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Characteristics of Temporary Migration in European-Asian Transnational Social Spaces

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Contents

Chapter 1
Introduction: Temporary Migration in European-Asian Social Spaces

Mustafa Aksakal, Kerstin Schmidt, Mari Korpela, and Pirkko Pitkänen

One of the key tendencies in the contemporary world is the increase in the volumes of people's mobility back and forth between nation-states for various reasons as well as the rise of people's engagement in cross-border social ties. People 'migrate, oscillate, circulate or tour' (O'Reilly 2007: 281) between their home and host countries, which means that they may leave one country, move to a second and then either settle there or return to their native country, or move on to a third.

In addition to considerable numbers of people who are mobile on a voluntary basis, there are also an increasing number of people who are, either temporarily or permanently, forced to leave their native countries, because of wars, natural disasters and other harmful situations. Moreover, it needs to be taken into account that the vast majority of human beings are not willing to migrate or are 'trapped' in their places of origin (Black and Collyer 2014). This latter aspect in particular points to the aspect of selectivity in migration (Haas et al. 2014; Skeldon 2014), indicating that only a small number of the world's population is in a position to engage in cross-border migration. Yet, from a 'mobilities' perspective (Urry 2007), regardless of people's physical immobility, they may be involved in and affected by various

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forms of mobility which also points to the significance of transnational social spaces (Faist 2000).[1]

Castles and Miller (1993) were among the first migration scholars who sought to provide a comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of the contemporary 'Age of Migration', meaning to identify the causes, processes and consequences of global human movements after the Second World War. Following this perspective, it can be argued that in today's world, many new transformational shifts are emerging. These transformations may shape migration (Castles 2010), or societies are altered in different ways by these human movements (Portes 2010). Some examples that provide insights into this 'migration and transformation nexus' (Faist et al. 2017) can be summed up in the following way: *first*, political and economic change under neoliberal globalisation has increased inequalities on a national and global level (Milanovic 2016; Harvey 2007), representing one major driver for conflicts but also for (temporary) outmigration; *second*, international labour migration, both temporary and circular, continues to be promoted politically in many destination countries (Castles and Ozkul 2014; Piper 2010); *third*, as a consequence, temporary labour movements (Lenard and Straehle 2010), as well as other types of temporary migration (Pitkänen and Korpela 2014), are on the rise; *fourth*, due to technological advances, the chains of transnational movements have lengthened and spread considerably (Pitkänen et al. 2012); and *fifth*, international migration, including temporary forms of movements, has significant effects on source country societies, such as on political processes (Kapur 2014), and on countries of destination, for instance, on the economic and social fabric (OECD 2017; Castles et al. 2014).

These developments not only provide the first indications of the current weight of temporariness and transnationality in international migration but also invite to provide an in-depth analysis of the current characteristics of temporary migration that is achieved by addressing processes and consequences related to human movements in the Asian-European migration context. This coincides with the general objective of this book, namely, to make a contribution to the study of temporary migration in Asian-European social spaces. In particular, the aim of this compilation is to provide from different disciplinary and spatial perspectives comprehensive insights on the reasons why people move on a temporary basis, the experiences they have while migrating temporarily as well as the ways in which different types of temporary migrants engage in transnational social spaces.

The findings discussed in each chapter in this compilation present the outcomes of some selected Asian and European national case studies that were part of the international research project 'Transnational Migration in Transition: Transformative Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of People' (EURA-NET).[2] In the remainder

[1] Social spaces, as understood in this book, refers to cross-border social ties and practices on different societal levels between temporary migrants and non-migrants that link places of origin with transit countries, as well as with previous and present countries of destination (Faist 2000).

[2] The project sought to attain an understanding of current temporary transnational migration between Asian and European countries. For more information on the project, see http://www.uta.fi/eura-net

of this introductory chapter, a general overview of theoretical and methodological accounts is provided with respect to temporary migration. In addition, the guiding questions are introduced, and hypothetical assumptions on influencing factors in temporary migration are discussed.

1.1 Current Temporary Migration Flows Between Asia and Europe

For many years, Asian migration was mainly directed to classical destination countries, such as the USA, Canada and Australia. Especially between 1945 and the early 1970s, Asian migration towards Europe gained in relevance and was based on colonial linkages, and to a minor degree, it was related to bilateral recruitment programmes (Castles et al. 2014).

Nowadays, human movements between Asian and European countries represent an important migratory context. Regarding the migration stocks, Asian migrants, some 19 million people were in 2013 the most important foreign-born group in Europe. Likewise, and in the same year, European sojourners at 7.6 million were one of the most important foreign-born groups in Asia (UN DESA 2013).

Regarding migrant flows, in the period between 2005 and 2010, movements between Asian (including Oceania) and European countries[3] with roughly 3.2 million movements had the highest scores, in comparison to human movements between South and North American and European countries (2.9 million) and African and European countries (2.1 million). Moreover, migratory flows between Asian and European countries increased significantly between the periods of 1990/1995 and 2005/2010 by more than one million movements (Abel and Sander 2014).

Many of these movements represent temporary forms of migration that might be determined either by legal regulations, by migrants' intentions, or by a mixture of both. Moreover, people can be engaged in international migration between the two regions for a variety of purposes including international education, work, humanitarian protection, family reunification and the wish to improve one's quality life elsewhere. In the following paragraphs, annual flows of migrants in particular legal categories to EU countries are briefly discussed.

Accordingly, the number of highly skilled labour migrants who moved from non-EU countries to European Union member states increased between 2011 and 2015 by almost 12%[4], which includes a significant number of Asian highly skilled migrants. In the case of the Netherlands, for example, the number of highly skilled

[3] Abel and Sander (2014) consider in their calculations the most relevant 24 European countries of destination.

[4] Highly skilled migration includes according to the definition of Eurostat highly skilled workers, researchers and EU Blue Card holders. The numbers of this group of highly skilled migrants rose from 42,403 in 2011 to 47,373 in 2015 (Eurostat 2016a).

(temporary) migrants increased from 7210 in 2011 to 9754 in 2015, corresponding to an increase of around 33%. Almost 60% of these temporary labour migrants came from Asian countries, such as India, China and Japan (Eurostat 2016a).

Next to labour migration, the numbers of international students migrating temporarily from non-EU countries to the EU increased between 2011 and 2015 by more than 220% (Eurostat 2016b)[5], whereby many of these students were from Asian countries, such as China, India and South Korea (OECD 2016), and migrated to European countries, such as the UK, France and Germany (UNESCO 2016). In the case of Germany, international student mobility from all Asian countries increased from 66,422 in the winter term 2011/2012 to 88,619 in 2014/2015, corresponding to an increase of more than 33% (Federal Statistical Office 2012, 2015).

Humanitarian migration to the EU has also increased in recent years, and, especially between 2013 and 2015, there was an increase of more than 200%; a significant number of these people originated in the Middle East and other Asian countries.[6] This becomes apparent, for instance, in the case of Hungary, where the numbers of asylum seekers from Asian countries rose almost tenfold, from 18,895 in 2013 to 177,135 in 2015 (Eurostat 2016c).

The number of family members (i.e. spouses, children and other relatives, especially from India, China and Pakistan), joining a non-EU citizen living in the EU, increased albeit by only 2% between 2009 and 2015 (Eurostat 2016d). However, EU country-specific differences exist. For instance, in Finland, the number of family members joining a non-EU citizen rose from 4,828 in 2011 to 5,126 in 2015, corresponding to an increase of almost 20% over 4 years. Around 50% of these family members migrating to Finland came in 2015 from Asian countries, for example, from Thailand, China or the Philippines (Eurostat 2016d).

The discussion on the statistical trends shows that international migration from Asia to Europe is a trend that has been increasing in recent years. Yet this statistical information does not provide insights into the causes of international migration, including the reasons for temporary movements. It has been argued that among the key factors contributing to international migration, including temporary movements, are the growing role of foreign capital and economic activities of multinational corporations (Held et al. 1999), which notably affect societies of the Global South.

In line with this statement, Portes and Walton (1981) observe that 'structural imbalancing', meaning the penetration of subordinated societies by political and economic institutions from the Global North, would increase the labour migration pressure in societies of the Global South (Portes 2006). This is so, because these politico-economic processes cannot only lead to dispossession (Harvey 2007) but likewise undermine common ways of living and working (Sassen 1988) and consequently increase inequalities within societies (Milanovic 2016).

[5] First permits issued for education reasons (study) increased from 145,364 in 2011 to 470,033 in 2015 (Eurostat 2016b).

[6] The numbers refer to rounded aggregated data on asylum and first-time asylum applications and increased from 431,090 in 2013 to 1,322,825 in 2015 (Eurostat 2016c).

The emergence and expansion of global cities (Sassen 2005) may be an additional explanation for rising temporary migration, because global cities have a high attraction for labour migrants due to their high demand for both low and highly skilled migrant workers.

Next to these structural reasons that might give rise to international movements, there are also many factors that facilitate people's mobility in different temporary migrant categories, such as recruitment agencies and human trafficking networks that form part of the 'migration industry' (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013; Xiang and Lindquist 2014) as well as recruitment programmes launched by destination country governments (Castles and Ozkul 2014). In addition, flying has become relatively inexpensive, and it is also easy to communicate over long distances online (Castells 1996; Harvey 1990). In relation to this, people are becoming more embedded in transnational diasporic communities so that they can use existing social networks and social capital (Faist 2000; Massey et al. 1993) to reduce the costs and risks and also to maximise the benefits in migration processes.

Many of these approaches have been invoked in migration studies to explain in general terms why people engage in cross-border mobility. Yet little attention has so far been paid to the systematic study of the characteristics of temporary migration, related to the aspects discussed above which is the main objective of this contribution.

1.2 Explaining Temporary Migration

According to King (2012), temporary labour migration that may refer to the movement of low-skilled or highly skilled workers is one of the categories of human mobility that have received the greatest attention in migration studies. In the past, temporary international migration was approached differently by source and destination countries. From a Global South perspective, the emigration of skilled population segments is often addressed critically as 'brain drain' or 'skill drain' (Ranis 2008). It is discussed in relation to losses of human capital in developing countries, either associated with absent returns on previous educational investments (e.g. the infrastructure for education, the training of teachers, etc.) (Docquier 2006; Langthaler 2008), connected to reducing productivity and per capita income and consequently to decelerated economic outcomes in migrants' countries of origin (Haque and Kim 1995; Lucas 1988) or associated with the loss of important tax revenue (Bhagwati and Hamada 1982).

The return of temporary highly skilled migrants is also seen as less useful for the development of source countries, because both scientific innovations and professional activities, for instance, in global cities – the places to which foreign highly skilled migrants often migrate – would commonly include types of training that are seldom in accordance with the developmental conditions in countries of the Global South (Portes and Walton 1981). In addition, it is argued that highly skilled migration would have only few outcomes for the migrants themselves. This is the case

because their migration would represent only a provision of flexible labour force for high-tech sectors in the Global North, which is frequently associated with unfavourable working conditions (Portes 2008) and 'brain waste' (Matto et al. 2008), meaning insufficient opportunities for social mobility.

In highly industrialised countries, the discussion was guided by different concerns in both academic and political discourses. Debates have pointed to the compensation of labour force shortages in many countries of the Global North after the Second World War through temporary migration, which has also been considered beneficial for migrants (i.e. in acquiring skills and competences) as well as for sending countries, especially after the return of temporary labour (Faist 2008; Kindleberger 1967). In response to these labour shortages in the past, many destination country governments have implemented bilateral recruitment schemes to attract foreign low-skilled workers, as in the guest worker programmes in many European countries (Castles and Kosack 1973; Castles 1986).

Temporary migration is currently a topical issue and understood politically in different ways. For instance, the European Migration Network proposes a very general definition and considers temporary migration as a process that 'involves a one-time only temporary stay and eventual return which closes the migration cycle' (2011: 21). UNESCO (2015a) understands temporary migrants as 'people who migrate for a limited period of time in order to take up employment and send money home', thereby reducing temporary mobility to labour migration and related activities to financial remittances.

Many destination country governments, including more industrialised European countries, are currently considering attracting temporary foreign workers as a part of their national development strategies. Although there may be some differences between the EU member states,[7] it can be argued that highly skilled migrants from non-EU countries are especially in the focus of current political agendas. This consideration points to the fact that from a policy point of view, certain types of temporary migrants are desirable in order to fill sectorial and/or seasonal labour gaps. These gaps may be related to demographic transitions, such as to an ageing population, which can be compensated for by incoming young labour force (Castles 2009) and to better competitiveness in the global markets, that is, the need to recruit labour with special skills or inexpensive labour force. Therefore governments, including those of European countries, have publicly discussed the temporary stays of highly skilled migrants – often with decidedly positive connotations – and have tried to create appropriate legal instruments to provide newly arriving temporary migrants with access to the domestic labour market.

From a critical viewpoint, it has been argued that temporary migration schemes in classical destination countries have served to reduce the social and political costs of migration. This means that the demands of employers are satisfied, while the idea that the migrants will not stay is thought to allay public fears and hostilities.

[7] For example, Korpela, Hyytiä and Pitkänen (in this book) note that in Finland, next to highly skilled, also low-skilled migrants represent a significant temporary migrant category, as seen in the case of seasonal berry pickers from Thailand.

In addition, it also entails that labour rights, entitlements as well as broader participation in society can be more easily restricted when migrants are only staying for a limited period of time (Castles and Ozkul 2014; Lenard and Straehle 2010). Some scholars argue that curtailing of labour rights and exclusion from entitlements and participation in public spheres may match with the general willingness of temporary migrants to accept unfavourable living and working conditions that are not only lower than the standards pertaining to the local population but also below the immigrants' living conditions prior to migration. This is so, because temporary stays are often linked to people's long-term intentions, potentially involving return or onward migration (Bauböck 2011; Ottonelli and Torresi 2012).

Sometimes these critical reflections are not only limited to temporary migration but also discussed in relation to circular forms of migration, meaning 'regular, repeated temporary labour migration' (Vertovec 2007: 3). In this regard, Skeldon (2012) argues that managing circular migration would mean introducing a range of institutional barriers that lead to the conversion of circular migration into a 'programme of temporary migration by another name' (Skeldon 2012: 53). This consideration indicates that circular and temporary migration schemes implemented by destination countries can sometimes pursue very similar objectives, namely, to 'bring in labour but not people' (Wickramasekara 2011: 86) which also shows the strong connection between the two concepts in political discussions.

Alongside these political debates, there are various academic approaches that address temporary migration and particularly emphasise migrant agency, such as those studies that focus on motivations for engaging in temporary migration. Piore (1979) introduces the term 'target earning' to explain that one important objective of temporary labour migrants is to accumulate sufficient financial resources abroad in order to build a house, start a small business or invest in other types of assets on returning home. It should also be noted, however, that many temporary migrants need to borrow money in order to be able to become temporary migrants abroad and they must then first earn enough money to pay back their debts (often with significant interest).

Other scholars discuss the motivational factors in relation to the objective of achieving a better income as well as improved labour conditions. Steiner and Velling (1994) discuss these motivational drivers in the context of guest worker immigration to Germany, and Constant and Massey (2003) address these factors in the case of labour immigration to the USA. Again, for the case of the USA, Massey and Akresh (2006) find that life satisfaction in the destination country and assets in the country of origin have an influence on the organisation of migration and decisions about the stays abroad. Guarnizo (2003) discusses this topic in relation to the expectations of non-migrants, such as families and friends, as a relevant factor for decisions on the length of stay. Bauböck (2011) also seeks to conceptualise temporariness and discusses aspects that potentially influence the duration of stay of international migrants. On this account, he proposes making a distinction between three different analytical spheres of temporariness: first, as an 'objective social fact', it refers to real-life events characterised by a concrete temporary stay in a destination country that is concluded after a certain period through return or onward movements.

Second, as a 'subjective expectation', it can be understood as a stay abroad limited in time that is 'subjectively intended' by the migrant. The scholar argues that the length of stay can be affected by changing migrants' future plans that 'can then conflict with non-corresponding expectations in the wider society about their departure' (Bauböck 2011: 670). Third, 'normative constraints' represent another way of perceiving temporariness, meaning that temporary migration can refer to 'legally prescribed' frameworks that formally legitimise or prohibit the duration of stay by law. Moreover, normative constraints may be linked to moral norms that 'are invoked primarily when disputing the normative validity of such legal permissions and prohibitions and when proposing alternative justifications for temporary admission or permanent residence rights' (Bauböck 2011: 670) by migrants individually or collectively. The modes of subjective expectation and moral norms emphasises especially the role of people's agency in temporary migration, because migrants' intentions prior to and during their stays abroad involve many decisive factors that might shape migrants' behaviours and patterns, such as those expressed in the ways of incorporation into the destination society and labour market (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012).

The Asian and European country chapters in this book illustrate that legal norms and political practices on the level of the EU and the EU member states to control and manage migration flows can have an influence on temporary migrants and their subjective expectations, but that they do not guarantee that mobile people stay for a predefined duration, because migrant behaviours and intentions may subvert these political intentions in many different ways. This also means that intentions and legal barriers can be conflicting (Bauböck 2011) or exert influence over each other and that therefore separate analysis of both aspects is hardly useful.

Several scholarly contributions focus critically on existing political discussions and measures for temporary migration not only because the perspective of the destination country but also because temporary migration is emphasised in a rather uncritical way (Lenard 2014; Sager 2014; Piper 2010). Although these pivotal considerations constitute reasonable criticism, many of these studies limit their focus to temporary low-skilled labour migration.

However, there are many good reasons (e.g. the increasing relevance of human trafficking networks, technological advances in recent years and consequently the expansion of transnational support networks) to consider that next to labour migration; there are also other relevant types of migration significant for temporary mobilities, including movements between Asia and Europe. In addition, also the previously noted causes for migration not only provide important insights to the structural conditions for the temporary outmigration of labour forces but also have the potential to explain why people who are not searching for work move to other places.

That the movement of distinct migrant categories gains in importance is also confirmed by Castles et al. (2014), who argue that not only are the numbers of labour migrants moving towards new industrial economies growing fast but also violent conflicts are leading to mass movements of displaced people, especially

from the less developed regions. Additionally, it can be argued that new types of mobility are also emerging as increasing numbers of people move temporarily for education, marriage or retirement or in search of new lifestyles abroad, which also holds true for temporary migration between Asian and European countries.

1.3 Categories of Temporary Migrants

Pitkänen and Carerra (2014) identify international students, highly skilled professionals, low-skilled workers, family members, lifestyle migrants, humanitarian migrants and undocumented migrants as migrant categories that exist increasingly on a temporary basis. In practice, these categories may be overlapping, and an individual may change his/her status from one category to another over time. Many temporary movements in the noted categories are relevant in both directions, meaning that they proceed from Asian to European countries and vice versa, which may also include return migration. In addition, in different country cases, some of the categories may be more relevant than in others; the national case studies presented in this compilation reveal these differences. The most relevant temporary migrant categories can be defined as follows:

(a) *International students* can be defined as a type of international migrants who have left their country of origin temporarily and moved to another country in order to pursue education (OECD 2013). Student mobility can be differentiated into credit and degree mobility; while credit mobility refers to international students spending an exchange semester in a foreign university, degree mobility refers to enrolment in an entire degree programme abroad (Cairns 2014; King and Ragharum 2013).

(b) *Highly skilled migrants* are often perceived by destination country authorities as temporary migrants who possess 'a university degree or extensive/equivalent experience in a given field' (Iredale 2001: 8). There are also other considerations that are not linked to education, but, for instance, are related to occupation or salary levels (Parsons et al. 2014). The employment sectors of highly skilled persons may vary from local private companies to multinationals and also include education and health care in the public sectors (Cerna 2010). Next to many male temporary migrants engaged, for example, in the IT industry, female migrants may also be involved in temporary labour schemes. In fact, there are certain programmes that serve as formal channels through which female workers from the countries of the Global South are recruited to work in the countries of the Global North, as becomes evident in the 'triple win' programme that organises temporary nurses from the Philippines to work in German hospitals (Aksakal and Schmidt 2015).

(c) *Low-skilled migrants* can be approached in two ways, either on the basis of the requirements for the job or on the educational level of the person who accomplishes it. Therefore, low-skilled temporary migrants 'can be either a

characteristic of the job or a characteristic of the worker' (Chaloff 2008: 127). While the needs of employers and the prerequisites of recruitment programmes focus on the level of skills required for the job, immigration policies focus on the migrants' level of education. The latter is in line with the definition by the OECD, suggesting that 'low-skilled are those whose education is less than upper secondary' (2011: 56). A particular category of low-skilled workers are the agricultural seasonal workers, for instance, those temporarily employed in the berry picking or the asparagus harvesting industries.

(d) *Family migrants* are defined by the UN as 'people sharing family ties joining people who have already entered an immigration country' (UNESCO 2015a). The right to family reunion for legal migrants is recognised by many countries, with the exception of some contract labour systems. Migration in the context of family reunification in most cases refers to spouses and children joining family members who are migrating or have previously migrated. Therefore the length of stay of the family members is usually linked to the length of stay of the migrant who (temporarily) works (or studies) in the destination country. Another form of family-related migration occurs when foreign spouses join partners already resident in the destination country in order to live together (Aksakal and Schmidt-Verkerk 2014). This form of family-related migration is typically more permanent, unless families decide to move on to live in another country or the relationship ends in divorce.

(e) *Lifestyle migrants* encompasses people from affluent industrialised countries 'migrating in search of a better quality of life' (Benson and O'Reilly 2009: 609), usually to destinations with a favourable climate and lower living costs in relation to the country of origin. These people may be involved in formal or informal labour markets, but, rather than pursuing career development, they move abroad in order to find a more meaningful and relaxed way of life. Life at the destination is often understood as more authentic than in one's native country, and the choice to live abroad is typically conceptualised as an escape from hectic, consumer-oriented lifestyles, the 'rat race', diminishing income opportunities and stressful working environments (Benson and O'Reilly 2009; Korpela 2010). Some Asian countries (e.g. Thailand and Malaysia) have particular visa categories for wealthy and healthy retirees, but in many countries lifestyle migrants reside on repeatedly renewed tourist visas.

(f) *Humanitarian migrants* may refer to both 'refugees' and 'asylum seekers'. The 1951 Geneva Convention defines refugees as people who are outside the country of their nationality 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion' (UNHCR 2006: 16). An asylum seeker is defined as someone who 'has applied for protection as a refugee and is awaiting the determination of his or her status' (UNESCO 2015b). In our project focusing on temporary migration, we included refugees and asylum seekers because, although many of them wish to settle in the destination on a permanent basis, in practice many end up being there only temporarily, either because they are not allowed to stay or because they move onward by their own choice.

Finally, it can be argued that many of these categories (e.g. international student mobility or humanitarian migration) have existed for many decades, but, as noted above, the number of human movements in these categories has risen dramatically in recent years. So far the literature has hardly perceived mobile people beyond labour migrants as temporary. This may be related to the fact that certain types of human movements have been and continue to be discussed in isolation from labour migration, as becomes apparent in the literature on student mobility, humanitarian or lifestyle migration. However, legal frameworks in many classical and newly emerging destination countries in the Global North and the Global South have enacted legal measures that provide these migrant categories with only temporary residence permits. Next to these legal constraints, subjective expectations merit consideration because, as will be discussed throughout the book, many mobile people involved in the temporary migration categories introduced above have different intentions prior to their departure from what they state later. This means that temporary migrants may initially plan to achieve their objectives in a limited period of time and thereafter to engage either in return or onward migration. Beyond the question if and why these intentions change during the stays, another question that emerges is what the consequences of both legal constraints and subjective expectations are for migrants and for destination and source countries. One response to these open questions might be related to temporary migrants' transnational engagements, a topic that this book seeks especially to address from different geographical angles.

1.4 Temporariness and Transnationality

Contrary to other approaches to international migration, the transnational perspective is one of the few viewpoints that emphasise migrants' agencies (Castles 2010; Faist 2010; Portes 1996) without limiting mobile people's motivations, behaviours and transactions to economic rationales, such as assumed in neoclassical theory (Harris and Todaro 1970; Massey et al. 1993; Sjaastad 1962). Moreover, studies on migrants' transnationality make it possible to avoid 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003), which refers to the assumption that nation-states and related societies represent the natural framework of societal life. As a consequence, by considering national societies as appropriate units of analysis for studying social dynamics, social scientists have assumed that these societies represent an analytical container. This also holds true for migration studies, in which, for instance, immigration and the integration of incoming foreigners have been addressed from the national perspective of destination countries. As a side effect, the political interests of destination countries were conflated with academic objectives (Castles 2007).

In this broader methodological debate, the importance of the nation-states and their respective societies is not ignored, but it is argued that a transnational angle, i.e. using cross-border units of analysis, a range of migration experiences that

previously could not considered can now be studied and theorised (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003). One of these units of analysis can be identified as migrants' transnationality (Portes et al. 1999), which refers to international migrants' cross-border ties and social practices with relevant non-migrants (e.g. family members, friends), left behind in their places of origin, previous destination countries or elsewhere. In other words, this means that the 'transnational perspective' focuses on the 'processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement' (Basch et al. 1994: 6).

The result of migrants' and relevant non-migrants' continuous transactions is social formations, defined as transnational social spaces (Faist 2000). These spaces comprise migrant networks, which are important for co-ordinating and operationalising cross-border social practices, such as on a collective-level civil society activism and the strategic planning of common goals. They are defined as channels connecting 'migrants and non-migrants across time and space [through which] information, assistance and obligations' are exchanged' (Boyd 1989: 641). Very different transnational spaces may emerge, such as transnational kinship groups (e.g. households, families and other kinship relations), transnational circuits (e.g. advocacy networks, business or science networks) or transnational communities (Faist 2000). In addition, there is a transnational mindset: individuals may be socially rooted in several places, sometimes discussed under the concept of 'transnational identities' (Massey and Sanchez 2005; Vertovec 2001), 'transnational citizenship' (Faist 2007; Smith 2010) or 'flexible citizenship' (Ong 1999).

The introduction of the transnational approach was undeniably a significant achievement for migration studies, because it made it possible to address different aspects of migrant agency. Cross-border migration studies have paid keen attention to the relationship between migrants' transnationality and international circular migration (Skeldon 2012) and settled migration (Dahindem 2010). Only in a few studies have particular categories relevant to temporary migration been investigated with regard to their transnational linkages. One example is seen in the study by Saxenian (2005) on 'brain circulation'. The author found that Chinese and Indian highly skilled migrants, who after graduating studied and worked in Silicon Valley, were able to build start-up companies in their countries of origin after their return. As temporary migrants in the USA, they developed transnational business networks, in which they were also embedded after their return. Through these links, they were able to engage frequently in technological and knowledge transfers between the country of origin and the USA. Next to the noted investments and knowledge transfers, these actors, according to Saxenian, were also able to achieve political shifts in their home countries.

In the case of Germany, Schüller and Schüler-Zhou (2013) show how Chinese international students, at the individual level and through alumni associations on a collective level, maintain strong transnational links to families, communities and state institutions in China and thereby continue to interact with people in their place of origin and to demonstrate loyalty to the homeland. These examples illustrate how temporary migrants develop cross-border links during their stays abroad.

Despite the increasing relevance of both immigration policies that foster temporary recruitment schemes and the increasing number of mobile people engaged in temporary migration, there seems to be no general conceptualisation that systematically links migrants' transnationality and temporariness. The transnational lens is a useful approach to overcome both theoretical and methodological limitations in studying temporary migration; the strength of this perspective is that it makes it possible to address how social lives and relationships among migrants and their friends and relatives are subject to alteration by border-crossing formations. Regarding temporary migration, this can mean that cross-border ties may influence the choice of particular destination regions, migrants' intentions and behaviours. Certainly, not all temporary international migrants are necessarily engaged transnationally, nor does the transnational approach provide an all-encompassing explanation for temporary migration, because other influential aspects, for instance, those related to the destination country, may also be relevant (e.g. discrimination and xenophobia).

However, the transnational perspective provides an additional analytical tool to address the characteristics of contemporary temporary migration, which is also reflected in each chapter of this book. In light of ongoing advances in communication and transportation technologies, it can be assumed that a growing number of international temporary migrants' lives will be characterised by transnational relationships and frequent transactions in transnational social spaces. Consequently, transnationality may influence more and more migrants' motivations and behaviours. Understanding these social processes entails not only analysing the conceptions and experiences of migrants but also those of non-migrants located in countries of origin, transit or previous and present destination. This suggests that there is a need to produce more appropriate information on the current transnational features of temporary migrants in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the dynamics related to subjective expectations and factors in previous destination and source countries that may influence migratory trajectories.

With regard to the various relevant temporary migrant categories introduced above, it seems especially important to understand which forms of expression transnational social spaces assume and what kinds of political, economic and social practices are present in each category. Next to migrants' experiences in their countries of origin, this can provide a comprehensive understanding of the social processes involved in temporary migration. Related to these and other research gaps discussed above, the following questions are of particular interest:

1. Why do people migrate on a temporary basis and not permanently?
2. What are the daily experiences of various types of temporary migrants? And how does temporariness affect their migration experiences?
3. How does temporary migrants' transnationalism appear in the European-Asian transnational social spaces?

To answer these questions, in the EURA-NET project, the Asian-European social space was taken as the main unit of analysis for several reasons. First, the primary axis of the current international migration is along the states in the south to the north and from the east to the west. Second, Asia is a region experiencing particularly

intense emigration to Europe, often with the expectation of an eventual return to the country of origin or onward movements. English-speaking countries have attracted most migration flows, but recent developments show that non-English-speaking EU member states have also become popular among Asian migrants. It is likely that this development will continue, particularly in light of Brexit and the related efforts by the UK governments to restrict migration, including highly skilled and international student mobility. Third, not only do Chinese, Indians, Filipinos, Thais and other Asians have an increasing presence in Europe, but Europeans also increasingly move to different Asian countries. In many cases, these migratory movements are temporary in nature (Pitkänen and Korpela 2014). However, it is evident that migratory movements from Asia to the EU and from the EU to Asia are unbalanced in terms of volume; whereas the number of Asian migrants going to the EU has markedly increased, migration from Europe to Asia is still modest according to the statistics. According to Eurostat (2016e), inflows from Asian countries to the EU amounted in 2014 to 251,823,[8] and the number of emigrants from the EU to Asian countries amounted to 87,219.[9] It is worth noting that the significant difference in numbers remains even when taking into consideration that many Europeans who reside temporarily in Asia have not registered their sojourns in their European native countries, and thus these stays do not appear in the statistics.

Nevertheless, the picture emerging in the country reports of the EURA-NET project (see Pitkänen and Carerra 2014; Pitkänen and Korpela 2014) is that many Europeans are adopting increasingly mobile transnational lifestyles and Asia is an increasingly popular destination. In relation to temporary migration, it is relevant to consider the role of external aspects that may be linked to sending, transit and/or receiving societies and how they influence subjective expectations and migration behaviours, including the duration of stay. This suggests that temporary transnational migration can be perceived as a more or less ongoing process, the trajectory of which depends to a large extent on diverse politico-legal, socio-economic and sociocultural factors located in different places that might affect distinct types of temporary migrants in different ways. Hypothetically the following can be argued for:

Influential factors in the politico-legal sphere: The governments of wealthy destination countries in particular aim to manage cross-border migration, which is often expressed in immigration policies that are selective in nature (Beine et al. 2015; De Haas et al. 2014). Although migration policies may often fall short of predefined goals (Bhagwati 2003) and thus have unintended consequences (Castles 2004), they may shape – regardless of the political purpose – the trajectories, general experiences and intentions of temporary migrants. For those temporary migrants from Asia living in the UK, this means that after Brexit in 2017, they may fear

[8] Data from Germany, Greece, France, Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Portugal and the UK are not provided by Eurostat; consequently these countries are not considered in this number.

[9] Data from the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, France, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria Poland, Portugal, Romania and the UK are not provided by Eurostat and are not included in this number.

restrictions to their career/educational opportunities or living conditions that may convince them, contrary to their initial purpose of staying for a certain period of time in the UK, to move on to another EU country or even to return to their countries of origin.[10]

Highly skilled migrants may enter certain EU countries through the Blue Card scheme, which means that at the beginning of their stay they are officially temporary migrants. As highly skilled migrants working in sectors with labour shortages are supported substantially by host country governments in obtaining a fixed-term resident permit after a certain length of time (e.g. in the cases of Germany and Finland after 4 years), temporary migrants may decide, contrary to their initial intentions, to stay long term.

Furthermore, from a transnational viewpoint, it can be argued that currently many countries of origin are interested in maintaining close links to their citizens abroad, such as discussed by Caĝlar (2006) for the case of Turkish local governments' engagement with their citizens living in Germany. In some cases this also means that governments are aiming to attract them back home for instance by offering highly skilled migrants new incentives as returnees and promoting these through transnational channels.[11]

Influential factors in the socio-economic sphere: As earlier research has shown, migrants' motivations for permanent or temporary stays abroad are often related to achieving better incomes and working conditions. Especially in the case of highly skilled temporary migration, this can mean that the availability of adequate employment opportunities, wages and working conditions, related to the expectations of personal career advancement, is important and affects decisions about the length of sojourn and the migratory trajectory. Decisions about the length of stay may also be influenced by economic conditions and developments in the places of origin. For example, an economic boom may make return particularly lucrative. Influential socio-economic factors may not only be relevant for labour migrants but also for international students, whose primary intention is to enter a particular host country temporarily with the objective of completing university studies. Most receiving EU countries provide graduate students with an opportunity to stay after graduation in order to seek for an appropriate job in the host country, such as in the cases of Finland, Germany and the Netherlands. Hence, if the economies in the receiving countries offer adequate working and career opportunities, the probability that international graduates will stay on is relatively high. This implies that migrants may

[10] The migratory conditions occasioned by the Brexit referendum in the summer of 2016 and the UK's request in early spring 2017 to exit the EU were at the time of this research not relevant and at the time of the publication of this book still very uncertain. Travis (2017), for instance, in a recent report in The Guardian suggests that the net temporary inflows into the UK decreased sharply after the referendum. Yet, there is no certainly about the consequences for migration flows after the Brexit petition, neither is there certainty about the effects on migrant trajectories of those who already lived in the UK previous to the Brexit negotiations.

[11] Fangmeng and Xiaojiang (in this book) for the case of China and Rajan, Suresh and Mahalingam (in this book) for the case of India found that both of these sending countries are very actively engaged in return.

change their intentions from staying temporarily to staying longer than they intended or longer than their legal status initially permitted. Socio-economic factors in the countries of origin may also influence the length of stay, for example, when economic conditions deteriorate and additional capital is required through migrant earnings, leading to an extension of the stay abroad. In contrast, transnational ties to family, friends and professional contacts may serve as social capital through which information on occupational opportunities in the country of origin is exchanged. This information may offer international students incentives to return without taking up employment after graduation, which may not have been their intention at the beginning of the sojourn.

Influential factors in the sociocultural sphere: Migrants' intentions and the final decision to stay or leave may also be influenced by sociocultural conditions in different societal spheres. Particularly in the destination society, this means that migrants who may be granted the right to permanent residence may decide in the course of their stay to leave earlier than intended due to difficulties in their integration process, including linguistic and cultural difficulties or experienced hostility (Castles 2013). For instance, humanitarian migrants or highly skilled migrants who are granted the right to permanent residence may change their status from permanent to temporary migrants by returning to the home country or by moving on to a third country, for instance, because they or their families experienced discrimination in everyday life or fear violent attacks. On the other hand, social conditions in the country of origin may influence the duration of stay, for instance, related to a more appealing lifestyle and a perceived greater freedom for personal development in the country of destination, leading to the intention to stay longer than initially envisaged. Or alternatively, one may miss one's native country and the people there, and this may contribute to an earlier than intended return. From a cross-border perspective, familial responsibilities in the source or previous destination countries may constitute an important reason for leaving earlier than initially planned.

As this brief consideration shows, migrants' intentions may change during the migration process, because diverse real-life developments may influence people's intentions and change temporary sojourns into permanent ones and vice versa or even lead to different patterns of migration. Moreover, some people have more freedom than others to choose their destination and how long they stay there, meaning that while for some migrants decisions on temporariness are voluntary, for others the duration of stay is determined by force of circumstances. Analytically, it is also important to consider time as a crucial aspect in temporary migration. This means that next to formal aspects, migrants' experiences in the course of their living in a destination country may shape their intentions, including the duration of stay. To address these various, sometimes interlinked factors affecting people's decisions to stay or leave, it seems appropriate to analyse temporary migration in relation to politico-legal, socio-economic and sociocultural factors located in places of origin, destination and transit.

1.5 Methodological Approach of the Study

As discussed in the preceding sections, temporary movements are an underresearched social phenomenon in current migration studies. The EURA-NET project sought to bridge this gap. The study could not focus on all migration from EU countries nor embrace human movements from all relevant Asian countries but captures a selection of countries that are on the one hand insufficiently studied and at the same time represent increasingly relevant national entities in the Asian-European migration context.

The study therefore focused on five non-English-speaking European Union countries (Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary and the Netherlands), because less research has been done on them and they have also been less popular migration destinations. Moreover, two European (Turkey and Ukraine) and four most significant Asian countries (China, India, the Philippines and Thailand) are included in the study.

Migration scholars have argued that to study human mobility adequately, it is useful to carry out an interdisciplinary (Favell 2008; King 2012), multi-scalar (Caĝlar and Glick Schiller 2015; Castles 2007) and comparative (Martiniello 2013) analysis. Following these claims, the EURA-NET research consortium was composed of interdisciplinary research teams from Asian and European countries, and in the chapters of this book, they address features of temporary migration in countries of origin, transit and destination. The authors address these features from the disciplinary perspectives of sociology, political sciences, demography, economics, ethnology, social anthropology, education and human geography. To grasp the very different aspects that shape temporary migration, the case studies address influential factors at the macro-, meso- or micro-level, which means that several contributions focus on two or even all three scales. Moreover, the authors engage in each chapter in comparative analysis of different temporary migrant categories, which will be complemented in the conclusion by a wider comparison of temporary migration features between the countries studied.

To capture the vast variety of people engaged in temporary migration, the project addressed the type of spatial movements which last between 3 months and 5 years, with variations in this range depending on the migrant category. This was based on the fact that within the EU policy framework, stays of less than 3 months are typically defined as tourism and do not require a residence permit, while people staying longer than 5 years are considered long-term residents. In addition, we included seasonal agricultural labourers who come to work in the EU countries on a 90-day Schengen visa. To sum up, rather than people's touristic activities, the research project was interested in the mobility of people whose motivation is related to work, education, lifestyle, protection or family reunification.

Transnational practices and the lived experiences of individual migrants were made visible through semi-structured interviews among people with experiences of temporary migration between Europe and Asia. Interviews were conducted in China, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, the Netherlands, the Philippines,

Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine. Some of these countries are predominantly migrant receiving societies (Finland, Germany, the Netherlands), while others typify migrant-sending societies (China, India, the Philippines, Thailand), and some are so-called transit countries (Turkey, Greece, Hungary and Ukraine). It is important to acknowledge that in practice, all the above-mentioned countries actually send and receive migrants and the aspect of transit migration is likewise to some extent relevant for a range of countries considered.

When conducting the interviews, account was taken that transnational migration may affect both those who migrate and those who 'stay behind' and that transnational movements are not just one-way flows from 'source' to 'destination' but rather a dynamic process consisting of a sequence of events across time and space and that the migratory flows involve people not officially defined as 'migrants' (e.g. degree students, lifestyle migrants[12]). Thus the target groups of respondents included both migrants and non-migrants, not just movers but also former movers (returnees) and non-movers (those who have not left home, e.g. family members of migrants living in the country of origin).

A total of 883 interviews were conducted among highly skilled professionals, low-skilled workers, university students, family-based migrants, humanitarian migrants (refugees, asylum seekers), returnees and migrants' family members staying behind. In some countries the group of respondents also included entrepreneurs. The number of respondents in each country was about 80. The interviews were completed in winter and spring 2015, just before the massive increase in humanitarian migration flows from Asia, particularly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, to European countries.

In each county, the respondents were selected using stratified random sampling to ensure that different groups of temporary transnational migrants were equally represented in the group of respondents (the size of each sample was proportional to the relative size of the group in the country in question). The interviewees included men and women, representing diverse national, educational and religious backgrounds and social classes. People were interviewed at various geographical locations in the project countries. Interviewees were gathered by using 'snowball methods', with the help of social media, migrant organisations and relevant NGOs.

The interviewees were asked the same questions in all the participating countries, with minor modifications depending on the context and the type of the interviewee. The questions were first formulated in English and then translated into local languages. Interpreters were used when needed. The questions covered the following themes: migratory background, characteristics of the interviewees' transnational activities and ties, their adaptation to local and transnational contexts as well as the consequences of temporary migration in the lives of the interviewees and their family members. The interviews were conducted predominantly face to face; telephone and Skype were used in a few specific cases. All the interviewees signed

[12] Lifestyle migrants are seldom a recognised category at all but considered tourists in spite of their long sojourns at the destination.

a consent form. In order to protect their anonymity, pseudonyms are used in this book, and no personal data that would make them recognisable is revealed.

Interpretative content analysis was used for the analysis of the qualitative interviews. To improve comparability between the countries studied, the data coding and analysis were conducted simultaneously and with the same guidelines in all the participating countries. We addressed people's experiences, practices and conceptions of temporary mobility as well as the consequences that temporary migration implies for mobile people, their families, and communities and entire societies in the sending/transit/receiving regions. As noted, attention was paid in the analysis to politico-legal (rights and obligations; political participation and identification), socio-economic (employment opportunities; entrepreneurship; professional qualification) and sociocultural (identification; social adaptation; social care practices) levels.

1.6 Contributions

The first contribution by Tian Fangmeng and Hu Xiaojiang shows that new migration flows have emerged and expanded between China and Europe and that these flows are decidedly temporary in nature. The chapter suggests that Chinese students increasingly pursue education at European universities, and highly skilled workers accumulate human capital, while European migrants in China appreciate exotic culture and the working experience gained abroad. The findings also show that Chinese migrants are often poorly integrated into the European host societies, and that in turn many European migrants live an isolated life in China.

Likewise the Indian chapter shows that university students and highly skilled experts are the most rapidly growing groups of temporary migrants between India and Europe. The growing business relations created by multinational companies and educational exchange programmes are the major reasons for this. S. Irudaya Rajan, Arya Suresh and M. Mahalingam conclude that the intentions regarding the duration of residence of Europeans are temporary by nature, as most of the European respondents reported wanting to go back to their home countries at some point of time.

Maruja M.B. Asis and Karen Anne S. Liao argue that temporary migration from the Philippines to Europe is largely fuelled by low-skilled labour migration supplemented by smaller flows of student migration. Temporary migration from Europe to the Philippines is smaller in scale, comprising migrants coming to the country as part of capital flows and development aid. Except for retirees, many Europeans are in the Philippines temporarily, mostly in connection with their work.

Low-skilled migration is the dominant form of temporary migration between Thailand and Europe, and the entry of Thai seasonal migrants to Scandinavian countries is a recent example of temporary migratory movements. Sakkarin Niyomsilpa, Manasigan Kanchanachitra, Pattraporn Chuenglertsiri and Sureeporn Punpuing find that European migrants in Thailand consist mostly of marriage

migrants, retirees and expatriates working in major Thai cities. The empirical evidence shows that many Thai migrants in Europe are vulnerable to labour exploitation, and many European migrants face legal challenges in Thailand because of the strict immigration policy and the complexity of Thai immigration laws and regulations.

Turkey is a country of transit. İlke Şanlıer Yüksel and Ahmet İçduygu write that although historically a country of emigration, Turkey today hosts a great number of temporarily mobile people with multidirectional migration patterns on the route between Asia and Europe. The Turkish chapter mainly concentrates on asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants, especially those in transit, because of their sheer volume.

Georgios Agelopoulos, Eleni Kapetanaki and Costas Kousaxidis provide empirical insights into the current situation of temporary migration between Greece and Asian countries. The authors consider Greece not only as a country receiving immigrants but also as a transit country for migrants en route to other EU countries from Asia and as a country that is a migrant-sending country. The case of Greece is especially interesting because of the effects of the economic and political crisis and due to the status of the country as a transit point during the recent 'migration crisis'.

The Hungarian chapter shows that Asia has recently become the most important source region for non-European migration to the country. Ágnes Hárs argues that in Hungary, migration characteristics and the temporary nature of migration have largely been influenced by the strict and harsh regulations in line with Hungary's generally restrictive immigration policy, coinciding with a distinct preference for ethnic Hungarians. As a consequence, the number of immigrants has remained rather low in Hungary.

The contribution by Ihor Markov, Svitlana Odynets and Danylo Sudyn shows that Ukraine is increasingly used as a transit country between Asia and Europe. Many Asians travel to Ukraine, remaining in the country for some time-seeking opportunities to continue their transnational movement to the West. The authors also argue that temporary migration has become a permanent way of life for many Ukrainian nationals residing in European countries.

According to Mustafa Aksakal and Kerstin Schmidt, the findings in Germany suggest that highly skilled professionals and international students represent the most important temporary migrant categories, followed by family members and humanitarian migrants. Most importantly, the motivation for entering Germany is often related to favourable opportunity structures regarding career development and education. Many of the migrants interviewed found it difficult to integrate into German society because of the perceived social distance, confusing bureaucratic procedures and language problems. These issues constitute barriers which in the absence of adequate local and transnational support often lead to changes in initial intentions regarding the length of stay.

The Dutch and Finnish chapters identify similar problems in the integration and adaptation paths of temporary migrants. Natasja Reslow writes that in the Netherlands, most of the temporary migrants interviewed reported experiences of discrimination, prejudice or stereotyping. The chapter reveals that a basic paradox

of Dutch migration policy is that, on the one hand, it aims to attract highly skilled migrants using various incentives and, on the other hand, it creates obstacles and ambiguities that discourage temporary migration.

Finally, Mari Korpela, Jaakko Hyytiä and Pirkko Pitkänen show that there is a contradiction between the intention to attract highly skilled migrants to Finland and the slow and complicated bureaucracy that makes foreigners feel they are not welcome in the country. The chapter also illustrates that while Finland attracts increasing numbers of temporary migrants from Asia, it is also increasingly popular for Finns to work, study or travel in Asian countries.

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Chapter 2
Education, Skill Flow and Integration: Temporary Transnational Migration Between China and Europe

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2.1 Introduction

China is one of the most dynamic regions in terms of migration in today's world. Its multiple migration waves have not only changed the landscape within China but also reshaped the images of overseas Chinese in the world. As China's economy has been growing rapidly, many Chinese are also pursuing overseas working or education opportunities. An official report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), an official think tank, estimated that the number of overseas Chinese has reached 45 million (Li and Wang 2010), including new migrants from mainland China, old migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan and second-generation Chinese migrants.

According to the global distribution of Chinese overseas population, those in Europe only amounted to less than 5% of the total in 2007. However, the growth rate of Chinese migration to Europe has been the second highest among all the continents over the past three decades. The number of Chinese migrants increased dramatically from 600,000 in 1980 to 2.15 million in 2007, indicating an increase of 3.5 times. According to a recent estimate, the total overseas Chinese population in Europe reached more than 2.5 million in 2012, of whom more than 2.3 million or 86% live in EU countries (Latham and Wu 2013). They originated from different communities and displayed a variety of skills. Consequently, this has also transformed the characteristics of many Chinese communities in Europe, such as their size, structure, organisation, economic activity, linguistic features and relations with hometowns in China (Wang and Zhuang 2010: 51–61).

Besides the expanding numbers, the composition of Chinese migrants has also changed considerably. Although the traditional emigration of less skilled and

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irregular migration from Southeast China continues in the twenty-first century, a new migration trend has also emerged and expanded, as highly educated Chinese students, professionals and investors move to foreign destinations. Their presence and participation are very helpful for the establishment of new academic and cultural connections with China (Wang and Liu 2011).

Since China began to open up in the late 1970s, the number of students studying abroad has rapidly increased, adding up to a total of 3.05 million between 1978 and 2013 (MOE 2014). China's large young population has generated a huge demand for high-quality education, which exceeds the capacity of its current college system. Chinese parents are also concerned with opportunities of employment and immigration, as overseas study is usually viewed as an important step for their future choices of occupation and location.

After completion of their studies, many overseas Chinese students sought jobs in their host country, continued their studies abroad or moved to another country. A significant number of skilled workers, who were trained in China, moved to developed countries by applying for a working visa. The increasing student and skilled labour migration to the United States, Europe and other developed countries has triggered a policy concern about a brain drain in China. However, China has also benefited enormously from the return tide of its expatriates even though the emigration of skilled nationals continues. Over 1.4 million overseas students had returned to China by 2013 (MOE 2014).

The migration pattern between China and other countries is not a one-way process, as China has already become an important destination country for migrants from all around the world. The number of foreigners in China also grew substantially after its adoption of an open-door policy in the late 1970s. These foreigners fall mainly into three groups: (1) foreign students from developing countries and the developed world; (2) expatriate professionals, diplomats and journalists; and (3) foreign experts working for higher education institutions or other agencies affiliated to the Chinese government.

Management of foreigners in China is mainly based on one law and one regulation – the Law on Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens of 1985 and a detailed explanation of 1986, which are the only legal provisions for visa management, and the Rules for the Administration of Employment of Foreigners in China of 1996, which regulates foreign labour employment in China. Another statute, the Regulations on Examination and Approval of Permanent Residence of Aliens in China of 2004, functions as China's immigration law. The Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People's Republic of China, the most recent law of all, was promulgated in June 2012 and came into force on 1 July 2013. It replaced the previous related laws and is applicable to the administration of the exit and entry of both Chinese citizens and foreigners. There are other specific regulations and rules at national and local levels. As several governmental branches are involved in the management of foreign population, some have proposed the establishment of a new agency such as the "Administration of Immigration" to provide a professional civil service (Shen 2011).

In the past few years, immigration to China has become much more diverse and numerous. It is reported that the total number of foreign residents reached nearly 594,000 according to the 2010 population census. Most (79.5%) of the foreigners in China are aged between 15 and 64 and are active economically with high-skill selectivity (Pang 2014). Geographically, foreign residents are highly concentrated in several large cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. South Korea (121,000), the United States (71,000) and Japan (66,000) are the three largest source countries, which contributed over 40% of all foreign nationals in China in 2010 (Xinhua News 2011).

Foreign migrants came to China mainly for study or employment (Liu and Chen 2014). Following the trend of internationalisation in higher education, Chinese universities have become more internationally competitive than before and in the past decade have actively developed their programmes for training foreign students in China. Over 356,000 foreign students were enrolled at 746 Chinese universities and research institutes in 2013 (MOE 2014). As another migrant group, 244,000 foreigners held work permits issued by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security by the end of 2013 (MHRSS 2014), their occupations ranging from high-level managers and experts in large projects to clerical workers hired by Chinese employers.

Most foreign workers are in the nature of temporary migrants, because only a few of them are qualified for applying for a permanent residence permit in China according to the Regulations on Examination and Approval of Permanent Residence of Aliens in China. Such people include those who have senior professional status or have had a large amount of investment in China for some years. Most of foreign migrants stay in China for a short period, as the duration of only 17.5% of them lasted over 5 years. Since China launched its visa programme or permanent residence scheme in 2004, fewer than 6000 foreigners have acquired such permanent residence permits (Pang 2014).

In addition, as the Special Administrative Area in China, Hong Kong has its own independent immigration policy and information collection system. Hong Kong has a long history of foreign presence as a harbour city and former British colony. It has evolved into one of the global major destinations for tourists and business visitors. According to its official statistics, Hong Kong's foreign population increased from 370,000 in 2001 to 475,000 in 2011. There is no major preponderance of migrants from any individual European country, except that British nationals constituted the third largest foreign migrant group and represented 0.5% of the total population of Hong Kong in 2011.

The following sections report our findings in the Chinese-European transnational space. For each section, we start from European migrants and then turn to Chinese returnees and family members. Based on the analysis of our interview data, we also tentatively raise some policy recommendations. The sections show that both flows between Europe and China show strong temporary characteristics. Chinese returnees pursued education at European universities and accumulated human capital, while European migrants in China appreciated exotic culture and gained working experiences abroad. We also found that the temporary migrants on both sides benefit

from their overseas experiences. The returnees utilise their advanced knowledge and familiarity with foreign culture to obtain high payoffs in the growing Chinese market. The European migrants acquire skills, and their expertise is generally appreciated in China. However, it was discovered that some Chinese returnees were not well integrated into the host societies, and many European migrants had an isolated life when living in China. This lack of integration may impair the benefits of migration and imped the communication between China and Europe.

2.2 Data Collection

With regard to the transnational characteristics of temporary migrants between China and Europe, we mainly target three groups – European migrants in China, Chinese returnees from Europe and family members of Chinese temporary migrants in Europe. The Europeans are further categorised as overseas students, employees, family migrants and entrepreneurs.

Between March and June 2015, we interviewed 80 individuals in total, including 44 European citizens, 29 returnees and 7 family members. Among Europeans in China, we interviewed 12 students, 23 employees, 5 entrepreneurs and 4 individuals who came to China due to family ties. We interviewed 33 respondents in Beijing, 26 in Shanghai, 19 in Hong Kong and 2 in Chongqing. The interviewees differed in gender, age, nationality, occupation, level of education and duration of stay in the destination country, as we attempted to diversify their demographic characteristics. For example, we conducted 12 interviews with students from 11 European countries, which covered most parts of Europe. With European interviewees, France (69), Serbia (59) and the United Kingdom (3) were the most common source countries, and the United Kingdom (9), France (6) and Germany the most common destination countries for Chinese returnees. The majority of all respondents (43) were women.

The respondents' ages ranged widely from the youngest at 22 years to the oldest at 68 years. They had stayed in China for at least 3 months, and about ten of them had stayed for over 5 years. However, even among the latter group of people, many of them moved back and forth between China and their home countries, so they could still be viewed as temporary migrants.

2.3 Migration Processes

We interviewed in total 12 European students in China. Most of them were studying for master's degrees and several aiming at doctoral degrees. As for the motivation for moving to China, several European students expressed a great interest in Chinese language, culture, history or geography. Some had previously visited China as tourists and found the Chinese society interesting. The others were motivated simply by

the opportunities of scholarship offered by the Chinese government or their national governments. Most student interviewees did not have any alternative study option at the time of choosing to come to China. Only a few of the interviewees reported that they could have moved elsewhere and just happened to be studying in China.

All the students we interviewed had received scholarships, which indicates that economic assistance was probably one primary precondition of their study in China. Most of them expressed the wish that experiences in China would enrich their lives and improve their understanding of China and the world. None of them regretted choosing China as a destination country. However, the majority of student interviewees stated that they would not stay in China for a long period and that they would like to return to their own countries or move to another foreign country as cultural and social barriers make China less likely to be a destination of permanent residence.

There were 23 European employees in our sample, thereby constituting the largest group of European interviewees. They had very diverse occupational backgrounds, including governmental agency staff, financial analyst, language teacher and interior designer. However, they shared similar motivations and incentives to migrate to China, while their migration processes and consequences differed considerably.

Several interviewees expressed a great interest in joining the economic boom in China, particularly as they could speak some Chinese. Most of the European employees we interviewed had come to the three cities in China alone, except that a few of them were accompanied with their spouses, which might indicate that young and single professionals dominate the skilled flows from Europe to China. These findings are consistent with those of Liu and Chen (2014) regarding the demographic profiles of foreign residents in China. European professionals' migration to China was probably explorative and transitional at the beginning of their careers and might help them gain some working experience and avoid the more competitive labour market in Europe.

Many of the employees we interviewed had already visited China as tourists or for business trips before their current stay for a relatively long period, so they had at least limited knowledge about local conditions in China. The newly arrived people also collected some information or solicited help from their Chinese acquaintances, as one interviewee remembered:

> I basically did everything by myself, researched a lot… [A Chinese friend] also gave me some tips about what to expect from China and Chinese people. (Nancy, 1982, female, employee, Portugal)

However, many interviewees still had negative images and expectations of China before their arrival, partly because their perceptions were influenced by the western media. Some respondents' family members and friends did not want to see their departure to China, as they thought China was a remote and strange country. After living in Beijing or Shanghai for several months, their views on China would generally become more positive. One respondent mentioned that:

> We expect that it [China] is one huge country, which actually it is, but we don't expect so much diversity. It is colourful, and we cannot imagine its colourfulness from the distance… I would say this organisation in China is a strong point – although it doesn't seem [like this] at the beginning, but later you will see it is so well organised as a big country like China should be. (Lisa, 1969, female, employee, Slovenia)

Most of them had stayed in China for several years. Only a few reported having a firm plan to stay in China permanently. For example, one financial analyst particularly mentioned that she had a longer-term plan to work in Hong Kong and really enjoyed the trips here: "I like the sort of role I'm in… I like the pace of the work...I thought would be longer term" (Jane, female, employee, 1967, Italy).

A majority of the interviewees would like to continue their mobile lifestyle and move on to the next destination, except that a few chose to return home for a more stable family life as they already had enough exotic experiences.

The background of the European entrepreneurs in our sample was decidedly different from that of other groups in terms of their experiences in China. We conducted five interviews with entrepreneurs from five countries – Poland, Ukraine, France, Denmark and Russia, whose origins represented different regions of Europe. At the time of the interview, they were all residents of either Beijing or Shanghai. However, the interviewees had previously lived in different Chinese cities, each with experiences of from one to five. Two of the interviewees were working in international trade, and two ran local restaurants. The remaining one operated an international school.

Two entrepreneur interviewees had begun their entrepreneurial careers in China after education or internship opportunities in the country, two after job opportunities in China and one after plans to migrate to China with a Chinese spouse. In a broader sense, their desires for migrating to China came from what most of the interviewees defined as a general improvement in their career prospects by spending time in a country so different from their own and one increasingly important on the world stage.

When it comes to future prospects, none of the entrepreneurs had a concrete plan for their personal, professional or family future; however, they did all share some plans. Two interviewees said they would like to move back home some day, whereas the other three said that they would like to migrate to another country other than their home country. Although China's economic climate is conducive to launching new businesses, it is not viewed by European migrants as a desirable place for retirement. Their future departure from China might be precipitated by the inhospitable environment, as one respondent imagined his place of residence:

> I don't know where, northern or southern hemisphere, I don't know which country, or which language, but for sure things that I know right now, it involves a garden, it involves very few people around, it involves probably a little bit of sun, a bit of water, a bit of mountains. (Basile, 1985, male, entrepreneur, France)

In addition, we conducted three interviews with family members from Hungary, Ukraine and Slovenia, all of which belong to Eastern Europe. One of the interviewees was female and two were male, and their ages ranged from 49 to 68. At the time

of the interview, they all resided in Beijing and had all been there for 1–2 years. All of them were married. As for the motivations for coming to China, the primary motivation of these family migrants was to be with their spouses, who were employed in China. One of them had tried to live away from her spouse, but was not comfortable with the relationship over a long distance and eventually moved to China to be with her spouse. The other two interviewees had accompanied their partners when those partners first migrated to China.

Among the Chinese migrants, there were 29 returnees in our sample; they formed the largest group of all interviewees. They had very diverse occupational backgrounds, such as journalist, scientist, manager and university lecturer. Most of the Chinese returnees had moved to Europe to take master's or doctoral degrees, and many of them already planned to return before their departure. Such a "brain circulation" was driven by both the quality of higher education in Europe and the dynamic job opportunities in China.

The returnees we interviewed generally perceived that there were more jobs for them in China than in Europe, and they could also mobilise their social capital in their home country. For example, one returnee we interviewed had taken Dutch citizenship and explained why he chose to live in China: "Life in Netherlands is too boring. If you pick up a job in 25, you know your status in 60. It's too stable, with no change" (Da Tong, male, returnee, 1986, Netherlands).

However, some also said that overseas Chinese students would first hunt for jobs in Europe and return home if they could not find a desirable position there. The returnees' decisions about coming back were more or less influenced by those who had stayed in their destination countries. Compared with the situation in Europe, the Chinese labour market was viewed as more competitive and poorly paid. Hence some interviewees were determined not to stay in China at the initial stage of their return, and some of their friends and relatives might also doubt whether returning was a reasonable choice for their career development. However, they tended to be more convinced of their return after a period of readaptation to China. Although quality of life may be inferior in China relative to Europe, it nevertheless affords more opportunities for professional mobility. One respondent back from Denmark put it as follows:

> …it depends on what you pursue. You are inclined to stay in Denmark if you prefer to have a stable and comfortable life; if you want to try your best and see what kind of achievement you can make, it is better to return to China. (Mu Hua, 1988, female, returnee, China)

For some other cases, they did not have much choice when they returned to China, either because they had signed a contract with the original organisation which sent them abroad for study or work or because they had children or elderly parents to look after. One interviewee explained her return in this way:

> I went abroad for study after I got married. My husband and I were separated during my overseas study, so I had no reason to stay alone after the completion of the program. (Zhang Ping, 1980, female, returnee, China)

Most returnees had some information about China's talent policies favourable to returnees, but they did not take them much into consideration when thinking about

returning, which has also been reported in other research on returnees (Tharenou and Seet 2014). The policies range from tax-free purchase of automobiles to the distribution of special research funding and vary greatly by programme and region (Zweig 2006). As one returnee in Shanghai said: "I am clear of related policies, but I know returnees working in Shanghai can get local hukou [formal resident identity]" (Li Dun, female, 1985, China).

Some started to learn about such policies only after their arrival in the current city of residence. Not many returnees planned migration to another country in the near future, except those who would like to visit their destination countries briefly for business purposes. The family members of overseas Chinese students told us similar stories as the returnees did, but they had a different angle. Most family members we interviewed were parents of overseas students. They reported that their children would not stay in the destination country for a long period, and they would like to see them back home. The push factors of return migration mentioned by these parents included security issues (e.g. terrorist attacks), social integration and cultural differences in the current country of residence.

Most families had supported the migrants during the process of their foreign journey, such as searching for related information, purchasing goods for travelling and providing financial assistance. Only one mother said that her family did not give her son any help. Many relatives of the temporary migrants also gave them emotional support or offered valuable advice. In this sense, Chinese overseas students live in a transnational space: they become embedded in a web of transforming social relations which facilitates their movements. However, our respondents seldom mentioned "international travel" between Europe and China, which is also an important feature of the "transnationalised home" (Leung 2007). This may be because most of them only travelled back to China for a limited number of times during their overseas studies or due to financial constraints.

2.4 Politico-Legal Aspects

2.4.1 Visa Applications and Administrative Procedures

For all of the student interviewees from Europe, it was not difficult to go through the administrative application process to obtain a visa and residence permit, as no respondent in this group showed serious complaints in this regard. A few students complained about the lack of the information about the necessary medical documents when they applied for residence permits. Most of the European employees we interviewed in Beijing and Shanghai also reported that it was not difficult to obtain a work visa, but it took a relatively long time. The amount of paperwork still lingered in many interviewees' memories. Only when they had gone through the process once did they come to find a more efficient way. By contrast, European employees in Hong Kong were generally satisfied with the visa application

procedure. One respondent felt the process was "very easy", because "I was supported by the employer and they were very clear about what I needed to do" (Jane, female, employee, 1967, Italy).

The European entrepreneurs had different experiences of the administrative process for obtaining visas and residence permits, not only because of the nature of their work but also because of the year they obtained their visas (e.g. the law had changed) and on whom the responsibility for dealing with the visa rested. Of those who to some extent negotiated their visas by themselves, all reported minor complications. One entrepreneur reported major complications during the time in China, including complex and unclear visa requirements, which resulted in loss of job opportunities, and the inconvenience of having to exit Mainland China every 1–4 months. Knowles (2015) also reports that young migrants from London encountered similar problems regarding their sojourning in Beijing. As the current regulations for foreign residents are not friendly to those with less formal employment, they have to find other ways to navigate the border.

When the family migrants first handled their visa formalities, they encountered two issues – having to do the physical examination required for the visa again with fees (they had already done it in their home country) and having to prove their marriage to their spouse. One family migrant who negotiated his visa unaided described the process as "very complicated and very long". They explained that the process had taken 4–5 months.

Upon arrival in Europe, most Chinese returnees prepared the paperwork of the visa application by themselves and occasionally solicited help from European universities or local friends. A couple of interviewees complained that they had a big problem dealing with their residence permits when they first settled in the destination country. During their stay in Europe, many stayed temporarily or travelled around in neighbouring countries.

Some respondents mentioned that the visa application procedure was complicated, because they could not get access to clear and complete information once and for all. In light of the above findings, we suggest that the Chinese authorities should simplify the administrative procedure for admitting foreign students and also that for recruiting foreign employees, and make them more transparent, especially the business, working and spouse visa requirements.

2.4.2 Political Engagement

Many European interviewees said that their relatives and friends in their native countries had negative images of China, especially regarding its political system. Some even viewed China as an obscure country where its citizens had no freedom at all. Our interviewees often corrected their misconceptions of China. As one language teacher reported: "[I told them] freedom is limited but people still have some freedom [in China]" (Nancy, female, highly-skilled, 1982, Portugal). A male family migrant from Slovenia mentioned China's political system as a major difference for

most foreigners but understood China better than did other European respondents because of the history of his own country.

Most of our interviewees were not politically active in either China or Europe, but some reported having a great interest in political affairs. A few European students said that they had no option for political participation in China, as the country simply did not leave much space for their activities. However, all the students but one had no specific concern regarding their inability to participate in local political activities.

Similarly, almost all of the European employees we interviewed only engaged in political activities in their home countries or participated in elections at the embassies or consulates of their countries of origin. Nor had any of them become involved in labour union activities. The employees had a general sense that as foreigners it was not proper to talk about politics in China, particularly in the work context. One respondent working at a university expressed her concern about a risk:

> It frustrates me a little not to be able to talk about politics. I have seen co-workers being fired for talking about politics in class so I always abstain from talking about politics. (Nancy, 1982, female, employee, Portugal)

All the entrepreneurs also reported that they were not politically active in China, and three of them suggested they had no opportunity for political participation in China. None of the interviewees seemed dissatisfied about this and instead seemed to recognise it as a difference in the political culture between Europe and China. Two interviewees noted the lack of religious freedom in China – specifically as regards the Catholic Church.

The Chinese returnee migrants we interviewed more or less knew the policies of international communication between China and their destination countries, particularly in their own fields. During their studies in Europe, many Chinese students paid little attention to local politics, but they might keep an eye on the turnover of governments, as a different party coming to power might change the policy on overseas students, such as the terms related to their sojourn and right to take up legal employment after graduation. As there are a large number of Chinese students in Europe and they are sensitive to policy change influencing their self-interests in the host countries, the local governments may view them as an important interest group and consult their opinions when making related policies.

No matter whether a returnee intentionally observed the political system in the destination country or not, democratic institutions in European countries had significantly influenced her political views. Many interviewees encountered the campaign activities of local candidates and compared them with the political life in China. One returnee from Denmark pointed out a difference:

> I know that governmental officials in Denmark, including prime minister and heads of ministries, have background of non-political occupations, such as horticulture. They have practical working experiences, which is quite different from the officials in China. (Wan Gang, 1986, male, returnee, China)

Another returnee from France worked for a local university in Shanghai. She had a more profound understanding of the political differences between Europe and

China. In our interview, she emphasised that French people have a great respect for the rights of the individual, which has a long tradition in that country's national history. She was particularly impressed by how much effort a French citizen would put into voting or striking. Comparatively, she had to say that the Chinese lack such awareness of these rights. Influenced by the French political culture, she became more inclined to defend the interests of local residents in her community. Her case shows that returnees from Europe did espouse certain foreign values and bring back social and political remittances to China.

However, when talking about politics at national level, many returnees did not think China should adopt democracy in the western style. When asked about their political positions, most returnees would stand on the side of China in the event of a dispute between China and another country. Over some internationally controversial issues like the Taiwan or Tibet issue, their attitudes were largely consistent with the official positions of the Chinese government. They would seek more detailed information if the dispute involved their destination country.

2.5 Socio-economic Aspects

How did the European students finance their living in China? All of those we interviewed received scholarships, and the types of these scholarships varied by programme, degree, major subject and sponsor. Most students either earned additional income by taking part-time jobs, such as language teaching and internships with payment or received money from their parents. By contrast, most returnees had been financially supported by their families when they were studying abroad, and only a couple of them obtained local scholarships. This contrast probably reflects the quality gap in higher education between China and Europe, as the former has to compete for foreign students with other countries by offering scholarships.

As for the employment prospects, several students said that they expected that there would be many more economic opportunities in China than in their own countries, so they should have a higher living standard in China. They attributed the higher remuneration both to their language skills (especially Chinese) but also their familiarity with foreign markets and cultures.

If European students have bright career prospects in China, employees from this region benefit from their human capital. Most employees we interviewed continued in the same profession in China as their countries of origin. Others obtained a degree first and then moved to China for job-seeking. They were generally satisfied with their salaries and other benefits and confirmed that their skills were well recognised in China. A French architect explained the reason:

> Because I'm French. Sometimes they [Chinese colleagues] need me because I'm a foreigner and they give an international personality…for the image. (Tom, 1988, male, employee, France)

Working experiences in China were believed by most respondents to be favourable to their career advancement. As for professional skills, the entrepreneurs we interviewed all believed that their skills were appreciated in China and generally reported that this was part of their positive development there. As for the standard of living and career development, these entrepreneurs did not specify that in China they could earn more money than at home, but instead stated that their time in China was an important part of their career development with the end goal of emigrating to another place.

Most of the Chinese returnees reported that their skills matched their current occupations and gave them competitive edges over those who had been trained in China. Except for a few respondents whose skills were undervalued or unused, most returnees gained a relatively high return on their human capital acquired in Europe. Some returnees had founded enterprises after coming back, and they thought that overseas experiences gave them open-minded ideas, collaborative skills and problem-solving abilities, which could afford them valuable opportunities and enable them to exploit products and markets.

2.6 Sociocultural Aspects

2.6.1 Impression of China and Europe

Our European interviewees reported their impressions of multiple facets of Chinese society. Their general impressions of China were both positive and negative, and they were sometimes surprised by Chinese people's behaviour. Some interviewees reported that some conceptions they had of China before they migrated there had turned out to be false – whether positive or negative. For example, a young newcomer to China expected the Chinese to be "quiet and timid" based on experiences with overseas Chinese, but she found in China "they're outgoing and loud…like many other cultures. So I was surprised by that" (Jennifer, female, employee, 1992, Ireland).

Young professionals tended to show their interest in China's dynamism. One interviewee compared the lifestyle in Shanghai to that in his home country:

> Shanghai offers more cultural events and activities, better food, so the working pace in Shanghai is faster, so you can make everything happen faster and easier. (Mikko, 1988, male, employee, Finland)

European employees in Hong Kong were particularly adapted to the local environment, as many business practices were similar in this former British colony.

Although Chinese culture differs substantially from cultures in Europe, our interviewees could generally, if superficially, appreciate Chinese culture and were fond of its cuisine, arts and even sports. Economically, they often mentioned the low-price commodities in China and really enjoyed the consumption culture. Socially, they viewed lack of hygiene as the most "disgusting" thing, particularly in some

public toilets and with regard to food safety in a number of restaurants. These responses are consistent with a survey (Zhu 2011), which reports that a considerable portion (23%) of foreigners were dissatisfied with the sanitary conditions in their communities.

In addition, the European participants often mentioned the generally poor air quality in China, and some expressed disappointment at not being able to exercise outdoors. One respondent complained about this when sharing her impression of life in China:

> Everything is just fine, interesting job, everything is ok, life is interesting, but this air here is killing. The pollution is the reason why I am thinking about whether to stay or not. (Lisa, 1969, female, employee, Slovenia)

With regard to the impressions of Chinese migrants of European countries, many Chinese still viewed Europe as a prosperous and joyful paradise, even after rapid economic growth and openness to the world for three decades. Some Chinese returnees were often asked by their relatives why they did not stay in their destination countries, as many of those who remained in China still imagined Europe to be the ideal living environment. The returnees themselves had a more comprehensive understanding of the differences between China and Europe.

When asked to compare China and one's destination country, most returnees reported that there were both negative and positive aspects in both countries. They generally enjoyed comfortable lives and clean environment in Europe but experienced rapid and dynamic social changes in China. For some returnees, there were no push factors driving them home, and only pull factors attracting them to come back, as they believed that they would have better career development prospects in China. However, they also noted some negative aspects in Europe. For example, one returnee from France said:

> As a joke goes, there are two kinds of Chinese in Paris. One has been robbed, and the other is going to be robbed. The city is not as wonderful as [our previous] imagination. (Zheng Hang, 1988, male, China)

2.6.2 Integration and Readaptation

No matter how good or bad the interviewees' impressions were, it was difficult for most of them to integrate into Chinese society. Few European respondents viewed China as their "home". For most European migrants, the language barrier was the primary reason why they could not integrate into Chinese society. Our interviewees acknowledged that it was difficult for them to learn and understand Chinese language, which hindered their communication with local people.

Some European students identified lack of fluency in Chinese as a major problem for pursuing their fields of research, since they could not approach Chinese people as their target population or read the relevant literature in Chinese. Although all the entrepreneur respondents stressed the importance of Chinese language in both

cultural and business terms, they could not speak fluent Chinese, either. Most of the entrepreneur interviewees also pointed to the lack of proficiency in English among Chinese people. In order to build a more international environment, local municipal governments with a large population of foreigners in China can provide more language courses in Chinese, especially at the basic level. At the same time, it is helpful to offer more public information in English. Liu and Wang (2014) report that the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Public Security has provided service cards and manuals in both Chinese and English.

Patterns of social networking also reflect the degree of integration of Europeans in China. European employees generally felt that they were treated well and highly respected by their colleagues in China, but there was an invisible boundary between their daily interactions. For example, one respondent reported:

> I have the feeling that there are two worlds in Shanghai – the expatriates' world and the Chinese world, because there are restaurants, events for mostly foreigners. We are treated in a different way. (Tom, 1988, male, employee, France)

For both institutional and cultural reasons (Huang et al. 2013; Wang and Yang 2011), foreigners in Chinese cities tend to concentrate in certain districts and become residentially segregated from local Chinese.

Many respondents engaged in few joint activities with local Chinese residents, partly because of the language barrier and partly because of cultural differences. Only a few of them reported closer relationships with local Chinese friends. Their social connections might also be affected by the urban culture. One businesswoman from Spain reported as follows:

> … in Shanghai, not so many [Chinese friends]…I used to have more in Beijing, but I think that in Shanghai people are more business oriented, so once you have Chinese friends here it is more for business, not for, let's say, for private relationships. So I have more foreign friends. (Cecilia, 1975, male, entrepreneur, Spain)

Several entrepreneur interviewees cited cultural differences as a reason for having few local friends. By contrast, many European employees in China tended to have quite a number of friends in some western countries and kept up their transnational friendships even on a daily basis. Some believed that Chinese people should be more open to foreigners. In this sense, local governments in China may consider establishing some community programmes for helping foreign migrants meet with the local population and become familiar with Chinese society. A survey study reports that European migrants in China are actually more willing to participate in community activities than those from other continents and that they prefer to join cultural events related to Chinese language, Tai Chi, or cuisine (Zhu 2011). These programmes can build mutual trust between both sides and facilitate the settling in of temporary migrants.

Many Europeans did not become accustomed to the Chinese lifestyle, which was another reason of their lack of integration. Many interviewees reported that some social and technical services were simply not available in China, such as online payment, due to the requirement for a Chinese ID number. It was also not easy for foreigners to buy automobiles and real estate. Besides these inconveniences, one

frequently mentioned concern was the strict regulation of the Internet in China, which forced many to buy VPN services to get access to banned websites like Facebook or YouTube. Online talk via Skype was often disconnected, as some reported. These activities indicate a desire to keep contacts with the world outside China and maintain a transnational lifestyle.

When asked about connection with their family members, most European students reported using Internet tools, such as Skype, WeChat, WhatsApp and email, as their major means of communication. A few of them also talked with family members by phone, but did so only in case of emergencies. Most of the students maintained contact with parents in the home country on a daily or weekly basis. The European employees and entrepreneurs followed suit. However, several of them also noted Internet censorship as an obstacle to staying in contact with family and friends.

Most Europeans never contacted the public or civil agencies that are supposed to help them with regard to their employment, health and integration, except those related to the paperwork of temporary migration. With a few exceptions, they all participated in certain kinds of social insurance programmes, such as medical insurance, but did not necessarily benefit from them. For example, for health care and social security, none of interviewees in the group of entrepreneurs were aware of the services available to them and instead dealt with such issues themselves. The institutional loopholes push foreign migrants, particularly those without formal employment, to face the risks by themselves or purchase international insurance services, which would probably discourage their entrepreneurial activities. The services and benefits of health care and social security entitlements should be more specific to foreigners, and the rules should be made clearer.

Finally, certain social values and administrative management practices in China made some European migrants feel particularly uncomfortable. One entrepreneur interviewee reported that she had had trouble doing business with local Chinese in the past because they cared too much about their share in a commercial deal. A university lecturer resided in a campus apartment, and she was very dissatisfied with the domicile regulation, which in her view did not respect personal autonomy and freedom. As she complained:

> It has many rules that do not make sense to an adult person…It doesn't make sense that my friends can't sleep over when I have another extra bed in the room. It doesn't make sense that my friend has to sign a paper to go to my room together with me. I would rather sign a document saying I am responsible for my actions and for the people that are with me, because I am an adult. (Nancy, 1982, female, employee, Portugal)

Some students complained that they could not work in China and support themselves or participate in the Chinese labour market immediately after graduation. The European interviewees had mixed feelings about the local working conditions and living environment and pointed out its positive and negative aspects. Some felt that they did not develop a deep professional relationship with their colleagues or did not like the Chinese work ethic (e.g. no time for leisure, working on Sundays). These

dissatisfactions may shape the opinions of potential migrants and hinder China from attracting foreign talent to come there in the future.

Like Europeans in China, we found that Chinese returnees were not well integrated into local societies when they were abroad, either. Many returnees made several local friends, but their relationships were often maintained at a superficial level. Some of them made more Chinese friends than European friends in a foreign country. Many decided to return to China because they did not have a sense of being at home in Europe.

On the other side, the Chinese returnees we interviewed maintained transnational connections with their family members and friends both before and after their return. Unlike European migrants in China, they preferred to use Chinese social media like QQ and WeChat. During their overseas stay, they chatted with their parents or friends in China, in order to release the emotional pressure and get encouragement from them. Some reported that they seldom told their parents about negative encounters in the destination countries because they did not want them to worry about their lives abroad. The family members in China reported similar patterns of communication, and some of them also visited their children in the host country.

Despite a lack of integration, some returnees believed that the European lifestyle had influenced their dressing and social interaction. For example, one returnee from Denmark said, "I like to use many brands in Europe, and pay attention to my physical appearance, so I can keep confident and optimistic" (Wan Gang, male, 1986).

Another Chinese back from France said that the experience in Europe had changed his attitude towards the balance between life and work:

> French people pursue quality of life. In their eyes, work is not only for living, and one should enjoy life after work…I care about how much vacation a company offers to employees after return. (Zheng Hang, 1988, male)

The preferences of these two respondents indicate that Chinese returnees not only acquired knowledge and skills in Europe but also followed the lifestyle in the host countries, which could enrich the cultural diversity in China, as temporary migration often leads to cultural transformation and integration.

2.7 Conclusion

As China is experiencing rapid economic growth and social transformation, new migration flows have emerged and expanded between China and Europe. New waves of Chinese migrants in Europe have changed the composition of local ethnic communities, as highly educated Chinese students, professionals and investors move to there. Meanwhile, China has increasingly become a destination country for migrants from Europe, although their numbers are in no way phenomenal.

Based on 80 individual interviews with European migrants in China, Chinese returnees from Europe and their family members, we have in this chapter described

their characteristics along three dimensions. Flows between Europe and China appear to be essentially temporary in both directions. Most of the respondents either did not have a firm plan to stay in the destination country or took their migration for study or work as a short phase for their career advancement. Chinese returnees pursued education at European universities and accumulated human capital, while European migrants in China appreciated the exotic culture and gained working experiences abroad. Looking ahead, they were inclined to move back to their origin country or move on to another country, which indicates an even more dynamic migration prospect in the future.

The temporary migrants on both sides benefited from their overseas experiences. The returnees utilised their advanced knowledge and familiarity with a foreign culture to obtain great advantages in the growing Chinese market. The European migrants acquired skills, and their expertise was generally appreciated in China. They also understood more about their destination countries and brought back social remittances, such as foreign lifestyle or awareness of rights, to their home countries.

However, we also find that some Chinese returnees were not well integrated into the host societies, and many European migrants had an isolated life when living in China. This lack of integration detracted from the benefits of migration and hindered the communication between China and Europe. The primary hindering factors were institutional, cultural and social. Governments on both sides of Eurasia can do more to facilitate temporary migration and interactions with local communities, for which we have given some specific suggestions in the chapter.

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Chapter 3
Experiences of Temporary Migrants in the Indian-European Transnational Space

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3.1 Introduction

India is one of the South Asian nations that built ties with Europe from very early days, given its vast resources and geopolitical location. Although ties between India and Europe can be traced back to antiquity, European imperialism brought India and Europe closer in the early eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The presence of Eurasians and Anglo-Indians in various parts of India is a legacy of European colonialism. During colonialism and its aftermath, trade ties and movements of people have increased manifold between India and Europe. In the wake of the liberalisation of the Indian economy in the 1990s, trade and investment between India and the EU grew substantially. In general, given the global integration of the world's economies and the existence of proactive migration policies, coupled with the advancement of travel and communication technologies, 'globetrotting' is an emerging phenomenon.

Temporary migration between India and Europe has increased in recent years (see Rajan 2014: 190–232). In particular, the flow of various types of migrants within the Indian-European transnational space has gained momentum after the proliferation of bilateral trade agreements and international agreements such as the World Trade Organization's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Broad-Based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) and Mode 4 liberalisation (on temporary movement of nationals from one country to another) (Chanda and Gupta 2015). Apart from economic migrants such as highly skilled, semi-skilled and low-skilled labour migrants, there has been an increase in the mobility of

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international students, medical tourists, lifestyle migrants and return migrants between India and Europe in recent years.

In general, temporary migration to and from India is currently education based, skill based or lifestyle based. During the last decade, student mobility has increased from India to the EU and vice versa (Chanda and Gupta 2015). This is mainly due to governmental initiatives and the EU's international exchange programme Erasmus Mundus, which allows student mobility within and beyond Europe. The programme offers scholarships and operates through academic collaborations between the EU and the rest of the world. Since the introduction of the Erasmus Mundus programme and other scholarship schemes, the migration of students from India to Europe has become quite noteworthy and significant. While the UK used to be the traditional destination for Indian students, other European countries like Germany, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries have also witnessed an increase in their numbers (Mukherjee and Chanda 2012). Further, government initiatives like the Prime Minister's Initiative (PMI) of the UK launched in 1999, the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (German Academic Exchange Service) (DAAD) in Germany, the Indo-Swiss Joint Research Programme (ISJRP) in Switzerland launched in 2008 and the Indo-French Consortium of Universities (IFCU) in France have facilitated the mobility of students, academics and researchers between India and Europe.

A further emerging pattern at present is that highly skilled Indians increasingly move abroad. While the early Indian migrants were mainly semi-skilled and low-skilled workers, since the 1990s, highly skilled Indian migrants with professional expertise, technical qualifications and skills have increasingly migrated to developed countries like the USA, the UK and, more recently, Germany, France and Belgium. At the same time, low-skilled Indians have emigrated to the Gulf, especially to the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries (Khadria 2002; Rajan and Percot 2011; Sasikumar and Hussian 2008).

Growing trade, investments and migration policies have been the main factors facilitating the increase in the movement of highly skilled migrants from India to Europe and vice versa. India is now ranked among the top ten trading partners of the EU and accounts for 3% of extra-EU trade (Chanda and Gupta 2015). The Netherlands, the UK and Cyprus are the preferred investment destinations for Indian companies which mainly invest in the service and IT sectors. The proliferation of bilateral trade agreements and international agreements such as the World Trade Organization's (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has also facilitated the transnational movements of highly skilled professionals. Every year nearly 20,000 Indians are granted work permits by the UK government, and the 'intra-company transfer' visa is considered an important route for investment-related mobility (Tumbe and Mukherjee 2015).

With regard to European migrants in India, there is a growing number of highly skilled expatriates from the USA and Europe working in technology hubs such as Bangalore and Hyderabad and in the financial hub of Mumbai (Tumbe and Mukherjee 2015:47). The surge in growth of the IT and ITES sectors in India has resulted in growing investment between EU countries and India; European banks and other financial institutions and transnational companies are increasingly out-

sourcing large IT projects to Indian companies. This has resulted in transnational movements of IT professionals working in the areas of business sales prospecting and marketing, project development, delivery of work onsite, knowledge and process transfer, training and skill upgradation and managing offshore offices for short- or long-term contracts (Satija and Mukherjee 2015:122).

In recent decades, transnational lifestyle migration has increased due to rising income levels in the industrialised countries. European lifestyle migrants travel for cultural, personal or spiritual reasons. India is a favourite destination for those who are interested in its traditional medical practices such as Ayurveda and Siddha, the spiritual and physical lifestyle practices of yoga and meditation. There are different hubs across India where lifestyle migrants arrive in large numbers. These include the Osho International Meditation resort in Pune, the Amritanandamayi Ashram in Kerala, the shrine of Shirdi Baba at Shirdi, the Sai Ashram in Bangalore as well as many other spiritual centres in North India and at the foothills of the Himalayas. Every year, hundreds of Europeans sojourn for several months in Varanasi due to its exotic and mystic image or travel to Goa because of its beaches and trance music scene (Korpela 2010, 2014).

3.2 Data Collection

The snowball sampling technique was used to identify 80 temporary migrants and semi-structured interviews were used to elicit research data. The demography of the interviewees can be seen in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.

International tertiary-level students formed the highest number of respondents (20), followed by highly skilled migrants, lifestyle migrants, returnees, families left behind, circular migrants, entrepreneurs and family-based migrants. It is known that many undocumented migrants live in various places across the country, engaging in low-skill activities, but unfortunately, we were not able to interview any of them.

Data collection in India was conducted in the cities of Pune, Bangalore, Delhi, Hyderabad, Bombay and Cochin and the state of Goa. The selection of cities reflects the nature and number of migrants they attract. These cities attract foreigners in large numbers, particularly in business sectors. Pune is a city known for its spiritual and cultural characteristics, Bangalore and Cochin for their IT hubs, Delhi for being the capital city, Bombay and Bangalore as being business headquarters and Goa for its party scene.

3.3 Migration Processes

The international tertiary-level students whom we interviewed had moved to India from France, Germany, Cyprus, the UK and Italy. The majority of them were aged between 22 and 28. The students interviewed had travelled across India and had thus a fairly clear idea of the country, given the short duration of their stay. They had

Table 3.1 Demography of migrants interviewed in India

Temporary migrants to India	*Nationality*	*Gender*	*Total*
Highly skilled workers	Netherlands (1), Luxemburg (2), UK (2), Germany (5), Sweden (2)	Female (3)/male (9)	12
Lifestyle migrants	Germany (4), Italy (2), Denmark (1), Netherlands (2), France (3)	Female (5)/male (7)	12
Entrepreneurs	UK (1), Germany (1)	Female (−)/male (2)	2
Students	Italy (7), Germany (5), France (4), Cyprus (2), UK (2)	Female (9)/male (11)	20
Family-based movers	UK (1)	Female (1)/male (−)	1
Circular migrants	Austria (1), Germany (1) Italy (1), UK (1)	Female (1)/male (3)	4
Non-movers	*Country of destination*	*Gender*	
Family members (non-movers)	Britain (6), Luxemburg (1), Italy (2), Germany (3), Ireland (1), Spain (1), France (2), Hungary (1)	Female (11)/male (6)	17
Returnee migrants	Germany (2), Switzerland (1), UK (3), Netherlands (1), Sweden (2), Italy (1), Austria (2)	Female (4)/male (8)	12
Total			80

Table 3.2 Type of migrants and city of residence

Category	Pune	Bangalore	Delhi	Hyderabad	Bombay	Cochin	Goa	Total
Student	05	04	02		05	04		20
Highly skilled	02	03	03		02	02		12
Lifestyle migrants	03	01			01	02	05	12
Entrepreneur					02			02
Family based					01			01
Circular migrant	01		01				02	04
Returnees	02	03	06		01			12
Family left behind	03		04	10				17
Total	16	11	16	10	12	08	07	80

come to India as part of the Erasmus Mundus exchange programme or the UN's internship programmes or to complete a semester of their MBA programme at a European university or a short course on India's arts and cultural heritage. In some cases, personal contacts had had a vital role in the decision to move:

> I had an Indian classmate in Europe, and a few years later we met again at a conference in Poland, and out of nowhere, I suddenly got this urge to visit India. That time I had the options of choosing between Mexico, Japan and India as part of the Erasmus-Mundus programme and without second thoughts, I opted for India. Though I never really kept in touch with him later on, nor did I find the contact useful once I reached India, which is where the spark came from. (Yara, 1989, female, student, Germany)

The European students who were interviewed in India were taking courses in subjects such as political science and international relations or arts, while most Indian student returnees had done their courses in Europe in advanced science streams such as engineering and physical sciences. Thus, while Indians mostly chose technical subjects which could guarantee them a job on completion of the course, European students mostly expressed interest in exploring the subject of their choice, and the career prospects afforded by the chosen subject were not their primary concern. Nevertheless, many student respondents from Europe were of the opinion that Europe is stagnating in terms of economic development, and they thought that the developing Asian nations now have an opportunity to boom in business sectors such as information technology, industries and advanced sciences.

The highly skilled migrants interviewed in India were from Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK. They were mostly those on secondment from their business firms in Europe working as visiting professors in an Indian university or on a short-term project or were ethnic Indians who had been settled in Europe for generations with PIO (Person of Indian Origin) status. Some of them were married to Indians which made it easier for them to relocate in India for a while. Most interviewees had significant migration histories, and most of them stated that their main intention was to gain personal experience and new knowledge rather than career advancement. This category of migrants consisted mainly of people in their 40s. They were mostly married and had already made enough money to settle down. They were not particularly keen to discuss their salary expectations and financial advantages. In most cases, the travel and return arrangements were arranged by their organisations, and hence, the social and bureaucratic hassles that they had to handle were negligible. Their priorities were mostly related to social security services and postretirement prospects.

Many European lifestyle migrants said that transnational travel was a part of their personal development. They wanted to understand India and its cultural heritage and experience the Asian world from a perspective beyond that of a tourist. They believed that their experiences in India could enrich their lives and provide better learning experiences than any education ever would:

> Every single moment abroad is an experience. It has its own share of challenges as well as rewards. But by the end of the day, whether good or bad, every experience is precious that gives more confidence and grip for the way forward. I feel myself transforming time to time with each travel. (Kim, 1983, female, low-skilled, Austria)

On the other hand, lifestyle migrants are in a precarious position as they do not come under the official social security structures either in their home country or in India. As Mari Korpela (2013: 71) writes, ‘Crises in one’s personal life, issues with health care, unregistered businesses, un-registered residency, visa regulations and children’s schooling are issues that highlight some of the vulnerabilities of the transnationally mobile lives of Westerners in Goa’.

The study conducted in India showed that, in some cases, there was a close connection between circular and temporary migration. Some respondents made regular short-term journeys to India without really settling down. In the course of our study,

we identified four such migrants from Austria, Germany, Italy and the UK. One peculiar case was that of an Austrian veteran who had been travelling to India regularly in the past 15 years at the time when it is winter in Austria. He had spent almost 6 months in India every year and visited his favourite spots, Goa, Pune, Manali and Dharamsala. Other circular migrants were highly skilled people who worked either as entrepreneurs or academics and spent a certain amount of time in India every year. Many European entrepreneurs had outsourced a large volume of work to Indian companies and hence visited India on a periodic basis to oversee and develop business activities. Circular migration was a preferred mode of movement which allowed them to enjoy the best of both worlds. On the other hand, we observed that temporariness had been challenging in many ways. The interviewees found it hard to maintain social relationships, and some of them had lost fluency in their mother tongues. Some of the respondents had actually lost interest in being permanently mobile.

The returnees interviewed were mainly graduates of European universities, who had participated in a short-term exchange programme or an internship in Europe or had been on a short-term secondment from an IT firm located in India. In most cases, the return was pre-planned, but many of the interviewees had tried to extend their stay in Europe for as long as possible. Their main reasons for returning were the completion of their course, expiry of visa or inability to find better jobs in European countries. In some cases, a strong desire to come back to their home country was the reason for the return. All respondents said that, given the chance, they would still want to travel or settle down in some countries in Europe or the USA. They all acknowledged that, although for a short period, living and working abroad had helped them greatly in building their careers or enhancing their social status in India. In many cases, the return was mostly an issue of better living and social acceptance:

> I had huge hopes on returning to India for a better job and increased prospects in marriage market. Expiry of my visa forced me to return to India, or else I would have preferred to stay in the UK. Yes, I secured my degree, got better job and a good wife, and a far better lifestyle. (Mayuresh, 1986, male, returnee from the UK)
>
> Yes. Travelling abroad has improved my social status and got me a marriage alliance from a respectable family. I got new friends once I returned to India and my friends' circle has widened since I am considered as a UK returnee. I would have preferred to stay there because of the higher standard of living and salary. My foreign sojourn helped me gain a promotion in my job and an increase in salary. It was a matter of increased social prestige. (Ajay 1985, male, returnee from Germany)

3.4 Politico-legal Aspects

The political and legal aspects of temporary migration can be contemplated from the perspective of migrants' knowledge of the laws and political system of the host country, their rights and obligations as temporary migrants, the politics of the home and host countries or their willingness to take an active part in the political affairs of

either nation. It became evident that most of the interviewees, young or old, were either unaware or not interested in the political scenarios in either their home or host countries. Marie, a female respondent from the Netherlands, was an exception in this regard. Marie said, 'I have not participated in politics, but I am of course interested. You cannot live in India and not be engaged in politics at an intellectual and emotional level' (Marie, female, highly skilled, 1960, Netherlands).

Political awareness was stronger among Indians in Europe than among Europeans in India. Some European students also mentioned that they were surprised to see such active political discussions among their Indian friends, which in their view was not very common in Europe:

> Politics is different from country to country and it is very much what the media projects it to be. Here on the campus (in India), students having very healthy and in-depth political discussions is a regular sight, but I haven't seen that in Italy. I think the youth here are more interested in the day-to-day political affairs and the knowledge they possess on such matters is appreciable. (Ioana, 1991, female, student, Italy)

Active political engagement was out of question for most of the temporary migrants we interviewed. None of the European migrants in India were engaged in political activities, party politics or trade unions although, at a general level, they might be interested in politics. Many of the interviewees had not exercised their right to vote even once, be they students, highly skilled or lifestyle migrants. However, many Indian returnees acknowledged that, after returning to the home country, they had continued to keep track of the political issues of the country where they had once lived. Some of them were of the opinion that the political scene in India was riddled with corruption and said that this was one of the reasons why they could not be happy in their homeland. A few returnees and family members of migrants also pointed out that the reservation policies implemented in favour of socially, economically oppressed sections of the various social strata of Indian society in the areas of legislature, government employment and educational sector made it very difficult for them to actually achieve what they wanted. They thought they might eventually have to leave India to fulfil their real potential due to the lack of viable opportunities in the country.

Among the returnees interviewed in India, there were European citizens with PIO (Person of Indian Origin) cards who had lived in Europe for many years. They seemed to have a better knowledge of and interest in the political affairs of their former host country. They also acknowledged that politics and policies played a huge role in the world of migration. According to them, being aware of the political circumstances was even more important for migrants than for the citizens of the host country.

Temporary migrants were generally not very well informed about their rights and obligations in the host county. This was the case both with Europeans in India and Indians in Europe. In many cases, there was no understanding of formal rules and regulations and most of their pre-departure training had come from other migrants or through the Internet. Moreover, the returnees we interviewed were quite unaware

of the schemes, if any, that the Indian government might provide for them. In fact, none of them had ever been part of any government scheme for returnees.

Transnational travelling had made many Europeans realise that the information given by the media is not always true. Many of our respondents had revised the notions about India which they had formed from films, print and news media. Although rape, corruption and other negative aspects of the country are widely discussed in the global media, they were not considered by the interviewees as providing a comprehensive picture of India. In fact, many of the female respondents felt that India was a safe country for women. Nevertheless, many problems were reported by the European migrants. Many of them had experienced overpricing by local vendors, rude behaviour from taxi drivers and bureaucratic hassles, mainly because of the lack of fluency in the local language and insufficient understanding of the system.

3.5 Socio-economic Aspects

The socio-economic scenario, as we observed, appeared to be very different among the Europeans in India from the Indian returnees from Europe. Most Europeans had chosen to come to India rather for a life experience and did not expect that their stay in India would enhance their professional careers:

> I am less interested in career progression than I am in expanding my role and mind, learning new things, understanding more, seeing more. I could not be happier. (Katherine, 1959, female, highly skilled, Netherlands)

However, for most Europeans, be they students or highly skilled migrants, their earnings at home or the scholarships in terms of Euros sufficed to enable a comfortable living in India. This was mainly due to the currency exchange rate. Many European students reported that their scholarships were sufficient both to cover living expenses in India and to leave money over for further travels:

> The amount I receive from the scholarship is way too much for me to maintain in India. In that way I have been able to save and I have started paying back my education loan. I do not have any other source of income. (Daniel, 1988, male, student, Germany)

The European interviewees, irrespective of category, mentioned that their families back home did not need their financial support, but this was not the case for Indian families. All the Indian families that we talked to acknowledged the vital role of remittances in their family incomes. Some migrants sent as much as Rs.50,000 (approximately $1,000) every month to their families back home. In the case of working-class and middle-class families, this money was either used to repay debts and loans or, in most cases, to marry off daughters and sisters. Although taking or giving dowry has become illegal in India, it persists as a cultural practice, so that marrying off daughters and sisters is a responsibility for the families. Upper class migrants engaged in portfolio investments and setting up new business ventures (cf. Zachariah and Rajan 2014).

All the Indian migrants returning from Europe reported that their experience of either working or studying abroad had enhanced their earning potential and, to a large extent, helped them to gain a respectable social status. The following quote shows that the aspirations were not only for economic but also for social advancement:

> Working abroad is not only financially beneficial. In my hometown, the neighbours feel happy as well as jealous about me staying in Germany. People at home and neighbourhood treat me differently. They keep on asking me about how it is in Germany for small little things. Looking at me, many people try to migrate abroad from my village. I have become an example for many young talents. (Harish. 1979, male, returnee from Germany)

From the responses of some temporary migrants, we observed that the attitudes of migrants varied according to age. What excites most people at a younger age, be it the pleasure of experiencing new lands, educational and career advance mentor money, all become less attractive and for many the urge to return to their roots, where there is more security and gained ascendancy. Social security schemes were strong priorities playing a major role in determining where the respondents wanted to reside. For many people, as they got older, the social security system that a country could offer was a major factor in the decision to settle down. In practice, this was one of the main reasons why most people, Indian or European, wanted to go back to Europe:

> I think I have left India permanently. I am pretty happy there. There is no plan to return to India mainly because the scientists in India do not get the kind of attention they need from the government or the corporate sector. The salary packages are abysmally low here. (Sreenivas, 1970, male, highly skilled, Indian born German resident)

> For many years I thought I would remain in India as I felt very much at home. However, since a few years I have started to realise that I would have great difficulty retiring at 56, because what would I do? I worry that I will wither away. In Europe people retire at 67 and I think that leaves much more opportunity to do something meaningful in life and provide an income, particularly since I have no family. So I now plan to return to my home country at some time in the future. (Esther, 1959, female, highly skilled, Netherlands)

3.6 Sociocultural Aspects

As far as the reasons for migrating abroad are concerned, there are two options – migration by choice and that by command. In many cases, short-term transnational migration takes place either on the orders of an employer or as a requirement of an educational institution as part of the person's professional or academic obligations. We perceived that among our respondents, voluntary migration made adaptation easier, while compulsory migration made things more difficult and inconvenient. This is one of the findings emerging from the interviews we conducted and was more prominent among the highly skilled migrants and students. In the case of lifestyle migrants and other categories of migrants for whom the move was a choice made by themselves, the sojourn tended to be more enjoyable and fulfilling.

However, as the following quotation from a French student shows, integration into Indian society was not always easy:

> I had to do a compulsory exchange programme in India where I have to complete one whole semester of my course. India has always been different from the rest of Asia. I thought of India as a big, crowded and noisy country (...) My family is scared of me being in India. They fear the water is not good. I had fallen sick in September and was bed-ridden. I had to take 4 vaccinations. I think the health system is good if you have money to treat yourself. Yes, I am always treated as an alien for my skin tone in India. The autorickshaw drivers treat me as I am an idiot who knows nothing about the city. (Thomas, 1990, male, student, French)

European students were mainly satisfied with their studies in India, but some complained that their efforts to work beyond classrooms and textbooks in a wider range were not much appreciated by the Indian universities. Some students also disapproved of the evaluation system of the universities, where knowledge was not tested but rather the capacity to memorise facts and reproduce them during exams. In the corporate sector, most Europeans were happy with the levels of appreciation in the work environments irrespective of the location.

The findings indicate that, for temporary migrants, one of the most challenging aspects of being constantly mobile is the sociocultural adaptation to the receiving society. Whether the respondents were Indians in Europe or Europeans in India, they had all faced this challenge. Most Europeans initially found it hard in India to get used to how they were stared at on the street and how they were seen as 'walking dollar signs' by the local vendors and autorickshaw drivers, how they were overcharged at national monuments and museums and how they did not manage to find local bars or pubs where they could get alcoholic drinks. The local people might also have preconceived conceptions about the behaviour or desires of foreigners because of their imagined or real wealth. As Savinetti (2015: 59) argues, it seems that their 'whiteness' is a reason for hawkers and autorickshaw drivers and sales people to charge them higher prices.

In general, cultural differences created a gap between Europeans and local Indians. For Europeans, many aspects of everyday life such as transport, communications, governance and the social infrastructure could be vastly different and challenging. The everyday challenges ranged from the clothes they wore to the food they ate. Indian society is comparatively more traditional and conservative than European societies. For instance, Indian social environments respond very differently to male and female migrants. Western women's non-verbal signals, such as having a bold stare, going out alone, socialising with men and loitering around streets, may be considered as being against the local codes of suitable behaviour for respectable women (Hottola 1999, 2002: 168). In the academic literature, there are reports of harassment of Western women by Indian men (see Hottola 1999; Korpela 2006). One European respondent reported that women are always looked upon with judgmental attitudes and that most cities, except the state of Goa, did not even have places where women could drink alcohol.

> I felt that the Indian society is more or less judgemental about things like drinking and smoking. The taboo only makes these things more and more attractive to kids. Parents are



Fig. 3.1 Board hanging on the gate of an apartment in Pune

> hesitant talking to children about such things. It is important that they talk rather than just judge. Lack of such discussions and sex education like training only makes a society more backward. (Irvin, 1989, male, student, Italy).

In many locations in India, foreigners, even students and young unmarried men, are among the least preferred neighbours in the housing industry. This is mainly because Indians are very particular about the peace and discipline of their closely knit family living space and consider young unmarried men and students to be a disturbance. Thus, it may be very difficult for a foreigner to find accommodation in India. A common problem is that the neighbours are sceptical about the lifestyle and values of non-Indians. When we interviewed a landlord in Pune, he said that although many foreigners had approached him to rent his apartment, the community did not let him rent out to them mainly because the neighbours did not approve of it. The neighbours feared that the Western cultural influence would have an impact on their children. For example, it was not easy for Indians to understand that Europeans had liberal religious views and most of them did not follow any religious practices. Many Indian families want their children to follow their religion, and there was a fear that the European lifestyle might undermine their faith and views on religion (Fig. 3.1).

All respondents, irrespective of their age or category, were of the opinion that being transnationally mobile would have a major influence on their attitudes. The Indian returnees interviewed criticised many local practices, such as throwing garbage on the street, ogling women, fighting on the streets, being abusive to children and spitting on pavements. It is evident that they had become intolerant of these issues during their stay in Europe. On the other hand, the family members of Indians

who were abroad expressed their concerns over religion. They were afraid that the sojourn in Europe might undermine the migrant's faith and views on religion.

Most of the respondents took the view that 'home' is where their family members are and where they could live safely and peacefully. For them, the location was not the main issue:

> You keep losing some as you gain another. It is a process and it helps you with views and opinions. It is more about a place where you feel safe, independent and not judged. The presence of the loved ones makes a home where ever it may be. (Dave, 1987, male, highly skilled, Germany)
>
> If you really think of it, nowhere is home and if you want one, anywhere can be home. For me, there is a little bit of home wherever I have been so far. (Sarah, 1991, female, student, Italy)

When a person is constantly mobile, what is subjected to the greatest strain is his/her social relationships. Knowledge of the local language made daily life easier in a foreign country and made it easier to communicate with the locals. When it comes to language, it is evident that Europeans in India are in a comparatively better position than Indians in Europe. In most parts of India, one can manage using English, and knowing the local language is not always essential. However, this is not the case in most European countries. It was noted that this advantage in terms of language made India a preferred option for Europeans compared to other South Asian regions. The role of the mother tongue in the daily lives of the respondents was limited to communicating with the families back home, and some of them had actually lost the fluency in their mother tongues.

3.7 Concluding Remarks

The study conducted in India revealed temporary migratory movements between India and Europe in both directions. The growing business relations created by the establishment of multinational companies and educational exchange programmes, such as the Erasmus Mundus programme, have contributed to temporary migration between the continents. A large number of tertiary-level students leave India to acquire higher degrees in European universities, and European students increasingly study in Indian universities.

India, with its rich cultural and historical heritage, also attracts large numbers of 'lifestyle seekers'. The study revealed that there are certain pockets in India that attract an unimpeded flow of lifestyle migrants. These places are friendlier and more welcoming towards foreigners than are other regions. Goa, Pune, Manali, Kovalam and Dharamshala are a few examples of such places.

Indians who move to European countries are increasingly highly educated. They are engaged in highly skilled jobs or higher education studies and have very strong social and economic ties with their families back in India. These strong family ties highlight a difference between the Indian and European migrants. Most Indian

respondents said they sent home money, even during their short stays abroad, unlike the Europeans who maintained minimal financial ties back home.

The findings show that many Europeans have become outsiders in India, but they are also not integrated (or not willing to become integrated) into Indian society (see Korpela 2013:66). Although there is no serious language challenge for European migrants since English is widely spoken in India, there is a need for the Indian government to simplify bureaucratic processes and make them more systematic and amenable to foreigners. Also, in order to maintain the flow of European students to India, it is necessary to make the courses more challenging and keep the standard high to meet the expectations of the European universities.

Our study revealed many positive impacts of migration. Whether in terms of facing challenges or in terms of adopting positive practices from foreign countries, all our interviewees reported that migration has had a beneficial impact on them at the personal or professional level. In particular, transnational migration appeared to be a valuable learning experience. Many Europeans had learned to better understand Indian ways and were ready to revise their picture of India. Moreover, the findings imply that a person who has been living abroad is able to take an outsider's view of the country of origin. For instance, Indians who had lived in Europe had begun to embrace some Western values, such as cleanliness. Although it is difficult to estimate the societal implications this kind of 'social remittances' may have, it is evident that they may have a great impact on individual level.

Many of the returnees interviewed expressed interest in going back or settling down in Europe. Most obviously, India has not been able to make efficient use of the human resource of returnees, and many qualified Indians migrate abroad for better opportunities and appreciation. It is hence important that India transforms its labour market in a way that the qualified and skilled returnees will be better accommodated. Taking into account the experiences and views of returnees when formulating policies and schemes will also help to introduce effective reintegration practices.

Most of the Europeans in India we interviewed were sure that they wanted to go back to their home countries at some point in the future. Many of them, however, said that they first wanted to travel more and see new countries before finally settling down in their country of origin. Most of them estimated that they would continue to be mobile in the next 10 years, possibly accompanied by their families. This can be seen as an indication that European people prefer to migrate temporarily.

We have not been able to define 'temporariness' because it is a concept that varies from one person to another. Understanding temporariness is a challenging task because most of the temporary migrants we interviewed were not concerned about their permanent settlement or considering their future plans. Sometimes they were not sure about where to settle down either. This attitude of temporariness made them less active in party politics and trade unions and had sometimes led to a lack of completeness in their cultural sphere. As we talked to migrants who had been living in different countries for many years, we observed that temporariness had been challenging on not one level, but on many. Many respondents found it hard to maintain social relationships, some of them had lost their fluency in their mother tongues and some had actually lost interest in being permanently mobile.

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Chapter 4
Enriching Journeys: Transnational Temporary Migration Between the Philippines and Europe

Maruja M.B. Asis and Karen Anne S. Liao

This chapter examines the bidirectional migration flows between the Philippines and Europe and probes the sociocultural, economic and political aspects of the experiences of transnational temporary migrants in this migration corridor. The analysis draws on interviews with 80 individuals, including 33 Filipino returnees and visitors from Europe, 38 European migrants in the Philippines and 9 Filipino nonmigrants with family members who are temporary migrants in Europe. Temporary migration patterns between the Philippines and European countries derive from different triggering and maintenance factors. Temporary migration from the Philippines to Europe is largely fuelled by labour migration supplemented by smaller flows of student migration. Although admission requirements to Europe are stringent, policies concerning residence and family reunification provide a pathway to long-term residence and citizenship. Temporary migration from Europe to the Philippines is smaller in scale, comprising of migrants coming to the country as part of capital flows and development assistance. Except for retirees, many Europeans are in the Philippines temporarily, mostly in connection with their work. Both Filipino and European migrants view migration as enriching and expanding their worldview. Many of them participate as economic actors in the destination countries; they are less engaged as political actors. Migrants' views and experiences offer insights to improving migration policies in the Philippines and Europe.

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4.1 Introduction

In 2015, the number of international migrants worldwide reached an all-time high at 244 million (UN DESA, Population Division 2016), a 41% increase compared to 2000. While the population of international migrants has increased in absolute terms since 1960, its share to the world's population remains at around 3.3%. Yet, more adults would actually like to migrate if it were possible to do so. Gallup migration surveys between 2007 and 2010 show that some 700 million adults or 15% of the world's adult population 'would like to move to another country permanently if the opportunity arose' (Esipova et al. 2010–2011: 2). An earlier round of the survey found that more adults would like to migrate temporarily for work (26%) compared with those wanting to migrate to another country permanently (14%) (Esipova et al. 2011: 12).

Against this backdrop of global migration, this chapter focuses on the migration linkages between the Philippines and Europe and their sociocultural, economic and politico-legal dimensions. We employed the migration systems as an analytical lens in guiding our analysis of temporary migration between these two spaces. Initially used by A. L. Mabogunje to analyse rural-urban migration in the 1970s, it was later applied to international migration by Kritz et al. (1992) and was somehow overtaken by other developments in theoretical thinking about migration. The basic ideas of the migration systems approach in international migration remain relevant: (1) migration flows are to be considered in relation to other flows of capital, goods ideas and technology; (2) any one of these flows between origin and destination countries trigger and sustain other flows; and (3) over time, these flows contribute to the formation of systems. It is valuable because it 'forces researchers to consider both origin and destination contexts and the relationship between them' (Bakewell 2013: 314). On the other hand, it does not take account how systems are formed and is noncommittal on the role of human agency in creating, sustaining and transforming these flows. These gaps are addressed by transnationalism, particularly the aspect of human agency, and are acknowledged: within and across these spaces, migrants and nonmigrants create and sustain transnational connections and processes through cross-border social ties and practices (Faist 2014). We took from the migration systems approach the bidirectional perspective and drew from the literature on transnationalism the centrality of human agency to examine transnational temporary migration flows between the Philippines and Europe. Based on interviews conducted with international migrants in the Philippines-Europe migration corridor and several nonmigrants in the Philippines who have family members in Europe, this chapter probes three key questions: (1) What is the place of transnational migration in the lives of migrants, and how does it figure into their worldview? (2) Given the bordered context of transnational migration, how do migrants navigate the social, cultural, economic and political institutions in their transnational crossings? (3) How do migrants view the impact of transnational migration in their personal life, families and communities?

Following this introduction, Sect. 4.2 reviews data on transnational migration in the Philippines, both generally and in relation to Europe in particular. Section 4.3 presents the context by discussing previous studies and related literature on the

Philippines-Europe migration system and outlining our data sources and methodology. Section 4.4 presents key findings from the study. The final section closes the chapter with some indications of new insights and potential contributions to the literature.

4.1.1 The Philippines as Origin and Destination

Large numbers of Filipinos have been migrating internationally since the 1970s. By 2013, the stock of overseas Filipinos stood at 10.2 million, comprising of 4.9 million permanent migrants, 4.2 million temporary migrants (mostly migrant workers) and 1.2 million migrants in an irregular situation (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2016). The Filipino diaspora accounts for 10% of the country's population. The economic impact of international migration is mostly felt through remittances (Asis and Roma 2010), a financial lifeline for many Filipino families and for the country as a whole. In 2015, remittance inflows to the Philippines were estimated at USD28.48 billion, up from 27.27 billion in 2014 (World Bank 2016). Despite an improving economy in recent years, overseas labour migration continues as the lack of decent jobs persists back home. Moreover, decades of large-scale international migration have created a society that is at home with transnational migration.

Two key external events in the 1970s accelerated contemporary migration from the Philippines. The first was the dismantling of immigration policies which used to favour immigration from Europe in traditional countries of settlement. The reforms started in the USA in 1965 and in the 1970s in Canada, Australia and New Zealand and signalled new immigration from other regions. Mostly through family reunification schemes, the Philippines became a major source country of immigrants to these settlement countries. Between 1981 and 2013, some two million Filipinos left the country to settle overseas, with yearly departures averaging 61,161 (CFO 2016). Most emigrants moved to the USA. Several countries in Europe, namely, Italy, Germany, the UK and Spain, are the major destination countries of Filipino emigrants to the continent (Asis and Battistella 2015; Battistella and Asis 2014; International Organization for Migration and Scalabrini Migration Center 2013).

The second key event was the huge demand for workers by the oil-rich Gulf countries, which triggered temporary labour migration. In 1975, some 36,035 Filipino workers (12,501 land-based workers, mostly to the Middle East, and 25,534 sea-based workers) left the country to work overseas (IOM and SMC 2013). Although intended to be temporary, overseas employment opportunities expanded to other regions (while also acknowledging the fragile state of the Philippine economy), and labour migration increased and expanded to the rest of the world's regions. The role of the institutionalisation of labour migration in the Philippines has also been advanced as an important factor in sustaining the phenomenon.[1] In

[1] For details on the institutional and legal framework of international migration in the Philippines, see IOM and SMC (2013).

Table 4.1 Annual deployment of land-based Filipino workers by region, 2010–2014

Region	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Middle East	684,060	764,586	852,042	863,152	885,541
Asia	280,808	415,224	476,021	471,422	420,106
Europe	48,179	57,880	47,070	38,204	29,950
Italy	*25,595*	*31,704*	*25,261*	*19,556*	*14,786*
UK	*5,249*	*5621*	*3913*	*4255*	*3335*
Ireland[a]	*3,317*	*2874*	*1763*	*884*	*540*
Spain	*3,262*	*3477*	*3255*	*2542*	*1610*
Cyprus	*3,000*	*3797*	*3484*	*2182*	*2339*
Americas	25,613	27,679	29,553	29,191	27,615
Africa	25,207	28,531	25,194	26,294	22,240
Oceania	12,341	19,492	27,391	31,237	21,311
Trust territories	3,196	4236	3682	4317	3867
Not elsewhere classified	42,272	1099	853	362	20,212
Total	1,123,676	1,318,727	1,431,566	1,469,179	1,430,842

Source: POEA (n.d.)

[a]The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration records data separately for the UK and Ireland

2014 alone, 1.8 million Filipino workers—1.4 million land-based workers and close to 402,000 sea-based workers—were deployed overseas (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration n.d). Note that the share of rehires (i.e. workers returning to the same employer) is larger than new hires among the deployed workers.

Table 4.1 shows that the Middle East continues to be the primary destination of land-based Filipino migrant workers, seconded by Asia and Europe, a far third. The number of Filipino workers going to Europe has been on a decline since 2011 brought about by policy changes in destination countries (e.g. the UK has halted the recruitment of health workers from the Philippines). More than half of the Filipino workers migrating to Europe go to Italy.

By comparison, international migration to the Philippines has been much smaller compared to outflows, and data on this are not as widely available.[2] The 2010 census of population listed 12 European countries with at least 100 of their citizens present in the Philippines, of which the top five countries are the following: UK (3604), Germany (3184), Italy (1460), Spain (1099) and France (1014) (PSA-NSO 2012). These countries are also the major destinations of Filipinos in Europe.[3]

[2] Interviews with officials/key staff of several European embassies in the Philippines indicated that they also had difficulty in estimating the number of their nationals in the country. In general, they were of the view that the number of their nationals present in the Philippines is growing.

[3] Based on *stock* estimates of overseas Filipinos, Germany and France rank among the major destinations of Filipinos in Europe (CFO 2016; see also ww.cfo.gov.ph/downloads/statistics/stock-estimates.html). These two countries do not figure in Table 4.1, which are *flow* statistics of overseas Filipino workers who were deployed to foreign countries for the years 2010–2014.

Foreigners coming to the Philippines may be admitted under three major categories: non-immigrant, immigrant and special resident visas.[4] Overall, the legal and policy framework for admitting foreigners to the Philippines is still anchored on the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. In recent years, there had been calls to amend and update the immigration law.[5] In the meantime, some moves have been taken to relax visa restrictions to boost tourism and investments. Among the major changes in this regard is the granting of visa-free entry to nationals of 157 countries (as of 15 April 2014) for a length of stay of 7, 14, 30 and 59 days. Nationals of European countries do not need a visa for an initial stay of 30 days, which may be extended. Eligible *balikbayans* (Filipino returnees) and their immediate family members (spouse and children) can be admitted for an initial stay of 1 year, beyond which they may apply for an extension.

4.1.2 Filipino Migration to Europe and European Migration to the Philippines

As a destination for Filipino migrants, Europe falls between the strictly temporary labour migration regime in Asia (including the Gulf countries) on the one hand and the permanent or settlement migration in the USA and Canada in North America, on the other hand (Asis and Roma 2010). The migration of Filipinos, mostly women, to Italy, Spain and Greece in the 1970s started out as temporary migration, but shifted to long-term migration by the 1990s. The transformation has been helped by legalisation programmes which enabled the migrants to access residence and to avail of family reunification. A constant feature of Filipino migration to Europe is the predominance of care workers (mostly domestic workers, nurses and other health-care workers and au pairs). In Italy and Spain, the concentration of Filipinos (including men) in domestic work has had a double-edged impact on their occupational profile: on the one hand, they easily find employment in this sector due to a high demand for such work; on the other hand, they had been 'trapped' in this sector (Zanfrini and Sarli 2010; Villaroya Soler 2010), unable to venture into other occupations. In Spain, some Filipinos have found jobs in restaurants and hotels, where their knowledge of English has proved useful in dealing with tourists. Very few Filipinos go into self-employment or entrepreneurship (Maas 2005, 2011; Fresnoza-Flot and Pecoud 2007); for the great majority, including those who had been in Europe for a long time, paid employment is the preferred option.

An edited volume on the history and development of Filipino migration to Europe, authored by Filipino migrants themselves (Hoegsholm 2007), provides an

[4] For details, *see* 'Visas and Visa Inquiry' in FAQs in http://www.immigration.gov.ph.

[5] During the 16th Congress, Senate Bill 2204 (Philippine Immigration Act of 2014) was filed for the purpose of reorganising the Bureau of Immigration and to support national security and economic development concerns (Republic of the Philippines 2014). It was targeted for approval before the end of the regular session in June 2015 (Monzon 2015), but it did not prosper.

overview of the different types of migrants, destination countries and organisations and communities formed by Filipinos to address their manifold needs. More recent research in Italy and Spain have uncovered the active transnational activities of Filipinos and the potential role of migrants' associations in linking Filipinos to institutions in the destination countries and to institutions in the home country (Zanfrini and Sarli 2010; Villaroya Soler 2010; Asis and Roma 2010; Baggio and Asis 2008). The turn to settlement in Europe has also cast attention to the young generation. This is a diverse group which includes those 'left behind' in the Philippines (Zanfrini and Asis 2006; Asis 2008a; Fresnoza-Flot 2009), the 1.5 generation (i.e. those born in the Philippines and immigrate as children/youth to Europe (Zanfrini and Asis 2006; Nagasaka and Fresnoza-Flot 2015) and the second generation (Zanfrini and Sarli 2010; Zanfrini and Asis 2006; Llangco 2013). These changes suggest that concerns about temporary labour migration (e.g. protection and welfare) are giving way to questions about transnational links and integration.

Research on contemporary European migration to the Philippines has been very sparse. One of the few studies pertains to the Dutch in the Philippines (Van den Muijzenberg 2003). Although small in number, Dutch volunteers played a key role in cementing links between the Philippines and the Netherlands, particularly in supporting development projects and disseminating information about the Philippines during the martial law period.

Thus, the existing literature on temporary migration between the Philippines and Europe is far from comprehensive and is notably uneven. Some indications that Filipino migration may be reaching a plateau in some destinations (e.g. Italy, Spain and the UK) may imply emerging and new issues and trajectories that will need research attention. The ageing of older waves of migrants, identity and integration issues of the younger generation and the transnational connections of different generations to the home country are among the trends to watch out for. Meanwhile, very little is known about European migration to the Philippines. Understanding the basics of this counterflow (the who, what, why and how) will contribute to a fuller picture of international migration in the Philippine context. Indeed, while the Philippines is mainly an origin country, in our globalised and migratory context, clear-cut distinctions between origin, transit and destination countries are no longer fixed.

4.2 Data Collection

Data for the study were collected through interviews with 80 individuals comprising 71 former or current international migrants and 9 Filipino nonmigrants who had family members in Europe. The interviews were conducted in the Philippines between September 2014 and September 2015. The definition of temporary migrants in the EURA-NET project, i.e. persons residing in another country for at least 3 months to at most 5 years, guided the screening and selection of interviewees. Some interviewees whose length of stay did not strictly meet the time criterion were still included nevertheless, as their experiences yielded interesting insights on

Table 4.2 Profiles of interviewees in the Philippines

Temporary migrants from the Philippines to Europe	**Country of destination**	**Gender**	**Total**
Returnee migrants	UK (7), Germany (4), Italy (5), Netherlands (4), Spain (4), Norway (3), Switzerland (2), Denmark (1), Finland (1), France (1), Scotland (1)	M (10), F (23)	33
Temporary migrants from Europe to the Philippines	**Nationality**	**Gender**	**Total**
Family-based movers	Germany (2), Finland (2), Belgium (1), France (1), Netherlands (1), Switzerland (1)	M (5), F (3)	8
Highly skilled workers	Germany (6), Spain (5), France (1), Netherlands (1), Belgium (2), Finland (1), Italy (1)	M (11), F (6)	17
Lifestyle seekers	Germany (2), Italy (1), Switzerland (1), UK (1)	M (5), F (0)	5
Students	Germany (3), Poland (1), Switzerland (1)	M (0), F (5)	5
Others	France (1), Belgium (2)	M (1), F (2)	3
Nonmigrants (Philippines)	**Previous migration experience**	**Gender**	**Total**
Family members	Yes (4), No (5)	M (2), F (7)	9

transnational migration and the shifts from temporary to permanent migration or vice versa.

In the absence of data that can be used to identify and select eligible interviewees, the recruitment of interviewees relied largely on referrals and snowball sampling. Interviews were conducted in nine sites in the Philippines: Metro Manila, Laguna, Ilocos Norte, Cagayan, Cebu, Bohol, Iloilo, Capiz and Davao del Sur. Half of the interviews were conducted in Metro Manila, and the rest were distributed in provinces across the three major island groupings of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Except for three interviews which were conducted via Skype, the rest were face-to-face interviews.

Table 4.2 presents the profile of the interviewees. Three types of interviewees participated in the study: 33 Filipinos who have returned from Europe within the last 5 years or were visiting, 38 European migrants in the Philippines, and 9 nonmigrants, i.e. Filipinos with family members who are temporary migrants in Europe. Of the 80 interviewees, 46 were women and 34 were men and their ages ranged from 22 to 77 years old. Filipino returnees and visitors from Europe included students (including one trainee) who pursued postgraduate programmes, domestic workers, a few professionals (including missionaries), tourists and workers who left the Philippines using a student visa. Professionals employed by international organisations and non-government organisations (NGOs) formed the largest group of Europeans in the Philippines, while the rest were visiting researchers, students and volunteers. Eight Europeans who have acquired permanent residence in the

Philippines were included in the study. They started out as temporary migrants who later applied for permanent residence, mostly because of marriage to Filipino nationals. The inclusion of nonmigrants in the sample provides insights about transnational migration from the perspective of family members based in the Philippines.

4.3 Migration Processes

Migration was a common experience for most of the interviewees. However, in comparing their experiences, carrying a European or a Filipino passport makes a significant difference in the ease with which they cross borders and shaping to some extent migrant trajectories.

4.3.1 Europeans Coming to the Philippines

Most of the European interviewees began travelling to other countries as children when their families would spend vacations in other countries. They started migrating independently during their student days, travelling mostly as backpackers. Later in their adult life, migration became part of their work, particularly for those involved in the development and humanitarian fields. For the highly skilled migrants, coming to the Philippines was not a conscious decision, but was dictated more by job opportunities. Once they were in the Philippines and had gradually settled, some of them learned to appreciate life in the country. One interviewee had this to say about his discoveries and his reasons for staying:

> [I like] The people, of course. That's number one. If you don't like the people, you leave. Number two, the professional perspectives. There is future in the Philippines at least for people of my academic and professional background. Apart from people and work, the third reason for which I want to stay in the Philippines, is that it has unlimited options for tourism. (Aldo, 1986, male, highly skilled, Spain)

Interviewees with children also appreciated the available school options in the Philippines, which were an added incentive to accepting their job posts. They hoped to stay in the country until their children completed their studies. For most, moving again to work in another country was a goal for career development and other reasons. Only a few mentioned returning to their home countries in the future, suggesting a strong transnational orientation:

> I'm still young. I want to go to other places. Next, maybe in Africa or another Southeast Asian country. I don't really want to go back. So, for me, it's clear that I'm probably going to leave. Where I'm going to go, how fast I'm going to go, will depend on my personal situation. If I would have an offer, I would stay here... You wouldn't want to move to South Sudan or Syria if you have little kids. I wouldn't do that... Which also means that the earlier I go to these places, the better for me. (Johann, 1985, male, highly skilled, Germany)

4.3.2 Filipinos Returning from Europe

The Filipino interviewees had varying levels of international travels before migrating to their respective destination countries in the region. As a group, student returnees were well travelled: 14 of them had travelled or migrated to other countries before they pursued graduate studies or training in Europe. None of them encountered problems with their visa application; many were provided assistance by their universities in this regard. Whether they were in Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands or the UK, none of them reported having experienced discrimination. The scholarship programme of six interviewees required them to render service to their home institution; thus, their return to the Philippines was given. All were happy to return to the Philippines, although none of them could categorically say that they were back for good. Plans for further studies and marriage or relationship with European nationals were common reasons for thinking about returning to Europe. For this particular group of returnees, returning to the Philippines was not necessarily the end of migration. For quite a number of them, their return was temporary to pursue other life goals mentioned earlier. Except for one interviewee who imagined herself growing old in Europe, the rest planned on returning to the Philippines at some point.

Among the migrant workers, five women had been employed as domestic workers in Italy and Spain. Two had travelled or worked overseas before going to Europe. Nora (female, 1938, low-skilled worker, Philippines) previously worked as a domestic worker in Saudi Arabia and later in Brunei. She was 54 years old when she migrated to Italy in 1992 to work in the same occupation. Her transnational search for employment has kept her away from the Philippines for an extended period of time, but with the intent to return to the Philippines someday. Four migrated to Europe through legal channels; they were either petitioned by family members or their family members found employers who hired them and provided the necessary papers. Two entered Italy as irregular migrants in the 1990s, paying an agent to arrange their entry to Italy from the former Yugoslavia. The regularisation programme in Italy allowed them to legalise their stay. None of them applied for citizenship because they did not plan to stay in Europe permanently. In fact, five of the six had already returned to the Philippines for good: three were in their 70s (including Nora), while the two younger women returned to take care of ageing parents or to be present at home to guide their children. The return of elderly migrants who had worked for many years in Europe is primarily retirement-related, while for the relatively younger returnees, familial responsibilities compelled their return to the Philippines.

Lay missionaries Raquel (female, highly skilled, 1948, Philippines) and Ellen (female, highly skilled, 1949, Philippines) had different trajectories in their European sojourn.[6] Raquel was based mostly in the Philippines but had been to Europe several times. She was assigned to Spain in 1970–1976 to teach English and

[6] In the Catholic church, a lay association refers to an organisation of laypeople (i.e. those who are not members of the clergy) who promote the Gospel in their ordinary life. They work in schools and universities, mass media, health care and research.

was sent anew to Italy from 2006 to 2012 as a member of their association's general council. Her last assignment included travelling to Africa to support the association's communities and projects in the continent. She returned to the Philippines in 2012 and had since been visiting Europe several times for short vacations. Ellen, on the other hand, spent a total of 42 years in Europe (2 years in Italy and 40 years as a teacher in the UK), gaining UK citizenship in the process (while retaining her Philippine citizenship). Her long stay in the UK was unplanned; it turned out that way because she was given one assignment after another. She returned to the Philippines in 2014. Ellen had lived in the UK longer than she had lived in the Philippines, her country of birth, but for her, her decades of living in the UK were 'just' temporary. Both have retired from teaching, but they continue to support the work of the association. They help in translating materials from English to Spanish and vice versa. One of them established an educational foundation providing assistance to support the schooling of children from poor families.

Carol (female, highly skilled, 1958, Philippines) went to Europe to study in the UK temporarily, but stayed thereafter because of her marriage to a Swiss national. She had been living and working in Switzerland and other parts of Europe for 20 years, retaining her Philippine citizenship all along. She and her family returned to the Philippines in 2013 after many years of planning for their return. It is possible, however, that they may live elsewhere at some point, because the children are Swiss citizens. Every year, they return to Switzerland to visit her parents-in-law and for the children to maintain their links to their country of birth.

Like European migration to the Philippines, migration from the Philippines to Europe is also economic-driven, particularly motivated by finding employment and higher incomes. Educational and scholarship opportunities offered another window to migrate temporarily to Europe, with some being required to return to render service to the home country upon completion of their studies.

The study also captured reluctant returnees, as in the case of five migrant workers who used a student visa to gain admission to Norway and the UK. They dealt with an agent or consultant to help them with the visa application, shelling out a large amount to fund their migration. According to three of the interviewees, they spent between EUR 13,460 and EUR 38,460[7] to migrate to Norway and the UK. Funding the migration project was provided by family members pooling resources, including loans. Failing to obtain a work permit, they had to return to the Philippines. Three out of the five returnees expressed plans of remigrating elsewhere, hoping to realise their plans to work overseas in other destinations.

Interestingly, some of the nonmigrants had also experienced transnational mobility for different purposes, ranging from leisure travel or tourism to staying overseas for work or further studies. Some of them also had plans of visiting their family members in Europe. The term 'nonmigrants' thus only indicates that they are based in the Philippines; it does not adequately capture their previous migration history, their comings and goings and their future migration plans.

[7] The interviewees spent between Php 700,000 and Php 2,000,000, a very substantial amount in the Philippine context. As of this writing, the exchange rate is about Php 52.00 to a Euro.

4.4 Navigating the Transnational Life

4.4.1 Politico-legal Aspects

Transnational migrants encounter the politico-legal aspects of migration through admission and integration policies. The admission policies of the Philippines and Europe impose different requirements for transnational migrants traversing the Philippines-Europe migration corridor. They present the first hurdle for migrants. Having gained entry, daily living, employment and interaction with the local population and local institutions pose subsequent challenges for transnational migrants as they carve a life in countries in which they are not nationals.

For most of the Europeans coming to the Philippines, their entry to the country was described as easy, particularly for those working for international organisations that provided assistance in dealing with immigration-related matters. However, dealing with the extension of stay was either confusing because of arbitrary or changing requirements and the bureaucratic maze. Those based outside of Metro Manila had to wait longer for decisions on their cases because regional offices had to consult with the Manila headquarters. Interviewees also mentioned the fees (i.e. emigration clearance certificate and travel tax) they had to pay each time they travelled outside the Philippines.

Visa issues presented a problem to some interviewees, with a number of them relying on the extension of their tourist visas to remain in country longer. For example, those not legally married to their Filipino partners cannot apply for permanent residence, which was a problem for Norbert (male, highly skilled, 1982, Germany), who followed his Filipino partner to the Philippines. In his 4 years of residing and working in the Philippines (broken by yearly visits to his parents in Germany), he just kept on extending his tourist visa. In legal terms, he violated the terms of his tourist visa and was an irregular migrant worker in the Philippines. His workplace had yet to comply with some requirements so that it could properly apply for work permits for the foreign personnel in its employ. Norbert did not indicate that the constant extension was troublesome. Jeni (female, highly skilled, 1984, Germany) was supposed to take on a university appointment in the Philippines; it did not materialise because she was not able to get a working visa. Because visa processing took a long time, she ended up not pursuing the post. Meanwhile, interns found it easier to enter the country on a tourist visa and to apply for an extension of their stay later.

The visa issues faced by the European migrants in the Philippines arise from bureaucratic limitations rather than other issues such as discrimination. However, though European interviewees reported that they did not experience discrimination in the Philippines, many commented on receiving undue attention because of being visibly foreign. Michelle (female, highly skilled, n.d., Finland) said locals would often comment about her white skin and blue eyes. She also felt that she was getting special treatment (e.g. being served first in parties) because she was a foreigner; she would prefer to be treated like everybody else. Several interviewees mentioned their

discomfort with the perception that they were rich. Outside of Metro Manila, the scrutiny can be more intense because of fewer foreigners. European women with Filipino spouses or partners received a lot of attention because this partnership is less common than that which involves a European man and a Filipino woman.

For the Filipinos who went to Europe, the visa application process required many documents but was otherwise straightforward. However, those who intended to work in Europe but had no work permit had to use intermediaries or informal networks and invested an enormous amount of money to gain a foothold in Europe. The use of mediators is a tricky issue, as some migrants who go through irregular channels may be at risk of becoming victims of human trafficking (Asis 2008b). According to the Filipino interviewees, they did not experience discrimination in Europe. Interestingly, their adjustment and sense of being at home in the countries of destination were aided by the network of Filipinos and/or membership in Filipino organisations. Those in Italy and Spain had many family members living in these countries, and their days off were typically spent with other family members.

Social networks were conduits of information about employment which enabled migrants to land a job easily. The downside of network-mediated employment is getting the same occupation as co-ethnics, thereby creating an occupational niche associated with the group. One event that brought Filipinos beyond their family circle is the celebration of Philippine Independence Day every June 12, an event spearheaded by the Philippine Embassy. For most Filipinos, the church serves as an important gathering place.[8] The Catholic church in Italy, for instance, has long provided a social space for Filipinos and has developed a variety of pastoral programmes providing them support (Cominelli, as cited in Osteria et al. 2013: 423).

In terms of participation in political groups or labour unions, both Filipino and European interviewees did not have much engagement with such organisations during their stay overseas. For Filipinos in Europe, family, ethnic and church networks were the main organisations that they were part of. Several European interviewees specifically mentioned steering clear of political involvement in the Philippines, particularly for those working for international organisations, which probably need to maintain a neutral political stance. The exceptions were Norman (male, highly skilled, 1955, Germany) and Christine (female, highly skilled, 1985, France) whose work involves engagement with local institutions. As an activist, Norman has been involved in political activities in the Philippines for many years, while Christine's work with an NGO requires her to deal with local officials. For the majority, the Bureau of Immigration was the only government agency they had dealt with.

Europeans in the Philippines were not inclined to form or to be part of associations with co-nationals. None of the European interviewees were members of national or expatriate clubs. Some interviewees commented that they could not relate with such clubs whose members typically include well-placed old timers and/or big businesspeople. The interviewees viewed these clubs as exclusive social spaces for privileged co-nationals whose realities were removed from their own.

[8] Most Filipinos are Roman Catholic. Some of the Filipino interviewees also attended other Christian churches when they were in Europe.

4.4.2 Socio-economic Aspects

The interviewees had various reasons for their migration, but the search for employment was the primary driver for the migration of Filipinos and Europeans alike. The two groups, however, differed in terms of the number of migrants involved, their profiles and occupations and the socio-economic impacts of their mobility.

For European migrants who sought employment in the Philippines, living in the country has given them benefits and privileges that come with their positions as 'expats' or international staff. Many live in condominium units, while those with spouses and children live in houses, some within a gated subdivision. They can afford to hire a chauffeur or personal driver for their families and a domestic worker or a nanny to help them with chores that they would normally do on their own if they lived in Europe. Many of the respondents recognised the stark difference between their lifestyle in the Philippines compared to how they lived in previous destination countries.

A number of Europeans who had been in the Philippines for some time were considered as local hires by their companies, and, thus, they did not fetch the same salary as those who were hired from the outside. While the local hires earned enough to live comfortably in the Philippines, they cannot afford yearly travels to Europe to visit their families. They also expressed concern (or their parents did) that since they are working outside Europe (and outside the fold of international organisations), they will not be covered by the pension system. An interviewee from France who had spent some time living overseas said that his generation will not be able to enjoy the pension system that provided protective cover for earlier generations. This was less of a concern for those connected with international organisations which not only offer a compensation package and incentives but also assure them of continuing membership in their national pension systems.

Several European retirees or long-term residents started an enterprise in the Philippines in partnership with their spouses or partners. Two of them started a school, one put up a family bar, while one opened a coffee shop and another one is operating an inn. All of these businesses are based outside Metro Manila. Meanwhile, those who did not engage in any income-generating activity were living off their pension. For most, their pension was sufficient to maintain their life in the Philippines; however, some expressed concern whether their pension would be sufficient in the long run especially for medical bills or covering the expenses of their families. In general, almost all European migrants did not send remittances to their families. Some interviewees, in observing the remitting behaviour of Filipinos, said that sending remittances to their families is not part of their practice.

After almost four decades of migration to Europe, the occupations of Filipinos are mostly in domestic work in countries such as Italy and Spain and, recently, in the health-care sector in the UK. Only one of the long-term residents in Europe went into business. On the whole, Filipinos across the different occupations experienced decent work conditions. Occasionally, domestic workers encountered demanding or difficult employers, but none reported having experienced exploitative conditions.

Most of them considered themselves fortunate for having employers who treated them like family members. Their employers showed concern not only for them but also for their family members. For example, Nelia (female, low-skilled worker, 1943, Philippines) shared how her employer tried to comfort her when her husband died. Her employer sponsored all her three children so that they can come and work in Italy. When Nelia visits her children in Italy, she does not fail to visit her employer and her employer's now grown-up children who remain close to her. Those who pursued graduate studies or training in Europe acknowledged that their international experience had been helpful, and the expertise they brought back with them is appreciated in their workplace.

Most Filipino interviewees reported sending remittances to their families in the Philippines. Even students reported either saving money or sending financial support back home, given the substantial funding they received from their study grants or scholarships. Several migrants sent remittances to support projects in their home communities—feeding programmes for children and donations to improve school facilities are some initiatives supported by migrants. Philanthropic practices of Filipino migrants are not uncommon (e.g. Baggio and Asis 2006). Apart from individual migrant giving, examples of collective donations to support for projects in the Philippines have been documented (Asis et al. 2010).

Due to their different occupations and incomes, European and Filipino interviewees have contrasting lifestyles. Many of the European professionals have the means to afford middle- to upper-class living; in the case of retirees, their pension is sufficient to live comfortably in the Philippines. Meanwhile, the Filipino migrant workers in Europe live in modest accommodation and focused their energies to earning a living, including taking on part-time jobs, to maximise their incomes.

4.4.3 Sociocultural Aspects

For most Filipino and European migrants, their migration experiences have been enriching, exposing them and opening their minds to different cultures. Several interviewees considered migration as promoting a sense of global citizenship. For Filipinos, particularly the younger ones, living apart from their families taught them to become independent. Overall, migrants adjusted to the conditions in their destination countries. When asked how their migration experience has changed them, some of the European migrants with extensive migration backgrounds said the following:

> I think definitely it opens your mind and makes you see things differently. I think it has made me less rigid... And yeah, also seeing different cultures. It really helps to [relativise] everything. But the negative part is that you tend to get lost. When you ask where is your home, you don't know anymore. (Leslie, 1970, female, highly skilled, Belgium)
>
> It certainly enriches. If you immerse yourself in the place where you are—if you don't do that ... then you miss out... I don't think it changes your technical skills per se, but your sensitivity to the local context where you work. Whether it's political, social or cultural. If

> you don't have an antenna for that, then in my opinion—you can be the best technical expert in the world, but you will always fail. If you are unable to communicate, if you are unable to negotiate, in the place where you work, then... that's when language becomes important. (Hubert, 1968, male, highly skilled, Netherlands)

In comparing their experiences of living in the Philippines and other destination countries, most of the European migrants appreciated the tropical climate, the friendliness and ease of talking to Filipinos (many speak English well) and access to cheap services. Those who were based in Metro Manila commented on its Americanised culture, pollution, traffic problems, the notable gap between the rich and the poor, the absence or lack of public space and the proliferation of malls, which some of them did not like. Adjusting to life in the Philippines was easy for most Europeans, especially compared to other places they had been to. For leisure, many of them would travel outside Metro Manila or engage in outdoor sports. Travelling to other places in the country is very affordable since airfares are cheap. Some were enthused with the Philippines' beautiful natural environment.

Christine (1985, female, highly skilled, France) has adjusted to living in the country, except for one thing:

> The only thing I don't get used to is to see old, white disgusting people with young, beautiful Filipinas [laughs]. I guess this is something that I will… and I don't want to get used to. . . . I guess sometimes, you know, they're in love and good for them, but…I'm not sure it's always the case.

Her discomfort may come from stereotypes about moneyed Caucasian men taking advantage of young women from an economically disadvantaged background. The phenomenon of mail-order brides in the 1980s (which has morphed into commercially arranged marriages) has fed this stereotype both in the Philippines and in Europe (Asis and Battistella 2015: 21).

Most European interviewees said it was easy to interact with Filipinos; the wide use of English in the Philippines helps in communicating with the locals. Also, the presence of many foreigners, especially in big cities, also reduces the feeling of being an outsider. Many of them have both foreign and Filipino friends. However, some interviewees said that while Filipinos are generally friendly, establishing deep friendships is another matter. Some interviewees said they had to learn in interacting with Filipinos, particularly the local staff they work with. Diana (female, highly skilled, 1984, Spain), for instance, observed that some Filipinos can be sensitive and that one must be tactful in dealing with them.

Filipino interviewees commented on differences in food, climate and culture between the Philippines and the European countries they lived in. The efficiency of the public system in European countries impressed many, and the contrast with the inefficient system in the Philippines was a common lament. Most said they were able to adjust in their respective destination countries; for the migrant workers, the most challenging adjustment was learning the language. Those in domestic work learned the local language from their employers, but since they did not have other co-workers and they did not have much interaction with others, their language skills were basic. Students were enrolled in English programmes; hence, many did not

have the opportunity to learn the local language. In general, the role of religion or faith life is more important for Filipinos than for European migrants. It is interesting to note, though, that there might be generational or class differences. Almost all the Filipino worker retirees considered religion as very important in their life, citing their faith in God as their anchor. In contrast, this was less salient among the student group.

Most of the Filipino returnees said they did not really experience major adjustments when they came back, although they had to get re-accustomed to some conditions, such as the noise and the climate:

> It was not difficult for me to re-adjust or re-adapt to people. Because, well, I was talking to them on the phone a lot of the time when I was in Europe, and even in Singapore. So, my adjustment primarily was the context. Meaning, the situation of the country, the environment. With the ties, not so much. (Alyssa, 1978, female, highly skilled, Philippines)

Regular visits to the Philippines keep the connections and memories alive. For many interviewees, the Philippines is home; thus, adjustments for those who return for visits and those who have returned more or less for good, if any, were uneventful. However, they acknowledged missing the discipline and efficiency they experienced in their host countries. On the other hand, some of them had a renewed appreciation of close family ties, Filipino culture and values and the natural environment of the Philippines. When asked what he valued in the Philippines, Jerold (male, highly skilled, 1985, Philippines), a returnee from the UK, highlighted the resilience of Filipinos especially in times of crisis or disasters. These responses reflect that temporary migrants' appreciation of the cultural norms and values of their home and destination countries is a differentiated and selective process. Migration invites comparisons between home and destination countries, but the assessment of positive and negative aspects of the places they had been is multifaceted.

Both European and Filipino migrants regularly maintained contact with their family and friends in their home countries and in other parts of the world, usually through the following: video chat using Facetime or Skype, call or messaging applications for mobile phones like Viber and WhatsApp, social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter and e-mails or phone calls. Some keep in touch with their professional contacts in previous destination countries, especially those who worked for international organisations and who studied abroad.

Many European migrants visited their home countries once or twice a year. The visits were occasions to introduce their children to their home countries and to meet their relatives. In the Philippines, they are occasionally visited by family members and friends from Europe who also take the opportunity to tour different parts of the country. Several interviewees said that due to the negative press about the Philippines, their families and friends expressed concerns about their safety in the country. Most Filipino migrant workers regularly visit the Philippines; it is less common for family and friends to visit them in Europe. Students were less likely to return to the Philippines for visits, except for those conducting fieldwork in the Philippines.

Notions of home drew a variety of reflections. Several European interviewees cited their countries of origin as home because that is where they grew up and where their family is based. Many of the migrants considered the Philippines as home

because it is where they are currently living, although some said they do not feel the Philippines can really be their home. Others said home is about their relations with the people that truly matter to them. In the case of Hernan, the Philippines is home because it is where his Filipina wife and children are:

> I think it's more now home in the Philippines...because I have family here. Home is where your family is... I live with my family. So that's home. (Hernan, 1955, male, highly skilled, Spain)

> I would say both [are] home. I think the place where you were born and where you grew up is somehow still a special home to you... I would say both are home for me, but there's still a kind of stronger feeling towards your place of birth and where you grew up. (Harmon, 1974, male, highly skilled, Germany)

> I have my home 'home' which is where I grew up. If I go there, everything is very familiar... But you know, you also see how it changes over time. It kind of changes without you... In general, it's more of a shifting concept for me, because in other places, I can also feel at home... because it's familiar. And after a while, if you haven't been to a place in a while, then you return, and you go and you see all these places and you see these associations... and it kind of feels like home. But, you feel it's moving on without you, and it changes, and you don't really feel part of it anymore. But, everything is so familiar. You know. It's a strange feeling. And also the people, they always change. People I studied with in different countries, most of them are gone there. Most of my friends from my school, they don't live on our island anymore because there's no prospects for them, no jobs. So, it's less the people, it's more the place for me. And now I feel at home here. It takes about a minimum of six months, I think? And then you feel like... Yeah, this is where I am, this is my home now. (Johann, 1985, male, highly skilled, Germany)

Diana thinks the Philippines is a temporary home, but her home will always be the country where she grew up. Pau (male, 1981, highly skilled, Spain) is less certain about what home means for him:

> It depends... Sometimes you think about Spain as home, but when you are there, you realise it's not your home anymore...The point is that in the end, maybe you just go there on holiday, so you are not there for a long time. You feel out of context there. You don't feel really home.

Among Filipino migrants, many consider the Philippines as home, mainly because it is where their families and friends are and where they want to settle for good. For Josefa (female, less skilled, 1944, Philippines), home is her house in her hometown where she was born and where she grew up in. Alyssa's definition of home is 'connected to people', particularly her family and husband:

> It's really where the people you value most are based... So, the roots are not physical, it's more emotional, the idea of home. (Alyssa, 1978, female, highly skilled, Philippines)

> Home is still where my parents are. I never really intended to settle down anywhere else other than the Philippines. I just went out to train, to get skills. (Carmelo, 1979, male, highly skilled, Philippines)

The experiences of European and Filipino migrants in their countries of destination reflect temporary migrants' capacities for adjustment and adaptation, which may have been honed by previous experiences of migration and international

travels. A significant aspect of their transnational lives is maintaining connections to family members, to close friends and, to a lesser extent, professional contacts. Temporary migrants viewed 'home' in different ways, suggesting a degree of fluidity and ambiguity in defining the concept (Lam and Yeoh 2004; Vertovec 2004). Although some migrants may have more than one home, the notion of home in relation to the family or the place where one grew up in continues to hold a special place for migrants.

Overall, findings show that despite their different backgrounds and different migration routes, Filipino migrants to Europe and European migrants to the Philippines share some similarities. For both groups, temporary migration is an opportunity-driven phenomenon, with motivations ranging from socio-economic factors (e.g. employment, income) to sociocultural ones (e.g. lifestyle, searching for a partner). Many of the migrants were able to adapt to destination countries through their social networks (in the case of Filipinos) and professional networks (mostly in the case of the Europeans in the Philippines). Few relied on host government institutions to facilitate their adjustment in the destination countries. Sociocultural transformations were common across different types of migrants, although many of them were not politically active in the destination countries.

Striking differences can also be noted in the migration experiences of these two groups of migrants. Filipino migrants to Europe had to comply with more requirements and faced more restrictions in seeking admission to European destinations. Once legally admitted, Europe offers a pathway for residence, which not only allowed for family reunification but also transformed temporary migration to settlement. Europeans coming to the Philippines were less burdened with requirements by comparison. However, beyond admission, it is difficult for Europeans (and foreign nationals in general) to acquire residency in the country. In terms of occupation, less-skilled migrants dominated Filipino migration to Europe, while highly skilled migrants were the majority of those coming to Europe. Compared to European migrants, Filipino migrants' social networks played a significant role in chain migration and inclining them to niche employment (domestic work and other care work) in European countries. Remitting to their families in the Philippines was a common practice for the Filipino migrants, but not for Europeans. It can be argued that Filipinos send remittances because they need to support their families back home (which motivated them to migrate in the first place). It is also possible that there are cultural underpinnings why Filipinos remit and Europeans do not, one of which is the different expectations of individual and family responsibilities.

4.5 Conclusion

The bidirectional exploration of migration flows between the Philippines and Europe produced some interesting insights about some lesser known aspects of mobility in this migration corridor. We highlight several of these in this section.

The study's findings suggest that the emergence and evolution of temporary migration between these two spaces derive from different triggering and maintenance factors. Migration from the Philippines to Europe has been largely fuelled by people flows responding to employment opportunities in Europe. Migration increased and was sustained by the transnational connections between migrants and nonmigrants. In Europe, Filipino migrants forge 'thick' social ties with other Filipino migrants. Such family and ethnic networks have shaped their economic and social adaptation in the destination countries. Migrants maintain links with nonmigrants in the Philippines. The possibility for family reunification in Europe has contributed to sustaining migration flows and transforming temporary labour migration into settlement.

Much of European migration to the Philippines has been triggered by investment flows and development assistance. These flows had been accompanied by the migration of European professionals employed by multinational companies and international organisations. Due to limited employment opportunities for foreigners in the Philippines, migration from the Philippines to Europe remains small in scale and mostly temporary. For work-related migrants, the Philippines was an assignment rather than a choice destination. However, uncertain conditions in Europe, such as the ongoing economic crisis at the time of the study, are also contributing to emigration from the region. For the younger migrants, the main driver was the search for better work prospects, while for the older ones, it was mostly affordable retirement (and warmer weather). The role of ethnic networks in triggering or sustaining further migration to the Philippines is not as important as Filipino migration to Europe. An acknowledgement of Europe also as an origin region of migrants holds implications for promoting dialogue and reciprocity in its engagement with third countries.

The study has uncovered insights about the return migration of Filipinos from Europe. (In general, the migration literature in the Philippines is mostly about those who leave, and little is known about those who return.) The return of talents who acquired education from Europe and the return of workers in their old age suggest different challenges and opportunities for the Philippines, which can be explored further in future research.

The study has contributed in filling some knowledge gaps about European migration to the Philippines and about the Philippines as a destination country. It would be interesting to examine the transnational practices of European migrants in the Philippines and in other parts of Asia. To date, the literature on transnationalism has traditionally focused on the transnational practices of migrants from the developing countries to more developed destination countries.[9] Furthermore, as a destination country, the governance framework of international migration to the Philippines remains focused on admission policies. Once foreign nationals are already in the country, the protection of their rights and providing programmes and assistance to integrate them in society are issues which have yet to receive policy attention.

[9] Beaverstock (2011), for instance, has done research on British expatriates in Singapore.

Finally, the ways in which temporary migration becomes permanent settlement, or how permanent settlement enables migrants to engage in transnational practices, suggest some fluidity in the presumed distinctions between temporary migration and permanent migration. A time element is often part of defining what constitutes temporary migration in policies and legal instruments. As illustrated by the views and experiences of migrants in the study (e.g. Filipino migrants in Europe who did not acquire citizenship because they had plans of returning to the Philippines or European migrants who are on tourist visas but have been extending their stay in the Philippines), the temporariness in temporary migration is not only time-bound, but is also a state of mind.

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Chapter 5
Transnational Migration Between Thailand and Europe: Migrants' Experiences and Perceptions

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5.1 Introduction

Thailand is both a receiving and sending country in terms of international migration. It also serves as a major transit point for many Asian migrants travelling to East Asia and Europe. It was estimated that there were close to 2.6 million foreigners residing in Thailand as of 1 September 2010, the majority of them migrant workers from Thailand's neighbouring countries. In the 2010 census, there were 200,564 Europeans in Thailand, accounting for approximately 8% of total foreign residents (Vapattanawong 2015). Although the number may seem small, the characteristics of European migrants differ vastly from those of the majority of migrants in Thailand. The majority of European migrants were males. European male migrants outnumbered females three to one as opposed to a more balanced sex ratio in the total foreign population. The majority of Europeans in Thailand were in the working age group (15–59 years) followed by the elderly (60 years and older) and children (0–14 years).[1] Most Europeans of working age are foreign expats working in multinational companies and educational institutions in Thailand. Interestingly, although the elderly represented only 7.3% of all foreign migrants in Thailand, the elderly from Europe made up 23.3% of all European

[1] According to the 2010 Thailand Population Census, the working-age group made up 66.8% of all European migrants, whereas elderly people and children accounted for 23.3 % and 9.9 %, respectively (Vapattanawong 2015).

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migrants.[2] It seems that Thailand's retirement visa had attracted a lot of attention from European retirees.[3]

In general, most European nationals are allowed to stay in Thailand for up to 30 days without a visa. Typical tourist visas can be issued to those wishing to stay longer, but not for more than 90 days. But in late 2015, a new six-month tourist visa was launched in Thailand aimed at long-stay tourists from high-income countries. Temporary migrants seeking employment in Thailand would need to apply for a non-immigrant visa B and later, within 90 days, for a work permit. The work permit will allow them a maximum 2-year stay, to be renewed every year. Other temporary migrants such as retirees and marriage migrants would be allowed a 1-year renewable visa.[4] However, they must prove that they have a stable income or choose to deposit a certain amount of money in a Thai bank. A new five-year long-stay visa was later introduced in late 2016 aimed at promoting medical tourism in Thailand (Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Interior 2016). Wealthy retirees from Western Europe, North America and Japan are targeted. Based on the 2014 data from Thailand's Immigration Bureau, British, German and French migrants formed the largest group of temporary migrants from the European Union in Thailand. In 2014, visa renewal/extension was granted to 29,368 UK nationals, 13,555 Germans and 12,365 French temporary migrants residing in Thailand. These figures did not include tourists and people in transit. Other major sources of EU migrants granted visa renewal/extension included Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Spain and Austria, respectively (Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Interior 2015).

Skilled workers, marriage migrants and retirees together accounted for the majority of European migrants in Thailand. Regarding skilled workers, most of them work in the education, trade and manufacturing sectors. The European marriage migrants are more concentrated in the Northeast of Thailand. As for retirement migration, Thailand is gaining popularity among Westerners and Japanese, with a rough estimate of 98,000 Western retirees residing in Thailand (Howard 2008). Furthermore, according to the Office of Foreign Workers Administration (2016), the

[2] The elderly accounted for between one fifth and one third of all foreign migrants from developed regions. They made up 32.3% of migrants from East Asia, 24.2% of migrants from North America and 20.2% of migrants from Australia and Oceania (Ibid).

[3] The Thai retirement visa is available to people aged 50 and above to reside in the country for a maximum of 1 year. It is renewable on a yearly basis. The visa requires a retiree to deposit THB 800,000 (20,000 euro) in a Thai bank account or provide proof of a monthly income of at least THB 65,000 (1600 euro) or a combination of the two (combination of a bank account + income × 12 = THB 800,000).

[4] The Thai government considers all foreigners residing in the country (excluding short-stay tourists) as temporary migrants, as Thailand has granted permanent residency status to only a very small number of foreigners each year, with a lot of requirements based on either skill or investment amount or family ties. At the end of 2015, there were just over 1000 foreigners granted permanent residency status in total. Therefore, marriage migrants, retirement migrants, expats with work permits, long-stay tourists (more than 90 days), student migrants and other long-stay residents are all classified as temporary migrants.

majority of foreign skilled workers in Thailand in December 2015 came from Japan, China, the Philippines, India, the UK, the USA, South Korea and France (Office of Foreign Workers' Administration, Ministry of Labour 2016).

As a sending country, it was estimated that roughly a million Thais were living or working in foreign countries in 2012.[5] The majority of Thais went to America and the South Pacific (39%), followed by East Asia (30%) and Europe (24%). Thai migrants in Europe amounted to approximately 250,000 (Department of Consulate Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). Thais migrated to Europe for the purposes of work, family reunion, training, study and temporary visits. In 2012, the UK, Germany, France, Sweden and the Netherlands were the top European destinations for Thais working/living in Europe. In 2013, Sweden, Finland and the UK were top destinations for Thai workers in Europe. Thai migrants to Europe were predominantly seasonal low-/semi-skilled workers from the Northeastern region of Thailand. The number of male migrants outnumbered that of female migrants by approximately four to one. The majority of Thai women in Europe were marriage migrants who also worked in low-/semi-skilled jobs, creating a blurred line between labour and marriage migration.

Regarding migration policy, Thailand still lacks a clear direction in temporary migration policy and strategy. Despite serving as both a major receiving and sending country, Thailand has not set up a high-level agency dealing with migration issues and policies. Many government agencies from various ministries share responsibilities in Thai migration policy decisions. Migration policies in the past were mostly a short-term fix for emerging migration issues and problems, rather than a policy that reflected long-term economic and social goals. However, there was an initiative by the Thai government to revamp Thailand's immigration policy, and to set up a national committee to coordinate all agencies involved. The reform process is expected to be completed before the general election in 2018 or 2019. As a sending country, there were some efforts to protect Thai migrants deployed overseas, such as through the Recruitment and Job-Seekers' Protection Act. As a destination country, Thailand mainly focuses on the regularisation of migrant workers from neighbouring countries to solve labour shortages. Except for tourism promotion, other types of migrants receive less attention from the Thai authorities.

The arguments in this chapter are, first, temporary migration between Europe and Thailand leads to an increase in Thailand's migration flows to and from Europe; second, temporary migration is associated with challenges for Thai migrants in Europe, including labour exploitation of low-skilled workers, risks of human trafficking and local integration difficulties; and third, challenges for European migrants in Thailand include the bureaucratic red tape of Thai immigration procedures such as visa renewal and work permit approval, health insurance, limited social security and local integration problems.

[5] The data were collected from 91 Thai embassies and consulates around the world in 2012, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand.

This chapter aims to analyse migration experiences and perceptions of temporary migrants in Thailand which include Thai returnees and European migrants residing in Thailand. It is divided into six parts as follows: data collection and methodology, the migration process of Thai and European migrants, the political and legal aspects of migration, the economic aspects of migration, the sociocultural aspects of migration and conclusion.

5.2 Data Collection

The snowball technique was employed in order to recruit Thai returnee migrants[6] and European respondents.[7] The geographical factor or the location of respondents was also taken into account, as most Thai migrants in Europe came from the Northeast and North of Thailand. Among the European migrants, highly skilled migrants lived mainly in Bangkok and its environs, whereas retirees and married migrants were concentrated in the Northeast and Northern provinces of Thailand.

The research team conducted in-depth interviews with 74 respondents, including 41 Thai and 33 European respondents. The Thai respondents consisted of 31 Thai migrants and ten family members of Thai migrants (who were living in EU countries at the time of interviews). The Thai migrants comprised 11 lower-/semi-skilled migrant workers and five persons in each of the following groups – student, highly skilled, seasonal and married migrants. For the 33 European respondents, 17 were highly skilled contract workers, seven were married migrants/entrepreneurs, six retirees and three irregular migrants.[8]

At the time of the interview, most Thai respondents were living in the North and Northeast of Thailand, followed by Bangkok/Central region, the Western region and others. Almost all of them had lived in the same hometown prior to their migration. For European migrants, the majority were highly skilled workers living in Bangkok and its environs, followed by the North/Northeastern regions where many married/entrepreneur migrants and retirees stayed (see Table 5.1 and Fig. 5.1). Many of the in-depth interviews were carried out in collaboration with researchers from Khon Kaen University in the Northeast and research networks in Chiang Mai province in the North.

[6] They must have worked/lived in European countries not more than 5 years and have returned to Thailand less than 1 year before participating in the study.

[7] People who had come to Thailand on a temporary basis and who had been in Thailand for at least 3 months.

[8] The European respondents include nine Germans, six French, five Dutch, four British, three Italians, two Danish, two Swiss, one Spanish and one Slovak.

Table 5.1 Number of respondents according to type of migration and region of Thailand

Type of migrant	Bangkok/Central	North/Northeast	West	East/South	Total
Thai returnee migrants	*9*	*22*	*8*	*2*	*41*
Low-/semi-skilled labour	4	6	1	–	11
Highly skilled labour	1	1	2	1	5
Seasonal migrants	–	5	–	–	5
Students	3	2	–	–	5
Marriage migrants	1	2	1	1	5
Migrants' family members	–	6	4	–	10
European migrants	*16*	*10*	–	*6*	*33*
Highly skilled labour	13	2		2	17
Marriage migrants/ entrepreneurs	1	5		1	7
Irregular migrants	3	–		–	3
Retirees	–	3		3	6

5.3 Migration Processes

In general, married migrants account for the largest group of Thai migrant stock in Europe. However, seasonal migration has accounted for the largest flow of the annual migration from Thailand to Europe in recent years. From the interview, seasonal migrant workers mainly worked as 'berry pickers' in Sweden and Finland.[9] Most married migrants and their families visited Thailand regularly during holiday seasons, and many of them had chosen to return to Thailand after retirement. Regardless of the length of their stay in Europe, most Thai marriage migrants took the view that their stay in Europe was temporary and they intended to return to Thailand at a later stage in their lives. No Thai respondents indicated that they had planned to settle in Europe permanently.

Economic and social factors play important roles in Thai migration flows to Europe. Relative deprivation, rather than poverty, encouraged many Thais to find different migration pathways to Europe with the intention of earning a higher income and improving their social status. Their economic and social achievements could be measured through remittances and acquiring assets such as land, houses, vehicles and gold.[10] Indirect economic motivations also include old age security and other benefits. With limited social security provision in Thailand, most Thai married migrants would prefer obtaining a permanent resident status or becoming an EU citizen, if possible, to gain an access to European social welfare.

[9] All interviews in this study were conducted during the period November 2014–August 2015.

[10] Migrant remittances are broadly defined as personal monetary transfers that a migrant worker makes to his/her relatives back in their country of origin. Remittances can generate a stable source of income that contributes to the support of migrants' family members back home. It can be used to invest in education, health and housing, thus improving household living conditions and reducing the vulnerability of family members, especially women and children (IOM 2009).

Fig. 5.1 Map of Thailand and distribution of respondents by region

Although the number of European migrants in Thailand was small compared to that of Asian migrants, it had steadily increased. Most interviewed European migrants were mobile and had lived in other countries either for study or work before coming to Thailand. Popular destinations were mainly developed countries in Europe and North America. Other destinations included Australia, East and Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa.[11] Higher-skilled European migrants normally came to Thailand on an employment contract. Most married and retired migrants

[11] Destination countries included Austria, Belgium, England, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

used to travel to Thailand as tourists before meeting their Thai spouses or deciding to spend some time in the country. All married migrants from Europe interviewed were male migrants living with Thai spouses. Many of them still had residences in Europe but chose to spend the winter months in Thailand on a tourist visa. However, some had decided to spend most of their time in Thailand and opted for a marriage or retirement visa. A retirement visa would be more expensive but requires no proof such as a marriage certificate. Many European married migrants also owned a property in the home village of their Thai wives for their long stay in Thailand.

The motivations for European migrants appeared to be quite different from those of Thais: the motivations were much more diverse and were associated with the nature of their work and occupations. Their motivations could be influenced by many factors such as the person's international experience, the lower cost of living in Thailand, family reasons, warmer climate in Thailand and unfavourable social welfare systems in their countries of origin. For example, an Italian freelance journalist stated that his motivation to work in Thailand was for personal interests. A German Protestant priest, aged 57 years, said that he wanted to change his work and life experience by moving overseas.

For many Europeans, migration to Thailand happened by chance as they were looking for work overseas and suddenly a job opportunity in Thailand came up. For example, a French engineer (aged 37) came to work in Bangkok after losing his job in India. For European migrants, personal networks did not play an important role in facilitating their migration to Thailand. It was more common to get basic information and helpful tips about living in Thailand from numerous websites, discussion forums and social media applications catering to foreign expats in Thailand. There were yet some entrepreneurial migrants who were well connected to local networks of Thai friends and European expats.

Similarly, most highly skilled Thai workers and students had migrated to Europe because of company transfer and education scholarships. Networks did not play any important role for them either. Instead, migration networks were crucial for seasonal and married migrants. For example, a Thai migrant worker (aged 55) who had regularly gone 'berry picking' in Scandinavia for 11–12 years said that he was introduced to the activity by his relative, also a berry picker. A few years later, he brought his son and daughter-in-law to work with him. They later became seasonal migrants who frequently travelled to Europe for the purpose of temporary employment.

Married migrants and lower-/semi-skilled workers also depended on networks of friends, relatives and family members to arrange for their migration. The majority of married migrants from Thailand met their European spouses through relatives or friends, particularly those who were married to foreigners. It is quite common for a Thai marriage migrant to act as an intermediary and provide translation services between his/her friends in home villages and other foreigners. Aside from personal networks, Ayuwat et al. (2011) has shown that other common channels of cross-cultural marriage between Thai women and foreigners include personal meetings at the office either in Thailand or overseas, meeting while travelling, internet and social media contacts and meeting through dating agencies. Many couples also met at bars and restaurants where their Thai spouses worked.

5.4 Politico-Legal Challenges of Temporary Migrants

A major challenge of Thai migrants in Europe is the entry permit. Low-skilled labour migrants from Thailand have a slim chance of obtaining a working visa to Europe. Many low-skilled labourers working in Europe were actually marriage migrants who later joined the labour market. Even marriage migrants have faced a lot of difficulties obtaining a marriage visa due to the language proficiency requirement in some countries such as Germany. As most Thai marriage migrants have a low level of education and are not fluent in either English or the local language of the destination countries, they have found that such a requirement is a daunting task for them.

Once Thai marriage migrants have moved to Europe, many of them cannot find a formal job with social security benefits. Due to the level of their education and limited language ability, many of them work in low-skilled jobs such as household cleaning jobs or as assistants in restaurant kitchens. Some interviewees had worked without work contracts and were not covered by social security. Although some Thai migrants could find a formal job in business enterprises, some were denied proper labour protection practices. For example, Noi (female, marriage migrant in Germany, from Northeast Thailand) complained of poor working conditions and of no regular holidays while working in a hotel restaurant. She decided to leave her job after facing labour exploitation due to long working hours beyond the legal limit.

Irregular migrants in Europe may face even more legal challenges. Following the naturalisation of many Thai women in Europe during the past few decades, these migrants have formed networks that brought in their relatives and friends to Europe. Some would later become irregular migrants. For example, Kwang (female, lower-/semi-skilled, Central Thailand) engaged in textile factory work during her short visit to France to meet her sister (marriage migrant). Some lower- and semi-skilled migrants fell victims to human trafficking, especially those related to sexual exploitation. The Foundation for Women (FFW), an NGO working on the issue of violence against *women*, reported that it provided assistance to 20 Thai women exploited in Europe during the period 2005–2009. All of them moved to Europe under the false promise of marrying European men or working in the agricultural or service sectors (FFW 2009).

Seasonal workers may also face many challenges. Some respondents were required to pay a minimum fee of 1500 euro to recruitment agencies to travel and work in Sweden and Finland as berry pickers. In general, European agencies recruiting seasonal berry pickers would ask Thai brokers to find and send workers to Europe, prompting major Thai brokers in Chaiyaphum and Phetchabun provinces to find seasonal workers from rural villages in the lower North and Northeast of Thailand. Many of them would become seasonal migrants who later encouraged their family members and friends to join them in the future. Some interviewed migrants were not informed about additional expenses on accommodation and meals and were pressured to work hard to earn enough money to pay for all the expenses and the debt incurred. Some were also cheated by recruitment agencies or

Thai brokers. Migrants with poor language skills and little experience were unprepared to deal with labour disputes in a foreign country. For example, a labour dispute involving Thai seasonal workers and their employer in Sweden in 2013 dragged on for many weeks and led to the suicide of a Thai migrant before the Thai authorities and employer took action to end the problem.

On the other hand, major challenges faced by European migrants in Thailand include visa issuance, work permit approval, language problems, lack of health insurance, traffic accidents, personal safety and political instability in Thailand. Most Europeans, regardless of the types of visa, expressed concerns about visa issuance of Thai government agencies. For example, Isaak complained about complex rules and regulations in applying for a visa:

> I read some books, some information, I checked the internet, I also asked my former colleagues who worked here, so I got more information about Thailand. I also contacted the community here during a trip called 'Look and see'… However, some things were not as clear as it should be, especially the question about visa and work permit. I took some information from different sides, but wrong information. So I came here with one idea of visa and work permit, and it was absolutely not easy to get it after starting my work here. (Isaak, 1958, male, highly skilled, Germany)

Janne (male, English teacher, Denmark), who spoke fluent Thai, also had difficulties obtaining a work permit. After waiting for over a year to obtain a work permit, while teaching in a school in Chonburi Province, he made many attempts to contact the immigration office and the Ministry of Labour to no avail. Janne did not want to make special payments to speed up the bureaucratic processes. He later moved to Pathum Thani Province and worked as an English teacher there. He found that the Thai government officials provided conflicting information[12] regarding the documents required to apply for a visa and work permit:

> When you do have questions, they always say this is the rule. When you go to another office, they say no, no this rule is not true, these are the rules. It's always really frustrating. I don't even know what rules are. I've been here for two and a half years. I've visited those offices. God, it seems like they always change the rules. (Janne, 1989, male, highly skilled, Denmark)

Some jobs, particularly NGO work and foreign media, seem to experience a tough procedure to obtain work permit approval. Applicants may have to wait for a very long time to get their work permits. Ines (female, NGO worker, Italy) said she had not received a work permit after waiting for more than one year. Since the military coup in May 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand has tightened visa requirements for foreign media and NGO personnel. For instance, foreign reporters based in Thailand are interviewed before they can renew their visa, work permit and press card.[13]

Not only the work permit issue but also the short duration of the work permit that was seen as inconvenient and not encouraging foreign expats to live and work in

[12] The efficiency of the Thai government officials partly causes this conflicting information.

[13] According to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand (CPJ 2016), at least five foreign reporters have had their visa applications denied since the coup.

Thailand. The general work permit is only issued for 1 or 2 years at a time, to be renewed every year. In comparison, a work permit for lower-skilled migrants from Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia can be granted for a 2-year period. It seems that the Thai immigration policy is designed to facilitate lower-skilled migration rather than attracting highly skilled expats. Many expats suggested that the work permit should be more flexible and follow the duration of the employment contract. Ivon (male, language teacher, Germany), who was also a married migrant living in Bangkok, compared the Thai work permit with his country's regulations and took the view that obtaining a visa was his top challenge in Thailand:

> First, it is the visa. You can only get for one year. In Germany, you can go, you can prove you can speak German, A1, A2, B1, B2 (level) and if you have German skill, you can apply for a three-year visa, residence permit, you can stay without any difficulty. You can even apply after seven years for a German citizenship. Here it is impossible. (Ivon, 1967, male, highly skilled, Germany)

Moreover, all foreigners residing in Thailand are required to report to immigration offices every 3 months. This regulation causes a lot of difficulty for some migrants, especially those who live in smaller provinces without local immigration offices. Some European migrants said that they sometimes forgot the date and were fined for delayed reports. Since April 2015, however, the Thai Immigration Office (2016) has allowed foreign residents to make such a report online.

Another major challenge for European migrants concerns the lack of social security benefits because European welfare systems are not transferable to Thailand. Whereas professionals and expats with a work permit are covered by health insurance arranged by their employers, many other expats such as retired migrants and married migrants are not covered by any health insurance. Some interviewed migrants with chronic diseases said that they would return to Europe once or twice a year for a medical check-up, dental treatments and to obtain medicines. European expats were also concerned about educational services for their children. Most of them would prefer sending their children to schools in Europe because of the higher quality and lower school fees because of the subsidised education system.

> I will plan to stay here, waiting what is coming up. The situation will make this up. But I am thinking about my daughter that she should study in a university in Germany. First thing, the university in Thailand is expensive but in Germany it is free. You can even get money, it is called 'children money'. (Ivon, 1967, male, highly skilled, Germany)

The language barrier was a common problem among foreigners living in Thailand. Bernardo (male, marriage migrant, Italy) depended mostly on his Thai wife to communicate with other Thais and foreigners since he could speak neither Thai nor English. Fortunately, his wife could speak both Italian and English. Despite such difficulty, he made good friends with a few European migrants in his neighbourhood. Many expats living in Bangkok and major cities were not enthusiastic about learning Thai as they could join extensive European and international social networks there.

Personal safety was also another concern. Although most European migrants were not worried about crimes in Thailand as they considered the country a safe

place, they were worried about the Thai police. Caspar (male, retiree, the Netherlands), who lived in Suphanburi with his Thai wife, was once searched and arrested by policemen for no reason. William (male, editor of an international magazine, UK), who lived in Bangkok, mentioned that he was stopped and searched by the police twice without any explanation.

5.5 Economic Challenges

This study found that lower-skilled and married Thai migrants tended to be those who bore great economic burdens within the household. The majority of married migrants usually expected financial stability from the mixed marriage; love and romance were secondary. First came the potential financial support from their European spouses and the opportunity to work in Europe and earn better income to support their families in Thailand: 'I wasn't looking for love at the time; I was looking for a pillar for my family' (Waan, female, lower skilled, Thailand).

For higher-skilled workers and students, the economic incentive, while still there, was not as obvious. Although experiences gained in Europe did pave the way for better job prospects and better pay, these respondents were not mainly driven by economic reasons for their overseas migration. For higher-skilled migrants, working abroad was a form of challenges; they saw it as a way to push their limits. Working abroad was an opportunity to acquire new skills and build international connections. For highly skilled workers, professional recognition and language skill were the main barriers to job placements in Europe. A Thai nurse who moved to France with her husband could not continue her profession there due to her limited language skills and the requirement for a license to practice. She finally became a private nanny. Another highly skilled worker in Germany was also unable to find a job that matched her training due to the language barrier. She thus decided to get a job in a kitchen, cleaning and chopping up vegetables.

Almost all married migrants worked to earn money to send back home. Most lower-skilled and married migrants changed jobs several times and found jobs through Thai networks in the area. Some got a job with their husband's help such as looking through classified advertisements. Married and lower-skilled migrants were quite willing to do any job as long as they earned money to send back home: cleaning, packaging, kitchen work or any other labour-intensive jobs. These jobs did not require high skills, and the language barrier was rarely a problem. Although some respondents were paid at a lower rate than locals, they did not regard it as a big issue since they realised that they were not in a position with much bargaining power. A low level of education coupled with a language barrier and lack of legal knowledge discouraged them from pursuing labour protection procedures in Europe.

Remittances are an integral part of Thai migration, particularly among lower-skilled and married migrants. The most common activity is in the form of financial remittances, where the migrant sends money to the family on a regular basis. In Thailand the culture of gratitude to the family is common. Remittance and taking

care of elderly parents are the means to show a person's obligation to their family. In a lower-income family, remittances are usually expected, and they serve as a yardstick of migration success. In many cases, a remittance of around 250–500 euro would be sent to the family on a monthly basis, plus occasional remittances during home visits. However, for a married couple, the decision to send back remittances is also more intricate. A European spouse often had trouble understanding the concept of filial piety that is deeply rooted in Asian culture. If the spouse was not willing to support the migrant's family, then the migrant would do whatever she could to find a job to earn income and send back money:

> My husband once asked me why I had to be responsible for taking care of the parents. I explained to him that because I earn more money than any of my siblings. And Thailand isn't like the UK where the government takes care of its elderly. In Thailand the children have to take care of their own parents. (Lamai, 1979, female, low skilled, Thailand)

For highly skilled workers, transnational economic activities were somewhat different. Those from a more affluent household, including students, were more likely to be on the receiving end of the transnational financial movements. Money sent back, if any, was more like a gesture to express gratitude.

Most Thai return migrants took the view that migration was temporary in the sense that they had planned right from the beginning that they would eventually come back to Thailand. They had not planned to 'settle and grow old' in Europe. Despite the length of their stay and residency status in Europe, their perception of migration was still a temporary step in their lives. Most Thai returnees perceived that migration helped to improve their socio-economic status in the home community. They sent remittances to family members when they lived in Europe and saved money for their eventual return to Thailand. Both remittances and savings were used for a variety of purposes including buying food, settling debts, investing in agricultural equipment, purchasing land, renovating homes, paying school fees, starting a small business, buying a car or motorcycle, paying hospital bills and so on. The higher economic status also commanded respect from their neighbours. Return migrants would also make frequent donations to local temples and Buddhist events, contributing to their higher social status in the villages.

For married and lower-skilled migrants, the economic impacts tended to be longer lasting than for seasonal migrants, as remittances were often used for agricultural production and business investments, such as small restaurants, buying and renting out properties and buying land for farming. More importantly, married/lower-skilled migrants were more likely to have acquired better language skills than seasonal migrants. The longer duration of their stay and their job-seeking efforts encouraged them to learn the local language and local culture to improve their economic prospects and build social networks. For example, a Thai returnee used her German language skill and cooking experience to her advantage by opening a Thai cooking school in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province targeting German tourists.

On the other hand, seasonal workers normally spend only a few months in forest areas in Europe picking berries. This requires fewer communication skills compared to other migrants. They typically earn relatively large sum of money during a

short period of time, but have to pay back debts incurred for the trip. Most interviewed seasonal migrants had borrowed money from the Bank of Agriculture and Cooperatives or private brokers to cover airfares and other expenses. Money left after settling the debt was used for miscellaneous expenditures within the household and investing in agricultural equipment. Temporary migration was thus a short-term fix for the household debts of these migrants. As household debts are common problems among rural Thais, young farmers normally migrate to major Thai cities or overseas destinations during the off-harvest season to earn extra incomes in order to settle their debts.

In comparison, the economic motivation of European migrants in Thailand was not as strong as that of Thai migrants in Europe; their motivations were more complex and multidimensional. Their incentives could also stem from social and personal reasons. Europeans tend to see international experiences as part of their lifestyles and travel overseas more often as a process of self-fulfillment. However, some European entrepreneurs came to Thailand because of its economic potential, stating that Asian markets were less saturated than European markets. Similarly, highly skilled workers may choose to come to Thailand because there is a job opportunity with the potential to lead to higher positions in the future. As Bangkok has served as a major hub for UN agencies and multinational companies in Southeast Asia, working in Thailand has offered an opportunity to grow in the corporate world. Some may come to Thailand to escape from the 'monotonous and routine life' back in their home countries.

As for retirees, Thailand is ideal mainly because of the lower cost of living, high standard of medical services (in private hospitals), good tourism infrastructure and its tropical climate. Some single retirees also managed to find local spouses to take care of them. Aside from the warmer weather, good infrastructure and tourism attractions, retirees mentioned the affordability of a decent lifestyle in Thailand on their pensions. Medical tourism is also a major policy which attracts many migrants to Thailand. Thailand has attracted both medical tourists and retired migrants in large numbers because it offers first-class yet affordable medical services. It has been estimated that Thailand earned more than US$ 11 billion during 2010–2014 from the medical tourism sector (ITC 2014).

Highly skilled workers are normally paid salaries similar to what they would be paid in Europe. These European expats living in Bangkok also enjoy a higher standard of living than those living in the provinces because of the more highly developed infrastructure, good medical facilities and well-established entertainment services:

> What is great here is that there are so many places to go out to eat and drink, like bars and restaurants. You never get bored. You have so many places to take your kids: zoo, playground, areas inside a mall. The beach is very close, the climate is much better. And we have a maid. (Camille, 1981, female, highly skilled, France)

However, the fluctuating exchange rate had affected the quality of life of some European migrants, especially the retirees living on a pension. With the depreciating euro, the amount of salary or pension money that migrants received from Europe

had declined in local value. Even worse, the 2008 global financial crisis wiped out the wealth and savings of many Europeans. Because many migrants survived with only their pensions, they would face financial problems if they were seriously ill. Some retirees ended up in the immigration detention centre and were eventually deported – so some expat networks such as the Lanna Care Net in Chiang Mai help to send some retired migrants to their home countries when the need arises (Vogler 2015).

5.6 Sociocultural Aspects of Migration

Transnational migration between Asia and Europe has affected migrants' transformation in terms of their opinions towards their home countries and their notion of home. It emerged from the interviews with returnees that the notion of 'home' is not only bounded by territorial space but also affected by the feeling of belonging to a certain society. Improved life opportunities and well-being also affect people's perception of 'home'. Most Thai returnees had the strong impression that Thailand was still their home. Despite their long stay in Europe, they thought that they would eventually return to Thailand:

> I intended to go back to Thailand from the start. I planned that if my husband retired (in Italy), I would come back to Thailand… I prefer to stay here (Thailand). I want to be at home because I can speak my language and it is easier to make a living. It is more difficult there. (Sunan, 1976, female, family migrant, Thailand)

Most Thai respondents did not have bad experiences in Europe. A few said that they faced some forms of discrimination, but not violent incidents. Although most said they were treated with respect, only a few felt 'at home' because of language and culture barriers. Most Thai migrants intended to return to Thailand at a later stage and felt that they were only 'guests' in European countries:

> It didn't offend me much because my friends were also thrown eggs at as well. My friends weren't happy about it and I understand. I think we are just guests living in their home (England)… They think that we take away their comforts, their facilities, their healthcare services. (Pen-sri, 1981, female, student, Thailand)

Most Thai migrants, except seasonal ones, were all interested in learning local European languages and adopted transnational social practices such as cooking both Thai and European cuisine to satisfy the preferences of different family members. They also made efforts to adapt to European working culture. After their return, some migrants said that they were more punctual, better organised and becoming more straightforward, the qualities that they acquired from living in Europe.

European migrants' notions of home were diverse. Some said that they did not miss their home country and were happy living in Thailand. Some married migrants felt that Thailand was their home, but there were those who missed friends and family and also the European way of living and culture. It should be noted that the notion of home is not only about where a person lives but also what a person is

offered in the country of residence. A Danish restaurant owner in the Northeastern Thailand stated:

> Many things depend on the environment and people around you. Of course it is very important whether you can find a job. Not everywhere can offer you a job that suits you. So you have to go and stay in a city that offers you this job. (Mads, 1960, male, entrepreneur, Denmark)

Some foreign groups and networks have been set up to provide advice and support for expats in Thailand. In Chiang Mai, the Lanna Care Net, Chiang Mai Expats Club and the Swiss Lanna Society, for example, are active groups catering for foreign residents in the city, mostly European retirees. The Lanna Care Net focuses on providing support for people facing medical problems due to the lack of health insurance (Vogler 2015).

Most European migrants said that their biggest obstacle to integration was the language barrier. Many also took the view that Thai society made a clear distinction between Thais and 'farangs' (foreigners), making it more difficult to integrate. Some European respondents could speak Thai and socialise with Thai people regularly, but most of them socialised only with fellow Europeans or spent time with their families. Many interviews indicated that highly skilled Europeans were more enthusiastic about learning Thai than other groups of migrants. Siamwala (2013) also found during the survey of 387 British expats working in Thailand that 56.3% of them claimed that they were able to communicate adequately in Thai.

Most Europeans maintained ties with their family and friends in Europe using social media. The frequency of communication ranged from daily to two to three times a month. Some of those living in Bangkok had joined sports clubs such as a tennis club or a football club, where they socialised with Thais and other expats. Obviously, migrants who lived in major cities like Bangkok and Chiang Mai had more social activities than those staying in smaller provinces. Europeans living in provincial towns might choose to visit European restaurants and bars and socialise with other expats.

Likewise Thai migrants usually contact their family and friends back home on a regular basis. They constantly follow the news and political development in Thailand. Most Thai returnees said they maintained ties with their families through social media such as Facebook, instant message applications (LINE, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger) and free calling applications (LINE, Skype). Most Thai students in Europe had joined Thai student associations and engaged in their activities.

Most European respondents said that they were satisfied with their lives and enjoyed living in Thailand. Highly skilled migrants normally had experienced upward economic and social mobility. Even irregular migrants found that Thailand offered them opportunities to start a new life. Many irregular migrants were language teachers in private tutorial schools and did not pay income tax. Some were lifestyle migrants and digital nomads who spent long periods travelling and working in Thailand and neighbouring countries. On the other hand, many Thai returnees experienced upward economic and social mobility when they came back to Thailand.

Returnees would often build large houses and engage in village activities and charity events, helping to increase their economic and social status. A Thai returnee, who had worked in a Dutch shipping company, had become a community leader upon his return. He had provided vocational training services in his community to help develop his home town.

5.7 Conclusion

Temporary migration between Europe and Thailand has grown steadily and is now the major type of migration flow from Thailand to Europe, with seasonal migration at the top of the annual flow. However, marriage migration still accounts for the largest accumulated number of Thai migrants in Europe. Although marriage migrants are supposed to be a long-term migration path, most Thai marriage migrants reported that their migration was temporary and they would later return to Thailand. For many low-skilled workers, marriage migration also served as a channel to enter the European job market. Their motivations were both to improve their economic opportunities and social status.

There has been an increasing trend in the past decade for Thai seasonal migrants to come to Europe. Thai seasonal migrants are mostly recruited by personal networks who work as agents for Thai and European recruitment firms. Their migration purposes are to accumulate decent savings (for farming investments) and repayment of household debts. These migrants have shown a limited degree of transnational social practices. Although most of them are repeat migrants, their language ability is very limited, and no efforts are made at local integration.

The major challenges for Thai migrants are labour protection for lower-skilled jobs, risks of family abuse and human trafficking, limited employment opportunities for people with low level of education, financial demand for remittances, limited language proficiency and a high degree of dependence on European spouses. For European migrants, the main challenges include difficulties in obtaining visa and work permits in Thailand, lack of health insurance and social security for some (mostly language teachers and freelance journalists), sociocultural differences between Europe and Thailand, limited expat networks in small cities and traffic accidents.

European temporary migrants in Thailand are dominated by skilled, marriage and retirement migrants. Marriage migrants and retirees are mostly intertwined as they are often European men married to Thai spouses. Most skilled migrants work in European firms and academic institutions. The motivations for European migrants are more diverse than for Thais as family and personal reasons play an important role in the decision to migrate. It was discovered that since Thailand's immigration policy has not allowed long-term settlement for foreigners, European migrants were of the opinion that their migration status in Thailand was temporary in nature. However, many marriage migrants had no desire to return to Europe and would keep

extending their visas in Thailand on a yearly basis. Their transnational activities included owning properties in both Thailand and Europe, active social media contacts with Thai and European networks and regular return visits to Europe for medical reasons.

In conclusion, the dynamic flows of transnational migrants, their networks and knowledge sharing have facilitated and sustained the two-way flows of temporary migration between Thailand and Europe. Both Thai and European migrants have adopted transnational social practices during the course of their overseas sojourns such as bilingual communication with their children, preparing both Thai and European cuisines and engaging in social activities with locals and foreigners. But the transnational social spaces of Thai and European migrants take different forms. Regular remittance sending and long-stay visits in the home country seem to be dominant forms of transnational social spaces for Thai migrants. By contrast, European migrants rarely send remittances to their families in Europe. European migrants reported more extensive use of social media and frequent travelling to various locations around Thailand. However, both Thai and European migrants share common transnational social practices in making regular contacts with their family members across the globe. They also seek advice and support from personal networks, existing migrant communities and the social media.

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Chapter 6
Flexibility and Ambiguity: Impacts of Temporariness of Transnational Mobility in the Case of Turkey

İlke Şanlıer Yüksel and Ahmet İçduygu

6.1 Introduction

Although historically a country of emigration, over the last three decades, Turkey has turned into a country of destination and also of transit. With rising numbers of non-Turkish immigrants, this trend is in contrast to the early Republican years, when immigration was used as a nation-building tool and concerned exclusively people of Turkish origin (İçduygu and Aksel 2013). Following the consolidation of Turkey as a key factor in international transit migration, the academic and policy-related literature (Şanlıer Yüksel and İçduygu 2014a) has picked up on the concept of temporary migration during the last decade yet calls for clear definitions and more empirical data. The current state of research on temporary migration reveals that the categories relevant to Turkey are flows of labour (both regular and irregular), highly skilled individuals, refugees, asylum seekers, migrants in transit, students and lifestyle migrants (Şanlıer Yüksel and İçduygu 2014b).

The General Directorate of Migration Management records a significant annual increase in total residence permits issued, while there was a steady but moderate increase in the number of work permits granted between 2007 and 2011. A substantial number of work permits were issued to non-nationals from neighbouring countries, including Georgia, Ukraine and the Russian Federation as well as countries with populations et ethnic Turks, such as Turkmenistan. Another perceptible trend is the rise in work permits granted to Chinese and Korean nationals. The majority of international students in Turkish higher education came from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Greece, Iran, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Syria and Kazakhstan. Finally,

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EU citizens, in particular from the United Kingdom, Germany (including naturalised citizens of Turkish origin), the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, have settled in Turkey as retired and non-retired lifestyle migrants.

Various economic sectors in Turkey rely on temporary migrant workers with irregular status mostly coming from Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan as a cheap form of labour, most notably in the textile, sex and entertainment, construction, domestic help and tourism industries. Another group of irregular migrants includes transit migrants who come to Turkey from Asia, Africa and, predominantly, the Middle East. They mainly stay temporarily in Turkey while seeking a means to enter European and other developed countries. Asylum seekers constitute the third and final type or temporary irregular migrants in Turkey. They have come from over 30 different countries, mainly in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Since the onset of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, almost three million Syrian nationals have fled to Turkey, making Turkey host to the highest number of Syrian refugees as well as refugees in general according to UNHCR data (DGMM 2016).

Following Turkey's change to an immigration country, the country has witnessed a significant legislative transformation in its national migration laws over the last decade. Since the 2000s, Turkey's changing migration profile, i.e. increasingly becoming an immigrant country, as well as EU-Turkish relations, have arisen as the two primary factors contributing to legal reforms concerning permanent as well as temporary migration. In addition, these legislative and policy changes took place in response to the increase in new forms of migration flows such as seasonal workers, circular migrants, highly skilled international migrants, lifestyle migrants and international students (Şanlıer Yüksel and İçduygu 2014a). The adoption of the Law on Work Permits for Foreigners of 2003 and the Law on Foreigners and International Protection of 2014 constitute the first genuine attempts to regularise and institutionalise Turkey's migration framework. While these reforms were initially driven by the process of 'EU-isation', i.e. harmonising migration policy with common European standards, the process has since been reoriented to Turkey's implementation of reforms for its own sake. Although the actual situation and some legal regulations clearly indicate the existence of temporary mobility of people in and through Turkey, regulations and policies lack a clear provision for 'temporary migration'.

According to a review of existing policy documents, regulations and laws governing migration/mobility management, there is no official definition of 'temporary migration' in the policy or legislative documents (Şanlıer Yüksel and İçduygu 2014a). However, the concept of 'temporariness' arose in the Law on Work Permits for Foreigners, enacted in 2003. 'Temporariness' is limited to 'foreigners who will temporarily come to Turkey for a period of over one month with the aim of engaging in scientific and cultural activities, and for a period of over four months with the aim of engaging in sports activities' (Article 8, L.W.P.F. § 4817). Thus, migrants coming for purposes other than scientific, cultural and sports are not included within the legal framework of temporariness. According to the law, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security grants three types of work permits: work permits for a fixed period of time, work permits for an indefinite period of time and indefinite work permits.

The 2014 Law on Foreigners and International Protection has introduced a new legal and institutional framework for migration and asylum flows. The law grants residence permits according to a foreigner's situation, recognising six different purposes of temporary migration relevant to this chapter: researchers, students, family members, work purposes (highly skilled, professional or labour migrants), interns and foreign nationals in need of humanitarian protection. Humanitarian protection is defined and categorised by the same law.

Since Turkey still applies a geographical limitation to the UN 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, only refugees coming from European countries are considered as 'full' refugees in Turkey. All other refugees from anywhere outside Europe arriving in Turkey successfully pursuing an individual asylum application to the UNHCR and undergoing refugee status determination procedures are considered 'conditional' refugees in Turkey. In the case of mass flows, as in the recent crisis, Syrians[1] are granted 'temporary protection' status. Both asylum seekers during their status determination process and migrants with temporary protection status are granted limited rights regarding access to health care, education, other social services and the labour market. The duration of temporary protection status is not clearly stipulated due to the ongoing conflict conditions. In this chapter, we also discuss the politico-legal categorisation of refugees and asylum seekers which have very important implications regarding the integration process, not only for the migrants themselves but also for Turkey and Turkish citizens.

As noted, Turkey hosts a great number of temporarily mobile people with its multidirectional migration pattern on the path between Asia and Europe. However, in this chapter we mostly focus on Turkey's connecting characteristic between the continents as a transit route. Although categories such as highly skilled migrants, lifestyle migrants and students make comparison possible, we concentrate on asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants, especially those in transit, because of their sheer volume. By means of underlining Turkey's characteristics as a transit country, we discuss how temporariness impacts on immigrants' daily practices, especially of those who are relatively disadvantaged in terms of access to rights. After introducing the methodological bases of the research, this chapter includes an analysis of the migration processes of temporary migrants in terms of the duration of their stay, previous migratory experiences and future plans and also their motivations for migration in relation to temporariness. Later the findings are discussed through a multi-level analysis of temporary migration on the politico-legal, socioeconomic and sociocultural dimensions. The chapter closes with concluding remarks discussing the results for the different categories of migrants.

[1] Regardless of their legal statuses in Turkey, Syrians will be referred to as refugees in this chapter since they are recognised as refugees by the UNHCR and other international organisations.

6.2 Data Collection

Asylum seekers, low-skilled labour migrants, refugees, entrepreneurs, highly skilled migrants, lifestyle migrants, students, transit migrants and Syrian refugees who legally enjoy temporary protection status emerged as the major categories of temporary migration in our research context (Şanlıer Yüksel and İçduygu 2014b). In order to adequately reflect Turkey's former status as a country of emigration, we have also included return migrants and family members of Turkish migrants in the sample. We decided to categorise migrants according to their respective statuses at the time of the interview. In terms of migrants' legal status, the regular-irregular distinction emerged 'not as a simple binary, but a continuum' as coined by Collyer and de Haas (2012:472).

Throughout the fieldwork,[2] we collected data from 75 temporary migrants and 5 family members of Turkish nationals abroad through in-depth interviews during the spring of 2015. Interviews were conducted mainly in Istanbul but also in Ankara, Alanya, İzmir, Fethiye and Eskişehir. Table 6.1 presents the nationalities, gender and number of respondents according to each temporary migration category. In total, the number of female and male interviewees was equal, but with a clear distinction in some categories.

The ages of migrants varied significantly from 22 to 73. Regarding the interviewees' countries of origin, most individuals in each category were mainly from Asian countries (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, India, Iran, Iraq, Moldova, Pakistan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) apart from the group of lifestyle migrants, in which all the interviewees came from European countries, such as Finland and the Netherlands. Moreover, the low-skilled migrants as well as the highly skilled migrants were in equal shares from Asian (Moldova, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, India, Syria, Tajikistan) and European countries (France, Spain, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine). The majority of the interviews were conducted in Turkish and English. The others were conducted in French, Arabic and Farsi; a translator was used and translated to Turkish or English.

6.3 Migration Processes

6.3.1 Duration of Stay

In regard to migration processes, previous mobility experiences, motivations for migration to Turkey and migration channels varied among the different categories of temporary migrants we interviewed. In light of these differences, migrants' durations of sojourn in Turkey are also wide-ranging. Most of the interviewees had stayed in Turkey for a period of 12–24 months.

[2] We thank Elif Naz Kayran, Selin Siviş and Lara Savenije for their assistance.

Table 6.1 Distribution of interviewees

Migrant category	Nationality	Gender	Total
Highly skilled workers	France (3), Spain (2), Italy (1), India (2), Syria (1)	Female (4)/male (5)	9
Entrepreneurs	Afghanistan (1)	Male (1)	1
Low-skilled workers	Uzbekistan (2), Pakistan (1), India (1), Moldova (1), France (1), Greece(1), Spain (1), Russia (2), Bulgaria (1), Tajikistan (1), Ukraine (2)	Female (11)/male (3)	14
Lifestyle migrants	Finland (4), Netherlands (3)	Female (4)/male (3)	7
Students	Iran (1), USA (1), Pakistan (2), Moldova (1), France (1)	Female (2)/male (4)	6
Returnees	Turkey	Female (6)/male (3)	9
Irregular migrants[a]	Afghanistan (2), Turkmenistan (1), Azerbaijan (1)	Female (2)/male (2)	4
Transit migrants	Congo (2) Iran (1)	Female (2)/male (1)	3
Asylum seekers[b]	Iraq (6), Iran (3), Syria (1),Afghanistan (3)	Female (4)/male (9)	13
Temporary protection status[b]	Syria (8)	Female (2)/male (6)	8
Refugees[b]	Congo (1)	Male (1)	1
Family members	Turkey (5)	Female (3)/male (2)	5
Total		Female (40)/male (40)	80

[a]Includes migrants coming to Turkey to live and work without valid documents.
[b]We used the category of asylum seekers for those who have applied for political asylum in the UNHCR system and whose applications are being processed. This refugee category is used for those who have been granted the status by UNHCR and are waiting to be resettled in a third country. Syrian refugees are categorised under the category of those who hold temporary protection status according to the Turkish legislation.

Highly skilled migrants stay relatively shorter than low-skilled labour migrants. Those coming to Turkey for employment and who are highly skilled tend to see Turkey as a step in their career paths, whereas low-skilled migrants, especially those coming from Asia and post-Soviet countries, stay in Turkey for longer time periods to be able to work, to earn better than they might have earned in their countries of origin and to send remittances. Migrants categorised under irregular status stay in Turkey relatively longer than those in many other categories, although it is not clear from the interviews whether they consider the situation in Turkey to be better or worse than the living conditions in their home countries.

While students generally stay for the duration of their formal education, European migrants moving to Turkey for lifestyle reasons tend to stay in Turkey for a longer, at times even indefinite, period of time. It is important to note that although lifestyle migrants stay for longer, they tend to divide their time between Turkey and their countries of origin. All the lifestyle migrants interviewed were from the middle class and mentioned that they still owned a house in their country of origin:

> I go back to the Netherlands many times. I came back in the beginning of this year and then I went in April, and now I go back in July for three weeks. Maybe come back in August, September. And I stay here for three months, then I go back in December, because Christmas and New Year. And then I come back again. I think, three, four times a year, I go back for a few weeks. (Judith 1945, female, lifestyle migrant, Netherlands)

Lifestyle migrants, while they move to new countries in search of a better way of life (O'Reilly 2007), simultaneously seek to safeguard the advantages their countries of origin may offer. These advantages may include a better health care, welfare or housing system (they often maintain multiple homes) (Gustafson 2006; Benson and O'Reilly 2009). Our informants also stated that although they enjoyed living in Turkey and tried to build a life here, they still wanted to keep contact with family members and friends left behind. They may even think of returning to their countries of origin in case of failing health.

The Syrian refugees (legally with temporary protection status) and asylum seekers of other nationalities we interviewed are likely to stay in Turkey for 1–2 years. The duration of their stay is generally determined by the conditions and rights provided by the Turkish state. Since Turkey does not grant refugee status except for Europeans, refugees and asylum seekers from Asian and African countries come to Turkey to be resettled in a third country through the UNHCR's refugee status determination process. Since the duration of this process cannot be known, these migrants' duration of stay in Turkey is likewise unknown. For example, a Congolese refugee who arrived to Turkey in 2006 was granted refugee status by the UNHCR in 2013 upon his personal application and was still waiting to be resettled in a third country at the time of the interview. His case shows the unpredictability of the situations of refugees in limbo. As for Syrian refugees, they try to move forwards to Europe, especially because the temporary protection status in Turkey grants limited rights to education or employment. Besides, it is extremely unclear for them whether they will be able to go back to Syria even if the war ends due to reasons such as lack of security, loss of property and the destruction in the country that may not be remedied for years. As such, their duration of stay differs across time. For those who are able to move to Europe through regular or irregular paths, this period is much shorter.

6.3.2 Previous Migratory Experiences and Future Plans

The majority of all the temporary migrants interviewed had no previous international migration experience, whereas some already had some earlier transborder experience.

Most of the highly skilled migrants, lifestyle migrants and student migrants had already lived abroad before coming to Turkey. Their previous destinations included many countries, but mostly China, Italy, Dubai and Russia. For most students, European countries had been their first choice rather than Turkey. They could not go due to a lack of resources or reasons such as failure to obtain a visa in the case of a

Pakistani doctoral student in biomedical engineering trying to move to Sweden. For low-skilled labour migrants, however, especially those coming from post-Soviet countries, Turkey was their first destination. They chose Turkey because of its geographical proximity, relatively more flexible visa formalities and open border policies and the prospect of job opportunities. This trend shows how social class and socio-economic status relate to the migratory context of different migrant categories. Different forms of capital that migrants accumulate and transform may clearly have an impact on their previous migratory experiences as well as future plans.

Differences in migrants' experiences and aspirations become more apparent where refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants are concerned (Massey et al. 1994; Engbersen et al. 2006; Van Meeteren et al. 2009). Their experiences are clearly different from the experiences of those arriving in the country with proper documentation. Since asylum seekers migrate because of displacement, their stay in Turkey is most often/usually not a choice or a decision, but a matter of necessity. Some of the refugees and asylum seekers had been smuggled into Turkey. Their testimonies showed that human smuggling networks operate mostly along the Syrian and Iranian borders as well as the Eastern Mediterranean Route (mainly Aegean Coast and Evros River) towards Europe. Most of the African and Afghan refugees were smuggled into Turkey through the border of Iran. The testimonies of refugees from Afghanistan revealed both the route and the means they used to reach Turkey. They first went to Pakistan, then walked to Iran and met with a smuggler in Tehran. From Tehran to the Turkish border, they travelled with a vehicle and again walked or rode a horse to cross the border. After arriving in Turkey, they travelled within the country by coach. The whole journey generally took about 30 days, and the cost ranged between 1500 and 2000 USD.

Almost all interviewees expressed uncertainty in regard to their future migration plans and the duration of their stay in Turkey. Most European migrants expressed the intention to move back to their home countries or to another country for professional and academic reasons. On the other hand, for migrants coming from Asian and African countries, the uncertainty is greater, and most of the time 'going back home' is not an option due to the adverse social, economic and political conditions in the country of origin. This constraint results in irregularity in migrants' statuses and causes them to take dangerous and even fatal steps to move forwards. Many want to continue to Europe:

> I want to go to another country, to any third country that will take me. If we can't be settled to a country, they should tell me, or settle us to a camp if it exists, because I can't withstand longer and they can put me there as well. I mean the life I live here is very difficult, these clothes you see on me were given to me by someone else and I can't even buy clothes for myself. I can't buy anything my daughter or wife want and there are no other words, I am in a very difficult position. Any country would be fine. (Sameer 1979, male, asylum seeker, Afghanistan)

Irregular migrants expressed their desire to stay in Turkey, but they wished to have regular status to be able to go back to their countries of origin from time to time. Some Muslim migrants, who did not want to go Europe but rather preferred to stay in Turkey even if their conditions were atrocious, consistently emphasised the

incidents of discrimination against migrants and Islamophobia in European countries. However, our interviews with highly skilled migrants and returnee migrants revealed aspirations to remain mobile due to the political instability in Turkey. They thought they might go back or go to another country even though they might have unfortunate previous experiences.

6.3.3 Motivations for Migration in Relation to Temporariness

Motivations to migrate varied among different temporary migrant categories. International students, highly skilled migrants and professionals saw temporary stay in Turkey as a part of their career development, in addition to opportunities for getting to know new cultures and extending their personal development. Especially migrants coming from Europe mentioned the various job prospects available in Turkey and opportunities afforded by the cosmopolitan character of Istanbul:

> I enjoy my job as a French teacher. The main reason to stay here, I feel good here in many ways. Not everything is perfect, but as a French person, I felt like I had more opportunities here, more space to develop my ideas and projects. For me as a French person, life is easier. I know that this is not the case for many Turkish people. This feeling of 'I can create something here'. (Celine 1986, female, highly skilled, France)

Some of the temporary migrants, regardless of status, had come to Turkey due to family reunification, while others stated that they had travelled with a boyfriend/girlfriend and later decided to stay. Lifestyle migrants from Finland and the Netherlands consistently mentioned the advantage of the climate and the low cost of living in Turkey compared to their countries of origin. One lifestyle migrant said:

> Because I like it here, because of the sun, because the people are very nice. They are friendly to me, and the food is good. It's a paradise for me. (Judith 1945, female, lifestyle migrant, Netherlands)

All the low-skilled labour migrants and migrants categorised as having irregular status had come to Turkey for reasons of employment. Especially migrants coming from post-Soviet countries stated clearly that there are more job opportunities in Turkey than in their countries of origin. Migrants from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan preferred to come to Turkey as a result of the common cultural characteristics and the basic knowledge of Turkish. Most of the labour migrants had a family member or friend who had come to Turkey previously. Thus they used their transnational networks to come and find a job, in addition to using employment agencies, which are usually unauthorised. The fees of these agencies, according to the interviewees, are generally equivalent to 1 month's salary of the migrant and may cost as much as 2000 USD according to interviewees.

Asylum seekers and refugees are a specific case compared to others in terms of the involuntary forced mobility they have faced. For almost all asylum seekers and refugees, Turkey is not a choice, but a contingency. Nevertheless there are some individuals who choose to be in Turkey in their search for protection. For instance,

an Afghan asylum seeker decided to move to Turkey from Iran so that his wife and daughter, who were in poor health, could receive better treatment. In the case of a Palestinian-Syrian teacher of Arabic who had been granted refugee status in France, his motivations for coming to Turkey were better job opportunities in terms of teaching Arabic, the opportunity to help fellow refugees and proximity to 'home'. These, however, were unique cases. Apart from them, all asylum seekers and refugees stated that they wished to continue to Europe or North America in order to have better living conditions and pursue their education and careers, since they lacked such opportunities in Turkey as will be discussed later in this chapter.

Most of the migrants tended to define temporariness through time frames of 3–4 years or less than 5 years, using the phrase 'not forever'. Some migrants connected temporariness to goals or identification:

> If you are staying in a place where you don't see your future objectives there, you prefer to be temporary. For me I don't see my future goals here, I don't see them here in Turkey and for me it is temporary. (Abrar 1986, male, student, Pakistan)

Although one of the lifestyle migrants from the Netherlands had been resident for a long time, he defined himself as 'temporary' because he felt 'Dutch, but not Turkish'. In other words, he perceived temporariness through belonging. A highly skilled migrant from France avoided giving a time frame for temporariness but felt 'temporary' because he believed he was highly mobile as an EU citizen. Some respondents spoke of the negative connotations of temporariness, creating obstacles to sustainable investment as in the case of an Indian low-skilled migrant worker:

> It is not good to be temporary. "Temporarily", meaning you spend time. Becoming permanent is a guarantee. It means that you earn something. At that time you know that you are here. It is different when [you are] temporary. You just mind your own business. But you won't stay. That is not beneficial. (Rajhan 1974, male, low-skilled worker, India)

As the quotation above illustrates, some of the migrants did not invest in Turkey socioculturally or economically due to the temporary nature of their stay. They believed that they were subject to discrimination in access to housing, jobs, health care and education. The understanding of the disadvantages inherent in temporary migration processes caused many to search for other opportunities to make settlement possible, especially those moving about with their families.

6.4 Politico-Legal Aspects

6.4.1 Procedures on Visas and Permits

All migrants in Turkey voiced grievances about long waits, complicated bureaucracy and uncertainty during the visa and work permit application processes because of a lack of qualified personnel. After the passing of the new migration law in 2014, not only regulations but also practices in migration management changed. A civil authority called the Directorate General of Migration Management now carries out

all official procedures and operations, previously taken care of by different institutions and the foreigners' division of the local police department. This fundamental change has resulted in resilient practices of bureaucracy.

Highly skilled migrants reported that their institutions/companies as well as legal agencies assisted them with their work permit applications. They nevertheless complained about the lengthiness of the procedure (usually 3–5 months) and the lack of coordination between different agencies. For example, a Spanish migrant working as a manager at a transnational company shared her experience of obtaining a visa from the Turkish Consulate before arrival. When she complained to the consulate about the lengthy process, the response she received suggested retaliation:

> They told me 'all Turks wait to come to Europe, you can wait too'. They made me wait to get my visa for four months. (Dolores 1969, female, highly skilled, Spain)

In most cases, residence and work permits need to be renewed, thus necessitating undergoing the same difficulties and paying high costs, every year. New regulations require private health insurance, thereby adding extra costs. Most of the labour migrants expressed concerns about the necessary fees. Lifestyle migrants in particular criticised the frequent changes in bureaucratic processes and heavy penalties for visa overstays since they tended to extend their stays in Turkey.

Until Turkey enacted the Law on Work Permits for Foreigners (Law No. 4817) in 2003, foreign nationals were banned from working in many sectors including the domestic sector. The new law facilitated the process of obtaining legal documents for labour migrants. The enactment of this law enables immigrants to search for temporary work and employment opportunities in Turkey. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior announced an amnesty programme in 2012 for the regularisation of irregular migrants living in Turkey:

> I paid about 2,000 USD as a fine for my seven years of irregular stay in Turkey. I did not have that much money, but thanks to my employer, she lent that amount. I paid her back monthly as I work. My passport was expired as well. So I also paid for the new Moldovan passport and fees for work permit. Paying fines at the Foreigner's Division of Local Police Department was easy, but getting the work permit was not that easy. My employer helped me a lot, she mainly did the work. The whole process took us months. It was costly, but I gained my freedom back. I was so afraid of deportation. Now I can travel back home or wherever I want to go. (Marinela 1965, female, low-skilled worker, Moldova)

In April 2015 the government passed new legislation to regulate social security procedures regarding domestic work. These reforms prevented some major problems caused by the informal and temporary nature of domestic work, such as the lack of social security or lack of access to health-care services. Nevertheless, the regulation causes many domestic workers, in particular women, to continue to work irregularly since their employers are unwilling to pay the high rates of social security fees. While domestic workers usually try to obtain a residence permit, they do not hold work permits. The need to find a Turkish sponsor to be able to continue their stay in Turkey forces them to work irregularly, leaving especially migrant women vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.

Concerning legal status, there are numerous differences between temporary migrants coming from Asian and post-Soviet countries and migrants coming from European countries, especially as regard regularity. Twelve interviewees without regular status had either been smuggled into Turkey without documents or had entered Turkey with valid documentation but overstayed the period for which their visas had been granted. Although some regular temporary migrants, i.e. some of the Syrian refugees, had been smuggled in, they registered upon arrival in Turkey and now had 'temporary protection' status. As mentioned, the experience of migrants in transit overlaps with that of irregular migrant workers, because transit, resettlement or a decision on political asylum usually takes a long time. Consequently, migrants have no choice but to work without a permit (Danış et al. 2009; İçduygu and Yükseker 2012). Although they do not need to tackle paperwork, they are obviously the most vulnerable group when they face official/formal burden. Out of fear of detention and deportation, they generally do not leave the flats they live in and often work informally in unlicensed manufacturing workshops. Unfortunately, irregular migrants are denied all basic rights, including the right to reside, or, in other words, to be where they are. The instability of migrants' legal status contributes to their exclusion from society as a whole.

Interviewees seeking asylum and expecting to be resettled in a third country repeatedly stated their condition of being in limbo due to the lengthy process. Without work permit they are not permitted to leave the 'satellite cities' in which they are settled; this state of uncertainty has reached an irrational level, especially after the arrival of the Syrian refugees. The interviewees mentioned that they had had to wait years for the RSD procedure to be completed. The length of the RSD procedure differs among asylum seekers from different countries. While an Iranian refugee had received an interview date in spring 2016, a Syrian refugee had been told that the earliest possible interview date was in 2023. There is no particular reason for the different waiting periods for interviews or the process in general. Unfortunately, the completion of the procedure does not necessarily result in immediate resettlement, which may take even longer. This shows the arbitrary nature of the bureaucracy at both national and international levels.

6.4.2 Access to Rights

Highly skilled migrants, students and most of the low-skilled labour migrants are entitled to work, education, health services and social security services. Asylum seekers and refugees, on the other hand, are highly vulnerable in terms of accessing even the most basic rights. The main shortcoming of the new temporary protection and conditional protection scheme is the lack of clarity in relation to the right to education, employment and housing. A small number of these people enjoy a limited right to work with special permission. The Turkish government attempted to pass a new law regulating Syrian refugees' employment conditions by the end of 2014, but did not realise this plan until January 2016. The interviewees expressed

their concerns about the government's practice of delaying and criticised Turkey's political climate for increasing their insecurity. Since asylum seekers and refugees are not entitled to housing, high rents become one of the major problems along with the lack of the right to work. They are therefore forced into the informal sector where they face discrimination and exploitation. Most of the money they earn is needed for rent:

> My wife is sick, she has some physical problems, and my daughter is developing slowly, the doctor says that she needs to have a good nutrition program and I can't fulfil it here. The conditions here are worse than in Iran. There are dangers there, but at least I could work and could buy these by working. Here I can't do anything because I am not allowed to work here. (Sameer 1979, male, asylum seeker, Afghanistan)

Regardless of their status, all regular migrants are legally entitled to health-care services, but nearly all the temporary migrants we interviewed complained about the health-care services. A Pakistani PhD student experienced a huge language barrier with doctors and public hospital administration during his wife's delivery, even though they had residence permits, a scholarship and private health insurance. A professional from India seeking treatment at private hospitals complained about the very high service charges as a consequence of Turkey's health tourism policy. Since 2011, health tourism has become an official state policy targeting middle and upper class foreigners travelling to Turkey for medical treatment. Therefore prices are comparatively very high. Unfortunately, asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants are again the most disadvantaged group concerning health-care services. They can access such services but pay higher fees than Turkish citizens since they are categorised as 'foreigners'. All the interviewees also complained about the high cost of medicines. Irregular migrants usually tried to get informal medical help when in need due to the risk of detention when approaching official medical services.

Highly skilled migrants and lifestyle migrants send their children to either international schools or private schools where the language of instruction is English:

> My children go to private school, there is no international school here [Alanya]. Only private schools, they are taught in English. Now a Russian School is established. We try to keep up with Finnish language at the Finn Cultural Center. We organise a kids' club in Finnish to reconnect them with Finland. They learned Turkish at the kindergarten, now they are bilingual and also speak English. (Margareetta 1972, female, lifestyle migrant, Finland)

Children of refugees and asylum seekers of school age with residence permits can enrol in public schools. Those without residence permits can attend schools as guests, without formal enrolment. In most cases, however, children did not attend school because of the discrimination they face and their lack of Turkish language proficiency. Their lack of proficiency in the local language results in their being excluded from daily practices.

Moreover, asylum seekers, refugees and migrants under temporary protection lack even the right to mobility. According to the regulations, they must stay and can only access services in the cities in which they are registered. If they wish to go elsewhere, they have to prove the necessity of this to the Turkish officials and obtain

permission to leave. The lack of even the most basic right to reside factually denies irregular migrants the right to be where they are. It forces them into a life in limbo, in which they have restricted freedom of movement, lack legal protection, have poor access to rights and face high exposure to exploitation, destitution and deportation. Regardless of their identity as undocumented workers, transit migrants or unrecognised refugees, irregular migrants are unified in their experience of disenfranchisement are disadvantaged position.

6.4.3 Political Participation and Identification

Concerning political participation, we observed that the level of participation and identification changes significantly in relation to the migrant's socio-economic status, educational background and, most profoundly, migratory status. Highly skilled migrants, lifestyle migrants and graduate students expressed an interest in both conventional (i.e. voting) and nonconventional modes of participation (i.e. protests) in their home countries as well as in Turkey. In a few cases, they held multiple orientations:

> I read Finnish newspapers on the Internet. I vote here for Finland's elections. There is a quite good participation in the elections here. But at the same time I care about the place where I live. I care about Turkish elections as well. I follow Turkish politics too. (Margareetta 1972, female, lifestyle migrant, Finland)

One of the most intriguing participation strategies we came across during the fieldwork was the Alanya Foreigners' Committee formed under Alanya Municipality. Alanya is a Mediterranean coastal town that hosts a significant number of lifestyle migrants in Turkey. The Foreigners' Committee of the city of Alanya was founded in August 2004 as the first of its kind in Turkey in order to provide assistance and help to the foreign residents of Alanya in coordination with the municipality. Since 2015 there have been members from 16 different nations on the committee. They come from Turkey, Germany, Iran, the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Georgia, Russia, Poland, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Azerbaijan, Syria and Lithuania. They all work on a voluntary basis and for the benefit of the individual organisations that they represent. They provide information on all activities and innovations through their website in Turkish, English, German and Russian. According to Balkır and Südaş (2014:138), this council, 'although having no legal authority, advises settled retirees about laws and regulations and their legal rights in Turkey'. The networking activities of the foreigners' council simultaneously create a passage from temporary mobility towards more permanent migration aspirations by facilitating social inclusion.

One of the major concerns raised by our respondents was that temporary migrants are not perceived and treated as nationals in Turkey. Turkey has a very long tradition of immigration, mostly of ethnic Turks and Muslims. They are called 'migrants' and used to be naturalised in easy ways (Kirişci 2000). According to the legislation,

non-citizens are categorised as 'foreigners', rather than migrants. This duality creates huge differences in the treatment of non-citizens in terms of rights. Our interviewees voiced obstacles in social life as a result of this perception of being a 'foreigner', i.e. in renting an apartment, enrolling their children in schools and finding jobs and in bureaucratic processes. Discrimination and stigmatisations lead to social exclusion and inequalities between migrants and local residents:

> For example, whenever I need to get my residence, because I am supposed to renew it every year, that's when I feel like a stranger. Not from one of them… Excluded. (Adèle 1967, female, highly skilled, France)

We observed that in a few cases, political remittances were transferred transnationally. For example, this was reflected in the case of an Iranian asylum seeker, a young lawyer who had escaped from Iran for political reasons and still continued to advocate for human rights issues in Iran through blogging.

6.5 Socio-economic Aspects

6.5.1 Employment Opportunities

All the working temporary migrants we interviewed had full-time jobs. Highly skilled migrants were either seconded to Turkey by their companies or had found a job before they arrived. Professionals employed at transnational companies considered personnel relocation policies 'good opportunities' (Partha, male, highly skilled, 1976, India). According to them, Turkey is one the best destinations because of its proximity to Europe and Asia and the resources it provides for professionals. Furthermore, Turkey suggests upward mobility since it is home to the majority of the Middle East and North African regional branches of transnational companies. Highly skilled migrants come to Turkey with their immediate families and enjoy the numerous social, cultural and economic opportunities Turkey provides. They generally find jobs corresponding to their qualifications, send their children to international schools, participate in international and national cultural activities and travel throughout the country. They also receive better pay and benefits than they do in their home countries. Other European highly skilled migrants who had found employment opportunities in Turkey independently mentioned difficulties in finding well-paid secure jobs in their home countries:

> Maybe this is even better here because working in France is more difficult. I don't know because I didn't work at any school in France, but worked in a hospital. But working in France is more difficult and it is the case in Europe as well, so I am satisfied with my work here. (Adèle 1967, female, highly skilled, France)

Low-skilled labour migrants generally find a job upon their arrival in Turkey on a tourist visa. The majority of low-skilled workers come from Asia, specifically from post-Soviet countries. Our interviewees were mostly working as domestic servants or in elderly or child care. Low-skilled workers living by themselves stated that they

were able to save part of their earnings, whereas others living in Turkey with their families claimed that their income was only enough for their daily costs. Refugees, asylum seekers and low-skilled migrants stated that they had previously held better positions/jobs in their home countries, whereas we observed upward occupational mobility among highly skilled professionals.

6.5.2 Working Conditions

Highly skilled migrants and professionals spoke positively about their working conditions, including the physical working environment, working hours, the content of work and personal satisfaction, all described positively by highly skilled migrants and professionals. Low-skilled labour migrants and irregular workers, however, usually faced precarious and unhealthy working conditions which did not include the proper safety measures:

> I can't go back. There is always war in Afghanistan. There is no other option, but to stay here. I don't have papers, permits. I cannot go anywhere else. So my plan is to continue like this. But if the boss gives my money, it would be much better [Laughs]. I work in textile workshops or do leatherwork. Do you know leatherwork, it makes you cancer. I work informally. My main concern is headman at the workshop frequently cuts our payments. It's only 500 Turkish liras [approximately 150 EUR]. I work from eight in the morning, till nine in the evening. There are Kurds and us Afghanis working. (Azad 1992, male, irregular migrant, Afghanistan)

The working conditions of low-skilled and irregular migrants working as domestic servants are particularly precarious, insecure and rough. Our interviewees complained about ambiguity in their job descriptions and long working hours. The market determines their wages. The attitudes and behaviour of employers are often arbitrary. Although our participants had not experienced this at first-hand, they shared others' experiences of psychological and sometimes even physical violence on the part of employers. Respondents reported health problems due to the irresponsible use of chemicals in cleaning work and physical deterioration such as back and joint pain. Irregular migrant domestic workers are unable to seek health care, since receiving such official services can mean deportation.

6.5.3 Remittances

Regarding transnational economic activity, non-European migrants reported sending remittances to their families. There appears to be a relationship between migrants' economic positions and their tendency to engage in transnational economic activities. However, this correlation is less evident in the case of social and political transnationalism. Migrants in transit clearly told us that they saved both their previous financial assets and earnings from informal jobs in order to continue

their transnational mobility. Only low-skilled workers and irregular workers said that they sent money to their families back home. They used both formal and informal ways, i.e. banking and through friends and family members. In contrast, while highly skilled migrants earn more, they generally make less use of remittances. They prefer to invest in their present environment and save for further mobility, creating a pattern of temporariness.

In terms of the transnational mobility of goods, nearly all the migrants received food from their home countries, generally by post. One domestic worker, however, mentioned that she sent a package of fresh fruit and vegetables, as well as clothing items, to her children in Moldova every month:

> I send one big box every month. The things that we don't have in Moldova. I go to Emniyet Otogar [International Bus Station in İstanbul] once in a month and I give the package to the Moldovan bus company. My son gets it from them. It is not expensive, about 20 liras [6 Euros]. (Marinela 1965, female, low-skilled worker, Moldova)

Family members of Turkish emigrants who are in Iraq, France and Austria considered the mobility of social remittances such as the flow of skills or cultural exchange, i.e. language acquisition, the development of occupational skills or entrepreneurship opportunities, more important than any financial remittances they might receive. One of the respondents reported on her husband's work-related temporary mobility. As a Turkish emigrant, he had worked in Egypt, Abu Dhabi and Tunisia for 2-year intervals as a contract-based engineer working in airport construction. He had decided to work abroad because of career advancement and higher pay. The remittances he sent supported the household consumption and enabled investment. Two of our interviewees married to temporary migrants did not work in spite of being highly skilled. This finding concurs with the literature (Acosta 2006; Kalaj 2009) asserting that income generated by remittances reduces labour market participation for nonmigrants, especially women.

Apart from the aforementioned cases, our research reveals that temporary migrants scarcely engaged in transnational financial activity.

6.6 Sociocultural Aspects

Regarding the sociocultural aspects of temporary migration and the temporary nature of mobility makes integration and identification ever more complex. One of the major obstacles to integration is the lack of Turkish language skills. Only 16 of the respondents we interviewed spoke any Turkish. The majority of them told us that they needed to learn Turkish to be able to find a job or to continue their studies. Many interviewees did not pursue Turkish language acquisition as they planned to move elsewhere. Highly skilled migrants told us they did not need to learn Turkish, because they spoke English or their native language such as French in their workplaces or social environments. Some participants coming from post-Soviet countries and Iran stated that they had learned Turkish while watching Turkish television,

especially Turkish TV series, back home. While a Moldovan undergraduate student had to learn Turkish in order to be able to continue her studies, an Iranian and a Pakistani graduate student did not, since the language of instruction of the university they are attending is English.

Moreover, one of the most interesting findings was respondents' enthusiasm to learn either Chinese or German since both languages are seen to be assets. Many highly skilled migrants and professionals mentioned their knowledge of Chinese or their intentions to learn it as they saw China as a possible future destination. As such, migrant assets such as language proficiency can be transferred into new patterns of mobility and can lead to temporary stays. Some of the asylum seekers, Syrian refugees and irregular migrants and migrants in transit repeatedly noted the importance of understanding German to move to Germany:

> I study German every day on the Internet, when I don't go to work. Germany announced to take in 60 thousand refugees. I won't wait here in Turkey, I'll try to go via smuggling and I need to know German. (Farhad 1985, male, transit migrant, Iran)

In terms of social cohesion and inclusion, the empirical data showed a clear-cut contrast between two groups of temporary migrants: highly skilled migrants, professionals, students and lifestyle migrants on the one hand and low-skilled labour migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, irregular migrants and migrants in transit on the other. The former talked about having Turkish friends, joining in sociocultural activities, sending their children to school, enjoying Turkish food, etc. They also mentioned that they enjoyed friendships with nonmigrants and found Turks very friendly, caring and showing solidarity when needed. Concerning cultural identity and integration, respondents belonging to this group raised an important question: 'Integration into what?' Their relationship with local communities results in (social) cohesion in two directions. While migrants adapt to Turkey, they also invite other migrants and nonmigrants to include inclusionary experiences into their own cultures and cultivate transnational networks and identities (Massey and Sanchez 2005; Vertovec 2001; Faist 2007; Faist et al. 2013). One noteworthy example is the experience of a Finnish female migrant in Alanya:

> We have founded the Finnish Cultural Association, not only for us, but for the locals to be able to learn about us. We celebrate Christmas and Easter together. We organise theatre plays, meet twice a week, and teach Finnish to the kids, to be able to connect them with Finland. We translated and adapted one of the plays of Andersen in two languages, Turkish and Finnish. And we distribute FINFO [the cover of the booklet is shown in Figure 6.1] in Turkish, a brochure on Finn culture. (Margareetta 1972, female, lifestyle migrant, Finland)

Although Margareetta tried to show an understanding of diversity, she presented her cultural identity by referring to a unique Finnish culture that is rather homogenous. Like Margareetta, in many cases, respondents tended to essentialise their cultural identities and sense of belonging.

By contrast, migrants in transit, labour migrants, asylum seekers and refugees experienced less interaction with locals. Moreover, they were seldom part of sociocultural activities due to the prohibitive cost, instead of saving money to move to another destination or to send back home. Irregular migrants were the most disad-



Fig. 6.1 The cover of booklet in Turkish entitled 'Guide to Finnish Customs and Manners'

vantaged group since they were often forced into hiding. One of the major concerns raised by interviewees was the emerging racist, discriminatory discourse and prejudices towards asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants:

> I am a foreigner here no matter what. Turkish people are very nationalist. We are only one colour to them, no matter where we come from or why we are here. They don't want to see us here. I speak three languages and I was a chef in my country. They look at me as if I am a bad person. (Farhad 1985, male, transit migrant, Iran)

Some of the respondents had developed identity management strategies against discrimination:

> If there are racist act towards Syrians, I prefer to say I am Palestinian; or, if I encounter with racist attitudes when I say Palestinian, I say I come from France. I have many options. (Darwish 1961, male, highly skilled/refugee, Syria)

Darwish's statement shows that migrants are active in terms of citizenship politics and agency. As they face the hardships of being a migrant or 'foreigner' in the case of Turkey, individual migrants' agency interacts in daily practices against the harsh reality of difficult social integration and discrimination. At the same time, their temporality allows individual migrants to be flexible in their daily rhetoric of identification.

Most of the interviewees maintained transnational social bonds either by telephone or social media. The use of information and communication technologies, i.e. smart phones and social media, not only provided them with a transnational connection but also became a strategic tool for survival, especially in the case of refugees and asylum seekers. Almost all the migrants, regardless of their status, mentioned daily use of applications such as Skype and WhatsApp to stay in contact with their

family members and friends left behind or living elsewhere in the world. Facebook is another tool connecting migrants with their families and friends where migrants not only receive but also provide each other with support.

Regarding the perceptions of migrants in relation to belonging, most of the temporary migrants identified 'home' as their countries of origin. This finding seems to correlate with the duration of their sojourn. We observed that as this duration increases, migrants tend to define Turkey as 'home' and vice versa. Migrants who had been compelled to leave their home countries involuntarily expressed their perceptions of belonging according to decent living standards, rather than location or origin:

> Where is home? For me it is the place where you can live comfortably, without stress, threats; the place where you can do the things you want to do. I love Iran, it is my hometown, and everything occurring there concerns me. It will always be my land; but I am not a nationalist. I am against nationalism. Ok, my homeland is Iran, but wherever I can set up a roof, wherever I can breathe securely is home to me. It is a place without stress. (Marjan 1985, female, asylum seeker, Iran)

6.7 Conclusion

Our research findings permit the main conclusion that temporary mobility of people in and through Turkey creates both ambiguity and flexibility at politico-legal, socio-economic and sociocultural levels. As our research has shown, the migratory context of different migrant categories is defined by social class, socio-economic status and legal status. Migration processes as well as migrants' living conditions vary among the categories. The future migration plans and the duration of their stay in Turkey of temporary migrants were decidedly uncertain. Concerning legal status, there are numerous differences between temporary migrants coming from Asian and post-Soviet countries and migrants coming from European countries, especially as regards regularity. Turkey has a very long tradition of immigration, mostly of ethnic Turks and Muslims, who were referred to as 'migrants' and were naturalised in practical ways. But as for temporary migrants, according to the legislation, non-citizens are classified as foreigners rather than as migrants. This duality creates huge differences in the treatment of non-citizens in terms of the rights extended to them.

There is limited transnational economic activity among temporary migrants. Integration remains the most problematic sociocultural aspect because of the temporary nature of mobility. These practices make it difficult for temporary migrants, regular or not, to be full members of society. Our research does not indicate whether the migrants consider themselves to be worse or better off in Turkey than their home countries, because they also reported huge problems, lack of opportunities and violation of their human rights in their home countries. As the migrants face these numerous insecurities, the only certainty that persists is that irregular migrants create a pool of flexible and cheap workforce for local employers.

Since the onset of the Syrian civil war, the UNHCR and Turkish government have registered more than 2.7 million Syrian refugees in refugee camps and in cities along the Syrian-Turkish border as well as major population centres, such as Istanbul. The protracted nature of the crisis and the continuing influx of refugees call for a more long-term policy in line with international migration and asylum standards. As public agitation grows and the Turkish government reaches its capacity to manage the crisis, Syrian refugees are increasingly choosing to leave Turkey and cross into Europe. Forced out of their country and without any path to seek asylum and safety, these and other refugees are risking their lives as they face dangerous voyages across the Mediterranean, smuggling networks and relentless border authorities. As the death toll increases inside as well as outside of Syria, the Syrian crisis demonstrates an urgent need for both Turkey and the international community to reconsider migration and asylum legislation and change to a policy of global governance in solidarity and international co-operation.

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Chapter 7
Transit Migrants in a Country Undergoing Transition: The Case of Greece

Georgios Agelopoulos, Elina Kapetanaki, and Konstantinos Kousaxidis

In the course of the last decade, Greece and Italy have become the centre of attention due to their role as the main entrance points for immigrants coming to Europe. Understanding the migration processes in the Mediterranean context requires taking into account the massive population movements after the collapse of empires in the early twentieth century, the post-WWII migration from Southern to Northern Europe, the migrant flows created by the political upheavals in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the recent refugee influx from Asian and North African countries. This chapter provides empirical insight into the prevailing situation of temporary migration between Greece and Asian countries. The aim is to present an analysis of the politico-legal, socio-economic and sociocultural aspects of this migration process.[1]

In our analysis, we consider Greece not only as a country receiving immigrants but also as a transit country for migrants en route to other EU countries from Asia and as a country sending immigrants. The case of Greece is especially interesting because of (a) the effects of the economic and political crisis on immigrants' present and future and (b) the status of the country as a transit point permitting immigrants' and refugees' passage to other countries of the European Union regarded as final destinations. We argue that in a country where the labour market lacks permanent employment opportunities and where there are rapid political changes, the integration of immigrants into a state of temporariness reaches extremes. In other words, the lack of permanent employment and the constantly changing legal framework

[1] The only available study along similar lines is that by Tonchev (2007). Tonchev's research was conducted in 2006. Although only a decade has passed, the socio-political and economic changes in Greece have been tremendous.

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regarding the status of immigrants and refugees[2] turns temporariness into a permanent condition.[3] This is a dynamic transnational process influencing the present lives and the future plans of natives, long-term migrants, temporary migrants and refugees. We call this process "integration to temporariness".

7.1 Migration Processes

The current population of Greece is the result of massive population movements that took place during the twentieth century. The compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey (1923), the voluntary exchange of populations between Greece and Bulgaria (1919), the genocide of the Jews of Greece (1943–1944) and the forced migration of Greek communists to socialist countries after their defeat in the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) resulted in a post-WWII society which considered itself nationally, ethnically, linguistically and religiously homogenous. During the 1950s, 1960s and until the mid-1970s, Greece, alongside other southern European societies, provided a workforce for Western European and Northern American economies. Soon after this period, Greece became a country that attracted immigrants. Based on the estimate of the League of the Greek Industries, some 20,000 foreign workers arrived in Greece in the mid-1970s, mostly from Middle Eastern countries. In addition, some 12,000 Muslim Palestinians and Lebanese of bourgeois background migrated to Greece seeking refuge from the wars in the Middle East. It is worth noting that the above populations settled in specific areas of Athens. This restricted their visibility in Greek society.

The political changes in Eastern Europe and the Middle East during the 1990s turned Greece into both a destination and a transit country. The first immigrants were seasonal workers from Bulgaria and Poland engaging in agricultural production and the tourist industry. During the 1990s and 2000s, large numbers of Albanian nationals, some of whom were ethnic Greeks, Bulgarians, Romanians and Greek repatriates from the former USSR, settled in Greece (Baldwin-Edwards 2008; Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2012; Labrianidis and Lyberaki 2001). It should be noted that the Greek economy experienced rapid development in the period between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. This served both to attract immigrants (Kasimis 2008) and to provide the financial background for upper middle-class Greeks to undertake postgraduate studies and employment in other EU countries (Labrianidis 2011).

The migratory situation has changed radically since the early 2000s (Papataxiarhis 2006; Trubeta 2012), and one of the main migration routes to Europe goes through Greece. This has resulted in the creation of immigrant communities in the main urban centres and smaller immigrant communities in the countryside (Dimitriadi 2013).

[2] Changes in the legal framework have been evident in both the national and the international context. The government elected in January 2015 passed a new citizenship law, making it easier for immigrants to obtain Greek citizenship. The legal requirements for immigrants and asylum seekers wishing to move from Greece to other EU countries have been restricted since March 2016.

[3] See also Graziano's similar argument in the context of the Philippines (2016).

These communities are more visible compared to those of the immigrants who settled in Greece in the 1970s. The largest of such communities are composed of Kurds, Iraqis, Somalis, Chinese, Filipinos, Sudanese and Afghanis and recently Syrians.

The present-day immigrant population accounts for almost 10 % of the total population of Greece. Based on their integration into Greek society, we can categorise foreign newcomers into two different groups: (a) immigrants coming from the Balkans and other former socialist countries of Eastern Europe (Albanians, Bulgarians, Poles, Romanians, ethnic Greeks repatriates from the former USSR) and (b) immigrants coming from the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asian societies (Agelopoulos 2013). The former are well integrated into Greek society and economy. Immigrants from Albania who settled in Greece in the 1990s to early 2000s are considered to be the most "successful" example of social, cultural and political integration into Greek society (Christopoulos 2004). Their "success" is attributed to cultural similarities with the Greeks, their entrepreneurial patterns, their favourable legal status[4] and their deliberate and conscious attempt to assimilate (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, op.cit; Papataxiarchis, op.cit). By contrast, immigrants coming from Asia, North Africa and the Middle East face significant legal problems and sociocultural barriers (Baldwin-Edwards 2008; Ventoura 2011).

From the point of view of the host society, a number of phenomena emerging in the late 1990s and the early 2000s are relevant in understanding the present-day context. For example, the rise of xenophobia as well as solidarity with immigrants escalated during that period (Christopoulos 2004). The institutional challenges for the Greek state posed by the arrival of immigrants in the last two decades continue to be an issue in political debates. From the point of view of immigrant communities, the limited integration of newcomers from Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries has had negative effects for their conationals arriving in the last few years.

The situation described above has dramatically changed during the last 5 years as a result of the economic crisis in Greece and the political instability in Libya, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. The socio-economic crisis in Greece has had important consequences for both incoming and outbound migration (Christopoulos 2013). In the last 10 years, more than 200,000 Greeks have migrated to other EU countries, the USA, Canada and the Gulf States. Most of them are highly skilled professionals and university graduates (Labrianidis 2011). Furthermore, the lack of jobs in Greece prevents incoming migrants from settling permanently in the country. The large numbers of refugees landing on the Greek islands are desperately looking for ways to continue their journey towards Germany and the Scandinavian countries. Some of them have discovered that there is no way onwards from Greece and have eventually settled down in the refugee camps established by the Greek state (Cabot 2016; Papataxiarchis 2016). The closing of borders to refugees has been definitive since late March 2016. This all started when the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary) closed their borders to exclude refugees in February 2016. Gradually Austria, Serbia and the FYR Macedonia followed suit by closing

[4] Many Albanian nationals who migrated to Greece during that time took advantage of the legal framework applied to repatriates living outside the country (Tsitselikis 2014).

Table 7.1 Countries of origin of immigrants settled in Greece during the last 5 years before the 2011 Census

Nationality	Percentage
Albania	31,90
Bulgaria	13,10
Rumania	7,60
Pakistan	7,50
Georgia	3,50
Cyprus	3,10
Afghanistan	2,70
UK	2,60
Bangladesh	2,50
Germany	1,70
Egypt	1,60
India	1,60
Russian Federation	1,40
Poland	1,10
Philippines	1,10
Syria	1
USA	0,90
Other countries	15,10

Source: Hellenic Republic/Hellenic Statistical Authority, September 2014

their borders. Greece and Portugal remained the only southern European countries with open borders for refugees. In July 2016, almost 55,000 refugees lived in Greece (UNHCR 2016). All of them perceived their sojourn in Greece as temporary and lived their everyday lives on the basis of their future plans to migrate to other EU countries (Table 7.1).

The increased number of immigrants and refugees has created many challenges for the Greek state (Christopoulos 2013; HLHR 2012; Papastergiou and Takou 2013; Tsitselikis 2014). According to Tsitselikis (2014: 153), "The political and socio-economic crisis foster anti-migrants feelings though mainstream public discourse that eased the adoption of a series of measures, at the borders or in the country. Undocumented migrants and asylum seekers became a target for xenophobic hysteria that eased the adoption of regulations and the implementation of special measures". Inside Greek society, two very distinctive trends evolve: on the one hand, a xenophobic reaction to the presence of immigrants and refugees led primarily by the neo-Nazi party known as Golden Dawn and, on the other, a positive empathy for refugees dominant during the last 2 years among the majority of Greeks (Agelopoulos 2015; Papataxiarchis 2016). The interaction between these two trends will be further elaborated in this chapter.

7.2 Data Collection

During our research, we decided to look for informants in different settings in two main Greek cities, Athens and Thessaloniki. Most temporary immigrants live, at least for some time, in these two cities. We were looking for respondents living in Greece for at least 3 months and up to 5 years. The snowball technique was employed to find informants for the study. Our initial intention was to conduct semi-structured interviews with the respondents based on a long list of topics related to their migratory experiences, but, eventually, most sessions were based on collecting information from both interviews and ethnographic observations (Table 7.2).

Many of the interviewees could be allocated to more than one of the above categories. A large number of the temporary migrants we interviewed can be classified as irregular and/or undocumented migrants. As Tsitselikis (2014) and Takis (2014) explain, this category is a rather dynamic one. This means that, in the case of Greece, the same individual may experience repeated changes in his or her legal status. For example, a third-country national may enter the country holding a student visa. When this visa expires, he/she may live as an irregular migrant for a few months and may later apply for a work permit.

Most discussions were conducted in English, some in Greek and some (mainly those which took place in the detention centre) with the help of a native speaker acting as an interpreter. We met our informants on a one-to-one basis or in pairs. In some demanding contexts, two of the researchers attended the meeting with the informants. This was, for example, the case with interviews conducted inside a police detention centre. The usual venues for the interviews were the workplaces of the interviewees, churches or coffee shops; a few took place in the homes of the interviewees.

Table 7.2 Interviewees

Population category	Number of interviews
Immigration: students from Lebanon, Afghanistan and Pakistan	6 men
Immigration: family-based movers	2 men
Immigration due to humanitarian reasons [asylum seekers and others] from Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran and the Philippines	17 men and 1 woman
Immigration: irregular from the Philippines, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Pakistan and India	37 men
Immigration: highly skilled from Turkey	1 man
Immigration: businessmen and entrepreneurs	0
Immigration: low-skilled visa holders from the Philippines, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Lebanon and China	5 women and 7 men
Emigration: returnee migrants from Asia	2 men
Emigration: family members of migrants	1 woman and 1 man

Some of the interviews with irregular migrants took place inside a police detention centre in Thessaloniki where they were staying for a maximum of 3–5 days. During this period, the authorities examined their identity documents and offered them the opportunity to apply for asylum.[5] When they were released, they held different kinds of papers: some were provided with a temporary residence permit (the asylum seekers), and some were given a written order to leave the country within a certain period of time. Access to the detention centre was provided to us by special permission from the Greek Ministry of the Interior and Administrative Reconstruction. Given the ethical issues involved, conducting interviews in the police detention centre was not an easy decision for us. We were aware of the multiple perceptions of our presence by the immigrants. As those who participated in the interviews explained, some migrants were willing to talk to us, while others were hostile to the idea fearing that we would pass on information to the police. This was an insuperable obstacle under these circumstances. To facilitate the process, we conducted the interviews in a separate room with only our interpreter present. Carrying out these interviews inside the detention centre was the only way to contact the rapidly increasing number of irregular migrants who usually leave the country immediately after being released from detention centres.

Actually, one of the most revealing research sessions we conducted was with Farash, a 25-year-old ethnic Arab from Syria. He volunteered to help us with interpretation from Arabic to English during our conversations with other irregular migrants held at the detention centre. He was fluent in English, with a cosmopolitan understanding of the world and excellent communication skills. He had worked as a journalist in his own country and had been arrested for not having travel documents. When we first met him, he was to stay for three more days in the detention centre. After that period, the Greek police was obliged to release him and to provide him with a document ordering him to leave the country within 30 days. Just after one of the interviews we had with two informants from Iraq, we turned off the tape recorder, and Farash stayed with us in the room. The guards looked hastily behind the bars and immediately turned towards the other corridor. Farash took the initiative to comment on the interviews as follows:

> Anyway, everybody is going to stay here for a few days. Some of those staying in this detention center actually wish to remain for a few more days: there is food, there are beds and blankets... This place may be a useful stop on the way to Europe. Unfortunately, it seems that this is the rule for us: everything is for a few days. (Farash 1990, male, refugee, Syria)

It was difficult for us to believe that people may actually wish to "have a stop" at a detention centre. As we were told by some of our Syrian interviewees, such a stop meant for the irregular migrants of Syrian origin that they would be given the papers that would temporarily make their stay and movement on Greek territory legal. Moreover the important point in Farash' comments was his statement about temporality. Farash's remark regarding "the rule" of temporary migration summarises the

[5] Since the summer of 2015, irregular immigrants are no longer taken into custody in Greece. They remain in identification camps until they are issued with legal documents.

methodological difficulty of our research. With few exceptions, temporary migrants in Greece live everywhere, and this "everywhere" constantly changes. To put it simply, temporariness refers both to the time and the place of their staying in Greece. This is particularly evident in the case of irregular migrants and asylum seekers, the two categories of temporary migrants most often found in Greece. For them there are no border zones because, as Khosrav (2010) argues, they *are* the borders. In other words, the border becomes an everyday embodied reality of the immigrants in all their transactions with the host society and state.

7.3 Politico-Legal and Socio-economic Aspects of Migratory Experiences

The migration experiences of the various categories of temporary migrants varied significantly depending on their previous countries of residence, migration channels, motivation for migration and demographic factors. In order to overcome an essentialist approach establishing a direct relationship between "causes" and "effects" of migration, we focused on the migratory backgrounds and the migratory processes of our informants.

Financial needs were the main but not the only reasons for migrating to Greece. Until 2010 it was easy to find a low-skilled job in Greece. In addition, Greece acted as a transition country leading to the job markets of other EU countries. Some of our informants decided to come to Greece not only due to financial needs but also due to their perception of cultural proximity between Greeks and themselves. Others mentioned reasons related to the climate, family unification and geographic proximity. As they explained, information about "the Greeks", "Greek culture", "life in Greece" and the local job market was provided to them prior to their migration by other immigrants (mainly relatives and friends). Some of the respondents had migrated to Greece for educational reasons.

One could detect a point of differentiation regarding the migratory experiences. The point of differentiation was that in some cases the decision to emigrate was a forced choice due to war, while in other cases, it was a considered choice. In most cases, there was a clear preference among the interviewees to use Greece as a base from which to continue to other EU countries. Crossing by sea is more risky but also easier than crossing by land. This applies not only to refugees (and migrants) landing on the islands in the Aegean Sea but also to those landing on Lampedusa and Sicily and also on the southern shores of Andalusia. This point is an important one and partly explains the general patterns of the 2014–2015 refugee movements in the Mediterranean.

All our interviewees had experienced various hardships such as great adversity upon their arrival in Greece, difficulties with the state bureaucracy, and difficulties related to the lack of necessary support structures that one could find in other European countries. For example, most of them complained about the negative

attitudes of the Greek police towards immigrants and the long delays of the state bureaucracy in providing them with documents regulating their presence in the country. Similar hardships were reported by two migrants who came to Greece because they were entitled to subsidiary protection. The first one stated that the choice of Greece was incidental and that he regarded Greece as a transition country for future migration towards Western Europe. He expressed his disappointment with his situation in Greece. The second one indicated that he made the specific choice of coming to Greece on the basis of advice from friends.

Returnees – Greeks who returned to the country after migrating for a period to Asia – reported similar narratives. Both of these were men in their 30s and 40s, holding postgraduate degrees and having had highly skilled "white-collar" jobs in large multinational companies (construction and IT companies). They stated that their reasons for immigrating were linked to the needs and demands of their profession and focused on the positive effects of migration in their lives. They referred to the opportunity they had to experience new cultures and make a lot of friends in the countries they visited. They also stressed the importance of good integration in order make the most out of this experience. It is obvious that their temporary migration experience was influenced by their higher social status and high income. Their experiences reflected the everyday reality of international businessmen.

Asian immigrants holding a work visa in Greece also had a relatively positive status compared to the majority of temporary migrants. Their age varied from 20 to 55 years, while the most common age group was between 30 and 40 years. In terms of marital status, they were predominantly married with children. They all lived in rented accommodation, either with their families, with roommates or on their own. Although most of them had a university degree, they were employed as housemaids with an annual income estimated between 3,000 and 10,000 Euros. The fact that university graduates from Asian countries work as low-paid housemaid abroad is a phenomenon not only in Greece but also in the Middle East countries (Nadeau 2007). In social mobility research, this phenomenon is described as status inconsistency. It has to do with the local scarcity of skilled jobs for immigrants and the difficulty they face in finding better jobs in other countries.

> I have graduated from a college, trained as a nurse. After migrating for 3 years to Singapore, I decided to move to Europe. Given my age, it was not possible to get a job as a nurse in a clinic. Unemployment is not an option, I have to support my family back in the Philippines. Therefore, I decided to get involved in low-skilled work with a stable income. I take care of an elderly Greek couple. (Bianca 1970, female, low-skilled, Philippines)

One could detect three main motivations for choosing Greece, though unequal in frequency. In the majority of cases, the interviewees stated that they had left their home country in pursuit of a better life in economic terms. There were also those who wanted to escape from a situation of insecurity (war, ethnic or religious strife, political repression). Lastly, there were those who chose to migrate in order to be united with their families. The interviewees who discussed their decision to come to Greece in more detail revealed two divergent attitudes with regard to their general appreciation of the opportunities that Greece offers immigrants. On the one hand,

Table 7.3 Refugees arriving in Greece by country of origin (January–December 2015)

Country of origin	Percentage of arrivals
Syria	56.1
Afghanistan	24.4
Iraq	10.3
Pakistan	2.7
Somalia	0.5
Eritrea	0.1
Other	5.9
Total	100

Source: UNHCR, January 2016

we found those who expressed satisfaction with their economic situation in Greece. They were usually immigrants who took advantage of migrant networks. In other words, they had the support of kinship and/or ethnic groups from the very first day of their arrival in the country. Thus they managed, relatively easily, to gain access to employment. On the other hand, there were also those who expressed disappointment with their economic situation in Greece and the acute difficulties that they faced in their effort to survive. They were usually single men without the support of conationals and kin. They were the most "strangers among strangers" and remained unemployed for longer periods of time. Their present status and their future plans to migrate elsewhere established a context of constant *integration into temporariness*.

The majority of our interviewees were asylum seekers and irregular migrants. Actually, these two categories crosscut each other. The asylum seekers we met were aged between 23 and 42 years, single and with no children. Most of them lived in rented flats, while some were lodged with friends.[6] Their educational backgrounds were very diverse. They were usually unemployed but some worked as manual workers in part-time jobs. For those who were employed, their annual income varied from 3,000 to 9,600 Euros. These details are important in order to understand that migrants and refugees in Greece are facing major dilemmas regarding their future in Greece. The most often mentioned motivation for migration reported by them was "in search of a better life". Elaboration of this answer involved explanations of their need to escape from problematic and repressive political situations. Their decision to come to Greece was based on the fact that Greece is the first EU country accessible along their migration path (Table 7.3).

Many of the interviewees regarded Greece as a transition country in the context of plans for future migration westward. This trend has been reported in all studies on migration to Greece during the last decade (e.g. Cabot 2016; Kasimis 2008; Trubeta 2012; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010). The respondents often described the Greek state's bureaucracy as "lacking the necessary support for foreigners".

[6] Following the massive influx of refugees which started in July 2015, most asylum seekers in Greece ended up living in refugee camps. However, the situation was different at the time of our field research.

Almost half of them had had difficulties in maintaining frequent contact with their families back home. Such difficulties were due to their relatives' limited access to Internet. As they explained, war in Syria and Afghanistan limited communication channels. This created anxieties and a sense of insecurity. As one informant told us, "how is my family going to find out if something happens to me?" We should keep in mind that immigrants in this category face numerous adversities on the voyage to Greece. However, reporting such hardships was often accompanied by a "sentiment of freedom" and the opportunity of "getting to know new cultures and ways of life". It was evident that the satisfaction of these immigrants was expressed in relative terms and sometimes with the remark that the situation in Greece "did not meet their expectations, but still is better than the situation in the home country" (Fahir 1995, male, Syria) and previous transit countries. One should keep in mind that such comments may actually be related to the interview situation itself. Interviewees often just wanted to be polite.

Only one of our asylum-seeking informants stated that he had a sufficient knowledge of Greek history and civilisation to exhibit some kind of cultural proximity with the natives. Three of the informants stated that they had a little knowledge, mainly through every day conversations with friends. This knowledge made it easier for them to become familiar with everyday life patterns in Greece. It also allowed them to present themselves to the Greek authorities in a more positive way, which acts in their favour in the decision to grant asylum. Many of the migrants from the Middle East that we interviewed stressed the cultural similarities of everyday life between Greece and their home countries. However, with the above-mentioned exceptions, the rest were not informed about the Greek history.

The better-than-home feeling was also evident in the largest category of our informants, the irregular migrants. The interviews with people who had immigrated to Greece and still had irregular status accounted for almost half of all immigrants interviewed. Respondents in this category were predominantly single and without children (32 out of 37), and most of them were aged between 23 and 30. As to their living arrangements, most of them were in custody during the interviews (33 out of 37). Their educational background was fairly diverse, although the majority of them had graduated from high school. Almost all the interviewees reported that they were unemployed, only one as holding a part-time job and another working as a hairdresser. The vast majority declared no income at all. They explained to us that they had left their home countries in order to escape from a situation of insecurity. The second strong motivation was the search for a better life in economic terms. Almost half of the interviewees stated that their decision to come to Greece was deliberate and mainly the result of advice from friends and family. Among the latter, many expressed their disappointment on discovering the economic crisis in Greece. They came with expectations for a better situation but found themselves in a country suffering from severe unemployment.

Irrespective of their initial plans, the majority of the respondents clearly expressed the will to move to another European country, with Germany being the most frequent choice. Needless to say, this category of temporary migrants had experienced extreme hardships in their everyday lives. Their main concern was the prolongation

of a state of uncertainty caused by the inability to obtain the necessary documentation. This concern has been also widely reported in the relevant literature (Dimitriadi 2013; Khosrav 2010; Tonchev 2007; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010). On a more human level, the most serious consequence in the interviewees' life was being separated from their families. Many of them described the emotional cost of parents being separated from children and spouses living in different countries. The hardships and the tiresome experience due to their constant movement through various countries as well as their detention were also mentioned in our discussions as negative experiences.

7.4 Problems in Everyday Life and Their Cultural References

The Greek state has been rather reluctant to extend any kind of rights to migrants with the exception of those classified as repatriates (Ktistakis 2001; Tsitselikis 2014). The rights of immigrants are an important aspect of the political agenda due to the rise of nationalism in Greece, the activities of the extreme right-wing party Golden Dawn, the migration policies and the new citizenship regulation introduced by the left-wing government[7] (Christopoulos 2013; HLHR 2012; Papastergiou and Takou 2013). Most of the migrants we interviewed complained about the violation of their "dignity as human beings". Such complaints had multiple references. Some expressed fears regarding Golden Dawn members. One interviewee had experienced physical violence during a racist attack, and two migrants had had their money and papers stolen in a racist incident (Ahmed, Iraq, male, 1994). Others complained about the xenophobic attitudes of some Greek policemen.

It is important to note that since January 2015, immigrants holding a legal residence permit and refugees enjoy, but with some exceptions, the same rights as Greek citizens regarding health care, education and social security. However, given the crisis and the collapse of the welfare state in Greece, such rights are actually "rights to poverty". This is an important aspect influencing the living conditions of immigrants and refugees alongside with the indigenous population in Greece. The austerity policies introduced in 2010 have had drastic effects on unemployment, average income and the welfare state provisions offered by the state.[8] In 2014

[7] The government elected in January 2015 passed a new citizenship law, making it easier for immigrants to obtain Greek citizenship. The SYRIZA party in its electrical manifesto promised to grant citizenship to second-generation immigrants. The legislation was also supported by other smaller parties and passed with a majority of 172 votes in the 300-seat parliament. The law is expected to affect nearly 200,000 second-generation migrants including those whose parents arrived in the early 1990s during a mass exodus from Eastern Europe. See Agabani (2015) and http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/5395/

[8] According to Eurostat and OECD statistics, unemployment in Greece was 12% in 2010. By July 2013, unemployment had reached 29%, the highest of all EU countries. The GDP growth was −2.52% during the period 2012–2015. The net national income which was 25,109 USD per capita in 2009 dropped to 21,121 USD per capita in 2012.

Greece was among the group of countries with the highest poverty rates (23.1 %), ahead of Spain, Romania and Bulgaria, and also ranked fourth in the poverty gap index after Spain, Romania and Bulgaria. The Greek Parliamentary Budget Office 2014 report explained that approximately 2.5 million Greeks were living below the poverty line, while 3.8 million were at immediate risk of falling below the poverty line. These numbers refer to the total population of approximately 11 million inhabitants. Meanwhile, the actual working hours in Greece are the longest in the EU, and the welfare state provisions are limited. The lives of immigrants were negatively affected. Most of them lost access to the Greek national health-care service and sought help at the social clinics and social pharmacies operated free of charge by various groups of citizens and NGOs (Cabot 2016). It was only in July 2016 that full access to free medical treatment and medicines for the unemployed was reinstated.

It became apparent that, in addition to the above-mentioned structural context, irregular migrants, low-skilled workers and asylum seekers living temporarily in the country had experienced harsh difficulties because of their legal status, limited language skills and inability to establish social contacts outside their ethnic group. Only one out of four interviewees reported having access to regular health services. The situation was better among those residing legally in the country. Many of them expressed ignorance as to their capacity to benefit even from the limited state welfare services available. Some of the interviewees linked this ignorance to their lack of language skills and the absence of any provision to help them improve their Greek language skills.[9]

Complaints about "irrational bureaucracies" were common among all interviewees. All the irregular migrant interviewees complained about the harsh conditions when being smuggled into the country. Their perception of politico-legal rights was limited to the very basics of getting access to work permits and asylum application procedures. Only few of the respondents, mainly those holding a working visa, reported paying taxes. Those interviewed in the detention centre were rather reluctant to talk about politics and their rights. In all cases, the informants described the difficulties and the adversities that they endured in the context of the official structures (reception centres, police and bureaucracy). The Greek governments of the June 2012–January 2015 period applied policies "to prevent illegal immigrants entering the country" (Monastiriotis 2012). Among these were the erection of a fence along the Greek – Turkish land border, the construction of closed detention camps for irregular migrants and a "zero tolerance policy" towards illegal immigrants applied by security forces.[10] By contrast, the reception and the attitude of the local population were considered warm and supportive. Many stated that Greeks have "accepted them as they are", in other words they have not experienced much

[9] The only available language courses for immigrants in Greece are organised by citizens' initiatives (Cabot 2016).

[10] Numerous criticisms of Greek government policies at that time have been published in the international media. See, for example, the August 2012 L.S.E. EUROPOPP issue (http://bit.ly/MONQlC).

discrimination at the hand of residents. As mentioned above, despite the existence of Golden Dawn, the majority of Greeks have positive empathy for refugees landing on the Greek islands.[11]

A limited number of temporary migrants expressed interest in the political situation in Greece and very few expressed interest in developing any sort of political involvement in trade unions. Those who actually had such an interest were related to well-established immigrant groups such as the Social Centre/Immigrants Place in Thessaloniki.[12] Their political interest focused mainly on the rights of migrants. Political engagement was more frequent among some left-wing migrants from Iran and Kurds from Iraq and Syria who had previously been politically active in their home country.

The majority of all respondents were unemployed or working in low-skilled and poorly paid precarious jobs. They were constantly changing jobs and regions in order to secure employment in the tourist and/or the agricultural sector. Due to the lack of opportunities and job offers, their employment was mostly occasional or casual. The type of manual work that they found did not meet their expectations and did not permit them to exercise their skills. The seasonal workers and those who stayed in Greece in a transit process were willing to take any job, usually on an illegal and unsecured basis. The income they received was used for the continuation of their trip.

The asylum seekers did not have enough money to send remittances home although they may have had relatives in need. Their transnational networks did not have enough capital and lacked the necessary legal documents to engage in enterprises or transfer goods. Female migrants from the Philippines were engaged in domestic servant jobs. Among the obstacles to securing regular employment were their legal status, limited knowledge of Greek but mainly the high unemployment rates in the country. In our interviews we came across the acute awareness of economic insecurity and despair experienced by the vast majority of the interviewees. For most of them there was no hope of sending any sort of financial aid to their families. Those who managed to send remittances stated that they were occasional and probably "insufficient" because they were unable to send more.

Among the most difficult things to discuss with our informants were issues pertaining to the impact of immigration on family and social relations and their general attitudes to life. These issues touched upon everyday practices and the ideological interaction between the various migrant categories, between immigrants and Greeks and between immigrants and the Greek state. In addition, these issues reflected the migrants' perceptions and understandings of global processes. To start with, the integration of temporary migrants coming from Asia to Greece appeared to be rather

[11] This attitude can be explained taking into consideration a number of factors, such as the activist know-how developed against economic austerity since 2010, the segmentary politics which constitute a structural element of modern Greek society (Papataxiarchis 2016) and the positive perceptions of refugees that were historically established in Greece since the early twentieth century. For a detailed analysis see Agelopoulos (2015).

[12] See http://socialcenter.espivblogs.net

questionable. As already explained, this tendency contradicts the experience of immigrants coming from Albania, Bulgaria and Romania who settled in the country during the 1990s and 2000s (see Baldwin-Edwards 2008; Dimitriadi 2013; Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2012; Labrianidis and Lyberaki 2001; Papataxiarhis 2006; Trubeta 2012). In order to understand the different degree of integration, we should take into consideration a number of factors: the economic crisis in Greece as presented above, the xenophobic attitudes among Greek supporters of Golden Dawn, the xenophobic discourse predominating in most TV channels (Bona 2016), the positive attitudes towards refugees among the majority of Greeks, the legal restrictions imposed by the state, the limited period immigrants stay in Greece (specially the asylum seekers), the lack of employment and the inadequate strategies employed by EU to integrate immigrants (Dimitriadi 2013; Trubeta 2012).

Integration into Greek society is related to immigrants' relationships with the native population, their conationals and other migrants. Most of the temporary migrants we talked with were not interested in learning Greek. This was because they were planning to move to another EU country. They learned just the very rudiments in order to cope with everyday needs (communication with authorities, buying food and tickets, finding a job). Their contacts with the local society were limited to employment networks and the volunteers of social and solidarity economy institutions (social clinics, legal advice groups, etc.). Most of the interviewed migrants limited their relationships to conationals. Although limited, their relationships with the natives were highly valued and were often expressed. "I have many Greek friends", Hakim (1994, male, Libya) pointed out. Some of the respondents had attempted to establish friendships with immigrants who had been living for a long time in Greece, such as Bulgarians and Albanians. Social relations with their relatives back home or in transnational networks were the most significant for them. Many interviewees expressed a significant amount of nostalgia for their lives in their home countries and pointed out that the distance separating them from their families caused psychological pressure on them and their kin. All maintained their transnational connections using technology. Most were in contact on a daily basis, using Skype, Facebook, WhatsApp, Facetime, Voice Over and various Google applications.

It is interesting to note that very few of our interviewees raised the issue of cultural coexistence even though we encouraged them to discuss it. Most of them came from ethnically mixed societies and already had the necessary skills to understand cultural coexistence. Students, highly skilled migrants, returnees and those holding a work permit took a more cosmopolitan and positive view of their migratory experience. They often expressed a general satisfaction and "preference for the different way of life". This contributed to establishing long-standing cross-national networks with conationals, other immigrants and Greeks. Such relationships were usually established in the context of neighbourhoods and workplaces.

However, respondents often stressed the difficulties of integrating into Greek society. Most of them reported experiencing some kind of discrimination at some point. Three had experienced physical harassment by some police officers and/or civilians (the identity of the assailants was not always clear to them). The respondents

typically referred to an acute sense of alienation and loneliness, intensified by the distance separating them from their families. Struggling to meet their everyday needs, they encountered many difficulties to adjust to the new social context, which they often characterised as "complex and constantly changing". Nicole (1995, female, low-skilled migrant, Philippines) pointed out that "the immigration policy of the government is always changing in Greece". Sohail (1997, male, irregular migrant, Afghanistan) stressed that after 9 months in Greece he was unable to understand the bureaucratic process necessary to obtain a legal residence status. It was among these categories of temporary migrants that we came across incidents of discrimination, racism or intense suspicion. However, as explained earlier, almost all of our informants mentioned the sense of freedom they enjoyed in Greece in comparison to the situation in their home countries. One pointed out that the sense of freedom goes hand in hand with the feeling of being a foreigner.

7.5 Where Is the Home?

Most of the informants argued that their experiences of migration have had a tremendous effect on their views about their home country. Some pointed out that they felt more able to contribute to their home countries as persons who "have travelled around the world". The interviewees indicated that the experiences of immigration had made them stronger by confronting life's difficult experiences and situations. In this respect, one could detect that the most important ideas shaping their attitude is hope and the struggle for economic security and survival. However, the perceptions of the future varied. We can classify these perceptions into three categories: (a) pessimism expressed as realism ("I will always be a low-paid migrant", "There is no place like home"), (b) optimism related to their past ("It will always be better as long as I am outside Syria", "There is no home any more") and (c) limited optimism in relation to religious faith ("I don't know, these are God's things"). In some cases, we came across all three of these perceptions in one interview. Similar to the argument raised by Castles (2010), the immigrants' perceptions of the future determine their understanding of home. For our informants there was always a "home" with references to their village or city of origin. In some cases, the original home was acknowledged as permanently destroyed ("There is no home any more").

However, the possibility of multiple homes was also mentioned. This often referred to places where one can find a permanent job and live a secure life. For most of the informants, the border was not a static and permanent point. As Khosrav (2010) reports, migrants may have a constant feeling of crossing a vast frontier zone based on a short "law trap". Our interviewees perceived certain provisions of the national and the EU legislation as directly influencing both the present and the future, both the transit temporary European space and the permanent home.[13] This was made clear to us at the very end of our research.

[13] For a detailed analysis, see HLoHR (2012) and Tsitselikis (2014). The most recent and rather paradigmatic example of such EU regulations is the agreement between EU and Turkey of 8 March

The "law trap" became more visible during early summer 2015, when we encountered the extreme increase of refugees coming from the Turkish coast to the Greek islands. The information received from these refugees clearly predicted at further increase in immigration. Refugees were raising their voice, explaining that the conditions in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya would force hundreds of thousands of people to migrate. It all sounded like an exaggeration in May 2015. But these refugees pointed out that the national and supranational (EU, international) legal framework regarding migration needs to be revised in order to cope with the radically new conditions. They argued that complementary policies regarding cultural understanding, social cohesion, pension transferability, migrant employment policies and remittances need to be revised given the increase in temporary migration. Such claims highlighted the constantly and permanently temporary aspect of the immigrants' imagination.

7.6 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter we have considered Greece as a country sending migrants, a country of temporary immigration and a transit country for those en route from Asia and Africa to other EU member states. The literature on migration has paid little attention to temporary migration processes,[14] and the issues of long-term intergenerational assimilation and integration are considered to be more important for the receiving societies (Alba and Nee 2003; Brubaker 2001; Castles 2010). However, our research indicates that temporary migration has significant effects even in what are perceived as permanent structures of receiving societies. For example, the fact that most of temporary migrants engage in low-paid jobs produces permanent effects on the class structure of Greek society and the outcomes of the Greek economy. In a country where the labour market lacks jobs for permanent employment and political changes are rapidly taking place, the integration of immigrants into temporariness reaches extremes. This creates dynamic processes involving sociopolitical, economic and cultural factors influencing the lives of natives, long-term migrants, temporary migrants and refugees. This form of temporariness is transnational, involving the past, present and future life scenarios of migrants in multiple places.

From a theoretical point of view, it is a call to revise the understanding of temporariness as a contradicting process to assimilation and integration (Ventoura 2011). Present-day immigrants are constantly integrated into temporariness alongside the societies sending and receiving them. What is evident from the analysis above is

2016. According to this agreement, Greece is allowed to return to Turkey all new irregular migrants arriving to the Greek islands after March 20. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1444_en.htm

[14] Most of the studies examining temporary migration focus on the issue of mobility (Cresswell 2006; Hannam et al. 2006; Salazar 2011; Schiller 2012).

that this temporariness produces new problems and reproduces already existing difficulties both for the immigrants and the host societies. Migration policies should target the establishment of a framework allowing migrants, host societies and states to generate long-term future plans. This applies to visas, work permit regulations, social security and educational provisions as well as political rights.

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Chapter 8
The Diversity of Temporary Migration in the Case of a Transit Country: Experiences from the Asian-Hungarian Transnational Space

Ágnes Hárs

8.1 Introduction

In Hungary migration, and particularly temporary migration, became an issue following the Communist regime's four decades of controlled borders and limited transnational mobility. The late 1980s and early 1990s marked a turning point: the previously closed borders of ex-communist Central and Eastern Europe were opened, and, among other countries, Hungary faced increasing inflows of foreign citizens. The first waves came from countries adjacent to Hungary where, for historical reasons, considerable ethnic Hungarian populations lived within a short distance of Hungary.[1] Brubaker (1998) has singled out ethnic Hungarians as a unique source of migration on account of their sheer numbers and the important mix of labour migration, where ethnicity plays a crucial role in engendering, patterning and regulating the immigration flows.

The history of Asian migration goes back to the same period, with new immigrant groups arriving from the Southeast Asian regions (Nyíri 2007; Szymanska-Matusiewicz 2014). Chinese immigration represented the first and largest influx to form a permanent Chinese community in the country. For them, Hungary was an attractive destination with a newly transformed free market economy, forecasts of rapid economic development and, above all, a recently signed treaty abolishing the

[1] As a result of the peace treaty concluding World War I, the population and territory of Hungary changed considerably and assumed its present form in 1920. A significant Hungarian minority remained in the territories assigned by the peace treaty to the neighbouring states (half of them to Romania, 27% to Slovakia, 13% to Serbia, 5.5% to Ukraine and the rest to Croatia, Slovenia and Austria, according to the census of 1910). Following the new status quo, various population movements occurred, but the situation remained essentially unchanged.

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visa requirement for Chinese citizens (Nyíri 2005, 2010). The sizeable Chinese immigration was later followed by an influx of Vietnamese (Várhalmi 2010, 2013). In accordance with other transnational social spaces (Faist 2000, 2006), the Chinese and later on the Vietnamese diasporic communities have coexisted with intense circular mobility and strong transnational networks among migrants and family members "left behind" (also Nyíri 2005, 2007, 2010; Várhalmi 2010).

Migration characteristics and their temporary nature have been largely influenced by policy frameworks. The vital and flourishing period of early Chinese migration remained short. Strict and prohibitive regulations soon followed in line with Hungary's generally restrictive immigration policy (Nyíri 2010), while the policy showed a distinct preference towards ethnic Hungarians (Fox 2007; Hárs et al. 2009). Visa requirements for Chinese citizens were reintroduced in the early 1990s. This brought the dynamic increasing in Chinese immigration to a halt (Nyíri 2005). Nonetheless, the Chinese and later-arriving Vietnamese communities survived; and their circular and transnational characteristics remained unchanged (Nyíri 2005, 2010; Várhalmi 2010, 2013).

8.1.1 EU Membership and the Next Wave of Migration Inflow

The next turning point occurred when Hungary joined the European Union on 1 May 2004. EU membership and becoming part of the Schengen region have determined Hungarian migration in the past decade (Hárs et al. 2009). Freedom of mobility meant a favoured position for those coming from inside the EU, while the entry from outside the EU remained strictly controlled. Economic and political differences along with regulations and existing networks have defined mobility inside and towards the EU in terms of direction and intensity (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010; Massey et al. 1993). As a new EU member state, Hungary has become a country on the front line of the Schengen area. This position has made the country attractive to non-EU citizens seeking to enter the EU for economic reasons, for those wanting to study in Europe and for irregular migrants and asylum seekers. According to the residence permit data, in 2005, a prompt rise emerged in the numbers of Asian migrants, particularly those coming from China and Vietnam but also from other Southeast Asian countries. This surge gradually abated to become a steady immigration flow. There has also been a sizeable inflow from Middle Eastern countries including Israel and Turkey (HCSO 2013).

The regulations of the European Union enable free mobility, employment and residence both for EU citizens and for others enjoying the same privileges. The latter consists primarily of permanent non-EU citizens holding long-term resident permits, their family members and others with special permission to sojourn. For Hungary, this raised concerns about adjusting the kin-state preference for those from outside the region (Tóth 2010). Since 2010, the preferences of Hungarian migration policy have transformed into decidedly restrictive alien policy regulations regarding third-country nationals, whereas preference has been shown to ethnic Hungarians in terms of a kin-state and diaspora policy (Tóth and Sik 2014).

8.1.2 Migration Policy Preferences and Influence

The overwhelming majority of migrants have come from the adjacent countries' ethnic Hungarian pool (on account of the aforementioned history), while Asia has turned out to be the most important source region for non-European migrants (Hárs et al. 2001; Hárs and Sik 2009). Although the number of immigrants has gradually increased, their share of the whole population has remained fairly low. The total immigrant population (i.e. foreign nationals) in 2011 was about 1.5% of the total population (Hungarian Central Statistics Office 2011).

The limited extent of non-European migration reflects Hungarian migration policy, which has influenced the temporary patterns of transnational migration. Although empirical experiences substantiate both target and transit migration in Hungary, the policy approach refers persistently to the transit character of the country (Tóth 2010, 2013). In particular, the patterns of humanitarian and irregular migration have been regarded as transit migration, which in turn has determined the policy approach. This perception is characteristic of Hungarian migration policy in general. As a result, the immigration policy is in principle defensive or even hesitant towards various groups of temporary third-country nationals.[2]

In the case of economic migrants, the preconditions for immigration are strict (e.g. with income levels determining if one is self-sufficient, with accommodation and with health care). The bureaucratic procedures for obtaining a residence permit are complicated and time-consuming (Tóth 2013). Foreign students attending university courses have to pay tuition fees, and the residence permits for purposes of study expire with the last semester. Graduates must leave the country promptly, but they may apply for a new permit through the relevant bureaucratic procedure if they wish to work in Hungary (Ács 2010; Zámbó 2012). Further, the state budget has provided only little financial or housing support for asylum seekers, in line with the basic principle and perception that their presence is undesirable and represents a danger. A high percentage of asylum seekers have been detained along with foreign arrivals who have crossed the borders irregularly, a practice which has been repeatedly criticised by NGOs and international bodies. The motivation was to deter asylum seekers from coming to Hungary. Overall, both the Hungarian asylum and migration policies are rather xenophobic as they both demonstrate a clear preference for migrants not to cause any burden or to leave the country (Tóth 2013).

There have been no recruitment programmes for foreign labour in Hungary (except for the sizeable pool of ethnic Hungarians from the adjacent countries); neither have Asian economic migrants, such as highly and low-skilled workers and entrepreneurs, experienced any preferential treatment or recruitment for economic gain. This is also the case for international students who reside temporarily for the duration of their studies but experience no policy-driven incentives to remain as highly qualified graduates. Regarding humanitarian migrants, lack of sufficient care,

[2] This is regulated by foreign policy and the immigration legislation. Migration strategy was first conceptualised in 2013.

intended to keep their numbers as low as possible, has resulted in a practice of detaining asylum seekers together with irregular migrants.

Overall, the general message of Hungarian migration policy is typified by a neglect or at least profound ignorance of third-country nationals – including various types of Asian migrants. The failing selectivity policy, in addition to the lack of support and personal treatment, has encouraged the temporary character of migration, influencing immigrants' decisions to leave the country even in cases where they were originally inclined to stay. Migration between Asia and Hungary has remained a spontaneous phenomenon and has not been encouraged. In the following sections, temporary migration is considered in this aforementioned context and understood in a relatively loose way. We consider migration as temporary if the migrant person intends to leave the country either to return home, move to a third country or envisage transnational back and forth mobility between the home and the destination country. In this sense, Hungary can be characterised as a transit country for temporary migrants, although there is evidence of diversity in temporary mobility.

The rest of the chapter will be organised as follows: Sect. 8.2 will discuss the methodology and data, while the following sections will analyse the evidence uncovered. Section 8.3 presents a discussion of the diversity in terms of temporariness, and Sect. 8.4 concerns the official issues and access to public services. Section 8.5 analyses the economic status and social position of temporary migrants, and Sect. 8.6 discusses the possibilities of integration into a transit country. Finally, the chapter will conclude that, according to the interview evidences, while Hungary has proven attractive to various Asian migrant groups, their everyday life is difficult due to the lack of a welcoming policy towards migrants, in line with expectations that migrants will only stay temporarily.

8.2 Data Collection

The empirical study was based on a series of semi-structured interviews. To cover most of the relevant groups of temporary migrants, the selection followed a rigorous structural design based upon the purposes of migration and the relevant countries of departure as identified in the literature and statistics (Hárs and Tóth 2010; HCSO 2013; Kováts 2013). The geographical location was not relevant, since in Hungary the overwhelming majority of migrants are concentrated in the capital city and its surroundings.[3]

The interviews focused on the characteristics of temporariness compared to the policy preference towards migration in Hungary. All were face-to-face interviews carried out between December 2014 and June 2015. To overcome language barriers,

[3] According to the census of 2011, 85% of Southeast Asian citizens were living in Budapest or its surroundings and 77% in Budapest. The share is slightly lower for migrants from the Middle East.

the interviews were conducted in six languages.[4] In order to facilitate communication, the use of interpreters was avoided except in few cases of irregular migrants. The most important reasons for temporary migration proved to be economic (highly and low-qualified workers, entrepreneurs) and studies (international students). Family reunification was also an important motivational factor. The transitory characteristics of irregular and humanitarian migrations were followed with particular interest. In addition, a few Hungarian returnees were interviewed.

About 60% of all interviewees were men. Male respondents were more common than women entrepreneurs or irregular/humanitarian migrants (in fact the latter group consisted exclusively of men). Women were more likely to be family movers, while both men and women were represented among highly and low-qualified employees and students. As for age characteristics, the migrants interviewed were not particularly young; on average, they were in their mid-30s. However, students and humanitarian migrants tended to be younger. Differences also appeared in terms of the region of origin. Reflecting the previously described characteristics, many interviewees came from China and Vietnam. All in all, the majority of Asian migrants had moved from Southeast and Central Asian countries, and most of the returnees were also from the same regions. However, the share of Middle Eastern and Arabic countries was also significant.[5] The selection of the respondents is summarised in Table 8.1.

8.3 Migration Processes

The general finding of the interviews was that migrants were mobile in their expectations and that they had no definite plans regarding their future decisions. For most of the respondents, Hungary had not been any planned migration target but had mostly been a matter of chance. Some migrants had oriented through web pages or advertisements or were channelled through international institutions (e.g. students), but transnational networks proved to be essential for many in deciding on the place of residence. The established Chinese and Vietnamese communities in Hungary provided particularly strong networks, although temporariness and vague expectations were present in these cases, too. Permanent transnational connections between the home and destination countries had encouraged various transnational migration patterns, and there were no clear distinctions between temporary, circular and permanent migration. As Örkény (2011) states, the Chinese and Vietnamese migrants

[4] The languages used in the interviews were English (32), Chinese (12), Vietnamese (9), Turkish (4), Japanese (4) and Urdu (1 – with an interpreter), while 18 were held in Hungarian. Whenever possible, interviews were conducted in the original language of the interviewee. Chinese was used by Chinese-speaking Hungarians.

[5] Due to the relevance of temporary migration, Israel and Turkey have been included as intermediate countries between Asia and Europe.

Table 8.1 Selection of respondents

	Entrepreneurs	Highly skilled	Low skilled	Students	Family	Irregular	Humanitarian	Total
Total	16	18	10	18	5	5	8	80
of which								
Male	14	9	5	8	–	5	8	49
Female	2	9	5	10	5	–	–	31
Countries of origin								
China	3	5	4	4	1	2		19
Vietnam	2		3	6		1		12
India	1	4	1		1	1		8
Japan		2		2	1			5
Korea		1						1
Taiwan		1						1
Philippines	1				1			2
Malaysia				1				1
Indonesia				1				1
Sri Lanka	1							1
Uzbekistan	1							1
Kazakhstan		1						1
Turkey	3		2	1				6
Israel	1	2						3
Iraq						1		1
Iran	1						1	2
Afghanistan							5	5
Pakistan				1	1		2	4
Hungarian repatriates returned from								
Korea		1						1
China	2			1				3
Indonesia				1				1
Israel		1						1

are not simply embedded in the receiving country but move constantly between the country of origin and destination. This vital physical mobility turns out to be part of the global system, fuelled by economic, financial and personal networks.

8.3.1 Economic Migrants

The main reason for migration was economic mobility. Although Hungary did not prove to be a "dreamland" for most of the migrants, it was still a place to find a job somewhere in Europe. In this sense, most of the migrants interviewed only expected to stay temporarily, hoping to spend some time in Hungary and then take off again for more preferred destinations.

Highly skilled temporary migrants formed a distinguished and elite group. They were mostly managers of multinational companies or professors and teachers who had been invited by academic institutions, universities or special schools. They intended to stay temporarily for a particular assignment. Most of them were Indians or Chinese. The transnational migration of managers or high-ranking experts was mainly intercompany mobility. They were posted or transferred to Hungary for a fixed term to accomplish a given task by order of the parent company. Staying in the destination country was not a real choice for them, although their preferences were taken into consideration. Nevertheless, after spending some time in Hungary, they mostly appreciated "the possibility of living in a relaxed European destination".

> They said that there is an opportunity, and that I have been selected..... And it's the first time I am working from Europe, even though I have been to Amsterdam and other places, short trips...And it was a good opportunity. That's the reason I picked it up. (Padam 1964, male, highly skilled, India)

While posted employees were subject to the company's orders and had to return home after completing their tasks, the migratory history of other highly skilled migrants could involve long experience of cross-border movements in Asia or Europe. Many of them had not definite plans either to sojourn in Hungary or to move back to Asia. When asked about the temporary nature of their lives, most highly educated interviewees said that temporariness was both challenging and rewarding, as it increased their professional prospects. Most of them, however, mentioned repeatedly that they were tired of the present way of life and hoped to settle down soon. Their plans were eventually to go back to Asia, but probably not to the original home country. These findings correspond with evidences of increasing migration inside Asia, particularly in the Southeast Asian region (Chan 2014). The interviewees' short-term plans were diverse, and their decisions largely depended on the existing possibilities. Expectations also depended on the individual's stage in the migration cycle. While some respondents had short migration histories and appreciated the future challenges and adventures, those with long migration histories were tired of the mobile life.

Among the temporary migrants interviewed, there were low-skilled Asians who had moved to work in Hungary. The common labour market of the European Union, in addition to the regulated work conditions and working time, eventually proved to be an attraction for various Asian low-skilled migrants. According to the interviewees, the preferred destinations were Germany or the Scandinavian countries. As the following quotation shows, for these migrants, Hungary was often the second best EU destination.

> I was looking around where to go in Europe. I came [up with] Germany. Unfortunately, it did not work. A friend suggested […] looking around in Hungary. A Turkish restaurant was looking for master baker. […] Well, I thought that job must be much easier and more comfortable in Hungary [than] it was at home. (Cem, 1985, male, low-skilled, Turkey)

The Chinese and Vietnamese migrants mostly found work through the transnational networks of their respective communities. They worked as shop assistants or in bars and fast-food restaurants. Migrants arriving without existing networks could find

low-skilled jobs in the Chinese Quarter of Budapest or in other shops. The interviewees revealed effective collaboration of families through networks to provide a supply of labour for their enterprises. Family members or acquaintances were invited from Asia to work in shops or enterprises run by their compatriots in Hungary.

> Actually, my aunt was here first. And when I was in 12th grade, she asked me if I wanted to come here with her. And I wanted to explore some new thing. So I decided to go. (Phuc 1991, male, low-skilled, Vietnam)

The possibility of setting up small businesses seemed to be the most suitable way for many Asians to make a living in a foreign country. For several entrepreneurs, the temporariness was a question of business success, which made their lives uncertain and transitory. The entrepreneurs from Asian countries mostly set up family businesses, small-scale shops, fast-food restaurants or coffee shops. These entrepreneurs often had backgrounds similar to those of the low-skilled workers. They had various links to Hungary like previous studies, family connections or friends. Remarkably, most of them had some networks in Europe, which was relevant in setting up businesses in Europe. The success depended on exploiting the accumulated business knowledge and expertise that opportunities in Hungary might offer. The expected profit of the investment was a clear motivation – as was the fact that Hungary is part of Europe. As the following interviewee argues, an additional plus factor was that Hungary is not a very expensive country.

> So I decided let's come back here, because the country is small, people are kind, climate is nice, it's not that expensive. I was thinking, ok, since I have lots of friends over here ... and I have 15 years of experience … maybe I can build a bridge between Hungary and Middle East countries.... (Jahan 1975, male, entrepreneur, Iran)

In other cases, the motivation for the investment was the advertised attractive investment environment offered to Asian entrepreneurs setting up businesses in Hungary, based on the efforts of Hungarian foreign trade policy.

> So I looked around for countries in Europe that had very attractive financial investment schemes, and surprisingly, Hungary was on top of the list. Your government was offering, you know, 100% foreign ownership of a local company and 10% corporate income tax rate. (Mark 1978, male, entrepreneur, Philippines)

Chinese and Vietnamese entrepreneurs typically maintained their businesses by making use of the vital and dense conational networks of families and acquaintances. Temporariness was partly characterised by the transnational lives of the actors. Children were left behind in China when starting the business. Some interviewees estimated that, later on, they might join their families, while others planned to return to Asia for a while. In practice, when businesses flourished in Hungary, many migrants continued to move back and forth between Hungary and Asia.

> I finished my BA and work now as entrepreneur in a family business with my older sister. I lived in Hungary in various periods...The first reason was to follow family. My parents were here, yeah, my whole family, my uncle and aunt. My parents came to Hungary first – but left after I came back to Hungary in recent years. (Dung 1990, female, entrepreneur, Vietnam)

8.3.2 Student Mobility

In the Hungarian case, foreign-language education (mostly in English) plays an increasing role in transnational migration. The relatively cheap tuition fees of these studies offered in foreign languages, as well as the geographical location of the country, made Hungary attractive for those Asian students who wished to enter the European Education Area. Asian students – or their parents – increasingly seek educational opportunities outside Asia. This became evident in the study conducted: the interviewees repeatedly referred to the importance of studying "anywhere outside the region". Their families had considered where to find a quality education in Europe at a reasonable price, and so the students had finally ended up in Hungary.

> I came here for financial reasons. I came to Europe; [but] I came here for the cheaper prices... For the moment, we try to stay in Hungary. If I had more money, I would have stayed in Canada. [...] Yeah, I mean, living and building up your career are two different things, right? You can live in any country which is suitable for your style, but building up your career is a different thing. (Linh 1985, female, student, Vietnam)

Some students planned to return home upon completing their studies, but in most cases the migration journey did not end with actual graduation. The students reported that they would prefer to apply for a new scholarship and continue their studies or to build careers in Europe. Their plans were, however, mostly uncertain when it came to deciding upon study in Hungary, and future plans were similarly vague. In this sense, the students interviewed were in transit, prepared to move on when the next opportunity in educational advancement presented itself. Uncertainty was typical and depended largely upon the possibilities as foreseen by the individual.

> I haven't thought about it. It depends on how I finish my studies. [...] I have to study well. If I can find a job, a good job here with good salary, maybe I'll stay. But if not, I'll go home. Not really permanently, but maybe stay some years. [...] I think if I finish, when I finish BA course here, I will start to think about a scholarship for an MA course. (Phuong 1994, female, student, Vietnam)

8.3.3 Irregular and Humanitarian Migration

The cases of irregular migration covered those who stayed in the country after their legal residence had expired and those who were caught and put in detention for violating the law. Asylum seekers had mostly arrived in Hungary as irregulars. They had left their homes for economic survival and because their lives and the freedom of their religious convictions had been in jeopardy. The routes that humanitarian migrants had traversed were more or less the same, an irregular West Balkan path through Turkey, Greece and Serbia to Hungary.

> I came first time to Turkey. I [got a] visa to Istanbul, and I stayed there about 6–7 months. ... I did have idea to go Germany or somewhere. So if I get visa, I can go straight; but I try, and I don't get. So there is some other people I meet where I live in a hotel. They say there is a system to go with a truck from Istanbul to Germany. This was the only solution, because my Turkish visa going to finish. (Madhav 1959, male, irregular migrant, India)

The interviewees had applied for asylum upon being caught as they passed along the irregular transit corridor from Turkey to the European Union. The interviews showed that there is only a narrow line between irregulars and people who apply to be and finally become subsidised and protected. It was noted that the procedure to obtain refugee or subsidiary protected status had taken years and people who had finally obtained the status struggled to develop a new life in Hungary. The future plans of irregular migrants, and even those who were recognised as subsidiary protected person or refugees, remained uncertain. Their poor treatment and the undesirable political and economic circumstances urged them to move on to a more welcoming destination.

> To be very honest, […] getting the positive decision after almost four years in the camps, I was so frustrated and fed up [with] Hungary… I finally plan to leave... (Dameer 1983, male, humanitarian migrant, Pakistan)

8.4 Politico-Legal Aspects

According to earlier findings (e.g. Tóth 2010, 2013), the policy climate towards foreigners has influenced the expectations of various migrant groups who have faced the burden of obligatory bureaucratic procedures in line with the unwelcoming spirit of Hungarian migration policy. These phenomena became obvious in the interviews. The bureaucratic procedures for obtaining obligatory permits, coupled with ignorance and a complete lack of official support, had shaped the everyday lives of many interviewees. Most of them had experienced endless paperwork and formalities when requesting a work permit, a resident permit or a visa (all are required to work in Hungary) or the vast array of permits and certificates needed to set up a business. For those coming from outside the EU, like Asia, the procedure for embarking on economic activity, starting a business or taking a highly or low-skilled job is long and time-consuming. Additionally, temporary migrants have to face these hurdles repeatedly, since resident permits are only issued for a limited period. Interviewees considered these everlasting bureaucratic and official issues the most discouraging part of their migrant lives. The process was demanding, and the interviewees had had a variety of unpleasant experiences. They clearly received the Hungarian authorities' unfriendly message that foreigners cause problems. Moreover, these inconveniences (i.e. the unfriendly welcome) were for many foreigners the first experiences with the nationals of the receiving country.

> Yeah, it was so horrible, because nobody could give me complete information [about] what I really need. Okay, it was also probably my mistake that I don't speak Hungarian. ... But in another way, so I see Hungary needs people like me, who speak many languages and pay taxes and, you know, work for this country. So if you welcome us, you should give me more support… (Aiman 1985, female, highly skilled, Kazakhstan)

> So every year is the same process. And the processes [affect us] so much. Because with time, you are losing your patience. And everything is making your life difficult here […] (Talya, 1987, female, low-skilled, Turkey)

Also for those who had come for economic reasons, the environment was not welcoming or inviting enough to entice the newcomers to stay. Opening new businesses is particularly difficult for foreigners from outside the EU. This had hindered the development of flourishing business networks of Asian respondents. Many interviewees had faced discrimination and lack of support for foreigners. Some of them spoke of their efforts to set up companies with investments in innovative businesses, but they gradually lost motivation and energy for that. They might even have decided to move at least part of the business to headquarters in another country.

> The only problem I encountered was with the Hungarian government, which is a little bit ironic […] considering the fact the government was very aggressive in promoting, you know, financial investment schemes to foreigners I would think that, you know, they would be a bit more helpful, but they weren't. [Obtaining permits] was extremely frustrating, but finally we had it done. And after…oh, after 7 months, the only thing that I don't have is the permit to prepare food. We applied for that in April. We still haven't got it, though. It's not going anywhere... (Mark, 1978, male, entrepreneur, Philippines)

All these unpleasant experiences had led to disappointment among temporary migrants and, in some cases, convinced them to abandon their plans and leave the country. At the very least, some had decided not to remain permanently. In this sense, the formal official requirements and bureaucratic procedures strongly conveyed the policy message to foreigners: foreigners are not welcome and are urged to stay only temporarily.

Temporary migrants and their family members arriving in Hungary have only limited access to free public services. The interviews revealed that school education and health-care services were important factors for foreign arrivals. Health care is only partially free, while education is, in principle, free for children of temporary migrants. In practice, however, the language barriers cause difficulties. In spite of the legal possibility for children of temporary migrants to gain access to free public education, it is not easy in everyday practice, since migrant children do not speak Hungarian and the schools are not prepared to meet their needs. Families who could afford private schools had decided to choose one of the few international schools, which could be rather expensive. With the lack of constructive help that tutoring programmes provide, temporary migrant children faced difficulties in public schools, and their parents had no means to help them apart from transferring their children to international schools with tuition fees.

> At first we enrolled her at the state school... of course, it's a bilingual school, but when they say bilingual, it's like, not really... So then we decided to transfer, because she was already crying every day. [...] Of course, if you pay for something, they, I would assume, they should be nicer compared to the free school.... […] we didn't plan for this one when we [came] here. We said, "Oh, free education!", because in the Philippines the education was very expensive. (Angel 1975, female, family migrant, Philippines)

As for health care, international students and foreign employees have free access to basic and emergency treatment, while their family members should arrange extra insurance. Private physicians are available, and in the case of particular problems (i.e. giving birth), one could go to private hospitals or to special private sections of the public hospitals. It became apparent that temporary migrants without insurance

were obliged to use the non-free sections of the hospitals or clinics, which provided health services at a reasonable price compared to the migrants' countries of origin. According to the interviewees, the fundamental problem was the language barrier. The interviewees shed light on various solutions to overcome the difficulties of health-care service. Solutions have been temporary, however. Some reported that they had tried to avoid visiting doctors and hospitals and accumulated a large amount of medicines in advance. Others would rather return to their home countries for treatment.

> I got sick. I found I couldn't express my symptoms. I couldn't understand the words… I have been to a hospital here several times. I found it really hard. So I thought I would go to see a doctor in Japan… (Rio 1977, female, family migrant, Japan)

The situation was better among Chinese migrants as the Chinese community, with its highly functioning network in Budapest, was prepared to overcome the language problem in the hospital by employing an interpreter.

> In the Chinese community here, we use the WeChat, which is an extensive messenger service. When I became pregnant, I looked up an interpreter there, and I instructed them to find a suitable hospital and doctor. An interpreter is accompanying me each time to see the doctor. (Xiu 1982, female, highly skilled, China)

8.5 Socio-economic Aspects

Depending on their labour market positions and the jobs they had, the interviewees' professional mobility varied from upward mobility among the highly skilled to downwards among others. The opportunity to accumulate work or study experiences in Europe appeared to be an important factor in the upward mobility of highly qualified workers and university students. Although these interviewees considered the novelty and the European environment to be real challenges, work experience in Europe was considered an important status-building step in their career paths. Similarly, teaching or studying in European universities was considered a means to achieve professional upward mobility.

> Earlier I was managing a set of Indians. When I came here, I started managing ten different nationalities from 32 countries. It makes a difference. (Naagesh 1974, male, highly skilled, India)

> Teaching Chinese in Europe is distinctive from Asia. I am familiar with the Asian environment, but not the European. … So it must be progress to teach here. (Nuo 1987, female, highly skilled, China)

On the other hand, low-skilled work was of no relevance in the professional mobility of temporary migrants. According to the evidence from the interviews, downward professional mobility or even "deskilling" were common among migrants. They yet accepted the jobs offered to them, because it was the only option. To use

the term of Piore (1979), they clearly had an instrumental relation to their work. In other words, the migrants would not have accepted the same job at home, where professional status would have been important to them. In the course of their temporary migration, they had to adapt to the prevailing situation.

> Basically, they don't need any professional background. It doesn't matter what you did before. I can feel that when you decide to work abroad, no matter what you were – like calligrapher, doctor or even police officer – you have to finish the assigned job now. It's nothing to do with your previous career life. (Yin 1964, female, low-skilled, China)

Regardless of their qualifications and abilities, humanitarian migrants with subsidiary protected or refugee status occupied a vulnerable situation in the labour market. In this sense, work represented downward mobility for those with higher education. They accepted any job offered, in order to retain their humanitarian status which entailed proving legal income. In other cases, those humanitarian migrants with little education could secure a low-skilled job in addition to supplementary training, which represented upward mobility for them. Patterns varied, but for many, the vulnerable position gave rise to hopes of being legalised, even if only on a temporary basis.

> I was hired as a normal processing clerk, because my CV was relevant. That's it. And basically because I was a refugee and I was paid relatively less salary.... Yes, that was the reason, because I know it now. If you hire a local person with a number of language skills, he will require more money, and they have better opportunities outside. So they can leave the company sooner for a better opportunity. (Aahil 1978, male, humanitarian migrant, Pakistan)

Downward mobility of economic migrants coincided in some cases with the hope of achieving a better quality of life. Entrepreneurs might not follow the economic rationale of seeking to increase the profitability of their businesses (Massey et al. 1993; Stark and Taylor 1991). The reasons varied. Some had become tired of the constant and tiring competition, while others reported that they would not mind suffering some economic loss if it would mean a less competitive environment and a chance for a better life. Hungary proved to be a convenient destination country for them when seeking a quiet place.

> I was earning a shitload of money in the Philippines, but I never […] had the time to spend it on my family. Now I'm earning 10 times less, and I've never been happier, because I get to spend every minute of my time with my family… (Mark 1978, male, entrepreneur, Philippines)

Other migrants decided upon a new and more enjoyable lifestyle at the cost of lower economic status. When seeking a new life and getting married in Europe, they preferred leisure to economic gain. In this sense, the entrepreneurs can be defined both as economic migrants who intended to do business and also lifestyle migrants seeking a more relaxed and pleasant existence.

> I tried to do trading. I took my saved-up money here. If you ask me if I am happy, yes, I am. If you ask me if I am as successful as I have been in Turkey, clearly no is the answer. (Ege 1963, male, entrepreneur, Turkey)

8.5.1 Economic Impacts and Differences in Work Culture

Interviewees' experiences and observations were rather similar when speaking about their everyday impressions and circumstances at work or in economic activities. The migrants occupied a particular economic position due to cultural differences. These findings seem to correspond with the evidence found in the literature (e.g. Altonji and Card 1991; Chiswick 1999; Borjas 1995) underlining the complementary nature of migrant labour.

Differences experienced in the work environment in Hungary were recognised from various aspects and were reported as "cultural gap at work". Differences were variously expressed but the dissimilarity in the work culture and work philosophy was obvious. The cultural gap was considered a difficulty but also an advantage and opportunity which secured a particular economic position and opportunities for migrants. Among others, entrepreneurial skills and the ability to adapt to new and innovative working methods and knowledge were recognised as cultural differences that were experienced in daily work.

> ...Hungarians are not very good managers. This is a general observation, because I am in touch with Hungarian companies. I don't see massive growth in any Hungarian organisation unless it is managed by another national. [...] Somehow it's because of the cultural thing. People don't see its importance in nurturing, putting people together in the global business. (Sabal 1983, male, highly skilled, India)

The Asian standard of labour and the intensity of work in Hungary proved to be very different. Asian people worked effectively and long hours. Chinese and Vietnamese enterprises and Southeast Asian workers might be characterised as very industrious. Small shops and businesses followed common Asian norms. Owners of small shops, particularly Chinese and Vietnamese, were free to work as long as they pleased.

> Asian people work really hard, but we don't care if don't have our own time or leisure time, so we just work [as much] as we can. We want to achieve our goals, so I think this is actually a benefit for the boss or the employer... (Wang 1988, female, highly skilled, Taiwan)

8.5.2 Economic Output and Remittances

For most respondents, Hungary was not a particularly attractive destination country in terms of promising economic gains, and for most migrants, remittances were not the primary issue. Remarkably, most families in the home country enjoyed a stable situation and even helped the migrants to become established in the destination country. Nevertheless, underdeveloped social welfare and pension systems in some counties of origin had been compensated in the form of remittances to support parents. In certain countries, remittances from children abroad were seen as a moral obligation, even when families were not in real need and often saved the money for unexpected problems in the future.

> In fact, my parents don't need the money. [my mother] still keeps the money and didn't buy anything. it's Vietnamese tradition […] thinking that our parents have spent almost half of their lives raising you – the child. [I also think] it's a very good tradition. (Kim 1993, female, student, Vietnam)

> Yeah, they don't really need my financial support thank God, not yet, but we support them. Father is a pensioner, he is a bank employee, but the pension is not enough so we do support them financially. And I believe it will continue. (Sabal 1983, mail, highly skilled, India)

Transnational family networks and mutual help had been essential in particular cases of temporary migrants' families. The following quotation illustrates the case of one international student interviewed.

> So up till now, my parents supported my life in Hungary. ..., but now, I receive a Hungarian government' scholarship... since the graduate school. (Haruto 1992, male, student, Japan)

Migrants from disadvantaged families, as well as irregular or humanitarian migrants in poor economic situations, might confront the dilemma of having families in need of support, while they themselves struggled to survive in constrained economic circumstances. In some cases, they had no opportunity to help.

> Well, I mean I was in Turkey I was not sending like every month, but like when I have like quite little saving... when I came to Hungary, it's..., quite very not easy... So I don't feel that this moment I should or expect to, you know, or they should expect me. So the other challenge which I face from my family is that. ... Then I tell them that I'm studying, I'm not working. (Kirpal 1988, male, student, Pakistan)

In other cases, however, mutual transnational support among family members was mobilised. The interview results outline the pattern of transnational families which created an economic unit of family members both at home, in the migrant's target country (Hungary) and possibly in other destination countries (in the EU or other regions). The strong transnational family network was based, in fact, upon a strong tradition of the family as an economic unit. The family members resided in various locations but remained in close contact, and from time to time, they channelled economic help in a given direction among family members. The family network created and offered a safety net to support migrant members and promoted overall mobility.

> Now I can't help anybody in the family, since I have a hard life. I have relatives, sister in London, yes also in France, Germany, Austria... about everywhere I have pieces of family. My sister, yes, she helped me with money. But it was not only my sister. I have a lot of friends and others [who] would send also money if I am in trouble. ... Well, and one of my brothers, he is now in Iran, and I help him to come out. I must help him, since he is my brother. I help him to come to Europe. So I find him money to come. I borrow money, and I will repay the money. (Almas 1980, male, humanitarian migrant, Afghanistan)

8.6 Sociocultural Aspects

As also in the findings of earlier research (e.g. Hárs and Tóth 2010; Kováts 2013), the general lesson that can be drawn from the interviews is that temporary migrants were not really integrated into the receiving societies. The interviewees seemed to

have little contact with other temporary migrant groups and were also isolated from the receiving society. Lack of language proficiency proved to be a fundamental obstacle, preventing temporary migrants from getting involved in various activities, developing social or political contacts and, in short, becoming integrated. Migrants mostly did not speak Hungarian or only at the basic, "only little Hungarian" level. Participation in language courses was not very common, and many considered Hungarian very difficult to learn. The majority of highly skilled migrants had made no efforts to learn the language, while students attended some Hungarian courses with limited success. Evidence from the interviews confirmed the general perception that "the Hungarian language is strange and not very easy to learn". To invest in learning the domestic language seemed to be too much effort, and the gain of the investment for temporary migrants had been little. On the other hand, low-skilled workers and small-scale shop owners spoke some Hungarian, since they had to use the language in the job. However, their contacts with local people were limited to work and interaction with clients.

> It's hard, yeah, because not everybody speaks English, which is sad. You know, it's not as if, you know, it's not as if I'm in North America […] I can't have that kind of, you know, that kind of big attitude. I have to adapt to the local way of living, which, fortunately or unfortunately, includes speaking the language. A lot of Hungarians actually told me, "Look, it's pointless for you to learn Hungarian, because outside Hungary it's a useless language". (Mark 1978, male, entrepreneur, Philippines)

As a consequence, migrants became stuck in various expat or co-ethnic communities, which separated them from the nationals of the destination country. Cultural differences also mattered, particularly in a country with a very low share of foreigners.

> There are so many reasons why I don't have friends. Because first thing: I don't drink alcohol. Second: I don't eat meat, so normally when some people invite me to their house... Plus, I don't speak that well Hungarian, and plus we have a different way of thinking. Because what they think, I don't think that way. Like here, in Hungary, I have some American friends, with whom I talk quite a lot... (Nakul 1982, male, entrepreneur, India)

Many respondents missed the company of friends at home in this transitory situation. This was the case especially among the students on foreign-language courses, highly skilled labourers and university professors. These migrants found themselves in a state of flux with companions who were also temporary migrants.

> We were quite separate... We never met [Hungarian students]. We made friends with other non-Hungarians at university, yes, because we experienced the same things – missing home and the loneliness – and we formed a community. We are really mixed. I still keep in contact with them, but they are not in Hungary. (Linh 1985, female, student, Vietnam)

All in all, the migrants lived in a rather insular world within the receiving country, and there were only limited and superficial connections to the native people. Due to the not very welcoming policy towards newcomers failed to give confidence and support towards integrating foreigners. This hindered involvement in everyday life in the receiving country. Connections to the local society were formal and weak – possibly at work (if the workplace was not a closed international environment), at school events (if the school was not international), during daily outings for shopping

or services or at the not very welcoming official and bureaucratic agencies, where they had to apply for the required permits.

Although the interviewees lived apart in the receiving society, they were actively involved in leading lives in their home and other countries. They maintained active ties with peoples in previous migration destinations or places where their family members lived. This active and fluid situation connected them to other places and tended to make their whole lives temporary. According to the evidence from interviews, family ties among temporary migrants were strong. Connections were vital and sometimes maintained with family on a daily basis. Internet was the basic medium, and some people had long daily talks with people back home, while their relationships with Hungarian people remained weak.

The respondents were aware of their "otherness" (see Tulloch and Lupton 2003; Williams and Baláž 2012). Since Hungary has a relatively small migrant population, foreigners felt as though they were objects of curiosity. According to the interviews migrants considered their otherness a major barrier to integration and used it to define their identity during the temporary stay. Otherness was mentioned by the interviewees as their general (and different) outlook or a model of their traditional (and unusual) lifestyle.

> I think I need to work harder to get accepted by people, because I am from a different... race... culture... yeah. ... If we were in England, let's say, this gap would have been smaller... There are two reasons for that: one, the language; second, England got used to lots of people from different races. (Hansa 1984, female, highly skilled, India)

The migrants interviewed were nevertheless proud of their otherness. Remarkably, the small ethnic shops or restaurants offered work opportunities but had also reinforced the person's sense of identity.

> Yes, because what I do is something special in Hungary. It is not everybody can make it, what I do. Here this is my food. Only mine. (Kanak 1953, male, low-skilled, India)

Altogether, people enjoyed their stay in Hungary. Europe and particularly Hungary – mostly the capital city Budapest – was described as a *clean and quite nice place.* However, this was often in contrast to home, where the city was presented by many as a "lively place with a lot of people and crowds, where you can never be bored". While getting used to a more peaceful city, the differences became challenging for migrants. Preferences could even shift from the home country to Hungary, accentuating the feeling of living in-between.

> It's a quiet environment in Hungary, not like China, where it's noisy. ... Because of the huge population, sometimes they don't obey the rules to queue up when shopping... Also the procedures... There are too many people in China. [...] As time passed, my thought is closer to Hungarian or European. (Qiang 1984, male, entrepreneur, China)

Indeed, people described feeling somewhat at home only temporarily in Hungary. Their focus was short term, without dwelling on previous or future destinations. When asked about their home, the respondents answered, "home is where you are at the moment" or "where family or partner lives". They felt happy with this temporary situation.

> ...home is where you have lived for some period of time. So when I was in Vietnam, I considered my old home as my home. But after moving to another city to study, I considered my flat and rental house my home.... I also consider Hungary my home. (Kim 1993, female, student, Vietnam)

No evidence emerged to suggest whether temporariness was the cause or the consequence of migration. Rather it was both. Some migrants were happy and enjoyed a life of temporariness, while others were tired of being adrift without a home. Among others, Sabal felt strong ties to their homeland and planned to return eventually: "I belong to India, for sure. So over a period of time, I will move back to India" (Sabal, male, highly skilled, 1983, India).

Differences were possibly due to the various stages that respondents were passing through in their migration careers. What they might consider challenging at the beginning of their journey could later become a source of enduring joy. Most, however, while enjoying aspects of temporary migrant's life, contemplated the end of this lifestyle one day.

> Well, there is a point like, you know, you need to live somewhere permanently... even if you understand the hard stuff and the advantages of living somewhere... (Utkirbek 1985, male, entrepreneur, Uzbekistan)

8.7 Conclusion

As an EU member state on the periphery of the Schengen region with reasonable costs of living, Hungary proved to be attractive to various groups of temporary migrants from Asia. Nevertheless, the inflow of migration has remained rather low due to the lack of a welcoming policy attitude towards migrants and the connected apparatus of the bureaucracy. In line with the policy expectations that migrants will only stay temporarily in Hungary, the country has been largely defined and interpreted even by policymakers as a transit country for various groups of migrants. This attitude was surprisingly ingrained and circumscribed the scope and vitality of temporary migration from outside Europe. In spite of the economic advantages, economic migrants and students have not been encouraged to stay but are subject to strict regulations. At the same time, the Hungarian migration policy has shown a distinct leaning towards ethnic Hungarians, which has gradually resulted in kin-state and naturalisation preferences.

Comparing ethnic migration in Asia and Eastern Europe, Skrentny et al. (2007) have stressed: "Asian ethnic preferences are more instrumentally integrated into larger policy objectives than those practices in Western Europe, and specifically they are geared toward economic development, utilising skills and investment preferences. In contrast, the European policies, especially the strong moves toward ethnic preference in Eastern Europe, have been mostly expressions of ties or efforts at protection. Rather than tools for economic development, European preferences are a kind of protective or expressive nationalism" (2007: 816–817). These differences

could explain the discrepancy between the generally restrictive Hungarian migration policy aimed at Asian migrants among others and the strong policy focus on the immigration of ethnic Hungarians. The former policy has worked against the economic role and advantage of the Chinese and Vietnamese migrant communities since their establishment.

As a consequence, the mainly spontaneous Asian migration flows have partly consisted of foreigners arriving for a limited time period (e.g. posted workers, invited highly skilled workers and university students). For these people, Hungary has been a step in their careers as temporary migrants. Other immigrants would have possibly stayed longer, but the lack of support and encouragement has resulted in circular migration or only a temporary stay for some of the people who had come mostly for economic reasons, to find a work or to set up a business. Their temporariness depends on the success of their business activities. These migrants mostly limit their sojourns, awaiting the next promising destination. Thus, they either become circular migrants or return home for good. Migrants with fond memories of their time spent in Hungary may also return to find a job and open a business or perhaps on account of family reasons. By easing bureaucratic procedures, fostering language learning and opening various channels to integration, migrants might be enticed to become involved in the economic activity and everyday life of the receiving community. This would benefit both Hungarian society and the migrants, urging them to exploit the mutual economic and social advantages of temporariness.

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Chapter 9
Ukraine and Temporary Migration in the European-Asian Transnational Space

Ihor Markov, Svitlana Odynets, and Danylo Sudyn

9.1 Introduction

Ukraine as a European non-EU country provides a special case of interest. Due to its location on the border of the East and the West, Ukraine has for centuries been a crossroads for international migration flows. These migration flows have become particularly intense since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Besides being a transit country, Ukraine is also a country of emigration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) has estimated that about five million Ukrainians reside abroad legally and unknown numbers illegally. Despite the lack of accurate statistics or available research data, it can be assumed that emigration from Ukraine has increased over the last few years, and this trend appears to continue as 310,000 Ukrainians are prepared to emigrate during the following years (IOM 2016; Peshko 2016). Recently, the intensification of Ukrainian outward migration has been caused by the economic crisis and unemployment, particularly among youth and highly skilled specialists, and by the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine, which has led to the annexation by that country of Crimea and a prolonged armed confrontation in South East Ukraine.

Ukraine is a country with low population growth and is thus in need of skilled newcomers (Libanova et al. 2010: 70–73). The current situation in the country is yet not conducive to the inflow of foreign professionals. The Revolution of Dignity and Russian military aggression[1] have given rise to new tendencies in cross-border migration, both into and out of Ukraine. First, an 'escape from conflict' has caused

[1] In 2014, Russia initiated military campaign against Ukraine and occupied part of its territory in response to a victory of Euromaidan, otherwise called the Revolution of Dignity.

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an increase in Ukrainian emigration to different countries.[2] Ukrainian men seeking to avoid military conscription move abroad and try to find low-skilled work there. Second, a number of foreign arrivals from Western Europe, Belarus and Russia are fighting as volunteers alongside the Ukrainian Army or pro-Russian military forces. Finally, there has been an increase in Russian citizens migrating to Ukraine (largely those who have suffered political repression in the Russian Federation) and seeking political asylum there (Dorosh 2016).

The EU countries and Russia are the most popular destinations for Ukrainian emigrants, but many Ukrainians also migrate to Belarus and to the countries of Southeast Asia. Likewise, people from different regions of Asia move to Ukraine, mainly using the territory of the country as an intermediate stage towards the EU (Libanova 2013). For various reasons, some of them stay in Ukraine longer than initially planned (Duvell and Vollner 2009). Transnational irregular migration is a common problem in Ukraine. Corruption, economic problems and the uncertain legal status of foreigners have created favourable conditions for transnational smuggling networks and made Ukraine an attractive transit country for irregular migrants from Asia to the EU (Ukraine Migration Profile 2010-2014 2015: 8–9). Many representatives of law enforcement agencies are involved in corrupt schemes which provide residence permits for immigrants and enable the irregular transit of people through Ukraine to the West. An extensive network of migrants' compatriots facilitates this transit mobility. Due to the lack of financial resources, the state control over transit flows throughout the relatively open 4,000 kilometers of borders with Russia, Belarus, and Moldova was further weakened in 2012 by the elimination of the Migration Control's Police Department. Despite this, in 2014 alone, 20,180 irregular migrants were charged and detained in Ukraine by the State Migration Service (Ukraine Migration Profile 2010-2014 2015: 64).

Research on migration flows from and to Ukraine has so far focused almost entirely on Ukrainians moving westward, especially to the EU, whereas immigration to Ukraine, transit migration through the country and the emigration of Ukrainians to Asian countries are largely understudied (Chorniy et al. 2014). In this chapter we report on various categories of transnational temporary migrants related to Ukraine: the focus is on both the intensive transit migration from Asia to Europe and back and on the massive outward migration of Ukrainians, not only westwards but also eastwards. We also discuss the status of irregular migrants in Ukraine and the role of transnational networks in the irregular transit migration through the country.

[2] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016) points out that compared to 2013, the number of Ukrainian refugees seeking political asylum in developed countries in 2014 increased more than ten times: up to 16,000 people. According to the national report by Libanova (2015: 79), The Policy of Integration of Ukrainian Society in the Context of Challenges and Threats of Events in Donbas, prepared for the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, about 1.1million Ukrainians went abroad because of the war in Donbas.

9.2 Data Collection

Seventy-nine semi-structured interviews were conducted in Ukraine with representatives of diverse categories of temporary migrants and nonmigrants. Due to the special characteristics of Ukraine as a transit country, the group of respondents included both immigrants and emigrants. Ukrainians living abroad were interviewed using Skype or face to face during their visits to Ukraine (e.g. for holidays). The data collection was accomplished with highly skilled professionals (5 emigrants+5 immigrants), low-skilled workers (5 + 3), students (3 + 5), entrepreneurs (2 + 3), family-based migrants (5 + 2), lifestyle migrants (2 + 2), humanitarian migrants (7), irregular migrants (4), circular migrants (3), transit migrants (5), returnee migrants (6) and nonmigrants (9). The group of respondents included both genders, ages ranged between 19 and 55 years. As the border regions are the hub of cross-border movements westwards, eastwards and southwards (Libanova 2013; Markov 2009), temporary migrants were interviewed in the western, eastern and southern parts of Ukraine (see Fig. 9.1).

The European destination countries of the Ukrainian emigrants interviewed were the UK, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, Norway and France, whereas the list of Asian destination countries included Vietnam, India, China, Malaysia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. The incoming migrants interviewed had come from various European countries (Greece, Denmark, Italy, Germany, Romania, France, Sweden) and Asian countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Palestine, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan).

Fig. 9.1 The regions of data collection

9.3 Migration Processes

Most Ukrainian migrants interviewed had ample experiences of transnationally mobile life. They had circulated from one country (or region) to another in a search of better living and working conditions and occasionally or periodically (typically one or two times a year) visited their country of origin. Their previous migration experiences made the prospective migration trajectories easier for them. Also many Ukrainian returnees estimated that they would eventually continue their transnational movements. Being involved in transnational migrants' networks was the main facilitating factor for them, and their lack of adequate employment options in the home country was one of the most important motivational factors. According to earlier research (Markov 2009), only few Ukrainians having worked abroad return permanently to Ukraine. The number of returnees has further decreased since 2014 in consequence of the Russian military aggression in Southern and Southern-Eastern Ukraine, which has led to the annexation of Crimea and the long-term armed conflict in Donbas (Libanova 2015).

Nevertheless, most of all temporary migrants interviewed expressed their intention to eventually return to their countries of origin. The most frequently mentioned reason was to rejoin their families at home (assuming that the family members had remained at home). The interviewees often said that initially their transnational movements were supposed to be only temporary. Their aim was to work abroad only long enough to achieve a certain goal, often financial support to the family and then to return home, but new immediate goals had emerged during their migration processes. For instance, at first the reason for migration might have been to pay off debts or buy some property at home, but then other needs emerged, such as the children's education or new opportunities to fulfil personal ambitions, and the migration project thus continued (Markov 2016: 250–251).

As regards humanitarian migrants, the research revealed that the majority of asylum seekers residing in Ukraine did not plan to seek refugee status in the country but that their intention was to move on to other European countries or to the USA. The humanitarian migrants interviewed had moved to Ukraine from Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan), often through Russia. They had entered the country hoping to move further to the West but did not have legal rights to move forwards and were thus forced to stay in Ukraine, possibly eventually seeking refugee status there. In this respect, the irregular Asian migrants appeared to be in a similar position to refugees. Their reasons for moving were either a threat to life in the home country or a desire to find better living conditions in the West. In both cases, the respondents had no prior experience of transnational migration. Like the refugees, the irregular migrants had mostly come to Ukraine via Russia. Once in Ukraine, some of them had tried to claim refugee status there after discovering that further movement was difficult or even impossible (cf. Duvell and Vollner 2009).

For most low-skilled Asian migrants, Ukraine was the first foreign country of residence, but many other arrivals had extensive experience of transnational mobility. This concerned, in particular, highly skilled specialists, lifestyle seekers,

students and returnee migrants. Of special interest here are the highly educated respondents who had come to work in Ukraine but who had later become interested in the transnational way of living, not as part of their professional experience but rather as a lifestyle.

The highly skilled interviewees from the EU and Asia had usually moved to Ukraine as intracompany transferees: their employers had sent them to work in Ukraine, or they had agreed to the terms and conditions of a posted vacancy in Ukraine. Their motivations for migrating were similar to those of lifestyle migrants. For example, a highly educated worker from Italy said that he came to Ukraine because it was difficult for him to find work in Italy due to his age. He was satisfied in his current job and life in Ukraine: the job was less stressful, and he liked the way of life in the country. Another interviewee from Romania had similar motivations. A German highly skilled specialist said that he wanted to take part in the societal transformations in Ukraine and witness the changes 'from socialistic economics to market economy, and from more … autocratic system to democracy transformations' (Michael, highly skilled, 1968, Germany).

The cases above represent examples of transnational labour migration with elements of lifestyle migration. The motivational factors of highly skilled respondents included the pursuit of a better way of life, life in a favourable climate, lower living costs and a more meaningful life (cf. Benson and O'Reilly 2009). Some interviewees from EU countries had moved to Ukraine for a relaxed and more balanced life in comparison to life in the home country. Some liked living in Ukraine due to the low prices and because of the country's social atmosphere and cultural environment. Some interviewees had chosen Ukraine because they had friends, family members or other social ties to the country.

The movements of university students to and from Ukraine were caused by multiple motivations: the students wanted to get higher education abroad, to improve their opportunities on the labour market, to gain new experiences and to see the world. While Asian students moved to study in Ukraine, Ukrainian students moved to study at European or American universities. A student from India said that she had decided to study in Ukraine because there was a university offering a course she was interested in but which was not available in India. The previous experiences were crucial for the international students' further migration prospects. Some students from Central Asia mentioned that they had chosen Ukraine due to their previous experiences of visiting the country and because of the availability of the networks of their compatriots that made it easier for them to integrate into the society. All student respondents expressed a genuine motivation for studies, but, in fact, misuse of student visas is a common phenomenon in Ukraine. Migrants coming from Asian countries may use the possibility to get a student visa solely in order to use Ukrainian territory for their further migration to the West. In 2010/2011 and 2013/2014, the number of entries to Ukraine for educational purposes was significantly higher (more than ten times than 2010) than the number of foreign students in Ukrainian higher education institutions (Ukraine Migration profile 2010-2014 2015: 56–57).

The interviews with temporary migrants revealed several criteria to which the selection of the destination country was based. Among circular migrants, the key criteria were geographic proximity to the country of origin and the ease of quickly returning home. Ukrainian entrepreneurs reported that the expectation of financial benefits encouraged them to travel abroad. The choice of destination country might be motivated by the person's desire to advance his/her professional career. In particular those highly and low-skilled Ukrainians who had migrated to Asia hoped that their experience in Asia would enhance their employability in Ukraine.

Ukrainian highly skilled specialists did not always choose the country of destination by themselves, but the decision was made by their company or organisation which wanted to send them to work abroad. One Ukrainian interviewee working in a mobile network company had changed his place of work from Ukraine to Kazakhstan and further to Uzbekistan since his previous projects had come to an end, and the manager wanted to send him abroad. He himself was also motivated to look for new projects in his own field of expertise in other countries. In the case of migration from Ukraine to Asia, one interviewee pointed out that he had moved to Malaysia due to his desire to work in Asia and see exotic cultures. He made it happen as he was still young and had an opportunity to travel.

For Asian migrants, the main reasons for selecting Ukraine as a destination were as follows: (1) It was easier to enter legally or gain refugee status in Ukraine than in Russia; (2) The presence of a large number of conationals helped newcomers to adapt to the new environment; and (3) It was easier to find a job and better conditions for doing business in Ukraine. The low-skilled Ukrainian workers had moved to the EU for the same reasons as the Asians come to Ukraine: they received either a proposal or an opportunity for employment abroad through the help of their transnational social networks.

The reasons why the respondents of foreign origin had chosen Ukraine as their destination were multiple. In addition to the availability of transnational social networks, professional factors were vital, such as relocating an employee to a new country (intracompany transferees), maintaining professional activities and advancing in the professional career. For highly educated workers from the EU, Ukraine appeared to be a place where they had an opportunity for free and interesting life. The events of the Revolution of Dignity and Russian-Ukrainian relations had motivated some EU citizens to move to Ukraine. One IT encoder from Sweden had arrived on Independence Square (Maidan) in Kiev to find out about the events directly from the participants and to become an instructor of the Ukrainian volunteer battalion 'Azov'.[3]

In the case of Asian migrants, entrepreneurs had chosen Ukraine on the basis of the ease of conducting business there, whereas most of the low-skilled Asian migrants and asylum seekers envisaged the possibility of using Ukraine as a stepping stone on their way further abroad. Many highly skilled foreign arrivals, both Europeans and Asians, planned to continue their migration paths to advance their

[3] According to the UN working group on mercenaries, a significant number of volunteers from the EU countries were involved in the military confrontation in Donbas.

professional careers. The highly skilled migrants from Asia wanted to continue their move towards the EU, while European highly skilled interviewees planned to move to other countries, although they were not sure where.

9.4 Politico-Legal Aspects

Regarding the legal regulations on transnational migration, it is worth mentioning that Ukraine has agreements with 63 countries on visa-free entry and a 90-day stay in the country. These include all post-Soviet and European countries and some Asian countries: Korea, Mongolia, Japan, Turkey, Israel and Hong Kong in China. Instead, visa procedures are obligatory for citizens of other Asian countries, including the mainland China, India, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam (Ukrainian Migration Profile 2015: 53–54). The Ukrainian legislation divides foreigners into two categories: tourists and those who are given a long-term residence permit (including refugees) (Chorniy et al. 2014). As obtaining a residence permit is difficult, many migrants enter Ukraine as tourists. Later on they try to change their status and get either the right of residence or remain in the country as tourists or illegally.

A topical issue in the Ukrainian case is the lack of a migration policy programme, which has resulted in almost total corruption of the law enforcement agencies dealing with migration issues (Malynovska 2016). In the study conducted, all respondents reported having difficulties in obtaining a visa or a residence permit. Those highly skilled interviewees with legal status in the country claimed that it was very difficult to get it. One interviewee from Kazakhstan said that he had asked his subordinates to conduct procedure for a residence permit on his behalf, because he could not cope with the humiliating bureaucracy. The lifestyle migrants interviewed had either been granted residence permits giving them rights similar to those accorded to citizens (except the right to vote), or they sojourned in Ukraine as tourists. In the latter case, they had the right to stay in Ukraine for 90 days and could de jure apply to the State Migration Service to renew their visas internally (Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers or Ukraine 2012). In practice, however, this process appeared to be very complicated and frequently impossible without encountering corruption. To solve the problems, some interviewees had left the country for a couple of days and then returned again on a tourist visa.

The interviews revealed that in practice, the categories of irregular migrants, low-skilled workers and humanitarian movers were hard to distinguish. First, obtaining refugee status takes a long time in Ukraine, often many years. Second, foreigners often arrive in Ukraine through irregular channels. For instance, those who come to Ukraine as tourists cannot legalise their status quickly because of the confusing and difficult procedures. They often encounter corruption and government officials demanding bribes. Therefore, newcomers from these categories find themselves in a vicious circle: they cannot be legalised because it requires money, but nor can they remain irregular because it likewise necessitates paying bribes. The

amount of bribes differs depending on the status the person is seeking. The following quotation is by a respondent from Afghanistan seeking refugee status in Ukraine.

> I have a sheet of paper that allows me to legally stay here – ['Application for Applying to Ukraine for Protection' –I.M, S.O, D.S.]. It used to be that the migration service gave them out for free. For the past 4–5 years you have to pay $250 to get one. If you don't have this permission, you need to pay 3,000 UAH a month to the 'verifier' + 500 UAH per family member. In order to obtain refugee status you need to pay $5000. (Evi 1969, asylum seeker, Afghanistan)

Another Afghan refugee pointed out that it was easier to obtain documents in Ukraine than in Russia. He had managed to obtain refugee status in Ukraine fairly easily but was forced to pay for the services of an illegal transnational network of Afghans. The interviewee had thus paid for the necessary documents twice, first in Russia and then in Ukraine. After having been granted refugee status in Ukraine, a foreign arrival may in some cases become a legitimate Ukrainian citizen. In practice, however, most refugees as well as transit migrants, irregular migrants and low-skilled workers live in anticipation of being legally granted refugee status, sojourn as tourists or just stay in the country without any permission but with a 'semi-legal' document indicating some sort of residence status. Such documents are a consequence of the current confusion in the Ukrainian legislation on migration, a large 'grey area' which keeps migrants in a semi-legal position despite their official status. For instance, humanitarian migrants have to pay for their semi-legal sojourn in Ukraine and to obtain or renew documents which often have no legal validity. Refugee status comes at the monetary price of a bribe; the representatives of the Migration and Border Services are involved in the corruption schemes along with the police. Some interviewees claimed that they could not be legally employed in Ukraine even if they had refugee status; others said that they had to pay huge taxes.

The legal position of many Ukrainian emigrants in the destination countries appeared to be rather complicated. Some returnee migrants reported entering EU countries on a tourist visa and then staying in the country illegally. In other cases, emigrants had become irregular during their migration trajectories. Ukrainian labour migrants often move from one EU country to another due to the fluctuations in the labour market and in pursuit of better social and legal conditions. Thus a person having been granted permission to stay in one EU country became an irregular migrant in another (Markov 2009). For those Ukrainians who had moved to Asian countries, the visa regulations appeared to be less complicated. Both the highly skilled and low-skilled Ukrainian migrants had typically had work permits during their sojourn in Asia. Further, employers in Korea, Mongolia, Japan, Turkey, Israel or Hong Kong had not necessarily demanded any work permit. One entrepreneur had continued his businesses in Southeast Asia, despite having only a tourist visa. For some family-based migrants, a tourist visa had been a means to get to a foreign country where their partners were already waiting for them. One Ukrainian family migrant in Turkey reported that she had entered the country on a tourist visa, and her further legalisation in Turkey presupposed either marriage or a 1-month residence permit which can then be extended.

Most of the interviewed temporary migrants expressed no interest in political affairs; they only reported watching the news on TV. However some exceptions emerged. The data obtained in the course of this and other studies (Markov 2009) indicate that Ukrainian immigrants to the EU as well as immigrants from Asia to Ukraine are actively involved in the political life of the host countries both at the local and national levels. They lobby desirable regulations and mediate interactions between the countries of origin and residence at various levels. One of the Ukrainian female migrants reported being a counsellor of the mayor of Rome for Eastern Europe. Leaders of new migrant communities are closely related to members of local and national parliaments. Both a highly skilled Ukrainian living in China, some students living in Europe and China and some low-skilled workers in the EU claimed that they had been politically active in contributing to solving the current problems in Ukraine, mainly during the Revolution of Dignity.[4] One female respondent reported helping volunteers in Ukraine. Others spoke of merely symbolic actions in support of Ukraine.

9.5 Socio-economic Aspects

In the Ukrainian case, temporary migrants (either immigrants or emigrants) can be divided into two groups:

1. Migrants who are forced to earn in order to financially support their families in the country of origin. This group includes circular low- and unskilled workers from Ukraine, returnee migrants, refugees, transit migrants, as well as irregular and low-skilled migrants from Asia.
2. Migrants who view migration as a strategy for their self-fulfilment, such as highly skilled migrants, students, lifestyle migrants and family migrants. During their sojourn in the destination country, temporary migrants may switch from the first group to the second or even fall into both categories simultaneously. Entrepreneurs can be placed in between these two groups: they are independent in their decisions to move, but the migratory movements are often determined by economic conditions for doing businesses.

Regarding the entrepreneurs interviewed, it was common that their business activities were not related to the areas of their own areas of expertise. All admitted that doing business abroad was a rather precarious source of income. The Ukrainian entrepreneurs residing abroad pointed out that they could not save any money. This group was characterised by a high level of uncertainty about the future and by a tendency for further migratory movements. Those entrepreneurs who had moved from abroad to Ukraine reported a readiness to leave the country if business conditions became unfavourable.

[4] In many EU countries, Ukrainian migrant associations and solidarity actions by Ukrainian nationals constantly lobby national governments and the EU to take a position in the Revolution of Dignity and Russian military aggression in Ukraine.

Most family migrants appeared to be unemployed, and the Ukrainian low-skilled emigrants were generally hired abroad for seasonal jobs or jobs associated with downward mobility compared to their professional status in Ukraine. The socio-economic situations and life strategies of returnee migrants were multiple. Some of them had continued to work in Ukraine in low-paid jobs, but many of those who maintained ties with friends and colleagues abroad were starting new migration projects. A Ukrainian returnee who had taken university studies and an internship in the UK had utilised his overseas experiences to land a prestigious job in Ukraine. Another returnee was working as a specialist in higher financial education at one of the largest enterprises in Ukraine, but because of the low wages in the country, she had moved to Italy where she worked in restaurant service, as a cleaner and child-minder. Thanks to the money she had earned and the experience she had gained during the migration process (the respondent worked in a family of hairdressers and took hairdressing courses), she was able to start her own hairdressing business at home:

> I have my own, albeit small, business: hair salon. I saw in Italy such small businesses… A family businesses. And I learned the model well, and decided to look into the process as much as possible. I was determined to have my own hair salon. If I had not lived those years abroad, I would have never achieved it. (Veronika 1980, migrant from Ukraine to Italy)

The highly skilled foreign arrivals were the only category of temporary migrants working in their own areas of expertise; most of them had been specifically invited to work in the country. By contrast, the foreign lifestyle seekers were constantly changing their place of employment and did not always work in the fields they were trained for. Their main criterion for taking a job was whether the job suited their lifestyle. The lifestyle migrants did not worry about their future professional prospects or career advancement. One migrant from Europe who had taken a doctorate in several disciplines worked as an English teacher in Ukraine. Another migrant from Uzbekistan who had established his own startup in Ukraine had previously worked in a scientific institution and had participated in many projects in Europe. He mentioned that his main occupation was a research work which he conducted alone; he preferred to do research by himself instead of working in a scientific institution. For both the above respondents, financial issues or professional career were not a priority, rather their educational backgrounds were means of maintaining their lifestyles.

The highly skilled Asian migrants were not as satisfied with their salaries in Ukraine as they were with the quality of life there: ‘Of course, with my wages in Astana I would be in a lower economic bracket because it is a relatively expensive city: services, for example, are twice as expensive in Astana. However, it is freer and easier here’ (Raman, highly skilled, 1980, Kazakhstan). Similar experiences were reported by some Ukrainian entrepreneurs residing temporarily in Asia.

> … for example, for as long as I live here I haven’t bought any clothing, the food has completely changed, hairstyle became ten times cheaper. If we look globally, nothing good happened in financial terms. But there are so much positive in other aspects, that it just outweighs those everyday things that were in Ukraine. (Dmytro, 1989, male, entrepreneur, Ukraine)

Ukrainian low-skilled workers residing in Asia reported having spent most of their earnings on rent (India and UAE). No professional career prospects were available for them, but this did not always bother them: the respondents said they acquired social capital which might be useful in the future, or they simply wanted to live a more congenial way of life.

The Asian refugees, transit migrants, irregular migrants and low-skilled migrants interviewed in Ukraine were largely engaged in temporary auxiliary work. The following discussion with Bishal, a transit migrant from Nepal (1980), illustrates this aspect:

Researcher: What do you actually do at your work?
Bishal: It's 'gruzhchik' (loader).
Researcher: Do you like it?
Bishal: It is necessary, and it is for food, for live, for everything.

Most Asians residing in Ukraine had sent money to their relatives back home but reported that during their first years in Ukraine they often received financial support from their families. Thus the nonmigrants were a source of financial and social support for migrants on their way to the destination and at an early stage of their sojourn in the host country. It was noted that only low-skilled migrants from Ukraine to the EU and from Asia to Ukraine remit money to their families or relatives at home. Low-skilled immigrants from Asia might request repayment of the money if they found themselves in financial difficulties. The representatives of other categories of temporary migrants sent money only if so requested. The money they earned was rather a means for developing their own activities. For them, the 'engine' of migration strategies was rather to find suitable living conditions and an opportunity for social self-realisation.

9.6 Sociocultural Aspects

All interviewees considered their stay in Ukraine as temporary but described the temporary nature of their sojourn in different ways. In most cases, temporariness was characterised by the length of the time the migrants resided in the country, while some referred to their temporary migratory intentions, to the level of integration in the host society or to their involvement in migrants' transnational networks. Only a few Ukrainians living abroad believed that they would remain in the destination country permanently, while the rest said that their intention was to return to Ukraine 'next year'. On the basis of earlier research (Markov 2009; Odynets 2015), it can be estimated that the return will often be postponed. In fact, nothing seems to be constant in the lives of temporary migrants except their prolonged temporariness. The price of this 'permanent temporariness' (Hugo 2013) was that the migrants never fully integrated into the host societies. In light of the research findings, this was the case both with the Ukrainians living abroad and foreign nationals living in Ukraine.

The prospects of returning home were often connected to the migrant's self-identification, such as the notion of 'where I feel at home'. According to Brednikova and Tkach (2010: 79), 'home' is often treated as 'the imperative of identity, the component of the feelings of selfness, family, community and the location in the time and space'. For many interviewees, 'home' was associated with their familial environment: 'Home is where there must be a private house, documents, family, work' (Baktash, 1983, male, humanitarian migrant, Afghanistan). Some interviewees with considerable migration experience and permanent displacement found it difficult to describe what 'home' meant for them. The following response to the researcher's question 'Where do you feel at home?' is enlightening. An Afghan irregular migrant answered: 'Nowhere' (Amed, 1983, male, Afghanistan). For some interviewees the perception of 'home' meant the whole world: 'Wherever I am. I am a citizen of the world. I mean, I could live anywhere' (Luca, 1982, male, lifestyle migrant, Italy).

All the temporary migrants interviewed acknowledged that migration had expanded their worldviews. They had become more open and tolerant towards new cultures, religions and different social groups. The low-skilled and family migrants from Ukraine especially highlighted the positive aspects of transnational migration. Their sense of self-worth had improved, and they had become more aware of their responsibility for their own lives (see Odynets 2015). All interviewees claimed that residing in a foreign country is a good thing because it makes people revise their values. In some cases, this might also result in bringing new ways of living into the countries of origin. The following discussion with Bohdan (1978, highly skilled migrant from Ukraine to Uzbekistan) illustrates transnational migration as a means for transforming one's ways of thinking:

> Researcher: Do you think that because you have migrated you change the country in which you live?
>
> Bohdan: Yes, I know that I change it.
>
> Researcher: How exactly?
>
> Bohdan: I know that my co-workers started to perceive their jobs differently. Workers still behave as the Soviet system demanded: they blindly do what the boss says; there is much that needs to be done in this respect. Also, thinking as part of the work process is absent, my co-worker will say and do what's expected, but he won't think about why he's doing what he's doing, why it is necessary, etc., but I ask and try to instill the belief in them that every worker, regardless of his role, should become professional in his field.

Some Asian migrants claimed that migration to Ukraine had forced them to postpone their personal plans, to change their cultural practices, and generally left them in a more uncertain position than before. The main problems in their integration and adaptation paths appeared to be the language barrier, corruption and unclear migration laws. Despite the critical perception of Ukraine due to its corruption, some Asians estimated that the corruption was even greater in their countries of origin. They felt that, compared to their home countries, Ukraine was more secure due to the civic society where the state is perceived as existing for the needs of people, not vice versa:

> Kazakhstan has developed a fixed vertical administrative structure built on nepotism. So, basically one cannot get a job in Kazakhstan without connections, it is virtually impossible without relatives. Regardless of what education you may have ... there are more possibilities for people to be successful in Ukraine than in Kazakhstan, this is obvious to me, so I will not argue my opinion. In Ukraine, the private business is much more developed. (Raman, 1980, highly skilled, Kazakhstan)

Most of the migrants interviewed had 'cancelled' the long distances between the places of origin and destination through the use of new communication and information technologies. The participation of temporary migrants in transnational social processes (Pries 1999) often took place through the social media. Contacts with their families at home were mainly maintained by means of Facebook, Skype and Viber (cf. Markov 2015: 1326). In the case of Asian migrants in Ukraine, the role of diasporic communities and social networks with their compatriots and other migrants was also of vital importance: 'We have no friends, only fellow countrymen' (Baktash 1982, humanitarian migrant, Afghanistan).

Some respondents had brought their family members or other acquaintances to the host countries and thus promoted the 'social chain' routing of their feasible migration. This way the nonmigrants likewise became potentially mobile. This was especially true among young and middle-aged Ukrainians who, thanks to the transnational social networks and the language training in Ukrainian universities, managed relatively easily to migrate across national borders:

> And I don't have my place here still. And I don't have highly paid job. And no one in our family has stable work, stable income. And in Ukraine situation is so uncertain, so, if there is such need, I think, that mother will migrate. And maybe I'll migrate too. (Maryana, 1991, nonmigrant, Ukraine)

9.7 Conclusion

Our research findings show that Ukraine remains a transit country with diverse flows of temporary migrants between Europe and Asia. Temporariness is usually defined through the perspective of receiving or sending countries, but, in the case of Ukraine, it is obvious that the dynamics of transit migration greatly determine the migrants' experiences of temporariness.

Representatives of all categories of temporary migrants appeared to be characterised by a willingness for further migration. Migrants' relatives at home and transnational social networks facilitated the prolonging of these migration projects. The characteristics of migratory movements might change during the migration trajectories, but, very often, temporariness had become a permanent way of life to the respondents.

In particular, there appeared to be four features which characterise temporariness in the Ukrainian case. First, the territory of Ukraine is used as a transit corridor for migrants from the East to the West, organised by transnational networks of smugglers. This group of transnational migrants mainly includes low-skilled migrants,

irregular migrants and refugees. Second, not only transit migrants but also the representatives of other categories, such as highly skilled specialists, students, entrepreneurs and lifestyle migrants, consider their sojourn in Ukraine mainly as one stage in their further movements to other countries, primarily to the EU and the USA.

Third, the dynamics of 'permanent temporariness' constitute a problem through the different categories of migrants, whether regular or irregular. For individual migrants, the transit through Ukrainian territory often takes several years (e.g. due to the need to earn money for further movements). The same dynamics of temporariness can be seen among those Ukrainian migrants who enter the EU or Asia and periodically circulate from one country (or region) to another in a search of better living and working conditions. Occasional or periodic return to the country of origin becomes one of the 'stages' of such transnational movements (Chorniy et al. 2014).

Finally, the outdated Ukrainian migration legislation and the involvement of officials in corrupt schemes are the fourth feature characterising contemporary Ukraine. The representatives of almost all categories of temporary migrants mentioned the confusion and uncertainty of procedures for their legalisation in Ukraine. The interviews with migrants from Asian countries particularly showed that the Ukrainian authorities responsible for migration are a part of the illegal transnational networks providing the necessary permits to stay in Ukraine. Due to the contradictions in Ukrainian legislation, gaining official status does not mean eligibility. This relates to the problems of corruption in the country. The prevailing regulations and corruption provide favourable circumstances for different kinds of irregular migratory movements.

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Chapter 10
Temporary Migrants' Experiences, Perceptions and Motivations in Asian-German Transnational Spaces

Mustafa Aksakal and Kerstin Schmidt

10.1 Introduction

Temporary transnational migration is an increasingly important phenomenon, which is partly reflected in the growing numbers of migrants and the alignment of the German migration legislation over the last years. On the one hand, international migration, and particularly temporary stays of Asians in Germany, has gained increasing importance. Accordingly, in 2013 Germany was the second most popular immigration country after the USA in absolute numbers (BAMF 2015); with 12.4% of all international migrants, immigration from Asia represents the third largest inflow of foreign people after EU and non-EU countries (Kreienbrink and Mayer 2014). On the other hand, two trends in immigration law can be noted: First, as Beine et al. (2015) observed for several receiving countries, also in Germany immigration laws are selective in nature and geared towards the attraction of migrants with particular characteristics. Second, the German immigration legislation has so far mainly been designed for temporary stays, since most permits are limited to a certain period of time (e.g. the regular resident permit, the EU Blue Card for professionals, the international student resident permit and the residence permits for asylum seekers). However, current German legislation also provides opportunities for more permanent stays, particularly for professionals who are able to incorporate successfully into the German labour market.[1]

In academia, temporary migration has been, for instance, discussed in relation to individual migrants' economic choices (Dustmann and Görlach 2015), economic advancement in respective countries of origin (Gibson et al. 2013) and social

[1] Immigration Act, available online at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/Zuwanderungsrecht_node.html

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development (Rahman 2009). Also, it is analysed with respect to the success of programmes for temporary labour (Martin 2004; Preibisch 2010), as well as in relationship to circular migration (Castles and Ozkul 2015; Ozkul and Obeng-Odoom 2013). In turn, there is a broad academic literature on migrants' transnationalism. In general, it can be argued that transnational studies have focused on the resulting dynamics of settled migration (Dahinden 2010), and less attention has been paid to temporary migrants' cross-border ties and activities. Transnational studies often focus on particular social practices and migrants' transfers, such as economic (Goldring 2004), political (Portes et al. 2002) and social remittances (Levitt 2001).

Temporary mobility has been rarely discussed in conjunction with transnationalism. An exception represents the study by Guarnizo and colleagues (2003). They address the reasons for migrants' transnational involvement and consider issues in the integration process, as well as 'socially expected durations' (Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1217) by families and friends in relation to cross-border engagement. This indicates that significant others' expectations are indirectly connected to migrants' temporariness, because they might influence motivations, expectations and decisions of migrants about the length of stay. Although this latter study provides valuable insights into the linkage between transnationalism and temporary migration, it does not address the complex set of factors that influences the temporariness of transnational migrants.

To contribute to filling this analytical gap, the goal of this chapter is to provide empirical insights into the understanding of current temporary transnational migration in the Asian-German transnational spaces. By analysing temporariness in migration and its transformative characteristics in the politico-legal, socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions, not only empirical but also theoretical insights into the interrelation between temporariness and transnationalism will be offered. The chapter provides an overview of the aspirations, experiences and perceptions of Asian migrants in Germany which are complemented by some relevant findings on German return migrants from Asia. The empirical data is based on a total of 84 qualitative semi-structured interviews, 73 with Asian migrants in Germany and 11 with German return migrants from Asia. According to the population size and significance of each country of origin in the respective migrant categories, we interviewed 26 international students, 21 professionals, 13 asylum seekers and refugees and 13 family members mainly from China, India, Turkey, Ukraine, Pakistan, Syria, South Korea, the Philippines, Afghanistan and Vietnam.

10.2 Migration Processes

The majority of the interviewed temporary Asian international students and professionals in Germany had previous internal or international migration experience. Thereby international destinations varied between other Asian countries, the USA or other European countries. Previous shorter stays in Germany, for instance, as exchange students or as participants in a summer school, were also common. The interviews showed that previous temporary migration experiences were often

based on different motivations than the current ones and often served as valuable experiences (i.e. living in foreign cultures, developing social networks) for the current stay.

In general terms, motivations for emigration of Asian temporary migrants in Germany were based on career development, particularly relevant for professionals as well as getting to know new cultures and extending the personal horizon, especially for international students. Migrant networks (King 2012) were relevant amongst almost all temporary migrants since they facilitated outmigration and served also as stimuli to migrate to particular destinations. Asylum seekers and refugees constituted a particular case since political repression or emerging military conflict represented an unexpected disruption in the life courses of people, which foiled their future plans. Results show that for refugees and asylum seekers, next to the search for protection, it was very important to continue interrupted career and education goals in Germany. Economic motivations were addressed to a lesser degree by the interviewees. In order to continue or to develop academic and professional careers, asylum seekers and refugees require an adequate infrastructure, which does often not exist anymore in their home countries.

Related to the motives of outmigration were the reasons for choosing Germany as a destination. In line with previous findings (Bessey 2012), the interviews showed that in the case of international students the very low tuition fees in comparison to other countries often determined the choice. This was particularly the case for those who considered themselves as not belonging to the wealthier population segments in their country of origin:

> Free education was the first thing, because the UK university was comparatively expensive, and plus, I am not from a very rich background. (Aisha 1974, female, student, Pakistan)

This indicates that the belonging to a social class can affect the decision about choosing Germany as a destination, particularly for people from lower social classes who desire to study elsewhere, but cannot afford it. In contrast, social class membership is unimportant for those who choose Germany due to the reputation of certain university disciplines. For instance, interviewees often mentioned the quality of university education in the field of engineering as a reason to prefer Germany over other potential destinations.

Next to the motivations for choosing Germany as destination, also aspirations and future life plans are relevant for decision-making processes amongst temporary migrants. Evidence showed that the latter are subject to a high level of uncertainty, and much seemed to depend on adequate opportunities in Germany and elsewhere:

> Right now as I said that after doing MA I don't know that I will be applying or taking so many options from other European countries, maybe USA and the UK also, so the best option, it depends, I will go for the best option. (Farouk 1984, male, family migrant, Pakistan)

As this quote shows, future migration plans were often ambiguous. This means that many interviewees expressed wishes to stay in Germany, but at the same time could imagine returning to their countries of origin. Several temporary migrants also mentioned their desire of living a transnational mobile lifestyle, indicating the tendency of temporary migrants to continue their transnational involvement.

10.3 Politico-Legal Aspects: Regulations, Institutional Practices and Political Participation

National regulations in Germany have changed since the adaptation of the New Foreigner Law (*Neues Zuwanderungsgesetz*) in 2005. Since then immigration policies are designed to attract certain migrant categories, such as professionals or students from non-EU and non-European countries, which is also expressed in the Law to Limit Immigration (*Zuwanderungsbegrenzungsgesetz*).[2] Legal regulations can represent an important hurdle for temporary migrants. Interviews showed that this was particularly relevant for some of the interviewed international students who indeed met the requirements for studying in Germany with respect to required qualifications and skills (previous diploma, grade averages, language skills, etc.) but who had difficulties to prove their financial independence by holding a block bank account. Another important issue, particularly perceived by interviewed family members, was the obligatory language skill tests, which are required for dependents from non-EU countries since 2007 (Green 2013). Some interviewees argued that language skill tests previous to arriving in Germany had significantly complicated their visa application process in the country of origins. Others stated that although language courses and related skill tests had been successfully completed, the expected ability to speak German and the related facilitation of the integration process in Germany did not materialise. It was often argued that the real challenge in the process of integration was not to complete the language courses but to practice German in everyday life, including the frequent interaction with German native speakers.

Institutional practices in the context of immigration policies were perceived differently by distinct temporary migrants. The personal considerations on policies and institutions varied due to the category in play and given to the support received previous to and during the stays. For example, in the case of a Philippine nurse who came to Germany on the basis of a bilateral labour programme, institutional support by the German government was provided. This led to the perception of a smooth visa application process:

> It was fast. It was well organized. It was God's blessing; it's already planned. It was not like, when you arrived you didn't know what to do. Everything was ok. The process was smooth. (Perla 1987, female, professional, Philippines)

In other cases empirical findings also indicate that support by employers was perceived as a facilitator during the process of obtaining a visa. Others who did not benefit from such support perceived high bureaucratic hurdles in the acquisition of their visa. One reason for this perception was the lack of German language skills,

[2] This is strongly related to the discussion on the need of foreign professionals due to a present – but above all a future – scarcity of skilled people in the country (Aksakal and Schmidt-Verkerk 2014). As argued by Castles (2009) in general terms, also in Germany this scarcity is mainly related to demographic change and consequent gaps in certain labour segments that might affect the country's competitiveness in the global economy.

which represented the most important obstacle when formally dealing with institutions. The importance of German language skills for managing German bureaucracy was deemed particularly striking by those people with previous migration experiences. During these previous stays abroad, many had developed their English skills with the hope to manage life also in Germany. However, once living in Germany, it became evident for a range of interview partners that a lot of people in Germany only possess basic English language skills and are unable to communicate in the subject areas necessary in the institutional context. This deficiency was, for instance, observed by temporary migrants in the case of institutional administrators in the handling of bureaucratic processes and was sometimes also associated with institutional discrimination:

> I feel like whenever I come into a contact with the German bureaucracy, like at the foreigners' office or like address registration place and again, I don't know if this is real or my own perception, but like I've been told "I can't help you, you need to bring a German person with you here" or something like this. And I mean she said that to me in English, so she obviously understands English and I didn't really quite understand you know, why she felt the need to tell me that I need to bring someone else to translate things. So that kind of a, like I wonder if it's an instance of racial discrimination. (Akari 1983, female, professional, Japan)

In addition to the issues reflected in the previous citation, also other expressions of this perceived discrimination were identified as arbitrary behaviour with regard to the practical implementation of particular regulations by officials. Particularly in the case of refugees and asylum seekers, for whom less formal support exists in dealing with their asylum application, institutional practices were perceived as unpredictable.

Another relevant topic in the politic-legal sphere is the political participation of temporary migrants. It was striking that a broad range of interviewed migrants did not exhibit significant political engagement in either emigration or immigration country policies. With regard to the transnational political engagement in hometown associations (HTAs), there was also a contrast to settled migration. Previous empirical findings suggest that long-term immigrants are politically engaged in HTAs' self-administration in Germany (Caĝlar 2006). In the context of temporary immigration to Germany, this was only the case amongst certain international students, who were involved in student union activities and thereby influence general university policies. Complementing the findings by Schüller and Schüler-Zhou (2013) on Chinese student associations, another interesting example is the one of an Indian student association, which provides help for newly arriving international students in Germany, organises some Indian cultural activities and supports Indian students – in collaboration with the Indian embassy – to find internships or employment positions in Germany.

> During summer fest we provide Indian culture and Indian food to people … so we make money through that which is fully replaced towards receiving students and helping them arrive safely … we provide them with tutors which they can contact for any further purposes. Second, we have a website through which we answer all relevant questions for every student who would like to join here. So we actually give them a preview through our web-

> site about how their life would be in Germany and answer these questions. Another objective that Indian association does take care of is to search for internships for students through companies here by showing our students. That is basically through the Indian consulate will be very helpful in helping us find organisation of business people who are in requirement of students as interns. (Ashraf 1986, male, student, India)

As the quotation shows, this student association provides support not only during the stays in the form of assistance upon arrival and after graduation but also in preparation of the stays. The interviewed international students involved in these associations were not directly engaged in politics in India or in Germany. However, next to supporting Indian students, they were participating in formal political structures of higher education institutions (e.g. the political involvement in the student union and parliament).

Yet, transnational political practices were more explicitly expressed in the motivation of asylum seekers and refugees regarding their future political engagement with homeland policies. As noted, this represents an exemption with respect to the political engagement amongst temporary transnational migrants in general. Consider the statement of a Bangladeshi asylum seeker:

> My wish [is] to learn [from] here and I need to spread it to Bangladesh, because we are learning, we are developing country and you are developed, fully developed country. Because I'm learning something from here I want to share with my country people "please go this way, because this way is good for you, this way is good for the people". So I want to learn from Germany, I want to share with my people and fundamentalist people actually, yes. Yes, my wish to here, because I want to learn from here and I want to share with my friends, with my society in Bangladesh do this, do that, because it's humanity and this is a right way for the people. (Sudipto 1991, male, asylum seeker, Bangladesh)

The aimed political engagement mentioned in the previous quote had not been yet realised but was planned in the future. Nevertheless, the statement shows that asylum seekers and refugees as temporary migrants maintain their transnational bonds; they did not only plan to benefit from political freedom in Germany but were also willing to contribute to the right to free expression in their countries of origin.

10.4 Socio-economic Aspects: Employment, Recognition of Skills, Social Mobility and Transnational Economic Practices

The study reveals that the majority of interviewed professionals had at the time of the interview a full-time employment. The most important labour opportunities used by highly skilled migrants in Germany were in the areas of different kinds of engineering, medical professions, science, management, journalism, law and consultancy. Also, a range of international students maintained themselves by different kinds of part-time jobs, either in the university as student assistants or in other labour sectors, often in auxiliary jobs.

The findings also show that most professionals perceived their labour conditions regarding content of work, working hours, work load and responsibility as positive. In contrast, the formal consideration of skills was often perceived as a long and laborious bureaucratic process by international students. Professional qualifications of highly skilled migrants were mostly fully recognised, which was also facilitated by the fact that many of them obtained their degrees at internationally recognised institutions in the USA or in other European countries. Medical doctors represented an exception because their qualifications were only partly recognised, which means that they had to pass additional exams in Germany.

Next to this formal recognition, also the acceptance of skills at an informal level seems to be an important selection criterion for the recruitment of temporary migrants. Many interviewees argued that the fluency of the working language, attitudes and social skills are often expected in German companies. They might represent important mechanisms of exclusion, potentially leading to inequalities between foreign and domestic professionals. A further important socio-economic aspect that temporary transnational migrants experienced was occupational mobility, which can be defined as a subfield of social mobility. Social mobility can be understood as the movement of temporary migrants from one social position, category or situation to another (Berger 2000). Many of the interviewed professionals perceived their migration experiences as positive, indicating upward mobility in their life courses. As the empirical evidence suggests, especially professionals working in German companies stressed their personal advances and career developments much more than intercompany transferees, who mainly compared their occupational mobility to their previous position in the company. At the same time, for professionals who did not migrate in the context of an intercompany transfer, the probability of changing the field of work was higher, as careers did not depend on company structures.

In contrast to the majority of professionals, other interviewed temporary migrants in Germany perceived their stays as a situation that led to downward mobility. Particularly, part-time jobs outside the academic context were perceived as unfavourable by international students. The dual labour market theory (Piore 1979) suggests that auxiliary jobs are part of the secondary labour market sector in countries of destination. According to this theory, in contrast to local workers, secondary labour market jobs are voluntarily accepted by labour migrants, because their reference frame is based on their social positions in peripheral countries of origin. Since migrants' previous labour conditions and socio-economic situations are assumed to be highly precarious, the secondary labour sector jobs in respective destination countries are associated with social upward mobility. In contrast to this theoretical idea, the situation of interviewed temporary migrants needs to be evaluated differently; a range of interviewed international students had worked previously as professionals in their home countries or abroad, and consequently auxiliary part-time jobs, in which they were engaged, were perceived as precarious. These jobs were mostly considered as a voluntary downward mobility, which is limited in time, because enrolling, for instance, in master studies, also meant for them an investment in their future with the expectation of career enhancement.

Temporary transnational migration of family members often involved unpaid housework. This situation was mostly considered as unfavourable, but the resulting personal consequences were perceived very differently; some expressed their satisfaction with not being responsible for providing the household income but with the making of a home. Others regretted that they had given up their previous highly skilled jobs before migrating to Germany, which meant a disruption in their careers, the limitation of financial resources and the lack of social contacts in the workplace.

In contrast to the above-mentioned international students and family members, the downward occupational mobility of asylum seekers and refugees needs to be considered clearly as involuntary. The most striking point is that occupational shifts were likely to be more permanent, in the cases when qualifications were not fully recognised. Furthermore, asylum seekers and refugees might have undergone gradual occupational downward mobility during different migration experiences over time, as the following reflection of a Pakistani teacher shows.

> I was a teacher in Pakistan…I had no problem of money. My father was a landlord and my brother had a handsome salary. We also have some agri-business as well. So [I had] no financial problems [With regard to his occupation in a previous destination, he states:] I was satisfied there and worked in a construction company as a foreman. I started work as a labourer but after two months I was promoted as foreman, because I was familiar and [knew how to] handle the heavy machines. The company gave me a handsome salary. (Hussain 1972, male, asylum seeker, Pakistan)

However, some temporary migrants perceived vertical social mobility not as exclusively related to occupation and income but also to other not exclusively material aspects of life. These include, for instance, the access to high-quality education, the possibility to expand professional networks, an increase in the quality of living arrangements, the expanded possibilities of free time activities as well as an increase in social prestige.

> I think it is positive only. I am personally getting very different and nice exposure in terms of my professional career. My children are getting better education here. My wife is getting better life here. My kids are getting better exposure, because they are now exposed to multicultural, multinational kind of environment. So all in all I think it's positive for me. (Ravi 1971, male, professional, India)

This quotation indicates that temporary migrants not only associated vertical mobility with changing income and personal career prospects but also with increases in the quality of life of their family's and themselves. As noted previously, an important characteristic of international temporary migrants was their cross-border bonds to people in the country of origin, as well as in previous places of destination. In the socio-economic sphere, transnational features can be framed, for instance, by the involvement in transnational businesses, labour opportunities and financial transfers.

As migration scholars argued, the quantitative significance of financial remittances in the context of international labour migrants is often highlighted in association with broader development outcomes in countries of origin (de Haas 2010), which is however not conclusively proven (Faist 2008; Kapur 2004).

According to our findings, these transfers play a relatively minor role amongst temporary transnational migrants. The majority of the interviewees indicate either that there is no socio-economic need by significant others or those temporary migrants are not in the economic position to remit money back home. In the case of international students, reverse financial remittances, meaning frequent money transfers from countries of origin to the destination (Khadria 2009), were, particularly at the beginning of stays, used for covering the living costs in Germany.

Some temporary Asian migrants engaged in transnational businesses related to the trade with very different products, including components, household items, cosmetics, baby food, alcoholic beverages as well as services. The empirical findings show that family members and students had established these border-crossing economic activities during the stay in Germany, as visible in the case of an international student:

> Actually, I got the financial support from my father, and also, we have a family company in Turkey, which is an export company, mostly export to Germany. So I try to coordinate things here and work for the family company. And also, I get the salary from this company. (Mustafa 1985, male, student, Turkey)

There is evidence that these practices served to gain first insights into entrepreneurship, but students also perceived these activities as a way of achieving financial independence during their studies and stay. A range of students also planned entrepreneurial activities after their studies based on the knowledge gained and the access to social networks they acquired in Germany.

In addition to these two forms of transnationalism of temporary migrants, transnational labour opportunities represent another area of significance. As suggested by the concept of brain circulation (Saxenian 2005), these can lead to significant development outcomes, in countries of destination and origin, as well as amongst the migrants themselves. Yet, as the present research shows, for some of the interviewed professionals, these opportunities served as an important escalator for career development, because professional knowledge is combined with expertise on the homeland economy. In turn, this background facilitated access to prestigious management positions and consequently leads to upward social mobility.

10.5 Socio-cultural Aspects: Worldview, Behaviours and Integration

The stay in Germany contributed to changes of people's worldviews and to the gaining of independence from their families. This was especially relevant for international female migrants in order to overcome personally experienced gender inequalities in places of origin. Additionally, interviews with female temporary migrants indicated that gender-related emancipative ideas were developed. Furthermore, some interviewees reflected how they had to learn to cope with the separation from their social environment and thereby acquired skills they

considered useful for living abroad. This indicates that changes in awareness and behaviours towards an independent life might serve as a coping strategy, because people were leaving their comfort zone when migrating temporarily. Living an independent life also included, particularly amongst international students, living arrangements in flat-shared communities, which was often perceived as stimulating open-minded and tolerant attitudes regarding different ways of life.

Beside these considered favourable aspects of the personal migration experience, respondents also reported adverse consequences such as psychological issues and disruptions to social life, particularly caused by the separation from significant others.

> My sisters and my family, they think that I'm more serious, a more serious person now. Maybe because I'm living alone here, and so it's affect my personality. And I feel bad sometimes when I visit my family. I feel bad because so many things, so many issues, hard to solve. (Aisha 1974, female, student, Pakistan)

In order to compensate these emotional and social gaps, most of the interviewees maintained close transnational social bonds either through temporary visits, phone calls or social media, which shows the significance of cross-border ties particularly in times of personal hardships. In addition to a source of emotional support, these transnational ties can also be understood as a form of social capital for facilitating access to migration-related information (Massey et al. 1993; Portes 1998). According to Coleman (1988), social capital refers to social structures facilitating the actions of people who are connected through these structures. Thus, referring to relations between people, three different forms of social capital can be distinguished: obligations and expectations, information flow and norms accompanied by sanctions.

In fact, the findings show that in the case of Asians in Germany, different forms of social capital were relevant previous to their arrival, during their stay and for future plans. Particularly, information flows were relevant in those cases, where the planning of the migration course was highly insecure and no formal supportive structures existed, such as amongst asylum seekers and refugees. This is, for instance, reflected in the following statement:

> Agents are easily available to arrange this illegal journey. I consulted with an agent in Afghanistan. One of my friends gave me the contact number of the agent and I consulted with him. The agent had directed us to follow his instructions while crossing different borders. He informed us about the people who helped us to cross the border. Agent had arranged some people who facilitate us; some time two people three people. They travelled with us and they also looked like migrants. I just followed them. (Jamil 1990, male, asylum seeker, Afghanistan)

Support based on social capital was not only received but also provided by temporary migrants in Germany. This exchange was particularly relevant amongst some professionals and students, who provided social remittances, defined as the flow of ideas, skills, settings and behaviours (Levitt 1998, 2001). In contrast to empirical findings revealed in previous studies, which found that emancipative ideas developed during the stay abroad were remitted back home, our findings show that these ideas were amongst interviewed temporary migrants mainly limited to the creation

of an independent lifestyle. This does not mean that social remittances as such were unimportant. For instance, the exchange of ideas can also be expressed by providing useful network contacts, as an Indian professional who used his networks to provide specific knowledge to his family and friends, highlighted:

> When my relative needs my help in various areas, I help develop sufficient contacts in India to help them. Sometimes somebody is asking some kind of medical assistance, for instance like in Mumbai which I know well. So, I turn contact to relevant persons and get all the appointments. So I'm in touch, so they come for help. (Ravi 1971, male, professional, India)

The empirical findings show that existing transnational ties with family members, friends and professional contacts were characterised by different patterns regarding the frequency and the means of communication. Furthermore, the frequency of visits to countries of origin and places of previous destinations varied amongst the interviewed migrants, depending on the geographical distance, available economic resources, travel opportunities related to the current occupation and the level of attachment to significant others. Despite this heterogeneity, all these communicative transactions served as kind of 'glue' of cross-border bonds (Vertovec 2004).

Evidently, temporary migrants' social relations were not limited to those with people in countries of origin and previous destinations, but also involved relationships to people living in Germany. These included relatives, friends, colleagues and acquaintances. Particularly, friends and colleagues were embracing co-nationals and other international migrants. The findings depict a blurred picture regarding feelings of acceptance; some interviewees perceived a social distance to German nationals, which was related to perceptions of discrimination in everyday life or the feeling of not being accepted. Other temporary migrants felt accepted and welcomed, especially evident amongst highly skilled migrants and family members married to Germans. Regarding the feeling of belonging, research results show that temporary migrants often identified 'home' as their countries or cities of origin, showing their maintained ties to these places. In some cases, such as amongst some professionals and international students, they related 'home' to their current city of residence, but there was no evidence that home was considered explicitly as Germany. None of the interviewed temporary migrants identified with societies of previous destinations. This identification with the current place of residence, including places in Germany, therefore might be of a temporary nature, limited to the time of stay.

There is evidence that the feelings of acceptance and belonging were often influenced by the temporary migrants' degree of cross-border involvement.

10.6 Temporary Migration from Germany to Asia

Temporary migration from Germany to Asia is focused differently because the interviews took place after the conclusion of the stay. With regard to the transnational characteristics, this means that these are considered in two different contexts:

First, their cross-border links to Germany during their stay in Asia and, second, their maintained cross-border links after returning to Germany.

Similar to Asian migrants in Germany, previous migration experience was also an important feature of German migrants in Asia and was equally diverse regarding motivations and migration patterns. As the interviews show, the main reasons for temporary stays abroad were often based on a mixture of interest in a different culture with educational and professional goals. Some interviewees aimed to strengthen their professional networks. In this respect, related to the motives for international stays of researchers, consider the statement of a German scholar who stayed various times in China, Indonesia and Thailand:

> It was crucial that research interests of the colleagues from the region corresponded to my research focus. On the other hand, the interest in the countries and, in the role of the respective countries and societies for my research, was also crucial and important. So I cannot say it was either or, but rather both. (Hans 1975, male, GA_professional, Germany)

Evidence shows that the temporary stay abroad represented only one phase of career development. Qualification processes often continue in Germany, indicating that this horizon regarding their professional future had a significant influence on the temporariness of stays in Asia. Therefore, particularly amongst German professionals, occupational mobility stayed closely in relation to their professional positions and careers in Germany. In other words, the results indicate that stays abroad were often perceived as temporary stages in people's careers, serving as a further qualification in their professional curricula. The findings suggest that temporary stays of Germans in Asia therefore need to be evaluated differently than stays of Asians in Germany. In the former case, not the reputation of the education system or certain labour market sectors of a particular country mattered but, in more general terms, the experiences and skills gained abroad.

There is a diverse picture regarding the perceptions of immigration policies and the treatment by institutions, sometimes depending on the countries in which they stayed but also on the migration channels. Similar to the experiences of Asians in Germany, most interviewed Germans experienced a low level of bureaucratic hurdles when their stays were embedded in formal institutional arrangements by companies or universities. Consider the case of a German international student related to the experiences of the visa application in China:

> The first visa was just, the university in China sent me something like the invitation letter, and, yeah, they sent me this letter, then, I call the agency here in Germany they helped me to apply for the visa because normally you have to go on your own to the embassy in Frankfurt or in Berlin or in Hamburg. (Jens 1991, male, student, Germany)

In the case of lifestyle migrants, these facilities often did not exist in the same way. Furthermore, some bureaucratic processes were perceived as time-consuming and highly demanding, as this example, also in the Chinese context, demonstrates:

> [It was] very complicated, because you need to write down everything as a Non-Chinese national. This means every day you need to indicate where you sleep, where you travel to, how you enter the country and how you are leaving the country. I think this is very complicated. (Stefan 1989, male, lifestyle migrant, Germany)

Regarding transnational economic activities, evidence shows that these were mainly limited to reverse financial remittances, which means that interviewed international students were sometimes supported by their parents to finance their studies and their stays abroad. This was also the case for some Asian temporary migrants in Germany. Yet, in contrast transnational businesses and transnational labour opportunities played a minor role for the interviewed German temporary migrants in Asia. After return, transnational links to friends in Asia were often maintained. Yet, these links were often weaker than the links maintained during their stays to German friends because the friendships with Asian were often based on the motives for the stay abroad, such as learning the language and cultural exchange. Most of return migrants perceived the contact to locals during their stay in Asia as very enriching experiences. Some of the interviewees also argued that the stays abroad had shaped their feelings of belonging:

> I myself feel after my stay in China on the one hand still very German, but above all as European. This is one of the most important changes for me. This is so, because I met there many persons of a European Origin. I realised that there are similarities, whether they were French or Czech, or English people. (Lisa 1980, female, student, Germany)

The citation indicates that the own migration experiences can help to develop a more open-minded and cosmopolitan perspective towards foreign people, which might not only be limited to contacts obtained abroad but also include established contacts with migrants in Germany after return.

10.7 Conclusion

In the existing literature, temporary migrants' transnationalism is often not comprehensively addressed, particularly with regard to the complex set of factors involved in the linkage. In contrast, the presented findings provide new insights into this relationship.

With regard to the temporary nature of transnational migration, the present research results show that in the politico-legal sphere, beside immigration policy, aspects such as the lack of institutional support, complex bureaucratic procedures as well as perceived institutional discrimination related to the functioning of institutions represent important factors that are likely to influence the temporariness of current Asian migrants in Germany. Regarding socio-economic aspects, evidence shows that beside monetary considerations, career opportunities in relation to the pursuit of occupational upward mobility, the recognition of previously gained skills in the German labour market and general satisfaction with the job are important aspects. Socio-cultural aspects are seldom considered in the analysis of the temporariness of migration. Yet, from a sociological point of view, the empirical data on temporary immigration to Germany show that migrants' identification with cultures and places in countries of origin or current destinations is also significant. These include experiences of social inclusion or exclusion; evidences indicate that the

latter aspect is often leading to psychological stressors and affecting strongly decisions about the temporariness of migrants' stays.

Immigration policies are designed to attract migrants with certain qualities to overcome the adverse conditions related to the predicted demographic change. Therefore, German legislation can be considered as open towards certain highly skilled mobile people but at the same time as selective with respect to international migrants in general. However, as our findings demonstrate the length of stay cannot be completely controlled by immigration laws but also depends on the above-discussed aspects influencing migrants' decision to stay or leave.

With regard to the transnational aspects of temporary migration in the social dimension, research findings show that most temporary migrants in Germany in all categories maintain strong linkages to countries of origin and to a lesser extent to relevant previous countries of destination. The frequency of contacts with different groups of people in these places is often hierarchised. With regard to the politico-legal dimension, it is worth noting that, in general terms (with the exception of asylum seekers and refugees), the lack of transnational political engagement with homeland or immigration policies is a distinguishing feature. Another characteristic of temporary migrants regarding their transnational commitment are socio-economic aspects. One interesting finding represents the relatively low significance of financial remittances to significant others in countries of origin. In contrast, reverse forms of transfers, meaning economic help mainly provided to international students by relatives in places of origin or in previous destinations, are more relevant. Especially, amongst some professionals and international students, transnational businesses are important features, indicating frequent cross-border activities with places of origin and previous destinations. There is also evidence that some international students plan to establish border-crossing enterprises, while their current studies are perceived as a part of the entrepreneurial strategy with regard to gaining knowledge and building networks. Findings also indicate that Asian professionals in Germany can have important career advantages, when they use effectively transnational labour opportunities. This is often achieved when professional know-how is meshed with knowledge on the economy of the home country or previous destinations. This groundwork enables professionals to have access to higher occupational positions in Germany.

With regard to German international students in Asia, the findings reveal that regarding border-crossing transactions only financial remittances played a role; similarly to the previously noted, it was used for financing expenses during their stays. Temporary transnational migration has also certain outcomes for individual migrants as well for countries of origin; the former is related to different kinds of social mobility, sometimes related to non-economic and non-career-related aspects. In sum, the study shows that there is a multi-layered relationship between the discussed temporariness and migrants' cross-border ties and practices that needs to be considered differently in research of contemporary forms of international migration.

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Chapter 11
Unfulfilled Expectations: The Contradictions of Dutch Policy on Temporary Migration

Natasja Reslow

11.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the experiences of highly skilled migrants and their families who move temporarily to the Netherlands. It uncovers a basic paradox: Dutch migration policy aims to attract highly skilled migrants to the Netherlands through various incentives, and yet in practice this policy does not manage to remove all the challenges and difficulties encountered by these migrants. Based on interviews with students, highly skilled labour migrants, and their families, this chapter concludes that migration to the Netherlands can be made easier and therefore more attractive for highly skilled migrants.

Dutch policy on temporary migration is very much shaped by past experiences with migration from former colonies and with the 'guest worker' schemes (e.g. Guiraudon et al. 2005; Rath 2009; Zorlu and Hartog 2001). For several decades, an official discourse of denial existed regarding immigration from the former Dutch colonies. For example, the Moluccans who arrived in 1951 were considered to be temporary residents who would eventually be returned to Indonesia. For this reason, they were poorly (or not at all) integrated into Dutch society: they were housed in camps, where their children also attended school, and their access to the labour market was restricted. Only in 1970 did the Dutch government recognise that this group of immigrants were not temporary but permanent residents in the Netherlands.

For many years, a 'myth of return' also surrounded the Surinamese arriving in the Netherlands. The Dutch government and parliament assumed that these people would eventually return to their newly independent country and only slowly came to accept that this would not be the case. In the 1960s, the Netherlands signed guest

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worker agreements with Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia (Geddes 2003: 105). Between 1963 and 1983, 415,800 migrants from these countries arrived in the Netherlands (van Eijl 2009: 29). All of these guest workers were intended to be temporary workers; indeed, a Dutch government paper from 1970 argued that the Netherlands needed 'manpower and not the immigration of families' (van Amersfoot and Surie 1987: 178). The guest workers from Southern Europe and Yugoslavia did largely return to their countries of origin with the onset of the economic crisis and the termination of the guest worker agreements in the 1970s. However, many of those from Morocco and Turkey stayed, and these migration flows have shaped the immigrant population in the Netherlands today. Up until the 1990s, there was therefore an assumption of short-term stay but a practice of long-term stay of migrants.

The resulting public debate about integration of migrants shapes Dutch migration policy to this day. Immigration and integration have become highly politicised issues in the Netherlands, with political parties taking clear and diverging stances. Right-wing populist parties have achieved electoral success (van Kessel 2011) and have been able to shape the political and societal debate on immigration. This has transformed the Dutch political landscape: some scholars argue that the most salient issue in Dutch politics is no longer the traditional left-right divide, but rather 'non-material issues such as national identity, immigration, asylum, law and order, and the future of European integration' (van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008: 400). The other Dutch political parties have changed in response to the challenge from right-wing populist parties. Bale et al. (2010: 417) argue that the Dutch labour party (PvdA) 'tied itself up in knots trying to adapt to the transformed political landscape': it understood the importance to the electorate of immigration issues, but the party leadership also did not want to alienate its substantial following among ethnic minorities. It paid the price at the polls in 2002 and 2006. The centre-right parties, the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the conservative liberals (VVD), have 'moved towards hard-line and restrictive policies' on issues of migration, asylum-seekers, nationalism and multiculturalism, in an attempt to find an answer to the challenge from the right-wing populists (van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008: 398). The political situation is reflected in Dutch migration policy, which for many groups of migrants has become very restrictive: there are age and income requirements for family reunification, integration exams must be taken abroad before migrants arrive, irregular migrants may be detained, and dual nationality is in most cases not permitted (Engbersen et al. 2007: 391; OECD 2012: 254; van Selm 2005; ter Wal 2007: 250).

Dutch policy and legislation identifies 12 different purposes of temporary migration that are relevant for this chapter (article 3.4 Aliens Decree), including family reunification, different types of labour migration (self-employment, the highly skilled migrant scheme, the EU Blue Card, seasonal work, regular labour migration, cross-border service provision, scientific researcher), various stages of education (study, internship, searching for employment after graduation) and cultural exchange (which includes working holidays and au pair migration). Whilst some of these categories of temporary migration are strictly temporary (including seasonal workers and cross-border service providers), others may lead the way to permanent

settlement in the Netherlands if the migrant concerned amasses a 5-year period of residence through renewals of the initial residence permits. Asylum seekers whose asylum application is granted initially receive a temporary residence permit for a period of 5 years. At the end of the 5-year period, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) assesses whether it is possible to return to the country of origin; if this is not the case, refugees may apply for a permanent asylum residence permit (European Migration Network 2012: 44). This has been criticised because 'in practice, no one is protected under the UN's 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as originally conceived. The status granted is not open-ended, as convention status would be expected to be' (van Selm 2005).

An analysis of policy documents uncovers several principles underpinning Dutch temporary migration policy (see Reslow 2014a). Dutch migration policy in general is restrictive; for example, a work permit will only be granted if there is an insufficient supply of labour in the Netherlands and other countries of the European Economic Area. However, the government aims to facilitate the admission of migrants who contribute to Dutch economy, culture or science (European Migration Network 2010: 11). In practice this means that highly skilled migrants (those earning more than 3,108 Euros per month) have an easier route to long-term residence in the Netherlands and are exempt from some of the requirements that medium- and low-skilled migrants have to fulfil; for example, they do not need to have a work permit. Temporary migration therefore concerns mainly medium- and low-skilled workers. Temporary migration is not seen as a tool for addressing shortages in the Dutch labour market; this should rather be achieved through the activation of groups in the population that are currently under- or unemployed. Indeed, given the economic crisis in Europe, policy documents question whether temporary migration is actually desirable for the Netherlands. Under any circumstances, there is a focus in Dutch policy on ensuring that temporary migrants return to their country of origin when their residence permit expires. The Dutch government believes that temporary migration can contribute to the development of migrants' countries of origin and prevent brain drain (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice 2008). Finally, in contrast to migrants whose stay in the Netherlands is more permanent, temporary migrants are not obliged to fulfil integration requirements, such as demonstrating knowledge of Dutch language and culture. This in theory emphasises the non-permanent nature of their stay, although it is of course counterproductive for those migrants whose initially temporary stays in the Netherlands become more permanent.

11.2 Data Collection

The sampling strategy for this research was based on previous research which sought to quantify temporary migration to and from the Netherlands (Reslow 2014b). The final sample of interviewees is presented in Table 11.1 below. Due to difficulties encountered with finding particular categories of migrants, the sample is made up mostly of highly skilled migrants.

Table 11.1 Sample of interviewees

Category	No. of interviews	Country of origin/destination and gender
Family	10	China (female: 3); India (female: 2); Iran (female: 1); Philippines (female: 3); Taiwan/USA (female: 1)
Study	31	China (female, 10; male, 7); Hong Kong (female: 1); Indonesia (female, 1; male, 1); Oman (female: 1); Saudi Arabia (male: 2); South Korea (female: 5); Thailand (male: 1); Turkey (female: 1); Vietnam (female: 1)
Highly skilled	17	China (female, 2; male, 1); India (male: 9); Indonesia (female: 1; male: 1); Iran (male: 2); Philippines (female: 1)
Search year	7	China (female: 2; male: 3); Indonesia (female: 1); Philippines (female: 1)
Researcher	10	Anonymous (female: 1); China (female, 4; male, 1); India (male: 1); Indonesia (female: 2); Iran (male: 1)
Au pair	1	Philippines (female: 1)
Intern	1	China (female: 1)
Asylum	1	Palestine (male: 1)
Family of Dutch abroad	3	Thailand (female, 1; male, 1; family, 1)
Lifestyle migrants	1	Thailand (couple: 1)

11.3 Migration Processes

One thing to note at the outset regarding migrants' migration processes is the contrast between the length of the current residence permit and the length of the total stay in the Netherlands. Seventeen of the migrants interviewed had been in the Netherlands longer than the length of their current residence permit. This use of consecutive temporary residence permits makes the phenomenon 'temporary migration' difficult to capture accurately. In the academic literature, this has been defined as 'any form of territorial movement which does not represent a permanent, or lasting, change of usual residence' (Bell and Ward 2000: 88). The Netherlands does not have a clear legal definition of the concept of temporary migration (European Migration Network 2011: 13). Dutch policy practice is to issue all migrants initially with a fixed-term residence permit, which can in some instances be renewed and may eventually lead to permanent residence. This means that there is no Dutch policy on temporary migration as such, because all migration is temporary at first.

11.3.1 Motivations for Migration

Interviewees had many and varied reasons for choosing the Netherlands: financial incentives; the quality of Dutch universities or a particular study programme; the perceived widespread use of English in Dutch society; having family, friends or a

partner in the Netherlands or Europe; having previously lived in the Netherlands; the existence of a country-of-origin community; opportunity to gain professional experience; and the opportunity to have a 'search year' permit after graduation. This does not include those migrating for family reasons, as for them the choice was dictated by their spouse's work. Indeed, one interviewee spoke of the cultural pressure behind her migration, as marriage is seen as centrally important, and it is the responsibility of the woman to follow her husband.

Many interviewees had lived abroad before, in a variety of countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, the UK, the USA and Vietnam. Even those who had not lived abroad were sometimes prepared for migration, for instance through having attended boarding school or due to their parents' experiences. One migrant explained that her father, who had studied abroad himself, made the decision when she was young to speak only English (instead of Indonesian) with her, in order to prepare her for studying abroad.

The 'search year' permit, which is intended to allow graduates from a Dutch university to spend 1 year searching for employment in the Netherlands, is actually being used to work. Although holders of the 'search year' permit are legally permitted to work, and do not require a work permit, government documents make clear that the intention of this permit is to grant graduates time to find a job that fulfils the requirements of the highly skilled migrant scheme (Nuffic 2013). In other words, once he/she has found work, the holder of a 'search year' permit should transition to a highly skilled migrant permit; this transition should be facilitated by their new employer. However, of the seven interviewees holding a search year permit, three were already working. Often it was not clear whether the employer would apply for a highly skilled migrant permit once the search year had expired – for instance, in one case the employer concerned was not part of the covenant with the IND and therefore could not sponsor such a permit. However, the residence right depends on having work and therefore on the employer. This puts migrants in a tricky position:

> It is pretty difficult for me to find a job and qualify for a visa. I have to find a job that qualifies for the 'kennismigrant' and the companies that are big, they are a lot more picky. Also the companies that I really have an interest in, usually I like smaller companies, they are more entrepreneurial, more unique and more casual in the work environment, but they are less capable of ensuring such migration assistance. (Cheng 1990, male, search year, China)

Being in such an uncertain position might cause these graduates to decide to leave the Netherlands in order to find more secure residence in another country. If it is the aim of the Dutch government to retain talented graduates after they complete their education at a Dutch university, then it should be easier/cheaper for businesses to keep an employee hired on a search year permit. This could be achieved by, for example, exempting graduates of Dutch universities from the labour market test (which allows employers to hire a non-EU national only if they can prove that there are no Dutch or EU nationals available to fill the position).

Several interviewees mentioned problems or had complaints regarding the migration regulations in the Netherlands. Firstly, there are frequent changes to immigration rules. Indeed, the migrants interviewed for this research project may have been affected by the changes to the Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act introduced in 2014, which, for instance, extended the time period after which migrants have free access to the Dutch labour market. Secondly, non-EU migrants are at a disadvantage compared to EU migrants, for example, due to the labour market preference for EU citizens. Thirdly, it is difficult for Asian students to find a job or internship because they are limited by law to 10 hours' employment per week and require a work permit even for part-time jobs. Finally, the costs and requirements for family visas can make it difficult for families to stay together or even to have family members from Asia come to the Netherlands for a visit. For example, the application for a tourist visa for the Netherlands requires that either the tourist themselves or their sponsor (family member in the Netherlands) has sufficient resources; for the sponsor, this means a monthly income of at least €1,500. This is a considerable hurdle and in combination with the difficulties of transnational communication can leave migrants feeling lonely in the Netherlands. Such feelings of loneliness might prompt them to return to their countries of origin. If the Dutch government wishes to encourage highly skilled migrants to stay, it could make it easier for Asian nationals to enter the Netherlands to visit family members, for example, by lowering the financial requirements for such a tourist visa to be granted.

Given their complaints about Dutch migration regulations and the high level of education of the interviewees, it was surprising to learn that many of them seemed to rely on partial, second-hand or hearsay information about the relevant regulations, e.g. regarding their entitlement to benefits or to work. This was clear from their use of phrases such as 'someone told me', 'I am not sure whether it is true or not' and 'I 'heard from some people'. This is significant, because if they do not know the exact rules and regulations, temporary migrants may not claim their full rights and entitlements. Given that Dutch policy tries to encourage the immigration of precisely the groups who were interviewed for this project (highly skilled migrants and their families), the provisions might actually be more generous than interviewees were even aware of. In order to prevent migrants from relying on potentially incorrect information, which may influence their future migration intentions, the government could present migrants on arrival in the Netherlands with information on migration regulations and contact details for IND (from which they can obtain further, accurate information).

11.3.2 Consequences of Migration

Many interviewees mentioned that in their country of origin having worked or studied abroad is viewed respectfully by others, although in countries such as India and China it is increasingly normal for young people to go abroad for a short period. One interviewee experienced that his difficulties with opening a bank account in

India evaporated when the bank discovered he had been living in the USA. However, interviewees felt that the image that is held of emigrants in the country of origin may contrast with the reality that they experience in the country of destination:

> They all try to judge you and think you have a lot of money. That is a wrong concept from the Chinese people because they just don't know how it is like overseas, they don't know the difficulties we face. They only see the shiny part: your work for the global company, your clothes, your nice husband … They don't see the difficulties we have been through. (Lin 1979, female, family migrant, China)

This positive view of living abroad could also be problematic because migrants felt unable to share their concerns with friends in the country of origin. Interviewees felt that migration is a privilege and that their concerns about everyday life in the Netherlands would therefore not be understood by family or friends in the country of origin or might even be resented.

Migration can have an impact on religious freedom, but this was found to work in different ways: some interviewees became religious, such as Chinese interviewees who began to attend church in the Netherlands (something they were not able to do in China); others were becoming less religious (or their process of secularisation was speeding up), perhaps due to the non-religious culture in the Netherlands (e.g. Houtman and Mascini 2002; van Tubergen 2007); and finally those who continued to practice their religion faced some obstacles, such as praying at the right times. Such obstacles can influence future migration decisions:

> It is difficult when you have your own beliefs to live in an environment where they provide things that are forbidden, so I think it is better for [my sons] to go back home … I don't want the boys to forget that Friday is a special day. (Fatima 1975, female, student, Oman)

11.3.3 Future Migration Plans Cannot Easily Be Pinned Down

Interviewees were asked whether they wanted to remain in the Netherlands, return to their country of origin/previous residence, move to a third country or circulate between countries. The responses show that future intentions (and therefore the very concept of 'temporary migration') are difficult to pin down because they change over time. Some migrants had become more determined to stay, whilst others had become more determined to go back:

> It is hard to say [how long we would like to stay in the Netherlands] … The thing is that the longer we stay here, the more we get used to it. Maybe the first day I came here, I had this idea to stay here for four years and then go back to Iran. In that time I had my friends, I knew a lot of job opportunities there, and I was thinking 'I am going to miss my family and friends'… But now, the more I stay here, the more I get used to it. I just feel more home here than when I go back there. (Firuz 1984, male, highly skilled, Iran)

> I wanted to be here forever, I applied to be here. Especially my first year in Leiden, I found everything was wonderful but the longer I stay here, the more I am sure I don't want to live here forever. (Xiu 1986, female, highly skilled, China)

Some migrants mentioned a desire to circulate between the country of origin and the country of residence, which could help to solve the problem of needing to be near to parents: interviewees mentioned that family is of central importance in Asian cultures. Several migrants wanted to return to the country of origin in order to be close to family, but for others it seemed more a sense of duty or requirement:

> [My parents] are still quite young now, but when they get older they might not be able or might not want to visit us anymore, so then we might go back … Chinese people feel like they should take care of their parents … We all face the same problem, especially in the one-child countries, because we don't have brothers and sisters who can help our parents, that is why we want to be near our parents. (Mei 1984, female, family migrant, China)

In order to encourage highly skilled migrants to continue living in the Netherlands, the Dutch government could facilitate their family ties by allowing some form of circular migration; for example, visits to the country of origin up to a certain length of time should not affect the accumulated residence in the Netherlands. This ties in with Dutch development policy, as circular migration is considered a tool for development (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice 2008).

11.4 Politico-Legal Aspects

This section examines the politico-legal aspects of temporary migration by focussing on migrants' entitlements and rights and their experience of prejudice or discrimination. These aspects of the migratory experience are relevant, because they may impact on future migration choices (and therefore on the temporariness, or otherwise, of residence in the Netherlands). Migrants who face discrimination or struggle to make ends meet may decide to return to the country of origin or move on to another country.

Often the entitlements and basic conditions of working in the Netherlands were mentioned positively, for instance, the end-of-year-bonus whereby some employees receive an extra month's salary in December. However, not all migrants were eligible for all the types of entitlements. One example is the 30 % tax ruling: under this regulation, 30 % of an employee's wage is provided tax-free, as compensation for the extraterritorial costs incurred from living and working outside the country of origin (Belastingdienst n.d.). However, it is only applicable for migrants who are recruited from outside the Netherlands; migrants who, for example, first studied in the Netherlands and then take up paid employment are not eligible, although since 2012 an exception is made for Ph.D. graduates from Dutch universities, providing they are recruited within 1 year of obtaining their title. This ruling could be expanded, for example, by disregarding the time spent enrolled as a full-time student when calculating the entitlement. This would incorporate more migrants in the

ruling and perhaps encourage them to work in the Netherlands after their graduation.

Almost all migrants were able to tell a story about discrimination, prejudice or stereotyping that they had experienced in the Netherlands, for instance, being laughed at, spat at or sworn at in the street. Both Chinese and non-Chinese interviewees experienced people in the street teasingly yelling 'ni hao'[1] at them. Although several interviewees did not seem upset by such experiences, some found such comments provocative and felt that the accusations levelled at them were unfair and based on misconceptions:

> [The Dutch] have this mentality that Filipinas are users. They will marry a Dutch guy, after five years they will divorce him and get all the money. It is really sad that they have this kind of mentality … Those were like the past, marrying the Dutch, it is easy and then you are going to stay and get all the money … When I met [my boyfriend's] parents they even asked me what kind of residence permit I have. (Catherine 1989, female, search year, Philippines)

> In the week of the carnival I went to my friend and I was at the station and reading the Koran. There was a girl and she looked at me very differently, it was like she was scared of me, really scared. I turned my head and smiled and said 'hi', and she looked really scared, took her stuff and ran away. I think it is understandable, after what happened at Charlie Hebdo. The perception of Muslims changed. (Dilan 1992, female, student, Turkey)

11.5 Socio-economic Aspects

This section will examine the socio-economic aspects of temporary migration. Two points should be noted at the outset: firstly, the sample of interviewees (highly skilled) can be expected to have a certain socio-economic status in the country of origin. This is, for example, reflected in the relatively low numbers of interviewees sending remittances. Secondly, the socio-economic status in the country of origin does not necessarily correspond with the socio-economic status in the Netherlands. For instance, some interviewees were used to having the services of a maid in their home in the country of origin, something which is not affordable in the Netherlands.

11.5.1 Differential Treatment of Ph.D. Candidates

Several of the temporary migrants interviewed had come to the Netherlands to pursue a Ph.D.; such a trajectory typically takes 3 or 4 years and therefore falls within the definition of temporariness adopted for this research project. The interviews revealed a differentiation between Ph.D. candidates at Dutch universities based on their source of funding. Traditionally, Ph.D. candidates in the Netherlands are paid a salary and treated as members of the academic staff, and these favourable

[1] Chinese for 'hello'.

conditions were mentioned by several researchers as being a reason for choosing to pursue a Ph.D. at a Dutch university. Increasingly, however, Dutch universities are also accepting students on a scholarship, and their conditions of employment are very different. Firstly, scholarships provide a lower level of income than a Ph.D. candidate salary. Secondly, scholarship students are not covered by Dutch healthcare and have to purchase international students' insurance packages. This means, for example, paying upfront the costs of medical treatment and then claiming compensation from the insurance company, as opposed to Dutch healthcare insurance where the costs are immediately covered by the insurance company. Thirdly, scholarship students do not have access to the same resources within universities, for example, an office or funding for attending extra courses. Finally, if scholarship students do not finish the Ph.D. on time and their funding therefore expires, they will need to show sufficient funding to stay in the Netherlands. This is quite a likely scenario: data from the Association of Universities in the Netherlands shows that for the period 2008–2013 the average duration of a Ph.D. trajectory was 60 months, 1 year more than the foreseen 48 months (VSNU n.d.). However, scholarship students do not pay tax in the Netherlands and are still eligible for government benefits such as a subsidy for rent. This is because they have a so-called zero appointment at the university, which means they have a contract and are affiliated with the university but are not paid (e.g. Leiden University 2014).

This issue has been the subject of intense debate in the Netherlands for the past few years: the Ministry of Education and the Association of Universities in the Netherlands favour a change in status so that Ph.D. researchers become students instead of employees, but the Ph.D. candidates' network of the Netherlands argues that this has serious negative consequences: Ph.D. students' bursary amounts to the equivalent of the minimum wage, they do not accumulate pension, do not have the right to sick- or maternity leave, and do not receive their own office space. This will make Ph.D. research a less attractive venture and therefore negatively affect the Dutch research landscape (aan de Brugh 2015; Else 2015; van Kleef 2015; PNN n.d). Ultimately, foreign nationals interested in pursuing a Ph.D. may well look past the Netherlands to the university systems in other countries, if these are more attractive. Education policy and migration policy thus seem to be at odds: the introduction of Ph.D. scholarships risks undermining the government's policy on encouraging highly skilled immigration.

11.5.2 Difficulty for Non-Dutch Speakers to Find Work in the Netherlands

Of the 78 migrants interviewed, 33 were in full-time employment, 9 migrants were in part-time employment and 36 migrants were not employed. This number includes those actively looking for work and those who had made a conscious choice not to

work. However, rates of employment vary within and between residence permit types. All of the interviewees with a permit as a researcher or highly skilled migrant were in employment. However, of the ten family members interviewed, six were employed and four were not. By far most of the students interviewed were not employed: 27 to the 4 who were employed. Those students who were employed were typically working in restaurants or within the university, for instance, as research assistants. Three migrants holding a 'search year' permit were actually already working versus four who were not (as explained earlier).

Several migrants had had an image of the Netherlands as being very international but after arrival felt that this was actually misleading: they were given the impression before coming to the Netherlands that knowledge of Dutch is not necessary, only to discover that actually it is necessary in order to function in Dutch society. Particularly migrants who had accompanied their spouses (in this sample: all women) found it difficult to find work, although before arriving they had the perception that this would not be problematic. Some interviewees really weighed their career concerns against the importance of being together with their partner:

> I have considered for half a year. He came here half a year earlier. I had a job in China, but I was worrying about my career, because I didn't have any working experience in the west. But after half a year I felt so lonely … I was worried that if I left the job [in China], I couldn't find a job like this one again … But during that half year I felt that I had to spend time with my husband. (Fen 1981, female, family migrant, China)

Migrants faced particular difficulties in the Netherlands, because even if they learn Dutch, their level of Dutch is unlikely ever to equal the level of English of the Dutch, and therefore it is difficult to compete with Dutch people for work. One interviewee summed up the frustration regarding the contradictions in Dutch policy: highly skilled migrants can freely bring their spouses with them to the Netherlands, there are no integration requirements and the spouses may work, but in practice they face a number of barriers related to language, such as finding work. This socio-economic aspect of migration is linked to migration processes, because it can cause migrants to return to the country of origin:

> I don't see lots of advantages here because you know I am a very career [oriented] kind of person. So when I am satisfied in my life, I have my favourite career. This is lacking here, so I don't see lots of advantages here. (Yasmin 1980, female, family migrant, Iran)

> I had options to stay here for long-term, but my wife couldn't find a job here because language is one of the major problems. We thought that she would find a job here and that we would maybe stay here for a couple of years, but it did not work out so. She will go back now … I will stay until the project ends and then I will go back. (Rajesh 1984, male, highly skilled, India)

For the interviewees who accompanied their spouse to the Netherlands and were unable to find work, migration may have important negative consequences, particularly a gap in their resumé. Given that, in this sample of interviewees, it is women who are affected, this is significant: women may already face career setbacks if

starting a family and therefore do not need to lose extra time on the labour market due to temporary migration. Simply encouraging highly skilled immigration is thus not adequate, because in many cases these migrants bring highly skilled spouses with them. The government must do more to facilitate these spouses in their search for work in the Netherlands, for example, by providing predeparture information that stresses the importance of speaking Dutch, job-matching services to existing vacancies in the Netherlands, or cheaper/free Dutch courses.

11.5.3 Remittances

Several interviewees found the Netherlands expensive or were only just getting by financially. In addition, given the sample of migrants interviewed (mostly highly skilled), they tended to come from well-off backgrounds, for example with university-educated parents or parents owning their own companies. It is thus not surprising that the rate of remittance sending was low. Relatively few of the migrants interviewed sent remittances, and those who did mostly sent them occasionally (rather than regularly).[2] Remittances usually served a specific purpose, for example contributing towards the costs of a family wedding or medical bills. Actually, several interviewees in the sample were *receiving* remittances, either regular or occasional financial support, gifts or sponsorship from a foundation or individual in the country of origin. This flow of money from developing countries to migrants in developed countries has been referred to as 'reverse remittances' (Mazzucato 2011), although little research to date has focussed on the phenomenon. Mazzucato particularly highlights remittances from home communities in the form of services rendered, such as helping migrants with childcare or looking after investments in housing and business. In the research conducted for this case, the remittances concerned are financial, perhaps due to the relatively young age of the migrants interviewed (meaning they are less likely to have children or investments in the country of origin).

Some interviewees felt obliged or pressured into sending remittances. There is often an assumption in the country of origin that life in Europe is easy and that the migrant is automatically well off, which leads to expectations about gifts or money:

> When they know you're living abroad they think you have lots of money. They say that you're better than us. I think the thinking is not right, it is not a fact that if you have been abroad you have a lot of money … Friends and even former students, they sent me emails and asked for money. I told them I couldn't help them because I also had to pay my bills here and I have to save money for my insurance, stuff like that. The first years it was really

[2] There is a possibility that the data collected regarding remittance-sending behaviour is incomplete or inaccurate: each respondent was interviewed only once so it was not possible to establish a relationship of trust and understanding. Financial issues are often considered sensitive, and so it is possible that interviewees were not entirely truthful regarding their remittance-sending behaviour.

> difficult to say no. But now they don't ask me anymore because they know I won't give them anything, only when it is very urgent. (Hazel 1979, female, family migrant, Philippines)

This is interesting in light of the fact that remittance sending has been described in some contexts as a 'social norm': an 'expression of gratitude and respect towards the migrant's parents for raising them' (Osaki 2003: 218). It seems that this norm is limited by migrants' socio-economic position in the country of destination, which may potentially damage relationships with family or friends in the country of origin if remittances are expected.

11.6 Socio-cultural Aspects

The interviews raised several interesting results in terms of the socio-cultural aspects of temporary migration. This section examines language and social relations, maintaining social relationships in the country of origin, and views on the country of origin and residence.

11.6.1 Language and Social Relations

Interviewees were almost universal in stating that Dutch people speak good English; however many still considered the Dutch language to form a barrier to their integration process in the country, for instance, because of difficulties in communication or understanding the surroundings or because some information is only provided in Dutch. Despite this, most migrants stated that they were not learning Dutch for a variety of reasons: a lack of time to learn, the good level of English spoken by Dutch people, the difficulty of the Dutch language, the fact that Dutch is not a widely spoken language, the foreseen short stay in the Netherlands, and the cost of the course. The time investment required to reach professional proficiency in Dutch was considered too great, especially given the short stay in the Netherlands.

Language abilities have important consequences for social relations. In general interviewees described Dutch people as, on the surface, being friendly, helpful and welcoming, although also very direct, blunt and straightforward. However, several interviewees had experienced difficulty in establishing close relations with Dutch people. So whilst they did not consider Dutch people to be unfriendly or hostile, relations remain rather superficial. As one interviewee put it: 'They are friendly, but it is hard to make friends with them' (Basim, male, student, 1993, Saudi Arabia). Whilst interviewees observed that all Dutch people speak good English, they noted that, in groups and in social settings, Dutch people prefer to speak Dutch. This is the case both during leisure time and also at the workplace: a distinction can be made between work (conducted in English) and socialisation during coffee or lunch breaks (where Dutch is preferred). Interviewees therefore found it difficult to

establish friendships without learning Dutch. This is problematic for temporary migrants, who often lack the motivation to learn Dutch due to a foreseen short-term stay and therefore may struggle with establishing social relations.

Other interviewees attributed problems establishing social relations to a fundamental cultural difference: they regarded their own Asian culture as very social, whereas they saw Dutch people as more private and independent. Examples given were that neighbours do not necessarily greet each other, or they do not know each other by name. Interviewees experienced a certain formality to socialising in the Netherlands: they felt that Dutch people are not quick to invite new friends to come to their house, and even social relations are dictated by the need to make appointments. Interviewees observed that Dutch people tend to focus their social efforts on their family and very close friends, rather than establishing new friendships. This came across as Dutch people being cold and not caring about others:

> I really don't like Christmas here because people just stick to their own family. It is very different from my country, because in my country we also celebrate with friends and people in groups. So we invite each other, for instance my family will invite other families to come and the next day the other family invites us. So we have a full schedule for Christmas. And everyone comes to each other's houses … But here is it more the core family, that is it. (Nirmala 1977, female, researcher, Indonesia)

> We feel that it is lonely because nobody talks to us. People don't mingle. I mean they are very close with their family and friends here, but beyond that not. It is the immediate family and friends. I am not judging whether it is right or wrong, but in India it is very different. (Rajesh 1984, male, highly skilled, India)

Dutch policy exempts highly skilled migrants from integration requirements. Nevertheless, in order to foster a sense of belonging in the Netherlands, the government could do more to facilitate social and cultural exchanges, such as by organising or sponsoring community events that bring migrants and locals together. These initiatives might benefit the government's policy on highly skilled migration since they could encourage greater social interaction and increase the likelihood that migrants remain in the Netherlands.

11.6.2 Transnational Ties

Technology was frequently mentioned as a means for keeping in touch with family and friends across borders. Innovations such as WhatsApp, Skype and Facebook (and in some cases their Chinese equivalents) have made it easy to communicate frequently across borders, although South Korean interviewees complained about the slow speed of internet in the Netherlands. The frequency of transnational communication varied hugely, for example, from once or twice per month to every 2 weeks, to weekly, to twice weekly, to three to four times per week and to daily.

Despite these possibilities for transnational communication, interviewees still felt that migration had negatively affected relationships with friends and family in the country of origin:

> You lose connection, integrity with your own family … Naturally this is happening. It is that I am a little bit out of my family. When something happens, for example for my family, an internal issue that everybody should know about, then normally I am the last person … Then I ask them: 'why didn't you tell me, why are you telling me this just now?'. They say: 'no, we didn't want to make you worry'. Then I have to explain: 'okay, you had the intention not to make me worry, but you made a lot of mistrust here. I can't trust that everything is safe and okay there'. And then I feel apart, that I am out of the main picture. (Arash 1980, male, researcher, Iran)

> You still tell things on WhatsApp or Facebook, but it is less personal. We are feeling like we are becoming strangers, we are losing the grip … We are not as close as we were. (Bambang 1984, male, highly skilled, Indonesia)

These experiences are significant because of the effects they can have: migrants choosing to remain in the country of destination may suffer emotional distress as a result of feeling detached and lonely. On the other hand, negative changes in relationships with family and friends can affect future migration choices, as migrants may choose to return to the country of origin in order to repair and improve these relationships.

11.6.3 Views on Country of Origin and Residence

The view of both the country of origin and residence may change over time:

> When you live in the Netherlands for five, six, seven years, then it is highly possible that your home country by the style of living offers you no longer enough satisfaction … with the social situation, with the welfare, with the political situation. (Arash 1980, male, researcher, Iran)

> When you start living in a new country, you try to see the positive things because you want to feel good. But after some time, when you got settled in and the procedures start coming up, I started to add things to my list of things I don't like [about the Netherlands]. (Xiang 1986, female, highly skilled, China)

These experiences echo the literature on acculturation, which identifies different stages of 'culture shock'. Originally this was conceived as a U-curve whereby the individual is first fascinated by the new culture, then critical of it, before finally coming to a state of acceptance. More recently, scholars have argued that different individuals may experience the process differently (e.g. Anderson 1994; Demes and Geeraert 2015).

Some interviewees who had visited the country of origin had felt like foreigners whilst there, even if the Netherlands is their first experience of living abroad. This was described by one interviewee as 'reverse culture shock'. They may even have faced hostility during such visits:

> People would say: 'You are being arrogant if you cannot adapt to your own home country', but I can imagine that when you are already adapting [to the country of residence] for two years … At that time I felt more like a foreigner in my own country than being home … Things that I normally did are just not there anymore. (Batari 1986, female, researcher, Indonesia)

> I am not used to the way how things work [in China] anymore … like walking down the street and not recognising the things around me anymore. And interacting with people, I am not used to the way people speak to each other … I would speak to people like I would do here [in the Netherlands] … being very direct to people, they might think you are weird or rude. (Bao 1991, female, student, China)

Coupled with negative changes in relationships with family and friends, the feeling of no longer being 'at home' in the country of origin may have consequences for future migration choices: migrants may choose to make an initially temporary stay in the country of destination into a permanent stay, because they no longer feel that they belong in their 'home' country. One interviewee described adaptation to Dutch culture as 'being not completely Chinese anymore'.

11.7 Conclusion

This chapter has reflected on the results of the interviews conducted with temporary migrants in the Netherlands. Most of the migrants interviewed were highly skilled (either working as a highly skilled migrant or studying at university). Although the Dutch government seeks to attract highly skilled migrants (e.g. European Migration Network 2015: 11), these migrants still face a number of challenges and difficulties in the Netherlands. Interviewees often mentioned feeling lonely in the Netherlands, for a variety of reasons: not speaking Dutch and therefore finding it difficult to make Dutch friends, the inadequacies of online communication with family and friends back home, or the strict Dutch visa policy on family visits. Many interviewees faced difficulties in maintaining ties with their countries of origin and experienced a sense of estrangement upon their return to their 'home country'.

Interviewees also expressed dissatisfaction with the Dutch migration policy, particularly with regard to unexpected difficulties to find work that does not require Dutch language skills. This chapter has suggested several ways in which the Dutch policy could be improved in order to achieve its own stated goals. For example, providing predeparture information on the Dutch labour market would help highly skilled migrants (and their partners) to make reasoned expectations and plan their stay accordingly; ensuring that migrants receive adequate information and assistance with regard to migration regulations and integration would also be useful. Despite experiencing difficulties, migrants appreciated many aspects of life in the Netherlands, such as the environment (air quality), rights and freedom (of speech, religion and information), public services (public administration, transportation, healthcare system and education), and the general quality of life and work-life balance.

There were a number of surprising findings that would deserve further investigation. Firstly, the interviewees, who were mostly highly educated, seemed to rely on partial, second-hand or hearsay information about the Dutch migration regulations. This is important because without complete and accurate information migrants may fail to claim the rights and entitlements that are applicable to them, thus adding to the general frustration about the country. Future research could investigate the tools used by states for providing information to migrants. Secondly, this chapter has discovered the existence of 'reverse remittances', which is money sent from developing countries to recipients in developed countries. This is a rather understudied phenomenon, and in the future scholars could take into account the socio-economic status of both the migrant and the family in the country of origin when investigating the role and direction of remittances. Finally, the very concept of 'temporary migration' remains elusive. The Dutch policy maintains that *all* migration is essentially temporary in the beginning, as migrants are issued with 1-year (renewable) residence permits. Future research could compare policy and practices related to temporary migration across countries, in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how policy-makers view this phenomenon.

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Chapter 12
Navigating Bureaucracies, Intentions and Relationships: Temporary Transnational Migration Between Finland and Asia

Mari Korpela, Jaakko Hyytiä, and Pirkko Pitkänen

12.1 Introduction

Historically, Finland has received significantly fewer immigrants than many other European countries. However, after its accession to the European Union in 1995 and the Schengen Agreement in 1996, international mobility to and from Finland started to increase significantly.

The population of Finland is approximately 5.5 million, of whom about 230,000 (about 4%) are foreign nationals.[1] Over half of all foreigners live in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (StatFin 2016). Most foreigners are from the neighbouring countries, Russia and Estonia, but migration from other European countries and from Asian countries has also increased. Migration based on family ties[2] is the most common reason for migrating to Finland (see Korpela et al. 2014), but this type of migration is typically not temporary. In 2015, the situation changed drastically when over 32,000 people, mainly from Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria, sought asylum in Finland[3] (Migri 2016a). In 2015–2016, less than a third of these asylum seekers were granted refugee status in the country.

[1] The percentage of people of foreign origin (including foreign nationals and those who have obtained Finnish citizenship) was almost 6% at the end of 2014.

[2] 6774 first permits issued in 2014 and 6036 in 2015 (Migri 2016a).

[3] The interviews described in this paper were conducted in spring 2015, before the sudden increase in humanitarian migration.

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Study- and work-related migrations are also central in Finland. During the last few years, about 5000 first residence permits have been issued annually for purposes of work[4] (Migri 2016a). In practice, however, the number of temporary labour migrants is significantly higher as the number above does not cover people arriving with work-related visas or people from other EU countries (Korpela et al. 2014). All in all, there are no comprehensive accurate statistics on the entire foreign workforce in Finland, and therefore various estimates are utilised (see Alastalo et al. 2016). In addition to labour migrants, the free tertiary level education in Finland has attracted increasing numbers of international students,[5] especially because of the numerous degree programmes offered through the medium of English. The majority of these students come from outside the EU, and more than half of them are from Asia (Garam 2015).

The Finnish population is ageing, and it has been acknowledged that the increasing immigration might help to improve the dependency ratio (the number of those aged 15 or under and 65 or over per 100 working age persons in the country) (e.g. Honkatukia et al. 2010; Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2014: 15; Saarto 2015: 6). Recent policies have acknowledged temporary labour migration as a means to overcome labour shortages in specific fields, but this has not yet led to many practical measures. The policy emphasis has been on permanent migration and on integration measures rather than on temporary migration. In addition, labour migration is allowed only in those occupational fields where there is a shortage of domestic labour. In most cases, recruits from third countries are allowed to come to work in Finland only after the Employment and Economic Development Office has assessed whether there would be suitable candidates in Finland or the EU/EEA available for the specific job within a reasonable period of time.

Emigration from Finland has also increased over time. During different eras, Finns have emigrated to work chiefly in the USA, Canada and Sweden, but in the new millennium, temporary emigration of highly educated Finns elsewhere in the EU and Asia has increased (Björklund and Koivukangas 2008: 13; Koikkalainen 2013). China and Thailand are among the most popular third-country destinations; today there are more Finns living in Asia than in Africa or Latin America (KELA). During the last two decades, it has also become popular for retired Finns to spend the winter months in Thailand (Heikkilä 2012: 13) or in Spain (Könnilä 2014).

The brief overview above shows that both immigration and emigration are significant phenomena in Finland. In this article we discuss our research findings on temporary migration between Asia and Finland. The focus is on immigration from Asia to Finland, but we also pay attention to return migration to Finland. Throughout the chapter, our emphasis is on how individual migrants navigate the various structural challenges, above all the institutional and bureaucratic rules that they face in Finland. We argue that the Finnish rules and regulations are not well adapted to the

[4] 5062 first permits issued in 2014 and 5436 in 2015 (Migri 2016a).

[5] 5611 first permits were issued to students in 2014 and 5869 in 2015 (Migri 2016a). In December 2015, the Parliament of Finland decided to introduce tuition fees for students coming from outside the EU/EEA (starting in 2017).

phenomenon of temporary migration. In this chapter, we first elaborate on the motivations of temporary migrants, and then we discuss the bureaucratic challenges they face. We also elaborate on the significance of money and work and discuss the temporary migrants' social relationships as well as their integration into Finnish society. Finally, we discuss their future plans.

12.2 Data Collection

In order to understand the experiences and views of temporary migrants, we interviewed 86 individuals in Finland. Among the Asian interviewees, we interviewed 15 highly skilled migrants, 14 low-skilled migrants, 16 degree students, 5 asylum seekers and 8 individuals who had come to Finland due to family ties (with either a Finnish or an Asian partner). Some, especially the highly skilled people, had lived abroad earlier, whereas for the majority, Finland was the first foreign country they had visited. Most of the interviewees were in the country on fixed-term residence permits, some on Schengen visas. A few had a permanent resident permit, but their intention was to stay temporarily in Finland. Among our Finnish interviewees, we included 13 lifestyle migrants, 6 returnees and 9 people who had relatives temporarily resident in Asia.

Most of the low-skilled migrants interviewed were seasonal berry pickers from Thailand and Ukraine. The highly skilled interviewees were working in the information and communications technology industry (especially the Indian interviewees), in international sales/marketing or as researchers in Finnish universities. The majority had been working in the same profession in their native countries, but a few were recent graduates trying to start their careers in Finland. Among the student interviewees, Chinese and Nepalese were the most common nationalities as is also the case in the statistics on Asian students.[6] The students represented different disciplines in traditional universities, technical universities and universities of applied sciences (UAS). All UAS students were studying for Bachelor's degrees, whereas all university students were Master's or Ph.D. students.

The age profiles and hence the life situations of the migrants interviewed varied a lot. The highly skilled were mainly in their late 20s to early 40s. The low-skilled workers were on average a few years older. The students were in their early 20s to early 30s. The lifestyle migrants interviewed could clearly be divided into two distinct groups: retirees spending their winters in Thailand and the younger generations, many of whom can actually be characterised as global nomads (D'Andrea 2007), understood as people who repeatedly spend long periods of time abroad (in this case in Asia) but who do not settle down in any particular location. The returnees had worked in Asia (or had accompanied their working spouses there) for a few months or a few years (Table 12.1).

[6] Russians are the biggest group of students from third countries, but they were not included in our study.

Table 12.1 Interviewees in Finland

Temporary migrants to Finland	Nationality	Gender	Total
Family-based movers	Filipino (3), India (4), Thai (1)	Female (8)/male (−)	8
Highly skilled workers	Chinese (3), Filipino (2), Indian (5), Japanese (1), Singaporean (2), Thai (1), Vietnamese (1)	Female (6)/male (9)	15
Low skilled workers	Filipino (1), Taiwanese (1), Thai (6), Vietnamese (1), Ukrainian (5)	Female (7)/male (7)	14
Asylum seekers	Afghan (2), Bosnia and Herzegovinian (1), Iraqi (1), Syrian (1)	Female (−)/male (5)	5
Students	Chinese (5), Indian (2), Japanese (1), Nepalese (4), Taiwanese (1), Vietnamese (3)	Female (10)/male (6)	16
Temporary migrants from Finland	Country of destination	Gender	Total
Family members	China (5), Korea (2), Thailand (1), Singapore (1)	Female (6)/male (3)	9
Lifestyle migrants	Thailand (6), India (5), India and Thailand (2)	Female (8)/male (5)	13
Returnee migrants	India (4), China (1), Thailand (1)	Female (5)/male (1)	6
Total			86

12.3 Migration Processes

Many of the temporary migrants whom we interviewed in Finland had specifically wanted to come to this country, for others it was one option among many, but in some cases the interviewees would have preferred other destinations, usually English-speaking countries, but they had not been able to obtain work or work permits there.

The seasonal workers had come to Finland for purely economic reasons, that is, to earn money. In the garden berry sector, Ukraine is the most important source country,[7] and in the wild berry sector, most berry pickers come from Thailand (see Korpela et al. 2014). In most cases, both the Ukrainian and Thai berry pickers worked on a piecework basis. This implies that they are in a vulnerable position because their income depends on the harvest. It has also been noted that the berry pickers are at risk of being exploited and that there may be various problems in their working conditions (Rantanen and Valkonen 2011). Yet the seasonal workers whom we interviewed were content with their work and earnings and were intending to

[7] There are also significant numbers of seasonal Russian berry pickers on farms in Finland, but their numbers are decreasing (Marjanpoimintatilastot 2011–2013).

return to work in Finland the following year.[8] Circular migration of seasonal berry pickers is indeed a significant phenomenon in Finland. This type of work is available for only a few months a year, and since the pickers come with Schengen visas, they cannot extend their stay in Finland even if they want to.

Some of the highly skilled migrants had come to Finland because of better earnings, but the majority emphasised that money was not their main motivation. Those highly educated people who were not in managerial positions and had no previous international work experience mentioned that salaries are better in Finland than in their native countries, but those interviewees who had high positions and opportunities to work in other countries mentioned that they could earn better incomes elsewhere. Some highly skilled migrants had been recruited by Finnish companies or international companies operating in Finland, but most of them had already worked for these companies in their native countries. Those intercompany transferees saw their stay in Finland as an important phase in their career development: they considered it useful to work at company headquarters and/or to meet Finnish customers. Some had come because it was in the interests of the company, for example, they came to help boost sales.

The youngest highly skilled interviewees, those who had graduated only recently, hoped that the work experience in Finland would serve as a stepping stone to better jobs elsewhere in the future. The academics were simply following available work opportunities without specifically wishing to come to Finland. Some academics mentioned that the competition in their native countries was so intense that migration had made their professional lives much easier. In addition, although many highly skilled migrants hoped that the work experience abroad would improve their career prospects in the future, some academics mentioned that having built up their career abroad meant that they would no longer be able to re-enter the academic scene in their native countries. Also, a young interviewee who had started her working career in Finland mentioned that returning to work in her native country in Asia would be difficult since all her work experience was from Finland. It is thus important to acknowledge that international experience is not always a valuable asset in the eyes of employers, although policies of temporary migration tend to present it as such. Moreover, those who leave because of intense competition are not likely to return even if at the destinations they are considered to be temporary migrants.

Many of our interviewees mentioned that their coming to Finland was partly motivated by their appreciation of the Finnish welfare state, relaxed lifestyle and clean environment. Some interviewees also mentioned that in Finland they worked fewer hours than in their native countries and that commuting times are significantly shorter in Finland than in Asian metropolises. This indicates, as in other studies (Olwig 2007; Ong 1999), that in addition to economic factors, people consider many other aspects when deciding whether or not to become (temporary) migrants. At the same time, it is important to remember that temporariness is not always the result of free choice and some have more freedom to decide than others: the low

[8] There is a methodological bias here: those who are the most troubled are least accessible for purposes of interview research.

skilled tend to have far fewer options than the more educated people. For example, a berry picker must leave when the harvest season ends and the visa expires, whereas an IT engineer has more chances of finding another job when one contract expires. Quite a few interviewees also mentioned the aspect of new experiences having been an important factor when they decided to move abroad:

> I like to live somewhere that is not your comfort zone, otherwise you would just be too lazy. It's just too boring for me. (May, 1981, female, family migrant, Thailand)
>
> I am quite an adventurous person. At a young age I actually wanted to just keep exploring the world and then to discover opportunities in different places. (Vanessa 1990, female, highly skilled, Singapore)

Therefore, our study suggests that people often consider several other aspects other than mere remuneration when deciding on the destinations of their temporary migration and policies should address these issues in addition to treating migrants as mere labour force.

Most of the students interviewed had not been interested in Finland in particular but had been interested in developed (mostly 'Western') countries in general. In fact, many of them had also been accepted to study at universities elsewhere but chose Finland because of the free high-quality education. High-quality education and free tuition have also been identified as the main pull factors in earlier research on foreign degree students in Finland (Garam 2015: 7; Korhonen 2013: 136–137). Many student interviewees mentioned that the options for future education at home were either very scarce or not of good quality or that there was too much stress and competition within the local higher education sector.

Finland encourages prospective students to apply on their own, and there is plenty of free information available online, yet some student interviewees still admitted to having paid an agency to take care of their admission-related paperwork. This seems to indicate that there is an official and unofficial migration infrastructure in play (see Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013; Xiang and Lindquist 2014) and consequently various actors in the game. In practice, people are in unequal positions in terms of who is in need and able to use these services. Moreover, the mediating agencies direct individuals to particular study programmes, and they do not necessarily provide the applicants with all the useful information. Some students had been disappointed when they realised they had been accepted at a provincial university of applied sciences instead of a traditional university in a larger city. A particular characteristic of the Finnish higher education system is that Bachelor's programmes are only accessible to those who pass entrance exams and only universities of applied sciences organise these abroad (in some 15 locations around the world) (FINNIPS). It is inevitable that many prospective foreign students do not have the opportunity to take such entrance exams. In addition, getting a visa for the purpose of taking an entrance exam in Finland is very uncertain, not to mention the financial burden it causes. All this creates a situation where potential foreign students have unequal opportunities depending on their financial standing and place of residence. The interviewees' main motivational factors to move to Finland are presented in Fig. 12.1.

Fig. 12.1 Reasons for migrating to Finland

12.4 Politico-Legal Aspects: Struggling with Bureaucracies

12.4.1 Visas, Residence Permits and Other Bureaucracies

In spite of increasing global mobility, people (or goods for that matter) are not free to move as they wish. Visas and residence permits are powerful mechanisms that administer and control people's cross-border movement, and they effectively restrict individuals' agency in terms of transnational mobility (see Korpela 2016). In addition, the length of one's stay is often determined by visas and residence permits instead of being a free choice on the part of the individual. Complaints about complicated bureaucracies were common among different types of interviewees. Problems and confusion in obtaining visas and residence permits were stated both among the Asian interviewees in Finland and among the Finns who had lived in Asia:

> It would be great if one could get a visa for several years. Visas have taken so much of my time and money. It has really been a nuisance. It would be best if I could get a visa to India for five or ten years. Then I would have the freedom to come and go as I wish, and to stay there. It'd be wonderful. I am sure there are a lot of missed chances, on both sides, I believe I could contribute better in India if the visa practices were easier. (Liisa 1966, female, lifestyle migrant, Finland/India)[9]

Although the seasonal workers had come to Finland on 3-month long Schengen visas, all the other interviewees except for asylum seekers had had to obtain a residence permit. The first residence permit to Finland is always a fixed term; typically for 1 year and later, a continuous and, after 4 years, a permanent residence permit may be issued if the grounds for residence still exist.

[9]The interviews with native Finns were conducted in Finnish. The quotations here are authors' translations.

Among our interviewees, obtaining a residence permit for Finland was not a problem per se, but almost all the interviewees complained about the time it took to obtain one.[10] Some highly skilled interviewees pointed out that the slow processes are harmful to Finnish companies and the international reputation of Finland in the business world. Obtaining the first residence permit from abroad takes several months, but it was also pointed out that renewing the permit in Finland likewise takes many months.[11] This creates problems for the migrants because they cannot travel abroad during that time. Such a situation easily causes the migrants not to feel welcome in Finland, and those with other options may choose to move elsewhere. There is thus a clear contradiction between the Finnish policies that welcome highly skilled labour migration and the actual practices that treat people in ways that make them feel unwelcome.

A few interviewees also mentioned that sometimes family members get shorter residence permits than the working expatriates, which causes extra inconvenience and high fees when the permits need to be renewed. The interviewees had not received explanations for the situation, which caused many to complain about the lack of transparency in the residence permit system; they felt they were at the mercy of arbitrary bureaucratic processes.

Several interviewees pointed out that the use of biometric methods (Maguire 2010, 2012) cause problems for potential migrants who do not live near Finnish embassies. India and China in particular are large countries, and it is difficult and expensive for people to travel to the Finnish embassy to apply for a residence permit. Especially if one has a spouse and children, such a trip can become expensive and difficult to arrange. This also means that policies put individuals in unequal positions; for example, some get their trips to the embassy paid by their employers, whereas others do not. Therefore, although the biometric systems may seem like a fair system from the state's point of view, they have created unanticipated consequences in potential migrants' lives. The fact that Finnish embassies do not issue visas to citizens of particular countries for the purpose of attending entrance exams due to fears of visa misuse (Kiuru 2012: 142–143) is another example of an unequalising practice.

The asylum seekers interviewed were worried about the lack of knowledge about the asylum process and the fact that no specific processing times were given.[12] The asylum seekers thus lived in a limbo state of uncertainty and boredom where they could not plan their future. This means not only individual suffering but also lost

[10] It should be noted that we did not interview those people whose applications for residence permits had been rejected.

[11] In order to renew their residence permits, international students need to prove their financial standing and the progress of their studies once a year. Since first residence permits are typically issued for 1 year, all migrants who stay longer must renew their permits at least once.

[12] According to EU directive 2013/32/EU Article 31, the maximum processing time for asylum applications is normally 6 months, but member states may extend the time limit up to 15 months in situations where a large number of third-country nationals or stateless persons simultaneously apply for international protection.

human resources. According to the statistics from the Finnish Immigration Service, in 2015, the average processing time for an application for asylum was 117 days (Migri 2016b), but this frequently varies, and an individual cannot know beforehand how long his/her particular case will take.

Our research material thus shows that there are many kinds of consequences of various bureaucratic rules and processes in the everyday lives of temporary migrants and, as a result, their lives may become unexpectedly complicated. Therefore the system of residence permits and the accompanying rules are not only mechanisms to administer migration but also means to exercise power over individuals.

Obtaining a residence permit is obviously only the first step in the process of moving to Finland. Getting one's paperwork in order is not an easy task for someone who does not speak Finnish or Swedish[13]:

> Because our company has a package of local immersion, we were assigned a location consultant, so I would say that it was because of her that life became simple. Had it not been her, life would have been hell. Because all the documentation is only in Finnish, and Google Translator is not very helpful. And many times, all these letters from the government are coming in, for Kela [the Finnish Social Insurance Institution] and for tax cards, all of them are in Finnish, you don't understand what is happening. […] I would say with the changing profile of the people coming in from different parts of the world, I think it has to be a little bit more supportive. […] I think the government here does not do a very good job promoting its friendliness. (Govinda 1978, male, highly skilled, India)

The quotation above, again, indicates that there is a contradiction between Finland wanting to welcome skilled migrants and the actual societal practices that affect the foreigners' everyday lives. Moreover, individuals are in unequal positions because some get help from their employers, whereas others do not. One constantly emerging problem in the interviews on the treatment of temporary migrants in Finland is banking. The banks demand a Finnish identity card from their customers if they want to use online banking. As temporary migrants, most interviewees could not obtain Finnish identity cards. Without such an ID card, one can open an account but cannot use it online. Online banking is used widely as an identification mechanism for various official services in Finland (e.g. the unemployment services, social security services, tax authorities). As a consequence, the lack of rights to use the online banking creates serious problems. Our interviewees found it difficult to understand why a passport or one's residence permit (that includes one's finger prints, photo and signature) are not enough for the banks. In their view, this practice has a discriminatory and even a racist tone. It certainly suggests that foreigners, especially those staying in the country on a temporary basis, are not treated equally with Finnish citizens. The problem with banks is also an example of how the practices of private actors (in this case the banks) can also affect one's position regarding officialdom (i.e. not being able to communicate with state authorities online).

[13] Both Finnish and Swedish are official languages in Finland. Swedish is the mother tongue of about 5% of the population.

Bureaucratic trouble does not only concern Asian migrants in Finland but also Finnish returnees. First of all, a particular characteristic of lifestyle migration among our interviewees was that many were navigating between the rules relating to permanent residence in Finland and their lifestyle, which entailed spending long periods abroad. One is included in the Finnish social security system and the public healthcare system only if one lives in the country for at least 6 months a year. Some of the retirees interviewed spent exactly 6 months a year in Thailand for this reason; otherwise they might have stayed longer. The retirees wanted to be included in the Finnish systems because they were aware that with increasing age illnesses might put an end to their current lifestyle and they would then need care in Finland, but the younger lifestyle migrants were likewise keen to retain their rights in Finland. Some of the younger lifestyle migrants had simply decided not to report to the authorities on their sojourns abroad in order to ensure their rights to social security and to public health care. In other words, many Finnish lifestyle migrants were troubled by the fact that they defined their home to be in Finland but the Finnish authorities often interpreted them as having moved away from the country.

Secondly, some Finnish returnees mentioned having had difficulties in adapting to the Finnish systems after their return. For example, one woman told that she had not been entitled to unemployment benefit because she had been abroad for a few years. She found this unfair as she had been accompanying her husband who worked for a Finnish company, and she had lost her own job in Finland because the husband had been sent to work abroad (by the same company).

The examples above show that transnational lifestyles are not appreciated or even recognised by the Finnish state bureaucracies and the state and its practices are heavily based on the sedentary norm that scholars of mobility studies have already been criticising for years (Salter 2013; Urry 2007). In fact, obtaining even a private travel insurance can be tricky for transnationally mobile people because Finnish insurance companies require applicants to be included in the Finnish social security system. Our research findings thus show that temporary outbound migration and return migration of Finnish citizens are largely ignored in Finnish policies. When state bureaucracies do not recognise transnationally mobile lifestyles, an increasing number of Finnish citizens end up living outside official systems or cheat them in order to ensure inclusion. It is appropriate to ask what the long-term consequences will be if an increasing number of citizens fall outside the services and benefits that the state provides for those whom it defines as residents:

> As a nomad I wish that the different authorities would take into account that there are increasing numbers of people like us. I believe a lot of skills are wasted because we, the nomads, must put so much money and time to these formalities. A lot of missed chances. I would like to ask those who make the rules to take into account the human potential here… They should consider that there are so many of us. (Liisa 1966, female, lifestyle migrant, Finland/India)

12.5 Socio-economic Aspects: Work Matters

12.5.1 The Significance of Money

Although money is not necessarily the main motivator when people decide to move temporarily abroad, its significance cannot be ignored. The seasonal workers whom we interviewed took considerable sums of money home with them. At home, they used their earnings not only for day-to-day living but also for paying loans, buying a car, renovating the house and so on. However, seasonal work abroad also carries risks: if the harvest is not good, the berry pickers are at risk of running seriously into debt as they often need to borrow money for their trip (Rantanen and Valkonen 2011).

Remittances are usually seen as important factors in transnational migratory movements (see Maimbo and Ratha 2005). In our study, the role of remittances turned out to be rather surprising. First of all, many interviewees said that they did not have enough money to remit. For example among students, and sometimes also among the spouses of Finns, the flow of capital was from the country of origin to Finland. The asylum seekers also mentioned that they did not have enough money to send home.

Secondly, none of our highly skilled interviewees sent regular remittances to relatives in Asia because they usually came from relatively well-off families, where there was no need for financial assistance. Some sent money to their parents and siblings if there was a special need, for example, an acute health problem. Yet several of them did regularly send money to Asia in order to pay off their own debts and mortgages. In other words, the earnings were used for the migrants' personal purposes; thus, their impact on the wider societal development is likely to be rather limited. The temporary migration policies often emphasise the positive impacts of temporary migration for the development in the countries of origin, but our data suggests that such impact may be limited because temporary migrants simply do not have any money to send or the money is used to defray their personal expenses rather than for investments. Nevertheless it should be noted that there is plenty of other evidences to show that migrants' remittances do indeed play a role in the Finnish context as well (Pew Research Center 2014; World Bank 2011: 117).[14]

12.5.2 Work in Finland

The highly skilled interviewees sent or invited to work in Finland (by either Finnish or international companies) were usually content with their work except for one nurse, who was disappointed that, in spite of her nursing degree, she was only allowed to work as a nursing assistant. According to earlier research, training jobs

[14] According to Pew, remittances sent from Finland to other countries in 2012 totalled $461,000,000.

and other ‘entry jobs’ are very important first steps in the careers of overseas trained nurses in Finland. In many cases they start their work as trainees or practical nurses and are thus overqualified for their tasks (Laurén and Wrede 2010; Nieminen 2010; Pitkänen 2011):

> I think that my nursing skill is not improving because I am not a nurse here, I only talk to the patients here, activities of daily living, not the stuff that the nurse really does. You really want to be a nurse, you know and improve your skills. […] I was assigned to throw out the garbage. I know it’s easy but I felt like am I a cleaner here. (Marie 1990, female, highly skilled, Philippines)

Some of the younger highly skilled migrants who were trying to start their careers in Finland complained about low salaries in the start-up companies they worked for. This suggests that the position of foreigners, even those with university degrees, is not always good in the Finnish labour markets. In fact, even foreigners with Finnish university degrees face difficulties in finding employment (Korhonen 2013: 145–147). According to CIMO (2014), under half (45.5%) of all foreign degree students were working in Finland a year after graduation. Furthermore, there is no information on whether they landed jobs matching their level of education.

Nonetheless, the highly skilled migrants were usually satisfied with their jobs and salaries. Their spouses and those who had moved to Finland because of a Finnish partner, however, suffered badly from under- or unemployment. Our family-based respondents were highly qualified and often had extensive work experience in their native countries. In almost all the cases, moving to Finland had meant a clear downward trend in their professional careers, and most were very discontent with their professional situation in Finland. At the time of the interviews, they were either unemployed, had jobs which did not correspond to their training and work experience (i.e. cleaning work) or worked without any salary (as interns). Many missed their careers and were becoming frustrated and bored in Finland:

> Sitting at home, watching TV, what to do, nothing to do, no people to talk. (Rita, 1988, female, family migrant, India)
>
> I just hate to feel useless, jobless. (May, 1981, female, family migrant, Thailand)

Most accompanying Asian spouses of temporary migrants in Finland had a fixed-term residence permit that did not entitle them to unemployment benefits or to the services of the unemployment authorities. A pressing problem in the Finnish labour markets is that if one is recruited from abroad, proficiency in Finnish or Swedish is typically not required, but if one arrives in the country, for example, as a spouse and starts to look for work when already in Finland, it seems to be almost impossible to find any work as fluency in the local language is required. Moreover, the migrant spouses are often considered overqualified for the jobs available to them. Many women end up staying at home with their children, but not everyone has children and in any case, this is not a long-term solution; our interviewees seemed to think that even if the women were housewives for a while, they would like to work outside the home later. Moreover, being a housewife is not something that educated Finnish women usually aspire to, and it is discriminatory to expect such a choice from foreign women. One consequence of the persistent unemployment is that most

family-based respondents interviewed did not want to settle permanently in Finland and some families ended up leaving the country earlier than initially planned. As a result, Finnish society may end up losing skilled migrants since they have other, more appealing, options than Finland. In fact, because of the difficulties in finding employment in Finland, even interviewees married to Finnish citizens planned to move away from Finland in the future. Our study thus clearly shows that the situation of accompanying spouses should be addressed at policy level because Finland loses much human talent when it fails to employ them.

12.6 Socio-cultural Aspects: Life Outside Work

12.6.1 Friends and Language Skills

The temporary migrants whom we interviewed seldom spoke much Finnish or Swedish:

> Finnish is a difficult language to learn and given that we are not really looking for a long term view for us that is a limited incentive to learn Finnish as well. (Govinda 1978, male, highly skilled, India)
>
> I feel that with the effort and time that I have to put into learning Finnish and I know that I won't stay here for long, then it doesn't motivate me to really learn the language. (Vanessa 1990, female, highly skilled, Singapore)

The comments above aptly describe a widespread attitude among temporary migrants in Finland, most of them were interested to learn some Finnish (seldom Swedish) but they did not have time or motivation to become fluent in it. Some interviewees also pointed out that they were working long hours and simply did not have time to attend Finnish courses. Several interviewees mentioned that since they did not intend to stay in the country permanently, they had little motivation to learn Finnish because the language skills are useless outside the country. At the same time, it became clear that it is extremely difficult to integrate into Finnish society if one is not able to communicate in the local languages (Finnish or Swedish).

Language training is not working efficiently in Finland in spite of (or perhaps because of) various actors organising courses in Finnish and Swedish (see Pöyhönen et al. 2009). The quality of courses varies significantly. Moreover, the most effective courses that provide full-time learning are available only for those foreigners who are registered as unemployed. In other words, in order to be entitled to effective language training in Finland, one must be unemployed. This is clearly a contradiction when at the policy level the intention is to attract labour force to the country. In order to be effective, the language training should also contain the vocabulary of real working life; learning everyday language and grammar rules is not enough (Kyhä 2011: 241; Raunio 2013: 170).

The temporary migrants whom we interviewed in Finland had very few contacts with local Finns; their friends were typically compatriots or other foreigners. Many

lamented the fact that they did not have Finnish friends. Some students also mentioned that some degree programmes seemed to attract a lot of students from certain countries, which meant that the expected 'international learning environment' did not necessarily materialise:

> I saw in my apartment that there are twenty Chinese students in the whole apartment and they are just waiting for me saying: 'Hi, are you the new student in the university? We look forward to seeing you! Oh, welcome to our university'. Oh gosh, I was shocked. (Min 1987, female, student, China)

Although the temporary migrants whom we interviewed seldom had local friends, they were frequently in contact with relatives in their native countries. Some were in contact on a weekly or monthly basis, but most were in contact daily, even several times a day. The means of communication included various social media applications. This very frequent communication means that transnational social ties between temporary migrants and their friends and relatives are kept strong and alive. The significance of the various mobile communication devices cannot be overestimated: they enable frequent, easy and cheap communication. In addition to maintaining social contacts, online communication enables one to easily follow news and events in one's native country even when living abroad. Although many of the temporary migrants interviewed did not follow the local news at their destinations, almost all of them said to follow news in their native countries regularly, which suggests that they felt they belonged there in spite of currently living abroad.

12.6.2 Children's Schooling

Although migration policies usually focus on migrating adults, many migrants come to Finland with their spouse and children. This applies above all to the highly skilled migrants; the low skilled are often not allowed to bring their family members with them because their earnings are not high enough according to the Finnish rules on family migration. Our highly skilled respondents talked a lot about challenges in their children's education in Finland. In Finland, children start school at the age of seven, whereas in Asian countries, they start school at a younger age. This creates problems for temporary Asian migrants. When the family returns to Asia, the child will lag behind in terms of studies, and this is problematic in the highly competitive Asian education system:

> The kids start generally one year ahead on education. So somebody who's coming and wants to go back, they don't want the kids to be losing one year. But the system does not… Unfortunately the teachers [in Finland] were not able to understand why somebody is requesting for the kid not to be going one class back. That was one surprise for us. […] This actually means that when he eventually goes back, he has already lost one year. (Govinda 1978, male, highly skilled, India)

Many parents were also concerned that children do not have proper lessons in Finnish kindergartens and, consequently, they tried to teach their children at home

(mathematics, reading, writing, etc.) in order to meet the standards that the children will face once back in Asia. In addition, although it seems to be relatively easy to secure a place in a Finnish day care centre where the language of tuition is English, not all foreign children get into the international schools as there are not enough of them in Finland. This again suggests that Finland is not paying sufficient attention to the needs of the family members of temporary migrants in spite of the fact that when they are not satisfied, the whole family may leave the country (see also Koskela 2010, 64). The need for tuition through the medium of English concerns above all the children of highly skilled families: for example, the children of the Indian people whom we interviewed had attended education through the medium of English in India.

Children's schooling is thus an issue that temporary migrants need to consider carefully when planning their migration. Several parents mentioned that moving transnationally on a temporary basis is not a good option once the children are in school because their education will suffer from the change of schools and education systems. This indicates, again, that money is not the only factor taken into account when deciding on temporary migration. At the same time, it must be noted that those earning low salaries are not allowed to bring their family members to Finland at all and the separation of families as a consequence of migration causes various kinds of problems (see Parreñas 2005; Vaittinen and Näre 2014).

12.6.3 Future Plans: Should I Stay or Should I Go?

All the asylum seekers interviewed planned to stay in Finland if they were granted asylum. They were very pessimistic about any quick improvements in the situations in their native countries:

> I believe that things have gone so bad that even 20 or 30 years will not be enough for the situation to change. If we compare for example Iraq and Saddam's situation until now. And the situation continues bad. Or if the order goes, everyone fights with each other. There are many sects in Iraq, it means chaos and the same in Syria. There is no choice but to forget Syria, I don't want to but I must. (Anas 1969, male, asylum seeker, Syria)[15]

A few other interviewees were also hoping to settle down in Finland, but most were sure that they would leave the country in the future, typically after a few years. After having graduated, degree students may obtain a year-long visa in order to seek employment in Finland, and many of the students interviewed were willing to work in Finland after graduation but most were not optimistic about their chances of finding work in the country because of a lack of language skills. Those interviewees who were struggling with money obviously did not consider Finland a very attractive location to stay in the long run, but many others also wanted eventually to leave.

[15] The interview was conducted in Arabic. The interpreter translated it into Finnish, and then the authors translated the quotation to English.

Especially the highly skilled interviewees were convinced that they would eventually leave the country:

> I already know that this is the country that I'm not gonna stay in for too long […] There are good things about Finland but not good enough for me to feel that I wanna settle down here. Personally I think that this is a country that is really good for a family with little kids or retired people but for younger people who are still trying to explore opportunities this is definitely not the right place. I definitely do have the intention to move to London or Berlin. (Vanessa 1990, female, highly skilled, Singapore)

The reasons for the willingness to move away from Finland included wanting to be closer to relatives, considering the Finnish climate too cold and, most importantly, considering career opportunities better elsewhere. The impossibility of bringing one's parents to live in Finland was also mentioned as one aspect that makes Finland less attractive in the long run:

> Maybe in another 5–10 years' time, the parents might need our help. That will be the time we will pack our bags and sell the house, go back, buy a house there, find a new job there or start a business. (Ajay 1978, male, highly skilled, India)

The obligation to take care of elderly parents was mentioned in several interviews, especially if the interviewee did not have siblings who could take on this responsibility. The consequences of China's one-child policy made the situation particularly difficult for Chinese interviewees as they would be the sole caretakers of their ageing parents.

It should, however, be noted that the migrants' future plans are only verbal reflections and it is impossible to say how their migration trajectories will develop as their intentions and circumstances may change. Nevertheless, most interviewees wanted to return to their native countries, and some were hoping to migrate elsewhere – often to a country where they had already lived previously or to an English-speaking country. Those who had already lived in several countries before coming to Finland were often tired of their transnational mobility and hoped to settle down in one place in the near future. Yet, although the Asian migrants in Finland knew they would not stay in Finland forever, very few knew when they would actually leave. The work contracts were often such that they might be extended. This created much insecurity in the interviewees' lives as they could not plan very far ahead. Temporary migration is in fact a rather vague status, and insecurity about the future is a significant personal cost. These problems strengthen the claim that temporary migration policies should not only focus on the labour market's needs; it is a much more complicated puzzle at the level of people's real-life experiences. Kaisu Koskela (2010: 62–65) also states that 'although decisions to come to Finland are often made according to economic and career related considerations, the decision to stay is largely influenced by social factors'. If policies view skilled migrants as temporary employees rather than as potential members of society, their needs beyond work are ignored, and such people many end up leaving the country.

12.7 Concluding Remarks

Reflecting on the research findings, it can be said that Finland is increasingly becoming an arena for people's transnational practices. The country is attracting increasing numbers of temporary migrants from Asia, and it is increasingly popular for Finns to work, study or travel in Asia. In addition, increasing numbers of Finnish retirees spend winters in Thailand. Our research, however, shows that the migrants' native countries remain highly significant for different kinds of temporary migrants: in spite of temporarily living abroad, the migrants maintain strong ties to their native countries, and they thus live within a transnational social space. This has much to do with their temporary status and temporary orientation; if one is not planning to stay in the destination permanently, it becomes increasingly important to maintain transnational ties to the place to which one intends to return. Moreover, if one sees one's stay in the country as temporary, one is likely reluctant to invest much effort into learning the local language or becoming integrated in local social circles.

Our study showed that the motivations for coming to Finland varied in different migrant groups. The students came because Finland offers high-quality education without tuition fees. While the low-skilled seasonal migrants came to Finland above all in order to earn money, many of the highly skilled migrants mentioned that money was not their main motivation; typically the highly skilled had come in order to improve their career prospects or to experience something different. Temporary migration policies should thus acknowledge the fact that money is only one factor when people decide to move abroad. This includes the need to pay attention to the needs of the accompanying family members and those left behind. Treating migrants merely as labour force ignores other significant aspects that affect people's (temporary) migrations. Therefore, although labour market needs often direct the policies and practices of the migrant receiving countries like Finland, it is clear that in the long run, such a view is too narrow if a country wants to attract (temporary) migrants.

It can be expected that, under favourable circumstances, the labour shortage in the ageing Finland may be alleviated by temporary migration. In practice, however, the situation is more complex, and there is no guarantee that Finland will be able to recruit the kind of people it wants or that Finland will be able to utilise the skills and potential of those people who do migrate to the country. The Asian migrants interviewed mentioned various kinds of bureaucratic problems in Finland, for example, the slow processes of obtaining residence permits and problems with banking. It is a contradiction that in policies Finland wants to fill labour shortages with temporary migrants but in practice, the slow and complicated bureaucracies make foreigners feel they are not welcome. From the temporary migrants' point of view, various legal and bureaucratic practices thus appear above all restrictive, and people end up in unequal positions as a consequence of such rules and practices.

Problems with bureaucracies do not only concern foreign nationals in Finland. One problem that our research identified is that there are various problems with the reintegration of returnee migrants in Finland. This means that Finnish society is at risk of wasting human resources when skilled people are marginalised in the labour

market. In addition to the difficulties that the returnees mentioned, lifestyle migrants stated having problems with the Finnish authorities who view their transnationally mobile lifestyles as signifying that they are not residents in the country; as a consequence of which, they are not entitled to certain benefits and rights in Finland. This shows that the Finnish rules and regulations fail to accept the transnational realities of many people's lives. It can thus be concluded that the Finnish policies and regulations have not effectively adjusted to the changing volume and nature of temporary immigration and emigration.

Our empirical data shows that defining a temporary migrant is difficult – people change their intentions, and, in fact, even if most of our interviewees were sure they would not stay in Finland permanently, very few actually knew when exactly they would leave. Therefore, it seems that temporary migration is above all an orientation – a state of mind of not residing in the country on a permanent basis. Sometimes, this is the choice of the migrant, but very often it is dictated by the rules governing visas and residence permits. Being a temporary migrant creates various insecurities in people's lives, and the future plans of our interviewees were rather vague. Moreover, although many people may initially consider temporary migration a useful and exciting phase of life, after a few years, people tend to become tired of temporariness. Among our interviewees, in particular among those who had lived in many countries before moving to Finland, many were tired of their transnational mobility and were hoping to settle down in one place. In other words, temporary migration is only a temporary solution for individual people.

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Chapter 13
Conclusion: Characteristics, Experiences and Transnationality of Temporary Migration

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Besides uncovering how politics structure the transnational movement issues in sending, transit and receiving societies, the previous chapters sought to make the transnational practices and lived experiences of individual temporary migrants visible. Since the 1990s scholars have explored the dynamics of transnational migration with an emphasis on the emergence of transnational spaces that transcend geographic, political, social and cultural borders (e.g. Faist 2000; Portes et al. 1999). What this literature has not done sufficiently is to explain the implications of the temporariness of migration with respect to these dynamics. The EURA-NET research sought to shed light on the everyday experiences of temporary migrants in the European-Asian transnational social spaces. Answers were sought to the following questions: (1) Why do people migrate on a temporary basis and not permanently? (2) What are the daily experiences of various types of temporary migrants? (3) How does temporariness affect their migration experiences? (4) How does temporary migrants' transnationalism appear in the European-Asian transnational social spaces?

Our findings indicate that it is important to pay careful attention to the experiences and needs of individual temporary migrants as they tend to be forgotten when countries formulate temporary migration schemes as tools to manage and control migration. In this concluding chapter, some previously discussed findings will be

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highlighted, particularly with respect to the similarities and differences between various types of temporary migrants in different national and transnational contexts. We first discuss the motives for temporary forms of migration as well as the structural and personal reasons why some migrants decide to stay in the destination country for only a limited amount of time. The second section elaborates on the everyday experiences of temporary migrants in politico-legal, socio-economic and socio-cultural spheres. The following section addresses temporary migrants' transnationality, and the last section discusses future prospects in terms of temporary migration.

13.1 What Makes People Move on a Temporary Basis?

The EURA-NET research reflected in the chapters of this book revealed that although the significance of mobilities motivated by economic- and career-related reasons is still high, other dynamics, such as transnational mobility based on education, seeking protection and the search for new lifestyles, are gaining an importance. In light of the research findings, it can be argued that temporary transnational migration has become increasingly popular especially amongst young, well-educated people. Growing numbers of relatively well-off youth both in Europe and Asia seek new experiences and opportunities across state borders, often with no intention to stay permanently at the destination. This applies particularly to international university students. The research revealed that even many students who were just in their early twenties had travelled within the European and Asian continents and elsewhere.

It is important to note that in practice, people's motives for temporary mobility are manifold and may change during the migration trajectories. For example, those who move primarily for educational reasons may also escape social shackles or flee political oppression, or may become labour or lifestyle migrants. Further, in the previous chapters, it became evident that the motivations for temporary migration appeared to be partly different amongst Asian and European interviewees. Economic and professional factors were highlighted by most Asian respondents; the lower-skilled migrants, especially seasonal workers, had moved to Europe first and foremost to earn money, while for university students and highly skilled professionals, educational and professional motivations largely drove their study and work in Europe. Amongst Europeans, the motivations to move varied from professional, economic and family reasons to personal aspirations, such as searching for new experiences. Amongst those Europeans who were residing but not working or studying in Asia, pensioners were motivated by cheap living costs and warm climate, while the younger Europeans were usually motivated by the adventurous lifestyle and interest in Asian cultures.

The contributions also show that temporariness was not always based on a person's own choice or decision; legal and policy frameworks in the recipient countries made it difficult for many migrants to sojourn permanently. Particularly in the cases

of Asian lower-skilled migrants and humanitarian migrants, temporariness was based on an exigency. Generally speaking, it can be claimed that whereas university students, highly skilled migrants and lifestyle migrants aspired to be transnationally mobile and often intended to reside abroad on a temporary basis, except for seasonal workers, several low-skilled migrants had moved abroad intending to stay there permanently, but, due to the laws and regulations in the receiving societies, their residence ended up being temporary. Temporariness was thus experienced very differently by high- and low-skilled migrants: while most highly skilled were happy with their temporary stays, low-skilled migrants were forced into temporariness even when they wished for more permanent stays.

Apart from these general features of voluntary and involuntary temporariness amongst highly skilled and low-skilled migrants, for most of the temporary migrants interviewed, their wishes to stay, move on or return were vague, depending on their legal, social, professional and personal opportunities and preferences. Various types of respondents evinced a high level of uncertainty with regard to the duration of their sojourn, and their experiences in the host societies had often altered their initial migration plans. Also, many of those who had moved abroad in order to work and had initially welcomed the opportunity for new experiences and better income eventually got tired of constant insecurity and wished to settle down in one place only.

In a nutshell, all these aspects demonstrate that the decisions to engage in temporary migration can be related to temporary migrants' personal backgrounds and expectations as well as to legal and policy frameworks with respect to moving to a certain destination. Moreover, the insights show that initial subjective expectations often change in the course of migration due to a variety of factors beyond political constraints that are related to temporary migrants' experiences. To achieve a more profound understanding of the daily experiences of temporary migrants, the preceding country chapters scrutinised the politico-legal, socio-economic and socio-cultural aspects of temporary migration. Although in analysing the characteristics of temporary transnational migration the sending, transit and receiving regions were understood as constituting one single field of analysis, in practice, people reside in (and originate from) one national context at once and national perspectives could thus not be avoided. Therefore, the different facets of temporary migration in the Euro-Asian context were discussed from the perspectives of traditional source countries (China, India, the Philippines, Thailand), transit regions (Turkey, Greece, Hungary, Ukraine) and destination countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Finland). Yet it was noted that transnational movements are increasingly multidirectional and that circulation increasingly occurs.

13.2 Everyday Experience of Temporary Migrants

In response to the research question raised in the introduction, this section is concerned with an overview of the experiences of temporary migrants in both European and Asian countries. The previous chapters showed the diversity of these

experiences, which will be discussed with respect to politico-legal, socio-economic and socio-cultural aspects.

13.2.1 Politico-legal Aspects

The contributions in this volume show that the ways in which state norms and laws frame temporary migratory movements make the European-Asian transnational space rather asymmetric. For instance, whereas Filipinos travelling to Europe have to comply with stringent requirements before they can be granted a visa to gain entry to Europe, Europeans travelling to the Philippines have visa-free entry for 30 days, and the visas can be renewed. Problems in obtaining visas and residence permits were stated by different kinds of Asian migrants. In some European countries (e.g. Finland and Germany), even highly skilled Asians complained about the very long processes of obtaining and renewing residence permits. Yet it was noted that those who received support from their employers or host organisations, such as invited highly skilled workers, intra-company transferees, academics and university students, perceived the process of obtaining visa relatively easy, albeit unnecessarily long.

Although most Europeans did not report having special difficulties in obtaining approval for their visits to Asian countries, complaints about complicated bureaucracies were common amongst European interviewees as well. For example, students complained that once they arrived in India, they had to go through tedious procedures at local police stations or the Foreign Registration Offices. In Thailand, married and retired migrants were required to renew their visas every year and report to the Thai immigration office every 3 months.[1] Difficulties in obtaining a Thai work permit were also a common obstacle for European workers. As a result, some Europeans worked in Thailand (illegally) on a tourist visa and were forced to exit and re-enter the country every 3 months.

The fact that temporary migrants often need to renew their permits at rather short intervals rendered them dissatisfied with the local bureaucracy; it was seen as a time-consuming and unnecessary experience. Temporary migrants were also in unequal positions in terms of dealing with the bureaucracy: some had got help and financial support from their employers, whereas others had to tackle the paperwork on their own and pay the related costs out of their own pockets. Further, even though both Europeans and Asians complained about bureaucratic processes, there appeared to be a significant difference in their situations: the outcome of bureaucratic hassles was in most cases positive for Europeans, and they could usually count on eventually obtaining the required permits, whereas the situation was much more uncertain for the Asian respondents as many of them eventually did not obtain the permits they wished for. This was not so much the case for Asian highly skilled migrants and

[1] After the interviews, these regulations changed in Thailand. It is currently possible for a foreigner to be granted a visa for 6 months.

international students but to a much higher degree for low-skilled and humanitarian migrants.

More serious problems were also mentioned by Asian respondents. Human trafficking and labour rights abuses were rampant especially amongst low-skilled migrants. Some Thai family migrants reported being forced to work in the sex industry. Refugees and asylum seekers complained that the long waiting time for decisions about their asylum applications was a serious hurdle. In Turkey, interviewees who sought asylum and hoped to be resettled in a third country repeatedly stated they were living in limbo conditions because of the lengthy process. For instance, Syrian refugees lived in the country under a temporary protection regime that places their legal status outside of the Geneva Convention (1951). According to the Geneva Convention's geographical limitation, only Europeans can apply for asylum in Turkey, and Syrians have thus been received as 'temporary guests'. Due to the official understanding of Syrian refugees as 'guests', they can easily fall into the trap of irregularity. Consequently, the number of irregular migrants in Turkey has increased so rapidly that one can even speak of a humanitarian crisis. As the Turkish government has reached its capacity to manage the crisis, many Syrian respondents stated that they wished to leave Turkey and cross into Europe – a task that was not easy to realise in practice.

The legal situation of humanitarian migrants is also difficult in Greece. Refugees often enter Greece with the help of illegal actors profiting from human smuggling and in many cases stay in the country longer than planned as they cannot continue to other EU countries. As a consequence the number of irregular migrants in Greece has increased rapidly. Most humanitarian migrants interviewed in Greece complained about the violation of their 'dignity as human beings'. Many of them had remained totally marginalised and faced serious social uncertainty. Some mentioned having experienced physical violence during racist attacks.

Hungary, as a Schengen country, has also gained growing importance as a transit region for regular and irregular migrants from Asia to Europe, typically through Turkey or the West Balkans. The Hungarian policies on migration and asylum are currently very restrictive, and the policy orientation is based on the notion that immigration is dangerous and threatening. This state of affairs was mirrored in the interviews conducted in Hungary. Experiences of unwelcoming attitudes were common amongst both regular and irregular migrants, causing many of them to decide to give up and leave the country. Similarly, Ukraine is a part of the Eurasian corridor for migration from Asia to Europe. A number of low-skilled workers, humanitarian movers and irregular migrants from different regions of Asia enter Ukraine via Russia intending to continue to the EU countries. They often consider Ukraine only as a temporary stop on their move to the West, or as a place where they could save enough money to move forward.

The research revealed that temporary migrants are typically not politically active and are sometimes not even aware of their rights and entitlements. Both Asian and European interviewees reported only little political engagement either in their host country or in the country of origin. Being temporary residents seems to make people less interested in politics. Lack of political interest may also be related to the

migrants' previous experiences. In some countries political participation in the public or at workplace may have a negative connotation or may even be a dangerous activity.

13.2.2 Socio-economic Aspects

Most Europeans residing temporarily in Asia are highly educated. Likewise the Asians, particularly Indian and Chinese nationals, who move to Europe are increasingly university students, highly skilled workers and their accompanying spouses (Pitkänen and Korpela 2014). This is mainly due to the growing intensity of bilateral academic and economic relationships between European and Asian countries. These transnational movements of highly skilled people appear to be essentially temporary in nature. It was noted that many highly skilled Europeans saw their stay in Asia as useful for their career development, and for most Asian professionals their overseas employment opportunities represented an important advancement.

In addition to the increase in transnational mobility of highly educated people, lower-skilled migration from Asia to Europe continues. Whereas for most Europeans, money was not the main motivation for moving, economic factors played a vital role for the majority of Asian low-skilled migrants. Common push factors were the burden or responsibility of providing for their dependent family members back home or earning extra income during the non-harvest season. Sending remittances back home is conventionally seen as an integral part of Asian migration, whereas Europeans hardly ever engage in this type of activity. Amongst the EURA-NET interviewees, Filipino and Thai labour migrants, in particular, said they send remittances to their families back home.

It was noticed that amongst some types of temporary migrants, the role financial transfers is not very significant. For instance, many of the Asian highly skilled migrants and international students interviewed said that they did not remit money at all. They either spent their earnings on their own expenses, often paying off mortgages or debts in their native countries, or saved money to be able to continue their movements to countries with better employment opportunities. It also became apparent that in many cases, the families of Asian professionals and students did not need financial remittances. In addition, the findings show that some temporary migrants did not earn enough money and were thus not in an economic position to remit even if there was a need. Some low-skilled respondents and students mentioned that they survived in the host country only because their parents sent them money. These 'reverse remittances' appeared to be particularly important at the beginning of the sojourn, when the migrants arrived in a new country.

The European professionals often said that their knowledge and professional skills were highly appreciated and valued in China and other Asian countries. Likewise the Asian highly skilled immigrants residing in Germany claimed that

their professional qualifications were mostly fully recognised,[2] but this was not the case amongst all Asians in the European labour markets. Rather it became evident that temporary migrants, high- and low-skilled alike, tend to be underemployed in Europe. Those highly skilled workers who were recruited to European countries usually worked in good positions doing work similar to what they had done before migrating, but those Asians who had moved to Europe for other reasons (e.g. as spouses) had typically ended up either unemployed or underemployed. For them moving to Europe meant a downward trend in their professional careers. Experiences of labour exploitation and discrimination were also rather common amongst low-skilled Asian respondents.

Several refugees and asylum seekers interviewed had had a good job and a high social position in their countries of origin. For them moving to Europe meant a clear social and economic downward trend. Also for many accompanying spouses, moving abroad resulted in a downward trend in their professional careers. Accompanying spouses were often unemployed in spite of their qualifications and work experience in the native countries, and unemployment was the main reason for why they did not express much motivation to settle permanently in the host society.

Some European returnees reported having bureaucratic problems and difficulties in gaining employment in the native country on their return. They claimed that their overseas work experience was not appreciated in the native country. The experiences were rather different amongst Asian returnees. For instance, those Filipinos who had returned to the Philippines after finishing their work in Europe generally had found employment upon their return. Almost all of them acknowledged that the skills acquired abroad were appreciated in their original home country. Indian returnees thought that their experience of working or studying in Europe had enhanced their earning potentials and had helped them to gain higher social status in India. Similarly Chinese returnees commonly felt that their international experience was highly appreciated in China and utilised in the national development processes.

13.2.3 Socio-cultural Aspects

The emergence of transnational social spaces gradually transforms not only wider societal patterns but also people's social and cultural practices are in a process of change. The temporary migrants interviewed generally perceived their transnational lives as a valuable learning experience: they had learned to know different cultures, gained independence, learned to cope with separation from family and acquired useful skills. Yet the personal costs of the transnational lifestyle were high, including disruptions in social relations, particularly due to the distance from the familiar social ambit. Nevertheless, advances in communication technology and

[2] In this respect, medical doctors were an exception because they had to pass additional exams in Germany.

innovations, such as Skype and WhatsApp, made it easy to maintain social relations across national borders. Many Asian migrants in particular were in contact with their family members on a daily basis, even several times a day.

One of the most challenging aspects of being a temporary migrant is adapting to the host society. The findings show that the Asian and European migrants share a common obstacle to their integration and adaptation paths: that of the language barrier. Most of the temporary migrants interviewed were not learning the domestic languages. The reasons were multiple: anticipated short stay in the country in question, lack of time, lack of motivation to learn a little-spoken language, good level of English spoken by people in the work environment, difficulty of local languages, lack of language courses and the cost of such courses. Temporary migrants typically learn only the bare basics in order to cope in daily communication with authorities, in buying food and so on. Initiatives like obligatory language skill tests or advanced language courses were often perceived as time-consuming obstacles.

The research also revealed that the social climate in the receiving societies was not always welcoming. This was the case in both Europe and Asia. While Europeans mentioned facing stereotypical perceptions in Asia, Asian migrants spoke about prejudice and discrimination in European societies. In the Netherlands, almost all the Asian interviewees were able to tell stories about experiencing discrimination, prejudice or stereotyping.

Both the Asian and European respondents claimed that it was not easy for them to form close relationships with people in the destination societies. The interviewees were mainly engaged with their co-nationals and other foreigners, with only limited and superficial interaction with local people. Families back home and other transnational 'kinship groups' (Faist 2000) were the most important groups of reference for them, and the role of diasporic communities was vital. For instance, for many Filipino migrants, diasporic organisations had become significant cross-border social spaces (see Pries 2008). Their adjustment and sense of being at home in European host countries was aided by their membership in Filipino associations and organisations. However, for instance, in the German case, many of the Asian temporary migrants showed little interest in engaging in any form of migrant association, which contrasts previous research into more permanent migrants in Germany (Caĝlar 2006).

In sum, the findings show that temporary migrants' length of stay depends on legal frameworks but also on their expectations and experiences in the countries of destination and on perceived responsibilities towards family members in their countries of origin. The contributions suggest that, in the Eurasian context, there are various manifestations of people's cross-border transactions and social formations between migrants and non-migrants which constitute transnational social spaces (cf. Faist 1998). As discussed in the introduction to this book, the type and intensity of individual migrants' involvement in different forms of transnational spaces are related both to the circumstances in the source and destination regions and to people's motivation for migrating, the purpose of stay and the anticipated length of sojourn. The research also revealed differences in the ways temporary migrants

experience their temporariness; for some it was a welcome choice, whereas for others a regrettable circumstance.

According to theories on transnationalisation, migrants are increasingly linked and contribute to changes in two or more societies: transnational migration is simultaneously related to social transformation in the countries of origin and destination, which in turn changes the conditions under which migration takes place (Castles et al. 2014: 81–82). This highlights the need to consider interconnections between temporary migration and wider societal processes in various locations connected to the migration trajectories. In the following sections, we summarise how temporariness appears in transnational migration and what implications there are in the European-Asian transnational social spaces.

13.3 Temporary Migrants' Transnationality

Any cross-border migratory movement can be seen as a result of interacting micro-, meso- and macro-structures. Micro-level activities 'that are the result of grass-roots initiatives by immigrants and their home country counterparts' (Portes et al. 1999: 221) create social, economic and cultural structures both at the micro- and meso-levels and provide feedback mechanisms which tend to perpetuate migration processes. In this way, through their individual and collective agency, migrants can also actively challenge structural constraints, such as efforts by the nation-states to control migration. The micro- and macro-levels are linked by a number of intermediate mechanisms, referred to as 'meso-structures'; examples include migrant networks, migrant communities and some forms of the 'migration industry', including traffickers (Castles et al. 2014: 26, 39; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg-Sorensen 2013.)

As stated above, wider legal and policy frameworks are largely related to outcomes regarding migrants' temporariness. National policies determining residence permit categories according to the varying levels of desirability of migrants may become constraints on migrants' permanent stay. The EURA-NET study revealed that people's plans and intentions may change over time, but temporary migrants are frequently constrained by national rules and regulations that limit their rights to stay in a particular destination country and by feelings of not being accepted in the receiving societies and labour markets.

A special challenge for temporary migration schemes is caused by the fact that as people become more mobile, they often cultivate social and economic relationships in two or more societies at once. This may be seen by national governments as a threat: as undermining the individual's loyalty to sovereign nation-states (cf. Castles et al. 2014: 5). In all countries taking part in EURA-NET, the policies on temporary forms of migration could be characterised as a policy of national security and national interests (also Pitkänen and Carrera 2014: 345–351). This applies to both receiving and sending societies. For the receiving societies, temporary migration schemes offer a useful tool of governance, allowing states to curtail newcomers'

rights to reside, work, participate and utilise social benefits, while for the source countries, they provide an opportunity to implement effective policies on return migration. In recent years, the governments of sending countries (e.g. China and India) have increasingly intensified contacts with their diasporas to involve overseas nationals in various forms of the national life (Portes 2001: 190).

The country reports in this volume show that the circumstances and opportunities for various kinds of temporary sojourns depend on many factors, such as the newcomer's legal status, national background, wealth and gender, but first and foremost the desirability of different types of temporary migrants depends on the individual's value in the domestic labour market. Although the labour market value of highly skilled is high, it seems that temporariness typically characterises the residence of highly skilled and presumably also their intentions. By contrast, lower-skilled people often migrate intending a permanent stay, but their residence often ends up being temporary.

EURA-NET revealed that temporary migrants differ not only in their migration experiences but also in their 'transnational mindsets' (Massey and Sanchez 2005; Vertovec 2001). While lifestyle migrants celebrated transnational migration and used it to their advantage, humanitarian migrants were forced into cross-border mobility and wanted to settle down in one place only.

One significant common factor contributing to the temporary migrants' transnationality is the possibility to communicate at a distance. Transnational mobility has become easier and cheaper as a result of new transport and communication technologies, which enable migrants to remain in frequent, or even almost constant, touch with family and friends in their countries of origin (and elsewhere) and to travel back and forth more often (if they can afford it). The findings suggest that with all types of temporary migrants, the emergence of transnational social spaces that extend face-to-face communities into far-flung virtual communities is a significant factor in the acceptance of life in 'permanent temporariness' (Castles et al. 2014: 5.).

While the government restrictions and other large-scale institutional factors often represent constraints for temporary migrants, the meso-level factors may facilitate their transnational movements. In particular, various types of transnational communities and networks are significant elements in the dynamics of temporary migration; they both stimulate and facilitate transnational migration processes. The evidence gathered in EURA-NET shows that migrant communities and networks are especially valuable assets for Asian migrants. For Filipino respondents, in particular, the diaspora had become an important social network. Likewise, Ukrainian labour migrants living in constant temporariness, sojourning in EU countries for a few years, moving to others and occasionally visiting home, highlights the role of transnational networks in their migration trajectories. The Ukrainian case also illustrates how transnational migratory movements may become self-perpetuating through the migrant networks and internal migration system dynamics.

The development of the migration industry is an inevitable aspect of an extension of the migrants' social networks and transnational linkages. The migration industry covers a number of regular and irregular actors, such as recruitment companies,

study abroad agencies, members of migrant communities and networks helping their compatriots on a voluntary basis, criminals who exploit asylum seekers or other migrants by charging them extortionate fees and police officers who seek to make extra money by showing people loopholes in regulations or issuing false documents. The preceding country chapters show that the role of irregular migration industry is vital, particularly in transit migration from Asia to Europe. A number of entrepreneurs and agencies, motivated by the pursuit of financial gain, provide a variety of services which facilitate irregular transborder migration towards the EU (cf. Hermandez-Leon 2008: 154; Nyberg Sorensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2013: 6).

The Ukrainian contribution suggests that the territory of Ukraine is commonly used as a transit corridor for migrants from the East to the West, organised by transnational networks of smugglers. The policy regulations and corruption in Ukraine are conducive to different kinds of irregular migratory movements. In many cases the Ukrainian authorities responsible for migration are a part of these illegal networks, and with considerable extra payments, they provide the necessary permits to stay in the country. The irregular migration industry is also a problem in relation to humanitarian migration. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, several human smuggling networks have been operating along the Syrian and Iranian border and the eastern Mediterranean route to transport refugees to Turkey. Greece is another transit country for humanitarian migrants *en route* to the EU. In many cases, refugees enter Greece from Turkey helped by smugglers and intend to continue elsewhere in the EU.

The transnational perspective has revealed that people's cross-border movements foster a transnational mindset not only amongst those who actually move but also amongst those who remain at home and are connected to migrants through the networks and relations they sustain across borders. In many cases, the transnational ties may be so strong and widespread that migration is as much about the people who stay behind as it is about the people who move. An important factor here is remittances, generally defined as the portion of migrants' earnings sent from the migration destination to the country of origin. However, this research conducted with temporary migrants implies that the role of remittances is not very central for some temporary migrants; while low-skilled migrants usually send financial remittances back home, some did not have enough money to send and some of the highly skilled migrants used the money for their own consumption and mortgages instead of remitting to relatives.

Although remittances usually refer to monetary transfers, social remittances also play a role in transnational movements. Social remittances are understood by Levitt (1998) as the ideas and models of behaviour migrants remit back to their sending communities when migrants return to live in or visit their communities of origin, when non-migrants visit the receiving countries and through new information and communication technologies which enable people to communicate at a distance. Social remittances are a key to understanding how temporary migration modifies the lives of those who remain behind. Yet it is noteworthy that social remittances are influential not only for sending but also for receiving communities (Järvinen-Alenius

et al. 2010). The EURA-NET findings suggest that, through multiple transfers of knowledge on different cultural and working practices and through skills acquisition, temporary migration changes people's cultural capital and identification and may gradually transform ways of life at all ends of the migration axis.

13.4 Future Prospects

To conclude: What did we learn from the experiences of individual temporary migrants and their family members in the European-Asian context? First, we learned that temporary migration needs to be understood as a transnational process where people belong simultaneously to their host and home societies. In EURA-NET, we took account of transnational social spaces as units of analysis, in which the ties and activities of various actors were scrutinised by 11 country teams. To bring together findings on different forms of temporary migration in different national/regional contexts, temporary migration was analysed in Asia (China, India, the Philippines, Thailand), in countries which are 'corridors' for temporary migration between Asia and Europe (Turkey, Greece, Hungary, Ukraine) and in Europe (Germany, the Netherlands, Finland). The research as a whole was conducted by European and Asian researchers.

Another lesson learned concerns the characteristics of temporary forms of migration. We learned that temporary transnational migration is a dynamic and multifaceted phenomenon which includes a wide range of challenges for countries of destination, transit and origin, as well as for migrants themselves and their family members. The failure of national governments and policymakers to see the dynamic characteristics of temporary migration has led to the belief that migratory movements can be turned on and off like a tap by changing policy settings according to the prevailing national interests (cf. Castles et al. 2014: 56.). This misunderstanding is the root cause of the frequent precariousness of temporary migrants' everyday lives. Uncertainty about being able to stay threatens migrants' professional career development, adaptation to the host society and their mental well-being. Although some individuals may welcome temporary migration as a convenient way to gain new experiences, knowledge and income, most of the migrants interviewed felt that in the long run temporariness is not a comfortable situation.

Strict immigration rules and bureaucratic practices cause temporary migrants much concern. The legal and policy frameworks in the receiving countries make it difficult or even impossible for Asian migrants to stay permanently in Europe, as well as for Europeans to stay permanently in Asia. This is the case even with such newcomers whom the receiving societies desired to stay permanently, such as highly skilled professionals, their spouses and university students. In fact, many highly educated temporary migrants are either unemployed or have failed to find employment commensurate with their skills.

The findings suggest that national governments consider temporary migration as a strategy benefitting the domestic labour market. However, the EURA-NET study

revealed that there is a mismatch between the long-term labour market needs and the ways in which the state norms and laws frame temporary forms of migration (see Pitkänen and Carrera 2014: 343–355). Most evidently, a narrow policy of safeguarding national interests eventually results in 'brain waste'. Thus, we learned that temporary migration schemes provide a quick fix solution to solve labour shortages, but it is far from clear that it is a sustainable, or even cost-effective, in a longer perspective.

Although the UK was not amongst the EURA-NET countries and the project deliberately focused on non-English-speaking countries, it is worth mentioning that the result of the Brexit referendum is likely to have a significant impact on transnational migration in other EU countries, too. The findings of EURA-NET indicate that already pre-Brexit, many of the temporary migrants interviewed said that they would have preferred to go to the UK (or to other English-speaking countries), but because it was too difficult, or impossible, to obtain a residence and work permit, they ended up going elsewhere. This tendency is likely to increase when the UK leaves the EU. Moreover, it can be assumed that some of the Asian migrants already located in the UK will move on, potentially increasing temporary migration flows to the EU.

The framing of transnational human mobility as 'temporary migration' is one of the factors limiting the capacity of migrants to integrate, as the policies do not address the possibility for them to be offered integration facilities (such as language courses) and be treated equally and with the same rights as permanent residents (Pitkänen and Carrera 2014: 349). Problems arise not only in the integration of temporary migrants but also in the reintegration of returnees. This appeared to be most evident in the European societies, while China and India have been relatively successful in attracting their nationals back home and in integrating them into the domestic labour markets. For instance, in many cities in China, highly educated returnees play a crucial role in facilitating technology transfer and transnational entrepreneurship (Zweig 2006).

Finally, we have learned that attempting to deny people the right to migrate is almost certainly going to force them to seek alternative channels through which to move. These channels may be increasingly irregular, which is likely to enhance the profitability of human smuggling. Paradoxically, irregularity is often the result of tightened immigration policy and hardened control measures, which have inhibited earlier forms of spontaneous mobility (Castles et al. 2014: 5; Nyberg Sorensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2013: 4).

From these findings, the following policy lessons can be drawn: There is a need to reduce bureaucracy and legal requirements for third country nationals coming to work or study in Europe, and for Asian countries this includes the reduction of legal requirements for Europeans working and residing in Asia. In all EURA-NET country cases, the processes related to obtaining and renewing residence and work permits should be made faster and easier.

A policy relevant to the labour market needs in the long term requires effective measures for integrating foreign arrivals into the receiving societies and labour markets, and that the migrants are not treated only as labour force but also as human

beings. This implies that there is a need for targeted integration measures for temporary migrants and their family members. The spouses of skilled migrants should be helped to find work in the destination countries, and the education systems should consider how to adjust to the needs of the children of temporary migrants. Additional support measures should also be developed to encourage international students to stay in the host country after graduation. Services in English should be improved, and free or low-cost courses in domestic languages should be provided for interested migrants. All migrants should be provided with easy-access information on their rights and obligations.

For European countries the findings call for improving policies on return migration and developing better reintegration schemes for returnees. Concerning the recent humanitarian migratory movements to Europe, targeted integration programmes should be developed and carried out in co-operation with local, national and European stakeholders. National and supranational (EU, international) mechanisms and legal frameworks need to be revised to cope with the vastly increased humanitarian migration. The right to work should be granted to asylum seekers and refugees, and access to health care and education services to all temporary migrants should be ensured.

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