

CHINA: A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE URBAN

Edited by Yannan Ding,
Maurizio Marinelli, Xiaohong Zhang



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palgrave
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ISBN 978-3-319-64041-9 ISBN 978-3-319-64042-6 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017951134

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Cover illustration: MirageC/gettyimages.

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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

This book grew out of two consecutive sessions titled ‘Urban Historical Geography of China’ that we organized for the 16th International Conference of Historical Geographers (ICHG), held during July 5–10, 2015, in London. A follow-up workshop was held on May 14, 2016, in Shanghai. We had been able to bring together a small and interdisciplinary group of scholars from across the globe to work on this topic. Our gratitude goes to them for their contribution, patience, and flexibility towards this book project. We would also like to thank our editor at Palgrave, Joanna O’Neill, for her professional support in every step of the manuscript preparing work. Many thanks go to our families and friends for their encouragement and support that made this book possible.

This book benefited from the financial support that we received from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC No. 41501153) and the Ministry of Education of China (grant No. 10JJD770003).

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1

Introduction

Yannan Ding

Pieter Bruegel and Chinese Urbanism

One of the epiphany moments of Chinese urbanism that I have ever had was a rather unexpected encounter with Pieter Bruegel the Elder (1525?–1569) inside a shopping mall in Hefei, in eastern China. This happened in a restaurant which had amber color artificial granite walls fitted with gilded strips and a semi-closed turquoise veranda, as well as other Europeaneseque ornaments. Reproductions of several pieces by the *Nederlandisch* arts master adorned its exterior and interior. *The Harvesters* was hanging between the pillars on the outside wall, while a section of the *Hunters in the Snow* was put up behind a round table, typically Chinese, in a dining chamber.

Granted, kitsch reproductions of masterpiece arts for decorative purpose are widely practiced. What is significant is that Bruegel's paintings embodied one of the earliest *urban* perspectives on the countryside, i.e. the *non-urban*. The sixteenth century was a time of changing geographical

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Y. Ding et al. (eds.), *China: A Historical Geography of the Urban*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6_1

vistas. Cities in northwestern Europe developed from an earlier stage of urban revival, a phenomenon better known as part of the Pirenne Thesis,¹ into full-fledged prosperity (Verhulst 1999). Thanks to the opening of global trade, Antwerp, where Bruegel became a master in painting, was the beacon of urbanism (Silver 1996; Porras 2011a, b). Instead of religious themes or portraits of the aristocrats, Bruegel chose to paint rural landscapes, village scenes, and peasant lives, which won him the nickname ‘the Peasant Bruegel’. Yet, it is beyond doubt that he was painting for the well-to-do bourgeois clientele.

Modern critics have lately begun to recognize the impact of the social milieu on the enigmatic rural-themed works of Bruegel. According to Porras, ‘The peasant (...) was a living embodiment of Renaissance Europe’s own cultural past’ (Porras 2011a:11). In the face of unprecedented changes in practically every aspects of life, and urbanization in the Low Countries in particular, the peasants and their way of life were in decline. Referring to Ethan M. Kavalier, Zagorin pointed out that ‘Bruegel was aware (...) of the emergence of new values of practicality, social mobility, pursuit of profit, and individual interest, which were replacing an ethos concerned for stability and the common good’ (Zagorin 2003:94). Rather than being satirical, condescending, or moralizing, Bruegel was empathetic and even somewhat nostalgic toward the quickly dissolving rural world. Indeed, the humanism in Bruegel’s works had been compared to that of William Shakespeare’s (Lewis 1973).

Without further adrift, it is worth noting that historians of China could observe certain resemblances in socio-spatial transformations between China and Europe. Lucien Bianco once noted that ‘the Chinese peasant movements in the first half of the twentieth century recall in many aspects those of past centuries in France, but much more often those of the seventeenth, even of the sixteenth, than of the nineteenth century’ (Bianco 2009:190). While this may remind one of the ‘time lag’ notion in post-colonial studies, Bianco is by no means a post-colonialist. His feeling derived from his senses as a prominent China scholar. He was able to see the *jacquerie* in Chinese peasant revolts, and *vice versa*. On the other hand, Maoism, according to him, was to certain classical Marxists and progressive minds ‘an ill-concealed taste for

conservative values such as attachment to the land and parochialism and even a certain obscurantist fascination for these values' (Bianco 2001:46). While this criticism on Maoism is open to debate, it is a plain fact that China under Mao Zedong remained a predominantly agrarian nation.

China's urbanization has finally gained momentum in the post-Mao era. Urban residents accounted for less than 20% of the population back in the late 1970s. By the 2010s, however, more than half of the Chinese people have made cities and towns their abode. Dwarfed by mega-cities, cities of as much as five million population could only be categorized as 'medium-size cities'. The abovementioned restaurant where the Bruegel paintings were to be found was located in a new town built upon the land which was fertile rice paddies only a few years back. Now tens of thousands of urbanites are making daily uses of that shopping mall. It is this kind of 'emerging cities' that contemporary urban China scholars have dedicated much effort to make sense of (see Friedmann 2005; Wu 2007; Logan 2008; to name but a few). Notably, Wu Fulong had been able to observe a 'New Urbanism' in these cities, not in reference to the late style of urban design, but rather 'refers back to Louis Wirth's classic study of the nature of the city: "urbanism as a way of life," to see how a new way of life is under formation in China' (Wu 2007:23).

Since mid-1990s, urban studies scholars tend to brand the current era as 'transitional', even though the actual meaning of the tag is notoriously ill-defined. Somehow 'transition' evokes the imaginary of a linear process, albeit very brief, in-between more established epochs. If present-day Chinese cities are breeding a new type of urbanism, one may rightfully question this urbanism about its quality and novelty. It is from this point of view that the encounter between Pieter Bruegel and the Chinese city is immensely inspiring. It is not too difficult to discern some similarities in the *experience of urbanization* between the two worlds that are separated not only by the massive Eurasian continent, but also by a few centuries' time. As power entangles with capital, fast urbanization brings with it confusion and disorientation. But it is also the high time for the revelation of being urban.

How Relevant Is Historical Geography

In a recent paper, Liu Weidong, a prominent Chinese geographer, expressed his concern over the crisis of the discipline. If research outputs continue to be ‘confined to libraries and academic publications’, and ‘are appreciated only by the members of small academic communities’ (Liu 2014:161), human geographers will be failing to secure their position in relationship with society, industry, and the state. Liu stressed that in utilitarian China, practical usefulness is the lifeline of human geography. To illustrate his view, he referred to urbanization and points out that while it ‘has become a central element of the Chinese government’s decision-making, and a central area of state intervention’, geographers however ‘are not much involved as they should do’, and they ‘are still far away from a clear understanding of urbanization that can be translated into practice’ (ibid. 164).

To be fair, Liu’s view is not unusual. Nicholas Phelps and Mark Tewdwr-Jones had also observed the ‘disciplinary insecurities’ of geographers concerning their field’s ‘position near the foot of the academic food-chain’ (Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones 2008:567). This situation is only exacerbated by the ‘disciplinary snobbery’ between geography and planning, leaving the practitioners of both fields regrettably distanced from each other. But the deep-rooted reason of the divide lies in the fact that the ‘postmodern sensibilities’ of present-day geographers ‘are in direct contradiction to the *modus operandi* of the corporate state apparatus it might seek to influence’ (ibid. 577, original italic). Planners, on the other hand, have no alternative but working in collaboration with stakeholders, and from time to time yield to the interests of its clients. This difference might help to explain the low involvement of geographers, and historical geographers in particular, in urban development.

Yet, there are reasons rooted even deeper than that. Back in 1979, when China’s urban boom was at its embryonic stage, historical geographers had already voiced their concern. One of the leading scholars, Hou Renzhi, pointed out that ‘as a branch of modern geography, historical geography must tackle issues such as the origin of the city, the evolution of the city site, urban functions, as well as the formation of urban morphology’ (Hou 1979:327). On the potentials of urban historical geography, he argued that ‘Thoroughly revealed law and trait [of

urban development] is both the primary study object of urban historical geography, and the essential knowledge [prerequisite] for urban reconstruction. Therefore, this is a field of study that should never be overlooked in urban planning' (ibid. 315). Trained in Britain, Hou was exemplary of the role a historical geographer could play with his own decades-long career dedicated to the study of Beijing. He showed that, for the part of historical geographer, there is not a lack of interest to engage the city. In the ensuing decades, however, historical geographers in general have very little impact on China's great urban transformation. This paradox may be called 'Hou Renzhi's Dilemma'.

Seeing from the supply end of urban knowledge, tertiary education for urban planner in China is mostly conducted in either architecture schools (Tongji, Tsinghua, etc.) or former geography schools (Nanjing, Peking, etc.) of the respective universities. Since late 1980s, many of the geography schools or departments were reshuffled and renamed in line with vocational orientations. Utilitarian critics would argue that historical geographers, who by the nature of their discipline, have to undergo lengthy period of training in archival studies and live at a 'slow' pace. They lack the practical know-how to be useful in a 'fast' time of drastic urbanization and social change.

Indeed, it is the demand end that dictates the well-being of a discipline. After the taxation reform in 1994, local governments in China were given more power to develop. In fact, they were also forced to do so in order to secure their fiscal viability. This has led to the so-called 'urban entrepreneurialism', and the local government is a key stakeholder in urban development. Chinese cities functioned as 'the country's engine of economic growth' (Wu 2007:3). Growth, or 'GDPism' as the colloquial language has it, is not just the outcome of development but rather being prioritized as the goal that has to be achieved. The role of urban planning has also changed from a regulatory mechanism to primarily an instrument for place marketing. For instance, a tinge of being 'international' is deemed as desirable when it comes to city image building. Wu has observed how city government has become client to 'signature architects' or international planning firms (Wu 2015:67). Put it in a succinct way, urban planning in China 'emphasizes actions rather than analyzing the current situation and identifying problems' (ibid. 194).

The often neglect of present allowed the stakeholders to adopt a *tabula rasa* approach in urban development. Less could be expected from their approach to the past. In fact, history has been tactically regulated so as not to challenge the legitimacy of current policy. Moreover, Deng Xiaoping made popular the old idiom ‘crossing river by feeling for the stones’ (*mozhe shitou guobe*), which then became the semi-official mantra of China’s reform. Historical geography might cause an unease ideological resonance of historical materialism, a worldview rather unfavored since the reform began. Against this backdrop, we could argue that ‘Hou Renzhi’s Dilemma’ is the inevitable by-product of contemporary China’s mode of development.

Urban Historical Geography of China: Where Are We

Sprouting rice plant breeds a special kind of fragrance. It is never too strong, but is very much evident in late spring when rice paddies are all in fresh green. There lingers a sense of harmony, and of tenacity and certainty, in the sight of vast irrigated rice-growing land. Such was the typical landscape, and indeed the social and cultural foundation, of China in the second millennium. China’s rurality has a life.

Yet, that image of China as an agrarian nation is quickly becoming obsolete. Researchers from within the academia and beyond tried arduously to make sense of this colossal transformation. John Friedmann laid emphasis on domestic elements and claimed that Chinese cities developed ‘in ways and directions that are not part of the Western repertoire of experience’ (Friedmann 2005:x). Others had laboured to interpret the Chinese experience against existing theoretic frameworks (Wu 2007; White, Wu, and Chen, in Logan 2008; Stapleton 2016; etc.). China’s experience was for some time lauded as the ‘China Model’. This buzzword not only captures the uniqueness therein which, whether intentional or not, serves to the celebratory discourse of the Chinese authority, but also advocates the viability of an advancing China within a certain international economic and political setting that benefits both Chinese and foreign stakeholders.

Against this milieu, Chinese cities are being planned, designed, built, sold, and governed. Urban China scholars, notably planners and economists, are the major suppliers of intellectual resources about urban development. Some of them have enough lobbying power to make an influence. As with other aspects of globalization, urban China scholars and their scholarship bear significant Anglo-American imprints. In view of that, Tang Wing-shing had warned us of the risk of transplanting Western concepts. In his words,

Random conceptual indigenisation happens when Western concepts are chosen on the basis of empirical observation without a critical socio-historical interrogation and there is a cosmetic signifier. Random conceptual appropriation refers to the scrutinisation of the Western concept according to the requirement of governing in a particular situation. (Tang 2014:58)

More importantly, Tang pointed out the power relations of knowledge production between scholars themselves, and between them and the state. This power relationship, when materialized, has policy and political ramifications. For instance, ‘the art of persuasion’, as Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones had it, of urban planners lies partly in their capability of presenting an appealing prospect. It is not surprising that ‘Insofar as these processes are wrapped up in technocratic order, they are difficult to dispute’ (Tang 2014:57). Unconvinced and skeptical towards this alliance between authorities of knowledge and authorities of power, Tang argued that urban China has to be understood ‘from the historical geography of China, or an open history and open geography perspective’ (ibid. 43).

Academic interest in China’s cities dates back to the turn of the twentieth century when European scholars, notably Max Weber, began to look into the role that the city had played in history. A few sociologists, both foreign and Chinese, made surveys of cities such as Beijing in the next few decades. But little in-depth analysis was done beyond that until the 1950s. By then, the United States had become the epicenter of China studies, and many scholars had had first-hand experiences of China as a result of their earlier study visits or military services during the Second

World War. Among them, Rhoads Murphey was probably not the most renowned scholar, but certainly one of the most thought-provoking. As early as in the days of McCarthyism, he had already reopened the scholarly inquiry into the old Weberian question on the difference between Chinese and European cities (Murphey 1954).

Twentieth-century urban historical geographical studies of China culminated in a trio of edited volumes, namely *The City in Late Imperial China*, *The Chinese City Between Two Worlds*, and *The City in Communist China* (John Lewis ed., Stanford University Press, 1971), published counter-chronically between 1971 and 1977 in the United States. As it turned out, the first of the trio was the last to get published. And while the other two dealt with more recent history, the first volume in fact covered a longer and more distant period in Chinese history. For several reasons, it was to become highly influential among historical geographers in China, many of whom were initially trained as historian rather than geographer.

It is worth noting that urban historical geography is more of an epistemological approach than an independent field of study. It takes the best of the both worlds of historical studies and contemporary urban geography. Scholars from other backgrounds could rather easily permeate as long as they adopt the time-space framework in their study. William Skinner, co-editor of the abovementioned trio, was an anthropologist. Collective contributions from historians (including sinologists), political scientists, sociologists, and others could, to various degrees, be deemed as historical geographical studies (see Guldin and Southall 1993; Davis et al. 1995; Esherick 2000; Faure and Liu 2002; etc.). Research on individual cities, such as Shanghai or Beijing, has proliferated vastly and has led to some purpose-built research institutes.

Notwithstanding these achievements, some of the fundamental questions remained open. The nature of Chinese urbanism, for instance, has always been a focus of debate. Max Weber did not believe imperial Chinese cities shared the urbanism of their European counterparts. However, David Strand once claimed that 'China's cities were fully urban in the sixteenth century' (Strand, in Davis et al. 1995:423), although he refrained from elaborating on what he meant by 'urban'. David Faure approached this debate with his case studies on vernacular history. Yet, rather than disqualifying the

Weberian thesis, his work in fact helped to prove its general validity (see Faure, in Faure and Liu 2002:58–84). Frederick Mote introduced the ‘urban-rural continuum’ concept into China studies (Mote, in Skinner 1977:101–119). There is a risk of interpreting it as an ideal balance between town and country, whereas in reality it denotes the situation whereby urbanism, if any, is subject to imperial authoritarianism and secondary to rurality. In China, cities are not the kind of ‘agent’ for social change as in the history of the West (Rowe 2017; see also Murphey 1954). One could argue that what had worked for Antwerp in the sixteenth century never worked for China’s traditional commercial towns.

Moving to the modern period, urbanism in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is equally contentious. Except perhaps a brief period in the 1950s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had never commanded urbanism as its Soviet counterpart once did. It is hardly surprising since it was the native, indeed vernacular, section that won the internal struggle over party leadership. Lucien Bianco doubted if Karl Marx would recognize his Chinese disciples (Bianco 2001:38). Whatever Mao might have understood as Communism, Maoism was conceived as incompatible with urbanism. As Murphey put it,

The Maoist vision of a true socialist society is inspiring, but one of its principal goals, industrialization, can be won only at the cost of seeing urbanism triumph, with the risk that urbanism’s anti-Maoist tendencies may persist. The root meaning of the word “bourgeoisie” is no accident. (Murphey 1974:70–71)²

Modern China faced the tasks of nation (re-)building as well as social-economic development—epitomized in urbanization. The isolation from advanced urban and industrial civilizations following the Sino-Soviet split must have been a fatal blow to the dream of building urbanism through China’s own efforts. Forty years have passed since Mao’s death, and today’s China is a very different country from that of his China’s modern history is forcefully divided into several periods which, while chronically sequential, can be fairly distanced from each other. This situation also renders research outputs on an earlier period not easily applicable or even relevant in the present time.

The Structure of This Book

The enigmatic images of Bruegel are definitely foreign, and yet they probably looked not totally unfamiliar to the restaurant customers. The snowy landscape is inviting to repose, and the rustic theme can be reminiscent to the new urbanites of their recent rural lifestyle. Bruegel's contemporaries included Abraham Ortelius, the great geographer who saw the world as a theater. Beyond instant affinities, the choreography that made this uncanny encounter between Bruegel and the Chinese city, arguably a symptom of Wu's 'New Urbanism', happen is not all very clear. Indeed, we believe that the need of a historical geographical appreciation of Chinese urbanism has never been greater.

This book started with two sessions themed 'Urban Historical Geography of China' that we organized for the 16th International Conference of Historical Geographers (ICHG), held during July 5–10, 2015, in London. A follow-up workshop was organized on May 14, 2016, in Shanghai. Most of the contributors to this volume have attended both meetings. We regret for not being able to include all of the conference and workshop presentations. We have also solicited for a few additional chapters from outstanding academics to broaden the scope and allow more cities, in particular those otherwise understudied, such as Changchun, Tunxi, Datong, and Qingdao, to be covered here. We extend our heartfelt appreciation and gratitude to all of them for their supports.

The first part of this book intends to put Chinese urban development in perspective and probe the relationship between nation and city. Kuo Hsiu-ling looks into the creation of public parks in modern Shanghai as a consequence of the city's increasing urban quality. The tension between tradition and modernity adds to the lure of Shanghai as the contact zone between China and the West. Fabio Lanza rediscovers an understudied field of urbanism, namely the urban communes, in the People's Republic. Little is known about the actual operations of this utopian urban experiment and its spatialities prior to this chapter. Liu Yishi's chapter on Changchun is particularly appealing because of the multiplicity of planning and governing policies throughout its history. Liu shows us how the city was used as the materialization of competing visions of nationhood as a function of authority changes.

Part 2 deals with the relationship between history and modernity. Zou Yi and Lin Xi provide a miniature study of Tunxi, a regional trade center of tea. While tea has long become part of urban lifestyle, particularly in Britain, both as consuming goods and as a cultural product, Zou and Lin's chapter has documented the impact of the global trade on a local town. Zheng Duan and Zhang Xiaohong unravel the myth that loomed over a special urban housing form: the New Village. They traced the development of it throughout the twentieth century as the concept was appropriated with different meanings by anarchists, real estate firms, the CCP, etc. Toponymy is one of the most visible markers of space. Huang Wenchuan's comparison between street names in Taipei and Shanghai provides us with a much needed analysis on the politics of naming through which morality, colonial history, and nationalism are manifested.

The chapters in Part 3 showcased the complexity of urban (re-)development in contemporary China. Fu and Hillier's chapter is a robust debunker of the developmentalist discourse that many city officials in China are eloquent in. As a matter of fact, the major of Datong, referred to in their chapter, was a controversial figure even among his peers because of his authoritarian style of governance. Maurizio Marinelli approaches contemporary urban regeneration from the perspective of the politics of aesthetics, arguably the most delicate product of urbanism. As he has shown with the case study on Tianjin, colonial legacy has been repacked to serve the interests of place marketing and historical rewriting. Philipp Demgenski documents the utterly different views over urban space through a case study of Qingdao. What is urban heritage to some is all the while the habitation to others. It adds another case to the debate on social justice in urban development.

Putting these chapters together, we feel strongly that present is *partly and only partly* a product of the past. The past, too, is not something fixed in time and space. To start with, the past can be futuristic and visionary. What matters is why and how the present is different from the past and its vision. Compared to contemporary urban geography and urban planning, historical geography tends to look on spatial changes in the longer term. Historical geography may not be able to provide an instant route map for development, but it strives to disperse any confusion accumulated either through forgetfulness or as a result of political regulation.

It is not quite likely that China's recently awakened thirst for urbanism could be satisfied with ease. Private car consumption, to take an example, has soared in the last two decades and is in fact promoted by the government despite the gigantic social and environmental backlashes. But China is also one of the most active proponents of renewable energy and e-mobility, particularly electronic vehicles (EV). Consumption may bring tranquility and relaxation, however ephemerally, just like in the shopping mall. But the city outside is chaotic, reckless, and rebellious.

It takes a Bruegelian eye, intimate while distant, compassionate and yet disinterested, to appreciate the aesthetics of Chinese urbanism. Only if we do it really well, could we hopefully avoid to fall into historical swamps, just as in Bruegel's *The Blind Leading the Blind*.

Notes

1. The 'Pirenne Thesis' was named after the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne (1862–1935). Pirenne offered the following explanation on the rise of cities and citizenship in Europe: 'The burghers of the Middle Ages were thus singularly well prepared for the role which they were to play in the future two movements of ideas, the Renaissance [...] and the Reformation' (Pirenne 2014:151). The 'Pirenne Thesis' has been constantly revised and occasionally compared to Max Weber's works (see Verhulst 1999; Boone 2012; Nicholas 2012; etc.).
2. Rhoads Murphey was probably using the term 'bourgeoisie' in Pirenne's sense. Pirenne was one of the first to deconstruct 'bourgeoisie' and point out that this social concept has its root in the physical expansion of the city.

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Part I

Nation and City



2

Shanghai Parks in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: Architectural and Cultural Exchanges Between the East and the West

Hsiu-Ling Kuo

Strolling around the renowned old district of Xujiahui in Shanghai today, one can easily spot signs of monuments and “historic relics” labeled on buildings along the streets almost every other step. These so-called historic relics, built between the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, are listed as historic monuments for the reasons that they bear characteristics of Western architectural features. In theory this should make the little journeys around these old city quarters adventurous and rewarding architectural wise. However, the hybrid nature of these buildings—a mixture and combination of architectural styles originated from Chinese tradition and architectural development of different Western countries—makes it difficult to appreciate or to evaluate these architecture according to conventional Western architectural historical values. Shanghai architecture, built in the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, carries the hallmarks of colonial

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Y. Ding et al. (eds.), *China: A Historical Geography of the Urban*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6_2

architecture, which tend to be diverse, flexible, and pragmatic. It is a hybrid of the local and the international, the Chinese and the Western, and the traditional and the modern. And indeed, the hybrid nature of these architectural settings and physical spaces also extended themselves to shape the actual cultural milieu and activities taking place within them. American Methodist missionary, Mary Ninde Gamewell, noted in her observation of Shanghai in 1916 that “Shanghai is a little world, where all China in miniature may be studied at close range. ... To an Occidental the chief fascination of this busy metropolis lies in the curious coming of things old and new, practices ancient and modern, which meet one at every turn” (Gamewell 1916, 7). It is in this light that this chapter intends to, firstly, discuss its major focus—parks as public space at the fin-de-siècle Shanghai—and to look into the ways in which these spaces were perceived by the general public and what roles they played in the interactions between the Chinese and the Western communities and in the production of the meanings of Shanghai’s urban culture. Secondly, it will analyze the cultural and architectural development created as a consequence of an ambiguous treaty system, which could not govern all aspects of activities in a fast and vividly changing society of Shanghai after 1842. Through observing both the physical space of the parks and the mental environment taking place in the parks during this period of Shanghai, this chapter will tease out the ways in which the Chinese society adjusted itself in terms of culture, social hierarchy, and life styles, when encountering the West. It is important also to bear in mind that park as public space has a life of its own. With time, the plantations and the physical architectural space, as well as the ways people interact with each other or utilize the space do alter. It is therefore certain that looking at the park from different points in history, one gets very different pictures. This is particularly true with Shanghai, a city with an immense diversity both historically and culturally.

According to various accounts provided by Westerners prior to the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, Shanghai was already an affluent and established seaport in her own right, not merely judging by the Chinese standard, but also in the eye of Western beholders.¹ With the endorsement of subsequent treaties (e.g. the Treaty of Bogue and the Treaty of Wangxia

signed respectively in 1843 and 1844), Shanghai's destiny toward further prosperity (and also, in some sense, chaos) was entirely determined. On one side of the turf, the Western powers, politicians and merchants alike, apparently recognized the trading potentials of the city early on.² On the other side, the futile Qing government and the turbulent political situation at the time had left the city with an exceptional liberal ground for those with ambitions to maneuver. This had then resulted in Shanghai being turned into a state, equivalent to *imperium in imperio*.³ History was to unveil to us the crucial role this particular period plays in the modern transformation of Shanghai and, to a large degree, of the entire China. By the late nineteenth century the city had thrived and grown into a modern metropolis. As much as modern economic activities and liberal trends enriched Europe in the nineteenth century, China too benefitted from cultural encounters and the colonial presences in major port cities. Out from this intercultural pot emerged the urban culture of Shanghai, which was henceforth far more tolerant and diverse than her Western counterparts at the time. From this point onwards Shanghai to its residents (new arrivals and the existing ones alike) and its visitors was both a phantasmagoria, where new things were brought in and created every day, and a platform where the old China encountered, interacted, as well as clashed with the modern West.

But how shall we understand this complicated process of transformation in Shanghai in this particular period of history? And how shall we interpret its subsequent effects or impacts on society, culture, and politics related to this city? While being turned into a ground where foreigners and the Chinese compete for opportunities and make most out of the security and freedom provided by the autonomous status in the foreign settlements, Shanghai was in fact also paving its way to a "world city (*Weltstadt*)" (Kuo 2011, 140–61) on the international stage in the context of a global trend of industrial capitalism launched by the West. Yet this development has been perceived and interpreted rather discordantly. On the one hand, a great number of Chinese literatures have so far feverishly portrayed Shanghai with the presence of foreign settlements as a space, where not just the Chinese sovereignty, but its sense of dignity and cultural identity were offended and compromised by the

intruding foreign presence. On the other hand, there have been also scholars holding the view that treaty ports like Shanghai acted as models of modern development, which positively led China into modernity.⁴ Either ways, little has been said in terms of seeing these transformations as mutually beneficial modes of cultural exchanges between the West and China. Utopian and overly idealistic this perspective might appear to be; yet this is what the reinterpretation of the past through a relatively dispassionate angle may offer, and through which alternative and somewhat more positive and constructive historical views may be articulated.

Parks and Gardens as Public Space

With the fast industrialization of the nineteenth century, major cities in Europe and the Americas not merely underwent drastic urban development, but saw the invention and constructions of large areas of urban greeneries, such as public parks, zoos, conservatories, and squares. The main purpose of public parks in the modern era was to provide the urban population with the opportunity to be nearer nature, however artificial this “nature” might have been. This had to do with the recognition of the beneficial effects of trees and plants in combatting air pollution under the growing concern of the necessity of improving urban living conditions with namely physical and mental recreations (Brantz 2007, 209). As a consequence, the second half of the century was to see heated debates over urban planning schemes aiming at creating a modern urban environment both for health and for leisure.

In China traditionally large encircled outdoor space was normally owned and managed privately. They are called gardens (*yuan*, 園) and tend to be large estates of walled green space dotted by buildings surrounded by man-made hills, pools, and lakes, e.g. Soochow gardens, royal imperial gardens of the Forbidden City, and the Summer Palace (Yiheyan). Unlike parks, which are inclined to be open to the general public no matter charging an entrance fee or not, *yuan* used to be

exclusively reserved for the estate owners and their guests, be it for specific recreational activities or simply taking a stroll casually. Due to the nature of a hierarchically stratified society in China before the twentieth century, these gardens were open (outdoor) spaces well-fenced against the interference of and the interactions with the general public. When Western-style parks,⁵ where one could rub shoulders and mingle with people of different social backgrounds, first appeared in Shanghai, they not only attracted large public attentions, but also quickly took a leading role in the cultural interactions and exchanges between the West and China. What was in common between the Western idea of parks and the Chinese yuan was that they were open spaces designed to keep a safe distance away from the undesired environments, be they poor commoners or negative outcomes of industrialization such as the poor working-class crowds and the industrial wastes and pollutants. Only people with status and properly dressed were permitted to enter parks where lawns were neatly trimmed and landscape carefully shaped. In all terms, parks and gardens were spaces where both nature and culture were tamed, sculpted, and oppressed.

With the arrivals and the increasing presence of the foreigners, new public spaces catering for various purposes, previously unknown or unheard of to the Chinese, started to emerge in Shanghai. Not just public parks, other public and recreational facilities, such as zoos, conservatory, swimming pools, summer villas, department stores, racecourse, and railway stations were also introduced. The Chinese urban population were to encounter a series of brand new experiences both physically and mentally. Being able to enter these public spaces and to utilize these facilities meant having not merely the wealth, but also the ability and the willingness to learn new skills and to cultivate new tastes. Just like the developments of all customs and cultural currents, there would always be those who could not afford to or simply refused to adapt, and those who feverishly embraced the new fashions. It is hard to tell to what extent and when exactly the Western-style customs were accepted by the local Chinese. But what we can notably see in the contemporary novels and press publications is that travel for leisure and entertainments had entered the life of Shanghai urban dwellers.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Shanghai was full of wonders to its visitors both within and without the country. Among various astonishments and awes, the excitements and impacts provided by architecture and public buildings were most immediately visible. Private houses and public buildings erected by the Westerners, mostly composed of distinctively European architectural features, were termed the “Western Scene” (*Xiyangjing*), which were sightseeing spots greatly popular among the Chinese visitors.⁶ Westerners arriving at Shanghai in the second half of the nineteenth century tended to be adventurous and optimistic about trade opportunities and prospects in the Chinese port cities. They were keen to take out leases on the lands and to construct their own buildings, which would serve their interests, despite not being permitted to purchase or to own the land. The buildings under the patronage of the Westerners in the Settlements tended to be constructed within a relatively short span of time and by architectural teams (e.g. architects, stone masons, carpenters) with mixed backgrounds and trainings, hence compared with the traditional wooden constructions and mason crafts of the Chinese buildings, the quality of the Western-style buildings constructed in Shanghai during this period of time was somewhat compromised, and the overall aesthetic effect of these architectures tends to be arguable. Despite this, thanks to their large-scale structure and common references to Western classical styles, Western buildings in the foreign settlements still managed to achieve a monumental impression conveying the ideas of pride, glory, and wealth of the Western civilization—a message the colonial powers constantly sought to express. Shanghai at the *fin-de-siècle* was already a sophisticated and grandiose theatrical stage where competing colonial, entrepreneurial, and nationalist interests demonstrated powers through architecture.

From the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, the development of Western architectural trends, e.g. neo-classicism, art nouveau, art deco, as well as functionalism of the 1920s hit the shore of Shanghai almost simultaneously as they took shape in Europe. The rich and the powerful of the city enjoyed the prestige of being the patrons for the nouveau exotic Western architecture and in the vanguard of

architecture, which served as the most efficient token to showcase their social and financial strength. What worth noting here is that architectural styles of the colonial offices and the commercial buildings, namely the headquarters of various foreign banks, such as Banque Belge pour l'Étranger and Deutsche-Asiatische Bank, built in the late nineteenth century tend to be a mixture of neoclassical styles, which spoke the same architectural language as and were in keeping with the mainstream architectural trend back in their home countries. What is disappointing and lack of excitement in style and structure of architecture in this period, commonly seen in colonial buildings, is that even buildings constructed in as late as the 1920s, such as the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation headquarter at the Shanghai Bund, was given a frumpy neoclassical façade (and structure), which was already considered outmoded and outright conservative in Europe at the time. The purpose for doing so was mainly to accomplish the mission of demonstrating the political glory and financial strength of the colonial empire, which was often the utmost function for erecting these buildings.⁷ The experimental characteristics of the buildings constructed in the Concession and the Settlements during the concessional period, be they European architecture or hybrid architecture of a variety of Western and Chinese features, were to be seen mostly, if not exclusively, in private mansions, villas, and houses.

Park Walls as Unlikely Cultural Barriers

Among the various types of new buildings and new public spaces, parks in the foreign settlements of Shanghai formed a genre of its own. The initial constructions of parks took place at and near the Bund with funds supplied by the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) of the International Settlement. They were for public use, but in a later stage (approximately from the 1870s onwards) for various reasons (mainly cultural differences) parks managed by foreign authorities were reserved exclusively for foreigners or sometimes “properly dressed and behaved” Chinese before June 1928.⁸ Great discontents and protests about the

park regulations especially after 1900, a time when nationalist fervor was boiled up to a high ground. Incidentally, Western-style parks built or owned by Chinese merchants, which this chapter will discuss in the second half, were open to all, but they were also almost exclusively Chinese spaces, as they were not designed to attract Western customers, who not only had already enough choices of park spaces exclusively reserved for them, but probably also viewed the non-SMC-managed parks as unsafe for visiting.

Due to the arrival of a large number of foreign settlers and Chinese rural immigrants, great dynamics generated in the Chinese port cities contributed to their fast urbanization during the concessional period. Parks built and managed by foreigners of different nationalities each possessed distinctive features, completed exotic and alien to the local Chinese populations. Major ones in the Concessions included the Bund Park (originally called “Public Park”, also known as Waitan Park), Hongkew Park (Hongkou Gongyuan), Parc de Koukaza (Gujiashai Gongyuan), and Jessfield Park (Zhaofeng Gongyuan).

The Waitan Park at the Bund, constructed with Shanghai Recreation Fund and completed in 1868,⁹ was one of the early Western-mannered public parks in Shanghai at the time. With its establishment, the Western idea of parks and leisure activities taking place in such an outdoor space open to public participation was widely introduced to the Shanghai residents. When the Park was first built, there were only a small green house and a guard lodge amidst lines of well-arranged bushes and trees. Between 1870 and 1888, artificial hills and a concert pavilion, and a water fountain were subsequently added. In 1880, Margary Memorial was constructed with a fund collected by British expatriates to commemorate Augustus Raymond Margary, who was killed in the Margary Incident. This memorial bore a style of European Gothic structure and marked the collision of the British and the Chinese local force in the southeast China. Due to the central location and the open panoramic views, the park was very popular, especially among (and perhaps vaguely from 1910s onwards until the end of the concessional period, exclusively to) the Westerners. Mary Ninde Gamewell spoke of the *Public Gardens* rather fondly, “This charming little park in

the heart of the city, with its lawns, flowers, shade trees, and a bandstand where the celebrated Municipal Band plays in summer, is a favorite resting place for weary pedestrians and a rendezvous for parents and nurses with young children” (Gamewell 1916, 44). But she also noted that Chinese were not permitted to enter the Gardens, except nurses accompanying foreign children, dressed in foreign clothes, or accompanied by a foreigner. “This is to keep the grounds from being overrun by the coolie class. Customs jetty has witnessed many a stirring scene” (Gamewell 1916, 44). Rather than the common interpretation of this regulation as a racist policy, it was more a class issue and concern, which intended to keep the Westerners away from the presence and disturbance of the poor working-class passersby or peasants. The public parks were meant for the educated middle- and upper-class visitor, who, be they Westerners or the Chinese, would respect and follow a common set of code of behavior.

In the 1936, the largest number of visitor recorded was 1,655,821 (Wang et al. 2011, 16). It was a point of gathering and for the general public to take part in leisure activities, such as listening to Western concerts, watching traditional ceremonies and celebrations (such as dragon boat races during the Dragon Boat Festival), and walking under the spring blossoms, both during the day and the night. Along with public cultural activities of this kind came the Western notion of the urban *flâneurs* (again, the middle and the upper class)—pedestrians who stroll casually and wander about in the park simply to enjoy and to observe the architectural surroundings and crowds around them. Parks are public spaces where one need not engage one’s self with anything in particular. This in turn stimulated cultural interactions and exchanges not just cross-nationalities, but to a large degree, cross-social hierarchies.

Another notable example of Western parks is the Hongkew Park (also once called Hongkew Recreation Ground), which spanned over 45 acres and was built upon a large farm field with a joint fund provided by the Shanghai Recreation Fund and the SMC in 1902. The park was designed by the British garden landscaper, William Innes Stuckey, with the English picturesque style. The design aimed at creating a rural and natu-

ral environment with a large area covered by lawns. Artificial stone hills, a rustic bridge, a lotus pool, a rose garden, and pavilion were the highlights of this massive open space. The green house growing a large variety of plants gave this park a touch of the typical British botanical garden popular internationally at the second half of the nineteenth century. Apart from the picturesque landscape, there were also a large variety of sport fields, such as golf course, tennis court, hockey court, basketball court and fields for football, baseball, and volleyball. These sport fields were popular leisure grounds for both foreigners and the Chinese gentry (Wang et al. 2011, 18). Mary Ninde Gamewell noted in her guide to Shanghai that,

Hongkew Public Park was not in Hongkew at all. This park ... was the largest in Shanghai, and a genuine godsend to foreigners remaining in the city during the summer. Those living in the neighborhood seek it in the early morning and late afternoon for golf and tennis, securing the exercise so necessary to health in this Eastern climate, and from far and near people resort these in the evening to rest and listen to band play. (Gamewell 1916, 50)

From Gamewell's account, we can see that public parks played an essential and distinctive role in the life of Westerners residing in Shanghai during the Concession's era both mentally and physically. And many of these Western sport and leisure activities also entered into Chinese civil life through the upper-class gentry.

Despite at later stages park regulations of various Western parks were modified on occasion to suit the changing political or cultural climate and sometimes even restricted the access of the Chinese locals, the Western cultural activities did still attract considerable attentions from the Chinese, especially the ones who had capacities and opportunities to work for and socialize with the Western communities. The walls and regulations aiming at fending off the cultural "other", which were in this case the local less well-off Chinese, turned out to become a strong magnet that attracted curiosities and imitations. These should partially explain why the parks and gardens arranged and filled in Western styles

and owned by Chinese merchants achieved such a success in the later part of the nineteenth century. Parks owned and managed privately by Chinese merchants opened for public use and charging entrance fees began to appear in the city in as early as the 1880s. With the concept combining private Chinese gardens and Western public parks, many parks, such as Shen Yuan, Xi Yuan, Zhang Yuan, Hsu Yuan, and Yu Yuan (愚園),¹⁰ were introduced. They gained significant popularity among the Chinese.

Take Zhang Yuan (1885–1919) for instance. It was a private garden built by a British garden specialist¹¹ in about 1872, before being sold to a rich Wuxi merchant, Zhang Shu-He, in 1882. Zhang Shu-He developed a taste for Western-style architecture and gardens after a visit to the Indochina and the Southeast Asia in the late 1870s when he worked for Lunchuan Zhaoshang Ju (the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company) (Meng 2006, 154–55). But what was in the mind of this successful Chinese merchant when he purchased a vast English garden in Shanghai in the early 1880s, when the memory of the Anglo-French allies' troops looting the Royal Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan) in Beijing during the Second Opium War were still fresh and disturbing for the Chinese in general? We cannot find records informing us anything in this regard. However, notable evidences suggest that the general atmosphere in Shanghai had been greatly improved since around the 1860s. "Affairs in the Settlement improved in 1867, and we are told that life in it was pleasanter, as the residents cheerfully met the altered times and sought their pleasure and recreation in quieter ways than formerly. Gardening and floriculture became a pretty general passion, and there would have been a flower show if the ladies' committee could have agreed upon where it should be held" (Maclellan 1889, 63). Having said that, widespread animosity toward Westerners, often triggered by clashes in other port cities in China, still took place throughout the 1870s in Shanghai, but the political climate and actual living condition in the city had greatly improved, especially for the Westerners (Maclellan 1889, 72–74).

Zhang Yuan was also given a Chinese name, “Weichun Yuan”. It started with an area of 21 acres and was expanded to 67 acres at its prime time. It is said that Shu-He Zhang initially bought the park for the recreation of his elderly mother, and after his mother passed away, friends suggested him to open the park to the public, so that the park would not be abandoned and deserted (*Shen Bao* 1885, 1). The park announced its opening on the 13th April 1885 with a small advertisement on Shanghai *Shen Bao*. Subsequently an anonymous article entitled “Notes on a Visit to Wei Chun Yuan” was published on the cover page of *Shen Bao* on the 22nd April, 1885. The article introduced Zhang Yuan to the public and praised the park’s owner as a virtuous Chinese son who made great efforts in both taking care of and entertaining his elderly mother. The terms the author chose to describe the physical environments of the park demonstrated an image full of conventional Chinese literary essences, such as scenes named as “lying dragons, crouching tigers”, jumping rabbits, and flying cranes. But in reality, we see from both written and visual records that there had been predominantly Western-style buildings in the park, though less significant constructions in Chinese traditional styles did also scatter here and there in the park. The Arcadia Hall (Ankaidi), completed in 1892, was allegedly the tallest building in Shanghai at the time of its completion and had a capacity of around 1000 audiences. Inside the Arcadia Hall there was a Western-style restaurant serving Western meals, though often still served with Chinese tea. In its heyday between 1890 and 1905, the park was the first public space to be equipped with modern Western facilities, such as photography, electrical lights, cinemas, and sports grounds, which were enhanced by activities of a mixed nature combining conventional and Western new trends, such as festive fireworks, traditional theaters, commercial promotion events, botanical shows, and playgrounds. Zhang Yuan did not charge any entrance fee and operated its business by charging its clients with the restaurants, venue rentals, and the usage of entertaining facilities (Shanghai Tong She ed. 1973, 572–73).

A note making comparison between Chinese traditional customs of building yuan (gardens) and the modern Western parks appeared in

Shen Bao in 1889. The author pointed out the extravagance of Chinese traditional gardens and their not contributing to positive practical results for the garden visitors. The article highlighted the constructive contribution and purpose of having a large open space in Western-style parks:

According to western ideas, gardens are built for promoting health, which appears to be similar to, but in reality rather different from, the Chinese customs which regard gardens as places for the relaxation of one's mind. Westerners believe that when people are packed in one room, the space permitted among them was so restricted that there wouldn't be enough space for air circulation. This 'dead air' is what the westerners called 'carbonated air', which is by all means harmful to human bodies. Therefore, it is recommendable to stroll in open-air gardens everyday and to breathe in fresh air. What westerners called 'cultivating breath [maintaining fresh air?]' is in fact a way to maintain health. ... The Chinese give too much attention to the scenery which pleases one's eye, but neglect the importance of maintaining health. In this regard, Wei Chun Yuan has uniquely made use of western ideas of garden arrangement very appropriately. (*Shen Bao* 1889, 1)

In this chapter we see that the Western modern concept of health started to gain public attention and acceptance. Not just the fresh air, but outdoor activities, such as sport exercises, were going to be both heavily invested and emphasized in modern culture in the decades to come for the Chinese. This was one of the many key modern ideas of life, which came along with the presence of Western culture in China.

Another popular public park worth mentioning is Yu Yuan, which was constructed and opened to the public in summer, 1890 with an entrance fee of 5 cents per person (*Shen Bao* 1890, 6). It told the story of the urban transformation of Shanghai at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century, a time when the Imperial Qing dynasty was on the way to its downfall, and the new republican government was struggling to come into formation. Since its inauguration, the Park regularly promoted itself with advertisements in major newspapers, notably *Shen Bao*. On the 19th July 1890, *Shen Bao* allocated a paragraph to introduce the Yu Yuan:

Located to the east of the Jin-An Temple, Yu Yuan has an area of thirty acres. The construction of the park began two years ago and has been recently completed. The park is designed and arranged with various sceneries and architectural settings, such as trees and flowers of rare species, pavilions, towers, pagodas, corridors, ponds, streams. It is a perfect place for meeting up with friends, hosting banquets, or simply strolling about and enjoying the scenery. ... The Park is named 'Yu' (which means 'silly' in Chinese), for only the great silliness can outwit the (superficial) cleverness. From now on, this park will be a quiet and elegant space where both Chinese and Western ladies may enjoy a cool and relaxed summer without being disturbed by the noisy crowds. (*Shen Bao* 1890, 2)

Yu Yuan quickly gained its popularity through continuous efforts of making itself seen, known, and visited by the general public. Unlike Zhan Yuan, which had predominantly Western-style buildings, Yu Yuan was dotted with constructions of both traditional Chinese- and Western-style structures, which were decorated with marbles and elaborate hand-crafts. Inside the park, smoke rooms, tea rooms, restaurants served both Western wine and food and Chinese tea and tea snacks.¹² Chinese garden-style artificial streams and sculpted bridges, hills, lakes, and boat yards, all bore names with Chinese traditional touches, e.g. Elegance Hall (Dunya Tang), Pagoda of Flower Goddess (Huashen Ge), Apricot Flower Cot (Xinhua Cun), and Nymphs Cave (Xianren Dong). Verses written in English and other foreign languages could be seen on the interior and exterior walls of some buildings. Sport fields were commonly facilitated in the parks. There were even areas designed and allocated for zoos, which kept rare wild animals, such as tigers, pumas, chimpanzees, cranes, and peacocks. The Pagoda of Flower Goddess on the artificial hills, camera house, was particularly crowded during seasonal traditional festivals, such as the celebration of chrysanthemum blossoms and moon festival in autumn. As a private enterprise wishing to attract maximum public attention and business, the Park made every effort to provide as many varieties of new-fashioned entertainments as possible. From these various records of the development of public parks, we can see that Shanghai at this point in history had been filled with an

amazing variety of public entertainments with newest industrial technologies and fashions around the world, catering both for the Western and Chinese residents.¹³

For two decades after its inauguration, news and advertisements of Yu Yuan regularly appeared on *Shen Bao*. It was only during the war years in around 1916 and 1917 Yu Yuan was badly managed and was eventually left unattended. Apart from the parks themselves, areas immediately neighboring or surrounding these public parks benefitted greatly from the good quality living environment and beautiful views. For this reason alone, the land and property prices soared, which also induced the expansions of the foreign settlement “influences” through constructing extra-settlement roads. This in turn created complicated status of the land ownership. However controversial the areas surrounding extra-settlement roads were, “[t]he Shanghai Municipal Council did not claim ownership of all this land..., but it did claim ownership of the roads and parks it had bought. Because of that ownership, they also claimed the right to police them and to tax the residents, both foreign and Chinese, who drew on the Council’s municipal services” (Clifford 1991, 28). As a result of this “service” (policing and order), these areas quickly became residential areas attracting the rich, both Chinese and foreign, their investments in estates, and the subsequent constructions of their Western-style villas and houses toward the end of the 1880s. Yu Yuan Road, for instance, got its name from the park, Yu Yuan, which was not located within the concessional area. Houses in the neighborhood of Yu Yuan and along the Yu Yuan Road were mostly grandiose Western villas and mansions. The Chinese residing in the concessional area generally held a positive view toward the development of the extra-settlement.

Due to sympathies with the contemporary political thoughts and common economic interests among the Westerners and the Chinese, the international settlement often served as a “buffer zone” (Bickers 2012, 865) between the Chinese residents and the Chinese state. According to the observation of the British judge, Richard Feetham, in his assessment of extraterritoriality of Shanghai for the SMC in 1930, Feetham saw the apparent popularity of the extra-settlement area,

which tended to attract large numbers and a variety of Chinese residents. The chief reason was the flexibility (or vagueness) in its legal status: the residents in the area were not fully bound by, and also not fully exempt from, the regulations of Chinese authorities and the rights of the individuals.¹⁴ In either case, they were protected by the settlement/concession authorities, in particular the wealthy merchants, who tended to enjoy the full protection of life and properties within the concessional areas and could therefore positively contribute to the prosperity of the area. Security and legal order had been a major factor for the development and prosperity in the territories of concession and settlement in Shanghai (Feetham et al. (1931), 355). In addition to security, the financial investments of the foreign banks attracted by the relatively secured and stable condition also played important roles in the urbanization of the city. Foreign banks and most Chinese banks in Shanghai would not accept commodities or properties outside the concessional areas as pledges for loans. This then led to the soaring of the prices of the properties and buildings within the concessional areas. Due to abovementioned factors, both the Chinese, foreigner residents, and the Municipal Council of Shanghai were keen on the development of extra-settlement roads and the expansion of the concessional areas. After all, the Shanghai municipal government would eventually be the beneficiary of the extra-settlement development through tax revenues.

Conclusions

The constantly changing political development meant constant new layers of policing system imposing on the city. And it goes without saying that Shanghai residents (both the Chinese or foreign) during the concessional period found it a commonplace having no single unified rule or order to follow. Protocols, treaties, and agreements were all too many and too few, which resulted in their incapability of defining the frontiers—the frontiers of not merely the physical geographical border, but also the social and cultural borders among the residents in

the city. The characteristics of not being able to be defined left a void in all aspects of life, on which the contemporary Shanghai residents did not hesitate to take liberties to maneuver. As Robert Bickers rightly pointed out that this was the vagueness with strength, which boosted Shanghai's prosperity and potentials beyond imaginations (Bickers 2012, 866).

Instead of chaos and outlawry, vagueness, ambiguities, and fragmentations often offered alternatives, which are constructive and essential to cultural prosperity. In this chapter, I have argued that Shanghai, as one of the major treaty ports in China at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century, served as a laboratory at the frontier—not just geographically and politically, but also culturally and socially, where both the West and the Chinese tested out what could be done and what not be. It was as a popular Chinese saying today goes: “mozhe shitou guohe” (cross the river by feeling the stones). To put it another way: testing each step before taking it and exploring one's way carefully. It was exactly this void and vagueness in all aspects in life created and offered in port cities like Shanghai in that particular period of history, which allows China, the Middle and the Central Kingdom, to loosen up its cultural frontiers, from which the country and its people reached out and interacted with the world.

With the inaugurations of Western public gardens and Chinese private parks, including the opening up of the royal gardens, the residences of former governmental officials, and residences of the newly thrived merchants to the general public, a whole series of new urban public spaces emerged in major Chinese cities since the 1880s onwards. Parks were not merely open spaces for touristic activities, but also grounds for the cultivation and exchanges of cultures. Codes of behavior, dress, and interaction for visitors to the parks gradually became a commonly accepted code of conduct for modern urban citizens. This “code of conduct” of public behavior was formulated through both written and unwritten regulations in the urban space. Through written park regulations a new generation of Chinese achieved social consensus in the process of shaping a new culture.¹⁵ The public space in the urban Shanghai

acted as the most visible point of contacts for the interactions of the West and the Chinese cultures.

Notes

1. Karl F. A. Gützlaff in his journey along the coast of China in 1831 spoke about Shanghai favorably: “[A]s far as the native trade is concerned, perhaps the principal commercial city in the empire. It is laid out with great taste; the temples are very numerous; the houses, neat and comfortable; and the inhabitants polite, though rather servile in their manners” (Gützlaff 1832, 50). See also Lindsay and Gützlaff 1834, 171–72, 289–90; Medhurst 1849, 107–110. John Orchard stated in his guidebook of Shanghai that, “(t)he early visitors were greatly impressed by the importance of Shanghai....[and] spoke of Shanghai as perhaps the principle commercial city of the empire. The settlement was no longer a fishing village but one of the largest urban centers not only of the Far East but of the entire world. ... There are various estimates of the population, ranging from a total of 527,000 based on Chinese records of 1811 to the estimate of 270,000 made by Robert Fortune in 1843” (Orchard 1936, 5–7).
2. In both French Jesuits’ and British Consul’s reports in the mid-1840s, they spoke very positively and confidently about Shanghai with foreign settlements, which would destine for a prosperous future and turn to be the “largest and most cosmopolitan” city in the East (Macpherson 1987, 17).
3. Resulting in such a status was in many ways totally unplanned both for the Qing government and the foreign powers. “The treaties did not state foreigners could build roads, provide their own water, light, or power, or establish protection. Still less did they imply that such governments could impose their powers upon the Chinese who lived within their borders, effectively excluding them from the purview of Chinese authority” (Clifford 1991, 16–17).
4. Discussions on cross-cultural encounters brought by the presence of the West as clashing orientations and cultural thoughts forced upon the Chinese (Meng 2006, 139–70; Liu 2014, 124–25).

5. The idea of parks charging an entrance fee and opening to the public originated from Britain, and when it first appeared, the landscape and horticulture were not included in the concerns of its creators. Take Vauxhall Gardens in London, the earliest and most notable case, as example; concerts, theaters, and circus performances were the main points to attract visitors throughout the time of its existence. Pleasure garden, as Coke and Borg defines it, “denotes an enclosed outdoor site, usually outside a town or city centre, where members of the public were admitted for a small admission price, In most cases, pleasure gardens had little horticultural interest, and were ‘gardens’ only in that they were out of doors.... The provision of such a facility where the general public could rub shoulders with princes and dukes, began as an entirely English concept” (Coke and Borg 2011, 1–2).
6. The idea of sightseeing also arrived in China through the emergence of public parks in port cities (Chen 2004, 94).
7. Additionally, as pointed out by Jeremy Taylor, these colonial institutions, in a certain sense, were “forced to be lined up”, they did not simply compete to outdo each other, but rather to compete for access to the waterfront on the Bund (Taylor 2002, 134). Tall and major Western buildings, such as headquarters or warehouses on the Bund, did also have other pragmatic (less immediately impressive and imposing) functions to cater for, such as fortification, insulation from fire, and hosting commercial activities, in the formation of their architectural styles and structures (Farris 2007, 79–80; Henriot 2010, 1–27).
8. The mystery of the Shanghai parks and public gardens forbidding the entrance of “dogs and Chinese” during the concessional period has been well investigated by Robert Bickers and Jeffrey Wasserstrom’s article entitled: “Shanghai’s ‘dogs and Chinese Not Admitted’ Sign: Legend, History and Contemporary Symbol” (Bickers and Wasserstrom 1995, 444–66).
9. “The Public Gardens, on what was then called the Consular mud-flat, were making this year and were handed over to the Municipal Council on the 8th of August, 1868. People began to build houses on the Bubbling Well Road, and to live there. Considerable additions were made to the public buildings in the Settlement; a new Theatre, a Mixed Court, a Seaman’s Chapel at Pootung were built, and the Masonic Hall was opened” (MacLellan 1889, 63).

10. Not to be confused with the Chinese traditional tea garden, Yu Yuan (豫園), written in different characters and pronounced with different tones in Chinese, but both are spelled in the same way with Latin characters in English.
11. “The park was originally built by a westerner, who specialized in building parks. No matter where the park might be, as long as this park builder had his hands on them, the parks would be transformed into beautiful leisure environments. This park was built for his own entertainment and had therefore accumulated the best features of all parks in the city. However, the westerner grew bored of staying abroad and left for his home country. He sold the park to the Xi Shan merchant, Shu-He Zhang” (*Shen Bao* 1885).
12. An in-depth introduction written by an anonymous writer appeared on the cover page of *Shen Bao* two days after its opening. The article described in details about what Yu Yuan had to offer in a traditional Chinese sense of narrative (*Shen Bao* 1890).
13. An article entitled, “A Quick Visit to the Island of the Flying Dragon” appeared on *Shen Bao* (20th July 1890, 7). It describes the Flying Dragon entertainment park, which staged the world’s circuses and equipped with the newest exciting high-rise roller coasters and boasted about extent of the popularity of the mechanics of the equipment for being simultaneously staged abroad in places such as Singapore, Burma, India, San Francisco, Japan.
14. Feetham’s account on the tactful way the foreign officers exercised their authority over the Chinese residents in Shanghai: “It was difficult for anyone who was not in immediate contact with the realities of the situation to appreciate the true nature of the problem of government with which the representatives of the foreign community in the Settlement were confronted in regard to the exercise of their authority over the Chinese residents. *Prima facie*, the Chinese who came to live in the Settlement remain subject to the control of their own Chinese authorities outside their residence in the Settlement brought them under the supervision of the Settlement Police and rendered them liable to municipal taxation, but it did not automatically exempt them from the jurisdiction of their own officials outside the Settlement. This was the aspect of the subject which impressed the Foreign Ministers in Peking, who viewed with impatience the claims

of the Council to limit the jurisdiction of Chinese authorities over Chinese subjects in the Settlement, and to increase its own powers so as to be in a position not merely to exercise the authority of a municipal body in maintaining order and levying taxation for municipal objects, but also to protect the Chinese against the actions of their own authorities” (Feetham et al. 1931, 95–96).

15. Tianjin Parks “Code of Practices in the Park” at the end of the nineteenth century serves as a good explanatory example. It specified that inappropriate manners, dressing, behavior, and speeches were not permitted to purchase tickets to enter the park. It also forbade men and women entering parks together and on the same day. Parks were opened to male visitors on Mondays, Tuesdays, Fridays, and Saturdays, and reserved for female visitors on Thursdays and Sundays (Chen 2004, 96–97).

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3

A City of Workers, a City for Workers? Remaking Beijing Urban Space in the Early PRC

Fabio Lanza

Space is not just the inert framework of streets, building, and monuments that surround us. Rather, I take urban space as what lies at the intersection of planners' abstractions, economic forces, and the lived practices of the everyday. Space was (and is) the primary location and measure of political change (Lefebvre 1991). In this chapter, I propose to examine the urban space of the Chinese capital as reflection and expression of fundamental political fissures in the project of Chinese socialism as it took shape in the first decade of the PRC. Specifically, I argue that the socialist city embodied the crucial tension between the radical goal of shaping new lived practices for its residents and the continuing and at times intensifying subservience of the very same people to the disciplinary needs of production and state building. In the urban space of Beijing in the 1950s and early 1960s, we can witness the continuing—but always

Research for this chapter was made possible by a grant from the Institute of Cultural Studies at Capital Normal University, Beijing.

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Y. Ding et al. (eds.), *China: A Historical Geography of the Urban*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6_3

failing—attempts of Chinese communists to create a city *of* workers that could be at the same a city *for* workers. And in that, I argue, we can view a manifestation, in very evident terms, of the irreducible problems of industrial work and urban revolution.

Planning the Modernist Dream

Beijing was supposed to be the glorious capital of the new state and, as such, a model of socialist urbanism for the rest of the nation, the embodiment of the criteria of socialist urban construction. In 1950, Peng Zhen, the then secretary of the Beijing municipal committee of the CCP—and soon to become mayor—tried to identify these criteria. He argued that everything in the new city was to serve the masses, to serve the recovery and development of production. “Beijing is the people’s splendid capital,” he continued, “therefore the construction of our municipal administration must at the same time serve all the offices of the central government which represent and lead the people of the entire nation; it must serve the popular masses, serve production, and serve the people’s central government. These three responsibilities are unified and cannot be separated” (BMA 001-009-0345).¹

The various plans for the capital drafted by Soviet experts and Chinese urbanists as well as the documents by those agencies charged with implementing them followed Peng Zhen’s modernist dictum and they illustrate the decisive factors that shaped the project of urban transformation in Maoist Beijing. First, the continuous emphasis on productivity, labor, and the working people points at one crucial character of the new capital: Beijing was to be a *city of workers*, and workers of a specific kind, modern industrial workers. These workers had to be invented, as pre-liberation Beijing had no modern industrial factory of recognizable size. Beijing residents had thus *to be remade into workers*. The expansion of industries and the creation of an industrial proletariat were a crucial goal for the new capital, which was to be transformed from a city of consumption to one of production (“Sulian zhuanjia Balannikefu guanyu Beijingshi jianglai fazhan jihua de wenti baogao,” 1987b). While that goal would remain elusive, the choice had very profound implications.²

Second, Beijing was also to be the capital of a highly centralized state with a huge and ever-expanding bureaucracy, hosting national and municipal offices, each of them duplicated in their government and Party branches. Third, Beijing was to be a model of a modern and more perfect city structure, in which the needs of the people, that is, the newly industrialized working masses, could be finally satisfied—or at least remade into forms acceptable to the new society. This was to be achieved through changes in urban space, in how people lived their everyday, in how work and leisure, transportation and residence were connected and integrated.

The dream or rather the project of the 1950s was precisely that the city could be made to serve these three different needs at the same time, and that these were not only compatible but could sustain one another. Beijing was going to be a city populated with new workers engaged in modernized industrial production under the vigilant eye and the overbearing presence of a large centralized bureaucracy. In addition, under new spatial and political conditions, it was assumed that these workers could and should produce at incredible high rates and yet live an organized, happy, educated, and engaged life.

By the end of the 1950s, however, Beijing did not look even close to the ideals articulated by Peng Zhen and by the various planners, and government documents highlight the many problems the city was still facing, specifically in shaping this new urban model. The failure had to do with the reality of economic and social constraints the Communist Party faced; the government simply did not have the resources to produce and control that amount of change. But I argue that the failure was more profound and its reasons went beyond the fiscal, economic, and practical contingencies of the time. Rather, that failure stemmed from the radical contradictions at the heart of Beijing's modernist project. The three responsibilities (production, state building, new lives for workers) were in the end incompatible: offices and factories took over space and resources from residence and leisure; the city developed around semi-independent work units and was far from functioning as an organized whole; but, more importantly, socialist "city construction" became realized in a form of industrial production and urban modernization that was antithetical to any radical step toward a more equalitarian organization of society.

Socialist construction created “workers” but not “new people.” And, I argue, it could not create new people precisely because it aimed at creating modern industrial workers.

A Scattered City

The first few years of Communist Beijing saw the incredible effort of the administration to bring the city back to a minimum level of functioning, after years of what was described as utter neglect. The Beijing municipal government was consumed by very practical matters: sewers and drainpipes were inadequate and often clogged, roads muddy and narrow, public transportation insufficient, electricity provision erratic, and clean water scarce. There was organic waste everywhere and several areas of the old city would flood at the first heavy downpour (BMA 002-006-00308/2).

Yet, even in this first phase of recovery and rebuilding, we see the emergence, at the street level, of processes that will lead Beijing to develop in ways conflicting with central planning and incompatible with the harmonious coexistence of production, government, and a new life for its residents. For example, while at this stage there was yet not much emphasis on industrial production, government documents provide evidence of a growing divergence between the needs of the people (whom the plans were supposed to serve) and the expanding requirements of various national and municipal organizations. This conflict was particularly harsh when it came to housing. The basic problem was that there were just not enough apartments and the city population was going to—and did indeed—expand at a rate much higher than that of construction, making the plague of the homeless or poorly housed increasingly worse (BMA 002-006-00308/5). In the early years of the PRC, the government seemed largely ineffective in facing this crisis. Or rather, the government was part of the problem. One of the driving force in the demand for new residential buildings were precisely central and local government organizations, including schools, hospitals, and the very agencies charged with city management. In 1951 they occupied about 200,000 buildings but the estimate was that they needed to expand as soon as possible by 57,000

more. The agencies' hunger for buildings was one of the factors leading to hikes in housing prices and rent, which increased fivefold between 1949 and 1951. Speculation became rampant. Workers and poor city residents started complaining that the "government protected the interests of the capitalists (the landlords) and not of the workers," or that "when the CCP became the official state, they forgot about the poor" (BMA 002-003-00205/1).

This was not really the case as the Beijing housing administration and the municipal government in general tried very hard to set limits to the expansion of state and local offices and to safeguard residents' houses. In 1950, the Beijing government apparently forbid construction of new factories within the limits of the city walls, for reasons of space and safety (BMA 001-009-00303/1). Schools, institutes, and agencies connected with the state and the government expanded largely outside the walls but they nonetheless tended to acquire space and resources independently of city planning, as they benefited from funding that came directly from the central administration. Inter-sectoral competition for resources, which plagued the Soviet system and was going to become one of the defining characteristics of the Chinese bureaucracy as well, clearly played a role here. But this was also expression of the existing contradictions between planning and production, between the need for accumulation and ideals of redistribution, between growth and equality. While planners drew up project for the entire city—horizontally—resources flowed instead to specific work units—vertically. This was not the best solution for city people as a whole, as it hindered the possibility of developing urban resources and structures for all the residents, yet it did respond to the immediate need to provide services to specific sectors of workers and it was functional to the necessities of production and the bureaucracy that managed it.

Production and Its Discontent

In 1953, when the first five-year plan was launched and the country officially moved out of the recovery and into the development phase, Beijing government officials were adamant about the need to correct the mistakes

of the previous years and to put city construction onto a better path. They repeated like a mantra the call for “unified planning, unified construction, unified management”³ and they stressed the need to “think of the city as a whole” (BMA 001-005-00122/1).⁴ Yet, the plan remained centered on industrialization and state building and, as in the previous years, this emphasis proved to be contradictory to ideas of organized city planning and to the creation of a “new life” for the city residents.

Officers argued that, while almost no change had taken place in the old city, Beijing had expanded massively, in terms both of population and size. But it was the pattern of the expansion that was particularly problematic. Of the 2,700,000 m². of new buildings in the capital, two thirds had been built outside the city walls. Or rather, one should say that they had been “scattered” around the old city, as factories and work units had developed in haphazard and unplanned patterns (BMA 001-005-00122/1).⁵ This was in part due to lack of a central project but perhaps more importantly to a system that privileged (and required) fast development at all levels and poured resources directly into large organizations (factories, schools, institutions), which acted independently from any unified plan. As a 1956 document aptly summarized “as long as funds are scattered, it is impossible to achieve any unified result.”

This scattered pattern was not in fact altered during the five-year plan, which actually seems to have intensified some of the more perverse phenomena by pushing for the creation of large industrial compounds. The list of problems mentioned in the government documents is quite long. Officers complained, for example, about the lack of any coherent building standards, and the autarchic character of much construction made it very difficult to raise technical management, productivity, and quality (BMA 001-009-00372/2). More importantly, this form of development produced an inefficient use of available land and resources. Organizations and factories took up land that had been previously devoted to farming; they tended to encroach on green areas; and they often fought with each other when expansion brought them in close proximity. They also tended to reserve large pieces of land and set them aside for future development. The central government seemed incapable of redistributing these areas, even when they remained unoccupied and unused (BMA 047-001-00064/3).

The dispersal of buildings and institutions outside the walls in such a pattern also made very difficult to provide services for the everyday life of employees and residents. Transportation was obviously an issue (there were cases of roads and pipelines built simply for one *danwei*) but often these sites also lacked services and cultural venues of any kind (BMA 001-005-00122/1). In general terms, stores and public facilities did not keep up with construction, and this was connected in large part with the scattered nature of the new developments. In 1949, stores and public facilities took up 5.2% of city space, and they had dropped to 3% in 1956. And while by then 71.3% of the new buildings had been built outside the walls (including 82% of the schools) only one third of the stores and half of public facilities were located in the same area (BMA 001-009-00372/1). In this perspective, the evolution of the *danwei* from political to economic/welfare units that took place in the 1950s happened in response to a situation in which employees had no access to basic services and resources in most urban areas (Bray 2005: Chapter 5). Yet, at the same time, that situation was in part due to the very lopsided development of factories, schools, and government institutions as independent and unruly units. The emergence of the *danwei* as the main organizational form of socialist life under Maoism was thus both a reaction to unintended consequences and a self-fulfilling prophecy.⁶

By the mid-1950s it had become clear that the need to quickly develop bureaucracy and production—the twin needs of modernization—quashed every other priority, including that of creating a better, socialist life for “the working masses.” Already in 1954, there were repeated calls by municipal officers to avoid projects that exceeded the “current production levels” and to focus instead of those that might benefit the largest number of people and lay out foundations for the future (BMA 001-005-00122/1). The crisis was particularly felt in terms of land, with the city space destined to work and production rapidly overtaking that for residence, leisure, and everyday life. The overall city population had increased from 2 millions in 1949 to 3.3 millions in 1955, a 65% jump (BMA 001-009-00372/1).⁷ In the same period the city surface had grown by 107%, but the composition of that growth is revealing of the issues. The built surface occupied by government offices, schools, and factories had

more than doubled in size (it had increased by 136%, 198%, and 90%, respectively) while housing and services had enjoyed a much more moderate growth (around 40%) (BMA 001-009-00372/1). Given that the housing situation in Beijing was already very dire before liberation, an increase in residential buildings that did not even keep up with the population growth was utterly disastrous.

Far from the planners' dream of an allotment of 9 m² of living space per person ("Guojia jiwei duiyu Beijing shiwei 'Guanyu gaijian Beijingshi guihua cao'an' yijian xiang zhongyang de baogao," 1987a; Sit 1995: 110–111),⁸ the large majority of Beijing residents lived in much more cramped conditions, with workers, artisans, rickshaw pullers, middle school students, and so on, enjoying less than 4 square meters per capita on average. Space, like most resources, kept being distributed according to wealth and status: cadres, doctors, professors, and left-over capitalists still enjoyed (or were allotted by their work unit) much more room, up to 20 square meters. The industrial workers, on other hand, seemed to be among the losers in this fight: those employed in state-owned companies had 3.5 m² each, a luxury compared to their less fortunate brethren in local and private companies (2.7 and 2.5 m² respectively) (BMA 001-009-00372/1). We see here developing the paradoxical situation by which workers, the new people supposed to be at the foundation of new life under socialism (and communism), were relegated instead to an everyday spent in incredibly constrained conditions, often far away from basic facilities.⁹

At the same time, those new industrial workers (and workers in general) were inserted in a labor regime that called for an incessant increase in production rates and that imposed strict hierarchy and factory discipline. Official documents celebrate the rise in productivity during the first five-year plan and, surprisingly, the method by which it was achieved—piece-rate wages. From the second half of 1953 the city government adopted piece-rate wages for 80% of the workers and 80% of them were allegedly exceeding their quotas; productivity skyrocketed and cases of employees lagging behind saw a drastic reduction (BMA 001-005-00168). Yet, if not the adoption, for sure the unabashed celebration of piece-rate wages by a socialist government cannot but sound somewhat strident, especially if it is compounded with I have just outlined

about housing and services. While production and labor were being increasingly disciplined, living conditions—and even more importantly, lived practices—were *not* being radically altered, in part because they could not be altered without challenging the organization of production and the disciplining of labor.

A Radical Attempt: The Urban Communes

The second five-year plan was partly superseded by the massive effort of the Great Leap Forward, which was supposed to lead the country toward rapid industrialization but also to a drastic reduction of basic inequalities. Looking at the specific case of Beijing, it does seem that the GLF perhaps contributed to the achievement of the first goal but it did not solve the problems I have mentioned so far. Actually, the failure of the most progressive urban measures implemented during the GLF ended up consolidating the situation of fragmentation and inequality.

In 1961, the city surface devoted to industrial production had grown by 4.8 times since liberation, and 240 km² of new factories had been added since 1958, about half of all the new factories built in Beijing (BMA 047-001-00155). The composition of the city population changed as well. Modern industrial workers more than doubled and went from 6.4% of the population in 1949 to 7.8% in 1957 and 12.2% in 1960. Beijing was starting to look a little bit more like a city *with* workers, if not *of* workers. The spatial distribution of the city, however, did not change much, only the area outside the walls became more congested while remaining poorly organized (BMA 047-001-00155). Rapid industrialization, it seems, did not come with an improved or more equalitarian distribution of space and resources.

While at the macro level the Great Leap Forward did not alter the pattern of spatial development of the previous years, this period was also characterized by a radical (and largely under-studied) experiment aimed precisely at solving the contradiction between the vital goal of production and the redistribution of resource on a (more) equal basis: the urban communes. Created as a counterpart to the more famous (and infamous) rural models, the urban communes had different and supposedly integrated

goals.¹⁰ By freeing latent or unused labor force (mostly women) and employing it in new, local and collectively owned factories, they aimed at massively increasing production, while at the same time liberating women from the drudgery of “trivial house work.” By providing services that substituted for female house labor (canteens, child care centers, laundries, tailors, etc., all manned by previously unemployed citizens), the communes were supposed to radically alter the pattern of family life and create a more equalitarian society. Welfare, which was at that point reserved only to employees of large enterprises, was extended, at least in theory, to all commune members. This expansion, however, was not the consequence of a rise in state expenses, but rather as a function of increased participation in production. The use of previously untapped (female) labor, that is, both necessitated and allowed for more widespread welfare provisions (Fig. 3.1).¹¹

The communes were touted as the organizational form best suited to transform the old city into a new socialist city, to move its residents from a “scattered, individualistic life to a socialist, collective one,” and to help push Chinese society into communism (Li 2006: 10). In theory, they merged administrative, political, and economic functions, overcoming the three-part distinction at the foundation of the Maoist city. The communes were to be at the same time organizations for production, for life, and for education (Li 2006: 10). Previously unused labor (i.e. women, plus the young and the old) was employed in local factories that either produced everyday objects (clothes, shoes, etc.) or processed semi-finished materials to be used in larger state-owned enterprises. People were also put to work in the various service centers providing welfare to the newly productive citizens. As the communes had an educational and political function as well, these workers were also supposed to attend after-hour classes aimed at improving their level of literacy, their technical skills, and their ideological consciousness.

The urban commune movement began in August 1958, more or less at the same time as its rural counterpart, and while it followed a similarly haphazard and tentative pattern, with plenty of local experimentation, the central government showed much less interest in pushing for rapid collectivization in the cities than it did in the countryside. In Beijing, the first commune was created in the outskirts of the city, in Shijingshan, but



Fig. 3.1 Luo Feng, "The box factory at the Beixinqiao people's commune," in *Shoudu chengshi renming gongshe suxie* [Sketches about the urban people's communes in the capital] (Beijing, Renmin meishu chubanshe, 1960)

it was followed by four more within the old wall boundaries.¹² However, unlike in the countryside, where communes quickly became the main production and administrative units, the first communes remained largely isolated experiments for about a year, possibly for fear of organizational disarray. In Beijing, between October 1958 and early 1960, experiments in collectivization (canteens, kindergartens, service centers) and in female-staffed local factories were conducted under the responsibility of the sub-district offices (*jiedao banshichu*). It was in part because

they reported amazing results at the end of 1959 that the movement was restarted in earnest (Li 2006: 122–123; Shih 1962), and most of the urban communes were created in 1960. They were usually disbanded or emptied out of meaning by 1962.

The early reports concerning several Beijing communes are almost uniformly glowing. They cite the sharply rising percentages of residents involved in production, the always-increasing participation in social welfare initiatives (canteens, crèches), and the somewhat astonishing list of services provided under the commune umbrella.¹³ These reports placed much emphasis on the “new life” the communes seemed to offer, in particular to women. One of the major successes recorded in the official documents was precisely women’s liberation from the burden of housework and their full participation in production (BMA 001-006-01703/11); or to put it differently, their transformation from housewives into workers. As workers, they were now supposedly free to devote time to study and become literate. In one district, one report proclaimed, “98% of the illiterate or semi-illiterate women under forty have started attending classes: production, work and study have become the topics that women now care about” (BMA 001-006-01703/13).¹⁴ Another report unabashedly celebrated the transformation of workers’ family dependents (i.e. housewives) from “consumers to a great productive army for the construction of socialism” (BMA 001-006-01703/20). Women’s work outside the home was touted for improving many families’ economic conditions. In one case, the commune recorded a 40% increase in household income, an increase that had allowed for the expanded purchase of consumer goods (BMA 001-006-01703/18).¹⁵ But it was the changes beyond the strictly economic side that official documents extolled more eagerly. Involvement in labor allegedly produced a radical transformation in family life, with husband and wife working together, helping each other (BMA 001-006-01703/6): now spouses “can discuss work, study, and current events, their life has become richer, and their feelings have a stronger foundation” (BMA 101-001-00782/5). In the newly and happily collectivized life of the neighborhood, even gossip and petty fights had allegedly become less common, and the police registered a drop in the number of quarrels among neighbors (BMA 001-006-01703/18).

Women, Labor, Welfare

Yet, even in these first, exceedingly positive reports, one can catch glimpses of things that really did not work in the commune structure. For example, the functioning of the system was predicated on full participation in the welfare services, yet the number of people who used them remained relatively small. In early 1960, in the Xuanwu district, while the number of residents involved in production skyrocketed, the percentage of laborers (male and female) who ate at the canteens remained low, sometimes as low as 25% (BMA 001-006-01703/6).¹⁶ Other documents highlight cases of housewives, specifically in the most indigent families, who while happy to get some extra income by joining production, refused to send their kids to child care centers (to avoid extra expenses). Some of the welfare services also proved to be completely noneconomical, as they were often run inefficiently and were overstaffed (BMA 001-006-01703/12). And while it is usually acceptable to run welfare at a loss (as the benefits come in nonmonetary forms), this was antithetical to the combined goal of the commune system—increased production as a way to expanded (and revenue-neutral) welfare services.

The failure of commune welfare became more evident in the following year: between 1960 and 1961, 76% of the childcare centers and 90% of the communal canteens were shut down (BMA 001-028-00036/12), and the closures sometimes took place suddenly, leaving people who relied on those services—as well as the employees—to fend for themselves (BMA 001-028-00036/15). With the progressive and rapid collapse of commune welfare, women workers quickly found themselves carrying the double burden of factory work and housework, in contradiction with the stated goal of the collectivization movement. In 1962, over 50% of the women workers in Beijing had more than two children who required care; 68.7% had to go home everyday to cook lunch and dinner; 75.3% of them shouldered the entire responsibility of cleaning, washing, grocery shopping, and so on (BMA 001-028-00036/17). One commune factory reported that about 90% of the female employees had to prepare every meal and do all the housework. None of them could obviously stay after work to study, thus making the educational mission of the commune

moot. There were also increasingly alarming reports of housewives and mothers getting sick because of overwork (BMA 001-028-00036/8). Similarly, surveys from 1961 and 1962 also highlight that the vaunted ideological transformation through participation in production and education did not happen. Most women were glad to have the opportunity to earn some extra money and escape the grip of their mothers-in-law; however, their aspiration was not to build socialism or produce more for the country, but simply to have the leisure to watch a movie, take a nice walk, and eat better food. Many refused to be active in the Party organizations, including the Youth League, in large part because that required longer after-hours commitment, cutting into the time reserved for rest, study, and family (BMA 100-001-00659/6). In a sense, beyond their other major institutional problems, the radical experiment of the communes failed also because it both could not change the daily life of female residents enough (by truly freeing them from housework) and it expected that daily life to be infinitely malleable—while women defended their right to the newly gained leisure (Fig. 3.2).

Women workers complained about salaries and about the quality and quantity of welfare services (*fuli*), both of which were significantly lower than in state-owned enterprises or large factories. While the commune was supposed to make housewives into workers, the persistence of these inequalities reaffirmed the lower status of commune employees (and gender roles). As one woman eloquently stated, voicing her complain over ridiculously low cloth rations, “we are commune members, yet when it comes to welfare, we are just housewives; we toil as much as workers in state factories, we all create wealth for the nation, so why aren’t our cloth rations the same?” Another female worker, less diplomatically, added, “they (the employees of state factories) are workers, we are just loose women” (literally “broken shoes”) (BMA 001-028-00029/5).¹⁷ In a sense, the communes’ very existence was premised on the continuation and the inscription of these inequalities, which substituted for an equal distribution of resources with a massive recruitment of underpaid labor. And by 1962, Beijing Party officers were stating explicitly and unashamedly that this was the case. They repeatedly declared that female work in the commune factories and service centers was to be subordinated to the needs of the state factories and that it was useful




Fig. 3.2 Zong Qixiang, "A view of the Erlonglu neighborhood industrial production," in *Shoudu chengshi renming gongshe suxie* [Sketches about the urban people's communes in the capital] (Beijing, Renmin meishu chubanshe, 1960)

only insofar it was cheaper (BMA 001-028-00036/9).¹⁸ Commune (female) workers were paid substantially less than their male counterpart in "normal" factories and agencies, and by 1961–1962, many communes have eliminated all the welfare subsidies and cut most of the welfare services. Women were therefore asked to participate in production without receiving anything in exchange except for a small monetary reward (BMA 001-028-00036/12). Female labor was also eminently *disposable*

labor. In reviewing the faults of the commune system, Beijing city officers blamed the excessive “egalitarianism” in salaries and imposed a return to “pay according to labor” and piece-rate wages (BMA 001-028-00036/13). This had also the direct effect of making commune (female) factory work more flexible: women workers would be employed and paid when there was a need and, in idle times, they could simply go back home to “cook supper and do house chores” (BMA 001-028-00036/17). Once deprived of its welfare and educational components, the commune experiment was reduced to the exploitation of disciplined, disposable, and underpaid labor.

Such a devolution of the commune system was in part connected to the practical malfunctioning of the new organizations and with the failure of the Great Leap Forward in general. But, taking a broader perspective, I would argue the crucial issue was that, despite the promise of a new collective life, this new life remained chained to production and labor, and that the entire system was predicated on the voluntary submission of each individual to an increasing and often unbearable amount of work. The commune welfare system was supposed to “serve production, serve the working women, and serve the building of socialism” but every document I have read hastened to reaffirm that the first goal—production—was the fundamental one (BMA 001-028-00029/3). The communes promised liberation as part of a more complete submission to a praxis of productivism.

Besides expressing the very practical needs of a developing country, this praxis was in part based on a belief in the transformative power of labor, perhaps best exemplified by Liu Shaoqi’s speech in September 1958, where he argued that one of the basic conditions for the transition to socialism was that everybody (meaning really everybody) had to be involved in labor—and specifically physical labor (Liu 1958). Yet many of the new female workers in the urban commune did not find anything uplifting in manual labor, which they considered akin to housework: an equal waste of their potential, and equally boring. And it was, apparently, tedious by default: women were reserved tasks that were low skilled and required long hours of repetitive work, and which they would fulfill inexpensively, precisely because they were not provided the salary and *fuli* guaranteed to male factory workers (BMA 001-028-00036/17). Factory

work in the urban communes, far from being liberating, was dull, mindless, and alienating (BMA 100-001-00659/11).¹⁹

Even the radical attempts of the Great Leap Forward, despite their declared concern for improved livelihood, did not alter the radical inequality inscribed in urban space nor the emphasis on productivism. Rather, one of the consequences of the Leap and its failure seems to have been the final acceptance of a decentralized and largely fragmented model of urban development and administration, with the work units' large compounds marking the space of the capital outside the perimeter of the now bygone walls, and resources, including welfare and services, being administered within those compounds. When the urban communes were disbanded after the Great Leap Forward, this also marked the end of any modernist dream of a perfectly functional city, organized around an integrated rational plan, capable of shaping production, governance, and everyday life.

Conclusion

It is difficult to extrapolate from a decade of documents about city planning, often very drab and pragmatic, something about the crucial political and social contradictions of the Chinese communist venture. But I will take a stab at a brief and incomplete assessment, conscious that this requires more analysis. "Workers" and "production" seem to me central categories to articulate these contradictions. In the early PRC, the imposition of factory discipline and production imperatives continued unabated or became even harsher, so even if workers' conditions and their status in society improved (at times dramatically),²⁰ the oppression embedded in the very structure of modern industrial production was not radically altered. The socialist factory was the place of rigid hierarchical structures, reflected in pay grades and diverse allotment of services, if possible an even more stifling model than its capitalist counterpart.

Karl Marx, as reread by Moishe Postone, criticized modern industrial society itself *as capitalist*, a capitalism analyzed "in terms of abstract structures of domination, increasing fragmentation of individual labor and individual existence, and a blind runaway developmental logic." The very

existence of the modern working class, the proletariat, is the basic element of capitalism, and as such, labor and industrial production reproduce the oppressive social relationships and inequalities associated with capitalism. Marx, at least the Marx of the *Grundrisse*, seems to imply that there is not much difference—at least in terms of extraction of surplus—whether ownership of the means of production belongs to an individual capitalist, to a corporation, or to the state itself: the structures of oppression and relationship of production inherent to industrial capitalism remain largely the same. Socialism, for Marx (and Postone), should imply instead “the abolition of the proletariat and of the organization of production based on proletarian labor, as well as of the dynamic system of abstract compulsions constituted by labor as a socially mediating activity” (Postone 1998). In this sense, then the socialist project of a city of workers, based on modern industrial production, was bound to reproduce the very mechanism of oppression of the modern (capitalist) city, and could not create a radically different form of life for those very workers. In the Maoist city of the 1950s, workers then remained “those who are not allowed to transform the space/time allotted them” (Ross 1988: 41).

What my analysis of city space does is to show how the emphasis on production and productivity—which dominated the factory and defined the workers in the 1950s—affected much more than the factory, as a specific distribution of resources and a series of political choices shaped the space of the city in ways that reproduced specific inequalities and forms of oppression. In that, the socialist city embodies the unsolved and perhaps unsolvable tension between a modernity conceived as technological, industrial, governmental modernization and one that aimed at the creation of new, more equal forms of social relationships embodied in a specific urban space.

Notes

1. All the archival sources from the Beijing Municipal Archives (BMA) are listed by folder number in the bibliography.
2. In 1954, modern factory workers were only 5% of Beijing population (BMA 001-009-00303).

3. “Tongyi sheji, tongyi jianshe, tongyi guanli.”
4. “Ba chengshi dangzuo yige zhengti.”
5. Very little had been changed within the walls. A 1956 document mention only forty-one new buildings in the old city (BMA 001-009-00372/2).
6. This is not the only factor leading to the emergence of the *danwei* system by the late 1950s, yet it is an important one. Yeh Wen-hsin and David Bray have identified earlier models in the Republican period, in the Yan’an years, and in the Soviet Union. Nara Dillon has described the evolution of the *danwei* in connection with provision of welfare (Bray 2005; Yeh 1997; Dillon 2015).
7. Planning documents stressed the need to keep the city population under control, and this growth was faster than expected. The recruitment of a large number of workers for the five-year plan—a reversal of immediate postliberation policies that aimed at sending “redundant” people to the countryside—was probably at least partly responsible.
8. The allotment of 9 square meters per person had been suggested by Soviet advisors who argued it was the standard in the USSR. Chinese planners pointed that this was completely unrealistic in Beijing.
9. While I am focusing on workers (which in this case means mostly workers in large factories), the situation was much direr for those who were not included in a work unit, including temporary workers and the unemployed. While factory workers saw a progressive increase in the services and welfare provided to them, the situation of those outside the *danwei* system did not improve significantly.
10. The “people’s communes” (*renmin gongshe*)—especially in their rural form—were the final outcome of the collectivization movement of the 1950s, which aimed at elimination of private land ownership and at increased production through organization of farm labor (male and female) under military-like discipline. Despite having the same name, these communes have nothing to do with later experiments, such as the short-lived Shanghai Commune (*Shanghai renmin gongshe*), which attempted at creating a form of direct workers’ rule during the Cultural Revolution. The Shanghai commune, unlike the earlier models, was directly inspired by the Paris Commune of 1871. On the people’s communes, see MacFarquhar (1983). On the Shanghai Commune, see Wu (2014).

11. As Nara Dillon cogently argues, “Rather than viewing welfare spending as a form of consumption, they began to view it as a form of investment that would help unleash the productivity of China’s workforce” (Dillon 2015: 233).
12. They were the Chunshu Commune in Xuanwu district, Tiyuguanlu in Chongwen, Beixinqiao in Dongcheng, and Erlonglu in Xicheng (Li 2006: 89). See also BMA 001-006-01703/20.
13. In April 1960, there were 38 urban communes in Beijing, 6 of them had been created in 1958, the rest in 1960. Thirty-four had a population between 10,000 and 50,000, only one was larger than 200,000 people. There were 3151 communal canteens, 12 old people’s homes, 1218 child care centers, 903 kindergartens, 181 nurseries, and 1952 service centers (*fuwusuo*) (BMA 133-010-00462). By November of the same year, the number of communes had risen to 48, 38 of them organized by neighborhood committees and 10 by large state-owned factories (BMA 133-010-00463).
14. Another report lists an 80% participation rate in night schools (BMA 001-006-01703/18).
15. This document lists all the new products bought by seventy families, including recorders, leather shoes, bicycles, and watches, and other goods for a total of 9535 yuan.
16. Only 24.5% of the labor force was reported using the canteens.
17. One of the male employees deployed the gender division in a completely opposite way: “we are men, yet here we are treated like housewives.”
18. They stated clearly: “we can reduce expenses because the communes operate on a low wage system and they have little welfare.” In 1962 Beijing, a commune factory worker made on average 24 yuan plus 0.7 yuan of welfare provisions (*fuli*). A state factory worker made 41 yuan plus 5 yuan of *fuli*. See BMA 001-028-00036/13.
19. One factory listed as one of the reasons for their success the fact that they were employing unskilled women who supposedly found meaning in a job that would have bored to death more skilled (male) workers (BMA 001-028-00036/6).
20. Most improvements applied only to those workers inscribed in the *dan-wei* system and not the temporary workers, the unemployed or partially employed.

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4

Changchun Across 1949: Rebuilding a Colonial Capital City Under Socialism in the Early 1950s

Yishi Liu

In the process of its urbanization and modernization in the first half of the twentieth century, Changchun's political status and functions have altered dramatically, as explicitly reflected in its urban form and the physical construction undertaken during each phase to match these alterations. A unique Chinese city, Changchun provides a unique case for studying the relationship between Chinese urbanism and the history of China's politics in the twentieth century, as most of the city before 1945 was planned by the Japanese under a unique form of colonialism and then appropriated for different political ends in the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1949.

Among many fundamental changes the most discernable was the transformation of Changchun's urban space. As Henri Lefebvre notes, "[a] revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential. ... A social transformation, to be truly revolutionary in character, must manifest a creative capacity in its effects on daily life, on language

The original version of this Chapter was revised. An erratum to this Chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6_11

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Y. Ding et al. (eds.), *China: A Historical Geography of the Urban*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6_4

and on space” (Lefebvre 1974, p. 74). This chapter deals with the discontinuities and continuities of Changchun’s urban construction under Japanese colonial and Maoist socialist regimes. Many scholars have studied the planning and architectural history of Changchun, especially the time period when it was the capital city of the puppet state of Manchukuo (Koshizawa 1988; Yamamuro 2006). Japanese architectural historian Koshizawa Akira produced his book on the city planning of Manchurian cities and later on colonial Changchun specifically (Koshizawa 1988). Nishizawa Yasuhiko, on the other hand, used a broader range of sources and insisted that imperialism was a system that encompassed almost every aspect of Japanese society in Manchuria (Nishizawa 1996), and architecture was no exception. Two dissertations on the built environment of colonial Changchun are of particular relevance. Tucker details how Changchun’s planning, parks, and political and cultural facilities emerged in the larger context of state and nation building of Manchukuo (Tucker 2000), and Bill Sewell’s work concerns more on Changchun’s spatial dimension under Japanese colonialism (1905–1945) and the evolution of idea of modernity (Sewell 2000). All aforementioned works end in the year of 1945, and no serious work on post-socialist Changchun exists.

I intend to extend the study of Changchun’s urban transformation across the divides of 1945 and 1949, to the ending year of the First Five-Year Plan (FFYP) in 1957. In this vein, after a brief review of Changchun’s urban development before 1949, the reconstruction of the downtown area and a newly developed industrial base in Changchun will be discussed respectively. As Prasenjit Duara notes, the ideals of decolonization and the anti-imperialist movement were built upon two pillars: socialism and the discourse of alternative civilizations (Duara 2003). With the Soviet aids, the PRC adopted the socialist program completely, and merited the socialist ideals of equality, market restrictions, and state redistribution programs as the alternative to imperialist capitalism. Significantly, the Japanese colonial government had a similar anti-capitalist mindset to compete and overcome the West, and the connections were evident in the spatial formation and reformation in Changchun.

A Brief History of Changchun Before 1949

Changchun existed only as a small trading town in the central part of Northeast China, also known as Manchuria in most part of the nineteenth century, and had established its status as a trading center for the collection of soybeans from central Manchuria (Sewell 2004). The Sino-Russian Secret Treaty signed in 1896 allowed Russia to build a small Russian town to the north of walled Changchun around 1900, as a minor railway settlement with extraterritorial jurisdiction affiliated to the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria that triggered urbanization and modernization of this region.

In the wake of the victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, Japan gained control over the southern half of the railway and Changchun became the breaking point between the two halves of the line. Having abandoned the existing Russian railway station and settlement, the Japanese built in Changchun their own railway settlement, or annexed land railway, and the Japanese construction of the Changchun settlement fell chiefly to the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR), a quasi-official corporation created in the model of British East India Company to take charge of modernizing programs to foster the growth of a modern society in Manchuria.¹ The SMR “went about its colonial projects in Manchuria in a consciously modern fashion, one that expressed a Japanese colonial modernity that had much in common with other colonial powers” (Sewell 2004, p. 226). By providing appropriate physical infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, libraries, and auditoriums (Sewell 2004) to the new section of Changchun, the Japanese were earnest to demonstrate their ability to run a modern city, an equal to the Western powers.

As a result of a chain of conflicts during the 1920s when the rising tide of Chinese nationalism under the warlord regime of Zhang Zuoling and Zhang Xueliang clashed violently with Japan (Mitter 2000), the Japanese Guandong Army² occupied the whole Manchuria in 1931 in the aftermath of Manchurian Incident, known also as “9/18 Incident” (Hotta 2007), and a puppet state of Manchukuo was established in 1932.

Much of Manchukuo’s modernity was evident in its new capital, Xinjing (Sewell 2004) (literally translated as New Capital), a much more ambitious

project based on the railway town and Chinese city at Changchun. The previous fragmented urban sections were incorporated into a larger plan, so-called the 1932 Capital Plan (Fig 4.1). The name—“New Capital”—connotes a new vision of modernity, more than just plazas, parks, and the




Fig. 4.1 The 1932 Plan of the New Capital, which incorporates four fragmented parts of Changchun. Source: By the courtesy of the Planning Institute of Changchun

other amenities commonly found in a modern urban setting, but to boast East Asian virtues and moralities to supersede Western materialism, and various construction projects of the city were initiated under the basic ideological principle of the Kingly Way, a concept that embraced ethnic harmony and Confucian values such as filial piety and loyalty and “supposedly reinvigorated Chinese tradition by making it more appropriate for a modern nation state” (Sewell 2004, p. 229).

While the SMR defined modernity almost materialistically—doubtless assuming that from material changes would emerge modern mentalities—Manchukuo authorities focused on morality, though in a very superficial way (Sewell 2004, Yamamuro 2006). In line with Manchukuo’s state ideology of the Kingly Way, the culture of Manchukuo was to surpass that of the SMR era “because it created an improved kind of national subject, one supposedly less beholden to the capitalist West and more in tune with Asian societies and traditions” (Sewell 2004, p. 229). In addition to an Asian unity to overcome Western imperialism and materialism, the Japanese highlighted in Manchukuo the cultural and racial continuity with themselves, and emphasized a cultural independence and the revival of indigenous tradition and ethics.

In order to distinguish themselves from Western colonialism in the 1930s, the Japanese consciously looked into indigenous sources for inspiration and legitimacy from the very outset. For example, the image of Confucius appeared on the bill of Manchukuo’s currency, and locating of the imperial palace at the center of the city and preserving a Taoist temple that advocated filial piety reflected on the undergirding ideal of the Kingly Way. However, the most distinguishing demonstration of the new modernity was the dominant architectural style for governmental buildings in Changchun of the time, that is, Developing-Asia style (Fig. 4.2), which displays striking characteristics such as large sloping roofs on a functional plan. An aesthetic pluralism was omnipresent in the colonial capital, involving various ethnic, religious, and cultural representations. In terms of architectural multiplicity, Changchun had an established tradition of incorporating different sources since the turn of the twentieth century, as Neo-classicism, Art Nouveau, bungalow, and eclecticism were all introduced in Changchun to compete with each other for modernization. However, when Changchun was made the capital of Manchukuo in 1932,



Fig. 4.2 The bird's view of the main gate of the First Automobile Works (FAW) in 1957. Source: By courtesy of the FAW Archives

indigenous elements were enhanced to match Japan's exterior policy of pan-Asianism and increasing hostility against the West. A commentator suggested the construction activities in the new capital were helping to renovate not only architectural forms but civilization itself (Naito 1934).

Decolonizing and Reconstructing Changchun's Urban Core

When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) assumed political power over all of China, Mao Zedong declared that the major task of this new urban-centered strategy was to bring about a transformation in the nature of the Chinese city (Mao 1976, p. 365). During the three-year economic recovery period (1949–1952), with the implementation of centralized planning, private ownership of the means of production was abolished or restricted to a minimum. When the FFYP (1953–1957) started, not only the urban landscape of Changchun was transformed, but also the general perception of the city was changed. By the end of 1957, the last year of the FFYP, Changchun was officially recognized a “new” city of an industrial base and home to many important socialist institutions, while the urban life in the city had long been attuned to Chinese socialism (Changchun Municipal Archive 1957/12).

By the end of April 1953, 19 work units (*danwei*) in the city had started construction, including research institutes, factories relevant to livelihood of the people such as electric power plants, universities, and so on. Due to Changchun's strategic geographical position on Manchuria, and its capacity of a host of important institutes and factories, the provincial seat moved from Jilin City to Changchun in 1954.

In rebuilding Changchun's urban core, the decolonizing efforts included three basic methods: manipulation of naming and renaming, erection of statues of Chairman Mao and revolutionary martyrs to replace old ones in front of existing colonial buildings, and completion of urban form with new buildings in socialist realism so that supplementation rather than demolition played a more active role in forgetting the past. However, the most impressive transformation in urban landscape came with a few important projects that gathered up along two major arteries of previous colonial capital: Datong Street (now Stalin Street) and Shuntian Street (now Xinmin Street, or "the street for new people"). New buildings along the two streets not only gave the city with an updated skyline, but also effectively eradicated colonial influence. Both the reconstruction of Stalin Plaza and Xinmin Street eradicated colonial memory through the complementation rather than demolition of existing spatial form.

Stalin Plaza (Previously Datong Plaza)

Corresponding to the rolling topography of Changchun, elevated plateaus were made circular plazas at the interactions of streets as the vistas in Baroque cities, serving to channel off traffic. Located at the center of the city atop a small plateau, broad avenues radiated from the hexagonal circle that made the plaza accessible from all quadrants of the city (Sewell 2000). Looking north, the wide Datong Street led straight to the first train station, south it continued unbroken for five kilometers (Sewell 2000). The plaza was the first constructed space of the new city (Sewell 2000), and the huge area of the circular plaza provided a perfect public space for mass gathering and ceremonies. The civic center on Datong Plaza at the heart of colonial Changchun expressed Japanese modernist goals vividly (Sewell 2000). Upon completion, Datong

Street which connected directly railway station in the north became an integral part in national political life, providing the theater where Japanese colonial politics could be displayed. In public celebrations, processions were directed to sweep over Datong Street, and important mass assemblies were staged at Datong Plaza, frequently inspected place by the emperor.

As the Japanese did not fully realize the 1932 Plan before they were defeated in World War II, the central plaza was incomplete in that two blocks were left empty up to 1955. After the Communist takeover, the Manchurian Bank fronting Stalin Plaza became the headquarters of China Bank, while the previous Capital Construction Bureau building was occupied by Changchun Municipal Party Committee. The colonial Municipal Policy Station, Manchuria Communication Building, and Capital Construction Bureau building functioned as what it had been designed for, but under a different name of Changchun Policy Department.

After the FFYP started, the Communists began to build their own monuments near the central plaza in Changchun, and a Workers' Cultural Palace (WCP) was proposed and construction began in July 1956 (Changchun Municipal Archive 1956/1957). Completed in late 1957, the WCP is an enormous four-storied building. Not unlike other colonial buildings in the surrounding area such as an elevated central portion above the wings, the location of the Palace at the center of the city indicates the important status of workers in the new regime under the proletarian-revolutionary ideology, thereby being enabled to reorient and recast China into a socialist nation. As in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, the WCP or palace had been a new, widely publicized building type, and it served the factory community as part of socialist content. However, the WCP at the center of Changchun was larger than a club, aiming to serve the whole city for theatrical performances, film shows, and political meetings.

To the south of the Palace stands the newly built Jilin Provincial Hotel, an even larger six-story building. Unlike the Palace, the hotel is abounded with traditional motifs, such as roof and window styles, exquisite decorations on cornice, and so on. Symmetry unmistakably featured all these buildings. Thus, if one can see socialism as a historically "rational" project of modernity in certain circumstances, one may be ready to acknowledge

the fact that socialist realism is, after all, a radical form of modernism and a radical formulation of the mainstream Enlightenment idea of modernity (Castillo 1995, p. 917). Along with the colonial institutional buildings, the WCP and hotel which were built under different political guise but with similar outlook eventually completed the urban design of the civic center. Once again, the central plaza became a fundamental site of ideological intervention and manifestation, but this time of socialist advantage over the decadency of the West. It was during this period that Stalinism left on Changchun an indelible mark through what became known as socialist realism, as exemplified in the hotel and the WCP. The alignment with socialist thinking encompassed new meanings of architectural and urban design aesthetics, and socialist realism was used as one major means to consolidate political power. As such, the civic center of the city was once again accorded preeminence as the locus of state power.

It is noteworthy that Datong Street functioned not as an area of retail concentration, as most buildings flanking the street were military and governmental offices, and it was designed to promote a modern façade of the city through the movement along the street. In the meantime, Datong Plaza served as a setting for principal public buildings and monuments, designed to provide room for parading troops and for the throngs of people on holidays and political events. These characters radically departed from the traditional capitalist planning. However, as war exigencies drained resources and labor away to the front after 1941, construction on the street ceased and the street did not thrive again until the Communists began new modernizing projects in the early 1950s. With the completion of central plaza, the intensification of official efforts to dominate public space and construct a new socialist monumental landscape accompanied the imposition of the socialist model.

Xinmin Street (Previously Shuntian Street)

Shuntian Street, to the west of Datong Street, formed the administrative quarter of Manchukuo. Offices for six ministries were erected along the street which terminated at the circular Anmin Plaza in the south. The foundation of the imperial palace was situated in the north, overlooking

this quarter from a vast plaza. However, the construction of Changchun as the colonial capital drew to a close by 1941 when the Pacific War broke out, by which time only foundation work of the palace was completed, while a few land lots were left vacant in this quarter. The names of the street (*Shuntian*) and the plaza (*Anmin*) were excerpted from Confucian classics, meaning following the Heaven and bringing peace to the people, also a major principle of the colonial ideology of the Kingly Way.

After the Communist takeover in 1949, the street was renamed *Xinmin* after the Communist regime was established, meaning “New People.” The circular Anmin Plaza at the southern terminus of the street was renamed to Liberty Plaza (in Chinese *jiefang guangchang*). The previous colonial Supreme Court at the corner of the plaza became an air force hospital.

Changchun Institute of Geology was established in December 1952. The site of the new college occupied the former palace and imperial garden. The existing foundation on the site, which was designed for a two-storied developing Asian palace, was used for a new main building of four stories for administration and teaching (Fig. 4.3). The project started in



Fig. 4.3 A typical Chinese-style apartment with the corner tower above the roof (by the author)

1953, and upon its completion in the following year, it was the first building in “national form” in Changchun, preceding those to be built in the First Automobile Works (FAW; Yang, p. 253).

The largest project of new construction along the street was Jilin Provincial Library, located in opposite to the previous Ministry of Transportation across Xinmin Street. Completed in 1957, it was a four-storied building with an extruding tower at the center, covering a total area of 12,000 m² (Yang, p. 256). Aside from the tiled tower, the most ornamented part was the portico that fronted the main entrance. In terms of decorative motifs, height, mass, and color, the library stood in harmony in the historic quarter with existing colonial institutional buildings.

The buildings that were newly built along Xinmin Street filled up previous vacant blocks of the 1932 planning, and had successfully transformed the former administrative quarter of Manchukuo into an educational and cultural district. Through education, workers were trained to become both politically enthusiastic and technically proficient, or in the parlance of the time, “both red and expert.” Promoting a large number of “red experts” was considered a crucial precondition for achieving a transition to socialism. New and old buildings along Xinmin Street played a vital role in producing proletarian subjects.

The reuse of existing spatial forms did not go beyond the years of economic recovery and it wasn't long before economic construction began to transform the urban environment. The massive construction project set out in the FFYP and launched in the mid-1950s called for the development of hundreds of new industrial plants, the majority of which were to be constructed in and around the existing major urban centers, resulting in dramatic expansion of cities and emergence of new forms of urban space. It is in this process that the newly built public buildings that housed key socialist institutions, such as the Provincial Hotel and the Library, came to dominate Changchun's spatial organization and urban life.

The distinctive character of the socialist conception of the city's center was that it functioned not as an area of retail concentration but as the political-cultural-administrative center. The more closely the socialist center approached the concept outlined above, the more radically it would depart from the traditional capitalist concept of the central

business district. As we have seen, the central plaza of Manchukuo's capital, which was renamed Stalin Plaza later on, resonated with socialist planning principles. The driving force to explore something new and different from what had been known in the Western civilization stipulated the connection between these modernizers, in which programs new nations would surpass Western materialism and capitalism through a competing approach to the modern, be it the Kingly Way or socialism.

Building the Automobile Town in Changchun

Rebuilding Changchun's urban core abounded with colonial legacies put great challenge to socialist planners, as the new regime intended to eliminate the residues of infamous history of Manchukuo. However, the most effective decolonizing effort to erase Changchun's colonial past was the construction of a large modern factory community in the southwestern outskirts of the city, that is the FAW and its housing compounds. In this way, Changchun was eventually transformed from a colonial cancer of consumption to a prosperous industrial center under Chinese socialism.³

Mao urged his colleagues in the eve of the establishment of the PRC in 1949, "From the very first day we take over a city, we should direct our attention to restoring and developing its production ... Only when production in the cities is restored and developed, when consumer-cities are transformed into producer-cities, can the people's political power be consolidate" (Mao 1976, p. 366). By contrast, Changchun as a former colonial capital city had been designed as a "political center," and the label of a "pure consumer city" needed to be eradicated, a more demanding and ambitious task of instituting socialism.

As a result of the Sino-Soviet treaty, the Soviet agreed to aid 156 major industrial projects during the FFYP, including the construction of China's first modern truck factories, that is the FAW to be built "in Mengjiatun in Changchun's outskirts"⁴ (Wu 2009, pp. 41–43). In the summer of 1951, students from Tsinghua University completed the surveying drawings of the area (Zhang 2004), and a modern socialist automobile factory would soon be built up on colonial remainders.

Building the FAW's Production Sector

Power stations, dams, hospitals combined with newly founded factory communities were altogether referred to as “the great construction projects of Communism,” demonstrating as they did the superiority of the new social system over the old, and the great accomplishments of the FFYP in Changchun.

The FAW was one of the largest factories of the FFYP. The general plan of the region was rendered by Soviet experts, and became a symbol of the friendship with the Soviet and the Eastern bloc. All important factory buildings were designed in Russia, and it was not surprising that factory buildings of the FAW bore the postmark of socialist realism that was still popular in the Soviet Union under Stalin's reign.

Like many contemporary factories in the Soviet Union and East European countries, the main entrance of the FAW and its plaza has been conceived as an architectural iconography and a symbol of the ideological content of building socialism. The founding stone of Mao's autography was set as focal point of the plaza, signaling Mao's strong personal interest. At its back stood a row of neo-classical gate houses, decorated with tall, simplified columns on the exterior wall, demonstrating the two fundamental principles of socialist realism, namely, classical composition and decoration.⁵ The Soviet Union provided the accompanying iconography of dramatic pictures of heavy industry such as steelworks in clouds of steam and coal smoke. These themes blossomed forth in literature and political rhetoric into a cult of steel, having both symbolic and linguistic points of contact with building socialism.⁶

Building FAW's Residential Sector

A lesson learned by the CCP from the deficiencies of the Soviet model of industrialization was to avoid overemphasis of opening new factories at the cost of improving workers' livelihood standard. Therefore, the construction of housing, groceries, and other auxiliary facilities of residential compounds started in concurrency with the construction of the factories of the FAW. After the Russian-produced general plan was sent to China

in April 1953, the Eastern China Industrial Architectural Design Institute in Shanghai (ECIA) was commissioned by the state to render the plan of FAW's residential and auxiliary buildings (Zhang 2004).

The ECIA worked on the layout of residential and other buildings by the summer of 1954⁷ (Wang 1955). The housing project started immediately. When the construction of FAW's main factories was underway, workers had already moved into the new apartments in 1955.⁸ By 1956, a total floor area of 320,000 m² was completed. According to 6 m² per capita in the specific plan, the newly built area was able to house approximately 50,000 people (Wang 1955).⁹ The factory and residential compounds consisted of the first modern and grandiose "automobile town" of the PRC.

The ECIA plan followed the principle that residential and industrial areas should be located close enough so that the journey to work takes no more than 30 minutes by bus or bicycle, the chief modes of daily travel.¹⁰ The FAW under construction hence was divided into factory area (production sector) and residential area (nonproduction sector), and the two parts altogether constituted a unique institution of Chinese socialism, that is, work unit (*danwei*). As scholars have revealed, *danwei* was featured by a lifetime social welfare system from cradle to grave, and a network of relationships encompassing work, home, neighborhood, and social and political membership (Yeh 1997, p. 60). Moreover, Chinese *danwei* became actively engaged in forming new urban communities on a large scale, hence promoted urbanization and modernization under Maoism. The FAW factory community was one of the first examples in socialist China with complete facilities that embraced collective life.

The FAW residential area consists of three parts: central garden and plaza, Chinese-style blocks, and Western-style blocks. The planning reflected the norms of Soviet socialism in building new towns: axial symmetry, regularity and clarity of the relationship between the principal and the subordinate, uniformity of style and height, and so on. Its land uses were primarily residential and recreational (with two shops on the tower's ground floor), in contrast to the mix of land uses often found in the West since the Industrial Revolution. Western-style blocks consisted of three-storied apartment buildings with a Western pediment as the most distinctive ornament. The Chinese blocks, on the other hand, are not only

larger and higher, but also richer and more varied in housing shape and the silhouettes as a whole.

Residential blocks (*jiefang*) are the basic elements for the organization of the residential area. In FAW's residential area, Chinese-style apartment blocks sandwiched the central park, while the Western-style apartment blocks are located diagonally away across the main street. Each block is unique, but all have a distinct axis to regulate the layout. Apartment buildings are laid on the four edges of each block along streets. Service facilities such as power distribution station and daycare center were placed inside the block. Part from buildings, playground, green space, parking space, and storage area are also included inside the block. Geometry and symmetry dominated the plan of each block, showing the strong order of space.

If examined closely, the Chinese-style towers of the factory buildings and Chinese-style apartments remind the audience of the colonial State Council and other typical institutional buildings under Japanese colonial rule, used for different purposes. Both Developing-Asia style and socialist realism enlisted a single, slender tower crowned with an Asian roof with an allure to Chinese (or East Asian as a whole) tradition, not to mention exquisite traditional decorations. However, the colonial towers were a combination of both Chinese and Western elements, that is a combination of sloping roof and modified column order. The socialist towers as a focal point too, on the other side, entailed Chinese decorative motifs alone. Towers were modest in the production sector, but the Chinese element in design is more illustrative in the residential area.

The experiment of planning the FAW residential area displayed the attempt of an alternative path to the socialist modern embodied in architectural representation and the new way of life. Large sloping roofs and traditional decorative motifs featured apartment compounds as a whole, but that did not mean architecture was entirely subordinated to tradition. Housing unit that met daily needs and modular system that realized mass construction were undergirded in housing design, not to mention the goal to facilitate collective working and living. Still less that it was to look old-fashioned. The architecture of a national form would certainly not be called modernist, but it would be new and responsive to the political demands of the time.

Spatial formation of the FAW's housing compound was supposed to stipulate a new way of life to create proletarian subjects. Based on the account of socialist life that many inhabitants and visitors have written about, profound social change was taking place in Changchun in the 1950s, and the former colonial capital city was superseded by a socialist industrial city. The FAW was an emblem of the "great victory of Maoism," the victory not only over former colonial cruelty, but also over the capitalist world and capitalist manner of production. On December 20, 1957, the official newspaper, *Changchun Daily*, proclaimed that "by the end of 1957 the FFYP has been successfully completed with the joint efforts of all people, ... and Changchun has already been a new industrial and cultural center" (Changchun Municipal Archive 1957/12).

Competitions and Connections of Changchun's Urban Construction Under Colonial and Socialist Regimes

Building the FAW in Changchun answered Mao's call for changing previous consumption cities into production centers by means of socialist urban planning which aimed at the correction of "the ills inherited from the era of capitalism." The FAW soon became a national symbol of the FFYP and the achievement of Chinese socialism, effectively substituting for Changchun's unpleasant association of with colonial rule while using similar architectural elements.

However, competition of the visions and practices of modernity was an underlining theme throughout the Manchukuo years, and this mindset to compete with the foes saw interesting continuities from the colonial buildup to the socialist reconstruction of the built environment, despite totally different ideological and propagandistic banners of the two regimes.

First of all, the principles of Changchun's city planning under both regimes were targeted at superseding and surpassing the Western model, in spite of extensive application of up-to-date planning and construction technologies. In Manchukuo, Japanese statesmen enshrined pan-Asianism

as the spiritual alternative to excessive Western materialism and individualism (Smith 1959, pp. 123–156). Asiatic moralities were celebrated in governmental discourse to emphasize ethical responsibilities as alternatives to capitalism whose mercantile consequences grievously plagued in the home islands of Japan. As a result, Changchun's city plan of 1932 aimed to "prevent the incursion of capitalist land speculation" and put all commercial activities under the colonial authorities. Besides, preparing for war with the Soviet Union, the Manchukuo's economy was run in a quasi-Soviet manner through state planning. For example, the Manchukuo government had initiated two Five-Year Plans for industrial development in 1932 and 1938 respectively, and the construction for the capital was also carried out under a Five-Year Plan of Capital Construction ending in 1937.

On the other hand, city planning in socialist countries was integral with the overall economic planning of the state, based on the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. Socialist planning, as some scholars argue, can be termed "active planning," that is, the active projection of economic activities (allocation of resources, distribution of income, transportation, etc.), to correct the ills inherited from the era of capitalism and to develop a new pattern for the city to embrace the ideal of socialist egalitarianism (Fisher 1962). Upon the establishment of the PRC, the Soviet sent numerous technicians and officials to help China building socialism. Under Chinese socialism, the predominant role of state and its ownership of means of production including land preclude capitalist speculation, and ideally all part of the city should be standardized with no sharp distinction as in capitalist cities. A shared anti-capitalist ideology sanctioned a centralized economic and political system for both regimes.

Second, the role of the city's center, that is, Datong Plaza or later Stalin Plaza to serve important public buildings and monuments as well as the site to provide room for parading troops and for gathering to celebrate state holidays ran into the socialist era. In planning colonial Changchun, as the general principles of socialist planning dictates, the distinctive character of the conception of the city's center was that it functioned not as an area of retail concentration but as the political, cultural, and administrative center. In socialist reconstruction of precapitalist city's center, normally the only commercial elements added were "the hotel for tourists, the single department store, and perhaps a restaurant and coffee shop" (Fisher 1962).

When the central Datong Plaza was erected in the early 1930s, it was surrounded by Manchukuo's institutional buildings: the central bank, the Capital Construction Bureau office, municipal police office, and the office of telegraph and communication. After the Communist took over Changchun, its name was changed into "Stalin Plaza," and a hotel and the People's Palace of Culture were added to complement the complex. The central plaza as a significant exhibit of national pride and its place in grand political movement and state building however remained. The absence of commerce in the center was evident in both colonial and socialist times, a radical departure from the capitalist concept of central business district, while commerce was alienated because land costs and goods prices were uniform under authoritarian regimes.

Third, the neighborhood unit in colonial Changchun provided another source for the socialist invention of work unit, or *danwei*, among other traditional and recent practices. The theory and practice of neighborhood unit planning of the 1920s such as Redburn was soon introduced to Changchun, as implemented in governmental housing districts in the back of Manchukuo's offices. On a larger scale, the whole urban residents were organized into neighborhood units (*ling zu*) under the surveillance of Concordia Association to maintain social stability and make preparations for war. The similar mechanism, so-called *bao-jia* system, had been practiced for many centuries in rural China, and had been recently revived by the Nationalist government to replant to urban areas (Yeh 1997). Various forms of neighborhood unit, either Chinese *bao-jia* or Japanese *ling zu*, resonate to the Confucian ideal of corporal life (*shouwangxiangzhu*).

During the first years of the PRC, the socialist regime reorganized the society into self-sufficient communities affiliated to production or administrative units, hence the specific *danwei* system. An elaborate division of the city into self-contained units was a common practice in all socialist countries, and basic tool of socialist planners to create "urban uniformity" was carried out by neighborhood unit. However, as scholars have noted, Chinese *danwei* had played a much more active role in stabilization of the society and mobilization of the mass, partly due to similar cultural practices in the long past.

Moreover, the decentralization of commerce in the Manchukuo era fit well into the socialist restructuring of city planning which demanded an equal distribution of social resources. When Changchun as colonial capital was built up, commercial buildings were unusually restrained both in small number and modest style, and few were seen along the most important Datong Street, while another widest street, Shuntian Street, was exclusively for governmental use. An absence of concentration of commercial buildings along vital arteries of the city is somewhat deviated from the normal practice in Western colonies where commerce and consumption were of paramount concern. However, commercial decentralization in Changchun eased socialist transformation targeting at standardization of all parts of the city.

Fourth, the unique architectural forms of the Manchukuo era featured by traditional elements were modified and applied in the attempts to achieve socialist goals. At the time, imported Stalinist monuments and socialist realism played a central role in new construction in Chinese cities. Realism and tradition were two of the fundamental principles of socialist realism, which called for “socialist content and national form.” Theorists dismissed modernism as a product of capitalism, and instead looked into recent practices of Chinese Revival and Japanese Developing Asian buildings for inspiration. The past cannot be erased or escaped.

In building and rebuilding Changchun, both the Japanese and the Communists envisioned their modernizing schemes to transform the society in new directions through alterations to the built environment. It was the ideology of competing with and overcoming the West to embrace modernity that activated bold experiments. And it was the driving force to explore something new and different from the West stipulated the connection between different modernizers through various modernizing projects, hence similarities of their approaches to the new visions of modernity. I have argued that although Maoist socialism aimed to reorganize Chinese society at large and indeed presented many unique aspects of the new life, the socialist inventions were restricted and diluted by the past. The subtle connections between the colonial past and socialist present and the processes through which the new system came to underpin a new revolutionary “science” of urban development and governance certainly need more exploration.

Notes

1. Such as operated ports, shipping lines, warehouses, telegraphic communications, urban construction, and other endeavors.
2. Also spelt as Kwantung Army. Examples also include Xinjing, or present-day Changchun, the city the chapter studies, which was spelt as Hsinking. I will use the present pinyin for all places and names throughout the chapter.
3. However, the application of traditional elements in factory buildings became the most infamous instance of extravagance at that time, and architects who advocated for such style became the target of nationwide criticism in 1954 and 1955.
4. Mengjiatun used to be a place for a secret unit of the Japanese army that also conducted bacteriological research like that of the infamous 731 Unit in Harbin. After the Japanese were defeated, Mengjiatun was virtually deserted, but the infrastructure such as barracks, water supply, railway transportation, electric power plant was left without much damage. It should be noted that China did not produce any automobiles before the establishment of the PRC.
5. The earliest example in Changchun, and in China as a whole, was the Soviet victorious monument built at the center of Stalin Plaza in 1945.
6. Chairman Mao declared that he would like to see clusters of chimneys from the Tiananmen. At a time when pollution was far from a popular concern, chimneys were the symbol of prosperous industry, especially in China which lacked heavy industry in the early 1950s.
7. “Because all units contributed to fulfilling the general plan produced by the Russian experts, the specific plan had thus been proceeding smoothly.”
8. An internal newspaper of the FAW, *Automobile Workers*, recorded the historic event on December 24, 1954.
9. The figures come from Yang Zhaoyuan. *Changchunjianzhuzhicaogao* (Manuscript of Gazetteer of Architecture in Changchun). The standard in the Soviet Union was 9 m², while “according to the current situations in China, this standard is not realistic.” The standard for the FAW housing was set at 6 m², which “still proved high.”
10. Unlike the United States, where the best housing is almost invariably located some distance away from industrial districts, and the quality of housing usually becomes better with increasing distance from the city center, in Chinese cities the quality of housing does not vary significantly over space and virtually no single family houses are constructed.

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Part II

Mediating History and Modernity



5

Tunxi: Urban Sectoral Agglomeration in a Regional Centre of Tea Trade

Yi Zou and Xi Lin

Introduction

Huizhou, located in the southern Anhui Province today, covers its own urban district, the County of She, the County of Xiuning, the County of Qimen, the County of Yi of the City of Huangshan, and the County of Jixi of the City of Xuancheng in Anhui Province, as well as the County of Wuyuan of the City of Shangrao in Jiangxi Province.

During the 791 years from the third year of the Xuanhe reign in the Northern Song Dynasty (1121 AD) to the first year of Republican China (1912 AD), these six counties remained consistently within the jurisdiction of Huizhou, where, from 1364 to 1912, its title was Huizhou *Fu* (an intermediary administrative level above *xian* in imperial China). This

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Y. Ding et al. (eds.), *China: A Historical Geography of the Urban*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6_5

long history of being within the same jurisdiction created a distinct local Huizhou identity in the cultural traditions and popular recognition among these six counties. For this very reason, after 1912, even when the bureaucratic level of *fu* was abolished and Huizhou *Fu* no longer existed, or after 1934, even when the County of Wuyuan was transferred into the jurisdiction of Jiangxi Province (thus no longer part of Anhui Province), locally it was believed that culturally the six counties still constituted an integral entity as the territorial foundation of the Huizhou culture (Tang 2004).¹ In the Ming and Qing dynasties of late imperial China, the people of Huizhou were famous for doing business, where they were called Huishang (Huizhou merchants), specializing in the four areas of salt, pawn, tea, and timber. Among the middle- to down-stream areas along the Yangtze River, there was a widespread saying, “wu hui bu cheng zhen” (no Huizhou merchants, no town). The Huizhou locals paid attention to both business and education, where commercial profits were partially committed to local education and cultural refinement. They made achievements in such areas as the humanities and history, mathematics, calligraphy, painting, and architecture. A Huizhou culture with strong local characteristics thus came into being, radiating outwards with the emigration of the local population, in a constant exchange with other local cultures and keeping abreast with latest trends (Tang 1999, 87–111, 284–295). For this very reason, in contemporary China, in spite of the fact that the six counties within the previous imperial Huizhou *Fu* now fall under the jurisdiction of two provinces, within the literary circle they are still referred to as the Huizhou area.

Since the Tang Dynasty, Huizhou has already been a well-known place of tea production. As early as in 1834, the House of Commons in the British Parliament had a series of discussions on tea duties, during which Twankay (Twankee/Twankey) was mentioned frequently, as a kind of green tea imported from China by the East India Company in London. Twankay was imported individually en masse into Britain, and also mixed in other green tea (e.g. Hyson). It was widely recognized among tea importers that this was the most suitable kind of tea for working-class consumers. Back then, British merchants were clear that different names of tea carried varying meanings. Some names signified the technique of production (e.g. Congou), while others

might suggest the place of origin (e.g. Twankay). Nevertheless, due to geographical distance, the exact location of this place was rather unknown to them (House of Commons 1834, 5, 18, 22, 58).

In 1875, experts from the Asian Branch of the Royal Society conducted an investigation on places of tea production in China, where they pointed out in no uncertain terms that Twankay derived its name from Tunxi, a famous tea marketplace in Huizhou, namely the City of Huangshan in today's China. As if by a mere coincidence, in *Aladdin*, a British pantomime, Widow Twankey, the mother of Aladdin, was a woman living in Peking (today's Beijing). For the Western audience, Twankey was a very *Orient-ish* name, although they at best had a very vague idea of where Twankey was located. For one thing, the stage setting was full of elements from Peckham, London. As pointed out in a theatre review in 1941, the very reason that Twankey was regarded with this *Orient-ish* flavour lay in its reminiscence of Twankay, the Chinese green tea in Victorian Britain (Anonymous 1941, 18).

Twankay, as a transliteration of a place in Huizhou, thus became a symbol pregnant with Oriental imaginations in the West. How did it exactly look like then?

Located in the hilly areas of southern Anhui Province, Huizhou is a relatively enclosed district surrounded by watershed-scale high mountains such as the Tianmu-Baiji Mountains on the east, the Huangshan Mountains on the north, with the Wulong Mountains in the middle. Low mountains and hills are scattered in the encircling ring of watersheds. The southwest extension of the Huangshan Mountains and the Wulong Mountains constitute a watershed inside Huizhou. The County of She, the County of Xiuning, the County of Yi, and the County of Jixi in the east belong to the Xin'an River Basin, and the County of Qimen and the County of Wuyuan in the west are part of the Poyang Lake Basin.

The Xin'an River Basin in the east is famous for green tea, with Tunxi being the manufacturing centre (Fu 1934). The County of Wuyuan and the County of Qimen of the Poyang Lake Basin in the west were famous for both green and black tea, but without a unitary sectoral centre, where the manufacturing of tea spread around all villages and towns in the county (Jinling 1936). Such a sectoral distribution pattern is related to the river system in the two basins.

In the eastern Xin'an River Basin, the two headstreams, such as the Jianjiang River and the Lianjiang River as well as their branches, finally converge into the Xin'an River in Pukou near the She County, showing a cluster-shaped river system. In the western Poyang Lake Basin, the Changjiang River, the Dabeihe River, the Xin'anhe River and the Wenshanhe River in the County of Qimen are mutually independent, and although the Gaoshashui River, the Hengchashui River and the Fuchunshui River finally converge into the Le'anjiang River, they are also mutually independent in the County of Wuyuan. Hence, the river system of the Poyang Lake Basin in Huizhou is generally fragmented (Fig. 5.1).

The multi-centric tea distribution pattern in the County of Wuyuan and the County of Qimen is attributable to the fragmented river system of the Poyang Lake Basin in Huizhou. Correspondingly, the mono-centric pattern of Tunxi in the Xin'an River Basin comes from the cluster-shaped river system of the basin (Zou 2015, 21–30).

However, the river system merely answers why a mono-centric pattern was formed for the tea industry in the Xin'an River Basin of Huizhou. It fails to explain why Tunxi was chosen as the centre. From the perspective of the river system only, the Huicheng Town near the confluence of the Jianjiang River and the Lianjiang River in the Xin'an River Basin was more likely to play the role of the main hub in the upstream of the Xin'an River. The separation of Tunxi from the main hub of the river system exactly proves the inadequacy of geographical factors alone to explain this pattern. Therefore, this paper tends to explain it from the history of development in Tunxi. At the same time, the spatial arrangement internal to the urban area in Tunxi was in no uncertain terms the result of an accumulated development in the history of the city, from which can be seen the overlapping process of Tunxi rising to be the centre of tea production and distribution. Henceforth, the structure manifests a projection of the geographical specialties onto the plane of urban development, revealing certain trends in the growth of urban space internal to a city with industrial agglomeration. Next, this article shall, from both internal and external perspectives, discuss the features of such a conglomeration-oriented city, with the history of Tunxi, the tea city, as a primary example.




Fig. 5.1 Rivers and mountain ranges in Huizhou

The Impact of Global Trade

Tunxi is the location of the municipal government of Huangshan City today, roughly equivalent to the administrative centre of traditional Huizhou. As a matter of fact, it was not until 1932 that Tunxi became the administrative centre of Huizhou. In its early history, Tunxi was not the administrative centre of Huizhou; neither was it for the County of Xiuning, *even* in which stead, it was no more than a small settlement 15 kilometres southeast to the town area of the County of Xiuning (Cheng 1491, Vol. 5, p. 7a), in stark contrast with its present status. This would naturally make us curious about the changes, as well as their causes, which had happened to Tunxi over the past four centuries.

In the mid-to-late Ming Dynasty, the creation of the Songluo tea drove the rapid development of the tea industry in Xiuning (Zou 2010, 69–79). In the Ming and Qing dynasties, merchants were levied taxes on the transportation and sale of tea. Xiuning's Taixia Xunjiansi, which collected tea taxes, was originally located near the Baiji Mountains, but it was relocated to the town area of Xiuning in 1577 (the fifth year during the reign of Emperor Wanli in the Ming Dynasty) and soon moved to Tunxi (He and Fang 1823, Vol. 2, p. 4b). Driven by the tea industry and other local specialty food products, Tunxijie, famous for its “two-kilometre-long street”, had become the largest-scale town under the County of Xiuning in the years during the reign of Emperor Kangxi in the Qing Dynasty (Liao and Wang 1693, Vol. 1, p. 45b). Notably, a record during the reign of Emperor Tongzhi in the Qing Dynasty indicated that any tea, before leaving Huizhou, should have its licence inspected in Tunxi (Wang and Zhou 1873, Vol. 15, p. 6a). In other words, tea produced in the County of She, in downstream of Tunxi, should be transported against the current to Tunxi for tax payment. Only within a larger historical context could this abnormal phenomenon be well understood.

The changes in the global political economy, especially the unfolding of global trade, had made their impact felt on the production and distribution of tea from the depth of the mountains in southern Anhui, which is located in the east of the Eurasian continent. Historically, the Orient and the Occident along the Eurasian continent developed into separate, great civilizations that, in spite of their mutual avarice of and ambition

for wealth accumulation, had at most limited exchange due to geographical constraints. On this continent, two macro areas, one southern while the other northern, can be roughly seen along such natural barriers as of the Alps, the Black Sea, the Caucasian Mountains, the Caspian Sea, the Hindu Kush Mountains, the Pamir Plateau, and the Tibetan Plateau. The southern macro area includes the cradles of a few ancient civilizations (e.g. Greece, Rome, Persia, Egypt, and India). By way of comparison, the northern one, with a climbing altitude, experiences an increasingly cold climate, with grasslands, forests, and quagmires. Traditionally, nomads had been quite active in these areas, with a historical record of both wars and trades. With a chain of intermediary influences along the route, these two macro areas became the major route for channelling east-west trade on the continent. The vulnerability of such trades was subjected to the political and religious contestations between and among varying nations along the road. For this very reason, European states attempted alternative pathways to external wealth and trade. In the fifteenth century, Spain and Portugal, two countries along the western coast on the continent, discovered the new lands in America and a maritime pathway to the east of the continent via the Cape of Good Hope. To pacify the struggles for wealth overseas, Spain and Portugal signed the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, with 370 leagues west of Cape Verde as the boundary. The west of this boundary was under the sphere of Spanish influence, while the east was under Portuguese influence (Newitt 2009, 65–65; Brotton 1997, 71–72). From the sixteenth century onwards, a large number of commodities from the east of the Eurasian continent were shipped to Europe by sea through Portuguese merchants. The opening of this maritime pathway for trade had a direct impact upon trade in southern China, as well as on the tea production and distribution in the mountainous areas in southern Anhui.

In 1535, Guangzhou Shibosi moved to Macao and began to carry on trade with businessmen from Portugal and Southeast Asian countries. The tea of Huizhou probably had been transported to Macao and sold to overseas businessmen by then (Wu et al. 1812, Vol. 3, p. 62a). In 1600, the British East India Company was granted a chartered licence to specialize in commerce with the Far East, upon which its scope of business in the Orient was gradually expanded. The fleets of the British East India

Company first reached Bantam in today's Indonesia, as well as Surat, Ganjam, and Madras in today's India. Furthermore, they purchased Chinese tea indirectly through Portuguese merchant ships (Ukers 1935, 66–72). Afterwards, the merchant ships of the British East India Company gradually approached the mainland of China. In 1676, a merchant house was established in Amoy, to purchase Chinese tea. In 1702, in order to satisfy the domestic demand back in Britain, it purchased a whole ship of tea, of which two-thirds was the Singlo Tea (Ukers 1935, 72–75). Singlo should be the transliteration of Songluo (Uchida 2001, 250), while the latter was a famous green tea from Huizhou. From this, it can be seen that at that time, some green tea from Huizhou had been shipped to Amoy for export.

After 1715, through repeated negotiations with local officials in Guangzhou, the British East India Company was approved to conduct Sino-British trades in Guangzhou. Its merchant ships could be directly moored at the Whampoa Port. With the chartered licence from the British government, it began its domination of Sino-British trade. Before opium was imported into China, tea used to be the absolute bulk commodity in the Sino-British trade. Against this background, the legitimate question that we can ask is: how much percentage would Huizhou tea occupy out of this Guangzhou-based trade by the British East India Company? At the University of Tokyo Library, there is a copy of *The Edinburgh Review* (No. LXXVIII), published in January 1824, which recorded the volume of tea of various kinds in the Guangzhou-based trade by the British East India Company in 1822. Of the total 25,874,546 pounds of tea, 2,419,045 was Bohea, 18,569,472 was Congou, 196,729 was Campoi, 115,738 was Souchong, 4,036,445 was Twankay, 130,420 was Hyson-skin, and 396,697 was Hyson (Anonymous 1824, 458–467; quote from Tanaka 1981, 153). Indubitably, Twankay referred to the Huizhou green tea, while Hyson referred to the green tea with long, slender, and slightly curly leaves. These two were quite well known among the tea market back then. Hyson from Huizhou was of such popularity that among foreign merchants, there even circulated a saying, in which the creation of Hyson was related to Li Yixin, a tea merchant from Xiuning during the reign of the Kangxi Emperor. For this very reason, it was highly likely that Hyson was a Huizhou tea variety (Hollingworth 1875, 12–13). Picha should be the

thin tea leaves sifted out during the making of Hyson. Since it was closely related to Hyson, it should have in equal likelihood been a Huizhou tea variety back then. By a conservative estimate, the Twankay tea actually made up 15.6% of the total volume of tea traded through Guangzhou by the British East India Company. If we count Twankay, Hyson, and Hyson-skin together, then the percentage rose up to 17.64%.

Despite the large distance from Huizhou to Guangzhou, the profit was massive. For this reason, areas as remote as Guangzhou could attract Huizhou businessmen to transport tea southwards. Products were shipped southwards along the Gan River from the Poyang Lake and transported over the Dayu Mountains, using the traditional commercial road from the middle reach of the Yangtze River to Guangzhou (Fig. 5.2). During the reign of the Jiaqing Emperor, Taiwan was already included in the imperial geography, where the “ocean was all settled and quiet”. For this very reason, merchants started transporting tea by sea, a practice that gained popularity and momentum after 1813. Nevertheless, Jiang Youxian, the Viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi, argued that if merchants were allowed to sell tea overseas by sea without restraints, on the one hand the imperial government would lose one way to check and balance foreign powers via trade, while on the other, it would be difficult to prevent merchants from illegally smuggling overseas some of the forbidden goods. For this very reason, he wrote a memorandum to the royal court. The latter, in its turn, accepting this suggestion, issued royal writs to the governors of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Anhui, as well as royal mandates to tea merchants all over China. According to these regulations, from 1818 onwards, all tea trade should have been “conducted in accordance with traditional customs, to be transported by river. Any transportation overseas by sea is thus forever forbidden” (Liang 1839, Vol. 18, p. 3b). When this royal writ was issued, there were merchants sailing out to sea from the Jianghaiguan Port in Shanghai, and then southwards to transport tea. For one thing, the Jianghaiguan Port for long was the port where Shachuan transported tea northwards to Shandong and Fengtian. Merchants took advantage of this loophole, sailing their ships out to the sea from this port. On the sea, instead of going northwards, they would go southwards. It was not before very long that the government took notice of this loophole. From the government’s perspective, it would




Fig. 5.2 The tea road from Huizhou to Guangzhou

rather sacrifice the tea tax levied at the Jianghaiguan Port than allow this loophole to become a leeway for ships to go out to the sea. This port was shut down and all the tea ships were ordained to “travel by inner rivers, so as to augment business tax revenues for the ports along these inner rivers. The tea tax at the Jianghaiguan Port will be forever abandoned, so as to ensure that no tea ship could export from here” (Yinghe 1821; quote from Fang 1988, 18–20).

Attracted by export sales in Guangzhou, tea merchants who were used to shipping tea along the Xin'an River before also began to sell their tea along the road passing through Jiangxi. In the meantime, there was another unblocked road from Huizhou to Guangzhou, namely, sea transportation along the southeast coastline to Guangzhou. However, the government had forbidden the southward seaway of tea trade since 1818 (the twenty-third year during the reign of Emperor Jiaqing of the Qing Dynasty) for fear that tea merchants exchanged prohibited goods in private with foreigners (Liang 1839, Vol. 18, p. 3a-4b).

As a result of the government's strict prohibition, Huizhou tea merchants had only one route to transport tea to Guangzhou, namely, the Poyang Lake—the Gan River—the Dayu Mountains. Qimen and Wuyuan—the two counties in the west of Huizhou belong to the Poyang Lake area, with a watershed from the counties located in the Xin'an River area in the east. From the east of Huizhou, to go southwards, the most convenient way would be to go against the currents of the Xin'an River, to cross over the watershed, and finally to enter the Poyang Lake area. For this reason, to sell tea in Guangzhou, tea merchants in the She County in the downstream of Tunxi had to sail upstream to pass through Tunxi.

Jiang's tea merchants from Fangkeng, the County of She, kept a copy of *Daoguang ershiliunian bingwu jin Guang tengqing zhangce*, which recorded the route they travelled to Guangzhou for selling tea. Starting from Huangdun in the County of She, the cargo was registered and transported to Tunxi, where they hired ship to transport it to Yuting in the County of Yi. The cargo went ashore from Yuting and the transportation changed to a land route, which was to cross over the watershed between the Poyang Lake Basin and the Xin'an River Basin. Roughly 300 to 400 porters were hired to ship the cargo by manpower (on shoulders and backs) to pass through the snaky mountain path as long as 62 *li*. When all the tea chests made their way to Qimen, from there barges and bamboo rafts were used to transport tea to Raozhou via the Changjiang River. They hired three seven-compartment barges and one six-compartment barge to ship the tea to Ganzhou. From there, it finally went unto the Gan River—the Dayu Mountain merchant route (Jiang 1995, 588–589). There was another handwritten copy of *Wanli yuncheng*, which could probably be an itinerary handbook authored by the Jiangs

from Fangkeng, equally recorded a similar tea route. From the She County, it would travel against the current upstream to Tunxi in the Xin'an River, then to Yuting in the County of Yi. It would cross over the watershed to Qimen, going downwards via the Chang River. Then, finally from Raozhou, it would enter the Gan River merchant route, travelling across the Dayu Mountain to go southwards until it finally reached its destination—Guangzhou (Wang 2002, 436–445).

Due to the pulling force in remote Guangzhou, Tunxi became an important in-transit hub of the She County's tea trade, turning into an increasingly prosperous tea market with the addition of the influence of the original local tea industry in the County of Xiuning.

The Agglomeration of Peripheral Supporting Industries

When Shanghai was opened as a treaty port in 1843, the tea produced in the Xin'an River Basin of Huizhou had been gradually exported via Shanghai, which was closer to Anhui than Guangzhou. In this way, tea merchants of the County of She no longer had to sail upstream to pass through Tunxi. By the same token, the tea produced in the Poyang Lake Basin of Huizhou stopped being exported via Guangzhou. Instead, merchants turned to sell tea to foreigners in Shanghai via Jiujiang, after the War of Taiping, the Heavenly Kingdom blocked the southward commercial road. All of these factors would have weakened the central position of Tunxi in the tea industry. Nevertheless, contrary to this hypothesis, Tunxi's social economy continued to boom, which was closely related to the aggregation of the supporting industries of tea in Tunxi.

A large number of consumables were required in the course of tea processing. For example, when tea was packaged, tin cans, wooden boxes, and bamboo crates were in great demand during tea harvest seasons every year. Moreover, due to the shortage of capital in rural areas, it was impossible to raise sufficient funds for the daily operation of tea manufacturers through rural fund-raising alone. Therefore, it was necessary to get loans from port cities (Liu 2005). Hence, financial services were indispensable

during tea harvest seasons every year. In the past two centuries of development, a complete chain of sectoral agglomeration of peripheral sectors to support tea production has emerged in Tunxi.

When green tea for export was manufactured, it needed to be packaged in tin cans first. To meet this demand, lead can workshops emerged in the streets of Tunxi, popularly known as *xizhan*. Multiple surveys in the middle 1930s showed that there were a total of four tin-can warehouses in Tunxi. The tin-can warehouses in Tunxi not only provided tea cans to local merchants, but also to those in Yuliang and Shendu from the County of She.

Tin cans filled with tea leaves needed to be put in a wooden box, and workshops engaged in wooden box manufacturing were called *xiangzhan*. According to an investigation during Republican China, there were a total of 23 box warehouses in Tunxi, which were far more than the tin-can warehouses. Similar to the industry of tin-can warehouses, the products of these box warehouses in Tunxi targeted not just local merchants, but also clients in surrounding areas. There were merchants in Yuliang and Shendu in the County of She engaged in the making of green tea for foreign merchants, albeit with a volume of production far lower than that in Tunxi. Merchants in these two places, by the same token, used tea chests made of materials from the tea chests in Tunxi. These chests were re-coloured on the facade and then nailed together for use. Such tea chests normally were tailor-made by box warehouses for the merchants without oil paint on the outside, for which reason they were referred to as “*baipixiang*”.

Every tea box needed to be wrapped by rattans, with different enlacing ways distinguishing the varieties of tea. Bamboo crates were placed between the rattans and the tea boxes for protection. Naturally, bamboo crates placed between the stephania rattans and tea boxes also play a role in protecting the tea boxes. In view of this, *mielouzuo* also emerged in Tunxi. A survey in 1936 indicated that there were a total of 12 bamboo-crate workshops in Tunxi (Shiyebu 1937, 15).

In Tunxi, the majority of tea manufacturers were joint ventures. However, since locally raised funds could not cover such tremendous expenditure as of collecting raw tea and manufacturing refined tea, the support of financial institutions was required, so as to attract external

capital investments. With a booming tea industry in Tunxi, the financial market thus came into being. From the late Qing Dynasty to Republican China, Tunxi's financial industry was dominated by three qianzhuang. Since the 1930s, modern financial institutions like the Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Local Bank of Anhui appeared successively in Tunxi, replacing these traditional money shops (Zhongguo 1937, 27–28, 102).

And thus, the four supporting industries including the tin-can, box, bamboo-crate industries and the financial services emerged in Tunxi. The tin-can, box, and bamboo-crate industries attracted a large number of migrant workers, clustering around different sectors. For instance, the tin-can industry was dominated by residents from the County of Yi, the box one by workers from Jiangxi, and the bamboo-crate one by locals from nearby counties in Anhui, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi. Among these migrant workers, some worked in Tunxi for half the year during tea seasons and returned hometown for farming for the other half of the year, while others settled down permanently in Tunxi.

In order to access services from the peripheral supporting industries, a plethora of tea manufacturers concentrated in Tunxi. As a result, except for raw tea in the County of Yi near Xiuning, raw tea in the County of She and the County of Jixi in the downstream of Tunxi, as well as the County of Chun'an and the County of Su'an in Zhejiang, were transported against the currents of the Xin'an River to Tunxi tea manufacturers for refining (Jianshe 1935, 27).

The Successive Provision of Daily Life Services

After Tunxi became the centre of tea business, a large number of migrant workers would flow in during the tea harvest seasons. Tea manufacturers employed tea-processing and tea-sieving workers from Anqing, tea masters from the County of Wuyuan and the County of She, as well as female tea-picking ones from nearby villages. We have to remember the huge number of workers in the supporting industries from the County of Yi who operated tin-can warehouses and those from Jiangxi running box warehouses. The division of tea labour in Tunxi was more than a mere

division of the urban labour in the city. More importantly, it involved a division of labour from neighbouring regions that joined the urban labour force during certain seasons of production in the year where the tea industry experienced a temporary shortage of labour supply. With Tunxi the centre, the six counties in Huizhou, as well as those in Anqing, gradually developed into areas of technical specialties. Therefore, as far as the supply of tea-related technical staff was concerned, there was an interesting geographical division of labour. Furthermore, tea purchasers from all over China could be found in Tunxi as well.

The influx of migrant workers, plus their families and relatives, had brought along with them many commercial opportunities. Apart from tea, some local specialties food products of Huizhou, as well as nearly southern Anhui and eastern Jiangxi, equally found their way to Tunxi. For example, tung oil, timber, Chinese tallow, raw lacquer, candied date, mushroom, ink-stone, ink, pear, medical herbs, firecracker, as well as chinaware of Jingdezhen—all these were brought to and distributed in Tunxi (Tunxi 1941, 35–39). Different agricultural and forestry products were sold in the market in different seasons, thus constituting sustained cargo flow. The high turnover rate of local products in Tunxi needed to be backed up by an adequate supply of daily necessities like cooking oil, delicacies from south China, salt, cigarette, cloth and kerosene (Hong 1944, 101). The busy input and output of cargos gave birth to the developed transportation, leading to booming shipping businesses under the Tunxi Bridge.

Because of tea, Tunxi witnessed the emergence of manufacturing service industries like tin-can and box warehouses, the process of which in its turn contributed to the consumption of and trade in local products and daily necessities. All these factors in their synergy led to an ever-expanding urbanization that was helped in no insignificant manner by a swelling population of migrant workers and settlers. By 1934, there were 417 stores, 4346 employees, and 59 daily life services in Tunxi (Tunxishi 1990, 110).

From April 4 to 6, 1929, when the tea market was in its busiest time of the year, brigand Zhu Laowu, who convened more than 100 bandits, robbed and burned the downtown streets of Tunxi (Anonymous 1929). In spite of this calamity, Tunxi recovered and regained its prosperity

within a short span of a mere three years, thanks in no small way to the vibrancy of the tea market (Anonymous 1933). This incident indicated not only the resilience of the tea market in Tunxi, but also its centric importance to the local economy and industrial development.

After the Anti-Japanese War broke out, a large number of officials and businesspersons from Suzhou, Zhejiang, and Shanghai came to Tunxi to seek refuge from the war. Accordingly, a certain number of government offices were relocated here (Tunxishi 1990, 1; Tunxishi 1985, 3). Since tea occupied a position of strategic importance during the wartime, the tea industry in Tunxi continued to boom. During the eight years of the Anti-Japanese War, instead of having its position as an economic centre weakened, Tunxi, in actuality, consolidated its place within Chinese national politics as an administrative centre in southern Anhui.

A significant indicator of urban development is the change of urban space. A small section of zigzag street from the east end of the Tunxi Bridge to the west end of Laojie today, formally called Bajiazhan, is the place of origin of Tunxi. Tunxi Town in the mid-Ming Dynasty was located there. In 1536 (the fifteenth year during the reign of Emperor Jiajing in the Ming Dynasty), the Tunxi Bridge was built, connecting Bajiazhan and the eastern part of Liyang (Tunxishi 1990, 32). Since then, Tunxi started its urban development from the intersection of the Y-shape where the Jianjiang River converged with the Shuaishui River and the Hengjiang River. The main direction of urban expansion of Tunxi followed the direction of river flow, from west to east, of the Jiangjiang River, to the upstream of the Xin'an River. From the east end of the Tunxi Bridge and the north shore of the Jianjiang River, the urban space expanded in two directions: west-to-east and south-to-north. Hejie, Zhengjie, and Houjie successively came into being. By the late Qing Dynasty and early Republican China, Tunxi's main urban part reached Hejie on the river in the south and Houjie in the north, and its east-west main parts included Xizhenjie and Zhengjie. The section from the Liyang Bridge to the Tunxi Bridge was Xizhenjie, and the section from the Tunxi Bridge to Zhendongge was Zhengjie. During Republican China, restricted by the coastline of the Jianjiang River, the Huashan Mountain and the Yangmei Mountain, the south-north span of Tunxi's main urban

part did not change much; while the east-west space continued to expand eastwards along the direction of the Xin'an River till it reached the Yuejin Road of today. Since 1949, especially the 1980s, Tunxi's urban district had continued to extend eastwards on a large scale up to the Liqian Village and the Waiqian Village. It crossed Tunxi's new bridge in the south, connecting the Jiangxinzhou Islet and Yanghu on the south shore of the Jianjiang River, and reached the railway in the north.

It can be seen from Fig. 5.3 that tea manufacturers and the three supporting industries like tin-can, box warehouses, and bamboo-crate workshops in Tunxi were mainly located at the edge of the city. To be more specific, tin-can warehouses were located in the north, box warehouses and bamboo crate workshops in the east, and tea manufacturers in both the north and the east. The number of tin-can warehouses was more or less stable. By way of contrast, in spite of their huge number, box warehouses and bamboo-crate workshops might appear, disappear, and reappear in accordance with varying demands in different seasons. Newcomers would choose the location of business according to the development pattern of the urban functional layout at that time. Notably, the place where box warehouses and bamboo-crate workshops were intensively located was the forefront of urban expansion back then. When we think of the reasons behind this phenomenon, it was not that box warehouses and bamboo-crate workshops chose the newly developed areas of the city. On the contrary, these businesspersons gradually moved towards the suburbs, thus pulling along with them the sprawl of urban expansion. Since tea manufacturers came and went on a yearly basis and they were at best loosely organized, their choice of business locations was very likely to change along with the urban development of the city. The core sector and its supporting industries created the embryo of the urban centre in Tunxi. Understandably, where the land development reached its maturity in the town centre, this would invariably push up the levels of rents and property values, for which a certain part of the industry would move outwards to the suburbs and outskirts, to take advantage of the lower rents and property values there. This process in general would contribute to the further expansion of urbanization.




Fig. 5.3 Location of tea manufacturers and supporting industries in Tunxi

Analysis and Conclusion

The preceding parts present the history of Tunxi since the mid-Ming Dynasty. The development of Tunxi City was driven by the tea-making industry. As this core industry grew, its peripheral supporting industries, by the same token, appeared in its vicinity. The operation of the core industry and manufacturing service industries attracted a large number of migrant workers who finally settled down permanently in local areas. They thus constituted the first generations of the urban population in Tunxi. With the commercial opportunities brought by the demographic influx and the geographical advantages in Tunxi, local specialties from southern Anhui, as well as daily necessities and other bulk commodities, began to concentrate and get distributed in Tunxi. As the population grew, not to mention that this was a population possessing a large amount of disposable income (settlers, workers, merchants, and ongoing tea dealers), this would inevitably lead to an ever-expanding area of providing daily life services to the urbanite.

During the four centuries from the late Ming Dynasty to Republican China, Tunxi's socio-economic development had been driven by the tea industry. In terms of its urban development, its expansion was also guided and pushed forwards by the core industry and its supporting industries. In a nutshell, the core industry helped to conceive the urban embryo, which, when mature, would turn outwards to its suburbs for expansion and further development. The developed urban centre could not be sustained unless through the provision of a large number of consumption and financial services, with intensive land utilization due to the concentration of populations. In order to reduce costs and land rentals, the manufacturing industry would gradually move outwards towards urban fringes. In spite of this seeming "retreat from the urban centre", their role in driving urban socio-economic growth and stimulating the growth of a new urban space was in no way diminished.

As a tea business centre, Tunxi did not possess the optimum geographic conditions for traffic. When transporting raw tea from the County of She and the County of Jixi to Tunxi, it was essential to overcome the difficulty of many shoals and rapids while going upstream. By the same token, labourers had to climb over the towering Wulong Mountain from the

County of Wuyuan to Tunxi. Nevertheless, constrained by the Qing government's "One Treaty Port" policy in Guangdong, as well as the royal forbiddance on maritime trade in the southeast sea areas, Tunxi became a main hub connecting Huizhou and Guangzhou. Furthermore, the agglomeration of tea-related industries and daily life services enabled Tunxi to constantly accumulate and maintain its leading position as an economic centre, not to mention that during the Anti-Japanese War, Tunxi also served as an administrative centre.

Acknowledgement This research was supported by the National Social Science Fund of China (No. 16BZS125).

The authors would like to thank Prof. Hsiu-Ling Kuo, Dr. Yannan Ding, Prof. Maurizio Marinelli, and other participants at the international workshop "Urban Historical Geography of China" for their constructive suggestions on a previous version of this paper. The authors also wish to thank "La Pour Société" (*Weishe*), an interdisciplinary scholarly forum for early-career social scientists at Fudan University, for the constructive remarks and suggestions made by the members thereof when this paper was presented in its draft forms.

Glossary

Pinyin	Paraphrase	Chinese
baipixiang	White crude box	白坯箱
Daoguang ershiliunian bingwu jin Guang tengqing zhange	Transcribed Ledger Book of Entering Guangzhou in the Twenty-Sixth Year of the Reign of the Daoguang Emperor (1846 AD)	道光二十六年 丙午进广 清账册
Guangzhou Shibosi mielouzuo	Canton Maritime Trade Supervisorate Bamboo-crate workshops	广州市船司 蔑篓作
Picha	Hyson-skin	皮茶
qianzhuang	Money shop	钱庄
shachuan	Large junks	沙船
Taixia Xunjiansi	Taixia police office	太厦巡檢司
Songluo	Sunglo tea	松萝茶
Wanli yuncheng	Ten thousand <i>li</i> Journey to Guangzhou	万里云程
wu hui bu cheng zhen	No Huizhou merchants, no town	无徽不成镇
xiangzhan	Box warehouse	箱栈
Xichun	Hyson	熙春茶
xizhan	Tin-can warehouse	锡栈

Notes

1. The County of Wuyuan was transferred from under the jurisdiction of the Anhui Province to that of the Jiangxi Province—a process during which local residents from Wuyuan had a number of movements to “Return to Anhui” (huiwan), supported sympathetically by the other five counties from the original jurisdiction of Huizhou *Fu*. This was an interesting demonstration of the emotional attachment, as well as the psychological identification, of local residents to the traditional area of Huizhou.

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6

What's in a Name: The “New Village” in Shanghai, 1930–1980

Duan Zheng and Xiaohong Zhang

Introduction

Workers' New Village (*gongren xincun*), as a collective form of living, has been considered as a typical socialist community of the Chinese urban space after 1949. Although most scholars traced this form of living space back to the “New Village Movement” led by Zhou Zuoren in China as early as the 1920s, little attention was paid to the development of New Villages in Shanghai from the 1920s until 1950. Most scholars choose to skip this part of history, and some even consider that the New Villages in China were of the same strain as the Soviet workers' village. For example, Luo Gang stressed that the construction of a Workers' New Village signified a radical break with old Chinese society; in other words, the purpose

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of constructing a Workers' New Village was to separate the new Shanghai, in which the working class is the leading class, from the bourgeoisie, hence decadent, old Shanghai (Luo 2007a).

Does the idea of space design for the New Village of the pre-1949 period share some kind of connection with the socialist transformation of urban space in China? When examining the actual process of the formation of urban space in modern Shanghai, one would find that before 1949, the New Villages were already distributed across the entire area of Shanghai, in the city center as well as in the suburban areas. The New Village certainly is not something invented or imported by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However the continuity between the New Village before 1949 and the one after 1949 was largely overlooked by scholars.

In this chapter, we probe the link between several types of “New Villages” that appeared in twentieth-century Shanghai. Drawing on the critiques of urban space production by Henri Lefebvre, we argue that despite the identical or similar use of the term, namely “New Village”, the intrinsic meaning of the term is defined by the given social, economic, and political settings. Undoubtedly, it will not only help us to better grasp the meaning of the construction of the New Villages in China in this historical process, but it will also enable us to understand the current features of Shanghai urban spatial construction and its cultural origins.

New Villages in Shanghai: A Brief History

The Arrival of the New Village in Shanghai

On the eve of the “May Fourth Movement” (*wusi yundong*), a historical event that was to change modern China's direction, a utopian kind of community was introduced into China from Japan. Mushanokouji Saneatsu, a renowned author, artist, and philosopher of aristocratic background, had founded the *Atarashiki-mura* in Kyushu. With that, he aimed to put into practice the principles of living and working together. Mushanokouji was influenced by nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European and Russian anarchists, notably Piotr Kropotkin (Klopfenstein 2011). His experiment was among the several similar utopian communities set up

around the world at the time. He launched the "New Village Movement" with the goal to enable people to lead a "human life", with small groups of people working together in a community and producing things according to their individual and common needs.

Chinese writer Zhou Zuoren was the first to introduce Mushanokouji's "New Village" in China and was enthusiastically involved in this movement. He authored many articles about the New Village in his literary and social critique circles. Among those who learned about this new movement were several future figures in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, including Mao Zedong. It is argued that Mao's later rural reforms, particularly the People's Commune, was influenced by the New Village ideal (Sun 1989). Nonetheless, the first Chinese "New Village" was established in Longhua, the southwestern suburb of Shanghai, in 1919. It was planned and constructed according to Japanese concept with the purpose of establishing a model community and of promoting the social transformation of the old Chinese society.

Soon, the concept of the New Village spread across major Chinese cities and caught the attention of intellectuals.¹ Followers of the "New Village Movement" were greatly encouraged. Some extolled the New Village system, arguing that it offers the possibility to properly develop the habit of civilian participation in political life and may contribute to bringing China's politics to normal track, enabling the forming of local autonomy (Wang 1929:91–93). Cao Lecheng wrote, in 1922, the New Village's "organization is good, its aim is the synergies of action to secure a safe living condition, in other words, its ideal can be summarized as 'Do what you can, take what you need'. On the one hand it's a commitment to the obligation to human as a whole, on the other hand, it's a commitment to one's personal obligations" (Cao 1922:9–10).

Commercialization of the New Villages in Shanghai in 1920–1950

Initially, the development of the New Villages was quite slow. Apart from Longhua, other New Villages were mostly built in the city center. Entering the 1930s, along with the continuous expansion of Shanghai City and

the soaring land prices, living in New Villages became desirable due to the novelty in design and the relatively low cost. With a surge in the number, the New Villages distributed throughout Shanghai. However, these newly built New Villages were very different from those in the original “New Village Movement”. Rather than being built by utopian social activists, they were mostly built by real estate companies and the municipal government. Some financially robust enterprises also took initiatives to build New Villages for their own employees.

The commercialization of the New Village has its roots in the history of the city. After the opening of Shanghai, real estate in Shanghai quickly became one of the pillar industries in Shanghai (Zhang et al. 2015). Meanwhile, social differentiation in Shanghai also increased prominently. The post-World War I prosperity of the national industry gave birth to the rise of the middle class in Shanghai. They were interested in identifying themselves with a stable and popular spatial image. Catering to these customers, the real estate industry extracted the symbols implicated by the New Village, such as hygiene and modernity, and rebranded their properties as New Villages. The demand was so high that contemporaries had already observed the degradation in construction quality and criticized this kind of over-consumption of the concept of the New Village.²

Three types of New Villages co-existed at that time. The first type was the Western-styled houses in the suburb. The second kind was the common *Linong* dwellings within the central city. The third type was the most authentic one, located in the countryside, but run by the real estate business. They all named themselves “New Village”. The majority of the houses belonged to what Qian Dongsheng described as New Village-style buildings:

The now popular “New Village” style building is a collective type of residential building. Normally they are composed of up to ten houses, each house can accommodate from six or seven to thirteen, fourteen households. Outside the house, they would set aside a considerable area of space as usual, in which the “village” residents could walk or let their children play games...These houses are mostly of Western-style, however, the kitchen, stairs, windows and doors sometimes still retained some Chinese style. (Qian 1948:3)

Meanwhile, the Shanghai Municipal Government also played an active role in the construction of the "New Village", mainly to ease the dire housing shortage in Shanghai. In 1934, the "Citizen welfare committee for Civilian New Villages construction" was set up. These "Civilian New Villages" (*pingmin cun*) were more of a welfare housing rather than company-built commercial New Villages. These government-built Civilian New Villages thrived in Shanghai as early as in 1936.

Soon after, the second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) broke out. A large number of war refugees flocked to Shanghai, especially to the concession area, triggering a new round of real estate development boom. The real estate industry in fact benefited from the war, and Shanghai saw a significant growth of New Villages that was even larger than in the pre-war era.

The Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) triggered yet another large influx of refugees. The resettlement of refugees and civilians, such as in the Tonghai New Village in Zhabei, was mostly funded by provincial associations (*tongxiang hui*). The Nantong New Village, for instance, was funded by the Northern Jiangsu Provincial Association. By 1949, the quantity and coverage of the New Villages had grown more significantly than it was in 1936.

"New Village" in the People's Republic

Upon taking over in May 1949, the new Shanghai People's Government under the CCP was faced with the increasingly acute issue of housing shortage. In October 1950, speaking at the second people's Congress of Shanghai, Mayor Chen Yi pointed out: "The current economic situation has started to get better; the social benefits of workers must be taken care of." In the same year, the Shanghai Municipal Committee of Workers' Housing Construction was subsequently established.

Constructed during 1951–1953, the Caoyang New Village was the first Workers' New Village in Shanghai. The architectural style is a typical suburban garden-type residential area (Ding 2007). Buildings in the Caoyang New Village have almost identical configuration and style, forming a large residential area of neat appearance. The construction

mode of the Caoyang New Village became the standard form of urban housing production under the auspices of the communist government. In 1952, CCP's official newspaper, *People's Daily*, wrote in a report:

In order to execute the order from Chairman Mao to solve the housing problem of workers within the big cities in the next few years, the East China Military and Political Commission and the Shanghai Municipal Government are implementing a large-scale building project—to construct a large number of residences for workers in Shanghai. In the first stage, twenty-one thousand homes will be constructed, on the basis of an average of five people per household; this could accommodate more than one hundred thousand people. Of which one thousand and two houses have been completed and the other is about to stage construction [...] The now completed one thousand and two houses, located at Caoyang Road near the western suburbs of Shanghai, were named “Caoyang New Village.”

During the period from 1950 to 1960, Shanghai constructed a large number of workers village in the suburban areas. But it was not enough to meet the extreme imbalance between the housing supply and demand. Although these New Villages were dubbed the Worker's New Village, only those who were awarded the title of “model worker” or “advance worker” had the privilege to be assigned one of the apartments (Luo 2007b).

The decade-long Cultural Revolution brought the construction of worker's villages to a halt, and their number barely increased during that time. After the reform and opening up in 1978, with the rapid development of the Shanghai urban economy, the demand for improving the living conditions of the people once again came into view. The construction of the workers' village began to enter into another period of rapid development, especially due to the fact that there was large-scale industrial construction in the northern suburb. Big industrial enterprises, such as the Baoshan Iron and Steel Plant, facilitated the building of yet more workers' villages. Therefore, their number once again saw explosive growth (see Fig. 6.1).

However, this was apparently the swan-song for the construction of New Villages in Shanghai. In the 1990s, along with the marketization of real estate production, this mode of government-led communal residence,




Fig. 6.1 Distribution of the New Villages, 1936

the Workers' New Village gradually faded away from the Shanghai urban space production process. What is worse, some of the Workers' New Villages had suffered from severe poverty following the reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the 1990s.

Alienation of the New Village Under the Capitalist Mode of Space Production

In his polemic *Reflections on the Politics of Space*, Henri Lefebvre criticized the academics in urban planning circles of a hidden postulate that “planned space was objective and ‘pure’; it was a scientific object, and hence had a neutral character” (Lefebvre 1976:30). By delineating the development of the New Villages in Shanghai, we could see that what happened in Shanghai is a strong rebuttal of that technocratic point of view. Indeed, we can clearly see from the process of the spatial production of the new villages that the mode of production of urban space and its development in the first half of the twentieth century are closely linked with the political and social conditions at a given time. The history of the “New Village” echoed what Lefebvre had forcibly argued: “[Space is] shaped and molded from historical and natural elements [through] a political process. Space is political and ideological. It is a product literally filled with ideologies” (ibid.:31).

The original utopian ideal of the New Village is more closely associated with salvation and national revival. Aspiring young people tend to relate the construction of the new village with self-organization. Among them, Minzhi Student Association was one of the most active organizations to promote these ideas in Shanghai.³ At about the same time of the establishment of Longhua New Village, they also set up a New Village of their own in Huai’an, in an attempt to establish a new type of social organization with the support of a local gentry named Mr. Bao Dasan.

Although this utopian ideal somewhat permeated through the history of the development of the New Village, still when the symbol of the new village was consumed by the real estate industry and made into a marketing strategy, the new village was no longer considered by the social transformers as a viable path toward social change. Thus the symbolic significance of the new village degenerated into merely one of the ways in which the city residents would pursue to improve their living conditions: “the recent declaration of the Chinese New Village Construction Society was issued to promote the construction of the new villages on the city’s outskirts, to encourage co-investment of the real estate, and to set eight advantages as a standard. This means considerable benefit for the citizens

oppressed by indecent owners and troubled by the noise of the city" (Shi 1935:83). The utopianism which was supposedly inherent within the idea of the New Village was gradually stripped away, while the idea became the marketing strategy of the real estate.

Without its original utopian ideal, the internal symbolic space of the New Village was both substituted and survived by its coincidental connection with the idea of the Garden City of Ebenezer Howard, whose work was just introduced to China at that time. Howard's concept of the Garden City, in particular the idea of introducing idyllic landscape into the production and planning of urban space, was proved to have a profound impact on the urban design and planning in Republican China (Dong 1934:30–44).

As can be seen from the expectation given to the construction of the New Village in the mid-1930s in Shanghai, as Shi Xin pointed out in *New Village Construction and the Construction of New Village*:

The current way of social cooperation to promote the construction of suburban new village, clearly this work has its inherent significance, for example to promote the communication between the urban and the rural life, and to enhance gradual urbanization of the rural area, but from the perspective of the whole society, this type of New Villages is merely a form of rural villages. Their construction cannot be considered as a strict form of New Village yet. (Shi 1935:83)

Obviously, the characteristics implied within the symbol of the New Village space, such as fair, clean, sanitary, and other elements, echoed with the idea of Garden City, and thanks to such characteristics, the New Villages were subsequently symbolically adopted by the rising middle class in Shanghai to identify themselves.

Therefore, there are myriads of forms in which residential quarters appeared under the name of the New Village. For example, there are Western-style houses and new *linong* housing. Lee Qingya described in his short novel, *Rose New Village—New Village in Shanghai in the Year Twenty-two*, about Zhenru New Village with Western architecture style:

Although this New Village is made up of only a dozen one-floor western-style houses, short and small, scattered in the wasteland, still they can be referred to as a "village" with a "new" meaning. (Li 1933:30)

These residential areas named themselves “New Village” to highlight their clean air and avant-garde design with public space included. As has been mentioned before, this had huge appeal to the middle class in Shanghai at that time. Therefore, the real estate industry would not simply let these spaces with such rich symbolic significance sit idle. Capital then penetrated into these symbolic spaces and consumed them. This is noticeable from this piece of advertisement depicted in the novel at that time:

The problem of housing, it is really difficult to solve for Shanghai. It is too costly, in addition to the bad environment. Now there are certain people who are enthusiastic about the welfare of the community and improvement of the society. They have bought about a hundred acres of land in west Shanghai, with fresh air and convenient transportation. They are preparing to construct what is called Rose New Village, in an attempt to pose it as a model solution to the housing problem in Shanghai [...] And heard that apart from residences, there are public halls, schools, shops, self-flow well, buses and other public facilities. Thus this organization is more than just to solve the housing problem (Ibid.:30)

Then, the novel went on to describe in detail what happened when the protagonist, with his wife, tried to bargain with the dealer. This showed us a vivid picture of the New Village adopted by a business driven by profit (ibid.:19). At this stage, the utopian social transformation ideal within the New Village became dormant.

On the other hand, the Civilian New Villages the Shanghai government had been constructing were aimed at citizens in the low-income social stratum, “The scope of this movement is confined to the outskirts of the city. And the social composition of this movement is people among the working class” (Shi 1935:83). Although the quality of living in these Civilian New Villages was definitely lower than the kind of Garden New Village the middle classes lived in, there were traces of the initial design which the New Village Movement once embodied. “The village streets are broad, and there are playgrounds, books, newspapers, cooperatives and public bathing houses, etc. The needs of the residents are perfectly taken care of,” wrote a contemporary observer (Anonymous 1936:21).

Then, in the magazine *New World*, there was an article describing in detail about a newly constructed Civilian Village—and highly praised its inner design:

[The Qimei New Village] has really good scenery with one side facing neat bamboo fences and the other side near a small creek (...) Outside the room, most households have planted all kinds of flowers. Some of them grow vegetables in their little garden, which is as beautiful as economic. The dormitory can be divided into three groups. On the side of the two groups, there are cement constructed laundry rooms, which can also be used for washing rice and vegetables. In addition there is one public toilet. In the center of the new village there is a primary school, a kindergarten, as well as the office of the new village. Outside the school lies a big playground. There is also a large canteen, a consumer co-operative [shop], and libraries, etc. All of which are well maintained. The public bathhouse is equipped with hot and cold water indoor, bathtubs and showerheads, etc. Men and women have separate areas. The public bathhouse opens every Tuesday and Friday. For just two cents, this is really a great deal! (Xu 1937:27–28)

The Civilian New Villages had a variety of public facilities; after that, consumer cooperatives became the standard configuration of the New Villages. Meanwhile, the environment inside the New Village was clean and hygienic. This kind of housing project, in the form of a New Village, affirmed what Kuo Chi-Jeng called a “clean, sanitary, comfortable” modern spatial image (Kuo 2004). Thus New Villages become the main choice of housing form for the urban middle classes.

Apart from the civilian New Village, the business and companies built collective housing projects to develop an ideal way of life for the modern Chinese urban middle class. Kaiming New Village is one such housing project. The allocation system in Kaiming New Village was highly praised and recognized by the social elites:

Among the cultural organizations in Shanghai, ‘Kaiming’ may not be the biggest, but as far as I know they are the only one to create such a place for community life. It is a reasonable approach, which also shows that a somewhat not too powerful cultural organization could build such facilities

requiring so much power. Just with a practical mindset, and do it step by step, Kaiming has set a great example for us, with our principle of ‘communitification of business’, and ‘family-oriented community’. (Bu 1948:41–42)

The Ideologification of the New Village in the Socialist Period

Shanghai was a special and important city for the CCP. Firstly, she is considered a revolutionary city. The establishment of the CCP and its activities in its early days were deeply linked with the city. Shanghai was the battlefield where the various trends of thought in modern China fought fiercely. Secondly, Shanghai is among the first few highly westernized cities in China. The image of Shanghai in the 1930s stood for modern and advanced in the eyes of the whole country. It is an “outside world” where both good and evil incarnate. From the socialist point of view, Shanghai is a city where capitalism prevails; thus, she needed to be transformed and reconstructed. Therefore, the guideline for Shanghai was to transform her from a consumer city to a production city. On the one hand, the pivotal change in the position of Shanghai was the result of a “natural process”. On the other hand, it is also due to the fact that the newly established People’s Government of Shanghai tried to establish Shanghai as a model and an example of socialist transformation.

In the 1950s, after the founding of the PRC, the Chinese government in Shanghai initiated a full-fledged socialist transformation. The transformation of urban space is one of the core contents. Apart from changing some of the old Shanghai street names, as documented by Wenchuan Huang’s chapter in this volume, the construction workers’ villages also fall within this scope. Mao Zedong famously delivered a speech in the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CCP, saying, “Only if we recover and develop the production in the city, turning a consumer city into a production city, then we could consolidate the people’s power” (Mao 1991:1428). This speech secured the guideline to turn Chinese cities from semi-feudal agricultural-handicraft cities to “productive cities”. In order to make a better living for the working class,

the supposed master of China, and to protect people's production and construction of a new China, the Chinese government began a large-scale movement to construct the workers' New Village across the country (Fig. 6.2).




Fig. 6.2 Distribution of the New Villages, 1986

The new government faced the pressing problem of a housing shortage, especially around the suburban and industrial areas. Most of the war refugees and economic migrants, as well as many workers, dwelled in shanty towns under precarious conditions. The so-called *Gundi Long* (dragon rolling on the ground) in the slums could barely be considered as a room. To this end, Shanghai urban construction departments started planning a project. In addition to the transformation of the shanty towns and slums, residential New Villages were gradually built in the open areas in the city outskirts with the aim of solving the housing problems effectively. This is the origin of the workers' villages in Shanghai.

As noted above, Shanghai established its first workers' village—Caoyang New Village—in 1951. It set itself apart from the old Shanghai *Linong* housing or the European-style neighborhood by its unique architectural style of suburban garden-style residential areas. The first decade of the People's Republic was seen as the “Three Major Reconstruction” (*sanda gaizao*) of the early days and the “Total Construction” (*quanmian jianshe*) period. During this time, Shanghai built 18 workers' New Villages. In fact, at the convention of the second secondary people's Congress of Shanghai in April 1951, Vice Mayor Pan Hannian pointed out in the “1950 Shanghai Municipal Government Annual Summary” that “to serve the working class, from the perspective of municipal construction, currently the most urgent task is to solve the housing problem for the working class in Shanghai” (Luo 2007b).

A report in the *People's Daily* in 1956 highlighted the continuity of the construction of the workers' village, proving that the transformation of Shanghai City was conducted in an orderly and gradual fashion.

(April) 25th, there are three more suburbs Workers' Villages starting their construction in Shanghai. This is the second batch of construction of Workers' New Villages since March this year [...] They will be completed in August and September this year. Then three thousand workers and their families could move into their new homes. The rest of the houses that could accommodate six thousand workers, are also expected to be complete in the next few months. From 1951 to now, Shanghai has thirteen New Workers' Residential areas. The total number of workers and their families living there counts more than 200,000 people. (*People's Daily* 1956/4/27)

Although named as the Workers' New Villages, they, like Caoyang New Village, were only assigned to model workers or advanced workers.⁴ Lefebvre famously said, "Like the societies that preceded it, socialist society must produce its space, but in full consciousness of its concepts and potential problems" (Lefebvre 2009:191). A socialist transformation of space is actually a kind of ideology transformation. Housing is not only a carrier for the material, but also embodies a certain kind of social thought. The universalized principles and demands for social transformation manifest themselves in the form of these specific aspects of housing demands. However, in the overlapping construction of both the concrete life and media, the image of the workers' villages of the socialist period changed along with the transformation of Shanghai City.

When describing the spatial structure of workers' village, we should emphasize the "utilization" of space by the working class. As the distinction made by Lefebvre between capitalism and socialism space states, "The production of socialist space means the end of the private property and the state's political domination of space, which implies the passage from domination to appropriation and the primacy of use over exchange" (Lefebvre 2009:192). In addition, this guide, with almost an advertising style to utilize space, reflects that the problems for the New Village are concrete usage and transformation. The industrial workers' needs, as the dominant class of socialist China, have to be taken care of, both literally and symbolically. So, the housing problem for workers was, from the very beginning, a huge political issue. Therefore, there is always this "constant" belonging to the political sphere, present in the construction, configuration, and representation of the New Villages. In a general way, we can say that we can find at least traces of the political problems of China from the space of the New Village.

From 1950 to 1990, Shanghai workers' New Villages had very distinct ideological attributes: the politics of space itself, which in a sense is the political inertia of the *lebenswelt* (both the private and public spheres). For example, the layout of Caoyang New Village imitates a five-pointed star (a symbol of the PRC), and the central location of the propaganda/news bulletin board and the managing and configuration between the private and public spaces were indeed very much politically orientated. However, these ideological attributes had different features in accordance with the major changes in China's political situation.

Obviously, the problematic for the early days PRC was still industrialization. Or more specifically, the problems facing China at that time were pre-modern problems. For the majority of the country, the problem was socialist construction. However, for Shanghai, the issue was complicated. Already, she had one foot into modernization, but that foot had to be treated as if it had not entered modernization yet. Then, there was the actual problem of modernization for the other aspects. The housing problem arose from the increase in industrial workers, which had to be addressed. Then, capitalist elements from the “old Shanghai” still occupied the heart of the city. Implementing the ideological transformation meant that you had to solve the critical problem inherent in the actual space and memories. That is, to set up its own discourse and the reality of modernity while denying the old Shanghai its status of modernity. Therefore, “Workers’ New Village” is an attempt to solve these two problems at once. As an actual space, they tried to erase all memories related to the New Villages before the PRC, combined with the re-naming of old places in Shanghai. These measures were to establish a brand new Shanghai from the cognitive space. And through the construction of the “New” workers’ community, they established a new principle for a new China, that is, “production–life”; and both as a symbol and model, the Workers’ New Village was to showcase that the working class were indeed the master and owner of the new China. Thus, the Workers’ New Village became the new city symbol for the new city of production that is Shanghai. Also, by allowing the model workers and advanced workers to live there, the Shanghai government was trying to set up models—while getting rid of the old (*pojiu*), but also establishing the new (*lixin*).

Then, from 1966 to reforming and opening up in 1978, China saw a complete, intense nationwide political movement, that is, the Cultural Revolution. Naturally, with the spreading and deepening of the political movement, the structure of “production–life” in the city was broken and restructured as “political–life”, so the function of the New Village also shifted to being ideology centered. The Workers’ New Village during this period basically functioned as a window to demonstrate the new socialist Shanghai and China. It is a very powerful tool for showcasing the superiority of socialism in terms of symbolic significance. The old Shanghai was famously called a “paradise for adventurers”, with its landmarks of

concessions, horse courses, and foreign architectures; Shanghai was where capitalism blossomed in the old China. And now that the new China has finished the transformation of Shanghai, the Workers' New Villages became a highly ideological space:

Although the Worker's New Village was presented to foreign guests as a landmark of socialist transformation, there was this big awkwardness to hide it. Because the Workers' New Village was initiated by those who lost their power and was then called "capitalist roaders" (*zouzipai*) before the Cultural Revolution, resulting in the production of the Workers' New Village not being fully recognized in the mainstream discourse.

After the reformation and opening up, Shanghai gradually turned back to a consumer city. With the opening up of the real estate market and the rise of the tertiary industry, the Workers' New Village gradually lost its association with the workers. Now, people from all ranks of life live in these Workers' New Villages. The impact of capitalism can be clearly seen, as the internal elements of the workers' village have completely changed in their functions. Their original purpose was basically lost thanks to the fact that now the "Workers" New Village has no workers and is not new anymore. The supposed master and owner of PRC, the socialist workers, lost their homogeneity and their identity during these years. Also contributing to this result is the fact that they lost the living space that could help maintain their identity and integrity. In the structure of "Consumption–Stimulation–Consumption", which differentiated workers into various identities, some became white collared and some became the discriminated migrant peasant workers. Ironically, during the Shanghai urban renewal project, the Workers' New Villages were the object for reconstruction along with the shanty towns and slums.

Conclusion

The construction of the New Village in Shanghai before 1950 demonstrates what Lefebvre wrote, "Space has been shaped and molded from historical and natural elements, but this has been a political process. Space is political and ideological. It is a product literally filled with

ideologies” (Lefebvre 1976:31). During this period, the production of space in the New Villages was the product of politics and economic background in the first half of the twentieth century. From the original space for the utopian ideals of social transformation, step by step, the New Village transformed into a living space of modernity, forged by the government and real estate industry. In this process, its internal concept of social transformation was not completely lost but was suppressed and absorbed for different purposes. Different social institutions explicitly or implicitly advanced their own agenda through the consumption of this concept. Meanwhile, the introduction of the idea of Garden City reinforced the original appeal for equality, freedom, and justice.

If we look into the New Village before and after 1950, we will find that “equality, justice, clean, sanitary”, the original spatial images, were the same elements with which the newly established Chinese communist government constructed the socialist living space of the Workers’ New Village. And they have been successfully transformed into political symbols, signifying the message that the working class is the master and owner of the new China. However, in the government’s discourse, they intentionally or unintentionally omitted the relationship between the Workers’ New Village and the New Village Movement before 1949.

Moreover, the “Workers’ New Village” revealed an epistemological break in the Chinese socialist ideology. The problematic of Chinese socialism has been constantly changing. Shanghai transformed from a consumption city to a production city, then back to a consumption city. But from the perspective of discourse, entering into a new era meant that we have to overcome the problems of the previous era. So, the space of a new socialist Shanghai was to solve the problem of the old Shanghai. A production Shanghai needs to solve the problem of a consumption Shanghai. Then, after reform and opening up, Shanghai tried to solve all the problems it had before all at once. So, there is the shift between three grand problems: The industrial “Production—Life” structure shifted during the Cultural Revolution to an “ideology-centered” structure. Then, after capitalism re-entered China, it turned to a “Consumption—Stimulation—Consumption” structure. The conversion between these problems can be seen through a specific historical object—the Workers’ New Villages. Also, with the interaction between the internal elements and the external structure of the

Workers' New Village, the concept of the Workers' New Village is also an ever-changing one.

Significantly, how we recognize and deal with the question of the Workers' New Village in Shanghai is closely related to how to understand Shanghai's past, present, and future. Past history is always about the legitimacy of present time. This unique urban space that is the New Village is the product of ideology, but it has also conceptually dissolved with the loss of the social basis which bred that ideology. The New Village was first seen as a sign of modernity from a pre-modern world, later became the ideological tool to interpret and legitimize the status quo, and finally, was disposed as a residue of the now dismissed ideology.

Acknowledgment All the illustrations in this chapter were made and permitted by Sun Tao from the Institute of Historical Geography, Fudan, Shanghai.

Glossary

Pinyin	Paraphrase	Chinese
Sandagaizao	Three major reconstruction	三大改造
Quanmianjianshe	Total construction	全面建设
Pojiu	Getting rid of the old	破旧
Lixin	Establishing the new	立新
Zouzipai	Capitalist roaders	走资派

Notes

1. Some of the discussions and debates reached national level, such as a piece by Zhou Zuoren et al., titled "Discussion of New Village", which appeared in the supplementary of *Minguo Ribao* (Daily of the Republic of China), No. 5, 2–4, in 1920.
2. See, for instance, a discussion titled "Construction of New Village" that appeared in *Jianzhu Yuekan* (Construction Monthly), 1935, No. 3, 42–43.
3. For more about the Minzhi Student Association, see reports in the Chinese language newspaper *Shenpao*, notably, "Speech on Autonomy of Minzhi

Student Association” on October 13, 1919, and “Meeting Note of Minzhi Student Association” on September 29, 1919.

4. For details of the allocation of Workers’ New Village housing, see, for instance, *Chronicle of Real Estate in Shanghai*, Shanghai: Shanghai Social Science Press, 1999, p. 229 [in Chinese].

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7

A Comparison of Politics of Street Names in Taipei and Shanghai

Wenchuan Huang

Introduction

The naming of streets after historical figures and events is an important part of modern culture policy; it not only provides spatial and semiotic orientation to the city but also serves to naturalize and legitimize a selective vision of the past. Street names thus can become a contest about who has the power to determine, how the landscape is represented, and whose history will be told. Street names also help to form the desired political consciousness among the population. Undoubtedly, political regimes have often sought to symbolize and represent the landscapes in order to affirm their legitimacy, control their territory, and promote their ideological norms (Bassin 2000; Gill 2005). Since the mid-1980s, toponymical studies have undergone a critical reformulation as scholars have altered traditional approaches to etymology and taxonomy to explore the politics of place-naming practices (Cohen and Kliot 1981; Azaryahu 1986, 1988; Carter 1987; Stump 1988; Rose-Redwood et al. 2010). The critical turn

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Y. Ding et al. (eds.), *China: A Historical Geography of the Urban*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6_7

approaches of toponymy emphasize the spatial politics of naming and the social production of place. A growing number of scholars have laid emphasis on regarding place naming as a contested spatial practice rather than viewing place names as transparent signifiers (Berg and Vuolteenaho 2009). The majority of studies on the politics of place naming have emphasized the questions of nationalism and political ideology. Owing to street names being convenient and popular political codes, it is not surprising that major political transforms are reflected in the renaming of streets. Traditionally, street names were dialect and assigned both geographical orientation and urban function or referred to a certain peculiarity associated with local topography and history. The modern practice of bestowing nonlocal names first was introduced in Paris with the construction of the Place de l'Odeon in 1779 (Jal 1867). Later on political, administrative, and urban agendas converged in the formal suppression of street names in general, and the naming practice in particular, to official control. Commemorative street-naming involves the formation of a shared past and should be treated as a powerful governmental strategy for exerting political ideology due to its nature as an authorized version of history in everyday life. Therefore, de-commemorative street-naming has become a critical policy in the waking up of regime change (Azaryahu 1996). In general, commemorative streets in most cases are named after people, events, battles, and organizations; these are usually regarded as the focal point of commemoration and this has gradually become the normal practice of the urban administration in Europe since the French Revolution (Azaryahu 1997). Less attention has been paid to streets named after geographical places because they were considered to be apolitical usually. Nevertheless, we may notice some indications from a few researched cases. For example, in Leipzig (the second city of former East German)—for that matter, German reunification was mainly articulated in geographical terms—most of the streets were named after former West German cities, such as Heidelberg, Ulm, Karlsruhe, Mannheim, and Heilbronn (Azaryahu 1997). In another case, that of Bucharest in Romania, after the National Salvation Front (FSN) proclaimed the restoration of democracy and civil liberties in 1989, the streets named after geography demonstrated the territory during the Great Romania (România Mare) era (1918–1938). At that time, Romania achieved its

greatest territorial extent to be the golden age of Romanian history (Light 2004: 164–165). The third case related to the new concessions of Israel, the Israel nation-state chose geographical places for the administered territories of Golan, Gaza, and the West Bank in order to reinforce national Zionist ideologies (Cohen and Kliot 1992).

The abovementioned three cases illustrate that street-naming after geography may have been operated to commemorate either the contemporary national/imperial territory or vanished lands belonging to the celebrated past. The purpose of street-naming after geography could be more than a reminder of national territory, and this chapter intends to take Taipei and Shanghai as examples to investigate the issue.

According to the history of China, after the Chinese Civil War, the Republic of China (ROC) led by the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated to Taipei in 1949, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing. Since then, the relations between mainland China and Taiwan are in conflict with each other. However, unfolding the map of Taipei and Shanghai, we will find the street names have a high degree of correlation in these two cities. Both are filled with names of places in mainland China. The streets named after geographical places of China original appeared in the British settlements of Shanghai in 1848 (Shanghai's Place Names Editor Committee 1998), and after 1863, while the British and American settlements were combined in the international settlement, the Municipal Committee made a street-naming rule that streets running north to south were given the names of Chinese provinces while east-west streets were given the names of Chinese cities. From then on, even Shanghai has undergone different political regimes and had street names altered, but the principle of naming streets after Chinese cities and provinces became the main rule, finally. On the other side, after the 228 incident in 1947, the KMT government decided to rename all the streets of Taipei with the place names of mainland China in order to reconstruct national identity. Subsequently, the place names of mainland China were inscribed on the streets of Taipei City. Although the geographical places of mainland China dominated the street names both in Taipei and Shanghai cities, we still critically analyze the different political ideologies and space representations of the naming strategy between these two cities located on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Shanghai and Taipei signified two different models of Chinese city formation, and yet shared experiences much in common. The most developed urban centers of China in the nineteenth century were coastal cities or cities on major waterways. For the reason of Western imperialism in China at the turn of the nineteenth century, dozens of treaty ports marked the Chinese coast and inland areas. Shanghai, as one of the five treaty ports, opened in 1843, and Taipei opened as the first treaty port in 1860 and then was colonized by Japan from 1895 to 1945 (Rozman 1990). The terms of the treaties that established the unequal treaty system and the treaty ports created a semi-colonial atmosphere in China in general and in the treaty port cities, especially Shanghai, where the development of foreign concessions compounded foreign influence. Although Taipei did not have foreign concessions as Shanghai did, it became a true colonial city with Taiwan's cession to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 (Cumings 1984; Chiautong 1972). Thus, both Shanghai and Taipei experienced the Western imperialist model of colonial transplantation of institutions and practices.

This chapter will make use of the concepts of critical theories to argue street names as the illustration of state power on its spatial politics by examining the streets named after geographical places in China between Taipei and Shanghai. This argument will be based on the political divergence on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to compare and analyze the different responses between the CCP and KMT governments.

Traditional Street Names Between Taipei and Shanghai During the Qing Era

Going back to history, Shanghai developed during the late Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) as one of China's principal trading ports. Since Shanghai had become the main port of trade, a circular wall was built to protect the town from predators. The walled city, named the Old Town of Shanghai, also formerly known as the Chinese city, is the traditional urban core of Shanghai. With the advent of foreign concessions in Shanghai, the Old Town became just one part of Shanghai's urban core but continued for

decades to be the seat of Chinese authority in Shanghai (Leffman and Lewis 2011).

The street names of Shanghai, bearing typical local features and rich cultural connotations, have witnessed economic and social transformation as well as the development of Shanghai. Consistent with the first records in 1505 (Shi 1989), there were only five lanes that appeared in the Old Town, as it was the government center of Shanghai county and the town area (during the Ming Dynasty). By the middle of the Ming Dynasty, the streets have formed a chessboard system. There are ten lines named after family names (such as Kang, Sha, Mei, Shong, and so on) and 15 Funs. The Fun, not running in a linear order is often an irregularly shaped street block, meaning that especially in central areas of the city. Most Funs are named to carry forward Confucian ethics or any auspicious words. With the fast business development in the town area, the number of streets had not reached 80 until the late Qing Dynasty (in 1874). With reference to the category of street-naming in the Old Town area, it showed most streets attached family names, local landmarks, and economic activities as the Chinese traditional naming system in traditional China town at that time.

In the other situation, Taiwan was under the Chinese empire officially, while the Zheng-family regime surrendered to the Qing Dynasty in 1683. This was despite the expense of the military and diplomatic campaign that brought Taiwan into the imperial realm. But there was opposition among many within the Qing government toward the annexation of Taiwan, arguing that its maintenance would become an economic burden on the empire and lead to abandoning the island. Only Shi Lang pointed out the dangers to coastal security if Taiwan fell into the hands of hostile powers and persuaded the Kangxi Emperor to make Taiwan part of China's recognized territory (Shepherd 1995). However, Qing authorities did not want to develop Taiwan over-aggressively, until the end of the Sino-French War in 1885. Afterward, Taiwan was officially established as a province in 1887. After Taiwan became a province of China, the capital of the island was intended to be moved from the south to the center of the island, but was temporarily moved north to Taipei (Davidson 1903). Taipei remained the provincial capital and became Taiwan's political,

Table 7.1 The categories of street names in Qing Taipei

Naming rules	Official buildings	Temple	Economic activities	Natural landscape	Relative location	Auspicious words	Total
Sum	18	20	32	26	12	20	29

Source: The Formosan Daily News: Sep. 24 1905: page 5. Taipei: The Formosan

cultural, and economic nucleus. It showed that the Qing Empire had not paid more attention to Taipei until the late nineteenth century.

Based on the space and history of Taipei City in the late Qing Dynasty, we noticed that many street names had a distinctly local character with landmarks, economic activity, or landscape, and only a few streets implicated Chinese auspicious words (Table 7.1). Hence, most street names happened through the process in which people perceived, comprehended, and shaped their places.

Apparently, the streets of Taipei were named mainly to reflect local conspicuous buildings and economic activities but not political symbols. At the same time, we can see the main street names recorded the temples; the trade companies and economic activities showed the culture nexus of power in Taiwanese local society. Considering these street names, it is helpful to understand the cultural politics of the Qing Empire in frontier Taiwan (Huang 2011).

According to the legacy of street names during the Qing era, no matter in Taipei or Shanghai, the street names occurred naturally and were characterized by domestic features to present the local landscape but not the consciousness of political power because the Qing Empire had no positive government strategy and no subjectivity pronouncing.

Colonial Operation and Politics of Street Names Between Shanghai and Taipei

Due to the First Opium War and the subsequent 1842 Treaty of Nanking, Shanghai became one of the five ports opened to foreign trade. Under the terms of the treaty, in 1843, the British quickly established a settlement along the banks of Huangpu River for the furtherance of their commercial

interests (Shanghai City Archives 2001). From then on, up to the reclamation of the settlements in 1943, the British, the American, and the French invaders established their respective orbits or settlement areas one after another. American and French involvement followed closely on the heels of the British, with distinct areas of settlement for the French in the south and the Americans in the north drawn out of the British settlement.

In contrast to Shanghai as an international settlement, Taiwan became a Japanese realistic colony, after the Qing Empire lost the First Sino-Japanese War and ceded Taiwan Province to Japan in 1895. Taipei, being the government center of Taiwan Island, has become the capital of Japanese Taiwan. We will base on the colonial governing strategy to compare the differences in street names in Shanghai and Taipei.

Rewriting the Street Names in the Settlements of Shanghai City

After its opening to foreigners, the streets of Shanghai area increased in number quickly. As per records, the number of streets was only 80 in Shanghai area till 1874, but then, there were already 406 streets in 1943 (Chen 2001). As can be seen, the streets expanded in the settlement area quickly. The category of street names in the settlement area was very dissimilar to the Chinese Old Town and in different settlements too. Details of the streets in any settlement were as follows:

Street Names in the British Settlements

In 1846, the first built road was named to Boundary Road in the British settlement, and then there were 25 road networks finished before 1865. Consistent with the category of street names (Table 7.2), most streets were named after local landmarks or foreign buildings and some of them were named after local place names, foreign place names, or foreigners.

Table 7.2 The categories of street names in the British settlement

Category	Street names	Total
Local landmark	The Bund/Bridge Street/Temple Street/North Gate Street//Louzar Road/Stone Road/Rope Walk Road Bund on Soochow Creek/ Bubbling Well	9
Local place names	Soochow Road/WuSong Road NanXun Road/Zhapu Road	4
Foreigner buildings	Consulate Road/Church Street/Boundary Road Custom Road/Mission Road/Park Lane/Fives Court Lane	7
Foreign place names	Broadway Road/Sikh Road	2
Foreigner names	Kirk's Avenue/Rnaomen Road/Seward Road	3
Total		25

Data: Shanghai's Place Names Editor Committee, 1998, *The Gazetteer of Shanghai*, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press

As we can see, most of the streetscapes matched landmarks. Nevertheless, even a few of them were named after foreigners or foreign place names, they still were the unique toponymic inscriptions that recorded foreign culture, landscapes, and colonial areas in Qing Shanghai at that time.

Street Names in the International Settlements After 1863

In 1854, the British, the American, and the French created the Shanghai Municipal Council to serve all their commercial interests, but in 1862, the French Concession dropped out of the arrangement (Maybon 1929). In 1863, the British and American settlements formally united to create the Shanghai International Settlement. The Shanghai Municipal Council declared a street-naming principle in international settlements (Haan 1984). Accordingly, the streets running north to south were named after Chinese provinces while east-west streets were named after Chinese cities. A small number of street names were altered, such as Church Street, which was renamed as Kiangse Road, Temple Street as Shantung Road, Custom House Road as Hankow Road, and Consulate Road as Peking Road, and so on. As we see, Park Lane, the main central road was renamed

to Nanking in order to commemorate the Treaty of Nanjing, which brought the British huge profit. This renaming of streets also stained the first illustration on which the names of provinces and cities were attached on the streets of China. But, in fact, most of these geographical places related to commercial ports opening for foreigners. By the way, except for the original area of the settlement, the majority of the streets were named after some prominent people who had made contributions to their countries, for example, Medhurst Road, Wetmore Road, and Dent Road commemorated the British consuls, and Hart Road was named after Robert Hart, who was the second Inspector General of Customs.

With the increase of Chinese immigrants, due to it being inconvenient for the Chinese to pronounce the streets named after foreigners and foreign places, most of the streets were renamed to Chinese place names, especially in the east of international settlements (Shanghai's Place Names Editor Committee 1998). From then on, imposing the names of Chinese provinces and cities to the streets became the norm in the international settlements after 1915 (Table 7.3). However, many streets still imposed

Table 7.3 The types of street names in British and American settlements

Settlement area	Time	Local place names	Names of cities and provinces	Foreigner names	Foreign place names	Others	Total
British settlement	1865		27				27
British settlement	1899		35	32		10	77
The east of the international settlement	1899		13	26	6	10	55
	1915		34	11	0	10	55
The west of international settlements	1899		21	35	5	10	71
Total in 1899			69	93	11	30	203
Total in 1915			90	72	5	30	203

Data: Shanghai's Place Names Editor Committee, 1998, *The Gazetteer of Shanghai*, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press

foreign figures or buildings on the urban landscape. In addition, street-naming after Chinese place names could also serve the purpose of commemorating the achievement of the Colonial empire in China.

Street Names in the French Concession

The French Concession was formed in 1849 and came to an end in 1943 when the Vichy French government signed it over to the pro-Japanese puppet government (Wang Jingwei regime) in Nanjing (Nanjing Nationalist Government). Its borders expanded twice in 1900 and 1914, while during the 1920s, the French Concession was developed into the premier residential area of Shanghai and covered the north-eastern part of today's Xuhui District and the western part of Huangpu District (Tang and Shen 1989). For much of the twentieth century, the area covered by the former French Concession remained the most expensive residential and retail district of Shanghai and was also the center of Catholicism in Shanghai.

Initially, most streets in the French Concession were named after local landmarks, such as Routes Lao Bei Men (old north gate), and only a few of them were named after French dignitaries. While the French Concession was enlarged to the west section in 1900, the French consuls set a street-naming rule at the new section; streets running north to south were named after Chinese mountains while east-west streets were named after Chinese rivers. However, all the streets attached with Chinese place names were erased and renamed after French dignitaries later than 1906. From then on, most streets affixed French dignitaries or figures in the French Concession. For example, Boulevard de Montigny was named after the first French Consul, the founder of the French Concession in Shanghai, and Route Pere Robert, was named after priests who worked in the large Catholic cathedral in Xuhui at the southwest edge of the French Concession. Others were named after famous generals in World War I (WWI), including Avenue Foch, Joffre, Corneille, and Moliere (Xue 1990; Zheng 1988).

As we see, the French gave French names to virtually all the roads in their Concession, and most streets were named to commemorate some

prominent people who made contributions to France. In order to distinguish with international settlements, the French used a different street-naming principle to construct a French streetscape in this Concession.

Japanese Places Inscribed on the Streetscape of Taipei City in Colonial Taiwan

After Qing China lost the First Sino-Japanese War and ceded Taiwan Province to Japan, Taiwan became a Japanese colony in 1895. In the Japanese colonial era, the government policies of Taiwan fell under three stages. It began with an oppressive period of crackdown and paternalistic rule, then a *Dōka* period (1919–1937) of aims to view Taiwan as an extension of the Home Islands to educate the Taiwanese to understand their role as Japanese subjects, and finally, a period of *kōminka* (1937–1945). With the rise of militarism in Japan in the mid to late 1930s, Japan had to utilize resources and material from Taiwan with the cooperation of the Taiwanese. It was necessary for the Taiwanese to be fully assimilated as members of Japanese society. The *Kōminka* policy aimed to turn Taiwanese into loyal subjects of the Japanese emperor (Tai 2013).

According to the street names of colonial Taiwan, Japanese governors did not rename the streets until the mid-occupation period. After reconstructing the cities of Taiwan, the Japanese regime conducted the “Renaming the *Chō*” project in 1916 to modify the street-naming strategy under the *Dōka* policy (Tainan State, Law no. 93, 1916). When city administration began in 1920, the government planned to rename the streets of cities in Taiwan. Based on this principle, Japanese governors renamed Taipei’s administrative divisions with the Japan prefecture style: *Chō*. The *Chō*, not running in a general linear order, is often an irregularly shaped block, especially in central areas of the city. For addressing purposes, municipalities may be divided into *Chōs* (neighborhoods) and then into *Chōmes* (districts). Hence, the Taipei City government divided the city region into 64 *Chōs* after the Japanese municipality system. More

than half the Chōs were concentrated in the traditional city core area; it intended that most people still lived in these areas.

In fact, there was no formal naming norm of the Chōs in colonial Taiwan. According to The Formosan reports, the Japanese regime originally intended to transform Taipei's street names into totally Japanese place names (The Formosan 1916, October 23). Finally, on March 24, 1922, Taipei City announced its 64 new Chō's names, and about 70% of Chōs were named after Japanese place names in Taipei City at that time (Table 7.4).

Consistent with the project of renaming the Chōs in Taiwan, we perceived the governing strategy of Japanese colonial regime. Apparently, based on the Dōka policy (assimilate), the naming strategy of Japanese Taipei presented that the Japanese colonial government initiated Japanese Chō's names to achieve a degree of administratively regulated spatial order, in which it was thought possible for a Taiwanese to "become" Japanese, even leaving a bit of native Taiwanese and Chinese culture in place. In addition, local authorities deferred to the colonial government by naming streets after colonial Governor-General and Tennō for commemoration in order to match the intersection of the hegemonic ideological structures with the spatial practices of everyday life. An indication of the complexities involved in colonial naming practices is the case of colonial Singapore, where an official, British-Colonial nomenclature, and a vernacular Asian-local nomenclature co-existed (Yeoh 1992).

Table 7.4 The naming system of Chōs in Taipei City, 1922

Naming system	Local place names	Japanese place names	Sum
In the core area of the city	12	22	34
Outside the core area of the city	7	23	30
Sum	19	45	64
Percentage (%)	30	70	100

Source: Taiwan zong du fu guan fang lin shi guo shi diao cha bu, 1922, The first circle yearbook of Taiwan basic data (Di yi hui taiwan guo shi yao lan biao), Taiwan zong du fu guan fang lin shi guo shi diao cha bu. Taiwan Sōtokufu (Taiwan zong du fu), The news of Taiwan Sōtokufu (Taiwan zong du fu fu bao), 1922.04.01)

To summarize, the Japanese colonial government intended to advocate Chō's system in the cities of Taiwan to achieve a degree of administratively regulated spatial order as Japan home land, undoubtedly. On the other side, due to the First Opium War and the subsequent 1842 Treaty of Nanking, the British, American, and French invaders established their respective orbits or settlement areas one after another in Shanghai City. In the settlement areas, they constructed an isolated space as a colony in China. Most of the street names imposed foreigner figures or buildings only but some streets were named after Chinese place names in the international settlements. Nevertheless, even street-naming after Chinese place names could also serve the purpose of commemorating the achievement of the colonial empire in China. Obviously, the street names in both Taipei and Shanghai cities provided a tangible record of colonial imagination and the ideological purposes of the dominant culture.

De-colonialism and Renaming the Streets in Shanghai and Taipei

Since the Japanese occupied Shanghai, the Wang Jingwei government set about eradicating the influence of the Westerners to rewrite the streetscape in 1943. Then, after the victory of the Pacific War, the KMT government renamed the street names to eradicate the colonial symbol again. The same situation also happened in Taiwan after the KMT established itself on the island. We will now compare the different operations of the de-colonization of commemorative street names in Taipei and Shanghai.

Erasing the Colonial Street Names of Shanghai

After the August 13 incident of 1937, the Japanese invaded Shanghai, and soon the Chinese District was occupied by the Japanese navy, followed by the foundation of the Wang Jingwei government. In November 1940, Wang's government signed the "Sino-Japanese Treaty" to cooperate with the Empire of Japan. On January 9, 1943, the Japanese Military

Department signed the “Treaty of returning foreign concessions and abolishing extraterritoriality” with Wang, promising to return the Japanese-occupied concessions and to support the Chinese in negotiating the return of foreign concessions with other foreign powers. As a result, on August 1, 1943, the Wang Jingwei government formally took back the foreign concessions controlled by the Japanese, British, American, and French in Shanghai (Haan 1982).

Immediately, the Wang Jingwei Government set about eradicating the influence of the Westerners and decided to announce a street-renaming project. In October 1943, there were 166 roads connected with foreign celebrities, for example, Avenue Eduard VII and Avenue Joffre were both replaced by Great Shanghai Road and Taishan Road. Another 74 roads named after Western institutions and foreign place names were also altered, for example, Mansion Road and Columbia Road were replaced by Jinling Road and Panyu Road. Furthermore, road names related to people or events in the concession, for example, Rue Du Consulat and Yu Qiaqing were also renamed as Ming Kao Road and Tibet Road. The majority of the streets were renamed after the provinces, cities, counties, towns, mountains, and rivers of China. In addition, streets named after Chinese cities were retained as usual. Most of them were located in the international settlements and the French Concession (Shanghai’s Place Names Editor Committee 1998).

With a policy of de-colonization, there were plenty of streets affixed with the geographical places of China in the Shanghai area during the regime of Wang. Owing to the large-scale adjustment, streets named after Chinese cities and provinces were in the majority, which promoted regular street-naming in Shanghai.

De-Japanification and Renaming the Streets of Taipei

Following World War II (WWII), Taiwan was placed under the control of the ROC to provide stability until a permanent arrangement could be made. He Yingqin, the ROC representative at the Japanese surrender

ceremonies, established the Office of the Chief Executive of Taiwan Province separated from the provincial-level executive system in mainland China. After the establishment of the provincial executive office, Chen Yi was appointed Chief Executive. Chen Yi arrived on October 24, 1945, and then proclaimed the day as Retrocession Day to make Taiwan part of the ROC (Roy 2003). Subsequently, a temporary Office of the Taiwan Province Administrative Governor was established in Taipei City. Promptly, at the same time, the Office of the Chief Executive of Taiwan Province introduced the Principle of Street-Renaming (Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office 1945) to eradicate the colonial past, also named as “De-Japanization”.

Depending on the Principle, the large-scale street names attached to Japanese places, people, or the glory of the Japanese had to alter. The target of toponymic cleansing in the wake of a regime change is crucial for understanding the symbolic transformation of the streetscapes. Alternatively, the new norm of street-renaming had to carry forward Confucian ethics, propagandize the Three People’s Principles of Sun Yat-sen, commemorate national leaders, or present the local geography or folk. Based on the above principles, at first, most of the street names of Taipei were changed back to their original names; the data showed that there were 81 streets (85%) renamed as local geography and folk (Table 7.5), such as North Gate Street, South Gate Street, and so on.

Doubtlessly, most of the streets were renamed after the concept of Chinese nationalism to remove the Japanesque names. In addition, streets named after the Confucian moral code and Three People’s Principles become the majority. The KMT’s national imagination was cultivated during the period when it had control of mainland China. However, while Chinese nationalism was enforced on China, Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule. This version of Chinese nationalism was transported to Taiwan by the KMT and imposed on Taiwan in the way of street-naming after WWII.

In general, we can conclude three naming strategies of de-colonization. One is to erase all “colonial” street names in order to destroy the colonial past. An example is post-colonial Singapore, where naming streets served to erase the colonial past and assert national independence (Yeoh 1996). The second is to leave colonial commemorations in their place. In Abidjan

Table 7.5 The patterns of street-naming in Taipei City after WWII

Time	Pattern							Total
	Chinese place names	Confucian ethics	Three People's Principles concept	Commemoration of national leaders	Local geography or folks	Auspicious words	Others	
1946	0	2	5	5	81	3	0	96
Percentage (%)	0	2	5	5	85	3	0	100
1947	78	7	6	9	11	8	0	119
Percentage (%)	66	6	5	8	9	6	0	100

Huang, S.C., eds. 1985. The history of roads in Taipei (Tai bei shih lu jie shih). Taipei: Taipei City Government

(the capital of Ivory Coast), streets were still named after French colonial heroes even after the Ivory Coast achieved independence for 20 years, which was interpreted by some as a sign of “cultural alienation” (Bänziger 1982). A third strategy is a selective de-commemoration of the colonial past (Azaryahu 1996).

As soon as the foreign concessions of Shanghai City controlled by the Japanese, British, American, and French in Shanghai were taken back on August 1, 1943, the Wang Puppet government, based on the de-colonization strategy, erased the names of 240 roads connected with foreign celebrities, Western institutions, and foreign place names and renamed them after the provinces, cities, counties, towns, and other mountains and rivers of China, as appropriate. After WWII, the KMT also took the de-colonization strategy to rename all the Japanesque street names of cities in Taiwan in a very short time.

Accordingly, both Shanghai and Taipei cities shared the same de-colonization policy as Singapore to remove the colonial past, but for the similar concerns of image construction of the nation. Both Wang and the KMT governments regarded the street names as an enlightenment tool to intensify political identity and emphasize Chinese nationalism and ideology.

The Commemoration of the Street-Naming and Nation-Building of KMT

When street names are used for commemorative purposes, they involve the formation of a shared past and should be treated as a powerful governmental strategy for exerting the political ideology and makeup of national identity to the structures of power and authority. Especially, commemorative street names with nation-building became paramount in the twentieth century in numerous cases of successful ethnic revivals and post-colonial state formations (Azaryahu 1996).

In 1912, the ROC was founded and more than 60 roads were named after the geographical places by the ethnic group (Han, Man, Meng, Hui, and Zang), such as Hanchu Road, Manzhou Road, Mengu Road, Xinjiang Road, and Xi Zang Road, in order to honor the establishment

of New China. These political views were embodied in new street names and indicated that the Republic was a unity of five nationalities (Shanghai's Place Names Editor Committee 1998). In 1927, Shanghai was set up as a special municipal city by the Republic of Chinese Nanjing National government in the Zhabei District. Then, in 1928, the Shanghai municipal government officially formed the "Great Shanghai Urban Planning" (MacPherson, Kerrie L. 1990) to initiate a new urban plan. According to the "Greater Shanghai Plan", the street system was constructed by the core of the City Hall, just as a figure of the Chinese character "Zhong", and centered with the due west, east, north, and south main roads in four directions. Following this order, San Ming Road, Wu Cheng (Five Powers) Road, Shijie (World) Road, and Datong Road were attached on the four main roads. This idea imitated the overall national government's "San Ming, Five Powers and World Harmony" of politics.

The four main roads intersected at City Hall and divided the new urban region into four sections. The naming of roads in these four sections was all capitalized with Chung, Hua, Ming, and Kuo in their naming policy. In the meantime, the words "Shang, Hai, Shih, and Cheng" were used as the first word for general roads within the four regions, and "Hu" was used for distributed roads around City Hall. The second character of each road was symbolized as praising the prosperity of the Chinese. In the Grand Shanghai Urban Planning of 1931, there were more than 60 roads which were led by the names "Chung, Hua, Ming, Kuo, Shang, Hai, Shih, Cheng, Fu" around the Wujiao Chang in Jiangwan District. Furthermore, the new urban roads which connected with nearby areas were named to commemorate the leaders of the Xinhai Revolution (1911), which then established the ROC, such as Yat-sen Road, Chihmey Road, and Huangxing Road. The Nanjing government chose a different street-naming strategy by utilizing the geographical names of the ethnic territories or the concepts of the City government of the ROC to announce their legal sovereignty only in Zhabei District.

After the victory of the Pacific War, the Wang Jingwei Regime had ended finally. In 1945, the KMT government issued a proclamation about renaming of street names. The norms of street-renaming had to be in accordance with the following:

To show the revitalization of the KMT after the war, names such as Fu Xing (revival) and Jian Kuo (building a state) were used to rename the streets. The primary purpose of this was to highlight the commemoration of victory in war. In addition, to commemorate KMT figures, names such as Zhongzheng and Linsen were also adopted (Li 2002). The KMT's national imagination was cultivated during the period when it had control of mainland China. However, while Chinese nationalism was enforced in China, Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule. This version of Chinese nationalism was transported to Taiwan by the KMT and imposed on Taiwan in the way of street-naming after WWII.

De-Kuomintang of Street Names in Shanghai and the Place Names of Mainland China Represented on the Taipei Streetscape After WWII

After KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the CCP was in full control of mainland China. On May 28, 1950, the Shanghai People's government announced new street-naming rules, as follows:

1. Street names should reflect the socialist revolution, the achievements of socialism construction, and the local history, culture, and geographical features.

2. Streets names were prohibited to commemorate Chinese famous persons, especially the leader of state. In this specification, we also found that there was no road named after Mao ZeDong, but Chung San Road and Huangxing Road were still in use. According to this rule, 15 streets named after KMT figures were eradicated. For instance, Zhongzheng Road, Linsen Road, Ying Shi Road, and Qi-mei Road were erased.

3. Street names closely related to the old regime or strong feudal ideals were to be adjusted or eradicated. In 1964, more than 40 roads with public and family temples, shrines, ancestral halls, graves, Buddha, Taoist holy men, and other feudal superstitions in their names were all modified. The names San Min Road, Five Powers Road, and Datong Road, which were related with the Three People's Principles, were renamed to

Sanmen, Wushin, and Shuangyang Road. In accordance with these principles, 220 streets in total were renamed in two years (Shanghai's Place Names Editor Committee 1998).

Under this situation, the new government embarked on widespread construction and renaming of the streets as one means of both commemorating a variety of events and personalities in history and proclaiming the agenda and ideology of the Communist state. For example, Zhongzheng roads were replaced by the Yan-an, Rui-jin, and Shi-men roads and Linsen Road was altered to Huai-hai to commemorate the shrines of the CCP. In addition, the Shanghai People's Government Management Institution adopted the principle of naming streets after Chinese cities and provinces and thus formed a set of scientific naming principles, that is, the orientation of streets corresponding to the location of Chinese provinces and cities. For example, Yangpu District is located in the north-east of Shanghai City. The streets in this area are given the city names of Jilin or Liaoning Province or Heilongjiang Province, such as Songhua Jiang Road, Anshan Lu, Benxi Lu, and so on.

On the other hand, the KMT government's program of "De-Japanification" created cultural estrangement, along with tensions between the growing population of migrants from the mainland and the domestic residents of the island, culminating in the 228 incident in 1947. The conflicting relationship between the so-called Chinese consciousness and the Taiwanese consciousness is strictly a post-colonial issue. After this accident, the Office of the Chief Executive of Taiwan Province decided to rename all Taipei's streets with the place names of mainland China to promote Chinese consciousness. Only one year after de-colonization renaming, the KMT government took Zhongshan Road as the central meridian and Zhongxiao Road as the central latitude and divided Taipei City into four districts. From then on, the place names of mainland China were inscribed on the streets of Taipei City, depending on their location in China. In addition, some streets attached geographical places in order to commemorate the triumphant battles of KMT. These roads were located around the presidential palace, such as Chongqing S. Road, Hengyang Road, Changde Street, Changsha Street, Taoyuan Street, and Yuanling Street. As a result, 66% of the streets were renamed after the geographical places of China in Taipei City after 1947 (Table 7.5). The

street names of Taiwan have not only uprooted Japan and implanted China but also removed domestic spirit.

The KMT completely demonstrated its “Great China” ideology with the street map in Taipei and in every single city as well. Even if this renaming system matched the concept of spatial orientation, it totally erased local identity and the identification of the residents with their locality. In order to intensify Taiwanese political identity, renaming the streets would be a good strategy to emphasize Chinese nationalism and ideology. While most local street names in the main cities of Taiwan were erased and renamed with the names of cities and provinces of mainland China, this will eliminate Taiwanese local identity and promote the Great China Nation consciousness instead.

By way of renaming the streets, the KMT erased the past of Taiwan and turned the island into a frozen imaginary of the pre-Communist Republican mainland, both politically and culturally. Taiwan was narrated as part of China and as embodying a particular form of the Chinese. Chinese culture ultimately became an object of discourse not only in a political sense, but also through the construction of knowledge. In addition, the commemorative street names can be regarded as a powerful mechanism for the legitimatization of the sociopolitical order.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the different political regimes sometimes used toponymic inscription to promote their own ideas by examining all the street names in the cities of Taipei and Shanghai, especially focusing on the concept of colonization and de-colonization.

According to the evolution of street-naming in Shanghai and Taipei, the following two points can be concluded: firstly, politics exerts a strong influence on street-naming. And as regimes transfer, the new regime always attempts to erase the influence of the former regime to show its supreme power and authority. Secondly, according to the categories of street names in both Shanghai and Taipei, we noticed that streets named after geographical places have been applied on the British settlement of Shanghai from 1845, and passing through different political

transformations, this type of naming has become the majority of street names in Shanghai; even represented in the Taipei City of Taiwan, too. Although streets named after geographical places might seem apolitical, the results serve as an omnipresent reminder of state symbolic ideology.

Street names of “non-locality” or commemorative places gain great identity and political capacities through ideological/symbolic intervention. With reference to the KMT, the leader’s names are usually attached on the main streets. On the contrary, the CCP usually assigned places of events as memorials on street names.

In short, research of street names as a system of political symbols depends on understanding the historical geography of different political ideologies and political powers. The politics of street names in China and Taiwan provides an avenue for exploring the nature of state power in East Asia.

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Part III

Contemporary City Building



8

Disneyfication or Self-Referentiality: Recent Conservation Efforts and Modern Planning History in Datong

Shulan Fu and Jean Hillier

Introduction

Over 2400 years old, Datong is a historical city well known for its surviving ancient city form, which was established in the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), and its surrounding Buddhist heritage sites dating from the Northern Wei Dynasty (368–534). The city boasts of a unique heritage which has been recognised by its listing as a National Historic City in 1982¹, the Best Tourism City in China in 2000² and a National Excellent Tourism City in 2003.³ Seeking to capitalise on the city's heritage and its tourist potential, in 2008, Mayor Geng Yanbo proposed the demolition and (re)construction of much of the old city and the improvement of its historic monuments. A series of conservation projects, including the

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(re)construction of city walls and renovation of heritage sites, were carried out starting in 2008 in accordance with the new city master plan (2006–2020), costing some RMB 50bn (EUR 6.67bn). The vision of the then-Mayor, Geng Yanbo, was for Datong to reinvent itself as a competitive tourist destination. Many projects that were implemented not only ignored the historical layers of development that actually form the historical city and maintain its variety, but also destroyed the heritage of modern urbanisation. The tourism-based redevelopment strategy has bulldozed the old city and replaced it with a new faux-historic, ‘ancient’, predominantly Ming-style city in the construction of an idealised heritage rather than a literal re-creation of historic Datong.

Regarding ‘Disneyfication’ as the creation of an area based on an abstracted history made to look and feel authentic, this paper aims to problematise the issue of authenticity in Datong’s planned past. Further, we question whether the (re)construction of Datong exemplifies Disneyfication and the commodification of heritage or, alternatively, the production of what will become a new ‘authentic’ self-referential heritage of the early twenty-first-century period.

There are many definitions of heritage. The UNESCO definition of cultural heritage as monuments, groups of buildings and sites of ‘outstanding universal value’ (1972, Article 2) has been loudly criticised by many scholars, including Kirschenblatt-Gimblett, who stated ‘heritage is the transvaluation of the obsolete, the mistaken, the outmoded, the dead and the defunct’ (1998, 369).

Lowenthal (1997) makes the important distinction between history and heritage. Nietzsche (2010 [1874]) further argues that we must not be slaves to historicism, but neither should we abuse historical knowledge. He suggests that ‘those who find no inspiration in daily life look to history—monumentalise it’ (Thoughtjam 2007, online). Actors ‘claim to monumentalise history for the good of collective. By building monuments, for instance, we are proclaiming: we will be great by making greatness exist once again! Greatness perseveres!’ (ibid.). However, as Nietzsche explains, we inevitably distort the past by monumentalising it. It is impossible to repeat history. Monumental history is thus a ‘theatrical costume’ (Nietzsche 2010, 7), often disguised as heritage. Heritage repackages the past for some purpose in the present, such as enhancing

national or local identity, economic tourism and so on. Heritage, for Schouten (1995, 21) is 'history processed through mythology, ideology, nationalism, local pride, romantic ideas or just plain marketing, into a commodity'.

The heritage 'industry' is often invoked by local municipalities seeking to make the transition from primary or secondary sector-based economies (such as coal mining and railway engineering in Datong) to the tertiary service sector. In line with Hewison's (1987) and Wright's (1985) UK-based understandings of an 'industry' which sanitises and commercialises versions of the past as heritage, city governments, such as in Datong, utilise the idea of heritage in order to reinvent the past as a 'golden age' in seeking to revive both the city and its economy. In doing so, officials seek to substantially demolish and (re)construct the old city in what may be regarded as 'fake authenticity', engaging 'an imagined past for current use' (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996, 6). Shopping malls, such as the Small East City [Dongxiaocheng] (Lu 2014), theme parks and urban 'revitalisation' programmes (re)produce particular representations of places in this way (Waitt 2000). Heritage may thus be appropriated and refashioned by interested actors, resonating perhaps with Kirschenblatt-Gimblett's (1998, 369) assertion that 'heritage is a new mode of cultural production in the present that has recourse to the past'.

In order to explore the question of whether Datong exemplifies the processes of Disneyfication or self-referentiality, in the next section, we examine the operative logic (Massumi 2015) of the city's transformation over time, including the part-concepts of progress, improvement or modernisation, harmony and self-referentiality. We then introduce our main analytical concepts of hyperreality and authenticity, highlighting, in particular, the recent debate in China concerning the importance of heritage authenticity. Following explication of our theoretical framework, we outline the modern planning history of Datong. We then critically explore two case examples of recent cultural heritage planning in Datong: the (re) construction of the city walls dating from the Northern Wei period and the 'improvement' of the Buddhist Huayansi temple complex. In conclusion, we ask whether the new, twenty-first-century (re)construction exemplifies Disneyfication or whether it may actually come to be regarded as an authentic representation of the current era.

Theoretical Frame and Methodology

We engage a theoretical frame and methodology inspired by Massumi's (2015) exploration of 'historical moments'. Our historical moments are four important master plans as we explain below. We do not 'do history' as such, but take an approach to the (re)novation of Datong which is both pragmatic and speculative. Pragmatically, we ask 'how does it work?' to generate, through selective demolition and reconstruction, an improved, modern, harmonious city, an increasing awareness of urban heritage and the attraction of tourism as key to economic growth. Speculatively, we ask what does how it works tell us about how we might rethink fundamental notions, such as of authenticity. In order to do this, we explore what Massumi terms the 'operative logic': the 'speculatively pragmatic formative forces' (Massumi 2015, viii) of change and transformation.

'An operative logic extrudes its own spatiality and temporality' (Massumi 2015, 231). It is productive of the space-times of its own operativity. An operative logic 'governs a pragmatic working out' (Massumi 2015, 212). In this paper, we demonstrate how the operative logic—of progress, modernisation or improvement, harmony and self-referentiality—is productive of the pragmatic working out of the planned stories of Datong. The part-concepts or elements (above) of the operative logic may be distinct, but in their pragmatic operation, they combine effectively in the production of the actual formation of the physical landscape of Datong.

These elements appear to be particularly relevant in Chinese logic. Ryckmans/Leys (1991, 2008 [1986]) comments that despite China's long history of architectural and cultural development, relatively few historical monuments remain. The author suggests that this stems from previous little-demonstrated interest in the past by Chinese people as a whole, but that there is a recent awakening of interest from the professional middle and upper classes who have the financial means to travel and visit historic places. However, we argue that a more important reason for this lack of monuments is the existence of a deep-rooted set of dominant values or operative logic as outlined above, which have grounded urban plans and projects.

Progress, modernisation and improvement have long prevailed as formative tendencies. From ancient periods, emerging dynasties demolished the palaces, temples and city buildings of the previous dynasty in order to remove any possibility of its restoration and to make their own mark (Fu 2015). Further, Li (2007) demonstrates the importance of the will to improve in China and how projects of modernisation and development are regarded as improvements: ‘everything new is better’ (Safford 2013, 2). Recent examples of demolition and reconstruction may thus appear as ‘the latest expression of a very ancient phenomenon of massive iconoclasm, that was recurrent all through the ages’ (Ryckmans 2008, 1). Ryckmans goes on to say that the periodic destruction of material heritage ‘seems to have characterised Chinese history’ (ibid.).

Chinese people have long emphasised the virtue of harmony at the heart of their culture. With regard to architecture, buildings should be harmonious in themselves (often symmetrical) and be co-ordinated with, be in harmony with each other and with the natural landscape. Cities were traditionally planned in the form of a cosmic diagram in order to maintain harmony and balance between humans and non-human nature. Even today, the website *China Daily* claims that ‘effective planning should steer towards harmonious settlements’ (2008, online).

Self-referentiality is a keynote trait of Chinese culture. As a reference to embedded cultural values, self-referentiality involves preconceived judgements about ‘good’ decisions and outcomes. The retro-ancient past [Chong-gu] is a long tradition of the Han Chinese philosophy postulating that to establish orthodoxy, one must restore an idea or a thing to its form when it first appeared long ago, in ancient times. This tradition is also reflected in urban planning: almost all the ancient Chinese capital cities were claimed to have been laid out to follow the *Rites of Zhou* (Zhou-li), a work regulating Han bureaucracy and organisational theory edited in the Zhou Dynasty (1045 BC–256 BC). In Datong, we may discern an element of fictive self-reference of an ancient past as imagined, rather than real, history invoked in heritage construction.

Having explained the operative logic, which we analyse below as the grounding planning and perceptions of cultural heritage in Datong, we now discuss the main analytical concepts which we employ in the paper.

Botz-Bornstein (2012, 8) suggests that several 'historical monuments' in China are 'not real but hyperreal'. Coined by Baudrillard (1983), the term hyperreality refers to an idealised reality. 'It is the state in which it is impossible to distinguish reality from fantasy, not because the fantasy is such a good imitation of reality, but because hyperreality produces images of something that never existed in the first place' (Botz-Bornstein 2012, 7). Where reality and representation are intermeshed such that it is difficult to determine where one ends and the other begins, simulation occurs. A simulacrum is a copy without an actual original which becomes accepted as true. The question of reality becomes redundant with simulacra. Baudrillard (1983) cites Disneyland as exemplifying hyperreality. Created to look realistic, the fake reality of Disneyland as simulacra creates the illusion of a version of other times and/or places, sanitised and non-threatening (no disease, no crime etc.) for present consumption. It is, as Eco (1976) calls it, a 'false authenticity'.

Sorkin (1992, 231) argues that Disneyland is 'a place everywhere and nowhere'. It is 'someplace that is "like" somewhere else ... [where] the "authenticity" of the substitution always depends on the knowledge, however faded, of some absent genuine' (Sorkin 1992, 216). The term 'Disneyfication' (Rojek 1993; Warren 1994), or 'Disneyisation' (Bryman 1999), refers to the creation of an area based on an abstracted history made to look and feel authentic, through processes in which 'pasts are condensed into easily consumed, bite-sized pieces lacking any authenticity' (Ashworth 2009, 79).

The inherent link between hyperreality and Disneyfication is that of (in)authenticity. Yet, what is 'authentic'? Teo and Yeoh (1997, 194) define authenticity as 'the accurate presentation of the past through the conservation of its relict features'. However, as the authors point out, what is 'accurate' is very much open to the (selective) interpretation of (often limited) available data. Authenticity should be regarded as 'emergent' (Cohen 1988) or ephemeral, as 'new' data may be discovered and opinions may change over time (Waitt 2000). In addition, there may be pressure on heritage officers to cater to the demands of politicians, developers and tourists, among other actors. Heritage landscapes may thus be 'manipulated', 'packaged' (Baillie et al. 2010) or 'spruced up' (Bristow 2010) to tell a 'good story', as in the case of Datong.

There is no such absolute thing as authenticity. It is a social construct: ‘a buzzword, obsolete before you know it’ (Beijer 2013, 532). If, as Ashworth and Graham (2005, 4) suggest, heritage is more concerned with meaning than with material artefacts, and the key issue is not what heritage *is*, but the work which heritage *does*—its performance—in the particular circumstances in which it is enacted (Silverman 2015, 69), logic asks why should it be necessary for it to have existed in reality at all? ‘Why not skip the preliminary stage of actual existence and jump directly to the final state of [fictitious] existence?’ (Ryckmans 2008, 4). This is what appears to be happening in Lijiang, as Su (2011) illustrates. The new ‘old’ Dayan area of Lijiang, rebuilt after the 1996 earthquake, is accepted as authentic of today’s heritage, as is the new ‘old’ Dukezong area of Zhongdian, devastated by fire in 2014 (Hillman 2015).

The ‘authenticity’ of these and other contrived constructions has recently become the topic of debate amongst Chinese heritage scholars (e.g. Hu et al. 2015; Long 2015; Zhang 2011; Zhu 2012). Opinion is divided as to the importance of a modernist, Western interpretation of authenticity (cited in Teo and Yeoh 1997, 194), represented in Zhang (2011), or a more postmodern interpretation of ‘becoming’ authentic which weaves interaction between agents (Zhu 2012).

Datong: Historical Stories

Datong is geographically located between the inside and outside lines of the Great Wall, on the northern border where the Han Chinese defended themselves from invaders. Since the time of its first foundation as Yun-zhong during the Warring States Period (475 BC–221 BC), Datong was at war for long periods, while the ruling regime changed frequently between Han and non-Han Chinese. Datong is described as having its heyday in four periods: as Ping-cheng during the Qin and Han dynasties, Du-cheng (capital city) in the Northern Wei Dynasty, Xi-jing (west capital) in the Liao and Jin dynasties, and Datong Fu-cheng in the Ming Dynasty (Datongshi 2000, 25). As described in the nomination files for National Historic City (1982), the recent urban form of the old city is generally considered to be the result of construction in the Ming Dynasty

(1372), when General Xu Da built the city walls on the earthen basis of the Northern Wei Dynasty (Wu 1782) and city buildings were constructed based on the Li-fang⁴ street form shaped in the Tang Dynasty. However, heritage sites inside or surrounding the old city include, among other notable sites, the Huayansi temple and Yungang Grottoes, which can be traced further back to the Liao Dynasty or even the Northern Wei Dynasty when Datong was under non-Han domination. Thus, unlike other historical cities in China, Datong is a complex city with far more complicated historic layers influenced by various cultures.

Planning Towards Modernisation Before the 1990s

Having undergone no crucial changes since the Ming Dynasty Datong started its modernisation at the end of the Qing Dynasty. The process was strongly influenced by the regional railway construction project that intended to link Mongolia with Beijing. Functioning as a hub for the Jing-zhang Line (Beijing-Zhangjiakou, started 1914) and later the Ping-sui Line (Beijing-Hohhot, started 1921), Datong ushered in a new period of development. Modern manufacturing and financial industries were introduced, and the urban layout changed as well. With more and more investors expecting the railway to bring prosperity and business opportunities, increasing numbers of modern houses and urban facilities were built in the area in front of the railway station, located just outside the old city to the north (Jiang 2007). By the 1930s, in addition to the traditional market area outside of the east and south gates, the area outside of the north and west gates was gradually beginning to urbanise (Anon 1926).

Following their occupation of Datong from 1937, the Japanese planned to construct a modern industrial city, Daidō. The planning was assigned to Uchida Yoshikazu from the Imperial University (now the University of Tokyo) in July 1937. He and his assistant, Takayama Eika, made the project part of an academic design studio programme in the university, and finalised the first version of the plan based on their students' work. Meanwhile, Sekino Masaru from the Fine Art School (now the Tokyo University of the Arts) prepared reports about Datong's background

information, including geography, history, historical remains, chronicles, maps and climate. After over a year's preparation, Yoshikazu, together with his son, Uchida Yosifumi, also a graduate student in the University of Tokyo, and his assistant, Eika, along with Masaru, visited Datong from September to October in 1938. They revised the plan based on their field surveys, and finished planning related legislation ordinances before their return. The final version was finished in February 1939 (Fig. 8.1b). A look at the drawings and text descriptions (Iwazaki 1939) reveals that the plan was 'remarkable' (Hein 2003, 317) in several ways, incorporating 'the most advanced standards and up-to-date planning concepts' (Lu 2006, 25). The plan included provisions for zoning, a green belt, traffic segregation inspired by Radburn, New Jersey, a satellite city, the conservation of the old city and the design of neighbourhood units based on the Detroit garden-city model (Takayama 1936, in Hein 2003; Lu 2006; Kuan 2013). The plan also aimed to set up a new city centre in the western area outside




Fig. 8.1 City map and drawing of the final Uchida Plan in the 1930s. (a) City map of Datong in 1937, (b) Drawing of the final plan in 1939. Source: Nakajima Naoto

of the city gate, while using a fan-shaped pattern of radial roads to connect the station area in the north and the traditional business centre in the south. The plan proposals mixed Western concepts and local Chinese traditions (Hein 2003). Yoshikazu insisted, for example, that the new courthouses should be constructed in local Datong style. The plan was widely regarded as 'one of the most sophisticated master plans of its time' (Lu 2006, 25).

War broke out soon after, and the plan was not fully implemented (Monkyo Sinbunsha 1941). A comparison of the drawing with aerial maps before and after the war indicates that only three main roads were laid out roughly according to the plan. One is the road connecting the Station and the North Gate (*ibid.*), while the other two are the north-east main roads for constructing a new urban centre in the west. During the same period, some renovation work was also done, such as on the North Gate, which was renovated with a Baroque-style façade.

Tucker (2005, 55) claims that the Japanese planners sought to build 'ideal cities', regarding conquered 'Manchuria' as a 'blank slate' or 'white page' for urban experimentation. Sorensen (2005, 143) points out that the indigenous Chinese inhabitants of Datong, not surprisingly, 'were unlikely to have been very enthusiastic about any plans for their cities that regarded them as non-existent and their land as a void territory'.

After the war, a new round of planning was ordered for developing Datong as one of the most important industrial cities in China, as required by the first Five-Year Plan.⁵ The resulting plan appeared in 1955. The plan had the support of experts from the Soviet Union and aimed to build a 'new industrial city supporting the steel base in Baotou' (Zhao 2001, 299) (Fig. 8.2a). Judging from the surviving drawing, this plan seems more realistic than the previous Japanese plan. Its main intended effect on the urban structure was to set up a new city centre in the south, where the traditional business area was located. By diagonal roads, the new centre was linearly extended towards the Heavy Industry Zone in the southwest, while also being linked with the old city in the north. By 1958, four main roads had been finished parallel to the city wall, on both the west and south sides. Along the main roads on the west side (which had been first shaped by the Japanese plan), the children's park, a stadium and new buildings housing municipal enterprises and institutions were




Fig. 8.2 Drawing of the master plans in (a) 1955, (b) 1985, (c) 2006. Source: Urban Construction Archive of Datong City

built. Instead of the south centre planned by the Japanese, the west part outside of the old city became the most active part and the new centre of the city.

The city master plan was revised twice before the 1980s. The first revision was made in 1958 (Datongshi 2000), following the new city definition as a 'base for heavy industry, international hub, and political, economic, and cultural centre of the Northern Shanxi Region' (Zhao 2001, 299). This version planned to remove the Japanese radial road pattern in the south and demolish all of the old Northern Wei Dynasty city wall to construct a 40-metre wide ring road. However, the limited funds could not support the whole demolition project, so during the project's execution 'only eight selected segments were totally demolished to ease transportation, and the remaining parts were truncated to half their original height' (Datongshi 2000, 113). The second revision was made in 1964, aiming to control the urban scale. This directional shift in planning led to more attention being given to improving the built-up areas rather than developing new ones. The four main streets passing through the old city crosswise were expanded to 20–25 metres wide by demolishing old houses. Public facilities were constructed along the new road outside of the west gate to meet residential demand, and the city centre square (now Hongqi Square), once planned by the Japanese for the south, was relocated to the former site of the west gate. The relocated square and its exhibition hall were finalised and functioned as a venue for rallies and a destination for processions along the new roads during the soon-to-come Cultural Revolution.

After the 1970s, which were influenced by reform and the opening up of China, Datong entered a new development period. Work began on a new master plan in 1978, resulting in a plan being finalised in 1985 (Fig. 8.2b). This time, a new city identification, 'historic city' (Datongshi 2000, 114), was added into the plan, while the main development direction was returned to urban expansion towards the southwest, as first proposed in the 1955 version (*ibid.*). Two general approaches directed attitudes towards the treatment of the old city. One, referred to as Ming Cheng Bao Hu (Conserve the Historic City), was to keep the original urban texture and architectural style by regulating reconstruction projects. The other, Jiu Cheng Gai Zao (Reconstructing the Old City), was to

demolish the old parts and reconstruct them in a convenient modern style. Clearly, the two approaches contradicted each other. For example, the renovation project in Sipailou, praised as ‘the most iconic and successful reconstruction project of the 1980s’ by the chief secretary of the City Construction Bureau, actually demolished 28000 square metres of historical houses and shops in the most central location of the old city and replaced them with widened roads and a modern commerce quarter with ten large malls (Li 1995). This contradiction in planning then led to long-term effects and difficulties in conserving the old city. The city succeeded in rapidly modernising, at the cost of losing valuable heritage in the 1990s.

Planning for Protecting the Ancient City (2006)

A turning point occurred in 1996, at the start of the ninth Five-Year Plan, when the coal industry was no longer encouraged by the state. As a result, Datong was ordered to change its city identification from that of a coal-based industrial city to a ‘comprehensive, multi-functional, and preliminary modernised city’ (Zhao 2001, 300). This change meant that the master plan was to be reconsidered, while the city searched for a new industry to support it economically. A round of discussions was initiated by the municipal government from 2000 to 2001, in order to clarify the city’s direction of development. Summarising the results of the expert opinions from all sides, the new direction was stated as follows: ‘Construct Datong as a new industrial processing base, regional business centre, and northern tourist destination by taking advantage of the historic city, nearby mineral resources, and the city’s location’ (Wang 2001, 3). The idea of treating the historic city as a development resource led directly to the planning efforts and numerous ‘retro’ construction projects implemented since 2000.

According to the master plan authorised in 2006, the main concern was to reconstruct the city in order to deal with its significant expansion in size while strengthening the importance of conserving the historic city (Fig. 8.2c). However, in reality, the renovation projects that started in 2008, headed directly by Mayor Geng Yanbo, were not fully in accordance

with the plan or even ignored the conservation restriction. The mayor called his approach ‘from Jiu Cheng Gai Zao (reconstruction of old city) to Gu Cheng Bao Hu (protection of ancient city)’ (Geng 2011). He did halt over 60 real estate development projects directed by the concept of Jiu Cheng Gai Zao (Reconstructing the Old City) which intended to destroy historical layers and pursue a modern style, but he also started no less than 80 projects for ‘protection and restoration’ from 2008 to 2012, which resulted in the demolition of more than 30790000 square metres of buildings and 71 streets (Datong 2013, 1083).

Government-led projects related to the restoration of historical settlements and streets were undertaken to reconstruct the city in the ancient style of the Ming Dynasty, including symbolic items, such as the city wall, the city gates, the palace (Daiwangfu) and the central business streets (Gulou), and to ‘comprehensively improve the surrounding environment’ (Datong 2013, 449) of nominated heritage sites from other ancient periods by planning new tourist squares and facilities in new styles which reflect a feature of the sites they serve, typified by the projects at the Huayansi temple and Yungang Grottoes.

The modern rebirth of historical street space is based on a ‘blend of traditional and modern experience’ to ‘create continuation of history’, a ‘re-interpretation of history’ (Zhou et al. 2012). Modern Datong has undergone the construction of tradition. The construction of the past gives the state the ‘opportunity to filter out what it deems undesirable and to retain what it considers beneficial to cultivating a sense of cohesion and national identity’ (Yeoh and King 1997, 59). For instance, neither the ‘non-harmonious’ layers of old streets and dwellings, nor the non-Han Northern Wei Dynasty city wall were deemed ‘desirable’ as representations of place identity. Further, decisions were taken to extinguish virtually all evidence of the Japanese occupation of Datong, with the exceptions of the (modified) North Gate and the Mass Graves Memorial Hall at the Meiyukou coal mine where 60000 miners died. Construction is pursued in the name of ‘harmony’—Jane Lu (national manager at the State Administration of Cultural Heritage) stated that buildings in Datong were previously ‘not harmonious’ (in Bruno 2014, online), being constructed at different times in different styles.

Case Examples Discussion

In Datong's historical development process since the modern era, a clear division of planning and its implementation directions can be observed. Furthermore, it is clear that despite a general direction of 'protecting the ancient city', apparent since the 1980s, but even in the 1939 Japanese plan, numerous historic dwellings in the old city have been and are being demolished, to be replaced with new 'old' buildings (see Fig. 8.4). Construction projects are more an idealised exploration responding to the new challenges of development rather than the implementation of conservation in the traditional sense. Throughout the stories of planning




Fig. 8.3 Project area of two cases in *Land Use Analysis of Datong Old City*. Map Source: Shulan Fu

in Datong, we can discern an operative logic of progress, modernisation/improvement, harmony and, to a greater or lesser extent, self-referentiality. In what follows, we examine the restoration of the west city wall and the improvement of the Huayansi temple complex environment.

Restoration of the West City Wall in the Ming Dynasty (2011–Recent)

This project is one of a series planned to ‘reproduce an integrated scene of Datong city in the Ming Dynasty’ (Datong 2013, 353). The project area covered the entire west city wall, including its surroundings, as depicted in Fig. 8.3. The project affects built heritage from almost the entire story of Datong and its planning history. For example, the Wei-du-da-dao Road was historically formed based on the Japanese plan; the settlements in between Wei-du-da-dao and the city wall, including modern residences, offices and Hongqi Square were formed based on the plan from the 1950s to the 1970s; the inner side of the city wall includes the Li-Fang street form shaped in the Tang Dynasty and the old houses constructed in the Ming and Qing dynasties prior to modernisation; and the Northern Wei Dynasty city wall was reformed in the Ming Dynasty and then half-lowered and partially removed during the 1950s. Ignoring these layers of heritage, all the above buildings were planned to be demolished in ‘restoring’ the wall. Even the extremely symbolic Hongqi Square,



Fig. 8.4 Recent photos of the West City Wall and Huayansi. (a) Construction scene of the West City Wall, (b) The tourist square in front of Huayansi. Source: (a) Jean Hillier (September 29, 2016), (b) Shulan Fu (September 23, 2016)

created to showcase the Party's new regime, was also planned to be demolished to make space for (re)constructing the West City Gate. Only the exhibition hall was kept intact through relocation. Besides demolishing all the former urban texture, the reconstruction itself may be questioned because of its method of implementation, which was extremely careless about the remaining original buildings. The modern rebirth of the old city is based on inaccurate ancient maps and literary descriptions about the Ming Dynasty. Modern construction materials and techniques have been used for the wall. New red bricks fill in steel reinforced concrete pillars and grey stones cover the construction so that it appears 'old'. The walls are a full scale replica of the originals (39 feet high and 60 feet wide at the base). Brand-new watchtowers have been constructed at intervals, while there are holes for traffic to pass through. As Ren (2014, online) comments, the walls are 'almost impressive' (emphasis in original).

The total demolition and new building of the city wall represents an operative logic of 'progress, modernisation and improvement'. Meanwhile, the part-concept of 'retro ancient past' explains why the Ming Dynasty was chosen to be the period for restoration, when the city wall had already lost its original form to plans implemented in the 1960s, and when it is clear that the Ming city wall was built on the clay wall of the Northern Wei Dynasty (386–557). The logic here is that although the Northern Wei Dynasty is the earliest period to which the wall could be traced back, it was not a period of Han domination. It fits the governments' needs of establishing orthodoxy for the new plan to choose the Ming Dynasty as the self-referential point of return. In addition, with little accurate historical data available, it is relatively easy to construct things which fit recent fictions about a 'good' past. A new 'old city gate' was constructed to replace Hongqi Square, which had reflected aspects of Datong's 'real' history and was the most symbolic urban space of the 1960s.

Improvement of the Huayansi temple complex environment (2008–2011)

The Huayansi temple is a national heritage site (nominated 1961) established in the Liao Dynasty (907–1125). The temple has been reconstructed several times, however, after being demolished by war and thus includes architecture from the Liao, Jin, Ming and Qing dynasties. The improvement project included the restoration of several historic buildings, the creation of a tourist square opposite the temple gate and the

construction of a new business complex surrounding the square, including an underground parking facility and a 'Liao-Jin style' gallery for an exhibition showcasing culture in the Liao and Jin dynasties (see Fig. 8.4b). In order to build the new tourist square and business complex, an urban block was demolished, including 45 historic residential courtyards, five modern commercial buildings, and three historic streets. After the project, the Huayansi temple site was expanded to more than five times larger than its previous size, from 9600 square metres to 60000 square metres.

Again, an operative logic of 'progress, modernisation and improvement' is apparent. The former historic residential area beside the temple was considered to be old and impeding the needed tourism and so it was demolished and a new tourist square complex constructed to 'improve the surrounding environment of the temple' (Datong 2013, 373). In order to be in harmony with the temple, the new tourist square complex was designed in Liao-jin style. This is a newly created style, made by borrowing architectural images and details from an antique wooden shelf inside the temple's scripture library (Bo Jia Jiao Cang), which is the oldest extant Buddhist scripture library, founded in the Liao Dynasty and renovated in the Jin and Ming dynasties. Choosing the sculpted images from a piece of artistic furniture rather than the architecture itself reflects the part-concepts of both self-referentiality and retro-ancient past. As one of the oldest artefacts inside the temple, the wooden shelf has retained its original appearance from the Liao Dynasty, and is therefore considered as reflecting the most 'correct' image of the Liao-dynasty style. However, the artwork from the wooden shelf is not reality, but a re-creation based on reality.

The new ancient city is more an idealised than a literal re-creation of Datong. It actualises an operative logic of harmony (the Ming-style walls, Tang-style Li-fang street form, Ming-Qin-style courtyards and Liao-Jin complex at Huayansi), progress, improvement, retro-ancient past and self-referentiality. The use of records, ancient artworks and Chinese ideals in the new (re)constructions is self-referential. Dressed as the city is in 'new clothes', are people conditioned to look in Datong for qualities associated with the Chinese cultural model rather than Datong's social, cultural and historical trajectories? As Waitt (2000, 258) suggests, the 'danger' of an official, commodified interpretation and representation of

Datong's 'heritage' story is that it closes off other versions. Little remains of the city plan from the period of Japanese occupation, for example. Perhaps this less harmonious history comes from a period which local officials would prefer to forget; yet, its national significance cannot be denied (see above).

Bruno (2014, 3) illustrates how much of the historic housing in the old city is being demolished 'because it doesn't date to as ancient a period as the renovators wanted'. Whitehead wrote that 'pure history is a figment of the imagination' (1967, 3–4, in Massumi 2015, 155). The new old city is imagined history: faux-history. But does this matter if heritage is merely a social construction attributed by the user, as Ashworth (2009) suggests?

It is clear that the renovation of Datong is not historically authentic. Despite the use of old maps, records and artefacts as reference, Datong is a replica city. Rather than conserve old houses, factories, shops and historic monuments 'out of harmony' with the preferred Ming, Tang and Liao-Jin dynasty styles, the structures were demolished in the name of harmonious improvement. If there is no such thing as real authenticity, does it really matter if Datong's heritage is manufactured or staged? As Bruno (2014, 4) comments, 'five or six years ago, Datong looked nothing like a historic city.' Today, it may be faux-history, but it gives the illusion of an historic place. Existential authenticity is not the authenticity of a place or object *per se*, but the existential experience activated by the place or object (Steiner and Reisinger 2006), as Lijiang and Zhongdian illustrate. These renovations of the early twenty-first century are 'authentic' of their time.

There is no tension in hyperreality between the past and the creation of 'culture' in the Chinese sense of an absolute self-referential quality (Botz-Bornstein 2012, 14). In the case of Datong, newly (re)constructed walls and buildings refer to a mythical cultural past which now has a real presence. Structures (such as the Huayansi complex) are real precisely because they are *not* real; that is, because they are not 'merely' items representing ancient civilisation, but of Chinese culture. As Botz-Bornstein (2012, 16) explains, 'anything that refers to the vast reservoir of Chinese culture is authentic enough because its relationship with this culture *makes* it authentic' (emphasis in original). Datong can dispense with or

demolish its original 'old' buildings as they are not needed in hyperreality. In fact, they obstruct the telling of a harmonious story. The authorities in Datong have not abandoned history, but merely its material expression. Representations of heritage become more important than experience of the original. Representations may only be facades, as in the new old city gate and the Small East City (Dongxiaocheng) shopping mall.⁶

Disneylands are constructed on the lines of Walt Disney's assumption that 'people prefer tidy replicas to the real thing' (Steiner 1998, 12). Disneylands are places where everything works, and they are clean and safe for visitors. As such, they 'whitewash' and sanitise history to render it more palatable to people.

It may be argued that Disneylands are effectively non-places (Augé 1995). This is a one-dimensional space; a space not rooted in time or sustained relationships with people. But can non-places become places over time as people get to know and form relationships with them? Perhaps, like the new old areas of Lijiang and Zhongdian, Datong will become recognised by tourists as 'unique' and 'a great place to walk around' (TripAdvisor 2017).

Conclusions

'Heritage sites are the ultimate reduction of the dimensionality of time' (Baillie et al. 2010, 57). Through heritage, the past merges with, and may be subsumed by, the present, narrating possibly historically accurate, possibly distorted or possibly entirely fictitious stories. If Massey (1993) argues for the redefinition of place to include its being a progressive site of social life, perhaps the traditional Chinese cultural vision of progress as frequently iconoclastic may indeed define Datong as a place? As AlSayyad (2001, 15) notes: 'the consumption of tradition as a form of cultural demand and the manufacture of heritage as a field of commercial supply are two sides of the same coin.'

The vision of progress, improvement and modernisation is a formative tendency, which, together with the part-concepts of harmony, self-referentiality and retro-ancient past, forms the operative logic underlying

the historical moments of planning and (re)novation of Datong. Everything is transient. Nothing is indispensable. Heritage is always in the process of re-making (Waterton and Watson 2015).

Through studying Datong's past via maps, records, plans, photographs and artefacts as repositories of the past, municipal authorities have drawn upon a found 'past' to design its present. Iconoclasm is not regarded as barbarism or abuse, but as the enabling of improved replacement and restoration. Heritage forms a bridge with the past, but it is not the past. Buildings represent ideas, not Nietzschean monuments.

Heritage is a resource (Hall 2009), with utility value. 'The Chinese past is a perpetually elusive enemy' (Botz-Bornstein 2012, 16). But this is an essentially pragmatic view. It may be regarded as 'progressive and flexible because it does not insist on the literal preservation of material things and because it is not attached to history as an object' (ibid.). As such, the (re)construction of the fabric of Datong with Ming dynasty-style walls and Tang or Liao-Jin dynasty-style buildings directs people's attention to a limited range of interpretations of the city's planning past.

The importance of heritage lies in the way in which it reveals to us something about ourselves and our worlds (Malpas 2007). Renovation in Datong presents an 'imagined rootedness' (Beijer 2013); a deliberate effort to evoke a sense of place rooted in a certain historic past. As Ashworth and Graham (2005, 5) comment: 'we create the heritage we require.' A Disney-type approach promotes the authenticity of the copy of the Ming- and Tang-dynasty construction and the creation of a new Liao-Jin style at Huayansi. Disneyfication exaggerates the hyperreal component of Datong's renovation. But place is a process of multiple histories and multiple identities. Previous, current and future master plans and renovations are part of this process. Mayor Geng's construction work is simply the latest in a series of histories and identities, each one 'authentic' to itself. Authenticity is thus not an absolute, but a dynamic social construct. Datong's (re)development is 'authentically' self-referential in its modern retro-ancient styles. In time, Datong's city walls and renovated buildings may be regarded as authentically representative of the early twenty-first-century vogue in China for recapturing the 'old' glory of post-industrial cities.

Acknowledgements Shulan Fu's contribution to this chapter was funded through the cooperative study 'Comprehensive Study on the Introduction Process of Neighborhood Unit Theory in Japan (15H04098B)', the 'Study on the Modern Planning History of Local Cities in China: Focusing on the Urban Renewal Constructions and Plans from 1908 to 1926 (NSFC 51408533)' and the 'Introduction and Exchange History of Modern Urban Planning Technology between China and Japan (ZJU Central University Programme 2-2050205-16-061)'. She thanks Prof. Nakajima Naoto of the University of Tokyo, the National Natural Science Foundation of China and Zhejiang University for their funding.

Jean Hillier's contribution to the revision of this chapter was written while she was based at Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China. She thanks Zhejiang University for affording her this opportunity.

Notes

1. By the State Council.
2. By the National Tourism Administration.
3. By the National Tourism Administration.
4. Li-fang (里坊) is an ancient concept of planning residential areas, following the *Rites of Zhou*, which refers to a chessboard-like arrangement of streets delineating walled blocks of residences. Chang-an (now Xi'an), planned in the Tang dynasty, is considered to be the most typical example of Li-fang put into practice.
5. In China, city master plans are made and revised by a municipality according to the national economy development plan, which has been revised every five years since 1951.
6. The constructed façade of a walled town serves as scenery for shopping and standardised consumerist experiences which do little, if anything, to engage people with the rich cultural heritage of Datong.

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9

The Politics of Aesthetics in Tianjin Between Past and Present

Maurizio Marinelli

You are warmly welcome. As a metropolis with both traditional and modern beauty, Tianjin boasts many places of historical interest, western-style buildings, residences of historic figures, and enchanting forests, lakes and beaches. (...) The Hai River is the pride of Tianjin, and it is made all the more beautiful by those impressive buildings, terraced platforms and theme parks along the river banks. (...) Impressive statues along the rivers banks and waterfront buildings combine to make a belt of beauty. (Liu et al. 2008, p. 89)

Look at how ugly it is! Now it's not Chinese, not Western. It's just ugly [Street vendor in Tianjin's Guyijie (Old Clothes Street)]

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Y. Ding et al. (eds.), *China: A Historical Geography of the Urban*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6_9

Introduction

This chapter engages with the politics of aesthetics in urban China, with particular attention to the promotion of global modernity through beautification projects. I use the term ‘modernity’ building on the connection of this concept—as emphasized by Michel Foucault—with the multiple notions of power, sovereignty, and therefore the bio-political (Foucault 1997, pp. 37–55, 75–100, 125–148, 213–244).¹ The premise is that urban transformation in China is characterized by a relentless performative strategy of reproduction of the state’s template of modernity via urban aesthetic regimes, with the aim of normatively legitimizing the state’s master narrative of progress, forwardness, prosperity, and globalizing newness. Building on the scholarship that explores the government-led campaign to create ‘better cities to engineer better citizens’ (Braester 2010, p. 6; Marinelli 2012), the chapter investigates, from a historical perspective, the strategy-making process of urban governance that lies behind the encomiastic upholding of the cause of beautification and global modernity in the port-city of Tianjin.

Tianjin has traditionally been the port of Beijing, 120 km to the northwest. In the second half of the nineteenth century, it became the most important commercial city in Northern China, having been opened as a treaty port in 1860, as a consequence of the *Convention of Peking* that the defeated Qing Government was forced to sign at the end of the Second Opium War (1856–1860). Between 1860 and 1945, Tianjin was the site of up to nine foreign-controlled concessions, functioning side by side.² British, French, and American concessions were established in Tianjin in 1860. Between 1895 and 1901 other concessions were ceded to Japan (1895), Germany (1898), and Russia (1901). With the signing of the Boxer Final Protocol in September 1901, following the repression of the Boxers’ uprising, even countries that did not yet hold concessions elsewhere in China such as Austria-Hungary, Italy and Belgium all succeeded in establishing self-contained concessions with their own prisons, schools, barracks, and hospitals. France, Great Britain, and Japan took advantage of the post-Great War situation and enlarged their holdings. Ruth Rogaski argues that Tianjin’s distinctiveness deserves the appellation hyper-colony:

‘drawing attention to the potential implications that arise when one urban space is divided among multiple imperialisms’ (Rogaski 2004, p. 11). This useful definition should be read in relation to Sun Yatsen’s claim that China was a ‘hypo-colony’: China was ‘the colony of every nation with which it had concluded treaties; each of them is China’s master. Therefore, China is not just the colony of one country; it is the colony of many countries. We are not just the slaves of one country, but the slaves of many countries’ (Sun 1923) (Fig. 9.1).

Significantly, at the turn of the twenty-first century, foreign architects and experts were working together with Chinese urban planners in the Tianjin Municipal Government-led regeneration and beautification of the former concessions. In March 2011, on the eve of the Terminal Operator Conference Asia 2011 (e.g. the oldest and most prestigious shipping port and terminal industry event), Tianjin was marketed as the ‘Gateway to the World’. For Tianjin’s policymakers, this should mean




Fig. 9.1 Map of Tianjin, 1912. From Madrolle’s guide books: Northern China, The Valley of the Blue River, Korea. Hachette & Company, 1912

something more than Beijing's Gateway to the World; this discourse echoes Tianjin's past global glories. Therefore, I intend to contextualize Tianjin's current transformation and the relevant global ambitions in relation to its historical legacy. The historical analysis is underpinned by the central issue of how colonial powers approached 'beauty' as a controlling metaphor of territoriality³ and how that paradigm of 'beauty' is being used today, by the Municipal Government, to re-write the city's history. From a theoretical perspective, I am aware that a critical engagement with the use of beauty as an axiomatic criterion of truth to push forward an urban governmentality project⁴ of modernity, progress and prosperity, requires an investigation of what art historian Terry Smith calls the 'currents of contemporaneity' (Smith 2006, p. 34). Historic time is not linear and, as Smith has poignantly argued, it is only 'the exploration of multiple and processual modernities' that allows us 'to grasp the complexities of the present' and capture 'the frictions between antinomies', such as the terms modernity and post-modernity, which can no longer characterize the contemporaneous condition (Smith 2006, p. 35). Contemporaneity, in this case, refers to the distinctive sense of past-presentness that one can witness in the contemporaneous pursuit of Tianjin's global ambitions by re-writing the city's history. Tianjin, with its multiple foreign concessions coexisting side by side (1860–1945), lends itself to be studied as a locale which encompassed some of the identity challenges of the global. This chapter will provide insights into: (1) How the Tianjin concessions' area became a pedagogical laboratory of global modernity: the elected place where the colonial experiment of creating a 'beautiful' and 'modern' city took shape; and (2) How these histories of beautification have resulted today in spatial and social projects whose 'beauty' remains contingent and ultimately contested.

China's Urban Transformation

Urban transformation in China constitutes both a domestic revolution and a world-historical event (Friedman 2005) because it represents the largest construction–reconstruction project in the planet's history (Wu 2006; Logan 2002). The creation of cities can be considered as the most

successful political and economic campaign launched by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the post-Mao era: it underpins the country's economic transformation from historic socialist planning to capitalist organization of production, while maintaining a strong character of state planning, since the state is firmly behind both the creation of new areas (*xinqu*) and new cities (*xincheng*), and the merging of existing ones (*tongchenghua*). Urbanization, promoted as a metonymy of global modernity, is progressively transmuting the physical and mental mapping of the Chinese territory and its people. According to a study by McKinsey Global Institute, rural to urban migration will create 400 million new urbanites by 2020. By 2030, there will be 1 billion Chinese living in cities, with more than 221 Chinese cities with a population over 1 million. By 2025, the GDP generated by cities will rise to 95% and China's total population living in cities might reach 70%, which would indicate an accelerated trend towards a progressive reversal of population distribution in 1978, at the beginning of the 'reform and opening-up' era, when the rural population fraction was 80% of the total (Woetzel et al. 2009).

So far, the three crucial areas of urban transformation, and the associated rhetoric display of a narrative of global modernity, are the Pearl River Delta in the south, which started developing in the 1980s; the Yangtze River Delta in the east, whose development accelerated in the 1990s; and Bohai Bay in the north, centred around Beijing and Tianjin, which started developing in the early 2000s. Earmarked as a strategic component of the 11th Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2006–2010), Bohai Bay is now a rising northern economic powerhouse that rivals both the Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas, and a competitive port cluster has developed around Tianjin—the metropolis that is striving to re-establish its pre-Communist era status of industrial capital of the north-east.

In my previous work (Marinelli 2009b, p. 32), I argued that Tianjin is by no means a global city, but is indeed a metropolis with global ambitions. Geographers have also pointed out that 'No Chinese city can really be labelled "global city", as on the whole the urban economy remains functionally based on the domestic sector' (He et al. 2006, p. 438). Nevertheless, considering the growing interaction between the domestic market and the global economy, Wu Fulong suggests the term

‘globalizing cities’, and employs the concept of ‘place promotion’ to explore the state-led process of remaking Shanghai as a world-city (Wu 2000, pp. 1359–1377).

Tianjin offers a singular example, revealing a simultaneous tendency towards ‘world-class-ness’ and ‘China-class-ness’. Its urban regeneration responds to a dual mechanism. On the one hand, a specific discourse of hyper-colonial modernity originally negotiated in the interstices of power of foreign–foreign and foreign–indigenous relations (1860–1945) has recently been interiorized by the Tianjin municipality via historical re-writing and the hegemonic discourse of an urban aesthetic regime of truth. On the other hand, an inter-referential mechanism of emulation and adaptation has been developed based on the experience of other ‘globalizing’ Chinese cities. These two dimensions will be investigated in the following pages.

Tianjin: The Past in the Present

Today, Tianjin has a total municipal population of nearly 15.5 million people, and encompasses the third largest urban area in China, after Beijing and Shanghai. The military fortress of Tianjinwei, on the Haihe River, was established on 23 December 1404, when the Ming Emperor Yongle (1360–1424) renamed the former town of *Zhigu* (lit. meaning ‘straight port’) *Tianjin*, literally ‘The Son of Heaven’s River Crossing’ (*Tianzi duhe zhidi*). The symbolic renaming had two functions. The first one was political, since it was here that Yongle had forded a crucial river to defeat his nephew, Zhu Yunwen (Emperor Jianwen, r. 1399–1403), whereupon he usurped the throne and proclaimed himself emperor. The second one was economic since it implied a recognition of Tianjin’s crucial role in relation to the new capital Beijing: Tianjin was at the northern terminus of the main economic and political artery between northern and southern China, the Grand Canal, which guaranteed the transport of grain from the south to the capital.

A popular saying encompasses the relation between China’s historical development and urban transformation: ‘If you want to understand 5,000 years of Chinese civilisation look at Xi’an, to understand 1000 years

look at Beijing, and to understand modern China look at Tianjin'. The city of Tianjin occupies indeed a highly unique position in modern China: it represents an unparalleled microcosm of the world in the late-imperial and republican eras, encompassing both the apogee and the decline of the age of imperialism (1860–1945). Yet, if we compare it with Beijing and Shanghai, urban historians and geographers have, surprisingly, devoted little focused attention to this city which, between 1860 and 1945, was the site of up to nine foreign-controlled concessions (*zujie*), as well as being, temporarily, home to a multinational military government (1900–1902), and a series of evolving municipal administrations, well deserving the name of 'hyper-colony' (Rogaski 2004; Marinelli 2007). Through co-existing concessions Tianjin showcases the idealized national experiences and identities of nine foreign countries and offers a unique opportunity to analyse the various styles of urban governance which were used by the colonial powers to organize, promote, and expand their commercial interests, both in China and throughout the region. Between 1860 and 1945, Tianjin became the second largest industrial and commercial city in China after Shanghai, the largest financial and trade centre in the north, as well as one of the most vibrant commercial centres in Asia (Jones 1940).

Today, the city's hyper-colonial phase is being actively re-interpreted as marking the beginning of Tianjin's globalization. Tianjin's hybrid cityscape has become a new frontier for the experimentation with new models of architecture and governance: what is designed, re-designed, and built or re-built in Tianjin is related to specific social, political, and economic forces that are redefining spatial policies and spatial control in a characteristic way (Wei, Jia 2003), that shows similarities to, but also differences from, Beijing and Shanghai (Wei, Yu 2006). What is distinctive in the case of Tianjin is the fact that the post-socialist phase coincided with the construction of the master narrative of Tianjin as a globalizing city. The historical contingency of Tianjin falling into the 'third wave' of China's urbanization strategy has contributed to obscure the possible negotiation and any controversial debates on Tianjin's post-colonial and post-socialist identity. The complexity of this double sword process is evident in the politics of beautification that, perhaps paradoxically, reveal striking similarities between the past and the present. The fact

that Tianjin's urban transformation in the post-Mao era started later than Beijing and Shanghai determined a specific strategy-making process that unfolded in the context of the municipality administration's reinvention of the past and rewriting of the city's history in the name of Tianjin's 'beauty' and 'charisma' (Marinelli 2010). It is useful to start analysing the main characteristics and the strategic direction of the beautification process in the past.

The Beautification Strategy of Hyper-Colonial Tianjin

Tianjin's concessions covered an area of 15.5 km², eight times larger than the original 'Chinese city', with the riverfront governed by foreign imperial powers. Each concession included a residential area whose planning, road layout, and public works system responded to the needs and expectations of its immigrant inhabitants. After the territorial occupation, the concessions became, in a sense, lifestyle showcases for their respective national identities. At the same time, each colonial power avowedly used its concession site to organize, promote, and expand the commercial activities of the firms of its own nationality in China and more broadly throughout the East-Asian region, since Tianjin progressively became a major international trading city with shipping connections to all parts of Asia.

The critical time when this process registered a significant acceleration was the beginning of the twentieth century. After the conclusion of the Boxer's 55-day siege (20 June–15 August 1900) of the foreign Legation Quarter in Beijing, Tianjin was occupied by an allied army and administered by an allied military government, known as the Tianjin Provisional Government (TPG). This multinational government ran the city for almost two years (July 1900–August 1902) and drastically transformed the cityscape. This was the crucial time when the blueprint of Tianjin as a 'modern city' emerged from the Western minds. As Lewis Bernstein points out: even though 'The history of the TPG was played out against the backdrop of the Great Power rivalry in China', this was a unique time

that 'showed the Chinese Government how cities could be transformed into money machines using modern administrative methods' (Bernstein 1988, pp. 213–215).

Anthony King argued that 'Colonial cities can be viewed as the forerunners of what the contemporary capitalist world city would eventually become' (King 1990, p. 38). One could argue that, in Tianjin, the politics of the dominant, foreign, urban aesthetic regimes produced an antecedent of what King calls the 'globurb' (i.e. globalized suburbs) and spaces of 'villafication' in his analysis of the neo-liberal/neo-colonial built environment (King 2004, p. 103). In Tianjin, a pedagogical designing of space, deriving from multiple economic, political, and cultural forces, was implanted on the ashes of the wounded Chinese city: the built form was radically transmogrified, a new transport system was implemented, electrical lighting and water supply systems were created, and radical public health work was undertaken. All this was done to guarantee the TPG's top priority of urban governmentality: the maintenance of public security and order through the standardization of administrative practices and regulatory discourses of bio-technico-power. This required first the annihilation of the Chinese-designed forms and practices of living, which were perceived by the foreigners as alterity, and later its replacement with a transcultural replica of what they identified as 'homely': through an uncanny kaleidoscopic mirror, the TPG foreign administrators imposed on the 'unhomely' territory their own alterity. It is significant that this process claimed to be based on a more or less plausible aesthetic–ethical justification, which shares the motivations of the 'City Beautiful' movement: the implementation of a precise governmentality strategy, which reflected prevalent concerns of environmental determinism, a performative practice which linked the ideas of bio-social well-being to the physical conditions of the city and justified radical interventionism in the name of an 'aesthetic' and quasi-ethical rationale. 'Beauty' was a leitmotiv in the colonial bio-politics of urban modernity. In Tianjin 'beauty' was ostensibly advocated to justify the spatialization of uncanny historical imaginaries imported from abroad, transported, and replicated via architectural languages and urban discourses of power in this microcosm of the geopolitics of imperialism.

It is interesting to notice the chronological synchronicity: 1901 was also the year when, in the United States, the team of architects led by Daniel H. Burnham designed the Plan for Washington D.C. Burnham was the former Director of Construction of the 1893 Chicago's World Columbian Exposition, also known as the 'White City' since it represented Chicago as a success story of sanitized modernity and advanced transport system. The 1901 Plan for Washington D.C. was the climax of the 'City Beautiful' movement that emphasized the power of beauty in the creation, or better the recreation, of the urban centre to induce civic pride and simultaneously assert social control. I argue that the concept of 'City Beautiful' can also be used to identify both the beautification process that occurred in Tianjin during the hyper-colonial era, and the massive urban revitalization programme, which has been conducted in Tianjin in the last 20 years under the aegis of beautification, and has been memorialized in the sleek Urban Planning Exhibition Hall inaugurated in 2009.

On 5 April 1902 the editorial 'Aesthetics in Tientsin', opening the *Peking and Tientsin Times*,⁵ raised a vehement criticism against the 'artistic desert' which, in Western eyes, characterized China at the time. Two dichotomous views dominated amongst the foreign residents: those concerned about aesthetic pleasure deemed it important to 'Bring beauty to the Tientsin streets and architecture', while those purely driven by their economic interests dismissed any aesthetic demand as 'Rubbish! We are here not for cultural beauty, but to make our pile in the least possible time, then to clear out' (Anon 1902, p. 1). The *Peking and Tientsin Times* editorial rejected the second 'ultra-utilitarian attitude', claiming that Tianjin had become home to 'many of us who are not here to make a pile and leave early, but to live and die' (Anon 1902, p. 1).

It is important to remember that the foreigners were a minority compared to the Chinese population. It is difficult to find reliable statistics regarding Tianjin's total population: Rasmussen's 1925 account reports that 'In 1860 it was conceded to be about 300,000' (Rasmussen 1925, p. 263), but this might be inaccurate, due to the citizens' attempt to avoid the heavy taxation system. In 1920, the official figures indicated the presence of '837,000 Chinese, 5,914 Europeans and Americans, 4,000 Japanese and 1,200 newly arrived Russians', but Rasmussen doubts the

total figure's accuracy (11,114) and suggests approximately 15,000 foreigners (excluding troops) as more realistic (Rasmussen 1925, p. 263).

What is significant is that 42 years after the creation of the first concessions (English and French in 1860), and seven months after the signature of the Boxer Final Protocol, with foreign flags waving in the hyper-colonial space of Tianjin, some foreigners had demonstrated their intention to come and stay. Nevertheless, the reasons were less ethical than the editorial claimed, since a derogatory representation of the Chinese Tianjiners clearly emerges from the colonial literature of the time.⁶

The 5 April 1902 editorial combines the derogatory language with a patronizing justification for the lack of aesthetic sensibility, due to widespread poverty:

We are in the midst of the most prosaic people on the face of the earth. The merits of the Chinese as a social aggregate are manifold and manifest, but their outward and visible life is to us sordid in the extreme: such huge multitudes of them live on the narrow edge that divides poverty from famine that it cannot be otherwise. (Anon 1902, p. 1)

Ultimately, the condemnation prevails: 'The result is an artistic desert, and many of us are in a chronic state of aesthetic starvation' (Anon 1902, p. 1). The fact that thousands of Chinese people were physically starving was considered inferior to the aesthetic needs of the colonizers, who were starving for visual pleasure.

The discourse of beauty, morality and hygiene is deeply embedded in the colonial ideology of conquering urban space. The creation of the foreign concessions in Tianjin can be interpreted as the imposition of multiple territorialities⁷: governance and governmentality, via state spatial and social practices of ordering and control in the Foucauldian sense of state formation and governing at a distance (Foucault 2007, 2008; Bray 2005), were justified by upholding the cause of 'beauty' and conferring to it an ethical concern. The bio-politics of colonial-globalizing modernity legitimized the superimposition of foreign architectures of power, constructing an image of Tianjin as 'home' for the foreign residents. The colonial subjects in hyper-colonial Tianjin were trying to map a 'colonial-global' liminal space and firmly inhabiting that hyphen. The once-massive

city walls (Guo 1989) paved the way for the emergence of neighbourhood enclaves that displayed a built form reminiscent of Brooklyn brownstones, Bavarian castles, Italian squares with fountains, and Parisian cafes. The strategic commitment to produce the 'real' within the Chinese space ended up creating other uncanny layers of 'real' intertwined with the 'unreal', in forms and processes dominated by mimicry and hyper-simulation (Baudrillard 1988, pp. 166–184). The rationale of the aesthetics' discourse of power could originate from the ancestral impulse of the foreigners to take their 'home' with them. This might derive from the profound nostalgia for a home left behind, but it also combined with a profound epistemic anxiety (Stoler 2009). Ultimately, it was this mix of nostalgia and anxiety which became the driving force for the colonial residents' appeal to overcome 'aesthetic starvation' by reconstructing their 'home' on Chinese soil, thus overcoming also the unsettling feeling of the uncanny (Freud 1985, p. 135).⁸

Nevertheless, there is an element which undermines the operational legitimacy and the logic of the 'diasporic' colonial subjects: the self-assessed legitimization of the destruction of indigenous homes. To demonstrate this, I will analyse, specifically, the creation of the Italian concession. This concession represents a significant case study, which allows us to delve more deeply into the intertwining processes of *domicide* and *memoricide*: the deliberate murder of home which leads to the obliteration of memory. (Porteous, Smith 2001, pp. 10–23)

The Creation of the Italian Concession

In the Italian case after the formal acquisition of the Italian concession in September 1901, it became clear that every unilateral action was legitimate: Ambassador Giovanni Gallina, after signing the concession's agreement with the Director of the Chinese Maritime Customs Tang Shaoyi, justified the immediate expropriation of what he referred to as the 'filthy Chinese village,' since 'all the other powers proceeded to the expropriation as soon as they occupied the area of their concession.' (ASMAE 1912–1914)⁹

At the Conference of ‘Orientalist-Geographers’ that was held in Macerata on 25th to 27th September 1910 to commemorate the ‘apostle and geographer of China’ Father Matteo Ricci (Anon 1911, p. 1), one of the invited speakers, Luigi Sborlino, presented a paper entitled ‘The Royal Italian Concession of Tien-Tsin’. With reference to the Italian concession, Sborlino emphasized that, after the acquisition of the territory, little had been done for a number of years. But in 1910, when he was delivering his speech Sborlino sounded extremely optimistic. Giving expression to a dream-like imagery he anticipated that:

In a few months our concession should be comfortably and beautifully provided with numerous European-style houses. We can imagine these houses—on two storeys, some of them facing large boulevards with pavements, others surrounded by pretty gardens and small vegetable plots, decorated with verandas—populated by our countrymen, who are actively occupied in running industrial and commercial enterprises, both locally and internationally; in such a way that to the train’s passengers, to the dwellers of the other concessions, and to the Chinese people living in Tientsin, our concession would appear as an enviable example of prosperity and a model of what the Italians are able to do when they want to. (Sborlino 1911, p. 110)

One could be tempted to argue that this is, more or less, what happened during the two following decades when the Italian concession became known as the ‘aristocratic concession’ (Discepolo 2006; Anon 2005; Anon 2006).

Sborlino’s early optimism derived from the fact that, after the expropriation of the salt mines, the expropriation or demolition of the ‘inhabitable or inhabited’ dwellings of the Chinese village,¹⁰ the removal of the graves from the cemetery, and the reclaiming of the wetland, eventually the new building regulatory code, the police code and the hygiene code were approved and introduced in 1908. This legislative effort followed the sale by auction (5th of July 1908) of 41 lots of land (equal to 10 hectares). The socio-spatial reorganization of this ‘laboratory of modernity’ (Stoler 1995, pp. 13–26) led to the creation of an Italian-style ‘neighbourhood’: a miniature venue of ‘Italianness’ or ‘Italian spirit’ (*Italianità*) (Marinelli 2007).

The urban aesthetic regime based on Western forms operated on the basis of a prospective transformism: the teleological and positivistic belief in the prospects for future transformation of the occupied area in a 'beautiful' neighbourhood. This credo became the leitmotiv of the final political decision of the Italian Government not to withdraw, and progressively originated the ultimate and dominant optimistic representation of the Italian experience in Tianjin (Rasmussen 1924, p. 25).

The superimposition of foreign spatial forms in the concessions area occurred after annihilating the indigenous homes: 'Early foreign construction in China displayed many eclectic European styles, but the most popular was a brand of Classical revivalism which was christened by Western expatriates in China the Compradoric style' (AlSayyad 2001, p. 159).¹¹ After 1902 the purists complained:

The municipality has some control over the houses to be erected, and we feel confident if they made a strand for a superior type of exterior they could do something to relieve us from the still too prevalent compra-Doric. Architects would react to their veto at once, and in a few years re-visitors should hardly recognize foreign Tientsin. Our cause, we know, is like beauty itself, somehow vague and indefinable, and its acceptance lies more in the region of feeling than of intellect, but in this it harmonises with all the best motives that influence men. (Anon 1902, p. 2)

The claim to the foreign residents' superiority, since they could appreciate 'beauty', was substantiated by their simultaneous ability to unmask the profit-driven mentality of those who were not properly endowed to understand art:

There is the matter of building ignoring the question of colour which, if we look at two fine buildings in Meadows Road, is by no means a hopeless one; there is still beauty of outline and proportion. Material plays a great part in architecture and we know that Pentelic marble cannot be got in this parish, but there are still the charms of rectitude and temperance, as Ruskin calls them. (Anon 1902, p. 2)

The profound motivation, which legitimized the appropriation of space, was disguised as primarily ethical. 'Rectitude and temperance' are

virtues which resonate with Confucian philosophy, but here they were associated with practical concerns. 'Architecture is the art that infuses into arid geometry the spirit of poetry and spiritualises even the straight line and the right angle. A pretty house is a delight as much as a picture: nor is its prettiness incompatible with comfort and usefulness' (Anon 1902, p. 2).

The combination of aesthetic and moral concerns was sufficient first to justify the expropriation of indigenous homes and then to proceed to the cultural superimposition of the foreign, through the reproduction of the motherland's original architectures in Tianjin.

Each colonial power annihilated the previous spatial organization of the site and reinvented the physical space under its control. Chinese historians have denounced foreign powers for land expropriation and forced removal of thousands of former residents without compensation (Zhang 1993, pp. 240–243). The official documents reveal how officials emphasized that, in the middle of the wars, Tianjin residents suffered immensely, to the extent that their 'family businesses were swept away' (*jiayedangan*); therefore, the officials asked the 'civilized countries' (*wenmingguo*) to avoid the 'extreme sacrifice of their land' (*xishengzhidi*)¹² (Liu 1936, p. 4).

The Italian settlers, as well as those occupying the British and French foreign concessions earlier, are accused of having appropriated public land, contravening the treaties (Wang 1982, p. 162); an entire cemetery was removed and graves destroyed for reasons of public sanitation (Fileti 1921, p. 22). There was a specific case of land expropriation, where the salt mines were located (115 *mu*¹³), and promises of full compensation to the merchants were not maintained (Fei 1991, pp. 262–263).

Tianjin vis-à-vis Beijing and Shanghai

The strategy-making process of Tianjin's urban transformation has been informed by the inter-relation between Tianjin and Beijing, on the one hand, and Tianjin and Shanghai, on the other. Historically, due to its proximity to Beijing, Tianjin had both benefitted and suffered from its role both as Beijing's 'political backyard' (*zhengzhi houyuan*) and as

Beijing's 'gateway to the world' (Ma 1985). But the 'beauty' of Beijing, especially during the late Qing and Republican era, is often described as superior to any other city. Historian Zhu Jiajin, in his Preface to a photographic book on Beijing from the end of the Qing Dynasty to the anti-Japanese resistance, affirms: 'When I look at these photos, I dream of the views and sights that I saw in Beijing when I was a child and then a middle-aged man (...) As a native of Zhejiang, I grew up in Beijing, so I cherish extremely profound feelings for Beijing, my second home. During my childhood, I lived in a house in Xitangzi Lane, north of Dong'an (Eastern Peace) Bazaar' (Zhu 1989, pp. 6–7). Zhu describes Beijing's beauty using evocative images: a crow's nest on an old elm tree, a magpie nest on a big Chinese bon tree and a sparrow under the eaves, the sky darkened by jackdaws in the winter. In his words: 'After 1924, the Imperial Palace (now Palace Museum), Beihai and Jingshan (Prospect Hill) were opened to visitors. I remembered my first climb to the Wanchunting (Pavillon of Ten Thousand Springs) on the summit of Jingshan, where I saw the square city walls, the towering gate and Jianlou (Embrasured Watchtowers) in the east, west, south and north, the straight streets and the roofs of the buildings hidden among the trees. I was stunned by the beauty of Beijing (*Wo juede Beijing tai meile*)' (Zhu 1989, p. 6). This perception of Beijing's 'beauty' is connected to the memory of his parents, who showed him Beijing's landmarks along the south-north axis: 'The glistening palaces and halls in the Forbidden City and the white clouds in the blue sky set off each other to form a beautiful picture of nature. Gazing into the distance beyond the city walls, I saw an endless plain in the east and south and hills and mountains undulating in the west and north like a decorative screen. The scenery of Beijing was lovely beyond all description' (Zhu 1989, pp. 6–7).

Tianjin is often referred to as the 'Shanghai of the North' (Edgington 1986, pp. 117). When we consider Tianjin's hyper-colonial era, we do not have any equivalent of the famous 'All about Shanghai and Environs' Standard Guide Book, which was published annually by the University Press in Shanghai.¹⁴ The authors of the 1934–1935 edition of the guidebook emphasize the uniqueness and the uncanniness of Shanghai: 'Shanghai is not China. It is everything else under the sun, and, in population at least, it is mostly Chinese, but it is not the real China' (Anon

1934–1935, p. 58). The guidebook also adds: ‘For glimpses of genuine native life one must wander into the highways and byways beyond the confines of the International Settlement and French Concession’ (Anon 1934–1935, p. 59). Interestingly, Tianjin is mentioned in the guidebook as a possible ‘excursion’ from Shanghai, with high-sounding words of praise for the city: ‘Only about three hours by rail from centuries-old city of Peiping¹⁵ (Peking) is one of the finest and most modern cities in China. Tientsin, 821 miles from Shanghai by rail, is the second most important port of China, with a population at this writing of more than 1,000,000’ (Anon 1934–35, p. 59). The cleanliness of the city is also emphasized ‘as contrasted with other cities in China’. Ultimately the comparison of Tianjin with Shanghai, from the point of view of the beauty and hygienic modernity, seems to indicate a preference for Tianjin: ‘Even the native City of Tientsin is almost entirely free from beggars and has broad paved streets and smart shops. Comparison of it with the Native City of Shanghai is much to the disadvantage of the latter.’ The remaining foreign concessions (British, French, Italian and Japanese—at the time when the guidebook was written) are portrayed as models of ‘clean and modern’, but these positive elements are ultimately ascribed to the imagery of the West: ‘Trees border the paved boulevards and the residential sectors are more suggestive of the Occident than the Orient. Hotel accommodations are excellent and there are many fine clubs’ (Anon 1934–35, p. 145).

The Tientsin editor of the *Far Eastern Times*, O. D. Rasmussen remembers that it was the Consul Representative of the Italian concession, Vincenzo Fileti, who first investigated the possibility of using asphalt for roads: in 1914 he contracted the American Standard Oil Company ‘to lay an experimental section of asphalt road along the Corso Vittorio Emanuele’ (Rasmussen 1924, p. 27). He also observed that ‘while other Concessions are only just starting on a programme of modern roads the Italian concession has nearly completed theirs, and possesses the least dusty and smoothest roads in Tianjin’. The sources indicate the internal reproduction, in the microcosm of Tianjin’s foreign concession area, of the competition between the various foreign powers, as demonstrated by their affirmation of the emblematic signs of modernity and ‘beauty’. Negotiating the specificity of its presence in the interstices of power between the various concessions, each of them contributed

to the construction of the narrative of ‘City Beautiful’, but in a self-reflexive and self-congratulatory fashion.

By 1930, when Tianjin was placed under the Executive Yuan of the Guomindang Government, the city was the second in China in terms of foreign trade (after Shanghai); and the largest industrial and commercial centre in northern China. Captured by Japanese troops on 30 July 1937, Tianjin was occupied until the end of the Second World War in 1945. At the end of the civil war, Tianjin was liberated by the Red Army in January 1949. After the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949, all the foreign property in [mainland China](#) was seized and nationalized. As historian Kenneth Lieberthal clearly states:

Tianjin in 1949 was a bifurcated society. (...) Under Western impetus, it gradually developed a modern economic structure that centered in the concession area of the great powers (...) Still, this modern economic structure did not displace the older society and economy on which it had been built. Rather, the two dimensions of Tianjin existed side by side, partially complementing and partially oblivious of each other. (Lieberthal 1980, p. 3)

Tianjin today is the city with the greatest number of remaining foreign-style buildings in China, and it is often referred to as a permanent ‘Exhibition of World Architecture’ (*wanguo jianzhu bolanhui*), a tag that encapsulates the fact that the city boasts the simultaneous presence of different architectural styles in what amounts to a *plein air* museum. Tianjin’s power-holders are acutely aware of their city’s history and regard its architectural heritage as having accrued specific kinds of economic, symbolic and emotional capital (Marinelli 2009a, 2010). Tianjin is thus promoted in numerous advertising campaigns as a ‘global city’. Chinese citizens and foreign tourists alike are told that they do not even need to leave China to experience the world: it is enough to visit Tianjin. Over the last decade the urban planning strategy for Tianjin’s former concessions has combined the re-ordering and re-designing of foreign space in concert with Tianjin’s vaunting ambition to promote its globalizing identity. Urban planners had to overcome a major problem, which derived from the bifurcation of many streets in central Tianjin, due to the differ-

ent concessions' topographical boundaries, but this is not often mentioned. Today, Tianjin Municipal Government officials and urban planners alike are striving to tell a unique story of 'beauty' that sets Tianjin apart from Beijing and Shanghai. This is a narrative that reinterprets China's transnational history and the city's architectural past in a novel manner. There is a high degree of competitiveness between Chinese cities, that is mostly based on economic criteria (Ni and Kresl 2008; Ni 2010), but also on a sense of 'pride' deriving from a reiterated narrative of global modernity. A crucial factor of Tianjin's competitiveness is the development, from 1994 onwards, of the Binhai coastal district, on the eastern seaboard of Tianjin. The Binhai New Area is officially presented as the 'dragon's head' of Tianjin's opening up: the equivalent of Shanghai's Pudong New Area. Binhai maintains an annual growth rate of nearly 30%, and its GDP effectively outpaced Pudong in December 2010 (Song 2010).



Fig. 9.2 The ex-Italian concession, May 2013 (by the author)

Tianjin has quickly learnt from the experiences of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen—all cities that have undergone what are now regarded in China as the first two waves of urban transformation—and is now riding the crest of the third wave. The Tianjin Municipal Government wants to set a new standard, a new ‘model’ for urban renewal. The city has thus become a site for generating new imaginations and practices of ‘globalization’—involving architectural design consultants from all over the world. Ultimately, Tianjin is currently undergoing a massive renovation programme to re-establish its pre-Communist era status as north China’s industrial and financial capital. The ambitious task is to claim a distinctive identity in relation to the capital Beijing, and to supplement the other role-modelling dynamos of the Chinese miracle, namely Shanghai and Shenzhen (Fig. 9.2).

Anniversaries and Historical Re-writing

In 2004, at the time of the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the foundation of Tianjin, Tianjin was represented as benefitting from its treaty port experience. Official publications emphasized how Tianjin ‘was among the first few cities in North China to open up and it became a base for the Westernization Movement’ (Xiao 2006, p. 6).

The association of treaty-port history with the rhetoric trope of ‘opening up’ indicates a strategic re-writing of the city’s narrative, unmasking the intention to present Tianjin as ‘a city of great historical and cultural significance’ but also ‘the largest coastal open city in the north of China’ (Xiao 2006, p. 6). Tianjin’s primacy was strictly connected to the fact that, thanks now to the concessions era, Tianjin ‘had taken the lead in China’s military modernization, construction of railroads, telegraph, telephone, post, mining, modern education and legal systems’ (Xiao 2006, p. 5). The interconnectedness between past and present was reinforced by the statement: ‘At the time, Tianjin was the second largest industrial and commercial city in China and the largest financial and trade centre in the North’ (Xiao 2006, p. 5). The use of the superlatives indicates the intention to stress the historicity of Tianjin’s primacy: the process of global modernity started taking place in Tianjin before it occurred in other Chinese cities.

The preamble of a book entitled *Tianjin Image* (*Tianjin yinxiang*) reveals both inter- and self-referential discourses on the city:

This is a city immersed in but not fettered by history
 This is a city endowed with but not obsessed with glories
 This is a city cherishing its own assets while embracing opportunities
 This is a city facing the vast sea and opening to the world
 Tianjin: a famous city whose culture is rooted in history
 Tianjin: a modern international port metropolis
 Tianjin: a central city that is spearheading the rejuvenation of a regional economy
 Tianjin, one of the most enchanting cities in China. (Chen and Gao 2006, p. 3)

Tianjin's image is articulated in partially antagonistic relation to Beijing. From the very outset, Tianjin is described as a city 'immersed in history' (*fuzailishi*). The use of a verb from the vocabulary of electrical engineering, one which literally means 'loaded with history', is calculated to convey a powerful image. In contrast, other cities are 'fettered by history' (*beilishi jingu*); the use of the passive voice suggests implicitly a critique of cities which are imprisoned by their past, à la Beijing.

Tianjin's power-holders are acutely aware of their city's history and regard its architectural heritage as having accrued certain kinds of economic and symbolic capital. Tianjin is thus vaunted as being different, unique. With its nine foreign concessions, Tianjin constitutes an unparalleled microcosm of the world, even when compared to other cities which were open to foreign trade and settlements during the late-imperial and Republican periods.

On 23 December 2004, a major exhibition entitled 'Tianjin seen through a hundred years of China' (*Zhonghua bainian kan Tianjin*) opened at the Tianjin Museum of Modern History (*Jindai Tianjin Bowuguan*). This Museum was founded in 2002 by the Tianjin writer Hang Ying, based on the proposition: 'History has bequeathed Tianjin a unique phenomenon of cultures belonging to different countries assembled together in one place'. The 2004 show reiterated this premise, and made the following claim: 'Tianjin is a stage that displays different architectural styles—it is the epitome of modern Chinese society'.

The exhibition ultimately promoted the city's history as being emblematic of 'the collision and fusion of Chinese and Western civilizations' (Tianjin Museum 2004).

However, the transformation of the city in the name of 'beauty' has often responded to the logic of destroying urban cultural heritage, both in the hyper-colonial and in the global era. Famous Tianjin writer Feng Jikai has been a vocal advocate of urban heritage preservation (Feng 2000), demanding 'protective transformation' of the ancient urban areas as opposed to 'developmental destruction': 'Whether superficially pursuing instant modernization, frenetically accumulating political accomplishments, or purely fixated on economic gain, the city administrators have wantonly handed over piece after piece of urban real estate to developers. The vast majority of these officials have absolutely no knowledge of the cultural heritage of these cities, and no desire to learn about it' (Feng 2001, p. 6).

During the 1980s and 1990s, the Five Street Area was 'revitalized'. More than 2000 garden-style villas had been built in the 1920s and 1930s in this area of 1.3 km². Since the year 2000, the former concessions have undergone another wave of municipality-led urban regeneration: the area has been radically transformed through various cycles of demolition and relocation, summed up in the Chinese expression *chaiqian*, as well as renovation and reconstruction. The most problematic aspect has been the uneasy negotiation between two differing approaches: the imperative 'to destroy the old and build the new' (*pojiu lixin*, an expression familiar from the Maoist era) and the wish 'to restore the old to make it look old' (*xiujiurujiu*). Tianjin Haihe Developing Investment Co. Ltd., a public company known to foreign architects and urban planners by the acronym HEDO and to Chinese stakeholders as HAIHE, claims that in its projects the second approach has been adopted (HEDO 2008). Walking around the renovated area with a volunteer from the group 'Memory of China' (*Zhongguo jiyi*),¹⁶ one constantly hears the term *zhengxiu* to describe what has befallen the place. The expression literally means re-style, since it is a shorthand for the verbs 'to put in order' (*zhengli*) and 'to fix up' (*zhuangxiu*). In reality, *zhengxiu* indicates that the place has been given a radical makeover.

Feng Jicai has criticized the official narrative of ‘pride’ and ‘marvel’:

(...) in a mere decade the unique features, historical ethos, and cultural attractions of many cities have been utterly destroyed. The cultural losses are enormous! How many cities in the world preserve their ancient features as a source of pride. We, on the other hand, show off the appalling “marvel” of changing the map every three months! It is no exaggeration to state that every single minute a significant portion of our historical cultural heritage is destroyed by an excavator. Yet the distinctiveness of each city is only formed after hundreds and thousands of years of accumulated human creativity. (Feng 2001, pp. 5–6)

Architecture in Tianjin is a witness to this history of human creativity. However, the ‘beauty’ of its architecture has often become subject to criteria of preservation in the name of ‘who’ lived in the building (especially if it was a high-ranking Chinese political leader, a warlord, or a prominent intellectual) as opposed to the artistic and historical value of the building itself.

The experience of urban regeneration in the former concessions seems to confirm what might be called a ‘façade thesis’: what has been regarded as being important is maintaining the façade or outward appearance of historical structures, the superficial mien of which is thought of as being sufficient to convey a sense of antique ‘Italian-style (意式)’. Here, beyond the ‘old-newness’ of the streetscape the spectacle of the ‘new-other’ emerges.

In 2004, a small number of Italian architects began collaborating with Chinese colleagues to restore 26 of the remaining 67 buildings in the area originally designed by colonial-era Italian architects. In 2008, one of these latter-day Italian architects, Barbara Cicolella who spent two years on the building site with Chinese workers on a daily basis, highlighted the discrepancy between what are essentially two radically different approaches to ‘restoration’: ‘In China’, she told me, ‘all the emphasis is placed on the façade [of a structure]’. The exterior as spectacle is the core of an idealized Chinese sense of an ‘Italian flavour’; meanwhile, the beautification of the ‘neighbourhood’ as a whole is supposed to convey the impression of modernity without necessarily inviting the viewer to go

beyond the surface, to look inside the buildings or attempt to appreciate culturally specific forms of living space. At the same time, an objective obstacle for the restorers has been sourcing locally high-quality materials and specific products commonly used to paint artificial and natural stone in Italy: ‘The quality of lime (calcium hydroxide) is inadequate,’ the Italian site manager told me, ‘Here they only have grey cement’.

Concluding Remarks

Contemporaneity consists precisely in the acceleration, ubiquity, and constancy of radical disjunctures of perception, of mismatching ways of seeing and valuing the same world, in the actual coincidence of asynchronous temporalities, in the jostling contingency of various cultural and social multiplicities, all thrown together in ways that highlight the fast-growing inequalities between them and among them. (Smith 2008, pp. 8–9)

Beauty has often been flaunted as a signifier of unassailable truth and as a semi-religious axiom. Susan Sontag poignantly noticed that beauty has been implicitly evoked at times, and also explicitly used and abused, as a metonymic trope of ‘indisputable excellence’; thus, beauty has functioned as ‘a perennial resource in the issuing of peremptory evaluations’ (Sontag 2002, p. 21). In post-Mao China, the concept of beauty has been widely associated with the political–economic campaign to build cities. The master narrative of the ‘City Beautiful’ movement ‘with Chinese characteristics’ has progressively dominated the official civic and political discourses during the three waves of China’s urbanization that have radically transformed China’s cityscape and the country as a whole. Beijing, for example, has often been referred to as ‘world beautiful city’ (*shijie meicheng*) and, especially from the 2008 Olympic Games onwards, subject-positioned in the omnipresent slogan: ‘Beautiful Beijing welcomes you’ (*Meili Beijing huanying ni*). The success story of ‘City Beautiful’ has been memorialized in the slick Urban Planning Exhibition Halls, first in Shanghai (2000), then in Beijing (2005), Chongqing (2007), Tianjin (2009), Hangzhou (2009), and so on.

This chapter demonstrates that, when connecting the past with the present identity negotiation of a city, the analysis of internal and external mechanisms of power and signification requires a reformulation of binary definitions (such as modern or post-modern, colonial or global), as well as new conceptual models and methodological approaches which capture the frictions of the city's temporalities and spatialities. The study of Tianjin's urban transformation across a wide span of time allows us to explore the past-presentness of the metropolis's globalizing ambitions, giving concrete meaning to the idea of 'colonial mentalities' and also, importantly, to the link between the colonial past and the globalizing present. Particularly significant are the politics of beautification on display in the urban governmentality project of Tianjin as a 'City Beautiful': beautification is a political strategy aimed to propose, expose, and impose a specific historical narrative, which produces a selected imagery of the city as a globalizing metropolis. This strategy encompasses a performative practice, which remodels the past, obliterating specific aspects of inconvenient truth deriving both from its colonial and its socialist legacy, and develops a picture of the future that frames and legitimizes a progressive course of action through systemic violence, which appears as endemic to the colonial–global political ideology and socio-economic order. The reinvention of the hyper-colonial past into the contemporary official narrative of Tianjin's global modernity can be understood only through the lens of the accumulation of the threefold present, since the present encompasses the selectively remembered past, the present ambitions, and the anticipated future with its relevant dreams and projected desires. The present, however, exists only in the mind since 'time is about changeability and multiplicity, the anticipation of things which is the future, the passing away of things which is the past, and the existence of things which is the present' (Smith 2008, p. 10).

This chapter also demonstrates that the emphasis on beautification in the presentness of Tianjin's global ambitions tends to erase the complexity of a spatialized time and place, reducing the inherited hyper-colonial multilayers of the city to the 'beautiful' façade of the 'Expo of World Architecture'. Once again, urban planning in Tianjin responds to the logic of ordering, re-ordering, and ultimately controlling the spatial-social

forms of dwelling in the city. In the past, the idea of ‘beauty’ justified the colonial powers’ annihilation of the Chinese space and the superimposition of the uncanny foreign built forms. Today, the façade of that ‘beautiful’ architecture serves a similar function: justifying destructive practices of *domicide* and *memoricide*, the creation of Tianjin as a ‘City Beautiful’ reinforces the current bio-political engineering project of a neo-colonial/neo-liberal aesthetic-social order. Both the making of modern Tianjin in the hyper-colonial era and the reproduction of the ‘Charming Tianjin’ today are grounded in a similar ideological discourse of modernity, which underlies both imperialism and contemporary globalism.

Tianjin’s beautification is the crucial component of a strategy-making process, which is informed, simultaneously, by the ambitious tasks of achieving ‘world-class-ness’ and ‘China-class-ness’. Understanding this process requires an investigation of the ‘currents of contemporaneity’: only the exploration of multiple and processual modernities will allow us ‘to grasp the complexities of the present’ (Smith 2008, p. 11). Modernity indicates a division of the world between the old and the new, the past and the present, while contemporaneity indicates the coexistence of conditions, the coexistence of spatialities in the presentness of the cityscape.

Notes

1. Cp. also: Foucault 2007, 2008. Bio-politics indicates the increasing concern of the State towards the population’s biological wellbeing: health and sanitary control, food and water supply, education, etc. Emerged in the seventeenth century, and progressively refined bio-politics became a normative political technology of bio-power: a political strategy for governing an entire population through a set of procedures, which establishes specific, licit and permitted criteria to evaluate and manipulate the biological features of the human species.
2. The term indicates a part of territory forcibly ceded by the Qing government to the colonial powers.
3. Territoriality is ‘the attempt to affect, influence, or control actions, interactions, or access by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a specific geographic area’ (Sack 1983, p. 55; 1986).

4. Michel Foucault coined the term ‘governmentality’ to rethink the nexus between government and power: the focus on ‘how we are governed’ draws attention to the variety of forces and systems of knowledge which are involved in the regulatory mechanisms of our lives, and the production of the conditions which allow to pursue the various national goals (Foucault 1982, pp. 220–221; Rose 1999, p. 3; Cp. also Foucault 2007). Being a way to re-conceptualize the relationship between the state, the government of others and the government of ourselves, ‘governmentality’ has assumed particular importance in Chinese studies (Bray 2005; Jeffrey and Sigley 2009, pp. 1–24). Urban governmentality—the term that I use here—is connected with the notion of bio-power: it allows to consider the citizens as the objects of policies produced not only with the intent to control, but also with the declared aim to improve the general health and wellbeing of the nation.
5. The English newspaper *Peking and Tientsin Times* was the voice of the foreign powers during that period (1900–1902).
6. This is a common trait of the sources that I have analysed in the historical archives in the United Kingdom, in France and in Italy.
7. Cp. note 3.
8. In Freud’s words: ‘The uncanny is that class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar.’ Freud points out how the concept of home and familiar (*heimlich*) progressively ‘develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite (*unheimlich*).’ This process stems from an intrinsic quality of *heimlich*, which embodies two sets of idea: familiar and intimate on the one hand, concealed and withheld from others on the other.
9. Count Giovanni Gallina signed the agreement regarding the Italian concession, together with the Director of the Chinese Maritime Customs Tang Shaoyi.
10. According to the 1902 census 13,704 people were living in this area. Around 17,000 people according to Consul Representative Vincenzo Fileti (Fileti 1921, p. 15).
11. Comprador refers to the frequent use of Neo-classical architecture (with the typical Doric columns) by foreign architects in China.
12. *Xisheng* is usually associated with the ideas of ‘laying down one’s own life’ and martyrdom.
13. 1 *mu* corresponds to 0.0667 hectares.
14. The first guidebook about Shanghai appeared in 1904, cp. Darwent, 1904.

15. Peiping (Northern Peace) was the new name of Beijing from 28 January 1928 to 1936, after the Guomindang decided to move the Chinese capital to Nanjing. Cp. Yue Dong 2000, p. 121.
16. Personal interview, September 2009. See also: Du Yu 2010.

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10

Living in the “Past”: The Effects of a Growing Preservation Discourse in Contemporary Urban China

Philipp Demgenski

Introduction

Against the backdrop of fast-paced cultural and economic globalization and the resulting profound socio-spatial transformations of cities around the world, the meanings, usages, and purposes of urban heritage have become increasingly diverse and contested. Different actors, including national and municipal governments, tourist industries, preservationists, and local communities appropriate and utilize heritage in a myriad of different ways and for various, sometimes contradictory, ends. Rodney Harrison speaks of an “*abundance* of heritage in our late-modern world” (2013: 3, emphasis in original). Perhaps as a result of this ubiquity of heritage, a very fundamental yet important question is sometimes overlooked in public and academic debates: Why heritage and why preservation? Different actors who make claims to heritage tend to leave the

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Y. Ding et al. (eds.), *China: A Historical Geography of the Urban*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6_10

necessity to preserve unquestioned. The aim of this chapter is to treat the wish to preserve as a cultural phenomenon, rather than a taken-for-granted positive aspiration, and to evaluate its meanings and impacts in the specific socio-cultural context in which it emerges.

The following chapter examines how a growing official and popular preservation discourse has been impacting urban redevelopment and the people living in an old and run-down inner city neighbourhood in Qingdao, a rapidly changing north-eastern Chinese metropolis with a variegated colonial history. China was long associated with poor preservation. In the 1990s, propelled by growth-oriented reforms, many old urban neighbourhoods were razed to the ground and residents relocated. Since the turn of the millennium, however, historic preservation has increasingly come to the fore. In recent years, the old inner city area that I discuss here has been (re)discovered as a place of historical value. The city government envisions it as an upgraded tourist site and a place for cultural consumption, while a growing circle of what I call “old-town protectors” have been demanding what they consider to be “authentic” ways of preserving the neighbourhood (Zhang 2006; Pan 2005, 2011). Both the official project and the “old-town protectors” quest for authenticity, each according to its own cultural-political logic, are part of what I refer to as the “heritagization” of Chinese urban society (Hsing in Zhang 2006: 478; Harvey 2001). In this chapter, I juxtapose their narratives with those of the residents living inside the inner city. First, what does preservation mean to these different actors and second, how does the existing preservation discourse impact the ongoing redevelopment project and the livelihoods of long-term residents living in this potential heritage site?

The data used in this chapter come from 17 months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Qingdao between 2011 and 2015. I begin with a more general discussion about heritage, followed by a review of the rise of preservation discourse in China. After introducing the city of Qingdao and its inner city, I present the discourses and narratives of the preservation advocates and those of local residents. In the final section, I discuss the impacts of the preservation discourse.

Heritage as a Cultural Phenomenon

Many scholars studying cities have spent considerable time contemplating the differences between looking at the city from above, the “‘God-like’ vision of the city” (Harvey 1989: 1) and the sense and experience of being in the city, of being in the midst of it all. De Certeau (1984: 92–93) has famously made the distinction between “the voyeur” (the one towering above and looking down) and “the walker” (the one living and walking in the city). While the former gets a sense of the whole picture, the latter “follow(s) the thicks and thins of an urban ‘text’ ... without being able to read it;” or to be more precise, “the walker” reads the city very differently from “the voyeur”. Even though every urbanite is both a “voyeur” and a “walker” in his or her own socio-spatial context, this voyeur-walker dichotomy serves as a useful metaphor to frame the complexities revolving around selecting, defining, and preserving a specific and potential heritage site.

Heritage preservation used to be a matter of “voyeurs” (the heritage experts). It was long considered an altruistic and benevolent goal in and of itself. “It is our duty to hand them (historic monuments) on in the full richness of their authenticity”, as the Venice Charter from 1964 phrases it (ICOMOS 1994: 1). The subsequent act of preservation then largely followed what Sullivan (1993: 16) calls the “freeze-frame” methodology, meaning that a piece of heritage is fixed in space and time. It becomes timeless and static and may not be changed as it is preserved. In more recent years, however, not least as a result of the rise of post-modernism and constructivism, the social and human sciences have fundamentally unsettled this fixed and taken-for-granted view of heritage preservation. It is now recognized that preservation is never neutral, but always political and that “certain histories and physical remains are necessarily excluded, privileging one period, class, or category of heritage over the others in a given place” (Bell 2013: 431–432). In line with this, Ashworth argues that heritage is the usage of the past in the present and that “new presents will constantly imagine new pasts to satisfy changing needs” (2011: 10). Moreover, following human geographers’

contributions to a more humanistic and processual understanding of space and place (e.g. Lefebvre 1991; Massey 2005), it is now widely acknowledged that an old building or physical area is always a product of social and cultural activity. Indeed, Laurajane Smith starts her book *Uses of Heritage* (2006) from the premise that all heritage is intangible. Artefacts are essentially created, given value and imbued with meaning in the present and for different purposes.

Today, heritage scholars and experts commonly call for a more communitarian approach to heritage preservation (Blake 2009). Individual stories and memories of the “walkers” who live in or use a designated heritage site or artefact are considered to be equally, if not more important, than the physical artefacts themselves. This attempt to listen to and empower local communities is certainly commendable, but we must not fail to recognize that the so-called “local community” is also a social construction, usually sanctioned by the state or other external entities (Hampton 2005: 739). Moreover, a local community may not at all be conscious of its identity as a carrier of cultural heritage or may even be critical of preservation, as I show in this article. Furthermore, a focus on individual experience and memory instead of authorized historical narratives is no less an act of choosing one narrative over another. In fact, in autocratic regimes like China where memory and history have been monopolized by the state, the two are necessarily related and intertwined (Watson 1994).

In view of the difficulties of finding ways to (re)define heritage or generate new standards for its preservation, scholars now increasingly refrain from engaging heritage as a theoretical or scientific concept and instead treat it as a global cultural phenomenon (Harrison 2013). Consequently, the processes and impacts rather than normative definitions of heritage inform many current scholarly discussions (e.g. Zhu 2015). This chapter follows this approach. Heritage concerns me in so far that it has or has not concerned my informants, and I am chiefly interested in why and to whom heritage matters and how a growing preservation discourse understood as a cultural phenomenon of contemporary urban China impacts the case of inner city redevelopment.

“Heritagizing” China

For the large part of the chaotic twentieth century, preserving old architecture or other cultural landscapes was not high on the agenda for China’s urban development. The Maoist years, especially the Cultural Revolution, followed the ideal of “destroy the old and create the new” (*pojiulixin*). After the beginning of the reform period (in 1978), China created a Law for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in November 1982 and joined the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage in 1985. Nevertheless, growth-oriented urban development largely defied any existing plans, making regulations on heritage preservation hardly more than a theoretical idea. During the 1980s and 1990s, many old inner city areas became victims of frenzied building activities and the search by local “pro-growth coalitions” for maximum profit and ultimate modernity (Zhang and Fang 2004). Old and run-down inner city areas were convenient targets for local governments to foster city-building, economic development, and the consolidation of state power (Abramson 2007; Hsing 2010).

A gradual change in attitude occurred in 2002 with the amendment of the Law for the Protection of Cultural Heritage and former President Jiang Zemin’s renowned speech at the 16th National Congress in which he called for the promotion of culture and related industries (People’s Daily 2002). In 2002, China and the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) jointly issued the “The Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China” and countless applications to UNESCO for Chinese sites to be inscribed on the World Heritage List followed (China Heritage Quarterly 2005). With regard to urban heritage and old inner cities, the term “historic district conservation” first appeared in the Chinese conservation context in 1986 (Zhu 2007). In 1994, the “Regulations on Plan Making for Famous Historic Cultural Cities” were introduced, which called for the integration of historic conservation into contemporary urban planning. Such ideas were further emphasized and refined in several subsequent nation-wide master plans and policies. The most recent “National New-type Urbanisation Plan

(2014–2020)”, for instance, particularly “stresses the need to incorporate traditional components in the building of new urban areas, reconciling new areas with the original, already existent natural and cultural characteristics of a city” (Qingdao Urban Planning Bureau 2015). Today, the idea of “preservation-oriented development” (*baohuxing kaifa*) has been established as an important dictate informing many urban redevelopment projects.

It would be wrong, however, to view preservation as an unconditional, altruistic goal in and of itself and it would be equally erroneous to view government officials or urban developers as having finally been made to see reason that demolition and short-term development are indeed detrimental. The mounting focus on preservation needs to be seen as a continuation of the previous growth-oriented reforms, now catering to the domestic tourist industry and a shifting consumer market. Examples such as Shanghai’s *Xintiandi* area have proven that the aesthetics of the “old” have enormous economic potential and that nicely redeveloped and repackaged inner cities generate monetary revenue, thus making them attractive to private developers. A number of studies illustrate how municipal governments across China have, over the past decade, initiated and shaped urban renewal projects as a way of place promotion, resulting in gentrification, commodification or what Zhang Li calls “accumulation by displacement” (2010: 137), leaving merely old-looking facades behind (Wai 2006; He 2007; Ren 2008; Shao 2013; Evans 2014).

What is important, however, is that China is not only trying to transform its cities from industrial, production-oriented growth-engines into places for third-sector industries and consumption (e.g. Wu 2007), it also increasingly aspires to “softer” and more “human-centred” (*yirenweiben*) forms of urban development (Hoffman 2011; Tomba and Cartier 2012). In this context, previous destructive urban renewal and “preservation-oriented redevelopment” practices have become targets of criticism, accompanying calls for more “genuine” forms of preservation. Simultaneously, the overall changing urbanization outlook has opened up discursive room for the wider public to partake in the debates over “correct” preservation practices. I elaborate on how these changes have been manifesting themselves in the concrete case of redevelopment in Qingdao below. First, however, I provide a brief introduction to Qingdao’s inner city.

Qingdao and Its Inner City

Qingdao is an economically flourishing port located on the southern side of the Shandong peninsula by the Yellow Sea. It is not only famous for its eponymous beer brand (Tsingtao Beer), but also for its European-style architecture. Qingdao was first established under German colonial rule (1898–1914) and subsequently occupied by the Japanese twice (1914–1922 and 1938–1945). Today, the remaining colonial architecture serves as a popular tourist destination and background for wedding photos with thousands of newly-weds travelling to the city each year to experience the foreign without having to leave the country.

Qingdao now has a population of over 8 million and covers an administrative area of 10,654 km² (Zhang and Rasiah 2013). A distinctive feature is its separation into two city centres. In the mid-1990s when Qingdao, like many Chinese cities, experienced rapid expansion and the urban fringes were heavily exploited, the seat of the city government, formerly situated in the old town, was relocated into a newly developed area along the coast.

Freed from the burden of being the political and economic centre, however, the old town was also neglected in terms of city planning and investment. Mayors and Party Secretaries have since promised to “upgrade” and “refurbish” old Qingdao, but so far, respective undertakings have only led to the patchwork-like redevelopment of certain areas. In the absence of any comprehensive and long-term plans, a few German monuments were preserved and now function as popular tourist spots, while other parts were either demolished or simply turned adrift.

In this chapter, I focus on one of Qingdao’s oldest areas, situated right in the heart of the historical centre. I refer to it by its original name, *Dabaodao*.¹ It came into being as a “Chinese town” under German colonial rule when Qingdao, like many other colonial cities, was spatially and ethnically segregated by means of an empty strip of land between the areas for the colonizers and the colonized. *Dabaodao*, located just north of the colonial centre, had originally been designed as a grid of streets that formed more or less rectangular patches of land. These were then purchased by individual businessmen, architects, or urban developers from different regions in China and even from abroad. The subsequent building

activity brought about a type of building that would later come to define *Dabaodao*, but also Qingdao as a whole: *Liyuan* houses. The character for “li” refers to a traditional administrative neighbourhood unit in urban China, whereas “yuan” means courtyard. *Liyuan* are courtyard-style houses, relatively secluded from the outside, but offering a large communal space within. One enters them through a small opening that is often sheltered by means of a “screen wall”.² Inside the courtyard, flights of stairs give access to an open, traditionally wooden, corridor that connects the rooms on the upper floors. Courtyards vary in size and population density. Larger, three- or four-storey courtyards host over 100 families, while smaller single-storey courtyards may only be occupied by less than ten. Today, the *Dabaodao* area is home to over 20,000 residents and the population density reaches up to 800 residents per hectare.³ Regardless of the courtyard size, actual living space inside *Liyuan* is extremely limited; it is common for families of three or more people to share a room of less than 10 m² (Figs. 10.1 and 10.2).

Like Shanghai’s *Lilong*, *Liyuan* is a dense, small-scale vernacular building. This style has evolved differently in various Chinese cities. *Liyuan* as a building type emerged in *Dabaodao* due to the enormous demand for dwellings that could offer commercial and residential space. Some *Liyuan* follow the perfectly rectangular layout of the northern-Chinese four-walled courtyard (*Siheyuan*) (e.g. Knapp 1990), but many also assume different shapes, showing southern Chinese (two storeys high) and European (adopting the French truss structure) architectural elements. Their final form reflects both the stringent building regulations of the colonial administration and the mix of Chinese migrants coming from different areas of the country, bringing along their own building traditions, and modelling new courtyards on existing ones. Over the course of almost an entire century of political turmoil, movements and reforms, *Liyuan* were demolished and rebuilt, transformed, extended, and replicated in many areas of Qingdao, and residents altered them according to their own local building habits. The 1930s, especially, witnessed an incredible building boom as many new migrants arrived and new *Liyuan* houses were built. Their architectural styles are thus difficult to ultimately pinpoint and it is probably most accurate to say that their emergence was



Fig. 10.1 Map of Dabaodao (by Ulf Etzold)

a historical accident, a product of experimentation, rather than a result of conscious architectural planning and design.

Even though *Dabaodao* (and most of its *Liyuan* houses) survived the Maoist and reform years, it has largely remained socially and spatially marginal. Courtyards today are seriously run-down and overcrowded; they lack private washroom or kitchen facilities, in-house tap water, and central heating. Many residents use old-fashioned wood burning furnaces as heaters and to boil water. Typical for many of China's inner cities, resi-



Fig. 10.2 A Liyuan Courtyard in 2012 (by the author)

dential composition and ownership structures are complex. Residents are a mix of the urban poor, which includes unemployed and laid-off workers, the retired and disabled, landless suburban farmers, and rural migrants (Wang 2004; Wu et al. 2010). Owing to a government scheme in the late 1990s that allowed residents to purchase their former work-unit housing at heavily subsidized prices, rooms inside *Liyuan* courtyards are now predominantly privately owned. However, owners often rented them out to short- or long-term migrants, who then sometimes sublet them to third parties. According to my surveys, about 70% of current residents are migrants with rural household registration (*hukou*).⁴ The remaining 30% consist of local people who failed to benefit from China's economic reforms and the scaling-down of the state-owned economy in the 1990s. Although they had legitimate city residence, when made de facto unemployed, they were forced to survive in the free market, which often meant working in the informal economy (Solinger 2002). In this article, I focus on the minority group of local residents who, owing to their status as

official urban residents, are entitled to monetary or other compensation in the event of housing expropriation. Migrants, as renters of rooms in *Dabaodao*, are not entitled to compensation nor are they seen as rightful occupants; thus they rarely have a voice in negotiations over redevelopment or preservation practices. Accordingly, while the marginal position of migrants in the general context of urban redevelopment in China certainly deserves anthropological attention, it is not of immediate interest here, as the impacts of the preservation discourse affect primarily the 30% of official urban residents.

The “Voyeurs”

Following de Certeau, I call those who want to preserve *Dabaodao* the “voyeurs”. Even though there exist fundamentally different ideas and narratives among preservation advocates, they are united in their predominant concern for the area as a physical entity. The urban plan, the city map, the history book, the old photograph, or the historical document serve as “portholes” through which they look down at *Dabaodao*, but without having to ever really engage with the current socio-spatial reality on the ground. This needs to be understood in the context of China’s changing “preservation-oriented development” regime.

Dabaodao and *Liyuan* are officially designated as a so-called “historic and cultural city district” (*lishi wenhua jiequ*) in municipal preservation plans, but they are not on the list of sites officially protected by the state (*wenwu baohu danwei*). The various government-led projects designed to upgrade and “preserve” *Dabaodao* over the past ten years largely followed the above-described logic of commodification and displacement. When I was doing fieldwork in 2012, for instance, the project under way was called “European-style scenic neighbourhood”. Its goal was to turn *Dabaodao* into a tourist and consumer space, featuring a “24 hour entertainment district”, a “creative arts district”, and an “area for local folk customs” with small boutiques, youth hostels, coffee shops, and bars lining the streets, as I learnt from a local planning official. The project tried to emulate explicitly other economically successful inner city redevelopment projects across China, for example, Shanghai’s *Xintiandi* area, but

to market its own distinctiveness. “We need to create something like *Xintiandi*,” a member of staff of Qingdao’s Urban Planning Bureau told me in an interview, “Qingdao has been consulting Shanghai on how to properly carry out preservation work; we want to do it like they did,” he said. This “Xintiandi-ization” was an important discourse among officials and planners. “Preservation” in this context meant the careful moulding of the old centre into assets of economic capital in the form of sites for consumption, while paying meticulous attention to the aesthetics of “the old”. Whether the original buildings were truly preserved or not thus mattered less than whether they looked “original” and “old”.

But there were also other official narratives. During fieldwork, officials and planners often drew connections between preservation and “softer” forms of urban development. “The old town and its old architecture represent our historical memory that we need to cherish and thus strictly preserve, making every effort to display the special characteristics of our city and speed up the process of creating a liveable city” (People’s Daily 2010). This is what Qingdao’s current Party Secretary said right after he was appointed in 2010. I often came across such statements. Once, I found myself in the sterile-looking specially set-up “Redevelopment Office” on the 39th floor of a high-rise, towering above and looking down upon the red-tiled roofs of old Qingdao, literally like de Certeau’s “voyeur”. Mr. Lu, the head of the office, ushered me into a conference room and we began chatting informally about the current project. “We need to preserve a piece of memory of our city; this project is not about money, it is about culture; we want to give something to the people”. Mr. Lu deployed the entire range of “politically correct” statements about how an inner city redevelopment project should be carried out today. These are indicative of a gradual shift in China’s general urbanization outlook, including a turn away from rent-seeking and displacement under the pretext of preservation more towards “genuine” forms of preservation. This shift reflects policy changes, but needs to also be seen in the light of an increasing pluralization and diversification of the planning process, especially a growing heritage consciousness among the general public.

In Qingdao, like in many other Chinese cities, citizens from a wide spectrum of professional backgrounds have come to care about history

and the past of “their” city. They include historians, architects, photographers, writers, journalists, white-collar workers, civil servants, police officers, and even lower-level government officials; I call them “old-town protectors”. They were not directly involved in or affected by the redevelopment project but, driven by a certain degree of nostalgia and in a reaction to previous forms of destructive urban development, they actively advocated for what they considered to be “authentic” ways of preserving *Dabaodao*. To them, authenticity referred to seeking correct and truthful historical narrative and knowledge and carrying out preservation accordingly. “Cultural heritage is the solidification of history”, as one informant phrased it.

“Old-town protectors” and the government’s ideas of heritage preservation followed very different cultural-political logics. In fact, the majority of “old-town protectors” denounced the government-led “preservation-oriented” project as a distortion of history and reality. They often referred to contemporary urban planning in general and Qingdao’s preservation activities in particular as “fake” and “only profit-oriented”. But the different narratives and discourses were nevertheless intertwined in that the government’s changing position pertaining to preservation allowed the popular preservation discourse to mushroom. Moreover, the state has even welcomed a moderate degree of civic participation in the debates over preservation vs. demolition. The result, however, has been that the now-established popular heritage discourse has also directly informed and influenced the official one. “Old-town protectors” were quite skilful in utilizing the media and their personal connections to the political system to lobby decision-makers and pressure them to deliver “authentic” preservation. A local university professor who was acting as an advisor to the city government in redevelopment questions once told me how city-level officials expressed their worry about “public outrage” during a government meeting that he attended. “The officials are extremely cautious not to do anything wrong.” By “wrong” he was referring to the demolition of buildings that the wider public regarded as historical and in need of protection. We can thus regard “old-town protectors” as “policy entrepreneurs”, those who wriggle their way into policy-making and even help shape policy outcomes (Mertha 2009: 996). This apparent pluralization of urban planning and the discursive room available for citizens to not only partake in

the debates about redevelopment, but to even directly influence decision-makers, can be viewed as a commendable aspect of China's changing urbanization ideology. But on the flipside, as a result of the ongoing debates about how to "correctly" preserve *Dabaodao* and its architecture, the official redevelopment project to create a "European-style scenic neighbourhood" ran into a deadlock and was eventually scrapped. This, as I move on to discuss, has had repercussions for inner city residents and points to some fundamental contradictions attending China's changing preservation discourse.

The "Walkers"

The residents of *Dabaodao* are "the walkers", those living inside of today's inner city. For example, my neighbour, Brother Dragon, was born and raised in *Dabaodao* in the 1950s, the youngest of six children in a room of 10 m². His entire youth was "wasted" during the Cultural Revolution. He saw Red Guards smashing the windows and crosses of Qingdao's Catholic Church and witnessed "counterrevolutionaries" being humiliated inside the courtyard. He never really went to school and, as a teenager, he was sent down to the countryside (*xiaxiang*). Upon his return he could not find a job and began helping his parents run a street food stall. Later, he worked for a business selling and fixing air-conditioners, but had to quit because of a leg injury. China's emergent private economy and the new labour market had no room for people like him. There was an abundance of younger and more qualified personnel who clearly had the edge over people like Brother Dragon who had not even completed primary school education. He has since been living off a small disability annuity, but constantly considers ways to make some extra cash on the side.

A different story is that of "Baldy", an unemployed welfare recipient in his sixties. I interviewed him in February, just before Chinese Spring Festival. His sparsely decorated room was bitter cold, with no heating or air-conditioning, only a bed, a TV, a closet, and a desk. Baldy drank a lot, empty beer bottles were piling up outside his door, and the air was filled with cigarette smoke. This room was his former work-unit housing. Like

many others, he had purchased it at a subsidized rate. It was the only “valuable” he possessed. In the 1980s and early 90s, after he had been laid-off, he jobbed “here and there”, he told me. His most recent job had been as a security guard at one of Qingdao’s universities, but because of his bad health, he was made redundant. He suffered from various diseases, including rheumatism.⁵ Baldy showed me a crumpled piece of paper from a hospital proving that he was “disabled”, as he put it. “I cannot work because I am handicapped. But they (the government) don’t care about us poor people here. I cannot even pay for medical treatment”.

Mr. Wang, another resident of *Dabaodao*, also lost his secure job in the late-1990s and was later on employed as a security guard at the Qingdao Urban Planning Bureau. He lived together with his unemployed wife, his Down syndrome sister, his mother, and a daughter in her early twenties. They shared two rooms of around 10 m² each. The pay in his new job was nowhere near enough to feed his family, so his wife had to work as a cleaning lady. Their daughter also found a job as a low-level white-collar worker at a company in Qingdao’s *Laoshan* district. She had to travel almost two hours to and from work everyday. This was a common fate of families affected by the downsizing of the state economy.

Brother Dragon, Baldy, and Mr. Wang’s family associated *Dabaodao* not with a distant and detached history, but with the concrete socio-spatial reality after 1949, specifically the later Maoist years and China’s reform period. They generate narratives of marginalization and having been left behind in a rapidly changing urban environment. Baldy once said to me: “Those who had any kinds of skills or qualifications moved out (of the neighbourhood) as soon as they could. Only people like us, the poorest of the poor, stayed behind. *Mei banfa*,” he sighed loudly. Almost all of the local residents I talked with expressed the strong feeling of “having been left behind”. *Mei banfa* means “there is nothing to be done” and it became the most commonly heard phrase, followed by “*dengzhe kan ba*” which means “let’s wait and see”. These were articulations of resignation that served to express how residents saw their own future and that of their current living environment.

The relationship between residents and *Dabaodao* was heavily influenced by this feeling and can perhaps best be described as ambivalent.

This ambivalence could manifest itself in various ways. Brother Dragon's room, for instance, was on the second floor, in the corner of our courtyard. It did not have a window, only a skylight. Brother Dragon was what one would call streetwise; he knew how to get by. Whenever I went over to his room, there would be something new; he had built yet another new shelf, found and repaired an old TV set, suspended a punch bag from his ceiling for exercise or installed a new powerful fan. Brother Dragon used his room and the courtyard environment creatively. He had replaced the original wooden door with a solid steel door and partitioned his room into two areas, an entrance area, which he used as a cooking space, storage, a toilet (a sink attached to a tube that led into the communal stone pit on the ground floor), and to raise a large dog that he usually kept in a tiny iron cage. The other area was his bedroom, living, and dining room. I spent many hours in this room, with him sitting on his bed, me on a wooden bench, between us a foldable table. The ambivalent relationship between Brother Dragon and his small room, the courtyard, the entire neighbourhood could always be sensed. "You know, buildings are like human life, they are ephemeral," he said to me one of the first times we talked. "If they decide to demolish this place, I will not have any hard feelings." But his opinion appeared to be equally ephemeral. A few weeks later he said: "I don't want to ever leave this place. This is my home. I like the freedom here. I can do whatever I want. I like the messiness of it all."

Feelings of rejection and attachment often lay close together. Expressions of anger and discontent were common and sometimes also directly translated into the negligence of public space. Quite a number of residents displayed a kind of "what do I care?!" attitude with regard to the courtyard environment. But this anger was also often paired with a strong sense of place-attachment and belonging. When Brother Dragon's parents died, he inherited the courtyard room. His three elder sisters had married out, one of his brothers died, and the other one gone "to work in other parts of China". "My parents gave the room to me, because I did not have the means to work outside, as my siblings did," Brother Dragon explained. "Living here often reminds me of my parents," he added fondly. Many local residents nostalgically recounted how things were "totally different, much better, in the past". Of course, the notion of the "good past" needs to be very much understood in the context of the dis-

satisfaction about the present and the fact that China’s political and economic transformations turned one of the most egalitarian countries into an extremely stratified one within a very short period of time (Goodman 2014). “Before, we were all just poor” a *Dabaodao* resident once said to me. The act of invoking the notion of a “better past”, however, also reinforced the feeling of indignation in regard to the present (Lee 2007: 140). It made many residents aware in a rather direct way that they were indeed the “residue”, living at the margins and assuming a backward position in a society that has been moving forward at an unprecedented pace. Mr. Shan, a retiree who has lived in *Dabaodao* for 40 years, said: “You know this society has developed, this country has developed, it is not so bad living here, but seeing all this change going on outside, I must say that my life here is really not up-to-date anymore.” A different resident said, “along with the development of society and the improvement of people’s quality of life, I more and more feel that my place is too small. No way to live here anymore.”

Important to understanding local residents’ feelings is also that *Dabaodao* was for many years portrayed as “unliveable” and “in need of upgrading” in official discourse. The government’s paternalistic redevelopment rhetoric conveyed the possibility for residents to experience an improvement in their living conditions *as a result* of redevelopment. For the most recent project, for example, a family living in a room between 25 and 40 m² in size could obtain over 700,000 yuan (around €100,000)⁶ plus various bonuses as compensation if they moved out within a certain time period. This sum would not be sufficient to buy a new apartment, let alone in an area as centrally located as *Dabaodao*. But it would be more than the majority of local residents have ever had at their disposal. It would be wrong to reduce residents’ relationships with their current living space to this tangible benefit; but it is certainly an important factor, particularly because so many other people have, over the past decades, significantly benefitted from housing eviction and redevelopment in Qingdao and in other Chinese cities. So local residents would sometimes ask rhetorically: “Other people all benefitted from redevelopment, why shouldn’t we?!” The constant talk about redevelopment fuelled residents’ expectations, but waiting for it to happen caused a great deal of frustration. Once, an informant got up during an interview and took out a pack

of crumpled newspaper cuttings that he had collected underneath a chair cushion. The first one dated back to 2006; the latest one was from 2012. All talked about the launch of the redevelopment project. Showing them to me made him even angrier; he was furious: “See! It’s all just empty talk! They have been promising things for years. But nothing has happened!” Many residents felt irritated by the talk about redevelopment that never concretized.

Residents saw a direct correlation between the current developmental stagnation and the existing preservation discourse. Thus, many regarded with considerable dislike the increasing number of experts, officials, historians, and photographers lingering about the neighbourhood and voyeuristically trying to capture a moment of “true Qingdao culture”. Numerous times while carrying out interviews or informally asking questions, an informant would suddenly burst out in anger, telling me that I was wasting my time, that there was nothing to do anyway and that the whole place should just be knocked down.

The Effects of “Heritagization”

Clearly, the “voyeurs” (“old-town protectors” and the government) and the “walkers” (local residents) generate very different kinds of narratives about the history, meaning, and present usages of *Dabaodao* and its *Liyuan* courtyards. “Old-town protectors” focus their attention on a more distant past, mainly the time before 1949. Local residents, in contrast, associate *Dabaodao* with the time *after* “Liberation” and so residents’ stories and memories begin precisely (not to say ironically) when the narratives of historians end. Furthermore, for “old-town protectors”, the physical remains—the *Liyuan* courtyards and their architectural uniqueness—make today’s *Dabaodao* meaningful. The same is true for the city government eager to capitalize on the old architecture for the purpose of place promotion. For local residents, however, the area is meaningful in that it is the place that they call home, but they rarely directly verbalize this meaning. Their feelings toward the area are ambivalent, influenced by negative emotions of being left behind, but also by a positive sense of place-attachment. At the same time, *Dabaodao* has an

economic meaning to local residents in that redevelopment brings with it the potential for monetary or other compensation. Lastly, regarding the use of the neighbourhood, "old-town protectors" demand authentic preservation. The government wants to create a place for cultural consumption and tourism. Local residents, on the other hand, use the area in their daily lives and transform it accordingly.

In the dominant preservation discourse, the social reality in the inner city and the fact that it remains a place for the urban poor is largely absent. Some "old town protectors" did display an awareness of local residents' struggles and also saw the need to include them into preservation activities. However, in their attempts to save *Dabaodao* from commercialization, the most pragmatic and promising strategy vis-à-vis the local government was to appeal to the architectural value of *Liyuan* houses. Ideas of local distinctiveness and historical value fed into the government's notion of city-branding and thus found resonance among officials. As a result of this exclusive focus on architecture, however, residents were often merely regarded as a necessary evil that had to be dealt with. Genuine attempts to include residents in the preservation activities did hardly exist. "How do you think the problem of residents can be solved"? I was asked this question numerous times but always struggled to answer it, because "the problem of residents" implied that current ways of using the inner city were incompatible with the attempts to preserve it. Indeed, some "old-town protectors" and government agents frequently labelled residents' ways of using the neighbourhood as "destructive", because they actively transformed their living space and thereby the courtyard environment and thus an artefact that was of historical significance, in the eyes of preservation advocates.

Moreover, the stagnation and failure of the redevelopment project have adversely affected residents in a number of ways. Many expressed their willingness to invest some of their own time and money to repair and improve their homes. But the insecurity, in particular the lack of information with regard to whether and when the city government might launch the project, prevented them from doing so. "Why would I spend my money and waste my time on renovating my place, if they suddenly decide to knock it down next year"? More than one resident expressed this concern. Accordingly, the failure to act on the redevelopment

announcements over and over again not only caused a great deal of discontent, but dangling out hopes to residents also contributed to the further disintegration of infrastructure and an overall “messy” environment, for which residents were then blamed by “old-town protectors” and government officials.

Finally, previous forms of urban redevelopment in China based on demolition and relocation may have been violent and often inhumane, but for potential evictees, the situation was straightforward. As a local informant once explained, “at least, in the past the situation was clear: they come in, you negotiate, you take the money and you are gone.” Now, as the current redevelopment project has failed over the ongoing debates as to how to carry it out “properly”, residents are forced to live a life of uncertainties, not knowing when, whether and under what conditions they may have to move out or will experience an improvement in their living environment.

Conclusion

“In the end, preservation is always better than demolition!” This is what an “old-town protector” concluded after a long conversation revolving around the question as to how to deal with *Dabaodao*. Quite contrary to this claim, rather than regarding the wish to preserve as an unquestioned positive aspiration, in this chapter I have argued for the necessity to carefully evaluate the meanings and impacts of preservation in specific socio-cultural contexts. The specific context that I have presented here points to the following problematic situation: We witness a pluralization and diversification of the preservation debate in Qingdao. More people take an active interest in questions of preservation and also have ways to influence decision-makers. But the exclusive focus on the preservation of architecture on the part of the government and “old town protectors” has largely excluded the urban poor living inside the inner city. Following the title of this chapter, at one end of the spectrum residents of *Dabaodao* live in a “past” that manifests itself through architectural remnants and is celebrated as cultural heritage; at the other end, however, they live in a “past” that is a by-product of previous political and economic reforms

and residents are merely regarded as a necessary evil. Furthermore, the stagnation of the redevelopment project has subjected residents to greater precarity and uncertainty pertaining to the future of their homes and ultimately their own lives. So I argue that the exclusive focus on architectural preservation does not do justice to the actual experiences, feelings, and expectations of local residents and even stands in the way of a more inclusive debate on finding a way of dealing with inner city problems based on its social functions and the needs of current residents. These needs, however, as the article has also pointed out, are difficult to reconcile with any attempts of preservation. Due to China's previous urban redevelopment practices, many residents associate redevelopment primarily with economic benefits. They feel that they are rightfully entitled to profit from redevelopment in the same way as other people in China have over the past years. Considering this then, it is indeed difficult to think of other, perhaps more participatory or inclusive forms of preservation that may actually do justice to residents' needs. So the final message that this article conveys is not that preservation is detrimental per se, but rather, that China's previous urban redevelopment regime has created conditions that make any forms of preservation difficult to achieve, which in turn also hints at the challenges China will be facing in managing its urban future.

Acknowledgments I am deeply indebted to Prof. Dolores Koenig of the American University in Washington DC for the time and effort spent editing and commenting on earlier versions of this article.

Notes

1. It was the name of a fishing village located in the area before the Germans occupied it.
2. Screen walls were erected at entrances inside courtyards to shelter the interior from the prying eyes of outsiders.
3. Based on data provided by informants.
4. China's *hukou* system came into being in its current form in the 1950s (Fan 2008). It divides the entire country into two groups: those holding a

rural and those holding with an urban household registration. The goal was to prevent the rural population from flooding into cities. An urban *bukou* offers significant advantages in terms of welfare, benefits, and subsidies. Since membership in either group is assigned at birth and inherited from the mother, Potter and Potter (1990: 296) refer to this birth-ascribed stratification as displaying “caste-like features”.

5. Chronic illnesses have been identified as one major cause of impoverishment in China, especially among retirees (Wu et al. 2010: 105).
6. As of December 2016, 1 yuan equalled 0.14 Euro.

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Erratum to: Chapter 4: Changchun Across 1949: Rebuilding a Colonial Capital City Under Socialism in the Early 1950s

Yishi Liu

Erratum to:

China: A Historical Geography of the Urban

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6_4

This chapter was inadvertently published without reference/citation and the same has been updated.

The updated online version of this chapter can be found at
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6_4

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Y. Ding et al. (eds.), *China: A Historical Geography of the Urban*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64042-6_11

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