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

TAIWAN'S IMPACT ON CHINA

WHY SOFT POWER MATTERS MORE THAN ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL INPUTS

Edited by Steve Tsang

The Nottingham China Policy Institute Series

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Steve Tsang
Editor

Taiwan's Impact on China

Why Soft Power Matters More than Economic or Political Inputs

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To Samuel Yin

Preface and Acknowledgements

There is a basic factor that distinguishes the relationship between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) from relationships they maintain with their other neighbors. It is the presence of an existential threat to Taiwan in this relationship. From the perspective of Beijing it poses no threat to Taiwan; its policy is driven by a determination to bring Taiwan into the fold of Mother China, preferably without the use of force. Beijing sees this in terms of national reunification and a historic mission, and therefore one that it would use force to accomplish should Taiwan not respond appropriately. From Taipei's perspective, this Chinese commitment and expectation means that it is a matter of survival for Taiwan as a political entity.

The second largest economy and a leading military power in the world, the PRC generally holds the initiative in its hands in this bilateral relationship. Inherent in this relationship is an asymmetry in power and influence, with the PRC enjoying a clear advantage. While the PRC does make the most of its lead to exert a strong influence on Taiwan, not least by imposing clear limits on what Taiwan and its people can do about their future, this does not imply Taiwan cannot also have a significant impact on some aspects of policy in the PRC.

The project that leads to the publication of this book was conceived to assess critically the kind of impact Taiwan can and does have on the PRC, and whether Taiwan can in any real sense be a model for the latter. For the purpose of this exercise, "impact" is defined broadly as a measure

of the kind of influence, whether deliberately projected through a government policy or emanates from its attractiveness, that Taiwan in fact exercises on the PRC.

When I first pondered this question my starting point was to probe how Taiwan's democratic transition could influence the PRC. Taiwan's successful and impressive transition from Leninist-style authoritarianism to democracy took place within one generation. If Taiwan is seen as an integral part of China, as claimed by the PRC government, its democratization should challenge, if not invalidate Samuel Huntington's thesis that people from the Chinese or Confucian civilizational tradition cannot make democracy work and flourish. Much as this is a conceptually attractive argument—and one which I have made elsewhere—the reality remains that the PRC under the Chinese Communist Party completely rejects Taiwanese democracy as a model. As the PRC becomes richer and more powerful following the success of the post-Mao reforms, it is getting more confident about its own consultative Leninist developmental approach. There is a limit to what impact Taiwan can have on the PRC in the political arena.

Taiwan delivers greater influence on the PRC in terms of economic development and modernization than in terms of politics. From the 1990s onward, Taiwan has contributed hugely to the success of the post-Mao reforms. It did so by exporting talents and management know-how to the Mainland, and by linking the PRC industrial base to the global value chain through the international network Taiwanese businesses had built up painstakingly in the post-war decades. As I explored and reflected on this further, I realized that Taiwan exerted even stronger influence on the PRC through the spread of its popular culture, music, ideas, and practices in everyday life. These are subjects which I, primarily a political scientist, do not have the competence to examine and answer properly.

In order to understand the true nature and scale of the impact Taiwan does (and does not) have on the PRC, I sought expert help from scholars and colleagues from across the world whose respective expertise enable this project to address the crucial issues with the appropriate disciplinary depth and breadth. The design for this project thus underwent a metamorphosis. It now seeks to ascertain how Taiwan's impact on China can be assessed at the macro, meso, and micro levels across the political, economic, and cultural spectrum, though I make no claim that this comprehensively addresses all the areas where Taiwan exerts influence on the PRC. This is reflected in the

finished product. The first two chapters, by myself and Anne-Marie Brady, address how politics affects and limits the scope for Taiwan to set itself up as a political model, at the macro level. This is complemented by two meso-level studies on how Chinese intellectuals as a whole (by Gang Lin) and on how Chinese academics who have visited Taiwan (by Chih-jou Chou) see the lessons that they should draw from Taiwan. In a contribution considering the economic impact that Taiwan has on Mainland China, Shelley Rigger and Gunter Schubert take a macro approach in providing an overall assessment of Taiwan's contribution to the PRC's economic and trade modernization. This is reinforced by Chun-yi Lee's case study on the electronics industry, at the meso level.

What is really striking about the findings of this project is the extent and scale of so-called "soft power" that Taiwan actually enjoys in the PRC. In tackling this subject the multi-level approach yields even greater value in that the individual conclusions complement one another. The parallel micro-level studies into the popular literature and popular music by Michelle Yeh and Pei-yin Lin, respectively, dovetail well with the macro-level study, by Yunxiang Yan, of how Taiwanese civility captivated the people of Mainland China. The limitation of Taiwan's cultural influence on the Chinese Mainland is, however, revealed in André Laliberté's meso-level study into how religion and religion-supported nongovernmental organizations face major restrictions from the Chinese government. In principle, the flourishing Buddhist revival in Taiwan should give it scope to make the greatest impact on a society that suffered from the existence of a belief void, brought about by the Cultural Revolution. But Laliberté's chapter demonstrates that the opposite is true, and underlines the limitations for Taiwan's religious influence on the PRC.

What this book shows is that Taiwan makes its greatest impact on Mainland China through its soft power, as the very attractiveness of its way of life leaves marks on Chinese citizens who come to know it, though not if it should reach into an area that the Communist Party considers a threat to its claim to legitimacy. This success is the result of an organic process, rather than the result of a clear Taiwan policy to influence the Mainland or, indeed, a deliberate programme to project soft power. While Taiwan stands tall as a political model that should inspire the PRC, functions effectively in helping the Chinese economy modernize and integrate into the global value chain, it is through the

very attractiveness of its civility and popular culture that Taiwan leaves the greatest marks on Mainland China.

*** *** ***

The breadth of coverage of this book makes it essential that it should be a collaborative work. I certainly cannot, and I do not know any scholar who has both the depth and breadth of knowledge to address on one's own all the issues adequately in a single volume. It is indeed the product of a collaborative project sponsored by the Taiwan Studies Programme of the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham. Without the support of the Programme, it would never have been completed.

In preparation for this publication, most of the contributors gathered in Nottingham to share, discuss, and debate our research findings. My fellow authors and I are much indebted to those colleagues who contributed their critical comments on our preliminary findings at the Nottingham conference, which proved invaluable and persuaded us to test further or even amend our hypothesis. They are: Melissa Brown, Julie Yu-wen Chen, Cong Cao, Andreas Fulda, Dafydd Fell, Mark Harrison, Don Keyser, Ping Lin, Alexander Naqvi, Gary Rawnsley, Ming-yeh Rawnsley, Chih-yu Shih, Jonathan Sullivan, Jeremy Taylor, Chen-yuan Tung, and Rod Wye. I am also grateful to Mandy Felton and the incredibly able and reliable team of administrators at the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies who ensured this project and the conference worked like clockwork. This process of intellectual exchanges and debates continued after the Nottingham conference as we move forward to prepare for publication, one that has taken over two years.

As the editor of this volume I am grateful to my colleagues for the good humor, cooperative spirit, and forbearance they showed when asked to meet one deadline after another while fulfilling their many obligations in the academic world, as well as demands on their time in private life. They are not named here as you already know who they are. Without their understanding and cooperation, this volume would have no doubt taken much longer to see the light of day.

Steve Tsang
Spring 2016

Contents

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACMRC	All China Marketing Research Co.
ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
BAROC	Buddhist Association of the Republic of China
CASS	The Chinese Academy of Social Science
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCTV	Chinese Central Television
CD	Christian Daily
CDB	China Development Brief
CDF	Chinese Development Fund
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
ECFA	Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
FIE	Foreign-Invested Enterprise
FLA	Fair Labour Association
GVC	Global Value Chain
HSP	Hsinchu Science Park
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IT	Information Technology
ITF	International Taoist Forum
KMT	Kuomintang
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
MAC	Mainland Affairs Council
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization

NTU	National Taiwan University
NZ	New Zealand
ODM	Original Design Manufacturer
OEM	Original Equipment Manufacturer
OT	Ordinary Trade
PC	Personal Computers
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
R&D	Research and Development
ROC	Republic of China
SAPPRFT	State Administration of Press, Publicity, Radio, Film, and Television
SARA	State Administration of Religious Affairs
SEF	Strait Exchange Foundation
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
TSROC	Taoist Society of the Republic of China
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Culture Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

List of Tables

1

The Importance of Taiwan to China

Steve Tsang

Taiwan is of great importance to China. According to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) Taiwan is a "sacred territory" of China.[1] Its future or, from Beijing's perspective, its anticipated reincorporation into China or not is a matter that can affect the capacity of the Chinese Communist Party of China (CCP) to retain legitimacy in China. With nationalism on the rise and the CCP seeing its legitimacy as based on the promotion of a "unified view of China and the world: One China, One Truth, One World, One Dream,"[2] the Party cannot afford to let Taiwan have a future separate from its own. Taiwan will, therefore, remain a core national interest of the PRC as long as the CCP retains its monopoly of power.

[1] The National People's Congress of PRC, *Constitution of PRC*.
[2] Callahan, *China: The Pessoptimist Nation*, 33.

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In strategic terms, as a territory over which China claims sovereignty Taiwan is a crucial link in the PRC's maritime strategy centered on the first island chain, a description that "refers to the first major archipelagos off the East Asian continental mainland, including the Japanese archipelago, Ryukyu Islands, China's Taiwan and the northern Philippines."[3] In Chinese hands, Taiwan can serve, as General Douglas MacArthur astutely observed at a time when US–PRC relations were very tense and war a real possibility, as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate defensive or counteroffensive operations by … forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines."[4] From the perspective of Beijing, "securing the first island chain is to secure PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy] survival through enlarged maritime defense depth."[5] With the Chinese Navy now in a position to try to transform the first island chain strategic concept into a reality for forward defense, securing Taiwan under PRC jurisdiction has become more relevant and valuable.[6]

Above all, however, to the CCP, the re-establishment of China's "rightful place" in the world requires what China would view as a satisfactory resolution of "the Taiwan question." The fulfilment of the "China dream" that President Xi Jinping talks about implies a need to get Taiwan on board with what he has in mind for China. By defining Taiwan as the most basic element of its core national interests, the PRC government will not compromise over its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan and will ultimately use force to secure its unification with the Mainland if required.[7]

Much as the official Chinese government position already acknowledges the central importance of Taiwan in its strategic thinking, the assessment of Taiwan's importance to China on geostrategic and political grounds cannot but underestimate the wider significance of Taiwan. The real value of Taiwan to China goes well beyond the bold rhetoric

[3] Li, "First island chain."

[4] MacArthur to C.A. Lewis, *Cold War's Odd Couple*, 16.

[5] You, *China's Military Transformation*, 184.

[6] For a detailed analysis of the geostrategic importance of Taiwan to the PRC, see Wachman, *Why Taiwan*, 118–52.

[7] Wang, "China's Search Grand Strategy," 68, 71.

Beijing uses on a regular basis. Saying so does not imply that the officially acknowledged importance of Taiwan is any less real or relevant. Taiwan's importance to China also goes beyond the economic and other practical contributions it has made to China's post-Mao reforms or modernization. What Chinese rhetoric overlooks are the dimensions that policymakers and policy advisers in the PRC prefer not to see or acknowledge. Highlighting the wider importance of Taiwan to China also does not imply that either I, or the other contributors to this volume, takes a position on Taiwan's relationship with Mainland China in terms of its legal status. Whatever the future may hold for Taiwan—be it as an independent country or as a part of the PRC—it does not negate its importance and value to China in the present time. Indeed, a territory (or country) can be of great importance to a big neighbor whether the two constitute one country or not.

The existence of Taiwan as a vibrant democracy where culture, religion, and the individual human spirit flourish shows that the consultative Leninist system Xi Jinping has reaffirmed for the PRC is not the only political system that works for the Chinese people.[8] The existence of a viable alternative model may be loathed by the CCP, which has no wish to see any challenge at all to its claim to legitimacy. But it is a matter of great importance to the people of China.

Under the CCP, even in the period after the end of the near-totalitarian rule of Mao Zedong, the scope and direction of political development in China has been put inside a straitjacket. This is the consultative Leninist political system which is fundamentally anti-democratic, even as it pursues and deepens reform. The CCP continues to monopolize the right to define "Chineseness," meaning that what is deemed Chinese is not whether it is in line with China's civilizational heritage but whether it serves the Party's purposes.[9] People growing up in China are brought up to embrace this definition of 'Chineseness'—so much so that few Chinese citizens ever wonder why Marxism or Leninism should be deemed Chinese.

[8] For the reaffirmation of the consultative Leninist nature of the Chinese regime under Xi, see Tsang, "Consolidating political governance strength," page 17–40.

[9] For the original exposition of the consultative Leninist nature of the post-Mao political system in the PRC, see Tsang, "Consultative Leninism," 865–80.

The nationalism the PRC government instils in its citizens includes the idea that the Chinese tradition is not compatible with "the Western idea of democracy."[10] This is by now a well-entrenched view in China (see Brady's Chap. 2).[11] It is possible to challenge it on intellectual grounds, but such challenges are ineffectual in either political or social terms. This idea is so widely and emotionally embraced that rejecting it requires getting most Chinese citizens to question basic information about their country, history and themselves that they have learned since childhood. Critical and independent scholars or well-educated and reflective individuals are able to do that. The average citizen of China or, for that matter, of any country cannot reasonably be expected to engage in intellectual discourses on why what they have always taken for granted about themselves and their country might be highly problematic.

The existence of Taiwan as a medium-sized power constituted overwhelmingly by people of Chinese heritage, and as a democracy, however, presents a concrete illustration that a quintessential Chinese community can modernize successfully without adopting the consultative Leninist or Maoist model. Democratic Taiwan is real and it is increasingly accessible to PRC citizens.

However Taiwanese citizens may feel about their collective identity, to visitors from Mainland China or, indeed, to nearly all citizens of the PRC, Taiwan is Chinese. As has been pointed out by Zhang Baoshu, a public intellectual based at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, "Taiwan's peaceful democratisation … demonstrates that notwithstanding 2000 years of authoritarian culture our country can … look to a future of democracy and modernisation."[12] Taiwan is a reality that Chinese citizens can see with their own eyes, make comparison with their homeland in their own mind, and reflect upon in private. The rising interaction between people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, particularly through the increase in the number of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan, has made the existence of democratic Taiwan much more relevant, at least potentially.[13]

[10] Li, "Confucian Value Democratic Value," 186–9.

[11] Han, "Sheishi zuida minzhu guojia."

[12] Zhang, *Gaige kexingxing baogao*, 209.

[13] Mishkin, "Chinese Tourists."

The fact that many Chinese tourists to Taiwan find watching Taiwanese elections or current affairs programmes on Taiwanese television in their hotel rooms an interesting and rewarding experience should be of the greatest value not to Taiwan's tourist marketing board but to social scientists seeking to understand the importance and relevance of Taiwan to China.[14] The vibrant, free, and, above all, irreverent political debates on Taiwanese television and the wider media, and the readiness of Taiwan's citizens and journalists to hold their senior government officials or political figures to account is something that Chinese visitors to Taiwan find either refreshing and intriguing or baffling. It is an experience that they cannot have at home.[15] What they witness in Taiwan is not happening in America or Europe and cannot be dismissed, therefore, as foreign or Western and irrelevant. It is an experience they gain in the "sacred" Chinese territory of Taiwan, delivered by people or political actors they call compatriots. It goes against what they are allowed to be told about Taiwan in the government controlled media, but they know what they have seen are real.

The contrast in the nature of political interactions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait may be obvious. But the differences go much further and they make the existence of Taiwan and its way of life even more valuable to the people of China. A democracy the government of Taiwan cannot simply define or proclaim what is Chinese or, for that matter, Taiwanese and what is not. A government in Taipei that ignores the prevalent public view on an emotionally charged matter such as national identity cannot expect to be re-elected. Unlike the CCP in the PRC, the elected government or the governing party in Taipei does not monopolize either the truth or history.[16] By maintaining a political framework and space in which Chinese civilization can develop without the constraints imposed by the CCP, Taiwan showcases how China's civilizational heritage can flourish, modernize, adapt, and develop as individuals, artists, writers, religious leaders, and others see fit.

[14] BBC, "Taiwan."

[15] MacKinnon, "Beijing Limits Democracy Tourists."

[16] Tsoi, "New History Curriculum."

Whether the culture and way of life in Taiwan should be seen as Taiwanese or Chinese is ultimately a political question rather than a strictly intellectual one. For Chinese citizens who have a chance to visit Taiwan and dabble, however superficially, in its way of life for a short time they will compare it with that they enjoy on the Mainland. Those who only pay attention to the quality of physical infrastructure will find Taiwan inferior to first-tier Chinese cities like Beijing or Shanghai but those who focus on the quality of life will find Taiwan inspirational, while those interested in both may find Taiwan simultaneously both inferior and inspirational. But what the overwhelming majority of Chinese visitors appreciate the most is, however, not Taiwan's democratic politics. As Chih-jou Jay Chen's case study of visiting Chinese scholars in Chap. 4 shows, it is the social interactions among people in Taiwan that have the greatest inspiration of their imagination.

However individual Chinese visitors feel about Taiwan the existence of a different way of life in Taiwan makes a fascinating contrast to the situation across the Taiwan Strait. It presents an alternative reality for the more thoughtful and critical-minded people of China to see that their civilizational heritage is compatible with democracy, human rights, liberty, and a way of life that does not embrace the dominance of the CCP. Above all, as Chen explains, it is the nature of the social relationship in Taiwan seen by Chinese visitors that has the greatest impact on them. In this sense, Taiwan's significance to China goes well beyond the Chinese government's formal acknowledgement of Taiwan's significance in China's geostrategic and political calculations.

Chinese Perspectives

The extent of the impact that Taiwan can have on the PRC, particularly in presenting an alternative model to the consultative Leninist system and thereby posing a challenge to the CCP's basis for legitimacy in China, is well understood by the CCP. As Anne-Marie Brady examines and explains in Chap. 2, the Chinese government (or, rather, the CCP) fully recognizes this potential challenge and is determined to preempt it from materializing. With this in mind it has set up a highly

elaborated bureaucratic structure, supported by research institutions, to manage not only its policy toward Taiwan but also the presentation of the general image of Taiwan, as well as institutions and political figures in Taiwan. Indeed, they lay down very strict rules on how Taiwan should be "framed" in narrative in government documents, the media, academic publications, and school textbooks.

This is not new, as the continued existence of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan after CCP won power and proclaimed the PRC on Mainland China posed a basic challenge to the legitimacy of the PRC.[17] The PRC's assertion that it is the successor state to the ROC did not gain universal acceptance for a long time, as the ROC has continued to exist. Indeed, the PRC did not manage to take over China's seats at the United Nations until 1971, more than two decades after it gained control of the Chinese Mainland in 1949. The subsequent rise of the PRC and the ROC government's quiet abandonment of its claim to be the sole legitimate government of all China could and should have lessened this challenge. But this did not happen in a linear way.

Democratization in Taiwan or the ROC has posed a different kind of challenge to the CCP. It has given the government in Taipei a modern source of popular legitimacy and established it as an alternative model of development for people of Chinese ancestry. For all its resilience and capacity to persuade the world to acknowledge that it is the sole legitimate government of China, the consultative Leninist system in the PRC is obsessed with pre-empting social movements that can pose a challenge to its legitimacy and monopoly of power.[18] This explains the need for the CCP to sustain, if not tighten, how institutions and individuals should be allowed to describe cross-Strait relations or even government offices and institutions in Taiwan. It is an approach that was clearly reaffirmed during the momentous meeting between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou as leaders of China and of Taiwan, respectively, in Singapore in November 2015. While the rest of the world saw media reports showing Ma and Xi meeting apparently as equals with their public statements available to them, PRC citizens saw a different story. On the Mainland, they watched

[17] Tsang, *Cold War's Odd Couple*, 83–110.

[18] Tsang, "Contextualizing China Dream," 14.

the statement Xi made in full but not that of Ma, and the news reporting implicitly put Xi as the leader of China and Ma as the leader of Taiwan province, even though their official titles were not used. In her chapter Brady produces in full an important document that illustrates the excruciating details to which the PRC government goes in ensuring how Taiwan is allowed to be seen and understood in China. This reflects not only the nature of the Leninist regime but also its awareness of the scope that Taiwan can impact upon China.

While how the Chinese government or the CCP frames Taiwan undoubtedly imposes powerful constraints and guidelines on how Chinese citizens should understand Taiwan and the developments occurring there, post-Mao China is not totalitarian and different perspectives do exist. In Chap. 3, Gang Lin shows the diversity of views among Mainland scholars on what aspects of Taiwan's general development and democratic experiences have been seen as valuable for Mainland China. In general terms and as far as different specific aspects of development are concerned, Mainland scholars have been keen to learn the lessons that Taiwan has accumulated, particularly if it is related to Taiwan's "economic miracle." The sophistication of their understanding has also improved with time. But this should not be seen as implying Taiwan as a whole being deemed a model for the PRC to imitate. Hardly any Mainland scholar takes such a view—at least not in public.

As Lin explains, when it comes to what lessons Mainland scholars like to draw from Taiwan, they are affected by the applicability of specific Taiwanese experience. There is, however, no general agreement on what particular Taiwan experiences should be deemed appropriate and valuable—drawing lessons to learn is often a subjective process. They are influenced by the personal experience and background of the Mainland scholars concerned, and how they understand what are politically off-limits. They also impinge on how the Taiwanese project their experience as relevant or valuable to Mainland China. In respect of the sensitive subject of democratic experience, for example, the overwhelming majority of Mainland scholars are likely to respond more positively if democratization in Taiwan is presented as how it can improve governance by increasing accountability. In contrast, presenting democratization as a matter of

Taiwanese exercising the right to self-determination is likely to provoke a negative response from most Mainland scholars.

The most important element of the "Taiwan miracle" is increasingly being seen by Western scholars in terms of the peaceful and impressive democratization process.[19] But most Chinese scholars prefer to ignore this and see the rapid transformation of Taiwan's economy from that of a war-torn agrarian one to an industrial and post-industrial one as the real "Taiwan miracle."

While sophisticated or senior scholars ponder what lessons they should draw from Taiwan, the overwhelming majority of Chinese visitors to Taiwan, including students who study in Taiwan's universities, do not approach it in the same way. In Chap. 4, Chih-jou Chen has used data collected from quantitative and qualitative surveys of Chinese visitors to show that what impressed them the most was not Taiwan's economic or political miracle.

It is the everyday relationship among strangers whom they have encountered or witnessed that resonate among Mainland visitors. Responses to his open-ended survey illustrate powerfully how individuals from China have been moved by the chance encounters they have had with Taiwanese or the orderliness, consideration, kindness, and open-mindedness that Taiwanese show to each other and to them as visitors. Many are also touched by how Chinese cultural heritage has been better preserved in Taiwan than on the Chinese Mainland. They are moved not because the Taiwanese are effective in seeking to convert them to support Taiwan. They are moved because they see the Taiwanese as compatriots and they would like to enjoy back home what they have witnessed in Taiwan and yet know are not available on the Mainland. Some of them invariably wonder why they cannot enjoy the same on the Chinese Mainland? More than any political or economic model, the experience on the ground in Taiwan is potentially a powerful force to show to the citizens of the PRC that a viable and desirable alternative to the consultative Leninist system can enable them to enjoy a genuine harmonious society, rather than living in one where they wait to be "harmonized."

[19] Tsang, "Forces Behind Taiwan," 1.

Economic Value

With the Chinese economy now the second largest in the world and its rapid rise, particularly in the last decade, captivating the world it is easy to overlook the role that Taiwan has played in helping China to rise economically. In Chap. 5, Shelley Rigger and Gunter Schubert re-examine how Taiwanese investors (*Taishang*) and managers (*Taigan*) played a leading role in helping to modernize the underdeveloped and insular economy of China in the Deng Xiaoping era, and bring it into the global value chain.

This constituted a major contribution to China's economic modernization and rise that Taiwan shared with Hong Kong. As Rigger and Schubert explain, what the Taiwanese did was essentially to transfer manufacturing from Taiwan to the Mainland. As they did so, Taiwanese industrialists added China to the global value chain that they had spent decades building up, something which Mainland manufacturers were generally unable to do on their own in the 1990s. For top-tier global companies such as Apple, for which quality assurance and timely delivery are as important, if not more important, than costs, manufacturing its products in China could happen principally because trusty Taiwanese companies took responsibility. Apple could, for example, rely on Foxconn to deliver the quality products it specified and largely left it to Foxconn to manage the manufacturing process on the Mainland. However, as examined by Chun-yi Lee in Chap. 6, a company like Apple is far too concerned with its reputation to leave matters fully in the hands of even a trusty partner like Foxconn, let alone lesser known Mainland manufacturers, once the factory conditions in China attracted negative international headlines.

What Lee has demonstrated in the case study of the electronics industry confirms, on the one hand, that Taiwanese investment played a key role in bringing Mainland China into the global value chain in the first instance. She also shows, on the other hand, that the Mainland Chinese seized the opportunity and learned the ropes quickly. In fact, the Chinese learned so quickly that it took them not much more than a decade to reduce significantly their dependence on their Taiwanese partners to stay part of the global value chain. Notwithstanding the limits Lee has

highlighted in Taiwanese industry's capacity to keep their Mainland partners in a lower part of the global value chain, their contribution in helping the Mainland Chinese economy to integrate into the global value chain in the first instance remains hugely significant. It taught or assisted the Mainland Chinese how to upgrade the economy quickly. This is a development that is no less important than Taiwan being one of the original models for China to develop special economic zones when Deng Xiaoping first launched the reforms in the early 1980s.

What Rigger and Schubert have also highlighted, in Chap. 5, is how the transformation of the Taiwanese communities on the Mainland, which number between one to two million, into what they call "linkage communities" have further affected their investment strategies on the Mainland. With so much of their investment and business future being tied to the Mainland, to which they do not feel a strong sense of emotional commitment, they have largely kept to themselves rather than seeking to integrate into the wider communities in China. This has the effect of somewhat limiting the impact they have on China, but it has also made their presence on the Mainland more sustainable. If the Taiwanese communities on the Mainland had sought to shape social and political developments there after the Taiwan model, they would have caused concern in, and triggered responses from, China's consultative Leninist government. Thus, the transformation of individual Taiwanese investors into well-focused and significant linkage communities have focused them on developing their businesses and, thereby, contributed to the rise of China as a manufacturing powerhouse in the global value chain.

Shaping a Way of Life

If Taiwan's political changes can be inspirational and its economic contributions invaluable to the transformation of China's economy, social and cultural developments in Taiwan have an arguably even greater impact on how the Mainland Chinese choose to live their life in the post-Mao era. How they do so on Mainland China today have become almost unrecognizable to how they did so before the 1980s. The world of "the blue

ants" is now a historical memory.[20] The CCP may still exercise control over many aspects of life in China, but ordinary Chinese no longer live in a regimented world, where human emotions had to be suppressed as a matter of routine to avoid getting into trouble, and knowledge of the West or, for that matter, of China's old civilization is largely beyond the reach of nearly all.[21]

When China moved into the reform period at the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s, Taiwanese popular culture began to be tolerated on the Mainland. Their dissemination was haphazard at first as a result of censorship but they were distributed, first somewhat surreptitiously and then openly, and were welcomed and embraced. As the Mainland Chinese do, they found solace in meeting long-repressed yearnings, and started to see a silhouette of an alternative and appealing way of life, through the songs, novels, and poems of some of the best Taiwanese artists.

By focusing on the cases of two prominent Taiwanese writers, Qiong Yao and Xi Murong, Michelle Yeh explores and explains in Chap. 7 how and why they captivated Mainland Chinese so easily in the 1980s. The Chinese embraced them as their novels and poems blended Western modernization with the powerful emotion of love and the beauty of the Chinese heritage, all of which were denied to them in the Maoist era. The ease and stylish way these Taiwanese writers expressed themselves in beautiful Chinese prose that allow love and modernity to come together made their writings much more accessible than the translation of any great work originally published in a Western language. Their writings pointed to a brave new modern and Westernized world while comfortably reminding readers that it blends in well with the genteel and beautiful tradition of the Chinese civilization. They are appealing to Mainland Chinese who were just beginning to emerge from the highly regimented and brutish world of the Cultural Revolution and the anti-Confucian campaign. They provided a glimpse of what a China that is modernized and unregimented and comfortable with its heritage could be like.

That this alternative vision of a modern China existed in Taiwan was not something that the writers stressed. Indeed, it was by not paying

[20] The term was used in the Maoist era. Guillain, *The Blue Ants.*

[21] Tsang, "Consultative Leninism," 86580.

attention to Taiwan's separate existence from the Mainland or their ideological difference that they made their writings readily accepted and loved by mainland readers, and tolerated by the CCP.

What Yeh has found with the influence of Taiwanese writers apply even more powerfully to singer Deng Lijun or Teresa Teng (1953–1995), the focus of Pei-yin Lin in Chap. 8. Deng has an even stronger hold on the Chinese than Qiong Yao or Xi Murong. Even though Deng had a close affiliation to the cause of the Republic of China that the Kuomintang advocated on Taiwan, and often gave morale-boosting performances in Taiwan's garrison compounds, she downplayed politics in performances aimed at Mainland Chinese and projected herself as a modern Chinese performing artist. Her appeal did not subside and fade away significantly, even as Mainland China successfully modernized itself in the post-Deng Xiaoping decades.

Deng remains highly popular today despite the fact that indigenous artists such as Wang Fei or Faye Wong, who were deeply inspired by her, established their own style and gained widespread popularity. Indeed, Deng did not just inspire and bring about popular music to the Chinese Mainland. Through her songs, which focus on love in a free society and the expression of individual emotion, she took her listeners to a world different from the one in which they lived. In the heyday of the Deng Xiaoping reforms, Deng Lijun, known endearingly as "young Deng," ruled at night as her songs captivated the heart of the general public on the Mainland, even though "old Deng" ruled in the day as his reforms appealed to the head, and reaffirmed the Party's leadership.

As Lin explains in Chap. 8 Deng's songs and the Chinese elements in the lyrics also "made her a natural cultural agent" to bridge the pre-PRC popular music (banned in the Maoist period) to that of the new era, where there is, simultaneously, a nostalgia for traditional Chinese culture and a yearning for modernity. Fans of Deng find them in harmony in her songs and in her style of performance. She was as comfortable projecting romance in modernity as she was in providing a new rendition of traditional China's high culture such as Song Dynasty (960–1279) poems in her songs—something that is clearly lacking in the revolutionary or red songs of the PRC. Deng continues to appeal despite having passed away two decades ago as her songs strike a chord with her Mainland listeners.

It will be a gross exaggeration to claim the import of Taiwanese popular culture shaped the new way of life in reformist China. At the end of the Maoist era, the people of the Mainland was desperate to get out of the grey, rigid, anti-West, anti-Confucian and brutish environment, and would have changed anyway. But the accessibility of Taiwanese popular culture, in parallel and complementary to that from Hong Kong, gave tremendous satisfaction to them and painted a world to which they aspired. As Taiwan was less Westernized than Hong Kong and used Mandarin as the lingua franca, its popular culture found a more receptive audience on the Mainland as a whole. As post-Mao China transformed in the following decades, the Mainland Chinese made use of the inspirations they gained from Taiwanese popular culture to develop their own. But the impact Taiwanese popular culture has had on China reaches further by providing an inspirational vision of what a free and modern China comfortable with its heritage can look like to Mainland Chinese searching for their own way in the post-totalitarian era.

The strong influence Taiwanese popular culture has on the Mainland suggests that the same should also apply to Taiwan's experience with religious development and, say, the flourishing Buddhist community of Taiwan should find ready following on the Mainland. This is a reasonable premise since China faces a belief void or "ideological vacuum."[22] Communism was badly discredited by the excesses of the Maoist era. It then collapsed as the state ideology following the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 and the subsequent implosion of Communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. But this is not the case. In the post-Mao era, the PRC may have transformed itself from a near-totalitarian Marxist–Leninist party-state to a much softer consultative Leninist regime, but it still sees religion as "the opium of the people."[23] To the CCP, religion is not like popular culture, where it is possible to adopt a carefully calibrated relaxation to enable individuals to have more personal space to enjoy themselves.

[22] Chan, "Falun Gong in China," 666.

[23] The term was used by Karl Marx, in his "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" (1844).

Religion is a matter that the CPP treats as of great importance to its continued hold to power—the *raison d'état* of the consultative Leninist system. Consequently, to the government of the PRC religion is something much too important to be left to religious leaders or the general public. By studying how religious groups have evolved in Taiwan and how Taiwanese religious leaders and institutions, as well as religion-sponsored civil society organizations, engage with their opposite number on the Mainland in Chap. 9, André Laliberté has shown that the impact that religions in Taiwan can have on the Mainland is limited. This is not just because the CCP exercises tight control over religion. As Laliberté explains, while Mainland scholars on religion are often able to think for themselves and understand the exciting changes that have taken place in Taiwan, they are less than enthusiastic about borrowing from the Taiwanese experience. They see the political context in Taiwan as completely different from that in which they need to operate. When it comes to civil society activities sponsored by religion in Taiwan, their applicability on the Mainland is severely constrained by the narrow scope for civil society in China, particular after Xi Jinping assumed the top leadership position.

How important Taiwan is to China and how its people live should not be seen only in terms of what impact Taiwan has demonstrably made on the Mainland. The existence of Taiwan and its alternative approach to matters of everyday living, such as civility or public morality, can in fact be of great value to Mainland China even for those Mainland Chinese who choose to reject the Taiwan approach. The reality is that Mainland Chinese who have visited Taiwan, or who think they know Taiwan, mostly have a positive view of the way the Taiwanese live together as a community.

In an important sense, this reflects primarily a feeling of dissatisfaction that Mainland Chinese have about the prevailing lack of public morality or civility in their own society.[24] When they witness how Taiwan, which appears to have preserved the traditional Chinese culture better than they themselves have managed, functions with great civility, they cannot but reflect on the shortcomings of their own society. This is much more

[24] Global Times, "Good Samaritan's Dilemma"; Lu, "Unbearable Coldness of Being."

poignant for them than seeing the same when they visit other countries like the United States of America or European countries, since they cannot dismiss what they see in Taiwan as alien and therefore inapplicable to their own country. How this should be understood is the focus of Yunxiang Yan's inquiry in Chap. 10.

Yan highlights the importance of making a distinction between "civility" and "Taiwanese civility." This is not only because there are sufficiently distinctive features that make civility in Taiwan noticeably different from that in the United States but also because this distinction matters to Mainland Chinese. While the discomfort of many Mainland Chinese with the poor standard of public morality is real and they are envious of what they see in Western societies like the United States of America, they find the American or Western approach cold and dull, and thus unattractive. From the Chinese perspective, the American way lacks *renqingwei*, or the human touch, something they see as an integral part of the traditional Chinese culture. Yan shows that the Taiwanese version of civility, in contrast, combines public morality with *renqingwei* and thus has a much wider appeal to Mainland Chinese. It is a desirable product of the quest for a Chinese approach to modern public morality that started toward the end of the last imperial dynasty. This is a century-long quest that has culminated in the desired result being achieved not on the Mainland but on the island of Taiwan. It is something to which most of them relate and aspire.

In an important sense the Mainland Chinese use what they see or think they have found in Taiwan as a mirror to reflect the inadequacies of their own country and their aspirations for the future. As they do so, they draw different conclusions, with some seeing this primarily in terms of Taiwan holding truer to China's traditional culture, some deeming this a result of democratization, and some focusing on other factors. In any event a clear majority respond positively to Taiwan's experience and see it as an illustration of what China could and should have been like. But many also hold a strong negative feeling toward Taiwan politics, as they think the Taiwanese have been poisoned by pro-independence politicians and seek to use Taiwan's differences with the Mainland as a basis for supporting Taiwan's permanent separation from Taiwan. Yan's research confirms the more anecdotal findings in Chaps. 7 and 8, where Yeh and Lin

find the Chinese relate much better to Taiwanese popular culture if they are not associated with cross-Strait politics or any assertion of Taiwanese independence.

The existence of this negativity toward Taiwan's politics of identity does not diminish its importance to China. Taiwan matters to the Chinese people in different ways. Its significance can be because Taiwan is seen as an alternative model that China can follow, or because of the contributions Taiwan has made, or can make, in political, economic, society or popular cultural terms. It can also be because Taiwan functions as a mirror to some Chinese and allows them to reflect upon themselves. Those Chinese who reject the Taiwan experience because they think the Taiwanese have, in effect, been brainwashed by pro-independence activists are, ironically, those who have themselves been brainwashed the most effectively by the CCP. They will continue to reject the Taiwan experience as long as the PRC is doing well. But when the Chinese economy falters and the PRC system fails to deliver "a better tomorrow," will their disappointment and disillusionment with the system they love so passionately lead them to reflect more critically? If Taiwan can stimulate reflections and debates in China, it is of significance to China, whatever the formal political relationship may be between it and the Mainland.

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2

How "China" Frames "Taiwan"*

Anne-Marie Brady

Since 1949 the fact that there are two sovereign states both called "China" has presented both an ideological and a security threat to the governments in Beijing and Taipei. Throughout the Cold War both governments dealt with the ideological aspects to this threat through the use of strict information controls, psychological warfare,[1] and shrill global propaganda campaigns aimed at influencing international public opinion on the issue of one China.

The rapid democratization of the Republic of China (ROC) from the late 1980s led to a gradual dismantling of information controls in Taiwan's public sphere. By the early 2000s the ROC government had

[1] Rawnsley, "Taiwan's propaganda Cold War," 82–101; Rudolph, "Media Coverage on Taiwan."

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radically adjusted its global strategy on how to influence international public opinion on the ROC's sovereign status and international relations.[2] The ROC government clearly no longer regards the People's Republic of China (PRC) as an ideological threat—though the security threat remains. Today the focus of the ROC government's China-related propaganda is essentially on defending the ROC's existing territorial sovereignty over Taiwan and the offshore islands. During the Chen Shui-bian presidency (2000–2008), Taipei's key contemporary propaganda tropes were the promotion of Taiwan (not the ROC) as a de facto independent state with a separate history from the Chinese Mainland; and Taiwan as a democratic society; and the unique identity of the Taiwanese people. The Ma Ying-jeou presidency (2008–2016) has both stressed the continuous history of the ROC, from 1912 to the present day and also the de facto independence of Taiwan. These tropes are inherently undermining to the legitimacy of the PRC, as well as Beijing's declared goal of its Taiwan propaganda: to "unify the ancestral land" (祖国统一).

Understandably, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government continues to perceive the ROC to be as much, if not more, of an ideological threat as it ever was when the ROC was a dictatorship under martial law from 1947 to 1987. Taiwanese democracy undermines the CCP's long-standing argument (going back to Mao Zedong's 1949 article on "The People's Democratic Dictatorship") that Western-style democracy does not suit China. Taiwan's democratization has spurred Beijing to step up its investment significantly in a vast range of measures aimed at filtering out the impact of the Taiwan political model on China. Yet it should be noted that, other than with regard to information control, the CCP does not attempt to impose the China Model on Taiwan. The CCP's Taiwan policy is akin to the Confucian saying 和而不同 (which can be translated in this context as "together but not the same"). Rather than making Taiwan the same politically as China, the CCP's Taiwan frames are intended to assist in reuniting Taiwan with the "ancestral land," molding global and domestic public opinion on Taiwan affairs (台湾事务)

[2] Lutgard, "Shifting roles of GIO," 243–64; Rawnsley, "Selling Taiwan," 1–25; Rawnsley, *Taiwan's Informal Diplomacy*; Rawnsley, "Selling Democracy," 1–9; Rawnsley, "Old Wine New Bottles," 1061–78; To, "Hand-in-hand," 174–5.

and the One China principle (一个中国原则), and placing limits on the ROC on Taiwan’s global political and commercial space.

This chapter utilizes framing theory as a tool to understand the CCP’s current information controls on Taiwan affairs and outlines Beijing’s Taiwan propaganda organizations’ institutional links within the CCP’s domestic and international propaganda systems.[3] The CCP’s Taiwan frames are in direct conflict with the evolving “Taiwanese identity” frames emerging from the ROC. Moreover they form part of a wider ideological project of the CCP government to frame global concepts of “Chineseness,” which is aimed at combating other ideological challenges to that trope such as the Falungong movement, activism around the issue of Tibetan independence, and Chinese democracy groups. Yet political, economic, and technological change in the PRC and globally may well be such that despite Beijing’s increased investment in Taiwan affairs and widespread promotion of its frames, in the long run it will be harder than ever to ensure that informational controls will have the desired effect.

China’s Taiwan Propaganda Organizations

The CCP values propaganda as an important tool of its domestic and foreign policy; and it is regarded by its proponents as both a science and an art form. Since the mid-1980s CCP “propaganda and thought work” (宣传与思想工作) has been modernized to incorporate approaches from social psychology, mass communications theory, marketing, political PR, and management.[4] The CCP-led propaganda system (宣教系统) links all government and private institutions, enterprises, and social organizations within the Chinese public sphere. It incorporates the network of propaganda cadres installed in party branches; the political department system of the People’s Liberation Army; the culture, education, sport, science, technology, health, and media sectors; and all public and private mass

[3] This chapter is part of a long-term project studying China’s modernised propaganda system. I have been conducting interviews and gathering data on this topic since 1998. My main findings to date are published in the monograph: Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*; edited collection: Brady, *China thought Management*.

[4] For more on this topic see Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*.

organizations.[5] At the pinnacle of the propaganda system the CCP Central Propaganda Department (中共中央宣传部)—partnering with relevant government agencies depending on the policy topic—establishes the boundaries of what can and cannot be said in the Chinese public sphere.

Many mass communication specialists, media professionals, and public intellectuals in China are increasingly critical of the CCP's efforts in the areas of propaganda and thought work. Yet in many ways, Taiwan-related propaganda and thought work is one of the success stories of the CCP government's attempts to mold domestic and foreign public opinion on certain issues.[6] The government's frames on the question of Taiwan are reproduced within the Chinese public sphere, including the traditional and non-traditional media, and they are also the norm at an international level. Efforts by the ROC to expand its international space or to assert its independence result in passionate outpourings on the Chinese internet. And unlike other aspects of contemporary CCP propaganda work—which is regarded as a "dark art" by most Chinese mass communication scholars, and tends to be shunned by them as a topic because it is either too politically sensitive or too distasteful—there is a considerable contemporary literature by Chinese mass communication scholars outlining various aspects of the CCP's Taiwan propaganda efforts and analysing how they can be improved.[7]

The CCP's Taiwan frames are set by the central Taiwan Affairs Office (国务院台湾事务办公室),[8] an agency within the State Council which coordinates with the CCP Central Propaganda Department and other relevant agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PLA to oversee China's Taiwan-related propaganda activities and agencies. Taiwan-related propaganda and thought work is an important task within the vast propaganda *xitong* (or machinery); it is seen as being so important that all party branches, regardless of their place in the Chinese

[5] Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, Chap. 2.

[6] For a discussion of another such "success story" see Brady and Yong, "Talking up the Market," 36–56.

[7] There are too many to list, but suffice to say a search on cnki.net in May 2013 revealed 1131 scholarly articles, 27 PhDs, 201 MAs, and 13 conference papers in Chinese Mainland sources on the topic of "Taiwan Propaganda."

[8] See Taiwan Affairs Office.

bureaucracy, have a Taiwan Affairs Office, just as they always have a Propaganda Section. The Taiwan Affairs Office guides (指导) a massive program of activities aimed at molding Mainland Chinese, Taiwanese, and international public opinion on the Taiwan issue, with the ultimate goal of ending the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War under the structure of "one country, two systems" (一国两制).[9] The Taiwan Affairs Office has limited powers, but its policy "guidance" is backed up by other state agencies with stronger powers, such as the State Administration of Press, Publicity, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT, 国家新闻出版广播电影电视总局) and the Ministry of Public Security. As the Chinese Mainland has expanded its relations with Taiwan in the last 15 years, so there has also been an expansion of China's Taiwan-related propaganda channels. The PRC has made a major investment in Mainland China-based television stations, websites, newspapers, and radio stations specifically targeting Taiwanese media consumers.[10] Xinhua News Service even has a dedicated Taiwan website, which notably, has a section promoting the guidelines on how to discuss Taiwan in the public sphere as outlined below.[11]

Chinese embassy officials around the world are tasked with mobilizing pro-PRC elements among the Overseas Chinese[12] and non-Chinese elites within each country such as parliamentarians[13]; at the same time as isolating and opposing those who promote Taiwanese independence and others the CCP regards as "anti-China" (反华).[14] In the last five years a Taiwanese company with strong PRC business interests, Want, has purchased radio and television stations, websites, and newspapers in Taiwan, all of which promote the CCP's perspective on Taiwan affairs in the Taiwanese media market, and frequently reprint Xinhua items verbatim, passing them off as independent reports. Want has made use of lawsuits to try and intimidate critics of its media dealings. In 2013 Want

[9] See CCP statements on this policy here: Taiwan Affairs Office, "One Country Two Systems."

[10] See for example Taiwan.cn, "Guanyu women."

[11] Xinhuanet.com.tw, "shetai xuanchuan yongyu."

[12] See, for example, Xinhua, "China's Society."

[13] For example, the NZ Parliament has a "Friendship Group" with the Chinese "parliament." See New Zealand Parliament, "Relationships with other parliaments."

[14] On China's management of the OC on Taiwan issues see To, "Hand-in-hand," 174–5.

Want's owner, Tsai Engmeng, and a consortium of Taiwanese business people with strong Mainland links, tried to take over Next Media, which controls Taiwan's most influential papers and magazines. The bid failed due to political controversy, but Tsai's group plan further media investments in Taiwan. In 2008 Mr. Tsai's company newsletter reported that he had met with the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office in Beijing and informed him that he planned to "use the power of the press to advance relations between China and Taiwan."[15] In contrast to the situation on the Chinese Mainland, Taiwan has one of the most open media markets in the world. Beijing's efforts to influence public opinion in Taiwan through its Taiwanese supporters has already had a noticeable effect on free speech in the public sphere on China-related issues such as the CCP government crackdown on the student protest movement in June 1989.[16]

All of the above agents of CCP influence follow a clear set of guidelines on how to guide public discourse on the Taiwan issue. In the following section I will explore the CCP's contemporary 'Taiwan' frames.

China's Current Taiwan Frames

In recent years the theory of "frames" and "framing" (框架; 框架理论) has emerged as a central concept in Chinese-language mass communications theory; it clearly has a strong resonance with many PRC-based scholars as an analytical approach for understanding China's political communication.[17] Only a couple of scholars outside China have used framing theory to analyse communication in China.[18] Framing theory enables us to decode the process involved when political and commercial actors attempt to shape how individuals understand issues and events. Frames help to simplify and condense the world by encoding it with

[15] Tacon, "Power Snacking."

[16] To, "Hand-in-Hand," 174–5.

[17] See the summary of Chinese language use of "framing theory" in recent years in Shao, "Meijie kuangjialun."

[18] Bondes and Heep, "Official Framing and Ideology"; Brady, "Mass Persuasion," 434–57; Thornton, "Framing Dissent," 661–81; Han, "Mainland China Frames Taiwan," 40–57.

meaning.[19] When political or commercial actors stereotype topics in a negative or positive way it can have a dramatic impact on an individual's subsequent choice of action; this is what sociologists have called a "framing effect."[20] Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson assert that frames provide "psychological weight" to contentious issues in the public and private domain[21]; weight that has a discernable effect in public opinion.

One of the main means by which the CCP sets "frames" in the Chinese and global public sphere is through guiding what can and what cannot be said in public (censorship) and also through setting correct political terminology to refer to contentious matters (in Chinese the "*tifa*" 提法 and also "*yongyu*" 用语). Perhaps more than any other topic in China, it is extremely important to use the correct frame when talking about Taiwan. In the pre-Internet, pre-social media era, information on China's Taiwan frames could only be found in classified publications aimed at senior- to mid-level foreign affairs officials, propaganda cadres, and media professionals.[22]

However, since 2002, signifying a major policy shift, a detailed policy document outlining the regulations on Taiwan *tifa/yongfa* has been widely circulated on the Chinese Internet. The 2002 regulations update similar guidelines set in 1996 that had previously only been available to mid to senior-level editors, foreign affairs workers and other officials—the gatekeepers of the public sphere in contemporary China. This new approach was aimed at making the guidelines easily available to Chinese Netizens—as of 2012 there were 564 million PRC citizens online[23] or nearly a third of the population.

The Internet and social media make it possible for every citizen to be a contributor to the public sphere. Some blogs and micro blog feeds in China have as many as 15 million readers, greater than many newspaper

[19] Snow and Benford, "Master Frames," 137.

[20] Nelson, Oxley and Clawson, "Psychology of Framing Effects," 236.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Shandong sheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo ban gong shi, *Shandong sheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huibian ziliao 1992–1998*, 1047–52; *Neibu tongxin*, 6–7; *Neibu tongxin*, 11; Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu zhengce fagui yanjiushi, *Xuanchuan wenhua fagui huibian*, 77–8.

[23] China Internet Watch, "China Internet Statistics Whitepaper."

readerships.[24] The change of tactics is an official acknowledgement of the power of new media to subvert the CCP's propaganda tropes and to operate outside of the party's traditional means of control over mainstream media. Since 2002 all new media in China such as micro blogs and texts has been required to follow propaganda guidelines as they are regarded as tools of mass communication.[25]

The new approach also represents a tacit acknowledgement of the shift in governance that has been underway in China since the crisis of 1989. In 1991, an internal CCP publication proposed that the CCP should drop references to revolution conferring it the right to rule and reconceptualize itself as a "party in power." This radical new suggestion gained widespread acceptance and was adopted as CCP policy during the 2002 16th Party Congress.[26] As a leading economic journal noted, this change was an implicit acknowledgement of the "need to establish a new basis for legitimacy" as the Communist revolution was no longer the basis for CCP legitimacy to rule.[27] China today remains a Party-State, but now one that bases its legitimacy to rule on popular support rather than moral right; what I have called elsewhere "Popular Authoritarianism."[28] Rather than the violent means of the past, the Party-State's legitimacy is now carefully manufactured (and monitored) through assiduous political public relations, polling, and other modern techniques of mass persuasion. And, in contrast to the Mao and Deng era, policing of censorship breaches in the traditional media is left to State administrative organizations such as SAPPRFT and the State Council Information Office (国家新闻办公室). In 2011 a further public sphere monitoring organization was set up, the State Internet Information Office (国家互联网信息办公室). This was in recognition of the fact that most Chinese citizens—especially the CCP's key target audience Chinese 18–24 year olds—now get almost all of their information from mobile devices. Since its foundation this organization has issued a series of new regulations aimed at better

[24] See here for what happened when one of the biggest *weibo* feeds attempted to make fun of the censors. Chen, "A Weibo Drama."

[25] Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 143.

[26] For more on this topic see Brady, "Mass Persuasion."

[27] 21 shiji jingji baodao, 17.

[28] See Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 191.

controlling online content in China. Further significant adjustments to information management have come since the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in 2013. The Xi administration no longer regards the traditional media as mainstream, and is adopting a multi-platform approach to both persuasion and censorship.[29]

The adjustment in controls is necessary not only because of the technical challenges involved in controlling information communication technology. As the "party in power" the CCP can try and set the frames that the traditional and non-traditional media adopt, but the marketized Chinese media is no longer the "tongue and throat of the CCP" (党的喉舌), as it once was. Time and again in recent years, even on taboo subjects, more commercialized Chinese media outlets will nudge at the censorship boundaries in order to make their content more appealing to media audiences. If media outlets want to attract audiences—which they must do as they are no longer in receipt of any subsidies from the government—then it is inevitable that they will attempt to adulterate the frames they receive from CCP agencies such as the Taiwan Affairs Office and Xinhua and make them more appealing. On top of this commercial imperative, not all, but many Chinese journalists and editors are constantly "playing line balls" (擦边球), pushing the boundaries of political censorship. Research by Gang Han shows that during the controversial 2004 Taiwan election, despite strict instructions from the CCP about only using Xinhua reports, there were noticeable differences in the way CCP Taiwan frames were covered in the Party paper *People's Daily* versus the commercial website Sina.com.cn.[30] China's citizen-journalists and bloggers utilizing new media are even less likely to follow the CCP government's frames—unless, like the traditional media, they are made aware of the censorship boundaries and are punished if they breach them.

The 2002 policy document issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office reveals the full extent of the CCP's attempts to set the frames on public discourse on the topic of Taiwan, both domestically and internationally. A simplified version of the regulations was circulated in 2012 and recirculated en

[29] Qu Yingpu, Deputy Editor-in-chief, *China Daily*, talk at Qinghua University, September 2, 2014.

[30] Han, "Mainland China Frames Taiwan," 40–57.

masse[31]; but the 2002 policy document is both more authoritative and still official policy. It is translated in full below. The 2012 update indicates that the politically correct Taiwan terminology does not change whether a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) or a Kuomintang (KMT) leader rules Taiwan. The guidelines note that the Taiwan *tifa/yongyu* are meant to be followed in Mainland China, Macau and Hong Kong; as well as globally.

Suggestions on the Correct Terminology for Taiwan-Related Propaganda

Taiwan Affairs Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Central Propaganda Department, Document 4, 2002.

(1)

1. Political authorities in Taiwan after October 1, 1949 should be referred to as the 'Taiwan authorities' or 'concerning Taiwan' or 'Taiwan-related'; do not use the term 'Republic of China' and never use the ROC calendar system.
2. Do not refer to the 'Taiwan government'. Do not directly refer to the Taiwan authorities' official organisations using terms such as 'State', 'Central', 'National'; or Taiwan's so-called 'Presidential Palace', 'the Five Branches of the Executive' or its subsidiary bodies such as the Ministry of Interior or Government Information Bureau. Refer to the 'Taiwan authorities' 'competent authorities", or 'Taiwan authorities' ministries' and 'departments'. If, due to special circumstances, it is necessary to broadcast the actual name of the organisation, you must add inverted commas or 'so-called' to the name.
3. Do not use the official title of so-called Taiwanese 'government' officials and politicians; instead refer to them as a 'well-known Taiwanese celebrity' a 'well known Taiwanese politician' or else 'Mr' or 'Madame'. In principle, the titles of Taiwan's municipal institutions and leaders can be used such as Mayor, Magistrate, Speaker, Councillors, County Mayor, Village Mayor, Local Council, Municipal Board of Education, etc.

[31] Gd-Info.Gov, "Yongyu Guifan."

4. Put inverted commas around the titles of all regulatory and official documents of the Taiwan authorities and their affiliated organisations. So-called 'white papers' of the Taiwan authorities should be referred to by terms such as 'pamphlets' or 'articles'.
5. The names of any organisations or political terminology associated with 'Taiwan independence' such as 'Taiwanese self-determination' and 'Taiwan sovereign independence' should be put within inverted commas. Don't refer to the 'Taiwan Solidarity Union' in propaganda materials; refer to it as the 'Taiwan Solidarity Party'.

(2)

1. In general don't put the institutions and leadership roles of the Kuomintang, Democratic Progressive Party, People's First Party and other political parties in inverted commas. However the internal organisations and factions of the DPP such as the 'Bureau of Chinese Affairs', 'Justice Alliance', or 'Welfare Alliance' should be put in inverted commas.
2. In general do not put inverted commas around the names of Taiwan's non-governmental organisations; however put inverted commas around any NGOs with a governmental background such as the 'Chung Hwa Travel Service' or the 'Taipei Economic and Cultural Office'. Avoid using the names of any anti-communist institutions such as the 'Anti-Communist Patriotic Alliance', the 'Three Principles United China Alliance', or anything crowned with 'ROC'. Any Taiwan NGOs and businesses with the name 'China' or 'ROC' can be referred to as Taiwan's 'China Iron and Steel Company' and Taiwan's 'Chunghwa Telecom'.
3. Taiwanese officials who come to China as individuals should be referred to as such. Taiwanese 'legislators' can be referred to as 'Taiwanese celebrities' or 'Mr XX', 'Mme. XX'; but not 'Legislator XX'.
4. The names of Taiwanese universities and cultural organisations with the same name as our institutions such as Qinghua University and the National Palace Museum should be put in inverted commas and prefaced with Taiwan or Taibei, for example Taiwan 'Tsinghua University', Taibei's 'National Palace Museum'.

5. In broadcasts remove the title 'National' from the names of any Taiwanese schools or organisations. For example say 'Taiwan University' not 'National Taiwan University', or 'XX Primary', 'XX High' instead of 'XX National Primary' or 'XX National High School'. For Taibei's 'Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall', don't refer to it directly, say instead 'Taibei Zhongshan Memorial Hall'.
6. Do not refer to the laws of the PRC as 'Chinese Mainland legislation'. Refer to 'legislation' in Taiwan as 'the regulations in the Taiwan region'. If you must refer to the 'legislation' of Taiwan in news reports, add 'so-called' in broadcasts and inverted commas in print. When reporting on cross-strait legal matters do not use terms which imply cross-straits legal equivalence, such as 'cross-straits legal affairs', 'cross straits marriage and inheritance matters', or 'cross-straits investment protection'.
7. Cross-strait affairs are China's internal affair; do not use the terminology of international law when referring to Taiwan-related legal matters. For example avoid the terms 'passport', 'notarisation', 'legal assistance', 'extradition', 'illegal immigrants'. Instead say 'travel document', 'cross strait notarisation', 'cross strait administrative collaboration', 'repatriation' and 'emigration'. Reports on the Taiwan Straits should not use the term 'the midline of the Straits'.

(3)

1. When discussing national affairs in an international context say 'China' or 'PRC', do not say 'Chinese Mainland'. When reporting on international events don't put Taiwan on a par with other states, refer to it as China Taiwan; or put it together with Hong Kong and Macao, as in the region of 'Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan'.
2. Regarding international organisations, international economic and trade associations, culture and sporting organisations where only sovereign states can participate, do not refer to 'Taiwan' or 'Taibei'. Use 'Taibei, China' or 'Taiwan, China'. In international sporting events organised by ourselves the Taiwan team can use the name 'Chinese Taibei'. Taiwan's designation in the WTO 'Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, Customs Territory' (simplified name 'China Taibei'), should be referred to using the simplified name.

3. Jointly organised cross-strait activities should be referred to as 'Cross Strait XX activities'. For cross straits activities involving Hong Kong and Macau, do not refer to 'China, Hong Kong, Taiwan etc' rather say 'Cross Straits plus Hong Kong', 'plus Macao'; or refer to people from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan as coming from 'the four areas within the cross-straits zone'.
4. In corporate reports, advertising, and notices don't refer to the investments of Taiwanese business people in the ancestral Mainland as 'joint ventures' or 'China-Taiwan joint ventures'. They can be referred to as 'Shanghai-Taiwan joint ventures', 'Guangxi-Taiwan joint ventures'. Taiwanese investors investing in China should be referred to as 'Taiwanese partners' not 'foreign partners'. Chinese provincial, municipal partners should not be referred to as 'Chinese partners' they can be referred to as 'Fujian partners' or 'Shanghai partners' etc.
5. When a province organises activities with Taiwan, report it as 'a province and Taiwan' (for example Fujian and Taiwan) or 'a municipality and Taiwan' (for example Shanghai); [and not China-Taiwan].
6. Non-Taiwan related propaganda should not describe China as 'the Mainland'. For example do not refer to 'reform and opening up on the Mainland' or 'the top ten songs on the Mainland charts'. Use instead 'China's reform and opening up' and 'the top ten songs on the Chinese charts'.
7. Don't refer to the government of the People's Republic of China as 'the Mainland government' and don't preface the institutions of the central government with 'Mainland', such as 'Mainland State Administration of Cultural Heritage'; don't refer to national statistics as 'Mainland statistics'. For reporting national statistics, if they don't include Taiwan figures, indicate this in brackets.
8. All propaganda and media coverage must at all times avoid use of the word 'Mainland'. If there is no way to avoid using it, use the terminology 'Ancestral Mainland' (*zuguo dalu*).

(4)

1. In propaganda and broadcasts aimed at Taiwan, on the whole, don't refer to 'after Liberation' [standard PRC politically correct phrasing to describe how the CP government came to power]; instead use 'before/after the establishment of the PRC' or 'before/after 1949'.

2. If Taiwan compatriots return from Japan or the US or other countries to Taiwan avoid implying that they are travelling from one country to another such as 'from Japan to Taiwan' instead say that they 'came from Japan' or 'they passed through Japan to return to the Ancestral Motherland/Taiwan'.
3. In our propaganda and broadcasts don't describe the Minnan dialect used by the people on Taiwan as 'Taiwanese language' [Taiwanhua], don't use 'Taiwanese language' in publications, don't use or promote 'Taiwanese language' in public (such as via 'Taiwanese pop singers', 'Taiwanese pop songs' and so on. Refer them as 'Minnan dialect pop singers' or 'Minnan dialect pop songs'.
4. Don't call Taiwan's ethnic minorities 'indigenous people', when reporting on cross straits ethnic minority exchanges, refer to them as 'ethnic minorities of Taiwan' or call them by their specific name such as 'Ami people'. In official documents refer to them as 'Gaoshan ethnic group'.
5. With regard to what Taiwan calls the 'mini-links', in our reports refer to 'direct links between 'Fujian coastal areas and Jinmen and Mazu Islands'. Don't use the phrase 'mini-links' and don't use the phrase 'three direct links'.

Readers should note that these stipulations on how to refer to Taiwan in the Chinese public sphere are entitled "suggestions." This tentative language reflects CCP awareness that while it can order Chinese media organizations to follow censorship rules, it can only "suggest" guidelines when it comes to the norms followed by the nontraditional media. The Central Propaganda Department has an uneasy relationship over the nontraditional media in China. As Beijing University journalism professor Jiao Guobiao pointed out in 2004 in a widely circulated online essay, the Central Propaganda Department is perceived by many in China as a "dark empire" with wide powers, which does not have legal authority for its stipulations.[32] Jiao was technically incorrect as the PRC Constitution grants the CCP a leadership role over the whole of society, but his view of the Central Propaganda Department is very widely held in present-day Chinese society. Despite being a one-party state, the impact of opening

[32] Jiao, "Declaration of Campaign."

up China is that even with censorship in place, the CCP must operate within the global marketplace of ideas and information. The CCP can "suggest" its frames are utilized by the nontraditional media and use its political power to punish those who breach these "suggestions," but until the status of Taiwan is resolved to Beijing's satisfaction CCP propagandists cannot assume that the government has won the campaign for domestic public opinion, let alone global public opinion. The ROC's frames on the Taiwan issue are in constant competition with the PRC's frames. CCP censorship measures can shut these views out of the Mainland Chinese public sphere, but they cannot completely prevent them being available to Chinese and non-Chinese outside the PRC.

The CCP government also needs to ensure that it has popular support for its policies on Taiwan. Year after year opinion polls on the Taiwan public reveal that rather than de jure independence, or reunification, most prefer the status quo—which is de facto independence and is, in fact, always changing, within the political boundaries of "no declaration of independence" and "no move towards reunification." If PRC public opinion were surveyed on the question of how to resolve the status of Taiwan, we can guess that most Chinese people would not want outright war; most would prefer increasing engagement leading to a peaceful resolution. This is basically the PRC version of the "status quo"; although it is an open question as to whether the "status quo" will have the outcome Beijing wants or the outcome most people in Taiwan desire.

In addition to the 2002 "suggestions," when controversial political situations arise in Taiwan politics, the Central Propaganda Department issues specific instructions on the limits of media coverage. For example, during the hotly contested 2004 Taiwan presidential elections, not only was the mainstream Chinese media strictly controlled as to how they reported the election, but Chinese web managers were told they must delete any posts which referred to the election at all.[33] In 2006, when controversy swirled around ROC President Chen Shui-bian and his family on charges of corruption, the Chinese media were told they should only report the controversy in brief using Xinhua coverage and that they were

[33] China Digital Times, "Censorship Vault 2004 Taiwan."

forbidden from using foreign news reports on the matter.[34] But restricting the coverage to Xinhua reports still does not ensure that CCP frames are reproduced exactly; the size of a headline, the prominence given to a story, or the choice of picture used, can all help to subvert frames and introduce other perspectives.

The Central Propaganda Department issues regular instructions on taboo words, phrases, and images in the Chinese traditional and non-traditional media. China's leading media conglomerates and major web-based companies such as Sohu and Baidu all receive regular updates from the Central Propaganda Department on these words so they can adjust their content accordingly. The Chinese media seldom breaks the rules on the correct *tifa*, but the Internet and social media is harder to control. However, the technology makes it easy to manage any censorship breach. If taboo words, phrases or images are used on the Chinese internet; then users' internet access is temporarily suspended or, if they manage a webpage, it may be closed down.[35] Lists of taboo terms have been widely available since 2004 when hackers uncovered this information as part of the software installed in a commonly used instant messenger software package in China.[36] The most currently available list features a number of Taiwan-related terms: "Blue Sky with a White Sun" flag [Kuomintang flag] (青天白日旗); Democratic Progressive Party (民进党); Cary S. Hung (洪哲胜) a well-known Taiwan independence activist; the Association for Taiwanese Independence (独立台湾会); Taiwan Political Talk (台湾政论区); the League for Taiwan Independence (台湾自由联盟); the Organization for the Establishment of the Country of Taiwan (台湾建国运动组织); and Taiwan + Independence League (台湾 + 独立联盟).

The CCP not only carefully controls what Chinese people are allowed to say in public about the status of Taiwan, but also tries to limit the impact in China of the alternative perspectives that can be heard in Taiwan's public sphere and the ideological challenge of Taiwan's democratization. A 1999 propaganda policy manual stated that reports by

[34] China Digital Times, "Censorship Vault Beijing."

[35] Wikipedia, "Shencha cihui liebiao."

[36] Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*, 134.

Chinese researchers on Taiwan's politics, economy, the military, and society should be strictly controlled and must be kept secret.[37] However, in the current period there is a dual-track level of information sharing of scholarly reports on Taiwan. Politically sensitive reports appear in CCP classified journals, while materials that support China's position and are less politically sensitive are made publicly available. This is in keeping with the above-noted changes to make CCP frames on the Taiwan issue more widely known and understood. Compared to a few years ago, the information now publicly available about Taiwan in China has expanded exponentially. The Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) Institute of Taiwan Studies lists papers on its website, which range from reports on Taiwan's efforts to expand its international space and China's response[38] to analyses of the DPP's efforts to get the ROC to be allowed to rejoin the United Nations.[39]

Nonetheless, Chinese Mainland-based audiences and readers are restricted from directly accessing Taiwanese people's own perspectives on Taiwanese society and politics. Only carefully vetted information on Taiwan and coming out of Taiwan will be allowed into the Chinese public sphere, and only carefully vetted political or social leaders coming from Taiwan are allowed to visit the PRC. For example, DPP politicians are "welcome" in China, but only if they renounce Taiwan independence.[40] Scholarly exchanges with Taiwan are encouraged; as long as the visitors are not known Taiwan independence activists and keep their political views to themselves when visiting the PRC. CASS is charged with keeping files on prominent Taiwanese social science scholars and their respective viewpoints on China.[41] In 2013, as part of an ever-widening of economic benefits the PRC is offering to Taiwan, the Taiwan Affairs Office announced that Taiwanese professors would be allowed to work at PRC universities after receiving "education permits" and that Taiwanese graduates of Mainland Chinese universities would similarly be allowed

[37] Xuanchuan wenhua zhengce fagui bianweihui, *Xuanchuan wenhua zhengce fagui*, 91.

[38] Institute of Taiwan Studies Chinese Academy of Social Science, "Reports on Taiwan's Effort."

[39] Institute of Taiwan Studies Chinese Academy of Social Science, "Analyses of DPP's Efforts."

[40] China.com.cn, "Zuguo dalv yuanze."

[41] Xuanchuan wenhua zhengce fagui bianweihui, *Xuanchuan wenhua zhengce fagui*, 89–90.

to apply for work in PRC government departments and enterprises.[42] However, it is much more difficult for PRC scholars to visit Taiwan as individuals; Mainland Chinese scholars wishing to attend conferences in Taiwan must get the permission of the central Taiwan Affairs Office, their local Taiwan Affairs Office and the Public Security Bureau.[43] They must provide a detailed itinerary of their planned activities in Taiwan and are explicitly forbidden from visiting Taiwan official institutions or politically sensitive sites such as Taibei's Martyr's Memorial or the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial.[44]

The ROC has a mature television, film, newspaper, and broadcasting industry that is a potential alternative to its equivalent in the Chinese Mainland. Until recently, no more than five Taiwan films could be shown in China each year and no more than ten Taiwan television programs per year could be broadcast across the whole of China. TV stations in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, and Fujian were only allowed to broadcast two programs from Taiwan per year.[45] But in 2013 the PRC's SAPPRFT announced that more Taiwanese films and television programs would be allowed into the Mainland Chinese market, so long as they met the following requirements: the films and shows must be a co-production between PRC and ROC companies; the story and main characters must relate to cross-Strait issues; any creative personnel on the production team should be approved by SAPPRFT; PRC actors should consist of a third of the actors; and the final cut must be approved by SAPPRFT before being shown in public.[46] The Taiwan film industry is struggling to survive. It receives very little government funding and must compete with Hollywood, so Beijing's offers of increased market share will be of interest to many Taiwanese companies despite the political restrictions they entail.

The Taiwanese Internet is also screened from Chinese audiences. All access to news-related Taiwanese websites and online newspapers is

[42] AFP, "China Offers Taiwan Companies."
[43] Jin, "Taiwan kaihui."
[44] Wuhan Daxue, "Wuhan Daxue ruogan guize."
[45] Xuanchuan wenhua zhengce fagui bianweihui, *Xuanchuan wenhua zhengce fagui*, 88.
[46] Xinhua, "Yinjin Taiwan dianying."

completely blocked to PRC-based Netizens.[47] Until a few years ago *all* Taiwan-based websites were off-limits in the PRC. However, nowadays, non-news-related Taiwan sites can legally be accessed from the Chinese Mainland.

Taiwanese journalists who wish to visit China are under strict control. They must apply to the Taiwan Affairs Office for permission to visit the Chinese Mainland on business and they may stay for no longer than one month.[48] Chinese officials are not permitted to accept long-distance calls from Taiwan-based journalists. They are warned to be "vigilant against Taiwanese and foreign spies coming in to China as journalists or spreading reactionary propaganda."[49] Reflecting the concern about activists coming to the PRC from the ROC, Taiwan-based nongovernment organisation (NGO) active in the PRC are under special management; which are even more constrictive than the rules applied to foreign NGOs.[50]

A further aspect of the PRC's global efforts to combat the influence of Taiwan's de facto independence—as well as other "splittists" such as Tibetan and Uighur groups and Falungong—is to manage international perceptions of what constitutes "Chineseness." The PRC's "Chinese culture" frames are a deliberate challenge to Taiwan's contemporary frames which highlight Taiwan's distinct culture and heritage. Since 2004 China has developed a worldwide programme of Confucius Institutes which are based in foreign tertiary institutions and engage in teaching Chinese language and culture. According to Li Changchun, from 2002 to 2008 the most senior CCP leader in charge of propaganda, the Confucius Institutes are an important part of China's foreign propaganda strategy.[51] Confucius Institutes must follow Chinese law as well as the law of the host country;[52] this means that any staff employed there may not be supporters of Taiwan, Xinjiang, or Tibetan independence or Falungong members.[53]

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[47] See here for a detailed lists of blocked sites in China: Wikipedia, "Fengsuo wangzhan."

[48] Baike, "Taiwan jizhe caifang guiding."

[49] Xuanchuan wenhua zhengce fagui bianweihui, *Xuanchuan wenhua zhengce fagui*, 85.

[50] Taiwan.cn, "Gongzuo guize."

[51] Xinhua Net, "Li Changchun's statements."

[52] Confucius Institute, "Confucius Institute Constitution."

[53] Bradshaw and Freeze, "McMaster Closing Confucius Institute."

China also tries to censor and restrict the promotion of Taiwan culture and perspectives globally in other ways. For example, in 2012 PRC diplomats pressured a local government in Oregon to remove a mural which advocated independence for Taiwan and Tibet, painted by a Taiwanese artist.[54] Globally, China has made frequent protests about public parades and cultural events which feature ROC flags and Taiwan-related activities.[55]

Managing Sino-foreign and insider–outsider relations is a key means by which the CCP manages political power.[56] Moreover oral propaganda (口头宣传) and the use of personal relationships to influence politics is a long-standing practice of the CCP. Hence, from the CCP's perspective, the ever-increasing personal contacts between Mainlanders and Taiwanese have the potential to unleash an army of advocates for China's position on Taiwan—so long as these "soldiers" follow and understand the CCP frames. In 2013 the Taiwan Affairs Office announced that there have been over 320,000 Sino-Taiwan marriages, at a rate of around 10,000 per annum.[57] Currently around one in five of every marriage in Taiwan is now between a Taiwanese man and Mainland Chinese woman.[58] In 2013 there were 240,000 PRC passport holders living in the ROC.[59] According to China's 2010 census there are around 170,000 Taiwanese residing in the PRC.[60] This rapid expansion in people-to-people links is a further reason why CCP agencies are now popularizing awareness of the current Taiwan frames.

But the potential for influence can go both ways. There are indications that some Chinese visitors to Taiwan go because they want to find out more about Taiwanese politics, in particular, how the democratic system works. From 1949 to 2008 the ROC allowed very few PRC citizens to visit Taiwan. However, since 2008, under the Ma administration, Chinese tourists have been welcome to visit Taiwan. In 2012, for

[54] Hall, "Mural Draws Fire."

[55] See, for example, the situation at the San Francisco Chinese New Year Parade: Hua, "Falungong Dispute."

[56] For more on this point, see Brady, *Making Foreign Serve China*.

[57] Taiwan.cn, "Liang'an hunyin."

[58] Lin, "Tradition and Progress."

[59] National Immigration Agency, "Foreign Residents by Nationality."

[60] China.org, "170, 823 Taiwan Residents."

example, a total of 2,586,428 PRC tourists visited Taiwan. The numbers are expected to grow still further.[61] There are currently 255 flights per week between Chinese and Taiwanese airports.[62] According to the regulations, Chinese tourists in Taiwan may only move freely apart from their tour group with the permission of their tour leader. They may not engage in any activity which might be perceived as harmful to cross-Strait reunification. Tourism operators may not arrange tour groups to Taiwan in the name of "organisations in the field of economy, culture, health, science and technology, education, religious, academic and other cross-strait exchanges and international events." Such groups can only visit Taiwan if their tours are organized by their local Taiwan Affairs Office.[63] Moreover, the regulations stipulate that Chinese tourists can only visit Taiwan if they hold a "PRC-resident Taiwan visit pass."[64] Chinese tourists visiting during the 2012 ROC presidential election were instructed by PRC authorities to stay in their rooms on Election Day until the election results were announced. The number of tour groups allowed to visit Taiwan from the PRC was halved during the election period. However, PRC tourists watched election coverage in their rooms and made detours to view candidate meetings. According to one woman who was interviewed by *The Globe and Mail*, "We like watching the debates and the [campaign] cars with the loudspeakers and also the in-depth reports about politics that we can see on the TVs in our hotel rooms. We talk about them a lot. We don't see those things in China."[65]

Conclusion

Despite being an authoritarian, one-party regime, the CCP government is also extremely mindful of public opinion in China on domestic and foreign policy issues. As I have argued elsewhere, in the post-1989 era,

[61] Lin and Kao, "Big-spending Chinese Tourists."
[62] Lee, "Airlines Open New Routes."
[63] Taiwan.cn, "Zhuyi shixiang."
[64] Baidu,"wanglai taiwan tongxingzheng."
[65] MacKinnon, "Beijing Limits Democracy Tourists."

the CCP government has even adopted some of the features of democratic societies, including many of the techniques of mass persuasion and social and political control.[66] Having a government keenly responsive to domestic public opinion and seeking to shape that public opinion to give the imprimatur of popular support to its policies is one of the markers of this trend.

The Chinese population as a whole is antagonistic to displays of Taiwan independence; but how highly do they prioritize resolving the status of Taiwan? Most surveys of Chinese domestic opinion show that economic issues are a top priority. However, from the CCP government's point of view, it is not enough to restrict Taiwan's international space; for strategic and ideological reasons, they would like a speedy resolution of the Taiwan issue. A unified China and Taiwan would result in a significant rebalancing of power in the Northeast Asian region and greatly enhance China's abilities to project its power globally. It would also greatly enhance the legitimacy of the CCP government to rule, and ensure the longevity of the regime. Hence in the last twenty years Beijing has continually upped the ante in its efforts to mold public opinion on the Taiwan issue in China, Taiwan, and internationally. Since 2002, reflecting political economic and technological changes in Chinese society, the CCP has popularized awareness of its frames, moving beyond the restricted information circles of the past; it has sought to better explain its policies and understandings of Taiwan to the Mainland Chinese population; it has continued to insist on the global acceptance of its political boundaries on the status of Taiwan; and it has found multiple means to insert its frames within the Taiwan public sphere. In all these efforts it can be said to have achieved considerable success in getting its frames accepted and utilized. An important arena to watch for further research will be the impact of these frames on the Taiwan public sphere in the years to come. China's economic power and the special benefits China offers to Taiwanese who accept the one China policy will be increasingly hard to resist. A further area to watch will be the extent to which the Chinese media cooperates to the letter of the law with the CCP's Taiwan frames and the extent to which the Chinese population will be influenced by increased exposure

[66] See Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship*.

to the Taiwan political model. The ongoing impact of information communication technology, which has the potential to make every person with an online connection a channel for mass communication, will be a further challenge to the abilities of the CCP's "China" to define domestic and international perceptions of "Taiwan."

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3

Taiwan's Developmental Experience for the Chinese Mainland: The Perspective of Chinese Intellectuals

Gang Lin

Taiwan's economic, social, and political developments have varying degrees of influences on the Chinese Mainland, given their common language, culture, history, and the similar political systems of the party-state that "have their origins in the revolutionary politics of early-twentieth-century China."[1] This does not suggest that the mainland will necessarily follow Taiwan's developmental trajectory with the same sequence and pace—starting with a transition from rural society into urban society via export-oriented market economy, going through social pluralism and movements, and ending with a liberal democracy characterized by competitive elections and multi-party politics. As Larry Diamond argues, political change in the Chinese Mainland will not follow the logic of Taiwan's transition. According to him, although the two sides have "evolved and adapted under new forms of authoritarian

[1] Gilley and Diamond, *Political Changes in China*, Chap. 1.

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rule after profound political traumas" and launched into a remarkable period of rapid economic growth and social transformation, "the differences between the two transitions of Taiwan historically and China in the future are more decisive than the similarities."[2]

One of the key intervening variables between the two developmental trajectories of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is the perception of Chinese intellectuals regarding which elements in Taiwan's development are most relevant to the development on the Mainland. Their perceptions and knowledge are both informed by economic, social, and political developments in Taiwan and conditioned by the Mainland's domestic and foreign situations. As Chu Yun-han of National Taiwan University argues, the quality of Taiwanese democracy will have a profound impact on the mainland's political development.[3] Street riots, political violence, endless parliamentary boycotts, and official scandals all have negative impacts on the acceptability of democracy to the mainlanders through the perceived democratic experience on the island. Moreover, some of Taiwan's developmental experiences are relevant to the Mainland because they can easily fit into the Mainland's current reform agenda, while others are less relevant due to the ideological distance between the two societies. While intellectuals on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have a similar, if not identical, interest in the issue of the relevance of Taiwan's developmental experience to the Mainland, this chapter focuses on the perceptions of intellectuals based on the mainland, assuming their ideas and open publications have more direct impact on the general public as well as policymakers on the mainland.

[2] Ibid., 243–4. It is worthy to note the nuance between the two co-editors: While Bruce Gilley compares economic development trajectory in Taiwan from 1951 to 1986 with that same trajectory in the Mainland from 1977 to 2012, Larry Diamond compares political development in Taiwan from 1971 to 1996 with the unknowable developmental trajectory in the mainland from 1977 to 2022, factoring in a generational lag of about twenty years, as well as the different world historical situations. Bruce Gilley is consistently optimistic about democratic future in the Mainland, whereas Larry's conclusion is that "China's transition to democracy will take longer, be driven by somewhat different logics, and be more fraught with internal and, potentially, international peril than was Taiwan's."

[3] Chu, "Democratic Future," 318.

Taiwan's Development Relevant to the Chinese Mainland

Since the beginning of the Chinese Mainland's reform and opening-up process in 1979, Taiwan's developmental experiences have diffused into the mainland's society swiftly. The "lost generation" of the Cultural Revolution was particularly impressed by Taiwan's "soft power" (popular music) and hard articles for daily use (e.g., folding umbrella), in addition to the successful stories of Taiwanese businesspeople. To learn from Taiwan economically (*jingji xue Taiwan*) has become at least a semi-official language. The Four Special Economic Zones, together with export-oriented developmental strategy first practiced on the Mainland in the late 1970s, were clearly in debt to the economic miracle realized by the Four Small Dragons in East Asia, including Taiwan.

To be sure, some people on the Mainland do not take Taiwan's economic success at face value. According to Li Jiaquan of the Institution of Taiwan Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), one of the most famous Taiwan experts on the Mainland, Taiwan's economic miracle has been greatly enhanced by the preexisting infrastructure left over by the Japanese colonial rule, in debt to the capitals, equipment and experts brought from the mainland to the island by the defeated KMT regime, thanks to the economic aid offered by the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, and the profits earned and reinvested by Taiwanese exported-oriented industries. While Li also recognizes the leaders' wisdom in Taiwan's developmental strategy, including giving priority to agriculture and light industries, linking domestic economic development to the international market, and combining governmental enterprises with nongovernmental enterprises and macro adjustment with micro management, he does not think that the Mainland can simply copy Taiwan's experience in economic development, given their difference in geography, historical conditions, and economic systems.[4] In other words, Taiwan's experience in economic development is unique, and therefore its successful economic policies would not achieve the same effects on the mainland.

[4] Li, *Li Denghui Zhuzheng Zhihou*, 368–80.

Not all intellectuals on the Mainland adopt the same position as Li Jiaquan. Back in the 1980s many people who were in favor of economic reform and openness regretted that the Mainland might had lost a golden opportunity to develop labor-intensive industries during the 1960s and the 1970s, at the time when China was engulfed by the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. In fact, Li himself has also recognized the disadvantages that the Mainland experiences as a latecomer on the international market. China's economic boom since reform, however, has indicated the relevance of Taiwan's experience in developing export-oriented economy to the Mainland. The Mainland's foreign trade, thanks to its labor-intensive industry, has begun to overtake Taiwan since 1992, earning the reputation of being the "workshop of the world."

These developments are well taken by Chinese intellectuals. An influential book titled *Taiwan's Experience and Mainland's Economic Reform* was published in 1995, edited by Yi Gang (currently the Vice President of Bank of China) and Xu Xiaonian and compiled by a group of overseas Chinese economists who had just visited Taiwan.[5] According to He Lüye, one of the reviewers of this book, the mainland should learn from Taiwan's experience in privatizing enterprises (*minyinghua*), which is a good choice for the Mainland that lacks the necessary capital to provide full employment. Taiwan's emphasis on agricultural development, its policy of high interest rates and the effective combination of government intervention with the market mechanism, are all good experiences for the mainland. At the other end of the spectrum, Taiwan's environment pollution, belated infrastructural construction, and deteriorating ethics are bad experiences that the mainland should avoid during its process of economic development.[6]

Indeed, Taiwan's successful experience in economic development has become the most popular subject within the Mainland's academic circle. Of the 314 papers published on the Mainland over the past three decades which referred to Taiwan's experience in their titles, 216 papers discuss Taiwan's experience in economic development. These are headed by agriculture (53), followed by investment (37), banking (36), securities

[5] Yi and Xu, *Taiwan jingyan.*

[6] He, "jingji fazhan moshi," 93–4.

(23), industry (22), and economic reform (15). Other papers deal with Taiwan's developmental experience in culture (34), politics and law (24), education (15), sciences (15), and medicine (15), as Table 3.1 indicates.[7]

If Taiwan's economic miracle was the most eye-catching experience for the mainlanders at the very beginning of China's process of economic reform and opening up, its success and failure in achieving equal income distribution have attracted greater attention in the mainland after thirty years of reform. According to Quan Heng, Taiwan has experienced a substantial change from economic growth with a relatively fair income distribution to an increased social polarization between rich and poor. Taiwan's success in the past was attributed to the government's regulatory role of establishing a market mechanism for business competition and employment fairness in the field of primary distribution. Its failure since the late 1980s has been the result of industrial upgrading, the resultant unemployment, and the lack of governmental role in the field of secondary distribution. As Quan Heng argues, the issue of income distribution on the mainland is more complicated. In the field of primary distribution, the government intervenes in the market and twists the natural process of income delivery, while in the field of secondary distribution the government fails to regulate income redistribution through tax, social security system and transfer payment. For Quan Heng, the Mainland government should play its active role in the field of secondary redistribution, while it should reduce its role in the field of primary distribution. In other words, the Mainland should both learn and take lessons from Taiwan with regard to advancing social transformation and harmony.[8] Many Chinese intellectuals have the same opinion and feel the government is overly involved in the market while failing to provide sufficient public goods in the secondary distribution of social wealth. Given the signal released by the new administration under Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, Taiwan's early experience in reaching social equality is an asset for the mainland to cherish.

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[7] From China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database (*zhongguo zhiwang*, http://www.cnki.net, accessed on June 5, 2013), the most representative search engine for academic papers on the mainland. These include papers published in various academic journals, dissertations for PhD and master's degrees, conference papers, and articles in newspapers.

[8] Quan, "Gongping zengzhang," 79–86.

Table 3.1 Papers published on the Mainland with Taiwan's experience as part of the title

Category (No.)	Subcategory	No.
Economy (216)	Agriculture, aquaculture & fishing	53
	Investment	37
	Banking	36
	Securities	23
	Industry	22
	Economic reform	15
	Macroeconomic management & sustainable development	11
	Market research and information	5
	Finance & tax	5
	Trade	3
	Service	2
	Insurance	2
	Economic law	2
Culture (34)	Tourism	17
	Culture	9
	Drama, film & TV arts	2
	Literature	2
	News & media	2
	Local history & ethnology	2
Politics & law (24)	Chinese politics and international politics	11
	Public administration	5
	Executive law and local legality	4
	Criminal law	2
	Party and mass organizations	2
Education (15)	Advanced education	4
	Career education	4
	Education theory and management	4
	Adult and special education	3
Science (15)	Construction science	5
	Sociology and statistics	4
	Agricultural science	2
	Environment science	2
Medicine (15)	Medical management	5
	Animal medicine	3
	Clinical medicine	3
	Preventive medicine and health	2
	Infectious diseases	2

Mainland intellectuals have also acknowledged Taiwan's experience in social organization. As Yu Jianrong argues, the successful experience of Taiwan's agricultural and rural development lies in its autonomous farmers' associations. Through an analysis of Taiwan's farmers' associations and their relevant regulations, Yu proposes to develop farmers' organizations on the mainland as an active actor or true interest subject (*xingdong zhuti*). These organizations should be locally oriented with a parallel division of labor between its deliberative and executive functions. The principles for building new rural villages on the Mainland are "rule of the farmers," "by the farmers," and "for the farmers," Yu contends.[9] Other scholars echo Yu's idea. Yang Tuan, a researcher associated with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that Taiwan's farmers' associations, which have a history of one hundred years and a membership of 8.5 percent of the population on the island, as well as their high levels of efficiency, can serve as an example for the Mainland's rural development after three decades of reform. According to Yang, Taiwan has overcome the dilemma of overly labor-intensive agriculture during the process of economic modernization, while the Mainland continues to suffer from this problem. Labor-intensive agriculture results in low incomes and a significant amount of hidden unemployment among the rural population, forcing farmers to leave their homeland and work in urban areas. But the unemployment risk of the farmer-worker in the cities forces them to have a division of labor within their families, maintaining a semi-manufacturing and semi-pastoral (*bangong bannong*) family structure. In an attempt to resolve this dilemma, Yang proposes that the Mainland should learn from the experience practiced in Taiwan as well as Japan and South Korea and convert individual, small-scale planting into larger-scale production. By creating farmers' associations that can integrate the economic and social functions, the Mainland can reduce the gap between the village committee (with its political function) and rural cooperation (with its economic function), enhance the linkage between farmers and township government, and therefore ensure the sustainable develop-

[9] Yu, "Nonghui zuzhi," 71–87.

ment of the rural village, agriculture and farmers (*san nong*).[10] Zheng Zhenyu proposes to borrow Taiwan's experience in developing non-profit organizations and make similar developments in Fujian Province.[11] The relevance of Taiwan's experience has been expanded from the field of economic growth and income distribution to the sphere of social organization, a domain that is more politically sensitive.

Intellectuals on the Mainland also recognize Taiwan's experiences in public administration, the rule of law, and democracy. In a web essay titled "The Practical Meaning of Taiwan's Experience," the author highlights the core value of Taiwan's experience, that is, the guarantee of the people's livelihood. After mentioning Taiwan's success in land reform, economic growth, equal distribution of income (*junfu*), price stability, balanced developmental programs, the dynamics of small and medium-sized enterprises, free compulsory education, full employment, foreign trade, and a good civil service system, the author argues that Taiwan's democratic reform in the 1990s has added new elements to its successful experience. Taiwan's mature democracy and its accompanying political stability indicates that the Chinese people not only have the ability to build a developed and just society with the livelihood of the public as the priority, but are also capable of establishing a consolidated democracy.[12] This perspective, however, is not popular in official publications and only appears in BBS, which enjoys more leeway to play within contemporary China.

Impact of Taiwan's Democratic Experience on Chinese Intellectuals

As a Chinese society, Taiwan's democratic experience has had a long-lasting impact on the mainlanders' understanding of democracy. The influence from the island can be seen to date back to at least the mid-1980s when

[10] Yang, "Yizhi Taiwan nonghui jingyan." This paper was first published in July 2009 and posted on August 16, 2011. The author works at the Center of Social Policy Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

[11] Zheng, "Jiejian Taiwan jingyan."

[12] Bbs.Cnhubei, *Taiwan jingyan xianshi yiyi.*

the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was first established, a landmark of Taiwan's democratic transition. At this time a number of liberal intellectuals used the case of Taiwan to justify their arguments that the Mainland deserves a similar process of political democratization. This, of course, was not the standard official point of view at this time. Typically, since the 1990s Taiwanese democratization has been understood by the Chinese government to be a movement related to Taiwan's separation from the Mainland. The image of Taiwanese democracy conveyed to the public at the time was characterized by political corruption, social chaos, and other similarly negative phenomena. Limited exchanges between the two sides, plus the increasingly assertive Taiwanese identity, have contributed to many mainlanders' misperceptions of the nature of liberal democracy. When democracy and national unification are put at opposite positions, the Mainlanders have tended to trade democracy for unification. Ironically, the sentiment of Taiwan independence released by democratic process has served as an antidote against the potential "peaceful evolution" on the mainland. For many mainlanders, Lee Teng-hui's speech at Cornell University was something more to do with Taiwan independence than with democratic value, despite the populist flavor in the topic of his speech—"What People Want are Always in My Mind." Similarly, Chen Shui-bian's slogan of "Taiwan stands up" in his inauguration speech of May 20th of 2000 amounted to the advocacy of Taiwanese independence, and has nothing to do with whatever democratic value he might have tried to convey in the wake of the first power turnover on the island.

The second change in governing party through the ballot box in Taiwan in 2008, however, received positive coverage from the media in the Chinese Mainland. Many KMT celebrities were interviewed by Channel Four of Chinese Central Television (CCTV), including Wu Po-hsiung (June 2, 2008), Hau Lung-pin (June 29, 2008), Jason Hu (July 7, 2008), Chou Hsi-wei (July 15, 2008), Wu Tun-yi (September 7, 2008), and Chu Li-luan (May 18, 2009). Since then, Taiwanese politicians and media commentators have often appeared in the mainland's TV programs. In addition, Taiwanese commentators, including Cheng You-ping, Chiang Min-chin, Lan Hsuan, Yin Nai-ching, and Wang Hong-wei, have become popular commentators in CCTV Channel Four

since this time. Although these people have to more or less adapt their comments to the political context of the Mainland when they appear in the Chinese media, their positive description of Taiwanese democratic politics, respect for popular votes, and the acceptance of electoral outcomes have demonstrated to mainlanders that democracy is a good thing per se. Competitive elections can end corrupt politics, expose the scandals of leaders, make government accountable to the people, and improve cross-Strait relations. In addition, Chinese intellectuals now are able to access the websites of some Taiwan-based newspapers, such as *China Daily*, *United Daily*, and *The Commons Daily*, even though the pro-DPP newspaper, *Liberty Times*, is still unavailable (with the exception of a short period in 2008). More intellectuals on the mainland now feel democracy is good for Taiwan and for cross-Strait relations, in contract to their perception eight years ago.

One influential book, *Taiwan's Democratic Transition: Experience and Inspiration*, has highlighted the changing perception of Chinese intellectuals regarding Taiwan's democratic experience. The book was co-authored by Professor Chu Yan-han of National Taiwan University, as well as other distinguished scholars on Taiwan, with a section for special discussion with Mainland scholars.[13] The perspectives of Mainland scholars are more relevant for this chapter. For example, Yang Guangbin of Renmin University of China argues that Taiwan's democratic transition with political interaction between the ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) and the opposition force (*dangwai*) has demonstrated a successful process under a system of one-party rule. According to Yang, the Mainland may follow Taiwan's trajectory to first ensure people's economic rights (prior to 2003), then social rights (between 2003 and 2023), and finally political rights (after 2023).[14] It is interesting to note that this timeframe is similar to that given in Larry Diamond's prediction that the Chinese Mainland may move into an uncertain democratization process after 2022 (see footnote 2). In a similar vein, Yu Jianrong contends that political development in Taiwan's grassroots society is most relevant to the Mainland. The

[13] Chu, *Taiwan Minzhu Zhuanxing*. It is worthy to know that most part of this book had been completed before 2009, but it didn't go to press until three years later.

[14] Yang, "Taiwan minzhuhua zhuanxing," 233–6.

Internet has created a space for netizens to share their common identity and political values. The "web identity," to use Yu's phrase, has replaced the command chain of formal organization. For the Mainland, as Yu argues, political development should begin with two steps. The first is to ensure local judicial independence. According to Yu, local courts should enjoy its autonomy in managing personnel and financial affairs, and the intermediate court should be independent from party and government at the same level. The second is to reform the system of people's congress through competitive elections. Just like Taiwan's political transition, which started with elections at the county level, the Mainland can see political reform at the central level as the final step.[15]

Li Luqu of the East China University of Politics and Law argues that the democratizations in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore have shown that Confucian societies can accept modern democratic culture and plural political institutions. According to Li, among East Asian countries and areas, there are two democratization models. One is that represented by Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. Their political transitions fit with the typical transition model in late developed areas described by Western political scientists. Another model is represented by Singapore and Malaysia, which have both experienced intra-system democratization. These regimes injected modernity and competition factors into itself in order to conserve the Confucian and authoritarian framework. The fact that Singapore and Taiwan, the two typical Confucian societies among others, followed different democratization trajectories invalidates the assumed impossibility of a society based on Confucian values to accommodate liberal democratization. Li recognizes that Taiwan's political transition, like that experienced by other cases in East Asia, has demonstrated the problem of uneasiness between the modern democratic spirit and Chinese traditional culture, resulting in constant social and political fissure and conflict. The common phenomena of patron–client politics, traditional family and faction politics, ethnic conflicts, and informal rule that constrain people's behavior beyond formal law and regulation, have all indicated the conflict between tradition and modernity. The diffusion of modern culture and the rise of the middle class, however, are the main

[15] Yu, "Wangle de renting chaochu," 237–9.

forces pushing for political democratization, regardless of the degree of the influence of Confucianism and the specific model of democratization (whether they have transferred into a new regime or not).[16] One may disagree with Li's argument that the Singaporean model of a modern society qualifies as a democracy. His point, however, is the comparability of the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan, suggesting the two sides will move toward the same direction, together with some other countries in East Asia.

Li Fan of the Institution of China and World Studies agrees that Taiwan's democratic experience has had a significant influence on the Mainland's democratization process. During the process of China's reunification demanded by the central government on the Mainland, the mainlanders cannot help but wonder why Taiwan can practice democracy characterized by party competition and political liberty but not the Mainland. After all, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are both Chinese societies influenced by Confucian tradition. According to Li, however, the process of democratization on the Mainland will differ substantially from what has happened in Taiwan. Taiwan's democratic transition started from authoritarian regime, while the mainland will begin with the movement away from totalitarianism. Regime difference has caused different types of transition, including various paths, strategies, and processes of institution building. As for the one-party system, Taiwan as well as Mexico started from the authoritarian rule and the party that promoted democratic transition had chances to come back to power; democratization in the totalitarian one-party system, however, often resulted in institutional collapse and few former ruling parties could return to power. The transition away from an authoritarian society can relieve the ruling party's concern with the process of democratization, whereas the transition away from a totalitarian regime will send it a warning signal. The Mainland, Li continues, may take a new transitory path different from Taiwan and Mexico, but it can learn some good lessons from the two transitory paths. In short, the mainland will take a long way toward democracy and the initiative stage will take very long time with a lot of blockage and problems and unpredictable future.[17]

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[16] Li, "Dongya liangzhong zhengzhi," 30–2.

[17] Li and Huang, "Dalu yu Taiwan." Paper delivered to a conference 'A Comparison between the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait in Political Development: Performance, Development and Trend' hosted by Taiwan Chengchi University, October 17, 2012.

This does not suggest that Chinese intellectuals have all taken competitive elections for granted. For some, political consultation can substitute for competitive elections as a way of reflecting the will of the people in a harmonious way. For others, China can achieve good governance mainly through the rule of law. In general, the Chinese scholars on the mainland believe democracy and the rule of law are good things, while keeping some reservation on the value of free elections. The economist Zhang Weiying of Peking University appreciates Taiwan's experience of initiating economic liberalization before political democratization. According to Zhang, Taiwan's authorities have offered a living space and free market for entrepreneurs, in addition to other active functions it played in the island's economic development. While entrepreneurship has provided an incentive for democracy, China has a long tradition of meritocracy. Thus, the ways in which democratization can be combined with elitism is a new issue that needs to be explored. Zhang argues that it may be difficult to practice Taiwan's elective politics on the mainland during the initial stages of democratization. Rather, Hong Kong's election featured by functional groups may be more relevant to the mainland in the future.[18] In a similar way, the sociologist Qiu Zeqi of Peking University argues that Chinese traditional politics was shaped by the expectation of being ruled by a good emperor, rather than normal party politics. Qiu wonders what the social conditions for electoral democracy are and how to guarantee the rights and benefits of the majority people. According to him, democracy is a political issue per se, but in Taiwan it has become a technical issue during the transformation of the political institution and party system. In the United States, the political position is more important than practical issues and party has its own belief and political integrity. By contrast, political vision is subject to short-term practical issues for the maximization of votes in Taiwan. According to Qiu, it is important to ensure the existence of a fair and participatory democratic spirit. If citizens' electoral rights have been distorted as purchasable goods (votes) of political parties, election will be disgraced as a purely political give and take, resulted in political opportunism. Thus, the Mainland should learn from the United States, Australia, and Sweden to maintain the core value of

[18] Zhang, "Jingji ziyouhua," 227–32.

democracy, rather than evolving in interest-oriented competition among different forces and factions with political brand names.[19] Both Zhang and Qiu take a cautious position on the relevance of Taiwan's democratic experience to the Mainland. Their reservation, however, is based on the different stages of democratization between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait or the poor performance of Taiwan's democracy compared with Western democracies.

Democracy and the rule of law are the two sides of the same coin. Some law professors and experts have also taken account of Taiwan's experience in search for the Mainland's legal and political reforms. As Si Weijiang contends, legal reform on the Mainland cannot proceed without being accompanied by a parallel process of political reform. As a matter of fact, judicial reform per se is itself an aspect of political reform. According to Si, Taiwan's abolition of the Martial Law and other legal articles that prohibit the establishment of new parties is the precondition for political reform.[20] Liu Jianhong, of the National Chung Cheng University in Taiwan, has published a paper on the relevance of Taiwan's Administrative Procedure Law to the drafting of the same law in the mainland. This paper was published in the *Journal of Ganshu Administration University* (no. 4, 2011) and posted on the Web of Government under Rule of Law, China University of Political Science and Law. Its main argument is that Taiwan's Administrative Procedure Law is a product of the spirit of democracy and the rule of law. According to Taiwan's experience, whether or not such a law can be passed and enforced depends greatly on the attitude of the administrative departments. Only when civil servants realize that the administrative procedure law not only guarantee human rights in general, but also protects the interest of civil servants in particular, freeing them of injustice pressure, can the administrative departments wholeheartedly accept the administrative procedure law.[21]

Law Professor Xu Zhangrun of Tsinghua University has a very high opinion of legal studies in Taiwan. Xu notes that a unique phenomenon in the Mainland's law studies and teaching during the early and middle

[19] Qiu, "Taiwan xuanju yinfa sikao," 245–52.

[20] Si, "Taiwan sifa gaige jingyan."

[21] Liu, "Taiwan xingzheng chengxufa."

1980s was the diffusion into the Mainland of the works produced by Taiwan's law scholars, whose recent works received considerable attention from their counterparts on the Mainland. This was substantially different from the situation before 1979 when the two sides of the same Chinese nation were still unfortunately subject to military tension and political hostility. According to Xu, Taiwan was a small island compared with the Mainland; from the geographical, economic, political, and military perspectives, the so-called two sides of the Taiwan Strait are asymmetric and therefore the notion of the "two sides" is not an exact term to conceptualize their relations. In addition, Taiwan's population of 23 million was dwarfed by the 1.3 billion people on the Chinese Mainland. Simply as a result of the Cold War between the capitalist camp, led by the United States, and the socialist camp, led by the former Soviet Union, Taiwan gained its strategic importance in the game of the great powers. However, Taiwan's true leverage in cross-Strait relations lies not in its economic miracle, advanced weapons, or foreign support, but rather in its political culture and legal system that will contribute to the development toward constitutional democracy—based on economic and social developments—on the Mainland. Xu is happy to see that the historical isolation of Taiwan from the Mainland has contributed to the plural development of Chinese civilization on the island. Once the communication channels between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are open, each side can attempt to persuade the other of the benefits of its own system. Such cultural pluralism originates from different social environments of the two sides and will lead to the enrichment of Chinese civilization. Xu recognizes that law studies in Taiwan mark the continuity and development of the mainstream of Chinese legal tradition that can be traced back to the political reforms introduced in the later years of the Qing dynasty. By contrast, the legal system on the Mainland began from the revolutionary practice in the regions controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. This legal system, following the experience of Soviet Union and guided by the Marxist doctrine of class struggle, emphasizes the two virtues of simplicity and convenience to the people. Both systems are chosen by different groups of the people during the large-scale social and cultural transition in modern China, thus, demonstrating different patterns of westernization. According to Xu, the different legal systems operating on

the Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau have demonstrated the openness and creativity of Chinese civilization. The future development of the Chinese people is likely to be guided by modern Chinese legal civilization, rather than the moral civilization and religious civilization, which have played such a significant role in the country's history.[22]

Conclusion

Taiwan's economic miracle, the relatively equal distribution of income, social autonomy and plurality, democratic transition with political stability and effective governance, and the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, have all had positive impacts on the relevance of Taiwan's experience to the Mainland. The acceptance of Taiwan's successful experience in creating an economic miracle on the part of the Mainland's intellectuals has increased gradually over the years. The book compiled by Yi Gang demonstrates a departure from the earlier reserved viewpoints represented by Li Jiaquan. One should bear in mind the group of Chinese economists led by Yi Gang once studied in the United States had more opportunities to learn about Taiwan's development—thanks to their group-visiting to the island back in the early or mid-1990s—than their counterparts on the mainland at that time.

Meanwhile, the knowledge and acceptance of Taiwan's experience in social, legal, and democratic development have also expanded gradually among Chinese intellectuals on the Mainland. The image of Taiwan's democracy was damaged by the quality of democratic process on the island for some years, including the politics of corruption and "black gold," the endless boycotts as well as the occasional outbreaks of violence in the Legislative Yuan, and the ineffectiveness of the minority government under the leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The increasingly confident assertion of Taiwanese identity and the movement toward independence have also aroused great concern among Chinese intellectuals and thereby have reduced the appeal of Taiwan's democracy for the Mainland. The peaceful development of cross-Strait

[22] Xu, "Duoxiangdu xiandai hanyu wenming."

relations, however, has reduced the distance of the two societies in terms of political value and institutions. As the Mainlanders in general, and Chinese intellectuals in particular, have an increased number of opportunities to visit Taiwan, their perception of Taiwan's experience has moved to the positive direction.

This is not to suggest that the Chinese intellectuals on the Mainland will all take Taiwan's experience of democratization for granted. As discussed above, the mainlanders are divided with regard to their view of the relevance of Taiwan's democratic experience. Their perception of Taiwan is also conditioned by their social status. Just as Joseph Fewsmith argues, well-off people tend to be more conservative with regard to dramatic political changes on the Mainland.[23] In this sense, one should not exaggerate the impact of Mainland visitors to Taiwan on China's political development, as those people tend to be richer and more conservative. Political context has also had a substantial influence on the Mainlanders' thinking about Taiwan. Whether Taiwan's experiences are relevant depends, to a great degree, on the direction in which the Mainland wants to move. From the perspective of path dependency, economic, social, and political developments on the mainland have their own institutional logic. The impact of Taiwan's experience on the Mainland, therefore, can be neutralized by other important domestic factors.

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[23] Fewsmith, "Staying in Power," 213.

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4

Inspirations from Taiwan: The Perspective of Chinese Academic Visitors in Taiwan

Chih-Jou Jay Chen

Introduction

"The most beautiful scenery of Taiwan is the people" was the title of a special issue in July 2012 of *New Weekly*, a magazine published in Guangzhou. This issue sold out at newsstands across major Chinese cities within days of its release and a further 200,000 editions were sold in the form of a book volume.[1] This view of Taiwanese people was echoed widely in Internet discussion forums. It seems that while the island's cities appear downright provincial in comparison with the spanking-new metropolises of China, Taiwan has one attraction that remains unmatched.

This chapter examines Taiwan's impact on Chinese people through cross-strait social interaction by assessing which elements of Taiwan's institutions and life have touched and made the most impact on Chinese

[1] Xinzhoukan zazhishe, *Taiwan zuimei de fengjing*.

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people, particularly Mainland scholars and students visiting Taiwan for educational exchanges. The major finding of this study challenges the conventional belief that Taiwanese democracy and economic investments in China are the most impressive achievements of Taiwan for Chinese visitors. For those who have personally visited Taiwan and accumulated first-hand knowledge of the country, what has left the most indelible mark on their minds are the social relationships and interactions in daily life in Taiwan. For Chinese scholars and students, the democracy by popular vote sweeping Taiwanese society is something interesting, yet they don't perceive it as an urgent necessity for China itself. However, many Chinese visitors, particularly those who have prolonged their stay and experienced closer social interactions on the island, were overwhelmed and deeply touched by the intimate "Chineseness" they encountered in Taiwanese society which they felt was absent in their home society. It is this notion of Taiwan as a "dream home" away from home that naturally moved Chinese visitors to the island. This study also finds that there exist attitudinal variations between Chinese degree-seeking students and short-term Chinese visitors. The degree-seeking students who had spent longer periods of time in Taiwan tended to appreciate political freedom and have a more sympathetic understanding of political identities in Taiwan.

Before Taiwanese investment in China and cross-strait social interactions really took off in the 1990s, there had been more than thirty years of armed standoff and hostility across the Taiwan Strait, lasting from 1949 to the late 1980s. In 1987, President Chiang Ching-kuo of Taiwan finally ended the period of martial law and began to allow family visits to China. In 1990, Taiwan went further by opening itself up to Chinese professionals, scholars, and students to visit Taiwan as long as they secured prior approval. Through these developments—beginning with visiting relatives, attending funeral ceremonies, and advancing to professional, educational, and cultural exchanges—, cross-strait exchanges have seen an increasing number of people going back and forth, engaging in various types of activities and visiting areas that interest them. Even during the eight years from 2000 to 2008 when Chen Shui-bian of the DPP was in power and tensions across the Taiwan Strait were high, the level of Taiwanese investment in China and cross-strait social exchanges continued to rise steadily. Meanwhile, from the early 1990s to the late 2000s,

cross-strait exchanges had been unequal and asymmetrical; Taiwanese could freely enter China for business purposes, capital investments, travel, and study, while simultaneously, Chinese capital and tourism were barred from entering Taiwan. During this period, Chinese professionals, especially those involved in educational and cultural exchanges, were the main groups that visited Taiwan. Despite the paucity of visitors, they have made significant contributions to shaping public opinion on Taiwan in Mainland China.

Since the KMT returned to power and regained effective control of the government of Taiwan in 2008, there had been a significant warming of Taiwan's relationship with China. Between 2008 and 2015, the two sides held ten talks and signed 23 trade and investment pacts, initiated direct cross-strait flights and made Taipei the first market outside Hong Kong to be permitted to clear Renminbi transactions. In June 2010, the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) opened up substantial cross-strait economic relations with cultural, educational, and social exchanges in its wake. Two months later, in August 2010, Taiwan's legislature passed a bill recognizing the degrees of a total of 41 Chinese universities, and, as of 2016, the number of recognized Chinese universities had increased to 155. Meanwhile, Taiwan started to allow its universities and colleges to admit Chinese degree-seeking students. These events were a continuation of the June 2008 opening of Taiwan to Chinese tour groups, which has reached a daily quota of 5000 Chinese citizens since April 2013.[2]

In the initial stages of the opening of cross-strait exchanges in the late 1980s, the Taiwan government only allowed academic and professional exchanges. The intended goal of these visits was to use these exchanges to produce common understanding and trust in order to lay the social groundwork for future political and economic interaction. Activities pertaining to educational and cultural exchanges were meant to set a standard and a model that would transgress borders and to start a dialogue of values. Thus, these academic and cultural exchange programs not only cast their influence on the academic and cultural groups participating in these activities, but were also expected to have a spillover effect into the areas of both politics and economics.

[2] National Immigration Agency, "Statistics of Chinese Visitors."

In China and Taiwan, educational and cultural exchanges were often assigned the role of "publicizing value and fighting for people's hearts." Although there are tendencies to internationalize higher education leading to increased revenues for private universities in Taiwan, the governments in both Taiwan and China are fully cognizant that academic and cultural activities do have political overtones.[3] In this sense, cross-strait academic exchanges can be regarded as a major component of cultural politics or so-called "public diplomacy," promoted by the government but carried out by non-state institutions and scholars. In contemporary international relations, public diplomacy has been expanded from state institutions to encompass non-state actors, such as universities, associations, and churches. The most effective form of public diplomacy are people-to-people exchanges, as they involve understanding each other and the building of lasting relationships. As such, economic capacity and military force are deemed "hard power" factors, while public diplomacy is seen as a "soft power" factor which aims at the media, art, culture and the academia to achieve national interest.[4]

Since both confrontation and competition characterize cross-strait exchanges, both Taiwan and China use exchanges to win over the identification of the other side's intellectuals and cultural elites. After all, it is the academics and cultural elites who lead the ideas of civil society, foster public opinion, and influence the state's policies. Since the mid-1990s, as China's economic power burgeoned, Beijing has applied political and economic pressure on Taipei, aiming to bring Taiwan back onto the track of reunification. Thus, Taiwan has been gradually drawn into the economic ambit of China. As such, China uses cultural and educational exchanges to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese. Beijing is not overly concerned that the Chinese intellectuals and cultural elites visiting Taiwan might be influenced by their counterparts in Taiwan.

For its part Taiwan is confident that its market economy, social vitality, multi-party democracy, and free media will project a positive image to visitors from among China's cultural elite. The Taiwanese government

[3] For the internationalization of higher education in cross-strait academic exchange, see Chou and Ching, *Taiwan Education at Crossroad*, 263–74; Schucher, "Where Minds Meet."

[4] Nye, "Public Diplomacy Soft Power," 94–109; Nye, *Soft Power*.

expects that Chinese visitors' contacts with Taiwan's democratic politics and open society will promote civic awakening and political reform in China, and encourage Chinese visitors to adopt a more peaceful stance toward Taiwan. The democratic institutions and associational activities that Chinese visitors observe in Taiwan may induce a challenge to the legitimacy of China's one-party state and foster the development of a dynamic civil society in China.[5] More importantly, to Taiwan, cross-strait cultural and educational exchange is deemed helpful in improving mutual understanding and respect. This is especially the case in relation to reaching political reconciliation and achieving a shared consensus towards a lasting peace.

This chapter considers how Chinese visitors respond to Taiwan. It does so by drawing upon the data from a questionnaire survey and individual reports of Chinese scholars and students visiting Taiwan, as well as recent publications by Chinese students who have studied in Taiwan. It examines how, and to what extent, the ideal goal of cultural and educational exchange has been realized through visitors' visits to Taiwan. If it has, then what negative or positive impressions did Chinese visitors have of Taiwan? That is, what aspects of Taiwan are known and appreciated or criticised by visiting Chinese guests? And what kind of social institutions and mechanisms are involved in facilitating such an understanding and exchange? I shall first analyse the nature and development of cross-strait cultural and educational exchanges. I shall then highlight how individual perceptions of Chinese scholars are influenced through their visits to Taiwan, and outline the social and political implications of these exchanges.

A Survey of Chinese Academic Visitors to Taiwan

In the late 1980s, Taiwan for the first time in its nearly forty-year cross-strait confrontation with China opened its border to permit Chinese professionals to visit the country. Initially, there were only a limited number

[5] See also Goldstein, "Foreign Policy Tool," 23–50.

of visits, being made mostly by Chinese students studying abroad. By 1992, however, the number of Chinese professionals visiting Taiwan had begun to increase, exceeding an annual figure of 1,000. This number rose sharply from 3653 in 1993 to 15,105 in 2000. Since 2001, an average of more than 20,000 professionals have visited Taiwan every year. After the KMT returned to power under Ma Ying-jeou, the number of Chinese professional visitors more than doubled, rising to 45,106 in 2008, and to 113,673 in 2009. In the period 2010–2013, an annual average of 150,000 Chinese professional visitors went to Taiwan, with educational and cultural exchanges accounting for around 57 percent of these. Meanwhile, the number of Chinese tourists to Taiwan first surpassed that of Chinese professionals in 2005, and the gap has been widening with the influx of Chinese tourists increasing rapidly, from 54,162 in 2005 to more than two million after 2012 (2,263,476 in 2013) (Table 4.1).

The data for this research were drawn from a survey conducted by the Chinese Development Fund.[6] The survey was conducted during the period of 2008–2010, interviewing 1,720 Chinese visitors who entered Taiwan for educational and cultural exchanges. Of these respondents, the largest group was composed of university professors, accounting for 44 percent of the total professional visitors, followed by students (28 percent), and other professionals (from media, culture and arts, and religious spheres) (also 28 percent). The majority of the respondents, 29 percent, were middle aged, being 39 to 48 years old. This group of academic visitors was highly educated, with 27 percent of them holding PhDs, 19 percent master's degrees, and 41 percent bachelor's degrees. For 82 percent of the respondents, this was their first visit to Taiwan.

Nearly all those interviewed carried lasting memories of their historic visit to Taiwan, with 66 percent replying they were "very satisfied" and 33 percent that they were "satisfied." Furthermore, all replied in the affirmative when asked if their trip to Taiwan was worth it: 75 percent said it was "very much worth it" and 25 percent stated it was simply "worth it." The inquiry as to whether the visit would impact on their fields of expertise elic-

[6] Chinese Development Fund (CDF; Zhonghua Fazhan Jijing Hui) is a non-profit fund established by the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwanese government. It relies on government revenue to promote cross-strait civilian exchanges.

Table 4.1 Number of Chinese visitors to Taiwan, 1988–2013

	Professionals	Cultural and educational visitors	Tourists
1988	5		
1989	71		
1990	78		
1991	205		
1992	1029		
1993	3653		
1994	3525		
1995	5379		
1996	6195		
1997	9426		
1998	12,665		
1999	14,575		
2000	15,105		
2001	25,718	13,743	N/A
2002	38,656	21,014	2151
2003	23,723	21,434	12,768
2004	28,868	14,945	19,150
2005	24,261	16,186	54,162
2006	28,572	19,819	98,548
2007	31,786	21,638	81,903
2008	45,106	27,912	90,035
2009	113,673	51,718	601,754
2010	158,530	89,469	1,188,929
2011	156,221	92,334	1,286,574
2012	155,173	85,106	2,001,941
2013	150,260	87,364	2,263,476
2014 (Jan.–Sep.)	113,302	26,441	2,470,217
Total	1,165,760	589,123	10,171,608

Sources:

1. Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan. http://www.mac.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=5717&CtUnit=3993&BaseDSD=7&mp=1
2. National Immigration Agency, Taiwan. http://www.immigration.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=1222244&ctNode=29699&mp=1

ited three responses: 39 percent replied it had a significant impact while a larger percentage (52 percent) said that it had somewhat of an impact, and a small number (9 percent) replied it had little impact. Thus, this survey safely concluded that these first-time academic visitors and professionals to Taiwan were favourably impressed and had an enjoyable visit which significantly impacted their professional expertise and disciplines (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of a survey of Chinese academic visitors to Taiwan, 2008–2010

	2008–2010	
Questions asked about this visit in Taiwan	Number	Percent
Being satisfied with the arrangement of this activity?		
Very satisfied	1109	66
Satisfied	563	33
Not satisfied	14	1
Very not satisfied	1	0
Total	1687	100
If the trip to Taiwan worth it?		
Very worth it	1257	75
Worth it	417	25
Not worth it	6	0
Not worth it at all	1	0
Total	1681	100
Whether it had an impact on your field of expertise?		
Had little impact	146	9
Had somewhat of an impact	874	52
Had a significant positive impact	659	39
Total	1679	100
How is the level of Taiwan's democracy than originally expected?		
Much better	175	14
A little better	507	40
No difference; as expected	465	37
A little worse	90	7
Much worse	19	2
Total	1256	100
How is the level of Taiwan's economy than originally expected?		
Much better	134	10
A little better	476	36
No difference; as expected	386	30
A little worse	296	23
Much worse	14	1
Total	1306	100
How is the level of Taiwan's living standards than originally expected?		
Much better	162	12
A little better	565	43
No difference; as expected	436	33
A little worse	137	11
Much worse	4	0
Total	1304	100
Ever visited a tourist site?		

(*continued*)

Table 4.2 (continued)

Questions asked about this visit in Taiwan	2008–2010	
	Number	Percent
Yes	1515	90
No	169	10
Total	1684	100
How is the attraction than originally expected?		
Much better	452	30
A little better	623	41
No difference; as expected	255	17
A little worse	171	11
Much worse	14	1
Total	1515	100
Had interaction with Taiwanese people in the trip?		
Yes	1611	95
No	83	5
Total	1694	100
If Taiwanese people sociable?		
A vast majority are	1214	75
A majority are	353	22
More are sociable	41	3
Less are sociable	3	0
Total	1611	100
Watched TV news broadcasts in Taiwan?		
Yes	1251	75
No	408	25
Total	1659	100
How is Taiwan's news broadcasts compared with China's?		
Livelier	1017	81
No difference	172	14
Less lively	62	5
Total	1251	100
Watched the political talk shows on TV in Taiwan?		
Yes	626	39
No	999	61
Total	1625	100
Like the political talk shows on TV in Taiwan?		
Very like	154	25
Like	307	49
Don't like	148	24
Don't like very much	17	3
Total	626	100
The effects of these political talk shows on TV		

(*continued*)

Table 4.2 (continued)

Questions asked about this visit in Taiwan	2008–2010	
	Number	Percent
Would engender social conflict	111	27
A good way to express opinions	301	73
Total	412	100

Source: Data are drawn from a survey conducted by the Management Committee of the Chinese Development Fund, Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan

The survey also asked respondents about their impressions with regard to politics, economics, and civilian life in Taiwan. Their overall impression was better than they had initially expected. More specifically, on politics, 54 percent indicated that the level of Taiwan's democracy was better than they had originally expected (including "much better" and, less enthusiastically, "a little better"). A small number (9 percent), the least fervent, replied that it was worse than they expected (including "much worse" and "a little worse"). The rest, a large number, 37 percent of them, replied that they felt no better or worse than expected in terms of politics in Taiwan. Taiwan's economic development impressed a large majority, with 46 percent saying it was better than expected. A significant minority (24 percent) found it worse, and 30 percent said it was as expected. Regarding social life, a large majority (55 percent) were impressed by the country's living standards and said that it was better than expected. A small minority commented it was worse than expected, and 33 percent said there was no difference. It should be noted that even though these visitors were highly educated and well informed, they still did not know much about Taiwan before they came here. A majority of them found Taiwan better than expected, particularly with regard to Taiwan's politics and living standards.

Although these visitors were attending educational or cultural activities and not visiting Taiwan as tourists, 90 percent of those surveyed said they had visited at least one particular tourist site. Of those who visited tourist sites in Taiwan, 71 percent thought the attractions were better than expected, while 11 percent considered them to be worse. An overwhelming majority of them, 95 percent, stated they had interacted with

Taiwanese people and also almost all of them, namely 97 percent, found the Taiwanese to be sociable.

In addition to tourist attractions such as scenic spots, historic sites, night markets, and local snacks, Chinese visitors to Taiwan were most interested in the news broadcasts and talk shows about Taiwan politics. Three-quarters of respondents said during their trips they watched Taiwan's TV news broadcasts. Of this number, 81 percent thought Taiwan's broadcasts were livelier than those in China. In addition to news broadcasts, 40 percent stated that they also watched the political talk shows and debates on TV. Of those who watched the political talk shows, 74 percent replied they liked these shows and thought that it was a good way to express opinions and it would not engender social conflict.

In addition to the closed-ended questions described above, the questionnaire also used open-ended questions to ask about events or experiences which left the deepest impressions of Taiwan on the respondents' consciousness. In order to systematize the responses, I first converted all the replies into text files, before dividing them into subcategories. They were classified into three layers (politics, economy, and society), and then into 19 smaller categories. The analysis found that what had the most profound impact on visitors were social aspects, including daily life in Taiwan, personal interactions, people's hospitality and friendliness, and the lifestyles of the people. Civic volunteer groups were also mentioned as an added attraction. On average, every respondent raised a social category at least once (on average 1.2 times). In comparison, the categories of Taiwan politics and economic development were mentioned less often; on average, respondents mentioned them less than once per person.

To summarize, the survey above shows that before Chinese visitors came to Taiwan their impressions drawn from textbooks, propaganda, and media were more about tall buildings to accommodate the heavy population density of a chaotic and tumultuous democracy. After their first-hand personal experiences in Taiwan, they largely discovered that Taiwan did not conform to their original impressions. The most profound impression of the majority of respondents was in the area of social life and social relationships, rather than in either economic accomplishment or democratic politics. In the open-ended part of the questionnaire, respondents often mentioned or commented on the Taiwanese people's

politeness and hospitality, their care and respect for elders and disabled persons, gender equality, social diversity, customer service, dynamics of religious expression, investment in education, civic organizations, and people's mutual trust. They made relatively fewer comments about economic activities and political events in Taiwan.

Reports from and Interviews with Chinese Students and Scholars

The subjects of the survey discussed in the previous section travelled to Taiwan where they stayed for periods between five and 12 days, usually as part of a group. To further explore views of Chinese scholars and students, this section uses information from their written reports and my own interviews, collected between 2008 and 2010. The year of 2008 represented a turning point in Chinese students coming to Taiwan to study since before this date there were only a few hundred Chinese students coming to Taiwan for short research trips, each staying for between two and four months. From 2008 to 2012, the numbers of Chinese exchange students coming to Taiwan increased tenfold from 1321 in 2008 to 15,590 in 2012, before jumping to 21,233 in 2013. From 2011, universities in Taiwan began to accept degree students from China pursuing undergraduate and graduate education. This number quickly increased from 928 in 2011, to 1864 in 2012, and 3554 in 2013. In 2013, there were 29,228 Chinese students enrolled in Taiwan's universities, of which 12 percent were degree students and 73 percent exchange students staying for one to two semesters (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Number of Chinese students in Taiwan

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Degree students	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	928	1864	3554
Exchange students	448	823	1321	2888	5316	11,227	15,590	21,233
Short-term auditors	1245	1146	1258	1307	1604	2265	3163	3163
Special programs	284	443	419	562	679	861	882	1278
Total	1977	2412	2998	4757	7599	15,281	21,499	29,228

Source: Ministry of Education, Taiwan

These Chinese students had different agendas than tourists from China. They went to Taiwan, joining different universities and staying for varying lengths of time. They had a variety of different experiences with the universities, society, and communities of Taiwan. It is expected that these students would become elites in various spheres and would have significant social influence in Chinese society. Thus, it is worth noting their feelings about Taiwan and the most vivid impressions they carry of Taiwan.

Not-So-Impressive City Landscape but Easy Accessibility

When reminiscing about their visits to Taiwan, the first impression of the Chinese students was the relatively poor state of Taiwanese infrastructure when compared with so many modernized cities on the Mainland. Their first impression of the architecture and city planning of Taiwanese cities was that it lagged behind in comparison to Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and other major Chinese cities. In the words of one student:

> Taipei and Kaohsiung are like second-tier cities in China. Taiwan buildings are old, small, and decrepit. Many are losing a layer of paint. Beijing buildings are like steamed bun just pulled from the oven: the colour is beautiful and they are especially fresh. But Taiwan buildings and streets are not even up to Shenzhen standards![7]

After speaking of this impression of the appearance of Taiwan's infrastructure, some of the Chinese students also acknowledged that the reason for its poor state was a result of property rights protection. Their understanding was that new buildings in Taiwan's cities were slow moving. A related issue was the accessibility of infrastructure. They were impressed with the highly developed and large number of universities and colleges, their well-equipped libraries and the easy accessibility of their services. In the separate remarks of two graduate students:

[7] A written report of a Chinese graduate exchange student A, 2007.

> Library infrastructure is excellent. You can freely enter and exit, sit and read, and there are even couches to recline upon. On the Mainland, students need to show their ID to go in and out, and department libraries won't let other departments' students enter.[8]
>
> If you compare Taiwan and the Mainland as two houses, the outside of Taiwan is a bit old, but when you go inside and look it is all decorated and adorned and the service quality is great. On the Mainland, outside appearance is new and shiny, but inside it is as flimsy and porous as tofu dregs. The Mainland is a large structure, but inside it is sparse. Taiwan is very small, but has great attention to detail and warmth.[9]

Apparently and understandably, Chinese visitors were not coming to see any high-end urban development and building construction in Taiwan. Nonetheless, they still felt surprised to see such an "unimpressive" city look in the supposedly highly developed urban Taipei. They liked to compare Taiwan with China's second-tier or even third-tier cities, which also have very new constructions that have not been around long enough to show signs of wear and tear. Chinese visitors soon found that although the Taiwanese themselves also complained about how ugly and boxy their buildings were, these buildings were still comfortable to live and work in because they were well maintained on the inside. Probably due to the surprise of seeing old and shabby buildings in Taipei, many Chinese visitors felt a strong contrast when they experienced the politeness and friendliness of people afterwards.

The Embodiment of a Harmonious Society

From 2004 onwards, the slogan of a "harmonious society" became China's announced objective, and the oft-repeated phrase was on everyone's lips. According to Chinese students and scholars, however, Taiwan is the real harmonious society. During their visits, they were much impressed by people's orderly behaviour and civil character. They found that Taiwanese society ran smoothly in good order and people were treated as "human

[8] A written report of a Chinese graduate exchange student B, 2007.

[9] A written report of a Chinese graduate exchange student C, 2008.

beings." They mostly agreed the Taiwanese people to be hospitable, polite, and courteous. Their sense of civic values was high; they were gracious and respectful and frequently expressed phrases of appreciation, gratitude and respectful regret. Chinese students commented on the cultured manner in which Taiwanese people thanked one, excused one, and were sorry if they were unable to provide for any simple request. Visiting Chinese students observed that they "have never seen this kind of behaviour" before. "When I first arrived I could not get used to it," one student said. She had been to Shanghai, Beijing, and Taipei, and though she felt the infrastructure of Taipei was not comparable to Shanghai and Beijing, "the difference was in people's character." Taiwan's harmonious society left a lasting impression on its Mainland visitors.

For example, Chinese students most often referred to the experience of seeing people queue at the subway station as an illustration of Taiwanese civil character. They reflected and explained:

> In 2008, Beijing hosted the Olympics and citizens had to practise "civilized behaviour." At the time, university students volunteered to stand in the subway demonstrating how to line up. At the Shanghai World Exhibition, the city even printed up a "civilization manual," telling people what was civilized behaviour. But in Taiwan, this kind of civilization education is not necessary at all.[10]
>
> The civic consciousness of Taipei residents is high, and this is reflected in many aspects of life, such as separation of garbage, observation of no eating or drinking on public transportation, and standing to one side on the escalator. In these ways, the public consciousness of citizens is naturally revealed.[11]

In addition to the order of daily life, the social values and norms in Taiwan also made a deep impression on Chinese students. They often mentioned the politeness of the Taiwanese, the attitude toward the elderly, gender equality, tolerance toward diversity, customer service, and dynamic religious activities.

[10] A written report of a Chinese undergraduate student D, 2009.

[11] Ibid.

> In truth, I have never been to 101, one of the tallest buildings in the world. Rather it is the common interactions that I find the most appealing here—discussions with my professors, working with my classmates, chatting with the owner of the copy shop. These all leave me with an impression of the spirit of responsibility, law abiding, and courtesy. This is something that we lost after the Cultural Revolution in China.[12]

What left a lasting impression on Chinese scholars and students in Taiwan were the island's social relations particularly between "strangers," which extended beyond the traditional Chinese family ties and the circle of close friends. It was this equality in social relations and respect in interpersonal interactions that made a particular impression on Chinese visitors. One witnessed this considerate and respectable quality apparent in the daily life of a shopkeeper, a librarian, a bus driver, and even among professors and classmates.

> In mainland China there are two popular phrases now: harmony and humanism (*yi ren wei ben*; Putting People First). These are just slogans in China advising people and officials on ways of observing good civic habits, but in Taiwan they are the normal habits of ordinary people.[13]
>
> Taiwan is not the flourishing place that I thought, but it does give one a sense of cordiality. But more so, Taiwan makes people fall in love not with its cities but with its hospitable and friendly people. For example, the service has a high standard and salesclerks have a great attitude. It is like if you don't buy from them you feel bad.[14]

Diversity and Vitality of Civil Society

The vitality of Taiwanese civil society and its civic organizations also leaves Chinese students and academics suitably impressed. One visiting student said:

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[12] A written report of a Chinese graduate student D, 2009.

[13] A written report of a Chinese graduate exchange student E, 2008.

[14] A written report of a Chinese graduate exchange student F, 2008.

> Taiwan has many civic organizations that have had a significant impact on society. Many people volunteer to serve in various social associations in temples, schools, museums, and hospitals. This is valuable social capital.[15]
>
> Taiwan has many different ethnic groups coming from different places and with different backgrounds. This is the situation, but we found that there is no ethnic conflict or racial problems. This is a diverse society allowing many different voices to exist. In Taiwan we discovered that people express their opinions and ideas very directly and frankly; no matter if it is about politics or public policy. If they have something to say they just say it. The news media is also very rich with different view points.[16]

Chinese students' most direct experience of Taiwan's pluralistic society is in their observation and participation of campus events and street protests. In April 2010, students' associations at National Taiwan University (NTU) held an event called "Doing Gender." The topic was "Climax Without Guilt; Diversity of Sexual Fun." Through an exhibition of sex toys and a series of lectures, the aim was to transcend sexual taboos and make it a subject that can be openly discussed. Seeing one of the posters around campus, a Chinese student expressed shocked surprise, taking a picture of the poster and posting it on her Weibo page to share with her friends on the Mainland, one of whom commented: "If this happened in our school on the Mainland, it would have quickly been blocked"

At the end of 2009, a plan to begin charging fees for the use of campus buses at NTU provoked a strong student backlash, with students circulating a petition and organizing a protest. A Chinese student remembered seeing the posters for the event and reacting with disbelief. He observed that the student union in China was just like the National Congress of the Communist Party, with its members automatically standing to applaud every proposal provided by the government.

> Taiwan has real student unions, taking on responsibilities to reflect students' opinions and dare to challenge the university. In China our student unions just hold events, and do not address issues of conflict between students and the school. They do everything else but standing up for students' rights.[17]

[15] A written report of a Chinese undergraduate exchange student G, 2009.

[16] Ibid.

[17] A written report of a Chinese undergraduate exchange student H, 2008.

On October 30, 2010, Taiwan held its annual lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) pride parade in the capital. University student groups from all over Taiwan turned it into a gala event, making flamboyant speeches and flying rainbow banners. There was a carnival atmosphere with all the bustle and excitement underlying the seriousness of the parade, which demanded a free society without let or hindrance. The Chinese students who attended said it was their first participation in a political or social protest parade. Chinese students were aghast; they were not allowed to form gay and lesbian pride groups or discuss same-sex attraction issues in China. Thus, their witnessing of this kind of openness in Taiwan was an eye-opener. One student said that because of this parade he began to consider questions that he had not considered before, such as, "If I were a Chinese political leader, would I allow gay or lesbian issues to be discussed so openly? Would I allow same-sex marriages?"

Chinese students personally observed and vividly experienced key elements of a civil society in Taiwan, namely, open discussions on public issues, the transparent governance of public affairs, and respect for civil rights. This was an exceptional civil society, in contrast to what they had experienced in China where there were numerous repressions and prohibitions. As one Chinese student said, "We are coming from an abnormal society to a normal society, from an uncomfortable life to a comfortable life." They seemed to be taking a cross-strait civics course.[18]

The Relaxed University Campus Life

Chinese students respect and praise their professors in Taiwan for their commitment to research and devotion to teaching. However, they have differing opinions as to many Taiwanese students' carefree, independent, and happy demeanour. They are most aware of the difference among students on each side of the Strait. Chinese students are characterized as serious, aggressive, ambitious, and goal-oriented. Chinese students said that they found it impossible to relax at university because the level of academic competition was so fierce. Most Chinese students are bright

[18] Keo, "Kuahai gongminke," 17–20.

and shrewd, studying with the ferocity that is required by market competition. They worship certificates which attest to qualifications, and are target-oriented, always thinking about the future road ahead. Chinese students' view of Taiwanese students is that they are simple, cheerful, and "laid-back," but also not vigorous and even too lazy.

One Chinese student explained that she could see the enthusiasm in the eyes of Taiwan students. In comparing student organizations across the strait, she said,

> Chinese student organizations are more goal-orientated with a focus on the collective. Taiwanese student organizations are for nurturing the individual. They emphasize that everyone should enjoy themselves in the activity and have personal growth.[19]

Chinese students complained that Chinese education and student life puts all the emphasis on course work and does not consider any other aspects of student life. The extracurricular activities for Taiwanese students allowed people to develop their interests and even to prolong graduation. This kind of "unproductive" activity, they said, was uncommon and abnormal in China.

> Social pressure in China is particularly acute; especially since everyone wants to join the elite and cannot afford to take a wrong step. Taiwanese society respects the individual and allows young people to flourish and gives them room for caprice and experiment. Taiwanese young people can develop their interest into a career. The society can accept this kind of play. Taiwan's diverse culture and tolerance nurtures Taiwanese young people to happiness. Outside of the social framework people can go different directions and discover their own character. In Taiwan there are many roads one can choose, whereas in China there is only one road that one has to continue to follow to the end.[20]

Student–teacher relationships in Taiwan, as well as student relationships, also leave Chinese students with a deep impression and a range of mixed

[19] A written report of a Chinese undergraduate exchange student I, 2007.

[20] A written report of a Chinese undergraduate exchange student J, 2009.

feelings. They found the relationships in the classroom to be warm and equal, and based on mutual respect and autonomy for each student. Taiwanese students do not have to cultivate personal relationships with professors in order to earn a high grade.

> Education for all, respect for democracy, and learning by teaching, these are the biggest lessons that I have learned here. The phrase 'education for all' means that teachers treat students equally and fairly. Democracy and respect in the classroom between students and teachers and among students are expressed in their communication and treating each other equally. In China, however, the teacher's authority cannot be challenged, and conflicts among professors will influence students. Malicious slanders toward professors or students are common on campus.[21]

The impression that Taiwanese students are laid-back and relaxed might not be concurred with by those degree-seeking Chinese students who are studying hard in graduate schools in Taiwan. The students and professors they met in graduate schools, particularly in top universities in Taiwan, were working seriously and tirelessly day and night, no less than their counterparts in China. What Chinese students did greatly appreciate was that they felt Taiwanese scholars were "for real" and that they had "substance" with regard to their researches, whereas Chinese scholars were more interested in "name-dropping" and "false erudition" rather than to go beyond the superficial in an analysis.[22]

Experiencing Chinese Culture in Taiwan

Visiting Chinese students attributed the particular nature of Taiwan's social system and life as being due to the presence of traditional Chinese culture. They expressed feeling especially close to culture and art, citing Chinese characters and literature, architecture, drama, popular rituals, funerals, prayer, and the type of common courtesy among individuals. All of these things they found to be the expression of Chinese culture. Many of them expressed the opinion that Taiwan had preserved traditional Chinese culture which had been lost in present-day China.

[21] A written report of a Chinese graduate exchange student K, 2008.

[22] Huang et al., *Lusheng Yuannian*, 135–7.

> In Taiwan, technology and economic development have not hampered the temples that you see everywhere. The grand temple fairs are held right by your side. Taiwan has preserved Chinese traditional culture, carried it forward, and enhanced it in ways much better than has China. I am quite moved by how Taiwan has cherished and protected Chinese traditional culture.[23]
>
> In my eyes, Taiwan is more Chinese than China. In China, much of traditional culture was wiped out during the Cultural Revolution. Everywhere in Taiwan, however, you can see these things—the Earth God Temples, memorial gateways, funerary practices, various rituals for inviting and sending off spirits. It really is more Chinese than China![24]
>
> Before I came to Taiwan I already knew that there was a movement of Taiwanization and "Desinicization" and thus was a bit worried over the future of Taiwan. After coming, however, I realized that the so called Desinicization would not succeed because I deeply felt Taiwan is more Chinese than China.[25]

Many Chinese visitors felt a strong sense of affinity while walking in the alleys and streets in Taiwan, not only because many streets in Taiwan are named after Chinese provinces and cities, but also because in visiting them they felt they were encountering their old home towns in their memories, which mostly had been torn down in China's recent wave of urbanization. One Chinese student compared wandering in the neighborhoods in Taipei to walking in the old Shanghai in the 1980s. "Taipei's tree-lined boulevards are just like the Hengshan Road of Shanghai."[26] However, these kinds of similarities no longer exist across the strait today, and it makes Chinese visitors nostalgic when experiencing familiar old scenes and life styles in Taiwan.

Experiencing Democracy in Person

Social life and human interaction in Taiwan, including democracy, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly, have all touched visiting Chinese students. The 2010 mayoral elections and the 2012 presidential elections

[23] A written report of a Chinese undergraduate exchange student L, 2008.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Huang et al., *Lusheng Yuannian*, 193.

on the island gave Chinese student visitors an intimate experience of Taiwanese democracy. One Chinese student said it was the first time that he had experienced an election, and that there was more to Taiwanese politics than just fist fights in the congress. They saw the streets filled with festive election banners and candidates standing on their campaign trucks driving by and asking for votes, and they themselves attended public election campaigns where they listened in rapt attention to election speeches. The students found a great difference between what they saw on the media and their own experience with Taiwanese society, which gave them new insights into Taiwan's democratic politics.

> I lived in China for twenty-one years and I never knew what an election was. Chinese elections are not transparent, and we don't know when there is an election, it is that suddenly somebody has been elected. I don't even know who our district magistrate is.[27]
>
> Taiwan democratized through several twists and turns, and there is no doubt that this is a great political breakthrough. From my own perspective, no matter what kind of problem arises in an election—some intrigue or vote buying—it is not entirely a bad thing.[28]
>
> Taiwan's party conflicts are still within democratic and legal frameworks. It can be said to be an orderly chaos, and it pales in comparison with the Cultural Revolution. My personal experience from living in Taipei and the Taiwan that is on the TV are two different Taiwans. Turning on the TV or opening the newspaper you can see all kinds of social chaos: political deadlock and protest, an economy in the doldrums, corruption scandals, and a deteriorating social order. This TV Taiwan makes people a bit worried. Then there is the other Taiwan that one personally witnesses, a humane and gracious society that adheres to a sincere civic culture. Putting these two Taiwans together creates an illusion, but which Taiwan is the correct one?[29]

Taiwan's lively election campaigns were indeed something novel and impressive for Chinese visitors, but few of them reflected on the extent to which Taiwanese democracy could be transplanted to China. They often

[27] A written report of a Chinese graduate exchange student M, 2008.

[28] A written report of a Chinese undergraduate exchange student G, 2009.

[29] A written report of a Chinese graduate exchange student N, 2009.

regard China as such a huge continental country with a large and diverse population that Western liberal democracy would be unable to offer a suitable model for its national development. Most Chinese scholars and students believed Taiwan's democracy was handed down by strongman Chiang Ching-kuo and only made possible by the smallness of the island – in both geographic and demographic terms. They were hardly aware that Taiwan's democracy was something fought for by Taiwanese people over several decades. They considered China to be too big and complex and, therefore, that its political system could not be equated with that of Taiwan. For them, democracy was an optional goal for national development, not a right people deserve. They cherish and value social equality, public engagement, and people's virtues in Taiwanese society, but they might not think those good social characters and interpersonal civility are associated with political institutions that underpin a dynamic civil society.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined and analysed the viewpoints of Chinese scholars and students who have either visited or studied in Taiwan. Before they came to Taiwan, they had certain fixed images of the island that were gleaned from textbooks and media as an island of skyscrapers, tempting tourist attractions such as Sun Moon Lake and Alishan, a tumultuous democracy, and probably the rejection of Chinese people. However, after several days or months spent in Taiwan, their impressions had changed considerably. They were most moved not by Taiwan's productive economic development or fashionable department stores, but rather by the normal everyday displays of hospitality, its engaging interaction with strangers, the nurturing prevalence of its traditional culture everywhere, and the vitality of Taiwanese civil society. They were visibly touched by Taiwanese good-natured kindness, equality and trust, values and beliefs, and civic organizations. For those who had stayed longer as exchange or degree-seeking students, many of them found it appealing to investigate social movements through participant observation. They attended protests and demonstrations with their Taiwanese schoolmates, and found

Taiwan's social movements a progressive force highlighting the island's vibrant democracy.

One fundamental reason for Chinese visitors being profoundly touched in Taiwan might be that they see Taiwan as a Chinese society with which they share a common origin, and a "province of China," a legacy from the unfinished Chinese Civil War of 1945 to 1949. For them, Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory. Even for those who denounced the Chinese Communist Party in China and supported Taiwan's democracy, they found it hard to perceive Taiwan as an unrelated independent country. Therefore, they felt confounded and frustrated when encountering Taiwan's growing independent identity and anti-China sentiment, which developed rapidly among the young generation in Taiwan, particularly during and after the Sunflower movement in the spring of 2014. For example, in an island-wide survey conducted in 2014, 60 percent of the respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, the highest level since such surveys began in 1992, whereas 33 percent identified themselves as "Taiwanese and Chinese," and only 4 percent as Chinese, with both of these latter figures being the lowest since the surveys began.[30] When Chinese visitors acknowledged that the Taiwanese are more Chinese than themselves, they would have a mixed bitter feeling encountering more and more Taiwanese refusing to be Chinese.[31]

Overall, then, Taiwan's open politics and democracy, its social equality and freedom, and its economic prosperity and innovation are all spheres of Taiwan's unique culture which engages China. Taiwan's social system displays vast seminal differences in comparison with China's repressed and contradictory society based on authoritarian governance contrary to Taiwanese democracy. For Taiwan, the anticipation of cross-strait social exchanges is to make Chinese visitors feel the difference between open democratic societies and closed societies. The openness, equality, and good nature of Taiwanese society have had a considerable impact on Chinese visitors, and would surely have increased their understanding and identification with the island. It also brings about political implica-

[30] BBC, "Taiwan independence."

[31] Hu, *Taiwan bushi wode jia*.

tions. Chinese visitors will ask of themselves and their government: if people in Taiwan can enjoy individual rights and dignity, and the feeling is wonderful when one enjoys them on a routine basis, then why can't Chinese people enjoy the same? Hopefully, in the long run, this can lead to substantial political reforms in China and a greater mutual understanding and peaceful relationship between the two societies across the turbulent waters of the Taiwan Strait.

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5

Taiwan's Contribution to China's Economic Rise and Its Implications for Cross-Strait Integration

Shelley Rigger and Gunter Schubert

The Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949 resolved to create a socialist economy in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Within a few years, both private property and open markets were gone, being replaced by state ownership of the means of production and the state-planned allocation of resources. Labor markets were replaced by a household registration (*hukou*) system that kept rural workers in agriculture and urban workers tethered to their assigned work units (*danwei*). At the end of the Great Leap Forward, the country witnessed the brief emergence of small-scale private production and local micro-markets, but these were quickly wiped out by the spasm of Communist orthodoxy that accompanied the Cultural Revolution. They finally re-emerged more than a decade later,

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when Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms began to take hold. For three decades China had no private ownership and no free markets—in short, no business. And yet today, less than forty years after the beginning of the reform process, China is a global business leader, being home to some of the world's largest companies and host to more foreign direct investment than any other nation—some $126 billion in 2015.[1] Its factories provide a vast array of goods to consumers around the world and much of its output hits the market under foreign brands. It is impossible to avoid the question: How did China go from being a nation without business to a leading economic player in a global market economy in just thirty years?

Most explanations of China's explosive economic growth focus on Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, which unleashed China from its Maoist straitjacket. But the ending of Mao's policies was no guarantee of success for the PRC economy (as is amply demonstrated by several of the economies in the former Soviet bloc). While permitting markets undoubtedly induced a commercial revival, there is a vast distance between petty trading and export-oriented contract manufacturing for global branded companies. Thus, the particular trajectory of China's development has raised a second question: Why and how did China's fledgling market economy become integrated into global manufacturing networks?

A complete answer to either of these questions would include many elements, but one of the most important (perhaps *the most* important) is foreign direct investment. And among investors, those originating in Taiwan played an especially important role. Their investment did more than finance China's economic expansion. Taiwanese investors, more than any other actor, introduced the contemporary business practices that enabled China to become a central player in twenty-first-century global capitalism. In the words of Chen and Tao, "Within China's massive process of transformation, *Taishang* [Taiwan-originated entrepreneurs] were the most important source of foreign investment for export manufacturing and a critical behind-the-scenes provider of stable support for China's maturing developmental model."[2] In Chinese parlance, the PRC business community "borrowed a boat to go to sea" (*jiechuan chuhai*). The boat was made in Taiwan.

[1] Xinhua, "FDI Rises 6.4 %."

[2] Chen and Tao, "Quanqiu ziben zhuyi," 52.

Over time, the importance of this borrowed boat has diminished as Mainland-born firms have learned to build their own boats, often following Taiwanese blueprints. Still, the effects of Taiwanese direct investment on the Chinese economy were transformative. As we will discuss later in this chapter, the effects on political relations between the two sides have been far more limited.

Borrowing a Boat to Go to Sea

The levels of cross-Strait trade and investment grew continually from the late 1980s until the 2008 recession, with the rates of increase rising sharply after the two sides joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2000/2001. After the recession, the rates rebounded, although not to the supercharged levels of the early 2000s (Fig. 5.1). This extraordinary process began in 1987 when President Chiang Ching-kuo decided to abandon his government's forty-year old policy of no contact, no compromise, and no negotiation with the Mainland and allow the Taiwanese to visit family members from whom they had been separated since the end of the Chinese civil war. Taiwanese who visited the Mainland in the early years were struck by both its backwardness and its



Fig. 5.1 Taiwan's trade and investment in Mainland China

potential. In the late 1980s the PRC was emerging from economic isolation, but it still had a large population of underemployed workers that Beijing was eager to move off state-owned enterprises' payrolls and into more productive activities. Meanwhile, in Taiwan, rising wages and land prices and increasing demands for labour rights and environmental regulation were raising the cost of traditional manufacturing in such sectors as apparel and shoes.

The appearance of a relocation destination that was welcoming, linguistically familiar, close at hand, and equipped with abundant labor could not have been more perfectly timed to revivify sunset industries and provide aging companies (and their managers) what the Taiwanese call a second spring. The labor-intensive manufacturers who made up the first wave of Taiwanese migration to the PRC moved swiftly: in less than five years, the "made in China" label had completely displaced "made in Taiwan" in the US footwear market.[3] It wasn't Chinese companies making those shoes, however, but Taiwanese manufacturers who had shifted their operations to the Mainland. When they relocated to the Mainland, the Taiwan-based entrepreneurs—*Taishang*—transferred more than money. They also brought the know-how and connections they had acquired during Taiwan's decades as a manufacturing hub. Taiwan firms' well-established role as contract manufacturers for global companies enabled the factories they opened in China to jump the queue and become suppliers to mid- and high-end global brands. In the words of You-tien Hsing, "Taiwanese investors managed to improve productivity and to transfer managerial know-how and the capitalist ideology of efficiency to China, and thus paved a fast lane for local China to link up with the world market."[4]

One critical difference between *Taishang* and other outside investors was their preference for directly managed operations over portfolio investment and joint ventures.[5] By 2008, hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese investors had established operations in Mainland China,

[3] Naughton, *Chinese Economy*, 417.

[4] Hsing, *Making Capitalism in China*, 10.

[5] Many of the distinguishing characteristics of *Taishang* are shared by Hong Kong investors, or *Gangshang*. However, Hong Kong capital pouring into China since the late 1980s was predominantly invested in trading and logistics, not in manufacturing.

bringing with them more (probably much more) than US$166 billion in investment funds.[6,7] By the early 2000s, official statistics ranked Taiwan fourth among PRC sources of foreign direct investment. Factoring in estimates of indirect investment through third countries boosted Taiwan to the number two position.[8] As of mid-2015, statistics from China's Ministry of Commerce ranked Taiwan fourth, behind Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, in total investment, with Taiwan and Korea running neck-and-neck.

According to estimates published by Tung Chen-yuan, in the two decades between 1988 and 2009 *Taishang* were responsible for at least 14 percent of China's foreign trade.[9] Driving those statistics were hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese entrepreneurs and managers. Most *Taishang* managed their businesses personally, either residing on the Mainland or commuting between Taiwan and the PRC. Mainland operations benefited from lower wage and land costs, as well as looser regulation and social welfare requirements, but they were risky and required close supervision. *Taishang* bosses were not about to turn their management over to people they did not trust, so the great majority of high- and mid-level managers in *Taishang* firms were also Taiwanese. These white-collar professionals are known in Chinese as *Taigan*, or Taiwanese managers, in order to distinguish them from the entrepreneurs and investors, or *Taishang*.

Implanting the 'Capitalist Spirit'

The Chinese economy *Taishang* entered in the 1990s was dominated by a state-owned sector with collective and private firms playing only a supplementary role.[10] The underlying logic of China's reforms was to avoid wrenching, destabilizing change by allowing the transition to a market

[6] This is an estimate based on official statistics that takes into account indirect investment through third-party sources such as Panama, Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands.

[7] Tung, "Taishang dui Zhongguo gongxian," 10.

[8] Ibid., 4.

[9] Ibid., 16.

[10] Naughton, *Chinese Economy*.

economy to unfold gradually.[11] Instead of selling off the mature trees in China's economic forest (as recommended by the advocates of economic "shock therapy"), Deng Xiaoping favored allowing new types of companies to grow up around the existing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Those new types included collective and private firms, which tended to be small companies that arose organically in response to the needs and opportunities that existed in local markets. China's large companies were primarily in the state sector; they shared the small firms' orientation toward China's domestic economy.

Joint ventures married foreign capital, know-how, and connections to China's large, underutilized labor force. Most manufacturing joint ventures involved foreign companies investing with SOEs (or, less often, with collectives), typically with the objective of selling products into the Chinese market. One of the best-known early joint ventures (made famous by Jim Mann's book *Beijing Jeep*) was a partnership between AMC and Beijing Auto Works. AMC hoped to sell Jeeps in China, but the project failed, in part because Beijing Auto Works was more interested in acquiring AMC's technology than in selling cars in China. AMC's experience was typical, and as the Chinese government eased restrictions on wholly-owned foreign enterprises, joint ventures lost their attraction for many foreign investors.

The norms and practices under which SOEs, collectives, and joint ventures operated reflected their origins within the socialist system. They relied heavily on connections to officials for business advantages and they excelled in the complex arbitrage that was encouraged by China's transitional economy, with its dual-track pricing and other semi-socialist features. Under pressure from the state to maintain employment and avert social unrest, many SOEs (even some joint ventures) continued to pay wage and welfare bills well beyond their actual labor needs. Through the 1990s—and, in some sectors, up to the present—China's economy was only partially responsive to market forces. It remained a dual-track economy in which a globally competitive, export-oriented manufacturing

[11] The goal of China's reforms has never been to implement a capitalist system. In theory, at least, present-day China is in the preliminary stages of socialist development, accumulating wealth and technology that will allow it to implement socialist forms of ownership in the future.

sector coexisted with firms that took cues from the Chinese party-state as well as from the market.[12]

It was into this landscape of partially reformed institutions and a large state-owned sector that Taiwanese companies inserted themselves. *Taishang* rarely chose to create joint ventures with Chinese firms as foreign investors did. For one thing, Taiwanese have a well-documented preference for being their own bosses—as the idiom "it's better to be a chicken's head than an ox's ass" (*ningwei jitou wuwei niuhou*) colorfully attests. Unlike most other foreign investors (with the important exception of Hong Kong and overseas Chinese) Taiwanese could speak and read the main languages of Mainland China, and while the institutions of Communist-ruled China were unfamiliar, they were able to grasp many of the underlying social practices that governed everyday interactions in the PRC. Taiwanese investment changed Chinese business at both the macro and micro levels. At the level of national policy and resources, Taiwan provided both the policy model Deng used to initiate export manufacturing and much of the financial firepower needed to get export manufacturing going on the Mainland. At the level of individual firms and people, Taiwanese investors introduced the hardware and software of modern business, enabling firms located within Mainland China to participate in the global manufacturing economy at a high level.

Inspiring Institutions: Special Economic Zones

The Deng Xiaoping mythology tends to stress the *sui generis* aspects of China's economic development, but, in fact, many of Deng's innovations were adapted from other countries' successful policies. In 1975 he led a delegation to France to meet with industry management, science and transportation officials; he returned a strong advocate for "study tours" aimed at teaching Chinese officials how things were done in other countries—including Western countries and Japan.[13] Among the ideas Deng imported were elements of the developmental state model used in Japan,

[12] Scissors, "Chinese State-owned Enterprises."

[13] Vogel, *Transformation of China*, 217–18.

Taiwan, and South Korea. The idea that state bureaucrats can design and implement a market-conforming development strategy is anathema to liberal economic theory, but it is a proven fact in Northeast Asia, where developmental states facilitated decades of rapid growth and deep development.[14,15] While Western economists waited for the PRC's hybrid economy to fail, PRC policy makers continued to borrow pages from the developmental state playbook, amassing success after success in the process.

One of the best examples of China adopting foreign economic models was its embrace of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as its mechanism for entering into international manufacturing trade. In the late 1970s, Deng and his CCP colleagues were looking for ways to increase trade without exposing the Chinese people to ideas and practices that might promote political instability. The solution they settled on was to create SEZs: self-contained economic areas, walled off from the rest of China, in which foreign companies enticed by tariff and tax incentives would employ Chinese workers to produce goods for export. SEZs promised the benefits of foreign investment without the danger of political or economic contagion.

Deng's study tours in the late 1970s did not, of course, include Taiwan, but Taiwan was clearly on the minds of Chinese policymakers as both a competitor and a model, long before Deng Xiaoping began openly advocating economic reform. In 1973, Premier Zhou Enlai singled out Taiwan's economic processing zone at Kaohsiung for praise in meetings with foreigners, including Australia's prime minister. Zhou's public statements demonstrated a detailed knowledge of the workings in the Kaohsiung EPZ. He instructed PRC officials to look into establishing an export processing zone in China based on the Kaohsiung model, and the People's Bank of China even raised money from China's then very limited foreign currency reserves to finance it. At a State Council meeting Zhou chided his ministers for falling behind Taiwan: "Hey Mr. Foreign Trade Minister, you're not as good as Yen Chia-kan [Taiwan's premier]. He established an export processing zone in Kaohsiung, and has really

[14] Johnson, *Developmental State*, 32–60.

[15] Onis, "Logic of Development State," 109–26.

developed their foreign trade … In the past, China did not possess the right conditions. Now, the situation has changed. We must think a little bit more about how to do this."[16]

Taiwan did not invent the Special Economic Zone, of course, but it made productive use of it at a stage of development similar to where China stood in the early 1980s. Its example offered evidence that a developing economy could use SEZs to soak up excess labor, create wealth, and acquire new technology. PRC policymakers borrowed from many models as they designed their special economic zones, but from an early stage, thanks to Zhou Enlai's patronage, Taiwan's example was a key ingredient in the mix; it played an important role in shaping and motivating China's SEZ policy. In 1980, the PRC designated four Special Economic Zones. Three of these—Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou—are in Guangdong province, near Hong Kong. The fourth is Xiamen, the city directly across the Strait from Taiwan. The earliest investors in SEZs were Hong Kong and overseas Chinese (many of whom were entrepreneurs with roots in Guangdong and Fujian who had migrated to Southeast Asia), but SEZ authorities had their eye on Taiwanese investment from the start. In 1984, six years before the Taiwan government formally approved indirect investment (via third countries) into the mainland, Xiamen already had implemented a special incentive program to attract Taiwanese investors.[17]

When the SEZ experiment proved successful, the central leadership quickly found ways to expand the area in which SEZ-like conditions would apply. In 1984 they declared certain cities, including Shanghai, to be "open cities" in which foreign trade was to be actively encouraged. Two years later, they implemented a "coastal development strategy," which extended the privileges of SEZ-based firms to the whole of coastal China, creating a huge export promotion zone. According to Naughton, "By around 1987, China had established what were, in essence, two separate trading regimes. EP or export-promotion trade, responding to the extremely open regulations in which it developed, grew rapidly and soon surpassed trade through the original regime in size. That traditional, but

[16] Reardon, *Reluctant Dragon*, 165.

[17] Oborne, *China's Special Economic Zones*, 111.

now partially reformed, system of 'ordinary trade' (OT) also grew, but much more slowly."[18]

PRC firms predominated in the ordinary trade sector of the economy, but foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) —led by firms from Taiwan and Hong Kong—dominated the export promotion trade sector: "… under the EP regime exporters—predominantly FIEs—were allowed to sidestep the entire complex and unwieldy apparatus of import controls, canalization, and regulatory monopolies that restricted development of trade under the OT regime. Unlike virtually all domestic enterprises, FIEs were not required to go through state-run foreign-trade corporations (FTCs) to import."[19] As if that were not enough, the PRC granted tax incentives to FIEs. Policy thus compounded the FIEs' formidable competitive advantage and reinforced their dominant position in the export sector. Together, Naughton writes, the EP regime and FIEs were "the motor of China's export expansion."[20] When China initially opened its economy to foreign trade at the beginning of Deng's leadership its leading exports were natural resources, even though China was resource-poor and labor-rich. PRC-originated firms were ill-equipped to compete in export manufacturing, especially given the onerous restrictions imposed on them by conservatives in the CCP leadership. It was only after the reformers implemented economic policies aimed at attracting foreign direct investment that the PRC finally was able to exploit its comparative advantage as a labour-rich economy.

In sum, China's "miraculous" transformation into a manufacturing powerhouse was made possible by economic regulations inspired by Taiwan's SEZ policy and financed by Hong Kong and Taiwan capital.[21] The macro-level institutions under which Chinese business flourishes today thus have a strong Taiwanese influence.

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[18] Naughton, *Chinese Economy*, 386.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid., 387.

[21] Differentiating between Hong Kong and Taiwan investment is nearly impossible, especially in the early years. Taiwanese companies used Hong Kong as the main point of entry for indirect investment, so much (in some years virtually all) of Taiwan's investment was recorded as coming from Hong Kong. Even today, Hong Kong is a transit point for Taiwanese money—as well as other foreign investment, and even PRC "round-trip" investment.

Imparting Expertise: Enterprise Management and Clustering

At the same time, both individually and in groups, Taiwanese companies have influenced China's micro-level economic institutions through the example they set, the training and experience they give to PRC partners and employees, and simply by doing business in the PRC. There is no question that PRC managers and entrepreneurs have learned from observing or working in *Taishang* companies, although there is less direct transfer of knowledge than one might expect, thanks to the particular form Taiwanese business in China takes. As a matter of fact, as we describe below, after nearly thirty years of interaction the Taiwanese business model has become localized in the PRC to the point where Taiwanese firms are becoming less essential to the PRC's export manufacturing economy. And different from the Special Economic Zone model, local integrated clusters have not yet become a specific feature of a maturing private sector economy in China.

The fact that Chinese and Taiwanese speak the same languages (both Mandarin and Minnan, the shared dialect of Taiwan and Fujian) and share many cultural traits makes working in the Mainland easier for Taiwanese than for other nationalities, but it is not the principal reason *Taishang* move their operations to the Mainland. The real driver behind *Taishang*'s investment strategy, at least in the manufacturing sector, is their position in the global manufacturing economy.[22] As contract manufacturers for brands headquartered elsewhere, Taiwanese companies have little autonomy and an intense fixation on cost. They relocate manufacturing to the Mainland (or elsewhere) because they are under pressure from their customers to reduce costs. In doing so, they have introduced contract manufacturing into the Chinese Mainland and significantly altered the way business is done in the PRC. While many kinds of Taiwanese companies operate on the Mainland—everything from furniture manufacturers to wedding photographers—the form of *Taishang* business organization

[22] In the past decade or so, Taiwanese have become motivated increasingly by the opportunities offered by China's domestic market, but export manufacturing is still the predominant activity for Taiwan-invested firms.

that has contributed most to China's industrial output is what the sociologist Chen Ming-chi calls the "fortress in the air" (*kongzhong baolei*).[23] "Fortress in the air" refers to a cluster of firms working together to make a product in a self-contained unit. These "fortresses" typically manufacture on a contract basis for a non-Taiwanese firm that is responsible for product development, branding, and marketing.

Taiwan's rapid economic growth in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s was powered by its firms' ability to manufacture products for export, most often under foreign labels. Except for a handful of globally important companies such as Giant, Asustek and Acer, Taiwan-based exporters are still selling mostly under foreign brands, and the vulnerability that comes with being a supplier to transnational firms continues to challenge *Taishang* firms. As Liu Zhentao writes, "the leadership role in this global division of labour is absolutely not in Taiwan Strait hands. The core technologies, key supplies and parts, production standards and brands, as well as the final markets and distribution networks all are in the hands of foreigners."[24] Taiwan may not be in the "leadership role," but until Taiwanese and other foreign manufacturers set up shop there, China was not involved in the global division of labor at all. Thus, another valuable Taiwanese contribution to mainland business has been introducing China—or at least many Chinese manufacturing and supply firms—into global production chains and networks. From footwear to information technology, *Taishang* have moved manufacturing lines from Taiwan to the Mainland, creating opportunities for Chinese workers to produce for a much larger and higher-end market than was available within China itself.

Taiwanese manufacturers in a succession of industries—apparel, footwear, toys, small electronics, IT products—started making goods for international brands on Taiwan then moved their operations to the Mainland in response to increasing opportunities—and pressures. Their decision to move to the Mainland drove up China's exports in these sectors, but it did not transfer the opportunity to sell to global brands to local Chinese companies. Instead, Taiwanese and other foreign-invested factories retain their advantage as suppliers to branded firms. Companies

[23] Chen, *Fortress in the Air*.

[24] Liu, "Qianxi Taishang," 76–7.

like Pou Chen footwear, which makes about 20 percent of the world's branded athletic and casual shoes, and Foxconn, the Apple supplier, have a long history of supplying foreign brands with reliable, high-quality merchandise and skilled design services. These achievements are hard for PRC-based companies to match, and the insularity of *Taishang* supply chains reinforces their dominant position.[25]

Although PRC-originated manufacturers do not enjoy the same access to global brands that *Taishang* firms do, they do benefit from the *Taishang* manufacturers' presence in China in many ways. Companies such as Pou Chen and Foxconn bring wealth and employment to Chinese communities. According to Tung's estimates, in 2008 *Taishang* employed between 13 million and 15 million Chinese workers.[26] That total was only about 2 percent of China's total workforce, but the opportunities *Taishang* offered were concentrated geographically; for a handful of regions, the employment effects were huge. Likewise, *Taishang* are a major taxpayer in many Chinese cities. Between 2000 and 2005, Tung estimates that annual tax receipts from *Taishang* constituted a little over 4 percent of China's total tax revenue.[27] Again, those contributions are concentrated in a few regions. And even if few local firms manage to break into the global companies' supply chains of which many Taiwan-based companies are long-standing members, they *have* put the skills they've learned from observing Taiwanese companies to work in manufacturing lower-end products for markets in China and other developing countries. In many cases, that skills transfer takes the form of Mainland staff—both managers and workers—working for a Taiwanese company long enough to learn its manufacturing and management practices then leaving to work for a Chinese firm or set up their own new business. This practice allows mainland Chinese to make profitable use of the sound training, valuable connections and numerous clients they have acquired while working for their former employer.

On the other hand, the particular mode of *Taishang* business operations, although being sensitive to international firms and markets, has also remained peculiarly Taiwanese, and in that sense hard for Chinese

[25] Chen and Ku, "Quanqiuhua xia Taiwan," 22.

[26] Tung, "Taishang dui Zhongguo gongxian," 29.

[27] Ibid., 33.

companies to emulate. One of the most noteworthy business practices Taiwan introduced into the PRC is the idea of industrial clustering. Chen's characterization of the "industrial fortresses" as floating in mid-air comes from the clusters' tendency to be self-contained and detached from the Chinese communities in which they are located. At the micro level, clustering describes groups of companies that co-locate in order to collectively complete a particular production process in which each firm specializes in a single narrow task. On a larger scale, industrial clustering encouraged the concentration of Taiwanese business in certain cities, most famously Kunshan, Xiamen, and Dongguan. By 1992—only two years after Taiwan lifted its ban on mainland-bound investment—400 Taiwanese shoe factories had opened in one tiny Guangdong town.[28] Kunshan—a city just west of Shanghai—is home to as many as 30,000 Taiwanese residents.[29] Rather than integrating into the mainland economy one at a time, groups of Taiwan-based firms within a single supply chain move to the Mainland together and reestablish production in a single location. The result is the "center-and-satellite" model of production in which parts suppliers cluster around a large company that coordinates the process and manages the sale of the finished product. In some cases, the central firm also organizes the importation of key components from Taiwan.[30]

Chen and Ku point out that the focus on production networks is not unique to *Taishang* in Mainland China: Taiwanese overseas investment has long followed this pattern. As they write, "Taiwan firms' international competitiveness is based importantly on Taiwan's own production networks, and for this reason, when they make overseas investments, they must preserve their supply-chain relationships with their domestic networks in order to remain competitive."[31] A key consequence of this model is that *Taishang* firms have had little contact with Mainland-based enterprises in the past, and even after more than twenty years of close interaction, PRC-originated firms still play only a very limited role

[28] Hsing, *Making Capitalism in China*, 4.

[29] Chang and Cheng, "Local response," p. 91.

[30] Liu, "Qianxi Taishang," 89.

[31] Chen and Ku, "Quanqiuhua xia Taiwan," 15.

in *Taishang* manufacturing networks.[32] Chen and Ku identify several reasons for the *Taishang*'s tendency to close their supply chains to local firms.[33] According to their research, *Taishang* believe Taiwan-based firms deliver components and materials that are more consistent in quality. Also, for a *Taishang*, doing business with a Taiwanese counterpart means strong reliability due to mutual trust. Trust in a Chinese business partner, on the contrary, is comparatively weak. As a buyer for a *Taishang* contract manufacturer explained, "I use connections with other Taiwanese to get things done. Trust is a cost."[34]

Taishang production also tends to be more efficient than that of local firms; the precise coordination among suppliers allows them to deliver high-quality parts just when they're needed in the next stage of just-in-time production. Chen and Ku observe that while, in some cases, local Chinese firms have taken over the manufacture of materials that have been in use, Taiwanese still use their pre-existing networks to develop new products. Gearing up for a new product typically requires purchasing new components in small quantities, which *Taishang* have no choice but to procure from Taiwan.[35]

In sum, while the cluster strategy pursued by *Taishang* on the Mainland largely excluded Chinese companies and thus hardly served the development and modernization of Chinese *businesses*, it did generate important secondary effects for the Mainland economy. Those effects included labor absorption, the transfer of management and technical knowledge, the generation of tax revenues for local governments and local infrastructural investment. Other benefits of *Taishang* investment included integrating the Mainland economy into global value chains (although mostly as a supplier of low-skilled labor that benefitted Taiwanese-led OEM-style production for big international companies) and, more generally, relo-

[32] Liu Zhentao borrows a phrase from Laozi to describe the gulf between *Taishang* and local businesses: *laosi buxiang wanglai*—"they got old and died without ever visiting each other."

[33] Chen and Ku, "Quanqiuhua xia Taiwan," 18–19.

[34] Interview (Shanghai, May 31, 2006).

[35] Chen and Ku, "Quanqiuhua xia Taiwan," 18.

cating Taiwanese companies to the Mainland, where they were able to remain profitable and innovative.[36, 37, 38]

China Learns to Build a Boat

When the PRC opened its economic doors, *Taishang* rushed in. For two decades, networks based in Taiwan occupied a unique niche on the Mainland, using Chinese labor and land to manufacture for their established customers overseas. While their fortresses might have seemed impregnable, however, the *Taishang* knew their Mainland hosts would eventually reoccupy the territory they had temporarily conquered. Their peculiar mode of contributing to China's global economic rise secured Taiwanese businesspeople a privileged position for some twenty years. But the PRC's domestic private sector has matured, and Mainland *Taishang* find themselves facing increasing competition from domestic Chinese and international (Korean, Japanese) entrepreneurs. Already in the early 2000s, voices within the *Taishang* community warned that their privileged position in the Mainland market would not last forever. Today, Taiwanese companies must adapt to structural changes in the Chinese economy, and, while this is a painstaking process, those firms that survive contribute to the upgrading of China's industrial sectors and their repositioning in global value chains.

In this process, the labor-intensive enterprises that constitute the bulk of *Taishang* firms are squeezed by rising production costs, including salaries, social benefit requirements, energy costs, and environmental regulations that require industrial upgrading. At the same time, the Chinese government is determined to push the labor-intensive, low-margin, high-pollution industries that drove China's economic miracle for three decades out of the market over the coming years as it pursues comprehensive economic modernization. Meanwhile, Chinese private enterprises are gaining on their Taiwanese competitors. The quality of their products

[36] Leng, "Economic Globalization," 230–50.

[37] Rowley and Lews, *Great China*.

[38] Sung, *Emergency of Great China*.

has improved, and their firm management has become increasingly efficient. Once shut out by established relationships between *Taishang* firms and the foreign brands, Chinese companies today are setting up OEM relationships with foreign companies, are developing their own brands and make strong efforts to participate in global value chains. In all these realms, they are supported by a 'developmentalist' government, at both national and local level.[39,40,41]

To remain profitable, Taiwanese entrepreneurs are forced, therefore, to choose among several strategies: They may leave the Chinese market altogether and relocate to countries with lower production costs (which, in some cases, include Taiwan itself); since the mid-2000s many labor-intensive companies have chosen this option. Another option is to make firms more cost-efficient by upgrading their product lines, or by closing down low-end product lines and switching to new ones at higher ends on the value chain. Yet another option is to target domestic Chinese competitors to set up joint ventures that can help Taiwan-based firms reduce transaction costs, achieve economies of scale, pool resources for industrial upgrading, and facilitate access to the mainland market by being incorporated into Chinese-controlled distribution channels. Obviously, these second and third strategies entail considerable benefits for China's evolving market economy. Industrial upgrading by Taiwanese companies dovetails with official efforts to push overall structural change in the Chinese economy. For example, direct cooperation between Taiwanese and Chinese enterprises, now visibly on the rise, will help Mainland firms assume a new position in global R&D. It also allows mainland firms join the production networks connecting Silicon Valley, Taiwan, and international companies that have made Taiwan one of the most dynamic export economies in the world. Chinese companies will be integrated into *Taishang*-dominated manufacturing clusters; those clusters will expand to include more domestic suppliers and R&D operations, further strengthening the Chinese drive to develop international brands and become a global economic powerhouse. Consequentially, "going domes-

[39] Lee, "Changing Cross-Strait Relations," 190–201.

[40] Schubert and Herberer, "Continuity and Change," 1–38.

[41] Chen and Huang, "Dalu taishang zhuanxing shengji," 73–95.

tic"—linking up with Chinese companies in joint ventures to capitalize on their domestic distribution networks while helping them to step up in global value chains—will be yet another contribution of Taiwan to the Chinese economy. It is, however, also the only option for Taiwanese entrepreneurs to survive on the mainland in the medium and long term (see Lee Chun-yi's Chap. 6).

Taiwan and the Mainland: Traveling in the Same Boat?

Changing the perspective, as much as Taiwan contributed (and contributes) to the transformation of the Chinese economy, the economic consequences of cross-Strait engagement have been profound for the island republic. On the one hand, access to the Mainland has driven enormous growth for many Taiwanese firms. Many low-end manufacturers were at the end of their lifespan in the late 1980s; the Mainland gave them a new lease of life. Even high-tech companies benefit from the scale of production China allows; a firm like Foxconn, which employs hundreds of thousands of PRC workers, could never have achieved its massive size in Taiwan. Islanders benefit from this growth in myriad ways, including repatriated wages and profits, job opportunities on the Mainland, employment in Taiwan-based units of *Taishang* firms (many of which keep substantial operations, including research and development, on the island), and the opportunity to live and work in a society with many successful international firms.

Cross-Strait trade and investment, therefore, has many benefits for Taiwan, but they also carry costs and risks. Some of those costs and risks are economic. Cross-Strait economic integration is often blamed for increasing income inequality on the island, and there is some evidence that it has helped to hollow out Taiwan's manufacturing industries. The types of growth it promotes on the island tend not to create large numbers of jobs, which has led to rising unemployment and underemployment as well as the stagnation of wages. In the 2016 presidential election, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen promised to implement reforms to spur economic development—including diversifying trade and encouraging innovation—aimed at reducing the island's dependence on the Mainland.

Focusing on these issues was, arguably, beneficial to her winning the presidency in January 2016. However, it remains a controversial point among scholars, government officials, and the wider populace in Taiwan to what extent a "refurbishment" and "rebalancing" of the Taiwanese economy would give it leeway to keep a distance to the "Chinese orbit"—and if that is desirable at all.

Another set of costs and risks for Taiwan are both economic and political. Beijing views cross-Strait economic interaction and Taiwanese migration to China as tools for drawing Taiwan into a deeper embrace—one that it hopes will ripen ultimately into political unification. According to this logic, economic cooperation enhances mutual understanding and trust across the Taiwan Strait, two of the preconditions for unification. Obviously, in comparative terms Taiwan is of minor significance for China's present-day economy, even though, as we have argued, cross-Strait investment and trade contribute significantly to structural change and the upgrading of the Chinese economy. Still, the political promise connected to close interaction with Taiwan is more important to the government in Beijing than these economic effects. It is important to know, therefore, whether cross-Strait economic interaction and the Taiwanese migration to China that accompany it are facilitating the Chinese objective of politically incorporating Taiwan. Such an assessment cannot be made solely by considering trade statistics, and hence simplistically focusing on Taiwan's rising economic dependence on China; it must be viewed in the wider context of increasing social exchanges across the Taiwan Strait and their impact on Taiwan's domestic debate over the island's position vis-à-vis China.

This poses a provocative and paradoxical question: Against a background of continuous investment on the Mainland, a rising trend of skilled labor migration across the Taiwan Strait and increasing numbers of Taiwanese residing in China over the long term, what contribution is Taiwan making to cross-Strait *political* integration—even unification? In the remainder of this chapter we assess three channels by which cross-Strait economic activity might assist the PRC in achieving its goals: Taiwanese migration to China and the rise of cross-Strait "linkage communities" (i.e., groups of people with personal links and life experiences stretching across the Taiwan Strait, such as Taiwanese businesspeople, professionals

and white-collar workers, students, and cross-Strait spouses); a possible identity change among those Taiwanese who are permanent residents on the Chinese Mainland; and the impact of these "linkage communities" on Taiwan's China policy and the island's domestic debate on the best way to engage China.

Labour Migration, "Linkage Communities," and Identity Change

Estimates of the number of Taiwanese permanently residing on the Chinese Mainland range between one and two million, but no official figures are available.[42] Much has changed since the early days of cross-Strait migration when Taiwanese entrepreneurs built factories in China and started to live there for the majority of the year, accompanied by management staff from Taiwan and, eventually, family members. In recent years, skilled labor migration, first by experienced professionals sent by their headquarters and now by young university graduates seeking opportunities across the Taiwan Strait, has increased significantly.[43] Attracting young Taiwanese to "jump into the sea" of China's vigorous capitalism has even become a business on both sides of the Strait.[44]

These young Taiwanese, most of whom settle in bustling megacities like Shanghai and Beijing, are fascinated by the opportunities offered by the Mainland economy. In fact, each year Taiwan loses many of its best and brightest to the Mainland. Although the "classical" migration pattern of *Taishang* and *Taigan* gaining a foothold in China by building up labor-intensive industries has lost momentum in recent years, high-tech investment and the migration of skilled labor will continue to shape Taiwan's economic position in China for many years to come. Today,

[42] Local Taiwan Affairs Offices do record the numbers of Taiwanese residing in their respective jurisdictions which could be easily added up to a nationwide figure. It is safe to assume that the Chinese government has this figure and that it updates it regularly, but for some reason it does not publish it.

[43] Tseng, "Escalator or Merry-Go-Round," 196–214.

[44] Job search sites like 104 Human Bank (www.104china.com) operate on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to help Taiwanese get access to China's labor market and to settle in their new environment after they have migrated to China.

young and well-educated Taiwanese professionals are being employed in increasing numbers by Chinese companies. They often no longer enjoy the privileges and benefits of earlier migrant cohorts, but they find a bracing training ground for careers in China and Taiwan.

Taiwanese who work on the Mainland are members of a rising global labor force attracted by China's dynamic market economy and contributing to its dynamism, but they also have a particular political significance: By working and living among Mainland Chinese, even dating and marrying them, these Taiwanese learn more about China and Chinese society than their compatriots back home. They become what has been labeled a cross-Strait "linkage community"[45] that, ideally, builds mutual understanding and trust by creating personal bonds between both societies, and reports their "Chinese experiences" back to Taiwan through regular visits or when they eventually return for work or retirement. They may even undergo an identity change in the sense that they start to feel more "Chinese" than "Taiwanese" or, alternatively, become advocates for Taiwan to adopt more accommodating policies toward the Mainland.

These assumptions, however logically plausible, are not supported by the available data. The level of personal contact between Chinese and Taiwanese is limited, and scholars who have researched the possibility of identity change have found little evidence. Moreover, Taiwanese permanently living in China—no matter if they are entrepreneurs, factory managers, or white-collar employees of some sort—usually keep a very low political profile. For instance, just as *Taishang* industrial clusters and supply chains rarely include local PRC companies, it has also been unusual for individual *Taishang* or *Taigang* to leave the cocoon of the Taiwanese community for the company of the Chinese. Most Taiwanese who live on the Mainland reside in Taiwanese neighbourhoods, work with Taiwanese colleagues, socialize with Taiwanese friends, and return to Taiwan when they have time off. One study found that while some *Taishang* do count local Chinese among their friends, "an even greater number … reported having few contacts among the mainlanders; these were restricted to business partners or clients with whom they only spent a limited amount of time: 'It's very rare that Taiwanese become com-

[45] Keng, "Understanding Integration and 'spillover,'" 155–75.

pletely integrated in mainland Chinese society. Take me, for example—I stay at home after work, watch TV and don't go out. So I don't meet any Chinese people.'"[46]

Although there are exceptions, Taiwanese entrepreneurs and their leading Taiwanese staff have remained detached from their social environment on the Mainland. Younger Taiwanese who have migrated more recently and live in China's big cities may be considered to be more integrated in Chinese society, but then again life in those urban metropolises is characterized by long working hours and a strong focus on one's professional career, allowing for little interaction with people other than one's work colleagues. The lifestyles of these Taiwanese resemble those of the cosmopolitans and expats who define places like Shanghai, Beijing, or Shenzhen as transnational or global—rather than Chinese—cities. Even though most of the people they see and interact with during the day are Chinese, they identify them not as "compatriots," but rather as "competitors" or "companions" equally preoccupied with their adaption to the speed and bustle of contemporary Chinese society. In short, Taiwanese long-term migration to China is becoming increasingly abundant and intensive, but there is little evidence that these developments entail a meaningful change in social relations between Taiwanese and Chinese, and even less so in terms of Taiwanese identity.

On the other hand, an increasing number of cross-Strait marriages are now taking place, and Mainland spouses are one of the largest immigrant groups in Taiwan today.[47] This phenomenon is a more promising channel for creating the kind of "linkage community" that could spur social integration across the Taiwan Strait. Current research has not yet identified clear trends here.[48] What can be observed already, however, is a particular life pattern among younger "cross-Strait families" that may soon become relevant for the social dimension of cross-Strait interaction:

[46] Schubert, "Political thinking of Taishang," 89.

[47] According to government figures, 343,790 mainland Chinese spouses (including Hong Kong) have been registered in Taiwan between January 1987 and November 2015. See National Immigration Agency, "Tongji ziliao."

[48] In the future, it will be interesting to study identity formation among the children of these marriages (for children from marriages of Taiwanese and Southeast Asians see Chen, "Life Adjustment of China," 179–90).

Couples do not necessarily move back to Taiwan after marriage; increasingly, they stay on in China, with their children obtaining a Taiwanese passport so they can make a future choice between the Taiwanese and Chinese education systems and job markets.[49] If this trend persists, cross-Strait social integration will take the form of people moving between China and Taiwan in different life periods, so that both sides become one "social territory."

Identity, however, is a different matter. As past and current research suggests, most Taiwanese, no matter what subgroup they belong to (*Taishang*, *Taigan*, young professionals, family members), have an unshakable understanding that they are "Taiwanese," and therefore different from their Chinese counterparts—different in social customs and manners, in the ability to trust others, in honoring a deal, etc. They may claim that they are also Chinese (*tongzhong*), that they speak the same language (not only linguistically but also so in terms of social code), and are the most "compatible" social constituency for Mainland Chinese to interact with, but very rarely would they contest their Taiwanese distinctness from their "Mainland compatriots." Even those Taiwanese who live in China for more than twenty years, claim to be Chinese, and insist that they are completely uninterested in what is happening back in Taiwan, can hardly conceal their emotional attachment to the homeland once they start to give the issue more serious thought.[50] Such individuals are few in comparison to the Mainland "Taibao" who insist that they are Taiwanese and know where their roots are, where they want to go back after retirement, where they would live happily among close friends and relatives, and where they can talk about politics!

In fact, there is little indication that Taiwanese identity formation among cross-Strait "linkage communities" deviates much from what is illustrated by Taiwan's regularly conducted domestic surveys, showing a high proportion of those who identify exclusively as "Taiwanese"

[49] Deng, "Taiwan Immigration Policy," 215–38.

[50] Taiwanese are often filled with bitterness or utterly ironical when talking about Taiwan politics and society. Real disinterest, however, would rather result in indifference. Note that official policies by the Taiwan government, most significantly making domestic health care insurance available to Taiwanese living in China as long as they pay their premiums, even if reduced ones, and return to the island regularly, are aimed at maintaining critical links to cross-Strait migrants and consolidate their Taiwan identity. However, it is hard to measure to what extent that impacts on the identity construction of these Taiwanese.

or "Taiwanese and Chinese," instead of "Chinese" only.[51] The available evidence rather suggests that increasing cross-Strait social integration does not weaken or eradicate a strongly felt "Taiwanese identity" among Taiwanese migrants in China, a fact that the Chinese around them also realize: "They know who I am, and I know who they are!" is a common view expressed by mainland *Taishang* across China. It is an open question whether this gap can be closed by even more social interaction in the future and, if so, what kind of Taiwan identity this will bring about. A reasonable hypothesis would be that a civic "cross-Strait" identity may emerge from this process—an identity that depoliticizes the "Taiwan issue" by demanding free and easy movement across the Taiwan Strait and pragmatic solutions to contending claims of political sovereignty.

Linkage Communities and the Struggle for Taiwan's China Policy

Even though cross-Strait economic activity has promoted only limited social integration between Chinese and Taiwanese, there is still the question of whether, and to what extent, cross-Strait "linkage communities" do influence Taiwan's domestic discourse on its relationship with China and help develop China's cross-Strait policy. Many Taiwanese worry that the PRC government cooperates clandestinely with influential *Taishang*, particularly by trading economic privilege and political access on the Mainland for *Taishang* strategic action to push Beijing's unification agenda. After the defeat of the KMT in the latest presidential and legislative elections in January 2016, *Taishang* involvement in Taiwan politics may become increasingly valuable for China in the future. Indeed, a number of big tycoons with considerable economic stakes in China have urged the Taiwan government not to give in to domestic pressure and to stay on course with its integration policies. In fact, there is almost unanimous sup-

[51] According to the latest survey conducted by National Chengchi University's Election Study Center, a renowned and widely respected Taiwanese research institution, 60 percent of all respondents identified themselves as "Taiwanese," against 34 percent of those saying they would be both "Taiwanese and Chinese," and only 3 percent claiming to be "Chinese." See Election Study Center National Chengchi University, "Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend."

port among *Taishang* of further progress in cross-Strait trade liberalization, including the facilitation of access for Chinese capital to Taiwan. In that sense, Taiwan's business community is China's strongest ally in its effort to push ahead with economic integration. However, this does not mean that *Taishang* as a "linkage community" buy into China's quest for unification. In fact, hardly any of them do. Most *Taishang* are fully absorbed by their fight to survive economically in Mainland China and even though they benefit from the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and will benefit from the Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement and the Cross-Strait Merchandise agreement if they are ratified, most of them feel remote from the Taiwanese battlefield and do not engage in systematic lobbying of any kind—although a few big tycoons certainly do.[52, 53]

The other so-called "linkage communities" that might enter into the domestic discourse on Taiwan's China policy—white-collar workers, young professionals, students targeting the Chinese job market, cross-Strait couples—restrict their political agency principally to voting in Taiwan's elections and do not exhibit much political voice—except for efforts to reform the country's immigration policies so as to ease cross-Strait mobility. There is a palpable mismatch between, on the one hand, the numerical significance of cross-Strait "linkage communities," those communities' economic significance in terms of Taiwan's return on investment and the economic and social consequences of labor migration and, on the other hand, these groups' participation in the domestic debate on cross-Strait relations and Taiwan's approach to China. That debate is left to Taiwan's political establishment, the economic elite and those civic groups on the island which regard cross-Strait integration as a danger rather than an opportunity for Taiwan. Hence, there is little effective contribution of cross-Strait "linkage communities" to China's declared struggle for "winning Taiwanese hearts and minds." They shy away from this struggle, as their members are politically overexposed in China and too afraid of social denigration and stigmatization in Taiwan to become engaged in a protracted "war of position" concerning Taiwan's China policy. At the same time, however, their rising numbers and Chinese experi-

[52] Schubert, "Assessing Political Agency," 51–79.

[53] Schubert, "Facing Dragon Riding Tiger," 91–109.

ences may gradually transform them into a social force that eventually becomes politically committed, with unpredictable results.

Conclusions

Taiwan has played a vital role in China's economic rise in the past, and its contemporary contribution to the Chinese economy remains meaningful as Taiwanese businesspeople, despite increasing domestic competition and regulatory pressure, participate in the upgrading of China's manufacturing and service sectors. At the same time, market-induced integration drives continuous cross-Strait migration and long-term residency in China by Taiwanese businesspeople and their families as well as young professionals and university students and graduates, deepening the mutual understanding between Taiwanese and Chinese. These are the "linkage communities" which are targeted by China's agenda of continuous cross-Strait economic and social integration to realize its agenda of unification. However, the "Chinese dream" of making Taiwanese themselves the driving forces of this agenda will probably not come true.

Taiwanese working and living in China strongly support close cross-Strait economic interaction, demand liberal policies allowing them to commute easily between both sides, and believe Taiwan must cooperate with Chinese to hold its ground in highly competitive international and domestic markets. Overall, Taiwanese "linkage communities" are convinced, with good reason, that Taiwan's economic future and prosperity are tied to China's integration into the global economy. In that sense, they make a significant contribution to amicable cross-Strait relations at the sub-official level. At the same time, however, the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese working and living in China has yet to display significant "identity change" in the sense of becoming "Chinese" or ardent supporters of political integration, even unification. In fact, the overwhelming majority of them do not question Taiwan's claim to political sovereignty. They may facilitate further economic and social integration across the Taiwan Strait but are no less "Taiwanese" than their compatriots in Taiwan, who find integration worrisome and dangerous for the island republic's future. It can well be assumed that by virtue of the way

they participate in and shape cross-Strait integration, Taiwan's "linkage communities" contribute to a conceptualization of China as being economically unified but politically diverse—an idea that positively resonates with the majority of Taiwan's populace.

In sum, Taiwan played a key role in China's economic development, particularly through the ambition, energy, and willingness to take risks on the part of Taiwanese businesspeople, and not least by the island republic's own economic success after the end of the Chinese civil war, which challenged Communist rule and provided some useful best practices to emulate in the process of market transformation on the Mainland. Today, Taiwanese "linkage communities" struggle to maintain their position in a changing Mainland economy where domestic Chinese actors have matured from apprentices into heavy-hitters. These Taiwanese are confidently rooted in the island of their birth, while sojourning in a land of opportunity and risk.

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6

Taiwan and China in a Global Value Chain: The Case of the Electronics Industry

Chun-yi Lee

This chapter aims to examine how Taiwan impacted upon China through the technology flow from Taiwan to China, and how Taiwan played a part in linking China's manufacturing with the United States. Theoretically, this chapter challenges the Global Value Chain (GVC) theory in that it overlooks the possibility that first-league countries may be unwilling to share all their knowledge insights. This chapter also investigates the role of Taiwan in the GVC ladder. In the high-tech industry—for instance, the semiconductor industry—the reason for developed countries to preserve more is directly linked to security or political considerations. On this note, this chapter links Taiwan to China, and explains the past changes of Taiwanese investment in China, especially in the IT/electronics industries. The chapter is structured as follows: the first section offers a definition of GVC theory,

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whilst the second section explains the importance of IT/electronics industry, and the implications of the IT industry in relation to national security. The third section focuses on the importance of the IT industry in Taiwan and provides a brief history of Taiwanese investment in China. The fourth section is composed of three sections: USA–Taiwan technology connections; Taiwan–China technology connections; and, finally, USA–Taiwan–China connections. The fifth section explores the impacts of Taiwanese manufacturers in China on the Chinese IT/electronics industry, using Foxconn as a case study, and, finally, I conclude that Taiwanese IT/electronics industries will have to face fierce competition with domestic Chinese entrepreneurs.

Global Value Chain Theory

From the Global Value Chain's (GVC) perspective: on the positive side, Bernard et al. indicated that in the developed countries, such as the United States, firms tend to be larger, earn higher profits, spend more resources on research and development (R&D), and pay higher wages.[1] For developing countries, the trade, investment, and knowledge flows that underpin GVCs can provide mechanisms for rapid learning, innovation, and industrial upgrading.[2] GVCs can provide better access to information, open up new markets and create new opportunities for rapid technological learning and skill acquisition. Sturgeon and Memedovic argue that because GVC-linked transactions and investments typically come with quality control systems and prevailing global business standards that exceed those present in developing countries, suppliers and individuals in developing countries can be 'pushed' to acquire new competences and skills through their participation in GVCs.[3] Sturgeon and Memedovic also describe the negative aspects of GVCs; for instance, for developed countries, GVCs perhaps

[1] Bernard, Bradford and Schott, "Survival of Best Fit," 219–37. Cited in Sturgeon and Memedovic, "Mapping Global Value Chains," 2.

[2] Lall, "Technological Structure," 337–69; Humphery and Schmitz, "Insertion in Global Chains," 1017–27. Cited in Sturgeon and Memedovic, "Mapping Global Value Chains," 2.

[3] Sturgeon and Memedovic, "Mapping Global Value Chains," 2.

will not guarantee the creation of vast job opportunities because innovation and new industry creation no longer automatically lead to large-scale domestic employment.[4] For developing countries, they also state that GVC provides a 'compressed' development which can create a series of policy challenges to host countries and force the host country to cope simultaneously with a wide range of issues,[5] for instance, uneven social development and limits of knowledge transferring from developed countries to developing ones.

The development of the electronics industry in Taiwan has been characterized by rapid upgrading from low-cost consumer goods to higher-technology items. Information technology (IT) is the key to the manufacturing of personal computers (PC), cell phones, handheld computers and consumer electronics such as game consoles. There is also an increased relocation of the electronics industry's key sector, chip making, to China. The characteristic feature of Taiwan in the IT industry is its local industrial clustering, which is the main reason for Taiwan's success in the supply chain.[6] The importance of industrial clustering means once the Taiwanese manufacturers receive an order from the branded companies, all the collaborative factories are reachable within short distances, thus the fulfilling of finishing of the brand companies' orders can be achieved within the shortest timeframe and also with good quality control. The success of IT/electronics products lies in efficiency. For instance, new generations of mobile phones are launched almost every six months or so, and, therefore, the capacity to keep pace is the strong suit of Taiwanese IT manufacturers. It is the main reason that Taiwanese IT manufacturers can produce the key components in the global value chain. The following section explains the strategic significance of the IT/electronics industry and asks how the IT/electronics industry helps to link Taiwan and China's industrial development.

[4] Davis, "Corporate Innovation." Cited in Sturgeon and Memedovic, "Mapping Global Value Chains," 4.

[5] Whittaker et al., "Compressed Development," 439–67. Cited in Sturgeon and Memedovic, "Mapping Global Value Chains," 3.

[6] Chen, "Taiwan's IT Firms," 338.

The Importance of the IT/Electronic Industry

Taiwan has long viewed her technology sector as a 'national champion' and therefore sharing it with Mainland China is a matter of national security. The reason that the IT sector has far more strategic importance than other sectors is because modern IT affects all sectors of an economy by providing both forward and backward linkages.[7] As Wang argues,[8] the development of the IT industry of a country is not a purely economic matter; it has more to do with political implications. Furthermore, in Chu's research, IT industry, especially in terms of the semiconductor industry, has not only political but also security concerns; and it relates to not only the cross-Strait relationship but also to the China-Taiwan-United States triangular relationship.[9] The reason for this is that the broad usage of the semiconductor industry, the chip making, applies to almost all civil and military high-tech equipment, consumer data processing, communications, automotive, industrial, medical, military, and aerospace. It is important to understand the triangular link among China/Taiwan/US not only from its conventional security perspective, but also from the perspective of knowledge transfer. I shall explain in the fourth section of this chapter the link between the USA and Taiwan, following Taiwan and China, and, in recent developments, an emerging possible direct link between the USA and China. In this section, I shall first explain the significance of the IT industry in Taiwan; secondly, I shall illustrate the link between Taiwan and China in this field.

The significance of the IT industry can be understood not only from a political/security perspective, but also from an economic perspective. The electronic hardware industry is arguably the world's most important goods-producing sector. Not only does it employ more workers and generate greater revenue than any other manufacturing sector, but its products also facilitate productivity in other sectors and stimulate innovation across entire economies.[10] As Sturgeon and Kawakami have pointed out,

[7] Nau, "National Policies." Cited in Wang, "Developing the Information Industry," 551.

[8] Wang, "Developing the Information Industry," 551.

[9] Chu, "Controlling the Uncontrollable," 54–68.

[10] Sturgeon and Kawakami, "Global Value Chains," 121.

"[i]n the past two decades, East Asia in general and China in particular, have become increasingly important in electronics as well as other industries, both as production location and final markets. This is also reflected in the flow of intermediate goods. Latest available figures show 'Greater China' account for 35.5 % of world intermediate electronic exports, up from 6.2 % in 1991. Exports of electronics intermediates from Mainland China have grown greatly, from less than one percent of world total in 1991 to 15 % in 2008. Much of this growth has come at the expense of the USA, Japan, and the UK, which ranked Numbers 1, 2, and 4 in the world in 1991; and Numbers 5, 4, and 14 in 2008."[11]

Since the 1990s Taiwan has aimed to transform itself from a reliable OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) to an ODM (Original Design Manufacturer). This means that today's Taiwanese high-tech companies not only want to carry out low-end assembling or packing, but also aim to establish their own brands. However, wishful thinking will not establish brand-name companies in the high-tech sector. What this will require is a huge amount of support from the government, and also the supply of human capital. In terms of governmental support, as Wang and Wong indicate, the Taiwanese government played a significant role in promoting the development of high-technology industries in Taiwan.[12] The state is important in concentrating national resources on R&D spending, and also in building up new innovation infrastructure—for instance, the establishment of Hsinchu Science Park (HSP) in the late 1980s.[13] In terms of accumulating human capital, the connection between Silicon Valley and HSP is a crucial one, which will be explained in section fourth below.

Apart from the Taiwanese government's efforts to create an environment of innovation, the early business model of most Taiwanese IT/electronics industries was to reserve the upstream factories in Taiwan and set up low-end factories in China for cheap labor and favorable tax-waiving policies. As Lutheje pointed out, Taiwanese contract manufacturers in

[11] Ibid., 122–23.

[12] Wang, "Developing the Information Industry," 551; Wong, "Innovation and Taiwan's Vitality," 169–75.

[13] Hsinchu Science Park, "Introduction Hsinchu Science Park."

the chip industry have taken the lead to build wafer-fabrication plants in China.[14] The advantage of Taiwanese firms is their strong link to Silicon Valley; this means that Taiwanese firms play a key role in managing relationships between Chinese factories and American IT firms.[15] However, since the start of the 2000s, Chinese domestic firms—such as Lenovo and Huawei—have also emerged, as pointed out by Hart-Landsberg and Burkett. These have become multinational firms in their own right, though it is doubtful whether these Chinese domestic firms could be internationally competitive or could develop further in the realm of R&D.[16]

China is a net importer of high-tech goods: between 1997 and 1999 high-tech goods accounted for 14 % of its imports and 8 % of its exports These percentages are relatively high—for example, for the EU during the same period high-tech accounted for 9.5 % of both exports and imports.[17] Dean et al. also indicated that China's processing trade is concentrated mostly in relatively high-tech products and carried out largely by foreign firms. In 2005, more than two-thirds of processing trade was accounted for by three key sectors: electrical machinery, machinery and optical, medical and precision instruments.[18] Foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs),[19] accounted for more than 80 per cent of China's processing trade. It can be argued that China has become the center of gravity of the global processing trade, due to its huge market of cheap labour and resources. High-tech products are concentrated heavily in two categories of products: radio and TV equipment and office machinery and computers. China's high-tech imports in terms of parts and components amount to more than three-quarters of their high-tech suppliers to China, as China served as the final assembly base. West European high-tech products are mostly capital goods: it is argued by Lemoine and Uanal-Kesenci that European transfers of knowledge to China follow a more traditional way, as they are aimed at modernizing investment capacity and not at

[14] Luthje, "Why China Matters," 345.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, "Dynamics of Transnational Accumulation," 20.

[17] Fontagne, Freudnberg, and Unal-Kesenci, "Trade in Technology and Quality," 561–82.

[18] Dean, Feng and Wang, "Measuring the Vertical Specialization," 6.

[19] FIE refer to three types: wholly foreign-owned, equity joint venture and contractual joint venture.

re-exports.[20] China has been the country with the largest trade deficit with United States since 2000, and a large proportion of China's imports from the USA (23 percent) and exports to the USA (65 percent) were processing trade.[21]

In the region of East Asia, in 1999 Japan was the largest supplier of China's imports for processing (25 percent), but the New Industrialized Economies (NIEs) accounted for the largest share of these imports (40 percent), with Taiwan being the most important supplier (20 percent), followed by South Korea. In contrast, European and US firms contributed only marginally to the supply of goods for China's processing industries (the percentage of European and US imports were 5 percent and 7 percent, respectively, for processing in 1999).[22] Recent research also finds strong evidence for the Asian countries' suppliers to China. From 2000, Japan and the NIEs accounted for more than half of the value of imported inputs in China's exports, both at the beginning and the end of the ten-year period. However the US and European market combined together accounted for 16–17 percent.[23] The structure of processing exports from China to Asian countries and western countries indicates that China became an export platform for Asian industries which were aimed at the world market, whereas western countries' importing from China was aimed at domestic markets.[24] Huang uses a very interesting metaphor to describe this regional economic structure: "This structure can be seen as a team of servants with China at the head, leading the others in providing cheap exports to the USA and using its hard-earned savings to finance American purchases of those exports."[25] Nevertheless, our picture of regional economic structure is slightly different from Huang's metaphor; China is not the head servant to lead East Asian countries to sell out their cheap labor. On the contrary China is the footman in serving, as on top of China, there are Japan, South Korea, Taiwan as

[20] Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, "Assembly Trade Technology Transfer," 839.

[21] Dean, Feng and Wang, "Measuring the Vertical Specialization," 6.

[22] Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, "Assembly Trade Technology Transfer," 839.

[23] Athukorala, "Multinational Production Networks"; Baldwin, "Managing the Noodle Bowl." Cited in Dean, Feng and Wang, "Measuring the Vertical Specialization," 4.

[24] Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, "Assembly Trade Technology Transfer," 833.

[25] Hung, "America's Head Servant," 16.

subcontractors to serve western markets. Chinese cheap labor is, therefore, is the capital for East Asian countries to secure their positions in global economic structure.

Taiwanese Investment in China

This section will first provide a historical overview of Taiwanese investment in China, and then, more specifically, it will explain the reason why Taiwanese IT industries have gradually taken root in China over the past three decades.

Cheap labour and Chinese governmental encouragement attracted Taiwanese businesses to invest in China[26] at the beginning of the 1980s.[27] However, before the government of Taiwan lifted martial law in 1987,[28] businesspeople were completely prohibited from investing in China. Following the lifting of martial law, the Taiwanese government[29] gradually released the controls on investment in China.[30] Nevertheless, by this period Taiwanese businesspeople still needed to transit through a third area or country, most of the time Hong Kong or Macau, to invest in China. The types of Taiwanese investment around the end of the 1980s were principally in the areas of traditional manufacturing. However, from the 1990s onwards, Taiwanese investors in China no longer focused on the advantages of cheap Chinese labour or natural resources. More and more big Taiwanese companies came to China because a more sophisticated industrial environment had been created.[31] The end of

[26] In this chapter, "China" refers to the People's Republic of China (PRC or "the Beijing government"). "Taiwan" represents the Republic of China (ROC or "'the Taipei government"). I will use the different terms alternatively.

[27] Sung, *Emergence of Greater China*, 63.

[28] On lifting martial law in July 1987, the Taiwanese government allowed Taiwanese businesses to invest in China. In November of the same year, the Taiwanese government allowed Taiwanese people to travel to China to visit relatives. Many Taiwanese businesses sought the chance to invest in China in light of the new regulations.

[29] My use of the word "Taiwanese" in this chapter refers to all residents and businesses who live in Taiwan. It does not imply any ideological position on Taiwan's current identity or international status.

[30] Kao and Lin, "The Changing Economic," 262.

[31] Steinfeld, "Cross-Strait Integration Industrial Catch-Up," 234–5.

the "Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion"[32] announced by then President Lee Teng-hui on May 1, 1991 also encouraged more Taiwanese investors to enter the Chinese market.[33]

The end of these temporary provisions signified that the Taiwanese government no longer regarded commercial activities in China as crimes. Therefore, the smoothest period for cross-Strait economic development was between 1992 and 1994. According to the statistical data from the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) in Taiwan, even the missile crisis from 1995 to 1996[34] had no impact on Taiwanese investment in China. From the end of the 1990s up until the present, Taiwanese investment in China has mainly consisted of high-technology industries. According to statistical data from the Ministry of Economic Affairs in Taiwan, up to the end of June 2010, Taiwanese investment in China amounted to 59.6 percent of total Taiwanese external investment.[35]

China has a great attraction for Taiwan's IT/electronics industries for reasons other than just the generic benefits that China can offer: cheap labour and governmental preferential tax-waiving policies. China has a peculiar combination of competitiveness that would mold the shape of the global IT industry development[36]: it has a huge and booming market for electronics products and services. It is important to bear in mind that the advantage of comparatively cheap and easily retainable labor declined after 2008, following the implementation of the New Labour Contract Law, which raised the minimum wage and enhanced workers' rights.[37] But China still proved the most attractive country for IT/electronics industries because it has a growing pool of skilled workers, not all of

[32] The "Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion" were promulgated by the ROC's secretary general to the office of the President on June 15, 1950. TDP, "History of Constitutional Revisions."

[33] Baum, "Direct Trade with China," 40–3.

[34] The Chinese government was furious that the United States issued a visa for then Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell University for his alumni reunion, as this violated the bilateral agreement between China and America. This triggered the so-called 1995–1996 cross-Strait missile crisis, during which the Chinese army launched a volley of nuclear-capable missiles into the sea 90 miles north of Taipei. This constituted a threat and thereafter some missile fire continued until 1996. Gilley, *Tiger on the Brink*, 251–3.

[35] MAC, "Statistic Data."

[36] Ernst and Naughton, "China's Emerging Industrial Economy," 48.

[37] Wang et al., "New Labour Contract Law," 485–501.

them. The Chinese government has strategically recruited talented people to the country, be they foreign workers or Chinese graduates returning from universities aboard. The following section introduces the linkage between USA–Taiwan–China in terms of talented human resources, which are the backbone of IT industry.

USA–Taiwan, Taiwan–China, USA–China Technological Nexus

I mentioned earlier the nexus that link the USA, Taiwan, and China in high-technology transfer. This section aims to scrutinize this dynamic hierarchy within the global economic structure.

USA–Taiwan Link

As Saxenian and Hsu point out,[38] attracted by the promise of better working opportunities, a return to their families, and also the missionary sense of contribution to their home country, there were a growing number of US-educated engineers who returned to Taiwan in the 1990s. Along with the establishment of HSP in 1980, this group of technological elites form the backbone of Taiwan's high-tech human capital. The HSP certainly is not the sole reason for Taiwan's IT success, but the HSP became the destination for hundreds of talented returnees from Silicon Valley to open new technology companies. Furthermore, the Taiwanese government also provided very good policy incentives to encourage this group of talented people to return to the HSP: for instance, preferential access to scarce and high-quality housing and access for returnees' children to enter the only Chinese–American school in Taiwan.[39] However, the tie of Silicon Valley and HSP was not meant to be a competitive one: rather, it was complementary and mutually beneficial. New product definition and cutting-edge innovation still remain in Silicon Valley, whereas

[38] Saxenian and Hsu, "Silicon Valley-Hsinchu Connection," 905.
[39] Ibid., 908.

Taiwanese companies whose leaders were trained in Silicon Valley continue to enhance their capacity to modify the products, and adapt as well as rapidly commercialize technology. In other words, Silicon Valley and HSP are in different leagues. From the perspective of knowledge flow, Silicon Valley does not regard Taiwan as a competitor; it is more in the nature of a "flying geese" pattern. In the framework of GVC, the Silicon Valley–HSP connection fit in well, mainly because the knowledge flow from Silicon Valley to HSP triggers the technology revolution in Taiwan, and pushes Taiwan's main industry into the high-technology era. However, one point has to be noted, which is that Taiwan always lags behind the Silicon Valley in this matter.

Taiwan–China Link

According to Tom Miller, eight of China's top ten exporters are Taiwanese electronic companies supplying branded PC sellers such as Dell or Intel with unbranded computers and components.[40] Taiwanese Original Design Manufacturers (ODM), in contrast to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), contributed a great percentage of global computer manufacturing, using China as the production base. In other words, the impressive number of Chinese producers in the high-technology sector, mostly computers, does not represent growth opportunities in the GVCs for Chinese domestic companies. The ODM contract manufacturers use cheap land and labor from China to produce high-technology products which have very little value added. According to Miller, the worldwide computer industry can be understood as a pyramid. Microsoft and Intel sit at the top, rich in intellectual capital and profit; below them are the global PC brands, Dell, Apple, Hewlett-Packard (HP), and Sony. Those branded companies were supported by Taiwanese ODMs with factories in China that receive components.[41] However, what Miller does not mention is that many contract manufacturers have already started to produce entire computers. According to an interview with Luethje in 2012 January,[42]

[40] Miller, "Manufacturing That Doesn't Compute."

[41] Ibid.

[42] Interview data G1, Guangzhou, January 13, 2012.

many Taiwanese ODM companies produced different styles of computers to Intel or Microsoft for their selection. Branded companies would choose one type and authorize their logos. The design, therefore, was not from Intel's own R&D but rather from the ODM's contract manufacturers.

The situation had, in fact, started to change in two dimensions from 2005 onward. First of all, as reflected in Luethje's interview, since the subcontractors already had the capacity to design a whole computer, they tried to compete on their own terms, a development symbolized by Lenovo's purchase of the IBM PC division that year. This was the first successful attempt by the Chinese electronics industry to compete against international brands. Secondly, Chinese industrialists used the global financial crisis of 2008 to make changes. While the credit crunch was having a severe impact on the leading Western economies, China maintained a growth rate of more than 8 percent.[43] The shrinkage of the leading Western economies meant China had to replace its previous economic model of export-driven growth. This was achieved partly by massive infrastructural investments, but also by an increase in domestic consumption. As Feenstra and Hong have pointed out, while exports remains important in stimulating employment in China, gains could be, and were, obtained from the growth in domestic tradable goods.[44]

As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, the Taiwan–China connection originally built upon Taiwan's manufacturers' ODM production model to produce global branded computers in China. Taiwanese manufacturers relied on their advanced production knowledge and their close relationship in USA–Taiwan Link, to bring large profits from the Taiwan–China link of the period from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. The change began in the early 2000s, when China began to produce Chinese branded electronic appliances, including personal computers and mobile phones. This was possible as the domestic market continued to grow despite the 2008 global financial crisis. Following this development China, started to bypass its Taiwanese partners and forged, as will be examined in the next section, its own links with Western countries, such as the USA–China link.

[43] World Bank, "Chinese Economic Development Update."

[44] Feenstra and Hong, "China's Exports and Employment," 1.

USA–Taiwan–China or USA–China Connection?

The Chinese government's enthusiasm to attract FDI aimed not only to boost local economic development, but also to begin a process of technology transfer through foreign investment. Nevertheless, as Leifner et al. concluded, most of the foreign investors were attracted to China either by low production costs, primarily in the shape of cheap labor and resources, or by the huge market potential of the country. This often resulted in a transfer of knowledge as they usually belong to more technology-intensive sectors, or needed to adapt their products to Chinese markets and thus had to respond positively to the Chinese government's pressure to transfer technology.[45] But such foreign companies usually only transferred technology reluctantly, as they were concerned about nurturing competition.[46] A second source of new knowledge transfer to developing countries is to build up their own technological base in domestic public research institutes or higher education institutions. This requires government support and collaboration with companies. In order to encourage research institutes not to rely solely on government capital and to pay close attention to the needs of enterprises, the Chinese government cut basic funding and started to link funding to performance. Instead, it encourages universities and research institutes to attract funding through cooperation with industry, patenting, licensing and even the creation of new technology-intensive companies such as the Tsinghua Unigroup.[47] The rest of this section examines how Taiwan in the late 1980s and 1990s paved the foundation of electronic or high-technology products' manufacturing models for China, and how their Chinese partners took advantage of this after 2000 and worked to build up their own networks with the Silicon Valley, thereby reducing the role of Taiwan as a key link in a global value chain that connects Chinese manufacturers to American technology production.

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[45] Liefner, Hennemann and Lu, "Cooperation in Innovation Process," 113.

[46] Hayter and Han, "China's Open Policy," 1–16; Young and Lan, "Technology Transfer to China," 669–79, cited in Leifner et al., 133.

[47] Gu, "New Technology Enterprises," 475–505; Liu and Jiang, "Nature and Implications," 175–88, cited in Leifner et al.: 114.

To be more specific, the successful experience of the Silicon Valley–HSP connection provides a model for China's high-tech development.[48] Therefore, major Chinese high-tech centers, such as Beijing's Zhongguancun and Shanghai's Zhangjiang, also provide incentives to attract international IT talent and returning students from aboard. Numerous ethnic Chinese technology associations in the Silicon Valley also serve as a bridge to link technology and talent between two regions. Furthermore, the state also played a crucial role in this process by founding the Hua-Yuan Science and Technology Association in Silicon Valley in 2001. The goal of Hua-Yuan was to promote a high-tech development module which could be encapsulated in the slogan "designed in Silicon Valley, manufactured in China." Naturally, this goal setting competed with a Taiwanese government-supported association, the Monte Jade Science and Technology Association in Silicon Valley, which originally had a very similar agenda and was established in Silicon Valley in 1990.[49] The competition and alliance of these two organizations with Silicon Valley, therefore, could be denoted as a symbol of triangular technology flow between the USA, China and Taiwan. However, the bigger question for Taiwan is: where is the strategic position among this triangular technology flow? Taiwan's role as a technology or capital broker or a bridge between China and developed countries is currently facing a serious challenge. China might still have a large technology gap to bridge in order to catch up with the first-league states—for instance, the United States or the European countries—but the gap between Taiwan and China is narrowing. In order to gain higher profits, Chinese companies sidestep Taiwanese contractors and deal with the Americans where they can.

What are Taiwan's Impact on China's electronic industry? Foxconn as a case study

The most significant impact of Taiwanese IT/electronic factories in China, is to serve as a 'teacher' for most of the domestic Chinese manufacturers. As I mentioned the main strength of the Taiwanese is the industrial clustering effect which enabled Taiwanese OEM/ODM factories to complete brand companies' orders efficiently and with good quality. Taiwanese

[48] Leng, "Taipei/Shanghai/Silicon Valley Triangle," 238.

[49] Ibid., 239–40.

OEM/ODM factories in China managed to do so by combining cheap and retainable labour in China, with management skill imported from Taiwan. Most of the Taiwanese OEM/ODM factories are crucial to the supply chain, but the profits of OEM/ODM factories are rather thin. Using Apple's iPod as an example, an iPod is sold at price of US$299, of which Apple's margin is $80, and Taiwanese manufacturers' margin is only $5, though the parts of iPods are mostly manufactured in China through Taiwanese manufacturers.[50] That means that Taiwan's ODM factories are not earning much of the profits: if the Taiwanese factories can only earn $5 net profit from a $299 iPod, what sustains the factory is the exploitation of the labour force by the lowering of wages and tightening up of the management skills. Hence, the problem of giant Taiwanese ODM factory, Foxconn, exploded into view in 2010.[51] In this section I use Foxconn as a case to illustrate the pattern of production of Taiwanese ODM manufactories in China.

The Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. Ltd was founded in 1974; and the Foxconn name originated as the trade name of Hon Hai before later becoming Hon Hai's subsidiary. The Foxconn technology group processes and assembles parts for personal computer, communication and consumer electronics (3Cs), digital electronics and even automobile components. Recently, it focused on fields of nanotechnology, heat transfer, wireless connectivity, material science, and green manufacturing processes.[52] After the CEO Terry Guo founded the group, the first manufacturing plant in Mainland China started to operate in Longhua, Shenzhen in 1988.[53] Though it was established in the 1980s, Foxconn grew exponentially after 2000. In 2001, Foxconn was the biggest private enterprise in Taiwan, with sales reaching US$44 billion. Since 2003, Foxconn has become the biggest exporting company in China, with a total income some of US$618 billion, and exports valued at US$516 billion: 3.9 % of

[50] Linden, Kraemer and Dedrick, "Case of Apple's iPod," 143.

[51] Chan and Pun, "Suicide of Migrant Workers," 1–50.

[52] Foxconn, "Company Intro."

[53] Ibid.

China's total exports at the time.[54] In 2011, Foxconn ranked number 60 on the Fortune Global 500 Enterprises list.

Foxconn established a reputation among the business partners as a producer characterized by efficiency, high quality, and high levels of flexibility. The Foxconn Longhua campus is known to be the world's largest 3C manufacturing base and the shortest supply chain.[55] Foxconn has contracts with numerous branded electronic companies, including Acer (Taiwan), Apple (USA), Dell (USA), Hewlett-Packard (USA), Intel (USA), Microsoft (USA), Motorola Mobility (USA), Nokia (Finland), Samsung Electronics (South Korea), Sony (Japan), and Toshiba (Japan).[56] Having processed so many brand companies' contracts simultaneously, Foxconn became the biggest processing factory in the world, supplying more than 50 percent of the components in the global electronics industry.

However, Foxconn's reputation has been tainted by 17 suicides that happened between January and August 2010. Since then, Foxconn has become the focus of global concern. From the perspective of academia, Pun Ngai organized a team of students and scholars from Taiwan, Mainland China and Hong Kong to start a series of investigations outside several of Foxconn's factories.[57] According to their book *To Live On, Foxconn Workers*, this investigation is an ongoing process. The publication of this book is the result of first-stage investigation, and they will continue to monitor Foxconn workers. From the perspective of the media, following the exposure of suicidal cases, Foxconn adopted a strict manner to block media reporting. However, from the end of 2011, Foxconn decided to let the western media inspect their factories.[58] Those reports unsurprisingly showed a very rosy picture of Foxconn and the vast campus of Foxconn city in Longhua, Shenzhen. These reports do not sit comfortably, however,

[54] Pun, "To Live On," 188.

[55] Foxconn official website English version. Foxconn, "Manage Concept."

[56] Pun, "To Live On," 5.

[57] Ibid.

[58] John Biggs is a reporter for Techcrunch, an online blog which constantly updated the news in the IT field. Mr Briggs wrote four pieces of diary-style articles to describe his four-day visit to Foxconn's plant in Longhu, Shezhen. Biggs, "The Future of Foxconn." Rob Schmitz is the second western reporter to enter Foxconn Longhau plant, he is the Chief reporter of Marketplace's (an American public media) Shanghai Bureau. Apart from writing down articles, Mr. Schmitz filmed a two-minute clip to show the making of iPhone on the site. *Inside Foxconn.*

with the reality that more than ten workers committed suicides in more than half a year. Academia, the media, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) paid great attention to the aftermath of suicidal events in Foxconn. In March 2012, an American-based NGO, Fair Labour Association (FLA), published their independent investigation of Foxconn.[59] The FLA report was commissioned by Apple. Whether the act of investigation was a way for Apple to clean up its name in the area of labor exploitation, Apple and Foxconn showed some resolution after the investigation. Apple and Foxconn agreed to reduce overtime working hours and also, in order to compensate the loss of labour force from this reduction, Foxconn agreed to hire more workers. Apple and Foxconn also agreed with the FLA to undertake a second examination in July 2013 to oversee those changes.[60]

Foxconn's case echoes what was argued earlier: the thin profit margin of processing trade or ODM factories, which leads to the exploitation of labor. It is not because Foxconn is a giant factory that enjoys exploiting workers' rights and wages, or that the CEO Terry Guo is a ruthless businessman who cares only about profits; it is the nature of capitalism. The "race-to-the-bottom" exercise drives factory owners to reap profits from workers. Apart from the exploitation of working conditions, the R&D level of those ODM/OEM Taiwanese factories in China is not high, which is another major weakness of Taiwanese IT/electronic factories in China.

The Taiwanese OEM pattern of production does not need groundbreaking innovation; all the Taiwanese OEM factories receive the orders from brand name companies and have relatively low-skilled barriers to finish the products. As a Chinese analyst from the Institute of Shanghai Social Science Taiwan studies center states:

> Taiwan is very protective of its patent or industrial knowledge. However, Taiwan's know-how is not at the high-end, it is not innovative, and Taiwan is still learning from western countries' know-how and is merely popularizing this knowledge to the local market. In other words, the 'know-how' from Taiwanese factories, can very easily be copied or learned by Chinese entrepreneurs.[61]

[59] Fair Labour Association, "Foxconn Investigation Report."

[60] Ibid.

[61] Interview data S1.

This is what I argue at the beginning of this section: most of small and medium-sized Taiwanese OEM factories became "teachers" of Chinese local manufacturers. After 2008 Taiwanese investors faced both a financial downturn and tighter legislation governing labour contracts. It meant orders from the brand companies fell while the wage bill increased. As a result, small and medium-sized Taiwanese factories closed down, and were replaced by domestic Chinese factories, whose owners had previously worked for Taiwanese companies and learned the "know-how" there.

It would be a gross exaggeration to assert that the growth in China's electronic industry only happened because of Taiwanese investment. In fact, as Ernst and Naughton argue, the Chinese state itself played a crucial role in the development of the IT industry. State ownership is significant in the whole industry, including the fostering of science innovation parks, such as the Zhongguancun park in Beijing, and the Zhangjiang high-technology park in Shanghai.[62] Furthermore, domestic Chinese entrepreneurs receive substantial support from the government for R&D and innovation. Nevertheless, the small and medium-sized Taiwanese OEM electronics/IT factories provided a good foundation from which the Chinese electronics/IT industry could take off. The Chinese factories learned from Taiwanese experiences in linking up with the brand companies and cost-effective factory management, and they then out-competed their "teacher," Taiwanese manufacturers, as they secured a place in the supply chain. Recent IT/electronics industrial developments in China indicate that the Taiwanese "industrial clusters" in China are now being replaced by Chinese domestic factories. According to one leading manager of a LED company in Kunshan:

> the government encouraged us to purchase components which are made from domestic Chinese factories instead of non-Chinese factories. Even though the price from the Chinese factories will be probably higher, the quality might not be as good as other non-Chinese factories, the government would provide us tax incentives for us to purchase from Chinese factories.[63]

[62] Ernst and Naughton, "China's Emerging Industrial Economy," 56.

[63] Interview data K2.

This is why most of the Taiwanese manufacturers are worried about the emergence of the so-called "red supply chain."[64] Chinese manufacturers have gradually decreased their dependence on non-Chinese subcontractors, and this could deal a fatal blow to Taiwanese electronics/IT factories in China. Simply put, the strength of Taiwanese factories lies very much on the industrial cluster and collaborative supply chains.

Conclusion

Based on the argument presented above, we can draw four conclusions. Firstly, the GVC theoretical framework overlooked many empirical limits. For instance, developed countries would transfer some, though not all technological know-how due to their concern over national security or economic competition. The GVC framework, therefore, reflects only the positive side of knowledge transfer among different countries, while neglecting some realistic constraints. Taiwan joined the GVC in the electronics industry after it managed to create a flow of human capital between Silicon Valley and HSP, which enabled the Taiwanese electronics industry to take off in the 1990s though it remained at a lower level in the GVC. Secondly, Taiwan played a critical role in incorporating Chinese manufacturing capacities into the bottom of the GVC in the electronics industry in the early 1990s by capitalizing on the symbiotic relationship it enjoyed with Silicon Valley. However, with the opening of the Chinese market and the transfer of skills from the Taiwanese to their Chinese partners, there was a significant increase the competitive capacity of China in the high-technology industry. Thirdly, with the rise of the "red supply chain," Taiwanese IT/electronic industries' clusters in China are becoming victims of their own success. They are now facing severe competition, even a threat, from the emerging Chinese supply chain, which was based on the know-how transferred from Taiwanese companies. For small and medium-sized Taiwanese OEM factories in China, industrial upgrading is easier said than done. For most of them it is nearly impossible to create a global brand and own the design. The creation of a new brand requires

[64] China Post, "China Supply Chain Plan."

huge capital input and the recruitment of talented human resources, and this is not always affordable for most small and medium-sized Taiwanese ODM manufacturers. Finally, while Taiwan played a key part in helping Mainland China to join the GVC in the rapidly changing electronics industry in the first instance, the Chinese themselves have quickly taken full advantage of this break and made themselves a major player in their own right. The tremendous and impressive successes of the Chinese in securing a place in the global GVC does not negate the contribution the Taiwanese have made, but it does show the limits to how Taiwan is impacting upon China in a significant sector.

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Interview data

Interview data G1, Guangzhou, January 13 2012.
Interview data S1: Shanghai, date: April 21 2014.
Interview data K2: Kunshan, date: 29 July 2015.

7

The Impact of Taiwanese Popular Literature on China

Michelle Yeh

Prologue

Coined in 1990 by the author Joseph Nye, the term "soft power" has become familiar not only in political discourses but also, increasingly, in vernacular English. In contrast to "hard power" (coercion and payment), "soft power," according to Nye, derives from three sources: culture, political values, and foreign policies.[1] In this chapter I argue that one area in which Taiwan has clearly exercised soft power on the Chinese Mainland is through its culture. More specifically, the period under investigation is the 1980s, and the cultural form is popular literature.

With the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and the ascendency of Deng Xiaoping (邓小平, 1904–1997) as the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, in the late 1970s the People's Republic

[1] Nye, *The Future of Power*, 84. The original study in which the theory was presented is: Nye, *Bound to Lead*.

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of China (PRC) entered the New Era (新时期). Like the opening of a floodgate, a variety of cultural products poured in from Taiwan and Hong Kong. This was manifested, above all, in the realm of popular music. The heart-melting love songs of Teresa Teng (Deng Lijun 邓丽君, 1953–1995) could not be more different from the masculine, patriotic tunes that had prevailed for decades. Despite the politically incorrect lyrics, it didn't take long for her songs to sweep across the mainland. Without ever having set her foot on the mainland, she was in fact the first pop star in PRC history.[2]

In the 1996 award-winning Hong Kong film *Comrades: Almost a Love Story* (甜蜜蜜), the female protagonist (played by Maggie Cheung) is a recent arrival in Hong Kong from the Mainland city of Guangzhou (Canton). Once in Hong Kong, she tries to make a living by working at McDonald's during the day and selling tapes of Teresa Teng's songs at a night market. At the end of the first night, to her dismay she has sold none. The male protagonist (played by Leon Lai), another recent immigrant, explains that no one will buy her tapes for fear of giving away their identities as mainlanders, many of who are staying in Hong Kong illegally. The scene is set in 1986, which rings true because Teresa Teng was immensely popular on the Mainland where people had only recently discovered her music.

Teng's popularity even put her on a par with the revered leader Deng Xiaoping, as implied by the expression: "We listen to Old Deng during the day, listen to Little Deng at night" (白天听老邓,晚上听小邓). In Chinese as in English, "ting" has two meanings, which are cleverly juxtaposed here: to listen [to music] and to obey. During the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign of 1983–1984, when Teng's songs were banned for being "decadent" and "pornographic," people continued to listen to them clandestinely; at the time there were even sayings like these in circulation: "Old Deng is no comparison to Little Deng" (老邓不如小邓) and "We don't want Old Deng, we want Little Deng" (不要老邓要小邓).

[2] Ironically, Teng not only hailed from Taiwan, but throughout the 1970s she was also working for the Nationalist government in propaganda warfare against the PRC with broadcasts to the Mainland. This was how Mainland people, who listened clandestinely on short-wave radio, were introduced to her songs before the New Era.

Three decades later, we can still find numerous reminiscences online. A blog belonging to "Old Wang with a Scythe" (弯刀老王) can speak for many:

> In those years, we listened to Old Deng during the day, to Little Deng at night. During the day, we broke free of the ideological cage and crossed rivers by groping for stones with our feet. We didn't care if it was a white cat or black cat; any cat that could catch mice was a good cat. At night, we drank "Sweet Wine Plus Coffee," danced "Tipsy Tango," chased away "The Loneliness of Love," searched for the "Maiden of the South Pacific," looked forward to "Longing for Love in Dream" and "Yearning" to express ourselves with "Ten Thousand Words": "Every day I pray and pray/Please chase away the loneliness of love."[3]

This short passage amalgamates the most memorable "policy statements" of Deng Xiaoping and the titles of some of Teresa Teng's best-known songs. It is revealing that for the blogger political reform went hand in hand with cultural liberalization—for the first time in decades, young people found an outlet for their longings for love through the refreshingly new tunes and romantic lyrics. The fact that the establishment and the older generations frowned upon these songs made them all the more enticing.[4]

The return of love was inextricable from the craze of popular literature from Taiwan and Hong Kong.[5] Qiong Yao (琼瑶, b. 1938) and San Mao (三毛, 1943–1991) quickly built up a huge following, especially among youngsters. Television and film adaptations of the former's novels, in particular, enjoyed phenomenal success as they reached wider audiences.

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[3] 那些年,我们白天听老邓,晚上听小邓。白天,我们冲破思想牢笼,摸着石头过河,不管白猫黑猫,逮住老鼠就是好猫;晚上,我们喝着《美酒加咖啡》,跳着《酒醉的探戈》,驱赶《爱的寂寞》,寻觅《南海姑娘》,期待《相思在梦里》,《祈望》《千言万语》地诉说:"我每天都在祈祷,快赶走爱的寂寞".

[4] See: Li, *Pop Songs*, 3–4, 10–11. The establishment's attempt to stem the tide of pop songs from Taiwan and Hong Kong also applied to the Campus Folksongs (*xiaoyuan mingge*) from Taiwan, which created a new craze in China on the heels of Teresa Teng.

[5] Romance from Taiwan and Hong Kong was not the only popular genre in post-Mao China. Martial arts fiction, especially as represented by the Hong Kong-based writer Jin Yong(金庸) (Louis Cha, b. 1924) and the Taiwanese Gu Long(古龙, 1938–1985), experienced a robust revival too.

The soundtracks were equally romantic and definitely helped popularize the author-cum-producer for decades to come.

Turning to the genre of poetry, English readers may find it hard to see any affinity between poetry and popular literature. Unlike most developed countries in the world, where poetry cannot be farther away from pop culture, it was widely and avidly read in post-Mao China throughout the 1980s. This was, in fact, true of all literature. Having recently emerged from the "Dark Ages" of the Cultural Revolution, writers were eager to write with their newfound freedom while readers were hungry for writings that were no longer shackled by political doctrines. Thus began a renaissance in literature. A new poetry emerged from the underground in the late 1970s and by the early 1980s attracted national attention. It was at the center of a controversy in the early 1980s over its allegedly incomprehensible style and became labeled as "Misty Poetry" (also known as Obscure Poetry, Menglongshi朦胧诗); but the controversy only made it more popular, especially among students and intellectuals. Virtually all the leading "Misty" poets went on to become internationally renowned figures.[6]

As the second wave arose in the mid-1980s, underground poetry flourished and developed in many directions. With a stronger self-awareness and more diverse aesthetic positions than under the Misty generation, the underground poetry scene established itself as an autonomous space distinct from, and virtually independent of, the "official" poetry scene. This was an unprecedented time in PRC history. On the one hand, we may say that underground poetry was maturing and coming into its own; on the other, it was apparent that the populist appeal that it had enjoyed only a few years before was fading. The larger context was that as the country became increasingly open, modernized, and consumer-oriented, a wider range of forms of entertainment were available to the masses. The market for literature also became increasingly diversified and commercialized. Highly experimental works tended to appeal only to literary-minded and specialized readers rather than general readers. Whereas in the early 1980s, the Misty Poets had levels of adulation normally associated with rock stars, the public would have a hard time naming famous

[6] For analyses of the historical and literary contexts in which Misty Poetry arose, see: Crevel, *Language Shattered*; Yeh, "Light a Lamp," 379–409.

underground poets of the younger generation.[7] It is no coincidence, then, that the most popular poet in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s came not from the underground poetry movement; rather, it was Xi Murong (席慕蓉, also 席慕容, b. 1943) from Taiwan.

This chapter will focus on the two above-mentioned Taiwanese writers: the romance writer Qiong Yao and the poet Xi Murong (who is often dubbed "the Qiong Yao in poetry"). In analyzing their phenomenal success in post-Mao China, my emphasis is not so much on the intrinsic qualities of their writings as on the sociocultural conditions of 1980s China that created an environment that was receptive to them. I am keenly aware of the difference in scale when it comes to the production and consumption of these two writers' works. As is well known, for decades Qiong Yao has been deeply involved in the marketing of her novels and the adaptation of her books for TV and films. She is virtually a one-woman industry – and a lucrative industry at that. By contrast, Xi Murong does not consider herself a "professional poet"; she is by profession a painter (whose work adorns her books of poetry and prose) and an art professor. She has not joined any poetry society or been involved in the "business" of publishing her books.[8] Thus, there is no comparison in quantitative terms. As I have stated, the two writers have each created a "phenomenon" in post-Mao China in their respective genre of writing. They have been paired by the media, critics, and readers alike as the best-selling writer and poet, first in Taiwan and then in China. Another similarity is that, commercial success aside, they have not entered the literary canon; indeed, they are often completely excluded from literary history.[9]

The questions I consider in this chapter are: What accounts for their immense popularity at this particular juncture in Chinese history? In what way did their works appeal to readers and create a significant impact

[7] It was not until the suicide of Haizi海子 (1964–1989) that poetry entered the public consciousness again. This happened again in 1993 when a leading Misty poet, Gu Cheng顾城 (1956–1993), committed murder (of his estranged wife) and suicide. As could be expected, both deaths received much media hype.

[8] See: Yang, "Xi Murong Phenomenon." The author defends Xi against the title "the Qiong Yao of poetry," which he interprets as a derogatory term and as unfair.

[9] For example, in the authoritative *History of Contemporary Chinese Poetry* (当代中国诗歌史) written by Hong Zicheng (洪子诚), the preeminent scholar at Peking University, Xi Murong is not mentioned at all, not even in the section on women poets of the 1980s and 1990s.

on China in the 1980s? A simple yet logical answer could be that Qiong Yao and Xi Murong were popular because they gave Mainland readers something new. One desires that which one does not have. The twofold meaning of the English word "want" nicely captures the logic since to want is both to desire and to lack something. But this answer requires further consideration. Sure, one wants that which one does not have; still, many choices are available when it comes to desires. Why does one want this rather than that? Besides access, what other factors are there? What I am proposing in this case is that one significant reason for the immense appeal of the two Taiwanese writers is that their writings resonated with the "collective unconscious" of post-Mao China, that their writings both reflected and reinforced the changing national aspirations and emerging social and cultural trends. In short, Qiong Yao and Xi Murong not only offered Mainland readers something new but, more importantly, they were among the first to respond to certain preexisting conditions.

Qiong Yao

In 1985, Qiong Yao made a grand entrance into China with six of her novels being published in quick succession. In addition, in December 1985 a chapter from another novel *Water Fairy*水灵 (1971),[10] titled "A Few Blossoms of the Heart" (心香数朵), was anthologized in *The Lover—Selected Short Stories and Novellas from Taiwan* (情人——台湾中短篇小说选萃), the first collection of Taiwanese fiction to appear in China. Forty more novels by Qiong Yao were to be published over the subsequent four years. The first six novels were: *In the Midst of the River* (在水一方, 1975), *The Young Ones* (彩云飞, 1968), *Gentle Wind* (翦翦风, 1967), *How Many Sunsets* (几度夕阳红, 1964), *Wild Goose at the Tree Top* (雁儿在林梢, 1976), and *Boat* (船, 1965).

Critics in Taiwan have long denigrated Qiong Yao's romances as escapist in that the world she creates is a far cry from real life and it is a negative influence on young women in particular. They have also criticized her formulaic and melodramatic plots, dismissing her as a writer of

[10] Hereafter in reference to Qiong Yao, the year in parentheses indicates the original date of publication of her novel in Taiwan.

"boudoir literature" (*guixiu wenxue*闺秀文学).[11] Lin Fangmei (林芳玫), the author of the only in-depth study of Qiong Yao to adopt a literary-sociological perspective, points out that Qiong Yao has been successful in "locking in" her readers (and viewers) in a tripartite structure of feeling that poses no threat to the patriarchal order: first, melodramatic imagination; second, romantic fantasy, which aestheticizes the objective world and elevates "eternal love" to a new religion; third, affective familialism, treating family relations as the ultimate resolution of all conflicts and the most effective form of redemption in life's plight and vacuity.[12] All of these studies focus on the Taiwanese context in which Qiong Yao's work was written, circulated, and consumed. However, there has been little attention to why she became equally popular in post-Mao China under distinctly different socio-politico-cultural circumstances. Why do her "formulas" work equally well for readers in post-Mao China?

To answer this question, we must contextualize the introduction of Qiong Yao within the cultural milieu of 1980s China—a period which saw the emergence of two major trends. With the "thaw" in 1978, China entered the "Age of Enlightenment." Knowledge that had been repressed and forbidden for decades returned with a vengeance. Broadly speaking, this re-emerging knowledge can be divided into two broad categories: Western and Chinese. For example, whether new or reprinted, translations of Western classics mushroomed and were extremely well received, often selling in the millions. While literary movements ranging from symbolism and modernism to postmodernism were introduced and re-introduced, many philosophical and political theories, such as existentialism, psychoanalysis, liberalism, humanism, civil society, and hermeneutics, were discussed and debated enthusiastically among academics. The publication of the enormously influential monthly *Reading* (读书) in April 1979 both reflected and helped create the intellectual ferment of the New Era. The first essay in the inaugural issue set the tone of the journal with its title: "No Forbidden Zone in Reading" (读书无禁区).[13]

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[11] One minority view is advanced by the culture critic Lin Wenchi Lin (林文淇), who argues that Qiong Yao's early fiction is realist in reflecting the social changes that Taiwan was undergoing. See: Lin, "Qiong Yao's Films," 4–19.

[12] See: Lin, *Interpreting Qiong Yao.*

[13] For the complete tables of contents of the journal from 1979 to the present, see the website: mall.cnki.net.

The 1980s also witnessed a revival of interest in traditional Chinese knowledge and reinterpretations of Chinese literature and culture. The former paved the way for the National Learning Fever (*guoxuere*国学热) in the 1990s, while the latter manifested itself in two forms of revisiting the canon: restoration and revision. Restoration refers to both traditional and May Fourth classics. Works ranging from *Dream of the Red Chamber* to Ba Jin's (1904–2005) *Family* became bestsellers and went through numerous printings. Revision is best represented by the movement started by young scholars of Chinese literature to "rewrite literary history" (*chongxie wenxueshi* 重写文学史). Hitherto neglected modern writers—most notably, the fiction writer Zhang Ailin (Eileen Chang张爱玲, 1920–1995), the literary scholar and fiction writer Qian Zhongshu (钱钟书, 1910–1998), and the Romantic poet Xu Zhimo (徐志摩, 1896–1931)—were not only rediscovered but were embraced by scholars and general readers alike. The modern canon underwent enlargement and veered sharply away from the Communist orthodoxy. Concurrent with and related to these efforts was the Root-Seeking movement (*xungen* 寻根) that arose in the early 1980s and gained momentum in the middle of the decade. Manifest in multiple genres and media—fiction, poetry, painting, and film—the movement represented a conscious attempt among artists and writers to redefine "Cultural China" and reassess the Chinese tradition.[14] Like Misty Poetry and the Stars Painters (星星画会) a few years earlier, the Root-Seeking movement marked another milestone in the history of Chinese literature and art.

In what way do Qiong Yao's romances relate to the High Culture Fever (文化热) outlined above? On the surface, they appear to be the exact opposite of the highbrow literature represented by Anglo-American High Modernism on the one hand and the indigenous avant-garde in fiction, poetry, and drama on the other. I submit, however, that despite the obvious differences between Qiong Yao's works and their Western and Chinese counterparts, certain aspects not only resonated with the new cultural trends but also, in fact, helped reinforce and popularize them in the New Era.

[14] For a succinct study, see: Hong, *History of Chinese Literature*, 366–73. For a study of cultural trends in the 1980s, see: Wang, *High Culture Fever.*

In his pioneering study, Thomas Gold points out that the popular culture of Taiwan and Hong Kong enjoyed phenomenal success in post-Mao China because it redefined "the essence of what it means to be a 'modern' Chinese" and it introduced "a new language for expressing individual sentiments."[15] This insightful observation harks back to the above-quoted reminiscence of "Old Wang with a Scythe;" for his generation, personal liberation was concomitant with the opening up of China and the national project of the "Four Modernizations" (四个现代化) under Deng Xiaoping. Gold also provides an apt framework for analyzing Qiong Yao's impact in my study. Her romances were so well received, I submit, because they tapped into two emerging social and cultural trends, or two aspects of the changing collective unconscious, in post-Mao China: modernization and a new discourse of love.

Consider the opening scene of *In the Midst of the River*, in which the main characters make their first appearances. This is how the female protagonist Shihui (诗卉) describes her elder brother Shiyao (诗尧):

> At this moment, my elder brother Shiyao has a lit cigarette in his hand and a copy of *Collection of World Folksongs*, recently mailed from the USA, on his lap, but he fixes his eyes on the television screen. On the screen Robert Wagner in *It Takes a Thief* is in the act of stealing a "world-famous painting" in some unimaginably ingenious way.[16]

In the course of just two sentences, the word "world" appears twice and there are at least five references to foreign things: an "American" collection of "world" folksongs, a "Hollywood heartthrob," a popular "American TV show" that ran from January 9, 1968 to March 24, 1970, and a "world-famous" painting—one thinks of *The Mona Lisa* or a Picasso. The matter-of-fact tone in which Shihui narrates the scene also suggests that she is not describing something exotic or unfamiliar, that the middle- or upper-middle-class lifestyle this picture represents is not unknown to Taiwanese readers.

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[15] Gold, "Go With Your Feelings," 255; the article is reprinted in Gold, "Go With Your Feelings," 255–73.

[16] 现在,我这位哥哥朱诗尧,燃着一支烟,膝上摊着一本刚从美国寄来的"世界民谣选集",眼睛却直直的看着电视机,那电视的萤光幕上,劳勃韦纳所扮演的"妙贼"又在那儿匪夷所思的偷"世界名画"了. All translations in the chapter are mine unless otherwise indicated.

The fact is that Qiong Yao's romances in the 1960s–1970s contain numerous references to Western music (both classical and pop), literature (almost all canonical writers), popular culture (movies and television shows), and lifestyle. In contrast, for Chinese readers in the 1980s, Qiong Yao conjured up a world that was novel and exotic, a world that was modern, westernized, and formerly forbidden in Mao's China. Yet this world was simultaneously more accessible, relatable, and "palatable" since the characters living such a lifestyle were ethnically, linguistically, and culturally Chinese as well.

Closely related to the detailed descriptions of a modern lifestyle is the fact that many characters in Qiong Yao's romances have studied or lived in the United States and Europe, and English words are sprinkled throughout. Not only do they function as markers of modernity, but they are inevitably associated with elegance, sophistication, and success. In other words, foreign things are ascribed a superior quality and a higher value. It is no exaggeration to say that the lifestyle conjured up in Qiong Yao's romances was an object of adulation and envy—first for readers in Taiwan and later for those in post-Mao China.[17]

To give an example, Du Xiaoshuang (杜小双), the protagonist of *In the Mist of the River*, exclaims:

> I think there is no better [television] show than the colorful world of Walt Disney! It is entertainment as well as education, with the most beautiful scenes and the most touching stories. This kind of show is truly "aesthetic"! How is it that Walt Disney can do it but we can't? I guarantee that if we had shows like this, sponsors of TV commercials as well as the general public would watch them, grownups as well as kids would watch them.[18]

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[17] Whether or not one needs to differentiate Hong Kong and Taiwan in terms of their impact on China seems to me a minor issue for this reason. Throughout the decades after the end of World War II, the two areas had extensive interactions and mutual influences in literature and popular culture, despite obvious differences in their vernacular language and political systems. Taiwanese culture entered China primarily via Hong Kong in the 1970s–1980s. This is evident in the fact that it was only after 1987, when the martial law was lifted in Taiwan, that civilians were able to travel to China. Another indication is that China—whether the government or the public—always referred to the two areas as "*gangtai*" 港台 throughout the 1980s–1990s, an expression that some still continue to use today. For 1980s' China, *gangtai* represented a "modern," "westernized," thus desirable, lifestyle.

[18] 我觉得最好的节目,莫过于华德迪斯耐的彩色世界!那是娱乐,也是教育,有最美的画面,有最富人情味的故事。这种节目,才真正是'唯美派'的节目呢!人家华德迪斯耐做得出来,

Even smoking is romanticized this way in *Wild Goose at the Treetop* when it is associated with the West:

> "In London, girls as young as fourteen smoke." She answers softly, then takes over his cigarette and lights it. He gazes at her as she takes a drag. The way she smokes is elegant and classy. A gentle waft of smoke envelopes her like a veil, making her look so poetic and picturesque, so dreamy and dreamlike …. His mind starts to wander again.[19]

Although smoking is by no means a new phenomenon in either Taiwan or China, the picture Qiong Yao paints of a young woman smoking openly and elegantly is both uncommon and romantic. Related to this idealized view of smoking is the fact that, when it comes to physical appearances, the features that the author emphasizes most about her heroines are almost always their "dreamy eyes"[20] and long eyelashes. While the first description is vague and subjective, the other is a facial feature that Chinese people usually identify with Westerners, as long eyelashes are clearly not a common Chinese trait! This is just another way in which Qiong Yao makes her heroines stand out: they may not be the prettiest girls in the traditional sense, but they definitely look striking.[21]

Finally, I'd like to single out another marker of modernity and westernization in Qiong Yao's romances: the ubiquitous presence of coffee drinking and coffee shops. Every one of her novels published in China in 1985 contains episodes of lovers dating at a tastefully decorated coffee shop in Taipei, where they engage in intimate talks over a cup of coffee. Echoing Lin Fangmei's above-mentioned assertion about preserving the

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为什么我们就做不出来?如果有这种节目,我包管广告客户要看,普通观众要看,大人要看,小孩也要看!

在伦敦,女孩子十四岁就抽烟。"她淡淡的回答,接过了他手里的烟,熟练的点燃。他凝视她,她吸了一口烟,抽烟的姿势优雅而高贵,那缕轻轻柔柔的烟雾,烘托着她,环绕着她,把她衬托得如诗、如画、如幻、如梦……他又神思恍惚起来。

[19] 在伦敦,女孩子十四岁就抽烟。"她淡淡的回答,接过了他手里的烟,熟练的点燃。他凝视她,她吸了一口烟,抽烟的姿势优雅而高贵,那缕轻轻柔柔的烟雾,烘托着她,环绕着她,把她衬托得如诗、如画、如幻、如梦……他又神思恍惚起来。

[20] The culture critic Li Ao李敖 wrote a scathing critique of Qiong Yao's first novel, *Outside the Window*, in 1965, in which he noted the numerous references to the heroine's "dreamy eyes" and "dreamy smiles." See: Li, "Without the Window."

[21] In fact, in a Qiong Yao romance, there is often a secondary female character who is more beautiful by traditional standards but lacks the inimitable flair of the heroine.

patriarchal order, without exception it is always the male protagonist who is in charge of the dating ritual: he puts sugar and milk in the female protagonist's coffee, essentially teaching her how coffee is to be enjoyed. Here is a passage from *How Many Sunsets*:

> On the wall there are exquisite, translucent lamps. One third of the room is taken up by a pond, with dense, nameless broadleaf plants floating on the surface and colorful tropical fish swimming briskly among the aquatic plants and in the crevices between the rocks. They pick a table near the pond and sit down. Xiaotong can't help but stare at the twinkling little fish and the paintings on the wall. On the stereo Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* is playing, the music floating softly in the air. The entire room is filled with an artistic feeling of peacefulness…. Coffee is served. Wei Rufeng puts sugar cubes and milk in the coffee for Xiaotong and stirs it with a small spoon.[22]

Similarly, *Wild Goose at the Treetop* clearly associates coffee shops with Western culture:

> The coffee shop is tiny and cute, situated on the newly developed Zhongxiao East Road. Inside, the décor is clean and graceful, with whitewashed walls, masts and lampposts of unvarnished wood, plain wooden tables and chairs. It evokes a village on a small Greek island. Jiang Huai and Danfeng have been sitting in the corner of the coffee shop for a very long time. Through the windows they have a view of the street. They had lunch together before they came here… "Athena"—this Greek-style coffee shop is named after a Greek goddess.[23]

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[22] 壁上有玲珑剔透的小灯,全厅三分之一的位置是一个水池,里面栽着叫不出名字的阔叶植物,绿荫荫的覆盖在水池上,池中养着五彩斑斓的热带鱼,正活泼的在水草和石缝中来往穿梭。他们找了一个靠着水池的位子坐下。晓彤不由自主的伸头去望着池中那些闪闪烁烁、五颜六色的小鱼,和壁上那些十分艺术的图案,唱机里在播送着一张贝多芬的命运交响曲,乐声在室内轻缓的流动。整个厅内,充满了一份宁静幽雅的艺术气息。…咖啡送来了,魏如峰帮晓彤放下了牛奶和方糖,又帮她用小匙搅着。

[23] 这家咖啡厅小小巧巧的,坐落在新开建的忠孝东路上。装饰得颇为干净雅致,白色的墙,原木的横梁,原木的灯架,和古拙的木质桌椅,颇有希腊小岛上岛民的风味。江淮和丹枫坐在咖啡馆的一角,已经坐了很久很久了。隔着玻璃窗,可以看到窗外的街景,他们一起吃过午餐,又一起到了这儿——艾琴娜——这"很希腊"的咖啡馆也有个希腊女神的名字。

Repeating the word "Greek" three times in the passage suggests how hard the author is trying to impress upon the reader that the notion of tastefulness is synonymous with Western culture.

Moreover, coffee is not just for dating; it provides an ideal ambience at family gatherings and is elevated to an "art," as seen in this passage from *The Young Ones*:

> After dinner, Yayun makes a pot of coffee. Then they all take a seat in the living room and chat as they drink coffee. Surrounded by a soft green, he feels that the room exudes peacefulness and tranquility. The ambiance is enchanting, even intoxicating. Yayun is making an even deeper impression on Yunlou. What a talented woman who can bring people closer together and create the right atmosphere! Yang Ziming [her husband] is truly blessed. He takes a sip of the coffee. It's perfectly brewed, not too strong and not too light, so aromatic and full-bodied. Making coffee is an art. He too knows how to make good coffee.[24]

To contextualize the above descriptions of coffee shops and coffee drinking in Qiong Yao's romances, let's bear in mind that Taiwan during this period was a loyal ally to the United States throughout the Cold War. The substantial economic aid and the prominent American presence on the island led to extensive Americanization and westernization of the society. American—and, to a lesser extent, European—influences were visible and palpable in both highbrow and popular cultures in Taiwan: from classical music to rock 'n' roll (often sold in pirated albums), from High Modernism and avant-garde art forms to TV shows and Hollywood movies, from the high value the society placed on achieving fluency in English to the outpouring of college graduates to USA (and, in much smaller numbers, to other Western countries) for advanced education.[25]

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[24] 饭后,雅筠亲自煮了一壶咖啡,大家坐在客厅里谈着天,慢慢的啜饮着咖啡。在一屋子静幽幽的绿笼罩之下,室内有股说不出来的静谧与安详,那气氛是迷人的,薰人欲醉的。云楼对雅筠的感觉更深刻了,她是个多么善于协调人与人的关系,又多么善于培养气氛的女人!杨子明是有福了。他饮着咖啡,咖啡煮得很好,不浓不淡,很香又很够味,煮咖啡是种艺术,他也能煮一手好咖啡。

[25] For a wide range of insightful perspectives on Taiwanese society in the 1970s, see Yang, *Ideals Continue to Burn*; Yang, *The 1970s: Confessions*. Although the focus is on the 1970s, the first volume provides comprehensive contexts and a chronology of major events from 1969 to 1981.

In the 1960s and 1970s, when these romances were first published, coffee drinking was far from popular and coffee shops in Taiwan were seen as upscale and exotic. While meeting a friend in a coffee shop or enjoying a cup of coffee at the end of a meal were common experiences in the West, under Qiong Yao's pen they were transformed into a measurement of good taste and successful life.

What I am suggesting is that just as these and other markers of a middle-class, modern lifestyle appealed to Taiwanese readers in the 1960 and 1970s, the same holds true for Chinese readers in the 1980s. As mentioned earlier, Western modernity seemed not only more accessible but also less alien and more palatable when it was mediated through Taiwan, another Chinese-speaking society that is geographically and culturally much closer than the West. After all, in the 1980s China had only recently opened up to the West, and the ideological and cultural differences were not so easy to overcome in a short time. Just as world literature was introduced and reintroduced to Chinese readers predominantly through translation, so "Hong Kong and Taiwan" (*gangtai* 港台) functioned much like *the* translator of Western knowledge and lifestyle.

By the end of the 1980s, Taiwan had begun to move away from American influences as nativist consciousness became widespread and gained ascendancy in the cultural sphere. In contrast, post-Mao China was still very curious about, and desirous of, the West, especially USA. It was common to praise something or someone as being "foreign-style" or "with a foreign flair" (*yangqi* 洋气) in Chinese. The term was probably coined in the late nineteenth century and has come to be synonymous with "fashionable" or "modern." Even today, it is still used as a compliment for both men and women, and a selling point for consumer goods in China. In contrast, the expression has long been obsolete in Taiwan.

I am by no means suggesting that Chinese readers loved Qiong Yao simply because her romances opened their eyes to the West. The reading process is never so simple and the reception of literature takes place at multiple levels, both conscious and unconscious. What I am emphasizing is that Qiong Yao was immensely popular in post-Mao China because what she represented was consistent with the collective desire of

the Chinese people for modernization and westernization. Moreover, the appeal of her novels went far beyond exuding a "foreign flair." In important ways Qiong Yao's romances offered nothing less than an initiation to romantic love for young readers; they were part and parcel of a new discourse of love that began to emerge in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

After decades of delegitimizing love between the sexes by the Chinese Communist Party, a new love poetry emerged after the Cultural Revolution. In Misty Poetry, Shu Ting (舒婷, b. 1952) gained national renown with her love poems, and to this day she remains the best-known woman poet in China. "To an Oak Tree" (致橡树, 1977) compares the male "you" to an oak tree and the female first-person narrator to a ceiba tree. The poem opens with a vow between the couple to always be loving and selfless:

> If I love you—
> I will never be a clinging trumpet creeper
> Using your high boughs to show off my height
> If I love you—
> I will never be a spoony bird
> Repeating a monotonous song for green shade.[26]
> (Translated by Johanna Yueh)[27]

The poem repeats the bold declaration of "If I love you." Moreover, it rejects the traditional Chinese role of woman as being dependent on her man like a pliant vine clinging to a tall tree—typically a pine, cypress, or oak. The poem then goes on to compare the bond between the couple to the "entwined" roots and caressing leaves of two trees. Rather than a vine, she is a tree in her own right. Standing as two equals, they greet each other though no one can understand their secret language.[28]

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[26] 我如果爱你——　绝不像攀援的凌霄花,　借你的高枝炫耀自己:
我如果爱你——　绝不学痴情的鸟儿,　为绿荫重复单调的歌曲。

[27] The translation is quoted from the website: China.org.cn. It is cited here and below with minor modifications.

[28] 我必须是你近旁的一株木棉,　做为树的形象和你站在一起。　根,紧握在地下,　叶,相触在云里。　每一阵风过,　我们都互相致意,　但没有人　听懂我们的言语。

While attributes such as equality, trust, and understanding may seem universal to any good relationship, to hear the poet declare them in "To an Oak Tree" was a breath of fresh air to post-Mao readers. During the Cultural Revolution, dating and open expressions of love between a man and a woman were strictly forbidden, and anyone who violated this faced grave consequences. More generally, privacy was non-existent as the line between private life and public life was completely erased in the name of the Revolution. In light of this historical context, Shu Ting's reference to the lovers' secret language that only they understand is especially bold.

Similarly, her "Goddess Peak" (神女峰), written four years later, is consistent with "To an Oak Tree" in representing a new attitude toward love. The Peak is an ancient allusion to the Goddess of Mount Wu who waited resolutely for the return of her lover, King Huai of Chu; she waited in vain, and she eventually turned into stone. However, the poem is not about fidelity, even less about the virtuous woman languishing in the boudoir, a common motif in classical Chinese poetry. Rather, Shu Ting expresses her skepticism openly: "But can the heart/Really turn into stone?" Instead of "being displayed on the cliff for a thousand years," she chooses to seize the moment and says: "I would rather have a good cry on my lover's shoulder through the night."[29]

In Misty Poetry, nature often parallels the human condition much like a sympathetic witness. This is also seen in "Goddess Peak," in which nature reflects the poet's rebellion against the traditional perception of women: "Along the riverbank/A torrent of golden coneflowers and privets/Is instigating a new revolt." The "new revolt" writ large is expressed in poetry as well as other genres in post-Mao China. In fiction, for example, writers, especially such women writers as Zhang Jie(张洁, b. 1937) and Zhang Xinxin(张辛欣, b. 1953), wrote memorable stories about the importance of love in life.

As part of the new discourse of love, the names of Qiong Yao's fictional characters all tend to be refined and elegant. In comparison to names in the PRC in earlier decades, they tend to be more literary, romantic, and

[29] 但是,心真能变成石头吗　为盼望远天的杳鹤　而错过无数次春江月明　沿着江岸　金光菊和女贞子的洪流　正煽动新的背叛　与其在悬崖上展览千年　不如在爱人肩头痛哭一晚。

feminine. Rather than the politically correct color "red" (*hong* 红) and its homonym "rainbow" 虹, we find "blue" (*lan* 蓝) and "purple" (*zi* 紫) for Qiong Yao's protagonists; rather than the patriotic sentiment of "protect the East" (*weidong* 卫东) and "sunrise in the East" (*xudong* 旭东), we find cloud (*yun* 云), wind (*feng* 风), rain (*yu* 雨), and bamboo (*zhu* 竹); rather than such roles as "soldier" (*bing* 兵) and "military" (*jun* 军), we find "poetry" (*shi* 诗) and "dream" (*meng* 梦); rather than the martial "tip of blade" (*feng* 锋), "steel" (*gang* 钢) and its homonym "unbending" 刚, we find "book" (*shu* 书) and "literature" (*wen* 文). The contrasts are understandable in view of the vast differences between Taiwan and China following decades of separation. While it doesn't mean that ideas related to patriotism or nation-building were absent in Taiwanese names, they were far from ubiquitous. It is therefore revealing that, as the society became increasingly open with a loosening of ideological control, the convention for naming also began to alter. Today, there is little distinction when it comes to the names of young men and women on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, although admittedly this is based on personal observations rather than hard statistics. Have Qiong Yao's romances had anything to do with it? The following real-life story offers a fascinating example.

In the May 20, 2013 issue of *The Daily Beast*, the American news and opinion website, Matt Lombard, who was teaching English literature in the city of Chengdu, related his experience of teaching *The Great Gatsby* to local students. A nineteen-year-old student in his class asked that she be called Antonia rather than her real name Mengting (梦婷): "The name her mother gave her at birth, which Antonia says means 'dream and beauty,' is the name of a character in a popular romance novel by the Taiwanese writer Qiong Yao. But Antonia feels her new name makes her more of an independent woman."

Given the fact that Antonia is a college student, we may assume that her mother was likely to have been born in the late 1960s or early 1970s and that she would have been in college or the middle school when the "Qiong Yao phenomenon" swept across the mainland. Two things are worth noting about this story. First, the fact that her mother named her after a Qiong Yao character (or a variation thereon) shows the impact of those romances on how she saw herself and what she wanted for her

daughter. Second, the fact that Antonia refuses to use her given name suggests that by 2013 Qiong Yao's works are already seen by young women—college-educated women, at least—as common, trite, and even downright embarrassing. Her negative reaction intimates the overexposure and saturation of Qiong Yao in China after three decades. Ironically, while her mother's generation found their new identities in Qiong Yao's characters, now her generation is turning away from those "dreamy and beautiful" names in asserting their own individuality.

Closely related to the characters' names is the language of classical Chinese poetry in Qiong Yao's writings. Paradoxically, her romances are not only permeated with a "foreign flair," but simultaneously characterized by the extensive use of literary Chinese. The titles of some of her novels, such as *In the Midst of the River*, *How Many Sunsets*, and *Deep Is the Courtyard* (庭院深深), are taken directly from Chinese poetry: the first from *The Book of Odes* (Shijing 诗经) while the latter two are from *ci* (词) or song lyrics of the Song dynasty. Other titles of three-, four-, or five-character constructions also smack of classical Chinese with their lyricism. In addition, the romances are sprinkled with classical verses. While many critics have noted this characteristic, and Qiong Yao herself has talked about her lifelong love for classical poetry, my emphasis here is that her use of language that echoes classical lyrics was part of Qiong Yao's appeal to readers in 1980s' China. As mentioned earlier, one of the major trends of the decade was a return to the Chinese tradition, including literature, both classical and modern. If prior to 1978 every Chinese was expected to memorize Mao Zedong's heroic poetry written in classical forms, Qiong Yao was now bringing back the beautifully romantic and delicately feminine elements of classical poetry that had been suppressed. Here is the conversation among the three main characters in *In the Midst of the River*:

> Xiaoshuang: "Like you said, we can rewrite classical poems. Take 'In the Midst of the River,' for example, it's elegant and subtle, and it promotes traditional Chinese culture. So much better than those pop songs like 'My Love Is a Torch'."
>
> Youwen: "Among modern writers, only Zhang Ailin is more mature, but still she's not profound enough …. I swear I will write something of

quality, something that can truly represent Chinese literature so foreigners won't think that China only has *Dream of the Red Chamber* and *The Vase of Golden Plum*!"

Yunong: "I just can't accept it. How is it that little Japan can win the Nobel Prize in literature but no one from China is even in the running?"[30]

One reason for Qiong Yao's populist appeal was the harmonious intertwining of Chinese tradition and Western modernity, of displaying pride in classical Chinese heritage on the one hand and living a sophisticated and affluent modern lifestyle on the other. Her romances present a seemingly perfect marriage between the East and the West, even though in reality they existed—and have continued to exist—in a precarious balance in China.

Xi Murong

Like Qiong Yao, Xi Murong created a sensation first in Taiwan, then in Mainland China. According to the poet, she started writing poetry at the age of thirteen when she scribbled some verses in her diary.[31] She did not publish her first collection, *Orange Jessamine* (七里香), until July 1981. Within a year, the book had gone through seven printings, and by 1985 it had gone through thirty printings. The unprecedented success continued unabated with her second collection, *Youth with No Regrets* (無怨的青春), published in 1983, followed by her third volume, *Nine Chapters of Time* (時光九篇), in 1987. It is no exaggeration to say that she is by far the bestselling poet in the entire history of Taiwan.[32]

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[30] 小双:"你说过的,我们可以改写古诗词,就像这支'在水一方',又典雅,又含蓄,又——宣扬了中国固有文化,总比那些'我的爱情,好像一把火'来得舒服。"

友文:"近代作家中,只有张爱玲的作品比较成熟,但是也不够深刻。… 我发誓要写一点像样的东西出来,写一点真正能代表中国的文学作品出来,不要让外国人,认为中国只有一部红楼梦和一部金瓶梅!"

雨农:"我就不服气,为什么小日本都可以拿诺贝尔文学奖,而我们中国,居然没有人问鼎!"

[31] Xi, *Orange Jessamine*, 192.

[32] The most comprehensive study of Xi Murong is by Tiong Shiuan Shiuan. See Tiong, *A Critical Analysis*. The study focuses on Xi's writings about Mongolia, her ancestral home, which is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Taiwan's modern poetry was first introduced into China at the end of 1983 with the anthology *Twelve Poets from Taiwan* (台湾诗人十二家), edited by the senior poet Liu Shahe (流沙河, b. 1931). Xi Murong was not among them. In fact, it was her prose that appeared first in China, in the 1985 collections *Painted Rainbow of the Heart—Letters to Young Mothers* (画在心中的彩虹——写给年轻母亲的信) and *There Is a Song* (有一首歌). Both *Youth with No Regrets* and a number of poems were published in 1986, and these were followed by others in 1987–1989. By 1991, her poetry had sold more than one and a half million copies.

But it is not just the numbers; her impact on readers—especially young readers—can be seen retrospectively in a headline that appeared in the *Xiamen Evening Post* (厦门晚报) on September 4, 2009: "Two Major Tasks for Youths in 1989: Memorizing English, Memorizing Xi Murong's poems" 1989 (年年轻人的两件大事:背英语、背席慕容诗).[33] To put Xi on a par with the national craze of learning English and to treat her poetry as an annual occupation for young men and women speak volumes for her enormous popularity.

An even more telling example is the following message, dated 10 December, 2011 and posted by a blogger named Helen. With the title "Rereading Xi Murong Now" (此时再读席慕容), the post reads:

> Too often I have ignored the feelings I once had. A recent issue that contained an interview by Yang Lan brought back the name Xi Murong from years ago.
>
> It has accompanied so many women through their girlhood days, their youth, and their past, as it will their future.
>
> Of course, that includes me.
>
> I must say that, in my life up to this moment, my attitude toward love came from *Outside the Window* [Qiong Yao's first novel] at the very beginning, then from Xi Murong. Later came one after another inscription of reality.[34]

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[33] http://news.ifeng.com/special/60nianjiaguo/60biaozhirenwu/renwuzilliao/200909/0904_7766_1335074.shtml, accessed April 6, 2014.

[34] 太多时候了,忽略了曾有的感受,直到近一期的杨澜访谈,才又焕发起多年前的这个名字席慕容,伴随着许多人,走过少女走过青春走了过去又走向将来/当然,也含了我/不得不说,人生至此,我的爱情观,最始之时,是《窗外》,然后就是席慕容,后来才是那一个个真实的镌刻. See: Helen, "Rereading Xi Murong Now."

The post is revealing in two ways. First, for young people in the 1980s, reading Qiong Yao and Xi Murong was not unlike an initiation to love. Second, Helen might not have meant to sound critical, but the last sentence contrasts the writings of the two popular writers with the reality of love, which she only came to understand later in life. The word "inscription" suggests the scars left by love. In other words, the kind of love she was initiated into through the romances and the love poems was a far cry from the love she experienced in real life.

Having discussed Qiong Yao's romances, we must now ask the question: what kind of love does Xi Murong represent that appeals to so many readers in Taiwan and China? The fact is, Xi has come under similar criticisms that Qiong Yao has received: her early poetry is described as precious, sentimental, and dreamy. Zhang Xiaofeng (張曉風, b. 1941), the renowned Taiwanese prose writer, penned the preface to *Orange Jessamine*. In it, she confesses that she had to overcome an obstacle before she came to appreciate Xi's poetry: "[It is] too beautiful, too beautifully pure, which makes it a little hard for us moderns to believe it. Usually, in our unhappy experiences, things that are too beautiful are either phony or bombastic. But after a little struggle I began to like the uniquely pure beauty of her poetry and prose."[35] Zhang goes on to say: "Poetry like this should not be left behind for people to study or annotate over and over again."[36] The preface is an example of damning with faint praise if ever there was one. Why did Zhang have to struggle? What was it that eventually convinced her that the "uniquely pure beauty" of Xi's poetry was genuine and sincere?

"Pure beauty" lies at the heart of the matter. The characterization is often associated with Xi's early poetry, and it is what catapulted her to fame in China in the 1980s and 1990s. As in the case of Qiong Yao's romances, I'd like to suggest that Xi's poetry resonated with the zeitgeist of the times and met the need that was created by preexisting sociocultural conditions.

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[35] 太美,美得太純潔了一點,使身為現代人的我们有點不敢置信。通常,在我們不幸的經驗裡,太美的東西如果不是虛假就是浮濫。　但僅僅經過一小段的掙扎,我開始喜歡她詩文中獨特的那種清麗。 Xi, *Orange Jessamine*, 27.

[36] 像這樣的詩……應該不是留給人去研究或者反覆箋注的, Xi, *Orange Jessamine*, 29.

First, Xi Murong filled a vacuum on the poetry scene in China. As mentioned earlier, underground poetry had emerged in the late 1970s and became wildly popular as Misty Poetry in the early 1980s. More importantly, it laid the foundation for a new poetry scene that ran parallel to, and was largely independent of, the establishment. As the underground or "unofficial" poetry scene developed and the poets experimented with a wide range of styles, poetry became more diversified, more complex, and less accessible. In other words, as a new generation of underground poets sought to theorize and experiment in new ways, poetry began to lose its appeal to general readers. Moreover, such "professionalization" of poetry took place at the same time as both rising consumerism and the proliferation of mass entertainment. The gap between poetry and the general public seemed to be getting wider and wider, and poetry could hardly escape the fate of marginalization.

Another factor contributed to the increasing isolation and marginalization of underground poetry. After the "Tiananmen Incident" of June 1989, some of the poets who had been active on the scene left China while many others went through a period of silence and self-reflection. Historically speaking, at this low point—both in the short term and in the long run—of underground poetry, Xi Murong's poetry provided a more accessible, more palatable alternative. It is also in this sense that her poetry was said to represent "the last golden age of poetry."

The second reason for Xi Murong's immense popularity is that, like Qiong Yao, Xi makes extensive use of the language of classical Chinese poetry. Many of her phrases and lines are either direct quotes or slight modifications. They come from a variety of popular classical sources, from *The Book of Odes* and Qu Yuan's (屈原, ca. 342–278 BCE) and *Songs of the South* (楚辞) to "The Nineteen Ancient Poems" (古詩十九首, third century), Li Bai(李白, 701–762) and Du Fu (杜甫, 712–770), to Bai Juyi (白居易, 772–846) and Du Mu (杜牧, 803–852). Xi's lines "Those who love deeply will laugh at me/In a thousand years/my peppered hair is not the only sign of aging" (多情應笑我 千年來/早生的豈只是華髮) in "Imprisonment" are a variation on Su Shi蘇軾 (1037–1101), and "Pass by a thousand sails … a thousand sails pass by" (過盡千帆…… 千帆過盡) in "Tragicomedy" (悲喜劇) is a variation on Wen Tingyun

(溫庭筠, ca. 812–866).[37] It is important to note that the classical verses Xi Murong draws upon are familiar to general readers. The quotations and variations do not alienate readers with their strangeness bur, rather, create a classical ambiance that is comforting and reassuring.

As China entered the New Era, readers who had been weary of Maospeak and the state ideology hungered for new readings, both traditional and modern. Classical poetry with a long, glorious history made a notable comeback. Xi's early poetry incorporated many famous lines, sometimes in their entirety, sometimes stitched together from different poems, sometimes modified with the modern vernacular. Paradoxically, what was old was made new to Chinese readers.

Last but not least, the exclusive focus of Xi Murong's poetry on the emotional world of the first-person narrator (only occasionally a second- or third-person female persona) is very much in tune with the rising consciousness of individuality in post-Mao China. Again, to quote Thomas Gold: "Song lyrics and written words provide a language for mainland Chinese to express individual emotions—the word 'I' occurs frequently—which had previously been denigrated."[38] After decades of glorifying the collective self at the expense of the individual self, the 1980s witnessed a rejection of the former in favor of the latter. This new orientation was evident in literature, literary theory, and philosophy. Xi's poetry may be seen as a continuation of the intellectual and cultural mainstream of the decade.

"Make me believe, Beloved/This is my story" (親愛的 讓我相信/這是我的故事).[39] In addition to the theme of love and the classically flavored lyrical language, Xi Murong's early poetry is characterized by the ubiquitous "I," "me," and "my"—all three words being the same in Chinese: "wo" (我). She pays meticulous attention to the self, not only the emotional self but sometimes the physical self as well. The poem "Maturity" (成熟) (written in 1959, thus one of her earliest poems) describes her "increasingly slender hands" (漸呈修長的雙手), "feverish cheeks" (火熱的頰), and "page after page of deep blue and pale blue tear

[37] All the examples are found in Xi, *Orange Jessamine* and *Youth with No Regrets*.

[38] Gold, "Go With Your Feelings," 262.

[39] Xi, "Four Seasons," 80.

stains” 一頁頁深藍淺藍的淚痕.[40] One of her most oft-cited poems, “A Flowering Tree” 一棵開花的樹 (1980) refers to “the moment when I am at my fairest” (我最美麗的時刻), “longing from my previous life” (我前世的盼望), and “my withered heart” (我凋零的心).[41] In “A Prayer” (祈禱詞) (1979), “wo” appears in 12 of 13 consecutive lines, with only one being the plural form, “women” (我們, “we”).[42]

Like Qiong Yao’s novels, Xi Murong’s early poetry is appealing in terms of its idealization and romanticization of love. Similarly, Xi’s love is almost always associated with youth and beauty. If Qiong Yao’s protagonists go to any lengths in pursuit of love, Xi sings of love despite—and because of—its impermanence. “Why is the most fleeting moment always the most beautiful?” (為什麼走得最急的都是最美的時光), she asks.[43] Love is both beautiful and sad, like the last aria in the grand finale of an opera.[44] In fact, without sorrow and pain, love would not be so unforgettable, an idea captured in the metaphor of pearl: the painful past is watered continuously with “warm teardrops” (溫熱的淚液) until over time it turns into a lustrous pearl.[45]

Central to the dominant theme of love in Xi Murong’s early poetry is the notion of a missed moment or missed love, and the concomitant regret. “A Flowering Tree” expresses a woman’s despair because the man she loves didn’t notice her beauty and her eager waiting. “Wish of a Millennium” 一千年的願望 (1976) pinpoints a specific moment of regret—“That moonlit night when I was twenty”—that the narrator wishes she could relive one more time. “The Secret of the Queen of the Night” (曇花的秘密) (1981) has as its central image the Cereus flower, which only blooms once on a single night of the year. The first-person narrator projects her own regret onto the “you” who has missed the rare blooming of the flower under beautiful moonlight.[46]

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[40] Xi, *Orange Jessamine*, 36–7.

[41] Xi, *Orange Jessamine*, 38–9.

[42] Xi, *Orange Jessamine*, 44–5.

[43] Xi, “Why,” 83.

[44] Xi, “Aria,” 180.

[45] Xi, “Clamshell and Pearl,” 28.

[46] 我愛也只有我/才知道/你錯過的昨夜/曾有過 怎樣皎潔的月 (Xi, *Youth with No Regrets*, 99).

Consistent with the regret of a missed moment or encounter is the representation of love as one destined moment or a single encounter, which is short-lived by nature but gains eternal life through the poet's remembrance. "In that July afternoon/Before the lotuses after new rain if/If you had not turned your head."[47] Similarly, "The moment you turned around/Many things were decided."[48] By remembering—literally, "head-turning" 回首 in Chinese—the moment, the poet relives the past over and over again. "Only in the moment of looking back/can one gain a lucid/heartache."[49] To the poet, love hinges on "a heart-pouring encounter" (一次傾心的相遇).[50] It may be a "beautiful mistake"[51]—a term Xi borrowed from a fellow Taiwanese poet Zheng Chouyu (鄭愁予, b. 1933), but the fact that it is irrevocable and unrepeatable makes it special. She would willingly "exchange the fragrance of one moment for all of my/Sorrow and loneliness of today."[52] Paradoxically, the destined moment is both unpredictable and inevitable.

Another paradox lies at the heart of Xi Murong's poetry: that love is both fleeting and eternal, fleeting because of a missed moment or a brief encounter, eternal because that moment or that encounter is forever inscribed in her memory, to look back on over and over again. Consequently, the poet prays for that precious moment, as expressed in the poem titled "Longing" (盼望) (1981). Instead of a lifetime, what she longs for is "one glance" from "you" when they meet on a "gardenia-blooming hillside," fall in love and then say goodbye. Again, we see here the paradox at work in the poem: a glance vs. a lifetime, momentary vs. long-lasting. The narrator chooses the former over the latter, apparently against common sense. But she doesn't need to explain why or justify her choice, for she does it through the use of imagery. The brief yet intense encounter takes place on a hill covered with blossoming gardenia, conjuring up a sea of bright white against dark green foliage with a strong

[47] 在那個七月的午後/在新雨的荷前 如果/如果妳没有回頭 (Xi, "Afternoon of Painting Lotus," 38).

[48] 當妳一回眸/有很多事情就從此决定了 (Xi, "Love's Beginning," 37).

[49] 只有在回首的刹那/才能得到一種清明的/酸辛 (Xi, "Beautiful Mood," 189).

[50] Xi, *Youth with No Regrets*, 114.

[51] Xi, "Distance," 113.

[52] 用芳香的一瞬 來換我/今日所有的憂傷和寂寞 (Xi, "One with No Regrets," 60–1).

sweet scent. The contrast between the richly sensuous image and the abstract, nondescript "lifetime" speaks volumes.

In the final analysis, Xi Murong's early poetry charms and moves readers with its heartfelt profession that the deepest love is to be found in a single moment, literally "a glance." When accompanied by the acceptance of destiny or the untranslatable Chinese word "yuan" (緣, destiny), it inevitably evokes sadness because such love does not—cannot—last by definition. The poem "Choice" (抉擇) (1979) epitomizes Xi's aesthetics of love. "For that one instant in a billion light years" with "all its sweetness and sorrow," the narrator expresses gratitude to all the helping constellations. As expected, the encounter is soon followed by parting; however, this is how "the poem composed by God" is completed. There is nothing left except to "slowly grow old."

All the key elements of a Xi Murong poem can be found here: the destined moment of love (it is "meant to be"), the privileging of the moment over a lifetime, love as the defining moment in life, love inevitably followed by separation, and, finally, all of this taking place when one is young and fair. What distinguishes "Choice" from Xi's other poems is the hyperbole: love is a cosmic event that happens once in "a billion light years," and God is the supreme poet of love. While the portrayal of love is far from realist, its appeal is undeniable: love is both beautiful and sad, both sweet and bitter, both short-lived and eternal, both extremely personal and fantastically cosmic. It is little wonder that Xi's poetry has so much appeal to readers—especially young readers—longing for love.[53]

Conclusion

The 1980s witnessed unprecedented transformations in contemporary Chinese history. The opening of the country to the world after three decades of isolation, the national project of modernization, and the loosening of ideological control combined to usher in an era of intense

[53] Lin Pingqiao (林平乔) offers two different reasons for Xi Murong's popularity in Taiwan and China in the 1980s: for Taiwanese readers it filled the spiritual void in the materialistic society; for mainland readers who had just come out of class struggles [of the Cultural Revolution], her poetry provided a sought-after home for pent-up feelings. See: Lin, "The Discursive Strategies," 124–7.

introspection and hopeful self-renewal. Having recently come out of the Cultural Revolution, the public—with intellectuals, writers, and artists at the forefront—veered away from collectivism and embraced individualism, away from ideological purity and embraced personal feelings and private experiences.

This chapter has analyzed the phenomenal success and significant impact of Qiong Yao's romances and Xi Murong's lyric poetry in post-Mao China by contextualizing them in the sociocultural milieu and the collective unconscious of the decade. Going beyond the curiosity factor or the mere pursuit of novelty, I have sought to account for the immense popularity of these two women writers by relating their works to several emergent discourses at the time: the discourse of modernization and westernization, the discourse of return to the classical Chinese heritage, and the new discourse of love. Of the three, the latter two are relevant to Xi Murong's lyric poetry, while all of them are applicable to Qiong Yao's novels. Together, the three discourses were instrumental in laying the foundation for the construction of a new imaginary of China: a China that has been reborn and is eager to join the modern, affluent, and sophisticated world as represented by the West; a China that is proud of its own cultural heritage, of which elements of gentility, lyricism, and romance had long been suppressed by the state orthodoxy.

The above analysis also addresses the question as to why it was these two Taiwanese writers rather than others who exerted such a significant impact. There is no denying the power of popular culture from Hong Kong; to focus on Qiong Yao and Xi Murong is not to dismiss the Hong Kong factor. However, it is also true that when it came to romance and poetry, no one could compare with the two Taiwanese writers in post-Mao China. Although Hong Kong is geographically closer to the mainland, Taiwan represented an Other that was both traditional and modern, both familiar and new. Qiong Yao's idealization of love and representation of an elegant modern lifestyle, as well as Xi Murong's paradoxes of love as simultaneously momentary and eternal, beautiful and sad, are both expressed in a classically flavored, lyrical language. When we consider the fact that nativist literature in Taiwan from the 1960s to the 1980s—whether fiction or poetry—attracted little attention from mainland readers in the New Era, it makes the phenomenal success of Qiong

Yao and Xi Murong even more significant. Taiwan could—and did—exert a major impact because its popular literature fulfilled a burgeoning yearning of the masses in post-Mao China, appealing to them in ways that mainland writers could not during the transitional period.

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8

How China is Changed by Deng Lijun and Her Songs

Pei-yin Lin

Named by *Time* magazine as one of the seven top female divas in the world, and rated number one in China's most influential cultural figure poll in 2009, the Taiwanese singer Deng Lijun (Teresa Teng or鄧麗君, 1953–1995) displayed her singing talent at an early age. As Michelle Yeh highlighted in Chap. 7, through her songs Deng Lijun has made a major impact on China as it embarked on reform under Deng Xiaoping. She began to record folk songs in 1967 and emerged as a popular singer in Taiwan in the 1970s. Toward the mid-1970s, she extended her career to Southeast Asia and Japan. Deng moved to Japan in 1984 to further her singing profession, and went into semi-retirement in Paris around 1990, before dying of an asthma attack in Thailand in 1995. Numerous Deng tribute concerts are held in China even now, and her songs and life continue to inspire directors and writers.[1]

[1] Examples include Peter Chan's 1996 film "Comrades: Almost a Love Story" and Lu, *Heri jun zailai*.

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Despite Deng's ubiquity, there is as yet relatively research on her. General reports about Deng are often embedded with nationalist discourses. In an event commemorating the 15th anniversary of Deng's death, for example, Wang Jin-Pyng (王金平), Taiwan's President of the Legislative Yuan, praised Deng for raising the morale of the Taiwanese people. In China, scholars accentuate Deng's "Chineseness" by referring to her as a "Chinese woman."[2] Existing books about Deng, other than those by Hilano Kumiko (平野久美子) and Ma Renzhong (馬任重), are largely commemorative accounts.[3] Hilano analyses Deng's Japanese stage image and popularity in Japan, whereas Ma examines Deng's singing features in comparison with two other Taiwanese singers—Chun Chun (純純) and Cai Qin (蔡琴). Both address Deng's "Asian appeal" and singing characteristics, paving a foundation for further investigation into Deng's impact on China.

This chapter will first outline the context in which Deng's songs were introduced into China and explain their reception. It will then explore how Deng's songs have changed both the non-musical and musical aspects of China. For the former, this chapter will analyse how Deng served as an emblem of liberation on the personal and political levels. For the latter, this chapter will discuss the function of Deng's lyrics and her contribution on China's popular music culture as well as the singing paradigm established by her.

The Dissemination and Reception of Deng's Songs in China

Similar to the novels by Qiong Yao (瓊瑤, 1938–) discussed by Yeh in Chap. 7, Deng's songs were introduced into China during an "opportune" period in which the earlier political control was thwarted and the Chinese people were eager to absorb novel things coordinating with the opening up of social imagery.[4] The Chinese people's first encounter

[2] Wang's speech. See Taiwan.cn, "Wang jinping."; Wang and Wang, "Tan Deng Lijun," 246–7.

[3] Jiang, *Juexiang*. It is an example of the commemorative accounts on Deng; Hilano, *Deng Lijun zhi meng*; Ma, *Dushe jiaolian yinyue jiangzuo*.

[4] Novels by San Mao (1943–1991), as well as songs by other pop singers like Feng Feifei (1953–2012), Liu Wenzheng (1952–) and Luo Dayou (1954–), enjoyed considerably wide circulation in China at this historical juncture.

with Deng came in 1976, when the journal *Mainland, Taiwan* (*Dalu, Taiwan* 大陸,台灣) used Deng's picture on the cover and the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) internal magazine *Reference for the Youths* (*Qingnian cankao*, 青年參考) published Deng's biographical details. Just a few years ago, under the rule of the Gang of Four, most Chinese people were wearing the plain "three old colours" (subdued blue, white, and grey) that earned the Chinese people nicknames such as "blue ants" or "grey ants" in the West. The social atmosphere was dull, with very limited access to popular culture. But this situation changed after the 1978 Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, which ushered in China's opening up in the subsequent years. Young people, who had been materialistically and spiritually deprived up to that point, began to seek alternative ways of self-expression.

Against the CCP's sanctioned sense of fashion, young men began to wear bell-bottomed trousers and young women longer hair. Although 'red songs' (*hongge*, 紅歌) were performed in public assemblies, it was Deng's songs that people were listening to privately. By 1980, Hong Kong and Taiwan (*gangtai*, 港台) music exemplified by Deng, together with Li Guyi's (李谷一) "To My Homeland" (*Xianglian*, 鄉戀) and the like, became increasingly popular in China's major cities. Yet the government frowned upon those songs that were deemed "ideologically problematic." The case of Li Guyi, a vocal soloist belonging to China's Central Band (*Zhongyang yuetuan*, 中央樂團) at that time, offers a glimpse of the CCP's ambivalence toward popular music. On December 31, 1979, Li sang "To My Homeland" as part of the TV programme *Legend of the Three Gorges*. She applied aspirant singing, one of Deng's trademarks, in her performance, and provoked sharp criticism.

Similarly, Deng's songs were at the start considered "inappropriate" by the CCP and underwent various phases of reception in China. In a meeting held in Beijing in early 1980 to discuss the orientation of Chinese popular music, both Li's "To My Homeland" and Deng's songs were regarded as "yellow songs" or a "decadent sound" (*mimi zhi yin*, 靡靡之音) and consequently banned. Deng's "When Will You Come Back?" (*Heri jun zailai*, 何日君再來) was considered "traitorous" and "obscure."[5] It even became the main target of *How to Distinguish Yellow*

[5] Barmé, *In the Red*, 125.

Songs (*Zenyang jianbie huangse gequ* 怎樣鑒別黃色歌曲, 1982), an edited volume consisting of essays on music theories. With its composer Liu Xue'an's (劉雪庵) defence that the song was an "anti-Japanese" one, the CCP's censorship of Deng eased. However, as most of Deng's songs touch upon male–female relationships, and were associated with such unwelcome "bourgeois values," they again became the target of criticism in the 1983/1984 Anti-Spiritual-Pollution Campaign, spearheaded by the conservative faction of the CCP.[6] Concerned about her listeners in China, Deng urged her fans to hand over the "illegal" cassettes and announced through the radio that she would select "purer" songs, such as folk ditties, for her future performances.[7]

These cassettes offer an interesting angle to examine the influence of Deng's songs on China at this time. One direct impact was the rapid mushrooming of audio-video companies. In 1979, there were only a few audio-video companies. Yet in 1982, the number exceeded 300 and all of them were doing the "stripping off cassettes" (*pa daizi*, 扒帶子) business.[8] Apart from bringing in profits from the audio-video business, Deng's songs ushered in a new listening experience. A Deng aficionado recalled that at the risk of being criticized by the readers, he and other friends, in the dark dormitory, listened to *gangtai* music that was "transmitted from a cheap smuggled cassette" that "was already dubbed" many times.[9]

If we view the enthusiasm of the Mainland Chinese (and especially that of young people) for *gangtai* music as a statement of aesthetic and political choice, then the bourgeois-fashioned *gangtai* music provided the Chinese listeners with an embodiment of a more desired "alternative" Chinese modernization that was more Western-leaning than the official modernization but still "Chinese" enough to identify with.[10] Deng's

[6] The campaign attacked Western values of freedom, individualism and artistic values. It was thwarted by the moderates (Hu Yaobang, for example) within the party, and can be considered a prelude to the 1987 Anti-Bourgeois Liberalisation Campaign.

[7] See Jiang, *Juexiang*, 233.

[8] See Wang, "Deng Lijun he women de yige shidai." "Pa daizi" means to analyse the music thoroughly, including noting down the melody and scores for individual musical instruments, gathering people to perform, and then releasing the tapes. It remained a major means for disseminating Deng's songs for a long time, providing an important learning and training process for Chinese composers and performers.

[9] Baranovitch, *China's New Voices*, 13.

[10] Brace, *Modernity and Music*, 144.

songs may have been too sweet from a contemporary Chinese perspective, but the nonpolitical feature and the bourgeois cultural imagination they afforded the general Chinese population were fairly 'perilous' within the context of the early 1980s China. It is no surprise that the CCP banned Deng's songs. The ban was relaxed around 1985, but by then Deng had given up the idea of staging concerts in China.[11] Nevertheless, Deng's songs fit in the feverish post-revolutionary era in which popular music was about to emerge. From stirring up controversies to being emulated, and becoming officially approved in the early 1990s, the dissemination of Deng's songs is indicative of China's volatile sociopolitical climate in the early post-Mao period.

Activating Personal Liberation

The contextual discussion above is beneficial in comprehending the appeal of Deng's songs for the Chinese listeners at that time. Deng's popularity makes a convincing testimony of the successful penetration of the *gangtai* popular music into China in the late 1970s. The sonorous experiences were new and compelling, partly because Deng's songs were about individual feelings, rather than about the Party or the nation, and partly because her soft singing, typical in popular music, was a style that had almost been forgotten after three decades. Several music-makers could still remember their first encounter with Deng's songs. Zhu Yigong (朱一弓), a music editor active in the 1980s, stated that although Deng had influenced the Chinese singers, she exerted a greater impact on music creation. She made the composers reconsider the subject and emotions of their songs, and how they could borrow the style to make Chinese popular music.[12] He continued that the reason why China did not have Deng-like singers or songs in the 1980s was due to the contextual difference.

[11] Deng personally felt she was not ready for this plan. The Nationalist government also tried to dissuade Deng from performing in China. James Soong, the former Director of the Government Information Office, revealed in an event in 2006, commemorating the 11th anniversary of Deng's death, that Chiang Ching-kuo in the early 1980s asked him to discourage Deng from entering China.

[12] See Wang, "Deng Lijun he women de yige shidai." In the article, the author quoted Zhu Yigong, who specified that the composer Su Yue was much inspired by Deng's songs, and stated that Chinese music-makers were able to reproduce Deng's style around 1984. The songwriter Jia Ding

Chinese songs then remained spiritual, as, for example, with Mao Amin's (毛阿敏) "Missing" (*Sinian*, 思念), without the secularity which formed the background of many Deng's songs. China today has the required material condition for making Deng-styled songs, yet the pure quality of people's minds has vanished. In short, Deng's songs helped introduce a modern experience and evoke earthy emotions in her Chinese audience.

For those used to listening to ideologically heavy revolutionary songs or model plays, Deng's and other similar *gangtai* popular songs were not only more easy listening, but also more in sync with the increasingly liberating social atmosphere. Deng's voice urged both the ordinary listeners and music-makers to contemplate what sort of music they would like. Even though it may be an exaggeration to claim that Deng's songs led directly to the Chinese government's increased tolerance toward popular music, the songs very likely played a positive role in relaxing the official censorship.

A major appeal of Deng's songs lies in their emphasis on individual feelings. For the Chinese people who lived through the Cultural Revolution, Deng's "decadent sound" served as a powerful means to "liberate people from their spiritual confinement," constituting "the most tender part of the generation's mental history."[13] It accelerated personal liberation during China's transition from the totalitarian Maoist era to the reform-oriented 1980s. Even though Deng's soft voice may be less subversive than those heard in rock music, her songs could be potentially provocative, when compared to many other songs available on the market.[14] For instance, "Plum Blossom" (*Meihua*, 梅花) and "Ode to the Republic of China" (*Zhonghuaminguo song*, 中華民國頌) challenged the CCP ideology in the same vein as her "When Will You Come Back?," whereas her other songs tested socialism with their implied "bourgeois decadence."

Deng's symbol as a liberator has been clearly endorsed by several Chinese public figures. In 1995, the year of Deng's death, the rock groups

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also praised Deng as an inspiration. He recalled that he was so touched by Deng's good music that he realised his past work lacked emotional force. See Jones, *Like a Knife*, 16.

[13] See Shi and Lou, *Deng Lijun sifang xiangce*, 218.

[14] Thomas Gold has pointed out that although China's cultural works tried to add Western techniques to traditional melodies by making "light music," the popular music from Hong Kong and Taiwan is still much more commercial and less dogmatic. He contrasted Deng's singing with that of Guo Lanying (a singer popular with the Yan'an set), concluding that Deng's voice is softer and more seductive. See Gold, "Go with Your Feelings," 907–25, especially pp. 913 and 914.

Black Leopard and Tang Dynasty, together with others, released the album "A Tribute to Teresa Teng" (*Gaobie yaogun*, 告别摇滚) in which they referred to Deng as an "enlightener." Similarly, Cui Jian 崔健, the godfather of Chinese rock, praised Deng's music as "something that truly has character," and Deng as a singer who "bravely sings out individual emotions, and love," like Zhou Xuan (周璇).[15] Yu Dan (于丹) also commented that Deng's songs enabled China to quickly open up, culturally, and made many exchange opportunities possible.[16] Those remarks suggest that Deng's songs were quite stimulating, as they are highly individualistic and expressive. They also accelerated China's cultural flow.

Encouraging the Chinese People's Yearning for Democracy

The spiritual liberation of Chinese individuals is closely connected to ideological emancipation. As Deng's rise to fame in China took place under the ideological divide between China and Taiwan, her popularity is tinted with political implications. Throughout the 1980s, Deng made frequent trips to Quemoy to rally the troops (*laojun*, 勞軍), winning her the label of the "eternal soldiers' lover." The Nationalists took advantage of Deng's burgeoning popularity to strengthen their propaganda, and ardently cultivated her as a cultural ambassador promoting Taiwan. Balloons containing anti-Communist leaflets, and Deng's music cassettes, were launched into China as part of the Nationalist government's 'psychological warfare' against Communist China. In addition, the Chinese audience could tune in to Radio Taiwan International (*Zhongyang guangbo dianyai* 中央廣播電台, nowadays Sound of Taiwan) to listen to Deng's music. It was said during the late 1970s that "old Deng (Deng Xiaoping) rules by day and little Deng (Deng Lijun) rules by night."

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[15] Cui 's reinterpretation of Deng's hit "The Tale of a Small Town" (*Xiaocheng gushi*) is on his 2005 album "Geini yidian yanse" (Give You Some Colours). For his comments on Deng, see Cui and Zhou, *Ziyou fengge*, 115.

[16] See Yu Dan's interview: Li, "Shidai jiyi."

Moreover, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence commissioned Radio Taiwan International to make a special programme on Deng. The programme, entitled *Time with Deng Lijun* (*Deng Lijun shijian*, 鄧麗君時間), was broadcast from Mondays to Saturdays at 8 p.m. for 25 minutes, from 1979 until Deng's death in 1995. Deng also received the "Patriotic Artist Award" organized by Taiwan's Government Information Office in 1981, and was named one of the "Ten Outstanding Young Women" in 1984 by the KMT-leaning quasi-political organization, the China Youth Corps. In parallel with the governmental promotions, Taiwan's media also regarded Deng's music as an emblem of the "voice of freedom." A report in the *United Daily News* in 1980 stated that Deng, the "free voice" from Taiwan, was not afraid of the challenge from the Chinese Communist's "model songs."[17]

This "ideological war" between China and Taiwan, through Deng's songs, was somewhat effective. The account of Wu Ronggen (吳榮根), a PLA (People's Liberation Army) pilot at that time, provides a salient example to illustrate Deng's impact. On October 16, 1982, Wu flew his MiG-19 fighter to Korea and he later "defected" to Taiwan. Upon arriving in Taiwan, Wu expressed that he was deeply moved by Deng's songs. At his welcoming party, Wu first censured "lack of freedom" in China, and then he sang "The Story of a Small Town" in a duet with Deng.[18] Subsequent PLA defectors, such as Sun Tianqin (孫天勤) and Li Tianhui (李天慧), also expressed their wish to meet Deng upon arrival in Taiwan.[19]

Despite insufficient evidence to pin down Deng's personal ideological affiliation, Deng participated in various events to sustain her public image as an anti-Communist, KMT-leaning artist. In fact, shortly after her death, there were reports that Deng had in fact been a KMT

[17] *United Daily News*, edition 3 (April 29, 1980).

[18] The meeting between Wu and Deng, arranged by Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence, took place on November 27, 1982, in Qingquangang, an airforce base in Taizhong. See *United Daily News* (November 27, 1982), p. 3. At the meeting, Wu also confirmed that his ex-colleagues, too, were fond of Deng's songs, but they were not allowed to listen to them and the cassette tapes, if found, would be wiped. Wu's experience not only attests to the power of Deng's songs, but also expounds the official reception of them.

[19] See Jiang, *Juexiang*, 301. Deng in the mid-1980s had met other PLA defectors, such as Wang Xuecheng and Xiao Tianrun, in public.

undercover secret agent.[20] Her fighting against authoritarian rule seemed consistent. She was one of the earliest artists who expressed support for the 1989 student movement in China. On May 27, 1989, Deng wore a headband saying "Long Live Democracy" when she showed up at an event in Hong Kong. While performing in Paris in 1990, similarly, she urged people never to submit to despotism.[21] And in 1991, she spoke to a Chinese audience in Quemoy, expressing her desire for them to enjoy democracy and freedom, just like the Taiwanese.

Regardless of whether Deng's continued "political involvement" was voluntary or due to the pressure from the KMT, her songs acted as a convenient advertisement for the KMT authorities. Deng's public image as a democracy promoter enabled her to be associated with anti-despotic idealism among a certain generation of Chinese intellectuals. Wu'er Kaixi (吾爾開希) recollected that many Chinese media deliberately played "The Moon Represents My Heart" (*Yueliang daibiao wode xin*, 月亮代表我的心) to vent their anger at censorship when the anti-spiritual campaign cooled down. He even concluded that the hope for love among the majority of the Chinese people was invested in Deng.[22] The Germany-based exiled writer Xu Pei (徐沛), when recalling the Tiananmen Incident, considered Deng as the epitome of freedom and hope and a symbol similar to the Statue of Liberty.[23] Xu further praised Deng as the symbol of the plum blossom (the national flower of the Republic of China) and her songs as the "spiritual companion" for the diasporic Chinese.[24] It may be difficult to quantify Deng's impact on the Chinese people's pursuit of democracy, but Wu Ronggen's case, together with the reminiscences of Wu'er Kaixi and Xu Pei, signals that a certain imagination was at work among the Chinese people in and outside China.

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[20] In June 1995, *Scoop Weekly* (*Dujiao baodao*) published an interview with Gu Zhengwen, a former senior KMT secret agent, in which Gu claimed Deng had worked for Taiwan's National Security Bureau. In *Reality of Deng Lijun*, written by two Japanese authors, Deng's 'spy status' was reinforced even though Deng's family denied it. See http://residence.educities.edu.tw/gramsci/DengLJ.htm.

[21] See Epoch Times, "Deng shengyuan liusi xueyun."

[22] See Wu'er Kaixi, "Wu'er Kaixi de liuwang biji – Deng Lijun shishi shisi zhounian."

[23] See Xu, "Deng Lijun de 'Zhongguomeng.'"

[24] See Bannedbook.org, "Xu Pei."

Deng's Lyrics as a Mnemonic of Humanity

As a singer whose songs deal with a wide range of issues, Deng changed China in many ways. In addition to encouraging people's self-expression and democratic pursuit, the songs helped Chinese listeners, especially the educated youths who had undergone the traumas of the Cultural Revolution, rekindle repressed human feelings and re-experience their bygone youthful love. Many of Deng's songs touch upon love, something of a taboo subject in the early years of post-Cultural Revolution China. Yet because of this, pirate copies of her songs were considered the "best betrothal present or dowry."[25] Wang Shuo (王朔) once commented on the emotional impact he experienced after hearing Deng's songs. According to Wang, listing to Deng woke up his humanistic side as well as softening and dissolving his hard surface.[26] Wang is not the only one who made a remark concerning the therapeutic function of Deng's songs. Official magazines from both China and Taiwan shared views similar to Wang's.[27]

Besides Deng's sweet voice and singing capability, the lyrics of Deng's songs further enhanced her influence on Chinese people. They are individualistic, rooted in real life, and forward-looking, helping the listeners regain their (lost) human emotions and feelings. Deng's songs are mostly about common emotions, such as male–female relationships. Even though some, such as "Atonement" (*Changhuan*, 償還), deal with betrayal, they recurrently call for the necessity of love, such as "I and You" (*Wo he ni*, 我和你), and the belief in love, such as "Wintry Love" (*Dong zhi lianqing*, 冬之戀情). Many of those lines are concerned with "small love" only, and are written in a colloquial way. Hence, they are easy for listeners to understand and identify with. Liu Xiaobo (劉曉波) once testified that Deng's songs pour out individual pains, sorrows, and emotions in life, like whispering.[28]

[25] See Want Daily, "Cross-Strait History" and Taiwan Panorama, "Shiyige zhangsheng," 74.

[26] Wang, "Wokan dazhong wenhua," 4–24.

[27] For the report from Taiwan, see Want Daily, "Shiyige zhangsheng" in which Deng's voice is described as having the ability to 'defrost the stiff reality'. For the report from China, see the special report entitled "Thirty Years after the Blow of Taiwanese Wind,": *Huangjin shidai*, "Thirty Years," 20. The article praises Deng's music as the most fashionable street culture, satisfying the spiritual deprivation of the generation who suffer from extreme materialistic and spiritual deficiencies.

[28] Liu, "Wang suli zou," 28–34.

Compared with other love-themed songs popular in Deng's heyday, Deng's songs are remarkably individualistic. Take, for example, "Our Lives are Full of Sunshine" (*Women de shenghuo chongman yangguang*, 我們的生活充滿陽光), a soundtrack for the 1979 comedy *Sweet Life* (*Tianmi de shiye*, 甜蜜的事業). Although the film is not overly ideological and focuses on ordinary working people, the lyrics link the individual joys with the larger society (such as the revolutionary ideals) or one's devotion to the nation. The absence of revolution and nation in Deng's love songs makes a stark contrast to "Our Lives are Full of Sunshine." When dealing with love, the lyrics of Deng's songs tend to focus principally on relationships between two individuals. This "personal" attention enables Deng's songs to be more in tune with people's feelings.

Deng's love songs are also more realistic than other Chinese love songs in the 1970s. For instance, "Kangding Love Song" (*Kangding qingge*, 康定情歌), a folk song about the mutual affection between a young lady and a young man, only touches upon the pre-dating admiration, and is narrated from a third-person omniscient point of view. Deng's lyrics, on the contrary, employ the first- and second-person pronouns frequently. They cover the melancholy caused by a bygone relationship, and are, to that extent, quite therapeutic. Some of Deng's fans even draw connections between Deng's lyrics and Chinese classical poetry, claiming that both enabled the Chinese people to retain their belief in the beauty of love.[29] With her wide-ranging music genres ranging from folk tunes and *huangmei* melodies, Deng's songs provided different "comforting treatment" for varied groups and ages of listeners.

The same value of faithful love can be rendered innovatively to cater for the needs of a contemporary audience. In other words, Deng's songs offered the Chinese music-makers a sonorous medium of social commentary. In the 2010 musical *Love U, Teresa!* (*Aishang Deng Lijun*, 愛上鄧麗君), many of Deng's songs were creatively re-cast to match the plotline—a male wannabe singer's journey of self-discovery. As the protagonist struggles through his life, several social issues of contemporary China, such as wealth inequality and forced urban demolitions, are

[29] See Xu, "Deng Lijun." Deng's importance as the pop singer who introduced love songs into China is also mentioned in Moskowitz, *Cries of Joy*, 19.

exposed. This illustrates that Deng's songs unnecessarily "lent themselves to a saccharine nostalgia-fest with little substance."[30] Rather, they evolve with China's changing social conditions and remain relevant nowadays. Li Dun (李盾), the director of the musical, commented that he wished to "… use Deng's warm voice to expel coldness for people on the road, and to let them harbour great dreams."[31] This illustrates that Deng's songs facilitate Chinese people to remain hopeful in overcoming the adversaries of their lives.

Resuming China's Pre-1949 Popular Culture and Nurturing the Emergence of Contemporary Chinese Popular Music

The dissemination of Deng's songs has also enabled China to reconnect with its musical tradition, especially its pre-1949 urban popular culture. Jin Zhaojun (金兆鈞), a Beijing-based music critic, explained:

> The lyrical tradition was resumed in the late 1970s when the Gang of Four collapsed. But the tradition resumed, at that time, was that from the 1950s and 1960s such as "A Bright Sunny Day in Autumn" (*Jiujiu yanyang tian*, 九九艷陽天) and "My Fatherland" (*Wode zuguo*, 我的祖國). However, what Deng brought into China were the songs from the 1930s and 1940s. Her music, after all, was an urban product in terms of its category. Chinese people, then, did not have much opportunity to listen to this type of music but it offered something different to the lyrical songs produced after the founding of the People's Republic of China. The twenty-something year-old people at that time (the most sensitive group), in particular, identified themselves with only this type of music.[32]

Jin's statement explicated the "niche" of Deng's songs in the history of Chinese popular music. Xie Xizhang (解璽璋), a Chinese writer and cultural critic, further echoed Jin's opinion by referring to the introduction

[30] See Frisch, "Resurrected Pop Icon."

[31] Hellotw, "'Jiulinghou' banyan Deng Lijun."

[32] See Wang, "Deng Lijun he women de yige shidai."

of Taiwanese and Hong Kongese culture into China around 1979, as a resumption of the "common people's culture" (*shimin wenhua*, 市民文化) cut by the CCP in 1949.[33] Although Xie does not specify what constituted the pre-1949 common people's culture, a scrutiny of Deng's songs shows that wartime Shanghai's popular culture served as an essential component of the secular culture. Yet this 'retro' feature of Deng's songs is likely to be age- or generation-specific, as it requires background knowledge of China's 1930s and 1940s popular music in order to fully appreciate the past.

Music scholars and critics nowadays agree that the "genealogy" of *gangtai* music of the 1970s can be traced back to pre-1949 popular music, particularly the Western-influenced music emerging in major Chinese metropolises such as Shanghai around the 1930s as part of the rapidly developing urban entertainment culture. Indeed, several of Deng's songs are reinterpretations of the older popular songs in Shanghai in the 1930s or 1940s. Hence, they make a natural link with the previous musical tradition. "When Will You Come Back?" and "Evening Primrose" (*Yelai xiang* 夜來香) are two widely known examples.

"When Will You Come Back?" is a song originally composed for the 1937 film *Stars Moving around the Moon* (*Sanxing banyue* 三星伴月). Whilst making the film, director Fang Peilin (方沛霖) asked the scriptwriter Huang Jiamo (黃嘉謨) to add the lyric. The song, sung by Zhou Xuan, became an immediate hit. In 1939, Li Lili (黎莉莉) sang it for the Hong Kong-produced film *Orphan Island Paradise* (*Gudao tiantang* 孤島天堂). In 1940, Li Xianglan (李香蘭) (aka Shirley Yamaguchi, 1920–2014) released a record of the song in Manchuria, making it even more popular than Zhou Xuan's version. Yet the song's popularity seemed to foreshadow its ill fate of being politically manipulated. The Japanese banned the song during the wartime, worrying that it would lower the soldiers' morale. Later on, Chiang Kai-shek banned it, as the Japanese twisted the original title into "Congratulations for the return of the Japanese army" to assist the war efforts. In the post-Mao China, the song was censored by the CCP.

[33] *Taiwan Panorama*, "Deng Lijun Zhang Huimei," 34.

The linkage with China's wartime urban culture is also facilitated by Deng's "Evening Primrose." In 1944, Li Xianglan made the song popular in Shanghai. Following Li's post-war trial and subsequent return to Japan, the song was seldom heard. Even though it was reinterpreted in Cantonese during the post-war period, the song had only limited circulation in post-1949 China due to the CCP's ban on the operation of cabarets or dancing halls, where the song was most likely to be played in public. The introduction of Deng's version of "Evening Primrose" thus connects the new China with wartime Shanghai's entertainment culture.

The temporality evoked by Deng's songs can be dated back to earlier times. Her 1983 album *Light Exquisite Feelings* (*Dandan youqing*, 淡淡幽情), in which the lyrics for all 12 songs were directly from the Song Dynasty *ci* 詞, is such a case. Considered by many Deng's best album, *Light Exquisite Feelings* revitalised classical Chinese culture with modern tunes. The Hong Kong entrepreneur Xie Hongzhong (謝宏中), with an aim of preserving Chinese culture and making classical literature more accessible, initiated the making of this album.[34] How to compose suitable modern melodies that could correspond well with the rhythms of *ci*, without sacrificing the elegance of *ci*, was a great challenge for the producers. Liang Hongzhi (梁弘志), one of the main composers for the album, decided to avoid the *enga*-style melody, and to write a narrative song (*xushi qu*, 敘事曲) for Su Shi's (蘇軾) *ci* work, instead.[35] Liang also used the piano and string music to highlight the features of Deng's voice.

The final result illustrates the organic combination of modern and classic, and the seamless compatibility of Chinese and Western elements. As Nimrod Baranovitch points out, most of Deng's songs were "based on Western harmonies," although the melodies "retained the traditional Chinese pentatonism."[36] Indeed, Deng's songs are "Western"; in particular, they use an electronic orchestra (such as keyboard, drum kit, guitar, and other synthesizers) to create a stronger rhythm sensation and evoke a certain mood. This makes Deng's songs quite "modern" and innovative

[34] See 360Doc, "Dandan youqing."

[35] *Enga* is a form of Japanese ballad that uses the "yonanuki scale", which means the fourth and seventh notes are not used.

[36] See Baranovitch, *China's New Voices*, 11.

compared with the usual Chinese songs whose accompaniment relies heavily on traditional Chinese instruments. The music arrangement in Deng's songs consequently offers a valuable "model" for many Chinese composers to emulate through their *pa daizi* exercise.

In this regard, Deng helped unleash forces for change in China's post-Mao music scene. At that time, the first lesson to learn for many composers would be how to arrange music for popular songs, including making use of electronic sounds. The composer Xu Peidong (徐沛東) concluded: "I stepped onto the road of popular songs was entirely because of Deng's influence."[37] Jin Zhaojun seconded Xu by claiming that Deng's singing, and the instrumental arrangement and composition of her songs, had a profound influence on Chinese singers and composers of popular music, and Deng's status remains unassailable at present.[38] Unfortunately, with Deng's concentration on concerts and the emergence of new music trends (such as the trend from the USA), Deng did not release 'hybrid' albums similar to "Light Exquisite Feelings." Otherwise, her impact on China's music scene could have been greater.

Establishing the Model of Clear Enunciation and Pure, Soft Singing

Nevertheless, Deng still left several traceable music-related impacts. Despite her death about two decades ago, there are still continuous concerts held in her name in China. Most of them did not have the approval of the Deng Lijun Foundation, managed by her third oldest brother, Deng Changfu (鄧長富). Deng Changfu was bothered by these "knockoff (*shanzhai ban*, 山寨版) concerts," especially as some performers made untrue claims that they were Deng Lijun's pupils or from the same music agencies as she was. These concerts, however, attracted the participation of many winners from smaller regional Deng Lijun Singing Imitation Contests. The winners' imitation was not merely limited to the way Deng sang. In order to become Deng as much as possible, some of

[37] See Zhang, "Tianxia shuiren bushi jun."

[38] Jin, *Guangtian huari xia liuxing*, 61–62.

the contestants would copy the way she dressed. To date, these singing competition shows have generated a few young female divas dubbed as the "little Deng Lijuns." They achieved a degree of celebrity and began singing tours in major cities of China as Deng's imitators.

The imitation competitions and various Deng-related talent shows yielded ample business opportunities and attractive financial gains for the organizing media groups, although copyright issues remain. It was reported that more than 90 percent of the tickets were sold quickly for the 2013 Beijing tribute concert, in conjunction with the 60th anniversary of Deng's birth, entitled "The Same Song, 1.9 Billion Cheers" (*Tong yishou ge, shijiuyi ge zhangsheng* 同一首歌,十九億個掌聲). To show respect to Deng's copyrighted content, the organizing company announced publicly on September 4, 2012 that the planned concert had already received authorisation from the Deng Lijun Foundation. Perhaps to protect its profit as well, the company issued a lawyer's letter, demanding the cancellation of the forthcoming Sheng Yan's (盛燕) concert in which Deng's songs would be performed.

In those concerts and competitions, Deng's impact, especially how she sang, is highly visible. Sheng Yan is one of the few Deng imitation show-winners praised by Deng's elder brother, Deng Changfu. Sheng comments on the difficulty of imitating Deng. She pointed out that Deng's pronunciation of each word and the way she ended each section are both quite unique. In order to sound like Deng, a singer must pay attention to all of Deng's singing features while at the same time be able to perform the whole song smoothly. Even though Sheng, herself, received vocal training at the age of seven, she still found the imitation challenging. She would usually spend several hours a day listening to Deng's singing and studying her voice.[39]

One trademark of Deng's singing is her enunciation of each word in the lyrics. Ye Xiaogang (葉小鋼), Assistant President of the Central Conservatory of Music, has commented on Deng's enunciation, pointing out that for revolutionary songs aimed at the mass appeal, the enunciation is usually faster and forceful. However, Deng's enunciation is mostly very clear and she would adjust it according to the content of the songs.

[39] Hu, "Deng Lijun chuanyue shikong."

China, at that time (in the late 1970s as well as the 1980s), lacked this way of singing. According to Ye, Deng's impact on Chinese music has much to do with the way she enunciated words, and Deng's "purest Chinese" (*zui chunzheng de guoyu*, 最純正的國語) made the listeners feel familiar and natural and thus, added to her popularity.[40]

Deng's other singing features included appropriate breathing, excellent aspirant singing (*qisheng*, 氣聲) and portamento (*zhuanyin*, 顫音) skill and a special ending sound. Her breathing when singing, compared with that of many other singers, was so smooth that it was hardly noticeable. She had good control of the lower part of her abdomen (*dantian* 丹田 in Chinese, roughly two inches below one's navel where one's *qi* 氣 resides), relying often on abdominal breathing, instead of chest breathing, to produce a more delicate voice. As such, her breathing could be very swift without much chest movement, which produces a very clean voice.

Deng Lijun was hailed as the artist who introduced Chinese female singers to the *qisheng* style by Jin Zhaojun. According to Jin, before Deng Lijun, singers sang either in the folk (*minjian*, 民間) style or the national (*minzu*, 民族) style, which is a style between the Western *bel canto* (*meisheng*, 美聲) and folk style. It was Deng who brought in the third style—the *qisheng* style, which is the so-called popular (*tongsu*, 通俗) style nowadays. Jin added that China's first batch of popular singers were "100% Deng Lijun's imitators".[41] Jin's statement may be hyperbolic, but Deng's impact as the *qisheng*-style trendsetter was noticeable in the performances of several Chinese vocalists, such as Li Guyi's "To My Homeland", Su Xiaoming's (蘇小明) "A Night in a Military Port" (*Jungang zhi ye*, 軍港之夜) and Cheng Lin's (程琳) "The Little Conch" (*Xiaoluo hao*, 小螺號). Actually, owning to the similar "decadent" and "obscene" singing style, a label attached to Deng's songs in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a high-ranking CCP member in charge of ideology criticized Li Guyi in a meeting in 1980 as "Li Lijun," even though Li denied Deng's impact on her.[42]

Likewise, Su Xiaoming and Cheng Lin became famous for their quasi-Deng Lijun singing style. Su caught official attention by performing

[40] QQ, "Deng Lijun yingxiang."

[41] See Wang, "Deng Lijun he women de yige shidai."

[42] See Li, "Li Guyi chang 'xianglian'."

popular Taiwanese campus folk songs (*xiaoyuan gequ*, 校園歌曲), which she learned by herself, in various non-major navy-related activities in 1980.[43] She was then invited to perform at the New Star Concert held in September in the same year in Beijing, at which she performed "A Night in a Military Port" and was criticized for her soft, non-combative interpretation. It was with the timely endorsement of Ye Fei (葉飛, 1914–1999), a Chinese Navy admiral, that the song escaped the ban and later became a great hit in China in the early period of opening up. Cheng Lin, a Chinese female pop singer nicknamed "Little Deng Lijun" around the 1980s, suffered from a similar "fate." Although she rose to fame with her Deng-style *qisheng* and vibrato singing, she was banned from performing until 1983.

Besides those "little Deng Lijuns," Deng's songs, such as "The Moon Represents My Heart" and "Evening Primrose," were frequently reinterpreted. This further demonstrates Deng's impact on China's popular music. The imitation and reinterpretation of Deng's songs, however, should not be taken as second-rate replicas. Rather, in many cases, they are merely a temporary process before an artist is able to establish his/her own singing style. Faye Wong (王菲), makes a salient case. From "Where is the Wind From" (*Feng cong nalilai* 風從哪裡來, 1985) to "Decadent Sounds of Faye" (*Fei mimi zhi yin* 菲靡靡之音, 1995), Wong revealed a distinct personal style, even though the songs in both albums are all Deng's songs. Compared with the Nationalist government's coining Deng as an anti-Communist cultural ambassador for Taiwan/Republic of China, Deng appeared to have exerted a greater impact on the apolitical aspect and on a more realistic level. The Deng-styled singing/performance, as well as contemporary singers' continual remaking of her songs, attests to it.

Conclusion

Deng Lijun and her songs changed China in various ways. They propelled the rebirth of China's secular culture and brought about China's own popular music. Her popularity in China benefitted from China's

[43] 'Campus folk song' is a genre popular from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s with a focus on university students' viewpoints on Taiwanese society.

opening up and the absence of popular music during the early post-Mao period. Yet the circulation of her music was subject to China's ideological censorship. Although the popularity of Deng's and other *gangtai* songs in China can be seen as a challenge to China's nationalist rhetoric, it needs to be stressed that party ideology is not always incompatible with popular music.[44] The CCP's promotion of Hou Dejian's 侯德健 "Descendants of the Dragon" (*Long de chuanren*, 龍的傳人), to prompt unification, offers an ironic counterpart to the KMT's coining of Deng as an anti-Communist artist. The different stages of reception are symptomatic of the CCP's ambivalence towards the values associated with bourgeois tastes, such as individualism and freedom. But Deng's case demonstrates that cultural dissemination cannot be fully dictated by political control. While Deng's "decadent" songs are mostly no longer banned, the political implication associated with her songs such as "Plum Blossom" seems to remain sensitive.[45]

Deng's songs have facilitated the Chinese listeners to express individual emotions. Her rise to fame in China can be understood along with the collective desire for other popular cultural/artistic products from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, or the West in general. For the Chinese people, those imported cultural/artistic goods represent novelty, and a "better" modernization. Compared with Hong Kongese, Japanese, and Western cultures, Deng's songs do not entail a language barrier and were therefore easier to appreciate. Looking back, the ideological confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait added an extra, thrilling excitement when listening to Deng's songs. The bygone age of the heavily politicized context provides space to re-examine how Deng has changed China from nonpolitical perspectives, but the change is unequally exerted and conspicuous primarily in China's affluent coastal provinces and major cities.

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[44] Marc Moskowitz regards Taiwan's (and also Hong Kong's) popular culture as the "feminine and Westernized other" of the masculinist PRC state and Beijing rock discourse. See Moskowitz, *Cries of Joy*, 27.

[45] It was one of the 37 songs that were on the "banned list" issued by Zhejiang Province's Cultural Bureau in 2010. See Lv, "Zhejiang jinbo 37shou ge." A Ningbo-based official said 'Plum Blossom' was listed because it contains a political factor that endangers national unification. Deng's "Ode to the Republic of China" is another song banned for a long time. It's unclear whether or not the ban is now lifted. The most ironic case in terms of Deng's banned songs is "When Will You Return", as it was banned by the Japanese, and also in Communist China, and Nationalist Taiwan.

Personal love remains the main theme of Deng's songs, enabling her listeners from different generations to take whatever encapsulates their interests. By highlighting individual sentiments rather than collectivist ideals, Deng's songs are touching and remedial. They not just crooning about man–woman relationships; they call for an unreserved belief in love. The Chinese elements in Deng's lyrics made her a natural cultural agent, bridging wartime popular music and that of the new era. Her clear enunciation and other singing skills are significant learning models for the upcoming great divas of contemporary China. The numerous tribute concerts yield ample business opportunities. They, too, offer platforms to sustain an imagined community of "greater China," bound by the common predilection for Deng's songs.

The large number and diversity of Deng's fans urge us to ensure multiple imaginations of Deng Lijun as a cultural icon, so that different generations of listeners can experience the varied layers of nostalgia evoked by Deng's music.[46] This nostalgia is not necessarily to be perceived as passive escapism or a media-controlled historical false consciousness, as Paul Grainge sees it.[47] Instead, as observed by Svetlana Boym, nostalgia is not always retrospective; it can be prospective, too.[48] Nostalgia can indeed be a constructive, though often tangled, engagement with the past. It is determined by the needs of the present, as exemplified by the musical *Love U, Teresa!*, and has an impact on the future.

As popular music plays a role in "forming, shaping, and maintaining various Chinese identities," Deng's songs and other *gangtai* music helped mold a new post-Mao cultural identity, which is non-class-based and non-politically-centred individual awareness.[49] The awakening of individual consciousness challenged the narrowly defined Chinese modernization, entailing alternative Chinese values and cultural imagination.

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[46] For the older generation, they could re-appreciate China's pre-1949 urban culture. For the middle-aged generation, they could recall their youthful days in the 1980s, and for those born in the 1970s or after, they could share their parents' taste, as shown at the Taiwanese singer Jay Chou's 2013 Taipei Concert in which Chou used special virtual image reconstruction technology in order to project Deng on stage, to sing with him.

[47] Grainge, *Monochrome Memories*.

[48] Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*.

[49] Latham, *Pop Culture China*, 355.

Although Deng's role as an enlightener/inspirer may be owing to historical contingency rather than her intent, she left an unsurpassed legacy on China's march toward popular music during its initial style-formation phase in the early 1980s. China's economic and political context has undergone rapid change since. Isolated listeners in early post-Mao era have become history, and audio entertainment becomes more varied and affordable. Deng's impact on China is perhaps more liable to the market demand than to Chinese government's party-state control.

China's market demand of Taiwan's popular music has been high over the past few decades, despite competition from other countries. The CCP's censorship waxes and wanes, but generally the Chinese government holds a *laissez-faire* attitude toward the circulation and consumption of popular music from Taiwan, which facilitates the Chinese audiences to continue with the 'negotiated' reception mode, characterized by their rethinking of the governmental control and ideology through Deng's songs, or those of more recent pop idols.[50]

Overall, it is not far-fetched to say that Deng's songs brought the Chinese people closer to Taiwan. However, this was not so much through the government-led ideological imposition. Rather, it was primarily through the various imaginations of Taiwan as projected through her songs. By listening to Deng, Chinese people could envisage what life would be like in Taiwan, and due to their predilection for Deng, they were likely to come to identity (more) with Taiwan's cultural and political values. Despite the Nationalist government's appropriation of Deng's songs in the late 1970s, I would argue that Deng exerted a greater and more lasting impact on her Chinese listeners in nonpolitical aspects, and the impact was personal, spontaneous, and real, rather than top-down, forced, and dogmatic as the Nationalists had schemed. Although it remains unclear whether or not the change brought by Deng could eventually lead to what Andrew Jones terms "an emancipatory mode," Deng demonstrated it would be equally difficult for the CCP to impose a 'hegemonic' reception of popular music on the Chinese masses.[51]

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[50] Andrew Jones classifies the reception of popular music in three models—the 'hegemonic', 'negotiated', and 'emancipatory'. See his Jones, *Like a Knife*, 46.

[51] Ibid.

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9

The Pluralization of the Religious Field in Taiwan and Its Impact on China

André Laliberté

Introduction

This chapter considers exchanges between Chinese and Taiwanese scholars who specialize in religious studies and assesses the extent to which such interactions have had an effect on how Chinese officials approach religious affairs, and, more precisely, to what extent the latter have borrowed aspects of religious policies implemented by their Taiwanese counterparts. It argues that the Chinese leadership can see the advantages of the Taiwanese authorities' prudent management of religious affairs in terms of securing stable governance, but some fundamental differences between the two polities make the wholesale adoption of Taiwan's approach somewhat difficult. This analysis is not primarily comparative[1]:

[1] Such a comparison would require looking into Taiwan under martial law, under a one-party state regime. See Gilley, Diamond, and Chen (2008) for a discussion of such comparison.

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Taiwan's democratic political system since the late 1980s differs in significant ways from China today with regards to the rule of law,[2] the political regime,[3] and the party system.[4] The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which China has selectively adapted some of Taiwan's approach in relation to religious affairs.

To explore this issue, the essay will proceed as follows: it starts with an overview of the changes in relations between the political and the religious field in Taiwan, marked by what I have called elsewhere a secular state with a *laissez-faire* approach.[5] This includes a pluralization in the field of religion, with a greater number of religious actors gaining legal recognition, visibility in the public sphere, widespread acceptance in broader society of their intervention outside of the religious field in the realm of social services provision,[6] and their relatively positive effects on the process of democratization.[7] It then looks at the increased cross-Strait exchanges in the religious field over the last twenty years, between religious actors, officials involved in religious affairs, and scholars studying religion advising the latter. Based on my ten years of attendance as a participant observer in conferences involving epistemic communities working on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, in Taiwan, China, North America, and Western Europe, these observations will track the flow of influence.[8]

The chapter then moves to a description of what Chinese officials have found useful in these exchanges between scholars doing research

[2] While Taiwan recognizes and applies the principle of the rule of law (法治), China implements an approach of rule by law (法制).

[3] While there may be many qualifiers for Taiwan's democracy and China's authoritarian regime, the fundamental dichotomy between democracy for the former and authoritarianism for the latter remains valid.

[4] Taiwan has a multi-party system, while China has, in theory, a one-party dominant party system if one counts the eight satellite parties. In fact, China works as a party-state.

[5] Laliberté, "Regulation of Religious Affairs," 53–84.

[6] Hsiao and Schak, "Les organisations bouddhistes socialement."

[7] Kuo, *Religion Democracy in Taiwan*; Chang, "Eastern Religions and Attitude," 555–83; Madsen, *Democracy's Dharma.* I am aware that this is written in a global historical context in which religious actors are sometimes responsible for a narrowing of civil society rather than its expansion, and their contribution to democratization can be ambiguous. Keeping that caveat in mind, I maintain that in Taiwan the influence has been globally positive.

[8] Because of the pervasive uncertainties of politics within China and in cross-Strait relations, I have decided to keep the names of the officials involved anonymous.

on religions. It looks at government and religious institutions' publications that document changes in the regulatory framework for religious institutions' involvement in the provision of social services as evidence that lessons were learned from Chinese officials. The essay will make the case that despite claims that a shared culture can overcome political disagreements, fundamental institutional differences make China resistant to adopting Taiwan's approach to a secular state respectful of what Alfred Stepan called a "twin toleration" between religion and state. In this liberal definition, the twin toleration includes both state non-interference in religious activities and the non-intervention of religious institutions in government, albeit the latter does not exclude the participation of religions in politics.[9] Chinese authorities since the beginning of the reform period in 1978 are, above all, interested in regime maintenance and they seek to retrieve selectively from Taiwan what will promote that goal. One particularly important aspect of regime maintenance being the Taiwan issue, the Communist Party supports initiative for exchanges in the religious field as long as they appear to favor unification between China and Taiwan, but it opposes them if it believes they are associated with the promotion of liberal democracy.

The Consolidation of Taiwan's Liberal Secular State Since 1987

Taiwan never had an equivalent to the Chinese State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) to monitor religious activities. During the regime of martial law (1947–1987) the state institutions came close, but they operated differently: the security apparatus, in particular the provincial police authorities, kept a close watch on religious affairs, and paid special attention to Yiguandao (一貫道), the Soka Gakkai, the Mormons and the Jehovah's Witnesses.[10] The authorities believed that the first one was guilty of a variety of crimes ranging from being a subversive secret society to engaging in obscene practices, the second one was alleged of

[9] Stepan, "Religion, Democracy Twin Toleration," 37–57.

[10] Ho, *Taiwan Sheng Jingwu Dang'an.*

supporting revanchist Japanese claims, and the last two ones were branded as seditious because of their pacifist views. The KMT also expected all religious associations, churches, temples, and other institutions to register among a limited number of religions duly registered by the authorities.[11] Failure to do so would have exposed them to a variety of sanctions. Moreover, religious institutions were subjected to a wide range of laws, regulations, directives, and guidelines from different branches of government at the central, provincial, and local levels.[12] A key feature of that system of state control over religion in Taiwan until the late 1980s, and which contrasted with the system still in place in China, however, was that the government did not implement a systematic and ideologically driven anti-religious policy. Some KMT leaders did harbor a strong bias against religions in general, but for many others, what they called world religions such as Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam, as well as Chinese religions with close connections with the KMT such as Lijiao (里教),[13] Tiandejiao (天德教),[14] and Xuanyuanjiao (軒轅教),[15] where considered as deserving state protection and recognition.[16] A routinized dimension of relations between the government and the officially recognized religions that has survived the period of martial law was their obligation to set aside funds for charity and expectations that they provide social services.[17]

This does not mean that everything was running smoothly in religious issues when Taiwan was under the regime of martial law. Besides the limited form of recognition to some religions and the police surveillance of the other ones just mentioned, authorities were making it difficult for adherents to carry out a variety of religious practices, especially when they were perceived as too closely idiosyncratic and locally based, dismissing

[11] Tien, *Great Transition.*

[12] Ch'iu, *Zongjiaofa Yanjiu.*

[13] "Religion of Reason."

[14] "Heavenly Virtue."

[15] "Cult of the Yellow Emperor."

[16] Much has been written about the Christian beliefs of Presidents Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Lee Teng-hui as well as DPP leader Peng Ming-min, but much less on the Buddhist beliefs of Justice Ministers Chen Lu-an and Wang Chin-feng or former KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung.

[17] NZB, *Zongjiao Faling Huibian*; NZB, *Shehui Jiaohuapian*; NZB, *Shehui Fuhu Pian*.

them as 'wasteful' superstitions.[18] The most serious instance of conflict between religion and state related to the situation of the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan, whose leaders endured arrest after they issued theological statements which sided with the local movement for Taiwanese self-determination.[19] Apart from this case, however, nothing like the persecution that culminated during the Cultural Revolution in China took place in Taiwan.

When Taiwan moved ahead in its process of democratization, the corporatist structure of control over religion broke down rapidly. In fact, trends underway during the period of martial law became acknowledged openly by authorities, and entrenched in the context of the rule of law, provided stronger protections preventing government harassment. Buddhist and Taoist associations, as well as Christian churches, were no longer compelled to join government-approved associations. At the end of the martial law period, the relevant authority in the Ministry of Interior officially recognized only eight religions.[20] During the Lee Teng-hui presidency, this increased to 11 and under Chen Shui-bian, the government recognized as many as 27 different religions.[21] The two largest of these religions in 2013, in terms of the number of places of worship registered under their name, are Buddhism and Taoism. Before 1987, there was only one national association for each religion authorized to be their official representatives, the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (BAROC, re-established in 1949) and the Taoist Society of the Republic of China (TSROC, established in 1966), respectively, in accordance with the typical corporatist and Leninist model that the KMT had adopted when it was ruling China.[22] In 2013, the situation is markedly different. A great number of associations are registered as Buddhist or Taoist, with some of them counting more adherents than many of the other 25 religions.[23] And the great number of associations captures only

[18] Ahern, "Thai Ti Kong Festival," 397–426; Katz, "Identity Politics," 157–80.

[19] Rubinstein, *Protestant Community on Taiwan.*

[20] They were the five recognized in the PRC plus Lijiao, Tiandejiao, and Xuanyuanjiao.

[21] Laliberté, "Regulation of Religious Affairs," 53–84.

[22] Tien, *Great Transition.*

[23] The Tzu Chi Foundation and the Foguangshan monastic order's affiliate, the Buddha Light International Association, each claim several millions adherents; Protestants of all denomination number less than 300,000, and Catholics even less.

one dimension of religious activities in Taiwan: the even greater number of folk religious sanctuaries suggests an unfettered religiosity.

To give the full measure of the differences in approach between the period of martial law and the democratic consolidation that followed, one can compare the status of Yiguandao before 1987 and the fate that awaited new religious movements such as the group of people who followed Song Qili (宋七力) ten years after. During the authoritarian period of KMT rule, Yiguandao was perceived by the public as a secret society that should be targeted for police surveillance because of its allegedly bizarre practices, even though this perception derived more from rumors and hearsay than serious investigations.[24] This situation contrasts with the one experienced by followers of Song Qili, a religious entrepreneur who was the subject of investigative journalism for fraudulent practices.[25] Some reporters and activists used the "Song Qili affair" and some other cases like his as a pretext to promote the necessity for a law on religion.[26] The KMT under Lee Teng-hui accepted to conduct some investigation on the most egregious cases of fraud, but did not promulgate any new legislation on religions as a result.

Epistemic communities of scholars working on religion played a key role in these developments toward a more tolerant state approach with regard to religions, even for those who have few followers because of their idiosyncratic beliefs. People like Ch'iu Hei-yuan (瞿海源) and Song Guangyu (宋光宇), for example, were key actors in undergoing genuine sociological investigations to better understand the reality of Yiguandao.[27] Their research showed that this movement was representative of an old syncretic attitude incorporating the three traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and other religions. They saw in it a relatively new type of organization, what Prasenjit Duara termed "redemptive societies," that had emerged during the Republican period in China and that had a

[24] Jordon and Overmyer, *The Flying Phoenix*.

[25] Song sold at a very high price photographs of himself surrounded by his 'aura,' which turned out to be simple image manipulations in dark room, before Photoshop began to be widely used.

[26] At about the same time as the Song Qili affairs, a Buddhist summer camp generated lots of controversy because a great number of participants expressed the wish to take the precepts, generating accusation of brain-washing against the abbot of the temple involved.

[27] Song, *Zongjiao yu Shehui*.

positive influence thanks to its philanthropic activities and its promotion of moral values.[28] Scholars like Hsiao Chin-huang (蕭新煌) developed sophisticated surveys on Buddhist associations to demonstrate their positive contributions to civil society.[29] Scholars such as Chang Ying-hwa (章英華) have considerably contributed to unpack the definition of religion in a way that renders the Taiwanese experience legible to outsiders.[30] They have shown the importance of "belief," "rituals," and "practice," which are more useful than a simple reference to "faith."

These studies are of tremendous importance to the understanding of religion in China as well. Reference to practices such as the Fengshui(風水), the Yijing (易經), and ancestors' worship make sense on both sides of the Strait. Millions of people in China and Taiwan instantly recognize these rituals and practices as theirs, even while they disagree among themselves about how to call them. For many KMT and CCP intellectuals they have long been dismissed as "superstitions" or "secret societies." In the beginning of the democratization process, however, Taiwanese scholars such as Zheng Zhiming (鄭志明) have given to these traditions the luster of folk belief,[31] and some even celebrated them as expression of national identity.[32]

Ch'iu Hei-yuan, Hsiao Hsin-huang, and others acted as government advisors on religious issues but also on the development of civil society.[33] The state authorities also invited the representatives or the leaders of religious institutions to the public consultations it organized on matters of relevance to them, whether this related to the provision of social services, the offering of higher education, or the passing of a law

[28] Duara, "Pan-Asianism," 99–130.

[29] Hsiao and Schak, "Les organisations bouddhistes socialement."

[30] Chang, *Taiwan diqu shehui bianqian.*

[31] Zheng, *Taiwan minjian zongjiaolun ji*; Zheng, *Zongjiao shenhua wushu yishi.* I have only indicated references to texts at both ends of Zheng's extraordinary output which used to be more than a book a year between 1984 and 2006.

[32] Katz, "Identity Politics," 157–180. I consider Paul Katz as a Taiwanese scholar because his employer is Academia Sinica.

[33] Hsiao and Schak, "Les organisations bouddhistes socialement"; Ch'iu, *Taiwan Zongjiao Bianqian*; Ch'iu, *Zongjiaofa Yanjiu.*

on religious affairs.[34] Many of the Taiwanese scholars were trained in the USA, Western Europe and Japan, but an increasing number, among the youngest cohort, are now trained in Taiwan. A supportive government in Taipei has also encouraged the development of the discipline of religious studies. This support was not without ulterior motives, but it has served the development of an objective and nuanced understanding of religion in contemporary society. The KMT has long been viewed, and indeed still views itself, as the promoter of Chinese traditional culture, which included Chinese religions, and used this approach in its propaganda to emphasize the contrast with the CCP. The pro-independence DPP has viewed the study of Taiwanese religions as an important aspect of nation-building. Both had their own reasons to encourage the growth of that field, and scholars have benefited from that support.

Government consultation with the epistemic communities involved with religions has also contributed greatly to a broader acceptance from the public of religious involvement in the provision of a wide variety of services.[35] This was true in the field of health care, education, and relief disaster, all areas of intervention in which religious institutions were left with considerable autonomy. As a result of this openness, some religious or religious-based institutions, such as the Tzu Chi Foundation (慈濟基金會) and its network of five hospitals, have become major actors in the provision of health care[36] and disaster relief.[37] While the privilege of providing education had long been granted to Catholic and Protestant institutions as a legacy of the republican regime in China and for the expediency of attracting American support, it is only during the process of democratic consolidation that this became possible for other religions on a large scale, in particular Buddhism, Taoism, and Yiguandao.

[34] NZB, *Zongjiao Faling Huibian*; NZB, *Shehui Jiaohuapian*; NZB, *Shehui Fuhu Pian.* It is important to note that the government welcomed the offer of religious institutions such as Christian churches and Buddhist associations to provide social services and sought some coordination, but did not impose that on them nor did it impose such activities as a condition to justify their existence.

[35] This acceptance has been welcomed by vulnerable populations, such as the aboriginal people, for a long time. The history of Christian missions in China and Taiwan are very different from each other, hence their different historical legacies.

[36] Huang, *Charisma and Compassion.*

[37] Laliberté, "Zongjiao Cishan Zaihan Chongjian," 193–220.

Organizations affiliated to these religions were granted the permission by state authorities to establish their own institutions for higher education.

It is important to note that the generally collaborative relations between the ruling party and religious organizations during the period of martial law prevented the development of an adversarial relation between state and religion and dampened, rather than exacerbated, the conflicts that could have erupted during the early stages of the democratization process.[38] The examples of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and Yiguandao were especially telling in this regard.[39] During the period of martial law, the PCT asserted its views on Taiwanese right of self-determination and some of its prominent leaders endured persecution as a result[40]; and, as we have seen above, Yiguandao was subjected to police surveillance. Yet the KMT did not ban the PCT nor persecuted Yiguandao followers.[41] The PCT had members in the leadership of both the KMT and the Tangwai opposition, and therefore was well positioned to act as mediator between the ruling party and its opponents.[42] Moreover, it was during the late part of the martial law period, under Chiang Ching-kuo, that the KMT supported the development of the two Buddhist associations that would afterwards occupy such a prominent place in the world of Taiwanese Buddhism: Foguangshan (佛光山) and the Tzu Chi Foundation.[43]

One outcome of this generally benign policy toward religion during the martial law period was that during the process of democratization, religious institutions had very few grievances against the authorities. Some that had benefitted from government leniency were likely to espouse the authorities' positions. When the issue of ethnicity risked being a divisive

[38] Kuo, *Religion Democracy in Taiwan*; Laliberté, "Buddhism for Human Realm," 55–82; Madsen, *Democracy's Dharma*.

[39] Lin, *Taiwan de Zhongjiao Chongtu*.

[40] Rubinstein, *Protestant Community on Taiwan*.

[41] The repression against some of the leaders of the PCT was harsh indeed, but the possibility that two members of the Church could compete for the first free Presidential election in 1996 demonstrates eloquently how much Taiwan had changed.

[42] This became clear in the 1996 presidential election, when the two leading candidates for the KMT and the DPP, Lee Teng-hui and Peng Ming-min, were both members of the Presbyterian Church.

[43] Laliberté, *Politics of Buddhist Organizations*; Chandler, *Establishing Pure Land*; Huang, *Charisma and Compassion*.

factor in elections, religious actors ignored the issue altogether. Yiguandao and the Buddhist associations, in general, have tended to adopt attitudes that were largely supportive of the existing social and political order.

Religious Exchanges Across the Strait

After the Singapore meeting in 1992 between the China-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and the Taiwan-based Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), informal exchanges between Taiwanese and Chinese improved briefly for a few years.[44] As a result of this improvement in the framework for people-to-people relations, many exchanges have occurred between people involved in religious affairs on both sides. But these interactions were often asymmetrical. Religious leaders on each side faced very different levels of constraints: although religious believers of any persuasion do not have to fear a denial of entry in Taiwan because of their belief, the Taiwanese adherents to religions such as Falungong are not welcomed in China.[45] Different Taiwanese religious groups had also dissimilar expectations over these exchanges. Buddhists were cautious about cross-Strait exchanges and they have diversified their activities outside Taiwan by establishing branches outside China, while Taoists saw no problem with the intensification of pilgrimages to ancestral temples in Southern China.[46] Visits to Taiwan by Chinese officials involved with religious affairs have increased over the years, but the Taiwanese cannot reciprocate because its government does not have a counterpart to the director of SARA.[47] Finally, visits to China by Taiwanese scholars are less constrained than those of their

[44] Relations between the two sides soured following the mishandling by local authorities in Zhejiang of the fallout to a hijacking in the Qiandao lake that led to the death of 23 Taiwanese tourists. Relations deteriorated further from July 1995 to March 1996, when China conducted missile tests in the Taiwan Strait to intimidate Taiwanese voters in the run-up to the Presidential election.

[45] Adherents of Yiguandao can go to China even if their religion is not recognized, like adherents of other religions such as Judaism, Mormons, etc. They can even worship in venues designated for them especially, as "aliens."

[46] Brown and Cheng, "Religious Relations across Taiwan," 60–81.

[47] There is a bureau for religious affairs within the Ministry of Interior's Department of Civil Affairs but it is a small office relative to China's SARA.

Chinese counterparts in Taiwan, who often have to mind what they are saying publicly.[48]

For both sides before 1992 exchanges among religious associations, officials, and scholars across the Strait were politically problematic. For the first four decades after 1949, the CCP's own policy on religion precluded the idea that any religious association from anywhere outside China could send people on the continent. Kuan noted the existence of three distinct periods between 1949 and 1992: hostility and radicalism against religions from 1949 to 1982; a brief normalization between 1982 and 1989; and a return to strict control after the fall of communism in Europe and the June 4 massacre.[49] During most of the brief period of tolerant policy toward religion in China, Taiwan implemented a "Three No Policy" that precluded any exchanges across the Strait.[50] This policy appeared vindicated following the 1989 June 4 massacre, which briefly led to an international rebuke of China, while Taiwan was entering the decisive stages of its democratization process under President Lee. But although Kuan indicated 2000 as the beginning of the second thaw on religious issues in China,[51] cross-Strait exchanges in which religious actors were involved had happened well before then. As Brown and Cheng noted, since 1987 there was intensive Taoist interactions and restoration of temples in China thanks to Taiwanese support.[52] This suggests that the CCP puts greater value on promoting exchanges with "compatriots" than acting out of its concerns about the subversive potential of religion.

Deng's 1992 Southern Tour, which restarted his policy of economic reform, coincided with a dramatic turn in cross-Strait relations that provided a more relaxed framework for religious exchanges.[53] In that year the ARATS and the SEF, two NGOs representing informally their respective governments, met in Singapore and thereby set the stage to overcome

[48] This is not a universal rule, and it is more likely to apply when scholars are travelling as part of a team within exchanges that have a quasi-official dimension.

[49] Kuan, "Religion Politics in China," 163–8.

[50] This policy was not implemented strictly, as the discussion below on Taoism suggests.

[51] Kuan, "Religion Politics in China," 169 ff.

[52] Brown and Cheng, "Religious Relations Across Taiwan," 68.

[53] The relaxing on religious issues happened before, but the repercussions on cross-Strait relations did not materialize.

some of the obstacles to person-to-person relations on both sides. The major flood that affected communities from Henan to Jiangsu that year provided the Chinese leadership with an opportunity to change the tone in cross-Strait relations, by appealing directly to Taiwanese "compatriots" for help, even if there were no official links between the two sides. The Taiwanese government responded indirectly by not preventing Taiwanese volunteers from going to China. This was not the first time that the Chinese leadership appealed to outsiders for the provision of relief disaster, including from religious associations,[54] but the call to Taiwanese NGOs represented an unprecedented development that opened up opportunities for Taiwanese NGOs with a religious background eager to go to China.

One of the most important of these NGOs, the Tzu Chi Foundation, responded to that appeal following meetings in 1992 between its chief administrative officer, Wang Tuan-cheng (王端正), and officials from both sides.[55] Tzu Chi is registered in Taiwan as a philanthropic association, and not as a religious entity, but it is nevertheless known throughout the island for its very distinctive Buddhist identity and the charismatic nature of its founder, Master Cheng Yen (證嚴法師), a nun who had received the precepts from one of the most respected Chinese Buddhist monk exiled in Taiwan, the late Master Yin Shun (印順導師).[56] The permission to deliver relief to China that Wang obtained from the CCP authorities was limited. Each visits by Tzu Chi volunteers in China lasted no more than a few weeks, but one positive aspect of these such short-term stays was that they were possible throughout the years, regardless of the status of cross-Strait relations.[57] One important component of Tzu Chi's presence that made that possible was the respect of a specific "Three No" policy: no politics, no proselytizing, and no publicity for its activities (for a summary of these

[54] In 1982, the Chinese government had appealed to the Hong Kong Branch of World Vision, another non-Chinese NGO affiliated to a religion. See CDB, "World Version."

[55] Tzu Chi's internal documentation show that Wang met Wang Zhaoguo, newly nominated head of the CCP United Front Department, and on a separate occasion Tang Shu-bei, Vice-Chair of Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation.

[56] Huang, *Charisma and Compassion.*

[57] And I should add, despite the sudden hardening of policies on religious organizations in general precipitated by the campaign against Falungong and other qigong associations after 1999.

activities, see Laliberté 2013,[58] for detailed accounts, see Ciji 2005–2011). In other words, authorities in China had accepted Tzu Chi conditionally for the provision of social service but cross-Strait religious exchanges were not allowed.[59]

After the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake devastated the province of Sichuan, the Chinese government again asked Tzu Chi volunteers for help with its post-disaster reconstruction. Ostensibly as a gesture of gratitude for the previous 15 years of humanitarian work in many parts of the country, the Chinese government decided this time to grant Tzu Chi the facilities to establish a permanent presence in China at the end of that year. The Taiwanese association registered in Beijing that year and started the construction of its headquarters in Suzhou. It established other permanent sites in Nanjing, Xiamen, and Shanghai, and deepened contacts with other Buddhist charities, such as the Donglin temple association, a philanthropic association in the province of Jiangxi that was led by one of the leaders of the Buddhist Association of China.[60] Clearly, since 2008, the CCP no longer objects to intra-religious exchanges, and it does more than just tolerate the involvement of religions in the provision of social services.

This is a remarkable development because the relations between Buddhists on both sides of the Strait were put to the test on many occasions. In 1997, for example, the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China, the organization based in Taipei that theoretically represented all Buddhists in China, triggered a "cold spell" in relations between Buddhists on both sides of the Strait by inviting the Dalai Lama to Taiwan.[61] The nomination of Jing Liang (淨良法師) as the new leader for the association in 2001 changed the situation dramatically. Jing Liang made relations between Buddhists across the Strait a priority of his tenure.[62] The extent of Jing Liang's success can be ascertained by the tremendous changes in the world of Chinese Buddhism in 2006, when the first World Buddhist Forum was convened in Hangzhou, involving the participation

[58] Laliberté, "Taiwanese Buddhist Association," 81–105.

[59] The nuns I had interviewed in Hualien in 2004 were very keen on respecting this policy, thinking about the merit of that approach in the long run.

[60] DC, "Taiwan Ciji."

[61] Kang, "Confucianism and Culture Renaissance," 66–71.

[62] Kang, "Confucianism and Culture Renaissance," 76

of many Taiwanese Buddhists. This culminated in 2009 with the convening of the Second World Buddhist Forum, jointly held in Wuxi (Jiangsu) and Taipei. Master Hsing Yun (星云大师), a major figure of Buddhism in Taiwan, contributed to organize the event in collaboration with his peers in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.[63]

Other religious actors from Taiwan have been present in China since the 1992 meeting in Singapore. Many of these religious exchanges serve the public diplomacy of the regime. As we have seen above, Taoists from Taiwan have been active at the local level in exchanges with co-religionists in Southern China. But under the Hu-Wen administration, the Chinese government also encouraged the development of Cross-Strait exchanges within a national, rather than a regional framework. Starting in 2006, the State Council has expressed its wish to have the Mazu pilgrimage included in the UNESCO World Intangible Heritage list in 2011.[64] In 2011, the SARA and the China Religious Culture and Communication Association[65] co-organized with the Chinese Taoist Society of Taiwan the second International Taoist Forum[66] in Hengyang, Hunan. This initiative from the PRC central government coincided with plans made by provincial governments: at the end of 2011, a delegation of visitors from Shanxi province responded to the invitation of the Taipei Jingming Zhongxiao Taoist Association of China (臺北中華淨明忠孝道教會) to look at Taoist and Buddhist sites,[67] and in 2012, the Henan's Taoist Association created its own Cross-Strait Exchange Association.[68]

Since the election of Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, there has been an increase in the number of visits by officials from central and provincial religious affairs bureaus to religious sites in Taiwan.[69] In September 2010, the new SARA director, Wang Zuo'an (王作安), visited the principal religious

[63] The lack of reliable data on the number of Buddhists in China prevents us from affirming categorically whether the organization of these fora by organizations close to the CCP reflects an official response to an increased interest in Buddhism in China, or whether it is merely another case of the united front strategy of reaching out to Taiwanese and Chinese overseas.

[64] TAO, "World Intangible Heritage."

[65] Its director is Wang Zuo'an.

[66] Pei, Xie and Ding, "Guoji daojiao luntan" and "ITF".

[67] Taiwanwang, "Futai jiaoliu."

[68] Yutaishichuang, "Haixia liang'an."

[69] See Fenghuang, "Guozongju zhanglebing" and Fojiaonet,"Sichuan zongjiaoju."

leaders in Taiwan: leaders of the Protestant and Catholic churches, Taoist, Buddhist, and Islamic associations.[70] His list of visits even included a meeting with the Taipei Archbishop Mgr John Hung Shan-chuan (洪山川), thereby suggesting a short-lived thaw between Chinese authorities and the Catholic Church.[71] Unsurprisingly, however, Wang's visit did not include meetings with spiritual leaders of Yiguandao or any of the other religions recognized in Taiwan that are not legalized in China. These meetings were meant to continue: in 2012, the SARA Vice-Chair went again in Taiwan to visit Buddhist leaders.[72] However, Taiwanese authorities could not reciprocate because there is no vis-à-vis to the SARA director: the only government unit exclusively devoted in any official capacity to religion in Taiwan is situated at a much lower level than the SARA in the public administration.[73]

But while proselytizing by Taiwanese religious associations was frowned upon in China, and attempts at exerting political influence in both directions were closely monitored, exchanges between scholars of religious affairs became increasingly frequent and also deepened. Not only did scholars from Taiwan and China often meet during international conferences in sociology, political science or Asian studies in North America and Europe, but, over the years, an increasingly dense network of Chinese and Taiwanese scholars exchanged views in symposia, workshops, and other scientific venues in China and Taiwan to focus on the study of Chinese religious in both sides of the Strait. Especially noteworthy in that regard is the series of conferences and summer schools organized over the years by Yang Fenggang, a prominent scholar of Chinese religions who was based in the USA, with his colleagues in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Scholars at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences such as the late Fang Litian (方立天), Qiu Yonghui (邱永辉), Zheng Xiaoyun (郑筱筠), Wei Dedong (魏德东), Li Xiangping (李向平), Deng Zimei (邓子美), Fan Lizhu (范例珠), Liu Yi (刘义), Gao Shining (高师宁), etc. have met with their Taiwanese peers Chiu Hai-yuan, Chao Hsing-kuang (趙星光),

[70] Yi, "Fengyu Jiancheng Taiwan Xing," 38–45.

[71] EDA, "L'Eglise catholique de Taiwan."

[72] SARA, "Zhanglebing futai jiaoliu."

[73] The Bureau for religion within the Ministry of Interior's Department for Civil Affairs, mentioned before, has diminished in importance since the end of Martial Law, while the reverse happened to SARA, which was before a lower-level Bureau for Religious Affairs.

Lin Duan (林段), etc. to discuss the results of their research, and compare and exchange views not only from the perspective of the sociology of religion, but also from the perspective of the governance of religious affairs. The presence of officials from the SARA during these events was certainly indicative of the Chinese authorities' interest in learning from academics on religious affairs.[74]

Also noteworthy are the yearly conferences on the social scientific study of religion organized in conjunction with the Research Institute on Religion of Renmin University, and a number of ad hoc conferences on Religion and philanthropy, Religion and law, as well as specific religions and ethics, convened in China and to which Taiwanese and foreign scholars are invited. Some of these conferences had a clear policy agenda: under the title of religion and the public interest (*zongjiao yu gongyishiye* 宗教与剐益事业), they paid close attention to the policies adopted for decades in Taiwan that included religious institutions in the delivery of social services, and, in particular, explored with representatives of the Tzu Chi Foundation the potential for Buddhist institutions based in China to perform similar activities. It is too early to draw any meaningful conclusions about the effects of these numerous exchanges on the evolution of state policy in China in the field of religion. Still, it is worth asking whether the increased exchanges between the two sides are suggesting that China is moving closer to Taiwan in matters of religious affairs, and, more broadly, a less authoritarian approach to civil society?

Fallout from These Exchanges

Knowledge on religious affairs in China has made considerable progress over the course of the past twenty years. While the study of religion for the first three decades of the new regime were inspired by a simplified version of the Marxist approach to religion known as the theory of "religion as opium," since the start of the Jiang Zemin administration, it has moved to a more subtle approach which emphasizes that "religion is a

[74] The author has been a participant at three of these events, convened in Wuxi, Beijing, and Hong Kong.

complex issue." This change of approach has gone hand in hand with major changes in the structure of the Chinese epistemic communities that study religion. Albeit not as free as their Taiwanese counterparts to express a wide range of view publicly via the media, Chinese scholars have been encouraged by the authorities to explore a wider range of issues than before. Religion used to be of concern to social historians, philosophers, and art historians, but rarely social sciences, but over the course of the last two decades, it is also a legitimate topic of investigation for sociologists and even political scientists and experts on international relations.[75] A significant factor in that change has been the role of a few individuals within and outside China who have promoted the study of religion as a legitimate field of inquiry. Some of them, such as Yang Fenggang and Wei Dedong, have been trained in the United States, and have, in turn, contributed to the training of Chinese scholars. Some others, such as Liu Peng (劉彭) and Gao Quanxi (高全喜),[76] have received part of their training in legal studies and advocate changes in the constitutional arena to improve freedom of religion.

Their contribution has been considerable in moving Chinese scholars away from analyses based on a narrow interpretation of Marxist theory. How far these changes in the scholarship are influencing policies remain to be seen.

Limited Impact of the ROC's Approach to Religion on the CCP Religious Work

What have been the consequences on the regulation of religious affairs in China that have derived from these cross-Strait exchanges among epistemic communities of experts on religion in China, i.e., the personnel of religious institutions, officials in party and state organs dealing with religious affairs, and scholars studying religion? How have these exchanges

[75] This is, of course, a double-edged sword, as knowledge on religion can contribute to its 'securitization,' as is demonstrated with the conflation seen in the association between Tibetan Buddhism or Islam with threats such as 'separatism,' 'extremism,' and 'terrorism' in some commentaries about national and international affairs.

[76] Gao, "On Rule of Law," 53–6.

affected the nature of relations between state officials and religious leaders in China, and what have been the outcomes for Chinese religious actors themselves? In other words, to what extent have the Chinese epistemic communities been influenced by their Taiwanese counterparts, or sought to learn from them, and how successful have the former been in influencing officials who make decisions on issues of importance to religious adherents? To answer these questions, we need to keep in mind that the ROC state does not proclaim a specific approach on religious matters,[77] while in China, the CCP has developed within its United Front Work Department a working group dedicated to the guidance of religion, known in Party-speak as "religious work." We should not infer from that that Chinese scholars are following party directives or even that the CCP expects them to do so. Scholars in Chinese religions are as independent in their mindset as any scholars in other societies, except that they have to be cautious in the tone they use in public.

A fundamental difference on religious matters between Taiwan and China remains despite the intensification of cross-Strait exchanges. Religion in China remains a deeply politicized matter, an important element in the CCP's assertion of its legitimacy: under Hu Jintao, it was a major component of its efforts to build a harmonious society.[78] Evidence from fieldwork has suggested a certain relaxation of regulations,[79] participation in religious activities by local party cadres,[80] and what anthropologist Robert Weller calls "governance by mutual hypocrisy," wherein the state looks the other way when religious practices diverge from regulations, as long as religious followers pretend to obey state directives.[81] This ambiguity, however, has appeared serious enough for some higher authorities that they have felt compelled in 2011 and 2013 to remind

[77] This does not mean that politicians do not care about religion. During electoral campaigns Taiwanese candidates make sure they are seen with religious leaders. But it is not an official policy and neither the KMT nor the DPP have in their electoral campaigns a program to guide religious institutions.

[78] Brown and Cheng, "Religious Relations across Taiwan," 60.

[79] Tong, "New Religious Policy," 859–87.

[80] Chau, *Miraculous Response*.

[81] Weller, "Increasing Religious Diversity," 135–44.

cadres that they must adhere to atheism.[82] For these party cadres, their belief in the subversive potential of religions remains as strong as ever, and the CCP wants to ensure that it can continue to nurture the development of religions in acceptable and non-threatening ways, in the area of philanthropy, culture, or history.[83]

Taiwanese officials approach religious matters in different ways: for them, religion represents an asset to civil society rather than a threat to political parties or the state. As we have seen above, the KMT and DPP have moreover managed to harness the social capital of religious institutions to their advantage: during the height of the Cultural Revolution in China, the KMT presented itself to the world as the protector of Chinese traditions and the guarantor of religious freedom. Since its existence was legalized, the DPP has actively encouraged the growth of popular beliefs and localized religious practices to reinforce its campaigns promoting Taiwanese identity. Chinese authorities have appeared to have move closer to those of Taiwan in adopting more relaxed religious regulations. But because of the existence of a very vocal neo-Maoist minority and many cadres still committed to the enforcement of atheist education, the possibility of rescinding this relatively open policy always looms on the horizon, as has been suggested by a recent spate of church demolitions which took place in Zhejiang during the Spring of 2014. The community of scholars may be more open-minded on religious matters than the CCP cadres, but they constantly face risks of punishment if they publicly move too far in their criticism of policies.

Despite the intensification of cross-Strait exchanges, the CCP has not moved China any closer to Taiwan on the issue of regulating religions. The Constitution does not say much about religious affairs besides the vague Article 36, which proclaims freedom of religion but not freedom of practice.[84] There had been major transformations in the CCP's approach to religious affairs since 1949, but these changes do not mean that China is

[82] The statement was reiterated on numerous occasions in 2011 and 2013 by Zhu Weiqun, executive vice-minister of the United Front Work Department in the CCP Central Committee (see: Ji, "CPC's Stance").

[83] Davis, *Ruling Resources and Religion.*

[84] The Constitution emphasizes also the right not to believe, and limits the right to believe by forbidding proselytizing.

moving closer to Taiwan. This is the case because these changes have little to do with Taiwan and follow a very different logic. As Kuan wrote, these changes in the CCP's policy towards religions resulted from three interrelated dynamics: the process of globalization, and in particular the efforts to join the WTO and the IMF, which created incentives for achieving conformity with international legal standards; the combined effects of a decentralizing states and market economies, which created opportunities for religious entrepreneurs; and, finally, growing human agency, which is emboldening Chinese citizens to assert their rights.[85] These dynamics certainly push in the direction of change, but other counter-dynamics move in the opposite direction.

The SARA recognizes only five religions and although officials and scholars have debated the issue of granting recognition to Confucianism or folk religions, there is no evidence of movement in that direction.[86] Notwithstanding the research produced by Chinese scholars on new religious movements, which have demonstrated that some of these movements are not opposed to the existing social and political order, Chinese political leaders have not changed their approach to the non-recognition of any other religions besides the five legally accepted ones. Moreover, each of these national religions holds a monopoly of representation over co-religionist: at all levels of government, the state only authorizes one representative for each of the five religions. This institutionalization of the five religions, obviously, does not mirror the complexity of China's religiosity. Many religious believers try to overcome the limitations imposed by state regulations by registering charities, study groups, or even meeting informally in lay societies (see for example Sun[87] and Ji[88] on this diversity within Buddhism). But in these situations, they always face the risk of incurring authorities' opposition. This lack of openness contrasts with Taiwan's approach, which has gone in the opposite direction through the 1990s: many associations can register simultaneously within a single religious identity.[89]

[85] Kuan, "Religion Politics in China," 171–3.

[86] Kang, "Confucianism and culture renaissance," 66–71.

[87] Sun, "Chinese Buddhist Ecology," 495–510.

[88] Ji, "Secularization as Religious Restructuring," 233–60.

[89] That is, the category Protestantism in Taiwan welcomes a variety of denominations. In China, all churches had to dissolve into a patriotic association.

The limited constitutional protection of religion and the strict control that the CCP wants to promote have led to an unexpected and self-defeating consequence wherein the state lacks a complete picture of the religious field, a situation that contrasts markedly with that in Taiwan. In 2004 the National Bureau of Statistics of China recorded a total of about 77,000 religious associations of all kinds for all five religions it recognizes, a tally that included not only religious venues such as Buddhist and Taoist temples (*si* 寺, *miao* 庙, *guan* 观, *gong*宫), mosques, and churches, but also religious associations (*xiehui* 协会), philanthropic societies (*gongdehui* 功德会, *cishan hui* 慈善会), and research institutes (*foxueyuan* 佛学院).[90] This number, for a population of 1.3 billion people, suggests an average of one religious venue for just over 16,000 people. When this proportion is set in comparison to Taiwan's, which counted in 2008 close to 15,000 places of worship for a population of 23 million, or one religious venue per 1,500 people, this suggests an enormous degree of under-reporting.[91] We end up with a paradoxical situation wherein China counts many unregistered religious associations and sites which are at risk of being harassed by officials because of their ambiguous legal status, while in Taiwan authorities have a much clearer view of the religious field but little or even no interest in policing it.

The greatest difference between Taiwan and China on religious matters, however, can be found in the relations between legally recognized associations and their respective governments: while religious associations in China must follow party directives and obey state regulations, in Taiwan since the 1990s religious institutions are not following directives from the state. In fact, they can even mobilize their followers or the public to oppose the ruling party or criticize the head of government without any fear of sanctions. For example, Master Hsing Yun, the founding abbot of the Buddhist Monastic Order of Foguangshan, had openly supported Chen Lu-an (陳履安) to oppose the KMT candidate, the incumbent President Lee Teng-hui during the 1996 presidential election, but never experienced any retaliation as a result of his position.[92] The defeat of his

[90] ACMRC, *Atlas of Religions.*

[91] This under-reporting may have a wide variety of causes: governments that lack the human resources to investigate, ability of religious associations to escape scrutiny, and in some area, simply the concatenation of more of a century of destructions since the Taiping rebellion.

[92] Chandler, *Establishing Pure Land.*

favorite candidate did not diminish the standing of Master Hsing Yun's global organization and did not prevent him from taking later on initiatives to foster dialogue between the KMT, then under a new leader, and CCP politicians. A public stand against the ROC President Chen by Wei Jue (惟觉老和尚), the abbot of the Chung Tai Chan Monastery (中台禅寺), during the 2004 presidential election, did not have detrimental consequences for his institution either.[93] In sum, while religious institutions in China must follow state directives, in Taiwan they are not servants of the state and they can even oppose those in power. For religions that are not legalized, such as Falungong, the difference is even starker: persecution in China,[94] benign indifference in Taiwan.[95]

There are cases wherein local governments' pragmatic behavior suggests that their application of policies on religion is more relaxed than before. For example, the local authorities in Shanghai and other locations where there are many Taiwanese or foreign residents have granted limited recognition or tolerated religions that are not registered by the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA), such as Yiguandao,[96] the Baha'i Faith, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and Judaism. These religious activities, however, are allowed only because they affect "aliens," who are expected to worship separately from Chinese. Besides this regime of exception to foreigners and Taiwanese "compatriots," religions recognized or practiced freely in Taiwan such as Falungong, the Jehovah Witnesses and Scientology are not allowed. In other words, there is no convergence in sight with policies on religion in Taiwan.

Possible Motivation for Sustained Control

Many factors explain the variations in the approaches adopted by local Chinese governments on religious affairs, but this essay has focused on the directives promulgated at the center, from which local governments

[93] Although the rebuke by Wei Jue led to a strong, indignant response from the media.

[94] Ownby, *Falungong*; Palmer, *La fièvre du qigong*; Tong, *Revenge of Forbidden City*.

[95] Falungong is not recognized legally in Taiwan because the adherents of this organisation did not ask for this recognition and Taiwan authorities do not require such registration.

[96] Billioud, "Yiguandao," 211–34.

choose to differ or not. What remains to be explained is the rationale of the central authorities in refusing to move in direction of a more liberal approach to religious affairs. This refusal is clear when one contrasts the existing regulations on religious affairs in China to the more liberal approach used in Taiwan, and, in particular, the spirit beneath each of these approaches. Documents by the CCP may have changed the general tone of its policies and moved away from a doctrinaire approach that looked at religion as "the opiate of the masses," but the practical consequences have not changed substantially: while there is recognition that religion will remain an important element in even a socialist society, most importantly, the prevailing view still holds that religion must serve it. In other words, the acceptance of religion in China remains conditional on its subordination to the state. The CCP still remain committed to the principle that it needs to provide guidance to religions in China. There is no fundamental shift in thinking in China comparable to the transition that led to a virtual regime of *laissez-faire* on religious matters in Taiwan.

Moreover, authorities in China still see religion in narrow terms. They only accept religions as long as the latter have institutions such as a clergy, congregations, and scriptures. The rest is dismissed as "superstitions." Moreover, there are religions that are considered acceptable and others that are dismissed as "evil cults." This is not because the think-tanks under their supervision are unaware of developments unfolding in the world of Chinese religions. Within the SARA, for example, the large body of scholars working for the institution is divided in four groups, looking at a variety of religions, including those that are not officially recognized.[97] It is just that the authorities look at it from the perspective of governance and focus their energies on the recognized religions, which, in their view, need state guidance.[98]

[97] While the first division looks at Buddhism and Taoism as national recognized religions, the second division looks at Protestant and Catholic Christianity as a recognized world religion that has arrived in China relatively recently. The third division looks at the affairs of Islam, somewhat in-between, as a religion that has adapted to China for more than a millennium and represents the faith of eight national minorities. The fourth division deals with all the 'others': world religions that have no presence of significance in China, whether old ones such as Hinduism, Judaism, as well as new religions; Chinese "cults," and "folk beliefs."

[98] Significantly, in my request for interviews at SARA, I was assigned scholars working on Christianity, and one scholar working on Buddhism.

Chinese officials rely on the material produced by Chinese sociologists, but they remain the final arbiters in matters of regulations for religious affairs. Yang has noted that Chinese scholars working on religion have had influence in the past on state religious policy: research by the Shanghai Academy of Social Science in 1987, which led to the conclusion that religion and socialism could be compatible, led, after debates, to the adoption by the CCP of the idea that they are "mutually compatible."[99] In the end, however, the concerns of Chinese scholars do not mirror those of their Taiwanese counterparts. The political context, but also the complexity of the multi-ethnic make-up of the country and the linkage between religion and national security make the relationship of religions to politics more complicated in China than in Taiwan. State and Party officials, if they take religion seriously and stop looking at it as a phenomenon doomed to vanish in the wake of modernization, have their own reasons to regard it as a security threat. As Chinese scholars have gained an increasingly sophisticated knowledge of religious affairs in and out of China, officials in government are acutely aware of its political potential. They do not agree with the KMT perspective that religion can support the ruling party.

Conclusion

The cross-Strait exchanges in the religious field have certainly contributed to the vitality of religious life in China. But this vitality has an uneven effect on individual religions. The exchanges between Buddhists may have improved the status of that religion in China and even on the global scene, but many of the religions that are recognized legally in Taiwan, such as Yiguandao, or that can be practiced freely in Taiwan, such as Falungong, cannot benefit from these exchanges. More specifically, the greater presence of Taiwanese Yiguandao followers in China, despite the CCP's policy of favoring "compatriots" investments, has not translated into greater acceptance of that religion in the legal system. The relations between officials on both sides, and relations between offi-

[99] Yang, "Secularist Ideology Desecularizing Reality," 115.

cials and religious actors did not have a significant impact either. The changes in the regulation of religion in Taiwan have not yet inspired any comparable move from the CCP on religious affairs. Finally, the years of exchanges between intellectuals involved in religious affairs on both sides of the Strait, which clearly showed the effects of Taiwanese scholarship on Chinese epistemic communities' study of religion, had no significant impact in China in any way comparable to Taiwan.

The intensification of visits by PRC officials to Taiwan during the Ma Ying-jeou years did not herald a process of learning from civil society. The Chinese authorities have not expressed an interest in the growth of civil society, remain critical of what they dismiss as "Western democracy," and the CCP remains committed to a worldview premised on the idea that religion should serve the state, admittedly an "improvement," form the perspective of religious believers, relative to the previous view that religion will vanish when society reaches a certain threshold of prosperity. On the other hand, the CCP sees value in encouraging relations between religious leaders, personnel, and believers on both sides because it thinks this will favorably affect its goal of achieving the annexation of Taiwan to the PRC. This support for cross-Strait religious exchanges, however, is selective. The CCP United Front Work Department officials have relied on the religious affairs bureaucracy and members of the Buddhist, Taoist, and Christian associations to nurture contacts with like-minded people in Taiwan, who, for their own reasons, see benefits in these exchanges. But some religions, such as Yiguandao, which has no registered counterparts in the PRC, remain excluded from these exchanges. It is no small paradox that the CCP, which has long considered religion as the expression of alienation in a backward society, uses it now among its tools to lure Taiwanese in the belief that they should embrace its "One Country Two Systems" policy. The efficiency of this strategy, however, remains questionable. Many Taiwanese who identify themselves as Buddhists do not support the views of prominent clerics such as Hsing Yun or Wei Jue that there is no such thing as an independent Taiwan. In taking sides so clearly, these religious leaders run the risk of losing support of lay co-religionists and see their importance diminish in the eyes of the CCP.

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10

Civility, Taiwanese Civility, and the Taiwanese Civility Reconstructed by Mainland Chinese

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Since the opening up of self-sponsored Taiwan tourism (*ziyouxing*, 自由行) for residents from selected Mainland Chinese cities in 2011,[1] the image of Taiwanese society has reached a level of near-perfection in the eyes of ordinary mainlanders. According to a rather conservative estimate during the third quarter of 2014, the annual number of visitors to Taiwan from the mainland will have reached ten million by the end of the year.[2] Almost all mainland visitors are impressed by the beauty of

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[1] Self-sponsored tourism began in Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen in June 2011, and by July 2014 it had spread to a total of 36 selected cities.

[2] According to the Association of Cross-Strait Tourism and Exchange, by September 2014 more than 9.36 million mainlanders had visited Taiwan, representing an increase of 43 percent from the same period of 2013. See China News Net "Dalu youke fuTai."

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both the natural and social landscapes in Taiwan, and hundreds of millions of mainlanders have a positive image of Taiwanese society. Central to all the praise about Taiwan society is the development of civility, that is, Taiwan as an advanced society with a culture and civility in which people are kind, warm, trusting, and helpful. The most noteworthy representation of this image appeared in the July 15, 2012 issue of *New Weekly* (新周刊), arguably the most influential magazine among young professionals and the middle class in China. Entitled "Taiwan: The Most Beautiful Landscape Is Its People" (台湾:最美的风景是人), the cover story consists of more than 200 pages of stories, reflections, and photos by leading journalists, writers, artists, and columnists. The issue became an instant sensation and led to a new wave of enthusiastic public discourse about Taiwan as well as to a marked increase in tourism to Taiwan among Chinese citizens.

To a great extent, the positive image of Taiwan society in the eyes and minds of mainland visitors is a view that is grounded in reality. As David Schak states, during the last two decades or so, Taiwan has indeed become "both a civil society and a society with civility."[3] In my opinion, the development of civility in Taiwan is indicative of two fundamental factors: first, it is closely tied to the democratization of the Taiwan polity and the rise of civil society; second, it combines modern public morality (*gongdexin*, 公德心) with traditional Chinese *renqing* ethics (*renqingwei*, 人情味). The latter distinguishes the Taiwan model of civility from its counterpart in American society where the intimacy and intensity of interpersonal relations tends to be sacrificed to maintain mutual respect, tolerance, and consideration in the context of a highly mobile and diverse society. It is this combination of modern civility and intimacy in interpersonal relations that renders Taiwanese civility attractive to mainlanders from all walks of life, who uphold Taiwan as the ideal model of a modern society to which they can relate. This is often generalized in the somewhat curious observation that "Taiwan has maintained the essence of Chinese cultural traditions."[4] However, there is a difference between Taiwanese

[3] Lee, "Cultural Intimacy," 31–55; Schak, "Development of Civility," 465.

[4] The view that Taiwanese civility is a continuation of Chinese traditional culture is reflected in most comments on Taiwan society by Mainland visitors. Han, "Taipingyang de feng" and Cai, "Benjiu gaiyou de Yangzi" are two of the most influential Internet essays that advocate this view;

civility in reality and Taiwanese civility in the eyes and minds of mainlanders who have reconstructed it as a critique of their own society.

Based on data gathered from field-research interviews, the scholarly literature, and the mass media, the present study aims to examine those factors that have led mainlanders to embrace Taiwanese civility so enthusiastically, how they have reconstructed Taiwanese civility in their narratives and reflections, and the impact of this particular aspect of cross-Strait exchanges on the mainland. In the following, I will first establish working definitions of civility in modern Western societies (particularly American society) and in Taiwan. Although both definitions include the essential elements of respect, tolerance, and due consideration of strangers as well as of acquaintances, there is also an important difference between the two. Unlike American civility, which emphasizes equality, social distance, and impersonalization, the Taiwanese model of civility embraces mutuality and closeness as well as hierarchy in interpersonal relations. In the second half of this chapter, I will examine how both Mainland visitors to Taiwan and those who have had access to Taiwan through the mass media have observed and embraced this distinctive feature of civility in Taiwan, and have then further reconstructed it into an imagined Taiwanese civility—hence a double imagination. In this process of imagining and reconstructing Taiwanese civility, the preservation of Chinese traditional culture has emerged as a new defining feature of Taiwan society. While most mainlanders uphold Taiwan as a praiseworthy example for the future of Chinese culture and society, their reconstructed Taiwanese civility has encountered criticism and resistance from public opinion leaders as well as ordinary people from Taiwan. I conclude the article by discussing the implications and impact of Taiwanese civility, both real and imagined, on mainland China.

The Notion of Civility and the American Model of Civility

Civility is regarded as the most basic and important mechanism that allows for a peaceful and orderly social life in modern societies. Although the definition of civility varies greatly from scholar to scholar, there is

for a much more focused expression of this view in the printed media, see *New Weekly*, no. 375 (July 15, 2012).

nonetheless a consensus that civility is a twofold notion that gradually emerged in Western Europe along with the process of modernization and eventually came to be accepted as a necessary component of modern social life throughout the world.

Broadly defined, the first connotation of civility, based on an ideology of the equality of moral worth among all members of the human community, denotes a set of individual rights and responsibilities, most commonly known as "citizenship." The second connotation of civility is associated with the notion of civilization (rather than citizenship) and is mainly manifested in the form of etiquette and manners. The former is substantial and political whereas the latter is formal and polite. Substantial and political civility contains a number of civic virtues in public life and constitutes the foundation of liberal democracy; formal and polite civility provides the norms and manners that guide and regulate the behavior of individuals in their social interactions. The first constitutes the intrinsic value of civility whereas the second represents the functional value of civility.[5]

In terms of both its intrinsic and functional values, civility serves as an ethical mechanism to communicate the most basic elements of civilized social life in modern societies, that is, mutual respect, tolerance, and consideration for both strangers and acquaintances, which are acted out by social actors in at least three ways. First, a person with civility is expected to show respect for others' rights and moral worth in social life and to maintain a nonjudgmental and unassuming attitude toward others' choices and life styles. Moreover, civility requires that the individual be tolerant of different opinions and refrain from violence, intimidation, or coercion; on the positive side, one should engage in reasoned and respectful dialogue with fellow citizens for the purpose of reaching agreement. One must be considerate of others in social life and in public spaces, showing respect for privacy, maintaining a distance from others' turf in everyday life, and using public spaces in a fair and self-restrained way. All of these are expressed and acted out in the form of manners and etiquette, which include the control and management of one's own body

[5] Calhoun, "The Virtue of Civility," 251–75; Boyd, "Value of Civility," 863–78; Buss, "Appearing Respectful," 795–826; Meyer, "Liberal Civility," 69–84; Orwin, "Civility," 553–64; Rucht, "Civil Society and Civility," 387–407; White, "Ambivalent Civility," 445–60. In my literature search on the notion of civility, I benefited from David Schak (2009).

movements in public life, the proper ways of interacting with others in various social settings, the proper use of public spaces and other public resources that are to be shared with others, and the showing of respect for others during dialogue and social interactions.[6]

It is necessary to make this distinction between substantive/political civility and formal/polite civility because the two do not always go hand in hand in real life. In some less than ideal situations, political civility may be expressed in ways that lack politeness, such as citizens' protest movements turning into violent unrest or members of a democratic parliament physically attack their political opponents (which has occurred in Taiwan and attracted the attention of mainland tourists; more on this below). Historically, refined manners and polite etiquette played an important role in bringing the militant noble class under political control on the one hand and in preserving the existing hierarchy and social rankings on the other hand.[7] Therefore, manners and etiquette are markers of class differences as well as of class boundaries, and historically civility was used as a vehicle to separate the civilized from the savage/uncivilized. As such, formal/polite civility functions as a mechanism of pacification by marginalizing the voices and behavior of the powerless.[8]

As Cheshire Calhoun notes, the development of civility in American society during the nineteenth century took a different turn as Americans disputed and discarded the European notion of hierarchy. Many etiquette manuals were published with the purpose of modifying European manners in order to fit the realities of daily life in the USA. As a result, a new conception of polite civility emerged, one which is more closely tied to the ideas of respect, tolerance, and consideration, coupled with the American emphasis on the equality of moral worth among all human beings.[9] Along with the growth of American influence throughout the

[6] Boyd, "Value of Civility," 863–78; Buss, "Appearing Respectful," 795–826; Calhoun, "The Virtue of Civility," 251–75; Meyer, "Liberal Civility," 69–84; Orwin, "Civility," 553–64; Rucht, "Civil Society and Civility," 387–407; White, "Ambivalent Civility," 445–60.

[7] Elias, *Civilizing Process*.

[8] Ikegami, *Bonds of Civility*; Starobinski, *Blessings in Disguise*; White, "Ambivalent Civility," 445–60.

[9] Calhoun, "Virtue of Civility," 257–59. It should be noted that the boundaries of this community, consisting of all human beings, were historically constructed and have been expanded constantly during the last 200 years.

world, especially in the period after World War II, the American version of civility gradually became the dominant global model.

In the American model of civility, respect is built upon an ideology that confirms the equality of moral worth among all human beings, and in which tolerance is achieved and maintained mainly through two mechanisms in the practice of social life. The first of these mechanisms lifts the notion of privacy to the level of political democracy and places it at the core of individualism, establishing the sacredness of personal boundaries. The second mechanism creates social distance through various institutional arrangements, such as changes in residential patterns and the protection of individual rights.

Erving Goffman's theory of theatrical performance and face-work in American social life reveals that civility was constructed by inserting and maintaining a certain relational distance among members of society, and consequently confirming the need for personal space among to the ever-growing list of individual rights that have had an impact on the development of civility in American society.[10] As Orwin notes: "Civility, then, as a contrived dilution of both citizenship and charity, resembles neither friendship nor love nor any other intense attachment. It more nearly resembles neighborliness. Good fences do make good neighbors; and in the case of civility, these fences are rights. … To treat someone civilly means to remain a respectful distance from encroaching on his rights and to accord him the dignity appropriate to a bearer of equal rights."[11] To make sure the good fences of social distance and individual rights are well maintained, American civility encourages people to be agreeable in their social interactions by concealing unflattering appraisals of others and not offering unsolicited advice.[12] American civility, argues Boyd, represents "something more than the anonymous self-interest of a Hobbesian world where possessive individuals chase after the next economic increment. And yet it is also something less than the intense moral solidarity dictated by ascribed identities of family, kin, or tribe."[13]

[10] Goffman, *Presentation of Self*.

[11] Orwin, "Civility," 560.

[12] Buss, "Appearing Respectful," 789; Calhoun, "Virtue of Civility," 253, 260.

[13] Boyd, "Value of Civility," 867.

In other words, American civility is respectful but impersonal, tolerant but distant, and considerate but not interfering or intrusive. Intense and emotional attachments have no place in the American notion of civility because it is a sociocultural mechanism of social interactions with strangers in a highly open and mobile society; being respectful, tolerant, and courteous is all that is necessary to be civil—albeit not necessarily civic.[14] As will be shown below, civility in Taiwan, however, is constructed in a different way.[15]

Taiwanese Civility: *Gongdexin* (公德心) and *Renqingwei* (人情味)

The youth self-awareness campaign organized by students at National Taiwan University in May 1963 is commonly regarded as "ground zero" for the development of civility in Taiwan. The original spark, however, was a letter written by a visiting American student who pointed out that although Taiwan society was full of consideration and generosity among acquaintances, treatment of strangers was poor and public morality was often lacking in social interactions in public space. The letter was published in the official mouthpiece of the Nationalist Party (KMT) under the title "Renqingwei yu gongdexin" (人情味与公德心), which can be translated as "Human Touch and Public Morality").[16] The letter vividly depicts the conflicts between the traditional and particularistic ethics of *renqingwei* and the much-needed modern and universalistic virtues of civility. There was hardly anything new in this open letter. In fact, the lack of civility (or public morality as it has been commonly referred to in Chinese public discourse) in public life had long been identified as one of the critical weaknesses of Chinese culture in meeting the challenges of modernization at the turn of the twentieth century. Liang Qichao was among the first to call for a

[14] Buss, "Appearing Respectful," 795–826; Goffman, *Presentation of Self*; Orwin, "Civility," 199.

[15] It is noteworthy that if a scholar only focuses on the substantial and political connotations of civility and treats it the same as the notion of "civil society," civility can be explained as the rise of free associations and the practice of certain democratic values in social life. Robert Weller's seminal book on civil society in Taiwan is a good example, but the central issues in Weller's work are not the focus of the present study (see Weller, *Alternate Civilities*).

[16] Di, "Renqingwei yu gongdexin," 6.

national campaign to build public morality and a new Chinese person as a citizen of the nation-state in the 1910s[17] and Fei Xiaotong offered arguably the most influential sociological account of the cultural premises that led to the lack of civility in the 1940s.[18] These are among the two best-known examples. Yet the fact that an American student openly criticized Taiwan society seemed to strike a much more powerful blow to the social psychology of the Taiwan people, especially college students. This may explain the immediate response by students at National Taiwan University and the rise of perhaps the first self-organized collective action of building civility by ordinary people, in contrast to the past government-led campaigns. Another noteworthy long-term impact of the open letter, in my opinion, was the recognition of the positive aspects of the traditional *renqing* culture, namely, the warm and affective mutuality of *renqingwei* (human touch). Although it was not obvious at that time, the issue of how to build a public morality while maintaining the human touch would eventually become an important focus in Taiwan society.

Like the government-sponsored civility campaigns of the past, the youth self-awareness campaign was relatively short-lived, and nor did it have an important influence on Taiwan society. The lack of public morality remained a serious social problem until the 1980s. In 1981 Li Kwoh-ting wrote: "Ours [Taiwan society] is, indeed, an almost 'normless' society, where social morals are almost in shambles".[19] Following Liang Qichao and Fei Xiaotong, Li called for the construction of a new type of individual–community relationship, or a sixth cardinal human relationship (第六伦). In explaining how to incorporate this new principle of public morality into everyday practice, Li listed the following five steps:

1. Never destroy public property and never yield to the temptations of avarice and corruption;
2. Make an effort to protect the environment against all kinds of pollution;

[17] Chen, *Gonggong yishi Zhongguo wenhua*, 4–8.

[18] Fei, *From the Soil*, 60–79.

[19] Li, *Economic Transformation of Taiwan*, 377. Li's essay was first published in Chinese in the major Taiwan newspaper *United Daily News*, March 28, 1981.

3. Preserve orderliness in all communities and eliminate urban blight;
4. Show respect for the rights and interests of all people;
5. Treat strangers fairly and without discrimination.[20]

Li's theory of building civility in Taiwan, especially the call for the sixth cardinal human relationship, added a Chinese twist to the Western notion of civility, that is, a top-down effort to encourage individuals to yield personal interest to the public interest, which is often represented by the nation-state. Actually, as soon as the English word "civility" was translated into the Chinese word "*gongde*" (公德) in the early twentieth century, the Chinese discourse essentially remained within the ethical framework of collectivism. One important feature of the collectivist discourse on civility is that more civic virtues are encompassed in the notion of civility (translated as public morality, or *gongde*), such as consideration for group interests, citizen responsibilities, patriotism, participation in collective activities, caring for public space and public property, and engaging in organized volunteerism. Many of these civic virtues are only realized in collective actions under the leadership of either the government or the community. Moreover, all of these lie beyond the three key elements of respect, tolerance, and consideration that are strictly defined at the level of autonomous and self-choosing individuals. Furthermore, *gongde*, as understood in such a collectivist perspective, actually defines the relationship between the individual and the group/nation-state instead of relations among individuals; this is why the Chinese discourse on civility has also been reinterpreted as a new concept of an individual–group relationship (*qunjiguan*, 群己观), as Li repeatedly explains in his elaboration on the sixth cardinal human relationship.[21] Given Li's high-ranking official position at the time (the early 1980s) within the KMT government, which continued to suppress oppositional voices in order to maintain its one-party rule, Li's idea of building a collectivist version of a new public morality was actually part and parcel of the state project of civilizing the Taiwan people according to a rather authoritarian blueprint of modernization.

[20] Li, *Economic Transformation of Taiwan*, 379–80.

[21] Li, *Economic Transformation of Taiwan*, 374.

The problem is that, in the absence of the development of viable civil groups and the legal protection of the rights of autonomous individuals, the public was generally represented by the state/government. Hence, the new notion of the individual–group relationship as the sixth cardinal human relationship was actually derived from the division between the small self (*xiaowo*, 小我) and the great self (*dawo*, 大我), as in the early discourse by Liang Qichao and others who argued that the small focused on personal interests and the great focused on the interests of the nation.[22] As such, the development of *gongde*, or public morality, often means the sacrifice of individual interests and rights for the sake of national development, such as the New Life Movement promoted by the KMT government first in the mainland and then later on Taiwan.

It is important to note that the early 1980s also represented the dawn of the democratic transition in Taiwan society, a period when various oppositional voices and forces were building momentum to undercut the last stage of KMT rule under martial law. In this context, Long Yingtai, a PhD in English and American Literature who was newly returned from the United States, published a series of poignant and critical essays in an op-ed column in the major newspaper *China Times*. In her first, and also perhaps most famous, essay, "Chinese, Why Are You Not Angry?" Long surpasses all previous criticisms of various kinds of incivility in Taiwan society by pointing out that ordinary citizens in Taiwan had the right to demand that the government take action against incivility and also had the responsibility to organize themselves to initiate a bottom-up approach.[23] With the goal of deconstructing the authoritarian government, in a number of popular newspaper columns Long continued to advocate a set of civic virtues. These social and political critiques were eventually published in a book entitled *Wild Fire* in 1985.[24] The book was an instant success, with 24 reprintings within three weeks of its first appearance, and it soon became a handbook used by both student and public participants in the pro-democracy movements. In retrospect, it appears that Long's most important contribution was to bring to Taiwanese society her personal understanding of American

[22] Chang, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao*; Chen, *Gonggong yishi Zhongguo wenhua*.

[23] Long, "Zhongguoren, ni weishenme bushengqi?"

[24] Long, *Yehuo ji*.

civility, political liberalism, and basic ideas of democracy. With her sharp, emotional, and sometimes fiery writing style, Long most effectively introduced the American version of civility by emphasizing the substantial political connotations of civility, namely, civic virtues as part of the social basis of democracy and the power and responsibility of ordinary people as citizens. This new understanding of civility obviously differed from the collectivist understanding of civility as reflected in the discourse among the Chinese intellectual elite, starting from Liang Qichao in the early twentieth century and moving on to the contribution of Long Yingtai's contemporary Li Kwoh-ting. In this sense, Long Yingtai made a unique contribution to the development of both civility and democracy in Taiwan.

Indeed, social development in Taiwan during the last three decades has revealed the close link between civility and democracy. It is no coincidence that the obvious growth of civility began after the lifting of martial law and the democratization of the Taiwan polity, and, more importantly, that in practice civility and democracy have mutually reinforced one another. Thus far, scholars attribute the development of civility in Taiwan to three major social changes since the late 1980s: political democracy, the rule of law, and civil engagement, all three of which are the result of Taiwan's democratization.

David Schak offers the most comprehensive account of the favorable conditions for the development of civility in Taiwan, but he identifies the establishment of democracy and the rise of a strong civil society, including socially engaged religious associations, as the immediate forces for positive change.[25] He also credits the pre-democracy government for the rapid economic growth with relative equality, the high level of education among the population, as well as the much improved provision of public goods, all of which were indirect forces in promoting the development of civility. In the final analysis, Schak seems to argue that civility is a product of modernization in affluent countries which are characterized by political democracy and the provision of social welfare. Therefore, his account includes practically all of the positive elements in Taiwan's recent history as factors that have contributed to civility.

[25] Schak, "Development of Civility," 447–65. See Weller, *Alternate Civilities*, for an earlier analysis of the rise of the Taiwanese model of civil society.

Anru Lee[26] focuses on the development and presentation of civility in the MRT subway system of Taipei city to offer a cultural account about how the laws, regulations, and the new cultural ideas may have changed the behavioral patterns of individuals to produce a new shared knowledge of being a proper passenger riding the MRT through their modern and civilized behavior. This new knowledge, in turn, created a type of cultural intimacy and helped to construct a new identity of the Taipei citizen; the civilized Taipei citizen then uses the cultural intimacy to influence the behavior of others. As a result, a new civility was born in the trains and stations of the MRT and then was projected to other public transportation lines as well as to other public spaces. Eventually, the civility created by the MRT regulations and the new cultural ideas contributed to the general development of civility in Taiwanese society. Equally noteworthy is the fact that Lee also documents the slow response among citizens to the new laws and regulations regarding the proper behavior on the MRT trains and how the authorities made efforts to implement the regulations. Her data reveal a considerable gap, probably of about ten years, between the establishment of political democracy and the spread of civility.

Both Schak and Lee closely follow the Chinese discourse on *gongde* and use it as a lens to examine the development of civility in Taiwan. For Schak, the most noteworthy and important improvements include people observing traffic rules, standing in queues, keeping the streets and other public spaces clean and orderly, observing new social rules of etiquette, such as no smoking rules, treating strangers with respect and courtesy, and civic engagement in volunteerism and philanthropy.[27] Lee describes in great detail how passengers on the MRT trains learned new ways to discipline their body movements, keep the public spaces in the train stations and train cars clean and pleasant, always line up on the right side when taking escalators, and strictly observe the "No eating, No drinking" rules while riding the trains. As such, both their accounts focus on the improvements in public morality, or the public aspects of civility, namely, those aspects that were derived from the American model of civility, such as obeying the rules of civic engagement.

[26] Lee, "Cultural Intimacy," 31–55.

[27] Schak, "Development of Civility," 453–4.

Yet what has happened to the previous behavioral patterns of warm and tense interpersonal interactions, or *renqingwei* (human touch)? Have they survived or did they become lost during the process of building a modern civility in Taiwan? There seems to be no scholarly account regarding this issue, and nor has there been much discussion about it in Taiwan public discourse. Intriguingly, the centrality of *renqingwei* in Taiwanese civility was first discussed by mainland visitors to Taiwan who were delighted to encounter the warmth and intensity of *renqingwei*, or human touch, that continues to play an important role in Taiwanese social life and seems to coexist peacefully with modern civility in Taiwan society. This leads us to the next questions: to what extent do the mainlanders' perceptions exist in reality, and to what extent are they an imagined reconstruction by the mainlanders for their own sake?

Taiwan as the Ought-to-Be China: The Reconstructed Taiwanese Civility by Mainlanders

To answer these questions, I conducted interviews in Beijing and Shanghai and organized similar interviews in Chengdu, Xuzhou, Baoding, and Xiangyang.[28] My initial assumption was that it was more likely people in the top-tiered cities of Beijing and Shanghai would have visited Taiwan or would have had more access to more information about Taiwan, whereas residents in third-tiered or smaller cities of Xuzhou, Baoding, and Xiangyang would have been less likely to have visited or to have had sufficient access to Taiwan. Residents of the second-tiered, yet large city of Chengdu would represent the middle point. A total of 53 people were interviewed, 18 of whom had visited Taiwan. The aggregated final results of interviews on the issue of civility, or culture in general, actually reveal more similarities than differences among people from the three types of cities. This may be due to the power of the Internet that brings informa-

[28] The interviews in the latter three cities were carried out by research assistants based on a list of questions that I designed in February and March of 2013; I conducted the interviews in Beijing and Shanghai in July of 2013 and June of 2014 respectively.

tion to every corner of the country (providing the information is not blocked by the Chinese government).

However, mainlanders in small cities seem to be more influenced by the dominant political discourse on the issue of unification and to express more strongly their firm opposition to any cultural or political indicators regarding Taiwan independence, whereas people in Shanghai and Beijing have more diverse views regarding this issue. Thus far, information collected from this as-yet-incomplete interview project shows that interviewees in Chengdu are indeed much more knowledgeable about civility in Taiwan in particular and in Taiwan society in general, and a number of them have actually visited Taiwan. Overall, people in the big cities hold a more positive view of civility and society in Taiwan, especially with respect to its political development, than those who live in the small cities of Xuzhou, Baoding, and Xiangyang. The major differentiating factor is the political issue of unification, which may or may not be related to the fact that more people from the big cities have visited Taiwan whereas people from the small cities only know about Taiwan by way of the mass media and pop culture.

Analysis of my interview data in all five cities reveals four features of Taiwan society that stand out as the most impressive among both mainland tourists and those who have learned about Taiwan through the media. Intriguingly, in most of the interviews these four features of Taiwan society are presented in comparison to their decline in mainland China. According to the frequency of the comments (from high to low) in the interviews, the four features are summarized below.

First, Taiwan has maintained Chinese traditional culture whereas Mainland China has lost its cultural traditions. Nearly 90 percent of the interviewees agreed that the most attractive aspect of Taiwan tourism is to see and feel the essence of Chinese traditional culture; the most commonly recognized features of the traditional culture are the old-style buildings, the street scenes, the mom-and-pop shops, the old-fashioned handicrafts and performing arts, and respect for the elderly. Some more articulate interviewees used Chinese phrases such as "*wenwen erya*"(温文尔雅, gentle and cultivated), "*binbin youli*" (彬彬有礼, refined and courteous),"*zunlao aiyou*" (尊老爱幼, respect for the elderly and love of children), and "*renxin xiangshan*" (人心向善, people performing

good deeds)to describe the patterns of interpersonal relations that they observed in Taiwan and they felt that these characteristics represent the essence of Chinese traditional culture. For example, Mr. Fang, a 51-year-old CEO of medium-sized company in Xuzhou, told the interviewer on four occasions during an one-hour conversation that there is nothing to be learned from Taiwan in terms of economics, business management, or politics, but the social harmony and the warmth of *renqingwei* on Taiwan is far superior than that on the mainland. "The best thing is that they [people in Taiwan] have maintained the moral norms of Chinese traditional culture, such as *liyi* (propriety) and *sancong side* (the 'three obediences and four virtues'). These represent the essence of culture that we must learn from Taiwan."[29] Virtually all of the interviewees concluded that this culture would not have been destroyed in China had the Cultural Revolution not occurred. A sharp-toned interviewee who runs a night club in Shanghai also added: "The inner quality among the Taiwanese is better than our inner quality because President Chiang Kai-shek brought traditional education and culture to Taiwan, and also because a large group of well-cultivated people accompanied Chiang to Taiwan. Government is important. If the government treats ordinary people with public morality, ordinary people will treat the society with public morality. It is all related."[30]

When I asked my interviewees to choose one word to describe the best part of Taiwan society, more than 90 percent immediately responded with the phrase *renqingwei*. Interestingly, some mainlanders compare Taiwanese civility with its Western counterpart, commenting that civility in American society is cold and distant, and makes them feel extremely uncomfortable. Too much privacy in Western societies, they observed, has alienated neighbors from neighbors and has even turned family members and relatives into semi-strangers. What they miss most in Western societies but they can find in Taiwan is the culture of *renao* (热闹, literally translated as "hot and noisy") and the warmth of *renqingwei*. Several interviewees who compared Hong Kong and Taiwan pointed out that Hong Kong is too Westernized and too cold, whereas Taiwan has main-

[29] Interview in Xuzhou, February 2013.

[30] Interview in Shanghai, June 2014.

tained the traditional *renqingwei* and thus is warm and kind.[31] This aspiration to achieve *renqingwei* and *renao* should be understood in terms of the absence or the presence of the intermingling of individual lives in daily experiences, namely, positive interventions in the lives of others. *Renao* is considered to be a very important part of *renqingwei*, but it is absent in Western societies because of the latter's emphasis on privacy and "good fences make good neighbors."

Second, Taiwan people are warm, courteous, and kind-hearted, contrasting sharply with descriptions of individuals in the mainland, who are characterized as cold, rude, and mean. All 18 individuals who had visited Taiwan spoke highly about the warmth, courtesy, and kindness that they had experienced from tour guides, shop owners and clerks, restaurant staff, and other professionals who they encountered during their visits. Eight out of ten shared the pleasant experience of asking local people for directional help and were deeply impressed by both the assistance and the warmth and kindness of the people. Orderly queuing was frequently praised as a marker of a high level of civility in Taiwan, as were the extremely well-behaved passengers on the MRT trains. Overall, of the 53 people interviewed, 52 percent praised Taiwan people for having a greater inner quality (*sushi*, 素质) and for being more polite and less materialistic. Interestingly, 79 percent of the interviewees attributed this greater inner quality to the preservation of the superior features of Chinese traditional culture, yet nearly 70 percent also pointed to political democracy, freedom of speech, and rule of law as the strengths in Taiwan society that implicitly were related to the development of civility. The most articulate view along this line was expressed by a 26-year-old man who had a received a master's degree in the UK and who had visited Taiwan as a tourist: "Taiwan is beautiful because its streets are all clean and the public spaces are well-taken care of. Even the public kitchen in the dorm was well-maintained, unlike in our case, as you know. Most Taiwanese seem to be less materialistic than we are and tend to spend more time and money on intellectual consumption, such as visiting bookstores or museums. Unlike us, they emphasize history and culture."[32]

[31] This point was expressed during four interviews in Chengdu, February 2013, and two interviews in Beijing, July 2013.

[32] Interview in Xuzhou, February 2013.

Third, public spaces in Taiwan are clean, orderly, and well-protected by ordinary people who utilize these spaces, whereas in China few people make a point of either utilizing public spaces or keeping them clean and well-maintained. About one-third of the interviewees noted that during their visits both rural and urban residents in Taiwan were extremely careful not to litter in public spaces; some observed that young student volunteers helped to clean the streets; and others commented that although there seemed to be more trash cans on Taiwan streets than on mainland streets, the streets in Taiwan are much cleaner because of the careful use of public spaces.

Fourth, Taiwan society appears to be more open, diverse, and fair/just than that in China. About one-half of the interviewees praised the cultural and political diversity that they observed during their short stays, mostly through watching television in their hotels. They told me that government officials in Taiwan appear to be afraid of the people and they always smile when speaking with ordinary people and often are publicly challenged in the legislature, something that would never occur in Mainland China. Five interviewees recalled how they observed local community elections, social protests on the streets, and political debates on television, and they concluded that the best part of Taiwan society is the political freedoms enjoyed by the people. Some interviewees remarked that the openness and democracy in Taiwan society is also related to Chinese traditional culture. As a 40-year-old woman entrepreneur commented: "They [people in Taiwan] are much better than we are in terms of maintaining Chinese traditional culture. China has experienced too many revolutions, which have destroyed our cultural roots. I think this is the most important thing that we must learn from Taiwan because it is the most basic. All other things are extensions of this [i.e., the traditional culture], such as self-cultivation, politeness, filial piety, and political democracy."[33]

There is, however, a limit to the mainlanders' appreciation for the political development in Taiwan. When asked to reflect on any negative things they had seen or experienced in Taiwan, more than 87 percent of the interviewees pointed immediately to the opposition to reunification that

[33] Interview in Beijing, July 2013.

they felt from either encounters with ordinary people or from watching political debates on television. The majority of these interviewees believe that some Taiwanese politicians promote independence in order to win votes and political power and the younger generations are easily misled or railroaded by such politicians because they do not understand Chinese history and the traditional culture. It is noteworthy that this actually contradicts their observation that Taiwan has maintained the essence of Chinese culture. As an 18-year-old student remarked: "Taiwan people have been misled by their leaders, such as Chen Shuibian, to believe that they are not Chinese, and they do not want to be reunited with China. This is no good." Some interviewees expressed even stronger criticism of Taiwan, as a 26-year-old civil servant asserted: "I did not have a good impression of Taiwan because it wants independence and it boycotts China. If someone were to offer me a gift from Taiwan I would not accept it because I am angry with Taiwan."[34] The chaotic debates in Taiwan's legislature, especially the violence between politicians, were also cited by some of the interviewees as evidence that Taiwan people are manipulated by low-quality politicians; other interviewees added that the economic slowdown was also evidence of poor political leadership.

Unlike the interviewees who provided highly fragmented yet multifaceted and sometimes contradictory comments about Taiwanese civility in particular, and about Taiwan in general, those who wrote and published accounts of their experience as tourists in Taiwan expressed much more coherent arguments to support their ideas. The above-mentioned four positive features of Taiwan society are dominant themes in such published essays, but the authors provide more details in much more polished written language and, most importantly, they also attempt to explain why Taiwan society is civil and polite. The interpretations of Taiwanese civility by these authors basically can be grouped into two topics: Chinese traditional culture and democratic transformation.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, one of the most famous and influential tourist writing that supports the traditional culture is the blog essay published in 2012 by Han Han. This is by no means coincidental because Han Han is widely regarded as the leading opinion leader

[34] Interview in Xiangyang, March 2013.

among the younger generations of Chinese and millions of fans follow his online writings. In this essay Han begins with several touching stories about his personal experiences during a tour of Taiwan, all of which are about Taiwan individuals who, with extreme warmth and kindness, made an extra effort to help him when he encountered difficulties. He reflects: "I felt a loss in the environment in which I live [China], where in earlier decades we were taught to be brutal and aggressive and in the more recent decades we have been taught to be greedy and selfish. These sentiments exist under our skin. I also felt a loss because our elders destroyed our culture as well as the traditional virtues, destroyed mutual trust, beliefs, and consensus among the people, but they did not build a brave new world. … What we have lost is what they [people in Taiwan] have retained; we lack something to be proud of."[35] The Taiwan that Han Han describes has been widely praised by many Chinese tourists, some of whom refer to Taiwan as "another China, a China in a cultural sense that lives in Taiwan,"[36] or, simply "Taiwan, the China that should have been."[37]

This culture–tradition thesis, however, has been disputed by many Taiwan people, especially Taiwan youth, who insist that social progress in Taiwan was achieved through the various waves of social movements, the democratic transition, and the self-cultivating efforts by ordinary people as individual citizens. The most vocal response in this connection is Liao Xinzhong's commentary on Han Han's 2012 essay, in which he notes that the key to civility in Taiwan is that people have learned how to respect one another in public life, but this has nothing to do with Chinese traditional culture. Another key to Taiwanese civility is the rule of law and this too is not a part of Chinese traditional culture. Regarding civic engagement in Taiwan, Liao observes: "In their mentality Taiwan people have now secured such an identity [of being a citizen] with the capacity to change society and indeed to participate in improving the society, instead of being docile subjects [of the ruler]."[38] In a similar vein, Gewala attributes the development of civility in Taiwan to the democratic transition,

[35] Han, "Taipingyang de feng."
[36] Zhang, "Zhongguo bashihou."
[37] Cai, "Benjiu gaiyou de Yangzi."
[38] Liao, "*Huiying Han Han*."

including not only the democratic polity but also the rise of civil society and civic engagement as well as moral self-cultivation by individuals.[39]

Although a minority, some Mainlanders assert that the democratic transition is the root cause for the development of civility in Taiwan. Shortly after Han Han published his influential essay, Li Huagang wrote a long article on his blog exploring the true cause of civilizational progress (i.e., civility) in Taiwan. He makes a number of strong arguments to show that Chinese traditional culture did not promote civility and public morality in pre-1949 China or in other Chinese civilizational regions, such as Burma or Hong Kong. He then describes his encounters with Taiwanese friends to indicate that Taiwan people do not accept the culture–tradition thesis. Instead, he argues, "a modern society with democracy, rule of law, freedom, equality, freedom of the media, private property rights, and freedom of speech inevitably creates courteous, modest, kind, respectful, friendly, and helping citizens. This is the deep reason for the social and civilizational progress in Taiwan."[40] Perhaps the most radical promoter of the democratization thesis so far has been Chen Hongguo, an associate professor at a Chinese university. He goes much further than others to attribute all the positive social features in Taiwan to what he calls "*minzhu de diandi*" (bits of democracy), ranging from good driving behavior, non-materialistic pursuits by youth, volunteerism, the warmth and kindness of *renqingwei*, the preservation of multicultural traditions, social protests and movements, and religious organizations and activities. He argues that these "bits of democracy" truly reflect the overall ethos of the society, or its civility.[41] Obviously, by conflating civility, civil society, and cultural change all under the umbrella of democracy, the democratization thesis comes to a dead end.

Thus far, Jiang Fangzhou, another popular and influential young writer in China, has presented one of the more well-balanced and acute observations of the flavor of Taiwanese civility in the eyes and minds of the mainlanders. While pointing out a number of mutual misreadings, Jiang sharply notes that mainlanders' appreciation of Taiwan has a lot to

[39] Gewala, "Guofeng meihua Taiwan."

[40] Li, "*Taiwan shehui wenming jinbu*."

[41] Chen, "Taiwan yinxiang."

do with their mixed feelings about China. She notes that it is much safer to use the issue of civility to criticize China. Therefore, "praise for the greater inner quality of Taiwanese people may be extended in different directions. The liberals argue that democracy improved the inner quality of the Taiwanese, whereas those who appreciated China during the Republican period [referring to the 1930s] claim that the positive inner quality of the Chinese was due to Chinese culture." She also notes that this appreciation of Taiwanese civility has also been used by Taiwanese in their dealings with mainlanders, and these merely represent differences in imagining one's motherland.[42] Similarly, Chen Wenqian, a well-known public intellectual and media host in Taiwan, points out that the mirror held by Han Han and others actually reflects Mainland China, rather than Taiwan.[43]

Conclusions

A closer reading of the testimonies by interviewees and the published essays by tourists reveals that most people on the Chinese Mainland admire Taiwanese civility solely because of the combination of *renqingwei* and *gongdexin*, or the human touch and public morality. Mainland tourists have cited countless examples of the warmth and courteousness of the Taiwanese during their visits to the island. Others have provided examples from Taiwanese films and television dramas, or from their personal encounters with Taiwanese professionals on the mainland. The coexistence of public morality and human touch thus differentiates the development of Taiwanese civility from its US counterpart, and perhaps from that in other societies dominated by people of Chinese origin such as Hong Kong and Singapore as well. Yet, upholding Taiwanese civility to the level of perfection is actually a result of a reconstruction by mainlanders in order to criticize the current state of affairs on the mainland.

Most cultural elite from Mainland China regard the preservation of Chinese traditional culture as the main contributing factor to the devel-

[42] Jiang, "Xiangxiang de zuguo."
[43] Chen, "Taiwan yinxiang."

opment of civility in Taiwan, essentially seeing Taiwan as the current realization of the Confucian ideal of "rich with propriety"(*fu er haoli*, 富而好礼)and other Confucian virtues. Yet a number of rank-and-file interviewees noted that Taiwan people are nice and polite because they are not resentful and they are not bullied by corrupt government officials. This rather intuitive observation shares a lot in common with the self-reflections by Taiwanese, as well as with the political readings about Taiwanese civility among liberal Chinese intellectuals and like-minded others.

It is noteworthy that the ideological underpinning of American civility is the notion of equality that sustains three basic elements of civility: respect, tolerance, and consideration. Manners and etiquette are created so that members of a society can treat one another as moral equals.[44] This contradicts Chinese traditional culture and Confucian ethics that are based on a notion of hierarchy and differentiated love and respect in accordance with one's social ranking. Several commentators and critics—Taiwanese and mainlanders alike—have noted this conflict, but many of them are critical of American civility for being cold and distant, or for its lack of *renqingwei* and *renao*", namely, a distaste of the "good fence approach" to civility.[45] An exception is Liao Xinzhong who has criticized the unfair treatment in Taiwan of foreign laborers from Southeast Asia as a serious flaw in the highly praised Taiwanese model of civility.[46]

In short, Taiwanese civility is unique in its own right: the political civility derives mostly from modern Western values, yet the polite civility benefits from the preservation of Chinese traditional culture. To a certain extent, Taiwanese civility combines the hard core of Western civility with the soft form of *renqing* culture. At a deeper level, Taiwanese civility lacks the Western emphasis on equality, privacy, and distance, which is precisely why it is so attractive to mainland Chinese who in turn have reconstructed Taiwanese civility to critique social conditions at home.

The fact that so many Mainlanders uphold Taiwanese civility as an example of an ideal modern civilization clearly indicates one potential impact that Taiwan may have on Mainland China, that is, to influence the

[44] Calhoun, "Virtue of Civility," 251–75.

[45] Goffman, *Presentation of Self*; Orwin, "Civility."

[46] Liao, "Taiwan de wenming pianjian."

ways Chinese people and government leaders perceive positive social development, especially the construction of modern civility, and to change some current practices in the Mainland. The ongoing imagination of Taiwanese civility will encourage Mainlanders to reflect, criticize, and, eventually, to change the uncivil social conditions in China. In this connection, both the culture–tradition thesis and the democratization thesis will be helpful for the mainland side to learn from the Taiwan experience. It is likely that, as the process of learning Taiwanese civility proceeds, mainlanders will realize that the two theses are actually closely interrelated and interactive. A more open and democratic society is perhaps the only possible way to provide a solid base for the preservation of the cultural traditions in the face of the onslaught of the profit-driven capitalist economy.

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11

Impact Based on Soft Power

Steve Tsang

Given the great disparity of aggregate wealth, power, and resources between Taiwan and the PRC, and how they are locked in a contest that can lead to the incorporation of the former into the latter it is tempting to see their relationship in David and Goliath terms. But, unlike the original biblical story, there is no compelling need for the contest to be settled immediately. The two have coexisted since the founding of the PRC in 1949, though there is no question that the PRC under the CCP intends to incorporate Taiwan into "Mother China" in due course, and by the use of force if necessary. In an important sense Beijing holds a clear strategic advantage and is overwhelmingly better placed to decide on the future of their relationship. It has an ultimate say over Taiwan's future, as it is the only one that can decide whether or not to use force to secure unification. The United States of America can and does try to deter the PRC from

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attacking Taiwan, but it cannot actually stop Beijing from making such a choice.[1] As to Taiwan no elected government there will proclaim de jure independence knowing this will trigger a Chinese attack. The political imperative for Taiwan in a cross-Strait relationship is to avoid a showdown with Beijing, and thus protect its way of life and maintain scope for it to develop in a direction and pace of its citizens' choosing—without having to test the reliability of the American commitment to help Taiwan defend itself under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979).

By having the capacity to insist on taking an irredentist approach over Taiwan the PRC has made itself highly impactful on Taiwan's politics. But this does not mean Taiwan cannot and does not, in turn, exert a strong impact on the PRC. This book shows that the opposite is true, though the nature of impact Taiwan has on the Mainland is fundamentally different from that exerted by the Mainland on Taiwan. Taiwan matters to the PRC not because it poses an existential threat to the Chinese Mainland or can require Chinese leaders to forsake certain options for its future.

Taiwan's impact on the PRC is based primarily on its considerable soft power. It is tempting to start by assuming this soft power is based on Taiwan's impressive democratic politics, which can offer great lessons from which Mainland China can or, perhaps, should learn. In reality, this is not a main source of Taiwanese influence on China. The Chinese government under the CCP fundamentally rejects democracy as suitable for the PRC, and maintains a monopoly of both historical and political narratives within its borders. As Anne-Marie Brady (Chap. 2) has argued persuasively, the party-state in the PRC keeps a tight control on how Taiwan should be presented to and perceived by the general public on the Chinese Mainland. This imposes a clear limit to Taiwan being a model for politics and development for Mainland China. Indeed, the effectiveness of this approach is indirectly but independently confirmed by Gang Lin in Chap. 3. Lin highlights that Mainland Chinese scholars carefully choose what lessons they think they should learn from Taiwan—the political limits of what is possible is implicitly but clearly a powerful factor.

The reality is that the consultative Leninist system in the PRC fundamentally rejects Taiwan's democratic model, and mainstream Chinese

[1] Tsang, "U.S. to Taiwan's Security," 777–97.

scholars or opinion leaders know they are not supposed to choose this as a lesson to learn from Taiwan. Indeed, this volume demonstrates that the soft power Taiwan enjoys on the Chinese Mainland is not the result of a specific government policy or of the successful hard work of a government agency in Taipei. For its part, Taiwan's propaganda machinery does not focus on projecting soft power but on competing "against a Goliath, the PRC, for support within the global community' and 'as part of a grand strategy for national survival and preservation."[2] The only really important contribution Taiwan's government has made in promoting Taiwanese soft power on the Mainland lies in facilitating cross-Strait exchanges and interactions.

Taiwan makes the greatest impact on the Chinese people today by being itself and by making its way of life, its modern literature, and its popular culture accessible to Chinese people who come to embrace them. This process started well before Chinese tourists or students arrived in Taiwan in large numbers. It is gathering momentum as contact between people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait increases, particularly as wave after wave of Chinese tourists can see or experience for themselves the alternative way of life they find on the island of Taiwan.

Even when movement of people across the Strait was tightly controlled, Taiwan already started to make its impact felt on mainland Chinese. As Pei-yin Lin (Chap. 8) and Michele Yeh (Chap. 7) have explained, songs, novels, and poems by some of Taiwan's best artists or writers managed to captivate Chinese listeners and readers in the heydays of the Deng Xiaoping reforms in the 1980s—even before Taiwanese started to travel to the Mainland in any number. They worked most effectively by filling a void and meeting a yearning of the Chinese created by the totalitarian repression of the Maoist era. The songs and performances of Deng Lijun, the novels of Qiong Yao, and the poems of Xi Murong came to be embraced by Mainland Chinese as they offered something attractive and suitable to fill this void.

This did not happen by design. Qiong and Xi did not write for Mainland readers. They wrote as writers do when not constrained by a totalitarian straitjacket. They appealed to Mainland Chinese as their

[2] Chao, "Taiwan's Diplomacy and Propaganda," 1024.

beautiful writings effortlessly melded together modernity and traditional Chinese culture, and projected imageries attractive to Chinese readers. Deng Lijun had to make compromises in order to accommodate the Mainland market, but she merely avoided politics as she did so. None of the artists in the case studies in this volume acted hand in glove with the authorities in Taiwan to project soft power or influence on the Mainland. Indeed, there is no real evidence that other, less successful but still notable artists were part of a government effort either. What the three case studies in these two chapters reveal is the classic emergence of soft power, where the very attractiveness of a way of life gets embraced by someone else.

But it is also important to put the scope of Taiwanese soft power in perspective. André Laliberté's case study (Chap. 9) shows how flourishing religions and their sponsored charitable activities in Taiwan are being received on the Mainland. The case of Buddhism and Buddhist-sponsored NGOs is particularly illuminating, as most Chinese see Buddhism as part of their civilization and generally overlook the non-indigenous origins of Buddhism. It is reasonable to assume that the revival of Buddhism in Taiwan would find a ready and receptive response on the Mainland, as has already been the case with Taiwanese popular culture. Laliberté has shown that the opposite is closer to the reality. Despite the collapse of Communism as a state ideology on the Mainland around 1989 and a popular desire to find an indigenous spiritual anchor, even Buddhism or their Taiwanese NGOs are not allowed to exert a strong influence on religious life on the Mainland. This is because of the political sensitivity of religion and the CCP's wariness over the activities of the NGOs sponsored by Taiwanese Buddhists. The CCP's adoption of a hard-line approach against the potential threat that is inherent in religion stands in contrast to its preparedness to allow nonpoliticized cultural products to be imported from Taiwan. It confirms that Taiwan can have greater impact on the Mainland where the impact is deemed by the CCP as not politically sensitive.

If artists like Deng, Qiong, and Xi have made considerable contributions in enriching the spiritual life and changing the popular culture on the Mainland, the Taiwanese people as a whole is making a potentially even greater impact on everyday life on the Mainland. Maoist totalitarianism brought about revolutionary changes to China, including the launch of a

"massive mobilization campaign … to destroy once and for all the residue of the Confucian tradition," which "marked the end of Confucianism as a state ideology," and "gravely undermined Confucianism as a moral philosophy for the Chinese."[3] This destruction of the genteel heritage of China's civilization on the Mainland in the Maoist era on the one hand, and the rapid rise of the *nouveau riche* in the last three decades on the other, have led to soul-searching among the more thoughtful Chinese. They have created the conditions for Taiwan to emerge as a source of inspiration and a model for modern civility for them, who are becoming uncomfortable with the poor state of public morality and civic responsibility in their own homeland.

As Yan (Chap. 10) has insightfully argued, the approach that the Taiwanese have adopted in making civility part of their everyday life while retaining the humanist approach in the Chinese tradition make Taiwan stands out as an inspiration and a model for Mainland Chinese. The people of China have been searching for an appropriate modern approach to good civic behavior and citizenship since the dying decade of the last imperial dynasty, but have not found it on the Mainland.[4] They have, however, found it on Taiwan, where it was spared the anti-Confucian madness of Mao Zedong and benefited from a better preservation of the Chinese heritage—notwithstanding the rise of a distinct Taiwanese identity. This is a relatively recent development, as it was only the rapid end of poverty for most PRC citizens in the last decade that has enabled them to have the luxury to reflect on and regret the lack of civility in everyday life.

This also coincided with the lifting of travel bans on Mainland Chinese to visit Taiwan and the rise of mass tourism. As verified by the independent research by Chih-jou Chen (Chap. 4), what Mainland visitors to Taiwan have found most impressive and appealing is the civil and hospitable way in which Taiwanese deal with each other and treated them as tourists on a daily basis. Taiwanese civility has caught the imagination of Chinese visitors as it is something they yearn for and can relate to readily, unlike civility in Western societies, to which the Chinese admire but find it hard to relate. This is not the product of any Taiwanese government

[3] Tsang, "Confucian Tradition and Democratization," 32–3.

[4] Harris, "Origins of modern citizenship,"181–203.

policy but the result of greater interactions between the people across the Taiwan Strait and changes that happened in the two societies after the end of the Cold War. It helps that Mainland tourists can see Taiwanese civility in action.

Acknowledging that Taiwan's impact on China as a whole is at its greatest on the cultural side is not to imply that Taiwan has had little economic impact on China. The vast investments Taiwanese have made on the Mainland, the factories they have built and managed, and the trade they have promoted have all been significant. Indeed, Taiwanese contributions in the economic sphere to China's development are highly significant, particularly in helping the Mainland economy to take off. They have been illustrated clearly in this volume, by the more general survey by Shelley Rigger and Gunter Schubert (Chap. 5) and by the specific study into the electronics industry by Chun-yi Lee (Chap. 6). Taiwanese investments and Taiwanese managerial expertise have helped Mainland China to modernize important parts of its economy and played a hugely constructive role in making the post-Mao economic reforms a success.

But the pace of Mainland China's economic transformation, and its rapid build-up of economic might, which enabled the Mainland economy to become the second largest in the world, requires a careful contextualization of Taiwan's economic impact on China. To put things in perspective, the Mainland's GDP in purchasing parity terms was only four times the size of that of Taiwan despite the enormous population disparity in 1980, but this widened to more than 12 times by 2010.[5] Taiwan's economic impact on the Mainland thus lies primarily in helping the Mainland economy to take off, particularly by facilitating technology transfer and in easing Mainland China's manufacturing sector into the global value chain. But the Taiwanese contribution is falling steadily in relative terms and at greater pace as the Chinese economy has soared ahead and expanded exponentially in the last decade.

All in all, Taiwan makes its greatest impact on China by presenting an alternative model of modernity that merges comfortably with traditional Chinese culture. It is from the attractiveness of the way of life in Taiwan that its soft power on the Mainland emanates. As long as the political

[5] Guo and Teng, "Taiwan and the Rise of China," 5.

system on the Chinese Mainland remain a consultative Leninist one or an essentially Leninist one, Taiwan's democratic experience can only have a very limited impact on China, as it will be dismissed by the CCP and mainstream academia as irrelevant at best. The small number of intellectuals who are interested in democracy will still find Taiwan's democratization inspirational, but they will not be allowed by the CCP to challenge the mainstream view as long as the CCP retains a monopoly of power in China.

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Index[1]

[1] Note: Locators followed by 'n' refer to notes.

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