous road linking Beer-Sheva's northern suburbs to the Tel-Aviv highway. Ovadia remarked,

> It is good that Beer-Sheva is growing, and I have to say that the University and Soroka hospital have brought a lot of good people here, really raised the level of our city. But believe me when I tell you how great it was when I was a youngster here in Beer-Sheva. Everyone knew everyone. And on Shabbat (Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath when work is forbidden and public transportation shuts down) after lunch when all the adults were napping, we would just walk up to the Andarta (the hilltop monument to the 1948 battle of Beer-Sheva at the city's north end) and gather there, discussing everything and nothing.

Ovadia talked more about the betwixt-and-between position of Beer-Sheva: his fond memories of a simpler, more carefree time in the periphery, coupled with recognition that Beer-Sheva's development has brought many opportunities for him, his wife and especially their children. The city's cultural and education institutions are flourishing, and its new governmental centre, judicial complex, shopping venues and hi-tech park prove that it is not a languishing desert town. And yet, Ovadia like most Beer-Shevans, is quick to note that his dramatically improved city cannot compare to fast-moving, prosperous and cosmopolitan Tel-Aviv, or to the historically significant capital of Jerusalem. Indeed, Beer-Sheva is always an afterthought, secondary to the Merkaz. I was recently reminded of this when I tried to arrange an inter-university committee meeting at Ben-Gurion University's Beer-Sheva campus. Immediately after receiving my invitation, colleagues urged me to change the venue to a place in Tel-Aviv. And I acquiesced because, according to a popular saying, 'It takes twice as long to travel from Tel-Aviv to Beer-Sheva as it takes to go from Beer-Sheva to Tel-Aviv'.

Designed to show that Beer-Sheva and Beer-Shevans are neither centrally nor peripherally located in Israel, but actively manoeuvring between both, this chapter presents an ethnographic exploration of shopping and safety in the city. Based on long-term participant-observation as a researcher-citizen (Weingrod 2004), augmented by individual and group interviews, its focus is on the lived and narrated practices of Negev urbanites as they navigate and negotiate between peripherality and centrality in their everyday experiences.[5]

Consuming in the Negev

When I moved from Chicago to Beer-Sheva in September 1992 I found myself adjusting with difficulty to the landscape. At the end of the long, hot, dry summer the colour green had faded to khaki, and the city's concrete, or 'brutalist',

architecture did nothing to add colour or cheer (Shadar 2014). I kept missing landmarks offered in directions because neighbourhood 'centres' looked nothing like the gaudy strip malls of North America or the urban storefronts of Europe.

Five years later, I watched in amazement as a new shopping centre, eponymously named BIG, began to emerge in sharp rectangularity and phosphorescent colours from the Negev's dun rolling hills. Rather than construct an environmentally appropriate shopping oasis in the desert, the design and semiotics of BIG placed it far away from the here and now (Gottdiener 1995, esp. Chap. 4). With its long rows of glass-fronted, spacious shops abutting huge, orderly parking lots surrounding a cheery enclosed playground, BIG expresses a future-oriented yearning for prosperous First World suburbs and their bounteous hypermarkets (Baudrillard 1994, 75–76). And if anyone should fail to make the connection between the new shopping plaza in Beer-Sheva and those in the USA, the prominent red, white and blue marquee highlighting the letters B-I-G proclaims that this is the case.

When BIG opened at the end of the twentieth century, sociologist Natan Uriely and I collaborated on a study of Beer-Sheva's shopping venues (Markowitz and Uriely 2002). Upon learning of the project, many of our university colleagues and neighbours took us aside and pleaded, 'Please do not be too critical of BIG. It is the only place in Beer-Sheva that is clean, safe, happy and efficient'. Similar sentiments were expressed by the people we and our research assistants interviewed there—mostly parents with children, Hebrew-speaking Ashkenazi and Mizrahi working-class and middle-class Israeli Jews; not-so-new *olim* from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union; and Arab Bedouins. All of them told us how easy it was to shop at BIG, and described the pleasure they got from being able to see, smell and touch an abundance of desirable items (see Lehtonen and Mäenpää 1997, 148; Miller et al. 1998; Shields 1992; Slater 1997). The BIG stores with their bright colours and readily recognized brand names of national and international companies work metaphorically to connect regionally marked Israelis to the centre of Israel and to the larger Western world of plenty. In these stores, people of all backgrounds can and do enact their individual, albeit (also) media-induced desires. Two young women from a nearby Bedouin town told us that they come to BIG 'because of the sense of freedom that we feel here. BIG is wide and open. We come in our own car and park near the stores. We don't run into all the people we know.' Shopping at BIG frees them from the constraints of their daily life in a place where everyone knows everyone else, and where behaviour is highly regulated. In the shopping centre they can be like all other anonymous shoppers; they can spray themselves with the latest scent, try on stylish outfits, and munch burgers and fries at McDonald's. The simulacrum of a worry-free American suburb becomes real, if only for a moment, and removes Negev dwellers from the harsh reality of their geopolitical situation in Israel and as part of the conflicted Middle East.

Since the year 2000, several more upscale shopping venues opened nearby: abutting BIG is Design +, which was originally planned as a fashion mall and opened under the name, Seventh Avenue. In recent years, furniture stores have become more prevalent than clothing boutiques, and in 2015 its name was changed to highlight the shopping centre's home décor offerings. One Plaza, which is across the road, features a multiplex movie theatre among a variety of stores, many of which replicate those in BIG. And in 2013, the 'Grand Canyon', Israel's largest shopping centre, opened for business just a few miles away.

Unlike BIG and its neighbours, 'Grand', as this *kenion* (Hebrew for 'mall') is colloquially known, is a four-storey enclosed structure, equipped with bright lighting, multi-level underground parking, escalators, elevators, restrooms, a food court and recreation areas. It is structurally similar to the malls found throughout the USA that are often featured on TV shows and in the movies.[6]

What differentiates Grand from its competitors is that although its name follows the semiotic scheme of a non-Hebrew word denoting large size (BIG, Mega, Super), the Grand Canyon refers to a specific site, a unique, must-see attraction in the USA. Just as it would be unthinkable for someone to travel to Arizona and not visit that natural wonder, by analogy, the grandeur of Beer-Sheva's *Grand Kenion* should make it 'natural' that anyone in the vicinity would spend time at this singular site. Jerusalem has the Knesset and its Old City, and Tel-Aviv has its theatres, boutiques, hotels and beaches; now Beer-Sheva is home to Israel's largest shopping mall, its Grand Canyon, a piece of 'America in Israel'. While such an assertion might strike sophisticated academics as a silly exaggeration, colleagues, acquaintances and friends have reiterated their pride in this new Beer-Sheva landmark and take pleasure in shopping there.

One day in February, 2016 I joined 24-year-old Rotem for a tour of the mall after she told me several times how much she enjoys it. Touching the merchandise as she showed me the styles she prefers and the purchases she recently made, Rotem and I breezed through H&M, the popular Swedish retailer that markets stylish clothing at low to moderate prices to a young clientele. While H&M has 18 shops throughout Israel, there were none in the Southern District until one opened the new Grand Canyon.

The importance of a prestigious location was equally true for the next shop we visited, Legaat baOchel (Touch the Food), a chic kitchenware and food boutique that is part of a six-store Israeli chain. Rotem tasted some of the wares as we looked at and sniffed a variety of teas, spices, dried fruits and nuts, candies and condiments. The manager passed by and offered us a sample of multicoloured Italian pasta that was simmering in a savoury sauce. He explained that of their six stores, 'this is the only one in Beer-Sheva. We waited to open in the Grand.' No other venue would do for Israel's leading culinary chain.

Our next stop, Toys R Us, was the only American store on Rotem's list of favourites. She showed me the plastic action figures of Spiderman and Captain America alongside similar, newly produced toys modelled on characters from the latest Star Wars film. While fondling the moulded plastic she told me that

she loves these figures. I asked her why: 'They just do something for me.' I looked at her quizzically, searching for a deeper explanation. She mentioned that the same was true for her best friend, but she couldn't or wouldn't be more specific. We moved on to look at sets of plastic pirates and knights in armour—'My Dad loves these; says they remind him of his childhood'—and from there crossed over to aisles of accessories for children to dress up like the leading characters from the Disney animated hit *Frozen*. Rotem pulled out her mobile phone and showed me a photo, explaining that she was wearing a duplicate of a dress featured in the film that a friend had sewn for her over a period of four months. This dress and her hairstyle, coupled with her poise, earned Rotem second place in Ben-Gurion University's 2015 Purim costume contest.[7] Her tone of voice then changed when she remarked, 'I wish they didn't just package and market these things only for children'. I asked if Toys R Us sells costumes for adults and she said no. After a pause, Rotem described a fancy-dress shop in Tel Aviv that does and told me about a costume she once bought there for the outrageous price of 400 shekels ($100). 'And I still have it!' she added, as we continued on our way.

We then visited the mall's pet shop where Rotem played with a parrot, which she allowed to sit on her shoulder, and then we headed for lunch. Rotem never goes to the upstairs food court that features McDonald's and local snacks; instead she prefers a comfortable and trendy café on the main floor. While we were discussing our tour and the shops we had visited, Rotem spotted her grandparents leaving another restaurant across from ours. She jumped up and ran over, embracing them, and then brought them over to our table where introductions were made and greetings exchanged. Unlike the young Bedouin women who like going to BIG to get away from all the people they know, Rotem enjoys running into friends and family while shopping and dining in the Grand Canyon. The mall thereby becomes a meeting place for people with similar interests, backgrounds and tastes.

For Rotem, and for thousands of Beer-Shevans of various ages, professions and ethnic backgrounds, the Grand Canyon, BIG, or Kenion ha-Negev provides the setting for adventures into alternative, enjoyable worlds of material abundance. Entry into these worlds does not require a disguise, mind-altering drugs, or alcohol. Even money is unnecessary, unless you want to turn the temporary pleasure of touching a sweater or trying on a pair of shoes into permanent features of your wardrobe. These mall-worlds serve as bridges between desires of the imagination and real-life routines of the quotidian experience. As Baudrillard has noted, what happens there 'is the work of acculturation, of confrontation, of examination, of the social code, and of the verdict: people go there to find and to select objects-responses to all the questions they may ask themselves' (1994, 75). But what Baudrillard failed to note in his discussion of hypermarkets is that one mall is not necessarily equivalent to others; shopping venues are not substitutable 'non-places' (Augé 1995), but specific locales in particular countries and cities that are negotiating their own placement as they produce locally tinged representations of the bounteous West (Classen and Howes 1996, 188).

Sixty-year-old Miri, like Ovadia the taxi driver mentioned earlier in the chapter, has lived all her post-*aliya* (ascension/repatriation to Israel) life in Beer-Sheva. A paramedical cosmetologist who is owner-operator of a private clinic, Miri and her family arrived directly to Beer-Sheva from Morocco in 1962. Reminiscing about those years, Miri, who speaks Hebrew with an unmistakable French lilt, remarked, 'There was nothing here, nothing but us. My father died from it; it broke his heart. (They had) promised him America, and what did he find? An empty desert instead.' After reviewing how her life improved over the years, pointing to the latest apparatus in her clinic and the flat-screen TV on the wall, Miri recounted some of Beer-Sheva's economic and cultural achievements. With a nod and a smile she concluded, 'There is no comparison. It's almost America.'

There are, nonetheless, critics and naysayers. Beer-Sheva's least affluent residents have not been able to capitalize on the city's growth, and municipal improvements tend to bypass their neighbourhoods. Even as they note that the prices of items there are beyond their means, some may partake of the city's explosion of 'America in Israel' shopping malls; others stay away, perceiving them as mocking and oppressive, inaccessible domains earmarked for a more exclusive clientele.

In an ironic twist, it might just be the case that Beer-Sheva does not possess enough affluent residents to support all of its shiny new shops and stores. On April 17, 2015 the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* published a scathing article, 'Malled to Death: Be'er Sheva's Ghostly Shopping Centres' that reported that the four-storey Grand Canyon 'created too much commercial space for the city, draining older malls of shoppers, tenants and revenue'. In the months following its opening, about a third of the stores in Kenion ha-Negev and a quarter of the shops in One Plaza shut their doors.

Most Beer-Shevans do not want any of these venues to close. Each is a crucial link to global consumer culture and a spatio-symbolic marker of centrality. Finally, Beer-Sheva has a variety of leisure spots and a seemingly endless selection of products to keep alive the blurred boundary between the here and now and the distant 'dream worlds provided by the surrounding goods' (Lehtonen and Mäenpää 1997, 164). Shoppers may or may not notice darkened storefronts in their favourite shopping centres, but if they do, they might expect that these will again be filled with even nicer things. Should they remain dark and empty, however, and cause a shopping centre or two to close, Beer-Shevans might (once again) find themselves placed in the periphery due to lack of the income and discernment needed to support the finer things in life: twenty-first century goods, images and tastes that comprise America in Israel.

SOUTHERN COMFORT AND (IN)SECURITY

Family gatherings, work, school, shopping, prayer, sports, meals and more together constitute the lion's share of daily life in Beer-Sheva. Accompanying the serenity of these everyday practices, however, is an underlying nervousness,

a sense of agitation that comes from the experiential knowledge that to live in Israel is to live in a country embroiled in a regional conflict and plagued by war (Markowitz 2013, 3). After 1948 until the first decade of the twenty-first century, Beer-Sheva was largely unaffected by these wars.[8] Comparing the safety of their city to the strife and bloodshed that punctuate civilian life in Tel-Aviv and especially Jerusalem (Ochs 2011), Beer-Shevans often joked that 'we are just too insignificant' for Palestinian militants to waste even one suicide bomber.

That complacency-in-the-periphery was first disrupted when a suicide bomber blew himself up in Beer-Sheva's Central Bus Station in August, 2004 and killed over a dozen civilians. The threat mounted when in 2008 newly developed long-range missiles launched from the Gaza Strip first hit the city. By the end of that year (Operation Cast Lead), and then in November 2012 (Operation Pillar of Defence) and again during the summer of 2014 (Operation Protective Edge), hundreds of missiles fired from Gaza hit southern Israel, and the IDF launched air attacks against the Gazans. For Beer-Shevans, blasts and booms disrupted their everyday routines, while sirens blared day and night. Everyday undercurrents of fear and vulnerability advanced to the fore, and behaviours shifted, especially in regard to time and space (Shir-Vertesh and Markowitz 2015). Although the wartime habitus receded after ceasefires were agreed, its residues lingered, which subtly informed and changed Beer-Sheva's quotidian life.

Although exposed to similar conditions, research participants' reactions to the violence and their comments about it varied, demonstrating not only the diversity of Beer-Shevans' political views and what Raymond Williams has called 'structures of feelings' (1977), but also their attitudes about the entire Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[9] Interlocutors and interviewees revealed diverse positions regarding the fate of those in Gaza who were bombarded by the Israeli air force. Many ignored the Gazans in their narratives by stressing the unfathomable reality that they themselves confronted, as exploding bombs threatened the serenity of their homes and health of their families. Some blamed the Palestinians for beginning the violence by shooting missiles across the border and asserted the rectitude of heavy Israeli reprisals. For others, empathy towards the Gazan other helped put their distress in perspective. Forty-year-old Omri mused, 'Thoughts of "we are not in Gaza" ran through my head. These are not one-ton bombs that are falling on our heads … That is something that causes anxiety. Those are things that turn your life upside-down.' And for some other Beer-Shevans, blaming the Palestinians for their distress helped them to hunker down and persevere against the danger by making lifestyle changes. Interestingly, these alternatives were not always or necessarily presented in opposition. Beer-Shevans' political emotions of frustration and outrage were often directed *both* at the enemy in Gaza and at their own government for allowing a rain of missiles to fall, putting them and their children in harm's way.

One of the major reactions to the violence that came up in interviews and conversations was how the home gained in importance, especially the shift of its centre from the kitchen or living-room to the home shelter or safe room

(Hebrew: *mamad*). In 1991, following the Gulf War, a new set of regulations was issued with 'specifications for building shelters in residential buildings in home front communities'. All new or renovated residential units (private homes and apartments) were required to include a secure space, and as of 2014, approximately 25 per cent of all buildings in Israel have a *mamad*.[10] Nevertheless, the homes of many people in Beer-Sheva are without a safe room, especially those in older and poorer neighbourhoods. When alarms blare, they have to run to a *miklat*, a concrete shelter in the neighbourhood, or stand in their building's stairwell. Nachshon, a long-term apartment dweller explained, 'Going into the stairway is only to make you feel that you are taking precautions. You are not really protected. Only a shelter can keep you safe.'

When missiles are launched from Gaza, Beer-Sheva residents are warned by sirens that they have 60 seconds to reach a shelter. Consequently, during the operations, most people monitored their lives in 60-second intervals, and space was likewise allotted new meanings which corresponded with these time frames. The home became a refuge only if it had a protected area within it or one in the neighbourhood that could be reached within 60 seconds. Those with a *mamad* or nearby *miklat* supplied them with mattresses and pillows to make the space comfortable as well as safe.

But the home, even if perceived as a refuge, sometimes turned into a pressure cooker, especially during the 50 days of Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014. In previous operations people could move about or flee to safer regions of the country. But this time, just about all of Israel was exposed to the threat of missile attacks. Thinking back to those summer months, 62-year-old Naomi rhetorically asked, 'Anyway, where am I supposed to go? If I go, then we all have to go. This is it. This is where we live.'

Whether they left for a while, or stayed in their homes, most Beer-Sheva area residents described feeling a sense of bodily tension that lingered. That tension manifested in different sorts of vigilance, the most patent of which was remaining indoors. But even in the relative safety of their homes people took special measures such as showering during the hours of daylight when bombings were least likely to occur, and leaving doors ajar and windows open so they could hear the sirens. Some women I know slept in their clothing, embarrassed to be seen running to a *miklat* in their pyjamas. By contrast, many men discussed their experiences with a nonchalant façade, focusing on the technical aspects of the weaponry. But, as a young father of three small children, Tamir's response to the blasé attitude of his suburban friends was different: 'I really lived the wars. In Beer-Sheva you experience every aspect of the war. People who are not afraid are those who didn't have to lie down on the ground with their hands over their head, hearing the rockets whistle over them, and feeling the ground shake when they hit.'

As each of these operations came to an end, Beer-Shevans went back to their 'normal lives'. But that normalcy now included the lingering physical and emotional effects that remain even in times of (relative) peace. Noises from motorcycles or certain songs often generate startled responses, while events announced on the news, such as targeted killings of Hamas officials and rumours of kid-

napped Israeli soldiers raise levels of alertness. Some friends and neighbours avoid places where rockets had hit, fearing that they might do so again.

Months after each operation, many people stated with certainty that it was simply a matter of time before the start of another round of violence. But even as they expressed that conviction, they have also learned to tone it down, to push anxieties into the background, knowing that should the need arise 'war-mode' is easily reactivated. And the process, the changes in behaviour and in what Bakhtin (1981) called chronotopes—spatio-temporal matrices that shape all texts; cognitive concepts as well as narrative features that demonstrate that human life is concretely embodied within a specific physical and temporal space—will begin all over again. But always in somewhat altered states.

After a year-long reprieve, acts of Palestinian-Israeli violence escalated again in September 2015, but this time, in seemingly uncoordinated stabbings and car-ramming attacks. At first, just like prior to 2004 these acts of violence were confined mainly to the West Bank and Jerusalem, and Beer-Shevans rested assured that the south remained safe. But on 18 October, Beer-Sheva became a central focus again when a brutal attack by a gun-wielding assailant took place at the city's central bus station. Several people were injured and two were killed, including an Eritrean asylum seeker who, mistaken for the terrorist, was violently assaulted by bystanders. Fifty-five-year old Tali commented, 'Our bubble had burst … it's bad enough when there are rockets. With the rockets, OK, you can stay at home, stay in a shelter. With this (unpredictable shootings and stabbings) there is nothing you can do.'

As nervousness increases so too do measures of self-defence. A prominent medical professional who has lived in the Negev for over 40 years told me that one day immediately following the knife attacks on Jews by Palestinian teenage girls in Jerusalem, he felt a wave of fear as he passed a veiled Bedouin woman on a narrow, almost deserted street in Beer-Sheva's Old City. 'I was thinking, what if she stabs me? I'm now armed, but I wouldn't have had the opportunity to draw if she had slashed at me.'

In Meitar, the suburb where I live, a woman waiting to be served at the small post office explained why she had a stack of second and third notices for package deliveries: 'I came here a few times, and there were lines of Bedouins. It's not just that I don't have the time to wait, but you never know. Not these days. There is always the possibility of an attack.' Taken aback, I commented, 'Sad'. She retorted, 'Nothing to do about it. Sad for us, and sad for them.'

A few days later I was travelling home from the university by car. A traffic jam had choked the four-lane road for half an hour; finally I approached the last major intersection before my destination. While creeping along at a snail's pace, a cement-mixer truck in an adjacent lane suddenly rolled straight into my car. I was astounded. I took a deep breath, opened my door, looked at the damage, and as the truck driver approached me asked, 'What did you do? Why did you do this?' Waving insurance documents, he immediately apologized for his oversight. Meanwhile, lines of frustrated drivers were impatiently blasting their horns as I moved my car into the space vacated in front of the truck. As

we exchanged insurance information, the truck driver told me his name, Ibrahim. Thinking about the assault in the Beer-Sheva bus station, I said that he was lucky to have had this mishap with me, and not with one of those crazy macho drivers. When I finally arrived home and recounted the incident to a friend, she told me that I was lucky to have been in a minor auto accident and not a car-ramming attack.

During the first decades of the twenty-first century, the existential state of Israel has been one of almost peace/almost war. Most of the time, Beer-Shevans have been going about their lives without paying undue attention to the threat of attack while incorporating mundane matters of security into the ways they navigate and negotiate time and space. Some periods, such as during Operation Pillar of Defence and Operation Protective Edge, were certainly times of exceptional insecurity. But those operations might have been felt more as intensifications of ongoing tensions than isolated, remarkable events. War-like outbursts should be seen, therefore, as a constant variable in Beer-Shevans' lives, as part of the everyday, part of the ongoing regional conflict. Daily life in the city and in its satellite settlements is, on the surface, calm; yet at the same time that ambience of peace is intrinsically coupled with incipient dread because the violence of war is always almost-present.

Conclusions: Betwixt and Between in Beer-Sheva

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, for much of humanity cardinal assumptions of modernity—certainty of continued progress coupled with assurances that the world is knowable and predictable, orderly and controllable—gave way to a 'liquid modernity', a condition of constant mobility coupled with uncertainty (Bauman 2000; see also Berman 1982). In such conditions, confidence in social categories and fixed definitions falters, and makes once taken-for-granted dualities like urban and rural, centre and periphery, power and subordination, and war and peace, more blurry than distinct. Such a shake-up of cognitive certainty, Bauman argues, results in feelings of insecurity and vulnerability, or what he calls 'liquid fear' (2006, 1–2).

This liquid kind of twenty-first-century dread is more than a floating sense of anxiety or a dystopic collective imaginary for it has a substantive base. Discoveries of impure water systems, cancer-causing pesticides, faulty automobiles and air pollution, to say nothing of nuclear meltdowns, seem to occur with increasing frequency. And even before everyday vehicles of mass transportation were maliciously used to obliterate New York's World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, several cities worldwide had become unsuspecting targets of terrorist attacks and brief, scattershot, often unresolved wars (Sassen 2010, 36). Since the year 2000, 'More and more contemporary warfare [has been taking] place in supermarkets, tower blocks, subway tunnels, and industrial districts rather than open fields, jungles or deserts' (Graham 2010, xiv–xv).

Unpredictable violence, cognitive uncertainty and liquid fear may indeed be hallmarks of our time. Yet this ethnography of consumption and chronotopes

in the Negev shows that while the residents of metropolitan Beer-Sheva may certainly experience anxiety, they are by no means daunted. They take pleasure in each other and in their city's offerings. Their lives are rich with plans for the future as they make the most of the here and now. In fact, less than a year after the end of Operation Protective Edge, some people claimed to have forgotten about it. 'If you hadn't told me when it was, I really couldn't say that I remember', remarked Naomi. After taking a moment to ponder what she had just said, she then asked, 'Are we resilient or insane? It's like collective amnesia … we all live with hope.' Reflecting similar sentiments from New York, Peter Marcuse noted that 'at some point people simply ignore the proclaimed threats' (2006, 921). But never entirely.

This idea of 'collective amnesia', or putting threats to the back of one's mind, may have implications for the planning policies for the city of Beer-Sheva. In their comprehensive review of the 2030 Master Plan, Nufer Avni and her colleagues noted that old top-down government planning strategies have been replaced with public–private partnerships which aim to consolidate, rather than expand, Beer-Sheva's already enlarged residential, business and leisure areas (2016, 26). They make no mention, however, of refurbishing, replacing or expanding neighbourhood bunkers and bomb shelters. And so, the city's new commercial centres that offer guarded entrances and public protection along with reprieve from the mundane, and new neighbourhoods with spacious living quarters including safe rooms thrive, while older ones are left to improve by themselves or to fall into decline. Like the residents of many cities worldwide where gaps between centre and periphery and peace and war are closing, Beer-Shevans too are learning to rely less on their government as they continue manoeuvring and negotiating, shifting fashions, chronotopes, sentiments and sensibilities in the ebbs and flows of the here-and-now in the in-between.

Notes

1. See The State of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, 'Israel in Figures 2012' www.cbs.gov.il/www/publications/isr_n_n12e.pdf. A long and contentious literature traces, debates and critiques the Ashkenazi/Mizrahi Jewish divide in Israel. Some key texts are Ben-Rafael and Sharot (1991), Yiftachel (2006), Khazzoom (2008).

2. The burial site of Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Rebecca, and Jacob and Leah is the Machpelah Cave in Hebron, 25 miles to the north-east, or halfway to Jerusalem.

3. Publication of the Balfour Declaration shortly followed the first battle of Beer-Sheva. To the joy of most Jews and the anger of most Arabs, the Balfour Declaration officially expressed British support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. At the end of World War I, the League of Nations granted its Mandate to Great Britain to govern conflict-ridden Palestine. After 30 years of Arab and Jewish insurgencies, riots, tensions and violence, the United Nations voted to adopt a partition plan for Palestine, and on 14 May 1948, the Jewish State of Israel declared independence just as Britain's uneasy

Mandate was about to end. The new country fought on multiple fronts for its independence against a combined invasion by the neighbouring countries of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq, including the second, October 1948, battle of Beer-Sheva.

4. Yiftachel states that, as of 1998, Israel's development towns (and it is not clear whether or not he is including Beer-Sheva under this rubric) were populated mainly by second-generation Mizrahim, 61 per cent, followed by recent Soviet and Ethiopian *olim* (19 per cent), veteran Ashkenazim (14 per cent), and Arabs (2 per cent), with the remainder third-generation Israeli-born citizens.

5. I have been a resident of the Beer-Sheva metropolitan area since I relocated to Israel in September 1992 to join the faculty of Ben-Gurion University (BGU). My first apartment was within walking distance of BGU. The next was a ten-minute bus ride away. At the beginning of 2000 I moved to the northern suburb of Meitar. At the turn of the twenty-first century, I developed a research project on shopping in Beer-Sheva with sociologist Natan Uriely (Markowitz and Uriely 2002), and later (2009–2015) teamed up with fellow anthropologist Dafna Shir-Vertesh, when residents of the Beer-Sheva area, ourselves included, lived through three IDF operations while experiencing missile attacks from Gaza (Shir-Vertesh and Markowitz 2015). Most recently, I have returned to the area of shopping by making several visits to Beer-Sheva's major shopping centres, sometimes alone, and sometimes in the company of research participants who accompanied me to their favourite stores.

6. Beer-Sheva has had an indoor shopping centre, *Kenion ha-Negev*, since 1988 which quickly became a local landmark. It also usurped the Ottoman-built (not-so) Old City of Beer-Sheva as the region's sole commercial and entertainment centre (see Markowitz and Uriely 2002, 219–20).

7. Purim is the springtime Jewish holiday that celebrates salvation by Queen Esther and her uncle Mordechai of the Jews of Persia from a plot to kill them by the King's vizier, Haman. The holiday is celebrated by a public reading of the Book of Esther, and a holiday meal accompanied by an abundance of wine, as well as the offering of charitable donations and gifts of sweets. Since at least the fifteenth century, Jews have taken to the streets and/or synagogues to stage plays, carnivals and masquerades during Purim. In Israel, the streets are full of masqueraders from little babies to very mature men and women, and both secular and religious Jews stage boisterous costume parties.

8. That does not at all mean that local sons and daughters, or their friends or relatives, were not injured or killed as soldiers or civilians in other parts of the country.

9. While this chapter focuses mainly on the experiences of Jewish Beer-Shevans in the rounds of violence that constituted the military operations, there were obviously two sides that were attacking and being attacked, bombing and being bombed. Israelis and Gazans both experienced physical and emotional suffering. Israeli casualties were far fewer than those in Gaza; during Pillar of Defence in 2012 over 160 Palestinians were killed compared with six Israelis, and in the 2014 operation Protective Edge, over 2100 Palestinians were killed in comparison to 73 Israeli casualties.

10. See http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1120725

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Coping with Economic and Political Agendas

Shipbuilding Decline and Dubious Futures: A Greek Ethnography of Creative Destruction

Manos Spyridakis

Introduction

According to Schumpeter, the leading figure in capitalist expansion is the daring entrepreneur who heroically attempts to advance, and even push to the limit, contemporary socio-technical developments in order to promote progress and innovation. Under such conditions the gap between the antiquated past and the promise of the future may be bridged by what he famously called creative destruction. There is no doubt that creative destruction is part and parcel of capitalist dynamics; however, this is not because of any learnt skill by talented individuals but the outcome of capitalism's inherent competitive ethos. The critical debate on the definition of skill, progress, development and on an almost axiomatic belief in technology as the core factor of change aside, continuous infrastructural upgrades engender constant uncertainty and liquidity (Ashton 1986; Narotzky 1997; Harvey 2014). The search for new markets and spaces plays a primary role as the means through which creative destruction is realised, resulting in new divisions of local and international labour. Hence, as Harvey puts it,

> The result is to exacerbate insecurity and instability, as masses of capital and workers shift from one line of production to another, leaving whole sectors devastated, while the perpetual flux in consumer wants, tastes, and needs becomes a permanent locus of uncertainty and struggle. New spaces are necessarily opened up as capitalists seek new markets, new sources of raw materials, fresh labour power, and new and more profitable sites for production operations. (Harvey 1990, 106)

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Indeed, this is the less glamorous—and indeed destructive—aspect in the love story between capital and space, especially when agents like workers, who do not belong to the entrepreneurial elite, are taken into account. For this reason, based on ethnographic analysis and its appeal to policy and decision makers (Pardo and Prato 2012, 3), I focus not so much on the 'creative' but the more 'destructive' effects of the global shipping capital on ordinary workers' lives in the urban setting of shipbuilding of Perama in Piraeus as well as on the way in which they experience and cope with these effects (Prato 2012, 95). Shipping capital is quite literally a moving capital, annihilating both space and time; and from this perspective geographers and anthropologists have shown comprehensibly that such movement creates spatial and social differentiations, resulting in the periodic empowerment of specific places and groups at the expense of others. As Massey phrased it, 'Capital's ability to roam the world further strengthens it in relation to relatively immobile workers, enables it to play off the plant at Genk against the plant at Dagenham. It also strengthens its hand against struggling local economies the world over as they compete for the favour of some investment' (Massey 1991, 26).

THE URBAN SHIPPING CONTEXT

The shipbuilding industry has a long tradition in Greece. Since the mid-nineteenth century, wooden vessels have been produced on the Greek islands, as well as in the Piraeus area, by small-scale family-run shipyards. By 1925, as the port gained increased importance for the transportation of goods and people, the Greek state decided to force these small-scale firms to move to the west side of Piraeus, in the area called Perama, which specialised in the building of wooden vessels and small metal boats, in repairing ships and the maintenance of machinery and devices, and in ship conversions. This process was accompanied by the arrival of immigrants from all over the country, who formed a considerable workforce employed in shipbuilding activities. These waves of immigration increased after World War II and the Greek civil war.

At the end of the civil war, the Greek merchant fleet increased considerably, owing to the high demand for tonnage in the global shipping market. Thus, Greek shipowners needed a shipbuilding base and industry for the maintenance, repairing and building of their vessels. A location near to the existing shipbuilding zone was the obvious and most suitable choice since it was, and remains, close to the port of Piraeus, and would keep the considerable transfer costs to a minimum. Moreover, it ensured the facilities of the emerging industries would be located close to the deep waters of the area, where passenger and commercial ships could easily be moored, built, repaired or maintained. The selected region was the Eleusis and Skaramanga area, next to Perama.

Consequently, by the end of the 1950s, the Skaramanga and Eleusis region emerged as an industrial hub for shipyards that would service the commercial fleet of Greek shipowners. In 1958, the Greek Shipyards Company was founded with private capital in the area of Skaramanga. The company was a product of

the huge worldwide increase in demand for tonnage capacity, but also boosted with the end of the Korean War and then the Iran-Iraq War and the closure of the Suez Canal (Vlahos 2002). It contributed to the growth of ship-building and repair in Greece in general.

The increase in production cycles led to the local emergence of small and medium-sized auxiliary enterprises that undertook the building, repairing and transformation of boats and shipping equipment through contract work and working-crew units. The latter specialised in smelting, electrics, steelwork and machine repairs, and in due course became connected through contract work to the newly founded shipbuilding industries. Moreover, thousands of jobs, both casual and permanent, were created for a specialised workforce that numbered in the region of 8000 workers, especially in the period of economic prosperity up to the 1980s (Vlahos 2002). Most workers were employed casu-ally on a contractual basis, meeting demand. Many were ex-sailors who either wanted employment back home or had been fired from other shipping compa-nies. Over the years, some of these enterprises grew, producing vessel parts and electric equipment, thus requiring additional workers and contributing to min-imising unemployment in the country. This, in turn, created considerable social dynamics, to the extent that the shipbuilding zone, combined with the wider area of Piraeus, where there had been a complementary development in arti-sanship and other industrial sectors (textiles, chemicals, steel, tobacco, machin-ery and electric works), once more became a destination for waves of immigrants from agricultural regions, who established households, engaged in new forms of social relations and developed a specific labour culture and cultural codes. Their shared motivation was the employment potential offered by the naval industry and the Piraeus harbour.

As the Greek industrial 'miracle' of the 1950s and 1960s began to falter towards the end of the 1980s, it dragged with it the naval sector—a process that became obvious after the two petroleum crises in 1973 and 1979. The Greek economic policy regarding the secondary sector was generally character-ised by weak adaptation to international economic conditions, a lack of vertical organisation and an inability to modernise existing industrial structures in response to investment strategies and the financial orientations of multinational capital. The two important industrial shipyard bases in the Skaramanga and Eleusis area were incapable of establishing a long-term business plan for mod-ernisation. As soon as they came under the state's control—for political rather than development reasons—their infrastructural deficiencies became apparent. Moreover, Greece had serious difficulty in keeping up with new technological specialisations and lagged behind in the face of competition from countries, such as the so-called 'Asian tigers' (primarily Korea and Taiwan), particularly in the shipbuilding sector where these countries became market leaders through integrated policies of cost reduction, rational distribution of investment, the application of new technologies and strategies for diversification of the final product to meet market demand.

The direct results of delays in tackling the structural problems of heavy industry and of deindustrialisation were the further development of the tertiary sector and a progressive return to lighter industrial activities, a strategy that was based on distorted profit objectives through the reduction of working costs, cheap technology and opportunistic provisional adaptations to perceived economic chances offered by international competition. A typical example is offered by the small shipbuilding enterprises of Perama, dependent on the economic activity of the big shipyards and worldwide trends in the sector. Although they are advantageously located and their labour force is experienced, having considerable specialisation in ship repairs, they are either unable or uninterested in changing and modernising their organisational structures, renewing their equipment and engaging in long-term investment planning based on the requirements of modern management and product diversification. However, no one can deny that the momentum of these enterprises could be much stronger if the indigenous industrial policy followed more rational tax and financial tactics, offered an appropriate technological infrastructure, avoided non-essential bureaucratisation and dynamically supported the growth of the sector. The combination of these limitations produced, instead, a context of uncertainty which discouraged further investment—a state of play that does not only affect the shipbuilding sector. This situation weakened the balance of payments and foreign exchange earnings and put at risk permanent employment and the demand for future employment.

In the shipping zone, there are currently about 850 enterprises which are categorised as follows: (1) small shipyards which undertake all kinds of shipbuilding tasks, albeit in a limited production cycle due to their insufficient infrastructure; (2) medium-sized shipyards which were established before World War II and specialise in the hauling and launching of ships and in repairing yachts; (3) small subsidiary firms supplying larger enterprises with necessary equipment; and (4) small repair firms, machine manufacturers and crew-based workshops.

The last category is the most common type of firm found in the shipbuilding area, as it is very flexible and mobile, subcontracting either to the big local shipbuilding industries or to the Perama zone. Their work structure is traditionally organised on the *pater familias* model. Typically, the boss is the owner of the firm employing his own kinsmen as the core workforce and ancillary casual workers, depending on the size of the subcontracted work. The workers are, sheet metal workers, boiler makers, tube makers, sheets metal carriers, metal welders, machine makers, scaffold makers, metal, fitters, sandblasters, carpenters, insulators, electricians, flame operators and general workers.

The Global Zone

Wider processes concerning the shipping economy that have taken place internationally have markedly affected the Perama zone. After the collapse of the former socialist countries, labour relations in the area, as well as the positioning

of the zone in the national and international labour market, changed radically. The decisive factor in regulating employment demand at the national level is the reduction in international trade undertaken by ships. The increase or decrease in demand in international commerce influences in turn the demand either for building new vessels or for the repair of existing ones. Commercial freights respond to the needs of international transportation and to the supply of merchant fleets.

Economic transactions in the shipping industry follow the classic rules of rationalised and cost-saving investment that characterise the free market (Spyridakis 2013). This, in practice, means that there must be a balance in the market between several factors. If the demand for shipping services is greater than the existing tonnage the market will 'react' as follows: (1) laid-up ships will be recommissioned; (2) navigation days increased; (3) minimisation of ship repairs; (4) a reduction in the decommissioning of ships; (5) freight prices will increase, new ships will be built and existing ships repaired; and (6) there will be new investment. On the contrary, if supply is greater than demand: (1) the amount of freight will be reduced; (2) ships will be transferred from one market to another (in seeking new customers); (3) there will be a reduction in navigation days (in order to save energy and thus reduce petrol costs), (4) the number of laid-up vessels will increase; and (5) there will be a very low rate of ship repairs.

The loss of customers in the Perama zone is mainly owing to the combination of the oversupply of tonnage, with reduced international demand, and the limited technology in local shipyards, which has remained unchanged since the 1960s. Regarding the first issue, the oversupply in tonnage, which is occurring globally, is due to overcapacity in the shipbuilding and ship-repair industry, which in turn has contributed to a decline in the price of vessels (both new and those under repair) and, consequently, of their freight. The two petrol crises of the 1970s contributed markedly to this situation (Akritopoulos 1996) and created the possibility for developing countries of that time, such as South Korea, to enter the global shipbuilding market and constitute an additional rival to Europe's industrial production. However, the current crisis—in which the overproduction of vessels remains the main factor—has favoured the emergence of an additional international competitor, China. In this competitive context, no more than 1000 ships on average are repaired annually. This reversal in output has been further affected by shipowners' strategy to opt for cheaper shipyards than the Greek yards.

At the same time as China has emerged as an economic rival to the West, the collapse of the Eastern bloc countries and the globalisation of national economies have accelerated the economic crisis in the European shipbuilding and repairing industry. Romania, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Bulgaria have adopted a low-cost shipbuilding policy, attracting customers at the expense of Western shipyards. Thus, an important outcome of economic globalisation is that one community's loss is another's gain (Lane 1996, 84). In the workers' view, the shipping capital 'does not have a country', meaning that shipowners'

primary concern is the minimisation of cost; therefore, they favour the above-mentioned countries, which, by diversifying their production systems and developing vertically structured industries of shipbuilding and repairing, have managed to keep their production costs to a minimum. The new global ship-building powers have managed not only to reduce the cost of labour but to survive in the face of the current crisis.

The 1994 agreement signed by the OECD countries testifies to the policy adopted internationally for overcoming the crisis.[1] According to this agreement, a policy must be followed based on: (1) the minimisation of production capabilities and, consequently, of labour; (2) the restructuring, diversification and specialisation of enterprises and intensive cooperation among them; and (3) the observance of fair competition and the abolition of state protectionism. The agreement mainly concerned the shipbuilding industry. However, it was expected that it would significantly affect other enterprises related to ship repair.

In the current crisis, the countries of the European Union (EU) are shouldering the heavy burden of the loss of customers. In the past years, production in the EU reached approximately 20 per cent of the global total. Strong competition, especially from Japan, China and South Korea, seemed to leave the Europeans with no other choice than to gradually reduce the shipbuilding and repairing sectors in their countries.[2] Moreover, shipowners whose companies are located within the EU prefer to give their business to countries outside the EU that offer lower production costs. This explains why European shipowners have placed only 18 per cent of their orders in EU countries' shipyards. Consequently, on 20 July 1990 the EU directorate issued its 7th Directive to bring the shipbuilding and repairing industry in line with OECD directives. According to this, the following objectives must be met: (1) state subsidies must be limited to up to 9 per cent and gradually will have to be entirely eliminated; (2) subsidies are to be supplied for the encouragement of research and development for the construction of high-tech vessels; (3) incentives must be established for shipowners to place the building and/or conversion of their fleets within the EU; and (4) overcapacity must be eliminated by minimising the labour force employed in the shipyards and by encouraging enterprises to diversify into other activities; subsidies should be provided for the closing down of units (Spyridakis 2006).

The international situation hit the Greek shipping industry heavily, including the Perama zone. Geographically Greece is fortunate, being at the crossroads of the commercial routes of the Eastern Mediterranean. The sea trade in this area is made possible through the Black Sea–Suez Canal, Black Sea–Gibraltar and Gibraltar–Suez Canal 'routes'. The ships plying these routes used to constitute the main customers for Greek shipyards, especially during the golden period of 1964–1974. Yet, particularly after the 1990s, these shipyards have experienced a maelstrom of crisis.

The situation of the Greek shipping industries and small-scale enterprises is not expected to change any time soon for a number of reasons: (1) a lack of the necessary management structure—the big shipyards' failure to attract the busi-

ness necessary for their economic survival will have a drastic effect on small-scale enterprises, which will face serious financial problems; (2) the pace of the global economy has accelerated the need for the rapid circulation of material goods and information. This means that services and commerce must be carried out in the shortest possible time. At present, the enterprises of Perama cannot meet this demand because the circulation of information is slow due to their ineffective administrative structures and they are instead burdened with an old-fashioned infrastructure (Vlahos 2002); so, delivery dates for shipowners' orders are not fully met at the required time, thus creating a negative reputation for local enterprises; (3) although the Greek shipyards—along with small-scale enterprises—enjoy a strategic position, they face competition from Turkish, Russian and Romanian shipyards due to the low labour costs in these countries. Finally, one of the 'internal' weaknesses of the small-scale enterprises is that instead of developing bonds of cooperation they do not undertake any initiative for coping with the current crisis together.

Experiencing the Decline

The economic decline occurred at Perama is part of a more general economic recession that is currently taking place in the wider region of Piraeus. Deindustrialisation began with the closing down of many textile manufactures. The same happened to enterprises specialising in plastics, smelting works and tobacco processing. The impact of deindustrialisation affected considerably the shipping companies established near the port of Piraeus. The lack of a plan for modernisation, combined with the existing old-fashioned infrastructure (traffic jams, a lack of modern telecommunications systems, continuous postponement of the port's modernisation and so on), led to shipping enterprises relocating from the port of Piraeus either to other suburbs of Athens or to London. According to the local trade union's estimation, in recent years there has been no investment by the state or by private capital in the wider area of Piraeus. Unemployment seriously affects younger and older workers, and especially women. According to the local trade union, the unemployment rate is over 20 per cent.

Dimitris is a 75-year-old public sector employee. He is currently employed in the customs office at Perama, where he is responsible for controlling the amount of petrol imported into Greece by BP. In 1962, when in his thirties, he left his place of origin to find employment in Piraeus. He found a job in the ship-repair zone of Perama as a sandblaster, one of the most dangerous and unhealthy local jobs. He recalls that the zone was different than today; there were small-scale shipyards specialising in the building and repairing of wooden vessels. Dimitris also remembers that near to the place where the town hall is located today people used to swim and enjoy afternoon walks by the sea.

As soon as the port of Piraeus became important, with its position at the crossroads for commercial transactions in the Mediterranean, the public enterprise OLP (the Port of Piraeus Organisation) built the docks for repairing

and modifying the ships. The ship-repair and ship-building zone mainly comprised the aforementioned small-scale enterprises which began to operate in the 1960s. The first workshops were installed in shelters provided by the OLP, for which they paid a monthly rent. From 1969 until 1990, activities in the zone expanded and new enterprises emerged. Dimitris also recalls that the zone began to decline slowly but steadily by the end of the 1980s. The repercussions of this decline only emerged in recent years, when workers realised that shipowners' preferences for the maintenance of their fleet were changing.

The economic prosperity that had occurred in the area during the 1960s was obvious in almost all aspects of life. Dimitris says, quite bitterly, that in those days the area was overcrowded and overpopulated: 'People were coming from all corners of Greece looking for employment here. Perama was like a heart, it gave life to everybody.' The strongest evidence for this was the high number of houses being built. He explained, 'I had to find a place to stay and it was really difficult then to find a contractor to build a house, as the demand for constructions was extremely high'. The sudden economic boom also affected construction workers who, according to him, experienced their most economically fruitful period in their working lives. Like today, the recruitment structure of local working crews was based on social networks. Usually, one could find potential workers in the local cafés where they met and exchanged information. Despite the increase in house building, there continued to be a significant problem with housing due to illegal building and high rents.

At that time, Dimitris' son-in-law, George, worked as a builder in Perama city. In his late twenties he made the decision to quit construction and get employment as a tube maker in the zone. He says:

> That time was very fruitful for us. It was, of course, the time of the dictatorship in Greece, but we only cared about employment of which there was abundant offer. There was an enormous increase in almost all jobs related to construction, shipbuilding included. Personally, I was convinced by a colleague to get employment over there. Wages were very satisfactory and if you had good relations with colleagues and contractors, you almost never ran out of work.

It is very telling that workers who began their careers in their early twenties did so at the time of dictatorship. In their view, the state worked 'properly' because there was constant police surveillance. No matter how oppressive the regime was, they report that the political situation facilitated local economic growth. The increase in jobs meant permanent employment alternatives and a consequent increase in wages. In their view, the methods of control adopted by the state at that time, however anti-democratic and authoritarian, 'contributed' to the well-being of the zone, particularly regarding employment. According to George, no one had the right to work in the zone unless he was 'controlled', and that happened as soon as one went through the workplace's gate. At the same time, wages had risen to very good standards because there was a constant supply of ships needing repairs.

According to Dimitris, during the dictatorship, the Greek establishment offered important economic incentives to shipowners, leading them to make deals for shipbuilding and repair for an extended time. This process brought about the emergence of new shipping companies in the port of Piraeus and of new contractors specialising in ship repairs. According to Dimitris, there was good 'money circulation', which continued almost to the end of the 1980s. Thus, the 'order' the junta imposed during the 1960s was viewed as a positive model for development. According to local opinion, what was present back then—that is, high employment and incentives for the sustainability of ship-building—is missing today.

From Dimitris' point of view, the 1990s were the decisive period of economic decline. At that time, workers from every specialism in the zone had their own syndicate. This meant that every syndicate acted according to its own corporate interests. By the 1990s, however, all the syndicates decided to join together to form a single union to look after the common interests of workers. This decision was made on the basis of employment availability. The syndicate wanted to increase its power and membership. Consequently, under the ideological guise of claims for better economic treatment or solidarity with the international labour movement the syndicate repeatedly went on strike. This entailed the frequent suspension of all work activity, which led to considerable delays in fulfilling shipowners' orders. According to Dimitris, the strikes which occurred particularly often in the shipbuilding zone had negative repercussions, as the majority of shipowners began to move their business to other regions in the Mediterranean.

As in other ethnographic contexts (Howe 1990), Dimitris, like many other workers and Perama residents, blame themselves for this situation. They accuse the union of extreme avarice and opportunism. As Dimitris stresses:

> We have forgotten that things need their time. We wanted to achieve a number of things in one night without considering a very important factor: employment availability. Everyone asks for as much as he can when employment is secure and abundant. Now we are experiencing a very strange situation, for we do not know how to get the zone clients back.

Although low wages were one of the main reasons for the economic boom that occurred locally during the 1960s, according to Dimitris workers 'wished to become rich immediately'. However, the metalworkers' high-wage levels increased repair costs. Shipowners did not want to pay that much and for this reason they moved their custom to low-cost countries.

The signs of economic decline began to be felt in the mid-1990s. However, the roots of this process can be traced back to the previous two decades, when the Greek state failed to strengthen and expand the shipbuilding sector. The reasons for the decline fall into two categories as they were due to internal and external circumstances. On the one hand, the technologically backward infrastructure, the inadequate compliance with the existing legal framework, the

vague property status in the zone, the unsatisfactory entrepreneurial activity of most of the local 'shops' and the repeated strikes created a sense of uncertainty concerning ship deliveries (Vlahos 2002) and feelings of unreliability in the market regarding zone productive capacity. On the other hand, as the orders for the building of new ships decreased worldwide, the shipyards located in low-cost countries became more attractive to shipowners. At the same time, the local big shipyards of Skaramanga and Eleusis Bay competed with the medium-sized enterprises of Perama with the advantage of the financial assistance they received from the Greek state. In addition, at that time the country was experiencing a recession, leading to massive closures and layoffs—which increased the oversupply of labour in the area.

Until the mid-1990s wages were satisfactory, and fixed on the basis of overtime work. The normal working day was eight hours. However, the 'nature' of the work allowed for extended working time, up to 17 hours per day on average. By agreement between contractors and trade unions, those who worked overtime were paid an increment of 100 per cent for every hour and, as in other cases (Zlolniski 2006), could potentially double their weekly salary. In Dimitris' view, this opportunity gave people the prospect of future prosperity and, as circumstances proved later, the false belief that economic well-being would go on forever. Indeed, a number of specialties emerged due to the economic boom in the region. Commercial activity rose to high levels. However, the resulting euphoria led to workers' continuous demands on wages and working conditions. As I have mentioned, ceaseless strikes took place, which Dimitris believes was one of the main reasons for the economic decline. As he puts it:

> After 1990, the majority of workers came from the countryside to look for a piece of bread here. Many had heard about the high-level wages in the zone and liked the idea of making some money. However, there were too many workers here already and most newcomers did not know anything about ships or working on them. So, it was very easy to strike. The difficult thing, however, was to find employment and think of ways to keep high levels of employment in this area. That was the issue then. Today, the problem is how to bring back the clients we have lost.

Dimitris' son-in-law, George, believes that the strikes and the workers' struggles in general were not the decisive factors for the economic decline in Perama. He says:

> We have to have dignity as workers. My father-in-law does not take into account the daily expenses. Daily expenses have risen in Greece since the time he mentions and are constantly rising. Most of our strikes concerned wages. This is the hot issue in any area, isn't it? Well, the point my father-in-law forgets to mention is that we asked for increments at a logical and satisfactory level, such that would ensure a decent living. Everyone knows that this country has a high level of inflation and everyone knows who creates it. For sure, I know it wasn't me. I pay my taxes and everything, whereas contractors in the zone don't. That's what I know

about this country. Well, why not strike? Isn't it logical, apart from the protection measures at work, to strive for the protection of our wages?

George is a very skilled tube maker in his forties and is currently unemployed. He married Dimitris' eldest daughter and moved to Perama in 1985. He now lives on the third floor of the house his wife received as a wedding gift. From George's point of view, the current situation is very difficult. He further remarks:

> Every economic investment undergoes crises. There was one in 1973, when the petrol crisis influenced almost all the global economy; one in 1980–1981, and so on. This one, however, is very extensive and I really have no idea how long it will last, for there is no positive sign of change on the horizon. On the contrary, the situation is getting worse day by day.

The day before, George 'went down' to the workplace, to look for employment. He found nothing. He says:

> All this time, like many of my colleagues, I was employed for five days a month and stayed unemployed for almost two months. It was too much. It was the way we worked—periodically, not on a permanent basis—but then we knew that at some point we would find a job; now things are a lot tougher.

Following the norm in the area, when he started working in the zone, George tried to get on good terms with local contractors, so that he would have options. In case one contractor had already hired a crew, George could look for a job somewhere else in the zone. This gave him a perspective and a sense of security. In his view,

> Workers back then felt things were settled down and in order. You could make plans for the future because you said to yourself: 'I do not have job today but it does not matter, I will find one in three or five days.'

George is trying to exploit his connections to find a job. He goes to small-scale shipyard managers to ask for employment. Every time, he says, he gets the same answer: 'They keep telling me to return the next week to see whether there is any work. My nerves are broken and my morale is low.' He is going through a very difficult time for an additional reason, his age; although a man in his forties is not old, his speciality is considered as being better performed by a younger worker. His anxiety about employment is increasing because he is the breadwinner in his family and has two daughters and a son to care for. He says:

> The problem is that I cannot go back to my place and find some peace. I may work five days in a month and make some money, but it isn't enough. I have three children and have to pay for their private lessons and give them some pocket money. I want to do that. For instance, I like to give some money to my son

because I know that he will spend it on his girlfriend, or whatever. I feel very sad when I cannot help.

Undoubtedly, these expenses could be limited even more than they already are. However, managing household expenses is a very difficult task for an unemployed worker, as each time he takes his salary he must repay the debts he accrued while he was unemployed, including loans from friends to meet every-day expenses like electricity and phone bills. Thus, a wage corresponding to a few days' work does not solve the problem of financial insecurity. Moreover, George lacks the motivation to 'go down' to zone very often because he is upset with the situation. He says:

> It is one thing to discuss things and another to live them. I do not want to go down and face total nothingness—not even a single sound of a hammer on metal. I have nothing to do and that is what makes me feel the saddest.

George's harsh circumstances mean that he cannot organise his life properly. Like many of his colleagues, he is in a state of constant employment insecurity. His primary task now is to survive. He does not go out with his family to meet friends or spend time in the local cafés as he did in the past.

His situation can be summarised by the word 'kyrios' (that is, 'mister'), which refers to a distinct status as opposed to other, lower statuses. This word connotes order and well-being in life; in this case, it refers to the previous con-dition in which George could run his household with ease and could foresee a secure future. He states:

> I was satisfied with work. I felt good, I worked for a specific time, earned a certain salary and spent accordingly. I was a 'kyrios'. Now, I have to spend my energy to convince any boss to hire me and then to work very hard to ensure my position and to earn some money to get by. I do not like this. I cannot stand it anymore. I wish I knew that this situation would end in two or five years. I play the sucker to get employed.

Above all, what George dislikes nowadays is the obvious deception that many workers in the zone experience from their bosses. According to contract regulations, workers must be paid their weekly salary every Friday. However, according to George, this happens only on paper, for the 'theory always differs from practice'. As he puts it:

> Contractors have the potential to find a way to survive. They have accumulated so much money through my labour that they can escape misery. The reality is that bosses have made their profit from me, that's all I know.

George's words sound bitter. He is very disappointed because he helped many contractors in the area in various ways by introducing them to skilled and fast workers but then they 'forgot' his dedication. The most humiliating effect

of economic decline is payment delay. Although George is well known among the local bosses, he is one of the many who are not paid regularly. For him, this condition is more difficult than employment scarcity for it defines his limits:

> You must negotiate not only your working power at a very low level, but also things which before never happened so often.

Contractors try to make the most they can by delaying workers' wages. George finds the whole process exhausting: 'I have to look around for work and then I have to deal with assholes to get my money', he says. With the pretext of friendship and continuous collaboration with workers over the years, bosses 'explain' that the enterprise is currently going through a serious crisis, but next week things will be fine. When next week comes, workers may face another excuse for their non-payment. When they are finally paid, they often receive lower payments than they are due. This not only means a loss of income but also a loss of insurance stamps and of various benefits. If a worker brings a legal complaint against his boss he will face two very serious consequences. First, he will be accused of being a 'sneak' by the boss, which means he may not work in the zone again. Local 'shops' will probably exclude him, as almost every employer follows the same practice. Second, the road to justice is very long and expensive. There are very few cases in which workers succeed in obtaining lost wages. In addition, the bureaucratic procedure is so exhausting that workers prefer to solve any problem concerning work either through the trade union or, as is the usual practice, on their own. They know that contractors exploit employment precariousness, setting their own terms for work and ignoring official signed agreements. Because of the oversupply of labour, they can informally pay workers less than the legally defined minimum. So, George is not in a position to demand a proper wage. His ability to find employment depends almost exclusively on the personal relationships he has created in the zone.

Usually, workers know the quality of the 'shop' in which they are about to be hired. Information about a 'shop' derives from rumours among colleagues and workers' personal experience of recruitment. For George, a worker has to manipulate this situation in such a way as to take his money and get hired again.

Apart from the quality of relationships, the scarcity of employment also entails scarcity of information about available work. For him, secretiveness and suspicion emerge as the defining norm in the area, narrowing the social network as a source of information and leading to more individualistic behaviour. He says:

> Everyone is trying to create his own network, through which he can exploit any information or rumour he hears. The situation has changed over recent years. Colleagues that used to give me a ring in order to let me know about jobs or about the quality of a boss no longer do so. People prefer individual solutions to their problems.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

As the combination of historical and ethnographic data clearly show, with the movement of capital whole regions and cities, like Perama, acquire special importance as spaces of production and hope for people's lives. New power geometries emerge from the roles cities play in the international division of labour, from their relationship with other cities to the functions they are supposed to fulfil within national contexts. As shipping capital has moved to other places of production, the once-prosperous region of Perama underwent severe industrial decline. Yet alongside the gradual deindustrialisation in the wider Piraeus region, the economic situation boosted fresh ideas on new topological investment and the use of space. Thus, especially after the Olympic Games of 2004, multinational companies, policy makers, local municipalities and private investors promoted a series of neoliberal-inspired renovation projects and processes generally aimed at changing the seafront of the Piraeus region. Some of these projects have been realised. For example, following an agreement with the left-wing government, COSCO, the Chinese-owned investment company recently managed to buy the majority of stocks of the public Port Organisation of Piraeus (OLP) with the aim of privatising the container docks in Piraeus. COSCO have also expressed a vigorous interest in expanding their activities in the neighbouring area, where the shipbuilding zone is located. The proposed changes converge to capture the meaning of what geographers have called the entrepreneurial city (Harvey 1989; Stevenson 2003). However, local civil society, organisations and administrators strongly question this perspective. To this, one should add that so far international experience has shown that entrepreneurship does not serve a social policy and a logic of urban cohesion; instead, it reproduces and exacerbates existing inequalities. For instance, Leitner and Sheppard (1998), showed that in economically declining cities like Cleveland (USA), Glasgow (UK) and Pittsburgh (USA), the rhetoric of development beautified a 'façade' concealing increasing unemployment, declining neighbourhoods as social spaces and emerging financial crises for low-income groups. Similarly, Smith (2002, 445) criticised the Brixton case in London, where gentrification essentially meant that high-income social strata moved into the area. Moreover, there is considerable scepticism about whether or not the various programmes that are meant to promote innovation in declining regions and cities can effectively cope with the problem of unemployment, as this strategy may end up benefiting specific business interests by ultimately subsidising their long-term profits.

On the other hand, workers caught in a situation defined by distant economic power structures, being de-unionised and unable to forge a 'class in itself' solidarity, have become powerless to defend themselves. Unlike the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, their creativity is driven by a risk of a different kind to that promoted by neoliberal expensive projects and by a particular heuristic logic through which a series of processes gain meaning, which in turn

helps them cope with the violence of extreme situations. As several carefully considered ethnographies have shown (Pardo 1996, 2004; Procoli 2004), agents follow ethical and rational codes of practice, taking into account the limits and the possibilities in the existing situation while trying to manage their existence to the best of their ability. The case of Perama workers is a significant ethnographic example of the way in which manual work 'insists' on reminding us that, in the so called post-industrial period of employment tertiarisation labour relations may have changed in form but their content reproduces the old socio-spatial discriminations and inequalities. We have seen how workers struggle to cope with this asymmetrical framework and to improve their existence, relying on their empirical knowledge about the exploitative labour system within which they are embedded and of the way it is oriented to profit making.

The debate about the economic future of Piraeus and especially of the shipbuilding zone continues, as there are counterbalancing pressure groups and arguments proving that unidirectional and macroscopic views about economic projects cannot fully explain the specific character of a place. In line with Maskovsky and Brash (2014, 263), the Perama story suggests that there is a much more complex articulation of forces, projects and actors operating at different levels which should be taken into account when addressing global urbanism and urban dynamics (Pardo and Prato 2012). To the extent that the relationship between the transformation of space and the attending social (re) arrangements will be determined by dogmatic neoliberal aspirations on land use, there is reason to believe that a planned future of this kind will lead to social and economic polarisation in the wider Piraeus area. As international experience of areas of interest to venture capital has shown, some people may benefit from the potential for profit generated by spatial restructuring, but there will most likely be few chances for those in the low-income social strata to benefit or simply cope with the increased cost of living. While the relevant debate goes on, mainly due to grass-roots social movements claiming what Lefebvre (1968) called the 'right to the city', the media and several stakeholders continue to forcefully promote the new ideal of the competitive city as the economic tide that will offer a new impetus to development. It seems reasonable to wonder whether that tide will 'lift all boats'.

NOTES

1. OECD members are those countries that have signed the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
2. For instance, until 1974 Sweden was the greatest power in the building of big oil tankers, but in 1985 it made the decision to stop subsidising its shipbuilding industry and to invest in the more economically safe car industry. At the same time, France reduced up to 80 per cent of their shipyard workforce whilst Germany reduced 40 per cent of theirs (Akritopoulos 1996).

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Navigating the Seas of the World of Unemployment in the USA

Judy Arnold

Introduction

The ranks of the unemployed in America have diminished to less than 5%—or have they? According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, unemployment declined from May 2015 to May 2016 from more than 6% to less than 4.7% (June 3, 2016). However, the current methods for calculating the unemployment rate are suspect in the USA for several important reasons. The major one is that the privileged 'powers that be' in America do not understand what unemployment is and do not understand the implications of unemployment for the general population. (For statistical purposes, unemployment is not simply not having a job.) The government generally does not understand how to obtain an accurate count of the unemployed. Moreover, it is important to each successive administration in Washington to be able to claim that the jobless rate is falling under their political party's watch and, of course, much improved over the statistics reported by the previous administration.

The stigma of unemployment brands those without jobs as welfare recipients who are too lazy to work and are draining the resources earned by the hard work of employed Americans. In response to this attitude, the US Congress has created a system for labeling its citizens as 'unemployed' that goes far beyond just not having a job. For example, many Americans who are old enough to receive social security benefits have lost their jobs and are claiming their benefits earlier than they intended. They are involuntarily unemployed, often unable to get other jobs because of their age, but are counted as retired, not unemployed, in the statistical analyses. In addition to the methods for

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determining who is to be counted as unemployed, government policies for applying for unemployment social services have developed into what seems to be a deliberate maze of requirements that are often impossible to navigate for many of the unemployed. In essence, the government punishes the unemployed.

In the digital business news publication *Quartz*, author Sarah Kendzior (2016) gives the following three reasons why the numbers seem like a lie. First, the labour participation rate discounts the millions of Americans who have been out of work for six months or more. Second, the '1099 economy,' referring to the tax form filled out by Americans who are temporary workers, contractors, freelancers, and often involuntarily self-employed workers, has increased. Third, there has been a surge in low-wage service jobs, coupled with a corresponding decrease in middle-class jobs.

In a Gallop opinion piece based on Gallop poll findings, Jim Clifton (2015) calls the unofficial unemployment rate 'extremely misleading' and continues with this poignant statement:

> if you, or a family member or anyone is unemployed and has subsequently given up on finding a job—if you are so hopelessly out of work that you've stopped looking over the past four weeks—the Department of Labor doesn't count you as unemployed. That's right. While you are as unemployed as one can possibly be, and tragically may never find work again, you are *not* counted in the figures we see relentlessly in the news … Right now as many as 30 million Americans are either out of work or severely underemployed. Trust me, the vast majority of them aren't throwing parties to toast 'falling' unemployment.

Clifton also points out that if a worker performs a minimum amount of work in a week and is paid at least USD20, maybe to mow someone's lawn, they are not counted as unemployed. Americans who want to work full time but are severely underemployed as part-time workers are not counted in the unemployment rate. While Kendzior concludes that the unemployment rate feels like a lie, Clifton says that the official unemployment rate, which cruelly overlooks the suffering of the long-term and often permanently unemployed as well as the depressingly underemployed, amounts to a 'Big Lie.'

One of the ways this Big Lie is perpetuated is in the various requirements for unemployed workers who are applying for unemployment benefits. In a cynical, almost deliberate punishment of people who have lost their jobs, the government has applied a maze of requirements for application that are complicated, and sometimes even impossible, to traverse for the uneducated and/or poverty stricken who lack the necessary technological resources. Moreover, the requirements vary from state to state, making it difficult for a worker to move from one to another in search of a job. For example, in one state, unemployed workers can receive 13 weeks of unemployment insurance while in another they can receive 26 weeks of payment. As unemployed workers travel in and out of the maze of requirements, they also travel in and out of the statistics that are being reported to the public.

This ethnographic study examines urban subjects in one representative state in the USA who find themselves unemployed. All of the workers described here have long, successful work histories. Several issues are raised in their stories. Even though the issues relating to being qualified to apply for unemployment insurance vary from state to state, these stories mirror the situation for all states. This study examines the process of application by telling the stories of four sets of individuals who qualify currently, or have qualified, for unemployment benefits in the recent past. Issues related to class structure are raised in these stories as issues of healthcare and childcare are paramount for workers, particularly in the poverty class who are scrambling simply to survive.

The first two sets of six individuals whose stories are referenced here include professionals who lost their jobs unexpectedly after many years of service. These individuals are highly educated with advanced degrees and many years of experience in the world of work. The first set of three professionals applied for benefits. The second set did not. All of the individuals in these two groups had long work histories, were at or above retirement age, and had worked at their last jobs for ten years or longer.

The third set of three subjects is a group of workers who are highly paid temporary workers, such as engineers who work on temporary contracts which end when a job is completed, and they are offered a new job elsewhere after a generally short term of unemployment. These workers as a group need special explanation. In addition to the workers in the preceding sets of professionals, this group underscores the point that even the highest end of the class structure can be affected by unemployment. Granted that while these representatives of the upper middle class who lose their jobs are generally in worse situations than they were in when they were employed, they are usually prepared for this period of unemployment and are not in the dire circumstances that poverty-class workers find themselves in when they lose their jobs. Many of these higher-class workers are contract workers who are paid high salaries with retirement and health benefits while they work on temporary contracts. These contracts are lucrative and can last for months or even years. However, once a project is completed these workers lose their jobs and move on to the next job, usually pretty quickly. Sometimes, in the interim, they do apply for unemployment benefits and are counted statistically as unemployed. When they become employed again, they are counted in the statistical rolls that show a decrease in unemployment. Yet the people in this type of situation were never genuinely hurt by being unemployed, nor were they unemployed for very long periods of time.

The fourth set of three subjects is from the poverty culture. Some apply for benefits on a fairly regular off-and-on basis as they move from one minimum-wage job to another; some work 'outside of the system,' working at jobs for which they are paid in cash. Therefore they might be working, even steadily, but they do not show up in the system as employed, and when they are not working they are not reported as unemployed. Some of these workers have the ability to do physical labour or minimum-wage jobs, but when they lose their job they do not have the mental or physical resources to work through the maze of requirements and do not even attempt to apply for benefits. This group is the saddest

group of all the unemployed, particularly because despite the fact that they are the hard-working poor, the general public often identifies them with the cheaters who try to defraud the government into awarding undeserved benefits.

In this study, each set of the twelve subjects provided three case studies highlighting workers with very different backgrounds and experiences but with the commonality that during the periods in which they were unemployed, they were either not counted at all in the unofficial unemployment rolls or were counted only briefly. Their stories vary depending on their general life circumstances and their position in the social structure. All would be willing workers if they could find a job.

The Unemployed Professionals of the Middle and Upper Middle Class

The three professionals in the first set who did apply for benefits were professors who lost their teaching jobs unexpectedly in 2013 and were replaced by younger people who were not as experienced and could be paid lower wages. These professors were all well over the age of 60 and were part of a large group of 20 who lost their jobs at a small American university. Age was decidedly a factor in the large group and only three out of the 20 who were over 60 found full-time jobs elsewhere. All were eligible for unemployment benefits at that time. Not all felt the need to apply for unemployment benefits. Those who did apply at that time were still unemployed at the time of writing but were no longer eligible for benefits, and were therefore not represented in the current unemployment reports.

The first professor in the set of three in this study left the meeting in which he was told he would not be rehired and went directly to the unemployment office to apply for benefits. This action turned out to be a particularly good move because the state in which he lived subsequently closed all local unemployment offices in an effort to save money. The closure of the local offices caused extreme hardship for those who tried to apply after those closures. This professor became the expert, giving out advice to those who followed him because of his early, proactive approach to the situation. However, in a matter of weeks, so many changes were made in the system that his advice became obsolete.

The other two professors in the first set of participants went to the unemployment office together only to find it closed. At this point, another significant change was made as they learned that while they could still apply for benefits for 26 weeks, they would not be able to reapply for another 26 weeks if they did not find a job. This limit was applied by the state government as another limitation to benefits that had been available before. These two professors became mired in a sea of requirements that had not previously existed. Since all of the local offices across the state had been closed, the state capital unemployment office became the hub for applications for unemployment for the entire state. From that point to the present, applications could only be

made online or by phone. Personal contact was not available except by e-mail or after hours of waiting on hold for a counsellor to become available to talk because the phone lines were so overworked. Face-to-face contact was possible only by traveling to the capital, and many of the applicants across the state did not have access to transportation that would get them there. It is unclear whether or not face-to-face contact would have even been allowed or possible, given the limited number of counsellors and the large group of applicants at that time.

Only applicants who had resources such as phones, transportation, technical skills, and above-average persistence because they had not yet been beaten down by the system were successful in their applications. The government had struck a major blow at the unemployment figures and at the unemployed who could not navigate the system of online and phone complications that came with the change from local to state administration. The two professors cited in this group were able to navigate the system ultimately because they knew how to call the offices of the commissioners and senators who could help them. Other applicants were not so fortunate. None of the three professors in this first set of participants is now counted as unemployed in the official records of unemployment because they drew unemployment benefits for 26 weeks and now, even though they are still unemployed, the benefits are no longer available to them. One of the professors works part time as an adjunct professor. The other two are unemployed. All three were forced to take early retirement and to claim social security benefits earlier than they intended after their unemployment benefits ceased.

The second set of three unemployed workers in the study included two more professors out of the group of newly unemployed professors and an occupational therapist who lost her job, including her family health insurance, after her husband was diagnosed with terminal cancer. None of these three participants even entertained the idea of filing for unemployment benefits. The two professors were retired from administrative jobs that they had held previously and were not particularly affected economically by losing their jobs because they were already receiving retirement benefits and would receive more from the jobs they had just lost. They accepted adjunct work and proceeded to spend more time with their grandchildren.

The occupational therapist, in her early 50s, was fortunate to find another job but not before she and her husband were deeply affected financially by the loss of her family insurance benefits. Her church and friends held events to help the couple pay the bills for the cancer treatments. Even though she obtained another job fairly quickly, she is still paying bills incurred by her husband's illness even though he died recently. At no time during her period of unemployment did she consider applying for unemployment benefits. In fact, all three of the individuals in this set of participants chose not to apply for benefits that were due to them because of the political and cultural objections which were part of their upbringing. It was their philosophical belief that it is wrong to depend on the government for help. The stigma of unemployment was greater

than their financial needs. It is significant that these first two sets of individuals represented upper middle-class families who had not faced issues such as unemployment personally before and who did not really know other people in their class who had faced these problems. They had the financial and mental resources to survive losing their jobs and move on to something else.

The third set of three workers included two engineers and a self-employed worker (1099er) who works at age 66 as a dance teacher, fitness instructor, and physical therapist. The two engineers qualified for unemployment benefits when their contracts ended. The third worker never worked full time for anyone but herself so when one job ended, she had to create another opportunity for herself immediately. Since she was not qualified to apply for unemployment benefits, she did not have the cushion that would tide her over until the next opportunity. She is a single woman who, fortunately, loves the work she is doing because she does not see herself ever retiring.

The first engineer in the last set of workers actually expected his contract to end earlier than it did and was hoping to retire and claim social security benefits when his last job ended. However, his wife had medical issues which required costly medication and treatment, and since she was not old enough to claim Medicare benefits, he needed to work for at least another year so she could qualify for Medicare. In the meantime, during what became a period of only a few months, this couple had to worry about healthcare costs which were exorbitant. The husband was then counted in the unemployment statistics during those few months and did draw unemployment benefits briefly. Ultimately, this engineer, who works in a very specialized field, did receive a lucrative new contract with benefits. However, he is working in a different state. His wife is maintaining their home in one state. He is living in an apartment which is paid for by his employer in another. The couple are traveling back and forth to see each other on weekends, alternating between the two states. They have pets in their home and have to pay to have them cared for when they are both gone. The gas and the wear and tear on their two cars represent a significant strain on their finances. However, the husband is employed and will remain so until his wife becomes eligible for Medicare in a year. The husband likes his work. However, he is over 65, tired of working, and wants to travel. The couple are not working to stay above subsistence level; they are working to maintain their lifestyle.

However briefly a worker like this engineer in this upper middle-class group is unemployed, they will be counted in the unemployment rolls and will face financial issues that are somewhat unique to this group. For example, these workers often have to relocate every few years and they have to find new housing each time. Often after long careers, they have never been in one place long enough to pay off a home mortgage. Their spouses are often unable to establish a career, as in the case of the couple referenced here, because they have moved so often. The wife held jobs in some of the cities where the family lived but was unable to maintain connections or establish a work history that would help her get new positions each time they moved. Therefore there is one spouse

who is unemployed and staying at home and another who is briefly unemployed but imminently rehirable. The wife is never counted as an unemployed worker even though she would like to work and has applied for jobs that she did not get. The husband received unemployment benefits briefly but when he was rehired, he became one of the statistics that created the illusion that the jobless rate was falling.

The second engineer was unexpectedly unemployed but ultimately did get another job in the same area where he lived before. Therefore, like the other engineer, he was only briefly part of the unemployment statistics. In the meantime, because they were able to stay in the same location, his wife, who is a trained wildlife reclaimer, was able to establish a lucrative pet-sitting business which she has maintained even after her husband went back to work. She is self-employed without benefits, but his job does provide health and retirement benefits. She would never have been counted on the unemployment rolls but he was, however briefly.

Both of these couples are in their 60s and though their employment records are long and exemplary, and they live in an upper-class neighbourhood with two or three family cars and many luxuries, they still have to find a way to maintain employment because of healthcare costs. This is a related issue, across the board for all classes in America, and was a theme repeated over and over in the stories of the individuals studied. It is interesting to note that the two couples, and the third individual in this group, all live in the same suburban American neighbourhood. In the immediate vicinity of these people, who are neighbours, not even looking at the neighbourhood as a whole, there were four other families with older (in their 60s) unemployed professionals who had not expected to lose their jobs and who would never have thought that they would become unemployment statistics. They also never thought that the relaxing retirement that they had dreamed of as they worked hard for so many years would not happen. Some of these workers will work well into their 70s rather than retire at their expected retirement age. Because they have been unemployed at some point in their careers, they have been counted in the unemployment statistics, but not for long. When they obtained new jobs, they became part of the statistics that made it look like the unemployment rate was falling significantly when really it was not.

The third individual in this set of three, except for a brief period that she spent as a physical education teacher, has always been self-employed. She is 66 but still maintaining an extremely taxing physical schedule as a dance teacher, fitness instructor, and self-employed physical therapist, working out of her home. She also works sometimes for companies or organizations, but as a part-time worker, so she is not counted in the unemployment statistics when one of those jobs ends. She has paid high prices for her own health insurance during her career and funded her own retirement for most of the time during her career. She now qualifies for Medicare. It is obviously essential that she stays healthy and uninjured. She expects never to retire but loves her work. Even though she has lost jobs at various times in her career, she has never been

counted in the unemployment statistics. She is a '1099 worker' who files for her taxes for most of her work as a self-employed worker.

Unemployment for the Upper Lower and Lower Class

The last set of workers includes two older women who lack the ability to travel through the maze to make an application for unemployment, and one younger woman who works at jobs in which her income is not officially reported. This group presents three more unemployed workers who have not applied for benefits and therefore are not included in the statistics measuring unemployment. This group represents the most underprivileged of all workers, the working poor. The two oldest women were drawing social security and had a place to live. The younger woman, while suffering from some medical issues that she could not afford to get treated, was willing and able to run her own business as a housekeeper and owned a house (which she shares with her mother and other family members) and a car. She is even able to employ some family and friends to help her in her business. But their incomes are not officially reported to the government as they are paid in cash. All of these women are struggling to become a part of the middle class. The first two women have lived middle-class lives but have difficulty maintaining it. The third woman is from generational poverty but is trying to fight her way out through hard work and by avoiding some of the pitfalls demonstrated to her by some of her older family members.

Taken individually, each woman in this group has her own particularly sad but representative story illustrating the plight of the upper lower and lower class who are fighting for survival, not just straining to maintain a standard of living. The eldest of the women (in her 80s) lost a job which she had held for over 40 years. When she learned of the maze of requirements involved in application for the benefits for which she was due, she simply did not apply: application had to be made either by using a house (not cell) phone or a computer. (The wait times on the phone were so long that the requirement for a house phone was made because so many cell phone calls were lost when the connection was lost or the phone batteries died.) This woman did not own a computer. She did have a house phone but was unable to understand the complicated instructions she was given and had heard stories about people staying on the phone for hours waiting for someone to talk to them. Moreover, she learned that she would be required to apply for three jobs each week and to keep records proving that she had done so. Again, she would need a computer and computer skills to get the required forms, and so forth. She literally did not know how to look for a job since she had held the same job for so many years. She did not feel that anyone would hire her anyway at her age. She totally ignored the fact that she was qualified for benefits from the government. She had no faith that she would receive those benefits even if she was qualified and did apply. She is now living on social security benefits alone. Her age and health currently

prevent her from working. While a woman this old, who has worked so hard all of her life, should be able to enjoy retirement, she would prefer to work because she needs the financial security. However, it is questionable whether she could now hold down any type of job. Her social security, based on a lifetime of low-income work, is the only help she receives from the government, and she lives in fear of losing it. She listens to (but does not understand) the discussions of the politicians who debate whether or not to continue funding social security or who predict that the system will be bankrupt soon. She lives in a perpetual state of worry that the government will take away what little she has.

The second woman still works part time in a minimum wage job. She has always done as many jobs as she could (while taking care of her mother and sister), but had one stable long-term part-time position which she lost. She had earned a college degree and had a lifetime desire to become a teacher, but she could not advance beyond childcare/babysitting jobs because she was unable to pass the requirements to become licenced as a teacher. Like the older woman, she lacked the skills and persistence to apply for unemployment. She now depends on social security as her main income but does work part time in a school cafeteria, hoping that someone will hire her as a teacher's aide. She tries to sell beauty products and Tupperware but has recently been unable to understand the process of ordering, even though she had done this work in the past. Her part-time job in the local school system does not give her enough work hours to qualify for benefits of any type. (This is probably a deliberate act by this employer, as this woman actually works longer hours to complete her work than the supervisor allows her to report.) This woman babysits and is paid in cash, and so does not report that income. Both the first and second woman do not really understand what unemployment benefits are and do not expect anything related to the processes that the government requires to work successfully for them anyway. Unemployment benefits are just one more thing 'out there' that is not for them.

The last worker comes from generational poverty, a term explained by Ruby Payne in her seminal text *A Framework for Understanding Poverty* (2003). This participant's family and friends are well able to 'work the system' and work at jobs which give them income that they do not report for tax purposes. They either work for themselves at odd jobs, construction or housekeeping, or work temporarily at those types of jobs for companies that do not provide benefits. This group exemplifies the term 'the working poor.' They work hard when they can. They are willing to do hard physical labour for as long as they can but are often hurt at those jobs and then persist at working until they are disabled and have to navigate the additional maze involved in proving their disability in order to get government help. These workers spend long periods of time unemployed but they are not eligible for benefits.

On the other hand, this woman has many friends and family who have lost jobs which qualified them for unemployment at one time or another who did

apply and who would be counted in the unemployment rolls briefly at some points off and on during their lives. The issue for many of these workers becomes whether or not a new job, likely temporary, will pay as much as the unemployment benefits. Those who need to work but have children also have to be concerned about the cost of childcare. They could not work if they could not pay for childcare, which puts parents in a particularly bad situation. These are the often publicized group of parents caught in the dilemma of either taking government help to support their children or going to work but not being able to provide adequate care for their children because they are working at jobs that do not pay enough for a family with children to survive.

Yet it is important to note that even in this cultural environment of poverty, there are those, including the woman referenced here, who will not apply for government help as long as they can get one more part-time job. They believe that hard work is necessary and that they should not be supported by the government. They are often suspicious of the government and want to avoid being involved with it. Even after the government passed legislation requiring citizens to have health insurance or pay a penalty, for example, this woman will not buy the insurance because she has been told that it is cheaper to pay the penalty and that it is 'wrong' to apply for what amounts to a socialist handout. Therefore, as is representative of people in generational poverty, going to a doctor is not an option either for an illness or for wellness care. A truly ill person goes to the emergency room where they will receive care. They will receive good care if they have a heart attack but no preventative care to keep them from having one. Film maker Morgan Spurlock illustrated this concept in his documentary *Minimum Wage* (2005), one of the episodes of his FX cable television program *30 Days*. In his study, he and his fiancé, upper middle class, white, and college educated, literally went from a night when they were dressed in thousands of dollars' worth of clothing and jewellery in Hollywood at the Oscars to Cleveland, Ohio, to conduct an experiment to see if they could survive for 30 days on minimum wage. They could not.

The ultimate issue in the *Minimum Wage* documentary was health related as Morgan Spurlock injured himself performing hard physical labour and his fiancé became ill with a urinary tract infection. Both of these medical situations were related to the hard work that they were doing to earn minimum wage. The only way they could get medical treatment was to go to the emergency room. The free clinics were full beyond capacity and turning people away who had been lining up at 2.00 and 3.00 a.m. hoping to receive care. Without insurance, they could not go to a doctor's office. The bills incurred far exceeded what they were able to pay. Just a little over halfway into their 30-day experiment, it became evident that they could not make it on minimum wage which at that time was USD5.15 an hour. (The minimum wage is currently USD7.15 an hour.) They kept their money in a tin can in their apartment and it was only filled with change at the end of the month. (People working the types of minimum-wage jobs that this couple held cannot afford a bank account. They keep their money themselves, and they pay their bills in person in cash.)

As was illustrated in the documentary, the real-life workers discussed here can be crushed financially by medical bills. The housekeeper from the group in this study has what might be a large tumour in her abdomen, but she has not had it checked by a doctor because of the expense. She fights through the physical symptoms related to this problem and does hard physical work as a housekeeper, essentially running her own business employing friends and family. She has worked particularly hard so that her son could have the benefit of a college education. He received a football scholarship and became the first family member in generations to attend college. However, covering the expenses which were not part of the scholarship became such a physical drain that his mother cried at the thought of trying to help her son financially knowing that she could not help. He was hurt during his first year at college and lost his scholarship. His mother is quite proud of the fact that he is now working and attending community college. This young man wants to become a special education teacher.

This woman has a home and a car. Her mother, who works for her, has serious vision issues but has never been to an eye doctor. She found a pair of eyeglasses in the lost-and-found at a business where she cleans offices at night and was amazed at how well she could see with them. However, she broke the glasses when working at another site and now can only rely on them for as much as she can hold them together by taping them. She has had to curtail her work as a housekeeper because she recently had a stroke. She was treated in the emergency room and was hospitalized for treatment. However, she is not receiving follow-up treatment because of the expense.

This mother and daughter and the rest of their family and their friends are faithful participants in the lottery. They buy tickets every week. Basically, they believe that no matter how hard they work, winning the lottery is the only way that they will ever become financially independent. Essentially, they use the lottery as their investment and retirement options—options that they do not expect to work. This group of people are close knit. They help each other find jobs. They loan each other money or cars or whatever they may have because they know that in the future, as Ruby Payne explains (2005), when they do not have money or a car, their friends and family will reciprocate. They are the working poor who survive.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the participants in this study represent the people who are 'non-statistics.' They are part of a large group of unemployed Americans who do not apply for unemployment benefits and therefore are not counted as unemployed in the monthly unemployment reports given by the government. So, is unemployment in America less than 5%? It is doubtful. The individuals discussed here are representative of categories of people in America who are 'making it.' Others, among them the homeless (who are not represented in this study), are living lives of desperation on the streets. It is no accident, for example, that

when a homeless person enters a program at a mission where help is offered, the first act by the staff is to help the person apply for benefits, such as social security or even unemployment benefits, because, living on the streets, these people do not have the resources to apply—particularly after the local unemployment offices were closed. In fact, some homeless people may not have the capacity to understand that they qualify for any benefits, particularly if they are mentally ill.

IMPLICATIONS

The implications of the stories represented by the people in this study are global. We live in a world in which attitudes toward the unemployed is not far from the days when we imprisoned people for stealing bread to feed their families. While there are people who happily 'live on the dole,' as the British say, or 'on the check,' as the Americans say, we also live in a world where there are people who, no matter how long or hard they work, will not survive. The Americans discussed in this story will survive. All four sets of the groups studied will survive. Other Americans, not part of the 'upper echelon' of the unemployed represented in this study, are not as fortunate, and there are many other citizens of the world who are far less fortunate than the Americans who will not survive. The poorest of the poor Americans live in quiet desperation in a land of plenty where their ultimate deaths are far easier than the poorest of the poor in third world countries. We live in an era of global terrorism that goes beyond the terror of sudden death from terrorist acts. We live in an era of personal terrors representing slow death because our governments would rather give false statistics about issues such as unemployment than deal with the issue straightforwardly.

Navigating the maze of unemployment is not for the faint hearted, and, as illustrated in this study, some unemployed workers do not even try. The need to tackle the maze is also not limited to people living on the edge or living in poverty. The workers in this study were primarily middle class, even upper middle class, or approaching middle class.

FUTURE STUDY

The categories of unemployment that should be considered for future study are distinctive and important. As anthropologists have aptly pointed out drawing on ethnographically based analyses (e.g. Pardo 1996, Chap. 2, 2012; Spyridakis 2012, 2013), labels such as 'chronically unemployed,' 'underemployed,' 'seasonally unemployed,' 'temporarily unemployed,' and 'self-employed' are distinctions that should be considered in determining the unemployment rate. In a *Wall Street Journal* article, Josh Zumbrun (2015) gives several reasons, some good and some bad, explaining the large number of Americans, out of a total population of approximately 320 million people, who are not in the workforce. Zumbrun points out that the Labor Department only counts people as unemployed who are actively looking for work. One group

that is not reported is the over 65 group labelled as 'retirees.' However, some of these want to work, as is shown in the stories of some of the professionals in this study. 'I'm retired' is not always the proud statement that it once was for this age group because many of them have lost their jobs and could not find others because of their age, thus living less affluent lifestyles in their 'retirement years' than they had expected in their younger days. Another group that is not reported includes those in the 16–20 age group who are going to school, or those who are slightly older and attending graduate school. Among these younger 'students,' some do work and go to school. If they lose their jobs, they are counted as unemployed. Some unemployed students want to work but cannot find jobs. Only those who are working or looking for work are counted in the unemployment statistics. Therefore there are Americans in the youngest and the oldest age groups who are willing and able to work but are unemployed and, whether they are reported in the unemployment statistics or not, account for 51 million of the 92 million Americans who do not work (41 million retirees and 15 million in the 16–20 age group). Many of the people who are not currently in the workforce are staying at home to take care of children, elderly parents, or both. Some are disabled or ill. In this study, the mother of the woman with the housekeeping business had a stroke and had to stop working, and the woman telling the story herself faces disability if she does not get medical treatment at some point. It is interesting to note that the mother wants her daughter to go to the doctor and the daughter wants her mother to go to the doctor, but neither will go until there is an emergency.

According to Heather Long (2016), the most important point cited in the *Wall Street Journal* is that fewer adults are working in America and that 2.6 million of the 92 million who don't work want a job but are not looking. Long-term unemployment is still high and 2.1 million Americans have been unable to get a job for over half a year. Some Americans have given up looking for a job, which has certainly been the case for some of the people in this study.

These statistics show that future study is important. For example, all of the subjects in this study had long histories of employment. When the professionals who lost their jobs became unemployed, it was either because they were on temporary contracts that would either be renewed or ultimately lead to other jobs, or because they lost their jobs after years of work in the same field in which they had every reason to believe that they could work for as long as they were willing and able to work. What seemed like temporary unemployment to some of the workers in this study became long-term unemployment, and they stopped looking after a few years, or they took part-time jobs. These workers, in spite of their long history in the workforce became either chronically unemployed or underemployed. All wanted or needed to work for financial survival. Some did not have to work. Further anecdotal and statistical studies should be carried out on subjects such as these who could still be an extremely valuable addition to the workforce.

There are many people in the USA who are unemployed. However, a large number are not represented in the statistics presented by the government. In

studying these people, it is important also to study related issues such as healthcare, which was identified as an issue in several of the stories recounted here. In the meantime, other issues that were not covered by this study but that need to be addressed are homelessness, mental illness, and drug abuse.

According to the National Alliance to End Homelessness in its 2016 annual report, 564,708 people were experiencing homelessness in a single night in the USA. While there are many studies about the homeless, more should be done related to those who have lost their jobs and therefore their ability to maintain homes for their families. In addition, studies about people in fear of losing their jobs who could easily find themselves on the street would be helpful in addressing the unemployment issue. Homelessness was at one time seemingly limited to those in generational poverty. Now there are anecdotal reports of homeless middle-class families whose children go to school without school officials even realizing that the children are homeless. Additionally, there are a large number of veterans who have come back from service, unable to find jobs, who find themselves homeless.

Veterans, often suffering from mental illness, have traditionally been part of homeless and jobless reports. Many find themselves unable to work and because of mental illness they have neither medical nor family support. With recent stories about the lack of adequate medical treatment for veterans, it is crucial to look at the related employment issues. How many of these veterans could work if they received treatment, particularly in those cases where they are simply returned to the streets after brief hospitalization and either get sicker or become involved in violence on the streets.

Mental illness is more than just a veteran's issue and is related to unemployment and to medical care. How many mentally ill patients could be treated and thus be helped to become employable, contributing members of the workforce if they received adequate care? Many stories are told about mentally ill patients who perform violent acts. However, what about the quietly mentally ill who are either homeless or live in squalid conditions alone or with families who are ill-equipped to care for them? These people should be counted in the unemployment figures, but many have never been able to hold a job, or even apply. Some will be reported as disabled but certainly a large percentage will not be reported. Some will have worked for brief periods, moving from job to job, and their individual on-and-off work histories will affect the unemployment reports.

Drug abuse in the USA is at an all-time high. In relation to unemployment, this becomes a 'which came first, the chicken or the egg?' issue. Drug abuse is statistically more widespread in areas of the country where the rate of unemployment is high. Are the youth turning to drug usage and drug dealing because they are bored or because no other jobs are available to them in their communities? Is it a simpler matter that drug users are unemployed because they use drugs?

In America, all of these related issues should be of concern. Is unemployment a symptom or a cause? None of the stories of the people reported in this study have significantly changed in the past two to three years and likely will

not change. Moreover, it should be noted that unemployment statistics only include those workers who have been laid off their jobs; they do not include workers who have had to leave their jobs because of personal circumstances or workers who were fired from jobs. The assumption is that a worker who has been fired was fired for good cause. In other words, it is their fault, not the employer's fault. Therefore employers often fire workers for reasons that are not really valid in order to keep from having to pay their contribution to unemployment insurance. Workers who are hurt on the job or are otherwise disabled because of health issues can apply to the government for disability benefits. However, the maze of requirements that must be dealt with to receive these benefits are even worse than those involved in applying for unemployment benefits. Disability claims should be examined in future works and attitudes toward those who apply for these benefits should be studied as the general population often assumes that someone who is receiving disability benefits is lying about their condition.

In the end, it is better to fight off misfortune at all costs. Workers in the USA who lose their jobs face a maze of requirements to get government help, which caused several of those who told their stories in this study to observe that it is a job in itself to apply for unemployment benefits and keep them, no matter how deserving the applicant might be. Moreover, the maze is accompanied by the stigma that has been placed on the backs of the unemployed by the general population, even though in the current state of the economy, everyone worries that they could find themselves applying for benefits. In other words, 'There but by the grace of God, go I.' Still, some of the population believe that having a job displays a Darwinian superiority over the jobless who are thought to be somehow cheating the government and its employed citizens. In the end, both the government and its citizens need to examine the system and find a way to employ the unemployed who want to work. The nation's economy will be all the better off if the jobless rate really does continue to fall and if the government really does take care of its unemployed workers by creating more jobs for them. Finding an accurate method for counting the unemployed and for reducing the maze of requirements will be essential in addressing the unemployment problem with all of its related issues.

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'Swimming Against the Tide': Working-Class Discourse on Gentrification in North Brooklyn

Judith N. DeSena

Introduction

The working class is in the midst of an economic crisis. Historically, in the USA it has been damaged by economic restructuring, whereby many industries employing American workers were closed and moved overseas. Technological advances, automating many jobs held by the working class, are also major contributors to their plight and have led to downsizing and a diminished workforce. In addition, many urban neighbourhoods in which working-class communities were created are in a tenuous predicament. Post-industrial gentrification is the latest crisis to confront the working class in urban neighbourhoods.

This chapter focuses on the once predominantly working-class neighbourhood of Greenpoint in northern Brooklyn, New York City. Working-class residents are increasingly threatened by new development and gentrification. Moreover, as gentrification moves to another stage, the neighbourhood is experiencing hipster culture as well. The cost of living in Greenpoint continues to escalate, with co-living arrangements among new, younger residents, driving up housing prices and outpacing the economic resources of working-class families. Gentrification creates substantial increases in housing costs for renters and also homeowners whose property taxes are calculated based on escalating market values. Food prices have also risen with supermarkets stocking organic items, which cost more than non-organic products. Greenpoint had been a neighbourhood that residents from surrounding areas or local employees

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would shop in because the prices were comparatively reasonable. Currently, Greenpoint's working class looks to shop in other neighbourhoods. Mom and Pop retail establishments are increasingly replaced by corporate chain stores such as Starbuck's and Rite Aid. Commercial banks have multiplied, and gone are the savings and loan institutions that invested in the neighbourhood by granting traditional, direct mortgages and home improvement loans. Some independently owned stores and businesses have closed because of significant commercial rent hikes. This briefly describes the present economic conditions that Greenpoint's working class are confronted by. With a focus on maintaining their place and their community in Greenpoint, the working class have developed strategies to mitigate the effects of gentrification. They exercise their activism through informal social networks and local, traditional institutions.

Through participant observation which takes the form of walking around the neighbourhood and talking to residents, merchants and local employees and owners of retail establishments, this chapter examines two major areas of everyday life for the working class in Greenpoint. The first is the experience of gentrification: the perspective of working-class residents on gentrification and development and the affect that it has had on them. Second, this chapter investigates the strategies utilized by working-class residents to maintain a place in their long-term, often lifelong and multigenerational neighbourhood of residence.

The Neighbourhood

Greenpoint is a peninsula at the northernmost tip of Brooklyn. It lies across the East River from Manhattan. It is also connected to neighbourhoods in Queens (Long Island City, Sunnyside and Maspeth) by a number of bridges and highways.

Adjacent to Greenpoint in Brooklyn, lying just across its southern boundary, is Williamsburg. Greenpoint and Williamsburg share the administration of many municipal services and together they make up Brooklyn's Community Board 1, an extension of New York City government in the community. Williamsburg was the first to gentrify and has experienced massive new development of residential and commercial buildings on the East River. Greenpoint's development is under way.

In 2010 the total population of Greenpoint was 36,091 (US Bureau of the Census, Tract Data 2010). Like New York City as a whole, the population exhibited small increases after 2000. There were few changes in the racial profile of the neighbourhood in that the large majority remained white. The formal education of Greenpoint's residents increased from 2000 to 2010. By 2010 the largest group of residents held Bachelor's degrees. This is a dramatic change since 1980. By 2010 the median household income in Greenpoint was USD56,143, indicating an increase in income. In terms of occupation, in 2010, management and business, science and arts professionals constituted the largest group, followed by sales and office occupations and service. This is in

contrast to1980 when the largest occupational group was in technical and sales followed by operators and labourers. The persistence and growth of a mostly white community, coupled with an increase of formal education and income among the population, and a shift to significantly more professionals and fewer labourers than in the past, are indicators supporting the growth of a gentrifying neighbourhood (Mason 2011).

In terms of housing in 2010, 80% of households in Greenpoint are renters, and about a quarter of these are not rent regulated (Scott 2003). Furthermore, 'The percentage of affordable housing in Greenpoint is dropping faster than it is in New York City as a whole. The percentage of rental units in the most expensive category is skyrocketing' (Scott 2003, 7). The notion of affordability is defined as being no more than 30% of a household's income going towards rental costs. In Greenpoint in 2000, 'about 40% of households paid more than 30% of their income on rent' (Scott 2003, 9). Market rate rents for a two-bedroom apartment in Greenpoint in 2002 ranged from USD1500 to USD1900 (Scott 2003, 16). This represents a 50% increase since 1997. In 2010 the median rent was USD1195. Additional indicators of gentrification within the housing sector are featured in articles in the local newspapers discussing 'skyrocketing rents' and 'loft regulations urged' (Greenline 2001a, b). Houses are selling for USD 1million and upwards, especially in the historic district (Mooney 2009). When viewed in conjunction with Williamsburg, in 2013 the median asking rent was USD3100 (NYU Furman Center 2015 http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/NYUFurmanCenter_SOCin_2015_4MAY2016.pdf). That represents a 23% increase. In 2014, residential building permits increased and the median sales price per condominium was USD806,000. There was also an increase in white residents and a decrease in Hispanics and blacks.

Greenpoint has been a sought after community with a deindustrialized waterfront. It was historically white and stable, relatively affordable, physically well kept, with high occupancy rates, relatively low crime, high levels of social capital and a high degree of neighbouring relative to other neighbourhoods. Ironically, it is these very characteristics that attracted gentrifiers and developers. Its authenticity, as seen through its buildings' minimal height, which contributes to its small-town charm, were appealing as a place of residence. At the same time, gentrifiers in Greenpoint do not participate in the established, social life of the community. They do not involve themselves in the very aspects of the community that attracted them to it in the first place. Instead, they segregate themselves from working-class and immigrant residents, and they socialize and create community with other residents like themselves. As described by one resident gentrifier, 'We liked that it was a neighbourhood with other creative people like ourselves.' In general, what has developed is a clash of social norms within the context of each group's lifestyle between ordinary, working-class and immigrant residents and upper middle-class gentrifiers. Subsequently, a parallel culture for each group develops and ensues. The working class (and immigrants) continue to engage in traditional, local institutions (religious and

ethnic organizations, parent–teacher association), while gentrifiers create new social milieus (bars with sidewalk seating, art galleries, music venues and new community organizations). These differences in lifestyle with conflicting social norms are played out in the course of everyday life.

The Scholarly Context

The concept of gentrification is being defined as 'the conversion of socially marginal and working class areas of the central city to middle-class [and elite] residential use' (Zukin 1987, 129). Although the literature refers to gentrifiers as middle class, this analysis considers them upper middle class with more job security and disposable money than the traditional middle and working classes. Research on gentrification focuses primarily on its causes and consequences. Analyses fall into two major theoretical perspectives, ecological theory and critical theory (Wittberg 1992). The ecologists examine the needs, tastes and desires of populations, which are responsible for precipitating neighbourhood change in the form of gentrification (Laska and Spain 1980; Friedenfels 1992). Included are studies that examine the strategies used by the middle class to create and produce gentrification in specific neighbourhoods (Kasinitz 1988; Krase 1982; Osman 2011). Critical theorists, on the other hand, view the causes of gentrification as manufactured by actions taken by the political economy—namely, the investments of capital and the policies of the state (Abu-Lughod 1994; Fitch 1993; Smith 1996; Zukin 1982, 1987).

Some scholars discuss changes in the process of gentrification in the 1990s. Smith (1996) contends that as a result of the 1987 stock market crash and subsequent recession, degentrification occurred. For Smith, upper middle-class and elite gentrifiers found themselves with lowered property values and forced interactions with minority groups, immigrants and women as they competed for the urban terrain. Hackworth's study of three gentrifying neighbourhoods in New York City (2002) argues that a major change in gentrification is that the state is investing in the process more directly than in the past and the process has been somewhat reversed. The shift is that corporate developers are now the pioneers, and gentrifiers follow them and the environments they build. Moreover, the actions by ordinary people against gentrification have been marginalized in that their concerns are dismissed by those in power.

The discourse on the consequences of gentrification examines the benefits and costs of this process on the local community. Scholarship profiles most gentrifiers as affluent, young, single, urban professionals and/or members of the creative class, and young, married couples who are both wage earners and have no children, or small families. More recently, gentrification has been fuelled by university students and recent graduates who create hipster culture and contribute to housing costs by co-living arrangements. Gentrifiers are credited with revitalizing older, city neighbourhoods, and by extension, the city itself through housing improvements and loft conversions, service upgrades to accommodate them, and an expansion of the local economy with the introduction of new bars, restaurants, retail establishments, and entertainment/recreation venues. Studies

dealing with the consequences of gentrification for the long-term community examine primarily housing, and present increasing housing costs resulting in the displacement of long-term residents (Cybriwsky 1978; Marcuse 1986; LeGates and Hartman 1986). Thus, in general, the major consequence of gentrification discussed in the literature is the displacement or 'replacement' (Freeman and Braconi 2004) of ordinary people, small businesses and industry (Curran 2007) with more affluent residents, sometimes elites, as well as the transition of 'mom and pop' businesses to retail chains and boutiques. There is a debate in the literature regarding the extent and effect of displacement (Lees 2008). Some scholars minimize dislocation as a 'natural' consequence of competition over residential space (Ellen and O'Regan 2011; Freeman 2006; Freeman and Braconi 2004; Hamnett 2003). With increasing gentrification, ordinary people have fewer choices regarding places to live and work, since affordable neighbourhoods with viable work and housing are reduced by gentrification and development. Moreover, classic market protections, such as public housing and rental housing with regulations, are diminished by proponents of gentrification through condominium developments and altered social policy (Newman and Wyly 2006).

Research studies on gentrification analyse both the gentrifiers and those residents most directly affected by gentrification. Of this last type, much of the scholarship investigates low-income, black and Latino neighbourhoods experiencing gentrification by whites. In some cases, tensions and disagreements between established residents and newcomers are presented (DeSena 2009). However, this is balanced in other studies by some of the positive benefits brought by gentrifiers, such as local amenities and the use of their social networks to bring about local improvements (Freeman 2006). In other cases, renters and long-term residents are less likely to have a positive view of gentrification (Sullivan 2007). Additionally, studies examining white gentrification of mostly ethnic and immigrant neighbourhoods (Betancur 2011; Martinez 2010; Murdie and Teixeira 2010) argue that gentrification created not only spatial displacement but also the dissolution of the ethnic community.

This chapter attempts to contribute to 'a new sociological perspective of gentrification from a working class standpoint' (Paton 2014, 185). It analyses the accounts of working-class people, the local hosts, and the wounded of gentrification and development. It investigates from their standpoint the specific ways in everyday life that a predominantly white, working-class community is affected by largely white gentrification.

Doing the Study

This is an ethnographic study of gentrification in Greenpoint, Brooklyn. Years have been spent engaged in various community settings with both gentrifiers and working-class residents. Fieldwork was carried out through participant observation in which I spent casual time with working-class residents and in the course of conversation posed a broad question: what do you think of the changes in the neighbourhood? From this, responses would include housing

costs from rents and sales, new commercial space and retail establishments, the loss of neighbours and merchants, and views on new faces and neighbours and their ways of life. The reactions highlighted in this chapter come from both men and women who are white, in their 40s and 50s, and life-long or long-standing residents of Greenpoint. Their answers were recorded immediately following our encounters.

Respondents told their 'story' of how gentrification is affecting their lives and how they are managing to 'hang on', remain residents and avoid physical displacement, while admitting and enduring increasing social displacement. They communicated the various strategies used by working-class residents to maintain a place in this changing neighbourhood. Findings suggest that support comes from traditional social institutions and local social networks.

Working-Class Discourse on Gentrification

Economic restructuring has had particular consequences for the working class. Although they remain encouraged to pursue the American Dream through home ownership and consumption, the means to achieve it has become tenuous. One illustration is found in the following encounter.

June 15, 2011

The East River Ferry started service this week with stops in DUMBO (Down Under the Manhattan Bridge Overpass), Williamsburg and Greenpoint, Brooklyn, Long Island City, Queens and 34th Street and Wall Street in Manhattan. The first two weeks of operation were free so many residents took advantage and rode the ferry to Brooklyn and Manhattan destinations. On the way back, I met Pete, a long-time neighbour. Pete and his wife bought their house from his mother-in-law. He has faced hard economic challenges working as a labourer. He has been laid off several times, finding himself in arrears on his mortgage and facing possible foreclosure. Pete explained:

> Bank of America won't renegotiate the mortgage. They want me to sell the house because it has value. So they'll get their money. They'll probably move to foreclose. If the house was devalued they would renegotiate. I watched so many friends be priced out. I have my daughter living upstairs, paying no rent because she can't find stable work. Where else can she live? She is now working two jobs, one is full time. Maybe she'll pay me half the rent. My son is in college. I pay his tuition. He was supposed to work and pay for school, but he hasn't done it. We used to have huge block parties. Now with all these new people, no one participates in them. Social life has changed. But there are more restaurants and more of a music scene. You know, the hipsters call us the 'hoodies'. We're from the 'hood'. I want to make a shirt that says: 'Greenpoint Hoodie'.

Pete also conveyed information about a neighbour who moved to a nearby block in Greenpoint, only to be priced out again. He then left the neighbourhood.

Pete reflects the economic state of the nation for both the working class and his neighbourhood. Because of ongoing layoffs, which have become typical for skilled labourers, Pete is at risk of losing his house. He also finds himself in the position of lodging his daughter because she too lacks the resources to afford an apartment in Greenpoint. As a member of the working class and in caring for his children, possibly to his detriment, and the additional layer of gentrification in which he recalls the fate of friends and thus changes in the neighbourhood, Pete initially resists foreclosure and displacement, and bides his time for other solutions. Of late, Pete and his wife have separated and have sold the house in an attempt to avoid foreclosure. He relocated to a two-bedroom apartment in a neighbourhood in Queens.

There are those residents in a different position.

November 3, 2012

Dorothy is a life-long resident who lives in the house where she grew up. It was originally owned by her grandparents and now by her parents. Greenpoint for her was a 'hidden gem.' She explains:

> There is something special here, friendliness, fellowship, community. The changes are good and bad. There's not a lot of crime, there are life-long relationships. We grew up with the same neighbours and same people. The changes are bikes, sidewalk cafes, condos that are unaffordable and in my opinion an eyesore. Every Saturday there is a moving truck and you don't get to know your neighbours. There is spillover from Williamsburg. It is an expensive place to live, the new stores, upscale boutiques, who shops there? You have to sacrifice. [Eventually], people will need to decide if they can stay.

Dorothy's housing situation is secure relative to Pete's since the place where she resides has been owned by her family for generations. But homeowners like Dorothy and her parents at some point can find themselves unable to afford to maintain their home. Real-estate taxes based on market values increase annually accompanied by rising property values stimulated by gentrification and development. As a result, homeowner's insurance also increases and, since Greenpoint is a waterfront community, some consider flood insurance as well. These are in addition to utility costs and the ordinary upkeep that homeownership entails, especially an ageing housing stock. And since Greenpoint is increasingly perceived as an affluent neighbourhood, the amount charged for housing renovations has also been escalating.

Pauline grew up in Greenpoint, left for a while and then moved back. She conveyed the following:

September 29, 2012

The neighbourhood is safer, cleaner, there's more restaurants, but it's more expensive. I'm lucky. When I moved back I went to a realtor and was sent to a

house owned by a Polish woman. I pay USD1200 but she has not raised my rent since I moved in. I was sent there because the realtor knew I was from the neighbourhood. The landlord wanted more money, but I told her I couldn't afford it. She knew she was getting someone good. There's no more kids. People can't afford to live here with kids. But there are plenty of dogs!

During the rezoning [process] we told people there would be affordable housing. Where is it? I don't know anyone who lives in one [a unit]. I don't know of any apartments. I feel like I bullshitted them.

I was unemployed for two years, I collected unemployment and worked other jobs [off the books].

Pauline's account suggests a few things about the community's social structure as it addresses a changing neighbourhood. There seem to be two economies operating. One economy is for long-term residents who are directed to particular homeowners as potential renters. In addition, Pauline knew how and where to obtain work in the local cash economy, most likely through an informal social network in which she participated. Pauline fought for affordable housing as the Greenpoint waterfront was rezoned from industrial to residential use. That housing has not yet been fully realized, as Pauline remarks, and she reflects on whether or not working-class residents in need will ever benefit from it.

Pauline also commented that, as for Dorothy, 'the family house that people can live in helps [them stay in the neighbourhood]'. This brings the analysis to Mark, who elaborated on Pauline's remark. He currently lives in an apartment in his mother's house.

October 23, 2012

Mark was born and raised in Greenpoint. Like Dorothy he thought there was 'good and bad' to the present neighbourhood changes and gentrification. He noted:

There have been improvements: more culture, diversity, restaurants. In the past, you could only find a Chinese restaurant and a diner. It's now an eco-friendly place. We have a nature walk. There is greenification and gentrification. There is a lot of money coming in. You can see there is a power in the vote now. Property values have gone up and there is an interest in preservation. People are pouring a lot of money into the old houses to restore them, bring them back to their roots. The spiritual and religious leaders are doing great things. They are interested in reaching out to those in need. The old factories are now condos, so there's no more [waste] transfer stations.

But, people are pushed out, the old, our seniors. There is major overcrowding. The family homes are knocked down and replaced with 16 families. Trust-fund money has come here. Everything has gone organic [food]. It's very expensive. Drug dealers are making a fortune. I fear that there has been too much development … I liked when it was desolate. We could play stick ball on West Street and go out and be left alone. Now there are people with dogs everywhere. You can't

walk. And movies [commercial filming on local streets], everybody is inconvenienced by it. Trash is overflowing. These bikes are crazy, they'll run you over. We could never bike or walk our dogs on Manhattan Avenue; that was Main Street. There are no more Mom and Pop businesses. These people come and they don't give a shit. It's entitlement with them. There's bar on top of bar. The special thing about Greenpoint was that everybody knew everybody. Now people hang on. There's no more Ambesol [pain management]. The ball is rolling and there's no stopping it. Those who bought a house when it was affordable can stay and hold on. My friends have moved out. They can't afford it. Their kids want to come here. People in rent stabilized housing stay by passing down the family lease. The 9 o'clock mass crowd [senior citizens] is the last of those who built the neighbourhood. I feel entitled. I contributed a lot to this place. At first it was exciting to see it [the neighbourhood] change. I thought, "the East Village is coming to me!" Who knew what would happen. There needs to be opportunity available to everybody.

I was once told that the only difference between Greenpoint and Bed-Stuy was color. Greenpoint was its own little cove between water and industry. It was a gold coast waiting to happen. My mother bought our house in the 1990s from a family friend. You would rent to people you knew. That rarely happens now. If you don't have the money you can't stay. People move to Pennsylvania and Florida. Some go to neighbourhoods that are like little nooks and crannies, Ridgewood, Maspeth, places with no direct public transportation.

March 2, 2012

Karl added to this notion of the family house as a way to remain a resident in Greenpoint by saying:

> Some are like me, assisting an elderly parent and living in their home. Rent stabilization [is another way that people stay]. The building I lived in is filled with the same people for years. The landlord is always walking around trying to see if anyone is moving. They would love for people to move.

Both Mark and Karl can manage in Greenpoint because, like Dorothy, they live in houses owned by their parents. However, in Karl's case, the house has become unaffordable since there is not enough income from his elderly, ill mother, Karl himself and a long-term tenant whom they remain loyal to accommodate while keeping the cost affordable. They struggle to meet expenses. Mark and Karl make mention of rent regulations as another strategy that benefits working-class residents. They refer to succession rights to family members residing in the household. Tenants sometimes encounter and endure harassment from landlords who attempt to encourage lower-paying tenants to leave. Some landlords have been suspected of starting fires and even offer buyouts (Kaysen 2014). Once tenants leave, rents can be increased, and in some cases to market rates. Rent regulations in general are declining.

May 13, 2013

Housing owned by family is not a permanent safeguard against displacement from gentrification. Doris and her husband are lifelong residents. They rent an apartment in a house owned by an in-law. Currently, Doris and her family are facing eviction because the owner is selling the house. She remarks:

> I'll have to leave Greenpoint. I looked at an apartment, USD1950 for four tiny rooms. I was told to go to Bushwick. I'm not living in Bushwick! My father in-law has apartments, but they have rented to [the same] those people for years. A friend of mine is also being evicted for the sale of her house.

Doris also volunteers at her church. She explains:

> Many people getting food at the pantry rent rooms, not apartments and share kitchens and bathrooms. They get them through friends, people they know. They move from pantry to pantry to supplement their food. Some live in rent controlled and stabilized apartments.

Doris has found a suitable apartment for her family in a Queens neighbourhood. Her resistance to Bushwick is based on a perception that it is unsafe. She plans to continue her volunteer work in Greenpoint. There are numerous cases like that of Doris in which family members are selling homes in Greenpoint for large sums of money, often evicting siblings in the process. Karl is an example. Since we first talked, his mother has passed away and his siblings have sold the house. Karl, too, has moved to an apartment in Queens.

With every working-class resident who moves comes a new face to the street and neighbourhood. Cathy reflects on this.

October 20, 2011

Cathy grew up in Greenpoint and now has adult children who were also raised in Greenpoint. She stated:

> It's disconcerting that I know few people on my block. We now have a loft in a building on our corner [formerly industrial space]. People were having roof parties, walking up and down the block late at night. It's very transient. There's no investment in the community. Our friends [who are resident homeowners] rent to two people, and then there are three or more living in the apartment. They were going onto the roof even after they were told that it was off limits. People like the high rents they can get, but it comes with a price. Another friend rented her upstairs apartment to a couple who were drug dealers. The cops came and arrested them!

Cathy describes aspects of gentrification that are sometimes missed. For the resident homeowner who can rent an apartment in their house, the higher rents that can be collected in a gentrifying neighbourhood are viewed posi-

tively. Their life's major investment finally pays off. However, as Cathy suggests, it comes with a price. For her it is the loss of community, no longer knowing neighbours and seeing friends lose control over the goings-on in their homes as they are disregarded by tenants.

In addition, Debbie, a homeowner and lifelong resident, added: 'It's not our neighbourhood anymore. I think about selling my house for top dollar and spending half of it for a house in Queens.' For Cathy and Debbie, they have come to realize that they now live in 'a world of strangers' (Lofland 1985).

Connected to Cathy's remarks is the issue of crime. Mark believes that 'The crime rate has skyrocketed. More money and iPhones bring more criminals.' Nicky, another lifelong resident, described a precinct council meeting which discussed rapes and robberies in the neighbourhood. He said: 'I once knew all the people who lived on [my street]. I don't know who lives there anymore. Because of this, local surveillance fails.'

There is another approach to 'cleaning up' the neighbourhood that was expressed.

November 3, 2011

Rita, a mother of six children, talked about how the cops were harassing the working-class kids playing basketball in a local park. She explained:

> '[Basketball] Hoops were removed in other parks and playgrounds.' Her friend interjected: 'The police are doing illegal searches of kids in the park. Working-class kids are the "element". It's being cleaned up for the gentry. I called 311 about the [public] art show in the park. Our new neighbors take liberties.' Rita responded: 'It [gentrification] has been good in some ways. Some of the streets are safer. You can walk them."

These women are expressing the effect of gentrification on working-class teens and young adults who, to a large extent, engage informally on the street and in the parks. For these women, the recreational style of working-class youth casts these kids as local ruffians. They have become a target of the New York Police Department's Stop and Frisk program. There is also recognition that some of the streets which were somewhat desolate have been repopulated by new retail establishments and pedestrian traffic. One woman feels safer using them as a result of gentrification.

Another long-term resident, Tracey, added to this discussion. As we discussed our children while waiting for the G train one morning, she told me: 'He [her son] comes home from work and plays basketball. You know, the Hispanic looking kids are being harassed by the police; but if they had blue eyes and blonde hair that wouldn't happen. The kids will end up with a rap sheet!'

Working-class residents also mentioned changes to local facilities and services. In addition to discussing her need for housing, Doris commented on local amenities, saying:

The Avenue is horrible. There are no good stores. There are pharmacies and 99 cent stores. There is nowhere anymore to buy a nice blouse. Key Food, the prices are crazy! They cater to the new people. I shop at Shop Rite in Long Island City. I shop by sales.

Another resident remarked, 'Oh no, organic food in the supermarket', articulating concern, like Doris for the store's offerings and prices. Matthew, a lifelong resident who works in Greenpoint, remarked: 'I've sat on the toilet longer than these people have been here and they want to change everything! I go to the laundromat and the machines are all taken up for drop-off service. It's ridiculous.'

Doris and Matthew suggest a change in local services that no longer cater to the needs of the working class. Doris focuses on retail and food. For Matthew, working-class residents do their own laundry in laundromats. Instead, gentrifiers use drop-off service. Matthew notes that this facility is changing to his disadvantage. One advantage, however, was conveyed by Nicky, who told me that he pays a 'local' price for his Christmas tree every year. The vendor knows of his lifelong status in Greenpoint. Nicky remarked: 'Let them charge full price to the hipsters.' Thus he implies that in the local cash economy, prices might vary depending on one's affiliation with informal networks.

Harold also commented on the addition of the city bus service. On September 8, 2013 the B32 bus route was introduced to provide a service to the waterfront communities of Williamsburg, Greenpoint and Long Island City (http://web.mta.info/nyct/service/NewBusServiceComing_BrooklynQueens_September2013.htm). Harold remarked: 'Did you see the bus stop on Franklin Street? It's for them to go from Williamsburg to Greenpoint to Long Island City.' As a lifelong resident, he knows that such services were not available when Greenpoint was predominantly working class. Unknowingly, and because of his history in Greenpoint, Harold is able to carry out a social class analysis.

Other local amenities have also been put in place since the community has been experiencing gentrification, development and its attendant population increase. McCarren Park Pool is an example. This public pool first opened in 1936 under the direction of Robert Moses and the Works Progress Administration. By the time of New York City's fiscal crisis, the pool and attached facility were in desperate need of repair. In addition, there were some problems with teens fighting. It was closed in 1983. There were a number of plans developed by the community for its redevelopment, but the property sat dormant for many years. In 2005 it reopened as a performance space, contributing to North Brooklyn's music scene. In 2008, renovations to the pool and portal began and it reopened in 2012 as a Play Center, which includes the pool (smaller than the original one), an exercise facility and programming for children. The pool also converts to an ice-skating rink in the winter.

Take the Money and Run

There are numerous residents who on inheriting the family home decide to sell since real estate has become so valuable. Small two- or three-family homes originally bought for less than USD10,000 in the 1950s which increased in the 1980s to USD100,000 or more depending on building type are now selling for millions of dollars. One example is a group of siblings whose parents purchased a house and an adjacent lot in the 1950s. After their parents passed on, the property was sold and each of them was able to buy their own home outside the community.

Other residents have decided to sell and use the proceeds for their retirement, moving out of state, or downsizing and purchasing an apartment in a less expensive neighbourhood. One resident said: 'I can no longer afford to take care of the house.'

Coming Home

There are instances in which residents who grew up in Greenpoint and moved to raise their family elsewhere would like to move back. That preference has mixed results. One example is Ted and Alice who were both born and raised in Greenpoint. When their parents decided to sell their large house and move, Ted and Alice also left Greenpoint to be closer to them. They became victims of Super Storm Sandy and lost their home and most of their belongings. They lived temporarily with friends in Greenpoint. It was suggested to them that they move back, especially since their parents had passed away. Alice replied: 'We can't afford to move back to Greenpoint!'

Another case is Tony, who left Greenpoint to raise his family, but returned after a parent passed away and an apartment became available in her home. Tony communicated that initially he was excited to be moving back, but eventually realized that he did not like it anymore: 'It's not the same place.' Tony experienced social displacement; he no longer felt that he belonged to the neighbourhood of his childhood and his coming of age, especially since only a few of his friends remained. Tony left Greenpoint again.

Finally there is Amy and Aidan, both of whom were born and raised in Greenpoint but moved to raise their children elsewhere. Now that their children are adults, they have recently returned to care for elderly parents. They hope to be able to stay.

Conclusions

In conclusion, one asks, what do these accounts tell us about gentrification processes for the working class? Respondents articulate some positive, but mostly negative outcomes. More varied restaurants and a music scene are viewed as positive effects. The negative outcomes include an escalating cost of living which is out of their reach, loss of services, loss of community, and ulti-

mately social and physical displacement. Physical displacement may be a final outcome as documented by some respondents, but there are many struggles along the way. This chapter attempts to unpack the notion of 'gentrification processes' that is used frequently in the scholarly literature and has a taken-for-granted understanding. Theory on gentrification should include an explicit presentation of the challenges for ordinary people. Pete begins to shed some light on it. He indicates that his adult children are also victims of gentrification, and economic restructuring and recession. Hence, families are affected and these respondents convey the everyday hardships experienced while their neighbours and possibly themselves are threatened by gentrification. Thus, by using an ethnographic approach and presenting the reports of those affected, one gains insight into the debate about displacement. Displacement is not negligible, as some scholars claim (Freeman and Braconi 2004). As a final event in the life course of residency, displacement includes tremendous loss in the everyday lives of ordinary people.

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The Plow and the Stallion: Political Turmoil in a Working-Class District of Budapest

László Kürti

In 2014 and 2015, several major demonstrations have taken place in Csepel, the 21st district of Budapest. At the beginning of 2014, members of the socialist party rallied at a local library against a commemorative book launch of József Nyírő, a well-known nationalist and anti-Semite writer who died in exile in Spain after the Second World War. On 24 June 2015, citizens surrounded the Workers' Home (*Munkásotthon*), a landmark independent cultural centre on the list of the district council to be nationalized.[1] A few weeks later, leftist and liberal political parties repeated their action by organizing an evening demonstration during which hundreds carried torches chanting anti-government slogans coupled with 'Save our Workers' Home'. Conflicts between concerned Csepelers and the right-wing district council did not abate. During the spring of 2016, hundreds of citizens gathered, voicing their objection to closing the rapid transit system connecting them to downtown Budapest and replacing it with the yellow streetcars (*villamos)* familiar on the streets of the inner city. One of the demonstrators succinctly summarized the gist of their objection: 'The present transport system is fast and works adequately but the slow streetcars will not be as useful to us. Actually, we do not want the Budapest city council decide what is best for Csepelers.' What was specifically behind these conflicts? Even by glancing superficially at these diverse actions, it will be obvious that these demonstrations were just the tip of the iceberg. In this chapter I shall describe how and why these urbanites responded to fundamental political and economic transformation following the collapse of the socialist system and how, in turn, they continue to struggle with remnants of the 'damned' system (*átkos rendszer* in local parlance).

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For more than a quarter of a century, anthropologists and other social scientists have sought to understand how socialism collapsed in Eastern Europe and how the transformation to a democratic and capitalist system occurred. I begin with the question of whether there is a need constantly to compare what socialist working-class urban life was like to what is observable now since even people interviewed in 2016 logically summarized that 'that was a different socio-economic and political system' not comparable to the current one.[2] Yet it is important to see, as one informant put it wryly, that 'many of the present problems are indirectly connected to state socialism but more directly relate to the period of transition that characterized the 1990s'. In Csepel, as elsewhere in the greater Budapest urban agglomeration, the post-1989 era is marked by an increase in the tertiary sector with specialized industrial, high-tech and logistics but in the district specifically, this change is coupled with a slowly ameliorating unemployment and an increasing infrastructural development observable throughout the former industrial areas. Why the recent turmoil then?

In this chapter I shall use my anthropological fieldwork in Csepel, originally visited in 1985–1986, and suggest major political developments crucial to understanding urban transformation as experienced by inhabitants. As I was connected to the Csepel Works officially, most of my informants, approximately 100 individuals and their families, came from a working-class background, and several managers and political figures were second-generation intellectuals. Subsequently, many of them have remained my continual inspirations as they have offered me their ideas and explanations about their changing lifeways. To comprehend fully the complexity of comparing Csepel today and 30 years ago, I rely on the idea of the sociologist Ivan Szelenyi—himself a former resident of Budapest—who claims that socialism created a different type of urban development from those observable in Western cities (Szelenyi 1993, 61). According to his thesis, in the socialist city there was less crime, poverty and concentration of wealth, services were backward compared with those of Western cities, the availability of goods, resources and labour was also monochrome and limited compared with the excesses in capitalist urban centres. His view—'less marginality' and 'less diversity', in his words—is markedly different from political science observations which strictly emphasize politics as anchored to dictatorial rule of the communist party, repression of individualism, large-scale corruption, shoddy goods, lack of infrastructure, and suppression of religion and cultural differences. Even since the political transformation of 1989–1990, scholars have increasingly used the phrase 'post-socialism' as a general framework to emphasize the legacy of communism in the East Central European economy, politics and culture (Hann 1994; Kürti 1991, 1997).[3] One idea has gained primacy: that the exit from socialism is a long and arduous process, a reason why more and more research highlights the inchoate nature of new social engineering as well as special cultural transformations of former socialist countries on their road to full-fledged capitalism. A retrospective look at Csepel's 30-year history reveals why Szelényi's idea is for several reasons a useful starting point in comparing the cultural transformation of

an urban environment in one location. For one, my fieldwork underlines Szelenyi's 'less marginality, less diversity', since Csepel, with all its difficulties and political quagmire, is definitely less marginal and more diverse today than ever before. The second main reason has to do with the question of whether post-socialist Csepel reveals 'less diversity' in politics, to paraphrase Szelenyi, since the past 26 years show a remarkable political turbulence that needs to be stressed in order to balance the anthropology of urban politics in settlements that were part of the Soviet bloc's power centres. In other words, the prominence of left-liberal rule during 1990–2010, its sudden demise and the past six years of right-wing governance offer a unique and divergent trajectory that requires explanation from the perspective of Csepelers who felt both the benefits and the disadvantages of remaining a 'Red town'.

Previous research on the early years of post-socialist transformation highlighted the enormous social consequences following the collapse of large state enterprises and institutions followed by the loss of jobs, unemployment and the marginalization of industrial workers. The first years of post-socialist transition have been studied by anthropologists, though most, we must admit, remained marginal to mainstream anthropological theorizing (Buchowski 1996; Hann 1993; Kürti 1996; Kürti and Langman 1997; Sampson 1996; Verdery 1996; Watson 1994).[4] Economists, urban planners, geographers, sociologists and political scientists have also paid increasing attention to the post-socialist city and the changing spatial and economic environment following the collapse of the Soviet bloc (Andrusz et al. 1996; Czepczynski 2008; Diener and Hagen 2015; Hirt 2012; Tsenkova and Nedovic-Buric 2006; Walker 2011). A new ethnographic approach has also been employed to assess how ordinary citizens have experienced the enormous social and urban transformations of the past two decades (Gille 2007; Giordano et al. 2014; Heintz 2006; Kideckel 2008; Lankauskas 2015; Prato 2011; Ten Dyke 2001; Tsypylma et al. 2011). However, the Hungarian capital has not occupied the centre of anthropological interest, similar to local political processes, especially those concerning parties and institutions that have also been neglected in anthropological analyses (Kürti 2002a).[5]

Csepel and Red Csepel—Two Cities in One

The years 1989 and 1990 were generally referred to ias the 'springtime of the peoples', and surely what followed is not easy to capture. Much had changed in Budapest, still the one and only political, cultural and economic hub of the country, a reason why one can often hear the phrase 'hydrocephalous country', a sarcastic expression of its primary and elevated status. Just like elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc, in 1989–1990 Hungarians experienced the lifting of Soviet domination, as the Soviet Union collapsed, the abandonment of single-party rule in favour of multiparty representation and free elections in more than 40 years. Key figures in this transition were (mostly) Budapest intellectuals keen to abolish the presence of political parties in workplaces and allowing the

dismantling of former state enterprises. This concerned most state enterprises (but not the railroads, for example), including the former behemoth of the Csepel Works, once employer of 40,000 labourers. As several new, much smaller, companies emerged, other plants simply vanished in the process.

The largest city in Hungary, halved by the River Danube and incorporated in 1873 from Buda and Pest, Budapest is an average-sized capital in Europe. Its population size is comparable to that of Bucharest, Vienna or Warsaw; Prague is somewhat smaller, Berlin larger, the Italian, French and Spanish capitals are vastly different both in population size, density and composition (Kürti 2002a). The city of Budapest comprises 23 districts. The 21st is Csepel, a fairly densely populated area comprising 722,226 residents living in a roughly 2575 hectare territory. The district is connected by two bridges to Budapest, the Danube just divides at the northern tip of what is properly called Csepel Island. This large, bean-shaped island is 48 kilometres long, with 12 settlements, including its largest northern part, Csepel proper. The island's population is about 165,000, most commuting to Budapest and its greater metro industrial-commercial hub to work, school and entertainment. Csepel is not old, though archaeological finds attest to its early medieval and even earlier history, and it was incorporated in 1717 when the court sanctioned German and South Slavic migrants to settle on the island. Similar to other agricultural settlements, Csepel had its own jurisdiction and locally elected municipal council. In 1892 a major transformation altered the local culture: two Jewish industrialists, Manfred and Berthold Weiss, bought a sizable property and started what later became known as the Weiss Manfred Iron and Steel Works. It was the beginning of massive industrialization: steelworks, a paper mill, a truck factory and even an aeroplane factory provided jobs for tens of thousands workers. In 1950 the incorporation into greater Budapest completely altered the local political life; from then on, decisions were made in downtown Budapest.

Through the socialist industrial planning, Csepel experienced population growth during the 1980s from 73,000 to 90,000 residents by 1990. The new incomers were mostly from the countryside, with a sizable Roma population who found work as unskilled labourers in the various factories. With the dismantling of state factories and the advance of economic uncertainties, families opted to leave instead of remaining in the district without jobs. By 2010, the population had dwindled to 72,226 (Szabó 2013, 484). With this, the number of wage earners also dropped significantly (Szabó 2013, 13). Despite the population loss in Csepel, the suburban belt of Budapest—comprising about 78 settlements—experienced steady growth. By the late 1990s, a quarter of Hungary's population lived in this agglomeration where new industrial and infrastructural developments contributed to the capital's primary position in the economy and politics.[6]

The ethnic composition has changed even though altogether 63,026 individuals have declared their Hungarian nationality and Hungarian as their mother tongue. The only significant minority population is the Roma, who number around 1185 persons, while a few hundred individuals belong to German and

Romanian ethnic minorities (Szabó 2013, 319). Many people I talked with assured me that unofficially the number of Roma may be twice as many (Kürti 2002b, 221–222). In the early 1990s, only the German-speaking (referred to generally as Schwab) and South Slavic minorities were visible in the cultural and artistic life of the district. This all changed in 1994 when the new minority law of 1993 (Law LXXVII) came into effect, allowing minority governments to elect their representatives (Belánszky et al. 2006). Suddenly in Hungary, numerous such administrative units were created, existing side by side with municipal governments. In Csepel, four minorities (Armenian, Bulgarian, German and Roma) were successful in creating their minority governments. In 2010, two more ethnic groups (Greek and Romanian), in 2014, another one (Ukrainian). Currently, there are seven minority governments in Csepel and their leadership is composed of a small group of three elected representatives.[7]

In tandem with the emergence of small ethnolinguistic minorities, religious diversity has also been less complex than one might imagine, an aspect of local culture that reinforces Ivan Szelenyi's model of 'less diversity'. Roman Catholics number 19,732 individuals and Protestants 6193, while more than 25,000 individuals did not wish to declare their religiosity (Szabó 2013, 381–383). There are smaller Baptist, Jewish, Greek Catholic and evangelist congregations as well, and among the middle-managerial level new alternative religions (the Faith Church) are also popular.

With the many new small family-owned businesses, the large percentage of unemployed of the early 1990s (around 15%) has given way to a healthier 6.3% (Szabó 2013, 488). However, this is still higher than in most districts of Budapest; only the inner districts range between 7% and 8% unemployed. Population in the inner areas still lives in multistorey housing projects built mostly in the 1970s and 1980s, and these urban enclaves (*panelek*, or *lakótelepek* in Hungarian) are easily recognizable from their monochrome and unkempt appearance. In the more outlying areas, one-family plots, with gardens dotting the landscape, their small size and especially the lack of animals are clear indications of the urbanized, working-class milieu.

During the 1980s about 30,000 Csepelers found work in the large factories and in particular in the enormous Csepel Works, a conglomerate of a dozen heavy industry plants. Seeing the Csepel Works for the first time in the mid-1980s, I, too, was struck by its size, ear-splitting din and lively atmosphere, and the contradictory images it projected.[8] People moved in and out of the factory and at the gates, through which only those with identification badges could pass, banners, signs and packed stores signalled a strong lifeforce. Outside the main gate, single-family workers' houses, with their small vegetable gardens, reminded the visitor of the remnants of the interwar working-class culture. All these are gone now owing to rapid road construction cutting through the district along a north–south axis. The main square, named after Saint Emerich (*Szent Imre*), is where several churches, a police station, the city hall, stores and a bus station can be found. It is still the political and religious centre, just as it was during the 1980s. There are numerous ten-story apartment complexes

dominating the district's landscape, many built during the 'glorious' years of Stalinism and state socialism.[9]

In 1990, Csepel suddenly became a non-communist, left-liberal city: the communist party was voted out of office, but many former communists filled the seats of the district's council for the next four years.[10] Many people had two or three jobs: their time, which had been regulated by the party, trade union, or the communist youth league earlier, was now under the constraints of the market and money. Monitored by the stock exchange, multinational corporations and transnational trade agreements, Csepel's economy has been in the grip of international players. Signs of the old system were demolished and removed both inside and outside the factory gates. The large Lenin statue, at the entrance to the factory, was removed from its pedestal and shipped to a warehouse. Some street names were also changed, a practice widespread in Hungary at that time as names of martyrs and politicians of the communist movements fell out of favour and were replaced by other names.[11] The heightened nationalistic policies since the early 1990s also contributed to the erosion of socialist and liberal values, a move visible across the former Soviet bloc (Waterbury 2010). Csepel is no exception and in my earlier analysis I called attention to the nationalistic appeal among citizens, with the Transylvanian connection being especially strong in Csepel: cultural programmes usually include Transylvanian Hungarian music, dance and literature (Kürti 2002b). Today the town's international cultural connections are secured with eight cities (called sister-cities, or *testvérváros* in Hungarian), among them two Hungarian settlements in Transylvania, Romania.[12] Interestingly, the young mayor of Csepel is also a Transylvanian Hungarian, born in the city of Nagyvárad (Oradea) in 1981.[13]

Surely one of the most visible signs of the economic transformation, one that hurt most of the workers, was the dismantling of the large industrial enterprise, the Csepel Works. Privatization resulted in numerous smaller firms, important large factories were quickly purchased by foreign concerns while others were converted to East–West joint venture companies. Despite these 'revolutionary changes', however, as one of my former informants told me, a lot had not been transformed by the dismantling of the communist state and the cornerstone, the Marxist-Leninist party (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party). What he mentioned was a well-known issue in the labour movement: despite all the slogans about democracy and market reforms, workers remained at the bottom of the social ladder.

LOCAL POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF VOTING

At the 1990 local elections (there were two rounds), citizens overwhelmingly favoured new politicians: out of the 35 representatives, 21 were elected from the Free Democrats, 8 from the Young Democratic Party (FIDESZ), and the rest of them represented socialist, Christian democratic and populist parties.[14] Only two leftist parties (Munkáspárt and the Szocialista Párt) were able to send

councillors to the newly elected town council, and as usual such minorities had no real input into the decision-making process.[15] With such a strong political platform in the hands of coalition partners, governing the district seemed smooth and straightforward at the beginning, but this did not persist. The first four years of the 1990s were dismal both for the municipal government and for citizens. The beginning of the decade witnessed the most turbulent economic transformation in the history of Csepel since the Second World War. A major collapse of the steel and heavy industries resulted in massive job losses, with thousands of workers becoming unemployed overnight. One of my former informants from the Machine-Tool Factory reminisced: 'We didn't know who to turn to. When I went to the unemployment office, they could not offer any jobs. When I went to my former union boss, he told me that they did not close the factory, it was the government.' I then asked one of my district representatives, a Free Democrat, but he just laughed and said: 'We didn't cause the collapse of the heavy industry, it was the communists!' Such sentiments were echoed by others as well and while residents agreed that communists were the culprits, the liberal first government was blamed for its political inertia.

Not surprisingly, most residents became disillusioned with the new political power established in 1990. Soon, one of the final straws that caused the government and the Free Democratic coalition to collapse was the case that involved development of a sewage project and the question of independence of the district from Budapest. The mayor and most of his party representatives concluded that the separation from Budapest and regaining its former independent status would prove beneficial to the district council and citizens alike. Large projects and major investments would make a profit and Budapest would be unable to siphon resources away in terms of both taxes and manpower. The mayor believed that a major sewage-treatment facility could serve several neighbouring districts, and building it would generate hundreds of jobs and would boost the district's coffer. In order to put pressure on Budapest city council, Csepel's leaders organized a referendum on the issue of independence from the capital.[16] The result was disastrous for the mayor and his supporters: Csepelers voted unanimously to remain as the 21st district of Budapest. This sealed the fate of the coalition of the Free Democrats and the FIDESZ in 1994 at the new municipal elections.

In this generally depressed economic climate, when Csepelers were worried about either their unemployment benefits or, alternatively, losing their jobs, all eyes turned to the parliamentary and local elections. In 1994 the socialist mayoral candidate secured his victory by receiving the majority of votes (34%, or 6871 votes). His opposition, the Free Democrats' candidate, was second with 21%, the Democratic Forum's candidate received 18% of the votes and, interestingly, two independent candidates also garnered 11% and 7% of the votes, respectively. The socialist victory in Budapest's outlying districts was not unique to Csepel: many voters in Hungary turned away from the nationalist agenda of the ruling government and voted for the Socialist Party.

In the post-1994 period, until 2010, Csepel was ruled by the socialists. The mayor's (Mihály Tóth) popularity was at its apex in 2002 when 17,000 people (63%) voted for him, but slow economic growth and meagre infrastructural progress eroded his success four years later. At the 2006 elections he received only 47%, or 14,044 of the votes (his right-wing challenger only 10% less). As elsewhere in the country, a small but vocal extreme right wing has also appeared in politics. The xenophobic and anti-Semitic party, the MIÉP, attempted to enter municipal politics but most Csepelers remained uninterested: in 1998 about 8% of voters (slightly fewer than 2000 people) voted for its candidates. 'We are Csepelers, we are committed democrats, liberals and socialists' was the statement I often heard in working-class and intellectual families then. Juxtaposed to each other, these concepts have existed since the 1980s and firmly became household expressions. At that time, socialist party leaders often emphasized to me the importance of 'socialist democracy', a phrase the opposition debunked as antithetical to one another. However, for most of the 1990s and 2000s, it seemed as if time stood still in Csepel and the district was firmly in the grasp of a steadfast socialist leadership. Unquestionably, one of the successes of the socialist mayor and his team was the creation of an up-to-date wastewater treatment plant that started operation in 2010, a project that caused the liberals to fall in 1994. Financed by the European Union (EU), construction of the plant took two years and costs about EUR0.5 billion. Now not only Csepelers but the rest of Budapest's biologically treated wastewater flows into the Danube (about 350,000 cubic metres per day). This alone, however, was insufficient to save the mayor's crumbling political hierarchy.

The 2010 municipal election was a watershed both nationally and locally. After a major electoral victory, the right-wing FIDESZ managed to have a two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament. A few months later, during the local elections, in Csepel there were three candidates running for mayor. The national ruling FIDESZ party supported its candidate, Szilárd Németh, a former wrestler, teacher and school principal of a working-class family background and already an MP.[17] Challenging him were the socialist party and the extreme-right candidates. The turnout was not as high as expected: out of the 62,000 voters only about 23,000 citizens went to the polls. The FIDESZ candidate garnered 11,805 votes (50%), the socialist János Szenteczky was second with 8698 (37%) and the right-wing candidate (József Pákozdi) received 2772 of votes (11%).[18] 'We suffered four years of right-wing rule, now we will do better,' commented one resident whose optimism was bolstered by her inclusion in the socialist ward voting list. Others remained sceptical: 'Do you know what these socialists want? More power, more money of course,' said another voter.

Trusting in their unshakable decade and a half rule, socialist party members and citizens with leftist leaning had high hopes for the next election in 2014. With mounting attacks from the right and the mayoral office and the lack of solidarity among the socialist party, members created a divide and it split into smaller parties. In the struggle, the former mayor, Mihály Tóth, was sidelined, and he decided to retire and quit politics. Gyula Horváth was nominated by the

Democratic Coalition to run for the prestigious position of mayor, and while he managed to garner 35% (9000 votes), this was only enough for second place. The ruling national FIDESZ candidate, Lénárd Borbély, won 47% (12,158 votes). The right-wing party had received a second chance to start another term in office. This underlined the fact that Csepelers had completely turned away from the left and continued to abstain from politics: voter turnout was low as usual, only a little more than a third of eligible voters went to the polls.[19] However, the sudden turn of events signalled residents' disillusionment with socialist promises and the scandal reaching extraordinary proportions. The Christian, conservative ideology of the FIDESZ assured a victory for the party with a slight majority: together with the mayor they now possess 12 seats in the 21-seat municipal council. Some of the former socialist candidates expressed their growing concern that altogether 3000 Csepelers voted for the extreme right-wing (Jobbik) candidates. In fact, József Pákozdy secured a seat on the municipal council on the compensatory list but in none of the election wards in Csepel did his party receive more than a few hundred votes. This signalled, as one local resident assuredly claimed, that the working-class families of Csepel 'will never support the extreme right'. He recalled the dismal winter days of 1944, when the Arrow Cross and one German military unit intended to ship the valuable factory machinery to Germany, but workers together with union leaders boycotted the military action, saving most of the machinery (Kürti 2002b, 79–80).

Victory of the right wing brought rapid and expected changes to Csepel after 2010. The town received a new coat of arms—the previous one depicted a plow, a sheaf of wheat and the river (symbolic of the past 100 years of agricultural activity and the connection to the Danube)—plus a standing white stallion and a medieval crown on the top of the crest. In refashioning Hungarian local politics according to the mainstream Christian and conservative ideology emanating from parliament and the ruling right-wing national government, the image of the white stallion is based on the thirteenth-century legend in Gesta Hungarorum describing the head stable master receiving land from Árpád, the mythical conqueror and founder of the first royal dynasty.[20] An obvious mythomoteur, tracing Csepel's history to a medieval legend releases the municipal government of one responsibility: it can completely elude the town's red heritage together with its associated heavy industries. Moreover, its political direction since 2010 has been legitimized by a novel symbol.

Similar to 2010, the 2014 municipal election was a milestone in the district's history since it reinforced right-wing rule and the continuing disinterest in party politics by the population at large. Out of the 62,688 eligible voters, only 26,287 Csepelers turned up at the polls (there were only 25,794 valid ballots).[21] As a reminder, in the first free election of 1990, only 28% of the district residents were interested in casting their votes (Kürti 2002b, 227). In addition to general voters' apathy, the 2014 municipal election was hampered by the many candidates (five) running for the position of mayor. Yet, even if the left-liberal parties decided in favour of supporting one candidate only, the

number of votes cast for him (mayors and previously all council presidents have been men) would not have been enough to challenge the right-wing candidate.

What can this brief and admittedly cursory survey of the past 25 years of local elections illustrate? It is easy to see that change has come slowly to this working-class suburb. While elsewhere in the nation's capital most of the district mayors became FIDESZ and Christian Democrats, or alternatively independent, in Csepel the socialists managed to secure their power base until 2010. In fact, most of the time, the mayor and his fellow socialist representatives received more than 50% of the votes. With the changing climate of attitudes, especially dissatisfaction with political scandal, corruption and crime, Csepelers could not let socialist rule continue. In 2010 and then in 2014, they made their voice heard: by allowing the right-wing candidates to win, they voted the left out of power. As a result, the expression 'Red Csepel' has become synonymous with socialist corruption and mismanaged policies.

From Economic Miracle to Mayhem

How was this 180° turn in political culture possible? To understand the ousting of the socialists from city hall in 2010 and again in 2014, disgruntled Csepel workers offer an answer. As János, a middle-aged informant, recounts, socialists have not paid sufficient attention to peoples' needs, especially those of former workers of the Csepel factories who found themselves without jobs. By the mid-2000s, 'most of us became sceptical about socialist leaders only wanting to maintain their power without social bases'. One woman argued:

> When I was laid off from the Csepel Works, actually the Iron Works, I was without a job. Two years later I was rehired by a smaller company that proudly declared that it will save the factory from bankruptcy, but that only lasted a year or two. None of the promises by the socialist mayor and his party came through. I am without a job since 2004.

One unemployed informant even suggested that 'It was the socialists who sold out our town. They allowed, even supported complete privatization of state companies and many managed to live well-off from the bonuses they received. To top all that, they became corrupt politicians in the process, skimming as much money as they could for themselves.'

The collapse of the large Csepel Works conglomerate resulted in many smaller national as well as international companies. There is now a truly global business climate in the city: besides a few Hungarian, there are Austrian, Chinese, German, Dutch, Swiss and American-owned companies producing ferrous and non-ferrous metal tools, objects and high-tech valuables.[22] During my fieldwork in the 1980s in two large factories (Machine-Tool Factory, Szerszámgépgyár, and the Non-Ferrous Metal Works, Fémmű), I was interested in what happened to workers. As both companies faced serious privatiza-

tion and reorganization issues, many found themselves suddenly unemployed. The former company became a German-Hungarian joint venture in 1991, a deal which lasted for only 18 months. Through high-level negotiations, a new deal was struck and a buyer from Singapore (Excel Machine Tools LTD) made an offer the Hungarian government could not refuse and the Far Eastern company became the sole owner of the factory.[23] Another successful buyout occurred between the Transformer Company and Siemens, the latter obtaining all the shares in 1996 and thus becoming the sole owner of the firm (today Csepel Siemens Zrt). The new business and industrial conditions forced workers into making one of two choices: either opting for retraining or searching for employment elsewhere. Several of my acquaintances from the 1980s managed to retain their positions. Some have been elevated to high managerial positions, a possibility facilitated by their language skills, education and noncorporate networks. One of them became so disillusioned with politics, however, that he quit his party and decided to stay away from all national and local elections.

Other factories from the once-famous Csepel Works did not fare well. The Tube Factory (Csepeli Csőgyár Rt.), providing employment for 6000 workers, had lost the majority of its workforce by the mid-1990s. With only a third of its original workforce left, it was divided into four independent but closely associated units. Workers and trade unions opted to abandon plans to obtain the majority of shares in order to create an employee-owned company. In reality, both groups were more interested in saving jobs than in risking profit. This resulted in a situation that characterized most industrial buyouts: managerial elites were able to obtain ownership, often with the financial backing of the state, or alternatively by inviting foreign investors. The Tube Factory, however, was not able to live up to the expectations set by international competitors: after few years of struggle the company filed for bankruptcy and was eventually dissolved.

The privatization process of the Csepel Metal Works (Vasmű) was somewhat different. The factory had 10,000 workers but by 1991, when the company was converted into a shares company, it retained only 1000 workers. Employees had a chance to buy property coupons but after initial excitement most of them decided, as one older worker I befriended in the late 1980s put it, 'to get rid of the cheap and worthless coupons'. With a joking gesture (flipping his finger), he pointed to a framed picture on the wall: it was a photo of him standing at the factory entrance with one of the coupons next to it. As he argued, workers saw little possibility of saving the Csepel Metal Works in light of the growing uncertainty of market conditions. Finally, in 1995 an American buyer (Universal Automotive Inc.) saved the company and most of the workers from unemployment. After 2004, however, the Americans pulled out and the company, or what was left of it, remained solely in Hungarian hands (Szabó 2009, 91). By that time my acquaintance became an embittered pensioner nostalgically mentioning the 'glorious days' when the smithy at the Csepel Metal Works was working at full speed.

While the closing of factories in Csepel was ubiquitous, not all suffered the same fate. The Dunapack paper factory was successfully amalgamated in 1990 by the Austrian family-owned paper and packaging Prinzhorn Group. Now it is the sole provider of high-quality paper and packaging products with state-of-the-art technology and a skilled workforce. The American bike company, Schwinn, and the similar Csepel factory reveal an interesting development, which exemplifies the flow of multinational capital and the reorganization of the industrial urban workforce on a global scale. Since the mid-1980s, Schwinn began experiencing a decline in its sales that forced the company to follow the international trend in shifting away from road bikes to mountain bike models. Feeling the squeeze of rising costs and the change in technology, it closed its plants, first in Chicago in 1983 and then in Mississippi in 1990. By this time the company's annual sales had dwindled to 900,000 bikes a year, about 10% of the total bikes sold in the USA annually (Dzierdak 2002, 79–80). However, most of the bikes were from overseas plants, China and Hungary. Schwinn had a 42% ownership stake in the Csepel plant. Eliminating production in the USA and firing workers in Illinois and Mississippi, Schwinn managed to boost production by hiring laid-off workers in Csepel, a large and skilled workforce without jobs since the closing of the gigantic Csepel Works. By the late 1990s, however, high-level corruption engulfed the Russian owner and he sold the company to Hungarian buyers.[24]

Other US firms were also potential investors: Powergren, for instance, bought considerable stakes in electric power production in Csepel in 1990–1991; by 2000 the American firm announced considerable losses, a reason why it sold its stakes in the Csepel companies. The new owner, interestingly, was also an American company (NRG Energy Inc.) from Minneapolis, but it too decided two years later that the Hungarian move was not of benefit to the company and sold Csepel.

'THE CORRUPT AND BLOODY CITY'

It has been admitted to me by both left- and right-wing politicians that local political life, led by the socialists since 1994, received a major blow when in 2009 a double homicide that shook the district made national headlines in the media for weeks. Even so, many years later, when Csepelers converse at the dinner table, bar or bus stop, one murderous incident occupies their imagination. An intricate story with a connection to major politicians, a disgruntled school principal and even the police chief, the case could easily provide ample material for an Agatha Christie murder-mystery. A main figure in the Csepel socialist party, a school principal of an alternative grade school founded and funded by a private foundation, Gábor Deme, repeatedly took money from the school's treasury to finance his lifestyle and growing mortgage payments. By forging bills with the help of his wife, an accountant at the school, he managed to cover up his actions for a while but was discovered during an audit. When confronted by the director of the school's foundation (József Takács), himself

a leading figure in the socialist party and a former deputy mayor, the principal admitted his guilt and offered to pay back the stolen money. A meeting was arranged at the school between them to which the director brought one of his teachers as an eyewitness. Aware of the time running out, the principal hired the school's security guard (Tamás Kun) to silence the director, who was ready to inform the public about the entire corruption. The meeting went according to schedule: the principal ordered the security guard to use his weapon and in no time the director lay dead from bullet wounds. The murderers demanded the keys for the server room from the teacher in order to erase the recordings from the security cameras. Pleading for his life, the teacher was unable to find the keys and was killed instantly. According to plan, the security guard wounded his arm and rushed to call the police and ambulance with the ridiculous story of an unknown masked assailant committing the horrific murders, which he had witnessed.

The fabricated story collapsed immediately when the police discovered a hidden tape recorder in the teacher's pocket. The execution of the two men being recorded, it was an open-and-shut case for the courts but not without further ramifications. As it turned out, socialist politicians as well as the local police chief were also involved. Before the fateful evening, the principal actually asked for help from the socialist member of parliament (MP) representing Csepel (György Podolák), but the two men could not agree on what actions to take. The school director also searched for high-level accomplices and visited the local police chief just hours before the murderous event; apparently he was ready to speak to the chief about money laundering and corruption within the socialist party involving several individuals. The police chief (Mihály Császár), who was immediately forced to retire after the case came to light, admittedly suggested that if there was sufficient evidence charges should be promptly filed.[25] Strangely, no actions followed, though later some documents concerning the stolen school money turned up at the police station.

The murder case occurred at the worst possible time for the socialist party when the economic recession was at its height and politicians were eagerly readying themselves for the approaching elections. The opposition took immediate action and following the uproar in the wake of the murderous incident, two right-wing MPs (Lénárd Borbély and Szilárd Németh) started a vicious mud-slinging campaign against the socialist leadership. The main targets were the mayor of Csepel (Mihály Tóth) and the president of the local cell of the socialist party (János Szenteczky). Both were accused of corruption and involvement in a public housing scam of recently refurbished apartments sold to friends and relatives below the market price. In fact, one of the beneficiaries named was none other than the police chief who was also compromised in the murder case. As the case unfolded, it became obvious that the mayor's assistant, a director of the district's utilities and service company (Csevak Zrt) and also in charge of supervising the sale of apartments, was a leading figure in the socialist party. Eventually, the case ended in court but it was dismissed owing to insufficient evidence. Nevertheless, by the autumn of 2010 with the

approaching municipal elections, the mayor and his comrades lost face and, in the words of the mayor, 'we could only look at the election-time with increasing trepidation'.

After the fateful election of 2010, the relationship between the FIDESZ-led municipal council and the opposition politicians escalated into a mutually resentful, onerous rivalry. To publicize the 'corrupt' socialist leadership, a 150-page report was published by city hall, aptly titled 'Red Csepel', with an obvious reference to the survival of communist corruption in the district (Ábel 2011). The booklet, with a print run of 35,000 and distributed to all households free, was obvious overkill. At the time, power was firmly in the hands of the right-wing FIDESZ, which won a decisive victory at the polls. The mayor's office did not retrench: a complete audit and revision of previous contracts was ordered. One of the questionable contracts—the building of a housing complex with roads managed by Csevak—amounted to more than HUF2 billion (roughly USD6 million). The president of the socialist party again was responsible for overseeing it, whose money-laundering scheme was unearthed. Consequently, he was fined by the courts for budgetary inaccuracies and money laundering, a charge he still vehemently denies. More than that, he was also fined for slander, a charge involving a 2010 election leaflet in which he used language that accused his opponents of being involved in political corruption. Mr Szenteczky is still a member of the city council, having secured his place on the left-liberal coalition compensatory list.

Conclusions

As former Soviet bloc countries comprise an ever-increasing proportion of global, especially EU, political and economic developments, there is a pressing need for more in-depth studies. On a granular level, there are few examinations of the actual roles that cities and urban industrial centres play in this. Existing anthropological analyses heavily favour rural agrarian small communities, a hallmark of classic ethnographic fieldwork practices in Europe. And although the scholarly literature now pays greater attention to political processes, we still do not know the full impact of global and national alterations on urban environments and their people. There is accordingly an enormous need—and enormous opportunity—for empirical, first-hand observations of the challenges city neighbourhoods face, and also how they negotiate and respond to these. As East-Central European states struggle with their socialist legacies and attempt full integration into the European polity, these inquiries will only became more vital.

The case study of Csepel presented here illustrates that, we, as anthropologists, are well situated to investigate the ways politics, economic transformation and concomitant ideological conflicts figure in the construction of new urban processes, class restructuring and local lifeways. Anthropologists working in post-socialist Hungary have not focused on how these processes are contested and negotiated from the perspectives of parties, institutions and concerned citizens, long a hallmark of political science and sociology. The challenge for

anthropologists of urban cultures clearly is, first, to adopt a broad-based cognizance of how national and local politics are played out in the neighbourhood in order to examine not only the actual workings of power relations and their institutionalization but also the impact of these on the lives of those investigated. Second, fieldwork, meeting face to face with informants and gathering information from various sources and analysing local media, are crucial aspects of the quest to achieve a multifaceted understanding of the ways in which politics and economic transformation are played out and negotiated in the local context. Long-term fieldwork in one location allows a penetrating anthropological analysis of economic and political transformation from the perspectives of individuals and families. In the last quarter of a century, the complex political transformation in Csepel, a working-class town of mythical proportions fabricated from real as well as imagined conceptions during the height of Stalinist state socialism, reveals that class conflict and political interests can change dramatically. Csepelers, whether they wished it or not, were planted in the vortex of an official working-class movement during the 1950s and 1960s; symbolic pilgrimages by Soviet leaders to Csepel were highlights of Budapest's international image-making, especially solidarity with the Soviet Union. This legacy lingered on for much of the transformative period that followed the collapse of the communist system after 1989, albeit most of it slowly eroded and turned increasingly against the city's socialist leadership as a result of unexpected social conflicts.

To save the district's diverse industry and reorganize the remaining companies, the municipal government ordered an urban development feasibility study. Assessing local capacities, the study calls for large governmental investments to create new jobs, restructure existing industries according to international standards and maintain local interests by allowing a healthy progression of social engineering in the coming years. It will be interesting to see how Csepelers, workers and intellectuals alike will respond to 'rejuvenate the factory town with a sustainable framework that can also serve as model for other rustbelt areas' (Ongjerth 2013, 5). The coming years will sustain or challenge the idea of whether Csepelers will maintain the current conservative, national worldview emanating from current governmental circles or, alternatively, will rely on their working-class identity. Based on the above ethnographic example, it is easy to summarize that after major and chaotic industrial restructuring, Csepel certainly took a more central place and became more diverse in both economy and politics than it was in the 1990s and certainly in the 1980s. One thing is sure: with the arrival of transnational corporations and full-scale globalization, Csepelers' local identity has been cardinally altered.

Notes

1. The municipal council decision of July 2015 declared that the Workers' Home should 'again belong to the residents of Csepel' and nationalization should take place. In 1991 the right of management of the Workers' Home was transferred

by the eight remaining founding factories to an independent foundation (Csepel Munkásotthon Alapítvány). Since subsequently all the companies went bankrupt or were amalgamated into new or joint ventures (there were no more founders left), this right was transferred to the courts. This forms the basis on which the municipal government seeks to possess the institution.

2. On the Hungarian working-class movement and politics during socialism, with comparative insights into East Germany, see Bartha (2013). For an English labour historian's view, see Pittaway (2012).

3. Socialist, Soviet bloc, communist and 'second world' are terms utilized across the disciplines to refer to the Marxist-Leninist states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Consequently, post-socialist and post-communist refer to the successor states that once belonged to the Soviet orbit. Some countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America were also part of that international 'fraternal association'. There is a growing literature on the usefulness and diverse meaning of such diverse terminology (see, for example, Giordano et al. 2014; Hann 2003; Kürti and Skalnik 2009), but that belongs to a different analysis.

4. I have dealt with some of the specific problems of East European anthropology, its nature and contents in another publication (Kürti 1996). I discuss specifics of urban anthropology in Hungary (Kürti 2014) in the context of the debate on the relevance of 'anthropological research in the city' (Prato and Pardo 2013; Forum 'Urban Anthropology' 2013, 2014).

5. For a joint attempt by Chris Hann and me to analyse local political transformation, see Hann and Kürti (2015).

6. On the economic and social development of Budapest in English, see Izsák and Probáld (2001).

7. The numbers of citizens voting for these minority representatives are few and far between, and, since 1994, continually dwindling. In 2014, for instance, only 252 Roma residents were registered to vote, only 84 turned up at the polling booths; comparable figures for Greeks are 26 and 14, and for Ukrainians 38 and 13, respectively. These figures are from the National Election Bureau 2014 Municipal Elections website (http://valasztas.hu/hu/onkval2014/990/990_0_index.html, accessed 10 September 2017). On the minority elections and representations, see Belánszki et al. (2006).

8. For the description of Csepel and my fieldwork there, see my earlier English publications (Kürti 1989, 1990, 2002b).

9. I have described some of the Stalinist and post-Stalinist years in Hungary in an earlier publication (Kürti 2013).

10. During the early 1990s, these individuals were acrimoniously referred to as 'parachuters' (ejtőernyős)—that is, those who parachuted from communism to democracy and successfully managed to retain their privileged positions.

11. In 1990 the street named after the Second World War mayor (Kalamár) was changed. In 2011, four more street names were eliminated: Council (Tanács), Supermarket (Áruház), Ságvári and Bajáki (the last two were communist martyrs). The new names are Károli Gáspár, Görgey Arthur, Popieluszkó and Mansfeld Péter, respectively. See *Csepeli Hírmondó* (2011). 30 May.

12. These are Vámosgálfalva (Găneşti), a town of 3500 people, of whom about 2400 are Hungarians, and Nagyszalonta (Salonta), a settlement in Bihor county, with a population of 17,000, of whom about 10,000 are ethnic Hungarians.

13. Much information about the local government, including the mayor, can be found on the official Csepel website (http://www.csepel.hu/onkormanyzat/polgarmester, accessed 10 September 2017).

14. For those not familiar with the current Hungarian party system, I recommend the English-language studies by Korkut (2012) and Tóka (1998).

15. Interestingly, in the past 26 years' municipal elections, no communist candidates of the Workers' Party (Munkáspárt) received more than 10–11% of the votes in any of the voting districts. It is only this party that claims legal continuation with the pre-1989 Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. The party has about 2000–3000 followers in seven working-class districts of Budapest. Csepel is one of them, but the party's homepage has nothing whatsoever on its activities there (http://budapest.munkaspart.hu/, accessed 10 September 2017. Since its inception in 1990, the Workers' Party has had a single candidate (Gyula Thürmer), but neither him nor any of his colleagues ever managed to win seats in parliament or become mayors.

16. Budapest city council is made up of elected representatives as well as the mayors of the districts. It has a president who is also made lord mayor in a city-wide election. The districts and the city council are on equal terms with no hierarchy between them; in other words, the lord mayor does not rule over the districts. Each district is under the supervision of its elected council. The districts are divided into voting wards, or districts, that send one elected councillor to the council.

17. Before 2014 the law allowed MPs to be mayors.

18. Figures for the Csepel municipal elections are calculated from the National Office of Elections, 2010 (http://valasztas.hu/hu/onkval2010/564/564_0.html, accessed 28 June 2016).

19. In fact, of the 62,688 eligible voters, only 26,266 people cast their votes; at the final count there were only 25,794 valid votes in the ballot boxes (http://valasztas.hu/hu/onkval2014/990/990_0_index.html, accessed 10 September 2017).

20. Before deciding, the municipal government conducted a public survey in which 65% of respondents opted for the coat of arms depicting the white stallion. Csepel is a toponym referring to a thicket or shrubs, which is more accurate especially in light of historical records: the Island of Csepel was for centuries used as royal hunting ground. For the medieval history of the settlement, see Bolla (2010) and contributions in the publication by Kubinyi et al. (1965).

21. For official election results, see the National Election Bureau 2014 Municipal Elections (http://valasztas.hu/hu/onkval2014/990/990_0_index.html, accessed 10 September 2017).

22. The largest energy-producing company in Csepel was owned by the Swiss Atel AG, until 2009 when it was merged as Alpiq Holding AG. Csepel Steel Pipe LTD is a Dutch-owned leading tube and pipe company and Csepel Grinding Manufacturer Co. is a Chinese firm. The plastic tube manufacturer Pipelife Hungary is owned by the Austrian Pipelife International GmbH.

23. See the Csepel Holding NYrt 2013. évi üzleti jelentés, Budapest, 29 April 2014 (http://www.csepel-holding.hu/DATA/vezetosegii_jelentes_2013_CSH_KU.pdf, accessed 10 September 2017).

24. The Russian Semion Mogilevich, a well-known crime figure who was involved with the Schwinn Company through an intricate global financial network criss-crossing Canada, the Cayman Islands, the Channel Islands, Israel, Hungary and

the USA. Some of the business deals and itineraries can be read about in the series of hearings of the Candadian Securities Commission, which also includes the Hungarian Schwinn (http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/10645.htm). While in Hungary, Mogilevich received Hungarian citienship by marrying a Hungarian woman.

25. The case was made into a documentary in 2014: *The Double Homocide in Csepel—Power by All Means* (A Csepeli kettős gyilkosság—hatalmat mindenáron) directed by Attila Csarnai and Dávid Géczy.

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From the Ban on Enjoyment to the Injunction to Enjoy: The Post-Industrial City and Its New Spaces of Control

Corine Védrine

In this chapter I examine the progression from one kind of urban planning to another, which has taken place in line with the transformation of capitalism. I focus on the progression from the industrial and disciplinarian town, where enjoyment was banned, to an urban setting that encourages enjoyment.

The discussion is based on the case study of the French city of Clermont-Ferrand, where the Michelin Company was created in 1832. The transformation of global capitalism has had a considerable impact on the local situation with the suppression of more than 18,000 jobs. Today the labour force has shrunk (to less than 6000) while the number of white-collar workers has increased (to more than 6000).

Clermont-Ferrand makes an interesting case study for urban anthropology because the city does not suffer from unemployment. Indeed, the reduction in available jobs has not caused any layoffs; those who are retiring or being retired are simply not replaced. Unlike other French cities, such as Saint-Etienne, Clermont-Ferrand has not been a victim of deindustrialization. Instead, it bears witness to the evolution of capitalism. The Michelin Company continues to be the foremost local employer, property owner and taxpayer. Today the firm needs to attract executives through a 'new spirit of capitalism' (Boltanski and

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Chiapello 1999) and the quality of life promised by urban renewal. Thus Clermont-Ferrand is witnessing sociospatial transformations in line with the needs of one of the largest actors of capitalism in the world. Ethnographic analysis[1] will bring to light the way in which the production of spaces, in which the life of workers used to be tightly controlled, is being replaced by the production of new controlled spaces involving a managerial class. In these spaces the enjoyment of these managers is ensured through the consumption of leisure, culture and aesthetic displays.

The Spirit of Paternalism and the Disciplinarian Industrial Town: The Birth of 'Michelinville'

With the success and the rise of the Michelin Company, the number of employees peaked at 32,000 in 1982, which was more than the number of Clermont-Ferrand inhabitants when Michelin first opened. Indeed, the company turned the small craft, wine-growing and market gardening town into an industrial city with four factories and many social structures (e.g. housing estates, schools, cooperative stores, sports facilities and hospitals). These facilities symbolized a paternalistic spirit aimed at winning the loyalty of the working classes who hailed from French rural areas and foreign countries (essentially Southern Europe and Northern Africa).

Edouard Michelin, one of the two founding brothers of the rubber tyre company, created the first social facilities in Clermont-Ferrand with his wife Marie-Thérèse Wolff. Subsequently, their grandson François Michelin broadly developed it up to the beginning of the 1980s. This paternalist policy is one of the elements of what inhabitants call the 'Michelin spirit', which justifies an entrepreneurial philosophy and the practices attendant on it. Indeed, the analysis of both the interviews and the internal documents of the firm shows that the Michelin spirit is not only a corporate culture which produces common values but corresponds to 'the spirit of capitalism' (Weber 1964) according to Michelin. From this perspective, it is an ideology that justifies capitalism by bolstering it with ethical arguments (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999) and evolving with it, giving the workers a reason to feel involved in the firm and remaining faithful to it.

In the Michelin Company, these reasons are economical, moral and social, while also including security. They are defended in a strict spirit and built around norms linked to secrecy and asceticism, as well as Christian moral values that are still guaranteed by a paternal figure, as incarnated by François Michelin. Workers have adhered to this ethos essentially because it offers them both an identity and social protection and security, and they are grateful for this structured framework:

> François Michelin was a father to me, Miss. Definitely. A father. He gave me everything, all I have and all I am today, is thanks to him. (Mr Paris, retired worker, 64)

He was a father to me. I owe him everything. (Mr Barthaire, retired administrative agent of the company, 65)

The main methods employed in the handing down of the Michelin spirit are the company's internal documents, education (scholastic, religious and physical) and surveillance from the hierarchy and space (both domestic and work spaces). Owner of a large part of the land of Clermont-Ferrand, the company is a real property developer that has produced and organized an industrial city in its own image, called 'Michelinville' by journalists in 1928. With all the factories and social facilities, the company gradually urbanized the rural spaces which separated Clermont and Montferrand at the time (joined in the seventeenth century in order to create Clermont-Ferrand).

From 1909 to 1980, Michelin founded 18 districts with around 8000 dwellings in the urban area of Clermont-Ferrand, their austerity being testimony to the Michelin spirit. Thus, in 1980, a third part of the city embraced a functional and disciplined architecture.

The spirit of discipline revolves around the work, the social and domestic spaces, their rational and utilitarian conception aimed at maintaining, controlling and reproducing its manpower. Naturally, the terraced layout, divisions and enclosures are at the origin of the thinking behind housing for the majority of workers and miners. 'Terracing is also the technology of the monotonous' (Murard and Zylberman 1976: 211), emphasized by an architecture without fantasy. 'Here is the "disciplinarian" habitat: a necessary space' (Murard and Zylberman 1976: 227). Foucault (1975) had demonstrated how discipline elevates the soul as it trains the body, through the control of space. With the division of space, each person is assigned to a particular place, and places are distributed according to disciplined and moral criteria determined by the housing service of the company (e.g. the number of points awarded by the firm according to the years of experience, the number of children, the merit level noted by the team leader, the conscientiousness displayed, the results of the social enquiry about the maintenance of the house and the customs of the family). The streets of the district called La Plaine, the biggest district built by Michelin with 1176 dwellings, expresses this spatial inscription of morality. Charity Street, Friendship Street, Goodness Street, Trust Street, Hope Street and Faith Street derive from Christian and kindly values, while Courage Street, Duty Street, Willpower Street and Bravery Street enshrine the virtues of work.

Of course, it was important for a large number of Michelin employees, who originally came from rural areas, to have a plot of land in order both to maintain symbolically a link to farming and to supplement the household wage. However, the fact that each home received a vegetable garden was not because the company was attentive to the rootless workers but because farming kept workers from meeting up in social spaces.

'In this way, we said, men didn't go to the bar' (Mr Pampi, retired worker, 80). The farming of these vegetable gardens ties up each person to their place (Frey 1989: 21), not only cultivating the vegetables but also inculcating the

healthy spirit advocated by the Michelin family. To prevent the risk of insalubrious and dangerous encounters for the employer, the role of the farming of this 'island of morality' (Murard and Zylberman 1976: 21) was paramount. The management of the interstices, the space-time between the sphere of work and the domestic sphere, is a struggle against all types of collectivity. The real danger for the company is not that the father of the family could get drunk in the pub, since it leaves him to get drunk in the factory in order to ease the hardships of the work. The danger is rather that to leave him the time to socialize and exchange ideas carries the risk of him becoming aware of his condition, even of organizing himself in opposition to the management.

The absence of public spaces, bars and small stores slows down the organization of a social life. The few rare collective spaces are dead-ends situated in the middle of dwellings, only useful for organizing an internal and closed life. Their closure responds to the guarantee of a familial intimacy as a 'space of sequestration' (Murard and Zylberman 1976: 275). Here the out-of-work space—that is to say, the domestic space—is conceived in relation to morally correct familial unity. Advocating the legitimate couple, restricting cohabitation and isolating singles, victim of what Murard and Zylberman called an 'apartheid' (1976: 202), are at the top of the criteria that determine the acquisition of a housing estate. Respect for these moral criteria is ensured by district supervisors, their presence being legitimized by their role as mediators for problems inherent in the dwellings:

> The supervisors kept an eye on things. It meant that if in a family something went wrong, through alcohol for example, or something else, then the supervisor could alert the social services. (Mme Voison 58, daughter and wife of workers)
> There were female assistant directors who came with their moped into the district to watch if you talked to the boys. (Mme Chime 50, daughter of a worker)

The internal spatial organization of the houses also participates in the tendency to supervise morally the workers, with a separation between children and parents. The intimate space is meant to encourage a healthy sex life, likely to discourage adultery and the frequenting of places dangerous to the management. In the same way, children are retained in their room because they now have their own space. These spaces are organized in a segregated way, depriving the inhabitants of the 'right to the city' (Lefebvre 1972; see also Pardo and Prato 2012), as they are isolated from the centre of activities of the city.

Of course, actors always '*bricolent*' (knock up) with these rules (De Certeau 1990), but the inhabitants of the Michelin homes accommodate themselves to them in exchange for healthy living conditions. Access to an estate house was viewed as a comfort and a social privilege, so very few people complained:

> All the dwellings in Clermont-Ferrand were very unhealthy. Whereas here, in each district, the homes are new, with the comfort of the shower, the laundry room and the vegetable garden […] Everyone was happy. The worker was happy, he had got his little home, his little vegetable garden, it was the dream. (Mr Chime, retired worker, 80)

Finally, in Michelin city, the spaces of moralization are also spaces of hygienic, cultural, sportive and scholarly education. The point is to produce 'good' workers, their quality being evaluated according to their degree of adherence to the Michelin spirit.

Strictness, discretion, punctuality, performance and saving are the main values handed on by the teachers to the pupils in the Michelin schools. As for the bosses' wives, they are in charge of the education of both the female workers and the workers' wives, in order to become 'good' housewives and 'good' home administrators. All the tasks attributed to the woman are inculcated within a moral framework during workshops for sewing, cooking, baby-wear making and so on. As for the men, they can join one of the numerous societies or play one of the numerous sports on offer. Keeping healthy as an investment to be cherished, maintaining the body and occupying the mind in order to prevent idleness and to stay away from 'bad habits' are the three principles which form the basis of the creation of the sports complex.

Michelin city is thus an industrial city whose spaces express the spirit of an ascetic, secretive (and closed), paternalistic, moralizing and disciplinarian company. These qualifying aspects find expression in a spatial organization that takes away the housing estates from the inner city, deprives people of public spaces and reinforces spatial segregation through a generalized mode of surveillance and an absence of social circulation. In Michelin city, the company is especially powerful and efficient as it has never been directly involved in local policy. The Michelin family has never supported a particular candidate, being satisfied with its local, national and global economic (and so political) weight in order to obtain everything it needs.

The Evolution of Capitalism and the Spirit that Justifies It: From Paternalism Directed at Workers to the Autonomous Enjoyment Promised to Managers

From the 1980s, the participation of Michelin in the globalization and internationalization of labour have had two main effects at the local level. First came ten plans for labour rationalization. A consequence of the offshoring of tyre production was a decrease in the workforce in Clermont-Ferrand of up to 50%. Another consequence was the closure of workshops in favour of a rise in the number of executives (mainly managers) and both offices and research spaces. Second, the paternalism addressed to the workers stopped.

The end of the paternalist era was sealed definitively by the departure of François Michelin in favour of his son Edouard Michelin in June 1999. The present boss embodies a new spirit that justifies a neoliberal capitalism, one no longer addressed to the workers but to the managers, who are the 'new industrial engine' (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999) to be enticed and turned into loyal subjects. Boltanski and Chiapello have shown how capitalism thrived on the criticism that had been made of it since the end of the 1960s, in order to develop further the spirit that justifies it. Capitalism was then accused of

interfering with freedom and of being a source of oppression by means of a hieratic power structure, a disciplinary authority and an excessive surveillance, widely present in Michelin city. Faced with the necessity of developing new arguments for the acceptance of work, factories have developed a new spirit of capitalism that promises autonomy of enjoyment and freedom at work with relaxed surveillance. The key terms of this new spirit, which cluster around the notion of 'project', are risk and the short term, but also mobility, flexibility, freedom and autonomy, all of which are expressed by the all-important turnover. Many now only stay a few years with Michelin in order to constitute a 'calling card' as they say (on this point, see, e.g., Sennett 1998):

> The day I no longer enjoy myself, when I won't be interested in my job anymore, when I won't progress anymore, I'll leave the company … Now, I'm having a ball in my job and as long as that is the case, I will continue. (Miss Nie, chemist researcher, 33)

The firms are once again faced with the problem of loyalty. This problem happened before during the industrial phase and was resolved for the most part through paternalism. Henceforth, two principal reasons motivate the managerial class criss-crossing the whole world: their enjoyment in their work and the quality of life offered by the town. As it happens, Clermont-Ferrand suffers from a bad reputation that is precisely linked to Michelin city. In the common representations of it, it is very much part of the stereotypical industrial and working-class cities, redolent of austerity, discipline and depression (Védrine 2009). This picture is widely fed by the media, especially during the 'scandal' caused by Edouard Michelin three months after his arrival at the head of the company. On 8 September 2009, Michelin announced a decent increase in profits (17.3%) and, at the same time, announced that it was cutting 7500 jobs in Europe. The next day, the share price of the company increased by 12%. The media treatment of the social consequences of financial capitalism depicted Clermont-Ferrand as a city abandoned by a company and its new unscrupulous boss.

In 1999, Michelin and the city council, both confronted with the same concern of improving their reputation in order to attract and retain executives, began working together to improve urban planning and the city image, to live down Michelin city and to take part in greater urban competition. Indeed, the statements of both the mayor and the new company chief from this date expressed the separation and independence of the city from the company, promoted by a new spirit of capitalism and of urbanism, also communicated in the national press.[2] Some 16 years later, during an interview, a manager of the council assigned to the 'network of Michelin cities' told us:

> Clermont-Ferrand doesn't have any image, if not a bad one. We have to change that. That's why we [the council] are creating a network of cities in the world where Michelin has a production factory.

The aim is to organize a big event in 2018 with an international conference about sustainable development, with the aim of making Clermont-Ferrand known to the world. Meanwhile, in the section called 'cadre de vie' ('living environment'), the website of the city announces: 'Clermont-Ferrand has changed and offers a new image' (http://www.clermont-ferrand.fr/-Grands-projets-.html, consulted 21 June 2016).

The Transformation of the Disciplinarian Industrial Town into an 'Attractive and Dynamic City', 'On a Par with the Other Big French Metropolises'

Clermont-Ferrand does not have the stature of a global city (Sassen 1991), nor of the situation of a 'loser' former industrial town (Rousseau 2008b).[3] It succeeded more quickly than others in its economic conversion into a post-industrial city, in part with the help of Michelin, widely counterbalancing the lost jobs in the local factories. Numerous jobs were created with the support of Michelin subsidiaries, such as 'la Side' (Société d'industrialisation et de développement économique) created in 1990. Having become 'Michelin Développement' in 2010, it advises, trains and finances various sectors in order to develop the regions where the factory is situated. According to a brochure dating from 2004 and introducing its aims, it participates in the 'common interest' of the enterprise and the regions in order to bring a local 'dynamism' or 'vitality'. There are two determining priorities: first, to develop a 'performing' subcontracting division; and second, to attract executive staff, 'high-level experts', which they hope to accomplish by offering their spouses local, 'efficient and diversified' jobs, and by providing them with a rich and fulfilling quality of life, with high standards of leisure, including varied cultural programmes and with an attractive living environment.

This is the beginning of a partnership between the council and the company to develop an infrastructure and reclassify Clermont-Ferrand, both socially and spatially, as worthy of welcoming the parent company of Michelin. It is also to propel the city into urban competitiveness with projects defended by an 'entrepreneurial mayor' (Prat 2007) in order to transform the city into a 'real European-scale metropolis'. Being faced with the threat of a departure that would be catastrophic for the region, the council has to satisfy the company and cannot be in opposition to its projects.[4] Indeed, the point is not to support economically the reconversion of an industrial area after the decline of industrial activity but to accompany politically the evolution of one of the world's biggest companies.

The transformation of capitalism, in which Michelin is one of the principal actors, is expressed locally by a social recomposition. However, it is a question of modernizing the image both of the firm and of the city to seduce, welcome and retain the young executives who arrive from all over the world. It is therefore necessary both to prove that Clermont-Ferrand is not limited to Michelin

city, highlighting all its economic, urban, social and cultural assets, and to transform the paternalist image of the firm into a symbol of modernity, prestige and excellence.

As for Michelin, it ensures its evolution through the communication of a new spirit of capitalism, less austere, less disciplinarian, more open and more dynamic, offering the possibilities of thriving at work thanks to a certain freedom of organization and an autonomy in decision-making. Social changes, and the evolution of the spirit of enterprise which is inherent to them, must express themselves in a spatial transformation. Michelin thus renovates and reclassifies its functional and dilapidated buildings, confirming the decline in the number of workers through the demolition and the mutation of workshops into office spaces. One of the four factories[5] destroyed in 2005 left 14 hectares where the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire built a 'mother-child hospital complex' in 2008, while the council developed a housing zone and an economic zone for the healthcare sector.

As for the rehabilitation of the old-fashioned image of a paternalistic company, this begins with a rebranding of the parent company as a place where all the executives of all the Michelin factories in the world can come. A concern for the landscape, which suggests an improvement of the Tiretaine, and the creation of a greenhouse for the exhibition of some rubber plants, heralds a new aesthetic while remaining loyal to its entrepreneurial spirit: simple and sober.[6]

> I arrived at the beginning of 2000. I said to myself: 'hey, they are renovating, it was high time! It is great what they have done. It is very pleasant to work in, it's beautiful. It's aesthetic, when the former buildings … it was walls with inside … you never knew what was going on inside.' (Miss Nie)

Still following a dynamic of communication, the opening of a cultural and tourist site called L'aventure Michelin on a brownfield site in 2009, and the modernization of Michelin man, emphasize this shift, from a local myth incarnated by the paternal figure into an international myth incarnated by a mascot (Védrine 2008).

Michelin sold its cooperatives to a chain store, the cultural spaces are now managed by the work council of the firm, and the stadium and the sports spaces by l'Association sportive montferrandaise. A portion of the schools and the hospitals are now managed by the public sector, the other part by the private sector. However, l'Ecole d'enseignement technique Michelin continues to train the future technicians of the firm, and the International School takes care of the schooling of the executives' children.

In 1984, Michelin began to propose to its tenants to get onto the property ladder of its housing estates, and then extended the offer to all the inhabitants of Clermont-Ferrand. The remaining dwellings were sold to the social housing landlords. Regeneration on the part of the social housing landlords and the tenants has involved a restyling of the facades, bringing in colours to put an

end to the monotony and initial austerity, the installation of administrative and commercial infrastructure to put an end to the isolation, a layout of collective spaces which invites people to come out of their confinement, and a social recomposition of the districts which put an end to social segregation. As it turns out, middle-class families are most interested in buying the houses with a garage and a garden. With the appropriation by the new inhabitants, and the reappropriation by the former ones, the old areas built by Michelin are undergoing some noteworthy transformations in terms of composition, landscape, uses and thus also social life. High hedges now grow between the houses, bringing the surveillance between neighbours to a close. Today we can see the transition from needs imposed by the company, the farming of the vegetable garden, to desires and leisure expressed by the inhabitants with swings and chaises longues, and other testimonies to the very idleness and lounging which were discouraged by Michelin. Today, each person is investing in their exterior space to reflect their sensibility and what they want to show about themselves.

All in all, the social withdrawal of the company has opened up real-estate opportunities. The first sector concerned is the one which corresponds to Michelin city, located between Clermont and Montferrand. I have mentioned the operations of demolition and regeneration. In 2000 the council also built a concert hall called Coopérative de mai on the site of a former Michelin food store cooperative. The second sector concerned is the inner city of Clermont-Ferrand. I cannot possibly describe all the urban projects of regeneration and gentrification which look after the image of a university city that welcomes 35,000 students and more than 6000 researchers (as much as the number of workers in the Michelin factories in Clermont-Ferrand), but I can highlight the projects which involve Michelin.

To keep up their common interest, the council and the company have developed a partnership, which presupposes negotiations and compromises. Thus they are completing together the infrastructure of the city, especially the economic and university sector, by setting up new engineering schools and new chemistry research hubs. An interview conducted with the local deputy of urbanism in 2003 revealed the existence of meetings between Michelin and the council every two months, in order to talk about the urban projects of the town in general, and about the lodging of managers in particular. A council representative stated:

> Michelin is the primary employer, the primary taxpayer, the primary property owner. It's a company more famous than the city in which it is established … nothing is done without asking them their opinion. Nothing important. For my part, during these meetings, I inform them about the big projects we have in mind, in order to check if they aren't a problem for them. A concrete example: they have a problem housing executives and especially foreign senior executives who come to Clermont-Ferrand for a few years to be trained. And when you are American, you are used to staying in a 100 m² flat in the historic centre. So they told us: 'we need to find a solution'; therefore, through the policy of allocating

properties, in our urbanism policy, this demand has to be taken into account. More precisely, this demand will be conveyed by an offer of new housing development, and it's my duty to be able to respond to this demand because, if the company is growing, Clermont-Ferrand will grow too. And if Michelin collapses or leaves Clermont, it will be a catastrophe.

Putting up the executives has two consequences for the city centre of Clermont-Ferrand: the gentrification of the historic centre and the creation of high-quality housing and hotels.

The urban projects mainly concerned urban spaces, along the lines of the key to contemporary urban policy: the tramway. This was made to circulate in 2006 on tyres.[7] The local deputy for urbanism explained:

> Of course they [Michelin] are permanently informed about what we intend to do and why. Especially in this case, 'la place de Jaude' is regenerated because there will be a tramway, and this tramway will be on tyres, and if it's on tyres it is because Michelin asked us.

Among these projects, those of 'la place de Jaude', realized in 2005, heralded a 'big change' and inaugurated the development of a 'new mood for the city' through the convocation of architectural and urban tools (via a rebranding and the creation of new spaces and infrastructure), artistic and cultural tools (via the spatial appropriation by the arts and street performances), and landscape and heritage tools (via spatial improvements).[8]

'Beautiful', 'welcoming', 'bright', 'flowery' and 'attractive', suggesting a 'unique sensorial dimension', with an 'aesthetic interest', promising a 'development of social life' and 'facilitating connections and common emotions': these are the words used by the council of its new public space, invoking all the physical, sensorial and social dimensions inherent in the definition of mood (Thibauld 2004). The preoccupation with ambiance was absent from the industrial town. However, since the 2000s, it has been at the heart of the discourse on urban matters in Clermont-Ferrand, both the spatial and symbolic rebranding and the urban policy of differentiation through the marketing of an image. It encourages the inhabitants to participate in the construction of a new identity through the production of a new urbanity, inviting new practices and new ways of being in the city.

From the Surveillance of the Workers and the Ban on Enjoyment to the Control of Managers Through Enjoyment

The austere and disciplinarian spaces of 'Michelinville' are slowly giving way to spaces of beauty and leisure. Just as the old limitations on the public spaces are substituted by the marketing of their new layout, so the geographic isolation of the former workers is substituted by the preoccupation of offering housing in

the city centre for the new salaried. This leads to the implantation of new, specialized and top-of-the-range shops offering decoration and prêt-à-porter, all very far removed from the workers cooperatives of 'Michelinville'.

As for the non-workspaces, they are no longer the vegetable gardens that kept their occupants away from places of leisure; they are precisely places of leisure. Bars or 'lounges', restaurants, nightclubs, art galleries, concert halls, cinemas and sports halls are all opening in order to satisfy the wishes of the new managerial class, which is also managed through these spaces of enjoyment. In this new city, single people are not isolated but welcomed, in special areas called 'dynamic districts' which ensure the satisfaction of their needs.

Clermont-Ferrand is hence one of the key witnesses of the passage from a paternalist policy, which aimed to attract employees and earn their loyalty via *social protection*, consolidated by social and economic advantages, to a seduction of employees via professional and urban *enjoyment*. In this dynamic, if the ornaments of the city, as disseminated by its urban marketing machine, allow it to enter urban rivalry, they also allow it more widely to play the game of seduction through the consumption of this urbanity.

We are tempted to say that the 'military, male and strategic' spaces, called 'phallic' by Lefebvre (1972: 138), are tending towards a feminization through spaces of seduction that produce decoys (Baudrillard 1979). The city of spectacle described by Harvey (1990), offered to the consumers of illusion, is the theatre of new spaces of control, probably more sly, which express the passage from a ban on enjoyment, by means of industrial surveillance and the encouragement of discipline, to an injunction to enjoy through the controlled consumption of leisure, culture and art. In this passage, in which executives become the object of the attention of both private and public policies, are not they the ones who are now the most normalized and supervised?

The analysis of the discourse of local urban policies shows a passage from urban segregation to both 'diversity' and 'social cohesion'. These notions are at the core of the statements that accompany the planning of public projects such as 'La place de Jaude' and 'Le Carré Jaude' built in 2013. At the time, it promised a 'reinforcement of functional diversity' and 'the maintenance of social diversity', assured by the creation of 51,000 square metres of housing with 'homes for buying, student accommodation, social housing, tourism residences', 'to equip with better services', offices, hotels, a cinema, parking and shops, all built around a 'green space'.[9]

The discourse and local urban policies also demonstrate the evolution of the spirit of capitalism. What draws our attention here is not the transformations of capitalism as a system but as an ideology whose values revolve around urban space and, more broadly, urbanism, itself a 'mixing of institutions and ideologies' (Lefebvre 1972: 62). Indeed, our assumption is that the critique addressed to both the former spirit of capitalism and to paternalism is linked to the critique of the industrial town. The critique addressed to the functional, disciplinarian and polluting city was the mainspring of the marketing discourse on the sustainable city ('located in its volcanic jewellery case'), aesthetic city ('more

beautiful'), with culture[10] and leisure ('more attractive'), and with a heritage ('a point of reference'). The promise of enjoyment inside the company is expressed as a promise of wellbeing and quality of life through the vehicle of urban planning, and particularly by the 'big urban project' as 'le Carré Jaude' was described.

The notions of 'the new spirit of capitalism' are today applied to the 'neoliberal' city, just as the notions of the former spirit (rationality, function, efficiency and discipline) were in the industrial town. Since the 1980s, the development and the success of the notion of urban project are a 'consequence of the withdrawal of the state, of the decentralization and the liberalization of the planning sector' (Mercier and Zetlaoui-Léger 2009), and they now express the introduction of the new values of capitalism in the discourses linked to urbanism and the public sector. The move from Fordism to a process of neoliberalization (Brenner and Theodore 2002) and the change of scale in the public sector are embodied in the new urban modelling, via a passage from the technical and rational masterplan to the urban project.

The notions of flexibility (of both urban spaces and urban practices), mobility and network[11] are also defining the contemporary city, which supplants the functional city divided into sectors of the industrial period. In this new city, managed by projects, the spaces of work and of leisure, and more widely the spaces of both social and family life, have been split, leading to new urban rationales. In this respect, Rousseau aptly shows the passage from an 'industrialisation made around an urbanism of immobility' (2008a: 1) as, for instance, through paternalism, to an urbanism of mobility developed by a flexible accumulation of capital and an increase in the 'mobility of human capital'.

In this context, common projects are necessary to the inhabitants for the maintenance of social cohesion, expressed in 'living together', the title of a section of the municipal newspaper *Demain Clermont*. A real political project, the urban project is promising both an identity renewal and a social cohesion for what Thomas called the 'supporter-city-dwellers' (Thomas 1995). Much more than this, it conveys the new values of capitalist society through the diffusion of stories produced to accompany the projects. The notions of autonomy and participation, for example (widely mobilized in Clermont-Ferrand with the new local urbanism plan Plan Local d'Urbanisme), are developed together with the notion of participatory democracy, the limits of which we now know. The language of a new urban utopia, of which the inhabitants are both confederates and yet keen to defend their local identities, seems to be one of urbanism and culture, these two being the main vectors of images widely marshalled by political and economic agencies.

> We are a part of the 15 big French dynamic cities and our cultural ambition no longer needs to be proven. Clermont-Ferrand is changing. We are completing our civic infrastructure with the projects of the large Library, the National Theatre and the stadium Philippe Marcombes. We will then have all the necessary assets to develop our territory on a par with the other big French metropolises. (statement of the Mayor in *Demain Clermont* n. 314, May–June 2016)

The urban project promotes these deployed efforts to 'increase the attractiveness', offering examples of the way urban marketing follows on more and more powerfully from company marketing. On these points, the big urban and political projects of Marseilles, Nantes, Dunkerque and Montpellier—to name but a few—have been the object of explanatory studies (Pinson 2009; Prat 2007; Hamman 2011).

What do the inhabitants have to say about this? Like the Michelin workers who were 'happy' (to quote Mr Chime mentioned above) in the housing estates, the executives are now showing their satisfaction about the 'quality of life' offered by the city. As far as the Michelin workers are concerned, they have appropriated the former housing estates or have settled on the outskirts of the city. Their view of the transformations of both capitalism and the city is tinged with ambivalence. Although they are proud of Michelin, they also feel abandoned by 'father' Michelin and powerless, especially when they have to witness the progressive closures of the workshops (Védrine 2009), which are accompanied by the disappearance of their once popular urban spaces:

> The places where we used to eat a steak in the morning in the inner city, that is finished now, since they are changing everything. (Mr Camitra, worker, 60)

As a further development of this research, it would be interesting to investigate what has become of those excluded from these sociospatial identity transformations. Indeed, though there are numerous sociological, geographical and political studies of the process of urban competition, urban marketing and gentrification, an anthropological approach would have to address at least three points.

First, we should ask whether cities such as 'Michelinville' should be studied as a specific 'social institution' with its 'dynamics and social, economic and political relations' (Prato and Pardo 2013: 81). To this end we should also keep in mind that the anthropological approach does not divide up the social but takes into account all the dimensions which compose it, via a firmly multidisciplinary approach.

Second, the anthropological approach allows us to study the ideology of capitalism centred on the urban space, using the traditional tools of the analysis of mythical narratives. On the one hand, capitalism as an ideology, and on the other hand, the urban discourse of the public planners are indeed legitimized by the stories which convey values, norms and rules about living together, and these can be brought to light by an anthropological analysis (Védrine 2015).

Third, urban anthropology centred on the anthropology of capitalism offers an approach to urban changes as described by the actors and their experiences, especially those excluded from these big transformations (see, e.g., Pardo and Prato 2012: 4). Where and what do they produce in terms of identity, culture and urban spaces? We suppose that these urban exclusions are also expressed in terms of the symbolic accessibility of these new spaces, which demand new urbanities after their rebranding. Here, Michelin indirectly intervenes through

the practices and representations of its managers, marked by a particular entrepreneurial spirit. Faced with the need to bring into the spotlight the way all this revolves around urban space, what are the modes of resistance, and the competencies and resources developed by those who are left out of these processes?

Notes

1. From 1999, 75 interviews with employees, retired people, inhabitants, urban actors (architects, urban planners) and political actors, were completed by an ethnographic observation of the city spaces and a few events (e.g. protest marches and the public funeral of Edouard Michelin), and the analysis of documents produced by the company. On the relevance of ethnographic analysis, see, for example, Pardo and Prato (2012).
2. For example, 'Clermont-Ferrand, the city which would like to forget Michelin' (*Libération*, 21 September 1999), 'A city looking for a new identity' (*Le Monde*, 3 February 2000).
3. *Demain Clermont* (March–April, n. 313 and May–June 2016, n. 314, p. 3).
4. For another country where the workforce is cheaper, or for Paris, like a lot of parent companies.
5. The factory 'Estaing' was essentially a storage unit for routing and vehicle maintenance, with up to 2000 employees. When it was destroyed, it retained only 500 employees, who were then transferred to one of the others factories in Clermont-Ferrand.
6. A small river which was buried by Michelin.
7. Telling the story which resulted in the creation of a tramway on tyres deserves its own study to explain all the political and economic dimensions. The point here is that for Michelin it is a way both of putting into circulation its innovation and advertising it.
8. This slogan was accompanied by a communication campaign about the new public place.
9. http://www.clermont-ferrand.fr/Grand-Carre-de-Jaude-le-projet.html
10. Clermont-Ferrand is a candidate for European Capital of Culture in 2028.
11. Both local and global, managed by *The Mission of international relationships*.

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Urban Planning and Local Instances

Resistance to Places of Collective Memories: A Rapid Transformation Landscape in Beijing

Florence Graezer Bideau

Introduction

I first visited the Bell and Drum towers neighbourhood, commonly designated as Gulou, during my fieldwork in Beijing between 1995 and 2000. During the 2010s, I returned to this area regularly, always struck by the contrast of the ordinariness of the lifestyle of the local working-class community in their dilapidated houses and the proximity of the Forbidden City. Since I started my visits, Gulou has undergone a gentrification process, with an important commodification of buildings transformed into bars, cafes, restaurants, designer boutiques and so on.

Gulou's transformation process is a classic example of a historic city's core zone. Its marginal position within the historical and cultural districts in the early 1990s resulted in poor maintenance of the urban heritage yet preserved a rich social community life. The municipal authorities have adopted various political strategies. In the late 1990s and early 2000s they transformed the southern part of the central axis (from the Yongding Gate to the Forbidden City), focusing on

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Qianmen and Dashilan. After that they intended to develop Gulou's northern part, up to the Summer Olympic Games site. The aftermath of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games saw several district transformation projects that, as in the case of the London Olympics (Lindsay 2011, 2014), provoked resistance from local communities, such as the Cultural Heritage Protection Center, civic associations and residential groups. Some 50 years after a conflict that opposed preservationists and modernists, the Maoist plan—strongly influenced by Soviet experts—opted for the transformation of Beijing into a modern, socialist capital city, largely overriding tradition (Sit 1995). Issues surrounding the conservation of city and historical districts were already at the heart of such reflections.

Urban Heritage in China

China has submitted propositions to the World Heritage List–an inventory of sites related to the Convention concerning the protection of the World of Cultural and Natural Heritage (UNESCO 1972)– ever since it became a state member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1985. It has maintained a strong interest in themes developed by the international organization. The heritage issue is not new in China (Zhang 2003), but the coutnry's participation in the international agency implies an adjustment to different measures. This is most notable in its active participation in several programmes launched by UNESCO, the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), and its hosting of three education and research institutes on world heritage for the Asia-Pacific region (World Heritage Institute of Training and Research for the Asia and the Pacific Region under the auspice of UNESCO, WHITR-AP, in Beijing, Shanghai and Suzhou), specifically to progressively submit successful propositions for heritage lists related to natural, cultural and mixed properties or intangible cultural practices (Bodolec 2014; Gruber 2007; Shepherd and Yu 2013). At the national level, with the help of academic institutions that work on concrete cases studies from a preservation technique or planning perspective, regulations have successively been implemented that protect buildings considered of value in rural or urban contexts.

The first heritage law, passed in 1957, concerns historic buildings. It was followed in 1982 by a law to protect cultural heritage that specified the selection criteria for representative cities of Chinese cultural identity. The notion of visual characteristic (*fengmao*) is articulated as standing against frenetic urban development that is destroying historical heritage. In the 1980s, traditional neighbourhoods entered into the category of properties to be preserved. In 1985, Beijing was proclaimed 'Renowned Historic and Cultural City' (Abramson 2001). Between 1990 and 2000, the municipality of Beijing designated 25 historic and cultural districts to be preserved, representing a fifth of the old city (Shin 2010; Zhang 2013a). Among them, two were designated 'traditional one-storey courtyard housing preservation districts': Nanluoguxiang in the East

City and Xisi Bei in the West City. The label 'construction control zone' was quickly introduced to protect neighbourhoods around outstanding properties, allowing an extension of the preservation zone (Abramson 2007). The renovation of Ju'er Hutong neighbourhood responded to this compromise, interpreting it as a way to preserve the *spirit* of the building (chessboard grid; *siheyuan*) while at the same time renovating and modernizing its interior to raise living standards (Wu 1999; Zhang and Fang 2003). In 2000, the municipal authorities completed the definition of this label by prohibiting the development of high buildings that severely transform tangible heritage in historical and cultural zones. So far there is no national funding for cultural heritage in China; projects of renovation or transformation depend on the economic conditions of each region as well as on political will. Additional regulations will gradually clarify the procedures of protection and labelling in the country. In 2003, for example, the 'Renowned Historic and Cultural City' label also came to include the protection of towns, and historical and cultural villages (Kaiping *diaolou* in the Pearl River Delta or Fujian *tulou* villages) (Yan 2015), and it was later extended to streets (Guozidian, Yandaixie and Nanluoguxiang Streets in Beijing) (Abramson 2014). To summarize, measures are scaled, allowing plasticity in the protection approach based on the political and economic contexts.

TRADITIONAL NEIGHBOURHOODS AND THE HISTORIC URBAN LANDSCAPE

In Beijing, the traditional district is considered to be, and presented as, a typical microcosm to preserve; a showcase to promote for ideological and economic reasons (Broudehoux 2004). However, the municipal will to preserve such neighbourhoods stands in conflict with progressive transformations of the city encouraged to enable pharaonic urban projects that bring an international visibility and recognition to Beijing. Architectural icons such as the Rem Koolhaas CCTV headquarters, the Paul Andrieu Beijing National Grand Theater, the Herzog & de Meuron Bird Nest of the Summer Olympics 2008 and soon the Winter Olympics 2022 are examples of such projects (Campanella 2008; Ren 2011). There is a special awareness of the values that heritage conveys, not only technically or politically (representing a time, a knowledge or an ideology), but also culturally and socially (the urban fabric reflecting the composition of society, a particular way of life, traditions of a community and so on).

This awareness is not unique to China; it is relayed through the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 2003), which was principally initiated by East Asian countries (Japan and South Korea). This new international instrument promotes cultural traditions and social practices that are representative of various groups. It places communities at the centre of the process, encouraging them to participate in decisions (Andris and Graezer Bideau 2014). In the case of Beijing neighbourhoods, the preservation of communities living in the *hutongs* is as primordial as the grid on a chessboard. The UNESCO Recommendation on the Historic Urban

Landscape (RHUL; UNESCO 2011) complemented existing heritage devices between the tangible and the intangible, while also attempting to quell the growing tension between urban development and the protection of property. Its holistic definition embraces a set (or historic centre) in both its physical/geographical and intangible/identity dimensions. Considered to be a non-homogeneous dynamic process, this definition is both attractive to, and programmatic for, various stakeholders. The HUL remains a recommendation that loses its 'clout' through its desire to encompass everything, to be 'all things to all men'. Moreover, it is interpreted differently within the various cultural, economic and political contexts in which it is supposed to operate.

How then must representative elements of heritage be selected for preservation? What criteria must be considered? Who are the actors involved? What role does collective memory play in the selection of buildings? Which role does the transmission of collective memory play in the urban context? How does urban transformation change the practices of ordinary residents and their memory of places?

Urban Change During the Mao Era

Urban change, incorporating all the topics raised above, was already under way during the Mao era. Indeed, the neighbourhoods around the Forbidden City were significantly altered by the modernization of the capital in the late 1950s (Gaubatz 1995). The implementation of the 1958 masterplan that transformed the traditional structure inherited from previous dynasties destroyed part of the walls and main gates of the imperial city and built broad avenues (including Chang'an) and ring roads whose axis changed the symbolic north–south of the capital structure. It exploited loopholes in traditional districts in order to impose the construction of new public buildings—the famous ten large buildings marking the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic of China—and large spaces, some with a clear political purpose, such as Tiananmen Place (Wu 2005). Mao also sought to establish more industry in Beijing in order to balance the production of primary sector forces (countryside) with secondary and tertiary (city). To this end, some old neighbourhoods were partially transformed to accommodate work units (*danwei*), 'micro-cities' within the city that reduced the distance between work and home (Bray 2005). These spatial structures include all necessary facilities for people to live together for their whole lives: scholastic and political education; medical care; catering; shops; leisure and sport; public space; retirement; and so on. Various types of *danwei* were implemented in the city, all comprising modern housing with higher standards of living than in traditional neighbourhoods. There were major industries in the east and the south, universities in the north and the military in the old neighbourhoods of the Eight Banners around the Forbidden City.

Courtyard houses (*siheyuan*), originally inhabited by a single family, became mixed houses (*dazayuan*) or social housing in which several families lived with shared facilities (usually bathroom and kitchen). These spatial structures were uncomfortable, usually rented and poorly maintained, resulting in the gradual

deterioration of the building. This modification of the residents' profile nevertheless enabled the maintenance of a mixed population in traditional neighbourhoods and made these residential areas popular. They became places where local communities carried on a particular way of life, shared collective memory and lived in proximity—an important factor in how a social organization perpetuates itself.

The ten years of turmoil during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) left their mark on the Beijing cityscape. Many buildings were damaged or destroyed by the Red Guards, who regarded them as marks of the old regime, symbols of feudalism or traces of old customs to be banned at all costs. Among these, particular ire was reserved for temples, ancestral halls, royal houses or those of senior officials, targeted both because of their outer shell (built architecture) and because of the lifestyles associated with them.

Urban Change During the Deng Era

The era of reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping impacted 'top down' urban policy. Along with the opening up of the country and the encouragement of private initiatives, China saw the emergence of a multitude of decision-makers entering the urban landscape (Hsing 2010). The profile of Chinese cities was disrupted and the urban fabric—so far largely maintained—underwent radical change. These changes included boulevards, the 'disneyfication' of neighbourhoods, the construction of high-rise buildings and so on, with former residents being relocated (Leaf 1995). Like other Chinese cities, Beijing entered an era of demolition, renovation and unprecedented transformation.

The system of social housing operated by the state since 1949 was gradually abandoned in favour of a real-estate market that is both sprawling and dizzying. Its growth rate meets the demands of the new middle class, now firmly installed in large cities, the upper classes, who consume excess goods and property, and the migrant communities, who can only afford to live in dilapidated neighbourhoods. Land speculation is rampant and is accompanied by a policy of expropriation that affects popular or historical districts, usually located in the centre of the city (Wu 1997). Thus housing, previously considered a public good, has become a commodity. Various reforms regulating urban housing were introduced in the late 1980s to control the development of Chinese cities.[1] These established two distinct real-estate markets: an affordable one for the middle and lower classes and a luxury one for the wealthy. These legislative changes and political decisions still have consequences for the social structure of these urban neighbourhoods.

Unlike in the Mao era, it is not necessarily the type of *hukou* (household registration) that determines the place of residence and allows community management by structuring local government. This local organization, which implies a community based on neighbourly relations, widely structures a homogeneous lifestyle where residents share many collective areas such as public spaces (streets, squares, bathrooms or kitchens), which become an extension of

their private space. Purchasing power and consumption tendencies are now significant factors for spatial reorganization and have a major consequence: greater social segregation. For example, the appearance of gated communities constitutes a kind of new *danwei* administered by private companies—gentrified neighbourhoods accessible only to privileged classes (Pow 2007; Tomba 2008). Social housing, which reflected a certain type of social order, is no longer the regime's priority. Local authorities must find a way of funding the maintenance or transformation of their housing stock. Selling apartments to private investors is one such way, overcoming budget deficits caused by renovations. Lucrative real-estate transactions that often ignore existing buildings, sometimes of historic or cultural value, also bring substantial income. These often overlook the needs or desires of residents whose families might have lived there for generations.

Increasing land speculation and evictions in Beijing have led the authorities to establish new Regulations on the Management of Urban Building Removal in Beijing in 1998 and 2001 to preserve old or dilapidated buildings and protect inhabitants after relocation, as well as recognize the legitimacy of financial compensation. The decree also authorizes the demolition of old neighbourhoods and the expulsion of their residents in order to modernize an area, allowing the construction of large-scale buildings and a profitable operation for investors. This is particularly pertinent for traditional neighbourhoods in the centre of the city with high real-estate value. These areas, however, also contain major heritage reference sites (temples, royal houses, towers, gates and walls), as well as more ordinary, everyday heritage traces (courtyard houses, streets, shops and restaurants) that are required to maintain a spatial organic structure with a mixed social organization. It is this balance that produces the visual atmosphere (*fengmao*) particularly emphasized by urban planners and local authorities.

Experiments have been tried in several neighbourhoods. The rejuvenation of the Qianmen neighbourhood (Ren 2009) in the making of 'New Beijing' for the 2008 Olympics Games is a good example of how a government project legitimized itself by combining modern elements and new architectural icons to transform a residential area into a commercial district for Chinese tourists and local consumers, the preservation of selected old buildings and the reduction of population density (Broudehoux 2009; Meyer 2008). Meeting a pattern widely documented in 'urban anthropology' (Prato and Pardo 2013), this illustrates a new need for consumption in the capital city, with traditional alleys and their immediate surroundings transformed into a kind of 'theme park' for visitors. In some cases the construction of 'fake hutongs' brings new economic function to an area that had previously been mostly residential. But the gentrification process can effectively exclude local inhabitants culturally, socially and financially as they can no longer afford to live in such areas (Siu 2007). Residents in Dashilan tried to resist the appropriation of housing by the municipal authorities (Evans 2014; Ou 2008). Having lost the landmarks of their community life in the new 'old' setting, former residents were offered financial compensation to relocate to other neighbourhoods (Gu 2001).

Neighbourhoods located on the Beijing central axis are particularly sensitive zones; their transformation might damage the Chinese authorities' project to eventually submit them to UNESCO for World Heritage accreditation. To summarize, the strong awareness of the need to protect heritage at the local and national level sometimes clashes with the fragmentation of urban policy (Felli 2005). The implementation of the various regulations, orchestrated by multiple agents operating at the national, municipal and local levels, produces heterogeneous, sometimes inconsistent, situations. Few traditional neighbourhoods were really preserved, others were redeveloped into areas of two-storey buildings with 'historic' roofs or iconic buildings redeveloped for the Imperial City's designation on the UNESCO World Heritage list (Zhang 2008, 198).[2] Others were simply demolished and their inhabitants relocated.

Gulou Neighbourhood: A Preserved Area in a Rapid Transformation Landscape?

Located in the north part of the Forbidden City, Shichahai is also part of the Beijing central axis. Composed of temples, historical royal mansions and a grid of ordinary, relatively well-maintained courtyards around a large natural lake, Shichahai is one of the 25 historical and cultural neighbourhoods of the capital city. Considered to be an organic living tradition for generations, some parts of the area have already been transformed to create a commercial hub of bars and restaurants that is reached from the main boulevards using three-wheelers. Changes to the area have impacted the everyday life of the inhabitants. The walls of the alleyways have been superficially renovated but the housing is still in poor condition. Land prices have nevertheless increased and residents await opportunities to move out. Meanwhile, they complain about the noisy bars, the drunken customers, and the congestion of cars and taxis in the narrow streets, all of which prevents them from enjoying the peaceful alleys of the past (Zhang 2013a, b) (Fig. 15.1).

The Bell and Drum towers lie in the eastern part of Shichahai. This neighbourhood is still quite well preserved. It is other areas that have been targeted for change, such as the *hutongs* mentioned above and bar streets in Shichahai (Gu and Ryan 2008; Yang and Bian 2016) or the hutongs' area in Nanluoguxiang, which was transformed into a tourist and commercial zone with restaurants, bars, shops and ceramics (Shin 2010). The two towers were built during the Yuan dynasty in 1272. They stand 100 metres apart and are important memorial landmarks of the city. They signal space (the northern edge of the Forbidden City and icon for the central axis of the northern part of the city) and time (the morning bell and evening drum signalled the opening and closing of the city's gates) for the entire population. Small shops surrounded them, adding a commercial centre to the residential one that is still present today. Since the 1980s, old Beijing people have moved out of the traditional neighbourhood as their *danwei* offered them modern, better housing. They usually rented their native home to fresh migrants looking for work, thus

Fig. 15.1 The Bell Tower viewed from Yandaixie Cultural Street, September 2015. ©
F. Graezer Bideau

the migrants became the new local residents. In the 1990s they were joined by
another wave of migrants who came looking for work in the transforming
Beijing. More recently, as traditional districts have turned into historical and
cultural neighbourhoods, craftsmen, students and expatriates, as well as small
entrepreneurs in tourist and commercial businesses, have settled there
(Fig. 15.2).

   This mixed community is living 'cheek by jowl' in a sometimes overlapping
collage. Its members have access to various standards of living and patterns of
consumption according to their age, gender, ethnic group, family status and
professional activity. Their lives have different rhythms and commuting pat-
terns, some live in the neighbourhood, some commute to work. For those who
live there, neighbourly relations are central as they enjoy proximity and mutual
help—access to goods in food stores, transformation works with the alleys or
siheyuan, childcare and so forth. They also share common interests and prac-
tices, such as recreational activities—dancing; taijichuan; playing chess, cards
and mahjong, looking after birds in cages, studying local history and so on.
Participant observations conducted in September 2014 and 2015 and inter-
views carried out in the district between December 2015 and February 2016
highlight a feeling of collective memory that maintains the residents' attach-
ment to this place.[3] A female resident of college age remarked:

Fig. 15.2 Everyday community life on the Bell and Drum Towers square, September 2014. © F. Graezer Bideau

> You know, my grandpa was born here. My dad was born here. And I was born here. This means so much for our family and for a lot of other families. We define ourselves by saying that we are *laobeijing* [indigenous Beijingers]. Your life would be meaningless without living in this place. Now we have to move far away, where, in the past, is not Beijing. Our children and their children will no longer be *laobeijing*! So it's not about moving out of Gulou, but about moving out of ourselves!

In his seminal work, Maurice Halbwachs (1950) demonstrates the importance of collective memory for a community's identification with the material configuration of their neighbourhood. Attachment to a spatial context provides a sense of stability and continuity, which is central to any evolving community. The dynamic process of expressing collective memory within the community mostly references the past—a specific moment or practice embedded in a particular place or site—better to enable a telling, or understanding, of the present. As Andrea Huyssen (2003) notes, people construct a sense of the past that informs us about the multiple voices arising from local communities and authorities. These heterogeneous expressions, ranging from dominant to subaltern positions, construct an urban memory coherent with the city landscape. Attachment to place as a memory or identity can be disturbed when brutal change occurs within the neighbourhood.

In historical and cultural districts where there has been demolition of the built environment and/or eviction and displacement of the local community, individual or collective resistance to these traumatic transformations is observed. These resistances take various forms—perhaps narratives or practices (Scott 1990)—and need to adapt to the continuously changing legal requirements that dictate the transformation of the city shape. They usually constitute everyday practices of informality (de Certeau 1990) expressed in political, economic, cultural and emotional terms, which stand in opposition to prescribed and orthodox practices and values. Urban heritage is a good framework with which to observe and analyse the use and appropriation of sites by the different stakeholders involved in the management and preservation of cultural heritage. This is even more pertinent with challenges and limits that the new recommendation on historical urban landscape brings to the local and national arenas (Bandarin and van Oers 2012). In Beijing, where issues of local identity and city appropriation are especially relevant, analyses of spatial justice (Soja 2009) can explore the organization of space that reflects social and political relations between various agents of the community as well as interactions between local communities and authorities (Fig. 15.3).

Gulou's location on the north part of Beijing's central axis is a sensitive area. From an official perspective, the management of the urban development may

Fig. 15.3 Demolition of the Bell and Drum towers square, September 2014. © F. Graezer Bideau

either improve or damage the concrete and visual perception of this symbolic axis. This became all the more important with the submission of the Beijing Central Axis (including Beihai) to the World Heritage List in 2013 and the award of the Winter Olympic Games to Beijing in 2022. The authorities, therefore, are paying careful attention to the transformation of this area. They do not want the kind of controversy they experienced during the 2000s with the south part of the central axis around Qianmen. Nevertheless, they may take into account the memorial references mobilized by local communities in their urban landscape and their strategy to be recognized as the legal inhabitants claiming the right to the city (Harvey 2008), the right of belonging to this place (Zhang 2013a) or the right to form a homeowners' movement (Merle 2014). Indeed, recent studies have highlighted the production of internal hierarchies constitutive of the process of patrimonialization (Herzfeld 2004; Smith 2006) or place-making (Feuchtwang 2004), where reference to collective memories causes rivalry and controversy (Connerton 2009). In studying the making of heritage sites, Michael Di Giovine (2009), among others (Bendix et al. 2012; Graezer and Kilani 2012; Svensson 2006; Wang 2012), elucidates the paradoxes of preservation concerning the territory inhabited and people's plural attachments by highlighting the prioritization of certain expertise over local knowledge and how within it local ownership is rhetorically replaced by universal ownership.

The 2010 and 2012 Gulou Projects

In 2010 the Bell and Drum towers neighbourhood was part of a transformation project led by the local authorities (Chongwen District) of the municipality of Beijing. The plan was to reconstruct the area on the basis of a Qing dynasty urban map, which would have involved the destruction of numerous *siheyuans* and *hutongs* in the vicinity. The government advanced various arguments including the upgrading of living standards in the neighbourhood while keeping its historical appearance. To make the necessary changes, many residents would be relocated to better housing in modern buildings on the outskirts of the inner city and awarded financial compensation. Like many other Beijing traditional neighbourhoods, Gulou has many informal buildings 'that serve a wide range of functions, from being the resident's extended living spaces, kitchens and storages areas, to providing space for vital economic activities such as retailing, restaurants or small workshops' (Zhang 1997, 85). These are not officially recognized by the city administration. Labelled as 'temporary or illegal construction', they are often occupied by illegal residents (officially called a 'floating population' (*liudong renkou*)): rural migrants looking for work in towns. These people, who are not officially registered in their place of residence—that is, with a rural *hukou* in a city—will not have access to the same compensation package as legal inhabitants.

To avoid the demolition of the cultural and historical landscape as well as the dismantling of the mixed community, many voices were raised in protest against the implementation of the 'Beijing Time Cultural City'. As Jiang Yue noted in

a *China Radio International* article on 20 April 2010, this municipal project, encompassing 12.5 hectares with a budget of RMB5 billion, proposed the building of a museum complex to celebrate the traditional cultural time—tellingly, this complex would include a conference centre, an underground shopping mall and parking lots. The reinstigation of the tradition of 'morning bell, evening drum' was even proposed. Beijing Cultural Heritage Protection (CHP) was the most active resistance to this costly plan to transform the area. A nongovernmental organization (NGO) engaged in historical preservation, CHP set up a website with regular updated information and organized public debate, initiating and maintaining general awareness that the new official project should avoid a repetition of the earlier Dashilan transformation. The website (http://en.bjchp.org/?page_id=2597) gives a voice to local residents, offers updated information about the ongoing project and suggests alternatives to it. A few months after this was initiated, the local municipality abandoned the project. There is still much speculation as to the real purpose of the project and the reasons behind its abandonment. The ethnographic evidence would suggest three possible explanations: the strong power of the preservationist voices; the cost-benefit impact of the transformation; the administrative transition that followed the merging of the two formerly separated Dongcheng and Chongwen districts into a new unified municipal authority (that is, the new Dongchen district). Possibly, but most likely it was a mixture of all three (Fig. 15.4).

Fig. 15.4 The Drum tower during the renovation project, September 2014. © F. Graezer Bideau

In 2012 the local authorities proposed a new Gulou renovation project: the 'Bell and Tower Square Restoration Project'. This was less ambitious than the last. Still based on a Qing dynasty map, it concentrated on the historical square between the two towers. Only courtyards without historical value and 'informal constructions' were to be demolished, to fit with a conception of the square that principally references a nostalgic visual connection to the area. Once again the local authorities proposed the relocation of residents, offering a compensation rate for their house, a new house in Shaoyaoju neighbourhood and a financial incentive for a quick decision to relocate, in order to launch the transformation project as soon as possible (Graezer and Yan Forthcoming). The tight framework envisaged by the authorities provoked an upsurge of resistance among residents. As Simon Rabinovitch notes in a *Financial Times* article on 26 April 2013, 'Police officers have been knocking on doors on a daily basis to remind people their time is up. Angry residents have had shouting and shoving matches with them. Many say they will fight to stay.' Despite local communities criticizing the absence of any upgrading of housing for decades, they are still very much attached to their neighbourhood and appreciate the quality of life, which will vanish once they are relocated to high-rise buildings.

Local Stakeholders' Narrative and Commitments

Gulou has become a battlefield in which three groups of stakeholders each claim to play a major role. Interestingly, both their narratives and their actions towards the preservation of Gulou neighbourhood turn on cultural heritage or urban landscape, although these key words are rarely mentioned. Official discourses use urban policy general terms: environment improvement, preservation, authenticity or cultural zone. Heritage activists debate government statements using academic approaches and propose alternatives, while the local population expresses its concern on practical, basic issues such as housing conditions, the deterioration of street life and the hope of a rise in everyday living standards.

The Dongcheng authorities base their transformation project on the plethora of regulations aimed at the protection of Beijing's traditional side, such as the General Plan for the Preservation of the Imperial City of Beijing in 2002 and the Humanism Olympic Cultural Heritage Protection Plan, enacted in 2003. They legitimize their lucrative project using the appealing term of memory—the traditional public square between two historic landmarks of the inner city—and the reinstigation of the 'morning bell and evening drum' tradition. They wish to enhance the visual connection to the surrounding environment by restoring an 'authentic' atmosphere that conforms to their perception of the past that they want to promote. Their conception of 'environment improvement' implies the demolition of illegal constructions with no historic value. The destruction of 66 courtyards will, in their eyes, upgrade living conditions in the area, improve the safety of local communities, highlight the 2010 renovation of the historical Bell and Drum towers and their vicinity, and maintain the 'urban landscape capital' within the district, all of which will bring sufficient

income through cultural and tourist activities. As the restoration project relies on the official language commonly used of 'historic district' largely practiced throughout China, there is greater insistence by the government on valuable tangible heritage than intangible cultural heritage. In its view, the preservation priority should be buildings, a policy easier to practice with the help of experts in architecture and urban planning. The idea of including local communities is still not entirely integrated into the conceptual and practical framework, and it implies conflict and resistance that is time-consuming for the economic development of the city.

Cultural heritage preservationist discourse is less homogeneous than the official discourse. The two use different approaches, ranging from strictly academic to practical salvation, in order to protect historical and cultural neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, they do have a common proactive use of communication to better promote transformation projects using media coverage. This is particularly true for the CHP, whose members committed themselves early to the protection of the Bell and Drum towers case. They took a stand against the Dongcheng project in 2010, publishing articles on the CHP website and organizing public debates within local communities about their right to resist the Gulou transformation and the collateral damage of relocation. They proposed an alternative development plan, published in a public letter entitled 'A Better Future for Gulou—CHP's Views on the Planned Redevelopment', available on line (CHP 2010).[4] Their governmental counterstatements insisted on the necessity of involving local communities in the decision-making process in their neighbourhood to maintain not only 'authentic' representation of the old Beijing built environment but also the current population in situ for an urban fabric that is coherent and lively. CHP then questioned the need to enrich Gulou's existing commercial and retails areas, which will only bring more tourists, invading the residents' privacy. The NGO also questioned which historical period the new project should comply with (Qianlong as one of the longest reigns in Chinese history: 1735–1796) and the need to implement a sustainable project for future generations. Its alternative plan was to use the same investment to rejuvenate the surrounding courtyards and to rezone the commercial areas outside the neighbourhood with the objective of avoiding a 'disneyfied'—or 'fake historical'—neighbourhood.

There was another perservationist group engaged in the protection of the Bell and Drum towers square in 2012: the Gulou Preservationaist Team or Watching for Bell and Drum Tower area. This was an interdisciplinary team that first shared their opinions on the local redevelopment through Weibo miniblog and then decided to document the process of demolition and relocation. They eventually launched research on the history of local courtyards and created an interactive webGIS platform–a combination of the web technology and the geographical information system–allowing public participation. Their historical focus allowed them to oppose the demolition of the 66 courtyards around the square, arguing that the shape and size of the square has been almost unaltered since the Qing dynasty, thus contradicting the historical

arguments of the official project. Lastly, they stressed the indivisible link between tangible and intangible heritage, built environment and inhabitants that forms the heart of traditional neighbourhoods. Separating these will result in the loss of memonic patterns within the area for local inhabitants and the destruction of its urban fabric. Cultural heritage preservationist discourse is quite closed to the underlying principles of the 2011 RHUL. Its reflections and practices converge to the core values of the UNESCO recommendation, a holistic preservation that includes tangible and intangible heritage and its inscription from a sustainable perspective in terms of human factors.

The local discourse is divided between inhabitants who want to stay in Gulou, with the hope of getting improved living standards, and those seeking financial compensation and a move to high-rise buildings on the outskirts of Beijing. Despite heterogeneity, all arguments are rooted in memory rhetoric. Most of them evoke nostalgia about the neighbourhood's 'golden age', when they used to live in a clean and homogenous environment (meaning before the settlement of non-Beijing people (*waidiren*) and mass tourism). The contrast between the remembered and idealized past and the chaotic present is often central to their complaints. During an interview, an old male resident said:

> President Xi Jinping used to be my neighbour, you know? Same age with me, same community. In the past, every child played together, no matter who you were, from high-class or low-class. Who cares! Everyone was equal! Now is different. You look at him and look at me. You see the difference? No you don't see it. It's not the difference between him and me. It's the difference between his kids and my kids. They never get a chance to play together. My kids are either playing with *waidiren,* or they even have nowhere to play!

The compensation rate offered by the local authorities was considered unsatisfactory by many residents, another frequent complaint. It was less than half of the amount proposed in other parts of the city (RMB100,000 versus RMB40,000). Again bringing to mind events in London (Lindsay 2014), they were also sceptical about the redevelopment works that local authorities might undertake to improve the area's environment and infrastructure. In a *Global Times* article on 7 September 2010, Li Shuang spoke of a 70-year-old resident envious of his previous neighbours:

> Since 2009, there have been rumours about our relocation. Then halted because two districts merged. Then came a new mayor. And we still wait for the notice! Some people moved out. But most stay and still are waiting. The government is just so unpredictable! So much *huangxier* [ungrounded rumours]. They say something today and forget it tomorrow. That's always the case, for many years.

Urban development and heritage issues have seen many changes in recent years, to maintain the confidence of inhabitants concerning their future. They feel cornered and insecure, and they focus on the *waidiren* who are 'uncivilized' and bring trouble to the community through their position outside the

collective memory, their illegal status within the local society and their 'informal constructions' that disfigure the historic urban landscape. 'They make money by telling lies!' one said. 'The peddlers sell expensive dirty foods; and the three-wheeler drivers just make up faked stories about Beijing's history for the tourists.' Another middle-aged male resident commented:

> If you want to come to Beijing, do education! I know many *waidiren* working in Beijing, they gained degree in college and work to make the country better. We welcome that kind of *waidiren*. If you don't have education and just want to make money from us and even make us living in a worse situation, go back!

Local discourses turn on memory and territory, and balance between tradition (old way of life) and modernity (comfort and consumption revolution) as well as constructing boundaries between 'them and us'—a classic theme in 'urban anthropology' (Prato and Pardo 2013; Pardo and Prato 2012). In today's unstable context, the so-called natives of the neighbourhood (*bendiren*) ascribe their threatened security to the outsiders, who become convenient scapegoats. To them, the mnemonic patterns are broken in everyday practice that brings life and breadth to the neighbourhood, rather than through its urban landscape. The RHUL aims to preserve community life within its built environment by keeping strong physical and emotional links between the organization of space and the social structure of the neighbourhood. Although its objectives are benevolent, they remain pure concepts to the community's everyday experience; they deal in practical issues and raise their voices to be heard.

Conclusion: Collective Memory in the Historical Urban Landscape

The modernization of the Beijing urban landscape has involved various processes ranging from urban planning to intangible cultural heritage. Changes at the turn of the twentieth century reflect national and international concerns by investigating a framework that combines urban development and heritage preservation. Examples of neighbourhoods such as Gulou, Qianmen and Nanluoguxiang show how the Chinese authorities have entered into a selective process that defines the historical built environment and its representation in a flexible way in order to respond as well as possible to the rapid transformation of the urban or rural landscape in a challenging market-oriented economy. Since the 2000s, the objective of the preservationist movement was to raise awareness of the inextricable links between tangible and intangible heritage. In its approach, coherent and lively urban fabric is bound to its territory and architecture and both need to be preserved. Local communities are attached to their neighbourhood's landmarks that embody their collective memory, which could be displayed in multiple layers and take shape in several dimensions. In Gulou, residents don't raise a united voice to express their intentions.

In reality, they are riddled with tensions and negotiations over the representations of their 'historic and cultural neighbourhood' and the different strategies they pursue in order to maximize their benefit in the current transformation process. Cheng Anqi and Zhang Zixuan, in a *China Daily* article on 29 March 2013, quote a 77-year-old resident: 'They [local authorities] want it to be a commercial tourism district but we want to save it!' Residents feel proud of the revalorization of the Bell and Drum towers area, but they also fear losing it as it was lived, practised and embodied for generations.

The 2011 UNESCO RHUL still needs to be proved as a new holistic device. The main question related to our case study is to what extent it can be applied in the Chinese context. Its plasticity allows a combination of saving the built environment and preserving community lifestyles. The RHUL also encourages better integration of the local community in any decision-making process, raising awareness and interest in redevelopment projects. Instead of simply placing a decision in front of residents, the participation encouraged by public debates or interactive media is a way to express local knowledge that will complement expertise from both preservationists and authorities. In Gulou, the empowerment of inhabitants through being allowed to express their opinions exarcerbated underlying tensions between *bendiren* and *waidiren*. Instead of uniting inhabitants around the shaping and reshaping of their collective memory that may have deep impacts on the neighbourhood's social life and the area's conservation, the transformation process is widening divisions between them.

Notes

1. These reforms on land property (1988), on land property rental (1990), on urban housing systems (1994) and on private property for housing (2004 and 2007) resulted progressively in the distinction between the land ownership and the right to use the land, and in the opportunities for land tenancy to rent, buy or mortgage for 65 years.
2. The Imperial Palaces of the Ming and Qing Dynasties in Beijing and Shenyang was listed in 1987 and extended in 2004 with Shenyang.
3. Several field studies were conducted in collaboration with Chinese and Western colleagues between September 2014 and February 2016. About 30 semi-structured interviews were conducted with local residents on issues of memory and territory. Interview questions were about discourses and practices on their experiences and attachments to the neighbourhood, their perceptions on successive renovation projects and change of housing conditions.
4. See http://en.bjchp.org/?p=2385

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Multiple Positionality: A Challenge for West African Urbanists

Dolores Koenig

West African cities face a daunting set of challenges in becoming effective and humane urban environments. These include climate change, political instability, regional conflict, poverty, lack of access to basic services, increasing income inequality and threats to food security (UN-Habitat 2014). To meet existing and future challenges, cities need to invest in new infrastructure at a 'staggering' scale (UN-Habitat 2014, 119). Key to making effective use of potential investment are the region's urbanists, who diagnose and plan for growth and change in the region's metropolitan areas.

This chapter, based on interviews conducted in 2008 and 2009, focuses on urban specialists in three French-speaking West African cities: Dakar, Bamako and Ouagadougou. I call these specialists urbanists, adopted from the French term *urbaniste*. The term includes not only city planners as such but also people with training in planning and architecture, often taught in the same schools in the French system. The group also includes scholars who deal in some way with urban growth and development, including geographers, economists and demographers. Many work in national or municipal agencies, but others work within the private sector, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and small for-profit firms.

How do these West African urbanists understand the challenges they face and what they, as urban specialists and experts, can do about them? Here I focus on the multiple positions occupied by urbanists in these cities. Defined as experts in urban systems, they are also realistic members of a bureaucratic class and citizens who are themselves residents of the cities they plan, run and criticize. This chapter proposes that each of their multiple positions presupposes certain approaches to understanding and action. These may be in conflict with

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one another, which can lead to contradictions in the actions of individual urbanists. While the contradictions do not themselves explain why city planning is often perceived as ineffective, they reflect the political-economic stresses in cities that affect those who plan them.

I first discuss Bamako, Ouagadougou and Dakar, the three cities that are the focus of this chapter, and some of the challenges they face. I shall then address some of the issues surrounding the role of urbanists. Finally, I examine the different roles of urbanists: as experts and rational planners; as political and economic realists; and as co-citizens and residents of their cities. The conclusion will discuss what we can learn about urban development by studying the role contradictions faced by urbanists.

THREE WEST AFRICAN CITIES: BAMAKO, OUAGADOUGOU AND DAKAR

This chapter focuses on the capital cities of three French-speaking West African countries. Two of the countries, Burkina Faso and Mali, are landlocked, while the third, Senegal, is on the coast. All gained their importance during the colonial period and were, to a large extent, the creation of colonial governments. Dakar was created as a port city in 1857 by the French, who, until then, had been confined to the island of Gorée off Senegal's coast. Initial settlement was at the tip of Dakar's peninsula, but owing to subsequent growth there is now a substantial population throughout the peninsula as well as inland, east towards the city of Rufisque. The present site of Bamako was a small ethnically mixed precolonial commercial town, which the French turned into a fort and administrative centre when they arrived in 1883. Ouagadougou was founded in the 1300s by the Mossi, also as a commercial centre. The French arrived in 1896, conquered the indigenous inhabitants and expanded the city. In all three cities, colonial governments created administrative centres and commercial activity, and the population increased alongside government activities. Because of their economic and administrative importance, all three became capital cities in their respective countries at independence in 1960. Although all grew relatively steadily through the colonial period, they remained relatively small at independence.

All three now have large and growing urban populations. In 2010, Burkina Faso's population was estimated to be 25.7% urban, Mali's 34.3% urban and Senegal's 42.3% urban (UN-Habitat 2014, 266). Moreover, in all countries, populations in cities are growing more rapidly than populations in rural areas. Although all countries have multiple cities, population growth and urban development have been concentrated in the capital cities. Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso had about 45.6% of the country's urban population in 2011; Mali's Bamako had 36.8% of its urban population, and Dakar had 55.6% of its urban population in the same period (UN-Habitat 2014, 103). Since independence, the population has increased substantially in all three cities (Table 16.1).

Cities attract people because they are centres of economic development, and for many West Africans it remains difficult to earn a living in rural areas. Urban

Table 16.1 Population growth in Dakar, Bamako and Ouagadougou

City	Estimated population by date				
	1960	1990	2000	2010	2015 (estimate)
Bamako	130,000	746,000	1,142,000	1,932,000	2,998,800
Dakar	379,000	1,405,000	2,029,000	2,926,000	4,227,000
Ouagadougou	59,000	537,000	921,000	1,911,000	3,662,000

Source: UN-Habitat (2014, pp. 270, 271)

Table 16.2 Predicted rate of city growth

City	Annual growth rate (%)		
	1990–2000	2000–2010	2010–2020 (est.)
Bamako	4.25	5.26	4.39
Dakar	3.67	3.66	3.68
Ouagadougou	5.38	7.30	6.50

Source: UN-Habitat (2014, pp. 272, 273)

areas offer many production facilities, ranging from relatively large-scale industry to so-called informal artisanal and craft production. Indeed, in West African cities, the informal sector offers many employment opportunities (UN-Habitat 2014). Urban economic activities make a significant contribution to the gross domestic product. Cities are centres of transformation and commerce and offer superior health services and educational institutions. Although they still attract substantial numbers of migrants, much of contemporary urban growth in West Africa is linked to natural increase (UN-Habitat 2014, 98). These three cities are still relatively small by world standards, but they are important national centres and growing fast. Even though the rate of growth of Bamako and Ouagadougou will likely decline, Dakar is predicted to grow slightly faster (Table 16.2). All will likely increase in population over the short term and face challenges related to rapid growth.

CHALLENGES FACING THESE CITIES

These cities now face some common challenges with regard to urban development. The first major issue is who should be the primary beneficiaries of urban development? On the one hand, a goal of urban planning is to create economically vibrant cities that will provide a strong base for development. In other words, one goal is cities that generate a strong enough tax base, through industrial or commercial taxes, resident income taxes or property taxes to become self-sustaining and potentially catalyse development in other areas of the country. Another goal is to provide sufficient services (including water, sanitation, electricity, road infrastructure, public transport and social support) to

make the city a viable and pleasant place to live. These services can be provided by the public or private sector or public–private partnerships, but they will cost in either fees or taxes. While one of these goals involves generating money, the other involves spending it. It is not always easy to meet both goals simultaneously.

One aspect of this question is to what extent the city ought to imagine itself a global city that benefits directly from globalization and international resource flows. Since a global city inserts itself directly into international trade, it needs to be made attractive to an international or global clientele as well as domestic residents. There is an underlying assumption that in developing country cities, international actors will have higher standards for basic services (and expect different kinds of service) than domestic actors might.

Among these three cities, only Dakar has made a major effort to present itself as a global city. One interviewee mentioned that Dakar has become a site of immigration for wealthy Africans from throughout the continent, who are looking for a cosmopolitan and politically stable city. Some international organizations have sited their headquarters there and major international conferences also meet in Dakar. In contrast, Bamako and Ouagadougou, landlocked cities, have focused somewhat more on becoming regional centres. Both have housed some West African regional organizations and have tried to institute housing and education options attractive to more affluent Africans. A geographer in Bamako noted that foreigners from less stable countries, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, have moved there as well. To the extent that public funds have been spent on amenities to attract foreigners, investment in services for existing residents may have been reduced. However, among the people I interviewed, there was little discussion of the idea of a global city, even in Dakar, and its potential urban development effects.

In contrast, there was much discussion among existing local residents about the issue of who development should benefit: to what extent to focus on the poor versus the middle class. In other words, to what extent should cities be made more welcoming to the poor? This is a complicated issue. Each of the three countries has had an explicit policy against poverty. The anti-poverty focus has been important for many international organizations as well. At the same time, many urbanists believed that making cities more liveable for poor people would only encourage others to move to the city. This in turn would create more spontaneous settlements and slums, which would then need to be upgraded. One Burkinabe scholar claimed that the mayor of Ouagadougou had said that if people could not afford to live there they should go back to their villages.

Thus there was a tension between upgrading the city for its middle-class residents versus improving the city for the many poor, some of whom are new immigrants. All three cities, for example, had housing projects to offer social housing for those least able to afford market-rate lodgings. Nevertheless, the quasimajority of this housing ended up in the hands of middle-class (albeit often lower middle-class) residents and not the truly poor. Many of these projects were organized as rent-to-buy developments. To qualify for a loan (even at

a subsidized price), buyers had to prove that they had enough income, something not available to the very poor. In Burkina Faso, the buyer had to have a bank account at the Banque de l'Habitat (Housing Bank) so that the mortgage payment could be automatically taken from it, another strategy that kept out the poorest, who usually live on cash.

Another issue facing these cities is that of the composition of the municipality. All of them had a demarcated city with a municipal government (often some form of mayor and city councillors), but the metropolitan urban area in all cases extended well beyond the formal city. As the city proper was built up, people moved into nearby peripheral areas. To what extent were these different municipalities organized into governmental structures? Did people think that the municipalities should be coordinated in any particular way? Only the metropolitan area of Dakar, known as Grand Dakar, had a formal approach to regional planning. This integrated 53 different local collectivities within the major cities of Dakar, Pikine, Guediawaye and Rufisque (plus several small, independent units). In 2008, when I carried out fieldwork, the group was trying to create a common vision through participatory planning. In Ouagadougou, in contrast, some politicians were trying to enlarge the city collectivity itself; at that time, Ouagadougou was a single commune with 5 arrondissements and 17 villages. Presumably enlarging the city would add or enlarge arrondissements, but some of the communes did not want to be integrated because they felt that this would compromise their autonomy. Bamako offered yet another possibility: no clear forward movement towards any form of metropolitan governance. By 2016, some people told me that this was now under way, but I did not find evidence for it. Bamako city formed an independent capital district, separate from any of Mali's demarcated regions. Many of Bamako's suburbs were formally part of two separate prefectures: Kati and Koulikoro.

Finally, the issue of climate change was important for all these cities. Dakar, on the coast, has had poor drainage. Some areas of the city have experienced substantial flooding and the question has arisen whether residents should be resettled out of those areas. As inland cities, neither Bamako nor Ouagadougou have had to face rising sea water, but Bamako has not adequately dealt with flooding on the banks of the Niger River. Ouagadougou has faced problems in providing drinking water for the city, as has Dakar. Access to drinking water may become more problematic if existing water sources dry up as a result of climate change as city populations grow. There is also the question of whether interior cities will face greater immigration from northern areas if they become hotter and drier (UN-Habitat 2014).

The growing number of people living in the city need to find housing, work and food without damaging the environment. Residents would ideally like to live in places with clean water, electricity, decent roads and transport, and social infrastructure such as schools and health facilities. However, existing growth rates has made it difficult, if not impossible, to plan effectively or to find sufficient resources to meet these challenges. Moreover, all the cities have faced challenges of municipal governance as the urban population flows outside the existing city boundaries.

I have chosen to discuss three cities rather than just one because although there are differences among them, they draw from a common tradition imprinted on them by their French colonial history. Once part of a single colonial federation, they are now all members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, which provides a single currency to mostly French-speaking West Africa, as well as the Economic Community of West African States, which unites West Africans across language boundaries. Although they come from distinct precolonial communities, there has been much interaction across community boundaries through commerce, warfare and religious conversion for a very long time. At present, all three countries struggle with responses to globalization and neoliberalism, both linked to the growth of cities.

STUDYING BUREAUCRATS

Urbanists are the experts tasked with solving the problems caused by rapid urban growth. Many studies, both classic and new, by domestic and international scholars, have looked at how rapid growth affects the residents of these African cities (e.g. Bocquier and Traoré 2000; Diarra et al. 2003; Ouédraogo and Piché 2007; Simone 2004; Skinner 1974). However, fewer scholars have looked at the bureaucratic class that attempts to create, manage or sustain change.

Urbanists are part of West Africa's bureaucratic middle class. As educated people with steady jobs, they form part of West Africa's elite. However, few, if any, characterized themselves in this way. Most of them did not feel that they were near to the top of the relatively small power structure found in their countries. Nonetheless, studying these bureaucrats is a kind of studying up (Prato and Pardo 2013). Fieldwork with them was based more on interviews than on participant observation. I met with urban specialists in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Dakar, usually in their offices, during several short fieldtrips in 2008 and 2009. Those interviewed included scholars, policy-makers, NGO representatives and others involved with urban development. The one group that I did not talk to directly was planners that work for private real-estate development companies. I also collected local scholarly and media accounts, read student theses and listened to the news. I paid attention to how people talked about their cities and neighbourhoods, most feasible in Mali, where I have been working intermittently for the last 30 years. Indeed, in Mali I have often heard colleagues discuss the issues they faced in finding lots and building homes. I have lived in several different neighbourhoods and been in many more. In Bamako, formal interviewing was complemented by years of participant observation.

This chapter is written in light of Nelms's (2015, 108) observation that the 'ethnographic examination of expert discourses and bureaucratic practices offers one way of getting inside the state'. In particular, it offers a way of understanding the contradictions faced by actors inside the state as they attempt to deal with their multiple positions. For example, Máximo Badaró (2015) showed how women in the Argentine military acted in some ways as soldiers

but in other ways as women. While female Argentine soldiers did adopt some of the institution's 'masculine' behaviours, they were also less willing than men to be on continuous duty and appealed for greater compatibility between their family and professional lives. Badaró suggested that women's valorization of their multiple identities has led to a more humanized Argentine military that recognizes officers as workers and citizens, as well as soldiers.

Erica Weiss (2015) considered whether Israeli soldiers who disagreed with military perspectives opted to become conscientious objectors, to leave the military through evasion (e.g. by getting a mental health discharge) or to stay on until their terms were up. Her analysis pointed to the balancing of different roles, including soldier, family member, Israeli citizen, and how differential evaluations of positions could lead to variable action.

Also relevant is recent work on the fragility of bureaucratic expert knowledge, especially in developing countries that lack resources. For example, Walford (2015) showed that Brazil's Laboratory for Meteorological Instrument could not always use the initial calibrations of its instruments, carried out in the developed world, because they did not always take into account field conditions elsewhere. Thus the laboratory had to develop its own devices despite a lack of resources, personnel and experience. After recent elections in Ecuador, a new government needed to figure out how to support and regulate the 'solidarity economy', which included many individual and collective enterprises with origins in popular life and oriented towards social ends (Nelms 2015). The discourses were inclusive and non-hierarchical, yet the new bureaucracies to support and regulate the solidarity economy still had to make pragmatic decisions about who to address and include in programmes because resources were limited. Interpretations of key principles also varied within bureaucracies, as shown by Ballestero's (2015) analysis of water regulators in Costa Rica. In light of a Costa Rican court decision that access to water for human consumption was a fundamental right, the country's water utilities could set prices to earn money for future investment and quality improvement but not formal profit. Water regulators debated the merits of different rate increase requests, based on their own varied understandings of consumer and utility needs. This work suggests that experts themselves work in a situation in which their expertise is socially constructed through their daily work.

These studies underline the role of state bureaucrats in creating the state and, in this case, the social and cultural face of the contemporary city. They show how citizenship, belonging and decision processes are negotiated, scrutinized, criticized and constructed through the work of bureaucrats who deal with urban questions (See Prato and Pardo 2013).

Urbanists and Their Roles

The different roles of urbanists position them quite differently in the urban context. Their occupation of these three roles may lead to a lack of coherence in their approaches to city development. The three major roles of urbanists are: planners, realists and co-citizens.

Urbanists as Planners

All three countries had some kind of urban planning department and all had at least attempted to create urban plans that delineate goals for future city development. These plans were rooted in visions of the city as a system that can be rationally developed. Most French-speaking urbanists were trained in some sense as intellectual heirs to Baron Georges-Eugene Haussmann, who 'rationalized' Paris in the mid-nineteenth century. Hired by Napoleon III to improve the water supply, sanitation and traffic circulation in Paris, Haussmann built rail stations and new wider roads and, in the process, tore down hundreds of old buildings and displaced their residents. The effects of this technocratic and top-down way of approaching cities has affected urban planning all over the world.

Although few of the urbanists suggested that their cities could be planned in the rational top-down technocratic manner envisioned by Haussmann, they explicitly or implicitly argued for a rationalized view of the city. They took for granted the value of creating urban plans (Schéma Directeur du Développement Urbain). Some argued for a return to basic rational planning principles. As one geographer-planner said, 'Mali needs a vision of where it wants to go'. Then the vision can provide a set of objectives. A Burkinabe NGO representative said that it was laws not just urban plans that needed a vision behind them, and he argued that a new land law for Burkina needed to start from a political vision about what involved actors wanted to achieve. The question of course is the source of the vision. The people I interviewed were mostly social scientists rather than engineers. Thus it was not surprising to hear one geographer say that some urban planning organizations were too full of engineers who just want to build things. Nonetheless, having a vision of the city is important to orient the plan.

The most extreme views about urban planning were found in Burkina Faso, which also had experienced the most radical creation of new housing developments in the past. In 1983, Thomas Sankara took power through a revolution meant to create a strong central power with no barriers between it and the mass of the population. This government's goal was to create a new society through mobilization and consciousness raising, and to deploy sufficient resources and labour to create good living conditions for the people as a whole. Among the strategies adopted by Sankara's government were the nationalization of land, the suppression of rents and the creation of mass housing developments. In the process, he razed many of Ouagadougou's existing neighbourhoods. As Alain Marie (1989) argued, Ouagadougou in 1987 looked like it had been bombed. Lots were created on the periphery to house those who lost their homes, but neighbourhoods and extended families were broken up. Actions like this left many alienated from the positive efforts of the regime and when Sankara was assassinated in 1987, many residents of Ouagadougou were simply indifferent.

Yet a few Burkinabe urbanists still emphasized the importance of creating a monumental urban core, even if it meant moving people out and resettling them elsewhere. When people claimed that ZACA II, a centre city commercial

development in Ouagadougou, remained largely empty because of the expense of building in it, one Burkinabe urbanist pointed to La Defense in Paris. 'It was empty for 30 years', he said, and it has turned out to be a thriving business district. So he did not worry that ZACA II might also take a long time to take off. He also claimed that some of the areas cleared by Haussmann in his development of Paris were empty for a long time as well. He said that it was perfectly normal that powerful people wanted to put their imprint on the landscape and buildings for hundreds of years; implicit was the idea that Africans have as much right to do that as do Europeans. Other Burkinabe accepted the idea of rational planning but were more nuanced. As one architect proposed, its state-sponsored housing projects were part of an effort to build a 'real city'—that is, to change the image of Ouagadougou from an overgrown village to a modern city. In contrast, other Burkinabe urbanists had become quite sceptical of large-scale planning, especially when it involved the expropriation and resettlement of existing neighbourhoods. As one demographer-urban planner said, when Sankara carried out massive urban renewal and tried to rationalize the city and its organization, 'look what happened to him—he got assassinated'. This was a cautionary note to any who might try to make too rational a city.

Modern 'sustainable' urban planning has become less technocratic and more participatory. Planners throughout the world, including West Africa, understand that more participatory methods of planning, which integrate the perspectives of city residents, can lead to greater acceptance and sustainability. Several argued for a vision based on more popular representations of the city and the needs of urban residents. As the head of a private architecture and planning university in Mali suggested, a planner needs to understand the people before undertaking urban design; the most recent Bamako plan was bad, he proposed, because it did not start from an understanding of where people were at the time. This was echoed by a Senegalese minister, who said: 'we often forget our culture when we build; we build buildings not adapted to our culture'. An NGO representative believed that it was important to reinforce what he called the 'citizenness' of people, to recognize that cities are multiactor systems. As he said to one audience, 'it's you, not the mayors or the President who will develop Senegalese cities'. This was echoed by a Burkinabe who emphasized the importance of building citizenship; this could concern local control over space, but also such mundane things as encouraging people to pay for trash collection.

At the same time, popular ideas are not a panacea. The representative of an NGO that carried out participatory restructuring and legalization of irregular neighbourhoods in Dakar said that it was impossible to please everyone in a large-scale neighbourhood renovation and reconstruction. The NGO would hold participatory workshops where it planned the site and laid out areas for roads and dimensions of lots and roads. But some people would not be able to stay where they lived and, of those, some would have to move to resettlement areas in more peripheral areas. These people would not be happy, he said. Moreover, certain elements of popular representations or 'our culture' may not be viable in a large city; most problematic was the idea of having one's own

green space, which led to the dislike of living in apartments. People in Dakar, confined to a small peninsula, began to live in apartments, but they still found it confining and uncomfortable. In Bamako and Dakar, where there were few natural barriers to the extension of the city, there was considerable urban sprawl. One NGO representative suggested that building consensus was not so much about finding agreement as it was about finding a compromise that everyone could tolerate.

Whether they approach planning from the top down or from the bottom up, however rational they expect the city to be, urbanists are experts who approach cities as wholes, with interconnected parts. They tend to have a more systematic vision than do individual residents, and they tend to think of the city and its suburbs as a metropolitan whole, meant to have at least some degree of integration. It is these ideas that they attempt to put into practice in their roles as bureaucratic experts.

Urbanists as Realists

During their interviews, urbanists spent much time explaining why they could not achieve their visions and goals. In this role, I consider them realists who understand their cities and the constraints that they face. They also understand how their national bureaucracies work and the limits of their own role as technical experts. They brought up multiple barriers to implementing their technocratic visions for their cities.

They did blame urban residents to some extent for the often observed chaos of African cities. They said that poor people may not know how to live in cities. In Burkina Faso, at least one urbanist claimed that many city dwellers remain primarily 'agrarian' in orientation. The planner in a Senegalese NGO blamed part of Dakar's drainage problems on people's lack of what he called civic-mindedness: they threw trash into the drainage ditches. Then when the rains came, they complained about the blockages. However, not only the poor were to blame. One Malian architect complained that even middle-class people did not know how to build appropriate houses; middle-class housing did not start with an understanding of landscape and site, he said. Instead people built big, hot cement blocks.

However, urbanists put much more blame on their governments. Many found the structure of urban governments irrational. A Burkinabe planner called the Dakar metropolitan organization of 53 collectivities crazy because of its very complexity. Others characterized the system in Bamako in the same way. Bamako lacked any formal system of coordination between the central city and its outlying districts, and within Bamako itself there was insufficient coordination among the six communes that make up the city proper. Moreover, the six individual communes and the city as a whole had different interlocutors in the national government. Each of the six individual communes had direct links to the Governor's Office, appointed by the central government, but the main central government link for the District of Bamako was the Ministry of

Territorial Administration. The director of Bamako's Urban Development Agency called this an unwieldy system created for unspecified 'political' reasons. Others believed that their city governments were not capable of running themselves. One Bamako planner claimed that the six communes that make up the city proper had neither the budget nor the experience to run themselves.

At the same time, governments do not always put rules into place before they begin major new activities. On the southern edge of Ouagadougou stands a new upscale neighbourhood, Ouaga 2000, but when building began, a formal *cahier de charge*, which sets out required building standards, such as setbacks and building height, was not in place. According to a Senegalese urbanist, the same was also true for Hann Maristes in Dakar: not only did it not have a *cahier de charge* when building began but it also lacked street numbers.

However, when texts were in place, they were not always followed. One Malian researcher proposed that the Schéma Directeur of Bamako, its urban plan, was cheated on almost as soon as it was written. For example, areas were set aside as environmental reserves, but people soon moved in and built there. This sentiment was echoed in Senegal, where one NGO representative said that there were good laws, such as the 1985 law sanctioning irregular construction, but they were not applied.

Why laws were not applied? One reason is that cities often lacked the resources to implement plans and rules. For example, Bamako had no property taxes; the communes used land sales to generate money, but once they had sold vacant lots within the commune they lost a major source of income. In Dakar, the ambitious Plan Jaxaay was created to resettle people living in low-lying flooded areas, but there were insufficient resources to implement it. New habitation sites that people had been promised turned out to be prohibitively expensive. Thus efforts at housing development often included features to benefit the upper and middle classes, in the hope that this might generate resources of some kind for the city or country. For example, Ouaga 2000 developers created a program of preferential loans for Burkinabe in the diaspora in a city where it was difficult for existing residents to get housing finance. This was clearly a strategy to get emigrants to invest at home. At the same time, a lack of resources meant that governments were sometimes hesitant to follow their own laws that required them to spend money. One Burkinabe NGO representative said that Ouagadougou's government was not willing to provide compensation and improvements to renovated urban neighbourhoods required by law because they could not afford to do so. However, he argued that this is a question of rights, and financing should be found in innovative ways—for example, indemnities for owners of existing buildings should be built into the cost of street construction.

The overall lack of resources led to other problems as well. In Burkina Faso, several people pointed to the simultaneous development of two major new neighbourhoods: ZACA II, a primarily commercial development downtown, and Ouaga 2000, a large neighbourhood on the south end of town that was both residential and a site for new government and international organization

offices. Both these neighbourhoods required substantial private investment, from domestic or foreign sources, to meet the building standards ultimately put in place. However, there simply was not enough interest or resources to develop them quickly. Thus large swathes of both developments were empty. Ouaga 2000 also had many empty buildings; people built houses but were unwilling to move into them because there was no real neighbourhood yet. Because the neighbourhood was on the edge of the city, commutes were long.

Finally, the lack of resources led to poor planning. For example, one architect talked of the basement leaks that were common in ZACA II multistorey buildings because the deep foundations ran into the underground water table. These problems arose, she said, because the appropriate studies were not done. At other times, an organization might be able to begin work but ran out of funds in the middle because of faulty assumptions. In ZACA II the planners assumed that they could finance improvements with money used to buy lots, but this was not the case. First, they thought that some of the expropriated people would use their indemnity to put a down payment on a lot in ZACA II; few did this because future building costs would be higher than most could afford. Therefore, people requested the cash compensation package, which required ZACA to spend funds. Some people did buy lots in the rush of interest; they were told they could get initial deposits back minus a nominal fee if they could not build. Many of these potential builders also found that they could not get the additional funds to build to the required standards, so they asked for their deposits back. Many other lots remained unsold. ZACA II found itself without money to pay back deposits and to finish some of the infrastructure work for the neighbourhood. They did not have any way to assist the expropriated who lived in new resettlement areas and faced unanticipated problems.

The lack of local resources also meant that municipalities went to major international donors when they could to supplement their own funds. Although national urbanists had their own visions, they were also willing to adapt or change their own goals to get greater resources from international donors. In the 1970s the World Bank funded many urban projects (Zanetta 2001), but contemporary goals focus on poverty, governance and health more than urban projects as such. One urbanist noted that it was necessary to show that fighting crime was part of good governance to obtain international funding to address the problem of increased banditry in Ouagadougou.

The lack of resources incited corruption at many different levels. One Burkinabe scholar mentioned that when any formal land parcellization took place, either through renovation of older untitled areas or the creation of new parcels, there was a lot of corruption. This proposition was echoed by others. The former director of infrastructure development in Dakar claimed that in every land distribution half the land went to bureaucrats. Moreover, bureaucrats may take advantage of the availability of lots to resolve financial problems. In Ouagadougou, people said that communal councils used gifts of land to repay political clients. In an urban renovation programme in Bamako, where new lots were meant to go to those displaced by the construction of new roads

and infrastructure, the mayor's office used them to pay the planners because no other funds were available (Touré 2002).

Once land has been parcelled out, corruption can enter at many levels. A Senegalese NGO representative noted that a single lot might be sold by two people to two different people. Lots may be sold by those without a right to sell them as well as the real owners. In effect, he believed that in a case like this, the strong dominated the weak. This was a problem noted by many in Bamako and Ouagadougou as well. Thus, when someone bought a lot, pressure was on the buyer to build something quickly to claim ownership. Complicated titling processes also generated many possibilities for corruption. A Malian geographer noted that people working in the mayor's office, often low-level clerks or secretaries, used titling requirements to earn illegal funds. They offered to 'help' lot buyers to move efficiently through the many steps involved in acquiring a legal title, for a standard fee per lot. There were also indications of payoffs in the process of urban renovation: several people in Bamako noted areas with crooked roads. They said that this was evidence that someone had paid off the road construction company to avoid being displaced.

Corruption can also be considered as one strategy among many to avoid strict adherence to formal laws. Several people noted that Sankara's revolutionary regime in Burkina Faso was run 'by exception'. In effect, Sankara wanted quick change, so he pursued actions by fiat rather than formally changing the laws. In 1984, the government simply declared itself owner of all the land in the country, thereby clearing the way for the massive urban renewal discussed above (Marie 1989).

These urbanists were confronted by many obstacles to realizing their mission of more efficient and human cities. They were fairly realistic about these and, when they could, they attempted to manipulate them to their advantage. For example, a Senegalese urbanist who worked on a World Bank project that funded communal infrastructure reminded the elected representatives that they should attempt to decrease land expropriation for this infrastructure because people were not likely to re-elect those responsible for their displacement. However, many urbanists felt that they were relatively powerless compared with the more entrenched political and economic interests in their countries.

Urbanists as Co-citizens

Urbanists are also urban residents. They generally want the same things as other city dwellers: safe neighbourhoods with good services and secure housing.

In all three cities, the ideal seemed to be to have one's own house with a yard or garden around it. In Dakar, this has become difficult if not impossible. There, one had to decide whether to live on the peninsula, with its downtown services and many commercial and government offices, or to move east onto the mainland. While it was possible to have a house with a garden on the mainland, the commutes could be quite long, thus many opted to remain on

the peninsula, but they moved into multistorey apartments that made use of the limited land area. Nevertheless, a Dakar legal scholar told me recently: 'We all would like to have our house with a garden too'. In Bamako and Ouagadougou, the goal remained achievable. As noted, both were on relatively flat plains. Housing in the central areas, however, was becoming scarcer and more expensive. Therefore many people, especially those who were young and less well off, found themselves pushed into the periphery. Many of the peripheral neighbourhoods, especially those recently settled, were irregular, in the sense of lacking formal parcellization and titling.

The peripheries were often considered a place for the poor, but as these cities have grown and younger people want their own homes, this is changing. In Bamako, which I know best, the periphery has become quite heterogeneous. Wealthier people invested there. They believed that land values would grow, and some became speculators. One Malian geographer also suggested that wealthy residents of the city wanted to get rid of their poorer urban neighbours. They bought them out and then offered them a place to rent (cheaply) on one of the lots on the periphery that they owned. Middle-class residents moved out to the periphery because they often had private cars that allowed them to commute easily. One interviewee said that some of these people lived like 'little kings' because they had strong social and cultural capital and political connections. The poor also moved out to the periphery, either scraping together enough to buy a small lot or renting more cheaply than they could in the city.

Nonetheless, once they moved somewhere, the first goal was to show clearly that the resident was the owner of the property. As noted, the first step in demonstrating ownership was to build something. This was one reason why land speculators often constructed rental properties on the lots that they bought. Although building is the primary way to show ownership, if ownership is not sufficiently secure, people may not want to invest much in the physical premises. Thus many partially built houses were strewn about peripheral neighbourhoods. This may reflect the inability of people to build any further, but it may also be a conscious strategy to avoid investing too much in case there is a future expropriation.

The long-term goal was for the owner to obtain a title deed for the property. This could happen in one of two ways. Wealthier owners, often land speculators, could get a temporary deed for rural property. Later they could regularize it and subdivide it into lots, each with its own title, which they could then sell. However, most people had to wait for a formal 'lotissement' or parcellization, carried out by the commune of which the village was a part. Once the commune had taken over the land (after some negotiation and compensation for the village that had previously claimed the land under customary tenure), it could then formally divide it into lots, which it could sell. Those who have already built in the area may be able buy the lot where they were or receive a new lot in compensation.

Formal parcellization may take a while, so for many the second step was to procure paperwork of some sort. People believed in the value of government

documentation and the use of technical experts to show evidence of the legal right to occupation. In Bamako, when a village was surrounded by the city, it might decide to do its own parcelling. In some places, the village hired surveyors and marketed lots. It then gave buyers a paper, which the commune then stamped, for a fee. This paper was unofficial. Nonetheless, if the commune were to carry out an official parcelling, many people believed that they would rehoused if they lost their lot. The use of surveyors to parcel out lots was taken as evidence of a kind of official status. As one person said, 'When you've got a surveyor, you've got a lotissement'. Further research is required to see under what conditions formal parcellization takes place and what happens to the people who are already living on unofficial lots.

Once formal parcellization takes place, residents have the right to public utilities, such as electricity and water. They also have the right to services such as public schools and health clinics. Again, much research remains to be done to determine how they get access to these, the role of private services (especially schooling and health) in the interim, and the time and political capital it takes to procure utilities and services. Again, this is a struggle, in large part because of the lack of resources. Bamako sits on the Niger River, but its water-treatment plant cannot supply all neighbourhoods with sufficient water. Even in Bamako's older neighbourhoods, when usage is high, water is not always available from the tap. Within the city proper, water pipes do not always reach outlying neighbourhoods and people are required to dig their own wells. So neighbourhoods need to organize to get access to utilities and services (Koné 2009). Resident urbanists with their knowledge of laws and requirements and robust social networks can be valuable participants in the struggle.

Conclusion

In their different roles, urban specialists follow at least three different logics: the logic of planners; the logic of economic and political realism; and the logic of urban citizenship. As planners they attempt to put their own imprint on the city, in light of their visions of urban life, based on their technocratic understandings of the rational planning of city systems. As realists, they position themselves as members of developing countries with limited resources and subject to corrupt practices. In this sense, they have a limited ability to act on their ideas and instead find themselves constrained by external forces over which they have little control. First, they are at the mercy of global forces, the same forces that affect overall urban growth in Africa. Second, they are also at the mercy of the political and economic inequality in their own countries. As one Burkinabe planner proposed, urbanists can give (good technical) advice, but the powerful may not follow that advice because they are motivated by goals that are not simply technical. At the same time, he noted that domestic resources may change suddenly, even for the better. He noted that Guinea Bissau struck oil and found itself suddenly wealthier and able to do things that it could not previously do. Maybe, he thought, Burkina Faso would find oil, gold or uranium.

As residents, urbanists act very much like their non-urbanist fellow citizens. If they cannot afford the expensive real estate inside the city, they go out to the periphery to build their houses. They follow various strategies to legalize their building lots and houses, sometimes becoming land speculators. They use their social and cultural capital to secure property for themselves, and also for getting utilities and services into their neighbourhoods. At times they may act in ways counter to what they believe as rational planners, excusing their actions by recourse to political realism.

The multiple positionality of urbanists in these three cities is, ultimately, a reflection of the contradictions of urban growth within the cities themselves. Although urbanists have the technical knowledge and authority to try to systematize the urban context and rationalize growth, they are caught by the same problems as their fellow citizens. They do try to use their more integrated understandings of urban growth to create better functioning and more humane cities, and some cities have seen notable changes, such as improved garbage collection, more participatory planning, and better access to health and education services. However, urbanists cannot act unilaterally to improve their cities. Their contradictory actions do not themselves cause the anarchy seen in their cities but rather reflect the serious problems facing West African cities today.

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The Strength of Weak Heritages: Urbanity, Utopias and the Commitment to Intangible Heritage

Michel Rautenberg

INTRODUCTION

Anthropologists and, more broadly, all of the social sciences have renewed their interest in reflecting on the concepts of heritage and of community, ever since international organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Council of Europe began promoting them, linking the two concepts to each other (Labadi 2013), for the purpose of hastening the processes of democratization among the various countries of the world and also within each country (Adell et al. 2015), as well as encouraging the sustainability of individual regions (Auclair and Fairclough 2015). One of the nodal points of these new policies is the emphasis placed on proximity in heritage practices, which results, within cities, in a renewed interest in neighbourhoods (Morell and Franquesa 2011) and in the furthering of the idea of a 'community of practices' (Adell et al. 2015). A community of practices is built on the model of communities of learners developed by Etienne Wenger (1998), who argues that individuals from a variety of backgrounds and with different interests can work together effectively as long as they share a goal and manage their negotiations jointly. The idea that, more or less explicitly, underlies these policies is that heritage carries with it a liberating power. This idea that was developed, among others, by the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, signed

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in 2005.[1] In other words, there is a potential direction that heritage could take that passes through empowerment. However, it is important to remember that the concept of empowerment is as ambiguous as it is rich. It is backed by starkly differing policies and ideologies, from the neoliberal views that were developed in Margaret Thatcher's Great Britain, for example (Dicks 2000), to the radical standpoints of postcolonial studies (Bacqué and Biewener 2013). Thus the heritagization of neighbourly customs and networks, which constitute both a practice and a fundamental value of urbanity, connects old and new residents, the development of tourism, and the protection and maintenance of the quality of life, international political processes and the management of localism, depending on the various political stakes, which may be in conflict with each other (Morell 2015). The heritagization of this urbanity, which has become a major issue in urban practices and politics (Rautenberg 2015a), creates new urban territories and reorganizes living environments, as Morell (2015) has clearly shown for Palma de Mallorca.

While emphasizing that location in public action is a governance style that makes very good use of heritage, it would be a mistake to reduce all heritage action to localism. Palma de Mallorca is a very good example of urban public policies and individual issues of gentrification coming together to contribute to the heritagization of several of the city's formerly industrial and working-class districts. Heritage can also be a driver for the mobilization of residents, citizens and anyone else who might be working for a particular cause. Thus we will see that in Villeneuve d'Ascq, a new French city, the memory of utopias that is built into the city's origins and still contributes to its current urbanity can be mobilized under certain circumstances—for instance, as a way to fight against changes that the residents consider harmful. This is a kind of heritage that we will call 'weak' because it has not gone through any of the instances or procedures of heritage institutionalization, such as the Council of Europe's not very formalized recognition. Looking at another situation, the 50th anniversary celebration of a cultural association that is engaged in intercultural activities in the region of Lyon, I highlight another kind of 'weak' heritage, which in this case is made up of the values that the group has stood for from its beginnings. I then propose that these forms of heritage end up becoming intermingled with the process that brings them to light—in other words, it is in the actions of the residents rather than in preservation by the institutions where heritagization resides.

RESIDENTIAL ENGAGEMENT IN 'WEAK' OR NON-INSTITUTIONAL FORMS OF URBAN HERITAGE

The heritage field has grown considerably since the end of the 1970s, especially since UNESCO ratified the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (Smith and Akagawa 2009). This has resulted in heightened tension between the two main forms of heritage: heritage that is called 'fixed' in the past and in a territory, in particular that of monuments or archaeological

remains; and a 'more mutable heritage centred very much on the present' (Smith and Akagawa 2009, 2). Heritage is no longer a noteworthy exception in our environment; it belongs to our daily landscape. It has become one of the chief tools for sustainable development policies, especially in our cities, where it is connected with social cohesion and citizen involvement (Auclair and Fairclough 2015). It is also involved in the mobilization of residents against political projects or development projects—private or state run—that threaten to change valued lifestyles or places (Hocquet 2013). This heritage boom has therefore forced local and national officialdom to reassess its basic assumptions and take note of popular movements and grassroots heritage practices, like those arising from neighbourhood networks and not always aligned with public policies or the interests of economic actors. People cherish this collection of practices and lasting bonds with their environment and are willing to mobilize for its distribution and protection. This is what I am calling 'weak heritage'. These are not objects, buildings or places that connect us to 'our' city but ideas, images, values and social relations that are part of our urbanity and that we would like to sustain (Rautenberg 2015a), although they may eventually be embodied in physical locations. I hope that the reader will forgive my bit of humour in calling this heritage 'weak', not to evoke its fragility but to emphasize how weakly institutionalized it is, as suggested in Granovetter's well-known text (1983). Spread by people who do not know each other very well or even at all, move in different social orbits and live in different neighbourhoods or towns, these 'weak' heritages mainly mobilize people who are in a position to widen the circle of those who might feel implicated, which gives an unexpected extra reach to this kind of heritage. On the one hand, this kind of citizen mobilization often goes through 'heritage communities of practice'—proposed by new heritage policies and promoted by the Council of Europe, these are intended to both manage and protect the transmission of the heritage under their responsibility. The states that make up UNESCO, on the other hand, continue to promote heritage that upholds their national unity (Adell et al. 2015). UNESCO, supported by non-governmental organizations and citizens' groups, especially those involved in protecting indigenous people, also places great importance on participation, recycling the strategies of the emancipation pedagogy of the 1970s and connecting them to the rediscovery of localism, to which heritage is presumed to give new value, as it does to the defence of cultural rights. This approach, in an almost counter-hegemonic way, attempts to protect communities, while the international organization, along with the vast majority of the states that constitute it, promotes a neoliberal ideological model of conservation, encouraging the commodification of heritage. Although they were not particularly concerned by that model at first, communities of practice have become increasingly important within urban heritage as the intangible cultural heritage concept has fostered a wide-scale embrace of urban spaces by urban residents, far beyond what is recognized by UNESCO. However, these alternative, non-institutional heritagization processes have to find a place within urban renewal policies that have other goals.

During the 'entrepreneurial turn' of the 1980s (Harvey 1989), European cities developed new governmental models favouring the 'project' over older bureaucratic models (Le Galès 2003), while capitalism was being transformed and the citizenry was demanding greater involvement in managing its daily environment. Citizens concerned with protecting their quality of life became more heavily invested in culture and heritage, traditionally the domain of public policies. Neighbourhoods became the subject of renewed governmental concern. They went from being territories defined above all by residential involvement and the spatial organization of the city to being political issues, mired in new forms of governance that were trying to reconcile governmental decisions with popular opinion. The neighbourhood found itself 'encapsulated' in the vertical structure of public policies, to the advantage of certain entrepreneurs, 'snakes' who know how to climb the 'ladders' of power through their favourable positions within the networks (Morell and Franquesa 2011). The neighbourhood played an important role in idealizing proximity, leading to a proliferation of governmental projects to conserve and protect the cultural landscape (Bandarin and Van Oers 2014), localism (Morell 2015) and the multicultural environment (Salzbrunn 2015). Increasingly, urban regeneration policies work with the population, as a collection of 'communities' of residents that take responsibility for the transformation of their neighbourhoods for the European Union and as 'heritage communities' carrying out the actions necessary for the preservation of their unique identities for UNESCO (Morell and Franquesa 2011, 199–201). The real issues behind heritage and neighbourhood are the decentralization of public decision-making, taking it closer to the residents, and the revival of the real-estate market. Morell (2015) shows the contradiction between these two issues.

This analysis shows that we must find a way to connect the preservation of the living environment, the evolutions in local governance and capitalism's double turning point—entrepreneurial and cultural—to all of which cities must adapt. Are all cities equally affected by this imperative towards communication and urban marketing? Does this phenomenon erase all other forms of urban lifestyle preservation? For tourism-driven Palma de Mallorca, Morell and Franquesa show that residents were able to assert other heritage forms and practices. Isnart (2015) shows how on the Island of Rhodes, also strongly marked by its medieval past, alternative heritage forms were able to surface in the process of defending a Catholic religious heritage for its own sake, unconnected to the Crusade-tourism sightseeing circuits. The fashion for urban marketing hides the more complex heritagization practices that residents engage in for causes other than promoting their city or economy.

The two ethnographic cases on which I will now focus illustrate the 'weak' form of heritage mentioned earlier. In both cases, it is the commitment to a cause, expressed through specific, regular actions, that breathes life back into the heritage. This kind of heritage is flexible, with contours defined through action and storytelling rather than governmental protection and policies, and it evokes a kind of 'heritage conscience … circumscribed in experience', a 'feel-

ing of the past' (Tornatore 2006, 526), rather than the groups of buildings or objects of which inventories are made. This kind of heritage belongs to no one, except for the heritage communities of practice, whose boundaries change from one event to the next.

Villeneuve d'Ascq: 'Weak' Heritage Forms of an Urban Utopia

Villeneuve d'Ascq is located in the suburbs of Lille in northern France. The expansion of this city is rooted in the urban utopias of the 1960s that followed the modernist movement (Rautenberg 2015b). In some neighbourhoods, the city illustrates the utopia of a 'country town' and of a more democratic operation, allowing for a variety of mechanisms for local democracy.[2] The research we did there from 2003 to 2006 shows that the first residents, who considered themselves 'pioneers', aimed to protect their immediate environments and the cooperative practices to which they were particularly attached, and which some of the newer residents were able to revive. Between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, the developers, architects and urban planners who designed and built the city wanted to give it an identity in line with the modernity of the time: green spaces, sporting facilities, cultural sites, support for new-technology companies and participatory democracy; a mix of individual and collective housing, of home ownership and subsidized housing. This period fell between the end of urban design's heyday, under the stewardship of governmental bridge and highway engineers and public works departments, and the beginnings of 'functional urban planning', which drew inspiration from the May 1968 movement and for which the new cities were the favourite field of operation. However, the proposals of the state's urban development department in charge of the project show some difficulty in seriously considering the territory's existing social and political realities as anything other than constraints (elected officials and residents were accused of hindering the functioning of the project) or as resources (strengthening the sense of a 'natural setting' that was desirable for the new city, just like the old farmsteads). One gets the impression that the planners would have preferred to have built on a vacuum. The 12,000 people who lived in the area before the city was created are only mentioned in passing in contemporary speeches and local newspaper reports. They continue to stay in the shadows in the following decades. At the same time, there are many speeches about the participation of the 'residents', betraying a real concern, on the part of both the urban development technicians and planners and the new city's elected officials, about building a city that was supposed to be more 'democratic'.

In many ways Villeneuve d'Ascq looks like the realization of a utopia. It approximates the tripartite structure of Thomas More's *Utopia* (Choay 1965). First, it critiques what it supplants (here, functionalism and the housing projects that supposedly dehumanized the city). Second, its project is to create a more harmonious society (i.e. the city). Third, it conceives the built-up space as a bridge between city and nature, founded on more democratic institutions

with the goal of 'changing the city'—in other words, a space that moves away from the old urban age to a new urban age. This desire is not new; it has been part of the development of most new French cities. Even now, more than 40 years later, these utopian ideas are not forgotten by long-time residents, the city's architects and certain elected officials. They have become part of an intangible cultural heritage which is still sometimes embodied in city planning to this day. Let us expand a little on these three main utopian ideas.

The first utopia is intangible. It involved creating an urban life that was different from the rejected urban past of large apartment buildings and the 'spectre of bedroom communities' (Vadelorge 2003). We call this utopia 'the opening'. It can be seen as a local paradigm shared by both those who conceived it and many residents. It is visible in architectural choices and social practices, as many pioneers from the 'golden age' of the first years remember. This idea is what gives coherence to the project of the new city, unifying the built-up space and the social, the practices and the dreams. It explains the prohibition on closing off gardens with tall hedges so that interactions can take place, the choice of certain homeowners not to fence off their property and the presence of public paths that snake between the houses. But it can also be seen in the welcome given to Chilean and Vietnamese refugees during the 1970s and the decisions to devote 50% of the housing stock to affordable or subsidized housing and to give priority to innovative companies. In other words, Villeneuve d'Ascq was supposed to be an open city, promoting social progress, in which the quality of the social relations was supposed to be the key to 'changing the world'.

The second idea has to do with the promotion of local democracy, built on a system of meetings, which was promoted by the government's planning department in order to exchange information between the population and the professionals. Here the technicians present their projects to the population, including the long-time residents of the three municipalities and the first residents of the new neighbourhoods. The atmosphere could become tense when the residents believed that their points of view were not being heard. Later, other systems were set up to allow organizations, elected officials and residents to work together on issues of interest to them all, including the management of public facilities, the establishment of day-to-day ecological routines, building permits, investment projects and the organization of neighbourhood parties. However, these systems eventually failed.

The third utopian idea is that of mixing city and countryside, following the old and well-known dream, or more specifically bringing nature into the city, consciously rebutting modernist functionalism. This explains the importance given to green spaces, private gardens and the greening of public spaces, now seen as recreational spaces, not simply sites of pleasure, as they often were in older French cities. The last farming operations are also preserved, treated as almost sacred and more as heritage sites than anything else.

From Urban Utopias to Imagination in the Acts of Local Residents

In the statements we collected from our interviews, many architects, planners, leftist elected officials, and old and new residents appeared to share the utopias of the time and a vaguely communitarian ideal of life. A sort of common vision, a spirit of sharing, emerged. This generation, which a decade earlier had experienced the events of May 1968 (some from very close up) with its demonstrations and occupying of universities, had not lost its illusions of a better world. The people who arrived in the new city were hoping for a friendlier, less conventional way of life. They wanted to build an ideal city, to forge amicable social connections, to carry out collective actions, to show solidarity. These new residents of Villeneuve were heavily invested in community life. They carried the torch for what appeared, then, to be modernity, and it seemed as though the new city was going to make it possible for these projects to blossom. Some of the pioneers, who in the past had had positions of responsibility in trade unions, politics or community clubs and groups, took the lead when it became necessary to defend special interests that turned into collective claims. They became engaged in developing neighbourhood activities or in joint proprietor associations. From the beginning, the new city allowed, and even encouraged, the development of individual plans and ambitions.

These social imaginaries occurred within the context of the city's profound and long-lasting transformation, which followed the serious transformation of European cities that began in the 1950s with the 'democratization of space' that governments were trying to promote (Secchi 2004). However, as the example of Villeneuve d'Ascq shows, residents were able to resist these institutional frameworks. The organizations that had been intended as a way to manage the subdivisions became more demanding than expected or desired. Sometimes they turned into powerful local opposition groups against public officials. It turns out that when projects that have been imagined and designed in architectural firms and urban planning offices are realized and carried out there are sometimes surprises in store as participatory utopia extends into social life.

The various agents involved in new cities often took charge of the narrative of their origins and their history very early on (Vadelorge 2003). Thus, Villeneuve d'Ascq's political and democratic identity relies on sagas that emphasize the state's heavy-handed approach to its beginnings. They can be categorized as founding narratives, falling somewhere between mythology and history. They were echoed by a number of our interviewees and we found them again in various publications to do with the city, in the local press, in biographies and in historical works. These founding narratives can be structured into three major interrelated themes.

The first is that of a technocratic adventure that causes the city to emerge from the ground almost by magic. The best-known story, which exists in several different versions, is that of 'one of General de Gaulle's ministers'—that is, Edgar Pisani, the minister of public Works from 1966 to 1967—who, like a

demiurge, is supposed to have flown over the site in a plane or a helicopter in order to decide on the placement of the city.

The second recurring theme involves the pioneers who went into battle against everyone—government authorities, developers and the urban community—to ensure that the city would live up to their residential dreams. Thus we find stories about protests 'against the defects' that people discovered in the apartments when they were first moving in; about the public authority's management of transportation routes in the subdivisions; about the opposition to the construction of the Alvaredo neighbourhood[3]; and about Gérard Caudron's first election, in 1977, when he ran on the platform of recalibrating the city's development plans, which he said had 'fallen into the hands of the technocrats'.[4]

The third theme comes up most often; it is that of the lost solidarity of the early years, when neighbours helped each other, bought lawn mowers together and used them in common, welcomed new arrivals with a shared drink, and organized big midsummer bonfires on the plain in front of the castle.

Nowadays, these narratives run together to make up an activist myth for the city, one of the pillars of Villeneuve's social imaginary, along with its heritagist, urbanist and landscapist elements. The importance of the urban landscape, which has managed to combine some of the typical traits of northern France's urban culture with architectural modernity, should not be underestimated. The residents of Villeneuve are attached to the position of nature in their environment, to the passages and alleyways between the houses and to the little gardens that they tend in front of their dwellings, even when they are part of the communal property. One of the pleasures often mentioned is walking in the city, running or taking walks around the lakes. When asked why they decided to move here, many residents mention nature, the sense of an urban village, the city's 'openness to nature and the countryside.' Many of those we talked to were unaware that the lakes and ponds that can be found all over the city were actually created at the same time as the new city. In the area around the castle, where the kind of collective struggles that we have quickly described here never really took place, the local government recently revived the midsummer bonfires in celebration of Saint John that were initiated about 30 years ago by local parents and other residents.

The original values that were in place when the city was created are still partially present in the mental image that people have of the city, although the residents' practices have changed quite a bit and the old values have now largely been overlaid with more 'classical' images of heritage. According to some of the witnesses, since 1974, public spaces have become closed off. Residents have 'forgotten' to trim their hedges, thus impeding the kind of communication that can happen over the backyard hedge and, even more, the visibility of their yards and gardens from the outside. The ownership association regulations have been modified to allow yards to be closed off. 'People are barricading themselves in', we heard during our interviews. A number of public pathways

have been privatized. At the same time, mutually supportive relationships within neighbourhoods are no longer what they were. Finally, a reading of local newspapers and community newsletters indicates that Villeneuve's heritage has been the object of veritable institutional invention, as there is an insistence on emphasizing the least little vestige that might anchor the new city in old, or even ancient, soil.

If we only had institutional memory to go by, we might think that Villeneuve d'Ascq was a city like any other, whose history was rooted in the soil of northern France, in spite of the memories of some people and the practices of others. Ten years ago the heritage of new cities was no respecter of utopias. And yet, what could look like a denial of collective memory continued to play its own part: however embellished or transformed they might be, the stories of the founding of the city and of some of the small events that dotted the history of its neighbourhoods had not been forgotten by the city's residents. They reactivated those memories whenever it came to recalling that the utopias of the past had not been erased, even if they were now more likely to fall into a private register or to have to do with neighbourhood socialization. This kind of memory was also mobilized for the sake of demanding that the public spaces be managed in a way that was more respectful of nature and to revive the manifestations and practices of neighbourliness. At the time when we were carrying out our research, these utopias were also invoked to argue against the construction of a large stadium on public territory, or to save a tree that was interfering with the flow of traffic from being cut down. They also appeared in the mayor's campaign speeches, when he reminded the city's inhabitants of how he resisted the government and its technocrats when he was first elected in 1977.

In this way, urban utopia seems to fit well with the social heritage of the city. Such 'social' heritage retains a real force, as well as a greater political and social efficacy than many of the city's more iconic heritage sites, such as the Flers 'castle', which is registered on the supplementary historic monument list. The following example, however, is based on a different kind of experience. It has to do with the treatment of interculturalism in a cultural organization. This is less about urbanity as space than it is about urbanity as a capacity of the city's residents—who associate the management of cultural otherness with lifestyles, knowledge, and practical and interpersonal skills—that constitutes an important part of the city's heritage.

From a 'Community of Experiences' to a 'Heritage Community of Practice': Villeurbanne's Ecumenical Cultural Centre

The Jean-Pierre Lachaize Ecumenical Cultural Centre (Centre Culturel Œcuménique, CCO) in the town of Villeurbanne, near Lyon, was established in the 1960s as a meeting place for students of the nearby university. Since the beginning, the CCO was involved, on the one hand, in the social work of the

district and in creating a network of social support there and, on the other hand, in helping immigrants, addressing political issues to do with relations between Europe and the third world, and providing support to refugees. When the centre celebrated its 50th anniversary, something about the activities of its membership that had never actually been made explicit finally became quite clear: their ongoing commitment, from the very beginning, to a principled sense of hospitality and to what we might today call the defence of cultural rights (Autant-Dorier and Aubry 2014).[5] When the 'Cultural Centre for Chaplaincies and for Catholic and Protestant Services' was created by Father Jean Latreille in 1963,[6] it was mainly intended as a way to provide chaplaincy services to the students of the nearby university. Very quickly, starting with the centre's 1967 handbook, the students who used it were asked to be truly engaged and not to arrive with a 'consumer mentality' (quoted in Chatelan 2012). However, in 1971, Latreille noted that 'the term "welcome centre" would have been just as apt. Because it is a real caravansary. You can find everything there, the best and the not so good, prayers and folk dances, catechism circles and card games, a real bistro during the week and a parish on Sundays' (quoted in Chatelan 2012, 21). The cultural centre had made itself open to the neighbourhood, but to some degree that was done to the detriment of its evangelical work and of the pastoral care of the students. Nevertheless, as the 1970s went on, the centre expanded, received new sources of funding from the town of Villeurbanne and in 1976 changed its name to the Ecumenical Cultural Centre, providing cultural events for the neighbourhood as well as chaplaincy services. The CCO does not intend to be just a place that 'rents out venues' but rather to remain a 'place of freedom, welcome and a meeting place for all those who work towards promoting humanity' (Chatelan 2012, 26). The centre makes itself available for training workshops and hosts evening debates for the women's commission of the French Communist Party, for the French Scouts, for the meetings of the neighbourhood merchants' association and for demonstrations in support of Tunisian students on hunger strike.

After this period of putting down roots in the community, a period of more intense activism followed in the 1980s. In that decade, the CCO developed pretty much in every direction, reaching out towards refugees, the unemployed, the underhoused and the youth. An increasing number of organizations were welcomed into the CCO and the permanent staff were expanded. In 1984 there were 176 organizations that met at the CCO, of which about 20 had their headquarters there. According to Chatelan, the diversity of activities made any kind of categorization virtually impossible: 'co-ownership boards, works councils and 'Christmas parties',[7] charitable organizations, student organizations, meetings on various worldwide conflicts (as those in Northern Ireland and in El Salvador) took place side by side with theatrical and musical rehearsals, the latter 'showing a growth of 800 percent in terms of hours of presence in the building from 1987 to 1989' (2012, 30). True activism took a back seat in order to support the activities of cultural organizations or those linked to the immigrant communities. The CCO now saw itself as 'a place for the recognition and expression of different cultures', 'a promoter of action'[8]

and an 'organization of organizations' as its members often defined it.[9] After intense internal discussions about the identity of the organization, in 1989 it drew up a charter in which two main priorities were identified: first, the CCO should function as the head of a network of organizations; second, its primary mission should be the fight against poverty in all its forms. In the following decade, the connection between the CCO and government services was significantly strengthened because of the demand placed on the CCO to participate in the policies for neighbourhood social development,[10] in particular by contributing to the training of managers for urban projects. There was a significant increase in the financial resources available to the centre, especially thanks to the involvement of the state and because there was a substantial expansion of the subsidy it received from the municipal government. In the 2000s, cultural activities and the economy of social solidarity were enhanced. For the leaders of the centre, however, it was the prefix 'inter' that was the best way to characterize the activities of the CCO (renamed in 2003 as the Jean-Pierre Lachaize CCO after its charismatic director)—that is, interconnection with other organizations and interculturalism, framing a project that was now oriented towards 'integrating a rootedness in the local with a citywide presence; supporting individuals and human rights by paying particular attention to the excluded, in order to give them a voice' (Chatelan 2012, 36).

In the conclusion of his article about the CCO, Chatelan emphasizes the centre's remarkable faithfulness to its origins. I would also point out its warmth, hospitality and openness. Chatelan proposes two hypotheses to explain the organization's success: first, the strong value put on reflection and intentionality, along with the intellectual foundation of which the centre has never lost sight; and, second, the idea that the CCO is a 'community'. The word 'community' was taken on at the beginning (in the context of the 'Community of Marist Brothers') but seldom used from then on, even though the idea that the CCO was supposed to be something more than a simple cultural organization was very widely shared among the board of directors, the paid staff and many of the people who used it. All of these stakeholders recognized that there was a 'CCO spirit'. How was this able to mobilize a 'community' of people who felt connected to the organization? That is what I shall now examine, through the lens of a particularly significant event in the centre's recent history—namely, the organization of its 50th anniversary.

The 50th Anniversary

In 2009, while the steering committee for the CCO's 50th anniversary was in the middle of its preparations and discussions, the director, Fernanda Leite, was asked: 'How does the CCO deal with the issue of balancing an appreciation for the contributions of these cultures with advocacy for intangible heritages?' She responded:

> We pay attention to the idea of promoting the public expression [of cultures] and the ways in which they interact with others, with the intention of constantly renew-

ing their ability to be a *language that moves freely in the world, in other words to be an expression that is disseminated by actors who are able to act*[11] and to formulate their way of 'being in the world', rather than worrying more narrowly about 'preserving a heritage' … And while the CCO welcomes these 'heritages' in order to allow them to exist, the *Words on the Spot* event creates a space for interaction among them. Thus, they find new geographies and new horizons in order to exist with others and not to be closed in on themselves and, as a result, they renew themselves.[12]

This interview excerpt does a good job of summing up the organization's philosophy. Elsewhere it says that it wants to be an 'incubator'—that is, a place that allows groups to mature and that promotes the public expression of cultures in a spirit of sharing and of adaptation to current conditions. In this spirit, heritage is not a collection to be maintained; it is action, involvement, sharing and transformation.

The 50th anniversary was the object of lengthy preparations by a steering committee made up of board members, the directors and researchers who had been 'enlisted' in the action research that had been set in motion a year earlier. The anniversary was seen as an effective device through which each person involved, whatever their status, would be led to commit to a more active role 'in order to resolve some issues of legitimacy that had been getting in the way' (Autant-Dorier and Aubry 2014, 49) of a reflection on the heritage dimension of the CCO's activities. The plan was to involve everyone in the research, starting from wherever their place was in the organization: 'Thus, the paid staff members of the CCO were in fact involved in the anniversary initiative, whereas up until that point they had been, rather, witnesses to the research' (Autant-Dorier and Aubry 2014, 49). The problem for the staff members and activists was that it was '"les about leaving a mark than about becoming involved in the relationship and making things happen, 'working together'"' (Autant-Dorier and Aubry 2014, 51), and that it seemed awkward, all of a sudden, to think in terms of being motivated by heritage. This awkwardness was intensified by the fact that the chief characteristic of the CCO, the interculturalism that was the reason for all of this activity, was in fact external to the institution. It was more a characteristic of the partner organizations, the city and even the world in which they were acting. So how could it be said to be connected to the organization's own heritage, even if only its intangible heritage? The suggestion was made to the members, whether elected or paid, that this would be an 'indirect' heritage—that is, not a direct characteristic of the CCO but rather a characteristic, primarily, of the organizations that it hosted and for which the CCO provided the possibility of it being put into action. For the CCO, interculturalism would be primarily a 'political dimension of the action' (Autant-Dorier and Aubry 2014, 51); therefore, in a way, that dimension could be considered characteristic of the CCO. That is what the 50th anniversary would bring about.

The anniversary celebration was held between 12 and 19 January 2013. The team of researchers was closely involved with events and activities of various

kinds that included writing a book sprint with an author from Quebec;[13] a study workshop with master's students entitled 'Citizen Sharing: (Inter)cultural Experimentations as a Mode of Citizen Activation' at which various experiments that had been conducted with artists and researchers were presented; a debate panel on the theme of 'cultural rights, universalism and communities'; a series of jointly conducted workshops on 19 January on the results of the book sprint, a 'speed dating' event on interculturalism,[14] a workshop on the topic of 'building the CCO of tomorrow', a 'connections lab' intended to map the CCO's network and a CCO photo booth; the presentation of three movies about the CCO; a debate and a round table on 'the CCO, the art of building commonality'[15]; and a buffet dinner.

The 50th anniversary celebrations highlighted the importance of action in the identity of the CCO within the framework of its history, as Olivier Chatelan shows. The CCO is not a 'cultural institution' that gains legitimacy from recognition by its trustees or its public; nor is it a 'project hotel', simply providing services to its partner organizations. 'The way in which it creates things has more to do with the connections that it puts into operation, the people that it mobilizes, and the places that it connects' (Autant-Dorier and Aubry 2014, 56), as the experience of the 50th anniversary celebrations shows. Area residents who came as neighbours, newly minted activists as well as old fighters of the 1960s generation, artists who were active in Asian, African and South American 'cultural' organizations, as well as artists specifically invited for the occasion, academics, students, intellectuals and elected officials all met there. They engaged in the various debates, some of them heated, and testified to the relationships that they had with the CCO. And yet there was something a little disappointing in all these contributions. We did not learn anything new about the experience that all of these people had of the CCO. Some things were confirmed, including the distance kept by the archbishopric, in the person of the archbishop of Lyon; the activist involvement of the elected socialist officials at the beginning of their careers; the function as an incubator for political consciousness; and the fact that connections with the neighbourhood had become more tenuous. The 50th anniversary celebrations confirmed the prominent position of 'inter', which we already knew about; the depth of activist involvement, along with its corollary—namely, clashes with the extreme right; and the important role the CCO had taken within the landscape of refugee culture and protection in Lyon.

Nevertheless, in retrospect it could be said that the 50th anniversary celebrations were a kind of epiphany, a reminder to the members of the CCO of everything that had been important to them since the centre was founded, everything that each of them cared about, and that the celebrations made it possible to set down in black and white; to present all this to the public in a substantial way and, finally, to pass it on, in particular such themes as hospitality, interculturalism, respect for otherness and commitment—nothing really new, in the end. And yet the 50th anniversary can be seen as an affirmation of the fact that what really matters, above all, is putting into practice and renew-

ing what one is in daily life, in a collective act that, on this occasion, is produced by the organization of a commemorative event. It is indeed a matter of heritage because it is something people care about, it is the very heart of this 'CCO spirit' that is often referred to but hard to explain, something that has been asserted for decades, it seems, which shows that it matters to people that it be passed on. This heritage could be considered to be 'weak' because, like Granovetter's weak ties (1983), it seems to be all the stronger for not being very institutionalized and for having been built up without a lot of fuss, which gives it that much more leverage in its ties to other groups and organizations without trespassing on their uniqueness. It is effective because it is open, and because it is not constrained by canonical narratives, iconic images, or sites that must be protected.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, let me return to the three situations that I proposed at the beginning. The gentrification of Palma de Mallorca—though one could of course have found something very similar in many other places like it—brings the urban politics of the rehabilitation of old neighbourhoods and the desire to keep property values up face to face with the residents' attachment to a local neighbourliness that they consider to be their heritage. The heritagization in this case has to do with spaces, buildings and lifestyles all at the same time. It involves public policies as well as residents, but it can also be an instrument for mobilizing opposition to governmental heritage policies. In Villeneuve d'Ascq, the heritagization of the founding utopias seems tenuous; it has not been asserted much or at all, it is not very visible within the urban space for anyone who does not know the city's history, and yet, from time to time, these utopias reappear in the public discourse, in the commitment of certain residents to their neighbourhoods or in citizen initiatives. There is no real network of residents and elected officials upholding this heritage, and yet, in our research, individuals who were strangers to each other or only slightly acquainted used almost exactly the same discourse of nostalgia about the city's past and seemed ready to defend the values and ideas which had been adopted 30 years earlier. These utopias still retain some of their symbolic and social effectiveness, much like the more or less idealized imaginary of the neighbourliness of Palma de Mallorca's working-class neighbourhoods. At the CCO, the spatial and material inscription of the generous ideas of its early years is not obvious, and yet the CCO, too, seems to have managed the feat of having held on to those ideas since the heyday of humanist activism in the 1970s. What we can learn from the CCO example, seen through the celebration of its 50th anniversary, is that what is truly the heritage in that institution, what the various stakeholders really care about, whether they are activisits, staff members, partners or simply regular visitors, is the 'community' of practices and action constituted by the CCO. This is a community with constantly changing boundaries, which involves multiple activities ranging from accommodating refugees

to cultural activities, from defending 'communitarian' organizations against very sceptical state powers to giving legal and technical aid to foreign artists and facilitating their entry into Lyon's artistic world.

In the end, what these three situations have in common is that the heritage that they create is built through practice; it is a symbolic resource that is activated collectively as a way for groups to defend themselves against things that seem as though they might attack their lifestyles or their ideals. Even if they happen to share some things—such as a taste for neighbourliness, the memory of old utopias that moved them to action in the past, or values of solidarity and hospitality—that is not all that connects all the people involved here. After all, there are many people who could feel affected but who nevertheless keep their distance. What really creates heritage is that these ideals and values are shared, put into movement through action, and that through them, people feel empowered to act publicly. This is not about 'capitalism's cultural shift', which creates economic value through gentrification, nor about the 'heritage communities' that UNESCO protects in order to promote intangible heritage (i.e. the heritage of residents rather than of institutions). This is also not about the territorial marketing that is so beloved by public bodies nor, of course, museological or monumental collecting. What makes these 'weak' forms of heritage so symbolically and socially effective comes down to their ability to mobilize people and groups, and that must be constantly renewed.

Notes

1. http://www.coe.int/fr/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/09000083746.
2. This research was carried out in two phases. The first, from 2002 to 2003, was a collective project examining the evolution of the notion of public space in new cities. The second, from 2002 to 2006, looked at the production of intermediate spaces in the vicinity of Villeneuve d'Ascq. This was based on multiple sources: interviews in the Lille region and in Paris with developers, landscapers and architects who had been involved in the construction of the city; regular observations in various contexts, including participation in guided tours of the city, cultural activities, and visiting stores and personal connections (of which we had many because Villeneuve d'Ascq is a university town); a systematic review of the municipal as well as the institutional press from 1977 to 1985, and again from 2003 to 2005; queries to the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies and to city services about the city's sociodemographic data from 1977 to 2006; and in-depth and repeated interviews with 22 residents beyond our personal connections.
3. This neighborhood was not part of the original plans and it was the subject of a memorable battle between the local government and the residents, who were against the project, which was supported by the state and by Etablissement Public d'Aménagement de Lille Est.
4. *La Tribune*, February 2000, no. 151.
5. I rely here on a collective research project led by the anthropologist Claire Autant-Dorier from 2012 to 2014. The team included a social psychologist, an

anthropologist, a videographer, a doctoral student in anthropology, the historian Olivier Chatelan and me. I have been involved with the centre since 2007, helping to facilitate its work. I have also participated in several studies and reflections on its workings and its institutional memory, particularly the 50th anniversary project, which is described later. During the latter, I was involved as a member of the research steering committee and a co-director of the thesis.

6. Father Jean Latreille came from a family of socially active Catholics who were well known in Lyon, which allowed him to involve a number of Lyon's industrial employers in the CCO's early years.

7. 'Christmas parties' are popular traditional events that gather the employees or stakeholders together in the last days before the Christmas holidays in many companies, associations and public offices. They are called 'Christmas trees' *(arbres de Noël)*.

8. From a speech by President Jean-Michel Privolt (1983–1987) (quoted in Chatelan 2012, p. 31).

9. For example, in 1985 the CCO supported the creation of the Villeurbanne Organization for Housing Rights (Association villeurbannaise pour le droit au logement), whose first goal was to facilitate access to decent housing for foreigners. The organization had its headquarters at the CCO, which provided rent-free rooms and equipment. The permanent staff and the board members of the CCO were involved in the life of the organization as well (Chatelan 2012).

10. Arising in the early 1980s in response to the social issues around subsidized housing areas, these policies became institutionalized during the following decade.

11. My emphasis.

12. One of the main cultural events organized every year by the CCO.

13. A book sprint is an intensive collaborative writing practice which takes place over several days (in this case five days). Twelve people participated, writing online on the CCO's core topics: connection to communities, attachment to a universe that feeds on diversity, involvement and social transformation.

14. Based on interviews that had been carried out beforehand, the participants were asked to role-play encounters.

15. Quotations here are from the programme for the event.

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Sport and the City: The Olympic Games and the Reimagining of East London

Iain Lindsay

INTRODUCTION

London's bid was built on a special Olympic vision. That vision is of an Olympic games that will be not only a celebration of sport but a force for regeneration. The games will transform one of the poorest and most deprived areas of London. They will create thousands of new jobs and homes. They will offer new opportunities for business in the immediate area and throughout London. (Jack Straw, House of Commons, 6 July 2005)

As a modus operandi of sport-related regeneration, London's hyperbolic Olympic narratives, as illustrated above, proliferated in the public consciousness during the event-delivery period. This period began in 2005 with the award of the Games and culminated with a grand opening ceremony in 2012. As this was a predominantly urban Olympics, the realities that underpinned such rhetoric were variously consumed, experienced and negotiated throughout the UK with an intensity and impact that were largely dependent on one's proximity to the venues. A nuanced methodology was required to capture London's evolution and to document the contrast between rhetoric and experiential reality.

Much research has explored from a holistic megaevent perspective the implications and outcomes of hosting the Games (to name only two examples, Preuss 2004; Gold and Gold 2007). There is, however, a distinct lack of academic research on the ethnographic realities of hosting, which significantly limits wider applicability because if there is one constant that above any other permeates all urban renewal, it is the impact of change on people's lives. Addressing this lacuna is crucial for us to understand adequately the realities of

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urban change as experienced by the local communities throughout the sporting events. More specifically, we need to comprehend how people navigate the evolution of once familiar spaces of social interaction into something that may be best described as 'foreign'.

Based on more than a decade of research, this chapter speaks to wider concepts of inclusion, exclusion, power relations, ideology and identity. If it can provide motivation to produce more studies of the realities of the practices of urban regeneration, belonging, displacement, urban neglect, citizenship and everyday life during megaevent delivery then it will have exceeded its objectives. Drawing on a critical reading of modern social theory, the discussion follows Pardo (1996) by advocating that the documentation of microlevel processes—particularly, the implications of regeneration—extends our insights and allows controlled speculation on the processual relationship between agency and structure.

The Olympic venues and the plethora of satellite regenerative projects, which systemically became 'Olympic-related' during the preparatory period, were expected to do much to facilitate this 'foreignness' and allay East London's deprived communities in the Olympic zones. This perspective was emphasized by the local mayor, Sir Robin Wales, who consistently voiced his desire to dramatically change his constituency via the 2012 Olympics.

The mayor stated that London was unlike any other Olympic host city because for the first time in history the Games were being used to transform completely a deprived area. Sir Robin Wales would say to any who would care to listen that the regeneration of his London Borough of Newham—its Olympic legacy—was the primary reason why London won the Games.[1] For 'London 2012', the contest that had the most enduring significance did not involve athletes, events or medals but could nonetheless be described as a gold rush. This was a contest of endurance and opportunism that marked life during the delivery of Olympic legacy.

Demarcating Legacy

Legacy is a highly contested and value-laden term, particularly when it is attached to sport. In the pre-Olympic milieu there appears to be a widespread conviction that legacy outcomes are achievable only through Olympic hosting, and this was certainly the case regarding London 2012. This led to the term 'legacy' becoming both self-evident and a means of justifying and legitimizing otherwize unpalatable levels of regeneration and upheaval. Accordingly, megaevent legacy is often, and indeed was in this case, portrayed as a panacea to address economic, social and political issues.

The 2012 Olympic Park cut across five 'Olympic' London boroughs. It was, however, primarily located within one—Newham. Statistical evaluations of pre-Games Newham painted this location as a deprived place of transition, with the Olympics being used as a catalyst to bring the borough closer to aspirational models of socioeconomic development. London's Olympic regeneration—although never specifically defined—ostensibly revolved around the idea that

hosting the 2012 Games would facilitate a regenerative process, for a 'better' Newham. This perspective was based on the assumption that all shared the same opinion of what constituted a 'better life'.

Documenting Newham's Olympic milieu was a highly complex affair, playing out in a highly complex location that required a tailored methodology to unpack it. It was imperative to define the research boundaries so that logic, practice and flexibility of approach should interweave. Accordingly, my ethnographic research was limited to the borough of Newham. Newham remains one of the most culturally and ethnically diverse places on the planet, with more than 300 languages spoken there (Newham Language Shop, 2005). To place this in context, Russia spans nine time zones and is home to 100 nationalities but 'just' 150 languages are spoken there (Sixsmith 2011).

This diversity was a selling point in the London 2012 Olympic bid. Yet, post-bid, the London that was to be showcased during the Games was certainly not one of crime and deprivation. Local residents' all-too-predictable failure to exploit Olympic opportunities resonates with Fussey et al's reflection (2011) that regional and economic 'legacy' benefits can often be seen to exacerbate social disadvantage and inequality rather than remedy them. No matter, when the world's gaze fell on Newham and the 2012 Olympic Games, a new East London was on show—a place that by virtue of hosting the Games was ostensibly a renewed, refreshed and resplendent safe space of social interaction.

Setting Up Camp

To rewind to the beginning, questions arose as what would be the best locations from which to track the Olympic evolution. At the outset, it appeared logical to assume that those living in the area surrounding the building site that was to become the Olympic Park would have a different experience from those living outside the immediate vicinity. An additional Olympic venue—the ExCeL—which lay to the south of the borough also required attention as it would host many Olympic events and was also expected to undergo a substantial Olympic transition.

Naturally, research boundaries must include people as well as places. All residents in the borough would experience the 2012 Olympics and their lives would be impacted on to varying degrees. The research needed a triple-fronted approach that would allow me to embed myself in the areas surrounding Newham's two major Olympic venues and that would facilitate access to key members of the community at large.

On this basis, Newham was divided into three distinct zones for research purposes. These were geographically defined locations within which ethnographic research was to record Olympic delivery and Newham's transformation. One zone was located in the immediate vicinity of the Olympic Park, which needed me to become established in a housing estate near the Olympic stadium. Another was located in the vicinity of the ExCeL London, the second major event hub. There I would collect ethnographic material in the housing estate close by. The remainder of Newham was defined as an Olympic *Dispersal*

Zone, and research in this larger locale involved ethnographic immersion in organizations that were tasked with running community engagement activities across the borough. The success of their endeavours was evaluated according to their ability to engage with all levels of Newham's diverse community.

The ethnographic pursuit of witnessing the realities of hosting the world's premier megaevent depended on capturing everyday life in and around the listed research hubs that encapsulated the emerging Olympic city. In the East London case, I observed how Olympic transformation brought about the imposition of an Olympic-related securitization that introduced a 'cleansing' function of the various areas, restricted access, authoritarian policing methods and increased tension between the local community and the police. Securitization prohibited those who were aggrieved from exercising their right to voice their discontent in the vicinity of the Olympic venues and, consequently, to the global media.

It is in cases such as this that the ethnographer must discern which narrative is more compelling and value laden in terms of the intended outcomes of the research. It would have been very easy to allow the research to become fixated on divergent agendas, such as human rights and social justice. Throughout the London 2012 preparatory work there were many such cases to explore, which an ethnographer would personally relate to. However, although valuable in and of themselves, focusing on such cases would have meant moving away from the intended objectives.

ASPIRATIONAL THINKING

During the latter parts of the opening decade of the millennium, in Newham and throughout the rest of the UK there was an atmosphere where it seemed almost unpatriotic or churlish not to feel a growing sense of excitement or pride in the fact that London would soon play host the 2012 Olympics. The powerful and often all-encompassing 'London 2012' was saturated with regenerative allegory from its outset and loomed large in the British psyche. However, those who lived through the daily grind of Olympic delivery experienced a reality vastly different from the media representation of the 2012 transformation.

Exploring the reasons for such a contrasting perspective underpinned my early forays into ethnography. The study began, quite appropriately, with the most crucial components of any ethnography: people and place. At the local level, during the Olympic delivery period, the members of the host communities became depersonalized people living in highly denigrated, geographically and demographically defined contested realms. Olympic discourse categorized their neighbourhoods as impoverished, low-income, high-crime locations and official discussion revolved predominantly around how best to 'tame' this part of London (Gibbons and Wolff 2012, 442).

After the 2012 Games, these East London's Olympic locales were left to post-event modification and reflective analyses with little more than statistics

and quantitative data to go by. The posthumous accounts of East London's Olympic transition have since been dominated by assessments that, based largely on these data, focus on the before and after situation, comparing and contrasting the post-event delivery outcomes with pre-event promises and the pre-event geographic and demographic setup.

My research aimed to address what the 'before and after studies' all too often tend to omit—the process delivery and the attendant local evolution. This chapter aims to rectify precisely the omission of such longitudinal ethnographic accounts of sports-driven urban regeneration. I suggest that by combining qualitative and quantitative analyses a new research paradigm could emerge that could contribute to the planning and delivery of future sports-driven regeneration. It is perhaps not surprising, but should nonetheless be acknowledged, that ethnographic research offers an account of Olympic transition that is altogether different from that offered from other viewpoints.

Building Research Fences

Research realities are constructs of people, place and time. 'Regeneration research' studies the evolution of all three. How best to capture the narrative raises significant issues which should be explored. Owing to the transformative nature of Olympic delivery and the ephemeral nature of Newham as a place, my research involved a study of great transience.[2] It asserted that the use of the term 'community' is necessarily flexible. This flexibility permeated the analysis; indeed, the expression 'Newham community' did not exclude people who would not define themselves in these terms, which brought out an ambivalence towards inclusion that is both an inherent and an incurable part of any 'community' (Bauman 1993, 8–10).

This is but one example of the way in which pragmatism should always permeate research. One should endeavour to simplify matters to the lowest possible denominator. Gone are the days when pontificating and navel-gazing were seen as markers of intelligence—and good riddance indeed. In this regard, in my analysis of London 2012 I did not use the word 'community' as representative of a holistic group against which to evaluate the implications of Olympic delivery. Rather, 'community' was considered to be the site where Olympic-delivery questions, issues, difficulties and contestations could be explored. Therefore, the Newham 'community' was approached as a 'relational space' within which to examine the reality of London 2012.

That said, it is very difficult to negotiate empathic feelings with those you spend significant time with as a researcher. It is indeed no surprise that the extent to which a researcher resists the urge to 'go native' and remains objective is one of the most highly contested issues in this kind of research. To contextualize this in the London 2012 case, it was readily apparent that during the delivery of the Olympics, various areas in Newham were modified to fit a particular image. Contrary to what was being portrayed in the media, this process marginalized the local communities, as opposed to empowering them,

which engendered in this researcher inevitable feelings of empathy, and reflections on morality and social justice. This process began with the communities that lay in the path of the Olympic juggernaut being quickly and efficiently relocated. Individuals, families and businesses were, with surprisingly little fanfare, shifted to locations deemed to be more convenient to the 'Olympic family' (Armstrong et al. 2011).

Newham evolved into something that could be described as a controlled zone in which behaviour, life and action became validated and determined by Olympic delivery decree. By the time the circus came to town, previously unimaginable numbers of police, army and private security personnel had occupied the borough. On the one hand, this meant that the everyday criminal activity that had typified the borough for so long became impossible to carry out. On the other hand, the occupation of such diverse security forces precluded long-established behaviour patterns and otherwise acceptable actions.

Following Mary Douglas (1966), consequences of these ordering processes can be seen to be a heightened visibility of ambiguity and an intensification of the existing community characterization of the 'disorderly'. This Olympic security paradigm therefore becomes highly symbolic and imposes a framework 'where the least action is capable of carrying significance' (Douglas 1966, 64). Order is expected and, in its articulation, becomes reinforced. In these circumstances it is very easy to allow one's ideological inner voice to conflict with the primary research objective of bearing independent witness to history. It could be argued that ethnography in particular requires absolute dedication and the single-minded pursuit of well-defined lines of inquiry, else it would fall into a moral, ethical or deeply personal (therefore biased) quest.

From a short-term perspective, the Olympic era Disneyfication of Newham proved to be a triumph for the global capital and its spin-doctors. However, what was described by one police officer as a 'big sports day' has now passed. The local police, like most people who work or live in the area, have quickly returned to a normality of population churn, high unemployment and high crime. The ex-pornographers who own West Ham United have since taken over the Olympic stadium; the obligatory high-end shopping mall is thriving, especially in the food hall cluster of fast-food outlets; and the kids who by sheer weight of police numbers were banished from the immediate Olympic vicinity are back. This is not quite 'purity' but, as ever, it is something approaching 'danger'. This begs the question: was this simply a reimagining of the emperor's new clothes narrative?

Magic Beans

> By staging the Games in this part of the city, the most enduring legacy of the Olympics will be the regeneration of an entire community for the direct benefit of everyone who lives there. (London 2012 Candidate File, 2004, p. 19)

From the outset, the 2012-related regeneration of Newham's locales promised to deliver a range of socioeconomic benefits that included employment

opportunities, improved housing, and commercial and public facilities. Newham residents were promised job opportunities, particularly in the construction and service industries in the short term, and in the longer term skills training to enhance their prospects. Notably, the reality of such socioeconomic enhancement altered the dynamics of this area and instigated waves of economic migration to this highly diverse borough. It is in this regard that Newham's Olympic legacy would become most apparent.

Ultimately, the research that underpins this chapter (Lindsay 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) contended that Newham's primary Olympic outcome could be identified in the redressing of the 'rent gap' in a deprived but potentially valuable location within an easy commute of the city.[3] This appraisal fits well with models of neighbourhood modification that are categorized as 'gentrification'. In a review of gentrification literature, Slater et al. claimed that this schema related to all aspects of the 'production of space for—and consumption by—a more affluent and very different incoming population' (2004, 1145). The paradigm of gentrification is deeply rooted in the social dynamics and economic trends of an area, and its signifiers and effects are heavily influenced by the nature of economic restructuring and by the goals of those charged with urban regeneration (van Weesep 1984, 80).

As is indicated by the above quote, it was to be expected that Newham's profile as an Olympic host would rise, and that this would ensure that during Olympic delivery and beyond the area would yield greater returns in the form of rents and property value. As a result of the allure of development and opportunity, this process did, and will continue to attract new, more affluent residents to the area.

It could be argued that this reality contradicts the ostensible 'Olympic' legacy intent of benefiting incumbent host communities through new opportunities. However, realism prevails and reward favours the proactive and assertive, and the 2012 Olympic Games did little to improve the lives of said incumbents. A definition of precisely what community would attain Olympic benefits was never provided by the deliverers and so the issue was open to interpretation. Also absent was any definition of what exactly these benefits would entail, barring the generalities around jobs and opportunities. It is worth emphasizing that although there is a fundamental difference between orienting Olympic legacy outcomes geographically, sociologically and ideologically, in the absence of specificity, everything is a matter of interpretation. Indeed, the absence of clarity in this regard may speak more of the intent of those who use the potential of Olympic legacy as a driver of change than of sports-led regeneration per se.

WIDE-LENS URBAN RENEWAL

Olympic hosts tend to have commonalities with many other sites of large-scale urban regeneration. Most notably, they are neighbourhoods similar to Newham in that they historically import poverty and are considerably more deprived than other locations. This reality 'needs' the renewal both of the place and of

the people who live there. The endorsements, incentives and 'carrot-and-stick' methods to move out directed at those who represent the old operate in conjunction with a strategic recruitment designed to attract a new post-regeneration demographic in their stead. Ethnographic portrayals of this process offer graphic insights into the nature and realities of how long-established neighbourhoods are repackaged and rebranded. Crucial to these commercial imperatives are notions of lifestyle, the marketing of an area's profile, incentives to relocate and the relationship of what is being sold to what is pre-existing. Contemporary attempts to sell such areas literally and metaphorically arise at precarious political junctures, when the global housing market is suffering turbulence and fiscal policies are increasingly intolerant of migrant workers and of citizens who are dependent on state benefits for their housing costs.

The larger rhetoric around selling regeneration stresses the convergence of social class in evolving locales. This geographic evolution might stress the tolerance of those living cheek by jowl with wide income disparities. This could be particularly evident in an idealized post-Olympic theme park that cannot draw on such success stories. This emerging process might indeed be seen to symbolize the segregation of social class that so typifies the UK and that in the metropolitan contexts has given rise to the growth of gated communities and the ecologies of fear and loathing (Lindsay 2012).

The 2012 Olympic delivery followed an easy-to-understand narrative of reclamation. The head of the Olympic Park Legacy Company, Andrew Altman, argued that the East London's pre-Olympic landscape was a 'gash' that required 'Olympic healing', which perhaps best exemplified the underlying logic of regeneration (Armstrong et al. 2011). It was expected that the post-Games period would subject the less affluent and the minority multiethnic communities that bordered the space of the Olympic Park to increased regulation, surveillance, policing techniques and displacement in order to ensure that the area would become suitable for the habitation of new people (Gibbons and Wolff 2012; Paton et al. 2014).

It was difficult to argue against the fact that Newham required regeneration and greater safety for its people. Figures commonly quoted at the time showed that each year approximately 30% of the borough inhabitants would move internally or externally,[4] which translated into a hugely 'rootless' population that saw the borough as a place of transit and transience, little more than a stop on a journey elsewhere. If, as some argue, place-related identities, relations and histories are formed and asserted through uniformity (Korpela 1989; Gregory et al. 1994), the absence of such identity-affirming uniformity leads to the consideration that it would be pertinent to apply to Newham Auge's (1995) conceptualization of the 'non-place'. Auge argued that if a 'place' can be defined as relational, historical and concerned with identity, then a space that cannot be defined as such must be a 'non-place' (1995, 77–78).

The tactics adopted for rebranding Newham provided insights into the nature of how a long-established neighbourhood synonymous with poverty and deprivation can be repackaged and rebranded on a global scale through the

use of a megaevent. Interestingly, attempts to sell this diverse, deprived area literally and metaphorically arose at a precarious political juncture, for the UK housing market was suffering turbulence and the fiscal policy of the UK government was increasingly intolerant of citizens who were dependent on state benefits for their housing costs.[5]

The successful London Olympic bid of 2005 promised regeneration for the East End of London. All would be winners: housing would improve, accessibility to thd area would increase exponentially, the various medical epidemics that marred this part of London would be addressed and the sporting chances offered to the multicultural youth who made up the borough's population would be without parallel in the UK.

Olympic-delivery Newham was—perhaps subtly—enforcing the transition of the borough from a 'non-place' to something else. This 'something else' was a rebranded Newham injected with something called 'culture', where a collective identity was intended to be delivered in hermetically sealed, Olympics-inspired instalments. This transitional period (2005–2012) saw Newham become something Lefebvre (1991) would conceptualize as a *differential space*. This, according to him, is an essential transition for a new space to be produced. Within this differential space the functions, elements and moments of social practice are restored, or indeed created (1991, 52). This theoretical perspective suited a definition of Newham as did the idea of it being a 'non-place' for so many of its dwellers, evidencing a 'very peculiar type of abstraction' that was aspiring to be real but was unable to create a holistic identity (1991, 53).

The absence of a tangible, definable place-identity contributed to the idea that Newham would be an ideal Olympic host. The borough lacked inclusion but the absence of unity or collective identity was not feared because it was never missed. In this regard, Auge's elements of a 'non-place' exemplified much of Newham. One might argue that the Olympic regeneration of selected parts of the area promised only to enhance its sense of differentiation and strangeness. This research demonstrated a complex, inconsistent interplay between ideology, rhetoric and implementation and, in doing so, it found that a wider pro-Olympic discourse of the benefits of hosting the Games proved at odds with the experience of the local communities.

Irrespective of the profile of Newham as a whole, certain component parts of this reclaimed post-Olympic metropolis are reminiscent of the precursors of many other gentrified urban locales (Jacobs 1996; Lees 2003). The post-Olympic properties will inevitably be attractive to those described variously as post-place flaneurs (King 1993, 152), transnational elites (Friedmann and Wolff 1982), stateless persons (Wallerstein 1993), cosmopolites (Hannerz 1992) and the 'creative classes' (Florida 2005). Such metropolitan migrants might actively seek the nuances of the 'non-place' to satiate their thirst for a vibrant, urban life. This promises to attract a specific affluent population and results in a dilution of diversity, whereby less economically able residents relocate elsewhere out of financial necessity (Cole 1987; Hughes 1990; Smith 1996; Ley 2003).

Back to Beginnings

Ethnographic research is not easy. It is not quick, especially in cases like this when one's study addresses the entire process of Olympic delivery, which lasts for seven years, and the legacy that follows. In addition to other skills, this kind of research requires perseverance, commitment, networking, relationship management and a single-minded determination to translate and codify everyday life for a variety of audiences. Although difficult and testing, the depth of such longitudinal research offers an opportunity to contextualize life to an unmatched degree, and this adds granularity and grounding to policy debate.

At this juncture, it is important to venture into theory to illustrate the import of a rigorous methodological framework that demands a solid grounding of analysis perspective and acts as the steady hand at the rudder that guides all research postulations safely into port. The perspective that I adopted followed the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's view that 'one cannot grasp the most profound logic of the social world unless one becomes immersed in the specificity of an empirical reality' (Bourdieu 1993, 271).

Ethnography, perhaps more than most research methods, will inevitably live or die by its subject matter. The researcher must catalogue, codify and structure everyday life, and must contextualize this in the appropriate academic theory and language. The difficulty with the ethnographic method is that, unless the codification and approach are permeated by appropriate foresight, accounts will invariably be catalogued as historical narratives that speak only to a particular place at a particular time and have little wider applicability. The theoretical and methodological conundrums that each researcher must overcome to avoid this are complex. One must first design one's research in such a way as to address its integrity to the specific subject matter at hand but should also be aware of the usefulness of the findings for a larger, more generalizable narrative.

In the case of the ethnography of London 2012, the generalizable narrative consisted of an assessment of sports-driven urban regeneration, which was ostensibly well defined and relatively understandable on a macrolevel. The main difficulty arose in making the transition from a specific subject matter to a reflection on the broader impact of rhetoric, realities and practices under study. Making sense of any urban milieu is not easy. As Bourdieu argues, an individual's history is intrinsic to guiding life in a particular though not necessarily determining direction. This applies both to the researcher and to the researched. In the Olympic regenerative milieu, those who formed Newham's communities could not attain significant pre-Olympic 'legacy' benefits because they lacked the prerequisite know-how to succeed, or even exist in what Bourdieu would call this *field*. Bourdieu called such know-how 'doxa', which refers to what is taken for granted within a particular society, to 'what goes without saying because it comes without saying' (Bourdieu 1977, 167–169).

Doxa helps to establish social limits and establish the sense of one's place within society. As expected, Olympic delivery did generate many employment

opportunities in the geographical confines of Newham. However, these proved inaccessible for much of the pre-bid community groups. Many Newham residents were ambivalent to the entire Olympic process because they were preconditioned to be pessimistic, able to get over disappointment quickly or to consider themselves ineligible for beneficial opportunities in the first place. To many pre-Olympic Newham residents, the Olympic opportunities were 'not for us' (Bourdieu 1979, 549). This then begs the question: What is for you? And, if someone else seizes the moment while you are inactive, then what?

It may be inferred that Olympic 'legacy' should focus on education and longer-term investment in deprived areas in order to help address the local class-related sociological issues through a steady and patient modification of *habitus* as opposed to the current model that inspired *hysteresis* for many Newham residents (Hardy 2008). This hysteresis was justified by the relatively tight time constraints of the Olympic Games and their ability to act as a mitigating spatial action. Throughout Olympic delivery, this Olympic-related hysteresis appeared to be celebrated by all except the local communities, who only partook once they resigned themselves to accepting that there would be no tangible Olympic benefits for them other than Olympic entertainment. Olympic delivery temporarily cleansed, created, isolated and commodified the Newham's Olympic locales.

Nonetheless, following the opening of *that* envelope in 2005, it was inevitable that parts of East London would be altered significantly. Grand theory helps us to understand and codify transition, but to drive debate this needs further development. In this instance, what was once a collection of diverse, multicultural East and South-East London boroughs were transformed into an 'Olympic City'. As this city grew, it developed a specific 'Olympic identity', accessible both to those who lived in the area and to the rest of the nation.

What we called 'London 2012' was—and remains—an ideological creation. Crucially, this ideological creation used the 'resources of history—real and imagined, language and culture in the process of *becoming* rather than *being*. It was less about "'who we are' or 'where we came from', so much as what we might become" (Hall 1996, 4).

RAISON D'ÊTRE?

The Olympic Games are one of the most powerful transformative mechanisms of the modern age. It is therefore no surprise that the grease that sporting events can bring to the wheels of change has not been overlooked by those who seek to expedite or 'super-size' urban development. Inevitably, all urban renewal precipitates change, which often involves displacement and resettlement. Enforced change, as a result of its divisive and emotionally charged value-laden nature, often precipitates morality, judgement or overly politicized projects. The danger is that although this absolutely raises awareness of a particular issue in a particular context, it constrains the research within the confines of short termism.

Moreover, ethnography can and should aspire to have greater import beyond academe. It is obvious that much academic and media exploration into contested domains is underpinned by concerns about particular social issues or by activism. In this regard, Prato and Pardo's analysis of research in urban anthropology (2013) has succinctly illustrated the complexity of collecting ethnography in this field, particularly in relation to both delimiting and defining the most appropriate research topic and identifying a contextually appropriate methodology.

A key strength of urban anthropology lies in rich and detailed ethnographic analyses of individual cases. However, if, as anthropologists, we wish to have an impact beyond the academic realm—for example, on wider policy—our research must avoid short termism and aspire to the applicability of the findings based on collaborative thinking and appropriate comparative analysis. Urban ethnography could become much more impactful if it produced well-structured and insightful case studies that were oriented to interweaving with a widely applicable urban research paradigm.

It could be said that this position is in contradiction with much ethnography and diminishes the intent and true value of the case study. I would argue that this is not the case. I believe that the urban ethnographer's intent must be to decipher, decode and translate contextually specific subject matter into a broader discourse to foster wider debate. Academic output necessarily resonates with the demands of a particular audience that is often unrecognizable to the research subjects. Less academic navel-gazing and greater attention to pragmatic, concise exposition would serve the discipline well. Indeed, this has emphatically proved to be the case with the research on which both this chapter and a monograph (Lindsay 2014) are based. Ultimately academic in their nature, when communicating with practitioners the research findings needed to be further 'translated'; to ensure accessibility, the narrative has to lose its academic jargon. This, it may be argued, is the inevitable conundrum of the urban ethnographer—one foot in the 'real world', one in the academic and two eyes searching for 'real-world' utility for one's work, the success of which depends on 'multilingual' translation. The true test is to produce content that resonates within academe, does justice to the 'field' and influences policy on some level.

Concluding Thoughts

In Newham the microlevel outcomes of large delivery processes facilitated a renegotiation of place-identity and place-ownership. This fostered an environment oriented to attracting a future affluent population while vilifying the pre-Games community. It was concluded that the Newham council strapline, 'live, work and stay', had failed, as attempts to remould Newham into a post-Olympic utopia that would empower pre-Olympic locals *and* enable prosperous and educated families were flawed.

However, the analysis offered here encourages us to move beyond the dismissal of the Olympic-delivery process as a mechanism for the dissemination of capitalistic norms and values. It promotes a shift in focus towards a contextually

applicable policy that is grounded in real life and in an awareness of the limitations of the population. This is not to say that the traditional residents of areas that are considered to be ripe for regeneration are incapable of positive change. It is to say that realistic evolutionary timeframes must be implemented.

The combination of relatively short Olympic delivery windows (seven years) and hyperbolic legacy narratives raised unreasonable expectations. Reality suggests that traditional residents in areas of regeneration will prioritize dealing with everyday realities where action is governed by life-learned behavioural norms and established interpretations of rationality and interest. By focusing on the microlevel, ethnography helps to shed new light on the way Olympic hosting influences opportunity, morality and individual choice, and on how and why these are accessible—or not accessible—to specific demographics. This can be translated into policy. It may also have wider applicability and may contribute to beneficial implementation.

The overarching research clarified how people negotiate their lives in a complex and evolving environment. The analysis identified the deep-rooted significance and dichotomies of sports-led urban regeneration, the symbolism of personal identity and the diverse implications of urban reclamation. The interactions between the local community and the Olympic deliverers profoundly informed the actors' sense of themselves, their urban setting, their identity and the way in which these interrelate, which has significant wider applicability for future regeneration processes and community relations.

The fact that so much modification is condensed into a relatively short Olympic delivery window ensures a period of hyper-regeneration that differentiates sports-led regeneration from other forms of regeneration. That said, there are common features to processes of regeneration. In the case of urban regeneration, existing social and cultural norms and values are contested, modified and in some cases erased entirely. Throughout the critical regenerative juncture, the civic choices and beliefs of the inhabitants of these contested realms emphasize the difficulties of urban reclamation. In the case under study, megaevent media coverage during the whole process of Olympic delivery indicated that mass reclamation projects that use sport for the purpose of implementing regeneration draw on a rhetoric that strongly stresses community enhancement and profess to enjoy local-level support. However, the reality 'that a new broom does not necessarily sweep clean' (Pardo 1996, xii) appears to be an inevitable aspect of the Olympic delivery rhetoric, only to resurface anew in the post-Olympic period of legacy evaluation.

The 2012 Olympic Games promised to deliver the systematic improvement of this part of East London referred to as 'London's Gash' by those tasked with its eradication. The longitudinal nature of the research that I have discussed here has offered an understanding of the realities and implications of such policies for the people who lived there during these transitional times. Such an ethnographic account of delivery reality was unprecedented and I suggest that unless the journey of change is properly understood, the view of the destination will always remain incomplete.

Aware of the importance of understanding the processual relationship between agency and structure (Pardo 1996), I argue that if our analysis carefully avoids a deterministic view of culture, organization and power it can bring to light critical processes, dichotomies and inconsistencies of urban regeneration and can have an impact that justifies the attendant methodological demands. It is through evolution of thought and process that the true value emerges of ethnography as a tool to contextualize and add to more widely accessible and broadly utilized forms of research that influence policy.

The insight offered by this research clearly indicates that the empirical investigation of the implications of sports-driven urban regeneration support an illuminating comparative analysis. A major objective of this study was to encourage the serious questioning of existing models of megaevent bureaucracy and relations of power, of overly structured analyses of social relations and of the class-analysis approach to contemporary sports-driven urban reclamation projects. It is hoped that this effort will be taken further by those who follow.

Notes

1. For more information, see http://www.newham.gov.uk/2012Games/MayorSir RobinWaleshailsarrivalofthe2012Games.htm?Printable=true.
2. The *leitmotif* of Newham is the exceptional churn of its residents. Recent figures revealed that some 30% of the borough demographic would change residence in the course of a year. Newham is consistently referred to as one of the most ethnically diverse places on the planet. There was no place of comparable diversity in Europe or indeed the world. As a consequence, the common language of contemporary Newham was English-Creole and comparisons to other research contexts were problematic.
3. The term 'rent gap' refers to the shortfall between the actual economic return taken from an area of land given its present land use (capitalized ground rent) and the potential return it would yield if it were put to its optimal use (potential ground rent). As a rent gap increases it creates lucrative opportunities for developers, investors, homebuyers and local governments to orchestrate a shift in land use—for instance, from working-class residential to middle or upper-class residential or high-end commercial (Smith 1979; Lees et al. 2008: 52).
4. See https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/6331/5231109.pdf.
5. For more information, see http://news.sky.com/story/1072240/welfare-reforms-will-make-benefits-fairer an http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2089696/Immigrants-claiming-UK-benefits-report-Stop-abuse-British-hospitality.html.

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A Revolution of the Urban Lifestyle in China? An Ethnography of a Harbin Neighbourhood

Kamel Labdouni

In the 2010s, living in town became the dominating lifestyle in China. This massive urbanization resulted from a long process that started at the beginning of the 1990s with the implementation of new policies. Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjing were the first cities to be affected by these policies. Most research in the social sciences focused on those locations where the first big urban transformations were occurring.

When that first wave of urban reforms came into effect, it gave rise to a second big wave, which affected cities with regional capital status. The city of Harbin, where I led an ethnographical survey at the end of the 2000s and the first part of the 2010s, fits that status. My study was influenced by the view that neither urban spaces nor the implemented urban policies are totally homogeneous. The work of the ethnographer aims to report the relative peculiarities of a local case, with a thorough look at how microgroups are affected in their intimacy by the urban transformation phenomenon and, then, to question it as a whole (Clavel 1992).

In my doctoral research, titled 'Modernization and Change in China' (Labdouni 2011), I applied Clavel's anthropological approach to how macrophenomena affect microentities in order to study the relation between 'locality'—that is to say, the community as a very flexible and adapting entity—and

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'local institutions of power', which are in essence more rigid in their structures, as demonstrated anthropologically by Leeds (1973, 21) and historically by Bergère (1986).[1]

To achieve a better understanding of how Chinese social structures works with regard to politics, it is important to note that, even though the Chinese central government handed down housing decisions to provincial authorities as part of its programme of decentralization, these local authorities are still accountable to Beijing. It should be added that the implementation of decentralized decision-making may vary, sometimes substantially, from one province to another. The province on which I focus represents a significant case study (Lisheng 2005).

In this chapter I shall study the processes of change that have affected the local community. I shall first provide a historical overview of Chinese urban lifestyle, from the old regime of the imperial dynasties to the communist era, addressing the specificities inherent in the geographical position of Harbin. I shall then examine the evolution of that local community in post-Mao China, which is the period examined in my ethnographic study.

A Civilizational History of the Chinese Urban Lifestyle

Anne Raulin (2001) has argued that large premodern Chinese cities, such as Nankin and Huangzhou, have followed the same pattern as that of other antique civilizations (Greek, Roman and Babylonian) in being characterized by the presence of city centres, market-dedicated spaces and streets in the fashion of imperial cities. The link to a broader and more global civilization model would also seem to be reflected in the long-established administrative system in China of implementing a hierarchy between cities (see e.g. Skinner ed. 1977). However, it must be pointed out that the establishment of a hierarchy of cities is also evidence of the profound drive for China to fit its historical development (urban or otherwise) into its tradition. Such a drive has been a part of the essence of what defines China since Confucius, whereby urban development has always been viewed as the embodiment and figurehead of the power of the state.

Chinese cities are traditionally both trade and exchange centres and administrative ones as they concentrate both political and economic regional authorities, which also rule the countryside.

Most books on Chinese history agree that the first urban settlements were defined thus around 1600 BC when the first Chinese 'cities' were developed under the Shang dynasty. It was during the fighting kingdoms era, between the fifth and third centuries BC, that cities gradually mutated into big trade and industrial production centres. Urban development continued under the Han, Sui and Tang dynasties, and over the centuries a specific urban culture appeared and set itself apart from the original farmer culture.

A new major transformation in urban development occurred after 1949, following the implementation of several successive reforms with the aim of bringing changes to what were perceived as the 'most archaic' regions of China.

The Chinese Communist Party had the objective of erasing differences between city and countryside and spreading the new political culture into the remotest areas. Because of the alignment of China to the Soviet orthodoxy, which dominated until 1957, the Communist Party adopted a quinquennial plan (1953–1957) to promote heavy industry. The rural exodus towards recently developed areas increased urban unemployment. It was during that time that the Chinese government started devising a method to solve the problems of both overpopulation and unemployment in industrial parks. In 1960, a migration control system was thus created in the form of the introduction of the *hù kou* (housing licence). This can be seen as being instrumental in the elaboration of urban planning.

Towards the end of the quinquennial plan, between 1957 and 1958, the administration was reorganized following the new 'Great Leap Forward' policy, which aimed to accelerate rural economy development by means of the massive collectivization of farmlands and by establishing the grouping of populations into 'people communes'. The two major aims of this policy were to reconcile agriculture and light industry within the same areas, and to minimize migration and absorb the mass of unemployed. The failure of this egalitarian policy prompted the return to a vertical system and the application of less 'utopian' policies, which resulted in putting production first and living standards second.

At the end of the 1960s, during the Cultural Revolution, the 'New Leap Forward' policy reintroduced small-scale industry into rural areas with the aim of urbanizing the countryside. Under the leadership of Mao, the Council of State thus tried to reduce the domination of the big cities and to end the separation between city and countryside. A short time later, Deng Xiaoping developed the 'Four Modernizations' reform, which translated into 'the development of cities, countryside, and of sciences and technologies', which endeavoured to catch up on the delay accumulated under Mao. Accordingly, on 17 October 1980, the *Renmin Ribào* (*People Daily*) published an announcement declaring that the new political line on urban development was aimed at 'controlling big cities and rationally developing small ones'.

With urban development naturally came a modernization of urban housing. Three main phases can be drawn from these modernization policies: 1840–1911 would correspond to a premodern phase during which the now traditional commercial and industrial cities (e.g. Shanghai) were developed; the wars of resistance (1937–1945) and liberation (1945–1949) would correspond to a sequence of stagnation in urban construction—in spite of the important social welfare system from which the population benefited, housing conditions degraded after 1949 (Junhua 2001, 14); and from 1979 to 2000, construction and modernization of housing experienced exceptional expansion to the detriment of agricultural land.[2]

It has been argued that this approach of making the countryside invisible is inherent to modernity (Southall 1993, 19). Urban modernization is the major process that has allowed the metamorphosis of Chinese society as a whole.

The beginning of that sequence of urbanization is the first landmark that sanctions the transition to a 'socialist market economy'. This reforming policy—which promoted the coexistence of socialism and market economy—had the declared objective of helping to bring the country out of the stalemate of the revolution. It aimed to organize pragmatically a mixed economy capable of avoiding the collapse of the regime on the one hand and the radical break that had arisen in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the other (Zhu 2005, 1373).

John Friedmann (2000, 2003) has analysed the relationship between economic transition and urban policies in China in terms of a long historical process to identify the true nature of the changes. According to him, the urban aspect of those policies does not amount to the growth of cities but consists in a structural transformation and in the increasing interaction of a vast urban–rural continuum or, as Gregory Guldin puts it, 'a hermaphrodite landscape, a partially urbanized countryside' (quoted in Davis 2006, 13).

Friedmann recognizes that the processes that have been at work for half a century in China are unprecedented, pointing out that at the beginning of the twentieth century the urban population was less than 10% of the total Chinese population (similar to the urban population under the Qin dynasty in the period 221–206 BC), while it is estimated that it will be approaching 60% by 2050. In that regard, Friedman suggests that we should speak of a 'new urbanization', although with a 100–150-year delay compared with the urban population booms that have occurred in Western Europe and North America.

Regional and Local Specificities of Manchuria and Harbin

Friedman refers to Skinner's study of cities in China to contextualize urban changes regionally and identify their nature. Skinner (ed. 1977) identifies an archipelago of nine macroregions. According to Friedmann, after 1980, the borders of these macroregions began merging into specific cultural and financial entities, leading to a territorial standardization in terms of language, transport, recreational activities and so on (2000, 9). Eventually, three big regions emerged: the west, the centre and the coast.

The industrial area of the north-east (which encompasses the three provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning) was virtually neglected by the central government, leading to a policy of privatization (or closure) of most state-owned companies. The resulting negative effects of that liberalization coupled with the progressive retreat of the protective state explain the continual worsening of the income gap at the end of the twentieth century. Between 1993 and 2001 there were supposedly 3.62 million additional unemployed people in the north-east out of a 48.84 million active population (+7.4%). This would seem to suggest that the new policy has had a rather disastrous effect on the worker population, all the more so since 1997 (the official beginning of that policy). New forms of poverty arose because of those institutional changes,

gradually eating away at the working units system (*danwei*)—a system to organize production as well as social welfare.[3]

The shutting down of the *danwei* has contributed to the creation of an ever-expending underclass made up of highly marginalized individuals who, reflecting the cultural pattern imposed by the *danwei* organization, do not usually move away from the local area. For those who want to move there is an added problem: being migrants, they are often excluded from urban territory because they do not possess the right housing licence (*hukou*) to take up residence there (Zhu 2005, 1385). It could thus been suggested that this new poverty does not result solely from the transition to a market economy but also from the attendant abandonment of one of the most important systems of redistribution. Let us now look at how these new policies have affected the situation in Harbin.

Initially a village surrounded by fields, Harbin is now a medium-sized city situated in part of the Chinese territory bordering Mongolia, on the far-eastern territories of Russia and Korea.[4] It lacks a prestigious past, but it can nevertheless be considered a traditional city. It is situated at the crossing between the cultural areas of East Asia and the Slavic world. From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, Harbin was a meeting place and a crossroads of intensive trade among the local population, Russian people and Western migrants. This 'syncretic' situation contributed towards giving it a specific urban cultural identity (St Clair et al. 2008).

Harbin was successively governed by Russia, Japan, the Soviet Union (for a very short period) and finally by the Chinese communist government. The official birth of Harbin is dated to 1898; it resulted from the Qing dynasty's donation of the north-east part of the Manchurian territory to Russia following the Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. In return, the Chinese government hoped to benefit from the protection of Russia in case of a new Japanese aggression. To transport goods to Vladivostok, the Russians built a train station and a system of railroad tracks, giving the name Kharbin to the urban settlement. They also set up the Chinese Eastern Railways, a company to oversee traffic in the whole of Manchuria, and helped to unify the city politically. Russian immigration contributed to an increase in the urban population. Furthermore, a significant number of Chinese immigrants were called to work with the Russians on the construction of the railway. Between 1896 and 1900 the mass transport of Chinese mainly from the province of Shandong was organized. The railway track would signal the border between the (Russian) 'Old Harbin' and the new 'Daowai' where the Chinese newcomers had settled. Although Russian domination had been well established at that time, the Russian defeat in the Russian-Japanese War of 1905 limited its power (Lahusen 2001).

During the years following the proclamation of the Chinese Republic in March 1912, the Harbin Chinese community started a policy of infrastructure development. The First World War and the Russian Revolution engendered the rise of Chinese nationalism in Harbin to the extent that it led to retaking control of the city by the Chinese army.

During the 1920s, Russians, Chinese and Japanese fought over that control, with Japan slowly gaining the upper hand and leading to the creation of the State of Mandchoukouo (in Manchuria). The War of Liberation saw the Chinese taking back control of the area. In the aftermath of that war, during 1930–1940, began the groundwork for the People's Republic of China.

After many consecutive troubled years—the Second World War and the eventual defeat of Japan, and the Chinese Civil War between Communists and Nationalists—in 1947–1948, Harbin and Manchuria fell under the dominion of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Layout of Urban Community Lifestyle in Harbin up to the 2000s

Before the liberation, three districts were clearly distinguished in the area: Nangang, Daoli and Daowai. At the time, Guxiang, where I carried out my study, was a nearby village. These three districts were connected by the railroad station, which was one of the major physical and symbolic borders of the city, along with the Songhua River. The centre of Daoli, formerly called Pristan, is now a tourist centre. Shops are spreading out along Zhongyang dajié (known as China Street at the beginning of the twentieth century). The presence of the Sofia Orthodox Church, restored at the beginning of 1990s after its destruction during the Cultural Revolution, contributes significantly to providing the district with its touristic aura. The omnipresent Russian architecture plays a part in this consumption-friendly atmosphere. Zhongyang dajié opens on Stalin Park along the River Songhua. Barges moor there and residents often ice skate there in winter. That large artery attracts young and old for walks.

Nangang is the most Russian-European district. St Nicholas cathedral was built there in 1899 and the foreign consulates settled there from 1907 onwards. Nangang has the largest area in the Harbin neighbourhood with a population density greater than that of Daoli. Close to a million people live there. The 'Haerbin gong Daxue' University (Harbin Institute of Technology, one of the most prestigious in China) is one of the main landmarks in the area. Several department stores and banks (among them, the agricultural Bank of Harbin and the international Bank of Harbin) line up on Xidazhi jié avenue, known as West Big Street. Nangang hosts Western shops selling luxury goods, fashion shops, one of the biggest Carrefour hypermarkets, as well as schools and hospitals (including a Muslim hospital). Hotels, bars and discotheques are situated in downtown Nangang. Three Christian churches (Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant) contribute to its architectural prestige. A Mao statue towers over a monument dedicated to the liberation on Xidazhi jié (xidazhi street). The Buddhist temple and the Confucian temple built in the 1920s are situated in the east of the city. These attract both worshippers and tourists.

As I mentioned earlier, my ethnographical investigation focuses on a neighbourhood community in the Gu xiang district, which is situated to the west of these two districts.[5]

It would seem that Gu xiang's location matches the place where Harbin initially originated even though it had only become attached to it later in the 1930s—it is now a subdivision of Daoli district. I previously mentioned that Gu xiangcun was the district's original name. It incorporates the meaning of *Cun* (countryside) and *Gu xiang* (native country). It was during the 1930s that the village merged with Harbin under Japanese influence and therefore lost 'Cun' from its name. At that time, the local residents lived a rural and traditional lifestyle and it was the Japanese who began to industrialize the area. Before 1949 the authorities used the term *Pinminku* (the poor people hole, a slum) when referring to Gu xiang. That expression was still in use in the 2000s among the inhabitants and only disappeared after the district renovation in the 2010s.

Urbanization under Japanese domination resulted in the destruction of the traditional housing, which reflected a rural environment and lifestyle, and the setting up of a more urban housing structure, which remained until at least the early 2000s.

It is relevant at this point to provide a more detailed layout of the district. Gu xiang is situated to the north-west of Nangang, not far from the New Town district. The northern border is marked by the River Songhua, while the southern border is delimited by the railway track that leads to Changchun. To the west, the River Yun liang he marks the border with the city of Shuanshang. Three big axes cross the district. Kan an lu (now called Xiangzheng jiè) is a north–south artery built in 1933 that leads to Nangang, Donglî and Xiangfang. Another important axis is Ai de Meng de lu, which leads to the airport and runs from the west of the district to the east. This acquired its current name in the late 1990s to show the friendship between Harbin and the city of Edmonton in Canada (where there is a street called Harbin Road); it was originally called Ji changlu and in 1979 was known as Harbin feijichanggong lu (the road to Harbin Airport). The third axis, Guxiang dajié, was built in 1932 and restored in 1981. It runs parallel to Ai de Meng de lu and also crosses the district in an east–west direction (just further up north). After the liberation, a significant number of administrative offices were located near this avenue and, since 1958, there has been a significant increase in the number of department stores, post offices, restaurants and pharmacies along this axis.

My research focused on a specific sector of the district, precisely in the area marked by the crossing between Xiangzheng jiè and Ai de Meng de lu. This area is crossed by a small river called Ting he xiao qu, which separates the more rural fields from the urban sector where the residents of the community live.

In this sector the infrastructure was limited and dilapidated. The uneven ground became slippery when it froze, and muddy in the rain, which could make moving about complicated for residents. Houses suffered from lack of insulation and were therefore cold. The smells of urine and excrement piled up in the public pits (one for every 40 houses) would rise when the weather was hot or wet. For that reason, the favourite season of many residents was winter. At the entrance of every *hutong* an electricity meter was installed.[6] The gender

sections of the latrines were separated by a brick wall and covered by a roof. On each side, six wooden boards on the floor allowed for three people to squat or stand over the pit. Cigarette butts were left lying about at the men's end and worn sanitary towels at the women's. The houses of the community were *píng fáng* (a type of ground-floor dwelling) with an iron front door and a rectangular window on the left-hand side. The windows were covered with plastic in winter. House entrances traditionally faced south to protect the home from the spirits coming from the north. However, in spite of the area being situated so far north, that belief was limited among the area's residents. External staircases allowed people to reach the apartments sometimes built on the roof, which usually allowed for two 15 square metre rooms and were mostly rented to migrants.

The population of the area has remained stable for years, which is mainly a result of the inheritance practice according to which a house is usually passed on to the first-born son. This culture of inheritance, which favours the male primogeniture, goes back to the origin of the cult of the ancestors. It was strengthened by the patrilocalism and patrilinear system which systematically discriminated against girls. Only sons could offer sacrifices to the family spirits and only sons could bear the family name, thus only sons could inherit (Fig. 19.1).

Before the mid-1980s, with the exception of the Russian-European-style houses in the centre, *ping fang* were the defining urban feature of the city. This

Fig. 19.1   Tianhe jiè, the main street of the area where the research was carried out. Author: Kamel Labdouni, March 2008

urban aspect was strengthened under Mao because this kind of housing seemed to fit well with the unit-work system. Within this, every district was standardized (to the point that it could be hard to differentiate one from another), yet they were clearly separated in order to allow better control. Each district was self-sufficient and offered the same essential facilities and services to its inhabitants: a house, a job, local services and the bare necessities (Gaubatz 1995, 29). Since 1986 and 1987, the *ping fang* architectural dominance has slowly decreased. Likewise, the inhabitants have become less and less ideologically defined by the cocoon created by the working unit as a new 'apolitical' culture has emerged, prompted by the significantly decreasing presence of the state (Davis 1995, 3). In 2003 and even more so in 2008, the *ping fang* received their final blow with the launching of large building campaigns of modern blocks of flats, which necessitated the demolition of the old housing.

A Problematic Process of Urban Transformation: The Complexity of Renovation Policies

Prior to the Summer Olympics of 2008, evictions multiplied all over the Chinese territory. The massive inflow of tourists and Western media demanded merciless work on the image of the country.[7] It was thus imperative for the authorities to take advantage of such collective dynamics to accelerate the launch of domestic policies and to destroy the unhealthy living districts. I studied the trajectories of a number of families to understand key moments of this phenomenon. Their case studies bring out different episodes of eviction, the experience of moving out and, then, their return to the area as occupants of new apartments. Their trajectories allowed me to understand how modernizing actions could be adapted to soften the protests that had ensued during the first phase of urban renovation (and which had sometimes been anticipated). I could also probe the nature of the changes that arose within the community and study the changes in people's attitudes.

During the period preceding the renovation, the living conditions of the local community had worsened considerably owing to a rise in unemployment and precariousness. The arrival of people from the countryside, who had come in search of jobs in spite of the Hu kou policy, had increased that state of crisis significantly.

Urban renovation engendered new legislation and policies, which in turn created new way of conceptualizing the notion of ownership, leading to new types of housing development. It is important to point out that urban renovation is a process that occurs over a given period of time. Significantly, throughout the process of renovation, legislators have amended the laws on the basis of past experiences (either positive or negative). The current legislation is a result of a synthesis between imperial traditions, Maoist conceptions and modernist aspirations.

The legal notion of private ownership was reintroduced in 1986 with the adoption of the Civil Law General Principles which broke with the communist vision (Herrmann and Lan 1997, 594). Those principles were in fact an update

of the 1930 Civil Code, which had cast the individual rather than the family as the cornerstone of the law. Since 1 July 2004, the notion of private property has been integrated into the constitution. On 8 March 2007, the notion of private property was strengthened again. That latter law confirms that the owner is responsible for the payment of the land tax and is registered to the Land Registry (and therefore has a licence). The registered owners have the right to give up, mortgage or rent their property, which can only be requisitioned with due compensation and only for matters of general interest.

For the first time, the principle according to which the residents' living conditions cannot be affected by requisition and that decent rehousing has to be provided was decreed and set in legislative stone. However, in case of dispute between occupants and owners, the user's rights supplant the right of ownership.[8]

As mentioned earlier, the central government has gradually delegated some of its power to the provinces and, in 1984, it increased tax pressure on them to optimize urban renovation. This new delegation of powers has generated a rivalry between provinces and municipalities, which revitalized the urban transformation as the power of local administrations was intrinsically linked to the success of construction projects. This gave rise, in turn, to an urban land market, which boomed after March 1998 when Prime Minister Zhu Rongji repealed the law that gave automatic housing rights to the working units. These changes were part of a wider series of reforms that were initiated by Deng Xiaoping and that resulted in ending the old housing system. It must be noted that while requisitioned grounds for construction remain as a rule under the jurisdiction of Beijing central government, each city has a land registry service called the Office of Lands that has the power to assign construction projects to public or private developers. However, the Office of Lands must follow specific procedures. First, it has to measure the area of the house and count the members in each household. Then, it has to provide rehousing in new accommodation that has to be at least as big as the former home. If the composition of the household changes (owing to departure, birth, death, marriage or divorce), the size of the new house is reassessed. The size can also to be set in accordance with the new standards of living. Expropriation procedures have rendered the ownership of the housing licence all the more essential because it provides evidence of the number of individuals within the household.

The complexity of these procedures mirrors the complexity of the various levels of governmental organizations, the main three being the province, the city or municipality, and the districts (for bigger cities or rural areas).[9] All three administrative authorities are involved in the management of the urban territory and, in the specific case of urban renewal, evictions and rehousing are jointly organized by the Committee of Construction, the provincial government and the central government in Beijing.

The reconstruction project in Gu xiang was launched on 24 October 2007.[10] On 1 April 2008 the newspaper *Harbin Ribào* (*Harbin Daily*) announced that

the city council had pledged to root out corruption from the attendant proceedings. On 3 April 2008 a meeting for the *daowai* district residents (also affected by a reconstruction project) was organized. During the meeting, the modalities of the procedure were discussed (rates, schedules, etc.). It was specified that the land would not be used for anything but the building of new houses and that a special effort would be made to relocate residents as close as possible to their original house. It was also indicated that the families that had to be relocated would receive an initial sum of CNY12,000 as compensation and a monthly payment until their rehousing. The monthly payment was calculated on the basis of the following formula: CNY10 multiplied by the number of square meters of the house of origin. This formula stressed the utmost importance for families to have the housing licence. After 18 months, the compensation would increase from CNY10 to CNY20 for each square metre. It was also agreed that people who did not have a licence but were willing to move right away could claim CNY800 per square metre compensation (Fig. 19.2).

The plan outlined above affected 5119 homes amounting to a total of 1,310,000 square metres. Three meetings were held before the evictions began. The local media reported that each meeting gathered 3000 'enthusiastic' individuals, who welcomed the president of the Daoli district and applauded him and his policy, which was said to be aimed at the poor. Information sheets were handed out afterwards. In reality, people were very worried and far from being reassured. A later article published in the newspaper *Harbin Ribào* on 8 May 2008 entitled 'For a Harmonious Destruction and a Reconstruction

Fig. 19.2 *Harbin Daily*—Reportage about the renovation project, published on 28 April 2008. Author: Kamel Labdouni, July 2010

which Favours the People' reported that in reality residents from the neighbourhood had six days to leave their house and collect CNY12,000.

Along with municipal authorities, a development company coordinated the project and outsourced some tasks to other private contractors. In order to deal with complaints and recordings, that company temporarily opened two offices in the district, which operated between April and October 2008. The Committee of Residents (Wen yuan hui), which was supposed to be in charge of controlling the district population, had little power there because its influence has dwindled over time (Fig. 19.3).[11]

The demolition of the old houses that began in March 2008 epitomized the inhabitants' worries, which had been building up for the past ten years. Over a decade these worries had been fed by many confusing rumours and had reached such a level that some people (mostly the elderly) even died from the stress and anxiety. As a whole, the community experienced the destruction of the old housing as a form of 'deportation'. That April, the situation reached breaking point as many local residents, faced with continuing delays and lack of information, began to question the project. They felt increasingly disorientated and anxious about their future, raising many questions, such as: Will we still be able to live together? Are we even going to come back? Where are we going to live? Will we simply be ousted and left? Thus, parallel to the material changes brought about by the project, an emotional transformation arose, which manifested into three stages: first, apprehension and fear of the unknown; then, 'mourning' for the loss of the former homes; and, finally, a form of emotional

Fig. 19.3 Early stage in the eviction and destruction process within the community. Author: Kamel Labdouni, May 2008

stasis that accompanied the old residents' departure to a transitional place without proper information about the delays or a guarantee that they would ever come back once the new housing project had been completed.

The Development of a New Living Environment

Initially planned to last 18 month and be completed by the end of 2009, the reconstruction was still under way in March 2010 when the first families from the old community began to move back into the first new buildings. At the entrance to the district the construction management office was transferred to an old house that had been built by the Japanese in 1937 and the frontage of which had been saved. The police station opposite had also been renovated (see Fig. 19.4).

To understand the inhabitants' attitude during the 'waiting' period, it is significant to point out that, while living elsewhere, they continued to converge on the area daily. It was as if the place was calling them back, they said. Between March and July 2010, some 70% of the inhabitants moved back. While the first two floors of the new buildings had been earmarked for new residents, the old community started to settle by resuming their former daily habits, such as playing mahjong (a traditional Chinese board game). The opening and closing times of the mahjong room were fixed features in their former routine. Many of the old shops had also been kept, with the same aim of establishing some continuity with the past. However, even if they were still living close to one another (sometimes only a few floors separated them), they experienced a nagging feeling of regret about being 'scattered'.

Fig. 19.4   The 1937 Japanese house. Author: Kamel Labdouni, December 2009

This new housing organization altered the way in which the inhabitants viewed themselves in relation to their community. A social divide emerged, mainly based on age. Younger people missed the spontaneous companionship they used to have in their *ping fang*, while older residents were initially quite happy with their new lodgings. The young adults found their new environment soulless and feared that they might get crushed by it. In contrast, having experienced hardship under Mao, older people contemplated the future with more enthusiasm; for them, the new housing situation meant more comfort and less housework. This divide, quite clear at the beginning, slowly moved towards a middle ground as both positions were first and foremost a way for each generational group to protect themselves from potential harm.

However, regardless of what each group said, it could be argued that the logic of the anthropological change brought by the urban renovation impacted everybody in the same way. As I stated earlier, the feeling of community was closely intertwined with the material aspect of that community—that is, the housing itself. Therefore changes to this material inevitably altered the former. Social behaviours ensue from how people view their environment over time (in the form of theoretical reflections) and how they grasp and actually live it—that is, the way in which those reflections practically translate into everyday life. If we accept that the series of feelings one experiences in a period of change is a way for one to claim that change so as to understand it better, then it could be argued that, in this community, feelings were invested with a ritual function in such a way as to allow the inhabitants to face these life-changing events.

Concluding Reflections

This ethnographic study would suggest that in Gu xiang a 'revolution' has taken place, which is manifested by the end of the *danwei* system and the emergence of a new environment. However, elements of continuity can also be found in this seemingly revolutionary process insofar as the local residents share a common memory of the history of their community and, at the same time, perpetuate long-lived habits as a way to absorb the life-changing phenomenon.

At the beginning of this chapter I asked if a revolution in the material and physical forms of the community—in this case, housing—is necessarily synonymous with a revolution in the way in which the community envisioned itself as a homogenous group with strong social cohesion. The ethnographic analysis seems to suggest that the 'physical revolution' that took place engendered and indeed necessitated a leap in the dark for the community. However, once that leap was made, the community began to rebuild itself by resetting familiar elements taken from their previous collective vision. Those elements had to be adapted to the new environment, yet they maintained a link to the former core of what they used to represent. As a consequence, the term 'revolution' needs to be understood as a transformation process—a metamorphosis that is not limited to the destruction of the former (physical) environment and the

beginning of a 'clean slate'. The community did not 'start' a new phase but evolved into it; the buildings were destroyed but a certain continuity endured. Even if the new physical environment has become wider and could have swallowed the community, the latter has managed to evolve into a 'community state of mind', which translated into the development of a neighbourhood-based network. For example, the market street has pretty much remained where it was and many of its shops are the same, allowing people from the community to maintain some of their everyday habits despite a wider environment. The same goes for the school and the mahjong room.

This chapter has presented aspects of the ethnographic study that I carried out among the community of inhabitants who lived in a poor area of the city of Harbin at the end of the 2000s. As I have outlined, Harbin is characterized by a number of peculiarities that have made it a kind of urban laboratory. Harbin's urban changes are also a vivid example of the effects of the communist policies implemented during the three Maoist decades, from 1950 to 1980. I have analysed the modalities of the urban transformation process that was initiated at the time of the survey under the influence of several reforms.

I have focused on how an 'urban revolution' has affected a specific local community. However, given the political dimension of that phenomenon, the analysis had to address the wider spectrum of national policies that considered 'secondary cities' like Harbin as urban laboratories. In such a framework, this ethnographic study also suggests that, in order to be fully apprehended, Chinese contemporary national politics and policies need to be placed in the context of the BRICS political and economic influence and of globalization as a whole.[12]

NOTES

1. On the relationship between micro- and macroprocesses in urban anthropology, see also Pardo and Prato (2013).
2. That phase is still currently in progress, and the year 2000 only marks the end of the survey made by Junhua.
3. Between 1950 and 1976, the organization of cities by the *danwei* confined life between four walls, creating borders within the urban space. The traditional urban organization dictated by the *danwei* was characterized by the fixed residence and immobility of the populations and the abolition of privacy (Davis 1995, 2–3). It is about a highly controlled environment corresponding to a standardized pattern, based on a mapping requirement with the objective to reduce the need for transport. With this working units model, China went further than the Soviet Union in the fusion between workplace and living quarters (Gaubatz 1995, 30).
4. According to a survey carried out in 2005 by the Harbin City Office of Statistics, the Harbin population is considered to be around 9,750,000. It reaches 4,500,000 within its inner territory. In 2007, 9,854,000 inhabitants could be counted, equal to half the population of Beijing. With a density of 183.5 per square kilometre, the population rate increase is 28/1000. The distribution by

age group is 1,366,000 people for the 0–14 age bracket, 7,628,000 people for the 15–64 age bracket and 756,000 people for the 65-year-old and above age bracket. The distribution of the population is 4,834,000 female to 4,916,000 male individuals. Some 93.45% of the population comes from the Han ethnic group.

5. Our study focused primarily on the life stories of a dozen families during the various stages of urban renovation. However, I do not discuss the details of their lives here. This will be part of a separate publication in which I address the cognitive aspects of how feelings and perceptions interact with the urban space.

6. *Hutong* are a type of narrow residential street commonly associated with northern Chinese cities, which resemble the *courées* of the industrial districts of northern France.

7. Lindsay's work on the regeneration of London's East End on the occasion of the 2012 Summer Olympics would stimulate an interesting comparative analysis (Lindsay 2012, 2014).

8. User's right is very ambiguous and therefore very easy to twist, especially since its definition and interpretation have gradually been left to local authorities to determine when managing particular situations.

9. That latter can administrate a city and the neighbouring smaller towns.

10. In the double sense of reconstruction and rebuilding.

11. The committee was created in 1949 and was inherited from the Maoist state apparatus to handle the district population. Originally used as a propaganda tool for the party, since the late 1980s it has turned into an organization to address local issues.

12. BRICS stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South-Africa and refers to the close economic collaboration among these countries.

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Change and Grassroots Dynamics

CHAPTER 20

Secondary Cities and the Formation of Political Space in West and East Africa

Lucy Koechlin and Till Förster

Introduction

The world is urbanizing rapidly, and with it African societies. Indeed, not only are the metropoles across the continent growing at impressive rates but so are smaller towns and cities in the former hinterland.[1] This growth and diversification of urban life in African countries is highly significant in political and social terms, indicating broader dynamics of social transformation taking place across society. We believe that secondary (or mid-sized, as they are also frequently called) cities are important sites of ethnographic research for two reasons. First, 'these towns often "work" better than the metropole, where life is fraught and shaped by much stronger social and economic tensions and contradictions' (De Boeck et al. 2009, ii). Second, secondary cities are not only fertile sites of new urban dynamics, but the emergence of actors and processes of urban articulations shaping distinct political spaces can be captured more easily than in the maelstrom of a metropolis.

Drawing on these two premises, this chapter is concerned with the formation of urban political spaces—that is, the articulation of shared identities and claims about what an urban society should look like. We seek to trace social actors, practices and the creation of such political spaces, building on examples from two secondary cities in West and East Africa: Korhogo in Côte d'Ivoire, and Kisumu in Kenya. Both cities play important roles within national politics and, within this context, have experienced conflict and violence in the last two decades. Korhogo was the centre of the rebels during the rebellion in Côte d'Ivoire in the 2000s, and Kisumu was one of the cities affected by the Kenyan post-election violence in late 2007 and early 2008. Our particular interest is,

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first, the formation of specific urbanities that emerge from the changing nature of social interactions, and its effects on the structuring of political spaces. Second, we question in what conditions they create inclusive, peaceful social spaces, and how and when political articulations tip into violence and exclusion. The comparative approach seeks to tease out some general insights into the formation of urban spaces in secondary cities and their effects on social agency and democratic politics.

The following section will briefly discuss existing research on secondary cities and contextualize our own approach.

SECONDARY CITIES IN AFRICA: A CONTEXTUALIZATION

Research on secondary cities has been relatively sparse, although there have been spurts of interest in the developmental potential of smaller cities beyond the capital 'growth poles' in African and Latin American countries (Rondinelli 1983; UN Habitat 1991, 1996; Bertrand and Dubresson 1997; Otiso 2005; Chen and Kanna 2012; Roberts 2014). Classically, 'urban' is defined by size, heterogeneity and density (Wirth 1938). With regard to secondary cities, this circumscription has been modified to include size, function and location (Simon 1992; Van der Merwe 1992). However, definitions of secondary cities are notoriously broad.[2] The *size* ascribed to such cities can vary from anything between 50,000 and 3 million inhabitants (UN Habitat 1991; Van der Merwe 1992; Roberts 2014). Their *function* relates mainly to the subnational context of national economies, and in particular to the capital city.[3] In the same vein, their *location* is primarily relevant with regard to the metropolitan centre. Immediately a key weakness of these approaches becomes visible: secondary cities, as the name already implies, are mainly conceptualized in terms of urban hierarchy in relation to the 'primary' city within a national boundary or an international network of cities.[4]

This approach is of limited usefulness for our purposes for none of these elements is per se meaningful. Our main critique is that they do not shed light on two important elements. First is the network of relations between the rural and the urban, and between different urban centres across a region (and beyond national boundaries) that goes beyond the relationship with the metropolis. Along with others, we strongly propose a non-hierarchical, contextual approach to the study of cities.[5] The nature of such relations—and hierarchies, where they exist—are always *empirical* questions, not definitional ones, and will vary significantly depending on the social practice or dimension in question. Hence our claim to approach the urban differently: without putting hierarchical relations first or, in Jennifer Robinson's words, by 'gathering difference as diversity rather than as hierarchical division' (Robinson 2006, 6). For anthropology, such a claim comes, of course, with a methodological challenge: how to do ethnography in enormously diverging contexts, scattered over a whole continent or even the entire Global South. Such ethnographic work calls for a thorough conceptualization of the urban as a social phenomenon—a conceptualization that can serve as a firm basis for comparisons.

Second, and most important for such a comparative ethnography, a conventional approach says nothing about the type of urbanity that characterizes secondary cities.[6] Not every large settlement produces urbanity that makes and shapes secondary cities in our understanding. We rather suggest the opposite: it is a particular kind of social practice that creates urbanity and makes a settlement urban. The interplay of encounter and distanciation is at the core of such urban social practices (Förster 2013, 2014; Koechlin 2015a, b). The two dimensions can relate in many different ways to each other, depending on the specific social practice that they build on. Hence urbanity can adopt many different forms according to the city's historical, social, cultural and political trajectory.[7]

Imagine a secondary city that has recently accommodated many migrants from different cultural and social backgrounds—say, some from remote rural areas, others who fled a distant region affected by a natural disaster, and still others who want to profit from the city's function as a trade hub. All groups are likely to have different attitudes towards the urban. While some may see their urban life as a temporary passage before they move back to the places where they came from, others may want to integrate fully into the urban context to obtain access to employment opportunities, and still others may see themselves as belonging to a wider network of trade that sustains their ways of making a living. In all cases, they will, as social actors, situate themselves differently in the urban context, such as by keeping a distance from possible competitors or seeking alliances with potential partners. Their ways of living in the city are different. Through specific social practices, they create different forms of urbanity, and different sorts of encounters and distanciation. Anthropologists will study such practices to acquire an empirically based understanding of how urbanity unfolds in a particular city. Not least, ethnography allows for the 'sensuous description to convey that encompassing nexus of social relations and cultural values' (Herzfeld 2013, 119), which may offer novel understandings of urban spaces.

As a social practice, urbanity can unfold wherever social actors encounter unknown people or distance themselves from them as others. In other words, city dwellers *create* urbanity while they are able to live according to the basic principles of urban life, encounter and distanciation. Heterogeneity is not a precondition of urban life but rather its product. To make it part of a definition would mean to confuse cause and effect (Förster 2014, 36f). As long as urban actors develop a sociality that they prefer and cherish, they are urbanites in the strict sense of the word—independent of the size of their cities. Yet secondary cities differ from capital cities, and they are also more than simply big towns. If size plays a role, it is only relevant as a sort of precondition that allows urban life to unfold, but it does not and cannot explain the specificities of urbanity in a certain city. Drawing on these theoretical reflections, we argue strongly that the nature of urbanity is primarily an empirical question of *how* urban dwellers encounter others and *how* they distance themselves from others—creating social spaces of and for themselves.

Secondary Cities and Their Significance
for Anthropology

Secondary cities are as relevant for urban anthropology as megacities. Urbanization is not restricted to a particular type of city—it informs all cities and permeates all spheres of urban life.[8] In many parts of the former Third World, secondary cities are often passageways where rural and urban ways of living face and sometimes confront each other, and where they eventually merge. Where such cities are not part of an industrial belt or a booming economic zone, they fill the middle ground between village, town and small city on the one side and the endless megacity on the other. The least that could be said about this space in between is that it fills a gap where things become urban; where urbanity may emerge in an unspectacular, ordinary way; where the interference of the national and the global is not as dominant as it often is in the metropolis. It is worth exploring this middle ground that urban anthropologists have neglected so often.

Secondary cities account for a significant part of urbanization in Africa. Arguably, their significance is increasing rapidly as a result of globalized communication and financial flows, on the one hand, and processes of decentralization and devolution, on the other, providing greater autonomy and authority to diverse urban centres. With the increasing demands in all sorts of services, secondary cities gain pivotal positions in many if not most African countries, serving as economic, social and political nodes at the provincial and regional levels. Very much in Prato and Pardo's sense, secondary cities are sites of urban dynamics, forming as well as formed by globalization, but they are also places of meaning and identity (Prato and Pardo 2013).

One important aspect is that secondary cities often accommodate people of diverging backgrounds without obliging them to abandon entirely their former ways of life. These people may adapt to the new urban setting but may also make use of their former local knowledge as much as they can—be it a rural lifestyle or another urban culture from afar. Many routines of daily life thus iterate into urban spaces and transform them into terrains where different daily lives interact and where they are less subordinate to the necessities of mere survival as they might be in a setting of extreme urban metabolism. Simultaneously, secondary cities become places where distant dreams and promises of modernity with all their loaded connotations are made visible and where new ways of living may become real temptations for many (Ferguson 1999). Of course, all this exists in capital cities with millions and millions of inhabitants as well, but the direct interaction of encounter and distanciation is perhaps more visible in secondary cities where the actors are not constantly under pressure.

Although secondary cities may accommodate diverse ways of living, there is more to them. From the perspective of their populace, they often have a unique character that the inhabitants are proud of. Secondary cities produce an urbanity of their own—an urbanity that is often more modest and less pretentious

than that of capital cities with their national and sometimes international aspirations. Though many institutions of the national administration may be present in secondary cities, these cities rarely make them the core of their identity. The centre of the state and its agencies is elsewhere, always present in the minds of the populace, though not necessarily functional and sometimes hardly visible in everyday life. One may therefore presume that the urbanity that the populace of secondary cities breeds is less affected by the national dimension that capital cities unavoidably have.

Researching the Urban

If encounter and distanciation are the essential dimensions of urbanity, anthropologists have to develop a methodology that captures how urban actors seek and shape encounters, and how they distance themselves from others. Such social practices can take extremely visible, concrete forms. For instance, when a neighbourhood decides to build walls around its yards, or when it builds a route to another neighbourhood across a stream. However, much more often, such practices are subtle and embedded in countless habits of everyday life. Avoiding a certain street or perhaps only one vendor in a market may be a practice of distanciation, while looking for a club to play football may be the beginning of repeated and intense encounters. Like all social practice, urbanity has a discursive and a performative dimension. One may talk about why a particular street is 'dangerous' and another 'safe', giving good reasons based on one's own experience or that of others. To a considerable extent, such practices are hidden in long-established habits that the actors take for granted. It's a matter of largely tacit knowledge that the actors are not cognitively aware of.

In secondary cities where landed property and streets are often less clearly demarcated and controlled, the urban populace usually creates a dense network of tiny and intricate pathways that link the points of their daily lives. Footways may run through the backyards of their houses, cut across the lawns of office buildings, open into a street where small market stalls align and finally end in thickets of thorny shrubs. Such networks of pathways mirror social practices—how the people appropriated urban spaces and made them theirs and, where such pathways do not exist, the intentional distanciation from places and sites that the urbanites consider to be dangerous and not theirs. So, the grid of urban planning disappears under a grid of daily practices—a web that the inhabitants have created over the years and which becomes visible as traces on the ground. Planners would call these networks of pathways 'informal' but, like the formal grid, they do have a normative dimension. They orient and mirror the urbanites' daily routines and routes through the city and hence their needs and images of the city. Urbanites remake their cities from day to day according to what they find appropriate to their social lives.

Yet, administrative regulations do play a role. One may walk across the property of one's neighbours, one may ignore where the limits of their plots are and where a street begins and ends, but when it comes to construction, things

change and the builders try to make sure that they are erecting their houses in a place that they can rightly claim as theirs. But what is a 'right claim'? Does it depend only on a legal framework? Most often, legal and other, practical norms overlap, and both may be sanctioned, though in different ways.[9] Frequently, using another's plot for work or selling something there on a little table, is a tolerated daily or nightly practice, but laying a foundation of a house is violating the fragile balance between the official rules and practical norms of the everyday. Tipping the balance to one or the other side may immediately cause political articulations about whose rights are violated and how urban spaces should be governed.

This balance, which characterizes secondary cities in Africa in a plethora of ways, is as deeply embedded in the interplay between encounter and distanciation as, say, leisure time activities in public spaces. As secondary cities are usually further away from centres where, for instance, aspiring politicians want to demonstrate their assertiveness and their capability of organizing something impressive or of getting an ambitious project off the ground, there is often more leeway for all sorts of urban articulation. And the precarious balance between the administration and what it often sees as chaos is just one among many.[10]

To address urbanity, one needs to look both at social practice and at discursive articulations. The two are not the same, nor is one simply the mirror image of the other. Many social practices generate a body of tacit knowledge of the city—knowledge that only those who live there can have. Their intentions are not articulated: they intend to act without expressing their intentions verbally, but through their practice they relate to the city as a social space. For instance, neither the urban council nor those who walk them plan the narrow pathways. Nobody expresses an intention to create them. They are 'just there', most people would say. Nonetheless, they are the outcome of intentional acts. And they may become the subject of political articulation and cause many a heated debate if someone dares to cut through them or to fine people who use them. Whether they are legal or not is a question that may eventually play a role when different actors articulate their claims and try to legitimate them with regard to one or another normative framework, the legislation being one among others.

To do ethnography in such a setting means to address both dimensions: the many social practices that urban life bears as well as the discursive realm of the city. It would be a mistake to frame the two dimensions as 'formality' versus 'informality'. The state and its rules are just one actor and one source of legitimation among others. What happens on the ground and what other legitimizing sources the actors may make use of is an open question that only empirical research can answer. Emic evaluations hence come both as practice and as articulated claims, and thus need to be part of one analytical framework. We have framed this approach as an Emic Evaluation Approach (EEA), which comprises the triangulation of three perspectives: (a) an analysis of social practice; (b) a social discourse analysis; and (c) a rotating mapping of the actors as their position is continuously shaped and reshaped by the first two processes.[11]

Two Illustrations from East and West Africa

In the following sections, two case studies will be sketched out in which the emergence of new political spaces are traced. The first is from Korhogo in Côte d'Ivoire, West Africa. Here, the cityscape was reordered by the military insurgency that divided the country for nine years. The family—or rather the clan—of the mayor that had dominated urban politics for more than 100 years suddenly found itself in a marginal position, while new actors emerged under the umbrella of rebel forces. The city was increasingly composed of many different, often competing, political spaces. Some neighbourhoods bred their own, stable governance arrangements and emerged as more or less independent political spaces, while others remained under direct rebel governance, and still others sought refuge in a complex arrangement of actors with diverging agendas. The second case study is from Kisumu in Kenya, East Africa. Here, the rapid growth of the city and the changing political and economic environment has led to the appearance of new types of housing estates. On the surface, these signify types of owner (investors rather than homeowners) and new types of living (in rented apartments rather than rented or owned houses and shacks). Digging a little deeper, however, they also indicate the emergence of political spaces in which actors articulate in new ways. In particular, the case study shows how actors understand and address social problems in these new spaces.

Korhogo, Côte d'Ivoire

A Trade Hub and Its Destiny Under Rebel Domination

Even before Côte d'Ivoire's independence in 1960, Korhogo had a dominant position in the regional trade networks that linked the northern savannahs of the country to Abidjan, the port from where raw commodities were exported to the colonial mainland and later to the European Union and North America. Within a century, it grew from a town of about 2200 to a city of some 200,000 inhabitants. It channelled cotton, groundnuts and cashew nuts, the main cash crops of the region, towards the railway further east and the harbour in the south. Korhogo also accommodated many state authorities. The French had made it a *chef-lieu de cercle*, and shortly after independence it became the seat of a county and later the provincial region of Poro. Today, Korhogo is the largest city in the northern half of the country.

What makes Korhogo exceptional is that a single family has dominated it from the very beginning of French colonial rule through to the present day. Péléforo Gbon Soro, who adopted the family name Coulibaly after his conversion to Islam, received the French colonial forces in the 1890s and was soon appointed *chef de canton*, a position that made him part of the colonial administration. As an intermediary ruler, Gbon Coulibaly gained enormous influence on both sides: the African populace and the civil administration of the colonial state. During the decolonization period, he became a close ally of Félix

Houphouët Boigny, who led the country to independence and became its first president. When Coulibaly died in 1962, the bonds between the two families were so tight that the family's hold over the city remained unquestioned and well protected by the president and his clan. As a political alliance, it was deeply embedded in the wider patrimonial networks that guaranteed stability in the country until the death of Houphouët Boigny in 1993.

It went without saying that the first mayor and head of the urban council founded in 1978 would belong to the same family. In fact, their candidate was re-elected three times until 1995, when another Coulibaly ran against the sitting mayor and won the polls. Though the two were closely related, uncle and nephew and both direct descendants of Gbon Coulibaly, that event marked years of heated political articulations, which often culminated in fist fights and even knifings between the supporters of the two politicians.[12] However, the city always remained the fief of the Coulibaly family. Only its representative was disputed.

In the late 1990s, the rules of the game began to change. First, the ethnonationalist ideology of *ivoirité*, literally 'Ivorianness', marginalized a large part of the population of the country's north. They were no longer considered to be full citizens, and their civil rights were no longer fully recognized. Their access to higher education and to public servant jobs was increasingly restricted. Second, the drastic devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994 turned out to have long-term consequences for the urban populace. While peasants profited from the lower exchange rate and were paid higher prices for their cash crops, the urban poor were increasingly unable to pay for imported goods, among them many basic commodities. Last but not least, many well-paid positions in the administration were occupied by elderly people who were unwilling to cede their jobs to the next generation. In particular, Korhogo's urban youth found itself cut off from most employment opportunities, a fact that it attributed to the continuing dominance of the Coulibalys in town.

After the military insurgency of 19 September 2002, Korhogo's mayor was immediately dismissed and replaced by a sort of ad hoc committee under the control of the *comzone*, the 'commander of the zone' or chief rebel of the region. However, because the insurgents had planned a sudden seizure of power, they were unprepared to govern the regions under their control and it took some time until they established a sort of civil administration. The initial insecurity had a double-sided effect. On the one hand, it was a time of confusion and muddling through that thwarted the commerce of the established merchants. On the other, it offered many opportunities that did not exist before. Once the rebels had recognized the importance of regional and international trade, and invited the merchants to resume their activities, Korhogo's market became a platform for duty-free trade.[13]

Neighbourhoods as Political Spaces

After the incipient period of rebel governance, which had brought most activities of the urban council to an end, many neighbourhoods tried to come to terms with the rebel command. In 2006, when a new *comzone* who actively

pursued an urban development agenda replaced the first, the main actors reached a political settlement. They represented major groups of the population: the chairman of the freight forwarders, who also ran one of the biggest bus companies and who presided over the transporters' union, was engaged, the imams of many mosques, the representative of the Senufo farmers and spokesmen of many other groups, such as the immigrants from Burkina Faso, an important group in the civil war context (Förster 2009).[14]

The settlement envisaged a spatial separation of power. The city centre, which included the main market and the streets where the bigger wholesale traders had their shops and where banks had their branches—most of them temporarily closed—would be policed by so-called 'traditional' hunters, the famous *dozos*, while rebel soldiers would control the main overland roads and hence access to the city. The zone also included older neighbourhoods close to the commercial areas. It was agreed that no insurgent should carry weapons in this area; only the hunters who would also be responsible for the security of civilians and who would be in charge of tracing criminals. However, the prosecution of serious crime would remain in the hands of the military command of the insurgents.

The arrangement worked comparatively well. A few violations occurred, but no serious incidents. Sometimes, insurgents carried weapons hidden under their clothes, but by and large they neither used them nor did they challenge the *dozos* who, after all, were often considered more powerful because of their bulletproof magical protection. The security governance arrangement was so successful that Korhogo was, in these years, safer than under the former state administration and its police. Unsurprisingly, rebel governance enjoyed more legitimacy than the dormant urban council. Many rebels thus invested in ventures that built on an ordered, civil social life.[15]

Despite such promising developments, governance remained uneven. Some neighbourhoods were almost completely abandoned.[16] Others were better off, trying to achieve alternative governance arrangements. An example was, and to some extent still is, Cocody, a neighbourhood situated outside the tarmac ring road that separated the inner parts of the city from the suburbs. It thus came under the direct control of rebel troops. However, the insurgents rarely controlled the area.[17] In 2006 and 2007, the headman of Cocody had introduced new political institutions that adopted and adapted older, local and modern forms of governance (Förster 2015). There was a 'general assembly' composed of representatives of all families living in the neighbourhood, and the head man had four councillors, who had different ethnic backgrounds. They should make sure, he said, that the interests of all groups living in Cocody were appropriately taken into account when a decision needed to be made.

Security was provided by groups of vigilantes that he had organized in a way that prevented abuses and 'irregularities', he claimed. Each group consisted of three, four or sometimes five men. Some of them were young and aggressive enough to impress possible intruders with evil intentions. But each group also had an elder member, or sometimes two, who were experienced *dozo*. These

men, the chief said, would appease the young men if they were running wild. They were also so experienced that they would be able to assess difficult situations that could always arise in such times of unrest. Three, later four, permanent watch posts were erected at the sides where the neighbourhood was accessible from outside. Each elder had a mobile phone, and in the case of an incident they were instructed to call the head man at home. In the evenings he sat in his living room, his three mobile phones within reach on a small coffee table on which he also rested his feet. Each phone was equipped with a different sim card, one for each of the three big mobile phone companies. Visitors came and went and discussed the latest events in town. Sometimes, rebel soldiers visited him, but they behaved as normal citizens. 'There is no problem here,' one of them said, 'so we can focus on other things.'

Cocody became a model for other neighbourhoods in town. The more independent it became, the more the population of other neighbourhoods urged their chiefs to follow the 'way of Cocody'. There were indeed attempts to copy the model, and not only with regard to security. Other governance arrangements were seen as attractive models for the future, as well as the institutions that sustained them: the general assembly, the regular consultation of the populace, the councillors and other elements that characterized Cocody's political regime. Cocody had become a self-governed social space that had emancipated to some extent from other areas of the city. Its political regime was neither 'traditional' nor 'modern'—it was a unique creation that had emerged out of the ongoing interaction between the main political actors of the neighbourhood, mediated by the institutions that the chief had introduced when he was invested in 2006.

However, the more attractive Cocody became, the more other chiefs articulated their opposition. Some claimed that Cocody's headman followed a very sophisticated hidden agenda. His efforts to make his neighbourhood safe and proper were only political instruments to improve his own position in the city. They suggested that he would surely run for the position of mayor after the end of the insurgency when the restored state administration would call for regular elections. The head man was upset when he heard about such allegations and commented bitterly: 'La politique est sale' ('Politics is dirty').

Kisumu, Kenya

Housing and the Emergence of New Political Spaces in Kisumu, Kenya

Kisumu is an interesting city for a range of reasons. First, it is the third largest city in Kenya after Nairobi and Mombasa, and one of the fastest-growing. Second, it is the only Kenyan city on Lake Victoria, bordering Uganda to the north-west and Tanzania to the South, with promising regional potential. Third, to the present day, it has been the centre of the political opposition and has endured decades of systematic neglect in terms of national investment and infrastructure. The effects are still palpable. The railway line between Nairobi

and Kisumu was discontinued in 2012.[18] Also, there is little productive industry in the city, although both trade and business have been picking up in recent years as a result of the East African Community free trade zone and trade with Uganda and Tanzania. The port is sleepy, despite the regional trade potential.[19] Tourism infrastructure, even with the spectacular landscape and location, is hardly developed. The only real development in terms of infrastructure is the recent inauguration of Kisumu International Airport, connecting Kisumu to a wider range of destinations, and the rehabilitation of the road network in and around the city. Fourth, because of its regional potential as well as the governance challenges that its rapid expansion poses, Kisumu was selected to be part of the Millennium City Initiative, bringing some coordinated research and planning efforts to the city seeking to address widespread urban poverty, improve health facilities and boost the business environment.[20] Lastly, under the new constitution of 2010, Kisumu is the capital of Kisumu County, bringing newly devolved political power and resources to the city.[21]

In terms of urban development, Kisumu has huge potential. Approximately 60% of residents live in informal settlements. Much of the periurban land is undeveloped and the city is still surrounded by bushland. With the influx of new residents and new employment opportunities, however, demand for land is surging. New housing estates are mushrooming all around Kisumu, and land prices are escalating.[22] Viewed from the outside, these estates are all very different in terms of aesthetics and urban practices. Some are obviously well planned and well serviced, with water, power, security and tarmacked roads. Others seem to emerge haphazardly, with buildings of all shapes and sizes popping up all over the place.

This rapid urbanization and transformation are happening in a context of a weak and incoherent legal framework, endemic corruption, regulatory change and inadequate planning processes. The context is further complicated by a range of institutional uncertainties surrounding devolution. Not surprisingly, public institutions are in no position to regulate and provide services to these new estates, especially given the speed at which these are appearing. The problem here is not just one of urban governance (i.e. in the conventional sense of who provides which services and how). Rather, from a more qualitative perspective, the question is what practices and actors are creating new types of urban interaction? In the case study discussed in the following section, the focus is on dynamic, actor-oriented governance formation as a particular type of political space.[23]

Lolwe Estate

Lolwe Estate is located to the north-east of Kisumu. It was planned in the late 1990s as an 'orderly' estate, with plots conforming to a square grid, uniform one-storey houses, recreational grounds, a school and a supermarket. The original buyers of the plots were middle-class families, mainly public officials, who wanted to own and build their own house.[24] The sale of the plots was very

slow to begin with, the first house being built in 1998 in the middle of bush-land. However, if you visit Lolwe now, you enter through a rusty gate that has not been closed for years, on a dirt road full of potholes. You look up and see an erratic landscape of building sites, scaffolding, new apartment buildings, wasteland and bush, at first glance messy and chaotic.[25] The road winds hap-hazardly through the estate, past different styles and sizes of buildings, with some apartment buildings quite literally touching each other, whereas other spaces are still uncleared bushland. There are only one or two of the 'old', one-storey compounds standing, which can hardly be seen between and behind the smart new apartment-houses.

Indeed, the explosion of land prices is the main push factor behind the seemingly random development of the estate.[26] It is clear that neither the coop-erative nor the municipality have enforced any building regulations or develop-ment plans there. As the staff member of the cooperative said, shrugging his shoulders, 'everyone builds according to their capabilities'.

The Emergence of Urban Political Spaces

In spite of all the 'failures' and 'dysfunctions' of Lolwe Estate, there are some important observations with regard to the emergence and transformation of urban political spaces to be made.

First, the aesthetics of Kisumu are changing. As the example of Lolwe Estate illustrates, new, more 'urban' neighbourhoods are emerging. This impression is compounded by the amount of construction work going on. Lolwe is a busy place, and the dynamics of the construction—with all the scaffolding, lorries, workers, people and so on—stir imaginaries of an urban place. This does not conform to the image of informal settlements of rickety shacks and corrugated iron; these definitely are 'proper' buildings, even if they are random in their layout. In other words, Lolwe is contributing to the aesthetic and practical diversity of urban neighbourhoods, an image that is reinforced by the kind of houses that are being built. The newer apartment houses of about three or four storeys are a new type of building in these for-mer periurban parts of Kisumu, and they strike the eye immediately. A new kind of suburban neighbourhood is emerging here, distinct from the shacks of the nearby slums, distinct from the symmetrical layout of one-storey houses in the neighbouring estate,[27] and distinct also from the rundown neighbouring apartment blocks built in the 1970s. These are 'smart' blocks, built by investors and intended as investment objects.

This brings us to a second dimension that is key to the formation of urban political spaces: the urban actors. Some are new actors, investors from Nairobi or even the Emirates, and from new professions such as brokers and estate agents. The economy of property development is itself producing new social and political formations. On a more mundane level, there are the people who live and work in Lolwe estate. The demographic composition is changing rap-idly because of the rapid development of the plots. Lolwe is increasingly char-

acterized by distanciation, rather than close interactions and encounters on a daily basis. In this sense it is definitely changing its character. However, because of its relatively small size and the one main entrance leading into the estate, frequent encounters between residents are possible. This mixture alone does not necessarily produce an urban space: suffice to note how many urban suburbs across the world feel distinctly 'provincial' rather than urban. What makes this potential of distanciation and encounters urban is the diversity of actors and interactions.

Indeed, the emergence of urban interactions can best be traced via the formations of specific political fields in Lolwe. The political moment of these interactions is when they become a subject of a political discourse, when actors explicitly identify and problematize issues and articulate claims, interests and practice around them.[28] It is in this political and actor-oriented sense that we understand governance: as 'relatively stable social spaces where actors, based on their respective agency, identify and address social problems through creative interaction' (Förster and Koechlin 2011, 31; see also Förster 2015; Koechlin 2015a, b).

Urban Governance as Specific Formations of Political Spaces

This brings us to the issues which are identified as common problems, and it is remarkable how these are addressed in Lolwe Estate. The new apartment buildings are smart, there is running water laid on with support from Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company (KIWASCO) with very few interruptions, and power is provided by the national power company in an orderly fashion. This is not self-evident and requires further empirical attention.

Taking the provision of water as an example, Lolwe Estate was not connected up to the mains when development started there around 15 years ago. KIWASCO, a 'semi-private' enterprise, is routinely underresourced and riddled with corruption and incompetence. In other words, the water supply in Kisumu is poorly planned and in no position to extend such services on its own accord. However, apparently developers can approach the company if they are seeking to connect their property or estate up to the mains water supply. Although they have to pay for the service (both 'frontstage' and 'backstage' payments), KIWASCO will then provide the technical support to connect up the plot to the nearest mains water pipe, and to lay the pipes to each house.[29]

A further interesting case is waste disposal. Apparently, the city provides bins where waste can be placed and will then be collected by the municipality. However, the bins are poorly serviced and located outside the estate, so they are of no practical use to the inhabitants. A clever businessman now offers a private garbage-collection service. For approximately KES 20 a month, every Saturday, full black bin liners can be placed outside the house or compound, and unfailingly they will be collected by two men in smart overalls, who also provide new bin liners.

In other words, Lolwe exemplifies the emergence of new political spaces and a new type of urbanity. No doubt these dynamics are triggered by wider structural processes, such as devolution and globalization. But what makes them urban are social interactions that are specific to this terrain.

Conclusions

Our enquiries in West and East Africa showed that secondary cities need to be studied as independent social spaces rather than as part of national or international urban hierarchies. Of course, the formation of political spaces within these cities is influenced by national legislations and politics, but the authors of the social practices that shape these cities are urbanites who know their cities from day-to-day experience and who pursue their own agendas. The nodal point of their political articulations is the city and the imaginaries that they have about its future; about how they will want to live and how they will want to live together. The city is thus an intentional object—an imagined community that the actors want to relate to in a specific way. These ways can adopt many different forms and, of course, they inform urban politics. Whether or not there is a general assembly where urban governance is discussed makes a difference. Whether different actors cooperate to provide water, or an entrepreneur organizes the garbage collection, also makes a difference. How urban actors assess such differences and how they can articulate their imaginaries of how such things should be done and eventually participate in processes of decision-making is at the centre of urban governance. In fact, the formation of political spaces in urban contexts directly builds on the politics of governance. Political spaces are, as both ethnographic cases have shown, produced by the interactions of actors who articulate their views and claims in relation to a specific social problem. In our first example, it was security under rebel domination, and in the second, it was the provision of public services in an overstretched municipality.

Urban ethnography thus has to follow the actors and their interactions. The political articulation always has two sides of course: by articulating their own imaginaries, the actors will, on the one side, distance themselves from those who do not share their ideas about how things should be done. However, distanciation immediately causes a reaction, which means that the actors will, whenever they articulate their ideas and interests, look for other actors who share their views. They are possible allies who could make their political articulations stronger and more relevant to others—opponents and supporters alike. An ethnography of urban politics has to trace the incessant processes of encounter and distanciation as social practice that produces political spaces within the wider context of the city. Residential neighbourhoods or business districts can emancipate from the city as an administrative entity with a governing council but they will remain part of urban politics.

Notes

1. For statistics and assessments on the growth and transformation of secondary cities, see UN Habitat (2014) or Roberts (2014).
2. For a discussion and literature review on secondary cities, see Roberts (2014, 22–24), Chen and Kanna (2012, 1–16) and De Boeck et al. (2009, iii–iv). For a detailed discussion of the distinction (or, rather, the continuum) between 'urban' and 'rural' settlements, see Satterthwaite (2006).
3. For a detailed discussion of the functions and typologies of secondary cities, see Roberts (2014).
4. This critique also holds true for more innovative ethnographic approaches that reconceptualize secondary cities as 'shadow' cities, concerned with an assumed invisibility of such cities, as opposed to the visibility of the metropolis (De Boeck et al. 2009).
5. See, in particular, Jennifer Robinson and Colin McFarlane (Robinson 2006, 2011; McFarlane 2010; McFarlane and Robinson 2012) on developing a more diverse and less normative, hierarchical comparative approach to the study of cities across the world.
6. For an early critique of definitional weaknesses of secondary cities, see Rondinelli (1983). See also Satterthwaite (2006) and Förster (2013) on the difficulty of general definitions of urban centres.
7. On the diversity of African cities, see Freund (2007).
8. Building on Pahl's (1966) concept of a rural–urban continuum, and as more recent trends of urban theory (e.g. Castells 1996; Gugler 2002; Scott et al. 2007), we think of urbanization as a social process that transcends the former dichotomy of urban vs. rural.
9. See Olivier de Sardan (2008, 2015). Such practical norms often sediment as habitual practices.
10. For a seminal contribution on 'seeing like a state', see Scott (1998).
11. The EEA is elaborated in theory and practice in Förster et al. (2011). It is also the methodological cornerstone of several research projects about cities in Africa and elsewhere at the Chair of Social Anthropology, University of Basel.
12. See http://www.jeuneafrique.com/194970/politique/la-guerre-des-coulibaly/ (last accessed 15 September 2016).
13. These trade networks extended to the neighbouring Sahelian countries, in particular Mali and Burkina Faso, but also to goods imported from afar, such as motorcycles of Chinese production.
14. Apparently, the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces also had a say. In the conversations that Till Förster conducted at the time, it remained unclear to what degree the UN acted as a broker. Some interlocutors told him that the UN officers were more observers than mediators; others told me that the settlement would not have been possible without the UN.
15. Some constructed business buildings and rented them out to companies, such as mobile phone service providers. Others opened new restaurants, and still others invested their money in a fancy nightclub: the 'Eden'.
16. For instance, the posh *quartier résidentiel*, where only high-ranking civil servants and expats from the Global North could afford to live before September 2002, then accommodated a branch of the rebel command, but most of the once impressive villas were looted. Even corrugated iron sheets had been stolen from the roofs.

17. Although in fact many of the insurgents held real estate close by, just a few hundred metres away and opposite the barracks of the UN forces.

18. The train line runs from Mombasa, Kenya, and terminated up to the 1970s in Kampala, Uganda.

19. However, plans are underfoot to construct a new port and to boost regional trade, an indication of the structural transformations which, slowly but surely, are transforming Kisumu. See http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Chinese-firm-to-build-Sh14bn-Kisumu-port/1248928-3130106-4m9purz/index.html (last accessed 20 October 2016).

20. http://mci.ei.columbia.edu/millennium-cities/kisumu-kenya/ (last accessed 22 June 2015).

21. http://www.kisumu.kenyacounty.co.ke/ (last accessed 22 June 2015).

22. http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/High-demand-drives-growth-in-real-estate-sector/-/1248928/1662416/-/j96v7jz/-/index.html (last accessed 22 June 2015).

23. In a series of publications, we propose thinking of governance 'as relatively stable social spaces where actors, based on their respective agency, identify and address social problems through creative interaction' (Förster and Koechlin 2011, 31; see also Förster 2015; Koechlin 2015a, b). Our emphasis is on the contingent interactions between, and practices of, actors that produce governance formations. Rather than predefine what governance problems are and deduce governance arrangements from these predefined problems—for instance, with regard to service delivery—we rather seek to capture the emerging and changing interactions between actors through which complex social problems are identified and addressed.

24. The plot owners were originally automatically members of the cooperative who, in theory, should meet annually at an annual general meeting to discuss and supervise the activities of the cooperative.

25. Although it appears that recently the authorities are seeking to assert some power again by enforcing building regulations. See http://www.hivisasa.com/kisumu/news/160446/construction-100-kisumu-houses-suspended   or http://www.sde.co.ke/pulse/article/2000148076/all-illegal-structures-in-kisumu-to-be-demolished (all last accessed 18 June 2015).

26. Interestingly, according to some informants, the power-sharing agreement brokered in 2008 by Kofi Annan after the post-election violence seems to have accelerated the land grabbing. With the local political leader Raila Odinga and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in power, there was less accountability towards the constituency and greater demand for rewarding patronage networks. As land was underdeveloped but potentially very lucrative, plots were the preferred fuel to reward political loyalty. According to the staff of the cooperative—the office of which is located on the estate—the price of one plot (9 m × 20 m) in the late 1990s was KES20,000; in 2004 it was KES40,000; and in 2014 it was anything between KES1.4 million and KES1.8 million and rising. See also http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/1144024703/lolwe-from-deserted-bush-to-bustling-estate.

    The estate of Kenya Re is right next to Lolwe, and it conforms to the model that Lolwe was originally striving for—that is, a manned gate, roads laid out in a grid, similar style of houses, with a school, restaurant and a recreational ground.

    Of course, this does not mean that there is no politics inherent in other forms of social relations and interactions. However, on a theoretical level it pinpoints the moment when the political becomes visible, so to speak. See Förster (2015) and Koechlin (2013).

As can be gleaned from this short description, this form of water provision differs significantly from other forms and contestations. For a vivid and very different case study from Southern Italy, see Marotta (2014).

27. The estate of Kenya Re is right next to Lolwe and conforms to the model that Lolwe was originally striving for—that is, a manned gate, roads laid out in a grid, similar style of houses, with a school, restaurant and a recreational ground.

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Two Types of Community Organization in Urban Africa

Motoji Matsuda

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to re-examine the problems and potentialities of community organizations in contemporary African urban society. This is also an attempt to question some positive images of community organization that have become part of the development strategy. These images portray participation, grassroots democracy, sustainability and ownership, which in some situations have become counter-public spheres and in others are active agents of good governance (Fraser 1992, 10–142; Butler 1990, 20–22).

Studies of voluntary associations appeared in the mid-twentieth century and have multiplied vastly since independence (Banton 1956; Little 1957). They are the point of departure for the discussion of these organizations in African urban anthropology. In Africa, particularly East, Central and Southern Africa, cities were originally established as points of control closely linked to European colonial dominance. They were either urban clusters that sprung from local settlements that preceded colonization or new urban settings constructed entirely artificially to suit colonial control. To ordinary Africans, the latter were alien worlds marked by the values, systems, languages and cultures of their colonial masters. At that time, many African urban dwellers were single, male, seasonal workers with temporary permits to reside in these colonial outposts. These men were subjected to various restrictions and numerous hardships imposed by the colonial authorities, including, for example, arbitrary layoffs, difficulty in securing housing, violent police harassment and institutionalized discrimination. In addition to this, there was a severe shortage of spaces and opportunities for recreation and amusement to enrich their lives.

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It was impossible for these African urban dwellers to overcome such difficult circumstances individually. It was by constructing a communality that drew on various resources as a basis to (re)create solidarity that they managed to cope with such difficulties. This is the social background of the voluntary associations for mutual aid that have been formed in staggering numbers in African cities since the 1950s. They were organized in such a way as to maintain cohesion through a common consciousness among their members. Typically, they drew on the collective identity of ethnicity or clan, or village, or homeland, or language and culture. Overall, they also functioned as an adaptive mechanism for newcomers to survive in a hostile and unfamiliar world.[1]

However, in the 1980s, African societies went through a period of political turmoil and economic meltdown. Despite a partial decline, from the 2000s this was followed by an era of hope bolstered by globalization and rapid economic growth. Thus, over time, cities ceased to be unfamiliar worlds that belonged to the colonial masters; they became important centres of modern African society. A growing number of people have been born and raised in cities, and there has been a rapid increase in residents whose social bonds to their ancestral homeland have been lost or weakened. African migrant workers in cities are no longer temporary urban residents. There are still conventional migrant residents in the cities, but there has been an important change among them. Traditionally, they were male workers who moved alone to cities to earn money for the survival of their rural family. It is now common for these men to bring their families to live with them in the city, or to move from their ancestral homeland to another rural area.

In contemporary African urban society, there is a growing contrast between two opposing worlds. One derives from the legacy of colonial domination and is marked by affluent goods, capital and education; the other is a world of anomie, anarchy and absolute poverty, where there are no survival guarantees.[2] In the former, middle-class residents can enjoy a lifestyle of excessive consumption and politically correct civic consciousness that meets a universal standard. The overwhelming majority of urban residents live in the latter, and are both direct victims and victimizers in terms of poverty, violence and environmental destruction. Marginalized urban residents live harsh lives in which they place great emphasis on perceived tradition or ethnicity. To survive in this world of existential hardship and live well at the fringes of African urban society, it is essential to construct a community with a specific social consciousness at its core and to create a solidarity based on such a consciousness.

In today's urban society one observes large numbers of voluntary associations based on conventional aspects, such as ethnicity, clan and homeland. One also sees that the meaning of these resources has changed greatly, becoming more modern. Moreover, these 'traditional' organizations no longer serve a central role in modern urban society. Such a role is now played by urban community organizations based on the logic of modernity, or global citizenship. Since the 1990s, African cities have witnessed the birth of numerous community organizations that assert ordinary citizens' rights based on the idea of

universal human rights (Gibbon 1993; Livingstone 1991; Wamae 1993; Weeks and Jamal 1993). One thinks, for example, of community organizations that have forged alliances with environmental and human rights NGOs. Standing up in protest against the contamination of rivers and the degradation of the human habitat caused by garbage dumping, or resisting the police in the forced clearance of slums and the removal of street hawkers, is becoming common in modern African cities.

The main aim of the present discussion is to offer an understanding of these urban community organizations in contemporary Africa—their functions, potentials and limitations—drawing on ethnographic fieldwork among Maragoli migrants living in Nairobi, the largest city in East Africa, as a case study.[3] The number of independent community organizations addressing urban problems such as poverty, unemployment and housing shortage in Africa is small compared with Latin American and Southeast Asian societies, where community leaders collaborating with global or national NGOs effectively engage with these problems. However, this kind of community organization is increasing in number in Africa.

Recognizing and recommending community-based initiatives is common sense in development studies or public policy. The expressions 'community participation', 'grassroots democracy', 'sustainability' and 'ownership' are now common in media reports, and in the reports and discussions produced by international aid agencies and NGOs. Many of these reports and discussions are based on the categorization of community organizations into two contrasting types. The first gives the illusion of being community based but is, in fact, imposed and controlled by outside forces, such as the state or international organizations. The second type is truly rooted in the community and relies on the initiative of its leaders who are assisted by national or global NGOs promoting universal human rights. However, while the political positions and formation processes of these types of community organization differ, they share imported ideas of modern national or civic society, which are alien to ordinary African urban dwellers. To them, in their everyday life, the ideas and practices of community participation, grassroots democracy, sustainability, ownership and citizenship are external.

I introduce criteria such as autochthony and allochthony, which help to classify urban community organizations. Such an organization based on an ideology external to the residents living inside the community is allochthonous. On the other hand, an organization based on the needs and convenience of residents' everyday life is autochthonous. The former type has a clear organizational structure with goals, norms and regulations, and it grows through global and national development strategies led by the international organizations, national governments or NGOs. The latter can be conceptually understood as an extreme opposite. Autochthonous organizations emerge spontaneously without fixed structure, goals, rules or leadership.

Some allochthonous community organizations appear to be similar to autochthonous organizations because they aspire to achieve sustainable

development by using community resources rather than depending on aid from outside. In some cases, these organizations strongly oppose large-scale development projects by manipulating counter-development discourses. However, they share their grammar and lexicon, based on modernity and post-modernity, with the agents that they sharply criticize and oppose. Certainly, their activities are organized in accordance with their appraisal of sustainability, democracy and universal human rights.

Allochthonous community organizations are managed and controlled by people with a higher education who speak the language of government officials, CEOs and global NGO activists—a language that is alien to ordinary residents' everyday life. Autochthonous community organizations are fundamentally different. They lack a clear goal and structure and are as evanescent as bubbles, appearing and disappearing on an ad hoc basis according to circumstances. Although they are acephalous, some kind of leadership does emerge in particular situations. These tentative leaders are not necessarily well educated or wealthy, and they do not have a sophisticated language. Lacking the coordination of strong, well-educated leaders, autochthonous organizations do not have the political character of development organizations. They are immersed in the everyday life of the community but are disengaged from a global, 'politically correct' language. Modern nationalistic or ethnocentric discourses are called autochthonous.

The primary focus of studies on community organizations has been on the allochthonous type. Interest in the autochthonous type has not been strong and has played a minor role in the discourse on community development strategies. Because these small organizations lack clear principles, do not make any formal demands to the local authorities and do not advocate a politically correct perspective, thus far they have been seen as insignificant, trivial assemblies of people in urban society.

In this chapter I address the limitations of allochthonous organizations based on the global/national development strategy and the potential of autochthonous organizations based on survival and aimed at improving everyday life conditions.

Of course, I do not argue that autochthonous organizations should be privileged at the expense of allochthonous organizations. It is well known that various allochthonous organizations have made great contributions to the improvement of the welfare of local residents and to the protection of their basic human rights. Also, in reality, allochthonous and autochthonous types of organization often overlap in some ways and it is almost impossible to distinguish them. The central point that I make here is that we need to recognize the potential of the autochthonous type of organization. This is also an attempt to offer a critical reconsideration of the concept of community participation and community-based initiatives that is commended in the current debate, and to set up a new perspective on community organizations rooted in the everyday experience and knowledge of ordinary African urban residents.

Two Types of Community Organization in Urban Africa

The Ideological Origin of Community-Based Organizations

There are various kinds of organization operating in African urban societies where residents are interlinked and play different roles, depending on age, ethnicity and locality. Among the most significant are the community-based organizations (CBOs), which are regarded as guardians of people's basic human rights and as grassroots agents of liberal democracy. Let us look briefly at the ideological nature of such organizations.

CBOs have emerged as a popular and dominant concept in many development projects in urban Africa. In particular, since the 1980s—when the adverse effects and limitations of large-scale, environmentally damaging development projects were observed—CBOs built on the idea of sustainable development became mainstream and politically correct. Why have CBOs become 'common-sense' and 'correct' since the 1990s? The answer lies in drastic changes in the strategy of donors. Development aid strategies for Africa can be roughly divided into three basic models. The first is the 'evangelical model', which involves the provision of advanced technology to so-called backward societies and of modern ideas and systems to traditional societies in order to 'save' them. However, donors have realized that this does not work well because the unilaterally transferred goods and ideologies do not fit into the social background of the aid-receiving societies. The evangelical model was replaced by a new one that focused on educating and training people as opposed to just providing goods. This second approach is known as the 'human resource cultivation model'. However, it brought no change in the African reality, despite numerous seminars and conferences, and training local personnel who understand the donors' language, ideology and strategy. Thus a third concept was invented by donors, which paid more attention to using technology and knowledge in line with the local context and with the participation of the local community as an independent actor. This 'participatory' model has been a major factor in raising interest in and directing attention to CBOs. Certainly, this model seems more democratic and liberal because it is based on local needs and community initiatives as opposed to being imposed by outsiders. The participatory model has recently been praised in many governmental and non-governmental development masterplans.

The transition from the evangelical model to the human resource cultivation model and then to the participatory model is also a historical transition in the relations of control that are visible in the history of European colonial domination in Africa. European missionaries and explorers first set foot in Western Kenya at the beginning of the 1880s. In the decade that followed, the British East Africa Company occupied the land as a trade route connecting the Indian Ocean to Mengo (now Kampala), the capital of the Ganda kingdom. Since then, Western Kenya has experienced an influx of Christian missionary groups from the UK, the USA and France. With the aim of 'civilizing' Africa, they

provided not only the Holy Bible but also advanced technologies such as modern farming methods, medicines and education (Lonsdale 1977, 841–870; Rasmussen 1995).

However, faced with a reality in which Africans did not change and remained 'uncivilized' despite the imposition of European advanced knowledge, the colonial government abandoned the concept of 'evangelizing civilization' and began to concentrate its efforts on training Africans to understand European supremacy and become voluntarily subordinate. The Christian churches produced a large number of 'mission boys', who were indoctrinated in the ideology of European superiority and then dispatched to key stations throughout the colony as agents of European civilization and domination. Those mission boys easily turned into collaborators with the white settlers. To promote a divide-and-rule policy, the colonial government also appointed them as chiefs and subchiefs. This philosophy of colonial governance, which became known as indirect rule, overlaps in essence with the human resource cultivation model of today's development aid concept.

In the 1920s, dissatisfaction among Africans with the local collaborators of the European rulers mounted. This time was marked by the development of labour unions and political associations advocating modern nationalism. To cope with this difficult situation, the colonial administrations advocated African participation in government and instituted a pseudosystem of legislation and justice that included native councils and native courts, granted as a favour to the African population to suppress their discontent. This policy worked effectively in preserving the colonial system, seemingly allowing the participation of local people but giving them no power to change the basic system and structure of their society. This kind of local participation during colonial rule is at the root of the contemporary participatory model of development aid, under which external experts have a monopoly on structural decision-making in finance and long-term planning, and local people can be given limited authority to make minor decisions.

From this point of view, we can see that the changes in the concept of development aid from the evangelical model to the human resources cultivating model and then the participatory model closely resemble the shifts in the methods of European colonial rule in Africa. This similarity is nothing special. While the nature of colonial rule was to exploit Africa, today the goal of development aid is to help Africa. Although colonialism and development aid seem at first glance to be diametrically opposed, they share the idea of unilaterally doing something for Africa and a strong belief that external knowledge is superior to that of Africans. In this regard, the colonial domination of the past and development aid of the present share the same mentality. Just as the African élite (the mission boys) were trained and drawn into voluntary submission in order to maintain the system of colonial domination, CBOs are now playing a role in demystifying newly emerging neoliberal economic agendas.

A Type of CBO from an Everyday-Life Perspective

So far we have briefly examined the nature of CBOs introduced and imposed under a global development strategy. Now we need to focus on a type of community organization that is created in the everyday life world of urban dwellers. Community-based livelihood organizations grow naturally in urban settings, and they are autochthonous because they have nothing to do with the local, national and global development agents. People use these organizations for skilful survival and to improve their lives. In the case of Nairobi, these CBOs formed in informal settlements. They have no political/economic elite and no experts who could manage a politically correct discourse on development and talk with funding agencies in the outside world. They are managed by ordinary people and have no regulations or clear objectives. Their membership is amorphous and their size and reach are fluid.

An acephalous social and political system used to be dominant in Western Kenya (Wagner 1950) and is still partly working today.[4] Western Kenyans traditionally created a flexible social system in which everyday hardships were successfully addressed by different leaders according to circumstances. Leadership was not fixed; it constantly shifted depending on the circumstances. Although the British assessed this system as primitive and in the prestage of state formation, it functioned effectively.

Today, as development strategies in terms of community organization are critically challenged, the potential of acephalous systems is likely to offer options that could be usefully exploited. I have examined both CBOs working in terms of development strategy and those working in terms of livelihood strategy. In the globalized world system, the former are praised as progressive and seen as liberal organizations, whereas the latter are ignored as being of no importance. I will stress the potential of the latter and will indicate that negotiation and articulation between the two types are needed for local people to live well. I shall discuss how livelihood organizations have been reorganized in African urban settings. In the 1960s, when many African countries gained independence, there was an expectation that traditional modes of social organization such as linearity, ethnicity and territoriality would be dismantled and replaced by identity formations based on the independent individual. However, 'detribalized' independent citizens did not emerge even after several decades of independence. Far from being dismantled, ethnic identity and social ties in cities were revitalized, becoming more tribal based.

This phenomenon is visible in every major African city. In this context, ethnic associations have been most prominent among livelihood organizations. The story that 'a newcomer who migrates from his homeland to the city is helped by his fellow tribesmen in housing, employment and adapting to urban society' seems to be popular but is, in reality, too romantic. In the harsh urban environment, people do not receive this kind of assistance just because they belong to the same ethnic group. This issue became prominent in the 1980s when Structural Adjustment Programs were imposed on urban dwellers and

the living environment deteriorated suddenly as a result of skyrocketing prices and personnel retrenchment (Heidhues and Obare 2011). In this challenging urban environment, city dwellers have relied mostly on mutual aid and on livelihood associations organized across the city. In an era when the dream of the one nation has vanished and belonging to the 'same ethnic group' lost effectiveness in the everyday life of ordinary urban people, a range of informal livelihood organizations emerged to provide support for people's everyday needs.

Now that we have entered a new era of 'privatization' in which individuals stick to their close and familiar networks, livelihood organizations rooted in the urban community could create a new communality and solidarity with others. This is why these organizations have now come under the spotlight.

The State and the Urban Community: Three Types of Relationship

In this section I consider the relationship between the urban community and the state. It can be divided roughly into three types, which are supportive, oppositional and indifferent. For instance, assistance from the state or local governments such as public pension and welfare benefits are typical examples of a supportive relationship, while the arbitrary use of public authority to oppress ordinary people is categorized as the oppositional type. According to the rules of modern civic society, an elective and responsible government is expected to make a contribution to the promotion of the nation's welfare. However, should it fail or neglect to meet such obligations, its relationship with the urban community would be of the indifferent type.

In the industrially developed countries of the northern hemisphere, a 'supportive' relationship has basically been dominant. In Africa, such a relationship occurs only in extremely limited ways. For example, most ordinary low-income residents in the major cities cannot expect the provision of public services by the state and local government. Conversely, an 'oppositional' relationship is prominent, including the violent clearance of informal settlements, abuse of power by the police, and indifference and neglect extending to a lack of garbage collection and the supply of water and electricity. Let us now briefly consider these three relationships in the case of Nairobi.

The Lack of a Supportive Relationship: Vanishing Public Services

Currently, the Nairobi residents who can benefit from public services are those living in the upper-class residential areas. Basic public services such as garbage collection, supply of water and electricity, sewerage and tarmacked roads are not available in the suburban informal settlements where the overwhelming majority of the city's population live.

From an historical point of view, it should be pointed out that in the early twentieth century public services in Nairobi were planned only for fewer than

2000 white residents. In contrast, all African city dwellers were regarded as temporary residents and were only targeted in terms of national security and public hygiene. In spite of the urban-oriented policy pursued since independence, basic infrastructure development has made slow progress in Nairobi's African residential areas. Under the new constitution of 2011, significant decentralization was instituted and the Nairobi County Government became the authority responsible for providing almost all public services. However, it cannot provide basic services for the poorer residents.

The Expansion of an Oppositional Relationship: The Oppression of Urban Residents by the State

Unlike neighbouring countries such as Tanzania, which maintained close ties with the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War, Kenya was pro-West from the beginning and achieved exceptionally strong economic growth thanks to the vast amount of development aid from the West. However, it implemented a heavy-handed policy of oppression that included frequent violent slum clearances. This trend further intensified from the second half of the 1980s through the 1990s, and the oppression of urban residents became more widespread and violent. The riots in Muoroto in 1990 symbolized this trend. Muoroto, a district full of shops in downtown Nairobi, was targeted for clearance by the municipal government; the rioting was triggered when, on an early morning, bulldozers razed the area. At the beginning of the riot, a small child was crushed to death under a demolished hut. More generally, the protesting crowd was met with ruthless violence at the hands of the armed police, who were confronted by the enraged residents with stone throwing and arson (Throup and Homsby 1998).

Since then, there has been no change in this trend. Ordinary city dwellers have continued to suffer from violent oppression from the state, as in the infamous post-election violence that rocked Kenyan society in 2007–8. On that occasion, repeated violent clashes occurred between Nairobi residents and the police in most of the poorer residential districts, which resulted in many casualties (Kimani 2009). Once a riot took place, the state mobilized the law-enforcement forces and started its persecution of the urban community. Unemployed youths in particular were hunted down. Moreover, violent housebreaking in the name of official searches disrupted the livelihoods of ordinary residents living in such informal settlements.

State Indifference and the Self-Help Strategy

Since the 1980s, when Kenya was forced to accept full-scale structural adjustment programmes, urban poverty has reached a level that could be defined as 'absolute impossibility for survival'. This level of poverty is obvious by looking at the housekeeping records of the ordinary porer resident. They show that almost all expenditure is allocated to survival food (see note 2). Obviously

there is not enough money for children's school fees or clothing. These urban dwellers have no money to spend on improving their quality of life.

In spite of national economic growth, the living conditions of the semi-employed and unemployed living in Nairobi's informal settlements are worsening, and hardship has grown as a result of the widening income gap. In these circumstances, an impoverished class known as the new urban poor has emerged massively. They do not own farmland in their home village and have lost their sociocultural ties to their homeland. They have no option other than to try to survive in an unstable and dramatically deteriorating living environment. Naturally, people must not only survive but also try to live well. And yet, even if they are employed and have their own place to sleep, they are relentlessly assaulted by the various problems that mark the difficulty of their everyday life, such as sickness, accidents, fires, theft, funerals of relatives and school fees. In order to cope, they need money that they would never be able to get by themselves.

Self-Help City

There is no social welfare system to help the new urban poor to cope. Reasonable options are available only to Nairobi's middle- and upper-class residents, who have no connection with the life of the overwhelming majority of lower-class residents. Bank loans are impossible to obtain and there are no public institutions to provide assistance. The state has remained totally indifferent and inactive regarding the improvement of the urban poor's livelihood. It has been recognized that day-to-day hardship can be addressed only through ordinary people's own initiative, through a self-help strategy. It has also been recognized that hardships of poverty cannot be overcome by lower-class residents individually and that it is necessary to come together into a new communality so that problems can be dealt with collectively. So, living in a harsh environment without any expectation of public support, ordinary lower-class Nairobi residents have created their own organizations, systems and networks to provide such everyday life services. Indeed, Nairobi has been a 'self-help city' for several decades (Hake 1977). The essence of this self-help strategy is to recreate a communality that can transform outsider into insider and reaffirm a newly developed consciousness of belonging with each other. This new communality also has the power to arouse primordial sentiments.

To be specific, in some cases, ordinary city dwellers living in informal settlements have infiltrated community organizations of the global development type managed by those who can master the global 'politically correct' discourse. They have concealed their mutual help activities. People may also participate in existing mutual aid organizations, such as ethnic and village-based associations, and adapt or domesticate them from within. They eventually create a new type of CBO mixing heterogeneous organizational principles. This self-help strategy is the driving force in the development of the second type of CBO instigated by the needs of making a livelihood.

The Creative Construction of Communality
Among the Urban Poor

The Infiltration of CBOs into the Global Development Strategy

We have seen that ordinary Nairobi residents, who are excluded from public services, have put into practice a number of self-help strategies in order to live better. As I have mentioned, in some situations they infiltrate community organizations belonging to the global development strategy. These organizations are structurally stable because they receive regular funding from NGOs, foreign aid agencies or public institutions and their leadership and activities are based on 'politically correct' ideas and norms. City dwellers who are tentatively accommodated in such organizations work to secure the social base for communality in order to make their livelihoods more stable. However, this kind of communality is far from traditionally based and never arouses a 'natural sentiment' of belonging together; instead, it is a being-for-itself entity based on reflective consciousness.

There are two subtypes of global development strategy that are seemingly opposed to each other. One is designed and backed by the state as the lowest agent in its power structure. In contrast, the other is an NGO model organized by intellectuals and activists who are distant from the state and in many cases collaborate with international NGOs and aid agencies. Sometimes these groups severely criticize the government for its human rights violations or environmental destruction. However, it is rare for such organizations to arise spontaneously from within the local community; most are initially designed outside the community. Coordinators, advisers and volunteers from international NGOs or from the funding agencies first train Kenyans to master the 'lexicon' of the global 'politically correct' standards, then organize poorer residents through them.

Local NGOs that collaborate closely with international organizations—whether non-governmental, governmental or intergovernmental—have enormous power as they rival the government in terms of budget, organization and political influence. Since they are based on, and governed by, universalistic ideas of 'political correctness', these powerful organizations are always standing as champions of justice and protectors of the weak. Their universalistic ideas can, however, be alien to ordinary residents. In this case, it easily degenerates into a doxa that never allows any question or criticism, and finally becomes a weapon of the strong. In this sense, community organizations of the NGO type are similar to those of the first type, which is controlled by the state.

CBOs' Altering of the Livelihood Strategy

Some poorer residents in Nairobi who survive in a rapidly deteriorating environment might well seek stability and security by joining an NGO-backed community organization. However, the tactics used by the overwhelming

majority involve altering the existing voluntary associations based on ethnicity, clan or homeland identity according to the demands of their livelihood. In the 1950s and 1960s, these seemingly traditional urban voluntary associations used to be one of the most popular research topics in African urban anthropology. Their members are brothers or neighbours; they share a strong sense of belonging because these ties are essentially natural and primordial. The ordinary urban poor can benefit from this sense of communality as a base for mutual aid. Today, however, these seemingly traditional voluntary associations are not what they used to be. In fact, they can be seen as a new type of organization based on a new type of communality.

For example, although clan-based voluntary associations in Nairobi are organized on clan identity and norms, in reality their membership is not restricted to fellow clansmen because it includes people who have minimal relations with the original clansmen. Outsiders can even be transformed into fellow clansmen by using expansive terms, such as 'matrilineal uncle' and 'sister's husband'. Through a skilful use of such tactics, residents in Nairobi's informal settlements can recruit as many people as necessary while keeping a primordial sense of belonging. This is how a new type of communality has been created. Livelihood community organizations created by modifying existing voluntary associations are in most cases small and unstable. They are never entrepreneurial but do safeguard the livelihoods of their members. In other words, their goal is not the development of their members' socioeconomic status but the improvement of the lives of marginalized people. Most of them are engaged in funeral services and assist with the transfer of the bodies of the members who have died in Nairobi back to their homelands.

There are 25 mutual aid associations of this type organized by Maragoli migrants from Western Kenya living in Kangemi, an informal settlement on the north-western edge of Nairobi.[5] The outlook and organizational principles of the associations that I observed and investigated in 2010 vary considerably. In general, the outcast urban residents have full control of these mutual aid associations, use them and dissolve them in response to their needs. In Kangemi there are also NGO-led development organizations of which Maragoli residents, especially women, are active members. For example, the Catholic Church has established a workshop in the church compound where local women make folk art dolls which are exported to Europe. However, those who take part in such organizations are a minority of 'special people'; their experience is totally irrelevant to the overwhelming majority of ordinary Maragoli migrants in Kangemi. There was not one case of participation in a community organization of this type among the nearly 200 local Maragoli migrants whom I interviewed. For them, participation in these community organizations, which might be seen as 'effective' in the global development strategy, is far from popular and has no bearing on their everyday life.

How can these people secure stability in their livelihoods without depending on such organizations? To improve their living conditions in the deteriorating environment, ordinary Maragoli migrants have developed stronger

cooperation and have increasingly looked for practical forms of communality, establishing various organizations in Kangemi. These community organizations are mutual aid associations which have been independently formed and reformed by the public according to the needs of their livelihood.

But what kind of group identity or sense of belonging is used in the formation or transformation of such organizations? Urban anthropological studies in the early 1950s and 1960s paid much attention to ethnicity and ethnic identity as the major principles for organizing cooperation and solidarity. According these early studies, people moving to the city from their homelands are taken care of by their fellow clansmen and taught how to survive in a multiethnic urban society fraught with tension and risk; ethnic associations would play a role in the adaptation to this new, unknown world. However, as I have mentioned, this is a myth. Certainly, these large ethnic associations do exist but they are frequently exploited by the ethnic elite (big men) for political mobilization, while the interests and needs of the livelihoods of ordinary members are rarely considered. In practice, ordinary people subdivide into a myriad of small units which in their everyday lives constitute the sociocultural base for mutual aid activities. These units are organized according to such principles as 'coming from the same village' (the locality principle), 'relatives who can trace their genealogy through 4–5 generations' (the small lineage principle), 'belonging to the same clan' (the clan principle) and 'belonging to the same age group' (the generation principle). New organizing principles have also come into existence in the urban context, such as 'working in the same occupation' (the workplace principle) and 'living in the same tenement compound' (the neighbourhood principle).

Using one principle in combination with others or amalgamating different principles in accordance with the needs of livelihood, Maragoli poorer residents in Kangemi have invented 'the right person'—a category that allows them to help each other with legitimacy and authenticity. They cunningly transform 'stranger' and 'outsider' into 'fellow being' and 'insider', so these subunits for mutual aid recognize people's belonging and include them in interaction networks. In brief, urban migrants who make a precarious living without resources for development have created a very intricate and complex mutual aid system that responds to changes in people's circumstances and to changing times. Through this system, ordinary Maragoli residents in Kangemi manage to domesticate and humanize a deteriorating urban living environment. They show a skilful ability to manipulate multiple organizational principles. They usually belong to different kinds of organization at the same time, and a multiplicity of organizations and associations play an informal role in their everyday lives. They are ethnicity-based organizations (the biggest one has tens of thousands of members), homeland-based development organizations (hundreds of people), village-based mutual aid organizations (tens of people), (sub)clan-based welfare organizations (several dozen people), and mutual aid or loan groups of friends and neighbours (about ten people).

This multiplicity of mutual aid organizations in Kangemi can be roughly categorized according to their organizational principle or organizational orientation (Nairobi-oriented or rural home village-oriented). Different principles and orientations coexist and complement each other. Specifically, among the 30 associations, there are two based on the clan principle and home oriented; two based on the village principle and home oriented; one based on the homeland principle and home oriented; four based on the clan principle and urban oriented; five based on the village principle and urban oriented; four based on the homeland principle and urban oriented; six based on the workplace principle and urban oriented; two based on the enterprise principle and urban oriented; and four based on the neighbourhood principle and urban oriented.

Thus, I stress, by using different organizational principles and orientations in line with the times and circumstances, marginalized urban dwellers have successfully improved their lives. In doing so, they have mainly relied on ethnicity-based associations. After Kenyan independence, nationalism and ethnic pride rapidly rose and homeland-based organizations were active throughout the period of economic growth. They were replaced by village-based organizations when living conditions deteriorated and became hopeless. In times of globalization, small lineage-based organizations have become revitalized and those based on friendship have flourished. Although mutual aid organizations are formed by drawing on principles such as belonging to the same ethnic group, the same village or the same clan, conditions for mutual aid membership are, in fact, fluid, for the kind of communality that forms the basis for mutual aid is not a fixed entity but changes as it is updated or created anew in urban settings.

CONCLUSION: THE POTENTIAL OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS BASED ON LIVELIHOOD PRAGMATISM

We have looked at diverse forms of spontaneous, nameless and informal livelihood organizations which differ from those initiated and controlled by NGOs or other authorities. The former are acephalous and fluid. The latter are dominated by the clear ideology of democracy, human rights or national interest, which has become the common language of modernity and globalization. In a context marked by state 'opposition' and 'indifference', Nairobi's residents in informal settlements are forced to opt for self-help and (re)construct a communality on which they organize mutual aid associations.

In terms of national and global development strategy, such livelihood organizations have been seen as 'irrelevant remains of a traditional society', since they lacked leadership and an organizational philosophy of a global standard. From such a point of view, they are destined to decline, and it is crucial that they should be modernized. However, the organizations with lofty ideals and a firm structure do not govern ordinary people's daily lives in African cities. By (re)creating flexible and adaptable practice, community livelihood organizations not only are the driving force in providing help to poorer residents and improv-

ing their everyday life but also are a hidden sociocultural apparatus for resistance against a kind of control from above that treats these people as passive objects.

When talking with the residents of informal settlements, the first priority tends to be the provision of adequate housing and employment. Obviously, these are crucial issues and the priority given to them points to a view of the urban poor that conflicts with their treatment as a social pathology to be subjected to correction and control. Nevertheless, this view is definitely inadequate by itself because it focuses on how to secure survival in a challenging urban environment. Lacking from this survival-oriented view is how people can live better culturally. It is undoubtedly essential that people are fed, clothed and housed, but if the 'survival' of the urban poor becomes the only goal, the fact that they should have the opportunity to actively improve their quality of life and their culture may easily be overlooked. However, it is important to stress that this survival-centred development strategy leads to people's focusing on their individual existential world, and thus searching for solutions to their individual desires, pleasures and suffering.

Community-based livelihood organizations have filled this gap through their cunning and creative practices. They have played a role in strengthening people's sociocultural roots and in helping them to live better in a harsh urban context. This is also why many of these organizations provide assistance in urban death rituals. In the 1980s, some Maragoli migrants to Nairobi's informal settlements invented a new urban death memorial ritual when their living conditions deteriorated drastically following the imposition of the Structural Adjustment Program from above and outside. Until they came to live temporarily in Nairobi as migrant workers, the Maragoli had no idea of urban death. Traditionally, when Maragoli people die in their rural home village, a well-established set of beliefs and practices comes into play. Death outside the Maragoli homeland in Western Kenya is 'unnatural'. Rural–urban migration has set the scenario for such 'unnatural death'. Maragoli urban migrants were perplexed and confused when death occurred in the city, outside the legitimate context. So in the 1980s a new urban memorial ritual was created with the help of livelihood organizations. This requires large amounts of money and is conducted in the deceased's urban residence six months after death. It is a hybrid entity that interweaves heterogeneous elements derived from Christian liturgy, traditional rituals of remembrance, exorcism and the regulations of modern organization. It might be seen as meaningless from a survival-centred perspective. However, although Maragoli migrants in Kangemi have to a large extent transformed the existing ethnic culture, this ritual plays an essential role in the quality and betterment of their life. It is an important aspect of their drive to construct their own existential world by organizing livelihood associations spontaneously and flexibly.

We need to understand the position and meaning of the livelihood organizations that I have described if we want to penetrate the depths of the everyday lives of marginalized African urban dwellers and analyse community

development in the city. As I have pointed out, even if CBOs with lofty goals, well-ordered structures and democratic rules of a global standard on survival-centric strategies could be successfully organized, they would find it impossible to connect intimately with them. Community organizations therefore have a key role to play in line with these people's daily lives and the techniques they have developed to combine and articulate heterogeneous ideas and principles. In the strategy of urban community development, it is most important to learn from the creative skills employed by the livelihood organizations in the construction and manipulation of different elements and to support the formation of more diverse and flexible livelihood organizations.

Notes

1. The expression 'adaptive mechanism' was used by Little (1957, 593). See also Parkin (1966, 90–94).
2. According to the household account books of one migrant family for 1991 and 2010, food accounts for more than 90% of expenditure (house rent and remittance are recorded separately in the urban books). School fees, medical bills, clothing and transportation costs cannot be covered (Matsuda 1998; Matsuda 2011, in Japanese).
3. The Maragoli, together with 16 other Bantu-speaking ethnic groups, who settled in Western Kenya have formed a new 'super ethnic group' called the Luyia. The use of the name Luyia to denote a 'super ethnic group' is comparatively recent. The first recorded mention of the name was in a general meeting of the North Kavirondo Central Association, held in June 1935 (Ogot 1967, 139). Kangemi was located on the western fringes of Nairobi along the main road connecting Nairobi with hub cities in Western Kenya. Since Western Kenya was the homeland of the Luo and Luhya—two of Kenya's largest ethnic groups—from the 1960s, Kangemi developed and expanded as an enclave for these groups.
4. This kind of resistance, embedded in urban everyday life, was called 'soft resistance' (Matsuda 1998).
5. This has been an urban colony since the 1910s.

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Urban Ethnography: Nothing About Us Without Us Is for Us

Cynthia Gonzalez

Introduction

Learning from the work by early anthropologists provides a critical reflection on the shifts in anthropology as a discipline and its relationship to *the field* (the location in which anthropological methodology is applied). Anthropology, as an academic discipline, operates from the social sciences to generate knowledge and discourse. Foucault (1984) suggests that discourse is dislodged from the location from which it emerges and comes to stand as truth. He argues that institutions control discourse, but that the impact of discourse moves beyond institutions. Discourse, thus, ceases to reside in what it does and is displaced by claims of truth (Foucault 1984). The power of discourse functions to move away from its origin, circulate, build on assumptions and become timeless under the guise of truth. Foucault discusses how discourse is no longer about the exchange between the process of reading and writing but instead about the signs it produces (Foucault 1984).

Historically, anthropology required the researcher to travel to a particular place in order to study a cultural phenomenon (Boas [1928] 1960), thus separating the work at home from the work in the field (Marcus and Fischer [1986] 1999, Chap. 5). A history of anthropology illuminates a complex process by which the researcher is immersed in studying and producing knowledge about 'the participant' community via ethnographic enquiry and fieldnotes, which has changed significantly as a result of anthropology's constant evolution in ensuring participatory engagement in the field. The evolutionary nature in anthropological enquiry redefines the field to include the participants' knowledge about how they understand their experiences. The integration of ethnog-

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raphy and participatory research in anthropological methodology relocates the role of the researcher, the participant and the field. This is particularly important when writing about historically disadvantaged communities as a discursive process.

Anthropology has evolved into a transformative and emancipatory process in which current ethnographies challenge dominant discursive formations of communities living at the margins to illuminate possibilities for advocacy by challenging systems of injustice that produce the conditions experienced in communities and by engaging scholars to study their own society as a field. Numerous scholars have engaged in critical dialogue related to interpreting the field within anthropology. More recently, the inclusion of urban communities in the field poses critical concerns related to whether this becomes urban anthropology or applied anthropology within urban areas. Scholars such as Giuliana B. Prato and Italo Pardo (2013) examine this question and determine that urban communities are now inclusive within anthropological enquiry rather than their own discipline of enquiry. They argue that with a transformative global world, our communities are becoming urban (Prato and Pardo 2013). They consider that anthropology is embedded in Western and non-Western studies in which the anthropologist is committed to real-world situations with effective empirical evidence through urban ethnography (Pardo and Prato 2012a, b).

Anthropology's evolutionary history calls for a disruption of rigid definitions of the field that separated the anthropologist from the communities they study. The changes in the social landscape of the world to large urban societies demand a focus in examining conditions within these areas, concentrating on the disparate experiences of urban adaptation for various groups inclusive of those living in poverty and racial/ethnic minorities. The future of social science research will seek an understanding related to urban societies and dynamics between people within these areas (Pardo and Prato 2012a, b). Urban ethnography presents itself as an effective method in conceptualizing and enquiring about the evolving urban world within anthropological applied research in which aspects of the field have shifted to (a) articulate the 'subject' without having to romanticize and make its location and people exotic; (b) understand that knowledge is not based on a truth but needs to be examined and revisited in multiple dimensions and; (c) social and geographical location that decentre the field where the researcher is immersed both in the locality and at home (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). The challenge is how to apply traditional anthropological methodology to the diverse contemporary societies, identify the methodological adaptations needed and avoid losing disciplinary identity (Prato and Pardo 2013). Drawing from cultural studies, post-colonial theory and participatory action research, this chapter conceptualizes urban ethnography within the context of anthropology, identifying its role in addressing subjectivity, representation and identify formations, which are essential when studying urban communities, and engaging ethnographies written by scholars studying their own environment and social experiences. This approach will situate the case for the use of urban ethnography in anthropology to understand social interactions, dynamics and culture in urban communities.

CONCEPTUALIZING ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHNOGRAPHY
WITHIN URBAN SOCIETIES

Rigid boundaries between communities participating in research, the research process and the knowledge produced about these communities may fail to allow us to further understand the lived experiences of certain groups. In response to Prato and Pardo's (2013) discussion about urban anthropology, numerous anthropologists commented to confirm the value added in applying ethnographic enquiry in urban communities as part of anthropology and not as a separate discipline (Ahmed 2014; Koenig 2014; Kürti 2014; Monge 2014; Pezzi 2014; Touval 2014). As the world transforms into high-density urban environments, the demand for a deeper understanding of subgroup lived experiences in these regions will become apparent (Pezzi 2014). The enquiry will ensure that decision makers are informed by those who understand and study these areas (Monge 2014), while preventing the displacement of vulnerable communities as a result of the constant transformative and shifting dynamics (Koenig 2014).

The inheritance of post-colonial formations, planning and public policies, and social engagement illuminate disparities in race, class, gender and sexuality (among other categories of identity) between groups living in urban societies determining a significant amount of enquiry and advocacy to illuminate these differences. Anthropology that engages social justice ensures that communities participating in research are active in their advocacy via knowledge production (Ahmed 2014). This process raises critical questions: What methods become useful for this approach? What tools are required to think about social justice within anthropological research methodology?

Anthropology differs from other social sciences in that it is embedded in participant observation and building relationships with people in a community through the researcher's immersion in the field (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). It is an interdisciplinary approach that critically engages with the study of cultures (Chambers 2000; Ahmed 2014). Anthropological research methods pay close attention to the conditions of disadvantaged communities and are attentive to the intersections between the political, social and cultural experiences of those particular communities (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Pezzi 2014). Thus anthropology positions itself as an effective discipline in studying urban spaces via the application of urban ethnography, especially by redefining the boundaries of the field from distant and exotic places to all communities in which disadvantage, oppression and struggle are constant lived experiences (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Kürti 2014). Ethnography facilitates a more inclusive enquiry about people in various communities, both urban and small-scale.

Ethnography as qualitative research is attentive to the participant's story (Chambers 2000; Pardo and Prato 2012a, b). Anthropology influenced early applied ethnographic work to the boundaries of the field and communities participating in research (Chambers 2000). Simultaneously, ethnography tends to contextualize events and communities beyond the realm of generalizable

data and information to intersect methods of enquiry into the historical, social, political, cultural and personal accounts of lived experiences (Tedlock 2000), thus enabling a shift in anthropological research (Pardo and Prato 2012a, b). Ethnographers are able to transcend the limits of research to include intersections of culture and society requiring a critical self-engagement on behalf of the researcher and their relationship to the enquiry (Tedlock 2000). An ethnographic narrative serves to maximize community involvement in unpacking and illuminating their lived experiences, imperative to historically disenfranchised communities.

Examining the dynamics of urban communities via participatory research engaging ethnographic enquiry presents opportunities to address discourse that operates against marginal groups. In urban societies, differences based on the sociopolitical and cultural landscape of that particular society impacts how subgroups access opportunities. The following sections introduce the concepts of subjectivity, representation and identity formation as they function in critical discourse to demonstrate how they can engage urban ethnography.

Subjectivity

The concept of subjectivity problematizes the idea of human nature by examining the effects in the production of the human subject that undermines their existence based on their social and cultural inheritance. Through theories of subjectivity, the social sciences have been able to identify forms of subjugation and the ways in which oppression operates within society. The development of urban societies is positioned within a history of subjectivity that must be examined. Post-colonial theoretical perspectives that interrogate forms of subjectivity have influenced anthropology to evidence the ways in which subject formations function as a construct for the development and maintenance of dominant institutions. An anthropological study of the historical present, vis-à-vis engaging post-colonial theoretical perspectives, can aid in challenging the dominant scholarly and popular interpretations of marginalized communities in the USA and across the world today. Post-colonial theoretical perspectives challenge dominant discourse to identify how present conditions of subjectivity are influenced by the histories of colonization and have evolved to include an analysis of subject formations.

Scholarship examining subject formation includes the rigorous work of the Subaltern Studies Collective (SSC) and its application of post-colonial theoretical perspectives. Post-colonial studies has adapted the term 'subaltern' from the work of the SSC, a group of historians who aim to critically discuss a historiography of subaltern themes in South Asian studies (Ashcroft et al. 2000). The subaltern, meaning 'inferior rank', is a term adopted by Antonio Gramsci that includes groups of individuals subjected to the hegemony of the ruling classes (Ashcroft et al. 2000). Gramsci was interested in the history of the subaltern class because he understood that the history of the ruling class was the history of the state that made subaltern history invisible. Founded by Ranajit

Guha in the 1980s, the SSC convened with a shared interest to write an alternative history of South Asia. The work of the SSC discovers a hidden past through textual criticisms that challenge the colonization of India to identify it as a form of subjugation (Ludden 2001). The SSC thus includes the subaltern history in its interrogation.

In the foreword of *Selected Subaltern Studies*, Edward Said (1988) argues for a new social consciousness and determines that the SSC will write an alternative historiography for subaltern people that articulates dismissed dominant accounts of marginalization because subaltern history is that which is missing from the official story, thus relevant when engaging the historiography of marginalized communities in urban societies. Said ([1978] 1994) argues that the European study of the Orient, in *Orientalism*, characterized the East as a collective with generalizable attributes of uncivilized people. The exchange produced a binary of civilized and uncivilized to perpetuate power over the uncivilized, which contributed to Europe's positioned strength over the Orient (Said [1978] 1994). Taking from the SSC, urban ethnography ensures a narrative of marginalized communities and builds scholarship relevant to its population group. The SSC redefines its relationship to modes of knowledge production by examining histories of domination and by shifting the narrative to include the subaltern's voice (Spivak 1988). In examining urban communities, in order to include the history of those made invisible, the enquiry must include a historical analysis of the inheritance of social dynamics that has made urban societies and human social experiences disparate.

In producing scholarship about social dynamics, Homi K. Bhabha (1994) determines that cultural production is effective in its ambivalence within colonial discourse, which provides a space to uncover the multiple meanings in the narrative without engaging the colonized. Knowledge production has the potential to never include marginalized communities. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1994) also challenges how the interpretation of the subaltern is organized in discourse. In her essay 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', Spivak (1994) argues that intellectuals' desire to know the subaltern dismisses and generalizes the subject position of the marginalized individual. She raises the question to challenge how knowledge production about the subaltern does not include the subaltern in the interpretation and is therefore not heard. The subaltern is spoken for and enters official and intellectual discourse rarely as determined by dominance (Spivak 1994). If the condition is understood in this way, it is hard to see how the subaltern can be capable of speaking since they are not heard.

The study of subjectivity is essential to urban ethnography in order to ensure inclusive representation of historically disadvantaged communities. Instead of considering the impacts of colonization in the past, Bhabha requests an understanding of how colonial experiences are in the present. The SSC exemplifies an approach to liberating the subjectivity in the subaltern by enabling an articulation of the subaltern's own identity even when the narrative falls outside what dominant knowledge has produced (Spivak 1994). This is particu-

larly useful when considering urban societies and their history to subjectivity as determined by the colonial encounter and its remnants in the post-colonial. However, when considering how subjectivity operates, an analysis of how 'the subject' is represented can illuminate dominant discursive practices about marginalized groups, inclusive of those living in urban neighbourhoods, racial/ethnic minorities, women, immigrants, and populations that have experienced disadvantage.

Representation

Scholars have suggested that practices of representation are limited by their claims of objectivity. Representation does not understand how it examines and interprets its subject (hooks 1992). Hall (1997) argues that the subject in dominant interpretations needs to be understood as a burden to empowering dominant structures. Marking difference serves to produce discriminatory and authoritarian forms of oppression that subjugate and construct the difference of the subject. Dominant interpretations of the subject come to stand as truths using representation as a tool. Representation serves to establish difference between groups (Hall 1997).

Race as a social construct has operated via representation that subjects one group to another. Race is a sociohistorical construct, which is neither objective nor static (Omi and Winant 1983). However, race is not only socially constructed as an identity but also an issue of political rights and access to state institutions (Omi and Winant 1983). David Ward (1989) traces the shift from the slums to the ghetto within the USA using a historical review of the nation's conditions at the time and influential policies. He determines that the term 'ghetto' was adopted to identify the crowded sections of the US inner city where ethnic minorities were segregated into living in poverty and social isolation (Ward 1989). The transition from slum to ghetto is identified when racial/ethnic prejudices overpower the social, cultural, political, and physical environment of the slums (Ward 1989). The study of race and social dynamics illuminates the perpetuation of isolation and segregation (Boas 1960). In this case, the markers of difference, identified by their social relationships, are an invention that enables institutionalized difference to perpetuate submission. By discussing naturalistic discourse, Colette Guillaumin (1995) demonstrates that race, in fact, exists naturally, not in nature but in social relations; it is naturally born from a socialized environment (Guillaumin 1995). Marking perpetuates submission by association and belonging, thus race becomes a marker, like gender and sexuality (Guillaumin 1995). This point is essential to understanding the structure of urban environments, which operate out of social constructs. There seems to be a push against enquiring into the ways in which minority cultures have remained flexible and adaptive to maintaining their traditions and navigating through oppressive tactics (Omi and Winant 1983). It seems as if such enquiry would illuminate the constant subordination of minority cultures, which is central to ethnographic research.

Foucault (1984) addresses how inclusionary and exclusionary practices in discourse have material affects—in this case, the access to opportunity, civil rights and human dignity by racial groups. Representation enables the interpretation of these discursive formations because they depend on meaning. Therefore representation functions through a system of meaning that produces power differentials between groups. To what extent does representation represent? If it does not represent, what does it do? Representation is used as a method to produce meaning in images, texts and the production of identities. The lack of engaging difference and fully understanding the subject, in representation, allows dominant identity formations to further marginality. In this case, we operate from subjectivity via representation that forms identity that determines the subject position of human beings in growing urban societies.

Identity Formations

Identity determines the sameness and difference between people, the marginal always being identified as a collective while the dominant are individualized (Hall 1994). Considering the power differential situated within identity formations, the dominant group determines the characterization and application of identity characteristics. Identity thus perpetuates the subjectivity of a collective group of people in which they all share the character quality of a member of their group. However, the dominant group is only made accountable to their individual behaviours and characteristics. Subjects are scripted to conform to dominant identity formations that are established as the norm (Hall 1994).

Spivak (1988) argues for a negotiation in the failure to critically think about the production of history and details how dominant structures construct identities by decentring difference (it is marked but not explicit). She specifically interprets *tokenism* to demonstrate how the subject is scripted into particular roles determined by dominant narratives (Spivak 1988). Through subjectivity and representation, the subject is characterized by and bounded to certain behaviour types. In urban societies, social dynamics enable these. Cultural identities are defined by their relationships to dominant hegemonies; they are not objectively neutral as symbolic systems by their very nature (Knauft 1996, Chap. 8). The assumption that identities are neutral does not critically engage how specific identity formations become the norm. Spivak (1997) recognizes that when normalizing identity, there is no need to become attentive to difference when it takes up space. In spaces where individuals are identified as tokens, they are expected to perform the role constructed by dominant identity formations. Therefore individuals are welcomed into specific spaces and are able to engage insofar as they perform their predetermined role. Spivak (1988) suggests that the marginalized individual needs to disrupt their subject position by understanding their history and refuting the script. Spivak discusses our failure to think about a history that produces us, but the importance for this critical engagement to render apparatuses of power unstable. Therefore the ambivalence of colonial discourse, identified by Bhabha (1994), can disrupt the authoritative position of subjective dominant identity formations.

The production of an 'identitarian script' negotiates difference between identity and how it presents itself in society. For example, the black man is always black but never fully human, and he struggles to discover the meaning of his black identity (Fanon 2008). The difference that lives in the body limits participation in society, so it requires control or annihilation (Fanon 2008). It can only show up if allowed or isolated. Cornel West (1993) expands on W.E.B. DuBois' concept of *double consciousness* (1989) in his essay 'New Cultural Politics of Difference', where he challenges monolithic and heterogeneous narratives in the construction of identity by dominant discourse. In *The Souls of Black Folk*, DuBois introduces his concept of *double consciousness* to reflect on the ways in which the black individual is looking and measuring themselves through the eyes of others, which splits the identity of the subject into two (DuBois 1989). Expanding on the struggle between two identities, West discusses how the subject becomes proximate to a universal identity limited by an 'identitarian script'. The performance of difference authenticates ways that are limited by dominant structures where individuals are subjected to acceptable identity formations. Dominant frameworks of identity assimilate and homogenize difference (West 1993). Similar to DuBois and West, Fanon, in *Black Skin White Masks*, introduces the term 'effective erethism' characterized by feelings of inferiority that influence the aspiration of the black man to be admitted into the white world (Fanon 2008). The colonizer does not attempt to understand the difference identified in the black man but produces the binary (Fanon 2008). For example, stereotypes are created based on the distinctions between groups. They are an invention, a pretence that is constructed because the real is not an option because dominant social formations do not want to include the subject in subaltern social construction (Hooks 1992). Sander L. Gilman (1985) defines stereotypes as assigned labels of images we fear or glorify to distinguish us from them and that serve as images from which the world is categorized. We are embedded in stereotypes because they serve to promote the difference between social groups, and they are embedded in a cultural and historical context. Categories enable the organization of the world that defines the loss of control because difference threatens order and control (Gilman 1985).

Human social interaction is driven by identity formations that are determined by representation and ensured through subjectivity. Urban societies encounter diversity and density across groups that operate from power differentials. To facilitate social cohesion, urban societies engage planning, policy and social engagement to support urban functions. However, to understand the dynamics within urban societies, we must intersect cultural studies and the history of injustices, which is integral to urban ethnography.

Urban Ethnography and Resident Researcher

At this juncture we have located the value of ethnographic anthropological enquiry at the intersection of subjectivity, representation and identity formations. Ethnography explores cultural phenomena via participant observation,

including the participant's point of view and everyday life, people and cultures. Including the urban nature of society, urban ethnography explores the intersections of the political, social and cultural dynamics to problematize the relationship between communities within urban environments, revealing disparate conditions of their social interactions.

Research is an exchange between the researcher and the participant where ethics and politics are a constant responsibility (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). Ethnography situates itself within participatory action research (PAR), which facilitates a discussion between the researcher and the community (Rahman 1991). PAR interrupts the distinction of the researcher as the provider of knowledge and invites participation of the people-for-themselves in the production of knowledge (Gaventa 1991). PAR contributes to social activism with an ideological and spiritual commitment to promoting people's collective leadership (Fals-Borda and Rahman 1991). This is particularly important for the study of urban environments related to marginalized communities that experience limitations as a result of discriminatory practices and ineffective responses.

Taking from critical anthropology, the development of anthropology and the field has immersed itself in ethnography. This is particularly important when studying urban communities within the context of advocacy scholarship. By advocacy scholarship I mean the set of actions, through academic concepts, from which the main objective is to ensure the common good of communities identified as vulnerable and marginal, seeking not only to produce knowledge but also to intersect the social, cultural and political. The researcher's point of view within ethnography draws on the importance of knowledge production while also determining the value in advocacy. Gupta and Ferguson (1997) highlight how research requires constant reflection and negotiation prior to engaging the field. Reflection is essential because scholars participating in urban ethnography explore complicated social dynamics. Advocacy work that includes the study of marginal communities requires a commitment to rethinking the field and the scholar-activists' relationship to the community they are studying (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). Learning from the transformed methodological work, we can see how anthropology has reconceptualized its relationship to the field since its inception. Anthropologists have challenged dominant discursive formations. Mary Des Chene (1997) suggests that scholar-activists should immerse themselves in the historical production of the space they are attempting to understand before studying the field. Moreover, when thinking about anthropology as a discipline for social advocacy, there is a need to rethink the spaces it inhabits. Instead of applying anthropology through the accumulation of more spaces characterized as exotic and/or primitive, it is now more about the relationship between place, people and the researcher, which may also be about communities that are identified as exotic and/or primitive (Scheper-Hughes 1992). This represents a historical shift in the anthropological approach via advocacy.

The urban includes the intersections of divestment in multiple communities, in which the implications for the researcher are increased. The researcher may

now also be a member of the community of study. That is, the researcher is now a participant in their own examination. An autoethnographic account of urban environments allows researchers to further explain the observations in the field. Through an autoethnographic principle the researcher offers a richer understanding of the field being examined (Sparkes 2000). Simply put, autoethnography is an approach to research that describes and analyses (*graphy*) personal experience (*auto*) so that the cultural experience (*ethno*) is understood (Ellis et al. 2010), thus situating research as a political, just and socially conscious approach (Ellis et al. 2010). Through autoethnography, researchers use both their methodological tools and research literature to analyse their experience and engage others with similar experiences (Ellis et al. 2010). Autoethnography encounters issues with reliability and validity since the objective nature of the approach is called into question. However, the work is validated with expanded engagement with and comparison to the lives of others with similar lived experiences (Ellis et al. 2010).

In *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit*, Thomas J. Sugrue (1996) examines his family's hometown of Detroit between 1940 and 1960 to offer a historical context of Detroit that challenges interpretations of poverty in the USA during that period. His main aim is to examine the relationship between poverty and race. He enquires about the influences of capitalism on black residents' poverty. Such economic inequality led to Detroit's impoverishment through changing labour and housing policies. Insights from scholars born in the community offer critical and valuable dynamics that would otherwise be left unseen. Sugrue (1996) is such a scholar who has provided an understanding of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, which was a result of racial separation and conflict in communities such as Detroit. His ethnographic work offers an example of scholarship that provides a critical challenge to dominant interpretations about the relationship between poverty and race, which is necessary for the purposes of advocacy in those communities through research that is autoethnographic and participatory in nature. However, when applying urban ethnography, the resident researcher does not have to come from the community as long as reflective critical pedagogy is followed.

Reflecting on the ways in which anthropological methodology enables an examination of marginalized communities, Kamala Visweswaran (1994) attempts to grapple with how she became familiar with feminist ethnography through her own work in *Fictions of Feminist Ethnography*. As a feminist, Visweswaran contends that ethnographic accounts are dedicated to restoring lost voices by their multiple narrative strategies. Taking the term 'deconstruction' as a practice that questions how dominant knowledge production fails in its historiography, which produces subjects that struggle to survive their present, Visweswaran argues for the researcher to critically examine the knowledge being produced and include the subject in the discursive formation. Exemplary in Visweswaran's reflections is Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1992) ethnographic text, *Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil*, which details her experience as a Peace Corps volunteer and later as an anthro-

pologist in the shantytown of Alto de Cruzeiro in Brazil where she was exposed to the unjust living conditions of the community. Scheper-Hughes narrates how, during her tenure in the Peace Corps, she struggled to understand what she witnessed, and 15 years later she returned as an anthropologist to immerse herself in the community. Her work intersects issues of race, class, gender and religion to detail how the community adapts to its conditions while continuously being subjected to unjust social conditions. For example, she illuminates the diminished quality of life of women via limited resources to reproductive education, health and mental support, though these same women have access to medicine. She does so to demonstrate how government agencies hinder rather than solve the conditions of the people in Alto de Cruzeiro (Scheper-Hughes 1992).

Scheper-Hughes' work demonstrates the risks that Visweswaran identifies in feminist scholarship where the anthropologist takes time with the community and attempts to reconcile contradictions that result from the research (Visweswaran 1994). Sugrue also serves as an example of reflection and shows how the participant researcher offers significant insights. Visweswaran critically discusses the complexities that emerge in research that remains committed to subjected communities within dominant limitations of what constitutes legitimate research. Scheper-Hughes applies urban ethnography to highlight how government neglect contributes to the social subjectivity of the community (Scheper-Hughes 1992). Sugrue (1996) highlights historical disadvantages in racial/ethnic minority neighbourhoods. Scheper-Hughes, through her ethnographic work, exemplifies how knowledge production can become inclusive of marginalized communities rather than reproduce their invisibility, while also discussing the historical circumstances that inform the current living conditions of the community. An examination of the historical present can demonstrate forms of subjugation to interrupt dominant historical narratives. These ethnographies engage urban ethnography to illuminate social dynamics within urban societies at the intersection of scholarship, knowledge production and advocacy. Urban ethnography serves as an effective methodological process that intersects history, community engagement and critical scholars with relevant social, political and cultural dynamics experienced by societies today for advocacy.

Inner-City Los Angeles: The Case for Watts

A US history of race identifies differences between racial groups. Policies such as Jim Crow, redlining and housing covenants precede the segregation of racial groups in the USA. Racial segregation concentrates poverty and isolates racial/ethnic minorities from the mainstream resources needed for success. In the USA, African Americans and Latinos are more likely to reside in poorer neighbourhoods regardless of their income level (LaVeist et al. 2009; Charles 2003; Goodman 2000). Segregation also restricts socioeconomic opportunity by locating racial/ethnic minorities in neighbourhoods with poorer public schools, fewer employment opportunities and smaller returns on real estate

(Goodman 2000). In the USA, residents in poor communities often pay more for the same consumer products than those in higher-income neighbourhoods—for example, for car loans, furniture, appliances, bank fees and groceries (Talukdar 2008; Karger 2007).

Watts has an area of 2.5 square miles and 40,000 residents in the south region of Los Angeles (LA), and is characterized as an urban inner-city community. Its boundaries include Alameda to Central Avenue (east–west) and 92nd Street to Imperial Boulevard (north–south). There are four low-income housing developments there (one at each corner of the neighbourhood). In Watts, a little more than 70% of residents are Hispanic/Latino and 28% are African American/black. About 30% of residents are living in poverty (making less than USD 15,000 annually) with a median household income of USD 28,700, which is well below the USD 56,266 median income for residents living in Los Angeles County (LAC) (US Census 2010a, b). The average age of Watts residents is 24, significantly younger than the LAC average of 35. Approximately 47% of residents have completed high school or more, while only 3.37% have completed a bachelor's degree or more. Additionally, in Watts, 54% of homeowners and 64% of renters experience economic hardship (determined by when 35% or more of the annual household income is spent on housing). The neighbourhood is young with poor educational attainment and economic wellbeing, which may have serious implications for generations (US Census 2010a, b).

During the 1965 civil unrest, the South LA/Watts region of the City of LA experienced a demand for improved quality of life. After the revolt, Governor Pat Brown appointed John McCone to head a commission to study the civil unrest (McCone 1965). Multiple studies, along with the commission's report, revealed that behind the looting were deeper problems such as unemployment, poor housing and inadequate schools, which prompted the people to demonstrate the need for these living conditions to be addressed (McCone 1965; Bullock 1969; Cohen and Murphy 1966; Cohen 1970; Horne 1997). Additionally, the commission's report offered recommendations for responding to concerns of police brutality, along with ways to support an improved quality of life in the neighbourhood. In 2013 the Watts Community Studio (WCS), a community needs assessment supported by the City of LA, discovered similar neighbourhood conditions and priorities (Watts Community Studio 2013). Some 50 years since the civil unrest there are calls for research advocacy that examines neighbourhood characteristics and its impact on critical and preventable health outcomes.

Considering various local reports on community health, Watts is usually within the most underserved and underresourced areas. In 2013, the *Health Atlas for the City of Los Angeles* (June 2013) compared neighbourhood conditions and health outcomes to conclude that the poorest of neighbourhoods experienced the least access to resources and the poorest health outcomes (Los Angeles County Department of Public Health 2013). Additionally, it developed the Community Health Equity Index (CHEI), comparing health outcomes

between neighbourhoods, taking into account land use, transportation, environment, crime and pollution to determine that low-income racial/ethnic minority neighbourhoods experience poorer health. CHEI standardized demographic, socioeconomic, health conditions, land use, transportation, food environment, crime and pollution burden variables and then averaged them, yielding a score on a scale from 0 to 100 in which lower values represent better community health (Los Angeles County Department of Public Health 2013). Watts was among the neighbourhoods with the poorest CHEI scores. Major findings concluded that life expectancy in Watts is comparable to the US life expectancy 40 years ago and that residents are dying 12 years earlier than wealthier LA neighbourhoods (Los Angeles County Department of Public Health 2013). Though these are key discoveries in assessing the importance of identifying social determinants of health and access to health services, we have yet to examine, at the neighbourhood level, residents' perspectives and perceptions regarding how they perceive their health, day-to-day activities and available resources for their wellness and safety. This approach will offer a significant understanding in determining local solutions to local problems via participatory research.

Watts is perpetually constructed as an underserved and underresourced community with low-performing schools, inadequate healthcare, poor housing, and high unemployment and crime rates that impact community health; residents experience the poorest health outcomes in the City of LA (Watts Community Studio 2013). In 2013 the WCS, a quality assurance project, in partnership with local non-profit organizations and the city council, applied ethnography to its community assessment (Watts Community Studio 2013). The project was presented as a community-led effort to offer an understanding of, and recommendations on, how to improve neighbourhood conditions via ethnographic surveying of residents. WCS used 2010 Census and other public agency data to learn more about Watts, and worked with local agencies to develop a survey for the people of Watts. In the four-week-long survey administration phase it collected 700 resident surveys in Watts and developed a report offering recommendations for neighbourhood improvement, which is now used for grant writing, staff/volunteer training and project development by government and local non-profits (Watts Community Studio 2013).

The WCS hired local youth to participate in the entire research process and trained them in ethnography. It is now seeking to apply recommendations and launch annual ethnography training programmes for youth. The scheme was replicated in LA as the Young Ethnographers Programmes in 2016 and it launched annual place-based interventions including neighbourhood beautification and community events. The report suggested a deeper analysis of resident perceptions and experiences related to health, education, housing and employment. More importantly, the training in ethnography has included a transformative process for youth living in these historically disadvantaged neighbourhoods, while the community leaders have utilized the reports for grants and interventions (LA Mas 2014). The WCS served as a modern approach to applying anthropological enquiry via urban ethnography.

CONCLUSION

A commitment to social justice, through anthropology, requires an engagement with knowledge production that is inclusive of the community and, thus, engaging community advocacy with one's research. With ethnographic methodology and the shifts in the forms of ethnographic enquiries, the field of anthropology began to see an ideological shift during the 1920s and 1930s through which the critique of the West became a critique of capitalism; anthropology expanded its discussion beyond the conditions of primitive spaces to the social order (Marcus and Fischer [1986] 1999, Chap. 5). Today, anthropology no longer attempts to solely critique or discuss the conditions of small-scale societies but also examines larger structures and power that contribute to the oppression of marginalized spaces, which is considered to be a form of activism. Urban ethnography maintains the history of anthropological discipline while addressing the shifting demographics of the urban world.

Scholars such as Prato and Pardo (2013) have contributed to situating urban ethnography within anthropology by following the evolution of the study of urban communities. They have determined that the 'urban' is the sociopolitical institution much different from small-scale societies and rural areas. In this sense, anthropologists are studying urban communities much more and considering real-time social issues related to race, class, gender and sexuality (Pardo and Prato 2012a, b). Having marked these critical shifts in anthropology and urban ethnography, anthropologists considered the value in addressing local knowledge within fieldnotes through peripheral observation (Touval 2014), engaging multidisciplinary frameworks via community studies to gain knowledge of human social and material conditions (Ahmed 2014). This would illuminate the inner workings of social dynamics that come with urban transformations (Kürti 2014) and determine how these impact people's lives (Pezzi 2014; Monge 2014; Koenig 2014).

Development efforts resulting from urban transformation can offer both opportunities and threats for communities deemed vulnerable. Literature that informs these dynamics can support community efforts that minimize threats and increase opportunities. Post-colonial theoretical frameworks engage a discussion of historiography of the present, the development project and subjectivity. Preconceived perceptions about communities such as Watts can reify the conditions of a neighbourhood, which in turn stigmatize the residents. The subject will struggle to understand their position in society from what they see in popular culture and, at times, repeat the pre-established role.

Subjectivity, representation and identify formation influence the social production of urban communities. A shift in this dynamic must occur within the community at the ground level with actionable outcomes through knowledge production and advocacy. An engagement with the historiography of a place can illuminate and interrogate the current conditions of livelihood in the community. A review of the ways in which current policy influences the neighbourhood can respond to the historical policies that hindered community development in the neighbourhood.

Neighbourhood and the study of place have developed as important concepts in research, policy and practice addressing social and health disparities (Acevedo-Garcia et al. 2003). The term 'place' is the location of the neighbourhood defined by its geography, land, people, agencies and buildings. Historical examinations of place highlight the impact of segregation of minority populations. Racial segregation and the impact of discrimination have led to perceived experiences of injustice among Black and Latino communities. Place-based research examines neighbourhood characteristics that determine the disadvantage for racial/ethnic minority populations when accessing appropriate resources for improved quality of life (Los Angeles County Department of Public Health 2009). This suggests that place-based research should consider a comprehensive approach to understanding the residents, their resources, and their opportunities and demographics by neighbourhood, situating urban ethnography as an effective tool in this process.

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influenced by performance theories, feminism, psychoanalysis and the anthropology of art, space and senses.

Hence, it is at the heart of a global city with neoliberal governance that we should look for spatialized everyday practices of creative dissent and of coping with reflective nostalgia, especially in places that used to host non-Muslim, non-Turkish people and their activities. The research focuses on everyday life and reflects on how creative dissent is expressed, staged and performed at the margins of Beyoğlu—for example, around Istiklal Avenue. This cultural production and creativity are linked to everyday politics and poetics that criticize homogeneity, cultural essentialism and ethnic-religious nationalism, while promoting cosmopolitanism, conviviality and respect for difference.

My ethnographic attention is directed at the ways in which art and aesthetics in everyday life empower people—such as artists, activists and ordinary citizens who resist various forms of discrimination, exclusion and marginalization in a hegemonic context. I explore the relationships among art, creativity and dissent, as well as the production of alternative, non-essentialist subjectivities and spatialities. I argue that the aesthetic, the poetic and the performative constitute important means of critical reflection and everyday resistance.

In what follows, I discuss certain ethnographic examples of creative dissent, reflexivity and nostalgia in the centre of global Istanbul. I consider various kinds of individual and collective practices that are staged and performed in the city centre, as ways of criticizing the hegemonic present and imagining alternative futures. These practices are informed by reflective nostalgia for a cosmopolitan past, while at the same time they promote new forms of conviviality and solidarity.

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The anthropological gaze in the city, which directs attention to everyday practices, helps us to understand how people make sense of their lives and how they cope with power relations and hegemonic forces.

challenged (Tsibiridou 2014; Tsibiridou and Palantzas 2016). Beyond rational claims for rights and modern forms of organized resistance against the central state, emotions and aesthetics, in the modality of *reflective nostalgia* (Boym 2001) over otherness, come to structure practices of solidarity and dissent. Emotional embodied trivial and literary aesthetics are used instrumentally by local agents in the spirit of *creative dissent*.[1] Politics regarding subjectivities, cultural values and civic virtues have been intersected through these inventive practices of social disagreement, especially when they are mediated by reflexive forms of acting in the field—that is, literature, memoires, artistic installation, performance and so forth (Sişmek 2004; Jale 2010).

FROM COSMOPOLITANISM TO REFLECTIVE NOSTALGIA IN CREATIVE BEYOĞLU

The case of Istanbul, just before Gezi and its artistic aroma of protesting after May 2013, urges us to explore the ways art and social activism have been developed in the district of Beyoğlu and its neighbourhoods, Peran, Taksim, Tarlabasi and Gezi (Baykan and Hatuka 2010; Çolak 2014). These places of otherness within modern Turkish culture are full of ambiguity, carrying the aura of either social exclusion and otherness or contradictory cosmopolitanisms (Yumul 2009; Komins 2002). We have to account here for the impact of the hegemonic cosmopolitan past on the management of the precarious present.

Fieldwork data require the researcher to search for the modality of encounter(s) between Western European/local cultural intimacies (Keyder 1999), used instrumentally by social agents. Within this frame, Beyoğlu inspires social agency of dissent, as a significant place of cosmopolitan multicultural and capitalist modern, at the end of the Ottoman Empire, and hosting minorities, intelligentsia, artists and left-wing activism during the national era (Komins 2002; Jale 2010). This new anti-conventional dissent is based on creativity and otherness, since Istanbul's cultural marketization as brand name and creative city (Tasbasi 2014; Durmaz 2015) that starts with the pedestrianization of Beyoğlu's main street in 1990 (Dokmeci et al. 2007).

The main argument here is that *reflective nostalgia* can become a useful analytical concept that can capture the spirit of creative dissent, developed among activists and ordinary people in Beyoğlu.[2] Against local and global authoritarian ruling and hegemonies, the Beyoğlu agents interact with its emblematic places (e.g. Taksim square, Istiklal caddesi and Tarlabasi) and buildings (e.g. Galata the Saray Lycesi, AKM opera and Emek cinema). These activists often return to trivial aesthetics of the past not in a melancholic spirit of loss[3] but rather by reflecting the self through otherness and thus they restore hope for a new tolerant symbiosis at the same time as they reclaim the right to the city (Lelandais 2013).

Between 1960 and 1990, this district of prosperity and modern leisure,[4] which in the mid-1950s lost its Greek-speaking residents, became a place of resistance, hosting public demonstrations and all forms of socially excluded and

marginal activities such as sex enterprises, music production, social activism and bohemian life. From the 1980s on, the existing everyday marginal experiences of leisure and love, bourgeois bohemian lifestyle (Parmaksizoğlu 2009) and left-wing resistance after the 1990s met with new technologies of dissent and protest based on the European Union's policies on human rights and civil society training—that is, 'the right to be different', as Kurdish, Alevi, feminist and LGBTI (Sişmek 2004; Jale 2010). Feminist critique against gender stereotypes, patriarchy, state militarism, and patriarchal conservative and authoritarian ruling has embraced the taboo issues of Turkish society regarding minority and female otherness, including the Kurdish issue and prohibition of the veil in the public sector (Arat 2004; Öktem 2011). Feminist activism became central to the new social movements' intersectional and creative practices—street art, literary style, performance, theatre and academic social critique—as main forms of protest. All of these practices are openly contested by conservative Islamists' ethics in the surrounding neighbourhoods of Beyoğlu (Tuominen 2013).

Thanks to its otherness, female in the plural sense,[5] and to the energy, agency and power of more than explicit modern representations, Beyoğlu became the metonymic place for dissent, in my view. This metonymy treats its transformation as a place where creativity and performance are chosen to shape alternative subjectivities and citizenship opposing and subverting mainstream standards: against gentrification plans and globalization's precariat, against middle-class patriarchal regularities, neo-Islamist conservative ethics, hate and discrimination policies oppressing minorities.

After 2000, the 3 T (Talent, Technology, Tolerance) characteristics of every global city (Sassen 2001), in the case of Istanbul's city centre found a perfect place to shelter. Nevertheless, the artistic spread came out through events promoting Istanbul as a global city, including the Biennale institution and as Cultural Capital of Europe (2010). In this entrepreneurial orgasm, both private sponsors and public institutions were involved either in promoting art or in contributing to the shaping of public space politics (Göktürk et al. 2010).

The example of Istanbul as a *rebel city* attracts intellectual interest and activism (Harvey 2012), while at the same time the local intelligentsia start to be reflexive about their own city and urban experiences.

We read in the text of Uğur Tanyeli, an architecture historian:

Taksim: If there is one square that in some way is meaningful for all Istanbuliots, it is Taksim. In the 1930's, when it was first designed, it was the symbolic focus in Istanbul of the newly founded republic. Its planned function was to serve as host for official holidays and ceremonies. The exact opposite happened. In the 1970's, it gradually took over Beyazit Square the function of being the place for political demonstrations. It was used especially as the place for the ceremonies of dissident left-wing movements, as for instance, on May Day. And thus it acquires its memories as the scene of the aggression of various right-wing and/or pro-government groups and organizations hostile against left-wing dissident movements. Therefore, since the 1970)'s, many people died or were murdered here. Most recently, the 2013 Gezi Resistance took place here. Groups against the

vulgar policies of the government clashed with the police here in a movement that developed spontaneously and formed a fulcrum of resistance. Today Taksim is, in a scene, being penalized as an outcome of that resistance. The Opera building (Atatürk Cultural Centre) that defines one façade of the square has been evacuated and gradually abandoned to demolition. The real centre of the resistance, Gezi Park, is purposefully being retained in a ruinous condition by the municipality. Even more ridiculously, since it is now being perceived as a 'fortress' that can be conquered and held by dissidents, police and government have made it their daily duty to obstruct groups entering the square; and it has become a target for dissidents the conquest of which is attempted at every opportunity and clearly will remain so for the foreseeable future. Taksim and Gezi are no longer names of places in Istanbul; but for every kind of dissident group (left-wingers, liberals, LGBT groups etc.) a fortress, a flag, a holy place and, for the government, a nest of malice. Besides, there is still a large Orthodox Church (Hagia Triada) on its border. From the 1980's on, extreme Nationalist-Islamist groups and the central administration have claimed that a mosque that will suppress it in terms of its size needs to be constructed here. This is still a point where political symbols clash. (Derviş 2014, 152)

Within this complex and multidynamic fieldwork, I attempt to restore the dialogue with such critical and self-reflexive voices and texts. Public anthropology facing global challenges and trends (Checker 2009; Mukherjee 2011), applied within this complex urban environment, brings an obligation to the researcher to follow critical voices from the field. In doing this the non-native researchers, as they communicate with local agents and their global aspirations of experiencing space, time and dissent, could understand dialogically the modalities of action over politics and aesthetics.

Ethnographing Through the City People

Even if it moves in the spirit of cultural critique (Marcus and Fischer 1986), the present analysis does not suggest the replacement of participant observation by the juxtaposition of creative artistic texts. On the contrary, an intensive and *thick description* in the field could unfold the net of the *deep play*, in Geertzean terms (Geertz 1973), from which we could pick up representative and significant characters/agents. The displacement from the description of 'facts' to empathy towards the modes' aesthetics and emotions that could structure the performed creative dissent politics signifies an alternative and not only complementary symbolic understanding related to our ethnographic praxis (Poewe 1996; Sharman 1997).

Ethnographing in Beyoğlu has shown that we should converse with critical and reflexive voices from the field and the discussants' texts that could multiply the mirrors of critical analysis reversing orientalist assumptions and distinctions between the local and the global. We should pay attention to their critical discourses and happenings in the way they are instrumentally used in order to negotiate disagreement. However, this dialogue within this district of modernity generates an additional need to widen our analytical concepts beyond the

descriptive methodology of discourses and happenings in the frame of neighbourhood (Mills 2010). That means to capture the aesthetics through which our discussants from the field experience dissent practices globally, we need better to follow their own modalities of expressive and poetic dissent (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Clifford 1988; Sharman 1997; Herzfeld 1997).

Loyal to the principle of *thick description*, we should target those signifiers which are meaningful to the key informants' *deep [glocal] play*; we should search for critical voices and aesthetics on a personal as well as a collective level, which intersect in the public scene of the Istanbul's global city centre and move between new creative aspirations, old cultural intimacies and plural cosmopolitanisms (Herzfeld 2004; Pollock et al. 2000).

In other words, if our discussants chose the literary style, performance, autobiography or artistic installation to speak about the unspeakable, are we authorized to restrict our analysis to fieldwork discussions, descriptions and impressions? What if discussants are also academics or artists who address international audiences? What if our discussants have come of age with European education standards and Western European values, familiar with social analysis and overstressing the contemplation of art and literature in their lives? How do these local informants interact with other popular/ordinary activists and artists while sharing the same political left-wing and radical discourses on activism and hope (Harvey 2000)? What if all these people use high technologies and connect globally as activists when it comes to issues of feminism, minorities and sexual orientation rights, environmental issues, civic virtues and citizenship? How could ethnography in an urban polyvalent environment be inscribed in this public arena without reproducing previous divisions between rich and poor neighbourhoods, urban/rural areas, minority/majority conditions? Last but not least, how could ethnographic practice challenge analytical assumptions and tools dominant in the study of the city, insisting on generalized analytical categories—that is, gentrification, neoliberalism, enclosures, the commons and cosmopolitanisms (Harvey 2000, 2012; De Angelis 2010; Pollock et al. 2000)?

To such regular and top-down standard categorizing we should respond by practising urban ethnography not only *in the city* but *through the city people*.[6] Anthropology of the public sphere should give priority to all self-reflexive texts dealing with the standard categories through discourses and aesthetics engaged locally as well as globally (Sitrin 2013).

Savouring the City Creatively

Dissent practices in Beyoğlu seem to move in this collective spirit of enjoying life and engaging with activism in the public sphere. Even if some of the protagonists are more aware of political issues—that is, neoliberal governmentality and gentrification projects—all of them are experiencing the negative effects of authoritarian ruling and neo-Islamist state conservatism. Equally, all of them share the genre of Western European cosmopolitanism (i.e. in education, civic

virtues of tolerance, citizenship and public space), while in their everyday life they are selectively using cosmopolitanism at the same time as they feel happy, ambiguous or critical before local cultural intimacies (i.e. customs, habits, old and modern hierarchies, patriarchal values and conservative Muslim ethics are not only remains from the Ottoman legacy and the neo- Islamist turn, but have equally been served by the Modern Kemalist secularization project (Kandiyoti and Saktanber 2002; Navaro-Yashin 2002)). In this spirit of disobedience, they not only use instrumentally cultural trivial aesthetics such as humour, embodied habitus of care and sharing with solidarity but they systematically include the other. This is a case of nostalgia for modern kemalist secularism (Özyürek 2006), or for Western-style romanticism that inspires them to revisit the cosmopolitan multicultural past of the city centre, as exemplified by Orhan Pamuk's literary style. As they feel sorry for ultranationalist pogroms against Greeks and Armenians, as well as against Kurdish and Alevi otherness, they become more tolerant of new excluded categories too, such as transsexuals, migrants and refugees. Feminists, LGBTI activists, anarchists, environmental activists, artists and bourgeois bohemians interact with each other in Beyoğlu side by side with Kurdish and Alevi activism and invent creative ways to express their dissent against authoritarian ruling, since old fashion activism does not inspire them (Arat 2004; Sişmek 2004).

Fieldwork encounters in Beyoğlu since 2008 can confirm the importance of the area for cultural production (Aksoy and Robins 2011). However, the turning point of all those practices where trivial aesthetics and creative dissent met with the politics of writing, art/creativity and emotional embodied aesthetics of tolerance was the carnivalesque exodus of all these mixed peoples, characterized by Erdoğan as 'looters' on the occasion of the Gezi protests in May 2013 (Çolak 2014).[7]

Creative dissent in the case of Beyoğlu goes together with neoliberal growth, high technology, work precariat, time flexibility, autonomous subjectivities and bourgeois bohemian lifestyle. Interventions by urban planners, architects, curators, artists and novelists usually interact with space and urban memories. Representations and the reclamation of the public spaces in Beyoğlu are traversed by self-reflexive experiences recalling the past with the other and reclaiming the future in terms of openness and tolerance.

During my fieldwork I was astonished by my feminist informants' timetable arrangements because they were always ready to participate or produce artistic and activist events around Istiklal Caddesi. Additionally, despite always being busy, my intimate friends in Beyoğlu found time to participate, support or organize activist and/or self-explorative artistic activities, especially during the evenings. However, this orgasm of savouring city-centre life does not always go with immediate reflexivity towards the city. Those who want to write about their experiences of the city need to keep their distance for a while. This is the case for Esmeray, who moved to the islands after 2011 (Tsibiridou 2014); for Pinar Selek, who became more poetically expressive when she was forced into exile in 2009 (see below); for another Istanbul colleague, involved in anti-gentrification activism; and also for me as an outsider ethnographer.

Let me quote from a previous study, focusing on a representative artistic and intellectual project, Becoming Istanbul (2008):

> By reading the book [*Becoming Istanbul*] we realized the need of the writers to narrate the permanent transformation of the city, as well as the fluid bond of its inhabitants with the urban space and its different connotations…, the never ending transformation and the endless will of capture by its permanent or temporary inhabitants becomes the modality of the unsatisfied will of its appropriation. Istanbul becomes the body of the mistress of the unsatisfied in love guy motivated by jealousy (see rubrics on pornography and eroticism). Since the last decades of the 20th century and the neoliberal governmentality multiplying the 'chaos', fluidity, liminality and passing through became the aesthetics of living and tasting the city. The latter include the management of the nostalgia over the past of the city negotiated and reclaimed equally be secularists and Islamists, Istanbul residents and newcomers. The vulnerability of the town can be proved by its multiple wounded and transformed centre, the Taksim square. The latter seems to symbolize and mutate the modality of 'passing through' as a philosophical stance of the pre-modern identities (different religions, languages and activities one culture of living in the city) ('Anarchy II', p. 18), the permanent will of its transformation and appropriation since the rise of capitalism, the social movements and the people raising against the authoritarian ruling and its military technology, since the foundation of the nation-state. We read under 'Taksim square' and elsewhere that the surrounded area of Beyoğlu represents the 'heart of the city', while at the same time it is endorsing liminal and marginal practices taking place 'out of somewhere' (Beyoğlu as Pera in Greek). (Tsibiridou and Palantzas 2016, 200)

In the present study I converse with two activists, both famous as a result of their emblematic actions, and thus key informants in my ethnographic practice: the feminist activist, sociologist and author Pinar Selek and the performance artist Erdem Gündüz. Both became emblematic symbols of resistance and creative dissent as they faced the cruelty of state power (Moore 2010). We follow their lived experiences and their dynamic interaction with urban space in Beyoğlu (Low 2003). Their critical and self-reflexive 'texts' and hermeneutics include their 'doings' (i.e. texts, interviews) and 'happenings' (performances, installations etc.) in their field of action.[8] In this field I felt that I should establish an outside/inside experimental attempt that could prioritize their intimate aesthetics and poetics.

Case 1: Feminist Persona, Street Life and Sociology, Literary Style and Autobiography

I met Pinar Selek at Amargi's feminist bookstore in October 2008. I had just started my fieldwork but I immediately felt the strength of her persona. My first impression was formed not only based on my main discussants, such as H., Y. and E., speaking highly of her work on the editorial board of the magazine and the constitution of the Amargi cooperative,[9] but also out of respect for the

torture she suffered during her imprisonment for more than two years (1998–2000), and her loyalty as she kept silent and did not reveal the names of her informants who belonged to the Kurdistan Worker's Party fighters. It was as a result of her initiative 'Street Atelier', a collective for those children living in the street, for transsexuals, minorities and other excluded groups living in the district of Beyoğlu. This inspiring scheme resulted in changing her own lifestyle, with Esmeray becoming fully engaged in creative standup and theatre performance activism, leaving behind her past as a prostitute (Tsibiridou 2014). As I noticed, it was her everyday presence at the events organized by Amargi, both at the bookstore and out in the city, under the constant threat of being captured and sentenced to death by the Turkish authorities, where Selek was active and known for her feminist stance, her anti-militarist discourse and pro-minorities actions.

Selek had been accused of terrorism because of her alleged involvement in bombing Missir Pazar (1998), a few days prior to her arrest in connection with her investigation into Kurdish terrorists. We held demonstrations and protests inside and outside Amargi in an attempt to support her and fight against her unjust prosecution, which continues despite proving in court that the explosion at Missir Pazar was caused by a gas leak and not a terrorist attack. It was her involvement in research, activism and editorial action that attracted my interest. I should mention specifically her sociological studies with fieldwork on marginalized categories in Beyoğlu, such as 'prostitutes and transsexuals at the Ülker street' (*Maskeler Süvarıker Gacılar*) (Selek 2001), and her study on the failure of the peace movements in Turkey with the contemplative title 'We Could Not Make Peace' (*Barışamadık*) (2004).

In 2008, Selek published in Turkish her study 'Becoming a Man while Crawling in the Turkish Army' (*Sürüne sürüne erkek olmak*) (Selek 2014) and edited three children's tales (*masal kitabı*) based on female characters (see indicatively 'The Green Girl', *Yesil Kiz* (2012)).

According to her confessions, it was her education in a French high school in Beyoğlu, her training in sociology, the affluent family environment in which she grew up, the leftist activism of her father, and the early and continuous contact with street children that contributed to her own cosmopolitan activism and her last cultural turn to the literary genre.

The acknowledgement of the importance of male domination by the emerging 1980s feminist movement was a decisive condition for the reconstruction of the resistance against central power, patriarchy and leftist blindness towards male domination and female invisibility. She openly criticized all of that through her sociological studies, her interviews, her fiction and her literary works.

Perhaps it was also no coincidence that in 2011 Selek published the first of a partly autobiographical novel, 'The Place where Frequently Passengers Stop' (*Yolgeçen Hanı*), relating the stories of four young people in a neighbourhood of Istanbul's city centre during the difficult (but for the social movements nonetheless inspiring) period which started with the last military coup in 1980 and led to the climax of the synergy between neoliberalism and conservative

Islam as well as the spread of new feminist-centric activism in Beyoğlu since 2000. Her novel was translated into French in 2013 as *La maison du Bospore*. In her exile in France, where political asylum was granted, her earlier sociological studies were gradually translated, followed by two other important post-reflective and self-referential confessions: that of "Away from Your Home … but until Where" (Selek 2012) and 'Because They Are Armenians' (Selek 2015a). These studies, which cultivate this type of reflective nostalgia by investing in otherness and intimate memories, bring self-awareness and engagement to a kind of creative dissent. They are about a self-awareness that came from displacement experiences, cultural and linguistic heterotopias; the shift to elsewhere, being a refugee, experiencing the exile and the shift into the mirror of the intimate minority other. I had to converse with her choices and aesthetics regarding dissent attitude, mostly as feminist persona.

The publication of the novel *Woman without Name* (*Kadının Adı yok*) by Duygu Asena (1987), a self-reflexive confession, became a symbol for the Turkish feminist discourse of the 1980s, followed by diverse life stories of feminists coming from academia, radical leftist groups and artists.[10] A typical example is the exhibition *Unjust provocation* (Haksız Tahrik) displayed at the Pera Palace Museum (2009), followed by Amargi's edition under the same title in Turkish and English. Some 13 academics and artists all of Turkish origin, except for Judith Butler, confess their experiences as feminists (Sönmez 2009). Pinar Selek was one of them.

Selek's (2009) text, 'Kadın Kılığinda Olmaz Abla/We Can't Protect You if You Dressed Like a Woman', and additional internet interviews (see Appendix 1) answer crucial research questions such as: How could experiences of the past towards the city shape creative dissent practices inspired by feminist mottos, critical of male domination and patriarchy? How could the engagement with art and minority otherness bring optimism ('half hope') for alternative globalized activism? Beyond Western modern male-centric regularities of resistance, from where women were usually excluded or objectified, what is the impact of female emotional self-reflexive experiences that include and/or invest in otherness in order to build new autonomous subjectivities and cosmopolitan tolerance?

Pinar in my eyes constitutes a symbolically emblematic persona for the new kind of feminist-centric activism in Turkey, based on tolerance, technology and talent, wide open to creative dissent and intersectional activism. I consider her case to be a dense metonymy for my research objectives. In the urban space, Beyoğlu's social agents engage with global issues that public anthropology should approach through discussants' own creative technologies, perspectives and aesthetics.

Reflective Nostalgia, Love and *Demi-Espoir*: Surpassing the Self Through the Minority Other

Pinar Selek reacts when she is presented as an expert sociologist dealing only with minorities such as the Kurds, Armenians, transsexuals and leftists marginal collectives. Her reaction lies in her involvement also with masculinity, with men

'being not at all a minority', as she ironically admits. She is interested in all forms of 'domination and power' because these intertwine with the social norms and the governmental institutional technologies, all of which reproduces male domination as cultural trivial aesthetics. The latter is initiated on the pretext that men have specific roles of 'protection' and 'control' towards women. This modality becomes a second nature of them and thus their domination extends against the 'weak' and 'powerless' people living with a minority status in Turkey.

Pinar comes to an understanding of female otherness through her own embodied experiences. In order to spend a night undisturbed with the kids living in the streets, she has to become 'invisible', to hide her being a woman, while when she stays with her transsexual friends in Ülker Street, she realizes the restrictions her friends have to endure only because they chose to live their lives 'as women'. Additionally, when conversing in the field with Kurdish fighters, she finds herself persecuted by the authoritarian state mechanism for about 18 years, and when she recalls the attitude of her Armenian classmates, she realizes that until the time had come for her to write and reflect on her past experiences she had only been 'observing without really seeing'.[11] According to her, the internalization of relations of domination and their silencing leads to their reproduction, even by those who, for reasons of principle, fight against them. What is needed is to create an awareness of these relations of domination first and foremost towards women.

Relations of domination are often filtered by cultural intimacy assumptions that make instrumental use and abuse of sexuality. Through domestic and state violence or honour and hate killing techniques within the family and the community, respectively, male domination is normalized and justified by fear within the social norms, if not legalized by law through state institutions (Kandiyoti and Saktanber 2002; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Öktem 2011). Such is the case of men being afraid to reveal humiliating aspects related to 'crawling' as a process through which they learn to be part of a hierarchy and order during their military training and their real battles with Kurdish 'internal enemies' during their tenure in the army in the eastern part of Turkey. The pathogenesis lies in the repetitive performance of masculinity in Turkish culture and educational and bureaucracy habitus, as well as in the excessive symbolic importance of ceremonies for young boys when they join the army to 'become a man' (Selek 2014).

Feminist movement in the 1980s started discussing and disclosing this kind of generalized male dominance even within leftist movements, which previously silenced women's and minorities' issues. However, following Selek's field research, for street life, among the transsexuals, the whores, the deviants, Kurdish migrants and leftist others, a discussion on the impact of intersection among activists becomes obvious. The creation of the Amargi cooperative addresses the need to criticize previous activist movements which reproduced hierarchies, and also provides a platform for intersectional activism and protests among different categories of domination.

The Amargi and the international World March of Women movement bring together anarchists, Kurdish women, Alevis, women wearing hijabs, transsexuals, homosexuals and lesbians and anti-gentrification activists foregrounding the negative experiences of domination that unite all of them. Between 2001 and 2012, when Amargi's bookshop was active, these unities of heterogeneous minorities suffered some setbacks. Selek, with her involvement in all of these, triggered dissatisfaction on many fronts, including in the act of protest. As she mentions in her interviews, increasingly she started realizing the importance of saying things in another way, apart from demonstrating, protesting, marching, academic discussions, assemblies, and even the collaborative project of the feminist bookstore.

More specifically, the growing publicity of Esmeray's performances, the increasingly emerging reflexive action of protest in a more artistic way in the context of the post-Biennale 2010 season and mainly the initiative of Hrant Dink, her pioneer Armenian journalist friend, who opened the dialogue not only for Armenian minority subjects but also for other minorities in the public sphere (see the bilingual magazine *Agos* that he was editing) seem to influence her attitude tremendously. Following Dink's murder in January 2007, a new massive wave of protest was triggered and took over Istanbul, overwhelmed by pain and desire for creative disagreement as a response to extreme deep-state authoritarian ruling. Within this climate, Selek moved beyond the social sciences when she turned to fiction, autobiography and emotional aesthetics, as she writes: 'Je crois que pour comprendre la vie, les termes scientifiques ne suffisent pas. Il faut l'art, les sciences, les rêves—il faut de tout' ('I believe that scientific terms are not adequate to understand life. There is need for art, for science, for dreams—for everything', interview with Pinar Selek by Undine Zimmer AVIVA-Berlin Interviews 19 May 2010 http://www.aviva-ber).

Her novel is like 'a scream coming from her heart' as she tried to talk spontaneously about all those things that cannot be described through scientific analysis: the everyday life in 1980 and 1990; the difficulties and fears in gender relations; the oppression of the political regime; and the genesis of a bottom-up new form of revolt as a way of life. The plot of the novel *La maison du Bospore* may unfold around the life of the main female character of the revolutionary Elif, but this character is further based on the friendship of three other characters who are complementary throughout the storyline. The second female character, a storyteller, reminds us of the evenings that Selek spent reading stories to the street children in the alleys of Istiklal Caddesi. In all her stories, true or imagined, collective action is strengthened by the power of myth, the power of dream and vision, which can equally rest on both the old cultural intimacies of sociability and the solidarity and hope expectations of new activism.

Her self-reflexive essay in French, 'Loin de chez moi … mais jusqu'où?' (2012), refers to the multiple experiences of displacement, the need for narration and writing beyond the norms of scientific rules in order to come to an awareness. While sociology as a discipline restricts her from emotions, memories and voices coming from the heart, on the other hand, literature, poetry

and fairy-tales can make her see the invisible, can make her 'speak about the unspeakable', all that is hidden in everyday trivial habitus. She writes:

> Je regards mais je ne vois pas—reconstruire la mémoire, partager, besoin d'écrire autoreflection-témoignage me mettre en question le demi-espoir pour être actif, l'écriture est registrer, pas expliquer, c'est la littérature qui te sauve' ('I am looking without seeing—share, need for reflexive testimony, put yourself in a half-hope status in order to feel active—writing is recording, not explaining, literature can save you') (which have become keynote words by Selek in her writings and multiple interviews; from Selek's interviews, 2012, 2013, 2015a, b)

In any case, the experience of displacement to Western Europe is basically a feminist call to empower her to 'spit it all from the inside', from the past tense, from taboo secret places. In the words of Virginia Woolf, Selek says: 'Mon pays à moi, femme, c'est le monde entier' (2012, 21).

She clearly brings into discussion the concept of 'evidence', the mode of discovering, registering and diffusing evidence. In my view, she is doing this journey in the way of Marcel Proust's *In Search of Lost Time*, this digging method over trivial habitus of the past. She realizes that the self-awareness around the concept of 'domination' becomes possible only when we turn our gaze to the minority other, his habitus over invisibility and discretion and his passivity in the face of the dominant majority's insults. The virtue of respect to intimate otherness starts by removing blindness in the way of reflective nostalgia. It is this modality of 'seeing through the intimate Other' that allows her not only to reflect on her own heart's memories and evidences, as she confesses, but to organize the type of dissent in literary and autobiographical aesthetics and thus be loud about her feelings (Selek 2015a). This way of exceeding herself through the other is what, according to her, leaves half-open the window of hope for mutual understanding, strengthening, common protest within collectives of solidarity (Selek 2015b).

However, this mode of existence through the other, which ultimately Selek proposes as a cosmopolitan feminist persona, is not only a peculiarity of empowerment but also a risk for entrapment within negative self and group interests social bonds. In the negative way of stagnation into tradition, they are these same social poetics of love and care that justify indiscretion/control and protection/suffocation as moral obligations not only in everyday life but equally within modern institutional forms of resistance, as a feminist persona is evoking experiences of female domination that could help to establish less hierarchical and male dominated structures of resistance. In my view, her intimate feelings can structure the politics of intersectional activism as we saw happening in Gezi.

> What made the Gezi Park protests so different from previous acts of collective action was its ability to bring together so many cross-cutting categories and identities. It's for this reason that it was not just 'women' as a category represented at Gezi Park: it was Kurdish women, lesbian women, feminist women, and leftist women, among others, raising the number of participants in the protest as a whole. (Acar and Uluğ 2014, 6–7)

Case 2: Before the AKM Building: The Standing Man in Taksim Square

If it is not ironic, it is also not accidental that 'The Standing Man' of the Gezi exodus in May–June 2013 protested at the few years before for women's right to wear the scarf. By imitating scarf wearing, he and other artists protested in support of women's freedom to cover their heads at the public universities and other public sector workplaces (see Appendix 2).

Gündüz is a young Turkish dance teacher, actor, performer and choreographer interested in the use of improvisation, ritual and performance in the production of political creative dissent. Born in Ismir into a middle-class family, in 2013 he became known internationally as "The Standing Man" in Taksim square, facing the AKM building. He thus became a global symbol of creative dissent. For his emblematic and high symbolic act he was awarded in 2014, along with the Pussy Riot group, the Václav Havel Prize of Human Rights Foundation for Creative Dissent (see Appendix 2).

Peaceful protests, which began in Istanbul on 28 May 2013 over government plans to eliminate Gezi Park in the Taksim square, resulted in protesters being tear gassed a few weeks later. Protestors in front of the AKM building were attacked by the police using hard batons and water cannons. Since then the overall prohibition of demonstrations and gatherings at Taksim square obliged the protestors to search alternative ways to protest.

I do not know if 'the standing man performance' facing the AKM building is only a kind of nostalgia for the modern (Özyürek 2006). However, it is a kind of reflective nostalgia by Erdem Gündüz cosmopolitan expectations that led him to 'creative dissent' performances. In my view it is the same motivation and modality of dissent that we noticed through Pinar Selek's confessions, scream from the heart and dissent practices. Both seem to converse with other self-reflexive voices, such that of Alper Maral, composer and musicologist:

> The AKM [Atatürk Cultural Center] was not only culture; it wasn't only opera, ballet, orchestra, plays, sound, exhibitions, films, etc.; it was participation in social life, naturally. Although some have argued with recourse to strange labels like 'upright', 'privileged', or 'elitist' that it was treading a reserving line, no, it had a much more important mission: Offering an option. And this option was the loser in the 'let's-let's not demolish it'—in other worlds, us, those who believe in the importance of offering an alternative. To explain, the AKM, located in the center of the city, opened a space, provided a platform for the repertoire of a certain worldview. That repertoire is no more valuable than any other repertoire, yet it is important that it exists, and it can be presented, within its own niche, to the follower-audience. (Derviş 2014, 84)

Reflective Nostalgia in Face-to-Face Confessions

It was 16/6/2013. I had yoga class and I was passing by as I wanted to get some books, near to Gezi. Suddenly I saw the tourists going to the square and said "this is how I'll do it". I started walking, crossing the square as the tourists

did. My friends had to stay out of it. I stood in front of the AKM to show my respect. It felt as a voice urged me to do my duty, as the old slogan Kemal Atatürk goes '*Ey Türk Gençliği*' (Let's go, Turkish youth). I was alone and I had to remain alone, otherwise the police would have captured us in line with the Public Gathering Act. I started to focus on the building and after a while, when it began to get darker, I noticed a candle inside this dark building. That flame kept me going until two in the morning. It was a flame of hope, of knowledge and tolerance that gave me the strength to carry on and not give up when policemen approached me to search my backpack. This flame armed with courage to start stripping off my clothes before they approached me and stopped me. I was alone and angry, but as my anger faded, my soul softened, my body after the first three hours no longer ached, I could stay for days. When the crowd around me started gathering, I realized that it wouldn't take a long time for the police to come and dissolve us. When they approached, I took three steps backwards, I collected in my backpack and I left quietly. I felt like I was in a state of trance for several hours.

The Turkish police was very confused when they discovered my activity in 2013, especially as they first thought it was about one of my earlier disobediences and anarchist protests. Then I was convinced that this was the proper way to support cultural rights. I was a believer but I am now sick of the instrumental use of religion, I became almost atheist, or to rephrase it, I think religion should be a personal matter, not a social or political one in the public sphere!

> You know I felt proud as a small minority against power, similar to how we were at Gezi, without leaders and with love between us, we asked for freedom and rights, but also for work with decent wages. Every time I talk about my experience, I discover new things, not with everyone but now with you here at the square … When you say that my experience is reminiscent of the candle and the passive resistance of the Sufi Dervishes!" I return the positive aura by mentioning that some of my Istanbulu friends, knowing that I will meet him that evening, are sending their 'love' and thank him for empowering them through his *creative dissent*!

These self-reflexive confessions took place in Istanbul on 26 January 2016, an evening when we were drinking Turkish tea inside the café Marmara, facing Taksim square with the AKM building somewhere in the background. Memories of the previous occurrence in this contested square, this multidynamic urban centre, were mediated, refreshed and reconstructed during the occasion of our meeting. Mixed feelings of hate and love, fear and hope challenged once again our mutual knowledge related to the interaction between lived space and creative dissent, the emblematic, ambiguous and full of contingency and expectations locus of Taksim square.

After all, according to the urban planner Murat Güvenc,

> The square, which acquires meaning is not merely a screen, a scene, or a background within cultural landscape, cultural studies, new literature, civil society

movements and urban political actions, it has a more or less public aspect wherever it may be. In regard of this characteristic, the square might be related to violence, happiness, celebration, protest, festivals, demonstrations and opposition displayed in public space. Opposition, jubilation and melancholy are expresses and end in the square … Nevertheless, however powerful it may be, the private, unshared mystery and signs of spatial practice and experience cannot be conveyed via metonymy alone. Inevitably, a zone that language and other tools of representation cannot sustain will remain between the square and its users. The plurality and subjectivity of such experiences, their established emotional depth cannot be conveyed via established tools of representations. This is because the square might simultaneously be a source of joy, spleen, chagrin, or fear and anxiety for different users. Due to such characteristics, the square challenges all conventional tools of representation. (Derviş 2014, 156–7)

Concluding Remarks

The analysis of urban spaces and activism in Istanbul, based on certain key informants, such as Esmeray, Pinar and Erdem, is a choice of the politics of writing, which is also a reaction to fieldwork demands. To inscribe the ethnographic research in an urban, polyvalent, environment with global intersections, activist practices need to be recorded through their own genres and aesthetics, including literature, sociological research, fairy tales, autobiography, documentary, performances and installations. All these critical and reflexive texts could interact with the fieldwork encounters in order to reveal modalities, motivations and aesthetics of dissent practices.

By analysing the modalities producing meaning in Istanbul's activism, beyond the usual discursive claims for rights, revolution and the commons, we notice the importance of trivial emotional habitus, feminist critique over domination, as well as faces of cosmopolitanism to be used at the core of every creative dissent. As we noticed in the case of Istanbul, global expectations of hope, solidarity and tolerance when they draw from the local habitus of sharing and social poetics of love usually reflect and include the minority other as a protagonist. Before complex power relationships and plural cosmopolitanisms, neoliberal governmentality and extreme state authoritarianism, emotions expressed and performed in the public sphere/space seem to make up the political.

Appendix: Websites, Interviews, Photos

For Pinar Selek

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%B1nar_Selek
http://ekladata.com/I-Ui6I9bj5uP1sitVrZ5mswkee0.pdf
http://www.pinarselek.fr/?page=article&&id=477
http://www.altermondes.org/pinar-selek-meme-la-gauche-setait-habituee-au-genocide-armenien/

Fig. 23.1   *Yeşil Kız* by Pinar Salek

Fig. 23.2 *Yolgeçen Hanı* by Pinar Salek

Fig. 23.3   *Parce qu'ils sont Arméniens* by Pinar Salek

For Erdem Gündüz

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erdem_G%C3%BCnd%C3%BCz
   http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=428&VideoID=566

Pieter Verstraete, Pieter. "The standing man effect", ıpc-Mercator policy brief July 2013, Sabanci University http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/IPC_standingman_SON.pdf

NOTES

1. Beyond graffiti and artistic installations, I borrow this term from cultural studies in order to include more discursive but equally creative forms of dissent, such as literary style, memoires and storytelling, or other embodied performances.

2. I found Boym's (2001) categorical distinction between *restorative* and *reflective nostalgia* very productive to support my argument here. Reconsidering the past not against the other but by reflecting on him (reflective nostalgia) works on the antipode of every ethnocentric ghost—that is, nationalism and cosmopolitan elitism (restorative nostalgia) expectations.

3. Such was the case of cosmopolitan melancholia (*hüzün)* in the book *Istanbul* by Orhan Pamuk (Puchner 2014), but not his inventive project about *The Museum of Innocence*, which is inscribed on the spirit of new cosmopolitics (Rassel 2014).

4. This includes AKM, Atatürk Cultural Center, the Opera House, Istiklal's shops and cafés, cinema entertainment and production in Yeşilçam Street.

5. One thinks of the plethora of feminist groups, prostitution and female artistic installations, Kurdish women, and LGBTI activism.

6. This perspective follows the detailed history and problematizing of urban anthropology, as was raised by the exhaustive analysis of Prato, G. B. and Pardo, I. (2013) and the following productive "Discussion and Comments, Forum 'Urban Anthropology'", *Urbanities* vol. 4, 2 (2014): 84–103.

7. The state usually blames this lifestyle (Erdogan called them 'çapulcu', which translates to 'looters'). I discuss this issue in a forthcoming study on çapulcu cosmopolitics.

8. The analysis relies on their public discourses and events, as well as their texts, performances and private discussions. See Appendix 1 for representative websites, photos, books and so on that are significant for their aesthetics.

9. For Amargi, see https://amargigroupistanbul.wordpress.com/about-amargi/information/, and for Pinar Selek, see http://www.pinarselek.com/public/page.aspx?id=241

10. See the position of the novel by Duygu Asena to the reflexive exposition 'How Did We Get Here?' (Salt Gallery Galata 2015, https://www.artsy.net/show/salt-how-did-we-get-here).

11. This conclusion of 'looking without seeing', perhaps not accidentally, resonates with the tradition of the Sufi's mystical knowledge. In my view, this is an equally interesting modality of cultural intimacy, like love practices, sharing food and care between the members of the community. Practices and realizations that remind us of the Alevi communalism and activism (Sişmek 2004) we have seen being implemented openly with significant symbolic importance during the Gezi protests (see the dancing Dervish with the tear gas mask) (Çolak 2014).

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Transnational Urbanities

Anglo-Indians: Buying into Nationhood?

Robyn Andrews

INTRODUCTION

January 2011 marked my first visit to Asansol. I arrived by train on a foggy winter's morning to run the survey, 'Anglo-Indians Count', as part of a collaborative project to capture a demographic snapshot of Anglo-Indians across the state of West Bengal.[1] At this stage, I was into my second decade of research with the community, with most of my research time having been spent in the metropolis of Kolkata. Even during the little more than 30 hours spent in Asansol, I could see that the situation for Anglo-Indians there was quite different from that of many Anglo-Indians in Kolkata and other parts of West Bengal. For example, as I conversed with Anglo-Indians on the evening of the survey, I was told that 90% of the population lived in their own homes and that adult Anglo-Indians were almost all graduates, both factors contributing to a profile of success. There were other indicators that they were in good shape, such as the evening's presentation of an All India Anglo-Indian Association (AIAIA) award for 'the most active branch'.[2]

Based on this short visit and the results of the survey, which corroborated the information I had been given that evening, I decided to go back and investigate the situation ethnographically. The material from the survey had indicated some significant and unique trends, but it was not able to explain why

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there was the high level of home ownership or why most of the people who had responded had such a high rate of tertiary education qualifications. I was particularly curious about the high level of home ownership, and whether this meant that Anglo-Indians in this town were 'buying into' the nation, literally, rather than being intent on leaving, as so many had, and still are, in other parts of India. And if they were identifying more with the nation, how else this was manifested. For example, I wondered if they were taking governance roles outside the community. I was also interested in how their minority ethnic and religious status might be playing out, along with their increased economic capital.

In this chapter I first discuss what it means to be a citizen of India, and later, after introducing the community, the study and findings, I consider where Anglo-Indians fit in to this category of Indian residents. I also explore how the increase in economic capital, in particular, is impacting on their sense, and practice, of nationhood.

BEING A CITIZEN OF INDIA

According to political scientist Subrata Mitra, the main articles of the Indian Constitution 'abjured racial purity in favour of birth and residence on the soil of India' (Mitra 2010, p. 46) with the fifth Article stating:

> At the commencement of this Constitution, every person who has his domicile in the territory of India and—
>
> (a) who was born in the territory of India; or
> (b) either of whose parents was born in the territory of India; or
> (c) who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years immediately preceding such commencement, shall be a citizen of India.

Mitra, in discussing the results of the four questions on citizenship in a 2009 Indian National Election survey, posits the theory that in a post-colonial state such as India there are overlapping legal and moral categories in the relationship between citizenship and identifying with the society, such that, 'Just as the legal right to citizenship is accorded by the state, identity, and following from it, the moral right to belong, is what people give to their claims to citizenship' (Mitra 2010 p. 47). He further explains:

> When both converge in the same group, the result is a sense of legitimate citizenship where the individual feels both legally entitled and morally engaged. If not, the consequences are either legal citizenship devoid of a sense of identification with the soil, or a primordial identification with the land but no legal sanction of this. (Mitra 2010, p. 47)

The study Mitra writes of identifies survey participants in different ways: by community, geographic location (including urban and rural), age, caste, class

and gender. Anglo-Indians, like many other minority communities, are not identified in the survey, so responses to the types of questions asked in order to ascertain the sense of citizenship across Indian nationals cannot be extrapolated to Anglo-Indians.

Even though Anglo-Indians are the only community in India to have 'Indian' in their name, the category of 'legal citizenship devoid of a sense of identification with the soil' is likely to apply more often than not, evidenced by their 'migration' culture, which I discuss later. A challenge to citizenship for Anglo-Indians is that they feel culturally different from others born on the subcontinent. Generally, as succinctly summarised by Pardo and Prato, 'citizenship ought to serve the purpose of establishing belonging to a specific group and defining the identity of its members' (Pardo and Prato 2010, p. 10), implying, ideally, a degree of homogeneity among those members. In India where there is such diversity, this is not the case. The issue of India's diversity, and maintenance of some form of unity all the same, is addressed by Shani (2010), among other Indian scholars who he refer to. He argues, drawing on the experiences of Muslims—the largest of India's minority groups—that for all the diversity, India's enactment of secularism means that there are strategies available for all to feel a part of the nation so that,[3]

> [b]y negotiating and balancing distinct overlapping conceptions for competing membership claims in the nation, diverse social groups could find a viable place in the nation, without entirely compromising their various group identities. (Shani 2010, p. 146)

There are other scholars, such as Brubaker (1998), who also write about citizenship, emphasising the characteristic of membership of the nation—that is, arguing that citizenship is synonymous with a sense of nationhood (1998, pp. 133–134).

There has been no direct investigation of Anglo-Indians' sense of citizenship, so the survey and ethnographic data explored in this chapter offer unique and valuable insights into this community's engagement with the nation, findings which are likely to be transferable to other minorities, especially those of mixed descent and groups in diverse geopolitical locations. The specific group discussed in this chapter is now introduced.

ANGLO-INDIANS

Anglo-Indians are a mixed-descent, minority Christian community which formed as a result of Europeans being in India, especially during the time of the Raj. They have a history (largely pre-1947) of employment in government jobs, such as post and telegraph, the police and armed forces, and the railways. There were so many Anglo-Indians employed by the railways that Laura Bear, a British anthropologist who carried out research with railway people (including Anglo-Indians) in Kolkata and Kharagpur, referred to them as the railway

caste (Bear 2007). Another feature of the community is that they are known, stereotypically, for following an epicurean lifestyle: if they have money today they will invite their friends over, have a party and have a good time, rather than save it for a 'rainy day'.

Another characteristic that Lionel Caplan identified was Anglo-Indians' culture of migration, or 'emigration mentality' (Caplan 1995). This idea is based in large part on the understanding that since India gained its independence from the UK in 1947, more than half of the population has left India for English-speaking Commonwealth countries: England, Canada, Australia and even New Zealand (Andrews 2007; Blunt 2005; Caplan 2001).[4] In the time I have spent with the community, I have seen a steady trickle of Anglo-Indians leaving India, and I know of still more who would like to go.

Of relevance to this chapter is the traditional residential situation of many of the Anglo-Indians in Asansol and in other 'railway towns' of India. Anglo-Indian railway employees throughout India have in the past been provided with mainly bungalow-style housing in discreet or bounded settlements or colonies (Bear 2007; Roy 2012). Within these, built on railway land, were churches (usually both a Protestant and a Catholic church), schools (at least a primary school, with secondary schooling often taken at boarding schools—locally or further away), a railway hospital and, to cater for their entertainment, railway institutes—gracious and sturdy meeting halls with sports grounds, pools, and expansive lawns. The consequence of this living arrangement in Asansol and elsewhere in India was that Anglo-Indians, especially those working for the railways, were able to live their lives quite separately from the rest of the town and its population.[5] A number of the people I interviewed in Asansol referred to the time up until the late 1960s as the 'good old days', and it did seem to be something of a Golden Age for Anglo-Indians in railway towns. Anjali Roy, who writes about Kharagpur Anglo-Indians, makes this same point in relation to present-day Anglo-Indian families there (Roy 2012).

The Research Site: Asansol

Asansol is situated in the state of West Bengal, in the Burdwan district, about 200 kilometers inland from Kolkata, the state capital. The municipal area has a population of more than 500,000, but the wider area, the 'agglomeration' of Asansol, is the third largest (after Kolkata and Howrah) in West Bengal with a population of well over a million (2016) (Census of India 2011). This contrasted with the impression I had of Asansol before I visited, based on what I had been told by Kolkatan Anglo-Indians of this 'sleepy railway town'.

Asansol has a significant railway junction which, historically, brought many Anglo-Indian families to the town. The railways were established there to serve burgeoning local industries, such as the collieries, which were opened (with East India Company connections) in the 1820s. The Ranigunj coalfields, for example, which were the first and largest supplier of coal in India, produced coal during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. The first train

ran from Kolkata to Ranigunj in 1855, and 70 years later in 1925 the Asansol Railway Division was established, with traffic linking Kolkata to North India rapidly increasing. Another prosperous local industry is the Indian Iron and Steel Company (IISCO), which was founded at several sites in West Bengal from 1864 (Chand 2015), including one in Burnpur, which currently feels close enough to Asansol to be regarded as part of the city. Of the Anglo-Indians I spoke to, a number had worked, or were related to people who had worked, for IISCO and the collieries as tradesmen, foremen, managers and secretaries.

In addition, Anglo-Indians have worked (and still do) in the prestigious English medium school controlled by and affiliated with the Anglo-Indian schools board. One of these, St Patricks, was the first Irish Christian Brothers' School in India when established in 1891 (St Patrick's High School 2016). St Vincent's (also a Christian Brothers' School) came soon after, in 1919 (St Vincents High and Technical School 2016). Before either of these was operating, the Loreto Convent School was the opened in 1877, originally founded for railway children to attend (Loreto Convent School 2015). All three Catholic schools are still running today, although they no longer offer boarding options, and all remain highly regarded for the education they provide. Also popular nowadays is an Assembly of God Church school which celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2012, making it a relative newcomer but adding to the choice of elite English medium Christian schools in the area.

Engaging in the Project

A year after my January 2011 visit to Asansol, I revisited in order to investigate why the situation there appeared from the survey to be so different, in important ways, from that of Anglo-Indians in Kolkata and other parts of West Bengal. It was clear that there had been a big change in their day-to-day lives since the late 1960s, when most worked and lived in the railway and the school quarters, and the population of Anglo-Indians was now only about 300—a tiny fraction of what it had been—yet their adjustment from their earlier, more populous situation seemed positive. Based on the survey, I framed the ethnographic component of the project as an investigation into whether the high home ownership rate meant that Anglo-Indians were putting down roots in India, which for a community known for its 'culture of migration' is counter to the usual trend. By drawing on ethnographic methodology, spending an extended period in the field and getting to know some people particularly well, the research focus extended into areas not considered prior to the fieldwork. Some of these I came to see as being relevant to citizenship in terms of how Anglo-Indians identify with and of the people of the land.

To introduce myself and the research to the community, I hosted a housie (or bingo) evening arranged by the local Anglo-Indian association. This event gave me the opportunity to meet a sizeable group of Anglo-Indians, see and participate in a regular community event, and indicate to them that I was con-

versant with this hallmark social practice. Before the end of the evening I gave information sheets to those who attended to take home and to pass on to others and I circulated a sign-up form for those willing to arrange a time then and there to be interviewed.

By living as part of a family for several weeks, I was able to carry out full immersion participant-observation fieldwork, from which I gained much more of an insider's understanding of how members of the community lived their lives in Asansol. My hosts were ever generous in introducing me to others, explaining recent and not so recent histories, inviting me to accompany them on excursions, and filling me in on details that I might not otherwise have been able work out; for example, what residential areas of the town were regarded, historically, as being superior to others, and why. I also enjoyed Anglo-Indian hospitality over delicious meals, meeting with wider family and friendship groups; joined groups on excursions such as shopping and school picnics; and accompanied my host family to Mass each Sunday, where I met with others from the community.

To investigate the original premise—to explore whether increased home ownership was indicative of a rise in nationhood—as well as immersing myself by spending my days with various members of the community, I carried out 28 informal interviews of at least an hour long. Of the interviewees, 14 were women, aged 34–82, six were men, aged 38 to late 70s, and eight interviews were with couples or small family groups. The questions I asked were framed to investigate key trends identified by the survey, in particular to understand how home ownership was playing out in terms of their sense of nationalism. Home ownership had seemed significant from the first visit, so I asked their reasons for buying, as well as the practicalities of the purchases, and their experiences of living in Asansol. Most Anglo-Indians I visited lived in modern, attractively and comfortably appointed two- and three-bedroom houses and apartments with multiple bathrooms, and separate kitchen and living areas. I observed, and the survey corroborated, that they had televisions, sound systems, computers and internet connections, and mobile phones, and they owned some form of transportation. This was not the case in other areas of West Bengal where Anglo-Indians were much less likely to own a vehicle.

Findings

About Home Ownership: Why They Could Buy

What I found when I asked how they came to own their homes was that there were a number of key reasons for being *able* to purchase a home, and there was one unique circumstance that made it more *desirable* in Asansol than in other places. I look first at the key reasons for being able to own property, which included inheriting property, working and saving well (in two categories—local and offshore), drawing on retirement funds, and there was one case of a person who had built their own home.

Inheriting property: There are a few 'estates' that have been in Anglo-Indian families for several generations with the present owners having inherited their homes; for example, the granddaughter of the builder of St Vincent's School lives with her family in the large and comfortable home he built at the same time. The original land has been divided up in a number of ways: between family members, given to a local order of nuns for an orphanage and old people's hostel, and they have built a fee-paying private school. On another estate there were plans for flats to be built in order to be sold on.

Upper income earners: There are a number of Anglo-Indians who worked in local industries such as the steel mills and collieries where they had been paid extremely good wages, especially in comparison to those paid to employees of the schools and railways. The women had worked as secretaries and the men as mechanics, engineers and foreman, and they earned well enough that past employees I met had retired very comfortably and owned their home. One who retired at less than 50 years of age said: 'My daughter had finished school so I said, "no, quit working, I've got our own house, I'll take it easy now".'

Very high earners: There are a number of families with at least one member (usually, but not always, adult males) who have been employed in the Gulf States. Their jobs include teaching, secretarial, manual labour, and in technical areas such as fitters, turners and welders. Some of these people had been working there for decades and now own their own home, and several others that they rent for example, in Mumbai, Kerala, and Delhi. I commented to one interviewee that the opportunities offered by the Gulf for employment seem to be 'a real Godsend', and she told me about her son's experiences:

> He went without any skills, and now he's getting better money than he would have in India. He's getting about, I think, 3 Lakhs per month. Fabulous money really, and with that people can save. There are a number of boys from here who are working in the Gulf.
>
> Thanks to that only we can all live in that same apartment, building I should say. We all have our own apartments there.

She told me that he had first bought an apartment for his family, and then bought one for her so that they were living close together. She added that there were other Anglo-Indian families in the apartment block too.

Retirement funds: Those who worked for most of their lives in the schools and railways have seen sharp increases in their wages since the 1970s, which for some was over the two or three decades before they retired. I was told: 'these salaries are index-linked and are regularly increased since 1970s when the "pay scales" come in. Since then they've been increased. Now we're in the sixth pay scale.[6] We were able to save from the increased incomes, and we spent these savings, combined with retirement funds, on a home of our own.' These indexed salaries have brought teaching and other government employment to the levels offered by private employees, which was the aim of the commission. Everyone I spoke to had also saved for retirement in what they referred to as their 'provident fund'.

Constructed his own home: One man I interviewed had built the family home. This was unheard of at the time he began the project, in the late 1970s, and even his wife confessed that she had not thought it was viable. She told me: 'I never supported him in the beginning. Because I said it would never be possible. My people were saying "he's mad" and they didn't talk to him for three years.' Over that three-year period he built their home from scratch, brick by brick, and invited 'everyone they knew' to a house opening on St Jude's Feast day.[7] They showed me photographs of the event with the parish priest solemnising the opening, and blessing the home they dedicated to St Jude.

These varied key reasons for being able to own a home meant that Anglo-Indians in Asansol could take advantage of a *unique circumstance* which involved St Vincent's School's land sale in the mid-1960s. The Catholic teaching order had originally bought the land from the railways for the establishment of a school, but 50 years later, in order to raise funds for the school, they sold a large piece of their property, still leaving them with plenty of land. For example, they still boast 15 sports playing fields. This sale opened up a sizeable area for residential development. Even though Anglo-Indians were encouraged to buy land at the time, and they certainly heard about it through working in the schools, almost none took the opportunity. As well as not being financially viable for most at the time, the location was a further disincentive. The interviews I conducted indicated that one of the reasons they may not have been interested, or may even have been scared to buy bare land or homes, initially, was because of the population living in the area. At the time the land was subdivided and sold, this area, known as Chelidanga, was populated almost entirely by Hindu and Muslim families. This has now changed. Within Chelidanga is an area known as Hillview, which, I was told, is home to about 3000 Christian families, with Anglo-Indians comprising less than 5% of the population.[8]

Initially, in the mid-1960s, it was mostly local Bengalis who bought the newly subdivided land and built on it. Then, about 15 years ago, the single- and even double-storey homes that they had built began to be bought by property speculators, who knocked them down and built high-rise apartment blocks in their place. It is these flats, or apartments, that Anglo-Indians began to buy from the late 1990s onwards. It appears that even though many owned property by this time, it was not until even more recently, mostly in just the last ten years, since the turn of the millennium, that they moved into them. Before this they remained in, for example, the rented railway quarters, and teaching accommodation their employees provided, and collected rent from their properties. Some of the people I interviewed explained that they moved into their homes once their salaries were sufficient to manage without the rental income. I also wondered if it was only by then that they had decided to stay in Asansol.

In 1991, once the number of Christians, mainly Roman Catholics, in the area began to escalate, a new Catholic parish of St John's was established and a church erected in the Hillview area. The Anglo-Indians in Asansol were then spread between attending the new St John's Church and Sacred Heart Church,

which is adjacent to the old railway settlement. I was told by the Sacred Heart parish priest that the church used to be full of Anglo-Indians but now there were only a few. When he told me about the sharp decline in numbers in the parish, which was when I was in the town for the survey, I thought the drop in numbers must be entirely the result of migration from the city, but it seems that it is a combination of migration from Asansol (which *was* considerable) and internal migration from one parish to another.

Why Did They Buy?

In discussing with Anglo-Indians the pragmatics of obtaining a home, they also shared their reasons for purchasing and moving into their properties. As I illustrate later in this section, the reasons often included the need for residential security. For many, though, a decision had to be made first: were they going to stay in Asansol long term? In every interview a story about this decision was offered: for some the narrative was along the lines of a half-hearted migration attempt being made, unsuccessfully, but for others the plans to go were still alive. For example, one man had bought land when St Vincent's School was first subdivided, but sold it again soon after because

> I was supposed to go to America. I was working for a colliery and my bosses were very fond of me. Some of them had the opportunity to go to America and they wanted to take me too. They were all working in coal there too. So I sold my land. I had bought it for Rs750 and sold it for Rs4500. Then it didn't work out so it was all a waste of time, and money.

A few years later, after he had married, he again tried to leave, as his wife explained: 'Father Foley was helping with all the Anglo-Indians to go [to Perth, Australia]. So, he was helping them out so I was thinking: why don't we also go?' They filled in the required applications and were interviewed in Calcutta but were unsuccessful. Only after that did they begin to think about a home of their own.

One person whose plans to leave are still alive is an Anglo-Indian woman in her late 40s with teenage children, who said:

> I always wanted to go, not for myself but for my kids, you know, for a better future.
> *Interviewer: How do you think it would be better?*
> Just Asansol! There's nothing here. I've grown up here, there's nothing in life. You just study, you go to school and you go to college, then you marry someone, then you come back and it's very … I don't want that for my kids, I don't want that at all for my kids. I'm not going to keep them in Asansol, they need to go out. Life here, you know, become a teacher and work here, and you come home. There's more to life! And so many Anglo-Indian children have gone out and they're doing well, they're doing very, very well.

There were others who were much less determined—for example, a man married to an Anglo-Indian who has two teenage children talked about whether they had considered migrating:

> I never really wanted to go because we were doing okay here, you know? We did attempt to go to Australia. We sent the forms in. We spent a year applying for the job. It was a very half-hearted attempt, you know?
>
> *Interviewer: You went through the motions?*
>
> (*Laughter*) Yes, so we were doing fine over here at that time? And in fact we heard about the people that were there—they struggled, you know?

This man explained further that it was only after they made the decision not to try to leave India that they bought the house they now live in. They were comforted by the thought that there were Anglo-Indians who migrated who had not found it an easy transition, reassuring them of the sense their own decision to stay.

The experience of a younger woman who is married to a Hindu man was also relayed to me:

> And without telling him [her husband] I went and got the papers done and everything was ready and I told him, 'You know, let's go to Canada' and he said 'You've gone mad! We're not going anywhere!' (laughing) and I'm like, 'Okay!
>
> *Interviewer: So do you think because he has roots, I mean Hindus…*
>
> It's not the roots. I think it's the security. He's frightened that if he goes somewhere else that he will not be able to provide for us. I think that is his fear. Because he's grown up with the idea that 'I have to run my parents' business.' That's the way he's grown up.

This woman's situation is influenced by marrying out of the community, which is no longer an unusual scenario for Anglo-Indians in India. Her marriage to a Hindu is very likely to accentuate the sense of belonging to the country, especially through her husband's identity.

Others, on the other hand, said that they were comfortable and felt secure in Asansol. For example, when asked if they had thought about leaving, two older women replied:

> No. I like India. I've been to Australia just for five days. And I didn't like it, no. Because in India there is so much noise, I'm used to that noise. You can see people walking out and about. It's very 'empty' in Australia. You don't know who your neighbour is, and everything, shops and all, are closed by 5.30.
>
> And:
>
> My husband said: 'At this age, leaving, will we manage? Will we have enough to take care of our kids? Like here we are settled, we know the security we have.' He says: 'What if it doesn't work out?' Being older he always thinks like that. I'm the person who is always like 'Go for it! Like, just go for it, let's try it out, no problem', the Anglo-Indian way!

The theme of 'security' was present in many of the interviews. In the excerpt above it concerned staying in an environment that was known, while for others the security considerations were more fundamental. For example, one mother and her grown-up daughter explained their pre-home purchase insecurity to me:

> Mum was not working at that time. Due to dad's demise, she was very sick. And I took it very bad at that time also, but I had kept at my job. We asked at dad's work if we could be given a room on rent. This man agreed, but he said: 'Okay, fine, you can stay in one room, and the other room I'll see what I can do with it.' So we shifted into one room. It was only mum and myself; so we managed.
>
> Now he wanted a tenant for the other room. So he got another tenant, but the bathroom was common. One bathroom and toilet was shared. We had a lot of problems because that tenant was very dirty. It was terrible. The bathroom became very bad. Poor mother, she liked everything clean.
>
> So that made us look around for another place. And then he started taking advantage of us, because, well, two ladies ... We were paying around Rs2500 rent, and every month he would increase the rent.[9] Then eventually he brought six of his children and he asked mum to teach free, because we were unable to pay the rent at the rate it was increasing. He said: 'Okay fine, you cannot pay me so much every month, then fine, you will teach my children free of cost in lieu of putting up the rent.' So six children mum taught free of cost. Gradually the number of kids started increasing, so I said: 'Mum, this is getting too much.' So then I went hunting all over, until we found this flat. Mum prayed to Saint Anthony, and Saint Anthony got this place for us. She said: 'If you get me a house, I'll name it after you'.
>
> Mum used to save, during that time also mum used to still keep saving. Saving up and saving up. We didn't know actually, when we had seen this place and we liked it, and we wanted to know if we had the money to buy it or not. So then mum did the calculations, then I realised that we'd saved up enough to buy the house.

The church, for this actively Christian community, is a focal point for many aspects of their day-to-day lives. It was not surprising then to find that proximity to their church was a significant influence on their residential preference. I spoke to one woman who said that after she had rented for many years, and been moved from one place to another as landlords terminated rental contracts, she began to look for an apartment to own. She told me: 'When I was looking for a flat I decided on this one because I can see the church, St John's church, from my balcony. We are so used to going to church and now my church is very close to here, and practically I go every day.' Most Anglo-Indians I met lived in the Hillview area, close to St John's church.

Scholars of Anglo-Indian studies (Almeida 2015; Andrews 2007; Blunt 2005; Caplan 1995) write about Anglo-Indians' longing to leave India, for all that Anglo-Indian political leaders, such as Frank Anthony (1969), actively encouraged them to think of India as home and to make their lives there. Many of the Anglo-Indians I met in Asansol seem to be coming around to this idea

of staying in India, having exchanged their dream of migration, with that of establishing a comfortable and secure home in Asansol.

A productive way of looking at Anglo-Indians' impulse to leave is to draw on Hage's work on existential mobility and migration of the Maronites of Lebanon (Hage 2005). The Maronites he interviewed said they felt they were not getting anywhere in life; that is, that they were 'stuck' existentially, so they remedied this by physical movement out of Lebanon. He proposes an inverse relationship between physical mobility, in the form of migration, and existential mobility (Hage 2005, 471). So, if a person feels they are happy and fulfilled, and making progress where they are, they feel no compulsion to move physically. According to Hage, 'Migrants and would-be migrants, like everyone else in the world, like to feel that "they are going places", and prefer to be "going places" by staying in the environments with which they are familiar' (Hage 2005, p. 470).

Historically, Anglo-Indians have certainly communicated a sense of 'stuckness', and the point of departure from Hage's idea is that Anglo-Indians, rather than preferring to stay in the familiar environment of India, have felt stuck when they are unable to leave; that is, when their compulsion to leave is thwarted.[10] Illuminating in the situation in Asansol is that many Anglo-Indians there are remedying their sense of being 'stuck' in India through a strategy of social and physical mobility into comfortable and secure home ownership.

But for all that there was talk of being content where they were, many Anglo-Indians have left, and are still leaving, Asansol. So many do seem to be following the migration trend for Anglo-Indians: that of leaving India, anecdotally mostly to Melbourne, Australia. A number of others, especially young people, have moved from Asansol to the metros, the big cities of Kolkata, Bangalore, Mumbai and Delhi, where there are more opportunities for employment as well as recreation.

Indicators of Citizenship Other than Owning Homes

Other ways in which people can experience a sense of belonging to a nation is if they, communally or individually, are able to wield power or influence in public and civic spheres. Owing to constitutional allowances, Anglo-Indians have representation at both national and state level: they have two nominated members of parliament in the Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament), and a nominated member of the State Legislative Assembly (MLA) in those states where Anglo-Indian population levels are highest, such as West Bengal. Along with a voice at the government level, there are material benefits attached to this political representation, of which one Asansol resident demonstrated her awareness:

> In fact, we've been getting a lot of financial help from our MLA. Whoever, over the years, Barry [O'Brien] had done a marvellous job. Wherever there's an Anglo-Indian family living, the roads were done up. *All* of the roads in

Hillview—he financed it. One family living in that area, the road was done. Concrete roads were built.

It's not because of this Corporation that we have here in Asansol, the Municipal Corporation here, it's not because of them, it's because we are living in the area, and our MLA has financed it. To give us that comfort.

In Asansol, Anglo-Indians also have some power and agency in public spheres through, for example, holding positions of responsibility in schools as headmasters or senior teachers, and as owners of schools. They are able to exert influence in religious institutions where they are members of parish finance and liturgical committees, and are involved in cemetery management. In addition, many people told me about one Anglo-Indian who is able to achieve improvements on behalf of the community through the Asansol Municipal Corporation. He has established a sound reputation within the community and also in the corporation, and he is spoken about in appreciative and affectionate terms:

In the Municipal Corporation, he's part of the ruling party. This whole party comes in…

Interviewer: He has a political position?

No, but whichever party comes into power, he swaps over. They grab him, come what may.

Interviewer: He's not political?

Not particularly. As long as CPI[11] was there, he was with them. Doing the same job he is doing now. And now when Trinamool took over, he's still holding the same job and responsibilities.

He is very well known in Asansol. Especially in this ward, in ward six. He has a major role here. For any Corporation or any problems, everyone comes knocking at his door. In fact, even when people have family disputes and fights, even at the servant flats they go there, 'Uncle, phone the police, we need help!' (laughs) He has to solve all the problems.

Challenges of Being Anglo-Indian in Asansol

I also asked about the challenges of day-to-day life in Asansol in order to understand what might alienate Anglo-Indians from a sense of membership of the nation. Such questions were sometimes triggered by observations I had made while out with Anglo-Indians, and seeing for myself some difficult encounters; for example, of being pushed aside when queuing to purchase items at an upmarket shopping mall, and of women being stared at lewdly by non-Anglo-Indians even when they wore very modest Western attire.

I wondered how Anglo-Indians were regarded by non-Anglo-Indians, as well as how they felt they were regarded. During the fieldwork period I was given the opportunity to address the former part of the question when I made a day trip to Kolkata to attend some business, travelling there and back by train. On the return trip I fell into conversation with neighbouring passengers, a Bengali family who lived in Burnpur (adjacent to Asansol) who were returning

home from their daughter's wedding. They were a well-to-do family who, the man of the family told me, made a good income working at a local mining plant. To their query about why I was going to Asansol, I told them I was spending time with Anglo-Indians there. The man responded: 'Since we've been in Asansol, since the 1980s, most Anglo-Indians have left. There are just a few left—the ones I work with in Burnpur. Those who remain are economically poor, they're not doing well.' He sounded regretful about this. He clearly had not realised, before I informed him, of the level of home ownership or how well educated so many of those living close to him were.

I also asked Anglo-Indians how they thought they were regarded. One answered: 'No problem, in fact they respect us.' He explained that money awarded by the AIAIA, or the Anglo-Indian MLA, was used for repairing roads where Anglo-Indians in Hillview lived. After this type of work, the roads are officially opened, or reopened, and the funding body is formally acknowledged. It was his view that this results in Anglo-Indians being increasingly respected in the area. The two responses seem at odds with each other, but with Anglo-Indians being such a minority community it is not surprising that outside the area where they live alongside their mostly Christians neighbours, Anglo-Indians' more recent change in circumstances would not be known about. It seems likely that their local Christian community would not only be acquainted with this knowledge but also be appreciative of the material improvements made to their environment.

The actions and words of the Anglo-Indians I spoke to can be seen as evidence of strengthening citizenship; that is, in Mitra's terms they are not only 'legitimate' citizens by birth but also identifying more closely with the land. According to Shani (2010), India as a nation-state makes it possible for diverse groups to experience a sense of nationhood, and it seems that Anglo-Indians, at least in Asansol, are prepared to take this opportunity they have by birthright. One of the ways they strategise to find a viable place in the nation is to live where they feel accepted and are physically comfortable. One person said:

> Most of us live in this locality, this Hillview area. There's the church and it's quite convenient. And since a number of Anglo-Indians are there we like to just stay close by. There may not be any interaction, but still you know that they are there.

The desire to be in close proximity to other Anglo-Indians was explained as being the result of feeling culturally closer to Anglo-Indians than to others:

> Because you know, community-wise, though we have lived in India so many years, I'll be very frank, we still have that foreign mind set, that we are not 100% Indian, though we have Indian passports, everything, but basically we don't think of ourselves as Indians.

This sense of Anglo-Indians identifying as being intrinsically different from others is shared by many Anglo-Indians in Asansol, and elsewhere in India

(as addressed elsewhere, for example, Andrews (2017)) and could impact on how Anglo-Indians see themselves in relation to the nation. Those who are cognisant of India's diversity and its brand of secularism may recognise that there is a place in the nation for all. This Anglo-Indian captured that sense by saying: 'I give them that respect. Because this is a secular country, we all have to live together, religious and whatever customs are there. You give them their respect, they'll respect you also.'

Conclusions

So, based on my findings, would I say that Anglo-Indians in Asansol by purchasing homes are 'buying into' the nation? Are they increasingly thinking of themselves as citizens of Indians? Discussion of home ownership in combination with migration aspirations has indicated that even in this part of India where Anglo-Indians lived materially comfortable lives, there was a range of sentiments. There was talk of trying to leave India (but not succeeding) in the not so distant past, so they were now 'making the most of it', or 'getting used to it' rather than wholly embracing citizenship. There were also those who seemed quite agreeable to a future in India, rejecting the idea of leaving for various reasons, and there were those who were still harbouring thoughts and dreams of leaving.

It seems to me that it is premature to claim that Anglo-Indian purchase of real estate is synonymous with their wholeheated embrace of being Indian citizens; rather, home ownership places them strategically for a more settled and continuing existence in India where their burgeoning sense of citizenship may be nurtured. It also provides the economic wherewithal to fund immigration ambitions, should they become a possibility.

Notes

1. For more about the project, see the report at http://www.international-journal-of-anglo-indian-studies.org/index.php/IJAIS/article/view/53
2. One of the measures used in judging this, I later learned, was the amount of funding the branch had applied for, and received, for road repairs and construction, as well as street lighting, and even for such things as extra water taps for public use. These additions benefited the entire area, not just Anglo-Indians.
3. For a detailed discussion of India's secularism, see Chatterjee (1995).
4. Anglo-Indians been not been enumerated in India's national ten-yearly census since 1951 so there is no reliable demographic data on the current numbers of Anglo-Indians in India. An indication of the uncertainty in population numbers is the fact that Frank Anthony (Anglo-Indian member of parliament and leader of the AIAIA) puts forward different figures for the population at the time of independence: he says that officially it was about 140,000 (1969:203), but he also uses the figure of "about 300,000 souls" (1969, viii),and says he believes the real figure to be between 250,000 and 300,000 (1969, 9).

5. Laura Bear (2007) in her research has drawn on their employment circumstances, including these living arrangements, to refer to Anglo-Indians as belonging to the railway caste.

6. It appears from a web-based search that a system of pay scales for government employees is in effect (see: http://finmin.nic.in/6cpc/), with the most noticeable rise in salaries occurring in the 1970s with the third pay scale. The seventh, renamed a 'pay matrix', was introduced on 1 January 2016.

7. St Jude is known as the patron saint of hope and impossible causes. The date was selected deliberately.

8. The area known as Hillview is roughly bordered by Chelidanga Road (now renamed Mother Teresa Road), Buddha Road, GT (Great Trunk) Road and SR Gorai Road.

9. At the time of writing, Rs2500 converts to USD37.

10. Of course many middle-class Indians also like their children to go to the West. This is a post-colonial process affecting numerous Indians. The difference between Anglo-Indians and Indians, though, is that the former feel they have historical and biological links to the West and, mostly, they have not felt the same attachment to India.

11. CPI refers to the political party, the Communist Party of India, which held office in West Bengal for more than 30 years.

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Transnational Fragmentation of Globality: Eastern-European Post-Socialist Strategies in Chicago

Vytis Ciubrinskas

Introduction

Since 1990, developments in urban anthropology have focused on the legitimacy of grassroots action and also the relationship between local and supralocal organizations or institutional practices as they affect urban dynamics (Pardo et al. 2013, 4–5). This shift is evident in research which focuses on the 'interrelationship between migrants and cities' and 'look[s] at the relationship between the locality and globality including historical transnationalism linked to labor migration' (GlickSchiller and Çağlar 2011, cited in Prato and Pardo 2013, 98). Within the context of this relatively new domain of urban studies, I wish also to include post-socialist transnationalism. The processes of postsocialist transformation, especially large-scale international migration from Central and Eastern European countries (e.g. Poland, the Baltic States, Ukraine and Russia) to the Western hemisphere are creating 'new realities' in Western urban settings.

This chapter is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 2006 and 2013 in different neighbourhoods of Chicago and its suburban areas, such as Lemont, among Chicagoans with a Lithuanian background. I explore a perspective of social enactment of difference through the ethnification of postsocialist immigrants by addressing their intraethnic and interethnic networking. This perspective focuses on strategies of loyalty and belonging, and on strategies aimed at achieving a 'good life' and prosperity in terms of capitalism and global entrepreneurship through the post-socialist practices of local networking

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among *one's own* group. I shall argue for a grassroots understanding of the complexities of transnationalism from an urban anthropology perspective which addresses a new web of intra- and interethnic relations among Chicagoans with an Eastern European background who are eager to share a 'common culture' and acquire (post-)socialist social capital. It comes up as two strategies: ethnification (as enactment of intraethnic ties and cultural citizenship) and compartmentalization (creating *one's own* spaces based on social capital transmitted from oversees). Both strategies are actually strategies of coping with downward mobility and assimilationist processes that threaten to submerge cultural identities into a Euro-American identity. In particular, diachronic processes of assimilation are resisted by (re)creating a social sphere for the ethnic and interethnic life of *one's own people* of the Eastern European region.

The transnational strategies and practices of contemporary post-socialist immigrants provide vivid examples of what urban anthropologists are taking increasing interest inthat is, social relations between local (community or urban neighbourhood) and supra-local (i.e. regional, national and transnational) levels—in other words, how microlevel networks such as 'family-kinship' or networks of *one's own people* function in transnational contexts.

Transnational processes posit mobility as an 'expansion of space for personal and familial livelihood practices' (Olwig Karin and Sorensen 2002, 6), and also as an important factor for the implementation and representation of cultural difference and distinctive social capital. It is important to identify how participation in transnational networks, engagement in mobile living situations and the creation of transnational loyalties (Vertovec 2009) have led to the creation of 'new realities' based on the blending of local–immigrant cultural contexts that reshape urban space and the embedded social contexts.

The enactment of immigrant culture or cultural citizenship and loyalty to an overseas homeland is usually based on the recognition of one's heritage as well as experiencing a livelihood that is distinctive in its transplanted context, and as one acquires social capital connected to one's overseas birthplace and networks. This mixture of loyalties, connections and transformations will be portrayed as remarkable in this arena of global capitalism, where processes of fragmentation of globality, such as ethnification, are occurring.

In this case, 'the city stands out as a crucial arena in which citizenship … identity and belonging … are constantly renegotiated' (Prato and Pardo 2013, 99; see also Appadurai and Holston 1999; Prato 2006). For the Lithuanian diaspora that is the subject of this study, the urban area of Chicago becomes the setting for a quest for grassroots actions. It should be noted that this is the largest urban population of Lithuanians living outside Lithuania and has only recently been challenged by that in London.[1] The grassroots activities we are considering rely on extensive social networks, based almost entirely on individual resourcefulness. Social bonds used among the recent post-socialist immigrants to create a circle of *one's own people* or to achieve a 'good life and prosperity' include sharing an ethnic language or a *lingua franca* (in most cases made up of Russian, Polish and English), a festive culture, gossip, lifestyles and

so on, but the most important strategy is the in-group reciprocity practised in the East European neighbourhoods among immigrants who share social capital and a legacy of poor living conditions in the former socialist economies.

This perspective urges us to understand the comparative scale of global fragmentation manifested in urban dynamics such as those brought out by the ethnification of city life that takes place beyond the China Town-type ethnic enclaves or by 'festive ethnicity' representations, such as the Chicago Neighbourhood Festivals or Taste of Chicago Festival.

Chicago has become a major immigrant and multicultural urban hub in the North Atlantic hemisphere. Over the last 150 years, it has become the main destination for immigrants from Poland and Lithuania, as well as for other Eastern Europeans (Thomas and Znaniecki 1958; Green 1975; Erdmans 2006, 1998; Fainhauz 1977; Eidintas 2003; Kuzmickaite 2003; Senn 2005). Chicago historian Dominic Pacyga, who compared the influx of immigrants to the city after the Second World War, has noticed that 'while Europeans dominated the pre-1950 immigration, both Hispanics and Asians would come to dominate the post-1965 immigrant numbers (2009, 389–90). With the end of the Iron Curtain and the Soviet system, Central and Eastern European immigrant numbers began to grow again. For example, Mary Erdmans noted that from 1986 to 1996, Poles provided the largest total number of legal immigrants to Chicago proper (Erdmans 2006, 116). Thus the Lithuanians who settled in Chicago at that time had opportunities to develop social networks and identities based not only on their Lithuanian identity but also on their post-socialist and Eastern European region-based identities.

The pattern of recent Lithuanian immigration to Chicago is similar to that of the Polish. Starting from proportional numbers of Poles in Chicago and the whole of the USA, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 133,797 Polish immigrants lived in metropolitan Chicago, joining an estimated 900,000 Polish Americans. Pacyga noted that 'Besides those Poles entering the country legally as refugees [of communism] or the requisite permission there were also large numbers of "vacationers" from Poland who often disappeared into the Polish American underground economy' (Pacyga 2009, 389–390).

The recent post-socialist wave of Lithuanian labour migration to the USA got under way in the late 1980s during the period of *Perestroika* and reached its climax in the early 1990s, right after the re-establishment of Lithuania's independence in 1990. From 1990 to 1996, an estimated 30,000 Lithuanians arrived in the USA in a variety of ways: as labour migrants; using immigration schemes based on family reunion; as part of the Green Card lottery; and as 'tourists', many of whom overstayed their visas. The US Census of 2010 estimates 654,000 Lithuanian Americans (Cidzikaite 2013), and between 1988 and 2000 approximately 20,000 new Lithuanians came and in the Chicago metropolitan area, including suburbs, there resided an estimated 100,000 second and third-generation Lithuanian Americans (Kuzmickaite 2003, 75–6).

The new wave of post-socialist immigrants brought 'new realities' to the city. Although many of these newer immigrants were better educated and held managerial and professional positions in Eastern Europe, large numbers were illegal. They came with particular experiences and livelihoods, with a command of Russian, which became the *lingua franca* for all immigrants coming from the former Soviet bloc countries (Ciubrinskas 2004, 58). They shared a moral economy based on *blat* (the Russian term for an 'economy of favours' (Ledeneva 1998). *Blat* as a basis for the development and dynamics of socioeconomic networks of support was widespread in Eastern Europe. There, 'the regime made people preoccupied with a shortage of everyday goods. [Consequently,] [t]hey learned how to use illegal middleman and connections (*blat*), and how to turn to the second economy and the black market' (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997, 73). In Gediminas Lankauskas' terms, it was 'knowing how to spin around' (Lankauskas 2013, 56) by knowing how to make do and be involved in the extensive use of social networks of friends and co-workers. 'Effective "spinning" required a great deal of cultural knowledge, as well as substantial investment in social networks and their constitutive informal contacts ("family, friends, workers' collective") as sites for storing and reproducing valued social capital' (ibid.). It was based on one's own resourcefulness, a sort of social prestige and social capital which appeared to be important for successful immigrant life overseas, at least at the beginning.

In a post-socialist Eastern European context, transnational processes posit social networking and 'knowing how to spin around' in order to accumulate good and valued services in a shortage economy of totalitarian socialism. Among post-socialist Eastern Europeans, the ability to 'spin around' is a distinctive mark of social capital, as intended by Pier Bourdieu: the building of informal networks which include personal relationships, family and household patterns, friendship and community ties, and mutual help in economic and social matters (Castles and Miller 2003, 27; see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 119). For post-socialist East European immigrants, social capital brought from oversees meant accumulating or extending personal networks, and the experiences and knowledge of making a living in a totalitarian regime and perpetual economic shortage by making suprakin ties of trust and creating groups of friends of *one's own people* (Ciubrinskas 2004, 56, 2014, 17–18). These groups are comparable to the suprafamilial personalized coalitions found in Mediterranean societies— the so-called 'friends of friends' (Boissevain 1974; Giordano 2012).

The quest to develop 'friends of friends' networks among the post-socialist immigrants rivals the quest to preserve one's own cultural heritage (language, symbols etc.) and the enactment of cultural citizenship. In this sense, among the immigrants from post-Soviet countries, transnationalism becomes a mode of cultural reproduction of social formations (Vertovec 2009; Al-Ali and Koser 2002, 2) and, according to Helen Kopnina's research in London and Amsterdam (2005, 131), social capital becomes a 'culturally important' strategy.

ETHNIFICATION: POST-SOCIALIST IMMIGRANTS' INTRAETHNIC BONDS

In Jonathan Friedman's view, globalization promotes the decentralization of capital accumulation, which produces fragmentation, and this in turn leads to 'a [re]turn to roots, to ethnicity and other collective identities' (Friedman 2002, 295). Fragmentation takes such forms as indigenization, nationalization (in terms of ethnification of the nation-state), regionalism and immigrant ethnification (ibid., 295–6). 'Immigrant ethnification' is central to understanding transnational migration and transnationalism itself, which, according to Steven Vertovec, is the establishment of an 'avenue of capital' in which very significant remittances often go beyond just the economic dimension and 'do not just flow back to the people's country of origin but to and from and throughout the network' (Vertovec 1999, 447–462). This is best exemplified by ethnic entrepreneurs whose management skills and moral control over human resources (knowledge of cultural idioms, norms and, in our case, *culturally important* strategies of social conduct) are very much culturally embedded. Immigrant cultural embeddedness, which often turns into cultural citizenship, is usually seen as a fundamental point of departure for their categorization and for treating them as 'radically different culturally' (Olwig 2003, 66).

On the other hand, as widely proven, international labour migrants and refugees themselves also want their cultural distinctiveness to be recognized and valued. They are therefore highly motivated to claim ownership of their cultural heritage practices and identity by constructing histories about their roots and by shaping their public and political practices of homeland, nationalism and cultural citizenship (Malkki 1992; Olwig and Hastrup 1997; Appadurai 1996; Kronh-Hansen 2003). Cultural citizenship in the USA could be understood as a form of multiculturalism that began in the 1970s and 1980s and, according to Lofgren, made cultural differences mainstream while making the USA 'more 'American' and more 'ethnic' at the same time (Lofgren 1998, 41–42). Thus immigrant ethnification, as a form of fragmentation of globalism, implies essentialism, homogenization and exclusiveness of cultural resource—that is, the cultural embeddedness of immigrants as a resource for their social networking incorporated in a diaspora life which could act as a model of cultural citizenship. In this case, the approach to citizenship as a prime expression of loyalty is altered by the concern with the moral and performative dimensions of membership beyond the domain of legal rights (Glick-Schiller and Caglar 2009).

The Lithuanian diaspora (particularly those born in Chicago) is a good example of how cultural citizenship and loyalty to translocal descent are constructed. Since the early 1950s, forced migrants—the 'refugees of communism'—forged a diasporic nationalist strategy 'to stay Lithuanian everywhere and forever'.[2] This strategy has been promoted through ethnic organizations and networks. It has been noticeable in Chicago since the 1970s when the headquarters of the global umbrella organization, the Lithuanian World

Community, founded in 1946 (Kucas 1975), was moved to the Chicago suburb of Lemont.

In the 1990s, a Lithuanian American wave began to leave the so-called 'Lithuanian neighbourhoods' and move to the south-western suburbs mostly inhabited by white lower middle-class families with 'good schools' for children.[3] A significant number settled around the suburb of Lemont, which from the late 1970s had already been known as the centre of the Lithuanian diaspora in the USA (the Lithuanian World Center was established there in 1978). Although later immigrants dispersed to other neighbourhoods, most remained rather close to the ethnically marked epicentre in Lemont. This model of settling down allowed their children to attend Lithuanian Saturday school, practise sports (basketball), stay close to the Lithuanian church and receive various ethnic services (e.g. buying Lithuanian food, going to a Lithuanian hair salon and attending a private Lithuanian doctor's office). Living close to other Lithuanians helped to avoid marginalization, labelling and the widespread practice of considering them as exotic migrants just on the basis of their 'incomprehensible' names.

The recent wave of immigration has been busy creating its own ethnic organizations. In addition to the already existing ethnic Saturday schools in the Lithuanian Youth Center at Gage Park and in Lemont, both of which were founded by the earlier immigrants, the new immigrants established a school in the northern part of Chicago—Naperville. Besides the existing diasporic media, they also started to publish their own newspapers. In the early 2010s, three Lithuanian newspapers were published in Chicago—*Langas*, *Vakarai and Čikagos Aidas*—and a radio station, *Studija R*, was established. They opened new sports clubs in Lemont, including a now thriving basketball league (the Chicago Lithuanian Basketball League, consisting of 15 teams), as well as other clubs, studios, ateliers and so on. Lithuanian capital enterprises (e.g. international transportation business company Atlantic Express and also Unlimited Carriers, both in the south-western suburbs) were established and a prestigious business club (the Chicagoland Lithuanians Rotary Club) launched.

The most popular way of maintaining intraethnic ties is to establish links through ethnic schools which serve as umbrella organizations for ethnic life, and through festive culture, including sports, concerts and private parties and gatherings of *one's own people*. As informants often say, one of the most popular forms of connecting and maintaining ethnic bonds is 'through children'. Ethnic (Saturday) schools, Lithuanian Catholic churches, ethnic leisure clubs, workshops and so on are attended by children. Most of the newer Lithuanian settlers, because of their residential dispersal, maintain their Lithuanian identity through active participation in these leisure time activities. They attend ethnic clubs (dancing, theatre, opera, etc.) and concerts which take place in schools, parish halls, cultural centres and Lithuanian restaurants which host shows by performers from Lithuania. Informants, when asked what connects them with other

Lithuanians in Chicago, usually list four things: basketball; parties; school-because it is through children that they meet other Lithuanians and the Youth Center, so called *kultūrnamis* ('culture house') with concert hall where, as I was told, 'something is always happening–now Landsbergis, now Storpirštis… besides you can dress up'.

Such ethnic institutions as Saturday schools and 'culture house' function as umbrella organizations that create a locus for networking which, if needed, leads to possible employment with Lithuanian companies, and this dynamic becomes part of an ethnic maintenance mechanism, as the networking becomes a means to an end to meeting other Lithuanians. Furthermore, since the locus of places provides a kind of historical map of immigrant waves and trajectories in the Chicago area, they also create a geospatial network of activity and affiliation. For instance, the Youth Center is located in the area that used to be populated by earlier Lithuanian immigrants (Gage Park), while the basketball centre is in Lemont.

Language is maintained as a marker of common identity and is widely represented in the Lithuanian media created by the current wave of immigrants. In everyday life, many informants are indignant about or mock those who do not maintain Lithuanian language. They say that Chicago is a gratifying place because

> Living in Chicago … there are no chances to lose Lithuanian language, how many Lithuanian restaurants, how many shops are there, wherever you go you will run into Lithuanians. That's what it is about Chicago—there is no excuse to not know Lithuanian. (Jonas, 30, engineer)

Giving such prominence to language also means stressing the importance of cultural heritage, origin and 'roots', which stimulates deep ties between immigrants. According to one of the informants,

> it happens here that we curse and argue with each other but in a way you still can't renounce those roots. (Zita, 35, employee at a Lithuanian-ownership company)

It speaks for the cultural embeddedness of immigrants, in *emic* terms—*šaknys* ('roots' or 'rootedness'). Migration itself is often viewed as 'uprooting'. One informant who was 'brought' to Chicago when she was 19 interpreted it as her 'uprooting'. She thought:

> that's it, there is no more world, 'mother, I hate you, why did you bring me here?' The trauma has healed but she says: 'you know, those people who have left, psychologically are very unhappy. (Nijole, 22, employee at a Lithuanian office in Chicago)

So in such cases the ethnic ties become a substitute for the ties left behind in a homeland and create a sort of extended family connection in the host country.

CONSTRUCTION OF *ONE'S OWN* SPACES: LIFESTYLE IDENTITIES AND LOYALTIES

Since the 1980s, the diaspora of Lithuanian Chicagoans started moving from their ethnic neighbourhoods in south-west Chicago to mainly white lower middle-class suburbs with 'good schools' for their kids. They clustered around the suburb of Lemont, which is ethnically 'unmarked' but known as the focal centre of the Lithuanian diaspora in Chicago.[4] The same pattern has been followed by the new post-socialist immigrants who arrived in the early 2000s. Such a trajectory could be understood as going beyond the creation of another ethnic niche or Lithuanian neighbourhood in Chicago. According to Neringa Liubiniene, who did research among the Lithuanian immigrants in Northern Ireland, it could be viewed as an attempt to build one's *own space* based on an intimate connection with *one's own* fellows. *Home* becomes a significant encompassing cultural trope as it is (re)conceived as a network of family, relative and friendship relationships (Liubiniene 2009). It creates a compartmentalized 'lifestyle' arena, different from the ethnic enclave and open to interethnic networking with other immigrants from the Eastern European region, particularly in this case Poles and those who speak Russian.

Such compartmentalization could be explained by new immigrants distancing themselves from the rest of the Lithuanian diaspora dominant by the DP (displaced persons) wave that came as a result of forced immigration. These older immigrants view the new Lithuanians as 'lacking Lithuanian culture' because they were 'contaminated' by being exposed to 'communist culture' (Ciubrinskas 2004, 61). Even in early 2010s in New York the post-socialist wave of Lithuanians may still be labeled as *tarybukai* (little Soviets), considered as 'traitors of the homeland' who 'tend to hide taxes' (Kripiene 2012).

So in this sense the participation of post-socialist immigrants in 'Lithuanian activities' in Chicago, as in New York (Kripiene 2012), is filled with some sort of scepticism, uncertainty and often disappointment. Even though they attend Lithuanian services in Catholic churches, bring children to Saturday schools or participate in cultural events, they still have a hard time getting recognition and support from the diaspora, which still holds most of the ethnic organizations in their grip.

On the other hand, recent ethnographic research indicates that many recent (post-socialism) Lithuanian immigrants are linked to each other in a kind of symbolic opposition to older Lithuanian Americans, through frequent social interactions and by expressing (post-)socialist Lithuanian practices and speech. This plays an important role in distancing the new wave of immigrants from the rest of the Lithuanian diaspora in the USA, especially the displaced persons wave of immigration. Kuznecoviene's research in London (2014) shows that the identity of Lithuanian immigrants is situational. Situated identities, particularly of minority groups of immigrants that are themselves fragments, hinders them from devoting themselves to maintaining (in this case) Lithuanian culture.

At the same time, adopting situated identities is an adaptive strategy that helps minimize marginalization risks and allows immigrants to deal more effectively with issues related to illegal status (Liubiniene 2009), to become established and to create a 'good life'.

The most important aspect in attaching oneself to the host country is 'the will for material wellbeing'. This is clearly stated in a response from Jurga, a 25-year-old employee in a Lithuanian-owned company in Chicago, who said: 'It seems that we are all attached to our material wellbeing. If someone told us that Lithuania will change and that one could gain an equal amount of revenue or that one could lead a similar life there [i.e. in Lithuania], I think everyone would leave immediately."

'Learning to live' in a new place is equally included in the construction of one's codes for belonging to the circle of *one's own people*. In other words, Lithuanian immigrants are motivated to create a fractured sense of *'one's own people'*: one part based on Lithuanianness and the other on loyalty to the host country. In this way a 'new reality' is formed both at the social level of urban spaces and at the situated level of the person since new immigrants take it on themselves to create their *own space* by adopting new lifestyles and blending sociocultural factors from both host and home countries.

Although the majority continues to identify with Lithuania, opinions regarding the questions of citizenship and loyalty tend to diverge. This may be influenced by the fact that most of our informants maintain their Lithuanian citizenship—'all of us are Lithuanian citizens' (Tomas, 34, construction worker). However, when it comes to voting, people are very reluctant. Although all their needs for voting easily are met by the Lithuanian Consulate in Chicago, few immigrants take part in elections. The home country is portrayed emotionally and culturally, and often it is not seen as the state, so loyalty becomes fragmented down to the level of one's 'roots', origins, language and a nostalgic youth. Daiva, a 26-year-old informant working in a Lithuanian-owned company, said: 'Everyone would like to die in Lithuania, because our roots, our language and our memories of young days are all there […] I don't feel as a member of Lithuanian Republic, but I do feel Lithuanian.'

When informants stress their 'roots', one may discern an almost fundamental aspect of 'Lithuanianness' that is tied neither to a precise territory nor to a place. Rather, one finds an attachment described by David Hollinger (1995) as *rooted cosmopolitanism*, which reflects the self-construction of fragmented identities that disregard both home and host states. The informants appear to focus mainly on descent as 'roots' with the home country and on 'material wellbeing' and cosmopolitan lifestyle in the host country. An informant claims:

> I have an American passport, but I am Lithuanian. They ask me, for example when we were traveling in Europe last year, and I always answer that I am a Lithuanian coming from Lithuania, not from America. I am a Lithuanian but I live in Chicago, and that's all. Well, I am a Lithuanian. Well, the passport doesn't make any difference. (Jonas, 30, engineer)

Although often I get a fully cosmopolitan response as well:

> I ascribe myself neither to Lithuania, nor to America, I don't ascribe myself as belonging to any country. I may as well live in Brazil. (Robertas, 41, businessman)

Many informants claim a double, Lithuanian American, identity: 'I am neither American, nor Lithuanian, but a Lithuanian American.' Such self-identification is more common among the more educated, studying or graduated (mostly from the US colleges) immigrants who have American friends from school and are usually open to assimilation and making steps towards the hyphenated Lithuanian American identity.

The double-identity decision speaks to the question of loyalty. In this respect, our informants clearly divide themselves into two distinct groups. The unattainability of double citizenship poses difficulties for the members of the first group. They must choose which one they want to keep: whether to maintain the old, Lithuanian one, or to accept the new one—that of a US citizen. Informants are particularly sensitive when speaking of this matter. A woman who accepted US citizenship and thus lost Lithuanian citizenship, for example, laments:

> We have been deprived of the opportunity to be Lithuanians. […] We are taken for traitors. […] If we had this opportunity, […] our little Lithuania would gain more revenue. (Ieva, 28, employee of a Lithuanian-owned company)

Others stress the redundancy or even harmfulness of double citizenship:

> If you live in one country and you decide the fate of both. […] They want to have the double-citizenship, to live in America, but they don't give a damn about Lithuania. (Rimantas, 32, worker in a transportation company)

> Patriotism ends with eating *cepelinai*. […] They want to make the double-citizenship only for the benefits [for the insurance and the guarantees] […] everyone's property, compensations for children, that's all. In any case, many take [the American citizenship] while keeping their Lithuanian passports to, as they say, take the most from both. (Tomas, 34, construction worker)

On the one hand, these claims suggest a certain indignation, while at the same time expressing cynicism not only towards citizenship but, in a way, towards loyalty itself. Within this process, fragmented identities become compartmentalized—identities that ignore both states by refusing integration (or by remaining conditionally illegal) into the main society (in our case, Americanization) and remain a minority even in their own parallel society, as part of structural exclusion (Kockel 2010, 74).

Loyalty to the host country is also discouraged by the illegal status of a considerable number of immigrants—according to various informants, about 10–20% remain illegal (Kripiene 2012) and have no connection to either state. It has been said that many of these undocumented Lithuanian workers work as truck drivers (living in their trucks) or take care of the elderly 'without showing themselves outside of the home' of their employers. In addition to that, those who own US passports hurry to help their relatives or family members join them in the USA by means of a Green Card, thus it is evident that there exists a situational 'consuming' of citizenship that seeks benefit for *one's own* 'fellows'.

These living conditions interact with the aforementioned situational identity. Such a sense of belonging—essentially an alternative to an ethnicity-based bonding—is usually associated with an individual lifestyle trajectory that depends on one's career and personal interests. According to circumstances, it draws on ethnic culture, ethnic communalism and Lithuanian citizenship, and may be defined as a manipulative, lifestyle identity (Friedman 1994). In many ways, it goes beyond ethnicity and the state(s) (both the homeland and the host country) and relies on *one's own people* circles in newly created, ethnically unmarked *own spaces*.

Construction of Interethnic Circles and Recreating the Region

A significant number of new post-socialism Lithuanian immigrants in Chicago transcend ethnic boundaries and easily get into social networks with undocumented or not fully documented immigrants from post-socialist Eastern Europe (especially Poles, Ukrainians and Russians). These interethnic networks are built on *one's own people* circles using mixed Russian-English-Polish language as a *lingua franca*, sharing workplaces and having strong relationships with their friends and relatives in their home countries.

In trying to understand how networking in interethnic circles of *one's own people* operates, we can use Alena Ledeneva's (1998) research on the economy of favours in Soviet Russia—that is, the mechanism of personal networks and ties (*blat*) based on trust and mutual exchange of services which constituted an informal economic practice in totalitarian regimes. Under the conditions of economic shortage, these ties were created in order to make a living through social networks. The need to provide for oneself and the norm of mutual reciprocity associated with strong (kinship) ties morally obliged individuals in these networks to come to the aid of the people one knew or who were members of one's community (Ledeneva 1998).

A similar situation of 'economic shortage' was experienced by the migrants who moved to the USA between 1989 and 2005, approximately during the first 15 years after Lithuania regained independence. Not knowing English and often working illegally 'without papers', those who overstayed their tourist

visas before 2009 when the visa requirement was waived would settle in an ethnic neighbourhood, staying in the basements of the diaspora Lithuanian's homes. They would do any job, and interacted with other immigrants from post-socialist Eastern Europe in the workplaces using Russian or a mixture of Russian, Polish and English as their *lingua franca*. As Rimantas, a 32-year-old employess of a Lithuanian capital transportation company, said, 'You get a mixed language—English, Polish, Russian.' These underground immigrants could easily enter the workforce by tapping into friendship or acquaintanceship networks of immigrants from post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe. Especially resilient ties were established through work. On arrival, some Lithuanian immigrants found employment together with Poles and Russians, as in the case of an informant who worked with Poles on night shifts for a cleaning company; these workmates became part of the circle of *one's own people* (fieldwork diary).

According to the research data, immigrants were often employed in construction, trucking, parcel transportation, auto repair, office cleaning, public food services, cosmetology and elderly care. Some immigrants worked in legal and medical services and for insurance agencies. Vaidas, the 39-year-old head of an insurance and real-estate company, said: 'We do a lot of business with Russians, Poles, especially real estate agents.' Even though some are self-employed, such as subcontractors for long-route haulage, bookkeepers and insurance agents, they are still closely related to the general market where they enter into work relations with companies usually run by people from ex-socialist countries. These immigrants share some key features. First, most of them work in fields that seldom require educational or professional qualifications. Doing these jobs, most of them feel that they have lost their profession, specialism or status. Sometimes the job might be illegal. So immigrants from different countries are bonded not only by their immigrant status but also by their low status in the labour market. Most are satisfied with their relatively low status probably because it corresponds to experiences that immigrants have brought from their post-Soviet countries of origin where pay cheques in some sectors of the labour market were given in 'envelopes'. Other unifying factors are the expectation to receive abundant, quick and non-taxable income, and choosing work based on the size of pay regardless of whether it will be earned legally. As the head of a Lithuanian-owned company in Chicago said,

> When an American comes to us looking for a job he asks what benefits he will get, when a Lithuanian or a Russian comes, all he wants to know is how much wages we will pay.

Violetta Parutis, who did research in London, noted that when searching for employment, many economic immigrants from post-socialist Poland and Lithuania aim for extra benefits, such as tax-exempt income and unlimited overtime (Parutis 2011, 52). They choose to work in relatively well-paid jobs, such as in construction and in private homes (old people, people with

disabilities, childcare). Parutis notes that for those immigrants who are better educated and have a greater knowledge of English, such work would only be a starting position to increase their cultural capital, as they strive to adjust to the environment and improve their language skills in order to get a better job in the future (ibid.).

The status of Eastern European immigrants in their places of employment in Chicago, and their expectations, attitudes and, possibly, social networks, are all based on shared experiences that are conditioned not only by their marginal immigrant status but also by their cultural understanding of how to manage economic shortage—a knowledge that they acquired in their countries of origin. Ethnographic research revealed tax evasion, exchange of services and concealment of various infringements. For example, I was told of a job that required two drivers but was done by one driver who worked overtime (fieldnotes). The exchange of services and favours among the immigrants from the Central Eastern European region can be partially equated with *blat* relations—involving circumvention of formal ways in order to access and manipulate resources (Ledeneva 1998, 37). Fieldwork among the Lithuanians in New York (Kripiene 2012) and Chicago (Ciubrinskas 2013, 2014) have documented patterns of *blat* or exchange and reciprocity in immigrant networks, especially in relation to 'finding a job' or 'getting an education'. In Chicago, the exchange of information and services or the manipulation of employment and income (legal and illegal) as well as information about profitable jobs, provision of work orders and clients, information about ways and forms to organize 'shadow' financial accounting ('black accounting') and so on are the most popular forms of *blat* found in the Eastern European job market.

Similarly, immigrants from the same post-socialist region share certain 'common culture' and leisure time activities, as well as discourses, patterns of consumption, festive culture and a sense of humour that is mutually understood. They shop in the same Polish, Lithuanian or Russian shops and are used to advertisements and other information in all three languages in the local Eastern European media (newspapers, radio stations). Movies from Eastern Europe, especially in Russian, are easily available for rent in most Lithuanian markets (observational data). Many immigrants from the post-socialist bloc are also used to visiting Russian restaurants in the northern part of Chicago 'in a white outfit' (dressed up).

When asked who they make friends with in Chicago, informants mostly said that they are friends with 'Lithuanians and Europeans but not with Americans'. Interestingly, Euro-Americans and immigrants from Western Europe are not considered 'Europeans'; only immigrants from Eastern Europe are. Informants tend to describe their friends as follows:

Friends from Europe are mostly Lithuanians, but there are also Poles, zero Americans. (Simona, 25, studies and works in a Lithuanian-owned company)

Friends—Russians, Lithuanians, Poles, because we are different, we dress differently, we eat different food, we talk different, we have different jokes. (Daiva, 26, employee at a Lithuanian capital company)

Some immigrants studied in Chicago suburban schools and colleges together with Poles, Russians and other students from Eastern Europe. As Simona, a 25-year-old Lithuanian student who also works in a Lithuanian-owned company, notes, 'At school, I was friends with Poles, Russians, Lithuanians, but not with Americans. We used to celebrate birthdays together … and also Christmas." Thus interethnic, former Eastern European bloc-related ties are easily created in the south-west of Chicago. They deal with structural or channelled multiculturalism—well defined by Baumann (1997) in his research in London as the 'dominant discourse'—and ethnic communalism through the interethnic networks of Eastern European immigrants from the former Communist region. Labour migrants as well as 'brain drain' immigrants with a Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Russian or Polish background are (re)creating the Eastern European region by using their *lingua franca* and sharing workplaces, the media and festive culture.

Conclusion

Current research on post-socialist Lithuanian immigration in Chicago (Kuzmickaite 2003; Ciubrinskas 2013, 2014), New York (Kripiene 2012) and London (Parutis 2011; Kuznecoviene 2014) shows the impact of the fragmentation of globality in diversifying the loyalties and the sense of belonging of the new immigrants. This appears to be how East European post-socialism is transnationalized in urban and suburban Chicago. It could be suggested that in contrast to understanding post-socialist immigration as a process of deterritorialization, we are encouraged to see it as a process of reterritorialization, as an attempt to create a new reality of *own spaces* made of *one's own* circles for Eastern Europeans in Chicago. Instead of assimilating into US society, post-socialist immigrants employ strategies of ethnification via cultural citizenship and lifestyle strategies which go beyond ethnic community lines by creating a new kind of belonging, which is compartmentalized within *one's own people* circles.

In addressing the question of how local and supralocal social networks and loyalties have been created among the Lithuanian immigrants in Chicago's urban dynamics, it is worth stressing that the translocal relationality of transnational urbanites is resourceful. It is expressed in the enactment of specific social resources and social capital built on bonds of intimacy, in-group reciprocity and networks of *one's own people* which embrace patrimonial family–kinship linkages, loyalties to homeland heritages and roots, ethnic identity and cultural citizenship. But it goes beyond intraethnic relationality, for social networks of *one's own people* include Lithuanians, Poles, Russians and Ukrainians, who have their own *lingua franca*, share workplaces and, in many ways, live in an ecological interethnic niche. It is both a result of fragmentation of ethnic grouping and a creation of a new ethnic hybridity based on common socialist experiences and sensibilities vis-à-vis their marginalization by the majority population.

The fragmentation of Lithuanian immigrant life leads to the development of social networks beyond those of the ethnic community. New social groupings are constructed as *one's own people* networks, which may include non-Lithuanians but are typically limited to other Eastern Europeans. This reformatting of the immigrant notion of *one's own people* can be considered to be a result of the transfer to the new setting of the exchange of services and favours that were an indispensable part of the way social capital was accumulated in the country of origin. These networks, first enacted through the ethnic circles of *one's own people*, often surpass ethnically defined boundaries to include other immigrants from the former Soviet bloc countries. Interethnic circles of *one's own people* are created and used to establish compartmentalized lifestyle identities, alliances and *own spaces*. The bonds of intraethnic and interethnic networking, exchange and reciprocity (favour for favour) take place among friends, acquaintances, relatives and colleagues. These bonds stress common interests and the resourcefulness of people who are expected to have the 'ability to deal with the situation' (Lankauskas 2013). Members of these ethnically hybrid groups are expected to be able to find and exploit work and know how to access legal and illegal resources. Such bonding can be seen as an *own space* alternative not only to the dominant US social institutions but also to the monoethnic spaces created by earlier presocialist waves of immigrants who, by and large, created ethnically based institutions and ethnic communities. It is also the recognition, re-enactment and re-creation of the post-socialist reality as 'translation' of the former totalitarian Eastern European region in the multicultural arena of urban and suburban Chicago.

NOTES

1. For many Poles, Chicago was seen as a friendly, even 'Polish', city (Pacyga 2009; Erdmans 1998). The city of Chicago has been the largest Lithuanian city outside of Lithuania since the 1900s. In the early 1920s there were more ethnic Lithuanians in Chicago than in Kaunas, at the time Lithuania's capital and largest city (Kavoliunas 1994). Only recently, London outnumbered Chicago with its Lithuanian immigrant population: according to official statistics in 2011 there were 40,000 Lithuanians in London (Lietuvos Rytas 2013).

2. Forced migration of Lithuanian immigrants to the USA includes those political refugees and exiles, and their descendants, who, at the end of the Second World War, fled from the Communist regime in Eastern Europe to the West and became concentrated in the displaced persons (DP) camps in post-Nazi Germany. In the late 1940s they were given an opportunity to move to North America, the UK, Australia and so forth. At least 30,000 of these Lithuanians from the DP camps settled in the USA, of whom about 12,000–15,000 settled in Chicago (Kucas 1975). Their experience in the DP camps became a social memory resource for later generations, was an exercise in living in a country (as well as in the city of Chicago) without really being a part of it, and served as a model identity after they settled in the USA. Most, if not all, of them underwent ethnic 'Lithuanian' enculturation in their families and Saturday schools, and through the efforts of

the Lithuanian American Community. The term "DPs" was coined to refer to Lithuanian political refugees and exiles who reached the USA from DP camps in Germany at the end of the Second World War.

3. Most were of the so-called DP generation who immigrated in the early 1950s after leaving the DP camps in early post-Second World War Germany.

4. Likely all of the Lithuanian diaspora in the USA know that Lemont is the new centre of Lithuanian culture in the USA.

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Haitians in Manaus: Challenges of the Sociocultural Process of Inclusion

Sidney Antonio da Silva

The arrival of Haitians in Manaus in early 2010 was initially considered by the local government to be a transitory event. It was expected that this population would largely pass through Manaus. Significantly, since 2014, the entrance of immigrants across the northern border has decreased and re-emigration to other countries has been considered a possibility. However, the migration process has made it possible for the Haitian presence to take root in Manaus and other Brazilian cities, leading to sociopolitical consequences, which include the transformation of humanitarian visas to permanent visas, family reunification and a sociocultural process of inclusion.

I focus on the situation in Manaus in the state of Amazonas because this city has been one of the major 'transit' places for many Haitians in northern Brazil. Furthermore, this Amazonian city also serves as a place for the migrants' sociocultural and economic reproduction. From this point of view, the Haitian presence in Manaus not only raises economic, social and political issues but also permits reflection on the limits of the multicultural ideology, which emphasize the belonging to a single society and nation-state. Cultural dynamics are generally permeated by relationships that go beyond location and national states, allowing newcomers to build 'transnational social fields' (see e.g. Glick-Schiller et al. 1995; Prato 2009a, b; Audebert 2012; Feldman-Bianco 2012).

Nevertheless, the historical experience of immigration in Brazil has revealed that the inclusion of immigrants in Brazilian society does not happen by government decree. Furthermore, this integration is not a one-way process; rather, it largely depends on how immigrants react to prejudices against them and how they organize themselves as an ethnic group to interact with the host society. In this sense, I assume that cultural elements in a new context play a diacritical

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role in the construction and affirmation of identity. In this 'symbolic struggle' for the recognition of differences and rights, immigrants' cultural and political forms of organization are essential in searching for broader exchanges and overcoming different types of discrimination and social exclusion that multicultural policies may impose on them in the name of defending cultural differences.

HAITIANS IN MANAUS: PROFILE AND CHALLENGES

Manaus is a city in the Amazon Rain Forest that has become the largest urban area in northern Brazil, with an estimated population of 2,057,711 (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 2015). Known as the 'Paris of the Tropics' at its height of gum production in the early twentieth century, it experienced deep changes after the price of this raw material declined and witnessed a significant migration from the rubber plantations to Manaus in 1922 (Oliveira 2003: 82). However, it is noteworthy that the crisis the city faced from 1920 to 1967 may not have had 'the same meaning for all of its residents' (Oliveira 2003: 137). This means that even in times of economic crisis the city has been taken over in different ways by the inhabitants and immigrants who remained there.

With the creation of the free trade Zone in 1967, domestic and international migration intensified. In addition to Brazilian northeasterners, Manaus received immigrants from Hispanic America and other continents. They came in search of opportunities, whether for skilled or unskilled labour, mainly to meet the demand on the assembly lines of local industries. Although this industrial park was once a powerful attraction, especially for internal migrants seeking jobs in Manaus, it is important to highlight that the industry has gradually come to employ fewer people overall and even fewer with high qualifications (Silva 2011: 156).

From this perspective, the arrival of Haitians in 2010 cannot be directly related to the possible jobs offered by the free trade zone, especially because 'the Brazil' they intended to find was much more distant; many job offers were in the cities of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba and Florianopolis, among others. Although they might have been able to choose their places of arrival or passage, it is important to note that it is capital that puts a labour force in motion (Gaudemar 1977). The problem is that insalubrious and underpaid jobs are generally reserved for immigrants (Sassen 1988).

Data collected in 2011 by the Migration Research Group in the Amazon (GEMA) showed that the profile of Haitians in Manaus was not different from the well-known standard profile of labour migration—that is, they were generally young (between 20 and 35), male and unmarried and had a middle level of education. Some of them had technical training, and a few had completed a university degree (Silva 2012b: 309–310).

In 2014–2015, GEMA conducted another survey in association with migration observatories from Brazilian universities such as Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), Universidade Federal de Rondônia (UNIR) and Universidade Estadual de Santa Catarina (UDESC). The survey targeted

Manaus and other Brazilian cities, such as Porto Velho, Curitiba, São Paulo, Balneario Camboriu, Chapecó, Porto Alegre and Caxias do Sul, with the aim of gathering information about Haitian migrants present in Brazil and their absent families. In total, 1043 people were surveyed and 280 questionnaires were applied in seven modules. The data confirmed the age profile outlined in the previous survey. However, they indicated some changes, such as the presence of people under the age of 18 (including children) and people over 50, revealing a process of family reunification.

As with any labour migration flow, there was initially an almost exclusive presence of men. This pattern started changing as the migration network consolidated. Then the presence of single women and women who had children or were pregnant emerged. Complete family groups can now be found among these immigrants.

Regarding gender, the new survey confirmed a large majority of men, which has been the case since the beginning of the migratory flow. Data collected by the Pastoral for Migrants of Tabatinga (Amazonas) indicated that out of the 2842 Haitians who crossed the border in 2011, 85.46% were men and 14.11% were women. That year the presence of 12 minors was also confirmed (Costa 2015: 66). These data were similar to those collected in the abovementioned survey, where 86.4% of people interviewed were men and 13.6% were women.

Concerning marital status, single people outnumbered married people (59.5% and 32.3%, respectively). Many people who described themselves as single also reported having children in Haiti or some type of relationship.

Regarding schooling, the vast majority of people had more than ten years of formal education (63.1% of respondents), which is equivalent to high school in Brazil. These data revealed that, compared with Brazilians, Haitians had a superior education level: in 2013, only 36.03% of Brazilians had between 11 and 14 years of formal education (National survey by sample households, PNAD/IBGE 2014).

With respect to religion, immigrants subscribing to different Protestant denominations were prevalent. However, it is worth questioning the considerable number of those who declared themselves Catholics (35%), perhaps hoping not to offend the interviewer because most of the interviews were held in the building of the Pastoral for Migrants of the Catholic Church. Another piece of information that should be further investigated in depth is that in a country where voodoo is considered a cultural tradition, only one respondent reported practising it, perhaps for fear of suffering prejudice—both in Brazil and Haiti, this religious practice, among others related to African-Brazilian religions, is labelled as witchcraft.

Regarding origin, the immigrants came from the capital Port-au-Prince, a city ravaged by the 2010 earthquake, and from cities that suffered no damage, such as Gonaives and Jacmel. A survey carried out by the Pastoral for Migrants of Manaus among women sheltered at the host house of São Francisco de Assis showed that of the 305 registration records from 2011 to 2013, the Haitian women came from 57 different cities, mostly from Aquin (55 registrations), followed by Port-au-Prince (44), Miragoane (23) and Croix de Bouquets (21).

These data show that the earthquake cannot be considered to be the only explanation for Haitian emigration; rather, it was a conjunctural event that aggravated the already difficult living conditions of the population. However, it is worth noting that for most people, the place of birth did not match the place of departure before they came to Brazil. This is because internal and international migration to countries such as the USA, Canada, France and others in the Caribbean Zone, as is the case of Santo Domingo and Cuba, is a historical phenomenon and is part of the socioeconomic reproductive strategies of Haitians (Perusek 1984; Audebert 2012).

Inclusion in the Brazilian Labour Market

The labour market sectors that used to absorb most Haitian workers in some of the cities surveyed were civil construction, followed by commerce and service. However, this sequence has been reversed: currently, commerce and general services employ the most workers. When they do not find work in the formal labour market, Haitian workers are forced to engage in informal activities, such as selling water or food on the streets to other Haitians and Brazilians. The difficulty in finding jobs is attributed to the local and national labour market reflux, the lack of professional qualifications required by the labour market and language barriers (Silva, 2013: 9). Although not mastering Portuguese makes integration into some labour market sectors difficult, speaking languages such as French, English and Spanish can open doors when applying for jobs in other sectors, such as hospitality and language teaching. However, with Brazil's labour market downturn since 2014, an increased number of immigrants are unemployed.

Data collected by the Pastoral for Migrants in São Paulo in November 2015 revealed that job opportunities in civil construction had disappeared, leaving openings only in the general service sector, such as gas station attendants, hotel maids, domestic service providers, general services, housekeepers and car washers. Every Tuesday and Thursday there were businessmen at the mission ready to hire immigrant workers. After attending a lecture on cultural issues regarding these immigrants and the legal requirements for hiring them, they proceeded to interview candidates. On a given Tuesday, there were about 150 candidates, mostly men, for 19 jobs.

An aggravating factor is that, in times of economic recession, the labour market becomes more selective and the salary is generally less attractive because of the decrease in compensation. For example, for a secretary position at a network wholesaler, the job specifications relate to gender (female in this case) and command of the English language in addition to Portuguese. The salary offered for this job was BRL1000 (approximately equivalent to USD320). For a crease-cutting position in a print shop, there were requirements regarding gender (male in this case), age (20 to 30 years old) and residence (in the same neighbourhood as the company) for a net salary of BRL900 (USD280).

For people with higher professional qualifications, the problem is to find a job in their working field. They have to revalidate their diplomas to engage in the same labour activity as in their country of origin, which is a slow and costly process. In this case, they have to accept jobs way below their qualifications. For those who have not completed their courses, the challenge is to enter a public university because immigrants must follow the same rules as those established for Brazilians who wish to apply for higher education.

As for labour rights, the data indicate an increasing precarization of labour relations: nearly 30% do not have a formal employment contract. Instability in the Brazilian labour market affects not only the access to labour rights but also the amount of remittance transfer, which, for the vast majority, does not exceed BRL500 (approximately USD150). However, there are Haitians who send only USD50 per month. Others cannot afford to send anything for several months as a result of unemployment.

As in many migratory flows, the purpose of money remittance is for immigrants to support their families and their children's education. Most interviewees confirmed this. The use of such remittances for other purposes, such as investment in real estate or small businesses, depends on immigrants' income levels and on the economic reproduction strategies they adopt, combining, for example, family labour and paid workers, as do Bolivian clothing manufacturers located in São Paulo (Silva 1997).

Facing Prejudices

If in the labour market challenges must be overcome in the medium and long term, in the sociocultural context this reality is not different. In Chapada, a district in southern Manaus where the Pastoral for Migrants is located, relations between Haitians and the local context are still restricted. In some cases, the relations are marked by distrust and intolerance on the part of local residents, who see Haitians as a possible threat either in occupying spaces that were once meant for exclusive community use (e.g. the sports court of St Gerard Church) or because Haitians receive privileged care from religious and civil authorities.[1]

This church has hosted one branch of the Pastoral for Migrants in Manaus. Since 2010, it has been the benchmark for most Haitians who arrive in the city in search of shelter, work and legal and religious advice, although most immigrants who use its services declare that they belong to an evangelical denomination (Silva, 2017: 110).

As with any other group of immigrants, the relationship with the local context is initially limited, confined to the scopes of work, family and church. According to the research outlined above, relations with Brazilians are generally friendly. However, there have also been cases of conflict and prejudice, particularly in southern Brazilian cities such as Curitiba, Balneario Camboriu and Caxias do Sul, where the presence of the descendants of European immigrants is significant. In these cities, more cases of prejudice have been reported

by respondents than in northern cities such as Manaus. Data from the Special Secretariat for Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice and Citizenship showed that, in 2014, 45 complaints were received through the 'dial platform 100'. The situation appears to have worsened for, in 2015, complaints reached alarming numbers, with 330 cases being reported. Among the most discriminated groups were Haitians (26.8% of reports), Arabs (15.4%) and northeasterners (10.2%). Regarding the concentration of complaints, São Paulo led with 23%, followed by Rio de Janeiro (11.2%), Minas Gerais (8.9%) and Rio Grande do Sul (7.5%).

In the Amazon—particularly in Manaus where, as noted by Sampaio (2011), researchers have devoted little or no attention to the black presence—the arrangements may take on other meanings. Haitians are easily identified by phenotypical traits (i.e. skin colour) and by cultural differences, with language being a differentiating element between them and the locals. Further investigation would be necessary to determine whether culture will prevail over racial matters, and whether through the appropriation of public spaces in the city new channels for dialogue with Brazilian society might be created.

One interviewee who had lived in Manaus for five years believed that Brazil has made an effort to include immigrants. As he stated, countries with an economic status higher than Brazil's do nothing in this direction. An example was the fact that one of them was chosen to carry the Olympic torch when it passed through the city on 19 June 2016. In fact, the status of new immigrants is currently 'determined by a new hierarchical *reputation-based* categorization' that depends on 'the international reputation of the migrant's country of origin' (Prato 2016: 194). Haiti is widely perceived as a poor nation and some Brazilians do not know its precise geographical location, believing that it is located in Africa.

The Cultural Dimension of Immigration

As noted by Carneiro da Cunha (1986), in another context, immigrants are not given the conditions to recreate their entire complex cultural reference, but they have a selection of some elements that become diacritics—that is, they become identity markers for the group. Language is one of them. In the case of Haitians, it is worth noting that they speak Creole and French—the two official languages in Haiti, given that Creole gained official status in 1987. However, not everyone speaks French, which is the language of higher social status (Pimentel and Cotinguiba 2014: 41).

Music is another possible differentiating factor and simultaneously a facilitating element of the rapprochement between Haitians and Brazilians—the influence of Afro rhythms in both Brazilian and Haitian music is evident. There is a musical group in Manaus formed by young Haitians called Sensation. Their performances have been restricted to church halls, including the Pastoral for Migrants. They have also performed at social parties in the community and at other official parties on special occasions, such as on Haitian Independence

Day (1 January) and Flag Day (18 May).[2] However, according to a group member, the purpose is to play in public places as a way of promoting Haitian music in Manaus. In this sense, the 'right to the city' (Lefebvre [1968]1996) remains restricted for these immigrants and presents a challenge to be overcome.

In the religious scope, relations seem to be more complex since churches for the Haitian community have been created in Manaus. This may be a potential factor for group segregation because of the linguistic element, which is an ethnic difference marker in relation to local followers. In the St George neighbourhood are the Wesleyan Methodist Church headquarters, and on Sao Paulo Street, in the same neighbourhood, a meeting room is rented to the Haitian community, whose members are mostly men. The female presence, as well as that of children, is still limited. At a service I once attended, I did not notice any young people. Furthermore, I was the only Brazilian and white person— that is, a 'foreigner' in that place. The service was held in Creole; occasionally the pastor attempted to speak a few Portuguese sentences, perhaps because I was there. At the end of the service, he requested that those who were there for the first time introduce themselves. I did so and explained the purpose of my visit, which seemed to be welcomed by all.

Considering that voodoo is part of the Haitian culture and part of Haitianness itself (Handerson 2010: 168), it is appropriate to wonder what happens to this tradition in a new context, where Haitians are generally welcomed by Catholic and Methodist churches. It is well known that the Catholic Church has historically struggled against both the practice of voodoo in Haiti and Afro-Brazilian religion in Brazil, classifying them as 'witchcraft', a practice involving an evil approach. We could hypothesize that despite its strong burden of prejudice and stigmatization, voodoo will still exist among Haitians as a 'cultural system' (Geertz 1973) that is capable of giving meaning, especially in situations of crisis and insecurity, such as the natural disasters in Haiti or the social factors of immigration.

This can be exemplified by a situation when a family member becomes ill or dies. In such cases, it is necessary to return to Haiti for healing—that is, to perform voodoo rituals, aiming to restore the 'order' that has been altered by disease or death.

In this transitional context, being 'Catholic' or 'Evangelic' may be an entry strategy in a new sociocultural context marked by Christian traditions, in the Catholicism or Protestantism versions. There is currently greater tolerance for religions of African origins in the Catholic Church, where members can transition from one religious system to another without major problems. However, the same cannot be said of neo-Pentecostal churches, which oppose, deny and demonize the practices of the African religious universe (Oro 2007). It is worth remembering that the doctrinal positions of religious institutions do not always coincide with those of their followers, who are usually concerned with the search for meaning and solutions to everyday problems.

During my fieldwork in Manaus, I witnessed a situation that could illustrate how voodoo is part of these immigrants' 'worldview', permeating their pathways in the new land. A group of newly arrived Haitians in Manaus were arguing with the nun in charge of their reception in St Gerard Parish. They declared that they did not want to go to a lodge maintained by the Pastoral for Migrants located in a neighbourhood called Zumbi, in the northern part of the city.[3] In addition to the distance from the city centre, which made it difficult for them to access their support network in central Manaus, the name of this place triggered the strong fear in Haitian Voodoo of becoming a zombie—that is, being in a lethargic and drowsy state when one has been considered dead by one's relatives. In this condition, the 'bewitched' person may be subject to any form of manipulation or even slavery (Handerson 2010: 138).

In a process of social integration sometimes marked by the dishonesty of unscrupulous employers Haitian immigrants certainly do not want to be turned into zombies, which would imply becoming slaves. Therefore, the abandonment of employment by Haitian workers, viewed by employers as unruliness or an inability to adapt to the rational universe of labour laws, can be their way of entering the Brazilian labour market in an insubordinate way, which would be the intention of some employers because the Haitians need to work to send money to their families in Haiti.

From this perspective, churches of different denominations have had a key role in the integration process of Haitians in Manaus and other Brazilian cities, especially on their arrival. The role of churches becomes particularly useful for those who cannot count on friends or relatives to address the first challenges every migrant facesthat is, to find work and housing. Other matters—such as how to handle documentation, learning the Portuguese language, obtaining professional qualifications and defending their interests—are some of the services provided to immigrants by churches and non-governmental organizations in the city. In this sense, the Pastoral for Migrants of the Catholic Church has been a place of solidarity and articulation for Haitians in a context sometimes marked by the indifference of local authorities and the prejudice of Brazilians who attribute the arrival of Haitians in Brazil to a Brazilian government initiative.

In general, the image of Haitians in the city is considered to be good because they are regarded as working and polite people who do not get involved in crime. On the other hand, the channels for dialogue with the local context still seem to be incipient. Beyond private initiatives—particularly churches, NGOs and associations—there is no state policy that aims to achieve their sociocultural integration into Manaus. The perception is that the city has become more 'colourful' with their presence. However, the issue that has been raised is how to address this diversity, ranging from localized intolerance (as is the case for some Brazilians who are bothered by their presence in the St Gerard district) to the exoticizing speech regarding Haitians, leading to discrimination.[4]

The Role of Associationism and Cultural Exchanges

Haitian immigrants have organized their own initiatives as a solution to assert their rights and exercise their citizenship in Brazil. Several associations have been created in different Brazilian cities in the last few years, aiming to gather Haitians and create an institutionalized channel for dialogue with local society. Such organizations include the Social Union of Haitian immigrants in São Paulo, the Associations of Haitians in Brasília, the Association of Bento Gonçalves in Rio Grande do Sul, the Association of Balneario Camboriu, the Association of Navegantes, the Association of Chapecó, the Association of Itajaí in Santa Catarina and the Haitians Association of Pato Branco and Cascavel in the state of Paraná.

The problem is that some associations do not make progress for different reasons, including the bureaucratic process of registration or a lack of money to register, internal disputes over divergent interests, or the turnover of its members, who migrate to other cities, paralysing the process. It is worth noting one case in Cascavel, in the state of Paraná, where the registration was denied because the association was considered to be an organization for 'political purposes'. This interpretation was based on Article 107 of the *Estatuto do Estrangeiro* (Foreigners Statute) of 1980, which prohibits foreigners from engaging in any political activity or creating organizations for such purposes. This article contradicts Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution, which, in addition to ensuring equality between Brazilians and foreigners, guarantees the 'full freedom of association for legal purposes'.

The following are examples of different goals defended by associations created by Haitians in Manaus. The Association of Haitian Workers in the Amazon (ATHAM) is one of them. It was set up in 2011 'to become a reference for immigrants and for those who want to learn about Haitian culture and get information about local labour market'. In addition, it proposes 'to promote citizenship and defend the rights of Haitians'. Among the potential partnerships identified by ATHAM there are the Government of Amazonas, the Public Ministry of Labour, the Manaus City Hall, trade unions, the Catholic Church, the Camargo Correa Construction Company, the Federal Police, universities and other institutions. There are prerequisites to being admitted, such as having completed at least high school or equivalent and to have an electricity, water or telephone bill for address verification. Such demands express a selective process because requiring a minimum education to be accepted as a member would exclude the significant portion of Haitians who have not completed high school.

Another association was established with the support of Pastoral for Migrants in February 2016. It is called the Community Association of Migrants and Refugees in the Amazon (ACMRA). Its objectives are:

> To promote activities in the following areas: social, agricultural, cultural, sports, recreational, educational, or to establish social programs and projects under their

responsibility; and to maintain legal, medical, dental and other services for the well-being of members, defending the patrimony, the administrative morality, the environment, the historical and cultural heritage.

In contrast with the admittance rules for ATHAM, residents of Manaus and northern Brazil, migrants, refugees and Brazilian citizens can take part in ACMRA.

In addition to associations already registered, another emerged in July 2015 called the International Community Association (LESPWA, which means 'hope' in Creole). It focuses on meeting social demands beyond the Haitian community of Manaus. Among the goals of this organization are sending money and school supplies to children in Haiti, and supporting projects that facilitate the economic and sociocultural development of Haitians, both in Manaus and in their country of origin.

As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Haitian presence in Manaus—in addition to the economic, social and political issues that it raises—brings out the limits of the multicultural ideology and some of its policies which, on the one hand, aim to protect diversity regardless of cultural practices and, on the other, seem to preserve minority cultures as if they were immutable (Prato 2009a, 2009b: 16). Additionally, the multicultural proposal emphasizes the belonging to a single society and nation-state, imposing limits on cultural exchanges because cultural dynamics is generally permeated by relationships that go beyond location and national states, allowing newcomers to build 'transnational social fields' (Feldman-Bianco 2012: 90). From this point of view, it is no longer possible to observe migration within the well-known conceptual framework, which used to consider it a temporally and spatially defined process between places of origin and destination. Instead, it is necessary to consider other variables, such as re-emigration, return migration and the circularity of people inside a country or between two or more countries involved in a migration process.

Understood as a 'total social fact' (Sayad 1998), migration has economic, social, cultural and political implications in the places of departure and arrival and in the place of transit. From an economic perspective, integration takes place via formal or informal labour markets, but the same cannot be said socially and culturally. The status of immigrants (see e.g. Prato 2016), who are considered by the labour market to be 'temporary workers', faces a series of limits, whether in the exercise of political citizenship or in cultural exchanges, as a result of the prejudice they might face.

Prejudice may impose limits on cultural exchanges; so, as researchers we must be attentive to the cultural recreation processes. In a new context, migrants will have to address a different cultural 'ethos' than the one they used to live by. According to Canclini (2013), in this process of exchange, cultural practices can coexist or hybridize, at least partially (see also Vàquez and Rodríguez 2009). However, Canclini also warns that 'la hibridación no es sinónimo de conciliación' ('hybridization is not a synonym for reconciliation');

instead, 'puede implicar combinaciones tensas y conflictos entre las culturas y estéticas que se entrecruzan desde posiciones desiguales' ('it may involve tense combinations and conflicts between cultures and aesthetics that intertwine from unequal positions') (Canclini 2013, 19).

In this context of cultural 'exchanges', the problem that arises is translation because the re-establishment of a cultural practice in a new context can gain new meaning, either for those who are not familiar with it (Brazilians) or for its protagonists (Haitians). There is nothing better to express this reality than the metaphors created, either within the language or via body aesthetics. From this perspective, the musical and religious universe of Haitians with African, European and Amerindian influences offers several possibilities of exchange or possible hybridizations with the Brazilian cultural context.

Conclusions

After a few years of Haitian presence in Brazil, it may be too soon to draw conclusions about the process of their sociocultural inclusion in the country, owing to the short period of this migration and to the high level of turnover, either to other parts of Brazil or to other countries, such as Chile and the USA. For others, Brazil may be a place of professional achievement via qualification and cultural exchanges. However, the historical experience of immigration in Brazil has revealed that the integration of immigrants does not happen by decree and that this is not a one-way process; rather, it depends largely on how they react to prejudice and how they become organized as an ethnic group to dialogue with the local society (Glick-Schiller 1977; Audebert 2012). To this extent, the urban context seems to be playing a significant role in processes of inclusion.

In this vein, steps have been taken in different cities where associations to represent immigrants have been set up. We must now hope that these initiatives thrive and strengthen the search for a wider citizenship to overcome their dichotomies, including legal matters (opposing Brazilians vs. foreigners), geopolitical matters (classifying them generically by categories, such as Caribbean vs. South Americans) or even cultural matters (reinforcing differences between African Caribbean and African Brazilian traditions).

Perhaps the proposal developed by Édouard Glissant (1997) with the 'archipelago-thinking'—which is inspired by the concept of the Caribbean and Arawak Indians who inhabited the Caribbean Sea islands before the arrival of conquerors—can be useful to consider the Haitian presence, not only in Manaus but also in other parts of Brazil and the world. Similar to the pre-Columbian inhabitants—who felt that they belonged not to an isolated island but to an archipelago—Haitians also move from island to island and across several continents, creating multiple relationships, even when physical presence is impossible. Hopefully, the difficulties they face throughout their paths in Brazilian lands do not turn Haitians into 'islands' but encourage them to continue questioning paralysing ideas and hegemonic cosmologies.

Notes

1. Italo Pardo's analysis of tolerance and trust, and of the relationship between migrants and the autochthonous population in a European urban context, stimulates comparative reflections on these aspects (Pardo 2009, 2012).
2. A meat and vegetable soup is served on Haitian Independence Day, symbolizing the equality and freedom they have earned because, before independence, this dish was restricted to the white elite who ruled Haiti.
3. In the Brazilian context, 'Zumbi' is the name of a black leader who led slavery resistance in Palmares and was decapitated on 20 November 1695.
4. On natives' attitudes towards different groups of immigrants and their culture, see, for example, Pardo (2009, 2012). On socioethnic fields of interaction with particular reference to religious beliefs and practices, see Vàquez and Rodríguez (2009).

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Imagined Multiculturalism in a Malaysian Town: Ideological Constructions and Empirical Evidences

Christian Giordano

INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to highlight the patent divergence between what may be regarded as the official, thus politically significant, version of Malaysia's multicultural and pluriethnic setup as a *consociational state* and its everyday life observed through ethnographic research in an urban setting.

In fact, as will be illustrated in detail, according to the official ideological construction fed to citizens nearly on a daily basis by politicians and the government press, the multicultural and interethnic coexistence is by definition harmonious, trouble-free and without collective traumas. This gives prominence to a sort of cordial equilibrium between the various ethnic communities that to an expert field study researcher, thus rather worldly wise, rings as not necessarily questionable as much as somewhat unlikely.

From the moment a European first lands at Kuala Lumpur's international airport, he is not particularly surprised by the structure's modernity and smooth-running services that are available in similar places in the Old Continent. His amazement increases once he arrives in downtown Kuala Lumpur for work or leisure, and not only because of the Twin Towers, which, though certainly an impressive architectural feat, have been outshined in terms of opulence and height by other skyscrapers in emerging (better yet, emerged) countries in the Far East and the Persian Gulf. What astounds the newcomer is the marked ethnocultural and social complexity and diversity which in Europe has started to

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emerge over the past 20 years but which, using German historian Reinhart Koselleck's terminology (1979, 349 ff.), is not yet fully established in the *space of experience* of European nations and their citizens. For a European, in fact, Malaysian society represents a challenge and a dare. This is because the ideal of ethnocultural homogeneity still cherished by national societies in the Old Continent regards diversity as an anomic phenomenon. Thus, especially if built along ethnic lines, diversity is perceived as an obstacle and a threat to social cohesion, which brings to mind the hazards of *plural societies* put forward by John S. Furnivall (1944).

For an anthropologist, therefore, this experience kindles a veritable need to delve into the actual workings of a society so different from their own, thus to carry out field studies.

The choice of an urban context is essential precisely because this is where cultural diversity is more visible. This is the context in which the difference between multiculturalism and multiracialism invented by politics on the one hand and an everyday life made of tensions, mutual suspicion, stereotypes, prejudice, ironic gibes, ethnic jokes and again conflicts (on extremely rare occasions involving physical violence), permanent negotiations and touch-and-go agreements on the other, may be observed with a wealth of ethnographic data. The theoretical and epidemiological significance of my urban research lies precisely in thematizing the gap between political ideology and everyday life.

MALAYSIA: A PRODUCT OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND A VERY DISTINCT CONSOCIATION

When we talk about 'plural societies', we use a term introduced by John S. Furnivall (1944): an acute British colonial administrator known until now for his analyses regarding the socioeconomic structure of specific societies in Southeast Asia (Burma and Indonesia). However, his observations, though only implicitly, refer to the situation in British Malaya and the Straits Settlements, which now constitute the entire peninsular Malaysia (aside from Singapore, which became an independent state after the separation in 1965).

According to this author, a *plural society* is characterized by 'two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit' (Furnivall 1944, 446).

According to Furnivall, the only circumstance linking these different social orders or, better yet, ethnic communities sharing the same territory is economy and, more specifically, the sheer exchange of goods. The predominant relation among the various groups was therefore material, entirely utilitarian, lacking a social and/or symbolic tie bearing witness to common values and ultimately to a shared identity. According to Furnivall, this link based exclusively on economic considerations, and not on common values, mutual solidarity and fellow feelings, is weak and quite unpredictable, however, as far as a society's cohesion is concerned. Plural societies are practically fated to be social configurations in

which a generalized warfare reigns, since the indiscriminate pursuit of personal economic profit is not curbed by a *shared citizenship* framework (Furnivall 1944: 451). For these reasons, social disorganization and political uncertainty constantly threaten plural societies. Furnivall deserves to be quoted verbatim:

> The community tends to be organized for production rather than for social life; social demand is selectionalized, and within each section of the community the social demand becomes disorganized and ineffective, so that in each section the members are debarred from leading the full life of citizen in a homogeneous community; finally, the reaction against these abnormal conditions, taking in each section the form of Nationalism, sets one community against the other so as to emphasize the plural character of the society and aggravate its instability, thereby enhancing the need for it to be held together by some force exerted from outside. (Furnivall 1944, 459)

From a current point of view, Furnivall's position can certainly seem questionable, and some authors have even challenged the soundness of the term 'plural society' as a socioanthropological notion.[1] In the course of informal conversations, however, a number of local expert colleagues endorsed the term's current validity by stating verbatim: 'we are living even now in a plural society'.

I ought to add, though, that luckily, until now, that obscure and pessimistic scenario at the end of Furnivall's has not come true, with the exception of the interracial riots in 1969. Maybe for Furnivall, as a colonial administrator, this was a way to legitimize also a future persistence of British presence in colonies with this ethnosocial structure.

INDEPENDENCE, DIFFERENTIATED CITIZENSHIP AND HEGEMONIC CONSOCIATIONALISM IN MALAYSIA

In fact, since its independence in 1957, this country has experienced a definite socioeconomic growth and an unexpected political stability. The 'deadly ethnic riots' thematized by American political scientist Dan Horowitz (1985, 2001) occurred solely during a severe crisis, as in the renowned and now distant May of 1969. Those disorders between Malay and Chinese have become a sort of negative national myth—that is, an incident that must never happen again, even though similar, yet far less disruptive, conflicts have occurred at times between ethnic communities in the recent past, and most probably will occur again in the future, since these interethnic tensions are inherent to societies such as the Malaysian one. We need to mention, however, that deadly ethnic riots have been occurring ever more frequently in the USA, the UK, France and also in the latest countries of immigration, such as Italy, Spain and Greece.

Contrary to some stances, I uphold the apparently paradoxical hypothesis that the coexistence of the different ethnic communities that make up Malaysia, especially the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities, was feasible thanks to a

veritable cult of difference, thus thanks to the recognition of ethnocultural diversity. Though not fulfilling everyone's expectations, the *social contract* in force since independence, and subsequently redefined, is based on a prudent if not wary variant of the concept of a *Malaysian Malaysia* as opposed to a *Malayan Malaysia*. The latter case would have meant establishing a national state along the lines of European ones with an entitled nation (the Malay) and extra national minorities (the Chinese, Indians etc.). The former case instead worked towards a more open and inclusive political solution, since, as Bellows aptly points out, 'A Malaysian Malaysia means that the nation and the state is not identified with the supremacy of any particular community or race' (Bellows 1970, 59).

This model of the state diverges from the classic European ones since it takes into account the country's polyethnic and multicultural structure of society. Thanks to this principle, at independence the entire population, without distinction between titular nation and minorities, was granted full citizenship. This is why I prefer defining the Federation of Malaysia as a consociation, in line with Michael Walzer's definition (1997, 22 ff.), rather than as a classic national state.

The constitution of 1957 represents the core of a consociative-like identity bargaining that has created a very specific type of ethnically differentiated citizenship (Hefner 2001, 28) grounded in the fundamental distinction between *natives*—that is, Malays, and the other communities regarded as *indigenous* and *immigrants*, first of all Chinese and Indians. Since the *natives* are economically and professionally the most disadvantaged group, they were granted a special statute concerning economy, education and property rights (especially with respect to land). As per Articles 89, 152 and 153 of the constitution, establishing the fundamental criteria of *affirmative action* regarding the Malays, these have specific territories reserved to them, special regulations for commercial licences, and concessions and quotas in higher education. In return, the so-called immigrants (mainly Chinese and Indians) were granted full Malaysian citizenship, as well as specific rights of religious and linguistic expression within a secular state in which Islam is, however, the state religion.

This institutional compromise, as two experts of this region—Milton J. Esman and Robert W. Hefner—have aptly pointed up, is the outcome of defensive strategies ascribable to reciprocal fears and mistrust that still characterize Malaysian society's different ethnic communities (Esman 1994, 57 ff.; Hefner 2001, 23).

Which fears troubled the different ethnic communities? The Malays and the other indigenous groups, being *bumiputera*—that is, *sons of the earth*, thus *natives*—feared that owing to their patent socioeconomic inferiority they would be overcome by the Chinese and Indian enterprise and suffer the same miserable plight of the Native Americans in North America, as some members of their elites stated verbatim (Esman 1994, 53). Chinese and Indians, instead, were concerned about the future of their flourishing economic activities and of their cultural identity in a state with a strong Islamic connotation. The message

conveyed by this instrument is that, though culturally different, we are all Malaysians; better yet, we are all Malaysians precisely because we can all cherish our diversity in this country.

Most likely, the doctrine of *national harmony*—the principle known as *rukun negara*—was invented because of these widespread fears. This ideological construct, though not very conspicuous in social practices, undoubtedly has a strong symbolic significance. It is a way to proclaim *unity in diversity*, though in practice it is a less optimistic *unity in separation* (Giordano 2012). However, these inventions are also necessary to legitimize the government's power, which to some extent is what has occurred for the past 50 years.

At this point we need to add that, in the context of the above constitutional compromise, public life abides by ethnoreligious boundaries. Because of these borders, the non-*bumiputera* have almost tacitly accepted the political pre-eminence of the *bumiputera* community, especially the Malay one, in exchange for their own economic freedom and supremacy. Consequently, Arend Lijphard speaks of 'hegemonic consociationalism' with reference to Malaysia (Lijphart 1977, 5). However, this asymmetry is far from complete or speaking about consociationalism would be misleading. In fact the federal government has always been a coalition of the three ethnic parties (plus a few minor parties) denominated the National Front (*Nasional Barisan*). From the very start, this coalition has compulsively pursued, better yet striven, to stage a spirit of *consensus* (*musyawarah*) that is difficult if not impossible to attain. Moreover, representatives of the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian Congress as a rule serve as cabinet ministers, although representatives of the United Malays National Organization always hold the key ministries. Accordingly, the office of prime minister is customarily entrusted to a Malay who must, however, be able to play the role of great mediator in case of inter-ethnic conflicts that could jeopardize the nation's unity.

We should also bear in mind that Malaysia is an elective monarchy, but that becoming king (*Yang Dipertuan Agong*) is the exclusive prerogative of the sultans of only nine of the federation's 13 states. Though a purely representative post, it has a strong symbolic value since it signals the political predominance of the Malay over the non-*bumiputera* and the other *bumiputera*.

After 1969, the compromise elaborated by the constitution has proved obsolete and, on several occasions, new forms of negotiated agreements have changed the character of Malaysia's ethnically differentiated citizenship. In spite of contrasts and permanent tensions among the various communities, a collegial and consensual solution has always been reached. Thus, after the 13 May 1969 ethnic riots, a New Economic Policy was launched granting further social rights to the Malays whose socioeconomic situation over the 12 years of independence had worsened compared with the middle and higher strata that were mainly comprised of non-Malays (Faaland et al. 1990, 17 ff.; Gomez 1999, 176 ff.).

In 1991, after a period of sensational and dizzying economic growth, which, apparently at least, somewhat lessened social differences between *bumiputera*

and non-*bumiputera*, the coalition government launched the project Vision 2020, whose primary goal was to finally establish a *bangsa Malaysia*—that is, a united Malaysian nation with a sense of common and shared destiny (Hng 1998, 118). In political practice, this would have meant establishing a consensual, community-oriented democracy (Hng 1998, 118) that would guarantee the existence of a tolerant society in which Malaysians of all colours and creeds are free to practise and profess their customs, cultures and religious beliefs, while feeling that they belong to one nation (Hng 1998, 119).

Vision 2020 aimed to make the concept of ethnically differentiated citizenship more inclusive by means of the notion of *bangsa Malaysia*, which would have brought together the various communities in a single civic body. Through the pursuit of excellence, Vision 2020 endorsed a less ethnic and more meritocratic idea of citizenship. From this point of view, Malaysia drew on Singapore's model of nation based on the combination of two founding myths: *multiracialism* and *meritocracy* (Hill and Lian 1995, 31–33).

When the current prime minister came to power, *Vision 2010* was shelved and substituted with the project called 1Malaysia, which, though endeavouring to distinguish itself from Vision 2020 maintains some of its goals, especially the ones related to the creation of a more cohesive national society where ethnocultural diversity remains an essential element.

Summing up the above observations, Malaysia will probably continue to be an ethnically divided society—that is, a multiethnic and/or multiracial entity based on consensual separation and sociocultural inequalities between natives and immigrants, and among the single ethnic communities. The ongoing tensions and disputes, the permanent negotiations and subsequent compromises and, last but not least, the symbolic and political significance of the cult of difference with its various stagings will still be the cornerstones of the complex construction of both national and local social cohesion in this country founded on *unity in separation*.

The process is not over yet, however, because with its fast-paced economic development, Malaysia is rapidly becoming a country of immigration and will have to tackle this phenomenon that makes the country even more ethnically and culturally diverse. However, this new situation is a challenge to the current *regime of toleration* that will need to be addressed in the near future.

Penang: Urbanity, Consociative Coexistence and Multicultural Cohabitation[2]

George Town, by now known as Penang, was founded for strategic reasons by the British East India Company in 1786 on the island of Pulau Pinang (at the northern passage of the Strait of Malacca). Between 1786 and 1819, on several occasions the British not only tolerated but also encouraged immigration from all over the world (Chinese, Indians, Burmese Malay, Thai, Javanese, Bugis from Sulawesi, Aceh from Sumatra, Armenians, Jews etc.).

However, even after 1819, when growth slumped as a result of the trade decrease caused by competition with Singapore and the drop in international prices for pepper, Penang was still a sought-after destination for potential immigrants. In fact, George Town's population rose from 6000 inhabitants in 1820 to 29,000 in 1824. In 1851, the city already numbered 43,000, and this had grown to by 60,000 in 1860. After this, Penang enjoyed another phase of economic growth favoured by the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) and the extensive introduction into Southeast Asia of *Hevea brasiliensis*, the India rubber tree. For British Malaya, and primarily Penang, this meant a striking sequence of succeeding migratory flows from all over China and southern India. Between 1860 and 1915, Penang became one of the major platforms from which immigrants then spread throughout the region to work on India rubber plantations or, more specifically, in Malaya's zinc mines. Again, colonial administration strongly encouraged this influx, chiefly of Chinese and Indians. The former were held in high esteem for their presumed Confucian ethic, while the Hindu (especially of Tamil origin), owing to their diligence and honesty, were considered *quite useful people* (Leith 1804, 25). These positive representations must be juxtaposed against the negative ones concerning the autochthonous population—the Malay, who had a terrible reputation among the British, as the following passage written by one of Penang's earliest governors proves: 'The proportion of the Malay inhabitants is fortunately very small' [in Penang, Chr. G.] as they are "indolent, vindictive treacherous people … incapable of any labour beyond the cultivation of paddy" and "fit for little else but cutting down trees" ' (Leith 1804, 25).

However, within the remarkable range of motherlands of those who came to Penang, China was definitely the greatest supplier of immigrants. In colonial times, but nowadays as well, they were a very heterogeneous group, both from a social and a cultural (i.e. religious and linguistic) point of view. Besides social disparities within the community that sprang from different causes linked both to their time of arrival and to their previous status in their society of origin, the George Town Chinese belonged to five creeds (Buddhist, Taoist, Confucian, Muslim and Christian) and at least eight linguistic groups (Küchler 1968, 89). Therefore it would be deceptive and misleading to speak of a close-knit national community in a period that included the entire nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century.

References to the Indian community as an ethnically or culturally homogeneous group would be just as misleading. Though the vast majority of immigrants to Penang were Tamil Hindus (of Shivaist tendency), we ought to bear in mind that some, though not many, were Muslims. Moreover, some groups that came from northern India and present-day Pakistan were also Muslim. We also ought to mention the Punjabi Sikhs, who, in the ranks of the British Empire's colonial troops, were stationed in the Straits Settlements, thus in Penang as well. Finally, Catholic Indians, with their distinctive Portuguese surnames, arrived from Kerala and Goa on India's western shores.

Despite religious unity under the banner of Islam, the Malay community itself was quite heterogeneous: on the one hand, a small minority of enterprising Malay merchants from Aceh (northern Sumatra) who, albeit no longer existing, we will look into further on given their important cultural heritage, and on the other, the greater number of 'local Malay'—that is, natives of the Malacca Peninsula—professing a much less strict Islam that merged Hindu and animistic traditions antedating their conversion.

Relations between the various groups were chiefly dictated by economic interests. Up until the end of the nineteenth century, the feeling of belonging to a specific ethnic group was barely unfolding, as the following emblematic example corroborates. Until the late eighteenth century, there was a harsh commercial rivalry between Chinese clans from the Hokkien province (the largest and most powerful group to this day) and those from Canton. This brought on recurrent conflicts (violent ones as well) between the two groups, which disrupted public order in George Town's centre and caused quite a few headaches to the British colonial administration. Moreover, the historical fact is that during these out-and-out wars between Chinese clans, the Aceh merchants repeatedly sided with the Hokkien entrepreneurs simply because the two groups shared well-tested commercial relations that guaranteed steady dealings between Arabia and China—that is, the vital foundation of this small Malay community's economic prosperity. Linguistic, religious and overall cultural differences were certainly not negligible but were left in the background. In any case, the Buddhist-Taoist Chinese from Hokkien had no qualms about joining forces with Muslims from Aceh to foil the loathed and likewise Buddhist-Taoist Cantonese, who responded in kind.

Ever since the founding of Penang in 1786, the British colonial empire, as previously mentioned, had based its domination policy on the *divide et impera* doctrine by encouraging divisions among the various ethnic groups of Palau Penang's society and George Town in particular. To clearly define which communities made up the local social fabric, thanks to a very Eurocentric and rather arbitrary outlook, the British in the end subdivided and reduced Penang's society into three large groups: Chinese, Indians and Malays.

This separation policy was matched by the communities' territorial segregation, each one living in its own district managed by a *kapitan*, who was overseen by colonial authorities and belonged to the corresponding ethnic group. Of Chinese, Indian or Malay origin, the *kapitan* was very familiar with the situation within his own territory and acted as liaison officer between the colonial powers and the community. In the end, he was also a representative of the Crown within the social and physical sphere of which he was in charge. Yet this colonial classification was quite simplistic and sketchy since it did not consider regional and social differences within each community's districts. In fact, the latter were further splintered within their own territory according to place of origin, religious belief, idiom and so on.

The Chinese lived mainly in their specific districts, and most of them, who were mainly businessmen, shopkeepers and artisans, lived and worked in the

city's centre—that is, the renowned Chinatown. Sources indicate that within George Town's Chinese districts there was a correlation between place of origin and occupation (Küchler 1968, 92 ff.). Thus the Cantonese were chiefly goldsmiths, barbers, carpenters and construction hands, while the Hokkien's fields were boat and shipbuilding, India rubber and fish commerce. The Hokkien, along with the Hainanese and the Hokchiu, also worked in catering. The Teochews and Hakka were chiefly farmers, but the latter were also almost the sole owners of pawnshops. Finally, the Henguas mainly dealt with tire and auto repairs (Küchler 1968, 93).

Yet within Chinatown each of these groups lived clustered around the single clan's temples whose acolytes not only shared religious beliefs (mainly Buddhist-Taoist) but also came from the same village and had the same surname. To this day when we tour the Khoo Kongsi, the Lim Kongsi, the Cheah Kongsi or the Yap Kongsi, we are aware that the powerful clans from the Hokkien province lived here in the nineteenth century and to some extent also in the twentieth century. This is also where the so-called *big five* lived—that is, the clans that carved up the opium market among themselves almost monopolistically (Wong 2014).

Unless working on the India rubber plantations outside the city, Indians (mainly Tamil from southern India, as previously mentioned) lived in their own district, which is still known as 'Little India'. Their main line of work was in cloth and spice retail (Küchler 1968, 100). In this case as well, Indian Muslims lived near their own mosques or mausoleums, such as the so-called Kapitan Kling mosque erected by the Chulia (Khoo 2014) and the mausoleum of Sufic tendency, also known as the Nagore shrine dedicated to a pious man named Syed Shahul Hamid, indicating the place where this saintly Muslim died and was buried in Tamil Nadu (Gellner 1969).

The Hindus instead lived close by the Sri Mariamman, a house of worship clearly built in the south Indian style.

Apart from the Aceh merchants who lived in a city district neighbouring Chinatown and located near their own mosque, still unmistakable with its Yemenite-style minaret, all other George Town Malay lived in traditional villages (*kampung*) in the urban area's surrounding countryside working the land, chiefly cultivating rice (Küchler 1968, 103 ff.).

Penang's Current Urban Layout

The current urban setup of the city of Penang is still distinctly along ethnic lines. Compared with the past, however, significant changes have occurred. The city's development over the last 25 years (1990-2015) has been spectacular to say the least. From being a typical colonial, rather provincial and relatively small town, Penang has changed its appearance through considerable construction activity. At a state level, too, there has been significant growth of urban sprawl, especially in the island's western part where the city proper is located. This led to a change in the ethnic structure described in the previous section. However,

the most substantial ethnic components in terms of numbers—that is, Chinese, Malays and Indians—still live in separate and distinct neighbourhoods, though this form of voluntary self-segregation is less noticeable than it used to be.

I ought to add that the underlying reasons for this separation are economic. In fact, the Chinese, being the wealthiest community, live chiefly in areas with the most expensive, if not lavish, houses, such as the ones along Gurney Drive close to the island's most elegant and popular seafront promenade lined with luxury shops. Penang, however, also has other luxurious areas characterized by mansions, some built during colonial times and currently beomg restored. Here, too, the majority of residents are Chinese.

Malays and Indians live in the island's south and south-west areas. These large condominiums, far less upscale than the ones of Gurney Drive, Tanjung Tokong and Tanjung Bungah, are nevertheless respectable and well kept. Equating these residential areas to slums, ghettoes, favelas, bidonvilles or even banlieues would be incorrect. Thanks to specific policies linked to the federal government's affirmative action, the Malays can count on a 5% discount on the purchase of apartments in these condominiums.

The actual ghettoes, of which there are fewer and fewer, are the small number of remaining villages known as *kampung*. As previously mentioned, in colonial times and during the first years following independence, these rural settlements' inhabitants were usually involved in rice cultivation. Nowadays, rice can no longer be grown in Penang's *kampung* since the abovementioned condominiums now rise in their surrounding areas. Those still living in the *kampung*, who may actually be defined as marginalized, are mainly Malay who are permanently unemployed, lack a steady job or are precarious workers. In some cases the Malay from the *kampung* are often reluctant to leave their traditional one-storey houses to move into the healthier multifamily apartment blocks built by the government. Besides, some intellectual circles would like to turn the *kampung* into heritage assets since they are reckoned to be representative of the Malay cultural heritage in the Penangite context where heritage assets are chiefly of Chinese or Indian origin. We shall delve into this aspect further on.

Politics of Heritage: Cult of Difference and Unity in Separation

In July 2008, Penang, together with its sister city Melaka, was officially inscribed in UNESCO's World Heritage Site list after a complex and difficult selection process resulting from disagreements in national politics. Since then the theme of cultural heritage has become central to the city's political, cultural and, last but not least, economic debates, strategies and activities. Heritage became a magic formula, or rather a narrative, on which the present and future could be built by exploiting, better yet, by mobilizing and, if need be, reinventing the past.

Our focus is on the exploitation of this narrative, especially in the political arena, since any careerist politician—that is, any bent on acquiring or maintaining power in Penang—resorts to the term 'heritage'. In fact, heritage represents an almost primary form of capital inherent to the cultural, symbolic, social and ultimately economic sphere (Bourdieu 1979).

Further to this point, I shall analyse a specific symbolic event of which I was able to follow every phase, thanks to the method of participant observation.

I am talking about the Heritage Walk staged in July by the chief minister of the State of Penang Lim Guan Eng, a Chinese Christian hailing from the so-called rival city of Melaka.[3] Lim Guan Eng is also an important politician at a national level since he is the secretary-general of the Democratic Action Party—one of the national opposition parties, in theory a non-ethnic party but actually supported chiefly by Chinese community voters. We can thus grasp why the DAP still has a solid majority in the State of Penang and especially in George Town where the Chinese are in the majority.

The above premise explains why the Heritage Walk staged in July 2013 on the fifth anniversary of Penang's recognition as a World Heritage Site was a crucial event for the city of Penang but also for the political career of Lim Guan Eng, who to this day (2016) is firmly in power despite his somewhat dwindling popularity.[4] Perhaps in this case too, as nearly always in politics, the phrase *sic transit gloria mundi* is apropos.

Let us now delve into the more specifically ethnographic details of the Heritage Walk of Penang's chief minister. This event may be seen as the crowning point of the celebrations marking the fifth anniversary of Penang's inscription on UNESCO's World Heritage List. It consisted in visits to three symbolic places included among the monuments recognized by UNESCO. The chief minister together with government members went first to the Han Jan Ancestral Temple, seat of the Penang Teochew Association. This Chinese temple belongs to the Teochew, a linguistic group with its own specific culture that for economic reasons in the nineteenth century emigrated from southern China to the Malay Peninsula especially—that is, present-day Malaysia and Singapore. Sizeable Teochew communities are also present throughout Southeast Asia, from Indonesia to Vietnam and from the Philippines to Thailand. Gifted with a remarkable entrepreneurial spirit, several Teochew have become prominent figures in trade, and also in politics and artistic activities. Finely decorated and superbly cared for by the Penang Teochew Association, this temple is also a product of the Theochew's prosperity since it has been modified and restored several times, and in 2006, two years before Penang's inscription on UNESCO's World Heritage List, it won the prestigious Asia-Pacific Award for Culture Heritage Conservation. This temple has become a symbolic place not only for the Teochew community but also for Penang's entire Chinese population. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Heritage Walk of the chief minister set off precisely from this location. This choice was certainly a shrewd political tactic of symbolic significance aimed at obtaining wide consensus among the Chinese community, which in turn paid homage to the chief minister with a performance

of the *Monkey Dance*—that is, a representation of human ingenuity. It is common knowledge that Chinese culture uses animal as metaphors for human beings. Ultimately, the *Monkey Dance* staged at the Han Jan Ancestral Temple aimed to emphasize and acknowledge the political skills, perhaps slightly ambivalent but not perforce negative, displayed by the chief minister during his years in power.

The Heritage Walk continued towards the Kapitan Keling Mosque, a place of worship built by the so-called Chulia, a group of merchants from southern India (Tamil Nadu) who settled permanently in Penang when the British arrived in 1786 (Khoo 2014, 109 ff.).[5] The Chulia, however, did business on the Malay Peninsula well before this date. They exploited the monsoon winds to travel back and forth from their homeland, Tamil Nadu. In brief, they were commuters along the Bay of Bengal routes (Khoo 2014, 27 ff.). To this day, this minority community is rather unique since they are Muslim, whereas the vast majority of Tamil are Shivaist Hindus who revere Shiva as the Supreme Being. In Penang's context, the Chulia, also in comparison with the Tamil Hindu, are a group characterized by a centuries-long history of economic and social success (Khoo 2014, 121 ff.). The Kapitan Keling Mosque, located in the most symbolically representative spot of George Town's centre and its most important architectural monument, is the tangible symbol of this success. Moreover, the Chulia, as Muslims, have integrated well into the local Malay society both economically and socially, predominantly through intermarriage, which has led to the emergence of a specific subgroup known as Jawi Peranakan (Khoo 2014, 121 ff.).

During the visit, the chief minister stopped at the cultural event area near the mosque where he visited the photographic exhibition featuring several vintage photos retracing the history of the Chulia after their arrival in Penang, thus also that of the Kapitan Keling Mosque. At the exhibition, expressly conceived and set up in view of the Heritage Walk, there was a cordial exchange of pleasantries along with several photos taken to substantiate the cordial relations between the exhibition's curators in traditional costumes and the chief minister.

Once again, we need to highlight the astuteness of visiting the Chulia community's most symbolically representative place. In fact, one could wonder why Lim Guan Eng neglected to visit a Hindu temple, given the numerical relevance of the Tamil community of that faith. The reason is quite simple. During the 2008 celebrations to promote Penang as a World Heritage Site, Lim Guan Eng, already chief minister at the time, visited Penang's oldest Hindu temple, the Sri Mariamman dedicated to the deity Lord Subramaniam. In this temple built in 1833 and located right in front of the Kapitan Keling Mosque, the chief minister and the Hindu priests exchanged gifts, an event similar to those described by Marcel Mauss (1973). Holding another ceremony at the Sri Mariamman temple, therefore, could have been interpreted by the Chulia as a lack of respect, and proper acknowledgement towards an Indian but not Hindu minority. As we shall see later, lapses in ethnoreligious sensitivity often cause

strongly emotional reactions, which in turn generate tensions between the various cultural communities.

The Heritage Walk proceeded towards the third destination: the Malay mosque, generally known as Masjd Melayu.[6] This designation is inaccurate, however, as it ought to be called Aceh or Acehnese Mosque, since historically speaking this mosque was designed and built by immigrants from the Aceh peninsula at the northern end of Sumatra. This ethnically and linguistically Malay group was culturally influenced to a notable degree by Yemenite Islam because of close economic relations with traders and skilled seafarers from the Hadramaut coast (Arabian Peninsula). The Acehnese, though, were a mixed population owing to their commercial and religious relations with the Hadrami. On this point we need to consider the common practice of mixed marriage between Acehnese e Hadrami that certainly encouraged cultural exchanges between the two groups and boosted hybridity.

Ever since the times of the Western world's Middle Ages, the Hadrami had specialized in the incense trade in particular, transporting their wares by sea from present-day Yemen to Aceh. Expert seafarers, the Hadrami would exploit the wet monsoon winds to navigate eastwards across the entire Indian Ocean and the dry monsoon winds to navigate westwards. From the region of Aceh on the northernmost tip of Sumatra, the *Hadramized* Acehnese would then transport the incense at first to the Malacca Peninsula (initially to the city of Malacca itself) and later on, following its establishment, to George Town. Here, Chinese merchants would buy the incense that they would sell in China especially. For the Chinese, incense was, and still is, a highly valued commodity and is used in their syncretistic religious ceremonies stemming from Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism.

This is the historical reason for the birth of this mosque, whose minaret unmistakably mirrors the architectural style of the Yemenite ones along the Hadramaut coast. Nowadays, however, the Acehnese, with their creolized culture, are no longer present because they have assimilated into the Malay population also through intermarriage, given the affinity of the Muslim religion. Yet one still comes across surnames approaching genuine Arab ones. This explains why the mosque is also inaccurately called Masjd Melayu.

During the walk, at less than 100 metres from both the Kapitan Keling Mosque and the Han Jan Ancestral Temple, by chance the chief minister and his entourage met a group of students on a fieldtrip. The class recognized Lim Guan Eng and both female and male students had group pictures taken with him.

The next stop was in front of the Acehnese Mosque for a performance of traditional Malay martial arts involving about 20 men and women, the latter wearing the *tudung*, a clear symbol of Islamic identity, and all wearing more or less the same outfits and some carrying wooden staffs.[7] There were three different types of performance: men against men, women against women and finally men against women. Clearly, the entire show was carried out without resorting to actual physical violence and involved only strictly necessary physical

contact. To a Western observer it resembled a ballet rather than a boxing match.

Concluding this ethnographic presentation, I should like to draw attention to the important fact that the atmosphere throughout the entire Heritage Walk event was extremely relaxed and above all without the visible presence of police or bodyguards. Even I was able to freely get up to 50 centimetres away from the chief minister and take some close-up pictures. The dress code, too, was very casual: the chief minister and his team all wore printed t-shirts with '5th Anniversary George Town World Heritage Site Celebration' on the front and *Perayaan Warisan* on the back.[8]

From the point of view of political anthropology, the Heritage Walk is clearly linked to the question of the political management of ethnocultural diversity aimed at maintaining social cohesion in a country characterized by a marked internal difference in terms of the social representations and practices of its various groups.

The fact of selectively yet very purposefully going to various essential symbolic places of Penang's different ethnocultural components also shows that the itinerary was designed so as to not upset any single community. In fact, the triad Chinese-Indian-Malay, in which the idea of an *ethnically differentiated consociation* rather than a European-like *nation* is rooted (Walzer 1997, 22 ff.), was mirrored in the Heritage Walk, though in a somewhat less classic fashion.

The Heritage Walk was also an excellent staging, or perhaps a metaphor of the previously mentioned *unity in separation*—a reality that to a liberal-oriented Western observer may seem paradoxical at first, but which in Malaysia is perfectly normal. In fact, the three communities involved (including as well the Muslim Chulia)—the Chinese, the Indian as well as Muslim Chulia and finally the Malay—not once came in contact with each other and perhaps were unaware of the performances staged by the other communities. Yet this division along ethnic and religious lines is the cornerstone of the actual practices of *toleration*, which are in contrast with certain Western ideologies of *tolerance* considered universal.[9] Therefore this specific form of toleration stems from a voluntary self-exclusion producing a necessary *cultural intimacy* (Herzfeld 2004), which to a Western observer may seem to smack of ghettoization. Finally, Asherson is most probably right in his analysis of the problematic coexistence of ethnic groups in the coastal cities of the Black Sea when he states that *cultural promiscuity*, at times forced and politically generated, is precisely what triggers the emergence of nationalisms, thus also the resulting bloodied conflicts that have torn apart this region even in recent times (Asherson 2007, 245).

To avoid stumbling into a naïve interpretation, as is often the case with anthropologists and which may actually be prompted by the ethnographic data, we need to ask ourselves whether Penang and Malaysia in general may be characterized as a success story. In point of fact, this is a situation of permanently unstable equilibrium of which federal, regional and local politicians are

aware and have been to which they have been responding accordingly. As in all consociations so aptly characterized by Michael Walzer, this type of situation requires constant governance, which above all implies permanent negotiations and constant compromises determined by the will to remain nonetheless united though ethnoculturally separate. Thanks to anthropological research in the urban context, we are able to reconstruct the sociopolitical course that has led Malaysia in general and Penang in particular to become one of the most dynamic small-scale (territorially speaking) tigers in Southeast Asia. The future, however, will prove whether this development model, an extremely complex one in terms of interethnic relations, stays that way.

Conclusion: The Relevance of Urban Research in Anthropology

Nowadays, urban anthropology is no longer the poor relative it was regarded to be up until just a few years ago (Pardo and Prato 2012, 1–2; 9–10; Pardo et al. 2015). One could even say that by now it has become a widespread and essential strand of anthropological theorization and empirical research (Forum 'Urban Anthropology' 2013 and 2014). This is also certainly a result of globalization, which has unquestionably stimulated significant urbanization processes (Prato and Pardo 2013, 97–100), given that the urban population is steadily on the rise. Thus the focus of interest of anthropology's empirical research has shifted and the former focus based on the study of so-called archaic societies—that is, primitive or peasant societies—rightly or not reckoned culturally homogeneous, becomes increasingly marginal. Studying the various dimensions of urban reality does not entail for an anthropologist a legitimization nowadays.

What I wish to point out in particular is that urbanity is definitely the place where intercultural coexistence, one of the most socially important and hot topics of modernity, can be best explored both extensively and in detail. In fact, this is where the mingling and clashing of different cultures, ethnicities and collective identities occurs. Here in the cities, rather than in somewhat isolated and homogeneous villages, is precisely where the political aspect of difference becomes visible.

The interesting aspect is not so much the cultural and ethnic diversity but rather its political management, since the intercommunity tensions, inherent in coexistence in a multicultural context, need to be governed by those in power. I believe that Penang, as a genuinely urban settlement with its great variety of narratives, metaphors, representations, strategies, tensions, controversies and conflicts (non-violent until now), is an interesting example of how urban anthropology may prove to be groundbreaking for anthropological theory in general, as well as an inspiration to and encouragement for comparative research in other similar societies that are increasingly facing the thorny challenge of intercultural relations.

Notes

1. Recent social analysis has addressed pluralism in terms of cultural values, thus going beyond strictly economic considerations. See, for example, Krase's discussion (2009) of the difference between multiculturalism and cultural pluralism.
2. In this chapter, Penang does not refer to the state of the Federation of Malaysia but rather, in line with local usage, to the city of George Town's neighbourhoods and contiguous developments, such as Tanjung Tokong, Tanjung Bungah, Jelutong, Bayan Lepas in the eastern part of Penang Island.
3. Not to be confused with the prime minister, who heads the federal government in Kuala Lumpur, a chief minister heads a local government, in this case that of the State of Penang.
4. At the time of writing, Lim Guan Eng has been accused of Graft-related offences by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission and formally indicted before the Penang Sessions Court. The charges, however, may turn out to be a political plot hatched by his adversaries (*The Straits Times*, 29 and 30 June 2016).
5. During colonial times, the *Kapitan* was the representative of an ethnic or religious community. *Keling* is the term used by Malays to refer to Indians.
6. Masjd Melayu means Malays' mosque.
7. The *tudung* is akin to the Arab *hijab* because it covers the hair, ears and neck but not the face. In Malaysia it is more of an ethnic than a religious mark of distinction and is a way to differentiate oneself especially from the Chinese and Indians.
8. *Perayaan Warisan* in Bahasa Malaysia may be translated as 'heritage celebration'.
9. On the key distinction between tolerance and toleration, see Prato (2009, 13–14, n. 17).

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Urbanity Beyond the City

Urban Development and Vernacular Religious Landscapes in Seoul

Liora Sarfati

In July 2014 I meet an Israeli government official working in Seoul who was surprised to learn that my research focuses on possessed Korean shamans (*manshin*) and that large numbers of such spiritual practitioners exist in the city. The next day he invited me to his office for a longer talk about my impressions of Seoul. He introduced his office staff, women in their 20s or 30s, Koreans who are well versed in English. 'They do not think that there are many shamans in Seoul,' he exclaims. I understood that I was in for a kind of test. My story must have seemed too far-fetched to be real. We started chatting in English, and the staff members politely enquire how I learned Korean and why I study shamanism. Have I really met a shaman in Seoul? I answered that I know quite a few practitioners of that vernacular religion and asked if they had met any. They giggled in embarrassment, and then the official urged us: 'Do it in Korean.' When we switched to the language that he could not understand, the talk became less formal. I told the secretaries how much I enjoy shamanic rituals, artefacts and music, and slowly their own stories began to emerge. Of course they all knew that there are *manshin* in Seoul. One had her fortune told as a teenager, and another had her marriage date decided after a *manshin* consulted with spirits of natural elements. I asked if they watched the popular television series *The Lotus Flower Fairy* (2004–5, director Yi Chinyŏng), which dramatizes the story of a young *manshin* over 174 episodes. We began discussing plot details and agreed that it was a fascinating story. Even the staff members who had never met a *manshin* in real life knew that they are mostly women, and how they practise supernatural mediation, possession trance and divination. Seoulites spend much time watching media products and their knowledge and attitudes are based, at least to some extent, on such mediated representations of the world. The official inter-

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vened in our conversation and asked me: 'So, do they or don't they know shamans?' Reluctant to reveal what was said in the shelter of a language foreign to him, I suggested: 'Why don't we meet some together?'

The next Friday, we embarked on an unofficial tour of Seoul's northern side. We visited the Shamanism Museum, established in 2013 by my dissertation fieldwork adviser, Prof. Yang Chongsŭng (Jongsung). To our delight, we met there the famous Manshin Kim Namsun, who came especially to join us. Manshin Kim had been participating in my research for the past ten years and was curious to meet a high-ranking foreign official. The visitors hear explanations about the various artefacts and are invited to bow and make a wish in front of a reconstructed altar on display. Later, I saw that Prof. Yang had uploaded a photograph of our visit to the museum's blog. I suggested that we continue to a rental shrine complex located on the hill above the museum. I was not sure if a shamanic ritual (*kut*) would be held there then but we would meet some interesting people, and see altars and sacred trees. While approaching the shrine we heard the loud drumming of a *kut*. We got lucky. The next hour was spent with the official and his wife standing, eyes wide open, while two rituals were being held simultaneously in adjacent shrine rooms. In one, an old *manshin* was commemorating a deceased person, holding his framed photograph and later inviting his soul to descend into her body for his family to consult and appease. In the other room, a younger practitioner was chanting in front of a young couple who could not have children. She took a live chicken and rubbed it on the barren man's face. Then she lit a piece of cloth and the flames were tossed around. The chicken was flung wildly above the couple's head to exorcize the spirits that were believed to be afflicting them. The Israeli official and his wife were convinced. There is a lively shamanic scene in Seoul. At the rental shrine, just behind a fancy residential area and a prestigious university, this was just another ordinary day.

In this chapter I maintain that the diverse and extensive presence of vernacular religion in Seoul makes even controversial practices, such as spirit mediumship, an inseparable part of the experience provided by the city. Persecution by the government in the 1970s and continuous disapproval by the literati elites have not liquidated various forms of divination and possession practices. Moreover, with the help of new-media promotion the practitioners have gained legitimized places to perform rituals and tell their myths and supernatural revelations. Contrary to the assumption of the Israeli official (before he met several *manshin*), most Seoulites are well aware of the existence of such perceived-ancient religious traits. Traditional belief systems and practices are well established in this megametropolis side by side with its elaborate futuristic architecture and technologically dense lifestyle. I have explored this religious urban landscape using participant observation and in-depth discussions and interviews since 2005.

In the early days of anthropological research in urban spaces, much of the scholarly debate was about whether cities should be explored using the same methodologies as in rural communities, and more broadly if cities are proper

sites for anthropological investigation (Prato and Pardo, 2013). These questions are answered positively through the insights and understanding that I and other anthropologists working there have gained from our close encounters with Koreans in Seoul (see e.g. Abelmann 2003 and Nelson 2000). This relatively new city was resurrected from the ashes of the Korean War in 1953 to become the centre of most of South Korean lifestyle, cultural developments and trend creation. As Prato and Pardo (2013) point out, it would be unnecessary and misleading to define clearly where the city begins and ends, as was attempted by leading scholars in the 1970s. The metropolis is ever expanding through a sophisticated creation of roads and subway lines, as well as networks of symbolic practices and activities related to consumerism and perceived global trends. In the rural areas, the inhabitants use service towns where the same chain cafe's, clothing stores and banks prevail as in the city. Similarly, dwellers in Seoul can shop in rural-style markets and little stores that are still widely spread across the city. While more than half of the population in Korea live and work in and around Seoul, regional family backgrounds are still dominant in identity formation. Seoul is often called a 'global city', but this term has come to be problematized to include also the uniqueness of each such place (Prato and Pardo 2013, 97). Therefore ethnography in this city does not produce an image of a sheer international highly technologized living space. It also shows strong local ideologies, practices and traditions. In order to produce insights from close encounters with *manshin* and other Seoul dwellers, my research became a 'multi-sited ethnography that at once offers an in-depth understanding of how people relate to the wider system beyond their neighbourhood and workplace and links nicely the analysis of micro-processes to the complexity of macro-level influences' (Prato and Pardo 2013, 96–7).

Cities are portrayed in public discourse and the media as sites of sophistication and technological progress, while city dwellers are seen as more intellectually gifted, creative, business oriented and globally informed than rural people (Florida 2002). Seoul, the largest South Korean metropolis, is perceived worldwide as the birthplace of Samsung and other technological innovations that challenge Western economic supremacy. However, as shown here, the city also offers extensive landscapes of aggregated traditional symbolism. Seoul's unique 'personality' is characterized simultaneously by innovation-inspired structures and lifestyles and various tokens of Korea's vernacular religions. Following the analysis of Steve Pile (2005), who looks for the slippery notion of cities' individuality, I explore the uniqueness of religious behaviours and material representation of cultural ideas in this urban cluster.

The religious landscape of Seoul is characterized by thousands of Christian churches, Buddhist temples, shamanic shrines and diviners' offices, all in a poetic relation with the local grounds. The interactions between structures and the people who use them or view them construct meanings and forms. Landscapes 'come into being only at the moment of their apprehension by an external observer, and thus have a complex poetics and politics' (Cosgrove 2006, 50). Churches were built in the early twentieth century close to

landmarks such as the King's Palace and the City Hall to maintain visibility around power centres. Churches amid neighbourhoods characterized by many *manshin*'s homes and shrines intend to proselytize the superstitious residents. In the early twentieth century, Kuksadang, the most famous shamanic shrine in Seoul, was moved from its original location on Nam mountain (*namsan*) to a less auspicious place as a demonstration of power by the occupying Japanese authorities. Considering the semiotics and aesthetics of spaces, that city dwellers move through is crucial in order to understand the emotional impact of materiality on urban life. My observations in Seoul yielded a theoretical understanding that articulates and adds to Aitken's conclusion: 'Spaces are active and powerful parts in the ways we as individuals, and we, as parts of families, communities, societies, cultures, and politics, apprehend and change the world' (Aitken 2014, 7–8). These activities, in turn, are closely related to historic events, political engagement, technological developments and dynamic cultural trends.

I specifically explore the relationships between the religious beliefs of people living in Seoul and spatial considerations that span well beyond the intention of these individuals. Both the religious and the practical considerations of geographical allotment of land are embedded in the vernacular cultural constructions and have been evolving and practised in uniquely Korean manners for hundreds of years. In the nineteenth century, *manshin* were banned by law from entering the city. Therefore, areas right next to the old wall's gates have become the hub of many divination offices. The relationships between humans and supernatural beings are experienced as a daily reality by many of Seoul's dwellers. Some who have made this belief system the centre of their lifestyle and livelihood serve as advisers to others, who use this practice at random. Everyone acknowledges the tradition of fortune telling as a Korean cultural trait.

Similar definitions of spiritual mediators abound in other cities too. Pardo describes how in Naples, in a Christian context, individuals who are 'regarded as having special personal qualities and access to special resources among the living and the dead … respond to unorthodox requirements of the relationship between actors' outcome oriented action, the moral demands of their identity and social norms' (1996, 104). I find this rendering of mediating between the living and the dead especially appealing in the Korean case because a negative stigma applied to fortune tellers and *manshin* as gain-seeking exploiters still abounds in the local discourse and in some media depictions. However, in all my encounters with *manshin* I have not met one who neglected her professional and personal morality or who treated with disrespect what she believed was the supernatural cosmos around her. In the Confucian world order, women who perform dances in public are seen as immoral and rude. Yet, from the Buddhist perspective, the function of these rituals in pacifying the dead and helping suffering clients who need spiritual consultation is perceived by the *manshin* and many others as a moral action of grace. This multilayered structure of morality has been at play in the designation of places for vernacular

religious activity. Even when Confucian-oriented rulers tried to marginalize these cultural trends, *manshin* and other fortune tellers managed to maintain their trade. They managed to do so even when they had to move outside the city walls. As in Naples, spiritual practitioners are considered marginal in society and raise suspicion because they gain monetary benefits by prophesizing. At the same time, in Seoul they take a leading and visible role in many locales that are described below. In contemporary Seoul, fortune tellers enjoy more freedom in erecting their consultation facilities, especially around the New Year. Fischer has discussed *adaptive agency* as the capacity to change the options available and to actualize these as viable choices using the help of others (Fischer 2008). In a similar process, personal levels of activity by fortune tellers in Seoul are supported by cooperation with clients, co-practitioners and city officials.

Within Korea's religions, shamanism, divination and ancestor rites are categorized as indigenous vernacular trends; they are initiated by individuals and repeated regularly by other individuals with similar intentions and structures to form a norm (Howard, 2006). Indeed, as Primiano (1995) argues, vernacular practices are based on individual interpretations of events and traditions, a feature that allows the adaptation of ancient belief systems to the fast pace of contemporary South Korea's urbanity.

Spatial patterns have changed in Seoul as a result of fast urbanization, increases in land prices and traditional neighbourhoods and professional zoning. The resulting composition is at the same time ordered and chaotic. Some streets are straight and lined with high-rise glass-covered office buildings, while just behind them winding steep alleys remind one of the old-time rural geographical layout. In this process, some aspects of Korea's divination and shamanism have become more homogenized and supervised, such as the government-supported shamanic rituals that serve as national emblems of Korea's unique indigenous cultures (Sarfati 2014). Still, within the city most practitioners enjoy the freedom of unsupervised self-promotion and ritual production that are less common in the more institutionalized Buddhism and Christianity. This urban phenomenon reflects and constitutes intricate relationships between micro- and macroprocesses. The individual need to consult diviners and perform exorcisms is enabled and accentuated by the city's acceptance of signposted divination huts and shrines. As suggested by Pardo's research in Naples (1996, 11), material and non-material aspects in people's life interact continuously, resulting in unique worldviews and actions. Typical production of meaning through interaction with spaces of vernacular religious activity is endemic to Seoul; at the same time, it is but another case of urban lifestyle, similar in parts to the situation in other 'global cities'.

The effect of vernacular religion on the urban landscape of Seoul will be examined below through three cases of interaction between urban dwellers and practices of vernacular religion. The first case is many divination tents in central downtown spots. The second is shamanic shrines in hills and mountains around Seoul that become a debated ground when the city extends and encapsulates

their sites. The third case is the representation of vernacular religion in the Korean media. An ethnographic enquiry into cultural trends in Seoul cannot ignore mass-communication platforms. As an anthropologist working in such an urban setting, I feel that in order to understand better the views of my informants, I must risk my methodological integrity and face 'the perceived danger of interdisciplinarity' (Prato and Pardo 2013, 94). The combination of these three cases offers a holistic perspective of Seoul as an intersection of an ultramodern hypertechnologized society and ancient cultural roots. Before I turn to the case studies, I shall discuss the manner in which Seoul dwellers experience vernacular religion.

Religious Experience in the City

As I have said, it would be unrealistic to separate the mode of living that utilizes ancient concepts and beliefs from the one that offers technological innovation. Instead, I offer an analysis that includes both within the term 'tradition', following Henry Glassie's suggestion that this word represents ways of using the past to create a future (1995, 395). Koreans who reside and travel in the urban maze of Seoul are exposed to tradition through structures and the activities held in them. A shared understanding of local customs serves as common ground for most Seoulites. These traditions encapsulate many symbols stemming from a collective (somewhat imagined) past that continuously develops and adapts to their densely populated South Korean present.[1]

A city such as Seoul is so dense that a person can hardly fathom it as real. Steve Pile observes that for many city dwellers the masses of people project a ghost-like quality making the city a kind of phantasmagoria (2005, 20). At the same time, this dreamlike life, which is so far from the primordial human state, might create a need to feel supported by beliefs in the supernatural. Mysticism can fit the confused personal experience of a city dweller, as Pile suggests after discussing voodoo in New Orleans and vampires in Singapore (2005, 72).

Yumin, a university professor who lives on her own near her parents' apartment, related her disappointment at her mother's belief in shamanic practitioners. She told me how her family pressured her to marry and how, in order to maintain a 'decent face', she had to hide that she did not reside in her parents' home. She did not feel the urge to marry because she was afraid that a husband might object to her prestigious full-time job. Furthermore, witnessing how gravely the death of her uncle had affected her aunt had added to Yumin's feeling that married life could harm her. Her mother consulted with a *manshin* on how to improve the situation of her grieving sister and unmarried daughter. The *manshin* offered to conduct secret services in the hills around Seoul without the family's participation. She also demanded a modest fee. Yumin recognized that the relationship with the *manshin* appeased her worried mother but she thought that other practitioners were fake and 'money seekers'. In many stories I heard the same inclination to state that a certain familiar *manshin* is a good person who wants to help people, while subscribing to the prevalent

stigma attached to the practice in general. Divination and spiritual mediation are intersubjective, especially in a situation that allows diverse attitudes to exist side by side, as is the case in Seoul's urban culture. Ingold rejects the idea that we occupy an 'intersubjective space marked out by our mental representations' (1993, 154). But even if there is ontological existence in urban spaces, the same objects can be understood differently by various city dwellers and policy-makers. The amount of time spent by each individual in observing, construct-ing and commenting on urban landscape marks, such as shamanic shrines, might create a differential reaction to the same experience. In Seoul, some city dwellers, such as Yumin's mother, use establishments of vernacular religion regularly and are glad to find these wherever they go in the city; others, such as Yumin, find the expressions of ancient beliefs unfit for their modern/Christian/ scientific perspectives. Prejudice against vernacular religious practices contin-ues to exist in significant parts of Korea's society (Kendall 1985; Kim C. 2003).

The discomfort experienced by some of Seoul's urbanites in relation to *manshin* and fortune tellers stems from both ideas and materiality. Diviners, shamans, fortune tellers and other spiritual healers use every advertisement venue available, including the Internet (Sarfati 2016). These new media of information transmission enhance the word-of-mouth system and increase the possibility of chance encounters between city dwellers and *manshin*. Controversial ideologies, such as the vernacular religion displayed in the streets, might cause emotional distress, but street patterns and geographical complex-ity can be even more disorienting (Jameson 1991). Route finding in Seoul is notoriously difficult because most streets have no name. While local taxi drivers are a trusted source of path finding who even know where the diviners' offices are located (they do not appear on GPS maps), *manshin* help their clients by placing subway posters and hanging signs along the way from the nearest sub-way station. Thus, individuals can choose a religious practitioner after seeing these promotional signs. This takes place in a situation where Seoul is charac-terized by the clutter of advertisements and small maps attached to walls and street signs. 'A place owes its character to the experiences it affords to those who spend time there- to the sights, sounds, and indeed smells that constitute its specific ambience. And these, in turn, depend on the kinds of activities in which its inhabitants engage' (Ingold 1993, 156). If we look at the city from a 'theoretical perspective of comprehending the urban from a phenomenological platform as a "lived space" ' (Channa 2013, 212), we can see how the extensive visibility of vernacular religion in the city adds to the character of Seoul and to the experiences that it offers. 'Urban society cannot be seen so "imperson-alised" that existing social and political set-ups including sacred elements cease to operate; deep-rooted social and cultural elements, and their political ramifi-cations, are evident in the way in which resources and space are distributed in urban areas and in which urban dwellers live their lives' (ibid.).

Rapidly changing cityscapes house a multitude of simultaneous events. Some *manshin* move into the downtown area, while others move outwards to the suburbs; in one square a shamanic *kut* ritual is held, while in another there

is a catholic mass. This polyphonic quality is apparent in the material existence and constant production of the city's lived landscape. Ingold (1993: 160) compares life in the city to an orchestra. Extending this metaphor, we could search for the producers, players and conductors of the urban materialization of folk belief in Seoul. In the cases discussed below, these considerations are taken into account when exploring how vernacular religion affects the cityscape.

Divination Booths in Downtown Seoul

About a month before each New Year's Day, Seoul's downtown is flooded with cloth or polyester tents and booths housing hundreds of fortune tellers. Divining one's future before each New Year is an ancient and documented practice in Korean culture. In village settings, people had to choose from a few known practitioners who could divine the future. In the city, this practice has evolved into large temporary camps housing diviners of all sorts, who cater for clients who have little if any previous acquaintance with them (Fig. 28.1).

The tents are located in central plazas, notoriously near T'apgol Park, and they multiply before the New Lunar Year (around February). Such spatial expressiveness demonstrates that Seoul allows its dwellers to practise a mass materialization of emotions and religious engagement. The stories of clients and practitioners convey religious eclecticism and tolerance. For a few weeks, the whole range of Korean vernacular religions is on display in a mixed

Fig. 28.1   A line of temporary divination tents near T'apgol Park in downtown Seoul

community where *manshin* and various other practitioners work side by side with no visible contempt. Such diviners normally work inside their offices and houses, located throughout town, and especially in neighbourhoods outside the old city walls, because of the aforementioned nineteenth-century ban. More recently, a 'divination café' phenomenon has sprung up in various entertainment areas, such as the Apgujŏng Rodeo Street and Hongdae University Quarter. The New Year month is the peak of their business and many venture into public spaces in search for more clientele. The municipality accepts this practice as a part of the urban experience of Seoul and as a need of its dwellers, and these squatters are not evicted.

Various divination methods have been employed in Korea, including kinds of astrology, analysis of spatial combinations of coins, sticks or rice thrown by the client, reading facial feature, hands and eyes, and even recently imported traditions such as tarot cards. Even people who see themselves as non-religious and do not practice any particular creed in their daily lives can be seen visiting such diviners before making crucial decisions such as marriage, establishing a business or choosing a college. Janelli (1980) shows how fortune tellers try to make predictions that would fit their clients' life based on background information that they solicit during fortune telling sessions. The reputation of diviners might be harmed if their divinations do not materialize. The commodification of this practice includes various models of interaction, some egalitarian, while others can be considered as done mostly for profit (Kim D. 2015).

Changing the landscape through the mass cooperation of individuals is not exclusive to the urban landscapes of Korea. Many rural towns host large-scale festivals each year, where thousands gather for a few days of traditional music, performance, food and crafts, all arranged in white tents in an open public space. Nourished by these traditional temporary space arrangements, Seoul's practitioners of vernacular religion prepare their tents in downtown Seoul before the New Year. If only a few people would place such divination tents in the streets, the effect on the cityscape would be minor. However, the landscapes of the mass divination tent camps in several central spots downtown reflect how 'the city is overdetermined spatially' (Pile 2005, 172): one cannot walk in downtown Seoul before the New Year without noticing the activity generated around the tents. Vernacular religion makes itself present in the city through this mass event. A tourist office slogan coined by the Korean government asserts that Seoul is the 'Soul of Asia'. Pile argues: 'What is real about cities is the sheer expressiveness and passion of its life' (Pile 2005, 1–2). Seoul's expressiveness around New Year's Day demonstrates that it allows its dwellers to materialize a mass iteration of emotions and religious engagement over a long period of time. This might be the city's uniqueness and soul.

Sites of Shamanic Rituals in the City

Seoul is a huge metropolis where 25 million people reside across an urban stretch that has extended to include Inch'ŏn, Suwŏn and similar subway-connected suburbs about 40 kilometres away from the city's centre. People

from all over Korea have been migrating to Seoul in increasing numbers since the 1950s. This has created an area with a multiregional population where *manshin* who practice *kut* styles from various geographic origins now reside close to each other. Most of these urbanized migrants cannot travel often to their hometown shrines. When they settled in the Seoul area, they had to find new places to perform. Many sacred mountain shrines are now on the outskirts of Seoul or even in its suburban residential areas.

Until the 1970s, *kut* rituals were usually held at the clients' house or at a communal village shrine (Kendall 1985). In Seoul, the municipal law against noise has prevented most *manshin* from practiaing at their clients' homes or in their own apartments (Kendall 1996). Only short quiet rituals and advising sessions are performed in residences. While the anti-noise law intended to eliminate or reduce shamanic activity in general, as was officially stated in the government-promoted 'New Community Movement' in the 1970s, it has simply resulted in a change of location. Rental shrine rooms, like the one described at the start of this chapter opening, were established on mountain slopes in and around Seoul and the practice continued. These privately owned shrines have few neighbours who might complain about the noise. The locations are chosen in relation to beliefs in supernatural entities, such as mountain gods.

Most *manshin* have a shrine that they prefer, often a specific room within one structure, where they practise whenever possible. Such shrines are often located in a row of roughly constructed rooms that from the outside look like a small industrial structure or improvised residential place. Several have been installed in premises previously occupied by restaurants that had closed as a result of misfortunes, such as fire or death on the premises, which made them unfit for business but suitable for shamanic practices.[2] Such a place must have a large kitchen, sufficient to feed *manshin*, their clients and the audience throughout the event. In a central place in the courtyard there are sacred trees marked with colourful cloth streamers and an altar with bottles of alcoholic drinks, sweets and other offerings. Improvement in public transportation and increased ownership of private cars makes worship on mountains easy and combines aspects of pilgrimage with *kut* rituals held outside the residential areas. This new trend does not encourage worship of house gods in situ, a practice that has been declining anyway with temporary urban residence patterns.

Owners of rental shrines are usually not *manshin* but their relatives or unrelated entrepreneurs. Female cooks help to arrange offering altars and fold costumes during and after rituals. When many helpers are needed for a specific rite, they are often recruited among the shrine's workers. For example, in the *tari-kut*, at least four helpers are needed to hold the half-torn ends of cloth bridges that symbolize the connection between the living and the dead. The *manshin* then rips the long white cloths apart by walking through them in a symbolic act of detaching the deceased from their relatives and transferring their souls peacefully to the other world. The cooks regard their help in this ritual act as a meritorious privilege. They contribute to helping the spirits of the deceased and in return these spirits will watch over them in the future. Male

employees in shrines serve as porters and butchers, who come to the site of animal sacrifice to cut the carcass after the initial offering has been made. Pieces of meat are taken to the shrine and some parts, such as the head, are usually cooked in the kitchen and then brought back to the altar (Fig. 28.2).

The shrine also serves as a retail point for goods used during *kut*, such as caffeinated soft drinks and cigarettes, which are priced higher than in ordinary shops. Cooking, handling the meat, serving the *manshin* and the audience, and discarding offerings as instructed by *manshin* used to be tasks performed by the family sponsoring the ritual. However, contemporary urban rituals are more private in nature, with less involvement of family and community. The extensive support from cooking to burning the artefacts cannot be fulfilled by the handful of ritual sponsors. Rental shrines' staff now undertake these supporting roles, thus becoming cultural professionals who are knowledgeable in the ritual norms of various styles and geographical origins.

ANCIENT SHRINES IN CONTEMPORARY USE

The demolition, relocation or preservation of ancient shrines in the city has been tightly related to historical, political and religious discourses relevant at the time when a decision was made about each shrine's site. The views of city dwellers on these issues can differ from those of planners and policy-makers, who sometimes seem to ignore the fact that the landscape should be conceptualized as a cultural process that affects individuals (Lee 2012). Some shrines

Fig. 28.2   Meat offerings in a *kut* ritual at a rental shrine in the north of the city

have been in their present locations for many years, maintaining more or less their original form. Such is the Kuksa shrine (*kuksadang*), which was mapped and documented in the early 1900s when, as I have mentioned, the Japanese colonizers moved it from Mt. Nam (*namsan*) to its current location on Mt. Inwang (*inwangsan*) (Grayson 1992). Unlike newer shrines, Kuksadang has only one room for rent and more rooms cannot be added. Several officially acknowledged ancient gods' paintings are displayed inside, and a metal sign near the entrance tells the history and significance of the shrine and the paintings. Inwangsan is close to downtown Seoul, and Kuksadang can be reached in less than an hour's walk from the central government complex or City Hall. In the fall of 2007, the structure underwent renovation that forced the owners to close it for a few weeks. This kind of renovation is costly because a designated national heritage site requires that the traditional features of the structure be maintained, including handmade roof tiles and carved wood facades.

Inwangsan is considered to be a sacred mountain where, overlooking the urban maze, worshippers prostrate in front of large boulders called *sŏnbawi*. Springs revered for their healing capacities draw people to climb the mountain with backpacks full of empty bottles to be filled and taken down for relatives or clients. Water plays important roles in the purification process that precedes and follows *kut*. *Manshin* wash before, during and after rites, offerings are ritually cleaned with water, and water is served to the spirits on offering tables. Even today, natural water sources are preferred for these tasks. Im (1996) describes how villagers prepared for *kut* by bathing in the river regardless of freezing winter conditions. Seoul's municipality acknowledges this belief. It has placed signs indicating *yaksu* (medicine water) along the hilly paths leading to the springs and erected a mountain-water drinking fountain in the playground of Sajik Park, at the foot of Inwangsan, below Kuksadang. A sign in Korean tells of the water's origins and warns that it has not been treated and might not be suitable for drinking. Passers-by drink the water from the fountain, while others climb higher to get it straight from the source on the mountain.

Mountain gods (*sanshin*) are important deities in Korea's vernacular cosmology. The attribute of Sanshin is a tiger. Usually, this large predator is lying beside or under the anthropomorphic figure of the god. In some paintings, the tiger represents Sanshin with no humanlike depiction. On Inwangsan, the mountain where Kuksadang is now located, there is a Shamanic-Buddhist village. The gate to this complex is right beside a ten-year-old building complex that begins a few hundred yards below, at the Tongnimun subway station. The first houses of the village, next to the parking lot, have been decorated with the typical Sanshin tiger and other religious symbols (Fig. 28.3).

When *kut* rituals are held in Kuksadang, the *manshin* bring the ritual artefacts to this parking lot and hire porters to haul the goods in a long flight of more than 100 tall steps. It takes only a few minutes to walk up from the parking lot to the shrine from that side of the mountain. On almost every visit to this shrine, I met *manshin* and viewed their rituals, including the most famous

Fig. 28.3 A house in Kuksadang Buddhist village with a painted wall of the Sanshin tiger

and fierce sequence where the practitioners stand on sharp blades (*chaktu*). Kuksadang is not threatened by urban development despite its proximity to new apartment complexes because it has been designated as an important heritage site, probably also because of its symbolic role in the post-colonial memory of the city.

Another ancient shamanic shrine is the Kǔmsŏngdang shrine, less than a mile away from Kup'abal subway station, a 20-minute ride from downtown Seoul. The shrine had been functioning since the nineteenth century, until a few years ago, when a massive construction project called New Town began tearing the hills down.[3] By law, a construction project of this scale requires an assessment of the historical and archaeological value that might be destroyed during the work. This is part of the plan to have Seoul designated as a World Heritage City, a title bestowed by UNESCO on cities where important structures are properly preserved and maintained. The Kǔmsŏngdang shrine was about to be demolished by the builders of New Town long after the academic assessments of the valuable structures in the area had been handed to the city officials. The shrine was simply not in the list of structures that deserved preservation. The scholars who prepared the survey thought that it was an unimportant crumbling site of an undesirable superstitious practice. A non-governmental organization (NGO) dedicated to the preservation of historical sites, Prof. Yang Chongsǔng, then a senior curator at the National Folk Museum, and several journalists joined forces to fight the New Town plan to

demolish the shrine. They produced a book with a survey of the historically valuable artefacts in the building and gave this publication to the relevant people and offices. Parts of their academic analysis of cultural meanings and values attached to that site were published as articles in large newspapers.[4] In early 2007, after the city had already reversed its original resolution and decided to keep the building, it demanded that the builders donate money for the preservation efforts and change their plans in order to keep the structure in its original location. As can be imagined, the entrepreneurs were not happy about this development. Not only were they to rework the whole construction plan but they also had to accept that a shamanic shrine, considered by many Koreans as a dangerous place, would stay on their premises. This could mean a drop in the sales of the apartments and value depreciation.

When I visited the place in November 2007, a tall metal wall enclosed the shrine. However, there were several places where one could easily crawl underneath it or squeeze between the planks. Many ritual artefacts have disappeared from the house, and the site manager said that while he knew that people had been coming in through the adjacent hillside, it was not his duty to guard the place. Prof. Yang's anger and the fierce protests of a well-known NGO leader and civic movement activist were of little avail. Prof. Yang had told me earlier that the city offered to purchase the artefacts from the owners of the shrine, but they demanded an outrageous sum equivalent to several hundred thousand US dollars. As a result, these objects were declared 'important city assets', which means that the city would be their guardian but not their official owner. This would allow the city to keep the items free of charge and display them in the shrine once its preservation and renovation was complete. However, the authorities could not remove the objects before the restoration works began and the shrine was left unguarded. During a visit to the construction site, Prof. Yang and the activist argued for a crooked old sacred tree that was left outside the fenced area to be included in the preservation plan. They explained their idea to the construction director and charted their plans for its preservation. They also noted many deviations from the conservation regulations, such as reduced distances between the preserved site and high-rise buildings. Their plea did not seem to concern the director. The meeting took place outside, on the muddy construction ground, and was conducted in very formal language, at times involving angry tones and mutual accusations.

In the summer of 2015, the neighbourhood was a lively urban suburb with shops, streets and many apartment buildings. The shrine has become a beautiful closed wooden feature inside the neighbourhood, to be opened only for authorized visitors and scholars. The crooked tree was gone. The paintings and ritual artefacts were taken away to storage (Fig. 28.4).

The *manshin* who had been using the Kŭmsŏngdang shrine as their regular worship site were no longer allowed to use it. Many other such cases have been documented throughout the city. Some sacred paintings exhibited in the National Folk Museum of Korea or in private galleries came from shrines that were demolished for urban development as early as the 1970s (Kendall et al.

Fig. 28.4   Kŭmsŏngdang preserved shrine in the New Town suburb of Seoul

2015). Thus, the destruction of sacred sites is also linked to the displacement of precious old artefacts and ritual practices. As Seoul extends into hills and mountains where *manshin* work, more such shrines might be destroyed or closed down.

The Kŭmsŏngdang shrine story ended on a somewhat optimistic tone when, in May 2016, it was reopened as the Shamanism Museum. Prof. Yang's own private collection—the one that I visited with the embassy official in 2014—is exhibited there, sponsored by the regional neighbourhood office. This has been transformed from a site of superstitious spiritual activity to a respectable cultural representation arranged according to Western museum standards, where labelling and historical explanations have allowed the municipality to embrace the structure. Aiming to promote visits to this neighbourhood, the museum's opening was attended by various officials and scholars and was covered by the media.

Vernacular Religion in Media Landscapes

Seoul dwellers' eager consumption of media products makes the mass media an integral part of urban behaviour, especially because most commuters use digital media products during their long journey to work. Hand-held screens have been common in South Korea from the early 2000s and allow subway and bus passengers to watch films and television drama, and play video games while they commute. The bus and subway companies have upgraded their services to

include fast Wi-Fi that enhances the use of online media during travel. Jason Mittell (2003, 36) argues that for television audiences, 'hierarchies between programs and genres are one of the primary ways in which television viewers situate themselves among media texts and their social locations'. An examination of the Korean media reveals a change in the genres that host practitioners of vernacular religion, which can be interpreted as a change in social perspectives. In the years 2002–2008, most diviners whom I watched on television were either the topic of a scholarly documentary programme that presented them as part of a vanishing tradition, or interviewed in humorous talk shows that presented them in a somewhat sardonic manner. I recall especially a New Year's divination session by a *manshin* interviewed in his shrine. The film crew emphasized the colourful lights, making it look more like a bar than a professional advising facility; the questions were posed in a mocking tone; and the editing was jittery and added to the grotesque depiction of the diviner. *Manshin* have often been shown in rituals using fast-forward editing, which creates a humoristic depiction of the practice. Some films, such as *Kwishini Sanda* (director Kim Sangjin 2004), presented vernacular religion as charlatanism. This film included in that scope shamanic practices, Buddhism, geomancy and Christian exorcism.

The increased representation of vernacular religion in various genres of television talk show, drama series and thriller in Korea from around 2010 testifies to the fact that divination and shamanism are no longer considered a marginal social category; rather, they are celebrated as an exotic yet relevant part of contemporary culture and heritage. In the talk show *Yi Sŭngyŏn with a Hundred Women* (2012–2013 on Story On TV), *manshin* were part of an extensive advising panel that included interior decorators, *p'ungsu* (geomancy) specialists and psychologists. In *Job Stories* (2011–2013 on TV Chosŏn), diviners through astrology and retina, *manshin*, palm readers and others were introduced and consulted as professionals, focusing on each participant's biography and abilities. *The Exorcist* (2008 and 2012 on tvN) was a thriller documentary where each episode was dedicated to deciphering an unsolved murder, often with the help of spirit mediums who embodied the deceased. Television dramas and films also focus increasingly on vernacular beliefs and practices.

Fortune Saloon (*Ch'ŏngdam Posal*, director Kim Chinyŏng 2009) is a film about a 'posh' divination parlour located in the expensive Kangnam ward in Seoul. There, several fortune tellers work using various divination styles. The film ridicules some divination practices outside the 'saloon' as a mere money-making business. For example, when the main protagonist visits a street fortune teller, he predicts that there will be rain and sells her an old and half-broken umbrella. After she leaves, he is shown looking at the newspaper's broadcast saying: 'The weather report brings me good money. It worked again!' Despite this cynical remark, that scene and other moments in the film demonstrate that the main characters, who work as fortune tellers, are sincere believers and clients of other *manshin* and diviners. This film's location in an area notorious for housing many diviners' offices tells us that while the media's

depiction is not necessarily an unbiased documentation of reality, it is closely related to urban lifestyle in contemporary Seoul.

Vernacular Religious Landscapes in Seoul

Several ethnographies have demonstrated that spiritualistic vernacular religious practices can be inseparable from post-industrial societies. Howard (2011) has studied the Internet activity of end-of-the-world-theory believers in the USA. New media and trance mediums in various research sites, including Europe, were discussed in an edited volume on the topic (Behrend et al. 2015). The vernacular religious landscape of Seoul debunks the assumption, still common in public discourse in Korea and elsewhere, that vernacular practices of possession and exorcism decrease in places saturated with technology and scientific education. In Seoul, such activities are embedded in the daily experiences of millions, and even those who do not engage actively in shamanic rituals usually perform ancestor rites and divination. The extensive use of street signs, commercials and promotional billboards by *manshin* and other diviners entices Seoul dwellers to establishments where religious services are offered. This cultural trait is visible on any city commute. Flooding Seoul with divination tents before the New Year, advertising shamanism online and in print, and broadcasting films and television programmes with spiritual mediators and diviners as consultants creates a sense of social acceptance of practices that were considered in earlier modern times superstitious and harmful. Even old shrines can sometimes be saved from demolition during the city's constant reshaping and extension.

The New Community Movement, initiated by the Korean government in the 1970s, saw vernacular religion as a marker of undeveloped rural residence patterns (Kendall 1985). It strived to abolish such practices in its attempt to modernize the Korean countryside. Paradoxically, in the early twenty-first century it is urban Korea that hosts most of this vernacular religion. When I first began my fieldwork in 2005, I had a naïve idea of anthropological fieldwork. However, while looking for a fieldwork site, I kept hearing the same advice from village people, owners of religious goods store, scholars and even shamans, 'the best practitioners live in Seoul'. My research shifted to ethnography at urban sites because most *manshin* who become successful want to move to the city, just like most of South Korea's population. The rural areas have been decreasing in population while more than a half of the country lives in the three largest metropolises: Seoul, Pusan and Daegu. In the summer of 2016, I walked in downtown Seoul and looked at the signs announcing *manshin* offices. Their numbers seemed to have increased since I first began to observe them a decade earlier. Conducting ethnography in an urban setting changed my perception of the anthropologist's quest. I came to understand that learning about a society that has come to be centred in huge metropolises demands a more fragmented, maybe nomadic, attitude to fieldwork. Furthermore, it requires awareness and analysis of the media. I did my best to maintain

ethnographic qualities in my work that, as asserted by Herzfeld (2013, 119), 'characteristically rests on the demonstrated achievement of *intimate relations with informants*, regardless of the kind of site involved (multiple, local, linear, or even electronic)'. By doing just that, the contemporary entwinement of vernacular religion in the lives of Seoulites unfolds and tells how a city can create a unique character through its ever adapting traditions and their management by individuals and institutions.

NOTES

1. Seoul is still inhabited mainly by ethnic Koreans, with only about 4% of non-Koreans.
2. Such are the rental shrine of Sŏ Kyŏng-uk in Yŏngju near Seoul and the Puk'ansan kuksadang shrine in the north-west of Seoul.
3. The project's name in Korean is also New Town, transliterated but not translated into the Korean language. The use of English in the name marks the project as innovative and sophisticated.
4. Newspaper items include a series of articles in Segyeilbo on 11 January 2005, p. 30, 12 January 2005 and 13 January 2005, p. 8, and an Internet item, including a video caption at Dongailbo on 13 November 2007, available online at www.donga.com/fbn/output?f=j_s&n=200711130151&main-1 (accessed 1 December 2007).

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Becoming Cities, Losing Paradise? Gentrification in the Swiss Alps

Andrea Boscoboinik

Introduction

Urbanization is an increasingly expanding process around the world. This chapter presents an example of a mountain urbanization process taking place in a Swiss Alps village. To theoretically contextualize these transformations, the chapter begins with considerations of the vanishing of former clear dichotomies such as rural/urban and centre/periphery. New forms of mobility, multilocal dwelling and tourism are then introduced since they are understood to be the major agents responsible for the rural–urban transformation. Moreover, rural gentrification is an explicative tool to understand how peripheral regions become new centres. The city has been exported to rural and mountain areas, and the places attractive to urbanites for their natural elements have become increasingly urbanized. As a result of upper-class urbanites exporting their way of life, the natural landscape is being covered with buildings and small villages are becoming cities. Consequently, former peripheral regions turn into gentrified places, as is happening in the Swiss mountains. Verbier, which transformed from a rural hamlet at the beginning of twentieth century into a famous tourist resort, is a clear example.

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Urbanizing Rural Spaces and the Mountains

Defining what is urban space and what is rural space may have seemed simple in the past but we encounter problems in attempts to delineate and characterize them today. The rural/urban differentiation has been a significant and relevant typology used to understand territorial, economic, social and cultural diversity. Considered to be antagonist concepts, the definition of one became, by default, the definition of the other. Rural space was everything urban space was not, and vice versa, cast as perfect dichotomies. Traditionally, the idea of rurality was closely linked to the basic dichotomy of village/city and associated with other dichotomies, such as tradition/modernity, local/global and centre/periphery, which mirrored classical evolutionary dichotomies such as Tönnies' Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft (1887) or Maine's status/contract (1861). Nowadays we find aspects of the city in rural spaces, and, more often than not, natural, rural elements in the cities, such as eco- or green neighbourhoods and urban gardens. Rural/urban borders have become increasingly blurred, where the city is no longer an exclusive place for the urban, nor is the countryside an exclusively rural location. Although the city/country contrast has become diluted, this does not reflect a complete rejection of the rural/urban divide. There are processes, however, that tend to intertwine those spaces, particularly when considered as places.[1] Consequently, research divisions between urban and rural anthropologists often vanish, and this even occurs between sociologists and anthropologists now overlapping in research questions and methodologies. If research is increasingly conducted in urban settings, this is in part the result of new forms of urbanization processes of former, principally rural, environments (see Prato and Pardo 2013).

Similarly, the centre/periphery model is broadly defined and concerns a division between a centre (core areas, powerful, dominant) and the periphery (dependent, subordinated areas). Traditionally, rural space was considered to be a periphery and urban space a centre. However, there are processes under way that are blurring their previously well-defined borders. What was once considered rural space is no longer *de facto* peripheral. Meanwhile, some rural areas are no longer declining or depopulating, and simultaneously some urban areas are no longer attracting resources, leading to economic decline and migration. Given the new mobilities and the new forms of living styles and work, the hierarchical domination logic implicit in the centre/periphery dichotomy ceases to be clear when problematizing the distinctions between rural and urban.

Definitions of rurality and urbanity are complex. One longstanding debate is whether 'rural' is a geographical concept, or whether it is a social representation, culture and way of life. The same is true of the concept of urban, which was once defined either in terms of demographic density or in relation to occupations other than agricultural or direct subsistence production. However, a place cannot be reduced to its geographic, demographic or economic definition. Moreover, places are not inert containers. They are politicized, culturally

relative and historically specific. Places are socially constructed and have multiple meanings (Rodman 1992, 641). Prato and Pardo (2013) offer an outstanding historical account of how the 'urban' has been categorized and understood through different approaches and authors. The representation of rural spaces, as well as cities, has usually been ambiguous, for those who are living either within or outside these spaces. The image of the other's place of living (rural for the urban, urban for the rural) has been idealized and demonized in different periods, sometimes simultaneously. The romantic period idealized life in the rural milieu, challenging the longstanding negative representations of rural areas as places of hard work, poverty, isolation, boredom and backwardness. Modernity valued the progress and development associated with urban life and rejected the traditional and conservative ways that typified rurality. In the traditional rural/urban dichotomy, urban space was considered to be the place of possibility, progress and modernity because it was simply the 'place to be', whereas rural space symbolized the crudeness of life and conservative behaviour. These perceptions influenced peoples' migration from rural to urban settings. The city was a place of employment possibilities and was perceived as a potential source of contentment and personal development. However, the city was also a place of danger and conflict, of impersonal and instrumental social relations. These emic perceptions influenced sociological research in urban settings, beginning in the nineteenth century (Prato and Pardo 2013).

Perceptions of both spaces change regularly and, even today, the rural/urban distinction persists in peoples' minds. For many urban dwellers, urban spaces have lost much of their attraction. The merits of the urban lifestyle and rural retreat are debated in journals and magazines, and on Internet sites (e.g. www.theguardian.com; www.debate.org; www.dailymail.co.uk; and www.reuters.com). After suffering a pervasive negative image, urbanite perceptions began to transform such that the countryside was slowly recast as a gentle, pure and safe space. For those who come from urban spaces, rural environments evoke memories of an intangible mythical paradise. Since at least the 1980s, there has been a revalorization of rural spaces, a process that is particularly noticeable in Western European countries. The countryside has become the object in the quest for inner truth. Its stability and conservative values of identity are now positive qualities, and it is frequently perceived by urbanites as a place of authenticity, genuine products, traditional values and traditions.

Today, for some well-off urbanites, it is the city that epitomizes all the negative aspects of life—pollution, anonymity and violence, among others—and that symbolizes disorder, danger and misery. Rural and mountainous spaces are then represented as places that break with the constraints of the everyday urban world. Some urbanites do not see many advantages of living in the city and consider it not only stressful but also a place where social relations are imbued with artificiality. The exodus reversed direction from the traditional migration from rural to urban spaces: now, some wealthy, urbanized people escape cities, either temporarily or permanently, to rural locations. A repopulation dynamic,

emerging both in rural areas and in the mountains, has begun replacing the discourse about depopulation in the peripheries. A new tendency of repopulation has been postulated, often induced by lifestyle migration, multilocal dwelling and the acquisition of second homes in tourist destinations in rural spaces.

Lifestyle Migration, Multilocal Dwelling and Tourism

Migration is a subject that has been widely studied in different disciplines, including geography, anthropology and demography, in order to understand the processes and outcomes of human mobilities in all their manifestations. Specific migration processes have been observed in connection with new forms of housing and ways of life of certain strata of urban populations. These new migrants do not migrate to escape poverty or difficult economic situations. Neither do they do so for political reasons, nor within the context of forced migration. Rather, these migrants are often from economically strong countries like those in Western Europe and the USA. They are relatively affluent and affirm that they are searching for a certain quality of life they say does not exist in their home countries. A number of authors have argued that certain rural regions experienced a population influx motivated above all by the quality of the landscape and environment, the possibilities of outdoor leisure activities, or a better quality of life (Benson and O'Reilly 2009; Hervieu and Viard 1996). They migrate in search of more idyllic environments, landscapes and quality services. They describe this 'better life' they are searching for as one that moves at a slower pace, is distanced from the pressures of modern city life, offers a healthier environment and provides a strong feeling of living in a community (Benson and O'Reilly 2009). This type of migration is often motivated by a search for 'paradise on earth' (Kuentzel and Mukundan 2005; Moss 2006; Moss and Glorioso 2014).

This type of migration has been called 'lifestyle migration' (Benson and O'Reilly 2009), 'global amenity migration' (Moss and Glorioso 2014) and 'residential migration' (Cognard 2011) and it has spread in the European Union with the adoption of the free movement of people. Many studies suggest that these new migrants are drawn to life in rural or periurban villages, mainly for reasons related to the physical environment (see Perlik 2011; Benson and O'Reilly 2009). The phenomenon of leisure migration, linked to a specific lifestyle, has been particularly well documented in Europe, especially with respect to Northern European retirees who move to Spain (Gustafson 2009; Huete 2009) and the British who settle in rural France (Benson 2009) and in the Alps (Geoffroy 2007).

Perlik (2011) questions the amenity concept because it does not differentiate between migration, in the narrow sense (one fixed residential place), and periodic changes, in the sense of a multilocal residence. He mentions the need to distinguish amenity-led migration from multilocal dwelling, as well as from tourism. Amenity-led migration should be restricted to those cases where people change their centre of everyday life for a constant period, but it does not

distinguish employed people from retired people, and the question of how long migrated persons and families stay in their new environment remains unknown (Perlik 2011, 3). For Perlik, the phenomenon characterized as 'amenity-led migration' in Europe is often indeed a process of multilocal dwelling; that is, several residences that ultimately increase one's professional opportunities, diversify one's habitat and add variety to one's leisure activities.

In Switzerland, a consensus is emerging among geographers as to the finding of a behavioural change in terms of housing: people have not just one but many homes simultaneously. This phenomenon is analysed in terms of seasonal or secondary residences and in reference to 'multilocality' (Perlik 2011; Duchêne-Lacroix et al. 2013; Hilti 2009). Margaret Rodman interprets multilocality as having a number of dimensions. She offers layered definitions of multilocality in her 1992 article 'Empowering Place: Multilocality and Multivocality'. She defines the term as the act of 'looking at places from the viewpoint of Others', as 'comparative or contingent analyses of place', as 'reflexive relationships with places' and as the way that a physical landscape 'shapes and expresses polysemic meanings of place for different users' (1992, 646–647). For our purpose, we will focus on multilocal living, which implies the existence and use of more than one place of residence, with or without a fixed place of work. 'By their multilocality people connect different meaningful places and build up individual meaningful arrangements' (Hilti 2009, 148). For Perlik (2011), multilocality is a new type of residential migration, with long-distance commuters travelling and temporarily escaping from the cities to resort locations. Multilocality also includes new forms of mobile work, second homes in attractive tourist regions and residences in quiet areas. Efficient transportation services and accessibility have contributed to still more people opting for multilocality with dwellings in the city and in the mountains (Messerli et al. 2011, 4).

Whereas some urbanites decide to run away from the 'unnatural', 'inauthentic' city and repopulate the countryside, others take a less drastic decision and rather than definitively leaving the city or having more than one residence choose to spend their leisure time in 'natural' and 'authentic' landscapes, while keeping only one home in the city. This can be described as 'open' tourism, understood as leisure activities that are not related to a specific address or destination, which can periodically change. In this context, urbanites search for more and more outdoor activities, rural authenticity, natural landscapes, local foods (*produits du terroir, Slow Food*), distinction through leisure experiences and exotic accommodations such as 'glamping' (glamorous camping) (Boscoboinik and Bourquard 2012). In brief, many urbanites search for all that cities cannot offer when planning their long or short holidays, where the image of the idyllic countryside reveals itself as a potent antidote to the many ills of the city, making such travel valuable even for a weekend.

The arrival of these new inhabitants, whether they stay for a year or only temporarily, facilitates the emergence of new forms of mobility, types of residence and sociability, and transforms the way of life in rural and mountain

areas. Lifestyle migrants, migrants for employment, multilocal dwellers and tourists have transformed both the social structures and existing models of social relationship in mountain villages (Richard et al. 2014; Ohnmacht et al. 2009). Transformations are mainly interpreted as resulting from new leisure practices and urban lifestyles. According to Lash and Urry (1994), a starting point for rural social change is the opening of rural society to the urban life-style: an inflow of resources—in particular human—to rural areas *from* urban centres. Consequently, the urbanization process is exported to places that had originally been preserved for the leisurely enjoyment of urbanites.

Tourism and leisure are not opposed to work and productive activities in distinct ways as they were previously (Boon 2006). As Manfred Perlik affirms, 'secondary residences have become fully fledged places for work, social net-works and leisure. The clear separation between work, weekend leisure, multi-locality and migration has been abolished. Leisure residences now are no longer part of tourism but a new form of dwelling' (2011, 4). New technologies such as smartphones, computers and the Internet allow people to work wherever and whenever they desire.

Perlik (2011) explains that it is also a new finding that dwelling in the moun-tains is not a tendency of rural life, or towards a rural living, but an urban attitude, not only in provenance but also in character. This reflects a substantial difference between the neorural movement of the 1960s and 1970s, when urbanites left cities for rural environments in order to be closer to nature, to become farmers, or in other ways make a living out of the land through cheese making, handicrafts and other homemade products. Today is not a counter-urbanization, or ex-urbanization, as some authors argue (Perlik 2011). Even when it could be understood as fleeing from the city, moving to rural or moun-tainous spaces is, in fact, an urban project unto itself.

Gentrification: From Periphery to Centre

Gentrification is the process by which former peripheral regions become wealthier neighbourhoods and is typically the result of an increased interest in a certain environment. Since the term was coined in 1964 by the British soci-ologist Ruth Glass (1964) for the transformations she observed in certain areas of inner London, most gentrification studies have been done in cities. Through this term, authors analyse the transformation of marginal and working-class neighbourhoods that have been the focus of investment by middle and upper socioeconomic classes. Such examples are manifold. The chapters gathered in the volume edited by Rowland Atkinson and Gary Bridge (2005), *Gentrification in a Global Context. The New Urban Colonialism*, illustrate that gentrification is no longer confined to Western capital cities but is a global phenomenon pres-ent in such diverse locations as Russia, Japan, Brazil, Turkey and Spain, to name a few. *Race, Class, and Gentrification in Brooklyn: A View from the Street* by Jerome Krase and Judith N. DeSena (2016) is an example of resistance to and promotion of neighbourhood change in Brooklyn since the 1960s. Both

authors have been working for decades on urban changes and gentrification processes in settings as different as Poland and the USA (e.g. DeSena 2012, 2009; Krase 2005, 1982). In the 2016 volume, the authors revisit two neighbourhoods in Brooklyn, which have been their long-term field sites since the late 1970s, allowing them to reveal a rare, comprehensive analysis of neighbourhood transformation (see also Krase and DeSena 2015).

However, gentrification is no longer confined to cities. Instead there are a growing number of examples of rural gentrification. The term 'greentrification' has been conceived of precisely to underline the central role of the environment in the social and geographical transformation processes that constitute rural gentrification (Richard et al. 2014). Literature on rural gentrification has highlighted the central role played by the representations of nature and the environment to explain migration in periurban areas (Bryson and Wyckoff 2010). Although landscape is the impetus motivating migration, migrants also act and modify the place where they migrate. Yet, if environment and landscape have an impact on migrants, the opposite is also true: the newcomers contribute to changing the landscape of the areas in which they invest, in particular on a very local scale via their practices, such as domestic arrangements and home improvements (Richard et al. 2014). As gentrifiers progressively evict—and sometimes even replace—local populations, they remodel local societies.

Richard et al. (2014, 2) remind us that studies carried out from the rural gentrification perspective tend to focus on specific types of transformation: (a) the arrival of new inhabitants (evicting, marginalizing or replacing local populations), motivated in part by environmental amenities; (b) those initiated by specific social groups, particularly those who hold a specific set of values and are inclined to impose them on their new social and physical environment; and (c) transformation of the environment at the instigation of new inhabitants and social groups motivated by symbolic aesthetics of idyllic rural life as much as by practical landscaping desires.

Gentrification and the urbanization process challenge the old categorizations of rural/urban and periphery/centre. Today it is possible to make a mountainous region one's permanent and only site of residence, without relegating oneself to living on the periphery. It may also be one of a few places of residence, with individuals commuting between them. Additionally, new mobilities and new forms of residence throw into question the notion of rural periphery. To distinguish the urban centre from the rural periphery, elements like the type of economy, resources, social organization, demography and culture, including the way of living, type of dwelling and values, have been used. A clear geographical categorization allowed one to distinguish, and oppose, an urban centre from a rural periphery. Urban centres were traditionally understood as places of social, political and religious influence, where power and knowledge were put forth, where industrial activities were focused—in short, the place where the bourgeoisie were starkly opposed to the peasantry. The rural periphery has always been thought of as the epicentre of tradition, less developed and less innovative than urban areas, homogeneous, conservative,

sparsely populated and reliant on the primary sector economy. Essentially, the city was *modern* and the rural was *traditional*. However, the centre's characteristics can be found in other places than those traditionally found in city centres. Gentrified rural spaces become central ones.

The distinction of urban centre/rural periphery was operative in a modernity that valued stability and mobility differently from the way post-modernity does. In recent decades, societies have become markedly more dynamic, heterogeneous and internationalized as a result of vastly increased levels and forms of mobility, understood as displacements of goods, information and people (Urry 2008). Dynamics initiated through mobilities appear not solely in advanced, modern societies but are indeed initiating global transformation (Ohnmacht et al. 2009, 1). Therefore, an opposition that could help us to think about life in the post-modern world should be dynamic, taking into account the phenomena of new mobilities and gentrification processes. To keep the centre/periphery category a relevant one, we must redefine its constituent halves: the centre nowadays is what is mobile and flexible, and the periphery what is static and inflexible. However, not all mobilities fit neatly into the category of centre. Rather, only migrants who move voluntarily and for motivations based on socioeconomic or cultural values fit into this category. Thus gentrifiers constitute a mobile category. They are individuals capable of choosing mobility for reasons motivated by landscape, intellectual proclivities and work, and as such these individuals constitute the centre, which could be either in the cities or in the rural milieu. In this context, the centre is no longer a fixed place but a space where individuals may fulfil their mobility desires. The periphery, in contrast, would then be the space where individuals are not able to move, or are forced to move.

Today, to be fixed in a place, neighbourhood or job, is excluding—a condition contrary to what was true previously—and, instead, mobility now may be regarded as a force of inclusion and integration. What once was the right to the city has become the right to mobility. Mobility has become the new centre—not a geographical or political centre but a social and cultural one.

The Case of Verbier

I shall illustrate urbanization in the mountains with one example taken from a brief ethnographic field study conducted in Switzerland.[2] The country has a long tradition of leisure tourism in its mountains. Our research was conducted in Valais, a mountainous region well known as a centre of tourism in southwest Switzerland. The Valais canton displays a combination of tourist attractions—particularly winter ski resorts, attractive natural landscapes for trekking in the summer and thermal bath resorts frequented year round—and a peasant/agrarian population. This mixture of tourism and the rural/natural environment is emblematic of Valais. For statistical purposes, it is an Alpine region that encapsulates elements of three types of spaces: rural peripheral areas, periurban regions and internationalized tourist centres. Even if rural

populations and agricultural activities have decreased continuosly since the 1990s,[3] the image of naturalness, mountains and authenticity continue to be central in marketing the region. The reasoning usually given in field interviews was that tourism promoters are interested in trying to maintain the attractive qualities of nature prevalent in the expectations of tourists and highly valued by local residents. This is true for all of Switzerland. Its national slogan for tourism on the webpage www.myswitzerland.com is simply 'Get natural'. Most pictures and publicity are based on landscapes, thus inviting visitors to experience nature. Natural landscapes sell well. As such, the marketing efforts of Valais fit into a wider national project of promoting natural landscapes as national heritage that simultaneously reflects Valais' local cultural values.

Participant observation and interviews were done in Verbier, a village that in the twentieth century quickly developed from a rural hamlet into a fashionable tourist resort. During multiple field visits between 2012 and 2014, open-ended interviews and informal discussions were conducted with various locals, as well as with French and English nationals living there. The discussions pivoted around the development of Verbier, our discussants' perceptions and representations of living on the mountain, and their reasons for this choice. We conducted in-depth interviews with leaders of cultural heritage projects and stakeholders in cultural institutions, as well as with political representatives at the municipality and regional government levels, including two detailed interviews with the president of the Municipality of Bagnes, which not only facilitated access to other political actors but revealed new nuances to local transformation processes related to tourism. While in the region, we collected academic literature, television reportage and archival material from local institutions.

In 1930, Verbier was not even a village. There were only sparse huts and a few small buildings for summer use when the cattle were pastured in the higher parts of the mountains. By 1990 it had become a famous tourist resort. Thus the transition from traditional to modernity happened rapidly (Deslarzes 1998). This observation appeared frequently during interviews. As one informant said, 'Verbier, 50 years ago was a farming village where people spoke the local dialect. Today, it is a fashionable resort where people mostly speak English.'

Owing to its sunny and good slopes, its development began with skiing. Before 1950 there were only alpine pastures, people lived in the alpine economy and accessing it was difficult—people had to travel up the mountain by foot or with horses. The transformation began with the laying of a road to the village in 1935. Its development, however, began in the early 1900s. As one Verbier inhabitant explained,

Travellers passing by towards the Grand-St-Bernard, the road to Italy, looked up and saw this huge white bowl in winter and some very good skiers have thought there may have something to do there, with skiing. They went up to this place and have found accommodation with local people sometimes maybe in the hay,

not even in a house and skied. They came because it was a very good place for skiing. Other more ancient resorts in Switzerland were developed for or by English aristocracy and mountaineers, particularly in summertime, or for the sanatoriums, for health reasons or cures. But for Verbier, it was its good location for skiing.

The development of Verbier is clearly explained by Deslarzes (1998), who analyses the different levels of its economic, architectural and cultural transformations.

From 1950, the resort developed quickly. As one informant recollected, 'Beginning with the first chairlift, then visitors coming that had to be accommodated, first in private rooms nearby and then in hotels, the ski school opened and gradually the resort has been developing, slowly until 1990, when there was a big boom in building.' According to Berthoud and Kilani (1984, 41), in only ten years, from 1955 when the tourist boom began in this region to 1965, the number of principal farms decreased enormously, from 557 to just 101. The area's agricultural character was gradually replaced by a focus on tourism promotion, from an area of productive land use to a consumed space. In 1960, a mass tourism boom created great upheaval. Growth euphoria dominated and the disappearance of farmers was not feared. Indeed, it was almost welcomed at the time. Testimonies in the television archives from 1960 illustrate Verbier's transformation from the primary (agricultural) to tertiary (services) sector and the positive perception of these changes. 'We are less tired and earn more money,' one woman said. Tourism development brought about the diversification of work opportunities: farmers became ski instructors, hotel employees and ski lift workers, or found other tourism-related activities that offered alternative employment, including work in the building industry. 'Now we have more resources, so we can afford paying for more fun,' said one farmer. It was at this time that interest in dance halls began to grow in Verbier. The transformation was wide and all-encompassing: from tradition to modernity, from rural economy to tertiary economy, from isolated hamlets to big chalets. However, not everybody appreciated these changes. Based on journal articles from 1930, Deslarzes (1998) found that resistance, critiques and fears about the transformation of social manners and landscape provoked by resort development were common.

From 1990, the development of Verbier was unbridled. The resort grew physically, with an average of 30 chalets being built per year, completely changing village features and characteristics. There is a discourse about the will of local authorities to control building development. Many informants explained that since the beginning of tourism in Verbier, the local authorities were focused on preserving its natural heritage, or what the promoters call the unique selling proposition. In order to manage the construction industry, the local authorities have established building regulations. Informants detailed that these are quite strict for Verbier and are motivated to preserve its built heritage. For example, buildings cannot be higher than five floors, roofs should be two

sides and may not be flat, one may not use bright or flashy colours and two-thirds of any facade should be covered by wood, among other constraints. Additionally, when we approached locals to ask about the rapidity of change in their village, they often answered by referencing the importance of retaining its traditional built aspects while respecting the natural environment. As one informant explained, 'Yes, there are many more buildings now, but they keep the ancient style and are environmentally respectful.' In this way, locals are able to incorporate modernization processes within their expectations of maintaining cultural continuity, revealing how tourism development can find synergy with local needs and external global processes.

However, even if local considerations have been incorporated into building development strategies, local authorities neglected to pay attention to traffic until early 2000, when the increase in tourism suddenly made the issue of car density a pressing one. This is explained by the fact that all traffic passes through the central roundabout. When there are 30,000 people travelling by car through the resort, particularly at peak periods such as Christmas and New Year's Eve, impressive traffic jams appear at the centre. These are an unexpected experience for those seeking natural and 'out of the noise' holidays.

Verbier's transformation experience is an example of excessive construction and unrestrained development. However, the discourses of both local authorities and residents emphasize that the environment should be preserved, because the landscape is one of the major reasons tourists visit. Echoing the feelings expressed by many, one informant said: 'Landscape considerations should be at the centre of our decisions.' However, a paradox is evident in the middle of the village, where a large billboard shows a complete natural landscape with the phrase 'extrêmement nature' (extremely natural). The picture starkly contradicts everything in its immediate vicinity (see Fig. 29.1): buildings. Even nearby hiking trails are asphalted. The natural landscape is being covered by construction. Villages, as Verbier once was, have become urban.

Tourism marketing by Verbier's tourism sector focuses on winter snow-related activities, including freeriding, skiing and snowboarding, but tourism promoters are aware of the importance of developing other attractions. Thus, cultural activities, heritage and history have recently been incorporated into their marketing efforts. To attract tourists in other seasons, summer activities have been developed, such as the Verbier Music Festival, a mountain bike marathon and a horse jumping show. However, promoters stress the natural landscape and the charm of traditional villages as the main attractions of Verbier, emphasizing also the quality of life, quietness and particularly the town's 'not to be disturbed' factor as other important qualities.

WHY DO THEY COME?

A further important point is that Verbier is not solely a tourism resort: many people have decided to settle there permanently since the 1990s. The population has almost doubled, from 1850 inhabitants in 1990 to 3000 year-round inhabit-

Fig. 29.1   Picture of Verbier, taken by Olivier Givre during the Summer School in 2014

ants in 2014 (Petite 2014). This increase reflects a recent trend of the growing popularity of transforming secondary homes into main residences. With regard to mountainous regions, scholars speak of amenity migration to describe new migrants interested in the tourist and landscape features of the places where they settle (Petite 2014). This is clearly reflected in the changes in Verbier.

Since around the middle of 1990s, residential migration patterns have changed significantly in Switzerland's mountain regions. The migrant profile now includes individuals and households attracted to a lifestyle considered superior to that of cities (Petite 2014). Residential migration data reveal that foreign people, often British, are increasingly settling in the Swiss Alps. According to the Municipality of Bagnes, to which Verbier belongs, around 40% of the population lives in the Verbier region. Of the people living in the municipality, 55% are not originally 'bagnards', and 30% of those are from foreign countries (www.bagnes.ch) It is possible to find offers to help foreigners to settle (see Fig. 29.2).

Life trajectories are key elements to understanding this process of resettlement. Many studies have taken into account the biography of individuals to explain their residential choices (Petite 2014; Halfacree and Boyle 1993). I thus asked my interlocutors the reasons and paths that led them to settle in Verbier. One Englishman in his 40s said he wanted to settle somewhere in the mountains.

Fig. 29.2 This notice in a local window in Verbier advertises the help available for settlement in Switzerland. Picture taken by Olivier Givre during the Summer School in 2014

He went first to France where his car wheels were stolen. This experience, together with other administrative difficulties, made him decide on 'a quiet place to live in, without crime, without violence. I wanted a place to develop business, with clear regulations, without corruption. I wanted a sunny place with nice views, a small resort with friendly people.' He thought Switzerland would be a good choice and discovered Verbier, where he lives now.

When asked about their motivation to reside in the mountains, my informants highlighted the qualities of nature, the beauty of the landscape, recreation and skiing opportunities. As mentioned in the characterization of lifestyle migration, my interlocutors referred to the search for a better quality of life, a safe environment to raise children and good schools, a peaceful and pleasant environment, a personal project and work as the reasons that led them to leave the city and settle in this mountain area. People emphasized the contrast with the city, using words such as 'stress', 'traffic jams', 'insecurity' and 'undesirable'. In contrast, mountains were cast as a desirable category, where words such as 'value', 'good air' and 'healthy' were used. Thus in people's minds the dichotomy of landscape/urban is still present.

Residential migration is then a rational decision of individuals, based on an appreciation of the quality of places and an understanding of an ideal life that their financial situation makes attainable. These migrants often mention the enjoyable aspects of both the natural and the social environment as reasons for migration, meaning that their choices fit into the amenity migration matrix. In this view, the attractiveness of the landscape and the quality of life are central

motivations for settling in a mountain region (Perlik 2011). Even when mountain villages undergo urbanization, their relatively low demographic density, activities, life rhythm and environment contrast with medium or large cities. 'Of course, you do not feel the same in Geneva or in Verbier,' a woman remarked.

Many people visiting or settling in Verbier stress the 'quiet' component. Here, 'quiet' does not mean that nothing happens because night life in Verbier during the high tourist season is eventful and is one important aspect that attracts young people. Instead, 'quiet' may be translated as 'secure' or as a 'do not disturb' character. Many promoters say that the *quiet* aspect of Verbier is important for making Verbier attractive to celebrities who visit it regularly and know they are not going to be harassed. As one promoter explained, 'People come here for its outstanding ski area, beautiful sunny slopes, ultra-trendy bars, hyper-luxury chalets, for big parties, for shopping, for meeting people and for being seen.' When talking about Verbier, my interlocutors regularly used superlatives.

Life trajectories are manifold, but several follow a similar pattern. Young women and men come for one or more seasons to devote themselves completely to skiing, or come for skiing and working generally in tourism-related activities and then settle in the town permanently after a few years. When settled, they continue their skiing and tourism activities, or work at home on a part-time basis. Some people who have settled in Verbier work for a local, regional or even international market. Their jobs are often related to trade, business, management, consultancy, bars, hotels or media. It is clear that today, mountains like the Alps, where agriculture once predominated, may transform to be enjoyed for other purposes. The economy in this area is not a rural economy but rather has integrated the demands of urban consumption and ways of living.

People who visit or settle in Verbier are part of a higher social class, or at least expect to be considered as such and consequently require amenities and all kinds of high-quality services. Distinction is a leitmotif in this context. New trends in shopping, rent possibilities and chalet acquisition are developing constantly. As a result, prices are rising, creating difficulties for native residents to stay there or to keep a family-inherited chalet. Thus Verbier represents a clear case of gentrification. Newcomers have increased the population and replaced the local inhabitants, who are moving out. They modify the environment and influence the local culture. Properties advertised by local estate agents are indicative of the high cost of housing in the village. For example, in 2014 a chalet cost CHF13,900,000.[4]

Beyond lifestyle migration, economic migration represents the arrival of a new population so the phenomenon should not be neglected. However, my ethnography has focused on the amenity migrants who made the distinction between themselves and their own migration path *and* economic migrants. This latter category includes people who work in hotel services or construction. According to our English informants, economic migrants do not ski, nor do they choose this place to live for the same reasons as amenity migrants, and

their main reason for living in the municipality is to earn money in order to build their house in their country of origin. Contrary to the amenity migrants, the economic migrants do not choose the place for its beauty but for the working possibilities it offers.

Indeed, an important factor that has to be taken into account when considering either international or domestic economic migration is that Verbier is the economic engine of the municipality and provides employment on a large scale. In all of our discussions, informants emphasized that the municipality's wealth comes from Verbier. Even if some local people may dislike Verbier's general developmental path or its urbanization, everyone agrees that it is the heart of the region's economic development and prosperity. It offers jobs to many people, in diverse sectors including construction, gastronomy and tourism-related activities, but farm-related jobs are few. The only caveat is the existence of a few summer Alpine pastures for shepherding that also provide a picturesque landscape of pasture and cows for tourists to enjoy.

Conclusion

Today it seems necessary to go beyond the discussion about the urban or rural character of places. The blurred borders of rural periphery/urban centres is partially a consequence of what has been conceptualized as amenity-led migration or lifestyle migration and interpreted as a change in values and preferences towards rural areas. This migration type refers to the mobility of the urban middle and upper classes who moved to rural locations in search of quietness and improved quality of life, while simultaneously remaining urban both in their jobs and in their ways of consumption and behaviour. It is possible to identify some socioeconomic factors that facilitate this amenity-led migration: increased mobility, with a dissociation between work activity and a fixed workplace; income from different economic activities; and a global societal shift in values and preferences (Perlik 2011). Consequently, the once polarized dichotomy of a productive metropolis and a consumptive leisure landscape is no longer polarized.

The classic scheme of centre/periphery is dissolved, as even spatially distant and sparsely populated mountainous regions may profit from the new residential population's affluence and purchasing power, whether or not they are permanent residents, as new infrastructure to support these populations, as well as the services they require, become sources of revenue enjoyed by native residents. The discovery of new locations for temporary or permanent residence by the trend-sensitive middle and upper classes turns former peripheral regions into gentrified spaces, as the experience of Verbier reflects. Thus gentrification as a process may be understood as launching new centres from former peripheries.

Tourism promoters present mountains and rural spaces to urban visitors as encapsulating everything that cities are not: places of quietness and harmony with nature, and resourceful spaces allowing a return to an idyllic, natural life.

Those representations, precipitated by marketing objectives, nourish a utopian imaginary for city dwellers searching to escape the artificiality of the urban. However, this utopian vision of natural spaces contrasts with the pressures induced by modernization and globalization, the rising international mobilities, lifestyle and labour migration, and the commodification of nature. The ideal of wild mountains is contradicted by the power of urbanization, infrastructural development and technological presence that go with the growth of tourism and lifestyle migration, which include such things as asphalt roads, housing, buildings and other infrastructure. Upper-class urbanites who do not want to compromise their level of lifestyle comfort export their way of life wherever they go. Therefore some traditional villages become increasingly urban and peripheral rural areas become tourist urban centres.

Some people decided to move because they love mountains and could no longer stand the city, but at the same time they urbanize the mountains. The paradox is more than evident: on one side, urbanites search for calm and clean natural environments, and beautiful landscapes, but to be as comfortable in the mountains as in a city. The natural landscape is being covered by construction and small villages are becoming semiurban, benefiting from a level of infrastructure that until recently one could only find in cities.

Today, new forms of mobility and lifestyle migration are the major agents responsible for the transformation from rural to urban and most recently important agents in the gentrification of natural environments. The city has been exported to the mountains and the places once attractive to such outsiders for their 'natural' aspects have become increasingly urbanized.

When a local resident of Verbier, his family having lived there for generations, was asked if the village had lost its soul, he answered: 'Times change, it's a fact. Maybe before, we would meet for a toast more easily, but one has to adapt to changes, as they say.'

Notes

1. 'Space' and 'place' are fairly complex words, and there is no space here for their development. Suffice it to say that if space can be described as a location, without any symbolic value, a place is, in contrast, a space filled with meanings and identity, and is symbolically invested (see, among others, Prato and Pardo 2013; Guérin-Pace and Filippova 2008; Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003).

2. I wish to thank Jean-Charles Fellay and Yann Decorzant from the Centre Régional d'Etudes des Populations Alpines for their invaluable help and collaboration in the field. I am grateful to Jean-Charles Fellay and Olivier Givre for the pictures taken when we were together in Verbier in 2014.

3. According to the Federal Statistical Office, agricultural areas are continuously decreasing. Since 1996, 32,000 ha are no longer cultivated. On average, approximately 2000 hectares have been abandoned per year (http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/07.html). Moreover, habitat areas and infrastructure have expanded at the expense of agricultural land (http://issuu.com/sfso/docs/002-0902#). In the Alpine valleys, traditional farming systems shrank dras-

tically during the twentieth century, whereas tourist facilities increased greatly in number.

4. In 2014 the exchange rate for Swiss Francs was CHF1.20 to EUR1.00.

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Unfolding Lisbon: An Anthropologist Gazes at a Capital City

Margarida Fernandes

Cities are often depicted as large built-up agglomerations, including a core and a peripheral region. They are characterised by their 'urban' features in opposition to being 'rural'. Such a distinction carries with it a bias, considering the city as 'civilised' while the rural areas lack 'development' and are somehow hostile to 'progress', 'backwards', associated to farming, poverty and a lack of modern amenities but, at the same time, the inhabited places in the countryside should remain unchanged, almost pristine repositories of 'tradition' and mediate the relationship between 'culture' and 'nature'. Rural life, far from the cosmopolitan chaos of the city, is also associated with a bucolic quietness and timelessness where the 'genuine' essence of being has been preserved. Cities embody the rush of modern life, always on the move, constantly changing, while the countryside remains true to itself, living at a pace of its own, almost unchangeable, marked by the rhythm of the seasons.

The Industrial Revolution is seen as the most important change in the growth of importance of cities but it would not have happened if the Agricultural Revolution had not taken place. Cities depend on rural areas to provide essential foodstuff without which it would be impossible to feed the urban populations. Thus the countryside changed concomitantly, liberating a workforce into the cities, increasing production in the fields while maintaining its role as a repository of a 'reserve army' of labourers. Although urbanity is in opposition to rurality, town and country are not truly at odds with each other; rather, they are in constant interaction.

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Nowadays the immediate vicinity of large cities is also heavily urbanised, engulfed by the suburban expansion. Furthermore, the production of foodstuffs has become an industry, heavily dependent on efficient transport and distribution networks, sophisticated technology and on wage labour, rather than produced in a 'cosy' world of peasants and small farmers. The whole metropolis may be supported by foodstuffs and other commodities coming from increasingly distant places, sometimes thousands of kilometres away on the other side of the world.

The countryside is constantly changing. It often bears little resemblance to the bucolic ambiance of the old days, portrayed by the romantic novels of the nineteenth century that still informs the imagery of what is wonderful about being 'rural'. Similarly, cities are not homogenous and the degree of urbanisation may vary hugely within built-up areas. Even in the more apparently cosmopolitan areas of urban spaces, neighbourhoods may display signs of refusal of the anonymity that characterises the idea of the city. Conversely the countryside is increasingly adopting the ways of life usually associated with urban areas. Gentrification of the rural areas, by those seeking a healthier lifestyle in the unpolluted atmosphere of the country and the return of the locals after retirement, forces rapid change in some places, whereas in others the forceful maintenance of architectural features makes of them a kind of museum where the inhabitants are constrained to adapt or move.

Although the administrative boundaries of cities are usually clearly delimited, the perception of those limits is not always evident to everyone; rather, the urban area is an interface of ill-defined interdependent centres and peripheries. The space of the city and the surrounding areas constitute a highly complex and dynamic spatial, social, political, economic and cultural entity. Diversity and similitude find expression in superimposed layers which may be conflictual but, usually, do not require clarification of their own contradictions. In its own dynamics, the city is capable of accommodating such differences without jeopardising its integrity or questioning its very existence as a sensorial space of experiences and meanings where varied expressions of belonging may be anchored.

As aptly debated in 'urban anthropology', cities are not monolithic entities (Prato and Pardo 2013; Pardo and Prato 2012). The fluidity of the urban experience is expressed in the ability of each city to be uniquely different in its aptitude to manage its own internal contradictions, to find ways to absorb or repel external influences, while retaining its wholeness, no matter how diverse the lives of individuals or groups within it may be. And yet cities, like most social spaces, are constantly changing and, surely, constantly outgrowing themselves. Thus, the city must be understood dynamically, encompassing several processes, not static entities (Pardo and Prato 2012, 4–6).

Cities are inserted in complex local, regional, national and international contexts that need to be addressed in their interactions, both synchronically and diachronically (Pardo and Prato 2012, 8–10). The global flows and connections, though not new, have been intensified owing to better transport and

communication facilities. Such changes also impinge on the countryside and in the proximity between urban and rural areas.

Old cities constantly reinterpret themselves while retaining their 'soul'; new cities, especially those planned[1] and new parts of old cities, eventually acquire their own 'character' through the adaptations brought about by social action. Even cities without people—built to plan only to become 'ghost cities'—have their own story to tell (Shepard 2015). Whereas the inhabitants of the city are, simultaneously, agents of change and keepers of 'authenticity' there, visitors, especially tourists, contribute to urban change while seeking the experience of the 'real' city. The elites and those invested with governing powers, including local, regional and national authorities determining policies and administering the life of the citizens, are, possibly, those responsible for the most dramatic changes in the uses of urban space and the shaping of city life. Such changes are not value free and often take into account the interests of particular sectors of society.

The complexity of urban life can only be fully understood by resorting to a varied range of levels and perspectives of analysis in order to comprehend its various aspects. Anthropological research in urban areas in Portugal and elsewhere at the end of the twentieth century has gained ground, somewhat inspired by sociologists and geographers using the ethnographic method. This openness of analysis, accommodating the contributions of other disciplines, and partaking, whenever possible, in theories, ideas and methodologies, constitutes one of the interesting aspects of what has become known as 'urban anthropology' (Pardo and Prato 2012, 4; Prato and Pardo 2013).

The history of each city is the result of its own experiences, adaptations and negotiations, through time, often permeated by conflict. No matter how sophisticated cities are, or how much planning has gone in to their organisation, each maintains its own overall character and distinctiveness that will prevail,[2] despite the rearrangements of its spatial configurations.

Ethnography Comes to Town

Anthropologists' interest in city life, or the lack thereof, is, at least in part, inscribed in the discipline's history, as Pardo and Prato have pointed out (2013). This is true of the discipline as a whole, but also of the national developments of ethnographic studies with the idiosyncrasies that contributed to the definition of which objects should constitute the privileged focus of research. In the Portuguese case, besides the strong emphasis on the colonial context,[3] ethnographic efforts have essentially been directed at rural areas.

According to João Leal, in the Portuguese anthropological tradition the 'popular culture is always synonym to rurality', excluding 'the cities and the urban popular layers' (Leal 2000, 40).[4] The result of such an estrangement is reflected in a relatively small number of books published by anthropologists and by other social scientists using the ethnographic method when addressing

urban contexts.[5] Furthermore, there is a relatively strong concentration of studies on the more popular aspects of city life, especially, in the case of Lisbon, the *bairros populares* (popular neighbourhoods) and, from the late 1980s onwards, 'ethnic minorities', maintaining the ingrained aura of rurality that pervades Portuguese anthropological tradition.[6]

Following the demise of the New State dictatorship in 1974, Portuguese academia—the social sciences in general and anthropology in particular—could finally enter a new era.[7] In the 1970s and 1980s the focus was on rural monographs and 'community studies', in the footsteps of Jorge Dias[8]; material culture, objects, architecture, arts, trades and techniques, inspired by Ernesto Veiga de Oliveira and Fernando Galhano; and on traditions, including religious or profane celebrations, linguistics and popular beliefs, in the path of Leite de Vasconcelos,[9] among others. These trends continued to dominate academic production in a sort of 'salvage anthropology' somehow to register and preserve the essence of the Portuguese people, and their 'traditions', which are at risk of disappearing. These efforts were, especially during the late 1970s and 1980s, directed particularly at the north-east of the country, more isolated and believed to be a reminder of some particularly 'pure' cultural niche where 'communitarianism', based on social harmony and equal exchanges, was wrongly believed to be the dominant cultural feature (O'Neill 1987). In the 1990s, the choice of fields and objects of study reflected the access to increasingly international debates and influences which broadened the horizons of the discipline.[10]

The geographical distance and the 'strange other' that had been at the core of the dominant tendencies of the discipline for so long were replaced by the cultural distance between the urban elite observing the rural 'other' or the poorer urban folks and the migrants, in line with the tendencies of urban anthropology elsewhere (see e.g. Pardo and Prato 2012; Prato and Pardo 2013). Gradually, the field has expanded to include a broader diversity of subjects of research. A shift in the dominant academic influences, from the French (and, to a lesser extent, German) to the Anglo-Saxon 'school', may also have contributed to the adoption of new terrains.

Lisbon: A City with Many Views

Lisbon is an ancient city. There is archaeological evidence of human presence in the region since prehistoric times. Successive groups shaped the landscape over the centuries and brought with them their genes and their cultures, blending influences from Europe, North Africa and the Mediterranean shores. Located at the estuary of the Tagus, the largest river in the Iberian Peninsula, as it reaches the Atlantic Ocean, and at a short distance from the Mediterranean Sea, its natural setting made it an important seaport since antiquity.[11]

Lisbon, overlooking the Tagus from the hills, descends towards the river where merchants, fisherman and seafarers of all sorts sought their livelihood. Like other cities, it grew mostly unplanned, generated out of the ingenuity of

its inhabitants, who used the space as an integral part of their daily lives. The urban space included neighbourhoods and streets of specific groups according to their religious beliefs and their trades.[12] The urban spatial arrangement of today is still marked by realignments and compromises but it is also the reflection of deliberate planning strategies.

The defence requirements of medieval times are still visible in the city walls around the Moorish castle, which the Christians conquered in the mid-twelfth century, accommodating various small neighbourhoods. As the population grew, the walls expanded. Although this nucleus was central to the political, administrative and economic life of the city, it could not exist without the surrounding areas which supplied the essential maintenance for the urban population. Some sources of those supplies were very close to the centre, or even within it, in small farms and gardens on ground floors or in plots in between buildings.

Small hamlets and villages, some of them at considerable distances, were gradually engulfed by the urban sprawl and became a somewhat indistinctive part of the whole. However, that impression of sameness is constantly broken by the claims of neighbourliness, as if it were an expression of a 'community' even if the traditions to which it lays claim had to be (re)invented.

The expansion of the city reflected the local, regional, national and international dynamics of the times, in an ebb and flow movement associated with the economic, political and cultural mood of the different periods in history. Planned and unplanned urban patterns coexist, mixing the old and the new, the rich and the poor, in a concoction that is part of the city's existence. Lisbon is not different in this respect from any other old European city; its distinctiveness is the reflection of its own way of being itself.

The period of geographic discoveries may be considered the golden age of Lisbon, and the Tagus was central to those endeavours. The exploits of sea trade at the height of the empire contributed to the expansion of architecture, especially the construction of opulent palaces and churches, mostly on the outskirts of the old citadel, but it did not contemplate any true form of urban planning.

Although there is some evidence of intentions to organise the city space in previous centuries, the strongest and clearest marks of Lisbon's urban planning are the result of the reconstruction following the 1755 earthquake.[13]

Inspired by the Enlightenment, the Marquis of Pombal oversaw the new plans that intended to avoid the consequences of similar acts of nature in the future by adopting a particular architectural structure, known as the 'pombaline cage', and by defining the rules of where new buildings could be located and how they should be built. The design was carefully drafted and although it includes other areas, its most impressive manifestation is the Baixa Pombalinar (Pombaline Downtown), with wide streets aligned in a rectilinear pattern opening into a huge square by the river, the Commerce Square or Palace Yard. This was planned as the designated place for the political and administrative centre of the country, close to where most economic activities were to be based,

especially those associated with maritime trade, in the height of the empire and its riches, arriving in Lisbon from across the sea, especially from Africa, from India and later from Brazil.

The late eighteenth century inaugurated the first deliberate attempt to develop industries and trade. Areas of Lisbon, and other cities, were designated for the establishment of specific industries.[14] These were adapted to their political, commercial, industrial and housing functions. The urban space was to be neat, distributed in some harmonious but socially segregated way, maintaining the poor at a short enough distance to ensure that the rich could count on a sufficient workforce to supply their needs but hidden from view whenever possible. The ancient inner-city neighbourhoods and the side streets of the fashionable boulevards, where more often than not respectable citizens would not go, housed the poor in squalid conditions.

Despite the efforts to industrialise, Portugal remained a rural country well into the twentieth century. The rural exodus associated with the Industrial Revolution, which occurred in other parts of Europe, had not happened in Portugal. There were diverse periods of outwards migration from the countryside to escape poverty and demographic pressure. Migrants chose the cities in the country or moved abroad—to Brazil, the Americas, the African colonies or the richer European countries—in patterns that reflected the opportunities of each period.

The 1960s were the time of urban growth, not so much because industrialisation efforts were increased and public works needed large amounts of workers but because the living conditions in the countryside were bad and men, who had been conscripted to the colonial wars, were not willing to return to their hamlets when they were discharged from the battlefields.

Lisbon was the main pole of attraction, but the lack of housing made it difficult for these new arrivals to find abodes. Slums started to be set up wherever there was some available space, and soon illegal neighbourhoods were built in bricks and mortar.

Most of the slums to some extent reproduced the lifestyle of the place of origin and included the rural habits as well as the domestic production of foodstuffs in small gardens close to home. These gardens not only were an economic strategy that enabled a richer diet and less dependence, but also represented an emotional connection with the way of life in the countryside and a form of occupation in people's leisure time.

Following the Carnations' Revolution that deposed the New State dictatorship and enabled the independence of the colonies, the mid-1970s produced some relevant changes in Lisbon's city life. One of the most visible was the arrival of *retornados*[15] from the former colonies, the new independent countries. The scarcity of dwellings to house the new arrivals was one of the issues of contention. The population of the city had grown fast and the new built areas obeyed the modern planning strategies that were supposed to create a more humane, cleaner environment for those who could afford it. Gradually, the outwards movement towards these new areas grew, engulfing the sur-

rounding 'rural' areas as people searched for a quieter life and better living conditions. Soon, the process snowballed and the opposite effect resulted: the quiet outskirts became overcrowded suburbia. In spite of all the good intentions, the suburbia of Lisbon involved all the inconveniences of the city without any of the services and amenities it had to offer. The villages around Lisbon were swallowed by the urban sprawl and became a commuters' hell. Still, Lisbon for a while maintained its old ways, mixing the 'urban' and the 'rural' within it. While the metropolitan area grew in size and number of people, the city itself consistently lost its population. In 1960, Lisbon had 802,230 inhabitants, but by 2011 the resident population was 547,733, a loss of around 30% in 50 years.[16]

The Country in the City

In the mid-1990s, every afternoon a herd of sheep crossed the Alameda das Linhas de Torres, not far from the Portuguese television headquarters, towards the back of the football stadium. The shepherd and his dog carefully guided the flock of between 50 and 100 sheep across the pedestrian crossing while the cars waited patiently in the busy rush hour for the last animal to reach the other side of the road. This was the time to return home after grazing somewhere in an area not far from Lisbon airport.

The busy road leading to suburbia connected two areas with a completely different environment, with open fields that appeared to have survived the sprawl of the busy city. The sight of the herd of sheep was peculiar and caused surprise—not for long, though, as the place where the enclosure was located soon after became the new middle-class neighbourhood of Telheiras,[17] whereas the pastures became the upper middle-class Quinta do Lambert estate.

According to Arroteia (1984, 52), in 1981 around 75% of Portuguese were engaged in agriculture. Furthermore, the regional imbalance was, and still is, striking. The littoral occupied a quarter of the area but had almost 70% of the population and contributed to around 80% of the industrial produce. Portugal had few urban centres worthy of that name and, while Lisbon was an ancient city, once the capital of a vast empire, at the end of the twentieth century it was still a mixture of urban and rural spaces.

This rural encroachment into the urban tissue was observable not only in the surrounding areas but also in the inner city, not so much because people would engage in 'rural' activities but because, as a result of a late rural exodus and delayed industrialisation, the inner city was inhabited by recently arrived migrants from the countryside.

Costa and Guerreiro (1984) show that in the 1983 electoral rolls of Alfama's two main parishes,[18] one of the Lisbon's most 'typical' quarters, 3997 individuals, corresponding to 53.7% of the adult population, were born outside the Lisbon Council area. Of these, 1992 individuals (10.4%) were from the Council of Pampilhosa da Serra in the mountainous midlands between the districts of Coimbra and Castelo Branco.

My own field research, initiated in the late 1980s, took place in one of the villages of Pampilhosa da Serra. My intention was to observe how these urban dwellers maintained their ties with their place of birth. One of the first aspects was that I could expand on Costa and Guerreiro's observations because although the small village I studied was in the same municipality, migration did not take individuals to Alfama but to other areas of the city, mostly Bairro Alto. The reason was that a previous period of migration had taken place in the 1930s and, whereas in the 1960s the port activities had attracted men to Alfama, in the 1930s the types of occupation were more diversified and were not attached to a specific location. Nonetheless, there was a Casa da Malta[19] in Bairro Alto to receive those coming from this village from where they would spread to wherever jobs were available, living in poorer neighbourhoods in small flats, rented rooms or parts of apartments.

Graça Índias Cordeiro refers to the 'syncretic evocations of ruralism, history and folklore' (2003a, 192) when addressing the performativity of *bairros populares* (popular neighbourhoods) and how they are reflected in the identities of the inhabitants. In her book *Um Lugar na Cidade* (1997) about the June festivities devoted to the popular saints (Saint Anthony, Saint John and Saint Peter) in Lisbon's Bairro da Bica, the peculiarity of the ways of expressing forms of sociability that are neither urban nor rural comes to light.

The sociability in the urban space is not necessarily marked by the absence of the patterns of neighbourliness, and the close-knit ties found in some areas of the city reflect the intertwining of the partaking of the spaces and forms of livelihood. Though these features are rather more evident and easy to observe in the *bairros populares*, they are not entirely absent from other parts of the town. At least at first sight there may not be any observable difference in those neighbourhoods between people from rural and urban origins. The accent may betray those coming from the countryside after many years in the city, but it does not take long for them to adapt to their new living circumstances.

A Place to Call Home, or Where Is My Homeland?

Just before Christmas, Ana expressed her sadness at not having a *terra* (loosely translated, homeland). She, like her father, was born in Lisbon, her mother was born on the outskirts of the city but has no relations in the now suburban place of her birth. As far as Ana and her mother know, all the family are from Lisbon and they cannot trace any connections elsewhere. Although, owing to her father's profession, Ana spent some short periods in other areas of the country, especially during the school holidays, her roots were always in Lisbon and she never really lived in any other place. Pedro does not have a *terra* either and he also regrets it. His parents and his grandparents were also born in Lisbon and he understands that a long time back there was some family connection somewhere up north, but he cannot locate it with any precision. His wife is also from Lisbon and she cannot pinpoint any place outside the city where her family might come from. As far as they know, they are all from Lisbon and that is it.

Ana and Pedro have never met. They are both about 60, highly educated, and they both have close-knit families with whom they spend the festivities, invariably in Lisbon or by going to a tourist place. Unlike a large number of Lisbon's inhabitants, they have nowhere to go at those times of the year when large numbers of people living in the greater urban areas move elsewhere to gather round the table with relatives coming from different parts of the country and from their countries of migration. Their connections to their places of origin are thus reinforced through the physical presence of all who can attend the occasion. It is not only at that time of the year that people travel between Lisbon, Paris or wherever in Europe or the world. Easter and the summer holidays are also times to 'come back' even for those who were born in Lisbon but are descendants of parents or grandparents from the villages and hamlets of somewhere else in the country. The impact of the absentee villagers' willingness to participate in village life is such that the calendar of many local patron saints' festivities have been moved to coincide with the summer holidays.

Both Ana and Pedro are old enough to remember Lisbon as it used to be in the 1960s, before the arrival of large numbers of rural migrants. It was different then and they did not need to go very far to find the wheat fields. Lisbon itself had its own picturesque aspects within it and they knew the city well.

Conversely, Amadeu was born in the mountains of central Portugal. He joined the navy as a conscript and, after a period in the colonial war, returned to Lisbon and decided not to go back to his village. He had relatives in the capital, so he found accommodation easily and soon after found a job in the Lisbon maritime authority. He got married to a girl from his village and they made their home in a flat on the outskirts of Lisbon. Not long after, their only son was born.

The family would go back to the village at least once a year, especially in the summer to attend the local fete in honour of Our Lady of Nazaré, in August. The son would spend his school holidays at his grandparents' house in the village, where he would meet his cousins and other children who also lived in urban areas and spent the summer in the village.

The parents and grandparents died long ago, the village is almost empty of inhabitants and only a few old people remain there all year long. Amadeu, his brothers and sisters all have houses in the village—one of them bought a house and the others divided the parental home into small independent dwellings. They also have land they inherited from their parents but it is now turned wild through lack of attention. Amadeu is in his early 80s and he has no energy left, not even for those chores he used to do, such as olive picking. Most villagers of his generation are no longer able to engage seriously in any form of agricultural work. The degree of abandonment makes it impossible to use the old paths to reach the fields that are now transformed into wilderness. Their children and grandchildren, born in the city, have never done any farm work and lack the required expertise, or even the interest, in that type of chore. While most people of Amadeu's generation have low levels of education, their offspring are almost all educated to university level and although they enjoy the village for the short duration of their holidays their lifestyle is completely urban.

When I first studied their village, in the late 1980s, I noticed that there was a strong attachment to it and, even though it was losing its population at a fast pace, the investment was increasing. Some houses were refurbished, the whole village was changing fast. The Comissão de Melhoramentos (improvements commission), based in Lisbon, was taking pride in the collective facelift, raising money and making plans to turn the village into something completely different to match the transformed houses.

The astonishing speed of the transformation led some to complain about the loss of 'character' that such changes would imply.

Amadeu and one of his brothers were enthusiastic participants in the changes. The ancient chapel where they and their parents got married and were baptised was pulled down and a new church was built in another location. The reason was that the old chapel's roof was leaking. On the same site, using the structure of the old chapel, a community centre was built. The old saints of the chapel were sold in an auction and the altar was sold to a nearby church.

The changes were not all in the buildings. Out of nowhere a bass drum band, which was not part of the old folklore of the place, was created and the community centre became a 'museum' housing objects to keep alive the memories of the village. Most contributed with some household artifacts and agricultural tools. That was it—the crystallised old village was to be in that place, kept under lock and key, while the village itself was modernised, urbanised.

A village that only had electricity in the 1970s and tap water in the 1990s now has a village square in what used to be the threshing floor. The old fountains were being decommissioned by the council, eager to control the water resources, and the old village paths are due to receive street names.

Ana and Pedro love their city dearly, and so does Amadeu, but whereas the latter has somewhere else to belong to and can relate differently to his places, Ana and Pedro have no choice. What they lacked was a strong sense of closeness and belonging that, in their view, the *terra* would provide. In practice they never experienced what it was like to have somewhere, a place of reference and belonging, where they are recognised as active participants and actors, and where they are listened to. They believe they are missing something because they miss an 'imagined community' within which they can interact widely with their extended family and friends, even if only on special occasions.

Unlike Ana and Pedro who have little to say about how their city is, Amadeu, who now lives in a modern urban neighbourhood on the other side of the River Tagus, where his voice is not heard, can have his say in the village, where his views count and he can influence the way it looks and lives. No matter if the village is almost empty for most of the year. This is his village and he belongs there. He loves his village and all it represents even though his harsh childhood memories of farming life can only survive, polished up and varnished, hanging on the walls of the impromptu 'ethnographic museum' in the community house.

Remaking the Habitats

The processes of change in the small village in the mountains of central Portugal and the city of Lisbon may seem at odds with each other but in some respects they are part of the same phenomenon of change inspired by a modernisation mood.

Lisbon is changing fast, new areas are taken up with buildings, while the facades of the old buildings of the city centre and the villas at the outskirts are being refurbished to their former glory to accommodate high-priced apartments in private closed condominiums, hotels, hostels and other amenities that inflate property prices to values that are out of reach of the Portuguese middle classes, let alone the poor. This is not a phenomenon specific to Lisbon. As Prato and Pardo remind us (2013, 88), all over the world cities are experiencing processes of revitalisation, usually serving the interests of the few who are wealthy and benefit from the changes. The poor are pushed out to ghetto-like purpose-built estates in distant places of suburbia or in less valuable parts of the city.

For a city centre such as Lisbon's, which was in a rather poor state of conservation, this craze of renovation, rehabilitation and revitalisation generates mixed feelings and leads to contradictory policies. On the one hand, the city centre looks nicer if it is polished up; on the other, whose city is it and for whom? The invasion of tourists[20] in recent years has created discomfort and price rises, but tourists bring the much needed money to improve the poor state of public finances. The natives suffer while the trams, used as regular public transport, become a touristic attraction with long queues and exorbitant prices. The debate is endless and social networks are a medium to express the ideas in favour and against the unremitting interventions in the city.

Whereas in Lisbon's city centre this process of change is managed by market forces and political planning strategies, in the village it is the doing of a group of engaged villagers without much outside intervention, there is no market there, nobody cares about that small place hidden in the hills, at least for now. The village has not been preserved to keep its original 'charisma', with its slate roofs and stone walls, in order to attract hordes of tourists eager to enjoy the 'authentic', 'traditional' settings of a 'typical' mountain village. This is not Piódão,[21] Sortelha, Monsanto,[22] Póvoa Dão[23] or one of the villages that became part of a touristified showcase of 'traditional' Portuguese rural settings. This is a 'normal' village, like many others, transformed by its own folks for their own living, in their own way and to their own taste, in their own interpretation of 'tradition' and 'authenticity'.

The parallels between the urban and rural transformations, in a world where increasingly people live in cities, may indicate, at least in the Portuguese case, a tendency towards urbanisation of some parts of the countryside, with the establishment of leisure and custom-made 'villages' for holidaymakers, while the descendants of the villagers gradually lose interest in the land of their

ancestors, which will be left to ruin, already a common destiny of many villages and hamlets where nobody lives and nobody goes.

Prato and Pardo have pointed out the importance of contextualising local dynamics and change in national and global historical processes (2013, 95; see also Pardo and Prato 2012). DiGaetano and Klemanski (1999, ix), referring to urban politics, maintain that they are not solely the reflection of national strategies; rather, cities are subjected to 'alignments and realignments' influenced by economic factors (see also Spyridakis 2011). These strategies are likely to combine local interests and outside dynamics in a globalised world marked by fast-spreading ideological patterns leading to 'neoliberal cites' where political strategies are subsumed to economic interests (Asef Bayat 2012, 111, cited in Jaffe and Koning 2016, 74).

The demographic changes in the city and the movements of the population are only one of the consequences of the capitalist logic applied in the way cities are understood—not as places to live in but as assets subjected to the laws of the market. The rising price of urban land pushes the population outwards to an increasingly urbanised suburbia, a sprawl that drives the poorer further out. Workers are forced to commute, even if public transport is inadequate and expansive. Small businesses and units of production can no longer afford the city and their space is taken up by multinationals, franchising and niche businesses (Jaffe and Koning 2016, 74).

Ana and Pedro are nowadays a rarity and feel odd for not having a *terra* like Amadeu and his son and granddaughter have. Soon enough, most of the dwindling urban population in Lisbon will be incapable of tracing their origins to anywhere else in the country. Maybe the yet-to-be born Amadeu's great-grandchild will never know the village of her ancestors or consider it to be her *terra*. Like Ana and Pedro, Amadeu's son has no *terra* of his own. He refers to the little village as the parents' *terra*. Some villages will be nobody's *terra* and the urban folks will no longer regret not having one of their own.

I do not know what happened to the sheep, the shepherd and his dog. I only know they are no longer a sight to be seen in the afternoons of my city. I do know what became of the grazing fields and the sheepfold: under the pressure of the markets, they were turned into housing estates.

Despite all the changes, Lisbon remains itself, loved by its people, leaning on its ancient history, reinventing its space, rediscovering its traditions, proudly overlooking the Tagus.

NOTES

1. Nineteenth-century sociologists have addressed these aspects of the modern city. For an overview of key sociological analyses and their influence on 'urban anthropology', see Prato and Pardo (2013). Urban planning allows for the 'legibility' of the city space. More often than not, this 'taming' includes the distribution of functions within the city and consists in some form of social engineering that favours economic and political domination. On this subject, see Scott (1998). For a critical view of Brasilia, a planned city, see Holston (1989).

2. Cities that experienced natural disasters, wars or accidents that destroyed the whole of or part of their built-up area assimilate such events into their own history. The collective memory is capable of crystallising such traumatic events, while the process of readaptation will heal the wounds, generate new ways of understanding the city and redefine the sense of belonging. Examples of reconstruction after traumatic events include New Orleans after Katrina (Gratz 2015), German cities after the Second World War (Diefendorf 1993), New York after 9/11 (Sorkin and Zukin 2002) and Chernobyl after the nuclear spill (Alexievich 2005).

3. The colonial context was central to the Portuguese administration of the overseas territories. Nowadays, the territories of the former Portuguese Empire together with the analysis of colonialism, colonial anthropology and the presence and impact of the Portuguese in the world are relevant fields of study.

4. Leal (2000) addresses the history of Portuguese anthropology and devotes a substantial part of his work to rural popular architecture and how it influenced the erudite urban architecture.

5. On this issue, see also Cordeiro (2003b).

6. For examples of early ethnographies of Lisbon, see Costa and Guerreiro (1984) on Alfama and the *fado*; Bastos (1997) on vagrants and the poor during the New State dictatorship; Cordeiro (1997) on the popular marches in the Bica neighbourhood; Chaves (1999) on Casal Ventoso; and Machado Pais (2001) on the parallel economic strategies. Of these only Graça Índias Cordeiro and Susana Pereira Bastos are anthropologists. The papers of a thematic volume of the journal *Ethnologia* on urban anthropology , edited by Susana Pereira Bastos (1999), recognise the city as a field of anthropological enquiry and emphasize issues relating to poverty, migration, ethnicity and identities.

7. The creation in 1977 of a Department of Anthropology at the University Nova of Lisbon and of the first anthropology degree outside the old colonial school was a major step forward. Nowadays, besides the research centres, such as the Centre for Research in Anthropology and Sociedade Portuguesa de Antropologia e Etnologia, and the associated laboratories, such as the Institute for Social Sciences, there are four anthropology departments in the country, three of them in Lisbon.

8. Jorge Dias is one of the founders of modern anthropology in Portugal, influenced by Tönnies and the German school of thought, with emphasis on community studies.

9. Leite de Vasconcellos is one of the precursors of anthropology in Portugal. His works rely on fieldwork and on accounts produced by local historians and folklorists, and they include linguistics, archaeology, philology, religion, oral tradition and ethnography.

10. Biological and physical anthropology were somewhat pushed aside and has its main centre in Coimbra University. For a detailed history of anthropology in Portugal, see Leal (2000).

11. On the importance of Lisbon as a port city, see O'Flanagan (2008).

12. In the old part of town, even in the part rebuilt in the eighteenth century, many streets and neighbourhoods retain those names: Rua da Judiaria (Jewry Street), Rua da Prata (Silver Street), Rua dos Sapateiros (Cobblers Street), Mouraria (Moorish quarters), Alfama (a corruption of the Arabic Al Hammam, the baths) and so on.

13. Estimated at around 8.5–9.0 on the Richter scale, this was one of the strongest earthquakes ever registered. Its impact and the ensuing tsunami and fires were huge. Voltaire, quite impressed by the event, wrote poems on this disaster, and in *Candide* (1759) he declares that the destruction affected three-quarters of Lisbon. On the Lisbon earthquake and urban planning, see Hope (2016), Gupta and Gahalaut (2013) and França (1978).

14. These included the production of silk in Lisbon. Port was produced for export to Britain in exchange for wool cloth, through the agreement established by the Methuen Treaty.

15. *Retornados* means 'returned' and refers to the refugees from the former colonies, especially from Angola and Mozambique. While some were Portuguese who had moved to the African possessions, others were Africans seeking to escape the uncertainty of the new countries. There is no certainty about the number of *retornados* arriving in Lisbon but estimates vary from 500,000 to a million or more.

16. According to the data of the censuses of the Portuguese National Statistics Institute. The only exception concerns the 1980s owing to the incoming *retornados* from the former colonies. In 2015 the Greater Lisbon area had 2,810,923 inhabitants, whereas the city, with 506,892 inhabitants, continues to lose its population.

17. Touted as having the highest concentration of higher education graduates in the country.

18. São Miguel and Santo Estêvão.

19. The Casa de Malta was a type of hostel where the newcomers from a particular village or parish would find accommodation in the city. Most of them were located in the poorer neighbourhoods of the inner city.

20. The sudden rise of tourists is partly the result of political investment in the business and also the fear of terrorist attacks in other fashionable destinations of Europe and the Mediterranean. Lisbon is considered a safe place with very low rates of criminality.

21. Piódão is one of the 'slate villages'.

22. Classified as 'the most Portuguese village of Portugal' in 1938 and a 'Historic Village' in 1995. For details, see Buescu ([1961]1984).

23. Póvoa Dão is a 'Medieval' village completely refurbished to become a tourist village. 'Typical' houses, with air conditioning and other modern amenities, are available for sale or rental from real-estate internet sites. Póvoa Dão is advertised as 'authentic Portugal'. For a glimpse, see Simões and Carreira (2013).

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Lost in the Shuffle: Urban African American Students Cast into a Rural White University in the USA

Talbot W. Rogers

Introduction: Theoretical Approaches

Ethnographic analyses have often focused on rural people's adjustment to urban life.[1] This chapter addresses the experience of undergraduate African American students attending a southern Appalachian University, which will be given the pseudonym Mountain University. The analysis focuses on six interviews that have been selected as representatives of the university's African American student population. All participants were between 18 and 24 years of age and came from a variety of academic disciplines. All came from cities which are much larger than the town that borders the university (approximately 2000 people). The nearest large city is 100 kilometres (66 miles) away. Only 25 African American students inhabit a campus of approximately 1200 mostly white students.

This study is similar to many other studies that have examined the adjustments made by African American students to colleges and universities with a preponderantly white population (Buckley 2012; D'Augelli and Hershberger 1993; Gray et al. 2013; Grier-Reed 2013; Torres 2009; Woldoff et al. 2011). Thompson and Fretz (1991) have summarised the common findings among these studies describing differences between black and white students in relation to perception of racial tension and hostility (greater among black students),

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expressing their levels of satisfaction (black students less inclined to express dissatisfaction) and levels of isolation (higher among black students) and shared identity with the academic institution they attended (higher among white students). A study carried out by Ancis et al. found that 'African-American students reported significantly more racial-ethnic conflict on campus, pressure to conform to stereotypes, and less equitable treatment by faculty, staff and teaching assistants' (Ancis et al. 2000, 180). Several studies agreed that African American students attending predominantly black institutions were happier and better adjusted than their counterparts in predominantly white institutions (Constantine and Watt 2002; Torres 2009). African American students were seen by Booker as giving 'accounts of being harassed, mistreated, and experiencing institutional and individual discrimination. Furthermore, and most troubling, these negative experiences were often as a result of interactions with university administrators, faculty, and classmates' (2007, 179).

Reflecting broader urban anthropological study of contemporary cultural pluralism and policies of multiculturalism perceived as mere 'tokenism' (see e.g. Prato 2009), Torres found that racism is a common complaint among African American students in predominantly white colleges. In particular, Torres remarks:

> Racism also remains a 'significant' factor in the lives of black students at majority white universities. Overt racist acts by white students are still commonplace and blacks are not treated as equals by white peers, faculty and administrators. They continue to be stereotyped as 'special admit' students and treated as 'second-class' citizens who are not ready to compete with white students on an intellectual level. As a result, many black students come to feel alienated, isolated and estranged from mainstream life on white campuses. (2009, 884)

The concept of isolation mentioned by Torres is another theme that runs through much of the related literature. African American students were isolated in many ways. They were often markedly outnumbered by whites. 'The large number of whites compared to the small number of blacks on campus makes this a wholly new experience with which they have had little direct experience' (Torres 2009, 892–3). Another form of isolation was the separation from their families. The intensity of this separation was considerably greater than that felt by their white peers. This can be seen as important in the light of Tinto's (1993) theory of college student persistence. He addresses what he sees as a need for successful students to make a considerable separation from their prior relationships, arguing that 'In a very real sense, a person's ability to leave one setting, whether physical, social, or intellectual may be a necessary condition for subsequent persistence in another setting' (Tinto 1993, 96).

Walpole (2007) notes yet another form of isolation, which refers to the social realm. 'The social isolation African American students at PWI's [predominantly white institutions] experience may be compounded by low levels of involvement in student activities, in part because the activities offered are less

appealing to African Americans' (2007, 239). The society that the African American student comes from can also be viewed as intensifying a sense of isolation. It has been argued that 'cultural values provide students with a map of appropriate and inappropriate behaviours. This has the consequence of prohibiting certain social activities for some students but not for others' (Swigart and Murrell 2001, 298).

Methodology: The Relevance of 'Grounded Theory'

In this study I have applied the principles of 'classic' grounded theory, as espoused by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967; see also Glaser 1992). This means that the literature review was conducted after the fieldwork was completed and the data analysed. I have decided to use this principle in order to minimise bias in formulating a theory explaining the statements of the participants. As Glaser has aptly pointed out,

> The question continually arises as to what is the 'proper' pacing of reading the literature on the grounded theory process. The concern is brought out by the dictum to not contaminate one's effort to generate concepts from the data with *preconceived* concepts that may not really fit, work or be relevant, but appear so momentarily. The danger is, of course, to force the data in the wrong direction if one is too imbued with concepts from the literature. (Glaser 1978, 31)

Six students were identified through purposive sampling. The dean of students, an African American, selected the students using criteria involving individuals with strong communicative skills. They were interviewed on campus and were often partially or fully interviewed by the dean privately to verify that their answers were not biased by the presence of the primary researcher, who was a white professor. All interviews were recorded and notes were taken throughout by the dean of students and the primary researcher. Later, the notes and excerpts from the interviews were coded. Coding was done in accordance with concepts espoused by Allan (2003). Here, it is worth reporting what Allan says about grounded theory coding:

> Grounded theory coding is a form of content analysis to find and conceptualise the underlying issues amongst the 'noise' of the data. During the analysis of an interview, the researcher will become aware that the interviewee is using words and phrases that highlight an issue of importance or interest to the research. This is noted and described in a short phrase. This issue may be mentioned again in the same or similar words and again is noted. This process is called *coding* and the short descriptor is a code. (Allan 2003, 1)

In my work, the codes were analysed using the Constant-Comparative Method developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). This continually compares data to data, data to concept and finally concepts to emergent theory. In agreement with Charmaz (2006), I have applied coding as 'the pivotal link' between

the data and the development of a theory that would explain those data. According to Charmaz, 'Through coding, you *define* what is happening in the data and begin to grapple with what it means' (2006, 46). From such a perspective, the codes can be regarded as 'elements of a nascent theory' that would not only explain the collected data but also direct further data gathering.

Through the coding process, I found approximately 12 preliminary categories; I identified two themes as syntheses of these categories. One was 'boredom'; this is the word used by the interviewed students. The way in which 'boredom' was used by the students to describe their experience seemed to encompass many forms of the theme of 'isolation' that has merged in many of the studies reviewed earlier. The other synthesising theme was 'adjustment'. Let us look in detail at these two themes.

Between Adjustment and Boredom

All the students interviewed for this study were polite, well spoken and highly motivated to succeed academically. They were all pleased with the progress they were making in their classes. They were far from home—most were admitted to Mountain University on scholarships. Few owned automobiles and, for those who did, the distances to the cities they had come from made weekend travel home prohibitive. As I briefly mentioned earlier, the two interviewers had different ethnic backgrounds—the primary investigator was a white professor and the dean of students was African American. Parts of some interviews were conducted separately; the results were then compared to ascertain whether the students spoke more candidly with the African American dean. No significant differences were noticed. The schedule of the interview questions stemmed from the basic research question—that is, 'What are your perceptions regarding being an African American student at Mountain University?' Here I analyse the results by grouping them into the two synthesising themes of 'adjustment' and 'boredom'.

Adjustment

The African American students who participated in this study often referred to a 'culture shock' when first entering Mountain University. In spite of the difficulty of adjustment, only one of the students was considering transferring away. In contrast, a premedical student who was committed to stay said that,

> As an African American, I feel that I have to show white people a different side of what they perceive black people to be.

Over and over, most students stated that they intended to graduate and made it clear that they were doing well in their classes. Their academic performances were uniformly at least at a satisfactory level. The problems were cultural. One student told the Dean:

> I would say it's the black and white thing … like I say that's really a small problem.

The Appalachian culture surrounding the college is markedly different from the urban environments which these students grew up in. One student remarked, particularly in regard to music:

> There's nothing for us here. There is nothing that we can call our own … They don't have the African American fraternities and sororities here … We don't have a radio station … it seems like everything around here is bluegrass or country. I don't have anything against it. There's nothing here—we make our own CDs and we have to find everything that we want … Maybe they never thought about it. There's not many of us, but I think having these things would draw us here.

Several students were surprised that the small towns near the college could not give haircuts to African Americans. The haircutting equipment necessary to properly cut their hair is different. Coming from much larger cities, the lack of variety was staggering. One of the students stated:

> Back home I'm used to a bigger place. I don't know that much about this town or Mountain County. That's one thing … that's a really, really big adjustment.

In a surprising contradiction to the findings of previous studies, the African American students at Mountain University declared uniformly that racism was not a problem. When asked to relate stories of racist incidents, they brought up what they made clear were isolated incidents. When asked if they had to deal with racism, most responded as one math major did:

> No. I do know some people that don't like mixed (racial) couples … It bugs me at times but I just ignore it. It reflects on the way she was raised.

Another student stated, without bitterness:

> I really haven't had any negative experiences. I don't speak out because you know anybody going to hear you out … I don't want to make this a black and white thing because there's more to it than that. I'm more cool with most of them [whites] than I am withb people.

Incidents had, nevertheless, occurred. A pre-veterinary student told a story about buying a refrigerator at Wal-Mart and having to take it back:

> and they say that we stole it. How can we steal a refrigerator that weighs about sixty pounds? The receipt number and the number on the refrigerator match up …and they were rude, too.

When asked if other experiences like this had occurred, the same student responded adamantly in the negative. Several students related incidents of racism but insisted that they were isolated and not a problem. One female student experienced her first roommate as giving her the silent treatment, refusing to

speak to her under any circumstances. She occasionally began to sleep in the room of a friendly white student and eventually changed roommates. There was no bitterness in her explanation—she simply moved on. It was clear to the interviewers that these were mature students who realised that some of the attitudes of their peers had to be tolerated. None of the students felt that racism was a major factor in their dissatisfaction with Mountain University. Racism, in their eyes, was little in evidence and, should it arise, could be dealt with in a satisfactory manner.

Similarly, the students generally felt that their professors treated them fairly. There was one exception when one of the students felt that the Education Department had been particularly difficult for her because of formally unexpressed racial overtones. Though the interviewed students reported occasional racial incidents involving the classroom, most felt that their academic life was well on track.

Students appeared to separate overt racism from the lack of diversity; the latter was perceived as a much larger problem. As an art education major stated, 'They preach diversity, but there is none.' Mostly, however, the interviewed students often lamented the lack of a larger number of African Americans on campus.

Boredom

The second synthesising theme that emerged in this study was 'boredom'. This word was used by all the participants to describe campus life. When asked what comes to mind first as a student at Mountain University, one student gave a representative reply:

> Boredom. I'm easily entertained but there's nothing to do on campus … I don't like being bored. I'm a very high-energy person. We go to Wal-Mart just to do nothing.

In particular, all students pointed out the lack of activity on the weekends as a major issue. One the students said:

> Nothin' here. If you want to go out and have fun you have to drive at least two hours. Basically, you have to make up your own fun. Mostly it will drive you insane.

The interviewed students had expected that the numbers of African Americans at Mountain University would be low. However, when they took up residency on campus they found that the sparse black population caused problems that they had not anticipated. Most of the problems related to social life and adaptation to a new lifestyle, leisure-time facilities, transport and other infrastructure to which they were accustomed in their home cities.

Suggestions for Improvement

It is significant to point out that the students interviewed felt encouraged by the nature of this study to make suggestions for improvement. Their suggestions included:

- an increase in African American scholarships;
- the establishment of African American sororities and fraternities on campus;
- organised weekend sports, particularly basketball;
- weekend facilities for recreation, such as laser-tag and roller-skating;
- organised dances and other social events;
- transportation to the nearest large city at weekends;
- the establishment of a football team—this was seen as a vehicle to bring in more African American students;
- more awards and other forms of recognition which would apply to blacks.

Conclusions

Recruited as scholarship students and then unconsciously discarded, the participants in this study were relegated to years of on-campus monotony. They reported that no one in power asked them how they felt about their life on the campus of this university. Their suggestions for improvement remained ineffectually dormant within their own constricted circles of friendship. The African Americans, probably along with the international students and other minorities of Mountain University, found themselves marooned on campus for an average of four years.

This isolation might be considered trivial in the light of the higher goals and hopes for lifetime advancement of African American students at Mountain University, but the social cost of four years of *ennui* to their bright young minds must be counted as a terrible loss. Beyond working on academic assignments, the weekends involve the heart of the remainder of the spare time these individuals possessed. For most of them, this time is spent with a few dozen other too-familiar students. If we regard a university as a vehicle to broaden and deepen our understanding of our world, then the world of these students has been seriously, unconsciously and institutionally constricted. African American students have been left spending weekend after weekend with little of interest beyond academia to occupy their time. Their white peers, meanwhile, routinely spend their extra time maintaining links to a wider world, leaving a small invisible and silent contingent on the campus. The black students have been separated from a broader culture by an unseen segregation and find themselves unable to become members of a wider community.

As Pardo and Prato have pointed out, nineteenth-century sociologists have often analysed modern European cities as 'fragmenting, rather than unifying places … characterized by impersonal relations and contractual bonds'. In con-

trast, urban settlements in the USA have at times been regarded as 'places bestowing identity that ideally transcend ethnic and cultural differences and social divisions' (2012, 5; see also Prato and Pardo 2013). In both cases, nineteenth-century analyses aimed to highlight the contrast between the urban and the rural. This study shows that the reality is rather more complex, bringing out the relevance of ethnographic research for an informed understanding of contemporary society. In particular, the research findings seem to suggest that it would be misleading to view the urban and the rural as opposed dichotomies and that a sense of belonging—of feeling part of a community—is equally relevant for urban dwellers as for country folks.

I should like to conclude this chapter with a socially oriented reflection. It would appear that, in spite of a declared commitment to diversity (see e.g. Prato 2009), we often marginalise our minorities without realising that we are doing so, at our peril. In the case of these minority students, they arrive on campus the unique gifts of their culture and character, yet these gifts seem destined to remain largely ungiven. It is not only a loss of a part of the promise and the hope that education extends to these students; it is ultimately an injury to our wider society and a lowering of the robust possibilities that diversity offers to our broader civilisation.

Notes

1. For an overview of 'classical' studies on anthropological rural–urban migration, see Prato and Pardo (2013).

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[1]Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refers to notes.