

Rio de Janeiro

Social and Urban Impacts of the *Maracanã* Stadium Renovation

*Fabrício Leal de Oliveira, Fernanda Sánchez,
Glauco Bienenstein and Giselle Tanaka*

Abstract In the twenty-first century, the city of Rio de Janeiro has gained visibility on the national and international stages because it was chosen to host the 2007 Pan American Games, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. This chapter analyses the urban, socio-economic and spatial impacts of the renovation

F.L. de Oliveira (✉) · G. Tanaka
Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbano e Regional, Universidade Federal
do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
e-mail: flealdeoliveira@gmail.com; gisellemegumi@gmail.com

F. Sánchez · G. Bienenstein
Escola de Arquitetura e Urbanismo, Universidade Federal Fluminense,
Niterói, Brazil
e-mail: sanchezf2010@gmail.com; glaucob01@gmail.com

of the *Maracanã* Stadium and introduces new elements into the debate on large urban projects and their relationship with social structuring and the appropriation of urban space. After an initial presentation of the Rio de Janeiro context and of some basic information on the renovation of the stadium and its surroundings, the main conclusions are presented and developed around political, institutional, symbolic, urban-architectural, socio-environmental, economic, financial and land-related aspects.

Keywords Mega-events · 2014 FIFA World Cup · Rio de Janeiro · Maracanã · Urban planning

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the urban, social and spatial impacts of the renovation of the *Jornalista Mário Filho (Maracanã)* football stadium in Rio de Janeiro, and it is based on a study completed in 2014. The main aim is to bring new elements into the debate on large urban projects and their relationship to the processes of the structuring and social appropriation of the urban space. After a brief presentation of the city of Rio de Janeiro socio-political context and the renovation process of the sporting facility, the main conclusions of the study are presented. The study analyses the relationship between the renovation project and political, institutional, symbolic, urban-architectural, social-environmental, economic, financial and land-related aspects. As opposed to the notion of ‘legacy’, which is critical to the official discourse to legitimise mega-events, we seek to understand how far the renovation of *Maracanã* goes in terms of its interfaces with different aspects of social reality. Thus, we examine: (i) the governmental decision-making process vis-à-vis the resistance of organised social groups; (ii) institutional exceptions and innovations made by the government; (iii) social, cultural and spatial disputes involving the ‘New *Maracanã*’; (iv) the de-characterisation of the stadium considering its status as a national heritage site granted by the National Heritage Institute (IPHAN);¹ (v) the transformation processes of land use and value; (vi) the socio-environmental impact; and (vii) renovation financing and sporting facility management.

7.1.1 *Rio de Janeiro: An Uneven City*

Just behind São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro is the second-largest Brazilian metropolitan region, with 21 municipalities and 12 million inhabitants. More than half of them, 6.5 million people (IBGE 2010), live in the city of Rio de Janeiro, commonly referred to as Rio.

The Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region concentrates its main economic activities as well as the high-income population in its more central municipalities, particularly in the central metropolitan core. The most peripheral municipalities concentrate the low-income population as well as the most precarious urban services (IBGE 2010). However, the metropolitan spaces are heterogeneous and may have, in different ways and at different levels, spaces of both affluence and poverty.

The city of Rio de Janeiro has the second-largest municipal gross domestic product (GDP) as well as the second-largest municipal budget in Brazil (IBGE 2010). Yet, Rio has 23 per cent or 1.4 million of its population living in favelas and 45 per cent concentrated in densely populated areas located in northern neighbourhoods served by railways (IBGE 2010). But the favelas spread almost throughout the city, including to the hills within the city in central areas and the affluent southern neighbourhoods.

A total of 18.5 per cent of Rio's households have a monthly per capita average income lower than or equal to half the Brazilian minimum wage² and 45.2 per cent have a maximum of one minimum wage, which corresponds, roughly speaking, to the range of people who depend upon public subsidies to buy a house. On the other hand, approximately 5 per cent of Rio's residences have a household per capita income higher than ten minimum wages.

While virtually all Rio households have access to a water supply, electricity and more or less adequate rubbish collection, the sewage services are much more precarious or in some cases non-existent in favelas and areas located to the west of the city, where one can find 37 per cent of households at the lowest income level.

In addition to the contrast between favelas and formal areas, inequality is expressed most visibly in the distribution of urban mobility conditions and access to employment, public facilities, commerce, services and leisure, which are concentrated in the central areas and high-income neighbourhoods. In 2013, the central area and the wealthier nearby

regions in the South Zone, *Tijuca* and the surrounding districts contained 44.5 per cent of commercial establishments and 54.5 per cent of formal jobs (PCRJ 2013), as well as 67 per cent of the highest income population.

Meanwhile, recent investments in urban mobility have benefited more the high-income neighbourhoods—especially in the emerging *Barra da Tijuca* region—and are distant from the poorest people living in areas far away from the main employment centres, both in Rio and in the peripheral metropolitan municipalities.

7.1.2 *Rio's Recent History: Brief Remarks*

Throughout recent Brazilian history, the city of Rio de Janeiro has played an important cultural and political role, not only as the capital city until 1960, but also because of its political opposition during the last Brazilian dictatorship (1964–85).

Despite its political and cultural influence on the Brazilian scenario, Rio was strongly impacted by the foundation of Brasília in 1960, as most of the political actors were transferred to the new capital. Two decades later, during the 1980s, a huge number of economic actors moved to other parts of the country, mainly to São Paulo, the richest Brazilian state. Furthermore, the combination of the rise of neoliberal views and Brazil's return to democracy in 1985 introduced discussion on new ways of dealing with public administration, including city management and planning. In this context, the old Fordist paradigms were strongly questioned, and new debates and models of coping with the new capitalist challenges emerged throughout the world.

By the end of the twentieth century, the rhetoric of competitiveness and increasing productivity had become widespread in almost all large Brazilian cities, affecting the civil and social rights guaranteed by the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988.

In the case of the city of Rio de Janeiro, the public administration's turning point was in 1993, when César Maia took office as Mayor of Rio supported by a strong political coalition. Competitiveness, participation in the global economy and promotion of the city's image were some of the keywords of the new urban agenda. Despite internal contradictions and dissensions, the next mayors followed these political and ideological guidelines, and together built a long-lasting close relationship between government and business to

define urban priorities and policies that should last at least until December 2016, when the term of the current mayor will end.

Hosting the 2016 Olympics and the 2014 FIFA World Cup, which promised to promote the city, attracting investments and transforming the urban scenario are the main features of this type of public administration.

7.2 PUBLIC SPENDING AND PRIVATE GAIN

In spite of the official discourse that emphasises partnerships with private capital, most of the spending on the 2014 FIFA World Cup came from the public sector, mainly from the Federal Government (direct investment or subsidised loans), but there was also significant spending from the Rio de Janeiro State and city governments.

According to the 2014 FIFA World Cup Responsibility Matrix, Rio de Janeiro spending was mostly on the renovation of the *Maracanã* Stadium and urban mobility facilities.

7.2.1 *Public Spending*

The consolidated Responsibility Matrix, released on the World Cup website in December 2014, reports a total amount of R\$1.05 billion (approximately US\$392.2 million)³ spent on the *Maracanã* Stadium renovation: a 38 per cent loan from the Federal Government, through the National Economic and Social Development Bank (*Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social* (BNDES)), and a 62 per cent investment from the State Government. Another R\$354.1 million (US\$132.3 million) was spent by the Municipal Government on urbanising the stadium's surroundings and on the remodelling of a multimodal station for public transportation.

The implementation of the Bus Rapid Transit system called *Transcarioca*, which links the international airport to the high-income *Barra da Tijuca* neighbourhood, cost R\$1.97 billion (US\$735.7 million), 60 per cent from the Federal Government and the rest paid for by the City Hall.

The Responsibility Matrix also includes the renovation of the *Antonio Carlos Jobim* International Airport (R\$443.7 million or US\$165.7 million) and a complementary structure for the finals of the 2013 Confederations Cup (R\$37.7 or US\$14.1 million), as well as tourism infrastructure (R\$18.9 or US\$7.1 million).

According to the December 2014 Responsibility Matrix, the total amount of public money invested was R\$3.8 billion (US\$1.5 billion), accounting for 100 per cent of the total spent.

7.2.2 *Private Gain*

Accumulation strategies by international, national and local agents are usually those which are rewarded with profit.

On the one hand, large Brazilian companies, contractors of construction projects and services for the government, such as Odebrecht and OAS, have increased their power over the city, winning public tenders and being involved in the majority of the World Cup or the Olympic projects, such as the implementation of the Bus Rapid Transit transportation system, the expansion of the subway system, the renovation of the *Maracanã* Stadium and the remodelling of the Rio de Janeiro docklands⁴ (IMD 2014).

On the other hand, since Rio de Janeiro became the host city for the 2016 Olympics, the preferred option of urban policy has been to remove low-income communities, which has favoured local strategies for land valuation. In the international image of the Rio Olympics, the city government wants to project the idea that there is no place for this juxtaposition of fabrics (formal and informal), which are so common in the city (Sánchez et al. 2014).

The political parties who control the city, state and federal governments have been allies since the first Eduardo Paes municipal administration in 2009, which silenced almost all institutional opposition to governmental actions. However, it is important to highlight that there has been resistance on the part of social movements, such as the ‘Popular Committee for the World Cup and the Rio de Janeiro Olympics’, a public channel of denunciation and resistance to removal and other actions related to these events (CPCORJ 2014).

7.3 THE ‘NEW *MARACANÃ*’: THE MAIN FEATURES OF AN ONGOING RENOVATION PROJECT

The renovation of the *Maracanã* Stadium, completed in April 2014, provides more evidences and allows us to update the debate on mega-events, especially with respect to their relationship with the implementation of public policies that increase the concentration of power and income, and the privatisation of public spaces and services. The main

public agent in this case is the State Government of Rio de Janeiro, the owner of the *Maracanã* Stadium, which is responsible for the process of renovation and private concession of this sporting facility. The political moment was fuelled by demonstrations in June 2013 that demanded, at least initially, a change of attitude from the public state administration.

7.3.1 *The Maracanã Complex*

The so-called ‘*Maracanã* Complex’ is made up of the *Maracanã* Stadium and a set of public facilities located in the same block as the sporting facility in the *Maracanã* neighbourhood, near Rio city centre. The construction of the Stadium began in 1948 and the sports complex, which includes the *Maracanãzinho* gymnasium, the *Célio de Barros* Athletics Stadium and the *Julio Delamare* Aquatics Centre, was only completed in 1965. The *Friedenreich* Municipal School, the old Indian Museum and the buildings initially used by departments of the Ministry of Agriculture are also part of the *Maracanã* complex.

Opened in 1950, the *Maracanã* was initially designed to receive 150,000 people.⁵ Over the years, after several refurbishments that started at the beginning of the 1980s, the stadium capacity was reduced by half. In 1999 the stadium was remodelled in order to fulfil FIFA requirements for the 2000 Club World Cup. Later, bigger and more radical changes were made for the 2007 Pan American Games, which included the suppression of the ‘geral’, a low-cost standing sector that allowed low-income people to watch the matches. This is the starting point of the progressive ‘elitisation’ of the stadium, which would only be completed in 2014.

7.3.2 *The ‘New Maracanã’*

A few months after the 2007 Pan American Games, FIFA announced that Brazil would host the 2014 World Cup, and a new period of the stadium’s adaptation started. The renovation project followed the constant demands in the specifications delivered by FIFA to the host cities.

In addition to changes in the football stadium, the project also included the demolition of the *Célio de Barros* Athletics Stadium, the *Julio Delamare* Aquatics Centre, the *Friedenreich* Municipal School and the building of the old Indian Museum, occupied by the indigenous movement and also known as ‘*Aldeia Maracanã*’. Among the reasons for these demolitions was the construction of parking lots, which would make the

stadium meet the FIFA requirement for parking spaces, and a shopping centre, which could become an important commercial attraction for the private sector in the concession to manage the stadium, a central element in the state government's strategy to maintain the facility.

The New *Maracanã*, as it has been called, was completely refurbished, and its capacity was reduced to 79,000 people. Among the main changes are the implementation of a fibre-glass-tensioned membrane roof, the total reconstruction of the stadium seating, an increase in the size of the area of private boxes and VIP sectors, and the division of the spectators into a larger number of sectors. Locker rooms, press rooms, restrooms, fast food restaurants and other services have also been remodelled. The field has been lowered and a new drainage system with much greater capacity has been installed. The result of all these changes was a huge increase in ticket prices and a radical change in the profile of the *Maracanã* spectators.



Fig. 7.1 The *Maracanã* stadium and its surroundings

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7.3.3 *The Stadium Surroundings*

The region where the *Maracanã* Stadium is located is well served by public mass transportation, with train and metro stations nearby, and is less than 15 minutes away from the city centre. Besides the railway, which separates middle-class neighbourhoods from the *Mangureira* favela (see Fig. 7.1), there is one of the most important road axes in the city, made up of broad avenues that connect the northern zone and the city centre.

In the immediate surroundings of the stadium, there is also the campus of the Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ); the Metrô-Mangureira favela, partially removed; and, on the other side of the railroad, the Mangureira favela; the ‘*Minha Casa, Minha Vida*’⁶ housing developments; and the *Quinta da Boa Vista* park.

7.4 SOCIAL AND URBAN ‘IMPACTS’ UNDER *MARACANA* REMODELLING

The discussion on the ‘legacy’ of the World Cup, and also of the Olympics, is the term which official discourses of Brazilian federal, state and city governments have referred to the alleged economic effects of mega-events and their material and immaterial results.

The notion of ‘legacy’ is usually associated with positive effects allegedly generated by large projects that are part of the mega-events portfolio. Its discursive efficacy is evaluated in terms of consensus promotion around the event, the legitimisation of certain public investments and priorities, and conflict and social tension prevention and/or elimination (Novais and Soares 2011).

This critical perspective not only sheds light on the ‘virtuous’ possibilities of the projects, but also strives to understand how far these project interfaces may reach different elements of the social reality. It is this methodological direction that will inform our analysis and allow us to identify general or specific relations between mega-events and the processes of social reproduction and the appropriation of urban spaces. These relations are often seen as ‘impacts’ and can be read from different perspectives, according to the aspect one wishes to highlight (Vainer et al. 2012.) As we will see in the following topics, social and urban ‘impacts’ have definitely been imposed as a result of the *Maracanã* renovation, while isolated or specific benefits belittle the alleged ‘legacy’ of the 2014 FIFA World Cup.

7.4.1 *Governmental Decisions and Resistance*

Public decisions involving public resources, spaces and equipment related to the 2014 FIFA World Cup were made and implemented without due legal process. Projects were not debated publicly, and the processes that involved decisions and public accountability were not transparent. Public documents were allegedly not made available to the public, not even when formally requested.

Groups of people affected by the construction projects were only heard after many steps were taken, such as lawsuits, pressure on the legislative power, public demonstrations and denunciations that, most of the time, were only broadcast by the international media, since the local media was rarely open to communicating these types of news.

Before the June 2013 demonstrations, the state government was inflexible about the renovation of the *Maracanã* complex. Many demonstrations were organised against the private concession of the stadium, the forced eviction of people who lived in *Aldeia Maracanã*, the removal of the *Metró-Mangureira* favela, the demolition of sporting facilities and the threats of removing the *Friedenreich* Municipal School. A large number of these demonstrations were organised by the ‘Popular Committee for the World Cup and the Rio de Janeiro Olympics’.⁷ On the other hand, athletes also spoke up against the incoherence of destroying sports facilities as part of the preparations for the mega-events. However, nothing affected decisions already made or the popularity of the governor Sérgio Cabral, who was supported by the Federal Government. Demonstrations were violently repressed, especially in the case of *Aldeia Maracanã*, but the government remained unmoved.

After the June 2013 demonstrations and their extremely violent repression by the police, one thing fuelling the other, the governor became one of the main focuses for demands and ‘Fora Cabral’ (‘Cabral out’) became one of the most popular slogans on the streets. His popularity plummeted, rumours about his resignation spread and old cases of private appropriation of public resources (particularly the use of state-owned helicopters for family trips) reappeared in the papers.

And what seemed impossible happened: cornered, the governor made a statement saying that he would no longer demolish the sports facilities. The political struggle changed the course of things and reversed the decision to demolish the *Célio de Barros* Stadium (partially carried out, since the training field was destroyed and turned into a parking lot) and

the *Julio Delamare* Aquatics Centre. Shortly afterwards, the decision to demolish the *Friedenreich* Municipal School was also revoked.

These accomplishments, however, cannot be seen as final. Promises and commitments made by the State Government on the reconstruction of the Athletics Stadium were not formalised, and there is no set date for its commencement. The *Julio Delamare* facility was not demolished, but it was closed, and employees were made redundant a few weeks before the World Cup. Nonetheless, there have been irreparable losses, such as the end of the popular sectors in the *Maracanã* Stadium, the violent removal of some of the families in the *Metrô Mangueira* community, and the expulsion of indigenous people and others who lived in the old Indian Museum.

7.4.2 *Institutional Exceptions and Innovations*

After the announcement that Brazil would host the 2014 FIFA World Cup, the Brazilian government made evident its decision to create special conditions for contracts and public bids for mega-events (Vainer and Oliveira 2014), as shown by the laws aimed at making the debt limits of cities more flexible, changing tax dispositions or instituting a Special Regime for Public Procurement in cases related to the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. The General Law for the World Cup (Federal Law 12.633/2012) establishes a set of exceptions to the existing legal order, ranging from the exploitation of commercial rights and the concession of visas to ticket sales (Vainer and Oliveira 2014).⁸

At the state level, measures for the administrative concession of the management, operation and maintenance of the *Maracanã* sports complex and the implementation of the Pacifying Police Unit (UPP)⁹ in the *Mangueira* complex stand out, significantly affecting the social appropriation of the sports facilities and the urban space, the removal of people in the surrounding areas, the increase in land values and the gentrification process.

At the city level, it can be highlighted that the Master Plan for Sustainable Urban Development, approved in 2011, defined that the areas under the influence of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the Rio 2016 Olympic Games facilities were included as ‘areas subject to intervention’. This guideline qualifies them as priority areas for plans, projects, construction projects or the implementation of specific, or exceptional, urban planning regimes.

7.4.3 *Disputes over the Meaning and the Social Appropriation of the 'New Maracanã'*

The history of the *Maracanã* highlights its importance as a symbol of the city of Rio de Janeiro, recognised by the sports world, politics and culture, making it, since the 1950s, an icon of Brazilian nationality and football and worldwide popular culture.

Due to the symbolic strength that transformed it into a material and immaterial heritage, throughout *Maracanã's* history both its architecture and its urban insertion as part of a sports facility complex have been closely intertwined with public and popular sports as well as with social representations and practices. The *Maracanã* and its social appropriation have been marked by disputes since its beginning, when the questions of whether it was really necessary and the choice of its location were under discussion.

Another important discussion related to whether or not the *Maracanã* should be listed as a heritage site and, if so, what should be preserved and what should be done in order to modernise it. At the beginning of 2016, questions and conflicts concerning the *Maracanã* related to the large investment of public resources and the concession model used for its renovation and modernisation for the 2014 World Cup. These disputes referred to the possibility of appropriation by different social groups who defend their own interests and devise their own arguments on the gains and losses, 'legacies' and 'ruptures' stemming from the social and spatial reconfiguration.

While the legitimising discourse of the 'New *Maracanã*' project was linked to the need to fulfil FIFA requirements, civil society, whether organised or not, has denounced the de-characterisation of the building and the ways in which these changes have directly affected the relationship between the space and its most traditional users.

The decrease in the stadium's capacity, the extinction of the so-called 'geral', the increase in ticket prices as well as the introduction of VIP sectors, and the imposition of a 'football fan behaviour manual' are some of the measures aimed at re-signifying the *Maracanã*. But these conditioning factors have been challenged by groups and social movements who have fought to continue its long-standing popular and democratic character.

Interventions made in the stadium as well as the logistics and the spatial disposition of military apparatuses in its surroundings during the 2014 World Cup restated the selective and excluding character of the space requalification process by means of legitimisation actions and orders.

Nevertheless, disputes over the usufruct of the *Maracanã* Stadium still remain on the agenda of social movements in the post-2014 FIFA World Cup and post-2016 Olympics context.

7.4.4 *The De-characterisation of the Stadium and the Disputes over the Creation of a National Heritage Site*

The process of turning the *Maracanã* into a national heritage site began in 1983. Yet, only in 1997, when interventions were being discussed to meet the FIFA demands for the 2000 World Club Cup, did concerns arise about the de-characterisation of the *Maracanã* complex. It was then suggested that not only the stadium but also the whole complex should be defined and protected as a national heritage site. Three years later, in 2000, after a favourable report by the IPHAN Advisory Board, its final status as a national heritage site was ratified by the Ministry of Culture.

The history of interventions, however, was not to be interrupted so easily. During the preparations for the 2007 Pan American Games, many changes were made to meet the demands of the organising bodies, including the suppression of the ‘geral’, which set an important precedent for larger interventions in the stadium’s architecture.

During the renovation for the 2014 World Cup, the meaning of the national heritage site status became one of the most controversial points.

As the renovation started in 2010, it was claimed that there were problems in the concrete structure of the roof that covered the bleachers. The solution presented was its substitution by a tensioned membrane structure. At that time, the IPHAN Regional Office in Rio de Janeiro issued an opinion stating that it did not oppose the changes to the roof based on the argument that the national heritage status of the stadium was only related to its immaterial cultural character, since it had been registered in the ‘Archaeological, Ethnographic and Landscape’ book and not in the ‘Fine Arts’ book, where recognised important architectural examples should be placed.

Later, in August 2011, when the renovation project was presented to the IPHAN Advisory Board, many members of the board criticised the interventions, which would lead to the complete de-characterisation of the stadium, and the arguments used to defend them, stating its disappointment with the disrespect shown towards the status of the *Maracanã* as a national heritage monument. Nevertheless, as it was not the Board’s prerogative to decide on behalf of the institution, the meeting ended up only with a reproach from the IPHAN Regional Office.

In 2011, a civil lawsuit was filed by the Federal Prosecution Office against the IPHAN and *Empresa de Obras Públicas* (EMOP), the public company responsible for the work on the complex. The charge was the demolition of the roof that had de-characterised the *Maracanã* and had also violated its heritage status *canã*. However, this was not accepted by the 6th Federal Court, which challenged, among other reasons, the technical opinions that had criticised the stadium's roof. The Prosecution Office appealed and the lawsuit had not been closed by the publication of this book.

7.4.5 *Processes of Land Transformation and Valuation*

The trends and possibilities of land transformation in the *Maracanã* area should be considered in the general context of Rio's real estate dynamics, which, along with global and domestic factors (the 2008 real estate crisis, the growth of housing credit, etc.), is also influenced by investments linked to the implementation of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. The renovation of the *Maracanã* complex and the supplementary actions that were carried out in the surroundings have somehow influenced the distribution of private investment, fuelled transformations and changed expectations and demands from the local population. In different ways, they may also have affected social representations attributed to the *Maracanã* and its neighbourhood. Except for the evictions, removal and relocation actions executed in the area close to the stadium, it is still not possible to state that the renovation of the complex is mainly responsible for the ongoing transformations, especially when it comes to the formal real estate dynamics south of the railway.

North of the railway, however, the renovation of the *Maracanã* may have been critical for the transformation of the use of space, particularly if we consider the influence of the World Cup in the supplementary measures implemented or planned in the region. The implementation of a UPP in the *Mangueira* complex, the expectations of sanitation improvements in the favela, the improvement in accessibility resulting from the building of the new footbridge over the railroad, and the new *Mangueira* I and II housing projects are directly related to the ongoing processes of land valuation.

Nonetheless, these transformations are found not only in the vicinity of the stadium, but are also shared by a significant number of other favelas in the city that received UPPs and significant resources from the Federal Government for different reasons, such as media visibility, their location in areas of interest for real estate capital or their proximity to areas where

sporting facilities or structures related to mega-events would be implemented. There is significant evidence that the mega-events in Rio de Janeiro have influenced the distribution of federal resources to the city and have redirected state government actions, especially those linked to public security and urban mobility policies.

In short, except for the cases already mentioned, in the intense dynamism of the region's real estate market, it is not possible to distinguish what can be specifically attributed to the renovation of the *Maracanã* complex. Nevertheless, interventions near the complex allow us to speculate on the influence of the renovation on land valuation and the social appropriation of space.

7.4.6 *Socio-environmental Impacts*

The renovation of the *Maracanã* has brought about a series of changes that have affected the surrounding population and the users of the sporting facilities in different ways.

Social access and public control over the existing facilities of the *Maracanã* complex deteriorated after the renovation. Activities in the *Célio de Barros* Stadium and in the *Julio Delamare* Aquatics Centre were terminated, and their relocation to other areas took place in a precarious way, with irreparable damage to athletes and users who had benefited from the facilities.

As this study has shown, social mobilisation, also including employees and users of the existing facilities, managed to change the decision to demolish the sports facilities and the *Friedenreich* Municipal School, but the extent or duration of this accomplishment is not yet fully known. Employees, parents and students from the *Friedenreich* Municipal School are still vigilant in relation to new renovations relating to the 2016 Olympic Games. Also, athletes, users and various supporters who were mobilised against the demolition of sporting facilities still do not have, by the publication of this book, information about the renovation projects that will be executed and are apprehensive as to the possibility of activities being resumed.

Pressures to vacate the *Metrô-Mangueira* favela and the old Indian Museum involved actions that violated human rights and disrespected international conventions on removal and relocation processes (ANCOP 2012). The violent removal processes had long-lasting negative impacts on part of the population of the favela (those who immediately accepted removal are currently living tens of kilometres away) and on the people

who lived in the Museum. The *Metrô-Mangueira* families who had resisted relocation to peripheral areas benefited from the change in the city government's strategy that offered well-situated housing close to the *Mangueira* complex. However, social mobilisation around the *Aldeia Maracanã* occupation in the Museum was not enough to guarantee its remaining, despite its success in preventing the demolition of the building, which, according to the state government officials, will be restored.

There are certainly many issues to be addressed when it comes to the removal of the *Metrô-Mangueira* favela. Poor access to housing in the city led homeless families to settle in some of the empty houses, which brought about new conflicts that evolved into violent confrontations with the police. By the end of 2014, despite commitments made to relocate these families, the situation in *Metrô-Mangueira* was extremely insecure and precarious, resulting in people living in the middle of trash and debris from demolished buildings.

The main change for the population of the *Mangueira* complex was the implementation of the UPP, which managed to improve security conditions in the area, but which has been broadly criticised by local leaderships. The UPP operations, classified by those interviewed as truculent, disrespectful or abusive, were followed by the regulation and formalisation of existing services and by increases in prices, especially electricity. According to the population interviewed during the study in *Mangueira* and the nearby housing developments, the main 'legacy' is the construction of the footbridge connecting the north of the railway to the *Maracanã* subway and train stations.

7.4.7 *Public Spending, Private Management and Economic Effects*

The final price of the renovation of the *Maracanã* Stadium was R\$1.05 billion (US\$392.2 million) (Brazil, Controladoria Geral da União 2014). However, if we add all the spending on renovation projects executed since 1999, the costs would double or be even higher.

Maracanã S.A. consortium won the public bid offered by the state government to manage the complex for 35 years. The concessionaire was made up of the following companies: Odebrecht Properties, IMX Venues and Arenas, a joint venture between the EBX and IMG Worldwide Groups, and the American company AEG, which operates more than 100 arenas in 14 countries.¹⁰

The group will pay 34 annual instalments of R\$5.5 million (US\$2.1 million), restated by the Extended Consumer Price Index (IPCA), and

has committed itself to invest R\$594.2 million (US\$221.9 million) in improvements in the surrounding environment, which initially included demolishing the Athletics Stadium, the Aquatics Centre and the Indian Museum (Concessionária Maracanã 2014). Later these definitions were changed by means of a first amendment to the contract, which excludes the demolition of buildings and requires the concessionaire to renovate these sporting facilities.

The Federal Government, or more specifically sectors of the Ministry of Sports, evaluates that the 2014 World Cup was a good deal, as seen in the following excerpt from a recently published news item (Costas 2014):

‘The World Cup is a historical opportunity to promote social and economic development both locally and nationally’, said, for example, the Ministry of Sports adviser for Large-Scale Events, Joel Benin, at the beginning of the year. ‘It will create 3.6 million jobs, move billions and leave an important legacy in the economic area.’¹¹

However, in the same item the author states that ‘economic consulting agencies, such as Tendências and Capital Economics, made their calculations and concluded that the general effect on the GDP was null or insignificant. But few expected a negative impact’.

On the other hand, the alleged positive impact of the World Cup on the Brazilian economy was criticised by the Minister of Finance Guido Mantega during an interview on the effects of the 2014 event on Brazilian GDP (Costas 2014):

‘[The World Cup] was a success when it comes to organisation. From the production and trade perspective, it brought damage’, said Mantega during an interview to the *Folha de S. Paulo* newspaper and to the *UOL* news website little more than a week ago. ‘[During the event] we had fewer working days. Industrial production fell and trade grew little. In fact, it was not a good result.’

7.5 CLOSING REMARKS

The transformation process of the *Maracanã* and its surroundings is still ongoing and has not finished with the end of the 2014 FIFA World Cup. The 2016 Olympics bring new prospects as well as uncertainties about the final project for the *Maracanã* complex. The implementation of a

shopping centre close to the complex, for example, a possibility considered by the state government, may create new challenges to the area. This new building, in addition to the projects around the stadium, the great potential for the renovation of the built areas in the vicinity, and the design of new planning guidelines and urban laws, could certainly transform the region even further. Therefore, discontinuities that are important in the process of production, management and social appropriation of space and are directly related to local interventions may be observed.

At the beginning of 2016, concessionaires announced their intention to return the stadium to the State Government, and alumni and athletes have demanded the reopening of *Julio de Lamare* and *Maracanãzinho* (Castro 2016). The imprisonment of the President of Odebrecht resulting from an investigation conducted by the Federal Police may also have contributed to the end of the partnership. Odebrecht's partner in the construction of the stadium, the entrepreneur representative of the Andrade Gutierrez firm, was also arrested as part of the same operation.¹²

According to press reports, the works would become a Rio 2016 Committee liability, with funds raised by the tax incentive law (Castro 2016). However, the measures for the management of these public facilities as well as the instruments to ensure social control over them remain open. It is hoped that this process will be followed and transformed by the resistance of social movements which managed to change public decisions after the June 2013 demonstrations. With the 2016 Olympics, Rio will once again attract the attention of the international media, and the results of this exposure, as the experience during the Confederations Cup showed, will be unpredictable.

NOTES

1. IPHAN stands for *Instituto do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional*.
2. These percentages refer to the minimum wage ruling in 2010 and to the period of Demographic Census data collection in August 2010.
3. In December 2014, US\$1.00 = R\$2.677 according to the Brazilian Central Bank. More details can be found at <http://www.copa2014.gov.br> (accessed 15 August 2016).
4. A large-scale urban renovation of the Rio de Janeiro docklands launched by the City Hall in 2009.
5. These numbers would be frequently surpassed and, on many occasions, the stadium accommodated more than 190,000 supporters.

6. The ‘Minha Casa Minha Vida’, which means ‘My House, My Life’, is a federal programme that includes the financing of new housing units for low- and middle-income populations.
7. The Committee is a space of political articulation, made up of urban social movements, non-governmental organisations, labour unions, legislative seats, research entities and community organisations, besides individuals with no institutional links.
8. Law 12.348/2010, Law 12.350/2010 and Law 12.462/2011.
9. UPP (*Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora*) is a state government security programme that includes the installation of military police units in slums and ostensive policing actions.
10. Information from the official Maracanã website: <http://www.maracana.com/site> (accessed 15 August 2016).
11. Available at: <http://economia.uol.com.br/noticias/bbc/2014/08/29/afinal-foi-a-copa-que-derrubou-a-economia.htm> (accessed 15 August 2016).
12. The President of Odebrecht was arrested in July 2015 as part of the ‘Lava Jato’ Operation, which investigated a corruption scheme involving Petrobras (one of the biggest Brazilian companies), politicians from different parties and large engineering and construction companies. Petrobras is a publicly traded corporation whose majority stockholder is the Federal Government. The cases of Odebrecht and Andrade Gutierrez were still under examination in January 2016.

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