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A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Celebrating the Legacy of Daniel Bar-Tal, Vol II.

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ISSN 2197-5779 ISSN 2197-5787 (electronic)
Peace Psychology Book Series
ISBN 978-3-319-24839-4 ISBN 978-3-319-24841-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015960759

Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Preface to the Second Volume

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been waging for decades, resulting in mass losses, destruction, and suffering with profound effects on the members of the involved societies. Furthermore, its effects reach beyond the involved societies and influence regional and global stability. Many attempts have been made to bring this conflict to peaceful resolution, but so far without success. Due to its intensity and extensive effects, this conflict has drawn the attention of scholars from numerous disciplines, who attempted to explain the causes of the conflict and the reasons for the difficulties in resolving it. Among these one can find historians, geographers, political scientists, sociologists, and others. Social and political psychologists have also addressed this conflict, and one of the most influential among them has been Daniel Bar-Tal.

This is the second of two volumes intended to pay tribute to Bar-Tal's scholarly contribution upon his retirement from his position at Tel Aviv University. While the first volume was devoted to Bar-Tal's general theory of the sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflict and the theory's relation to other prominent theoretical frameworks, this volume is devoted to applying Bar-Tal's theory to the specific case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his most recent book, published in 2013, Bar-Tal acknowledges the immense effects that living in Israel, being exposed to this conflict, and taking part in it have had on his thinking, theorizing, and empirical research regarding intractable conflicts. We too, as his former students, have been inspired by living in Israel and by Bar-Tal's work to continue to investigate the sociopsychological dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and through them to advance the understandings of intractable conflicts in general.

We were by no means the only fortunate ones to benefit from Bar-Tal's guidance. Over the years Bar-Tal has educated dozens of scholars, most of whom conducted their research in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and contributed to its understanding. Specifically, over the past 15 years, a group of Bar-Tal's graduate students and other colleagues met every other Monday to present their work, exchange ideas, develop collaborative projects, and learn about the work of other scholars. Under the guidance of Bar-Tal and his colleague Amiram Raviv, this group became a cohesive collective and a sort of "intellectual family." To those of us who

took part in that group, Bar-Tal is not just a world-renowned scholar, but also simply Danny, our friend, colleague, and mentor. Through the years of leading this group, one of Danny's dreams has been to publish an edited volume, to which different group members would contribute chapters. He was never able to realize that dream himself, but in a way, we fulfill that dream for him in this volume, since 12 out of the 18 chapters in the volume are written by members of the group who are Danny's former students.

In studying an intractable conflict as complex as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is very difficult and perhaps nearly impossible to adopt an entirely impartial position. This is true especially if the researchers are also members of one of the societies involved in the conflict. Hence, none of the contributors to this volume can claim complete objectivity. One of our regrets regarding this volume is that we were not able to include a larger number of Palestinian contributors. This is, in part, an unfortunate reflection of the present intractable state of the conflict, in which it is very difficult for Israelis and Palestinians to collaborate with each other. As a result, most of the contributors are Jewish Israelis, and the volume is inevitably biased toward their perspective, though as the different chapters illustrate, this perspective is far from uniform and in fact encompasses a multitude of perspectives. While Palestinian perspectives are admittedly underrepresented in this volume, they are not entirely absent, and we are happy and proud to include chapters by Eman Nahhas and by Anan Srour (with Adi Mana and Shifra Sagy). We can only wish for a future of better relations between Israelis in Palestinians, which, among many positive effects, may also allow more extensive collaborations between scholars and enrich all the parties' knowledge.

This volume begins with an introductory chapter by Keren Sharvit, which presents an overview of Bar-Tal's theory of the sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflict and discusses how the theory can be and has been applied toward understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The rest of the chapters in the volume then expand on the different components of the theory and their manifestations in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Part I of the volume is concerned with the effects of the conflict on young children and the manner in which children are socialized. Yona Teichman (Chap. 2) presents a developmental perspective on children's acquisition of stereotypes and prejudice. Meytal Nasie (Chap. 3) then discusses the manner in which children's direct experiences of violence and indirect experiences of education in preschools and elementary schools shape the formation of the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict. Part II deals with the role of collective memories and narratives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rafi Nets-Zehngut (Chap. 4) discusses the Jewish Israeli collective memory of the conflict, the changes it has gone through over the years, and its relation to developments in the conflict and to the Palestinian collective memory. Eman Nahhas (Chap. 5) discusses the collective memory of the 1948 war among young Palestinians in Israel and the manner in which it has been preserved despite attempts by the state to silence it. Then, Srour, Mana, and Sagy (Chap. 6) present empirical findings regarding the reactions of Israeli Jewish and Arab adolescents when presented with the narratives of their own group and the "other" group. Part III deals with societal

beliefs and the ethos of conflict, which are central components of the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict according to Bar-Tal's theorizing. Eli Podeh (Chap. 7) presents a historical perspective on the Israeli and Egyptian perceptions of each other during the Nasserite period. Neta Oren (Chap. 8) and Ronni Shaked (Chap. 9) then discuss the Jewish Israeli and the Palestinian ethos of conflict, respectively. Part IV deals with the relationship between ideology, ethos, and affective experiences in the context of the conflict. Daphna Canetti (Chap. 10) discusses the relationships among exposure to violence, experiences of distress and threat, the ethos of conflict, and political preferences. Pliskin and Halperin (Chap. 11) discuss the role of emotion and emotion regulation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the manner in which they may relate to and interact with the ethos of conflict in the Israeli society.

Part V deals with the role of education and educational interventions. Ohad David (Chap. 12) presents an educational case study in which Israeli Jewish children learned about encountering "otherness" while applying the sociopsychological model of identity. Then, Soli Vered (Chap. 13) discusses the potential role of peace education in transforming intractable conflict and the reasons that such education has not been implemented in Israel. Finally, Part VI deals with the role of various actors and potential interventions in possibly advancing peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nimrod Rosler (Chap. 14) discusses the role of the two national leaders, Rabin and Arafat, in the peacemaking process during the 1990s. Tamir Magal (Chap. 15) discusses the role of civil society organizations in Israel in different phases of the conflict. Maoz and Ron (Chap. 16) discuss the potential of structured encounters between Israelis and Palestinians to promote peace. SimanTov-Nachlieli and Shnabel (Chap. 17) present the needs-based model of reconciliation and discuss how fulfilling Israelis' and Palestinians' needs might encourage them to respond pro-socially toward each other. Lastly, Ofer Shinar Levanon presents the concept of "transitional justice" and discusses the need to integrate it with knowledge regarding the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict.

Keren Sharvit
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Sociopsychological Foundations of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Applying Daniel Bar-Tal's Theorizing

Keren Sharvit

The theory of the sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts, developed by Daniel Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013), refers to the social and psychological processes through which societies involved in intractable conflicts adapt to the difficult conditions of the conflict and to the consequences of this adaptation for the dynamics and continuation of the conflict. The theory was developed, to a large extent, on the basis of research conducted by Bar-Tal, along with his colleagues and students, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, as will be discussed in detail in what follows, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is considered a prototypical case of an intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007a). It is an intense and violent conflict, which has involved extensive deaths, injuries, destruction of property, displacement, and constant experiences of threat and danger, all of which have caused considerable suffering to the members of the involved societies. Such difficult conditions are bound to have a psychological effect on society members, as well as consequences for macro-level societal processes. Bar-Tal's theorizing and research is concerned with these dynamics. The aim of the present chapter is to present an overview of the theory of the sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts and demonstrate how it applies to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The subsequent chapters in this volume then elaborate on the different elements of the theory as observed in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_1

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as an Intractable Conflict

Conflicts between societies and nations are not a unitary phenomenon. They may be classified along a continuum that varies between short-term low-intensity conflicts that involve minimal violence on one end and intense protracted conflicts that involve extensive violence on the other end. Bar-Tal's (2007b, 2013) theorizing is concerned with conflicts that are placed at the negative end of this continuum, of which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one example. The theory begins by delineating the defining characteristics of intractable conflicts, some of which were originally suggested by Kriesberg (1993). Specifically, intractable conflicts are violent and protracted, demand extensive investment, play a central role in the lives of the involved societies, and are perceived by them as total, irresolvable, and having zero-sum nature.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is indeed protracted, with roots dating back to the Jewish immigration and settlement in the territory of Palestine/Land of Israel in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Jews and Palestinians have repeatedly clashed over the control of this territory, which both parties consider to be their historic homeland (for detailed historical reviews, see Gelvin, 2005; Gerner, 1991; Morris, 1999; Tessler, 1994). Over the years, the conflict has expanded, involving other regional and international parties and additional issues including religion, culture, and economy. In some periods, it was inseparable from the broader Israeli-Arab conflict that involved Israel's other Arab neighbors (see Podeh, Chap. 7). Importantly, several generations have now been born and raised into the conflict and are not familiar with alternative realities.

The conflict had been violent since its beginning. Although the extent of violence fluctuates, it continually characterizes this conflict. Over the years, the conflict has involved several wars, numerous large-scale military operations, military occupation, violent uprisings, and terror attacks. Engaging in such extensive violence has forced the parties to mobilize all their available resources toward the conflict, as well as to recruit the support of external parties (see e.g., Hever, 2013; Lifshitz, 2000; Swirski, 2005; Tov, 1998).

The conflict is central to the being of the involved societies and leaves its mark not only on the collective lives of the Israeli and Palestinian societies but also on the daily lives of individual society members (Bar-Tal, 2007a). It receives extensive attention in the media and occupies a central place in the public discourse of both societies. Consequently, it affects many of the decisions that are made by leaders, institutions, and individuals. Moreover, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also draws attention from the international community. Many international actors consider this conflict to be a threat to world stability, and numerous states and international organizations have been involved in attempts to resolve it.

As mentioned earlier, there are multiple issues in dispute between Israelis and Palestinians. The conflict concerns issues that are believed to be fundamental and essential to the existence of the parties and central to their national identities, namely, the rights to self-determination, statehood, security, territory, and resources (Bar-Tal, 2007a; Dowty, 2008; Khalidi, 2010). In addition, the conflict involves disputes around religious and cultural issues. Because these issues are seen as existential, they became protected values (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007; Landman, 2010), and the conflict came to be seen as a zero-sum game, in which

neither of the parties was willing to consider compromises. Indeed, attempts to negotiate resolution of the conflict revealed that the Palestinian's minimal demands exceed the Israelis' maximum willingness for concessions and vice versa (Caplan, 2011; Gerner, 1991; Tessler, 1994).

We have seen then that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is characterized by all of the defining features of an intractable conflict as proposed by Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013). Many of the issues in dispute in this conflict are real and tangible. Nonetheless, living under the harsh conditions of the conflict for prolonged periods inevitably affects the psychology of the members of the involved societies. These psychological processes, in turn, influence the positions and behavior of society members and, through them, affect the conduct of whole societies.

As a result of the conflict, members of both societies have been subjected to a variety of negative experiences. In addition to the physical pain of deaths and injuries and tangible losses resulting from destruction of property, displacement, and so on, research indicates that the conflict has been a cause of extensive mental suffering (e.g., Bleich, Gelkopf, & Solomon, 2003; Canetti et al., 2010; de Jong et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2009; for a review of statistics regarding deaths, injuries, and mental suffering, see Nasie, Chap. 3 and Canneti, Chap. 10). These negative experiences pose considerable challenges, to which societies and their individual members must adapt. Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) refers to three specific challenges that intractable conflicts pose to the involved societies. The first challenge is satisfying the basic needs that are deprived as a result of the conflict, such as the need for knowing, mastery, safety, positive identity, and others (Burton, 1990; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Staub, 2003). The second challenge is learning to cope with stress, distress, and negative emotions that are caused by the conflict and that accompany society members for extended periods of time. The third and final challenge is to win the conflict or at least not to lose. For this purpose, it is necessary to mobilize society members to take part in the conflict and make sacrifices for the sake of the group. Only when this challenge is met can societies maintain an intense conflict with an opponent over time. Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) maintains that societies involved in intractable conflict develop a unique sociopsychological infrastructure, which is essential in order to address these challenges. The next section presents an overview of this sociopsychological infrastructure and its manifestations in the Israeli-Palestinian case. The following section discusses the functionality of the sociopsychological infrastructure for meeting the challenges posed by the conflict.

Sociopsychological Infrastructure of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) refers to three interrelated elements that constitute the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict: collective memory, ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientation. These elements are discussed elaborately in other chapters of this volume; therefore, in this chapter, they are reviewed only briefly.

The "building blocks" of collective memory and ethos of conflict are societal beliefs, which are defined as cognitions that society members share regarding topics and issues that are of special concern for their society (Bar-Tal, 2000). *Collective memory* is comprised of societal beliefs referring to the history of the conflict, which together form a narrative that describes the beginning of the conflict, its progression, and major events that occurred in its course (Cairns & Roe, 2003; Pennebaker, Paez, & Rim, 2013; Wertsch, 2002). The collective memory does not represent an objective or neutral account of past events. Rather, it is selective and biased in ways that serve societies' present needs (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Páez & Liu, Chap. 5, volume 1 of this series; Southgate, 2005). Specifically, societies that are involved in intractable conflicts tend to develop narratives that justify their own goals in the conflict, blame the rival group for the outbreak and continuation of the conflict and delegitimize them, and portray the ingroup in a positive manner and as the sole victims of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013).

Research conducted among Israelis and Palestinians indicates that the two societies have indeed developed collective memories with these characteristics. Although referring to similar events, the narratives of the two groups are dramatically different from each other and at times appear to be mirror images (Adwan & Bar-On, 2004; Rotberg, 2006; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). Central points of dispute between the two narratives refer to the sources of the conflict and the events of the 1948 war. Israeli Jews see the Jewish immigration to the Land of Israel as the revival of a nation that has been in exile for thousands of years, which is returning to reclaim the land of its forefathers. The Palestinians, in contrast, see the Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine as an invasion of foreign colonialists, which led to the dispossession of the indigenous population. The Jews see the 1948 war as their "war of independence," in which they successfully defended their newly established state against the Arab nations who sought to destroy it. The Palestinians refer to the same events as "the catastrophe" (Al-Nakba), in which many Palestinians were expelled from their homes, towns, and villages and became refugees, resulting in the dispersion and disintegration of the Palestinian society (for an elaborate discussion of these narratives, see Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4 and Nahhas, Chap. 5). In the Israeli society, there has been some movement in recent years toward a more critical narrative of historical events (Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4), while Palestinians generally continue to adhere to the dominant narrative (Nahhas, Chap. 5).

A second central element of the sociopsychological infrastructure is the *ethos of conflict* (EOC). A societal ethos is a system of shared societal beliefs, which define a given society's central characteristics and give meaning to its members' social identity (Bar-Tal, 2000; see also Cohrs, Uluğ, Stahel & Kişlioğlu, Chap. 3 and Jost, Stern & Sterling, Chap. 4, volume 1 of this series). An EOC is an organized worldview that allows society members to comprehend the prolonged context of conflict in which they live and guides their behaviors within this context. The societal beliefs that comprise the EOC are organized around eight themes (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2007b). Beliefs about the *justness of the ingroup's goals* indicate the goals over which the conflict is fought and their crucial importance. For example, both Israelis and Palestinians believe that the land of Palestine/Israel is their group's historical homeland, and that they have a right to establish their independent state in it. Beliefs

about *security* refer to the importance of keeping the group secure and the conditions needed to achieve such security. In the Israeli and Palestinian societies, these beliefs often refer to the use of force (military service in the Israeli case and armed struggle in the Palestinian case) as necessary in order to protect the group. Beliefs about *positive collective self-image* attribute positive characteristics, values, and behaviors to the ingroup. For example, both Israelis and Palestinians describe the conduct of their own group's members in the conflict as heroic and courageous. Beliefs about *ingroup victimization* present the ingroup as the victim of unjust harm by the adversary. Israelis, for instance, sometimes portray attacks against them in the context of the conflict as a continuation of the historical persecution of the Jews. On the Palestinian side, great importance is placed on commemorating the Nakba of 1948, and later violent events are portrayed as a continuation of the Nakba. Beliefs that *delegitimize the opponents* deny their humanity and exclude them from those worthy of moral treatment. One manifestation of these beliefs in the Israeli-Palestinian case is the tendency to portray the opponent as an evil ruthless aggressor. Beliefs about *patriotism* encourage loyalty, love, and sacrifice for the ingroup. In both the Israeli and the Palestinian societies, those who sacrificed their life for the sake of the group are glorified as national heroes (and in the Palestinian case as *Shahid*s, i.e., martyrs). Beliefs about *unity* refer to the importance of remaining united in the face of the external threat. Finally, beliefs about *peace* refer to peace as the ultimate goal of the society and to society members as peace loving. Though the contents of the Israeli and Palestinian EOC are predictably different, and often seem like mirror images of each other (Oren, Bar-Tal, & David, 2004), the central themes of the EOC as described by Bar-Tal (1998, 2007b) are found in both societies (for extensive reviews of the Israeli ethos, see Oren, Chap. 8, and for the Palestinian ethos, see Shaked, Chap. 9). Despite the different contents of the various themes, research has shown that they all load on a single underlying factor (Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, & Zafran, 2012).

Extensive research has demonstrated the prevalence of EOC beliefs among both the Israeli and the Palestinian societies. On the Israeli side, frequent expressions of EOC beliefs have been found in adult and children's literature (Ben-Ezer, 1992; Cohen, 1985; Govrin, 1989; Shaked, 1989; Teff-Seker, 2012), drama and films (Gross & Gross, 1991; Shohat, 1989; Urian, 1997), the mass media (Sharvit & Bar-Tal, 2007), school textbooks (Bar-Tal, 1998; Mathias, 2002, 2005; Podeh, 2002; Yogev, 2010), national ceremonies (Arviv-Abramowitz, 2011), leaders' speeches, and public opinion polls (Oren, Chap. 8). However, there are also findings indicating that alternative beliefs began to appear in the Israeli society since the late 1970 and gained prominence especially in the 1990s. These alternative beliefs are observed in cultural products (Bar-Tal, 2007a) and in public opinion polls (Oren, Chap. 8). Nonetheless, the EOC has remained a dominant belief system in the Israeli-Jewish society, and one consequence of this dominance is that among Israeli Jews, contents that are consistent with the EOC come to mind more easily than contents that contradict the EOC, regardless of individuals' personal adherence to the EOC (Sharvit, 2008).

Research regarding the Palestinian EOC has been less extensive, yet evidence exists for the prevalence of the Palestinian EOC in Palestinian school textbooks

(Adwan & Bar-On, 2004; Adwan, Bar-Tal, & Wexler, in press), in the writings of Palestinian children and adolescents (Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012; Ricks, 2006; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006), in leaders' speeches and political publications (Shaked, Chap. 9), and in public opinion polls (Oren et al., 2004; Shaked, Chap. 9).

The final element of the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict is a *collective emotional orientation*. This concept refers to the characteristic tendency of a society and its members to express particular emotions (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & De Rivera, 2007). According to Bar-Tal (2007b), societies involved in intractable conflicts tend to be dominated by the emotions of fear, anger, and hatred (see also Čehajić-Clancy, Chap. 9 and Jarymowicz, Chap. 10, volume 1 of this series). Research has indeed revealed the prevalence of these emotions and their expressions in the Israeli society (Bar-Tal, 2001; Halperin, 2008; Halperin, Canetti, & Kimhi, 2012; Halperin, Russell, Dweck, & Gross, 2011) and to some extent also in the Palestinian society (Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit, Bar-Tal, & Hobfoll, 2014; Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012). Research also suggests that these emotions are related to collective memories of the conflict (Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, & Drori, 2008; Nahhas, Chap. 5) and that they are related to and may also interact with the EOC (Lavi et al., 2014; Pliskin & Halperin, Chap. 11). Though fear, anger, and hatred have received the most attention in research, other collective emotions may also appear in situations of intractable conflict, including humiliation, pride, and hope (for a review, see Bar-Tal, 2013).

Having reviewed the elements that comprise the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict, we can now turn to the question of why this particular sociopsychological infrastructure tends to develop under the condition of intractable conflict. As mentioned earlier, Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) maintains that the sociopsychological infrastructure develops as it does because it is functional for addressing the challenges that intractable conflict poses to the involved societies. The following section reviews the functions of the sociopsychological infrastructure in more detail.

Functions of the Sociopsychological Infrastructure

Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) lists several functions of the sociopsychological infrastructure. First, the infrastructure illuminates the conflict situation, providing a clear, meaningful, and holistic explanation for why the conflict began and why it continues and cannot be resolved. By doing so, the sociopsychological infrastructure fulfills the fundamental human need to form a coherent, organized, and predictable understanding of the world (Baumeister, 1991; Burton, 1990; Reykowski, 1982), which gains special importance in situations that involve uncertainty and threat, such as situations of conflict. In addition, being able to make sense of and find meaning in difficult situations within an existing worldview has been shown to be important for coping adverse traumatic events (Antonovsky, 1987; Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998; Frankl, 1978; Horowitz, 1986; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Kobasa, 1985; Moos & Schaefer, 1986; Taylor, 1983). Hence, the

sociopsychological infrastructure helps society members address the challenges of fulfilling deprived needs and coping with stress. Supporting this function of the sociopsychological infrastructure, research has demonstrated that the EOC is activated among Israeli Jews in times of distress (Sharvit, 2014). Furthermore, adherence to the EOC attenuates the relationship between exposure to property loss as a result of the conflict and depressive symptoms among both Israelis and Palestinians (Lavi et al., 2014).

An additional function of the sociopsychological infrastructure is to justify and provide legitimacy to negative actions of the ingroup toward the adversary in the context of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007b; 2013; see also Jost et al., Chap. 4, volume 1 of this series). These actions are usually harmful toward humans or property and would be considered severe moral violations under other circumstances. In providing justification for such acts, the sociopsychological infrastructure allows group members to disengage morally (Bandura, 1999), thus avoiding unpleasant experiences of cognitive dissonance and group-based moral emotions such as guilt and shame (Halperin, Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Rosler, & Raviv, 2010; Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006; Sharvit, Brambilla, Babush, & Colucci, 2015). Supporting this function of the sociopsychological infrastructure, a study by Sharvit and Zerachovich (2014) found that Israeli Jews who adhered strongly to the EOC reported experiencing similar low levels of guilt and shame when presented with information about Israel's treatment of the Palestinians, whether that information was framed positively or negatively. In contrast, those who reported low EOC adherence distinguished between the two frames and reported elevated levels of guilt and shame when the information was framed negatively.

Another function of the sociopsychological infrastructure is establishing a differentiation between the ingroup and the rival and a superior position of the ingroup (Bar-Tal, 2007b, 2013). According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), individuals derive part of their self-esteem from the groups to which they belong. Therefore, they are motivated to uphold a positive view of their group and to maintain optimal distinctiveness between their own group and other groups (Brewer, 1991). The sociopsychological infrastructure contributes to establishing such distinctiveness and sharpens it by delegitimizing the opponent while presenting the ingroup in highly positive terms. It has been argued that groups involved in intractable conflict tend to develop oppositional zero-sum identities (Brewer, 2011). Accordingly, Kelman (1999) suggests that in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, each party believes that in order to maintain the legitimacy of its own identity, it must delegitimize the other party.

Finally, Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) discusses the role of the sociopsychological infrastructure in preparing society members for the conflict and mobilizing them to participate in it. By emphasizing the ingroup's victimization and delegitimizing the opponent, the sociopsychological infrastructure prepares society members for the negative experiences and difficulties that await them in the future of the conflict. As a result, society members become attentive and sensitive to cues of threat, so that when the threats materialize, they do not come as a surprise. This provides a sense of predictability and immunizes society members against impending threats.

However, if the sociopsychological infrastructure only prepared society members for the worst, it could soon lead to despair. Hence, in addition to preparing, the sociopsychological infrastructure also mobilizes society members to participate in the conflict in order to defend themselves and advance the societal goals. By justifying the goals of the conflict, emphasizing the importance of security, and fostering patriotism and social unity, the sociopsychological infrastructure encourages society members to take part in the struggle against the enemy and make personal sacrifices on behalf of the group (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997). An example for the importance of the sociopsychological infrastructure for mobilizing participation in the conflict can be found in the prevalence of messages reflecting the EOC in the training of new recruits to the Israeli army (Borovski-Sapir, 2004).

Institutionalization of the Sociopsychological Infrastructure

As mentioned earlier, the beliefs and emotions that comprise the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict tend to be widely shared among society members. Consequently, they occupy a central place in the societal discourse. Moreover, due to the functional role of the sociopsychological infrastructure in times of conflict, the involved societies devote great efforts to imparting the sociopsychological infrastructure to their members. This is evident in the frequent appearance of the elements of the infrastructure in numerous societal channels of communication and socialization (Bar-Tal, 2013). Consequently, most society members are exposed to the sociopsychological infrastructure from early childhood and throughout their lives, becoming highly familiar with it. For example, research reviewed by Nasie (Chap. 3) indicates that the contents of the Israeli EOC and collective memory of the conflict are presented to children already in preschools. Research by Teichman (Chap. 2) reveals the consequences of this socialization, demonstrating that Israeli children acquire negative views of Arabs at early ages. On the Palestinian side, research has found expressions of the sociopsychological infrastructure in the writings of children and adolescents (Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012; Ricks, 2006; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006), again demonstrating the early acquisition of the infrastructure.

These processes eventually lead to the institutionalization of the sociopsychological infrastructure and to the development of a culture of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). According to Bar-Tal, a culture of conflict develops when the elements of the sociopsychological infrastructure are integrated into the society's cultural symbols, which communicate a particular meaning regarding the continuous experiences of the conflict. The symbols of the culture of conflict eventually become routinized in group members' daily lives (Bar-Tal, Abutbul-Selinger, & Raviv, 2014). Routinization takes place when society members engage regularly in practices related to the conflict. For example, Palestinians must go through Israeli checkpoints and deal with various restrictions to their freedom of movement (Longo, Canetti, & Hite-Rubin, 2014), and Israelis have to go through security searches at the entry to every public place. Routinization also involves exposure to images and

symbols of the conflict (e.g., monuments, street names, weapons, shelters) and to information about the conflict in society members' daily lives. Finally, routinization involves integration of words and expressions relating to the conflict into the language. For example, Israelis often use military terminology in their discourse, even when referring to issues that are not related to the conflict (Tsur, 2013).

Implications of the Sociopsychological Infrastructure

The research reviewed thus far has suggested that the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict is functional for dealing with the challenges that the conflict poses. Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) points out, however, that the sociopsychological infrastructure has other consequences, which are not necessarily functional (see also Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). The sociopsychological infrastructure justifies the conflict and encourages society members to participate in it and to defend their group with force. When this takes place among both parties to the conflict, the result is continuation and escalation of the conflict.

Moreover, once the sociopsychological infrastructure crystallizes, it can instigate a freezing tendency, which involves a preference for maintaining one's existing beliefs and resistance to changing them. Freezing leads to reluctance to search for alternative information and resistance to persuasive arguments (Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Consequently, the sociopsychological infrastructure becomes a prism through which society members process and evaluate new information, resulting in selective and biased information processing (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). This reduces the likelihood that new information, which suggests possibilities of resolving the conflict peacefully, would be considered seriously. Several studies conducted among Israeli Jews indeed demonstrate that adherence to the ethos of conflict affects the processing and interpretation of new information in ways contribute to the continuation of the conflict and reduce the likelihood of peaceful resolution (Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Degani-Hirsch, 2007; Porat, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2015). One practical implication of these findings is that Israelis and Palestinians may disregard peaceful gestures coming from their opponents because those are inconsistent with their sociopsychological infrastructure. For example, the peace initiative of the Arab League was proposed in 2002 and reified by the League several times since. Israel, however, has never responded to the initiative and refuses to discuss it.

Conclusion

Societies cannot survive and function if the individuals that comprise them are not well adjusted and functioning. This may drive societies to develop collective mechanisms that allow society members to cope with difficulties that they may face (deVries, 1995). We have seen that societies involved in intractable conflict develop

a unique sociopsychological infrastructure, which assists them in dealing with the challenges of the conflict but at the same time contributes to the continuation of the conflict. The question arises, therefore, whether the sociopsychological infrastructure is in fact beneficial to societies that are involved in intractable conflicts. I suggest that the answer to this question depends on the outcomes that the group believes are desirable and feasible. Recall that members of societies that are involved in intractable conflicts believe that the conflict is irreconcilable and that the goals over which it is being fought are essential to their existence (Bar-Tal, 2007b, 2013; Kriesberg, 1993). Hence, they may not believe that peaceful resolution of the conflict is feasible or desirable in the foreseeable future. If this is the case, then the society needs to prepare to face the challenges of a protracted conflict, and the sociopsychological infrastructure remains functional. However, if the group believes that conflict resolution is feasible and desirable and decides to engage in a process of peacemaking, then the sociopsychological infrastructure becomes counterproductive and a barrier to conflict resolution (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). This discussion points out the paradoxical role of the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict. On the one hand, it helps societies and their members address the challenges that the conflict poses. But on the other hand, it contributes to the continuation of the conflict, which is the situation that creates those challenges in the first place.

It follows that any attempts to resolve intractable conflicts and minimize their detrimental effects on individuals and societies must take into consideration the nature of the sociopsychological infrastructure, the functions that it serves, and its implications. Given that the sociopsychological infrastructure plays a role in the maintenance and escalation of conflicts, changing its component beliefs and emotions may be a necessary step toward achieving reconciliation and developing a culture of peace (Bar-Tal, 2013). Yet it is important to keep in mind that the sociopsychological infrastructure serves important functions for the members of societies involved in intractable conflicts. Thus, in order to pose a significant challenge to the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict, any alternative infrastructure must include different means of addressing the challenges that the societies involved in the conflict face. Moreover, the peacemaking process brings with it additional challenges, which also need to be addressed (Rosler, Chap. 14). Only when these challenges are successfully addressed can members of societies involved in intractable conflicts, including Israelis and Palestinians, hope to not only cope and endure the adversities and suffering that these conflicts cause but to eliminate them completely.

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Part I
Acquisition of the Socio-Psychological Repertoire

Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: A Developmental Perspective

Yona Teichman

Introduction

One of the richest and diverse areas in the literature in social sciences deals with stereotypes and prejudice. Paradoxically, relatively limited interest has been devoted to questions such as when stereotypes and prejudice emerge, what is their developmental course, and what are the mechanisms that determine their content and complexity. Despite this observation, it has to be noted that in recent years an increase in theoretical and empirical interest in the acquisition and development of stereotypes and prejudice in children is evident. The accumulating results indicate that developmental trajectories of stereotypes and prejudice are influenced by affect, by cognitive and personality development, and by their social context.

Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) were the first to suggest that stereotypes and prejudice are rooted in childhood experiences. Influenced by psychoanalytic thinking, they proposed that hostility originally experienced toward harsh parents is projected or displaced toward other people. The easiest targets for rejection or hate are disadvantaged out-groups. At that time Allport (1954) and later Black-Gutman and Hickson (1996) suggested that social knowledge is acquired through social learning, identifying mechanisms such as imitation, modeling, or association. However, most studies showed that children's attitudes were not related to their personal environment: parents, teachers, and peers (Aboud, 2008).

Following the pioneering theoretical ideas, the first empirical studies were conducted. The most famous are Clark and Clark's (1947) doll studies and later the work of P.A. Katz (1976; Katz, Shon, & Zalk, 1975).

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_2

Theoretical Views Explaining the Development of Stereotypes and Prejudice

For a long time the examination of the developmental trajectory of stereotypes and prejudice has drawn on two major theories: socio-cognitive theory (SCT) (Aboud, 1988) and social identity development theory (SIDT) (Nesdale, 1999; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001). SCT suggests that due to limited cognitive capabilities, affective influence (fear), an egocentric social perspective, and early emotional attachments to individuals perceived as similar to the child, preschoolers prefer their own ethnic group and express dislike toward other ethnic groups. As cognitive development advances, at the age of 7–8, views of people shift to more objective criteria; thus, cognitive maturation encourages social tolerance.

Ample findings indicate that in multiethnic nonviolent social contexts, children aged 3–4 from dominant groups are capable of ethnic differentiation, expressing liking for the in-group or even dislike for the out-group. When they reach the ages of 7–9, stereotypes and prejudice decline (Aboud, 1988; Bigler & Liben, 1993; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001). It follows that 10-year-olds and above should manifest a further reduction in biases. However, studies that included children aged 10 and up reported a renewed elevation in prejudice (Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Rutland, 1999; Teichman, 2001; Vaughan, 1987). Thus, additional factors to cognitive development affect pre- and early adolescents and reintroduce social biases.

Another challenge to SCT emerged from findings showing that the developmental trajectories of ethnic preferences of majority and minority children differ. Irrespective of age, majority children prefer their own group, whereas young minority children tend to prefer the majority group, and only later their preference shifts to their own group (Aboud, 1988). Since the developmental changes in ethnic attitudes proposed by the SCT are based on universal patterns of cognitive development, SCT cannot account for the difference between same-aged children who belong to different social groups. Furthermore, findings for minority children in conflict indicated that even 12–13-year-olds did not express preference for their in-group (Teichman & Zafrir, 2003). Again it seems that factors other than cognitive maturation influence the development of children's intergroup repertoires.

The second major developmental theory—SIDT (Nesdale, 1999; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001)—is based on social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Drawing on the tenets of SIT, SIDT attributes major importance to the experience of individuals as group members and to their *social identity*. According to SIDT, individuals develop as group members; thus, many of their experiences, thoughts, feelings, and actions occur within a group framework. They categorize groups, identify with the groups to which they belong, and integrate them as a part of their self-identity. Moreover, individuals perceive and treat others according to the knowledge they acquire about the relationship between their group and any given out-group. Subsequently, they engage in social comparison, and being motivated by a basic need to enhance their collective self-esteem, they favor

the in-group and devalue out-groups. Importantly, SIT and SIDT highlight the fact that social self-enhancement stems from collective experiences and is not influenced by age. Indeed, empirical evidence confirms that even a superficial newly established group identity (in a minimal group paradigm), children and adults favored in-groups and discriminated against out-groups (Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Vaughan, Tajfel, & Williams, 1981).

Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, and Griffiths (2004) offer a developmental paradigm that applies to children aged 2–7 of dominant groups in multiethnic communities. The developmental sequence is comprised of four stages that progress from *lack of differentiation* between social groups (age 2–3) to *ethnic prejudice*, reached at the age of 6–7, when children not only prefer their own group but are also capable of disliking or even hating out-groups. According to this paradigm, the transition to out-group rejection depends on advances in the development of cognitive abilities, social knowledge, and motivation for self-enhancement. Nesdale and his associates did not study children below the age of 5. Thus, their full paradigm still needs empirical testing, but already now it may be said that existing findings indicate that capabilities for social differentiation and social preferences appear very early in the development.

One example for early expression of social biases emerges from studies conducted in contexts of conflict. The idea that conditions of conflict accelerate the development of prejudice was mentioned by many (Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2001; Brewer, 1999; Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble, & Fuligni, 2001). This qualification acknowledges that the cognitive capabilities required for the development of intergroup categorization and preferences emerge early in life and their activation depends on the context. Indeed, findings obtained in Northern Ireland (Cairns, 1987; Connolly, Smith, & Kelly, 2002) and in Israel (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006) indicate that in a context of an intractable conflict, preschoolers develop social categories and children as young as 2 and 3 years old express in-group preference and even out-group rejection.

Irrespective of conflict, findings that social preferences are expressed very early in human development received important confirmation from studies performed with preverbal infants (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). Even more surprisingly studies with nonhumans (rhesus macaque) (Mahajan et al., 2011) revealed that the monkeys differentiated between in- and out-group faces, displayed greater vigilance toward faces of out-groups and, as humans, favored in-group members. The researchers conclude "… that the architecture of the mind that enables the formation of these biases may be rooted in phylogenetically ancient mechanisms."

The findings reported for very young children and prehumans constitute another challenge for the developmental paradigms (SCT and SIDT) suggesting that the development of prejudice depends on cognitive capabilities that emerge at preschool age or even after the age of 6. In an attempt to reconcile the difficulty regarding the evolvement of prejudice as well as the previously mentioned challenges (reemergence of prejudice at the age of 10–12 and differences between majority and minority children), Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005) examined the development of stereotypes and prejudice in several studies in the age span of 2–17. To my knowl-

edge, this series of studies constitutes the widest perspective on the development of social perception and attitudes. The studies were performed in Israel that represents a socialization context of a violent political conflict. Accounting for the influence of conflict on children's social perception and attitudes and highlighting theoretical thinking related to *personality development*, Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005) and Teichman and Bar-Tal (2008) proposed an alternative theory regarding the development of intergroup repertories. The new theory, referred to as an integrative developmental-contextual theory (IDCT), points out the simultaneous influence of factors acknowledged by SCT and SIDT and calls attention to additional factors such as affect, personal development, and context. The recent version of the theory is presented in the following section.

Integrative Developmental-Contextual Theory (IDCT)

IDCT proposes that social psychological intergroup repertories (SPIRs) that include stereotypes and prejudice are products of simultaneous influence of multiple factors in a given social context. This proposition is derived from Marcia's (1998) theoretical expansion of Erikson's (1968) developmental model. Marcia (1998) stressed the cumulative progression of experience along the life-span. Thus, although developmental experiences and issues are stage specific and critical stages are defined, all developmental issues have precursors and successors that unfold through life. Advancing from stage to stage, individuals face new stage-related issues that are experienced with association to the accumulated experiences and resolutions from previous stages (vertical progression). The accumulated attainments and experiences from each stage are the foundation for the next developmental stage (horizontal progression). In Marcia's words: "…each stage has its preparatory predecessors in the form of partial resolutions occurring before that stage's ascendancy. As well, each stage, once its ascendancy has been reached and the psychological issues resolved, contributes its strength to the resolution of succeeding stages" (p. 32).

As for factors influencing the development of SPIRS, IDCT acknowledges the role of cognitive development and socially embedded self-enhancement motivation, highlighted by SCT and SIDT. However, instead of focusing on any specific factor, IDCT includes both and traces their influence within a developmental perspective. Along with cognitive and social identity development, IDCT acknowledges affect, *personal* self-identity and motivation for personal self-enhancement, and social context as factors exerting important influence on the development of SPIRs.

Applying the cumulative schema to the development of SPIRs, IDCT proposes that though having critical stages, all the factors involved in the development of SPIRs (affect; cognitive and identity development, personal and social; and context) are active all along the developmental span. However, in different stages, a different factor has the potential for acquiring salience and major influence, but due to contextual conditions that also exist through the development or previous experiences, it does not always do so and other factors may overshade it. Thus, in infancy



Fig. 1 A representation of the integrative developmental-contextual theory (IDCT)

the main factor is affect, in school age, cognitive development, and in pre- and early adolescence, social and personal identity development.

Proposing that at any given time SPIRs are determined cumulatively by multiple factors expands the theoretical perspective to a wider developmental span than that covered by SCT and SIDT. On the younger end of the developmental trajectory, IDCT relates to children from the time they can use language, namely, ages 2–3, all the way through adulthood. This theorization suggests a differential approach, in which the specific configurations of the different factors vary by age and context, thus influencing information processing and being influenced by it. The different configurations determine specific developmental trajectories for each case. This theoretical framework is depicted in Fig. 1.

Factors Identified by IDCT as Influencing the Development of Social Biases

An examination of the proposed factors involved in the development of stereotypes and prejudice will demonstrate that IDCT helps to explain findings not explained by SCT or SIDT, such as the expression of out-group negativity among very young children, the maintenance of prejudice among 7–9-year-olds, the reemergence of prejudice during pre- and early adolescence, as well as differences between majority and minority children.

Affect: Aboud (1988) suggested that in infancy and young age, the basic reactions to people are determined by the emotions they arouse (positive/negative). However, Aboud (1988) also stated that "in the social domain affective processes dominate from 3 to 6 years and then decline" (p. 119). Contrary to this position and closer to Allport's view, IDCT proposes that negative affect (i.e., anxiety, threat, or fear) produces negativity toward the individuals or groups that arouse such feelings and create distance from them. The implications for a context of conflict suggest that early in life children absorb the affective atmosphere related to the dangerous out-group. These affective consequences interfere with information processing and reappraisal of experiences, thereby causing individuals to overlook new inputs and to judge out-group members by relying on expectations or stereotypes (Wilder & Simon, 2001). Thus, irrespective of developmental progression in other domains (cognitive, identity development), affect may stabilize beliefs and attitudes established at a very early age and may instigate, maintain, or perpetuate them (Silverstein & Flamenbaum, 1989). Indeed, the fact that through the life-span emotions play an important role in interpersonal and intergroup perceptions and responses was reported in many studies (Bar-Tal, 2001; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1994; Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, & Griffiths, 2005; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). The continuous influence of affect is shown in Fig. 1.

Cognitive development: Since Aboud's (1988) contribution to the understanding of prejudice in children, cognitive development is acknowledged as an important determinant of prejudice. However, cognitive skills guide social perception and attitudes much earlier than proposed by SCT and SIDT. As previously mentioned, the view that infants possess cognitive capabilities needed for acquiring social knowledge, developing a theory about their environment, and expressing it in preferences and rejections is based on ample empirical evidence. Apparently, infants are aware of stimuli in their surroundings; they process information, absorb, encode, analyze, categorize, and remember their inanimate and social environment (Hamlin et al., 2007; Hirschfeld, 1996; Sherman, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Younger, 1993). Later in development, contextual inputs (information), experiences (affect), and the desire to preserve consistency and continuity (Stangor & Ruble, 1989) reinforce and stabilize the initially formed categories, beliefs, and attitudes associated with them.

Integrating affect and cognition as underlying factors in the development of SPIRs provides the developmental background for Allport's (1954) definition of prejudice as "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization" (p. 9). The *early established* antipathy and faulty generalizations constitute the foundation for the primary intergroup categorization and biases. These biases continue to develop and depending on the level of threat in the context gain power or decline during preschool age. Accordingly, in a context of an intractable conflict, one would not expect 8–9-year-olds to express moderation toward the enemy.

From preadolescence (age 10 and later), abstract and hypothetical thinking begin to develop, providing the ground for valuing justice, dignity, equality, and human rights. All of these contribute to the advancement of social tolerance (Kohlberg, 1969; Selman, 1980). However, as with children aged 8–9, advance in cognitive development represents *a potential* contribution, the realization of which depends

on the context in which they grow up and on the other factors involved in the influence on the development of SPIRs. A factor of major importance for this age is identity development.

Self-identity: Extending the theoretical thinking about the development of social biases beyond school age directs attention to self-identity. IDCT refers to self-identity as an integrated identity, including personal identity, social identity, and the self-esteem related to each.[1] Importantly, self-identity as well begins in infancy (Amsterdam, 1972) and proceeds through the developmental span (Marcia, 1998). This suggests that in early development, along with affective and cognitive influences on SPIRs, experiences related to self-esteem may influence the development of children's intergroup biases. Considering minority children, it is plausible that, due to the salience of identity and its social meaning, this factor influences their intergroup responses earlier than it does for majority children, motivating them to express out-group preference.

Irrespective of specific environments, during pre- and early adolescence (ages 10–14), identity formation and consolidation become the main developmental task (Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1998). The insecurity aroused by the processes involved in the integration of the different aspects of identity increases the need for self-reassurance. In this stage the status of the groups to which one belongs, the drive for self-enhancement identified by SIT and others (Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1998), and intergroup comparisons which reflect on self-esteem become highly relevant. It follows that in pre- and early adolescence, the advancement in cognitive development or affective experiences alone cannot account for social biases.

In multiethnic communities as well as in a context of intractable conflict, it was found that, compared with younger children and occasionally with adolescents, pre- and early adolescents manifest an increase in in-group preference and out-group rejection (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Teichman, 2001; Teichman, Bar-Tal, & Abdolrazeq, 2007; Vaughan, 1987). These findings support the contention that issues and motivations activated during early adolescence influence intergroup biases. Likewise, findings reported by Nesdale and Brown (2004) show that children aged 9 and 12 were more sensitive to a negative representative of their *in-group* than were younger children. The fact that this reaction was more pronounced at the ages of 9–12 may be attributed to the threat that the negative, unlikable in-group member posed for the group members' self-esteem.

A more direct examination of the association between self-worth, in-group favoritism, and out-group rejection may be performed, comparing intergroup responses of participants with high and low personal or collective self-esteem (Crocker, Blaine, & Luhtanen, 1993). In the child and adolescence literature, few studies have examined issues related to self-esteem. As in the adult literature (for a review see Long & Spears, 1998), these studies have yielded inconclusive results. Studies that examined 6–9-year-olds reported that high-self-esteem participants expressed higher in-group favoritism (Bigler et al., 1997; Gagnon & Morasse,

[1] Other aspects of self-identity, i.e., gender identity, religious identity, family identity, etc., are also parts of the integrated identity but are not considered in this chapter.

1995), whereas results reported for participants, aged 10–12, reported this tendency for low-self-esteem participants (Sasson, 2004, reviewed by Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). Possibly, while younger children manifest self-enhancement or self-maintenance, older children experiencing stronger self-doubts manifest self-protection (Crocker et al., 1993). Focusing on collective self-esteem, Teichman et al. (2007) reported that irrespective of age, participants from the highest collective self-esteem group displayed highest intergroup biases. More importantly, the highest biases were expressed by the 10–12-year-olds.

The often reported manifestation of biases by pre- and early adolescents offers support for the relationship, suggested by IDCT between identity-related needs during these stages and intergroup responses. However, further examination of this proposition is required, and more empirical evidence to support it will be presented.

Social Context: As reflected in Fig. 1, affective experiences and cognitive and identity development are embedded in a *social context* and nourished by it through information processing. The information processed regarding any group, its representatives, or events related to them is molded by the group's social knowledge and shared beliefs that include categorization of social groups and their stereotypical definitions. Thus, most often new information is processed in a way that reinforces the existing feelings, concepts, and motivations related to the in- and out-group and the cycle never stops.

In an attempt to identify the factors within the social context that influence social knowledge, Tajfel and Turner (1986) noted the importance of the status of groups, legitimacy and stability of the status relationships, and the nature of the boundaries between them, mainly permeability. Others added factors such as group norms (Brown, 2000), intensity of group identification (Brewer, 1999), and the threat that groups pose for each other (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). By now, the influence of most of these factors on social perception has been examined and confirmed in studies with children (Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2001; Bigler et al., 1997; Nesdale et al., 2005).

Conflictual intergroup relationships exert intensive and lasting effects on personal and intergroup reality. These effects are of special interest for the study of the development of stereotypes and prejudice. On the personal level a conflict determines the level of threat, anger, hostility, sense of danger, uncertainty, and hardship (affect). Conflict accelerates information processing and thus the acquisition of specific linguistic expressions, concepts, and knowledge while at the same time controls others (cognitions) (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Cairns, 1987; Connolly et al., 2002; Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006). Finally, conflict intensifies awareness regarding group boundaries and distinctiveness, namely, the collective and personal identification (identity) (Brewer, 1999), and commitment (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999).

On the intergroup level, conflict determines the content and intensity of the intergroup repertoire. It institutionalizes the norms guiding the behavioral intentions and actual behaviors toward the adversary, the status ascribed to the involved groups, the type of boundaries between them, and as a result the level and type of contact between their members. Usually, the information disseminated in societal channels presents the in-group as pursuing moral goals, while the out-group is demonized (Bar-Tal, 1989;

Sande, Goethals, Ferrari, & Worth, 1989). In creating this dichotomy aggression, violence, and animosity become salient topics in the social discourse.

The circular interaction between the personal and contextual levels contributes to the creation of the most critical aspect of the social context for intergroup perspective, namely, the body of shared beliefs. These beliefs are constructed and shaped through the cumulative experiences experienced and information processed within each society. Shared beliefs are expressed in products such as tangible and intangible symbols, scripts, habits, rules, narratives, concepts, and knowledge relating to one's group and other social groups. Together these products represent the shared psychological repertoire (SPIR) that provides meaning, definitions, rules of practice, and codes for intergroup relationships (Teichman & Bar-Tal, 2008).

SPIRs are transmitted to the younger generation by socialization agents. Children absorb and process information related to shared beliefs, and it shapes their perspectives on their social world, including their views about the nature of the relationships between their group and other groups within or outside their society (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Nasie, Chap. 3). With time the repertoire becomes rigid and resistant to change.

In a study reported by Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005), Israeli preschoolers mentioned television as the main source of information about the adversary out-group. Parents, particularly mothers, were mentioned in the second place and only then teachers. The fact that television was mentioned in the first place suggests that the information reaching children exposes them to the violent aspects of the conflict and to the different sentiment toward in- and out-group. It does not come as a surprise that children who grow up in conflict express stereotypes and prejudice about the adversary in a younger age than children growing up in a multiethnic society express toward minorities.

Socialization is reflected not only in content of beliefs and the affect which accompanies them but also in the structure of in- and out-group images, i.e., their level of complexity and the level of homogeneity attributed to members of the two groups. It is plausible to suggest that promoting simplification and generalizations about any out-group advances stereotypical thinking about it. New findings regarding complexity of images displayed by Jewish Israeli children will be presented in the next section. These findings provide evidence for the fact that a conflict encourages generalized images and, again, the tendency of pre- and early adolescents to stand out in favoring the in-group.

Complexity of Images of Jews and Arabs Revealed by Jewish Israeli Youth

The perceptual differentiation of objects of social attitude was studied with adults extensively. Its relationship to in-group preference was repeatedly confirmed (Linville, 1982; Linville & Jones, 1980). Livesley and Bromley (1973) were the first to examine complexity with children. Complexity refers to quantitative

differences in perception or attributions to in- and out-group representations. As such, it may be considered an implicit measure for the assessment of differential group perceptions. Livesley and Bromley (1973) asked 7–15-year-olds to attribute traits to eight figures that differed by age. Results indicated that the *number* of the attributed traits used increased with age and that same age figures (in-group) were attributed more traits than different age groups (out-groups). This line of research was adopted with a different measurement methodology based on human figure drawings (HFDs). It was proposed that complexity may be inferred from the number of items drawn in a figure. Indeed, as hypothesized, participants drew in-group figures (a Jew) with more items than out-group figures (an Arab). Interestingly, the critical age in which differentiation in complexity emerged was early adolescence (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Teichman, 2001).

A recent study performed with Jewish Israeli children and adolescents aged 8–16 continued to examine different aspects of complexity of mental images of "a Jew" and "an Arab" (Teichman, Stein, & Shechner, in preparation). The images were assessed using HFDs that were systematically scored for complexity, but in this study the drawings were followed by questions regarding social knowledge about the two groups reflected in the attributed name and profession to the drawn figures. The scoring of the names and professions was quantitative reflecting the variety of names and professions associated with each group. A name or profession mentioned by many participants received a low complexity score, while those mentioned rarely received a high complexity score. An examination of the developmental range revealed that with regard to the in-group age, differences were almost defused and all age groups presented members of their in-group (Jew) as more complex. For the out-group (Arab), the critical age at which differences in complexity emerged was early adolescence. Namely, after acquiring a certain level of complexity related to names or professions at the age of 8–9, at the age of 10–12, it regresses to a lower level. The regression suggests motivational influence to present the out-group members with a lesser complexity. It is suggested that in-group favoritism expressed explicitly in complexity is even more conspicuous than favoritism expressed in content variables. Although prevention and intervention are beyond the scope of this chapter, these findings imply that introducing more complexity to social representations before the onset of adolescence along with interventions related to the stabilization of personal and social self-esteem may facilitate preventions aiming at reducing the development of stereotypes, prejudice, or racism.

Summary of the Developmental Paradigm of Social Biases Proposed by IDCT

The theoretical and empirical evidence presented in this chapter is based on studies that examined children in a broad developmental range from preschool age through different stages of adolescence. Children reacted to in- and out-group stimuli, with explicit investigator determined traits and feelings, or to free-response implicit

measures. They were assessed on content and structure variables. The findings suggest that in multiethnic social contexts, social biases emerge at the age of 3–4 and preschoolers express only positive in-group biases. For school-age children, the leap in cognitive development and conflict-free personal development leads to a reduction in social biases that reappear in pre- and early adolescence. Moderation may appear in late adolescence when cognitive and identity development reach maturity and consolidation.

For children who grow up in a context of conflict, due to the interplay of emotional, cognitive, identity-related, and contextual influences, from very early age forward, children absorb threat associated with the out-group representing the adversary. The threat accelerates social categorization and the emergence of positive in-group *and* negative out-group biases. The continuous exposure to negative and threatening information reinforces these biases. In terms of progress in age-related trajectories, two different treks are plausible: Conflict could either amplify or defuse the conflict-free developmental pattern. Amplification would suggest an intensification of the developmental trends outlined above; diffusion suggests a commonly shared age-free social bias overpowering developmental, age-related influences. The findings reviewed for the Israeli context (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005) reveal with few exceptions for the in-group a tendency for a diffused positive preference and for the out-group a zigzagging pattern in which biases are acquired early in preschool age, occasionally drop at school age, and reemerge in the onset of adolescence. In late adolescence both reduction and acceleration were observed. The available findings suggest that as proposed by IDCT an integrative approach that accounts for the simultaneous influence of multiple factors offers a framework for a comprehensive look at the developmental trajectory of social biases.

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Young Children's Experiences and Learning in Intractable Conflicts

Meytal Nasie

Intractable conflicts, by definition, include violent confrontational experiences. As a result, the parties involved have undergone chronic conditions of intense violence, threat, stress, insecurity, uncertainty, pain, and bereavement. Such conditions have a formative and lasting effect on society members (Bar-Tal, 2007; Canetti, Chap. 10; de Jong, 2002; Fay, Morrissey, & Smyth, 1999), including the youngest generation (Cairns, 1996; Papageorgiou et al., 2000; Sagi-Schwartz, 2008). The socialization of children in societies involved in intractable conflict is affected by the intense situation in which they live. From a very early age, they learn about the conflict and concepts related to it, both due to their inevitable personal experiences and to the learning processes in the social and educational systems. These processes are not based on passive absorption of information, but on active and reflective processing of information as active observers and participants in the conflict. Children perceive, think, evaluate, judge, and reflect. They actively construct their worldview based on materials coming from their own experiences in the conflict reality and materials they are provided by agents of socialization in the family, the mass media, and the educational system.

Of special importance for this chapter is that, in order to successfully cope with the conflict, the societies involved make tremendous efforts to impart their own societal beliefs[1] to society members and to preserve them among the coming generations. When these beliefs support the conflict, they become a barrier for peacemaking (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Oren, Chap. 8). This is especially true when the leadership highly adheres to conflict-supporting narratives and controls the formal

[1] Societal beliefs are defined as cognitions shared by society members that address themes and issues with which society members are particularly occupied and which contribute to their sense of uniqueness (Bar-Tal, 2000; see also Oren, Chap. 8; Shaked, Chap. 9).

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_3

institutions, which, in turn, impart these narratives to society members. A main formal institution is the educational system which widely disseminates contents that are in line with the dominant themes of the conflict to the youngest generation.

The present chapter will first discuss the personal experiences of children in the context of an intractable conflict, as a direct firsthand way to learn about the conflict. Second, it will describe the indirect ways in which children learn about the conflict, by being continuously exposed to information about the conflict through its various representations in their daily environment and through socialization agents. Subsequently, the chapter will indicate the content that young children acquire regarding the conflict in pre-school and elementary school, focusing on the Israeli-Jewish case. Finally, it will discuss the consequences of these early experiences and learning for the continuation and preservation of conflicts.

Children's Personal Experiences in Conflicts

In areas of conflict, conflict-related events and violent confrontations between the sides involved are an inseparable part of society members' daily lives, including children. A recent 10-Year report by UNICEF (2009) indicates that more than 30 countries and territories have been affected by conflicts, touching the lives of over one billion children, of whom approximately 300 million are under the age of 5. Therefore, many young children inevitably accumulate significant conflict-related experiences that serve as primary sources for their early learning about the conflict. In such an environment, almost every child is affected by conflict-related events, albeit at different levels of intensity and directness (Cummings, Goeke-Morey, Merrilees, Taylor, & Shirlow, 2014; Sagi-Schwartz, 2012). Most studies on the effects of political conflict, as reviewed below, have involved school-age children and adolescents rather than pre-school children. However, it may be said that living in the context of intractable conflict imprints a society member from the day she/he is born and becomes an active absorber of experiences and information. Infants may hear sirens, shootings, and bombardments and/or may detect emotional distress among their family members. Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that experiences of conflict are very powerful and have a determinative influence on children even in their early years of life (Feldman & Vengrober, 2011; Meijer, 1985; Wang et al., 2006). As an infant or toddler grows, these experiences become more concrete, identifiable, understandable, and meaningful. Children may experience a loss or observe the injury of a family member or of acquaintances. They may encounter destruction or violence in cases of shooting, bombardment, terror attacks, or displacement from their home as refugees. They may also undergo humiliation, detention, imprisonment injury, torture, or recruitment by armed forces and active participation in violence (e.g., Basu & Dutta, 2010; Betancourt, Brennan, Rubin-Smith, Fitzmaurice, & Gilman, 2010; Myers-Bowman, Walker, & Myers-Walls, 2003; Rafman, Canfield, Barbas, & Kaczorowski, 1997; UNICEF, 2013; Wessells, 2006).

The direct experiences are especially frequent in areas where conflict is violently intensive and also occurs in residential environments. Among Palestinians, for example, Thabet, Karim, and Vostanis (2006) examined the conflict trauma exposure of 309 pre-school children between the ages of 3 and 6 years in Gaza. They found that the children tested were exposed to three traumatic events on average (range 0–15). As reported by their parents, 92 % of the children had witnessed mutilated bodies and wounded people on television; 51 % had witnessed bombardment of other people's homes by airplane; 28 % had witnessed fire by tanks and heavy artillery on neighbors' homes; 20 % had heard about the killing of a neighbor or a close relative; and 19 % had witnessed demolition of a friend's home. Abu Hein, Qouta, Thabet, and El Sarraj (1993) carried out a survey of 1200 children aged 7–15 in Gaza and found that 71 % reported night raids at home, 52 % reported witnessing assaults of family members, 35 % had been beaten, 19 % had been detained, and 16 % had been injured. A recent study by Dubow et al. (2010), which investigated Palestinian children from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, aged 8, 11, and 14, showed that most of the children were exposed to political conflict and violence. Specifically, 61 % experienced a loss of, or injury to, a friend or family member; 73 % experienced a nonviolent event that disrupted their lives (e.g., spending a long time in a security shelter); 88 % indicated that they or significant others had participated in political demonstrations; 73 % had witnessed actual violence; and 99 % had witnessed media portrayals of political violence. In Israel, parents of children aged 2–7 years, who were relocated to a safety camp during the Second Israel-Lebanon War (July to August 2006), reported significant exposure of their children to war-related experiences with severe stress reactions. Specifically, most of the children had had three (34 %) or four (47 %) experiences. The most prevalent experiences had been hearing explosions, living in bomb shelters, hearing alarm sirens, and witnessing environmental damage (Sadeh, Hen-Gal, & Tikotzky, 2008). Landau et al. (2010) found that Israeli children and adolescents aged 8, 11, and 14 reported considerable exposure to various types of violent events, such as loss or injury of a friend or family member, witnessing actual violence, and they themselves or significant others participating in political demonstrations. In addition, Slone and Shechner (2009) found that 85 % of the Israeli children and adolescents aged 10–18 years had taken part in a security drill at school, 66 % reported exposure to acts of terrorism through the news on television or in newspapers, and 39 % had experienced the absence of a family member for an extended period due to military or political involvement.

High levels of exposure to violence have also been reported among children in other conflict regions. Straker, Mendelsohn, Moosa, and Tudin (1996) found that South African adolescents reported similarly high exposure to violence. In Sierra Leone, children and youth, who constitute a majority of the population, were found to be exposed to violence and the most affected, both as perpetrators and victims (Betancourt, McBain, Newnham, & Brennan, 2013; Mcintyre & Thusi, 2003). Similarly, Derluyn, Broekaert, Schuyten, and De Temmerman (2004) interviewed 301 former child soldiers in Uganda who had been abducted by the northern Ugandan rebellion movement, Lord's Resistance Army, at about the age of 12.5 for

a period of more than 2 years. On average, children had been exposed to six different traumatic events (range 0–13). Specifically, 77 % had seen someone being killed during their abduction; 64 % had been forced to participate in fights; 63 % had had to loot properties and burn houses of civilians; 61 % had had to stay in Sudan, under difficult circumstances; 52 % had been seriously beaten; 39 % had had to kill a person by themselves; and 39 % had had to abduct other children.

In Northern Ireland, during the prolonged conflict between the Catholics and the Protestants, Muldoon and Trew (2000) examined experiences of conflict-related events by 689 children aged 8–11. Seventy percent of the sampled children reported seeing soldiers on the street, 60 % experienced bomb scares, 54 % reported getting stopped at checkpoints, 24 % reported witnessing people shooting guns, and 23 % reported getting caught in a riot. In Sri Lanka, Elbert et al. (2009) found, in a sample of 420 children 10–14 year olds, that almost all children reported experiencing or witnessing a series of life-threatening events. Specifically, 79 % reported combat experience, with 58 % having witnessed bombing, 40 % shelling, and 30 % having experienced an attack on their homes. Furthermore, 40 % of the children had witnessed someone's death. The study revealed a high number of traumatizing experiences in children and found that about one in four children suffered from PTSD. During the siege in Sarajevo, among the investigated population of children and adolescents, 85 % had had direct or indirect experiences of sniper fire, 66 % had lost at least one member of their family, and almost all had experienced serious deprivation of basic needs, such as food and/or water and/or warm clothes (Husain et al., 1998). In Lebanon, Macksoud and Aber (1996) found that the average number of war traumas experienced per child was as high as six. These included displacement, separation from parents, bereavement, witnessing violent acts, exposure to shelling or combat, physical injuries, emigration, involvement in the hostilities, and extreme deprivation of basic needs. These trends also appeared among Kuwaiti 7–14-year-old children, during the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait, when most Kuwaiti children were exposed to unpleasant war experiences (Al-Eissa, 1995). In addition, among Bosnian refugee children 8–13 year olds who had experienced the war in Bosnia, 90 % had been forced to leave their village or town, 64 % had been separated from their family during the war, 63 % had stayed in the basement for long periods because of shelling, 59 % had experienced shelling at close proximity, 54 % had been in situations which made them think they were going to die or be killed, and 43 % had seen a dead body (Papageorgiou et al., 2000).

This line of research points out the variety of children's experiences during wars and conflicts, which are unfortunately increasing every day. Because each country has its own type of conflict, the experiences that children face are quite variable from country to country in their type and intensity. However, despite their variety, what becomes clear is that the essence of these experiences is similar, since all these experiences have unpleasant implications for children's life such as harsh conditions, distress, suffering, pain, and interruption of the normal life. In addition, these experiences may be accompanied by negative emotional reactions of children such as fear, panic, anxiety, insecurity, and helplessness. Since these experiences usually persist over long time, they may also have serious and cumulative effects on the children.

They affect the children's health and well-being, which, in turn, affect their psychosocial and physical development (Landers, 1998; Zahr, 1996; for review, see Williams, 2007). Finally, these powerful contexts also influence the beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of the younger generation regarding the conflict, the in-group, and the rival group. The threatening and violent environment affects children's broad and realistic understanding of violent conflict and especially of war (Becirevic, Roberts, & Baker, 2009; Blankemeyer, Walker, & Svitak, 2009; Miljević-Ridjički & Lugomer-Armano, 1994). In addition, at a very early age, they form a clear social identity and identification with the in-group as well as clear differentiation between their own group and the rival (Oppenheimer, 2006). Also, they attribute negative images to the rival (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). Finally, they acquire emotions related to the conflict—especially fear of the enemy and hatred toward it (Bar-Tal, 1996; Myers-Walls, 2004; Punamäki, 1982). The following part describes at length the indirect ways in which children learn about the conflict and the contents that they acquire within this context.

Children's Indirect Learning About Conflicts

Complementing the above experiences, children also absorb information about the conflict indirectly by being continuously exposed to representations and expressions of the conflict in the environment in which they grow. This exposure may occur even in areas where armed conflict is of relatively low intensity. Family members talk about the conflict because it is an inseparable part of their lives, and children indirectly hear language that is laced with a vocabulary of conflict and that uses terms and words to describe its nature, the rival group, and the in-group. From an early age, children may also be exposed to information provided daily by the media about the conflict. They may observe visual violent representations of the conflict and/or hear discussions about it. The conflict is also reflected in various visual images and symbols of everyday life to which children are exposed (Bar-Tal, Abutbul-Selinger, & Raviv, 2014). These symbols and images may have a variety of contents, modes, and forms, but all refer either directly or indirectly to the conflict. Examples include military personnel seen in public spaces, weapons carried by members of the armed forces, fighter planes and helicopters flying overhead, statues and sculptures related to the conflict, checkpoints, street names and memorial sites commemorating battles or fallen soldiers, bomb shelters, gas masks, and even advertisements whose contents are related to the conflict.

Furthermore, children, like all society members, engage on a daily basis in practices that are related to the context of the conflict situation and are established either formally or informally. Formally established practices are imposed by the authorities and may even be required by law, as, for example, security searches in train stations and airports and security drills at schools. Informally established practices may emerge as norms observed by society members, as, for example, paying attention to suspicious objects in public places. In view of this flow of information,

it should not be surprising that children who live in conflict zones absorb this information continuously from birth and they form concepts, categories, impressions, understandings, and preferences. Specifically, they learn the categorization of the in-group and the rival; their characteristics; vocabulary related to conflict and war; their meaning, connotations, and implications; as well as acquiring an emotional repertoire connected to this knowledge including fear, insecurity, threat, and hatred (e.g., Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Connolly, Smith, & Kelly, 2002; Miljević-Ridjički & Lugomer-Armano, 1994; Oppenheimer, 2006; Teichman, Chap. 2).

This political socialization regarding the conflict begins immediately with birth and then continues directly and indirectly, as the child is intentionally and unintentionally exposed to agents of socialization. Agents of socialization such as family members, teachers, and the media describe and explain the conflict directly to the children. They provide information and interpret it in a particular way. For example, parents may respond to questions and may also initiate talk about the conflict, trying to explain its features (e.g., Moyer-Gusé & Smith, 2007; Myers-Walls, Myers-Bowman, & Pelo, 1993; Shamai, 2001). Pre-school teachers may refer to different facets of the conflict, such as the bravery of the fighters, the cruel rival, commemorative conflict events, and stories about the collective memory of the conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006). In addition, children themselves as observers may ask questions, verbally interact, and take an active part in societal, communal, and familial ceremonies and rituals commemorating conflict events and fallen individuals. Finally, children may also see and listen to information provided daily by the media about the conflict through the news (e.g., Cohen & Adoni, 1980; Lemish & Götz, 2007) or on television programs for children. The next section discusses specific learning of conflict-related narratives in early childhood.

Conflict-Related Narratives of Ethos of Conflict and Collective Memory

The harsh conditions of intractable conflicts pose serious challenges for the societies involved in them, which, in turn, have to satisfy the basic needs of their members that arise in such conflicts: psychological needs of knowing, mastery, certainty, safety, positive identity, and so on (Burton, 1990; Staub, 2003; Tajfel, 1982). The theory of the sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2007, 2013) suggests that societies that are involved in intractable conflicts develop a sociopsychological repertoire, which includes a collective memory, an ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientations. This repertoire allows them to cope successfully with the challenges that they face. The present chapter focuses on two elements of this repertoire, namely, ethos of conflict and collective memory.

Ethos of conflict is defined as a configuration of central, shared societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society and give meaning to societal life under conditions of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000). The societal beliefs which comprise the ethos of conflict are organized around eight themes: justness of

the in-group's goals, delegitimization of the rival, positive collective self-image, in-group victimization, security, patriotism, unity, and peace (Bar-Tal, 2013; see also Oren, Chap. 8; Sharvit, Chap. 1). *Collective memory* of the conflict consists of societal beliefs and narratives that represent and construct the history of the conflict to society members (Halbwachs, 1992; Wertsch, 2002). These beliefs and narratives develop over time and describe the conflict's outbreak and its course, providing coherent meaning to the past (Devine-Wright, 2003; Tint, 2010). They provide a complete and meaningful picture of the conflict: explain the causes of the conflict, describe its nature, refer to major events, present the image of the rival, portray the in-group's presentation, legitimate present claims and acts, and make major attributions of responsibility for the eruption of the conflict, its continuation, and the violence used (Bar-Tal, 2013; see also Nets-Zenghut, Chap. 4).

The fundamental premise suggests that every society in intractable conflict needs narratives and societal beliefs of ethos of conflict and collective memory, because these enable successful adaptation to the conditions of the conflict and make it possible to withstand acts perpetrated by the rival (Bar-Tal, 2013; Canetti, Chap. 10). Because these societal beliefs are so essential for coping with the harsh experiences of the conflict, the involved societies try to maintain the dominance of their own beliefs among the in-group members. Such societies use social mechanisms to preserve this repertoire and impart it to their members. This is carried out through socialization processes which include all social institutions and channels. These include the educational system, curriculum, textbooks, cultural institutions, channels of communication, the army, the leaders, and national ceremonies. In this process, the ethos beliefs and the collective memory are imparted to the young generation as well. This is an effective way for the society to ensure the preservation of the societal beliefs, since the young members may acquire and store this repertoire from an early age and carry it through their lives.

Learning the Ethos of Conflict and Collective Memory in Early Childhood: The Jewish-Israeli Case

This section presents new empirical evidence from the Israeli-Jewish case study that beliefs and narratives of ethos of conflict and collective memory are already transmitted and absorbed at a very early age. It focuses solely on the educational system (pre-schools and schools) as a central socialization agent that imparts beliefs regarding the conflict (Barrett, 2007; Covell, 1999). In societies where the educational system is under the control of the government, the state recruits the system to serve as a crucial agent of socialization to convey the formal narratives to the younger generation. Political socialization takes place in pre-schools and schools in two major ways: first, by providing contents of national conflict-related narratives in different ways. These include school textbooks, teachers' instruction, discussions, ceremonies, informal education, trips, symbols presented at schools (flags, maps, photos of leaders, plaques memorializing the fallen in the schools), and so on.

Second, schools on all levels usually avoid presenting alternative information about the conflict and thereby limit critical and open discussion of topics related to conflict (see also Lange, 2012).

This form of socialization is very powerful because it reaches all the members of the younger generation in any society in which education is compulsory. In Israel, formal education begins at the age of 3 (see Sprinzak, Bar, & Levy-Mazlum, 2005), and this increases the potential of acquiring conflict-related beliefs at such an early age. In addition, children spend many hours of the day in pre-schools and schools, and these by definition provide knowledge related to the reality in which the society lives. Schools and pre-schools as formal institutions are supervised by the government in Israel with the goal of imparting official narratives (Podeh, 2002). In this context, Bar-Tal, Spivak, and Castel-Bazelet (2003) found that 64 % of the 5- to 6.5-year-old children in their study reported that they acquired information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from their kindergarten teachers. Similarly, Ben Shabat (2010) found that 50 % of the 6- to 7-year-old (first grade) children in her study reported that they acquired information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from their school.

The themes of ethos of conflict and collective memory are transmitted in Israeli pre-schools and elementary schools, especially through national ceremonies and holiday celebrations marking events that are directly and indirectly related to the conflict. A series of studies, reviewed below, involving Jewish-Israeli state pre-schools and elementary schools recount the contents acquired by young children, as well as contents delivered by teachers, regarding the conflict. These studies mainly reflect the messages conveyed and learned through Jewish holiday celebrations that take place in schools and pre-schools. In particular, they include Hanukkah, Purim, Passover, and Lag BaOmer, which are festivals based on biblical and postbiblical historical events during which the Jewish people celebrated their victories and survival of persecutions by the Seleucid, Persian, Egyptian, and Roman empires, respectively. In addition, they reflect messages disseminated and learned through national memorial ceremonies such as Holocaust Day, Memorial Day for Israel's Fallen Soldiers, and Independence Day. These studies were carried out by interviewing pre-school and school teachers and children about these events, after the ceremonies and celebrations.

Ceremonies and celebrations, based on the collective memories of the Jewish people, have been documented as powerful events which transmit contents for the formation of national identity, as well as effective tools that the nation uses to convey its doctrines to its members (Arviv-Abromovich, 2010; Furman, 1999; Handelman & Katz, 1990; Lomsky-Feder, 2003). In Israel, these ceremonies and celebrations are significant in the educational framework and take place every year from pre-school to the last year of high school. In fact, for children, they strongly convey the collective memory of Jewish history that preserves the conflict-related narrative at present (Ben-Amos & Bet-El, 2005). Thus, already in pre-school, children absorb the official narratives imparted by the formal institutions of the state.

Based on interviewing *pre-school teachers*, this series of studies found that the messages relayed to children during the ceremonies and celebrations refer to differ-

ent facets of the conflict-related narratives of ethos of conflict and collective memory. For example, they *justify* the in-group's goals by relating the present period to Bible stories of "the Promised Land" and emphasizing that the Promised Land belongs to the Jews: "I say that we are free people and we protect our land that was promised to us by Abraham, Isaac and Jacob"; "I tell the children that on Independence Day we came back to the Promised Land" (Eldan, 2006). They also justify Jewish goals by relating them to the Holocaust: "The army was established because of what happened to us in the Holocaust, so we will not find ourselves helpless again" (Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009). Pre-school teachers also emphasize the importance of *national security* and of the Israeli army that ensures Israeli security, and they refer to the threats that Israeli society faces: "I tell the children that we have a strong army and we will not go like sheep to the slaughter anymore; we can defend ourselves"; "The children understand that if we don't defend ourselves we can be killed"; "Our country has a lot of enemies around us"; "I explain what an army is, who serves, what the different corps are, and the role of the soldiers" (Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006).

In addition, teachers emphasize beliefs of *positive collective image of the in-group* by describing events in which Jews as a small group overcame a stronger adversary, placing particular value on attributes of heroism and courage: "We were few against many and won heroically"; "Seven Arab countries fought us, and despite [the disparity in army sizes], we defeated them"; "Although Jews had no weapons and the Arabs did, they managed to establish the state, because of their courage and bravery" (Eldan, 2006). Positive collective image is encouraged by assigning unique attributions to one's own group: "I tell the children how special our people are among all nations"; "We are a light unto the nations"[2] (Eldan, 2006). Teachers also transmit beliefs of *self-victimization* especially in relation to the Holocaust: "Hitler decided that he wanted to eliminate all the Jews"; "On all the holidays we had bitter enemies and Hitler was one of them." On Passover, the message is unequivocal and generalized: "In each and every generation, they rise up against us to eliminate us"[3] (Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006).

Teachers emphasize the importance of *national unity* as well. First, they indicate the importance of ignoring internal conflicts, which are emphasized in relation to the Holocaust as a lesson for the present: "You shall remain together. This is the message of the Holocaust. Hitler spread hatred; you will spread love and will remain together"; "In the Holocaust it was every man for himself. There is a clear lesson from the Holocaust; stay together and be united; you have no one but each other"; "If we are not united in this country, what happened in the Holocaust can happen again" (Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006). Second, they strengthen consensus and sense of belonging, as well as identification with the country: "Memorial Day is a day the entire nation feels pain. You are part of the nation"; "It is important for me to explain to children that our strength can be maintained with our unity"; "It is

[2] A term used in the *Book of Isaiah* (Isaiah 42:6).

[3] A phrase from the *Passover Haggadah* (text used on Passover).

important that they recognize the national symbols and feel part of the nation" (Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006).

The theme of *patriotism* is emphasized by pre-school teachers, especially in relation to Memorial Day when they talk with children about Israel's fallen soldiers. In this regard, the teachers transmit two main messages. One refers to the emotional relations between the individuals and their country, fostering love, loyalty, concern, and pride: "I teach them to love their homeland. This is our place; we shall protect and defend it"; "This is a most beautiful and ancient country, King David lived here, and all the figures that they know from the Bible"; "I want them to feel a sense of belonging, respect and love for the country in which they live." The second message focuses on mobilization, contribution, and sacrifice: "It is a privilege to contribute to the country"; "Many people have paid a high price to let us live in this country. This is the duty of all"; "We shall be proud that there are soldiers who are willing to sacrifice themselves for the country" (Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006).

Finally, pre-school teachers transmit the value of *peace*. Peace beliefs are reflected in general aspirations: "We must aspire for peace"; "We want peace and serenity in this country and that everyone will live in peace." Teachers were likely to present Israeli society as peace loving: "We pray for peace and I tell about Abraham who was a peaceable person"; "We always reach out our hand for peace" (Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006). The teachers also talked about interpersonal peace as necessary for children before the intergroup peace: "First of all they should know what peace is in kindergarten- before knowing about the larger peace"; "We start from the small peace when the children fight and then talk about peace between nations" (Eldan, 2006).

In accordance with the content taught by the teachers, a study by Ben Shabat (2010) found that *children* absorb the collective narratives and express them. They learn to *justify* the conflict with Arabs according to the self-perceived righteousness of their in-group goals. They believe that the main reasons for the conflict include the desire of the Arabs to "rule over Israel" and their aspiration to "harm" or "kill" Jews. Children 6 and 7 years old said in interviews: "The Arabs started the conflict, because they wanted to rule the country"; "The Arabs always want to fight with us; they want to steal our country, and to do bad things to us" (Ben Shabat, 2010). They perceive the in-group as *victims*, by relating past attempts to harm Jews to the present Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and thus the historical events are constructed and reinterpreted in accordance with the events of the present. For example, children indicated that Arabs today behave toward Jews in the same way as did past enemies: "Today as well, there are people who want to kill the Jews and harm them. I mean the Arabs who live in Gaza and only want to shoot Qassam rockets at us"; "The evil Arabs want us to become their slaves, like in Egypt"; "The Arabs in Gaza are like Haman[4]; they want to kill the Jews" (Ben Shabat, 2010). In addition, about half of the children in Ben Shabat's study (2010) responded positively to the question of whether today there are people who treat the Jews as they were treated in the Holocaust. For example: "Yes, Hamas today treats the Jews in the same way; they shoot Qassam rockets at us and

[4] Haman is the Persian antagonist in the story of Purim.

they want us to suffer"; however, the other half answered negatively: "No, because the Nazis did much worse things than the Arabs did."

Young children demonstrate well-defined *negative stereotypes* toward the out-group. For instance, Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005) described a pattern of 2–3-year-old Israeli children seeing members of out-groups as "bad" and expressing extreme emotions of hate toward members of these groups. In another study, Ovadia (1993) interviewed 114 Jewish-Israeli children aged 3–6, in which they were asked what they knew about Arabs. The great majority of the responses pertained to the violent behavior of Arabs (i.e., acts of war or terrorist attacks). Israeli-Diner (1993), who interviewed 100 Jewish-Israeli children aged 2.5–6, similarly found that most of the children perceived the Arabs negatively (i.e., in terms of behaviors, traits, and appearance). In addition, Bar-Tal et al. (2003) conducted a study among thirty-one 5–6.5-year-old children from religious and nonreligious kindergartens. Most of the children in this study also attributed negative traits to Arabs as "bad" and "evil" (see also Teichman, Chap. 2).

Generally, it was found that children tend to be pessimistic regarding the future of the conflict and *do not suggest peaceful means* for conflict resolution. Instead, they tend to suggest violent and unilateral solutions. For example, when children were asked "What shall we do about the conflict?" 68 % of them suggested "beating," "fighting," "killing," or "expelling" the Arabs, and no one suggested a peaceful solution (Bar-Tal et al., 2003). In Ben Shabat's study (2010), approximately half of the children held pessimistic views regarding a peaceful solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and said that it was impossible to solve the conflict. The other half suggested one-sided solutions and indicated what the Arabs would do: "The Arabs must agree to a cease-fire and talk with Israel"; "The Arabs should move to another country"; "The Arabs have to apologize and give up"; "We will make a peace with them, then they will go to another country and we will stay here." Only about a tenth of the children held alternative beliefs and suggested a peaceful solution that involved compromising, such as dividing the country between Arabs and Jews or connecting the two countries. For example: "We will give half for them and half for us and then everyone will be satisfied"; "We need to let them be here without wars."

Conclusion

This chapter has provided evidence to suggest that children who grow up in conflict areas are aware of the conflict and experience it in a powerful way from a very early age. These children absorb and learn contents related to the conflict from their own experiences, from environmental cues, and from direct instruction by agents of socialization. Taken together, these sources lead to acquisition of beliefs of ethos of conflict and collective memory already at a very early age, as demonstrated through new empirical evidence from studies conducted in Israeli-Jewish educational system. The Israeli-Jewish case study allows us to assume that generally, children who

grow up in conflict areas acquire early in their childhood a comprehensive system of beliefs that makes their understanding of the conflict meaningful. Imparting these beliefs at such an early age, in a frequent and intense manner, leads to inculcation of these conflict-related narratives deep within the children's sociopsychological repertoires. A line of research in social psychology has established that early political socialization (especially acquisition of negative stereotypes and prejudices) has a lasting impact on the lives of society members in their adulthood and thus plays a major role in the dynamics of the intergroup relations (Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2001; Carter & Rice, 1997; Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001; Sears & Levy, 2003). It can be assumed that the described impact, found in societies uninvolved in violent and protracted intergroup conflict, is even stronger in the powerful context of intractable conflict. Indeed, there is evidence indicating that children and adolescents maintain the patterns manifested at a younger age, in which in-group preference and out-group rejection are amplified and in which the ethos of conflict is manifested (Abdolrazeq, 2002; Barzilay, 2012; Fuxman, 2012; Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012; Teichman & Bar-Tal, 2008).

These beliefs eventually become a barrier for conflict resolution (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011) and one of the possible explanations for the continuation and persistence of intractable conflicts. The adherence of society members to conflict-related beliefs and the transmission of these beliefs to the youngest generations perpetuate a cyclic process through which, among other factors, society becomes more deeply entrenched in conflict. The ethos of conflict and the collective memory remain in the repertoire of the youngest members of society and influence their perceptions and behaviors as adults, which, in turn, feed the new generation's repertoire and so forth. They also constitute a prism, through which society members look at the future of the conflict, and continue to fuel the conflict and to maintain its insolvable nature.

Generally speaking, societies can extricate themselves from this circle by changing behavior patterns and investing efforts in changing their sociopsychological repertoires. To this end, changes are required from both rival sides to reduce the level of violence and to show willingness to resolve the conflict in peaceful ways. It is hard to say where to start since, on the one hand, changing behavior requires changing the repertoire and, on the other hand, changing the repertoire is hard to achieve in a violent reality. The information received from the violent reality reinforces the validity of the conflict-supporting repertoire. However, it is reasonable to assume that if the change in the repertoire among society members begins at an early age on both rival sides, it may increase the chances that the younger generation will develop an alternative repertoire which eventually may lead to an alternative reality. A promising start is through the educational systems, which should include more alternative and complex information within the conflict-related narratives they impart to the youngest generations.

Acknowledgment Meytal Nasie is grateful to the Azrieli Foundation for the award of an Azrieli Fellowship.

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Part II
Collective Memory and Narratives

The Israeli Collective Memory of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian Conflict: Its Characteristics and Relation to the Conflict

Rafi Nets-Zehngut

Introduction

In the course of intractable conflicts, the rival groups develop a sociopsychological repertoire which includes ethos, collective emotional orientation, and collective memory (CM) (Bar-Tal, 2013; Oren, Chap. 8, Pliskin & Halperin, Chap. 11; Sharvit, Chap. 1). This chapter focuses on CM, using as a case study of the Israeli-Jewish ("Israeli") memory of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict ("the conflict"). After providing a theoretical review of CM, it reviews the changes that this Israeli memory has gone through since 1948, as well as its impact on the Palestinian CM and on the conflict.

Collective Memory

CM is generally defined as representations of the past that are adopted by a group. It is an umbrella category that includes various types of (sub)memories (Nets-Zehngut, 2012a). To address some of the main types, first is the **popular** memory, defined as representations of the past held by society members, best manifested directly in public opinion surveys (Midelton & Edwards, 1997). This memory significantly influences the psychological reactions of people (e.g., their collective emotional orientation and ethos) and consequently their behavior; therefore, it is accorded great importance (Paez & Liu, Chap. 5, volume I of this series; Tint, 2010).

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_4

Second is the **official** memory—the representations of the past adopted by the formal institutions of the group. This memory is manifested, for instance, in publications of the army, exhibitions in national museums, and textbooks approved for use in the educational system (Olick, 1998). Third is the **autobiographical** memory, which is that of the people who directly experienced the events at hand, typically demonstrated through their memoirs and oral histories. This is a primary source of knowledge about the past (in addition to documents) and is therefore usually accorded considerable importance. Fourth is the **historical** memory, the way the **research community**—academic and independent scholars—views the past in its studies (Winter & Sivan, 1999). Fifth and final is the **cultural** memory—the way the society views its past via, inter alia, newspaper articles, memorials, monuments, films, and buildings (Assmann, 1995).

The significance of the latter four kinds of memories is mostly that they influence the popular memory (Liu & Hilton, 2005).[1] In addition, official memory has its own separate importance: it represents nations in the international arena and therefore influences their foreign relations (Langenbacher, 2010). In light of the aforementioned wide significance of CM, it has recently gained salience in the academic, public, and diplomatic spheres (Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, & Levy, 2011).

The representations of the past are assembled in narratives. A **narrative** is generally a story about a certain topic that has a plot with starting and end points, providing sequential and causal coherence (Bruner, 1990). There are past, present and future narratives - the first one is relevant when CM is discussed. When a past narrative is adopted by a group (e.g., ethnic group or a state) as the depiction of the past, it becomes part of its CM (Wertsch, 2002).

When the topic at hand is the history of a **conflict**, the past/historical narratives address the major events that led to the eruption of the conflict and that occurred in its course (Nets-Zehngut, 2013a). These narratives are typically selective and biased, providing self-serving, simplistic, and black-and-white views of the conflicts (Bar-Tal, Oren, & Nets-Zehngut, 2014; Paez & Liu, Chap. 5, volume I of this series; Tint, 2010). They usually touch on at least four main themes: delegitimization of the rival, positive image of the in-group, presentation of the in-group as the sole or main victim, and justification of the conflict's outbreak (when the in-group initiated the conflict) (Bar-Tal, 2007). As such, these narratives play two important roles in the conflict, the first being an internal role. When a group adopts such narratives, they then become part of its members' popular memory. As a result, the narratives influence group members' psychological reactions and consequently their behavioral reactions—negatively toward the rival and positively toward themselves. Thus, these narratives promote a hostile approach toward the rival and the mobilization of society members to be patriotic and to contribute their share to the struggle. The second role is an external one—they present the in-group positively to the international

[1] Reference is made here mostly to the influences of the **external** manifestations of these four memories (e.g., books, articles, and films) in contrast to their internal manifestations (e.g., a memorandum sent within a state ministry) that influence the popular memory much less. For a discussion of external and internal collective memories, see Nets-Zehngut (2012b).

community, promoting support for the group (Bar-Tal, Oren, & Nets-Zehngut, in press; Nets-Zehngut, 2012b).

Adoption of such typical historical narratives into the CM of societies is often perceived as functional during the conflict's climax, due to the internal and external effects described above. However, such narratives also inhibit peaceful resolution of the conflict and the parties' reconciliation. Internally, the group members are discouraged from signing a peace agreement with a rival that is perceived so negatively and is untrustworthy. Externally, the rival is discouraged from negotiating with an in-group whose narratives are so biased and negative against it (Auerbach, 2010; Bar-Tal, 2007). Thus, the more a party's CM can be transformed to include less biased and negative narratives—as long as there is factual basis for such a transformation, and usually there is—the more the party's psychological reactions can accommodate peace and reconciliation. The rival can then be viewed in a more legitimized, humanized, and differentiated manner. Moreover, from the rival's point of view, observing such positive transformation within the in-group will encourage it to take part in peace and reconciliation processes (Nets-Zehngut & Bar-Tal, 2014; Paez & Liu, Chap. 5, volume I of this series). Such transformation, however, is difficult to achieve, partly because intractable conflicts typically cause severe collective traumas to the parties involved (Nets-Zehngut, 2012c; Staub, 2011).

The above discussion describes the direct impact of the CM of conflict on the conflict. CM, however, also influences the conflict indirectly, as mentioned above, via its impact on various psychological reactions of people, including their collective emotional orientation and ethos. These psychological reactions also influence the CM.[2]

After describing the general background of the CM of conflicts, let us address our case study.

The Israeli Collective Memory of the Conflict

Until the late 1970s, the Israeli CM of the conflict largely reflected the **Zionist** narrative, which was largely a typical narrative of conflicts as described above. It was significantly biased and distorted, presenting unrealistically the Israelis very positively and the Arabs/Palestinians very negatively (Oren, Nets-Zehngut, & Bar-Tal, 2014). Generally, this narrative delegitimized the Arabs/Palestinians as well as blamed them for the outbreak and the continuation of the conflict. In contrast, the Jews (prior to 1948) and later the Israelis were portrayed positively as peace loving and moral, the sole victims of the conflict (e.g., Firer & Adwan, 2004; Podeh, 2002). Specifically, for example, according to the Zionist narrative, the Jewish pioneers in the pre-Israel period promoted the prosperity of the local Palestinian economy, the 1936–1939 Palestinian uprising was directed mainly against the Jewish community, and the Jews tried to prevent the eruption of the 1948 War (as well as all other Israeli-Arab wars). Additionally, the 1948 Palestinian exodus was presented—for

[2] For a discussion of these indirect reciprocal impacts, see Sharvit (Chap. 1).

example, in studies, veterans' memoirs and main newspapers' articles—as exclusively caused by a willing flight of the Palestinians (Nets-Zehngut, 2011a, 2012e, 2015a). Moreover, according to this narrative, in 1948 the Jews/Israelis were outnumbered by the Arabs/Palestinians ("David vs. Goliath"), the post-1948 Palestinian infiltration into Israel was caused by political-terrorist motivations, the Palestinians also left their localities willingly in the 1967 Six-Day War, and Israel always acted morally in the battlefield. These Zionist themes were presented in various outputs such as studies (historical memory), memoirs (autobiographical memory), newspaper articles (cultural memory), and state publications (official memory) (Nets-Zehngut, 2012d, forthcoming; Podeh, 2002).

Since the 1970s, however, a change has occurred. Members of various Israeli societal institutions have begun presenting a **Critical** narrative of the conflict (often entitled since the late 1980s "post-Zionist"). Generally, this narrative was less biased and self-serving, presenting the Israelis less positively and/or the Arabs/Palestinians less negatively. Specifically, this change took place, inter alia, in the historical memory, presented in scholarly research. For example, Yeoshua Porat (1976) argued in his book that the 1936–1939 Palestinian uprising was directed mainly against the British and not against the Jews. As for the 1948 Palestinian exodus, many scholarly studies (see reviews in Nets-Zehngut, 2011a, 2012f, forthcoming) and daily newspaper articles (cultural memory; Nets-Zehngut, 2012e, 2014), as well as some 1948 Jewish war veterans' memoirs (autobiographical memory; Nets-Zehngut, 2012e, 2014, 2015a), have begun presenting the Critical narrative. According to this narrative, some Palestinians left willingly (e.g., due to fear, societal collapse, and calls of Arab/Palestinian leadership to partially leave), while others were expelled by the Jewish/Israeli fighting forces. Moreover, other studies argued that the Zionist pioneers acted against the local Palestinians, taking their lands and closing trading markets to them (Kimmerling, 1983), and that in an agreement with Abdullah, King of Jordan, Jews divided the territory in 1948 (Shiftan, 1986).

This societal change intensified in the late 1980s with the commencement of a historical revisionist period commonly called the "New Historians" era. New additional historical studies criticized previously unexamined aspects of the Zionist narrative or supported criticism raised earlier (Caplan, 2010). For example, studies argued that Israel avoided peace negotiations prior to the 1948 War, negotiations that could have prevented the war, and that the military balance between the Jews/Israelis and the Arabs/Palestinians in the 1948 War favored the former in some phases of the war (e.g., Flapan, 1987). As for the 1948 Palestinian exodus, historian Benny Morris (1987) supported its Critical narrative in many documents (mostly in his seminal book *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949*),[3] and such support, though typically less wide in scope, was also provided by many other studies (see review in Nets-Zehngut, 2011a, 2012f, forthcoming). Thus, since the late 1980s and at least until the early 2000s, the Critical narrative of the exodus was largely the exclusive one among Israeli studies (Nets-Zehngut, 2011a, 2012f). Moreover, since the late 1980s the publication of Critical newspaper articles also

[3] The book was actually published in early 1988, not in 1987 as written there.

has increased (vast majority), along with Critical 1948 war veterans' memoirs (about a third published) (Nets-Zehngut, 2012a, 2014). At the same time, Israeli NGOs (cultural memory) began to present the Critical and the Palestinian narratives regarding the exodus more significantly in their publications (Nets-Zehngut, 2012e). Onward, beginning in the 1990s, some history textbooks used in the educational system (without official state approval) began to present the Critical narrative of the exodus (Firer & Adwan, 2004; Podeh, 2002).

As for the post-1948 Palestinian infiltration into Israel, studies argued that it was mainly caused by economic and social motivations (e.g., harvesting their own abandoned fields and visiting relatives) and not political-terrorist ones (e.g., Morris, 1993). It was also asserted that in the 1967 War some Palestinians were expelled, a claim supported by other sources, such as 1967 war veterans including senior IDF officer Uzi Narkiss (see review in Nets-Zehngut, 2012d). Studies also argued that throughout the conflict immoral and illegal acts were conducted by the Jews/Israelis, including massacres, rapes, and tortures (e.g., Morris, 2004; Yahav, 2002). The documents provided by the scholarly studies, and the testimonies given and newspaper articles written by Israeli war veterans, presented a solid basis to conclude that the Critical narrative regarding the conflict is more accurate than the Zionist one.

In contrast to the societal institutions, the situation at the Israeli state institutions (official memory) did not change so drastically and early. For example, in reference to the 1948 Palestinian exodus, at least until 2004, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF; Nets-Zehngut, 2015b) and the National Information Center (Nets-Zehngut, 2008, in press) continued to present the Zionist narrative, as they had since the early 1950s. The situation was similar with regard to the approach of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at least until 1967 (Nets-Zehngut, 2012d, forthcoming).

However, in some state institutions, changes have occurred regarding, for instance, the presentation of the 1948 Palestinian exodus, but only since the late 1990s. For example, from December 1997 until May 1998, the Israeli national television channel broadcasted a prestigious television series, Tekuma (in Hebrew, "Resurrection"). The series covered the main events in the history of the state, and while describing the 1948 War, it stated that some Palestinians were expelled (Kleinberg, 1998). In addition, while until 1999 the Ministry of Education's approved history and civics textbooks presented largely the Zionist narrative, between 2000 and 2004 they have presented the Critical one (Nets-Zehngut, 2013b).[4] Similarly, in 2005, the Israeli National Archive published a book containing a selection of documents pertaining to the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, discussing openly the expulsions of Palestinians in 1948 (Rosental, 2005).

Lastly, regarding the Israeli popular memory of the conflict, the first study that explored this memory was conducted in 2008, using a representative sample ($N=500$) of Israeli-Jews to examine their memory of 23 major events/topics in the conflict. Generally, the study found that Israelis' memory of the conflict (across 23 topics) was closer to being Critical than to being Zionist. Specifically, for example,

[4] Reference is made here to the textbooks for the national secular educational system, the biggest in Israel.

regarding the responsibility for the eruption of the conflict and for its continuation, only 43 % of the Israelis attributed it only to the Arabs/Palestinians, while a similar percentage, 46 %, attributed it to both Arabs/Palestinians and Israelis and 4 % to the Israelis (the rest did not reply). Another example is regarding the 1948 Palestinian exodus: only 41 % percent held the Zionist narrative, while 39 % held the Critical narrative and 8 % that of the Palestinians—that the exodus was caused only by expulsion (the rest did not reply). That is, 47 % of the Israelis believed that some or all of the Palestinians were expelled in 1948 (slightly more than those holding the "no expulsion" Zionist narrative, 41 %). Even though there is no survey evidence of what the popular memory was like until the 1980s, the dominance of the Zionist narratives regarding the conflict in other types of memory until those times (as reviewed above, e.g., historical, official, and autobiographical) probably shaped in a Zionist manner the popular memory as well until around the 1980s. Hence, the new findings of the survey probably represent a major change in the popular memory of the conflict to being less Zionist and biased.[5]

Summary and Discussion

In sum, the Israeli CM of the conflict has transformed over the years. In the first period after the establishment of the State of Israel, it was highly biased and distorted, holding almost exclusively the Zionist narrative. As time passed, however, mostly since the late 1970s, it has become less biased and distorted, giving way to holding also—at times significantly—the Critical narrative. This process started among the societal institutions/memories and since the 1990s was followed by some state institutions (official memory). Let us address several phenomena that are related to this CM transformation such as self-censorship, impacts of the Palestinian and Israeli CMs on each other, and the impacts of the Israeli CM on the conflict.

Self-Censorship

One of the mechanisms that inhibited the aforementioned transformation of the Israeli CM prior to the 1970s, and slowed this process onward, was self-censorship. This took place among members of various Israeli societal institutions (e.g., scholars and journalists, respectively, Nets-Zehngut, 2011a, 2012d, forthcoming) and state

[5] It should be mentioned that regarding some topics, the survey found the Israeli memory to be inaccurate and biased (e.g., regarding the extent of involvement of Israeli-Palestinians in terror activities against Israel, many people perceived it much higher than it is actually). For data regarding the Israeli popular memory of all the 23 major topics, see http://www.collective-memory.info under "Publications," accessed January 17, 2015. For an analysis of the survey's findings, see Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal (2016, in preparation).

institutions such as the National Information Center, the IDF, and the Ministry of Education (respectively, Nets-Zehngut, 2008, 2013b, 2015b; Nets-Zehngut, Pliskin, & Bar-Tal, 2015). That is, these individuals and institutions intentionally did not expose in their publications information and narratives that contradicted the Zionist narrative of the conflict and therefore could have challenged its hegemony in Israel. For example, regarding the 1948 Palestinian exodus, many members of these institutions decided independently not to present information about expulsions or the Critical narrative at large, even though they believed that the Critical narrative was accurate (see, e.g., Nets-Zehngut, 2011a, 2013b, 2015b, forthcoming; Nets-Zehngut et al., in press).

Impacts of the Palestinian and Israeli CMs on Each Other

Let us address these two directions of impacts. One factor that inhibited the transformation of the Israeli CM over the years was part of the Palestinian CM of the conflict. Regarding the 1948 Palestinian exodus, for example, the Palestinian official and historical memories of that event have been somewhat biased and distorted, claiming that all the Palestinian refugees were expelled (Nets-Zehngut, 2011b; see also Nahhas, Chap. 5). This, despite the fact that even according to the Palestinian autobiographical memory of the exodus—of the refugees themselves—the expulsion was only one of several causes of the exodus and not even the central one (Nets-Zehngut, 2011b, 2013c). The Israelis were aware of this biased tendency of the Palestinian official and historical memories, and this was one reason for their reluctance to admit the 1948 expulsions (Nets-Zehngut, 2012d). Nonetheless, recently, a change has occurred in the Palestinian historical memory of the exodus: at least some of the studies published by Palestinian scholars present the Critical narrative regarding the exodus (see review in Nets-Zehngut, 2014). Moreover, since the early 2000s, nine projects of Israelis and Palestinians addressed the historical narratives of their conflict: PRIME, Shared Histories, Circles of Knowledge, Zochrot, History's Double Helix, Shared Narratives, Van Leer, IHJR, and Gabay-Kazak. The projects were conducted mostly by scholars, as well as some educators and peace activists, all of whom tried to expose each party to the narratives of the other, reduce gaps between the narratives of both parties, or agree on two parallel but legitimized narratives (Nets-Zehngut, 2013d). The above Critical Palestinian studies and the Israeli-Palestinian narrative-negotiation projects are manifestations, and facilitators, of a transformation of the Palestinian historical memory of the conflict. This, in turn, may support additional transformation of the Israeli CM of the conflict to being less biased, since the Israelis will notice, if they have not done so already, the more open and critical tendency of their Palestinian colleagues. The reverse process may also occur among the Palestinians.[6]

[6] These narrative-negotiation projects can also influence directly the Israeli collective memory of the conflict, to becoming less biased.

Palestinian scholars were aware of the critical trend in Israeli historical memory since the 1980s (e.g., the New Historians). Some of the Palestinians (e.g., the renowned late Edward Said) were encouraged by this trend, believing that they also should be more critical in their studies of their history, like their Israeli colleagues (Nets-Zehngut, 2015c). This was one of the causes of the aforementioned recent transformation of Palestinian historical memory of the exodus to being more critical (Nets-Zehngut, 2014).

Such transformation can have various positive impacts: Israelis can observe this transformation, therefore allowing themselves to be even more critical than they already are. Consequently, both parties can take part in a circular process in which each is becoming more critical, encouraging the other side to be so, and so forth. Such transformation in the Palestinian historical memory can also lead to a similar transformation in the other types of Palestinian memories (e.g., official or cultural), making them also more critical and less distorted. All these impacts can indirectly support the resolution of the conflict.

Impacts of the Israeli CM on the Conflict

In the limited scope of this chapter, two such main impacts can be carefully suggested:

1. *Impacts of the Israeli popular memory on the Israelis*. The Israeli popular memory of the conflict was, as said, highly distorted and Zionist oriented in the first decades after Israel's establishment. Therefore, in those decades this memory probably led—based on the above literature review—to negative emotions, perceptions, and motivations of the Israelis toward the Arabs/Palestinians. For example, it promoted hawkish political attitudes among the Israelis and reduced their willingness to reach peace with the Arabs/Palestinians. It also increased Israeli willingness for revenge and attack of the Palestinians, as well as their wish to continue the conflict. This state of affairs supported the continuation of the conflict. Nonetheless, as time passed, apparently mostly since the 1980s, the popular memory transformed to being less distorted, Zionist, and negative. This led to the reverse reactions than those that occurred before the 1980s (i.e., more positive approaches toward the Arabs/Palestinians), consequently promoting the resolution of the conflict (Nets-Zehngut & Bar-Tal, in press, in preparation). The reverse, though, is also true—the situation of the conflict also influences the popular memory. For example, the Israeli-Jewish popular memory of the causes of the 1948 Palestinian exodus was much more Critical oriented in 1999 (when Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations seemed to be resolving the conflict) compared to its more Zionist nature in 2003 (after the collapse of the negotiations and in the middle of the second Palestinian uprising/intifada) (Nets-Zehngut, in preparation).
2. *Impact of the Israeli CM on the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem*. This problem is one of the core issues that needs to be addressed in a peace

agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. For decades after the 1948 War, Israel refused to acknowledge in its peace negotiations with the Palestinians the Palestinian 1948 tragedy and any kind of responsibility for the exodus, holding the Zionist narrative of "no expulsion" (Caplan, 2010). In contrast, the 2000 Camp David and the 2001 Taba Israeli-Palestinian peace summits witnessed a change. At that time, the Critical narrative of the exodus was so prevalent in Israel, as described, that it was hard for Israeli negotiators to ignore it, as was done before. Therefore, they expressed in the summits a basic willingness to publicly acknowledge the Palestinian 1948 tragedy and willingness to consider accepting implicitly and indirectly Israel's shared responsibility for it. This was a significant factor promoting the resolution of the refugee problem and therefore also of the conflict (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007).

In conclusion, the Israeli CM has transformed since the 1970s, from being initially distorted and Zionist (inhibiting the resolution of the conflict) to being more accurate and Critical (promoting various positive impacts on the conflict). While this description addresses the impact of the CM on the conflict, it should be said that there was also a reverse impact. That is, the impact on the Israelis of the changes over the years in the characteristics of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict promoted the aforementioned change in their CM. As time has passed, Israel grew stronger (militarily and economically), won all the wars in which it participated, and all this increased Israel's confidence in its existence and reduced the security threat. This in turn—especially until 2000—decreased Israel's need for a biased Zionist CM that will mobilize its citizens to support their country in the conflict (Shapira, 2000).

Despite the aforementioned transformation in the Israeli CM of the conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not yet been resolved. What does it say about CM and conflict dynamics? Does CM really matter? Addressing this wide point briefly, it can be said, first, that it takes two to resolve a conflict. The Palestinian CM of the conflict is largely still significantly biased, especially the official memory, though also the popular one (Nahhas, Chap. 5; Nets-Zehngut, 2011b, 2014). This state of affairs inhibits the chances for peace. Second, regarding both Palestinians and Israelis, CM is not the only factor that influences achieving peace. Many of the other relevant factors are the other components of the psychological repertoire (collective emotional orientation and ethos) as well as social characteristics and the context of the conflict, as presented above. As for this latter factor, the year 2000 represented for the Israelis (and probably also for the Palestinians) a major negative shift in the conflict. Naming some of the main changes, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process collapsed, the second intifada erupted, later Hamas took over Gaza Strip, and missile attacks became part of Israeli life. All this promoted a major shift in the political attitudes of Israelis to the right and maintained this shift (Ben-Eliezer, 2012). It is the cumulative impact of all the factors, within both rival parties, that determines whether peace will be reached. CM addresses the past, but when the present is so dire, it is not surprising that support for peace in Israel is low. Specifically, in the Israeli-Palestinian case, despite significant transformation of the Israeli-Jewish collective memory of the conflict to being less Zionist, the Palestinian counter

memory followed this direction only partially and later; and the situation of the conflict deteriorated dramatically since 2000. These were some of the main reasons for the fact that despite the Israeli-Jewish memory transformation, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not yet resolved.

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The "Silenced" Narrative of 1948 War Events Among Young Palestinians in Israel

Eman Nahhas

Introduction

To Palestinians, the 1948 War events were a tragedy whose consequences are felt up to the present day and whose victims are not only external and internal refugees, but also the entire Palestinian population living in Israel. For this minority, the disaster continues to constitute an open wound (Jarrar, 2010). In order to meet the challenges of their present marginalized status as second-class citizens who are collectively excluded and discriminated against in an ethnic state that denies its non-Jewish citizens a national identity, power, property, goals, and definitions (Abu-Saad, 2006; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury, 2014; Sultany, 2012; Yiftachel, 2012), Palestinians in Israel have had to develop their own collective cognitive-affective repertoire. Such a repertoire has developed to include as its basic components societal beliefs of collective memory and an ethos of conflict, collective fear orientation, collective hatred orientation, and collective anger orientation (Bar-Tal, 2000; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).

The 1948 War events have evolved as the pivotal core of Palestinian collective memory. These occurrences connect Palestinians to a specific point in time that has become for them an eternal present (Masalha, 2008). Israel's victory in the 1948 War had a direct impact on the capacity of Palestinians to write their own narrative. Since 1948 their attempts to create a coherent narrative of their collective past have often been challenged and silenced (Khalili, 2007). The 1948 War included not only the destruction of 80–85 % of the Palestinian villages that fell under Israeli control and the expulsion of approximately 60 % of the Palestinian people; it was also directed at silencing the memory and eradicating the landscape of the dispossessed population.

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_5

The war led to the disappearance of most of the Palestinian printed word. Israelis destroyed and confiscated all public libraries, printing presses, and publishing houses, as well as land registries, municipal council archives, schools, and cultural centers (Abd al-Jawad, 2007). In addition, depopulated houses were blown up or razed to the ground, perpetuating the Zionist narrative that Palestine was virtually empty territory before the Jews arrived (Masalha, 1997).

In fact, random life stories told by individuals who have undergone these war experiences cannot create a national narrative and a collective memory with which a whole community can identify. National narratives and collective memory should be expressed through major societal communication channels and take the form of cultural products such as books, plays, and films. Palestinians in Israel do not have their own national agencies or archives through which young generations could be made aware of their collective memory. In addition, they face deliberate silencing of their narrative by Israeli authorities. Actually, this was the reason to conduct this study which aimed mainly to investigate the nature of the Palestinian popular collective memory[1] regarding 1948 War events among young Palestinians who did not experience the events nor studied about them via official authorities.

The Current Study

The sample consisted of 20 Palestinian young men (ages 21–35, average age 29.19) who reside in the Galilee, Israel. The mode of inquiry used in this study was qualitative and interpretive in nature and comprised in-depth phenomenological interviews which included open-ended questions. A designated interview schedule examined the collective memory of 1948 War events, participation in commemorative events and activities related to the events, feelings about what happened, who are the major agents transmitting that memory, and, finally, the influence of the 1948 War events on the interviewees' values and present lives.[2] Based on the qualitative form of inquiry, the method of analysis used was derived from thematic field analysis as outlined by Rosenthal (1993), which involved reconstructing and categorizing the interviewees' narrative, and classification of their life experiences and values into thematic fields. Tutty, Rothery, and Grinnell's (1996) guidelines were used to analyze the interviews, according to which units of meaning were categorically classified and relevant themes identified.

Before commencing the analysis, the interviews were transcribed (i.e., the interview scripts, observational notes, and memos were converted into word processing

[1] A popular memory is one that is held by a group of people who do not necessarily possess power, and it refers to the societal beliefs of collective memory held by them as part of their repertoire. Popular memory is that which is accepted by the public as valid and reflected in oral accounts of the society members, in their customs, traditions, and social practices (Alonso, 1988).

[2] It should be indicated that all of the interviewees preferred to be interviewed in their homes, and the names used are pseudonyms to ensure anonymity.

documents). These transcripts were then analyzed using Atlas.ti., a qualitative research software which analyzes text-based data through line-by-line coding of themes and units of meaning. The following section will present the result of many hours of reading through the transcripts and analyzing the contents in order to get the main themes raised by the interviewees.

Young Palestinians' Narrative of 1948 War Events

Almost all of the interviewees initiated their narrative regarding the 1948 War events with one common assertion of a "…nation that had been invaded and occupied by another foreign nation, and a substitution of residents." They perceive Historic Palestine before 1948 as empty of Jews. For example, *Najati* asserted that "The Jews entered this country, occupied the Arab cities and villages and displaced the Palestinians from their homes and country." It was blatant that all the interviewees began their narratives with the verb "entered" (*dakhal*), which revealed their perception that "the Jews were not here." Then they resume their narratives with two verbs that definitely describe destructive actions, namely, "occupied" and "expelled" (*eĥtal and tarad*).

The interviewees' narrative regarding the collective memory of the 1948 War events contains three major well-defined themes: (1) The Zionists had a predetermined plan to empty Palestine of its Arab people, (2) the Jews committed atrocities, and (3) the Palestinians fled out of fear.

Almost all of the interviewees emphasized that there was a master plan to expel Palestinians from the new Israeli state, and they even initiated their narratives with this specific claim. *Rateb*, for example, emphatically claimed that "…it was the Zionist leadership's strategy to expel the Palestinians out of the country. If we look at the villages that were destroyed, we will find that there was a political strategy to empty these villages of their residents. These villages either resisted the Jewish invasion or were located in strategic positions, such as major junctions or the state's border regions."

Young Palestinians referred to the strategies used by the Zionist forces as "deceitful" and used very negative terms to describe such strategies. For example, when *Ma'adi* was asked what he knew about what happened in 1948 War, his answer was loaded with very negative expressions that delegitimized the Jews. He claimed: "It was a series of killings, slaughter and expulsion, very inhuman and harsh."

In addition to highlighting the theme of the predetermined plan to expel the Arabs, the majority of the interviewees also noted that Palestinians fled their homes and villages out of fear. *Rateb*, for example, said that "…there was a big fuss, and the Jews were perceived as ghosts. The people were shouting in terror: 'The Jews are coming, the Jews are coming'. So when the people heard that the Jews were approaching the village, they just ran away." *Sleem* also explained how "… Palestinians left their houses wide open and had no time to take any of their personal belongings because they were frightened by the growl of the tanks that were approaching their village."

The claims regarding the Palestinians' frightened reaction were juxtaposed to the claim that Jews committed atrocities and killed Palestinians. For example, *Noor* tried to explain that Palestinian villagers were forced to flee after being attacked by the invading Jewish *Haganah* (Jewish forces) "People were harshly attacked and assassinated by the Jews; a lot of people were killed and the rest had to run away in fear."

In fact, the *Deir Yassin* massacre was repeatedly cited by the majority of the interviewees as the most significant stimulus that triggered the Palestinians' flight reaction. For example, *Najati* claimed that "…news about Deir Yassin and other atrocities terrified the people and made them seek secure places."

However, the majority of the interviewees asserted that fear was an inevitable reaction to the expulsion strategies used against the Arab villagers. For example, *Najlawi* said: "There was a process of deliberate uprooting of Palestinians. They aimed to frighten the people in order to force them to flee. The Jews committed lots of massacres to frighten Palestinians and in addition they also loaded men onto trucks and threw them out of Israel's borders." *Najlawi's* claim echoes the major claims that were accentuated again and again by every interviewee.

Briefly, the three pivotal themes reflect a "black-and-white" approach, in which a definite cause brought about a clear-cut result without involving too many factors or participants on the "scene." The sole "actors" were the Jewish forces that invaded their country and occupied it, pushing the majority of the Palestinian nation out of the country.

Family Settings as a "Mnemonic Community" and Grandfathers as Narrative Transmitting Agents

All interviewees had asserted that they were never taught about what happened in schools. All the information had been acquired via informal socializing agents such as family members and friends. Their grandfathers, the so-called Nakba generation, were the main source of knowledge. They used to recall their memories of what happened in 1948 again and again during their family gatherings, expressing their yearning for the simplicity and serenity of life before 1948. For those elders, the year of 1948 represents a significant turning point. Before that year they enjoyed simple life as peasants and farmers, but after 1948 they all were forced to work hard to make a living and secure themselves and their families a quiet life, due to the fact that most of them had lost their land which was their main source of living.

For example, *Sleem* recalled these occasions, stating: "We used to listen to my grandfather's memories every time he gathered with the elders in the diwan[3] or in the yard of the house. My grandfather used to talk about his personal memories of the 1948 War and we used to listen very quietly because we were young and not

[3] ***Diwan*** (divan)—a word that is basically used to refer to a Muslim council chamber or law court or a room where a committee meets (such as the board of directors of a company), and it is used also to describe a room in which notables are accustomed to meeting.

supposed to respond." During these adult gatherings, *Sleem* learned the detailed story of *Abu Ahmad* who was displaced from *Amqa*[4] together with more than 1500 people. *Sleem* asserted that the same story with the same details was constantly repeated, so that he became familiar with it as though it was his personal memory.

In contrast to those inadvertent discussions, a few interviewees asserted that their grandfathers initiated frequent deliberate conversations, in which they shared their personal memories of the 1948 War as well as their collective memory of the 1948 War with family members, who played the part of active listeners, asking and commenting on the shared stories. In these few cases, the interviewees claimed that their grandparents spontaneously shared their personal and collective memories with family members. For example, *Dimani* claimed: "The fact that my grandfather experienced the 1948 Nakba and took an active part in the Palestinian resistance forces has powerfully influenced his life and has caused him to share his detailed stories with us again and again. In fact it was not only he who initiated the telling; we were actually always thirsty to listen to his vivid, interesting stories." *Dimani* wondered how he managed to listen to the same stories with identical details on a daily basis. However, he claimed that the way his grandfather presented the past was very attractive. *Dimani* explained "My grandfather's vivid stories were so sincere; his memories were clear and included a lot of minor details, so I used to listen very carefully." Cappelletto (2003) explains that when the representations of the past are a mixture of autobiographical and historical memory, the story with all its descriptive details is recounted by those who were not witnesses as if its events had been personally experienced by them. In point of fact, the transmitted stories have become a means of communication within the families of those who experienced the 1948 War, especially among those who were not only witnesses, but who took an active part in it.

In Zerubavel's (1996) conception, the *Nakba* generation represents a "mnemonic community," made up of those who witnessed the war, experienced the expulsion, and are still engaged in remembering it. This mnemonic community incorporates new members by familiarizing them with the community's past, which they did not have to experience personally in order to remember it (Zerubavel, 2003). According to the interviewees' claims, their grandfathers spontaneously shared their personal and collective memories with family members when they met together. For them these familial narrative sessions serve as both a socializing process and an exercise in memory. Their narratives combine autobiographical and historical memory, so that the story with all its descriptive details will also be recounted by their family members, who were not in fact witnesses, as if the events had been experienced by them personally. Actually, the transmitted stories become a means of communication within the family and between the family and outsiders. Consequently, all members of this mnemonic community, the first generation as well as their descendants, feel as if they serve as bearers and transmitters of an unforgettable memory, which is relevant to their present and reflects on their future as well.

[4] A Palestinian village that was destroyed in 1948 and on its ruins the Jewish Moshav of Amka was built.

Triggers for Sharing the Narrative of the 1948 War Events

Discussions about the 1948 War events are frequently held within family settings. The continuous clashes between the Israeli Defense Forces and Palestinians and the numerous wars that have occurred between Israel and the neighboring Arab states stimulate a need among elderly Palestinians to initiate a discussion about the collective memory of that period with their family members. For example, *Sleem* mentioned that "…in the last Gaza war as we saw the Palestinians fleeing their houses, my father and grandfather never stopped linking the scenes of the fleeing people with my grandfather's experience in 1948." As a matter of fact, Israel is a violent war zone where different generations are exposed to chronic political violence[5] (Canetti, Chap. 10, Nasie, Chap. 3; Sagi-Schwartz, van IJzendoorn, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2008). It can thus be assumed that 1948 War analogy is intensified among all Palestinians whenever they are exposed to more recent political violence.

In addition, the core of young Palestinians' existence as unequal citizens in the state of Israel is also a constant reminder of the fact that their nation was defeated in 1948 and became a minority in Israel. *Rateb*, for instance, indicated that "…being exposed to prolonged bias and discrimination by the so-called democratic Jewish state is enough to initiate a discussion in which 1948 is referred to repeatedly." Oka (2009) claims that Palestinians in Israel have been suffering from the violent consequences of the *Nakba* for over 60 years. Therefore, it seems that their collective memory is still connected to their present and future situation.

Additionally, having relatives living in the Diasporas, who are unable to visit, is also a topic that stimulates frequent discussions of the 1948 War events. These relatives are especially remembered on holidays, when all the family members gather together to celebrate and remember those who are absent. It must be mentioned that most of the Palestinians who live in Israel have family members, such as brothers, sister, uncles, and aunts, who have been living in exile for many years. Ties to family and friends living in the Diaspora are maintained mainly through sentiments stemming from memories. The connection with them is more powerfully imagined and remembered than acted upon. For example, *Mureed* became choked up when remembering his uncle, whom he had never met. He complained: "I grew up knowing that I have an uncle who lives in the Diaspora; his memory is endlessly raised and it is always loaded with feelings of Ḥasra (sorrow). It is really painful to watch your parents and grandparents crying just at the mention of his name."

Farsoun (2004) highlights the significance of kin and family (*'a'ilah*) ties in Palestinians' daily life. He claims that both traditionally and in a contemporary context, Palestinians formulate their experiences and conceptualize their lives not as independent individuals but as members of an extended family. The family provides

[5] Major wars in the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1948 and 2011: the 1948 War, the 1956 Sinai War, the 1967 War, the 1973 October War, the 1982 First Lebanon War, the 1987–1993 Intifada, the 2000–2005 Al Aqsa Intifada, the 2006 second Lebanon War, and the 2008 and 2014 Gaza Wars.

the individual with psychological, social, and economic functions. Family ties are permanent, reckoned through the male line, and characterized by mutual support, material assistance, trust, and sacrifice of the individual's interest for the greater welfare of the family. So, missing any family member is perceived as very tragic, especially when his or her absence is forced and not voluntary.

In addition to relatives who live in the Diasporas, most of the interviewees claimed that the "topography" of the country is a constant reminder of the "previous" life of Palestinians on this land (before 1948), including such features as cactus fences, fig trees, street names, old Arabic buildings, and other remnants of the past. For example, *Sabeel* claimed that as he joins his family on trips in the area surrounding *Kufor Kanna*, they pass by several remnants of *Loubieh* and *Sajara* (former destroyed Palestinian villages). He assures "When I see the trees and the remnants of the destroyed houses of Sajara, I always wonder what happened there and what happened to the people who were displaced." The pre-1948 physical locations of the destroyed villages have become conceptual and memorial spaces maintained and shared through many forms and forums (Davis, 2011).

In brief, it can be assumed that despite the long period of a silenced memory, remnants of destroyed Palestinian villages act as mnemonic arenas that recreate, represent, and preserve the collective narrative of the 1948 War among young Palestinians. On a basic level, these venues served as the forum where the *Nakba* generation individuals could articulate their own memories, which is the first stage in transforming personal memories into collective ones.

The Influence of the 1948 War Events on the Lives of Young Palestinians

Nearly 67 years have elapsed since the 1948 War, but it seems that its consequences continue to preoccupy young Palestinian generations. The majority of the interviewees discussed the major influences that the *Nakba* has had on their lives, whereas none of them stated that it was not relevant for them.

For most of them, the prominent theme centered on family dispersion and detachment. They talked about the fact that they had relatives living in exile whom they had never met. For example, *Mureed* mentioned that his grandfather's brother and uncle were expelled to Lebanon and never returned. He asserted that the story of that uncle is repeatedly mentioned by his family members as a theme loaded with emotional difficulties regarding the events of 1948. Another effect that was mentioned was land shortage resulting from land confiscation. During the twentieth century, Palestinians were dispossessed of a majority of land they had previously owned and possessed individually and collectively. Thus, as years went by, young Palestinians in Israel have become more and more distressed by the problem of land shortage and housing difficulties. Between 1948 and 1990, the Palestinians in Israel lost close to a million acres of land (Beit-Hallahmi, 1992). *Galeel*, for example, lamented the hundreds of *dunams* expropriated by the Israel Land Administration (which is responsible for

land under the control of the Development Authority and the Jewish National Fund, as well as the state) for the sake of building the Carmiel industrial area. He said "Each time I pass by the industrial area of Carmiel, I recognize the extent of our loss. My grandfather owned hundreds of dunams there and now I have nothing but half a dunam for building my own house." In this vein, Rekhess (2002) states that the massive expropriation of Arab lands constitutes a "…living symbol of a wound that has not healed (p. 24)." Generally for Palestinians, the term "land" brings to mind painful reflections of exploitation, uprooting, and dispossession.

The Influence of the 1948 War Events on the Values of Young Palestinians

Apparently, despite the fact that the interviewees did not personally experience the events of 1948, their perception of these events and their personal experience of their effects have acutely influenced their life values. First, the great majority of interviewees highly value land ownership. Indeed, regardless of the fact that land is no longer the source of their livelihood as it was for their grandfathers, their relation to the land is still pivotal. Land seems to be the basis of their sense of belonging, economic and psychological security, and social and cultural continuity. Lacking land ownership brings none of these, so *Abed* claimed: "Losing our properties is an open scar which hasn't stopped bleeding. Land is a matter of belonging; I don't mean land in terms of material possessions, but in terms of the psychological significance of the sense of belonging to the land." Similarly to *Abed's* claim, there were numerous voices which cherished land ownership and also affirmed their refusal to sell even a tiny piece of land. For example, *Rateb* affirmed: "I should buy as many dunams as I can but I should never sell a single meter." Similarly, *Najlawi* stated that "…the drive to land ownership is like a legacy." He declared that his forefathers' claims about their close attachment to the land have turned him into a strong adherent of land ownership as well.

Second, it is interesting to note that the interviewees also emphatically asserted their readiness to sacrifice for the sake of their lands and homes. According to *Dobeiss*, "…the experience of the Palestinian refugees and internally-displaced ones assure me that there is no way that I'll abandon or give up my land, no way, as simple as that!!!." Equally, *Shiha* asserted: "Due to the fact that I know about the millions of refugees, belonging to the land has become very crucial for me. A person who knows the effect of a poison should never taste it: I learned not to surrender and not to abandon my house, no matter what."

Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, and Orehek (2009) explain how the biological need for physical survival is intimately linked to the quest for personal meaning and significance. Thus, when an individual undergoes a threat undermining his security or experiences feelings of relative deprivation or frustrated expectations in situations of political, social, or economic inequality, significance is envisioned as something that is lost and must be regained. In this respect, the readiness to sac-

rifice oneself for the group in the hour of need stands as a supreme good, where individuals regain significance by contributing to some communally defined collective goal (see also Bélanger, Caouette, Sharvit, & Dugas, 2014). In view of this, the threat of losing home or land, which is perceived as very significant for Palestinians, justifies their readiness to die. As Crenshaw (2007) summarized it, "Sacrifice for the cause is both personally redemptive and a mark of honor, a way of becoming a hero and part of an exalted elite" (p. 153).

Third, the interviewees outlined their appreciation of coexistence with Jewish Israelis. In fact, they talked about a "conditional" coexistence, in which Palestinians should receive their rights as an indigenous minority in Israel; only then would they be ready to coexist with Jewish citizens. For instance, *Damoor* claimed: "Israel is a given fact that we should accept, but I believe in a conditional coexistence. I will demand to receive all my rights, which are totally equal to those of the Jews. I don't feel like a beggar; I want to assure that we are the owners of the place, so nobody is doing us a favor." Similarly, *Arari* declared that "…if the Israelis want to coexist peacefully with us, they should give us our full rights in order to make us feel like Israeli citizens…I'm a man whose country was occupied and I've learned to accept and coexist with my occupier, but the other should give me my rights. Today, a new Russian immigrant has more rights than I have… So I believe that only if we receive all our rights, will we be able to coexist and get closer to one another." It is noteworthy that experiences of discrimination and subordination for these young people were intimately linked to stymieing their readiness for coexistence. For example, *Hamdi*, who works in *Carmiel*, a Jewish city adjacent to his village, tried to explain his anger regarding the Jews' attitudes toward him by saying: "I believe that I'm ready to live with the Jews and work with them. However, if I attempt to live in Carmiel, not every house owner will agree to rent me his house; it is just sad and irritating." The experience of the interviewees in the context of living in a Jewish settlement or studying in a Jewish school serves to remind them of their subordinate status relative to the Jewish majority. Indeed, the intention to coexist with Jewish Israelis is described by *Najati* as "…knocking on the door of a deaf man who could actually hear with the use of a hearing aid, but chooses to remain deaf."

Rabinowitz and Abu Baker (2005) claim that the struggle of young Palestinians for civil equality "…displays a new assertive voice, abrasive style and unequivocal substantive clarity" (p. 2). Similarly, Hammack (2010) found that Israel's young Palestinian citizens are increasingly shifting the weight of their hyphenated identities toward the Palestinian rather than the Israeli, rejecting the state's attempts to subordinate and delegitimize them. Palestinian citizens of Israel have become increasingly mobilized and vocal in expressing their dissatisfaction with their subordinate status within Israel (Peleg & Waxman, 2011). The younger generation of Palestinians demands collective recognition as a right and not as a favor. In this vein, *Damoor* stated that "…Arabs in Israel are the original inhabitants of the region; we are not immigrants, we were here all along." Actually, this perception, which anchors the legitimacy of the demand for collective recognition, has become especially popular in the political-national discourse of Palestinian Israelis in recent years (Jamal, 2011).

Participation in Commemorative Activities

The vast majority of the interviewees stated that they are increasingly taking steps to commemorate their *Nakba* by participating in activities such as organized visits to the sites of abandoned villages (on 2 days: Israel Independence Day and *al-Nakba* Day[6]) and the preservation of remaining sites and ruins, especially mosques, churches, and cemeteries. *Ma'adi*, for example, stated: "For me, going to Hittin once or twice a year is mandatory and not optional." Similarly, *Dimani* declared that his participation in such activities is "…a moral duty and a way of showing solidarity with the Palestinian nation." As a matter of fact, the grandsons referred to various meanings attributed to these commemorative activities. For example, *Shiha* explained that "…public marches to the villages have become a transmission tool to commemorate displacement and to instill national awareness in young Palestinians, who are expected to continue the struggle." In this vein, *Mureed* explained that in order to continue this struggle, a strong link with the *Nakba* generation is required: "It is important to remind the world that there are still millions of people residing in refugee camps. So, due to our responsibility to transmit the memory, we should ask those who 'know' in order to be capable of transmitting the collective memory comprehensibly." *Sabeel* summarized this point, declaring that "…we know that by commemorating the Nakba, we are helping young generations to remain attached to their history and culture. Doing so actually strengthens our national identity and keeps us united."

Second, and most importantly, the interviewees use these memorial activities as a tool to show resentment and to protest against discrimination. For example, *Habaji* shared the experience of the people of *al-Ghabisiyya* (a destroyed village in the Western Galilee) when they were prevented from praying in the mosque on Fridays: "When people were prevented from entering the mosque, they just prayed outside the fences surrounding it and set up camp outside the mosque in a show of resentment against the Israeli authorities' practices." Apparently, the younger generation of Palestinians is central to having transformed *Nakba* Day into a general Palestinian national memorial day. The younger generation's visits to destroyed villages have taken the form of a protest against what is being done to them currently (Jamal, 2011).

To sum up, it can be concluded that the collective public expression of the memory of the 1948 War among the young generation hints at various characteristics of this generation: First, a new generation of Palestinians has grown up that have chosen to emphasize their national identity rather than hiding it. Second, their growing sense of marginality has been another factor contributing to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the *Nakba* memory and its narrative.

In short, the *Nakba* memory is still relevant to the present-day reality of Palestinian citizens of Israel. According to Rekhess (2002), "It is a living, breathing

[6] 5 Iyar, the Hebrew date of Independence Day in Israel, and May 15, the date of the establishment of the state in the international calendar, is assigned by Palestinians as *Nakba* Day.

issue; it is not a historic event that is over and done with, but rather a tragedy whose consequences continue to this day and whose victims are not only refugees in camps, but also the Arab minority in Israel. For this minority, the calamity continues to exist as an open wound" (p. 30). Clearly, this memory has never been erased and is being transmitted to successive generations. The interviewees were mainly angry and resentful toward what had happened in the 1948 War. Anger, as a "socially-constructed emotion which is evoked in events where the individual perceives other individuals' or groups' actions as unjust or unfair" (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009, p. 97), involves appraisals of relative strength and high coping potential (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). In many cases, it is linked to aggressive behavior (Berkowitz, 1993) or active attacking tendencies (Roseman, 2002). Thus, as a more educated generation imbued with negative feelings such as anger and a sense of being discriminated, these young Palestinians have evolved the most "radical" collective memory, which totally negates the hegemonic Israeli-Zionist narrative. This generation feels much more powerful and believes that the collective memory of the 1948 War events should be transmitted to successive generations, considering itself responsible for being the messengers.

Conclusion

Generally, it can be claimed that the analysis of the interviewees' narratives demonstrates that despite the silencing of the Palestinian narrative by the Israeli official authorities and institutions, the narrative related to 1948 War events (so-called Nakba) is still prevalent among young Palestinians who neither witnessed nor experienced those events.

Overall, this study has helped to illustrate a bottom-up mode of the articulation of the Palestinian collective narrative regarding the 1948 War events and to highlight the core factors that aided in the "preservation" of such a narrative across time. It should be noted that young Palestinians' narrative provides a black-and-white picture ("them, the Jews, against us, the Palestinians"). Similarly, on an affective level, young Palestinians express emotions such as anger and resentment regarding the events in addition to sorrow and grief that are strongly connected to catastrophes.

It is necessary to address the relationship between emotion and collective action. Given the negative emotional material that has emerged from this research, it can be suggested that the depth of collective anger evident among young Palestinians is an important means of preserving their memorial narrative. Although many different emotions play a role in intergroup conflict—including hope, fear, and hatred—anger is thought to be especially critical in the initiation and maintenance of such conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2007). Halperin (2008) examined the relationship between three group-based negative emotions—fear, anger, and hatred—and political intolerance in Israel, finding that anger contributes to political intolerance, while hatred mediates the relationship. Similarly, Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, and Petrovic (2010) found that fear and anger are predictors of motivation for intergroup aggression.

Accordingly, it is suggested here that the negative emotion of anger developing out of the negative experiences of younger Palestinians in Israel may in turn foster negative beliefs and actions. Feelings of anger can generate feelings of revenge, which can produce a cycle of violence and perpetuate feelings of victimhood on both sides of a conflict. In addition, sharing such negative feelings might generate both a strong feeling of "us" but also an "us against them" mentality. So it can be assumed that if the Israeli government continues denying and negating the Palestinian narrative, those who lack significant identification with Israel and wholeheartedly embrace Palestinian identity are much more likely to engage in system-challenging behaviors.

In conclusion, this research showed that the Palestinian collective memory of the 1948 War events has not faded away but rather has become more distant from the Zionist narrative, stating the opposite of the disseminated hegemonic narrative. In fact, this counter-narrative is very significant for Palestinians for a number of reasons: first, it outlines their common origin, forming a shared past and providing that sense of continuity which is crucial for the construction of their social identity. Additionally, it helps them construct a positive social identity, since it provides them with a sense of commonality, cohesiveness, belonging, uniqueness, and solidarity. In view of this, being members of an ethnic minority that is deeply engaged in an intractable conflict with the state within which they live has caused them to hold on to their collective memory. It can be seen to fulfill such essential functions without which their society would find it impossible to adapt to such confrontational conditions.

The significance of collective memory to society members in times of conflict could generate an accelerated tendency to become involved in all types of memorial practices, maybe even turning them into "memorial maniacs."[7] They aspire to maintain the dominance of their own main narrative among in-group members and also to persuade other groups of its validity. However, whenever the counter-narrative of one group in society strongly opposes or challenges the dominant hegemonic narrative of another group, those memories might be hotly contested. In some cases, such intense contesting of memory among different groups remains contained and does not develop into violent conflict. In other cases, however, collective memory and its various public representations may play a major role in intensifying ethnic warfare. If so, narratives of collective memory serve as smoldering embers which can burst into flame at any moment.

The findings of the present research suggest that the ground is very fertile for further possible interethnic conflict between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian minority in Israel. As discussed previously, the feelings of anger among young Palestinians, their sense of relative deprivation, and their expressed readiness to make personal sacrifices could mobilize these generations in a moment of crisis to rebel, protest, and commit violent actions against the Jewish majority. In other words, feelings of injustice may lead to vengeance; the seeds for future conflicts have been planted and might possibly spur those potentially capable of violence into

[7] A term used by Doss (2008) to refer to "the contemporary obsession with issues of memory and history and an urgent, excessive desire to express, or claim those issues in visibly public contexts" (p. 7).

action. On this basis, reconciliation is needed in order to stabilize peaceful relations. Reconciliation is defined as groups' mutual acceptance of one other (Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003; Staub & Pearlman, 2001). According to Bar-Tal (2009), the essence of reconciliation "involves socio-psychological processes consisting of changes of motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes and emotions by the majority of society members" (p. 365). Auerbach (2009) suggests a "reconciliation pyramid" (p. 302). She claims that identity conflicts erupt in two groups involved in identity conflict when at least one side feels that the other has negated its identity. Thus, they should initially become acquainted with the clashing narratives relating to the core issues of their conflict. However, familiarity with these narratives is not enough but can only pave the way for truly and fully acknowledging them, which means understanding and recognizing them as authentic and legitimate. This acknowledgment implies recognizing that there are at least two narratives (Salomon, 2004). Such recognition is crucial because as mentioned earlier, the collective memories of each party's own past support the continuation of the conflict and make peacemaking impossible (Bar-Tal, 2007).

The grievances of the opposing group must not only be known but must also be acknowledged. From the Palestinians' point of view, it is vital to acknowledge their differing national narrative, and it is certainly important to learn about this narrative from their perspective. An acknowledgment by the state is necessary in order to conclude this sorrowful chapter in the history of the Palestinian nation. The evolvement of a new Palestinian generation "standing tall" suggests that acknowledging their narrative and providing legitimacy to their demands for equal citizenship is the key to improving interethnic relations between the two nations residing in Israel. Such acknowledgment of the Palestinian narrative could open the door for a greater willingness on the part of the Palestinians to acknowledge the Israeli narrative, and potentially to the development of less biased and one-sided narratives among both parties. Such changes to the collective memory could be an important step toward reconciliation.

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Perceptions of Collective Narratives Among Arab and Jewish Adolescents in Israel: A Decade of Intractable Conflict

Anan Srour, Adi Mana, and Shifra Sagy

One of the core concepts in Bar-Tal's paradigm of understanding groups in intractable conflicts is that of collective narratives (Bar-Tal, 2007). This article presents a theoretical approach and an empirical measure to examine perceptions of collective narratives during a decade in which the political situation moved from peace talks to violence. We looked at the sociopolitical context as a significant factor in the development of empathy, anger, and readiness to legitimate collective narratives of both the "other" and one's own group.

During the past decades, different theoretical concepts have been developed relating to multidisciplinary aspects of collective narratives: social knowledge, culture, ethos, social representations, historical narratives, social identity, collective memory, and communicative memory. The concepts deal with the way members of a group share a common world of knowledge, beliefs, actions, and emotional patterns, providing a basis for their sense of shared identity (Assmann, 1992; Bar-Tal, 2000; Dougherty, 1985; Griswold, 1994; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Moscovici, 1988; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_6

In social psychology, the collective narrative is defined as a social construct that creates clear connections on a continuum between historical and current events (Bruner, 1990). Collective narratives enable the individual members of the group to understand the social reality and the relationships between their group and other groups and provide personal interpretations that help them to behave and function. These individual interpretations are developed to a great extent by social agents—sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly—that direct the thoughts, the feelings, and the behaviors of each of the group members (Bar-Tal, 2000; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Turner et al., 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). On the macro level, collective narratives are a type of lens through which members of the group perceive past and current events and imbue them with justification and meaning for their social, ideological, and political acts (Bar-Tal, 2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

The relevant literature differentiates between approaches that focus on the content of group members' shared narratives and models that center on the processes of narrative structuring by educators, politicians, thinkers, media, and ideologues (Ahonen, 1999). The models that focus on identifying group members' shared content usually deal with defining the narrative and clarifying the social representation of an event or a particular phenomenon. Thus, for example, some researchers have examined specific representations of the concept of "war" or "peace" among groups in conflict as opposed to groups that are not (Covell, 1999). Other studies have examined representations of leaders or specific historical events (Liu et al., 2005; Von Borries, 1995). In this approach, the collective narratives were studied with an emphasis on content; each study related to a specific group and to a specific conflict. A unique effort at generalizing and developing an applicable measure for various conflicts appeared in an international study, "Youth and History" (Angvik & Von Borries, 1997), which examined perceptions of general historical events among youth in Europe and in the Middle East.

Other approaches center on the processes that form the basis of the narratives, such as social representation theory (Moscovici, 1988) which described the construct of the narrative as a process during which the social dialogue among the group members and the dialogue with the "other" are crystallized. In other words, historical narratives are the same shared social representations that enable group members to understand their shared past and to use it to interpret the present and future, as well as enabling communication between group members and the development of a sense of shared collective identity. Research that has focused on collective narratives has dealt with questions of organizing the system of collective representations, placement of the narratives (e.g., center vs. periphery), and the relationship to social beliefs and behaviors (Liu, 2005; Liu, Sibley, & Huang, 2014).

In this chapter, we will describe a model for research about perceptions of collective narratives (Sagy, Adwan, & Kaplan, 2002) which integrates both approaches described above. The model is directed towards identifying specific content, both cognitive and emotional, in the perceptions of collective narratives of national intractable conflicts. Moreover, the model makes it possible to empirically investigate collective narratives and identify possible changes that can occur over time (Sagy, Ayalon, & Diab, 2011).

We will describe a longitudinal study that has employed this model and an empirical measure to examine perceptions of collective narratives in different historical and political contexts of the intractable Israeli–Palestinian conflict among Jewish and Arab adolescents in Israel. The model examines the relations of the perceptions of "in" and "out" groups and focuses on the levels of the perception of the collective narrative using measures of legitimization, empathy, and anger towards the collective narratives of both groups. Thus, the model is proposed as a measure to explore intergroup relationships, one which is sensitive to changes in the level of perceived intractability of the conflict through different historical periods.

Cognition and Emotion in Perceptions of Narratives

The sociopsychological foundation of perceptions of societal collective narratives includes both cognitive and emotional elements (Moscovici, 1988), which crystallize into a complete integrated perception of the "in" and "out" groups. In accord with this basic assumption, our study examines not only the cognitive perception of the narratives but a variety of emotions that the narratives provoke (empathy, shame, guilt, anger) as well. The model examines these perceptions as expressed among members of the group as individuals. However, the picture we get from this examination allows a diagnosis of trends that are common within the groups at different historical periods.

Although differentiating cognitive and emotional components is sometimes arbitrary and may cause injustice to the description of the real situation (Parkes, 1971), we hope that it may contribute to a more reliable study of the complicated concept of narratives. Knowledge and legitimization of the collective narrative are the two cognitive elements in the model. Members of the social group tend to build their worldview on the basis of their shared social knowledge, coming from shared experiences in the history unique to them (Griswold, 1994). The model's empirical measure evaluates the level of social knowledge as related to the collective narratives of the in-group and the "out"-group. The reference to knowledge and other aspects of narrative perception are the focus for many political science researchers (e.g., Dolan & Holbrook, 2001). Most of these studies have examined the extent to which individuals do or do not have knowledge of a range of political or historical issues (Von Borries, 1995) and changes in the level of this knowledge over time. Beyond that, as far as we know, the relationship between knowledge and other aspects of narrative perception has not been studied.

The second cognitive component, which is more central to the model, is the level of readiness to legitimize the narrative of the "in" group and of the "out" group. The willingness to legitimize the in-group narrative is an important part of building a national identity and a positive in-group collective image (Kaplovitz, 1990). In contrast, delegitimizing the "other's" narrative plays a central role in violent conflicts (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). The empirical measure in our model enables assessment of the levels of legitimization and delegitimization in the perception of one's own group narrative and that of the "other" group in different situations.

Besides its emphasis on the cognitive perception of the collective narratives, the model relates to the emotional repertoire that accompanies these perceptions. The emotional component has been found to be significant in political perception and in particular, in its interaction with cognitive knowledge (Dolan & Holbrook, 2001). Both individuals in society and the society as a collective are likely to develop a collective emotional orientation that lasts over time due to exposure to the same narratives (Bar-Tal, 2007).

The collective emotional orientation is likely to characterize a society or culture when it is integrated with the collective narrative as well as when it is self-preserved by bonding processes that are characteristic of that same society (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). This emotional learning allows for interpretation of the narrative of the in- and out-groups and is passed on via the family and/or by educational, cultural, and political framework (Averill, 1980). Emotional orientation has a special meaning in the context of conflict situations, as, for example, in the collective feelings of fear and hatred in Israeli society or in Northern Ireland (Halperin, Russel, Dweck, & Gross, 2011). Despite the role of emotions as significant components in perceptions of collective narratives, only a few studies have examined particular emotions (Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2011). In the model described here, we attempt to broaden and deepen existing knowledge on the connection between the cognitive perceptions of collective narratives and particular emotions, including both negative (e.g., anger) and positive (e.g., empathy) ones.

We expect that higher correlations between cognitive and emotional elements of collective narrative perception reflect a more coherent attitude. These correlations would be observed in periods with higher tensions between the groups and, mainly, higher perceived intractability of the conflict. Supporting results have been presented in a previous study (Sagy et al., 2011) that examined 8 years of violent intergroup relations.

Development of the Model and the Empirical Measure

In their model, Sagy et al. (2002) focused on the cognitive and emotional elements of the perceptions of one's own group narrative and the delegitimization and dehumanization of the "other's" narrative. The model and the measure were developed in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by a group of Palestinian and Israeli researchers (Sagy et al., 2002), in order to enable a deep understanding of the social processes that take place between members of the two national groups who are living in persistent and violent conflict. The research developed by Sagy and her colleagues (2002) allows empirical examination of the concept in other conflictual contexts such as religious, national, and ethnic groups. Up to now, this model has been studied among national collectives (e.g., Israelis and Palestinian, Sagy et al., 2002): groups that are divided by regime (Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians living in the West Bank, Mana, Sagy, Srour, & Mjally-Knani, 2015), and minority and majority national groups living in Israeli society (Arabs and Jews who are citizens of Israel, Sagy et al., 2011). Two studies focused on religious

groups in conflict: One related to Palestinian religious groups of Muslims and Christians in Israel (Mana, Sagy, Srour, & Mjally-Knani, 2012; Srour, Sagy, Mana, & Mjally-Knani, 2013) and the other examined the Israeli Jewish religious conflict between ultraorthodox and national religious communities (Kalagy & Sagy, 2015).

The contextual approach requires that the measure be constructed according to the unique characteristics of the collectives and groups being studied. Moreover, collective contents cannot reflect the shared narrative of all the members of the society studied. Thus, the model suggests examining central contents in the shared social identity which are well recognized by most members of the group. Of course, members of the society accord different degrees of importance or centrality to any specific content, and it is possible to find individual differences among members of the group. Due to the complexity of working with collective narratives, the measure enables assessment of legitimization and accompanying emotions towards specific content in the general collective narrative (Srour et al., 2013).

Based on the DeVellis (2003) model of scale development, the process of developing the questionnaire in each conflict context includes several stages. It begins with focus groups of both parties in the conflict whose participants are asked to describe the relationship between the two collectives from their points of view. Three criteria are used in the selection of the collective narratives that are raised in the focus groups: (1) the narratives are related to a significant historical/political/social events in the past as well as in the present, (2) there is a high level of familiarity of the narrative to the research population, and (3) two contradictory narratives are provided for the same event/issue reflecting the different points of view of each group.

Based on the contents obtained in the focus groups on relevant narratives, the research teams (who are usually members of the examined groups) adjust the themes to specific narrative items. As a result, the questionnaire includes pairs of narratives of each group, each pair concerning a historical, social, or political event. In the questionnaire, two narratives for each of the above events are presented to the participants. They are asked to rate their readiness to legitimize the narrative and their feelings of empathy and anger regarding the narrative of their own group and the narrative of the "other" group on a five-point Likert-style scale (1, don't agree at all; 5, agree very much).

Here are some examples from the questionnaire in the context of Israeli–Palestinian conflict which includes events like the Balfour Declaration, the Six-Day War, Rabin's assassination, the First Intifada, the Second Lebanon War, the 2000 Oslo Accords, the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and events in the Arab sector in Israel in 2000, which were presented from the point of view of the two collective narratives (Jewish and Arab narratives). One example is the item about the Balfour declaration—the Israeli narrative is: "Many Israelis (Jewish-Israelis) view the Balfour Declaration as the first international diplomatic recognition of the right of the Jews for a state in the Holy Land." The Palestinian narrative is: "Many Palestinians view the Balfour Declaration as an unfair and illegitimate promise of the British to the Jews." Another example is the narrative of 1948. The Israeli narrative is: "Many Jewish Israelis view the 1948 war as an important event marking their survival and independence," and the Palestinian narrative is: "Many Palestinians view the 1948 war as a disaster/catastrophe."

The Israeli–Palestinian Intractable Conflict

According to the conceptual paradigm of Bar-Tal (2007), intractable conflicts are defined as protracted, irreconcilable, violent, of zero-sum nature, total, and central; parties involved in such conflicts have an interest in their continuation (see Azar, Jureidini, & McLaurin, 1978; Bar-Tal, 1998, 2013; Goertz & Diehl, 1993; Kriesberg, 1995). Intractable conflicts undermine the security and well-being of societies worldwide (International Crisis Group, 2010).

Bar-Tal (2007) claims that societies involved in an intractable conflict over a long period develop a collective fear orientation because of the ongoing threats and dangers to individuals who are involved. In situations of ongoing conflict, fear leads to perceptual biases about the conflict and about the other side, creating cognitive stagnation and a tendency to avoid risks and bringing about justification of the existing policy (Bar-Tal, 2001; Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002). Fear and threat at the individual and collective levels lead to cognitive biases so that events are likely to be processed and interpreted incorrectly in ways that strengthen suspicion, delegitimization, and lack of trust towards the "other" (Bar-Tal, 2001).

Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) argued that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is so resistant to resolution because of the unique characteristics of the opposing narratives, the central one being a perception of exclusive legitimacy. The narratives of the conflict, among both Israelis and Palestinians, have been central to the national identities, are celebrated through myths, monuments, and national ceremonies and are strongly represented in literature and songs as well as in school textbooks (Bar-Tal, 2013; Ben-Amos & Beth-El, 1999).

During the decade investigated in this study (1999–2009), social representations of one's "own" group and the "other" group significantly changed among cboth groups, due to the changes in the political and social context. For example, the other group moved from "peace partner" to "no partner for peace," from "choosing peace" to "no choice, war." We expected that these changes in perceiving the "in" and the "out" groups would be reflected in the perception of both groups of the collective narratives of "in" and "out" groups that expressed their social representations.

In addition to the first stage in 1999–2000 (Sagy et al., 2002), administered when the optimism following the Oslo agreement was strong, three additional stages were conducted: in 2002, during the Second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada when suicide bombers exploded in public areas in Israel and hundreds of Palestinians were killed or injured in military actions all over the West Bank and Gaza; in 2004, after the Israeli army invasion of Palestinian towns in West Bank and massive military operations in the Gaza Strip; and in 2009, after Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, which caused more than a thousand fatalities and thousands of injuries and was initiated as a response to intensive missile attacks on communities and cities in southern Israel.

In the current study, we examined levels of cognitive and emotional perceptions of collective narratives in these different historical–social periods of conflict. We suggest three measures related to narrative perceptions as indicators of the intractability or violence of the conflict:

(a) The *level* of readiness to legitimize the narrative of the "in" and the "out" groups and the *levels* of empathy and anger towards the narratives of the "in" and the "out" groups are expected to reflect conflict intensity.
(b) The *gap* between in-group and out-group narrative perceptions is also expected to be wider in more violent periods.
(c) The correlation between emotional and cognitive ccomponents of the perception of the narratives: the more violent the stage of the conflict, the stronger the correlation as reflecting the coherence of attitudes towards both narratives (Sagy et al., 2011).

Method

Sample

The study was conducted in four stages, during which the questionnaires were distributed to a sample of 5627 high school students, of which 3748 were Jews and 1849 were Arabs. Of the respondents, 2950 were in the 10th grade and 2638 in the 12th grade (see Table 1). The samples in each stage were different and ranged between 545 participants and 1188 in the Jewish samples and between 365 participants and 575 in the Israeli Arab samples. Ages ranged from 15 to 18 among both groups. Careful consideration was taken to provide representation of different types of schools and various types of locations.

Measures

The Perceptions of Collective Narratives Questionnaire

The questionnaire was formulated by a team of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian researchers.[1] It included structured questions that presented the mainstream views of the Israeli Zionist and Palestinian narratives concerning particular historical events in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Three criteria were followed in the selection of the tested narratives:

1. Level of contradiction—the two research groups hold different narratives regarding the same event.
2. Level of familiarity—the narratives are well known among the research group members.

[1] The team included Prof. Shifra Sagy, Prof. Sami Adwan, and Dr. Muhammed Farhat from Bethlehem University and Dr. Avi Kaplan and Dr. Fatma Kassem from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

Table 1 Demographic characteristics of Israeli Jews and Arabs at the four stages of the study

		1999–2000		2002		2004–2005		2009	
		Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs
	N	1188	575	1001	531	545	365	1014	408
Gender (percentage)	Male	39.6 %	41.2 %	41.0 %	43.3 %	47.0 %	35.3 %	46.4 %	39.5 %
	Female	60.4 %	58.8 %	59.0 %	56.7 %	53.0 %	64.7 %	53.6 %	60.5 %
Grade (percentage)	10th grade	55.0 %	52.3 %	54.5 %	50.1 %	51.7 %	54.4 %	49.7 %	54.5 %
	12th grade	45.0 %	47.7 %	45.5 %	49.9 %	48.3 %	45.6 %	50.3 %	45.5 %
Religion (percentage)	Jews	96.4 %	–	97.6 %	–	95.8 %	–	98.2 %	–
	Muslims	–	74.9 %	–	80.0 %	–	67.9 %	–	87.1 %
	Christians	–	22.3 %	–	15.6 %	–	27.4 %	–	10.8 %
	Druzes	–	2.4 %	–	4.0 %	–	4.7 %	–	0.8 %
	Others	3.6 %	0.4 %	2.4 %	0.4 %	4.2 %	–	1.8 %	0.3 %

3. Timeline—the narratives related to significant historical/political/social events in the past (e.g., the Holocaust, the 1948 war) as well as in the present (e.g., the Gaza War in the 2009 study).

Two narratives for each of the chosen events were presented to the participants, one attributed to each group. They were asked to rate their readiness to legitimate and their feelings of empathy and anger regarding the narrative of their own group, and regarding the narrative of the "other" group, on a five-point Likert-style scale (1, don't agree at all; 5, agree very much).

Different events were selected in each study, taking into consideration the recent events and the length of the questionnaire. Some events appear more frequently in the questionnaire and others less often, based on the team's evaluation of the narrative as central to the conflict. For example, the Balfour Declaration, which appeared frequently in the first versions of the questionnaire, was eliminated from later versions, while the 1948 war and Holocaust narratives were kept in all versions as very important narratives.

We computed six scores by averaging the respondents' answers to all statements representing the score (legitimization of all the in-group narratives, legitimization of all the out-group narratives, empathy towards all the in-group narratives, empathy towards all the out-group narratives, anger towards all the in-group narratives, anger towards all the out-group narratives). Reliability of the scales was found to be satisfactory. Cronbach's alpha of the measures ranged from .60 to .87 for the legitimacy measure in the Jewish samples and from .71 to .89 in the Arab samples. For the empathy measure, Cronbach's alpha ranged from .59 to .86 in the Jewish sample and from .80 to .89 in the Arab sample. For the anger measure, Cronbach's alpha ranged from .57 to .88 in the Jewish sample and from .78 to .91 in the Arab samples.

The data was analyzed only after standardizing the scores in each research stage for each presented narrative. This procedure enabled us to draw conclusions about the general tendency of weighing the collective narratives of the in- and "other" groups, regardless of the number and specific narratives that were used in the measure at each stage.

Procedures

The questionnaires were distributed in Hebrew and in Arabic. They were administered to the students in their classrooms during a normal class period and were answered anonymously.

Results

The scores were standardized by calculating a *z*-score for each study among each national group regarding each element: legitimacy, empathy, and anger towards in-group narratives and out-group narratives. An average of the three elements was calculated after multiplying the anger score with −1, and the gap between in-group and out-group narrative perceptions was calculated for each group by detracting the out-group narrative score from the in-group narrative score.

To test our hypothesis regarding the differences in collective narrative perception during different periods, we conducted a four-way mixed-design analysis of variance (4×2×2×3). Group (Jews or Arabs) and study (2000, 2002, 2004, or 2009) were the between-subject factors, while perception elements (legitimacy, empathy, and anger) and narrative attribution (Israeli or Palestinian narrative) were the within-subject factors. The findings revealed significant main and interaction effects between all factors.

The significant main effect of group ($F(1,5410)=40.91$, $p<0.001$) refers to the tendency of Jews to assign more legitimacy and feel more empathy and less anger towards collective narratives in general, both of the in-group and the out-group. Moreover, we found a general tendency, among both groups, to perceive the in-group narrative as more legitimate and feel more empathy and less anger towards it rather than the out-group narrative as reflected by the in- vs. out-group narrative main effect ($F(1,5410)=312.32$, $p<0.001$). The interaction between narrative attribution and group was also significant ($F(1,5410)=3598.79$, $p<0.001$). This result reveals that the tendency to prefer the in-group narrative is stronger among Arabs than among Jews. The averages of the perception of the three elements among Jews were 0.14 and −0.18 for in- and out-group narratives, respectively, and 0.35 and −0.29 among Arabs (the same order).

The main effect of study period was also significant ($F(3,5410)=37.41$, $p<0.001$), indicating that narrative perception is affected by the political/social contexts. More interesting is the interaction between this factor and group ($F(3,5410)=24.59$, $p<0.001$), indicating that both groups did not report similar changes along the four stages. The following presents the results regarding changes along the studies for each element separately (see Table 2 and Figs. 1, 2, and 3).

Legitimacy

Concerning in-group narratives, Arabs reported a sharp increase in legitimizing the in-group narratives in 2002, and then this tendency was moderated. Jews tended to perceive their in-group narratives as less legitimate in 2002, but they later continued to give more and more legitimacy to their in-group narratives. Concerning out-group narratives, both groups showed a tendency to decrease legitimization over time.

Empathy

Concerning in-group narratives, both groups felt more empathy towards in-group narratives in 2002 than in 2000, but this tendency changed to feel less empathy in the next two studies. Arabs continued to feel low empathy towards the out-group narrative with minimal changes in the consecutive studies, but Jews started with high levels of empathy towards the out-group narrative but reported a continuous decline over time, reaching the level of Arabs' empathy towards the out-group narratives in 2009.

Table 2 Means of standardized scores of perceptions of collective narrative of in- and out-groups among Jews and Arabs along the four stages

Group	Year	Israeli narratives			Palestinian narratives			Total		Gap
		Legitimacy	Empathy	Anger	Legitimacy	Empathy	Anger	Israeli narratives	Palestinian narratives	In–out
Jews	2000	0.32	0.47	–0.27	–0.19	–0.07	0.15	0.35	–0.14	0.21
	2002	0.21	0.61	–0.40	–0.31	–0.24	0.31	0.41	–0.28	0.22
	2004	0.60	0.53	–0.46	–0.50	–0.81	0.32	0.53	–0.54	0.56
	2009	0.64	0.17	–0.57	–0.63	–0.83	0.34	0.46	–0.60	0.45
Arabs	2000	–0.70	–0.82	0.76	0.64	0.76	–0.54	–0.76	0.65	0.55
	2002	–0.91	–0.92	0.91	0.94	1.01	–0.71	–0.91	0.88	0.72
	2004	–0.80	–1.02	0.74	0.86	0.92	–0.51	–0.85	0.76	0.78
	2009	–1.07	–0.76	0.98	0.65	0.84	–0.54	–0.94	0.68	0.60



Fig. 1 Means of *z*-scores of legitimacy given to in- and out-group narratives among Jews and Arabs. The *solid line* is the in-group narratives and *dashed line* is the out-group narratives



Fig. 2 Means of *z*-scores of empathy towards in- and out-group narratives among Jews and Arabs. The *solid line* is the in-group narratives and *dashed line* is the out-group narratives

Anger

Concerning in-group narratives, Arabs reported less anger towards their in-group narratives than Jews in 2000 and 2002, but they reported similar levels in 2004 and 2009. Jews showed a continuous tendency to feel less anger towards in-group narratives in each of the four consecutive studies. On the other hand, while Jews reported a mild increase in feeling anger towards out-group narratives over the years, Arabs reported mixed strong tendencies. Arabs showed an increase in anger towards out-group narratives between 2000 and 2002, but then a decline occurred in 2004 and again an increase in 2009.



Fig. 3 Means of *z*-scores of anger towards in- and out-group narrative among Jews and Arabs. The *solid line* is in-group narrative and *dashed line* is the out-group narratives

In general, both groups showed a tendency to more strongly reject the "others'" group narrative in the recent stages. The only exception was a slight decrease in 2004 among Arabs, but coming back to the 2002 level in 2009. Moreover, both groups showed an increase in adhering to their in-group narratives in comparison with the first study in 2000; the Jewish group showed the highest level of adherence to in-group narratives in 2004 while the Arab group did so in 2002.

Moving to the second measure, gaps between in-group and out-group narrative perceptions could be a good indicator for conflict intensity. Arabs reported significantly higher gaps in all the four stages, whereas the study in 2004 showed the highest gaps in both groups (see Table 2). The strongest change among Arabs occurred between 2000 and 2002, but among Jews the strongest change took place between 2002 and 2004.

The Relationship between Cognitive and Emotional Components of Perception of "Other" Group Narrative

Our third measure, which we hypothesized would change according to different levels of violence in the conflict, was the relationship between cognitive and emotional aspects of the attitude towards the other narrative. Table 3 presents the correlations between z-scores of legitimacy and both empathy and anger towards other group narratives among both groups for the four stages. First, we found stronger correlations between legitimacy and empathy rather than legitimacy and anger among both groups over the four study stages. Moreover, the results suggest that according to these measures, the relations between cognitive and emotional components also became stronger in the more recent stages among both groups, indicating greater coherence between cognitive and emotional aspects of collective narrative perception as the conflict

Table 3 Pearson correlations of perceived legitimacy to empathy and anger towards the out-group collective narratives among Jews and Arabs along the four study stages

	Jews		Arabs	
Year	Empathy	Anger	Empathy	Anger
2000	0.62	–0.34	0.64	–0.18
2002	0.65	–0.35	0.77	–0.35
2004	0.69	–0.56	0.81	–0.40
2009	0.75	–0.56	0.68	–0.49

became more violent. The only exception was a mild decrease in the correlation between legitimacy and empathy among Arabs in 2009 as compared with 2004.

Discussion

Our paper presents results from a longitudinal study which took place over 10 years, dealing with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as it is perceived by the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel. The study examined young people's perceptions of their own group and the "other" group's collective narratives. Living in a conflicted area has resulted in different interpretations by each side, of recent as well as of historical events which relate to their group's belief systems. It is commonly agreed that the sociopsychological repertoire that accompanies intractable conflicts serves as a prism through which society members absorb information about the conflict and interpret their experiences (Bar-Tal, 2007), and that these can lead to a stubborn rigidity of repertoire (Kelman, 2007). In this longitudinal study, we asked if and how this repertoire of interpretations of past and present events, held by adolescents from both sides, changed in accordance with changes in the reality of the conflictual situation between peace talks and violent events. Following the failure of the Oslo Accords in 2000, on the Israeli side, there was an escalation of violence, snipers, and checkpoints in 2002, tanks and invasions in 2004, and air bombing in 2009 and on the Palestinian side, shootings in 2002, suicide bombs in 2004, and missile attacks in 2009.

Our examination concerned three different aspects of collective narrative perceptions. First, we examined interpretations of past and present events as reflected by three measures: readiness to legitimate, feelings of empathy, and feelings of anger towards the narrative of one's own group and towards that of the "other" group. Second, we investigated the discrepancy between perceptions of the in-group and out-group collective narratives as measured by the gap between the mean of standardized scores of legitimacy, empathy, and anger of both narratives. Third, we explored the relations between cognitive (legitimacy) and emotional (empathy and anger) elements of narrative perceptions as measured by the correlation between legitimacy and anger towards collective narratives of the "other" group. These aspects were examined at

four stages of the longitudinal study which, in the political context, moved from peaceful times to violent events.

First, the results reveal a tendency by members of both groups to give more legitimacy and feel more empathy and less anger towards their in-group collective narrative and to give less legitimacy and feel less empathy and more anger towards the out-group collective narratives. This tendency, however, increased over the 10 years of the study among both groups. In general, this tendency was stronger among Arab youth as compared to the Jewish youth. Arabs also showed significantly higher gaps between the perceptions of their in-group and out-group narratives in all four stages. Actually, the differences between Arabs and Jews lessened through the research stages. Although Arabs have continued to show more adherence to the in-group narratives and have rejected those of the out-group in comparison to Jews, these differences have become smaller as time went on, while Israeli Jewish youngsters have gradually become more radical in their perceptions of the two collective narratives and more similar to their Arab counterparts.

It appears that this decade of research, which started with the failure of the peace process and continued with increasing violence, has impacted individuals' perception of in-group and out-group collective narratives, so that they adhere to the former and reject the latter. The adherence to in-group narratives seems to be an effort to depend on collective belonging as a source of meaning for the challenges and existential fears faced on the national level (Mana et al., 2012; Srour, 2014).On the other hand, the rejection of the other group's collective narratives might express the social representation of the "other" group as the enemy, inhuman, and seeking to wipe out one's own group (Moscovici, 1988).

As mentioned, Arab participants presented weaker reactions to changes in the political situation and remained more stable in their perceptions over the decade. This finding could be attributed to their starting point. They were more radical in their collective narrative perception from the early stage during the Oslo talks. In spite of the peace process, Israeli Arabs felt a threat to their identities and existence as a discriminated national minority in Israel (Smooha, 2010). The dual loyalty of this minority both to the Palestinian people and to the Israeli state has become almost impossible in politically violent periods. The collective narrative questionnaire seems to be a sensitive measure in this complex situation.

Examining the gap between the in-group and the out-group perceptions of collective narratives could be another significant reflection of conflict intensity and intractability. We found the highest polarization among Jews in 2004 as they strongly adhered to their own narratives and strongly rejected Palestinian narratives. These results can be understood against the backdrop of the loss of hope for peace, on the one hand, and the intensified violent events and existential fears, on the other. The Israeli Arab minority adolescents, however, reported the greatest adherence to their in-group narrative and the greatest rejection of the out-group's narratives in the 2002 stage. It seems that the October events in 2000 and the beginning of the Second Intifada are events that can explain this polarization. From the Israeli Arab point of view, the traumatic events of "Land Day" in 1975, during which nine Palestinian Israeli citizens were killed by Israeli security forces in demonstrations against land expropriation in

the Galilee, repeated themselves in October 2000; therefore, the social representations of "us" and "them" were reproduced and confirmed by the more recent events, causing a new phase of polarization of perceptions of collective narratives.

These results, however, were changed as a decrease in the gap between perceptions of narratives was found in 2009 among Arab students. This reflects less adherence to the Palestinian narrative rather than more rejection of the Israeli Jewish narrative. It seems that the Arabs have become more critical of their in-group collective narrative rather than accepting the Israeli Jewish majority collective narrative. The change in this stage can be attributed to the Arab minority feelings of shared stress with the Jewish majority during the Lebanon War, when Israeli Arab villages and cities were also attacked by missiles fired from Lebanon (Sagy & Braun-Lewensohn, 2009). We may cautiously suggest that, in that period, the Arab minority experienced less identification with the Palestinian component of their identity but no change in their Israeli one (Smooha, 2010). Overall, it appears that among the Arab adolescents in Israel, in-group narrative perceptions are related to identity construction within complex circles of belonging, from the political situation regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the regional situation to the minority–majority relations within Israel.

The third measure of perceptions of collective narratives included in the scope of this study is the relationship between the cognitive and emotional elements of the "other" group narrative. This measure seems to reflect the level of coherence of the attitudes towards the "other" (Sagy et al., 2011). We hypothesized that there would be a higher need for coherence in times of threat and stress as a means of achieving a certain closure for the individuals as well as for the collective (Kruglanski, 2004). In wartime, a high level of personal sense of coherence has been found to be a significant resource in coping with stress (Sagy & Braun-Lewensohn, 2009). Thus, we expected higher correlations among the cognitive and emotional elements to appear in violent periods. This hypothesis received support throughout the four stages of the study. We found levels of coherence to be quite different in the two groups of Israeli Jewish and Arab students. The level of coherence in the attitude towards the out-group increased over the years with the escalation of violence. In both groups the lowest measure of coherence was found in the first period during the Oslo talks. It seems that this period of a relative peace, or hopes for peace, "allowed" for a lower level of consistency and more openness to different perspectives in both groups (Sagy et al., 2011). The results of lower coherence during this stage seem to reflect less rigidity of the sociopsychological repertoire and provide the opportunity for social changes needed to proceed with the peace process at the social level. During the following stages, however, which were characterized by more violent events of war and terror, the coherence of the attitudes increased among Israeli Jews. Their coherent perceptions could be a significant resource in coping with the stressful situation. At the same time, this coherent pattern of perceptions could explain the high resistance to change among these youths (Halperin, Russel et al., 2011). As suggested by Sagy et al. (2002), these results also indicate the influence of top–down processes: changing reality and actual social events (peace talks vs.

war and terror) lead to changes of perceptions of the in- and out-group among youth who are living in conflicted areas.

Another important issue that requires attention is the differentiation between the two emotions: empathy and anger. Empathy is described in the literature as an emotional-cognitive process (Strayer, 1987) that results in understanding and "feeling with" others, while anger is usually described as a more physiologically related emotion (Harris, Schoenfeld, Gwynne, & Weissler, 1964). Furthermore, anger is evoked by threat against the self, especially when the threat is perceived as an unjust assault that interferes with one's attempts to realize specific personal goals (Lazarus, 1991). We found that the Israeli Arab adolescents felt less empathy and more anger towards the "other" group narratives than did their Jewish counterparts. This result could be part of the tendency of the neglected and offended minority to reject the majority narrative (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; see also Nahhas, Chap. 5).

Another differentiation is noteworthy. Over the stages of the longitudinal study, there were relatively higher correlations between legitimacy and *empathy* towards the "other" collective narratives among Arabs and higher correlation between legitimacy and *anger* towards the "other" collective narratives among Jews. In other words, it seems that for Arab adolescents, the barrier towards legitimization of the Israeli Jewish collective narratives was associated with a lack of empathy towards those narratives, while the main hindrance of the Israeli Jewish youth towards legitimization of the Palestinian collective narratives was associated with a feeling of anger towards these narratives. The role of empathy and anger in the ability to listen to the "other" life story has been described in several studies relating to Palestinian–Israeli encounters (Sagy, 2000). The ability to empathize with the suffering of the "enemy" and to overcome the anger which arises while listening to the "other" narratives was found to be a contributing factor in enhancing readiness to reconcile (Sagy, 2015). However, as far as we know, the differentiation between these two emotions with relation to the cognitive component of legitimization has not been examined. Our results hint at a different pattern of emotional-cognitive connection among the Israeli Arab and the Israeli Jewish adolescents which can be understood by both cultural and contextual (majority vs. minority) factors. It seems that further research is needed to investigate the different meanings of anger, empathy, and legitimization for these two conflicted groups as well as for other groups in conflict.

Despite these meaningful results, the generalizability of our study conclusions is limited. The limitations are mainly in methodological concerns. The first relates to the question of representativeness of the samples. Although we attempted to carefully consider this question by randomly selecting the schools during the first stage, some of the schools refused or could not participate in the later stages of the research. Second, our sample is limited to high school students whose experience with the "other" group is very limited, and their identity construction process is still in its early stages.

In spite of the methodological limitations of this longitudinal study, it may still indicate some important directions to explore in order to deepen our understanding of perceptions of collective narratives in intergroup relations within the context of intractable conflict.

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Part III
Societal Beliefs and Ethos

"Seeing Through a Glass Darkly": Israeli and Egyptian Images of the Other During the Nasserite Period (1952–1970)

Elie Podeh

Introduction

About two decades ago, I began to study Israel's place in the Middle East. My interest stemmed from two considerations: First, the peace process that began with the 1993 Oslo Accords believed to herald a new era, in which Israel would be more integrated in the region as a result of growing Arab recognition of it. Second, my own realization that the academic separation between Israel and the Middle East—the fact that Israeli studies have traditionally been isolated from Islamic and Middle East studies—was a mistaken institutional decision motivated by ideological and practical reasons. Consequently, Israelis have developed a perception of the Middle East that separated Israel—politically, economically, and particularly culturally—from the Arab-Muslim Middle East. The need to form a Jewish-Zionist identity also necessitated an independent academic historiography—a process that has been impressively accomplished by various departments of Jewish and Eretz-Israel studies at various universities. This development further institutionalized the academic separation between Jewish-Israeli studies and Orientalism—the discipline that included the study of Islam, Middle Eastern history, and languages (such as Arabic, Persian, and Turkish but not Hebrew). This separation, it should be emphasized, did not exist in the German universities from which leading professors came to Palestine and

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_7

established the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in the Mandate period. However, with the establishment of the Institute of Jewish Studies in 1924, and the Institute of Oriental Studies two years later, this separation was institutionalized and later reproduced in other Israeli universities (Lazarus-Yaffe, 1999; Milson, 1997; Podeh, 2006, pp. 93–100).

My assessment that this separation was artificial and detrimental to scholars in both fields prompted me to focus on the question whether Israel—not only geographically speaking—should be considered part of the Middle East. More concretely, should we speak of Israel *and* the Middle East or Israel *in* the Middle East? Far from being a question of terminology, this duality represents in essence a core issue: Do Israel and the Middle East constitute two distinct or complimentary entities (Podeh, 1997)? My intellectual journey also included the development of a graduate course called "Israel in the Middle East"—a title with a clear statement about my proclivity—which has been taught since 1997. Though modest, my suggestion to teach such course in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies was designed to initiate a dialogue on whether Israel should be part of the Middle East. Although this was meant as a purely academic rather than political exercise, it was based on the conviction that studying both sides would yield a better understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[1] It was here that I first encountered Daniel Bar-Tal's academic literature; while drafting the course's syllabus, I thought that the students required an understanding of some cultural and psychological aspects of the conflict from the Israeli side. As a historian, the psychological insights derived from the material opened new vistas for me and my students; they were important in motivating me to investigate the importance of images and perceptions of the Other in intractable conflicts—of which the Arab-Israeli conflict is undoubtedly a primary example (Podeh, 2004). My subsequent venture into the study of views of the Other in history textbooks—this time in the Israeli education system—was influenced by Bar-Tal's influential work on the topic (Bar-Tal, 1998; Podeh, 2002).[2]

It is a given that stereotypes, and prejudice, and images of the Other play a significant role in conflicts between states and individuals. The Arab-Israeli conflict is no different from other international and regional intractable conflicts, in which the view of the Other, filtered through various state socialization agents—such as the media, the education system, the arts, and others—shapes decision-makers' beliefs, attitudes, and emotions (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). In analyzing how people process information, Alexander George (1980) posited that beliefs and images about the environment, which are used by individuals to fashion a

[1] It is interesting to note that one of my Ph.D. students, Nimrod Goren, whose dissertation was jointly supervised with Daniel Bar-Tal, founded later a think tank called Mitvim—The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies—one of the major tasks of which is to deal with Israel's place in the Middle East.

[2] Many years later, Daniel Bar-Tal and Sami Adwan collaborated in an international research team (in which this author was involved as well) in a project initiated and sponsored by the Council of Religious Institutions of the Holy Land, called "Victims of Our Own Narrative: Portrayal of the 'Other' in Israeli and Palestinian Schools Books." http://d7hj1xx5r7f3h.cloudfront.net/Israeli-Palestinian_School_Book_Study_Report-English.pdf.

relatively coherent way of organizing and making sense of confusing signals, may be biased and stereotyped since information processing is selective.

Societies engaged in intractable conflicts develop a conflict ethos, which, according to Daniel Bar-Tal (2013), is "a configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a dominant orientation to a society; these beliefs illuminate the present state of affairs and conditions and set goals for the future." This ethos, in his opinion, "binds the members of society together, along with the goals and aspirations that impel them toward the future" (p. 174). According to Bar-Tal's typology, the challenges of intractable conflict fuel eight themes of societal beliefs in the conflict ethos: (1) justness of one's own goals, (2) delegitimization of the opponent, (3) self-victimization, (4) positive collective self-image, (5) security, (6) patriotism, (7) unity, and (8) peace. Research shows that delegitimization plays a highly important role in analyzing the image of the other. By denying the adversary's humanity and morality, delegitimization constitutes a psychological permit to harm the delegitimized group, by violent means if necessary. His research identifies several forms of delegitimization: dehumanization, outcasting, trait characterization, use of political labels, and group comparison (Bar-Tal, 2013; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012).

It was only natural that an article in a book dedicated to Daniel Bar-Tal's academic contribution deals with images and perceptions of the Other. Though his contribution was mainly in the theoretical field, he argued that "without the study of context it is impossible to understand the functioning of individuals in groups because human thoughts and feelings are embedded in historical, social, political, and cultural contexts" (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005, p. 7). Therefore, this chapter explores Egyptian and Israeli perceptions of the Other within a specific historical context: the stormy years of the Nasserite period (1952–1970). The main thesis is that both countries developed a diabolical image of each other, which hampered the chances of conducting a serious peaceful dialogue. These mutual negative images trickled top down to society and became an integral part of each nation's collective memory.

The Nasserite View of Palestine and Israel

Egyptian interest in the Palestine conflict began in the monarchy period (1923–1952), particularly during the years of the Arab Revolt (1936–1939). A combination of domestic and external factors triggered Egypt's involvement in the Palestine issue, which King Faruq used to bolster his shaky legitimacy, since the opposition forces, such as the Muslim brotherhood, often flogged him with the Palestine whip. Palestine also constituted a core element in the growing importance of pan-Arab ideology in Egypt's intellectual and political life, as a result of which Egypt's aspiration to play a pivotal role in Arab politics required active involvement in the Palestine question. Finally, Egyptians shared with Arab Palestinians a history of anti-imperialist and anti-British struggle (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1995). Growing commitment to the Palestine cause eventually led Faruq to intervene in the 1948 War, though his major concerns were Hashemite aggrandizement plans and the

imminent threat to his own legitimacy. Although it had joined the Palestinian and Arab chorus against the UN Partition Plan, Cairo had no difficulty in adopting a realistic attitude toward the existence of a Jewish state after the war (Doran, 1999).

Before seizing power in July 1952, Nasser experienced the Palestine problem first hand, participating as an officer in several battles in 1948. The war was crucial in crystallizing his awareness and understanding that Egypt's problems were in Cairo and not Palestine: "We were fighting in Palestine," wrote Nasser in his *Philosophy of the Revolution* in 1953, "but our dreams were centered in Egypt. Our bullets were aimed at the enemy in its trenches before us, but our hearts hovered over our distant country, which we had left in the care of the wolves" (Nasser, 1955, p. 21). While besieged in Faluja in Palestine, Nasser and his fellow Free Officers realized that "the biggest battlefield is in Egypt." In fact, Faluja appeared to them as a microcosmos of Egypt, which, "too, is besieged by difficulties and enemies; she has been deceived and forced into a battle for which she was not ready" (ibid, pp. 22–23). Palestine was not the reason for the 23 July Revolution, as Nasser emphasizes in the *Philosophy*, but it added impetus to a deeply ingrained process. Interestingly, Nasser's acquaintance with a certain Israeli officer during the armistice talks is described in a factual manner devoid of negative overtones (ibid, p. 24). A similar attitude is reflected in his brief memoir of the war, published in 1955 (Khalidi, 1973).

In the immediate post-1952 period, domestic problems and future relations with Britain were the prime foreign policy issues rather than Palestine (Aburish, 2004; Mohi El Din, 1995). Interestingly enough, Nasser maintained surreptitious contact with Tel Aviv (including Prime Minister Moshe Sharett) in 1953–1954 through several intermediaries and did not rule out the possibility of reaching some accommodation with Israel (James, 2006).

However, as Nasser consolidated his rule, Israel and Palestine gradually emerged as pivotal elements in his rhetoric. The two issues were, in fact, interconnected: by supporting one (Palestine), Nasser was bound to negate the other (Israel). Four reasons led to Nasser's changed outlook: First, the fact that since the 1948 War, Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip, with its Palestinian population, meant that it could no longer ignore the Palestine question. Second, Palestine had since emerged as the ultimate source of regime legitimacy and a core element of the pan-Arab ideology; the liberation of Palestine, therefore, was intertwined with Arab unity (Sela, 1998; Telhami, 1992). As a result, any leader aspiring to Arab leadership was compelled to place the Palestinian cause at the top of his agenda.

The third reason was the growing conviction that Israel wished to eliminate the Palestine problem and expand its territory from the Nile to the Euphrates, in line with the biblical borders of the Promised Land. This belief was confirmed, in Egyptian eyes, by three developments: the first was the discovery of a Jewish espionage group responsible for several terror incidents in Cairo and Alexandria in July 1954, which was masterminded by the Israeli intelligence. Operation Suzanna (or "the Mishap," as it became known in Israel) contributed to a growing sense of mutual mistrust, and Egyptian Jews were consequently considered potential traitors (Heikal, 1986). The second event was Israel's attack on Gaza, on 28 February 1955,

in which 31 Egyptians were killed. The scale of the raid surprised and humiliated Nasser, leading him to believe that its coincidence with the formation of the Western-led defense organization Baghdad Pact was part of a concerted Israeli-Western conspiracy against him. Moreover, the raid convinced Nasser that all the messages that had been conveyed to him by Western intermediaries were designed to lull him into a state of false security. Israel, in the Egyptian view, "was determined to challenge the rising star of Egypt by every means at its disposal, and primarily by force" (ibid, pp. 66–67). The raid, therefore, had "a dramatic effect on Egyptian images of Israel" (Gordon, 2006; James, 2006), setting Nasser on a collision course with Israel. The third event was Israel's participation, along with Britain and France, in the 1956 Suez War (termed *al-udwan al-thulathi*, the Tripartite Aggression). More than anything else, this collusion (*mu'amara*), substantiated Israel's role as an imperialist stooge bent on conquering Palestine and the entire Arab world (Stein, 2012). Thus, by defending Palestine, so it was argued, the Arabs were effectively defending the Arab world from the Zionist threat.

The fourth reason for the change in Nasser's policy was connected with his need to compensate for the absence of a specific program of action against Israel with growing rhetoric. Political, military, and financial considerations motivated Nasser to adopt a "short-of-war" policy based on economic boycotts, maritime blockades, and Fidayyin raids from Gaza. His propaganda increased in intensity, and state propaganda included anti-Semitic and Nazi elements with increasing frequency (Beinin, 1998). In the aftermath of Nasser's policy shift in 1956–1960, some 36,000 Jews were forced to leave Egypt, and their property was in most cases confiscated (Laskier, 1992). Ironically, his inflammatory rhetoric eventually became a self-made trap, as the Arab enthusiasm it aroused contributed significantly to the escalation leading up to the 1967 War.

The negative image of Israel, Zionism, and the Jews was disseminated through various state agencies. Of particular importance were Nasser's speeches and interviews delivered in the state-controlled media (newspapers, radio, and TV). While Nasser's negative expressions were usually oblique (see below), radio and TV broadcasts, as well as books, booklets, and propaganda pamphlets published by the Ministry of National Guidance, Ministry of Education, and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, used direct and explicit negative epithets in their publications and teaching materials (Harkabi, 1976; Klein, 1997). In fact, Egyptian propaganda included all the forms of delegitimization identified by Bar-Tal: dehumanization, outcasting, trait characterization, political labeling, and group comparison (Harkabi, 1967, 1976).

Close scrutiny of Egyptian propaganda reveals the centrality of four themes: first, the need and desire to destroy Israel, either by active involvement of the Arabs or by some other unspecified divine interventions. The terminology used to portray this theme was rich and often direct: liquidation, wiping out, annihilation, purification, cleansing, throwing into the sea, destruction, elimination, and disappearance (ibid). Often enough, Nasser and certain state agencies used ambiguous expressions, such as "liberation of Palestine," "restoration of the stolen rights," "just solution for the Palestinian people," and "solution based on UN resolutions," which were construed by Israel as euphemisms for the same target of eliminating Israel

(ibid). According to Harkabi's meticulous study, the direct terms appeared more frequently in local media, while more euphemistic expressions were more frequent in foreign media.

The second theme of Egypt's propaganda was the depiction of Israel as an expansionist enemy aspiring to control the region between the Nile and the Euphrates. The mission of the Arab states was to defend themselves against the inherent imperialism of Zionist ideology (Harkabi, 1976). The third theme was the equation of Israel and Zionism with Western imperialism and colonialism. According to the Egyptian and Arab view, Israel functioned as a "spearhead," "bridgehead," "base," and "instrument" of imperialist forces. The memory of the crusaders' invasion was often evoked, linking the establishment of Israel to a chain of transient imperialist invasions of the Middle East, in which the Jewish settlements were no more than colonies. The fourth element of Egyptian propaganda was the use of delegitimizing anti-Semitic terms and labels. One major feature was the descriptions of the vileness of the Jews, depicted as monsters, cancer, thorns, vipers, octopi, spiders, parasites, riffraff, demons, monkeys, pigs, dogs, microbes, bacteria, a fifth column, and other negative characteristics. Also common was the association of Israel and the Jews with the fabricated *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which was widely translated and circulated by state agencies in Arabic and English from the mid-1950s onward. Publication of these and similar anti-Semitic pamphlets "exposed" the ways in which the Jews achieved influence and world domination (Harkabi, 1976; Lewis, 1986). These treatises were backed by the dissemination of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* in Arabic during and after the Suez War (Laskier, 1992).

Anti-Semitic themes were also prevalent in Egyptian films produced during the Nasserite period; Jewish figures were often stereotyped, associated with usury, greediness, cunning, seduction, and the Satan (Shafik, 2007). Demonization of the Jews was also found in the Egyptian romance literature (Somekh, 1996). Moreover, the Jewish community in Egypt was portrayed as an alien and mostly European society, servant of wider Jewish and Zionist interests, and part of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy. The Jews were blamed for exploiting Egyptian society's honesty and hospitality in order to promote their own economic aspirations (Mayer, 1987).

In the early 1960s, the anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic image of Israel had become well embedded in Egyptian political culture, as attested by two official documents. The first was the National Charter—probably the regime's most important ideological document—drafted in 1962, which stated, "The insistence of our people on liquidating the Israeli aggression on a part of Palestine land is a determination to liquidate one of the most dangerous pockets of imperialist resistance against the struggle of peoples…Our pursuit of the Israeli policy of infiltration in Africa is only an attempt to limit the spread of a disruptive imperialist cancer" (Rejwan, 1974, p. 262; Stein, 2012, pp. 62–63). The second was the Charter of the Arab Tripartite Federation, consisting of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, which was proclaimed in April 1963. Its text, which stated that "unification is a revolution because it is closely tied to the question of Palestine and the national obligation to liberate it," was interpreted by Israel as a direct Arab call for Israel's annihilation (Podeh, 2004, pp. 86–87).

Nasser's setbacks in the Arab world—particularly the dissolution of the union between Egypt and Syria in 1961 (the United Arab Republic)—as well as Egypt's military involvement in Yemen, reinforced his commitment to the Palestinian cause. In response to Arab accusations of inactivity vis-à-vis Israel, Nasser initiated the establishment of the palestine liberation organization (PLO) at the Cairo Arab summit in January 1964: Under Ahmed al-Shukeiri, the PLO became an Egyptian proxy in the Arab-Israeli conflict, serving as a cover for avoiding war with Israel. Nasser's support of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian cause in the years 1964–1967 grew in direct proportion to his inactivity against Israel (Shemesh, 1996).

The escalation that led to the outbreak of the June 1967 War was accompanied by increasingly frequent declarations in the Egyptian media, touting Israel's liquidation as a national aim (Harkabi, 1976). Even Nasser's rhetoric drifted in that direction. Thus, for example, in a speech on 26 May, following the evacuation of UN forces on the border and the closure of the Tiran Straits, Nasser declared that "the [impending] battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel" (Laqueur, 1969, p. 335). In a speech 3 days later, Nasser insisted that war was not about the UN forces or the Tiran Straits but dealing with the entire Palestine problem (ibid). With that, Nasser completed the circle that had begun with limited interest in the Palestinian issue in 1954 and ended with a full-fledged commitment. His overconfidence fed by enthusiastic Arab support of his moves, Nasser fell victim to his own inflammatory rhetoric of the preceding years; it became a trap of his own doing, which blurred his ability to distinguish between image and reality.

The Israeli View of Nasser and Nasserism

The results of the 1948 War presented a paradox to Israel's political leadership: On the one hand, Israeli leaders developed a sense of contempt and derision for the Arab states, their corrupt regimes, and the indolent leaders who had led their people to such a crushing defeat at the hands of the Jews in a war of "the few against the many." On the other hand, Israeli leaders feared a second round against the Arabs, whose goal would be the annihilation of the Jews and the obliteration of the shame of defeat. The sense of historic Jewish victimhood caused fear to override hope (Bar-Tal, 2001). As early as 1949, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion expressed his concerns of a unified Arab world that would act against the Jews, using the historic comparison with the crusaders. Ben-Gurion's profound knowledge of history taught him that the emergence of a charismatic leader is a necessary precondition for unity and spiritual rejuvenation. He was especially apprehensive of the emergence of leaders of the stature of Prophet Muhammad, founder of the puritanical Wahhabiyyah movement in the Arabian Peninsula Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab or secular Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). It was the latter who particularly haunted Ben-Gurion: In his diary, he confessed that the fear of "the possibility of our annihilation" still gnawed at him in view of the "existence of sixty or seventy million Arabs—and it is possible that a Mustafa Kemal will rise up among them" (Shalom, 1995, p. 39).

The 1952 revolution in Egypt was initially welcomed by Israel. The impression was that the group of young officers from the middle and lower-middle class would better represent Egypt than the wealthy illegitimate elite under King Faruq. Israel hoped that the new regime would not need to use nationalist anti-Israeli rhetoric to compensate for a lack of political legitimacy and would thereby establish a congenial basis for direct dialogue. Thus, on August 18, 1952, speaking to the Knesset, Ben-Gurion welcomed the new regime. Israel also initiated secret contacts with Nasser in 1953–1954; although they failed to produce any tangible results, participation in these talks signaled that Nasser and Egypt did not desire war (Sheffer, 1996).

To become acquainted with Nasser's worldview, his booklet, *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, was translated by the military intelligence, and attention was directed to Nasser's conceptualization of Egypt's leadership role in three circles—the Arab, the African, and the Islamic. The simplistic interpretation in Israel (and in the West generally) was that Egypt was bent on attaining hegemony in these spheres. It was believed that Israel constituted an obstacle to Egypt's aspirations. Ben-Gurion was greatly influenced by the booklet, as evidenced by his frequent references to it in his diary. At a Knesset debate in early 1956, Ben-Gurion concluded that "the ambition to destroy Israel is planted deep in Nasser's heart and is a cornerstone of his nationalist viewpoint" (Podeh, 2004, p. 76). A careful reading of *The Philosophy*, however, would substantiate that this conclusion was derived not from the actual text but from Ben-Gurion's interpretation of it and his negative image of Nasser.

By early 1956, then, Nasser's image in Israel had become highly negative. The change in the Israeli view was the result of a spiral of several events, beginning with the detention of an Israeli ship and its crew passing through the Suez Canal, in September 1954. It continued with the two death sentences in the trial of the Egyptian Jews involved in Operation Suzanna in January 1955. For some unknown reason, the Israeli leadership believed—following some secret diplomatic exchanges of third parties with the Egyptian regime—that Nasser had promised to refrain from passing death sentences. Israeli disappointment was also expressed by Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, who usually advocated a moderate and restrained policy vis-à-vis Nasser. In his diary, he concluded, "We have lost our faith in him as a result of the hangings" (Podeh, 2004, p. 77). Next, following a series of border infiltrations from Egypt, which involved sabotage and murder, Israel initiated the Gaza operation in February 1955 (see above). Nasser's negative image in Israel (and in the West generally) was strengthened by several policy choices made by Nasser in 1955: his opposition to the Baghdad Pact, a pro-Western defense organization, his participation in the Bandung Conference of nonaligned countries, and recognition of the People's Republic of China. The event that fixed Nasser's negative image was, however, the Czech arms deal, which was viewed by Israel as altering the regional balance of power and concurrently giving the Soviet Union a foothold in the Middle East. Nasser's July 1956 decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company served as ultimate "proof" of Nasser's aggressive ambitions, "confirming" his imperialist desire to seize control of the oil fields and achieve dominance in Arab and Islamic circles. This negative image of Nasser and

Nasserism, formed during the years 1954–1956, would not change until Nasser's death in September 1970.

Israeli discourse on Nasser and Nasserism, as reflected in the media and decision-makers' rhetoric, included three major themes: one, the perception of Nasser as a kind of Arab Hitler or Mussolini, associated with Nazi type of activity and ideology; Nasser's *Philosophy of the Revolution* was portrayed as the equivalent of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. The perception of Nasser as an expansionist and imperialist, bent on attaining hegemony in the Arab, Muslim, and African circles, was seen as a reflection of Nasser's desire to acquire "living space" for Egypt—a term borrowed from the Nazi term *lebenstraum*. This analogy was immediate and self-evident for the generation that had personally experienced or closely followed the Holocaust. The conflation of Nasser with Nazi ideology stimulated delegitimation and dehumanization of Israel's enemy and laid the groundwork for Israel's use of force against Egypt during the Suez War.

For example, Ben-Gurion informed the Knesset when introducing his new government in November 1955, immediately after the signing of the Czech arms deals:

> The rulers of Egypt are buying these arms with one goal only: to uproot the State of Israel and its people…The head of the ruling military faction in Cairo has announced that its war is aimed not only against Israel but against world Jewry and against Jewish finance which rules the United States. *This kind of talk is known to us from Hitler's day* [my emphasis], and it is highly mystifying that the Czechoslovakian government in particular is ignoring the Nazi dogma that is being sounded anew on the banks of the Nile…There is a duty to inform all the aggressors of the world…[that] the Jewish people in its land will not be as sheep to the slaughter… Not many nations fight for their freedom and their existence. What Hitler did to six million helpless Jews in Europe will not be done by any enemy of Israel to the free Jews rooted in their homeland. (Podeh, 2004, pp. 77–78)

Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal was interpreted as an attempt to conquer "living space" stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. If he succeeded, Ben-Gurion warned, he "will be able to continue to weave his expansionist designs toward Jordan, Syria and Iraq, which will facilitate the encirclement of Israel. And no force will then be able to prevent him from executing the rest of his plan to create the Egyptian Empire" (ibid, p. 81).

A major event that further reinforced the aggressive image of the Egyptian leader was the unification of Egypt and Syria and the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958. The Israeli Foreign Ministry viewed the unification as "the beginning of the fulfillment of Nasser's vision of an Arab empire signifying one nation, one government and one leader—Nasser" (Podeh, 2004, pp. 82–83). With the formation of the UAR, the fear that a charismatic leader of the caliber of Bismarck or Atatürk would unify the Arabs appeared to be coming true in the form of Nasser. The "aggressive" interpretation of the unification reverberated in the Israeli press and in the Western press translated into Hebrew. The press frequently used the term "Anschluss," identified in the Western collective memory with the annexation of Austria by Hitler, to describe Egypt's domination over Syria. The UAR was seen as the realization of Nasser's vision of an Arab empire, as out-

lined in *The Philosophy*, and the first step on the road to Nasser's control over Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the remaining major oil states (Podeh, 2004).

From the establishment of the UAR onward, Israel consistently viewed almost all developments in the Arab world—such as the civil war in Lebanon and the toppling of the Western-oriented Hashemite monarchy in Iraq (July 1958)—as a product of Nasserite machinations. Ben-Gurion viewed the Iraqi coup as "the gravest development [in the region] since World War II." According to his pessimistic and disillusioned analysis, "all the Arab states will be in Nasser's hands soon." Ben-Gurion viewed the developments in the Arab East as a clear parallel to Hitler's designs for Europe:

> What happened with Nasser happened with Hitler… No one paid attention that Hitler had already stated what he wanted. It was all in his book, the methods too. Hitler told the truth. No one believed him when he said it. The same is true for Nasser. Nasser put his cards on the table. He clearly stated what he wants in his booklet *The Philosophy of the Revolution*. He wants three things: he wants to be the ruler of the Arab nations, to be the head of Islam, and to be the dictator of the African continent. And he goes about this step by step. All that I have heard about him shows that he is not a fool, he is cunning as a snake. He knows how to speak to each person in his own language. (Podeh, 2004, p. 84)

Nasser's involvement in Yemen since September 1962 was considered another attempt to control the Arabian Peninsula and the oil fields. Even the formation of the Tripartite Federation between Egypt, Iraq, and Syria in April 1963 was seen as an ominous threat, particularly the wording of the charter—"Unification is a revolution because it is closely tied to the question of Palestine and the national obligation to liberate it" (Podeh, 2004, p. 86). In an unusual step, Ben-Gurion dispatched personal letters to numerous heads of states around the world that maintained diplomatic relations with Israel, to alert them to the dangers facing Israel. The letter emphasized that "this is the first time in our generation that a constitutional document by three states designates the annihilation of Israel as one of the primary, and perhaps the primary goal of the unification of Arab armies." Ben-Gurion emphasized that, in contrast to Israel's quest for peace, as stated in its Proclamation of Independence, "the aspiration to annihilate Israel has been harbored by the Arab rulers ever since the reestablishment of the State of Israel" (Podeh, 2004, p. 87).

In the early 1960s, Nasser hired German scientists, some of whom had served the Nazis during World War II, to build his long-range missile program. Though Nasser's decision was largely based on commercial considerations and these experts' availability, his association with ex-Nazi experts further "substantiated" Nasser's image in Israel as "a Hitler" bent on the destruction of the Jewish state (Bar-Zohar, 1965).

The third element in the Israeli discourse on Nasser was the Egyptian leader's depiction as a dictator, heading a regime that was bent on exploitation and oppression of the common people, rather than achieving a classless society and social justice, as propagated by official state media. No longer was it presented in the Israeli press as "progressive" or "revolutionary" but rather as a corrupt dictatorship. The most widespread term used to describe Egypt's new ruling elite was "gang" (*knufiyya* in Hebrew); Nasser was often called a "dictator" and "despot" (*rodan* in Hebrew).

The use of these terms emphasized the moral superiority of Israeli democracy over the Egyptian totalitarian regime. In addition, Nasser's military rank of colonel during the revolution was used extensively to deride his status and highlight the illegitimate nature of the regime, which came to power by coup rather than by democratic means. A typical depiction of Israel's view of the Egyptian regime appears in a speech by Ben-Gurion in early 1956:

> A revolt took place in Egypt… Several military figures took control of the regime. Their intent at first might have been perceived as changing the condition of the Egyptian people. There is no nation in the world where illness and ignorance are so shocking as in Egypt… Yet this man announced publicly that his intention was that Egypt shall head all the Arab nations, lead the Muslim world, and hold hegemony over the entire African continent. If so, there are two ways to accomplish this: the long and difficult way, by correcting the wretched situation in Egypt…or a second way, by external conquests and war with those whom the Arab nations hate—a war with Israel. The rulers of Egypt have chosen the second way. (Podeh, 2004, pp. 80–81)

This negative view of Nasser, coupled by mutual mistrust, sabotaged the peaceful discussions that had begun in Paris in September 1965 between a high-ranking Egyptian official and Israeli Mossad agent. Following the initial contacts, head of the Mossad, Meir Amit, was invited to Cairo in February 1966. However, Prime Minister Eshkol (who succeeded Ben-Gurion in 1963) was persuaded by his ministers and advisors to suggest a European venue for the meeting, against his and Amit's better judgment. The insulting Israeli response foiled the continuation of the dialogue. Undoubtedly, the opportunity missed by Israel was a result of the highly negative image of Nasser, developed in the preceding years, which led Israeli decision-makers to treat peace overtures with skepticism and suspicion because of the enemy's "known" duplicity (Podeh, 2015).

The opportunity that such talks offered to trigger a change in Israel's image of Nasser quickly disappeared as developments escalated toward war in mid-1967: What started as an Israeli-Syrian air clash in April erupted into a political and ultimately military showdown in May to June. As the situation escalated, Arab enthusiasm for war heightened, and Egypt's inflammatory propaganda machine increasingly used derogatory language, in which Israel's liquidation became its main aim (Harkabi, 1976). Thus, when Nasser, called for "the destruction of Israel" in one of his speeches on May 26, 1967, the response of Prime Minister Eshkol and the Foreign Ministry was a deep sense of fear. The Foreign Office instructed its representatives to maintain an aggressive line: "Nasser's image [should be portrayed] as the Hitler of the Nile who has always sought hegemony in the Middle East. To fulfill this goal: 1. He was prepared to make use of the experience of Nazis and to be aided by war criminals; 2. He disseminated *Mein Kampf* and the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in Arabic translation, as well as varied anti-Jewish literature; 3. He openly announces his intention to annihilate Israel" (Podeh, 2004, p. 89). A message sent by Eshkol to President Johnson emphasized the threat of Israel's annihilation and invoked the memory of the Holocaust (Podeh, 2004). This was not merely a cynical attempt at enlisting Western support; it was a genuine reflection of the Israeli image of Nasser and Nasserism.

Conclusions

Mutual Egyptian and Israeli perceptions during the Nasserite period followed patterns that are typical of intractable international conflicts. Each party developed a collective memory and ethos that included negative images and stereotypes. Unsurprisingly, the diabolical images that the parties developed of each other shared certain features. Thus, each side viewed its adversary as an imperialist, expansionist aggressor, bent on achieving hegemony and acquiring territory, either in the three circles of influence according to the Israeli interpretation or from the Nile to the Euphrates, according to the Egyptian interpretation. In addition, both parties, according to the framework developed by Bar-Tal and Hammack (2012), used delegitimizing and occasionally dehumanizing elements in their rhetoric, including outcasting, trait characterization, and group comparisons. Thus, demonization occurred on both sides of the border; often enough, events were interpreted in a way that dovetailed with the "established" images of the adversary.

Interestingly, the two parties did not possess an ingrained negative image of the other at the outset; Nasser initially did not consider Israel an immediate enemy and had no preconceived negative image of Jews and Israelis. Likewise, the Israeli decision-makers initially viewed with favor the toppling of the monarchy and the seizure of power by the young officers. Nonetheless, a spiral of events in 1954–1955 triggered mutual suspicion and mistrust. From the Egyptian point of view, it appeared as if "the Israelis dealt him [Nasser] one humiliating blow after another" (Aburish, 2004, p. 73). From an Israeli perspective, Nasser emerged as the epitome of their worst fears, evoking immediate and remote memories of annihilation and the Holocaust. At that point, images and historical reality became interwoven, and the negative images became solidified and entrenched by the Suez War. These images changed little since then, even when peace feelers were sent to the other side. In this respect, the Israeli-Egyptian conflict, like other intractable conflicts, involved leaders (and societies) with closed minds and fixed images of each other. One may wonder if the same process of demonization has been ongoing between Israel and Iran in recent years (Ram, 2009).

Palestine and Israel constituted two sides of the same coin for Nasser, growing commitment to the first and necessitated hardening the position vis-à-vis the second, first rhetorically and then practically, as seen by the escalation leading up to the June 1967 War. The entanglement of Palestine in Egyptian foreign policy, which was also due to the centrality of the Palestinian cause in pan-Arab ideology, gradually receded in the Sadat era. Yet, an analysis of Israeli-Egyptian relations shows that reality and image were intertwined; "Every 'reality,'" wrote Harold Isaacs, "is made up of the sum of somebody's images; every 'image' is part of someone's reality. Images, moreover, appear in the eye of the beholder" (Isaacs, 1975, p. 258).

In spite of these negative mutual images, Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty in 1979. In his speech at the Knesset, on 20 November 1977, Sadat acknowledged the existence of a psychological barrier between the two sides: "A barrier of rejection. A barrier of fear of deception. A barrier of hallucinations around any action,

deed or decision. A barrier of cautious and erroneous interpretations of all and every event or statement. It is this psychological barrier," he concluded, "which I described in official statements as representing 70 percent of the whole problem."[3] Interestingly enough, 35 years after the signing of the treaty, this barrier still exists, at least on the Egyptian side. An examination of current Egyptian school textbooks demonstrates that they are replete with biases, omissions, and delegitimizing elements (Podeh, forthcoming). This historical context of the cold peace between Israel and Egypt substantiates the argument that the two parties have not yet reached the stage of reconciliation (Podeh, 2007). This stage, according to Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004), begins "when the parties in conflict start to change their beliefs, attitudes, goals, motivation and emotions about the conflict, about each other, and about future relations" (pp. 22–23; see also Bar-Tal, 2013). Unfortunately, it is doubtful whether this process will begin before a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at hand. Meanwhile, the parties, according to a famous saying attributed to Apostle Paul in a different context, will continue "seeing through a glass, darkly," meaning that at present they suffer from an obscure or imperfect vision of reality, which may disappear at the end of time.

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The Jewish–Israeli Ethos of Conflict

Neta Oren

One of Bar-Tal's main contributions is the concept of ethos of conflict. Ethos in general is defined by Bar-Tal as "the configuration of central societal beliefs that provide central characterization to the society and gives it a particular orientation" (Bar-Tal, 2000, p. xiv). Much of Bar-Tal's work, however, is dedicated to a specific ethos—the ethos of conflict. According to Bar-Tal (2000, 2013; Bar-Tal & Oren, 2000; Oren & Bar-Tal, 2006), such an ethos evolves during an intractable conflict and includes specific themes, such as beliefs about the goals in the conflict, about security, about own victimization, and about the opponent's lack of legitimacy. He notes that ethos of conflict is a major component of the psychological repertoire that allows a society to cope effectively with the stressful conditions produced by a conflict. But at the same time, the ethos functions as a barrier to the peace process by providing an epistemic basis for continuation of the conflict (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Oren, 2010).

In what follows, I will elaborate on the meaning of the concept of ethos of conflict from a collective perspective,[1] the way it changes, and the reciprocal relationship between ethos of conflict and conflict resolution. I will focus specifically on the Israeli–Jewish ethos, including the changes in the adherence of the Jewish–Israeli society to the ethos of conflict during the years 1969–2013.

[1] There are several studies that analyzed the ethos of conflict at the individual level, while trying to assess the degree of adherence of an individual to the ethos of conflict. As noted, this chapter will focus mostly on the collective level.

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_8

The Context of the Israeli–Arab Conflict

I begin by outlining some major events in the conflict in order to help the reader understand the context in which the Israeli ethos of conflict evolved and changed. The roots of the Israeli–Arab conflict can be traced to the Jewish immigration movement to the territory known since the 1920s British Mandate as Palestine. Inspired by the nationalist ideology of Zionism, the new Jewish immigrants aimed to establish their own state in the territory that they considered as their old homeland thousands of years before. This intent, and the ensuing changes in the demographic balance of the area, was bitterly opposed by the local Arab populations and triggered the process by which local Arab populations would develop a distinct Palestinian national identity as well. The end of the British Mandate in 1947, and the war that erupted following this event, shaped the history of the region with the establishment of the state of Israel and as many as 800,000 Palestinians becoming refugees in neighboring Arab states.

Between 1949 and 1967, the Israeli–Arab conflict was largely an interstate conflict, and Israel's focus was on Arab states in the region—especially Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. This stage of the conflict includes several additional wars between Israel and Arab states such as the war between Israel and Egypt in 1956 and the war between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967. The 1967 war ended with the Israeli capture of additional territories (the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and the Golan Heights), some of them heavily populated, thus bringing additional Palestinians under Israeli control.

However, following a major war in 1973, Israel's neighboring states gradually withdrew from direct military confrontation, and in 1979, a peace treaty was signed between Israel and one of its major Arab enemies—Egypt. At the same time, an independent Palestinian movement emerged, which eventually took over the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that was created by the Arab League in 1964. As a result, the Arab–Israeli conflict became "Palestinianized" (Kelman, 2007), and Israel's focus shifted to the Palestinians (see also Morris, 2001; Sandler, 1988).

During the 1980s, PLO guerrillas, who had been staging raids on Israel from Lebanese territory, provoked several large-scale Israeli invasions of Lebanon. Eventually, in June 1982, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon, driving 25 miles past the border and moving into East Beirut. They forced the PLO leadership to flee to Tunisia, but Israeli armed forces stayed in South Lebanon until 2000. In December 1987, while IDF was still in South Lebanon, a popular Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip began and continued, at varying levels of intensity, through the early 1990s (what is known as the First Intifada). In 1993, a "Declaration of Principles" between Israel and the Palestinians was signed that led to a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan in 1994 and an interim agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in 1995. A reescalation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict began with the failure of the July 2000 US-mediated Camp David Summit between Israel and the Palestinians. With the eruption of what is now known as the Second Intifada, the negotiations with the Palestinians ceased, and the level of violence on both sides

surged. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip and from four settlements in the West Bank. This act was followed by considerable chaos within Gaza. The Hamas movement, which calls the replacement of the State of Israel by a Palestinian Islamic state, won the elections held in the Palestinian Territories in January 2006, leading to the formation of a unity government. In June 2007, amid growing anarchy in Gaza, Hamas militants drove the rival secular Fatah party out of the Gaza Strip. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas dissolved the unity government with Hamas and formed a separate government based in the West Bank.

During the years 2007–2014, several attempts at direct and indirect negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas took place, all to no avail. At the same time, the relationship between Israel and the Hamas in Gaza remained tense and erupted into several major confrontations (in 2009, 2012 and 2014).

In many ways, the Arab–Israeli conflict is a prototypical case of an intractable conflict, characterized as lasting at least 25 years, violent, and perceived as unsolvable, over goals considered existential, and of zero-sum nature (see Bar-Tal, 2013; Kriesberg, Northrup, & Thorson, 1989; Sharvit, Chap. 1). Yet, some events since the late 1970s, such as the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, the Oslo agreements in 1993 and 1995, and the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994, pointed towards a more tractable end of the conflict's dimension during the 1990s.

Content of the Ethos of Conflict

As noted, Bar-Tal (2000) defined ethos as a configuration of central societal beliefs. Societal beliefs, then, are the building blocks of an ethos according to this definition. They are defined as cognitions shared by society members that address themes and issues with which society members are particularly occupied and which contribute to their sense of uniqueness. This implies that at least some group members hold in their mental repertoire the same beliefs, and they are aware of this sharing. Furthermore, most society members do not have to agree with these beliefs, but they have to recognize their importance and view them as one of the society's characteristics.

According to Bar-Tal (2013, p. 175), not every societal belief in a given society is included in the ethos of a society, only those that meet particular criteria. In addition to being known to the majority of the members of a society, the beliefs of the ethos (a) are often invoked in public debates as justifications, explanations, and arguments; (b) influence politics and decisions taken by leaders of society; (c) appear in many cultural products, such as literature and films; (d) appear also in numerous social expressions, such as rituals and ceremonies; and (e) are imparted to the younger generation and to new members of society.

Bar-Tal (2000, 2013; Bar-Tal & Oren, 2000) claims that during an intractable conflict, an ethos of conflict often evolves that may include the following themes: beliefs about the goals of the society in the conflict, about security, about own

victimization, about the opponent's lack of legitimacy, about positive self-image, about national unity, about patriotism, and about peace. Several studies applied Bar-Tal's ethos of conflict framework to analyze the Jewish–Israeli ethos. Included in this line of research are numerous studies that look at the prevalence of the above eight themes in Israeli official and cultural texts. Among others, Ben-Shaul (1997) studied siege beliefs in Israeli films. Arviv-Abromovich (2010) analyzed beliefs of ethos of conflict as they were reflected in the official ceremonies of Memorial Day for fallen soldiers and Independence Day during the years 1948–2006. David (2007) traced the beliefs of ethos in school readers used to teach Hebrew literature from the pre-state period until 2003. Bar-Tal, Zoran, Cohen, and Magal (2010) analyzed the existence of the ethos beliefs in Sabbath leaflets distributed in Israeli synagogues on Saturdays during the 2009 Gaza War. Lastly, my own research (Oren, 2005, 2009, 2010, forthcoming) reviewed the appearance of the ethos themes in Israeli public opinion polls, cinema, school textbooks, leaders' speeches, and election platforms during the years 1969–2013.

The above studies reveal that the eight themes of the ethos of conflict mentioned by Bar-Tal were indeed part of the Israeli ethos for many years, although some changes appeared over time that will be described later. This means that these themes were shared by the majority of Israeli society over a period of time, they served the political and economic leadership to justify and explain their policies, they appeared in various cultural products, and they were imparted to the younger generation and to new members of society.

Justification of Israel's Goals—These beliefs emphasize the Zionist goals of creating a Jewish state in Israel and reject any possibility of compromising on this goal (as in creating a binational state). The right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel, as well as the negation of the Arab right to the same land, is justified using historical, theological, legal, moral, and cultural arguments. Among the arguments cited, the land of Israel was promised to the Jewish people by God, the land of Israel was for generations' home to the Jewish people, and this link was not severed—at least in spirit—in centuries of exile. Anti-Semitism in general and the Holocaust in particular demonstrate the need of the Jewish people to have a safe haven.

Special attempts were made through the years to refute the Palestinian claims to self-determination, statehood, and "right of return". Some of the arguments used in this context are as follows: Palestinians are part of the Arab nation and not a separate people; no national, societal, financial, or cultural accomplishment of any substance can be attributed to the Arabs inhabiting the land of Israel; and the land was desolate and neglected prior to the return of Jews. Finally, claims for self-determination by the Palestinians were raised only at the time of and in response to the establishment of the Jewish settlement in Israel.

Security—This theme presents the Israeli society as a society that is under existential threat. Threats such as war, terrorism, and unconventional weapons have always featured prominently in the Israeli public discourse. Therefore, security has become

the most cherished need and value, promoted as a cultural master symbol in the Israeli Jewish ethos. All the channels of communication and agents of socialization paid tribute to the security forces, resulting in absolute confidence and trust in the Israeli Army. Military means were seen as more effective in dealing with threats than diplomacy or negotiations. Israel was seen to have a right and a duty to arm itself adequately to address the threats, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons (Bar-Tal, Jacobson, & Klieman, 1998).

Negative Image of the Arabs—At the core of the beliefs in the Israeli ethos, related to the Arab opponents was the perception that all Arabs were part of a single homogenous group (the "Arab World") with no meaningful way to classify them into subgroups. During the most intense period of the conflict, the image of Arabs was dominated by negative stereotypes describing the Arabs as primitive and backward. They were viewed as murderers, a bloodthirsty mob, and treacherous on the one hand, but cowardly and poor soldiers on the other. Other beliefs effectively delegitimized the Arabs by comparing them to Nazis—the embodiment of evil in the Jewish–Israeli discourse. They were perceived to be pursuing the extermination of the state of Israel and its inhabitants and as having no interest in peace (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007; Podeh, Chap. 7).

Victimhood—Israelis perceived themselves to be the victims in the conflict with the Arabs. In this regard, the ethos describes all Israeli actions during the conflict as self-defense and the Arabs as "forcing" Israel to act aggressively. Furthermore, this view was consistent with a "siege mentality," self-perception of Israel as a victim of unjust deeds, mistrust directed even at friendly states and allies, and the idea that Israel cannot trust anyone but itself (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a, 1992b).

Positive Self-Image—This theme presents Jews as "the chosen people" and "a light unto the nations". In addition, this theme includes the belief in Israel as an advanced society, Israel as a peace-loving society, and Israel as a regional military superpower.

Patriotism and Unity—These beliefs encouraged taking pride in Israel and Israelis, denigrated emigration from Israel, and enforced the importance of willingness to make sacrifices for the homeland, especially in the military context and specifically making the ultimate sacrifice in defense of the country (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997).

The theme of national unity evokes the concern that internal discord may weaken Israel's ability to withstand the threats it faces. Accordingly, it demands conformism especially relating to the goals in the conflict with the Arabs.

Peace—Peace is considered a core value in Israeli society. However, during the intense period of the conflict, the common belief was that peace would only come about by having the Arabs forgo their goals and embrace Israel's goals instead. There was no recognition that achieving peace would require a prolonged process which would include compromises on the Israeli side as well. Rather than being seen as a realistic short-term prospect, peace was viewed as a distant hope or dream.

The Structure of Ethos

Another important observation of Bar-Tal (2000) is that ethos is more than the sum of the main societal beliefs in a society. In this regard, he notes that "Although it is important to study societal beliefs separately, the study of their wholeness, the ethos, enables a more complete understanding of a society" (p. 141). He also notes that "the investigation of the configuration of dominant societal beliefs allows us to elucidate the structure of the ethos" (ibid). Indeed, as part of the research of ethos of conflict, Bar-Tal and his students examined the structure of the Israeli ethos of conflict as a whole at the individual level. For example, Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, and Zafran (2012), using a scale designed to assess individuals' adherence to ethos of conflict (EOC), found that

> *The eight themes of beliefs that comprise the Ethos of Conflict load on a single factor, suggesting that the different themes constitute a coherent and Gestalt view of the conflict conditions. Each of the themes is unique in content and, at the same time, adds to the holistic orientation so that the different belief themes complement one another and form a core societal outlook about the conflict. (p. 53)*

In my work, I elaborate on the structure of the ethos of conflict at the collective level. My views about how the components of an ethos relate to each other are based on empirical studies of national ethos such as the study of McClosky and Zaller (1984) (about the American ethos) and the vast psychological literature regarding cognitive structures (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958) and value systems (Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989; Tetlock, 1986). This literature suggests that first, the elements comprising an ethos are organized around a limited set of core themes. Indeed, as we saw above, Bar-Tal (2013) describes an ethos of conflict with eight main themes. Second, some themes may be more prominent in the ethos of a society than others. That means that more members of the society share these themes and there is less public debate about them. In addition, more prominent themes of the ethos are more frequently found in cultural products, such as school textbooks and media discourse. In the Israeli context, I found that some themes such as the goals in the conflict and security were very dominant in the Israeli ethos, while other themes such as national unity and siege beliefs were less dominant. The latter themes appeared in some periods more than in others. In addition, they were not equally distributed among different segments in the Israeli society and among different sources of the Israeli ethos. For example, siege beliefs were common in school textbooks, but the centrality of these beliefs in films and in leaders' speeches changed over the years, and they appeared infrequently in some periods. During the 1990s, they appeared mostly in speeches of hawkish leaders but not in speeches of dovish leaders. Public polls also reveal that the agreement with these beliefs varied over time. For many Israelis, these themes may represent a "temporary state of mind" that arises in some situation (like when Israel faces international criticism or during a war) but weakens with changes in circumstances. Indeed, Sharvit (2014) demonstrated in her research that conditions of high (vs. low) distress, either related or unrelated to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, increased the activation of the ethos of conflict among samples of Israeli Jews.

Third, an understanding of the structure of ethos requires analysis of how the core themes relate to each other and to other systems of beliefs and values in the society. The beliefs and themes of the ethos can coexist in harmony, clash, or be partly harmonious and partly clashing with each other or with other beliefs in the society. In addition, some issues, events, or contexts may trigger conflict among the values while others do not. In some contexts, tension may appear in societal beliefs within a specific theme of an ethos (e.g., between majority rule and minority rights within the democratic values system). Other contexts may create a conflict among the different themes of the ethos or between the ethos beliefs and other societal beliefs in the society. For example, in the Israeli case, tension exists between the belief in the value of democracy, that is a societal belief in Israel, and the belief that it is necessary to ensure a Jewish nature for the state. This tension becomes apparent in the context of Israeli control of the territories captured in 1967, which are densely populated by Palestinians. Keeping masses of Palestinians under Israeli occupation may strain democratic practices. On the other hand, adding masses of Palestinians as new citizens to the Jewish state threatens the goal of having a Jewish majority and a Jewish state.

Furthermore, it is important to identify the strategies employed by the society to address inconsistencies among the different themes of the ethos or between the ethos beliefs and other beliefs in the society. Indeed, the psychological literature points to several strategies for dealing with cognitive imbalance. People may deny the inconsistency by questioning the evidence of its existence, they may add new cognitions to bolster one of the clashing beliefs, they may engage in cognitive differentiation, they may change one of the beliefs, or they may decide that one of the beliefs is more important than the other(s) (Abelson, 1968; Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958). The last two strategies can play an important role in the process of change of ethos of conflict (and also in the process of conflict resolution), as will be described in the next sections.

Changes in the Ethos of Conflict

Changes of ethos over time might take several forms. One type of change takes place when the ethos as a whole becomes more widely or less widely shared among society members. Another type of change involves shifts in the composition of the ethos. Some beliefs or themes of the ethos may be dropped while others are added. In addition, the internal balance among the different beliefs and themes in an ethos may change over time, as some themes may become more dominant while others become more peripheral. Finally, an ethos may also be contradicted by the evolvement of new central societal beliefs that begin to constitute an alternative ethos.

With regard to the Israeli ethos, I identified the following trends of change in the Jewish–Israeli ethos of conflict during the 1967–2000 period:

The main change regarding *the goals theme* was a significant erosion in the belief denying the Palestinian goals of self-determination and statehood, a change that

started following the 1978 Camp David accord between Israel and Egypt. The rejection of the Palestinian "right-of-return" to the 1948 boundaries, on the other hand, has not weakened materially and still constitutes a societal belief in the Israeli society. As for *security*, the perception of the nature of the existential threat shifted during the 1990s away from the danger created by the establishment of a Palestinian state, terrorism, or a conventional war—to focus on the threat of unconventional weapons in the possession of Arab states. The prestige of the armed forces remained mostly intact during this period, but open criticism of the military and its leaders became more acceptable and common. Since the late 1970s, a change was also observed in the beliefs related to the means of achieving security: from an almost total preference of military means (increasing pace of arms development and acquisition, decisive military victories) to a recognition of the importance and value of the diplomatic component, going as far as preferring it over military means in achieving national security goals.

Changes were apparent also in beliefs related to *the opponent's image*. Specifically, following the peace process between Israel and Egypt, Israelis started differentiating between different groups within the Arab world—even identifying different subgroups within national entities, such as the separate factions within the Palestinian population. Another pronounced change, evident both in opinion polls and in cultural products, was the decline in the delegitimization of Arabs: they were increasingly portrayed in more human terms, and some of the negative stereotypes previously ascribed to them (cowardly, primitive, and traitorous) became less prevalent. In addition, the belief that most or all of Arabs had no interest in peace with Israel but rather aspired to exterminate it, declined as well.

In parallel, opinion polls, cultural products (e.g., movies), and political platforms all indicated a marked decline in *victimhood* themes during the early 1990s, specifically a recognition that Israel was not the sole victim in the conflict, combined with a more positive view of the world's attitudes toward Israel. During the early 1990s, there was also an erosion in the *positive self-image* of Israelis, especially as it related to Israel's moral superiority, but also to some degree its military dominance. *Patriotism* also experienced decline, with the willingness to sacrifice as well as the denigration of emigrants becoming less pronounced. However, it still constituted a societal belief in the Israeli society.

Finally, a dramatic change was observed for beliefs concerning *peace*: starting in the late 1970s (following the peace process with Egypt), the content of these beliefs shifted in the sense that peace was now perceived as a realistic prospect and was discussed in concrete rather than abstract terms, with reference to specific political solutions that acknowledged the existence of the Arab population in the territories. As well, peace beliefs were less concerned with a comprehensive resolution of the conflict with all Arab nations, but rather addressed the prospects of peace with specific Arab nations.

In sum, between 1977 (the Israeli–Egyptian peace process) and the early 1990s (before and during the Oslo process), the hegemony of the Israeli–Arab conflict ethos in the Israeli society started to decline, making the Israeli society less cohesive. Many of the beliefs that comprised the ethos lost their status as widely held

societal beliefs: beliefs rejecting the Palestinian claims to self-determination, statehood and their ties to the land, the image of all Arabs as objecting to peace with Israel and aspiring to exterminate it, siege beliefs, and the view of Israeli Jews as a chosen people and morally superior. Other beliefs retained their place in the Israeli ethos, but their support in the Israeli public diminished: the willingness to sacrifice and the prestige of the Israeli military. Still other beliefs, specifically about peace and about the nature of the existential threat to Israel, significantly changed their content. Comparatively, peace beliefs became more dominant in the ethos, while the dominance of security-related beliefs declined. These changes, in turn, intensified the internal contradictions between the beliefs in the ethos. For example, the new content of the peace beliefs (portraying peace as a realistic short-term prospect achievable by means of negotiations) contrasted with the beliefs rejecting all Arab claims and goals. Since the late 1980s, Israeli society started acknowledging the inconsistencies among its values in the context of Israeli control of the territories (for instance, maintaining a Jewish majority, democracy, and peace) and tried to resolve them by changing the context that was triggering the inconsistencies (give up some of Israeli control of the territories). This trend intensified following the First Intifada.

The end result of all of the changes described above was an ethos significantly shrunken and weakened and a reduced tendency to consider the conflict as a zero-sum game. Israeli society migrated from having a single, hegemonic conflict ethos to being exposed to several competing belief systems, of which the original ethos was one (that still enjoyed support within a significant proportion of the population). It is important to note that the Oslo agreement was preceded by 5 years of conciliatory changes in the Israeli ethos. In other words, the ethos was not only a product of the context and the situation of the conflict, but may have also had an effect on what happened in the conflict. I will return to this observation later.

However, the eruption of the Second Intifada in 2000 and its violence reversed the trends described above and restrengthened some of the societal beliefs of the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, Halperin, et al., 2010; Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008). First, there are indications that negative stereotyping of the Palestinians has become more common since 2000. For example, while in 1997 39 % of Israeli Jewish respondents described the Palestinians as violent and 42 % as dishonest, by the end of 2000 the figures were 68 % and 51 %, respectively (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008). Since 2000, Arabs are again unanimously blamed for the continuation of the conflict and for intransigently rejecting a peaceful resolution. In 2007 and 2009, only about 44 % of Israeli Jews believed that the majority of Palestinians want peace, compared to 64 % who thought so in 1999. Accordingly, polls indicate an increase in the percentage of respondents who think that the ultimate goal of the Arabs is to eradicate the state of Israel from 50 % who thought so in 1997 to 71 % who thought so in 2009.

Second, since 2000, there was also restrengthening of positive beliefs about Israel as militarily superior to the Arabs. For example, in 1993, 58 % of Israeli Jews believed that Israel had the ability to wage war successfully against all the Arab states. This percentage dropped to 48 % in 2000 and then rose to 67 % in 2004 and 72 % in 2005 (Oren, 2009). In 2009, 74 % believed that Israel would be able to cope

successfully with total war with the Arab states, and 80 % were confident that the Israeli army could defend the State of Israel (Ben Meir & Bagno-Moldavsky, 2010).

Finally, since 2000, there are many indications that peace beliefs have become less central in Israeli society. For example, in a time series survey of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University, respondents were asked to rank four values (democracy, peace, greater Israel, and a Jewish majority in Israel). A drop from 72 % in 2000 to 57 % in 2009 has been found among those who ranked peace as "the most important value" or "second most important value." In addition, as violence erupted in 2000, Israelis began to express pessimism about the chances of resolving the conflict. For example, INSS surveys show a decrease in the degree of optimism and an increase in pessimism regarding the chances for peace from 56 % who thought that it was not possible to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians in 2001 to 69 % in 2007 and in 2009.

In the next section, I will further elaborate about the link between changes in the ethos of conflict and changes in the conflict context, including causes for change in the ethos following changes in the context of the conflict.

The Ethos of Conflict and the Conflict Context

According to Bar-Tal (2013), the ethos of conflict is a major component of the psychological repertoire that allows a society to cope effectively with the stressful conditions produced by a conflict. It fulfills the epistemic function of illuminating the conflict situation, which is characterized by uncertainty and stress (Burton, 1990). By doing so, it prepares the society for violent acts by the enemy as well as for the difficult life conditions that may ensue. It attunes the society to information that signals potential harm, allowing psychological preparations for lasting conflict and immunization against negative experiences (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Additionally, it functions as a motivating force for mobilization and readiness for sacrifice on behalf of the group that is essential in time of intractable conflict. It also enables the maintenance of positive personal and social identities with the sense of worthiness and integrity that every group strives to preserve on both individual and collective levels. This is especially important in times of intractable conflict because, among other things, the ethos justifies the negative acts of the in-group towards its enemy, including violence against humans and destruction of property (Apter, 1997).

At the same time, these beliefs usually fuel and maintain the conflict and serve as explicit barriers to a peace process. More specifically, they encourage the rivals to keep hurting each other; they constitute obstacles to commencing negotiations between the parties, to continuing the negotiations, to achieving an agreement, and later to engaging in a process of reconciliation. For example, beliefs about own victimization are strongly associated with willingness to continue military operations at all costs and a desire to punish the other side even if such punishment means retaliation and suffering inflicted upon one's own group (Schori-Eyal, Klar, & Roccas, 2013). Beliefs about delegitimization of the opponent exclude negotiations

with the other side because of the perception that it cannot be trusted and that its only aim is to harm and destroy one's own group. Beliefs about the justness of the in-group's goals that define these goals as protected values prevent any compromises regarding these goals, even if such compromises might lead to a better result in terms of the protected values themselves (Landman, 2010).

Recently, Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011; Bar-Tal, Halperin, et al., 2010) included the ethos of conflict, along with other factors, such as general world views, circumstantial beliefs, and intergroup emotions (e.g., fear, hate), in a framework for understanding the sociopsychological barriers to peace. They focus mostly on information processing during the conflict. According to this framework, societal beliefs about the conflict "provide a prism through which individuals perceive and interpret the reality of the conflict. That prism, integrated with general cognitive and motivational biases, frequently leads to selective, biased and distorted information processing of new, potentially positive information" (Bar-Tal, Halperin, et al., 2010, p. 72). The reason for this unwillingness to hear alternative information is a "freezing" of the societal beliefs about the conflict. More specifically, the freezing process involves continued reliance on these beliefs that support the conflict, a reluctance to search for alternative information and a resistance to persuasive arguments which contradict held positions. The result is that the societal beliefs of the ethos of conflict preserve the continuation of the conflict because they prevent acceptance of information that provides an alternative view about the conflict or the rival. Indeed, several studies show that ethos of conflict influences processing of information regarding the conflict and hence functions as a conservative ideology (see, e.g., Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Dgani-Hirsh, 2009; Porat, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2015).

The ethos of conflict, then, may help a society to pursue a conflict more or less successfully—to win it or at least not lose it—but may also prevent the society from resolving it. For the latter to happen, the rivals would have to change their ethos of conflict. This change may allow readiness to be exposed and receive alternative information that could shed a new light on the conflict and the rival and willingness to adopt this new information that opens ways for peace building.

Change in the ethos of conflict may contribute to efforts to resolve an intractable conflict also when seen from the perspective of the well-known ripeness theory. According to this perspective, resolution of a conflict usually results from a long process of searching for a formula that will satisfy both parties' aspirations (Pruitt & Kim, 2004). Several conditions may encourage such a process. According to ripeness theory, "If the (two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution" (Zartman, 2000, pp. 228–229). Put differently, the first condition produces motivation to escape the conflict, and the second condition refers to optimism about finding a solution (Pruitt, 2005). A change in the ethos of conflict can produce circumstantial beliefs that relate to these conditions for ripeness. For example, the decline of confidence in Israel's military superiority during the 1990s may have made winning the conflict decisively seem less likely. As a result, the status quo of continuing the conflict became less desirable. Indeed, surveys from the late 1980s and early 1990s (before the Oslo accord) show that simultaneously

with the change of the ethos beliefs, a reduction occurred in the rate of respondents who chose the alternative of "status quo" as the preferred solution of the conflict (Levinson & Katz, 1993; Shamir & Shamir, 2000). Likewise, awareness of the inconsistencies among components of the ethos in the context of the conflict may have increased the motivation to end the conflict, since the conflict was perceived as more costly in psychological terms. This idea appeared in the election platform of the Labor Party that won the 1992 elections, stressing the inconsistency of the beliefs in Israel as a democratic state and in peace on the one hand and beliefs that refute Palestinian claims to self-definition on the other (Oren, forthcoming). In addition, a decline in the belief that the Arabs wish to exterminate Israel and in Israel's isolation in the world in the pre-Oslo period may have encouraged more optimism and hope for peace. Indeed, Israeli assessment of the chances of achieving peace increased from 57 % in 1986 to 66 % in 1990 and to 77 % in 1991 (Levinson & Katz, 1993; Shamir & Shamir, 2000).

But what may bring about a change in the ethos? Many factors may cause such a change. For example, changes in the society's configuration may lead to changes of its ethos. In this case, the new members of the society may not believe in the old societal beliefs. The younger generations may adopt new values or give different meaning to the old ones (Inglehart, 1997). Mass waves of immigration may also affect the ethos of the society. However, the reality or experience of the society's members may influence the ethos of the society even in the absence of major changes in the society's demography. In this case, the information from new reality or experience may cause society members to reevaluate their current societal beliefs. Two concepts are highly relevant in this regard: major events and major information. Major event is defined as an event that causes wide resonance, has relevance to the well-being of individual society members and to society as a whole, occupies a central position in public discussion and on public agenda, and implies information that forces society members to reconsider their accepted psychological repertoire (Oren, 2005). The term major information refers to information supplied by an epistemic authority, such as the president, government officials, and intellectual agencies, about a matter of great relevance to the society's members and to society as a whole. Like a major event, it occupies a central position in public discussion and on the public agenda and implies information that forces society members to reconsider their accepted psychological repertoire (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2007).

In my work (Oren, 2005, forthcoming), I studied the effect of several major events in the Israeli–Arab conflict and related major information on the Israeli ethos of conflict. Analyzing public polls, election platforms, and leaders' speeches, I demonstrated how major events in the Arab–Israeli conflict and related major information, such as the visit of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem and the Israeli–Egyptian peace process, had an immediate and dramatic effect on the ethos beliefs of the Jewish–Israeli public. Sadat's visit and the peace process were extremely surprising and nonambiguous events that were accompanied by major information that highlighted the aspects of the events that contradicted the ethos beliefs, for example, beliefs about the Arabs as not having any interest in peace. I identified these specific characteristics of the event as enhancing its potential to bring about changes in

prevailing beliefs (for an extended discussion about characteristics of major event that may enhance its potential for change in ethos of conflict, see Oren, 2005). Indeed, as noted above, immediately following this event, the beliefs depicting the Arabs as objecting to peace with Israel as well as those rejecting Palestinian self-determination were significantly weakened. Peace beliefs also materially changed their content from an abstract view to a concrete and practical one.

I also demonstrated how significant changes in the Israeli ethos of conflict during the early 1990s occurred as a result of the First Intifada and the Gulf War. More specifically, during this time, there was a decline in the perceived intention of the Arabs to exterminate Israel and in beliefs about Israel as a victim. Erosion was observed also in self-image both in the moral sense and in the military might sense. Patriotism beliefs also declined. More importantly, in this period, Israelis became more conscious of the contradictions between their ethos and other societal beliefs, e.g., the clash among the values of democracy, peace, and maintaining a Jewish majority. The main strategy that was used to solve the contradiction among these three values was changing the context that was perceived as putting these values into conflict with each other, in other words, to advocate giving up the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Indeed, since the First Intifada, we witness a trend toward greater willingness to give up these territories.

All these changes occurred despite the fact that the leadership referred to the Intifada during most of its duration in a way that was consistent with prevailing beliefs. According to Israeli officials at that time, the Intifada was a massive outbreak of violence carried out by small local radical groups, as another plot against the existence of the state of Israel. Most Palestinians, according to this view, were actually quite content with the status quo and, hence, sought no more than local autonomy under continuing Israeli rule or as part of a Jordanian–Palestinian confederation. Israel's role and duty was defined as restoring law and order and protecting the lives and property of both Israelis and peaceful Palestinians. As such, this perception of the Intifada was consistent with the existing societal beliefs of conflict such as positive self-image of the Israelis and societal beliefs about security. The changes in the ethos beliefs among the Israeli public in this case were, then, mostly on the basis of a major event (the First Intifada) and less in response to major information.

I explained this outcome with some characteristics of the event such as its long duration and the fact that the Intifada was perceived as a negative event that came as a surprise and generated some (but not extensive) fear among Israelis. More specifically, as time passed, the intensity and the magnitude of the Palestinian protest, and the long duration of the Intifada, could hardly be interpreted as a set of local riots, but rather as a popular uprising. The event presented the Palestinians in the territories as a group with national awareness and motivation to fight for its rights. This information refuted prior beliefs that identified the Palestinians as part of the "Arab nation" and not as a separate people. The Intifada further exposed the Israelis to information that contradicted existing beliefs of the ethos of conflict, for example, positive self-image beliefs that assumed the moral and humane behavior of Israelis soldiers. Cases of violent behavior, killing, and abuse of unarmed

Palestinian civilians challenged these Israeli beliefs about the humane behavior of Israeli soldiers in their encounters with Arabs.

In sum, in this case, the duration of the event may have eroded the influence of the related major information. In addition, information concerning other events in the international system during the Intifada years could have also transformed Israelis' attitudes regarding the conflict and its ethos: the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block, the resolution of other conflicts around the world such as in South Africa and Northern Ireland, the Gulf War (that increased fear of weapons of mass destruction and hence may influence security beliefs and self-image in the military might sense), and the changes in the policy of the Unites States regarding the PLO. In other words, the fact that the event of the Intifada was not exclusive on the world (and media) stage for its duration may have also diluted the effect of the Intifada-related major information.

It must be noted that while some major events and/or major information inputs may weaken the ethos beliefs, others may have the opposite effect of reinforcing them. Indeed, Bar-Tal and Sharvit (2007) show how the major event of the Camp David Summit with its unsuccessful ending and outbreak of the Second Intifada, along with the major information regarding these events that was provided to the Israeli public by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, their associates, and army commanders, bolstered beliefs of the ethos among the Jewish–Israeli public. For example, they point to strengthening of beliefs regarding delegitimization of the Palestinians, self-victimization, and internal pressure for conformity. Bar-Tal and Sharvit identify characteristics such as the fact that the event was intensive and included negative psychological conditions for the society as explaining these changes.

The changes in the ethos of conflict that were described above, then, present a circular relationship between ethos of conflict and major developments in the context of the conflict. For example, significant changes in the ethos started after the Israeli–Egyptian peace process in 1979 (in themes about the goals in the conflict, about the image of the Arabs, and about peace). It seems, then, that this event shaped Israeli ethos of conflict rather than being a product of such a change. On the other hand, changes in the ethos of conflict that preceded the 1993 Oslo accord between Israel and the Palestinians may have provided a significant contribution to the mechanisms and conditions that made the 1993 Oslo accord possible. The collapse of the Oslo process, in its turn, restrengthened the ethos of conflict that currently serves as one of the barriers to a peace.

Conclusion

Ethos of conflict is a major component of the psychological repertoire that evolves during an intractable conflict. Studies showed that societal beliefs of ethos of conflict that were identified by Bar-Tal (2000, 2013), i.e., beliefs about the goals in the conflict, about security, own victimization, delegitimizing the opponent, positive

self- images, patriotism, and peace, were central beliefs in the Israeli society, that is, they were shared by the majority of the Israeli society over a period of time, they served the political and economic leadership to justify and explain their policies, they appeared in various cultural products, and they were imparted to the younger generation. The research about changes in the Israeli ethos of conflict reveals that the relationship between ethos and conflict is mutual: the Arab–Israeli conflict shapes the Israeli ethos but also is affected by changes in Israeli ethos that contribute to the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict.

It is important to note that the ethos of conflict is only one component (although a central and important one) of the psychological repertoire that creates major obstacles to beginning negotiations, achieving agreement, and later engaging in a process of reconciliation. Other components include collective memory of conflict (Nahhas, Chap. 4; Netz-Zenghut, Chap. 5), as well as collective emotions (hate, fear, the desire for revenge; see Pliskin & Halperin, Chap. 11). In addition, other beliefs that are not directly related to the conflict but reflect general world views (such as religious beliefs) also fuel disagreements that may serve as barriers to negotiation (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). Lastly, conflict resolution and reconciliation require that all sides undergo a similar psychological change. Thus, a change in the ethos of conflict in both societies (the Israeli and the Palestinian) is needed for the reconciliation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

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Ethos of Conflict of the Palestinian Society

Ronni Shaked

This chapter sketches the ethos of conflict of the Palestinian society. It deals with its roots, the process of its formation, its components, and its unique content as reflected and expressed in the psychological repertoire of the Palestinian society. First, I will define and characterize the concepts and notions that relate and connect to the idea of "ethos." The analysis will be based on the important scientific work of Daniel Bar-Tal which contributed to the development of modern academic research on intractable conflicts. The second part of the chapter will review briefly the evolvement of the Palestinian ethos through the major historical events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which crystallized, shaped, and influenced the ethos. The third part will discuss the composition and nature of the eight themes of societal beliefs which are the building blocks of the ethos of conflict of the Palestinian society. The discussion will emphasize the four dominant societal beliefs that constitute the Palestinian ethos of conflict: justness of the goals, patriotism, delegitimization, and victimization. I will illustrate the significance of each societal belief, its contents, and its contribution to the ethos of conflict of the Palestinian society. The last part will deal with the Palestinian culture of conflict and its components.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict exists on the physical, national-ideological, and psycho-socio-cultural levels. Essentially, the conflict revolves around one territory which two people claim as their homeland. The continuing and violent nature of the conflict has turned the struggle between the two people to one rich in symbols, myths, beliefs, emotions, as well as religious beliefs. Since all of these are closely interwoven, it is sometimes difficult to separate myth from reality and narrative from historical facts

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_9

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a prototypical case of a conflict which meets the criteria describing an intractable conflict: it is prolonged, irreconcilable, violent, and perceived as having zero-sum nature and total. It is considered to be unbridgeable with the involved parties having an interest in its continuation (Azar, 1990; Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000; Kriesberg, 1998; Sharvit, Chap. 1).

In order to meet the challenges of the conflict, a society develops a psychological-social repertoire of societal beliefs, attitudes, and functional emotions. The resultant repertoire constitutes the basis of a psychocultural infrastructure, at its center the ethos, which accompanies the conflict and serves as a foundation for the development of a culture of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000).

In light of the prolonged experiences of the members of a society involved in an intractable conflict, they develop an **ethos of conflict** defined as a configuration of central societal beliefs, which leads to a specific governing orientation of a society experiencing an intractable conflict. The ethos of conflict is the narrative of the present which reflects the experiences of the members of the society, gives meaning to their social life, and connects present issues of significance with future goals and aspirations (Bar-Tal, 2000; 2003, 2013).

The **societal beliefs** of the ethos of conflict are reflected in language, stereotypes, images, myths, and collective memories and are also connected with the emotional orientation of the society. Bar Tal (1997, 1998, 1989, 1990, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997; Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin & Zafran, 2012; Nets-Zehngut & Bar-Tal, 2007) proposed that the challenges that arise in an intractable conflict can lead to the crystallization of eight themes of societal beliefs in the ethos of conflict that are crucial in the functioning, mobilization, and struggle of the group during intractable conflict.

1. **Justness of the goals**; These societal beliefs delineate the ingroup's goals and establish their justice, justify and outline the way to attain them, and reject the adversary's goal as unjust.
2. **Delegitimizing** beliefs deny the adversary's humanity and morality and portray the opponent in delegitimizing terms, through dehumanization, outcasting, extremely negative trait characterization, political labels, and group comparison that define the opponent as an enemy (Bar-Tal, 1998, 1989).
3. **Victimization** beliefs are based on viewing the ingroup's goals as just and the wickedness of the opponent's goals (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009).
4. **Patriotism** beliefs reflect the attachment of love and loyalty of society members toward their nation and their homeland. (Tamir, 1997).
5. **Positive collective self-image** beliefs involve intense self-justification and self-glorification.
6. **Security** beliefs provide psychological conditions to maintain security, motivating and mobilizing society members to participate in coping with the stressful situation.
7. **Unity** beliefs refer to the importance of maintaining unity and solidarity and keeping the society's consensus.
8. **Peace** beliefs are the supreme goal of a society that will be implemented after achieving the goals of the struggle. Peace is described in utopian terms and as a dream.

I propose that the analysis of societal beliefs of an intractable conflict should take into account the religious dimension. Religious beliefs intensify the conflict by providing it with symbols, myths, and intense emotions. The ethno-religious solidarity acts as a basis for political organizations and loyalties. In periods of violent conflict, religious beliefs act as a stabilizing anchor and a source of support for the other societal beliefs. Religion is one of the factors in the crystallization of a social identity and one of the driving forces of societies (Weber, 1963), and it supplies a communal identity to the believers.

Historical Background

The beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, when the Zionist settlement enterprise in the ancient land of Israel/Palestine took its first steps (1881–1882) (Kimmerling & Migdal, 2003). In the eyes of the Arab inhabitants of the land, the new Jewish settlers were foreigners who had broken into their territorial, social, cultural, and religious area. The purchase of land by the Jewish settlers led to disputes with the indigenous population and the emergence of suspicion, hostility, fear, and an existential threat, together with feelings of anger and hatred, turning the new settlers into the enemy (Mandel, 1976). The violent local disputes became the concern of the Arab population as a whole, and fear of the Zionist newcomers, who were viewed as colonialist invaders, drove the population to resist and to struggle by means of violence (Khalidi, 1997).

Those first three decades of the conflict saw the emergence and formative period of the ethos of conflict of the Palestinian society, which developed in reaction to the Jewish Zionist settlement of Palestine (Khalidi, 2006). The development of these societal beliefs received an impetus following the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, which promised the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. The declaration was perceived by the Arab inhabitants as a threat to their future. Henceforth, territorial conflict between Palestinians and Jews broke out, which involved violent confrontations that culminated in the war of 1948.

From the 1920s, a culture of conflict began to develop within the Palestinian society and in its core the Mukauma—resistance by violent struggle.[1] Since then, the conflict has been accompanied by incessant violence, and it exists in a permanent reality of low-intensity conflict and eruption of waves of high-intensity conflict every few years. The intractability of the conflict and the negative experiences of violence have crystallized and shaped the societal beliefs of the Palestinians, especially the beliefs regarding justness of goals, victimhood, and delegitimization.

Three additional seminal events have had a major impact on the Palestinian ethos of conflict. The first is the war of 1948, known among the Palestinians as the Nakba

[1] For definition of the concept, see Milstein, M. (2009). Mukawama: The challenge of resistance to Israel's national security concept. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, pp. 9–10, 29–34 (in Hebrew).

(catastrophe), which crushed the Palestinians, sociologically, demographically, as well as psychologically and created the refugee problem (Morris, 1987). The Nakba is the "chosen trauma" (Volkan, 2001) for the Palestinians, the central event in their national consciousness, and their collective memory of the conflict (see Nahas, Chap. 5). The Nakba for the Palestinians is not a onetime event but an ongoing process, which many believe will come to an end only in a new context which enables them to regain their rights as before the Nakba.

The second major event was in 1964 with the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) resulting in the reconstruction of the Palestinian national identity and its goal to establish a Palestinian State (Cobban, 1984).

The third major event was the Nakasa—the defeat in the 1967 war, resulting in the conquest of the whole of Palestine by Israel, including the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the third holy shrine of Islam—which was perceived as the defeat of Islam and led to the intensification of the conflict (Gazit, 2003). The Nakasa intensified the hatred and hostility toward Israel, Zionism, and Judaism, especially from a religious dimension, and deepened the ethos beliefs, especially the perceived victimization of the ingroup.

The first Intifada (uprising) against the Israeli occupation (1987–1993) brought the Palestinian ethos of conflict to one of its peaks. It was a kind of patriotic declaration, crossing borders of social standing, sex, age, and geographical division stressing societal beliefs of unity, justness of goals, and positive collective self-image.

Paradoxically, the Oslo process in 1993, which led to mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO and to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), did not lead to any significant change in the Palestinian ethos, not even with regard to peace. On the contrary, postponing the discussion on core issues—Jerusalem, refugees, borders, and settlements—led to disappointment and strengthened the Palestinian ethos of conflict. The Al-Aqsa Intifada, which started in September 2000, was deadly and bloody and caused great suffering to both sides.

The Palestinian civil war (2007) between the Islamic movement Hamas and the national secular Fatah caused division between Gaza and the West Bank, but did not affect the ethos because it did not refer to the conflict with Israel. On the contrary, the wars between Hamas and Israel in Gaza, in 2008, 2012, and 2014, strengthened and stabilized the ethos of conflict in Gaza as well as in the West Bank.

In sum, according to the Palestinian perspective, which is reflected in their narrative collective memory,[2] at the end of the nineteenth century, the Palestinians, who were the earliest inhabitants of Palestine, fell victim to the Zionist movement, which motivated the Jews to migrate to a territory not theirs—Palestine—while spreading the false myth that the land was the homeland of the Jews. The Zionists, who arrived in Palestine as colonialist settlers, began to take over the land. In the Nakba and subsequently, the Jews adopted methods of terror, expelled Palestinians from their lands, destroyed their homes and villages, and turned them into refugees. The State of Israel, which was established on Palestinian land, did not respect international

[2]This part is based on official documents of the PA, http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=2087

laws and did not allow the refugees to return to their homes. In 1967, Israel, which sought to expand and spread, conquered all the territory of Mandatory Palestine. It refused to retreat from it, and by means of its military power—backed by Western imperialism—it intends to continue to expand in the Middle East. The Palestinians are fighting with all the means at their disposal in order to win back for themselves their natural and lawful rights and ownership of their territory.

The Palestinian Societal Beliefs About the Conflict

Bar-Tal (2000) emphasized that any attempt to understand the ethos of a society requires an analysis of the particular societal beliefs that comprise it. In this part I will analyze the contents of the eight themes of the societal beliefs which are the building blocks of the ethos of conflict of the Palestinian society.

Justness of the Goals

Palestinians' beliefs about justness of their goals are based on their perception that they are the indigenous people, descendants of the Canaanites, who had lived in the land centuries ago, before the ancient Hebrews (El-Hasan, 2010, 2013; Litvak, 1994, 2009). Therefore, the territory belongs to them, and they have the full right to return to their homeland, from which they were exiled in the Nakba, and have the right to build an independent state in their homeland. Their beliefs are based on the international legitimization and from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In 1977, the Palestinian National Council coined a new idiomatic expression to describe the Palestinian goals in the conflict: "Thawabit," namely, the firm, just, and unchangeable principles and goals.[3] The Thawabit are protected values, red lines, which the Palestinian society with all its diverse parts, the PLO and its factions, adopted as goals that cannot be compromised or surrendered, and no leader has the right or authority to change them.[4] The Thawabit have become the cornerstones of the ethos of conflict of the Palestinian society, featuring prominently in all cultural products, in the media, in the speeches of leaders,[5] in official documents,[6] in textbooks, and notably in the daily life of the Palestinian society.[7] The Thawabit are consensual, dominant, and hegemonic in the Palestinian society including Hamas.[8]

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[3] http://palestineun.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/conclusions-of-the-PLO.pdf

[4] http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=4883

See, for example, the claim of the popular front, Al-Ayam 15.12.2004.

[5] For example, the speech of Abu Mazen: http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=8748

[6] http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=4938. See the Independence Declaration.

[7] Graphic wall in Dehisha refugee camp; pictures were taken by the author.

[8] Al-Ayam 29.7.2004.

The following are the Palestinian Thawabit:

- The establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital.[9]
- The right to self-determination.
- The right of return of the Palestinian refugees according to the international and Arab resolutions.
- Release of all the Palestinians prisoners from the Israeli jails.
- Since 2012, in response to Israeli demands, the objection to recognize the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people was added to the Thawabit.[10]

Although The Thawabit were formulated in 1977, they were the demands of the Palestinians since the early 1920s. The demand to establish an independent Palestinian state was the first article in the resolution of the third Palestinian Congress in 1920, and since then, it has become a permanent and constant demand. It was demanded in the uprising of 1929 and in the Palestinian revolt of 1936, it was the main demand of the All-Palestinian Government in 1948, and it appeared in the Palestinian charter as well as in all the resolutions of Palestinian National Council (PNC) and the PA. Thus the Thawabit became instruments enabling the Palestinian leadership to adjust their demands according to the level of the conflict and the possibility of its resolution.

Patriotism

As a societal belief, patriotism grew already from the beginning of the early 1920s, when Palestinians began to develop a strong and growing national identification with Palestine. The Nakba and its devastating results, such as living in refugee camps, gave rise to a kind of patriotism—wataniyya, which refers to yearning and longing for a homeland. The establishment of the PLO in 1964, with its main goal to liberate the Palestinian people in their homeland, gave rise to the concept of **Mukawama**, meaning resistance and referring to violent struggle of various forms and nuances, which became the dominant and permanent feature of the culture of conflict of the Palestinian society and an upmost expression of patriotic beliefs. It expresses the willingness and readiness to fight and to sacrifice. This is evident in the emergence of the mythical figure of the Fedayee—the new Palestinian fighter, which was depicted as a fearless hero, restoring honor to his people and liberating his homeland, a figure which transformed from the image of the poor refugee to a revolutionary hero (Jamal, 2004).

Since the establishment of the PLO, the Palestinian society has developed a sense of national pride. The new patriotism includes love of the people and the land and revenge against Zionism; steadfastness includes living in refugee camps as a

[9] http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=59&more=1#4

[10] http://palestineun.org/category/mission-documents/statements/page/2

way of showing commitment to the land of Palestine. A poster published by Fatah in 1969 illustrates a new Palestinian patriotic message. It shows a Palestinian fighter with a koffiyeh on his head and a Kalashnikov in his hand with the words "my way, my blood, my name, my house and address is Palestine".[11] Patriotism has encouraged the armed struggle and legitimized it.

On March 30, 1976, which came to be known as Land Day, Palestinian citizens of Israel held violent protests against land expropriation in which six Palestinians were killed by the Israeli Army. This was another milestone in the national revival of solidarity and love of the homeland, with land as a focus of patriotism. A poem by'Abed Ebeid Al-Zara'i became the anthem of the Land Day: "For the olive trees… and for the sake of the citrus trees, we want to fight till we die, till we get back our Palestine".[12]

The first Intifada brought Palestinian patriotism to one of its peaks in terms of preparedness for sacrifice for the homeland and unity around the national leadership—the PLO. The Palestinian flag became an inseparable part of the landscape in the territories. The Palestinian society is portrayed in the Intifada literature as fiercely patriotic, solidly united, with values of national honor, and glorifying its martyrs (Marouf, 1997; Nachmani, 2001).

The Oslo agreement created new symbols of patriotism, such as security forces, flag, and anthem. The return of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat to the territories was accompanied by rallies and gatherings in every town of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The rousing speeches by Arafat used mantras and patriotic slogans and created the popular expression of patriotism "with spirit and blood we shall redeem and liberate Palestine."

The emergence of Hamas in 1987 led to the construction of more patriotic societal beliefs that are based on religious patriotism (Shaked & Shabi, 1994). Hamas has stated that "nationalism is part of a religious belief" (Sela & Mishal, 2006).[13] Palestine as a homeland became a waqf,[14] and the struggle for its liberation is a religious duty; the armed struggle became a jihad, and the patriotic sacrifice became death for the sake of Allah. Hamas succeeded in Islamizing the Palestinian patriotism (Abu Amr, 1992).

The motif of a struggle bound up with blood and sacrifice occupied a central position in the Palestinian societal beliefs about patriotism. Without sacrifice, patriotism has no significance (Bar-Tal, 2000; Somerville, 1981). These motifs grew stronger and were reinforced in the course of the Al-Aqsa Intifada; they were expressed in acts of sacrifice by suicide bombers. The presence of the myth of the martyr—shahid—in the Garden of Eden in the Palestinian society as a whole provided the spur and incentive for these acts of sacrifice, which are the psychosocial

[11] Ronni Shaked, private collection of posters and pictures.

[12] Retrieved 3-9-2013 from http://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/content/print/19456.html

[13] The Hamas Charter, Article 12.

[14] Waqf means the permanent dedication by a Muslim of any property for any purpose recognized by the Muslim law as religious, pious, or charitable. According Hamas, all Palestine was proclaimed as a Waqf for the Muslims.

products of the societal beliefs of patriotism. This phenomenon encompasses both religious and national patriotism and involves a dominant presence of myths and societal beliefs. The martyr is perceived as a hero who is esteemed and honored. School textbooks present martyrs in a positive way and respect them (Firer & Adwan, 2004).

The Mokauma is hegemonic and consensual in the Palestinian society. For example, in 2000, 52 % of the Palestinians supported the Mokauma; in 2001, 75 %; in 2002, 90 %; and in 2003, 75 %. In 2004, 82 % supported armed struggle and 59 % supported suicide terrorism. In 2008, 48 % supported armed attacks; in 2010, 32 % supported armed struggle; and in 2012 41 %. In 2104 42 % believed that armed struggle is the most effective means for establishing a Palestinian state.[15] The Mokauma, especially the armed struggle, mainly contributed to social solidarity and strengthening of the societal beliefs; above all the Mokauma escalates the conflict and its intractable nature.

The Palestinian patriotism contains a number of central features: it combines national and religious patriotism, in which religion serves as a platform for nationalism and as a motivating vehicle; it is a blind patriotism, devoid of self-criticism (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999); it is a patriotism geared to the struggle against the adversary, and it is motivated by "love of the homeland," the struggle to achieve the national Palestinian aims, and by the societal beliefs relating to the justness of the goals. The Palestinian anthem states: "Palestine is my home, is the soil of my victory. Palestine is my revenge and the land of steadfastness."[16]

Delegitimization

Palestinian delegitimizing beliefs portray the natural character of the Jew, the Zionist, and the Israeli as involving negative traits, including racism and fascism. Zionism and Israel are considered inciters of violence, aggression, and wars (Rubin, 1993). The term "Zionism" has become a label for political deviation and a synonym for colonialism. Zionism and Israel are portrayed as cruel, oppressive, bloody minded, demonic, and Nazis.[17]

The Palestinian delegitimization of Judaism, Zionism, and Israel draws on the conflict, on the religion of Islam, on the Arab world, and on the Western world. Collective experiences connected with the conflict and its violent nature created negative impressions of deaths and injuries, damage to property, stress, fear, suffering, and anxiety, which led to the development of delegitimizing beliefs. The perception of the Jew as an enemy in the Koran and the Hadith led to the creation of a

[15] Polls conducted by Khalil Shakaki, retrieved from http://heb.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4354&articleid=6496

[16] Retrieved from http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=2353

[17] See leaflets of the First Intifada: No. 1, 10-1-1988; No. 5, no date indicated; No. 4, 21-1-1988; No. 7, 13-2-1988; No. 9, 2-3-1988.

delegitimizing infrastructure with diverse expressions, mainly dehumanization, stereotyping, and assigning negative traits to Jews. The Jews are described in the Koran as killers of the prophets, as deviants from the truth, and as descendants of monkeys and pigs. These images, which leaders and religious preachers use, have helped to shape the Palestinian delegitimizing beliefs.

A survey conducted in the West Bank in 1972 shows that the motif of attributing negative stereotypical traits to Jews is predominant. Jews were portrayed as cowards, deceitful, thieves, and greedy (Peress, 1972). In cultural products, the Jew is presented as weak and humiliated on the one hand, and as a sneaky conspirator on the other (Moreh, 1975). In the second Intifada, Jews were perceived in the same way, as a prototype of evil murderers, violent, satanic, and racist.[18]

During the first Intifada and also in the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli soldier was described as one who humiliates Palestinians without distinguishing between old and young or men and women. The description of Israel, Judaism, and Zionism as inferior and noxious creatures appears in articles in newspapers, on posters, in caricatures and drawings, as well as in sermons in the mosques (Elad-Buskila, 2006). The Jews are identified as viruses, as insects, as worms, as grasshoppers, as scorpions, as donkeys, as monkeys and pigs, and as only half-real creatures.[19] A widespread image of the Jew is that of the snake, a motif borrowed from Western anti-Semitism (Shragai, 2010).

Delegitimization also appears in school textbooks, especially through ignoring the existence of Israel and describing Jews as colonialists[20] (Adwan, Bar-Tal, & Wexler, in press). The attribution of negative characteristics includes expressions such as bloodsuckers, dishonest, moneylenders,[21] war traders, sadists,[22] and murderers of elderly, women, and children.[23]

Since the founding of the Hamas in 1987 and the process of Islamization, the image of the Jew became more negative and connected to "monkeys and pigs" which was taken from the Koran. Hamas's first leaflet begins with the words "Here are the Jews—brothers of the monkeys, and the killers of the prophets."[24] The same image reappeared in 2012 in the Fatah community: "our war is with the descendats of monkeys and pigs, it is a war of religion and belief."[25] In 2012 the term "descendents of the monkeys and pigs" appeared 86 times in various contexts in the online version of the Al-Quds newspaper referring to Jews and Zionists. Other dehuman-

[18] For example, Al Hayat al Jadeeda 31.10.2004.

[19] Al-Resala 1.6.2007; 13.7.2006; 28.2.2008. Al Hayat Al Jadida 7.3.2004; 27.2.2009; 23.5.2010.

[20] See, for example, Arabs History and problems of the present, for 10th grade, part 2; 2005, Ramallah.

[21] Releases of the United National Headquarter: No. 8 March 1988; No. 1 January 1988; Hamas release 11-9-1990.

[22] President of Al-Quds Open University, Dr. Younis Amr, Al Hayat Al Jadida 25-3-2009.

[23] Sheikh Taysir Tamimi, the head of Shari'a Courts, Palestinian TV 9-6-2009.

[24] Ronni Shaked, Private collection, 1987.

[25] Palestinian TV 21-9-2012.

ized images were donkeys, dogs, and mice.[26] These images appear in sermons, speeches, and media.[27] Burning Israeli flags is common in demonstrations and rallies. The Swastika appears in graffiti and posters in demonstrations.[28]

An analogy between the State of Israel and fascism and Nazi Germany is a widespread motif. The Palestinians maintain that a similarity exists between the State of Israel and the National Socialist fascism, both ideologically and in actual behavior, since they are all racist. Since the occupation of the territories in 1967 and the need to delegitimize and dehumanize Israel, the use of Nazi imagery has intensified. In the first Intifada, nearly every leaflet labeled Zionist Jews and Israel neo-fascist. Prisons were called "Nazis concentrations Camps" and Israel—a fascist, racist entity—and especially the settlers were called Nazis.[29]

In the Hamas covenant, Zionism is portrayed as a Nazi enemy behaving brutally toward women and infants. Paragraph 20 of the covenant asserts: "The society facing us is a cruel enemy which acts like a Nazi."[30]Jews are labeled as fascist Nazis, even in official announcements of the PA.[31]

The analogy of Israel with racism is a central motif in the Palestinian delegitimization, which reached a peak on 10 November 1975 in a vote in the UN General Assembly inspired by the Palestinians stating that "Zionism is a form of racism and racist discrimination." Although this resolution was abolished in 1991, the slogan "Zionism is racism" filtered down to Arab and general public opinion and served as a foundation for the delegitimization of Israel.

During 2012, the terms "Zionist racism" and "racist" appeared in the Palestinian communication channels many times: in the official Palestinian news agency Wafa, 874 times; in the news agency "Maan," 726 times; and more than 3000 times in Al-Quds newspaper.

Comparing the Jews with crusaders is another way to delegitimize and exclude Israel, since it is compared to an imperialist-colonialist movement (Sivan, 1998). The concept appears especially in fundamental documents of the Palestinian movements.[32] The crusaders are described as a small group imbued with religious ideology representing a foreign culture, which came to conquer the Arab region as a whole and Palestine in particular in a cultural-religious struggle. The analogy between Israel and crusaders serves as a motivating instrument for waging a holy war, a jihad, against the "new" crusaders—the Jews.

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[26] Al Hayat al Jadeeda 20-3-2004, 5-6-2012; Al Risala 28-02-2008; The Palestinian TV 30-08-2012.

[27] See Ronni Shaked, Yediot Ahronot, 14-1-2001.

[28] Pictures, private collection of Ronni Shaked, 25-2-2013.

[29] The Intifada leaflets No. 19 8-6-1988; No. 12 2-4-1988; No. 3 2-1-1988; No. 2 January 1988; No. 7; No. 2; No. 12; No. 13; No. 17.

[30] The Hamas Covenant, Article 20.

[31] Palestinian Information Ministry, cited in Al Quds 17-11-1997.

[32] The Hamas Charter, Article 34, 35.

Victimization

The sense of victimization rests on feelings of historical injustice suffered by the Palestinians, especially in the Nakba and since the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. It is dominant and enshrined in day-to-day events rife with physical suffering and mental anguish, injustice, and abuse of person and property. The societal beliefs relating to the experience of victimization present the Palestinians as the sole victims of the conflict. They portray themselves as victims of the victims. They believe that they suffer unjustly from the consequences of Holocaust, for which they are not to blame (Bar-On & Sarsar, 2004). The Palestinians adopted the analogy between the Holocaust and the Nakba, maintaining that the establishment of the State of Israel, while stealing Palestine, turned the Palestinians into the victims of the Jews victimized by Nazism.

The beliefs stress not only that the Palestinians are victims of Zionism, but also victims of the Arab world, which neglected them and did not help them to achieve their rights. They view the Arab leaders as betrayers, using the conflict for their own political purposes (Khalili, 2007).

The experience of victimhood drove the Palestinian society to search for justice in the international arena by harnessing the societal beliefs relating to the justice of the goals, which furnish the rationale and explanation of the goals of the conflict.[33] The victimization narrative creates a dichotomy between the good Palestinians and the others who are the bad, between the abusers and the abused, and between the moral and the immoral.

Since the reality of their lives is in the shadow of the Nakba, the event which, in their view, turned them more than anything into victims of the conflict, the Palestinians consider the Nakba the ultimate trauma of their victimhood. Since the Nakba, the Palestinians enumerate a long series of massacres and other injustices that reinforce the societal beliefs and the sense of victimization. Israel's actions are perceived as a long succession of assaults and physical abuse, with the aim of completing the expulsion of the Palestinians which began with the Nakba in order to Judaize Palestine. Since the Nakba, the feelings of suffering and distress intentionally caused against them have intensified, feelings of having been robbed and beliefs about the constant threat of expulsion, transfer, uprooting from their land, or as they put it "a new Nakba." This feeling leads the Palestinians to a psychological state of victimization.

Because the Palestinians are the defeated party in the conflict, because of the negative experiences, and because of the feeling of injustice and wrongdoing accompanying their defeat, Palestinians' beliefs about societal victimization have become dominant and central in the ethos of conflict of the Palestinians society. I maintain that the Palestinian experience of victimization has turned the Palestinian people into a "victimization community" which preserves the memory of the victimization as a

[33] For example, see President Abbas speech at UN General Assembly, September 2011. Retrieved from http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=7390

central part of the collective memory of the conflict, perpetuates the societal victimization beliefs, and weaves into its sociopolitical reality a mythical plot, by means of which it comes to acknowledge itself as a community of suffering and victimization.

Other Themes of the Palestinian Ethos of Conflict

The societal beliefs about justness of the goals, patriotism, delegitimization, and victimization are the most dominant and hegemonic in the Palestinian ethos of conflict. They are the key themes that feed and maintain the conflict, without which it will be almost impossible for any society to survive intractable conflict and withstand it. Without changing these societal beliefs, it is impossible to reach resolution of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). Henceforth I will describe briefly the other four themes:

National Unity. Despite the ideological sociological and geographical divisions between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, resulting from the Palestinian civil war in 2007, Palestinians have aspired to unity and emphasize its importance in their national struggle. They have not excelled in unity, but they managed to join their forces in times of escalation in the conflict against Israel, as, for example, in the first and second Intifada. The beliefs stress that victory will be achieved by unity[34] (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994) and independence will be reached with the strength of unity.[35]

Furthermore, beliefs about unity became stronger as a result of the division between Fatah and Hamas in 2007, which enhanced the calls for unity. Polls conducted between 2006 and 2009 reflect the high importance and concern attributed to Palestinian's national unity. They indicate that achieving national unity is the predominant desire of the majority of the Palestinians.[36]

Positive Self-Image. The asymmetric characteristic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which the Palestinians are perceived as the weaker side in number and power, necessitates them to find their strengths out of their weakness for the sake of keeping a positive collective self-image. This positive image is important for sustaining collective morale and coping with the stronger rival. The words of a Palestinian young man illustrate this point: "We are mentally and psychologically much stronger, they are materially stronger, with airplanes and missiles."[37]

One way to present their strengths and enhance their positive self-image is by emphasizing historical events in which they confronted the strong Israeli army successfully. For example, the success in the battle of Al-Karameh in 1968, in which

[34] Leaflet no. 10, p. 69. Leaflet no. 1, p. 54, Leaflet no. 28, p. 143.

[35] For example, Abu Mazen's speech in January 2011. Retrieved from http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=601976&issueno=11723#.UoZnAsR-xK0

[36] Retrieved from http://www.heskem.org.il/sources-view.asp?id=1632&meid=43; http://www.heskem.org.il/sources-view.asp?id=1651&meid=43; http://www.heskem.org.il/sources-view.asp?id=296&meid=43

[37] Interview with a 24-year-old Palestinian man in the West Bank in 17-12-2012.

the Palestinians inflicted heavy losses on the Israeli side, became a symbol for victory and pride (Jamal, 2004). Similarly, the battle of Jenin in 2002 was described as a "heroic battle," "a legend".[38] Also, the image of a boy throwing a stone on a tank contributes to this "positive image."[39] An additional way to enhance the positive image is by using attributes of heroism, courage, endurance, and resistance—whether passive or active. This image was a source of identification for the society and played a strong psychological role in transforming the state of despair of many Palestinians into feelings of hope.

Security. Palestinians' societal beliefs about security are related to the perception that Israel aspires to completely transfer them out of the country. Feelings of fear, uncertainty, and beliefs about victimization play a major role in their perceptions of security.[40] In a poll conducted in June 2013, 74 % of the Palestinians were worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished.[41] Collective emotions of insecurity, fear, and frustration led to the development of societal beliefs maintaining that Israel intends to deport and transfer the Palestinian and to cause another Nakba. These beliefs have increased in the last decade, largely due to increases in Jewish settlements in the West Bank and violent interactions between Palestinians and settlers.

Peace. Beliefs about peace are the least common in the Palestinian ethos. A study that examined adolescents' articles in newspapers between 1996 and 2007 (Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012) found that only 3 % reflected peace beliefs. Such beliefs were presented through general and vague terms or terms that reflected doubts and disappointments regarding peace. In addition, only 2 % of the contents of Palestinian school textbooks[42] refer to peace[43] and reflect a general aspiration for it without referring directly to Israel. The Palestinians emphasize the link between peace and justice and often use the phrase "just peace" (salam 'adel).[44] Among Palestinian adolescents, peace means justice, independence, and freedom (Biton & Salomon, 2006).

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[38] Retrieved from http://www.alestqlal.com/ar/index.php?act=Show&id=11008

[39] Retrieved from https://fr-fr.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=351496761635

[40] http://mondoweiss.net/2013/09/general-assembly-transcript.html

[41] http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2013/p48ejoint.html

[42] Retrieved from http://www.israeli palestinians school books.blogspot.co.il/; See http://d7hj1xx5r7f3h.cloudfront.net/Israeli-Palestinian_School_Book_Study_Report-English.pdf

[43] See Israeli-Palestinian School Book Project Research Materials, Posted 1 February 2013 by IsraeliPalestinianSchoolbooks, retrieved from http://www.israelipalestinianschoolbooks.blogspot.co.il/

[44] See, for example, Arafat's speech, The Nobel Peace Prize 1994: "Only in an atmosphere of just peace shall the Palestinian people achieve their legitimate ambition for independence and sovereignty, and be able to develop their national and cultural identity, as well as enjoy sound neighborly relations, mutual respect and cooperation with the Israeli people". Retrieved from http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1994/arafat-lecture.html and in the first speech of President Mahmoud Abbas in 2005: "We will also continue on the path of Yasser Arafat to achieve just peace – the peace of the braves". Retrieved from http://www.multaqa.org/access/inside.php?id=565

Conclusion

As an intractable conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict touches the emotional and psychological needs of the Palestinian society, and this is in addition to economic, social, or political interests. The psychocultural infrastructure has become an inseparable part of the conflict, created the culture of conflict, and has become a central force driving the behavior of the Palestinian society in the conflict in all its aspects. Thus, a vicious circle has been created that feeds itself: the psychological infrastructure feeds the conflict and drives its intractable character and nature, and the continuation of the conflict and the accompanying violence feed and reinforce the psychological infrastructure (Bar-Tal, 2013). A similar infrastructure also developed on the Israeli side, as Oren (Chap. 8) describes.

The Palestinian ethos of conflict is a foundation pillar of the Palestinian society. Since the beginning of the conflict and until present day, it tends toward aggravation and escalation; the ethos of conflict is hegemonic, dominant, rigid, and stable and prevents the growth and development of an alternative ethos. There are no disagreements over the ethos. It is the unifying factor in the Palestinian society.

The ethos of the conflict is comprised of societal beliefs, which make it dominant, solid, and impenetrable to changes. There is a reciprocal relationship between the ethos and the realities of the conflict. Each one strengthens the other and it is sometimes difficult to know which is the cause and which is the effect. In order for the Palestinian and the Israeli people to advance toward reconciliation and a better future, a culture of peace needs to develop. As long as the reality remains unchanged, and with it the culture of conflict, Palestinians as well as Israelis will not implement and adopt culture of peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will continue with its current intractable character.

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Part IV
Distress, Emotions and Ideology

Harmed by Our Protection: Exposure to Political Violence and Political Preferences in the Range of Fire

Daphna Canetti

Introduction

Understanding and ultimately resolving long-standing conflicts remains a first-order global goal. Unfortunately, however, radical shifts in political attitudes—such as increased out-group negativity—can significantly hinder peacemaking efforts and dismiss reconciliatory measures. Civilians living in societies suffering from intractable conflicts face extended periods of time under difficult conditions of human and material loss, exhaustion, misery, uncertainty, grief, danger, demands for resources, and other hardships (Bar-Tal, 2007). I believe that psychological mechanisms representing wrongs or hardships suffered—commonly termed "grievances" (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010)—can serve as a key to understanding radical political shifts following exposure to political violence. For this chapter, I focus on *prolonged* exposure to political violence. The term "political violence" is used here to include violence waged between countries, protracted conflicts within countries, and to a limited extent, to relate to the consequences of singular terrorist attacks. I address changes in two types of political attitudes: intra-societal attitudes (e.g., exclusionism and political intolerance) and intersocietal attitudes (e.g., support for militancy, violence, and reconciliation).

Civilians living in societies suffering from intractable conflict deal with daily exposure to war-related events, including resurgences of political violence and terrorism that cause casualties. Many studies have shown that political violence often results in large-scale political transformations in affected societies: for example, political violence has been linked to deterioration in economic conditions (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003) and the availability of employment (Greenbaum, Dugan, & LaFree, 2007). Individual-level exposure and its effects, however, have received less

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_10

attention outside the boundaries of clinical psychology and social work. This situation is surprising, since individual exposure to conflict and violence can result in drastic, sometimes long-lasting, changes in the physical and mental health of exposed individuals, which in turn has implications for the wider politics of conflict, including radical shifts in political attitudes (Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014). Hence, the following questions deserve particular attention: How are people changed by the societies they live in? How does exposure to conflict violence lead to—mostly radical—changes in civilians' subsequent political attitudes and behavior?

I argue that *in order to understand the impact on political attitudes among those affected by political violence*, *we must account for personal exposure*, *along with various psychological mechanisms such as stress and threat perceptions*. In addition, I argue that ethos of conflict, as a set of ideological beliefs in an intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013), helps to understand changes in political preferences toward current policy issues. I put forward a methodological claim arguing that systematic rigorous empirical research in conflict zones is not only feasible, but of the utmost importance to deepening our understanding of human behavior under continuous existential threat and uncertainty. Through a review of relevant contemporary literature on political psychology in conflict zones, I hope to contribute a more nuanced understanding of how individual exposure to political violence and terrorism shapes the politics of conflict, including the extent to which it is possible to change individual responses to exposure—an issue that consumes much social and public policy and is central to clinical, organizational, and health agendas aimed at improving lives. *Theoretically*, *the work presented here connects individual trauma subsequent to political violence with wider collective political attitudes and behavior and*, *as such*, *breaks new ground*.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the world's most deeply intractable conflicts. It is protracted, violent, total, and central, perceived as zero-sum, and imposes high material and psychological demands on both sides (Bar-Tal, 2007). Particularly, since the eruption of the second "Intifada" (Palestinian uprising) in September 2000, in which thousands of Israeli and Palestinian civilians were injured and killed (B'tselem, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c), both sides have suffered the worst period of mutual violence since the 1948 war. This eruption of violence was accompanied by a severe economic crisis both in Israel and in the territories administered by the Palestinian Authority (Jaeger & Paserman, 2005). Continuous exposure to conflictual violence has led to heightened levels of distress and threat perception in both populations, as well as adherence to the ethos of conflict (Al-Krenawi, Graham, & Kanat-Maymon, 2009; Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; Solomon & Lavi, 2005).

For the majority of Israelis and Palestinians, routine exposure to violent conflict events is an unfortunate reality. Since 2000, 6835 Palestinian citizens have been killed by Israeli security forces, and a further 1767 were killed during Operation Protective Edge (2014); 1155 Israeli citizens have been killed by Palestinians since 2000 (B'Tselem, 2014a). Meanwhile, in just the past 2 years, 2172 rockets and 175 mortar shells were launched by Palestinian militants from

the Gaza Strip into southern Israel (B'Tselem, 2014a), forcing a huge segment of the Israeli population to live under constant threat of attack. Of the Palestinians killed during Operation Protective Edge, 431 were minors and 200 were women under the age of 60 (B'Tselem, 2014b). Thousands of Gazans were exposed to conflict violence.

Though the basic contours of a compromise and a two-state solution to this long-standing conflict are acknowledged, significant factions of the public on both sides object to compromise (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Oren, 2010; Maoz & McCauley, 2005). The inability to resolve the conflict peacefully in spite of the numerous bilateral attempts and third-party interventions may be greatly attributed to the sociopsychological barriers that underlie the disagreements and prevent their resolution (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). Specifically, years of exposure to violent conflict gave rise to the development of dominant conflict-supporting beliefs in both societies, each accusing the other of responsibility for the continuation of the conflict and for refusing a peaceful resolution (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; Shamir & Shikaki, 2010).

Analyzing how this intense exposure to conflict can affect the political behavior of civilians is critical to our understanding of political behavior and conflict zone preferences. Specifically, does exposure to conflict change citizens' preferential attitudes toward intergroup relations, diplomatic negotiation, or violence? Existing work on the linkages between conflict exposure, political attitudes, and voting behavior has provided a host of contradicting evidence. For example, research into the rally-around-the-flag effect suggests that, at least in the immediate aftermath of attacks or the beginning of wars, citizens become more militant, "rallying around the flag" and supporting the incumbent government's military efforts (Mueller, 1970).

However, research on public sensitivity to casualties suggests that civilian support for war (and the incumbent party) will drastically wane in the wake of increasing casualties on their side, limiting the longevity of the rally effect. Studies on actual exposure to conflict violence also offer a mixed bag of political attitudes as shown in Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport, and Hobfoll (in press) study. While some studies have demonstrated how exposure can lead to pacification (Beber, Roessler, & Scacco, 2012), others have shown radicalization stemming from a host of other mechanisms such as threat, trauma, or revenge motives (Canetti, Hirsch-Hoefler, & Eiran, 2014). Research on whether a violent or nonviolent conflict strategy engenders support for negotiation and compromise among civilians, and how much warfare civilians can absorb before they soften their militant attitudes, has also been inconclusive (Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport, & Hobfoll, in press; Longo, Canetti, & Hite-Rubin, 2014). Some studies demonstrate the efficacy of these strategies (whether violent or nonviolent) in pacifying the population, while others show that these tactics simply serve to inflame militant sentiments and lead toward a violent spiral of conflict (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007; Kocher, Pepinsky, & Kalyvas, 2011; Lyall, 2009).

This chapter is structured as follows: first, I define individual exposure, showing that civilians are not exposed to political violence to the same degree. Further, I

identify post-traumatic stress symptoms (PSSs)[1] and perceptions of threat as key mechanisms for understanding changes in political attitudes, followed by an extended model which accounts for ethos of conflict/ideology. I show that prolonged exposure to violence does not *directly* translate into political preferences—rather, it is prolonged individual exposure, along with **stress** and threat perceptions, that encourage uncompromising and militant political attitudes.

Exposure to Political Violence and Political Attitudes

While other studies test the effects of political violence on civilians' political attitudes by looking at pre- and post-event samples, they fail to measure individual exposure (directly or indirectly) to the attacks (Davis & Silver, 2004; Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Jakobsson & Blom, 2014; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). Although studies in political psychology focus on individual exposure, they define exposure broadly—the number of victims one knows (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002; Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007). I argue that to understand the relationship between political violence and political attitudes, one needs to measure individual-level exposure. I define such exposure as the harm inflicted on individuals amid political violence (Canetti, Halperin, Hobfoll, Shapira, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Lyall, Blair, & Imai, 2013; Zeitzoff, 2014).

In a recent study conducted in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Canetti, Russ, Luborsky, and Hobfoll (2014) employed a novel strategy to identify individual exposure to political violence, combining physical, geographic, and emotional, personal exposure of civilians. The definition of personal exposure is based on the assumption that political violence *deliberately* creates fear and anxiety, not only among those who are personally exposed—that is, who were harmed themselves or whose family members or close friends were harmed—but also among members of the targeted group that do not suffer personal injuries but witness the attack from some emotional and/or physical distance (Canetti, Russ, et al., 2014). In line with this, recent studies show that the negative effects of exposure to terrorism and political violence are in no way restricted to individuals who have been directly affected by attacks (Cohen & Arieli, 2011; Palmieri, Chipman, Canetti, Johnson, & Hobfoll, 2010). Keinan, Sadeh, and Rosen (2003), for example, showed that exposure to media coverage of terrorist acts was associated with the development of symptoms similar to those of PTSD. Hence, the direct and indirect impact of exposure alone on the individual does not suffice as a comprehensive definition. Rather, exposure along with other individual grievances amid conflict—such as the threat of loss or knowing someone who might be harmed—can elicit severe distress and

[1] As field research deals with the general population and not a clinical population, it does not allow for diagnosis. However, we conducted a study which compared our questionnaire scales to that of clinical interviews, which revealed an equivalency and which strengthens the validity of the scales (Hobfoll et al., 2011).

impair mental health and are thus an integral part of our definition of individual exposure to political violence.

A growing literature in political science has sought to address the role of war and conflict exposure in informing political attitudes and behavior, specifically on intra-society attitudes toward exclusionism and political intolerance and inter-society attitudes toward war and compromise (Canetti, Rapaport, Wayne, Hall, & Hobfoll, 2013). Historically, attempts at integrating this large literature have been hampered by discipline and subfield divisions between research that studies the effect of *war* on political attitudes and studies that explore the more specific impact of *actual conflict exposure* during war. The present chapter seeks to unify these areas of study, analyzing the impact of war and conflict exposure on political attitudes at various levels of disaggregation—national, city/neighborhood, and individual.

Thus, the casualty sensitivity hypothesis postulates that, after the initial shock of the crisis wears off, the public will become increasingly war-weary in the face of casualties, blame the incumbent government, and support a cessation of hostilities. Indeed, the public's sensitivity to casualties is often postulated as a primary reason for democracies' reluctance to go to war and the democratic peace theory (Russett, 1990). This theory has also been diligently explored by researchers who have found significant theoretical nuances. For example, casualty sensitivity depends on the context in which the casualties occurred (Gelpi, Feaver, & Reifler, 2006) and may be a result of both recent casualties and overall casualty trends (Gartner, 2008). Essentially, this means that support for war among the public does not reflexively decline with casualties, but is a result of a rational cost-benefit model that includes casualty counts as a cost (Larson, 1996). This cost-benefit calculation incorporates many factors, such as the public perception of the "principle-policy objective" (Jentleson, 1992), the casualty tolerance of other domestic elites (Larson, 1996), the presence of multilateral international support (Kull, Destler, & Ramsay, 1997), and the expectations of success in the conflict (Gelpi, 2001).

This literature in its current form has several shortcomings. First, most studied cases examine the United States, limiting their generalizability to other conflict contexts. Second, research in these areas has generally not examined individual differences in war support and militancy among citizens who have been *more* or *less* affected by the conflict. Finally, these studies generally explore attitudes *during* war. They do not answer the central question of how political attitudes will change during periods of calm in an intractable conflict.

A second strain of research addresses some of these limitations, utilizing lab in the field or natural experiments to disaggregate the civilian population and explore the impact of individual or neighborhood level conflict exposure on political attitudes in various conflict contexts. For example, a recent study conducted in Israel (Grossman, Manekin, & Miodownik, forthcoming) found that the assignment of Israeli citizens to an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) combat unit in accordance with their health profile scores (in other words, the assignment to more conflict exposure based on the random distribution of poorer or stronger health) hardened attitudes toward the rival and reduced support for negotiation and compromise post-service. Former combat soldiers were also more likely to vote for right-wing parties. The

authors speculate that a host of mechanisms related to conflict exposure—socialization, prejudice, threat, and trauma—may play a role in this process.[2] Likewise, in Vietnam (Kocher et al., 2011), studies have found that bombing of Vietnamese villages systematically shifted control of these areas to the Viet Cong insurgents rather than pacifying the civilian population. Thus, the US airpower was ineffective in pacifying the population, as the Vietnamese blamed the United States and became more supportive of the local Viet Cong following exposure to these bombing campaigns. In the United States, Bonanno and Jost (2006) found similar results in response to the 9/11 attacks. Examining high-exposure survivors of the 9/11 attacks, they found a significant conservative shift in political attitudes. This shift was, in turn, strongly associated with increased desires for revenge, patriotism, and militarism against Al-Qaeda and other groups.

However, some other studies have contradicted this trend of exposure to conflict violence leading to increased militancy. In Sudan, for example, Beber et al. (2012) found that exposure to violent riots by South Sudanese in Khartoum led to *pacification* of the North Sudanese, who became more likely to support the South's secessionist claims in the riot's aftermath, even if they recognized that secession would negatively harm their economic well-being. This suggests that groups exposed to violence placed personal safety considerations above all else, supporting compromise on a core conflict issue in order to increase their own personal security. Likewise, in Israel, a recent study (Gould & Klor, 2010) found that though *votes* shifted to the right in the immediate aftermath of terrorist attacks, *political attitudes* actually shift to the left over time in response to terrorism (e.g., the increasing public acceptance of a two-state solution).[3] This indicates that terrorism brings a leftward shift to the entire political map, including the stances of political parties; thus, it is critical to distinguish between the effects of terror on political attitudes and its effects on party preferences, because the platforms of parties are possibly endogenous to the level of terrorism (Gould & Klor, 2010).

Mechanisms Affecting the Exposure-Attitude Relationship

In the wake of these conflicting results, several recent studies have tried to explore the nuances of the way conflict exposure is translated into political attitudes. In Ireland, Hayes and McAllister (2001) found that *indirect* exposure to violence enhanced public support for paramilitary groups and reduced support for the decommissioning of paramilitary groups. However, *direct* exposure to violence influenced

[2] A study by Borovski-Sapir (2004) revealed the effect of socialization in military training bases on the development of conflict attitudes.

[3] A study by Sharvit, Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, and Gurevich (2010) on the effect of terrorism on political attitudes found that in the aftermath of terror attacks during a period of violence escalation, those aligned with "dovish" political views became less favorably disposed to supporting peace, while those holding more "hawkish" political opinions became more favorably disposed to supporting peace.

Catholics and Protestants differently. Catholics exposed to violence increased their support of paramilitary groups, whereas Protestants exposed to violence became less supportive of such groups. This difference may be attributable to the differential experiences of violence in this asymmetrical conflict—for Catholics, redress could only be found through paramilitary groups, while Protestants could turn to the government. In Afghanistan, Lyall and colleagues (2013) asked whether the combatant's *identity* affected exposed civilians' political attitudes. They found that harm inflicted by one's own group or co-ethnics will generally be ignored, while harm inflicted by the out-group will increase antipathy and support for militant action. In Israel, Longo et al. (2014) found that exposure to checkpoints increased militarism and support for violence and encouraged voting for the militant Hamas party among Palestinians but that this increase was largely explained by variations in perceptions of humiliation felt at checkpoints.

The question of which mechanism accounts for this empirical relationship has different implications for generalizability and the conditions under which governments might seek to enhance public support for militancy and exclusion of outgroups (or vice versa) through engagement in major violent conflicts. Let us therefore outline the logic underlying each of the mechanisms. Contemporary literature offers numerous psychological mechanisms that do not speak about individual-level exposure, but about emotions (e.g., Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2011) or needs (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, Chap. 17) in conflict. These many competing results demonstrate the need for a deeper exploration of the mechanisms underlying attitude change in the wake of exposure to violent conflict. What factors will cause citizens to become pacified after conflict exposure, and what factors will trigger increased militancy? What role does individual psychology—specifically, individual differences in reactivity to conflict exposure—play in affecting subsequent political attitudes? I argue that psychological distress and threat perceptions are central drivers of political attitudes such as political intolerance, extremism, and support for compromise or violence. I also argue that another common mechanism behind why individual-level **exposure to violence** might instigate militancy, hostility, resentment, and rebellion is the ethos of conflict.

Psychological Distress

In today's atypical conflicts, exposure to violent conflict events among the civilian population is incredibly high. Such exposure might possibly lead to a host of psychological disorders and physical illnesses that can affect conflict attitudes (Canetti, Hall, Rapaport, & Wayne, 2013). Post-traumatic **stress** disorder (PTSD) is one such debilitating disorder; symptoms include reexperiencing of the traumatic event, active avoidance of reminders of the trauma, emotional numbing, and hyperarousal (Spitzer, Gibbon, Skodol, Williams, & First, 1994).

I examined how PTSD symptoms resulting from terrorism relate to aggression, militancy, and ethnic exclusion to form a defense and protection (Canetti

et al., 2009; Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, & Johnson, 2006). If the actions of others have been threatening and if that threat has had emotional consequences, then counteraggression may be one coping response (Chemtob, Hamada, Roitblat, & Muraoka, 1994).

Prolonged exposure to conflict violence has indeed triggered substantial psychological trauma among Israeli and Palestinian civilian populations. In a large survey conducted in Israel in 2011 (Chipman, Palmieri, Canetti, Johnson, & Hobfoll, 2011), almost a third of the sample reported some form of impairment caused by post-traumatic stress, and a fifth of these respondents met the full criteria for diagnosis with PTSD. A second study, conducted in the Palestinian territories in 2010 (Canetti et al., 2010), discovered that the prevalence of PTSD and depression for Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem was extremely high.

Recent studies have demonstrated the central role of this type of trauma and psychological distress in informing citizens' response to conflict violence in a variety of contexts. A study conducted on adolescents in Israel (Shamai & Kimhi, 2006) found that young adults living close to the Lebanon border were significantly less supportive of political compromise and suffered from higher **stress** and threat levels. Stress and threat were in turn negatively correlated with support for political compromise, indicating that the stress and threat of living in a more active conflict zone may crystallize the formation of more militant political attitudes. Other studies conducted by Canetti-Nisim and colleagues (2008) have found that personal exposure to terrorism predicted psychological distress, which led to an increase in the perceived threat of future attacks from Palestinian citizens of Israel and, in turn, predicted exclusionist attitudes toward Palestinian citizens. These findings suggest that personal exposure and psychological distress play an important role in the development of extreme political attitudes among citizens in conflict contexts and therefore set the ground for the *stress-based model of political extremism* (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009).

These studies have been replicated in other countries. In Uganda, civilians living in conflict zones had high prevalence rates for symptoms of PTSD and depression. These respondents were more likely to favor violent over nonviolent means to end the conflict (Vinck, Pham, Stover, & Weinstein, 2007). In Rwanda, civilians who experienced traumatic exposure to conflict violence were more likely to express PTSD symptoms and in turn less likely to have positive attitudes toward three factors related to reconciliation: belief in nonviolence, belief in community, and interdependence with other ethnic groups (Pham, Weinstein, & Longman, 2004). Studies of the psychological implications of terrorist attacks in the United States (Galea et al., 2002; Schuster et al., 2001) and Spain (Miguel-Tobal et al., 2006) have also pointed to PTSD as one of the most problematic expressions of pathological psychological reactions following exposure to terrorism. Studies on Israeli and Palestinian civilians have shown that the more an individual was exposed, the more likely he or she was to fall into a group with a worse trajectory (i.e., chronic poor mental health) (see Hobfoll et al., 2009).

Perception of Threat

Although inherent to PTSD, a key distinct factor connecting exposure to violence and political attitudes is the perception of threat. Perception of threat is the appraisal of danger that the "other side," or out-group, poses to the life or well-being of the individual or group (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; Huddy, Feldman et al., 2002). Indeed, since 9/11, a growing number of researchers have begun to examine the impact of terrorism and violence on psychological aspects as well as political ones (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; Laor, Yanay-Shani, Wolmer, & Khoury, 2010; Rubin, Brewin, Greenberg, Simpson, & Wessely, 2005). Our group joins others in examining the impact of threat perceptions as drivers of harsh counterterrorism policies and increased intransigence (Gadarian, 2010; Herrmann, Tetlock, & Visser, 1999; Huddy, Feldman, et al., 2002; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004) while rephrasing the discussion of conflict exposure and the psychopolitical consequences.

Threat perceptions are heightened in situations of prolonged conflict, with seemingly unrelated events liable to be seen as threats. This is true for both relatively circumscribed and acute incidents of political violence, such as NYC 9/11, Madrid 3/11, London 7/7, or Oslo 7/22 (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Jakobsson & Blom, 2014; Lerner et al., 2003; Rubin et al., 2007), as well as violence over prolonged periods (Cairns, 1996).

An extensive body of work establishes perception of threat as a significant predictor of a wide array of attitudes and beliefs. This array includes prejudice, animosity, and hostility (Jackson, Brown, Brown, & Marks, 2001), exclusionism (Canetti et al., 2009), and political intolerance and xenophobia (Quillian, 1995). Several studies reveal that perception of threat is positively correlated with political preferences supporting aggressive national and international security policies (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Huddy et al., 2007). The centrality of perceptions of threat to policy preferences is particularly important when studying intractable conflicts.

The Ethos of Conflict

I view ethos as a specific case of political ideology of conflict. Ideology constitutes a coherent worldview often prevalent in one's culture, which can provide a sense of meaning in the face of individual and collective threats. Theories of distress resulting from protracted conflicts emphasize the importance for the coping process of finding meaning, establishing a coherent worldview, and adhering to a cultural worldview (Antonovski, Meari, & Blanc, 1978; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). A strong ideological belief may attenuate the effect of exposure to political violence on psychological distress. For example, studies have shown that the relationship between exposure and psychological distress was weaker among

individuals who were highly committed to an ideology compared to those who were less committed (Kaplan, Matar, Kamin, Sadan, & Cohen, 2005; Punamäki, 1996; Shechner, Slone, & Bialik, 2007).

It has been suggested that there are qualitative differences in the effects of various ideologies. Jost and Hunyady (2005) proposed that system-justifying ideologies that defend the social status quo are especially functional for coping with adversities. For example, threat perceptions were found to be positively related to conservatism. Thus, conservatism can be seen as a part of a coping strategy when facing high threat levels. Political extremity, either conservative or liberal, was not found to be related to perceptions of threat, a finding that stresses the possibility that not all sets of ideological beliefs are as functional in situations of threat (Jost et al., 2007).

Ethos of conflict is a particular ideology that is prevalent among societies that are involved in intense violent conflicts. It can serve as a system-justifying ideology and thus may play an important role in the effects of political violence exposure on coping with adversity created by political conflict (see Jost, Stern, & Sterling, Chap. 4, volume 1 of this series). Ethos of conflict is likely to decrease support for the peaceful resolution of intractable conflicts. It has been shown that the ethos is a coherent feature of Israeli society (Bar-Tal, 2007) and is an active part of the psychological repertoire of most Israelis (Sharvit, 2014).

In light of the above theorizing regarding the role of ideologies in general and conservative system-justifying ideologies in particular in coping with adversities, I propose that high levels of psychological distress relate to high levels of ethos, posttraumatic, and depressive symptoms, even in times of exposure to conflict (Canetti, Lavi, Elad-Guy, & Bar-Tal, in press). The beliefs that comprise the Israeli and the Palestinian ethoses of conflict are, to a great degree, mirror images. There are eight beliefs: justness of the goals, victimization, security, positive collective self-image, delegitimization of the adversary, patriotism, unity, and peace. Full descriptions of the content of these beliefs in both societies can be found elsewhere in this volume (Oren, Chap. 8, Shaked, Chap. 9; Oren, Bar-Tal, & David, 2004).

Conclusion

Despite recent developments in the study of the political psychology of civilians in conflict zones and in particular those related to the psychosocial infrastructure of intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2013), the manner in which prolonged exposures to political violence impacts attitudes toward peace and violence and the role of psychological components in determining these attitudes have remained unclear. Our findings provide powerful evidence that exposure to violence reduces the willingness to compromise and prompts support for further violence (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Haass, 1988; Zartman, 1989; Zartman & Touval, 1985). Our ongoing analyses reveal that under prolonged exposure, elevated levels of distress influence perceptions of threat, which in turn are associated with more intransigent and militant attitudes.

This chapter points to individual-level outcomes as key micro-foundations of conflict. At the theoretical level, my work extends previous research on political

attitudes among civilians living amidst political violence by connecting individual trauma subsequent to such violence with collective attitudes toward peace and compromise. I propose a mediation model linking individual-level exposure to political violence to reduced support for negotiations, with psychological distress and threat perceptions as mechanisms bridging the two. More importantly, my colleagues and I have continuously tested and validated this model across populations of Israelis and Palestinians on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (e.g., Canetti, Elad-Strenger, Lavi, Guy, and Bar-Tal, in press).

At a practical level, my work provides useful guidance for practitioners seeking to advocate peace. Specifically, the current findings highlight the role played by individual-level exposure, coupled with stress and threat, in acting as a barrier to peace. It thus demonstrates the importance of removing violence, particularly violence directed at civilians, from the political landscape. In addition, our findings emphasize that actions to reduce threat perceptions are crucial to the success of any peace negotiations. As a start in this direction, acknowledging and legitimizing the losses of the other side are imperative for building support in those constituencies that find moving toward peace most challenging.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict offers ample evidence that waves of violence will continue to take their psychological and political toll. Civilian casualties in and of themselves constitute impediments to breaking the cycle of violence, as affected civilians and their communities become increasingly resistant to peace. From a defensive coping perspective (Hobfoll et al., 2006), hardening their hearts by adopting defensive attitudes aimed to protect the self (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., in press) may be the most effective means for individuals victimized by violence to help themselves: adopting a more militant attitude has been found to be an effective coping mechanism in dealing with increased conflict, perception of threat, and resulting stress. However, these militant attitudes perpetuate the conflict by increasing support for militant policies (Canetti, Hall et al., 2013). Only by changing these protective dynamics can we hope to create a psychological-societal infrastructure capable of sustaining formal political agreements in conflict zones.

Acknowledgments This research was made possible, in part, by grants awarded from the National Institute of Mental Health (R01 MH073687), from the Israel Science Foundation (487/08), from the US-Israel Binational Science Foundation (2009460), and from the Institute for Social and Policy Studies and the Macmillan Center at Yale University. I also thank Mahshov Institute in Israel as well as JMCC and NEC Institutes in Ramallah for enabling data collection. Of course, all errors are mine.

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Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict and Their Relation to the Ethos of Conflict in Israeli Society

Ruthie Pliskin and Eran Halperin

Life under the conditions of intractable conflict and the challenges posed by it are known to lead to the emergence of a multifaceted sociopsychological infrastructure, comprising various societal beliefs about the past and the present and collective emotional orientations (Bar-Tal, 2013, chapters 4–6). A central element within this infrastructure is the Ethos of Conflict (EOC), a concept brought forth by Daniel Bar-Tal to describe "the configuration of central societal shared beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society" (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2013; see also Oren, Chap. 8). In an intractable conflict, the EOC is formed to provide individuals with the ability to deal with the challenges of life under such difficult circumstances, but as it becomes more entrenched, the conflict-supporting societal beliefs comprising it may begin to serve as barriers to the conflict's transformation and resolution.

Because of the omnipresence of the conflict in societal life, individuals carry the beliefs of the EOC with them throughout their daily routines. Indeed, multiple studies have demonstrated that the long-term societal beliefs of the EOC influence not only people's attitudes but also their behaviors (e.g., Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Dgani-Hirsch, 2009; Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Zafran, & Halperin, 2012; Porat, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2013; and see Bar-Tal, 2013 for a review). What remains to be explored, however, is the process by which this long-standing psychological construct influences intermittent political reactions and even behavior. How are people's long-term societal beliefs about the conflict, the ingroup, and the adversary *translated* into

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_11

concrete policy support and personal action? *Through what process* do these beliefs act to shape individuals' interpretation of new information and the way they react to it? And what processes might be at play in times in which individuals strive to act contrary to the mandate of these societal beliefs? In the present chapter, we would like to propose that an examination of emotional processes may serve to answer these important questions. In other words, we propose that in the context of intractable conflict, the influence of the EOC on actual decisions and behavior is at least partially mediated through emotional processes.

This view of the central role played by emotions in this process has received some initial support in the literature (e.g., Halperin, 2011; Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2011), highlighting the importance of understanding how emotional processes shape attitudes and behaviors. More importantly, however, when studying the influence that emotional processes have on attitudes and behaviors in a context as unique and difficult as intractable conflict, it is important to understand how the long-term features of that context, and chiefly the EOC, shape this influence. Indeed, the EOC may influence these emotional processes in several important ways, such as shaping the emotional experience itself, shaping the outcomes of that experience, and shaping the efforts people make to modify their emotional experience.

Below, we will discuss each of these possible influences. First, however, we will review the existing knowledge on emotions and their regulation in the context of intractable conflict, drawing on evidence from Bar-Tal's native context: Israeli society and its experience as an actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Next, we will briefly describe the EOC and its function as a conflict-supporting ideology. Subsequently, we will discuss the existing knowledge on the EOC-emotion relationship and the various features of EOC as an ideology that may affect emotional processes. Finally, we will examine each of the possible influences EOC may have on emotional processes, mentioned above: its influence on the levels of emotion experienced, its influence on the outcomes of experienced emotions, and its influence on processes involved in the regulation of emotions. Throughout the chapter, we will draw on examples from Israeli society.

Emotions and Emotion Regulation in the Context of Intractable Conflict in Israel

From Emotion to Group-Based Emotion

Even though the study of emotions has grown rapidly (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett, 2010), scholars do not yet agree on a single definition, with differences pertaining mostly to the boundaries of the concept and its phenomena (e.g., emotional words, emotional experience, emotional expressions, or emotional behavior; see Frijda, 2004). The number of scientific definitions proposed has grown so rapidly that counting seems rather hopeless (Kleinginna and Kleinginna already reviewed more than 100 in 1981). In our work, we adopt William James's (1884)

classical perspective on emotions as flexible response sequences (Frijda, 1986) that are called forth whenever an individual evaluates a situation as offering important challenges or opportunities (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). According to this definition, emotions transform a stimulus into a motivation to respond to it in a particular manner (Zajonc, 1998).

But emotional experiences and their motivational, attitudinal, and behavioral implications go far beyond the intra- and even the interpersonal context (see Halperin, Sharvit, et al., 2011 for a discussion of these). There is wide consensus today that emotions are driven by intra- and intergroup dynamics, are often expressed within social contexts, and in themselves influence the nature of intra- and intergroup relations. Most relevant to the present discussion is the concept of group-based emotions (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Empirical research has demonstrated that individuals may experience emotions not only in response to personally relevant developments but also in response to developments that affect other members of their group (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordin, 2003). Although the emotion-provoking event is not personally experienced, group-based emotions are personally experienced emotions with various possible targets, including events, individuals, or other social groups. In this final case, they are termed intergroup emotions: emotions one experiences as a result of identification with a certain social group and targeted at another social group (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007).

Group-Based Emotions in Intractable Conflict in Israel

As we have stated earlier, emotions have the ability to influence individuals' opinions and even actions in the context of intractable conflict. Halperin, Sharvit, et al. (2011) presented a comprehensive appraisal-based framework for understanding the influence of emotions over conflict-related beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. The most basic element in this proposed framework (see Fig. 1) describes a sequence of psychological processes beginning with exposure to the emotion-provoking stimulus, which may be real or remembered information pertaining to the intergroup context. As an illustration, an Israeli may hear on the news that a member of her group has been hurt by a rocket launched by Palestinian militants. This exposure results in individual cognitive appraisal of the stimulus, and depending on the specific ways



Fig. 1 The process model of reactive emotions and their influence in the context of intractable conflict

in which the information or events are appraised, the appraisal results in the experience of a discrete emotional reaction. For example, if the Israeli appraises the launching of the rocket as unprovoked, she may respond with anger; if she believes the action stemmed from the perceived fundamental evil nature of the Palestinian group, she may react with hatred; and if she believes she is also at risk of being hurt by similar actions, her reaction might be one of fear.

Each emotion, in turn, is associated with specific emotional goals, and to address these goals, individuals may adopt or strengthen certain political attitudes, or, alternatively, take or support certain lines of political action. In other words, discrete emotions influence people's political reactions to specific events by simple translation of the core emotional goals and action tendencies of the emotion into support for (or opposition to) practical policies that are seen as relevant reactions to the emotion-eliciting event. Accordingly, the same event would lead to support for different policies among different individuals who experienced different emotions in its wake. For example, if an Israeli's dominant emotion in response to aggression by Israelis would be group-based guilt, it could lead to support for policies aiming to correct the wrongdoings and/or compensate the Palestinians (see Čehajić, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011; Čehajić-Clancy, Chap. 8, volume 1 of this series). If he is instead dominated by hope for a better future, he may be motivated to search for new avenues to change reality in the long run, probably by seriously considering new political information and creative political solutions to the conflict (see Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014; Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat, & Bar-Tal, 2014; Cohen-Chen, van Zomeren & Halperin, Chap. 7, volume 1 of this series, Jarymowicz, Chap. 9, volume 1 of this series). Conversely, if the Israeli is dominated by fear of retaliation by the Palestinians, most of his efforts would be devoted to support of policies that would increase his feeling of security (see Jarymowicz, Chap. 9, volume 1 of this series, Dupuis, Porat, & Wohl, Chap. 10, volume 1 of this series; Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010).

The above differences in the outcomes of different emotions stem from the fact that each emotion has its own unique "story" and thus its own unique ramifications. Whereas anger is a highly motivating emotion (Mackie et al., 2000) that may lead to either destructive (Berkowitz, 1993; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994) or constructive (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Halperin, Russel, Dweck, & Gross, 2011) action tendencies, hatred unequivocally results in destructive attitudes or goals (Halperin, 2008, 2011; Sternberg, 2003). Fear, contrary to both of these emotions, is an inhibiting emotion, leading to closure and risk avoidance (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Gray, 1987; Halperin, 2011)—which may be indirectly achieved through either aggression (e.g., Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) or compromise (e.g., Gayer, Tal, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2009; Halperin, Porat, & Wohl, 2013; Spanovic et al., 2010). Hope, a positive emotion, leads to greater openness to new information and ideas (Snyder, 2000) and therefore to greater support for compromises and changes required for ending an intergroup conflict (Bar-Tal, 2001; Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, et al., 2014). Empathy, on the other hand, is directed at the outgroup rather than the (political or social) situation and therefore leads to action tendencies serving a goal of helping the group (Čehajić, Brown, & González, 2009; Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011), not necessarily affecting attitudes toward the ingroup or

the situation itself (Rosler, Cohen-Chen, & Halperin, in press). Understanding that each group-based emotion has a unique profile and a unique set of ramifications is highly important for understanding emotional dynamics in conflict but also for understanding how these various ramifications can be changed by tackling the emotions associated with them. The study of emotion regulation, described below, can make use of these understandings for the purpose of overcoming barriers to conflict resolution.

Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict in Israel

As demonstrated in the previous section, it is now well established that group-based emotions play a central role in shaping people's attitudes and behavior in conflict situations, with the Israeli context as no exception. Following this understanding, our research in recent years (e.g., Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, et al., 2014; Halperin, 2014; Halperin, Pliskin, Saguy, Liberman, & Gross, 2014; Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013) attempts to employ strategies of emotion regulation, previously used in basic psychology, in the context of intergroup conflicts as a tool for promoting conflict resolution.

We first focused on cognitive reappraisal, one of the most widely-researched emotion regulation strategies, finding that its use was associated with Israelis' increased support for humanitarian aid to the Palestinians during wartime (Halperin & Gross, 2011). Subsequent experimental studies, conducted in Israel, demonstrated that reappraisal instructions increase political tolerance toward disliked groups (Halperin, Pliskin, et al., 2014) and increase support for conciliatory policies immediately after an anger-evoking event and even following several months (Halperin, Porat, Tamir, et al., 2013).

However successful, the use of direct emotion regulation may have limited applied potential, due to both practical difficulty in administering wide-scale training and the personal motivation required for people to employ such strategies (Tamir, 2009). Furthermore, recent findings indicate that beyond a dearth of motivation to regulate emotions in a manner congruent with conciliatory attitudes, individuals involved in conflict are often motivated to regulate their emotions in the opposite direction (Sharvit, Brambilla, Babush, & Colucci, 2015). In order to overcome these obstacles, we have begun developing methods designed to *indirectly* regulate emotions (For a review, see: Halperin, Cohen-Chen, & Goldenberg, 2014). This approach involves a process of (1) identifying a potentially destructive action tendency, (2) connecting the action tendency to a discrete emotion associated with it (following Frijda, 1986), (3) identifying the emotion's core appraisal theme (e.g., Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984), and (4) finding a way to directly change this core appraisal theme so as to transform the emotion and its consequent action tendency (see Fig. 2).

Several studies have demonstrated the great promise contained in this approach. For example, in a series of studies, Halperin and colleagues (Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011) hypothesized that a core appraisal of hatred, that the outgroup's negative character is inherent and unchanging, is based on a



Fig. 2 The steps to developing indirect emotion regulation interventions in intractable conflict

more fundamental belief that social groups hold stable characteristics, known as an "entity" (or fixed) implicit theory about the malleability of groups (e.g., Rydell, Hugenberg, Ray, & Mackie, 2007). Indeed, we found that promoting an incremental view of the malleability of groups reduced intergroup hatred, thereby increasing support for compromises, among both Israelis and Palestinians (Halperin, Russell, et al., 2011). We have since conducted several other studies along these lines, targeting various discrete emotions. In all cases the process was the same, be it to transform levels of hope (Cohen-Chen, Crisp, & Halperin, 2013; Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, et al., 2014; Saguy & Halperin, 2014) and guilt (Čehajić et al., 2011), and always resulted in more constructive intergroup attitudes.

As demonstrated, research has provided much empirical support for the effectiveness of both direct and indirect approaches to emotion regulation in intergroup conflict in general and in Israeli society in particular. Nevertheless, much work is still needed for these approaches to materialize into implementable interventions to improve intergroup relations or promote conflict resolution. One key to such materialization may be in the examination of the unique characteristics of the context at hand, such as the EOC in societies that, like Israel, are involved in intractable conflict.

The Interrelations of the Ethos of Conflict and Emotional Processes in Israel

The findings presented thus far are promising in that they demonstrate how the adoption of previously accumulated knowledge about affective processes on the individual and group-based levels can further our understanding of the psychology of emotions in intergroup conflict and reconciliation. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that these emotional processes never exist in a vacuum. Every stage of the emotional process responds to the context in which the emotion arises and to the unique sociopsychological features of this context, with the EOC one such prominent and omnipresent feature in the extreme situation of intractable intergroup conflict—one that is intimately related to the emotions that arise in such realities.

As the EOC is an ideology, it is important to first understand the function of ideology more generally. Ideology can be defined as an organized construct of beliefs, attitudes, and values that provide a general worldview about a present and

future reality (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Various examinations into ideological belief systems have provided evidence for a connection between the set of long-standing beliefs contained within an ideology and a variety of interpersonal and intergroup attitudes and outcomes (see Jost et al., 2009 for a review). But beyond ideological content, researchers have also identified the importance of the cognitive as well as underlying psychological and motivational properties of ideology (Jost et al., 2009), which are universal to ideological belief systems around the world (Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007). According to this view, all ideologies can be described in terms of two dimensions that form their "discursive superstructure," and these determine whether someone belongs to the political right (high acceptance of *inequality* and low openness to *change*) or political left (low acceptance of *inequality* and high openness to *change*) (Jost et al., 2009). Moreover, this approach claims that each end of the ideological spectrum fulfills different relational, epistemic, and existential needs, with people high in needs such as the need for cognitive closure (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), the need for security, and the need for certainty (Jost et al., 2009) more likely to adopt rightist ideologies. Thus, it is important to take into account both the specific contents of the ideology (the societal beliefs contained in it) and the motivational basis for its adoption in understanding how ideology may shape other psychological processes.

But ideology takes on specific contents in the context of intractable conflict—namely, in the form of the EOC. As described in other chapters in this series (see Oren, Chap. 8, Shaked, Chap. 9, Cohrs, Uluğ, Stahel, & Kişlioğlu, Chap. 3, volume 1 of this series, Jost, Stern & Sterling, Chap. 4, volume 1 of this series), the EOC plays a central role in intractable conflicts in general and within Israeli society in particular. This conflict-supporting ideology denotes a strong adherence to a set of societal beliefs, including beliefs about the justness of the group's goals, about security, of a positive collective self-image, of the group's victimization, of delegitimizing the opponent, of patriotism, of unity, and of peace (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007). Because of the centrality of the conflict in such societies, self-identification of individuals in conflict as rightists versus leftists is highly related to their level of adherence to the EOC. Indeed, empirical examinations have shown that the EOC serves as the dominant ideology influencing the attitudes and political reactions of individual members of societies involved in intractable intergroup conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal et al., 2009, 2012; Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit, Bar-Tal, & Hobfoll, 2014; Sharvit, 2014).

With the above in mind, we already know that group-based emotions play a key role in intractable conflicts, and Bar-Tal's theory stresses the importance of the EOC within these contexts. What we do not yet know, however, is how these two important constructs may act together to influence the psychological processes of individuals involved in intractable conflicts. The integrated model of psychological barriers to conflict resolution (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011, 2014) has already initially proposed that emotions are intimately related to the EOC. First, the model suggests that certain emotions function to freeze the sociopsychological beliefs contained in the EOC and stabilize their rigidity. The emotions prevalent in intractable conflicts, which are characterized by high stability and resistance to change (Abelson &



Fig. 3 The influence of Ethos of Conflict on emotions, the results of emotion, and emotion regulation processes

Prentice, 1989), serve as glue, holding the conflict-supporting beliefs together. In this regard, Sharvit (2014) has recently demonstrated that the EOC is activated in times of emotional distress—indicating that emotions can serve to increase the accessibility of these beliefs.

Furthermore, according to appraisal theories of emotions, each and every emotion is related to a unique configuration of comprehensive (conscious or unconscious) evaluations of the emotional stimulus (Roseman, 1984). Hence, emotions and beliefs are closely related and reinforce each other steadily. More than a decade ago, Lerner and Keltner (2000) argued that each emotion activates a cognitive predisposition to appraise future events in line with the central-appraisal dimensions that triggered the emotion (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). This appraisal tendency approach is of great importance in our context, mainly because it signals that long-standing beliefs and intermittent emotions that arise in the context of conflict constantly feed into one another, creating a vicious cycle of entrenchment in these beliefs and increased emotional reactivity. Indeed, the literature on emotions in conflict designates ideology—namely, EOC —as an important factor influencing individuals' cognitive appraisals of conflict-related events and stimuli, thus influencing emotional reactions to such events and stimuli (see Fig. 3 as well as Halperin, Sharvit, et al., 2011).

For example, the belief in the justness of the group's goals, which is embodied in the EOC, should theoretically be associated with higher levels of anger in response to any action or attitude undermining or criticizing efforts to achieve these goals, because a core appraisal of intergroup anger is a perceived unjust wrongdoing by the outgroup (Halperin, 2011; Mackie et al., 2000). Similarly, the belief that the outgroup's character is negative and subhuman (the EOC theme of the adversary's delegitimization) should be associated with higher levels of intergroup hatred, because a core appraisal of hatred is that wrongdoing by the outgroup is intentional and related to the outgroup's fundamental nature (Halperin, 2008). An additional connection may be drawn between the EOC belief in security, its absence, and the constant need

to achieve it and intergroup fear, which stems from a perception of threat to the group and relates to a desire to reduce this threat (Gray, 1987). As a final example, the belief in the ingroup's positive collective self-image should be associated with chronically high levels of pride, a group-based emotion associated with the evaluation of the group as meeting or exceeding desired standards (Lewis, 1999).

While the relationship between the contents of the beliefs of the EOC and emotions has received some attention in the literature, the way that emotion may be shaped by the needs and motivations underlying the adoption of this rightist, conflict-supporting ideology has not. The findings brought forth by the recent view of ideology as "motivated social cognition" (Jost et al., 2009) and especially those related to the differing epistemic needs that characterize people of different ideologies indicate that ideological differences are related to differences in fundamental cognitive processes, even with regard to stimuli unrelated to one's held ideology. For example, Amodio, Jost, Master, and Yee (2007) found that leftist individuals outperformed rightist individuals in a go-no-go task requiring the management of cognitive conflict, explaining that rightists' higher need for certainty made them less equipped to manage the task. This focus is relevant to the present discussion, because, as the ever-growing literature on the relationship between emotion and cognition has demonstrated, the neural circuitry of emotion and cognition interacts from early perception to decision making and reasoning (Phelps, 2006). Thus, cognitive processes and the factors affecting them likely play a decisive role in shaping emotional processes and determining emotional outcomes. In other words, it may be the case that beyond the influence of ideological content—namely, EOC—on emotion, the differing epistemic needs related to the adoption of such ideologies, such as needs for certainty, security, and cognitive closure (see Jost et al., 2009), influence emotional processes and outcomes by influencing the process through which new events and information are appraised.

We argue that these attributes of the EOC may influence the emotional process and its outcomes in several important ways. First, it may influence the emotion experienced—its type or its intensity. Second, the EOC may influence the outcomes of the emotional process, leading people to greater or lesser likelihoods to act in the face of emotion or to different modes of behavior. Finally, it may have an impact on processes related to emotion regulation, influencing individuals' ability to regulate their emotion, their motivation to do so, and the way in which they chose to do so (see Fig. 3 for a full conceptual model of these influences).

The Effect of the Ethos of Conflict on Experienced Emotions

The EOC may exert an influence on the emotional process in several different ways. First, in line with appraisal theories of emotions, ideological content should influence emotional reactions to new conflict-related occurrences by guiding people's appraisals of these occurrences. Accordingly, two individuals holding different ideologies will respond differently to an emotion-eliciting event because they

differently appraise that event. Empirical findings support this approach, with ideology leading to differences in emotional reactions, through the mediation of appraisal processes (Halperin, 2011; Halperin, Pliskin et al., 2014; Kahn, Liberman, Halperin, & Ross, in press). As discussed above, the EOC has been conceptualized as a long-term factor influencing the appraisal of new events and stimuli (see Halperin, Sharvit, et al., 2011), with its beliefs potentially feeding into emotion-relevant appraisals.

Indeed, adherence to beliefs of the EOC has been found to lead to varying levels of discrete emotions, such that higher adherence to the EOC leads to stronger fear, anger, and hatred experiences in response to information about Palestinian intentions (e.g., Halperin, 2011). Likewise, high EOC adherence leads to lower levels of guilt and shame among Jewish Israelis in response to information on Israeli mistreatment of Palestinians at checkpoints (Sharvit & Zerachovich, 2014). A recent reanalysis of two large data files collected in Israel in recent years,[1] published here for the first time, provides further support for these relationships between ideology, measured either on a right to left scale or using the EOC scale, and discrete emotions. More specifically, rightist ideology and adherence to EOC showed significant negative correlations with compassion and empathy and positive correlations with intergroup's hatred, anger, and fear. Furthermore, when regressing either ideology or EOC on all of these emotions, almost all remained significant predictors, indicating that each emotion is uniquely related to ideology, above and beyond the relationship between ideology and the other emotions. While these results are highly intuitive, they provide empirical support for the existing theoretical intuitions.

In addition to the beliefs of the EOC, it is possible to conceptualize ideology in the context of intractable conflict by examining its intensity or structure rather than its content. To this end, the literatures on moral conviction and sacred values are particularly useful. Moral conviction reflects the extent to which a person experiences subjective evaluation of an attitude target in terms of fundamental right and wrong (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Such fervor in adherence to ideology also characterized strong adherents to the EOC in conflict situations, and thus it is a relevant construct to examine in the present chapter. Moral conviction has also been tied theoretically and empirically to differences in the experience of emotion. Skitka and her colleagues (Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka & Wisneski, 2011) posited that people might have stronger emotional associations with policy outcomes when they hold positions with strong rather than weak moral conviction, proposing that these emotional associations may help explain how morally convicted attitudes motivate individuals toward various political behaviors. Indeed, empirical

[1] Data file 1 consisted of a representative sample of 501 Jewish Israelis (253 females and 248 males) who voluntarily participated in a telephone survey conducted in Israel in October 2007, 3 weeks prior to the Annapolis Conference to relaunch peace negotiations. Data file 2 included a representative sample of Jewish Israelis who completed an online questionnaire distributed by the research firm Midgam Project (MP) in two waves: 808 participants responded in February 2012 (during a period of relative calm) and 402 (203 females and 199 males, ages ranging from 18 to 81, $M = 45.65$, $SD = 15.4$) responded again in November 2012 (during Israel's 1-week military operation in Gaza, a time of war).

work has demonstrated ties between moral conviction and anger (Mullen & Skitka, 2006) and also ties between morally convicted policy preferences and positive as well as negative emotions (Skitka & Wisneski, 2011), with emotions partially mediating the relationship between moral conviction and political behavioral intentions.

Research addressing moral conviction and emotions in the specific context of intractable conflict (Reifen Tagar, Morgan, Skitka, & Halperin, 2014) examined how both ideology and moral conviction were related to the experience of group-based emotions, namely, anger and guilt. Jewish Israelis' anger immediately after a war between Israelis and Palestinians was predicted by political ideology, such that rightists were angrier at the Palestinians than leftists. Guilt, however, was predicted by ideology only for those high on moral conviction, namely, Israelis on the left and right differed in their levels of guilt substantially only when moral conviction was high. With these results in mind, it may be important, in the future, to also consider the effect of moral conviction on the emotions of strong rejecters of the EOC.

The Effect of the Ethos of Conflict on the Outcomes of Emotion

A second key aspect of the potential relationship between the EOC and emotions in conflict relates to possible differences between people high or low in adherence to the EOC in how they respond politically further to experiencing similar emotions. When considering how levels of EOC may moderate the relationship between discrete emotions and their outcomes, two emerging hypotheses emerge. Intuitively, it may be argued that, in a conflict, the conflict-supporting rightist ideology is more "hot emotional" than "cold cognitive" (see arguments in "How to Create a Leftist," 2012; Kroeger, 2005), and therefore the positions of rightists should be most guided by emotion. However, there is little evidence in the literature to support this prediction. Conversely, research indicates that rightists' positions change less than others' positions under different circumstances: ideological rightists such as high adherents to the EOC are consistently found to be more rigid in their beliefs (Jost et al., 2009; Stone & Smith, 1993). As stated earlier, the EOC provides a clear ideological orientation to its adherents, providing certainty and security in the face of the uncertain reality of life under conflict. This certainty may make individuals high in EOC less susceptible to the effects of emotion. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that individuals relatively low in adherence to the EOC would be guided by their emotions more than high-EOC adherents.

We recently tested this interesting question and found consistent support for the latter hypothesis across six studies (Pliskin, Bar-Tal, Sheppes, & Halperin, 2014), all conducted in Israel. In two initial experimental studies, induced empathy raised Jewish-Israeli leftists', but not rightists', support for conciliatory and humanitarian policies toward an adversarial outgroup (Palestinians) and even a non-adversarial outgroup (asylum seekers), even though the manipulation affected people's empathy regardless of their ideology. In a third experimental study, induced despair similarly led to reduced support for gestures to the Palestinians only among leftists, despite

similarly affecting levels of despair for rightists and leftists alike. Then, a series of correlational field studies provided further support for our hypothesis, this time showing that both positive (empathy) and negative (anger and fear) emotional processes were related to support for policies only among low-EOC (leftist) participants (both among Jewish Israelis and Palestinian citizens of Israel, PCIs), in positive (peace negations) as well as highly negative (wartime or threat by governmental policies) conflict-related contexts (Pliskin et al., 2014). Similar trends were found when examining the effects of induced fear (Pliskin, Sheppes, & Halperin, 2015) in the context of intractable conflict.

We also have initial evidence that moral conviction moderates the relationship between emotions and support for policies (Glik, Halperin, & Tamir, in preparation). In two correlational studies conducted among Jewish ideological rightists in Israel (i.e., Jewish Israelis particularly high in adherence to the EOC), participants responded to measures of moral conviction, read an anger (Study 1) or empathy (Study 2) inducing text, and then reported their levels of anger or empathy and their support for conflict-related policies. Results revealed that the more morally convicted the participants were, the more their willingness to support aggressive action was related to their anger. Interestingly, this pattern also held true for empathy—in this case an emotion somewhat at odds with these participants' moral convictions. Among participants who were morally convicted, there was a stronger relationship between empathy and support for conciliatory policies toward the Palestinians. Thus, it appears that there may be more nuanced variations among high-EOC individuals in their susceptibility to the effects of emotion, beyond the differences between them and low-EOC individuals.

The Effect of the Ethos of Conflict on Processes of Emotion Regulation

Finally, it is important to examine the influence that the EOC may have on processes related to emotion regulation. No studies have been published specifically addressing the various facets of this relationship, but it is possible to hypothesize as to its nature, and there are a few initial unpublished empirical indications regarding it. First, it is possible to view the EOC as a potent motivator to experience—and therefore regulate—emotions. Rightist ideology, more generally, is associated with resistance to change, and therefore rightists may be motivated to feel anger in the face of attempts to change the status quo and therefore choose to upregulate anger in reaction to such attempts. This is especially true in the context of intractable conflict, in which the EOC functions to sustain the conflict and guides the interpretation of new information. This ideology may thus motivate people adhering to it to upregulate pride or downregulate empathy toward the outgroup, in accordance with the societal beliefs in a positive collective self-image and the outgroup's delegitimization, respectively. Initial findings from an experimental study examining ideology as a possible motivation to up- or downregulate emotions provide support for this hypothesis.

When Jewish Israelis were given a distraction-based emotion regulation strategy before viewing an empathy-eliciting presentation regarding an injured Palestinian, they either up- or downregulated empathy (compared to a control condition), depending on their ideology: rightists' empathy decreased, but leftists' empathy increased (Porat et al., in preparation). Interestingly, a similar manipulation of cognitive resources, used by Sharvit and her colleagues (2015), also decreased the negative association between guilt and rightist ideology, with findings indicating that rightist ideology is associated with decreased levels of guilt only when cognitive resources are sufficient to allow for conscious downregulation of this emotion.

EOC may also serve to influence the effectiveness of various emotion regulation strategies—both due to the motivation factor described above and because people of different ideologies have differing cognitive and epistemic needs. Therefore, cognitive change-based strategies of emotion regulation may prove more appealing and effective for people low on the EOC, as leftists in general tend to be higher on need for cognition (Sargent, 2004). An alternative, opposite hypothesis might be that because leftists are higher on the need for cognition, low-EOC individuals tend to employ strategies for cognitive change automatically (for evidence that leftists automatically "correct" their initial response, see Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002) and therefore will be largely unaffected by an intervention designed to promote the use of this strategy, compared to high-EOC individuals. One study, referenced above, has examined these possibilities, finding moderate support for the second hypothesis. When Jewish Israeli leftists read reappraisal (versus neutral) instructions before reading a text about PCIs, it had no effect on their levels of negative emotion. When their rightist counterparts underwent the same procedure, those in the reappraisal condition reported lower levels of negative emotion toward the Palestinians than those in the control condition (Halperin, Pliskin et al., 2014). Nonetheless, no other studies have tackled this question directly, and these hypotheses remain to be thoroughly examined.

Summary and Thoughts for the Future

As we have seen above, the central and potent role played by emotions in intractable conflict is growing clearer and clearer over the past few years (for a full review, see Halperin, 2014). Indeed, emotions may serve to explain the process by which the EOC—Daniel Bar-Tal's conceptualization of the specific societal beliefs that serve as the dominant ideology in societies in conflict—exerts its influence over individuals' attitudes and behaviors. But beyond understanding the importance of emotions and their study in this context, it is important to understand that emotional processes and their regulation are also a product of the specific context. Therefore, the study of emotions should not be implanted "as is" from other disciplines into political psychology, as if the emotions exist in a vacuum. When examining emotions in the context of intractable conflict, the EOC is a uniquely important feature of the context, as it is prevalent, strong, and constantly promoted by individuals and societal

institutions (see Bar-Tal, 2013). While we believe this is true in the context of any intractable conflict, this statement is all the more relevant in the Israeli-Palestinian context, within which Bar-Tal initially developed the concept of an EOC. In this chapter, we examined how the EOC shapes emotional processes in this context by influencing the extent to which individuals experience various emotions, their susceptibility to the downstream effects of these emotions, and their willingness and ability to regulate their emotional experiences.

Throughout the chapter, we examined existing findings and hypothesized as to the possible effects of the EOC wherever findings were lacking. An important next step would be to identify these and other gaps in our understanding of the influence the EOC may have on various stages in the emotional process and develop studies to bridge these gaps. Such studies should both examine how these influences may be manifested in societies involved in intractable conflict, such as Israeli society, and include innovative experimental methods to explore the causality and inner workings of these processes. Of all the issues examined above, the clearest gap exists in our understanding of how the EOC might shape emotion regulation processes in the context of intractable conflicts. Because processes of emotion regulation may provide an important key to overcoming barriers to conflict resolution, this may be the most urgent gap to fill in our empirical knowledge with regard to the EOC-emotion relationship.

Another important avenue for future examination would be to understand the other side of the reciprocal EOC-emotion relationship: namely, how repeated emotional experiences shape adherence to the EOC. A central assumption in the theory on psychological barriers to conflict resolution is that such effects occur (see Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011), but there is little empirical data to illustrate and illuminate the process by which emotions exert their influence on the EOC. One recent empirical examination (Sharvit, 2014) begins to shed light on this process. Its findings indicate that inducing anxiety and negative emotions in individuals leads to the greater automatic activation of EOC beliefs, even when such an induction is unrelated to the conflict. Furthermore, it appears that this activation occurs outside direct awareness, as the resulting distress is unrelated to explicit self-reported adherence to the EOC (Sharvit, 2014). This initial demonstration of a way in which emotional experience shapes and reinforces the EOC (see also Canetti, Elad-Strenger, Lavi, Guy, & Bar-Tal, in press) proves that while an examination of the causal influence of emotions on the EOC may be challenging and may require a complex longitudinal design, its findings and their significance would be exceptionally rewarding.

Finally, the present discussion focused on the Israeli context, Bar-Tal's native context, and one of international importance due to the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the global agenda. Accordingly, the findings brought here are mostly those collected in this context. While findings on the EOC from other societies involved in conflict exist, they are few, and even fewer have tackled its relationship with emotional processes. Therefore, it is important that future research expand our understanding of these interrelations to other societies, illuminating similarities across specific contexts, but also differences stemming from specific contextual differences.

Findings from a multitude of societies would enrich the literatures in political psychology and conflict resolution, but, more importantly, they could help guide attempts to promote effective conflict resolution, in which both general psychological processes and unique contextual differences are taken into account.

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Part V
The Role of Education

When Jewish and Zionist Identities Encounter Otherness: Educational Case Study

Ohad David

In recent decades the social sciences have shown an extensive theoretical and scientific interest in defining the reciprocal relationship between "identity" and "otherness," as well as analyzing the dynamic impact one has on the other. It appears that globalization, which creates transnational identities, and the multicultural era, which has given birth to the politics of identity and sub-nationalities, have awakened a discourse over the definition of both of these concepts (Ben-Rafael & Sternberg, 2001; Deaux, 2006). Within the science of social psychology, the theories of social identity and self-categorization have created a foundation for the understanding of cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes which lead to dividing social stimuli into groups (categories), defining the boundaries between an in-group and an out-group, and adopting behaviors consistent with the membership in the in-group (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1999; Turner, Hogg, Oaks, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). All the models analyzing the concept of identity in sociopsychological, sociological, and/or anthropological terms have recognized the crucial role of defining the boundaries between self-identity and other identities in the process of forming one's own identity as well as in intergroup processes (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Ben-Rafael, 2002; Brewer, 1991; David & Bar-Tal, 2009; Eriksen, 1995). In political science, theories of nationality have faced issues such as the boundaries of citizenship and conflicts between national identities and the identities of ethnic minorities (Brown, 2000; Yakobson & Rubinstein, 2010). And in the field of education, complex dilemmas have been debated, such as the role of the national educational system in maintaining national solidarity, teaching values, and imparting fundamental ethoses, as opposed to recognizing the cultural plurality of students (Banks, 2004; Schlesinger, 1993).

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_12

However, it would be a mistake to assume that "identity" and "otherness" are relatively new concepts or social realities; they are as old as humanity. According to the biblical story, man succeeded in building the Tower of Babel because "the whole earth was of one language and of one speech" (Genesis 11:1). The declaration that all of those present spoke one language is not limited to a linguistic characterization, but in a broader conceptual sense, it describes people who had only one system of codes, values, and behavioral norms which allowed them to coordinate their activity and build the tower. However, the moment that God confused their language so that they began speaking in different languages, they could not continue building Babel and were scattered over the face of the earth. From that time until today, the encounter between different identities is simultaneously the basis for benevolent deeds and troublesome confrontations.

In this chapter, I will propose three different paradigms through which we can interpret the connections and tensions that exist between the concepts of "identity" and "otherness." Subsequently, I will consider the implementation of this theoretical analysis in a specific context related to the intractable conflict in which Israeli society is involved. An important observation in Bar-Tal's work is that almost all intractable conflicts are identity based (Bar-Tal, 2013). There is no doubt that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is such. Both the Jews and the Palestinians perceive the conflict in terms such as sovereignty in the territory which is "our homeland" and "the cradle of our culture tradition" (Morris, 2001). Therefore, it is extremely important to analyze the role of each paradigm in encouraging or moderating the intractability of the conflict. The implementation of the theoretical analysis will be based on an educational program which was devised and put into practice in an elementary school in Israel following expressions of racism against Muslims.

Three Paradigms of Identity

Like many theoretical definitions, the meaning of "identity" in general and "national identity" in particular is dependent upon the paradigmatic glasses through which we view these concepts. Sagi (2006) proposed three different models for the analysis of the concepts of "identity" and "otherness" in three opposing ways.

The basis for the **paradigm of essentialism** is that identity is a fixed, coherent, and homogenic trait, which is not dependent upon transitory historic, cultural, and social contexts; it exists by virtue of itself—a natural "given" into which an individual is cast at birth. This paradigm factors identity as an innate essence which is formed through internal-group processes, rather than one that has been shaped by a historic and social process, in which others have a distinct role in its formation and development. This approach does not maintain, of course, that no other identities exists other than self-identity, but it does underrate the role of other identities in forming a self-identity and establishing its singularity. Essentialism emphasizes the constant striving for authenticity: only those who bear the characteristics which are identifiable as essential to defining the collective (beliefs, values, norms) can be

considered individuals who authentically embody their identity in their lives. In light of this view, cultural exchanges with other identities are seen as a threat to the authenticity and uniqueness of the self-identity, since they harbor a danger of altering its firm and homogeneous essence, as well as endangering individuals' true loyalty and commitment to their collective identity.

The paradigm of essentialism thus magnifies the self and negates the role of the other in the process of forming one's own identity. In contrast, the **paradigm of radical constructionism** deconstructs identity while at the same time magnifies otherness. It emphasizes the march of the Western world toward a global and cosmopolitan era, in which national identities will play a secondary role, if any, in defining one's concept of belonging (Habermas, 2001). Furthermore, as far as the radical constructionist is concerned, there is no such thing as a "real unique identity." Individuals and collectives invent themselves over and over again through their contact and negotiations with others (Bauman, 1995). Therefore, the "other" is the sole medium through which identity is constructed. The ideology of multiculturalism associated with postmodernism and post-colonialism, which maintains that national identity is the product of constant conflict with others, is an explicit application of this paradigm. This ideology deals with the dissolution of hegemonic national identities and the strengthening of the identity of "others" (the generic name given to minorities), which, according to this approach, have been repressed by hegemonic national collectives (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991; Chambers, 1994). For example, Yona and Shenhav (2005) maintain that "our viewpoint requires us to adopt an asymmetrical attitude toward efforts to establish collective identities—while it criticizes the practices involved in creating ethno-national identities that lead to the creation of a cultural, political and economic hegemony… it supports these practices when they are adopted by groups trying to free themselves from that hegemony" (p. 154).

The third paradigm suggested by Sagi is the **paradigm of moderate constructionism**, which maintains that identity and otherness are constituted in a reciprocal manner: the formation of an identity is a dynamic process during which a dialogue is maintained vis-à-vis other identities. The dialogue is based on recognizing a unique self-identity, and confirming the authentic existence of the core of this entity, while maintaining the possibility of transcending this identity through cultural exchanges and dialogue with other identities. The foundation, or core, of self-identity includes the primary complex of beliefs, feelings, and practices available to the individual or society, which determine their basic attitudes toward the social world. Nevertheless, the dialogical character of identity formation allows the individual or society to deviate from these primary components to encounter new contexts of meaning. In the process of dialogue, human beings decide what part of the "other" will become integrated in their own self-identity (if at all) and what part of the other's identity will be rejected. This is a process of redefining and reinterpreting one's self-identity, which distances us from what Taylor (1994) calls the "monological ideal" typical of the paradigm of essentialism and from the fragmental ideal and the lack of commitment and loyalty that is characteristic of the paradigm of radical constructionism.

Identity and Otherness in the Context of Intractable Conflict

According to Bar-Tal (2013), a society that is engulfed in an intractable conflict develops a sociopsychological infrastructure which helps it in dealing with the constant state of conflict, and this becomes the prism through which the society interprets events related to the conflict. Within this infrastructure, I wish to describe two elements which are particularly relevant to the present discussion.

The first pertains to the societal beliefs of positive self-image, de-legitimization of the enemy and victimhood, which are part of the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000). The societal beliefs related to positive self-image paint self-identity in bright and favorable colors, suggesting that those who bear this identity possess positive characteristics and that the entire collective behaves according to values which are moral and just. In contrast, the societal beliefs of de-legitimization label the enemies—meaning, of course, the "others"—with extremely negative social characteristics, describing them as the ones who act outside the boundaries of accepted norms and human values. The combination of these two societal beliefs creates a prism which maximizes the distinction between the in-group and the out-group, but also the homogeneity within each one of them. In addition, the societal belief of victimhood puts the blame for the eruption, escalation, and continuance of the conflict on the shoulders of the enemy and focuses on the atrocities done by the adversary. These three societal beliefs are internalized into the collective's self-identity and become part of its contents (Oren, Bar-Tal, & David, 2004).

The second element I wish to emphasize is collective emotional orientation: the strong feelings which have developed in individuals who have been exposed to the conflict for a long period of time, which are now shared by members of the society due to their broad exposure to a variety of social media. Most important to the present discussion are the negative emotions of fear and hatred (Bar-Tal, 2001; Halperin, 2008). Life in the shadow of extreme violence, physical destruction, and extensive killing gives rise to collective fear. It is not only the fear associated with the next violent event, but mainly a fear from the generalized "other." The fear is not directed at the enemies just because of the possibility that they could harm one physically, but rather because their beliefs negate the mere existence of the self-identity. In addition, feelings of collective hatred could arise toward the others, who are perceived as the enemy, fostering violent acts against them. It should be noted that the beliefs and negative feelings discussed here could conceivably spread to include not only the enemies themselves but any person or group who is identified in one way or another with the enemies. Negative stereotypes, prejudice, and expressions or acts of racism are the result of generalizations such as these (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Spears, Oaks, Ellemers, & Haslam, 1997).

Implications for the Educational Arena

I would like now to combine the notions derived from the two theoretical frameworks outlined above into a holistic view and to consider its educational implications. My argument will be as follows: the attitude of educators and educational

programs to the question of identity and otherness expressed through a particular paradigmatic lens might intensify the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict or moderate it. Both the paradigms of essentialism and of radical constructionism go hand in hand with the intensification of this infrastructure. The first one tends to interpret contacts with others as a possible threat to the authenticity of self-identity. "Others" are categorically "others," so that between myself and their "otherness," a distinct and clear boundary exists. The second paradigm "attributes the 'other' the exact same thing that it negates from the self-identity" (Sagi, 2006, p. 229), i.e., the legitimacy of its existence as a genuine cultural and historical phenomenon. It delegitimizes the self-identity and puts the "other" in a position of the ultimate victim.[1] In contrast, the paradigm of moderate constructionism is the only paradigm which might be applied in the educational arena toward moderating the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict, because it is the only one which legitimizes both sides of the conflict.

Identity and Otherness: Educational Case Study

In order to examine the argument above, I will now present an educational case study. This educational program was devised and implemented by teachers and students at an elementary school in Israel in response to the occurrence of incidents of racism on soccer fields in Israel. In the season of 2012–2013, two Chechen Muslims joined the Beitar Jerusalem soccer team. Hundreds of Beitar fans objected to allowing the Chechens to play on the team, claiming that only Jewish players should be allowed on the team, and certainly not Muslims, the religion identified with the Arab enemy.

The school administrators decided that they could not ignore such incidents and initiated a program based on a staged courtroom.[2] The real incidents provided background material for the trial, but some fictional details were added: the team's management gave in to the pressure asserted by the fans and fired the Muslim players under the pretense of "incompatibility with the social and cultural composition of the team" (in reality, the Chechens remained on the team). The dismissed players appealed to the court, contending their contracts had been breached because they were foreigners.

[1] For a critical review of the dichotomy between essentialism and radical constructionism, see Calhoun (1994, 2007) and Smith (2000).

[2] The program was initiated as part of the school's progress towards the "Ma'arag Award—Excellence in Jewish, Zionist and Civic Education." I wish to thank the school's principal and teachers who initiated the program for letting me use their educational materials.

The Prosecution's Arguments

The prosecution began its argument with the claim that Israel is a democratic state and therefore is obligated to maintain certain values: "The State of Israel is a democratic country. The Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty applies to honoring basic human rights; its purpose is to protect individual persons' dignity. Israeli law forbids racial discrimination. In the case at hand, the cessation of employment was due to racial discrimination. The Beitar team had employed foreign players in the past, but not Muslims; therefore the plea of the social composition of the team cannot be an argument." This argument is universal in its nature: it is based on a policy of human rights derived from the liberal-democratic Western culture of which Israel is a part.

However, these claims did not satisfy the prosecution, which turned to defend its arguments on the basis of Jewish culture itself: "The Hebrew law and Jewish tradition defend the plea that the attitude toward foreigners must be humane. The Bible warns us about our treatment toward foreigners 36 times: 'The stranger who sojourns with you shall be to you as the native among you and you shall love him as yourself; for you were strangers in the land of Egypt'." The prosecution even quoted a judgment made by the assistant chief justice, Judge Menachem Aylon, who wrote: "It appears that there is not another individual about whose treatment the Bible so repeatedly warns us such as the foreigner, if in words or in deeds…as foreigners we were in Egypt."

Later in the trial, one of the fired players is called to the stand and says: "At school I learned about everything that happened to the Jewish people, and I thought that a nation that had suffered from racism would behave according to other standards." It appears that the prosecution was calling upon the collective memory of the Jews in order to establish its argument that humane treatment of foreigners has not been derived from liberal-democratic thought alone; it is a basic tenet of Jewish identity itself. Both the prehistoric memory (of slavery in Egypt) and the more recent historic memory (discrimination in the Diaspora) form a bridge of awareness between Jewish suffering in the past and a moral beacon of behavior in the present.

The Argument for the Defense

The defense presented two types of arguments. The first was pragmatic: employing foreign players causes more harm than benefit to the team. Economic damage due to the cancellation of subscriptions by fans and moral damage that causes the team to lose games are the main pragmatic claims. But then, the defense turns to a second type of argument, which is of an ideological nature: "In the contract there is a clause which states that there is a possibility of cancelling the contract with the players when there is an incompatibility with the social-cultural mentality of the team. Indeed there appears to be an incompatibility… these players were unable to adjust to the team spirit. The team is Israeli and Jewish; it represents the State of Israel. Israel is a Jewish state: the state emblem is the seven-branched candlestick

(*Menorah*) from the Temple; the Israeli flag bears the stripes of a prayer shawl (*Tallit*); the national anthem begins with the words 'a Jewish soul still yearns'…the social and cultural fabric of the team is different."

The arguments of the defense strongly stress the need perceived by the heads of the team to prevent an encounter between the Jewish identity and other identities. The Jewish character of the team identifies with the Jewish nature of the state, and both of them are expressed in an essentialist terminology. The case presented here is that preservation of the authentic Jewish identity of the state and the team requires building walls of separation between Jews and non-Jews. The fact that the emblems of the state are taken from Jewish culture, and express the national character of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, constitutes a basis for defining all of the social relationships existing under the political roof of the state in terms of possible threat to an authentic Jewish identity.

The Court's Judgment

The Court opens its judgment in the trial with: "In the case brought before us, there **seems to be** a confrontation between the character of the state as a Jewish national state and the state as a democratic entity. It is our duty to protect the values of the State of Israel, as well as the balance between its Jewish nature and its democratic nature." This statement indicates the court's stand that the values of the state and the way it operates must represent both its nature as a Jewish national state and its nature as a democratic state, sworn to protect human rights.

However, following the opening statement, the judges maintain that in the case before them, there is no contradiction between the two value systems: "Throughout the entire history the Jewish people has experienced the tragic consequences of racism… We cannot allow racism. Jewish culture pays special attention to foreigners. Images of our slavery in Egypt as foreigners in a foreign land are imbedded in our collective memory. Slavery in Egypt gave birth to the ideas of freedom of man and ethical behavior towards foreigners and the weak among us… 'One law and one ordinance shall be for you and for the stranger who sojourns with you' (Numbers 15:16)… In the spirit of this commentary, we can say that in order for the State of Israel to be a Jewish state, it must be a humane and just state for all, including minorities and the foreigners within it."

If this is the case, the court adopts the language of the moderate constructionist paradigm, according to which there is a Jewish national, religious, and cultural identity, which has existed from ancient times until today as a unique identity. However, this does not mean that cultural exchanges with others inevitably endanger the authenticity of the Jewish identity. The opposite is true: a significant part of the positive values on which that identity is based falls in the realm of humane and equal relations toward the identities of others.

Deficiencies in the Arguments of the Prosecution and the Court

All the arguments on both sides were related to issues of Jewish identity. However, while the defense emphasized the nationalistic elements of this identity (e.g., the relationship between Jewish tradition and the emblems of the state and its character as a Jewish state), the prosecution referred mainly to cultural and moral aspects derived from traditional Jewish writings, mainly the Bible. But it could have anchored its claims also on modern Zionist writings. By doing so, it would have demonstrated that not only Jewish culture, but also the Zionist idea itself, is not congruent with the essentialist point of view.

For example, the prosecution could have cited Benjamin Ze'ev Herzl, the man who envisioned the establishment of the State of Israel. In his utopian novel "Altneuland" (*The Old New Land*) ([1902], 1997), Herzl describes an election campaign taking part in the Jewish state. The campaign centers around the conflict between the party standing for ethnocentric and racist ideas and the liberal party which supports the idea that the new society being formed in the Land of Israel must be based on social equality. The racist party uses the slogan: "Whoever is not Jewish will not be accepted to the new society." In contrast, the liberal party affirmed that "we must preserve that which has made us a great nation: freedom of thought and expression, tolerance and love of humanity. Only then will Zion really be Zion."

The prosecution could have also cited Ze'ev Jabotinsky, founder of the Revisionist party (the secular right-wing party in the Zionist movement), and its youth movement, Beitar. As mentioned above, Beitar is also the sports association to which the soccer team discussed here belongs. Therefore, it would have been of special importance to understand Jabotinsky's worldview concerning identity and otherness and to present it during the trial. Jabotinsky was a realpolitik and a liberal Zionist leader. He believed that the Arab national movement in Palestine will use military force to prevent the Zionists from achieving their national goals. Therefore, he called upon building what is known as an "Iron Wall" against it, so that it will recognize that the Jewish national movement cannot be defeated. Yet, at the same time, Jabotinsky developed a comprehensive worldview of the relationships that should exist between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in the future Jewish state. These relationships should be based on full equality: "Even after the formation of a Hebrew [=Jewish] majority [in the Land of Israel], there will always be here a large Arab population. And if this part of the population will know bad times, then all population will suffer. Therefore, the solid political, economic, and cultural condition of the Arabs will always be the basis for a healthy and solid country. Full equal rights of both nations, both languages and all religions will prevail in the Hebrew State" (Jabotinsky, 1953, p. 298).

Both examples of Herzl and Jabotinsky are expressions of identity taken from the paradigm of moderate constructionism: a national Jewish identity exists, and it receives recognition and legitimacy within an independent political entity. Social communications with others under the umbrella of the state furthers ratification of that identity on the one hand and a fruitful dialogue with other identities on the other.

Summary and Educational Implications

There is no doubt that the sociopsychological processes which create collective identities require that borders be defined between self-identity and the identity of others. Without these boundaries and without defining the singular characteristics of the in-group, the concept of identity has no meaning. The controversy discussed in this chapter relates to the nature of the boundaries and of the relationships formed between identities.

The analysis of the mock trial shows how arguments based on essentialism of identity emphasize—directly or indirectly—raising the walls of separation between Jewish identity and Muslim identity, which is in keeping with the intensification of the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict. It includes negative stereotyping, feelings of threat and fear, and beliefs which create a dichotomy between positive self-identity and negative otherness (Bar-Tal, 2013). In contrast, the arguments that were based on a moderate constructionist way of thinking emphasized—clearly or by inference—the need to lower the walls of separation between Jews and Muslims and create relationships between Jews and Muslims based on mutual respect and humanism in order to contribute to a change in the sociopsychological foundation of the conflict.

All in all, the moderate constructionist view is the only one among the three paradigms presented here which answers the challenge of identity and otherness. The other two paradigms annul one side of the equation or, at best, do not give it the place it deserves. In contrast, the paradigm of moderate constructionism maintains that identity and otherness are two sides of the same coin. Thus, the educational system has to implement pedagogical programs that will allow students to deal with questions and dilemmas which arise from the encounter between their national and cultural self-identity and other identities. This notion has great significance when we turn to conceptualize the roles of the educational system in peacebuilding processes (see, e.g., Bar-Tal, Rosen, & Nets-Zehngut, 2009; Salomon, 2002; Vered, Chap. 13). This theme is, of course, beyond the scope of this chapter. But it is worth mentioning that it is not possible to educate students to "recognize the national identity of the other" without fostering their own national identity and facilitating identification with the in-group. For this reason, the arguments in the trial which were based on moderate constructionism facilitated the cultivation of a national Jewish-Zionist identity among the students and at the same time developed their willingness to engage in a dialogue with the other. Most of the arguments which denounced prejudices and racism stemmed from Jewish and Zionist culture and history themselves. It should be noted that the analysis here dealt with relations between Jews and Muslims in which those involved were not Israeli Arabs or Palestinians. However, the conceptual analysis made here is valid in terms of all encounters between identities and certainly relative to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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Peace Education Between Theory and Practice: The Israeli Case

Soli Vered

Education has long been perceived as an essential tool in promoting social change. Alongside providing knowledge, the educational system also instills values, symbols, norms, collective memories, attitudes, perceptions, and social as well as national goals. As such, it serves as a central socialization agent by which societies construct, reinforce, and transmit their social ethos to younger generations (Dreeben, 1968; Himmelweit & Swift, 1969). Through curricula, textbooks, learning materials, teaching in the classroom, and extracurricular activities, the educational system transmits messages and narratives that have a wide-ranging impact on political, social, and cultural processes. Among these are also processes concerning war and peace (Bar-Tal, 2013; Firer & Adwan, 2004; Slater, 1995).

In recent decades, peace education became accepted throughout the world as an educational element necessary for modern democratic societies. Generally speaking, it aims to reject violence and conflict and promote a culture of peace against the culture of war (see Iram, 2006). This educational effort strives to encourage justice and equality, to foster tolerance toward the other, to eliminate prejudices and stereotypes, to impart skills in conflict resolution, and to increase tolerance and trust between rival groups (Bar-Tal, 2002; Bjerstedt, 1993; Danesh, 2006).

Peace education has many faces, and it is carried out in various ways and at different levels corresponding to society's needs, characteristics, and goals and the sociopolitical context (see Bar-Tal, 2002; Harris, 1999; Salomon, 2002). Various definitions have been suggested, seeking to encompass this broad field (see, e.g., Fountain, 1999; Reardon, 1988, 2000; Harris, 1988; Staub, 2002). However, according to Salomon and Cairns (2010), the fundamental conception of peace education relates to edupsychological processes that take place in the context of

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_13

war, threat, violence, and conflict and addresses attitudes, beliefs, skills, and behaviors in such contexts.

In societies involved in intractable conflict (see Sharvit, Chap. 1), peace education is designed to instill a new worldview in the younger generation – new attitudes, values, motivations, and skills that are consistent with principles of reconciliation and a culture of peace. These include new conceptions regarding the nature of the conflict and the nature of peace, regarding one's ingroup and the opposing party, and of the need to reconcile. The new approaches are destined to replace those thinking patterns, shared beliefs, motivations, and emotions which nurtured the conflict and which were built and reinforced for decades. Peace education thus involves a process of social change, since it must overcome a deep-rooted sociopsychological infrastructure that supports the conflict and contradicts the fundamentals of peace building (Bar-Tal, 2013; Firer, 2002; Salomon, 2002, 2011).

Noteworthy is that even societies engaged in deadly prolonged conflict cherish the value of peace, which in fact is one of the leading themes in the conflict-supporting narrative of ethos of conflict (see Oren, Chap. 8, Shaked, Chap. 9). However, peace in this regard is presented as a general, abstract, amorphous, and idyllic aspiration, a utopian dream or a heart's wish. Genuine education for peace, on the other hand, involves specific reference to certain beliefs, images, ideas, perceptions, and emotions. When it truly educates for peace, then, the school system may serve as a central instrument for communicating messages and contents that actually support ending the conflict and encourage reconciliation between the parties. Thus, peace education may contribute to nurturing young people who will become agents for positive social change as regards to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and establishing peaceful relation between the rivals (Ardizzone, 2001; Bar-Tal, Rosen, & Nets-Zehngut, 2010; Clarken, 1986; Smith, 2010).

Peace education, therefore, is perceived to be a crucial element in promoting peace building and establishing conditions required for reconciling (Aall, Helsing, & Tidwell, 2007). Indeed, there are societies and nations that have started implementing peace education programs as mechanisms for social change, even while still being involved in conflicts, indicating their strategic intention to embark on the path toward peace (see, e.g., in Northern Ireland, Duffy, 2000; Smith, 1995, 1999, and in Cyprus, Papadakis, 2008; Zembylas, 2011).

These widely accepted perceptions are also reflected in Israel's state education goals, one of which is "*educating toward the desire for peace and tolerance in relations among people and nations*" (State Education Law 1953; Amendment Act 2000). Given that peace education is marked as one of its goals, this chapter seeks to examine Israel's education policies applied in practice over the years in light of the prolonged Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflict and as related to political and social developments that took place in its course. Specifically, it intends to investigate whether and how Israel's peace education policy reflected crucial events and movement toward peace that took place since the late 1970s, as well as escalations of the conflict in recent years.

The examination of Israel's educational policies in changing contexts will relate to two models of direct and indirect peace education suggested by Bar-Tal, Rosen,

et al. (2010). Their conceptualization outlines the scope of possible themes of peace education within varying circumstances of conflict and the given political-societal and educational conditions, as will be hereinafter described.

Direct and Indirect Peace Education

In his book on sociopsychological foundations and dynamics of intractable conflicts, Bar-Tal (2013, Chapter 3) describes the context of conflict and its determinative influence on society members who take part in it. He notes that an intractable conflict is not stable but has a dynamic nature. Its context, referring to environmental as well as psychological conditions, changes over time in various directions.

In evaluating the development of peace education, four contextual levels may be considered (see also Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009). The first level refers to the overall context of the conflict and its fluctuations of low or high intensity. It includes such circumstances as the levels of violence, the status of the peace process, and the behavior of the rival which influence the beliefs of ethos of conflict and the emotions among society members. The second contextual level concerns the ruling government and political climate, which determine the levels of closedness or openness of the society, restricted or free flow of information, obstruction or legitimation of alternative views, and so forth. Obviously, the leaders' ideology, their views regarding the conflict, and their perceptions of the goals of education constitute an important backdrop to the development of peace education. A third context to be considered is the views of society members regarding the conflict and the levels of objection or support of the public for the peace process. This includes also the levels of opposition or ripeness of the society to changing the ethos of conflict and reconciling with the rival. Lastly, the fourth level of context refers to the standing of formal educational authorities in leading particular educational policies and their mobilization for the missions of the intractable conflict or, alternatively, in support of peace-building processes. This aspect is particularly important in centralized educational systems, in which the education ministry determines the contents of educational policy and its implementation.

As noted, Bar-Tal et al. (2010) present two types of peace education depending on the political-societal climate and educational conditions at the background of its development. They suggest that when the political-societal conditions are favorable to the development of peace education, and the educational system is ready both administratively and pedagogically for this major endeavor, it is possible to implement *direct peace education*. Supportive contexts are created when a peace agreement is achieved, violence has ceased, the leaders convey messages of peacemaking, and at least a majority of society members substantially support the peace process. Under these circumstances, education can relate directly and specifically to the themes of the culture of conflict that characterized the involved societies, which served as barriers to the conflict's peaceful resolution.

Direct peace education focuses, then, on changing beliefs, attitudes, values, and behaviors related to the culture of conflict. In addition, it presents themes that allow construction of a new culture based on an ethos of peace, including new collective memories and an emotional orientation of hope and trust rather than fear and hatred. Possible themes of direct peace education may include general studies of peace and conflict; reference to the particular conflict in which the society is involved, as well as to the peace process on its meanings and implications; change in the presentation of the opponent concerning legitimization, equalization, differentiation, and personalization of the rival group; reanalysis of the history of conflict and reconsideration of past acts by both parties; and more.

However, the political-societal conditions are often unfavorable to the development of peace education and do not allow challenging themes of the culture of conflict – such as the conflict's goals, its course, its cost, or the image of the rival. Indeed, when violence or hostile rhetoric of the opponent still continues, it is very hard, if not impossible, to carry out direct peace education. In such a context, the beliefs of the ethos of conflict as well as emotions of fear, distrust, and hatred are reinforced. Consequently, large segments of the society support continuation of the conflict and object to a peace process. Moreover, contents of direct peace education in these circumstances are perceived by the institutions and society members as being detrimental to the common efforts to withstand the rival.

Under these conditions, Bar-Tal et al. propose that it is possible to engage in *indirect peace education*. This type of education suggests that the scope of themes to be addressed within the school system could be limited to fostering general skills, dispositions, and values relevant to peacemaking and reconciliation. These themes contribute to the solidification of democracy and humanism in general and thus can – and should – be part of the educational line of every society that cherishes these values.

These may include, for example, dealing with questions of identity and multiculturalism, enhancing sensitivity to human rights, stressing the rejection of violence, instilling tolerance and empathy toward other ethnic groups, fostering critical thinking, and nurturing conflict resolution skills. Indirect peace education does not aim to promote profound sociopsychological change in the short term, but rather aspires to establish a new sociopsychological repertoire conducive to peacemaking indirectly. This new repertoire can focus on general themes and values of democracy and humanism that do not directly negate the contents of the ethos and collective memory of conflict. The ultimate purpose of indirect peace education is for the young generation to transfer these general insights to the context of the conflict eventually, so that in the long run they may contribute to its peaceful resolution.

In general, then, it can be expected that when a peace process is underway and has public support, the political-societal climate will allow direct peace education. Whereas when the conflict still continues, violence takes place, and the sociopsychological repertoire of the ethos of conflict is dominant among the majority of society members – only indirect peace education can be applied in the school system. The primary importance of the conceptualization of these two models is in proposing that some kind of peace education could be implemented under any

circumstances; not only in response to a peace process, but also under unfavorable conditions, and even in a state of ongoing conflict.

In order to examine how these possibilities were reflected in Israel's state education, the next part provides a general overview of Israel's educational policies applied in practice over the years of changes in the context of the conflict and in the political, societal, and educational conditions. Examination of the Israeli case may provide an answer to the question of whether, and what kind of, peace education can indeed be applied in varying circumstances in the complex reality of living with conflict. Thus, while the present chapter focuses on Israel's education policies, the results of such a review may contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities of implementing peace education – whether direct or indirect – in other societies involved in intractable conflict.

Peace Education in the Test of Reality: Israeli Chronicles

Israel's educational policies have gone through significant changes over the past decades with regard to conflict and peace (see Vered, 2015). They reflected the evolution of the Israeli-Arab/Israeli-Palestinian conflict and were influenced by its sociopsychological infrastructure that has also transformed over the years (see Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4, Oren, Chap. 8). These changes were also reflected in transformations of the national narrative presented in learning materials and textbooks used in schools. Numerous studies have examined the representation of the Israeli-Arab conflict and of Arabs in Israeli textbooks in different periods of the conflict (see, e.g., Adwan, Bar-Tal, & Wexler, 2013; Bar-Gal, 1993; Bar-Tal, 1998; David, 2012; Firer, 1985; Firer & Adwan, 2004; Podeh, 2002, Chap. 7). A thorough review of these studies is beyond the scope of the present chapter, yet the following overview relies, in part, on their findings.

High Intractability: Educating for Conflict (1948–Mid-1970s)

At the climax of the Israeli-Arab conflict, from the late 1940s until the 1970s, the political-societal conditions prevented the development of any educational line reminiscent of peace education. The life of Israelis during these decades took on all the characteristics of an intractable conflict in their high intensity. The societal beliefs of ethos of conflict prevailed in Israeli society, and the hegemonic culture of conflict was dominant (Oren, Chap. 8). This dominance was well reflected in the educational system, which was used to hand down to the younger generation the hegemonic Zionist narrative and its values. To support processes of building the newly established state, education in this period focused on creating social cohesion and provided the youth with a national identity assured of its righteousness and strength. In these contexts, the goal of the Ministry of Education was to educate students for

constant mobilization as citizens of a state surrounded by enemies seeking its destruction (see Firer, 1985; Kizel, 2008; Yogev, 2010).

Podeh (2002) points out that, in fact, the educational system at this stage did not develop any clear position at all regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict. Thus, although hatred toward Arabs was not intentionally built into the educational system, the system still conveyed militant messages and the most negative attitudes toward Arabs. This approach reinforced the ideological and cultural consensus among Israeli society regarding the conflict and the image of the Arab. In the long run, then, the absence of an educational policy concerning the "Arab question" contributed to the formation and perpetuation of hostility between the parties.

However, over time, several significant events and developments that have taken place have moderated some of the conflict's intractable features and affected the relations between Jews and Arabs in the region. These changes were followed also by transformations in the repertoire of the sociopsychological infrastructure of the Jewish society in Israel, as certain segments of the society have altered their beliefs, attitudes, and feelings regarding the conflict and its goals.

The 1967 war marked the first step toward changes in the educational policy regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict. Its results led to political, cultural, and societal changes in Israeli society, including processes of democratization and openness, growing awareness of the Arab problem, and legitimization of the existence of a Palestinian entity (Morris, 2001). The political and social developments increased awareness by the Ministry of Education of the Arab issue and stirred debate over the desirability of teaching it in the educational system (see Podeh, 2002, pp. 37–39). Later, in the mid-1970s, the ministry introduced a new curriculum for history and civic studies. The educational reform reflected the political-societal processes and decreased the focus on national goals.

Moderation: Peace Education Taking First Steps (Late 1970s–Late 1980s)

Less than a decade later, a most dramatic turning point took place in the relationship between Israel and Egypt, with the beginning of a formal peace process between the two states. In November 1977 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made his historic visit to Jerusalem, and two years later, the signing of the peace treaty officially ended over thirty years of hostility between the two parties. These formative events in the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict brought about additional changes in the sociopsychological disposition of the Jewish society in Israel. Large parts of the Israeli public shifted from delegitimization to recognition of the national rights of the Palestinians, as well as to willingness to settle the conflict peacefully (Bar-Tal, 2007; Oren, Chap. 8).

Nonetheless, these seminal political and social developments were not translated at the time into actual change in the educational policy with regard to peace. In fact, the educational system remained firmly fixated on the main themes of the hegemonic

Zionist narrative: it continued to instill a sense of threat and fear of the Arabs, while reinforcing the Zionist-Jewish identity and strengthening the society's stance against the enemy (Firer & Adwan, 2004; Pinson, Levy, Gross, & Soker, 2010; Podeh, 2002).

And yet, toward the mid-1980s, the change in context ultimately bore an educational fruit. The conflict at that stage was still ongoing but quite moderate, and the culture of conflict, particularly after the Lebanon War in 1982, had lost its absolute hegemony with parts of the public demanding peace (Oren, Chap. 8). During that period, the Ministry of Education adopted a more truthful and open approach with regard to the issue of Jewish-Arab relations, which brought some changes in teaching the historical narrative of the conflict and in representing the Arabs (Kizel, 2008; Podeh, 2002).

This new attitude was eventually translated also into guidelines laid down by the ministry, headed by Zevulun Hammer, for a new policy of educating for Jewish-Arab coexistence. The proposed program, published in early 1984, marked the first signs of peace education. It introduced new attitudes of openness and readiness to get acquainted with Arab people and Arab culture, and respect toward Arabs as human beings. In addition, it dealt with several aspects of the Israeli-Arab/Israeli-Palestinian conflict using concepts of multiculturalism, respect, tolerance, and equality. The policy was intended to reach all students from kindergarten to high school and was planned to be integrated in as many subject matters as possible. It also intended to examine all the school textbooks to eliminate expressions of hatred and negative stereotyping of Arabs, and new educational programs were supposed to be developed within three years (Ministry of Education, 1984).

However, this initiative was never implemented in this format, but was rather shifted into another direction. The new Minister of Education Yitzhak Navon, appointed in September 1984, decided to focus on education for democracy and declared the topic as the main educational subject for the two following school years (Ministry of Education, 1985). At the backdrop of this decision were manifestations of racism and intolerance among Israeli society at that time, among them the killing of Emil Grunzweig during a "Peace Now" rally in 1983 and the rise of the far-right party Kach (Podeh, 2002). Subsequently, in 1986 a new unit for education, democracy, and coexistence was established in the ministry in order to promote such issues as active citizenship and improving relations between different groups in Israeli society.

As part of the new policy and under the unit's guidance, through the mid-1980s, various measures of peace education focused on education for democracy and coexistence between Jews and Arabs within the State of Israel were carried out. These included new textbooks written for different grades, wide-scale teacher training, encounters between Jewish and Arab students, new educational programs, and activities by nongovernmental organizations in the school system aimed to advance the values of democracy and coexistence. The ministry, then, eventually turned away from dealing directly with the issue of relations with the Arab states and with the Palestinians. Nevertheless, as Podeh (2002) notes, its engagement in education for democracy and coexistence during these years contributed to deepen the discussion within the educational system on themes of direct as well as indirect peace

education. Among these were the promotion of positive attitudes toward Arabs and tolerance toward the other and toward minorities, pluralism, questions of identity, and peaceful relationships.

However, this momentum of peace education stopped when political and societal conditions changed. The outbreak of the first Palestinian uprising (Intifada) at the end of 1987 brought violent confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territories, and the educational efforts eventually disappeared from the agenda of the Ministry of Education.

Peace Process: The Educational System Mobilizes for Peace (Early 1990s–2000)

During the 1990s there were additional turning points in the peace process, including the Madrid Conference in 1991, the agreements reached between the Israelis and the Palestinians between 1993 and 1995 ("Oslo Accords"), and the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994. The new context of peacemaking required the advancement of mutual trust building and decreased hatred between the parties. The educational system, however, was not prepared at the time for this surprising peace process (see Pinson et al., 2010). Yet eventually, the ministry responded to the changing political and social situation and under Minister Amnon Rubinstein – for the first time ever – began implementing direct peace education fully.

In May 1994, a most comprehensive educational program was published, which stated that education and teaching should provide students with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that will enable them to achieve educational goals set forth in the spirit of peace. It included new topics such as the concept of peace, the history of the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab world, the Middle East peace process, and others (Ministry of Education, 1994). The new program was implemented at the district and school levels, as well as in teacher-training courses, in the ministry's work plans, and in wide-ranging activities of nongovernmental organizations in educational institutions. In addition, hundreds of new educational materials for teachers and students were published. They dealt directly and extensively with the essence of peace education, understanding of the Arabs, the history of the conflict, and the meaning of peace.

In this manner, to support political developments, the state educational system sought to establish a psychological process among students dealing with their preceding values, beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, emotions, images, and stereotypes. Its purpose was to instill in students a new worldview grounded in an ethos of peace that would facilitate different perceptions of the past along with establishing new expectations for the future – appropriate for peacemaking and for reconciliation with the former enemy.

However, these efforts did not have a chance to be sufficiently developed and become established. In fact, peace education was met with many objections and faced social, political, and educational difficulties (see Firer, 1995). Palestinian violent acts against Israelis during this period aroused fear, disappointment, and anger.

Opposition to the Oslo Accords among Israeli society eventually culminated in the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in November 1995. In this situation the implementation of extensive peace education was very difficult. The reappointment of Hammer as the new education minister in 1996 brought an end to the short mobilization of the educational system for the peace process and to the advancement of another agenda which emphasized mostly Zionist and Jewish values.

Reescalation: Leaning on a National Ethos (2000–2014)

During the first decade of the 2000s, there was a substantial withdrawal from the peace process. The failure of Camp David Summit in July 2000, followed by several violent clashes over the years such as Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2009, led to renewed strengthening of some of the intractable characteristics of the conflict. The deterioration in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also reinforced some of the societal beliefs of the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Oren, 2010; Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008; Oren, Chap. 8). Consequently, peace education as a process aimed at changing hearts and minds to promote the end of the Israeli-Arab/Israeli-Palestinian conflict has vanished completely from the ministry's policies. Instead, the desire for peace remained part of the militaristic discourse within the ethos of conflict, as a utopian goal (Pinson et al., 2010).

In recent years, parallel to reescalation of the conflict with additional violent confrontations, the state education policy seems to have taken a more narrow-nationalistic direction. The ministry, headed from 2009 to 2013 by Gideon Sa'ar from the center-right, national-liberal party of the Likud, has focused its efforts on strengthening the Jewish and Zionist identities of students and launched a series of initiatives aimed at reinforcing Israeli heritage and culture as well as militaristic values in schools (Ministry of Education, 2009). At the same time, state education seemed to renounce themes relating to humanist values and democratic citizenship and avoided dealing with sensitive social and political issues that are on the public agenda (see Aloni, Yogev, Michaeli, & Nave, 2011). In addition, various instructions and decisions made by the ministry have reflected its opposition to enabling open discussions on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which could promote tolerance, empathy, social responsibility, and freedom of expression. These include, for example, the instruction to cease using a history textbook that presents both Israeli and Palestinian narratives of the conflict, the removal of the concept of "Nakba" from the official curriculum of the Arab sector, and others.

In March 2013, Rabbi Shai Piron from the center party of Yesh Atid was appointed Minister of Education. His term in the ministry ended after less than two years, due to political disputes that ended the government's term. Like other issues that the ministry did not succeed in addressing in this short period, peace education too had no revival (see Kashti, 2014; Kashti & Skop, 2014). In general, it appears that despite statements made regarding education for shared life, the educational system remained primarily focused on reinforcing Jewish, Zionist, and militaristic values at the expense of promoting universalism and Jewish Arab coexistence.

Conclusions: Is It Possible to Apply the Theory in Practice?

The concise review of the policies applied over the years by the Israeli Ministry of Education sought to examine whether, and under what circumstances, Israel has educated its future citizens to enable a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This, in order to investigate how models of direct and indirect peace education, proposed by Bar-Tal, Rosen, et al. (2010), were reflected in Israel, being a typical case of a society involved in an intractable conflict. As mentioned, the conception of Bar-Tal et al. suggests that, theoretically, themes of some type of peace education could be appropriate in certain political and social conditions. When the conditions are favorable to the development of peace education, it is possible to implement the direct model within the school system. If the political-societal climate does not allow direct challenging of themes of the culture of conflict, Bar-Tal et al. advise that it is possible to engage in indirect peace education.

Given that it is defined by law as an educational goal, one would expect that peace education will indeed be implemented in some form as an integral part of Israel's educational policy. Yet, the most important conclusion of the above overview is that Israel never fully implemented for a continuous period any consistent framework of peace education as a process aimed at instilling in students a new worldview to advance peacemaking. Generally speaking, this could be attributed to the political instability of the Israeli democracy. Since Israel's school system is centralized and directed by the Ministry of Education, the frequent turnover of governments affects its swaying back and forth over the years.

Bringing their worldviews into office, often reflecting the ideological orientation of the ruling government, and having the power to set nationwide educational goals, education ministers have a critical impact on the direction taken by the school system. Israel's education policy is thus influenced by the frequently changing ministers, leading ever-changing educational agendas. This instability is evident in many levels and aspects of education in Israel; among them are the fluctuations that occurred over time in peace education and the absence of a constant educational line in this matter. A notable example is the extreme changes in peace education policy within a few years during the 1990s, by the end of which the achievements attained in 1994–1995 were completely gone due to shifts in power and leading ideologies.

However, characteristics of Israeli politics and the structure of the state education system are only part of the story. Indeed, as suggested by Bar-Tal et al. (2010), the changing educational trends can be traced to the broader context of the Israeli-Arab/Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the sociopsychological processes that have taken place in Israeli society over time. Thus, in order to understand the ongoing failure of the state school system to educate students for peace and, particularly, to appreciate the attempts that were made to apply peace education policies at certain times, the political-societal conditions in which these educational circumstances were formed must be considered.

The context's determinative influence on the chances of peace education being effectively initiated is particularly evident in three periods in the Israeli school system.

In the early decades, extremely negative conditions made it absolutely impossible to consider any instance of peace education. The conflict was characterized by all the features of an intractable conflict, the culture and ethos of conflict dominated Israelis' belief structures and the political-social order, and the educational system was mobilized for the missions of nation building and the intractable conflict. In stark contrast, in the mid-1980s and, especially, in 1994–1995, extraordinary favorable circumstances enabled exceptional attempts to implement peace education in the educational system. The peace processes in the late 1970s and during the 1990s, along with processes of democratization and openness and changes in public opinion, greatly facilitated the launching of direct peace education and legitimized its institutionalization in schools. Moreover, consistent with Bar-Tal et al.'s conceptualization, the changes in political-social contexts were the factors that ended peace education efforts both in the 1980s, when the conflict had escalated, and in the 1990s following strong opposition to the Oslo agreement with the Palestinians and later the collapse of the peace process.

However, these periods were quite exceptional in the history of Israeli education. In fact, it appears that even the peace agreements that were achieved with Egypt, Palestine, and Jordan only slightly influenced Israel's education policies overall. Rather, the educational line faithfully adhered over the years to the narrow-nationalistic ideology and maintained support for the hegemonic Zionist narrative of the conflict. Thus, the societal beliefs, worldviews, images, and values generally conveyed in Israel's school system reinforced the conflict-supportive narrative and contributed to the conflict's perpetuation. As noted by Pinson et al. (2010), the Ministry of Education has encouraged peace as the noblest value and the ultimate desideratum of Israeli society, yet still has been engaged most of the time primarily in imparting the ethos of conflict to students and in preparing them for conflict.

Indeed, the ongoing state of conflict, which in the last decade seems to be escalating, undoubtedly makes it very difficult for the educational system to focus on such values as peace and reconciliation that seem far out of reach. At the same time, the dominant political forces in Israel seem to have taken in recent years a more nationalistic direction, and significant parts of the public have lost confidence in the prospects of peace. The main question still remains, then, whether under such unfavorable political-societal conditions education can still prepare students for peace and reduce the fear, distrust, and alienation that they feel toward the rival.

According to the theory proposed by Bar-Tal, Rosen, et al. (2010), even in a state of active conflict, in which the sociopsychological repertoire of ethos of conflict dominates among society members, it is still possible to apply indirect peace education. They suggest coping with these challenges by educating for general values and fundamentals of democracy, assuming that the indirect way – which supposedly does not challenge the contents of the ethos of conflict – can take place even when violence is still ongoing. Had this been the case, such topics as tolerance, human rights, acceptance of the "other," and resistance to violence, as well as conflict resolution skills and education for critical thinking, could have been taught as an integral part of Israel's overall educational policy throughout the years.

Nonetheless, the Israeli case shows that even these general themes, widely valued by many societies, are often neglected in the context of violent conflict in favor of focusing education on national values. In fact, it appears that in this context, they are perceived as potentially threatening the national ethos as well as the overall climate that requires conformity and obedience to ensure full mobilization of society members. Thus, while in theory peace education in its indirect form is essentially about humanistic education, in practice its contents are loaded with politically sensitive meaning that concerns core themes of the collective narrative of conflict.

Furthermore, in a state of ongoing conflict, dealing with human rights and the moral necessity to establish justice and equality to every individual, group, or nation could have ideological and political implications. Hence, when leading political forces want to prevent the use of universalistic criteria for evaluating the conflict and the ingroup, education retreats into a closed, particularistic, and nationalistic approach. In Israel, too, the educational system tends over the years to conservatism and authoritarianism that do not leave much room for critical thought and for contents which might challenge the existing political and social order, even if indirectly.

These conclusions are particularly disturbing in light of Israel's traumatic experience of attempts at making peace, which teaches that the educational system must not wait for the "appropriate" sociopolitical conditions in order to engage in peace education. Embarking on the road of peace-building requires change of the conflict-supporting narratives with their basic goals, premises, assumptions, and aspirations. Such transformation demands change of fundamental views about the conflict, the goals of the group, the rival, the image of self, and so on. The new repertoire should include ideas about the need to resolve the conflict peacefully, personalization and legitimization of the opponent, alternative views of the conflict as being solvable, new ambitions that encourage peaceful resolution of the conflict, building trust between the parties, and eventually recognition of the need to construct a new climate that promotes peace-building. These ideas have to be adopted by society members to enhance the peace process, and education has a crucially important role in this endeavor.

Upholding an uncompromising national ethos, fostering a continual consciousness of an existential threat, and reinforcing a sense of alienation toward its rivals, Israel does not educate its future citizens for peace. This is very unfortunate, especially in light of Bar-Tal et al.'s (2010) theory which suggests that it is actually possible, even if difficult, to apply peace education even in societies still involved in conflict. If it truly desires to achieve peace, Israel must find a way to nurture among the younger generation at least the necessary moral environment for making peace with its neighbors.

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Part VI
Prospects for Change?

Containing the Duality: Leadership in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Nimrod Rosler

The movement toward the peaceful resolution of an intractable conflict is long and difficult, while advancement and deterioration are intertwined. This process is characterized by a complex political and social context creating difficult challenges for societies previously engulfed by conflict and for those who lead them. In the current chapter, the sociopsychological characteristics of peace processes and the challenges they create for those engaged in them are examined, and a conceptual frame for the role that leaders play in peace processes is delineated. Using the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as a case study, examples of how the leaders on both sides addressed these challenges in public speeches designed to mobilize group support are suggested.

The growing body of research exploring the psychological barriers that inhibit conflict resolution and ways to overcome them focuses primarily on the level of society and its members (e.g., Arrow, Mnookin, Ross, Tversky, & Wilson, 1995; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2009, 2011). Barriers to conflict resolution, according to this approach, originate from factors such as attitudes, beliefs, motivations, emotions, and ideologies that exist among society members as well as specific political and social institutions. These factors contribute to the maintenance of the conflict by freezing the existing disagreements and fueling them while blocking openness to new information. Whereas their important influence over public opinion is increasingly examined (e.g., Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat, & Bar-Tal, 2014; Maoz, Ward, Katz, & Ross, 2002; Porat, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2015), the influence of one of the most prominent social agents, political leaders, is overlooked. The achievement of peace requires that leaders engage upon a constructive political process of negotiation and creating official agreements. Yet they must also mobilize group members by

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_14

addressing the long-standing sociopsychological infrastructure of the conflict that is being challenged and preparing them for the changes that peace will bring.

The Legacy of Intractable Conflicts and Their Aftermath

The legacy of intractable conflicts that include objective characteristics such as violence, protractedness, and immense human and material investment in the conflict, as well as subjective perceptions and feelings like zero-sum nature, irresolvability, and high levels of mistrust, animosity, fear, and hatred (Bar-Tal, 2007, 2013), creates a heavy burden with which society members and their leaders must deal. Many of these characteristics, their implications, and the attitudes and emotions that society members hold during the conflict were previously studied and found to create difficult barriers to peacefully resolving these conflicts (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Oren, 2010; Halperin, 2011; Sharvit, 2014). In fact, the transition from intractable conflict to peace is a difficult, nonlinear, and easily reversible process requiring the fulfillment of conditions on several levels—political context, society, and leadership (cf. Bar-Siman-Tov, 1997; Bar-Tal, Landman, Magal, & Rosler, 2009; Zartman, 2000).

Scholars from diverse disciplines have dealt with the challenges confronting groups engaged in reconciliation processes (e.g., Hewstone et al., 2008; Kelman, 1999; Lederach, 1997; Rouhana, 2011) that are mostly post-agreement efforts aimed at restoring peaceful relations between societies that have been involved in protracted violent conflicts (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004). However, few have examined this issue within the context of peace processes (cf. Brewer, 2010; Darby & Mac Ginty, 2000), which are defined as the coming together of adversaries in dialogue in order to reach a political agreement on the issues under contention (Deutsch, 1973; Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012). This stage is crucial in the transition from an ongoing protracted conflict to peace, with successful peace processes paving the way for reconciliation and stable peace. Although leaders play a critical role in this process, very few studies have examined what part they play and/or the challenges that peace processes entail for groups long accustomed to living under conflict (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1997; Gormley-Heenan, 2007; Hermann & Gerard, 2009).

The Duality of Peace Processes

Peace processes are fragile stages in the transition from intractable conflict to peace. They are essentially dual in nature, retaining many of the characteristics of conflict even as real and perceptual processes of de-escalation begin to develop (Rosler, in press). Alongside gradual political changes stemming from negotiation and dialogue—such as midterm agreements or transitional arrangements (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1997; De Dreu, 2010; Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012)—the level of institutionalized violence begins to de-escalate. As both sides begin to invest in the peace process materially and psychologically, economic and cultural joint projects are initiated

(Fitzduff, 2002). A new perception of the conflict as being amenable to resolution by peaceful means emerges and becomes institutionalized among growing parts of society (Bar-Tal et al., 2009), who begin to acknowledge that accepting former protagonists as legitimate partners for peacemaking does not pose a threat to their own existence. Increasingly, segments of society begin to regard the sociopolitical goals imposed by the conflict as no longer sacred or total and to pursue new objectives that recognize the importance of mutual cooperation with the other side (Bar-Tal, 2013).

At the same time, spoilers on both sides set themselves in opposition to the process (Stedman, 2000), some adopting peaceful protest and persuasion, others threats, coercion, and violence. Both the deep-rooted psychological infrastructure of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007) and the still present evidence of violence (Höglund, 2008) reinforce conflict-oriented beliefs and emotions, which ensure that the conflict remains a central element of social life. The long, turbulent history of conflict makes the potential collapse of the peace process very tangible. Hence, decision-makers are likely to continue channeling resources toward maintaining security and defense, as well as preserving the psychological infrastructure of the conflict.

This duality characterizing the peace process creates difficult challenges for the society that embarks on the road of change. During the conflict society members had confronted a dichotomous context that became inherent to the identity of the group. In this context, the group's positive collective image, its goals, and their total justification are clear. On the other hand, the negative collective image of the enemies and their malicious aims, as well as the win-lose nature of the struggle, are taken for granted (Oren, Chap. 8; Shaked, Chap. 9). The psychological infrastructure of the conflict, which includes societal beliefs and emotions that support and justify the continuation of the conflict while providing meaning to the situation, helps society to cope with it (Canetti, Chap. 10). However, the peace process creates an ambiguous context, in which the clear in-group versus out-group distinctions are being undermined; the goals and motivations of the society are undergoing significant changes, and reality is becoming increasingly unpredictable. Furthermore, the supportive psychological infrastructure of the conflict is becoming less relevant and useful to coping with the new situation, and its basic premises regarding the other side, one's own group, and the nature of the conflict are being challenged. This transition process, both psychologically and politically, will intensify the resistance to change (Marcus, 2006) in the context and within society which is underway. Therefore, peace processes highlight the need for a charismatic leader capable of generating a sense of a stable and predictable social environment, ensuring security and control, and providing common understanding and justification for the new path.

Leadership Roles in Peace Processes

While political scientists frequently perceive political leaders primarily as decision- and policy-makers (Elcock, 2001; Gormley-Heenan, 2007; Kellerman, 1986), social psychologists tend to highlight their function as agents of social influence and entrepreneurs of social identity (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Hogg, 2007).

Although political leaders are required to make tough decisions on controversial issues, this is only one aspect of their role in the process of peace-building.

In addition to determining the course of action taken by their group, providing it with a rationale and epistemic basis, and shaping its identity, political leaders must be attentive to group members' needs, seek to fulfill them, and provide their followers with new coping mechanisms. Doing so legitimizes their leadership and the policies they espouse while mobilizing their group for collective action. The challenges that a leader faces in the peace process context fall into three principal categories: dealing with threats to basic psychological needs for security and control, adapting the collective identity, and creating mobilization for the process while coping with social polarization.

A leader's initial task is to respond to the pressing psychological needs for security and control engendered by the culture of conflict and by the peace process reality (Bar-Tal, 2013). These needs are directly threatened by the uncertainty inherent in the process of change (Marcus, 2006), the risks involved in breaking the circle of violence (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1997), and the actions taken by spoilers (Stedman, 2000). Because resources and power are inevitably ceded in seeking a settlement whose outcome is far from assured, stress is created among society members, and the leader is expected to help them cope.

The reality of peacemaking requires the leader to construct a new shared understanding that the detested enemy must now be recognized as a partner in the pursuit of peace and that the goals previously perceived as existential are now subject to negotiation and compromise. In a wider sense, the collective identity of the group having been largely dictated by the conflict now has to be modified (David, Chap. 12). The group's leader must therefore help the public adapt their societal beliefs, collective emotions, and values (Rosler, Cohen-Chen, & Halperin, in press).

The threat that peace poses to the conflict ideology and its identity-related components requires gaining the group's support and legitimacy for the process and tends to create a growing social polarization between members who support the process and those who oppose it based on ideological and/or material grounds. Hence, leaders must identify personally with the norms and values of the group, frame policy in accordance with these, and appeal to resonating messages that also strengthen socio-national unity and solidarity (Haslam et al., 2011; Snow & Benford, 1988).

The three principal challenges that leaders face in the peace process are derived from the characteristics of the context. Since the prominent characteristic of peace processes is duality, we can assume that the basic role of the leader in this context is to cope with the duality and lead social change toward peace. One of the most powerful tools that leaders possess in order to fulfill these demands is rhetoric—the art of persuasive speech (Aristotle, 1909; Condor, Tileagă, & Billig, 2013). In light of the above analysis of leaders and their roles, their speeches should reflect their identification with their group's values and use them to address the dual reality, cognitions, and emotions that group members encounter while motivating acceptance of the new peace-oriented ideology.

Rhetorical Containment

The duality that evolves during the peace process creates a tremendous difficulty to societies that developed institutionalized psychological mechanisms to cope with the long conflict and became habituated to it, at least on the psychological level (Bar-Tal, 2013). Thus, for example, while the conflict seems dichotomous and clear, the peace process includes risks, uncertainty, and dual reality that create resistance to change and a sense of chaos. I suggest that using their public rhetoric, leaders can assist in containing the duality of the peace process while enabling the public to accept change.

The function of *containing* was suggested in the psychoanalytic literature (cf. Bion, 1962; Segal, 1989) and refers to the capacity of comprehending feelings, conflicts, and other difficult experiences of another; helping her or him to work them through, moderate, and ease them, so they can be internalized in their new form. Therefore by containing the duality, the leader can aid the public in moderating and processing the difficulties and the pain involved in the peace process. Through their speeches, leaders can support the transition from a dichotomous perception of the conflict to acknowledging and accepting the complex character of the process. Furthermore, by constructing a set of beliefs and emotions supporting the peace process and emphasizing the commitment to peaceful conflict resolution, the leader can assist the public in adapting its collective identity and internalizing the new attitudes and emotions.

Duality and Social Challenges in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, 1993–1995

The Oslo Accords, beginning on September 1993, constituted a dramatic shift in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For the first time, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) engaged in an ongoing negotiation process that led to mutual recognition and several interim agreements. Following secret negotiations, both sides turned from an illegitimate and vicious enemy to a partner to dialogue and implementation of accords in the civil and security spheres.

A sharp duality characterized this process, especially during the years 1993–1995, when on the basis of mutual agreements the Israeli army redeployed its forces in the occupied territories, new national Palestinian institutions were created gaining control over some territory in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and security and economic cooperation started developing between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel. But at the same time, Israel kept on building in the occupied territories, and radical spoilers began to employ severe violence. Through the use mainly of suicide terrorism within Israeli cities, the radical Islamic opposition movements strived to sabotage the transfer of powers from Israel to the PA, compromise the credibility of the interim agreements, and halt the process as a whole (Kimmerling

& Migdal, 1994; Shikaki, 1999). Radical Israeli spoilers began protesting violently against the process, culminating in a deadly terrorist attack inside the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron on February 1994 and the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on November 1995.

The Oslo Accords created and intensified major challenges to the Israeli and Palestinian societies. From the Israeli side, the need for security and control was deprived following the violent actions taken by Palestinian radicals that brought an increase in Israeli fatalities compared to the years before the peace process started (Arian, 1998).[1] In addition, societal beliefs delegitimizing the PLO were undermined following the shift in the stance of the Israeli government toward the PLO (Kimmerling, 2008). The process created stress among society members due to the uncertainty and risks that were integral to negotiating with a non-state actor that was labeled as a terrorist organization by Israeli law until early 1993, as well as following the harsh dual reality of peacemaking alongside violence. The process intensely created a need for social mobilization in light of the narrow parliamentary majority that the Israeli government had and the deep polarization it created within the Israeli public and elites between the supporters of the process and those who objected it (cf. Bar-Siman-Tov, 1997; Grinberg, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 1997).

The Palestinian society had to confront during the Oslo Accords dramatic changes in their national goals and perceptions of the conflict following the interim agreements with Israel that did not accomplish an end to the occupation and contradicted their original goal of freeing Mandatory Palestine as a whole. In addition, their security needs were deprived by the continuation of violent confrontations with the Israeli army and Jewish settlers and the growing polarization between the mainstream Fatah movement and the Islamic opposition groups that escalated to violence (Kimmerling & Migdal, 1994; Said, 2000). Stress was elevated even before the process began due to the PLO's support of Iraq during the First Gulf War that brought to severe loss of economic and political resources and the sharp increase in the construction of houses in Jewish settlements in the West Bank. It was later intensified during the peace process due to the uncertainty regarding its final results, the delays in its implementation, the decrease in the standards of living of Palestinians residing in the occupied territories, and the increase by 44 % of the settlers' population between the years 1992 and 1995 (Khalidi, 2006; Kimmerling & Migdal, 1994).[2]

Hence, the leaders of both sides of the conflict had to contain the duality of the peace process and mobilize the support of their people for its continuation. Yitzhak Rabin, serving as the Israeli Prime Minister between 1992 and 1995, and Yasser Arafat, who continued during this period to serve as the PLO Chairman, addressed these challenges in their public speeches.

[1] http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables.

[2] http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/settlements-and-outposts.

Rhetorical Containment in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

The rhetorical expressions of ways through which Rabin and Arafat addressed the duality of the Oslo Accords were examined in research that I recently conducted (Rosler, 2012b). The research was based on qualitative content analysis of public speeches made by the two leaders between 1992 and 1995. The results of the study show that when both leaders sought to provide their public's needs while paving the way for the process of change, they used *rhetorical containment*—each in his own unique way.

Rabin repeatedly mentioned in his speeches the violence of the radical Palestinian Islamist groups, while condemning it and referring to the Israeli casualties as victims of the spoilers of the peace process:

> A deadly terrorist attack was carried out this morning in a bus in Ramat-Gan area… No doubt it was carried out by one of the extreme elements who wish—using deadly terrorism against innocent people—to achieve their political aim: stopping the negotiation process between us and the Palestinians. (Rabin, July 24, 1995)

In order to explain the dual life experience, he differentiated between the spoilers in both societies, who were delegitimized in his speeches as "extremists," "murderers," and "lunatics," and the supporters of the peace process. This was part of Rabin's efforts to lead a perceptual change and mobilize the Israeli society for his twofold goal in the peace process—achieving peace and conflict resolution while fighting terrorism and achieving security. Therefore, he emphasized the importance of the resilience against the violent actions and the destructive political goals of the spoilers:

> One straight line connects the lunatics and racists all over the world. One line of blood and terror is drawn from the men of the "Islamic Jihad", who shot Jewish worshippers in synagogues in Istanbul, Paris and Amsterdam, and the Jewish "Hamas" man, who shot the Ramadan worshippers.
>
> …For those who still doubt the commitment to peace of the state of Israel, I say loud and clear: Don't get it wrong—we will continue with peace-making. (Rabin, February 28, 1994)

Another rhetorical aspect of acknowledging the duality that characterized the Oslo Accords while mobilizing for its continuation was expressing ambivalence toward the process and the PLO. Rabin expressed mixed feelings of hardship and pain inherent to the process of change in the conflict while mentioning the opportunities and hope that this process opens up. However, he clearly delineated the achievement of peace as a feasible and desired goal while stressing the willingness of Israel to act on this basis:

> We cannot choose our neighbors nor our enemies, even not the cruelest of them. We have only what there is—the PLO which fought against us and against which we fought. Today we are looking with it for a path to peace. (Rabin, September 21, 1993)

To conclude, Rabin rhetorically contained the duality by referring to the complex reality which included serious violence, ambivalent feelings, and difficulties that this reality aroused. Along with that he emphasized the importance and need to continue to advance the peace process as the long-term response to difficulties and

threats, as can be seen in the quote from his speech on a Memorial Day ceremony in Jerusalem:

> We are doing these days everything possible to end wars, so no more Israeli families will have to confront the doorbell, the messengers of grief, the terrible tragedy. These are difficult days for Israel: The terrorism is increasing, today Jews and Israelis paid with their lives as well, the enemies of peace are trying to sabotage, and beyond the bloodshed and booby-trapped cars, we are trying to reach out for peace, to stop the bereavement. In spite of the difficulties, we are continuing the march for peace. (Rabin, April 13, 1994)

Yasser Arafat addressed the duality of the peace process using different rhetorical content. He presented complex—sometimes even contradicting—mobilizing messages in his speeches. His messages moved between constructing the need to continue the sacrifice and struggle against Israel and commitment to the peace process and negotiation with Israel. These complex messages can be found in one of his public speeches carried out in a Gaza rally:

> Today marks a plebiscite in favor of the National Authority, the PLO, and the peace process—the peace of the brave. On this day, we pledge to the Fatah Hawks and to those who made the great victory… in every part of the Palestinian territory, I tell you, brothers, we fought for the sake of this land, and for its sake we will fight to keep this Palestinian flag flying over this Palestinian territory. (Arafat, November 21, 1994)

Similar to Rabin, Arafat differentiated between elements within Israeli society who support the process, such as the Israeli leadership, and other elements such as the Jewish settlers and parts of the Israeli army, who are sabotaging the process and trying to maintain the occupation. However, he also expressed ambivalence toward the process and the other side, as well as skepticism toward Israeli intentions:

> While today we celebrate the signing of the first step … it is the right of our people and of everybody concerned with genuine peace to point to the measures isolating holy Jerusalem from its surroundings and preventing the Palestinians from entering it and the other sacred Islamic and Christian places. (Arafat, May 4, 1994)

In addition, Arafat addressed the duality by acknowledging the past sacrifices and courage that the Palestinian struggle took while presenting the peace process as a continuation of that patriotic commitment. He also mobilized the Palestinians to support the peace process by reframing powerful symbols from the period of the violent struggle:

> Alive and great nations make their wounds, the sacrifice of their martyrs, and their long suffering the motives for the future and the banners for building a new era based on justice under the shadow of tolerance and coexistence. (Arafat, May 4, 1994)

> Brothers, when we fought and launched the Intifada, we fought with courage and triumphed with an iron will, and when we made peace, we did so with courage. Therefore, we called this peace the peace of the brave. (Arafat, March 24, 1995)

To recap, Arafat rhetorically contained the duality by acknowledging in his speeches the distress and difficulties which were part of the peace process, as well as past grievances. Furthermore, he walked on a tightrope, committed to the peace process and the agreements which had been signed, simultaneously retaining the legitimacy of the struggle against Israel:

> From my political position, and from my position as PLO chairman, I understand that when we signed the agreement with them, we signed that agreement in the name of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people everywhere, here inside the homeland and outside the homeland. We must respect that agreement.
>
> I remind you and remind all of our people and Arab and Islamic nations that when the Prophet Muhammad, God's blessings and peace be upon him, signed the al-Hudaybiyah truce agreement, Quraysh refused to have the Prophet sign his name as "Muhammad the Prophet of God"… Umar Bin-al-Khattab called that agreement the humiliating agreement, and said: Prophet of God, how can we agree to have our religion humiliated?
>
> We signed that agreement in Oslo, and if any of you has one objection to it, I have one hundred objections. (Arafat, April 16, 1995)

Discussion

Moving a social group from conflict to peace and reconciliation is a complex process. As one of the most influential of all social agents, political leaders are expected to guide and assist their group in the process of change. While previous research in this field has largely focused on the difficulties created by intractable conflict or reconciliation (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2007, 2013; Lederach, 1997), this chapter suggests a conceptual framework within which the sociopsychological challenges that confront leaders in a peace process can be analyzed. Drawing attention to the real and perceptual duality of peace processes, leaders in this context are required to address a diminished sense of security and control, accommodate their group's collective identity, and create social mobilization for peace. I suggest that in order to fulfill these tasks, leaders use rhetorical containment that assists their society in processing the complexity and duality inherent to this context while constructing perceptual change and internalization of new attitudes and emotions supporting peace.

Interestingly, during the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the two leaders and their followers encountered a challenging dual reality. However, each one of the leaders had a different way of coping: Arafat adapted his mobilizing messages to the perceptions prevalent among his people (see Shikaki, 1999) supporting both the continuation of the peace process and of the struggle against Israel, while Rabin led with determination a perceptual change supporting peacemaking. The complex reality that each leader faced probably had a major influence over the level of success of their efforts to rhetorically contain the duality. The opposition to the process on the Palestinian side aimed most of its violent efforts to bring the process to a halt toward the Israeli side and was led by movements that did not constitute the mainstream of Palestinian society at that time. Hence Arafat was successfully able to maintain the support and legitimation he had for his leadership and his policy during that period. However, the harsh violent attacks carried against Israeli civilians, the radical spoilers, and the strong mainstream opposition groups within Israel created tougher circumstances for Rabin and resulted in his partial success in gaining public legitimacy and mobilizing for peace (cf. Grinberg, 2009).

To conclude, leading peace processes not only demands political and rhetorical ability but also depends on a triangular interaction between three factors: leaders, their constituents, and the context in which they operate. In this regard, the peace process poses challenges to the group that can be addressed by the leader. By meeting these while mobilizing for peace, a leader can influence the context toward conflict resolution. Yet any of these factors can impact the process in the opposite direction, pulling the conflict back to violence, as events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the beginning of the twenty-first century indicate.

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The Role of Peace Organizations During Peacemaking Processes: The Case of the Jewish-Israeli Society

Tamir Magal

Introduction

Long-standing intractable conflicts give rise to a prevalent system of societal beliefs which develops into a culture of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). This culture perpetuates the conflict and undermines any attempts to resolve it peacefully. Any attempt to resolve such conflicts is dependent on the ability to challenge and undermine these societal beliefs and sway significant segments of society to accept alternative beliefs which support peaceful resolution. In most cases such a process, which can be referred to as peacemaking, initially requires bottom-up mobilization through grassroots practices. Only in its later stages, when supported by a significant part of society members, will the initiative pass to national political leaders, who will institutionalize top-down mobilization.

In these initial stages, individuals and civil society organizations serve as bearers of alternative beliefs and fulfill a role as agents of mobilization. However, these organizations are often marginalized and excluded from the process in its later stages. The present chapter intends to highlight the different roles of such organizations throughout the peacemaking process. The chapter will first elaborate the conceptual framework regarding the distinct phases of peacemaking and the roles that civil society organizations play within this process. Then it will examine these roles through a case study of the emergence and development of Israeli peace organizations during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, the chapter will conclude with some general remarks as to the role of these organizations in the peacemaking process.

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_15

In his conceptual writings, Bar-Tal (2013) outlined three phases in the peacemaking process: emergence, legitimization, and institutionalization. The transition between these distinct phases depends on two distinct factors: *acceptance* and *internalization. Acceptance* refers to the willingness of political elites to acquiesce to these attempts to challenge the culture of conflict and not to oppose them. *Internalization* refers to the active support of the general population which grants legitimacy to these alternative beliefs.

Emergence refers to the initiation and endorsement of alternative beliefs regarding peacemaking, which contradict the consensual ethos of conflict. This phase is characterized by official state repression and marginal levels of public support. Legitimization occurs when these alternative beliefs and their bearers become accepted as part of the legitimate public discourse. This phase is characterized by official acquiescence to alternative activism, together with small but meaningful public support. Finally, institutionalization refers to the internalization of such alternative beliefs by elites, societal institutions, as well as societal channels of communication. This phase is characterized by active official endorsement and high levels of public support for alternative beliefs.

Peace organizations are civil society groups, which are dedicated to promoting a peaceful resolution of an intractable conflict (Magal, 2013). In each stage of the peacemaking process, peace organizations play a specific part, which may be divided into several distinct roles.

In the *emergent phase* of the peacemaking process, individuals and groups that are critical of the conflict form organizations, which seek to challenge the consensual ethos of conflict. These organizations espouse an alternative belief that peaceful resolution of the conflict is indeed possible. They may also endorse alternative beliefs which counter specific components of the ethos of conflict. These specific alternative beliefs may espouse a humane view of the enemies and their goals, may recognize their national collective rights, or may acknowledge possible wrongdoings by the in-group. Through various types of activities, these organizations strive to raise public awareness and support of these alternative beliefs.

During the *legitimization phase*, peace organizations emphasize and increase their endorsement of specific alternative beliefs. Some of these organizations specify a clearly defined vision of what a future peace should look like. Furthermore, these organizations also mobilize ever-growing public support for the general belief in a peaceful solution, as well as for specific beliefs regarding peacemaking.

During the *institutionalization phase*, when societal institutions adopt the peacemaking agenda, peace organizations become incorporated into the institutional process, and their activities become more professional and less controversial in content. New organizations are funded by members of the institutional elites, while veteran organizations begin to receive government support and funding. These organizations focus most of their efforts on internalization of alternative beliefs in public opinion through educational activities at the grassroots level.

The remainder of this chapter will examine the emergence and development of the Israeli peace movement while implementing theoretical concepts developed above. The historical presentation of the Israeli case study will be divided according

to major historical events. These events have been shown to affect both the character of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and public beliefs and attitudes toward it (Oren, 2005, Chap. 8). As will be seen, these events correspond with shifts in the character of the peacemaking process.

Emergent Phase

Pre-state/Yishuv Period

Alternative beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been part of the Israeli-Jewish discourse even before the establishment of the state of Israel. During the *Yishuv* period, two groups of intellectuals which were centered at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem—*Brit Shalom* (Hebrew: peace covenant) and *Ihud* (Hebrew: union)—expressed their opposition to the Zionist animosity toward the Arab population of Palestine. These groups espoused the establishment of a binational state, where Jews and Palestinians will enjoy equal rights (Heller, 2003; Ratsabi, 2002). However, although they were comprised of people of great renown and reputation, both groups were harshly derogated and delegitimized by the Jewish national leadership (Epstein, 2008; Hermann, 1989). Furthermore, these early attempts to challenge existing societal beliefs failed to gain significant traction within public opinion and remained the purview of a negligible group of supporters. These attempts signify the beginning of the emergent phase of peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian context, as political elites actively opposed them while public support remained negligible.

Following the 1948 War

Following the establishment of the state of Israel, alternative beliefs about the conflict were largely relegated to political parties which represented the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel. These parties were effectively excluded from political discourse within the Jewish-Israeli society (Greenstein, 2009; Lockman, 1976). In 1962, a Jewish-Palestinian group *Matzpen* (Hebrew: compass) splintered from the Israeli Communist Party (Maki). This group attempted to challenge societal beliefs regarding the conflict by expressing strong opposition to the Zionist national project, coupled with support for a binational solution. However, as it represented the excluded fringes of Israeli politics, *Matzpen* did not gain any acceptance within the Israeli society while its members were derogated as "traitors" and suffered legal repression (Greenstein, 2009).

A more mainstream attempt to challenge the ethos of conflict came from the *New Outlook* journal, founded by members of the United Workers Party (Mapam) in 1957. This journal brought together Jewish and Palestinian writers, who expressed

their support for a peaceful solution, and enjoyed modestly sized distribution both in Israel and in neighboring Arab countries. During the 1960s *New Outlook* sponsored several international conferences, which were attended by prominent Jewish and Palestinian figures (Bar-On, 1996). These conferences, although not forming a continuous dialogue, created awareness of the possibility of a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The lack of formal repression and the modest circulation that the journal enjoyed signaled the beginning of legitimization phase in the peacemaking process.

Legitimization Phase

Following the 1967 War

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the territories) in the 1967 war ushered a wave of religious and nationalistic sentiments which gave rise to the Greater Israel movement. Following the war, an overwhelming majority (approx. 90 %) of the Jewish population believed that the Arabs did not desire peace with Israel and supported the idea of Greater Israel (Oren, 2005, Chap. 8). The *Peace and Security Movement* (PSM) was established in May 1968 to counterbalance these sentiments. PSM began as a petitioning campaign, initiated by a group of academics and signed by over 300 prominent figures from Israeli academia, arts, and science. This petition called upon the Israeli government to express its willingness to relinquish the territories in exchange for peace. The group also endorsed negotiations with Palestinian representatives and expressed willingness to resolve the issue of Palestinian refugees (Epstein, 2008). Following this successful initial mobilization, the PSM consolidated and attempted to mobilize public support for a peaceful solution through house meetings, newspaper ads, and rallies. Some of its leaders formed a political party "Peace List," which ran in Israel's general parliamentary elections in October 1969 but received only 5100 votes (Bar-On, 1996). Although not subjected to formal repression, PSM did suffer derogation in the public discourse (Hermann, 1989).

Concurrently in 1969, the *New Israeli Left* organization—*Siah* (Hebrew: dialogue)—was founded by radical students from Tel Aviv and Jerusalem universities who were previously active in Mapam and Maki (Kaminer, 1996). It filled a niche between the anti-Zionist *Matzpen* and the more mainstream approach of PSM. *Siah* espoused "recognizing the right of the Palestinian people for self determination in Eretz Israel, and a just solution for the problem of Palestinian refugees" (Siah, 1969). *Siah* attempted to mobilize public support through grassroots activities at university campuses and in high schools and included at its height several hundred participants. *Siah* also sought to expand its constituency by participating in protest activities organized by other radical groups such as *Matzpen* and the Israeli *Black Panthers* (Portugez, 2013).

Both *Siah* and PSM represent attempts to mobilize public support for the possibility of peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, combined with initial steps to raise awareness and recognition for alternative beliefs about the enemy. These two organizations initiated grassroots mobilization activities and enjoyed modest public support, while their activities were tolerated by state authorities. However—due to its identification with the Israeli mainstream and its attempt to integrate into the institutionalized political system—PSM fulfilled a more meaningful role in initiating the legitimization process of the idea of peaceful solution to the conflict.

Following the 1973 War

The 1973 war represents a landmark for alternative beliefs in peaceful compromise within the Israeli society. The war disrupted the Israeli climate of euphoria and superiority and left a sense of insecurity and unease in the general public. Following the war, an overwhelming majority of the Jewish population still mistrusted the Palestinians and Arabs (90 %). However, support for the idea of Greater Israel decreased significantly (55–60 %) (Oren, 2005, Chap. 8). Increased political contention during this period created new opportunities for peace-oriented activism (Bar-On, 1996). One such initiative was the *Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace* (ICIPP), which was founded in 1975 by a group of 100 well-known Israeli figures. Among them were a former army general, a former director general of the finance ministry, and a former member of the Israeli parliament (Dekar, 1985; Hall-Cathala, 1990). ICIPP was the first to outline concrete principles for peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including recognition of the PLO, a Palestinian state alongside Israel, and the sharing of Jerusalem (Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, 1976). The Council attempted to mobilize public support for its plan through lectures and conferences and initiated informal dialogue between prominent Israeli and Palestinian representatives (Yesod, 2004). Its activities contributed to the creation of alternative beliefs regarding the enemy and an alternative vision of peace. Concurrently, a religious peace organization named *Oz VeShalom* (Hebrew: strength and peace) was founded in 1975 by a group of moderate religious leaders who wanted to counter the influence of the Greater Israel movement among the religious Jewish public. It used rabbinical arguments to justify interreligious tolerance and peaceful relations (Hall-Cathala, 1990; Landau, 2003). *Oz VeShalom* expanded the constituency which was susceptible to the idea of peaceful solution. Both these organizations enjoyed modest public support. However, they were allowed to act freely, with no formal restrictions or attempts of political repression.

Peace Now (PN), the biggest and well-known Israeli peace organization, was established in 1978, following the political turnover in 1977 and the historical visit of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to Israel. Initially focused on the Israeli-Egyptian peace process, from the mid-1980s, PN focused exclusively on the Israeli-Palestinian

issue (Bar-On, 1996; Hermann, 2009). Through house meetings, conferences, and rallies, PN mobilized large-scale public support for peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on a vague "territorial compromise." Furthermore, members of parliament from the Ratz and Labor parties actively participated in some of these activities (Reshef, 1996). This public mobilization served to legitimize the idea of a peaceful solution. PN also initiated large-scale meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, which served to break down stereotypes and rehumanize the enemy (Bar-On, 1996). The significant success of PN in mobilizing public support, as well as its acceptance and endorsement by political elites, ushered a new phase in the peacemaking process.

Institutionalization Phase

The First Palestinian Intifada

A major turning point in the evolution of the Israeli peace movement came with the outbreak of the first Palestinian intifada in December 1987. Even before the intifada, political elites began to internalize the idea of peaceful resolution.[1] However, the intifada dashed the illusion of enlightened occupation and emphasized the dilemma between the ideal of Greater Israel and the need for personal security in the public's consciousness. This dilemma convinced significant segments of the Jewish public to support a peaceful resolution of the conflict (Svirsky, 1996). Following the outbreak of the intifada, support for territorial compromise among the Jewish population steadily increased, while the public became evenly divided in its opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state (Oren, 2005, Chap. 8). During this period numerous new peace organizations emerged, some of which represented specific constituencies and focused on specific types of activity. These included rabbis, doctors, psychologists, women, and generals.

The *Council for Peace and Security* (CPS) was established in 1988 by a group of retired military generals and senior public officials. Through flyers, newspaper ads, and public lectures, the Council espoused a peaceful solution based on territorial compromise. Their influence relied mainly upon their personal prestige and reputation, as former members of the institutional elites (Bar-On, 1996; Hermann, 2009). The council signified the acceptance and internalization of the idea of peaceful solution within the political establishment.

Another important sector within the Israeli peace movement included the women-only peace organizations. These organizations first appeared in the early 1980s, during the height of public protest against Israel's war in Lebanon (Gilath, 1991; Zukerman-Bareli & Benski, 1989). However, during the Palestinian intifada additional women's peace organizations were founded, which collated into two

[1] This process is exemplified by the Peres-Hussein negotiations and the London accords (Bar-On, 1996).

loosely knit coalitions—*Women's Peace Network* and the *Women and Peace Coalition* (WPC) (Deutsch, 1994). These organizations endorsed a two-state solution and mobilized women through grassroots activities. Among their most significant activities were weekly *Women in Black* vigils, routine house meetings of ordinary Israelis with Palestinians, as well as ongoing dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian feminist leaders (Deutsch, 1994; Sharoni, 1995; Svirsky, 1996). The annual conferences of WPC brought together several thousand participants each year. These activities expanded the constituency and outreach of the peace movement, as well as contributed to the growing rehumanization of the enemy.

The Oslo Peace Process

The Labor party's victory in the 1992 general elections, after 15 years of nationalist rule, signified the public's willingness to entertain the idea of a peaceful settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, only a significant minority actively supported a territorial compromise (40 %), or the establishment of a Palestinian state (35 %) (Arian, 1995). In September 1993 the Israeli government and the PLO signed the Oslo declaration. As Rabin's government progressed with the Oslo peace process, peace organizations were relegated to promoting alternative beliefs at the grassroots level (Hermann, 2009). Some of the more confrontational organizations ceased their activities, while others turned to grassroots educational activity. Peace activists from various women groups came together to establish *Bat Shalom* (Hebrew: daughter of peace), which focused on joint seminars and dialogue activity between ordinary Israeli and Palestinian women (Kershenovich, 2000; Sharoni, 2000). *PN* invested most of its efforts in youth education through its youth movement, while other organizations initiated ongoing dialogue groups.

In contrast, some of the more radical activists in the Israeli peace movement, who were critical of the Oslo accords, founded *Gush Shalom* (Hebrew: peace bloc). This organization raised public awareness regarding core issues of the conflict which were not addressed in the Oslo accords, such as Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem (Magal, 2013). Following the Oslo accords only a marginal minority of the Jewish public was willing to acknowledge these issues (12 % and 15 %, respectively) (Arian, 1995). In the late 1990s, as the official peace process became moribund, other organizations joined *Gush Shalom* in raising alternative beliefs regarding core issues of the conflict. The most notable was *Bat Shalom*, which organized a series of activities to raise public awareness regarding such issues as the sharing of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees (Cockburn, 1998; Sharoni, 2000). These organizations broke the taboo over core issues, promoted alternative beliefs, and initiated public debate around these issues, which later enabled their discussion in formal negotiations. By the time of the Camp David summit in July 2000, a significant minority among the Jewish population (30 %) was ready to discuss these core issues as part of the formal negotiations (Arian, 2002).

Rollback: The Reemergence of the Ethos of Conflict

The Second Palestinian Intifada

The failure of the Camp David summit and the outbreak of the second intifada in October 2000 substantially affected the Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking process. Following the outbreak of violence, Israeli leadership placed the blame on the insincerity of the Palestinian leadership and resumed delegitimization of the Palestinians as terrorists and murderers (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008). This trend was further enhanced by the escalation of violence and the beginning of the suicide bombing campaign in 2001. As the intifada escalated, Israeli public's support for a peaceful solution to the conflict dropped (from 50 to 40 %), while suspicion and mistrust toward the Palestinians rapidly increased (from 50 to 60 %) (Arian, 2002; Oren, Chap. 8).

The outbreak of the intifada disrupted the activities of the numerous dialogue groups which were active during the Oslo period and ended official funding for grassroots organizations. As a result, many peace organizations ceased their activity, while those that remained active adopted other roles and tactics. Therefore, it may be concluded that the peacemaking process suffered a significant rollback following the outbreak of the intifada.

However, even at the height of the intifada, some peace organizations maintained their activities and continued to espouse alternative beliefs regarding rehumanization of the enemy and willingness for a peaceful compromise. Newly formed mainstream initiatives, such as *The National Census* and *The Geneva Initiative*, sought to challenge the widespread notion of "no partner." These initiatives presented alternative principles for peace, formulated in track-II negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, and sought to rally public support for these alternative ideas. Mainstream organizations, such as *PN* and *CPS*, sought to arrest the tide of declining public support through more traditional means such as rallies and educational activities.

Radical peace organizations took a different approach. Veteran organizations (such as *Gush Shalom, Rabbis for Human Rights*, and *the Coalition Against House Demolitions*) as well as newly funded ones (e.g., *Ta'ayush, Women's Coalition for Peace and Justice,* and *Anarchists Against the Wall*) engaged in acts of civil resistance—such as clearing road blocks, rebuilding demolished houses, and supplying food to besieged Palestinian communities. These activities emphasized the existence of an alternative voice within the Jewish community and signaled comradeship and solidarity with their Palestinian counterparts.

Other organizations challenged societal beliefs regarding the justness and morality of the Israeli point of view. Newly funded organizations, such as *Machsom Watch* (Hebrew: checkpoint watch) and *Shovrim Shtika* (Hebrew: breaking the silence), dedicated their activity to raising public awareness regarding misconduct and wrongdoings of the Israeli authorities (Katriel & Shavit, 2011; Kaufman, 2008; Naaman, 2006). Another organization, *Zochrot* (Hebrew: remembering),

dedicated its activities to raising awareness of the Palestinian Nakba and educating the Jewish public regarding past atrocities of the Israeli side (Aviv, 2011; Bronstein, 2005; Lentin, 2007).

Such tactics led to growing alienation between radical peace organizations and the majority of the Jewish-Israeli public, as they were considered by many as unpatriotic and even traitorous acts. These organizations were often derogated in popular discourse. However, their activities were not inhibited, and no official repression was enacted during this period.

The Gaza Disengagement

The idea of unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was first proposed by the leader of the Labor party, Amram Mitzna, during his 2003 general elections campaign (Eldar, 2002). This idea was later adopted by Likud's leader, PM Ariel Sharon, in his speech at the Herzliya conference in December 2003 (Sharon, 2003). The disengagement plan was formally approved by the Israeli government in June 2004 and won the Knesset's approval in October of that year. The death of the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in November 2004 created new opportunities for a mutually agreed-upon withdrawal, which were rejected by PM Sharon (Bakhur-Nir, 2004; Bar-Siman-Tov & Michael, 2007). During the period leading up to the execution of the disengagement plan, support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict among Israeli Jews increased (from 32 to 40 %), while a majority of the Israeli public supported unilateral disengagement (53 %) (Truman-Institute, 2005).

Consequentially, despite its unilateral character, the disengagement plan was favorably accepted by Israeli peace organizations, which perceived it as "a step in the right direction" (Shefer, 2004). Most notably, mainstream organizations such as *PN* and *The Geneva Initiative* organized a popular mobilization campaign of support for the plan. Such mobilization was intended to counterbalance the mobilization and resistance raised against it by the *Greater Israel* movement. Other peace organizations, although more critical of the disengagement plan, also took part in this campaign which proved to be the last great mobilization effort of the Israeli peace camp.

Following the Disengagement

Although the second Palestinian intifada ended following Israel's disengagement from Gaza, the societal peacemaking process did not resume. The Jewish public support for the idea of a peaceful solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained steady (55–60 %). However, expectations that such a solution will materialize decreased steadily between 2005 (40 %) and 2012 (30 %), and the public's

willingness to support territorial compromise also declined (from 48 to 30 %). This decline is largely due to a lack of trust in the sincerity of Palestinian intentions and disbelief regarding their commitment to a peaceful solution (Ben-Meir & Bagno-Moldavsky, 2013).

However, some of the blame for this deterioration may also be placed on the Israeli peace organizations. The majority of organizations which remained active during this period focused their activities on solidarity and support for the struggle of the local Palestinian population (Aggestam & Strömbom, 2013). Some of these organizations assisted and supported calls for boycott and divestment on Israeli products, institutions, and individuals. Such activities alienated these organizations from the Israeli public and adversely affected the perception of their legitimacy in the public's eye (Peled, 2010; Steinberg, 2009). Even those organizations which targeted the Israeli constituency in their activity focused exclusively on raising awareness through educational activities and did not attempt to mobilize the public to actively support peaceful conflict resolution. Therefore, even when formal negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian representatives where taking place, no significant public mobilization campaigns were undertaken to support these negotiations (Aggestam & Strömbom, 2013).

Furthermore, besides their lack of appeal to the general public, Israeli peace organizations were systematically derogated and delegitimized in a campaign orchestrated by right-wing political leaders and civil society organizations (Golan, 2014; Peled, 2010, 2012). In some respects, even though the activities of Israeli peace organizations are still tolerated and their activists are not being arrested and harassed by state officials, their current state of legitimacy and influence may be equated with *Siah* and *Matzpen* in the late 1960s. However, when examining the composition of societal beliefs, one finds higher support for some alternative beliefs regarding the conflict and higher general support for peaceful conflict resolution, compared with similar beliefs during the 1980s. More specifically, support significantly increased for the evacuation of settlements (30 % in 1990, compared with 49 % in 2012), as well as for the sharing of Jerusalem (9 % in 1995, compared with 37 % in 2012). However, support for the issue of Palestinian refugees has significantly decreased since 2000, returning to its level in the 1980s (10–15 %) (Ben-Meir & Bagno-Moldavsky, 2013; see also Oren, Chap. 8). Therefore, it may be concluded that, although Israeli peace organizations have been significantly delegitimized, some of the ideas and beliefs they have been propagating still enjoy substantial support within the Israeli public.

Conclusion

The case of the Israeli peace movement enables us to draw several conclusions regarding the role of civil society organizations within the framework of peacemaking process.

Peace organizations were found to play a significant role in raising public awareness and legitimizing alternative beliefs regarding the possibility of peaceful resolution to the conflict, as well as mobilizing support for specific alternative beliefs which challenge the ethos of conflict. In this regard, these organizations affect the climate of public opinion, which enables the progress and sequencing of the peacemaking process. However, as other factors also affect the climate of opinion, it is difficult to assess the direct effect of the activities of these organizations on changes in public opinion.

In each phase of the peacemaking process, peace organizations fulfilled specific roles. Some of these roles were bounded to a specific phase, while other roles extended and overlapped into different phases of the process. Most of the organizations examined performed a specific role and ceased their activity when that role became obsolete. Only a handful of organizations were able to adapt their activities to the needed changes in roles.

By mobilizing public participation through their activities, peace organizations gained legitimacy for their cause, as well as legitimated their own existence and activities. However, these organizations could not overcome dramatic changes in the political context and could not maintain public support and legitimacy for the peacemaking process against the backdrop of a recurring cycle of violence. Furthermore, as peace organizations devoted most of their activities to bridging the divide between the warring communities, they became detached from their own constituency and lost their ability to garner legitimacy and support for their alternative beliefs. However, as the Israeli case might indicate, legitimacy and support for these alternative beliefs may not always be so strongly linked to the legitimacy of the organizations themselves.

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The Road to Peace: The Potential of Structured Encounters Between Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Promoting Peace

Ifat Maoz and Yiftach Ron

Introduction

Intractable ethnopolitical conflicts, such as the long-running dispute between Israelis and Palestinians, are often protracted, deeply set conflicts involving intense hostility and repeated violence. These conflicts significantly influence the emotions, thought processes, worldviews, and ethos of those involved in them (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2013; Bar-Tal, Rosen, & Nets-Zehngut, 2009; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011).

Contesting narratives play a crucial role in intractable conflicts, with each side adopting a narrative that justifies its own claims, demands, and position while delegitimizing those of the other side (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2011; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006). Selective and limited exposure to the narrative of one's own side in the conflict can heighten intergroup dispute and misunderstanding as well as strengthen the tendency to exclude out-groups from the realm of moral responsibility (Bar-Tal, 2007a; Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006; Salomon, 2004).

This chapter presents an overview of an extensive research program investigating the processes that take place in structured intergroup encounters through interviews with Israeli Jews who have been repeatedly involved in such encounters (Bekerman, Maoz, & Sheftel, 2006; Maoz, Bekerman, & Sheftel, 2007; Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron, Maoz, & Bekerman, 2010). Its goal is to discuss the extent to which the

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_16

exposure to the narrative of the other through the encounter process can transform deeply set beliefs and values that have been identified by Bar-Tal (2007a, 2010, 2013) as central to the societal ethos that preserves and perpetuates situations of intractable conflicts.

Narratives in Intractable Conflict

While intergroup conflicts are often rooted in competition over material resources and political or territorial control, they are often made salient through the construction of stories that motivate intergroup antagonism (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006; Hammack, 2008, 2009; Kriesberg, 1998; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Paez & Liu, Chap. 5, volume 1 of this series). Group narratives are limited by nature both in terms of the extent to which they are able to represent others and their otherness and in terms of the quality of those representations (Bar-On & Adwan, 2006; Bar-Tal, 2007a). Especially in intractable ethnopolitical conflict, the opposing narratives of both sides are characterized by the absolute justification and idealization of the national self and the cultivation of its victimized collective identity alongside the exclusion and the devaluation of the "enemy" and their narrative (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2010; Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai et al., 2009; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012).

As a conflict between rival nationalist movements, the conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinians is framed in largely narrative terms (Rotberg, 2006). Substantive research led by Daniel Bar-Tal has identified the role played by the ethos of conflict, collective memory, and ethnocentric narratives of Israelis and Palestinians in shaping national identities that negate one another and construct the psychological reality of the conflict as a "zero-sum game" (Bar-Tal, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2007a, 2010, 2013; Bar-Tal, Rosen et al., 2009; Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, & Zafran, 2012).

Conflict-supporting narratives play a major role in the eruption and the persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the societies involved investing efforts as well as material and cultural resources to form, legitimize, and maintain the dominance of these narratives (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2007b, 2010, 2013). Clusters of "societal beliefs" about security, identity, and history that construct coherent narratives are told and retold by Israeli Jews and Palestinians that inherently delegitimize the counter-narrative (Bar-Tal, 2007a; 2010; 2011; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Nahhas, Chap. 5; Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4; Oren, Chap. 8; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; Shaked, Chap. 9; Srour, Mana, & Sagy, Chap. 6).

It is these attitudes and beliefs regarding the causes and nature of the conflict, as well as perceptions regarding the opponent and the desired solution to the conflict, that reconciliation-aimed intergroup encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinians aim to address (Maoz, 2011; Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron et al., 2010).

Intergroup Encounters and Exposure to the Narrative of the Other

While much of the earlier research on intergroup contact has centered around its outcomes and effects (Tropp, Chap. 12, volume 1 of this series), recent scholarly work increasingly focuses on the communicative, cognitive, and emotional processes that evolve within the contact situation (Maoz, 2011). Stephan (2008), for instance, has stressed the importance of cognitive and affective intergroup processes, such as the reduction of threat and empathizing with the other's suffering. This may also include cognitive moves, such as taking the out-group's perspective (Chambers, Baron, & Inman, 2006). Salomon (2004) claims that *the* collective narratives of groups in conflict *and* their implied delegitimization of the out-group's narrative should be the main target for change when promoting intergroup reconciliation. Maoz (2000, 2004, 2005, 2011), in an extensive longitudinal research program, focuses on power relations and dynamics of domination and control in Jewish-Arab encounters aimed at reconciliation. This research points to the importance of enabling the minority group to present its agenda and claims in a majority-minority intergroup interaction in conflict (Maoz, 2000, 2011). Bar-Tal (2002, 2004, 2010, 2013; Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009; Bar-Tal, Rosen et al., 2009b) importantly conceptualizes the main goal of education for peace as educating towards recognition of the perspectives, goals, needs, and narratives of the other side in conflict.

Against this backdrop, intergroup encounters aimed at Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation have increasingly come to focus on the narrative or storytelling approach (Bar-On, 2009; Bar-On & Kassem, 2004; Maoz, 2011; Maoz & Bar-On, 2002). However, very little empirical attention has been devoted to the impact that the exposure to the narrative of the other in conflict has on the ethos, beliefs, emotions, and views of those involved in dialogue encounters.

Can exposure to the narrative of the other through the intergroup encounter transform deeply set beliefs and values that have been identified by Bar-Tal (2007a, 2010, 2013) as central to the societal ethos of intractable conflicts? In the next section, we present an overview of findings from our research program that address this question.

Exposure to the Narrative of the Other and Transformation of Beliefs in Intractable Conflict

Overview

Our analysis relates to a unique and extensive set of data, which includes in-depth interviews with Israeli Jews who have been continuously involved in Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation-aimed intergroup encounters over a considerable period

of time (for a more complete and detailed description of this research program and its products, see Bekerman et al., 2006; Maoz et al., 2007; Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron et al., 2010). The findings presented here are based on an analytical inductive process informed by the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This analytical process revealed that first and most significantly, in line with Bar-Tal's (2002, 2004, 2010, 2013; Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009; Bar-Tal et al., 2009) seminal writings on the goals and mechanisms of peace education, facing the narrative of the other is indeed experienced as a transformative experience that has the potential to change deeply set beliefs related to the ethos of conflict. Encountering the narrative of the Palestinian other is described by most of the Jewish dialogue participants as a meaningful, dramatic, and transformative experience that seriously undermines their previously held narrative, ethos, and worldview (Ron & Maoz, 2013a; Ron et al., 2010). The dramatic response to encountering the narrative of the other is not surprising, given the extent to which individuals who belong to opposing parties in conflict tend to be monolithically invested in the ethos, beliefs, and narratives that justify their own side (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2010; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006).

Second, more specifically, and also consistent with prominent conceptualizations by Daniel Bar-Tal (1998, 2000, 2002, 2011; Bar-Tal, Rosen et al., 2009), our findings point to the particular psychological, cognitive, and emotional changes brought by the continued exposure to the narrative of the other in conflict. These involve increased awareness of the Palestinian perspective in the conflict and of Palestinian pain and suffering (Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b). These interrelated themes are exemplified by the following closer analysis of relevant quotes from our interview data (see also Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron et al., 2010 for a more detailed and complete description of the findings of this research program).

Findings: Accounts of Transformation—Excerpts from the Interview Data

A close analysis of our interview data revealed accounts of dramatic transformation in the perceptions, feelings, and worldviews of Israeli Jews who have been involved in extended encounters with Palestinians, following their repeated exposure to the perspectives and experiences of their Palestinian counterparts (Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron et al., 2010).

Yair,[1] a Jewish-Israeli male, described his experience of exposure to the Palestinian narrative during a dialogue encounter in the following way:

> I can tell you that it was a very meaningful experience… It hadn't happened to me before, certainly no Arab had ever told me—you are responsible for this and that. It's really powerful. It questions whether my own story, my national story, is correct and right. And not only is it not, but I'm a party to something that causes pain and suffering… oppression, discrimi-

[1] All names have been changed.

> nation. Speaking about how I could support certain things, morally, democratically, humanely… Things that hold it up to your face that you are responsible for violating basic rights.

Exposure to the Palestinian narrative is portrayed by Yair as forcing him to question his own "national story." The experience, which confronts Yair with the pain, frustration, and sense of oppression and discrimination among his Palestinian interlocutors, undermines his own narrative about how humane, moral, and enlightened he is (Ron & Maoz, 2013a).

Yoav, another Jewish-Israeli male who also went through a similar process of Jewish-Arab dialogue, described his reaction to the encounter with Palestinians and their narrative:

> Finally my eyes were opened and I understood what the hell was going on… I'd go home and I'd be totally wiped out. So emotionally charged and so sad or pained or I don't know what. I went through a very difficult period. But fascinating. Fascinating because I dealt with things that I'd never dealt with before, and they opened my eyes and broadened my horizons… It was the first time I could really hear about other people's suffering in the first person… It was the first time I realized where I live, in terms of the state, Zionism, all sorts of concepts that I'd been fine with until then… And that's where it hit me. It hit me and left its mark, that there are questions and a story I haven't been told. Let's say, they concealed it from me. I wasn't smart enough or sophisticated enough or involved enough to find it out on my own. It took me quite a long time. And it's not a simple story, it's really complicated, and it's to do with me too, with my nation, my tradition, my history.

The following excerpt from the interview with Naama more specifically describes the process through which the exposure to the Palestinians' narrative and point of view elicited a new understanding in her as a Jewish Israeli:

> It's like the other has got a face, and that what I know to tell about history, they tell something else, and to suddenly see things through their eyes. And it's like the very fact that you can look at what happened differently, it was really dramatic. And their description of life in the Occupied Territories, like, their everyday life, how they live, what happens to them there. All sorts of bits of information that as a Jew, you know, who lives in Israel and watches the news on TV, you've got no idea what's going on.

Naama describes the face that the Palestinian other is given during the dialogue encounter and the opportunity to "see things through their eyes" while implying that the dialogue has brought her to understand that her knowledge and perspective on the conflict—as an Israeli Jew—have been only partial and selective ("what I know to tell about history"). It thus seems that encountering the narrative of the Palestinian other inevitably and powerfully forces the Jewish dialogue participants to confront the incompleteness and selectiveness of their own in-group narrative regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000, 2007a; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006).

Several of the participants note that the encounter with Palestinians and the exposure to their narrative had substantially changed their perspective on their own society—the Jewish-Israeli society.

Sharon described her experience as follows:

> I feel, I see, that Israel is in a very dark place. It's really sad, I mean, a kind of victimhood… I think that most people in Israel don't understand that there's an occupation… They don't

> understand what it means, and they don't want to know. They only see how miserable they are, we are… We've got racism here which is based on seeing us as good and them as bad and that's why we're allowed to be racist. It's terribly frightening, and sad.

Sharon portrays Israel as a society living in denial and with a sense of perpetual victimization (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007a; Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai et al., 2009; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Halperin, Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Raviv, & Rosler, 2010). This description conveys Sharon's criticism of her own society.

In a similar vein, many of the interviewees spoke of how the encounter with Palestinians and their narrative of the conflict brought about dilemmas and even a sense of alienation regarding significant aspects of their identity as Israelis (Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron et al., 2010). Naama explained how her identity as an Israeli was unsettled by the encounter with Palestinians and their perspectives, how the dialogue with the story of the other caused her to feel detached from the ethos and symbols of Israeli identity, and how hard it was for her to take the experience back to her family and friends:

> There was something about my identity as an Israeli that was really, really, really unsettled by the encounter, so much so that I left with a really difficult experience of feeling alienated from my identity… Alienation from parts of my identity of Israeliness, from symbols, the flag, the national anthem, all sorts of ethos. And a very difficult feeling. It was really hard to go back to my friends, my family, like, how to convey what I'd been through… It clashes with returning to reality, to the family, like, things that it arouses in other people.

This sense of conflict and alienation and the criticism expressed by many of the encounter participants were not only directed at the state and its symbols or at Israeli society in general. The criticism that followed their encounter with the other was also directed at who they, the participants, had been before the encounter—their previous narrative and state of awareness and the way they had been raised and educated (Ron & Maoz, 2013a; Ron et al., 2010). For instance, Yoav attacked the "Zionist bubble" in which he had been raised and socialized:

> I lived in a bubble; totally, I didn't know what was happening in East Jerusalem. I wasn't very interested either. Even when I joined the army, what did I understand? What did I know? Nothing. I was completely living in a bubble. Really. A Zionist bubble… I grew up in a very conformist family. Very mainstream. I mean, what the state says is sacrosanct. Zionism was the best thing ever to happen, no questions asked. I grew up in the bosom of Zionism… And I didn't ask too many questions.

Yoav describes the social and ideological environment in which he grew up as a "Zionist bubble" characterized by conformism, a lack of critical awareness, ethnocentricity, blindness, and indifference to the circumstances of the lives of Palestinians ("I didn't know what was happening in East Jerusalem. I wasn't very interested either"). Yoav's comments clearly show how large the gap is between his previous and current levels of awareness and between his views and those of his family. This gap, described by many of the Israeli-Jewish participants (Ron & Maoz, 2013a; Ron et al., 2010), reflects the potential impact of continuous exposure to the narrative of the other through the encounter process to challenge and transform narratives and beliefs deeply rooted in the ethos of conflict. This process entails a destabilization

of one's own narrative, identity, and self-image, and although difficult and painful, it is portrayed by participants as meaningful, formative, and "eye-opening" (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007a, 2010, 2011, 2013; Bar-Tal et al., 2012).

Conclusion

This chapter points to the potential of confronting the narrative of the other in conflict to transform deeply set beliefs and values that have been identified by Daniel Bar-Tal (2000, 2007a, 2010, 2013) as central to the societal ethos that preserves and perpetuates situations of intractable conflicts. In the specific context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this potential is realized among Israeli Jews by creating a greater awareness of the perspective and narratives of Palestinians in conflict and of the discrimination and injustice suffered by Palestinians (Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron et al., 2010). The aim of confronting contested narratives through dialogue with the other is thus to disrupt those regimes of feeling, thinking, and moralizing that underlie and perpetuate a monolithic ethos of conflict and to reconstruct more complex and inclusive narratives (Bekerman & Zembylas, 2011).

More specifically, the analytical process presented in this chapter revealed the following two major interrelated themes:

First and most significantly, in line with Bar-Tal's (2002, 2004, 2010, 2013; Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009; Bar-Tal et al., 2009) important writings on the goals and mechanisms of peace education, facing the narrative of the other is indeed described by Israeli Jews as a transformative experience that has the potential to change deeply set beliefs related to the ethos of conflict. Encountering the narrative of the Palestinian other is described by most of the Jewish dialogue participants as a meaningful, dramatic, and transformative experience that seriously undermines their previously held narrative, ethos, and worldview while at the same time entailing a great deal of difficulty, defensiveness, and resistance (Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron et al., 2010). The dramatic response to encountering the narrative of the other is not surprising given the extent to which individuals who belong to sides in conflict tend to be monolithically invested in the ethos, beliefs, and narratives that justify their own side (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2011, 2013; Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai et al., 2009; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006). It seems that repeated, non-mediated personalized encounters with out-group members and their narratives may disrupt these regimes of feeling and thinking, constitute a space enabling intergroup inclusion, and, thus, can bring about change even in such entrenched narratives and beliefs.

Second, more specifically, and again consistent with prominent conceptualizations brought by Daniel Bar-Tal (1998, 2000, 2007a, 2011, 2013; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011), our findings point to the particular psychological, cognitive, and emotional changes brought by the continued exposure to the narrative of the other in conflict. These involve increased awareness of the Palestinian perspective in the conflict and to Palestinian pain and suffering. Exposure to the Palestinian narrative also increases Israeli-Jewish awareness of the structural power asymmetry

that is embedded in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to the injustice and discrimination that are repeatedly enacted towards Palestinians (Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron et al., 2010).

These findings reflect the unique role of intergroup dialogue in altering awareness and attitudes of *high-power* group members in settings of asymmetric conflict. While disadvantaged group members constantly face situations of power asymmetry in their daily lives and are often compelled to interact with the point of view and the narratives of their out-group, high-power group members can limit their interactions to the boundaries of their in-group and are less exposed to intergroup situations. Intergroup encounters constitute a unique and rare opportunity enabling members of more advantaged groups to increase their awareness of power asymmetries and of issues of social justice.

In line with the seminal work of Daniel Bar-Tal (2000, 2002, 2004, 2007a, 2010, 2013; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006; Bar-Tal, Rosen et al., 2009), then, the analysis brought here as well as Jewish-Israeli participants' accounts of dramatic cognitive and emotional transformation indicate that confronting contested narratives in ethnopolitical conflict is not only a difficult task but also a transformative form of intergroup engagement. It can create spaces for more complex and multifaceted beliefs, attitudes, and feelings towards the others in conflict and thus increase societal, cognitive, and emotional readiness for reconciliation.

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Addressing Israelis' and Palestinians' Basic Needs for Agency and Positive Moral Identity Facilitates Mutual Prosociality

Ilanit SimanTov-Nachlieli and Nurit Shnabel

Introduction

A famous quote of Israel's first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion is that "The fate of Israel depends on two things: its strength and its righteousness." This quote points to two basic resources that are perceived by many Israelis as critical for their in-group's survival and prosperity, namely, its power and its morality (i.e., righteousness). However, in societies involved in intractable conflicts (for definition of such conflicts, see Bar-Tal, 1998; Kriesberg, 1993, Sharvit, Chap. 1) such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, attaining one of these resources is often perceived to come inherently at the expense of the other. This trade-off is reflected in two other quotes of Ben-Gurion, who, on the one hand, stated that "Israel will be tested not through its material wealth, military might or technical achievements, but in its moral character and human values" yet, on the other hand, said that "If all the great ideals in the world were placed on one tip of the scale, and Israel's existence was placed on the other, I would choose the latter."

According to Bar-Tal's (2007, 2013) theorizing, Israelis' attempt to "square the circle" and satisfy their strong motivation to protect both their in-group's strength and its positive moral identity simultaneously often translates into rigid beliefs regarding Israel's urgent need to defend itself at any cost and the unquestionable righteousness of its way. Such rigid beliefs are characteristics of societies involved in intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011), whose members become frozen in their self-defense and self-righteousness (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Oren, 2010) due to a *sociopsychological infrastructure* that both reflects and perpetuates these beliefs. As explained in detail by Sharvit (Chap. 1; see also Bar-Tal, 2007, 2013),

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_17

this infrastructure is comprised of three elements: *collective memories*, the *ethos of the conflict*, and *collective emotional orientations*, which feed the experience of urgent need for self-defense and justify the in-group's self-righteousness, "thus becoming part of a vicious cycle of intractable conflict" (Bar-Tal, 2007, p. 1430).

The goal of the present chapter is to integrate Bar-Tal's theorizing with the logic of the needs-based model (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008) whose main tenet is that groups' unaddressed psychological needs serve as barriers to reconciliation. Focusing on the Middle East conflict, we propose that Israelis and Palestinians become frozen in their self-defense and self-righteousness beliefs because the involvement in the conflict chronically threatens their ability to address their fundamental psychological needs for *agency* (i.e., strength and ability to protect their security and pursue their goals) and *positive moral identity* (i.e., ability to maintain a just and humane image of their in-group). Palestinians' and Israelis' strong clinging to these beliefs reflects a psychological strategy that allows them to deal with the frequent threats posed to their in-group's agency and positive moral identity. Optimistically, however, and in line with the logic of the needs-based model, we provide empirical evidence suggesting that addressing Israelis' and Palestinians' fundamental needs can defreeze their rigidity and open them to reconciliation. To achieve our goal of integrating these two lines of research (i.e., Bar-Tal's theorizing and the needs-based model), we now turn to describe the main principles of the latter.

The Needs-Based Model: A Brief Overview

The needs-based model has been proposed in an attempt to explain the dynamics between victims and perpetrators and point to ways to improve it. It suggests that transgressions pose asymmetric threats to victims' and perpetrators' identities. In particular, transgressions impair victims' sense of agency, namely, they threaten their identity as powerful, autonomous social actors who are able to determine their own outcomes. Consequently, victims are motivated to restore their agency and strength (e.g., by taking revenge, Frijda, 1994). Perpetrators, in contrast, experience impairment to their moral identity. Because the sanction imposed upon those who violate their community's moral standards is their social exclusion (Tavuchis, 1991), perpetrators are motivated to restore their positive moral identity and reassure their (re)acceptance by meaningful others in their community. In terms of "Big Two" theorizing, which argues that there are two fundamental content dimensions along which people judge themselves and others (Abele & Wojciszke, 2013), victims can be said to experience threats to the dimension representing constructs such as competence, respect, power, and agency, whereas perpetrators experience threats to the dimension representing warmth, love, communion, and morality. Consequently, conflicting parties experience a psychological need to reaffirm their impaired identities (SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, & Nadler, 2013).

Building on human needs theory (Christie, 1997), which argues that conflicts can be managed through the satisfaction of basic human needs such as the need for security and positive identity, the needs-based model further argues that victims' and perpetrators' unaddressed needs block the path to reconciliation. Yet, addressing these needs through a reciprocal exchange of messages between victimized and perpetrating groups can remove these emotional barriers and facilitate reconciliation. To examine this claim, in one study Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, and Carmi (2009, Study 1) exposed Israeli Arabs and Jews to two speeches allegedly given by their out-group's representative on the 50th anniversary of the 1956 Kafr Qasim massacre, in which 43 unarmed Arab civilians were killed by the Israeli border patrol. In line with the needs-based model's rationale, Arab participants showed greater willingness to reconcile with the Jews following an empowering (compared to an accepting) message conveyed by a Jewish representative (i.e., a message that reaffirmed Arabs' right for pride and self-determination). By contrast, Jewish participants showed greater willingness to reconcile with the Arabs following an accepting (compared to an empowering) message from an Arab representative (i.e., a message expressing sympathy, understanding, and brotherhood toward the Jews).

While this experiment supports the logic of the needs-based model, its contribution to our understanding the dynamics between Israelis and Palestinians *in general* has remained limited because it focused on a specific episode in which the social roles of victims vs. perpetrators were distinct and clear-cut. However, the conflict as a whole—despite the undeniable power differences between Palestinians and Israelis—is characterized by mutual transgressions. That is, because Israelis and Palestinians repeatedly aggress against each other, the conflict as a whole is marked by a "duality" of social roles in the sense that both groups serve as victims in some situations and as perpetrators in others. Our recent research (Shnabel & SimanTov-Nachlieli, 2015; SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014, 2015) aimed to amend this shortcoming of previous work within the needs-based model's framework through investigating how the experience of such duality influences the psychological needs and consequent behaviors of Palestinians and Israelis.

Duality of Social Roles: The Primacy of Agency Effect

In line with the logic of the needs-based model, we hypothesized that group members who feel as both victims and perpetrators at the same time would experience heightened needs for *both* agency *and* positive moral identity. To examine this hypothesis, we conducted an experiment (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014, Study 2) in which Israeli Jewish participants were randomly assigned into three different roles: "pure" victims, "pure" perpetrators, and "duals." Using a recall task developed by Mazziotta, Feuchte, Gausel, and Nadler (2013), participants assigned to be victims were asked to recall and write about two incidents in which their ingroup was victimized by Palestinians (e.g., the Passover massacre of 2002 in which

30 unarmed Israeli civilians were killed by a suicide bomber). Participants assigned to be perpetrators were instructed to recall and write about two incidents in which their in-group victimized Palestinians (e.g., the 1994 Cave of the Patriarchs massacre in which 29 unarmed Palestinian civilians were killed by an Israeli settler who opened fire inside a Mosque). Finally, participants assigned to be duals were instructed to recall and write about one victimization and one perpetration episode.

Note that due to the conflict's nature, it was impossible to ask participants to recall neutral (control) incidents within the conflict: cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians (e.g., a friendly football match) constitutes a positive rather than a neutral episode, and a period of quiet cannot be considered "an incident." To overcome this obstacle, we used bipolar scales for our dependent variables with neutral levels represented by their midpoints. These midpoints represented no change in participants' needs and behavioral tendencies and, thus, corresponded to a control condition such that scores lower or higher than the midpoint represented respective decreases or increases in needs and behavioral tendencies, which were our main dependent variables (note that the pattern of results reported below was replicated in another study that used a real control condition, see SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014, Study 1).

We found, consistent with previous findings obtained within the needs-based model's framework, that victims, but not perpetrators, showed an increased need for agency (e.g., "I would like Israel to demonstrate more power"), whereas perpetrators, but not victims, indicated heightened need for positive moral identity (e.g., "I would like Israel to act more morally"). Correspondingly, victims showed increased vengefulness (e.g., "Israel must use unrestricted force against any act of terrorism"), whereas perpetrators showed increased helpfulness (e.g., "Israel must provide humanitarian aid to Gaza"). Of most interest, however, were participants in the dual condition, because this condition corresponds to the dynamics that generally characterize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more closely than the conditions of "pure" social roles. We found that similar to victims, duals showed a heightened need for agency, and similar to perpetrators, duals showed a heightened need for positive moral identity. However, in terms of behavior, duals resembled victims: like victims, they showed heightened vengefulness, whereas unlike perpetrators, they did not show increased helpfulness. These findings suggest that even though duals are motivated to restore both their agency and positive moral identity, they place greater priority on addressing the first need (i.e., restoring agency through using force) rather than the latter need (i.e., restoring positive moral identity through increased helping behavior).

This finding contradicts current social-psychological theorizing, which points to morality as the most important dimension in in-groups' identity—the one that was most important to group members' pride in their in-group and psychological closeness to it (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). This finding is highly consistent, however, with Bar-Tal's (2007) theory about the collective fear orientation that develops in societies involved in intractable conflicts, as part of their unique socio-psychological infrastructure. Due to this emotional orientation, acute security threats become chronically salient, and beliefs about dangers to society members

and to society as a whole become embedded in societies' collective memory and ethos. This set of beliefs "justifies and legitimizes the most immoral acts and allows the attribution of one's own immoral behavior to the rival's violence and external-situational factors" (Bar-Tal, 2007, p. 1441).

Bar-Tal's perspective is consistent with Maslow (1970) who viewed security as one of the basic needs that has to be satisfied for the well-being of humans. This perspective thus explains why even though duals in our study experienced enhanced needs for restoration of both agency and positive moral identity, the first need received primacy in determining their behavior toward Palestinians (as opposed to participants in Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto's, 2007 research mentioned above, which was not conducted in a context of an intractable conflict). Bar-Tal's perspective also offers insights that may explain why our dual participants did not experience a pressing need to remove the threat posed to their in-group's moral identity. It is possible that Israelis, who chronically experience moral threats (e.g., in the form of economic and academic boycott initiatives; see Shnabel & Noor, 2012), become habituated to them and continuously repeat their "habituated course of action" (Bar-Tal, 2001, p. 620) without considering alternative responses. Such a habituated response may be illustrated in a recent speech of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: "There is a new campaign against us…but this is not new. Boycott campaigns against Jews have always existed" ("Netanyahu: Boycott campaign is anti-Semitic," 2014). Admittedly, participants in the perpetrator condition responded to the experience of moral threats by increased helpfulness. Nevertheless, perhaps the experience of simultaneous agency and morality threats made participants in the dual condition revert to a habituated, dismissive response toward the moral threats, similar to the one expressed by Netanyahu.

The Agency Affirmation Intervention

Although our above findings pessimistically revealed that duals show heightened levels of aggressiveness and vengefulness, we reasoned that the fact that they did show an enhanced need for positive moral identity (as opposed to "pure" victims who did not exhibit a similar enhancement) leaves some room for optimism. In particular, we theorized that addressing Palestinians' and Israelis' urgent need for agency may allow their need for restoration of positive moral identity to come to the fore and exert its positive effect on their mutual behavior toward each other. To examine this possibility, we developed a novel "agency affirmation" intervention in which Israeli and Palestinian participants were exposed to a text that reassured their in-group's strength, competence, and resiliency. We hypothesized that once group members would be reminded of their in-group's agency, they would be more willing to relinquish some power for the sake of moral consideration. This greater willingness, in turn, would lead to their lower vengefulness and greater helpfulness toward each other.

We tested the effectiveness of this agency affirmation intervention in a series of four experiments. In the first experiment (Shnabel & SimanTov-Nachlieli, 2015,

Study 1), which focused on Israeli Jewish participants, we pitted the agency affirmation intervention against a moral threat manipulation, which was found to increase prosocial tendencies in various interpersonal and intergroup contexts (e.g., Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Hopkins et al., 2007; see also Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006). Thus, our experiment used a 2 (agency affirmation [yes, no])×2 (moral threat [yes, no]) between-subjects design. Participants assigned to the agency affirmation condition were exposed to a text that affirmed Israel's strength, self-determination, and resilience (i.e., reminding participants that Israel is a strong nation that has proved its strength and resilience in many domains such as economy, technical achievements, and military might). Participants assigned to the moral threat condition were exposed to a text that portrayed Israel in a way that undermined its positive moral identity (i.e., reminding participants that since the 1980s [the onset of the first Intifada, in which the violent military oppression of the Palestinian uprising by the Israeli Defense Force severely tarnished Israel's moral image], many nations including the Palestinians perceive Israel as immoral). Participants assigned to the agency affirmation and moral threat condition were exposed to a text that combined both agency affirmation and moral threat, whereas control participants read no text. We found that compared to the control condition, the exposure to agency affirmation significantly reduced Israeli Jews' aggressiveness against Palestinians while increasing their helpfulness toward them. By contrast, the exposure to a moral threat did not affect Israeli Jews' aggressiveness or helpfulness tendencies. As expected, the positive effect of agency affirmation was mediated by participants' willingness to relinquish power for morality (e.g., "Israel must give up its power superiority in order to be just and fair with the Palestinians").

While the above experiment was conducted during a relatively calm period of the conflict, the onset of a military operation in Gaza provided us with a (hopefully) unique opportunity to test the effectiveness of our agency affirmation intervention during wartime. During this operation, the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) air force bombed more than 1500 sites in the Gaza Strip, including rocket launch pads, weapon depots, government facilities, and apartment blocks, while Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups fired over 1500 rockets into highly populated areas in Israel including the cities Rishon LeZion, Beersheba, Ashdod, and Tel Aviv. On the sixth day of the operation, we recruited Israeli Jewish participants to take part in an online experiment, in which they were randomly assigned either to a control, no-text condition or to the agency affirmation condition, which exposed them to a text based on the previous study, yet with specific adjustments to better fit the war context. For example, the text referred to the effectiveness of the Israeli Iron Dome anti-rocket defense system, which was used for the first time during the operation and proved to be highly effective. Interestingly, the positive effect of agency affirmation was replicated even under these extreme conditions of security threat: Participants in the agency affirmation condition showed significantly greater willingness to relinquish power for the sake of moral considerations (e.g., "Israel should restrain its operations in Gaza to maintain its positive moral image in the world"), which in turn led to less vengefulness (e.g., "Israel must protect its citizens even at the cost of harming many Palestinian civilians in Gaza") and greater helpfulness

(e.g., "When the operation ends, Israel must make substantial financial investments to improve the situation of Gaza's civil population"). An alternative explanation—specifically, the reduction of existential threat—was ruled out, and all the effects reported above persisted when controlling for political left-right orientation and in-group identification (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2015, Study 4b).

After establishing the effectiveness of agency affirmation among Israeli Jews, we turned to examine whether it would have similar effects among Palestinians (Shnabel & SimanTov-Nachlieli, 2015, Study 2). We were concerned that it would be harder to replicate the positive effects of agency affirmation among Palestinian (compared to Israeli) participants for two reasons. First, we reasoned that as the party who is often perceived worldwide as the David rather than the Goliath in the Middle East conflict, Palestinians may experience a less pressing need to restore their moral identity compared to Israelis. Even more importantly, we also thought that as the weaker party in the conflict, Palestinians might be less susceptible than Israelis to an affirmation of their in-group's agency (i.e., it might be harder to effectively affirm Palestinians' agency, due to their in-group's relative inferiority in terms of military force, economically, etc.). Notably, despite the power asymmetry, the obtained pattern of results generally corresponded to the one obtained among Israeli Jews. Using a 2 (agency affirmation [yes, no])×2 (moral threat [yes, no]) between-subjects design, we randomly assigned Palestinians from the West Bank into the four experimental conditions. Once again, the exposure to moral threat (i.e., a reminder that since 2000 [the onset of the second Al-Aqsa Intifada in which the killing of Israeli civilians by suicide bombers severely tarnished the Palestinians' moral image], many nations including the Israelis perceive the Palestinians as immoral) did not affect participants' prosocial behavioral tendencies. Yet, in line with expectations, exposing Palestinian participants to a text that affirmed the Palestinians' strength and resilience (i.e., reminding participants that the Palestinian nation is strong, cohesive, and known worldwide for its inner strength and resiliency) increased their willingness to relinquish power for morality (e.g., "The Palestinians must give up the use of violence in order to be just and fair in the conflict against the Jews"). This, in turn, led to greater helping tendencies toward Israelis (e.g., "Palestinians should not hesitate to provide humanitarian aid to Israel in cases of natural disasters such as the Mount Carmel fire").

As the final step in our research program, we turned to establish that the effectiveness of agency affirmation did not result merely from the general reassurance of in-group *positive* identity, regardless of particular *content*. Specifically, we aimed to establish that to increase prosociality in contexts of dual conflicts, the affirmation must focus on the specific identity dimension about which conflicting groups are most concerned, namely, their agency. For this purpose, we assigned Israeli Jews to one of three conditions: a control, no-affirmation condition, the agency affirmation condition, and a corresponding morality affirmation condition, which assured Israel's moral identity (i.e., reminding participants that Israel is a moral nation that has proved its morality in various ways such as sending teams to aid countries facing natural disasters). We chose morality affirmation for comparison because, first, the needs-based model consistently points to agency and morality as the two

fundamental identity dimensions that are impaired among conflicting groups. Second, according to the social labeling literature (Kraut, 1973; Strenta & Dejong, 1981), an affirmation of a group's morality, which labels the in-group as moral, can activate group members' self-perception of themselves as moral people and consequently lead to prosocial behavior consistent with this label. Nevertheless, we did not expect morality affirmation to exert positive effects on prosocial behavior in the present context, given our general reasoning that in dual conflicts the restoration of agency is a prerequisite for moral needs to come into play. Although the two affirmations were perceived as equally positive (i.e., presenting Israel in a positive light), consistent with previous findings, agency affirmation increased prosociality (i.e., decreased actual donations to an anti-Palestinian organization and increased donations to a pro-Palestinian organization), whereas the morality affirmation failed to increase prosociality (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2015, Study 4a).

In summary, the series of four experiments described above revealed that an affirmation of the in-group's agency led to greater prosocial tendencies and behaviors. It is interesting to note that in another series of experiments, Shnabel, Halabi, and Noor (2013) also found evidence of positive effects of agency affirmation. Specifically, Shnabel et al. (2013) exposed Israeli Jews and Palestinians to a text that highlighted that both parties are equipped with lethal weapons and have actively inflicted substantial harm upon each other. The exposure to this text was found to increase Palestinians' and Jews' sense of in-group's agency (e.g., their belief that their in-group has the power and resources to solve the conflict) compared to a control, neutral-text condition. The increase in agency, in turn, translated into reduced engagement in competition over the victim status and greater forgiveness tendencies. It seems, thus, that drawing group members' attention to their in-group's strength, even through a reminder of how this strength was *misused* against the out-group, can address their pressing need for agency. Addressing this need, in turn, can contribute to more constructive relations even between groups involved in intractable conflicts.

Summary and Conclusions

For several decades, Bar-Tal's research has been devoted to identifying the components of the sociopsychological infrastructure that blocks societies involved in intractable conflicts from coming to terms with each other. His legacy for us, the new generation of researchers, is to find ways to disassemble this infrastructure and defreeze the conflicting groups' rigid conflict-related beliefs. In this chapter, we argued that Israelis and Palestinians experience an inherent dilemma between their need to protect their security and agency, on one hand, and their need to maintain a positive moral identity, on the other. We have reviewed empirical evidence suggesting that, sadly, the first need, which dictates revenge and aggression, has a greater impact on group members' behavior than the latter need, which pulls behavior into prosocial directions. Optimistically, however, we also showed that an affirmation of their in-group's agency allowed Palestinians' and Israelis' need for positive moral identity to come into play and exert

its positive influence on their mutual prosocial tendencies and behavior. Thus, removing the threat to Palestinians' and Israelis' sense of agency can "defreeze" their rigid clinging to aggressive defensiveness and self-righteousness.

Our endeavor joins the efforts of other researchers whose work tries to disassemble the harmful sociopsychological infrastructure identified by Bar-Tal's work. These include dialogue group interventions aiming to "work through" the conflict by developing empathy and mutual recognition of suffering (Maoz & Bar-On, 2002; Maoz & Ron, Chap. 16) or increasing group members' insights regarding how their conflict-related beliefs serve its perpetuation (Sonnenschein, 2008). Laboratory-based interventions that build on Bar-Tal's legacy include emotional regulation techniques (Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013) and interventions intended to change Israelis' and Palestinians' beliefs regarding groups' malleability (Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011). We hope that our joint efforts will build a large body of knowledge that may contribute to our understanding of how to remove the sociopsychological barriers to enduring peace.

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Transitional Justice in Societies Emerging from Intractable Conflicts: Between the Right to Truth and Collective Memory

Ofer Shinar Levanon

"*The truth must dazzle gradually*
Or every man be blind."
Emily Dickinson

Introduction

This chapter examines the manner in which research regarding intractable conflicts can inform and shape truth-seeking processes, contributing to the development of the right to truth, an emerging principle of international law within the framework of transitional justice. The quest for truth can be met with serious hurdles in societies involved in prolonged and violent conflicts such as the Israeli or Palestinian society: Most members of such societies find potentially shameful truth about their collective past hard to bear. Therefore, in these societies the principal goal is not to search for truth but rather to deny and avoid it. As noted by Michel Foucault, social truths are inherently limited, as "Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true" (1980, p. 131).

The work of Daniel Bar-Tal (2013) has contributed significantly to illuminating the unique sociopsychological attributes of intractable conflict pointing to the pervasive manner in which societies create a distorted view of the past and present, a view which is extremely difficult to change. This conflict-supporting repertoire of

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_18

beliefs, thoughts, and emotions, while functional for a society, allowing it to address the considerable challenges of the conflict, becomes a barrier to conflict resolution. Peacemaking requires construction of a new repertoire of beliefs that must gain wide acceptance by society members in order to support peaceful resolution efforts and later stable and lasting peace (Bar-Tal, 2013; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). In order to avoid resurgence of violence, peacemaking requires a process of coming to terms with the past, generating a more complex social narrative of the conflict and ingroup's responsibility for gross human rights violations that occurred during the conflict's violent stage. However, truth-seeking efforts, exposing disturbing truths about each society's involvement in the conflict, will likely encounter significant difficulties because they threaten societies' ability to maintain societal beliefs of positive self-image and a positive social identity, which are central societal beliefs observed in every society, especially in societies involved in intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2013).

Yet the growing research available regarding the vital role that truth avoidance plays in sustaining and cultivating conflict-supporting repertoires of societies involved in intractable conflict has, unfortunately, rarely informed truth-seeking efforts undertaken in the context of transitional justice processes or the right to truth as an international law concept. While truth-seeking efforts have been extensively discussed in the context of other political and judicial difficulties, the problematic nature of such efforts in the context of society's conflict-supporting repertoire has not been extensively discussed by transitional justice researchers. In a similar manner, the difficulties that societies face in acknowledging past wrongs have not been addressed by evolving definitions of the right to truth.

To further examine this argument, the following section briefly discusses transitional justice and its goals and mechanisms, while the third section explores the role of truth seeking as a transitional justice goal. The fourth section briefly discusses the right to truth as a developing concept of international law. The final section examines the sociopsychological dynamics of societies involved in intractable conflict as challenges to truth-seeking efforts.

Transitional Justice: A Brief Introduction

Consisting of a multitude of processes and mechanisms and recognized by the United Nations as the primary approach to dealing with legacies of mass human rights violations, transitional justice has become a thriving field of research and practice.[1] Transitional justice processes were implemented, to some degree, in dozens of conflicts, as evident by the large number of truth commissions, more than 40 (Hayner, 2010; Phelps, 2014).

[1] In 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council has appointed a Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence, largely regarded as the four pillars of transitional justice.

Emerging in the late 1980s and early 1990s, mainly in response to political changes in Latin America and Eastern Europe, transitional justice refers to a field of activity and inquiry focused on how societies address legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or other forms of severe social trauma, including genocide or civil war, in order to build a more democratic, just, or peaceful future (Bickford & Shelton, 2004). Another definition of transitional justice, offered by the International Center for Transitional Justice, suggests that transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and nonjudicial measures, including criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and institutional reforms, that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses (Boraine & Valentine, 2006; ICTJ, 2013). Ruti Teitel (2000), who coined the term, notes that paradigmatic cases of transitional justice processes have taken place at the heels of a political transition, such as a transformation from an oppressive regime to a democratic and liberal one. Despite substantial variation in political, cultural, and geographic circumstances, transitional justice mechanisms are assumed to share a common set of goals, aiming to avoid "repeating, reenacting, or reliving past horrors" (Bhargava, 2000, p. 54), deterring gross human rights violations, restoring dignity of those victimized by atrocities, and thereby creating the best possible conditions for democracy.

Transitional justice processes entail an inherent tension between the focus on the victims' needs and even perpetrators' needs, thereby failing to address wider social needs (Teitel, 2003). The challenge of creating an all-encompassing social transformation, not only a process aimed at victims or victimizers, is echoed in the opinion of Kader Asmal (2000), South Africa's former Education Minister, regarding the South African transitional justice process. Asmal notes that the true scope of the problems which should be addressed by the process requires the transitional justice process to include not only those who have "pulled a trigger nor held a smoking gun," i.e., those directly involved in the violence, but also those who have benefited from the societal system defended by the violence. Asmal's views demonstrate the gap between, on the one hand, "normal" criminal accountability and, on the other hand, the more pervasive approach of transitional justice to the moral transformation of society as a whole. Erin Daly (2002) suggests that a transformation of social norms by a transitional justice process involves a change in the culture of the given society, which extends beyond the transition of legal norms. This transformation is manifested at all levels of society (Lederach, 1995; Teitel, 2000).

The effectiveness of transitional justice is fundamentally linked to social contextuality: The need to create a transitional justice process reflecting the specific social circumstances may explain why successful transitional justice mechanisms cannot be replicated, as different societies do not share the same set of historical circumstances, narratives, or societal beliefs (Daly, 2002; Elster, 2004; Fletcher, Weinstein, & Rowen, 2009; Hayner, 2010; Wierzynska, 2004). Legal scholars have called for the incorporation of local and national justice—with regard to both values and procedures—in the facilitation of transitional legal solutions (Waldorf, 2006). According to Hayner (2010), creativity and sensitivity to national needs are likely to be the most important components contributing to the success of a transitional process.

A United Nations Secretary-General report expressed support for contextually based transitional legal solutions, noting that experiences from other places should simply be used as a starting point for local debates and decisions (United Nations Secretary-General, 2004). While the report highlights the value of contextuality, noting the importance of local, including indigenous and informal, traditions of justice, it also stresses the need for conformity with international standards regarding the administration of justice and the settling of disputes.

Psychology, both clinical and social, has yet to play a major role in guiding transitional justice processes. A telling example of the gap between transitional justice theory and psychology is the absence of the term "trauma" from Teitel's (2000) seminal work, *Transitional Justice*. Some scholars have noted that by providing a voice to victims, allowing their stories to be heard by sympathetic listeners, forging a relationship with them, and establishing potentially affirmative roles for bystanders and perpetrators, transitional justice can provide key elements of recovery for trauma victims (Minow, 2000), helping them regain a sense of dignity and self-worth (Barsalou, 2005). However, others have been more cautious with regard to the therapeutic or psychological healing effects of transitional justice rituals (Hamber, 2006; Martín-Beristain, Páez, Rimé, & Kanyangara, 2010). Furthermore, scholars have noted that knowledge of the effects of transitional mechanisms on social and individual healing is limited (Minow, 1998), as "international law and its institutions are not designed to focus on the social and psychological processes that guide how people form attachments in groups and communities" (Weinstein & Stover, 2004, p. 14).

The need to address the past has yielded different approaches, yet establishing the truth about past wrongs has always been considered among the chief transitional justice goals (Hayner, 2010). In states emerging from repressive regimes, truth commissions are considered a preferable option to prosecutions of former authoritarian leaders, which may halt the transition and even lead to reinstatement of the repressive regime (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003; Zalaquett, 1992). Truth has also been regarded as a first, crucial, step on the road to other transitional justice goals, including justice and reparations: as was the case in South Africa, a highly divided society, in which reconciliation was established through truth (Teitel, 2000). The importance of truth may also reflect victims' needs: As noted by a wife of disappeared man from Nepal, quoted by Eduardo González and Howard Varney, "It's okay if they give us truth now, then the other things will follow. The first thing is finding out" (2013, p. 14). The following section will examine truth seeking as a pillar of transitional justice.

Truth Seeking as a Transitional Justice Goal

Truth seeking as a transitional justice goal is often met with fierce opposition from political and military elites who were responsible for planning and ordering of past human rights violations and therefore are likely to suffer from the consequences of

truth-revealing processes. Hence, the ability to establish factual truth in the context of transitional justice processes depends, to a large extent, on "cooperation by the former organs of repression: the minister of the interior, the army, the police, the intelligence service, the militia and so on" (Hazan, 2006, p. 37). Reflecting this notion, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has granted amnesty, on an individual basis, to those who testified to having committed crimes while proving a political motivation. The historical truth sought by the commission allowed various types of truth to emerge, from social truth, factual and forensic truth, personal and narrative truth, and finally healing and restorative truth (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998).

However, willingness to grant amnesty for truth, either as a "blanket" amnesty for a certain group of wrongdoers or granted on an individual basis, has received criticism from international bodies, who question the benefits of studying the South African example. According to a report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2006): "amnesty laws and similar measures (…) may violate the right to truth. Human rights bodies have generally rejected amnesties for serious violations of human rights (…) based on the need to combat impunity for these crimes and to ensure that victims and their relatives know the truth" (paragraph 45).

The struggle against blanket amnesties in exchange for truth has led to perceptions of truth seeking as clashing with the goal of establishing justice in international tribunals. For example, while the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia announced that truth-finding was a one of its "fundamental objectives," the adversarial mode of trial has afforded priority to other goals (Doak, 2011). Moreover, in contrast to prosecutors' duty at the International Criminal Court to establish truth (according to Article 54(1)(a) of the ICC statute), no such duty is set out for the judges, a prevailing problem in all international tribunals (Eser, 2011). However, truth commissions aim to provide an account of past human rights violations, an acknowledgment of the secret wrongdoings of the state (Asmal, 1992; Roht-Arriaza, 2006; Van Zyl, 2005) or an "affirmation of atrocity" (Minow, 1998, p. 4). For example, the mandate of Guatemala's 1994 Commission for Historical Clarification provides that 'the right of the people of Guatemala to know the whole truth regarding these events, which, if clarified will help to ensure that this sad and painful chapter will not be repeated and that the process of democratizing Guatemala will be strengthened."[2] Such truth-seeking processes are thought to promote justice eventually (Millar, 2011). However, following the South African transitional process, the focus has moved to truth-telling, which aims to catalyze psychological or socio-emotional healing (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008) as well as provide restorative notions of justice to victims and perpetrators alike (Leebaw, 2003; Teitel, 2003).

[2] Agreement on the establishment of a "Commission for Historical Clarification of human rights violations…that have caused suffering to the Guatemalan people" preamble, § 2, cited in Kritz (1995) p. 220.

The rapidly growing field of transitional justice scholarship focusing on truth and truth seeking and the pivotal role played by truth-seeking mechanisms in transitional settings have been mirrored, to some extent, by the developing concept of the right to truth. The following section will briefly explore the right to truth, pointing to its attempts to address the needs of victims and their families rather than those of society.

The Right to Truth as an International Law Concept

The right to truth has undergone major changes in the last few decades, extending to far more than a limited right of family members of those who disappeared due to violence and war. The right to truth has grown in scope as well as through a gradual process of codification, as conventions and other documents of international law have included references to the right to truth. This process has reflected a rise in the significance of truth seeking in the context of transitional justice: The right to the truth has been cited as a legal basis of several instruments establishing truth commissions and other transitional justice mechanisms (Hayner, 2010; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2006).

Adopted in 1977, Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions[3] is the first document of international humanitarian law which explicitly recognized the existence of "the right of families to know the fate of their relatives".[4] The Principles on Combating Impunity, approved in 1997 by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, better known as the Joint Principles, stressed that the effort to battle impunity has long been established as a social interest spearheaded by victims and their families. An updated set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity have reaffirmed the inalienable right to truth in the context of gross human rights violations and serious crimes under international law.

The right to truth has been extensively developed through the jurisprudence of the Inter-American human rights bodies: In a 1988 case the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has recognized the existence of the right of relatives of victims of forced disappearance to know the fate suffered by the disappeared person.[5] In a series of cases brought before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the court has gradually extended its definition of the right to truth as a right of society as a whole, rather than an issue that influences only victims and their families (González & Varney, 2013; Schonsteiner, 2011). In a more recent, 2009 decision, the court

[3] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.

[4] Article 32, Protocol I.

[5] Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (Ser. C), No. 4, par. 181, p. 75 (29 July 1988).

emphasized an additional, collective, dimension of the right to truth, yet did not provide additional remedies on that basis.[6]

The International Committee of the Red Cross (2005, p. 421) has recognized the growing significance of the right to truth by declaring it to be a rule of customary international law. The first study by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2006) on the right to the truth expanded the scope of the right, arguing that: "[T]he truth about gross human rights violations and serious violations of human rights law is an inalienable and autonomous right, linked to the duty and obligation of the State to protect and guarantee human rights, to conduct effective investigations and to guarantee effective remedy and reparations. This right (…) has both an individual and a societal dimension and should be considered as a non-derogable right and not be subject to limitations."

In 2006, the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which, while stressing the need to combat impunity for the crime of enforced disappearance, further reaffirmed the right to truth as a right aimed at victims and their families: "each victim has the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of the enforced disappearance, the progress and results of the investigation and the fate of the disappeared person" (Article 24(2)). In 2009, the Human Rights Council has adopted a resolution on the right to the truth, emphasizing that as part of this right, access to information should be granted to individuals, presumably victims and their families, yet also to the public. In 2011, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed March 24th as the International Day for the Right to the Truth. The proclamation acknowledges the significant conclusions of the reports by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. A 2012 resolution by the United Nations Human Rights Council has detailed several judicial and nonjudicial mechanisms aimed at facilitating the right to truth. Finally, as noted above, a Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence was appointed by the Human Rights Council, providing further testimony to the increasing recognition of the importance of the right to truth.

Sociopsychological Dynamics of Societies Involved in Intractable Conflict as Challenges to Truth-Seeking Efforts

Scholars have noted that society plays a crucial role in promoting the right to truth: Some researchers argue that the role of civil society in promoting truth can be even more important than that of the state (Davis, 2005), while others note that a synergy of both civil society and the state is the best method to unveiling hidden truths (Phelps, 2014). While transitional justice scholars have often stressed the importance of public participation in truth-seeking processes, such as truth commissions, since

[6] Las Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 211, 1310 (24 November 2009).

public participation demonstrates a commitment to legitimacy, public participation is often discussed in a more limited context, helping lawmakers to understand the needs of victims (González & Varney, 2013). A more concise view of truth commissions' role in shaping public views is offered by Teitel (2000) who notes that truth commissions allow victims' testimony to be narrated by "commissioners' quasi-state authors," thereby becoming "sharable truth, a national story, and the basis of transitional consensus" (p. 82).

Yet according to the groundbreaking work of Daniel Bar-Tal (2007a, 2013) and fellow conflict resolution researchers (see other chapters in this volume), some societies will likely strain to legitimize and endorse such truth-seeking processes and their outcomes. Societies emerging from an intractable conflict are unlikely to support historical accounts, which expose shameful chapters of their collective past based on public testimonies by victims of the conflict and their family members, which will be acknowledged by a truth commission and later included in the commission's final report. Socially constructed accounts of the past in societies involved in intractable conflicts are not only rigid but almost unbearably difficult to untangle (Nahhas, Chap. 5; Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4; Srour, Mana, & Sagy, Chap. 6). Although intergroup conflicts are all too common, even inherent to human relations, intractable conflicts, or violent conflicts lasting more than a generation, are a distinctive category of conflicts manifesting clear and all-inclusive sociopsychological attributes and dynamics. In order to protect individual members of society from insufferable psychic pain due to the prolonged and violent conflict, societies develop functional beliefs, attitudes, emotions, values, motivations, norms, and practices (Bar-Tal, 2007b, 2013). These provide a meaningful picture of the conflict situation, justify the behavior of the society, facilitate mobilization for participation in the conflict, and maintain a positive social identity. Societies involved in intractable conflict perceive the conflict to be existential, zero-sum in nature, and unsolvable. This world view preoccupies a central position in the lives of the involved societies and therefore requires immense investments of material and psychological resources (Bar-Tal, 2007b, 2013; Coleman, 2006; Kriesberg, 1993, 1998). Eventually, the unique sociopsychological repertoire solidifies, forming a sociopsychological infrastructure, a well-organized system of shared cognitions: ethos of the conflict and a collective memory of the conflict and collective emotional orientations (Nahhas, Chap. 5; Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4; Oren, Chap. 8; Pliskin & Halperin, Chap. 11; Shaked, Chap. 9; Sharvit, Chap. 1). The sociopsychological infrastructure of societies involved in intractable conflict tends to limit access to truth by creating a "tunnel vision" of reality, precluding contrasting information and alternative approaches to the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007b; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Jervis, 1976; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Vertzberger, 1990; White, 1970). For societies involved in intractable conflicts, shared cognitions serve as the basis for forming social identity (Ashmore, Jussim, & Wilder, 2001; Cash, 1996; Oren, Bar-Tal, & David, 2004; Ross, 2001; Worchel, 1999). According to social identity theory, individuals derive part of their self-esteem from the groups to which they belong and with which they identify (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Reynolds, 2010).

The study of sociopsychological structures created by intractable conflicts sheds light on what is currently a less discussed aspect of the legal right to truth: the cognitive and emotional costs required from the majority of the members of society to accommodate unpleasant truths which directly contradict hard-earned beliefs, thoughts, and emotions. Stanley Cohen's (2009) seminal work on states in denial suggests that the right to truth may be met with resistance from societies as collectives emerging from a prolonged and violent conflict: Too much truth may compromise social stability. Cohen (2001) notes that "societies have an astonishing ability to deny their past" (p. 138), which is likely to reflect a top-down, state-sponsored process. However, a social "collusive wall of silence" (p. 138) can also be generated without the state's active involvement.

Arguably, societal legacies of silence may linger long after human rights violations have ceased, adding to the burden of victims and their families. Revealing the truth through transitional justice mechanisms involves exposing the currently held social ethos as distorted and inaccurate. More so, truth-revealing mechanisms will be perceived as contradictory to the interests of society as they are believed to fracture social unity and cast a shadow over society's ability to continue to hold on to a moral self-image. Such an image is vital to most members of society during the active stage of the intractable conflict (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, Chap. 17), protecting them from exposure to unmitigated, painful, negative feelings of guilt and shame.

Therefore, the need to reconcile between internalized social cognitions and emotions, which are highly dichotomous and polarized in nature on the one hand, and a much more complex account of the past, generated through truth-seeking mechanisms on the other hand, is likely to take its toll not only on social identity as a construct and the self-identity of the majority of society members but also on society's willingness to legitimize the findings of truth-seeking processes.

Resistance to such processes has been demonstrated by Israel's refusal to cooperate with the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (the "Goldstone Commission") report as well as the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict. Israel unfortunately serves as a prime example of the impact of intractable conflict on society's ability to negotiate difficult truths about its past involvement with human rights violations. Such historical view is in direct opposition to the collective memory and ethos of the conflict of the Israeli Jewish society, both of which regard the Israeli Jewish society as a victim of a hostile world (Bar-Tal, 2007a; Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009; Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4; Oren, Chap. 8).

A transitional justice process aimed at transforming the Israeli–Palestinian conflict would therefore have to utilize a revised concept of the right to truth acknowledging the pervasive nature of sociopsychological dynamics of societies involved in the intractable conflict. In order to be effective, truth promoting transitional justice processes will have to address the psychological needs of societies emerging from intractable conflicts. Given the deeply ingrained yet distorted worldview, such processes would likely be prolonged and open-ended, allowing members of society to gradually distance themselves from past cognitions and emotions at their own pace. This process is unlikely to be attained utilizing single-shot solutions offered by courts or even by certain truth commissions.

Conclusion

While transitional justice processes should aim to "reconceive the social meaning of past conflicts, particularly defeats, in an attempt to reconstruct their present and future effects" (Teitel, 2003, p. 76), this is neither a simple nor straightforward task. Effective transitional process should be layered upon existing national narratives, reflecting collective social memory and aimed at creating a representation of past narratives (Hamber & Wilson, 2002). Available research regarding the role of collective cognitions and emotions in sustaining the mental health of members of societies involved in intractable conflict should inform transitional justice efforts and promote the much needed psychosocial sensitivity.

Scholars have stressed the importance of the distinction between "right to the truth" as a legally enforceable right in international law and the societal interest in knowing the truth (see, e.g., Groome, 2011). The dichotomy between right to truth and the social implications of truth echoes a broader distinction, between legal and psychological approaches to conflict resolution (Millar, 2011). Yet truth-seeking mechanisms in societies involved in intractable conflicts would benefit from gaining knowledge regarding societies' sociopsychological dynamics, which has led them to develop resistance to potentially unpleasant truths. Knowing more about sociopsychological dynamics can also lead to lessening tensions between social goals and the needs of victims, which too often have been neglected in pursuit of more pressing goals of punishment and/or societal reconciliation (Doak, 2011; Hamber, 2001; Wexler & Winick, 1998).

Yet while addressing the needs of victims is imperative, sociopsychological dynamics of societies involved in intractable conflicts imply that the right to truth should first reflect society's need to know hidden truths, which are actively denied and hidden, and second society's need for a gradual process, reflecting the societal investment in hiding the truth as a necessary process enabling psychic survival during a prolonged and violent period.

Studying societies' unequivocal support for a distorted memory of the past, held by a majority of their members, including memories of their responsibility for past human rights violations, will allow transitional justice practitioners to create a socially sensitive process, lessening potential opposition and gaining legitimacy for the process. Daniel Bar-Tal's (2013) research can inform transitional justice practitioners and scholars regarding the intricate manners in which truth is hidden from society and by society, as long as it is perceived as a threat, rather than a cure, for society's ailments.

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K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), *A Social Psychology Perspective on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7