Chapter 4
Cosmopolitanism and Europe: An Original Encounter in the Thirties (1929–1939)

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« Le Dix-neuvième Siècle a été un siècle de doctrines. Le Dix-neuvième Siècle, siècle romantique, siècle qui commence en 1760, siècle de producteurs de grandes idéologies sentimentales: idéologie démocratique, idéologie légitimiste, idéologie capitaliste, idéologie neo-catholique, idéologie socialiste, idéologie nietzschéenne. Ces idéologies se sont étendues jusqu'à nous, pour mourir parmi nous. Le Vingtième Siècle les a tuées. Le Vingtième Siècle est un siècle de conscience planétaire. Il exige de politique de faire face à des difficultés venant des quatre coins de l'horizon. De là ce repliement de nations sur elles-mêmes, qui est peur et nécessité de concentrer ses forces devant tant de périls et de problèmes et qui est aussi veillée d'armes avant de se jeter à corps perdu dans des luttes globales. Dans de telles conditions, les idéologies conçues en Europe au siècle dernier deviennent insuffisantes, trop étroites. Il devient nécessaire de les mêler, de les marier, de leur faire engendrer des enfants plus complexes et plus souples. De fait, nous les voyons, ces idéologies, courir les unes après les autres, se frôler, se toucher, s'embrouiller dans une orgie qui prend des proportions cosmiques ». Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, *La fin des doctrines*. (1936)

The 1930s are commonly considered an age of nationalisms, fascisms, and totalitarianisms. During such a decay, it is apparently difficult to identify direct commitment in cosmopolitan ideas or in any kind of "Europeanism."[1] In spite of the climate

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[1] "Europeism" here means the second sense that is normally linked to the expression "idea of Europe." In fact inside the academic world, there are mainly two meanings linked to his expression: the former defines a consciousness, a "being" (also an existing tendency), a differentiation between what Europe is and what it is not, and a perception to be something of peculiar called Europe, whereas the latter indicates a project, a vision, a "should be," and something to realize or to desire that is not yet present that will be common to all Europe. Of course in historical praxis, there are a lot of connections between these two ways to think about Europe, but we can say that, even though they are not separated, they can be conceptualized as distinct (so it is possible to distinguish but not to disconnect about that). See Visone (2016). On the idea of Europe as a project, see Voyenne (1964), Duroselle (1965), Pistone (1975, 1993, pp. 700–709), Stirk (1989), Den Boer et al. (1995), Du Reau (2001), Pagden (2002), Telò (2004), Chabot (2005),

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of the period 1919–1929, which was signed by the League of Nations and characters such as Briand and Coudenhove-Kalergi, the following could easily be described as a time in which not only cosmopolitanism but also "Europeanism" were out of the continental Europe *Zeitgeist*.[2] As I tried to show in other works, this impression is correct for "Europeanism" only if along with such concept, we only consider its "liberal" version as it was thought during the 1920s (1919–1929).[3] In fact, the specific context of the 1930s produced a group of new ideas of Europe – thought as a political whole – characterized by their metapolitical breath: in such a decay, it was clear that reordered Europe wasn't just choosing what the best institutional organization for Europe was inside a defined "ideology," but it was about choosing (and affirming in direct concurrence with others) a new model of civilization beyond the nineteenth century's one.[4] But is such a consideration still true as far as cosmopolitanism is concerned? Was it completely out of touch with the 1929 and 1939 reality in continental Europe? In order to give a partial answer to this wide question, it is interesting to define what "cosmopolitanism"[5] means here. By observing the debate of that period, cosmopolitanism can be considered as not only "the doctrine defending the insignificance of sociopolitical distinction among states and nations, giving to each individual the world's citizenship" but, more specifically, the idea that "each men is a citizen of a universal organism" that can be concretely defined "as a republic or as a universal monarchy" in which it is possible to keep a national distinction but only inside the universal community.[6] In fact, such an idea was shared by a group of intellectuals that were aware that in the 1930s the world entered a new era in which Europe was no longer the center of the world nor history's[7] locomotive. If an epoch of world interdependence was starting, it was necessary to rethink the world as a community starting from Europe that, during the 1930s, seemed to be on the brink of collapsing. Europe was seen as a strategic point to originate this transformation also because of the increasing challenge of fascism that in the same

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Anderson (2009), and Colombo (2009). About Europe as a consciousness and a "being," see Morin (1988), Gadamer (1989), Geremeck (1991), Cacciari (1994), Fontana (1994), De Benoist (1996), Cardini (1997), Tielker (1998, 2003), Mikkeli (1999), Balibar (2001), Consarelli (2003), Todorov (2003), Bauman (2004), De Giovanni (2004), Pera and Ratzinger (2004), Scuccimarra (2004, pp. 61–75), Pellicani (2007), Rossi (2007), Garcia Picazo (2008), Habermas (2008), and Consarelli (2012). See also the idea of *conscience europeiste* in Brunetau (2014, p. 57).

[2] See George-Henri Soutou (2014, p. 9). Different from this context is the American and the English one characterized by the work of authors such as Clarence Streit, Barbara Wootton, Lord Lothian, and Lionel Robbins. On this debate see Bosco (2009) and Castelli (2002).

[3] See Visone (2012a, b), pp. 137–151.

[4] See Visone (2012a, 2015).

[5] About the history of the concept, see Scuccimarra (2006).

[6] See Mori (1992, p. 495). In fact the etymology of the Greek word cosmopolitanism implies a tension between universe (kosmos) and city (polis). Any kind of cosmopolitan thought has lived this tension trying to subordinate local aspirations to global values and perspectives. See Bresciani (2014, p. 170).

[7] See, as example, the reflections of Paul Valery (1931) and the considerations of Moritz Bonn that invented the word "decolonization" in 1932 to describe such a context. See Reinhardt (2002, p. 288).

period tried to impose a new European order, in direct contrast with the idea of a democratic Europe open to a cosmopolitan world system.[8] In order to better clarify this debate, it is now interesting to examine the encounter between cosmopolitanism and "Europeism" and to analyze a few particular positions that came up such context marked by the 1929 crisis:

1. It is now important to start by saying that from 1929 to 1939, intellectuals were commonly engaged in a radical ideological struggle. In fact, as many coeval observers and historian noticed, the 1930s were characterized by an authentic "clash of ideologies," by a radical conflict on the different collective directions to follow. The ideological battle was fought – as Enzo Traverso notes – by intellectuals who were completely engaged in it.[9] In such a context, the study of European "projects" and "visions" elaborated by intellectuals takes on a particular interest not only to grasp the idea of Europe but also to better understand the 1929–1939 decay. In fact, in that epoch the "lines of loyalty… ran not between but across countries" and imagining new orders and new political identities beyond the nation-state was more common than we can actually suppose nowadays.[10] In such a scenario, it is important to stress how a cosmopolitan feeling was, asymmetrically, shared inside different ideological families that, for their contemporary struggle against fascisms, were directly hit by several persecutions.[11] Many socialists, anarchists, republicans and liberals were forced to exile and thus to live out of their countries.[12] This condition was fundamental to produce, in some cases, a true identification between the idea of a new European order and the prospect of a cosmopolitan system that would guarantee peaceful relations among the different civilizations. But, for an important part of these intellectuals, such a result was in any case impossible to pursue adopting the old instruments of the League of the Nations and using the problematic logic of "international pacifism."[13] In fact it was clear that – especially with the challenge of fascism – it was not possible to evoke any kind of stable peaceful solution among sovereign nations, founded on shared values (as it was on the nineteenth century). Thus the new order would have been the result of a creation that would

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[8] About this debate see Visone (2014, pp. 113–142).

[9] See Traverso (2007, pp. 191–219).

[10] See Hobsbawm (2003, p. 102).

[11] For example, José Ortega y Gasset considered Europe the only possible civilization potentially capable to take "mando" (rule) over the globe in such a scenario. He recognized the dignity of others civilization without considering them able to give to his contemporary world a common direction. According to him only a new united Europe would have been able to do it. All this view put him out of the kind of cosmopolitanism that we are talking about here. See Ortega y Gasset (2007).

[12] See on this the considerations developed by Jundt (2009, pp. 13–16).

[13] Different, of course, is – just to give an example – the position of the cosmopolitan and federalist Scelle (1932/1934).

have been victorious only if it had been able to answer better than fascism to the issues opened by the fall of the liberal XIX Europe.[14]

2. As we have seen, it is possible to consider among these intellectuals who, in such harsh times, fought this struggle for a new cosmopolitan order in Europe and in the world. In this "group" some names are more interesting than others for the quality of their commitment. Among them it is impossible to exclude two figures frequently underestimated as Anna Siemsen and Andrea Caffi. These two intellectuals where strongly engaged in criticizing the nationalist order of their times and in finding alternatives to the fascist way toward a new European order (with all its implication for the entire globe). Who were they? Being a pupil of Joseph Bloch, Anna Siemsen was a socialist pedagogue and an intellectual who escaped to Switzerland after the collapse of German socialism. According to Francesca Lacaita, she is one of the most interesting characters of the German emigration during the 1930s because of her deep engagement and culture.[15] Remarkable writer she could be considered for her sensibility to international and pedagogic problems that gave her the ability to fully understand the global measure and radicalism of the fascist challenge.[16] Andrea Caffi was a socialist and libertarian intellectual that had an adventurous and unique life. He was born in Saint Petersburg and there he started to frequent a socialist and Menshevik environment. Then he had the opportunity to study with Georg Simmel in Germany and to sink into the Parisian intellectual context of World War I period. Then, after some experiences as a reporter and a diplomat, he became strongly engaged in the antifascist struggle. For that reason he was forced to exile in France where he continued the collaboration that had started during the 1920s, with Carlo Rosselli and with the group of "Giustizia e Libertà"[17] until 1935. He is considered one of the most original intellectuals of the 1930s and one of the most significant cosmopolitan characters of his times.[18] Starting from their thoughts, it may be possible to show a hidden aspect of the 1929–1939 debate and to examine if cosmopolitanism was completely out of touch inside that intellectual context.

3. Anna Siemsen's pondering over European order is well condensed in her work "*Dictaturen – Oder Europäische Demokratie*?" (1937) where she highlights the coincidence between social democracy and political democracy as aims of the socialist movements. This book was written during her exile in Switzerland. In fact the advent of Nazism in Germany (1933) represented a terrible threat for any

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[14] As Thomas Mann wrote in 1934, it was impossible to find an agreement with Hitler. Thus it was necessary a new organization of the "universalist forces" that had to be able to impose itself over the world. See Mann (1958, pp. 340–341).

[15] See Lacaita (2010, pp. 13–21). About the German exiles' debate concerning Europe, see Schilmar (2004).

[16] About Anna Siemsen's life, see Siemsen (1951) and Rogler (1995, pp. 7–53).

[17] See Saporetti (2004).

[18] About Caffi's life see Bianco (1977) and Bresciani (2009) and all the documents inside the Andrea Caffi page of "Biblioteca Gino Bianco" http://www.bibliotecaginobianco. it/?r=28&s=132&p=25&t=andrea-caffi.

political opponent. She actually lost her job as a pedagogy professor at Jena's University, and considering the new German political context, she decided to move to Switzerland. She had already engaged into the socialist debate as a critic of SPD and, since her rupture with the Socialist Workers Party (*Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei*), as a militant in the Swiss Socialist Party and feminist writer. Among the end of the 1920s and 1937, she reached the conviction that the battle for socialism and euro-federalism was the same. She wrote that capitalism and sovereign nation-state were strictly intertwined and that they have to be fought together.[19] In fact, in her view, it was impossible to effectively defend and pursue socialist goals with the coeval division of Europe among sovereign national states. She wrote:

If one lives in complete loneliness in the middle of savage nature it is then possible to let him and his family live in anyway they want,. They can set fire to their settlement, they can kill each other: at the very end it is their own business. It is possible to keep their sovereignty. But if one lives in close contact with others there is no other solution than to limit the sovereignty of a fire starter and of a murderer even inside their own house because, if they are allowed to keep it, it would be a danger for all their neighbors. Europe's people live in close contact among each other …What we call today in Europe State's Sovereignty… is nothing but a cosmetic camouflage of the current absence of international law in reason of which pacific states are exposed to aggression and the ones organized on liberal principles are exposed to barbarism and all the small and weak are exposed to the oppression of some dictatorial, aggressive and unscrupulous states. (Siemsen 1937, pp. 19–20, p. 18)

In her view that system founded on national sovereignty was also the cause of the success of dictatorships and of the incumbent war among Europeans, well represented by the Spanish Civil War. At the same time, that "sovereign disorder" restrained Europeans from creating a new world order based on peace and equality as opposed to the concrete possibility of a war among the European states and the colonies that started to claim their independence (India, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, etc.). She fully understood that "decolonization" had started and tried to speak to Europe about the new inedited situation:

Today the great English colonies of Australia, Canada and South-Africa are no longer dependent regions but autonomous members of a confederation of states. Japan has actually become a superpower that looks dangerous for Europeans. China, India, Egypt and Asiatic people fight fiercely for independence. And the Abyssinian war has an effect that goes in the same direction of the world war: also the least and more trivial African people is becoming convinced that European domination is not an unavoidable destiny that must be docilely accepted and that such a destiny has to be dominated and defeated. However, by following such a path, Europe is pushed back onto itself. (Siemsen 1937, pp. 25–26)

This European movement – with its political and economical consequences – would lead to a new world conflict. Against that threat – she was sure about the fact that another world conflict would destroy Europe more than other parts of the World – Anna Siemsen called for a European democratic federation founded by the European continental and democratic states (Spain, France, Belgium with

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[19] See Siemsen (1932, pp. 50–55).

USSR as external warrant) that would defeat fascist dictatorship to create the basis for a larger union:

Europe has to become an economic union if they don't want to suffocate inside their thirty-six tight boundaries. Europe has to establish an imperative common juridical order if they want to avoid suicidal civil wars of their States. Europe could preserve the multiplicity and the richness of their national cultures only if they protect themselves from external subjugation and from internal oppression through a free federal constitution. (Siemsen 1937, p. 18)

This federal "Europa-Union" would create a new kind of socialist and pacifist society, founded on "internal colonization" or on the redistribution of richness and work in the poorest areas of Europe. Of course these wouldn't be an aristocratic/meritocratic society – as hoped by some coeval liberals[20] – but an egalitarian one in social and political terms. Furthermore, that kind of federation of equals could be the pillar of a new multilateral world order, founded on cooperation and equality among the different parts of the globe. She affirmed:

We are probably at the beginning of a decisive era. In Europe the socialist movement is trying to radically transform the relations among men. Out of Europe the sense of their human rights is awakening in each people and they start to defend their independence against European masters and exploiters…The Union of the same Europe, the collaboration without constrictions with other freed continents are still possible today. And if such a thing could not assure overabundance of richness and power for a dominant class as it was in the past, it could differently (and it is better) procure to every workers freedom, security and a satisfied existence. (Siemsen 1937, pp. 25–27)

Siemsen's idea is to promote a new kind of cosmopolitanism in which the New Europe would not be the "ruler" but the crossroad of a cultural and economical exchange based on the equality of its participants. In order to accomplish such a condition, it would have been necessary to defeat any dictatorship in Europe and to create a new federal, democratic, and socialist order for the old continent. This would have hindered Europeans' last attempt to think themselves as the masters of the world due to the beginning of an unprecedented era of politically pacific collaboration. In this sense the European Union, as a new pan-European democracy, would have become a possible new source of peaceful relations among the world's peoples. In fact:

The more the European states arm themselves and weave one against the other, the stronger the awareness and the will of resistance awakes, and the wider the sense of revolution of Asian and African people spreads. In spite of some temporary success, in spite of our technical superiority, we won't be able to keep them subjugated and deprived of their rights for a long time. A democratic Federation of European States would still have a lot to give them; it could create peace on the basis of juridical equality, in economic cooperation and in cultural exchange. But such a Europe hasn't been born yet. It could be that the tribulations that we are experiencing are just the labor pain of such a new Europe. Whether they lead Europe to a happy birth or to its end, it depends on the will of all of us. (Siemsen 1937, p. 5)

4. Andrea Caffi was always very interested in such view that, by crossing anarchism and socialism, it tried to think against the idea of a modern e centralized

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[20] Such as José Ortega y Gasset (2007).

nation-state. Influenced by the thought of Proudhon and Herzen – and by the personal experience as Italian immigrant in Russia – Caffi developed strong criticism toward national sovereignty as the pillar of international order.[21] After joining "Giustizia e Libertà" (1929), he tried to develop this criticism in close relation to the huge civilization crisis in which Europe was involved after the end of World War I (a crisis that became unavoidable for any intellectual after the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange in October 1929).[22] He thought that the only way to react against nationalism and the risk of a new war inside the old continent was represented by the creation of a European Confederation that would aim to start a path toward the end of national sovereignties. In fact, in a 1932 essay Caffi affirmed:

The Union of the European States in a legally defined superior political body, provided with organs and tools to effectively govern, suddenly makes the nightmare of a bad war disappear and the same questions that today are source of hurricanes would immediately (or since the first phase – very far from the transformation in true United State – and when the notorious sovereignty of the Confederation single members will be barely undermine) be abolished. (Onofrio 1970, p. 61)

Impressed by the debate that followed the Briand declaration and by the idea of an "Antieuropa" that was thought to be the fascist answer to liberal, cosmopolitan, and democratic "Paneuropa,"[23] he insisted on the necessity of a European political unification that had to be realized to grant, through federalism, individual and collective freedom in the face of the threat represented by a possible hierarchical Europe created by the fascist regime. According to him the time had come for European democracies to realize such a union:

If democracies don't know how to implement it – the political Union – in time (and this failure would seal their condemnation to a total eclipse) it is not absurd that triumphant dictatorial regimes will try it; but the Confederation wanted by the democrats would be organized through peaceful ways and would respect each nations' equal rights, whereas the fascist Mitteleuropa will not be strengthened if not by iron and fire, and inside of it, close to other oppressive hierarchies, there shall be a division among one or two dominant peoples and several other slave one. (Onofrio 1970, p. 62)

The proposal of a kind of European federalism – that he considers the final result of a political joint effort aimed to European unity – was, thus, fostered by a concern to liberty and autonomy that, linked to his intellectual formation, was also stimulated by the works of Georges Gurvitch and Wladimir Woytinsky.[24] The former developed – with *L'idée du droit sociale* (1932) – an idea of juridical pluralism founded on the social right (*droit sociale*) that emanates directly to

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[21] See Bresciani (2014, p. 175).

[22] During the 1920s Andrea Caffi was engaged in studying and criticizing the ideas of Oswald Spengler and Hugo von Hofmannstahal about the crisis of European civilization and culture. See Visone (2012a, p. 154). Also during the 1930s, he continued to study the right-wing culture and the fascist ideology as it appears clear in Caffi (1932, pp. 55–72).

[23] See Visone (2014).

[24] See Bresciani (2014, p. 176).

each community without any relationship to the sovereignty of the state. The latter was convinced that the crisis of 1929 and the fascist rise needed a unitary European answer that could be achieved only through a federal model, as he wrote in *Tatsachen un Zahlen Europas* (1930).[25] According to Caffi, without such an answer not only Europe would have risked a fascist reunification – with all its consequences – but there would have been a new terrible war because of its sovereign state system that creates deadly divisions among men. In 1935 he firmly and provocatively tackled the problem:

> Until there are States, sacred egoism is the supreme law…and – thanks to God – today it is no longer possible to be mislead about using this selfishness for general interest; these are chimeras to be abandoned to the non innocent games of liberal historiography. What is forcing Europe to war is not fascism itself but the very order of Europe divided into sovereign states. Territorial divisions, corridors, national minorities and the economic ruin created by custom barriers were not invented or created by fascism. Can these questions be solved step by step without starting war? And what has been done about that in seventeen years time? It is no longer about sovereign states' European policy but more about overcoming them altogether. (Caffi 1935)

Thus, European federalism, according to him, will be structured onto the ceasing of the sovereignty of nation-states. This would have created the premises for a redemption that, carried out at a European level, could include also other civilizations creating something new but inspired by "universal" western culture line. Caffi was aware of the fact that his cosmopolitanism was coping here – with its identification of western "humanism" with "universalism" – its true limit. As he wrote to Carlo Rosselli in 1929:

> Maybe the word "to save Europe" is still too defensive (keeping it simply for the rivals at the apogee – Maybe we have to synthesise: Europe – America – East – China (?) naturally (here is my limit *ultra quem non possum*) I don't want and I don't think to a civilization in which our traditional line isn't dominant: Plato – St. Sofia – Leonardo – Galileo – Voltaire – humanitarian socialism. (Caffi 1929)

Thus the problem for Caffi was not simply unifying Europe but changing the world in a socialist sense, a way that for him required the end of nation-state sovereignty and the beginning of a new European federal system oriented to answering to the new needs of human coexistence in the world. His aim was realizing, against fascism and beyond the modern sovereignty, "a society in which only spontaneous bonds exist, where right is created, rediscovered, carried out newly in any instant, where man and citizen are no longer distinct categories."[26] But this post-national spontaneity, thought through European tradition of thought, was in potential contradiction with the spontaneous independence of other extra-European civilizations to choose other potential traditions to think about their new society. In this sense it is well comprehensible why he focused on Europe as the continent in which to realize his cosmopolitan experiment and

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[25] In 1930 he published also, for Paneuropa Verlag, a French translation of his former work *Die Vereingten Staaten von Europa* (1926).

[26] Andrea (1970, p. 206).

why he was doubtful toward a potential political subject able to go beyond Europe itself. In this sense, according to Marco Bresciani, his cosmopolitanism lived in the irreducible tension and in the potential conflict between his universalist attitude and his awareness of the persistence of any particular identity and culture.[27]

5. As we have seen, these intellectuals were both "socialists" and "cosmopolitans." According to them, the new historical reality forced men to think and to organize themselves out of the nation-state boundaries and logics. In this sense, following their discourse, if one wanted to realize "socialism" in such a scenario, it was necessary to think to a new organization of Europe, able to put an end to the old logic of hierarchical control and competition founded on the nation-state sovereignty. This logic in fact created all the premises of war and, with and together to war, the whole of condition that legitimized and produced the exploitation of man by man.[28] In this sense the rupture with the nation-state system was the way to discover new solidarities and to create a new kind of transnational equality among individuals and communities that would be founded on a new federal European system. In this sense their "cosmopolitanism" – which was political and founded of federalism as tool of a new coexistence out of the old state-system[29] – marries their "socialism" as an answer to the new scenario of their epoch. A time in which not only the economical order was a world one but in which for the first time the world was felt as composed by others civilization able to fight (and to win) with Europe in a historical scenario that lost its only protagonist: the old continent. Thus rethinking Europe as a federation was for them a way to rethink the human coexistence on the world and to try to give a new direction to the same history. In this sense – also if their ideas were, of course, in the minority also inside the socialist world – we can say that they react to their *Zeitgeist* being also deep observers and critics of it. If they were out of touch with the mainstream national/international solution adopted by socialist parties during the 1930s, they were also sharp interpreters of the new problems of such a decay. Cosmopolitanisms, apparently useless in a time signed by fascisms, become a political resource to such a thinker to adapt socialism to a new intertwined and polycentric world and to challenge fascism on the field of the creation of a new civilization able to substitute the nineteenth century one. The same criticism to the idea of national sovereignty was thought to be a radical rupture with an "old world" that they considered responsible for the dramatic

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[27] Bresciani (2014, p. 187).

[28] Also if Caffi and Siemsen's ideas were not accessible to Spinelli and Rossi, it is very interesting to find some similar analysis (about the "reactionary" role of nation-state and about the socialist necessity to substitute it with a federal state) inside the "Manifesto of Ventotene" written in 1941/1942.

[29] Of course there are differences between the two thoughts analyzed here. For example, the "federalism" of Caffi is closer to the Proudhonian one – with a strong influence of Gurvitch – while the model of Anna Siemsen is constituted by Swiss system. In any case they were both interested, as final aim, in transform the European society in the interest of the "person" more than in simply putting some states together.

developments of their time. There is also another element of originality in this relation among cosmopolitanism and a new idea of Europe created under the sign of socialism. In the eighteenth century, the idea of a culturally (and sometimes politically) united Europe was often thought as a fundamental aspect of *philosopher*'s cosmopolitanism. In such a context, Europe was considered the land of the "progress" and of the "knowledge," the true center of the world, and the first civilization inside of it.[30] In the 1930s, some authors – such as the two that we consider here – started to wonder not only whether Europe could keep on being the center of the world (and as we saw Anna Siemsen clearly answers no) but if it is right to Europe to continue to impose not only its power but its culture over the rest of the world.[31] And this – in the context that produced the concept of "decolonization" – is an element that, in spite of being embryonic, suggests to continue to deepen the debate of such a controversial decay.

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[30] This superiority was affirmed in spite of all the criticism that authors such as Montesquieu and Voltaire claimed against their society and in spite of their positive consideration of other civilizations (such as China). See the classic study Chabod (2003, pp. 106–121). This conviction was just partially modified by the affirmation of the USA after the independence's war (1783). See Chabod (2010, pp. 122–127).

[31] Also in Caffi the impossibility to renounce to "European tradition" in a hypothetical new world order becomes a conscious "limit."

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