Jorge Vala · Sven Waldzus
Maria Manuela Calheiros   *Editors*

The Social Developmental Construction of Violence and Intergroup Conflict

Springer

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To Maria Benedicta Monteiro

dedicated social psychologist, admired mentor, indispensable colleague and dear friend

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Introduction and Overview

At the moment we write this introduction, Europe faces a dramatic situation: Hundreds of thousands of war refugees are knocking on Europe's doors asking for shelter. These people think that here is a place of freedom, peace and laws that guarantee their human dignity, without exception. Europe for itself is alert, seems undecided, if not divided. Heads of state haggle over refugee quotas with their EU colleagues, while some communities and cities try their best to solve the logistic challenges popping up everywhere, many signaling upwards that they are on their limits. Whereas citizens in all affected countries spontaneously provide food and support as volunteers, borders are closed in panic in some countries; quite unsuspicious middle-class people join crowds manifesting their unwillingness to accept more refugees and enemies of the open society seem to feel that their hour has come. Politics is shaking, the right for asylum, fundamental part of European legislation and even part of some countries' constitution, seems out of a sudden negotiable, turning into a mercy that can be granted or not, a political option that can be chosen depending on whether peoples decide to define themselves as a national group that is generous or tough.

Is it possible that such situations occur without provoking an even stronger, overwhelming mobilization of humans for the defense of other humans? It is. Mental walls divide us and the people (*demos*) that used to be one whole and exclude now as *ethnos* those others whose essence places them outside the scope of where the principles of justice apply.

Which mental processes feed these situations? This book opens ways of understanding such phenomena and proposes ways of action. These ways open up in such a fertile research area as social psychology is indeed. They part from the supposition that there is no discrimination, benign or blatant, no collective crime and no institutionalized violence that does not involve social relations between groups.

However, this book raises some questions that go beyond the more traditional research on the social psychology of intergroup relations. First, while dedicating an

important part of investigation to the description and explanation of intergroup discrimination, social psychology has often overlooked that discrimination is not a question of mere ingroup favoritism but a phenomenon that manifests itself in social inequality, violence and aggression, often hidden, legislated or legitimized.

We would say that the very term discrimination, filling social psychology books on intergroup relations, reveals some hesitation in the naming of what often is not just a question of quantity (some more for my group than for yours), but a question of inequality that involves violence and aggression. This book calls for attention to the violent dimension of intergroup relations such as, for example, the one that expresses itself in racist discrimination. The conceptual and empirical advances described in this book search to show how this violent dimension of intergroup relations can be better understood through the articulation between psychological and social factors.

Second, this book conveys another message: The proposal that the socio-developmental dimension of psychosocial processes is fundamental for the understanding of interpersonal and intergroup relations and that the study of this dimension should be stimulated. In fact, social psychology lives predominantly in a paradigm that is principally synchronic, forgetting diachronies on various scales, among them of psychogenetic and sociogenic order. What various studies including the ones in this book propose is that intergroup relations should also be studied from a socio-developmental perspective emphasizing learning processes in their cognitive and emotional dimensions.

These two types of contributions offered by the authors of this book to the study of intergroup relations—attention to the violent dimension of this kind of social relations and the necessity of a socio-developmental approach—are largely inspired by the works of Maria Benedicta Monteiro to whom this book is dedicated.

The oeuvre of Maria has always been inspired by the insight that social inequalities and discrimination can be easily overcome if we understand better the articulation between the underlying psychological and social factors and take account of the social developmental approach. In this vein, Maria was especially concerned with the articulation between social status, social norms, socio-cognitive and socialization processes in order to understand discrimination, social inequality, and intergroup conflict and violence.

The first wave of studies that Maria developed was about the learning of violence by children. It was in that context that she studied the consequences of filmed violence—spread through television—on children's aggressive responses and on the construction of a paranoid representation of the world (cf. Chap. 8 of this book).

Inspired by Jacques-Philippe Leyens, the studies that she conducted in this field constituted her Ph.D. thesis. Those studies showed not only how these violent images from TV have an impact on the learning, expression and legitimation of aggressive responses but also how these same images contribute to the construction of a fearful world and of a conformist vision of that same world. In this latter case, her experimental studies with children remain unique in the literature about the paranoid construction of the world, a research line started by George Gerbner.

After Ph.D., Maria dedicated herself to the study of intergroup conflict. This was the next logical step, a logical enlargement of her initial studies about violence. Using Tajfel's Social Identity Theory as a reference, three aspects characterized this research line of Maria: (a) the concern with relevant social contexts (cf. Chap. 4 of this book), (b) the asymmetries between groups and the consequences of such asymmetries in the reactions to conflict and (c) a question that remains obscure: the role of the history of conflicts in the way groups cope with aversive relations. Can there be a present without a past, without a historical memory? The problem remains unanswered in a social psychology that lacks a diachronic perspective.

At the same time she studied the conflictual relations between groups in diversified organizational contexts, Maria initiated a research line on the collective beliefs about educational practices (cf. Chap. 7 of this book). This concern with the "children" as a theoretical object became one of the strongest axis of her work that, beginning during the nineties, focused on the comprehension of the learning and development of prejudice and the possibility of reducing it among children (cf. Chaps. 2 and 9 of this book).

These two lines of research—construction and reduction of prejudice—were developed in parallel. In the case of the studies about prejudice reduction, Maria's research explored, in a systematic way, hypotheses derived from the models of decategorization, mutual differentiation, common ingroup identity and dual identity (cf. Chap. 5 of this book). Underlying these models are the contact hypothesis, realistic conflict theory and social identity theory. The theoretical core, common to all these models and theories, is the process of categorization. Based on Gordon Allport, Maria combined this theoretical core with the positional level of analysis, proposing social status and status inequality as the analytic and meta-analytic factor that is fundamental in the understanding of social behavior and specifically intergroup conflicts (cf. Chaps. 1 and 3 of this book).

As mentioned, a second important contribution of Maria's research lines was her studies about the learning of prejudice and discrimination. Maria and her team studied, in an original way, the articulation between cognitive processes and normative constraints in relation to the learning of prejudice. They have concluded that the children's age is important, not because prejudice decreases with age due to cognitive factors, but because when children get older, they are better in managing their expressions of prejudice according to permissive signs that may or may not be present in specific contexts. That is, older children are more capable of managing the use of anti-prejudice norms according to the context and the need for a positive self-presentation (cf. Chaps. 6 and 10 of this book).

We can now wonder about what unifies such a diversified work. We suggest two meta-concerns. The first is about the need to build a social psychology of development (or a developmental social psychology) or a psycho-sociological systematic approach to the process of psychological development. This concern marked the research of Maria on the learning of violence and prejudice and on prejudice reduction.

The second unifying concern or foundational stone in Maria's research is the idea that status inequality is a key variable to the understanding of

psycho-sociological processes. This key variable has helped understand the origins and consequences of conflicts ever since the studies that she developed about intergroup relations and intergroup conflict in organizational contexts. This concern was also present in the studies of Maria about the conflicts associated with ethnic categorizations. In their researches the fact that low-status groups discriminate less than high-status groups is a pervasive result. Also, in Maria's studies about the learning and reduction of prejudice, a very early internalization of a dominated position emerged. Of course, in many circumstances, minorities internalize the ideologies of domination, and the costs of revolting for social change are much higher for them than for those who are simply committed to maintaining the status quo. But the history of the world is also the history of minorities' revolts and victories.

Inspired by these key contributions of Maria's work, each of the chapters of this book addresses one or even both of these meta-concerns from a particular angle. The book is organized in three parts. The chapters in the first part entitled *Power, Self and Intergroup Relations* introduce some of the most fundamental concepts, ideas and findings on the consequences of and responses to people's position in asymmetric social relations and reflect on how they are intertwined with people's self-expression and self-development from early on. In Chap. 1 Ana Guinote and Alice Cai present a comprehensive, scholarly review on the effects of power on powerholders. Power is with no doubts a key concept if one wants to understand asymmetric social relations. The chapter does not only bring together the most important approaches to the understanding of what it means to be in a powerful position, but also proposes a very clear conclusion namely that power amplifies the active self of the powerholder, a self that is understood as situated and linked to the social context. Implications of this conclusion resonate perfectly with the skeptical yet optimistic spirit of Maria's work and of this book: Yes, power may magnify problematic self-aspects such as tendencies to preserve one's power and to pay less attention to other's needs compared to one's own—tendencies that contribute to the maintenance and aggravation of social inequality beyond of what is acceptable. Yet what is magnified by power depends on what dominates in the person and in the contextualized situation, including the possible inclusion of others in the self and the possible endorsement of ideologies promoting equality. Chapter 2 by Dalila França then introduces the socio-developmental perspective in a didactic overview on the socio-cognitive self-development of children. It equips the reader with fundamental background knowledge that is useful for the understanding of later chapters reporting research results with children of different age. What this overview makes clear, among others, is how closely children's self is intertwined from the beginning with the social world they live in, how fundamental the role of social categorization is for children's understanding of the social world and themselves as part of it, how the notion of their position in social structure becomes more and more sophisticated over the course of their self-development, and how much children advance with age in the flexible mastering of complex, often contradicting social affordances within interpersonal, intergroup and institutional contexts. Chapter 3 by Joana Alexandre, Miriam Rosa and Sven Waldzus addresses how

asymmetric status positions work out in intergroup relations. In particular, the chapter focuses on one of the possible ways in which disadvantaged groups can deal with their situation: Social creativity. This chapter introduces social identity theory, which is fundamental for the understanding of asymmetric intergroup relations and has played a key role in Maria Benedicta Monteiro's thinking and work. Much in line with Tajfel's thinking, in a study on children from different ethnic backgrounds the authors present evidence how under circumstances social creativity can contribute to the upholding of the status quo. However, the authors also present empirical results from several studies in which they demonstrate how minorities are able to hold views on social reality, particularly on more inclusive superordinate categories, that are specifically, and very systematically distinct from the views held by their dominant majority outgroups. With that they provide evidence for the so far neglected emancipative potential of social creativity in studies with members of ethnic minorities in Portugal, members of a strong belief minority (Evangelic Protestants in Portugal) and one study with people from Porto—the allegedly minor rival of Lisbon. They claim that—compared to the alternative strategy of open social competition with the powerful outgroup—social creativity has been underestimated as a strategy of social change.

The second part entitled *Social Construction of Identities and Social Categories* contains three relatively specialized chapters that focus on the advancement of existing knowledge by proposing new (or renewed) theoretical positions. All three chapters have in common that they highlight the socially constructed nature of social identities and meaningful social categories, and that how these identities and categories are constructed has an impact on the relations between members of these categories. They also have in common the underlying motive to elaborate on ways of prejudice reduction and their obstacles. In Chap. 4, Jacques-Philippe Leyens and Jorge Vala guide our attention to the importance of the ideological dimension of intergroup relations. This dimension had been emphasized already by Tajfel in his latest writings but has then been largely neglected in intergroup research. This chapter covers research on explicit ideologies such as colorblindness and multiculturalism as well as equalitarianism and meritocracy, but also on rather ideology constituting fundamental beliefs such as belief in a just world, limited scope of justice and denial of full humanity to outgroup members. The research the authors report demonstrates how ideologies and shared fundamental beliefs have a pervasive influence on people's construction of reality and can bias their judgment and their moral feelings, often undetected by their consciousness. Importantly, these processes are fundamental for the legitimization of asymmetric status and power relations between members of different social groups. Chapter 5 by Sam Gaertner, Rita Guerra, Margarida Rebelo, John Dovidio, Erick Hehman and Mathew Deegan proposes a new, functional approach to the understanding of how effectively prejudice can be reduced in members of majorities and minorities by either recategorizing completely as members of a more inclusive common ingroup or by creating a dual identity, that is simultaneous salience of common ingroup identity and subgroup identity. The efficacy of these two forms of recategorization for prejudice reduction had been found to differ depending on

whether group members are in a minority or in a majority group. Contradicting results on this efficacy in the US and in Portugal required and inspired the development of the functional approach that is presented in this chapter. It emphasizes the importance of taking into account the larger social context when considering the groups' interests as causing and motivating group members' attitudes as these interests are not generic for majorities or minorities as such. In Chap. 6, Annelyse Pereira reflects on the role of social norms on the one hand and social beliefs on the other hand in regulating expressions of prejudice. After introducing these concepts in brief but informative reviews, the author uses the example of attitudes towards homosexuals as a vehicle to elaborate the complex interaction between these two fundamental factors. In times of social change, social norms on how to think about particular intergroup relations might change faster than beliefs about the nature of social groups or vice versa, which can produce contradictory or paradoxical effects on people's expressions and enactment of prejudice. This is another example of a recurrent theme in the work of Maria Benedicta Monteiro and those that were trained or inspired by her: The individual's adaptive maneuvering within complex psychosocial constellations explains their more or less prejudiced responses better than single (e.g., cognitive) factor or single (positive distinctiveness) motive approaches.

The last part *Social Developmental Processes of Violence* elaborates the conditions and genesis of violence in developmental processes more directly, but each chapter focusing on a very distinct aspect. In Chap. 7 by Maria Manuela Calheiros and Leonor Rodrigues the violence lies in the maltreatment of children, and the chapter is focused on one key factor of this phenomenon: Caregivers' cognition in parent–child interactions. After reviewing literature on different sources of variability in these cognitions that have been proposed as well as on the importance of caregiver cognition for the explanation of maltreatment, the chapter presents original research with a sample of abusive mothers. This study tests how much previous experiences with the child in focus and other children, as well as current perceptions of the child may influence abusive mothers' values, beliefs and situational attributions. With some exceptions, results seem to indicate that previous experience is much less important than current perceptions of the child, and if there is any impact of previous experience it is there rather because it shapes current perception as well. In their own way these results underline the value that a social psychological approach has for the understanding of child maltreatment. Chapter 8 by Patricia Arriaga, Dolf Zillmann and Francisco Esteves is a comprehensive state of the art review on the effects that exposure to or enactment of violence in mainstream media has on aggressive behavior, emotions and empathy. In line with contemporary technological developments the authors also cover the more and more widespread consumption of violent video games, which put the player in a more active role than traditional media (such as television) put their viewers. As the field is extremely controversial, the authors are very careful and rigorous in their analysis of the actually existing evidence as well as in their conclusions and recommendations for future research. Despite all controversy, and after reviewing existing literature as well as a large number of own empirical work the authors

come to the conclusion that there is an impressive amount of evidence for increased aggressive motivation and impulsivity as a result of exposure to media violence, but that it is not clear yet how much it affects people's real-life behavior. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is no evidence for cathartic effects, a topic also explored by Maria Benedicta Monteiro in her research on the effects of filmed violence and an idea that had been present in the controversy for decades but can now be abandoned. In Chap. 9 João António, Rita Correia, Allard Feddes and Rita Morais give a comprehensive and broad overview on how intergroup relations develop in childhood. There review touches several important aspects such as acculturation goals of minorities and their meta-perceptions of the majorities' acculturation preferences, the importance of social comparisons as well as the way how the broader social context, particularly more inclusive superordinate categories, is related to status asymmetries between children from different ethnic background. Again, like in previous chapters, the importance to take into account social context factors in the understanding of intergroup relations is one of the most important take-home messages from this chapter. For instance, effects of as well as preferences for acculturation strategies such as assimilation or integration depend on minorities' perceptions of what the majority expects them to be or do. And again, like in Chap. 5, it was the challenge to deal with results of research conducted in Portugal that contradicted previous findings in Anglo-Saxon countries that inspired and required the advancement in theorizing towards more contextual models. Finally, Chap. 10 by Ricardo Rodrigues, Adam Rutland and Elizabeth Collins presents a new complete theoretical model of children's intergroup attitudes. It builds on three previous models that had been proposed to explain the dynamic variation of prejudiced responses during child development and empirically backed up in the literature, but it has the intention to combine the major ideas of all three of these previous approaches in one comprehensive and integrative model. In the center of this theoretical models are two strong social norms, the ingroup loyalty norm and the norm not to be prejudiced (outgroup fairness norm), but the model takes a social developmental and social psychological stand simultaneously. Therefore it has two kinds of hypotheses, one regarding longer lasting changes in the availability and interiorization of these two norms and one regarding the situational and context dependent salience of these norms. With this combination the authors are able not only to explain existing results but also to generate new systematic hypotheses, still to be tested, for a variety of social contexts modeled by socio-structural variables proposed by social identity theory, such as status differences, their stability and legitimacy.

One of the major characteristics of this book is that it is rich and full of innovative ideas. Many chapters contain scholarly reviews, present new data or articulate new and innovative theoretical positions. Another characteristic is related to the first, namely the great variety and heterogeneity of the different research lines presented in the different chapters. Clearly these different research lines all go into different directions, rendering a concluding and integrating final chapter obsolete. Nevertheless, apart from all being inspired by Maria Benedicta Monteiro's research interests and works, these chapters share more common ground and more common

concerns than one might think after going into the details. The way how social reality is constructed as a hierarchical order, how social norms and beliefs on how to uphold or challenge this social order are learned, the way how shared ideas are learned and repeatedly processed in these complex constructions—all of it is necessary to be taken into account if one intends to understand how violent social relations develop, perpetuate themselves and can be changed.

As editors of this volume, we would like to thank all the colleagues that contributed with their enthusiasm and intellectual commitment to make this book in honor of Maria Benedicta Monteiro possible. Their contributions come from different universities across Europe, the United States and Brazil and are representative of an important part of the intellectual network of Maria. We also would like to thank all reviewers of the papers included in this book. Their generous help definitively contributed to improve the quality of this work. A special thank you goes to Dr. Leonor Rodrigues who helped the editors in all phases of the organization of this volume. The preparation of this book would not have been possible without her generosity, support and substantive suggestions. As editors, we are also grateful to the Centro de Investigação e Intervenção Social, funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (National Science Foundation), and the School of Social Sciences, University Institute of Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL) for the financial support that allowed the publication of this book. It is our sincere hope that this book will inspire new synergies between the study of intergroup relations, the analysis of social and interpersonal violence and a socio-developmental approach of the socio-psychological phenomena.

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Part I
Power, Self and Intergroup Relations

Chapter 1
Power and the Social Self

Ana Guinote and Alice Cai

To Maria Benedicta Monteiro,
as a dear friend, and for her pioneering contributions
to social psychology in Portugal and beyond.

Abstract This chapter presents a comprehensive, scholarly review on the effects of power on powerholders' social judgments and behavior. Power is with no doubt a key concept that characterizes asymmetric social relations. The chapter does not only bring together the most important approaches to the understanding of what it means to be in a powerful position, but also proposes a very clear conclusion namely that power amplifies the active self of the powerholder, a self that is understood as situated and linked to the social context. Implications of this conclusion resonate that power may magnify problematic self-aspects such as tendencies to preserve ones power and to pay less attention to other's needs compared to one's own—tendencies that contribute to the maintenance and aggravation of social inequality beyond of what is acceptable. Yet what is magnified by power depends on what dominates in the person and in the contextualized situation, including the possible inclusion of others in the self and the possible endorsement of ideologies promoting equality.

Keywords Power · Self · Social inequalities · Social perception · Corruption

Introduction

Social power is arguably one of the most important concepts in social sciences (Russell 1960). Whether within family members, organizations, or between nations, power differences are omnipresent and have a profound impact on how individuals think, feel, and act. The decisions of those in power determine the fate of others, from large-scaled genocides, to small-scale contributions to the outcomes of institutions and societal groups (Georgesen and Harris 2006; Weisenthal 2009).

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Society has witnessed visionary leaders gaining power, and enforcing social reforms. Power is everywhere, for good or evil, and has fascinated and captured the attention of philosophers, politicians, and social scientists over the centuries.

Social psychology has made important contributions to the understanding of how power impacts individuals and groups. Initially, the detrimental effects of power for human social behavior came to the fore when abusive behavior started to be unraveled in more controlled conditions (e.g., Kipnis 1972; Zimbardo 1971), and when dominant social actors elicited blind obedience to orders from fellow human beings (e.g., Milgram 1965). Subsequently, pioneering work in social cognition showed that power decreases social attention and increases the propensity to stereotype others (Fiske 1993). Since then, a great deal of research has been conducted on the social consequences of social power. This chapter reviews work on the effects of social power on individuals as social perceivers and actors.

The chapter will address how having power affects social perception (e.g., social attention, attitudes, and judgments the powerful have of other individuals) and how it affects the ways individuals relate to others (e.g., how power is used and the ways power biases social behavior). The general social judgemental and behavioral tendencies of powerholders will be discussed, together with an examination of the motives and socio-cognitive mechanisms that trigger the general effects of power. In addition, the chapter will demonstrate that social perceptions and behavior of powerholders are flexible and depend ultimately on the confluence and saliency of various factors that operate on a moment-to-moment basis. These factors include goals triggered by having power, dispositions, subjective experiences, temporary goals of the powerholder, and objective as well as subjective power legitimacy. Taking into account the situated nature of power related behavior will help us understand and integrate conflicting findings in the literature. It will be proposed that powerholders more readily assimilate their active self (Wheeler et al. 2007) to salient goals, needs and affordances (see Guinote and Chen, in press). This in turn has consequences for how they think and act as social beings. Before diving into the effects of power we will first define power and discuss how it is acquired.

What is Power and How is it Attained?

Power is most commonly defined as one's ability and potential to influence others in psychologically meaningful ways (e.g., thoughts, feelings and behaviors; French and Raven 1959; Vescio et al. 2005) and/or to control valuable outcomes by giving or withholding rewards and punishments (Blader and Chen 2012; Fiske 1993; Fiske and Dépret 1996; Keltner et al. 2003). These valuable resources can be physical (e.g., food), economical (e.g., salary) or social (e.g., acceptance), and its control can exist at individual (e.g., subordinate vs. managers) and at intergroup (e.g., social classes, genders, and ethnic groups) levels.

A related concept is *personal power* (Lammers et al. 2009). Whereas social power refers to the ability to influence and control others (Emerson 1962; French

and Raven 1959; Weber 1978), personal power refers to the ability to ignore influence, and thus be less dependent on, and controlled by, others (Galinsky et al. 2008; Van Dijke and Poppe 2006). Personal power emerges when people possess valued resources such as knowledge or money, or a strong individual belief in personal control (Pittman and Pittman 1980). It has been argued that people usually prefer to increase their personal power (i.e., independence from others) and have no special desire for social power (i.e., control over others; Van Dijke and Poppe 2006). Nevertheless, social and personal powers often go hand in hand, and increasing one's control over others could also lead to personal freedom from the influence of others.

One intriguing question that arises is why did hierarchical structures evolve and who is given the privilege to have authority and control over resources? According to an evolutionary perspective of power, leaders emerged to coordinate group activities, and therefore power has group-serving functions linked to the attainment of collective goals (Van Vugt et al. 2008; see also Arendt 1969). For example, leaders tend to emerge very visibly during a situational crisis (Sherif and Sherif 1953), and people who can better resolve problems and group conflicts tend to attain leadership positions and be labeled 'charismatic' (Flynn and Staw 2004). The fact that leaders emerge during these pressing situations suggests that power is afforded to those who can help the group.

It has been documented throughout history that power tends to be allocated to those who behave in socially engaging manners, and to those who are able to advance the interests of the group (Boehm 1999). In other words, individuals who can create alliances, form relationships, and resolve conflicts more easily attain high power positions. In non-human primates, power is afforded by groups, where networking and social service are key to the affordance of power (Boehm 1999). For example, in chimpanzees and bonobos, power is achieved by building strong alliances, negotiating conflicts, and allocating resources fairly between group members (De Waal 1989; Winter 1973). In humans, dispositions linked to extroversion and dominance are linked to power aquisition. Dominance and extroversion help individuals exercise influence and establish social relationships needed to rise to power. These social abilities to build bonds and create group spirit enable individuals to help the group pursue collective goals and carry out tasks efficiently. For example, it was found that more socially dynamic and outgoing individuals at summer camps (Savin-Williams 1977) and in fraternities (Keltner et al. 1998) were the ones that rose to leadership positions. A relationship between extraversion and perceived leadership position was also found in university and non-university populations alike (Judge et al. 2002; Lord et al. 1959; Mann 1959).

Although powerholders can play a critical role in fostering group wellbeing and pursuing group goals, they can have less desirable effects on others, especially once power is established and is stable. Ironically, those who are "endowed with power can use their influence in self-serving ways to dominate instead of to lead" (Kipnis 1976). These corruptive and abusive uses of power and the conspicuous link between power and aggression (Fiske 1993; Georgesen and Harris 1998; Howard et al. 1986) have drawn the attention of researchers and the general public. Many of

the impressions formed on power derive from an inspection of how individuals who have power behave in Western societies. Only recently, researchers have devoted attention to boundary conditions and nuances observed across cultures. These issues will be discussed later in this chapter.

Effects of Power, Theories, and Mechanisms

A number of perspectives have emerged over the years that explain the effects of power on judgment and behavior. A functional perspective takes into account how the cognitive system, in particular attention, is geared toward the satisfaction of the needs and adaptation of the individual. Because power changes, the relations between individuals and the social environment, power automatically changes cognition in the service of adaptive action. This perspective has been highlighted by Fiske's power as control (PAC) model (Goodwin et al. 2000; Goodwin et al. 1998) and Guinote's situated focus theory of power (SFTP). In particular, power affects individuals' goals system (Guinote 2007a) by increasing the moment-to-moment attunement to goals and needs, and the ease of satisfying these needs or attaining goals.

According to the approach-inhibition theory of power, powerholders live in reward-rich environments which orient them toward opportunities and rewards. That is, power activates the behavioral approach system (BAS; Gray 1982) that is primarily concerned with reducing the differences between one's current state and the desired end state, and simultaneously leads to disinhibition of action. Powerless people, on the other hand, live in difficult and constraining environments and are more sensitive to threats and punishments. Powerlessness thus activates the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), which is associated with attentional vigilance to threats and behavioral inhibition. More recently Guinote (in press) discussed evidence that power activates one specific type of behavior approach: that of wanting and seeking goals.

One consequence of the activation of BAS in powerholders is that they are more likely to experience positive rather than negative emotions. For example, those with dominant personalities or those who were assigned to powerful roles were found to be more sensitive to signs of positive feedback from their interaction partners (Anderson and Berdahl 2002; Berdahl and Martorana 2006). This in turn led powerholders to think they were more liked by others compared to powerless participants, who underestimated how much their partners liked them (Anderson and Berdahl 2002).

Their positivity bias can prevent powerholders from responding appropriately to other's distress. Indeed, during a face-to-face dyadic interaction with partners who disclosed experiences of suffering, those who had higher sense of power experienced less emotional reactions to another's suffering (Van Kleef et al. 2008). Powerful individuals also self-reported lower levels of distress and compassion, and weaker motivation to connect to their partners. These findings were consistent with physiological evidence showing that high power participants engaged in parasympathetic processes (i.e., respiratory sinus arrhythmia reactivity) to buffer

themselves against their partner's distress. Not surprisingly, the distressed participants who disclosed their predicament felt socially less connected with their high, as compared to equal, power counterparts.

In addition, powerful individuals were also found to be less strict than their powerless counterparts in judging the morality of their own behavior (Lammers et al. 2010). Power reduces also sensitivity to social disapproval (Emerson 1962; Thibaut and Kelley 1959) and conformity pressures (Côté et al. 2011; Galinsky et al. 2008). This could be because powerholder's positivity bias and greater control lead them to experience more entitlement (De Cremer and Van Dijk 2005; Stouten et al. 2005), pride (Schmid Mast et al. 2009), and higher self-esteem (Wojciszke and Struzynska-Kujalowicz 2007).

In spite of this evidence, the determinants of powerholders' social behaviors are nuanced and multifaceted. We argue that the understanding of powerholders' behavior requires a consideration of both the approach motivation and the functional adaptation of the individual. These effects will be considered in this chapter. The chapter will integrate disparate findings in the power literature related to the ways powerholders feel, think, and act as social beings, following a situated perspective on power proposed by the SFTP. Together the evidence will demonstrate that ultimately, power amplifies the *active self* (Wheeler et al. 2007); that is, the part of the self that is currently active. It therefore leads to two types of effects on social judgment and behavior: (1) it leads to systematic and chronic biases, guided by goals associated with power, dispositions, and chronically accessible response patterns; and (2) it can potentiate biases linked to temporarily accessible constructs and experiences, such as temporarily activated goals, concepts, feelings, and affordances (Guinote 2008; Weick and Guinote 2008). The latter effects occur due to the ways power affects cognitive processes. Thus, power facilitates responses in line with accessible constructs, and if this tendency favors the operation of enduring response tendencies of the person, it also allows the expression of temporarily accessible goals, values, and attitudes. Furthermore, when in conflict, temporary and chronically accessible biases can cancel each other out.

In the next sections, we will review the literature showing that power affects the types of goals that individuals possess (i.e., the direction of their strivings), as well as the ways they pursue goals, which in turn has consequences for social judgment and behavior.

Functional Effects of Power Position: Default Attention and Flexibility

The functional tradition (e.g., PAC, Fiske 1993; SFTP, Guinote 2007a) argues that cognition serves adaptive action, and that many of the effects of power on social attention and behavior derive from differences in the needs and challenges that arise with the experience of power (or powerlessness). The cognitive system implements

strategies of information processing that aim to enhance or maintain the adaptation of the individual.

Powerholders can more easily attain desired outcomes and experience fewer challenges (see also Lewin 1947; Vescio et al. 2003), so they deploy attention in line with their core motivations and the primary affordances of the environment. In contrast, powerless individuals are dependent on others and experience more constraints; they therefore engage in more controlled cognition and pay attention to their superiors and their environment (see Fiske and Berdahl 2007; Keltner et al. 2003). Thus, powerless individuals operate under divided attention (Guinote 2007b).

As a consequence of being self-sufficient, powerholders develop a sense of confidence in their judgments (Briñol et al. 2007; Fast et al. 2012; Lee and Tiedens 2001; Tost et al. 2012), form an independent self-construal (Lee and Tiedens 2001), and experience more social distance (Lammers et al. 2011; Smith and Trope 2006). This independence implies that they do not need to perceive others accurately nor take advice from other people (Fiske 1993; See et al. 2011; Tost et al. 2012).

Individuals who lack power were found to seek more advice, especially from experts, whereas powerholders ignore advice received both from novices as well as from experts (Tost et al. 2012). The effects of power on advice seeking derives from increased confidence. In addition, in negotiations, powerful individuals are less likely to ask diagnostic questions and more likely to ask leading questions (De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004). Since diagnostic questions allow negotiators to develop more accurate impressions of their partners than leading questions (Klayman and Ha 1987; Skov and Sherman 1986), the strategies of powerless individuals reflect greater accuracy motivation, which led to more accurate judgments, than those of powerful individuals (Biesanz et al. 2001; see also Erber and Fiske 1984).

Individuals have an innate need to control desired outcomes and be successful in their interactions with the environment (Fiske 2004; White 1959). This need is satisfied in powerholders and thwarted in powerless individuals (Fiske and Dépret 1996). Since attention is guided by primary needs and goals, it is unsurprising that social power affects attention, across species. In non-human primates low rank animals direct their attention upwards. For example, low rank rhesus macaques follow the gaze of the higher rank monkeys but not vice versa (Deaner et al. 2005). In humans, increased control and decreased reliance on others for valuable resources demotivates them from deploying attentional resources in social inter-actions with others, and prevents them from forming representation that include the unique attributes of others (De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004; Fiske 1993; Fiske and Dépret 1996). In contrast, powerless individuals are dependent on others, and so they are socially more attentive, as a way to comprehend and predict their superior's actions, and to regain control (Erber and Fiske 1984; Fiske 1993; Fiske and Dépret 1996; Neuberg and Fiske 1987). This motivation is lacking in powerholders.

The motivation to attend to the social environment that characterizes powerless individuals also occurs more generally when individuals are dependent on others, even when others do not have direct power over them. Outcome dependency

produces heightened attention to information about another person that is inconsistent with expectations. For example, when individuals work together in a group task, they are socially more attentive compared to when they work individually (Erber and Fiske 1984). In one study, Eber and Fiske found that participants formed less stereotypical impressions of a schizophrenic mental patient when they believed that their outcomes in the experiment were dependent on the target (see also Neuberg and Fiske 1987). Thus, powerlessness is a particular case of asymmetric interdependence akin to control deprivation in social contexts.

Power between groups—such as gender or ethnicity—affects social attention in similar ways as power between individuals. For example, research on face recognition showed that Black South Africans (a disempowered group) exhibited a reversed cross-race effect (CRE; Meissner and Brigham 2001), such that outgroup White faces were better recognized than ingroup Black faces (Wright et al. 2003). Similar race relations in the US can also explain the consistent finding that Whites tend to show a larger CRE than Blacks. Furthermore, when White participants viewed Black and White faces displaying either angry or neutral expressions, cross-race recognition improved when Black faces were angry (Ackerman et al. 2006). More recently, Shriver and Hugenberg (2010) showed that powerful cross-race targets were recognized more accurately, attenuating the CRE effect, regardless of the valence and stereotypicality of the targets' behaviors. Similarly, members of a minimal minority group elaborated more while reading social information about an interaction partner, and processed their attributes more extensively in a think aloud task than those who were assigned to a majority group (Guinote et al. 2006). These effects of group size on social information processing were mediated by perceived control.

Not surprisingly, members of disempowered groups tend to perceive dominant groups in more complex and varied ways than their ingroups (e.g., Guinote et al. 2002; Guinote 2001). This phenomenon is a reversal of the typical outgroup homogeneity effect, where people tend to perceive outgroups in more simplified and homogeneous ways than ingroups (e.g., Park and Judd 1990). When groups lack power, group members seem to be motivated to attend to their dominant counterparts and to be accurate in their perceptions. They therefore develop more complex perceptions of those powerful outgroups (Guinote 2001; see also Lorenzi-Cioldi 1998).

Differences in accuracy motivation can influence the ability to take the perspective of another individual and the level of empathy toward others. In a series of studies, powerless individuals were more other-focused and therefore showed more empathic accuracy than those in high-power roles who were more self-focused (Côté et al. 2011; Galinsky et al. 2006). Those primed with a sense of high power were less inclined to spontaneously adopt another participant's visual perspective, and were less likely to take into account that others do not possess the same privileged knowledge. Powerful participants were also less accurate in determining the emotions expressed by others (Galinsky et al. 2006) as they made more mistakes in an emotion recognition task compared to a control group (Galinsky et al. 2006). In addition, power also decreased metastereotyping (Lammers et al. 2008),

which refers to the ability to infer what others think about them. In this experiment, metastereotyping was measured by asking participants to indicate the likelihood that an outgroup member would see them in a stereotypical way. Participants who received low power manipulations, either through priming or role enactment, were more likely to activate metastereotypes and to think that others would see them in a stereotypical way compared to control and high power participants.

These laboratory findings also translate into real-life power differences. For example, Guinote and Phillips (2010) asked managers and employees in the hotel industry to read stereotype-consistent and inconsistent information about an ingroup (English) and an outgroup (Afro-Caribbean) job applicant. When reading at their own pace, employees spent more time reading the information than managers, showing greater social attention. More importantly, employees took longer to read stereotype inconsistent information than managers. This suggests that employees were more motivated than managers to understand the unique attributes of the job candidates compared to attributes associated with stereotypes. This was not the case for managers.

The decreased environmental and social constraints of powerholders affect not only social attention but also cognitive functions. Powerholders are able to control attention in a top-down manner, and can trust default processes (Guinote 2007a, 2010a, b). They also show greater flexibility. Therefore, powerholders use a wider range of processes to guide judgment and behavior and can rely on their internal states. These include subjective experiences and feelings that arise on a moment-to-moment basis, as well as more controlled cognition when motivated to attain goals (Briñol et al. 2007; Guinote 2010a, b; Keltner et al. 2003; Weick and Guinote 2008). To exemplify, powerholders display more genuine smiles that are determined by their levels of happiness, whereas those who lack power control their behavior more and feel obliged to smile regardless of their feelings (Hecht and LaFrance 1998). Powerholders also report their true attitudes more often than their powerless counterparts (Anderson and Berdahl 2002), and more freely retaliate in response to their partner's inappropriate displays of anger compared to powerless individuals (Van Kleef and Côté 2007). Similarly, in negotiations, powerful participants' attitudes toward their powerless opponent were more influenced by their own social value orientation (e.g., whether they are dispositionally pro-social or pro-self) than by their partner's reputation (e.g., whether the opponent was competitive or cooperative). In contrast, powerless individuals adapted to a powerholder partner by altering their own negotiation tactics and attitudes according to what they expect the other person to be like. In sum, powerholders tend to engage in more authentic behaviors that are in line with their inner feelings, which can change from one situation to another (see also Guinote et al. 2012; Guinote 2010a, b; Keltner et al. 2003; Kraus et al. 2011).

Power also affects how agreeable individual are. Powerholders are better able to disregard the feelings of their subordinates and to behave according to their personal feelings and accessible constructs. Conversely, powerless individuals tend to

engage in agreeable interactions (Copeland 1994) and to get along with the powerholders (Snyder and Kiviniemi 2001). For example, powerless negotiators notice and consider their opponent's emotions more than the powerful (De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004; Van Kleef et al. 2006). Furthermore, the partner with low power adopts emotions similar to those of higher power (Anderson et al. 2003). By mimicking their interaction partner, low power individuals can facilitate communication (Bavelas et al. 1988; Bernieri 1988; Condon and Sander 1974; LaFrance 1979, 1982). Likewise, low power speakers are more polite than those in powerful roles (Holtgraves 2010; Ng and Bradac 1993) by making less direct requests and asserting themselves less forcefully. These actions are functional as they accommodate the powerholder's comfort and decrease potential conflict, which the low-power individual cannot afford.

Flexibility: When the Powerful Pay Attention

In spite of a default lack of social attention that characterizes powerholders (see Goodwin et al. 2000), powerholders are capable of paying attention to others when doing so is important for current goals (e.g., Overbeck and Park 2001). For example, Overbeck and Park (2001) assigned participants to a powerful (teacher) or a powerless (student) role and asked them to exchange e-mails with each other. In reality, participants communicated with a simulated confederate. Low power participants were asked to make requests, while powerholders were asked to render verdict on each request. After the e-mail exchanges, all participants completed a series of attention and judgment measures designed to assess the degree to which they paid attention to each other. Powerholders remembered more information about their interaction partners and made more accurate judgments compared to participants in powerless roles. It was concluded that when power is associated with responsibility, then powerholders are capable of paying attention to their subordinates.

According to the SFTP (Guinote 2007a, 2010a, b) the links between power and social behavior are more influenced by moment-to-moment motivations and affordances than the links between powerlessness and social behavior. Compared to powerless individuals, the social attention of powerholders is more situated—and therefore more variable—and more easily influenced by temporary needs and attentional triggers that unfold on a moment-to-moment basis. By default, the attention of powerholders is guided by chronically accessible knowledge structures stored in memory (e.g., schematic information such as stereotypes) and the feelings of independence that arise from having power. As a consequence, in most situations powerholders will deploy poor social attention. That is, they will not be aware of other's perspectives, needs, and attributes, and will act in ways that are primarily driven by motivations of the self or by organizational goals rather than by social concerns.

However, attention is malleable and linked to current demands. If transient goals or inner experiences (e.g., ease of retrieval, emotional states) call for individuated attention, then powerholders are capable of paying attention to others and engage in pro-social behavior. This argument is consistent with the PAC model (see also Fiske and Berdahl 2007). Below we will discuss how the motivations and affordances encountered by powerholders shape their social attention and behavior. We argue that ultimately the social attention of powerholders will depend on their current goals and the active self.

Power, Goal Pursuit, and Social Behavior

In addition to influencing social attention and the propensity to rely on accessible information, power also affects the types of goals individuals possess. Power gives advantages to individuals by increasing the availability of resources, and is a buffer against social competition and aggression. Therefore, individuals in power positions often have a desire to maintain power (Glick and Fiske 1999; Georgesen and Harris 1998). Having power also affects the individuals' goal system by facilitating the attainment of goals, with little resistance. Therefore, powerholders can focus their undivided attention on important goals, and are usually goal focused (Guinote 2007c; Overbeck and Park 2006) and ready to act (Galinsky et al. 2003). Typically, chronic goals associated with dispositions of the person (see Chen et al. 2001; Guinote et al. 2012), goals that maintain power (Fiske 1993), goals linked to self-serving opportunities and rewards (Keltner et al. 2003), or goals associated with power roles guide the behavior of powerholders (Overbeck and Park 2006; Vescio et al. 2003; for a review see Guinote, in press).

A social consequence of powerholder's goal focus is that they are more likely than powerless individuals to objectify others. That is, powerholders tend to view others through the lens of currently held goals (i.e., seeing others as objects or tools in service of one's own goals; Gruenfeld et al. 2008). For example, in one study, powerholders were more likely to approach individuals who were instrumental for their goals and disregard other individuals (Gruenfeld et al. 2008). Specifically, male participants who were assigned to a high-power condition and primed with the concept of sex were more likely to choose a highly attractive female participant to work with (i.e., was instrumental for the sex goal) than males without power or sex primes. This occurred even though the target was only moderately competent in the complex analytical task at hand (i.e., was not instrumental for performance goals).

Power heightens the emphasis on instrumentality when approaching other people (Gruenfeld et al. 2008). In one experiment, participants were assigned either to a powerful or control condition by recalling a past event, and then primed with the goal of being sociable by means of a word-search task. Powerful perceivers reported greater attraction (e.g., liking, feeling good about, desiring to be friends with) toward those individuals who were social (i.e., instrumental) than to those who were antisocial. However, the attraction of control participants was unaffected

by the target's sociability. In a similar experiment, powerful participants reported greater approach toward, and liking of, those who were kind but incompetent than those who were unkind but competent. However, this difference disappeared when those in power had an activated performance goal. Conversely, baseline participants consistently reported greater attraction for the kind than the unkind participant regardless of their performance goals. The results suggest that those in power focus more on the target's instrumentality instead of their other positive but goal-unrelated qualities.

In addition, powerholders only increase attraction toward instrumental others when they are actively pursuing goals. When the goal is completed, attraction toward such targets also ends. Together, these studies reveal that powerholders overlook personal qualities, ideas, interests, and emotions of other individuals, unless these are useful for their own goals (Galinsky et al. 2003; Gonzaga et al. 2008). Instead, they objectify others and approach only those who are instrumental to the satisfaction of their own needs, whether it is to maintain the status quo or to satisfy current goals.

Maintaining the Status Quo

One question that arises is whether powerholders have top-down priorities; that is, whether power changes not only their attention and how they pursue goals, but also the types of attitudes and goals they pursue. Past research (e.g., Fiske 1993; Goodwin et al. 2000; Guinote and Phillips 2010) found that a typical goal often pursued by powerholders is the desire to maintain power and the status quo (Fiske 1993; Kipnis 1976; Ratcliff and Vescio 2013; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; see also Bobo and Fox 2003; Bobo 1999). The quest for power and status has been described as a fundamental human motive (Frank 1985; McClelland 1975; Winter 1973) and is particularly strong for independent individuals and individualistic cultures (Ratcliff and Vescio 2013). Once power is acquired, humans and other primates generally attempt to maintain it. This is the reason why unstable hierarchies are especially stressful for powerholders as they face the possibility of losing their power. These reactions are accompanied by an increase in the stress hormone cortisol and a decrease in testosterone (a hormone linked to dominant behavior) in powerholders (see Rivers and Josephs 2010).

One theory that has examined the desire to maintain social hierarchies is the social dominance theory (SDT). SDT proposes that dominant social groups are particularly motivated to endorse ideologies justifying intergroup hierarchies and social inequalities (Pratto et al. 1994). These ideologies entail hierarchy-enhancing beliefs, such as prejudice (e.g., racism and sexism), that serve to legitimize subordination and discrimination of groups who are lower in the social hierarchy (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). One consequence of these hierarchy-enhancing attitudes is the belief that low-power individuals deserve their disadvantaged positions because they lack effort or ability (Quist and Resendez 2002).

Indeed, one's level of social power, associated with belonging to privileged ethnic or socio-economic groups, is correlated with higher scores on social dominance orientation (SDO), which is a measure of preference for group-based dominance and anti-egalitarianism (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius et al. 2004). Higher levels of SDO correlated with endorsement of hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing beliefs and social policies, which creates a more pronounced social hierarchy. For example, SDO is the strongest predictor of generalized prejudice against minority groups (Altemeyer 1998; McFarland and Adelson 1996) and increases the tendency to allocate fewer economic resources to ethnic outgroups compared to ethnic ingroups, even if doing so can lower the absolute profit of the ingroup (Sidanius et al. 1994; Sidanius et al. 2006; Pratto 1999).

A number of researchers have also showed that powerholders may seek information that confirms stereotype-based expectations that justify and help maintain their powerful positions (e.g., stereotypes of incompetency to outgroups). In this case, powerholders may pay less attention to individuating information, such as stereotype-inconsistent information, through effortful, motivated routes. Indeed, Fiske and colleagues found support for these hypotheses in a series of studies using both situational and personal determinants of power (Fiske 1993; Fiske and Dépret 1996; Goodwin et al. 2000; Vescio et al. 2006). The authors found that dominant group members develop mixed stereotypes that ascribe competence to powerful groups (hence reinforcing their right to be powerful) and warmth, but a lack of competence to subordinate groups (Fiske 2001; Russell and Fiske 2010). By ascribing negative stereotypes of incompetency to low status groups, powerholders can justify the power divide, and by assigning positive stereotypes to subordinates (warmth), they can maintain a positive relationship with their powerless counterparts (Fiske 2001; Russell and Fiske 2010).

Other forms of deception can be seen at an individual level where powerholders act in patronizing ways, such as discriminating against their subordinates by giving them less valuable resources but more empty praises (Vescio et al. 2005). Hence, powerholders tend to deceive group members at the service of their own ends through shared ideologies and stereotypes. In short, both effortless and effortful attention strategies toward stereotype-confirming information (e.g., Fiske 2001) can help preserve, or even bolster, existing power identities (Goodwin et al. 2000).

At the ideological level, the motivation to maintain power can also be seen in powerful individual's endorsement of moral principles that stabilize the power hierarchy (Lammers et al. 2009). For example, research has shown that high power individuals rely more on rule-based and less on outcome-based moral thinking than their powerless counterparts. Generating norms, values, ideologies, and other abstract rule-based principles have been pointed out as the primary means by which power relations are stabilized (Foucault and Gordon 1980; Sidanius and Pratto 1993). Relying on these system rules can allow the powerful to secure compliance with the system and to defend the status quo (Gramsci 1971). As a consequence,

rule-based moral thinking benefits the powerful as it stabilizes their goal of maintaining their power positions.

The desire to maintain the social hierarchy and power gaps is particularly pronounced for powerholders who have a dominant personality; that is, those who aspire to attain powerful positions typically through manipulation and force rather than via respect, reputation, or knowledge (Henrich and Gil-White 2001). Maner and Mead (2010) demonstrated that leaders who had dominant personalities, but tenuous power, restricted subordinate's access to information in order to protect their own power, even if doing so decreased overall group performance. This behavior was mediated by a desire to protect their powerful role within the group, which outweighed the importance of overall group performance. In addition, when the hierarchy was unstable, dominant leaders sought to exclude the top performers from their groups because they were seen as a threat to their power.

Moreover, research has shown that men who have a dominant personality, and are particularly concerned with protecting their status and power, are more likely to harass other people than men who do not have this trait (Maass et al. 2003). This is why people who threaten male supremacy are more likely to be victimized because they can lead to feelings of power illegitimacy in powerful men (Berdahl 2007; Maass et al. 2003).

Another way to maintain the status quo is through negative evaluations of subordinates, in particular if they are outgroup members. Even though, past studies have not found a link between power and self-reported prejudice (Chen et al. 2001), these conscious judgments could be affected by social desirability (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; Vescio et al. 2005). When more subtle, implicit measures of prejudice were taken, powerholders showed greater prejudice than individuals who did not have power. For example, Richeson and Ambady (2003) found that the power of the perceiver, rather than the power position of the target, led to greater implicit prejudice in intergroup encounters. Similarly, by including a control condition in more recent studies, it was found that the effects of power on prejudice derive from having, rather than from lacking, power (Guinote et al. 2010). In this study, powerholders, compared to participants who did not have power, showed a stronger facilitation (e.g., faster classification of words as "good" or "bad") of positive words after exposure to White faces, and negative words after exposure to Black faces).

Furthermore, using an affective misattribution procedure (Payne et al. 2005), White powerholders showed more positive affective responses after being primed with photographs of White as compared to Black faces. Automatic negative evaluations of disadvantaged groups were also found using an implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald et al. 1998; Guinote et al. 2010; Ottaway et al. 2001). Even though, power does not necessarily affect explicit attitudes and judgments, it does lead to implicit negative attitudes by increasing automatic negative evaluations of stigmatized groups.

The negative implicit attitudes of powerholders are reflected in derogative behavior toward subordinates. This tendency was first experimentally documented by Kipnis (1972). In this study, participants who were given absolute power in a simulated work situation (i.e., those who enacted powerful roles by overseeing the

work of others with more managerial resources), exerted their influence over others more forcefully by giving and taking away monetary rewards and by using fewer persuasion tactics compared to those with less absolute power (i.e., those who enacted powerful roles with less managerial resources). Similarly, research by Sachdev and Bourhis (1991) found that participants assigned to minimal powerful groups, by being able to rate other participants' work and award credits to them, were more discriminatory and less parity oriented than those in subordinate groups. For example, compared to members of subordinate groups, powerful group members discriminated more against outgroup members by giving them less credits than to a fellow ingroup member.

In summary, people who have power, and in particular those with dominant personalities, are often motivated to bolster the hierarchical structures that afford them their privileged positions (Fiske 1993; Sidanius and Pratto 2001). This occurs by using power to achieve their own ends, by offering more privileges to the self, by exhibiting effortful stereotype and prejudice, and by using others in instrumental ways. Therefore, power has often been associated with a number of negative consequences such as abuse of subordinates, unfair allocation of resources, and inattention to social information.

Self-serving Goals

According to Kipnis, those who are "endowed with power can use their influence in self-serving ways to dominate instead of to lead" (Kipnis 1976). These corruptive and abusive uses of power and the conspicuous link between power and aggression (Fiske 1993; Georgesen and Harris 1998; Howard et al. 1986) have drawn the attention of researchers as well as the general public. In social psychology, numerous studies have researched the tendency for powerholders to exploit others, rely on stereotypes, and activate prejudicial attitudes (Fiske 1993; Georgesen and Harris 1998; Goodwin et al. 2000; Guinote et al. 2010; Keltner and Robinson 1997).

The self-serving biases of people in power have been demonstrated in a number of studies throughout the past decades, and received also support in a meta-analysis. Powerholders in experimentally or naturally occurring positions tend to evaluate the self in a more positive way and to derogate subordinates (Georgesen and Harris 1998). For example, participants who were given greater power were more exploitative in a prisoner's dilemma game by using more competitive tactics, even when their partners consistently cooperated (Lindskold and Aronoff 1980). Powerholders also used more deception and promised to cooperate, but then competed with their partners in order to increase personal gains (Haney et al. 1973). In a more recent study, Lammers and Stapel (2010) found that feelings of power increased dehumanization. This tendency may decrease powerholder's sense of guilt when abusing their power for selfish ends.

In summary, past and contemporary studies have suggested that power abuse is frequently found, and that once people acquire power they often prioritize their organizational or personal goals at the expense of communal goals. These tendencies include self and ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation through prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, and objectification (Mummendey and Otten 1998; Scheepers et al. 2006). In spite of this evidence, our understanding of the self-serving tendencies of powerholders needs to be tempered by considering the values and dispositions of the powerholder and the context in which individuals find themselves. These aspects will be discussed below.

Dispositions and Power Roles Can Attenuate the Effects of Power

Even though power affords the pursuit of self-interests and the desire to maintain power, these tendencies depend on the specific individuals. Individuals differ in their leadership beliefs (Bass 1985; Vescio et al. 2003) and personal disposition and values (Chen et al. 2001; Côté et al. 2011; DeCelles et al. 2012). Leadership beliefs were found to moderate the relationship between power and pro-social versus self-serving actions. Leaders who endorsed self-serving beliefs (i.e., exchange oriented individuals who believed that leaders should fully take advantage of their status) made more selfish resource allocations than those endorsing group-serving beliefs (i.e., communally oriented individuals; Chen et al. 2001; Rus et al. 2010). Thus, power magnified prior goals and beliefs that individuals possessed. Similarly, powerholders who rejected the dominant cultural stereotypes of low-status group members (e.g., women), showed less discrimination against these group members compared to those who endorsed such stereotypes (Vescio et al. 2005). Consistent with these claims, Côté and colleagues have demonstrated that elevated power allows more pro-socially inclined individuals to focus on their pro-social goals and motivations and, in turn, attend to and identify others' emotions more accurately (Côté et al. 2011).

Evidence that individual differences in beliefs about power roles affect powerholder's social behavior was also obtained using a variety of correlational measures. The Misuse of Power Scale (MOP; Lee-Chai et al. 2001), a measure of personal power beliefs and behaviors, has been shown to be positively related to SDO, right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1998), a cynical philosophy of human nature, Machiavellianism (an attitude related to self-serving power; Christie and Geis 1970), and the likelihood to sexually harass (Lee-Chai et al. 2001). Machiavellianism was negatively related to emotional intelligence.

Similarly, individuals who were high in empathic power (i.e., orientated towards communal goals) showed more interpersonal sensitivity, whereas those high in egoistic power (i.e., oriented towards personal goals) did not (Schmid Mast et al. 2009). In addition, those who identified with an empathic leadership style received

higher scores on the profile for nonverbal sensitivity test (an index of interpersonal sensitivity) than those who identified with an egoistic leadership style (Schmid Mast et al. 2009).

In a more recent study, Guinote et al. (2012) examined the confluence of dispositional and contextual prompts on the behavior of powerholders. In a series of studies, the authors found that power energizes accessible goal pursuits and these can be chronically or temporarily accessible. That is, power boosts the active self. In one study, participants' relationship orientation was first assessed. Later, participants took part in a study in which they were given power (vs. were in a control condition) and were primed with a construct that was either neutral or opposed to their dispositions. Participants then distributed resources between themselves and another individual in an economic game. Pro-social individuals who had power acted in more pro-social ways than those who did not have power, and the reverse was true for pro-self participants. However, this was only the case under the neutral prime, when chronically accessible constructs guided behavior. When an opposing construct had been activated (i.e., when a competition goal was primed for pro-social participants and cooperation was primed for pro-self participants), no differences were found between powerful and powerless participants. Under these circumstances, the chronic and temporarily accessible primes canceled each other out. It was concluded that power enhances reliance on accessible constructs regardless of whether these constructs are chronically or temporarily accessible, and that chronic and temporary influences may cancel each other out.

Organizational culture and goals were also found to have an influence on the social behavior of powerholders. In fact, people often underestimate the impact that the situation can have on powerholders (see Overbeck et al. 2006). Specifically, the tendency to believe that someone's behavior reflects their disposition and preferences (known as the correspondence bias; Jones and Harris 1967), is more pronounced for powerful than powerless targets. Observers tend to underestimate the constraints on powerholders and overestimate the constraints on powerless individuals. According to the SFTP, both person as well as context variables can influence powerholders (Guinote 2007a).

In a demonstration of the power of the situation in organizations, Overbeck and Park (2006) assigned participants to power roles in organizations that were 'product centered' versus 'person centered'. Subsequently, participants allegedly interacted with subordinates. It was found that participants who were assigned to power roles in person centered organizations individuated better their subordinates. In these organizations, powerholders had better memory of subordinates' personal attributes and perceived them in more differentiated ways compared to powerholders in product centered organizations. The authors concluded that powerholders can flexibly direct their attention and use social attention to advance the attainment of organizational goals.

In a similar vein, Vescio et al. (2003) found that powerholders tend to rely on stereotypes of low power individuals only when those stereotypes are contextually relevant and useful to the powerholder's goals. For example, in a masculine

domain, high-power men's perceptions and behaviors toward low-power women were stereotype consistent (i.e., focusing on women's weaknesses) as these disadvantages could hinder goal attainment. However, in a context where women's stereotypes were uninformative, powerful men were attentive to women's strengths that could enhance goal pursuit. In this latter situation, both female and male employees were treated in a similar manner by the powerful because women stereotypes were irrelevant. Overall, these studies on power and stereotyping show that the pursuit of goals for which stereotype information is informative can accentuate stereotyping in powerholders, but the pursuit of goals for which individuating information is relevant can decrease stereotyping and enhance social attention. That is, although powerholders can be described as having a propensity to be socially inattentive, they are capable of paying attention to others when this advances their goals.

The influence of the situation on powerholders' social behavior can also be seen in the actions of powerholders. Galinsky et al. (2003) asked powerful and powerless participants to take part in a commons dilemma or in a public dilemma. Public dilemmas call for cooperation and pro-social behavior (e.g., giving resources to a common good), whereas commons dilemmas activate the goal of pursuing self-interest (e.g., taking resources out of a common good). In this study, having power led participants to act more pro-socially in the public dilemma, but more selfishly in the commons dilemma (Galinsky et al. 2003).

We have so far focused on goals that are triggered by an act of will that are directly related to power roles. Could, however, the broader social context also influence social attention and the behavior of powerholders? Recent findings suggest that this is the case, as socially shared social values have been shown to activate goals in powerholders. These studies have compared values associated with power across cultures, as well as organizational goals and values. For example, individualism, defined as the need to be autonomous and recognize and accept the existence of social inequality, is associated with personalized power concepts, where power represents opportunities for status and personal advancement. In contrast, collectivism, defined as seeing oneself as part of a group and perceiving all members as equal, is associated with a socialized power concept, or the notion that power's aims are to serve others and to advance collective goals (see Torelli and Shavitt 2008).

These differences can be seen in the ways people perceive, remember, evaluate, and respond to power-related stimuli (Torelli and Shavitt 2010). For example, people with an individualistic orientation preferred brands that represented personalized power values of status and prestige, whereas those with a collectivistic orientation reported higher likings for brands that symbolize concerns for the welfare of others and pro-social values. Moreover, Eastern collectivistic cultures mostly seen in places such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America, associate power with responsibility and restraint, whereas Western cultures mostly seen in Europe and North America associate power with rewards and freedom from constraints (Zhong et al. 2006). Since, evidence that power leads to self-serving biases has been

obtained primarily in Western countries, further cross-cultural research is needed to establish the generalizability of these findings across cultures.

In summary, research on the links between power, social attention, and behavior points out that a number of factors can attenuate or even reverse the self-serving biases often found in powerholders. An understanding of the effects of power necessitates a closer examination of dispositions, organizational goals, culture, and other temporarily activated goals. Thus, power leads to general behavior tendencies but not to static and unitary forms of social behavior across different contexts (see also Overbeck and Park 2006; Schmid Mast et al. 2009). Consistent with the SFTP, the effects of power on social behavior can be predicted from an examination of power, the person, and the situation. Studies that show a general tendency for self-serving biases in powerholders and those that show an impact of dispositions and organizational goals can be reconciled by considering the fact that power has probabilistic effects on social behavior. That is, power leads to a propensity for behavior that helps maintain power and attain desirable outcomes for the self, but it can depart from these tendencies when cultural, organizational, or dispositional goals have strong opposing influences.

Power, Experiential Information, and Social Judgments

We will now turn our attention more closely to the ways powerholders form judgments and decisions. An examination of cognitive processes associated with power can elucidate the context dependency of powerholders' social behavior. Specifically, we will focus here on the role of experiential information on judgments.

Cognitive experiences, such as feelings of familiarity or ease of retrieving information, can also affect judgments (e.g., Schwarz et al. 1991). Research has shown that cognitive experiences, or experiences that arise during thought processes, affect the extent to which powerholders rely on stereotypes more than the extent to which powerless individuals rely on stereotypes. Guinote (2007d) examined this issue in the context of social perception after suppression of stereotypes. Past research had shown that suppressing unwanted thoughts magnifies the expression of these thoughts once suppression is released (Wegner and Erber 1992). Stereotype rebound occurs because perceivers assume that they are motivated to stereotype when it is difficult to suppress unwanted thoughts (see Förster and Liberman 2001), and they use the experience of difficulty as information to guide their social judgments. In this experiment, Guinote (2007d) asked White Americans to enact the role of a *judge* or a *worker* in the laboratory. Participants were then shown a picture of an African-American target, and were asked to describe a typical day in the life of this person. Half of the participants were asked to avoid using stereotypes during this task, whereas the other half were not given such instructions. Participants then read ambiguous information about another person whose race was unspecified. Consistent with hypotheses, participants who

suppressed stereotypic thoughts gave higher ratings for traits that are relevant to the stereotypes of African-Americans (poor, lazy, and unintelligent; see Devine 1989), than those who did not suppress. Importantly, stereotype rebound was more pronounced for powerful than powerless participants, indicating that powerful individuals base their judgments on the experienced difficulty of suppressing stereotypes more than powerless individuals.

The impact of cognitive experiences was also examined using manipulations of the ease of retrieval (Schwarz et al. 1991). The ease of retrieval paradigm allows one to separate the relative contributions of content-based and experiential influences on judgment. In one experiment, participants were asked to recall a past event in which they were in a powerful or powerless position, and were then asked to generate many (difficult) or few (easy) characteristics on which they felt men and women were different. Powerholders perceived the two gender groups in more stereotypic ways after having retrieved few as opposed to many attributes. Since, generating many differences between the gender groups was hard, then this difficulty led powerholders to perceive the gender groups as similar to one another and in less stereotypic ways. This was not the case for powerless individuals. Individual differences in sense of power (Anderson and Galinsky 2006) are also positively correlated with reliance on ease of retrieval (Weick and Guinote 2008). These studies show that subjective experiences are more easily used in the construction of social judgment by powerholders compared to powerless individuals.

Power and Legitimacy

Thus far, the effects of power have been documented when power positions were legitimate—that is, when powerholders felt, either subjectively or objectively, that they deserved to be in a power position (Lammers et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2008). However, power can be seen as unfair, undeserved, or illegitimate. When power relationships are perceived as illegitimate, unjust, or undeserved, powerholders may experience threat and face oppositions, and the stability of power hierarchies may become questionable (Rodriguez-Bailon et al. 2000; Spears et al. 2010; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981). Illegitimate powerholders may therefore focus more on possible losses and experience less sense of control (Langens 2007). Simultaneously, powerless individuals may cease focusing on their disadvantaged positions and attend instead to the possibility of social change (Lammers et al. 2008; Spears et al. 2001). This possibility orients powerless individuals toward opportunities that can give them a higher sense of control.

Consistent with these claims, research with primates has found that when hierarchies are unstable, alpha males respond with more stress and ill health, whereas the stress of subordinate animals decreases (Rivers and Josephs 2010). Similarly, the illegitimacy of power in humans also has dramatic influences on social perception and behavior (Lammers et al. 2008; Willis et al. 2010; Willis and Rodríguez-Bailón 2010). In particular, it moderates the effects of power on

approach and goal directed behavior. That is, when power relations are illegitimate, the powerless, instead of the powerful, are more sensitive to rewards and are more inclined to opt for the riskier plan (Lammers et al. 2008; Langens 2007). In addition, illegitimately powerless individuals exhibited the same ability to control attention as those who were legitimately powerful (Willis et al. 2010). That is, illegitimacy improved cognitive abilities in powerless individuals.

This deviation from the common control-abundant environment of the power-holder causes them to be socially attentive. For example, Ebenbach and Keltner (1998) found that high power members who experienced threat-related negative emotions were more accurate in their judgments of their opponents' attitudes compared to those in high power who did not experience such emotions. Those who were given no reason for assignment to a high power role (i.e., illegitimate power) felt more uneasy in judging others (e.g., give nicknames to lower power participants) than those who were assigned to leadership positions based on their abilities (a legitimate reason; Smith et al. 2008).

Importantly, even though the threat that comes with illegitimate power activates fear of losing power and avoidance in powerholders, their social behavior is quite different from the typical social behavior of people in control deprived and avoidant states. Instead, powerholders show a strong desire to maintain the power hierarchy and have the opportunity to use power, to some extent, at their discretion. This idea was initially presented in the social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981), which predicted that when members of 'superior' groups feel threatened, then they will likely rely on intergroup comparisons to guarantee their positive social identity. Tajfel (1981) argued that having illegitimate power may generate a substantial amount of psychological conflict that can only be solved through finding new justifications for the maintenance of status quo. Perceiving powerless individuals as homogeneous and incompetent will allow those in power to legitimize their position (Huici 1984). Consistent with this claim, power illegitimacy was found to heighten the propensity for power abuse and the prioritization of personal gains over group goals (Maner and Mead 2010). Those whose power is threatened tend to assert power in more authoritarian ways (Georgesen and Harris 2006; Morrison et al. 2009), and prefer to use schematic information about subordinates.

Researchers have argued that illegitimate powerholders justify their ostensibly undeserving position and maintain power differentials through stereotyping (Fiske and Berdahl 2007; Rodriguez-Bailon et al. 2000). For example, one study found that when role assignments were illegitimate, high-power participants showed significantly more attentional bias toward stereotypical information than those in legitimate positions (Rodriguez-Bailon et al. 2000). In another study (Fiske and Berdahl 2007), participants were assigned to a secure (i.e., a legitimate and justified) or an insecure (illegitimate) power position and were then asked to read information concerning hypothetical groupmates (e.g., math students). Illegitimate powerholders paid more attention to negative stereotype-consistent information than those in legitimate positions. This supports the notion that the threat imposed upon illegitimate powerholders prompts them to engage in attentional processes that allow some kind of justification of their privileged positions (i.e., by attending to

negative stereotype-consistent features of the target person). Legitimate power-holders, on the other hand, did not feel threatened as their position was obtained based on their skills. They did not focus more on stereotype-consistent than inconsistent information, nor did they exhibit a differential processing of negative and positive target information. The authors concluded that this tendency to stereotype negatively is a strategic way used by the powerful to keep their power, and could be translated into racist remarks and anti-immigration policies.

Not only illegitimacy, but also other threats to the exercise of power have a negative impact on the social behavior of powerholders. In today's society, many believe that power should be assigned to individuals on the basis of competence that serves to address group problems. Therefore, power increases the need for individuals to feel competent in order to hold onto their power (Georgesen and Harris 2006) and to fulfill the demands and expectations associated with powerful roles (Fast 2009). Fast and Chen (2009) demonstrated that self-perceived incompetence, similar to power illegitimacy, weakens the link between power and the behavioral approach system (Keltner et al. 2003), and increases the tendency to aggress. In a series of studies using various manipulations of power (real-life power roles and power priming) and measures of aggression (questionnaires regarding generalized aggression and exposing strangers to loud noises), the authors found that self-perceived incompetence in the powerholder leads to aggressive behaviors. Moreover, giving powerholders a boost in their self-worth eliminated this effect, as it reduced the need to defend one's ego. Thus, a threat to the ego of powerholders caused them to abuse their power.

Conclusions: An Integrated View of Power and the Social Self

This review gives us a multifaceted perspective on the ways power affects individuals as social beings. Power leads to a tendency to engage in salient goals, including self-serving goals, organizational goals, goals associated with enduring preferences and dispositions of the person, as well as the goal of maintaining power. Salient goals can also reflect temporary states of the person, including emotions and subjective experiences or affordances of situations. Across these contexts power-holders are goal focused and respond in more unequivocal ways compared to individuals who do not have power.

One question that arises is how can we predict the behavior of powerholders? According to the SFTP (Guinote 2007a, 2010a, b), the answer to this question is that power intensifies the active self, which are parts of the self that are activated as a function of the person in context. Therefore, one needs to look more closely at the opportunities that arise with power, the person, the power roles, and the organizational and societal culture in which power is exercised. Individuals occupy power roles in leadership positions that can serve religious functions, organizational,

political, or educational functions. They may be embedded in a collectivistic or individualistic culture and in organizations that serve humanitarian or economic goals. Powerful actors can vary in their dispositions and values, and in the aims with which they exercise power. As a consequence, the broader social context can influence the way power which is exercised, not only through norms and laws that restrict the use of power, but by influencing powerholders' motivations.

We therefore conclude that power magnifies dominant tendencies of the individual in context. Evidence thus far suggests that dispositions and social or organizational culture matter and are capable of counteracting the drive to pursue opportunities for the self that are afforded by power. One interesting avenue in power research is to examine not only the typical biases of powerful people, but also how powerholders respond in context and pit different influences, such as dispositional, cultural, and situational, against each other. Put differently, it is important not only to ask *how* powerful people act, but also *when* they act in particular ways and *why*.

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Chapter 2
From a Sense of Self to Understanding Relations Between Social Groups

Dalila Xavier de França

> *... Populational location in different social positions that reflect*
> *and intervene in the relations of individuals to each other.*
> Mathias (2014: 132)

Abstract Our sense of self arises from our understanding that we are unique and different from others that are close to us, and that these other people have similarities and differences among themselves and in relation to us. Understanding the self and others as separate entities requires reasoning about the social world, including understanding people, interpersonal relations, institutions, and social structure. This chapter introduces the socio-developmental perspective in a didactic overview on the socio-cognitive self-development of children. It equips the reader with fundamental background knowledge that is useful for the understanding of reporting research results with children of different age. What this overview makes clear, among others, is how closely children's self is intertwined from the beginning with the social world they live in, how fundamental the role of social categorization is for children's understanding of the social world and themselves as part of it, how the notion of their position in social structure becomes more and more sophisticated over the course of their self-development, and how much children advance with age in the flexible mastering of complex, often contradicting social affordances within interpersonal, intergroup, and institutional contexts.

Keywords Socio-cognitive self-development · Self · Social categorization

Introduction

Our sense of self arises from our understanding that we are a particular kind of object, that we are unique and different from others that are close to us, and that these other people have similarities and differences among themselves and in relation to us. Understanding the self and others as separate entities requires reasoning about the

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social world, including understanding people, interpersonal relations, institutions, and social structure.

The phenomena of self-perception and perception of others have been studied in the field of Social Cognition (Fiske and Taylor 1991). The theory of mind (Legerstee 2005; Delval 2007), which can be defined as the ability to attribute mental states or understand what others think or believe (Premack and Woodruff 1978; Leslie 1987) has provided important contributions to the knowledge of social interactions in children.

Children are active processors of their own experiences. From birth onwards their expressions of crying, smiling, and discomfort gain significance through interaction with others. Every movement of a child causes a reaction in others and so gains intentionality, allowing her to interpret events that happen to her. The complexity of these basic expressions enables the acquisition of notions of self, of others with whom one interacts and of interpersonal relations resulting from these interactions. The acquisition of these mental representations begins very early and consists of a process of ongoing elaboration that is dependent on the child's cognitive development and previous social experiences. This development continues throughout life (Schaffer 1996).

This chapter aims to theoretically analyze the phenomenon of perception and understanding of self and other in childhood and how related processes impact the understanding of relationships between social groups. We intend to answer the following questions: How does a child understand his/her own social world? To what extent do children have a sense of self and show an understanding of other people, institutions, social structures, and relationships between social groups? We begin with a discussion of the perception of self and the first notions of identity and present studies reporting the origins of the sense of self from birth onwards. Then we analyze when and how people develop an understanding of the existence of others. We will also assess children's views of the structure of society, focusing on family, school, and social class. We end our review by examining children's conceptions of social groups, including national and racial groups, as well as children's intergroup attitudes.

The Perception of "I": The First Notions of Identity

The 1970s and 1980s were a time of enormous progress in the study of self-development in children. In these years different methodologies were developed enabling assessment of this phenomenon. We will begin our analysis with an overview of these studies.

Theory suggests that self-knowledge develops through relationships and social interactions, that is, involvement with others. A child's ability to perceive that there is a world out there requires an understanding of the existence of an "I" or "self." Both understanding the social world and the existence of self are intertwined with the perception of the existence of the other (Damon and Hart 1992).

Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979) have shown that the development of an understanding of the self has two stages. First there is the formation of the existential self, which refers to the feeling of being distinguished from others and having continuity over time. The first task for a newborn child is to learn to perceive herself as an active agent, separate from other objects in the world. Lewis (1990) states it is unlikely that the newborn distinguishes himself from his environment early in life. However, within a few months, children become able to differentiate themselves from others and gain knowledge that they exist and are unique. This consciousness marks the beginning of identity and the move to the second stage of self-development, which, according to these authors, consists of the development of the categorical self, that is, the self as an object of knowledge (see also Asendorpf et al. 1996), referring to the self-definition of the individual in terms of age, gender, and size. More recently, the term 'self-concept' has been applied which involves knowledge of one's physical appearance, beliefs, feelings, and having self-reflective thoughts (Lewis 2011).

How, then, do the existential self and the categorical self come into being? According to Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (*ibid*) some aspects of how children interact with caregivers are fundamental to the development of the existential self; in particular, the child's experience of the relationship between their actions and the results produced. For example, when the child cries or screams and the caregiver responds by trying to interpret the child's wishes, the child can deduce: "when I cry or scream, my mother comes." Equally important to the development of the existential self are situations in which parents imitate the child's behavior. In this sense, parents work as their child's social mirror (Harter 1998).

The categorical self arises shortly after the existential self, in a manner similar to the development of an understanding of the nature of other objects. First, the child acquires the knowledge that objects exist and have permanence in time and space (i.e., if an object is hidden under a box a child recognizes the object is still there); with age children develop the cognitive abilities to understand specific characteristics such as color, size, shape, and texture (Piaget 1937). Thus, the development of the categorical self derives from the existential self. The categorical self changes over the course of life depending on the cognitive abilities of the child and variations in social relations, age, culture, and social group, as well as on inter-individual differences such as gender (Lewis 2011; Martin and Ruble 2010).

Research on the development of the notion of self in children has focused on the study of the emergence of self-understanding and particularly on the development of measures that can be used with new-borns in the pre-verbal stage. The measure most commonly used in this investigation has been self-recognition in mirrors, photographs, and video recordings (Harter 1998). In the late 1970s, two teams (Bertenthal and Fischer; and Lewis and Brooks-Gunn) began systematic research using these self-recognition measures. Bertenthal and Fischer (1978) studied children aged 6, 8, 10, 12, and 24 months. Based on their research findings they proposed a five-stage theory of self-recognition, defined by the type and complexity of actions the child is able to perform at each stage.

The first stage concerns tactile operation (5–8 months). During this period, when the child is placed in front of the mirror, it tends to touch parts of its projected image. This, however, does not provide evidence that the child understands itself to be a causal agent or is able to distinguish itself from others.

To study the second stage, Bertenthal and Fischer (1978) created the hat task (9–12 months) that consists of dressing the child in jacket that has a rod attached to it, which holds a hat above the child's head. When placed before the mirror, a child who has reached the second stage will look at the reflected hat and then look up at the real hat and try to touch it. This action shows that she realizes that there is a causal relationship between the movement of her body and the projected image. In other words, the child is aware that the object is linked to herself, but is not part of her own body. Researchers consider children who have achieved stage two to perceive the self as an active causal agent.

To study the third stage (12–15 months), the toy task is used, in which a toy is placed behind the child's head while he looks into the mirror. If the child turns and looks at the real toy, this movement indicates a breakthrough in the sense of self as a causal agent as he differentiates the movement of his body from that produced by other persons or objects, demonstrating a self-other differentiation.

To study the fourth stage (15–18 months), Bertenthal and Fischer (1978) propose the *Rouge task*, which involves painting the child's nose with rouge and putting her in front of the mirror. The child touching her nose or verbalizing that something is different is the first evidence of a sense of the categorical self, represented by the child's ability to recognize her own facial features.

To study the fifth and final stage (18–24 months), the authors developed the Name task. In this task, the researcher points to the image of the child in the mirror and asks: "Who is this?" To pass this test, the child should give his own name or use the appropriate pronoun. At this stage, the child realizes he has unique characteristics that can be labeled by his proper name.

Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979) conducted studies with children from birth to 30 months of age. Their methodology went beyond the mirror test, in that they were able to separate children's self-recognition in concrete immediate situations (such as their recognition of their own actions in front of a mirror and their recognition of personal characteristics when looking in a mirror) from those in past situations or in situations unrelated to immediate reality (such as images of themselves in pictures and videos). In the present, the child learns that the image in the mirror "acts like me," whereas in situations involving recordings from the past the child learns that the images on video or in a photo represent a self that "looks like me."

Other research by Emde (1988) added that some important skills are developed between 10 and 15 months and are consolidated between 18 and 30 months. In the first period, children need interpersonal connections and shared experiences. For example, they share games with their mothers or participate in activities carried out by their mother. This sharing of experiences through reciprocal interactions with adults marks the emergence of a sense of we-I distinction, which develops with children's ability to use both linguistic and symbolic representation. This occurs through their ability to internalize parental rules, denoting an initial manifestation of moral

behavior, which raises the sense of we-I to another level. The internalization of these rules and prohibitions allows children to regulate their own behaviors and resist "temptation" in situations in which parents or other authority figures are not present.

The Construction of the Self in Childhood, Middle Childhood, and Early Adolescence

During the preschool period (3–6 years) children tend to build concrete cognitive representations of observable characteristics of the self. Self-evaluations at this stage are often unrealistically positive, as children have difficulties distinguishing between what they want to do and what they are able to do (Harter 1998). During this phase, there is a proliferation of categories children use to define themselves—they begin to describe themselves in terms of specific labels such as age (Stipek et al. 1990). Evidence of consciousness of gender and race categories can be seen in children around the age of 3 (Katz 1983; Martin and Ruble 2010). This learning takes place alongside early concept development, when the child becomes able to recognize the relevant perceptual cues for inclusion or exclusion of an object in a category.

Knowing when children develop the cognitive skills to perceive characteristics as stable is of particular importance in this stage. Aboud and Ruble (1987) observed that children's awareness of the constancy of self is expressed before they are aware of the constancy of others. For example, children perceive their own sex as permanent (being a boy or girl) despite wearing clothes of the opposite sex sooner than they are able to recognize that others are boys or girls regardless of the clothes they wear. In another study, Arthur et al. (2009) showed that 4-year-old children who were taught that biological characteristics such as sex are fixed, showed greater skill in distinguishing between gender appearance (depending on outfit) and reality (being a boy or girl) than children who were taught that such characteristics can change. Yet, the ability to recognize constancy of sex for everyone appears around the age of 4 or 5, whereas the understanding of ethnic constancy appears around the age of 8 or 9 (Aboud and Ruble 1987).

During middle childhood and early adolescence (6–12 years), the self becomes more differentiated due to increased cognitive and language skills. At this stage, children have a multitude of concepts to describe themselves and others (Durkin 2004). These self-descriptions, concrete at first, gradually become more focused on internal states and psychological characteristics such as skills, knowledge, emotions, values, and personality traits (Damon and Hart 1992). Children may inductively compile piecemeal information into a composite self-representation. For example, a boy could become interested in a girl, but refuse to invest emotionally in her because he sees himself as shy and ugly. The ability to take another's perspective also arises during this developmental stage. This skill enables children to build a rudimentary "idea of self," as they are able to imagine how they are perceived and judged by others and to show affective reactions, such as pride or embarrassment (Harter 1998).

At this stage, children are able to integrate positive and negative feedback into an understanding of the self that includes opposing concepts. For example, a child may see herself as both outgoing (with friends) and introverted (in front of strangers). This ability to integrate opposites allows for the attenuation of extreme evaluations and permits self-descriptions that are more consistent with the descriptions others give of the child (Harter 1998).

Children become more sophisticated in their ability to make use of information through social comparisons at this age as well. Children begin to refrain from directly communicating social comparisons they make (e.g., I got a 9 and you got an 8) and instead find more subtle ways of expressing comparisons (e.g., what was your score?). This is interesting as it indicates that children are becoming aware of the negative social consequences of extremely straightforward questions and statements (Altermatt et al. 2002; Pomerantz et al. 1995; Rhodes and Brickman 2008). In other words, children are increasingly able to recognize that other people in their environment judge their behavior in terms of good and bad.

In the next section, we turn to the question of how children perceive others as distinct individuals. When do they begin to perceive the other as endowed with emotions, intentions, and thoughts? What observable changes in cognitive development are involved in this process? These questions are addressed by examining research into children's understanding of the existence of others.

Perceiving People in Childhood: The Development of an Understanding of Others

Within the framework of social cognition understanding of the other encompasses the understanding of other individuals as subjects who have intentions, desires, and beliefs (Delval 2007). From birth onwards children show an interest in others, although it is not possible to state that they perceive differences between people and other objects. Legerstee (1999) noted, however, that by 5 weeks old children mimic people's expressions, such as sticking out their tongues, but not expressions of inanimate objects (drawings of human faces). Based on experimental studies, Legerstee concluded that 5-month-old children are able to use strategies to interpret and predict the behavior of people and attribute purposeful behavior and intention to them.

In another study Legerstee and Markova (2007) found that 3-months-old babies express positive affect (smiling) and negative affect (looking away) in different ways to social (their own mother) and non-social (a doll) stimuli. They found that this behavior continues up to 9 months. In this study, the children expressed more positive affect in face-to-face interactions with their mothers than with a doll. Markova and Legerstee (2008) argued that children's understanding of the thoughts and feelings of others begins developing at birth through the reciprocal exchange of emotions between the child and her caregivers. These emotional exchanges provide

a window into the complexity of the other's consciousness, through such things as directing the other's attention to interesting things in the environment (e.g., showing the other an object).

Concern for others advances toward the desire to understand the psychological states of others and their causes. A study by Zahn-Waxler et al. (1992) illustrates this motivation. These authors studied children from 13–15, 18–20, and 23–25-months-old, examining prosocial behavior and attempts to alleviate observed anguish and anguish caused by the child. The results showed that children express interest in, try to understand, or experience the situation and engage in behaviors with the apparent goal of alleviating the distress of others. The results also show that 13–15-months-old children preformed predominantly physical actions, whereas 18–20-months-old children exhibited a wide range of prosocial actions (assistance, comforting, empathic interest, etc.). Prosocial behavior increases with age and is independent of the child's role in the distress of others (being the cause or merely witnessing the distress). It is noteworthy, however, that children were generally less empathically interested when they were causing anguish than when they were only spectators.

Perspective taking ability was studied by Selman (1980), who proposed a stage theory of the understanding of the self versus the other. He claims that self-other understanding evolves from a lack of awareness of the other's social perspective to the ability to compare different points of view; with this last stage being achieved only in late adolescence or adulthood. Somewhat at odds with Selman (1980), but consistent with Zahn-Waxler et al. (1992), Slomkowski and Dunn (1996) observed, in a longitudinal study of children 40–47 months of age, that interactions with friends were characterized by shared communication. This shared communication included variations associated with the ability to take the other's perspective and understand their thoughts and feelings.

One way researchers examine what people understand of others is through the method of asking for descriptions of others (parents, friends, etc.). Some conclusions from these studies are that children up to 7 or 8 years old usually describe external aspects of others such as physical appearance, clothing, and possessions. After this age, children increasingly refer to internal states such as personality traits, needs, motives, and attitudes when describing others. With increasing age, there is an increased tendency to infer others' intentions, feelings, and the causes of their behaviors. Behaviors are often attributed to situational factors, at first, and later to psychological factors and interpersonal perception (Harter 1998; Shantz 1983; Shelley 1982).

These findings are similar to those of Livesley and Bromley (1973) in their research with children from 4–16 years, who observed that children demonstrated awareness of people's inner states, such as needs and intentions. Until the age of seven, children tend to focus their perceptions on observable and concrete aspects of the people they describe. From that point on, there is a trend toward the use of more inferential and abstract concepts such as noting regularity in others' behavior, traits, and abilities.

Rholes and Ruble ([1984]) deepened the analysis of the perception of regularities of behavior in a study with children 5–6 years old versus those 6–10 years old. The authors concluded that with increasing age, children perceived the behavior of people in a given situation as a good predictor of the behavior of that person in other contexts. Moreover, Rholes et al. ([1990]) found that young children (5 and 6 year olds) were less likely to assign personality traits and capabilities based on the observed behavior of people. The authors explained this as resulting from the cognitive immaturity of children, which did not allow them to notice general themes that link certain classes of behavior with certain dispositional characteristics. The cognitive ability to make such connections leads children to build more global self-evaluations, in the sense that they include dispositional characteristics in their self-descriptions (Higgins [1991]).

These studies on the understanding of self and others are precursors of what is referred to today as theory of mind (Legerstee [2005]). One of the methods used in studies in this area is the false belief task, which investigates whether children understand that people can hold different beliefs about reality. These studies found that children start, at age 3–5 years, to succeed in such tasks, that is, to understand that two people can hold different understandings of reality, because they have observed different things (Hugles and Leekam [2004]).

Children's Conceptions of the Structure of Society: Family, School, and Social Class

The ability to perceive others as individuals with their own interests and intentions is only part of the knowledge of social beings. In order to fully become a member of society, it is also necessary to understand social structure, organization, rules, and social roles (Delval [2007]). In this section, we analyze how children acquire knowledge of the structure of society. For this we will examine their understanding of social relations in institutions like family and school. Then we will discuss children's notions of social class.

The defining characteristics of a social group are its structure and organizational patterns, which reflect the relationship between members and transcend the individual characteristics of the people who make up the group (Shantz [1983]). According to Triana and Simón ([1999]), knowledge of the social world may fulfill an adaptive function, as it enables recognition of the elements and processes that produce the world that surrounds us. This knowledge allows us to predict the consequences that our actions can have on social reality and thus makes us act in a coordinated way in our societal relations.

Cognitive factors are involved in the development of social knowledge in children and determine this process (Delval et al. [1999]; Torres [1999]; Triana and Simón [1999]). Berti and Bombi ([1988]) claim that progress in social understanding is achieved through a series of transformations departing from an undifferentiated

perception, around the age of five, and advancing toward a more sophisticated understanding, around the age of 11.

This knowledge is not always derived from direct experience with complex social phenomena, such as collaborating on teacher decisions made in school. In many cases, it is mediated by instances of socialization such as television, parents, peers, and especially school. Furthermore, social knowledge varies according to children's socio-cultural context, socio-economic status, ethnicity, and nationality (Barrette and Buchanan-Barrow 2005).

Given that children enter some key institutions, such as family and school, very early in life, much of their social knowledge emerges from their understanding of these institutions. Thus, we focus on some conclusions based on studies in this area.

Starting with the family, Martínez and González (2010) stated that Spanish preschool children have a sense of family based on their immediate experience of home and being together. For example, participants in their study depicted the nuclear family more because this was the day-to-day model they knew. Thus, for most of the children studied, the family is father, mother, and siblings; rarely considering relatives such as grandparents, uncles, and cousins. Triana and Simón (1999) noted that preschool children give concrete answers to questions relating to the role of their parents. Their responses usually refer to the role of parents in child care, how much they help in performing tasks, obtaining money to fulfill basic needs, and monitoring children in various activities. School age children can assign affective functions to family and realize that different members can perform the same task.

Triana and Simón (1999) also noted that children show a different understanding of what each parent does. Thus, preschool and school age children attribute tasks such as child care and housework to mothers. Fathers, in turn, are responsible for the economic maintenance of the family and carrying out home repairs. Economic support was cited by preschool and preteen children as the father's function and, to a lesser degree, also assigned to the mother by preteens. These children also attribute affectionate care to the mother and, to a lesser extent, the role of advisor.

Studies of children living in contexts different from the traditional family, such as those residing in institutions or shelters, have found that they held a more idealized and less complex concept of the role of parents than those living in a more traditional context. They also attributed similar roles regarding care giving, affection, and help to mothers and fathers (Suárez et al. 2005).

After family, school is the place children frequent early in life and where they spend the majority of their time. An analysis of the school's role as a promoter and facilitator of understanding of the social structure is justified by its organizational characteristics, with its own rules and power hierarchy, making it similar to a micro society (Buchanan-Barrow 2005). Although most studies involving children in the school context study only the cognitive aspects of the academic goals of the school, we found some researchers interested in children's understanding of the role of teachers and principals, and of the school as a system.

Scholars in this field have shown interest in examining how children understand the concept of authority and how they learn the rules and different social roles in the school environment (Buchanan-Barrow 2005). To Berti (1981) children's

understanding of authority, at 5 years of age, is very limited. However, at around 8 years old children begin to understand that a boss has institutional status to exercise power over others; although even at this age they are often unable to distinguish between a factory manager and the factory owner.

Children's understanding of the notion of rules begins in preschool, when they already have the skills to understand rules acquired in the family, that is, in the interaction with their caregivers and peers. These are moral rules; as they are independent of the context and self-evident, for example, do not hurt people. When starting school, children are confronted with a complex set of social conventions, i.e., rules constructed by certain groups to regulate interactions within particular contexts. These rules require greater cognitive effort to understand, especially for younger children, as the reasons for the rules are not evident, requiring further explanation, such as the restriction on the use of hats at school (Smetana 1981; Tognetta 2007).

Buchanan-Barrow and Barrett (1998) observed 5–11-year-old children and found that even the youngest had considerable ability to handle various types of school rules.

Another element that will become part of the lives of children upon entering school is the understanding of different social roles: teacher, principal, and their own, the student. In studies conducted in Scotland and France, children around age seven believed the teacher's role was to support the less able children in the class. By 17 years old, children responded to questions about the teacher's role by claiming that the teacher should prepare students for the wider world. This was interpreted as being due to the understanding of the school's goals in terms of preparation for the labor market (Buchanan-Barrow 2005).

As we have seen even 5-year-old children understand, to a limited extent, the idea of authority (Berti 1981). This understanding supports the notion of hierarchy and power in school. Thus, 6-year-old children say it is the principal who makes or changes the school rules, while starting at 7–8 years old children involve the teacher in the school organization, and 9–11-year old children say that parents are also involved with school (Buchanan-Barrow 2005).

Another aspect that underlies children's understanding of the social structure is the notion of class hierarchy. To what extend does a child grasp the idea that we are not born predestined to occupy a certain role in the economic structure of society? Do children understand that the nature of an occupation has a significant influence on social class and the possibility of living in wealth or poverty?

A 5-year-old, giving reasons for wanting to be white, said that it was because of liking to shop (França 2006). This response shows that even at such a young age this child was aware of social inequality based on economic means. Emler and Dickinson (2005), in a review of children's understanding of social class and their ideas of wealth and poverty, claim that as early as 5 or 6 years old, children are aware of social class and economic differences.

Initially, the views of children are anchored in the extremes of wealth and poverty, which can be based on representations of princes and commoners in fairy tales, such as the perception of differences in material possessions like housing and

clothing. Emler and Dickinson (2005), however, found evidence that at 6 years old some children relate wealth to better jobs and earning more money. This link between wealth, better jobs, and wages becomes the standard responses of 8–9-year-old children.

Leahy (1990) described three stages in the development of a conception of wealth and poverty, based on a study with a large sample of children from 6–17 years old. The first stage, called peripheral, was present in children 6 years of age, and is characterized by tautological explanations for wealth and poverty, for example: "People are rich because they have money." Ramsey (1991) corroborated these results in preschool children. Here, children's explanations of wealth and poverty were limited to the concrete. The second stage is called central and is characterized by responses that include internal characteristics and psychological attributes of the person in explanations for their wealth and poverty. Children from 11–14 years old describe the differences between rich and poor as occurring because of differences in intelligence and ability, that is, being poor or rich depends on the qualification level in work, on effort, or on talent. The last stage, called socio-centric, was present in 17 year olds, and is characterized by explanations involving socio-political and structural issues such as political power, exploitation, limited opportunities, and life events. Dar et al. (1998) found similar results. The teenagers they studied gave answers demonstrating an accurate understanding of the multifaceted nature of social structure.

As children come to understand the social world, they are still faced with the necessity of dealing with the different groups that make up society; they must establish a sense of identity and internalize the values, norms, representations, and practices necessary for social integration (Barrette and Buchanan-Barrow 2005). The formation of concepts of national and racial groups stands out in this scenario as these aspects were the most analyzed by scholars in the field.

Children's Conceptions of Social Groups: National and Racial Groups

Children spend a lot of energy trying to understand their place in the world, including the impressions that people have of the groups to which they belong (Dunham et al. 2007). Individuals are born in a country and with a certain ethnicity; these aspects can include key cultural and physical traits that will impact their psychological momentum, a fact that has led many scholars to look principally into the study of national and racial groups in childhood. These studies on children's concepts of a nation started with the investigations of Piaget and Weil (1951), Barrett (2005).

Piaget and Weil (1951) argue that the development of the concept of nationality and the subsequent development of attitudes toward their own and other nations involve the dual and parallel process of cognitive and emotional development. The authors found that children around the age of seven had a limited and confused

understanding of their own country. Children seemed not to base their feelings about different countries on geographical or historical facts, but on learned social and affective facts of a comparative nature. Children learn that foreign countries can be "bad" or "good," almost before they learn anything about them (Tajfel 1981).

Barrett and Short (1992) asked English children from 5–10 years old for their images of European countries, including France, Germany, Spain, and Italy. They found that 5–7 year olds have limited knowledge about different countries and even some fundamental uncertainties about their own, for example, when confusing internal territorial divisions of the country with the country itself.

Barrett (2013), when reviewing studies on the geographical understanding of the country itself, found that understanding begins from about 5–6 years old and knowledge about other countries starts at 7 or 8 years old. This knowledge extends and develops significantly in adolescence; and is influenced by gender, ethnicity, children's travel experiences, cognitive factors, and educational experiences.

Studies in this area have broadened to include feelings for one's own country, knowledge of national stereotypes, and identification with one's own country. Feelings about different countries and emotional attachment to one's own were analyzed through children's preferences for their own or other countries. Barrett (2005) argued that children's preferences for their own country tend to be random before 7 or 8 years old; however, an enemy country is generally disliked. At 7 or 8 years of age the preference for one's own country is generally higher than for other countries, and remains strong until early adolescence. In adolescence, children begin to make comparisons between their own country and other countries, with their own country being seen as superior. The perception of superiority of their own country declines after the age of sixteen.

Torres (1999) claims that national consciousness develops through social comparison mechanisms. All peoples and nations transmit values, symbols, and myths, which result in favorable social comparisons to other people. National socialization includes the transmission of stereotypes and prejudices associated with other peoples and nations, preventing the perception of them as a heterogeneous reality.

Rutland (1999) observed in a sample of British children that before the age of ten they did not display national prejudice, ingroup favoritism or self-stereotypes. In this study, ingroup favoritism began only at 10 years old, at which time children began to reproduce the self-stereotype of 'The British'. However, prejudice, particularly directed at Germans, appeared at age twelve, becoming more evident among the 14–16 year olds. Rutland's (1999) results seem to be strengthened by Barrett (2005), which stated that feelings and assigned traits about national ingroups are less positive between 5 and 11 years old. At this stage, there was a greater perception of positive feelings and traits attributed to national outgroup.

We will now consider how children understand their own racial group. What is their understanding of race and of relations between racial groups? Racial categorization is cognitively analogous to the categorization of objects, in the sense that learning racial categories follows the same principle as learning about object categories (Hisrschfeld 2005).

To Hisrschfeld (2005), humans have a natural interest in each other and this interest makes them attend to all aspects of other people's lives such as their behavior, relationships with others, and group affiliations. Children are born prepared to react to social entities and by the age of 5 years they distinguish between aggregates (people who are merely physically close to each other), and groups as single entities (people who are together intentionally; Hisrschfeld 2001). This demonstrates how much children are prepared to respond to social entities, which is an important aspect in understanding social groups.

The development of racial categories requires the ability to classify people based on their appearance. As stated by Katz (1983), children are able to recognize relevant perceptual clues allowing them to differentiate people by race, and this ability occurs first at about 3 years of age. This race recognition increases significantly by the age of five (Aboud 1988; Clark and Clark 1947; Katz 1983).

To better appreciate children's thinking about racial groups it is important to understand when they perceive themselves as belonging to a racial group, which can be tested by analyzing their self-categorization. Aboud (1977, 1980, 1988) noted that racial self-categorization becomes more consistent as children age. Thus, 3-year-old white Canadian children self-categorized as white about 75 % of the time, while these rates rose to nearly 100 % between 6 and 8 years old. Some black children self-categorized by 3 years old as well, but numbers of these children were generally small among the younger ones (3–5 years), and rarely exceeded 90 % of children between 8 and 10 years old. Indeed, Milner (1983) studied English, Pakistani, and Indian children of 5–8years old in England. He found 100 % correct self-categorization among the English children, but for the Indian children this figure was 76 % and in the Pakistani children this figure dropped to 52 %.

In a study of Brazilian children, França and Monteiro (2002) found that 80 % of children as young as 5 years old categorized others based on race. With respect to racial self-categorization it was observed that only 39.7 % of black children and 54 % of mulatto categorized themselves in terms of their own race, while among white children the figure was about 79 %.

When children understand the difference between groups, separating them using appropriate categories and including themselves in those categories, attitudes about the different groups emerge as well. These attitudes can be influenced by specific circumstances of the context of intergroup relations (such as conflict and intergroup competition), by the social status of each group and degree of identification. Some studies based on social identity theory (Bigler et al. 1997; Nesdale and Flesser 2001) have shown the presence of ingroup favoritism in children, and that favoritism may be dependent on the social status of the group. Differences between their group's status and that of other groups is already understood by children as young as 5 years old and these differences have an impact on their group attitudes (Nesdale and Flesser 2001).

Nesdale and Flesser (2001) found that when children believed that group boundaries are permeable, that is, that it is possible to change group membership, children from low status groups wanted to change to the other group more often than children from high status groups did. In addition, children from high status

groups viewed themselves as more similar to their group than did those of lower status. In contrast, when switching groups was not possible, children from lower status groups perceived themselves as more similar to their own group than those of higher status.

Ingroup favoritism was observed by Magie et al. (2005) in African-American and Latino children 6–9 years old, who evaluated transgressions committed by whites as more negative than offenses committed by blacks. In a recent study, França and Lima (2011) found that the attitudes of indigenous and black Brazilian children toward their own and other groups differed depending on whether they were supported by national affirmative action programs. Children who were supported by affirmative action programs said that they were black and enjoyed their group more than those who were not.

Other studies have shown that attitudes about groups can be determined by social norms present in intergroup contexts, finding that the presence of an anti-racist social norm reduces intergroup bias in majority group children as young as 8 years old (Fitzroy and Rutland 2010; França and Monteiro 2013; McGlothlin et al. 2005; Monteiro et al. 2009).

Conclusions

Our initial curiosity concerned children's social understanding. We asked how do children understand themselves, other people, social institutions, structures, and groups. Through this theoretical exploration, we discovered that children develop an understanding of social reality by building their own theories in the different domains of social knowledge when searching for explanations of the various phenomena and real-life situations they encounter. Hisrschfeld (2001) affirmed that even very young children have lay theories about society that emerge in order to reason about aggregates of human beings. These theories increase in complexity through novel experiences and cognitive development.

We conclude our analysis by addressing current trends in the study of social cognition. Recent studies in this area have found evidence for the importance of the socio-cultural context in the development of self-recognition in the mirror. They also show the necessity of developing new methods to study this phenomenon and they emphasize the importance of social norms that influence the social consciousness. A study by Kartner et al. (2012) exemplifies this trend. In this study, children of parents who encouraged autonomy had higher rates of self-recognition. Another study, from Rochat et al. (2012), showed that indicators of children's consciousness of themselves, such as self-recognition in a mirror, are influenced by social factors and not the outcome of a mental or introspective process. In their study, they showed that children do not remove a sticker from their face (which would indicate self-recognition in the mirror in the standard paradigm) in a context in which the social norm was to have a sticker on your face.

In the field of intergroup relations, research has discovered a number of things about social interactions and the ways children develop these interactions (Rutland et al. 2010; Killen and Rutland 2011). Some explanatory models should be emphasized here, such as Social Domain Theory (Turiel 1998; Smetana 2006), which aims at understanding intergroup relations established by the child while considering the development of moral and normative judgments in different social contexts. It conceives that social interactions established in early childhood with family and caregivers are precursors of moral judgment. According to this model, social judgments are made on the basis of their moral, societal, and psychological implications. Social judgments are based on the child's reasoning, and develop as the child's reasoning develops (Killen and Rutland 2011).

Another prominent model is the model of the development of subjective group dynamics (DSGD; Abrams and Rutland 2008; Abrams et al. 2003), which has recently (Abrams et al. 2009) been linked to research on the theory of mind. Among other assumptions, this approach assumes that moral judgment and understanding of norms require the ability to understand that others assess the actions of people and can accept or reject them. In other words, our actions are represented and evaluated in the minds of others. Thus, moral reasoning and the theory of mind develop concurrently. Research supporting this perspective suggests that the socially oriented reasoning children use to decide whether to accept the authority of adults can be predicted by a child's developmental level of theory of mind and their emotional understanding (Lane et al. 2010).

Studies undertaken during this half century of research in understanding of the self, others, and the relationships between social groups have shown advances, but there is still a need to continue research in this area. We hope that this chapter will raise new issues to be investigated. The studies presented here clarify aspects of the understanding of the social development of children and adolescents, which can be translated into practice by parents, educators, and other institutions. Focusing on research about intergroup attitudes and understanding how these attitudes manifest developmentally can help to promote positive social experiences for children and young people of minority and majority groups.

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Chapter 3
Intergroup Relations and Strategies of Minorities

Joana Alexandre, Miriam Rosa and Sven Waldzus

Inter-group relations is a two-way affair. This means that to improve relations between groups both of the interacting groups have to be studied.

Lewin (1946, p. 151)

Abstract This chapter addresses how asymmetric status positions work out in intergroup relations. In particular, the chapter focuses on one of the possible ways in which disadvantaged groups can deal with their situation: Social creativity. This chapter introduces social identity theory, which is fundamental for the understanding of asymmetric intergroup relations. Much in line with Tajfel's thinking, in a study on children from different ethnic backgrounds the authors present evidence how under some circumstances social creativity can contribute to the upholding of the status quo. The authors also present empirical results from several studies in which they demonstrate how minorities are able to hold views on social reality, particularly on more inclusive superordinate categories, that are specifically, and very systematically distinct from the views held by their dominant majority outgroups. With that they provide evidence for the so far neglected emancipative potential of social creativity in studies with members of ethnic minorities in Portugal, with members of a strong belief minority (Evangelic Protestants in Portugal), and one study with people from two regions, Lisbon and Porto, the latter the allegedly "rival" of Lisbon. They claim that—compared to the alternative strategy of open social competition with the powerful outgroup—social creativity has been underestimated as a strategy of social change.

Keywords Status positions · Intergroup relations · Social creativity · Superordinate categories · Religious minorities · Ethnic minorities

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Introduction

Often, we have the impression that the way things are is not the way things should be. We feel that we are members of a disadvantaged group and that we should do something about it. The history of mankind is full of examples of how certain groups try to influence status and power inequalities in intergroup relations in order to change the ingroup's disadvantaged social position. Recent examples that received large media attention are the uprising of people in northern Africa and the Middle East and huge manifestations in southern European countries that are not any longer ready to accept strong austerity measures taken by their governments. However, there are other less visible and less spectacular processes of social change that are going on permanently in all parts of the world.

The current chapter is dedicated to a deeper understanding of the social psychology of socially disadvantaged or devalued groups, particularly if they are minorities (e.g., Blanz et al. 1995). We think that such a contribution is the best way to honor Maria Benedicta Monteiro, who herself has dedicated large part of her research to the question how relative status influences intergroup perceptions (Guinote et al. 2007) and intergroup attitudes (Alexandre et al. 2007; Feddes et al. 2013; Guerra et al. 2010; Monteiro et al. 2009), research that has inspired the authors of this chapter in their own work over many years.

In this particular chapter, we approach this issue by examining intergroup judgments of both minority members and members of their more powerful outgroups, in the light of often pervasive social reality constraints related to shared collective representations of social status or/and power inequalities (Alexandre 2010; Ellemers et al. 1997; Waldzus et al. 2004).

As group-based social hierarchies are characteristic of most human societies (e.g., Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Sidanius et al. 2001), a distinction can be made between groups that are considered as having a higher status position, which are usually perceived as valued, dominant, and/or powerful, and groups that are considered as having a lower status position, which are usually considered as socially devalued, disadvantaged, and/or powerless and that hold less privileges or resources (e.g., Tajfel 1978, 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Often, particularly in interethnic contexts, such status and power asymmetries co-vary with groups' size, for instance if in a certain country a majority dominates one or several less numerous minorities culturally, linguistically, and politically (Tajfel 1981). Differentiation based on relative status and/or power positions influence how these groups perceive themselves and how they are perceived by others (Verkuyten 2000). In the current chapter, the focus is on intergroup relations in which such minorities of lower status are involved in intergroup relations with higher status majorities.

Is There Power in the Few? Minorities and Their Challenges

An important milestone in research on minority groups was Moscovici's work on minority influence in the 1970s. His work made it clear that majorities do not just exert social influence over minorities, but that minorities and majorities can simultaneously exert influence over each other (Moscovici and Personnaz 1980). This scientific move was important and still is, as apart from some exceptions (e.g. Barreto and Ellemers 2009; Bergsieker et al. 2010; Goffman 1968; Major and O'Brien 2005; Schmitt and Branscombe 2002; Schmitt et al. 2003; Tajfel 1978; Wright et al. 1990; Wright and Tropp 2002) social psychological research has traditionally treated lower status minorities as rather passive targets (Lorenzi-Cioldi 1988). Their point of view in the analysis of the nature of intergroup dynamics has typically been considered to be of less importance than the attitudes of majority group members (Alexandre 2010; Demoulin et al. 2009; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Shelton 2000; Ryan et al. 2007). More recently, there has been an increasing interest in minorities' points of view (e.g., Outten et al. 2009). However, even these attempts rarely go beyond the role of disadvantaged groups as victims of discrimination. For instance, in 2008 the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA 2009) conducted the first European Minorities and Discrimination survey on experiences of discriminatory treatment, racist crimes, and the report (or not) of complaints or incidents. What has been neglected so far is how minorities can actively influence the construction of social reality, that is, of large-scale contexts and standards, thereby changing frames of reference that perpetuate their relative disadvantage (Howarth et al. 2012).

When studying minority members as agents in behalf of their group it is important not to limit such research to the rather specific phenomenon of collective action, which directly challenges asymmetric power and status relations, as is the case in the above-mentioned examples (Dixon et al. 2012). Collective action is not the only response to inequality that minorities have at their disposal. It is also important to take into account that intergroup relations do not exist in a vacuum (Tajfel 1981). Intergroup relations play out on the backdrop of a collectively constructed social context. This social context includes allegedly shared standards, values, and norms that help maintain the system of stratified social structure (Turner and Reynolds 2001). While the context might be consensual to a degree, it can also serve as a playground of disagreement.

The analysis of such disagreements is particularly relevant, as a growing body of research shows that higher and lower status groups endorse different perspectives or ideologies on intergroup relations, such as differences in the endorsement of diversity/pluralism and multiculturalism versus assimilation and color blindness or differences in the endorsement of asymmetric status hierarchies and inequality (e.g., Deaux et al. 2006; Demoulin et al. 2009; Dovidio et al. 2009; Farley 2005; Hehman

et al. 2012; Ryan et al. 2007). Therefore, a full understanding of intergroup relations can only be accomplished by encompassing multiple perspectives (e.g., Dafflon 1999; Demoulin et al. 2009; Lewin 1948).

Social Fight or Flight: Coping with Minority Status

Social reality that is characterized by status and/or power asymmetries impacts intergroup dynamics in general. For example, majority group members tend to dislike practices reflecting minorities' unique values (Saroglou et al. 2009). It can also make it more difficult for members of minority groups to consider their ingroup's values and attitudes as universal and superior, when compared to relevant majority outgroups' values and attitudes (Axelrod and Hammond 2003). Socially valued majorities holding a dominant and powerful social position often develop a sense of "ownership" over a self-relevant inclusive category that they share with devalued minority groups (Deaux 2006a, b; Hornsey and Hogg 2000). For example, in the U.S. White Americans often see themselves as being more "American" than racial minorities (Doane 1997). Therefore, they tend to feel more entitled to privileges and resources (Wenzel 2004). Even when these assumptions are challenged, it is easy for members of dominating groups to endorse belief systems supporting the preservation of social inequalities (e.g., Alexandre 2010; Blumer 1958; Dovidio et al. 2009; Morrison et al. 2009). Such belief systems often encourage negative attitudes, stereotypes, and/or feelings toward devalued or disadvantaged minority groups (e.g., Stephan and Stephan 1985; Deaux 2006a, b), and further legitimize their negative treatment within society (e.g., Deschamps et al. 2005; Ellemers and Barreto 2001; Pettigrew 1998).

Such minority groups are often under a cognitive-affective crossfire (Tajfel and Turner 1979). As Lewin (1948) puts it, "one of the most severe obstacles in the way of improvement seems to be the notorious lack of confidence and self-esteem of most minority groups. Minority groups tend to accept the implicit judgment of those who have status even where the judgment is directed against themselves. There are many forces which tend to develop in the children, adolescents, and adults of minorities deep-seated antagonism to their own group. An over-degree of submissiveness, guilt, emotionality, and other causes and forms of ineffective behavior follows" (p. 151).

The degree to which minorities accept the judgments of the higher status majority varies from case-to-case. Following Tajfel (1978), a *continuum* can be defined in minority members' behavior and attitudes, where acceptance of inferiority and rejection of the own group's inferior status can be considered the two extremes. Research has been providing evidence for both: On the one hand, Social Identity Theory postulates a degree of the so-called consensual discrimination (Rubin and Hewstone 2004) and there is evidence suggesting that members of devalued groups at times accept group-based inequalities and the relative superiority of members of higher status groups, a phenomenon that some scholars interpret as 'system-justification' or as ideologies that legitimize group-based

inequalities (e.g., Jost et al. 2004; Major and Schmader 2002; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; see however, Brandt 2013). Indeed, social inequalities can become "self-fulfilling prophecies" for minorities (e.g., Snyder et al. 1977): It has been shown that negative attitudes toward certain social groups lead members of these groups to behave in a way that confirms such negative expectations (e.g., Word et al. 1974; see also Major and O'Brien 2005), presumably because they internalize inferiority or face additional concerns resulting from those expectations. Moreover, the acceptance of relative social inferiority (e.g., Allport 1954; Jost and Banaji 1994; Tajfel and Turner 1979) has often detrimental consequences for self-efficacy and performance (e.g., Steele 1997; Steele and Aronson 1995), well-being and psychological distress (e.g., Broman et al. 2000; Crocker and Major 1989; Barreto and Ellemers 2003; Outten et al. 2009; Richman and Leary 2009; Twenge and Crocker 2002).

One might be tempted to consider such accepting of relative inferiority simply as "false consciousness" (Adorno 1954/2003; Marx 1872/1969), however, it is often hard to avoid due to reality constrains in everyday life (Ellemers et al. 1997; Spears et al. 2001; Yzerbyt and Corneille 2005). That is, to ignore such reality constraints minority members would have to disconnect themselves from socially relevant belief-systems that are behind the social organization of large sectors of society. We will come back to such a solution later on when addressing minorities with strong belief systems.

However, even if minorities partially accept relative inferiority, it does not mean that lower status groups cannot at the same time display "reality-constrained ingroup favoritism" (Ellemers et al. 1997, p. 188), that is, using more subtle ways of achieving ingroup positive distinctiveness (Oldmeadow and Fiske 2010; Tajfel and Turner 1979).

Tajfel and Turner (1979) have addressed some of the psychological and behavioral strategies that minority members use to face or to change their (negative) social position (Blanz et al. 1998; Ellemers 2001) and thereby achieve self-enhancement. These so-called *identity management strategies* depend on the ideological context (Turner 1999; Turner and Reynolds 2001; Verkuyten and Reijerse 2008) shaping group members shared beliefs about the socio-structural characteristics of the intergroup relation they are in: When status differences between groups are perceived as stable and legitimate, but, members are believed to be able to move freely between groups, these permeability of boundaries promotes an individualistic strategy of social mobility. In this case, individuals can distance themselves from their devalued ingroup which in some cases means that they can identify with the valued outgroup (see also Verkuyten and Reijerse 2008).[1] When intergroup boundaries are perceived as impermeable, as is often the case with ethnic and racial groups, minority individuals tend to be more inclined to adopt collective strategies,

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[1]However, there are psychological boundaries for social mobility, such as high ingroup identification that prevents people from trying to change their group membership, especially when such membership is chosen (e.g., Jetten and Branscombe 2009).

rather than pursue individual mobility. These collective strategies generally fall under two categories: social competition and social creativity. Social competition includes collective action, open hostility, and conflict, whereas social creativity involves rather a reframing of the intergroup relation that allows for positive inter-group comparisons. For the purpose of this chapter we will mainly focus on the latter (i.e., social creativity), as it has found less attention so far in the literature.

Social Creativity

One type of social creativity strategy involves avoiding comparisons that are unfavorable for the ingroup, by attempting to create new comparison dimensions that are favorable (see also Lemaine et al. 1978). Such a strategy allows group members to see the ingroup more positively without necessarily questioning the superiority of the outgroup on the status-relevant dimensions (see also Mumendey and Schreiber 1984). One of the classical studies showing the use of a social creativity strategy was conducted by Lemaine (1974). He engaged two groups of children that were camping in a competition that aimed at building the best hut. For one of the groups only a set of inappropriate materials was provided, which put its members in a disadvantaged position for winning the competition, compared to the members of the other group of children. As a consequence, he found that children who belonged to this group created new dimensions of comparison with the out-groups that favor their ingroup (e.g., making a good garden). Such socially creative strategies have the effect of redefining the position of the group using unorthodox dimensions that tend to favor the ingroup without directly challenging the outgroup as would happen in social competition strategies (Douglas et al. 2005). They are based on a motivation to reduce the impact of lower status groups' negative social identity, especially if the status relation is perceived as legitimate and stable (Rubin and Hewstone 2004).

Social creativity can serve both individual and collective functions. For example, if creativity is about changing comparison dimensions, it is group level social creativity, whereas focussing on areas in which oneself performs better than other members of one's ingroup is more an individual level strategy (Branscombe and Ellemers 1998). In the same vein, processes and outcomes of social creativity can be looked upon at individual or collective levels. Crocker and Major (1989) suggest that devaluing dimensions selectively, that is, valuing more the dimensions in which the ingroup is better, is related to higher levels of group members' individual self-esteem. For instance, researchers studying ego-defence (e.g., Crocker and Major 1989) or ego-justification perspectives (see Major and Schmader 2002) postulate that members of devalued groups tend to devalue domains in which their own group has poor or negative outcomes (e.g., showing academic disengagement). However, social creativity can also have political implications. The use of creativity strategies can imply rejecting mainstream norms and thereby differentiating one's group from more privileged groups (e.g., Schmitt and Branscombe 2002), therefore,

strengthening the ingroup collective esteem and members' wellbeing (Outten et al. 2009; Outten and Schmitt 2014).

Social creativity can also correspond to attempts to enhance the ingroup's social position through comparisons with third groups that are not the majority, particularly with other devalued groups. Brown (1978) analyzed an intergroup setting involving three groups from an engineering factory, one with a higher status position and two with a lower status position. Generally, results showed that all the three groups tend to favor the ingroup through a positive differentiation process: The higher status group distanced itself from the other two, whereas members of the other two groups minimized the difference between the ingroup and the higher status group while at the same time trying to distance themselves from the other lower status group.

There is evidence that positive differentiation with other devalued groups occurs at early ages. Alexandre et al. (2007) found that 9–13-year-old black Portuguese, white Portuguese and Roma Portuguese children use this social creativity strategy. The authors asked children from all three groups to indicate their preferences for contact with ingroup or outgroup members. Children of all the three groups showed preference for contact with children of the higher status group (white-Portuguese), but the children of the minority groups showed a similar pattern as the workers from Brown's (1978) study. They expressed an equally strong preference for ingroup targets but less preference for targets of the other devalued outgroup. The same pattern was found for internal (vs. external) attribution of success to targets from the three groups involved (Fig. 3.1). That means that the expressed high preference for

Fig. 3.1 Effects of 9–13-year-old children's ethnicity on internal and external attribution when facing successful white, black, and Roma targets. *Note* Error bars are 95 % confidence intervals (CI). Figure based on data from Alexandre et al. (2007), p. 207

the ingroup does not only result from some closeness or familiarity, but indeed indicates a positive ingroup evaluation rather than internalization of the devaluation that these minority children experience from outgroup children. Parts of these results were replicated more recently (Feddes et al. 2013).

Prototypicality Matters: The Role of Superordinate Categories

Traditionally, social creativity strategies have been considered as less effective for the promotion of social change than social competition, because they presumably only change minority members' representations instead of directly changing asymmetrical power relations in society (Tajfel and Turner 1979). However, recent research on the role of more inclusive, superordinate categories that include several subgroups (i.e., both minority and majority groups) seem to suggest that creative contributions of minorities to the collective construction of such superordinate categories might actually carry the potential to trigger social change as well (Subasic et al. 2008).

To understand this potential of social creativity, it is important to analyze status and/or power asymmetries in terms of prototypicality differences within social categories. Minority groups often deal with their alleged lack of prototypicality. For instance, when people think of US-Americans they might rather imagine a White, Christian, male American, rather than a Black, Muslim, or female American. Following the Ingroup Projection Model (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999; Wenzel et al. 2007), such prototypicality constructions are often dominated by majorities, but even if the odds are not very high, minorities might be able to challenge such ethnocentric prototypicality constructions, which, as we will see, can have tremendous consequences for minorities' self-definition.

The Ingroup Projection Model was developed by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999). It adopts self-categorization theory's (Turner 1985; Turner et al. 1987) assumption that the evaluation of intergroup similarities and differences is only possible if one's ingroup and a relevant outgroup are compared with respect to a broader category in which both groups are included. Thus, part of the devaluation of minorities results from social comparisons within a larger categorical context (e.g., Black and White Americans are compared as Americans). The prototype of a superordinate category provides the norms or standards according to which the subgroups are compared and evaluated. Relative ingroup prototypicality is defined as "the degree to which the ingroup is perceived to be more (or less) prototypical for a given superordinate group than the outgroup" (Wenzel et al. 2007, p. 336). Because "self-categories tend to be positive" (Turner et al. 1987, p. 58–59), the more similar a subgroup is to the prototype of the superordinate category, the more positively it will be evaluated. Moreover, the Ingroup Projection Model also adopts Social Identity Theory's (Tajfel and Turner 1979) assumption that groups tend to

strive for a positive social identity. Therefore, it postulates that superordinate categories may trigger ethnocentric intergroup comparisons (Gumplowicz 1883, 1887; Sumner 1906). Other groups are evaluated not according to neutral standards, but according to the standards that reflect the own group's characteristics and values (e.g., Boen et al. 2010; Devos and Banaji 2005; Devos et al. 2010; Imhoff et al. 2011; Paladino and Vaes 2009; Ufkes et al. 2012; Waldzus et al. 2004; Wenzel et al. 2003), thereby rendering the outgroup more negative, as it naturally deviates from these standards. In other words, group members tend to *project* distinctive ingroup attributes onto the inclusive category and therefore the ingroup (its attributes and values) is considered to be more similar to the prototype of the (positive) inclusive category than the outgroup (*ingroup projection*).[2]

Ingroup projection is not an inevitable process, which means that not every group perceives itself to be more prototypical than other groups. Several predictors of ingroup projection have been studied, particularly social identification (e.g., Wenzel et al., 2003), the cognitive representation of a given superordinate category (e.g., Waldzus et al. 2004; Wenzel et al. 2003), as well as its valence (Wenzel et al. 2003, Study 3).[3]

While there are differences in the extent to which groups project, depending on the above-mentioned moderators, ingroup projection is a pervasive tendency. It partly results from cognitive biases (e.g., Machunsky and Meiser 2009, 2013; Rosa and Waldzus 2012), but to be prototypical is also highly desirable, particularly when superordinate categories are positive. Prototypicality leads to more security in the ingroup's position (Jetten et al. 2002), and it gives the ingroup more power to define the prototype of the superordinate category (Reicher and Hopkins 2001). This motivational hypothesis is conceptually similar to positive distinctiveness (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and goes in line with Turner et al. (1987) argument that "ethnocentrism (…) depends upon the perceived prototypicality of the ingroup in comparison with relevant outgroups (relative prototypicality) in terms of the valued superordinate self-category that provides the basis of the intergroup comparison" (p. 61). Research has found that the higher the ingroup's relative prototypicality, the more negative is the evaluation of outgroups that are different from the ingroup(e.g., Alexandre 2010; Boen et al. 2010; Hahn et al. 2010; Kessler and Mummendey 2009; Machunsky et al. 2009; Tseung-Wong and Verkuyten 2010; van Leeuwen

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[2]Ingroup projection is similar to, but not the same as, the false consensus effect (Ross et al. 1977) and social projection (Allport 1924; Krueger 2007). At a group level, it corresponds to an overestimation of ingroup prototypicality (Kessler and Mummendey 2009; Mark and Edward 1995), and differs from *social projection* not only theoretically but also empirically (Bianchi et al. 2009; Machunsky et al. 2009). Whereas, ingroup projection describes a generalization process that is made from the ingroup to the superordinate category (of attributes and values) with important implications for intergroup evaluation (intergroup level), social projection implies a generalization of the individual self to the ingroup (see also Waldzus 2009) and is relevant for the representation of an ingroup's prototype (interpersonal level).

[3]Other predictors have also been tested, though it is not our purpose to discuss them deeply: intergroup threat (Ullrich et al. 2006), conditions of information processing (e.g., Machunsky and Meiser 2009, 2013; Rosa and Waldzus 2012), and group goals (Sindic and Reicher 2008).

et al. 2003; Waldzus et al. 2005; Waldzus and Mummendey 2004; Waldzus et al. 2005; Wenzel et al. 2003). This is especially consequential in cases of status asymmetry because, through projection, high status groups will tend to perceive the asymmetry as justifiable and legitimate (Weber et al. 2002; Sibley 2010).

Ingroup Projection in Asymmetric Intergroup Relations

Because groups disagree in the extent of prototypicality they assign to ingroup and outgroup(s) (Imhoff et al. 2011; Waldzus et al. 2004), the perception that being different means being worse is likely to be reciprocal for both ingroup and outgroup (s). However, in asymmetric intergroup relations minorities seem to have fewer possibilities for ingroup projection. It is not yet completely clear why this is the case, but some prototypicality cues that seem to be used by many people to infer prototypicality make it more likely that majority prototypes come into people's minds when they think about the superordinate category. Such cues are for example being simply more people (e.g., heterosexuals as compared to homosexuals), having been member of the superordinate category for a long time (e.g., local population as compared to immigrants), or simply overlap in the names of the subgroup and the superordinate category (e.g. European Union and Europe; Americans of the US and Americans of the American continent; men when used to talk about humans). Some majorities even get so used to take their subgroup as *pars-pro-toto* that their subgroup identity, such as Non-disabled people, West-Germans, or ethnically White Americans, somehow fades away or becomes very implicit (Doane 1997). Thus, "(…) it is minorities in particular who are likely to find social reality to be a stumbling block for claims of prototypicality" (Wenzel et al. 2007, p. 364). In line with this reasoning, research has shown that ingroup projection is affected by reality constraints, that is, by status and power asymmetries between groups (e.g., Devos and Banaji 2005; Waldzus 2004, Study 3). Minorities often consider the majority outgroup to be more prototypical than the own minority group.

Minorities' Ingroup Projection

Members of minority groups are often perceived to deviate more from desired societal norms and values, relative to members of majority groups (Turner 1985). These social asymmetries can lead to an intergroup consensus in terms of prototypicality perceptions, as both minorities and majorities might agree that minority members are less prototypical for a common superordinate category, and therefore inferior to members of the majority. Supporting this notion, Waldzus et al. (2004, Study 3), examined prototypicality perceptions among East and West Germans, and found that members of both groups agreed that West Germans were the more

prototypical subgroup for the superordinate category Germans. Such findings suggest that ingroup projection can be viewed as an adaptive perception that takes into account social reality asymmetries. Most importantly, however, in this study there was still a divergence between both subgroups. The constraints posited by social reality lead members of the lower status minority to recognize the relative superiority of the outgroup, but groups disagreed about the difference in typicality between East Germans and West Germans for Germans in general. The minority perceived a smaller prototypicality difference between the groups than the majority did.

Devos and Banaji (2005) found similar results in the U.S. with White and Black participants. Black Americans considered White Americans to be highly prototypical of the superordinate American category, likely due to reality constraints (Yzerbyt and Corneille 2005). Nevertheless, there was disagreement between the two groups when came to the relative prototypicality assigned. Black Americans did not rate their ingroup as low in prototypicality as Whites did, suggesting that Blacks participants might have engaged in ingroup projection.

Hence, although minorities often take into account social reality in their relative prototypicality judgments (Alexandre 2010), disagreement about such aspects might indicate some resistance of the minority to completely accept the status quo defined by the majority. Such disagreement, if expressed persistently, might contribute to a change in social discourse and thereby promote social change in the long run, particularly when minorities advocate increasing tolerance rather than through conversion strategies (e.g., Prislin and Filson 2009). Accordingly, Waldzus et al. (2004) assume "that strategic concerns about the positive identity, status and power of one's group should render claims for prototypicality an argument in a discourse, be it with ingroup members, outgroup members or external observers" (pp. 397–398). Although we are not aware of respective research in these contexts, one can easily imagine how important such prototypicality claims are for various minority groups such as homosexual couples claiming their rights to marry and to adopt children, disabled persons claiming their right to have public spaces adapted to their needs, or women claiming equal recognition for their work.

The Role of Complexity

Questioning asymmetric prototypicality constellations and disagreeing with the majority's view is one step. Is it possible, however, to convince majorities and even some members of the own minority group that consensus is possible about equal prototypicality between minorities and majorities? A partial answer to that question comes from research on the cognitive representation of superordinate categories. Like social categories in general, superordinate categories are mentally represented, at least partly, as prototypes (Turner et al. 1987). According to Rosch (1978), the prototype of a category can be described as "those members of a category that most

reflect the redundancy structure of the category as a whole" or "the clearest cases of category membership defined operationally by people's judgements of goodness of membership in the category" (pp. 36–37). As long as there is a clearly defined prototype, minorities are at disadvantage when it comes to being perceived as the subgroup most representative of superordinate category. However, Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) argue that relative ingroup prototypicality may be dependent upon the definability of the superordinate category. A relatively undefined proto-type can undermine ingroup projection as it does not provide a sufficient basis for claims of high prototypicality. Under certain circumstances superordinate cate-gories can be assumed to be relatively weakly defined (Rosch et al. 1976), and they can vary in their degree of clarity (Hogg et al. 1993) or definition. Apart from low clarity or vagueness the complexity of the representation of superordinate cate-gories has been found to influence relative prototypicality judgments (Peker et al. 2010). Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) suggest that the representation of a certain superordinate category can be *complex*, if the "distribution of representative members on the prototypical dimension is (…) multimodal" (p. 167); that is, "distinctive positions on the dimensions of the prototype can be perceived as equally prototypical or normative" (p. 168; see also Waldzus 2010). If superordi-nate categories are complex, they are explicitly diverse and different groups can be considered prototypical and normative for that category (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999; Waldzus et al. 2003; Meireles 2007). Thus, a complex representation might mitigate the existence of a simple or clearly defined prototype (e.g., Machunsky et al. 2009).[4] For instance, in one study with Germans and Poles as subgroups and Europe as the superordinate category (Waldzus et al. 2003, Study 2), complexity was manipulated by asking German participants to write about the diversity (vs. unity) of Europe, assuming that this kind of manipulation would generate the activation of different dimensions of the superordinate category and therefore a more diverse representation of this category (see also Waldzus et al. 2005). As predicted, they found that in the high complexity condition relative prototypicality of Germans compared to Poles was lower than in the control condition (see Peker et al. 2010 and Waldzus et al. 2005 for replications).

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[4]Complexity as it was conceptualized within ingroup projection research is conceptually different from (work-group) *diversity* as it is defined in organizational science (e.g., van Knippenberg et al. 2004): Generally, the latter refers to two major aspects, *social category diversity*, that is, differ-ences in visible attributes (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, age), and *informational/functional diversity*, which is related to less detectable attributes (e.g., educational background). Diversity in that sense corresponds to characteristics of the members, which is also closer to the idea of variability or heterogeneity postulated by several researchers (e.g., Judd et al. 1995; Park and Judd 1990). The focus is mainly on differences between (sub)groups rather than a particular representation of a given superordinate category (e.g., organization).

Although related in several ways, complexity as it has been defined within ingroup projection research should be distinguished from *multicultural ideologies* (e.g., Wolsko et al. 2000; Verkuyten 2005; Verkuyten and Brug 2004). Whereas the former corresponds to a cognitive representation of a given group, multicultural ideologies refer to belief systems about a given society as a whole (Waldzus 2010). Both concepts are, though, related insofar as endorsement of a multicultural ideology might facilitate the establishment of complex representations of superordinate categories and vice versa.

Complex representations, in particular, can play an important role in the identity management of members of lower status minority groups. They may be a way to turn a secure (stable, legitimate) asymmetric intergroup relation into an insecure one, by providing a desirable alternative to the status quo. Moreover, they allow for such social change to be achieved without necessarily generating intergroup conflict, as they also affect intergroup perceptions of majority members for whom complex representations of superordinate categories might be more acceptable than a simple loss of the dominating position. For instance, Prislin and Filson (2009) found that minority effected social change that undermined the majority's dominating position affected majority members' identification less negatively if it was achieved via advocating tolerance for diversity of possible viewpoints, which corresponds to a complex representation of superordinate categories, than when it was achieved by converting majority members to the minority's position. Such research can help to understand several historical developments that have led to more equal intergroup status positions, such as reduction in institutionalized racism and sexism and the emancipation of homosexuals in several societies (e.g., Subasic et al. 2008).

In sum, there are reasons to assume that inducing complex representations of superordinate categories as part of a shared overall belief system can reduce prejudice among members of the dominant group (Waldzus et al. 2005) and increase social identity of minorities, without undermining the positive social identity of the majority. Is there any empirical evidence that complex representations actually lead to consensus about more or less equal prototypicality between minority and majority members? For such balance in prototypicality judgments it would not only have to decrease the relative prototypicality of the majority from the point of view of majority members, but also to increase relative prototypicality of minority members from their own point of view. Across three studies Alexandre (2010) examined whether the effect of complex representations of (positive) self-relevant superordinate categories on relative ingroup prototypicality is moderated by status. Using both natural (Study 1) and with artificial groups (Studies 2–3), she found that when minority groups are presented with a more complex representation of a positive superordinate category, they tend to increase the degree to which they perceive their ingroup as prototypical of the superordinate category, more than majority groups do.

Negative Superordinate Categories

The same logic seems to work when negative instead of positive superordinate categories are used as frame of reference for intergroup comparisons. Although prototypes of social categories representing ingroups are usually positive (Hogg et al. 1993) and although self-categories "tend to be evaluated positively and that there are motivational pressures to maintain this state of affairs" (Turner et al. 1987, p. 57) it is true that sometimes people can belong to social categories that have a negative connotation. Groups can be reference groups (Allport 1954) even if they are negative, and they can also be used as a comparison frame for intergroup evaluations. Under some circumstances people do identify with social categories that are negatively evaluated (e.g., Mlicki and Ellemers 1996). After the 9/11 terrorist attack, countries with a strong Islamic influence were more negatively than positively evaluated by North Americans and Western Europeans reflecting concerns about terrorism (e.g., Kalkan et al. 2009). What can we expect in terms of prototypicality judgments when more inclusive categories have a negative connotation? Wenzel et al. (2003) suggested that when inclusive categories are negatively evaluated the meaning of prototypicality changes. Being prototypical for a negative superordinate category should have negative implications for the ingroup. Wenzel et al. (2003, Study 3) found support for this hypothesis. In a computer-based experiment, they found that the evaluation of the reference standard moderated prototypicality perceptions. More concretely, they manipulated the valence of Europe by asking German participants (one of the subgroups) to type into an open text-field their thoughts about either the positive or the negative aspects of the inclusive category (Europe). In the positive condition, they found the usual positive and negative relations of relative ingroup prototypicality with ingroup identification and attitudes toward the outgroup, respectively. In the negative superordinate category condition, however, these relations were reversed. The less German participants identified with Germans, the more they saw them relatively prototypical, and the more they saw them as prototypical, the more positive were their attitudes toward Poles (outgroup).[5]

Alexandre (2010) tested whether complexity will also lead to consensual equal prototypicality for minorities and majorities when the superordinate category is negative. More specifically, in two studies (Study 4 with Black and White

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[5]More recently, Bianchi et al. (2009, Study 2) showed that ingroup projection depends not only on the valence of the superordinate category, but also on the valence of the ingroup: participants (German students) were first asked to think about Germans in general, then, the positivity of the image of such category was manipulated. Following Schwarz et al. (1991) half of the participants were asked to write down three positive aspects of Germans (positive ingroup image condition), and the other half to write down twelve positive aspects of the same group (less positive ingroup image condition); note that the method is based on the difficulty that members will have to list twelve instead of only three positive aspects. Participants displayed more ingroup projection, that is, they considered their ingroup to be more relatively prototypical, in the positive ingroup image condition than in the less positive image condition.

Fig. 3.2 Estimated marginal means and standard errors of perceptions of prototypicality of the ingroup (IG) and outgroup (OG) as a function of status and complex representations of a negative superordinate category (criminals in Portugal). *Note* Figure from Alexandre (2010), p. 105

Portuguese and Study 5 with artificial groups) she tested the interaction of group status and complexity of superordinate categories in perceptions of relative ingroup prototypicality when those categories are negative. In a context in which a superordinate category is negatively evaluated (e.g., criminals in Portugal in Study 4), members of a devalued group (Black Portuguese) might perceive themselves to be more prototypical than the advantaged outgroup (White Portuguese). The question was whether this unfavorable negative prototypicality decreases when the representation of the superordinate category is complex. Overall she found in both studies that prototypicality perceptions were constrained by status differences. Lower status minority groups perceived themselves and were perceived by the outgroup as less prototypical of a positive, but as more prototypical of a negative superordinate category than members of the higher status majority group. Most importantly, complexity helped members of the lower status groups distance themselves from the negative superordinate category by claiming less relative ingroup prototypicality (Fig. 3.2).

Minorities' Claiming Higher Prototypicality

In none of the cases with positive superordinate categories that we have discussed so far did minorities find conditions to perceive themselves as more prototypical than majorities. The reason, we propose, lies in the reality constraints discussed above. However, is it possible that minorities can stay unaffected by such reality constraints and freely engage in ingroup projection? Despite an observable tendency of minorities to share part of the majorities view, it is also possible to identify particular minority groups that perceive themselves to be superior or more

Fig. 3.3 Estimated marginal means and standard errors of the difference between ingroup and outgroup prototypicality (relative ingroup prototypicality) depending on group membership and accuracy motivation. *Note* Figure from Rosa (2011) Study 4, p. 120

prototypical of a certain inclusive category that they share with a higher status group (e.g., Rosa 2011; Rosa et al. 2011).

Examples of such groups are those with strong beliefs and groups that consider themselves to be representative of social change on the level of more inclusive, superordinate categories. For example, a strong belief system can be a form of social identity (Ysseldyk et al. 2010) which is self-selected. Therefore, one can expect strong identification (an important moderator of ingroup projection, e.g. Ullrich et al. 2006; Wenzel et al. 2007) within strong belief groups (Jetten and Branscombe 2009). Rosa (2011) hypothesized that unlike most minorities that show outgroup rather than ingroup projection, minorities whose group is based on a strong belief (e.g., religious groups, political/environmental activists, etc.) should consider themselves highly prototypical for a superordinate category that is belief-related.

Consistent with that reasoning, in a study with Catholics (majority) and Evangelical Protestants (minority) in Portugal, she found that, although members of the Protestant minority perceived their status, as well as meta-perceptions of relative prototypicality (i.e., how they are seen by the others), to be lower, they considered themselves even more prototypical than the Catholic majority for the superordinate category of Christians in Portugal. Interestingly, the Protestant minority showed the pattern usually found in unquestioned majorities. Rosa and Waldzus (2012) had shown different sources of ingroup projection among majorities, depending on perceptions about the security of the intergroup context. For secure majorities, whose higher status is not challenged, ingroup projection stems from a cognitive bias (i.e., reduced under high accuracy instructions, when participants are instructed to think twice before they answer), driven by rather unspecific motives such as

cognitive efficiency. In contrast, for insecure majorities, who's higher status is questioned and instable, ingroup projection is the result of socially motivated cognition (e.g., defense motivated and therefore not reduced or even increased under high accuracy instructions).

For the strong belief minority (Protestants in Portugal), relative ingroup prototypicality was reduced under high accuracy instructions, indicating that it was a bias motivated by cognitive efficiency rather than identity defense (Fig. 3.3). These data suggest that this minority group is unaffected by the reality constraints that minorities usually face.

How is that possible? Does the strong belief of these people make them blind to social reality, so that they are unable to adapt their prototypicality judgments to the social context? Rosa (2011) hypothesized that this is not the case. She conducted a similar field experiment with another sample of Evangelical Protestants, in which the same minority (Evangelical Protestants) was comparing to the dominant majority (Catholics) based on a belief-unrelated superordinate category (Portuguese) or a belief-related superordinate category (Christians in the Portuguese context). It was found that the so-called "reality constraints" were only ignored in the belief-related context. Although in both superordinate category conditions, Protestants perceived their status and meta-perceptions of prototypicality to be lower than those of the majority, they only showed strong ingroup projection in the belief-related superordinate category condition, and again this was reduced by high accuracy instructions, replicating the finding of the previous study. In the belief-unrelated superordinate category condition, the same Protestant minority showed the pattern usually expected for minorities. Their prototypicality judgments corresponded with reality constraints, such that they perceived minorities to be less prototypical than majorities (Fig. 3.4).

Thus, the high relative prototypicality claimed by strong belief minorities—which seems to indicate that the group is immune against shared collective constructions of

Fig. 3.4 Estimated marginal means and standard errors of the difference between ingroup and outgroup prototypicality (relative ingroup prototypicality) depending on group membership and accuracy motivation. *Note* Figure from Rosa (2011), Study 5, p. 141

Fig. 3.5 Estimated marginal means and standard errors of the difference between ingroup and outgroup prototypicality (relative ingroup prototypicality) depending on group membership and superordinate category change. *Note* Figure from Rosa et al. (2011)

social reality that are dominated by the majority outgroup—do not constitute a lack of social adaptation. On the contrary, it is highly specific and adaptive. One might speculate whether such superiority claims might put such groups in a good position to induce social change in the long run. Particularly, the kind of minority influence Moscovici had in mind when developing his research program.

Minorities claiming superiority in the sense of being even more prototypical than the majority outgroup might consider themselves as *avant-garde*, as being the for-runners of a better future compared to the current state of affairs. Rosa et al. (2011) conducted research that provides some evidence for this idea, even for minority groups that are not based on strong shared beliefs. In one study, they manipulated perceptions of future betterment by presenting Portuguese participants with a fake newspaper article that either contained information about prospective growth in the Portuguese economy (e.g. more exportation) or information about the ongoing poor economic climate of the country. Participants who were members of a minority group (Portuguese from Oporto) perceived their ingroup to be more prototypical of the superordinate category Portuguese than the majority (Portuguese from Lisbon), but only when the superordinate category was portrayed as improving in the future (Fig. 3.5).[6]

Taken together, these results challenge the common understanding of minorities as complying with reality constraints and acknowledging inferiority. The results

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[6]When interpreting these results one has to take into account that the dimension of improvement in the future fitted the minorities self-stereotype (i.e., being strong in industrial production). Corresponding to the adaptive nature of prototypicality, judgments would not expect the same results for dimensions that do not fit the self-stereotype of the minority.

suggest that minorities can regain a sense of positive social identity if they are groups with strong beliefs or if they see themselves as contributing to the improvement of the superordinate category.

Summary and Concluding Remarks

In the current chapter, we presented an original approach to minorities' strategies in intergroup relations. In contrast to previous projects of that kind, which emphasize more than the important role of collective action and open confrontation as path of emancipation (e.g., Wright and Baray 2012; Wright and Lubensky 2009), we focused on social creativity strategies in which minorities exercise social influence by contesting shared belief systems that are dominated by majorities' points of view. In the center of our analysis was the concept of relative ingroup prototypicality (Turner et al. 1987; Mummendey and Wenzel 1999), because it represents on the cognitive level the essence of a group's value and recognition in the social arena. Research of the last four decades has shown that people's need to be valued as a group, is crucial for fostering a sense of positive and meaningful social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979). In the constant race for recognition, minorities rarely start off in the pole-position. On the contrary, relative status is often used as a cue or reason (Rosa and Waldzus 2012) to determine what is normative, and thus minorities are often perceived (Devos and Banaji 2005; Waldzus et al. 2004), as non-prototypical of higher order categories that define what is considered desirable within the broader social context. Shared beliefs of that kind, such as Americans are typically White (Devos and Banaji 2005) or that Germans are more prototypical Europeans than Poles (Waldzus et al. 2003, 2005), contribute to the disadvantaged position that minorities usually occupy. To function in such a social context, minorities often have to swallow "reality constraints" (Ellemers et al. 1997; Waldzus et al. 2004; Yzerbyt and Corneille 2005). However, these same shared belief-systems, that perpetuate their disadvantage in society, might also create opportunities for minorities to exercise social influence and potentially better their relative standing in society.

In the current chapter, we discussed research showing that there are several conditions under which minorities can emancipate themselves from the stigma attached to being relatively disadvantaged. Such strategies have a broad range. First, there are self-serving attempts to—collectively or individually—climb up the social hierarchy by differentiating oneself from other disadvantaged groups (Alexandre et al. 2007; Feddes et al. 2013). Second, this emancipation can be achieved via reliance on strong ingroup beliefs that ignore the majority's perspective on identity-relevant dimensions (Rosa 2011). Third, one's minority groups can contribute to a more complex, multifaceted definition of superordinate categories (Alexandre 2010; Waldzus 2010). Finally, some minorities can be understood as an *avant-garde* representing the betterment of the superordinate category in the future (Rosa et al. 2011). We do not consider this list to be complete. Other

conditions enabling minorities to see and present themselves as highly prototypical may exist, and it will be an important task of future research to discover them.

The history of social change almost always involves minorities actively challenging the status quo, to create a place where their disadvantage is at least diminished. In our opinion, the role of social creativity strategies as strategies of actual social change has been underestimated thus far within social psychological (for exceptions see Prislin and Filson 2009; Subasic et al. 2008). One reason might be that they are less visible than some forms of spectacular collective action. Moreover, as they do not directly challenge existing power asymmetries between groups of different social status and therefore might be considered 'opportunistic' from a revolutionary point of view. However, one has to keep in mind that revolutions are mostly carried out by mobilizing majorities (which can be temporary alliances of various minority groups) against illegitimately ruling elites and that the competition for recognition and the fight for minorities' rights is far from over after the breakdown of old oppressive political systems.

On the contrary, historical examples such as the breakdown of the colonial system after World War II and of the communist system at the end of the twentieth century, but also recent revolutions in several North-African and Middle-East countries are blatant examples of ongoing post-revolutionary struggle. We suspect that prototypicality is a key issue in such struggles as it renders one's group representative of larger society and thereby informs feelings of social (in)justice (Wenzel 2004) and provides legitimacy for power claims (Weber et al. 2002). Minorities will only be able to be included in institutions of political representation if they can convince other members of the society, most of the majority members, that they are an integral part of society and therefore to a certain degree also prototypical or at least indispensable (Tseung-Wong and Verkuyten 2010).

Moreover, in more stable societies many social inequalities are perpetuated as long as minorities are considered non-prototypical. The miserable situation of Roma in many European countries is just one example (FRA 2012). At the same time, there is evidence for slow and continuous social change due to minorities' struggle for recognition. Homosexuals can meanwhile marry in many countries, and European politicians have started to recognize that Muslims are part of Europe. Recent projections indicate that in 30 years minorities will be more than 50 % of the U.S. population (Richeson and Craig 2011) and needless to say that the election and even re-election of a president who has an African father was unthinkable in the United States 30 years ago.

In some cases, minorities' ambitions can be highly problematic, particularly if they base their claims on rather exclusive strong beliefs that immunize them against majority driven public discourse. However, often they contribute to a more just and inclusive society by permanently influencing beliefs that these minorities share with majorities within larger societal contexts (Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins 2006). The relevance of taking into account their perceptions, their interactional concerns, and their opportunities and strategies of social influence is more important than ever, not only for understanding intergroup relations, but also in order to develop intergroup interventions that intelligently accompany on-going social change.

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Part II
Social Construction of Identities and Social Categories

Chapter 4
"Back to the Future:" Ideological Dimensions of Intergroup Relations

Jacques-Philippe Leyens and Jorge Vala

Abstract Many phenomena studied by social psychology are based on ideologies. Ideologies are ideas or systems of ideas inspired by values and objectified in social norms about the way societies should be. This chapter guides our attention to the importance of the ideological dimension of intergroup relations. This dimensions had been emphasized already by Tajfel in his latest writings, but has then been largely neglected in intergroup research. This chapter covers research on explicit ideologies such as colorblindness and multiculturalism as well as equalitarianism and meritocracy, but also on rather ideology constituting fundamental beliefs such as belief in a just world, limited scope of justice, and denial of full humanity to outgroup members. The research the authors report demonstrates how ideologies and shared fundamental beliefs have a pervasive influence on people's construction of reality and can bias their judgment and their moral feelings, often undetected by their consciousness. Importantly, these processes are fundamental for the legitimization of asymmetric status and power relations between members of different social groups.

Keywords Ideologies · Intergroup relations · Multiculturalism · Meritocracy · Belief in a just world · Infra-humanization

Introduction

Many phenomena studied by social psychology are based on ideologies. Ideologies are ideas or systems of ideas inspired by values and objectified in social norms about the way societies should be. These ideologies can influence the way people perceive the world, and impact people's behaviors within social interactions

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(e.g., Katz and Hass 1988; Lerner 1980; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Guimond et al. 2014). Adopting an inclusive perspective on the concept of ideology (for a review see Billig 1984), this chapter will be devoted to analyzing the role of some core ideological principles in the dynamic of intergroup relations. That is, we focus on the impact of ideals about social life and specifically about perceived optimal paths toward harmonious intergroup relations on intergroup attitudes and behaviors.[1]

Throughout its history, the study of intergroup relations has been structured by a diversified range of theoretical perspectives, from personality and psychopathological factors (Adorno et al. 1950) to socio-structural variables (Sherif et al. 1961), cognitive structures (Allport 1954; Hamilton and Guifford 1976), and cognitive and motivational mechanisms articulated by the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Despite the fact that ideologies and their underlying psychological processes were initially considered as important factors associated with the triggering, exacerbation, and mitigation of intergroup conflicts, they did not inspire main stream research. For instance, conservatism and authoritarian ideologies are present in the seminal theoretical approach of Adorno et al. (1950) to discrimination against minority groups, and "social myths" concerning social justice were identified by Tajfel (1981) as core organizers of intergroup relations. Despite these contributions, however, the importance of ideologies has either been relatively forgotten or the object of radical criticism (Lichtman 1993). Radical criticism considers ideologies as literary scenarios (Freeden et al. 2013). Ideologies might be considered scenarios but, far from being literary options, they determine people's thoughts and behaviors.

This chapter follows the forgotten research avenue opened by Tajfel (1981), when he proposed the importance of ideologies or "social myths" to understand intergroup relations. First, we discuss some research results where ideologies are the triggering processes. We will limit ourselves to research we have personally conducted. This constraint leads us to concentrate on *color blindness versus color consciousness* ideologies (e.g. Maquil et al. 2009), belief in a just world (Lerner 1980; Correia et al. 2007), and beliefs underlying infra-humanization (Leyens et al. 2007).[2] Second, we present research that highlights the role of egalitarian and meritocratic ideologies that frame justice norms and mitigate or exacerbate

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[1]There are, in fact, different focuses on the relationship between ideologies and psychological phenomena. For instance, Jost et al. (2003) studied some relevant associations between motivated social cognition and conservative ideologies. Our point of view takes another approach: the study of the impact of some core ideological principles about social life on intergroup relations.

[2]If color blindness and color consciousness are controversial ideological principles applied to "ethnic" relations, the belief in a just world as well as infra-humanization (based on the common sense prominence of secondary emotions in relation to primary ones concerning the definition of humanness) are largely diffused ideological principles that constitute important elements of crucial ideological systems. Indeed, the belief in a just world is part of conservative ideology and is considered a prototype of the ideological level of analysis in social psychology by Doise (1982). Infra-humanization per se is not an ideology but a psychological process associated with the belief that "mine is better than yours," that is, with the ideological principle that supports *group*-based hierarchies (see Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

intergroup conflicts. Finally, we conclude by insisting on the need for an enlargement of the study of the role of ideologies in the construction of psychosocial dimensions of social reality and specifically on the construction of social categories and the dynamics of intergroup relations.

This chapter is dedicated to Maria Benedicta Monteiro and honors her contribution to the study of violence and intergroup relations. Considering social norms as the objectivation of values and ideological principles, this paper has been inspired by Maria's contribution to the study of the impact of social norms on the way intergroup attitudes form and develop (e.g. Monteiro et al. 2009; França and Monteiro 2013).

Disentangling Racially Prejudiced and Non-racially Prejudiced Aspects of Color Blindness and Color Consciousness

In 1954, the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. decided that schools should be desegregated (see Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka in 1954). This decision was sustained by research published some years before, in 1950, by Kenneth Clark (see Benjamin and Crousse 2002). In his research, Clark concluded that institutional discrimination, and specifically racial segregation in public schools, was harmful to the psychological development of black children. This point of view was later developed by the hypothesis that social categories automatically led to prejudice and that social categories necessarily imply ethnocentric conflicts between groups. The same categories were supposed to nourish the negative stereotypes that support prejudice. Specifically, research accentuated the role of decategorization in the elimination of frontiers (Wilder 1981), and as a path to personalized information (Brewer and Miller 1984). Such a perspective can feed the ideology called *color blindness*, which posits that the best way to curb prejudice is by treating individuals equally and without regard to their color or to their so-called ethnicity. Supporters of decategorization were helped by the fact that this process favored conditions of intergroup contacts (Allport 1954). This chapter is not the place to develop ideas on contact conditions leading to harmonious relations between groups but it is proven that, given the presence of those conditions, contact is the best predictor of prejudice reduction (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). But this line of reasoning is not a path without obstacles. For instance, some authors argue that the practice of forced desegregation does not correspond to appropriate contact conditions (Gerard 1983). The relation between the accentuation of categorization and negative intergroup attitudes was questioned (e.g. Park and Judd 2005), and more complex models of social categorization and intergroup harmony and conflict have been developed both in the USA (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000) and in Europe (Hewstone and Brown 1986).

Adversaries of color blindness in Europe and elsewhere—notably in Canada—support *color consciousness* (or multiculturalism). Such ideology emphasizes that differences between groups should be recognized, respected, and positively evaluated (Berry et al. 2006; Bourhis et al. 1997). In many ways, color consciousness is incongruent with color blindness. Debates over the advantages and disadvantages of both ideologies are not lacking. For instance, in France, color consciousness is condemned because it is often presumed that it will lead at best to communitarianism or a multiplicity of neighboring ghettos, and, at worst, to endemic racism (see Guimond 2010). In fact, the accentuation of cultural differences between majorities and minorities is empirically associated with subtle racial prejudice (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995) or with cultural racism (Vala and Pereira 2012). On the other hand, color blindness is criticized primarily because equality is understood as similarity and the models for this similarity are necessarily members of the dominant majority. Consequently, such similarity means the assimilation of minorities by dominant cultural models (Jones 1998) and, from this perspective, color blindness can promote a society where the majority does not recognize the negative experiences of minorities and minimizes or makes invisible their culture and history. It is in this context that, during the past decade, research has accumulated evidence in favor of color consciousness as an ideology that can diminish racial prejudice (e.g., Apfelbaum et al. 2008; Demoulin et al. 2002; Norton et al. 2006; Richeson and Nussbaum 2004; Wolsko et al. 2000, 2006; Verkuyten 2006).

Leyens and collaborators (Maquil et al. 2009) took a nuanced approach to the two ideologies (Fig. 4.1) and suggested that each ideology comprises a positive and negative aspect (see also Park and Judd 2005). Their reasoning was based on two key factors: the importance (high vs. low) attributed to the diversity that characterizes our social world or the categorical ethnic heterogeneity of a given society, and the salience of an ethnocentric worldview (high vs. low). As illustrated in Fig. 4.1, when associated with low ethnocentrism, that is, recognizing group differences and at same time respecting and positively evaluating these differences, color consciousness ideology could be associated with the strategy of acculturation called integration or multiculturalism in the cultural relations' models proposed by Berry (2001) and by Bourhis et al. (1997). However, if color consciousness is associated with high

		Importance of "ethnic" origins	
		High *color consciousness*	Low *Color blindness*
Ethnocentrism	Low	Integration	Individualism
	High	Segregation	Assimilation

Fig. 4.1 Dimensions of color consciousness and color blindness (majorities' perspective). Based on Maquil et al. (2009)

ethnocentrism, or devaluation of minorities' culture, it can generate the segregation of minorities and express racial prejudice (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995) or promote the essentialization of group differences (Verkuyten 2006).

On the other hand, color blindness ideology associated with low ethnocentrism corresponds to a strategy of acculturation that Berry and Bourhis called individualism, i.e., recognizing the salience of the uniqueness of each human being over and above social categories. In contrast, the combination of color blindness and high ethnocentrism sustains a strategy that produces assimilation, a model of acculturation based on the cultural inferiorization of minorities. In fact, such a strategy requires that minorities conform to the way of life that majorities consider superior, i.e., their own culture. This picture illustrates how effectively color blindness and color consciousness have both a dark and a bright side as ideological principles in relation to cultural relations between asymmetrical groups (Levin et al. 2012).

In the context of this theoretical framework, Maquil et al. (2009) tested whether the degree to which people unconsciously adhere to the different strategies of acculturation (assimilation, individualism, integration-multiculturalism, and segregation) correlates with the performance in an intellectual task carried out in different contexts (with an assimilated or with an integrated partner). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: in one condition, participants had to solve a problem together with a clearly Moroccan female student, dressed in European style, i.e., completely assimilated; in another condition, participants had to interact with the same student dressed in the identical European clothing but wearing a Muslim veil (integrated). The more the Belgian female participants endorsed color conscious ideology (pro-integration or pro-segregation), the better their performance was. Other researchers have already produced such a result in White–Black interactions (Dovidio 2001), demonstrating that clear racists or non-racists were better in a task with a black person than aversive racists. Moreover, the more students favored assimilation, the better they performed when the Moroccan girl was completely assimilated. This result is not surprising since it corresponds to what assimilation is and wants. More surprising, at first sight, was the result of pro-individualism (pro color blindness and non-ethnocentric) students: they succeeded least when the student wore the Muslim veil. In other words, when Belgian students were in favor of individualism, they did not accept that others displayed belongingness to a group. These findings tend to show that the individualistic strategy, albeit not ethnocentric, is the one that generates most "misunderstandings" in social interaction, specifically more than integration/multiculturalism (the other non-ethnocentric strategy). In a more general context, other research by Maquil et al. (2009) also showed that both among the majorities and minorities integration and individualism correlated negatively and significantly with different measures of prejudice, whereas assimilation and separation correlated positively with prejudice.

Because ideologies are systems of well-entrenched ideas inspired by values, they are often resistant to empirical data. For instance, despite research results, multiculturalism is increasingly criticized in Great Britain, with the argument being that ghettos are replacing integration or that integration is generating segregation. Interestingly, those most opposed to the non-racist aspect of color consciousness

(integration or multiculturalism) are the non-ethnocentric procolor blind persons (individualists). The individualists support the idea that their stance is the only democratic one (Gauchet 2002). They resist the reality that people, willingly or not, are parts of groups and could not survive without group protection. Encounters between two individuals are certainly better than encounters between a Black and a White person. Individualism is, however, impossible on a large scale, whereas integration may attain the aims looked for by individualists: successful integration leads to encounters between individuals who are also members of groups.

Concerning the impact of assimilationist ideology on public policies, French policy toward immigration is clearly shaped by this ideology (Guimond et al. 2014, 2015). France is not alone in this domain. In Flanders, Belgium, language is of paramount importance. People speak different Flemish dialects but the Flemish government wants to make Dutch an official language, even for foreigners who do not plan to stay in Flanders. The paradox in the vicinity between France and Flanders is that if the Belgian government had followed French assimilation during the nineteenth century, Flanders would speak French like the rest of Belgium. These examples show a preference for official assimilationist positions in France[3] and in Flemish Belgium.

Recently in the United Kingdom and Germany, the conservative and center-right have been calling for an end of multiculturalist policies. However, research continues to show that multicultural ideology can overcome the potentially negative aspects of salient categorization, that is, salience of diversity in a given social context. Indeed, following the research by Wolsko et al. (2000, 2006) into the positive impact of multiculturalism salience on judgments about groups, Costa-Lopes et al. (2014) manipulated the salience of ethnic categories in Portugal, as well as the salience of multiculturalism. Results showed that categorization salience led to more ingroup bias unless a multicultural ideology was also made salient. Multiculturalism buffered the negative impact of categorization salience.

Color blindness and color consciousness are the most discussed dimensions of ideological thinking in diverse societies not only by common people but, as illustrated above, by public decision policy makers. The importance of a discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of those ideologies is based on the fact that both reflect preoccupations with social harmony and try to solve social problems. The model presented in Fig. 4.1 intends to enlarge the context of the traditional approach to the ideologies about cultural diversity and goes beyond the model of Berry (2001) about acculturation because it integrates acculturation strategies within the context of ideological options.

Like color blindness and color consciousness ideologies, beliefs about social justice are other crucial factors studied in the search for a more harmonious society.

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[3]Guimond et al. (2015) surveyed a representative sample of French people. The results do not correspond to the official policy. Whereas the French think that their compatriots are in favor of assimilation, they are in fact pro-integration. Only the extreme right-wing favors assimilation.

We will focus now on the Just World Theory proposed by Lerner (1980), as it can open stimulating contributions to the understanding of justice ideologies as organizers of intergroup relations.

Belief in a just World, Secondary Victimization, and Intergroup Relations

According to the just world hypothesis (Lerner 1980), individuals consider, at least implicitly, that the world is just because people get what they deserve and deserve what they get, a key aspect of conservative ideological thinking. In this sense, injustice, particularly the suffering of innocent victims, constitutes a threat to the belief in a just world, leading individuals to engage in different strategies to re-establish the truth of this fundamental belief. A logical and rational strategy to restore justice is to help the victims through emotional or instrumental support, acting for example on the conditions that led to suffering and injustice. However, when people believe that it is impossible or non-normative to help, they engage in strategies of victims' secondary victimization. Secondary victimization can assume different forms, such as devaluing the victims' suffering or implicitly considering that they deserve to suffer. This secondary victimization is mainly applied when victims are perceived as innocent (Correia and Vala 2003).

An overview of Lerner's theory about this belief in the just world shows that it was primarily conceived in order to understand judgments of fairness at the individual or interpersonal level (Lerner and Clayton 2011; Hafer and Bègue 2005; Dalbert 2009). Building on this research, Correia et al. (2007) extended the just world belief to the intergroup level of analysis. They formulated and experimentally analyzed the hypothesis that injustices that occur to innocent victims only threaten our belief in a just world if the victims belong to "our world" (our ingroups) but not when victims are members of outgroups, namely disliked minorities. In other words, they tested the hypothesis that the suffering of an outgroup victim is not evaluated within the framework of justice principles.

In one of the studies carried out to test this hypothesis (Correia et al. 2007), participants were confronted with a five-minute film showing a child experiencing great suffering. The innocence of the victim was manipulated, as well as the victim's group (a child belonging to a typical Portuguese family vs. a child belonging to a Gypsy family). After the film, participants were invited to collaborate in a color perception task. This perceptual task was actually an emotional Stroop task developed by Hafer (2000), through which the threat to the belief in a just world was measured. In the perceptual color task, participants were invited to identify the color of a set of asterisks that appeared on a computer screen. The display of the asterisks was preceded by the subliminal projection of a word related or not with justice on the screen. It was expected that words related to justice would interfere more in the task (higher latencies) in the condition where the victim was presented

Fig. 4.2 Means of color identification latencies for justice-related words and neutral-related words (Based on study 2, in Correia et al. 2007)

as an innocent ingroup victim. The results following the hypothesis allowed for the interpretation that only the innocent victim of the ingroup threatened the observers' belief in a just world (Fig. 4.2). These results were replicated in other experiments where it was also possible to verify when, in an intergroup context, an innocent victim is more likely to be the target of secondary victimization (Aguiar et al. 2008).

Aguiar et al. (2008) designed their studies based on the scenario used by Correia et al. (2007). One of these studies analyzed the degree of victim discrimination, a form of secondary victimization. As in previous studies, participants were confronted with a film about a child who was presented as an ingroup member (a child belonging to a typical Portuguese family) versus an outgroup member (a gypsy child, as in previous studies). However, in this new research, the authors not only manipulated the group the child belonged to but also contrasted his status (victim vs. non victim). The derogation of the target child was evaluated using an implicit measure, called "intergroup time bias" (ITB) (Vala et al. 2012). The intergroup time bias refers to the time people invest making a judgment about a target (e.g. an ingroup member) compared with the time spent on the same judgment relative to another target (e.g. an outgoup member). To measure ITB, participants were invited to form an accurate impression of targets indicating whether or not traits that appear on a computer screen apply to those targets or not. The time spent on trait attribution (and not their valence) to the targets indicates the interest and attention deserved by targets: the longer the time invested by participants to form an impression, the greater the value of the target under evaluation. In the experiment of Aguiar et al. (2008), participants formed an impression about four targets (ingroup vs. outgroup child; victim vs. non-victim).

As expected, the victim of the ingroup was more derogated (less time invested to form an impression of ingroup victim) than the non-victim of the ingroup. According to our interpretation, this occurred because the ingroup victim threatened

participants' belief in a just world. Moreover, participants invested the same time judging the victim and non-victim of the outgroup because outgroup members did not threaten their belief in a just world. In sum, together, these studies show that the suffering of ingroup members—but not of disliked outgroup members—is affected by justice concerns. Moreover, this last research also shows that, paradoxically, an ingroup victim is more derogated or the object of more secondary victimization than an outgroup victim.

It was in this research context that Correia et al. (2007) proposed revisiting the concept of scope of justice (Deutsch 1985; Opotow 1990; Staub 1990). This concept proposes that people create ideological frontiers for the application of justice principles and, consequently, that some people are excluded from the "just world." Indeed Lima-Nunes et al. (2013) found that the relationship between prejudice and discrimination against immigrants is mediated by a restricted scope of justice. This mediation is moderated by people's belief in a just world. Specifically, the mediation only occurs for high believers. Moreover, the relevance of the phenomena described is stressed by the results of Alves and Correia (2013) demonstrating that the belief in a just world is socially normative. That is, this belief is perceived as a socially valued way of thinking and an acceptable principle of legitimation of social relations (Costa-Lopes et al. 2013).

Graded Humanity Relies on Metaphorical Ideologies About Alterations of Humanness

Results presented in the previous section suggest that not all human beings, including ingroup members, are included in the scope of justice. This is perhaps because not all human beings are perceived to be part of our moral community and are perceived as not totally human. Indeed, it is not infrequent that some groups label themselves as "people" or, like the Bantus, call themselves "humans" and call neighboring groups derogative names such as "louse's eggs." As will be seen later, dehumanization is often linked to human-made disasters such as genocides (Staub 1989). However, this extremity is not necessary and people may unconsciously dehumanize outgroups in everyday life.

The broadest sense of dehumanization is the restriction of humanness. Dehumanized groups are not as human as our group is. Two metaphors are normally used to describe the dehumanized groups (Haslam 2006). Either they are like animals (animalistic dehumanization) or they look like objects or machines (mechanistic dehumanization). These two types of dehumanization correspond to two distinct kinds of humanness. Humanity may be defined in terms of what is uniquely human compared to animals. It is the case of uniquely human or secondary emotions (e.g., love, admiration, contempt, envy) in opposition to non-uniquely human or primary emotions (e.g., happiness, surprise, fear, sadness). It can also be defined by the negative core characteristics that form human nature (e.g., narrow-mindedness,

stubbornness). While the first definition contrasts humans to animals (human uniqueness), the second one opposes humans to robots (human nature). Believing in the humanity of ingroups and perceiving outgroups as less valuable is part of the principle that "mine is better than yours," and it stems from the ideas that sustain and legitimate *group*-based hierarchies (see Sidanius and Pratto 1999). In this section, we will focus on infra-humanization, that is, the belief that outgroup members are less human than we are, and that they are closer to animals than we are (Leyens et al. 2000, 2007). It is a perception of graded humanity that should not be confused with dehumanization, where the gradient of humanity is reduced to almost nothing (Leyens 2015).

Infra-humanization is particularly important in the understanding of intergroup relations because it does not need conflicting relations between groups. It requires identification of group members with their group, as well as the perception that one's group is different from outgroups. Another important predictor of infra-humanization has to do with symbolic threat, that is, the threat that customs and values will change due to the action of outgroups. The symbolic threat means that ingroup ideology is at risk. Stated otherwise, because our common ideology is threatened, we react with another ideological principle, the ingroup superiority and related outgroup infra-humanization that restores our group's perceived high status.

The first studies about this topic appeared at the end of last century, and today an increasing number of them, over 140 publications, show the functions of infra-humanization (Leyens 2009; Haslam and Loughnan 2014). For instance, by infra-humanizing outgroups, people do not feel culpability in harming them. Infra-humanization also alleviates responsibility, and justifies not helping needy persons. Moreover, it explains why discrimination may occur without feelings of guilt. Infra-humanization is also a specific form of derogation of outgroups that are not socially successful. To take an example, a study conducted in Brazil (Lima and Vala 2004) showed how economic success is ideologically linked with skin color. In this investigation, White Brazilian participants were presented with a story about people that succeeded or that failed in their endeavor. The description of people was illustrated with pictures of Black people versus those of White people. Pre-tests indicated that those people were clearly perceived as Black or White people. Independently of color, targets that did not succeed were infra-humanized. Surprisingly, people who succeeded were perceived as whiter than people who did not. By contrast, individuals who failed economically were perceived as darker than people that succeeded. For Black people, the judgment is clear: their color is associated with failure and, as a consequence, with reduced humanity. The situation is ambiguous for Whites. Their color will depend on their success and, if they fail, they will become infra-humanized "Mulattoes." Thus, "Mulattoes" have the color of successful Blacks and of failing Whites.

Fiske et al. (2002) have built a stereotype content model of groups around two orthogonal dimensions: warmth and competence. Rich people, for instance, will be in the high competence/low warmth quadrant, while a housewife will be in the low competence/high warmth quadrant. Using neurological imaging, Harris and Fiske (2006) showed that the brain activity associated with the low/low quadrant, such as

the homeless and drug addicts was more similar to the brain activity pattern that is usually observed in situations with objects than in situation with people. That is, these results suggest that people in the low/low quadrant are no longer considered human, but disgusting objects. Similarly, Vaes and Paladino (2010) found that the more typical the characteristics of low/low groups are, the less human they are rated (see also Leyens et al. 2012).

Research on dehumanization is still in limbo and care should be taken, as illustrated in the following study. Morera et al. (2014) have shown that the distinction between animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization and the convergence between people low in competence and warmth and non-humanity are not that stable. Participants had to associate human, animal, and machine words with three groups of people: professionals (e.g. radiologists, bankers), evil persons (e.g. a mercenary and a terrorist), and the lowest of the low people, like a homeless person and a drug addict. Professionals were linked to human words; evil persons were associated to animals *and* machines; finally the lowest of the low received animal *and* human words. Evil persons thus mixed the two kinds of dehumanization. Drug addicts and the homeless may have been seen as humans given the Spanish context where many people lost their jobs and homes because of the financial crisis. These findings do not put earlier results at risk but suggest that social context can influence the meaning of social categories and, consequently, the infra-humanization process.

Equalitarianism, Meritocracy, and Intergroup Relations

We will now discuss our research into the role of equalitarian and meritocratic ideologies that shape justice norms on the expression and consequences of prejudice. We will start by studies on the role of equalitarianism and meritocracy in the effects of infra-humanization and then we will discuss our research on the impact of those ideological principles on racial prejudice.

Egalitarianism, Meritocracy, and Infra-Humanization

As mentioned above, several studies have shown that infra-humanization is not inevitable and can be moderated by different social factors (Vaes et al. 2012, for a review). Importantly, as reported in a study carried out by Pereira et al. (2009), the impact of infra-humanization on discrimination may be moderated by egalitarian and meritocratic ideologies. In the study, participants first received an article supposedly taken from a prestigious weekly newspaper. In order to manipulate infra-humanization of Turkish people, for a third of the subjects, the article reported a study showing that the ancient Turkish language was comparable to European languages in the frequency of secondary emotions words. For another third, the article stated that ancient Turkish did not have secondary emotions in its

Fig. 4.3 Effect of
infra-humanization on
discrimination against
Turkey, mediated by
symbolic threat after
egalitarian norm prime (Based
on Pereira et al. 2009)

vocabulary. In the third condition (the control condition), the text dealt with the relationship between age and learning a new language. Symbolic threat and opposition to the entrance of Turkey in the EU were the main dependent variables.

Participants exhibited greater openness to Turkey's joining the European Union and expressed a lesser feeling of threat when Turkish was described as similar to the European languages concerning the frequency of secondary emotions (non-infra-humanization condition) than when it was presented as dissimilar. Interestingly, symbolic threat mediated the link between the differential perception of Turkish (infra-humanization vs. humanization) and the opposition to Turkey's entrance in the European Union. That is, the differential perception of Turkey led to different levels of threat that explained the degree of opposition to Turkey as part of Europe (Fig. 4.3).

In a follow-up study, infra-humanization was manipulated and participants were primed with egalitarian versus meritocratic ideologies. Independently of the ideological manipulation, infra-humanization had an effect on symbolic threat and on the opposition to Turkey's entrance in European Union. The interesting finding deals with the mediation. When meritocracy was salient (primed), there was no mediation. It was not the case when egalitarianism was primed. Participants primed with an egalitarian norm felt the need to explain their discrimination against Turkey through the evocation of the symbolic threat. This justification was unnecessary when the context promoted meritocracy, that is, when it was salient that some groups, due to their characteristics, deserve more and are superior to others. This study illustrated how egalitarianism and meritocracy have different implications for the legitimation of discrimination and the relationship between infra-humanization and discrimination.

Egalitarianism, Meritocracy, and Racial Prejudice

Inspired by Sherif and Sherif's (1953) group norms theory of attitudes, Crandall et al. (2002) developed a normative theory about prejudice. This theory proposes that social norms affect the expression of prejudice, i.e., prejudice decreases when group norms proscribe it and increases when they are permissive. In the same vein, Monteiro and collaborators (Monteiro et al. 2009; França and Monteiro 2013) specifically analyzed the impact of the anti-racism norm salience on the expression

of racial prejudice by children. In a typical study of this research line (see Chap. 10 of this book), the experimenter asked 6–7-year-old children versus 9–10 years old to distribute resources to Black and White children. Two experimental conditions were used: activation of the anti-racist norm (the experimenter is present) versus non-activation (the experimenter is absent). Results showed that 6–7-year-old White children expressed prejudice independently of the norm's salience, whereas the 9–10-year-old only discriminated against Black children when the anti-racist norm was not activated. These findings suggest that older children are able to monitor their behavior in accordance with group norm salience. Similarly, the theory of aversive racism (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986) stresses the importance of contextual anti-racism norms on the expression of racial prejudice. According to this theory, when the interaction context indicates the socially desirable type of response, or when individuals feel that their self-definition as egalitarian subjects is in question, they are less likely to think and act in a discriminatory way.

Another line of research opened by Katz and Hass (1988) examined the relationship between norms and racial prejudice using a different perspective. This line of research focused on two opposite ideological perspectives about justice: one based on the value of egalitarianism and the other based on the value of meritocracy. According to the authors' hypotheses, the priming of egalitarianism attenuated racial prejudice, whereas the priming of meritocracy exacerbated it. As proposed by Sidanius and Pratto (1999), meritocracy and egalitarianism correspond to two opposite legitimizing myths regarding social dominance: one, meritocracy, is a hierarchy-enhancing myth according to which groups are unequal; and the other, egalitarianism, is a hierarchy-attenuating myth. Consequently, the salience of hierarchy-enhancing myths, like meritocracy, in contrast to egalitarianism, contributes to greater levels of racial-based inequality as shown in the study of Katz and Hass (1988).

Following this line of research, Pereira and Vala (2014) carried out a series of studies to examine the impact of egalitarianism and meritocracy on the "Intergroup Time Bias" (ITB) in impression formation, that is, pro-ingroup bias manifested in the time invested to make a judgment about an ingroup member relative to an outgroup member. As mentioned above, they proposed that time is an important resource and, consequently, people will invest more time in ingroup than outgroup members, when racialized social relations are at stake (Vala et al. 2012). In this context, less time invested in the outgroup relative to the ingroup means outgroup discrimination. According to Pereira and Vala (2014), the ITB effect can be moderated by the contextual activation of egalitarianism and meritocracy. In their study, participants were randomly assigned to one of the following conditions: a condition where they were primed with the egalitarian norm; another one where the meritocratic norm was primed; and a control (no prime). Results showed that the activation of egalitarianism significantly reduced the ITB effect relative to the control condition. However, meritocracy did not significantly increase ITB. This later result can be discussed in the context of the diverse social meanings of meritocracy. Indeed, Son Hing et al. (2011) showed that meritocracy can mean different things to people: descriptive meritocracy, that is the perception that society

actually rewards effort and merit; or prescriptive meritocracy, that is, an ideal about the functioning of a society, a society where effort and merit should be effectively rewarded. According to Son Hing et al. (2011) the later meaning of meritocracy functions as a principle of justice whereas descriptive meritocracy is associated with the legitimization of social inequalities. Coming back to the results of Pereira and Vala (2014), it seems very likely that the manipulation of meritocracy they used was perceived by participants as a mixture of prescriptive and descriptive meanings of meritocracy and, consequently, only slightly increased outgroup discrimination.

Egalitarianism also has different meanings. A study by Lima et al. (2005) showed that descriptive meritocracy clearly increased the implicit racial prejudice measured by the IAT (Greenwald et al. 1998). However, egalitarianism only reduced implicit prejudice when primed as "solidarity egalitarianism" (i.e. social egalitarianism that involves solidarity between citizens) but no effects were obtained when it was primed as "formal egalitarianism" (in the sense of constitutional equality of rights and duties for all).

Despite the ambiguity of the meanings of egalitarianism and meritocracy, literature is not scarce about the effects of these normative principles on intergroup attitudes. Work by Augoustinos et al. (2005) further illustrates this. They examined anti-affirmative action attitudes in Australia and demonstrated that attitudes correlated to the endorsement of meritocratic orientations. The priming of meritocracy also led members of low status groups to perceive that they were not discriminated against (McCoy and Major 2006). On the contrary, the contextual activation of egalitarianism facilitates individuation in impression formation (Goodwin et al. 2000). In the same vein, Bodenhausen and Macrae (1998) suggest that the egalitarian norm may inhibit the categorization of members of minority groups, and Maio et al. (2001) report effects of the salience of reasons for equality on egalitarian behavior in a minimal group paradigm. Using representative samples of European countries, Vala et al. (2004) and Ramos and Vala (2009) showed that egalitarianism predicts positive attitudes toward immigrants whereas meritocracy predicts negative ones.

Conclusions

Humans are social beings and, for most aspects of their wellbeing, people need to interact with privileged others and these others are at the origin of groups. Social psychology theorized groups as a result of the social categorization process and, in this sense, groups are like *boundaries*. But history tells us that boundaries always imply more or less cooperative or conflicting *relations* and that boundaries and relations are fed by beliefs and *ideologies*. Most research has been dedicated to the study of boundaries through the process of social categorization and its dynamic that creates groups, superordinate groups, recategorization of groups, or even implosion of groups via decategorization. Less research has been directed to the study of group relations and how the nature of those relations moves from cooperation to conflict and shapes people's minds and collective action. Even less

research has studied the way ideologies configure categories and intergroup relations. This chapter aims to contribute to underlining and foregrounding the importance of research on ideologies and intergroup creation and relations. Nevertheless, ideologies were present at the beginning of the inquiry about intergroup conflict, as can be illustrated by the research program developed by Adorno et al. (1950) and inspired by the intellectual climate of the Frankfurt School. In addition, the last paper by Tajfel (1984) deals with ideologies, justice, and intergroup relations.

Accordingly, ideologies that trigger intergroup processes are presented and discussed in this chapter: ideologies of color blind/color consciousness about intergroup differences and the construction of juster societies; the belief in a just world, based on the conservative ideology, and its impact on ingroup and outgroup victims' evaluations; the ideas about humanness that structure the infra-humanization of groups in the context of a bounded scope of justice and group-based hierarchy ideologies; and finally meritocratic and egalitarian ideologies objectified in social norms. In other words, we proposed and tried to show how ideologies and their correspondent social norms inspire the efforts to regulate diverse societies, establish the boundaries of humanness, and underlie the meanings of justice and justice principles that justify racial prejudice and discrimination.

This chapter has been mainly structured by our own research and its relation to the research of other authors who share similar perspectives on the role of ideologies in intergroup relations. This option has allowed us to present our approach and research. However, it excludes the discussion of important dimensions of intergroup relations also shaped by ideologies, like the study of extreme forms of conflict, such as nationalism (Staub 1989; Billig 1995), dehumanizing, moral disengagement, and delegitimization (Bandura 1999; Bar-Tal 2004), to give just a few examples. Indeed, the banality of torture after September 11, the current reemergence of nationalism in Europe, the religious neo-extremisms, the banality of submission in the different spheres of society should be the object of urgent research by social psychologists in the context of an inclusive conception of ideologies.

To sum up, group boundaries are sometimes like walls. Because groups and their boundaries are social constructions, ideologies have a role in this landscape too. Ideologies may reinforce the strength of the wall dividing groups, but they may also indicate holes in the concrete, or even produce them. In fact, boundaries are no more than what we make of them and the cement is provided by our ideas about what societies should be.

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Chapter 5
The Common Ingroup Identity Model and the Development of a Functional Perspective: A Cross-National Collaboration

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Abstract This chapter proposes a new, functional approach to the understanding of how effectively prejudice can be reduced among members of majority and minority groups. According to the functional perspective, derived from the Common Ingroup Identity Model, groups prefer and adopt the representation that most effectively promotes their group's goals. Majority groups generally prefer a one-group representation (e.g., we are all on the same team) because it deflects attention away from disparities between groups and reduces subgroup identification, thereby reducing the likelihood of collective action that challenges the status quo. By contrast, minority groups prefer a dual identity (e.g., we are minority and majority group members on the same team) because it recognizes group distinctiveness, drawing attention to group disparities, which can motivate both majority and minority group members to mobilize to address injustices. However, contradicting these findings, results obtained in the US and in Portugal required and inspired the development of the functional approach presented in this chapter. It emphasizes the importance of taking into account the larger social and historical context when considering the groups' interests as causing and motivating group members' preferences for one-group or dual identity representations, and that these preferences of majorities and minorities are more flexible than we previously thought.

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Introduction

This volume honors the career of Professor Maria Benedicta Monteiro. Among her many achievements, we are personally indebted to Professor Monteiro for her interest in and talent for bringing together senior and junior scholars internationally for productive new collaborations. These collaborations, of which ours is but one, have mutually benefited the careers of junior and senior scholars and advanced the field with new insights and initiatives that could be drawn only from such collaborative networks.

The international collaborations of authors of this chapter, which have been sustained for several years, were initiated by Professor Monteiro. Professor Monteiro's scholarly interests in the Common Ingroup Identity Model led her to encourage her graduate students to forge a cross-national collaboration with the originators of the model. She also personally laid the foundation for this collaboration. Orchestrated by e-mail communication, Professor Monteiro arranged for her students, Rita Guerra and Margarida Rebelo, to meet Sam Gaertner and Jack Dovidio at the 2004 Biennial Conference of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues in Washington, DC. Afterwards, Professor Monteiro generously nurtured collaborative opportunities by arranging for Sam Gaertner to participate on Margarida's Ph.D. Examination Jury and to co-chair Rita's Ph.D. research. Rita then pursued and was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship from the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia in Portugal to work with Sam at the University of Delaware for one and a half years.

This chapter recognizes Professor Monteiro for her assistance in forging our cross-national collaborative research on the Common Ingroup Identity Model from which the functional perspective emerged. This perspective would not have been developed if not for the insightful professional match-making of Professor Monteiro. In this chapter, we summarize research on the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000, 2009) that has guided our work on the reduction of intergroup bias. This research has obtained converging evidence across a variety of methodological approaches including laboratory and field experiments, as well as cross-sectional and longitudinal surveys. The work has also involved participants ranging from elementary school children to corporate executives who experienced a corporate merger. We highlight the unique and important contributions from the collaborations that Professor Monteiro initiated.

We first discuss the impact of social categorization on attitudes toward outgroup members. Then we proceed to discuss ways in which two groups might form new group boundaries, or recategorize: one form in which subgroup boundaries more or less disintegrate, and another in which members from different groups are recategorized primarily within a single, more inclusive, superordinate entity. Although

recategorization within a new, common group identity may directly replace separate-group identities (as a one-group representation), forming a common super-ordinate identity does not require group to abandon previous group identities: People can, and often do, form superordinate identities in which subgroup identities remain salient (i.e., a dual identity).

Serendipitously, cross-national differences emerged from studies in the United States (Dovidio et al. 2001) and Portugal (Guerra et al. 2010) with regard to *which* of these recategorized representations was most effective at reducing bias among majority and minority group members. These results significantly shaped the direction of work on the Common Ingroup Identity Model and expanded its scope theoretically and practically.

Social Categorization and Intergroup Biases

The causes of prejudice have been traced theoretically to many forces, including intra-individual, psychodynamic (Adorno et al. 1950), cognitive (Doise 1978; Tajfel 1969), cognitive-motivational (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner 1975), interpersonal (Feagin 1978), and cultural (Jones 1997) factors. In addition to the varied causes of prejudice, the actual nature of prejudice itself may be complex and varied. Whereas traditional forms of prejudice are direct and overt, contemporary forms may be indirect and subtle. For example, aversive racism is a modern form of prejudice that characterizes the racial attitudes of many White adults who genuinely regard themselves as non-prejudiced, but who have not completely escaped cul-tural, cognitive, and motivational forces that promote racial bias (Dovidio and Gaertner 2004; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; see also Kovel 1970).

One basic assertion we have made in our research on aversive racism is that the negative feelings that develop toward other groups may be rooted, in part, in fun-damental, normal psychological processes. One such process, identified in the classic work of Allport (1954) and Tajfel (1969) and others, is the categorization of people into ingroups and outgroups—"we's" and "they's." People respond more favorably to others whom they perceive to belong to their group than to different groups. Thus, if prejudice is linked to fundamental, normal psychological processes, then attempts to ameliorate it should be directed not at eliminating the process but rather at redirecting the forces to produce more harmonious intergroup relations. By shifting the basis of categorization from race to an alternative dimension, it may be possible to alter who is a "we" and who is a "they" through recategorization, and thereby undermine a potentially contributing force to aversive racism.

Categorization enables decisions to be made quickly about incoming information (Fiske and Taylor 2007). The instant an object is categorized, it is assigned the properties shared by other category members. Time-consuming consideration of each new experience is forfeited because it is usually wasteful and unnecessary. Categorization often occurs spontaneously on the basis of physical similarity, prox-imity, or shared fate (Campbell 1958). Social categorization has potential to produce

systematic social biases in evaluations of others when the circumstances emphasize the importance of that categorization (see Dovidio and Gaertner 2010, for a review).

Over the past 30 years, different approaches have considered the role of basic group processes, such as social categorization, for understanding the nature of these biases and ways to reduce them. From a social categorization perspective, one universal facet of human perception essential for efficient functioning is the ability to sort people, spontaneously and with minimum effort or awareness, into a smaller number of meaningful categories (Brewer 1988; see also Fiske et al. 1999). Evidence indicates the use of social categories might be rooted in humans' evolutionary heritage, since other primates, such as the rhesus macaque, also attend strongly to group membership within their species (Mahajan et al. 2011). Given the centrality of the self in human social perception, social categorization further involves a basic distinction between the group containing the self, the ingroup, and other groups, the outgroups (i.e., between the "we's" and the "they's") (see Social Identity Theory, Tajfel and Turner 1979; Self-Categorization Theory, Turner et al. 1987).

Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner 1985; see also Abrams and Hogg 2010) posit that how a person conceives of himself or herself, in terms of personal or collective identity, is critical in determining the person's response to others. Specifically, when personal identity is salient, a person's individual needs, standards, beliefs, and motives primarily determine behavior. In contrast, when one's group identity is salient, "people come to perceive themselves as more interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences from others" (Turner et al. 1987, p. 50). Under these conditions, collective needs, goals, and standards are primary as group properties are defined by differences from other groups.

When collective identity is salient, the distinction between ingroup and outgroup members as a consequence of social categorization has a strong influence on social perception, affect, cognition, and behavior. Perceptually, when people or objects are categorized into groups, actual differences between members of the same category tend to be minimized (Tajfel 1969) and often ignored in making decisions or forming impressions, while differences between groups tend to become exaggerated (Abrams 1985; Turner 1985). Emotionally, people spontaneously experience more positive affect toward and are more attracted to other members of the ingroup than members of the outgroup (Castelli et al. 2008; Otten and Moskowitz 2000; Smith and Mackie 2010), particularly toward those ingroup members who are most prototypical of their group (Hogg and Hains 1996). Cognitively, people retain more information in a more detailed fashion for ingroup members than for outgroup members (Park and Rothbart 1982), have better memory for information about ways in which ingroup members are similar to and outgroup members are dissimilar to the self (Wilder 1981), and remember less positive information about outgroup members (Howard and Rothbart 1980).

In terms of behavioral outcomes, people are more helpful toward ingroup than toward outgroup members (Dovidio et al. 1997), they work harder for groups identified as ingroups than outgroups (Worchel et al. 1998), and show greater readiness to approach ingroup members and avoid outgroup members (Paladino and

Castelli 2008). When ingroup-outgroup social categorizations, rather than personal identities, are salient, people tend to behave in a more greedy and less trustworthy way toward members of other groups than if they were reacting to each other as individuals (Insko et al. 2001). Thus, although the functional nature of the relations between groups can further influence the degree to which discrimination is manifested (Campbell 1965), the process of social categorization itself provides the basis for social biases to develop and to be maintained.

Social categorization is a dynamic process, however, and people possess many different group identities and are capable of focusing on multiple social categories simultaneously (Allport 1954; Brewer 2000). By modifying a perceiver's goals, motives, perceptions of past experiences, expectations, as well as factors within the perceptual field and the situational context more broadly, there is opportunity to alter the level of category inclusiveness that will be primary or most influential in a given situation. This malleability of the level at which impressions are formed is important because of its implications for altering the way people think about members of ingroups and outgroups, and consequently about the nature of intergroup relations. Attempts to combat these biases have been directed at altering the nature of social categorization.

Two such approaches are decategorization and recategorization. Decategorization refers to influencing whether people identify themselves primarily as group members or as distinct individuals (Tajfel and Turner 1979; see also Brewer 1988; Brewer and Miller 1984; Fiske et al. 1999). With decategorization, group boundaries are degraded, inducing members of different groups to conceive of themselves and others as separate individuals (Wilder 1981) and encouraging more personalized interactions. When personalized interactions occur, people "attend to information that replaces category identity as the most useful basis for classifying each other" (Brewer and Miller 1984, p. 288; see also Miller 2002), and category-based biases are further reduced. De-emphasizing social categories as a basis for judgment allows people to recognize the unique and positive qualities of others formerly seen only in terms of their outgroup membership and to facilitate more personalized contact that undermines the validity of stereotypes (Miller 2002). In addition, because decategorization degrades the ingroup boundary as well, pro-ingroup biases are also less likely to appear. Recategorization is an alternative category-based strategy for reducing intergroup bias in which members of two or more groups are induced to perceive the aggregate as members of the same, more inclusive group. The recategorization strategy for reducing intergroup bias represents the primarily basis for the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000).

The Common Ingroup Identity Model

The Common Ingroup Identity Model identifies potential antecedents and outcomes of recategorization, as well as mediating processes. The general framework specifies the causes and consequences of a common ingroup identity. Specifically, it is

hypothesized that the different types of intergroup interdependence and cognitive, perceptual, linguistic, affective, and environmental factors can either independently or in concert alter individuals' cognitive representations of the aggregate. These resulting cognitive representations—one-group, two subgroups within one-group (a dual identity), two groups, or separate individuals—are then proposed to result in the specific cognitive, affective, and overt behavioral consequences. Thus, the causal factors that include features specified by the Contact Hypothesis (e.g., cooperation, equal status, opportunity for self-revealing interaction and egalitarian norms supported by local authorities; Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2011), are proposed to influence members cognitive collective representations of the memberships that are, in turn, involved in mediating the relationship between the causal factors and the cognitive, affective, and behavioral consequences. In addition, we proposed that common ingroup identity may be achieved by increasing the salience of existing common superordinate memberships (e.g., a school, a company, a nation) or by introducing factors (e.g., common goals or fate) that are perceived to be shared by the memberships.

Once outgroup members are perceived as ingroup members, we hypothesize that they would be accorded by the benefits of ingroup status. Thus, upon recategorization there would likely be more positive thoughts, feelings, and behaviors toward these former outgroup members by virtue of categorizing them now as ingroup members. These more favorable impressions of outgroup members are not likely to be finely differentiated, at least initially (see Mullen and Hu 1989). Rather, we propose that these more elaborated, personalized impressions can soon develop within the context of a common identity because the newly formed positivity bias is likely to encourage more open communication and greater self-disclosing interaction with former outgroup members. Thus, over time a common identity is proposed to encourage personalization of outgroup members and thereby initiate a second route to achieving reduced bias.

Sherif et al. (1961) classic Robbers Cave study dramatically demonstrated that inducing two groups who were in overt conflict to cooperate toward the achievement of mutually desirable goals, which neither group alone would be capable of achieving, improved intergroup relations significantly. This research, though, did not directly address the underlying psychological processes of *how* cooperation reduced the intense animosity between these groups. Our work on the Common Ingroup Identity Model was intended to illuminate these underlying processes.

Common Superordinate Identity

From the perspective of the Common Ingroup Identity Model, cooperation (along with other features identified by the Contact Hypothesis; Allport 1954; see also Dovidio et al. 2003) operates psychologically through recategorization to reduce intergroup bias. With recategorization, as proposed by the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner et al. 1993), if members of different groups are induced to

conceive of themselves as a single more inclusive, superordinate group (e.g., as when Black and White football players regard themselves primarily as members of the same team) rather than just as two completely separate groups, attitudes toward former outgroup members are expected to become more positive through processes involving pro-ingroup bias. From this perspective, cooperation among Sherif et al.'s (1961) groups of summer campers increased positive attitudes toward outgroup members because it changed members' perceptions of one another from "us" and "them" to a more inclusive "we." In particular, recognizing the basic role of social categorization processes in creating and maintaining bias, we propose that interventions to reduce bias can be targeted at this pivotal process.

Theoretically, the rationale for these changes in intergroup bias rests on two related conclusions from Brewer's (1979) analysis that fit nicely with the tenets of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner 1975) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner 1985). First, intergroup bias often takes the form of ingroup enhancement rather than outgroup devaluation. Second, the formation of a group brings ingroup members closer to the self, whereas the distance between the self and non-ingroup members remains relatively unchanged. Thus, upon ingroup formation or the adoption of a group-level identification, the egocentric biases that favor the self are transferred to other ingroup members. As a consequence, increasing the inclusiveness of group boundaries enables some of those cognitive and motivational processes that contributed initially to intergroup bias to be redirected or transferred to former outgroup members. Alternatively, if ingroup and outgroup members are induced to conceive of themselves as separate individuals rather than as group members through de-categorization, former ingroup members would no longer benefit from the egocentric biases transferred to the group upon self-identification as a group member.

In one of the earliest tests of the Common Ingroup Identity Model, the recategorization and decategorization strategies and their respective ways of reducing bias were directly examined in a laboratory study involving homogenously European American, freshmen, and sophomore college students enrolled in an Introductory Psychology course (Gaertner et al. 1989). In this experiment, members of two separate ad hoc laboratory groups of college students were induced through various structural interventions (e.g., seating arrangement) either to conceive of themselves as two separate groups (i.e., a categorized representation), recategorize themselves as one superordinate group or to decategorize themselves, and to conceive of each other as separate individuals.

Supportive of the value of altering the level of category inclusiveness, these changes in the perceptions of intergroup boundaries reduced bias. Furthermore, as expected, these strategies reduced bias in different ways. Recategorizing ingroup and outgroup members as members of a more inclusive group reduced bias by increasing the attractiveness of the former outgroup members. Decategorizing members of the two groups by inducing conceptions of themselves as separate individuals decreased bias by decreasing the attractiveness of former ingroup members.

Similar research by Guerra et al. (2004) and by Rebelo et al. (2004) investigated the Common Ingroup Identity Model with 9- and 10-year-old children in Portugal.

These studies varied the cognitive representations of 3-person groups of African Portuguese (lower status) and European Portuguese (higher status) fourth-graders using procedures similar to those of Gaertner et al. (1989). For instance, to promote a one-group representation, children from the different groups were seated alternately around a table during their interaction; to maintain a two-group representation, children from the different groups were seated opposite one another at the table. Although each 3-person group was composed of either African Portuguese or European Portuguese children, the group labels assigned to these groups used alternative categories (e.g., the blue and green groups) to de-emphasize status differences associated with these groups of children.

These studies conducted in Portugal replicated the results of Gaertner et al. (1989) conducted in the USA. Compared to the condition that maintained a different-groups representation, the interventions designed to induce decategorization and recategorization reduced bias between African Portuguese and European Portuguese children and there were no interactions involving group status. Moreover, as in Gaertner et al. (1989), these interventions worked in different ways. Decategorization reduced bias primarily by decreasing positive orientations toward ingroup members; recategorization reduced bias primarily by increasing positive evaluations of outgroup members. The finding of similar results across separate studies conducted with ad hoc homogenously White and also different racial groups, in different countries, at different times, among people of different age groups using different specific measures offers generalizable support for the role of decategorization and recategorization processes for decreasing intergroup bias.

The results of these studies involving conditions of categorization, recategorization, and decategorization converge on a common conclusion. Consistent with Self-Categorization Theory, "the attractiveness of an individual is not constant, but varies with the ingroup membership" (Turner 1985, p. 60).

Dual Identity

The development of a common ingroup identity does not necessarily require each group to forsake completely its less inclusive group identity. Recategorization can take two forms. First, two distinct social entities can be combined conceptually to form a single superordinate category, that is, one inclusive group. However, a second form of recategorization can also emerge in which members maintain their initial ingroup identity within the context of a superordinate category, a "dual-identity" or a "two subgroups in one-group recategorization." For example, we believe that it is possible for members to conceive of two groups (for example, parents and children) as distinct units within the context of a superordinate (i.e., family) identity. In addition, because a dual identity representation maintains associate links to the former outgroup categories as well as the superordinate connection between the subgroups, any positive effects of intergroup contact may generalize to outgroup as a whole, beyond those present in the contact situation.

Indeed, the value of a dual identity to facilitate generalization of the effects of intergroup contact relative to a one-group representation has been supported empirically (see González and Brown 2003, 2006).

When racial or ethnic group identities and the associated cultural values are central to members' functioning or when they are associated with high status or highly visible cues to group membership, it could be undesirable or impossible for people to relinquish these group identities or, as perceivers, to be "color-blind." Under these circumstances, demands to forsake ethnic or racial group identities to adopt a color blind ideology might arouse strong reactance and result in especially poor intergroup relations (see Schofield 1986). Under these conditions, encouraging recategorization in terms of a dual identity would be expected to be more effective than attempting to create a single superordinate identity (Crisp et al. 2006).

A number of our earlier field studies (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000) across different domains of group life (i.e., multi-ethnic high school students, corporate executives who experienced a corporate merger and members of stepfamilies) converge to support the value of a common (i.e., one inclusive) ingroup identity for reducing intergroup biases. The role of a dual identity appears more complex, however. In contrast to the consistently positive relationship between the experience of a common identity (i.e., a one-group representation) and more favorable intergroup orientations, the strength of a dual identity can have different effects, associated with either positive or negative intergroup responses. For instance, in the multiethnic high school study (Gaertner et al. 1996), a dual identity was related to lower bias, whereas in studies of banking executives involved in a merger and of members of blended families, a stronger sense of a dual identity was related to greater bias and conflict (see Gaertner et al. 2001; see also Mummendey and Wenzel 1999; Waldzus et al. 2004). Our most recent international collaborations, for which Professor Monteiro laid the foundation, help to illuminate the roles of a single superordinate identity and a dual identity on intergroup relations, particularly between members of majority and minority groups.

Majority and Minority Group Status: A Functional Perspective

While Pettigrew and Tropp's (2006) meta-analytic work revealed robust positive effects of intergroup contact toward a range of other groups, the effectiveness of intergroup contact is moderated by group status: The beneficial effects of contact are less pronounced for members of minority groups relative to majority group members (Tropp and Pettigrew 2005; see also Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). Thus, the core question for contemporary researchers and practitioners is not simply whether or not intergroup contact is beneficial—there is ample evidence that it generally is —but rather the current critical question involves how to structure intergroup interventions to maximize beneficial effects of intergroup contact for *both* majorities

and minorities. Understanding the roles of common-group and dual-identity representations can offer valuable insights into this issue.

According to the functional perspective, which was derived from the Common Ingroup Identity Model, groups prefer and adopt as a standard the representation that most effectively promotes their group's goals (Dovidio et al. 2009; Guerra et al. 2010; Hehman et al. 2012). Majority groups generally prefer a one-group representation because it deflects attention away from disparities between groups and reduces subgroup identification, thereby reducing the likelihood of collective action that challenges the status quo (Wright and Lubensky 2009). By contrast, minority groups prefer a dual identity because it recognizes group distinctiveness, drawing attention to group disparities, which can motivate both majority and minority group members to mobilize to address injustices (Tyler and Blader 2003). Consistent with this reasoning, Dovidio et al. (2001) found that for European Americans, the majority group in the US, intergroup contact reduced bias primarily through creating a stronger one-group representation, whereas for ethnic minorities, the effectiveness of intergroup contact for reducing bias occurred primarily through stronger dual identity representations.

One particularly valuable aspect of cross-national collaborations is that they provide investigators with the opportunity to test the boundaries of their theoretical constructs and earlier empirical findings and, as in our case, to modify our theoretical model. In particular, there may be variation across cultural contexts regarding which representation is optimal for reducing intergroup bias among minority and majority groups (Guerra et al. 2010). In particular, in cultural contexts in which the status of minorities is tenuous because of the nature of immigration policies, minority group members may prefer a one-group representation, because it reduces their sense of vulnerability, whereas majority group members may prefer a dual identity in which the different group memberships remain identifiable, because it mitigates threat to the distinctiveness and status of their social identity (see Gaertner et al. 2007; Guerra et al. 2010).

Research Conducted with Children in Portugal Supports this Reasoning

Guerra et al. (2010), (see also Guerra et al. 2013; Rebelo et al. 2005) examined the effectiveness of different recategorization strategies on reducing bias among European Portuguese and African Portuguese children. Participants interacted under conditions emphasizing (a) primarily their national identity, (b) both their ethnic and national identities, or (c) separate group identities. Each of the two recategorization strategies—emphasizing only national identity or both ethnic and national identities—was successful in promoting more positive attitudes toward the outgroup children relative to the separate-group control condition. More importantly, in contrast to the findings of Dovidio et al. (2001) in the United States and

consistent with a functional perspective regarding which representation would most effectively promote their group's goals, the dual identity condition was more effective for the European Portuguese majority group, while the one-group condition was more effective for the African Portuguese minority group.

According to Guerra et al. (2010, 2013), due to historical factors the situation of black people in Portugal and in the United States are not equivalent and they appear to be in different phases of societal change and development. Consequently, the stage of integration may moderate the acculturation goals of ethnic minorities and also influence the preferences of majorities.

Supportive of this reasoning, research conducted with Portuguese adolescents showed that African Portuguese students who stated an "assimilated" identity had higher school achievement, relative to participants stating an "integrated" identity (Maurício and Monteiro 2003; Mouro 2003). For the majority children, however, the dual identity representation may offer a degree of positive differentiation from the minority—which consequently may lower intergroup bias more than recategorization due to the lower levels of identity threat it may arouse to the traditional Portuguese identity. Thus, a dual identity may not be functional for second generation, lower status Portuguese children of African immigrants who may strive for assimilation and equality with European Portuguese children. For the higher status, European Portuguese children, however, the dual identity representation affords them some degree of positive differentiation from the lower status, second generation, African Portuguese children.

In addition, these effects generalized beyond the immediate contact situation over time and to the groups as a whole. In the Guerra et al. (2010, 2013) studies, the effects of the experimental conditions generalized to new racial ingroup and outgroup members depicted in photographs when the same measures were readministered to the participants three weeks later. In Rebelo et al. (2005) the effects generalized to additional ingroup and outgroup children in the school, as well as to other children who lived in their neighborhoods when these measures were administered just after the intergroup contact situation.

Other international collaborations offer additional support for the functional perspective to group representations. Esses et al. (2006) investigated whether manipulations of the salience of a common national ingroup increases or decreases bias against immigrants. Specifically, they explored whether these effects differed between Canada and Germany, countries with different histories and public discourse on immigration. Canada has a long tradition of supporting immigration while Germany has been a nonimmigration country until recently.

The results showed differences between Canadian and German participants. Canadians revealed more favorable attitudes toward immigrants after an induction of a common national ingroup that included immigrants, whereas Germans revealed less favorable attitudes toward immigrants after inducing a common national ingroup that included immigrants. Consistent with the functional perspective, Esses et al. (2006, p. 266) caution that "in applying the common ingroup identity model to naturally occurring groups, it is important to take into account the context in which groups are situated. For some groups, a superordinate identity may be welcomed

and have positive effects on relations among previously separate groups. For others, a superordinate identity may be perceived as a threat to their ethnic subgroup identity and result in a backlash against the other groups involved."

Understanding the functional dynamics of one-group and dual-identity representations for different groups also helps illuminate some of the seemingly inconsistent results we observed for the effects of a dual identity in previous research. Initially, in conceptualizing the functional dynamics, we focused on how majority and minority (or, more generally, high and low power) groups strategically prefer and pursue different group representations in their interactions (e.g., Hehman et al. 2012). Majority group members typically prefer a one-group representation because it deflects attention away from group-based disparities and helps preserve the status quo; minority group members prefer a dual identity, because recognition of separate identities facilitates recognition of group-based inequities while the simultaneous salience of common identity creates a sense of moral inclusion among majority group members that promotes action to achieve equality. These preferences systematically shift as a function of the contextual power of the groups (Hehman et al. 2012).

Our collaborative work described in this chapter illuminates a second aspect of the functional dynamics of group representation—how people may attend to different identities to assess progress toward achieving their representational preference in a given context. That is, depending on the preferred group representation, a dual identity can signal progress, or highlight problems with respect to achieving the desired representation. In a multiethnic setting, a dual identity represents a desired goal: the achievement of mutual respect for difference within the context of common school identity. It thus predicts positive intergroup attitudes and relations. However, in company mergers and step-family contexts, where the primary purpose of the merged entity ideally was to create a singular (one-group) identity, a dual identity appears to signal barriers to the achievement of superordinate identity and is therefore associated with negative intergroup orientations. Thus, our international collaborations have substantially extended the Common Ingroup Identity Model and offered new perspectives of the roles and relative effectiveness of common and dual identity not only across national boundaries but also across a range of social and organizational contexts.

Conclusion

The research discussed in this chapter suggests that historical, cultural, and motivational factors may moderate whether the one-group or dual identity forms of recategorization is more effective for reducing bias among lower status, African children and higher status, European children. We thank Professor Maria Benedicta Monteiro for taking the initiative to bring us together collaboratively. The findings of our collaborations illustrate that a functional approach can be a valuable element of more comprehensive interventions to reduce intergroup bias. They expand the scope of the Common Ingroup Identity Model to consider how acculturation

processes may moderate the integration goals of ethnic minorities as well as the preferences of majorities. Moreover, our collaborative research emphasize the importance of understanding how cultural and organizational contexts shape the effects on intergroup relations of interventions that emphasize common and/or dual identities in ways that improve the attitudes of both majority- and minority group members—which are both necessary for positive intergroup *relations*—in complementary and enduring ways.

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Chapter 6
When Beliefs Become Stronger than Norms: Paradoxical Expressions of Intergroup Prejudice

Annelyse Pereira

Abstract We start by analyzing how social psychology has approached the study of the influence of norms on attitudes and discriminatory behavior. Then, we emphasize the need for a greater interaction between current paradigms on normative social influence and other traditional areas in social psychology, mainly in the field of beliefs about the nature of social groups. We illustrate this interaction by presenting new data that demonstrates the moderating role of the beliefs about homosexuality on the influence of antiprejudice norms on homophobic prejudice. In times of social change, social norms on how to think about particular intergroup relations might change faster than beliefs about the nature of social groups or vice versa, which can produce contradictory or paradoxical effects on people's expressions and enactment of prejudice. The homophobic prejudice is an example how the individual's adaptive maneuvering within complex psychosocial constellations explains their more or less prejudiced responses better than single (e.g., cognitive) factor or single (positive distinctiveness) motive approaches.

Keywords Social norms · Social beliefs · Homophobia · Positive distinctiveness · Prejudice

Introduction

In this chapter, we review the literature of social norms in social psychology, with special emphasis on the central role of these norms in the formation and expression of prejudice in general and of homophobia in particular. This chapter is inspired by the seminal work conducted by Maria Benedicta Monteiro on the role of social norms on attitudes and intergroup behaviors (e.g., França and Monteiro 2013; Monteiro et al. 2009). We start by analyzing how social psychology has approached the study of the influence of norms on attitudes and discriminatory behavior. Then,

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we emphasize the need for a greater interaction between current paradigms on normative social influence and other traditional areas in social psychology, mainly in the field of beliefs about the nature of social groups. We illustrate this interaction by presenting new data that demonstrates the moderating role of the beliefs about homosexuality on the influence of anti-prejudice norms on homophobic prejudice.

The chapter is organized in four parts. In the first part, we discuss the different notions on the nature of norms and analyze the major studies on the processes of normative social influence. In the second part, we review the literature on the influence of norms on the development and expression of prejudice. In the third part, we highlight the need for a better link between the study of normative social influence and beliefs about social groups. This link is aimed at expanding our understanding of the resistance people have toward changing their discriminatory attitudes and behaviors with regard to highly stigmatized social groups. We finish the chapter with a discussion regarding the central role representations about the nature of different social groups simultaneously exert on the expression and restraint of prejudices.

Norms and Normative Social Influence

People make use of social norms as a strategy that helps them to understand the social situations they are involved in, especially in contexts of uncertainty (Cialdini and Trost 1998). However, there is no consensus regarding the usefulness of the concept 'norm' to explain some social behaviors and attitudes. For some researchers (e.g., Latane and Darley 1970), the concept of social norm is too vague and abstract to be used in the explanation of social behavior. Other authors (e.g., Berkowitz 1972; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), think that, without the concept of norm, the nature of attitudes and social behaviors would not be understood (for a critical review, see Dubois 2003). As to its meaning and content, the concept of social norm is also controversial (Cialdini et al. 1990). Norms are variously and sometimes contradictorily defined as values, rules, social habits and conventions, or even as traditions. Despite the controversy surrounding the lack of clarity and specificity of what a norm is, the literature has highlighted the importance of norms as a variable regulating prejudice (e.g., Crandall et al. 2002; Katz and Hass 1988; Pereira et al. 2009a; Pettigrew 1958) and intergroup relations (e.g., Costa-Lopes and Pereira 2012; Gaertner and Insko 2000; Turner et al. 1987). Still according to others, this regulating variable can even play a central role in the development of prejudice and discriminatory practices since childhood (e.g., Allport 1954; Monteiro et al. 2009; Sherif 1936). In this sense, the analysis of the expression(s) of prejudice must necessarily consider the role that normative context plays in the evaluation of prejudice effects on outgroup members.

Although the lack of consensus about what is a norm is typical in the literature of this area, most definitions of norms emphasize two features that can be considered

less polemical about its nature, its descriptive, and its prescriptive functions (Cialdini and Trost 1998). As Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) observed, the obvious inconsistency of the concept of norm reflects a systematic distinction between norms that tell us *what is more typical* in a certain kind of attitudes or behaviors (i.e., a descriptive norm) and norms that inform us about *what is typically approved or convicted in a society* (i.e., a prescriptive norm). Perhaps a better definition of norm should recognize these semantic differences. In this sense, Miller and Prentice (1996, p. 800) have proposed a pragmatic definition of norm according to which "the social norm is an attribute of a group that is to be considered both descriptive and prescriptive for its members." More recently, Paluck (2009b) defined 'norm' as a socially shared conception of how people behave or how they should behave. Thus, a social norm can be defined as the reference to a group characteristic that is considered both descriptive and prescriptive for a given social community.

The Study of Social Norms in Social Psychology

Research on social norms can be divided into three thematic clusters. A first set of studies analyzes the mechanisms of norm formation. A classic example of this type of study is research conducted by Sherif (1936) about how an individual frame of reference becomes a group frame of reference, thus originating a social norm. In a classic research, Sherif asked participants, in the first phase of the study, to estimate distances between random points of light allegedly moving in a dark room. In fact, the light remained motionless and the perceived movement was an optical illusion named "autokinetic effect." Sherif found that, after a series of 30 estimates, each participant tended to form an individual frame of reference, relatively stable, about the length of the alleged movement of light, based on which he/she organized his/her perception. In the second phase of the experiment, participants were asked to perform the same task in groups. After a few estimates, each individual tended to abandon his/her preformed reference frame as a group frame of reference emerged, i.e., individual estimates adjusted to each other, thus creating a new group norm that guided the judgments of group members. Moreover, participants maintained their group judgments, even in later estimates, leaving aside the previous frame of reference or "individual norm." In the third phase, each group member was gradually replaced by a naive individual (i.e., who had not participated in earlier phases of the study), that also began to perform his/her estimates based on the preformed group norm (see also Jacobs and Campbell 1961).

These results led Sherif (1936) to put forward that individuals organize their experience according to individual reference frames, especially when no objective criteria are available to assign a meaning to these experiences. However, when individuals enter a group situation, they spontaneously build other norms that govern their behavior and the perception of their environment. These group norms are more powerful than individual norms, as they continue to guide the actions of individuals, even when they have created an individual norm before, or when they

have not contributed to the formation of that norm (for a critical review see Garcia-Marques 2000). In addition, research conducted within the 'autokinetic effect' paradigm led Sherif (1936) to conclude that, in contexts where objective criteria for action are absent, people behave according to the group norm that is more easily available. Based on this research, we can understand social norms as successive group frames of reference through which the world is interpreted.

A second thematic cluster of studies seeks to identify the kinds of norms at work in a particular context. For example, studies by Jellison and Green (1981) on the 'norm of internality' (Beauvois and Dubois 1988) are paradigmatic about this group of studies (see also Beauvois et al. 1998). In the first experiment, Jellison and Green showed that a target was more positively evaluated when participants believed that it used more internal than external causes to explain its own life events. In the second experiment, Jellison and Green asked college students to answer an internality scale which assessed causal attributions to life events. Next, they asked students to respond again to the same scale, not as individuals but as an average college student they would respond to. The results showed that, as individuals, students presented themselves with higher values of internal causal attributions than those that were reported for an average college student. In the third experiment, participants who were instructed to present themselves in a positive way answered to the scale of causal attributions with a higher internality score than participants who were instructed to present themselves in a negative way. These studies showed, not only the normative pressure that exists in our culture to assign high internality scores to oneself or one's group, but also the importance of this phenomenon when evaluating the normative nature of other social phenomena, such as the 'individualism bias' (Dubois and Beauvois 2005) and, more recently, the 'belief in a just world' (Alves and Correia 2008; Lerner 1980).

Finally, the third theme addresses all the conditions and processes through which norms influence attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Katz and Hass 1988; Paluck 2009a; Pereira et al. 2009a, b; Vala et al. 2004). The most paradigmatic example of normative influence is the classic investigation performed by Kelman (1958). This author carried out an experiment in which he analyzed the impact of source characteristics of normative social influence (power vs. attractiveness vs. reliability), as well as the pressure to comply with the norm (high normative pressure vs. normative simple activation vs. absence of the norm) regarding racial discrimination in American schools. Participants were students of a school exclusively attended by Blacks that consensually supported the anti-racial discrimination law in schools, i.e., they sustained that schools should be biracial and that White-Black coexistence should be enforced. The aim of study was to examine the normative conditions that could decrease participants' support to the law against racial segregation in schools. Participants listened to a recording in which the source of influence argued that some schools should be attended only by Black students, so that the Black culture and history would be preserved in America. Regarding the effect of the characteristics of the source of influence, in one experimental condition (the source of influence's *power* to control), the source of influence was presented as the 'President of the National Association of Black Schools' who would use his

institutional power to get students' support to his view. In another experimental condition (the source of influence's *attractiveness*), the communicator was presented as the "President of Student Council," who represented all the council members' view. In the third experimental condition (the source of influence's *reliability*), the communicator was presented as a "Professor of the History of Racial Minorities," and his opinion was presented as being based on scientific research and "historical evidence." After listening to the recording, all participants completed a questionnaire, indicating to what extent they agreed with the communicator's view (i.e., the source of influence). Normative pressure was then launched as the second independent variable. In one experimental condition, before answering the questionnaire participants had to identify themselves in the questionnaire so that the 'communicator' could access their responses (high *normative pressure* condition). In another experimental condition, the questionnaire responses were anonymous, and participants completed it immediately after they heard the recording (*normative simple activation* condition). In the third condition, participants' anonymity was also ensured, but the questionnaire was only administered two weeks after they heard the recording (control condition).

The results showed that when the communicator was presented someone with control over students, participants' views were influenced only in the high normative pressure condition, i.e., participants displayed a lower rejection of the segregation 'law' when they believed that the source of influence could recognize them. When the communicator was presented as *attractive*, participants' opinions were influenced, both in the high normative pressure condition and in the normative mere activation condition. In contrast, when the communicator was presented as *reliable*, normative conditions did not influence the participants' opinions, who maintained their refusal to the proposed racial segregation in schools.

According to Kelman (1958), these results illustrate three different processes through which normative influence guides people's attitudes and opinions: mere *compliance* (i.e., a change in behavior regardless one's opinion), *identification* with the source of influence (i.e., adopting the source of influence's views because people value group membership), and internalization (i.e., the perceived relationship between one's values and norms conveyed by the source of influence—see also Kelman 1961). In this sense, people follow a normative prescription when they want to avoid punishment or obtain a reward, when they identify with the source of the normative message, or when the norm is consistent with one's system of beliefs and values previously internalized (see also Deutsch and Gerard 1955; for a review, see Cialdini and Trost 1998). These conclusions imply that people can more easily refuse to comply with a normative standard when the pressure is not strong enough, if they do not identify with the source of the norm, or when the message is not congruent with their internalized beliefs about the target of social influence.

We believe that these conditions are central to understand the tension between the normative function of social attitudes and potential social pressures to inhibit the expression of those attitudes. This tension is exemplified in the domain of prejudice, where we can observe the tension between the normative function of prejudice and the social pressure to reduce prejudice.

The Role of Regulatory Factors in Prejudice

The influence of regulatory factors in prejudice was first described by Sherif and Sherif (1953) in the context of the *Realistic Conflict Theory* (see also LeVine and Campbell 1972). According to these authors, intergroup attitudes (e.g., prejudice or hostility) basically depend on the objective characteristics of the social context in which a particular relationship between groups occurs (Sherif et al. 1961). In this perspective, the ingroup bias would encompass a regulatory function because it would serve the group's interests (see also Blumer 1958; for a similar analysis in Sociology). Indeed, the normative nature of prejudice has been identified since 1950s in research on discrimination motivated by racism. For example, Minard (1952) examined the interaction between Black and White workers, both inside and outside a coal mine in Pocahontas in the southern US. He found that 20 % of the White workers presented a positive behavior toward Blacks in both contexts, while another 20 % expressed negative behaviors in both contexts. As for the other 60 %, both inside and on their way from the mine to the city, they exhibited a high frequency of interactions and of egalitarian attitudes toward Blacks. However, in activities going on outside the work context, there was a poor interaction between the two groups. These results led Minard to conclude that the more positive attitudes that White workers held in the workplace were only due to the normative pressure of the context in which they were placed.

Pettigrew (1958) also interpreted the results obtained by Minard (1952), arguing that the behavior of most White workers in the coal mine could be explained by normative and cultural factors, while the different behavior of a minority of workers could be best explained by personality factors or individual differences. Pettigrew also discussed the prejudice of Whites against Blacks in South Africa and the southern U.S.A. He concluded that the impact of cultural and regulatory factors (e.g., the social context in which people were socialized) was greater than the impact of personality factors such as authoritarianism and conformism stating that "in areas with historically embedded traditions of racial intolerance, externalizing personality factors underlying prejudice remains important, but socio-cultural factors are unusually crucial and account for the heightened racial hostility" (Pettigrew 1958, p. 40).

Over the past 30 years, the study of the normative function of prejudice has focused on the analysis of a specific type of social norm—the anti-prejudice norm. It is a prescriptive norm, supported by the value of equal rights and opportunities, which clearly condemns discriminatory behavior of people based on characteristics of the groups to which they belong, such as the discrimination that occurs based on the color of their skin (see Crosby et al. 1980). The influence of this norm has been analyzed in the context of various theories on the contemporary expression of prejudice (see Fiske 1998 for a review). For example, McConahay et al. (1981) manipulated the salience of the anti-racist norm (Studies 1 and 2) by placing a Black experimenter in the context in which White participants' prejudice was to be assessed. The results showed that the mere activation of the anti-racist

norm was sufficient to reduce the blatant form of prejudice, but did not alter the "modern form of prejudice." In a similar way, Sears and Henry (2003) posited that contemporary racism is not color-based, but defined as the perception that Blacks are violating the values that "symbolically" represent the American standard of merit. Furthermore, this research had already suggested the possibility that people may, on the one hand, publicly comply with the anti-prejudice norm through a public expression of egalitarian values, and simultaneously cultivate, on the other hand, latent negative feelings against members of minority groups. Yet, it is due to the approaches of "ambivalent racism" and "aversive racism" that the regulatory conditions that facilitate the expression of positive attitudes and those that inhibit the negative attitudes toward members of minority groups were identified.

The ambivalent expression of racial prejudice involves the presence of conflicting feelings of sympathy and aversion regarding Blacks. According to Katz and Hass (1988), people no longer evoke the argument that Blacks are inferior to Whites, because they would be violating the anti-prejudice norm. However, they may argue that Blacks are not trying hard enough to improve their living conditions. In this case Whites would not be opposing the anti-racist norm, because they focus on meritocratic values that are highly normative in the North American culture. In fact, Katz and Hass have shown (Study 1) that the pro-Black attitude reflected the internalization of the anti-prejudice norm, while the anti-Black attitude reflected the norm that facilitated prejudice. This norm is based on the belief that the society is meritocratic, i.e., the belief that people are indeed evaluated and rewarded according to their ability, personal effort, and efficiency at work (Son Hing et al. 2011). According to Katz and Hass, because norms are based on values, they influence this bias as far as they specify to the group members what they should and should not do, prescribing appropriate behaviors and actions to be inhibited. These authors experimentally tested this hypothesis in a study in which they primed the value of equality, either in a context of merit or in another context. The results have shown that the mere activation of egalitarian values was sufficient to ensure that participants would inhibit the expression of anti-Black attitudes. The opposite effect was obtained when the value of merit was activated. The interpretation proposed by Katz and Hass was that the contemporary expression of prejudice expressed the conflict between the value of equality that supports the anti-prejudice norm, and the value of merit, which facilitates the expression of ingroup bias. Accordingly, the expression of prejudiced attitudes is ambivalent because it reflects both positive and negative internalized attitudes. This means that the expression of prejudice depends on the characteristics of the regulatory context, i.e., negative attitudes toward a target group would be more acceptable in permissive settings, while positive attitudes would be more desirable in anti-prejudice contexts.

In turn, the theory of aversive racism describes how this tension is resolved (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986). According to their authors, prejudice can show an aversive pattern of expression because it represents a particular kind of ambivalence. This ambivalence is caused by the conflict between individuals' conscious adherence egalitarian values and to the anti-prejudice norm and their negative feelings and beliefs relative to members of the target group of prejudice

(see Dovidio and Gaertner 2004). The theory also proposes that 'aversive racists' are very concerned about their public image as egalitarian people, who sincerely believe to be, so that they avoid behaving in an anti-normative way in interracial contexts. Consequently, the expression of prejudice occurs only in contexts where the anti-prejudice norm is not evidently activated. Nevertheless, even when the anti-prejudice norm is clear, aversive racists will seek, in the interaction context, non-racial factors that can formally justify the expression of non-egalitarian attitudes toward the target group. In this case, discrimination occurs indirectly and only when the anti-prejudice norm is not activated. Dovidio and Gaertner (2000; see also Sommers and Ellsworth 2000) have shown this phenomenon in a series of investigations on White people's discriminatory behavior against Black people in situations of contracting for employment and mock trials in courts (for a meta-analysis, see Aberson and Ettlin 2004).

The role of normative factors is also considered by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995), when proposing the distinction between blatant and subtle prejudice. The cross-nationally consistent results of their study support the value of the blatant-subtle distinction as two varieties of prejudice. Blatant prejudice consists of two factors: threat perception and rejection of close relationships. For subtle prejudice, three components were found: the perception that the outgroup does not stick to traditional American values, the enhancement of cultural differences and the denial of positive emotions toward members of the target group. From the arrangement of these two forms of prejudice, Pettigrew and Meertens derived three types of individuals: the *blatantly biased*, who present a high rejection of close relationships as well as high negative emotions and low positive emotions toward target group members; the *subtly biased*, who present a weak opposition to close relationships as well as a denial of positive emotions toward target group members; and *egalitarians biased* or not prejudiced, who do not display any rejection of close relationships and show a clear expression of positive emotions toward target group members According to this model, *blatantly biased* individuals do not accept the norm of equality and subtly prejudiced individuals, although they accept and identify with the norm of equality, did not internalize it, so that when there is a favorable context, discriminatory behavior can occur against outgroup members. In turn, non-prejudiced individuals are those who accept and internalize the egalitarian norm, so that no biased behaviors are expected to be displayed by them (see Pettigrew and Meertens 2001).

The contextual effect of the anti-prejudice norm has also been observed in other paradigms. For example, Blanchard et al. (1991) manipulated the salience of the anti-prejudice norm using a procedure in which participants listened to a partner of the experimenter express positive views toward Black people. The results showed (Study 1) that the mere activation of this norm was sufficient for participants to express less negative attitudes toward Black people than participants in a control condition, as well as in a condition in which the partner expressed negative attitudes toward Blacks. Similarly, Blanchard et al. (1994) manipulated the anti-prejudice norm by simply having the experimenter's partner express anti-racist attitudes and this condition was sufficient to reduce prejudice against Black people. Later, using

the minimal-group paradigm, Gaertner and Insko (2001) were able to show that the mere activation of the anti-prejudice norm, also operationalized through the activation of values of equality and justice in White participants, reduced ingroup bias. In the same vein, also Hertel and Kerr (2001) found that participants did not show ingroup favoritism in a context where the norm of equality was activated. In a different way, using the paradigm of majority consensus as the norm Asch (1952) and Stangor et al. (2001) analyzed the mechanism of normative influence by showing that White participants expressed less negative attitudes toward Blacks when they believed that their own attitudes were more negative than the ingroup norm (operationalized through the perception of group consensus) and expressed more negative attitudes when they were led to believe that their own position was more favorable than the ingroup norm.

Normative Social Influence and the Development of Prejudice

The expression of intergroup prejudice in childhood has been widely studied according to different analytical perspectives. The dominant approach in this field has suggested that the development of prejudice in childhood follows the normal cognitive developmental course, so that the expression of more outgroup prejudice by younger children (i.e., younger than seven years) is a symptom of the limitations in their cognitive abilities (Aboud 1988, 2008). That is, children would be less able to process all relevant information about a target person and the social context in which the assessment takes place, and these limitations would result in attitudes based on preconceptions about the category to which the target person belongs (see, for example, Allport 1954). However, research results regarding this assumption were not always conclusive. For example, Killen and Stangor (2001) showed that even U.S. White children aged 6 years perceived it as wrong to exclude other children from joining a group, only for reasons of sex or skin color (e.g., to exclude a boy from a dance class only because he was a boy). They also found that those children were able to classify these acts as unfair and discriminatory. That is, even young children with limited cognitive skills (according to Aboud's socio-cognitive theory) were able to express unprejudiced attitudes, which suggests that prejudice may be related to learning and the internalization of other factors beyond those implicated in cognitive maturation.

In line with this hypothesis, in two studies about the development of racial prejudice in children, Monteiro and colleagues showed, in a study with White children both in Brazil (França and Monteiro 2004) and in Portugal (Monteiro et al. 2009), that 6–7-year-old children displayed ingroup bias (handing over more money to a White peer than to a Black one), both in the presence and in the absence of a White experimenter (norm activation procedure in study 1). However, older children (8–10 years) showed a different pattern of behavior: in the presence of the experimenter, they distributed the money equally between the two target peers, while in the absence of the experimenter they replicated the younger children's

biased behavior. Study 2 replicated study 1: before asking the children to perform the money allocation task to the two target children the experimenter used normative statements to manipulate an intergroup similarity/dissimilarity norm regarding Blacks and Whites in our society. The authors concluded that the explicit activation of the norm of racial equality was sufficient to inhibit biased attitudes in favor of the ingroup in older, but not in younger children. Even more important was the conclusion that, in the absence of an external normative pressure (the mere presence of a White adult in study 1 or the explicit statement of the norm of equality in study 2), older children displayed the same biased behaviors as younger children. The authors finally claim that White children's expressions of prejudice toward lower status groups become polymorphic from middle childhood onward, i.e., that different intergroup behaviors can occur (more racist or more egalitarian), according to normative context requirements (see also França and Monteiro 2013).

In sum, the research on the role of normative factors in the development of prejudice shows that a simple contextual activation of the anti-prejudice norm can be sufficient to decrease the expression of negative attitudes toward minority groups, coined by some authors as 'target groups protected by an anti-prejudice norm' (e.g., Crandall et al. 2002; Vala et al. 2012). The question we now ask is whether the mere presence of this norm is, in fact, sufficient when dealing with prejudice against socially stigmatized groups.

Is the Presence of the Norm Sufficient to Reduce Prejudice?

The effect of the norm can depend on the recognition that not all minority groups are protected by an anti-bias norm. For example, Crandall et al. (2002) found (Studies 1, 2 and 3) that negative attitudes toward a range of social groups were predicted by the extent of normative acceptance of prejudice toward those groups: the more the expression of prejudice was socially accepted or allowed against certain groups, the greater was their rejection (e.g., homosexuals, prostitutes, immigrants). For instance, it is widely accepted in societies where there is a clear autonomy of the state in relation to prevailing religions, the right of citizens to freedom of sexual orientation. However, the long tradition of social stigma suffered by people with minority sexual orientations, even in these countries, seems to reveal a persistent resistance to that anti-bias norm that is guaranteed by the Charter of Human Rights.

Research in social psychology has tried to understand how social norms work in general and particularly, how the anti-prejudice norm works in relation to the heterosexuals' expression of attitudes, emotions, and behaviors toward the homosexual minority, in order to grasp the underlying resistance to compliance with that norm. For example, Masser and Phillips (2003) conducted a study to examine the mixed impact of injunctive norms, from a social group with which participants identified (the heterosexual group), and their level of homophobia on the expression of prejudiced attitudes against homosexual individuals. In three experimental

conditions, participants received information that most people agreed with a pre-conceived set of normative statements (pro-prejudice norm), that the majority disagreed with these statements (anti-prejudice norm), or did not receive any information (control condition). The level of homophobia was measured before and after the manipulation of the norm. The results showed that participants' prior level of homophobia was critical in the responses to the norm manipulation: only the most homophobic participants, provided with a pro-prejudice normative injunction, held prejudicial attitudes against homosexuals. Subjects low in homophobia, on the contrary, showed low levels of homophobic bias in all conditions.

Although this result is important to understand the relative power of norms and individual beliefs on the expression of homophobic bias, other research suggests that people's opinions on the rights of homosexuals are sensitive to contexts where the normative social influence takes place, so that the mere activation of the anti-bias norm is sufficient to change the extent of support that is given by participants to the increase of gay rights. In fact, Monteith et al. (1996) showed that the mere activation of this norm, operationalized by the presence of an experimenter's partner who publicly expressed the normative character of certain responses, influenced students' opinions regarding the improvement of homosexuals living conditions on campus, although it was not sufficient per se to reduce students' bias against homosexuals.

According to Hornsey et al. (2003), this is possible because when prejudice is directed against homosexuals, the moral component that integrates the representation that straight people have of this group can cancel any pressure to comply with the anti-prejudice norm. These authors conducted a study that analyzed the role of the regulatory context in the relationship between participants' perception of homosexuality as a moral problem and their intention to participate in private (e.g., to vote for a political party that supported gay marriage) and public (e.g., to participate in a march) events in support of gay marriage. Hornsey et al. manipulated the salience of a normative procedure in which participants were given a chart with the alleged results of a survey: either there was a strong support for gay marriage (the acceptance of homosexual marriage condition) or a strong rejection of marriage (the rejection of homosexual marriage condition). The results showed that participants in the marriage-acceptance condition expressed a greater intent to participate in public and private events to support gay marriage, but this intention was only found in participants who disagreed with the statement: homosexuality is a moral problem that must be solved. These results reflect the type of norm defined by Kelman (1958) as *internalization*, where the norm influence is consistent with the beliefs or values of individuals in the context in which the normative influence is being processed.

Pereira et al. (2009a) examined this issue more directly in a study that manipulated the conditions under which the anti-bias norm reduced the expression of prejudice against homosexuals. They created situations in which people could experience different levels of pressure to reduce prejudice. Based on an experimental paradigm similar to the one developed by Kelman (1958) in his studies of normative social influence, Pereira et al. (2009a, b) manipulated three levels of

activation of the anti-bias norm: simple activation of the norm, high normative pressure, and no activation of the norm (control). Participants were informed that they would participate in a study on beliefs related to people's sexual behavior. In the simple norm activation condition, participants were provided with an instruction that explicitly stated the anti-prejudice norm. Participants were informed that the study was monitored by an alleged "Center for the Support of Equality and Social Justice Policies of the National Committee for Human Rights." In another condition, in addition to the norm activation participants had to disclose their identity and provide their contact details so that, if necessary, they could be summoned to explain their responses to the questionnaire. Finally, in the control condition the norm was not activated and participants were not subjected to any regulatory pressure. After the norm manipulation, participants completed a scale that measured prejudice against homosexuals. The results were informative (see Fig. 6.1).

The mere activation of this norm was not sufficient to reduce homophobic prejudice. Specifically, a lower expression of prejudice occurred only when people felt socially pressured, i.e., when not only the anti-bias norm was activated, but also participants were asked about their personal data and could thus be identified. In this condition, the expression of prejudice against homosexuals was clearly lower than in the control and in the simple norm activation conditions. This result was consistent with previous empirical evidence having shown that the anti-prejudice norm seems not to work when it deals with attitudes against highly stigmatized sexual minorities, such as homosexuals and other sexual minorities, such as prostitutes (e.g., Camino and Pereira 2000; Lacerda et al. 2002; Pereira et al. 2004). In fact, while the mere presence of the norm is sufficient to reduce prejudice against Black people (França and Monteiro 2013; Katz and Hass 1988), in the case of


Fig. 6.1 Homophobic prejudice in the three anti-prejudice norm conditions

homophobia the simple activation of the norm is not sufficient to reduce the bias (e.g., Monteith et al. 1996). This can occur because the homophobic prejudice is seen as more socially tolerable than prejudice against other groups protected by the anti-prejudice norm, as was shown in studies by Crandall et al. (2002). This brings us to the next question: why is the mere presence of the anti-homophobia norm insufficient to reduce homophobic attitudes?

Norms and Beliefs About the Nature of Homosexuality

Our proposal is that the paradigms with which the study of normative influence has been developed need to be extended to other equally important fields of research in social psychology, as exemplified by the study of the representations that people hold about the nature of social groups. Indeed, previous research has investigated the effects of anti-bias norms in the reduction of prejudice without sufficiently isolating the conditions that favor or inhibit the influence of those norms on prejudiced attitudes toward homosexuals. Moreover, that research did not pay enough attention to another side of the process of normative influence, for example, they neglected the social conditions that inhibit the pressure to comply with the anti-prejudice norm. Based on the paradigm introduced by Kelman (1958) on the conditions under which people follow prescriptive requirements, Pereira et al. (2015) conducted a series of studies intended to help fill this gap, by examining the moderating role of beliefs about the nature of social groups in the normative social influence process.

Our idea was to bridge the study on the influence of the anti-prejudice norm with the classic research in social psychology about the role of common sense theories in the evaluations people make about themselves and their social world (see Gilbert 1998; Heider 1958; Moscovici and Hewstone 1983; Weiner 1985). A typical example of these theories is the belief that each class of objects has a fixed and unchangeable essence that defines the nature of the deeper elements of the corresponding categories (e.g., Allport 1954; Kashima et al. 2005; Medin and Ortony 1989). According to Rothbart and Taylor (1992), people have a tendency to assign essences, both to natural and to social categories. For example, social groups are often represented as a biological species, or biological causes are attributed to explain the behavior of their members. Haslam et al. (2004) reported that essentialist beliefs are characterized by the fact that people connect social categories primarily to a biological nature, including: the belief in the universality of the attributes thought to characterize the members of a social category, the belief in the stability and immutability of social categories, and the belief in the distinctiveness and rigidity of boundaries between social categories.

Homosexuality is a privileged area for the theoretical bridging that we propose given that there is a wide variety of beliefs about the nature of homosexual behavior which may explain the fact that the presence of an anti-prejudice norm is not sufficient to reduce homophobia. For example, research has shown that essentialist

thinking may involve beliefs that homosexuality is biologically inherited, genetically determined and unchangeable (Haslam and Levy 2006). Research has also shown that the belief in biological essentialism is related to less homophobic attitudes (e.g., Hegarty and Pratto 2001; Norton and Herek 2013; for a review, see Herek and McLemore 2013). The explanation for this effect is based on the idea that these beliefs can promote a representation of homosexuality as natural, immutable, inevitable, thus reducing the perception of homosexuals as accountable for their behavior (Pereira et al. 2014). These beliefs can thus act as a facilitator of the effect of the anti-prejudice norm in reducing homophobia.

However, there are other beliefs about the nature of homosexuality that should be considered. For example, Lacerda et al. (2002) found that, in addition to the biological essentialist belief, people can assign homosexuality a religious moralizing, psychological, and cultural nature. These authors also showed that the belief in the religious nature of homosexuality was associated with the idea that homosexuals have a deep predisposition to sin and to thwart the will of God, while moralizing beliefs reflect the idea that gay people share a deep tendency to violate traditional values, central to what is believed to be decency and good manners (see also, Pereira et al. 2011). In turn, the belief in the psychological nature of homosexuality is linked to the idea that the source of homosexuals' sexual preferences are psycho-affective disorders while the belief in the cultural nature of homosexuality is linked to the idea that homosexuality is determined by the culture to which one belongs, and is thus a 'normal' expression of human sexual behavior. Of greater importance, Lacerda et al. (2002) have shown that the belief in the moral and religious nature of homosexuality were the best predictors of both blatant and subtle forms of homophobia, while the belief in the biological and psychological nature of homosexuality was negatively related to blatant homophobia, but positively related to subtle homophobia. Only beliefs in the psycho-social nature of homosexuality were associated with anti-homophobic attitudes (see also, Pereira et al. 2013).

Our idea is that these beliefs are not simply linked to attitudes toward homosexuals either in a positive or in a negative way. We think they can also serve to moderate the influence of the anti-bias norm in homophobic attitudes. Specifically, we suggest that the anti-prejudice norm may be insufficient to reduce the homophobic bias. The normative influence will depend on the beliefs that people hold about the nature of homosexuality. In line with the proposal of Kelman (1958) on the internalization of norms, we suggest that the effectiveness of the normative pressure to reduce prejudice against gay people depends on the patterns of beliefs about homosexuality that are activated in the context where normative influence is being processed. Specifically, we propose that the effect of the anti-bias norm on the expression of prejudice will be moderated by beliefs about the nature of homosexuality, i.e., the anti-bias norm can only reduce prejudiced attitudes in contexts in which this norm is not inconsistent with individuals' beliefs about the nature of homosexuality.

To test this hypothesis, we conducted two studies on the role of beliefs about the nature of homosexuality on the influence of the anti-bias norm in reducing

homophobia (Pereira et al. 2015). The first study examined whether the relationship between the perception of the anti-normative nature of homophobia as well as homophobic expressions of prejudice are moderated by beliefs about the nature of homosexuality. The results indicated that this relationship depended on both biological and religious beliefs about the nature of homosexuality. In fact, the more the expression of prejudice was seen as anti-normative, the lower was the expression of homophobic prejudice by heterosexual participants with poor adherence to beliefs in the biological or the religious nature of homosexuality. However, participants for whom homosexuality had an essentially religious nature, anti-normative homophobia did not imply a lower expression of prejudice against homosexuals. That is, the anti-prejudice norm was not strong enough to reduce homophobia in these participants.

In the second study this effect was experimentally tested. Using the previous paradigm, we have shown that the reduction of the expression of prejudice against homosexuals only occurred in participants with poor devotion to biological and to religious beliefs on the nature of homosexuality. In these participants, the mere activation of the norm was effective to reduce the expression of homophobia when compared to the control condition. The reduction of homophobia was stronger in subjects who were subjected to a higher normative pressure to decrease homophobic bias. However, of greater importance for the understanding of homophobia was the fact that normative influence was completely ineffective in participants with high adherence to religious or to biological beliefs about the nature of homosexuality. Even when submitted to a high pressure to comply with the normatively prescribed attitudes those participants did not reduce the expression of homophobic attitudes. Our interpretation of this phenomenon is based on the idea that, when conceiving that homosexuality is biologically inherited, fixed, and immutable, or that it is a human weakness to fall into temptation to sin and disobey God's laws, people can have access to other normative arguments that help them to maintain negative attitudes toward homosexuals, despite the social pressure and the strength of the anti- prejudice social norm.

Final Thoughts

In this chapter, we reviewed the literature on social norms and stressed the idea that a more appropriate understanding of their nature implies the recognition of both their descriptive and prescriptive nature. A social norm is a socially shared conception of how people behave or how they should behave in society (Paluck 2009a). We pointed out that research on norms can be organized into three strands: studies on group processes of the formation of a social norm (Sherif 1936), studies on the characteristics a social phenomenon must present in order to be considered normative (e.g., Jellison and Green 1981), and studies on the influence of norms on attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Kelman 1958). Our deepest analysis focused on this third line of research.

Specifically, we examined the tension between prejudiced attitudes and behaviors toward minority groups and the normative pressure to inhibit their expression. More precisely, we showed that the mere presence of an anti-prejudice social norm can be a sufficient condition for reducing prejudice against certain minority groups, as exemplified by the modern decrease in the public expression of blatant racism against Blacks in Europe and USA (e.g., Dovidio et al. 1996; Vala et al. 2006).

This example of normative social influence can be interpreted as reflecting different psychological mechanisms. For example, people act in accordance with a norm because it is embodied in their self-concept, and consequently they act with self-regulated patterns (Cialdini and Trost 1998). From this perspective, people tend to act in accordance with prescriptive norm requirements because they are motivated by a mechanism of internal consistency. The noncompliance with the norm would be inconsistent with their self-concept and could cause psychological discomfort and a decrease in self-esteem. This view corresponds to the idea of norm internalization proposed by Kelman (1958). Another mechanism at work in reaction to a norm can be conformity. The decrease in the expression of prejudice would occur as a preventive strategy against possible penalties for the breach of what would be socially or legally correct. This second possibility is closer to the phenomenon of simple acceptance of the norm described in Kelman's typology (1958). This distinction also corresponds to the results found in literature on the motivational processes underlying the anti-prejudice norm (e.g., Plant and Devine 1998). Internal motivation is the result of anti-biased patterns internalized and personally important to the human self-concept while external motivation is the result of social pressure to comply with the norm.

We have shown, however, that the presence of the anti-prejudice norm in a given context may be insufficient to reduce the expression of homophobic prejudice. In fact, in the studies presented above, people expressed less homophobia only when they were under high pressure to meet this norm. This phenomenon suggests that normative social influence can be damped or mitigated by other social factors that are relevant to the development and expression of prejudice against socially stigmatized groups. In this sense, we suggest the need for studies bridging social influence and normative beliefs about the nature of social groups (Pereira et al. 2015).

We have tried to illustrate this connection by reviewing our own research on the importance of the relationship between normative contexts and normative beliefs about the nature of homosexuality; specifically about homophobic attitudes resistance to change. This research sought to extend the ideas of Kelman (1958) on the conditions that favor and those that hinder the process of social influence. We have shown that the anti-homophobic norm effectiveness depends on the biological and religious beliefs people hold about the nature of homosexuality. In line with the studies on the role of essentialist beliefs about homosexuality (e.g., Haslam and Levy 2006), our results showed the powerful role of these beliefs in the reduction of homophobia, but only in people for who held the belief that homosexuality was not biologically determined. Finally, in line with research on the importance of religious beliefs about the nature of homosexuality (e.g., Lacerda et al. 2002), we have

shown that these beliefs can also cancel out the effectiveness of normative influence, even in participants who experienced high-pressure to comply with the anti-homophobic norm.

According to our view, the set of studies reviewed here stresses the importance of integrating different fields of research in the theoretical analysis of intergroup attitudes and behavior, namely in the study of normative factors (Katz and Hass 1988; Minard 1952; Pettigrew 1958; Sherif and Sherif 1953), studies on the role of cognitive factors on essentialist beliefs (Allport 1954; Haslam et al. 2004) as well as on religious beliefs about the nature of homosexuality (Lacerda et al. 2002). The relationship between these domains opens up new research possibilities, especially with the aim of identifying the socio-cognitive factors that can buffer or heighten the effectiveness of social norms, as Kelman had already warned us in his early studies on social influence.

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Part III
Social Developmental Processes of Violence

Chapter 7
Parent–Child Interactions as a Source of Parent Cognition in the Context of Child Maltreatment

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For Maria Benedicta Monteiro, with affection and gratitude

Abstract This chapter describes how violence lies in the maltreatment of children, focusing on one key factor of this phenomenon: Caregivers' cognition in parent–child interactions. After reviewing literature on different sources of variability in these cognitions as well as on the importance of caregiver cognition for the explanation of maltreatment, the chapter presents original research with a sample of abusive mothers. This study tests how much previous experiences with the child in focus and other children, as well as current perceptions of the child may influence abusive mothers' values, beliefs, and situational attributions. With some exceptions results seem to indicate that previous experience is much less important than current perceptions of the child, and if there is any impact of previous experience it is there rather because it shapes current perception as well. In their own way, these results underline the value that a social-psychological approach has for the understanding of child maltreatment.

Keywords Social development psychology · Parent–child interactions · Maternal beliefs · Child maltreatment

Introduction

Although there are references in the parenting literature regarding the active role of parent cognitions since the beginning of the twentieth century (Sigel 1985, 1992), it was only in the 1980s that parents began to be seen as information-processing

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individuals, which motivated the emergence of a theoretical interest in cognition of individuals in the family context.

Key publications in the area of social developmental psychology (Goodnow 1988; Goodnow and Collins 1990; Miller 1988; Sigel 1985) arose alongside the research into parental cognition. This research looked at the nature, origin (Bugental et al. 1998; McGillicuddy-DeLisi and Sigel 1995; Miller 1995), and intergenerational transmission (Schofield et al. 2014; Simons et al. 1992) of values, beliefs, and attributions; the relationship between cognition and parenting practices, development (Miller 1988; Wong et al. 2009), and child behavior (Okagaki and Divecha 1993; Sigel 1985, 1992). It was also around this time that the literature began to analyze the process of parental cognition construction and to what extent these cognitions serve as guides and norms for parents from lower social classes (e.g., Polansky et al. 1983) and ethnic minorities (e.g., Erickson and Egeland 1996; Lau et al. 2005). In recent years, there has been a decrease in the scientific literature on the nature, origins, and consequences of parental cognitions, but there has been a growing interest in the application of this knowledge in the context of prevention programs and intervention with troubled families (Bugental and Johnston 2000, 2010; Gracia and Herrero 2008; MacLeod and Nelson 2000; Mah and Johnston 2008; Knox et al. 2011). Additionally, in Portugal, there has been recent research into the issues surrounding the nature and origin of the variability of parental beliefs and the effects of these beliefs on parental practices (Calheiros 2006, 2013; Castro and Monteiro 1996; Monteiro and Castro 1997).

The raising of children touches every part of society and is really about a society both continuing and adapting. As such the members of this society invest time, wealth, and emotion into child rearing. However, despite this care, child maltreatment still occurs and the desire to eliminate maltreatment results in a plethora of policies, practices, and social responses which are inevitably linked to the different ideas about children, parenting, and the social constructions thereof. Although some authors deem it crucially relevant to the understanding of child maltreatment as a social problem (e.g., Calheiros 2013; Dubowitz et al. 1998; Korbin et al. 2000; Portwood 1999; Simarra et al. 2002), the analysis of common sense views in the light of child maltreatment constitutes a line of research that is still scarcely explored.

To address the issue related with parent cognition in the context of child maltreatment, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part presents a brief theoretical framework about the different approaches regarding the origin and variability of the constructs that comprise parental cognitions, specifically those related to the parents' experiences with children. In the second part, the results of an empirical study carried out in Portugal are discussed and integrated into the literature of child maltreatment. The study examined maltreating mothers, specifically, how their experiences and perceptions of their children's affected cognitions (i.e., values, beliefs and attributions) and abusive and neglect practices.

Parental Cognition and Sources of Variability

Parental Cognitions' Contents and Structure

To speak about a topic such as parental thinking assumes that the reader is already familiar with use and origins of key concepts in the literature. However, a brief overview of the pitfalls is warranted as there has not been a harmonization of both the theoretical underpinnings of the field or agreement on terms. Starting from the different theoretical approaches, the same construct has been given multiple meanings and designations. Sometimes, various theoretical approaches are all integrated in a comprehensive model of parental processes that assume a set of differing conceptions. While some specify the centrality of the cognitive component of beliefs (e.g., Sigel 1985) or outline a theoretical basis as in the case of attributions (e.g., Dix et al. 1989), others are more inclusive and describe a variety of cognitions included in the same construct designated by ideas that do not need to be specified (Goodnow and Collins 1990) or by ideologies (Palacios et al. 2000). However, in the majority of the studies, cognitions are still too broadly defined as beliefs (McGillicuddy-DeLisi and Sigel 1995). These differences in definitions and approaches are important, not only because they influence the selection of contents under study and have implications to understand changes in educational processes during parental development, but also because they influence various views of the relationship between the different types of cognitions and parenting practices.

Sigel (1985) assumes that people organize their thinking in belief systems that guide not only the parents' actions, but also the selection of the events they will react to and the strategies that they implement. In this approach, beliefs are organized hierarchically from more general—that is, far away from the object of analysis—to more concrete or specific—that is, close to the object of analysis. Sigel (1985) and Miller (1988) reported two major areas of interest in the study of parental cognitions. The first relates to general beliefs about development, which addresses parents' implicit theories about the child's nature, developmental, and education processes (Sigel 1985). It is under this definition that parental values about how they want their children to develop and the values they attempt to give them are often mentioned (Castro 1997; Kohn 1977; Hoffman 1988). This is especially true for values related to long-term goals (LeVine 1988), all aspects of family life (Goodnow and Collins 1990), beliefs about the self (Sigel 1985) and social identity (Carugati et al. 1990; Castro 1997). The second area of interest refers to more specific beliefs that are more closely related to action (Sigel 1985), from which beliefs about discipline and attributions about child behavior can be outlined.

It is within this approach that Dix and Grusec (1985) propose an analytical model of parental attributions, in which they are directly derived from parental beliefs and determine parental actions. Different authors (e.g., Bugental and Goodnow 1997; Goodnow 1988; Miller 1995) suggest that attributions, as a classical subject in social psychology, are called to the study of parental cognitions, since it is difficult to demonstrate the usefulness of general parental ideas and

beliefs in explaining parental practices. This is one of the reasons that has motivated the interest in analyzing cognitions at lower levels of abstraction and more related to parent–child interactions (Bugental and Goodnow 1997; Goodnow 1988; Miller 1995). This interest in parental attributions is due to the idea that the way parents describe and explain what happens during a child's education has important implications for the parental emotional and behavioral responses, as well as in the long-term quality of family relations. Therefore, emotional and behavioral responses are influenced by variations in the interpretation of educational events (Dix and Grusec 1985; Dix et al. 1989).

It is also important to consider the definition of the constructs that comprise parental cognitions. According to McGillicuddy-DeLisi and Sigel (1995), the definition of belief as a cognitive structure is not synonymous with values and attributions. Each of these concepts "share and reflect a cognitive process but refer to different aspects of cognition that are not interchangeable" (McGillicuddy-DeLisi and Sigel 1995, p. 347). The authors adopt Sigel's definition of belief as "knowledge that can be accepted as probable or as truth and for which the evidence may not be required since it [the evidence] is the basis of beliefs but not the belief itself" (Sigel 1985, p. 348). Beliefs and values influence attributions, i.e., attributions are based on the knowledge of a child's behavior and the beliefs regarding the motivation for those behaviors (McGillicuddy-DeLisi and Sigel 1995). Beliefs and attributions differentiate from values because while beliefs consist of a set of ideas assumed to be truthful (Sigel 1985), attributions refer to a set of explanations that parents use to understand the educational process. Meanwhile, values can include a cognitive component like beliefs but are not considered the same as fact, and values do not focus on the antecedents of the educational context. Parental values, rather than truths and explanations, refer to the goals parents strive for their children (Kohn 1977). In general, the multidimensional nature and the relationship between different contents of parental thought reflects a molecular approach which analyses the structure and organization of constructs based on a set of specific beliefs separating knowledge, expectations, attributions, values, and other beliefs from one another.

A somewhat different approach, advocated by some including Goodnow and Collins (1990) and Palacios et al. (1992, 2000), conceives parental cognitions as a whole, coherent set. The authors claim not only that all content (i.e., beliefs, attributions, values and expectations) is included in parental cognition, but also this gestalt creates internal consistency and forms a system of beliefs that constitutes parents' implicit theories about education. Departing from the concept of ideas, these authors consider a broad set of contents of parental thinking (i.e., beliefs, values, expectations, attitudes, etc.) that allow the analysis of their structure, level of consistency, as well as the relationship between them.

Now that the structure and definition of the components of parental cognitions have been presented, the literature review shall move toward a topic that includes the several works that have attempted to understand the dimensions parents use to think about their children, explain their behavior, and justify the parents' own behavior. In particular, these dimensions encompass the following eight points:

(1) parents' goals for their children (Castro 1997; Hoffman 1988; LeVine 1988); (2) beliefs about the nature of children, the course of their development and education (Castro and Monteiro 1996; Monteiro and Castro 1997); (3) beliefs about child emotions (e.g., Halberstadt et al. 2013; Stelter and Halberstadt 2011); (4) beliefs about learning, educational methods, and family-school relationship (Castro 1997; Castro and Monteiro 1996); (5) beliefs about parental influence and responsibility (Palacios et al. 1992); (6) beliefs about disciplinary methods and techniques (Goodnow and Collins 1990); (7) attributions about child behavior (Bugental et al. 1989; Dix and Grusec 1985); and (8) beliefs about family and intrafamily relationships (Caprara et al. 2004; Goodnow and Collins 1990). Item eight is both an understudied area and of superlative importance to the parental maltreatment topic.

Regarding the contents of beliefs of the population of abusive and neglectful parents, there have been some studies looking at different aspects of this population. Specifically, these domains have included physical discipline (Simons et al. 1991; Trickett and Susman 1989), values and goals that these parents have for their children (e.g., Iverson and Segal 1992); attributions about education and, specifically, about educational control (Bugental et al. 1989; Bugental and Johnston 2000; Bugental et al. 2010) and child intentionality (Daggett et al. 2000); as well as beliefs about the child as a person, and about perspective-taking in education, specifically the different stages and levels of parental thinking complexity (Calheiros et al. 2015; Sameroff and Feil 1985; Sameroff and Fiese 1992). However, in general, the literature on parental cognition, with the exception of causal attributions (e.g., Bugental and Johnston 2000; Bugental et al. 2010), is still scarce and only dates back to the 1990s.

As can be seen, in the research of parental cognitions in the broader domain of parenthood, three key areas of content stand out: beliefs, values, and attributions. Therefore, these specific constructs will be considered in reviewing literature specifically concerning parental cognitions in families with history of maltreatment.

Origins of Parental Cognitions: Theoretical Perspectives

The literature on the origins of parental cognitions regarding education, parenthood, and development is organized in three theoretical perspectives (Bugental et al. 1998; McGillicuddy-DeLisi 1992; McGillicudy-DeLisi and Sigel 1995; Miller 1995): (1) Information processing perspectives where parental cognitions are transitory, related to specific behaviors or contexts, and constructed through interaction with children (e.g., Mills and Rubin 1990; Rubin and Mills 1992); (2) Constructivist perspective in which cognitions are the starting point of all parent–child experiences, serving as guides for action and constructed during an individual's development (e.g., Sigel 1985, 1992); (3) The Transactional perspective where beliefs are cultural scripts that are absorbed and transmitted by the culture (e.g., Palacios et al. 1992; Sameroff and Feil 1985; Sameroff and Fiese 1992).

Each one of these perspectives on parental cognition conceptualizes the origins and the sources of variability of parent cognitive activity. Therefore, the first two perspectives—information processing and constructivist—assume that an individual's experience serves as the origin for parental cognition about children and education, i.e., for the former, the start is in parents' experiences with their children while for the latter, the cognitions start with the parents' experiences of their own parents and continues to evolve throughout their parental experience. The last perspective mentioned—transactional—frames beliefs as a function of the parents' social status and network.

The following section provides a literature review about sources of parent cognition based on current and prior parent–child interactions as primordial contexts for understanding the explanatory models of normative populations.

The Importance of Parent–Child Interactions as Sources of Parental Cognitions

In the context of parent–child interactions, historically there have been the following two traditions in the approach to the parental cognition processes: (a) concern with cognitions formed in response to particular patterns of stimulus events and (b) concern with cognitive processes that reflect the individual's history (Bugental et al. 1998; Bugental and Johnston 2000).

From the information processing perspective parental beliefs are conceptualized as constructed and readily changed by direct experience with children (Goodnow and Collins 1990). From this perspective, the cognitive processes focus on the child as a 'set of stimuli' and depend on the information available in the interaction context and, therefore, the explanations parents usually attribute to child behaviors (stimuli) are seen as evaluations formed by a controlled and conscious process dependent on time, situation, and actors involved (Bugental et al. 1998). In general, research that deals with parental cognitions based on stimuli will focus on the deliberate reasoning that occurs in response to specific educational events or for specific children (e.g., child age and ability, interaction contexts).

As a specific example of models that consider cognitions as factors that filter special aspects of child behavior, it is important to describe Rubin and Mills' research on parental beliefs (Mills and Rubin 1990; Rubin and Mills 1992) and Dix and Grusec work on attributions (1985; Dix et al. 1986).

Rubin and Mills' research program was longitudinal and intended to analyze the type of changes that determine parental beliefs, especially the child's age, parental experience as a parent, and the experiences unique to each individual child. The results generally suggest that, although parental beliefs about specific type of information can change in response to child growth and development, many beliefs and the general operational cognitive processes are stable over time. Changes found in beliefs are a result of parents' knowledge about a child's characteristics and skills (Mills and Rubin 1990; Rubin and Mills 1992).

Above all, the studies that most focus on the child as a stimulus are the studies on parental attributions about children's skills at different ages (Dix et al. 1986, 1989; Grusec and Mammone 1995). These issues have been much discussed both by Dix and Grusec (1985), Dix et al. (1986, 1989) and Grusec and Mammone (1995). Therefore, their research program is described next.

According to Dix et al. (1986), Grusec and Mammone (1995) parents use an attribution process for their children's behavior that has a set of influence factors related to their child, differs from attribution process for adults, and which promotes a different pattern of attribution. The child has less power and autonomy than the adults with which the child interacts, and therefore the child's behavior is mainly determined by external control and pressures. At the same time, as a result of the child's developmental process, the quick and continued developmental changes lead to less stable inferences than attributions toward adults. All these factors contribute to the fact that parental inferences about children do not exactly obey to the same attributional dialectic than attributions about other adults' actions. Taking into consideration all the above-mentioned, Dix and Grusec (1985; Dix et al. 1986), propose a model that presupposes two types of attributional determinants: child factors (e.g., type of behavior, age); and parental factors (e.g., beliefs about education) (Davidov et al. 2012; Dix and Grusec 1985; Dix et al. 1986, 1989).

These authors' research confirms the majority of these predictions with children from age 4–13 (Dix et al. 1986, 1989). As expected, parents of older children, judge a child's behavior as more intentional, that is it is under child's control, and more reflective of dispositional factors as compared to parents of younger children. Parents say that older children are more knowledgeable about the way they should behave and, therefore, are more responsible for their actions. Fincham and Grych (1991), in turn, reference that the older the child, the more the parents' attributions about negative behaviors are internalized, stabilized, and global. Also Gretarsson and Gelfand (1988) found two effects as children age: behavior was seen as more stable and the negative characteristics were seen as more determined by innate factors.

Other authors from a constructivist perspective have suggested that parental experience and parental learning influence adult cognitive processes related to children. For example, Holloway and Hess (1985) showed in studies on parental attributions about child behavior and performance, mothers use the information they already have to make attributions. Also Holden (1988) showed that people without children require more information than those who are already parents to solve educational problems. Bugental et al. (1998; Bugental and Johnston 2000) refer to the moderating role of parental experience and contexts as possible explanatory factors in the construction and continuous modification of cognitions.

These studies seem to reveal some important aspects regarding the origins of parental cognitions about education, specifically the role of recent experience, and the experience acquired by parents regarding their kids through time. They show that, although there are some changes based on the knowledge gained about their own children's characteristics (that changed with age), in general, there is

continuity and stability in the beliefs that have been studied so far (Bugental and Johnston 2000).

Longitudinal studies have also shown the continuity of parental values, beliefs, attributions, and practices in different child age ranges (e.g., McNally et al. 1991). Nevertheless, there are some differences in the importance parents give to autonomy and affect-expression issues, as well as in the type of disciplinary techniques they prefer when children are older.

Therefore, several authors have been pointing out the importance of taking into consideration not only the parental experience acquired through time (Bugental and Johnston 2000; Miller 1995), but also, because results are still contradictory, the role played by child's age and behavior in parental cognitions. On one hand, Miller (1995) refers to the absence of child's age effect on parental cognition. However, on the other hand, research about the origins of parental beliefs concerning disciplinary practices (e.g., Chilamkurti and Milner 1993), reveals that parents evaluate and perceive the severity of a child's transgression based on the child's age.

Research on Parental Cognition Sources in the Context of Maltreating Parents

Only recently, the discussion has started concerning the cognitions of maltreating parents. Specifically, like "normative" parents, maltreating parents' actions are internally organized through cognitive variables, including beliefs about education and development of children (Bugental et al. 2010; Calheiros 2006, 2013). Previous little attention has been given to the research on the cognitions or the sources of the cognitions of parents who maltreat their children; however, there has been considerable attention given to the different conceptualizations and representations that people have of what is maltreatment (e.g., Calheiros et al. 2016; Dubowitz et al. 1998; Portwood 1999).

The second part of this chapter, presented below, seeks to respond to three key questions concerning the determinants of parental cognitions, and integrates the responses to them with the results of an empirical study in Portugal. The Portuguese study tested the relation between maltreating mothers' cognitions and determinant factors. Specifically, these factors include (1) maternal experience (2) the mothers' perceptions of her child's behavior and (3) child development. The results of the study are integrated and discussed in the light of the literature about maltreatment.

The literature describes an uncertain causal relationship with child characteristics and a history of maltreatment (Bugental et al. 1990). When a relation has been found, child behaviors that facilitate child maltreatment have been conceptualized either as determinants, mediators, or a consequence of maltreatment (Bugental et al. 1989). The positions that child variables assume in the models of child maltreatment are even more difficult to define if we take into consideration the unequivocal relation between sociocultural factors (i.e., poverty and low socioeconomic status) and maltreatment practices (Erickson and Egeland 1996).

One of the attempts to understand the relationship between child characteristics and negative parental attitudes was carried out by developmental psychologists in studies that focused on abusive parents' perceptions and expectations. According to Azar and Siegel (1990), during a normal interaction with children, non-abusive parents have expectations that vary throughout the education and growth process of children and have correct perceptions about children's skills, as well as about what should be their own role in children's developmental process. On the contrary, abusive parents have distorted expectations about children, which can contribute to their abusive style. There is some support for this idea. Abusive parents displayed less consciousness about their child's behavior, which leads to an erroneous understanding of the child and to inadequate parental behavior (e.g., Milner 1993; Milner and Dopke 1997). This lack of parental consciousness reflects in many different ways. Abusive parents, when compared to the general parental population, have unrealistic expectations, difficulty in recognizing and in discriminating children's emotions, and have distorted perceptions of their children's development (for a review see Camilo et al. 2016). They also present high expectations of their children's skill levels, particularly concerning family responsibility and taking care of siblings. Children are seen as having all of the attributes of adults and also as being solely responsible for negative events. Therefore, abusive parents respond to their children's bad behavior with aversive and punitive responses. Underlying this scheme of parent–child relationship, there is also the idea that the child must provide and be a source of security for parents (e.g., Azar and Rohorbeck 1986). It is important to highlight the idea that this type of expectation is related to everyday events and small transgressions and not to more complex and severe events (Milner and Dopke 1997; Montes et al. 2001). Regarding severe transgressions, mothers' expectations about their children's obedience are low, and the reverse occurs toward less important transgressions (Chilamkurti and Milner 1993). According to some authors (Davidov et al. 2012), these expectations can be associated with not only negative perceptions about the child, but also with the use of coercive disciplinary techniques.

Even more interesting is the acknowledgment, in the few studies undertaken about neglectful parents' cognitions, that their cognitive processes are quite similar to the ones of abusive parents (Camilo et al. 2016). Twentyman and Plotkin (1982) found that neglectful parents are less capable of estimating a child's developmental needs and reading the child's subtle signs, than the general population of parents. Herrenkohl et al. (1983) affirmed that neglectful parents have a limited knowledge about parenting, few parenting skills, and little motivation to be a parent. Even when they realize that there is a problem or need, they might misinterpret the signs because they have unrealistic expectations about child's behavior (Dubowitz et al. 1998). In turn, both developmental psychologists and social psychologists who study parental attributions have said that the majority of parents interpret their children's misbehavior in a way that allows the preservation of a positive image of the child. The parents attributed those misbehaviors to external causes and therefore uncontrollable by the child, unstable in time, and specific to the situation (Dix 1991; Gretarsson and Gelfand 1988). However, parents that have an incomplete knowledge or distorted understanding of their children's normal development tend to

make negative attributions about their child's behavior (Rubin and Mills 1992), display negative attributional biases towards the children (Bugental et al. 1990; Bugental and Johnston 2000; Dix 1991), and describe the inadequate behavior of the child as internal, controllable, stable, and global (idem). In fact, Twentyman and colleagues (Larrance and Twentyman 1983; Twentyman et al. 1984) among others (Bugental 2004; Bugental et al. 1990; Milner 1993), suggest as a part of cognitive models of parental maltreatment, that certain types of parental attributions lead to parental abuse or to disciplinary techniques of power assertion (Montes et al. 2001). The initial support came from Larrance and Twentyman (1983), which stated that while abusive mothers make stable and internal attributions about the child regarding negative events, while, at the same time making external and unstable attributions regarding positive events. Non-abusive mothers show the opposite pattern of attributions. This conclusion was later supported by the results of Bradley and Peters (1991), which revealed that abusive mothers feel less responsible for the negative interactions they have with their children, and also consider their children less responsible for successful interactions. Additionally, abusive and non-abusive parents also differ from each other in terms of the hostile intentionality they attribute to their children behavior (Montes et al. 2001) and in terms of attributions they make about children's skills (Diaz et al. 1991). Abusive parents usually exaggerated in the first and were scarce in the second.

Bugental (2004), Bugental et al. (1989) have shown that abusive parents also differ from non-abusive parents in the perceived control about education dimension. Abusive mothers usually perceive themselves as having less control of their children, and especially about children's negative behavior. Therefore, when parents perceive they have less control and power over the child, feelings of parental apprehension or anxiety are activated (Bugental et al. 1996). The maltreating parents, in turn, become more physically abusive in their interactions with the child and tend to use more coercive practices (e.g., Bugental 2004; Bugental et al. 1989). These results are consistent with the literature on social power that reveals that people who have doubts about their power make more use of coercive control tactics (e.g., Kipnis 1976). Luster and Kain (1987), for example, found differences between parents that believed they had a low effect on their children (low effectiveness) and parents that believed they had an effect on their kids (high effectiveness). While parents with high effectiveness showed love and affection toward their children, low effectiveness parents, especially men, tended to be rigid and stern.

The literature has, however, very few empirical studies measuring the effect of the experiences that maltreating parents have with their children on the maltreating parents' own values and beliefs. Moreover, literature in the area of social cognition hardly ever contemplates these parents. In fact, authors coming from a social cognition approach, although they are interested in the study of at-risk parents (e.g., Crouch et al. 2010; McCarthy et al. 2013; Milner et al. 2011) have not studied maltreating parent populations. Iverson and Segal (1992) have done one of the few studies that specifically analyzed the relation between child behavior, parental values, and beliefs using a sample of abusive and neglectful parents. Nevertheless,

the results did not show differences between maltreating mothers and the control group in terms of the relation between parental behavior, obedience, and independence values. Perhaps then it is not surprising that studies on maltreating parents have focused on the specific contents of parental cognitions, like expectations and attributions.

Focusing on the expectations and attributions means that parental cognitions are more a product of stimuli. A result of this approach is that the deliberate reasoning that occurs is a response to specific events or specific children rather than as a general response. In addition, the cognitive processes underlying contents like perceptions, expectations, and attributions are more focused on the child as a stimulus and, therefore, depend on the information available in the interaction context. Nevertheless, other authors have suggested that parental cognitions about their children and education are influenced by parental experience and learning throughout their children's development (Bugental et al. 1998; Bugental and Johnston 2000).

Focusing on the specific history of the child/parent interaction raises the following three questions. (1) Does the behavior and development of children only constitute one influential factor of specific contents of parental thinking—those that are more directly related with the child, like attributions—or do they also constitute an important variable for the construction of other contents of parental thinking, namely values and beliefs about children and education? (2) What is the role of the parental experience and perception throughout a child's development? (3) Last, what is the role of a parent's perception of child's behavior and development based on the available information in the current interaction context? With that goal in mind, three key models were tested.

Dix and colleagues' model (Dix et al. 1986, 1989), as was already mentioned, defines the importance of child characteristics and behavior in the construction of parental causal attributions, but not in maltreatment situations. Rubin and Mills' model (1992) states that emotions, strategies, and the cognitive processes involved in the choice of educational strategies are functions of the child's behavior. However, the 'coercive cycle' model developed by Patterson (1998) and further researched by Bugental et al. (1998), Bugental and Johnston (2000) affirms the continuity of behavioral and educational patterns in parent–child interactions in samples of problematic children and maltreating parents. These authors also found that the children's negative characteristics of development and behavior, associated with other factors like the number of children in the family, might be related to maternal experiences of stress, which leads to negative perceptions of the child in the underlying parental cognitions (e.g., Patterson 1998).

In an attempt to understand the role of all these factors, we tested a model of direct and mediation effects with a sample of 102 maltreating mothers with children from ages 6–12. The first goal was to understand the role of child characteristics (i.e., sex and age), maternal perceptions of past and current child development (health problems, developmental and behavioral problems throughout child's development), and of maternal experience (number of children) on the maternal cognitions (values, beliefs and attributions). In that sense, like other authors

(e.g., Dix et al. 1989; Sigel 1985), the decision was made to adopt a molecular approach of parental cognitions that is based on different aspects and contents of parental thinking like values, beliefs, and attributions. The second goal was to analyze the relation of all these variables with abusive and negligent parental practices.

Child's sex and age variables were excluded from the analyses because they did not correlate with the other variables in the models.

Results of sequential regressions indicate that it is not possible to explain variation in maternal conformism values through prior maternal experience with the child variables and that the explanation of maternal independence values was also weak. Column 'Model 1' of Table 7.1 shows the effect of perceptions about previous child developmental and behavioral problems and of maternal experience (number of children) on maternal independency values. There was only a significant effect of perceptions about prior child's behavioral problems, which explains 4 % of the observed variance.

Results of 'Model 2' (Table 7.1) and the Sobel's test (1982) confirmed a mediation of this effect by maternal perception of child aggressiveness (t (100) = 2.10, $p < 0.05$). Overall, adding the more proximal variables of parental cognition increased the explained variance in parental independency values by 13 %.

Table 7.1 Results of regressions with the predictor variables—number of children, perception about prior developmental and behavioral problems—and the mediation variables—perception about current child's responsible behavior and cognitive development—on the prediction of maternal values

	Maternal independency values	
Predictors	Model 1	Model 2
Step 1		
Number of children	−0.11	−0.03
Perception of prior development problems	−0.05	0.00
Perception of prior behavior problems	−0.21*	−0.04
Step 2		
Cognitive child development		−0.21[†]
Perception of current child's responsible behavior		0.01
Perception of current child aggressiveness		−0.28*
Comparative perception of child		0.11
ΔR^2		0.12
ΔF	2.43[†]	3.52**
Total Adjusted R^2	0.04	0.13

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; [†]$p < 0.10$
Only results for maternal independency values are presented, as it was the only one with significant results

Table 7.2 includes the set of statistically significant sequential regressions for the maternal beliefs models. The results of 'Model 1' show that the number of children and the maternal perception about child prior developmental problems have a positive effect on maternal permissive beliefs, although this last effect is only marginally significant. No effect is found between these variables and mother's traditional beliefs dimension.

The results presented in 'Model 2' of Table 7.2 suggest that for the permissive beliefs, significant effects are found for the perception of current child's responsible behavior dimension and current health problems. However, in the presence of these variables, the effects of perception of prior developmental problems and number of children on permissive beliefs lose their significance. The analysis of the conditions under which a mediation effect occurs reveals that the perception of child's responsible behavior variable mediates the relation between prior development and permissive beliefs, that is, the more prior developmental problems, the lower the perceived current behavior responsibility of the child, the stronger the permissive beliefs. The test of the indirect effects confirms this mediation effect ($t(100) = 1.95$, $p = 0.05$). As a whole, 16 % of the permissive dimension's variance is explained by all predictors together, including this mediation effect and marginally significant effects of current health perception and number of children.

Table 7.2 Results of regressions with the predictor variables—number of children, perception about prior child's developmental, behavioral, and health problems—and the mediation variables—perceptions about current child's responsible behavior and cognitive development—on the prediction of maternal beliefs

| | Maternal permissive beliefs | |
	Model 1	Model 2
Predictors		
Step 1		
Number of children	0.26*	0.19†
Perception of prior development problems	0.21†	0.13
Perception of prior behavior problems	−0.14	−0.18
Perception of prior health problems	0.05	0.03
Step 2		
Cognitive child development		−0.04
Perception of current child's responsible behavior		−0.29*
Perception of current child aggressiveness		−0.05
Perception of current health problems		0.19†
Comparative perception of child		0.06
ΔR^2		0.10
ΔF	3.50*	2.43*
Total Adjusted R^2	0.09	0.16

*$p < 0.05$; $^{†}p < 0.10$

Only results for permissive beliefs' models are presented, as it was the only one with significant results

Table 7.3 Results of regressions with the predictor variables—number of children, perception about prior children's developmental and behavioral problems—and the mediation variables—perceptions about current child's responsible behavior and cognitive development—on the prediction of maternal attributions

| Predictors | Maternal attributions | | | | | |
| | Control attribution | | Child intention attribution | | External attribution | |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Step 1						
Number of children	−0.15	−0.01	−0.13	0.01	0.43***	0.42***
Perception of prior development problems	−0.12	0.01	0.01	0.11	0.27**	0.25*
Perception of prior behavior problems	−0.11	0.00	−0.44***	−0.22*	0.10	0.04
Step 2						
Cognitive child development		0.20		0.25**		0.14
Perception of current child's responsible behavior		0.37***		0.20*		−0.08
Perception of current child aggressiveness		−0.01		−0.32***		−0.02
Perception of current health problems		0.11		−0.07		0.03
Comparative perception of child		−0.03		0.03		−0.15[†]
ΔR^2		0.20		0.26		0.01
ΔF	2.33[†]	4.86***	8.58***	8.75***	15.55***	7.43***
Total adjusted R^2	0.04	0.26	0.18	0.42	0.31	0.31

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$; [†]$p < 0.10$

Table 7.3 presents the set of sequential regressions undertaken for maternal attributions' models (attributions of maternal control, positive attributions of child's behavior intentionality and external attributions). The results of 'Model 1' show that none of the initial variables predicts maternal control attributions. For the child's intention attributions, only perception of child's prior behavioral problems has a negative effect, which alone explains 18 % of its variance. The number of children and mothers' perceptions about children's prior developmental problems has positive effects on mothers' external attributions explaining a total of 32 % of its variance.

The results of the mediation analysis, presented in 'Model 2' of Table 7.3, reveal that the only variables with a positive effect on the maternal control attributions were child cognitive development and perception of child's responsible behavior, together explaining 26 % of its variance.

For child positive intention attributions (e.g., capacity, knowledge and effort) significant effects are found of perception of current aggressiveness, child's

cognitive development, and perception of child's responsible behavior. In the presence of these variables, the relationship between prior behavioral problems and child positive intention attributions weakens, despite a persisting negative direct effect. The test of the indirect effects confirms a partial mediation by perception of current aggressiveness (t (100) = 2.69, p = 0.007) but not by perception of the child's current responsible behavior (t (100) = 1.56, p = 0.11). With other words, the less previous behavioral problems mothers perceived, the less aggressive they perceived their child currently, leading in turn to more positive intentions mothers attributed to the child (e.g., capacity, knowledge and effort).

Altogether, 42 % of child intention attributions are explained by all predictors entered into 'Model 2' together.

Finally, it is not possible to explain external attributions with the new variables introduced in the second model. The results of 'Model 2' show that only the comparative perception of the child has a marginally significant negative effect on external attributions.

Having established the link between mothers past experience, their current perceptions of their children and maternal cognition will now analyze the explanatory power of all these variables for maternal abusive practices. Maternal cognition (values, beliefs and attributions) are assumed to be mediator variables in these models.

As shown by the results in Table 7.4, if we analyze the change in the model's explanation by entering the cognitive variables we see that these variables explain 31 % of variance in maltreatment, out of 62 % overall explained variance. In case of neglect the variance explained by these variables is much smaller, indicating that it is particularly in the practice of maltreatment that the cognitive variables have their largest explanatory power. Moreover, when comparing the processes involved in the relations between the variables of these two models, we found that at the level of cognitive variables there were three indirect effects, apart from the direct effects of maternal permissive beliefs and control attribution on maltreatment, as well as the effect of external attribution on neglect. The first indirect effect was that the relation between cognitive development and maltreatment was mediated by maternal traditional beliefs (t (100) = 2.09, p < 0.05). The second involves the mediation of the effect of number of children on neglect by permissive beliefs (t (100) = 2.03, p < 0.05) and the third one, the mediation of the effect of perception of the child's current responsible behavior on neglect by external attributions (t (100) = 1.87, p = 0.08), respectively.

Several questions motivated the overall analyses we presented. We wanted to know the explanatory power of maternal experiences (past and current ones) when predicting mothers' values, beliefs, and attributions, the explanatory power of all of these variables when predicting maternal abusive practices and, finally, the processes that interlink these variables with each other.

First, results indicate that mothers' current perceptions of their child are related to the way how they see their previous mother–child interactions. That is, the more previous developmental problems they see, the less collaboration and responsibility they perceive in their children, and the more difficulties they see in their relation to

Table 7.4 Results of regressions with the predictor variables—number of children, perception about prior children's developmental and behavioral problems, perceptions about current child's behavior and cognitive development—and the mediation variables—values, beliefs, and attributions on the maltreatment practices

| | Maternal practices | | | |
| | Maltreatment | | Neglect | |
Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Step 1				
Number of children	0.12	0.14	0.27**	0.12
Perception of prior development problems	−0.17[†]	−0.14	0.14	0.05
Perception of prior behavior problems	0.40***	0.30**	−0.01	0.02
Cognitive child development	−0.30**	−0.09	−0.33***	−0.21*
Perception of current child's responsible behavior	0.04	0.03	−0.17[†]	−0.01
Perception of current child aggressiveness	0.04	−0.11	0.00	−0.03
Perception of current health problems	−0.16[†]	−0.15*	0.09	0.02
Comparative perception of child	−0.23*	−0.15**	0.04	0.06
Step 2				
Conformism maternal values		0.00		−0.07
Independency maternal values		−0.10		0.06
Maternal control beliefs		0.16		0.19
Maternal permissive beliefs		−0.25*		0.31***
Maternal traditional beliefs		0.35***		0.05
Control attribution		−0.17*		−0.12
Child intention attribution		−0.10		−0.02
External attribution		0.08		0.24*
ΔR^2		0.31		0.14
ΔF	6.52***	10.15**	8.81***	3.45*
Total Adjusted R2	0.31	0.62	0.39	0.50

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$; [†]$p < 0.10$

them as compared to other children. Further, the more behavioral problems they see in the past, the less collaboration and responsibility they see in their children as well, but also the more they perceive their children as aggressive. The child's cognitive development seems to be related with the number of children and the perception of prior developmental problems, that is, the more children the mother has and the more difficulties she perceived in the past, the more difficulties the children have in their current development.

Overall, although the results do support to some degree proposals by the literature (Crittenden 1999; Patterson 1998) regarding the role of the child in circles of coercion and neglect in parent–child relations, the fact that the levels of explained variance are relatively low is not entirely consistent with the idea of a continuous circle of violence claimed by Patterson (idem). That leaves the possibility open that

there are other factors predicting current maternal perceptions and children's cognitive development. But, as the same author noticed (Patterson 1982), developmental characteristics, negative behavior of the child, and mothers previous experience (number or raised children) can be associated with other stressful maternal experiences that fuel negative perceptions of the child. Family dimension is one of those, as has been mentioned by Conger et al. (1984).

Given the nature of children's social development, one variable that could better explain this process of change in perceptions and ideas that parents have about their children is age (e.g., Dix et al. 1986, 1989; Rubin and Mills 1992), a factor that not turn out to be relevant in the studied sample.

Second, the results presented here about the origin of maternal cognitions indicate that it is not so easy to explain the variations seen in the values of conformity or independency; in traditional or permissiveness beliefs, or in control attributions based on the maternal experience (number of children) and on the perceptions of their children's prior behavior and development. In fact, only positive attributions about child's behavior and the mothers' external attributions seem to be explained by sources of mother's experiences acquired during the experience of motherhood which is consistent with findings of Bugental et al. (1998), Bugental and Johnston (2000).

The results also suggest that, although some beliefs (e.g., permissive beliefs) and values (e.g., independency values) are explained by current experiences with the child to a certain degree, mother's control and positive child intention attributions are mainly the ones that are explained by the information currently available in the interaction context.

These results as a whole are not that surprising with respect to maternal values, since others had already demonstrated that these are more related to maternal distal variables and less to a child's behavior (e.g., Carugati 1990; Castro 1997), even in abusive and neglectful samples (Iverson and Segal 1992). Regarding the sources of maternal beliefs, several authors (e.g., Rubin and Mills 1992) affirm the importance of the parents' current and prior experiences with the target child. Our study shows that mothers with more children and with prior development problems hold the more permissive beliefs.

Regarding maternal attributions the proposed models showed high capacity to explain a reasonable percentage of their variance, which is consistent with the literature on parental attributions (Bugental et al. 1989; Dix et al. 1986, 1989) given that they are one of the more specific dimensions of the cognitions.

Finally, the results also show that there are many different processes connecting these variables. Permissive beliefs, independency values, and child intention attributions were explained through a generating process based on perceptions of the child, such as prior developmental and behavioral problems and current perceptions of child's responsible behavior and aggression. That is, the more prior developmental problems and the more current health problems perceived, the greater will be the child's current behavioral problems (e.g., lack of responsibility) which, in turn, increase the adherence to permissive beliefs. Moreover, the more prior behavioral problems, the greater will be the child's current aggressive behavior,

which, in turn, is negatively related with independency values and attributions about child's intention and positive control. Positive maternal attributions about their children are also directly linked to the perception of child's responsible behavior and to the child's development. Furthermore, attributions about maternal control over their child's behavior are related with positive aspects of current child development and child's responsible behavior. In contrast, the mother's attributions about factors that are external to her and the child appeared to be more related to prior factors of the child's developmental history and to family dimension.

These results are quite similar to the ones that other authors have presented (Bradley and Peters 1991; Bugental et al. 1990; Dix 1991; Montes et al. 2001). Furthermore, we found that abusive mothers make negative and intentionality attributions of their own children's negative behavior and see themselves as less responsible for the negative interactions between mother and child. It also seems understandable that maternal perceptions of children's negative behavior are linked with the rejection of independency values. The relation between permissive beliefs, prior developmental problems, and a perception of the child's irresponsibility was more difficult to grasp. This means that the different perceptions mothers have about their children's behavior to have a quite surprising role in the different systems of maternal beliefs. To determine to what extent these findings correspond to Bugental and colleagues' hypothesis (Bugental et al. 1996) that the same pattern of existing behaviors leading to cognitive biases may underlie both abusive and neglectful practices, it is necessary to understand how the different perceptions and ideas combine to determine abusive and neglectful maternal practices. Let's stick, therefore, in the following, to the meaning of the regressions that were found for the values, beliefs, and attributions as intermediating variables and abusive practices as outcomes. First, when analyzing the variability of maternal practices, the maternal perceptions of their children seem to be important aspects that have to be considered. On the one hand, prior behavioral problems, developmental difficulties, and negative perceptions of the children compared to other children seem to be variables that are more important for the explanation of maternal practices of maltreatment. On the other hand, the number of children in the family, difficulties with responsibility and developmental problems of the child are variables of the maternal experience that better explain negligence.

Second, when analyzing the variability of maternal practices in terms of maternal cognitions, maternal values, beliefs, and attributions play a more decisive role in the prediction of maltreatment than of neglect. The results found for maltreatment go along with the literature that claims that more authoritarian (punitive and restrictive) mothers are those that endorse more traditional values, values of obedience, order, and authority and less values of independence and self-regulation of the children (e.g., Kelley et al. 1992; Oliva et al. 1995; Segal 1985). They also show less positive attributions to control and intentionality of the child and perceive less maternal control of the children's behavior (Bradley and Peters 1991; Bugental et al. 1990; Dix 1991; Luster and Kain 1987).

There is no evidence for a process of continuity in the models explaining maltreatment, as maternal perceptions of current behavior did only weakly or not at

all contribute to its explanation. We would like to highlight that neither perceptions of aggressive characteristics of the child nor of a lack of responsibility had any effect on maltreatment, because they play such a central role in the setup of some maternal ideas and are so often referred to in the literature on maltreatment (Dodge et al. 1994; Egeland et al. 1983). These results were even less expected insofar as the perception of prior behavioral problems was directly related with maltreatment practices.

The child factor that seems most important, even if in an indirect way, is cognitive development. That is, contrary to Patterson's (1998) proposal that outlines reciprocal effects of parents' and children's aggression as coercive circles, it seem to be the physically and intellectually rather fragile children that, given some specific maternal ideas, are more vulnerable to abusive practices of parents.

The central role of maternal ideas in maltreatment is also evident in the findings showing that maltreating mothers reject permissive ideas, defend traditional beliefs about education, and believe in the power of control, despite the fact that they do not feel very responsible for the negative behavior of their children, as has been mentioned already by other authors (e.g., Kelley et al. 1992; Oliva et al. 1995; Segal 1985).

In contrast, maternal ideas do not play such a central role for the prediction of neglect. Neglect is rather characterized by a mechanism of additive continuity in previous developmental difficulties, perceptions of children's lack of responsibility, permissive maternal beliefs, number of children, and external attributions in the interactions with the children. These results are completely in line with authors claiming that one of the most influential factors of parents' negligent practices consists in "difficulties of adjustment" between mothers and children in various domains (e.g., Dubowitz 1999; Harrington et al. 1998), and with regard to other areas of personal life (Crittenden 1999). They are also in line with Himmelstein et al. (1991) who mention about the role of number of children in long-term causal attribution that mothers with just one child attribute more importance to educational and parental factors than mothers with more than one child.

Overall these results show that the relation between maternal ideas and mothers' educational practices is unquestionable, even if it is a bit easier to explain practices of maltreatment by these ideas than practices of neglect. Moreover, linking the pattern of results to the ones discussed in the previous point culminates in a rather simple conclusion: It is not enough to analyze dysfunctional parenthood as a homogeneous entity. As Goodnow claims (Goodnow and Collins 1990), it is necessary to analyze distinct abusive parental practices in order to understand the specific mechanisms that explain the relation between the ideas and the different patterns of parent–child interaction. Whereas maltreating mothers seem to act rather under the direct influence of their ideas about education and parenthood and less based on the perceptions they have of their children, for neglecting mothers the maternal ideas interlink, via a process of continuity, their parental context (having many or few children), their perceptions of behavior throughout the children's' development and the way how they interact with them.

General Conclusions and Implications

Beliefs are indeed subject to evolution, and when they change in response to new social conditions or scientific progress, they frequently are the focus of public debate. Regarding the belief systems of maltreatment populations, an analysis of the diversity of the sources of these beliefs may contribute to the awareness of child maltreatment and to shed some light on predictive issues (stability and change of social behavior), the justification (planning and strategies), and implementation of intervention programs targeted for specific at risk groups. Therefore, a major question in considering community based child protection should focus on how maltreatment parents (abusive and neglect) view their children's, education and development. It is also important to determine the extent to which these ideas correlate with the main personal and interactional experience factors. This kind of analysis will provide information potentially useful to the development of maltreatment prevention initiatives, focusing on raising parents' awareness on the cognitive risk factors for this phenomenon, and to develop and implement programs targeted for specific social groups.

This chapter aimed to respond to a set of questions about the determinants of parental cognitions specific to 'what is a child' in reference to child development and education. Also underlying this is a critique of the parenting practices of maltreating parents. Accordingly, results of an empirical study undertaken in Portugal were integrated and discussed in the light of the literature about maltreatment. That study intended to test the relationship between maltreating mothers' cognitions and determinant factors like maternal experience and the mothers' perceptions of child behavior and development in order to understand the importance the determinant factors played in the construction of maternal cognitions about their children.

The results obtained illuminate the origins of parental cognitions when maternal experience is taken into account. In short, these results show that it is always easier to explain maternal attributions based on the educational experience with their child than it is to explain beliefs and values. Furthermore, it is important to highlight other patterns that emerged from the models tested: with the exception of attributions, in which mediation and linear effects were found both for prior and current educational experiences, all other maternal cognitions (beliefs and values) are better explained through mediation processes—i.e., cumulative processes of maternal experience—than by the direct effect of maternal experience with children.

Finally, the results also indicated that on the one hand, prior behavioral problems, developmental difficulties, and negative perceptions of the children compared to other children seem to be variables that are more important for the explanation of maternal practices of maltreatment. On the other hand, the number of children in the family, difficulties with responsibility and developmental problems of the child are variables of the maternal experience that better explain negligence.

In this sense, the research on this field could help reorient prevailing ideas on intervention and contribute to better reflect the real needs of the parents and the interests of children.

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Chapter 8
The Promotion of Violence by the Mainstream Media of Communication

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Abstract This chapter gives a comprehensive state-of-the-art review on the effects that exposure to or enactment of violence in mainstream media has on aggressive behavior, emotions, and empathy. In line with contemporary technological developments, the authors also cover the more and more widespread consumption of violent video games, which put the player in a more active role than traditional media (such as television) put their viewers. As the field is extremely controversial, the authors are careful in their analysis of the actually existing evidence as well as in their conclusions and recommendations for future research. Despite all controversy, and after reviewing existing literature, as well as a large number of own empirical work, the authors come to the conclusion that there is evidence for increased aggressive motivation and impulsivity as a result of exposure to media violence, but that it is not clear yet how much it affects people's real-life behavior. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is no evidence for cathartic effects, a conclusion that is similar in research on the effects of filmed violence, and an idea that had been present in the controversy for decades but can now be abandoned.

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Introduction

There can be no doubt that violence is prevalent in public media. Violence abounds in news and entertainment programs. It dominates both realistic and fictional formats, and it permeates children's fare, and "adult-content" often indicates an even higher level of violence. Given such ubiquitous presence in the media, it does not come as a surprise that citizens, educators, and scholars have started to wonder about, and examine in rigorous terms, the consequences for human affairs and society of the apparent overrepresentation of violence in the media.

Broadcast media, such as television, are an established cultural source of information and communication. However, new technological developments are changing our entertainment, preferences, and communication styles. Now there seems to be a preference for interactive media over broadcast media. Among the various entertainment media, video games have become increasingly popular in the past decades, both in the EUA (Siwek 2014) and Europe (ISFE 2012). Like television programs, violence is one of the main ingredients of many popular video games (e.g., Dietz 1998; Smith et al. 2003; Thompson and Haninger 2001; Thompson et al. 2006).

In this article, we will focus on the influence of exposure to media violence on users taking into account the effects of watching broadcast media and playing video games. Research on the consequences of violent play using video games is more recent than that on watching broadcast media, but recent studies have provided evidence for some shared negative short- and long-term effects. We will discuss theoretical assumptions and review empirical findings in this area. We will also discuss methodological concerns, address questions that remain unanswered, and make suggestions for future areas of research in this field.

Research on Watching Violence in the Media

Enculturation of Violence

Since the dawn of television, speculation, and theories emerged in efforts to forecast the implications of such dramatic technological changes.

A *cultivation theory*, proposed by Gerbner and his collaborators (Gerbner 1970; Gerbner and Gross 1976; Gerbner et al. 1994), became the initial focal point in the discussion of societal impact. According to cultivation theory, exposing individuals to the same dominant messages, images, and values, over and over again, may contribute to the development of their conception of social reality in a consistent way. Therefore, it has been hypothesized that those who are more exposed to violent portrayals may have such violent concepts and images cognitively available, and consequently may perceive the real world as a more violent and a scary place to live in (Shrum 2001).

Gerbner's primary concern was that global media conglomerates might form, usurp power, and arbitrarily control the populace. He anticipated a momentous shift

in the exercise of influence, likening the power of television in modern society to that of religious institutions in earlier times. Eventually, however, his concern about the holders of media power gave way to more mundane interests, such as probing media content for partialities in projecting social reality as well as for apprehensions created thereby. Under the heading of *social indicators*, Gerbner and his collaborators addressed representational distortions—like the overrepresentation of white persons along with the underrepresentation of black persons in heroic roles and the reverse in villainous roles. The idea behind this theory is that consumers who watched a great deal of media programs would be more likely to believe that these distortions are accurate representations of social reality. The call for the removal of existing biases was part of an effort toward a more appropriate *enculturation* of the public. Nevertheless, enculturation by the communication media was thought to reach deeper than the perception of social reality. The obtrusive overrepresentation of violence, in particular, was expected to produce affective reactivity and related protective behaviors. Gerbner and his associates examined these possibilities in surveys that separated light from heavy viewers of television. Operationally, they sampled viewers of up to two hours of daily watching and compared them to viewers who watched four or more hours daily. The surveys ascertained and compared the groups' apprehensions about becoming victims of violent crime. The expectation was that heavy viewers, as they accumulated more exposure to violent victimizations, would report greater apprehensions. The findings confirmed this expectation, lending credence to the proposed enculturation chain from greater exposure. That is, accumulation of media violence is correlated to exaggerated estimates of the prevalence of violence in society and, in turn, to intensified apprehensions about endangerment, possibly along with increased protective alertness.

The findings and their interpretation were soon challenged, however. In research similar to that conducted by Gerbner and Gross (1976), Doob and MacDonald (1979) reported that, after considering the density of crime in the viewers' neighborhoods, a relation between media use and fear of crime could not be observed. Instead, violent neighborhoods seemed to bread fear of victimization. Hughes (1980) and Hirsch (1980) also faulted the media-enculturation claims, attributing the findings reported by Gerbner and Gross to demographic factors such as the age, gender, and education of interviewees.

Despite its intuitive appeal, the process of media enculturation projected by cultivation theory has been debated and challenged by several researchers. A major reason for this may be the theory's definition and the singular concept of violence. Explicitly, in behavioral terms, violence is a coercive, mostly physical, destructive action that victimizes particular parties. The accumulated presentation of such actions may well induce apprehensions and fear in most viewers. This, however, is not what the media are featuring, especially regarding fictional formats. Rather, the entertainment media present violence in formula formats that juxtapose "crime and punishment". Violent actions are not shown in isolation, but in a context that entails its punishment. In fact, violence in drama seems to be needed for resolutions to be appreciated (Zillmann 1998). Purely victimizing violence tends to foster empathic

suffering with victimized parties. In stark contrast, the display of retributive, corrective, punitive violence renders empathy defunct, and even invites the enjoyment of the restoration of justice, violent as this restoration may be. Media violence, then, has to be seen in that context. Violent drama in accordance with this "formula" can be enjoyed, ultimately, and attract audiences—rather than conjure up lingering fear and repulse audiences. Counter to the assumptions of Gerbner's "mean world syndrome", it may actually be suggested that, for the most part, media violence projects too safe a world, as perpetrators are promptly brought to justice, making "the streets safe" again.

Research by Wakshlag et al. (1983) found a partiality for violence in the context of justice. Respondents who were either minimally or severely crime-apprehensive could choose between crime drama that featured destructive violence without punishment, or the same violence when duly punished. The mere aggregation of violent actions was found to hold little appeal for both men and women, especially for those who were severely crime-apprehensive. In contrast, drama that entailed and highlighted the restoration of justice proved highly attractive, especially for severely crime-apprehensive men and women. These findings suggest that the restoration of justice, as a salient theme of popular crime drama, may be capable of mitigating the distressing, potentially fear-evoking reactions to prior violent happenings and actually pacify crime-apprehensive viewers.

Such mitigation was observed in related work. Tamborini et al. (1984) ascertained apprehensions about urban crime after exposure to various presentational formats of violent victimizations. After exposure to a crime drama presenting a series of violent crimes against citizens, estimates of fear of personal assault were comparatively high. They were markedly lower after exposure to these crimes when followed by their punishment via due force and incarceration. However, after exposure to a city-crime documentary, fear of assault reached an extreme far above the level after crime drama. All these effects proved short-lived, as traces of them could not be found during the following days.

The failure to detect effect residues after some passage of time points is common to almost all experimental research on media violence limited to assessing immediate consequences of one-time exposure. However, this method provides superior control of stimulus and response conditions. Within this research paradigm, the theoretical reasoning has similarly concentrated on the immediacy of aggression instigation. With the exception of developmental models (Bandura 1973; Huesmann 1986; Singer and Singer 1981), theories have embraced *cognitive cueing* as the principal effect mediator (Geen and Thomas 1986).

The priming and cognitive-neoassociationistic models of Berkowitz (1984; Jo and Berkowitz 1994) dominated the initial explorations. These models posit, essentially, that exposure to media violence activates aggression-related cortical structures that guide, for fleeting moments, the selection of aggressive actions. Research by Berkowitz (1974) and Berkowitz and Powers (1979) exemplified these cognitive conceptions most clearly. Male respondents were provoked by a confederate and given an opportunity to aggress against him. Just prior to being given this opportunity, the respondents were shown a film featuring violent actions as either

justified (men attacked another man in retaliation) or unjustified (men attacked another man for no reason). Immediately after film exposure, respondents who had seen the justified violence were more severely aggressive toward the confederate than respondents who had seen the unjustified violence. In terms of cognitive mediation, the provoked respondents are thought to make moral judgments about the fictional character's actions as either moral and deserved or amoral and underserved. When the respondent judged the violent actions as deserved, the approval tied into the respondents' own retaliatory inclinations, render them more justified than would otherwise be the case, which then lead to increased aggressiveness.

The concept of aggression-facilitation by eliciting cues is not restricted to the tacit sanctioning of violence. Any media information that activates cognitive structures pertaining to violence can enter into aggressive inclinations and thereby make aggressive actions more likely and more intense (Berkowitz 1974). The mere image of guns, for instance, has been found to enhance retaliatory aggression. Even name-associations had this capability (Geen and Berkowitz 1966). When provoked respondents were shown a film in which a character of a particular name took a beating, they punished their own nemesis more when he shared the fictional character's name than when he did not.

The nomenclature of the facilitation of aggression by media cues has changed considerably. However, labels like neural priming and cognitive networking mostly rephrase the eliciting-cue hypothesis of media violence; that is, witnessing others' perpetration of violence triggers cognitions which impinge on the cognitive preparation of reprisal against one's own tormentors and thereby foster an escalation of overt aggressive actions against them. Research using brief exposure to fictional violence and immediate post-exposure aggression assessments has consistently shown a facilitation of aggression. Geen (1994), in summarizing the findings within this compact research paradigm, recorded this constancy but pointed to the arousal of annoyance and anger as a necessary condition. The predicted "effect is most likely to occur when the viewer has been provoked in some way and is therefore relatively likely to aggress" (p. 152). By implication, research within the short-exposure, immediate-effect paradigm has not demonstrated that media violence breeds violence in the absence of an established aggression propensity. The consistency of findings of aggression enhancement also implies that brief exposure to media violence does not appreciably reduce motivated aggressive actions. In other words, there is a void of evidence of cathartic effects. Generally speaking, exposure to media violence has rarely, if ever, been found to diminish existing aggressive inclination.

The experimental exploration of media-violence effects has been greatly advanced by the incorporation of personality factors. In an exemplary study by Bushman (1995), for instance, the degree of trait aggressiveness was differentiated. Initially, the implications of this trait were examined for selective exposure to violent material. It was found that high trait aggressive individuals were far more attracted to violent films than were individuals with low trait aggressiveness. A second study focused on moods after exposure to violent fare. High aggressive individuals were found to report greater anger than their less trait aggressive counterparts.

Numerous other investigations probed alternative traits and also led to the construction of more complex theoretical perspectives that integrated cognitive considerations and the influence of affective states and emotionality. Anderson and Bushman (2002b) proposed the General Aggression Model (GAM), a multipath model which integrates the expression of immediate aggressive behavior from prior theoretical models, and includes internal factors, such as cognition, affect, and arousal, through which violent cues can affect aggressive behavior. Nevertheless, many questions remained regarding which pathway or pathways influence aggression after exposure to violence. In the interest of greater ecological validity, research on the effects of media violence on aggression sought methods to better simulate actual consumption patterns. These designs have also included delays in assessing consequences, thereby addressing not only nonimmediate effects but their duration. In terms of theory, such delays in effect assessment circumvent the mediation via eliciting cues present in short-term memory. Delayed effects obviously depend upon the retention and recall of relevant event cues over extended periods, making the frequency of their activation at different times, and the regency of the activation of salient cues primary considerations. Accessibility of mediating cognitions will be chronic rather than transitory (Bargh et al. 1988; Higgins 1996). In more practical terms, the delay of effect assessments provides information about the duration of these effects and, at the very least, ensures that they are not ephemeral.

The prolonged-exposure, delayed-measurement paradigm was employed in a media-violence investigation by Zillmann and Weaver (1999). On four consecutive days, male and female respondents were shown intact feature films that either displayed a great deal of exceedingly graphic, gratuitous violence, or were entirely devoid of violent action. Following exposure to each film, the respondents indicated how much they liked or disliked the film. One day after exposure to the last film of the series, respondents participated in ostensibly unrelated research on emotion recognition. After partaking in a skill assessment, a research assistant commented either politely or abusively on their performance. In the abusive treatment, the assistant disparaged the respondents by insinuating their lack of intelligence and maturity. Shortly thereafter, respondents were put in a position to harm the assistant. The findings showed that the two hostility enhancing components, film content and provocation, operated independently and failed to combine, as might have been expected. First and foremost, it was found that the accumulated exposure to exceedingly violent films was capable of escalating, even after a day's delay, hostile and punitive behavior, independent of whether such behavior was explicitly provoked or not at all provoked. This effect of accumulated exposure differs from much research on immediate effects of short-term exposure in which increased aggression is contingent upon provocation (Geen 1994). It can only be presumed that accumulated exposure to excessive violence fosters a more diffuse disposition for the use of punitive behavior, with apparent disregard for specific mitigating circumstances. On the other hand, the findings also showed that provocation, compared to no provocation, increased hostile, punitive behavior, regardless of violent or innocuous film content. Finally, the effects of accumulated exposure to media

violence were entirely parallel for men and women. Men, however, were overall more punitive than were women.

Another investigation by Zillmann and Weaver (1997), using the same procedure of accumulated exposure to media violence along with delayed effect assessments, focused on psychoticism as a pivotal personality characteristic. Persons with pronounced psychoticism tend to lack empathy, exhibit social discontent, hostile dispositions, lack of concern for danger, callousness, recklessness, and ultimately a propensity for physical aggression. For all potential respondents, measures of psychoticism were secured weeks prior to participation in the experiment. The distribution of these measures was separated at the median. The resulting separation of persons of high as compared to low psychoticism was compared to surveyed population distributions and found to match them closely, thus allowing generalizations. Men and women of the two groups of low and high psychoticism were exposed to four intact feature films, again on consecutive days, and one day later queried about their position on a variety of issues related to aggression. Four genres of films were employed: innocuous films without violence (i.e., the no-violence control condition), conventionally violent films, superviolence films, and horror films. A content analysis across the films confirmed that, compared to the conventionally violent films, the superviolence genre featured twice as many violent encounters, three times as many injurious assaults, and ten times as many killings. It also included more unprovoked and, in particular, sadistic violence. Violence in horror movies was somewhat less frequent, but exceeded the other genres in dwelling on pain from violence. The delayed measures were the acceptance of violence as a means of conflict resolution, crime apprehension, and the embrace of the death penalty for perpetrators of violent crime. Regarding conflict resolution, respondents were presented with crime scenarios, such as hostage takings for money extortion, and provided with choices ranging from the patient yielding to demands through the use of threat in negotiation to the immediate employment of deadly force. All choices were graded from nonviolent to recklessly impulsive violent solutions. The findings were surprising in showing that women, whether low or high in psychoticism, were not appreciably affected by the accumulated consumption of any of the violent genres. Similarly, men in the lower half of psychoticism were not appreciably affected. In stark contrast, however, men in the upper half of psychoticism, estimated to represent half the population, were significantly affected. In these men, the consumption of superviolence genre consistently fostered markedly greater acceptance of violence as a means of conflict resolution. The consumption of movies featuring violence less frequently and of lesser consequence (i.e., the conventional violent films) had no such effect. Somewhat surprisingly, horror films, despite their display of much violence, also failed to enhance the acceptance of violence as a means of conflict resolution. One reason for this might be the often exaggerated portrayal of violence that diminishes its realism. Another is that, in contrast to highly realist films which apparently show more satisfying violent solutions to social conflict, horror offers no resolution of conflict, and thus cannot elicit cognitions that could mediate such resolution. The findings did not reveal any effects of accumulated exposure on the delayed measure

of crime apprehension. As immediate post-exposure assessments did show increased apprehensions in previous research (Tamborini et al. 1984), it would seem that such apprehensions are short-lived and that possibly created apprehensions dissipated during the one-day delay. Regarding the endorsement of the death penalty, however, the accumulated exposure to superviolence, but not to other genres, did have specific delayed effects. Overall, respondents having seen the superviolence genre films embraced the death penalty to a markedly higher degree than did respondents in all other film conditions. A closer inspection of this overall effect showed that it was mostly attributable to men's judgment. The consideration of the focal personality characteristic further revealed that, whereas the variation of film genres was inconsequential for persons of low psychoticism, persons of high psychoticism embraced the death penalty much more strongly after having seen the superviolence genre films than after having seen the films in any of the other genres. The key finding, then, is that men of pronounced psychoticism stand out in being particularly vulnerable to being influenced by higher levels of violence in media. Exposure to such violence is apparently capable of enhancing these men's acceptance of both the employment of injurious force in solving social conflict and the death penalty for the deliberate illegal infliction of death upon others. The findings relate to the proposal that liberal consumption of media violence leads to desensitization in perceiving and evaluating violent actions (Fanti et al. 2009; Linz et al. 1989). Perceptual-evaluative changes are thought to give normalcy, if not legitimacy, to violent actions, especially when these actions are believed to have utility. The reported findings can be considered to accord with this proposal, but only for men predisposed by relatively high psychoticism.

Repeated and prolonged exposure to media violence may also be related to increased enjoyment from this exposure (Krahé et al. 2011). According to Carnagey et al. (2007), this effect can occur as a consequence of the reduced negative affect often associated with violence. In Huesmann and Kirwil (2007) opinion, both the reduction of negative emotional responses to violence and the increase of positive responses to these types of stimuli can occur, although experiencing pleasure due to watching violent displays may only be developed by some individuals.

Despite the majority of empirical studies demonstrating that exposure to filmed violence has negative effects on viewers, not all literature reviews draw similar conclusions. Experimental research on the effects of media violence has been criticized by some authors for failing to validly measure aggressive behavior (e.g., Freedman 1984; Tedeschi and Quigley 1996). In particular, it has been suggested that the measures used in many laboratory-based studies to study aggression lack of ecological validity, a criticism that has been rebutted by many authors (e.g., Anderson and Bushman 1997; Arriaga et al. 2004; Giancola and Chermack 1998). Another major concern is that aggression is legitimized by instructions. Respondents are commonly told, or it is implied, that it is alright to apply aversive treatments to their adversaries. However, recent work on impulsive aggression has devised procedures that bypass and dispel such criticism. In Zillmann and Weaver (2007) study, for example, respondents were explicitly instructed not to exceed specified levels of aversive stimulation. Respondents who were strongly provoked

immediately after being exposed to a film segment portraying extremely violence often violated the limit set for retaliatory actions. Given emotional preparedness for aggressive action, the presence of violent imagery is apparently capable of triggering impulsive, uncontrolled aggressiveness.

Other authors have highlighted that research in this area have produced contradictory findings. One fruitful way to estimate the direction and magnitude of effects is meta-analysis, and because the focus of most studies in media violence research has been on viewers' aggression, several meta-analyses were conducted on this outcome variable (e.g., Anderson and Bushman 2002a; Andison 1977; Bushman and Anderson 2001; Hearold 1986; Paik and Comstock 1994; Wood et al. 1991). These studies consistently supported the claim that exposure to media violence is related to aggression. Bushman and Anderson (2001), for example, evaluated the correlations between exposure to filmed violence and aggression over 25 years (beginning in 1975 in intervals of five years) and found that the effect size has increased, which may indicate a change in the way violence is portrayed and consumed. Nonetheless, the average effect sizes have ranged from small to medium, using Cohen's criteria, depending on the methods used (e.g., research design, program characteristics, seriousness of the social outcome variable) and other moderator variables (e.g., predisposition for aggressive or antisocial behavior). For example, the effect sizes have been smaller when the outcome variable measures serious offensive behaviors representing greater harm than other minor aggressive actions, such as hitting or stealing, although they all achieve statistical significance. They interpreted this finding as suggesting that "the role of media in the complex processes governing behavior may be comparatively modest when the act is severe and dramatic" (p. 224). Nonetheless, the conclusion taken from seven previous meta-analyses was that media violence is an important contributor to interpersonal aggression (Comstock and Scharrer 2003). This interpretation is also consistent with a recent meta-analysis conducted by Savage and Yancey (2008) in which they have analyzed the effects of media violence on serious criminally violent behavior and have found small but nonsignificant effect sizes. Taking into account these findings, a report on media violence prepared by the International Society for Research on Aggression (Media Violence Commission 2012) concluded that a large body of research suggests a link between consumption of media violence and aggressive behavior but highlight that "these conclusions are about aggressive behavior, not criminally violent behavior" (p. 337).

Notwithstanding the consistency in the findings of effects from watching excessive amounts of media violence, societal and scientific debates about this topic have continued and were extended to other media entertainment, and in particular to digital gaming. The hypothesis that playing violent video games would increase the likelihood of aggressive behavior has been subject to intensive research and has also raised controversy.

Research on Playing Violent Media Games

As in the case of television or film violence, the content analyses of most popular video games indicate that violence is one of the predominant contents (e.g., Dietz 1998; Smith et al. 2003; Thompson and Haninger 2001; Thompson et al. 2006). Thus, it seems important to readdress some of the old questions regarding the effects of frequent exposure to violence portrayed by broadcast media to those portrayed by these new interactive technologies, and also to compare the ways in which media shape our social reality beliefs and affect our emotions and interpersonal behaviors.

The most successful releases of video games usually depict gross violence involving threats and several types of torture that tend to result in the death of human-like or animal-like characters (Herbst 2008). Violent video games may also glamorize crime and specify detailed techniques that can be used or developed to commit criminal offenses. Hartmann et al. (2014) have also shown the high prevalence of moral disengagement factors in most popular violent video games, such as the dehumanization of opponents by portraying nonhuman creatures, or enemies not possessing personality or other human qualities; a distorted representation of the consequences by minimizing the harmful consequences of violence; and the provision of cues that morally justify the portrayed violence. Besides violence, some video games have also been criticized for glamorizing the use of illegal drugs, discrimination of particular races, ethnicities, religions, and homosexuality, and for reinforcing sexist stereotypes. Because of these objectionable contents, several games were subject to censorship in many countries. Some games were actually banned by governments of various countries, such as the cases of Germany, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Iran, Malaysia, and the People's Republic of China. In some other countries (e.g., Portugal), self-regulatory ratings are being used with labels that inform about the content information and suggest the recommended age. Although the suggestion of age restrictions and the specification of violent content were created to provide some guidance to educators, giving them the means to select games that would protect children from objectionable contents, research has also indicated that these classification systems with their violence warnings may actually increase the attractiveness of the most violent video games for youngsters. In fact, warnings may contribute to the forbidden fruit effect (Bijvank et al. 2009). Interestingly, some individual differences have also been related to the enticing restriction labels, with a stronger effect for boys than girls, for individuals high in some personality traits, such as for those high in trait aggressiveness and psychological reactance.

Some researchers have also claimed that propensity for increased aggression following playing with violent video games might be significantly higher than exposure to a violent film or violent television program. The principal reason for this is that violence in video games cannot only be seen but can be virtually enacted. To the extent that the virtual maneuvers trace and simulate actual fighting, whether in hand-to-hand combat or in firing guns, proprioceptive feedback will

guide the acquisition of skillful actions for prospective employment (Vorderer and Bryant 2006). Moreover, as virtually enacted behavior yields success, especially in getting things one's way by fighting, the behavior is rewarded and the enjoyment of the experience may reinforce the violent activity (Grodal 2000; Mul 2005). Punishment during the enactment of virtual violent actions also occurs in video games, but it might not be associated with moral sanctions nor with forming moral judgments, that could otherwise contribute to the vicarious learning of the negative consequences of violence and to a decrease on aggression, as it was demonstrated by the pioneering media studies conducted by Bandura on observational learning (Bandura 1965; Bandura et al. 1963). In contrast with seeing violence being punished, players are rewarded for using violent actions toward their opponents and punished if they do not properly succeed in defeating them. In this vein, being punished when displaying violent actions may actually increase negative affect (e.g., anger, frustration) as well as aggressive cognitions and physiological arousal, all factors that facilitate aggression. Some of these latter hypotheses were tested in three studies conducted by Carnagey and Anderson (2005). The authors compared the effects of reward and punishment for violent actions within a violent video game on subsequent aggressive cognition, hostile feelings, and aggressive behavior, while controlling for arousal levels. In one of the studies a nonviolent video game was also used for comparison. Results showed significant effects of punishing for violent actions on hostile affect, although it did not prime aggressive thoughts nor did it increase aggressive behavior. In addition, all the three experiments indicated that rewarding violent actions affected the three aggressive outcomes relative to playing a nonviolent video game. There is some reason, then, to expect that behavioral consequences of virtually enacting violence will be stronger than those of merely seeing it.

However, few studies have directly tested potential differences in effects on subsequent aggression between watching and playing with violent video games using experimental designs in which participants were either playing or watching violent and nonviolent video games (e.g., Graybill et al. 1987; Polman et al. 2008). Polman's study (2008) is one such exception, in which both violent and nonviolent video games were matched on relevant factors (e.g., game difficulty, perceived entertainment, and frustration) to control for potential confounding variables related to the gaming experience. Their findings indicate that playing a violent video game increases boys' aggression more than watching the same violence on the screen, although no significant effects on aggression were found for girls. This was interpreted as suggesting that violent video games contributes to more aggression than watching violence on television, but specifically for boys. However, the generalization of their findings from watching a violent video game on screen to watching a television program may be problematic because of the participants' awareness of seeing a violent video game on the screen (instead of a television program).

Because video games are a media undergoing constant development, the findings from gaming with violence are scarcer those related to film violence, especially with respect to providing a longitudinal perspective. Nonetheless, at least nine meta-analyses have been published so far in this field, considering mostly

experimental and cross-sectional designs to determine the effect sizes of playing violent video games on different outcomes (Anderson 2004; Anderson and Bushman 2001; Anderson 2004; Anderson et al. 2010; Greitemeyer and Mügge 2014; Ferguson 2007a, b; Ferguson and Kilburn 2009; Sherry 2001).

The interpretation of the meta-analyses' findings have also been debated. While many researchers provided evidence of significant effect sizes on the relationship between playing violent video games, high aggressive cognitions, affect (hostility/anger), arousal, and aggression, and low prosocial behavior (Anderson 2004; Anderson and Bushman 2001; Anderson et al. 2010; Greitemeyer and Mügge 2014), other researchers have questioned these results, specifically those reported on behavioral outcomes such as aggression (Ferguson 2007a, b; Ferguson and Kilburn 2009). In two meta-analyses conducted by Ferguson in 2007 (Ferguson 2007a, b), the author has expressed doubts about the generalizability of results obtained from laboratory experiments on how the person behaves in real life. Again, one major criticism was related to the validity of the aggressive measures that are usually used in laboratory settings, which in his opinion was contributing to increase the effect sizes of media violence. The author also claimed a publication bias problem in this field of research, i.e., the tendency for the research community to publish studies in favor of theoretical hypotheses in which the statistically significant results are obtained. One of the Ferguson's meta-analysis included articles that were published between 1995 and 2005 (Ferguson 2007a) while the other included articles between 1995 and 2007 (Ferguson 2007b). Because the time frame of the publish data were relatively similar, we will just discuss the results obtained in the meta-analysis that included aggressive thoughts, physiological arousal, and prosocial behavior as outcome constructs (Ferguson 2007a). By including experimental and cross-sectional studies in the analysis, the author reported evidence of publication bias for aggressive behavior in particular. Overall, and without correcting for publication bias, Ferguson have shown that the effect sizes obtained from correlational studies were relatively weak (r between 0.13 and 0.15) compared to the results found in experimental studies (r between 0.25 and 0.30). However, once corrected for publication bias, the effect sizes obtained for aggression in both experimental ($r = 0.15$) and nonexperimental ($r = 0.06$) studies provided no support for the link between digital gaming and aggression. In addition, the author also concluded that the larger effects found in their meta-analysis for aggressive behavior was related to the use of "less standardized and reliable measures of aggression" (p. 470).

After these claims by Ferguson, Anderson et al. (2010) have published a largest meta-analysis on playing violent video games, which included Eastern and Western countries, involving 381 studies with 130,296 participants from experimental, cross-sectional, and also longitudinal studies. Besides the inclusion of aggressive behavior, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and prosocial behavior, the authors also added a combined empathy/desensitization variable. The analysis also took into account the methodological qualities of the publications, and several potential individual differences as moderators such as age, gender, culture, previous experience with video games in general, and with violent

video games in particular. In addition, several gaming features were included when testing the effects from experimental studies, such as the player's perspective (first or third person), player's role (e.g., hero or criminal), and type of opponent or target (human or nonhuman). Overall, the results confirmed the link between playing violent video games and increase of aggressive cognitions, hostile affect, physiological arousal, aggressive behavior and reduced empathy, and prosocial behavior. Also important was the fact that gender and culture were not moderators of these findings, and age was only a marginal moderator of the effects on aggressive behavior. Prior exposure to violent video games was, as predicted, positively correlated with all aggression-related outcomes, and negatively with empathy and prosocial behavior. Also relevant, the authors found no evidence of publication bias in their meta-analysis.

More recently, a new meta-analysis was published by Greitemeyer and Mügge (2014) on the relationships between playing violent or prosocial video games and several social outcomes (cognition, affect, arousal, aggressive behavior, and helping). Data included experimental, cross-sectional, and longitudinal studies that became available since 2009, which led to a sample of 98 independent studies with a total of 36,965 participants. The effect sizes ranged from small to medium in terms of their magnitude and were very similar to those reported by Anderson et al. (2010), thereby revealing that playing violent video games were significantly linked to aggression and aggression-related variables and to reduced prosocial outcomes. Interestingly, playing prosocial video games was associated with decrease on aggression and aggression-related variables and increase on prosocial outcomes. Like the meta-analysis conducted by Anderson et al. (2010), publication bias did not influence their findings. In addition, the authors compared the average effect sizes taking into account the results reported in studies that were neither (co) authored by Anderson and Bushman, nor by Ferguson, and concluded that "Anderson and Bushman, but not Ferguson, have reported effect sizes that are very similar to the effect sizes reported by other researchers" (p. 583).

Thus, it seems that the results on the effect sizes have been relatively consistent, ranging from small to moderate in magnitude, depending on several factors, such as the research design (experimental, cross-sectional, longitudinal) and the outcome variable (cognitions, affect, arousal, behavior). However, some important differences in these meta-analyses do exist, such as the allegeable publication bias in this field, claimed by Ferguson (2007a, b), which in his opinion overestimate the violent video game effects on aggressive behavior. Also relevant is the way the effect sizes have been interpreted. Whereas, some researchers interpret these effects as relevant, others considered them unimportant. Nonetheless, these different interpretations transmit the impression to the community that no conclusion can be reached, which should not be the case. Based on the stronger consistency in results that has been provided by many meta-analyses conducted in this field, the overall conclusion seems to support the assumption that violent entertainment consumption, in which gaming with violence is included, is consistently related to aggression-related outcomes at cognitive, affective and behavioral levels. These results are in line with classic social-cognitive theories (e.g., cognitive neoassociation theory, social

learning theory, excitation transfer theory, social interaction theory) and also to more recent integrative models, such as the general aggression model (for a review read Anderson and Bushman 2002b).

Nonetheless, in our view, many other questions remain, especially the ones addressing "when" or "for whom" violent media entertainment tend to predict or cause more strongly the aggressive-related variables, but also the processes explaining the media violence effects. In fact, it has been difficult to conclusively find the mediator variables that explain the behavioral outcomes, such as the increase in aggression or the decrease in prosocial behavior. While some studies suggest that violent video games can increase aggression primarily through priming aggressive cognitions (Anderson and Dill 2000; Barlett et al. 2009; Carnagey and Anderson 2005), others have shown that hostile feeling was the primary route of influence (Arriaga et al. 2008), although feelings are often measured by self-report, which implies awareness about their own feelings, thereby involving aggressive cognition as well.

Another important consideration is how long the effects on all these dependent variables last. There are actually some studies showing how long the effects of exposure to media violent tend to last on these outcomes (Zillmann et al. 1974). However, few studies have addressed the question regarding overt behavioral responses. In trying to determine the time frames for the short-term effects of gaming with violence, Barlett and co-authors (2009) concluded that playing a violent video game increases aggressive thoughts and hostile feelings during the first 4 min immediately after game play. A decline in these responses follows, with arousal and aggressive behavior lasting about 5–10 min. Nevertheless, as the *authors clearly stated,* those results must be interpreted with caution. Several factors that were not considered in this study may also play a moderator role on the effects, such as the time dedicated to these violent contents or the individual characteristics of players (e.g., predisposition for aggression). Bushman and Gibson (2011), for example, also addressed the question of how long the effect of playing a violent video game on aggression lasts, but considered the role that rumination about the game may play this process. The authors concluded that playing a violent video game for about 20 min predisposed men for aggression for an extended period of time (at least until 24 h after gaming). However, these results only occurred among those who ruminated about the violent video game, suggesting that gamers instructed to keep thinking about their game play may be more influenced by their content.

The potential route of physiological arousal on aggression has received less attention, given that it is a common procedure to control for the arousal levels by preselecting violent and nonviolent content on similar overall levels of arousal. Nevertheless, some studies have addressed this question. For example, an investigation by Krcmar and Lachlan (2009) examined the effects of short periods of time spent with violent video games on retaliatory aggression. Feedback from the respondents' sympathetic excitation was ascertained after each period of play. Compared to initial levels, excitation was markedly elevated for ten to 15 min. It was appreciably lower after 20 min. After half an hour, it had returned to initial

levels. Both verbal and physical aggression proved to wax and wane with the respondents' level of excitation. The study thus corroborates previous theories of arousal, by showing that the intensity of aggression tends to be mediated by the amount of excitation created by preceding activities (O'Neal and Kaufman 1972; Zillmann 1983). It further suggests that prolonged engagement with media violence, as arousal continues to diminish, may lose its facilitating effect.

Other important questions are related to the emotional changes from continuous, repetitive, and long-term exposure to threats of violence. Many authors argue that violent stimuli—usually perceived as threatening to our survival—tend to evoke defensive reflex responses, which would correspond to an increase in physiological arousal and negative affective states such as anxiety and fear. In turn, these reflexes facilitate information processing concerning the context of the fearful stimulus, thus preparing the organism for fight or flight responses (Lang et al. 1997). However, with repeated exposure to violence, an emotional desensitization may occur.

Desensitization has mostly been defined as "a reduction in negative emotional response to scenes of violence" (Anderson et al. 2010, p. 154). Therefore, many studies have relied mostly on physiological responses of arousal toward real depictions of violence, showing that media violence engenders a reduction of emotional reactivity to stimuli with similar content: in this case, violence (e.g., Arriaga et al. 2015; Bartholow et al. 2006; Carnagey et al. 2007; Engelhardt et al. 2011). Others have conceptualized desensitization in a broader way and included distinct measures, such as social judgments (e.g., the severity of victims' injuries, the guilt of offenders, the sentence for a perpetrator), moral evaluations, and also empathy (e.g., Funk et al. 2003, 2004). As we mentioned before, the meta-analysis conducted by Anderson et al. (2010) also included research that analyzed desensitization and reduced empathic responses from playing violent video games, but these factors were combined into one single category. However, in our perspective these variables are conceptually distinct and also differ in the type of measurement. Thus, we need to pay closer attention to the very notion of desensitization and differentiate it from these other related constructs.

Carnagey and co-authors (2007), for example, sought to discern whether repeated exposure to video game violence blunts emotional reactions to real-life violence, a consequence that might lead to increased aggressiveness. Respondents were for 20 min engaged in play that featured either exceedingly brutal, injurious violence, or innocuous actions. Immediately thereafter they were exposed to scenes of actual violence. Heart rate and galvanic skin responses were measured during the latter exposure. Both measures indicated the expected decrease of emotional reactivity to real violence in respondents who had absorbed fictional violence beforehand. The obtained effect was interpreted as desensitization to real-life violence. There are, however, alternative explanations. The sensibility decline may have resulted from saturation and emotional exhaustion. Respondents without prior exposure to violence, in contrast, were unprepared for shocking imagery. A simple contrast effect could also have been invoked, especially as the fictional portrayal of violence may have been more graphic and dramatic than the newsreel footage of real violence.

Conceptually speaking, desensitization is rarely the result of an isolated experience. Usually, it develops gradually and is built up on the basis of numerous salient experiences. Once formed, it is also thought to persist as a response disposition. As the described experiment is limited to immediate disposition formation and equally immediate effect assessment, the finding can be considered to have little bearing on desensitization.

This situation has been remedied, however, by related research in which desensitization was operationalized in accumulated pertinent experience (Bartholow et al. 2006; Engelhardt et al. 2011). Specifically, the so-called chronic exposure to violence, measured in the respondents' self-report, has been shown to yield desensitization ascertained in diminished cortical reactivity. Event-related brain *potentials* (ERPs), in particular the late positive potential P300 component (a waveform that exhibit a typical peak around 300 ms after stimulus onset), were recently used as indices of emotional desensitization to test the effects of violent video games on emotional responsiveness to violence depicted in real settings. For example, Bartholow et al. (2006) compared the P300 in participants with low and high chronic use of violent video games, while being exposed to neutral, violent, and negative nonviolent depictions of real-life contexts. Results showed smaller amplitude and an increased latency of P300 among chronic users of violent video games when exposed to depictions of real-life violence, compared to the levels that these stimuli evoked in nonviolent players. The authors have interpreted this finding as suggestive of a reduction in the defensive motivational system associated with violence, indicating that regular playing of violent video games may increase emotional desensitization to violence. Using a similar picture viewing paradigm and the P300 amplitude as an index of neural desensitization to violence, Engelhardt et al. (2011) tested the short-term effects of playing with violent video games (relative to nonviolent video games) on desensitization while also considering participants' previous exposure with violent video games as a moderator. In addition, this neural response was tested as a potential mediator in the relationship between playing violent video games and subsequent aggressive behavior. It was found that participants high in previous exposure to violent video games showed smaller P300 amplitude to violent pictures, regardless the game condition to which they were assigned during the experiment (i.e., exposure to a violent or to a nonviolent video game). In the authors view, this result may indicate that a single exposure to a violent video game may not affect P300 amplitudes among heavy users of violent video games because these individuals may be already desensitized. In contrast, P300 amplitude during exposure to pictures with depictions of violence was smaller among participants who did not have previous habits with violent video games but were assigned to a violent video game during the experimental study, compared to individuals who were exposed to a nonviolent video game. Additionally, this smaller P300 amplitude was related to high aggression, supporting the assumption that neural desensitization mediates aggressive behavior. In both studies, the smaller P300 response to depictions of real-life violence was interpreted as a reduced activation of the approach/avoidant motivational system. However, we should consider that this neural measure, and other physiological

responses, such as skin conductance, or pupil dilation, are mostly sensitive to the intensity of emotions, but not indicative of the hedonic emotional valence (i.e., it does not indicate whether emotional responses are negative or positive) (Bradley and Lang 2007). Therefore, for the evaluation of emotional desensitization it will be important to consider other emotional dimensions besides their intensity (i.e. the arousal component). Linz and co-authors (1988), for example, highlighted that self-awareness of reduced arousal may also play a relevant role in the habituation process, leading to a dissociation between the response and the stimulus elements, and to a reduction in the negative valence previously associated with those stimuli. Therefore, along with physiological assessment of arousal, emotional desensitization should be complemented by assessing the individuals' appraisals of affective changes. In line with this perspective, Arriaga et al. (2011) investigated both the intensity and the valence of emotions (pleasure vs. displeasure) to investigate whether exposure to violent video games would affect emotional responsiveness to real-life violence. In their study, arousal and emotional valence were assessed using physiological and subjective measures while participants were being exposed to neutral, violent, and negative nonviolent depictions of real-life contexts. It was found that those who played the violent video game (compared to playing a non-violent video game) reported lower feelings of displeasure when viewing negative pictures of real-word, but also reported lower pleasure toward pleasant stimuli. In addition, for those high in previous exposure to violent video games this affective attenuation toward emotional stimuli (positive and negative) also mediated the effect of playing violent video games on aggression.

The desensitization hypothesis would also predict that repeated exposure to violence decreases viewers' anxiety and fear toward violence. The diminished emotional response in turn may contribute to underestimate the seriousness of violent actions (Carnagey and Anderson 2003), which may reduce empathy toward victims, increase the indifference toward others' suffering, or exert a dehumanization effect. In line with this last perspective, Bastian et al. (2012) showed that gaming with violence reduced both the perception of humanity of the self and of one's opponent. Greitemeyer and McLatchie (2011) have similarly showed that persons playing violent video games contributed to ascribe lesser humanness to other people and demonstrated that this dehumanization mediated the effects of playing with violence on aggressive behavior.

Other hypotheses have been developed to explain the potential consequences of chronic exposure to media violence. For example, the possibility that a higher exposure to content in video games may contribute to cultivate the belief that real word resembles that the virtual world has also been investigated. However, to our knowledge only three studies addressed the cultivation theory applied to gaming with violence and the results were not conclusive. Anderson and Dill (2000) and van Mierlo and van den Bulck (2004) used a correlational methodology, but only Williams (2006) conducted a longitudinal study testing the effects of a violent online game on the world view during the course of one month. Anderson and Dill (2000, Study 1) found an association between high exposure to video game violence and less feelings of safety (but not with estimates of crime likelihood).

However, after controlling the effect of gender, the association became nonsignificant. In van Mierlo and van den Bulck's study (2004), the violent video game play predicted high estimates of crime prevalence and of proportion of policemen in the total male workforce. However, no relationship was found between this exposure and other measures outcomes, such as the prevalence of murder. Nevertheless, the authors also highlight the need to be cautious about these results because several respondents might have misinterpreted the world view measures and responded to them differently from what was expected. Using an experimental methodology, Williams (2006) found that playing an online violent video game over a month affected male gamers' perceptions of real-world dangers that had close parallels with the in-game world (e.g., high estimates of experiencing robbery with a weapon in the real world such as those portrayed in the violent video game). However, gamers' perception did not generalize to other real crimes that did not occur in the virtual world of the game (e.g., estimates of the likelihood of rape, of physical assault or of murder), suggesting the specificity of the cultivation effect. Also important, it contradicts the original perspective in Gerbner's theory regarding the generalizability of content that make up the core assumption of the mainstreaming effects.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter has reviewed a number of different consequences of the overrepresentation of violence by the mainstream communication media in terms of their societal impact and intrapersonal and interpersonal effects. Several meta-analyses have been published in this field of research. Overall, the findings from the meta-analyses, and the effect sizes reporting small to moderate effect sizes (based on Cohen's guidelines), have been consistent regardless of the type of medium (Media Violence Commission 2012). The extensive research thus suggests detrimental effects on interpersonal relations, especially in the short-term from exposure to violence, either portrayed in realistic or in fictional formats. This can take the form of an increase of immediate propensity for aggressive behavior or a decrease of prosocial behaviors.

Less well understood are the underlying mechanisms. Although, theory and research indicates an increase of aggressive thoughts, negative affect, and arousal immediately after the exposure, research does not show homogeneous results regarding the pathways by which exposure to violence impacts interpersonal relations. In addition, the effects also vary depending on a number of factors, including the type of media, the length of exposure to media violence, the frequency of media use, the individual dispositions, and the types of measures that have been used, just to name a few.

The assumption that we can talk about one single concept of an entertainment medium is also problematic, since much specificity within each type of medium

exists and should be considered (Williams 2006). Therefore, the effects will depend on the type of media and its specific features.

If we consider video games, a number of relevant factors should be addressed in future studies. Games have goals, rules, and a wide range of different narrative structures, which must be decoded by players and much learning is needed for an effective performance. Almost no research has examined player's gameplay choices and tactical strategies used inside the virtual world, nor their own interpretations of the gameplay activity while playing. Video games allow players to find their own strategic solutions and to pursue their chosen paths inside the game, which will depend on the players' choices, previous game experiences, skills, motivations, perceived control and engagement (Weber et al. 2009).

Recent studies also indicated some mitigating factors that may counteract the negative effects of exposure to violence. For example, Greitemeyer et al. (2012) have shown that playing a violent video game cooperatively in a team relative to a play the game alone increased the player's willingness to cooperate in an unrelated task. Similarly, in two subsequent studies, Greitemeyer (2013) has shown that playing a violent video game cooperatively in a team also increased empathy compared to playing the violent video game alone.

In addition, we should bear in mind that individuals usually choose to enter into fictional worlds to have fun and enjoyment. Consequently, it will also be important to examine the role of viewers or player's goals and motivations on the effects of exposure to violence (e.g., Denzler et al. 2011).

Most efforts until now focused on the short-term effects of exposure to media violence. Although many studies of traditional media formats have reported negative long-term effects from this exposure, gaming effects have been studied less and further research using longitudinal designs is required. Both cultivation theory and emotional desensitization effects have been reviewed in the present chapter. However, research in cultivation theory in particular has shown inconsistent results, which precludes us from stating conclusions on this topic. Like cultivation, emotional desensitization is considered by many authors an indirect and subtle consequence of prolonged exposure to media violence. Yet since research on emotional desensitization is developing, distinct conceptualizations and measurements have been employed to study desensitization, threatening the generalizability of some conclusions. In this line of research, many studies have shown that exposure to violence in virtual formats may reduce the intensity of emotional responses toward real-life violence. We have suggested the integration of dimensional models of emotions and accordingly consider both hedonic valence and arousal dimensions, given their specific relations to behavioral orientations of approach and avoidance (e.g., Bradley and Lang 2007). Recent neurophysiological research on emotion has been studying other specific physiological and neural brain structures associated with these two behavioral motivational substrates of emotional processes. Future studies using neurophysiology measurements would be of crucial value for understanding the brain structures associated with exposure to violence and their relation to emotional responses in general, and to emotional desensitization and empathy in particular.

Another important issue is the length of time and the number of exposures that are necessary to reduce emotionality to displays of violence in real settings. While many authors argue that reduction in emotionality toward real-life events might be a long-term effect of repeated and continuing exposure to media violence, some recent studies examined the effects with experimental designs and found support for their immediate effects (e.g., Arriaga et al. 2015; Fanti et al. 2009; Riddle 2010).

To sum up, there is still much to learn about the consequences of exposure to media violence. Additional research is needed to identify the relevant mechanisms and conditions that contribute to explaining the many effects of this exposure on users.

Television, films, internet, books, and video games are common entertainment and communication forms that occupy a considerable amount of time in our daily life. We live in an era of technological innovation, of which those in digital and information and communications technologies are very relevant. Many additional changes in these media formats are expected to occur in the coming years, which ultimately can produce different outcomes. For example, many online games are now being played by thousands of gamers, but the majority of studies examined offline single-player games. There are considerable differences between offline and online games, including the social context of the gameplay and the narrative structure. Online gaming typically involves social interaction and some recent studies have shown, for example, that behavioral responses can be more strongly influenced by the social context of game play than by the game's violent content (Ewoldsen et al. 2012). Many recent online games that feature violence allow gamers to make their own contribution to the development of the virtual world in which they are engaged. These new possibilities may have a number of different consequences on gamers' intra- and inter-personal responses.

Having considered many remaining uncertainties in the effects of media violence, as well as their psychological and physiological mediation, we might want to step back a bit and take a bird's eye-view of the pertinent research. In these terms, the most troublesome deficiency derives from our inability to convincingly demonstrate the ultimate result of exposure to entertaining violence on real-life transgressions. In the interest of protecting research participants from developing persistent violent inclinations, measures of interpersonal aggression were mostly taken within a playful context that tended to sanction the behavior of focal interest. On such grounds, it is untenable to project exactly how much societal violence may be engendered by an excessive preoccupation with playful violence. Psychological longitudinal studies are called for to close that gap. On the other hand, the massive experimental work is impressively consistent in showing various facets of enhanced aggressive motivation and impulsivity. This circumstance must be interpreted as compelling evidence against the contention that witnessing or playing aggression is cathartic—a conception that dominated earlier discussions and that continues to be adhered to in some academic quarters (e.g., Feshbach and Singer 1971; Jones 2002; Kestenbaum and Weinstein 1985; Unsworth et al. 2007). Clearly, the representative available research gives no indication that fictitious or playful violence can function as a surrogate for actual violence; that is, as a violence substitute that depletes the

impetus for the actual infliction of harm. In contrasts, there is ample reason for concern about the effects of consuming entertaining violence.

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Chapter 9
Creating a More Inclusive Society: Social-Developmental Research on Intergroup Relations in Childhood and Adolescence

João H. C. António, Rita Correia, Allard R. Feddes and Rita Morais

> *If, therefore, gradualism is permitted, it would seem wiser to start the process of integrating with elementary schools rather than with high schools.*
>
> Allport (1958).

Abstract This chapter gives a comprehensive and broad overview on how intergroup relations develop in childhood. The review touches several important aspects such as acculturation goals of minorities and their meta-perceptions of the majorities' acculturation preferences, the importance of social comparisons as well as the way how the broader social context, particularly more inclusive superordinate categories, is related to status asymmetries between children from different ethnic background. The importance to take into account social context factors in the understanding of intergroup relations is one of the most important take home messages from this chapter. For instance, effects of as well as preferences for acculturation strategies such as assimilation or integration depend on minorities' perceptions of what the majority expects them to be or do. It was the challenge to deal with results of research conducted in Portugal that contradicted previous findings in Anglo-Saxon countries that inspired and required the advancement in theorizing towards more contextual models.

Keywords Intergroup meta-perceptions · Prejudice development · Acculturation · Status positions · Intergroup relations

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Introduction

Societies in the European Union (EU) are getting increasingly culturally diverse. Reports by the European Commission show that migration is not only the main driver of population growth in most of the EU member states, but also that it contributes to a younger population (Eurostat 2010) and this trend is expected to continue (Lanzieri 2011). This development is reflected in schools across Europe which have experienced and are experiencing unprecedented levels of ethnic diversity that poses opportunities but also challenges in regard to integration.

In order to gain a better understanding of the factors that can improve or hamper the development of an inclusive society, it is crucial to examine relations between social divisions based on ethnicity already in place during childhood and adolescence. The question of how a more inclusive society can be achieved is addressed in this chapter by exploring four contemporary themes in the context of social-developmental research. This chapter includes research findings of the Harmonia project which was supervised by Maria Benedicta Monteiro. This project focused on consequences of social diversity in the school context. More specifically, the project focused on how ethnic minority students adapt within the majority society, the role of parents in the formation of intergroup attitudes in children, the development of status perceptions in children in multi-ethnic schools and the development of interventions to reduce intergroup bias amongst minorities and majorities.

The first part of the chapter focuses on the relevance of acculturation attitudes of majority groups as a structural factor to understand the social adjustment of ethnic minorities. It is argued that for the promotion of social adjustment of ethnic minorities it is important to change majority acculturation attitudes in the direction of more overtness to inclusion and acceptance of minorities as part of the so-called in-group, i.e., creating a sense of "we" instead of "us and them".

In the second part, the role of parents in the development of children's intergroup attitudes is discussed. Traditionally, parents are considered to have a strong influence on children's attitudes, thereby possibly perpetuating prejudice in society. However, research results are mixed and seem to vary depending on the level of attitudes being measured—implicit or explicit—as well as on the social status of the groups involved in the intergroup comparison. In addition, intragroup variables, such as identification with the family, parental practices and educational beliefs regarding ethnic-related topics have also been shown to influence the role of parents in children's attitudes.

In the third part, it is highlighted that contemporary societies are composed of multiple ethnic groups and cannot be fully understood by using the typical dyadic view of one majority and one minority group. In this part, evidence is presented showing that from a young age onwards children seem to be aware of status differences between different ethnic groups and motivational processes seem to play a role in their representation of status differences.

Finally, in the fourth section, different ways of structuring intergroup contact between lower and higher status ethnic groups are discussed. Structuring intergroup

contact is a promising approach in influencing the development of intergroup attitudes in childhood and it can provide a valuable contribution to creating more positive intergroup relations.

Acculturation Attitudes and Social Adjustment—Shifting the Focus from Ethnic Minorities to the Ethnic Majority

Acculturation studies represent one of several lines of research in the field of psychology addressing the topic of inclusion/exclusion of minorities and corresponding social consequences. Acculturation is usually defined as a process of change resulting from contact between cultures (Redfield et al. 1936). Although this process has several implications for all ethnic groups involved, the degree to which groups change as a consequence of acculturation is not identical. High status groups change less than low status groups and consequences of acculturation are more relevant for minority and stigmatized groups (Bourhis et al. 2009).

In Berry's acculturation model (1984)—the predominant model in the field—the combination between immigrants' wish to keep their cultural heritage and the wish to establish contact and relations with members of the host society result in four acculturation orientations: Integration (maintenance of culture of origin and contact with members of the host community), Separation (maintenance of origin culture and refusal of contact with the host culture), Assimilation (rejection of own cultural heritage and orientation to contact with the host culture) and Marginalization (rejection of origin culture and rejection of contact with the host group). These acculturation orientations have been found to be important predictors of factors related to social adjustment, such as self-esteem (Giang and Wittig 2006), acculturation stress (Berry et al. 1987), general well-being (Phinney et al. 2001) and intergroup attitudes (Phinney et al. 2007). Most research findings in this field suggest that Integration is the orientation that is more commonly assumed by immigrants (e.g., Phinney et al. 2006). Even though Integration is often portrayed as the most adaptive and therefore successful orientation with respect to both psychological and sociocultural adaptation (e.g., Phinney et al. 2006), some authors have raised doubts. As Rudmin (2006) has pointed out, "extensive published but widely uncited data cast doubt on claims that integration is preferred by minority groups or is beneficial for them" (p. 1). From our point of view, no single acculturation strategy can be taken as the most adaptive. In fact, as argued by Verkuyten and Wolf (2002), differences in people's attitudes and behaviour depend on the cultural environment and the specificity of each context needs to be taken into account. According to these authors, acculturation strategies can be "examined as context-sensitive responses to questions of heritage culture maintenance and change" (p. 783). In line with this, it can be argued that the social context contributes to the success of each specific acculturation strategy (see also Schwartz et al. 2010).

Acculturation and the School Context

Acculturation of children and adolescents of ethnic minority background has been the focus of many studies in the field in which the school context was the setting (e.g., Berry et al. 2006; Vedder and Horenczyk 2006). School constitutes a key environment for intergroup contact for most immigrant children and adolescents (Vedder and Horenczyk 2006), and therefore a principal factor for long lasting effects on children's interethnic attitudes (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). There are several aspects of school life that may serve as indicators of adaptation levels to the host society. One of these factors is school achievement, which has been proposed as a major indicator of the extent to which children adapt themselves to the host society (Trickett and Birman 2005).

Maria Benedicta Monteiro has focused part of her research on the study of acculturation of Black children and adolescents. Monteiro and her colleagues applied the four acculturation orientations of Berry's model in the Portuguese society. They found consistent results that show that children and young adolescents with an Assimilation profile were the most successful at school (Carvalho 2009; Maurício 2001; Mouro 2003). These findings seem to contradict the dominant view in the field that proposes Integration as the most adaptive acculturation orientation. The results of a subsequent study showed that the positive attitude towards the host culture (i.e., the common denominator to both Integration and Assimilation) explains higher school achievement (António and Monteiro 2010). These results support the argument that attitudes towards the host culture have a stronger impact on sociocultural competence in mainstream culture than attitudes concerning the origin culture (Vedder et al. 2006; Ward and Rana-Deuba 1999).

Acculturation Attitudes and Meta-Perceptions

The study of acculturation and adaptation to society has thus far mainly focused on the acculturation attitudes among ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, it is relevant for this issue to look at the social context involving ethnic minorities and try to understand how it influences the relationship between ethnic minorities' acculturation orientations and their adaptation to the host society. Three key social agents should be looked at in order to understand the social context that structures attitudes in ethnic minorities: parents, peers (both majority and minority) and the ethnic majority group as a whole (that is, the attitudes of the ethnic majority as perceived by minorities).

The relevance of parental attitudes in the development of children's attitudes is a central topic in the work of Maria Benedicta Monteiro (e.g., Carvalho 2009; Correia and Monteiro 2011), as illustrated in the next section of this chapter. Regarding acculturation attitudes, Carvalho (2009) showed that ethnic minority children who perceive their parents as wanting them to maintain the culture of origin were more orientated to the culture of origin than to the host culture.

A recent survey among a representative national sample has shown that the majority of the Portuguese population (55 %) considers that Integration is the acculturation orientation that immigrants and their descendants should pursue. Nineteen percent of the sample opted for Assimilation, 14 % for Marginalization and 13 % for Separation (António 2012). These orientations were measured by items concerning attitudes towards the Portuguese culture and the culture of origin independently. When considering this pattern of results, it can be concluded that the ethnic majority group holds positive attitudes towards both the maintenance of immigrant's origin culture and their adoption of the Portuguese culture.

Another recent study regarding the acculturation attitudes of White and Black adolescents in Portugal showed similar results: White adolescents generally have a positive attitude towards both the adoption of Portuguese culture as well as the maintenance of the culture of origin by immigrants and their descendants António and Monteiro (2015a). However, Black adolescents in the same study, when asked about their perceptions about White acculturation attitudes, reported lower perceived levels of support for both the maintenance of the origin culture and the expectation to adopt the Portuguese culture. This gap between majority acculturation attitudes and meta-perceptions of those attitudes (that is, the perception of majority acculturation attitudes by minorities) is a key factor in the study of acculturation and deserves increasing attention by researchers in the field.

Some research in the field of acculturation has been guided by the question of how attitudes amongst the host majority group towards the inclusion of immigrants and their descendants in the wide society could influence minority members' social adjustment. Bourhis et al. (1997) aimed to bridge orientations of acculturation of immigrants and the host majority in their Interactive Acculturation Model. In this model, the levels of conflict between majority and minority are predicted by the relative fit of the modes of acculturation held by minority and majority group members. In line with this, other authors (Horenczyk 1996; Pfafferott and Brown 2006; Zagefka and Brown 2002) examined how the relationship between acculturation orientations of minority members and the orientations of acculturation that they perceive as shared by most majority members influence the adaptation of the minority members to society in general.

Maria Benedicta Monteiro and her colleagues conducted different lines of research to address this topic. For example, Carvalho (2009) found that in schools in which White children were the majority, ethnic minority children that identified with their origin culture tended to be less successful at school than those minority children who identified with the majority culture. Results in a recent study by António and Monteiro (2015b) provided some additional insight in how social adjustment can be affected by meta-perceptions amongst minorities. Their results indicated that, for ethnic minority adolescents, the relationship between adopting the host culture and the extent of social adjustment is moderated by perceived majority attitudes. In this study participants were distributed by two experimental conditions. In one condition they read a fake newspaper article reporting that the White majority group favours the adoption of the majority culture by immigrant and ethnic minorities. In a second condition participants read a similar article with the

opposite argument: the White majority did not want ethnic minorities to adopt the majority culture. In the first condition the usual positive association between the adoption of the majority culture by ethnic minority members and their social adjustment to the wide society was not found. In contrast, this association was only found to be present in the second condition (see Fig. 9.1). Based on these results two main conclusions can be drawn: first, perceiving the ethnic majority group to favour integration (or assimilation) of immigrants and ethnic minorities is associated with higher levels of social adjustment to the host society independent of the personal acculturation attitudes of minority members; second, the personal acculturation attitude of minority members is only decisive for their social adjustment when the majority is perceived as being unwilling to accept ethnic minorities as a part of the host culture.

These results illustrate the notion that the larger social context as perceived by ethnic minority adolescents influences their social adjustment. In conjunction with studies that show the high impact of perceived discrimination on both psychological and sociocultural adaptation (e.g., Vedder et al. 2006) these results stress the relevance of the social context as perceived by minorities in regard to acculturation outcomes.

Based on the overview given above, a possibly promising intervention aimed at facilitating inclusiveness of the society should focus on reducing the gap between majority attitudes and minority meta-perceptions of those attitudes. This can, for example, be accomplished through public debate on acculturation attitudes of ethnic

Fig. 9.1 Perceived quality of intergroup relations according to personal and perceived attitude towards the host (Portuguese) culture

majority and minorities. It is fundamental to understand the acculturation attitudes of the majority in order to promote a more inclusive society in which the inclusive definition of "we" should embrace more and more diversity: a society not only capable of valuing differences, but one that cherishes diversity as a core value.

Parental Attitudes Influencing Children's Intergroup Attitudes

A second key area of research related to processes of inclusion in society is the development of children's intergroup attitudes under the influence of parents. The assumption that racial attitudes develop via exposure to so-called 'socializing agents' from childhood (e.g., Allport 1954; Devine 1989) is an old one, but little work has been published that fully explains how this process occurs. Indeed, this common sense assumption has not received clear empirical support (Degner and Dalege 2013). The relationship between parental ethnic attitudes and children's attitudes is often poorly articulated, which has resulted in unclear definitions and methodological shortcomings in studies. In this section, recent research is outlined that focuses on associations between parental and children's intergroup attitudes. This will be illustrated with some recent work by Maria Benedicta Monteiro and her colleagues incorporating both explicit and implicit measures of prejudice.

Parental Influences on Children's Intergroup Attitudes

There exist several theories focusing on the influence of parental attitudes in the development of children's intergroup attitudes. For example, Developmental Intergroup Theory (Bigler and Liben 2007) posits that there are several ways in which adults influence the development of children's social attitudes. Parents, teachers and other caregivers teach children in an explicit (conscious) but also in an implicit (unconscious) way how to label groups, by giving children relevant criteria for categorizing and segregating individuals (see also Patterson and Bigler 2006). That is, parents teach their children what attitudes they should hold and how they should behave, by expressing openly prejudiced remarks and behaviours, but also by expressing non-verbal cues, or by presenting themselves or acting differently in public or private contexts. In this sense, parents provided cues to their children indicating what to think about other groups, as well as information conveying under which conditions it is appropriate to express those opinions openly. Likewise, Attachment Theory suggests that children internalize their parents' expectations and values to the extent that they are securely attached (Bretherton et al. 1997). In addition, Social Learning Theory contends that children develop beliefs and behaviours by mimicking those of their important others (Bandura 1977). What these

theories have in common is that they put forward parents as important actors in the development of children's attitudes. However, research findings about the relationship between parental and children's attitudes does not provide a clear picture.

Studies that examine the correlation between parental and children's explicit racial prejudice have yielded mixed results. On the one hand, a series of classical studies have provided evidence of positive associations between parental and child attitudes. For example, Mosher and Scodel (1960) found a positive correlation between White mothers' ethnocentrism and their daughters' social distance from African Americans and Jews. In addition, Carlson and Iovini (1985) reported a positive association between White father's social distance from African Americans and their sons' prejudice. Also, Epstein and Komorita (1966) found a positive correlation between the child's social distance score and his perception of his White parents' social distance from other social and ethnic groups. In a more recent extensive longitudinal study in which children from 6 months to 6 years-old were included, Katz (2003) also showed a positive correlation between parental and children's attitudes for preschoolers.

On the other hand, Aboud and Doyle (1996) did not find any correlation between mothers' responses on a scale measuring racial prejudice and their children's responses on two scales assessing child prejudice (see also Branch and Newcombe 1986; Katz 1976; Radke-Yarrow et al. 1952). These inconsistent results illustrate the complexity of the relation between parental and children's prejudice and call for a better understanding of this relationship, by focusing on possible moderating factors and by using both explicit and implicit attitude measures.

Explicit Versus Implicit Attitude Measures

Traditionally, attitude research was circumscribed to the assessment of explicit attitudes (i.e., attitudes that people report in a consciously controlled way), which are highly influenced by normative social pressure and self-presentational motives (e.g., Dunton and Fazio 1997). The assessment of implicit attitudes (i.e., attitudes not consciously accessed and controlled), on the other hand, is expected to help predicting more spontaneous behaviours (e.g., McConnell and Leibold 2001).

Racial attitudes are a topic particularly prone to the influence of social desirability and several authors (e.g., Sinclair et al. 2005; Correia and Monteiro 2011) contend that the use of implicit and indirect measures can help to clarify some of the ambiguous results in past studies. For instance, Correia and Monteiro consistently found a positive correlation between highly blatant prejudiced parents and their children's implicit prejudice. Also, Sinclair and colleagues correlated parental explicit prejudice with children's implicit prejudice. Their study showed a positive correlation between parental and children's attitudes, even though the results were only significant for children highly identified with their family, that is, those children who experienced strong, positive relationships with their family. Correia and Monteiro took these results further and conducted a series of studies addressing the

relationship between parental prejudice (flagrant and subtle) and children's preju-
dice (implicit and explicit). The authors found that low identification with the
family and less closeness to the family acted as moderators in the relationship
between parental explicit prejudice and their 9 year-old children's implicit preju-
dice. In line with this, Castelli et al. (2007) argued that children's perceptions of
their parents' expectations in terms of racial attitudes have an influence in children's
attitudes. They provided evidence that the personal attitudes of young children
(aged 4–7) were related to children's perceptions of expectations and attitudes of
their mothers.

The studies discussed above show that the relationship between parents' and
children's racial attitudes is complex and that the processes involved are influenced
by several variables, such as the identification with the family or children's age
(cognitive maturation stage).

Parental Ethnic Socialisation Messages

Another approach to explore how parents influence the development of children's
prejudice is to address socialisation messages that are transmitted from parents to
their children. This issue has been almost exclusively studied in minority families,
mostly addressing issues related to minority perception and protection from prej-
udice, as well as attitudes towards their own ethnic groups. The minority approach
has often focused exclusively on the presence/absence of the race topic in parental
discourse. Ethnic socialisation seems to be a complex and multifactor concept
(Hughes and Chen 1997) and its understanding in dominant groups could shed
some light on prejudice development in children. Katz (2003) and Correia and
Monteiro (2011) have done some of the few studies about ethnic socialisation
messages in majority groups. For instance, Correia and Monteiro have shown in
several studies that the relationship between parental and children's prejudice
involves both explicit and implicit dimensions and that the messages transmitted are
related to the level of parental prejudice in each of these two dimensions. The
researchers found that active parental socialisation for prejudice and the strength of
family times were fundamental variables in the relationship between flagrant and
subtle parental prejudice and children's prejudice. Parents conveyed prejudice
through messages (e.g., "children should play with their own kind") and segrega-
tion practices (e.g., limiting their children's friendships or choosing schools with
low minority attendance rates).

As this overview has shown, parents are considered key socialisation actors in
the development of intergroup attitudes in children and are considered a key factor
in better understanding how prejudice develops in childhood. However, as will be
shown in the next section, the increasingly multi-ethnic contexts in which children
and adolescents are embedded also influence how children exhibit intergroup
attitudes.

Social Comparison Processes in a Multi-ethnic Context

In the area of intergroup relations most research has focused on dyadic relations between a majority (high-status) group and a minority (low-status) ethnic group. The questions asked include how members of ethnic majority groups think about, feel about and behave towards ethnic minority members or vice versa. As noted by Verkuyten and Zaremba (2005), research on the development of inter-group attitudes tends to ignore the dynamics of current multi-ethnic contexts in Western countries. For example, research on the contact hypothesis (testing the idea that contact between members of different ethnic groups results in more positive attitudes towards each other; Allport 1954) has mainly taken the perspective of majority group members in research conducted among adults (Tropp and Pettigrew 2005) and with children (Tropp and Prenovost 2008; Raabe and Beelmann 2011). However, in order to better understand how a non-inclusive society perpetuates itself, it is not sufficient to only look at how majority group members view one minority group in a society or vice versa. More insight is needed in addressing questions as, for example, how and under which conditions do minority groups perpetuate inequality by derogating other minority groups?

One of the key factors in answering this question is how minority children compare themselves to other groups. Classical studies on social comparisons done with minority and majority children have used a so-called doll preference paradigm. In this task, Black (African-American) and White (European-American) children were presented with Black and White dolls and asked to choose which doll was associated with positive or negative characteristics (i.e., the good doll, the bad doll, which doll they liked best etc.). Results have been mixed; some studies have found that minority children had a stronger preference for majority children (the out-group) than for children of their own group (Clark and Clark 1947). In other studies no out-group preference among minorities was found (e.g., Katz and Zalk 1974). However, as noted above, social comparisons may work differently in a multi-ethnic context where different minority groups are involved.

This point is illustrated by research by Hagendoorn and colleagues in the Netherlands (Hagendoorn 1995; Verkuyten et al. 1996). In their studies, the hypothesis was tested that ethnic groups share consensus about the relative position of the different ethnic out-groups in society. In two studies amongst adults and youngsters from the ethnic majority and multiple ethnic minority groups, the researchers found that (a) each ethnic group preferred their in-group, (b) there was a consensus about the hierarchy of ethnic groups in society within each group, and (c) ethnic groups largely agreed on the ethnic rank order.

Maria Benedicta Monteiro and her colleagues provided first evidence for this phenomenon within children in the Portuguese context. A first study by Alexandre et al. (2007) included 60 Portuguese children 9–13 years old. Twenty White-Portuguese children, 20 Black-Portuguese children and 20 Roma-Portuguese children were asked for their social preference regarding their own and other groups. Specifically, children were asked (2007, p. 205): "Think of a

White-Portuguese/Black-Portuguese/Roma-Portuguese child. Tell me whether you would you like him (her): (1) to live in your neighbourhood, (2) to play with you at the playground, (3) to sit next to you in the classroom, (4) to be your friend, (5) to marry you one day". Three preference scores were created for each respective ethnic out-group. The number of times each out-group was chosen was then counted (zero to maximum five) and averaged over all contact situations. The results are given in Fig. 9.2.

As can be seen in Fig. 9.2, White-Portuguese majority children showed a significant preference for White- over Black-, and Roma-Portuguese children. Both minority groups, however, showed a different pattern: Black-Portuguese children showed no significant difference in preference between Black- and White-Portuguese children, but preferred both groups over the Roma-Portuguese minority out-group. A similar pattern was found among the Roma-Portuguese who showed no difference in preference between White-Portuguese and Roma-Portuguese, but did prefer both groups over the Black-Portuguese minority out-group.

In a second study, Feddes et al. (2013) included children of the same ethnic groups in Portugal. However, besides children from 9 to 12 years old they added a younger age group of children aged 6–8. The purpose was to examine possible differences depending on age. In addition, besides asking for social preferences and intergroup attitudes, it was investigated how children themselves perceived the social status of their own group and the other groups. To measure this so-called *subjective social status*, they used a 'social status ladder' which is depicted in Fig. 9.3.

Children were presented with three pictures of, respectively, White-, Black-, and Roma-Portuguese children. Children were then asked to assign their in-group and the two out-groups to one of the ten ladder rungs according to "the importance of the group in Portugal". The term 'important' was used following Bigler and Liben (2007) who have shown that children from an early age onwards learn about the importance of minority and majority groups in society. A score was then obtained for each target group ranging from 1 (= *the least important*) to 10 (= *the most important*).

Fig. 9.2 Social preferences of White-, Black-, and Roma-Portuguese children (0 = Low preference, 5 = High preference)

Fig. 9.3 Social ladder to measure children's subjective social status of their ethnic in-group and ethnic out-groups

Most important group

Least important group

The results were as follows: both younger and older White-Portuguese children rated their in-group to be the most important, followed by the Black- and, finally, the Roma-Portuguese out-groups. Black-Portuguese children showed, across age-groups, a pattern similar to the earlier preference findings reported by Alexandre et al. (2007); they rated their in-group to be equally important as the White-Portuguese out-group but evaluated both groups as significantly more important than the Roma-Portuguese out-group. The Roma-Portuguese participants, however, showed no differences in perceived social status between any groups.

What can we learn from these studies? First, the fact that there exist differences across ethnic groups on the measures of social preference and subjective social status is in line with a motivational account of prejudice development. Children as young as 6 years-old are aware of differences in terms of importance of ethnic groups and make use of social comparison strategies to create a favourable image of their ethnic in-group. This depended, however, on the social status of the group. For minority groups these socially creative strategies of comparison seem to serve as a

strategy to cope with their lower-status condition by upgrading their in-group in comparison to other minority out-groups (see also Tajfel and Turner 1979).

In relation to an inclusive society, these findings give rise to the possibility that, in order to climb up the social ladder, minorities downplay other minorities thereby perpetuating inequality. These studies underline, therefore, the importance of studying the wider ethnic context and not only focusing on a dyadic majority group —minority group association, but to investigate associations between different minority groups as well. Importantly, and as will be outlined in the next section, research suggests different ways in which contact between ethnic groups can be structured; in turn, this may influence intergroup attitudes within majority as well as minority members.

Structuring Contact to Improve Intergroup Attitudes

The question on how more positive intergroup relations can be developed and sustained has been one of the key topics in Social Psychology and, more specifi- cally, in the field of intergroup relations (e.g., Allport 1954; Brewer and Miller 1984; Brown and Hewstone 2005; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Hewstone and Brown 1986). Intergroup contact has probably been one of the most researched ways of reducing intergroup bias and promoting more harmonious relations (e.g., Dovidio et al. 2005) but its effectiveness is shaped by several factors including group status. Indeed, in Western societies, intergroup contact involving asymmet- rical status groups is becoming more and more frequent and research by Maria Benedicta Monteiro and her colleagues has shown that group status moderates the effectiveness of different contact-based prejudice reduction strategies/models (e.g., Dovidio et al. 2009; Monteiro et al. 2009a).

In this section, the focus will be on how intergroup contact between asymmet- rical status groups—a majority higher-status group (White-Portuguese children) and a minority lower-status group (Black-Portuguese children)—can be structured to reduce intergroup prejudice.

The Common Ingroup Identity Model

Drawing on the critical role of social categorisation's effects on intergroup attitudes (e.g., Brewer and Gaertner 2001), the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000) posits that prejudice reduction can be achieved by reengineering intergroup boundaries, therefore changing the structure and nature of the intergroup relation. This process aims to change the relation between the subgroups from an intergroup ("us" vs. "them") to an intragroup level ("we"). The model proposes two distinct processes to reduce intergroup prejudice— recategorisation and dual identity. In recategorisation, in-group and out-group

affiliations are blurred and a superordinate category is made salient, encompassing both the former in-group and out-group members. In dual identity, a combination of the distinctiveness of the subgroups and the commonality of an inclusive super-ordinate category is sought. That is, a "two groups in the same team" cognitive representation, in which both the in-group and the out-group keep their subgroup identities salient in the context of a binding superordinate category. The authors of the model have argued that these cognitive representations reduce intergroup bias by redirecting the cognitive and motivational processes responsible for the initial in-group bias towards the new more inclusive superordinate category. This results in a more positive evaluation of former out-group members, while former in-group members' evaluation remains unchanged.

The Common Ingroup Identity Model, both in the form of recategorisation and dual identity, has received strong empirical support (e.g., Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). Results have shown that, in general, the salience of a superordinate category is an effective way to improve intergroup attitudes, both among adults and children (Gaertner et al. 2008). For example, Cameron et al. (2006), in a school intervention based on scenarios depicting different forms of extended-contact, found that both recategorisation and dual identity improved White British children's attitudes towards the refugee out-group. However, research results have shown that group status is an important moderator of recategorisation and dual identity's effects on prejudice reduction, both for adults and children (González and Brown 2006; Hornsey and Hogg 2002; Monteiro et al. 2009b; Guerra et al. 2010).

The Moderator Role of Group Status

Based on previous work showing that generally majorities endorse Assimilation and minorities endorse Integration (Van Oudenhoven et al. 1998; Verkuyten 2006), Dovidio et al. (2000) proposed that recategorisation would be particularly effective to reduce intergroup prejudice for majority groups, while dual identity would be more effective for minority groups.

Dovidio et al. (2001) found that for European Americans (a majority, higher-status group) intergroup contact reduced intergroup bias by increasing the perception of a one-group representation. For ethnic minority groups, however, dual identity was the cognitive representation mediating intergroup contact effects on reduced bias. Another study by Gaertner et al. (1996) in a multi-ethnic high school showed that self-categorisation of ethnic minority students both at the level of the ethnic subgroup and at the level of the superordinate category (e.g., Korean American) was related to more positive affect towards other ethnic groups.

However, while some studies seem to show that recategorisation is more effective for majority groups and dual identity for minority groups, other studies with adults and children have shown a different pattern of results, (González and Brown 2006; Hornsey and Hogg 2002; Guerra et al. 2010; Monteiro et al. 2009b). For example, Guerra and colleagues (2010) have shown experimentally that making

salient a superordinate category, whether in the form of recategorisation or dual identity, is an effective strategy to reduce intergroup prejudice among Black-Portuguese (minority, lower-status group) and White-Portuguese (majority, higher-status group) children aged 9–11. The authors conducted a field experiment with full interactions between two groups of three children each, divided on an ethnicity basis (White-Portuguese vs. Black-Portuguese), and further recategorised as 'one-group' (Portuguese) or 'two groups in the same team'. The results showed that relative to a categorisation control condition, recategorisation and dual identity were effective to reduce intergroup bias. However, dual identity was more effective to reduce intergroup bias for the majority higher-status group, whereas recategorisation was more effective for the minority lower-status group.

Even though there is extensive evidence that making salient a superordinate category improves intergroup relations, as reviewed above, this is not always the case. Historical, structural or contextual factors play an important role in determining the effectiveness of a superordinate category for intergroup relations (Dovidio et al. 2007). Besides the moderator role of group status reviewed above, in the next section we present more recent work by Monteiro and colleagues showing that the type of superordinate category can critically influence the effects of recategorisation and dual identity for majority higher-status and minority lower-status groups.

The Critical Role of the Type of Superordinate Category

The relationship between the subgroup and the superordinate dimensions of categorisation is also likely to influence the effectiveness of the different cognitive representations (Gaertner et al. 2010) to reduce intergroup bias. When different groups are categorised along multiple dimensions of categorisation, such as the subgroup and the superordinate level, the relevance of the different social categories to the perceiver may not be equivalent (Crisp and Hewstone 2007; Urban and Miller 1998). When one dimension of categorisation is, contextually, more important than the other, a "category dominance pattern" may emerge and the target groups become primarily evaluated on the basis of the important dimension whereas the unimportant dimension has practically no effect on groups' evaluations (Miller et al. 2006). For example, when there is a logical or empirical correlation between different dimensions of categorisation (e.g., social status and ethnicity), the significance of the categorical boundaries increases, reinforcing the original in-group-out-group distinction and, consequently, maintaining intergroup bias. On the other hand, if the categorisation dimensions are independent of each other, group boundaries are not convergent and improved intergroup attitudes can be expected (Crisp and Hewstone 2007). A study by Hall and Crisp (2005) illustrates this point. The authors asked university students to generate dimensions of social categorisation that were either related or unrelated to the superordinate category context "students". The results showed that participants who generated related

dimensions (e.g., major studied) showed higher levels of intergroup bias than participants who generated independent dimensions (e.g., nationality) relative to the superordinate category context.

Extending this rationale to the study of prejudice reduction between majority higher-status and minority lower-status children, Morais and Monteiro (2009) tested the effectiveness of two types of superordinate category: a status-related superordinate category—the national group (Portugal)—and a status-unrelated superordinate category—School. The authors expected that the national superordinate category, Portugal, would emphasise the differences between White-Portuguese (majority, higher-status group) and Black-Portuguese (minority, lower-status group) children, resulting in less positive intergroup attitudes, compared to the category School, which should de-emphasise subgroup differences and trigger more positive intergroup attitudes. The results showed that both White-Portuguese and Black-Portuguese children perceived the majority higher-status group as more prototypical of the superordinate category Portugal than the minority lower-status group, compared to the category School where both subgroups were perceived as being equally prototypical, i.e., equally included. Out-group attitudes were also more positive when the salient superordinate category was School, compared to when it was Portugal.

In a second study (Morais and Monteiro 2011) testing the efficacy of recategorisation and dual identity using both types of superordinate categories, the authors found that although recategorisation and dual identity School and Portugal were able to reduce intergroup bias among majority higher-status and minority lower-status children, compared to a categorisation control condition, they had different effects on groups' prototypicality perceptions, i.e., the degree to which each group was perceived as representative of the superordinate category. For the White majority higher-status group, when the superordinate category Portugal was salient, neither recategorisation nor dual identity were able to overcome the perception that the majority higher-status group was significantly more prototypical of being Portuguese than the minority lower-status group. Conversely, when the superordinate category School was salient, the perception of subgroups' prototypicality was more equivalent, namely in dual identity. When the superordinate category was Portugal, only in the dual identity condition were prototypicality perceptions of the White and Black-Portuguese children equivalent. On the other hand, when the salient superordinate category was School, Black-Portuguese children perceived both the in-group and the out-group as equally prototypical both in recategorisation and in dual identity conditions.

These results draw attention to the fact that the relationship between the subgroup and the superordinate dimensions of categorisation can influence the effectiveness of recategorisation and dual identity in intergroup situations involving asymmetrical status groups. Indeed, some superordinate categories can emphasise the differences and asymmetries between the subgroups, whereas superordinate categories that are independent of the status differences between the groups have the potential to foster a more inclusive and egalitarian intergroup context, leading to more harmonious intergroup relations.

Conclusions

In this chapter four social developmental research themes were discussed that aim to increase our understanding of the development of intergroup attitudes in ethnic minority and majority children.

The first perspective shows that acculturation studies cannot neglect the role of majorities' acculturation attitudes as structural factors for the understanding of the social adjustment of ethnic minorities. In order to create more inclusive societies it is important to know majority attitudes and consequently promote broader definitions of "we", capable of accepting and valuing differences in the in-group.

In the second part of the chapter, the role of parents in the development of minority and majority children's attitudes was described. It was shown that, regarding parents, research results are mixed. The outcomes seem to depend on factors such as ethnic status and the age group targeted in the studies. The use of both implicit and explicit measures has now shown that parents may influence children's attitudes even when they are not aware of it.

The third part highlighted the importance of taking the complexity of contemporary society into account when studying intergroup relations. Our societies do not only consist of one minority and one majority group. Different minority groups are present which results in a complex and dynamic social structure influencing children's attitudes depending on their group membership. Children are aware of differences in group status in society from a very young age and research findings illustrate that minority children may favour both the majority out-group and their own ethnic group at a cost to other minority groups.

The fourth part presented research on how intergroup contact could be structured in ethnic diverse schools in order to improve intergroup attitudes amongst both majority/higher-status and minority/lower-status children. It was concluded that in a context with unequal status groups, a common superordinate category that is not related to social status (e.g., School) compared to a category related to social status (e.g., Portugal), results in more positive out-group evaluations, amongst both higher- and lower-status group members. In addition, amongst minority members, a status unrelated superordinate category (School) has positive effects on how prototypical they perceive themselves to be compared to a higher status out-group.

This chapter started with a quote by Gordon Allport reflecting his opinion that integration should start in elementary schools rather than in high schools. The school context is one of the most powerful to start developing the foundations to a more inclusive society. As the review in this chapter illustrates, this could be done by aiming at working with acculturation attitudes of the majority, actively involving parents in making them aware how they (unconsciously) may be a source of influence, taking into account the complexity of the multiple ethnicities present in Western societies and by structuring contact in a favourable way for both minority and majority children.

As illustrated by this chapter, Maria Benedicta Monteiro has conducted research on a variety of themes related to creating a more inclusive society. She hereby conducted

strong empirically-based research in an applied setting: the school context. The studies reviewed in this chapter show that applied research results in a greater understanding of socio-psychological underlying processes that, in turn, can benefit the development of effective interventions. By combining a Social Psychological and a Developmental Psychological approach, Maria Benedicta Monteiro has provided an important contribution to a promising new field of research.

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Chapter 10
The Multi-Norm Structural Social-Developmental Model of Children's Intergroup Attitudes: Integrating Intergroup-Loyalty and Outgroup Fairness Norms

Ricardo Borges Rodrigues, Adam Rutland and Elizabeth Collins

> *…we discussed the importance of the generic 'groupness' norm … [but] All our results show that another social norm, that of fairness, is also powerful in guiding … choices and that the pattern of data can best be understood as showing a strategy in which a compromise between these two norms is achieved whenever possible.*
>
> Tajfel et al. (1971, pp. 173–174)

> *Double-dealing, like double-talk, is hard to learn. It takes the entire period of childhood and much of adolescence to master the art of ethnocentrism.*
>
> Allport (1954, pp. 309–310)

Abstract This chapter presents a new complete theoretical model of intergroup attitudes of children—the Multi-Norm Structural Social-Developmental (MNSD) model. The MNSD offers a comprehensive and integrative approach that builds on three extant social-developmental theories that explain the dynamic variation of prejudiced responses during child development. The unique contribution of MNSD is in integrating hypotheses on the role of competing social norms, using social-developmental and social psychological theory. The MNSD proposes that two strong social norms, the ingroup loyalty norm and the norm not to be prejudiced (outgroup fairness norm), operate in a complementary rather than mutually exclusive way in social-developmental intergroup contexts. In specifying when and how these norms become influential and shape intergroup biases of children, the MNSD proposes two kinds of hypotheses, one regarding lasting changes in the availability and internal-

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ization of these norms and one regarding the situational and context dependent salience of them. With this the authors explain existing results and generate novel untested systematic hypotheses on how the dynamic relationship between groups' complex normative repertoires and socio-structural variables proposed by social identity theory (status differences, their stability and legitimacy) might operate insidiously to protect or reify the status quo within asymmetric intergroup contexts.

Keywords Children · Prejudice development · Ingroup-loyalty norm · Fairness norm · Status positions

Introduction

Recent empirical and theoretical advancements in research into the development of intergroup attitudes, biases, and behavior in childhood have increased the need for theoretical integration in social-developmental psychology. The present chapter suggests an integrative perspective, we term the Multi-Norm Structural Social-Developmental (MNSD) model. It is the first to consider the role of social norms across intergroup contexts in explaining children's intergroup attitudes, while identifying the conditions—structural, situational, and social-cognitive—that account for changes in how norms operate in different intergroup contexts.

The study of intergroup relations and their metamorphosis through childhood has fascinated researchers and practitioners since the early twentieth century (Monteiro 2013), and is still vital: a recent meta-analysis conducted by Raabe and Beelmann (2011) found that more than half of the published studies examining intergroup relations in childhood have been conducted since the 1990s, with several new theories emerging since 2000.

This dynamism is likely fuelled by multiple forces. For one thing, social exclusion by and of children, based on group identity (ethnicity, age, gender, social class) remains a pervasive and pressing worldwide problem with negative consequences for members of target groups (Killen and Rutland 2011; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Vala et al. 1999; Vala and Costa-Lopes 2010; Vala and Pereira 2011). Child targets of discrimination consistently show worse long-term outcomes compared to their non-targeted peers: lower self-esteem, higher school dropout rates, and increased risky behavior (Coker et al. 2009; Gibbons et al. 2004; Harris-Britt et al. 2007; Schmitt et al. 2014).

For another, social attitudes developed in childhood are commonly stable into adulthood, meaning that prejudiced children are likely to become prejudiced adults (Alwin et al. 1991; Smith 1990; Wells and Lekies 2006). The pervasiveness of prejudice renders social interventions to prevent its early development pivotal in societies' efforts to fight ongoing and insidious cycles of social exclusion (Aboud et al. 2012). However, the effectiveness of such interventions is dependent on the predictive power and generalizability of existing theories.

In spite of recent significant theoretical advances concerning our understanding of the origins of intergroup biases in childhood, and the role of social norms in particular, there remains a need for integration of existing theoretical proposals. In this chapter, we propose the *Multi-Norm Structural Social-Developmental* (MNSD) model, providing an integrative theoretical perspective that considers the role of socio-structural variables in the development, salience, and impact of multiple, sometimes conflicting, social norms—such as norms of ingroup favoritism versus those of fairness—on children's intergroup attitudes (Sherif and Sherif 1953; Tajfel and Turner 1979).

The chapter is organized in five sections. We first provide a brief review of seminal social-normative approaches to children's intergroup attitudes and behaviors. Second, we review the concept of the social norm in the developmental and non-developmental literature. In the third section, we review empirical evidence concerning children's intergroup racial attitudes and the main tenets of the contemporary Social-Normative Approach to children's racial attitudes. The fourth section reviews contemporary socio-developmental intergroup theories, focusing on how social norms have been conceptualized and measured. The final section presents the central ideas and hypothesis of our MNSD model.

A Seminal Social-Normative Approach to Children's Intergroup Attitudes and Behaviors

Allport (1954) offered a seminal theorization concerning the role of social norms in the development of children's intergroup attitudes and behaviors within the specific context of racial relations in the USA, the main ideas of which remain remarkably valid and relevant for our MNSD model. According to Allport (1954), White children's intergroup attitudes and behaviors develop in three sequential stages: *pregeneralized learning of prejudice* occurs in children up to 6 years old and consists of the acquisition of basic social-cognitive abilities (e.g., categorization) and the learning of negative racial labels. *Total verbal rejection of outgroups* takes place between the ages of 7 and 11 and is characterized by an understanding of racial membership as a permanent characteristic and the expression of generalized clearcut positive evaluations of Whites and negative evaluations of Blacks. Finally, *differentiation* refers to a period of adolescence where a decrease in the intensity of verbalized prejudice can occur, accompanied by an increase in the negativity of the underlying attitudes. In this stage, the consistency between what the adolescent thinks and speaks is context dependent.

This model considers the role that cognitive and social factors play in the development of attitudes and behaviors in a context of conflicting norms. In addition, it distinguishes between children's "verbalized" racial attitude and the "true" attitude communicated through non-verbal behavior.

The coexistence of conflicting social norms that children learn to manage with the help of parents and teachers is a key aspect of Allport's model. While egalitarian

pressures inhibit the expression of racial biases, ethnocentric pressures increase their expression. Allport proposes a developmental hypothesis of differential impact of the two sources of social pressure depending on age. Younger children should be influenced more by a non-internalized pro-ethnocentrism norm, and be perceived as more prejudiced than they in fact are. However, older children may have internalized the pro-ethnocentrism norm but comply with an opposing egalitarian norm under specific conditions.

Allport's (1954) model proposes that the influence of a pro-prejudice norm on children's expression of racial attitudes not only precedes the influence of an opposing anti-discrimination norm, but is also likely to become internalized between late childhood and early adolescence. We speculate that one consequence of the pro-prejudice norm primacy is that when the anti-prejudice norm begins to take effect, it may only superficially override the influence of its predecessor, thus be restricted to contexts where the expression of racial prejudice is socially unacceptable.

This hypothesis has been tested recently and extensively under the Social-Normative Approach (França and Monteiro 2004; Monteiro et al. 2009; Rodrigues 2012; Rodrigues et al. 2012a, b; Rutland 2004; Rutland et al. 2005). Significantly less is known concerning the normative-driven primacy of racial biases, a hypothesis we shall consider within the *MNSD* model.

"Social Norm": A Multifaceted Concept

The concept of the social norm is central to social science research on intergroup relations and contemporary theories of racism. Social norms help to explain why individuals become prejudiced (Sherif and Sherif 1953) and how prejudices are communicated in different contexts (Crandall et al. 2002). Early conceptualizations of social norms treated them as *rules* in the context of moral development (Kohlberg 1963; Piaget 1932; Sherif 1936), defined depending on children's developmental stage—first, inflexibly externally imposed and enforced in proportion to the degree of deviation; later, internalized or weighed depending on the situation and focused on regulating intentions more than behaviors.

Social norms are still important in contemporary theories of intergroup relations in childhood and adolescence. Most definitions include three main features: (1) being shared with a significant degree of consensus within a given social context (family, friends, social groups, or institutions); (2) setting meta-expectations for target individuals' behavior by establishing what others regard as (in)appropriate behavior in a given circumstance (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen 1975); and (3) being enforced through the anticipation of external or self-imposed sanctions or rewards (Coleman 1990; Durkheim 1912/1965; Horne 2001a, b; Parsons 1951).

Cialdini and colleagues' systematized this in their typology, distinguishing three types of norms: *descriptive*, *injunctive*, and *personal* (Cialdini et al. 1990, 1991;

Cialdini and Trost 1998). *Descriptive norms* refer to what a majority of individuals do in a given situation. *Injunctive norms* refer to the shared rules or beliefs as to what constitutes approved (prescriptive) or disapproved (proscriptive) conduct (interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup) (Cialdini et al. 1990). Hence, while descriptive norms inform individual action through *what others do*, injunctive norms specify *what ought (not) to be done* and control behavior through the promise of social sanctions (Cialdini et al. 1990, see also Deutsch and Gerard 1955). On the contrary, *personal norms* constitute an individual's self-based standards for behavior connected to internalized values (Cialdini and Trost 1998, p. 160). Where injunctive norms pressure individuals to comply under the threat of external sanctions, personal norms elicit normative behavior through the anticipation of self-enhancement or self-deprecation (Cialdini and Trost 1998; Schwartz 1977; Schwartz and Howard 1982).

This typology and the literature in general conceptualize norms exclusively as explicit constructs accessible to individuals' introspection. However, Yoshida (2007) recently tested the concept of *implicit cultural norms* (see also, Yoshida et al. 2012): associations between specific beliefs or behaviors and knowledge of the extent to which these are shared (descriptive) or socially approved (prescriptive). Based on this conceptualization of implicit social norms, explicitly proscribed prejudices might still be implicitly normatively prescribed—an important component of the MNSD.

The Many Shades of Contemporary Intergroup Relations in Childhood: The Case of Racial Attitudes

Several literature reviews have summarized the numerous studies that provide evidence of the pervasiveness of racial biases across childhood and adolescence. However, these have also revealed divergent findings regarding how exactly racial biases evolve as children age (Aboud 1988; Aboud and Amato 2001; Brand et al. 1974; Brown 2010; Cameron et al. 2001; Nesdale 2001; Proshansky 1966; Rutland 2004).

With highly visible and salient social categories, like age, gender, or race, there is substantial evidence that intergroup biases among high status children first appear around the age of 3–4 (Brown 2010; Nesdale 2004). The earliest literature reviews found that racial prejudice was evident in young White children that became stronger with age (Brand et al. 1974; Proshansky 1966); and theorized a continuous, cumulative socialization process of children into prejudice attitudes. Later reviews found a decrease in expressed racial biases in children starting between the ages of 5 and 7 (Aboud 1988, 2008; Aboud and Amato 2001; Brown 2010; Raabe and Beelmann 2011). This finding provided the empirical ground for the development of Cognitive Developmental Theory (Aboud 1988), which hypothesized that children's increasing cognitive maturity (e.g., in categorization and classification skills) directly accounts for the observed reduction in prejudice (Aboud 1988; Doyle and Aboud 1995).

Contrary to the main hypothesis of CDT (Aboud 1988), Raabe and Beelmann (2011) found that this reduction in racial bias was moderated by the relative group status and the type of prejudice measure used (implicit or explicit). For low status children, prejudice against outgroups arose between 5–10 years old. Among high status children it arose earlier (2–7 years old) and then decreased in middle childhood (5–10 years old); but, only when intergroup attitudes were explicitly assessed. According to the authors this decrease in only explicit racial prejudice is consistent with an inhibition of prejudice expression driven by children's growing awareness of an anti-discrimination norm rather than by a direct effect of children's cognitive development. This hypothesis has been tested using a revised Social-Normative Approach.

A Social-Normative Approach to Children's Racial Intergroup Attitudes and Behaviors: The Role of an Anti-discrimination Norm

Studies testing the hypothesis that the decrease in high status White children's racial biases in middle childhood is driven by awareness of an anti-discrimination norm find (a) explicit and implicit racial attitudes follow divergent age-patterns, (b) accountability moderates the level of racial prejudice children express, (c) legitimating racial differentiation produces explicit biases, and (d) a salient anti-discrimination norm directly reduces explicitly measured biases (FitzRoy and Rutland 2010; França and Monteiro 2004, 2013; Rutland et al. 2005, for reviews see Monteiro 2013; Monteiro et al. 2009; Rodrigues 2012; Rodrigues et al. 2012a, b; Rutland 2004; Rutland et al. 2010).

Studies conducted in Portugal, the UK, and the USA, have found that explicitly, but not implicitly, assessed racial biases become less evident with age (Baron and Banaji 2006; Rodrigues 2012; Rodrigues et al. 2012a, b; Rutland et al. 2005); whereas implicit pro-White biases were significant and constant across age groups (Baron and Banaji 2006; Rodrigues et al. 2012b). When ingroup-accountability was systematically manipulated, making the anti-discrimination norm salient, older children's adherence to the norm varied depending on condition, suggesting the anti-discrimination norm was not internalized, and raising questions about predictors of implicit intergroup biases. For example, França and Monteiro (2004, see also Monteiro et al. 2009) tested how 6–7 and 9–10-year-old White Portuguese children distributed a limited number of coins between a White and a Black target, either under a condition of accountability (to a White experimenter) or anonymity (the child was alone). Results showed that while younger children favored the White target across conditions, older children favored the White target only when the resources were distributed in the condition of anonymity.

Several studies provided more direct evidence of the role of an anti-racism norm in inhibiting children's intergroup biases in racial or nationality intergroup contexts (FitzRoy and Rutland 2010; Monteiro et al. 2009; Rodrigues et al. 2012a, b;

Rutland et al. 2005, 2007). These have either experimentally manipulated or measured personal, descriptive, and prescriptive versions of an anti-racism norm. Rutland and colleagues (2005) found that, independent of age, a personal anti-discrimination norm was associated with lower outgroup racial prejudice under moderate ingroup-accountability (experimenter present), but, unexpectedly, it was linked to increased outgroup prejudice under higher ingroup-accountability (experimenter present with video-recording). However, in the nationality intergroup context, the personal anti-discrimination norm was associated with increased positive outgroup and negative ingroup evaluations across conditions of accountability.

A series of studies conducted by Rodrigues and colleagues (2012a, b, see also Rodrigues 2012) with White Portuguese 6–11-year-old children measured their perception of a prescriptive ingroup anti-racism norm. These provided evidence that children's perceptions of this norm mediated the age-associated decrease in children's explicitly assessed racial biases (Rodrigues et al. 2012a) and that this norm was more likely to become salient and impact evaluations made by older children held accountable to the ingroup.

Together, these studies provide convergent evidence that children's explicit racial and national attitudes are normatively driven and contextually malleable. They show from age 6 on children are aware of an anti-discrimination norm that is particularly salient in racially mixed intergroup contexts. Also this anti-discrimination norm is more likely to become activated, and inhibit the expression of intergroup biases, among older children and under conditions of ingroup-accountability. However, there is also evidence showing that extremely heightened ingroup-accountability may make younger children inhibit racial bias but produce biased behavior in older children (Rutland et al. 2005), an effect that might reflect psychological reactance (Brehm 1966) as children feel pressured to conform to a non-internalized anti-discrimination norm.

Notwithstanding the significant contribution of the Social-Normative Approach, past research has been silent on why children, particularly older ones, show implicit racial biases despite pervasive and strong anti-racist normative pressures. Monteiro et al. (2009) offered a tentative hypothesis: younger and older children learn and are required to handle not only an anti-discrimination norm but also a conflicting ingroup-favoring norm (see also Allport 1954). They posited that older children are better equipped to manage these conflicting norms according to salient contextual demands. A hypothesis we shall reexamine within our *MNSD* model.

Social Norms Within Contemporary Socio-Developmental Intergroup Theories

In the present section, we discuss three contemporary social-developmental theories on intergroup relations that consider the role of social norms alongside social-cognitive and social identity processes: *Social Identity Developmental Theory*

(SIDT: Nesdale 2004, 2008); *Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics* (DSGD: Abrams and Rutland 2010; Abrams et al. 2003a); and the Social-Reasoning Developmental (SRD) perspective (Killen and Rutland 2011; Rutland et al. 2010).

Social Identity Developmental Theory—"The Role of Inclusion and Exclusion Ingroup-Norms"

SIDT (Nesdale 1999, 2004, 2008; Nesdale and Flesser 2001) offers a socio-developmental adaptation of Tajfel and Turner's (1979, 1986) Social Identity Theory, according to which children's intergroup attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors develop in four phases—*undifferentiation*, *ethnic awareness*, *ethnic preference*, and *ethnic prejudice*.

SIDT proposes that around the age of 5–6 children enter the *Ethnic Preference Phase*, characterized by knowledge of ingroup status and expression of ingroup preference by high status group members. The change to the *Ethnic Prejudice Phase*, where racial prejudice and outgroup discrimination become evident, takes place around age 7–8, but only if children experience (a) racial constancy (i.e., awareness of racial membership as immutable), (b) high ingroup identification, (c) perceived intergroup threat, and (d) ingroup norms condoning or prescribing outgroup prejudice. SIDT defines social norms at the group level as "the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors considered appropriate to be displayed by the members of a particular group" (Nesdale 2011, p. 602).

Several experiments have assessed the impact of manipulating inclusion and exclusion group norms and the role of the hypothesized moderators. For example, Nesdale and colleagues (2005b) conducted a study with 7–9-year-old Anglo-Australian children placed in a high status competitive racial intergroup situation where inclusion and exclusion descriptive ingroup norms and intergroup threat were manipulated. As expected, the results revealed a differential impact of norms and threat condition depending on age. While 7 year olds' expressed evaluations aligned with the inclusion or exclusion norm (favorable or prejudiced toward the outgroup respectively) with ingroup threat inhibiting the positive effect of the inclusion norm; 9 year olds' expressed neutral outgroup evaluations except under the condition of an exclusion norm and high intergroup threat, where they expressed a negative outgroup evaluation. Studies manipulating the inclusion/ exclusion norms and empathy (Nesdale et al. 2005b) found that empathy was positively associated with liking for the same-ethnicity outgroup, unless an exclusion norm was present.

More recently, studies have been conducted examining the interactive effects of school norms, peer norms, and accountability on children's intergroup attitudes (McGuire et al. 2015; Nesdale and Lawson 2011). Findings indicated, irrespective of age, an inclusive school norm was less effective when the peer group had an exclusion norm and children were held accountable to their peers or teachers. This

supports the SIDT hypothesis that both the ingroup peer and school norm influence children's intergroup attitudes (Nesdale 2004).

Overall, studies conducted within the framework of SIDT provide evidence that children were responsive to manipulated inclusion and exclusion ingroup norms somewhat earlier than initially predicted (Nesdale 1999, 2004)—as early as 5 years old, as well as to a school level inclusion norm (Nesdale et al. 2005a, b; Nesdale and Lawson 2011; McGuire et al. 2015). In addition, when intergroup threat is low, older children respond relatively less to exclusion norms than their younger counterparts, suggesting that under such conditions older children might be prone to assume an unspoken inclusion norm (see also Monteiro et al. 2009, Study 2). However, it should be noted that these studies were conducted in artificial, competitive, and asymmetric intergroup conditions with high status participants. It is therefore relevant to ask to what extent this evidence can be generalized to other conditions, namely natural intergroup situations involving equal status groups.

Next, we review the Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics model, which examines the role of norms and socio-normative processes exactly within symmetric intergroup settings involving real intergroup categories.

Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics—"The Role of an Ingroup-Loyalty Norm"

The DSGD model proposed by Abrams et al. (2003a, see also Abrams et al. 2003b), aims to explain how children judge specific ingroup and outgroup members depending on whether they deviate from or converge toward ingroup and outgroup norms (for a review, see Abrams and Rutland 2010; Rutland et al. 2010). In this context, *subjective group dynamics* refer to how groups and specific group members are evaluated in an intergroup context based on the relative support they provide to existing group norms, typically ingroup-loyalty.

The model makes three main hypotheses. The *first* is children's understanding of group dynamics improves as they develop from early to late childhood. Specifically, with age children begin to appreciate that group members are judged within their respective groups according to the extent to which their behavior conforms with or deviates from that group's norms, and the potential consequence of behavior for the group and its cohesion. The *second* hypothesis specifies the factors driving this developmental integration of intra- and intergroup judgments, which include both basic (e.g., categorization) and advanced (e.g., perspective-taking) socio-cognitive abilities alongside children's social experience (Abrams and Rutland 2010). The *third* hypothesis predicts that children's relative differentiation between normative and deviant ingroup and outgroup individuals (i.e., *differential evaluation*) is driven by their knowledge of ingroup and outgroup norms (i.e., *differential inclusion*).

Differential inclusion is defined as each child's understanding of the extent to which individuals are accepted by respective ingroup and outgroup members, as a consequence of how much their actions comply with or deviate from group norms and thus affect the positive social identity of their ingroup or an outgroup (Abrams et al. 2003a). Given that differential inclusion is typically measured in the context of group members' deviance from norms of group-loyalty (i.e., showing ingroup favoritism) and requires taking the perspective of ingroup and outgroup members, differential inclusion reflects children's knowledge that, in general, group-loyalty norms exist in both ingroups and outgroups (Abrams and Rutland 2010; Abrams et al. 2009).

Within the DSGD model, prescriptive norms can be either *opposing norms*—when the ingroup and outgroup have competing goals and perspectives—or *generic norms*—when the same prescriptive norms are held by both groups (Abrams et al. 2014). Almost all prescriptive norms can be categorized as either *moral norms*, which are by definition universal and pervasive (e.g., "one should not inflict harm"), and *social-conventional norms*, which are more context-dependent and therefore less widespread (e.g., "one should not eat with one's hands"; Abrams and Rutland 2010; Killen 2007; Killen et al. 2004; Turiel 1983). However, according to the DSGD model, the group-loyalty norm—which is the typical opposing norm—constitutes a special type of norm that is neither moral nor social-conventional, as it is strong and pervasive like moral norms, but confined to specific circumstances involving some degree of intergroup competition (Abrams and Rutland 2010, cf. Rutland et al. 2010).

Two studies testing the underpinnings of the DSGD model (Abrams et al. 2003a, 2003b) were conducted with 5–6 to 11-year-old children in intergroup contexts involving summer school or nationality categorizations under conditions of equal status. In both preliminary checks of the normative context showed expressing relative ingroup support (i.e., ingroup loyalty) was perceived as typical for both ingroup and outgroup. Results of both studies confirmed children's perceptions of this cross-cutting group-loyalty norm increased with age, and the more they acknowledged the norm the more positive their evaluation of ingroup normative (vs. ingroup deviant) and outgroup deviant (vs. outgroup normative) group members was. In the nationality context, the relationship between knowledge of group-loyalty and relative support for ingroup normative and outgroup deviant members was stronger among older children (Abrams et al. 2003a).

Further research found the effect of the group-loyalty norm on evaluations of individual ingroup/outgroup members was stronger for older accountable children and was absent for younger children (Abrams et al. 2007); and that even in an intergroup setting with no history of relationship between the groups, older children (a) anticipate group-loyalty norms, (b) abide by general principles of morality, and (c) use these two anticipated norms in parallel but independently when evaluating normative and deviant ingroup and outgroup peers (Abrams et al. 2008).

An Integrative Social-Cognitive Developmental Perspective—"The Role of Socio-Conventional Pro- and Anti-bias Norms"

Rutland et al. (2010; see also Killen and Rutland 2011) have recently proposed the integrative Social-Reasoning Developmental (SRD) perspective. This perspective considers the theoretical and empirical contributions of Social Domain Theory (SDT, Turiel 1983), Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), the DSGD model, and the Social-Normative Approach.

The SRD perspective seeks to answer the general question *how* does the child decide to exclude others and *what* contextual factors are weighed, focusing on *how* the child reasons when making such decisions (Killen and Rutland 2011). The goal is to explain the apparent paradox created by the early and simultaneous emergence of intergroup exclusion and morality in childhood by offering an integrative hypothesis that children "simultaneously develop the ability to think about the social world using different types of judgments, while considering notions of group identity, social-conventional norms, and morality." (Rutland et al. 2010, p. 281).

Within this perspective social norms are distinguished from moral principles, and defined as prescribed cultural expectations regarding attitudes, values, and behavior, derived from specific peer group or more general societal conventions, traditions, and customs (Rutland et al. 2010). The SRD perspective acknowledges the existence of both anti-discrimination and group-loyalty norms and contends that self-presentational processes can operate either to inhibit or facilitate children's prejudice, depending on salient norm(s) in the intergroup situation. Children are less likely to express intergroup bias when anti-discrimination norms are salient or intergroup contact is high, as this triggers reasoning based on moral principles of fairness and justice. However, group differentiation and intergroup exclusion emerge when norms promoting exclusion (e.g., group-loyalty) are salient or perceived intergroup threat is high, as these elicit socio-conventional group-based reasoning.

Research into the SRD perspective has empirically confirmed that children often must weigh moral principles and group-identity, as both can be simultaneously and independently influential when the intergroup situation elicits moral concerns uncorrelated with group membership (Abrams et al. 2008, Study 2).

The SRD offers a comprehensive and insightful integrative social-normative perspective on children's intergroup biases by explicitly proposing that the norms regulating the relationship between the groups can differ between contexts, and that their salience depends on situational factors such as intergroup contact or intergroup threat. However, this perspective is silent about the possibility that different and conflicting norms might operate within the same intergroup context, as originally proposed by Allport (1954; see also Monteiro et al. 2009), and the possible social-structural origins of these norms.

A Multi-Norm Structural Social-Developmental (MNSD) Model of Intergroup Attitudes in Childhood

The preceding review highlights the central role of social norms in contemporary social-developmental theories of intergroup attitudes in childhood. Empirical evidence converges to show that across contexts intergroup biases tend to closely follow prevailing group norms. However, the factors that influence whether and how much anti- versus pro-bias norms dictate behavior in a given intergroup context have not been integrated into existing theory in a clear and comprehensive manner. Furthermore, as explicit and implicit attitudes become dissociated in older children, anti-discrimination norms explain changes in explicit attitudes, but the predictors of the implicit biases remain largely unknown.

Our systematic analysis of which norms typically influence children's intergroup biases across intergroup contexts is consistent with Tajfel et al. (1971) and Allport (1954), in which both groupness/ethnocentric and fairness/egalitarian social forces influence intergroup bias.[1] Nevertheless, unanswered questions remain: Is it the case, as predicted by these authors (Allport 1954; Tajfel et al. 1971; see also Monteiro et al. 2009), that these conflicting norms can operate simultaneously and possibly dynamically, within the same intergroup context?, What are the origins of these intergroup norms?

The MNSD model provides an integrative social-developmental framework describing the role group norms play in shaping children's intergroup attitudes. With the MNSD model, we propose that the social structure—as defined by Tajfel and Turner (1979) in their Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict—provides a framework for the intergroup normative processes that regulate the development and expression of intergroup biases.

Our model has two main hypotheses, the *intergroup structural normative repertoire* (ISNR) *hypothesis*, which addresses the question of *which intergroup norms are typically available in intergroup contexts* and *what the role of the intergroup social-structure is*; and the *multinorm social-cognitive situated influence* (MNSI) *hypothesis*, which addresses the question of *why* and *how specific intergroup norms become salient* (rather than others that are also part of a group's normative repertoire) *and influence children's intergroup attitudes depending on context and child's age*.

Specification of (1) the social-structural conditions of the intergroup context—status asymmetries, legitimacy and stability of these status asymmetries, and the permeability of intergroup boundaries; (2) the situational conditions—e.g., ingroup accountability; and (3) social-cognitive factors of the participants—e.g., perspective-taking ability; should allow the prediction of which norm(s) will become salient and influence children's explicit and implicit biases in a specific situation.

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[1]Tajfel et al.'s (1971) initial hypothesis about the influence of two conflicting norms was abandoned some years later, purportedly because of the difficulty of predicting which social norms would be activated in a given situation (Brown 1988; Jetten et al. 1996; Tajfel 1978).

The Intergroup Structural Normative Repertoire (ISNR) Hypothesis

The *intergroup normative repertoire*, derived from the more general concept of the *shared psychological intergroup repertoire* (Teichman and Bar-Tal 2008), designates the definite set of intergroup norms that can potentially become salient and regulate group members' behavior within any intergroup situation. Accordingly, the *intergroup structural normative repertoire* (ISNR) hypothesis predicts that:

> (a) Existing intergroup norms can be categorized according to two fundamental intergroup norms: an ingroup focused norm that prescribes loyal behavior towards ingroup members (ingroup-loyalty norm), and an outgroup focused norm that prescribes fair (favorable or unfavorable) treatment of the outgroup (outgroup fairness norm).

It is important to note that the intergroup attitudes and behaviors that fall within the boundaries of the outgroup fairness norm depend on the specific configuration that this norm takes in the intergroup context, ranging from favorable to unfavorable to the outgroup. In contrast, the range of behavior allowed by the ingroup-loyalty norm should be relatively restricted, varying between ingroup favoritism to egalitarian intergroup behavior.

Similar to societal norms, intergroup norms can be specified according to their *oughtness* (descriptive or prescriptive), *visibility* (explicit or implicit), and *content* (pro or anti the display of intergroup bias) (Cialdini et al. 1990; Jetten et al. 1996; Yoshida et al. 2012, see Table 10.1). In addition to these three dimensions, intergroup norms can also be typified according to their *group focus*.

Group Focus of Intergroup Norms

Close examination of the norms manipulated or measured under the different social-developmental theories (see Table 10.1) indicates that intergroup norms typically have an ingroup (internal) or outgroup (external) focus—i.e., they can be relatively more concerned with the regulation of intergroup bias to communicate the group's cohesiveness and the quality of intragroup relationships, or to communicate the extent to which the group is adequate and fair in relations with the outgroup. Accordingly, these norms should help groups regulate intra and intergroup group behavior that is relevant for the group's social identity, specifically allowing groups to protect and/or boost a positive group identity.

This *ingroup-outgroup focus* conceptualization aligns with Allport's (1954) distinction between ethnocentric (ingroup focused) and egalitarian (outgroup focused) social pressures, and Tajfel et al.'s (1971) normative explanation for minimal group results hypothesizing the combined influence of a 'groupness' (ingroup focused) and fairness (outgroup focused) norm.

It is also consistent with Brewer's (1999) prediction of a fundamental distinction between 'ingroup love' and 'outgroup hate' motives underlying the formation of

Table 10.1 Intergroup norms in contemporary social-developmental theories on children's intergroup attitudes

Theoretical model	Intergroup context	Norm	Norm type (oughtness, visibility, and focus)	Assessment method
Social-Normative Approach (SNA)	Context: asymmetric status Racial groups Participants: higher status children	Anti-discrimination	Prescriptive and descriptive Explicit Outgroup focus	Measured and manipulated
		Pro-discrimination	Prescriptive Explicit Outgroup focus	Manipulated
Social Identity Developmental Theory (SIDT)	Context: asymmetric status Racial and drawing groups Participants: higher status children	Outgroup inclusion Outgroup exclusion	Prescriptive Explicit Outgroup focus	Manipulated
Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics (DSGD)	Context: symmetric status School, national, and minimal groups Participants: equal status children	Ingroup loyalty	Prescriptive Explicit Ingroup focus	Measured

intergroup attitudes. According to Brewer (1999) individuals are primarily motivated to protect the integrity of and be loyal to the ingroup which, under special circumstances—intergroup threat or anticipation of negative intergroup interdependence—can lead to outgroup hate and hostility. Consistent with Brewer's (1999) hypothesis, Aboud (2003) tested 4–7-year-old White children and found that although ingroup favoritism did not appear until age 5, it was stronger and its increase more pronounced with age than outgroup prejudice. Also as expected, the association between ingroup and outgroup evaluations was weak (Study 1) or nonsignificant (Study 2).

Rodrigues (2012), Rodrigues et al. (2012a) recently tested the ISNR hypothesis by examining the explicit racial attitudes of White Portuguese 6–10-year-old children towards Black Portuguese children, and assessing their perceptions of the extent to which ingroup members (White adults) held and prescribed an ingroup-loyalty and an anti-discrimination norm. Results confirmed that the two norms were perceived as independent constructs that were moderately negatively

related. In addition, a social developmental change in children's perceptions of group norms was found: while younger children stated that the ingroup held both norms, older children acknowledged only the anti-discrimination norm, which hints at potential conflict between showing loyalty to the ingroup and not discriminating against the outgroup, resolved as children age by retaining the ingroup-loyalty norm only implicitly.

Reciprocity

To understand intergroup bias, it is important to consider the role of perceived group interdependence and shared expectations (norms) about how ingroup and outgroup members are likely to behave and reciprocate to each other's behaviors. Research highlights how shared positive ingroup reciprocity expectations underlie individuals' ingroup favoring behaviors. (Gaertner and Insko 2000; Kiyonari 2002; Makimura and Yamagishi 2003; Yamagishi et al. 1999). Several authors have also examined the role of outgroup (negative) reciprocity expectations, specifically in the context of the 'outgroup fear hypothesis' (Ng 1981; Jetten et al. 1996), which contends that intergroup discrimination reflects group member concern with intergroup equity in a context where outgroup members are expected to favor their ingroup members. Consistent with this hypothesis, several studies with adults have found that ingroup members expect outgroup members to favor same group members (Gaertner and Insko 2000; Jetten et al. 1996). Importantly, studies conducted under the DSGD model found children also perceive that outgroups, like their ingroups, uphold a loyalty norm (Abrams et al. 2007, 2009).

Hence, our MNSD model proposes that intergroup norms should be conceptualized as *intergroup bounded normative derivates of a more general norm of reciprocity that materialize from processes of perceived interdependence and reciprocity within intergroup contexts*. Gouldner (1960) was among the first authors to consider reciprocity as a general norm guiding social relations across levels— interpersonal, intra/intergroup, and societal—that he defined as a widely shared, cross-cultural, social prescription, according to which *people should help and not injure those who have helped them*. He hypothesized that reciprocity can take the form of 'positive reciprocity'—reciprocation of a positive behavior with a positive behavior—or 'negative reciprocity'—reciprocation of a negative behavior with a negative behavior (for supporting evidence, see Eisenberger et al. 2004).

In this vein, the MNSD model proposes that the ingroup-loyalty norm generally makes individuals anticipate positive reciprocation within the ingroup and negative reciprocation between groups, the latter being further regulated by an outgroup fairness norm stipulating a favorable, neutral, or unfavorable outgroup evaluation depending on the intergroup social-structure, namely the extent to which there are social asymmetries and these are perceived as (il)legitimate.

Developmental research has shown that by approximately 3 years old children have an early understanding of the dynamics of reciprocity (Warneken and Tomasello 2013, but cf. Berndt 1979; Olson and Spelke 2008), and this skill

Fig. 10.1 Multi-Norm Structural Social-Developmental (MNSD) model

develops as children age (Berndt 1977; Harris 1970; Levitt et al. 1985; Staub and Sherk 1970). In fact, children are more likely to reciprocate to friends and family than to strangers from the age of 3–4 (Olson and Spelke 2008), which coincides with the age high status children start displaying group-based biases in intergroup contexts with highly salient social categories (e.g., racial categories, see, Raabe and Beelmann 2011) (Fig. 10.1).

Intergroup Social-Structural Conditions

In addition to advancing the idea that intergroup relations are regulated by an ingroup-loyalty norm and an outgroup fairness norm, the MNSD model, in its ISNR hypothesis, further proposes that:

(b) The specific configuration (i.e., strength and visibility) that the ingroup-loyalty and outgroup fairness norms take within a group's normative repertoire in a given inter-group context is shaped by the existing intergroup social-structural conditions – group status, stability and legitimacy of status asymmetries, and permeability of group boundaries.

This hypothesis considers the social structure as defined by Tajfel and Turner (1979), namely *status differences*—asymmetries in the social standing of the different groups, *status legitimacy*—the extent to which the high- and low-status groups accept the status structure as legitimate, *status stability*—whether an alternative status position for a group as a whole is likely to be realized, and

permeability of group boundaries—the possibility for group members to leave one group and join another. Substantial evidence shows these social-structural variables critically impact ingroup bias of both higher and lower status group members in intergroup contexts with real and artificial groups (for a review, see Bettencourt et al. 2001).

Evidence from research with both children and adults, where status asymmetries and legitimacy of those differences differ either within or between the studies, allows for a further specification of the ISNR prediction based on specific intergroup social-structural conditions:

> (b.1) Within asymmetric intergroup contexts where group differences are perceived as illegitimate but stable, a high status group's intergroup normative repertoire will likely promote a subtle ingroup-loyalty norm – prescribing an implicit favorable evaluation of the ingroup – and an explicit outgroup fairness norm – prescribing a favorable evaluation of the outgroup;

Studies within the Social-Normative Approach (reviewed earlier) have been conducted in asymmetric intergroup contexts focusing on White higher status children's racial attitudes. Although social-structural conditions were not assessed in these studies, other evidence suggests that White children recognize status asymmetries between racial groups (e.g., Feddes et al. 2014), perceive these differences as illegitimate (Killen and Stangor 2001), and view group boundaries as impermeable (for reviews see, Aboud 1988; Brown 2010).

Consistent with hypothesis b.1, several studies have found evidence of the explicit outgroup fairness norm: high status children acknowledged an ingroup anti-discrimination norm, and lower levels of racial bias were driven by perceptions of this norm, especially among older and ingroup-accountable children (FitzRoy and Rutland 2010; Monteiro et al. 2009; Rodrigues et al. 2012a, b; Rutland et al. 2005). In addition, some of these studies specifically tested Allport's (1954) *conflicting norm hypothesis*, and showed evidence of the subtle operation of the ingroup-loyalty norm hypothesized by our model (Monteiro et al. 2009; Rodrigues 2012; Rodrigues et al. 2012a, b). In these studies, when older children were anonymous, the ingroup-loyalty norm became salient, suggesting that the anti-racism norm was not internalized as children aged, and that the ingroup-loyalty norm was driving children's intergroup attitudes under more private conditions.

Additional support is provided by studies conducted within SIDT manipulating inclusion and exclusion norms and examining high status children in asymmetric intergroup contexts, where status differences are presented as legitimate, or legitimacy is manipulated (Nesdale 1999, 2004, 2008; Nesdale and Flesser 2001). Results indicated that both inclusion and exclusion manipulated norms influence younger children substantially, however, older children seem less responsive to the exclusion norm, which only leads to a negative outgroup evaluation when status differences are presented as illegitimate (see, Nesdale et al. 2005b). This supports hypothesis b.1 in that the influence of the ingroup-loyalty norm is more subtle in older children, until there is some threat.

Complementing hypothesis b.1, the ISNR predicts that:

(b.2) Within symmetric intergroup contexts, especially when group status is perceived as unstable, a group's intergroup normative repertoire will likely promote a visible ingroup-loyalty norm – prescribing an explicit ingroup favorable evaluation – and a visible outgroup fairness norm – explicitly prescribing an unfavorable outgroup evaluation.

The DSGD model studies (Abrams and Rutland 2010) tested children in intergroup contexts where equal status was assumed and there was some degree of explicit intergroup competition—a soccer competition between two countries (Abrams et al. 2003a) or children attending two summer schools (Abrams et al. 2003b). These studies systematically found that children recognized, increasingly with age, a prescriptive ingroup-loyalty norm held by both the ingroup and outgroups; and that perceptions of these intergroup opposing ingroup-loyalty norms was associated with favorable evaluations of individual ingroup loyal and outgroup deviant members, particularly in older and ingroup-accountable children (Abrams et al. 2003a, 2007, 2009).

Research conducted with adults in symmetric and asymmetric intergroup contexts provides further support to hypotheses b.1 and b.2. Specifically, several studies have found that individuals hold an implicit preference for ingroup members who display ingroup-favoritism—an effect the authors coined as *implicit ingroup meta-favoritism* (Castelli and Carraro 2010; Castelli et al. 2008b)—and expect others to display the same preference (Jetten et al. 1996).

Providing specific support to hypothesis b.2, Smith and Postmes (2009) conducted a study in a symmetric group-survival intergroup context that addressed the role of intergroup competition and threat. Results revealed that ingroup-favoritism consistent with a *positive-negative asymmetry effect* (Mummendey and Otten 1998) escalated to intergroup-hostility when there was obstruction to ingroup advancement from the outgroup and same-group members met and interacted to discuss the ingroup's survival plan.

Social-Structurally Grounded Strategic Management of Intergroup Norms

The MNSD model's social-structural explanation of intergroup norms implies that social norms are factors that are internal rather than external to the intergroup situation. In this vein, the model further hypothesizes that:

(c) Ingroup-loyalty and outgroup fairness norms included in a higher status group's intergroup normative repertoire are dynamically managed so as to preserve or boost the group's social identity, and their configuration (visibility and strength) rapidly changes as a response to perceived threats.

(c.1) When a higher status group's legitimacy is challenged regarding whether it treats the outgroup fairly, the ingroup-loyalty norm should become less visible and operate only implicitly alongside an outgroup anti-bias norm that is explicitly reinforced. This should be especially the case when status asymmetries are perceived as stable.

In contrast,

(c.2)   When a group's higher status is threatened as status stability decreases while remaining legitimate, both ingroup-loyalty and outgroup pro-bias norms should become more visible and strong.

Combined, these hypotheses propose that a higher status group's intergroup normative repertoire is managed to allow the group to protect advantageous status asymmetries either via an indirect and insidious normative process when the legitimacy of status differences are challenged, or via a direct and explicit normative process when the legitimacy of status differences are not questioned but the stability of that relative advantage is.

This hypothesis (particularly c.1) is consistent with Vaughan (1978) and Hogg and Mullen (1999), who propose that a threat to the status structure should increase higher status group members' motivation to secure their status advantage. Vaughan (1978) conducted a longitudinal study over a period of 9 years with 5–12 years old Maori (low status) and Paheka (high status) children examining the relationship between changes in the stability and legitimacy of status differences and intergroup attitudes (see also, Bettencourt et al. 2001). As the legitimacy and stability of the social structure decreased over the years, higher status Paheka children's strong explicit ingroup preference reduced somewhat, while lower status Maori children's intergroup attitudes changed from outgroup to ingroup preference (but cf. Yee and Brown 1992).

In a similar vein, a recent study led children aged 11–12 to believe that their school class had a low intergroup status, and manipulated the legitimacy, stability, and permeability of that low group status (Boen and Vanbeselaere 2002). Results revealed that ingroup bias was higher when legitimacy was lower.

The Multi-Norm Social-Cognitive Situated Influence (MNSI) Hypothesis

The MNSD model asks a final question: how do children manage their group's intergroup normative repertoire over the course of childhood and as they navigate different social situations? More specifically, how do children manage conflicting normative prescriptions, and do so taking into consideration the demands of the specific situation? Addressing these questions, the MNSD model proposes the MNSI *hypothesis*, according to which:

(d)   Higher-status children learn first the ingroup-loyalty norm, and only later the outgroup fairness norm. Situational activation and behavioral conformity to each norm should be facilitated by the degree of norm congruence, but also by children's social experience, perspective-taking abilities, and understanding of group dynamics, namely ingroup and intergroup reciprocity.

Evidence shows that high status children show intergroup biases in intergroup contexts where social categories are highly visible and salient early in childhood (Raabe and Beelmann 2011). In addition, both higher and lower status children are aware of and sensitive to socially valued status differences and acknowledge pervasive intergroup bias favoring higher status groups (Bigler et al. 2001; Feddes et al. 2014; for a review, see Brown 2010). Accordingly, as children develop the ability to take the perspective of others and to understand consensus and socially shared expectations, such as those conveyed by group norms, whether general or specific (Banerjee 2000; Rodrigues et al. 2012a), status differences and intergroup bias may become encoded as general societal descriptive norms where higher status groups are typically favored over lower status groups. Also, ingroup-favoring behavior may be implicitly (if not also explicitly) prescribed within higher status groups, compounding the directive of the descriptive norm (Dunham et al. 2008).

Children's awareness of general loyalty and support between people closest to them—via many sources including adults' nonverbal behaviors (see, Castelli et al. 2008a, 2012)—possibly develops alongside an increasing understanding of the dynamics of reciprocal behavior within closer relationships, such as with same group members (Berndt 1977; Harris 1970; Levitt et al. 1985; Olson and Spelke 2008; Staub and Sherk 1970; Warneken and Tomasello 2013). However, in asymmetric intergroup contexts higher and lower status children's experiences differ: while for the former the experience of positive ingroup reciprocity is normatively supported descriptively—through the descriptive pervasiveness of ingroup favoring intergroup biases—and prescriptively—via the explicit and/or implicit favorable evaluation of ingroup-loyal members, for the later the positive reciprocation of closer individuals (e.g., same group members) will lack descriptive and possibly prescriptive normative support.

These conditions should facilitate internalization of the ingroup-loyalty norm in higher status children as they move from *heteronomy*—strict adherence to adults' rules and obedience to authority—to *autonomy*—critical consideration of adult and peers' rules (Piaget 1932; Sherif 1936). This prediction is consistent with Rodrigues et al. (2012), showing that higher status White children internalized an ingroup-loyalty norm between middle and late childhood and several studies showing lower status children and adults hold pro-outgroup implicit attitudes (for a review, see Dunham et al. 2008).

Once higher status children gain experience with openly expressing ingroup-favoring bias in different social situations they enter a new developmental stage (around age 6). After this, in intergroup contexts where status differences are perceived as illegitimate, children's expression of intergroup bias should be subject to positive or negative prescriptive feedback by adults or older peers depending on whether the context is private or public. Studies reviewed earlier using the Social-Normative Approach are consistent with this hypothesis, showing that children around age 6 are aware of prescriptive norms against the expression of intergroup bias (FitzRoy and Rutland 2010; Rodrigues 2012; Rodrigues et al. 2012a, b; Rutland et al. 2005).

By the end of middle childhood (between the ages of 9 and 12), and as Allport (1954) hypothesized, there is evidence consistent with this hypothesis that higher status children understand when to follow the early learnt ingroup-loyalty norm, and when to conform to outgroup fairness norms proscribing the expression of unfavorable outgroup evaluations (Monteiro et al. 2009; Rodrigues 2012; Rodrigues et al. 2012a, b). The *when* refers to whether the situation holds children publically accountable, and to *whom*. Acquisition of this expertise should be facilitated by children's social experience with the communication of intergroup attitudes in different contexts, particularly through parental socialization and interaction with peers (see, Aboud and Doyle 1996; Castelli et al. 2007; Degner and Dalege 2013).

Children's increasing social-cognitive skill, in tasks such as recursive thought and analysis of group dynamics, should also facilitate the activation of norms so as to integrate their group's intergroup normative repertoire as the situation demands (e.g., ingroup accountability), in particular when incongruent norms are salient (Abrams et al. 2007, 2009; FitzRoy and Rutland 2010; Nesdale et al. 2005a; Rodrigues et al. 2012a).

In intergroup contexts where status differences are perceived as legitimate—e.g., situations involving intractable conflict where the status-structure is openly challenged by lower status groups (see, Nasie and Bar-Tal 2012)—there is no incongruence between the ingroup-loyalty and the outgroup fairness norm, as the latter openly prescribes the exclusion of the outgroup. Normative congruence is also expected when status asymmetries are small or nonexistent. In these situations, children should show earlier the ability to adequately manage the existing norms.

Conclusions

This chapter reviewed the social-developmental literature proposing social norms as a key factor to understanding children's intergroup attitudes. Reviving Allport's (1954) seminal hypothesis about the role of conflicting norm pressures in the development of children's intergroup racial attitudes, we reviewed several contemporary social-developmental theories that consider social norms as a driving force for children's intergroup attitudes—the *Social-Normative Approach* (Monteiro et al. 2009; Rodrigues 2012; Rutland et al. 2005); *Social Identity Developmental Theory* (SIDT) (Nesdale 1999, 2004, 2008); *Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics* (DSGD) (Abrams and Rutland 2008; Abrams et al. 2003a, b), and the *Social-Reasoning Developmental* (SRD) perspective (Killen and Rutland 2011; Rutland et al. 2010).

In spite of considerable convergence among these theories on the centrality of social-normative processes, Allport's (1954) view that children's intergroup attitudes may reflect two conflicting social norms has been fairly disregarded. Studies testing these social-developmental theories in a myriad of intergroup contexts involving real and artificial groups have examined the effects of pro- or anti-bias

intergroup norms, but have implicitly assumed that differences in children's responses between age groups or intergroup contexts cannot be readily explained by the operation of conflicting norms. Furthermore, in the context of a *single-norm hypothesis* where anti outgroup bias norms are assumed to explain reduced levels of explicit bias, divergent implicit biases have rarely been considered as reflecting the influence of norms. Finally, the research has not yet embraced the systematic search for origins of the intergroup norms identified as important.

In order to address these limitations in the literature, in this chapter we identified the norms of different theories propose and systematized the structural characteristics of the different experimental intergroup contexts used. We proposed the concept of an *intergroup normative repertoire* which includes two fundamental norms that regulate individuals' behaviors in intergroup contexts—an ingroup-loyalty and an outgroup fairness norm (pro or anti outgroup bias)—while systematically exploring the role that the intergroup social structure (Tajfel and Turner 1979) plays in how these norms become integrated and the specific role they play within a group's intergroup normative repertoire.

This analysis culminated in a new integrative theoretical proposal: the MNSD model. The MNSD provides an integrative perspective on the role ingroup-loyalty and outgroup fairness norms play in shaping the development and expression of children's intergroup biases. To account for the origin of different norms and how children manage them as they grow older, the MNSD considers the interactive moderating role of social-structural variables (status asymmetries, status legitimacy and stability, and permeability of group boundaries), situational factors (ingroup-accountability), children's social-cognitive development (perspective-taking), and social experience.

In a nutshell, the MNSD proposes that conflicting intergroup norms are managed within higher status groups' intergroup normative repertoire in a way that allows group members to preserve their social standing, in an way that is optimally calibrated to existing intergroup structural conditions, even when changes in the social structure hold the potential to challenge the status quo. In devising this model within the territory of childhood, we hope to have helped to move the field a step closer to understanding how children learn to navigate the intricate web of social norms that regulate intergroup relations, and how complex social normative pressures might contribute to the pervasiveness and insidious reification of social inequalities and intergroup bias in contemporary societies.

dedicate Martin Luther King' (1963) quote: "Law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice … when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress."

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