

Perspectives on Geographical Marginality

Stanko Pelc

Miha Koderman *Editors*

Nature, Tourism and Ethnicity as Drivers of (De)Marginalization

Insights to Marginality from Perspective
of Sustainability and Development



 Springer

Perspectives on Geographical Marginality

Volume 3

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This book series *Perspectives on Geographical Marginality* comprehensively overviews research, on areas and communities impacted by processes of marginalization as a result of globalization, economic, environmental, political and social change. This series seeks to discuss and determine what is geographical marginality by inviting leading international experts to publish theoretical and applied work. It also seeks to rigorously debate the degree to which local areas and communities are responding to these process of change and with what success.

The series stems from the International Geographical Union's (IGU), 'Commission on Globalization, Marginalization, and Regional and Local Response' (C12.29). As is suggested by its name, the commission researches the problem of geographical marginality offering a leading forum from which this series will be led. Marginality cannot be defined without putting it into a certain perspective: economic, political and social (including cultural). Marginality has to be clearly distinguished from peripherality. Marginal areas may be a part of periphery or even the centre, but "cannot really be attributed to them".

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- Theory of marginalization;
- Transformation of rural areas from the viewpoint of globalization and marginalization;
- Drivers of marginalization in border and peripheral areas.

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Editors

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Preface

Geographical marginality as a conceptual framework for the research of multifaceted problems evolving from human impact on nature and vice versa is relatively new and its relevance needs to be further discussed in future. Sustainability, or, to be precise, the absence of it, has many links with marginality and marginalization. Both terms are to certain extent ambiguous as they are very widely used. That makes the topic of relationship between marginality and sustainability even more relevant. Future development should in all areas only be sustainable. Actually, if the development is not sustainable, it should not be named development because this term by the definition involves not just quantitative component (growth), but includes qualitative aspects, too. There cannot be any improvement in terms of quality if the growth in production neglects the impact of this development on the quality of life of future generations. Following the path of short-term profit maximization on the account of future generations means marginalization of our descendants and limitation of their prospects for long-term survival. However, unsustainability is not only a driver of long-term marginalization. Unsustainable economic practices are most common in those areas of the world where the awareness of environmental issues is still low and the need for any kind of sources of income is high. Multinational companies are always moving their operations in the direction of the cheapest labour and the lowest environmental restrictions, thus marginalizing the countries where they open their often environmentally offensive branches and employ their low paid workers that are working hard and have long working hours. Employees in the countries that used to host their branches before they moved them elsewhere are marginalized as well, as they become jobless. Therefore even better developed countries with a much higher public awareness of environmental issues and declared orientation towards sustainable development often implement dubious developmental solutions. As permanent growth of the GDP is so extremely important issue for politicians that work on four years re-election cycles, they are often giving priority to the solutions that result in short-term effects rather than those that will give the results sometime in the far future.

Unfortunately, systematic studies of marginality are rare and to come to some conclusion we have to use the insights given by many different partial studies that

often use different approaches and deal with many different topics. What we try to find in the variety of these studies are different drivers of marginalization. In this third book of the series *Perspectives on Geographical Marginality* we are trying to reveal different aspects and different drivers of marginalization. The authors prepared their chapters on the basis of their papers presented at the last two conferences of the International Geographical Union's commission C12.29 Marginalization, Globalization and Regional and Local Responses, held in 2015 in Agri (Turkey) and in 2016 in Ljubljana, Koper and Maribor (Slovenia). The last conference focused on sustainability and this is the reason why the book starts with more nature oriented topics, followed by the insights into different roles that tourism plays in (de)marginalization process, drivers related to ethnicity and other predominantly economic topics.

We would like to express our appreciation to all the chapter authors who have contributed a wide variety of interesting topics that enable us to get better insight to marginality from many different perspectives.

Koper, Slovenia

Stanko Pelc
Miha Koderman

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Part I
Introduction

Chapter 1

Drivers of Marginalization from Different Perspectives

Stanko Pelc

1.1 Setting the Frame

The first two books in the series “Perspectives on Geographical Marginality” covered several topics that have been presented and discussed at the conference of the IGU Commission on Marginalization, Globalization and Regional and Local Responses, held in Nainital in the Indian Himalayan state of Uttarakhand. In such a mountainous setting the geometric view of marginality was clearly predominant and the mountains and the problems of mountain dwellers were the prevailing topics. In 2015 and 2016 the annual conferences of the commission were held in Ağrı in eastern Anatolia (Turkey) and in Slovenia. At these conferences a wide range of topics has been presented, and this book contains a selection of those that are in one way or another linked to the problem of marginality and (de)marginalization.

The conference held in Turkey has failed to attract geographers from the host country, which clearly shows the marginality of the location where the conference has been held. The area populated by Kurds with a completely new university has been making promising developmental steps towards demarginalization, but unfortunately the peace process terminated in 2015 and the marginalization of territories settled by Kurds will obviously increase. This could be a very interesting topic, that would deserve to figure in our book, but unfortunately no author could write about it, considering that southeastern Turkey and academics living there are experiencing a very difficult situation at present.

The 2016 conference held in Slovenia on the other hand attracted several Slovenian authors that presented some interesting case studies from their own country. That is the reason why several chapters are dealing with Slovenia, a country that can hardly be an example of a typical marginal region. On the contrary, it is more a representative of the better developed part of the world. However, even

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in the most developed parts of the world there are individuals, groups and areas that are pushed to a marginal position from a certain point of view and by a certain process that is harmful for their economic, social or cultural situation. From that point of view, case studies from Slovenia can show many similarities with the majority of European nations.

1.2 Marginalization and Demarginalization

The simplest definition of marginalization may be that this is *the process in which something or somebody is pushed into a marginal position* (dictionary explanation: the social process of becoming or being made marginal (especially as a group within the larger society; (WordNet 3.0, Farlex clipart collection 2003–2008). Marginalization is always social, but it can be caused by many different factors. These can be defined as drivers of marginalization. Some of them may be physical by nature while others are social. In the last case, all the factors that are the result of human activities are considered as social. Whatever humans do is done within a social context. All activities have some kind of impact on other members of the society. When we are trying to observe the process of marginalization we intend to examine those activities and circumstances that have a certain effect on social structure with special regard to the changes in the position of certain social groups or entire societies. The result of the process of marginalization is a certain degree of marginality from a certain perspective. Two basic diametrically opposite perspectives are “self-perspective” and “other-perspective”. A person or a social group may consider its situation as marginal and feel marginalized, or others consider a person (social group) as marginal. The only way to get insight into the perception of marginality of an individual or social group is the use of qualitative research. However, it is much more common that researchers start their research by considering marginality as an extremely unfavorable position from their perspective. Quantitative or qualitative indicators or a combination of both can be engaged in determining when and where this unfavorable position occurs. As in many other cases the crucial problem is the threshold. In the research of geographical marginality, we have not yet managed to come to widely accepted indicators of marginality that could be used to indicate the marginality point—the point from which the individuals, social groups or societies can be defined as marginal. Déry, Leimgruber and Zsilincsar raised this question too, referring to “Gino Germani (1980)” who accepted that there may be some “partial marginality”, and the above authors went even a step further to “point to the fact that marginality *is always* partial, somewhere in-between, since no one can be fully marginal or fully not-marginal ... marginality is always ‘grey’. Hence, there should be a point where one crosses the fence; then again, there should be some measure of marginality or of non-marginality, when one is closer or further from the ‘fence’—otherwise, we are condemned to work with constant ‘blurriness’.” (Déry et al. 2012, p. 8; original emphasis). They consider this dilemma as “similar to the one around the urban-rural

dichotomy (and of threshold values in general): where do towns and villages begin? Statistics alone (number of inhabitants) do not help.” (ibid.)

The non-existence of a clear “marginality point” is no longer a problem when we change the focus from marginality as such to the process of marginalization. In this case, we need to start with a social group (individual, society) in an unfavorable situation (spatial, economic, social) and to observe whether their situation improves (demarginalization) or worsens (marginalization). The above cited authors (Déry et al. 2012, p. 13) also concluded that “marginality is continuously changing (augmenting or diminishing)” and consider that this “left open the door for more research in this field and try to figure how to ‘see’ these changes.”

We can say that the authors of the chapters in this book are presenting many different case studies mainly from this point of view even though they are not clearly pointing that out.

1.3 Nature as Socially Induced Factor of Marginalization

Humans are a part of nature, but we live within highly structured social contexts that enable us to overcome natural constraints on the one hand and build social constraints on the other. Societies of hunters and gatherers manage(d) to survive in very harsh natural conditions. We could say that there were no or only very few areas where people could not live (survive). It was always just the balance between available resources (food and shelter) and the number of people inhabiting certain area. Large areas with scarce resources allowed survival to few people. It all radically changed after the Neolithic revolution with the beginning of agriculture. In agricultural societies, the areas with appropriate natural conditions for growing crops became cultivated while those with worse conditions or those that were even inappropriate for growing crops did not attract human settlements and became uncultivated. Their significance for human survival became less relevant or even irrelevant. We can say that the phenomenon of marginal land appeared with the beginning of agriculture. This had nothing to do with profit but with energy input. The land where more energy was needed for cultivating than the energy got from the crops, was beyond the margin of cultivated land. Marginal land where the input and output of energy was equal was the land that could serve only for bare survival and was only cultivated in case that certain groups of people had no other option to survive than to cultivate this marginal land.

The extent and the location of marginal land in the above sense varies according to the development of technology and social organization. Deserts can be changed into fertile lands, new techniques of growing crops, new machines, new seeds, fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides etc. cause changes in the extent of cultivated land and shift the position of marginal land. Of course, the changes are not unidirectional. McCann (1995) in his book “People of the Plow—An Agricultural History of Ethiopia, 1800–1990” devoted one chapter (From Royal Fields to Marginal Lands) to describe the complex of political, social and economic changes that

caused a dramatic shift from a once flourishing agricultural region into a region where in about hundred years agriculture deteriorated so much that the region like the rest of northern Ethiopia experienced a deadly famine as a consequence of the 1984–85 drought in combination with civil war and other socio-economic and demographic factors. The reason for such deterioration was that region lost its political importance (royal seat moved from Ankober to Addis Abeba), market conditions changed, incoming migrants used agricultural practices from the place of their origin inappropriate for the natural conditions in the region etc. A new use of the land (technology, ownership relations) transformed formerly valuable land into a marginal area.

The above example is taken from a feudal context. However, we must consider that in the capitalist system marginal land is no longer just the land that can guarantee barely enough crops (food) for people to survive from its yield. It is also the land that does not give any profit—the land where the invested capital in all forms on the long term equals the incomes of sold crops—where we have to deal with a ‘no profit situation’.

Of course, the incomes depend on the market situation that is constantly changing (the prices of the crops going up and down). With the revolution in transportation every single farm has to compete with the rest of the world. It is therefore the global market that sets the limits where natural conditions for certain crops are appropriate or not for market oriented agriculture. Kang et al. (2013) in their article about marginal lands, quoting several authors such as Peterson and Galbraith, Strijker, Schroers, Heimlich, Hart etc. state that there are three different terms for marginal lands:

- physical marginal lands,
- production marginal lands, and
- economic marginal land.

According to Schroers (2006a, b, cited in Kang et al. 2013, p. 130) an economically marginal land is “an area where a cost-effective production is not possible, under given site conditions, cultivation techniques, agricultural policies as well as macro-economic and legal conditions”.

In the physical and production sense, marginal lands “generally refer to the areas not only with low production, but also with limitations that make them unsuitable for agricultural practices and ecosystem function” (Heimlich 1989 and Hart 2001 cited in Kang et al. 2013, p. 130). Within agricultural production terminology marginal lands (marginal cropland, marginal farming land) is the opposite of prime farmland with the best combination of physical and chemical characteristics that make it the most productive.

Peterson and Galbraith (1932) when describing the situation on the westward slopes of Sierras descending from the top down, have written that:

At some point on the slope the grade of land becomes such that it is possible under the conditions of the moment to cultivate the land and fulfill the requirements of the hitherto outlined ‘necessary remuneration.’ Presumably forestry and perhaps grazing have been

carried out prior to this point on land of less satisfactory grade. Since cultivation must be defined more or less arbitrary it will be used here in the sense of actual manipulation of the soil for the purpose of producing crops (p. 299).

This fact is far from being the same for all crops, so it would be right to presume that this should be the point where any crop or combination of crops yields enough for the “necessary remuneration”.

“The point where it is no longer possible to cultivate remuneratively a lower grade of land—the uppermost rim of remunerative cultivation on the hitherto mentioned slope—is the margin of cultivation. Subject to some further qualification that land may be considered truly marginal.” (ibid.) When they present the factors determining the position of marginal land they first expose the human factor with its two main dimensions. The first one being the “capacity for remunerative cultivation” and the second one the “standard of living which he [the operator; S.P.] is willing or able to accept”. From the present point of view we have to consider that agriculture has to compete with many other activities that usually offer higher remuneration and a higher standard of living on the one hand and that there are different kinds of state interventions that are “improving” the remuneration in order to control the extent of marginal lands on the other. Considering that other factors are the size of the farm unit, price, costs as well as the “relation of the margin of cultivation to the opportunity margin for non-agricultural use” (such as forestry, grazing or even recreation), Peterson and Galbraith (ibid.) state that “the margin of cultivation in abstract theory at least is highly mobile or dynamic concept.”

From our point of view it is important to find and observe the main factors that influence the ‘movements’ of marginal land in a certain area under certain circumstances. Actually, these movements are the process of marginalization and demarginalization of agricultural land. It is obvious that natural conditions, no matter how important they may be for the productive function of agricultural land, are only the basic pre-condition for certain units of land to be marginal from an agricultural point of view. The rest are socio-economic factors therefore it is possible to consider the process of (de)marginalization of agricultural land as socially induced. Short term effects of socio-economic factors are predominant while the natural conditions are basically stable (long term changes of fertility, climate conditions etc.) even though some exceptional natural disasters may also have important short term effects on yields and annual remuneration.

Beside the above described approach to (de)marginalization (of agricultural land) we also must consider the wider aspect of (de)marginalization of nature in general. Enormous advances in the development of technology and the persistent need for the maximization of profit and for permanent economic growth brought humanity into the position ‘man against nature’. For some time, it seemed that humanity overruled the nature and that the only purpose of nature is to serve humanity. Nature has been reduced to a resource provider. We can consider this reduction as the marginalization of nature. Nature strictly ‘in service’ of mankind is nevertheless utopian and this kind of anthropogenic view of nature is false. Facing the problems that almost all societies experienced in the sixties of the past century

certain people concluded that humanity should know what it can expect if its attitude towards nature and natural resources does not change. The emergence of the Club of Rome and its 1972 book “The Limits to Growth” (Meadows et al. 1972) is a major step towards the changes in the attitude towards nature especially in connection with economic growth and development. The book presents the results of an expert team research that “examined five basic factors that determine, and therefore, ultimately limit, growth on this planet—population, agricultural production, natural resources, industrial production and pollution” (ibid. pp. 11–12). Two decades later the so-called Rio process started focusing on climate change as the major problem caused by human activities. It took another quarter of a century to get together 195 nations at the conference in Paris that agreed that the rise of the air temperature should be kept well below 2 °C. In the meantime, the Brundtland commission prepared the report ‘Our Common Future’ (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) and since then the terms sustainable development and sustainability are very frequently used, although their true meaning may still be ambiguous.

The first part of this book opens with the chapter where the concept of marginality is debated from the viewpoint of its links to sustainability. Marginalization of nature and environment are rarely discussed (in geography). In comparison with geometrical marginality based on an extended center-periphery model (marginality from a socio-economic point of view), ‘ecological marginality’ shows the upside-down picture of marginal areas. What is considered central from economic perspective is marginal from environmental (ecological) point of view. The most modern Central Business Districts (CBDs) of today certainly are the financial and managing centers of economic activities. However, from an environmental point of view, CBDs are wastelands made of glass, concrete and asphalt. The vegetation plays purely a decorative role, being placed on the roofs of the buildings or at the edges of the streets. The centrality of natural wealth is on the contrary where the best-preserved areas of the planet are. Those that are far away from human greed and from activities such as mining, industry and even tourism.

However, when we observe the importance given to nature (environment) in decision making processes, we may see how often it played a minor, unimportant (marginal) role and in many cases, it still does. Unsustainable development still dominates worldwide. Huge areas of rainforests are cut down or burnt to give way to palm oil plantations or other forms of ‘development’. There are certain links between marginalization of nature in the process of economic growth and marginalization of societies (social groups) living in the areas with unsustainable development that the opening chapter of the book’s first part is devoted to.

In the following chapter Žiberna discusses the land use changes in the region of Svečinske gorice, a hilly area south of the Austrian-Slovenian border. The author considers the area as considerably marginal especially when compared with the region on the Austrian side of the border. This is in a certain contradiction with the natural conditions for vineyards. The vineyard areas of Svečinske gorice are among the most vital in northeastern Slovenia. However, the process of agricultural abandonment took place in the region, and subsequently the natural succession

processes are able to progress. Land use changes show the growing share of forests while the share of arable land is decreasing. All that may result in further marginalization of the region. The author presents the results of the analysis of land-use changes between 2000 and 2015 in relation to selected physiographic features. In his research, he mainly focused on cultivated areas with a special regard on vineyards.

The following chapter by Zorn shifts attention from micro- to macro-scale and from land use to natural disasters. It tries to reveal another perspective of marginality induced by natural processes. Natural disasters frequently occur throughout the world. Nature is not choosing between developed and less developed countries. Earthquakes, forest fires, hurricanes etc. occur in both. However, many examples show that certain countries are much more vulnerable than others. The number of lives lost or people affected by natural disasters is much higher in less developed countries. The reasons are not only natural conditions. There are many social factors that Zorn discusses and points out weak social safety network, lack of early warning systems etc.

The last chapter in the first part of the book is dealing with relatively marginal part of the world—Northern Caucasus. Vinogradova, Gracheva and Belonovskaya present the changes in climate and land use. They believe that the conventional schemes of development of the spatial distribution of grassland ecosystems in intermountain basins of the Central Caucasus must be corrected due to historical changes in land use.

The intermountain basins of North Ossetia have been changed from natural ecosystems to cropland more than 3000 years ago. The current slope topography clearly reveals the long-term past human impact. The authors of the chapter have used a multidisciplinary approach to analyze the changes in land cover during the last sixty to sixty-five years. Especially in the last two decades the changes have been extremely profound. They estimated the changes in heat and humidity for the territory of the North Caucasus and are presenting the changes at different height levels after year 2000. The chapter informs us which vegetation types are recovering and succeeding former agricultural vegetation on former agricultural terraces. The process is explained by climate change and reduced human impact. The creation of natural parks, trails and tourist routes is considered as an option for sustainable development and demarginalization of the region.

1.4 Tourism as a Developmental Opportunity of Marginal Regions

Tourism as an economic activity is often considered to be very promising and with great potential for growth. A quick look on the UN World Tourist Organization website (UNWTO 2016) reveals that international tourist arrivals recently grew considerably. In 2015, a total of 1184 million international tourist arrivals were

recorded worldwide. The growth of 4% or more, which is higher than the long term average, lasts since 2010. Tourism as such seems to be very promising and often imposes big expectations in areas with developmental problems. Especially in backward rural areas with relatively unspoiled nature and poor accessibility to industrial, commercial and residential centers, tourism is often seen as a redeeming developmental activity which may be highly overrated. Tourism cannot be a substitute for uncompetitive agriculture or missing industry. There are only few special places where the majority of the local population can live from the revenues from tourism. Not every single rural area can expect such an outcome from tourism development. However, tourism can play an important role in regional development when it is combined with the development of other sectors.

There are countless rural areas with more or less characteristics indicating marginality. Usually they are remote, agriculture is less viable, nonagricultural working places are not easily accessible. Young people go to school in relatively distant centers and eventually never come back or they even do not go to school—they just move in search of employment. The average age of population is growing, as is the share of farmers that are too old to work on their farms. Agricultural land is less and less intensively used or abandoned. The low standard of living provided by agriculture is no longer acceptable for young people, and this is the reason for their decision to leave and try to avoid inevitable marginality in case they stay and continue the practice of their parents. They may change one marginal situation with another in the city if they get a low paid job, cannot afford a proper apartment or even don't get a job and must live in a slum. In such cases emigration from an often relatively attractive rural area seems to be a mistake. However, the viewpoint of visitors is often in severe contradiction with the perspective of local inhabitants. While visitors usually only see the beauty of nature, astonishing sceneries, tranquility etc., local inhabitants work hard all-day long during many hours, living under the threat of natural hazards such as hail, frost, avalanches etc. that can ruin all their labourious efforts in a single moment. It is often hard for them to understand that there is this other view and that it can be an opportunity for additional income that may pave the way out of their marginal situation.

In mid 1990s I have been involved in an integral rural development project in a relatively remote rural area (Vojsko) near an old mining center Idrija in central part of Slovenia. The village Vojsko consists of many scattered houses (single farms) covering large area on a small karst plateau with several cultural and natural attractions that are worth visiting. As one of the outcomes of the first phase of the project, we prepared a promotional booklet presenting the mentioned attractions and the attractiveness of the location itself. To convince potential visitors that the location is worth visiting as it differs so much from urban and suburban areas I described it as “the place where you can still observe two hedgehogs fighting in the middle of the road in the moonlight of an early summer night”. That was something that I experienced once when I was leaving the village after one of the late evening meetings with local inhabitants involved in the project. After the booklet was already published and in circulation the municipal development officer informed me that certain people from the village did not like the part of the booklet that was

trying to present their village as a romantic, idyllic place—they would prefer that it would be presented as tough, harsh environment with unbearable living conditions expecting that this could provoke sympathy and eventually some developmental support. It was a bit of a disappointment, because we had several workshops and one would expect that people involved in the process of preparation of the ‘developmental vision and goals’ for their village would gain the awareness about what can attract tourist and thus enable the development of rural tourism. However, they obviously could not separate themselves from deeply rooted sense of their marginality that did not let them see what is their comparative advantage.

One of the important motives for people to travel and visit certain places is the search for something different, to meet people that differ from those that they meet in their everyday life, to change the environment that they constantly live in with the one completely different, often even leaving their ‘comfort zone’ in a search of an adventure.

Vojsko karst plateau certainly is something different and for some people even enchanting. However, it is only an hour and a half car drive from Slovenian capital Ljubljana. The inhabitants are Slovenians as the vast majority of population in Slovenia. The residents of the capital may look up on them as a bit backward, but they are not that much different and above all, there are plenty of similar places and people all over Slovenia. To attract visitors you need to persuade them that you are able to offer them something special. That is not an easy task nowadays as you need to compete with the global tourism market.

To see, explore and experience something much different than rural areas of one’s own country, something that not so long ago one could only see in TV documentaries, means to travel to more distant places. Within the globalized society equipped with efficient modes of transportation this became possible and accessible to considerable share of ‘westerners’ and especially in recent years to ever growing numbers of ‘easterners’ (at first Japanese, Koreans, Taiwanese etc. and recently more and more Chinese). For many material culture of faraway places and the material evidence of old cultures that have vanished long time ago are still a dominant motive of their visit. However, we must not forget the interest for still existing cultures ‘belonging to the past’. Cultures that may not differ that much from the one of visitor’s recent or even long time ago ancestors.

In 2003 I attended an ‘IGU Marginality Conference’ in Kathmandu. After the conference I made a tourist visit to Chitwan National Park. At that time there were very few tourists in Nepal, because of the fear of the ‘Maoists’! The number of tourist arrivals in 2003 was the lowest since the beginning of 1990s (338,000 compared to 363,000 in 1990 and 790,000 in 2014) (World Bank 2016). Nevertheless, the offer was similar then as it is today. Besides natural attractions such as riding on the elephant and searching for the rhinos, observing birds and other animal life while walking through the jungle or from a boat, watching elephant bathing and visiting Elephant Breeding Centre, they also offer the visit of the village and a Tharu dance. Tharu are the natives living in the Tarai, the southern part of Nepal where Chitwan National park is situated. During my visit of the village as a part of the ‘tourist package’ I felt a bit awkward even though we were

only three intruders: the guide, me and my 17 years old son who was accompanying me. The guide was explaining about the life in the village, showed us around between and through the huts of the people living in the village. It was like watching a 3D documentary where the three of us were completely separated from the observed persons even though we were moving among them. They were doing their ordinary daily tasks as usual not paying any attention to us, so it seemed as if we were in an open air museum with live people as the main exhibits. It was a clear sign of marginalization of local population and an example of how marginality can be used for tourist attraction. Of course, an average tourist usually does not reflect much of what he sees, besides he does not get the whole picture of what the Tharu people of Chitwan had to go through so that tourists from around the world can now enjoy the beauties and the adventures of the national park. McLean (1999) spent 20 months among Tharu people investigating the consequences that they suffered because of the establishment of the national park. Their traditional life has dramatically changed because of the park. Their deep bond with nature and woods where they were practicing their shifting cultivation has been broken as they lost their resources by being forced to leave the area. The relocation was conducted with force as McLean (1999, p. 40) was told:

My informants told me how soldiers forcibly removed all the villages located inside the designated boundary of the park. Houses were burned down, fields and houses were trampled by elephants, men, women and children were threatened sometimes at gun point. Those who lived inside the boundaries tried to fight for their land, but lost and as a result became landless for life.

Similar is the case of Maasai in Africa (Azarya 2004). Those living near or in the areas that became protected as game or national parks also experienced several restrictions that limited their herding and had severe influences on their traditional way of life not to mention that in some cases they also had to evacuate protected area and to move elsewhere. Cited author in his article points out close tie between globalization and marginality as a tourist attraction. He tried “to show how tourism feeds on and further promotes an increasing attraction to the peripheral, even to the miserable, that are exhibited as objects of curiosity” (Azarya 2004, p. 950). The reason is of course the ‘curious traveler’ in his search for adventure and exploration that has money, time and means to visit places at the periphery and wants to see with his own eyes how ‘exotic tribes live their primitive life’. The number of such curious explorers is considerable and is still growing. Similar to idyllic places of unspoiled nature where tourists are seeking peace and relaxation, the periphery with population living traditional way too, cannot accept masses of tourists, because masses destroy the core attractiveness of such places. The feeling of being “curious explorer” would be lost. There is no real adventure in mass consumerism. However, majority of tourists that are motivated by all kind of adventures still want all the amenities that they enjoy at home. Therefore, this kind of tourism has some benefits for local population too. As Azarya (2004, p. 953) states:

Some of the natives are active in servicing those amenities. They stack the refrigerator with cold drinks, learn how to pour the wine and make the bed, fix the shower or change a flat tyre while their cousins or neighbours exhibit their 'different' local customs (fieldwork in Kenya, 1987, 1995). How to implant the familiar facilities within the new environment without endangering its 'difference' as tourist destination, without diluting the local within the global is a major balancing act that the tourism industry has to face constantly.

Closest to this kind of 'exploring the living history' is the last chapter in the second part of the book about Cuban tourism. The other two cases are about Soča valley in Slovenia and a Mediterranean island Ibiza. Marginality from an economic perspective frequently means that economic activities in marginal areas have less impact and are therefore less harmful for nature. As already mentioned, this is the case with the upside-down ecological picture of centrality. Marginal from the economic point of view is of central importance from the ecological perspective. However, agricultural landscapes reflecting traditional agricultural practices and evoking nostalgic feelings may be even more interesting for tourists than 'untouched' nature itself. Therefore, marginal rural areas have a lot of potential for a certain degree of tourism development. Besides, many of these areas are also close to different kinds of natural attractions or areas for recreational activities in nature (fishing, hunting, canoeing, canyoning, rafting, hiking etc.). Economic marginality as a consequence of deteriorating agriculture and absence of industrial development in the past together with relative isolation due to remoteness is under certain circumstances a comparative advantage and an opportunity for the development of sustainable tourism.

The role of tourism in sustainable development of a mountainous border region along the Soča river is presented by Trček and Koderman. Their starting point is the fact that in recent decades, tourism trends have shown a growing demand for adventure tourism. Statistical data show that the largest number of tourists in Slovenia is visiting tourist destinations in the mountains. The case study of Bovec municipality presents one such destination. It is situated along the Slovenian-Italian border and on the southern slopes of the Julian Alps. Eighty percent of its territory is included in the only Slovenian national park (Triglav National Park). Location at the border in the mountains far away from major centers is the reason for certain deficiencies considering the economic situation and infrastructural equipment. Besides, the region has been hit by earthquakes three times in the last four decades that caused severe material damage.

What local development planners believe to be the most promising activity in recent years is sustainable tourism as an economic activity that is particularly suitable for the conservation of protected areas in mountains. Furthermore, it can help to neutralize marginalization processes expressed as depopulation, abandonment of arable land etc.). The authors present the situation and discuss future possibilities for the development of sustainable tourism in the region.

A completely different situation is presented in the chapter by Capella who writes about demarginalization of Ibiza. The island itself, like much of the rest of the Mediterranean tourist destinations, has been heavily affected by mass tourism. Because of the competition of new tourist destinations worldwide that emerged in

the 1990s Ibiza has lost its attractiveness and has been in a way marginalized. However, private and public investors that benefited from the club culture phenomenon in 2000s made Ibiza famous and attractive again. It became the globally best-known nightlife destination. This led to a transition to luxury tourism with Ibiza's nightlife as the main attraction. The process of marginalization has therefore been successfully reversed and Ibiza has become one of the most exclusive tourism destinations in Spain. Capella focuses mainly on how the global activity of music has benefitted a destination that managed to turn away from possible marginalization.

The last chapter of the second part takes us to the other side of Atlantic Ocean. Faganel and Trnavčević describe how the marginal communist country Cuba is making its first steps towards sustainable tourism. They state that improved relationship with the USA gave a momentum to the development of Cuban tourism. Marginality in the case of Cuba may be regarded as a comparative advantage for the development of tourism. It makes it exotic. It has long been famous for rum and cigars, but at present there are also streets full of old cars, socialist ideas, music etc. The country is mysterious and therefore attractive and looking for investors that would invest into tourism infrastructure. Cuba receives substantial revenue from the tourism sector, second only to health services exports. The largest number of tourists comes from Europe and the numbers are growing on yearly basis. There is a fear that the 'paradise' will eventually disappear soon. Expanding demand is causing the need for the improvement of tourism infrastructure. Unfortunately, Cuba is not in a good enough shape to cope with that. A lot of money is spent to maintain free health and education systems. The Ministry of Tourism is considering an increase in the number of hotel rooms and would like to build more resorts and golf courses with foreign investment. Foreign companies mostly from Spain have put forward several proposals to build hotels and other tourism facilities and government officials are now working on the feasibility studies. The authors are evaluating the possible scenarios for regional development and trying to predict potential consequences for Cuban society

1.5 Ethnic Groups Between Marginality and Inclusion

If tourism in general is not something that we would usually connect with marginality and marginalization, ethnicity certainly is. It is discussed from many different perspectives. We will start this section of our introduction with an illustrative case. In 2016 we were witnessing an environmental struggle of Native Americans against oil companies that were building a pipeline near the Standing Rock Indian Reservation in North Dakota. The protests drew a lot of attention of mass media and the protesters gained a lot of support on Facebook. Over 1.6 million people visited their FB site <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Standing-Rock-Indian-Reservation/109268902425837> by November 5, 2016 to express the support to their struggle. Protesters from the Standing Rock Sioux and 200 other

tribes claimed that they are trying to protect their water resources not only for themselves, but for their descendants, too. Besides they believed that the pipeline would disturb their sacred lands and burial grounds (Erbentraut 2016). The pipeline builders on the other side claimed that they are building according to the legal obligations and on private property (not crossing the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe's reservation at all). Besides they argued that the pipeline would not endanger the water resources as pipelines are the most secure mode of transportation of oil (Midwest Alliance for Infrastructure Now (MAIN) 2016).

Who is wrong or right in this case is not of primary importance for the discussion on marginality and ethnicity. The fact is that in this case an ethnic group is fighting, what the protesters believe to be, a fair fight for their rights that have been violated since the beginning of colonial era. When Leimgruber (2004, p. 156) writes about ethnicity his first statement is that "colonization of the world by the Europeans has been an example of systematic marginalization of entire peoples". The history of colonization is a sad story about killing of millions of natives. People who were in the eyes of newcomers nothing more than savages equal to any other form of fauna and therefore did not deserve the same rights as humans. One of the problems that caused many conflicts was the difference in the attitude towards land. Native people in America or Australia did not develop the concept of land ownership that was something basic for new settlers that came to colonize the land previously settled by natives. As Leimgruber (2004) stated:

... land questions have subsequently become core issues in the current debates between Australian Aborigines or Native Americans and their respective governments, but the road to satisfactory solutions is still long. Land has a particular significance to the Aborigines as well as to other indigenous peoples (p. 157).

Denying them the right to their land and limiting them to the areas of their reservations is one severe form of marginalization. It is a form of segregation. If the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe did not have the right to be an equal partner in the process of planning the location of the pipeline this is another form of marginalization. If they are being beaten and arrested because they are standing for what they believe is right, it is because they are marginal. However, their marginality has obviously changed, because they are no longer generally looked up as "savage Indians" that are attacking "white man" bringing progress and civilization. Public opinion is predominantly on their side and they won a lot of sympathies worldwide. That may be the reason that even Barrack Obama the president of USA at that time had to express his opinion about the problem publically, promising that the proper solution is going to be found. As the course of events shows that is not very likely especially since the new president Donald Trump has already cleared the way for the construction of the Dakota Access pipeline.

However, it is not only the natives that are marginalized in modern societies. In the case of America or Australia, immigrants from the period of colonization became dominant majority populations of these continents. The more usual situation for immigrants is that they become a minority within society they became a part of. Actually, in many cases they even did not become a proper part of the

society that they live in. Weisberger (1992) when trying to define marginality from a sociological point of view is talking about a man that no longer fully belongs to his old culture (i.e. of the area of his origin) and is not integrated into the new one. Therefore, he constructs the responses to his situation within these new coordinates in order to alleviate or resolve his double ambivalence.

The reasons for migration are many. One of the most horrifying is fleeing from conflict zones where one's life is in constant danger. The numbers of displaced persons are growing and in 2016 reached the peak value of 65.3 million people that have been forced to leave their home. Nearly 21.3 million out of that are refugees and over half of them are younger than 18. Besides, there are also 10 million stateless people which means that they have no access to basic rights such as education, healthcare, employment and freedom of movement. Nearly 34,000 people are forcibly displaced every day (UNCHR 2016). A large share of all refugees came from only three countries: from Syria 4.9 million, from Afghanistan 2.7 and from Somalia 1.9 million. The host countries with the largest numbers of refugees in 2016 were Turkey with 2.5 million, Pakistan 1.6 and Lebanon with 1.1 million. Living in a refugee camp being dependent on humanitarian aid is certainly a life at the margin of modern society. That may be the reason why so many people are trying to cross the Mediterranean to reach the promised land in Europe—most often Germany. From January to August 2016 there were 524,430 new asylum applications in Germany—more than in 2015 (441,891) and more than in the rest of the countries of the developed world (Canada and USA together 148,297). The huge number of asylum seekers together with many more economic immigrants is a huge pressure on democracy in receiving nations. No wonder the domestic population has all kind of fears mixed with stereotypes and prejudices that are a 'fertile soil' for right extremism and racism hidden under the idea of the protection of the homeland (i.e. western) cultural values. The idea of multiculturalism is at stake as never before. And of course, from the viewpoint of marginalization—the newcomers may have avoided marginalization in a refugee camp or in their own country, but must most probably have to expect marginalization within the society that they have managed to move in.

Marginality of refugees and economic immigrants from a geographical perspective deserves special attention and we hope that it will hopefully be further elaborated in one of the future books in these series. In this book, we devote more attention to one other ethnic group that is marginalized in many European countries. This is Roma population. As Leimgruber (2004) has stated:

Among those people who are still victims of discrimination we find the representatives of the itinerant lifestyle, the Roma or Gypsies, the People of the Road. They are generally regarded with considerable distrust. And the attitude towards them is close to racist. Yet, they have a double image, somehow like the North American Indians, oscillating between romanticist admiration and fear of their otherness. Many people are fond of Gypsy music and dancing, and in his opera *Carmen*, the French composer Georges Bizet (1838–1875) has immortalized the Roma. On the other hand, whether settled or nomadic, they have their particular lifestyle and culture, which distinguish them from all other societies and do not please everybody. (p. 162 f.).

On January 07, 2014, Spiegel Online in English published an article about Roma people in Germany titled “Europe’s Unwanted people” (Spiegel staff 2014). The following story is an illustrative example of how a lot of Europeans see the ‘Roma’ problem. The article is describing a house in the Duisburg suburb of Rheinhausen that has been settled by Roma immigrants:

Roma came from Romania and moved into it (the house). More of them came, until the building almost exclusively housed Roma immigrants, more than the structure could accommodate. They held barbecue parties in the back yard, which led to complaints from neighbours. Rubbish piled up around the building and the garbage disposal service refused to remove it. That attracted rats.

Window panes broke and no one replaced them. The stairwells began to smell of urine. Some inhabitants stole, tricked people or robbed them, which led to frequent visits from the police. In the first nine months of last year, a total of 277 crimes were attributed to people living in the building.

Then far-right activists came. They demonstrated in front of the building and railed against it in Internet forums. On a Facebook page named after the address of the house, “In den Peschen 3-5,” Stefan K. wrote: “Chuck a bomb in, that’ll sort it.” Marian D. demanded: “Burn those wankers down.” The page had 1,690 likes until it was shut down last August.

That month, the building’s occupants armed themselves with clubs. Left-wing activists mounted a guard at night. When the police tried to enter the building one night in August, the people inside kept them out with iron bars and pepper spray (Spiegel staff 2014).

The other side of the story reveals the ‘European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey’ EU-MIDIS (European Union agency for Fundamental rights 2009). Every second Roma respondent was discriminated against at least once in the year prior to the survey and every one that has been discriminated against experienced 11 incidents of discrimination within a one-year period. Most of them did not report their discrimination experience because they believed that their complaint would have no consequences. Almost one quarter of Roma respondents avoided places of potential discriminatory acts against them. The vast majority of respondents had no idea about which organization could help them in cases of discrimination while more than two thirds of respondents answered that discrimination on the basis of ethnic or immigrant background is widespread in their country. The answers also showed that Roma are often victims of (racially motivated) personal crime, assaults, threats and serious harassment but most of them did not report those acts against them because they believed that the police would not be able to do anything. The respondents also believed that they are often stopped by police, customs or border control because they are Roma. The survey sample member states were Bulgaria, Czechia, Greece, Hungary Poland, Romania and Slovakia. In each of them 500 Roma respondents were interviewed between 3rd May and 10th July 2008.

In this book two chapters are dealing with the marginalization of Roma in Slovenia, and two present case studies of Beduins in Israel. One chapter is devoted to Malaysian ‘aborigines’, while the third part opens with Leimgruber’s introductory chapter about minorities as an expression of diversity and an exercise in tolerance. He claims that all countries of the world are confronted with minorities

and the problems coming out of that need to be solved within a specific context. The conventional understanding of the term minority as purely quantitative is discussed in relation to qualitative aspects. Minority is not necessarily just the group that is of minor number of members but also the group that has minor power (has less influence in matters that are important for its members, has no access to power etc.). The society as a system encompasses numerous elements and most of them may be minorities of different kinds. The problem is that the so-called mainstream (dominant social groups representing the majority) simply overlooks or ignores them, and so does the political system. It is not just ethnic and cultural groups that are marginalized this way, there are also minority groups such as the handicapped, the poor, the unemployed, the LGB community, or ex-convicts. Leimgruber discusses minorities from a viewpoint of cultural diversity that should be acknowledged in a way biodiversity is. He also shortly presents examples of Switzerland with its mixture of languages and the religious situation of Greater Mekong region.

Bin Abdullah's case study is devoted to the problem of the Orang Asli tribe (the Malaysian aborigines). They have settled in Malaysia 11,000 BC. At present, they are a small minority with less than 0.5% of the total population. They practice agriculture and live in the interior of the country, lacking access to health and education. To change that and to improve their socio-economic conditions the government resettled many of them within special Resettlement schemes. Some of them have been successful while some others caused certain problems. The author of the chapter analyzed different resettlement schemes focusing essentially on regional development, sustainability, and marginalization. Three case studies in Peninsular Malaysia are presented and the outcomes discussed.

The case of the Orang Asli is followed by two case studies presenting the findings about the situation of the Roma population in Slovenia, revealing the problems of their settlement. Roma used to be 'people of the road' in Slovenia too, but in the last decades they all permanently settled. That was often problematic, because they occupied land that was not their property, and their presence was not welcomed by their Slovenian neighbours who had been living there for centuries. In her chapter Janko Spreizer is debating this problem from the anthropological point of view. She presents narratives and imaginaries of Roma and their social exclusion showing how Romani settlements are marginalized places. She presents the case of Loke a Romani settlement near Krško and discusses the problem of legalization of their settlement. She is also trying to present how the Roma constructed the meanings of their social exclusion and how that meaning changed in the process of legalization of their geographically and socially marginalized settlement. Another important issue she deals with is the meaning of localities constructed in Romani narratives of belonging to a marginal place.

Zupančič on the other hand has a different approach to basically the same problem. In his chapter, he systematically presents the process of spatial and social transformation of Roma settlements in Slovenia in general. Among 6000 settlements in Slovenia slightly more than one hundred are Roma settlements—settlements with mostly ethnic Roma inhabitants. These settlements are structurally ghettoized areas and their inhabitants socially marginalized. Many, although not all,

live in very poor conditions in many cases even without drinking water or electricity; usually there is no sewage either. As these settlements are ghettoized places this often causes problems and may be a source of conflicts with the residents of neighbouring non-Roma settlements. Slovenia intends to transform Roma settlements with several measures, and plans are on the way. Zupančič discusses the problems of adaptation, modernization and legalization of these settlements within the context of integral urban planning in order to achieve higher standard of living and demarginalization of ethnic group. He presents his analysis of the effectiveness of some of the newly planned interventions for deghettoization of Roma settlements and their incorporation into the Slovenian settlement system as well as the demarginalization effects that this may bring to the Roma population that lives in settlements where these interventions are taking place.

The last two chapters in the ethnicity part of the book are devoted to Israel Bedouins. In one of them Yahel, Kark and Perry present multicultural dimension of ethnographic museums in Israel. They present museums of nomads and Bedouin in the Middle East and discuss whether Israel represents a multicultural society. Their detailed case study is devoted to a museum of the Bedouin (Joe Alon Center for Regional Studies) aiming to reflect multiethnic and multicultural societies within the Negev. They present how the museum evolved through the years also discussing its efforts to create a bridge between Jews and Bedouins. The question whether museums are nurturing mutual respect for cultural diversity and whether they narrow or widen the gaps between competing national narratives is raised and discussed.

Meir similarly to Leimgruber relates cultural diversity to biodiversity while presenting his case study about Bedouin villages in Israel. Only in his case he discusses the integration of both into the concept of bio-cultural diversity. He discusses the problem of Bedouins being detached from their pastoral life and relocated to towns by the government. Consequential reduction of grazing had implications on biodiversity. The author believes that Bedouin contribution to biological diversity is not recognized and argues policies considering this issue.

1.6 Possible Drivers of Marginalization from Different Perspectives

Marginalization has a wide range of understandings. As earlier stated it is basically a process in which something or somebody is being pushed towards the margin of something. In purely abstract sense this something is limited space with its margin (limit, border). The point where the distance from the margin in all directions is maximized is the center. Marginalization could therefore from the widest possible understanding be any action pushing something or somebody in this space in the direction from center towards the margin. The opposite could be named demarginalization or centralization. The question that arises here is whether this

understanding is acceptable or should the term marginalization be used only when something or somebody that is being pushed is already close to the margin. Of course, another critical question to be answered is how close to the margin, i.e. the general problem of defining thresholds—also already discussed.

It is not the intention of this book to give the answer to the above-mentioned questions. Therefore, the fourth part presents very different case studies that in some cases may seem marginal for the topic of marginality, or in other words the understanding of marginality must be very wide to consider them marginality studies.

We could cluster the drivers of (de)marginalization discussed in the last book part into groups of drivers related to:

- migration,
- local (regional) development,
 - political transition impacts
 - proprietary issues
 - local socio-economic changes
 - self-government issues
 - regional disparities
- agricultural activities

Migration is one of the core issues when we are discussing marginality and marginalization from a societal point of view. Park (1928) has already nine decades ago discussed migration in the context of marginality. He based his findings on the autobiographies of Jewish immigrants. He states that all their stories are basically the same story—“the story of the marginal man; the man who, emerging from ghetto in which he lived in Europe, is seeking to find a place in the freer, more complex and cosmopolitan life of an American city” (p. 892). Park writes about the conflict of cultures and “the divided self” as an outcome of assimilation process at the individual level. This fight between old self and new self is deeply unsatisfying and as he writes “it often terminates in a profound disillusionment” (ibid.). At the beginning of the 1990s Weisberger (1992) went even a step further stating that it is not only the separation from the old culture and merging with the new one that causes a person’s ambivalence. It is also the incapability of returning to one’s own culture after being ‘contaminated’ with the new one. However, the focus is still on the individual not on the society and the culture that he tries to fit in, even though Park stresses that the ambivalence is more severe in the case that an individual is confronted with natives with hostile attitudes towards immigrants. Those are ever more present in today’s world. Elisa Rustenbach analyzed negative attitudes toward immigrants in Europe. She tested eight possible explanations, one of them is cultural marginality theory. She states that this theory has various forms. The core proposition of all of them is that it is more likely that people will “have anti-immigrant attitudes when they cannot relate to immigrants as a result of having

different cultures or experiencing different struggles such as suffering persecution or discrimination” (Rustenbach 2010). The analysis showed that this is relatively unimportant in explaining negative attitudes towards immigrants. The societal integration showed the strongest significance considering the connection with negative attitude. ‘Natives’ are afraid of immigrants because they bring too many unknown elements (customs, culture, language etc.). What consequences that may have is an uncertainty that they can hardly overcome, especially if their level of interpersonal trust is low and that may be one of the reasons for the development of a negative (anti-immigrant) attitude (ibid). At present, the millions of immigrants intensify the fear of ‘the others’, and the widespread anti-immigrant attitude strengthen (extreme) right wing parties. Public discourse is becoming increasingly hostile for immigrants. For those that just arrived illegally and live in all kind of ‘receiving centers’ (migrant camps) the degree of marginalization could hardly be higher. Those that have managed to immigrate legally and live in ghettos of big cities in poverty and social deprivation may be even more affected by negative attitudes of a considerable part of local populations.

The situation for migrants that managed to realize their dreams—study abroad, get a diploma and a relatively well paid job—is much different. For many of those who came from parts of the world where kinship is still very strong those dreams were realized with the help of their families. Therefore, they are obliged to return the favor by sending money back home and support the family. At the individual level these are the ‘escapes’ from marginality that have the reverse impact on the marginality at a larger scale (demarginalizing the region that these individuals have emigrated from). For some countries, such revenues coming from their diaspora may represent a considerable share of total revenue and may have at least some demarginalization effects.

A Common denominator of another group of drivers of marginalization is local and regional development. The first subgroup is related to the political transition from socialism to capitalism and to the impacts of this process on development at local or regional levels. From a political perspective, the major change was from a one-party to a pluralistic democratic system, and economically from a centrally planned to market economy and from state to private ownership. These changes had huge but diverse impacts on the different regions of former socialist countries. In many cases, this transition was simultaneously also the process of the disintegration of multinational states (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia). Post-socialist territories became politically unstable and civil wars of different intensity and duration broke out (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Chechnya etc.) The loss of lives, the destruction of cities and villages, and the displacement of thousands of people were the major factors of marginalization of regions where the armed conflicts took place. These territories were labeled as ‘dangerous’, ‘conflict areas’, ‘mistrustful’ etc., which also had economic consequences even for larger areas than the one that suffered from armed conflicts. I had to cancel a conference about planning issues for marginal areas in 1999 due to many cancellations that followed after NATO started bombing attacks on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (at that time consisting of Serbia including Kosovo and Montenegro). Even though the

majority of participants would be geographers knowing that Slovenia is physically closer to Germany than to Serbia, many of them were afraid to travel to the 'conflict zone'. Potential tourists or investors probably have less knowledge about the geography of the region and were therefore even more discouraged to travel or do business with the region that belonged to the 'zone of conflict'. This is a clear example of marginalization of a wider territory because of political instability on post-socialist territories that escalated into military operations. It could be an interesting topic for a wider marginality study, but we lack such a case study in this book. The cases that we have are related to ownership issues and to social and economic changes at the local level.

The change from state owned land, infrastructure and means of production to private ownership was probably the one that affected post-socialist societies and economies even more than the change of the political system. Privatization and introduction of market economy led to a massive increase of inequality, not only among citizens, but also among the regions. Socialist Yugoslavia for example had a multilayered system of development support for underdeveloped regions. Many bigger companies had their branches in these regions, not to mention small local factories that were established as part of a planned development or because of a local initiative that was supported with the developmental program. After the collapse of the Yugoslav market and the invasion of foreign competitors on national markets, many of these economic subjects in underdeveloped regions went bankrupt, the workplaces were lost and workers had to find new jobs outside the region. That meant longer commuting times or even outmigration, not to mention the rise of the share of unemployed. All that was even more depressing for a population that had in former times experienced 'full employment' (if not in the region than at least elsewhere within the country, although some people preferred to go abroad to get a better paid job in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden etc.). The beginning of the transition was therefore the beginning of marginalization of the above-mentioned regions. However, when the process of the accession to the EU started, attention was increasingly devoted to their development. Slovenia was the first country to join, followed by Croatia, while the rest of former Yugoslavia is still engaged in the process of accession. The transition can therefore be regarded as a process of socio-economic changes that pushed many (underdeveloped) regions of the post-socialist world deeper into marginality, but has afterwards also brought changes in the attitude towards these regions resulting in different kinds of 'developmental' programs provided for them. Sometimes the success of such programs at the local level may depend on the necessary conditions such as the availability of land for basic infrastructure that is needed for the development of production or service zones. Unsolved property issues related to de-nationalization may be a reason for the marginalization of a local community that finds itself in uncertainty because the owner of the land that would be appropriate for development is not legally confirmed.

Another important factor in the process of marginalization related to local development is local level administrative division. The appropriate size of local (self-governing) units is of crucial importance for the successful functioning of

these units. Defining what is the right size is unfortunately not an easy task. It is certain that it needs to be small so that people have more influence on the decision-making process and are more familiar with the issues that a local unit has to resolve. However, it must not be too small, because such units may be economically too weak and may also suffer a lack of human capital. These are the factors that are pushing such local units into marginality.

At the regional level, the post-socialist transition brought a lot of comparative advantages to the regions for the country capitals. Centralization caused growth of regional disparities and marginalization of regions that were lagging behind, not only behind the central but also the major part of the other regions. Those regions which became a part of the EU can count on the support of the ERDF (European Regional Development Fund). It pays special attention to regions that are marginal from a physical point of view (remote areas, mountainous regions) and therefore represents an important mechanism for demarginalization, but regional disparities continue to be an important issue to be addressed by the policy of regional development.

In some cases, the situation of at least one part of the population of an underdeveloped region may be improved (or worsened) by some specific economic activity. We have already devoted quite a lot of space to tourism, but there are some niche agricultural practices that may also play an important role in demarginalization at local or regional level. This part of the book deals with tea growing and aquaculture. Such economic activities can have demarginalizing effects on marginalized farmers if they bring additional income to their households or if their income grows because of the prosperity of the activity. However, the process may also take the opposite direction in case of a major change on the market. It may have disastrous consequences especially when the existence of a large share of the population depends on the activity that has suddenly become economically unviable.

In the chapter that opens the last part of the book the topic of migration, education and marginality attracted Overton and Murray's attention. They present networks and strategies of migrants in the Pacific Islands. They understand marginality in this case as an outcome of the location that weakens the connection of island states to the global economy and reduces the opportunities for their sustainable economic development.

The main topic of their research were education and migration strategies of a local population that needs to overcome the constraints that they meet in their home region and therefore have to find the opportunities elsewhere. There is a whole range of diverse strategies across the region varying in form, occurrence and political implications.

The strategies can only be expanded because of the existence of kin networks (Pacific people's diaspora) that may be further forged by states. The authors are discussing the possibilities for facilitation of those strategies that can strengthen the demarginalizing process through migration and education.

The chapter that follows deals with unresolved problems with Church property that can have marginalizing effects. In it Havlíček argues that property settlement

between the church and the state attracts little media attention in Czechia no matter how important it may be for regional development. The longer that this process lasts, the more difficult it is to reach an acceptable solution. Unresolved problems with land property that used to be the property of the church and was nationalized during the communist period have negative effects on local communities and sometimes regions as well. They could not use the 'blocked' land for development, because of the unresolved proprietary issues. The author presents the consequences of such situation that lasted for two decades and reveals the differences among more and less affected regions according to the share of municipality's land that has been a subject of the restitution.

The Czech case is followed by two chapters presenting self-government changes and regional disparities in Slovenia. In his chapter Nared is discussing the past two reforms of the self-government system in Slovenia and their consequences for the polycentric urban system and regional development. He particularly exposes the cases of less accessible remote areas with developmental problems. The first reform had been introduced in the 1970s and the second in the 1990s. The result of the first reform was a socialist communal system with strong emphasis on polycentrism while the second brought further diffusion of power to small municipalities (whose number grew from 147 to 212 at present). Slovenia has no intermediate level units (between national and local level of government there is no regional one), therefore all power is divided between national and municipal authorities. The author presents his findings about the positive and negative effects of these reforms on local development and relates them to demarginalization in peripheral areas.

The findings of Vintar Mally to a certain extent confirm the findings of Nared. She presents regional disparities as the path to sustainability. As mentioned above Slovenia has no regional level political units. Therefore, statistical regions are spatial units that are usually used for different kinds of regional analysis. Slovenia is divided into 12 statistical regions. Vintar Mally assessed the economic development of these regions with a set of 32 indicators of sustainable development. The results showed considerably large and persistent disparities. These are largest in the field of economy and smallest in the field of environmental issues. The author discusses regional differences and tries to present her findings from the perspective of marginalization.

In the next chapter, we move from Slovenia to Sri Lanka and in a way also from macro- to micro-economic scale. Kohmoto presents the example of marginalization of tea estates in the changing global and national context. Sri Lanka is the world's largest tea exporter, but is losing its competitiveness on the global market. Tea is still produced on large plantations from the colonial era, but on the other hand Sri Lanka was a pioneer in introducing organic tea production and thus benefitted from being first. The issues discussed in the chapter involve the relationships between organic tea growing on one side and sustainability, costs and prices as well as workforce involved on the other.

In her case study, Begham Mustafa examines the aquaculture system practiced by small farmers in Khulna in Bangladesh. These farmers prefer to grow shrimps (giant freshwater prawn—*Macrobrachium rosenbergii*) instead of paddy. They have

adopted modern farming technology that is very sustainable and environmentally friendly, and they are satisfied with their output. Their ponds are relatively small, but they earn enough to avoid poverty. Of course, they need certain skills to be successful (water management, pond preparation, maintenance, selection of species, seeds, equipment, material, feeding schedule etc.). Begham Mustafa believes that the understanding of management practice of farmers in Khulna can be a model for aquaculture management elsewhere and a means for demarginalizing farmers living under the poverty threshold.

The last chapter is a case study from Croatia. In it Cvitanović and Fuerst-Bjeliš are discussing the post-socialist transition as a driver of geographic marginalization. They are stating that geographic marginalization may also be a consequence of globalization, deindustrialization or economic transition. Some areas may benefit from these processes while others may be marginalized. Changes in society and economy that occurred during the post-socialist transition period (1991–2011) in the less developed region of Hrvatsko Zagorje in northern Croatia were the focus of their research. The region is traditionally agricultural and located on the Slovenian-Croatian border. Settlement patterns and changes in agriculture were analyzed. The research methods were a combination of remote sensing, household questionnaire surveys and regression analysis. The region experienced population aging, a change of educational structure, population density and employment. Consequently, settlement patterns and patterns of land use have changed. The authors are interpreting differences in spatial distribution of changes from the viewpoint of accessibility to centers, border location and natural conditions.

1.7 Conclusion

This book offers a variety of topics that can be this way or another linked to marginality and marginalization. This introductory chapter is an attempt to put them into a common framework. That is certainly not an easy task as the authors often differ in their understanding of marginality and marginalization. In many cases they are primarily following their research interest about a certain topic that is linked to marginalization, but their main focus was not on the analysis of this link. The conceptualization of marginality and marginalization from the viewpoint of their specific research foci has therefore been one of the aims of this chapter.

Even if the reader, who is reading about all the presented cases, bears in mind his own conception of geographical marginality and marginalization, these case studies give further insight into the complex topic of marginality and marginalization.

I hope that the conceptual issues discussed in this introductory chapter, will help the reader to concentrate on the marginality and marginalization point of view when reading about all the different case studies included in this book.

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Part II
Nature as Socially Induced Factor
of Marginalization

Chapter 2

Marginality and Sustainability

Stanko Pelc

2.1 Introduction

Sustainability is a relatively new concept, with the adjective sustainable becoming a fashionable term in a relatively short space of time. That may be one of the reasons for wide range of different understandings as well as for the improper or inadequate use of the term sustainable. Policy makers are producing ever new policies, strategies, resolutions etc. for sustainable development, sustainable agriculture, tourism, transportation amongst others. Some important decision makers on the other hand are still not convinced that this is the only possible solution for long term human existence on planet Earth, or they are simply too short-term or profit-oriented. Considering the huge developmental differences between the global North and South (one of important spatial dimensions of marginality (Leimgruber 2004, p. 17) we may understand the countries of the South claiming that they have equal right to develop their economy in the way that countries of the North did in the past—using fossil fuels. However, it is not only the countries of the South that still see this kind of energy as an unavoidable basis for their near future development. Slovenia as a country of the global North, an OECD member with GDP a bit above 28,000 USD per capita in 2015, has recently invested more than 1.4 billion Euros into a thermal power plant that uses local lignite. In Plut's opinion the construction of the new block 6 of Šoštanj thermal power plant is a result of lobbying and has been politically forced with knowingly false key baseline data (Plut 2016). Furthermore, the ruling elite in Slovenia is more and more keen to take the decision for the construction of the second block of Krško nuclear power plant. Plut therefore considers Slovenia's energy development scenario as only moderately changed, centralized and intensive fossil-nuclear energy oriented, with excessive pressures on the environment. The presented example shows how difficult

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it is to act sustainable when there is a conflict between economic interests of different present time lobbies and interests of future generations (and nature).

A similar example from the highly developed North, only at much larger scale is from Canada. The Alberta oil sands is the world's largest present time energy project that, considering its huge devastating effects on the environment, might poetically be called "Hell in the boreal forest". Hundreds of square kilometers (60,234 ha of land had by 2008 (Gosselin et al. 2010, p. 167)) been transformed by surface mining from boreal forest into an anthropogenic wasteland. Mining is polluting the air and leading to the widespread deposition of chemicals in lakes and rivers as far as 50 km away from mining operations (Paskey et al. 2013). Huge highly toxic tailings ponds that attracted world's attention after the death of 1600 ducks are another big environmental issue, not to mention the problem of greenhouse gases emitted during the extraction of oil from oil sands. All this is the result of an intentionally hostile attitude towards the environment that is in this text termed "the marginalization of the nature". It is one of several possible perspectives of marginality issues related to nature discussed in this chapter. The concept of marginality and its links to sustainability are the key topic. To use the term marginalization in a context where this is a process concerning nature and environment is not a common practice in geography. The starting point used here is Leimgruber's (1994) definition of marginal regions and his four approaches (geometrical, ecological, economic, social). He considers ecological view of marginal regions as "ambiguous: it can either be taken as the natural potential of an area for human survival, or as the state of the environment." This later can be interpreted as marginalization of nature (environment). Another important aspect of marginality and marginalization research is the relation between environment and marginality. The starting point for this discussion is the book part "Environmental Drivers of Marginality" from von Braun and Gatzweiler's edited book "Marginality: Addressing the Nexus of Poverty, Exclusion and Ecology" (von Braun and Gatzweiler 2014). From the perspective of agricultural economists, the endowments of natural resources and the degradation of the land play a critical role in the processes that lead to marginality and poverty. Sustainable intensification of agriculture in such cases is the key strategy to cope with poverty and escape from marginality.

2.2 Marginalization of Nature

Marginalization of nature or marginalization of the natural environment is mentioned several times in Leimgruber's book *Between Global and Local: Marginality and Marginal Regions in the Context of Globalization and Deregulation* (Leimgruber 2004). He states that environment "has maintained its marginal status in economic thinking, especially as the flexibility of the economic system permits firms to change the location of critical production units" to third world countries with less effective environmental protection. Rapid growth of the Chinese

economy, just recently becoming the second largest in the world, is an exemplary case of environment's marginal position in the process of economic development. It is very common these days to read news about severe pollution in Chinese cities that confines population to stay inside, because going out harms their health. As Leimgruber (2004, p. 55) stated more than a decade ago: "Human activity still tends to marginalize the environment, putting human needs and wants (and greed) in first place, even if we know that the natural environment furnishes the fundamentals of our existence." In his first attempt at defining marginal regions he presented four possible approaches to marginality (Leimgruber 1994, p. 8)!

1. **Geometrical.** In this sense, marginal regions would be those at the geometric periphery of a larger area (e.g., a State, a Continent or an otherwise defined territory).
2. **Ecological.** This view is ambiguous: it can either be taken as the natural potential of an area for human survival, or as the state of the environment.
3. **Economic.** Marginality in this case would be defined by the production potential, accessibility, infrastructure, attractivity within space economy.
4. **Social.** In this case we would focus on minorities and socially marginal groups, according to various criteria (ethnicity, language, religion etc.).

He considered the second approach as delicate because ecological marginality is usually the antipode of economic marginality. From the center-periphery perspective economically the most developed areas such as London's City (CBD), the world's most important financial center is ecologically marginal. On the other side, economically marginal areas with few or no human interference are ecologically preserved and can be considered as ecologically central. At this point it is necessary to address the problem of center-periphery perspective. Its linear design with two diametrically opposite ends is not appropriate for such a complex phenomenon as (ecological) marginality. The position closer to one end means more familiarity with the extreme value (at that end). In the case that the end of the line is periphery that means more peripherality (Fig. 2.1). The degree of peripherality grows in the direction of "extreme periphery" at the left end of the line.

Marginality does not occur only at the extreme periphery. Marginal individuals or groups may be present all along the center-periphery line. For example, central parts of the old city center may fall into decline and become a ghetto for people at the lowest level of social hierarchy, usually immigrants or contemned ethnic groups or both. We can observe the spatial proximity of the mainstream social classes and those with few access to social benefits and sources necessary for descent life along the line. They may not be neighbours, but they do live in the same city. Marginality's location is therefore not exclusively peripheral. If marginality of individuals and social groups is in a nonconformity with the center-periphery line than such nonconformity of ecological marginality should be acceptable as well. This is the reason for consideration of center-periphery continuum as a not very practical framework for the conceptualization of marginality, except in the case of geometric approach.

Areas considered as environmentally marginal should:

- have a low level of biodiversity,




Fig. 2.1 Center-periphery line and the degrees of centrality and peripherality along the line between the two extremes (*dotted line*)

- be poor providers of ecosystem services,
- be largely transformed into non-productive technical landscape.

There is no doubt that there are many such areas all over the world and in many cases these are urban areas with high concentrations of wealth, power, interactions, movements of people, cargo and information etc. The reason for the transformation of these areas into anthropogenic wasteland is the human aspiration to adapt the environment in a way that best serves human activities at certain place. To move around smoothly and fast we need paved streets, roads, highways. To use space effectively we put more and more people to live and work in high multilevel buildings that we build in large numbers close together and over large areas. Plants that used to occupy the area of today's city are 'ghettoized'—they may only live in a kind of 'fauna reservations' called parks! Even there, human race largely decides which species may and which may not live there. Similarly it can be stated for the agricultural landscape even though the space there is in major part 'settled' with fauna (cultural plants)! The level of biodiversity of course is very, or in cases of large monoculture fields, even extremely low. The extent of human interference is so intense and widespread that these kind of areas cannot only be considered as marginal in a sense that they are located at the edge of "predominantly natural areas" (ecologically central areas). Agricultural land and vast areas of economically productive forests occupy the major part of the dry land. Natural as well as agricultural landscapes can sometimes be only strips at the margin of one another, but more often they form large complexes of either natural or agricultural land or even complexes where both types are occupying different parts of certain area. The marginality that we can attribute to the landscapes highly transformed by human impact is therefore not a consequence of their location at the margin of naturally well preserved areas.

From the perspective of the marginalization of nature (natural habitats, environment), however, it is possible to consider this kind of areas marginal. By marginalization of nature it is meant that the importance of nature is at the edge (at the margin) of 'human' priorities. Human in this case does not mean the whole humanity, but rather a very small part of it, the part that has the power to direct the decision-making processes (politicians, corporate management, financial oligarchy etc.). It is an influential minority that still values profit and power more than anything else and knowingly does not stop to act unsustainable, despite the catastrophic influences of profit based economic growth on nature, as well as on human race (on the whole planet). The part of humanity that does value the nature and fights for changes in attitude towards it has already achieved a lot, but still not enough to make a final break through with sustainable, nature caring value system. The consumer-based society and values spreading from the western world to the developing countries blurs the image of a disastrous future with "must have" commodities creating and satisfying ever new needs. It is a kind of an addiction. Even though, one knows how harmful smoking is, he/she cannot quit smoking, because it is easier and more pleasant to continue smoking than to fight an unpleasant and hard fight against the addiction. Similarly, it is more convenient to do business as usual and to keep trying to maintain high level of standard of living, especially its material part than it is to change habits and to try to reduce individual environmental impacts. Knowing what the negative human impacts on nature mean for the future of mankind and for the entire planet is obviously not enough threatening.

Many people nowadays realize that future development should be redirected towards long term sustainability. However, there is large majority that is more or less ignorant and serves the earlier mentioned minority that follows the path of short term profits. Kay Milton, an environmental and ecological anthropologist, professor emeritus in anthropology from Queen's University Belfast posed a question "Why are some people in western societies actively concerned to protect nature and natural things while others are not?" (Milton 2002, p. 92). She concludes that it is a matter of values and she therefore rephrased it into: "Why do some people value nature and natural things more than do others?" (ibid., p. 93). The reason might be that for some nature is sacred. There has been a lot of discussion about different attitude towards nature among natives in America or Aborigines in Australia and most certainly among hunters and gatherers in prehistorical time. There are also many different views about how to define "sacred". Kay Milton's viewpoint is that it should be based on emotions. Sacred can be looked upon as something that matters most to people. It gives them sense and pattern or, put in other words, it gives their life meaning and their response to the things that they hold for sacred is, in her opinion, emotional. The following statement shows the importance of the process of socialization on the creation of "sacred" (Milton 2002, p. 108):

What each individual comes to value most will depend on the context in which they learn about the world, the kinds of personal experiences they have, the ways in which they engage with their fellow human beings and with their non-human surroundings.

The awareness of the importance of nature and the need for change in humanity's attitude towards it is growing and is, in some countries, strongly supported through educational system. On the other side, there are also numerous non-governmental organizations that are fighting for the protection of nature, not to mention the "green" parties, some with more and others with less or few political influence. The public pressure, as well as immense number of research results showing the highly probable course of undesirable events have forced politicians to act. At the highest international level the Rio process that started in 1992 brought up crucial issues that should be solved in order not to deplete the important resources for future generations. The UN, as the widest international organization is, in many aspects responsible for the future of the planet, shows its dedication to sustainable development by putting it into the center of its attention as may be concluded just by looking at the UN website. Under "What we do" there are five fields of UN activities. "Maintain international peace and security" is logically on the first place, followed by "Protect human rights" and "Deliver humanitarian aid". Then follows "Promote sustainable development" and the last field of UN activities presented is "Uphold international law" (United nations 2016). All these issues may be considered anthropocentric, including the one that is focused on sustainability. Protection of nature may implicitly be included, but the main goal is still the nature in the service of humanity (present and future generations). "The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" adopted by UN General Assembly in 2015 puts forward 17 sustainable development goals and 169 targets (UN General Assembly 2015). In the first five goals 'nature' does not appear. These goals focus on the problems that are mainly a consequence of immense present social inequality, aiming to end poverty and hunger as well as to ensure healthy life, quality education and gender equality. Water appears in the sixth goal, but the goal itself mainly concentrates on the supply of clean water ("sustainable management of water and sanitation for all"). The next six goals all use the adjective sustainable, with nouns such as energy, economic growth and employment, industrialization, human settlements and cities. The only one not using the term sustainable is focused on the reduction of inequality among countries. Goals 13–15 mention climate, oceans, seas, terrestrial ecosystems and forests, but again, mainly as resources, not as values that deserve protection and conservation as such. The only goal that can be interpreted from this perspective is the second part of the goal 15 that aims to "halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss". The last two goals are again concentrated on society, institutions and global partnership needed to implement prior goals.

What we can conclude about the position of nature from these goals is that nature does matter, but it is not of central importance. The goals are focused on the development and on the humanity while nature's role is still to serve as the resource provider and the picturesque scenery of humanity's existence. There is no clear evidence that these goals show respect for nature 'per se' and this is not only because of its importance for the survival of humanity and for securing certain level of living for all its members. This means that nature while being far from holding marginal position on global political agenda, is also far from being the ultimate value by itself with no reference to the benefits for humanity. With other words,

global political consensus does not give nature a status that could be in any way defined as sacred, but it aims to partially demarginalize it, because of the benefits that protection, conservation and reduction of degradation brings to humanity.

2.3 Nature as a Marginalizing Force

Turning the focus from nature to humanity brings us to the other side of the story about marginality and nature. In this case, natural (environmental) conditions may be the cause for marginality of certain social group or the whole of local or regional society at various levels.

At past meetings of the IGU commissions dealing with marginality and marginalization¹ there have been several diverse presentations that put the above relationship into perspective. The first case to be presented here is from Ethiopia. Harsh conditions for rural population in many parts of this country are well known, as are the cases of droughts and famine. However, not so often mentioned, but also very important, is a conflict between wildlife and humans. They often compete for the same resources; humans may play the role of predators in relation to wildlife and vice versa and very often the problem is the wildlife predation on crops and livestock. This is not a problem only in developing countries. Slovenia, where 60% of territory is covered with woods also experiences a lot of damage to its agriculture because of wildlife, but farmers receive compensation and their existence is not endangered. In Africa, the situation is different and farmers on subsistence farms may experience hunger or at least must work much harder to protect their crops. The consequence is “local hostility against the conservation policy” (Dixon et al. 2010). Farmers in Western Ethiopia that are practicing wetland agriculture feel that their rights are not protected, while the rights of animals are. They believe that the number of animals that are predated their crops and destroying their fields is growing because they are not allowed to kill them. The wider picture reveals the causes of the problem: the dynamic of the coffee market and population pressure on the land. There are more and more coffee forests and more and more land is cleared for agriculture. The wildlife is therefore forced to live in ever smaller areas of woods and in search for food they are predated farmer’s crops, therefore causing “regional food security problems” (ibid.).

Yet another interesting case from Africa reveals a problem of development projects, often induced from outside neglecting the importance of natural conditions and the relationships between local population and their environment. Tony Binns when writing about community based development in Africa puts forward an interesting and probable thesis (Binns 2010).

¹It started as the Study group and became a Commission with several names, the present being C16.29 Marginalization, Globalization and Regional and Local Responses.

... a detailed understanding of the local scene is an absolutely essential pre-requisite for successful and sustainable projects, and this must include a sensitive understanding of the relationships between people and environment.

According to him geographers could play an important role in “understanding and accelerating development processes”. Academics of other disciplines often tend to concentrate either on people or environment, while geographers are more keen to take a holistic perspective which is absolutely needed in such cases. Marginalization caused at least partly by natural conditions, can only be avoided in this manner.

A quite different perspective is revealed in the paper titled “Environmental marginality and natural disasters ...” presenting a case from northern Portugal (Regua, river basin of Douro river) (Gomes et al. 2007). In the autumn and winter of 2000/2001 there were extreme precipitations causing a series of disastrous events with great material damage and numerous casualties. Many people lost their homes due to numerous landslides and the authors report about the fear that local population had to live with after these disastrous events, some of them even having nightmares. Douro valley is a famous wine region and there is no doubt that this kind of land use had a certain share in the complex of conditions triggering the series of landslides. Nevertheless, it is a natural disaster (or a series of it) that in a certain way marginalized many people in the region. The authors even mention self-marginalization, meaning that some people that they interviewed reject the idea of changing their place of residence and/or their traditional economic activity (usually producing port wine). Their attachment to the land of their ancestors and to the tradition can be explained by their highly valuing of their piece of land and their home (as something sacred to them—emotional tie to the land). Therefore, neither the fear, nor the influences of globalization can make these people change their life situation. They prefer to live in marginal conditions than to move and change their life.

Another aspect of natural disasters in relationship with marginalization is emphasized by Bradley Cullen (2007).

When a region suffers a disaster, marginal groups are generally the most severely impacted. Low-income households, minorities, the elderly, and people living on assistance, who are often too poor to move elsewhere, often occupy areas extremely vulnerable to both natural and technological disasters. The significance of the losses to these marginal groups often far exceeds that of their non-marginal counterparts, because even though their economic losses are less they represent a far higher percentage of their total assets.

This brings us to the relationship between marginality and poverty. The authors that by my opinion have contributed the most to this topic are Franz W. Gatzweiler and Joachim von Braun, both being editors and authors of the books *Marginality: Addressing the Nexus of Poverty, Exclusion and Ecology* (von Braun and Gatzweiler 2014) and *Marginality: Addressing the root causes of extreme poverty* (Gatzweiler et al. 2011). The first one also examines the issue of environment and ecology and has therefore attracted attention as this chapter focuses on marginality and sustainability.

It is interesting that, within the above cited work, marginality represents an inclusive and interdisciplinary framework for the research of poverty. Marginality is understood as multidimensional. Everybody who is poor is marginalized in one way or another. On the other side "... the socio-cultural context and individual perception will define in which and in how many dimensions someone needs to be marginalized in order to be considered poor" (Gatzweiler and Baumüller 2014, p. 28). The marginality framework is constructed from complexes of societal and biophysical clusters. Human and social capital, capabilities of actors and communities etc. can be found within societal complex while biophysical consist of geographic location, soil quality, vegetation, and climate as well as of manmade infrastructure. Both complexes can play enabling or constraining role, while the actors (individuals, communities) following certain rational choices, take decisions to improve their situation by reducing the constraining conditions on one side and enhancing the enabling causal clusters. These actions may result in certain degree of well-being or in poverty (Gatzweiler and Baumüller 2014, p. 36). The poor and marginalized are not the sole actors that can influence on their situation. They may be caught in the vicious circle of poverty and marginality and the decision makers, a level or more above them, should react after being warned by feedback mechanisms to take actions for the reduction of constraining complexes. Only then can the marginalized poor act on their own for their own well-being.

Besides the presented conceptualization of marginality, the book also presents a discussion about the concept of marginality from an ecological perspective. Marginal in this case is "applied to describe phenomena that occur at biophysical limits of any kind" (Callo-Concha et al. 2014, p. 58). To define marginality conditions of an ecosystem is a very complex task because of the immense number of mutual interactions and positive and negative feedbacks. Marginalization could therefore, in this case, be linked to the carrying capacity of the ecosystem. There is a limit in the size of population of certain species that can be sustained in an area. It depends on the resources needed for the survival and the competition with other species dependent from the same resources. Translating this from ecological to social systems results in a consideration of marginality as an "overexploitation of a system's resources, often due to either high human population density or else decreased resource availability" (ibid., p. 59). The authors of the cited chapter perceive the attachment of values by humans to everything around them that can improve their living conditions as their aim to achieve ideal homeostatic conditions. By the analogy with living organisms in general, they define marginal conditions as those that are threatening because of homeostatic imbalance. It is the human brain's responsibility to detect the position out of homeostatic range and to stimulate corrective actions.

Of course humans are no longer purely physiological beings that can therefore survive outside the margins of ecological suitability. With the use of modern technology, they can adapt to extremely hostile environment, but are in such cases highly dependent on inputs from external sources. These inputs are not always feasible and, in cases of remote geographical locations far from centers that concentrate all the main resources, people mainly depend on available local resources

and if these are too scarce to guarantee satisfactory well-being then people living at such locations are considered 'marginal'. Farmers who are facing the lack of water, poor (low productive) soils or other factors limiting the results of their agricultural practice are marginalized due to the restrictive conditions within the ecological system that does not provide goods and services that would ensure them their well-being. Such situation may evolve due to degradation (desertification, soil acidification or salinization, air or water pollution, etc.) that may be caused by local or global actors (degradation-induced marginality).

Restricted availability of resources that causes marginality is not necessarily equal for all. Some have more adaptive skills (within social system) and may, through competition, avoid marginalization on the account of others as in a case when one actor takes land or resources from another. On the other hand, the central government may impact on local communities through the appropriation of land. The drivers of marginalization are constantly under the influence of changing socio-ecological factors and out of the direct control of people that are directly affected (*ibid.*, p. 61).

Callo-Concha and his co-authors argue that marginality should be addressed through resilience and adaptability. They agree that overuse of local natural resources aggravates poverty. That often happens because of overpopulation. They cite several cases of resource depletion that lead to the marginalization and poverty of local population. One of them is, for example, from the West African savannah where limited soil productivity and highly variable precipitation patterns are constraining agricultural systems. Others are cases of slash-and-burn agriculture causing deforestation and soil degradation and overpopulation causing the migration to less productive mountainous environment. The authors believe that increase of resilience (a concept originally used in ecology) and the adaptive capacity of socio-ecological system can prevent marginalization. However, that can only be achieved by considering all its interlinked components. It must guarantee food security, generate income opportunities and above all maintain ecosystem services (*ibid.*, p. 63).

The above discussion again reveals the anthropocentric stance that is pointing out the restrictions in the socio-ecosystems which do not allow for the well-being of their inhabitants. Ecological marginality is therefore largely understood as a scarcity of essential natural resources within a specific spatial-social context. Unsustainable agricultural practices often emerging from overpopulation always worsen situations and enhance marginality and push the already poor into even deeper poverty.

2.4 Conclusions

Despite numerous international incentives that resulted in Rio process, the Paris climate agreement and in the adoption of sustainable development goals it is still not possible to say that nature has been positioned in the place where it used to be in the time when humanity has been fully aware of its total dependence on nature and valued it as sacred. Sustainable development goals can be interpreted as an

anthropocentric stance that still considers nature as subordinate to humanity. Nature still ‘must be managed’ to serve humanity for its long-term survival and well-being. However, recent coordinated international actions may be considered as a step away from brutal exploitation that has marked 19th and 20th century and thus as a beginning of a process of demarginalization of nature.

The important role played by nature in the process of marginalization can be confirmed by numerous case studies that are revealing how the scarcity of natural resources that are necessary for relative well-being of inhabitants of certain socio-ecological system, marginalizes these inhabitants or at least most of them. Of course, nature represents only one dimension within the marginalization process, the other is always social. It is the way that society is organized that forces certain parts of its members to live in unfavorable natural conditions that do not provide them with satisfactory resources. The solution can therefore only be in changes in social organization that will result in reduced inequality in the availability of resources. These changes can only be achieved at those levels of decision making process that are higher than local. Local, marginal communities are usually helpless and unable to take the decisions that could help them improve their unfavourable situation. Often they have no other choice than to further degrade (deplete) their environment, thus worsening conditions for their survival. They need the aid of the wider community to adopt sustainable agricultural practices, or other economic activities that can provide them necessary incomes. Sustainable development for marginal regions with natural constraints must respect specific natural conditions and cultural traditions. Practices that may be successful elsewhere in different natural and cultural conditions may not be appropriate if at least some of the mentioned conditions differ. It is therefore essential to develop problematic marginal regions with appropriate multidisciplinary approaches so that no aspect of the expected consequences of developmental actions is not overlooked.

The final thought of this chapter might be that unsustainable practices often go hand in hand with marginality, but the only way to overcome marginality is through development that is directed towards sustainability and respects social, cultural and natural conditions of the region. On the other hand, the major part of unsustainable practices is still caused by the decisions taken by the wealthiest and the most powerful that are thus marginalizing the rest of humanity and nature itself.

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Chapter 3

Land Use Changes in Relation to Selected Physical Geographical Features from the Viewpoint of Marginalization—The Case of Svečinske Gorice, Slovenia

Igor Žiberna

3.1 Introduction

Land use is the varying activities executed by humans to exploit the landscape. It can serve as a reliable indicator of landscape structures and processes (Kladnik 1999, p. 192), and as such, is a reflection of the interaction between natural, historical, and socioeconomic factors (Gabrovec and Kladnik 1997, p. 11). Land use and its changes can also reveal the shifts in a society's value system. Since the beginnings of civilisation, humans have modified the landscape according to their needs. One of the most important functions of land use has always been the cultivation of the landscape and the production of food, which is one of the major priorities of land use, as it ensures both individual existence and the preservation of humankind.

The prosperity of a society can be ensured by striking a balance between various factors: ensuring the health of the population, access to lifelong learning and feelings of safety, while also guaranteeing social life and appropriate living conditions (Vrabič and Kek 2012, p. 26). Healthy and nutritious food in adequate quantities is undoubtedly one of the most important indicators of the quality of life; however, recent global trends indicate that food surpluses have turned into deficits, which is a result of rapid population growth and a rise in the living standard of some developing countries, as well as of climate change and associated natural and ecological disasters. Land use changes are one of the most important causes of food deficits, especially the shrinking of arable land due to an increase in built-up areas, greening, or afforestation. As a consequence of these processes, food security is becoming more and more serious issue not only in developing but—owing to changed economic circumstances—also in developed countries.

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Compared to other EU member states, Slovenian land use trends are rather disturbing when considered from the self-sufficiency perspective. Land use data in the European Union area is systematically collected by the Eurostat office, operating as part of the European Commission. Land cover/use data is divided into two categories: biogeographical (land cover) and socioeconomic (land use). In 2009, Eurostat launched the LUCAS project, a survey containing statistical data relating to land cover/use in European Union member states. In the first report, results were made available for only 23 EU member states, excluding Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, and Malta. In the EU states included in the survey, land cover/use was largely dominated by woodland (39%), followed by arable land (24%), grassland (20%), shrubland (6%), water areas (5%), built-up and other artificial areas (4%), and bareland (2%). Forest cover was highest in Scandinavia (Finland 68%, Sweden 66%), with a slightly lower percentage in Slovenia—63%. Estonia (55%) and Latvia (52%) also had over 50% of woodland covering their total area, while in neighbouring Austria, 47% of the land is covered with forest.

The percentage of arable land is commonly inversely proportional to the percentage of forest cover. In 2009, the smallest proportion of arable land was recorded in Sweden (4%), followed by Ireland (5%), Finland (6%), and Slovenia (11%). Denmark (48%) and Hungary (47%) had by far the biggest proportion of total area covered by arable land, followed by Poland (36%), the Czech Republic (35%), and Germany and Italy (both 33%). The average share of arable land in the discussed 23 EU states was 24%, while arable areas accounted for 17% in neighbouring mountainous Austria. Compared to other EU states, Slovenia has a higher than average percentage of woodland and a lower than average share of agricultural areas. A high percentage of forest cover can in itself be advantageous, as forests can absorb CO₂ and act as greenhouse gas sinks, whereas from an energy and economic perspective, timber is an important renewable resource and raw material, the added value of which should be improved in the timber industry. As will be shown later, the high proportion of woodland in Slovenia comes at the expense of arable land. According to Plut (2012), 50% forest coverage would be sufficient to maintain a stable and balanced system in terms of food security, ecosystem demands, and timber management in Slovenia.

An even better indicator of the self-sufficiency of individual countries is a comparison of arable land per capita. It is estimated that in our climate zone, food self-sufficiency could be achieved with a level of around 0.3 ha of agricultural land per capita (Perpar and Kovačič 2006, p. 64). In this respect, the current situation in the EU is rather unfavourable, as in 2009, only one third of EU states included in the survey met this condition (Fig. 3.1). Compared to other states, Slovenia is at the very low end of the spectrum, with 0.0858 ha per capita. The situation was worse only in the Netherlands and Belgium, while the EU average is 0.2178 ha of cropland per capita. The issue of food security thus affects the majority of EU member states, with Slovenia sitting at the very bottom of the table in this respect.




Fig. 3.1 Arable land per capita in selected countries of the European Union in 2009 (ha/per capita) (Source Eurostat regional yearbook 2012)

Svečinske gorice are one of the regions in north-eastern Slovenia, which can be denoted as the area with unfavourable socio-geographical characteristics. The area is characterized by a high ageing index: in the year 2016 most of the settlement have ageing index higher than 130, individual settlements, even higher than 160 (the average for Slovenia is 124). The average gross earnings for the area in the year 2016 was 1305 eur (average for Slovenia 1525). The area also have above-average unemployment (16.1% in 2016, the average for Slovenia was 11.8%) (<http://gis.stat.si/#>). Despite the great density of the road network and the nearness of the second largest Slovenian city (Maribor), Svečinske gorice in the last 25 years remained on the periphery. Similar marginal status—not only physical, but also socio-geographical, have some regions, in which we can observe the alike condition (Haloze and Goričko). One of the forms of manifestation of marginalisation is also the reduction of cultivated areas and land-use changes in the direction of the overgrowing of arable areas and afforestation, which leads to a substantially lower utilisation of the natural potential. At a time when food is becoming a strategic component, this is a very unfavorable process.

3.2 Methodology

The article discusses changes in land use in the period from 2000 to 2015. The information about land cover/use has been taken from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food (MAFF), which annually publishes reports on agricultural land use in 'shp' format (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food, 2015). For each category, vector data was converted to a raster image with a cell size of 5 m × 5 m. The methods of data capture have changed since 2000, when all forms of land use were classified in 21 categories, whereas in 2015 the number of categories rose to 26. By combining classes, we have designated eleven categories of land use:

- cultivated fields and gardens
- vineyards
- orchards
- other permanent crops
- meadows
- overgrown land
- mixed land use
- forest
- built-up and other artificial areas
- water areas,
- other.

Land use data has been compared to various geographic location data (altitude, relative elevation, slope inclination, and exposition) and to global solar exposure. The geographic location data was obtained using a digital model of elevations with a cell size of 5 m × 5 m (Archive of The Surveying and Mapping Authority of RS, 2011). Land use data for 2000 and 2015 were compared to determine the course of the changes in land use, as well as their intensity and connection to geographic location. Special attention was given to more intensive forms of land use, especially to cultivated fields and gardens, and vineyards and orchards.

To analyse the utilisation of the vine-growing potential in Svečinske gorice, the area was also classified with respect to the topoclimatic suitability for winegrowing. Two main criteria were used, specifically relative elevation and global solar radiation. Relative elevation is known to be an important factor in wine production; in locations with higher relative elevation, frosts and freezing temperatures are less likely to occur, while insolation (duration of solar exposure) is usually greater due to less frequent fog. Greater global solar radiation means a greater amount of energy, which is favourable for winegrowing (Žiberna 1992). In addition to astronomical factors (geographic latitude, position of the sun, which depends on the day of the year and time of day), relief characteristics were also considered (inclination and exposition of slopes) (Žiberna 2011, pp. 49–50) in the construction of the global solar exposure model (GSE). Relative elevation is more important in nighttime and global solar irradiation in daytime (Žiberna 1992, pp. 129–130). When defining the topoclimatic land capability of winegrowing locations, the

Table 3.1 Methods and types of topoclimatic land capability

Relative height (m)	Global solar radiation (kWh/m ²)		
	>1200	1000–1200	<1200
>50	1. class	1. class	2. class
25–50	2. class	2. class	3. class
<25	3. class	3. class	4. class

locations were divided into four classes, with first-class positions representing the areas of highest quality for winegrowing. The methods and types of topoclimatic land capability are shown in Table 3.1.

In the analysis of land use change, our primary aim was to identify the differences in area size across individual classes. Further steps also included an analysis of the direction of land use changes within the discussed 11 categories, which was then summarised according to the following categories:

- change in land use within arable land (e.g. cultivated field into vineyard or vineyard into orchard)
- change in land use within non-arable land (e.g. meadow into built-up area or overgrown area to forest)
- change in land use from non-arable into arable land or intensification (e.g. meadow into vineyard or overgrown land to cultivated field)
- change in land use from arable into non-arable land or extensification (e.g. cultivated field into overgrown land or vineyard into meadow).

Since viticulture is one of the most important economic activities in Svečinske gorice, the changes in land use were also considered in a wider context. To this end, our analysis also incorporated the existing information on wine-growing areas for the year 1824. Wine-growing data for 1824 was obtained from maps scanned from the Franciscan Cadastre, published on the website of the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (<http://arsq.gov.si/Query/suchinfo.aspx>). The maps of all cadastral municipalities in Svečinske gorice were combined, compared, and geo-referenced. Our next step was the digitalisation of all wine-growing areas, with which a new class was formed; this was then used in follow-up spatial analyses, especially in comparison of wine-growing areas in relation to their natural-geographic factors. Land use data at the level of cadastral municipalities are not directly comparable, as the cadastral boundaries have been redrawn many times since 1824. However, the data clearly point to the differences in the size of specific land categories.

3.3 A Brief Geographical Description of Svečinske Gorice

Svečinske gorice is a micro-region of the western Slovenske gorice region. Its landscape is typical for sub-Pannonian north-eastern Slovenia—in other words, characterised by lowland and hilly sections—and it bears all the characteristics of the periphery of the Pannonian Basin. Having a specific climate and relief, as well

as vegetation and soil, the area has excellent conditions for the development of agriculture, which has significantly marked the social-geographical traits of the area. Sub-Pannonian north-eastern Slovenia is a lowland, a former seabed, and later a bay of the Pannonian Sea in which tertiary rocks were deposited; these were covered by large quantities of sand and gravel in the area of Plio-Quaternary depressions. In terms of climate, this is a continental area, characterised by warm summers, cold winters, and usually sunny autumns. Agriculture is the traditional economic activity in sub-Pannonian Slovenia: arable farming and livestock breeding in the lowlands and fruit production and wine growing in the hilly terrains.

Svečinske gorice is the westernmost part of the Slovenske gorice region (Fig. 3.2). It is known to be composed of older Miocene rocks, largely of marine marl, sandstone, and clay, which in sporadic patches are also mixed with Litotamnia limestone (Kert 1994). Due to its resilient rock, the Svečinske gorice area differs from the Slovenske gorice area primarily in terms of greater absolute and relative elevation. This is especially important for the development of wine production, as surface share in the thermal belt is increased.




Fig. 3.2 The position of Svečinske gorice on the area of the northeastern Slovenia (Source DTK250, GURS 2016)

3.4 Changes in Land Use in Svečinske Gorice in the Period from 2000 to 2015

The area of Svečinske gorice, measuring 5626.9 ha in total, was dominated in 2000 by meadows (1837.3 ha or 32.7% of the area), followed by forests (1584.2 or 28.2% of the area), cultivated fields and gardens (688.3 ha or 12.2%), built-up areas (483.9 ha or 8.6%), orchards (476.5 ha or 8.5%), and vineyards (364.7 ha or 6.5%). In 2000, overgrown areas covered 81.9 ha or 1.5% of the area. In 2015, the land use structure was slightly different: the area is dominated by forest (1804.6 ha or 32.1%), followed by meadows (1768.8 ha or 31.4%), cultivated fields and gardens (572.5 ha or 10.2%), built-up areas (432.8 ha or 7.7%), overgrown areas (358.1 ha or 6.4%), orchards (355.2 ha or 6.3%), and vineyards (317.4 ha or 5.6%). In absolute terms, the most dynamic increase was recorded for overgrown land (for 276.2 ha or 4.9 percentage points), which was at the same time also the biggest change recorded in both absolute and relative terms. A significant increase was also detected in woodland surfaces (for 220.4 ha or 3.9 percentage points). A decrease was recorded for all types of agricultural land: the largest concerned orchards (by 121.3 ha or 2.2 percentage points), followed by cultivated fields and gardens (by 115.7 ha or 2.1 percentage points), and vineyards (by 47.4 ha or 0.8 percentage points) (Fig. 3.3).

Cultivated fields were reduced primarily at the end of the Pesnica River valleys and its tributaries: Svečina, Slatina, Plač, and Špičnik. A reduction was also observed in the Dobrenje brook valley, which is a consequence of the newly built highway. Several larger interconnected fields also disappeared at the end of the Cirknica valley, in the south-eastern part of the area (Fig. 3.4). The reduction of cultivated fields and gardens is most conspicuous on gradient slopes suitable for




Fig. 3.3 Land use in Svečinske gorice in 2000 and 2015 (Source Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food 2015)

farming: of the total 115.7 ha, 70.1 ha or 60.6% of fields disappeared on slopes with less than a 10° inclination and 90.8 ha or 78.5% on slopes between 10° and 15° gradient. In these cases, the reduction of cultivated fields and gardens is therefore not a consequence of rationalisation or less favourable cultivation conditions. As much as 32.8% of all surfaces used as cultivated fields are situated on slopes with a gradient lower than 2°, which is a defining feature of lowland areas. This reduction of cultivated fields and gardens is also hard to justify in terms of fertility, as the most drastic reductions can be detected in areas with eutric brown soil on Miocene rock sediments, which besides rigosoil (the anthropogenic type of soil found in vineyards, i.e. on steep slopes), is the most fertile soil in the Svečinske gorice area. As much as 57.2% of all cultivated fields and gardens that were situated on these soils have disappeared.

Fruit-growing areas were reduced in the lowland with a relative elevation of up to 25 m (18.2 ha or 15.0%) mainly in the belt between lowland and thermal belt (64.4 ha or 53.1%). Unfortunately, as much as 75.5% of all fruit-growing areas are situated on surfaces with favourable exposition (south, south-west, south-east). As much as 93.1% of all fruit-growing areas were reduced on slopes with the greatest solar exposure, i.e. with over 1000 kWh/m² of annual global solar radiation.

In the period considered, arable land has diminished by a total of 5.1% (to 283.9 ha). Areas that used to be agricultural land are evenly distributed throughout the territory, with a slightly higher concentration in the northern area of Svečinske gorice and on the slopes between brooks Cirknica and Dobrenje. In both cases, these surfaces used to be largely devoted to fruit-growing (Fig. 3.4).

An increase in overgrown land in Svečinske gorice can mainly be detected in the northern and western border area, and in the southern, south-eastern, and eastern sections. Newly emerging patches of overgrown land can also be traced along the new highway in the Dobrenje brook valley, where discontinuation of farming took



Fig. 3.4 The area of the reduction of fields and gardens (*left*) and arable land (*right*) in the area of Svečinske gorice between 2000 and 2015 (*Source* Own calculations)

place due to land fragmentation (Fig. 3.5). The increase is most noticeable in the lowland areas with a relative elevation of up to 25 m. In 2000, only 6.8 ha of land in this belt was overgrown, while by 2015, this surface area had grown over 13 times larger, i.e. 91.3 ha.

Forest areas also increased throughout the entire area of Svečinske gorice, most noticeably in the area between brooks Svečina and Plač and in the southern and eastern part of the area in question (Fig. 3.5). In 2000, as much as 128.7 ha (7.1%) of land presently covered with forest was used as meadows, 51.0 ha (2.8%) as mixed land use, 38.7 ha (2.1%) as overgrown land, and 37.8 ha (2.0%) as fruit-growing areas. Forest areas developed most quickly in low relative elevations: as much as 76.6% (168.4 ha) of all newly grown forest areas are situated on relative elevations up to 75 m.

Newly built-up areas (Fig. 3.6) are predominantly a consequence of the suburbanisation process. They emerged mainly in more densely populated areas in the south-eastern and southern part of the territory (in Pesniška dolina in Pesnica near Maribor, between Dolnja Počehova and Gradiška, and in Zgornja Kungota), in Svečinski potok valley (Svečina), and between Svečina and Ciringa. Built-up areas increased also as a result of the new highway and its associated infrastructure in the Dobrenjski potok valley.

The most common changes in land use were: cultivated field to meadow (on 243.1 ha or on 4.3% of the entire area discussed), meadow to overgrown land (212.5 ha or 3.8%), orchard to meadow (138.6 ha or 2.5%), meadow to cultivated field (137.6 ha or 2.4%), and meadow to forest (128.6 ha or 2.3%). Frequent changes of land use were: meadow to orchard (83.1 ha), vineyard to meadow (59.9 ha), meadow to built-up area (59.0 ha), mixed land use to forest (50.7 ha), and orchard to overgrown land (49.7 ha).



Fig. 3.5 Newly-created overgrowing areas (*left*) and newly-created forest areas (*right*) in the area of Svečinske gorice between 2000 and 2015 (*Source* Own calculations)




Fig. 3.6 Newly-created built-up areas in the area of Svečinske gorice between 2000 and 2015 (Source Own calculations)

In the period from 2000 to 2015, the existing forms of land use were preserved on 3872.2 ha or on 68.8% of the area under study. Changes in land use have thus occurred on approximately one third of the territory. Changes within arable land occurred on 73.3 ha (1.3% of the area), whereas changes within non-arable land occurred on as much as 715.3 ha (12.7% of the area); the process of conversion followed a pattern of meadow to overgrown area to forest. The processes of intensification (conversion of non-arable into arable land) occurred on 340.0 ha (6.0%), while the processes of extensification (conversion of arable into non-arable land) occurred on 623.9 ha (11.1% of the area). The ratio between intensification and extensification in Svečinske gorice was thus 1:1.83—for every hectare of new arable land there was 1.83 ha of non-arable land.

3.5 Changes in Wine-Growing Areas in Svečinske Gorice

Svečinske gorice has long been known as a typical wine-producing region (Zupanič 1969; Šilih 1979; Kert 1994). Because of this, the changes in winegrowing areas have been dealt with separately, in our analysis of land use changes covering the period from 1824 to the present-day.

In the period from 2000 to 2016, winegrowing areas in Svečinske gorice decreased from 364.7 ha (6.5%) to 317.4 ha (5.6%), i.e. by 47.4 ha or slightly less than 3 ha per year.

Vineyards were reduced primarily in the northern and north-western part of Svečinske gorice, where, in places, reductions in larger interconnected areas occurred (Fig. 3.7). Out of a total of 364.7 ha of vine-growing areas in 2000, 251.0 ha or 68.8% were preserved until 2015. 60.0 ha (16.5%) of vineyards were converted to meadows, 16.6 ha (4.6%) to overgrown land, and 14.7 ha (4.0%) to forest. 9.2 ha (2.5%) of vineyards were converted to orchards and 8.5 ha (2.3%) to cultivated fields.

A comparison of some natural, in particular topoclimatic, factors important for viticulture and the actual prevalence of vineyards are of considerable interest. In 2015, vineyards were, as expected, concentrated in the thermal belt: only 15 ha (4.8%) of vineyards were located on relative elevations under 50 m. The majority of vineyards were located on relative elevations between 75 and 100 m (120.5 ha or 38.0%). Despite the fact that Svečinske gorice is known for having the steepest sloping terrains in Slovenske gorice, the vineyards are not found on steeper sloping to the extent anticipated, presumably because of adverse cultivation conditions and the cost of machining. With the inclination angle increasing, the share of vineyards does rise at first, but only as far as a 15–20° gradient, where vineyards reach the highest concentration (122.7 ha or 38.6% of all vineyards), only to drop again, in




Fig. 3.7 The area of the reduction of vineyards in the area of Svečinske gorice between 2000 and 2015 (Source Own calculations)




Fig. 3.8 Land capability for viticulture in Svečinske gorice (*Source* Own calculations)



Fig. 3.9 Potentially first-class viticulture areas in the Svečinske gorice (*Source* Own calculations)

spite of the more favourable topoclimatic conditions on the south-facing sites. It comes as no surprise that an increase in global solar irradiation also increases the share of vineyards: the largest section of vine-growing land is situated in areas with an annual rate of over 1200 kWh/m² (132.2 ha or 41.6% of all vineyards). The large majority of vineyards are thus situated on first-class wine-growing sites (245.6 ha or 77.5% of all vineyards), whereas only 56.3 ha or 17.8% of vineyards occupy second-class locations.

Wine-production in the area, especially on first-class sites, has a significant but still untapped potential (Fig. 3.8). In 2015, out of 1,218.8 ha of first-class vineyard sites (accounting for as much as 21.7% of the entire area of Svečinske gorice), land use was as follows: meadows on 396.4 ha (32.5%), forest on 237.8 ha or 19.5% of all first-class locations, and vineyards on 245.6 ha or 20.2%. First-class locations for viticulture are used also as overgrown land (237.8 ha or 9.1%) and orchards (104.3 ha or 8.6%). If the potentially first-class viticulture areas presently used as meadows, forests, and overgrown land were converted into vine-growing areas, the acreage of new first-class vineyards would increase by 744.6 ha, i.e. 2.3 times the current figure (Fig. 3.9). The Svečinske gorice region thus has an outstanding winegrowing potential, which is unfortunately largely under-utilised.


Winegrowing was more widespread in Svečinske gorice in the past than it is today. The analysis of the maps in the Franciscan Cadastre from 1824 (Fig. 3.10) suggests that vineyards at that time covered 852.9 ha of the area in question, or



Fig. 3.10 Svečinske gorice on the maps in the Franciscan Cadastre from 1824 (Source Archives of the Republic of Slovenia, 2015)

15.2%. In 2000, vineyards amounted to only 364.7 ha (6.5%), and in 2016 to 317.4 ha (5.6%) (Fig. 3.11). It is worth mentioning that at the end of the 19th century, vineyard areas decreased drastically because of occurrences of phylloxera

Fig. 3.11 Vineyards in the area of Svečinske gorice in 1824, 2000 and 2015 (*Source* Archives of the Republic of Slovenia, 2015; Own calculations)



and that the renewal of vineyards was carried out using American rootstock, which was ecologically more demanding and also frost-sensitive (Zupanič 1969). Vineyards were thus maintained in areas with more favourable topoclimatic conditions. This is confirmed also by the fact that in 1824 as much as 13.3% of vineyards were situated on relative elevations under 50 m (presently only 4.8%). In 1824, 68.8% of all vineyards were located on first-class sites (presently 77.5%). Nevertheless, wine-growing on steep terrains underwent a gradual reduction: in 1824, 58.3% of all vineyards were located on inclinations under 20°, whereas in 2015 this number rose to 76.8%. This shift in winegrowing to gentler slopes also coincided with the shift from manual to predominantly mechanised methods of winegrowing. Machining on steeper slopes can be relatively costly, and safety is also an issue. It can thus be said that despite a decrease in vine-growing land, vineyards are concentrated on more favourable locations, which are, however, still under used in Svečinske gorice.

3.6 Conclusion

Since 2000, there has been a substantial reduction of arable land in Svečinske gorice. From 2000 to 2015, arable land was reduced from 1529.5 ha (or 27.2% of the entire area) to 1245.6 ha (or 22.1% of the entire area), in other words, by 283.5 ha (or 5.1 percentage points) or annually by 17.7 ha. Arable land was reduced primarily on the account of fruit-growing areas (by 121.3 ha or 2.2 percentage points) and cultivated fields and gardens (by 115.7 ha or 2.1 percentage points). Reductions have also been observed in wine-growing areas, the region's hallmark, giving the landscape its distinctive appearance. From 2000 to 2015, wine-growing areas decreased by 47.4 ha or 0.8 percentage points. On the other hand, the areas that grew most markedly were primarily overgrown areas (by 276.2 ha or 4.9 percentage points) and forest areas (by 220.4 ha or 3.9 percentage points), which proves that the area is undergoing the distinct processes of overgrowing and afforestation. The ratio between intensification and extensification is 1:1.83, which is above the average recorded for north-eastern Slovenia, where the ratio is 1:1.60. Acknowledging the great potential for winegrowing in the area, it should be noted that only one fifth of all vineyards are located on first-class sites.

Svečinske gorice is one of the regions in north-eastern Slovenia, which can be denoted as the area with unfavourable socio-geographical characteristics. The area is characterized by a high ageing index: in the year 2016 most of the settlements had ageing index higher than 130, individual settlements, even higher than 160. The average gross earnings for the area in the year 2016 was 1305 eur (average for Slovenia 1525). The area also have above-average unemployment. Despite the great density of the road network and the nearness of the second largest Slovenian city (Maribor), Svečinske gorice in the last 25 years remained on the periphery. One of the forms of manifestation of marginalisation is also the reduction of cultivated areas and land-use changes in the direction of the overgrowing of arable areas and

afforestation, which leads to a substantially lower utilisation of the natural potential. At a time when food is becoming a strategic component, this is a very unfavorable process. It can be seen that as far as land use is concerned, Svečinske gorice is treading a similar path to other marginalised areas of north-eastern Slovenia, such as north-eastern Goričko and eastern Haloze.

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Chapter 4

Natural Disasters and Less Developed Countries

Matija Zorn

4.1 Introduction

Natural disasters frequently occur across the world, affecting both developed and developing countries. Different communities and countries have greater or lesser vulnerability to the impact of disasters (Who are most vulnerable to natural hazards? 2016). There is no linear relationship between a natural hazard and a disaster; the most hazard-prone countries are not always those that are least able to cope (Shepherd et al. 2013). Many studies have shown that there is a strong relationship between economic factors and natural disasters (cf. Guha-Sapir et al. 2004; Khan 2005; Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters 2010; Schumacher and Strobl 2011; Guha Sapir and Santos 2012; Shepherd et al. 2013; Klomp and Valckx 2014; Daoud et al. 2015; Hallegatte et al. 2016).

A disaster is defined as a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society, involving widespread human, material, economic, and/or environmental losses and impacts that exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. Vulnerability is defined as the characteristics and circumstances of a community, system, or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a disaster. These circumstances can be linked to the structure and status of the national economy, the condition of physical infrastructure (including access to water and sanitation), and the socioeconomic characteristics of households (including income, health, and education). Vulnerability is thus the concept that explains why, with a given level of physical exposure, people are at greater or lesser risk (adapted from UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction 2009; Lal et al. 2009).

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The vast majority of lives both lost and affected by natural disasters are in developing countries, underlining the link between poverty and vulnerability to disasters. “Simply put, people in wealthier countries have better access to the kinds of resources that help both prevent natural disasters becoming crises and to cope with them when they do occur.” Poorer people are often marginalized socially, politically, and geographically, and they may often not even receive early warnings of disasters (Who are most vulnerable to natural hazards? 2016). Fothergill and Peek (2004, p. 103) write that socioeconomic status is a significant predictor in the pre- and post-disaster stages: the poor are more likely to perceive hazards as risky, are less likely to prepare for hazards or buy insurance, are less likely to respond to warnings, are more likely to die and suffer injuries, have proportionately higher material losses, have more psychological trauma, and face more obstacles during the phases of response, recovery, and reconstruction.

Between 1991 and 2005, nearly 90% of disaster-related deaths and 98% of people affected by disasters were in developing nations, with more than 25% of these deaths occurring in the least-developed countries (Silbert and Pilar Useche 2012).

Developing countries are more vulnerable to natural disasters because:

- People live in areas at high risk from natural disasters (e.g., unsafe urban areas);
- The housing is poorly built and can be easily damaged in the event of a disaster;
- Countries are not equipped with early warning systems; and
- People have few assets and a weak social safety network to help them cope with disasters (Snel 2002).

There are not only differences between countries, but also within countries. Vulnerability in rural areas is connected to poor governance, poverty, and debt, which force farmers to burn wood for fuel and to engage in unsustainable farming techniques, which drive deforestation and consequently slope processes. The World Bank estimates that 70% of the world’s poor live in rural areas. In these areas, the most problematic are natural disasters that affect the agricultural sector. In this regard, nearly two-thirds of all natural disasters in the 1980s and 1990s were of hydro-meteorological origin, which sweep away harvests, destroy plantations with high winds or rainfall, or increase salinity on large tracts of arable land (Guha-Sapir et al. 2004). According to the World Disaster Report 2001, more than 90% of all deaths caused by natural disasters were from droughts, floods, and windstorms (Snel 2002).

Poverty in rural areas results in migration to urban areas (rural-to-urban migration), usually to unsafe areas, the consequences of which can be disastrous; for example, settlements on unstable slopes prone to landslides and debris flow (e.g., Guatemala City and Rio de Janeiro) or settlements on canal embankments prone to floods (e.g., Manila and Dhaka). Poor populations often end up living in high-risk or environmentally degraded areas, have the least access to social safety nets or infrastructure, have few savings or available credit (Guha-Sapir et al. 2004), and have limited formal insurance mechanisms (Sawada and Takasaki 2017).

4.2 Global Damage and Fatalities

The damage caused by natural disasters is increasing around the globe (McBean 2004; Löw and Wirtz 2010; Fig. 4.1)—and not because of their potentially higher frequency, but the increased vulnerability of society. Greater vulnerability of society is connected with the rapid increase in population, settlement of hazardous locations that were empty until only recently, more frequent increases in population density, and a larger share of urban population. Greater vulnerability is also influenced by increasing property and real-estate prices, a more diverse and modern (expensive) infrastructure, and especially human alienation from the natural environment. There is also a resulting lack of knowledge of natural processes, and denying or even underestimating them (Zorn and Komac 2011; Zorn and Hrvatin 2015).

In the 1950s, the average cost of damage caused by natural disasters was around \$3.9 billion a year (Riebeek 2005). This was followed by a jump in the damage recorded, finally amounting to an average of nearly \$120 billion a year in the last twenty years, with average fatalities of more than 62,500 a year (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Such an increase in damage is most often ascribed to climate change, connected with an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. “Additionally, climate change has a clear regressive effect on world development,




Fig. 4.1 Direct damage (overall losses), insured damage (insured losses), and fatalities caused by natural disasters around the globe between 1995 and 2015 (adapted from Munich RE 2013, 2014, 2015)

Table 4.1 Direct damage and fatalities caused by natural disasters around the globe between 1995 and 2015 with five-year averages (adapted from Munich RE 2013, 2014, 2015; Zorn and Komac 2011; Zorn et al. 2012)

	Period	Damage(\$ bn)	Fatalities
Total	1995–2015	2500	1.3 million
Average per year		118 (from 30 (1997) to 380 (2011))	62,500 (from 7700 (2013) to 296,000 (2010))
Total	1996–2000	321	160,300
Average per year		64.2	32,000
Total	2001–2005	547	481,000
Average per year		109.4	96,200
Total	2006–2010	544	562,000
Average per year		108.8	112,400
Total	2011–2015	893	88,000
Average per year		178.6	17,700




Fig. 4.2 Poverty in rural areas results in migration to urban areas. Migrants usually live in shantytowns (their global population is about one billion; Snel 2002) with high population density, poor infrastructure, lack of proper sanitation, and high vulnerability to natural disasters (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; photographer: Drago Kladnik)

impacting poorer countries more than rich ones” (Ibarrarán et al. 2009, p. 552). According to Hallegatte et al. (2016) every 1 °C warming reduces income by 1.2%

Table 4.2 The greatest natural disasters in terms of absolute number of fatalities and in terms of damage for each year around the globe between 1995 and 2015 (adapted from Munich RE 2013, 2014, 2015; Zorn and Komac 2011; Zorn et al. 2012)

Year	No. of major natural disasters ^a	Greatest natural disasters in terms of absolute no. of fatalities	Greatest natural disasters in terms of damage
1995	615		Japan earthquake (Kobe): \$131 bn; 6430 fatalities
1996	600		China flood (Yangtze River): \$26 bn; 2700 fatalities
1997	530	Iran earthquakes: 2300 fatalities	Central Europe flood (Poland, Czech Republic): \$5.3 bn
1998	702	Tropical cyclone in India (Gujarat; Jun.): \$1.7 bn; 10,000 fatalities	China floods (May–Sept.): \$30 bn; 3656 fatalities
1999	700	Turkey earthquake (İzmit); \$24.5 bn; 17,800 fatalities	
2000	890	India floods (Aug.–Oct.): \$1.2 bn; 1450 fatalities	Floods and landslides in the Alps (Oct.): \$8.5 bn; 38 fatalities
2001	720	India earthquake (Gujarat; Jan.); \$4.5 bn; 14,000 fatalities	Topical storm Allison (US, Texas; Jun.): \$6 bn; 25 fatalities
2002	700	Afghanistan earthquake (Mar.): 2000 fatalities	Europe floods (Aug.): \$18.5 bn; 230 fatalities
2003	700	Iran earthquake (Bam; Dec.): >22,000 fatalities	Europe heat wave and drought: \$13 bn; >20,000 fatalities
2004	650	Southeast Asia earthquake and tsunami (Dec.): >200,000 fatalities	Japan earthquake (Honshu, Tokyo, Nagaoka; Oct.): \$28 bn; 760 fatalities
2005	670	Pakistan and India earthquake (Oct.): 87,000 fatalities	Hurricane Katrina (US, Louisiana; Aug.): \$125 bn; 1300 fatalities
2006	850	Indonesia earthquake (Yogyakarta, Java; May): \$3.1 bn; 5750 fatalities	
2007	960	Cyclone Sidr (Bangladesh, India; Nov.): 3300 fatalities	Japan earthquake (Jul.): \$12 bn; 11 fatalities
2008	750	Cyclone Nargis (Myanmar; May): 135,000 fatalities	China earthquake (Sichuan; May): \$85 bn; 70,000 fatalities
2009	900	Indonesia earthquake (Sept.–Oct.): 1195 fatalities	Winter storm Klaus (France, Spain; Jan.): \$5.1 bn; 26 fatalities
2010	970	Haiti earthquake (Jan.): \$14 bn; 222,570 fatalities ^b	Chile earthquake (Feb.): \$30 bn; 520 fatalities
2011	820	Japan earthquake and tsunami (March): \$210 bn; 15,840 fatalities	
2012	920	Tropical cyclone (Philippines; Dec.): >1000 fatalities	Hurricane Sandy (US, Caribbean; Oct.): \$50 bn; 210 fatalities

(continued)

Table 4.2 (continued)

Year	No. of major natural disasters ^a	Greatest natural disasters in terms of absolute no. of fatalities	Greatest natural disasters in terms of damage
2013	920	Tropical cyclone (Philippines, Vietnam, China; Nov.): \$10 bn; 6095 fatalities	Floods (Central Europe): \$15.2 bn; 25 fatalities
2014	980	Floods (India, Pakistan; Sept.): \$5.1 bn; 665 fatalities	Tropical cyclone (India): \$7 bn; 84 fatalities
2015	1060	Nepal earthquake (Apr.): \$4.8 bn; 9000 fatalities	
Total	16,607		
Average	790.8		

^aBased on the UN definition of great natural catastrophes

^bCavallo and Noy (2010, p. 31) report that in terms of the number of fatalities in relation to the total population of a country this was “the most catastrophic natural disaster in modern records” because about 3% of the population died

in the short run, and by 0.5% in the long run (they also cite another study with a 3.8% drop in income in the long run). The Munich Reinsurance Company (Munich RE), which has one of the largest climatic databases on natural disasters, also draws attention to the impact of climate change, but on the other hand also highlights the increased vulnerability of society (Munich RE 1998; 1999; 2010):

- Increase in the number and density of population, and urbanization (in the 1950s, less than 30% of the world population lived in urban settlements, whereas today this percentage has increased to over 50%; Fig. 4.2);
- Increase in the value of property, buildings, and infrastructure;
- Development in dangerous zones;
- Greater vulnerability of industrial society to natural disasters; and
- Destruction of the natural environment.

However, one must also be cautious in reporting the increase in damage because, as Guha-Sapir et al. (2004, p. 39) state, for many disasters in the past the damage was not even recorded. This is also connected with their claim that damage caused by disasters was “usually considerably underestimated.” In addition, collecting data on damage is not systematic and also not methodologically uniform; data on direct damage predominate. On the other hand, developing countries in particular tend to inflate the actual costs of damage in order to obtain more international aid (Raschky 2008).

Table 4.2 shows that the natural disasters with the largest number of fatalities are not necessarily the most “expensive.” The former are primarily common in developing countries (Guha-Sapir et al. 2004; Ibarrarán et al. 2009), where a large





Fig. 4.3 Paths of super-typhoons with wind velocities >200 km/h that crossed the Philippines from 1945 to 2005 (Ebbinghausen 2013)

number of deaths are especially connected with poorer preparedness for natural disasters such as inadequate construction legislation, poor infrastructure, and weak institutions. The UN states that Japan, for instance, has nearly 40% more people exposed to tropical cyclones than the Philippines. However, if both countries experienced similar sized cyclones, fatalities in the Philippines would be seventeen times higher than in Japan (Natural Hazards Risk Atlas 2011). In 1999, the US reported two to three times as many disasters as Bangladesh, yet in Bangladesh disasters caused thirty-four times more deaths (Snel 2002).

“With natural hazard cycles repeating themselves every few years, developing countries find themselves in a vicious cycle of loss and recovery without the ability to move forward and achieve sustainable development” (van Ness 2005). For example, every year, twenty typhoons hit the Philippines. Figure 4.3 shows the

Fig. 4.4 North Atlantic tropical storm and major hurricane frequency from 1970 to 2012 from the HURDAT best-track dataset (Maue 2013). Between 1970 and 2012, there were 484 tropical storms, including 104 major hurricanes (21.5%; wind velocities >175 km/h). Between 1995 and 2012, the ratio was slightly higher: 24.5%, or 66 major hurricanes out of a total of 269 storms



paths of super-typhoons with wind velocities greater than 200 km/h that crossed the Philippines from 1945 to 2005, and Fig. 4.4 tropical storm and major hurricane frequency from 1970 to 2012 in the North Atlantic, which threatened Caribbean island countries. Due to climate change, economic losses from tropical cyclones could increase from 9 to 417% by 2040. From 1970 to 2010, the GDP exposed to tropical cyclones increased from 3.6 to 4.3% of global GDP (Hallegatte et al. 2016).

The World Bank estimates that more than 90% of the populations of Bangladesh, Nepal, the Dominican Republic, Burundi, Haiti, Taiwan, Malawi, El Salvador, and Honduras live in areas at high relative risk of death from two or more hazards (van Ness 2005). High mortality and affected population rates are especially high in countries with high multiple hazard intensity and low socioeconomic status (e.g., Bangladesh, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Madagascar; Shi et al. 2016). It is estimated that by 2030 325 million extremely poor people could be living in the forty-nine countries most exposed to the full range of natural disasters (Shepherd et al. 2013).

4.3 Natural Disasters and GDP

Khan (2005) estimated that in 1990 countries with higher per capita GDPs (i.e., > \$14,000) had an average of 1.8 deaths per million people per year due to natural disasters, and countries with lower per capita GDPs (i.e., <\$2000) had an average of 9.4 deaths per million people per year (Cavallo and Noy 2010). Raschky (2008) wrote that a 10% increase in GDP results in about an 8.74% lower death toll.

To illustrate this, one may look at the large difference in the number of deaths between the earthquake in Haiti (Jan. 12th, 2010; $M = 7.0$; over 220,000 deaths, Table 4.2) with a per capita GDP of \$1200 (in 2010) and the (fifty-four times) more powerful earthquake in Chile (Feb. 27th, 2010; $M = 8.8$; about 500 deaths) with a per capita GDP of \$15,400 (Cavallo and Noy 2010; The World Factbook 2011). In the case of Haiti, 11% of those exposed to the earthquake lost their lives, compared to 0.1% of those that experienced the Chile earthquake. The case with other disasters is similar; for example, storms: cyclone Nargis (2008) killed 135,000 in Myanmar (Table 4.2), whereas hurricane Gustav with a similar strength killed “only” 153 in the Caribbean and the US (Shepherd et al. 2013).

Nonetheless, as reported by Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008), the ratio between economic development and vulnerability to natural disasters is not always linear because better preparedness or resilience of society can result in increased construction in dangerous areas; Sadowski and Sutter (2005) showed this in the case of hurricanes.

Preparedness for natural disasters has largely decreased the number of deaths in developed countries; on the other hand, costly preventive measures, expensive infrastructure, and high property values have increased the value of the damage (Guha-Sapir et al. 2004; Table 4.2). Of course, this only applies to absolute damage. If damage is expressed in GDP, a different picture is obtained. Table 4.3 shows

that small island countries in particular stand out in this regard. Raddatz (2009) wrote that small countries are mainly vulnerable to windstorms, whereas they do not stand out with regard to other types of natural disasters. He also cited the fact that in small countries windstorms result in a 2–3% drop in GDP, whereas in large countries they have no visible impact on GDP. The ratio of damage in terms of GDP as shown in Table 4.3 has a strong impact on countries' development. Honduras was reported to be lagging behind at least twenty years due to the 1998 hurricane, when damage was estimated up to 42% of GDP in the previous year; 90% of Honduras' roads suffered to some degree, and 90% of the banana crops were destroyed (Guha-Sapir et al. 2004). In Central America, natural disasters have caused more than fifty-six million deaths and \$22 billion dollars of economic damage over the last thirty years, equivalent to 37% of the aggregate GDP of these countries (Ibarrarán et al. 2009).

For comparison, the damage caused by the Kobe earthquake—which was one of the costliest natural disasters (about \$131 billion; Table 4.2) in the last two

Table 4.3 The greatest damage caused by natural disasters in terms of GDP from 1974 to 2003 (adapted from Guha-Sapir et al. 2004)

Country	Year	Natural disaster	Damage (\$ m)	% GDP in the previous year
Saint Lucia	1988	Hurricane	1000	413
Mongolia	1996	Fire	1713	192
Vanuatu	1985	Tropical cyclone	173	139
Western Samoa	1991	Tropical cyclone	278	138
Dominica	1979	Hurricane	44	99
Mongolia	2000	Winter storm	875	97
Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis	1995	Hurricane	197	89
Samoa	1990	Tropical cyclone	119	62
Nicaragua	1998	Hurricane	1000	51
Honduras	1998	Hurricane	2000	42
Belize	2000	Hurricane	270	39
Tonga	1982	Tropical cyclone	20	34
Zimbabwe	1982	Drought	2500	31
Yemen	1996	Flood	1200	28
Guatemala	1976	Earthquake	1000	27
Salvador	1986	Earthquake	1030	27
Nepal	1987	Flood	730	26

decades—amounted to less than 3% of Japan’s GDP (Guha-Sapir et al. 2004), and in the case of Japan’s 2011 tsunami/earthquake—the costliest natural disaster (about \$210 billion; Table 4.2) in the last two decades—damage amounted to 4.27% of Japan’s GDP.

Snel (2002) writes that the average cost of natural disasters as a percentage of GDP is 20% higher in low-income countries than in rich industrialized countries, and Ibararán et al. (2009) write that, over roughly the last thirty years, damage to developing countries was on average 0.69% of GDP, compared to 0.08% for developed countries. One of the most recent major natural disasters, the Nepal earthquake (M = 7.8; 2015; about \$4.8 billion; Table 4.2), is estimated to have caused losses equivalent to around one-third of the country’s GDP (The World Bank 2016).

Raddatz (2009) writes that in low-income countries a climatic disaster results in a 1% decline in per capita GDP, and in middle- and high-income countries the losses are 0.5% and 0.25%, respectively.

The World Bank (2016) reports that disasters’ impact on GDP is twenty times higher in developing countries than in industrialized nations.

Table 4.4 shows victims of natural disasters versus GDP in the ten richest and ten poorest countries in 2002. Figure 4.5 shows that low-income countries have the highest proportion of victims relative to the size of their population, and that in high-income countries this number is much lower. For example, from 1995 through 2014, 89% of storm-related fatalities were in lower-income countries, even though these countries experienced only 26% of storms (The World Bank 2016).

Table 4.4 Victims of natural disasters versus GDP in selected high-income and low-income countries (adapted from Guha-Sapir et al. 2004)

High-income countries			Low-income countries		
Country	GDP per capita in 2002 (US\$)	Annual average victims/100,000 population (1974–2003)	Country	GDP per capita in 2002 (US\$)	Annual average victims/100,000 population (1974–2003)
Luxemburg	44,000	0	Somalia	550	2701
United States	34,600	59	Sierra Leone	580	155
Norway	31,800	5	Burundi	600	674
Switzerland	31,700	2	Congo, DR	610	114
Ireland	30,500	4	Tanzania	630	1531
Canada	29,400	72	Malawi	670	8748
Belgium	29,000	2	Afghanistan	700	1120
Denmark	29,000	0	Eritrea	740	6402
Japan	28,000	182	Ethiopia	750	5259
Austria	27,700	29	Madagascar	760	2090




Fig. 4.5 Low-income countries show the highest proportion of victims relative to the size of their population. The figure shows the mean number of victims per 100,000 inhabitants per World Bank income groups for five-year periods, 1974–2003 (Guha-Sapir et al. 2004) (Classifications by income level (GNI per capita): (1) low-income economies: \$1025 or less, (2) lower middle-income economies: \$1026–\$4035, (3) upper middle-income economies: \$4036–\$12,475, (4) high-income economies: \$12,476 or more (The World Bank 2016))

4.4 Factors for High Losses

In addition to a country’s development, Khan (2005) believes that its location, the degree of democracy, and the power of its institutions are also vital with regard to damage and casualties. For example, in Asia the possibility of a natural disaster is 28.5% greater than in Africa.

Cavallo and Noy (2010) wrote that, between 1970 and 2008, 96% of all deaths and 99% of all those affected by natural disasters were recorded in the following three areas: Asia-Pacific (60% of all deaths and 90% of all those affected), Latin America and the Caribbean (8% of all deaths and 3% of all those affected), and Africa (27% of all deaths and 6% of all those affected).

According to the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), between 1980 and 2000 75% of the world’s population lived in areas affected by natural disasters (Burney et al. 2007). It was also written that 11% of people exposed to natural hazards live in poor countries, but they suffer 53% of total fatalities (The cycle of poverty and natural disasters 2010).

The UNEP also matched disaster risk to country types; for example, earthquakes hit the hardest in countries with high urban growth rates (e.g., China and Indonesia): forty out of the world's fifty fastest-growing cities are in quake zones (Snel 2002). Similarly, tropical cyclones do the most damage in countries with a high share of arable land (e.g., Myanmar and the Philippines), and floods cause the most problems in countries with low GDP (e.g., Bangladesh and India; *The cycle of poverty and natural disasters* 2010). From 1970 to 2010, the world population grew by 87%, whereas the population in flood plains increased by 114% and in cyclone-prone coastlines by 192% (Hallegatte et al. 2016).

Damage is less and casualties are fewer in democratic countries, which tend to invest more heavily in mitigating disasters (Khan 2005); something similar applies to the power of the relevant institutions (e.g., because of the absence of corruption) and the entire institutional framework (e.g., the stability of governments; Raschky 2008).

4.5 Case Study: Haiti, Repeating Tropical Storms in One of the Poorest Countries

In September 2004, Haiti was hit by hurricane Jeanne, the consequences of which were over three thousand dead, thirty thousand homeless, and hundreds of thousands without adequate care. The damage “should have been minimal at worst” because Jeanne was a mere tropical storm as it passed through Haiti, and neither the Dominican Republic nor Cuba experienced losses of life (van Ness 2005). “The contrast in the death toll in Haiti and Dominican Republic, sharing the same island and storms, underscores the point that disasters are manmade, not natural” (*Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters* 2010, p. 27). Haiti's inadequate warning system, poor governance, civil conflict, rampant poverty, and deforestation left the western part of the island vulnerable. In addition to the storm itself, massive soil erosion, the loss of biodiversity, habitat destruction, and deforestation all have devastating human impacts and impede economic development (van Ness 2005). The hurricanes, storms, and floods that regularly batter Haiti kill more than ten times as many people than in the neighbouring (and richer) Dominican Republic (*The cycle of poverty and natural disasters* 2010).

Haiti has gone from being 40% forested in 1920, to 20% forested in the 1950s, to only 1–2% forested today, with no plausible hope for a reversal of the trend (in comparison, the Dominican Republic is 47% forested; van Ness 2005).

Acute poverty and civil unrest play key social roles in aggravating the effects of natural disasters in Haiti because 76% of Haitians live on less than \$2 per day and 55% live on less than \$1 per day; the food supply covers only 55% of the population, and 40% of families face food insecurity on a daily basis. All of this leads to poor health, diminished productivity, lack of education, and foreign debt due to lack of foreign investment, crime and corruption, and unsustainable agricultural

techniques. The combination of these factors exacerbated the effects of heavy rains (van Ness 2005).

Poor governance and poverty are also reflected in a lack of urban planning and ignorance. For example, Gonaïves, a town of 300,000 and the hardest hit by the hurricane, was allowed to extend into a flood plain due to rural-urban migration (van Ness 2005). After the hurricane, the United States' Southern Command initiated a project to see emergency centers built and stocked by the US government (filled with communications equipment, emergency vehicles, medical supplies, food, water, tents, and blankets). When completed, these would cover the Central and South American hurricane zones. One was scheduled for Haiti. All that was required from the Haitian government was the title to a piece of property where the facility would be constructed. The property had already been surveyed and selected. Haiti's government had promised approval, but Haiti's president killed the project by simply ignoring it. In 2008, over a period of thirty days, Haiti was pummeled by four successive hurricanes (Fay, Gustav, Hanna, and Ike) and in Gonaïves almost the entire population was rendered homeless (Hurricane season, a time for the corrupt to profit 2009).

4.6 Case Study: Slovenia, Earthquake in a Peripheral Part of the Country

In 1976, earthquakes with magnitudes of 6.4 (on May 6th) and 6.1 (on September 15th), or an intensity between IX and X and between VIII and IX on the European Macroseismic Scale (EMS), hit northeast Italy and northwest Slovenia. In Italy the quakes claimed 939 lives, and 157,000 people lost their homes. There were no deaths in Slovenia, but 12,000 buildings were damaged and 13,000 people were left homeless (Orožen Adamič 1980; Pipan 2011b).

Breginj is a remote, hilly border settlement with a population of about 190 at an elevation of 550 m in the Municipality of Kobarid (Slovenia), about 14 km from the town of Kobarid, today's municipal seat, and 30 km from the town of Tolmin, the municipal seat at the time of the earthquakes (Pipan 2011a; Pipan and Zorn 2013).

When talking about post-earthquake recovery in Breginj, a periphery at four levels could be observed (Fig. 4.6):

- (1) National: the Municipality of Tolmin from the perspective of Slovenia (or at that time Yugoslavia);
- (2) Regional: the Municipality of Tolmin from the perspective of all affected municipalities;
- (3) Municipal: the Kobarid area from the perspective of the Municipality of Tolmin; and
- (4) Local: the local community of Breginj from the perspective of the Kobarid area.




Fig. 4.6 Four levels of periphery of the settlement of Breginj (northwest Slovenia) with regard to post-earthquake recovery after the 1976 earthquakes (Pipan 2011a; Pipan and Zorn 2013)

As regards the “first level of periphery,” from the perspective of the Slovenian capital Ljubljana the affected area is a distant, marginal mountainous border area, and even more so at that time from the Yugoslav capital Belgrade (in Serbia). Regarding the “second level,” in Slovenia, as in Italy, the responsibility for recovery after the 1976 earthquakes was assumed by the municipalities. The communal assemblies of the municipalities of Tolmin, Nova Gorica, and Idrija established an inter-municipal board that coordinated post-earthquake recovery across the entire area affected. The Municipality of Tolmin was most affected; however, because it did not have a majority of votes on the inter-municipal board, its needs may have been overruled by the other two municipalities, which had not been as badly affected and were also more economically developed at the time. The consequence was a lack of funds for recovery in the Municipality of Tolmin (Pipan 2011a; Pipan and Zorn 2013).

Selective allocation of recovery funding was also typical at the municipal level (the “third level of periphery”). With an area of 939 km², the Municipality of Tolmin was the largest in Slovenia, which is why there was a clear gap in economic development between the municipal center and its periphery. Spending as part of post-earthquake recovery was thus directed to the central area of the municipality (i.e., Tolmin), followed by the areas of Bovec and Kobarid, where recovery was underway in Breginj. The disparity between the periphery and the center was also reflected in the Kobarid area (the “fourth level of periphery”), where the local community of Breginj—that is, distinctly peripheral settlements compared to the center of Kobarid—was most affected. Thus in the local community the planned post-earthquake recovery of Breginj was not fully implemented because of the allocation of funds in the Kobarid area (Pipan 2011a; Pipan and Zorn 2013).

Due to the lack of funds after the 1976 earthquakes, the community of Breginj had little chance to experience positive impacts in growth during and after the recovery phase (cf. Komac et al. 2013).

4.7 Conclusion

According to Sawada and Takasaki (2017), natural and technological disasters have been occurring more frequently than financial crises and violence-related disasters. Whether they occur in developed or developing countries, they destroy people’s lives. Poor people living in developing countries are particularly susceptible to natural disasters, and vulnerability to natural disasters is a major barrier to mitigating poverty and facilitating economic development:

Strengthening private safety-net mechanisms and designing effective public risk management and social protection policies are critically important in protecting the poor from the adverse consequences of natural disasters over time (Sawada and Takasaki 2017).

Impoverished people are more exposed to natural disasters because they tend to live in marginal areas (flood plains, steep land, etc.) prone to different natural

hazards, have low-return livelihood systems, and have limited physical infrastructure (Sivakumar 2008). Marginal neighbourhoods are often built on sites unsuitable for settlement, lacking basic urbanization, filled with environmental problems, and exposed to natural disasters (Schmidt et al. 2005). For example, 80% of the poor in Latin America, 60% of the poor in Asia, and 50% of the poor in Africa live on marginal land (Lal et al. 2009). An additional problem of marginalized sections of society (e.g., the very poor) is that they have little economic clout or political voice, meaning that “their well-being gets ignored” (Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters 2010, p. 114).

Although the frequency and severity of natural disasters are not significantly different between developed and developing countries (Sawada and Takasaki 2017), the consequences differ greatly regarding the much greater number of victims in low-income countries (Fig. 4.5 and Table 4.4) and economic losses, which are much higher in high-income countries (Table 4.2).

The physical size of a country is likely to be positively correlated with the frequency of disasters (Sawada and Takasaki 2017), but smaller countries can experience more severe damage, as shown in the case of island countries (Table 4.3).

Where disasters ... strike, they tend to have the greatest long-term impacts on those people living in the poorest quartile or quintile. Beyond their impact on incomes, disasters can lead to long-term setbacks in health, education and employment opportunities. [This is why] human and economic development are the best methods to prevent natural disasters (van Ness 2005).

However, some estimates show that in developing countries for every \$100 of official development assistance only forty cents is spent on reducing disaster risk (DeCapua 2013).

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Chapter 5

Climate Change Effects on Mountain Regions Marginalized by Socio-Economic Transformation—The Case of North Caucasus

Vera Vinogradova, Raisa Gracheva and Elena Belonovskaya

5.1 Introduction

The North Caucasus, stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, after the collapse of the Soviet Union became borderland between Russian Federation and neighbouring countries, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Mountain regions of the North Caucasus are traditional rural areas. Over the past 25 years, socio-economic situation of mountains has changed significantly as a result of the destruction of the planned economy, the transformation of land use and population outflow. In the geographical context, the mountain regions of the North Caucasus can be called as a marginal area. The current abandonment and underuse of the semi-natural grasslands, which are the most valuable landscapes of the rural mountain areas, complicate marginality and make it as many-sided problem. The same aspects of marginality are characteristic for remote regions of many countries (de Almeida 2012; de Castro 2012; Gonzales De La Rocha 2004; von Braun and Gatzweiler 2014 and others).

The North Caucasus is usually divided into Eastern, Central and Western Caucasus. At present, all parts of the North Caucasus have many similar problems relating to the border area, socio-economic and environment issues.

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Our study area is Republic of North Ossetia-Alania situated in the Central Caucasus where all these issues of marginality are particularly evident. The question arises what are current climate change effects on the mountain area? Does climate change lead to deterioration of environment and marginality increasing or to improvement of landscape conditions and life quality?

5.2 Study Area

Central Caucasus is located between Mount Elbrus in the west and Mount Kazbek in the east. Its sub-parallel ridges alternate with wide uplifted intermountain basins, which have been the main areas of population settlement and economic activity in the past millennia. Due to the mountainous barriers, slopes of intermountain basins have contrasting climatic conditions (Vagin 2002). On the leeward southern and eastern slopes, high temperatures and lack of moisture in summer and cold winters with thin snow cover are characteristic. Those conditions decline position of woody vegetation; the dry steppes, typical steppes and meadow steppes replace each other with the altitude. The northern and western slopes are much more cool and wet. The elfin birch and mixed woodlands and post forest mesophilous meadows are spread there (Shiffers 1953; Belonovskaya 1995; Gracheva and Belonovskaya 2010). On the height of 2300–2400 m above the sea level mountain steppe ecosystems give place to the subalpine meadows.

Areas at altitudes of 1750–2560 m a. s. l. were studied in the wide intermontane basin between Bokovoi Ridge (Side Ridge) and Skalistyi Ridge (Rocky Ridge) in North Ossetia-Alania (Fig. 5.1).

The conventional classic scheme of spatial distribution of ecosystems must be corrected taking into account the population dynamics and land use history.

5.3 Population Dynamics, History and Changes of Land Use in the Mountains of North Ossetia

Outmigration from mountain regions can be documented using censuses data for the last 120 years. The reasons of population outflow are typical for many mountain regions of the world: dependence on natural processes, heavy manual labour and its low profitability, low living standard; in the second half of the 20th century, industry development, urban lifestyle and education became the main drivers of outmigration of young people.

The proportion of the mountain population within the Republic dropped from 20% in 1900 to 1% in 2010 (Fig. 5.2), and at present is about 0.6%. Due to the overall small size of the mountain population, there is danger of the extinction of mountain communities (Gracheva et al. 2012).




Fig. 5.1 Location of the study area. 1—location in the Central Caucasus; 2—location of key study areas

Slope topography of the intermontane basins reflects the long human impact, and soil memory has records of duration and variety of human activity. According the historical records, ecosystems of intermontane basins of North Ossetia have been adapted and used under cropland for more than 3000 years. In XIII–XIV centuries, after the mass Alan population exodus from the plain caused by the invasion of the Mongols and Timur, extensive exploitation of mountain slopes up to 2000–2100 m a. s. l. under arable land, including terracing, started (Bliev and Bzarov 2000). About 100 years ago conversion of mountain arable lands into pastures and haylands began; but the majority of areas of croplands were transformed for extensive animal husbandry in 1950s and 1960s. Thus, post-forest and partially subalpine grasslands of the North Ossetia and their diversity have been developed on the former arable lands just over the past 60–65 years. The short time of grassland development is a reason of observed convergence of plant communities formed on the different slopes of the intermountain basins (Table 5.2).

Fig. 5.2 Population dynamics in North Ossetia, 120 years. Republic in general (*above*);—mountain regions (*below*). *Sources* State Censuses 1897–2010





Fig. 5.3 Mountain livestock dynamics in the Iraf district, North Ossetia-Alania (*Sources* data of archives of the Iraf district and local municipalities)



In the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet system and demise of kolkhoz economy depopulation of the mountains continued, and livestock, small cattle particularly have decreased significantly (Fig. 5.3). For the last 20 years the system of mountain land use has changed a lot. More than 60–70% of mountain grasslands are being underused or abandoned due to the sharp livestock decrease. In the last two decades, former agro-ecosystems of the area have been mainly developing under the influence of natural processes (Belonovskaya et al. 2016). The current natural processes are conditioned to a large extent by climate change.

5.4 Climate Change Effect in the Mountains

The changes of heat and humidity in summer were studied for the territory of 42–44 N 42–44.5E using Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), the index of vegetation conditions (VCI), Satellite Climatic Extremes Index (SCEI) and the sum of active temperatures (air temperature above + 10 °C).

Green and healthy vegetation reflects much less solar radiation in the visible (Ch 1) compared to those in near-infrared (Ch 2). More importantly, when vegetation is under stress, Ch 1 values may increase and Ch 2 values may decrease. The Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) is defined as:

$$NDVI = (Ch2 - Ch1) / (Ch2 + Ch1),$$

where Ch 2 and Ch 1 are the radiation measured in channels 2 and 1, respectively. The healthy and dense vegetation show a large NDVI (Kogan 1997).

VCI quantifies the weather component. The weather-related NDVI envelope was linearly adjusted to scale from 0 for minimum NDVI value to 100 for the maximum for each grid cell and week. It is defined as follows:

$$VCI_i = 100(NDVI_i - NDVI_{min}) / (NDVI_{max} - NDVI_{min}),$$

where NDVI, NDVI_{max} and NDVI_{min} are the smoothed weekly NDVI, multi-year maximum NDVI and multi-year minimum NDVI, respectively, for each grid cell. VCI varies from 0 to 100, corresponding to changes in vegetation condition from extremely unfavorable to optimal (Kogan 1987).

The spatial and temporal variations in the biophysical parameters of drylands indicate directly or indirectly the extreme nature of the climate. The latter manifests itself in deviations (anomalies) from long-term average values of the NDVI, albedo, and surface temperature. For example, the negative anomaly of the NDVI appears and causes the positive anomaly of the surface albedo. Energy that previously was spent on soil transpiration and evaporation now is being spent on the turbulent heating of the air and soil. This results in the formation of positive anomalies of surface and air temperatures. Consequently, drought can be expressed through an index that is a negative function of the abnormalities of the biophysical parameters (Zolotokrylin and Titkova 2012).

In the period when precipitations are higher than the long-term average values, drylands are characterized by positive anomalies of the NDVI and negative anomalies of the albedo and surface temperature. In this case, the index becomes positive as a function of anomalies of the biophysical parameters.

The climate extremes index can be presented as follows:

$$SCEI_i = -(\Delta A_i / \sigma A + \Delta T_{si} / \sigma T_s) + (\Delta NDVI_i / \sigma NDVI),$$

where ΔA_i is the anomaly of albedo for period i , σA is the standard deviation value of albedo for the basic period. Similarly for T_s (surface temperature) and NDVI.

The values of the indices that were less than -1 (drought) and more than 1 (overhumidification) were analyzed (Zolotokrylin and Titkova 2012).

The data of albedo, the surface temperature, and NDVI are received from the Land Processes Distributed Active Archive Center (LP DAAC), NASA (NASA Land Data Products and Services). All parameters have a resolution of 1×1 km. The data were analyzed for the periods 2000–2014.

The sum of active temperatures was calculated as the sum of mean daily temperatures taken for the days when they exceed the threshold of $+10$ °C. Sums of active temperatures and precipitations were calculated basing on the data of the climate archive meteorological network (All Russian Research Institute of Hydrometeorological Information—World Data Center).

5.5 Analysis of Vegetation Conditions (Vegetation Indices)

On the base of the previous studies and using the vegetation condition index VCI (Zolotokrylin and Vinogradova 2010) two contrast periods in the early 21st century differing in the degree of wetting were selected. The period of 2000–2006 can be described as a transition from the more humid period in the late XX century (years 1987–1999) to the drought period of 2007–2014. The vegetation condition index (VCI) analysis shows that in the 21st century in most parts of the territory (at heights of 500–1000 m above sea level) the sufficient moisture conditions were observed ($VCI > 70\%$). Only on the Greater Caucasus slopes the vegetation condition index was lower and equaled to 40–60% that corresponded to normal moisture conditions. Starting about 2007 the situation was changing. In the foothills the moisture decreased and the VCI went down by 5–10%, and in the middle and high altitudinal zones it grew by 5–15% (Fig. 5.4). Thus, the middle and high altitudinal areas are becoming the sufficient moisture zone with favorable vegetation conditions. In particular, it was observed that humidification increases and vegetation conditions in mountain-meadow, subalpine and alpine belts (in the area of glacier retreat) improve. That led to the restoration of vegetation and overgrowth of slopes. Values of the vegetation condition index in 2007–2014 compared to 2000–2006 increased by 10–15% and corresponded to the normal moisture conditions. In the most parts of territories located below the level of 1000–1400 m and in the region of the Caucasus Rocky Ridge this index decreased by 10–15% that caused degradation of vegetation conditions (Fig. 5.4).

Maps of mean seasonal changes in the NDVI over the period of 2007–2014 compared to 2000–2006 demonstrate that the vegetation index (NDVI) decreased in the areas with low altitudes (500–1000 m) after 2006. This fact shows the degradation of vegetation in the foothills. In the mountains of study area, the vegetation index grew and the conditions of vegetation improved (Fig. 5.5).




Fig. 5.4 Map of vegetation condition index (VCI). Changes over the period 2007–2014 compared to 2000–2006

The satellite climate extreme index (SCEI) showed the growth in the second period at the middle and high altitudinal areas where dry conditions converted to the neutral and moist ones. The index increased by 0.5–1.5 points. In the other parts of territory, especially on the plains and in the foothills, the aridity grew and the index decreased by 0.5–1.5 points (Vinogradova et al. 2015).

Linear trends of vegetation indices were calculated for different altitudinal belts. In the foothills and middle altitudinal areas the NDVI trend was negative, however at the higher levels its absolute values decreased and at the elevation of 1800–2000 m above sea level it became positive and grew up to maximal values in the alpine and subalpine belts at altitudes of 2800–3000 m a. s. l. (Fig. 5.6).

Similar to the NDVI, the VCI trend grew when the altitude increased. VCI trend became positive at the altitudes of approximately 1400 m a. s. l. It reached maximum in the alpine belt (2800–3000 m a. s. l). Thus, the trend of climate change during the last decades may have improved the conditions for vegetation growth and productivity.





Fig. 5.5 The map of the vegetation index (NDVI). Changes over the period 2007–2014 compared to 2000–2006

Fig. 5.6 Dependence of NDVI linear trend on height in 2000–2014



5.6 Meteorological Parameters

During climate warming, the sum of active temperatures on the considered territory was growing by 100–150 °C both for the flatland stations and for the stations located at the middle altitudes (Table 5.1). In the early 21st century, the sums of

Table 5.1 Sum of active temperatures and annual sum of precipitation before climate warming (1951–2000) and during climate warming (2000–2010)

Meteorological station	Altitude, m above sea level	Sum of active temperatures, °C			Annual sum of precipitation, mm		
		1951–1980	1981–2010	2000–2010	1951–1980	1981–2010	2000–2010
Gudermes	74	3714.2	3862.8	4136.2	442.6	471.2	451.0
Pyatigorsk	538	3091.6			517.4	546.8	
Mineral'nye Vody	315	3192.2	3354.8	3525.1	421.4	505.1	517.3
Budennovsk	134	3676.4	3777.1	3918.9	352.6	419.8	446.2
Vladikavkaz	702		2985.1	2984.6		907.9	941.2
Groznyi	162	3646.5	3504.5	3446.3	434.7	487.3	595.5
Kislovodsk	943	2684.3	2631.6	2780.6	586.6	664.3	672.1
Shatgatmaz	2070	737.7	929.9	1062.4	622.1	630.6	652.9

active temperatures continued to grow, and more active growth was observed in the east of the territory and at the stations located at the middle altitudes. The active vegetation period duration was increased by 3–7 days. As well, over the period of current climate warming and, especially, over the last decade the precipitation total growth was observed almost throughout the entire territory, both for the whole year and for the summer time (Table 5.1). These changes cause improvement of vegetation regime in the middle mountains of the North Caucasus.

5.7 Changes of Vegetation Cover

The current grazing regime in the mountain regions of North Ossetia leads to unbalanced pasture use in terms of space and intensity. Rapid and widespread natural forest regrowth can be observed in the underused post-forest hayfields, and a considerable expansion of scrub and elfin birch woodlands is seen in the abandoned sub-alpine grasslands. The neighbouring grasslands sometimes used for “alien” livestock continue to be overused (Gracheva and Belonovskaya 2010).

The distribution of the actual and potential vegetation communities through different altitudinal zones and slopes of different aspects as well as the satellite vegetation indices are given in Table 5.2. The trends of the satellite vegetation indices correlate well with the changes of mountain ecosystems. Improvement of the vegetation conditions (VCI) and growth of the vegetation index (NDVI) were noticed almost for all landscapes with exception of strongly eroded steep slopes. In those areas, where the vegetation condition index (VCI) decreased the sparse steppe vegetation has developed.

Table 5.2 Plant communities spatial distribution in the Uallagkom basin (Republic of Northern Ossetia-Alania, Iraf district)

Altitude, m above sea level	Slope aspect and inclination, degree	Plant community		Satellite vegetation indices NDVI, VCI	Trends heat and humidification
		Actual	Potential		
1834	S; 30–35	Mountain steppe (total coverage—30–40%)	Mountain meadow steppe	NDVI—growth trend—0.002 VCI—growth trend—0.25	Heat increases Humidity increases
1890	SWW; 30–35	Mountain meadow steppe (total coverage—100%)	Mountain meadow steppe		
1923	SWW; 5	Mountain meadow steppe (total coverage—80%)	Transition between mountain meadow steppe and subalpine belt, high mountain meadows		
1952	SWW; 10	Mountain meadow steppe (total coverage—70–80%)	Transition between mountain meadow steppe and subalpine belt, high mountain meadows		
1919	N; 15	Subalpine meadow (total coverage—70%)	Birch elfin wood		
1920	N; 15	Subalpine birch elfin woods with herbs (density—50–60%)	Subalpine birch elfin wood		
1996	NE; 5	Subalpine meadow (total coverage—90%)	Subalpine birch elfin wood		
2040	N; 30	Complexes of subalpine meadows and birch elfin woods with herbs (density—40–50%; height 4 (5) m)	Subalpine birch elfin wood		

Notes Aspect of slope: *S*—southern slope; *SWW*—south-western slope; *N*—northern slope; *NE*—north-eastern slope

In the early 21st century, the forest-meadow-steppe, subalpine and alpine belts feature positive trends of the VCI and NDVI indices, and the essential rise of these indices over the period 2007–2014 compared to 2000–2006. That indicate the improvement of vegetation conditions which is confirmed by the expansion of the pine woodlands on the southern and eastern slopes, and birch woodlands on the slopes of northern and western exposures. The trees expansion which occurs from upper toward lower zones of the slopes can be considered as a result of grasslands abandonment; that

means consequences of land use transformation. The trees invasion up the slope, in subalpine zone, can be considered as effect of abandoning as well as of climate change.

As well in subalpine and alpine belts, an essential rise of the vegetation index (NDVI) and vegetation condition index (VDI) was observed. The maximal positive trends of these indices pointed at the improvement of grass vegetation conditions and widening these belts. The alpine vegetation expands occupying the slopes following the retreat of glaciers.

It is observed that the albedo went down in the early summer on the top areas of the slopes due to earlier snow cover melting and melting of glaciers. In the second half of the growing season a slight rise of the albedo was observed. Therefore, the albedo and surface temperature analysis proves that in the intermontane basins of the North Caucasus the heat provision grows and the growing season prolongs. These facts, in turn, promote the restoration of vegetation in synergy with consequences of socio-economic transformation.

5.8 Conclusion: The Future of the Mountain Regions of North Ossetia

In the grassland zone of the intermontane basins of the Central Caucasus, the trend to regeneration of natural boundaries of altitudinal zones is observed: the restoration of mountain meadow steppe and sub-alpine meadows and expansion of pine and elfin birch woods on former agricultural lands including agricultural terraces. These processes occur under the climate change (rising temperatures, increasing moisture) and the weakening of the human impact on the grasslands of intermontane basins.

Mountain regions of the North Ossetia and of the Central Caucasus as a whole are at a crossroads today. Many-sided marginality can deepen dramatically and can result in the extinction of the mountain economy and settlements. Vegetation regeneration on one hand can improve the quality of the grasslands; on the other hand woodland expansion reduces grazing areas. However, animal husbandry has almost ceased and its revitalization is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future.

The mountains of North Ossetia have the vast resources for recreation, green energy and high-value organic products. Today, national parks and nature reserves play an important role in the tourism development; the most tourist flows go to the grasslands areas. The return spatial mobility of population becomes more and more intensive, and ancient abandoned villages can find a new life.

The climate change with positive consequences for the mountain landscapes is one of the opportunities to overcome some aspects of marginality of the territory creating favorable conditions for multi-functional economy instead of mono-functional rural activity.

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Part III
**Tourism as a Developmental
Opportunity of Marginal Regions**

Chapter 6

The Role of Tourism in Sustainable Development of Mountainous Border Region—The Case of Bovec Municipality, Slovenia

Urška Trček and Miha Koderman

6.1 Introduction

The Alps represent the most extensive and also the highest mountain range system that lies entirely in Europe, with the Alpine Range stretching across 1200 km, through eight countries (Austria, France, Italy, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Germany, Switzerland and Slovenia). In 2015, Alpine Convention issued a special report on demographic changes in the Alps, which showed that Slovenian Alps are the most sparsely populated. Among the three of the most sparsely populated municipalities in Slovenia (with less than 9 inhabitants per km²) was the Municipality of Bovec, lying in the central part of Julian Alps in the north-western part of Slovenia, next to the Italian border (Permanent Secretariat of the Alpine Convention 2015, pp. 17–23). The region is strongly characterized by the Soča river, therefore the area of Bovec is often referred to as part of the Upper Soča Valley region. In 2015, there were 3134 inhabitants living in this municipality in which mountainous area covers 367.3 km² (Statistical office RS 2016). High levels of unemployment and depopulation are two challenging features of the Municipality of Bovec, related to the abandonment of the highland agriculture and traditional forms of land cultivation in some areas during past decades.

In search of opportunities for the revitalization of the area, sustainable tourism seems to be one of the options with the most potential. By identifying the importance of sustainable tourism in the Municipality of Bovec, two aspects play an important role. First is the importance of sustainable development and the devel-

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opment of sustainable tourism suitable for mountainous (protected) areas, while the second is relative marginality of the area, which can be seen as a result of being both border and mountainous region. The aim of this study was to identify tourism development opportunities in the context of sustainable development concept, while keeping in mind that by developing tourism, the area is limited in terms of the protection of delicate mountain environment. In order to identify these opportunities, an analysis of the relevant scientific literature has been conducted and data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia were examined. They revealed the characteristics of tourist visits and specificity of the tourist offer in this municipality. In-depth interviews with representatives and stakeholders of the Municipality of Bovec, Soča Valley Development Centre, Local Tourism Organization and Goriška Local Energy Agency were also conducted in 2015 for this purpose. Authors also analyzed the statements of the Bovec Cooperative Development Society which published its opinion on sustainability of the area on the internet.

6.2 Development of Sustainable Tourism in the Mountain Areas: Examples of Good Practice

Mountain areas are important sources of water, energy, minerals, forest, agricultural products and recreation, hotspots of biological diversity and endangered species, and can therefore be considered as one of the most important parts of the global ecosystem (Beniston 2003, p. 5). About 10% of the world's population depends directly on mountain resources, while approximately 40% relies on them indirectly through water resources, hydropower, logging, mineral resources and recreation (Schild and Sharma 2011, p. 237, and Schild 2016, p. 111). Nevertheless, marginality is one of the main characteristics of these areas, which according to Schild (2016, p. 115), is a result of paying insufficient attention to mountainous regions. Economic growth, development of communication and transport and globalization of international relations had an impact on rapid urbanization, growth of the cities and pushed rural mountainous areas into marginal position. Due to the migration of inhabitants this resulted in increased marginalization.

Although Schild (2016, p. 111) notes that mountains are marginalized in development agendas, they have been identified by the EU as an area where the effects of the climate change are the strongest. Following the example of Baltic, Danube and the Adriatic-Ionian macro-region, EU formed the Alpine macro-region, which aims, inter alia, to exploit the opportunities for sustainable and innovative development, by focusing on mobility, connectivity, environment and energy (European Commission 2014). The first global example of ensuring transnational sustainable development in the mountain areas is the Alpine Convention. It established territorial framework for common approaches, transnational instruments

and regional cooperation in all the countries through which the Alps stretch (Permanent Secretariat of the Alpine Convention 2011, p. 13).

Price (2004b, p. 5) also believes that sustainable development of mountain areas should be achieved through cross-border cooperation and regional approaches, as economic and societal processes in those areas that extend across the boundaries. Two different types of developments could be recognized in mountain areas in Europe. First, there are areas where accessibility contributed to the development of tourism. Here, the population is stable or even increasing. Mountain tourism led to increased urbanization in the late 19th century and today represents the most important source of income. With the development of ski tourism, the negative pressure on the Alps increased. Mrak (2011, pp. 14–16) points out that this form of tourism should be developed very carefully. In her opinion skiers in general have different values than mountaineers and skiing as a form of recreation has a major impact on the transformation of the landscape and the environment. Second, there are mountain regions that primarily depend on forestry and agriculture. Here populations are facing depopulation and ageing, which are effects of emigration. Nevertheless, Price emphasizes the meaning of new employment patterns, which are the result of new communication technologies that are removing the traditional borders of inaccessibility (Price 2004a, pp. 3–4).

Sustainable development must also be regionally adapted – it should not represent merely the need to protect the environment. Elements such as development of urban areas, infrastructure, land use and conservation of cultural heritage, must be adapted in accordance with space and environment (Lampič and Špes 2011, p. 212). In her work ‘Signs of sustainability’ (Znamenja trajnosti), Bogataj (2013, p. 77) notes that the concept of sustainability was more naturally exploited in smaller communities and on the outskirts, where the conditions for human existence were harder and there were fewer alternatives. Exclusion and marginalization, which can be characterized for the peripheral society, led to the isolation and to the maintenance of sustainable tradition. Simoneti and Vertelj Nared (2011, p. 92) believe that environmental protection can be seen as an opportunity for further development, whereby it is necessary to take different stakeholders (policy, local community and development interests) into account. That was a case in some countries of Alpine region (France, Italy and Switzerland), where legislation for promoting organic crops and products of mountain areas is in force, and so ensuring them special status (Price et al. 2011, p. 51).

Because of fragility and previously mentioned importance of mountainous areas, it is also crucial to develop sustainable tourism. This certainly has to be the case in Slovenia, where, as shown in Fig. 6.1, the mountain municipalities receive a quarter of the total Slovenian tourist visit (Statistical office RS 2016).

Simultaneous development of tourism products and development of goods and services, such as transportation, accommodation, food and beverage, guiding, infrastructure and other activities, is essential. As Meyer (2009, p.19) states these are the areas, that have to be sustainably developed by the stakeholders. According to Štuhec Lešnik and Slapnik (2014, pp. 483–484), tourists today tend to give greater importance to spending holidays in nature, where they seek the




Fig. 6.1 Tourist arrivals in 2015 according to the type of municipality (*Source* Statistical office RS 2016)

opportunities for recreation and adventure. In addition to that, their awareness about healthy and organic food and beverage supply is increasing. In recent decades, tourism trends indicate that tourists are getting more and more active, with increasing demand for experiential tourism (Erhatic et al. 2013, p. 90). Alps, for example, attract more than 60 million tourists annually, providing 10–12% jobs in tourism sector all over the alpine region (Price et al. 2011, p. 10). Sustainable development of tourism products is therefore vital and, as Meyer (2009, p. 22) states, three aspects need to be taken into consideration. First concern is the importance of preserving biodiversity and natural resources, of which, both, tourists and locals are aware of. Second is the involvement of locals in the development of the products, while third is the focus on long-term profitability and concern for attractiveness and diversity of the products.

In order to sustainably develop the Alpine regions, Price et al. (2011, p. 57) highlighted the importance of developing partnerships, promotion and cooperation of different stakeholders and organizing platforms for views and knowledge exchange. Such cooperation has to be transnational, regional and local, linking organizations, initiatives and networks. Many examples of good practice which follow this model and are focused on sustainable development and green tourism can be found in Austria. There, protected areas (such as Wildnisgebiet Dürrenstein and Hohe Tauern National Park) have developed special forms of tourism, whereby they exploit the potential of the area by cooperation of various institutions. In the field of eco-tourism and educational tourism, they offer various forms of trekking (photo-trekking, trekking on snowshoes), photo safaris, and botanizing (collecting plants for scientific purposes or for research on plant characteristics in particular area). They also offer educational workshops, nature experiencing, natural wellness, learning about local cuisine, etc. The number of visitors in those parks is limited and their influence on the protected areas is monitored, thus successfully promoted

for tourism purposes. They offer products with high value added (Plut et al. 2008, p. 30).

Another project, worth mentioning, is an international project, which was created in collaboration of the Austrian Alpine Association with the Austrian Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management. The project is entitled Mountaineering Villages and is carried out in the frames of Alpine Convention in places characterized by mountain tradition. The project aims to develop sustainable forms of tourism in accordance with its natural resources, culture and competencies in the field of mountaineering activities. The Austrian and Italian regions, where the project is already underway, recorded an increase in visits from walkers, hikers, climbers, ski mountaineers and others, which do not need an extensive tourist infrastructure for their activities (Ministrstvo za okolje in prostor 2015). Project financing has been carried out under European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (Planinska zveza Slovenije 2015). There were some initiatives for the implementation of this project in Slovenia. It could be carried out by Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning and Alpine Association of Slovenia, but it is not yet clear which villages could be included (presumably the village of Zgornje Jezersko). The project will be launched in case that there will be some interest shown from the local authorities of alpine villages (Ministrstvo za okolje in prostor 2015).

6.3 Municipality of Bovec and Its Potential for the Development of Sustainable Tourism

Municipality of Bovec is the fourth largest municipality in Slovenia by its area. It is characterized by a border location in the alpine space. It borders on three Italian municipalities (Tarvisio, Chiusaforte and Resia) and is in close proximity with the Republic of Austria. Due to its location in the Julian Alps, almost 88% of the area of the municipality is hilly and 79% of the municipal territory is a part of the only national park in Slovenia—the Triglav National Park (Soča Valley Development Centre 2013, p. 20). As Pelc (2010, pp. 105–106) stated, border and poor accessibility play an important role in this region and are considered to be an obstacle for normal communication and logistics, which strongly influences the emigration (and, consequently, the depopulation).

Due to the natural conditions (relief, share of forest areas and erosion), farming restrictions and difficult transport accessibility, the municipality (together with other municipalities in the Upper Soča Valley region) is considered an area with limited potentials for the development of economic activities. As a result, the population is economically weak and demographic trends are unfavorable for decades (Lokalna akcijska skupina za razvoj Posočja 2008). The region is also one of the seismically most endangered in Slovenia and has had an intensive post-earthquake

reconstruction in the past. At the same time, the area has the most intensive emigration of the population within the Triglav National Park. In the past hundred years, the number of population in municipality has decreased by three quarters (Rejec Brancelj and Smrekar 2000, p. 45). Along with the process of depopulation, most of the thirteen settlements in Municipality of Bovec face home abandonment and overgrowing of once cultivated agricultural land (Perko and Orožen Adamič 1999, p. 65). In comparison with the year 2000, the proportion of barren land has increased for 21 hectares or 105%, the share of utilized agricultural area has decreased for 4% (Statistical Office RS 2016). As Pelc estimates, marginalization of this region came from the loss of economic potential in the transition between the 19th and 20th century and can today be seen as a result of intensive depopulation. The area is at the same time located near some of the most recognizable tourist points in Slovenia (such as Bled, Bohinj, Kranjska Gora), which in regard to marginalization, make the area a bit more central. Tourism, as well as organic farming, is thus spontaneous response to the threat of marginalization (Pelc 2010, p. 112).

The population density in the municipality has been constantly decreasing in the last 15 years. In 2015, the municipality had an average of 8.5 inhabitants per km² (Statistical Office RS 2016). The number of inhabitants in 2015 decreased for 16.5% compared to 1971. Besides the loss of population, the area also witnesses the aging of the population. The aging index (Fig. 6.2) in the Municipality of Bovec grew faster than the national average (2000: 139.6; 2015: 190.4), while the average age of the population has also increased significantly from 2011 to 2015 (from 42.0 to 47.1 years).

Another significant factor, which has an impact on the development of the municipality, is Triglav National park that covers almost four-fifths of the




Fig. 6.2 Aging index in the Municipality of Bovec and Slovenia in the period between 2000 and 2015 (Source Statistical Office RS 2016)

Municipality of Bovec. In theory, this fact makes the idea of sustainability an unavoidable solution for the area. The importance of it was also emphasized by the Bovec Cooperative Development Society (2013); meanwhile Local Tourism Organization stressed out the meaning of green tourism for the region (Humar 2015). A civil initiative has also emerged in the municipality, which calls for the further consideration of the concept of sustainable development and strengthening it within the area of Municipality of Bovec. Nevertheless, in the scientific and technical literature, the municipality hasn't been recognized as a unit, which fully introduced the idea of sustainability in its development concept. According to the survey, which Plut et al. (2008) conducted among local residents in Triglav National Park (their research sample included more than 80% of all residents in the park), respondents see nature conservation as a crucial value, but consider standards of conservation regimes too strict (Groznik Zeiler 2011, p. 28). The Triglav National Park Act from 2010 provides development guidelines that promote the sustainable development: organic farming together with complementary farm activities, traditional building construction, and supply of products with designation of origin, geographical indication, brand development, sustainable energy consumption and development of eco-tourism (Triglav National Park Act 2010, Article 10).

From the perspective of tourist arrivals on a general level, Triglav National Park recorded a 32% increase between 2000 and 2009, meanwhile the Upper Soča Valley region (part of park where Municipality of Bovec is located), recorded decrease. This could be linked to region's greater dependence on the weather. Among other development problems of the tourism inside Triglav National Park, unfavorable demographic structure, lack of entrepreneurial initiative, seasonality of tourism, inadequate infrastructure, poorly developed public transport as well as problems with special planning have been identified. The solutions that were presented stress the importance of maintaining primeval features of area, integrity and diversity of natural and cultural heritage, and the need for development of specific tourist offer, which will increase the responsibility and attitude of tourists and visitors towards nature. The development of tourist products should also be based on the strengthening of coexistence of the local population with the nature, and should derive from the cooperation between tourism providers and Triglav National Park conservation policies (Mlekuž and Zupan 2011, pp. 22–33).

6.4 Tourist Activities and Opportunities for Sustainable Development in the Municipality of Bovec

Between 75,000 and 80,000 tourists annually visit the Municipality of Bovec. They generate about 200,000 overnight stays. Analysis of the tourism characteristics has revealed that foreign tourists are far most numerous guests, their numbers range between 50,000 and 63,000 visits annually (Fig. 6.3). The ratio between foreign and domestic guests was 78:22. The decline in the number of Slovenian tourists




Fig. 6.3 The number of overnight stays in the Municipality of Bovec between 2008 and 2015 (Source Statistical Office RS 2016)




Fig. 6.4 Motives for visiting the upper Soča river valley according to a survey conducted by the Soča Valley Development Centre; N = 878 (Source Soča Valley Development Centre 2014)

between the years 2013 and 2016 can be interpreted with the fact that Kanin ski resort and cable car was closed (cable car started to operate again in the 2016/2017 season). Foreign guests tend to stay in municipality longer than domestic—in 2015, the average length of stay was 2.6 days for the foreign tourist and 2.0 days for domestic one. In 2015, 77% of foreign visitors generated 82% of all overnight stays (Statistical Office RS 2016).

Among the reasons for visiting the Municipality of Bovec, top four are as follows:

- a desire for relaxation and rest,
- hiking,
- water sports activities and
- historical tourism (Fig. 6.4).




Fig. 6.5 Arrival of tourists in the Municipality of Bovec by months and years (Source Statistical office RS 2016)

These motives were detected by a survey carried out by Soča Valley Development Centre in 2014, in which tourists or visitors of the Upper Soča Valley region participated (therefore, the results do not relate solely to the visitors of the Municipality of Bovec, but also to the visitors of neighbouring municipalities of Kobarid and Tolmin).

In terms of identifying the tourism characteristics, another survey results can be used. The latter was carried out during preparation of the new strategy for the development of tourism in the Municipality of Bovec for the period 2016–2020. In the survey, the views of people from and outside the area on tourism in Bovec were analyzed. Inter alia, they have compared the perception of the state of tourism in Bovec in 2005 and in 2015. Questionnaires were filled in by internal respondents (locals, tourist service providers, restaurant owners, etc.) and visitors (whereby, they had to live at least 80 km away from Bovec). The comparison showed the locals see the situation worse than the outer respondents (Strategy of tourism in the Municipality of Bovec 2016–2020 2016).

A detailed overview of tourist visits to the municipality by months (Fig. 6.5) shows marked seasonality of tourism, which reaches its peak in summer (Statistical Office of the RS 2016). Poor transport connections and inaccessibility of the valley over Vršič mountain pass in the winter, together with the closed ski resort Kanin, contributed to dominant summer season. July and August thus represent the peak of the season, somewhat higher number of tourists were recorded as well in May, June and September. Peter Domevšček from Soča Valley Development Centre (2015) pointed out that tourist season in Bovec is too short, which makes it difficult for an individual to generate enough income to survive throughout the year. Following on, tourism should not be the driving force in the region, which is why, the area urgently needs other sources of income. He sees tourism more as a complementary activity, which enables providers to offer guests higher quality service, because they do not depend solely on the arrival of visitors. Nevertheless, both Pelc (2010,

p. 112) as well as Mlekuž and Zupan (2011, p. 33–34) see tourism as an important opportunity for the demarginalization and stress its importance for the necessary change of negative population trends in the settlements of the park.

Among the weaknesses of tourism in Bovec, the lack of strategy for its development can be stressed out. The current strategy for tourism development in Bovec was prepared in 2005 and remained in force until 2015, but the strategy for the 2016–2020 period has been in preparation for several years. According to Janko Humar from the Local Tourist Organization, absence of this strategic document can be very harmful. He also pointed out that the new strategy will be based on a sustainable model and derived from natural and cultural heritage and outdoor activities, carried out in the protected nature. Among the challenges they have set for themselves, he highlighted:

- a solution for winter season and intermediate seasons,
- fierce competition,
- instability of the environment,
- the importance of quality tourism, which cannot be massive,
- offer for families,
- location's accessibility and
- sufficient public transport.

Key values which will be included in the new tourism strategy are based on the river Soča, caring for nature, hospitality and ambition for tourism development.

Based on the fact that developing sustainable tourism in Bovec would take place in a protected area as well, there are some options, which Plut et al. (2008, pp. 38–39) have identified as major potential opportunities for such areas. Those are: development of various forms of tourism activities, agriculture and small businesses (which may have an important impact on wider regional development), focus on eco-tourism and geotourism (based on strengthening geographical features of the area or so called “sense of place”), together with cultural, culinary and educational tourism.

According to Peter Domevšček (2015) from Soča Valley Development Centre, protected and preserved nature, which is typical for the Municipality of Bovec, is the main reason, receiving a title ECO is easier to get here than in any other urban area. However, Humar (2015) points out that the campsites in the whole area of the Upper Soča Valley are not active in the acquisition of the Ecolabel title.¹ There is only one such camp in the region (Camp Koren), even though the Ministry of the environment and spatial planning co-finances major part of costs, which arise from obtaining this title. Since sustainable development for the region is crucial, Humar regrets the lack of interest by camp owners, especially because the trends show, that such titles benefit tourism development and help the area to become more

¹The EU Ecolabel (Ecolabel flower) is an instrument for identifying products and services that have reduced environmental impact throughout their life cycle. It is a voluntary label promoting environmental excellence which can be trusted and can be recognized throughout Europe. It is also a commitment to environmental sustainability (European Commission 2016).

recognizable. Being “green” can become a niche of the whole national tourism, especially after Slovenia was appointed as the first “green destination” in the world by the Dutch Green Development Foundation in 2016. Humar (2015) also stressed out that camp sites are the most successful providers of accommodation in Bovec, although they are extremely weather dependent. He also stated that Slovenian Tourism Organization educates people and provides information, so there are no real obstacles to obtain the title.

Mlekuž and Zupan (2011, p. 23) also noted a general increasing trend of valuating the green tourism service and environmental protection among consumers, visitors and tourists. Moreover, they emphasized the importance of environmental signs and labels, which will expectedly increase in the future, because tourists and travelers will pay more interest to the information relating the protection of nature and the environment. New forms of tourism demand will evolve, arising from contemporary lifestyles, where health and living with nature is of extreme importance.

For the development of sustainable tourism, which is adapted to expectations of contemporary guests and is in balance with nature and economy, several different areas have to be steered sustainably. Goriška Local Energy Agency highlighted the production of green and renewable energy, which hasn't yet been established in tourism sector in the Municipality of Bovec. So far, solar panels are only in use in a mountain hut on Kriški podi. The agency also sees a lot of potential in energetic features of the area (Goriška Local Energy Agency 2011, p. 44). Another area, where there is a lot of potential, is public transport in the municipality. The agency saw the field of public transport as disorganized, with generally large buses in use and energy consumption in transport basing solely on fossil fuels. The local company Avrigo d.o.o, carries out the intercity transport and connects only the large settlements and main roads, but the local natural and cultural heritage attractions are not covered by the provider. Inclusion of the latter to the existent public transport network would therefore reduce the dependence of visitors from their own means of transport. Goriška Local Energy Agency suggested the use of minibuses, which use environmentally friendly fuel (such as ethanol, natural gas or biodiesel), since they have also noted the majority of main roads in municipality are congested (Goriška Local Energy Agency 2011, pp. 47–50).

Deriving from the facts presented above, the application of the model of “Mountaineering Villages” would make sense in certain villages of the Municipality of Bovec. Inclusion in the project would enable promotion of the area in Austria and Italy. Visitors would be attracted to the villages in other months, not only in summer. Nevertheless, Humar (2015) is cautious with the implementation of the project in this area. He sees this type of tourism as very developed and recognized in Austria, however, this does not necessarily mean that such concept would be applicable in the Bovec region. He pointed out Log pod Mangartom as potentially suitable village for the implementation of this project, but expressed the need for education of the local tourism providers who should become familiar with this concept before it is introduced to the area. He emphasizes the importance of understanding the needs of tourists by hotel owners and service providers, as they

can only offer the best service if they themselves are involved in activities such as hiking, skiing, rafting, etc. He does not think that there are plenty of such individuals in the villages of the municipality of Bovec.

The Austrian concept of “Mountaineering villages” would nevertheless have some comparative advantages in the area of the Municipality of Bovec, when compared to other alpine areas. This region has the impact of sub-Mediterranean climate, which gives the region a sense of Mediterranean character. The climate type of municipality is under the influence of Mediterranean Sea, which can be seen in precipitation regime and temperature conditions, as average annual temperatures in the Valley of Soča are significantly higher compared to the Sava part of the Julian Alps (average annual temperature of Bovec is 9.2 °C, while in Rateče, north from the mountain pass Vršič, the temperature is 6.5 °C) (Slovenian Environment Agency 2016). The Mediterranean character of the area can also be seen in architecture—the body of a traditional house in the Upper Soča Valley is built in Mediterranean style, only its roof has an alpine character (Kajzelj 2002, p.147).

Other alpine villages, which are also included in the “Mountaineering villages” project, do not have such characteristics. There are six mountain huts in the Municipality of Bovec located above 1500 m of altitude, municipality’s settlements are not too large, while a range of new forms of eco-tourism could also be introduced here. The project can be an opportunity for the return of the Italian tourists, since, as Domevšček (2015) has pointed out, providers haven’t paid enough attention to them, even though they are just over the border. The analysis of statistical data also showed that the number of Italian tourist has decreased since 2008 and they also create considerably less overnight stays (Statistical Office of the RS 2016).

A unique local brand, which in the Municipality of Bovec hasn’t been established yet, could also represent an opportunity to develop a single, sustainably oriented tourism, which could also promote cuisine and cultural heritage of the area. Humar (2015) thinks that stakeholders should cooperate and unify under one brand in a wider, cross-municipal context, which would include the whole Upper Soča Valley region. The importance of the establishment of the local brand was also stressed out by the Triglav National Park representatives (Mlekuž and Zupan 2011).

6.5 Conclusion

Based on the analysis of tourism indicators and the opinions of local stakeholders we can conclude that tourism in the Municipality of Bovec is an important economic activity, which faces certain limitations on infrastructural and developmental levels. Among the many constraints in infrastructure, which contribute to seasonality of the tourism in the area, the lack of transport connections and inaction of cable car and ski resort Kanin in the period 2013–2016 can be pointed out. This had significant consequences for the whole region and led to a higher unemployment rate at the municipal level, as well as significant decrease of domestic tourist visits

in the municipality. Restarting the cable car at the end of the year 2016 gives hope for the revival of the winter season and the return of domestic guests, but in this vulnerable mountainous and demographically quite unstable environment further development of the ski resort has to be carried out extremely carefully and in accordance with the principles of sustainable development. A further threat to hasty decisions in the field of tourism can be represented by seismic risks and potential erosion processes, which is why mass winter tourism cannot and must not be a key development paradigm.

Besides firmly established sports tourism (which is carried out from May to September and is thus seasonal), other developmental concepts could represent an important niche (these include culinary and cultural tourism, as well as geotourism, which promotes tourism activities that preserve nature and the welfare of the local population). Even the application of the model of the “Mountaineering villages”, a project that has already been launched in Austria and Italy, seems interesting in terms of reducing the seasonality of tourist visits in the Municipality of Bovec. Some of the villages in the municipality comply with the requirements of the project and the area itself would be especially attractive for tourists because of its unique Mediterranean character, which other areas do not offer.

The Municipality of Bovec represents sensible and demographically endangered environment for the development of tourism. Due to its specific characteristics sustainable forms of tourism (mentioned above) combined with other economic activities (also based on the principles of sustainability) seem to be the only possible direction away from marginality of this fragile mountainous area.

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Chapter 7

The Ibiza's Nightlife as a Bend from Marginalization to Tourism Centrality

Hugo Capellà i Mitermique

7.1 Introduction

Currently, Ibiza is a place known around the world for entertainment and recreation. It has become a space that has been idealized (Dumazedier 1962) by people worldwide who are eager to visit. This study focuses on understanding the process of constructing this myth (Touraine 1969)—through local agents and through reflections by others—from a cultural perspective (Mitchell 2000). Emphasis is placed on understanding how music, nightclubs (Nash 2000), and the construction of nightlife in Ibiza have been a part of constructing a unique place known globally (Campo and Ryan 2008).

Ibiza had been a very small and poor island of the Mediterranean, for centuries. At first, the island, was frequently attacked by pirates and even after those dark periods, life was still very tough and difficult. Many inhabitants, were forced to migrate to the other Balearic Islands, to the Spanish Peninsula, Northern Africa (Franch-Alegria, during 19th century, or even further to South America, mainly to Argentina. The paradox of how a small island in the Mediterranean became world-renowned will be understood through the following hypothesis: the construction of a global myth based on the concept of freedom (Bonnet 1995). This incredible change has happened in just 60 years, passing from an unknown place to a world best known place. To confirm the hypothesis, this chapter is based on fieldwork that uses qualitative tools to consider the local image and the image held by others to understand the process through which the myth arose. The results of the study seek to appraise the process in Ibiza as an excellent research laboratory for understanding not only the processes of tourism and new technologies but also contemporary society in terms of the experience of entertainment (Rodaway 1994).

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7.2 A Wild Past (1970s)

Ibiza's wild past is viewed as being connected to the hippy movement of the 1960s and 1970s. On one hand, this movement allowed this somewhat forgotten island to become known, opening it to foreign tourism. On the other hand, this past destined the island to have its rebel image, which has only recently been used as a positive characteristic for a boom in music and nightlife around the Fiesta Days on Ibiza (Anderson 1991).

7.2.1 *Pityusic Islands Marginality*

The Balearic Islands and particularly the Pityusic Islands (Ibiza and Formentera) were a fringe and marginal Mediterranean archipelago until the beginning of the 20th century. The glorious past that came from the Mediterranean trade shrank from the splendours seen during Antiquity to well into the Middle Ages, when geopolitical interest shifted more towards the Atlantic and the new territories. The area of the Pityusic Islands off the coast of Africa became linked with the influx of piracy. Simultaneously, the islands' landscape did not allow for greater development, leading to widespread migration to the continent or to other lands.

Until the beginning of the 20th century, Ibiza was considered a territory that was very much on the periphery of decision-making centres. Ultimately, this situation was to the island's benefit because it was able to conserve an almost unchanged habitat—a pure reflection of the pristine Mediterranean. Its landscapes, coasts, clear waters, and well-preserved architectural heritage in its towns would transform it in a jewel that was first discovered by the hippies, later opening it to the world again.

The remoteness of Ibiza also made it possible for its inhabitants to organize themselves with a great degree of looseness and freedom from decision-making centres. From the very beginning, the island acquired a very autonomous character that would fit well with the new ways of thinking that would soon arrive on the island. Far from being a closed territory, Ibiza has been an island that is curious about foreigners. The root of this characteristic can perhaps be attributed to a number of different factors, such as having been ruled by different peoples and cultures—from the Phoenicians to the Carthaginians, passing through Rome—or a significant Berber, as opposed to Arab, heritage, without forgetting the concern on the part of Christians for controlling this territory due to its late conversion. Similarly, the size and small population of the island forced it to develop more survival strategies than other places in the world due to the limited resources on the island. However, one natural resource—salt—allowed it to establish more libertarian and less feudalized settlements than those in other islands because the tributes and lands were distributed among its small-scale farmers. To a certain degree, all of these factors led to the forging of an island character that was more tolerant and

open to foreigners without leading to a loss of its own customs (Grimalt and Prats I Serra 2001).

The arrival of the hippies to the island with their proposals and ways of thinking fit perfectly with the locals, creating a curious cohabitation without any type of conflict, despite the enormous differences between the two groups: a group of young people from the European and North American elite and the insular society that had maintained its traditions unaltered for centuries. Far from the logical clash that one might imagine, both parties knew how to respect each other and even developed a reciprocal admiration centred on the love that they shared for the island.

7.2.2 The Hippy Seed

The tourist boom that shook a large part of the Mediterranean coast also similarly impacted the Balearic Islands beginning in the mid-1960s (Ramón 2001). The number of tourists and visits—both national and international—transformed the economy and the infrastructure of the archipelago. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the impact was first observed in the Island of Mallorca and, to a lesser degree, in the Island of Menorca and the Pityusic Islands (Cirer-Costa 2001).

In this manner, Ibiza was not included in the process, but it attracted an international hippy movement that was amazed by the island's beauty. Starting in the 1970s, Ibiza, which had always been a very peripheral place, became a libertarian and tolerant exception under the somewhat-condescending watch of the Spanish authorities of the time (the dictatorship) to give the impression of openness and to incentivize tourists whose money was very welcome (Planells 2002).

In this manner, Ibiza became the flag bearer of an alternative lifestyle model that was in keeping with the values of the hippy movement and that came together with the values of the island societies that had stagnated in tradition in a very interesting manner. Despite the great cultural differences between locals and the new residents, everyone shared a deep love for the islands and their nature, becoming joint defenders of their values (Simard 2000).

7.2.3 Just One More Mass Tourism Destination (1980s to 1990s)

Development in the Balearic Islands led to widespread tourism development. With the growing arrival of tourists under the so-called sun and beach tourism model, the initial claim by the hippy movement gave way to democratization. The speed at which this process occurred forced the island to respond to a massive demand for

tourism (Lalive D'Épinay 1982), that left little space for planning and was the result of improvisation performed by private capital with the backing of the public authorities. The impact on the fragile equilibrium of these islands came swiftly with the initial occupation of the coastline and the deep transformations in infrastructure to allow for the flood of tourists who came during a brief period in the year, based on the holidays and the favourable climate of the summer season (Ramón and Serra 2013).

After two long, out-of-control decades, investors themselves saw the limits and the long-term impact of tourism on resources and began to propose new strategies to diversify the tourism industry while maintaining the existing flows (Hall and Page 1998).

7.3 Music as Redemption: Ibiza's Global Reference (2000s)

Until the year 2000, the process of tourism development of Ibiza in places such as San Antonio, Santa Eulària, and the City of Ibiza itself appeared very similar to that of the rest of Balears as a result of widespread tourism. However, in this section, we observe how Ibiza took a different course, rediscovering its beginnings. After observing the impact of widespread tourism on the island, the first response was to diversify tourism with actions such as extending the season, seeking different tourist groups, and developing different tourism activities such as sport and entertainment activities (Costa 1989). Nevertheless, the success of these strategies was limited, in large part because they were the same approaches that were implemented in other tourism destinations in the Mediterranean that were also saturated and, more concretely, they were in a context of competing at a disadvantage compared to other islands in the archipelago, particularly Mallorca. In comparison, Ibiza offered fewer choices, and its dependence on Mallorca was detrimental.

Nevertheless, Ibiza was able to develop an authentic strategy from its own entrepreneurs that would shape the future of the island and have an unparalleled impact around the world. Returning to its hippy heritage and libertarian image, there was a strategy that incentivized a diversity in terms of entertainment (Corbin 1995) and, in particular, nightlife through nightclubs and music (Augé 1992). The parties in Ibiza began to acquire a reputation for their diverse character and began to transform tourism in the island from a sun and beach family- friendly model to a demand for nightlife centred on a younger and more elitist public. This transformation emerged spontaneously, but over time, it acquired an almost collective business strategy dimension, with the more or less implicit support of the authorities (within a policy of lax laws).

7.3.1 The Impact of Global Nightlife in Ibiza: Youth Tourism

The promotion of the island's image through its parties with the release of record labels, elaborate shows (Bensa and Fassin 2002), and the transformation of buildings into large entertainment businesses (Rosa 2002), made it possible to return to the already known name of Ibiza and to catapult it as a symbol of entertainment and partying (Allemand 2010). This development was something that occurred not only at the national and international scale; rather, it was something that transformed the island into a global icon (Amirou 2000). The process of reinterpreting the hippy alternative image in a contemporary global context (Jauréguiberry 1994), came from local businessmen (from the island and from elsewhere). They were the actors who understood the authenticity of the island to convert it into a unique product that went beyond tourism. Given the party reputation of the island, the traditional sun and beach tourists began to stay away, which made it possible to attract visitors who were willing to spend large sums of money to experience the nightlife in Ibiza. There was a shift from tourism to the experience of shows and culture.

In this manner, by the mid-2000s, Ibiza had become internationally renowned in the electronic music industry (its own record labels and invited DJs) and for its nightclubs (Goulding and Shankar 2011) (such as Space, Privilege, Amnesia, Café del Mar, Pacha, Ushuaia, and Esparadis); it has also become one of the most sought-after stages during the summer in show business (with parties organized by the *Matinée* group, La Troya, Supermarxé, and Circuit). Simultaneously, from the cultural perspective, the construction of the image of the island had a minimal physical impact and, on the contrary, made it possible to emphasize the natural Mediterranean environment of the island and the libertarian heritage of the reinterpreted hippy movement (Perrot 1997).

With its network of nightclubs (Sönmez et al. 2013), Ibiza began to generate an entertainment niche that attracted record labels and international DJs, which transformed Ibiza into not only one of the destinations in the global circuit but also a destination with international renown, almost exclusively during the summer period (Fontaine and Fontana 1996). The dissemination of the reputation of its parties crossed borders, attracting people from all over the world to Ibiza. Simultaneously, it became a world-renowned destination through the dissemination of its parties through video, the Ibiza-based record labels, and the lyrics to songs that include Ibiza as an icon and that have been emulated in other parts of the world, such as "Ibiza's Party". This highlights the island's own style, which is defined by freewheeling parties and a relaxed environment that goes beyond labels or conventionalism. We find ourselves with the case of one of the few non-urban destinations that has managed to concentrate and attract nightlife, even going so far as to

displace some of the international record labels and entertainment events in the main cities around the world (Nora 1974). A couple examples are London with the Ministry of Sound show and Paris Hilton's parties, which were associated with the Supermarxé parties.

Combining all of the efforts of individual businessmen, the nightlife industry is presented as an enormous entertainment platform with a volume of shows every night (during the summer season) that is found in an international city. Music and parties have incentivized a licit and illicit industry (Malborn 1999).

The result of this distinctive and authentic strategy, which was crafted by local actors but had a global impact, has led to a radical transformation of the tourism industry in the island in a process that has increased the elitism that had only been observed in certain exclusive Mediterranean destinations that were already well-established on the French Riviera (Saint-Tropez, Nice, Cannes, and Monaco itself).

Currently, the exclusivity of the island is beginning to generate a new transformation, slowly displacing the Ibiza nightlife in favor of luxury tourism, with yet-unquantifiable consequences.

7.3.2 From Popular to Exclusive: Pursuing Familiar Tourism

Even 10 years ago, Ibiza would have never imaged that, after the parties, it would become one of the most coveted tourist destinations. Today, the island is one of the largest consumers of luxury products, such as French champagne (according to data, Moët Chandon champagne). The trend towards the elitism of the island has caused a significant process of property speculation with multimillion-dollar mansions for rent and the implementation of luxury services and infrastructure, such as polo fields and the construction of a luxury sport seaport.

The island has become a symbol of success, whose label is sought after and controlled by the people of the island themselves, given that it has become synonymous with success and luxury.

The origin of all of these transformations was music and the music industry, which made it possible to disseminate the image of the island throughout the world through song lyrics and videos of the island (Bouillin-Dartevelle et al. 1991). In the first phase, this situation caused traditional sun and beach family tourists to be scared away, leaving out of fear of such sin; and in the second phase, the name recognition of Ibiza was exploited to transform it into an icon of entertainment and fun and, finally, owing to its success, towards luxury.

7.4 An Amazing Island: An Unreachable Destination (2010s)

By 2010, Ibiza had become its own brand around the world, independent of other powerful images such as the Balearic Islands or Spain. Ibiza went down its chosen road, a result of its success. Presently, however, it finds itself at a crossroads, between reconverting itself once again into the cutting edge of music, art, and the culture scene through entertainment or yielding to the emerging industry of luxury services, becoming part of the club of the most exclusive international destinations. Today, Ibiza is becoming a dreamlike tourist destination that is ever more inaccessible to ordinary tourists or spectators. It has become more focused on appealing to a select group of celebrities and rich businessmen. This current process entails the risk of moving away from the initial successful image of the hippy movement. The island could become a victim of its own success and renounce its alternative character, in the process losing part of its uniqueness and charm. It seems that the authorities are attempting a middle ground, considering luxury as a way of avoiding the impact of widespread tourism while conserving—even if, to a certain degree, it is false—its unique character based on a false simplicity and anonymity. Perhaps the authenticity of the process could be judged, although if we analyse its initial hippy origin story, it was also based on a utopia that was in large part sustained by many of the children of the global elite.

7.4.1 *Ibiza as a Global Reference*

The Ibiza concept has been successful at fitting perfectly with the existential and experiential character of contemporary societies. Faced with the loss of traditional collective symbols and faced with a fascinating universe of multicultural societies, individuals have begun to increasingly relativize that which has been rationally established and to value once again that which appeals to what is experienced through the senses. Music and nightlife have become catalysts towards an unparalleled space of freedom that the island has been able to understand from its previous hippy experience (Tutenges 2012). However, success did not merely consist of having a unique characteristic that could be of interest to others. Simultaneously, the island was able to find the appropriate channels with access to new information technology and the telecommunications boom (Missonnier et al. 2003), a unique method of disseminating its message in the freest manner possible. Entertainment makes it possible to reach people informally and experientially, making them feel a global message as something individual. The experience of Ibiza is lived first-hand; simultaneously, however, there has been a way to disseminate it to everyone on an equal basis internationally. What is interesting in this

case is how the message that is transmitted through entertainment and music has become universal, despite cultural and historical differences. For this reason, we speak of a cultural process, given that it concerns an artistic message that can be interpreted by each one of us. Ibiza is more than an image or a brand, and it is viewed as the construction of one of the first collective global myths. For this reason, it would most likely be a mistake to confine it to a concrete image that would reduce its potential in the long term, which is what seems to be occurring now with the trend towards luxury.

7.4.2 Ibiza's Process of Exclusiveness

As a paradise, Ibiza seems to have become an exclusive space that is only accessible to those who can afford it. As a benefit, the luxury services development strategy mitigates ever-growing pressure of tourism on the northern Mediterranean region. Nevertheless, it is moving away from its original libertarian and egalitarian character, and it could fall into a middle-term vision, as noted above.

Ibiza could become another luxury destination, such as Monaco, Marbella, or one of the Emirates. However, it can continue to be one of the few places in the world that is centred on the concept of freedom and entertainment (Thornton 1995), a position most likely only shared with a few places such as Las Vegas. Ibiza is the only island in the world that, from a cultural and artistic perspective, has allowed for the construction of a dream, something that is only possible at certain times in some of the most important cities around the world such as Paris, New York, and Tokyo (McVeigh 2004). Ibiza is the only island that has been able to create a space of freedom and imagination within the contemporary Western world. Frequently disparaged and under the moralizing gaze, Ibiza's nightlife can be understood, on the contrary, as a new creative stage in the arts (music and show business) as well as a reconceptualization of entertainment from Western frameworks through new technologies (St John 2004). The reconceptualization of entertainment from Ibiza not only contributes economic incentives but also once again presents the foundations of entertainment themselves beyond tourism. It is the result of the reinvention of the island itself (Yonnet 1999), which is only recently being understood by certain academic fields (in the field of branding or marketing) and in terms of institutional recognition (by local and regional authorities).

We have presented an incredible case of how a marginalized island from the Mediterranean, very forgotten, became thanks to music and nightlife, one of the most well-known and exclusive spots in the world.

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Chapter 8

Cuban Tourism—The Marginalized Communist Country’s First Step Towards Sustainable Development

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8.1 Introduction

Caribbean tourism market is flourishing, with over 28 million tourists in 2015 and an estimated expenditure of 34 billion USD (Caribbean Tourism Organization 2016). McLeod (2015) states that the Caribbean transformation of “sugar-based economies to tourist destinations has been remarkable”. The island of Cuba represented a historically important tourist location before the Cuban Revolution took place. Tourism industry in Cuba almost disappeared after the revolution. Soviet Union financially supported Cuban economy for decades because of its anti-American feelings, sending them cheap oil and buying sugar with higher prices as found on world markets. After the disintegration of Soviet Union in the 1980s Russian help ceased and Cuban economy precipitated. In the early 1990s the Cuban economy decreased by 35%, Cuban export decreased by 80% while import decreased by 75% (Pérez-López 2002, pp. 508–509). Because of difficult economic times the government found tourism industry as a fair possibility to help the Cuban’s economy.

Mass tourism slowly began to increase and problems started to arise. Responsible tourism is being developed in such a manner that it maintains vital in a tourist area for an unlimited time, without changing its social and economic characteristics, respecting the environment and culture. Tosun (2001) analyzed the challenges to sustainable tourism development in developing countries and stressed that despite the obvious positive consequences, brought by tourism development; it is not an easy task to implement such principles, especially if we take into account

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the socio-economic and political conditions in the developing world. Political and economic choices and trade-offs that have to be taken are difficult.

Leimgruber (2010) stressed that the concept of marginality cannot be limited only to the economic aspects, there are also social and cultural consequences of economically based marginalization to be taken into consideration, for example. Conradson and Pawson (2009) agree that regional marginality is besides economic also “an imagined and discursively constructed condition”. Geographical marginality can be studied as a situation observed and measured from outside, but Pelc (2010) is arguing about the ‘sensation of marginality’ as a concept which is present among the population of certain area. Until 2008 some of Cuban hotels and other facilities were opened only for foreign tourists—they were accused of tourism apartheid (Roig-Franzia 2008; Mazzei 2012).

Due to decades long economic and political embargo of the island of Cuba, the marginality is seen both from inside and outside the country. Mazzei (2012) identifies tourists on Cuba as the privileged group and Cuban population as a marginalized group. But even the population is split between those who have the access to the tourism industry and US dollars and those who don't. The later face a realistic danger of poverty; so from dual economy a social duel might arise. Due to the return of this material inequality first tendencies of Cuba's future marginalization can be traced. Also the once-balanced city-country relations of Cuba are giving way to a growing disparity. The migration to the capital has increased since 1990 and begins to disintegrate the previous integrity of the territorial state (Klopfer and Mertins 2001). Burchardt (2002) is warning that colored citizens are the next possible target of marginalization after the Castro era. Darlington (2009) confirms this issue:

Until 1959, Cuba had beaches, clubs and barbershops reserved for whites. One of the first things Fidel Castro did after his socialist revolution triumphed was declaring racial discrimination illegal. The revolution did deal an institutional blow to racism, but also incorrectly declared a centuries-old problem solved with just a decree or a law ...

So we have present a multifaceted example of a marginalized Cuba, Caribbean region, underdeveloped, geographically isolated, where the GDP per capita reached 6790 USD in 2013, while translated into purchasing power (PPP) it equaled 20,649 USD (The World Bank 2016). A steady growth can be seen since 1996, when the GDP per capita was 2284 USD and PPP 7346 USD. After the USA–Cuba detant the number of tourists grew, 3.5 million visited Cuba in 2015—capacities were pushed to limits (Trotta 2016), while in 1995 there were 742,000 (The World Bank 2015). And it is interesting that Americans can only enter Cuba on officially sanctioned trips »such as ones organized by educational groups, or via countries with connecting flights, including Canada, Mexico or Panama« while »travel for tourism remains officially off-limits due to the economic embargo« (Fieser and Gayol 2015).

Inhabitants are very much aware of their own prosperity level, as there are many emigrants that left Cuba—mostly to Florida, USA; they are sending money to their relatives regularly. And there are many tourists, coming to the country, as the

popularity of country as a tourist destination increases. We shouldn’t forget that incoming tourists bring changes with them for local people. And we should keep in mind the influence of modern communication and information channels, cruise shipping industry etc. After the recent death of revolutionary leader Fidel Castro the first cautious steps of opening the country will be strengthened. Cuban government, although against the free market economy, understands the growing demand for tourism services as an opportunity to improve the economic situation of the Treasury, citizens are seizing the chance to better their financial status, but these changes bring some possible threats, too. The main question is how to create opportunities upon all of these challenges. Newly elected USA president Trump will probably not hesitate to find a common language with Cuban government as he showed to be quite pragmatic—interests of construction and gambling industries are free of ideology.

8.2 Literature Review and Analysis

The establishment of NAFTA, EU and other free trade agreements influenced the export of goods (mostly agricultural) from Cuba, making the tourism sector even more important. The loss of financial assistance from Soviet Union in early 1990’s changed the approach to tourism industry (Lindeman et al. 2003), which is supposed to finance Cuba’s social programs, such as free education and accessible health care. Pattullo (2005) documents the move away from a socialist model of state owned tourism infrastructure in 1987, introducing the joint venture ownership—hotel rooms tripled in ten years, from 1990 to 2000, reaching the number of 33,000 international standards fitting rooms in 200 hotels. The existing 63,000 rooms are filled up quickly, so the opening to USA helped private sector offering rooms in family homes, too (Hamre 2016). Despite the difficulties that American tourists are still facing because of restrictions imposed by their government, they enter Cuba through neighbouring countries, like Canada and Mexico; Cancun i.e. accounts the constant growth of flight passengers from USA while tourist arrivals remain flat (Acevedo et al. 2016).

Hingtgen et al. (2015) suggest that Cuba should enable a more entrepreneurial climate for a stronger private sector, and entrepreneurs should show more interest to develop tourism products which would diminish the importance of mass tourism. Entrepreneurial changes and their relevance in a collectivist society have been already examined by Koh (2002), Kline and Milburn (2010) and Hingtgen et al. (2015). While tourism promoters are trying to satisfy the growing demand and to help the struggling Cuban economy, planned development and increased numbers of visitors, mostly in Havana and Varadero, put in danger the cultural, social and natural environment. Majority of Cuban hotels—71% are situated on the beach, 2% in nature parks and the rest are in cities (Thomas et al. 2015). Especially the coastal regions are threatened, as new hotels are being built on the beachfront, endangering the traditional social environment, as much as the flora and fauna diversity.

Sustainable development of the tourism sector is already a big issue, Caribbean countries pursue the vision of a viable and resilient industry that provides better quality of life to their citizens, which should participate in the planning of future tourism development, countries should cooperate regionally (CTO 2008).

Other authors, like Bailey (2008) argue that governments under the pressure of global tourism trends change the policies to form more welcoming climate for international investment. This is a real tragedy, as in the run for a competitive offer they might destroy the social structure and natural richness of places. Gonzalez et al. (2014) warn that headless tourism-based city planning process leads to »an unequal, polarized, segregated city, where severely impoverished territories exist alongside intensely gentrified areas. These cities are socially fractured and fragmented in an urban development sense«. These processes create disabled »conurbations« very different from classical city concept. And it is quite clear that there exists no such money that would allow renovation of the impoverished two million Havana city, as the real owners flew from Cuba and nobody tried to restore their houses for 60 years—nowadays the real estate are pretty much in ruins.

Authors like Amendola (2000) and Soja (2008) haven't discussed or tackled the inequalities or segregation which tourism industry creates but they accorded that huge concentration of hotels and other tourist infrastructure becomes alienated from "normal" cities. Weaver (1988) introduced the term of "tourist plantation" economies, replacing former colonial plantation economies. Monreal (2005) has developed this argument for Cuba. Before that Ash and Turner (1976) wrote about undeveloped coastal areas turning into "pleasure peripheries" of Western cities. Wilkinson (2008) expressed the fear that in the post Castro era ecology in Cuba might become undesired obstacle for tourism plans (Gonzalez et al. 2014).

Perez et al. (2013) classified Cuba among ten most noteworthy islands regarding biodiversity, thanks to complex geology and tropical climate, 22% of surface is representing six Ramsar wetlands and ten National Parks. Smith (2009) noted growth of interest in the demand of local cultural tourism: if managed sustainably this might help to revitalize the cultural traditions. And yet, tourist offer has been focused on the classical tourism, based on beach and sun. Gonzalez et al. (2014) proposed an indicator system capable to assess the sustainability of nature-based destinations on Cuba, measuring social indicators, too, i.e. local population perception of public services improvement because of tourism, than the improvement in transportation infrastructure because of tourism etc. We mustn't forget that tourism brings also some negative effects to the lifestyle at tourist destination. Contrary to these tourism business helps prevent young people leaving the country, brings an increase in the number of local employees and similar.

Anfuso et al. (2014) benchmarked Cuban coastal scenic assessment, categorizing and classifying beach sites; La Habana and Varadero were marked as attractive, while many others received low scores for natural parameters. Authors suggest that in the latter the improvement is possible only addressing human parameters, e.g. removing litter and chaotic protective structures. But in Italy Concu and Atzeni (2012) found significant differences among the tourists depending if the beach type is urban or rural.

In the Cuban case the development of tourism brought not only the economic recovery but also social divisions (Espino 2000). Spencer (2016) is talking about geopolitical inequalities that emerge from tourists’ mobility versus the “supposed place-boundedness” of Cubans. Most tourists, despite their willingness to discover other countries and cultures, don’t want to change their usual lifestyle. Azarya (2004) writes that such tourists are being followed by certain amenities and so these come in the contact with local people that are servicing them, while Judd (2003) investigated Cuban tourist enclaves and points out that they “change consumption, suppress local culture and replace it with Disney culture”.

People from Europe, Canada and South America are coming to Cuba also to use their health care (Wagner 2006) and this trend might turn into a major potential problem if doctors and hospitals will focus more on the tourist and neglect local citizens (Garret 2010). Iordache and Ciochina (2014) assessed the growth of medical tourism internationally by one fifth per year, representing a yearly income of one hundred billion dollars.

Canally and Carmichael (2011) discuss the manipulation of:

... the political economy of tourist destination image, which traces the influence of inter-governmental and extra-governmental power structures that manipulate the image of a potential tourist destination (Cuba), to manufacture a discourse that aligns with the ideologies of the political elites in the US.

There is a global trend to revolutionize today’s life model; Liu (2016) i.e. gives us a heads up, when she argues that “top-line growth doesn’t ensure bottom-line prosperity”. And she proposes that leaders should grab for the chance of remaking the country’s economic development, using a wider vision.

Nevertheless, not every tourist wants the same kind of leisure experience. De la Pena et al. (2016) study on hedonic theory demonstrates that tourists expect price differentiation based on “membership of international hotel chains, high quality offers, diversified rooms, and adaptability to specific needs of each client”. McLeod et al. (2016) identified a gap between the development of Caribbean islands and success of tourist industry; they advise reassessment of Caribbean tourism and redirection for sustainable benefits.

8.3 Discussion

Tourism is only one of the initiatives being promoted from Cuban government to improve the economic condition of the country. Of course it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the influence of all these sectors; we are concentrating on tourism industry only and its effects on marginalization. There are two ways to see the tourism contribution in underdeveloped regions:

- (a) the fight with poverty through tourism will be successful and sustainable only if it is accompanied with the network of conscious tourist operators and consumers; or

- (b) it is seen as an aid to a poor community, without giving them the empowerment and needed knowledge.

Financial investors, construction lobbies and big tourism industry will mostly build on mass tourism, which gives to the local community precarious working places with low salaries. Competition within the world tourism industry and huge profit appetites direct capital owners to promote the number of tourists, competing with low prices. While living costs will increase, local people have to cope through the month with modest wages; from this point it is not very far to the appearance of alcohol problems, prostitution, drugs, crime.

Tourists' expectations about how to spend their leisure time are moving towards alternative tourism more and more. Some tourists prefer to spend holidays engaged in direct interactions with local people, their heritage and nature, growing personally and educating themselves. Cuba has a lot to show in this regard, several locations are inscribed in the World Heritage List (UNESCO 2016a): Archaeological landscape of the first coffee plantations in the South-East of Cuba; historic centre of Camagüey; old Havana and its fortification system; San Pedro de la Roca castle, Santiago de Cuba; Trinidad and the Valley de Los Ingenios; urban historic centre of Cienfuegos; Viñales valley; and two natural parks: Alejandro de Humboldt National park, and Desembarco del Granma National Park. Besides these sites there is also a tentative list waiting for consideration: National Schools of Art, Cubanacán, Ciénaga de Zapata National Park, and the Reef System in the Cuban Caribbean. The First coffee plantation i.e. offers remaining physical evidence of pioneering form of agriculture on a demanding terrain and demonstrates the Caribbean history from a social, economic and technological standpoint. While Trinidad, a historic and homogeneous city from 16th century, with Andalusian, Moorish and European neoclassical buildings, grew on the basis of flourishing sugar cane industry from nearby Valley de los Ingenios, where a living museum has been arranged with sugar mills, barracks, plantation houses, and more.

And then there is the Cuba's intangible cultural heritage, listed at UNESCO (2016b): unique La Tumba Francesca (French drums); while Rumba in Cuba, a festive combination of music and dances and all the practices associated, and Punto guajiro or Punto Cubano, a song genre of improvised poetic music art from 17th century are at the moment on-going nominations. The Cuban authorities and regional bodies are organizing capacity-building workshops on safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage, where stakeholders like bearers of intangible heritage, national committees and institutions receive intensive training, offering a platform where participants reflect collectively on experiences and challenges in safeguarding intangible cultural heritage within the wider context of sustainable development (UNESCO 2014). Baldacchino (2007) also warned that we won't be able to understand island people and society "if we treat them as microcosmos of larger continents"; so it would be easier to engage and acknowledge "singularities and idiosyncrasies of their environmental and social landscapes". And Brohman (1996) already knew that alternative forms of tourism in rural areas might contribute to reverse the "historic trends of inequality and dependency".

Gössling (2015) highlighted challenges for Caribbean tourism and mentioned also concerns about the utilization of cultural resources for tourism development.

Cuban economic aristocracy in exile from Florida, Cuban political aristocracy with their next generation, Spanish companies' aspirations building from the country's tradition as a former colonisation superpower (besides others already mentioned) are stakeholders with increasing appetites to enter the Cuban tourism ground and it will be very difficult to safeguard the Cuba's natural and social environment. Forces have to be joined from national NGO's, conscious individuals, Caribbean tourism associations etc. before it will be too late. The marginalization issues must be exposed and openly discussed in order to help the viable social and economic development of the country. Threatening neoliberal tendencies for the privatisation of everything everywhere should be avoided.

8.4 Conclusion

Problems of tourist activities' development along the coast and inland, like their multiplication in the last decades and those that are still planned, requests better environmental and social knowledge of the environment's quality and fragility, of the importance of identity resources for the purpose of the heritage to be safeguarded as much as the opportunity for the landscape improvement and economic valorisation. It would be also necessary to organize capacities for planning the transformation and to pre-program the anthropic load capacity in order to avoid irreversible alterations of the landscape qualities and the environmental balance of places. It would be appropriate that authorities and other involved stakeholders disseminate a new tourism culture, which puts enough attention on natural and social environment's fragility and to identify risk factors for inappropriate and non-sustainable use of resources (Calcagno Maniglio 2004).

Civil society all over the world should become involved to promote responsible tourism, build economic relationships based on equity. Tourists should get in contact with Cuba's cultural projects, together with the local people. From the improvisational traditions in singing verses of Mayabeque (Pérez 2014) to the farmers lifestyle based on permaculture (Spencer 2016); from children who learn to sing in improvising verses and playing traditional instruments to the intact caves as water carriers; from habaneras roads, with their stories of destruction and reconstruction telling an eventful history to the small communities of the center of the country; to the tobacco plantations, agro-ecological experiences of the farms included in the tourist routes of Viñales (Simoni 2009). This would represent a challenge for the local development, an invitation to the participation in the transformation processes, more opportunity for the inhabitants of the country, a cultural bridge and exchange with developed countries.

We can see that marginality appears in many different forms, so policies and strategies for tourism development should be well balanced. Gössling (2015) argues that changes in tourism might have their starting point in rethinking policies of

tourism development and their implementation. When we approach tourism in Cuba in a more responsible way, tourist will be able to enjoy its beaches, its forests, the cultivation of tobacco, colourful colonial towns, the historic antique cars and the horse-drawn carts. Habana is an architectural marvel in motion in his daily life, in search of its glory. Cuba with its people, its cultural richness, it's always cheerful spirit and ready to face endless difficulties with thousand smiles. But we shouldn't forget that Cuba is changing, its people change and love their country, they live it and they feel it. Sustainable tourism might help Cuban people to increase their quality of life, without destroying the nature and social ties. Cuba is a country of contrasts and contradictions that you learn to love because it takes you forever. So Cubans and tourists as important social factors should merge their forces and enjoy the results of positive educational engagement to overcome negative effects of the mass tourism. Growing populism, emerging neopopulist alliances, neoliberal considerations and new inequalities are on the rise worldwide, threatening to create new forms of marginalization. The lessons from this chapter could be of good use for other places and people in the world, which are being exploited without hesitation and especially for other centrally governed less developed countries.

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Part IV
Ethnic Groups Between Marginality
and Inclusion

Chapter 9

Minorities—An Expression of Diversity and an Exercise in Tolerance

Walter Leimgruber

9.1 Introduction

Majority—minority issues are characteristic of every society. Everywhere, there are numerically superior and inferior groups of all kinds. But numbers suggest that majorities and minorities are purely quantitative categories. Billionaires are a minority, poor people a majority; however, the former are outside minority research, contrary to the latter. The qualitative difference lies in the fact that billionaires have access to power, whereas the voices of the poor are rarely heard.

Discussions about minorities usually focus on ethnic and cultural characteristics (language, religion); sometimes they include economic and social features (income, employment, education, health). We have learnt to live with social and economic minorities, but cultural and ethnic minorities are often threatened by the majorities because they do not fit into a homogenous society. Tolerance, respect for the Others, is required. The problems of economic and social minorities can be solved through appropriate political, economic and societal measures intent to reduce the gap between majorities and minorities.

People stamped as minorities carry with them a negative image and are perceived as disturbing the mainstream way of life (such as the Roma and other non-sedentary groups; Leimgruber 2010). Coping with them is therefore a challenge to both politics and society: it means, for example, to communicate in several languages, tolerate different religious manifestations, and accept multiple cultural traditions. Majority groups often look down on minorities and marginalize them. Integrating them is a difficult process, and the price may be high. The integration of ethnic minorities in the Greater Mekong Subregion, for example, into the modern

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world poses “serious problems of poverty, culture loss, and marginalization of ethnic groups” (McCaskill et al. 2008b, p. 1).

The minority problem is ultimately qualitative, despite the quantitative nature of the term. A minority group is numerically inferior to the majority, but this is only a superficial characterization. Rather, “subordinancy is the chief defining characteristic of a minority group” (Encyclopaedica Britannica 2014, minority) and has to do with power relations. Power is part of every relationship (Raffestin 1980, p. 45) at all scales, and “[t]hose with power make the rules” (Rattanavong 2008, p. 269). Power covers all human relations: financial power (consumption), social power (social hierarchy), cultural power (the dictatorship of the mainstream). Access to power is therefore much more important than numerical superiority as the case of South African Apartheid demonstrates. The true minorities are those with no access to power, and they are marginalized.¹

9.2 Minorities and Diversity

This chapter was inspired by Switzerland and the Greater Mekong Subregion. In both regions there are various kinds of minorities, an expression of cultural diversity. However, people have accepted this situation in different ways.

Minorities are discussed with reference to a spatial unit, usually the nation-state. They are therefore also a question of scale: a group can be a minority in one spatial context but part of a majority in another. As a German speaking Swiss I am part of the German speaking majority in my country, but the five million German speaking Swiss are a small minority among the about 90 million German speakers in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Northern Italy etc. The same holds good for the Swiss French- and Italian speakers. The few Romansh-speakers are the only true national linguistic minority. Other linguistic minorities (English, Spanish, Portuguese, Tamil etc.), resulting from immigration, account for almost as many people as the French-speakers (Table 9.1).

Drawing the boundaries of a nation-state often created minorities because the boundary-makers ignored the societal facts on the ground. Borders thus cut across linguistic, ethnic, cultural and other groups. In this way different kinds of minorities emerge, each posing a particular challenge to the respective societies and their cultural policies (Bennett 2001). We can identify four distinct cases, each with its specific kind of social and cultural diversity (Leimgruber 2004a, p. 21):

1. A majority group rules a country but extends into a neighbouring state where it is a minority (Slovenes in Italy and Austria, Hungarians in Serbia, Slovakia, Romania, etc.)

¹To some extent this applies also to women who are all too often marginalized when it comes to major decisions in all strands of life (see Lucas 2015 and other contributions in that volume).

Table 9.1 Languages (principal or ‘mother’ tongue) in Switzerland, 2014

Language	% of residents
German	63.3
French	22.7
Italian	8.1
Romansh	0.5
Other languages	20.9

Source Swiss Statistical Office (the total is 115.5% because many people indicated two or more languages as main/mother language)

2. A small minority group is divided into two or three groups by one or more state boundaries (Kurds, Catalans, Basques etc.).
3. A small minority living inside a state territory is unique and has no other ethnic, linguistic or cultural relatives (e.g. the Romansh in Switzerland, the Sorbs in Germany, etc.).
4. Diaspora designates a group that has been fragmented and lives scattered around the World. The Jews have been frequently quoted, but many Diasporas have emerged over time as a consequence of international migration.

Minorities (and thus diversity) are the result of historical processes. The present-day situation need not be final and is likely to change. Also, migrations as well as cultural policies are often the root of minority problems (Bennett 2001, p. 28).

“Diversity is the characteristic of nature and the basis of ecological stability” (Shiva 1993, p. 65). A high biological diversity is a sign for a sound ecosystem, both globally and regionally. This includes a high variety of plants and animals coexisting in a dynamic equilibrium. In agriculture, crop diversity is an important strategy to maintain soil fertility, defend the crops against pests, and ensure a varied food supply (Rattanavong 2008, p. 271). This is the basis of organic farming, where “biodiversity is both instrument and aim. Natural ecological balance, below and above ground, is a key to its success” (Scialabba 2003). Most people would agree on this basic principle, even if most current conventional agricultural practices oppose diversity.

What is important for the natural world also applies to human social systems. We are all different from each other, and although this difference may pose practical problems, it is vital in the long-term. While the importance of biodiversity has been gradually recognized, many people have not yet understood the richness of cultural diversity and its significance.

Diversity is the expression of the many ways nature and human societies organize, express and adapt themselves to equally varying conditions of life. “Diverse ecosystems give rise to diverse life forms, and to diverse cultures.... Cultural diversity and biological diversity go hand in hand” (Shiva 1993, p. 65). Proof is the fact that societies across the globe have developed different strategies to cope with similar conditions of life. Southeast Asia is a good example for diversity (Kumar and Siddique 2008).

The diversity in human systems differs from ecosystem diversity because value judgements play a central role in our thinking. Diversity will be seen as good and beneficial by those who are open-minded, but as bad and detrimental by people with a narrow outlook. Attitudes towards diversity in all fields (including nature) are therefore related to people's worldviews. Agricultural monocultures are an expression of short-term profit-oriented quantitative and linear thinking, whereas organic farming represents the very opposite (long-term orientation, quality and organic or systemic thinking). Linear thinking and uniformity are detrimental to both ecosystem and society, uniformity is the enemy of progress and an obstacle to development. The great inventors and thinkers were always marginal people, because their ideas deviated from the mainstream, but they took mankind forward.

This takes us to a fundamental principle to be applied with minorities: renouncing value-judgements along to the 'black-white' or 'good-bad' dividing line.² We are all human beings with strengths and weaknesses, and everyone possesses his and her particular gifts—on this level we are all equal. Differences occur on a lower level, and they are usually highlighted when it comes to deal with groups outside the mainstream. Politics often promotes a homogenous society, ostensibly in order to simplify life and administration, but homogeneity is an instrument of domination. Language is a manifestation of power (Raffestin 1980, p. 91) and occupies a particular place in politics (ibid. p. 97). Linguistic diversity, therefore, prevents the political power from totally and easily controlling its population. Minorities are obviously an obstacle to domination.

From an ecological perspective, homogeneity is negative. Monoculture farming leads to rapid environmental degradation: excessive synthetic fertilizer application results in soil depletion, and an increase in input will result in diminishing returns (Aubert 1996). It simplifies the technical side of agriculture, but ultimately annihilates its efforts. Heterogeneity is achieved through crop diversity (intercropping) and rotation, promoting diversity and maintaining soil fertility in the long run.

Our life is marked by short-term economic thinking, but little attention has been paid to the benefits diversity can offer the economy in the long run. In a seminal paper, the biologists Peter J. Edwards and Cyrus Abivardi emphasize the economic potential of biodiversity: "over-exploitation of resources, loss of genetic diversity and damage to ecological processes and life support systems have greatly reduced the planet's capacity to support people in both developed and developing countries" (Edwards and Abivardi 1998, p. 244). Maintaining biological diversity is in our interest, mainly because "we do not know how important species diversity is for the long-term stability of ecosystems; ..." (ibid.).

The arguments are different in the human world, but the two diversities are related. Diversity in society is a stimulant to the development of social life. The variety of values, ideas and opinions drives human thinking, promotes innovations, teaches us to reflect, and helps to improve our quality of life. The former director of the United Nations Environmental Programme, Klaus Toepfer, summed up the

²Epitomized by the sheep on Animal Farm, bleating "Four legs good, two legs bad" (Orwell 1945).

analogy to biodiversity: “Respect for biological diversity implies respect for human diversity” (UNEP 1999, p. xi). In this volume on cultural and spiritual values of biodiversity, scientific analyses and source texts testify to the key role diversity plays in people’s lives on all continents. Difference is regularly described as an asset, not as a drawback. Indigenous peoples, in particular, hold a lot of knowledge that would be useful for the future. “Indigenous peoples represent 95% of human cultural diversity, and, I daresay, 95% of humanity’s breadth of knowledge for living sustainably on this Earth” (Joji Carino before the UN; General Assembly 1997, p. 32). In other words, there are economic benefits to be gained from cultural diversity. Biological and cultural diversity are comparable because of existing and potential benefits and because they help to integrate the human society into the ecosystem; they are in fact complementary (Table 9.2). Both include use values and non-use values, the former being of immediate or future economic importance, the latter acting on the human mind and soul. Both are equally important for the future of mankind.

Our western society has largely forgotten the contribution diversity in both domains has furnished to humanity in the past, is furnishing at present, and is able to furnish in the future. By emphasizing external (secular) values over spiritual ones, we have destroyed not only the environment but also human solidarity. Most traditional societies lived in harmony with nature, and there exists a “spiritual attachment to land and to the biodiversity that is found within that land or near the river” (Morea Veratua from Papua New Guinea, UNEP 1999, p. 154). “Traditional or indigenous knowledge systems of nature, environment, and the various ecosystems within it, represent the most valuable survival kit in rural areas” (ibid.). Spiritual (sacred) values are needed to preserve biodiversity, such as holy hills (the Dai in the Xishuangbanna region of Yunan; ibid., p. 381 f.) or sacred groves (Western Ghats; ibid., p. 382 ff.). This is also the message conveyed years ago by Schumacher (1999, in particular p. 24).

For centuries Europeans saw themselves as superior to nature and other cultures (Said 1978). They exported their values to other continents and influenced the transformation of traditional practices anchored in local knowledge about diversity. Modernization became the key term to improve the living conditions of supposedly primitive (non-European) societies. The consequences are dramatic, both for ecosystem and society, as an example by Jiang (2008) demonstrates. Her case study of a Khmu village that has moved from the traditional slash-and-burn agriculture to modern rubber plantations illustrates major recent transformations in the Mekong region. Rubber trees replaced the rainforest, which “preserves three times as much water as a rubber plantation” (Jiang 2008, p. 250). Also, “[r]ain washes away six times as much topsoil in rubber plantations than in tropical rainforests” (ibid., p. 248). As a result, the regional climate has become drier and hotter (ibid., p. 250). The Khmu used to live in close relationship with their environment. Their simple techniques (slash-and-burn agriculture, limited burning, using sowing sticks, and leaving tree stumps for new buds to grow) had a modest impact on the ecosystem. They lived on a variety of foodstuffs and survived if one crop would fail. Diversity ensured their survival. Large rubber plantations have replaced almost all

Table 9.2 Comparing biological and cultural diversity (Leimgruber 2014, p. 72, based on Edwards and Abivardi 1998 and Leimgruber 2004a)

	Use value			Non-use value	
	Direct use value	Ecological/cultural function value	Option value	Existence value	Bequest value
Biological diversity	Food (animal, vegetal) Raw materials (timber, fibres) Tourism	Flood control Photosynthesis Nutrient cycles Waste assimilation	Future medicines Genes for plant breeding New technology Resource substitute	Satisfaction that resources exist Psychological balance Re-creation	Altruism Between-generation equity Respect
Cultural diversity	Learning Alternatives Problem solving strategies	Exchange	Innovation Alternatives Experience	Satisfaction that variety exists Psychological balance Re-creation Intellectual challenge	Altruism Between-generation equity Experience

agricultural surfaces and created a high dependency on the world market for the sale of rubber and on external food sources. While their life was in a way secure because of nutritional diversity, they now depend on a monoculture and the whims of the world rubber market and its price fluctuations. Swidden farming has been condemned as detrimental to the environment, but a considerate practice with sufficiently long planting cycles allows the vegetation to recover (Miescher 1996, pp. 82–84).

Along with numerous authors (Anderson 1996; Attfeld 1999; Carson 1962; Edwards and Abivardi 1998; Shiva 1993; Van Dieren 1995 and others), I insist that diversity is fundamental to the future of this planet. Species extinction robs us of a genetic resource pool, the extinction of languages reduces the range of ways of thinking. Thinking in diversity is more complex than linear thinking, but the only way of tackling a complex reality, because it stimulates mental flexibility. Shiva (1993) rightly criticizes western thinking as monocultures of the mind, as reductionist and unsustainable—similar to agricultural monocultures. Uniformity kills, both in agriculture and human society. “Yet what is ‘unproductive’ and ‘waste’ in the commercial context of the Green Revolution is now emerging as productive in the ecological context and as the only route to sustainable agriculture” (ibid. p. 58).

Diversity is an indicator of difference, and this is what geography is about, “the uneven distribution of phenomena over the earth surface” (Forsberg 1998, p. 19). All processes take place under different cultural, social, economic, and political circumstances; there is no uniformity. A ‘geography of difference’ (Miller 1998, p. 262) builds on the variety inherent in human thinking and acting. We must see difference as “a positive quality” (Leimgruber 2004c, p. 278). The political corollary is to recognize that unevenness (difference) must not lead to discrimination. The goal for development politics should be “to eliminate undesired (economic and social) disparities by maintaining the desirable (cultural) diversity” (ibid.).

9.3 The Negative Perception of Minorities

The minority ‘issue’ is only superficially a numerical question; it has much more to do with psychology, with perception, with “understanding ourselves” (Tuan 1974, p. 1). Many people have a problem with minorities, considering them a threat instead of an enrichment. Minorities may be a challenge to the social system, but they only become a threat if we consider them as such. Many groups suffer from such negative attitudes: foreigners, strangers, refugees, asylum-seekers, drug addicts, the poor, organic farmers,³ members of religious sects, youngsters, the

³They are now recognized as a most valuable group in modern society since they work for, not against the ecosystem. The organic movement is almost 100 years old (Leimgruber et al. 1997), but its true merits have only been recognized since the 1980s.

elderly, the gay community, etc. Such negative perceptions of minority groups oscillate between indifference and violence.

Overemphasis of the ‘We’ against the ‘Other’ can result in skewed perceptions and lead to conflicts, as is the case in Myanmar. “The Burman-dominated authoritarian state saw diversity as a threat, and gave little priority to developing the ethnic borderlands; successive regimes also restricted ethnic political, cultural and social expression. These grievances run particularly deep in Rakhine State, where there is a strongly-held sense of separate identity, in part because it was historically never integrated into the Myanmar state.” (International Crisis Group 2014, p. 7). Such a condescending attitude is the basis of discrimination, which fosters violence as the only answer.

Stereotypes usually arise out of individual cases but are not justified as generalizations. Judgements are often made following single incidents, and entire groups will eventually suffer. Knowledge and experience are the keys to avoid this:

Of course, the fact that all actors move in situated contexts within larger totalities limits the knowledge they have of other contexts which they do not directly experience. All social actors know a great deal more than they ever directly live through, as a result of sedimentation of experience in language. But agents whose lives are spent in one type of milieu may be more or less ignorant of what goes on in others (Giddens 1984, p. 91; original emphasis).

To know a person or a country is likely to increase a constructive attitude and promote the understanding of people, countries or groups.

Prejudices result from a number of elements that influence the way minorities are perceived, treated and often discriminated: origin, religion, language, personal names.

The origin of immigrants is significant because they arrive from a different cultural background and socio-cultural system, which marks them as outsiders. This was the case with the Italian workers in Switzerland in the 1950s and 1960s, although they spoke one of our national languages. Their presence was felt as a burden on our society, and the political reaction became virulent. Years after, when other linguistic minorities arrived (from Spain, Portugal, Ex-Yugoslavia), the Italians vanished from the xenophobic discussion. We realize nowadays that they, as well as other immigrants, have considerably enriched our culture (e.g. in the field of food and eating habits).

Although religion has lost a lot of its significance in our society it is still an important cultural element. Switzerland is a Christian country with Protestants and Catholics as major groups, a difference still felt today (e.g. with public holidays). With the Tibetan refugees (1960s) we obtained a Buddhist minority, which integrated well with our society and managed to maintain its traditions. Initially, Muslims did not create problems, but the rise of Islamist terrorism has produced generalized fears of Islam and a widespread islamophobia.

Language is an important vehicle of communication and allows to identify a speaker’s origin. In German-speaking Switzerland, local and regional dialects dominate conversations, and non-German speakers manifest considerable

difficulties when it comes to learn German. An additional problem for them is that we do not speak the written German except under specific circumstances. Communications between employer and worker, between doctor and patient etc. are better conducted in dialect. This problem is unknown in the French and Italian speaking parts of the country.

Personal names are related to language. A strange name or even suffix (such as the Slav endings of *-ic*) may suffice in Switzerland to stigmatize a person, particularly in the German-speaking part. And Switzerland is by no means unique. “A Thai surname carries with it preferential treatment regarding various opportunities in Thai society, such as getting into the army or police or being promoted to higher positions in government. Many ethnic minorities therefore change their names in order to avoid discrimination” (McCaskill et al. 2008a, p. 17; McCaskill 2008, p. 312). The personal name is part of one’s identity; by adopting a new surname, an individual may improve his/her chances in the mainstream society but risk discrimination and marginalization within his/her own group. But a change of name is not possible everywhere (in Switzerland, women can adopt their husband’s, and men their wife’s name).

Minorities are often seen as an obstacle or unwelcome element in a nation, they are “problematic” (Jackson-Preece 2004, p. 7) and viewed as not being helpful in state building. The origin of this idea lies probably with John Stuart Mill who argued that the existence of different languages within one state prevents the working of a representative government (*ibid.*, p. 11). However, many states function well despite (or because) of minorities. Nationalism and chauvinism are often the source of tensions between dominant and minority groups, as in the Carpathian Basin (Romania) where Hungarian minorities were considered as “the main supporters of Hungarian irredentism and revanchism” (Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998, p. 13).

9.4 Minorities as an Asset

The negative attitude towards minorities overlooks the role they play for social diversity. As pointed out above, minorities are beneficial because they remind us of the differences that exist within our societies and the diverse nature of mankind. However, the current globality paradigm is opposed to diversity and discards minorities as *quantité négligeable*. Our western civilization is characterized by a ‘chess-board mentality’ where everything has its orderly place in a ‘mental square’, there is no space for flexibility. This will eventually result in social and spatial marginalization.

Why are minorities an asset? The answer can be found in Table 9.2. The diversity due to minorities not only offers direct use values but also long-term option values. Every group has its own ways of thinking and acting, of responding to social and natural challenges, of securing its livelihood.

Minority studies focus on ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, leaving aside other possible categories. But even so this emphasis shows various difficulties in daily coexistence that can be traced back to our perception of people and should be corrected and overcome.

Among ethnic minorities, particularly indigenous peoples are still considered to be backward and not modern (McElwee 2008, p. 63). However, modern is a very relative term and refers mainly to technological achievements. From an ecosystems perspective, backwardness is a positive value. Ethnic minorities are often traditional societies that cherish sacred values, biodiversity, and the ecosystem (UNEP 1999). They take care of the environment in ways the western world has largely forgotten. By declaring mountains, forests, and watercourses as sacred and inhabited by nymphs, dwarfs, and other invisible creatures, they protected them from destruction. The taboo (Anderson 1996, p. 11) used to be a powerful instrument to this effect. We tend to discard the spiritual side as superstition because it does not fit with our secular worldview, and by discarding this important aspect, we ruin the ecosystem (and at the same time, with similar arguments, also our societies).

Linguistic minorities stand for a diversity of ways of thinking and problem solving, the opposite of linguistic uniformity, which “suppresses ways of thinking and expression” (Leimgruber 2004b, p. 189). To promote uniformity in languages as a political programme is an assault on this diversity. To be able to express one’s ideas in one’s own language is a human right: nobody must be discriminated because of language: “The non-discrimination principle is a fundamental rule of international law” (Ayton-Shenker 1995). On the international stage politicians prefer to express their views and ideas in their own language (in the UN or during press conferences). Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (entry into force in 1976) is explicit:

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.

The European Court of Human Rights follows the UN practice (Council of Europe 2011, p. 13):

20. According to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right of everyone to take part in cultural life, enshrined in Article 15 § 1 (a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, includes the right to express oneself in the language of one’s choice. This may be particularly important for persons belonging to minorities, who have the right to preserve, promote and develop their own culture, including their language.

This holds good even if the individual countries can develop their own regulations, in particular in “communications with public authorities” or “to receive information in a language of one’s choice” (ibid.).

Switzerland has solved this problem by declaring German, French and Italian as national and official languages, and Romansh as a national language. All federal legal texts must be in the three official languages and are equally binding. The

Confederation uses Romansh as an official language when communicating with Romansh-speakers, but in the Grisons it is an official language. The cantons are regional sovereign states and have their own language policy, which is important in the case of bi- and trilingual cantons (Berne, Fribourg, and Valais as bilingual, Grisons as trilingual). The term ‘diversity’ figures in the Preamble to the Swiss Constitution, and ‘harmony’ is a goal in the relations between the various linguistic groups. There is an overall appreciation of this diversity, and the minorities are cherished, even if in everyday reality, communication can be difficult.

Diversity extends into the dialects, particularly among the German-speaking Swiss. Their dialects are a particular challenge. While standard German is used in writing and education, dialects are central to everyday informal oral communication. There are, for example, more than 35 regional and local expressions for ‘dandelion’ and about as many for ‘kiss’. In the French-speaking part, dialects have disappeared, and the Italian dialects are used in families and with friends only. Romansh consists of five different dialects.

Religious minorities can refer to the same article of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 as linguistic ones. However, religion is a delicate field. Religions are worldviews, mental philosophical constructs, and ideologies. Their foundation is the belief in a superior and invisible force called God, which/who is beyond criticism. Religion as a belief system penetrates people’s life much more than languages. Learning a new language is a personal enrichment, and we do not abandon the old one. Religious conversion, however, has far reaching consequences on one’s perceptions and actions. It occurs when the new religion is seen or propagated as superior to the old one.

But religious conversions are also a way to break out of traditional bonds. In the Mekong region, for example, the two most popular alternatives to traditional religions are Christianity and Buddhism, “chosen because they release hill peoples from their all encompassing bonds with their traditional communities and provide more options for individuals in coping with today’s globalized world” (Buadaeng and Boonyasaranai 2008, p. 84). This breach with tradition is a sign of cultural transformation, but it is “a challenge for hill peoples to maintain their plural local, ethnic, national, and global identities within the framework of the world religions” (ibid., p. 81). Their identity may even be reinforced as the Christian churches “usually adopt some Karen and Akha cultural elements” (ibid., p. 81), including language and writing system, traditional dress, food. This recalls the situation in Africa and Latin America, where indigenous cultural elements have been incorporated into Christianity. This is also a sign that religions can be dynamic and adapt themselves to regional particularities without altering the fundamental belief.

9.5 Conclusion

Despite its wide range the term ‘minorities’ is conventionally used for a restricted number of cases. The two books on the Mekong region (Leepreecha et al. 2008; McCaskill et al. 2008a), for example, that motivated me to engage in this reflection, discuss it from the ethnic perspective with reference to indigenous peoples. The political discourse is even more restricted and eclipses a systemic view because it would mean to accept the role they play in a society.

The same restricted view holds good for international conventions and treaties. Such agreements are a step forward towards recognition of their significance, but the way to implementation is long. The protection of minorities does not mean to put them under a glass cover. They must be accepted as they are and be able to choose freely to what extent they want to accept and adopt mainstream values and how much of their own particularities they will retain. A well-established and stable political system will gain a lot if it provides a minority with a higher status than its share of the population would mathematically justify. To overemphasize a minority signifies that it is appreciated, that it is part of the national diversity, and that it is not a threat to the majority. Sharing the political power helps to integrate minorities and provides them with a sense of citizenship, which will be beneficial for the entire society. Tolerance in this domain is a sign of generosity, too often absent from power politics. The way we treat a minority defines the way it will treat us.

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Chapter 10

Resettlement of Orang Asli (Aborigines) in Malaysia—Marginalization or Demarginalization of an Ethnic Group

Jamalunlaili Abdullah

10.1 Introduction

The Orang Asli, literally means “original people,” are the indigenous minority of Peninsular Malaysia. However, they are a very small minority of the population, accounting for 149,723 (0.6%) of the total Malaysian population of 30 million people (JKOA 2006).

The Orang Asli tend to live in the interior of the peninsular, shying away from the rest of the population. They could be found living within or adjacent to Malaysian rainforests due to their shy nature and great dependence on agriculture and forest produce.

Due to their remote locations, the Orang Asli lag behind other ethnic groups in Peninsular Malaysia in terms of physical and socio-economic development. While Malaysia is considered as an upper middle income nation, most of Orang Asli are classified as extremely poor. Their settlements tend to consist of basic wooden houses which are of substandard quality compared to average Malaysian houses. In addition, due to their very remote locations, they lack access to quality healthcare, education and basic amenities which most Malaysians take for granted.

Due to this situation, the Malaysian government has embarked on various programs to improve the livelihood of the Orang Asli and perhaps to try to assimilate them into the mainstream Malaysian society. The two main programs are the resettlement of Orang Asli in new location (ex-situ development) and the redevelopment or improvement of existing settlements (in-situ development). The main objectives of these programs are to improve their settlement physical condition through provision of better houses and infrastructure, provide better access to

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government services such as health and education facilities and to improve their socio-economic conditions.

The ultimate aim of the resettlement and redevelopment programs is to demarginalize the most marginalized segment of the Malaysian society. It is hoped that by relocating the community to areas closer to main population centre (ex-situ development) or by improving their existing settlement (in-situ development), the marginalization of Orang Asli, geographically and socio-economically, can be reduced significantly.

While the intention is noble, not all programs are able to achieve the objective of reduced marginalization. While some Orang Asli have become less marginalized due to the programs, some others may perhaps become more marginalized due to their inability to cope with different socio-economic environment in a different setting. This chapter presents the evaluation of the process of demarginalization and marginalization of Orang Asli in Peninsular Malaysia due to the resettlement and redevelopment scheme implemented by the government.

10.2 The Orang Asli in Malaysia

The Orang Asli are considered the earliest inhabitants of peninsular Malaysia, who are believed to have settled as early as 11,000 BC (Bellwood 2011). This very small minority consists of three main groups of which are Negrito, Senoi and Proto Malay which are divided into 18 sub-ethnic groups. Different ethnic, language, mode of livelihood and social organization pattern differentiate the Orang Asli. Orang Laut, Orang Seletar, and Mah Meri, who live close to the coast, are mainly fishermen while some Temuan, Jakun and Semai sub-ethnic groups have taken to permanent agriculture. The other tribes engage themselves in hill rice cultivation, and hunting and gathering of forest products to trade with local communities. A very small number of Negrito are still semi-nomadic where their livelihood is depending on seasonal forest. Although most of Orang Asli groups are forest dwellers or live in rural areas, a fair number live in or near urban areas where they are involved in waged and salaried jobs (Haron et al. 2009).

Living mostly in rural areas, within and adjacent to the tropical rainforests, their dominant economic activities are small scale agriculture and hunting and gatherings. Due to this geographic and socio-economic situation, Orang Asli is considered as the most marginalized group in Peninsular Malaysia. Orang Asli tend to practice communal land activities whereas Malaysia practices Torrens Land Law whereby private land ownership is recognized through land title issued by the land office which the Orang Asli do not possess with. Despite roaming the forests or working on the lands for many generations, the Orang Asli may not have the legal rights on the land which provide hardship to them should the forests are logged or the land taken by the state or individuals for economic development.

From the four types of processual marginality cited by Leimgruber (2004), namely the contingent, systemic, collateral, and leveraged, the Orang Asli in

Malaysia are considered as a result of the first two processual marginality. Systemic marginality which is produced by hegemonic forces within the Malaysian political and capitalist economic system generates inequities through the distribution of social, political and economic benefits. Being very small in number which translates into insignificant political force, and living in remote areas, the Orang Asli are unable to reap economic benefits of Malaysia's rapid economic growth and activities. Despite working on the lands for generation, without own individual titles, the Orang Asli face difficulties in staking ownership claims on the land. In addition, the Orang Asli are considered the least educated ethnic group and with practically no capitals make them a result of contingent marginality. Their uncompetitive characters in Malaysian capitalist economy make them further marginalized in the society.

Due to their special status as the earliest inhabitants and their marginalized setting, the Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 or Act 134 (Government of Malaysia 2010) was passed to provide special protection to the Orang Asli. The Act has provided the provision under S6 and S7 for any state authority to gazette any area on the state land to be declared as Aboriginal Areas or Aboriginal Reserves for the occupancy of aboriginal peoples. In addition, under S8 the state authority may also grant rights of occupancy of any state land for the aboriginal peoples, but only as a tenant at will. Settlement areas for aboriginal people in Malaysia cover about 50,563 ha of land. From that area, about 19,701 ha are gazetted under the Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 (Act 134) and another 30,489 ha were already approved by the state governments as settlement areas but yet to be gazetted under the Act. On the aspect of ownership, only 0.03% of the lands were owned individually by the aboriginal people (Idrus 2011). Most of the lands are occupied without proper registration by this community, which in the case of any land dealings or acquisitions, the rights of these aboriginal peoples are being denied.

The Orang Asli are known to be very attached to their cultures and lands. They live in their own community and have their own administration system led by a hereditary headman. Their use of land may differ from one tribe to another. There are at least 20 types of land usage related to their ways of life which include settlement area, sacred place, hunting area, area for staple planting, plant area for ritual/traditional events, and inherited orchards (Aliran 2010).

The land usage might be different according to their living area or way of life, but the Orang Asli have traditionally followed the system for a very long time. Although the Orang Asli traditionally live a nomadic lifestyle, some have established their living area and stay within it for generations. After the adoption of the Aboriginal People Act 1954 (Act 134), many settlement areas for Orang Asli have been gazetted which become proper and permanent Orang Asli villages. However, there are many other settlements which are not gazetted and may be taken over for other developments or abandoned due to the governments' programs of Orang Asli resettlement.

10.3 Resettlements and Redevelopment of Orang Asli Communities

Resettlement and redevelopment of orang Asli community have been conducted since the British colonial period due to the communist insurgency threats in the jungle. The early stage involved relocating the community away from areas under the Communist influence. In addition, the government felt that Orang Asli should not be marginalized from the rapid economic development experienced by the country. However, in line with the establishment of Department of Orang Asli (JHEOA) in 1954 under a new law called Aboriginal Peoples Ordinance, the focus of development has shifted to protect Orang Asli and their way of life from rapid economic development, as well as providing them education and health facilities and suitable development, especially in settled agriculture programs (Redzuan 2008).

The policy continued after Malaysia gained her independence in 1957. Various transformation programs were implemented by the government in order to improve the socio-economic status of Orang Asli and to ensure they will not continue to be further marginalized. These consist of the provision of basic amenities, education, and skills training in cooperation with state governments. Three major development programs were established; structured settlement programs, economic development, and social development (Redzuan 2008).

Structured settlement programs aim to provide better accessibility for the Orang Asli and to improve their socio-economic conditions. The programs can be ex-situ, involving relocating the Orang Asli into a totally new settlement, regardless the distance; or in-situ, improvement of their existing settlements. Specific programs are Regrouping Plan (RPS), Village Restructuring Project (PSK), New Village Plan (RKB), Natural Disasters Project and Orang Asli Settlement Customary Land Survey and Land Acquisition. These programs provide new or better housing and specific physical amenities such as piped water supply, electricity, roads, and education and health facilities to the Orang Asli communities.

In addition to structured settlement programs, various socio-economic development programs such as entrepreneur mentoring program, retail space development program, income generation program, and Social Welfare Development Scheme (SPKR) have been implemented by the government to enhance the socio-economic status of the Orang Asli. Facilities and programs to improve their health and education are also part of the whole government efforts.

10.4 Impacts of Resettlement and Redevelopment on Orang Asli

Many resettlement and redevelopment projects for Orang Asli have been implemented by the government throughout the country over the years. The aim is the same; to provide better accessibility to the community, to improve their access to

health and education facilities and services, and to improve their socio-economic conditions (Idrus 2011). It is a strategy to integrate them into the mainstream economic development and the wider national community (Abdullah et al. 2016). While the objectives are noble and some resettled and redeveloped communities have achieved these benefits, certain communities may not achieve the desired effects. This is perhaps due to unfavourable locations of the new settlements, especially with regards to the traditional source of living from agriculture or jungle produce, to the social and psychological impacts of adapting to a new and modern environment.

The resettlements of Orang Asli have brought mixed results, judging by various studies evaluating their impacts in Malaysia. Lim (1997) argues that regrouping exercise of Jakun families in Keratung and Bukit Seruk 3 in the state of Pahang was a success due to higher income from permanent agriculture and wage earning. Improved housing and physical facilities, as well as the better confidence of the community were also evident. Other studies have also found that many Orang Asli communities were satisfied with their new settlement.

On the other hand, Ab Hadi et al. (2013) argue that the resettlement of Orang Asli has a negative impact on the environment, negating the aim of conservation initially envisaged. Forum Asia contends that it leads to increased poverty and deterioration of health among some villagers. Karim and Hashim (2012) in their study of resettled Orang Asli in urban Bukit Lanjan, find that many Orang Asli there had difficulties in adapting to new life in metropolitan settings.

The negative impacts of resettlements of Orang Asli cited in some literature in Malaysia follow the trends in some other countries around the world. In Australia, some of the impacts of resettlement include poverty, low self-esteem, a poor sense of emotional dependency, homelessness, high levels of family violence, suicide and substance abuse (Memmott et al. 2000). SPERI (2012) argues that resettlement of the highlander H'mong tribe in Luang Prabang, Laos, has led to land conflict and land dispute with Khmu community which was already there, as well loss of bio-cultural diversity and traditional knowledge. This chapter summarizes the findings of three case studies of Orang Asli communities' resettlement and redevelopment of which the author and his colleagues and students were directly involved in evaluating the impacts. For more details analyses of these cases, readers can refer to Abdullah et al. (2015, 2016, 2017).

The first case is on resettlements of 183 Orang Asli families who were resettled through Remote Area Integrated Program (Program Bersepadu Daerah Terpencil—PROSDET), Pantos in Pahang state. The 183 families were resettled from six villages upstream of Telom river, namely Kuala Suar, Lanai Baru, Perangkap, Tisut, Nyentil and Harong into a new settlement downstream. Each family was given a house together with six acre of palm oil plantation for their livelihood. The main reason for resettlement of the six villages were to provide better education and health services to the six river village communities in an easily accessible settlement, PROSDET Pantos.

The second case study is the resettlement of the Temuan tribe whose 247 ha of land which they traditionally used for agriculture and forest roaming activities were

taken over in the mid 1990s by a developer for high density urban development. It is located only 17 km away from Kuala Lumpur City Centre. To ensure the Orang Asli will be able to continue their livelihood in the area, the developer and the Selangor state government allocated 18 ha of land for their new settlements within the area. It consists of 147 units of bungalows, given to each household, with community facilities such as multipurpose hall, shop houses, small mosques, school and Orang Asli mini museum. Besides, 130 units of apartment were given to single children above 16 years old. Some lands were provided to the Orang Asli for farming while the developer provided for trust funds and scholarships to the community.

The third case study is a redevelopment of Orang Asli village of Ulu Kuang, Selangor. It is considered a suburban location located about 30 min' drive north of Kuala Lumpur. The settlement had been gazetted as Orang Asli Reserve by the state government, covering 140.4 ha (347 acres). It is occupied by 470 people, consisting of 120 families (Department of Orang Asli Development—JKOA 2013).

The aim of all three case study resettlement or redevelopment projects is basically the same, to demarginalize the Orang Asli communities and to integrate them into the mainstream economic activities. Results of the author team's observations and surveys of almost all households in the communities reveal interesting findings on the impacts of these programs on the marginalization of the communities.

It was found that the third case study, Ulu Kuang, was the most successful program and had the most positive impacts on the Orang Asli. This was perhaps due to the fact that the nature of the program was redevelopment of existing settlement whereby the houses were rebuilt and rearranged in a more systematic manner on the same site. In addition, almost 400 acres of land in the settlement had been gazetted as Orang Asli reserve, which provides readily available land for agriculture activities for the community. In addition, being long-time residents of the community which is close to major employment centers have prepared these Orang Asli for employment in various industries near the community. Compared to some Orang Asli communities, the percentage who was still schooling or had completed at least primary school was much higher at 78%.

In terms of satisfaction with the housing facilities provided, for the three variables questioned, namely housing arrangement, house space and interior comfort, the mean on the Likert scale had changed from very unsatisfied to satisfied or very satisfied. The same findings were valid for all variables under the categories of commercial and services, infrastructure and utilities and public facilities. Most importantly, in terms of the three variables for socio-economic indicators, namely employment, income and property ownership, the mean responses had changed from very unsatisfied before the redevelopment to very satisfied after the development. The only improvements that the Orang Asli hoped to be implemented were reliable water supply and solid waste disposal system.

It was found that in-situ development which provides basic physical and infrastructure facilities have improved the livelihood of these Orang Asli community. This is rather different compared to some resettlements programs of Orang Asli in other areas. Perhaps this is due to the fact that these Orang Asli were not

moved to new locations, thus providing continuity in their life. The fact that the land has been gazetted as Orang Asli reserve has played a big role in their success. In addition, being provided with basic education to take up employments in the urban Klang Valley has helped their socio-economic conditions as well.

On the other hand, the case study of the Temuan tribe in Bukit Lanjan was rather unique. They were given rather generous compensations, despite losing a big chunk of forested areas to new urban development. Although they had worked on the lands for generations, they did not have titles to the land. Compared to Ulu Kuang, Bukit Lanjan is located right in the heart of a very urbanized area of Kuala Lumpur metropolitan area. The bungalows and apartments given to them are worth millions now. The trust funds and scholarships given to the community also were supposed to provide them with better prospects of living in urban areas.

Although the tribe had moved a few times earlier which had caused some changes to their lives, the relocation to Desa Temuan of Bukit Lanjan was most profound in that they had to move from traditional settlement into a modern, planned housing estate surrounded by high rise modern development (Karim and Hashim 2012).

A survey and observation of the Desa Temuan twenty years after their resettlement have found a rather high number of vacant houses and houses rented to non-Orang Asli. Meanwhile most of the 130 apartment units were rented out to non-Orang Asli, the children given the apartments moving back to their parents' houses. It was also found that the museum no longer functions as an information centre. While the neighbourhood still looks decent, it was evident that non-Orang Asli have moved into the village development built exclusively for this tribe.

The high number of vacant houses was rather surprising considering that landed properties are very much sought after in the area. The Orang Asli are not allowed to sell the houses given to them for free. It was further revealed that occupants of the vacant houses felt uncomfortable living in the modern environment and have moved out to live with other Orang Asli tribes elsewhere in the Klang Valley.

A survey of 45 households who agreed to participate found that the average household size was 12.6, a much higher number than the Malaysian average of 4.5. This is because these Orang Asli live as extended family whereby married children with kids tend to live with their parents due to economic necessities. These children would rent out their apartments to earn extra income.

Forty percent of the respondents worked as labourers such as gardener, construction workers, and guards followed by self-employed (27%) and unemployed (17%). As in other Orang Asli communities generally, the Orang Asli do not hold high paying or professional jobs. The high unemployment rate, much higher than the Malaysian average of less than 4%, was rather worrying. In terms of income, 77% of the respondents earned less than RM1000 per month (RM4.4 = USD\$1), the minimum wage in Malaysia. Thus, despite living in nice bungalows, the Orang Asli in Bukit Lanjan were considered relatively very poor, living in the affluent society of Damansara Perdana.

In education, the biggest percentage (37%) held a Malaysian Education certificate (SPM—equivalent to eleven years of schooling) with only 4.6% without any

formal education. Those with tertiary education constituted 5.1% of the population, below than the Malaysian average of 15%. However, this education level of Orang Asli here was much better than other Orang Asli settlements, perhaps due to its location in urban areas where education facilities were more accessible staffed with very qualified teachers.

The results of the survey showed that only one third of the respondents felt comfortable in their new settlement; a majority would rather live in their original place which was a forest. This was not surprising since these respondents, who were head of households are used to their traditional lifestyle and had difficulty coping in a new and modern environment. In terms of standard of living, the highest percentage (38%) felt that theirs have gotten worse while 33% felt that theirs have improved. The former understood that their lack of education and low wage jobs have made it difficult to support their big families in high cost urban areas.

Majority of respondents complained that their biggest problems were those related to socio-economy, namely limited job opportunities and low education level. Social problems such as drinking, gambling and illegal racing were rather serious, while almost half felt that the physical setting surrounded by urban areas and away from forests made life unbearable. Although 40% of respondents indicated they prefer to move out, they have to stay put in the new settlement since they have no other place to call home.

MK Land, the developer, had provided some assistance including free apartments, land for farming, education scholarship and Malaysian Government trust funds. However, the Orang Asli had not been able to capitalize on these assistance perhaps due to their low education level, high cost of living, and inability to adjust to new urban setting.

The Temuan tribe of Bukit Lanjan is rather ironic, being much better off than their cousins in the countryside, yet being very marginalized in their own neighbourhoods, in which they have lived for generations. Perhaps, this is parallel to the case of marginalization of Italian speaking Swiss that Leimgruber (2004) had done extensive study of.

PROSDET Pantos, in a very rural area in the state of Pahang, provides a geographical setting opposite that of urban Bukit Lanjan. The 183 families from 6 villages upstream of the Telom River were resettled on cleared lands downstream. The main reason for resettlement exercise was to provide better health and education services to the Orang Asli since the old villages along the river could only be accessed by boats which would take almost 2 hrs. During the monsoon season, these villagers were virtually unreachable due to high water table and flooding.

In the old villages, the Orang Asli used to live in their individual wooden houses within their roaming areas where farming and hunting were their daily activities and main source of income. Some have cultivated their land with rubber and tropical fruits. At PROSDET Pantos, which was accessible by tarred road, these Orang Asli are resettled in brick detached houses provided free by the government. In addition, each household was given 2.4 ha (six acres) of land planted with oil palms to provide them with steady source of income.

Survey and focus groups discussion among the Orang Asli indicate in terms of satisfaction in the new settlement, the number is split in the middle. While 50% are unsatisfied with life in the new settlement, another 45% are satisfied. The main reasons given for dissatisfaction are lack of suitable land to garden/farm, the new houses are not suitable for their extended family, loss of income from cash crops and inadequate basic amenities.

It is rather interesting that some of the Orang Asli consider the new settlement as a transit home as their children attend primary school in the area while others consider it as their permanent homes. The first group are those from traditional villages who can still go back to their homes and orchards due to the short distance, while the latter's traditional home are much farther away which require high cost for river boats transportation.

In terms of aspirations, the majority wish for a secure and better standard of living and for their children to pursue higher education as well as to work in the public sector. Only 29% wish to continue family tradition of farming. Thus, it seems that despite some resistance to the resettlement by a small but vocal group within the community, the majority sees the new community as a necessary step to reduce their marginalization in the socio-economic development of the nation. This is perhaps due to the fact that while they received new home with 2.4 ha (six acres) of oil palm land, they can still choose to return to their traditional villages if they wish to, especially those whose traditional villages and orchards are still easily accessible.

10.5 Conclusion: Marginalization or Demarginalization of Orang Asli as a Result of Resettlement?

The redevelopment and resettlement programs of Orang Asli throughout Malaysia are implemented to demarginalize this ethnic group so that they would be able to reap the reward of socio-economic development enjoyed by the mainstream Malaysian society. However, as the three case studies have illustrated, in certain situations, the resettlements have caused certain segments of Orang Asli to be more marginalized as a result of these programs. These are the people who due to their low education level, lack of skills and confidence are unable to cope with life in the new resettlement areas. They tend to be older people who are used to living in the rural areas relying on resources of the forests and agriculture practices.

The types of programs implemented have direct impacts on the results. Redevelopment of Orang Asli settlement within their areas, especially in reserve or gazetted area, as evidenced in the case of Ulu Kuang, would have lower negative impacts on this ethnic group. The in-situ development has caused the least negative impacts to the community and provides greater mobility in terms of education and employment. This is perhaps the best example of demarginalization of the Orang Asli in Peninsular Malaysia.

On the other hand, resettlement of Orang Asli especially in urban setting as illustrated in the Bukit Lanjan case, has caused a significant number of the ethnic community to be more marginalized. The inability to cope in the new urban environment together with high cost of living has forced some families to abandon their new homes. Some of the olds have returned to rural or forested areas elsewhere while the young ones are grappling with social problems including drinking, gambling and illegal racing. The handsome property and monetary rewards provided have not been able to alleviate the sufferings experienced by some segments of the community.

In the case of PROSDET Pantos in Pahang, the result of redevelopment had caused some to be marginalized while others have become demarginalized. The difference is due to their access to orchards in traditional villages upstream, those whose land is rather substantial and close by are much well off after the resettlement while those whose holdings are much farther upstream have found it very hard to earn a living since the new settlement does not provide a steady source of income and the new houses require the payment of monthly utility bills. Even though they are provided with palm oil plantation, the return has been minimal due to poor soil condition and management issue of the plantation. However, one main positive development of this resettlement is the people's hope and confidence that the new settlement can provide secure and better standard of living and greater opportunity for their children to pursue higher education.

The three cases have vividly shown that in addition to improved physical infrastructure which is rather easy to achieve, the government needs to implement better strategies related to the socio-economic conditions of this marginalized ethnic group. These include better education and skill training opportunities to allow them to compete better in the modern economy. Despite being geographically and socio-economically marginalized throughout the history of the nation, the Orang Asli of Malaysia are always hopefully looking forward to the days when they will no longer be marginalized.

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Chapter 11

Roma, Social Exclusion and Romani Settlements as Marginalized Place: The Case of Loke

Alenka Janko Spreizer

11.1 Introduction

Yes, Mem, ghettos exist. They create ghettos. How? Is this not a ghetto? We are pushed into one common settlement, where all inhabitants belong to the same nationality. We are not allowed to separate from and leave behind the [Romani] settlement, and they claim that there are no funds available for such spatial managements (Interview with a Roma resident from the settlement of Loke, August 16, 2016.)¹

July 7th 2016, local newspaper Dolenjski list reported that several Romani representatives gathered in Dolenjska, (SE Slovenia), where Roma² are considered an “autochthonous ethnic community”, appealing to solidarity and common interest of all Romani representatives, who addressed the state for immediate access of Roma to basic infrastructure (water, sanitation, electricity). They identified the urgent need for starting the process of legalization of Romani settlements and arrange appropriate content, funds and control of tenders, aiming at improvement of infrastructure in Romani settlements. Romani Associations expressed their legitimate expectations that the state and local communities should allocate funds for Romani residential issues in the state budget, increasing the funds for infrastructure. The president of the Romani Union of Revival, Darko Rudaš, proposed immediate

¹All informants are anonymous and their names are coded for the reason of confidentiality.

²The term Roma is used here for communities traditionally known as Gypsies. Roma is a self-designation, but this term may also include Romanichels, Sinti, Ludar, and Gypsy-Travellers. Following the leading academic journal, the Romani Studies, the noun Roma and the adjective Romani is used.

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installation of agricultural water pipes and electric off-road construction lockers for informal Roma settlements without drinking water and electricity.

Two weeks later, July 19th 2016, the leading national newspaper Delo featured another article with the title: *The state measures push Roma into ghettos: The state ignores the wishes from the field and does not co-finance the resettlement of families from illegal settlements.*

The article delivered the latest news on the informal Romani settlement in Loke, in the Municipality of Krško, and the joint efforts of municipality, the local community of Loke and Romani inhabitants to find a solution to the Romani housing problem and spatial management. The journalist reported about the answer of the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology (MEDT), after the local community of Krško applied for funds for the improvement of the Romani settlement infrastructure. MEDT rejected the application for funds, which was to be invested in the building of the house for a Romani family that agreed to leave Loke, and was able to find their location in the nearby village Gržeča vas outside the Romani settlements (Zore 2016).

Spatial and educational segregation of Roma is in fact as widespread in Slovenia as elsewhere in Europe. When Roma municipality councilors reflected on the Romani housing problem in previous years, they strongly rejected the racialized discourse of the regional civil initiative, which stigmatized their settlements in terms of “isolate or reserve” (Janko Spreizer 2011–2012), when similarly referred to socio-spatial seclusion (Wacquant 2010). Compared to the past, representing Romani settlements as ghettos was a major discourse turn. Rejecting the ethnic homogenization of settlements and segregation of Roma in Krško in one place, Moran Jurkovič, Romani councilor at this Municipality, labeled another Romani settlement, Kerinov Grm, as a ghetto, when critically reflecting on the efforts of the state, municipality and “ethnic community” of Roma to find a solution to their housing problem.

Spatial management as a part of social integration of Roma is in discourse represented as one of the most conflicting issues in the Dolenjska region. The rhetoric of Romani representatives implicitly reflects criticism when they address the slow and bureaucratic approaches of the state and local communities to the “solving of existential and residential problems” of Roma, which were claimed as one of the priorities of the Government Programs for Roma.³

³Slovenian government has accepted the Program of Measures for Helping Roma in the Republic of Slovenia in 1995, Equal Employment opportunities for Roma in 2000, The National Program of the Fight Against Poverty and Social Exclusion in 2000, and National action program for Roma 2010-2015. Romani housing and the urgent need for legalization of Romani settlements was addressed several times.

11.2 Socio-Spatial Seclusion of Roma and “Gypsy Ghettos”: Theoretical Framework

We see them as people with special needs ... They need us, the majority of people in terms of thinking. Should I walk 20 steps backwards so that I can live with people who live in the Stone age? (Interview with a Non-Roma resident from the settlement of Loke, August 18, 2016.)

Locally present but spatially separated and confined in the woods or a remote agricultural land, imagined as morally and intellectually inferior or backward, described as socially and temporally distant from civilians,⁴ Roma are represented as Others in Krško.

As elsewhere, Roma are in discourse constructed as “internal outsiders” (Bancroft 2005, Gay y Blasco 2016, p. 447). Placed on moral and political margins as in different areas of Europe, Roma are perceived as nomads by the state and settled populations and as outsider groups that seem to devalue space and transgress or disturb the meaning of place. In the pan-European institutional discourse on solving “the Roma issue” and in the imagination of local populations, Roma are often rejected and are the target of hostility from states and other residents. They are often victims of hatred, violence or different forms of discrimination in education, health, labour market and housing. Stigmatized, they are often spatially segregated in marginal and distant places. Analyzing the processes of spatial management and segregation, which are partially played in the arena of law at the level of national and local spaces and which trigger anti-Roma sentiments, Bancroft (2005, p. 4) showed how “space is an important factor in the interaction between outsider groups and the institutions and practices of modernity, nation and state”.

Scholars, who discussed mobility, nomadism and space of Roma, Gypsies and Travellers (Kendall 1999; Theodosiou 2003; Levinson and Sparkes 2004; Sigona 2005) have showed that (imagined) nomadism is used to legitimize segregation and sedentarization policies (Levinson and Sparkes 2004; cf. Kendall 1999). Marginality of Roma is reproduced at the local, national and European level through a multitude of social, educational and spatial segregations (Gay y Blasco 2016: 447). Despite the international programs and initiatives Roma for social inclusion of Roma, they still live in spatially incarcerated areas, and their situation may be seen as catch 22 (Marushiakova and Popov, 2015).

This chapter was theoretically inspired by recent studies on Roma, spatialization, racialization and social exclusion that explore the social and cultural formation of “Gypsy ghettos” (cf. Vincze and Rat 2013; Powell 2013) in contemporary Europe. As Wacquant explained, socio-spatial seclusion is manifested in many configurations as a generic process that may concern institutions, activities and populations, such as elite, migrants or Roma. Socio-spatial seclusion may occur in the countryside or in an urban environment, around a city, in a milieu that is characterized as

⁴*Civili* or civilians is the term used both by Roma and non-Roma to refer the latter.

“spatial accumulation and intense accretion of various forms of capital (economic, cultural, social, and symbolic), fostered by administrative machinery” (Wacquant 2010, p. 165).

It was suggested that the “theoretical concept of the ghetto can elucidate the ways in which the spatial marginality of sites serves as a weapon of ‘confinement and control’ for the dominant and ‘an integrative and protective’ device for the stigmatized Gypsy-Traveller population” (Powell 2013) or underprivileged Roma of Eastern Europe (Vincze and Rat 2013).

Roma in Slovenia have the status of an ethnic community under the Constitution and the Roma Community Act (2007).⁵ Over the last 25 years, the state has adopted ethnic legislation and several administrative measures regulating the living conditions of marginalized Roma. After 1995, the state has developed several programs for the Roma community,⁶ but housing, residential problems and legalization of settlements started in 2002 in Krško. Roma are organized in several associations, unions, Councils and forums, but none of these institutions have political power: those institutions provide elaborates or recommendations to government. The government was not successful in implementing the national action program for Roma in previous years; many interlocutors see the main obstacle in the reason that jurisdiction is divided between the local communities, the municipalities and the state.

As a social anthropologist, I will present my ethnographic fieldwork research in the Romani settlements in the municipality of Krško. My ethnographic data were collected sporadically during my short visits in 2000, 2010, 2012 and in August 2016 in Loke at Leskovec pri Krškem. I carried out desktop research on the existing legislation and national documents on the spatial planning of Romani settlements, municipal planning documents of Krško on Romani issues (2002, 2008) and Detailed Municipal Spatial Plan for Gmajna 3 Housing (2015). I interviewed Roma and non-Roma [*civili*, civilians], the municipal councilors of Krško, the vice-mayor of Krško and the representatives of NGOs as well as the Amnesty International. I reconstructed the case, among other things, by way of media discourse on spatial management of Romani settlement, which highlighted Roma ghettoization and marginality.

11.3 Municipality of Krško, Spatial Management of Roma

In the 1980 s, they [the Roma] settled with us. Despite the presence of Roma, the municipality did not want to talk about them. Because if you are not talking about a problem, it is not detected. /.../ At that time [around 1993], the idea was to build a

⁵The Roma Community Act in the Republic of Slovenia—ZRomS-1 is a system act defining the role of state bodies and self-governing local communities’ bodies in realizing special rights of the Roma Community; it also regulates the organization of the Roma Community at national and local level, as well as its financing. Roma community. Government of the Republic of Slovenia office for National Minorities 2016.

⁶Roma community. Government of the Republic of Slovenia office for National Minorities 2016.

joint [Romani settlement], where all Roma would be resettled from the municipality of Krško and Brežice. The location was a former rocket base in the barracks of Cerklje, which was state property. Ours [Roma] were on Loke. There was the family of Felix, others were from Rimš. His father was from there. Ours. He was civilian. (Interview with a Krško municipality officer, August 18, 2016.)

The municipality of Krško was one of the municipalities which stated the spatial management of Romani settlement in 2000, when they hosted round tables on legalization of Romani settlement. Media have reported that the municipality has purchased usurped farmland where the construction of the biggest Romany community started after 1995. Then, the municipality started with the legalization. First, they turned the farming land into a building site, and in later years they produced the location plan and urbanization of the plots. The parcels of land were sold at non-market price. Until 2007, the Krško municipality has already spent 150 million SIT or 625.939 EUR, and the state has recovered more than 70 million SIT or 292.105 EUR from the tenders. In 2009, the legalization of Kerinov Grm was finished, but the situation of other Romani settlements was still in liminal state (Brajović Hajdenkumer 2007).

Situated in south-eastern Slovenia, where the Sava valley expands into the vast plains of Krško polje, the Krško municipality is 100 km away from Slovenia's capital Ljubljana and 50 km away from Croatia's capital Zagreb. Krško is located just beside important traffic infrastructure, near the tenth railway corridor and near the A2 motorway, which is a part of an important pan-European corridor (Wikipedia 2017). When I drove down the highway to Leskovec pri Krškem, I was surprised to see huge halls of international corporations, such as Greichaber Logistik and Bosch, and a number of hypermarkets under a massive electric transmission line. The process of urbanization and the presence of the economic capital of multinational corporations, such as Deichman, Lidl, Müller and New Yorker are apparent at the very first glance.

Present-day Krško is the center of the Posavje region and a municipal center. Municipality has a population of 25,884 (SURS 2016), among whom were 352 Roma with permanent residence and a number of unregistered residents until 2007.⁷

There are several Romani settlements in the Krško area, the largest being the legalized settlement of Kerinov Grm. Both Kerinov Grm and the nearby smaller settlement of Drnovo were included in the formal spatial planning strategy (2002), whereas two other settlements Rimš and Loke near Leskovec, were labeled as illegal by the decision of municipality. The plot where the Rimš is located was returned to the Catholic church and Roma do not have access to water or electricity.

⁷Romska problematika. Občina Krško. [Romani issues. The Municipality of Krško].

11.4 Protective Confinement to Woods and Mutual Distancing in the Past: The Case of Loke

Previously, there was a forest company. Our ancestors worked there. Then they got the location. They said: you can stay. There was a tent and nothing else. Latter they brought the boards, because locals allowed us to build that wooden shag (Interview with a Roma resident from the settlement of Loke, August 16, 2016).

Roma came to us, and then they went into the state forest to prevent their removal. When the men were imprisoned, women with children remained in the place. Mom was their godmother when children were born. Mom wrote them letters and read them when a letter came from a man in prison (Interview with a municipality representative of Krško, August 18, 2016).

When I was looking for the Jurkovič family in GPS I lost the signal. After a phone call I came to the woods on the edge of Loke, where Roma built houses in the middle of a forest. I was looking for their address on the Google Maps and Google Street View, and I noticed that the camera stops in the bushes and then turns to the fence of the first house near the narrow local street. Why did it not enter into the settlement? Was it because this settlement was considered “illegal?” Or was it perceived as a dangerous zone into which the Big Brother did not dare to enter?

In this ethnically homogenous settlement Roma have lived for several generations; the Romani settlement is confined to the woods where Roma seem to have felt safe in what resembles the former socialist regime. Compared to the past when Roma of Krško were socially constructed as those “who have always been around here” or those who are still looking for their place under the sun and/or are seen as newcomers rather than local inhabitants (Janko Spreizer 2016, p. 174, p. 180), Roma in Loke were seen as those who came to the villagers of Loke or those who belonged to the place. The locality and belonging of Roma was narrated through the informal settlement of the family that emerged in the time of SFR Yugoslavia on nationalized land which was formerly the property of the local non-Roma families. At the time, the land belonged to the state and the plot was used by the local Forest Company. The company had certain economic benefits for not employing Roma. In exchange for their work (cleaning the forest and planting trees) without employment contracts, Roma were tolerated and symbolically they were given the right to stay there. With the local and state consent, they first set up tents 70 years ago and then they started building shacks. They kept to themselves and did not disturb other locals, since their movement was under the watchful eye of their neighbours. Perceived as “more civilized due to racial mixing with civilians”, their presence in the woods was tolerated by the majority as they stayed confined from the village. They lived without water, electricity and other infrastructure. When men were imprisoned due to small thievery, women were allowed to stay in the woods and from time to time they came to locals asking for food, dress and at the birth of new-born babies Roma also asked neighbours civilians to be their godfathers or godmothers. The narrations revealed the asymmetric power relations between Roma who were asking for a place to stay, food, support and help. Because they

were confined to the forest and socio-spatially separated from the village, they were not harassed by police or treated as a menace.

11.5 Romani Settlement Legalization Act of Krško, and Violation of Human Rights

Loke are not Roma settlement, because the municipality did not identify it as Roma settlement. This is a duality between formalism and reality. We do not know the interests of the mayor. Amnesty International constantly reminded us that the settlement is illegal, but it has been designated as illegal by the municipality. Krško applied to the tender for displacement of families, because they are aware of the problem, but then the municipality's application was rejected by the government, because this [new location] is not a Roma settlement. (Interview with Amnesty International representative, August 22, 2016).

After the disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia in 1991, the state land of the forest company in Loke was denationalized and given back to its owners, the Trenc family. The latter did not aim to drive the Roma away, but wanted to sell 8 hectares of the forested area to the municipality. The Trenc family was aware that Roma, poor and unemployed as they were, would not be able to get a loan for purchasing the plot, so they offered their property to be sold to the municipality. The municipality was not ready to buy the entire area and the Trenc family, reluctant to sell only one portion of it, settled with the Roma. Meanwhile, the Roma of Loke were able to connect the settlement to the water mains, but obtaining electricity was not possible, because the older members of the Trenc family had died and their heirs would not give their permission.

In 2002, the Municipality of Krško adopted the Romani Settlement Legalization Act and Loke 20⁸ was not included in spatial management plan.

Discussion with local inhabitants [Roma and "civilians"] revealed that the settlement remained separated from the rest of the majority population. The settlement has no other infrastructure, such as sewage, but they pay the sewage disposal fee. They do not have access to public transport, but their children who attend school have the van transport at their disposal. On the other hand, the children who could attend a kindergarten could not be transported with a school van due to bureaucratic obstacles, since they are not students of the mandatory school. The inhabitants of Loke have bad infrastructure, but they obtain the one house number and in the past they could all be registered to the permanent address under the same house number. Until recently, the registration was not possible anymore, due to the owner dispute,

⁸The settlement of Loke has the same name as the location Loke 20, which is also the home and a permanent address of the Roma residents in the local community of Loke.

which is why newborn children are registered at the Center for social work, where they have their permanent residential address.

In 2008, 64 Roma lived at the permanent address Loke 20; the area was intended for building (Romska problematika 2008). The municipality intended to start the spatial managements in the location settled by the Roma, underlining that this location was actually a part of Leskovec. On the other hand, no provisions were made as to where the Roma would be resettled. With the administrative act Loke was proclaimed “illegal”, since the municipality legalized only 2 settlements, Drnovo and Kerinov Grm, aiming at confining Roma to that location.

In 2009, the private company Si Investicije d.o.o. [SI Investments] bought the land from Trenc’s heirs. In 2012 Roma heard that the land was intended for the building of an elite residential neighbourhood. With the support of local NGOs they organized a round table where they informed the local community about the possible dislodgment to a new location. A few years later, the private company agreed to sell the land to Roma, but the Romani dwellers could not afford to buy it at the market price. For the municipality, the price of the land was too high but in 2012 the municipality did not have an alternate solution for Loke (R. R. 2012). Since then, 8 Roma families have lived under the threat that their 5 houses would be bulldozed and “cleared” from the area. Several NGOs and Romani representatives underlined that basic human rights and special rights of Roma were dismissed to serve the interest of economic capital in the process of urbanization and transformation of the former socialist state to a neoliberal one (Interview with a Roma resident from the settlement of Loke, August 16, 2016).

Amnesty International (AI) has appealed several times that the state and the local communities do not respect international law on basic human rights, such as access to drinking water and lack of the legal security of tenure (2011, p. 15) in the case of Roma, but their appeals were ignored or rejected at the Courts. Families in Loke live in permanent fear of what will happen to their houses and they live under the threat of being forcefully evicted. In 2014, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2014, E/C.12/SVN/CO/2) recommended that the State party should: “(a) Prioritize the legalization of Roma settlements, or work out other solutions in genuine consultation with the Roma communities. The state should also strive “not to carry out forced evictions of Roma, and enact legislation governing forced evictions which complies with the international standards and is in line with the Committee’s general comment No. 7 (1997) on forced evictions. For those Roma who live in informal settlements, the state should provide “access to basic services, such as water, electricity and sanitation, also in accordance with the recommendations set forth by the Governmental Commission on Roma in 2011 that requested municipalities to provide water to Roma”. It was also appealed that the state should “take effective measures to end segregation of Roma communities, and prevent acts of discrimination against Roma attempting to buy or rent housing outside their segregated areas” It was recommended that the state should also “facilitate access to social housing for Roma”.

The latest spatial management plans of Krško (OPN UL RS, 61/2015) and the detailed local residential plan Gmajna 3 (OPPN, UL RS 13/2016) did not include

the spatial management of the Romani settlement Loke. Before the plan Gmajna 3 was adopted in 2016, several local inhabitants tirelessly demanded to solve the problem of Romani housing. Some residents and municipality councilors even mentioned that this territory should belong to Roma. The paragraph 5 of Article 5 stated that at the location Gmajna 3 B are Romani houses on the private property and that the owner should “solve the question of their resettlement” (OPPN, UL RS 13/2016). Administrative machinery generated several documents of spatial management where Roma were excluded and the municipality did not plan any solution for resettlement of Roma settlement of Loke. Instead of planning the financial resources and time schedule for spatial management and resettlement of those who wanted to move outside Loke, the state and the municipality has conferred relocation and housing of Roma on the owner of the land.

After 2012 when the company SI Investicije revealed their future plans, Moran Jurkovič, the Romani municipality councilor, and the Municipality of Krško cooperatively continued with the activities for Roma housing. Jurkovič found a location with a house in Gržeča vas and the owner of a house agreed to sell the house for 45,000 EUR. However, Jurkovič was unable to apply for a loan because he was unemployed. His family lived on social support and they invested their funds in building the house in Loke.

The vice-mayor of Krško reported that the municipality applied for 15,000 EUR at the MEDT and their tender for the development of Romani infrastructure. The municipality would contribute the same amount of money and an equal share would be paid by Jurkovič's family in future years. In addition, a certain share would be given by unknown sponsors. The house would be the first property of the municipality and once the family was able to pay the whole amount, it would pass into its ownership (Interview with the vice-mayor of Krško, August 18 2016).

My interlocutors criticized the fact that the funds were available only for the resettling to ethnically segregated settlements and not for the resettlement outside Romani settlements. In July 2016 The MEDT explained to municipality of Krško and NGOs that the funds could only accommodate projects for the basic infrastructure in the Romani settlements and rejected their application for funding. Actors at the Ministry claimed that it was not possible to ignore the regional development legislation pursuant to which funding was available to accelerate the development of the settlement, where members of the Romani community live. The municipality was advised to apply for funds at the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities to solve the housing or social problems of Roma.

The Head of the Office for Minorities, Stane Baluh, denied the intentional ghettoization of Roma imposed by the state and its ministries, but interlocutors and articles in newspapers reported that the process of ethnic segregation of Roma in Kerinov Grm already had negative consequences. The biggest Romani settlement of Krško, Kerinov Grm, was rather perceived as ghetto, a site of ethnically homogenized and criminalized group, which was confined to a location separated from the majority population (Zore 2016).

Krško's Municipality interlocutors insisted that the state should also provide funds to invest in housing for Romani families outside Romani settlements, if the state seriously intended to solve "Romani Issues".

When I visited this settlement known as a case of good practice (Amnesty International 2011) and talked to the inhabitants, I heard several stories which could not convince me that in this remote and legalized settlement the process of social inclusion was a smooth one. Roma who did not buy land plots there were imagining of leaving the place, because "it was not good to live in a segregated space". Representatives of Roma criticized the fact that there should be one big Romani settlement in Krško, and appealed for other options such as resettlement to non-Romani settlements.

My interlocutors at Amnesty International told me that after several years, there was still no strategy for Roma resettlement or a financial compensation for the so-called illegal settlements—or any other agreement that would eliminate the threatening possibility to become forcibly evicted and consequently homeless.

11.6 Conclusion

This chapter analyses socio-spatial seclusion that started in the former socialist state and which is still persistent in the countryside or in urban environments of contemporary Slovenia. Administrative machinery (the state with its minority legislation) has provided the legal framework, which regulates the special situation of Roma as an ethnic minority within the broader EU legislation on Roma. Despite several national plans on legalization of Romani settlements and spatial plans and regulations of the places of Roma at the municipality level, the Jurkovič family has not been able to regulate and legalize their dwellings in negotiations with the last owner, the local community or the state in the last 25 years.

The locals, NGOs, Roma representatives and media issued reports on spatial seclusion, underlining the claims that the state pushed Roma in ghettos, constructed Kerinov Grm as a separate space, populated by a homogenous ethnicity and labeled a poor community with a group of weak social capital: as a group, Roma are constructed as those with distinctive cultural habits, because they allow early marriages of their youths. The state and responsible ministries ignored the proposals of local inhabitants searching for displacement of Roma in Loke from their Romani settlement and emplacement in nearby /a/ farming house/s/ in a case if Roma are willing to leave Romani settlement.

In the interviews with my interlocutors, Krško was perceived as a wealthy local municipality⁹ with the only nuclear power plant in Slovenia, two additional water power plants and the storage of nuclear waste from the power plant. The NGOs affirmed that the rich municipality could also have a big symbolic capital in solving

⁹As local community they receive 8,5 million EUR from the state budget as a compensation, and they distribute this money amongst their local inhabitants.

the Romani housing, but it seems that there is no such political agenda at the state level. Although the Municipality of Krško could invest its funds into the resettling of Roma from Loke, it was ready to invest only a part of municipality's funds into the legalization of Romani settlements: the vice-mayor insisted that the state with its ministries should also contribute, because the responsibility for legalization of Romani housing is divided between the local community and the state.

The state and the municipality remain trapped in the administrative machinery, claiming that Loke or Gmajna 3, section B, is not considered a Romani settlement. The new spatial plan has been drawn and it was accepted at the municipality meeting after the negotiation with some councilors. The OPPN Gmajna 3 was approved as if Romani buildings did not exist at the location. In narrations on the urbanization plans for Loke and Gmajna 3 some interlocutors were guessing that this place would be urbanized for the elite professional workers of the nuclear power plant. In accordance with their opinion, the place would be transferred to location for the elites and would become another kind of a place of social seclusion: a place of residents with symbolic, cultural and economic capital who stay enclosed in their rich neighbourhoods to which Roma do not belong. The sociospatial seclusion of Roma to Kerinov Grm and their social exclusion from the spatial management plan bears a clear message: people with a lesser cultural, economic and social capital cannot be seen as a possible part of an elite neighbourhood. Not protected by the state or the municipality and by not being included in the spatial management plan, they are symbolically erased and live under a serious threat that the owner will remove their houses one day, leaving them homeless.

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Chapter 12

The Planned Process of Spatial Integration of Roma Settlements in Slovenia—The Way to Deghettoization and Demarginalization?

Jernej Zupančič

12.1 Introduction

In the last two decades, interest in Roma “issues” has been on a rise, namely from different perspectives (Bešter and Medvešek 2013). Issues of living in specific Roma settlements stand out greatly. Due to the separate development and special social circumstances, these settlements developed into rural and urban slums. Unorganized settlements are undoubtedly the cause of both personal and collective (local community, neighbourhood) marginalization and exclusion in almost all European countries (Macura and Macura-Vuksanović 2006). We can reasonably talk about the process of ghettoization and settlements as ghettoized spaces (Pirc 2013, p. 13). In some Roma settlements, the high density of buildings is not only a problem of low living standards, but also causes disputes and even conflicts between neighbours. On one hand, poor living conditions reflect the social marginalization and are also the most important reason for persisting in above mentioned marginalization on the other (Klopčič 2010). However, solving the residential problems of Roma is quite often founded on an illusionary expectation that it is possible, using primarily the instruments of social interventionism on one hand and systematic development of Romani settlements with technical or community infrastructure on the other—i.e. electrical installation, water distribution system, road surfaces with connections to the public road network, municipal cleansing service, and sewer system—to simultaneously achieve social indications of integrations, such as higher enrolment in educational institutions, educational achievements, and indirectly more successful competition on the labour market. We now have a decade’s worth of more intensive interventions in Roma settlements with the goal of technical renovation and legalization. There is data, plans, and

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analyses of situations and good practices, providing sufficient material for a performance review of various approaches and measures. In the last decade, community infrastructure has been constructed in many Roma settlements; however, the goals of integration are far from achieved (Zupančič 2015, p. 7, 22).

Currently, Roma community is experiencing rapid social and demographic transformation, which is reflected primarily in changes of the way of life and their spatial conduct. The transformation of Roma settlements is primarily a professional challenge, from analysis to planning and management (Zupančič 2013, p. 43). Roma settlements need to be intentionally and systematically demarginalized. Below we discuss the question of normative and functional integration of Roma settlements into the Slovenian settlement system. Roma settlements are thereby considered as spatial units of locally continuous Roma settlement, whether their residents identify themselves ethnically as Roma or not. The comprehensive discussion of Roma settlements considers their internal diversity, as well as spatial, material, and cultural potentials and actual characteristics of communication between the Roma and their neighbours.

12.2 Roma Settlements in Slovenia: Brief Overview

The belief that a high majority of Roma live in ethnically homogeneous “Roma-settlements” is not quite correct. Newer studies confirm an increased heterogeneity of these settlements and a high share and number of ethnic Roma who live dispersed across Slovenia. The number of settlements varies due to different understanding of the concept “Roma settlement”. According to the records, there are 107 spatial units, considered as settlements where Roma represent the only residents or they are in great majority (Zupančič 2012, pp. 90–91). Those “settlements” are not recognized statistically as settlements due to the illegality and unsolved property issues. Later, studies found an even greater spatial dispersion of Roma; they also lived in many smaller settlements, so that the number of such settlement units climbs to about 130. Additionally, quite a few Roma left their environment and live in mixed marriages in urban environment, and new, in-depth studies show that many Roma settlement are actually ethnically mixed. Compared to over 6,000 “statistical” settlements in Slovenia, this represent just a bit under 2%, while Roma represent only 0.5% of total Slovenian population. Urban populations in larger cities are a completely new and another group. They live primarily in Ljubljana and Maribor; the latter are mostly immigrants from the areas of former Yugoslav federal republics (now independent countries), who came to Slovenia within the last three decades (Zupančič 2014, pp. 47–50).

Roma settlements are mostly newly formed, as permanent settlement became predominant only in the 1970s and later. Permanent settlement attempts were already undertaken in the 18th century in the territory of the former Habsburg Monarchy during the ruling period of Maria Theresa, but they proved unsuccessful (Štrukelj 1979). Later settlements, associated with quite forceful measures, also

failed to have a permanent effect (Štrukelj 2004, p. 39). However, Roma were at least partly “territorialized”; they were registered in areas of certain municipalities, even though they did not have permanent residence in one place, but were moving in order to make a living (various “travelling” trades, also begging). Still, due to the aforementioned “territorialization”, a segment of the Roma population settled down. Especially Roma in Slovenian eastern region Prekmurje predominantly settled down between World War I and II, and later. With them, nomadism gradually faded into folklore. The process of permanent settlement was a generation late in Dolenjska, Bela krajina, and Posavje region (Žugel 1991). Permanent settlement actually succeeded only after significant social changes and modernization processes of Roma society, and not due to intentional efforts by the government. With permanent settlement, some conveniences of urbanized and modernized society became at least partially available to them. However, permanent settlement quickly proved to be a continuation of the marginal social status, even in new circumstances. Permanent settlement was, in spatial terms, most often limited to a single family. Later, due to marriages and high fertility, it expanded significantly, and immediate family and distant relatives often moved there as well, so that Roma settlements obtained certain structural and physiognomic characteristics. Because of the lack of real estate ownership and legal regulations, financial assets, as well as a system of values, constructions differed greatly, and were mostly of poor quality. Roma settlements became open rural (and as well as urban) “slums” (Zupančič 2007, pp. 23–26).

Formation of Roma settlements is related to the characteristics of their culture and social processes. Stabilization started in the phase of intensive social restructuring of Slovenian society, from rural to semi-rural and industrial. Some families separated from previously familial communities, either because of the means of survival or because of various disputes (which were not a rare occurrence). We must also consider the process of dissolution of traditional Romani society in this context, which during modernization faced challenges of both economic and psychological nature (Zupančič 2009, p. 22). Because of familial connectedness, Roma settlements acted (and still do) socially very homogeneously (Škraba 2007). Moving away often represented a kind of intentional ethnic assimilation.

Larger Roma settlements, such as Pušča (Rudaš 2011), Vanča vas or Sotina in the Prekmurje region (Komac 2005), Kerinov grm near Krško, Hudeje, Brezje—Žabjak in the Dolenjska region, Lokve in Bela krajina, and similar were formed by repopulation by residents who were not related. In these settlements, a new Roma community began forming in the phase of social modernization, which had stronger territorial and weaker familial ties. Real estate (location), which was not very important in the semi-nomadic phase (see more in Štrukelj 1991, pp. 38–42), began taking on new significance. Roma cultural identity could no longer persist purely on tradition and a way of life, but began to identify increasingly with the territory of permanent settlement—the location of permanent settlement was becoming the premise for identity. Permanent settlement became the venue for sociability and the starting point for livelihood and other functions (Klopčič 2007). The new dimension of spatial mobility was represented by motorization, as new means of transport

allowed a wide area of activity to be established. This territorialization was dramatic, even shocking in a way, and often understood as coercion (Zupančič 2006). It was understood neither by Roma, who experienced it, nor the majority population, who was often a kind of victim as well, as Roma took over their real estate (Žugel 1991). The absence of concepts, which would accompany and direct the process of permanent settlement, was most likely a problem. For this reason, the formation of current permanent Roma settlements was seen from the perspective of the majority as uncontrollable. In reality, locations of most current Roma settlements were thought out: in places with the highest possibility for ensuring livelihood and where the opposition of real estate owners was still bearable. Most locations were probably only temporary at first; however, since they proved suitable, they became permanent settlements (Zupančič 2014).

12.3 The Concepts of Spatial Integration Are Concepts of Demarginalization

In 2007, under the auspices of a special expert group, a framework development plan for the Roma settlements in Slovenia was prepared, which stated that most Romani settlements could be developed and modernized in existing locations by establishing measures of legality, organizing ownership relationships, and establishing at least minimal technical and construction standards; the debated settlements would then be included in the Slovenian settlement system (Zupančič 2007). Only a few Roma settlements do not have these options and would require replacement locations or individual housing solutions to be found. Legality is one of the fundamental goals in resolving the housing issues of Roma, but this can be achieved in multiple ways, from the previously proposed legislative and systematic solutions to intervention solutions with inexpensive pre-fabricated constructions. Improvised construction solutions were especially common during rapid demographic growth, which, due to limited space, led to (excessive) density of buildings and related issues between neighbours. In this context, we must also mention the idea of the intervention legislation (1993) and the ad hoc legalization aimed at quickly establishing formal legality. Experience of this legal interventionism is poor—problems only became exacerbated. Intervention solutions increase the aspirations for governmental interventionism, reduce the willingness of population to use legal forms of spatial conduct, and strengthen the belief that creation of good living conditions is the task (including financial task) of society or government, and not an individual's potential (owner, user). In the long term, it leads towards a distinctly inert, self-oriented development, and away from integrative efforts. The position of gradual structural adaptation and simultaneous legalization became dominant. Roma settlements are to be gradually modernized, equipped with community infrastructure equivalent to that in other settlements in Slovenia, while legalization would be achieved as a legal completion of these processes. The idea is based also

on the competitiveness between Roma settlements and municipalities, as the construction of community infrastructure is almost entirely dependent on governmental intervention assets in the form of calls for tenders (Zupančič 2012, pp. 99–100).

12.4 Five Steps of Adapted Planning of Roma Settlements Development

In Slovenia, the spatial planning on local level is under the auspices of municipalities and thereby indirectly and directly dependent on the endeavors of municipal councils and mayors to initiate certain procedures in the context of arranging Roma settlements, to obtain the funds, and to complete said projects. Cooperation of the local population is therefore extremely important. Ultimately, realization of Roma settlement development strategy depends on awareness, commitment, and also expert competencies of local governments—economic, spatial, and personnel potential of municipalities on one side and participatory willingness of Roma communities on the other. The planning dynamic exposed the complexity of the decision-making process on spatial issues and the importance of informal factors, exposing the weakness of predominantly technically, procedurally, and economically oriented system of spatial planning.

Legalization is a long and difficult process of achieving legislative compliance and regularity. Within the wider context, it is understood as dynamic intertwining of various legal and regulative, economic, social, socially psychological, cultural, and political steps aimed towards the same goal. If integration of Roma settlements into the Slovenian settlement system is a strategic goal of the government, achieving legality is a tactical, stage goal at the level of municipality as administrative unit. This must follow regulatory and legal perspectives and guidelines on one hand, and seek manner of achieving planning efficiency considering specific issues of Roma settlements on the other. The process requires a tripartite collaboration of local, national, and Roma side.

How do we then plan development of Roma settlements on the local level? (Table 12.1)

In a wider sense, they can be explained as follows:

Step 1 Definition of actual surface area of Roma settlement as real estate suitable for residential facilities is a measure undertaken by the municipality, which defines the current area of the settlement as suitable for construction, thereby indicating the intention of establishing legality. Without this step, the others are not possible. This is a measure of certain planning bravery and trust that residents will actively participate in the process. In areas where Roma simply “wait”, for various reasons, for an intervention solution, this measure has no developmental purpose. In this context, we must highlight the problems of security of agricultural land and protected areas. The problem occurs in many agriculturally suitable and even less suitable areas while protection is implemented especially in the vicinity of water resources

Table 12.1 Five steps to spatial integration of Roma settlements in the Slovenian settlement system

Step	Description of activity	Main actors	Main results expected
1. Definition	Defining the area of Roma settlements for developed land suitable for residential use	municipality	Under a municipal planning document, the area becomes suitable for establishing legality
2. Resolution of ownership	Through various schemas, Roma acquire ownership rights; land allotment is performed, settlement redevelopment plan is prepared	Roma municipality companies real estate owners	land subdivision resolution of ownership relationships
3. Concept of opening settlements	With various activities, Roma in the settlement break down barriers and integrate in the local environment	Roma government institutions experts civil society	Residents increase the level of responsibility towards common goods A positive perception of the settlement gradually develops
4. Development planning	Via calls for tenders and other ways, municipalities obtain funds, expert solution, redevelopment and renovation are undertaken, and a settlement development model is prepared	participation of government institutions expert institutions	acquisition of development funds and substantive programmes
5. Redevelopment and legalisation	Redevelopment of degraded area, development of public infrastructure, and surrounding connections	Municipality and Roma	Formal integration of settlements in the Slovenian settlement system and reorganization of situation

Source Zupančič 2015, 16

and for certain habitats. The former can represent a serious issue and an insurmountable obstacle, while the later requires mitigation measures or changes of legislation on protected areas.

Step 2 includes establishment of ownership relationships, either by obtaining ownership right or usable right of superficies. Sale of the real estate to Roma is extremely difficult and slow. Regardless of the reasons for such reticence, it represents a huge obstacle in the concept of arranging Roma settlements. This step can only be changed in a trustworthy setting of mutual neighbourliness. To promote legal transactions with real estate, this subject required much more attention and tactfulness and economic models that are stimulating and economically sustainable.

Step 3 represents a set of measures and procedures to increase contact between residents of Roma settlements and their closest neighbours. This is likely the central part of future efforts for modernization of Roma settlements. Considering the

contents, this phase is completely atypical for planning systems, as it does not have a procedural nature, but is some sort of generator of societal climate: it creates conditions in which a participating approach to local planning is even possible. The nature of current problems of marginalized and especially ghettoized environments requires specific measures and social aspects. In practice, this means either establishment of direct contacts (e.g. organization of meetings, frequent visitors by representatives of institutions, organizations, societies, and other factors of civil societies, promotion of cultural and sports activities, care for natural and cultural heritage, etc.) or placement of institutions and facilities and public and open areas that are by their nature intended for socializing during various activities within Roma settlements. The main purpose is to increase the scope of human contact. By opening up, an atmosphere can be formed that facilitates resolution of problems.

Step 4 is of economic expert nature, with participation of expert institutions and supporting financial instruments (activities via calls for tenders). Operational plans for infrastructure construction, routes of village streets, and locations of buildings are drawn up, including construction and technical admissibility. Here, a settlement development vision is required—a document defining local potentials and architectural cultural heritage worthy of protecting just as precisely as the redevelopment plan with the construction of basic community infrastructure. The question of protection and economization of cultural heritage is a peculiarity, as most planners so far did not pay much attention to it.

Step 5 encompasses the procedures of redevelopment and legalization, where-with Roma settlements are formally integrated into the Slovenian settlement system. In terms of financing, it is related to calls for tenders, and divided into stages in terms of organization. Visually, it is defined primarily by the road network, which provides the main guidelines of spatial development. Village streets provide access to all buildings, whereas the access or transit road connects the settlement to the public road network. A special feature of quite a few Roma settlements are access road leading to and from the settlement, and surrounding roads that encircle the settlements—these are a feature of exclusively Roma settlements. On one hand, they provide easier access to all building, and are therefore the result of adaptations to actual floor plan and high density of residential building, while they act as a form of spatial obstacle to further expansion of the settlement on the other hand. The junction of access and surrounding area is connected to other public surfaces and building, from public transport stops and potential parking areas, and can act as a good option for the placement of other buildings or preparation of areas such as parking lot, welcome boards, greens, tree avenues, etc., and in some locations also ecological community islands for the collection and removal of waste. An important element of settlement are also open and especially public areas: greens, playgrounds, courtyards, parking lots, sport surfaces, protected nature areas, facilities for sports, education, cultural activities, and socializing. Due to the high spatial density, these facilities can primarily be located on the edges of settlements. In this case, surrounding roads are very handy. A third aspect of redevelopment has to be mentioned here, specifically the visual aspect. Care for a settlement's appearance is exclusively under the purview of villagers.

12.5 Special Importance of Public Space in Roma Settlements

The concept of redevelopment and legalization of Roma settlements is a road leading these spatial and social units from being illegal and structurally poor to integration into the Slovenian settlement system. Redevelopment of these circa 400 km² surfaces with circa 8,000 residents is a developmental necessity (Zupančič 2014, p. 202). A special chapter in this process represents the implementation of public surfaces and public community infrastructure, as well as reservation of surfaces for general common purposes, including open green areas (Varga and Friškič 2013). This planned public good is a novelty for residents and they have not encountered it before, so it is often undervalued in planning practice (Zupančič 2007; as well as Pirc 2013, p. 45).

Preparation of free building area for educational, social, sports, and cultural needs is somewhat different. There are interests for placement of religious markings and chapels. A special place is also reserved for kindergarten and potential educational activities. They have a special purpose as a public institution in a Roma settlement. Kindergarten, as a public infrastructure facility, has a practical and symbolic significance. In addition to their primary purpose—education of children—it represents a manifestation of the “state” in the settlement. Its vicinity provides children with easier access to school, and makes their parents’ decision to trust the school, which is within reach, easier. For this reason, interest and cooperation with a kindergarten or school are generally higher. Furthermore, constant comings and goings of teachers and other school employees starts to increase the flow of people between Roma and other settlements (Žnidarec and Demšar 2006, pp. 42–55). Roma have therefore increased options to meet their neighbours and other people. So, in addition to the educational role (in this case) of kindergartens, the social component, which occurs as a parallel consequence of the existence and activity of the public institution, also needs to be highlighted. It brings a certain flow of different people and experience into the Roma settlement, and demands certain adjustments from parents.

In practice, “day centers” proved to be predominantly successful, located either as kindergarten or some other special-purpose area (Komac 2005). In day centers, Roma pupils receive additional learning assistance, while some older pupils also successfully provide such assistance (Bešter and Medvešek 2013). Forms of mutual assistance and solidarity thus develop within the “public” sphere, which should lead directly to greater success of pupils, while also strengthening work and learning habits.

Public institutions and their support infrastructure (day centers, clubs, playgrounds, socializing areas) are a path that opens these settlements to the outside world. Public institutions, kindergartens included, are a breath of fresh air and highlight “public” matters. Thus the settlement as a whole acquires a certain diversity and everyday manner, thereby enabling Roma residents to “go out”. On the other hand, primarily larger Roma settlements are suitable to also provide other

functions, in addition to residential: work, education, relaxation, cultural life, etc. They thus enable increased functionality of Roma settlements, their path outwards, and therefore their establishment in the wider local environment (Zupančič 2015, p. 20)

12.6 Conclusion

The achieved forms of technical modernization and implemented legality in over half Romani settlements in Slovenia are otherwise encouraging results of quite substantial efforts into demarginalization of Roma residential areas. However, implementation of access to electricity, water, community installations, road network, and other technical goods do not by themselves bring what is most desired: integration. This is a more difficult and above all complex process that requires a stronger and more intensive interaction between participants in the process of spatial planning of Roma settlements. The obvious progress of some Roma settlements is proof of the effectiveness of presented construction. Demarginalization of Roma settlements will require additional attention in the future, especially in the segment of internal cultural and social instances of spatial conduct. On the other hand, the endeavours, done from time to time in the resolution of “issues” of Roma settlement, with its non-uniformly defined systems of norms, incentives, and sanctions, is guilty of producing, in its planning effectiveness, generally poorer results. This brings the entire complex of redevelopment and legalization of Roma settlements back to the starting point, to the developmental paradigm of Roma settlement: the manner, approaches, and ultimately key goals of integration efforts. Is the approach of raising the scope of social interventionism more suitable (effective and permanent in the long term), or, as opposed to now, is it the model of competitiveness, whereby social resolution has the function of also achieving other goals and is not just a value in itself?

It is better to lean towards the latter, since, using the former approach, leaves Roma more or less permanently stuck in a sort of controlled refuge as permanent beneficiaries of social transfers, pittance, and as subjects in tests of neighbourly tolerance. It is better to trust the developmental strengths of Roma, despite the errors and side tracks that happened, are happening, and will happen. Interventionism is necessary, but primarily as an instrument of slow but more reliable, more permanent, and more economical participative development model of marginal areas, especially if the politics of employment, education, and social security are more harmonized and subordinate to the principle of competitiveness and empowerment of members of this community in the labour market. Finally, Roma settlement areas can be reasonably considered in terms of spatial and cultural capital (largely unutilized), which can realize its goals in the paradigm of sustainable development, shaking off its existing economic and administrative tutorship.

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Chapter 13

Multiculturalism and Ethnographic Museums in Israel: The Case of a Regional Bedouin Museum

Havatzelet Yahel, Ruth Kark and Noam Perry

13.1 Introduction

This chapter considers multiculturalism in Israeli society, and its expression in museums. It showcases one regional museum that aimed to present two different cultures in the Negev in Southern Israel.

The study is based on archival documentation, data collection, and interviews of people involved in the establishment of the center and museum, as well as current employees, guides, and visitors. We begin by examining ethnocentric museums in Israel, with special emphasis on minority ethnographic museums, posing the question whether Israel represents a multicultural society. Then we look at the existing world nomadic and Bedouin museums. We then present our case study—a museum of the Bedouin, part of the Joe Alon Center for Regional Studies which aims to reflect multiethnic and multicultural societies within the Negev. We explore how the Bedouin museum and the Center evolved through the years, look at the Negev Bedouin society, an ethnic minority group in Israel, and elaborate on the challenges to present differing identities and narratives in one regional center.

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13.2 Museums of Nomads and Bedouin in the Middle East

For the sake of comparison we mention several museums that present nomadic and Bedouin cultures in the Middle East. Some of these were established by individual foreign and indigenous collectors and others by local or state authorities. We will not touch here upon topics of Orientalism (Said 1979), nationalism (Anderson 1983), and post-colonialism (Bhabha 2000).

Among the nomadic and Bedouin museums in the Middle East are:

In Turkey, Enver Yalçın recently opened the museum of nomads in Fethiye. The museum focuses on the life of the Yörük people in the southwestern district's Kargı village. It contains 2500 artifacts which include many ancient agriculture tools from different parts of Turkey.

Among the Museums in Egypt we can find several Bedouin museums in the Farafra Oasis in the Western Desert of Egypt.

An interesting museum is the El-Arish Bedouin Heritage Museum which focuses mainly on the Egyptian Bedouin lifestyle in the Sinai Peninsula in the last 100 years. This museum, established by the association for the preservation of the Sinai Bedouin heritage, contains artifacts such as tents, costumes, food utensils, jewelry, traditional medicine, and medicinal plants (*Al-Shark Al-Awsat* 2009).

In Jordan there are several museums. The "al-Hayat al-Shaabia," the Jordan Folklore and Popular Traditions Museums, opened in Amman in 1975. It displays nineteenth- and early twentieth-century nomadic desert Bedouin, village, and urban everyday lifestyle and culture (Guide2jordan 2017; Visit Jordan, Amman. 2017).

Another museum, also called "al-Hayat al-Shaabia" was established in 1987 in as-Salt. It aims to preserve the local heritage of the district of al-Balqa. Its collections illustrate Jordanian culture, showing how people faced the challenges of nature and how they adapted to their environment. It compares the lifestyles, houses and tents, weapons, and utensils of the villagers and nomads (Visit Jordan, As Salt 2017).

There is also the Ammarin museum at the Bedouin Camp in Beidha, Jordan (Nadinetoukan 2017).

In Jeddah, Saudi Arabia there are two relevant museums. The Jeddah Regional Museum of Archaeology and Ethnography is a major museum in the historic Khuzam Palace in the Al-Nuzlah al-Yamaniyah quarter in the south of Jeddah. The building was constructed as a royal palace from 1928 to 1932 under the supervision of Muhammed bin Laden. One collection contains archeological and historical artefacts ranging from the Stone Age to pre-Islamic and Islamic cultures. A second collection holds ethnographic items portraying the recent culture of the region. There are also two royal halls containing private historical items, documents, and photographs of King Abdul Aziz and King Saud (Cuddihy 2001; Trip adviser, Jeddah 2017).

Another museum in Jeddah is a historical museum in Tayebat International City, belonging to Abd al Rauf Khaleel. The museum complex contains 300 rooms, part of which displays Bedouin culture and costumes.

In 2014 as part of a program to promote the country's culture, Saudi Arabia planned to spend 1.7 billion USD to construct 230 museums. (News, Cultural Tourism 2014; Google 2017).

In Dubai, the Dubai Bedouin museum located in the historic neighbourhood of al-Fahidi, presents exhibitions on its Bedouin heritage, the history of the emirate, which is part of the United Arab Emirates, and its growth from the sands to a modern country (Visit Dubai 2017).

The National Museum of Qatar is currently under construction in the capital, Doha. The building was designed by architect Jean Nouvel, and was scheduled to open in 2016. The museum's mission is to celebrate the culture, heritage and future of Qatar and its people, embodying the pride and traditions of Qataris while offering international visitors insights on the natural history of the desert and the Persian Gulf, artifacts from Bedouin culture, historical exhibitions on the tribal wars and the establishment of the Qatari state, and finally, on the discovery of oil to the present.

13.3 Multiculturalism and Ethnographic Museums in Israel

Multiculturalism in Israeli society plays a role in the phenomenon of museums. There is a high ratio of museums to population size in Israel (over 200 existing museums) with a significant growth of ethnographic museums in the last two decades (representing over 10% of the total). This may reflect stages in the evolution of multiculturalism in the Israeli context: following the initial Jewish melting pot concept of integration of a diversity of immigrants, ethnic re-awakening took place in the country with ethnocentrism being expressed also in the form of museums (Perry and Kark 2017).

These local ethnographic museums function both to distinguish and to integrate the cultural groups they represent in Israeli society. Museums of Jewish communities in general reproduce Zionist narratives, while at the same time expanding the museum mission to include life in the Jewish Diaspora. Some museums of non-Jewish cultural groups function to reclaim their local, enduring, predominantly Arab-Palestinian narratives, which often conflict with the Jewish Zionist narrative. Museums in Israel face challenges in fulfilling the differing, and sometimes conflicting, needs of multiculturalism. They may thus serve the roles of both reflecting and contributing to the evolution of Israeli society with its component ethnic and social groupings (Kark and Perry 2012).

The ethnic re-awakening in Israel today includes the establishment dozens of ethnocentric, separatist new museums, which challenge Zionist and statist formative narratives. These museums serve their communities, and the entire Israeli society, by giving each community a space of its own, to reclaim and recount its individual story. Sometimes while glorifying to an exaggerated extent the contribution of certain groups at the expense of the epic narrative of Israeli statehood. Museums in

Israel can lead, contribute, and assume a very important role in nurturing multiculturalism, by giving groups individual and mutual respect; adequately emphasizing, while maintaining historic accuracy, the cultural idiosyncrasies of each ethnic group; and highlighting the roles and contribution to the development of Israeli society, in all of its groups and ethnic components (including women, Mizrahi Jews, Palestinians/Arabs, migrant workers, etc.).

At the same time, one must consider the dangers in comprehensive adoption of multiculturalism, which include regressing to racist discourse and emboldening un-enlightened un-democratic cultures. A blind adoption of multiculturalism could also contribute to an unjust disregard of the past contribution of the kibbutzim and other agricultural settlements, especially as the backdrop to today's struggles over real estate, or it could lead to backlash and the strengthening of political parties and groups that oppose multiculturalism all together. The display in museums brings forth the difficulties in bridging the gap between nationality-citizenship-uniformity and nurturing multiculturalism-difference-diversity of each and every group, as well as the extent to which each approach should be represented. It may be that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict follows a similar pattern. Every resolution of the conflict must go hand in hand with mutual change in perspectives over the conflicting national ethos of each group inhabiting this country. Here lies another leadership challenge for multicultural ethnographic museums (Perry and Kark 2017).

13.4 Bedouin Museums in Israel

In Israel we have the Museum of Bedouin Culture at Lahav in Southern Israel in the Negev (discussed in detail below), the Bedouin Heritage Center in Shibli in the Galilee, and the Bedouin Heritage Museum at Rahat, one of the Bedouin towns in the Negev, set up by the local residents to tell their own story, but which did not persist (see Fig. 13.1).

The Bedouin Heritage Center-Shibli was set up in 1897 for a short term by the local council and Diyab Shibli, who in 2000 re-opened it as a tourism center and a potential economic support for the village women. The village of Shibli, located at the foot of Mount Tabor, is populated by the remnants of the Arab a-Sabih Bedouin tribe, most of which scattered in Jordan during the 1948 war. In 1987, a Bedouin heritage week was held in the village; as part of it, an exhibit was made in which many Bedouin schools throughout Galilee participated. The local council continued to foster the site at which the exhibit was mounted. Afterward, the private collection of Diyab Shibli was added, and he was appointed director of the museum (Shibli studied museology at Tel Aviv University). Later the council decided to close the



Fig. 13.1 A Bedouin “orientalist” painting of nomadic life in the cultural center of the largest Bedouin town in the Negev, Rahat. Artist: Zuhir Al-Huzayl (by R. Kark, 2008)

exhibit, and Diyab Shibli chose to take it under his own auspices. He moved the items to a building that he rented next to his home and reopened the heritage center in 2000 (Shibli 1992).¹

At the entrance, a movie on the Galilee Bedouins is screened, and a few objects are hung on the walls. The small exhibit is arranged in one large room, and contains traditional garb, housewares, vessels for making coffee, cooking and baking utensils, rugs embroidered in various stages of preparation, many agricultural implements (see Fig. 13.2), and personal items (jewelry, prayer beads, and the like). The exhibit does not have written explanations, and Shibli himself guides the visitors. Outside the building, there is a Bedouin hospitality tent as well as a garden of herbs and medicinal plants, which in Shibli’s opinion complete the exhibit. Shibli hopes to develop the place. Currently the local council together with Wexner Foundation

¹Shibli, Diyab. Director of the Bedouin Heritage Center, Shibli, Interview with Noam Perry, 17 June 2006.



Fig. 13.2 Display hall, Bedouin Heritage Center, Shibli (by N. Perry, 2006)

Alumni are promoting an extensive development plan for the village in order to make proper use of the village potential to attract tourists, especially the Christian pilgrims visiting Mount Tabor.


13.5 The Joe Alon Center for Regional Studies

13.5.1 The History of the Center

The center was initiated by members of Kibbutz Lahav in the 1970s, who wished to establish within the kibbutz area a research center specializing in the Shfela and Negev regions. The center agenda was to facilitate three major tasks - an archeological collection, a center for environmental study including a display of flora and fauna, and a Bedouin folklore collection.² The triple agenda with a strong reliance on archeology is reflected in the symbol of the center: three stylized clay pots (see Fig. 13.3).

²Navon Avi interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav, 4 Nov. 2015.

Fig. 13.3 The Joe Alon Center's symbol (Joe Alon Center Archive)



The archeological display is intended to present nearby findings from several expeditions.³ This includes relics from the chalcolithic period (around 3500 BC) through the Canaanite and the Jewish kingdom, the period of the second Jewish Temple, the Mishnaic and Talmudic eras (2nd–4th centuries C.E.). A second museum would hold the many Bedouin objects purchased from the Bedouin, or given as gifts by Bedouin to the neighbouring kibbutz. These objects were previously displayed in one of the Kibbutz warehouses.

The predominant founders and first directors were Avi Navon and Uzi Halamish, both members of Kibbutz Lahav; Halamish had previously served as head of the Benei Shimon Regional Council municipality, within whose boundaries Kibbutz Lahav is located.

Initial funding for the 60-m² building of the center was given as a loan by Mifal HaPayis, the national lottery of Israel with additional early support from the Joe Alon Association.⁴ In July 1973, Colonel Yosef (Joe) Alon, a former air force pilot, and one of the founders of the Israeli air force, was assassinated in Maryland while serving as Israel's air attaché to the United States. His friends established a non-profit association in his name. The "Center for Regional and Folklore Studies" was dedicated to his memory in 1973, with the inauguration of the first building in 1975.

After the opening, the Keren Kayemet Le-Israel (Jewish National Fund-JNF-KKL) provided a substantial amount to enable it to build a second floor and observatory. The KKL is the primary Zionist movement involved with Jewish land purchases before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. It received a space for exhibiting its own important contribution to Jewish settlement in the Negev (Fig. 13.4). The rooftop observatory provides a wonderful view of the surroundings, and even has a telescope for gazing at the stars.

In the 1980s, the Center directors initiated an ambitious plan (Lissar 1980) (Fig. 13.5). It aimed to include five new buildings to facilitate the study of the history of the area and its characteristics, including the following:

- Collecting and displaying the archeological findings.
- Collecting and exhibiting local Bedouin ethnology and folklore.
- Collecting and exhibiting the local flora and fauna, a geological display, and samples of the local agriculture.

³See the list of the many archeological expeditions in Israeli Antiquity Authority website: <http://www.hadashot-esi.org.il/search.aspx> (accessed 5 Jan. 2017).

⁴Uzi Halamish interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav, 8 Oct. 2015.



Fig. 13.4 KKL exhibition in Joe Alon Center (by H. Yahel 2015)




Fig. 13.5 Proposed site plan, architect Zvi Lissar, Program for Joe Alon Center, 1980 (Joe Alon Center Archive)



Fig. 13.6 Aerial photo of Joe Alon Center, around 1985 (Joe Alon Center Archive)

- Guiding pupils and visitors at the local historical site.
- Encouraging and developing tourism in the countryside.
- Assisting research delegations and local researchers.
- Organizing meetings and symposia.

However only the Museum of Bedouin Culture materialized (Fig. 13.6).

In that period, a large private collection of objects representing Bedouin tribes of the Sinai Peninsula was created by Orna Goren, an Israeli who lived with her family in central Sinai from 1975, where a substantive number of Bedouin live. As an archeologist, she was aware of the importance of preservation. Goren established a museum for Bedouin culture in Sinai. However, in 1982 as part of the peace treaty with Egypt, Israel was obliged to withdraw from Sinai and Goren needed a place for her exhibits. Navon offered to display her collection along with the existing Bedouin objects in the newly-built space. Goren became the Bedouin museum's first curator, a task she carried on until 2006 when Chavi Feingold, her assistant, took over the position.⁵

Halamish, Navon, and Goren traveled to the United States and Mexico to gain impressions of museums devoted to native tribes. In 1985, with the help of the Joe Alon Association, the KKL, Israel's government, and some private contributors, the

⁵Navon Avi interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav, 4 Nov. 2015; Feingold Chavi, interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav Forest, 9 Feb. 2017.

museum was reopened, combining the two collections. Since that time it has been managed by the Bnei Shimon Regional Council (Navon 1988).

Shortly before the reopening, many of the archeological items were stolen, and the Israel Antiquities Authority refused to grant the center suitable antiquities to replace those that had been stolen.

Despite the attention devoted to Bedouin culture, Halamish wished to maintain the museum as an interdisciplinary study center about the place and its entire region, and not only for the field of Bedouin culture. Halamish has said that it had been suggested to call the place the “National Museum for Bedouin Culture” and to refrain from delving into other subjects, but he was opposed to this idea, and therefore promoted the establishment of two additional wings.

13.5.2 The Jewish Heritage Wings

In the 1990s, Halamish began development of two new wings focused on Jewish history: the Bar Kochba Museum and the Museum of Jewish Pioneering Settlement in the Negev.

Bar Kochba led a revolt against the Roman Empire in 132 C.E. He established an independent Hasmonean Jewish state which he ruled for three years. Under his leadership, the Jewish community dug a complex system of underground caves and channels in which to hide themselves from the Romans. Several of these caves were discovered near the Center. The display included several replicas of connected caves, where visitors could see and sense the underground life of the Jewish warriors. It also had a film and several objects in glass cases with explanations. This museum was open only for a short while, due to safety issues (see Fig. 13.7).

The second new museum wing focused on Jewish settlement in the Negev in modern times. “Daroma,” an impressive and costly audiovisual display was a central part of the exhibit, telling the history of Jewish settlement, mainly that of the 20th-century Zionist movement. This wing was also closed, unable to continue the expensive audiovisual display.

Fig. 13.7 A replica of underground Bar Kochba caves in the museum (by H. Yahel 2015)



When Halamish left his position as manager in 2010, his first successor, Eyal Zamir, put all the focus on the Bedouin museum. However, in 2013, another shift occurred. Ofir Libstein who volunteered to be the head of the center, explained:

Until a few years ago, the Museum of Bedouin Heritage was the core, but today it is becoming the center for multicultural settlement in the Negev. We have two central wings, one that preserves the Bedouin heritage, and the other representing the progress of Jewish settlement in the Negev. We provide a meeting point between the two populations. When I say multiculturalism, I mean that you can find in this region, for example, Bedouin from the cities as well as recognized and unrecognized villages, along with people from Hashomer Hatzair kibbutzim, evacuees from Gush Katif who are instructors in the center, and religious and secular Jews who live together in Kibbutz Kramim.⁶

Barkai Saar, who took over the management after Libstein in 2015, emphasized the relations between Jewish life in the olden days and the nomadic Bedouin culture.⁷

13.6 The Museum of Bedouin Culture

13.6.1 *Who Are the Negev Bedouin?*

In the Negev desert, in the southern part of the State of Israel, live around 1 million people, of whom 230,000 are Muslim Bedouin and the rest Jewish. The Negev is a peripheral and marginal region.

The Bedouin are the poorest sector in Israel and suffer from high unemployment and a high birth rate (Annual Bureau of Statistics 2015). As a traditional community, the women are subject to various restrictions in the public sphere. One-third of the Bedouin men are married to more than one wife, although illegal under Israeli law (Lapidot-Firilla and Elhadad 2006; Abu-Rabia et al. 2008). The Negev Bedouin are not a homogenous community, comprising at least three different groups. The “genuine” or “true” Bedouin were once nomadic tribes living as herders in the rough conditions of the desert. For their survival they developed a unique way of life with traditions, strict laws, and an enforcement system. These Bedouin tribes roamed between the Arabian deserts, and arrived in the Negev mainly within the last 200 years. The fellahin—farmers who immigrated from the Nile valley in Egypt seeking available arable lands—joined the genuine Bedouin tribes and took upon themselves many of the Bedouin traditions. The third group consists of former slaves, who had been bought by sheikhs. In 1948 War and immediately thereafter, the Bedouin went through significant changes, with more than three-quarters of them fleeing from the Negev to neighbouring countries (Yahel and Kark 2015). The 11,000 Bedouin that remain within Israeli borders have

⁶Hazman Ha-Yarok, 28 Mar. 2013.

⁷Saar Barkai, interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav Forest, 29 Sep. 2015.

gradually begun to settle in towns and villages, leaving their nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life. Currently, 60% of the Bedouin live in planned towns, while the rest are widely scattered in unauthorized settlements, where they suffer from a lack of infrastructure. The current problematic situation is strongly related to land disputes between the state and around 15% of them, in an area of about 600,000 dunams (Yahel 2017). Over the years since 1948 many state committees have proposed various solutions to the disputes, but with very limited success.

13.6.2 *The Bedouin Culture Exhibitions*

The permanent exhibition of the Bedouin culture—one of the largest of its kind—was opened in 1985. It includes around 500 heritage objects of the more than 3000 that the museum holds. About 100 of the displayed objects were collected by Goren in Sinai. The 828-m² exhibition was designed by Dodik Gal of the Israel Museum. The museum received official recognition from the state (Feingold personal interview 2017). One of the museum's brochures states:

“[The museum] was established in 1985 when it became apparent that the formerly nomadic Bedouin tribes of Sinai and the Negev were in a process of transition to a more settled way of life, moving to established towns and villages. The Bedouin have recently acquired a modern way of life, reflected in cultural, social and economic changes as well as changes in housing, dress etc. As a result, many of the former Bedouin ways of life are disappearing, and with them the objects and traditions of Bedouin society, prompting a need to collect, preserve and record them before they completely disappear.”⁸

The displays include mainly traditional objects: Bedouin arts, weaving, weapons, and artifacts (see Figs. 13.8, 13.9 and 13.10). It also presents a sheik's grave and the unique traditions around it. Household items, jewelry, and artwork were donated by Bedouin families. The brochure describes the setting:

“The visitor walks around the display in a circle, resembling the wanderings of the Bedouin and the cycle of the seasons. Displayed here are different types of dwelling, articles of clothing, examples of crafts and traditional economies, pieces of jewelry, toys, etc. A display of authentic woven carpets hangs down from the ceiling into the central hall. The visitor continues down a flight of stairs to the lower floor, devoted to more spiritual aspects of traditional Bedouin life: history, society, the cycle of life, traditional medicine, and the customs of the Bedouin market.”⁹

The Bedouin heritage is also presented in the traditional host tent outside. Visitors can hear stories and folktales, while the Bedouin host tends an open fire. Visitors are offered bitter coffee, sweetened tea, and baked pita straight from the *taboon* oven. In the outdoor setting, there are also live animals, such as camels,

⁸See in the museum website: <http://www.joealon.org.il/?page=category&cat=63> (accessed 5 Jan. 2017).

⁹Ibid.



Fig. 13.8 Weaving loom, the Bedouin museum collection (by H. Yahel 2015)



Fig. 13.9 Bedouin weapons and other artifacts, the Bedouin museum collection (by T. Regev 2013)



Fig. 13.10 Camel saddle, the Bedouin museum collection (by H. Yahel 2015)

goats, and horses (Fig. 13.11). Outside the museum buildings a herb garden, including a section for herbal medicine was cultivated.

Bedouin objects are also presented, in the Satellite museum (mobile exhibits) initiated with the cooperation of educators from Rahat, a nearby Bedouin town.¹⁰ “The Color of the Desert” exhibit was presented in Bedouin towns and villages as well as Jewish schools throughout the country.

13.6.3 Guides

The primary guides for the museum have always been Bedouin, offering tours in Hebrew and Arabic (Fig. 13.12). Most of the guides are Negev residents. Several, including head guide Auda Abu Ka’ud, are from the ‘Arab a-Ramdin tribe, which prior to 1948 had lived on the lands where the museum is now located and had then gone to dwell in the Hebron hills, now under the Palestinian Authority. After 1967, these employees received permission to work in Israel.

¹⁰Halamish Uzi interviewed by Noam Perry, Lahav, 16 Aug. 2007.



Fig. 13.11 A camel in the museums yard (by H. Yahel 2015)

13.6.4 Management

Paid executives of the museum are all Jewish, although Bedouin representatives have been part of the governing board. An important aim of the museum was that it should operate in full cooperation with Bedouin community leaders.¹¹

13.6.5 Visitors

At its peak, when all Israeli third-grade classes visited the museum as part of the curriculum, there were more than 50,000 visitors a year. When the Ministry of Education abolished the practice, the number of visitors dropped.¹² In 2012, there were about 15,000 visitors, with an increase in 2016 to about 35,000.¹³ The internal distribution of visitors was inconsistent during the last years, however the number of Bedouin pupils have doubled in the last 4 years to about 10% of the visitors. However, according to interviews, there is an increased interest in the museum by

¹¹Uzi Haramish interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav, 8 Oct. 2015.

¹²Ofir Libstein, *Hazman Ha-Yarok*, 28 Mar. 2014 http://www.kibbutz.org.il/itonut/2013/dafyarok/130328_jo_alon.htm (accessed 9 Jan. 2017).

¹³Feingold Chavi, interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav Forest, 9 Feb. 2017.

Bedouin individuals and leaders.¹⁴ Halil Abu Shriki residence of Lakiya, a nearby Bedouin village brought his family to visit the museum, explaining:

“I come here at least once a year and enjoy seeing the items and explaining our tradition to my children and grandchildren. I lived in a tent but they live in a house.”¹⁵

His wife Na’ama wanted to have a picture with her daughter and grandchild in the small tent on the lower floor of the museum, noting they have nothing like that in their village (see Fig. 13.13).

13.6.6 Limitations of the Bedouin Exhibition

Regarding technical aspects, the exhibition has not changed since 1985, and is outdated. There is an urgent need to invest in conservation of the exhibits and displays.

As for its content, despite its clearly-stated aims and its cooperation with the Bedouin community, the museum has been criticized for not reflecting the many changes that have occurred in Bedouin society since the 1980s, including the accelerated urbanization and current social problems. The lack of connection to contemporary Bedouin society even led to the resignation of Orna Goren.¹⁶ Almost all the displays present past traditions. Current Bedouin urban life, and the story of the new Bedouin villages and towns are hardly mentioned. In 2006, when Goren left her position at the museum she noted that her suggestions for changes had been rejected due to budgetary restraints. She further explained:

“A museum should develop, to be connected to the Bedouin population and demonstrate what is happening within it today.... I think that I also represent the Bedouin ... who wish to see the change...”¹⁷

Feingold shares this view and thinks that the physical aspects of modern Bedouin life should be included in the display.¹⁸

But not everyone agrees that the museum should address current issues. Ali Abu Qrinat, a Bedouin museum guide for fifteen years believes that:

“We [Bedouin] should present our past heritage, there is nothing worth presenting in the present.”¹⁹

These contradictory views remain as an open question. The Bedouin community has gone through many changes in the last 100 years, from traditional nomadic to a

¹⁴Salah Abu-Habi, *Hazman Ha-Yarok*, 28 Mar. 2014.

¹⁵Halil Abu Shriki, interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav Forest, 29 May 2015.

¹⁶Uzi Halamish interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav, 8 Oct. 2015.

¹⁷*Haaretz*, 4 Sept. 2006.

¹⁸Feingold Chavi, interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav Forest, 9 Feb. 2017.

¹⁹Ali Abu Qrinat, interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav Forest, 29 May 2015.



Fig. 13.12 Ibrahim Abu Khaf during guided tour in the museum (by H. Yahel 2015)



Fig. 13.13 Naama Abu Shriki with her daughter and grandchild in a small tent (by H. Yahel 2015)

Fig. 13.14 Part of the wall hanging in the bedouin Museum (by H. Yahel 2015)



modern, western-like, permanent-dwelling way of life. Modernity brought, among other things, decreasing respect for the elderly and the traditional leadership; the empowerment of women, many of whom want to be more independent and to be able to study and work outside the village. It also gave power to the movement against polygamy. Other current challenges relate to ongoing land disputes, the question of unrecognized Bedouin settlements, and the poor quality of Bedouin public services. Whether they like it or not, new western perceptions are entering through the back door. One interesting example is the large embroidered wall hanging (more than 5.5 m², see Fig. 13.14). This work was a project of a workshop, the “embroidery of women’s dreams.” The stories and symbols depicted are not representative of desert life, but rather those of sedentary communities with many green trees.

13.6.7 The Bedouin—Joe Alon Center Relationship

The relationship between the Center and the Bedouin community has been one of respect and appreciation, but over the years it has become more complex. Four factors are notable: first, the museum was not established by the Bedouin community which is the subject of the exhibit; second, the museum is located outside of the many Bedouin settlements; third, it is managed by non-Bedouin Jews; fourth, the center does not represent a “single-ethnic community,” but puts the Jewish and

Bedouin narratives side by side in the context of a place, since it was initially created as a regional museum for the Negev (Perry and Kark 2017).

These issues are not necessarily negative, especially the first two. Some Bedouin express their appreciation for the conservation of their objects, some of which are rare and unique, and would otherwise likely have vanished forever.

As for the location of the Center, it is in a “neutral” territory outside of inter-tribal disputes, since the Lahav Forest region was not part of any current Negev tribes’ territory. There are no Bedouin tribes living in the Lahav forest, so there are no claims of discrimination raised by one or another tribe. Its neutral location assuages the fear that the museum might be “taken over” by one tribe at the expense of others, to present only their specific tribal legacy.²⁰

But the two other issues are more problematic. Regarding the issue of Jewish management, the museum director has requested that Bedouin leaders become more involved, and over the years, the board of directors included Bedouin leaders. The center is seeking a Bedouin curator to work together with the Bedouin guides. According to Barkai and Feingold, until now no Negev Bedouin has expressed any interest in studying the field of museology.

As for the question of dual narratives, the current position of the museum board is in favor of change.²¹ It was decided not to re-open the Jewish wings and to focus only on the Bedouin exhibition. They also drafted a new vision to the Center which states:

“... to create a comfort zone for acquaintance between Jewish and Bedouin groups, since these meetings rarely happen elsewhere in the region.”²²

The aim is to promote the center as a bridge builder between Jews and Bedouin, while the Bedouin minority should feel empowered and respected.

In September 2016 the Bnei-Shimon Regional Council, decided to take over the old building that holds some of the center offices as well as the KKL and Jewish exhibitions. There, they opened high school classes for the Desert Stars initiative. Desert Stars is a nonprofit organization working to foster a young Bedouin leadership through a long intensive program.²³ This seems to be the final negative response to the debate over dual narratives under one roof in a regional museum in southern Israel.

²⁰Ali Abu Qrinat interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav Forest, 29 May 2015; Ibrahim Abu Kaf interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav Forest, 29 Sep. 2015; Navon Avi interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav, 4 Nov. 2015.

²¹Barkai Saar, interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav Forest, 29 Sep. 2015; Eimi Chopin Ein-Gedi interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav Forest, 29 Sep. 2015; Yaron Ben Shalom Richardson, interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Shoket, 1 Feb. 2016.

²²Barkai Saar, interviewed by Havatzelet Yahel, Lahav Forest, 29 Sep. 2015.

²³See Desert Stars homepage: <http://www.desertstars.org.il/home> (accessed 7 Jan. 2017).

13.6.8 *The Future of the Center*

The future of the regional center as a whole, and the Bedouin museum in particular is now uncertain. It is clear that the only museology activity will be that of the Bedouin museum. The high school management hopes to motivate the pupils to be involved in the Bedouin museum programs, but the museum staff have expressed concerns that in the future, the museum will become merely the “back yard” of the high school.

13.7 Conclusion

We have presented a case study of one regional center in southern Israel where an attempt was made to present two different narratives of local communities: the Jewish majority and the Bedouin minority. One of the questions raised was: is it possible to operate a regional multicultural ethnic museum in Israel? According to the experience of the Joe Alon Center, displaying two ethnic cultures with differing and contradicting histories and narratives under the same roof proved to be difficult and problematic. This outcome can be connected to poor management, and too many changes over the years, but our conclusion is that today in Israel, with so many challenges facing the communities, each one needs a place of its own in order to be empowered by ethnographic museums and centers.

The Joe Alon Center now prefers to focus on the Bedouin, and to put aside the Jewish history. This preference is both interesting and important, due to the fact that the Bedouin are a non-dominant minority group in Israel. This route provides a better chance to encourage the Bedouin to participate and get involved in the preservation of their traditions. The museum could play an important role in Bedouin empowerment, especially for the younger generation. We hope that all members involved in the municipality, in the high school, and in the center will collaborate in order to strengthen the positive potential and possible impact of the museum.

Some museums can function as bridges between different parts of Israeli society, and thus may contribute to its future as a multicultural state, as in the Joe Alon Museum’s initial mission. As a part of a “supposedly multicultural national policy,” Israel should embrace these museums, support them, and encourage additional under-represented cultural groups to establish museums.

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Chapter 14

Recognition Policy of Bedouin Villages in Israel, Marginalization and the Ethic of Bio-cultural Diversity

Avinoam Meir

14.1 Introduction

Since the birth of the State of Israel in 1948 Bedouin settlement in the Negev desert has attracted the attention of countless scholars studying cultural, social, economic and political issues concerning the far-reaching changes in this indigenous minority. Countless recent studies were conducted on state policy of Bedouin settlement, with similar issues, cast within indigenous rights and social justice (e.g. Roded and Tzfadia 2013; Yiftachel and Roded 2014). The reason for such great attention is perhaps rooted in this group's (population 2016—240,000) extreme marginality in Israel. Bedouin marginality is multi-faceted: indigenous tribal traditional agro-pastoral people versus a settler modern urban industrial society; a Middle Eastern orthodox Muslim culture versus a Western Jewish secular culture; and an Israeli Arab-Palestinian identity versus Zionist Jewish identity. Their marginality is accentuated even within the Arab minority of Israel (about 1.2 million) as the most economically backward group (Abu-Saad and Lithwick 2000).

While these issues are important, environmental issues have been almost entirely missing from research discourses with only few studies (Meallem and Garb 2008; Kissinger and Karplus 2015) mostly limited in scope. This is striking given the extreme change in this close-to-nature culture and the recent growth of international interest in the impact of global climate change and resource exploitation on cultures and habitats of indigenous peoples (e.g. Salick and Byg 2007).

This lacuna is even more striking given that the policy of settlement of the Bedouin concerns a major environmental resource—that of about 1000 km² of territory (about 5% of national area) which they presently inhabit. This resource is contested by both the Bedouin for pursuing their traditional livelihood and by the

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state for implementing its national development projects. The conflict revolves around land ownership within what the Bedouin regard as their traditional tribal territories (Meir 2009). Yet little theoretical or empirical research has been conducted about *environmental aspects* of state Bedouin settlement policy and the benefits that may accrue to all involved—the Bedouin, the state and the environment if such issues are integrated into policy.

This situation may be termed environmental *marginalization*. The people inhabiting this desert environment are marginalized as their environment is driven to the backstage of state-indigenous politics. Adopting Leimgruber's (2004) quaternary classification of marginality, our concern is with a systemic marginality that is produced by hegemonic forces within the Israeli political and economic system. However, rather than generating inequities through the maldistribution of social, political and economic benefits, in our case we focus on the maldistribution of environmental benefits.

This chapter presents precisely this issue. Our purpose was to explore it from a conceptual-theoretical perspective such that it provides a wicket for a further empirical study. Since at macro-scale Bedouin detachment from their major subsistence resource of livestock grazing is primarily of a cultural nature, there is by necessity a close association between culture and environment. We submit that this linkage and the environmental shortcomings of state policy are best understood through the encompassing concept of biocultural diversity. However, based on our interpretations of this concept with regard to the Bedouin, we also explored briefly its interactions with the broader fields of environmental ethics and justice in terms of rights not only of the people but also of the eco-systemic environment involved.

14.2 Bedouin, Space, Environment and State

Our point of departure is an understanding of this society in its most fundamental historical condition as a close-to-nature grazing-cultivation pastoralist culture. Its social system is anchored in tribal organization (Marx 1974; Ben-David 2004) with an internal indigenous customary law (Bailey 2009; Stewart 2006) that leans upon historical accumulation of social knowledge. From the spatial and environmental perspectives (e.g., Stewart 1986; Perevolotsky 1987) this system covers delineation of territorial tribal boundaries and informal management regulations of space and eco-systemic resources that concern usage, cyclical movement and location of fixed and mobile abodes.

To best grasp the Bedouin-space-environment-State nexus we begin by the recently proposed concept of consummate space (Meir and Karplus 2015). This concept is particularly applicable to a unique small cultural group, such as an indigenous one, which constitutes distinctive spatial enclave within space of the greater society. We suggest that within the greater space, which has its grand mode of production (Lefebvre 1991), these cultural groups seek their distinctly optimal production of space. The search integrates land uses, modes of spatial and

environmental management and ‘regulation’, and ideals, symbols and experiences constituting group-based customary patterns and practices. Consummate space implies perfectness in terms of congruence, stability and mutual harmony of the components vital for the fully-realized existence of this cultural group (see e.g. Harvey 1985; Karplus and Meir 2013). As an imagined entity it is manifested in intimate familiarity with and acceptance of its tangible components and their self-produced rules and regulations concerning the permitted and forbidden. Its stability is reflected in high individual and collective economic, environmental, social and political security and assuredness in their space, facilitating socially, culturally, politically and environmentally sustained resilience in the face of pressures applied by external processes of space production.

Bedouin space until mid-20th century may be described as relatively consummate whereby their livestock grazing and dry farming economy continued almost uninterrupted. This enabled a long period of accumulating environmental knowledge (Marx 1973; Bailey 1976) through intimate relationships with first nature (landforms) and second nature (biological and zoological entities). This vernacular knowledge has transformed into Bedouin’s unique culture as their third nature (Karplus and Meir 2014) and a supporting pillar of their consummate space.

Similar to other pastoral societies in the 20th Century (Khazanov 1994), and indigenous peoples in general, since the early 1950s the State of Israel has been interfering with Bedouin delicate space-environment nexus. Broadly, state attitude towards the Bedouin was driven by security and geo-political motives. The resultant settlement policy involved considerable relocation of Bedouin groups from their traditional territories (Meir 1997; Ben-David 2004; Yahel and Kark 2014) and dispossession of their land rights (Yiftachel et al. 2012). Spatially, since the mid-1960s this policy intended to relocate all Bedouin population (then ~ 20,000) into state-planned towns. Until the late 1980s, seven such towns were established and about half of the Bedouin population was resettled. These new town-dwellers, belonging largely to a landless subgroup, were traditionally sub-ordinate to the real Bedouin landlords (Ben-David and Gonen 2001). As such they were not part of the land conflict. Relocation to towns was perceived a social upgrading as the state allotted them with small land plots for residential purposes in exchange for evacuating their spaces. The real Bedouin, constituting the second half of the population, have been refusing to wave their land rights and relocate to towns. They settled independently within their territories in dozens compounds of squatter villages which have become unrecognized by the state. The struggle for recognition involves demands for provision of municipal and state social services and infrastructures, and eligibility for municipal independence and elections. In the recent decade the state has recognized 12 villages (population ~ 60,000). However, the land conflict with the state is not resolved and this recognition has been “on paper” only without actual resettlement. The remainder of the population in the unrecognized villages, numbering about 30–40,000, has not even been included in this ‘recognition’ scheme. In fact, all unrecognized villages (population ~ 100,000), are still not regulated spatially.

Bedouin economy has been shifting toward integration with the secondary and tertiary sectors in the urban labour market. Yet, in many respects the Bedouin in these villages still resemble their traditional agro-pastoral subsistence economy. This group is the focus of our theoretical engagement with environmental aspects of state policy of recognition and settlement.

14.3 The Bedouin and Cultural Diversity

State policy towards Bedouin settlement desires their evacuation from traditional territories under the disguise of social modernization through the Western urbanization model (Meir 1997). Implementation of this policy involves functional detachment from subsistence grazing and dry farming economy. This policy, reflecting cultural transformation, completely disregards Bedouin indigenous historical attachment to their places and their significant material emotional and symbolic meanings. It constitutes thus a unidimensional and linear view of Bedouin culture premised on an assumption that this society has been a socially, economically and culturally homogenous pastoral-nomadic group. This assumption entailed therefore a vision of the desirable future for these people in which they are destined to linearly follow the urbanization trajectory of development.

We contend that, from the perspective of cultural diversity, these views of Bedouin culture are highly simplistic. In a globalized world cultural diversity that is, the quality of coexistence of diverse cultures within the same political realm, is viewed currently as highly vital for the survival of humanity in the long-term, calling thus for protection of unique sub-cultures (see UNESCO 2002). In examining pre-urbanization Bedouin society we suggest it is capable of contributing considerably to cultural diversity nationally and regionally. Those multiple dimensions of Bedouin marginality highlighted above are customarily viewed from marginality's negative perspective that requires adopting equity values in closing development gaps towards the majority culture. However, by adopting an alternative perspective of marginality we may view it precisely as a resource (Meir 1999) such that these dimensions may carry significant positive meanings. We may look at the Bedouin from the perspective of liminality in its interpretation as an edge culture. This interpretation implies the Bedouin practice a significantly different mode of living with modes of knowledge normally unavailable to the host culture. This knowledge constitutes a cultural capital and an important resource for the benefit of the wider society in various areas of life. This notion of marginality as an advantage is commensurate with Santos' (2007) post-abyssal thinking and the role of 'other' knowledge ecologies in shifting the status of marginal regions and peoples into center stage as equally legitimate and valuable to those of 'core' regions and cultures.

While the Israeli government ignores this local potential contribution to cultural diversity, the Bedouin were quite cognizant of it. In the late 1990s they launched a public campaign for state recognition and development in their villages. It was

directed against the regional master plan prepared by the state in 1995 which ignored these villages altogether. The Bedouin prepared an alternative plan with one of its sections dealing specifically with their culture (RCBUV 1999) which we interpret here from the perspective of cultural diversity. In this document they argue that as part of the Arab minority sharing the same space with the Jewish majority they cannot be excluded from this regional bi-cultural reality.

However, the major notion in this plan was that of a multi-faceted Bedouin society. First, following the seven-town urbanization program, this society is now divided between urban culture and a rural culture, the latter still greatly oriented towards grazing and cultivation. The latter tier contains itself further sub-divisions, with groups that rely on grazing and those with greater inclination towards cultivation, both as cultural extensions of their semi-nomadic agro-pastoral heritage. Furthermore, historically geographically and tribally this subdivision is diverse in its origins in the Levant, northern Arabia and northern Africa. Finally, even within the unrecognized villages there are still some peasant landless subgroups whose ancestors became annexed by the Bedouin in late 19th Century for cultivating their land as sharecroppers or as slaves but did not settle in towns yet (Karplus 2010). As shown also by linguists Rosenhouse (1984) and Henkin-Roitfarb (2011) Bedouin dialects vary locally as well as nationally within the Israeli Palestinian Arab minority.

All these constitute an internal and external mosaic of considerable cultural diversity within Bedouin community. In Bedouin view (Meir 2005) their culture is capable of generating interbreeding with the Jewish majority culture, enriching thus regional cultural diversity and become an active partner in the regional multi-cultural system rather than a passive trailer of a unitary urban culture to which the state destines them.

14.4 Biocultural Diversity

The concept of cultural diversity and its crucial role in human existence draws upon its predecessor—biological diversity. For our purposes we adopt a basic common and encompassing definition that regards biodiversity as the “totality of genes, species and ecosystems of a region” (Larson 2001, p. 178). Biodiversity is regarded a vital resource, and is thought to be essential for the long-term survival of life on earth. Contrary to past ethics, in recent decades it has become conventionally accepted that all life forms including humans are equally sharing the same earth ecosystem. Therefore the two concepts should be viewed integrally in what has become accepted as *biocultural diversity* (Maffi 2001, 2007). Its basic notion is that by preserving the multitude of cultures, however small and local, global as well as local, biodiversity can be preserved with considerable benefits for the wellbeing of humanity also biodiversity.

The biocultural diversity discourse refers particularly to those liminal cultures such as indigenous peoples. These groups tend to inhabit marginal edge or

transitional environments that are most often remote and characterized by extreme conditions avoided by core global and national cultures. These environments contain eco-systemic assets in flora and fauna highly valuable to the local cultures but not less to the core culture yet unfamiliar to its members. Turner et al. have shown that such edges of ecosystems often exhibit high levels of species richness. Similarly, cultural transitional areas, where cultures interact, are rich and diverse in cultural traits of many small groups who inhabit them. This results in availability of a wider overall range of traditional ecological knowledge since their indigenous inhabitants take action to maintain their ecological sustainability (Turner et al. 2003).

These notions are highly related to the concept of biocultural diversity. In communities that rely directly on local natural resources for subsistence the social and cultural structure may be viewed as reflective of a latent vernacular system of management and preservation of these resources. This system, as elaborated by Kideghesho (2008), is the reservoir of all beliefs, customs and taboos inherent in their heritage. In the absence of importable external resources, the system is dependent upon and tied to the local natural resources through a process of long and uninterrupted evolutionary and symbiotic local relationships. It carries thus the entire accumulated cultural knowledge produced in this symbiosis. This is embodied in the local group's language which is the reservoir of local concepts, terms and names that by necessity reflect closely the local biocultural diversity as its major source (Smith 2001).

Biocultural diversity as a theoretical concept has not escaped criticism. One of the major criticisms has been that the power of biocultural diversity is diminished when local indigenous communities suffer the impact of western economic and development powers. In such a reality, argues Holt (2005), the cultural diversity gradually disappears, to be followed then by the environmental values cherished traditionally within practice and language. But we wish to reverse this proposition. We maintain that if such cultural systems are given the opportunity to preserve their consummate space such that it remains uninterrupted, there is quite a significant potential of preserving their culture, their particular ecosystem (which no other culture can or wishes to inhabit), and thus its biodiversity. That is, policies of development should not highlight economic benefits solely but rather become 'culturalized' by aiming at cultural benefits to the local group too, particularly among indigenous peoples.

14.5 Bedouin Unrecognized Villages and Biocultural Diversity

Despite various constraints imposed by the state on Bedouin grazing and cultivation, such as limited grazing spaces and water allocation and despite non-profitability of this enterprise, the Bedouin continue to maintain their livestock

(sheep and goats) estimated at about 200,000 heads (Landau et al. 2015) in both towns and the unrecognized villages. Many households still raise animals but at very small flock size. While men have entered the waged labour market, their women take a major role in this activity. For some households, with large flocks, this is their prime source of income. But for most others this is a cultural symbol and a vehicle for maintaining Bedouin tradition while also providing some extra income under conditions of permanent economic uncertainty, high unemployment rate and lowest income levels (Ginguld et al. 1997; Kressel 2003; Degen and el Meccawi 2009; Wachs and Tal 2009).

The last 2-3 decades have witnessed a lively research on the ecological value of Bedouin livestock grazing, attesting to the significance of the issue (Perevolotsky and Seligman 1998; Perevolotsky 2006; Wachs and Tal 2009; Golodets and Boeken 2006; Boeken 2012). The major conclusion by these studies is that, contrary to reduced biodiversity and increased land degradation effects of Bedouin grazing as previously argued (Society for Protection of Nature 2008), in Middle Eastern ecologies biodiversity can peak and land degradation reduced precisely through livestock grazing, provided that it is practiced at moderate levels that avoid blanket overgrazing and maximized livestock production value. As shown the Bedouin have the ecological know-how to maintain the quality of their grazing ecosystems under uninterrupted conditions (Bailey 1976) that is, politically uninterrupted consummate space, as revealed also by Meir and Tsoar (1996) regarding vegetation density, soil stability and desertification effects of overgrazing.

We may now relate this to the notion of biocultural diversity. Only about 7% of the Israeli urban Jewish population (the core cultural group) actually inhabits the Negev desert which constitutes about 50% of national territory. The Bedouin, in contrast, view this region as their natural habitat. Livestock grazing carries thus a potential ecological value in preservation of biodiversity. In other words it is Bedouin culture that best fits the ecological conditions of this ecosystem, possessing the know-how for merging between these two components of biocultural diversity. And yet, despite attempts by the state, Bedouin livestock grazing has been largely an unregulated enterprise, practiced particularly in the unrecognized villages. The risk of overgrazing and soil degradation at presently unrecognized spaces, where their consummate space has been interrupted severely, is significant.

Interpreting this from state Bedouin settlement policy, recognition of Bedouin villages may serve as a vehicle for achieving considerably greater regulation of livestock grazing. This can be reached through enhanced planning and implementation, including land ownership arrangements, of those villages that have recently already received formal recognition. Eco-systemic regulation of livestock grazing will thus become part of the overall regulation of Bedouin space in these villages as a vehicle toward reaching moderate grazing capable of increasing biodiversity and reducing land degradation. As shown by the above-reviewed studies, sufficient scientific knowledge has been accumulated concerning various aspects of flora, fauna, soils, and hydrological and geomorphological processes related to grazing in this region to facilitate establishment of criteria for moderate livestock grazing in terms of flock size, composition and spatio-temporal distribution. The

vernacular knowledge accumulated culturally by this indigenous group will complement this rational scientific knowledge for the benefit of the local ecosystem.

14.6 Environmental Ethics Implications for Policy

Environmental benefits accrued from Bedouin grazing have already been accounted for (e.g. Wachs and Tal 2009). To this we may now add an environmental ethics perspective that is itself viewed from the perspective of marginality. The marginality discourse mostly highlights issues related to social and distributional justice. However, based on the concepts of consummate space and advantageous marginality proposed above, and following Karplus and Meir (2010), we may suggest that any social group (indigenous peoples in particular) has the cultural right for its unique spatiality that is, to produce its own consummate space within an ecosystem based on its cultural richness. Accepting the biocultural diversity paradigm, in which human cultures and their ecosystems are integrated at equal weights, it is insufficient to highlight human rights without equally highlighting ecological rights. We submit that as much as humans have the right to enjoy biodiversity as an ecosystem service for improving their livelihood and cultural sustainability, the ecosystem itself has an equal right to enjoy the cultural service generated by the cultural diversity of the people who inhabit it so that it can maintain its own biodiversity and become thus sustainable itself. This corresponds with the spirit of the deep ecology ethic (Naess 1989). The bi-directional ethic of biocultural diversity is an inherent ecological and cultural value, particularly among marginal indigenous peoples practicing tight relationships with nature.

This ethic is not only an abstract concept but one that carries practical implications. State policy of Bedouin settlement in the Negev may be interpreted as an attempt to reduce their internal and external contribution to cultural diversity through driving them towards the modern urban Western core culture. Consequently their right for spatiality, based on their unique pastoralist indigenous culture, has been denied, but concomitantly such is also their contribution to their ecosystem's sustainability, entailing thus its declining biodiversity. Linguistic studies have shown that Bedouin dialects, in terms of semantics of prepositions and cognitive aspects, have been changing inter-generationally following sedentarization (Rosenhouse 1984) including space-time terminology (Henkin and Cerqueglini forthcoming). As their forced settlement (*sédentarisation*) is associated with detachment from herding, which relied closely upon the natural environment, this linguistic change carries implications also for their cultural relations with the natural environment in terms of losing valuable vernacular indigenous knowledge of ecosystem management.

14.7 Conclusion

Following forced settlement (sédentarisation), forced relocation to towns and integration into the labour market economy, Bedouin traditional capacity to contribute to biocultural diversity has declined considerably. This is a lose-lose game for all entities involved—the Bedouin, the ecosystem, and the state. The alternative is an in situ recognition of all Bedouin villages in the Negev. This will allow the state to regularize livestock grazing at the desired moderate levels. Such policy change can contribute to the preservation and even increase of both biological diversity and cultural diversity through preserving significant components of traditional Bedouin pastoralist culture. It will facilitate materialization of the joint right for bioculturality by both the Bedouin and the ecological system and thus the right for social, spatial and environmental justice for this marginal group. This may become a win-win solution, working for the mutual benefit of all parties involved in this nexus of Bedouin, space, environment and state.

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Part V
Possible Drivers of Marginalization
from Different Perspectives

Chapter 15

Migration, Education and Marginality: Networks and Strategies in the Pacific Islands

John Overton and Warwick E. Murray

15.1 Introduction

Marginality is manifested and expressed in many different forms across the world. As a consequence, society and its constituent communities have evolved a diverse range of strategies to cope with and lessen, its effects. For many, migration is a common response to limited resources and opportunities. The search for higher education is also seen as way to build capability to respond, both within marginal areas and also in terms of its effect of facilitating migration. In this chapter we examine the case of the Pacific Islands in relation to migration and education. We first explore the context of marginality in the region and its multiple dimensions. We then focus on the role of education in expanding the options available for the regional population before analysing the strategies adopted by states, kinship networks and individuals to exploit linkages with external economies and politics in ways which ensure a flow of resources back to the Pacific. We conclude by suggesting that these strategies amount to processes of ‘demarginalization’: active, conscious and astute actions of communities to engage with the outside world that preserve hearths and cultures as valuable resources rather than, as is often portrayed, constraints to achieving wellbeing and sustainability.

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15.1.1 Marginality in Oceania

The Pacific Island region covers a vast area of the Earth’s surface and includes a wide range of environments, populations, cultures and economies (Fig. 15.1). The concept of marginality seems to be particularly appropriate for this region and many authors have identified several dimensions to the vulnerability of people and countries in the region. We examine several of these in this section before offering a counter argument: that such negative views tend to portray the region as passive and fragile and thus limit the discourses of development available to people and states (Fry 1997). Instead, we draw on the work of Pacific scholars to open the debate to the possibilities of active and innovative forms of progressive development that link the region to the outside world.

15.1.2 Geographic

A simple reading of the geography of the Pacific Islands region stresses its geographic marginality. Firstly, there is the issue of isolation. Although we might see the Pacific islands as being located in the middle of one of the most dynamic and prosperous regions in the global economy—the so-called Asia Pacific region including North and South America, East and Southeast Asia and Australasia—the




Fig. 15.1 Map of the Pacific Islands

reality is that, in terms of transport and communications, most of the Pacific Islands are not well connected to main trade routes and transport costs are high. This means that the islands are not closely integrated into the global economy. Isolation is compounded by fragmentation. Many island states are characterised not by a single concentrated land mass and population but by many small islands. The country of Fiji, for example, has a population of around 850,000 people and over 300 islands, 100 of which are inhabited. These islands and their communities need to be linked together with services and trade and the costs of air and sea transport to integrate these places illustrate the costs and difficulty of linking these countries to the global economy. Such 'islandness' is an important dimension of marginality.

There is also the issue of size. With the notable exception of Papua New Guinea, no Pacific Island country has a population in excess of a million people (Table 15.1). Many have fewer than 100,000 people and some are true microstates. The country of Tuvalu, for example is fully independent with its own government, legislature, bureaucracy, international airport, diplomatic representation, currency and flag. Yet its total population is just over 10,000 people. The per-capita costs of being a microstate and supporting this state infrastructure are very high indeed. Other similar sized or even smaller states and territories exist but often they are in a political relationship with a metropolitan state—a theme we examine more below. Smallness, then, imposes costs and this can be a significant economic burden. It also means that, whilst independent, small island states are sometimes seen as having a little presence in international political diplomacy.

15.1.3 Environmental

Geographic marginality is paralleled by environmental constraints. Although some of the larger Pacific Island Melanesian states (Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia) have relatively substantial land masses, most of the island states of Polynesia are comprised of low lying coral atolls or the remnants of volcanic cones. The islands lie in an Ocean that experiences periodic cyclones, droughts and tsunamis. Furthermore, their often limited and fragile marine and terrestrial resources are subject to environmental degradation through pollution of lagoon waters, deforestation and coastal erosion.

However, although these contemporary environmental issues are serious and pressing, they have paled compared to recent concerns with climate change. The prospect—and many in the region would argue, the reality—of global warming and sea level rise has put the small low-lying islands of the Pacific at the centre of global concerns about climate change. Because many islands are coral atolls and often are no more than two or three metres above sea level at the highest, they are particularly susceptible. At its worst, predicted sea level rise may lead to many such islands—and in the case of Tokelau, Kiribati and Tuvalu, whole countries—disappearing beneath a rising sea, the effects of sea level are already being manifested in the form of coastal erosion and inundation and mounting saline intrusion of fresh water

Table 15.1 Populations and areas of Pacific Island States and territories

	Population (estim 2013)	Land area (km ²)	ODA per capita (\$US)
American Samoa	56,500	199	n.a.
Cook Islands	15,200	237	1,006
Federated States of Micronesia	103,000	701	1,390
Fiji	859,200	18,333	106
French Polynesia	261,400	3,521	n.a.
Guam	174,900	541	n.a.
Kiribati	108,800	811	594
Marshall Islands	54,200	18	1,733
Nauru	10,500	21	2,741
New Caledonia	259,000	18,576	n.a.
Niue	1,500	259	12,200
Norfolk Island	1,895	35	n.a.
Northern Mariana Islands	55,700	457	n.a.
Palau	17,800	444	1,992
Papua New Guinea	7,398,500	462,840	89
Pitcairn	45	47	n.a.
Rapa Nui	5,700	164	n.a.
Samoa	187,400	2,934	631
Solomon Islands	610,800	28,000	472
Tokelau	1,200	12	20,050
Tonga	103,300	749	786
Tuvalu	10,900	26	2,459
Vanuatu	264,700	12,281	343
Wallis and Futuna	12,200	142	8,650

Source Pacific Community 2016

lenses, making habitation already problematic. Added to the real threat of sea level rise, global climate change also poses the threat of potential increases in the incidence of storm events and droughts and, through warming, threats to vital processes such as coral growth and key subsistence crops.

15.1.4 Economic

Allied to geographic marginality, and largely a result of it, is the economic marginalization of the region. Isolation and fragmentation as we have seen lead to high transport costs. It can cost as much if not more to ship products to an outer island from the country's main port as it costs to transport the same goods from a far

distant metropolitan country to the main port. And shipping services may be far more irregular and infrequent. Smallness adds to these economic constraints for economies of scale cannot be achieved. These factors combine to mean that economic strategies based on export-led growth through exporting commodities for the global economy are simply not viable with small volumes and high transport costs. Indeed, global trade liberalization has severely affected former industries in the Pacific which enjoyed a degree of metropolitan protection and subsidy—including sugar, tropical fruit, rice and garments for example.

Some Pacific Island countries, such as Papua New Guinea, Fiji and New Caledonia enjoy rich natural resources: minerals, oil and gas, forests and fisheries. Yet these, again, are the larger states of Melanesia. For the other small island states, especially those with atoll environments, mineral and soil resources may be virtually non-existent. Large maritime exclusive economic zones may offer opportunities to exploit fisheries but this requires financial and regulatory resources usually beyond the capabilities of small populations.

15.1.5 Cultural

Finally we note that some authors have suggested that marginality and relative poverty in the Pacific islands has resulted from cultural factors. In the past, authors such as Watters (1969) have pointed to the way the persistence of traditional communal societies has limited the emergence of capitalism, enterprise and modernity. Communal land tenure and forms of exchange may promote social cohesion and subsistence but they also inhibit the ability of individuals to trade and exploit their lands and marine resources. Communal land cannot be readily used to gain credit—a key potential investment resource—and the individual accumulation of wealth is inhibited by cultural norms which encourage sharing and the conspicuous dispersal of wealth amongst one's kin. Thus, some have argued, the persistence of traditionalism and communal land tenure has further marginalized the economies of the Pacific Islands from an expanding and increasingly integrated global market economy.

15.1.6 Questioning the Discourse of Marginality

Yet we question these frames of reference for marginality in the region. It is true that these processes—the geographic, economic and environmental constraints in particular—do impose costs and do limit the ability of people in the region to compete in conventional forms of engagement with the global economy. However, the picture is far from one-sided. Pacific scholars in particular have rejected these views of the region and its people; views which stress vulnerability, fragility, smallness and passivity (Hau'ofa 1995; Thaman 2003; Teaiwa 2006). The Ocean is

seen not as a constraint and a place of emptiness and poverty but rather as a productive and interconnected realm where people move, adapt, trade, and prosper. Culture is not a barrier but instead promotes an ethos of shared welfare and mutual responsibility—a worthy alternative to the individualism, violence and social isolation of modernism and a much more sustainable model than global capitalism (Batibasaga et al. 1999).

Thus we approach the issues of marginalization in the Pacific Islands with this much more positive frame of local adaptation, resilience and agency. In the following sections we analyse how Pacific Island people have sought opportunities by actively interacting with the wider world and securing their welfare.

15.2 Education and Migration Strategies

Education lies at the centre of the ways many in putative marginal areas forge new futures for themselves and their children. Given the constraints and opportunities facing people of the Pacific Islands we see that this forms a central strategy in this region also.

15.2.1 *Education in the Pacific*

There is much emphasis on education in the Pacific region. For some countries with high fertility rates, there are young populations facing limited economic opportunities. Governments throughout the region have invested heavily in education, often with the assistance of aid donors (Murray and Overton 2011). The Millennium Development Goals spanning the 2000–2015 period did much to highlight the importance of universal access to primary and secondary education (Tolley 2008). Within the Pacific, many children living in remote areas and outer islands were not able to attend local primary schools, let alone progress to secondary education. The issue is not just about building more schools and training more teachers: roads and bus services are needed to get children to and from schools and accommodation is needed for children from small outer islands who have to attend secondary schools elsewhere. In some parts of the region though, the record was good: in Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Niue, Cook Islands, and the French and American territories of the Pacific, high literacy rates were the result of many years of investment in primary education.

The focus on universal education and the considerable efforts to ensure this, however, has raised concerns about the appropriateness of education in the region. Several educationalists in the region have questioned the appropriateness of curricula which follow exclusively Western epistemologies, values and content (Gegeo 1998; Gegeo and Gegeo-Watson 2001; Coxon and Munce 2008; Sanga and Taufe'ulungaki 2005; Helu Thaman 1993). They have argued persuasively that not

only do such curricula train students for urban employment often far removed from the realities and needs of the rural existence that most of their parents lead but also, they undervalue and demean indigenous knowledge and epistemologies. It could be questioned whether spending on such Western-styled education is merely guiding young people to get on a plane and go and train, live and work overseas (Gamlen et al., 2017). In response, there have been some important initiatives to redress the balance. At one level, there have been several rural training centres and local curriculum projects which have sought to utilise and strengthen local knowledge and skills (Fleming and Palomino-Schalscha 2016) and at the other, there has been a growth in tertiary training in the region, through institutions such as the pan-regional University of the South Pacific as well as various national universities and technical training colleges.

Yet despite these efforts and a considerable growth in the past three decades in the number of children attending schools and universities within the region, there is still a considerable flow of students overseas for education.

15.2.2 Education for Migration

Education is a major driver of migration. This occurs at different levels. For the most remote and marginal areas without suitable schools, children move from remote villages and islands often to capital cities on the main islands to attend secondary schools or tertiary institutes. Many others go overseas for what is perceived as better quality secondary schooling or university study. Government scholarships support some pupils but it is often family resources that invest in such movement and education, a sign of the value that is attached to education.

Migration for education raises a key issue for the long-term development of the Pacific. Overseas education equips students for life and work overseas but it often means they become less suited (in terms of skills and aspirations) for living at home in the islands. The skills and knowledge they attain overseas are more appropriate for the metropole and there may be little demand for specialist skills at home. Furthermore, even when the skills are applicable, employment in the big cities on the Pacific Rim (Sydney, Auckland, Los Angeles, Vancouver, Hong Kong) may appear more attractive and lucrative than a return to a poorly-paid civil service, nursing or teaching job at home.

15.2.3 Education for Development?

Therefore some key questions are raised regarding the role of education in development. It is universally acknowledged that education is good for development, whether from a neoliberal human capital development perspective or a more radical view of consciousness raising and political awareness (Mayo 2008; Colclough

2012). We could suggest that education is also a way of combatting marginality: it both develops skills to provide a way out for those living in marginal areas and raises awareness of the problems (and solutions) that lead to marginalization.

However, in relation to marginalization, education may contribute to the very process of marginalization. The ‘brain drain’ phenomenon (Adams and Page 2005; Docquier and Rapoport 2012; Gamlen 2014) involves the loss, in effect, of the youngest, brightest and best from marginal areas and they take their skills and incomes to more core and prosperous areas, never to return. Education may leave behind the elderly, low skilled and unemployed and this can be seen in some parts of the Pacific where depopulation is occurring (Gibson and Mackenzie 2011, 2012; Overton and Murray 2014).

On the other hand, a ‘brain drain’ may not be an entirely negative process and some authors have suggested a more optimistic view (Gamlen 2010; Jacobs 2016). Better educated expatriates may have left the Pacific Islands to work overseas but this does not mean they are either permanently removed from the region or distanced from its welfare. Pacific Island people living and working outside the region contribute greatly in the form of remittances back to their family members, churches and, ultimately, businesses in the islands. Such flows of remittances form substantial components of Pacific economies—sometimes up to a quarter or a third in countries such as Tonga and Samoa (see Connell and Brown 2005). Furthermore, it seems as if these remittance flows do endure over long periods of time, even inter-generationally (Macpherson 1992; Poirine 2006). And migrants also return home. They come back to look after relatives, enjoy a more peaceful life, retire or start a business. They bring back their savings, skills, experience and connections.

Therefore, we can suggest that education and migration are playing important but complex roles in transforming living standards and cultures in the Pacific Islands. It may be that education is undermining local knowledge systems and cultures and depleting local economies of skilled young people; yet it could also be simultaneously providing viable alternatives for otherwise underused human capital, contributing new sources of material wealth, and also, effectively, helping support and preserve long standing ways of life and social structures.

15.2.4 Uneven Opportunities and Impact

A further complication as we try to understand the links between education, migration and marginality in the Pacific, is that these trends are very uneven across the region. Some territories face easy access to the metropole and have high education levels and high migration. This is the case for many of the smaller Pacific countries linked politically and socially to France, USA and New Zealand in particular. Often their citizens have full citizenship rights to enter, live, attend school and work in the metropole. They can move freely. The inhabitants of other countries—the larger independent states—have fewer migration opportunities and, often as a result of much lower historic levels of foreign development assistance, are also

Table 15.2 Typology of education strategies

Education strategy	Education level/type	Migration implications	Development implication
Local customary	Non-formal, local, locally controlled	Restricted	Localised, conservative, traditional/customary, social status quo with some social and political challenges
Rural training centres	Locally based, wider skills	Low	Rural-based development based on local skills and resources, self-sufficiency, resilience
Universal primary education	National curriculum, basic literacy and numeracy skills	Limited	Universal participation, gender implications, basic education as a basis for national development goals. Possibilities for social transformation?
Secondary education	National curriculum, higher literacy etc. skills	Some movement to schools, likely to encourage future urbanisation for employment	A more literate national workforce, raised expectations for urban employment, knowledge of outside world
Vocational: national	Technical skills training—e.g. trades, nursing, religious	Movement to cities for training, some skills for international (e.g. nursing)	National development—skilled workforce.
Tertiary education	'National university'—builds national capabilities at higher level—general education and some professions	Movement to cities, some transferable skills/qualifications for overseas (but lower status)	National development—human capital-based. Builds skills in public service, teachers etc.
Vocational: global orientation	Targeted training schemes for overseas work (maritime etc.)—focus on international qualifications	Movement within country to centres but limits need to travel overseas for training	Global-oriented development with niche labour markets—remittances and saved incomes
Overseas tertiary: scholarships	Targeted degrees overseas—higher level skills and professions	Migration overseas to university but may be bonded to return home	National focus on higher skills (medicine, engineering etc.)—some opportunity for later migration overseas and remittances
Overseas education	Open choice to travel overseas for education. Privately funded or open government scholarships (not bonded)	Migration overseas often with intention to stay overseas	Globalisation—remittances and migration

Source Gamlen et al. forthcoming

struggling to provide basic primary and secondary education. Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, for example, have the lowest rates of literacy and school attendance in the wider region. In these cases, improved educational provision and access may lead to more children in school but it will not guarantee that they have jobs to go to when they graduate; nor will they easily be able to take their skills overseas to work.

Therefore, the relationship between education, migration and marginality is uneven. Better education, migration and the free flow of labour, remittances and ideas may contribute to some forms, and awareness, of marginalization, yet it can substantially mitigate and reverse many other marginalizing processes. For others, better education—faced with constrained migration—can exacerbate marginalization. It can provide inappropriate skills for a limited local labour markets, ignore and undermine local knowledge and endogenous development values and strategies and build a mounting population of urban-dwelling, educated but unemployed and dissatisfied people marginalized from mainstream, economy and society.

In order to begin to understand some of this complexity, we have begun to examine more closely the various educational options that might be open to governments and communities in the Pacific (Gamlen et al., 2017—see Table 15.2). Here we can see a wide range of educational strategies, from small-scale locally-based learning to international tertiary education. What we suggest is that there is no single educational strategy that is best or that will lessen the marginality and poverty that is sometimes experienced in the region. Rather, different states, families and individuals will perceive opportunities and costs which may or not match their particular situations and capabilities. Some resources can be provided by the state; some by communities; and some are only available to those who can call on considerable family financial resources. It is to these varied resources and networks that we now turn.

15.3 Networks and Relationships

To understand these complex relationships, we need to look at the way Pacific Island peoples have developed particular strategies in order to build social capital and exploit wider networks and relationships. In some ways the ‘marginality’ of the Pacific and its populations is an externally constructed and imposed framework. In a historic sense the peoples of the Pacific were adept at developing and maintaining networks and interactions at great distances given the sea-faring prowess of especially the Polynesians (Hau’ofa 2000). It is only with the advent of colonialism and the imposition of western notions of scale, distance and proximity that the concept of marginality has been applied. Furthermore, the arrival of the demarcation of territory in the form of borders within and between territories and (eventually) countries based on Westphalian notions of sovereignty also sits uncomfortably with the indigenous forms of globalisation that were long in place by the advent of the colonial period. In this sense then, marginality is a neo-colonial construct in the

Pacific. This is not to suggest that the real challenges of marginality in the context of surviving in the contemporary capitalist economy are not acutely felt; they are and the design of appropriate educational policy is crucial in overcoming this. But marginality is a constructed consequence of the particular political economic history of the region and the kinds of dependency that have evolved.

What are the kinds of relationship and networks both in history and in the contemporary scene that have evolved that have subverted this imposed view of marginality and how might this relate to the types of education and migration integration that we seek?

15.3.1 From ‘Transnational Corporations of Kin’ to ‘Diasporic Social Networks of Kin’

Historically, kinship networks have been one of key processes used to subvert and challenge marginality both imagined and real. Pacific people, and this is especially the case in Polynesia, have always travelled great distances, fanning out across enormous swathes of ocean and maintaining social, economic and cultural networks over many centuries. In doing so a diaspora of Pacific peoples was long existent before the concept of diaspora was employed to describe it. To early Pacific peoples the concept of distance and isolation was quite different to how those things are perceived in the West. The ocean was seen a unifying entity not something which divides.

The strong sense of family that imbues Pacific life was the essential lifeblood of this indigenous globalisation. Communalism and collective ownership of resources which characterises traditional and many contemporary Pacific societies in the islands themselves has been contemporised and still drives these networks. As Pacific peoples in the contemporary world, due to political-economic arrangements with the rim countries—especially New Zealand and Australia—retain relatively free movement the diaspora has expanded territorially (see Barcham et al. 2009). Pacific Islanders who may be second or third generation born in New Zealand or Australia still feel a very keen sense that their home is on their island of origin. In an early paper on this Bertram and Watters referred such networks as transnational corporations of kin (1985; see also Munro 1990). Whilst this was useful in terms of identifying the important role of diasporas in allocating and optimising resource flows, it was essentially Western in terms of its construction. It can be argued that the frame of reference for networks of kin are not bordered nation-states and territories but diaspora which have long existed. Furthermore, the use of the term corporations is also misleading—Pacific Island people are not profit-maximisers; rather they tend to use networks to optimise the allocation of resources and ensure their equitable and sustainable flow. The West could learn a lot from the Pacific diaspora in terms of optimising globalisation. A better term to describe these entities might be diasporic social networks of kin. In the reality of the regional

political economy there are of course real physical borders, but the particular formation of these networks allows relatively unbounded de-marginalisation to take place.

The above explains why remittances per capita in the Pacific diaspora are amongst the highest in the world (Connell and Brown 2005).¹ As transport technologies have improved there has been an increasing circular migration across the region where young people leave the island to study and work in the Rim and later return. Sometimes family members may not return for generations, but maintain the links through financial flows and flows in kind. This is why aunties and uncles in Auckland or Brisbane for example will host young Pacific islanders attending educational institutions. In all of this the original unbounded sense of place that Pacific peoples had before the arrival of Western imposed national boundaries is a driving factor. Notwithstanding this, it is sobering to note that many Pacific peoples occupy the lower socio-economic strata of the societies they live in on the Rim, and this has been and remains a significant brake on mobility. In some ways, Pacific peoples living in the former metropolises are more marginalised in social space than their ancestors who live on the islands. However, as this situation improves and the welfare of Pacific people rises, mobility is likely to increase further. It is such movements that offer the prospect of making the most of un-bounded space that might be promoted as development models for the region. De-marginalisation in this sense is something which Islanders have always practised although the technologies, velocities and spatialities have evolved. Education and work offer the prospect of income for the Pacific homelands—although this is also a potentially vulnerable strategy and imbalanced outflow raise the threat of unsustainable de-population especially in the smaller territories such as Niue, Tokelau and Wallis and Futuna for example.

15.3.2 Metropolitan Links and Subsidies

This inherent tendency of Pacific populations to seek unbounded space for the expansion of diasporic networks of kin has resulted in various strategies to facilitate this in the context of contemporary international and postcolonial relations. Unlike other parts of the colonised world, independence did not come rapidly after the Second World War exposed the weakness of many of the former empires. As we know, in Africa and Asia the fall of empire was rapid. This was not the case in the Pacific and it was not until the mid 1960s that the first island territories gained independence. Compared to Africa and Asia the push internally for independence was not as marked. This is not to say that there were not violent struggles in the

¹Although data are patchy and variable, the World Bank estimates that for 2012, remittances accounted for 22% of Samoa's GDP, 25% of Tonga's and 5% of Fiji's, though only 0.1% of Papua New Guinea's GDP. The world average for remittances is about 0.7% of GDP (see <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS>, accessed 3 March 2017).

Pacific— in New Caledonia (ultimately unsuccessful), and Samoa—there was conflict and this continues to the present in West Papua for example (Wesley-Smith 2007). After WW2 Western nations too were keen to maintain close links and in particular in the context of the Cold War as the Pacific Island held a geopolitical comparative advantage.

As a consequence of these particular historical processes only around half of the territories gained independence, some explicitly rejected it—such as Tokelau—and others obtained relationships with the former metropole that allowed the pursuit of a mixed and layered form of sovereignty. In Niue and the Cook Islands for example the concept of ‘self-governing territories in free association’ with New Zealand was used to replace colonial incorporation. This arrangement allows free movement of Niueans and Cook Islanders to and from New Zealand, grants them citizenship in both, allows the free-flow of labour and financial resources, and places foreign policy and defence largely in the hands of New Zealand (Connell 2008). This allows the Polynesian networks of kin to expand and circulate in ways which mirrors the way they have done for millennia. There is a range of other arrangements that have defined the ‘sovereignty’ of the Pacific territories including ‘compact’ agreements in the case the US territories and various forms of incorporation in the case of the French territories. These have evolved in part as a consequence of the interaction of the geopolitical needs of the metropole and territories—though it must be said that the former gains the most—especially in the case of the French and US territories. As such, Pacific sovereignty can be conceptualised on a continuum and it is this that allows relatively unbounded movement Pacific peoples have employed as de-marginalising strategies historically. This set of factors allows for easier migration access, especially to universities and secondary schools overseas. It also leads to significant flows of labour migration. As a consequence many more people from Wallis and Futuna, Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, American Samoa, for example live ‘overseas’ than at ‘home’ (though these concepts blur in the Pacific geographic imagination). Regional labour migration schemes have been established in Australia and New Zealand in the recent past and this allows for circular and temporary movement from places that do not have association agreements or compact such as Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, and Tonga. A final consequence of the various close agreements that have been forged is the high levels of per capita aid that characterise the region. A material consequence is that small societies in the islands themselves can often sustain infrastructure—such as primary and secondary schools—that would not be possible in communities of similar sizes in New Zealand, France or the USA for example.

15.3.3 *MIRAB Economies*

Attempts have been made in the literature over the last four decades or so to summarise the relationships discussed above and provide a theoretical framework for their interpretation and evaluation. The most widely known in this regard is the

MIRAB concept (migration, aid remittances bureaucracy) (Bertram and Watters 1985; Bertram 1993, 2006; also Evans 1999; Oberst and McElroy 2007). In essence these authors argue that MIRAB is a sustainable strategy for small island states to sustain higher living standards than might be predicted by domestic income levels given few opportunities for production/export-led economic growth (Bertram 1986). Implicit in this is the idea that marginality (location, size, environment) is coped with or mediated through wider engagement with the metropole in terms of aid flows and remittances. In this small territories ‘trade-off’ sovereignty for resources and thereby adopt a range varied but similarly close relationships with former and current metropole (McElroy and Pearce 2006; McElroy and Parry 2012; Wesley-Smith 2007; Baldacchino 2006a, b). Various territories and countries of the Pacific correspond to the MIRAB model to varying degrees and over time its relevance has waxed and waned. There have been pushes in recent times to reduce aid for example, especially following the end of the Cold War, the rise of anti-immigration discourse in more recent times also threatens to undermine the sustainability of the model in countries and territories where this is not guaranteed in constitutions. Notwithstanding this, the role of remittances through kinship networks as discussed above, as well as levels of aid that remain high per capita, continue to support high government expenditure and employment in a number of Pacific societies. Aid is used to build educational networks and fund certain strategies and therefore remains very important. Most recently scholarships to institutions in the metropole have formed a very important and growing component of aid relationships with important consequences for the appropriateness or otherwise of development strategies encouraged by the donors.

But MIRAB can be criticised in three main ways. Firstly, it frames Pacific marginality from a Western perspective, seeing the Islands as dependent on the metropole. It could be argued that the relationship is in fact a result of witting strategy on the part of the Pacific and that dependency actually goes both ways. Secondly, and linked to this point, MIRAB overplays the importance of economic resource allocation in this process—and the role of communal and cultural processes are seen as a means to an economic end—the reality is far broader, more complex and less economically deterministic. Finally, MIRAB fails to recognise that facing marginality in the Pacific has a long history predating aid relationships established after the 1960s—and MIRAB is only one expression of that.

15.4 ‘Demarginalization’ Through Unbounded Educational Spaces

What can we say about the role of education and migration in terms of marginality? In essence we suggest that they are actively used in combination as strategies to ‘de-marginalize’. We see clear evidence for this across the Pacific where diasporic networks of kin that were formed before colonialism are contemporised and

perpetuated through such flows. Unbounded spaces where such networks are encouraged can have de-marginalising effects, even when in a territorial sense marginality appears self-evident. In order to make sense of this we conclude with some thoughts under three headings; education and globalization, education as revolution or reaction, and education through state structures or individual agency.

15.4.1 Education and Globalization

In some ways what we see in this case study is a process of alternative globalisation. Not achieved through conventional neoliberal approaches involving free trade and export-led growth, which are completely unsuitable in the context of the Pacific region (Firth 2000) but rather the engagement of the resources of the metropole (aid, scholarships, labour migration) to facilitate preparation for and participation in the global labour markets (Connell 2010). This process builds on a much earlier movement of people that we have termed above ‘indigenous globalization’.

As we have seen Pacific Island populations are highly mobile but also strongly connected back to their hearth—indigenous globalization is not a matter of a race to the bottom. Rather it involves a careful and selective engagement with the outside world whilst maintaining kin and home through diasporic flows of people, goods, money and knowledge that transcend borders. This type of progressive globalization is to be encouraged—others could learn a good deal from it. However, it is not without its risks and the potential for de-population where educational strategies are not appropriate hovers ever-present. The challenge is to design educational forms that allow locally-oriented progressive globalisation. This has not happened to date and much more research is required in this area.

15.4.2 Revolutionary or Reactionary?

The role of education in development and social progress is far from simple or uncontroversial—there is no linear connection between education and development and there are many examples of inappropriate strategies that may actually worsen progressive development prospects. The advantages of standardised universal education are accepted in a rather undifferentiated way in current policy—a silver bullet for development. We require a much more complex understanding in this regard—a more geographically differentiated reading. In the case of the Pacific we see a situation whereby education could either further marginalise or de-marginalise depending on the nature of the system that is designed and the process of its implementation. We need more sensitive research in order to build the evidence in the search for more geographically appropriate educational and migration strategies that for small territories and states and work in that area is on-going in Wallis and

Futuna, Papua New Guinea and a number of other case studies In the case of the Pacific, the role of migration for education as currently pursued can be seen as revolutionary—building skills for the global workforce, allowing migration and the pursuit of livelihoods elsewhere. It also leads to the questioning long-held customs and beliefs that may oppress certain disenfranchised groups including the young in general. Yet in practice it is simultaneously reactionary—those customs and kinship networks which define it retain a degree of control over resource and people flows. Education rarely challenges the status quo at home as we have seen in various guises in places such as Samoa, Vanuatu and Fiji among other places. To progress is to maintain the best of tradition whilst allowing for progressive change. In some ways in today's globalised world it is that combination which is required in order to facilitate de-marginalisation.

15.4.3 State Subsidies or Individual Agency?

Finally, we see in the literature that education is conventionally analysed through a rather Western-centric lens of the state. This viewpoint underpins the debate concerning which policies, what resources are to build schools, and what concepts to develop curricula are required among other things. Such an approach makes the assumption that education should be standardised and provided universally (if we can afford it). Whilst we certainly agree with the latter, the former is very problematic. Viewing the role of education in development from this frame emphasises bounded spaces and places national and territorial interest above all else.

It is in this context (what we term the retro liberal turn elsewhere—Murray and Overton 2016) that we see an increasing role of aid donors from the metropole moving away from MDG-inspired universal basic education to targeted skills training for their own labour markets (especially in New Zealand and Australia). Such a process can perpetuate marginalisation and has been evolved to benefit the metropole explicitly—it is essentially neo-colonial in our opinion.

In many Pacific Islands it is the agency of the family that is more important than the role of the state—and this agency transcends borders. Families find ways to by-pass state systems at home to access international resources, decisions about which children get education and which stay at home. It is this agency that offers the greatest promise in terms of access to appropriate education and the de-marginalisation of Pacific territories. This is not to romanticise the past and play-down the significant threats that exist but rather to point towards the importance of traditional forms of dealing with marginality as potential ways forward. The potential for agency varies widely across the region, according to socio-economic status, environment, geopolitical situation and many other factors. As noted previously some of the most marginalised components of Pacific Island society are found in settler populations in the metropole—a geographic conundrum in some ways. In facilitating the progress of these populations and those of the islands there is therefore still a critical role for the state providing universal primary

education and a range of secondary and vocational education facilities which allow for choices at the individual level to be made eventually. The provision of tertiary scholarships which brings benefits to the metropolitan universities, whilst laudable as part of a long-term complete strategy in theory, do not deserve in our opinion to be prioritised as they currently are as they marginalise rather than the opposite. States also need to intervene to allow diaspora to grow and evolve by maintaining pathways and reducing border controls as much as possible. It is this combination of enlightened state regulation that facilitates diasporic expansion and welfare optimisation through networks of education and migration that offers the most promise for the de-marginalisation of the Pacific Islands.

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Chapter 16

Demarginalization and Church Property: The Case of Czechia

Tomáš Havlíček

16.1 Introduction

The presented study, examining the role of property reacquired by churches, especially the Roman Catholic Church while overcoming selected framework conditions in peripheral regions (Havlíček et al. 2008) of the prevalingly secular Czechia develops amongst other things the previous work (Hupková et al. 2015) which analysed the process in which the present democratic state returns the church property nationalized by the Communist regime after 1948. This represents a unique situation which poses certain risks (for example, present-day churches do not have sufficient experience with administering such property), but also brings significant opportunities that the following text intends to present using selected examples from peripheral regions of Czechia.

Recovered church property was blocked until 2012. It was not permitted to sell such property, to change its purpose regarding the land-use planning and to develop land falling in this category. This situation placed significant limits on further development of the affected, mostly peripheral, regions and often further increased their marginalisation. This state of affairs has been described in some detail on the example of the town of Červená Řečice in the Vysočina Region (Hupková et al. 2015). Opportunities for further development of the town were very limited because nearly all properties surrounding developed land were once owned by the Roman Catholic Church and the utilisation of such land was disabled by the “blocking provision” (Act No. 229/1991). This development presents a symbol of the negative repercussions of the unresolved property issues between the state and churches at the municipal level. More than 80% of the municipality’s land is subject to the block on formerly church-owned property. Not only does the block on church

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properties result in stagnation in the development of infrastructure and new construction, but it also brings a series of associated effects which prevent or hinder the natural socio-economic development of a given territory. The municipalities miss out, in large degree, on the possibility of new residents moving in. Consequently, the influx of young families with children was limited, which in turn led to increases in the proportion of older residents. In connection with the low number of children in the municipalities, the local elementary school was often closed down (Havlíček et al. 2005). This blockage of properties also results in the devastation of the cultural and spiritual values of a municipality that is affected (Hupková et al. 2015). Architecturally, culturally and historically valuable buildings situated on blocked properties are frequently left to fall into disrepair and eventual ruin. The further postponement of an eventual solution will lead to irreparable damage to a number of valuable structures and, as such, to the loss of part of the local cultural-historical heritage. The primary concern for the municipalities is that contested properties cease to be blocked and that the new owners of these properties have complete control over them.

The study assumes that the returning of land to the original owners (i.e. the church) can open up new development potential for the peripheral regions in question. The objective of the presented study was, in particular, to describe and analyse the implications of the process of church restitution and the potential development of mainly peripheral regions as a result of the change in ownership and the related new activities.

16.2 Historical Aspects of Church-State Relations in Czechia

Throughout Czech history sacred and profane powers have been closely connected. This mutual connectivity and influence has led to many conflicts. Religion—more specifically, Christianity—played a decisive role in the initial process of creating a political state on the territory of present-day Czechia. For some time, beginning in the 10th century, Czechia found itself situated along the ideological divide between Eastern Orthodox and Western, Roman Catholic influences (Hupková et al. 2015). During the period of broader European reformation, the Czech lands fell increasingly under the influence of Protestant movements and churches that were connected with regional political forces. Protestant churches' attempts to take control of political power in the Czech lands were, in the end, suppressed by the Hapsburgs' strong anti-Reformation movement, following the Battle of Bílá Hora (White Mountain; in 1620). Religions other than Catholicism were forbidden by the Habsburg rulers and, eventually, non-Catholic religious communities were made illegal by the state. This step led to the emigration of Protestants or to their Catholicization during the Baroque (Counter-Reformation) period, which,

incidentally, also involved the construction of numerous sacred symbols in the landscape (wayside shrines, chapels and crosses).

The creation of Czechoslovakia in 1918 brought about the separation of state and church (primarily Roman Catholic) power and yet, at the same time, a “state” Czechoslovak Hussite Church was established after the pattern of the Anglican Church in England. By the beginning of World War II, members of this church comprised more than 10% of Czechia’s population. After this point, there was a gradual decrease in the number of adherents of the Czechoslovak Hussite Church and, at the present time, only 1% of the population claims membership of this “state” church (Havlíček 2006).

During the 20th century, two separate political dictatorships (Nazism and communism) led to significant state restrictions limiting the operations and freedoms of church institutions. State power even assumed certain aspects of religious thinking and behaviour in its ideologically charged discourses. So-called political religion (Mayr 1995) emerged, founded on ideologies taken from existing religious structures, which were, at the same time, strictly suppressed (Hupková et al. 2015). During the period of communist rule, the state limited and regulated church operations. The fall of communism in Europe and in Czechoslovakia brought a renewal of religious freedom and renewed separation of church and state powers. Under the communist regime, the state confiscated a large number of church-owned properties (3% of Czechia’s land area) and part of this property was returned to the churches (Hupková et al. 2015).

The long and drawn-out nature of the talks concerning the eventual form of the property settlement between the state and the churches indicates just how complicated the topic is. Within Czechia’s secularized society, a large majority of the general public is opposed to the idea of returning property to churches and religious societies. According to one church representative, 70% of Czechia’s inhabitants do not agree with the return of church property to the churches (Hupková et al. 2015). Property settlement between the state and the churches that are affected is not a simple issue confined only to the subjects involved. Local self-governing authorities, i.e. municipalities, and to a lesser degree regions and private entities are important stakeholders in that they either use—or would like to use—blocked properties. The churches can be viewed as passive stakeholders due to the fact that they have never made an official proposal or request for settlement of the outstanding property issues. Instead, the churches have waited for the state to initiate negotiations. In contrast, the municipalities that are affected can be designated as active stakeholders which initiate and actively promote measures leading to the eventual settlement of the matter. This long process (20 years) of the restitution of church property is also the result of the secular society (Havlíček 2005) and its reflection in the decisions of the political system in Czechia.

16.3 Church-State Relations and Church Property in Czechia

The interplay between state and religious (church) powers has an important role in the development of every society and its territory. This is a relationship undergoing numerous transformations depending on the type of the secular power and religions involved. The separation of Church and State we saw in many European countries in the past has been taking place only in the recent years in Czechia (Knippenberg 2005). During their existence, religious institutions acquired mainly immovable assets; these were used for the purposes of worship and self-sustainable everyday operation of the church. With the increasing secularisation of European, and Czech societies, the influence of religious institutions diminished hand in hand with their property and importance as symbols in the religious landscape (Hupková et al. 2015). Many religious buildings and other immovable property were transformed into secular establishments in the past 50 years (Knipperberg 2005). Political changes, especially the onset of authoritative (primarily communist) regimes, were another reason for the change in the purpose of church property. Dictatorial regimes viewed religious institutions as an obstacle to success in controlling and manipulating society. They endeavoured to hamper freedom of speech and assembly while controlling or even seizing church property in order to weaken the role of churches in society (Havlíček et al. 2017).

During its rule, the communist regime in Czechoslovakia seized extensive property (buildings, forests, agricultural land, etc.) from churches and religious societies between 1948 and 1989 (most of the confiscations took place at the beginning of this period). The state made an attempt to remedy the property injustice of the communist dictatorship after 1989; however, only selected buildings (especially large churches, monasteries and some monastic buildings) were returned on the basis of the 1990 “list law” while a general property settlement between the state and churches/religious societies was yet to be accomplished (Hupková et al. 2015). This historical injustice was repaired only 22 years later through Act No. 428/2012 Coll., on property settlement with churches and religious societies. Forty percent of these former church assets (today owned by municipalities and regions) will not be returned; instead the state will pay to churches financial compensation worth CZK 59 billion (EUR 2.2 billion). Consequently, 56% of property held by the state will be returned to churches. 98% of these assets belong to the Roman Catholic Church; until recently they were administered mainly by the Land Fund of the Czech Republic (mostly agricultural land) and Lesy ČR (Forests of the Czech Republic), a state enterprise managing forest land. A large part of this property was returned to churches, mainly in 2014 and 2015. Only a small part of church property still remains to be returned. Thus, over 30,000 hectares of




Fig. 16.1 Regional differentiation of restituted church properties in administrative districts of municipalities with extended competence (MEC) in Czechia (2016) *Datasource* Lesy (2016), Státní pozemkový úřad (2016)

agricultural land (Státní pozemkový úřad 2016) and around 80,000 hectares of forest land (Lesy 2016) were returned to churches by April 2016, which together accounts for approximately 1.4% of the total area of Czechia (Havlíček et al. 2017).

However, church restitution did not take place evenly in the territory of Czechia and the regional differentiation of this process shows several characteristics (Fig. 16.1). It is necessary to bear in mind in this respect that not all restitution claims of churches have been resolved to date, and the analysis presented is hence only a preliminary survey of the differentiation, although the resulting state of affairs is not likely to differ very significantly. The returning of immovable property to churches to date shows relatively large regional differences, which are much more significant in the eastern part of the country.

Significantly above-average figures (more than 2% of the area of the administrative district) are present especially in the MEC administrative districts near the border with Slovakia and the districts to the south and southeast of Prague.

Figures below average are shown by the northern regions near the border with Poland, with an above-average proportion of evengelic and evengelical churches, as well as in the southeast, near the border with Austria, with a very low proportion of forest land in usable land.

16.4 Restitution of Church Properties to the Roman Catholic Church as an Example of Demarginalization

Although the returning of church property by the state involves 16 churches and religious societies (Hupková et al. 2015), the Roman Catholic Church absolutely dominates the process as it receives 80% of the total financial compensation and more than 95% of the real estate returned to churches by the state. Consequently, in the initial analysis of the role of church real estate in the local and regional development of peripheral regions, the present study concentrated only on the Roman Catholic Church and its relevant activities. As mentioned above, it can be assumed that investment activities triggered by the church restitution can help stop marginalisation or even initiate gradual development, i.e. de-marginalisation of the relevant areas and regions. In this respect, it is also likely that the church will use the financial and immovable assets acquired within the restitution after 2012 for the benefit of the territories in need (peripheral territories) where the returned land is located and will not transfer much of these funds to centres.

The total investments of the Roman Catholic Church in Czechia induced by restitution amounted to nearly EUR 50 million in 2015 and were, and still are, directed to four major sectors:

- (a) agriculture and forestry,
- (b) administration, restoration and construction of buildings,
- (c) purely financial investments,
- (d) entrepreneurial projects with an innovative regional character such as mini-breweries owned by the Roman Catholic Church.

In addition to purely financial operations, the remaining three investment areas have an effect on the local and regional development of the regions concerned. In peripheral regions, investments of the Roman Catholic Church in agriculture and forestry primarily increase the number of jobs in areas with above-average unemployment, especially in the border regions of Czechia (Havlíček et al. 2008) where a large part of the real estate returned to the church are located, especially forests, arable land and pastures (Fig. 16.1). Other regions with above-average proportions of immovable property returned to churches are located in the east of the country near the border with Slovakia as well as in the northeast at the border with Saxony and in peripheral regions south of Prague where the unemployment rate is often twice as high as the national average.

The property returned includes mainly assets serving other than “ritual” purposes such as forests, meadows and farmland, as well as farm buildings within monasteries and castles. The church gradually adapts such buildings to mainly social and economic purposes. In the area of social welfare, the church sets up hospices, medical facilities specialising in aging-associated diseases (for example, Alzheimer centres) and retirement homes.

The economic purpose of such real estate includes mainly forestry and agriculture. In this way, several agricultural farms were established and deal with

ecological farming (bio products) and specialised agricultural products (for example, gluten free food, special beer sorts, etc.).

Thanks to the returned property, churches were able to accomplish projects supporting their own operation as well as numerous endeavours in areas including charity, Christian ministry, education, medicine and cultural heritage, which often serve as a platform for dialogue between churches and the public. The church also lets many such spaces (those it cannot use for its own ends) for lease and, rarely, sells them to public and private entities.

It is too early yet to express the benefits of these activities e.g. in terms of decreasing unemployment or increasing proportion of young people. So far, the activities performed in the process of recovery of church property are building a platform for enhancing the social capital in peripheral areas and regions (Jančák et al. 2010) and hence a greater likelihood of further development, or de-marginalisation.

16.5 Conclusions

The process of church restitution, i.e. returning of property by the state, constitutes a new challenge for local and regional development in Czechia and, especially in peripheral regions, new opportunities for further development, in spite of the fact that Czech society is prevalingly secular and continues to oppose the returning process. During its rule between 1948 and 1989, the communist regime in Czechoslovakia confiscated extensive assets from the property of churches and religious societies. Although the state attempted to remedy the property injustice from the communist dictatorship after 1989, 22 more years had to pass before the matter was finally resolved (Hupková et al. 2015).

This chapter has sought to analyse the process of church restitution in general and its implications in local and regional development. It is too early to present a more thorough analysis of the effects of “newly” (after 2012) acquired church property on regional development of the relevant territories on the example of the Roman Catholic Church, but some basic initial trends can already be summarised: First, analyses show a significant regional differentiation of the church restitution process, which could bring benefits to peripheral regions with a high proportion of returned church property. In this respect, regional priorities of the Roman Catholic Church will be important. Second, it is obvious that the initial projects of the church (Arcibiskupství pražské 2016) were directed more to large cities (establishing community centres, church schools and care facilities) and, for the time being, less to selected peripheral territories (such as the northeast of Czechia). Third, the initial investments in peripheral, mainly rural areas are differentiated into the following three main categories:

- Projects related to care for ill and elderly people,
- Projects focusing on regional, mainly food products, and
- Projects related to forestry and agriculture.

Probably the next ten years will show the direct effects of church restitution and financial compensations on the local and regional development of peripheral regions.

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Chapter 17

Local Self-government Reforms in Slovenia: Discourse on Centrality and Peripherality

Janez Nared

17.1 Introduction

Despite its small size, Slovenia is remarkably rich in its natural, social, and cultural diversity, which characterizes its landscape and the settlement system (Marot et al. 2013; Ciglič and Perko 2013; Perko et al. 2015; Urbanc et al. 2015; Smrekar et al. 2016a, b). With more than six thousand settlements, the population is rather dispersed, and therefore providing services of general interest and services of general economic interest must be well defined to adequately cover the needs of the population throughout the county. To support balanced development of the country's territory, the Slovenian Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning reworked the Spatial Development Strategy of Slovenia (2004) and studies to support this process. One of these was a study of the polycentric settlement system in Slovenia (Nared et al. 2016), which clearly indicated the importance of municipal centers in the settlement system and providing services of general interest and services of general economic interest. Because the study uses the central place theory to explain the polycentric system, it automatically suggests the perception of the territory as a polygon of central places and peripheries as their counterparts.

The discussion of centrality and peripherality follows Christaller's (1933) theory of central places, Friedmann's (1966) core-periphery model, and Leimgruber's (1994) notion of marginality in geometric and economic terms, which all support the perception of a territory as a network of centers with adjacent peripheries. Although Friedmann's concept foresees that the urban system would become fully integrated with reduced spatial inequalities, the unequal distribution of economic activities, specialization, and a division of labour remain important factors in the contemporary territorial structure and explain different levels of centrality, as

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suggested by Christaller's theory. This could also be explained by contingent and systemic marginality, which depend on market competition and hegemonic forces within the political and economic system that generate inequities through the distribution of social, political, and economic benefits (Leimgruber 2004, 61–62).

In Slovenia, the central place theory has a long tradition. Studies on central places started in the 1960s (Vrišer 1967) and were periodically carried out in the 1970s (Kokole 1971; Vrišer 1978), 1980s (Vrišer 1988), 2000s (Cigale 2002; Drozg 2005; Benkovič Krašovec 2006), and 2010s (Nared et al. 2016a, b; Nared and Razpotnik Viskovič 2016; Nared et al. 2017). Although the methodology changes from one study to another, the central focus is on providing services of general interest and services of general economic interest as well as market-oriented services to the population. The interest in the central place theory as a theoretical basis for the Slovenian settlement system is rooted in the concept of polycentric development in Slovenia, which has marked Slovenian territorial development since the 1960s. At least in theory, if not in fact, polycentrism has been the leading principle of Slovenian spatial development and a guiding force in defining the settlement system, local government, and regional policy (Nared 2003).

This chapter presents the impact that local government reforms have had on the development of Slovenian territory, particularly from the perspective of less-developed (peripheral) areas. In this regard, two main reforms are considered—one from 1960s/70s and one from the 1990s—by comparing their role in the development of the polycentric settlement system.

To determine the role that the last two local government reforms have had on territorial development in Slovenia, I examined central places in Slovenia in 2016 guided by the following research question: “How have the last two local government reforms in Slovenia influenced its settlement system?”

17.1.1 Local Government Reforms in Slovenia

The territorial organization of what is now Slovenia has undergone several transformations, mostly connected to major political processes such as the establishment of new states (the Austrian Monarchy, Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Republic of Slovenia) and constitutional changes defining the level of (de)centralization. Before the Second World War, there were 469 municipalities in what is now Slovenia and, following the establishment of a communist system after the war, municipalities played a central role in the decentralization process. They gradually gained more authority and at the same time their number decreased. In 1955 there were 130 municipalities; their number decreased to eighty-three by 1960 and to sixty-two by 1964 (Haček 2005). This was a one-tier system that combined local government functions and the functions of the central

government. Responsibilities related to central government were at the forefront, corresponding to 85% of the functions (Šmidovnik 1994; Kopač 2005).

In 1963, the municipalities (or “communes”) became a constitutional category, and thus central territorial units focused on providing basic services for their residents (Haček 2005) and on economic self-sufficiency (Šmidovnik 1994). The role of the municipalities increased again with the new constitution in 1974, in which, based on the Yugoslav self-management system, municipalities turned into the main territorial units for exercising self-management. Although it was expected that their role in terms of local government would increase, they remained the lowest level of the central government (Haček 2005).

Despite the fact that the municipalities were a kind of branch of the central government and that the local self-government found its application only in the local communities, municipalities became an important factor of development (Haček 2005). In particular, their role has increased with the concept of the polycentric settlement system, which was intended to develop regional centers as growth poles (Drozg and Premzl 1999). Instead of strengthening regional centers, their growth has been limited (Verlič Christiansen 1999) and they devolved to a local level. Municipal centers have become important supply centers and have experienced faster economic development. Pursuing the principles of the neo-classical growth theory, the regional policy of that time also helped redistribute economic power to less-developed areas (Nared 2003). By building new factories, the number of settlements with jobs rose from fewer than 2,000 in 1971 to 4,225 in 1991 (Drozg and Premzl 1999).

The local government reform from the 1960s and 1970s proved to be an important factor for spatial development in Slovenia, where its main effects were due to synergies of territorial reform, the newly established regional policy, and the concept of polycentric development of the settlement system, which altogether have shaped former municipal areas as important territorial units that still persist today in the form of administrative units as branches of the state administrative system at the local level and in the form of closer cooperation of the newly established municipalities derived from former larger municipalities (Rus et al. 2018).

The second major local government reform took place in 1994. At that time, the former communal system was dismantled with a thorough administrative reform that resulted in a two-tiered government system. The former “communes” were transformed into administrative units and represent a decentralized administrative organization of the state fully responsible for functions related to the central government, whereas functions related to local self-government were transferred to the newly established municipalities. The reform resulted in 147 municipalities, and their number grew over the following years: to 192 in 1998, 193 in 2002, 210 in 2006, and 212 in 2011.

The legal preconditions for establishing a new municipality were its population (which was never truly respected) and providing services of general interest and services of general economic interest that are in the domain of local self-government, such as primary school education, basic healthcare, water supply, waste management, and so on. Consequently, some small towns that sought to

become municipal centers enhanced their service provision with new health clinics, full nine-year primary schools, and other services covered by the local level. Thus local government reform was also reflected in the settlement system when appraised on the basis of services of general interest and services of general economic interest.

17.2 Methods

The conceptual framework of this study comprised the following steps:

- A definition of central settlements in Slovenia;
- An analysis of the supply of central settlements with services of general interest in relation to the population size of that settlement (under- or oversupplied settlements);
- An exploration of the supply level of the respective settlement in relation to population growth and the settlement's role in the local government system (a former municipal center from the 1960s/70 s, a new municipal center from the 1990s/2000s, or a center without administrative functions).

17.2.1 Definition of Central Settlements in Slovenia

In defining central settlements, examples were followed from previous studies (Vrišer 1967, 1988; Kokole 1971; Cigale 2002; Drozg 2005; Benkovič Krašovec 2006) and six levels of centrality were defined (Table 17.1), ranging from centers of international importance as the most important level in the country to centers of rural importance at the other end of the spectrum (Nared et al. 2017). To rank the settlements in different centrality levels, types of services were defined that are expected at the specific level of centrality on the one hand (Table 17.1, Column 3) and centrality according to the population size on the other (Table 17.1, Column 2). Because many services of general interest coincide, it was decided to use only four main functions: public administration, education, healthcare, and the judiciary. In the end, both principles were merged into a combined index of level of centrality (l_{cen}). The index equally weighted the average level of centrality from the four functions ($\frac{\sum_{i=1}^4 l_i^f}{4}$) and the level of centrality based on population (l_{pop}).

$$l_{cen} = \frac{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^4 l_i^f}{4} + l_{pop}}{2} \quad (1)$$

Table 17.1 Level of centrality for settlements and criteria for individual levels (Nared et al. 2017)

Level of centrality	Population	Expected functions	Centrality index value
1. Center of international importance	$\geq 50,001$	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public university • University medical center • Higher court 	≤ 1.50
2. Center of national importance	20,001–50,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • College, university faculty, or academy • Large general hospital 	1.51–2.50
3. Center of regional importance	10,001–20,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • District court • Junior college • Hospital • High school 	2.51–3.50
4. Center of inter-municipal importance	3,001–10,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Health center • Local government office • Local court 	3.51–4.50
5. Center of local importance	1,501–3,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nine-year primary school • Health clinic • Municipal headquarters 	4.51–5.50
6. Center of rural importance	501–1,500	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Branch primary school 	≥ 5.51
6a. Center of rural importance with fewer than five hundred people	500 or less		Fewer than five hundred people and at least two functions

Although it was first intended to disregard settlements with a population under five hundred, many of them are well supplied, and so it was decided to add a new category of central settlements with a population below five hundred but that had to contain at least two of the four functions examined (Nared et al. 2017).

17.2.2 *Defining Level of Supply*

It was presumed that settlements of the same size should have a similar level of supply. In this regard, I compared the centrality level of each settlement according to its population with the centrality level of the settlement based on its supply with services of general interest. When the centrality based on population was lower than the centrality from the four functions, the settlement was oversupplied, and it was undersupplied when the centrality from the four functions was lower than that based on the population size.

17.2.3 *Defining the Supply Level of Settlements in Relation to Population Growth and the Settlements' Role in the Local Government System*

In the last step, I compared the level of supply a settlement has with the population change from 1971 to 2015. Thus I tested whether the under- or oversupply of an individual settlement was due to population change during the last four decades or whether the reasons for this should be sought in the local government reforms that took place at the same time.

17.3 Results

Based on the combined index of centrality, there are 396 central settlements in Slovenia's urban system (6.5% of all populated Slovenian settlements), of which there are (Fig. 17.1):

- 2 centers of international importance (Ljubljana and Maribor);
- 4 centers of national importance (Celje, Koper, Novo Mesto, and Kranj);
- 13 centers of regional importance;




Fig. 17.1 Central settlements in Slovenia (Nared et al. 2016)

- 37 centers of inter-municipal importance;
- 58 centers of local importance;
- 282 centers of rural importance.

The second analytical step (Fig. 17.2) studied the difference between the level of centrality by the four functions and the level of centrality by population size (Table 17.1, Column 2) for each individual settlement. The results showed that the undersupplied settlements are mostly located near important national or regional centers, whereas the oversupplied settlements are mostly located in less-developed and sparsely populated areas. The undersupplied settlements predominate in suburban areas and are expected to be undersupplied due to intense population growth. On the other hand, the oversupplied settlements may have experienced a population decrease in the past four decades or, alternatively, increased their supply with new services (such as becoming a new municipal center).

To test this assumption, data on oversupplied and undersupplied settlements were compared with data on population growth during the last forty years; the results showed that the change in population only partly explains the results. I therefore created a matrix in which the *x* axis represents the population growth and the *y* axis the level of supply, and additionally compared the four categories of settlements with data on their administrative character (Fig. 17.3).




Fig. 17.2 Difference between level of centrality by the four functions and level of centrality by population size (Nared et al. 2016)




Fig. 17.3 Level of settlements' supply in relation to population growth over the last four decades

As evident from Fig. 17.3, there are only twenty undersupplied central settlements that experienced a decrease in population. Among the undersupplied central settlements whose population has grown (196), the great majority are centers without any administrative functions (134). These are followed by new municipal centers and former municipal centers.

Due to the general population increase in Slovenia between 1971 and 2015, the number of oversupplied central settlements with a decrease in population is also rather low. Among thirty-eight such central settlements, twenty-four are new municipal centers, three former municipal centers and eleven centers without administrative functions.

The group of oversupplied central settlements that have experienced population stagnation or growth is rather numerous. Out of 142 such central settlements, seventy-eight are new municipal centers, twenty-six former municipal centers, and thirty-eight centers without administrative functions.

More than 90% of the undersupplied central settlements have experienced population stagnation or growth and thus it is possible to confirm that the two categories have a strong negative correlation ($r_s = -0.32$). On the other hand, the same is not valid for the oversupplied central settlements, and so it is necessary to search for other reasons. One of them is surely the structure of the central settlements in term of their administrative status. As can be seen in Fig. 17.3, municipal centers play an important role, and so it can be concluded that local government reforms play an important role in the Slovenian settlement structure.

17.4 Discussion

The Slovenian settlement system is very dispersed. Not only there are many settlements (more than six thousand), but also at the city level the cities are numerous and only a few of them have a population over ten thousand. This is also visible in the system of central settlements, with almost four hundred central settlements that have their own functional areas competing for resources and many of them striving for decision-making power. This fact was clearly evident in the latest local government reform, in which there were many attempts to establish new municipalities, resulting in the current 212 municipalities. Being on their own, they were allowed to steer their own development, which was limited to basic infrastructure in many cases.

Because providing services of general interest and services of general economic interest is mandatory for each municipality, the areas that would like to become a new municipality enhanced their institutions. Thus some branch primary schools became full nine-year primary schools and some of the new municipal centers obtained their own health clinics. By becoming the seat of a municipality, they also provided better accessibility to services in the local domain (e.g., an administrative center, libraries, water treatment, waste management, and social care). Thus the centers became better supplied as well as responsible for many territorial management decisions. Although they are weak in terms of human and economic potential, they have important jurisdictions as well as access to tax revenues. In the absence of administration at the regional level, alongside the national level they are the only decision-making power regardless of their area and population.

This process went hand in hand with structural changes in recent decades that in spatial terms were most evident in demographic change and intense suburbanization processes (Ravbar 1997, 2005; Bole 2004). Areas surrounding centers of regional, national, and international importance have faced rapid economic and spatial development, enhanced by the new freeway network and increased car use (Bole 2004; Bole et al. 2012; Gabrovec and Razpotnik Visković 2012), whereas the developing suburban cities became increasingly residential areas with a very limited level of services and economic activities (Topole et al. 2006; Bole 2011). As shown in Fig. 17.2, this process is evident in the Ljubljana Basin (including Kranj and Jesenice), in the surroundings of Maribor, Celje, Velenje, and Nova Gorica, and in the coastal conurbation (Koper, Izola, and Piran). On the other hand, in less-developed and sparsely populated regions in southeastern and eastern Slovenia there are wider areas where centers are mainly oversupplied.

Although some areas with oversupplied centers have faced outmigration as a result of the postwar abandonment of farming (Ravbar 1995), this is not the main reason they have become oversupplied. In contrast, Kokole (1971) argued that centers in southeastern Slovenia are undersupplied due to the general developmental level of the area.

As indicated in Fig. 17.3, the oversupplied centers are mostly those that are municipal centers (72.8%), and among them the new municipal centers dominate,

with more than 56.6% of the total oversupplied centers. This clearly shows that being a municipal center guarantees better access to services and thus provides better living conditions for the residents. Furthermore, it demonstrates the role that both local government reforms have had on the Slovenian settlement and spatial structure.

The impact that both reforms have had on the spatial development in Slovenia was strengthened by regional policy in both cases. In the 1970s there was an initial attempt to improve the development level of less-developed areas by introducing a traditional regional policy that strove to provide comparable living conditions for people no matter where they live (Nared 2003). This fostered the development of infrastructure and created new factories, and development was further strengthened by the concept of polycentric development (Ravbar 1995; Drozg and Premzl 1999). Importantly, polycentric development was not implemented at the regional level, as originally planned, but instead devolved to the local level, enhancing the development of the former municipal centers (Nared 2003). The local government reform starting in 1994 was similarly strengthened by a localized regional policy, especially in the last ten to fifteen years (Nared et al. 2017). In the absence of decision-makers at the regional level, the deciding power again devolved to the local level. Thus the main decision-making body at the regional level was a regional council represented by all of the mayors in the region (Rus et al. 2018), who put local interests before regional ones. The situation clearly reflected in contemporary regional development in Slovenia is visible in the centralization within Ljubljana and the Ljubljana Urban Region, and also in quickly developing municipal centers that are gaining in importance in relation to regional centers (Rus et al. 2013).

Despite the favorable results suggesting that the central settlements in peripheral regions are well supplied compared to those in suburban areas, this situation might blur the problems that peripheral areas have recently faced. One reason for this is methodological because the methodology used importantly depends on the four selected functions (public administration, education, healthcare, and the judiciary). Thus being a municipal center per se offers an advantage to the settlement when the network of central places is defined. In addition, small municipal centers do not have the authority and resources to fully use the potential that the status of an independent territorial body offers. Furthermore, the demographic decay of some very small municipalities has resulted in a situation without any children to attend the school, and it is also difficult to get teachers or physicians to work in more remote areas. Matters are even more complicated in the case of services of general economic interest and marketable services. Post offices, for example, are frequently commissioned to some local entrepreneurs (e.g., shops, bars, etc.) or limited to the lowest degree possible by providing services limited to certain days and hours (Nared et al. 2016). One of the important issues is also providing services of general interest in suburban areas. The vicinity of larger centers and their residential character hinders the development of services, which is often supported by the residents' behavior. Specifically, they use the services in areas where they work, which are often centers of regional, national, and international importance. Because of this, purchasing in residential areas is very limited and consequently services

cannot develop. In the short term this is probably not a problem, but it could become one when the suburban population ages. The current dependence on cars, which is a consequence of increased mobility and spatial planning that has not taken the need for public transport into account, could cause gentrification and marginalization of contemporary residential suburban areas in the long term (Bole et al. 2012; Gabrovec and Razpotnik Visković 2012; Nared et al. 2012; Nared and Razpotnik Visković 2012).

Another important issue in studying the provision of services of general interest and services of general economic interest is the relation between cohesion and competitiveness. Contemporary studies of the polycentric settlement system favor the competitiveness of cities, mostly studying higher levels of centrality and not considering central settlements at the local level (Kloosterman and Musterd 2001; Parr 2004; Burdack and Bontje 2005; Green 2007; Meiers 2007, 2008; Burger and Meiers 2012). In contrast, for peripheral areas the crucial role of the centers is providing basic services, which places the discussion in the cohesion context. Thus, the creation of the settlement system may not only provide the foundations for a competitive economy but also pave the way to more balanced and cohesive development of the country's entire territory.

17.5 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the impacts that the last two local government reforms have had on territorial development in Slovenia. In this regard, it examined the central places in Slovenia in 2016, analyzing centrality based on population size, centrality based on the provision of services of general interest (public administration, education, healthcare, and the judiciary), and a combined index of centrality that included both of these aspects (population and services). By comparing the size of a settlement with the services it offers, it was possible to distinguish between over-supplied and undersupplied central settlements. Those were put in the context of population growth/decline and were additionally studied from the administrative perspective (i.e., formal municipal center, new municipal center, or center without administrative functions).

The results show that the provision of basic services in less-developed areas often surpasses the supply available in the same-sized suburban centers. This can be explained by the immense population growth in suburban areas, where the development of services and jobs has not followed apace. On the other hand, the oversupply of central settlements is not related to population decline, but instead to local government reforms in Slovenia over the last fifty years and additional jurisdictions and services that the new municipal centers have gained as local administrative headquarters.

In this regard, local government reforms and the newly established municipal centers play an important role in ensuring cohesion of the country's territory, particularly from the perspective of less-developed and peripheral areas. This role

has even been strengthened by side effects of the concept of polycentric development in the last decades of the twentieth century, in which the initially planned promotion of regional centers devolved to municipal centers and a localized regional policy took root in Slovenia, particularly in the last fifteen years. In both cases, local centers have gained new authority and reduced their deficit in supply with services of general interest in comparison to the regional centers.

The results indicate that the provision of services of general interest is relatively rigid and inflexible, and that it adapts to the population's needs only in the long term, which has a positive effect especially on less-developed and marginal areas. Despite this, thorough reflection is needed to secure the provision of services in the longer term. Namely, adapting functions to population size would have a severe impact on less-developed and sparsely populated peripheral areas.

The results presented show that Christaller's theory is still relevant in spatial development. The functions that an individual settlement has make it a pull area for its surroundings. By devolving services to the local level during the last two local government reforms, settlement system became polycentric, whereas the increased mobility and persistent distribution of jobs in some limited centers on the one hand and the decentralization of the population into suburban residential areas on the other had enhanced the linkages among the centers, which confirms Friedmann's core-periphery model, suggesting that the settlement system is becoming increasingly complex and interconnected. At the same time, geometric marginality is not necessarily a disadvantage. As shown in this chapter, many geometrically peripheral settlements are better supplied with services of general interest in comparison to settlements in the suburban belts of large cities. This is due to the intentional and unintentional effects of local government reforms, which suggest that marginality could be overcome through prudent administrative measures.

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Chapter 18

Regional Disparities in Sustainable Development of Slovenia—Cohesion or Marginalization?

Katja Vintar Mally

18.1 Introduction

Sustainable development as a contemporary development paradigm imposes the requirement that progress in the economic, social, and environmental spheres be balanced. Sustainable development in close concert with environmental ethics strives to eliminate any kind of marginalization of populations or parts of the world. In investigating regional disparities we therefore proceed from the assumption that those regions which fail to follow the requirements of sustainable development will over time become even more marginalized.

Contemporary understanding of the process of marginalization focuses on geometric, ecological, economic and social types of marginality (Leimgruber 2007; Leimgruber 2010), in which marginalization is understood mainly as weak, inadequate integration into predominant structures and processes or as a lower level of development. Both are reflected in different dimensions of marginalization, but usually its socio-economic aspect is given greatest emphasis (Schmidt 2007). In order to better understand how marginalization occurs or emerges, it is important to know how systems operate (Déry et al. 2012), which is also in keeping with the approach used to study sustainable development. The crucial requirement of sustainable development is in fact this balancing of different development goals, in which right from the start there is a clash between socio-economic and environmental goals, since in the past the pursuit of the former as a rule occurred to the detriment of achieving the later. Pelc (2010) concludes that areas that are marginal based on social and economic criteria, and areas that are marginal based on environmental criteria, are usually mutually exclusive. Socio-economically more developed regions (i.e. central regions) are frequently more degraded and thus more

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marginalized from the environmental standpoint due to the environmental pressures of various human activities, while regions with a well-preserved natural environment (with high quality water resources, relatively unpolluted air and soil, greater biodiversity) have preserved their valuable ecosystem services precisely because of their social, economic, and geographical marginality.

In Slovenia, balancing regional development and guiding it towards the goals of sustainability in past decades has proven to be a difficult challenge. If we judge the country based on the extent of the use of natural resources and the pressure on the environment's ability to absorb the load, as is for example taken into consideration by calculations of the ecological footprint, its development model to date has been highly unsustainable. In the time since Slovenia's independence (1991) up until the global financial and economic crisis, a time of considerable economic growth, the ecological footprint of the average Slovenian inhabitant more than doubled, though in recent years, due mainly to the effects of the crisis, it has been somewhat reduced. But the Slovenian ecological footprint (5.8 global ha per capita in 2012) is still more than twice the biocapacity of the country's territory (2.4 global ha per capita) (Global Footprint Network 2016). The appropriation of natural resources and ecosystem services, which is above average on the European as well as the global scale, however, is not reflected in a proportionate socio-economic advancement of the country. Slovenia did raise its human development index from 0.766 to 0.880 in the period 1990–2014, but not its relative position, remaining in 25th place among all the countries of the world (UNDP 2015). Here it is important to stress that the number of inhabitants in the country has remained essentially unchanged and that many countries have achieved a similar level of prosperity with lower pressures on the environment and use of natural resources.

Slovenia is a member of the European Union, where sustainable development is given priority in various sector policies, the umbrella strategy Europe 2020 (European Commission 2010), and the special Sustainable Development Strategy (Council of the European Union 2006). In Slovenia, sustainable development was strongly emphasized in Slovenia's Development Strategy (IMAD 2005), which as the umbrella development strategy in the country "based on the principles of sustainable development and the integration of development policies" (IMAD 2005, p. 15) also emphasizes balanced regional development and the reduction of developmental lags in the least developed regions in the country as being among important development goals. The whole of the cohesion policy of the European Union (European Commission 2016) also strives towards this same goal.

At the regional level development trends in Slovenia are monitored only through examining the data from the so-called statistical regions, since an intermediate administrative level between the municipalities and the country as a whole does not exist. The next section of this chapter presents a comparison of the results of two studies of the development trends and current state in Slovenian regions that were carried out using indicators of sustainable development in the periods 1996–2002 (Vintar 2003) and 2010–2014 (Vintar Mally in press). The results of this evaluation

of sustainability are compared with the findings of other development evaluations used by the government to monitor and encourage development in the direction of greater cohesion.

18.2 Economic, Social and Environmental Development Disparities in the Light of Sustainable Development

Guiding regions towards a more sustainable development path requires ongoing “measurement” of their progress. This is usually conducted using sustainable development indicators. Although the concept of sustainable development is often criticized for having too broad and vague a definition, it is in fact these indicators for monitoring it that define it most clearly. Thus, particular dimensions of sustainability or similar indicators appear repeatedly in different frameworks of indicators (see for example United Nations 2007; European Union 2015), and there is generally no dilemma as to whether for an increase in the level of sustainability it is desired that we “measure” increasingly higher or increasingly lower values.

In studies at the national or even more detailed spatial level, the set of indicators must be additionally adjusted to the specific features of the country and the availability of data. For the evaluation of development disparities among Slovenian regions we thus selected 32 indicators for the period 1996–2002, which we then also calculated for the period 2010–2014, though some of the original indicators were adjusted or replaced due to improvements in the collection of statistical data. These changes limit directly comparable results between the two periods but within a particular period they are entirely comparable. Both studies included 6 economic, 12 social, and 14 environmental indicators, which were selected as being representative of particular dimensions of sustainable development and by means of which we attempted to evaluate to what extent particular regions approach or diverge from the general goals of sustainable development.

For all indicators the calculation of the value for each region was followed by standardization, in order to eliminate differences due to units of measurements of variables. For each indicator we assigned scores to regions in a range from -2 ($-$) for a negative contribution to sustainable development to $+2$ ($++$) for a positive contribution to sustainable development. As a basis for assigning scores we used the arithmetic mean of regions to divide positive and negative scores and the standard deviation to determine the threshold for doubling negative or positive scores. Thus if the value of the indicator for a particular region showed an above average successful approach towards the goal and was less than one standard deviation from the arithmetic mean of regions, we assigned a score of $+1$ ($+$), and for a larger deviation then $+2$ ($++$). Negative scores were assigned based on the same principle to regions with below average achievements. The assigning of scores was based on the prior decision as to whether it is desirable for a particular indicator from the standpoint of the goals of sustainable development to have a

higher value (for example, increase in the extent of protected areas, spending on research and development, gross domestic product, the share of people with higher education, etc.) or as low a value as possible (for example, the share of unemployed, index of aging, water consumption per capita, production of municipal waste per capita, etc.). The overall evaluation is designed from the standpoint of an economically developed country, in which the majority of the population have their material needs satisfied and which strives towards the reduction of excessive pressures on the environment, dematerialization, and the elimination of interregional disparities in the welfare of inhabitants. It is important to stress that the same evaluation in developing countries would need to take into account reverse starting points in particular indicators with respect to desirable or undesirable phenomena. In such countries an increase in the aging index of the population, for example, would be evaluated as a positive contribution to sustainable development, since it would indicate a slowdown in the fertility rate and population growth as a precondition for faster socio-economic advancement, while in countries with an overly aged population a further increase in the index would only increase the threat to the social security system.

Based on the scores of regions for individual indicators, an average score for the economic, social, and environmental development of the region was calculated in which each indicator included carried equal weight in the final value. Based on the same principle the arithmetic mean was calculated for all three areas, which we call the indicator of sustainable regional development (ISRDR).

Slovenia ranks among high income countries of the world, since according to gross national income per capita in 2014 (30,360 USD per capita, PPP) it occupied 36th place in the world and 17th place in Europe (World Bank 2016). During the economic crisis Slovenia's lag behind the average for the European Union increased sharply and in 2014 it achieved only 83% of average GDP per capita (PPP) for the European Union (IMAD 2016). However, based on the criteria of income we nevertheless cannot claim that the country or its individual regions are marginal. But certainly there are large economic disparities among Slovenian regions, as also indicated by the ratio between the region with the lowest (the Pomurska region) and the highest (Osrednjeslovenska region) GDP per capita, which over the period 1995–2014 increased from 1:1.8 to 1:2.1 (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 2016). For the evaluation of the successfulness of economic development of Slovenian regions in pursuing sustainable goals the following six indicators were used:

- Gross domestic product (€/capita),
- Gross value added (€/capita),
- Expenditure on fixed assets (€/capita),
- Average Research and Development expenditure (% of GDP),
- Disposable income (€/capita),
- Service sector employees (%).

Table 18.1 Average scores of Slovenian statistical regions in the main development spheres, 2010–2014

Statistical region	Economic indicators—average	Social indicators—average	Environmental indicators—average	ISRD
Pomurska	-1.17	-1.08	-0.07	-0.77
Podravska	-0.83	-0.67	-0.79	-0.76
Koroška	-0.83	-0.08	0.50	-0.14
Savinjska	0.17	-0.67	0.00	-0.17
Zasavska	-1.17	-0.92	0.00	-0.70
Spodnjeposavska	-0.67	-0.58	-0.36	-0.54
Jugovzhodna Slovenija	0.67	0.08	0.57	0.44
Osrednjeslovenska	2.00	0.92	-0.36	0.85
Gorenjska	0.00	1.17	-0.21	0.32
Notranjsko-kraška	-0.67	0.92	0.57	0.27
Goriška	0.50	0.92	-0.07	0.45
Obalno-kraška	0.50	0.25	0.14	0.30

For all the selected indicators, a higher value is desired for achieving greater economic sustainability, with the purpose of achieving greater material well-being in the regions, increasing the economic power of the population and the economy, and improving the employment structure and competitiveness of the economy. The average score of the economic sphere for the period 2010–2014 (Table 18.1) was highest in the Osrednjeslovenska region, which has a score that is higher by 3.17 than that of the economically weakest Pomurska region. Regions of the eastern part of Slovenia (especially Pomurska, Podravska, Koroška, and Zasavska) are pushed most to the economic periphery of the country (Fig. 18.1), and this situation was also shown by these regions in a study at the end of the 20th century. In general the rankings of the regions did not change essentially between the two periods, which indicates that these economic disparities are deeply rooted.

Similar findings also apply for disparities achieving social goals of sustainable development, which are based on ensuring the highest quality possible education, health care, and housing conditions for the population. With respect to preventing marginalization, in addition to access to public services the prevention of poverty and social exclusion is also very important, especially for more vulnerable groups (for example, unemployed women and less well educated people), as is maintaining the vitality of the population and reliance on endogenous human resources in the region. The aspects of social sustainability mentioned were studied using twelve indicators:

- Unemployed with uncompleted or completed primary school (%),
- Share of unemployed women (%),
- Population density (inhabitants/km²),
- Population growth index,




Fig. 18.1 Indicator of sustainable regional development and rankings of regions in the main development fields, 2010–2014

- Aging index,
- Average age at death (years),
- Recipients of social assistance benefits in cash (no. of recipients/1,000 inhabitants),
- Usable floor area (m²/capita),
- Registered unemployment rate (%),
- Number of students per 1,000 inhabitants,
- Internet users (index),
- College degree holders (25–64 years) (%).

Social indicators monitor progress in increasing the quality of life, which improved according to some criteria but worsened according to others in Slovenian regions between the two periods studied. The population of Slovenia is very slowly increasing: over the period 1996–2014 it grew from 1,990,266 to 2,061,085 (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 2016), but at the same time some regions recorded a decline in population (especially Zasavska, Pomurska, and Koroška region), and calculations and comparisons of the indicators also point to a rapid aging of the population in all regions. In general the educational level of the population, housing conditions, and infrastructure improved, and life expectancy increased. On the other hand, the financial-economic crisis after 2008 was reflected in higher unemployment and significantly increased the number of people subjected to poverty and social exclusion.

Based on the average scores of regions in the social sphere it can be seen that the top six places (Fig. 18.1 and Table 18.1) are occupied by regions from the western half of the country, with the best conditions shown by the Gorenjska region, followed by Goriška, Notranjsko-kraška, and Osrednjeslovenska region. The absolute range of disparities in social scores (2.25) is smaller than that for economic scores but still greater than the range in environmental scores (1.36). Regions in the eastern part of the country show an above average aging of the population, and some also show a drop in the number of inhabitants; they have a poorer education structure and more difficulties in providing employment, and an increased risk of social exclusion for inhabitants.

A comprehensive evaluation of the current state and trends in the environmental sphere was most difficult since there is a lack of synthetic indicators and it is therefore necessary to use a larger number of indicators in order to capture at least the most important issues. With the combination of environmental indicators included we tried to cover all environmental elements (air, water, soil, biodiversity, space), either through evaluating their current state, the pressures they face from economic activities and population, or the responses of society to existing environmental problems. The final selection of fourteen key environmental indicators comprised the following:

- Organically farmed land (%),
- Wooded areas (m²/capita),
- Road freight transport growth index,
- Intensively farmed land (m²/capita),
- Quality of air (assessment),
- Municipal waste (kg/capita),
- Natura 2000 sites (%),
- Water consumption (m³/capita),
- Average expenditure on environmental protection (% GDP),
- Built-up areas (%),
- Treated wastewater (m³/capita),
- Housing with district heating in place (%),
- Motorization rate (cars/1,000 people),
- Livestock density index (LSU/ha).

In both periods studied the analysis of environmental indicators showed that interregional disparities in this sphere were the smallest, and scores in comparison to social and economic ones were more or less evenly distributed. At the same time the order of the ranking of the regions changed most between the two periods with respect to the average score for the environmental sphere. We can thus conclude that through a sound policy in the environmental sphere we could most easily achieve cohesion, as supported also by the fact that in most of the country the environment is still in a well preserved state.

The most favorable score in the environmental sphere in the period 2010–2014 was shared by the regions of Jugovzhodna Slovenija and Notranjsko-kraška, followed by Koroška (Fig. 18.1 and Table 18.1). The regions of Podravska, Osrednjeslovenska, and Spodnjeposavska most lagged behind the achievements of other regions. Regardless of the existing disparities among the regions it should be emphasized that since the end of the 20th century great progress has been achieved in the country in reducing air pollution and in monitoring pollutants, which can be seen in particular in the improved quality of water resources and air (replacement of energy sources, installation of desulphurization units and filters on the biggest air polluters, systematic construction of wastewater treatment plants, improved waste management, etc.). Likewise, there has been a growing trend towards environmentally friendly agricultural production (especially the growth of organic farming) and greater attention given to protected natural areas (national protected areas, the Natura 2000 European network of areas). On the other hand there have been some negative trends of increased traffic and the extent of material-energy flows, and an increasingly greater concentration of pressures from settlement, economic activities, and infrastructure in lowland areas, especially in the vicinity of regional centers.

18.3 Regional Disparities in Slovenia According to Different Measures of Development

A comparison of Slovenian regions according to the value of the synthetic indicator of sustainable regional development (ISRD) in both periods studied shows that the six westernmost regions have maintained above average (positive) values and the other six regions have below average (negative) values (Fig. 18.1). The ranking of regions has not essentially changed, since the rank of a particular region changed between the two periods by at most two places (in the second period there was an improvement in position by two places for Jugovzhodna Slovenija and a drop by two places for the Gorenjska and Podravska regions). The range of values in the period 2010–2014 was somewhat smaller but due to changes in the indicators included and the method of assigning scores we cannot attribute this directly to a reduction in disparities among regions. Due to greater development disparities between the eastern and western halves in the social and economic spheres there also appears a sharp dividing line between the two parts of the country in the ISRD (Table 18.2).

A comparison of the ISRD with the so-called development risk index (DRI), which is used at the national level for ranking regions according to level of development in particular program periods, shows greater differences in the rankings of regions. The latest available calculations of DRI are for the current program

Table 18.2 Changes in the development risk index and the indicator of sustainable regional development since the end of the 20th century

Statistical region	DRI ^a				ISRD			
	2001–2005 ^b		2010–2014 ^c		1996–2002		2010–2014	
	Score	Ranking	Score	Ranking	Score	Ranking	Score	Ranking
Osrednjeslovenska	8.7	1	35.5	1	0.74	1	0.85	1
Obalno-kraška	82.4	2	81.4	4	0.42	4	0.30	5
Gorenjska	83.1	3	66.6	3	0.67	2	0.32	4
Savinjska	92.3	4	92.6	5	-0.19	7	-0.17	8
Goriška	93.8	5	100.4	6	0.57	3	0.45	2
Jugovzhodna Slovenija	101.7	6	64.7	2	0.28	5	0.44	3
Koroška	103.9	7	121.6	8	-0.30	8	-0.14	7
Zasavska	113.9	8	125.1	11	-0.82	11	-0.70	10
Spodnjeposavska	116.8	9	101.5	7	-0.70	10	-0.54	9
Podravska	116.8	10	123.9	9	-0.70	9	-0.76	11
Notranjsko-kraška	127.0	11	124.8	10	0.07	6	0.27	6
Pomurska	159.5	12	161.8	12	-1.12	12	-0.77	12

Sources Vintar (2003), Pečar and Kavaš (2006), Pravilnik o razvrstitvi (2014); own calculations

^aA higher value of the index means greater risk to the development of the region

^bPeriod of data by means of which the development risk index was calculated for the program period 2007–2013

^cPeriod of data by means of which the development risk index was calculated for the program period 2014–2020

period 2014–2020 and are based on data from the last few years before the start of this period (Table 18.2). In comparison with ISRD, DRI includes a smaller number of indicators, and the selection also changed in part based on the availability of data. The most recent set encompasses 14 indicators: GDP per capita, gross value added per employee, gross fixed capital formation in GDP, unemployment rate for young people (15–29 years), employment rate (20–64 years), proportion of the population with tertiary education (25–64 years), the share of gross domestic expenditure on research and development in GDP, the proportion of treated wastewater with at least secondary treatment, the proportion of protected land areas in the region, the share of the estimated damage caused by natural disasters in GDP, the unemployment rate, the index of aging, disposable income per capita, and population density (Pravilnik o razvrstitvi 2014).

The results of both synthetic indicators are not directly comparable due to different methods of standardization but we can compare the relative position of regions with respect to the selected method of evaluation. Due to the predominance of economic and social indicators in DRI (only three indicators could be characterized as environmental) the rankings of the regions differ significantly between DRI and ISRD: for example, two regions are ranked four places higher (Goriška and Notranjsko-kraška), and one region (Savinjska) is three places lower. With respect to DRI the Osrednjeslovenska region has the lowest development risk and the Pomurska region has the highest (Table 18.2). The governmental Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development found that during the time of the last crisis, regional disparities in level of economic development and risk of poverty became smaller, but this was a result of the greater drop in economic activity or in other words the greater economic decline of regions that before 2008 had a more advantageous position (IMAD 2016). This thus does not mean a reduction in the marginalization of the least developed regions of the country. A more detailed insight into the disparities in the level of development of particular parts of the country is given by the coefficient of development of municipalities, which is used by the government to determine the level of co-financing of investments in Slovenian municipalities. The index is calculated from ten indicators that cover economic strength of the population and of the economy (income tax base per capita, gross value added of companies per employee), demographic characteristics (index of aging, density of settlement), employment opportunities (number of jobs for the size of the economically active population, unemployment rate, employment rate), environmental protection (share of Natura 2000 areas, proportion of the population with a connection to the public sewer system) and cultural heritage (cultural monuments and infrastructure) (Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Slovenia 2015).

Strikingly high values for the coefficient of development of municipalities are shown, as expected, for the central part of the country, especially the municipalities in the Osrednjeslovenska region, while low values point to the marginalization of particular areas along the border, especially those that are also in high mountain or forested Dinaric karst areas, or have poor transport connections with national and/or regional centers. Greater frequency of municipalities with a low coefficient of development is also noticeable in regions that lag behind economically (Fig. 18.2).




Fig. 18.2 Coefficient of the development of Slovenian municipalities in 2015

18.4 Conclusion

Quality of life for the 21st century population is no longer represented merely in terms of socio-economic well-being, such as that enabled by classical centers of power (for example, urban areas or regional and national centers), but also in terms of a high quality living environment, of which an indispensable part is an unspoiled and unpolluted natural environment offering numerous ecosystem services, which are valued also from aesthetic, recreational and other nonmaterial aspects. Sustainable development guides us toward balancing different development goals and the creation of the living conditions described. In general we cannot say of Slovenian regions that the disparities among them are growing, or that cohesion is increasing, since very diverse trends are recorded in different areas. But we can with certainty conclude that the prevailing development model in the country is still unsustainable, and that economic and social disparities are the most deeply rooted within it.

Evaluation using indicators can have a strong communicative value for the broader public, experts, and sectoral policymakers, since it indicates weaknesses in the functioning of the system, as a result of which particular parts of the system lag behind in the pursuit of contemporary development goals and thus become susceptible to marginalization. Usually these are areas that even now are faced with a range of problems, hence their ability or flexibility in coping with new challenges such as those brought on by climate change or broader social changes is questionable. Experience to date shows that without deliberate long-term measures in regional development we cannot expect cohesion, since certain regional disparities are very deep-rooted and create an additional obstacle to following a more sustainable path.

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Chapter 19

Marginalization of Tea Estates in Sri Lanka in the Changing Global and National Context

Daichi Kohmoto

19.1 Introduction

Many developing countries around the world still depend on the export of a few agricultural products and/or mineral resources. Commercial plantation-based agriculture which expanded under colonial economics is a typical example in case.

Plantation agriculture can be seen as an expression of productivism whose objective is to produce food on a large scale through specialization and productivity improvements. As a reflection of this characteristic, plantations are still often cited for the various historical problems that they have not been able to rectify, including monoculture farming, structures that exploit and domineer over their workers, and environmental issues (See Beckford 2000; Harteminsk 2005 etc.). However, countries and regions where plantation agriculture is still practiced are beginning to feel the effects of the new liberalism-inspired globalization of food systems. In these countries, studies have confirmed economic, social and political instability (Nuhn 2004), and shifts to manufacture-based and service-based economies (Lincoln 2006).

This study focuses on the tea industry in Sri Lanka. Tea production in this country has been conducted by export-oriented commercial plantations inherited from the time of British colonial rule, and these plantations have had a major impact in defining the socioeconomic conditions in Sri Lanka.

Interviewing surveys were conducted at head offices of plantations and managing departments of tea estates, as well as with tea estate workers and residents in 2005. Information was also gathered from a variety of papers and other sources. Much of this study is based on my previous paper (Kohmoto 2008) written in Japanese.

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19.2 Global Tea Production and Distribution, and Where Sri Lanka Stands

Black tea produced in Sri Lanka is well-known as Ceylon Tea. However, the Sri Lankan tea industry, particularly the estate sector, is burdened with structural problems for sustainability. Tea production is growing around the world as a result of improvements in land productivity. Global consumption is also on the rise, primarily in developing countries. Consumption in advanced countries, however, is declining and this has caused a prolonged decline in global tea prices. Sri Lanka, the world's largest exporter, has continued to produce tea, primarily on plantation estates that were built during the colonial era.

Tea production in the four leading tea producing countries shows that while India and China have continued to expand production since 1960s, and Kenya has established its position as a new producer, Sri Lanka's production remained low until around 1990. Kenya had surpassed Sri Lanka in production amount after 2005. Both countries export most of the black tea they produce. Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi are up-and-coming producers of teas for export. In China, production of teas other than black teas is growing partly as a result of diversifying preferences in markets such as Japan.

At the time of 1980, top 10 destinations of Ceylon Tea were Iraq, UK, Egypt, USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Syria, and Canada. In 2014, they were Turkey, Russia, Iran, Iraq, UAE, Syria, Libya, Kuwait, Azerbaijan, Japan, and Chile. This change shows that while Sri Lanka does export to a wide range of countries, a relatively large proportion of their tea is exported to Russia and the Middle East. Kenya, on the other hand, exports to a small number of specific countries including the UK, Pakistan and Egypt now, resulting in market segregation between Sri Lankan exports. India's major markets include the former Soviet Union and UK, China's major markets (for black teas) include neighbouring countries such as Japan and Hong Kong, and major importers of Malawi's teas include the UK and neighbouring South Africa. The majority of these exports are believed to be black teas. Green tea exports to western Africa and other regions where green tea is consumed in large amounts primarily come from China.

Black tea consumption is high in the former Soviet Union, UK and other developed countries, and Pakistan. Tea consumption has been declining in developed countries including Germany, France, Australia and the UK, where an increasing number of consumers are shifting to other soft drinks such as mineral water and juices (Grigg 2003). In contrast, tea consumption in developing countries and the former Soviet Union is rising in all income levels mainly because teas are less expensive than coffee and are better thirst quenchers (Weinberg and Bealer 2001; Grigg 2003). While global production and consumption levels are both on an increasing trend, these consumption trends have put global tea prices on a declining or stagnating trend.

19.3 Sri Lanka's Tea Production and Distribution Structures

Even after 1948 when Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain, its economy was largely driven by the export of plantation crops (teas, coconut, and rubber). In 1977, the country introduced market economy policies to diversify its economy, and by 1990, clothing exports and workers working abroad had increased dramatically. Meanwhile, tea exports continued to grow with large volumes exported to Russia and the Middle East, both regions where tea consumption continues to grow, unlike Europe and North America.

However, things are not going as smoothly as they may appear. Particularly, the nationalization of tea plantations that occurred between 1972 and 1975 caused a decline in Sri Lanka's competitiveness in the international market. According to Manikam (1995) and Shanmugaratnam (1997), there was considerable discontent among the people of Sri Lanka (then called Ceylon), primarily among small-scale Sinhalese farmers who had had their land expropriated by British plantation operators, and this had been the backdrop for the nationalization movement. Private corporations who owned tea farms were threatened by nationalization and reduced business investments in the late 1950s; in particular, much of the British capital left Ceylon and moved to locations such as Kenya where they could pursue the "economy of scale". After all the plantations were requisitioned and nationalized between 1972 and 1975, various problems arose including corruption surrounding the hiring of plantation managers, lack of business acumen, and excessive political intervention in decision making processes. Furthermore, government policies that prioritized rice farming, export taxes, and a drop in international tea prices caused land and labour productivity to stagnate.


Sri Lanka's tea industry has been slow to introduce mechanization and new production methods. For example, tea factories around the world began employing a new and efficient method called the CTC manufacturing process in the 1980s. As of 2004, 97% of tea factories in Kenya used CTC whereas only 5% currently do so in Sri Lanka (based on information from these country's respective tea boards). Because introduction of this technique was delayed nationwide, European buyers, particularly the British buyers, came to see Sri Lanka as a "country that used orthodox methods" (according to an interview with the Sri Lanka Tea Board). Tainted by this image, many Sri Lankan tea factories that actually implemented CTC have not been able to generate profits from their sales, and the rate of CTC implementation has been falling since it peaked at 8% in 1995.

Why then has production been increasing since the 1990s? This has to do with Sri Lanka's regional disparities in tea production. There are three general categories of tea growing areas in Sri Lanka: lowlands (elevation of 600 m and lower), middle lands, and highlands (1200 m and higher; Fig. 19.1). All of these areas are located predominantly in the south-western region, which I will discuss in detail later.



Fig. 19.1 View of a typical landscape of tea estates in the highlands

Fig. 19.2 Tea production levels over the years by elevation (Compiled from the FAO Statistical Databases-www.fao.org)



In terms of the lowlands, 69.9% of the tea growing acreage there (according to the 2002 agricultural census) are farmed by individuals growing tea on small plots (smaller than 4 ha; hereafter referred to as “small holdings”) and not by the plantation sector. Growing area and productivity among small holdings improved dramatically in the 1980s thanks to increased government support (Fig. 19.2). Meanwhile, the plantation sector which mainly operates in the highlands and middle lands (making up 80.1% and 79.3% of the growing areas, respectively) has been undergoing privatization since 1992. The national government,

while maintaining the state-owned status of land, established 22 regional plantation companies (RPCs) and separated the majority of plantations from the two national companies that had been controlling them. Since then, control of these RPCs have been gradually transferred to private corporations through a tender process, with active participation from foreign capital and domestic non-agricultural interests. These steps proved to be effective and resulted in a slight growing trend in production in the plantation sector.

According to the Sri Lanka Tea Board (2004), 95.5% of Sri Lankan tea are packed at tea farms and neighbouring factories before they are sent to Colombo for the weekly auction. Eight Sri Lankan brokers perform tastings on samples shipped from each factory and auction these teas to buyers. After the auction, they are shipped from the port of Colombo under the “Ceylon Tea” brand.

19.4 Problems in the Plantation Sector Stemming from Structural Changes

The plantation sector in the Sri Lankan tea industry is facing a variety of problems stemming from the structural changes described above. In the following discussion, I have categorized these issues into three broad categories:

- (a) land use and the environment,
- (b) sales price, and
- (c) labour.

19.4.1 Land Use and the Environment

Humbel (1990, 1991) elaborated on the shift in tea farm land use in Sri Lanka by comparing aerial photos taken in 1956 and the 1980s. Figure 19.3 shows the results of his study as percentages of land used for tea production by DS division (a unit of land that loosely corresponds to local municipalities). In 1956, tea farms were mainly found in the middle—to highland provinces of Nuwara Eliya, Kandy and Badulla where plantations predominated. In the 1980s, tea farming acreage declined considerably in Kandy, which lies at the northern edge of the core tea farming region, and in the neighbouring province of Kegalle to the west. According to the agricultural census of 2002, tea farming acreage declined steeply in Nuwara Eliya and Badulla, with contrasting growth in the provinces of Ratnapura, Galle and Matara where small holdings predominated. These outcomes resulted from tea plantations in the middle—to highland areas going out of business and abandoning their land. In turn, this has resulted in a variety of issues including labour and




Fig. 19.3 Changes in distribution of tea lands by DS divisions

employment issues for tea farm workers, soil erosion and landslides, and water depletion (Humbel 1990 among others).

There have been considerable delays in the replanting and supplementary planting of tea plants in the plantation sector, even in tea fields that are being maintained; delays that were primarily due to inertia from the prolonged period of state ownership (Fig. 19.4). Of the entire harvested area in the middle—to highland regions where estates predominate, less than half are being planted with high-yield tea plants (vegetative propagated) and, in many cases, seedlings planted during the




Fig. 19.4 Management agencies of tea estates and replanting situation of tea bushes by districts (VP = vegetative propagated; “Sri Lanka census of agriculture—2002: Report on estate Sector” and “Census of tea small holdings in Sri Lanka 2005”, Department of Census and Statistics)

colonial era are still being picked (Fig. 19.5). This is in stark contrast to the lowlands where small holdings predominate. Tea plants begin to lose their vitality over the years and are said to have a life span of about 100 years. Plantation companies who aimed to gain short-term profits by increasing yield relied on chemically synthesized agricultural chemicals and chemical fertilizers that cost less compared to replantings or supplementary plantings. This has had a detrimental effect on sustainability, in terms of both the environment and business operations (Illukpitiya 2003; Illukpitiya et al. 2004).

Fig. 19.5 Difference in appearance of VPs (vegetative propagated) and seedlings (VPs are at the *bottom right* and seedlings are at the *upper left*)



19.4.2 Prices

Figure 19.4 shows the variations in the average price of 1 kg of tea during the periods 1987 through 1989, and 2002 through 2004 for each sub-district (also referred to as agro-climatic districts) as defined by the Sri Lanka Tea Board. This shows that the price of tea from the northern parts of the mountainous and hilly regions of Kandy, Matale and northern Nuwara Eliya have remained generally low since the 1987–89 period, and has seen a sustained relative drop leading up to the 2002–04 period. In terms of elevation, many of the tea farms in this region belong to the middle land category, and their low prices are mainly due to the fact that these farms are unable to produce teas with distinct characteristics such as those that characterize highland or lowland teas.

Teas from the southern part of Nuwara Eliya province, which lies in the southern part of the mountainous and hilly region (made up of tea producing areas called Western or Dimbulla, and Nuwara Eliya) where many of the tea fields are in high elevations, and the region centered around Badulla (tea producing area called Uva), but particularly the former, command high prices. This is because the characteristics of teas produced in these regions, particularly their refreshing aroma and bright color, match the tastes of consumers in countries such as Britain, and also because brands from these areas have established a favorable reputation. However, most sub-districts experienced a relative drop in their prices because the nationalization of plantations among other factors had made buyers leery. Meanwhile, teas from Koslanda/Haldumulla on the southern edge of Badulla, and Haputale were exceptions whose tea prices rose dramatically. I will discuss this phenomenon later.

Meanwhile, the price of teas from southern provinces, namely Kakutara, Galle, Matara and Ratnapura were second after Nuwara Eliya as of 1987–89, and continued to rise during 2002–2004. We believe this was due to the several factors: small holdings are predominant in these regions, demand increased in the middle east and Russia where teas with smokey aroma and rich flavor are preferred,

these regions are suited for large volume production throughout the year due to their hot and humid climate, and teas from these regions are widely used in blends. Obviously, the trends in price for lowland teas is in stark contrast to those for teas produced in mountain and hilly regions where estates predominate.

19.4.3 Labour

The plantation sector has been plagued with labour drains and shortages, as well as ongoing increases in labour costs, and consequently, relative declines in productivity (Shanmugaratnam 1997; Wijeratne 2003). The majority of tea plantation workers are descendants of people who were forcibly relocated from southern India during Britain's colonial rule and are known as Indian Tamils. They make up 95% of the workers in the middle and highland tea farms (Fernando 2000). Indian Tamils were not granted nationality until 1974. In 1977, public schools that taught in Tamil were built on and around plantations and this contributed to improving the level of education among Tamils (Little 1999).

Union movements gained momentum and wages have been increasing steadily. These developments, however, proved to be a major setback for plantation companies. Particularly, as education became widespread, younger people increasingly avoided working (Fig. 19.6) or living (Fig. 19.7) on tea farms, looking for employment opportunities in nearby towns or relocating to Colombo for work.

Additionally, social systems surrounding plantation workers have attracted much criticism. Research has been conducted on the oppression of female plantation workers even before privatization (Samarasinghe 1993), but recent studies have been more critical, based on gender theory perspectives that originated in developed industrial nations (Philips 2003, 2005). These studies prove that the social status of plantation workers after privatization has not fundamentally improved or has

Fig. 19.6 Tea estate workers picking tea



Fig. 19.7 Residents' houses called "lines" in a tea estate



worsened in some cases, and bring into question the validity of the current state of affairs.

Sri Lanka's tea industry, especially the plantation sector, is burdened with structural problems for achieving sustainability in the areas of the environment, economy and social justice.

19.5 The Implementation of Organic Farming: History and Overview

Sri Lanka is a pioneer with regard to the introduction of organic farming, including the world's first certified organic tea farm which was developed in response to demand for organic farm products from developed countries (Kohmoto 2006). Since 1986, there has been a rise in the number of Sri Lankan companies that hold organic certification (which were defined in developed countries) and export organically grown tea. In the plantation sector, six companies and seven tea farms have been certified organic. As mentioned in the previous chapter, case B in Table 19.1 (Figs. 19.8 and 19.9) was the first tea farm in the world to acquire organic certification. This was primarily due to heightened awareness for organic foods in western European countries and the environmental awareness within the mother company, the Stassen Group. In 1984, Stassen Natural Foods was established which implemented biodynamic farming in response to demands from German buyers, and was certified by Naturland, a German organic certification organization, in 1986. Twelve of the neighbouring tea farms (as of the current date) are jointly operated on a project basis. In 1991, the Needwood Organic Tea Estate (case D) broke away and is now under independent management.

Case C is one of the 20 tea farms that the RPC (regional plantation company) converted to an organic farm in 1992. In 1999, the company that operates case B

Table 19.1 Overview of certified organic tea estates

Estate name	Company name	Established year of the company	Elevation	Area (ha)	Harvested area (ha)	VP ratio (%)	Number of workers	
A	Venture bio tea garden	Stassen Natural Food (Pvt) Ltd.	1984	High	403	287	40.9	860
B	Idulgashinna bio tea garden	Stassen Natural Food (Pvt) Ltd.	1984	High	357	278	4.8	985
C	Koslanda organic tea garden	Maskeliya Plantations (Pvt) Ltd.	1992	Mid	1029	214	13.8	432
D	Needwood organic tea estate	Needwood Emmag (Pvt) Ltd.	1966	High	153	94	16.0	350
E	Thottulagara organic tea estate	Greenfield Bio Plantations (Pvt) Ltd.	1997	High	110	75	18.7	226
F	Nilmini estate	Nilmini Estate (Pvt) Ltd.	1999	Low	39	14	100.0	
G	Maussawa estate	Guayapi Lanka (Pvt) Ltd.	1999	High	20	8	0.0	9

Based on interviews and various other information. Data from 2003 through 2005 was used
Case D separated from case B and become independent in 1991

VP ratio denotes the percentage of VPs or vegetative propagated plants planted per harvested area

Fig. 19.8 View of certified organic tea estate case B



Fig. 19.9 Organic tea grown on case B



converted one of the Stassen group's conventional tea fields to organic. This eventually became case A. The company's aim was to acquire a field in a region with different climatic conditions from case B to ensure a consistent supply of organically grown tea. The same year, Lanka Organics, a company that markets a broad range of Sri Lankan organic agricultural products, acquired a part of the tea field owned by the RPC (regional plantation company) and this became case E. Case F grows organic tea on a plot which was part of a deserted rubber plantation at an elevation of 300–400 m. Case G is run by Guayapi Tropical of France which acquired a mostly abandoned tea farm. The company began growing organic tea on this land in addition to providing ecotourism services.

The majority of farms that have been converted to organic farming are situated at high elevations, and are concentrated in the Haldumulla and Haputale regions (Fig. 19.10). We believe the main reasons for this is that all of these tea fields are on




Fig. 19.10 Changes in tea prices by districts (After the statistics of Sri Lanka tea board. Annual average prices of tea are shown as a relative change, because the change of monetary value is large. The circles with a white center show the districts which the price fell relatively from 1987-89 to 2002-04. The circles with a black center show the districts which the price increased relatively. The cases both years are same size of the circles are shown as semicircles of white and black)

steep hills scattered with exposed rock (Fig. 19.8 shows case B) which makes it difficult to achieve large volumes and productivity improvements, and that consumers in developed countries tend to see tea grown in highlands as being better in quality.

A characteristic of organic teas is that they are not sold at weekly auctions in Colombo in the form of dried tea leaves, but are purchased directly by buyers who are primarily from developed countries. Distribution channels differ by company. For example, cases A and B transport dried tea leaves from their farm to their factory in Colombo, package them (see Fig. 19.8 for case B), and sell these packages to buyers from developed countries at their head offices next door. Case C completes packaging in their factory on the farm, transports the packages to their head office in Colombo, and exports them through buyers from developed countries as well as through domestic buyers. Case D has their head office on the farm so they complete the entire process on site and sell to buyers from developed countries.

19.6 Tea Farm Land Use and Its Effects on the Environment

According to Humbel (1990), Haldumulla region where cases A, C and D are located experienced one of the most dramatic rates of decline in tea farming acreage between 1956 and 1980 (38.0% decline)—a decline that still continues. By 2002, the tea farming acreage in this region had shrunk by 73.4% from 1956 levels. This was due to the region's conditions that make it difficult to improve productivity or increase yields. For example, case C harvested 307 kg/ha on its organic farm which is considerably lower than the average yield of 1576 kg/ha for this company which operates 18 conventional tea farms. What is more, this discrepancy had actually widened from 1994 levels, which were 348 and 1447 kg/ha, respectively. The VP ratio (percentage of vegetative propagated plants planted per harvested area) was a mere 13.8%. In fact, it was precisely these unfavorable conditions that had led the company to choose case C as a site for organic farming. One can say that organic farming contributes to maintaining these low-yield farms that would otherwise have been abandoned. Similar observations can be made of other certified organic tea farms. In fact, most yield only meager harvests of 300–400 kg/ha, extremely low even by Sri Lankan standards, and most have VP ratios of less than 20%.

Organic farming has also had an impact on environmental conservation. Organic farming uses no agricultural chemicals or chemical fertilizers, and instead uses nature's system of material circulation and its ecosystem. Therefore, it can have a major impact on environmental conservation. Of significance here in terms of tea farming is shade tree planting, which places tea plants in the shade (Fig. 19.9). The difference between organic and conventional farming is exemplified in the scenery that they create. In conventional farming, shade trees are usually removed to reduce the spacings between tea plants to increase productivity. Meanwhile, in organic farming, shade trees are planted to create a natural forest with tree layer, sub-tree layer, lower tree layer and shrub layer where tea plants make up the shrub layer. This setting contributes to better nitrogen fixation and moisture retention in tea plants, monoculture is avoided, and soil erosion is also prevented. As a result of

avoiding monoculture, the plants become less susceptible to diseases and this allows operators to reduce the use of agricultural chemicals and chemical fertilizers. Additionally, this mode of planting ensures biological diversity as represented by microorganisms in the soil. The effects of organic farming on environmental conservation have been confirmed by many existing studies (Sivaram and Ganewatte 1999; Mohotti 2002, 2004 among others). In fact, the longer a farm has been certified organic the more progress there has been in terms of shade tree planting and their growth. While the total organic tea farming acreage amounts to only a small percentage of Sri Lanka's total tea farming acreage, they are all located in mountainous areas and near water sources. Therefore, these efforts are meaningful to conserve the environment.

19.7 Impact on the Tea Farming Business

Operators can expect a rise in tea prices by converting to organic farming. Figure 19.10 shows the change in annual prices for 1 kg of tea. It also shows that regions producing highly priced teas have shifted to low lying areas, and that, in contrast to the price of teas from the high- and middle lands that have been declining, teas from Koslanda/Haldumulla where cases C and D are located, and Haputale where cases B and E are located continue to increase in price. The former is a particular case in point. While the region posted the fourth lowest average annual price among sub-districts during the 1987–89 period, it went on to produce the highest priced teas for the 2000–04 period. To a large degree, this rise in price has been due to the “organic premium” conferred on these teas. According to per factory production figures for 2004 compiled by the Sri Lanka Tea Board, while production at Koslanda/Hadumulla (2 of 4 factories) and Haputale (2 of 10 factories), respectively made up only 10.0 and 14.4% of total production, a comparison of average prices shows that teas from Koslanda/Hadumulla and Haputale were respectively priced 2.7 and 1.6 times higher than conventional teas, confirming the effects of the organic premium.

However, the issue from the perspective of tea farm operators is whether this organic premium is enough to compensate for the extra production costs involved in certified organic tea farming. Production costs at certified organic tea farms were 293.78 (Rs./ha) for cases B and D (2001 figures from Jayakody and Shyamalie 2002) and 467.12 (2004 figures compiled by the author) for case C. Meanwhile, production costs at two neighbouring conventional tea farms operated by the same company, Ampitiakande/Mahakande tea farm (Ampitiakande/Mahakande Group; hereafter referred to as “A/M tea farm”) and Poonagara tea farm (Poonagara Estate; hereafter referred to as “PE tea farm”) were 148.88 and 148.41 (2004 figures compiled by the author), respectively; considerably lower than costs incurred at certified organic farms.

A breakdown of costs shows that tea picking makes up the largest percentage of costs. On organic farms, picking made up 19.9% (58.46 Rs./ha) for cases B and D



Fig. 19.11 Tree pruning and compost making on case B

combined, and 28.9% (135.00 Rs./ha) for case C. On conventional farms, tea picking accounted for a larger percentage of costs at 38.0% (56.60 Rs./ha) on the A/M tea farm and 28.3% (56.88 Rs./ha) on the PE tea farm. When we look at the percentage of costs spent in compost making (Fig. 19.11)—an important feature of organic farming—costs in cases B and D were 24.8% (72.86 Rs./ha), case C 17.3% (80.94 Rs./ha), A/M tea farm 0.3% (0.48 Rs./ha), and PE tea farm 0.0% (0.00 Rs./ha), indicating the large percentage that compost making comprises in the overall cost of organic farming. The percentage of weed removal costs was also larger on organic farms at 4.6% (13.63 Rs./ha), 9.4% (44.11 Rs./ha), 2.6% (3.83 Rs./ha) and 2.5% (3.75 Rs./ha), respectively. And while costs for chemical fertilizers appear only for conventional farms at 0.0% (0.00 Rs./ha), 0.0% (0.00 Rs./ha), 9.7% (14.40 Rs./ha) and 9.5% (14.05 Rs./ha) respectively, these make up a smaller percentage compared to the cost of compost making in organic farming. As you can see, organic farms are generally more expensive to operate, with considerable costs going towards compost making and weed removal. This is because, in organic farming, the use of chemical fertilizers or agricultural chemicals is not allowed, operations tend to be labour intensive, and yields are often small. Costs incurred by case C are higher than cases B and D because, unlike other certified organic farms, they have a policy of producing their own organic fertilizer on-site. To date, they have not been able to generate revenues commensurate with these costs.

To overcome these obstacles, organic farms must find buyers who are willing to purchase organic teas at high prices. The company that operates cases A and B exports to buyers in Germany (126 t), Italy (72 t), France (54 t), Australia (54 t), US (36 t) and Japan (1 t). The company that runs case C exports to the US (4.3 t), Germany (1.0 t), France (1.0 t) and Japan (0.7 t) (export figures as of 2004).

Organic teas are exported exclusively to developed countries, which is in contrast to conventional teas that are exported to the Middle East and Russia. Organic operators make new buyer contacts primarily through their web sites, international trade shows for organic and natural foods, referrals from certifying organizations, and eco-tourism operations.

Meanwhile, competition with other organic tea producing countries has been intensifying. About two-thirds of the global production of organic black teas come from India (Kilcher et al. 2002). In Darjeeling, 20 of the 87 tea plantations have converted to organic since 1989 due to stagnating yield increases and various other reasons (Vossenaar and Wynen 2004; OECD 2005). In 1996, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences set up their Organic Tea Research and Development Center (OTRDC) to create their own organic certification, and this has brought about a rapid increase in the production of organically grown green and black teas (Vossenaar and Wynen 2004). In addition, Kenya, Tanzania, Myanmar and Seychelles also export organically grown teas (Harris et al. 2001). Meanwhile, market growth for organic products has been slowing in developed countries, creating a glut of organically grown teas (Wai 2006). Therefore, while Sri Lankan organic tea plantations have been the pioneers of the field, they are faced with difficulties in attracting buyers from developed countries and are unable to expect purchase prices to increase in the future.

In fact, the company that operates cases A and B has reportedly been seeing profits dwindle over the past few years compared to the first few years immediately after acquiring organic certification. Case C has not been able to find enough buyers who will pay prices commensurate with their high production costs, and currently distribute half of their organic tea production through the Colombo auction alongside their conventional teas. This company actually makes up for the losses incurred in their organic operations with profits from their conventional teas. An “emotional attachment” to the hard work that was put into these farms is the primary reason for this situation being tolerated within the company, and the company is reportedly discussing whether or not to discontinue their organic operations. Other companies have also attempted to implement organic farming in the past but were forced to bow out. For example, Bogawantalawa Plantations, an RPC that operates 11 tea farms, introduced organic farming on a portion (24.1 ha) of their tea farm in Dikoya (a high-elevation area in Nuwara Eliya) between 2001 and 2003, but discontinued this project because they were unable to project a profit. Similarly, Watawala Plantations, an RPC that operates 18 tea farms, introduced organic farming on a 127.5 ha area on their tea farm in Elgin (a high-elevation area in Nuwara Eliya) in 1998. However, because they were not able to turn a profit and also because of frequent labour disputes stemming from the labour intensive nature of organic farming, the company abandoned organic methods and resumed the use of chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals in 2003.

19.8 Impact on Tea Farm Workers and Residents

An important factor in plantation management, aside from the financial concerns we have seen in the examples above, is the management of workers and residents. According to a study of cases B, C and other farms by Guruge et al. (2005), workers on certified organic farms had lower concentrations of fluorinated organic compounds (FOCs) in their blood streams compared to city dwellers and workers working on conventional farms, indicating that workers on organic farms were healthier. Interviews with management have revealed that almost 100% of the workers and residents on cases A through E were Indian Tamil, which is essentially the same ethnic make up found in the middle and highland regions. However, since further details were not available, we conducted interviews on school education and job choices with individual households working at or living on cases B and E, and households on conventional tea farms that neighboured cases B and E, with the number of households interviewed being 10, (47 individuals), 24 (79 individuals), 14 (50 individuals) and 11 (55 individuals), respectively.

In Sri Lanka, education is mandatory for children aged 5 years or older for a period of 9 years, and the government strongly encourages its citizens to take up senior secondary education for an additional 2 years. Tuition is basically free in public schools. Table 19.2 shows that while the number of non-schooling individuals is smaller and the number of withdrawals before grade 6 (primary level education) is larger among worker or resident families of certified organic farms than residents of conventional farms, these two groups have several factors in common:

- (a) a large number of individuals in their 30's or older had withdrawn from primary school;
- (b) although the individual had enrolled after education became mandatory, people currently aged 17 or older, primarily women, had withdrawn without completing their mandatory education; and
- (c) almost all of the students currently aged 16 go on to take senior secondary education. Another notable trait not shown in the table is that an increasing number of students, mainly males, are enrolled in Tamil schools in nearby towns instead of Tamil schools on their tea farms.

A study of occupations and places of employment by the author shows that individuals aged 45 or older were either tea farm workers or retirees. Residents who had completed school up to at least grade 10 fell into one of three categories:

- (a) those who had no fixed employment and were searching for a job while continuing their studies or domestic work at home, or grew vegetables and sold them in nearby markets (if they were allowed to grow vegetables on the farm);
- (b) those who commuted to jobs in neighbouring cities and other locations outside the tea farm; and

Table 19.2 School education background of tea estate residents

(s)	Organic tea estates										Total			
	Male					Female								
	No	Sc	Pr	Jn	Sn	Cl	No	Sc	Pr	Jn		Sn	Cl	
80							1							1
70				1			1							2
60			6									7		14
50			9	1	2						1	7	1	20
40			2	3	3						4	7	4	19
30			6	3	2		1					6		18
20			2	2	2		1				1	6	1	21
10		9		2	1						2	3		19
0		5					4					3		12
Total	0	14	25	12	10	0	8	7	33	9	7	1	1	126
Other tea estates														
(s)	No	Sc	Pr	Jn	Sn	Cl	No	Sc	Pr	Jn	Sn	Cl		
80													0	
70			1				1						2	
60	1		2	2			2						7	
50	1		2						5		1		9	
40			2	1	1		3			1			8	
30	1		6	1	1				5	4		1	19	
20	1		2	4	2	1	1		5	4	6	1	22	
10		4		1	1			10		1			17	
0	5	4					6	6					21	
Total	9	8	15	9	5	1	13	16	10	10	7	2	105	

No no schooling; Sc currently receiving schooling; Pr primary (grades 1-5); Jr junior secondary (grades 6-9); Sn senior secondary (grades 10-11); and Cl college (grades 12-13)

This table shows the number of people who withdrew before completing these stages

(c) those who worked in Colombo or overseas.

As the level of education among tea farm residents improved, the number of tea farm workers declined, with less than half of the people in their 20's working on tea farms. In case B however, only a few workers worked away from home, and this is largely due to the social welfare policies implemented by management. The company that operates cases A and B embodies the social egalitarian policies embraced by organic agriculture, and provides community-based social development programs rooted in equal opportunity for workers of both genders, and carries out renovations and repairs on worker housing (most of which are tenements called "lines" built in the colonial era) based on their motto "Applying the concept of organics to social development." Case C uses the premium that they earn from their fair-trade certification to purchase sewing machines and for other means to offer income opportunities to their workers, particularly women. In contrast, in case E where the previous management had neglected social welfare aspects of their operation due to their heavy focus on profit, workers went on strikes and economic gaps formed between the plantation's residents (Fig. 19.12).

While the decision to introduce organic farming to plantations is primarily made by the management with no participation from the workers or residents, the workers are forced to carry out labour-intensive work such as compost making and weed removal. Organic farming requires more labour than conventional farming in other areas as well. Therefore, certified organic farms must improve their social welfare programs beyond that which conventional farms provide and implement programs for empowering their workers (skill development and the granting of certain rights). They must clearly communicate, particularly to younger workers, the merits of



Fig. 19.12 Residents' houses called "lines" on case E tea estate (Of special note are the additions made to homes occupied by households with people working away from home)

working on an organic farm and ensure their dignity as tea farm workers. These approaches also coincide with policies embraced by fair-trade certification, which most farms have acquired, and also speak to consumer sensitivities. However, these measures are not easy to implement without sufficient profit to back things up. These findings show that Sri Lankan tea plantations implementing organic farming face corporate management problems and a range of other issues for their sustainability.

19.9 Conclusion: Marginality and Its Future

Tea estates in Sri Lanka are surely in the process of marginalization, and they have three characters. Firstly, their marginality is structural due to global and national socio-economic changes. Secondly, most of the workers are descendants of migrants, and they are ethnic minorities. Thirdly, they are living and working in marginal locations.

Under these conditions, organic farming on tea plantations is characterized by a variety of post-productivist elements, making it distinct from practices implemented on traditional plantations where productivism was the imperative.

However, tea plantations that have introduced organic farming face high production costs primarily from compost making and weed removal. Organic tea plantations are strongly impacted by general wage increases in the Sri Lankan tea industry due to their labour-intensive nature, but are not able to earn profits that are commensurate with these rising wages. The fact that attracting buyers from developed countries has not been as easy as initially envisioned, and that prices have not risen as anticipated are primary factors of this problem. If the current situation persists, not only is the number of organic tea farms unlikely to grow, but the survival of existing certified organic tea farms may be at risk.

To enhance its value, story of the farmers' life and social welfare, ecotourism namely product-oriented tours for limited number of consumers with special interest, and learning activities especially education for sustainable development for both producers and consumers are necessary.

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Chapter 20

Pond Management System Among Small Farmers in Khulna, Bangladesh

Firuza Begham Mustafa

20.1 Introduction

Aquaculture industry is growing tremendously in Bangladesh and the country is listed as top 5 world producer after China, India, Vietnam and Indonesia (FAO 2013). Aquaculture plays an important role in nutrition, income, employment and foreign exchange in Bangladesh. Fish contribute approximately 80% of the animal protein intake of the Bangladeshi population, 3.5% of GDP and 9% of export earnings (FAO 2012). Bangladesh aquaculture products' major market are European and Middle Eastern countries (FAO 2012).

The giant freshwater prawn, *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* is gaining popularity as a key aquaculture species and the global production currently exceed 220,000 tons (Rasid 2015). Since last 30 years many researches started on *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* (giant freshwater prawn) in diverse subjects. The earlier studies are focusing on enhancement of production, innovation in the technology, disease outbreak and prevention, soil investigation, water quality, feeding (Tacon and De Silva 1997), fry and brood stock selection and genetic studies (Hai Nguyen Thanh et al. 2015). Among social perspective research is included ethics in farming (Filipe et al. 2011), social implications, gender affiliation in aquaculture (Weeratunge 2010), labour issues, wages, marginalization local consumer, poverty, certification, organic farming (Paul and Vogl 2013), environmental impacts, land use changes and best management practice.

Pond management is one of the crucial aspects in rearing aquatic animals. It sometimes covers different aspects and it varies in perspectives. Mushtaq et al. (2007) state that pond management refers to managing the water distribution, accessibility, fees and political power in the management—which is more related to

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irrigation pond management. While Brune and Drapcho, 1991 as cited in Bosma and Verdegem (2011) look at the balancing of water ecosystem as pond management (balancing production and decomposition processes).

Pond management actually is more about human involvement in the farming activities (Firuza 2005). In this study, pond management in aquaculture refers to pond preparation, water management, feeding, stocking density, genetic selection, growth and production. Best practised pond management plays an important role in determining the survival rate, yield per square meter, production capacity and cost factor for disease outbreak.

Paddy-fish culture has grown significantly in the 1980s in Southeast Asian countries. This type of farming has been first recorded in China as early as 2500 years ago and has been noted for its low input, high production, and efficacy in nutrient recycling (Liu and Cai 1998). The integration of fish into rice farming provides invaluable protein, especially for subsistence farmers who manage rain-fed agricultural systems. Rice fields provide shade and organic matter for fish, which in turn oxygenate soil and water, eat rice pests and favor nutrient recycling. These farming systems, as a part of an integrated ecosystem in line with the local cultural, environmental and economic conditions, are composed of complementary sub-agricultural ecosystems; these play important ecological service roles, such as bio-control and nitrogen fixation. The traditional low input rice–fish farming systems have a significant function in protecting the global environment and maintaining its biodiversity (Lu and Li 2006).

The paddy and aquatic culture started in 1970s in Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines with high challenges in the sustainability, water resources and environmental issues, low survival rate and yield (Little et al. 1996). Paddy-fish is very common despite much conflict in terms of sustainability and environmental impacts; but paddy-prawn farming especially *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* is a rare practice. The research presented in this chapter was conducted in order to reveal and understand the pond management practice among the *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* small farmers (less than 5 acre/2 ha) in Khulna Bangladesh. The fundamental objectives of the study were derived from questions how the small farmers in Khulna are producing *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* successfully with high survival rate in sustainable manner? The special focus has been on:

- (i) farming system,
- (ii) pond preparation,
- (iii) seedling/brood stock
- (iv) feeding management,
- (v) fertilizer and chemicals,
- (vi) water management
- (vii) stocking and harvesting.

The description and analysis of pond management applied by *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* farmers can serve as a source of inspiration/idea for how this could be

developed further, especially in terms of survival rate, yield production and sustainability.

The term small farmer refers to a traditional and semi-traditional farmers with special characteristic in their farming intensity practice, sometimes it is referred as homestead pond culture¹ and “quasi-peasant” in contrast with “quasi capitalist” (Belton and Azad 2012).

20.2 Methodology and Study Area

20.2.1 Method

Data was collected in November and December 2012 using combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Open ended questionnaire was prepared to gather information regarding the characteristics of the farmers, farm management, assets, production, input, feeding, water management, practice and routine. In-depth interviews were conducted with five selected farmers from a few villages and different pattern of farming practices. Non-structured focus group discussions were used to gather information from the farmers and associated people such as processing company, agent/middle man, fisheries department and workers. The average duration of discussion was 2 hours.

Observation and field notes were done using transect walks. Transect walk is walking with or by local people through an area, observing, asking, listening, discussing, identifying (Chambers 1994). This method was used for the field survey. This method was very crucial for understanding of the farming environment and to record in situ observation. This direct interaction with the farmers generated on-the-spot questions that gleaned informal information on resource-use patterns which helped in understanding the farming practices and daily livelihood activities of the farmers (Paul and Vogl 2013).

A field work survey was done in selected farms in Khulna District (Southwest of Dhaka), Bangladesh. In-depth interview technique was used to gather information and data from the following five farmers Mr. Habibul Rahman (EPZ commercial farming area), Mr. Iqbal Hawladar (Mathardia, Mongla), Mr. Mahbubur Rahman (Rajibpur Village), Mr. Habib Sarwar Titu (Rajibpur Village) and Mr. Khukan Dhali (Rajibpur Village). The farmer’s ponds size varied from 8 to 60 ares.

¹Homestead pond culture is a small component of the household farm enterprise, used for multiple purposes including bathing, washing, watering livestock and irrigation for dyke or homestead vegetable production, whereas the fish produced by homestead aquaculture is generally marketed locally in small quantities at sub-district or union level markets by marketing intermediaries with limited buying power (Belton and Azad 2012).

20.2.2 Study Area

Bangladesh came into existence in 1971 when Bengali East Pakistan seceded from its union with West Pakistan. It is located between Burma and India in the Southern Asia with total area of 147,610 square kilometers out of which water covers 10,090 km². Major rivers that are crossing the country are Brahmaputra, Ganges (Padma) and Jamuna (Fig. 20.1). The Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers rise in the Himalayas (collectively with catchments in five countries: China, Nepal, India, Bhutan, Bangladesh) and ultimately deposit their sediments in the Bay of Bengal (Wilson and Goodbred 2015). Climate is tropical with mild winter (October to March), hot, humid summer (March to June) and humid, warm rainy monsoon (June to October). The country is frequently hit by cyclone and hurricane. About a third of this extremely poor country is flooded annually during the monsoon rainy season. The entire country is mostly flat alluvial plain with hilly southeastern part where the higher point is Mt. Keokradong with 1230 meters. Land use is 63.11% arable land, 3.07% permanent crops and other 34.5% (Bangladesh Country Index 2013).

Fish contribute about 63% of the available protein in the diet and the rest 37% protein comes from livestock and poultry. It indicates the importance of fish in contributing to the level of nutrition of the people of Bangladesh (DOF 2008). Field data was collected from farms in Mathardia, Mongla and Rajibpur villages in Khulna Division, southwest of Dhaka (Fig. 20.1).

The water resources of Bangladesh are vast (Table 20.1), covering 4.3 million hectares of inland water. A sub-tropical climate, suitable soil and water conditions create a very high potential for aquaculture development. Pond aquaculture is an integral component of the farming system in Bangladesh. Estimates show that the country has 0.3 million ha of ponds, offering huge potential for aquaculture (DOF, 2008 as cited in Murshed-E-Jahan and Pemsil 2011).

20.3 Discussion

20.3.1 Overview of *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* (Golda) Farming in Khulna

Macrobrachium rosenbergii production in Bangladesh is mainly practiced by small farmers (small size of ponds) operating in almost every paddy field in Khulna division. Output from the small farms has turned Khulna to become the major producer of *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* in the country (Table 20.2). Almost 80% of the land area in Khulna is dominated by *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* co-existing with paddy (IAA—Integration Agriculture and Aquaculture). Before 1980s, Khulna's main production was paddy, but once the *Macrobrachium rosenbergii*



Fig. 20.1 Map of Bangladesh, note location of Khulna in southwest (Khulna location: 22° 48' 51" N, 89° 60' 97" E) Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section, Map No. 3711, Rev. 2 <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/banglade.pdf>

Table 20.1 Physical dimension of water resources in Bangladesh

Item	Amount
Coastal line (km)	710
Seawater area (sq. km)	68,480
Annual renewable surface water (billion m ³)	1160
Annual average rainfall (mm)	2300
Daily average delta discharge (million m ³)	3000
River discharge (million m ³ per second peak time)	1.5
Annual renewable surface water (billion m ³)	1160

Sources Combination data from DOF (2008), Ahmad et al. 2001 (in Chowdhury 2010)

Table 20.2 Shrimp and prawn production in Bangladesh in 2010–2011

Division	Bagda	Golda	Harina	Chaka	Others	Fish	Total
Dhaka	0.00	1270.4	48.48	0.00	16.16	276.8	1611.83
Khulna	38,451	35,165.1	17,488.9	2331.9	3497.8	47,702.3	144,636.8
Barisal	858.4	3283.75	239.53	31.93	47.91	1192.1	5653.58
Rangpur	0.00	12.11	0.00	0.00	5.28	7.60	24.99
Rajshahi	0.00	10.44	0.00	0.00	2.03	3.24	15.71
Chittagong	17,259.9	0.00	122.0	0.00	4501.8	11,105.8	32,989.45
Shyhet	0.0	4.1	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.3	6.4
Total	56,569.2	39,868.0	17,776.9	2363.8	8070.9	60,290.0	184,938.7
Percent	30.6	21.6	9.6	1.3	4.4	32.6	100.0

Bagda: *Penaeus Monodon* Horina (*Metapenaeus monoceros*)

Golda: *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* Chaka (*Fenneropenaeus indicus*)

Source Department of Fisheries Bangladesh 2012

aquaculture of gher² started and started to boom, Khulna turned to a major producer of *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* in whole Bangladesh (Table 20.3). It contributes to almost 88% of *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* production in Bangladesh in 2010–2011, followed by Barisal (8.2%) and Dhaka (3%) (Fig. 20.2).

Khulna is a paradise for *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* farming, it has conducive environment and suitable landscape for the farming due to:

- (1) abundance of freshwater around the year,
- (2) suitable fertile soil,
- (3) perfect climate-sunny and plenty of rain,

²Gher is a Bangla word used for the physical construction made for growing freshwater prawns in an impounded environment. These constructions, generally built in paddy fields, are used for growing both paddy and prawns. The gher usually have a large dike with canals and an area dedicated for paddy cultivation within the gher (Nurazzaman 2012). Gher is therefore a modified rice field or pond located beside canal or river (Paul and Vogl 2013).


Table 20.3 Production of shrimp in 2010–2011 in Khulna District, Bangladesh

District	Area of shrimp farm in ha			Production in metric tons					Total
	Bagda	Golda	Total	Bagda	Golda	Others	Fish	Total	
Bagerhat	47,900.00	18,556.06	66,456.06	13,177.00	12,828.90	8177.62	16,034.10	50,217.62	
Chuadanga	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Jessore	825.00	14,479.00	15,304.00	207.00	7525.20	2272.40	2,747.60	12,752.20	
Jhenaidah	0.00	2.43	2.43	0.00	1.25	0.00	0.50	1.75	
Khulna	36,557.18	13,960.42	50,517.60	9980.00	8409.14	785.00	16,601.76	35,775.90	
Kushtia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Magura	0.00	7.31	7.31	0.00	4.80	1.00	1.32	7.12	
Meherpur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Narail	0.00	2277.25	2277.25	0.00	1165.20	185.00	393.00	1743.20	
Satkhira	60,348.00	7664.00	68,012.00	15,087.00	5230.56	11,897.45	11,924.00	44,139.01	
Khulna division	145,630.18	56,946.47	202,576.65	38,451.00	35,165.05	23,318.47	47,702.28	144,636.80	

Bagda: *Penaeus Monodon* Golda: *Macrobrachium rosenbergii*

Source Department of Fisheries Bangladesh 2012

Fig. 20.2 Prawn and shrimp farming in Bangladesh division from 2002–2011
 Source Department of Fisheries Bangladesh 2012



- (4) physical surface: landscape, topography
- (5) similarity of pond conditions with wild environment,
- (6) natural fry from giant rivers,
- (7) water logging (Shah 2006) and
- (8) perfect salinity.

Other social factors supporting the production are:

- (1) indigenous innovation in farm operation,
- (2) availability of local/natural feed for prawn,
- (3) partial organic practice,
- (4) cheap labour, and
- (5) existing paddy ponds.

20.3.2 *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* Farming Practice

Farming System/Prawn Production System

Macrobrachium rosenbergii farmers in Khulna practice unique farming system, which incorporates paddy, prawn, vegetables and fruits in the farming areas. The farmers plant paddy during the dry season (summer) and rearing giant freshwater prawn during the rainy season (winter) and producing vegetables and fruits all year around. Table 20.4 shows the thematic schedule/calendar for *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* farming, paddy and other crop with climate index in Khulna division Bangladesh.


In the 1980s farmers produced paddy for whole year and caught aquatic animal from the riverine during winter (rainy season). Slowly, once the aquaculture activities entered the area, the farmers started integrating aquaculture in their paddy field. Almost 80–90% of the farmers in Khulna practice this method. The farmers involved in the activity are generally very small farmers with land area being less than 0.3 ha. Almost all the farmer display similar background small size of pond

Table 20.4 A thematic schedule/calendar for Macrobrachium rosenbergii farming, paddy and other crop with climate index in Khulna division Bangladesh

Descriptions	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
Max daytime temperature (°C)	26	29	33	35	34	32	31	31	32	32	30	27
Monthly rainfall (mm)												
Hours of daylight (Daily)												
Pond preparation for aquaculture farming												
Fry stocking												
Prawn rearing entire pond												
Prawn rearing on pond canal												
Harvesting—continues												
Pond preparation for paddy cultivation												
Paddy planting												
Paddy harvest												
Vegetables												
Fruits ^a												

^acoconut, mango, guava, jackfruit, banana, papaya

Fig. 20.3 Typical *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* farm layout in Khulna division Bangladesh



and labour source is mainly from family members. Seasonal labour contracted on a daily basis is only hired during pond preparation and harvesting. It is estimated that more than 90% of the 570 million farms worldwide are managed by an individual or a family and that they mostly rely on family labour (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2015). Family members are not paid any salary/wages. Family labour is not recognized as having monetary value by the prevailing social structure in Bangladesh (Paul and Vog 2013). Among the common activities involving family members are releasing post-larvae, feeding, pond guard, harvesting and marketing. There is difference between male and female member contributions.

Multi-usage of the pond areas is very common, farmer try utilizing maximum of the every space of the farm compound for production. Rearing animals like cows and sheep in the ponds areas which are located next to farmer's house. Most of ponds share same compound with farmer's house. Some perennial fruit crop are grown in the surrounding areas. Figure 20.3 shows the typical layout of the farm in Khulna area.

Farmers used dikes to grow vegetables and this spur additional income and food resources for the farmers. Among the vegetables planted in the pond areas are beans, gourds, eggplants, lady fingers, pumpkins, beet, bitter gourds, tomatoes and pepper. Farmers utilized the bench/bunds areas to grow fruit trees such as mango, banana, coconut, jackfruit guava, papaya and sugarcane.

This practice can be categorized as Integrated Agriculture and Aquaculture (IAA) referring to combining agricultural activities with aquacultural farming in the same areas at the same time. This system is very practical for small farmer. The major purpose of this practice is to earn as much as possible and to utilize all the available inputs.

In an IAA system the pond may provide additional benefits such as water storage capacity and improved soil fertility in addition to the returns from fish culture. Ponds can be used to process many forms of agricultural by products, including livestock and poultry manure and convert this manure into high-grade fish protein. Ponds and crops can be integrated using crops and crop residues as feeds and fertilizers for fish and pond sediments and water can be used as crop fertilizers and




Fig. 20.4 Pond cross cutting layout in Khulna Bangladesh *Source* Fieldwork 2012

irrigation water, respectively (Little and Muir 1987 as cited in Murshed-E-Jahan and Pemsli 2011).

Pond preparation

The field investigation found there is a new concept of pond layout and system used by farmers with the following basic principal:

- (i) pond bottom has two floors, higher in the middle and lower toward the edges (average one meter lower). During summer season- higher ground is used for paddy planting and lower ground used for aquaculture
- (ii) during winter (raining season) the entire pond will be filled up (both lower and upper floors) and *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* will take place in the entire ponds.

Figure 20.4 shows pond cross cutting layout of the ponds in the study area. Similar concept for fish farming in paddy field is practiced in Shaanxi China (Wu 1994 in Liu and Cai 1998).

The farmers use same plot areas to plant paddy when there is less rain and utilize maximum the pond bottom which is highly nutrient to grow paddy. In rainy season,

the farmers utilize the rain water to fill the pond and start their giant freshwater prawn farming. The farmers conduct their farming operations in tune with the weather. In many countries, especially Malaysia and Thailand; cleaning pond bottom is the major cause of environmental degradation as it pollutes the nearby riverine. Many farmers in this area change their pond layout arrangement to utilize all the fertile top soil to grow paddy (Ahmed 2001).

The most important feature is that the farmers are rearing *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* whole year in their pond where in summer *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* occupy canal at the edge of pond. On the other hand, during winter the rearing takes place in entire pond (including the paddy plots). This shows the significant role played by *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* in this farming system.

This aquatic species overshadow paddy in all areas, monopolize farming time, and are reared around the year. *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* merges as a personal preference for farmers due to:

- (1) high ability to change it into cash anytime,
- (2) high market appreciation (higher price compared to paddy),
- (3) easy maintenance, and
- (4) ready buyer/ready market

During the survey investigation, farmers frequently refer the ponds as a “bank” as it eliminates their poverty. The presented scenario is a special achievement in aquaculture industry and an example of a success story. Small aquaculture farmers in other developing country are suffering from poverty, insufficient income, marginalization, unsustainability and environmental issues.

Less than 50% of the pond area in general was used for canals and rest of the area for growing paddy. This practice, which started as a small venture in Bagherhat district, has spread to almost all parts of Bangladesh although still most of the activity is concentrated in the Southwestern part of the country. The farming area is reported to be growing at about 10% per year (Nandeesh 2003).

Seedling/fry/brood stock

Farmers collect the brood stock/fry from the wild or get supply from middle man which collects the wild fry from the nearby rivers. The farmers prefer to rear the local breed because:

- (1) the survival rate is higher (Ahmed 2001);
- (2) the immunity to disease;
- (3) better adaptation to local ponds, perhaps because of the locality and natural characteristics of the local environment.

The farmers prefer wild fry because of its size, but are also facing challenges of limited supply. Meanwhile there is lower demand for hatchery fry because of its vulnerability and lower survival rate. Many farmers prefer to choose male fry (monotonous) as this will produce huge or large giant prawn and will lead to higher production.

Table 20.5 Pond management by farmers in Khulna District, Bangladesh

Description	Pond 1	Pond 2	Pond 3	Pond 4	Pond 5
Village name	Mongla	Mathardia	Rajibpur	Rajibpur	Rajibpur
Location	22° 48' 51"N 89° 60' 97" E	22° 59' 40"N 89° 65' 10" E	22° 77' 984"N 89° 43' 69" E	22° 77' 984"N 89° 43' 698" E	22° 77' 97"N 89° 43' 75" E
Started/Age of aqua	1 year	4 years	8 years	3 years	4 years
Size of pond	4 acre/16,187 m ²	3 acre/12,140 m ²	3 acre/12,140 m ²	1.5 acre/6070 m ²	4 acre/16,187 m ²
Depth (meters)	1.0-1.5	1.0-2.0	1.1	1.1-1.2	1.0
Material	Sand/earth	Sand/earth	Sand/Earth	Earth	Earth
Stock density	12,000 male/acre 300 male/are	4000 fry and 4 kg fish 100 fry/are	8000 per acre 200 per are	6-8,000 per acre 150-200 per are	6000 per acre 150 per are
Cycle	Continues	Continues	Single stocking/continues harvesting	Single stocking/continues harvesting	Single stocking/continues harvesting
Pellet	Yes, pellet and natural resources	Yes, pellet and natural resources	Yes, pellet and natural resources-snails	Yes, pellet and natural resources-snails	Yes, pellet and natural resources-snails, com
Drainage	Natural river	Natural river	n/a	n/a	n/a
Water source	River	River	Rain water	Rain water	Rain water
Fry sources	River	River	River	River	River
Survival rate	95%	80-85%	80%	80%	60%
Productivity (Kg/ha/season)	1200 kg/ha	320 kg/ha	213 kg/acre (for ha ×2.2)	213 kg/acre (for ha ×2.2)	200 kg/acre
Water Colour	Green	Light Green	Light green	Light green	Light green
Vegetation in ponds	Absent	Absent	Absent	Absent	Absent
Pond repairmen	Whenever needed	After raining season	Dry season	Dry season	Dry season

(continued)

Table 20.5 (continued)

Description	Pond 1	Pond 2	Pond 3	Pond 4	Pond 5
Village name	Mongla	Mathardia	Rajibpur	Rajibpur	Rajibpur
Removal of bottom	Yes, dry season (Jan-until April)	Yes, dry season (Dec, Jan, Feb March)	No removal-plough for paddy farming	No removal-plough for paddy farming	No removal-plough for paddy farming
Liming	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fertilizer	no, maybe	Yes, cow dung + phosphate	Yes, urea	Yes, urea + cow dung + TSP	Yes, urea
Harvesting	Continues	Continues	Continues	Continues	Continues
Water management	When needed, dry season	When needed-every 2 times per months	Depend on raining	Depend on raining	Depend on raining
Food management	2 times: 9 am in the morning and 5 pm in the evening	2 times: 8 am in the morning and 5 pm in the evening	2 times-morning and evening	2 times—5-6 am morning and 5 pm evening	3 times—5 am morning, 1 pm and 5 pm evening
Pond environment	Located in commercial areas (EPZ) Export Processing Zone-	Located in the middle of the village- at the surrounding pond —coconut, cow shelter, vegetables and farmer house is located close to farm-50 m	Surrounded by vegetable garden-lady finger, tomato, beans, bittergourd, banana, and other kitchen essential.	Surrounded by vegetable garden-lady finger, tomato, beans, bittergourd, banana, and other kitchen essential.	Surrounded by vegetable garden-lady finger, tomato, beans, bittergourd, banana, and other kitchen essential.

Pond 1 Mr. Habibul Rahman, *Pond 2* Mr. Iqbal Hawladar, *Pond 3* Mr. Mahubur Rahman, *Pond 4* Mr. Habib Sarwar Titu, *Pond 5* Mr. Khukan Dhali

Feeding Management

Farmers use very minimal commercial inputs in their ponds. Very limited pellet or processed feed is given to the *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* owing to;

- (1) higher purchasing cost,
- (2) availability and
- (3) accessibility.

The farmers get the feed supply from middle man and local distributor. They feed the prawn with additional natural food such as raw and boiled maize, crushed snail and soya. Farmers use local and natural inputs as feeding materials which are of lower cost and easily available. This is winning point for the small aquaculture farmers in Khulna as they minimize the operational cost. Most of the aquaculture farmers in Southeast Asia, especially in Malaysia, suffer from higher operational cost being dependent on processed feed, and are also using imported feed from Thailand. This is a high burden to farmers as feed represent 60–70% of the total cost of production.

The snail supply in mass quantity is done by poor marginalized people who earn livelihood by collecting sea snail. This value-chain supply help the marginal group to up-lift their life. Furthermore, the shell of the snails is used as a source for the production of lime which is very useful and important for liming pond bottom surface during the pond preparation process. Almost all the farmers practice feeding twice a day, usually at morning and afternoon. Interesting to note is that the farmers allow the aquatic species to find own food in the ponds which are rich in algae and other aquatic life. This practice is an important element that makes the whole farming system or production a semi-organic and semi intensive.

Fertilizers and chemicals

Farmers are using local and natural fertilizers in their pond. It is a common practice for farmers to utilize cow dungs as fertilizer, with the aim to increase the anaerobic activity in the pond. Besides, farmers also use urea and phosphate in ponds. Lime is used widely during pond preparation.

Water Management

Giant freshwater prawn farming in Khulna mostly uses water from river and rain. Bangladesh has huge freshwater sources; Ganga River and Madhumati River are running across Khulna. Plenty of rain almost through all the year with higher fall during the May-September period is ideal for the farming activities. Water quality is determined by farmers just by observation and experience. Farmers have no special equipment or instrument for the water testing. There is no single pond in the area that would have aeration installed.

Stocking and harvesting

The farmers have no strict guidelines in releasing fries into the ponds, the stocking varies from pond to pond. It was found the farmers release 6000–12,000 fries to each pond (Table 20.5). Some farmers release only male fries and some other release fish fingerlings for together for their own consumption. A range of carp species is cultured with the prawns, but harvested throughout the year mainly

for household consumption. Farmers stocked Common carp, *Cyprinus carpio* L., Silver carp, *Hypophthalmichthys molitrix*, Indian major carp, *Catla catla*, *Labeo rohita*, *Cirrhinus mrigala* and Grass carp *Ctenopharyngodon idellus* (Ahmed 2001).

Farmers practice single stocking and continues harvesting—where the farmer does prawn size selection—when a prawn reaches certain preferable size (usually 250–600 g per piece) the farmer starts collecting the desired/marketable product and sell the produce to the middle man. Using this practice farmers get instant and relatively high income due to favourable price of prawn. These help them to redeem the products on the spot each time they need cash and keep them above the poverty line. Farmers idealize the pond considering it as a “bank” and their prawn is real “cash crop”. This is very different from the situation in Malaysia where farmers are always “sour face” and traumatized with loss of production due to disease outbreaks or low survival rate.

20.3.3 *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* Farming Knowledge/Training

Most of the *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* farmers in Khulna never had any formal training, vocational practice or education course. They learn the practice from their neighbour farmers, relatives and friends. This can be classified as knowledge gained through oral lesson and the knowledge spread from “mouth to mouth”. Any new management practices will spread fast through oral discussion. Moreover, many farmers are illiterate only some with a primary education (Table 20.4), and all with peasant background. Some farmers mentioned that neighbours and friends who received training are the main source of technical assistance (Ahmed 2001).

20.4 Conclusion

The paddy-prawn integrated farming in Khulna, Bangladesh is an indigenous knowledge which improved from each cycle of farming and its spread through verbal communication. The paddy-prawn farming in Khulna is not to supply cheap animal protein to farmers, but is important income generator. The farmers involvement in paddy-prawn farming helped them to get rid of poverty and marginalization.

However, the farmers prefer to rear *Macrobrachium rosenbergii* instead of paddy farming only because of the cash value and ready market. The farmers have improved their living standards and manage to satisfy basic needs since they started the paddy-prawn farming.

The key success of farmers in Khulna, Bangladesh is being less dependent on processed commercial pellet and utilized farm waste including animals, maize and soya grain, while many marginal farmers in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Philippine are suffering from high production costs because of their dependence on processed feed and foreign labour.

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Chapter 21

Marginalization Between Border and Metropolis: Drivers of Socio-Spatial Change in Post-socialist Croatia

Marin Cvitanović and Borna Fuerst-Bjeliš

21.1 Introduction: Theoretical Background and Research Context

Marginalization as a process and marginality as a concept are extremely complex and can be defined in a number of ways. Basically, marginalization is the process of becoming marginal, or being pushed into a marginal position (Pelc 2016), and therefore, should be an intrinsically relational process and/or concept. Some authors see marginalization as a process of decline from a previous state (Déry et al. 2012). As a relational process and concept it cannot be static in space and time. It is constantly changing and is deeply dependent on wider socio-economic changes, such as globalization, deindustrialization or economic transition, which can cause profound and spatially heterogeneous changes, benefiting certain areas while creating disadvantages for others (Fuerst-Bjeliš and Cvitanović 2016). Marginalization is always a social process, although it can be triggered by a number of various factors.

Marginalization as a process is anchored in the concept of marginal, or marginality, and is an extremely broad and perhaps ambiguous term. What is certain is that it always has a negative connotation, such as being at the margins, or to be of minor importance or influence (Pelc 2016). But, of course, it is also a matter of perspective. Inner and outer perspectives may substantially differ, because they are of different scales and they do not refer to the same system (Déry et al. 2012).

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That is why most researchers include both qualitative and quantitative methods of measuring marginality.

In their review of the recent insights to marginality, Déry et al. (2012) identified a common denominator of the marginalization process. They found that in each case studied, there was a significant change in power relations (whether it was connected to relations within the system, or change in the case of integration into new (bigger) systems), followed by a lack of adequate adaptation.

In this view it follows that (one of) the most powerful and perhaps the most common triggers of marginalization is the integration of a local system into a new (mostly) larger one, when the local system, failing to adequately adapt to a new situation, is losing its relevance as well as becoming increasingly marginalized. So, as Déry, Leimgruber and Zsilincsar have put it: “paradoxically, integration may signify marginalization” (Déry et al. 2012).

Discussing the forms of marginality within the context of “processual” marginality, Leimgruber (2004) points specifically to the change in the system of production, market forces, and competition; which marginalizes people, regions, or countries.

Loss of importance in this context is usually characteristic for rural areas where the economic structure is dependent on primary resources such as agriculture, and where relative proximity to larger centers is found to be of crucial importance. As the review of the analysis by Déry et al. (2012) has shown so far, the process of marginalization, as a social process, usually manifests with a sharp decline in the number of jobs, population, increase in out-migration, as well as in economic dependency in general. Such indicators are therefore mostly used by researchers to quantitatively measure the marginality of the region.

Hrvatsko Zagorje (the northwestern-most Croatian border region, and the study area) displays most of the previously-discussed marginality issues. The region is traditionally a rural and agricultural area which has experienced a change in power relations since the beginning of the post-socialist transition period, i.e. since the beginning of the 1990s. According to Leimgruber’s typology (2004), the “processual” marginalization took place here, as it was triggered by a change in the system of production, market forces, and competition, deepening the pre-existing marginal character of the region. The region has since been integrated as a local system into a larger open market system that replaced the former system of a state-planned economy. The lack of adequate adaptation to the new conditions is reflected in deindustrialization followed by increasing unemployment, population outflow, and ageing.

The second important element of fostering marginalization, observed in previous research, is proximity to a larger urban center, in this case, the strongest and most-populated economic and political center in Croatia—the Zagreb metropolis (Fig. 21.1).

Hrvatsko Zagorje is also a border region, and as such, it is also experiencing what Leimgruber (2004) defines as “geometrical” marginality that may be close to the concept of periferality. Certainly, with its location in the northwest of Croatia on the border with a correspondingly marginalized part of Slovenia (Vintar Mally



Fig. 21.1 The location of the study area

2016), this region has been additionally burdened by the change of its border character after the dissolution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. What was formerly a largely administrative border within the same country suddenly became an international political border.

In the post-socialist period, the region of Hrvatsko Zagorje has been under the influence of its specific position between the border and a metropolis; between a kind of “dead end” and an extreme pulling force. At this point, we can define two key aspects of marginalization in the context of the post-socialist transition. Social aspects comprise processes of decline in the number of jobs, increasing unemployment, population outflow, and ageing; all followed by land use and land cover change reflected in the environment. Territorial aspects indicate the further “borderization” of the region, with the geometrical marginality or the peripheral character of the region on one side, and the strength of the major pulling force at the other.

The study of geographic marginalization during periods of rapid societal, economic and institutional changes such as post-socialist transitions can offer new insights into the characteristic of geographic marginality. Such analyses can be seen as a sort of a “natural experiment” with two political systems which occupied the same environment over a relatively short period of time, emphasizing the role of socio-economic changes that can drive marginalization processes in certain areas (Fuerst-Bjeliš and Cvitanovi 2016). The geography of marginalization tends to find answers about the causes and consequences of marginalization (Pelc 2016). In this regard, the main research questions of this study were:

- What are the spatial manifestations of marginalization?
- How do spatial manifestations of marginalization affect the development of the region?
- How do global trends act on local and traditional environments?
- How are peoples' attitudes and values driving changes in the environment?
- Do these factors foster marginalization and in what way?

To reach the answers, the research was based on a mixed methodology, combining a quantitative approach via remote sensing and regression modelling, and both qualitative and quantitative approaches using a household survey. Land use and land cover changes, as well as demographic and socio-economic variables, were employed in the context of acquiring the outer perspective of marginalization of the region, while the household-based approach was used to reach the inner perspective of marginalization.

21.2 Krapina-Zagorje County: The Study Area

Krapina-Zagorje County was formed as a regional administrative unit within the newly independent Republic of Croatia in 1992. It encompasses the southern part of the historical and traditional region of Hrvatsko Zagorje in Northern Croatia. With an area surface of 1,224 km² and a population of a little over 130,000, it is one of the most densely populated counties in the country. Characterized by small dispersed settlements and traditional subsistence agriculture, it is a typical rural area of Croatia. The average settlement size is less than 400 people and only 24% of the total population lives in urban areas. The area is characterized by a heterogeneous topography ranging from the alluvial plains of the Krapina river (around 150 m a.s.l.) to the peaks of Mt. Medvednica and Mt. Ivanščica reaching altitudes over 1000 m (Cvitanović 2014).

According to the earliest reliable documents, the first permanent settlements in Krapina-Zagorje County were located in hilly areas in altitudes of 300–500 m, away from the seasonally-flooded and swampy lowlands. Stronger colonization of the low-lying alluvial plains in the County started only in the 19th century, as a consequence of migration of population from the surrounding hills to more accessible river valleys in the area. The colonization of lower altitudes was facilitated by the agricultural and economic revolution, which was caused by the abolishment of serfdom in 1848. New economic development, mostly coal mines and the textile industry, occurred alongside the building of the railroad in the river valleys in the late 19th century; this attracted a large number of people in search of new employment opportunities (Crkvenčić 1957).

These broad-scale social and economic changes from the 19th century created the typical smallholder agriculture with highly fragmented estates in the county. The fragmentation of land is a result of a dynamic relief, but also of the aforementioned agricultural and economic revolution in the 19th century, when the

previously communally-owned land (organized into cooperatives) was divided and distributed among the population. Already in 1895, three quarters of all estates in the central part of the County were smaller than 5 ha in surface area each (Crkvenčić 1958). A new cultural landscape was formed in the region, further strengthened after the Second World War when legal provisions prevented any substantial re-parcellation of land or increase in land holdings (Plaščak 2009). This traditional smallholder agriculture has remained the most important and most enduring element of the cultural landscape and cultural identity of the region to this day.

The period after the Second World War saw the formation of a state-planned economy within the communist and socialist framework in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, of which Croatia and Hrvatsko Zagorje were a part. The processes observed in Hrvatsko Zagorje were characteristic for the entire county, and for other republics of the Yugoslav Federation. They included accelerated economic development and a decrease in agricultural employment, with an increase in education and employment levels, particularly amongst women. Deagrarianization and migration to cities together with industrialization affected settlement patterns, especially around major cities and alongside major roads. Rural settlements located a greater distance from major cities were characterized by depopulation due to migration of population in search of employment. Those who continued to live in remote rural settlements created a new class of society in Yugoslavia, the so-called “worker-peasants”. Worker-peasants commuted to cities on a daily or weekly basis (mostly due to lower education levels and lower income as a consequence), but also continued with their agricultural practices as a livelihood strategy in their settlements of origin (Spevec 2009).

After the collapse of socialism in 1991, the obsolete smallholder agriculture did not go through a process of modernization, and the total number of cattle was halved in a period of one decade (Croatian Ministry of Agriculture 2013). The processes of population ageing and migration to cities continued, causing agricultural abandonment in remote rural areas and also around major urban settlements. These processes are characteristic not only for traditional rural areas of Croatia, but of the broader region, and Krapina-Zagorje County was chosen as the best possible case study for the analysis of the interplay between the post-socialist transition and marginalization in traditional rural areas.

21.3 Data and Methods

This chapter is methodologically divided into three parts. The analysis of land cover change in the period of 1978–2011 was based on spectral analysis and classification of Landsat images. The focus has been placed on changes in agricultural land and settlement patterns as the best proxy for changes indirectly caused or mediated by the post-socialist transition. The analysis of causes of the observed land cover

change was investigated through multiple regression analysis and further elaborated through a detailed questionnaire survey covering 262 households in the region.

The causes of the observed land cover changes were explained through the interaction between the environment and people. Human activities (e.g. agriculture, housing construction) were seen as drivers of environmental change, while simultaneously being influenced by the environment itself—as well as by both societal and economic changes. Under the assumption that land cover changes and different societal and economic changes can be identified and quantified, it was possible to create a model based on statistical correlations between these two types of variables. The importance of such a model is in creating a framework within which it is possible to evaluate the importance of different variables causing the observed changes, as well as for the possibility of predicting future changes (Woods and Skole 1998; Morita et al. 2007).

Apart from the environmental variables gathered from remote sensing images, the variables used in this research were based on the Population Censuses from 1991 and 2011, as well as on auxiliary information such as ortho-photographs and statistical yearbooks. The multiple regression model was based on the fact that 98% of agricultural land in Krapina-Zagorje County is privately owned and that 89% of households still actively practice some form of agriculture.

21.3.1 Remote Sensing

Landsat TM and Landsat ETM+ satellite images were used in the remote sensing of Krapina-Zagorje County. The images were classified using K-means and Fuzzy-C unsupervised classification methods, and the anniversary years were 1978, 1991, and 2011. The achieved accuracy for agricultural land was between 75% and 85%, and around 70% for settlements. Therefore, with the help of auxiliary data (geo-referenced ortho-photographs) and several fieldworks, a substantial number of misclassified pixels were manually corrected, resulting in a higher level of accuracy for the final land cover maps. The land cover change maps were created by a post-classification overlay, and the observed trends in this study were further validated by similar findings from the Corine Land Cover Maps and through the aforementioned questionnaire survey.

21.3.2 Regression Analysis

The explanation of human-induced land cover changes depends largely on the ability to explain socio-geographic factors connected to observed changes (Woods and Skole 1998). In geographic research, different models of regression analysis are often used for such purposes (Rutherford et al. 2007; Zampella et al. 2007; Lo and Quattrochi 2003). The dependent variable (y), in this case the change in land cover,

is a function of a series of independent variables x_1, \dots, x_p where $p \geq 1$. However, the variable y doesn't depend only on the variables $x_1 \dots x_p$, but also on a certain number of variables which are not available (Reimann et al. 2008). Multiple regression analysis facilitates in creating a simplified link between an independent variable and a series of dependent variables, and is also a tool of evaluating their importance. In this research, the evaluation and reduction of a number of independent variables was achieved through backward stepwise regression. After the backward stepwise regression procedure, the only remaining variables in the final model were those which would significantly decrease the explanatory power of the model if they were eliminated.

The most often used (independent) variables in land cover modelling, apart from physical-geographic ones, are those connected to the education level of the population, population ageing, and population density. Previous research included a variety of variables, such as an increase of school-level children and literacy rates (Asia Pacific Network 2001), employment levels in different branches of industry, the number of cars per household or land prices (Morita et al. 2007), or different distance factors (Serneels and Lambin 2001). The variables used in this research were based on previous research and on expert knowledge of the area. They are: changes in population density; changes in higher education levels; changes in employment levels; and physical-geographic variables categorized into nine altitude and slope categories. They were calculated for each municipal unit (32 in total) because these are the smallest administrative units in Croatia for which we had available socio-economic data.

21.3.3 Questionnaire Survey

Multiple regression analysis enabled us to establish a correlation between e.g. changes in employment and agricultural abandonment, but did not establish causality or give insight into household management practices related to the observed changes. Therefore, a questionnaire survey on 262 households in the county was conducted as the third part of this research. This survey gave us additional insight during the interpretation of remote sensing data and multiple regression analysis, and also provided us with some new data which would have been unavailable otherwise.

The questionnaire consisted of 46 questions about the socio-economic status of the respondents, their livelihood strategies, the size and type of land in their possession, their plans regarding agriculture and possible resettlement, etc. A part of the questionnaire consisted of 14 Likert-type questions regarding cultural values about the land, living in rural/urban areas, and work. The questionnaire was analyzed using SPSS 20 software, and a Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficient; chi-square and t-test were used, depending on the nature of the analyzed variables.

21.4 Results

21.4.1 *Changes in the Land Cover of Krapina-Zagorje County from 1978 to 2011*

According to the results from the remote sensing analysis, the general land cover categories did not change significantly over the studied period, with over two-thirds of all land cover remaining unchanged during 34 years of socialism and post-socialist transition (Fig. 21.2). Forests have been the dominant and the most stable land cover in the region, covering 51% of the surface area in 1978, 46% in 1991, and 44% in 2011. They are mostly located on higher altitudes and outside zones of immediate human influence, and have been changing due to secondary succession (increase) or sourcing of wood for fuel (decrease) (Cvitanović et al. 2016).

The majority of observed land changes were in the grassland and agricultural land categories. While the socialist period (1978–1991) was characterized by a decrease in agricultural land, the post-socialist transition has witnessed a slight increase in agricultural land mostly at the expense of grasslands (Cvitanović et al. 2017). A little over half of these changes occurred in altitudes up to 200 m.

The built-up areas covered 1% of the surface area in 1978, 2% in 1991, and 3% in 2011. The overwhelming majority of the observed increase in built-up areas occurred in altitudes up to 200 m.

21.4.2 *Multiple Regression Modelling*

The backward multiple regression analysis reduced the initial 13 variables (from the first step) to seven variables, explaining a statistically significant amount of




Fig. 21.2 Changes in major land use/cover categories in the 1978–2011 period

variability of the transition between **built-up land** and **other categories**. The model accounted for 79.7% of the variance. Lower altitudes and flatlands were positively correlated with an increase in built-up areas, while higher altitudes and steeper slopes demonstrated a negative correlation. Regarding socio-economic variables—population density, higher levels of employment, and higher education levels were positively correlated with an increase in built-up areas.

Four variables remained in the model, explaining the **arable land to grassland** conversion that accounted for 73% of the variance. Increase in grasslands was negatively correlated with population density but positively correlated with an increase in education levels. This was also characteristic for higher altitudes and steeper slopes (Cvitanović et al. 2017).

Regarding the **grassland to arable land conversion**, the model managed to account for only 29% of the observed variance, and only the physical-geographic variables remained in the model. The increase of the share in flatland areas was positively connected with this process, while an increase in altitudes of 300–400 m demonstrated a negative correlation (Cvitanović et al. 2017).

21.4.3 Questionnaire Survey

One person per household (identified as the person making most of the decisions regarding agriculture and livelihood strategies in the household) was surveyed. The youngest respondent was 21 and the oldest 90. The average age of the respondents was 43, which is in accordance with the average age in the County; 59% of the respondents were women. The average size of the household was 3.9 and 19% of the households had only members older than 50 years of age.

Over 60% of all household dwellings of respondents for the questionnaire survey were reportedly built prior to 1978. During the studied period, 18.7% of respondents built a house, a further 2% built a barn, and 13% both a house and a barn. The most important reason for building a house was marriage and/or family expansion (53.5%), while 39% stated that the lack of space or inadequate quality of living areas was the main reason. Over 90% of the respondents did not plan on building a house or a barn in the future.

Regarding agricultural practices, around three-fourths of the land in the county is currently being cultivated. The main stated reasons for practicing agriculture were: tradition and way of life (33%); having an important source of food (28%); and cultivating high-quality organic products (26%). The reasons for not cultivating the land were: advanced age or illness (31%); economic reasons (25%); and other reasons such as lack of time, distance, etc. (Cvitanović et al. 2017). Around half of the surveyed households owned and used agricultural machinery; with 54% of the machinery having been bought prior to 1991 and a further 15% prior to 1978, emphasizing the low level of mechanization and its advanced age characteristic for traditional smallholder agriculture.

Less than 10% of the surveyed households owned cattle and less than 30% owned pigs. During the studied period, 61% of households reportedly reduced or completely abandoned cattle herding, with the main reasons being economic or health reasons (Cvitanović et al. 2017). In general, agriculture was seen as an important part of local tradition, and the land was seen as intrinsically very valuable. Such claims scored the highest level of agreement on the Likert scale in our questionnaire (Cvitanović et al. 2016).

The analysis regarding the activities of house and barn building demonstrated a statistically-significant difference related to the age of the respondents. Around 30% of the younger respondents (up to 39 years of age) built a house during the studied period, but only 19% of the middle-aged respondents (40 to 59 years of age) and 8.7% of respondents over 60 years of age did the same ($\chi^2 = 24,748$, $df = 8$, $p < 0,01$). There was also a statistically-significant difference between the age of the respondents and the reasons for (not) practicing agriculture ($\chi^2 = 61,706$, $df = 16$, $p < 0,01$). As much as 34% of the younger respondents had never practiced agriculture, while for the oldest group of respondents the share falls to 20%.

21.5 Discussion

Agricultural lands in Krapina-Zagorje County recorded relatively strong rates of land cover change during the later stages of socialism and the early part of the post-socialist transition. They include changes in forest cover, agricultural land, and built-up land. During the later stages of socialism, a recorded net loss in arable land was detected, and a consequential increase in grasslands. Such trends were noted earlier in other parts of Croatia as well, mostly connected to the processes of deagrarianization and migration to cities in search of employment in industry (Crkvenčić 1981; Vresk 1972). It was a part of a wider trend in socialist Yugoslavia comprising the deruralization and transformation of the countryside, and the transformation of the rural population into industrial workers (Slavuj Borčić et al. 2016; Seferagić 2006). Abandoned land was often termed “social fallow” (Hartke 1953), signifying the importance of the social character of land cover changes. Similar results have been recorded in neighbouring counties as well. The study by Horvat (2013) documented a loss of agricultural land amounting to 8% and an increase in built-up land of 3% in Međimurje County during the 1978–1992 period.

However, there was a noted change in trends during the post-socialist transition. Despite negative demographic and economic trends (ageing of population, employment outside agriculture, lack of interest in traditional agricultural practices), there was a slight increase (1.5%) in agricultural land in Krapina-Zagorje county in the 1991–2011 period, mostly at the expense of grasslands. The same process has been noted in the neighbouring Međimurje County (Horvat 2013).

21.5.1 Increase in Agriculture in More Marginalized Regions

The results from the multiple regression modelling and questionnaire survey pointed to the two-sided character of changes in agricultural land use/cover following the collapse of socialism. Areas close to the border with Slovenia and further away from main roads and local urban centers were characterized by more negative demographic and economic trends, but at the same time not necessarily by an overall decrease in agriculture. Such households are typical partially deagrarianized households practicing polyculture on small land parcels. The unfavorable education level and age structure of the population together with higher unemployment suggested that these areas were the least successful in adapting to new conditions of integration into the open market system, and transforming to market economy. So, while the system operates locally, its integration has been unsuccessful and the region is undergoing the processual marginalization. Agriculture was shown to be an important source of food for the household that also generates a small income from selling extra produce to friends and neighbours (Cvitanović et al. 2017). The unfavorable peripheral location (of the county) close to an international border and away from larger urban settlements indicated that the state border was playing a role in unfavorable economic development and negative socio-economic trends in the area. However, such marginalized areas can also be found in the northeastern part of the county, away from the international border, main traffic roads, and Zagreb as well, pointing to the additional existence of inner peripheries. The marginalization of these areas is seen as processual in its negative socio-economic trends, but the cause is, undoubtedly, at least partially geometric in nature.

21.5.2 Increase in Agriculture in Less Marginalized Areas

On the other hand, a certain number of settlements alongside important traffic routes and closer to Zagreb and/or local urban centers (characterized by comparatively favorable demographic and socio-economic trends) witnessed an increase in agriculture. The reason for this increase is probably different—as much as one quarter of respondents claimed that agriculture is their favorite pastime or hobby, and that the reason that they engaged in agriculture was to produce good-quality organic food (Cvitanović et al. 2017). Such answers were more common amongst younger respondents with comparatively higher income, but also amongst a number of retired respondents, many of them so-called “weekend-tourists”. This shift from food production to a preference for natural and cultural amenities has been previously documented in post-industrial countries in the West—with agricultural land being used for recreation and enjoyment as well as to experience the rural lifestyle (Sorice et al. 2014; Johnson 2008). The reason for comparatively fewer negative




Fig. 21.3 Changes in education levels during the post-socialist period in Krapina-Zagorje County demonstrate the correlation between increased education levels and the proximity to major roads and larger urban settlements

socio-economic trends in this area is again, undoubtedly, partially geometric—proximity to Zagreb and/or local urban centers enables easier access to the employment market and educational, recreational, and health facilities (Fig. 21.3).

21.5.3 Increase in Built-up Areas

Further insight into land cover trends following the post-socialist transition was gained by analyzing the changes in the built-up category. New houses were being built mostly in lowlands and flatland areas in the county—areas with better traffic connections to Zagreb and to local urban centers. Additionally, the process of built-up expansion was negatively correlated with altitudes of 300 to 400 m and slopes with an inclination above 12°. The socio-economic variables which were statistically significant in this study were population density and higher education—areas with comparatively favorable trends in population and education dynamics recorded an increase in built-up land. The results indicated that the process of migration from hills in higher altitudes to lowland areas with better traffic connections (which began in the 19th century) has not yet finished. This was also

characteristic during the socialist era, but post-socialist changes have since accelerated the process. Other research has also demonstrated that the migration from rural areas to municipal centers is still an ongoing process, characteristic for younger and better-educated segments of the population, while the older, less educated and less employable remain in rural areas (Njegač 1995; Spevec 2009). This was further corroborated by results from the questionnaire, where the younger population built houses and barns more often, on a statistically significant level.

21.6 Conclusion

The collapse of many subsidized industries in former socialist countries in Eastern Europe has resulted in higher unemployment levels. It can be seen as a change in power relations in places where a planned economic system has been integrated into a wider, global open market system with different characteristics. Subsidized industries were usually located in already marginalized areas, acting as a state-sponsored developmental tool (Vodopivec 1994). With the aforementioned changes and exposure to market forces, areas which were economically and demographically stronger managed to adapt to new circumstances, while less successful areas have been characterized by an accelerated decline. Such processes in a heterogeneous area have manifested themselves heterogeneously, both in economic and socio-demographic terms. Less favorable areas are turning again to self-subsistence agriculture as a household livelihood strategy, especially in households with aged members. These households are usually located in hilly and mountainous areas close to the border with Slovenia or far away from urban centers and/or important traffic routes. This indicates the importance of spatiality in the analysis of marginalization within the context of change in power relations. Conversely, areas with comparatively better socio-economic trends have been characterized by an increase in life-style agriculture which is seen as a cultural amenity or physical exercise. This is characteristic for areas with relatively larger local urban centers or those located on important traffic routes to Zagreb, enabling daily or weekly commutes.

Regarding settlement patterns, again the geometric part of the process of marginalization played an important role. Areas located in lowlands, closer to major traffic routes, have been characterized with an increase in built-up areas, while areas located in higher altitudes, far away from urban centers and closer to an international border have been characterized by out-migration.

These changes in the extent of agriculture and its character, as well as settlement patterns, are just symptoms of major changes caused by broad-scale political change and subsequent market reforms. More successful areas have been characterized with a variety of livelihood strategies which can include daily or weekly migration to urban centers, development of agro-tourism, and local industry. This variety of livelihood strategies has been unsuccessful in preventing the observed negative trends from occurring, but it has been able to weaken or slow them. On the

other hand, areas with limited economic possibilities have been characterized with a sharp increase in unemployment and are turning again to traditional agriculture as a livelihood strategy. The location of these areas close to Slovenia indicates the role that the border plays in marginalization; but such areas can also be located away from the international border, pointing to the existence of inner peripheries. Such a process of economic decline and further marginalization would have probably continued without the political and economic changes of the post-socialist transition, but they have undoubtedly been accelerated by it. Agriculture can be a good indicator of such changes, but it is important to analyze its concomitant relationship to other potential indicators.

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Part VI

Conclusions

Chapter 22

(De)Marginalization, Development and Sustainability: Brief Reflection of the Variety of Findings and Views Presented

Stanko Pelc and Miha Koderman

22.1 Introduction

The chapters of this book cover such a diversity of topics that at first sight it seems that they could hardly have anything in common. The intention was to tie them together with a common focus on geographical marginalization and sustainability thinking. However, there are still large gaps between the flourishing tourist destination of Ibiza and the problems that resettled Orang Aslis in Malaysia have to deal with, or between land use in hilly hinterland of Maribor in Slovenia and the role of Bedouin museum for desired multiculturalism in Israel. Nevertheless, life itself is diverse and to comprehend its meaning one needs to go through many different experiences. To get better insights into marginality, marginalization and what drives or reverses it, one needs to be acquainted with several case studies focusing on different topics and from different perspectives as well.

Marginality as a “common denominator” or the research approach to diverse issues that geographers pay attention to, because of their spatial relevance, may be engaged with for several reasons. It attaches geography to sociology and other social sciences since marginality can be defined as both a spatial and as a social conceptual framework. Further it enables one to interpret changes that occur in society and space considering the direction of the process towards greater or lesser marginality. It already encompasses spatial, economic, social, cultural, political and other dimensions—so it may be considered as a kind of umbrella conceptual

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framework for the interpretation of complex processes. Similarly von Braun and Gatzweiler “use the marginality lens to understand and explore the links between poverty, exclusion and ecology” (von Braun and Gatzweiler 2014, p. vi). Whenever geographical research focuses on phenomena that are closely related to human-environment relations and which are strongly influenced by either socio-economic/political or natural conditions (or both) that are causing worsening or improving individuals/groups wellbeing by pushing him/it to/away from sources of “wealth, power and prestige”, the conceptual framework of marginality can be engaged with.

As sustainability has a strong emphasis on human-nature relations at least when we are considering it from the perspective of economic development the first part of the book deals with nature, both from the perspective of marginalization of nature and from the perspective of nature as being a driver of marginalization and in this concluding chapter some basic thoughts about this issue are given.

The second part of the book offers only a few case studies that focus on very diverse regions, but it is exactly this diversity that allows us to see how wide the range of geographical marginality studies can be and this is one of the most important issues discussed below.

Ethnicity as a driver of marginalization links geographical research of marginality with sociology and ethnology. Leimgruber considers ethnic mixture and the presence of all kind of minorities in society as the diversity that should be recognized by society as valuable in a sense as bio-diversity is while Meir goes even a step further and claims that cultural and bio-diversity may be strongly linked as in case of Beduins in Negev from his case study. However, the minorities are often marginalized because of the fears that the majority nurtures because of the lack of the knowledge about the culture and the character of minorities they share the same living space with. Or, as in a case of Slovenian Roma minority, they even don't want to share the same living space, thus pushing them into “ghetto” settlements.

Finally, we link this themes together and present common conclusions from case studies that range from kinship based educational migration in the area of Southern Pacific to post socialist changes in a rural hinterland of Zagreb in the region Hrvatsko Zagorje located at Croatian-Slovenian border. Two other case studies are closer to the last mentioned as they are focused on regional development in Slovenia while the other two are dealing with agricultural practices that may be considered as potential drivers of demarginalization—organic tea production in Sri Lanka and shrimp farming in Bangladesh.

22.2 Nature ‘Marginalizing’ or ‘Marginalized’

According to Pelc's stance (Chap. 2) nature is both marginalizing and marginalized. It is marginalized within the decision-making processes that are deliberately ignoring long term effects of pollution and resource depletion thus pushing nature

(environment) towards the margin of the value system putting short term benefits of social elites in its center. However, there are also short term survival strategies that force poor marginalized people to cause harm to the nature thus 'cutting the branch they are sitting on'.

The effects of natural disasters in areas with land degradation because of overpopulation (exceeded carrying capacity) are much austerer or may even be caused by the degradation. Zorn (Chap. 4) presented a whole range of data supporting the hypothesis that marginality from the global scale plays an important role in consequences that natural disasters cause, especially in terms of fatalities and from relative points of view in terms of damage too. From the perspective of social class it is obvious that people from low income group, especially those below poverty line, are most gravely affected by whole range of natural disasters. They live in more endangered areas, because these are the only areas they can afford to live in, the housing is usually of low quality and cannot guarantee proper safety. Besides, local and national authorities are often too incompetent and too corrupt, not to mention their lack of finances, to establish any kind of early warning system. Those marginalized socially or/and spatially can expect to get less (adequate) help and will usually have to wait longer to be helped. Thus, it may be concluded that life in marginal areas and at the margin of society is life at a much greater risk of a grave damage and potentially fatal event caused by a natural disaster. The effects of natural events become disasters within social context and within that context marginality plays an important role.

Clearly different perspective of marginalization may be obtained from the case study of land-use changes in Svečinske gorice (Chap. 3). It is a border area but far from being spatially marginal as it is located in the hinterland of an important Slovenian regional center Maribor (20–30 min by car). However, the vicinity of Maribor may be one of the reasons for the reduction of cultivated areas. Land-use changes such as the overgrowing of arable areas and afforestation resulted in lower utilization of the natural potential. It was easier for farmers to augment their income by engaging in non-agricultural activities in nearby Maribor than to invest into their small farms and the development of highly productive vineyards although there are almost perfect natural conditions for that as shown by Žiberna's maps. It may be stated that marginalization in this case is manifesting in the fact that local population is pushed in relatively unfavourable socio-economic situation in which it is not possible to utilize advantageous natural conditions of the area it lives in.

The last case study from Northern Caucasus (Chap. 5) reveals marginality from both a global and a regional scale. The study area is a part of global periphery and also marginal within the regional context due to the fact that it is mountainous and as such went through a process of transformation. The result is the restoration of mountain meadow steppe and sub-alpine meadows. Besides, agricultural lands including agricultural terraces are overgrown by pine and elfin birch woods. The authors of the chapter mainly focused on the climate changes that also influence this transformation. The overall result is the new type of landscape that may offer new opportunities for the remaining population. However, the idea for natural parks and

tourist development should be further researched to evaluate what are the chances for such development as it strongly depends on the socio-economic situation within wider regional context and political readiness for appropriate action as well.

22.3 Does Tourism Have the Potential to Reverse the Process of Marginalization

Tourism represents an economic sector that is usually perceived as one of the most important developmental opportunities for geographically marginalized areas and regions. Poorly developed local communities and their authorities strive to promote the natural and cultural phenomena in their areas, as they expect economic benefits from potential visitors and investors. They anticipate that the development of tourism can significantly contribute to the local development in general, as this sector is known for its multiplier effects which encourage the growth in the primary and secondary sectors as well. According to Rusu (2011, p. 71), the term “Multiplier” means “that the value of expenditure is multiplied by some estimated factor in order to determine the total economic impact.” Multiplier effects are therefore often referred to as secondary effects of tourism spending and can take many forms, including spending on goods and services by tourists visiting the area, investment by external sources, government spending on infrastructure and export of goods stimulated by tourism. In this regard, tourism can have the potential to alleviate and, in the long term, slowly reverse the process of marginalization. However, tourism development must also be addressed from the perspective of sustainability, as this activity is closely connected with nature and specific cultural environments, where thoughtless actions and strictly profit-oriented investments without the cooperation and inclusion of the local community can have devastating and irreversible consequences.

The first one of the three case studies dealing with tourism paid attention to the perspectives of sustainable tourism development in the area of the Upper Soča Valley in north-western Slovenia (Chap. 6). This peripheral border area may be regarded as geometrically marginal, but it is much more appropriate to state that, in some regards, the region experiences a certain degree of marginalization that results in emigration and depopulation, abandonment of arable land, as well as an above average unemployment rates. Due to its location in the mountainous terrain of the Julian Alps, tourism here is currently mainly propelled by outdoor sport and hiking leisure activities and is thus characterized by seasonality. As the authors pointed out, there is a lot of room for improvement, especially from the aspect of sustainability. As almost 80% of the municipal area is included into the national park and considering the astonishing potential of the natural beauty, sustainable tourism is the only acceptable option. Authors propose the developmental concepts such as culinary, cultural and geo-tourism as possible niche activities in the fragile

mountainous environment. Their adoption could play an important role in preventing/reversing the process of marginalization.

Tourism and its multiplier effects have largely contributed to the development of the Balearic island of Ibiza, world famous and exclusive tourist destination in the Mediterranean (Chap. 7). The island of Ibiza experienced several different phases of tourism development and lost its appeal and attractiveness in the last decades of the 20th century, when new tourist destinations started emerging worldwide. In that period, the island was, in a way, marginalized by stiff competition. The process of marginalization was reversed in 2000s, when private and public investors in tourism sector started building a new image of the island, based on the club culture phenomenon with Ibiza's nightlife as the main attraction. This gradually led to a transformation of the once mass-tourism holiday resort into an exclusive, luxury tourism destination, which is only accessible to those who can afford it. The luxury tourism development has alleviated the growing pressure of tourism activities in the sensitive coastal environment, as the number of tourist arrivals on the island is nowadays much smaller than previously in the time of popular mass tourism. This may well make a contribution to the sustainability and nature preservation of the area, but the long-term effects of the elite-oriented tourism should also be devoted appropriate concern. Implementation of similar spatial and social segregation policies has in certain cases significantly contributed to the increase of the multi-layered gap between the local communities and tourists. Elitism has always been closely connected with the process of marginalization and the case of tourism development of the island of Ibiza may once again be put to the test.

The third tourism case study is focused on the tourism development of Cuba, also an island, only much bigger than Ibiza and undoubtedly marginal from several aspects (Chap. 8). At global scale Cuba belongs to the group of 'developing countries of the Third World',¹ one of the few remaining with a socialist regime and suffering from decades long economic sanctions and political isolation put on them by their powerful neighbour, USA. On the other hand "paradise" is a suitable word to describe the island's tropical weather, numerous beaches and nature conservation areas. This is the reason for the fact that mass tourism is increasing on yearly basis. Due to the country's poor economy, their ambiguous goals for the improvement of tourism, infrastructure development will depend on extensive foreign investments that will significantly affect the natural environment and social structure of the population, thus threatening to create new forms of marginalization. Cuba may already be on its way to becoming one more country where centrally governed decisions (mostly regarding the privatization of state owned land) have subsequently led to the rise of neoliberal considerations and populism alliances. The lessons learned from similar situations in certain countries of Eastern Europe which have already completed the process of transition from communist regime to

¹It should be emphasized that this group of countries is very diverse and Cuba according to Human development index is close to Serbia and above Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina and China as well. The World Bank already stopped using the distinction between developed and developing countries.

democracy, could be valuable in terms of preventing the marginalization of the changing Cuban society in post-Castro period.

To answer the question in the heading: yes, tourism has the power to reverse the process of marginalization as shown in the case of Ibiza, while the other two cases are rather pointing out what could potentially work to achieve this, rather than giving firm evidence of such development. However, even as far as Ibiza is concerned, we must not neglect the fact, that it was still far from being marginal, although it was caught in the process of marginalization that could eventually have pushed the island's economy all the way to the 'edge'. Therefore, it was actually the change in tourism offerings, the innovation, that put Ibiza back on the 'path of success' and not tourism as such.

22.4 Ethnicity Issues—The Central Topic of Marginalization in Society and in Space as Well

The remaining population of 'natives' living in reservations is probably one of most common associations affiliated with the term marginal. When thinking about marginality in the European context, one of the first thoughts that would cross one's mind would probably be: 'Roma'. Ethnic as well as other minorities are very often the subject of marginalization. The majority's feeling of endangerment by otherness that usually characterizes minorities is the major driving force of the marginalization of these groups with prejudice as the fuel. However, it should not be so. Minorities should be valued as an important wealth that society possesses and ethnic diversity should be valued the same way biodiversity already is (Chap. 9). The majority should not be afraid of the positive discrimination of minorities. Giving them the freedom to choose how much to conform to the mainstream lifestyle and being able to accept their otherness without fear is the first step towards their demarginalization. There are many more steps which need to be taken in order to achieve the full acceptance of all 'the other' and the recognition of the diversity that they bring as an 'asset' for society.

The case studies presenting the situation of ethnic groups in our book cover Orang Aslis from Malaysia (Chap. 10), Slovenian Roma (Chaps. 11 and 12) and Bedouins from Israel (Chaps. 13 and 14). The first case study reveals marginalization of indigenous population of Malay Peninsula. They were resettled as the government decided that their traditional way of life was no longer possible due to their remoteness, poverty and thus poor accessibility to health care. They were certainly observed as marginal from perspective of authorities and the mainstream majority in Malaysia. However, the decision taken from above, based on the assumptions and made by government officials that probably do not have the empathy to understand and feel how native people assess their situation and how they value their way of life and their material and mental situation, certainly is an act of marginalization of this ethnic group even though it was meant to be for their

benefit. As the field work interviews showed, the resettlement more often caused further marginalization rather than the opposite. The results were better in the cases where the settlement was rebuilt at the same location where people lived before and the worst in the case where the native population has been settled into urban environment, getting new houses with very good housing conditions, but with a total lack of opportunities for income generation. Their former strategies were not appropriate for their new socio-economic context and most of them were unable to adapt to new circumstances. The 'noble' action of authorities with the intention of improving the life conditions in majority of individual cases resulted in a worsening of life situation and thus in even severer marginalization of the affected individuals. The case study clearly showed that not giving certain group the right to have a major influence on the decisions concerning their life is an act of marginalization, often putting some or even all of members of such a group into more unfavourable situation than before. To reduce marginalization the voice of marginalized minority groups should not be ignored.

The problem of settlement is also present in two cases from the other side of the world and in much different circumstances, but with some similarities as well. The ethnic group in these two cases are not a part of native population, but also used to live nomadic way of life and had to settle permanent in recent decades. The problems concerning this settlement are segregation (Roma living in separate Roma settlements), property issues (settlements built on the land that they do not own), lack of basic infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), often but not always very poor housing, etc. The first presented case (Chap. 11) shows how Slovenia in two and a half decades of its sovereignty did not manage to solve the afore-mentioned problems at a legislative level in such a way that the local authorities would have the capacity and means to deal with Roma integration into local society. Even though the Roma minority is represented by a Roma counsellor in every municipality with a Roma population, their voice may easily be overheard as shown in the presented case, their problems remain unsolved and their situation uncertain. The interests of majority prevail and the Roma remain marginalized. The second case study revealed the plan that should be followed in order to legalize and integrate the Roma settlements into Slovenian settlement system (Chap. 12). While the previous case study focused primarily on an individual family thus presenting what the core problems are and how are they perceived by the affected members of the minority group, this case presents the overall situation and the ideas for action needed to overcome the problems. It has been acknowledged by the author that there have been some positive results already achieved in the field of reconstruction of certain Roma settlements, but he emphasized the fact that the reconstruction and equipping the settlements with appropriate infrastructure is just the first necessary condition for the integration of Roma settlements into Slovenian settlement system. However, to achieve the integration of Roma population into Slovenian society is a much more complex problem and will take much more time and effort on the side of the majority population and on the side of Roma as well, not to mention political 'playmakers' on local as well as on national level. Nevertheless, if the Roma population will remain to live in separate Roma settlements, no matter how well

equipped and built, they will still be secluded, marginalized and the integration even more difficult.

The last two cases are from Israel and they both deal with the Bedouins. Their marginalization is analyzed in Chap. 14, where it is examined from the perspective of (bio-)cultural diversity. The situation is very much like the one in the case of Orang Asli ethnic group in Malaysia. The resettlement of Bedouin to reduce their marginality most probably means that they are being marginalized even more. However, this resettlement may also be regarded as a possible act of diminishing biodiversity. Because many tribes were detached from pastoral life and relocated to towns by the Israeli government, their traditional activity, grazing of livestock, consequently became unprofitable, but is still maintained on a smaller scale as an important cultural symbol. Apart for being one of the prime sources of income for Bedouins that are continuing to live in unrecognized settlements in the Negev, sheep and goat grazing in the desert represents an important ecological value in the preservation of its biodiversity. One could therefore claim that the marginalization (in terms of relocation and the resultant spatial segregation) of the Bedouins has as a side effect manifested on a completely unimagined level—in the marginalization of Negev's nature and biodiversity. This case clearly shows how thoughtless political decisions can have complex and far reaching consequences that can threaten natural ecosystems. The solution for the demarginalization of Negev Bedouins could be not only through recognition of their settlements, but also through recognition of their role in maintaining ecosystem services and biodiversity. Financial support would be beneficial and could probably follow the example of the EU and its Common Agricultural Policy aiming to achieve higher biodiversity and to maintain provision of ecosystem services.

The other chapter devoted to Bedouins (Chap. 13) is devoted to the topics of multiculturalism and ethnographic museums. It analyses the case of the Regional Bedouin Museum in the Negev desert. As institutions, museums are an important part of the country's educational system, as their primary functions are the conservation of objects of cultural, historical or artistic importance, and their presentation for the public. In Israel, museums face significant challenges in fulfilling the differing, and sometimes conflicting, needs of multiculturalism. Here, one of the main problems is related to the objective, non-biased presentation of non-Jewish cultural groups with predominantly Arab-Palestinian narratives, which often conflicts with the Jewish Zionist narrative. Similar issues can be found in many other countries where the culture and politics of the dominant majority often prevail over minorities or non-dominant ethnic groups. The latter are usually marginalized by the dominant groups in several ways, as already discussed in the several chapters of this book, however such subtle marginalization can also be found in the museums' exhibition collections and accompanying explanatory notes, as well as information boards. To avoid this aspect of marginalization, the society's mainstream must step away from its majority-centred and sometimes nationalistic policies and include the relevant representatives of the non-dominant ethnic groups with active participation

in the management of the museums and its collections. In this way, the existence of multiple cultural traditions within a single country could be properly addressed, while promoting the maintenance of cultural diversity.

22.5 Migration, Regional Development, Post Socialist Transition and Niche Agricultural Activities in the Same ‘Marginality Basket’

In the last part of the book a large diversity of case studies is presented. The starting point are the Pacific islands—undoubtedly marginal areas from a global perspective (Chap. 15). The authors come to some conclusions regarding the possibilities for demarginalization through education. The first one is that migration based education may be pushing island societies in both directions – towards as well as from the margin, depending on what kind of strategies are implemented. They also recommend that the best of tradition should be maintained while at the same time the progressive change should be allowed to foster demarginalization. Furthermore, they consider different kinds of aid from the metropolis that is fostering education focused on skills being mainly needed for the labour market in the metropolis as neo-colonial and thus being a driver of marginalization, draining the periphery of its best resources. The family, on the other hand, still plays the most important role in decisions taken considering who and how can get the resources available for the appropriate education. According to the authors the role of the authorities is to guarantee basic education at local and secondary at regional level. They do not approve scholarships for tertiary education as they bring more benefits to metropolitan educational institutions (Australia, New Zealand) than to students from periphery (Pacific Islands). More effective, according to them, would be to foster the diaspora and let it grow by maintaining pathways and reducing border controls as much as possible. Close ties between diaspora and their families at home can be a powerful driver of demarginalization through networks of education and migration.

The other two case studies from ‘Third World’ (Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) revealed how certain agricultural activities may benefit some marginal (local) societies and improve their economic as well as social situation thus pushing them out of poverty and away from the margin of wider society. Although the focus in both cases is on the economic activities that are presented, the final emphasis is on the importance of these sustainable agricultural practices in the demarginalizing process. However, the case study about tea estates (Chap. 19) shows how complex is the situation that economies of the developing countries have to cope with in the context of globalization and worldwide competition. This is the reason for the marginalization of traditional tea production in Sri Lanka. Being the first to start with organic production pushed the process into the opposite direction, but still without any guarantee that organic tea producers can be competitive enough to

maintain much more sustainable, but also costlier organic production. The case study from Bangladesh reveals how proper pond management with the use of sustainable practices of growing prawns can change the wellbeing of farmers in a marginal region (Chap. 20). It is exactly the use of sustainable methods of farming that makes the difference in this case and the author's stance is that this could be an example of good practice that could help farmers in other regions and other countries to change their unsustainable practices and escape the dependence on multinational companies that, in combination with low survival rates of their prawns keep them in marginality and poverty.

The remaining four case studies are from the Central European context (Slovenia, Croatia, Czechia) which from global scale are far from being marginal. Even from a wider regional scale (EU) these three countries could hardly be defined as marginal. However, at a micro-regional scale we may notice that there are processes that may be driving certain regions towards the margin when observed within the national context.

One of the Slovenian cases is showing how the reforms of local government system influenced the local situation through the dispersion of services and enhancement of the polycentric system (Chap. 17). Large numbers of new municipal centres managed to get new services thus improving living conditions for the population of peripheral areas far from higher rank regional centres. Furthermore, the process of devolvement of government at the local level to numerous small municipalities did contribute to higher levels of influence of local population on the decisions taken that directly influence their every day's life. At present, according to the author's stance the analysed process and the observed changes have had a more demarginalizing than marginalizing effects. However, small peripheral municipalities are economically weak and often also lack human capital, and it may therefore be questionable, how long can the described situation last.

The other case study from Slovenia is about regional disparities and sustainable development (Chap. 18). The observed development is not yet sustainable and developmental differences between regions are deep rooted and it will be hard to overcome them. That might be a potential danger for these regions to be caught by a process of marginalization instead of the opposite.

The last two case studies both examine the post-socialist transition. The one from Czechia focused on the process of the restitution of Church property. This remained unsettled for more than two decades thus blocking an important part of the land suitable for local development and therefore causing negative developmental effect in those administrative units that had an important share of such land. The situation may be defined as marginalization of those local units that could have develop, but were blocked by unsettled property issues between the state and the Church.

Finally, the Croatian case study examined the post socialist changes in a border region with Slovenia north-east from Zagreb (Chap. 21). Hrvatsko Zagorje is a traditional underdeveloped peripheral hilly region within wider commuting range of Zagreb, the capital of Croatia (about one hour car drive). The differences in land use

changes and the overall economic, demographic etc. situation in the region is strongly related to accessibility to regional centres and especially to Zagreb. Higher and less accessible hilly areas are showing more characteristics that can be defined as the effects of marginalization such as the return to self-subsistent agriculture as a livelihood strategy by the older population or combined involvement in agricultural and non-agricultural activities (commuters—part time farmers). The transition from socialism to capitalism, according to the authors only accelerated the observed changes. Even in the heart of Europe it is difficult to avoid marginalization of less accessible areas within the context of ‘market economy’ and globalization.

22.6 Concluding Remark

As mentioned above marginality is a complex phenomenon and very diversely understood. Marginalization on the other hand, when defined as a process in which something or somebody is being pushed into a less favourable position and if this position is closer to the margin than to the average, can be traced and observed almost everywhere, not just at the extreme periphery. Driving forces of these changes can be defined as drivers of marginalization. In search of an understanding of these issues we have examined what factors play an active role in marginalization. Knowing and understanding is the key for appropriate intervention aimed at reversing the process of marginalization, enabling it to become a process of demarginalization. Case studies presented in this book reveal just selected small bits of a complex mosaic of marginality and marginalization. Much more still remains to be ‘unveiled’.

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